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Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Alison E. Bell

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Walden University
2021

Abstract

Effect of Political Party Affiliation on Refugee Admissions to the United States

by

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MPhil, Walden University, 2020

MA, Moody Graduate School, 2002

BA, Moody Bible Institute, 2000

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

May 2021

Abstract

The president determines the number of refugees to be admitted to the United States each year after consultation with Congress, but there is a gap in literature related to whether party affiliation affects refugee admissions. The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on refugee admissions and any moderating effect of Congressional majority affiliations. The eight research questions centered on the effect of the president's party on the refugee ceiling and admissions, regional allocations and admissions, and the extent to which Congressional majority parties moderate these effects. Total global and regional refugee numbers were controlled throughout this study. The theoretical framework of historical institutionalism was used to examine political parties as institutions guided by historical positions and choices. This quantitative study involved a secondary data analysis of data collected from the U.S. government and the United Nations. Hierarchical regression was used to determine the relationship between refugee admissions and presidential party affiliation, as well as the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities. Regression analysis showed that presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the refugee admissions, but having a Democratic president was predictive of higher admissions of refugees from both the Near East and South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Future researchers may examine additional ways that presidential administrations, rather than Congress, affect refugee admissions. Positive social change implications include furthering understanding of the role of party affiliation in refugee admissions to help refugee service providers better prepare for the refugees that will be admitted in the upcoming fiscal year.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my mother, Claudia Lavy, who taught me the relentless pursuit of justice.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables	v
List of Figures	vii
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study.....	1
Background.....	2
Problem Statement.....	5
Purpose.....	7
Research Questions and Hypotheses	7
Theoretical Framework.....	10
Nature of the Study	11
Definitions.....	12
Assumptions.....	15
Scope and Delimitations	15
Limitations	16
Significance.....	17
Summary	19
Chapter 2: Literature Review	20
Introduction.....	20
Literature Search Strategy.....	21
Theoretical Foundation	22
Literature Review.....	26
History of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Until 1980.....	26

The Refugee Act of 1980 and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program	31
Partisanship in Immigration and Refugee Policy.....	35
Refugee Policy and the Trump Administration	40
Factors Affecting Partisanship and Refugee/Immigration Policy	42
Gaps in the Literature.....	52
Summary and Conclusions	55
Chapter 3: Research Method.....	60
Introduction.....	60
Research Design and Rationale	60
Research Questions and Hypotheses	60
Variables	63
Research Design.....	66
Methodology	67
Population	67
Use of Archival Data	68
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs	69
Data Analysis Plan	79
Threats to Validity	82
Internal Validity and Credibility.....	82
External Validity.....	83
Summary	84
Chapter 4: Results.....	85

Introduction.....	85
Research Questions and Hypotheses	85
Data Collection	88
Results.....	90
Descriptive Statistics.....	90
Research Question 1	98
Research Question 2	101
Research Question 3	103
Research Question 4	114
Research Question 5	127
Research Question 6	128
Research Question 7	128
Research Question 8	134
Summary.....	139
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations.....	142
Introduction.....	142
Interpretation of the Findings.....	143
Limitations	148
Recommendations.....	150
Implications.....	151
Conclusion	152
References.....	154

Appendix A: Countries Categorized as East Asia	178
Appendix B: Countries Categorized as Eastern Europe and Central Asia	180
Appendix C: Countries Categorized as Near East and South Asia.....	182
Appendix D: Countries Categorized as Latin America and Caribbean	184
Appendix E: Countries Categorized as Africa.....	187

List of Tables

Table 1. Final Admission Ceilings and Regional Allocations by Party Affiliation.....	91
Table 2. Party Affiliations During the Fiscal Year of Admissions.....	93
Table 3. Annual Ceilings and Regional Allocations.....	94
Table 4. Total Admissions and Regional Admissions	95
Table 5. Total Global and Regional Refugees at the Finalization of Admissions Ceilings and Regional Allocations.....	96
Table 6. Total Global and Regional Refugees for the Calendar Year Overlapping the Fiscal Year	97
Table 7. Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ1	100
Table 8. Model Summary for RQ1	101
Table 9. Model Summary for RQ2	102
Table 10. Model Summary for RQ3 for East Asia	104
Table 11. Model Summary for RQ3 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia	106
Table 12. Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ3 for Near East and South Asia.....	108
Table 13. Model Summary for RQ3 for Near East and South Asia R.....	109
Table 14. Model Summary for RQ3 for Latin America and Caribbean	112
Table 15. Coefficients for RQ3 for Latin America and Caribbean.....	112
Table 16. Model Summary for RQ3 for Africa	114
Table 17. Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for East Asia.....	116
Table 18. Model Summary for RQ4 for East Asia	117
Table 19. Model Summary for RQ4 for Eastern Europe & Central Asia.....	118

Table 20. Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for Near East & South Asia.....	121
Table 21. Model Summary for RQ4 for Near East & South Asia	121
Table 22. Model Summary for RQ4 for Latin America & Caribbean.....	124
Table 23. Coefficients for RQ4 for Latin America & Caribbean	124
Table 24. Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for Africa.....	126
Table 25. Model Summary for RQ4 for Africa	127
Table 26. Regional Allocations & Regional Refugee Totals for Near East and South Asia, Excluding FY19.....	130
Table 27. Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ7 for Near East and South Asia	131
Table 28. Model Summary for RQ7 for Near East and South Asia	131
Table 29. Regional Allocations and Regional Refugee Totals for Latin America and Caribbean, Excluding FY94-FY95	132
Table 30. Model Summary for RQ7 for Latin America & Caribbean	133
Table 31. Regional Admissions and Regional Refugee Totals for Near East and South Asia, Excluding FY19	135
Table 32. Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ8 for Near East and South Asia.....	136
Table 33. Model Summary for RQ8 for Near East and South Asia	137
Table 34. Regional Admissions and Regional Refugee Totals for Latin America and Caribbean, Excludign FY94-FY95	138
Table 35. Model Summary and RQ8 and Latin America & Caribbean.....	139

List of Figures

Figure 1. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual (Dependent Variable: Regional Allocation for Near East and South Asia)	107
Figure 2. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual (Dependent Variable: Regional Allocation for Latin America and Caribbean).....	111
Figure 3. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual (Dependent Variable: Near East and South Asia Admissions)	120
Figure 4. Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual (Dependent Variable: Latin America and Caribbean Admissions).....	123

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The Refugee Act (1980) outlines the process for admitting refugees to the United States. The Refugee Act established that the admissions ceiling, the maximum number of refugees permitted for admission to the United States in a given year, and regional allocations, the maximum number of refugees to be admitted to the United States from specific geographic regions in a given year, is to be set by the president, annually (§ 207(a)(1)). The president does this each year by issuing a presidential determination, after sending a report to Congress and consulting with the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, also known as the Judiciary Committees (§ 207(d)(1)). In this study, I examined the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on annual admissions ceiling and regional allocations. I also examined whether the political party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities moderated any effect the president's party affiliation has on the same. Because the global number of refugees fluctuates over time, this study controlled for the total number of global refugees as well as global refugee totals by geographic region.

In Chapter 1, I review the background on the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and provide an overview of the literature related to this study. I outline the purpose of the study, the research problem, and research questions (RQs) and provide an overview of the nature of the study. Chapter 1 includes a preview of historical institutionalism as the theoretical framework for this study, with further discussion in Chapter 2. Finally, this chapter includes a list of definitions relevant to this study and discussion of the assumptions, scope, limitations, and significance of this study.

Background

Before the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, U.S. refugee law and policy were not wholly distinct from broader U.S. immigration policy, and the United States did not have federal law defining refugees that was in line with international law (Scribner, 2017; Teitelbaum, 1980). The Refugee Act aligned U.S. federal law with the definition of “refugee” as outlined in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), which the United States had signed in 1967. The Refugee Act established the current United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and determined that the president would consult with Congress each year regarding refugee admissions (§ 207(d)(1)) and set the number of refugees permitted to be admitted through the USRAP annually. Research published within months of the passage of the Refugee Act points to political disagreement about the admission of refugees and other immigrants to the United States (Teitelbaum, 1980). However, that study did not identify which group or groups held the differing positions that its author presented.

Refugees are a subset of the broader U.S. immigrant population, having been granted entry to the United States with refugee status through the USRAP under the provisions of the Refugee Act. Although little research has been done on the effect of political party affiliation of the president or the chambers of Congress on refugee admissions, much more research is available on political party affiliation and immigration policy more broadly (Breshnahan, et al., 2018; Brown & Brown, 2017; Chacon, 2017; Doucerain, et al., 2018; Druckman, et al., 2013; Fennelly, et al., 2015; Finley & Esposito, 2020; Fussell, 2014; Hajnal & Rivedram 2014). Through the 1950s and 1960s, before the

Refugee Act, Congressional Republicans and Democrats were divided on immigration reforms related to maintaining or eliminating national origin quotas (Triadafilopoulos, 2010). These quotas limited the number of immigration visas issued based on nationality and excluded most immigrants from Asia (U.S. Department of State, n.d.g). This early debate on immigration reform saw Republicans favoring maintaining national origin quotas. At the same time, Democrats opposed the quotas and advocated for increased immigration from multiple countries (Triadafilopoulos, 2010). This trend continued through the recent 2018 midterm elections (Torres-Gill & Demko, 2018).

A review of asylum cases adjudicated in the 1980s found that asylum seekers who had their cases adjudicated by Republican-appointed judges were less likely to be granted asylum than those whose cases were adjudicated by judges appointed by Democratic presidents (Yarnold, 1990). Researchers examining political positions have found that immigration similarly fell along party lines (Barnett, 2002; Breshnahan, et al., 2018; Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). Fennelly et al. (2015), in their study of votes taken on immigration-related legislation in the 103rd through the 112th Congress (1993-2012), found that Republicans consistently favored restricting immigration while Democrats consistently voted in favor of expanding it. Fennelly et al. also noted that votes on immigration-related issues were “more likely to pit a majority of Democrats against a majority of Republicans than votes on all issues combined” (p. 1423). Other researchers have consistently found that Republicans are more likely to favor and vote for restrictive immigration policies than Democrats, who are more likely to support fewer immigration restrictions (Brown & Brown, 2017; Durometer & Méango, 2017; Hawley, 2011).

Despite these findings, little research has been devoted to the effect of political party affiliation on refugee policy, specifically, until the election of Donald Trump. Trump made refugee policy part of his platform as a presidential candidate. During the Trump campaign, then-candidate Trump promised to send Syrian refugees admitted through the USRAP back to Syria and ban Muslim refugees from entry to the United States (Scribner, 2017, p. 265). Following his election to the presidency, Trump enacted Executive Order No. 13,769 (2017) banning the issuance of visas to immigrants and refugees from several Muslim-majority countries, reducing the overall number of refugees admitted to the United States for the fiscal year (FY), and indefinitely banning entry of Syrian refugees to the United States. Executive Order No. 13,769 was superseded by Executive Order No. 13,780, which, like the order that preceded it, reduced refugee admissions to the United States for the FY, although permitted exceptions for entry to the United States from otherwise banned countries for individuals who were granted refugee status.

In the wake of the 2016 election of President Trump, a substantial body of research has been published on the political division over refugee policy, much of it along political party lines (Adida, et al., 2019; Finley & Esposito, 2020; Fullerton, 2017; Johnson, 2018; Saldaña, et al., 2018). The authors of these studies have focused mainly on divisions under the current administration, without consideration for a review of political party positions on refugee admissions before the Trump administration. Although these researchers have looked at political divisions, they, like scholars who have studied earlier divisions on immigration policy along party lines, have not examined

data related to refugee admissions. Several researchers (Harvard, 2018; Simeon, 2017; Walden, et al., 2017) noted that global refugee levels reached several new annual recorded highs between 2015 and 2019 but did not provide an analysis of the impact of these changes on U.S. refugee resettlement levels.

I addressed that gap by examining the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. Furthermore, I examined whether the political party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities moderate any effect that presidential party affiliation has on refugee admissions through the USRAP. This study clarified not only whether there are political divisions on refugee policy, but the implication of those divisions on refugee admissions to the United States. I controlled for annual global refugee levels, both in aggregate and by region, when analyzing the effect of party affiliation on refugee admissions to the United States.

Problem Statement

Since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the number of refugees admitted to the United States has been set before the beginning of each federal FY by the president (§ 207(a)(1)), in consultation with the Committees of the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate (§ 207(d)(1)). The reports submitted for review to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees detail not only the overall number of refugees to be admitted during the upcoming FY, but also the number to be admitted from individual regions of the world and from specific population groups. Despite research on the politicization of asylum in the United States beginning in the 1980s (Yarnold, 1990) and

analysis on the effect of political party affiliation on legislative efforts related to immigration since the mid-1990s (Hinojosa & Schey, 1995), little research has been conducted on the extent to which the political party affiliation of the president affects refugee admissions and whether that effect is moderated by the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities.

Following the election of Donald Trump, his administration enacted a series of changes to refugee policy and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) (Randolph, 2017). As a result, several articles related to the executive orders and USRAP changes, as well as to the political party divide on refugee policy, were published (Chacón, 2017; Fording & Schram, 2017; Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Martin & Ferris, 2017; Nagel, 2016; Scribner, 2017). Although the recent literature has highlighted current political divides on refugee policy, it has not provided an analysis of the effect of political party on proposed and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP, either in aggregate or by regional or specific population groups. This research addressed the gap in understanding the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP, in aggregate and by region, since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, while controlling for global refugee levels, in aggregate and by region. I further explored whether the political party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities moderates any effect of the president's political party affiliation on refugee admissions, while controlling for overall and regional global refugee numbers.

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the political party affiliation of the president affects the proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP and whether that effect is moderated by the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities. In this quantitative study, I explored how the dependent variable of the political party affiliation of the president affects the variables of the annual admissions ceiling, actual annual admissions, regional allocations, and actual regional admissions, while controlling for global refugee population levels. I also examined whether the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on refugee admissions, while controlling for the number of refugees worldwide and by region. These variables were reviewed by federal FY since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which established the current refugee admissions process.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H_0 1: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

H_a 1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H_02 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

H_a2 : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_03 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on USRAP regional allocations.

H_a3 : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on USRAP regional allocations.

RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_04 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on USRAP regional admissions.

H_a4 : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on USRAP regional admissions.

RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H₀₅: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

H_{a5}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H₀₆: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

H_{a6}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H₀₇: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations.

H_a7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations.

RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H₀8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions.

H_a8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study was historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism understands institutions, including political parties, as guided in decision making by historical positions and choices (Steinmo et al., 1992). This path dependence, or dependence on previous decisions and historical directions, makes institutions slow to change. Ware (1996) noted that this dependence can make institutions into “prisoners [of] their own history” (p. 18) and reluctant to move in new directions. Although historical institutionalism is tied closely to the concept of path dependence, it does not maintain that institutions are unable to change. Sorensen (2015) argued that institutional change does occur, often through incremental steps, but other times through “major upheavals”

(p. 19) that lead to new institutional positions or directions. Although gradual, incremental change is frequently a result of forces within the institution, whereas abrupt changes are often caused by external forces (Capoccia, 2016). As my focus was on examining the effects of political party affiliation on refugee admissions, I evaluated the extent to which parties have either remained steadfast in their positions, as exemplified in current political divisions over refugee admissions, or if the Trump administration's policies represent an abrupt departure from past policy positions. Historical institutionalism is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

Nature of the Study

The nature of this study was quantitative research using a nonexperimental correlative design. It was an independent-measure study consistent with the goal of understanding how the political party affiliation affects refugee admission to the United States. Both proposed and actual refugee admissions, in aggregate and by region, were examined by federal FY compared to the political party affiliations of the president and Senate and House majorities during the same FYs. Data on refugee admissions were available online through the Refugee Processing Center (RPC), which is operated by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). The RPC makes refugee admissions data since 1975, including data by region, available online. The RPC also makes available online the annual reports to Congress since FY 2004. Annual Presidential Determinations on refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 were available through the Federal Register.

Definitions

Admissions ceiling: The maximum number of refugees permitted to enter the United States in a given FY, as set annually by presidential determination (Martin & Yankay, 2013).

Asylee: A type of immigrant. As it relates to this study, an asylee is an individual in the United States, or at a port of entry to the United States, who is unable to return to or to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality (or, for those without a nationality, outside of their country of habitual residence) due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group and is seeking protection in the United States. Asylees in the United States are present in the country before being granted asylum status (International Rescue Committee, 2018; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service [USCIS], n.d.a).

Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration (PRM): A bureau of the U.S. Department of State that has primary management responsibility for USRAP, including responsibility for overseas refugee processing and managing processing priorities (USCIS, n.d.b).

Country of first asylum: The first safe country that an individual travels to after fleeing their country of origin (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], n.d.).

Federal fiscal year (FY): The U.S. federal FY, which operates October through September and is named according to the year in which the FY ends (e.g., October 2018–

September 2019 is FY19). Refugee admissions to the United States are managed on a FY basis (USAGov, n.d.).

House majority: The political party holding the majority of seats in the House of Representatives; the House Majority Leader is elected by the party holding the majority of seats in the House as their spokesperson for their party (U.S. House of Representatives, n.d., para. 6).

Immigrant: A broad term that refers to an individual born outside the United States as a non-U.S. citizen and who now resides in the United States (International Rescue Committee, 2018).

Presidential determination: For the purpose of this study, a document issued by the president each FY that establishes the overall number of refugees to be admitted to the United States during the upcoming FY and number of refugees per region who can be admitted (USCIS, n.d.b).

Presidential party: The “organization that selected and supported the candidate who ran under its label and who subsequently became president” (Passarelli, 2019, p. 88).

Refugee: A specific type of immigrant who is outside of their country of nationality (or, for those without a nationality, outside of their country of habitual residence) and who is unable to return to or to avail themselves of the protection of that country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group (8 USC 12 § 1101(a)(42)). Refugees in the United States are accepted to the U.S. Refugee Admissions

Program (USRAP) while outside of the United States and then enter the United States on a refugee visa (International Rescue Committee, 2018).

Regional admissions: The number of refugees admitted from a specific global region during a federal FY (Bruno, 2018, p. 6).

Regional allocations: The maximum number of refugees permitted to enter the United States from each region of the world in a given FY. These allocations are subsets of the overall admissions ceiling (Martin & Yankay, 2013).

Report to Congress: For the purpose of this study, an annual report submitted on behalf of the president to the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary with proposed refugee admissions for the upcoming FY (U.S. Department of State, 2018).

Senate majority: The political party holding the majority of seats in the Senate; the Senate Majority Leader is elected by the party holding the majority of seats in the Senate as the spokesperson for their party (U.S. Senate, n.d., para. 2).

Total global refugees: Total global refugees recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, not including Palestinian refugees in the Near East, who are under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Goddard, 2009, p. 475).

Unallocated reserve: The number of refugee admissions slots not designated for a specific geographic region but reserved to be used for refugees from any region should the need develop for refugee slots in excess of the number provided in the regional allocation (Bruno, 2015, Summary section, para. 1).

United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP): An interagency collaboration between governmental and nongovernmental agencies in the United States and abroad to identify, screen, and admit refugees for resettlement to the United States (USCIS, n.d.b).

Assumptions

In this study, I assumed that the president has more considerable influence over refugee admissions than does Congress. This assumption is based on the fact that the president sets proposed refugee admissions by presidential determination (Refugee Act of 1980 § 94 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1)) based on an annual report to Congress by the current administration (§ 207 (d)(1)). Although both the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary consult with the president on refugee admissions, it is the presidential determination that ultimately sets the final admissions number, both in total and by region. Therefore, I examined the effect of presidential political party affiliation on proposed and actual refugee admissions, while reviewing the potential moderation of those effects by the political party affiliations of Senate and House majorities.

Scope and Delimitations

Given the relatively short history of refugee admissions to the United States under the Refugee Act of 1980, I examined data from FY81-FY19, inclusively. FY81, which began October 1, 1980, is the first FY in which refugees were admitted to the United States following the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which was signed into law on March 17, 1980. FY19 was the most recent FY for which complete refugee admissions data were available at the time of this study's proposal. Because this study included

complete data from all years of refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act, there are no generalizability concerns.

I controlled for the total number of refugees globally, as well as the total population of refugees by geographic region since the passage of the Refugee Act. The UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency, makes global refugee numbers available for all refugees worldwide, as well as by refugee country of nationality. Worldwide refugee population data are available from the UNHCR, beginning with data from 1951. I included data beginning from 1979.

Limitations

This study was limited in its focus on Senate and House majorities rather than on the individual members of the Senate and House Committees of the Judiciary. Although majorities of both Committees reflect the majorities in each chamber of the Congress, this study did not account for the relative influence of members of the Judiciary Committees. I also did not account for the nature of the relationship between the chairs of the Judiciary Committees and the president.

This study is also limited to analysis of the effect of political party affiliation and did not include a consideration of external political factors, which may be confounding variables. Although global refugee levels, both in aggregate and by region, may be effects of global political events, I did not address those political events specifically. Previous studies have demonstrated that refugee populations resettled by the United States are negatively correlated with locations of U.S. military engagement without regard for the severity of the refugee situation in those locations (Berman, 2011, p 124). Future

researchers could explore external factors, such as military engagement, as covariates with political party to analyze their effect on refugee admissions.

Because the study includes data from each year since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 (FY81-FY19) and each year of global refugee data for calendar years 1979-2018 from the UNHCR, the outcomes are valid as the entire population being studied was available rather than a sample of the population. Because PRM's regional groupings of countries changed over time, each FY (FY81-FY03) required some level of recategorization of countries into region to align with current regional groupings. Additionally, the UNHCR does not categorize countries into region in its annual data, and countries of nationality and countries of first asylum were grouped into regions corresponding with Department of State regional designations. These categorizations and recategorizations into groupings that could be compared over time are a potential threat to internal validity in this study (see Babbie, 2017). I discuss the process of operationalizing these variables in detail in Chapter 3. In discussions of the relationship between the Trump administration, it should be noted that the FYs included in this study only account for a portion of the years of the Trump administration and do not include presidential determinations for FY20 or FY21 and arrivals for FY20.

Significance

I found no reviews of the effect of political party affiliation on proposed or actual refugee admissions through the USRAP that were published before the election of President Trump. Without a review of the extent to which party affiliation has affected refugee admissions historically, one cannot identify whether the current political divide

on refugee policy is a contemporary anomaly or whether it has existed since the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. This research addresses the gap in understanding the current political divisions related to refugee policy within the broader context of the history of the USRAP. It provides a framework for understanding the relationship between political party and refugee policy for those working in refugee admissions and resettlement.

Despite the lack of research on the subject, refugee resettlement and human rights organizations hold that the USRAP has long held bipartisan support before the current administration (Human Rights First, n.d.; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants [USCRI], 2017). The ability to anticipate the number of refugee admissions and the backgrounds of those refugees is essential to refugee resettlement organizations. As funding for refugee resettlement is provided by the U.S. government on a per capita basis (i.e., funded based on the number of refugees the organization resettles each year; U.S. Department of State, 2017), the ability to anticipate the number of refugee admissions in an upcoming FY is critical to a resettlement agency's ability to plan fiscally. Predicting the background of refugees who will be admitted through the USRAP helps resettlement organizations prepare for the specific linguistic and cultural needs of anticipated refugee groups. This study contributes to positive social change by providing resettlement agencies with information to help prepare in advance for the number and backgrounds of refugees that will be admitted through the USRAP. Resettlement agencies may be better equipped to anticipate refugee admissions and, as a result, improve the quality of services that newly admitted refugees receive.

Summary

Despite the existing research on the correlation between political party affiliation and immigration policy positions and the current research on political party affiliation as it relates to refugee policy, there is no research on the effect of political party affiliation on the implementation of refugee policy as measured by proposed and actual refugee admissions. As resettlement agencies are funded on a per capita basis, the ability to anticipate the number of refugees who will be admitted to the United States in an upcoming FY against a current FY is vital to financial planning. Likewise, the ability to anticipate regional allocations in future years against a current year allows agencies to plan for the cultural and linguistic needs of the refugees they will serve. Chapter 2 provides a thorough review of existing literature. I also substantiate historical institutionalism as the appropriate framework for this study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the political party affiliation of the president affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP and whether these effects are moderated by the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities, while controlling for global and regional refugee levels. The resettlement agencies that provide refugee resettlement services in cooperation with the USRAP hold that refugee resettlement enjoyed bipartisan support before the election of Donald Trump (USCRI, 2017). Recent literature (Adida et al., 2019; Finley & Esposito, 2020; Fullerton, 2017; Johnson, 2018; Saldaña, et al., 2018; Schmidt, 2019; Scribner, 2017) has highlighted political divisions on refugee policy under the Trump administration but has not provided an analysis of political divisions or unity before the Trump administration.

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature search strategy and the theoretical framework of this study and review the existing literature. This literature review includes a history of refugee resettlement in the United States before the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980; the passage of the Refugee Act and the establishment of the USRAP; political positions on immigration, broadly, and refugee policy, specifically, since the passage of the Refugee Act; and refugee policy under the Trump administration.

Literature Search Strategy

I used Google Scholar and several databases available through Walden University, including Academic Search Complete, Nexis Uni (formerly LexisNexis Academic), Political Science Complete, ProQuest Central, SAGE Journals, SAGE Premier, and the multidatabase search engine Thoreau Multi-Database Search, to identify relevant literature. Search terms for these databases included *USRAP*, *United States Refugee Admissions Program*, *refugee resettlement*, *admissions ceiling*, *refugee admissions ceiling*, *refugee priority groups*, *refugee politics*, *refugee policy*, *immigration policy*, and *refugee P2 groups*, and the Boolean searches USRAP “political party,” “refugee admissions” “political party,” immigration “political party,” asylum “political party,” refugee “presidential determination,” refugee “report to congress,” refugee “political party,” and “admissions ceiling” “political party.” The focus of these searches was peer-reviewed literature published 2015-2020. Because research has not been conducted on the history of political positions related to refugee policy and admissions, I included limited searches for relevant literature in the 2000s, 1990s, and 1980s that could provide contemporaneous accounts of political beliefs about immigration and refugee policy.

In reviewing the available literature, I found limited studies on refugee policy in the United States, the majority of which focused on policies related to the services refugees receive following their resettlement (Dubus, 2018; Gilhooly & Lee, 2017; Gonzalez Benson, 2017). Few studies considered refugee admissions policy, and those that did were primarily concerned with refugee admissions policies beginning in the

Trump administration (Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Saldaña, et al., 2018). Given these limitations, the literature review was broadened to include studies on immigration policy in the United States, as refugee policies are a subset of broader immigration policy. Also considered was the limited research that has been conducted on asylum policy in the United States, as asylum policy and refugee policy are related in that both asylees and refugees are defined in U.S. and international law as individuals feeling persecution in their country of nationality (Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967).

Theoretical Foundation

The theoretical framework for this study was historical institutionalism. Steinmo et al. (1992) first discussed historical institutionalism in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, in which they defined *institutions* as organizations as well as the rules, practices, norms, values, and social conventions that order the organization's conduct. These institutions can include branches of government, political parties, and the structure of political party systems (Steinmo et al., 1992). In seeking to understand institutions and institutional behavior, historical institutionalism is concerned with not only contemporary institutional positions and practices but also the origins of those positions and practices, viewing institutions as “the legacy of historical processes” (Thelen, 1999, p. 382). Historical institutionalism argues that the strategies and goals pursued by individuals within organizations are shaped by their institutional and organizational contexts (Steinmo et al., 1992).

As with other branches of neo-institutionalism, historical institutionalism includes path dependence as a central idea. Path dependence holds that, once an institution establishes a belief or practice, it becomes increasingly difficult to change that idea or practice as time progresses (Fioretos, 2011). Consequently, beliefs and choices that occur early on in an institution's development can have a significant impact over the life of the institution (Sorensen, 2015, p. 21). Given this path dependence, theorists must explain how institutional change occurs, despite the institutional tendency to remain set in an established path. Before Steinmo et al.'s (1992) seminal work on historical institutionalism, the prominent model of understanding institutional change in neo-institutional literature was punctuated equilibrium. In the punctuated equilibrium model, institutions generally enjoy extended periods of stability or equilibrium that are punctuated by occasional crises resulting in institutional change, after which institutions return to a state of equilibrium (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 15).

In contrast to the punctuated equilibrium model, historical institutionalism posits a model of institutional change characterized by institutional dynamism or the dynamic, rather than static, nature of organizations and how institutional dynamics either reinforce or gradually change institutions. (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 16). Ikenberry (1994) noted that the historical institutional approach to path dependency is a "critical junctures and developmental pathways" (p. 16) approach, which holds that basic institutional logic is set during critical moments. The approach holds that future changes tend to be further developments or extensions of what was set in those crucial moments, rather than departures from them. In considering institutional dynamics, historical institutionalism

looks both at mechanisms that maintain institutional trajectories and those that result in institutional changes.

Fundamental mechanisms that maintain institutional trajectories, or those that result in further development or extensions of those paths set during previous critical moments, include positive feedback, increasing returns, and sunk costs (Fioretos, 2011, p. 374; Thelen, 1999). Positive feedback most often consists of the generation of positive external collaborators, supporters, and networks resulting from a position or choice (Fioretos, 2011, p. 377). Positive feedback can also result from an individual using their institutional authority to create institutional rules that strengthen their positions of power (Sorensen, 2015, p. 23). Increasing returns refers to the initial benefits that an institution receives from taking a position (positive feedback) and how they benefit from maintaining that position increases over time when compared to alternative positions (Fioretos, 2011). Although alternative positions may have, at one time, been equally beneficial to the institution as the chosen position, over time, the chosen position's benefits become increasingly helpful when compared to the benefits the institution would gain from changing positions. Sunk costs refer to the idea that individuals within institutions must weigh the costs and benefits of change against "maintaining or losing their investments in *past* arrangements" (Fioretos, 2011, p. 373). Individuals who hold positions of power within institutions may owe their current positions to those who came before them in the movement, the movement's founder, or another institutional leader or may owe their position of power to historical choices the institution made to follow specific ideational positions.

Contrary to the punctuated equilibrium model, historical institutionalism focuses on gradual institutional change. Historical institutionalism holds that most institutional change happens gradually over time, rather than in through radical change. However, radical change is not considered impossible within a historical institutionalist framework (Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen, 2015). Fioretos (2011, p. 347) identified four sources of this incremental change: layering, drift, conversion, and displacement. Layering involves creating a new policy without eliminating an old policy (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Where eliminating an old policy or practice may prove controversial and create conflict within an institution, layering a new policy over an old policy can create gradual change without disrupting institutional relationships. Drift refers to the transformation of an otherwise stable policy as a result of changing circumstances (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). As exogenous changes occur, institutions may shift or drift in a position to adapt to new conditions (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 17). Conversion refers to internal policy adaptations through the way they are implemented (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Rather than changes to the policy or position itself, conversion concerns changes in implementation, which may, over time, result in changes in outcomes. Displacement refers to the rescission and replacement of existing institutional policy (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Whereas layering creates a new policy without eliminating the previous policy, displacement represents a formal replacement of an existing policy or position with a new one.

In considering radical changes to institutions, historical institutionalism holds that such changes can happen one of two ways. First, radical change can result from the accumulation of gradual changes that have occurred over time (Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen,

2015). Indeed, historical institutionalism holds that the accumulation of incremental changes represents the most common cause for radical institutional reforms. Radical change can, however, also occur from “exogenous shocks” (Fioretos, 2011, p. 374). Such external shocks are like the punctuations identified in punctuated equilibrium theory. However, historical institutionalism does not hold that such shocks are necessary for institutional change, nor are they the most common cause of institutional change.

This study was concerned with the effect of the political party affiliation of the president with refugee admissions to the United States, along with any moderating effect had by the political party affiliations of the Senate and House. Steinmo et al. (1992) identified political parties as institutions in their seminal work on historical institutionalism. By examining the effect of political party affiliation on refugee admissions to the United States, this study identified whether the sharp reductions in refugee admissions under the Trump administration are the result of accumulated incremental changes toward refugee reductions by the Republican Party or represent an exogenous shock to Republican positions on refugee resettlement in the United States.

Literature Review

History of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Until 1980

Refugees are one type of immigrant, so understanding current refugee policy and the policies that led to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 requires an understanding of broader U.S. immigration laws. Control over immigration is generally considered to be one of the few “universal attributes” (p. 21) of national sovereignty (Teitelbaum, 1980). Until *Chae Chan Ping v. United States* (1889), which established that immigration

regulation was a federal responsibility, U.S. immigration policy was a patchwork of state and federal laws (Steil & Vasi, 2014, p. 1108).

Before WWII, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, immigration policies were based on employer demands for labor and nation-building, with a focus on maintaining national homogeneity by implementing restrictions on nations of origin (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014, p. 805; Triadafilopoulos, 2010, p. 169). Among the most well-known immigration acts of this time is the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which was passed in reaction to Chinese immigration to California and the U.S. West Coast to work as laborers (Zolberg, 1988). Hutchinson (1981) noted that beginning in the 1880s, Congress provided for the admission of immigrants who would otherwise have been excluded, if they were seeking to immigrate to the United States “to avoid persecution or punishment on religious or political grounds” (as cited in Zolberg, 1988, p. 653). Although these exemptions permitted admittance of those who would otherwise have been excluded based on factors such as illiteracy or ability to be economically self-sufficient, such admissions were still governed by existing quotas that restricted immigration by national origin. These national origin quotas benefited many Eastern European Jews and Armenian Christians while continuing to exclude groups such as the Chinese (Zolberg, 1988). Under these exemptions, more than 2 million Eastern European Jews were admitted to the United States between 1881 and 1914 (Zolberg, 1988, p. 654).

The next major attempt to address special groups of immigrants fleeing persecution was the Act to Regulate the Admission of Aliens to and the Residence of Aliens in the United States (1917), also known as the Immigration Act of 1917, which

was vetoed by President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, due to his opposition to the law's literacy requirement and based on his belief that an exemption for those fleeing persecution would require the United States to pass judgment on other governments (Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 19). Seven years later, the Act to Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States (1924), also known as the Immigration Act of 1924, supplanted prior immigration acts and effectively banned Asian and African immigration to the United States, while putting significant limitations on Eastern European immigration (Fussell, 2014). The act remained in place until after WWII. Millions of people were displaced across Europe following WWII, having fled political, religious, and ethnic persecution (Brown & Scribner, 2014). Despite the displaced millions, opinion was mixed about accepting Jewish refugees into the United States. Members of Congress feared that Nazi spies could be among those claiming to be Jewish refugees, and to accept them would be to put the United States in danger (Welch, 2014). Although Roosevelt supporters were more likely to support allowing Jewish refugees to be admitted to the United States, only 23% of Americans supported raising quotas to allow for more Jewish refugees and immigrants to enter the country (Welch, 2014, pp. 627-628).

In response to the refugee crisis in Europe, President Harry Truman, a Democrat, advocated in 1946 for the United States to admit refugees fleeing communist regimes. Truman was opposed by Senator Chapman Revercomb (R-WV), who stated his belief that the United States should not accept anyone from communist countries, as they would bring with them their communist ways of thinking and negatively influence the American people (Scribner, 2017, p. 268). Despite such opposition, the Displaced Persons Act

(1948) passed with Truman in office, which allowed for the admission of 200,000 Eastern European refugees into the United States. Although not increasing the number of available visas for immigrants, the Displaced Persons Act was the first legislative act that specifically addressed refugee immigration (Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 20).

After the Displaced Persons Act expired in 1952, Congress passed the Refugee Relief Act (1953), which was signed into law by President Dwight Eisenhower, a Republican (Martin & Ferris, 2017). The Refugee Relief Act specifically allowed for the admission of individuals who entered displaced persons camps after 1945, and such entries were in addition to, rather than subject to, existing national origin quotas (Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 20). Eisenhower went on to approve the admission of an additional 38,000 Hungarian refugees between late 1956 and May 1957 who had been displaced by the Hungarian uprising of 1956 (Brown & Scribner, 2014; Martin & Ferris, 2017). 1957 saw the passage of the Refugee-Escapee Act (1957), which allowed for admission to the United States of those who had escaped a communist or Middle Eastern country fleeing persecution for racial, religious, or political reasons (Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 20). This ad hoc approach to addressing refugee needs continued under the presidency of John Kennedy, a Democrat, who admitted 100,000 Cuban refugees between January 1959–December 1960, which led to the establishment of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (1962) to fund support for refugees, mainly Cuban nationals living in Miami, Florida (Brown & Scribner, 2014).

The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (1965) (INA) under President Lyndon Johnson, a Democrat, marked a departure for U.S. immigration laws that had

been based on national origin quotas. The INA replaced national origin quotas with a focus on family reunification and skilled immigrants that have remained focuses of the U.S. immigration system (Drometer & Méango, 2017). Despite removing national origin quotas, the INA continued to favor European immigrants while limiting immigration from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, giving particular preference to immigrants Western and Northern European countries (Barkdull et al., 2012; Fussell, 2014). The INA reserved 6% of visas for refugees. Still, it did not establish a formal refugee admissions process nor align the definition of refugee with the refugee definition established by the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (Tichenor, 2016, p. 691), to which the United States declined to be a party.

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was focused, specifically, on addressing the needs of European refugees who had been displaced “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951”. When the United Nations met in 1967, the Protocols Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) was issued and expended protections by eliminating geographic and time limitations (Brown & Scribner, 2014). Although the United States ratified the Protocol in 1968 (Fitzpatrick, 1997), refugee admissions continued on an ad hoc basis through emergency legislations such as the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (1975) after the fall of Saigon under president Gerald Ford, a Republican, that admitted 130,000 refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Brown & Scribner, 2014) and the admission of 640,000 Cubans following the Communist Revolution in 1979 under president Jimmy Carter, a Democrat (Kerwin, 2018).

The Refugee Act of 1980 and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program

By the end of the 1970s, as many as 14,000 Southeast Asian refugees affected by the Vietnam War were arriving in the United States each month (Gonzalez Benson, 2016). In response, Congress held hearings in 1979 to examine how to best address this spike in admissions (Gonzalez Benson, 2016). Senator Dick Clark (D-IA), who had been appointed to be the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated the need for “permanent and consistent refugee policy” (Brown & Scribner, 2014, p. 104) to replace the ad hoc responses to various refugee crises (Brown & Scribner, 2014, p. 104). The Refugee Act of 1980 was first introduced as S. 643 by Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and, after passing the Senate, Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) and Peter Rodina (D-NJ) sponsored the same as HR 2816. In testimony before the House, proponents of the Act argued that it would give Congress “greater and more explicit power than it has had before with regard to the numbers and nature of refugees to be admitted to this country” (H.R. Rep. No. 69-2, at 4500 (1980)). The Act passed the House with 63% of Democrats voting in favor and 72% of Republicans voting against the Act (GovTrack, n.d.), and was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter.

Despite passing through a Democratically controlled Congress and being signed into law by a Democratic president, the Refugee Act was not without detractors. Echoing Revercomb’s objections to admitting communists in 1946, opponents of the Refugee Act also expressed concerns that admitting refugees from the Soviet Union under the Refugee Act would admit communists who could undermine the United States from within

(Scribner, 2017, p. 268). Other opponents worried that the Refugee Act would undermine existing immigration policies that favored Europeans (Scribner, 2017, p. 268). These concerns were not limited to politicians. A 1980 national poll indicated that only 19% of U.S. respondents wanted to expand refugee admissions to Indochinese refugees (Teitelbaum 1980, p. 21).

Concerns about moving away from European-favoring policies were not unfounded. The Refugee Act represented a move toward non-discriminative immigration policies and into alignment with the 1967 Protocols (Brown & Scribner, 2014; Teitelbaum, 1980). These were not the primary focus of the Refugee Act, however, which was to establish uniform refugee admissions and assistance procedures through the establishment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (Barkdull et al., 2012; Brown & Scribner, 2014; Congressional Digest, 2016; Violet, 1999).

While the Senate and House Judiciary Committees have primary responsibility for and jurisdiction over immigration issues (Fennelly et al., 2015), the Refugee Act delegates to the Executive Branch the annual refugee admissions ceiling and regional allocations, based mainly on the administration's belief about strategic benefits of resettlement of specific populations (Berman, 2011). U.S. geography and the USRAP's overseas refugee admissions processing allows the administration to choose the nationalities, ethnicities, and other qualities of refugees to be admitted (Berman, 2011). The president's administration is required to submit a report to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees outlining the intended ceiling and regional allocations (Bruno, 2015), then cabinet-level representatives meet in-person with representatives from the

Judiciary Committees to discuss the administration's report before the president issues the annual presidential determination finalizing the ceiling and regional allocations (Bruno, 2015). Despite the legislative history of the Refugee Act making clear that Congress intended to maintain active participation in refugee admissions (Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, 2018), the Refugee Act does not require congressional approval of the ceiling or regional allocations, but only requires that cabinet-level members of the administration consult with Congress (Congressional Digest, 2016, p. 5).

While the presidential determination sets the total admissions ceiling at the start of each fiscal year, these have been periodically modified in acknowledgement of changing global realities. Changes to the admissions ceiling may be done by issuing a new presidential determination or through executive order. In both FY88 and FY89, annual ceilings were increased through presidential determination by 15,000 and 22,500, respectively, to address the growing numbers of refugees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Determination No. 88-16, 53 Fed. Reg. 21405 (May 20, 1988); Determination No. 89-15, 54 Fed. Reg. 31493 (June 19, 1989)). In FY99, the ceiling was increased through presidential determination by 13,000 to accommodate Kosovar refugees (Determination No. 99-33, 64 Fed. Ref. 47341 (Aug. 12, 1999)). The reduction in the admissions ceiling under the Trump administration through Executive Orders Nos. 13,769 and 13,760 in FY17 represents the only instance in which the ceiling has been lowered, rather than increased, mid-fiscal year. While regional allocations can be modified, increases in regional allocations are generally resultant from using part or all of

the unallocated reserve for the given fiscal year, rather than by presidential determination (Bruno, 2015, p. 3).

The USRAP is not a single entity, but rather a collaboration of many agencies including USCIS, part of the Department of Homeland Security; PRM, part of the Department of State; and the Office of Refugee Resettlement, part of the Department of Health and Human Services (Biddle, 2018). PRM works collaboratively with the UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to manage overseas processing of refugees before their admission to the United States (Biddle, 2018). As of 2016, the United Nations estimated that there were 20 million refugees globally, not including an additional 5 million Palestinians (Colloton, 2016). For each refugee, the United Nations seeks one of three “durable solutions” (Brown & Scribner, 2014). The first durable solution, voluntary repatriation, involves a refugee being able to return to their country of nationality when there is no longer a threat of persecution (Brown & Scribner, 2014). The second durable solution, local integration, involves a refugee being able to remain safely in the country in which they currently reside, generally their country of first asylum, after fleeing their country of nationality (Brown & Scribner, 2014). This solution requires that the refugee be provided with valid access to socio-economic, legal, civil, and human rights in that country (Brown & Scribner, 2014). The third option, third-country resettlement, involving resettlement to a third country (other than the country of nationality and the country of first asylum) is considered for those who are “in urgent need of protection and [those] for whom other durable solutions are not feasible” (Thomas-Greenfield, 2001, p. 165). Resettlement is the last UNHCR option and only

available to less than 1% of refugees in the world (Lindsay, 2017), and the USRAP represents the United States' program for admitting such refugees.

Refugee admissions have fluctuated from a high of 159,252 in FY81 to a low of 22,491 in FY18 (International Rescue Committee, 2019b). Before FY18, the lowest annual admissions number was in FY02, when 27,131 refugees were admitted in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. (Nagel, 2016). While the refugee populations (nationalities) admitted to the U.S. post-9/11 have changed, and new security procedures have been implemented (Barkdull et al., 2012, p. 108), there has been no significant legislation to address refugee resettlement in the U.S. since the Refugee Act, mainly due to political polarization and inability to work 'across the aisle' (Magner, 2016, p. 187).

Partisanship in Immigration and Refugee Policy

While Americans have historically favored limited immigration (Fussell, 2014), the link between partisanship and attitudes toward immigration policy has grown stronger over time, as immigration has become an increasingly politicized issue. The winners of the 2016 elections were among the most hostile toward immigrants in recent U.S. history, according to studies by both Holoma and Tavits (2018) and Schmidt (2019). Melkonian-Hoover and Kellstedt noted that both the United States and Europe are experiencing right-wing populist responses to immigration that frame immigrants as outsiders or "others" (2019, p. 51).

Fears about immigrants have been a theme throughout U.S. history as new immigrant groups would arrive, often presenting as right-wing populist responses (Jiang

& Erez, 2018; Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 52). In the 1820s – 1850s, German and Irish, particularly Irish Catholic, immigrants were the “others” that populist movements opposed (Finley & Esposito, 2020, p. 181), including the Republican Party, which opposed Irish Catholic immigration (Gratton, 2018, p. 131). Republican strategy shifted in the 1860s to promoting immigration as they sought both to increase votes among existing immigrant communities and to promote immigrant labor to employers in need of laborers (p. 132). The increase in immigrant labor, however, proved to be competition for U.S.-born laborers, and, in the 1880s, Republican strategy shifted again to restricting immigration to garner working-class votes (p. 129).

From the 1890s through the 1920s, southern and eastern European immigrants were the targets of “othering” in the United States. “Othering” did not occur only in U.S.-born communities but was also seen in immigrant communities across the country. Norwegian- and Swedish-language newspapers denounced immigration from southern and eastern Europe in favor of immigration from northwestern Europe (p. 134). Other immigrant communities, including German and Croatian speaking communities, published news articles opposing restrictions on immigration from southern and eastern Europe (p. 134). This “othering” of eastern Europeans remained through WWII when Jews fleeing persecution by the Nazis were denied entry into the United States, and quotas limiting eastern European immigration remained in place (Welch, 2014).

The passage of the INA in 1965 marked not only a break from a focus on national origin quotas in immigration policy but also the deepening of party divides on immigration. Elimination of quotas that were intended to increase western and northern

European immigration to the United States was closely tied to the broader U.S. Civil Rights Movement, which framed the INA's reforms as liberal (Tsai, 2019). When President Reagan framed immigration as an economic issue in the 1980s, however, the majority of Republican senators supported the admission of immigrants (Jeong et al., 2011, p. 514). Reagan argued:

Rather than putting up a fence, why don't we...make it possible for them to come here legally with a work permit and, then, while they're working here and earning here, they pay taxes here. (Johnson, 2018, p. 15)

Jeong et al. argue that this Republican support was borne out of a Republican Party dominated by economic conservatives rather than social conservatives (2011, p. 524). It was this economically conservative Republican Party that passed the Immigration Reform and Control (1986) (IRCA), which granted amnesty to undocumented immigrants present before January 1, 1982, and who had been continuously present in the United States since that time, approximately three million people (Jeong et al., 2011, p. 517). The IRCA provided a means to authorize workers through amnesty while also requiring employers to hire only work-authorized employees (p. 517).

Between the 1980s and the 2010s, the Republican Party became increasingly dominated by social conservatives rather than by economic conservatives (Jeong et al., 2011, p. 524). In 1990, Congress passed and President George H. W. Bush signed into law the Immigration Act of 1990 (1990), which increased overall immigration up to 700,000 per year for 1992-1994, then 675,000 per year thereafter, created five employment-based visas by occupation, created a diversity lottery program to admit

nationals from countries with limited immigration to the United States, created Temporary Protected Status, created a family-based visa program, and reduced the number of relative visas available to temporary workers (Johnson, 2018, pp. 15-16). By comparison, when the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (1996) was before Congress, social conservatives in the Republican Party proposed amendments to reduce family-based and work-based immigration (Jeong et al., p. 519). Because pro-business, economic conservatives in the Republican Party opposed the amendments, however, they did not pass (p. 519).

Polarization on immigration policy maintained a low profile in national politics throughout the 1990s (Nagel, 2016). Yet, congressional votes on immigration-related measures were the most polarizing of all issues voted on from the early 1990s through the mid-2010s (Fennelly et al., 2015). Citing Citrin and colleagues in studies from 1990, 1997, and 2009, Fussell (2014) noted that Republicans consistently preferred restrictionist immigration policies, while Democrats consistently favored more expansionist policies (p. 487). In reviewing Senate races from 2010, 2012, and 2014, Reny found that Republican candidates were more likely than Democratic candidates to make anti-immigrant appeals to gain support (2017, p. 736). Additionally, Reny found that Republicans in states with increasing immigrant populations were more likely to make anti-immigrant appeals than those in states with low immigrant populations. However, this increase was moderated by the size of the voting-eligible immigrant population in the candidate's state (p. 743). While Democratic voters were shown to be more likely to support expansionist immigration policies if their community had a large

immigrant population (Hawley, 2011), immigrant population growth had no effect on Democratic Senate candidates making pro-immigrant appeals in Reny's study (2017, p. 742).

The terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001, had a profound impact on American politics. Following the "9/11 attacks", Muslims and others of Middle Eastern descent became the "other" of concern in the United States, facing increased scrutiny, particularly for immigrants and refugees (Barkdull et al., 2012; Disney, 2017). The 9/11 attacks also allowed socially conservative Republicans to argue that immigrants and refugees were a security threat, to take stronger anti-immigration positions, and move the party closer to positions that were contrary to the pro-business, economically conservative positions of 1986 and 1996 (Jeong et al., 2011, p. 519).

The civil war in Syria led to the highest level of refugees in recorded history in 2015 (Walden et al., 2017). With the influx of refugees and immigrants from Syria into Europe, the Obama administration announced that it would accept ten thousand Syrian refugees into the United States through the USRAP. Republicans quickly expressed opposition to Syrian refugee resettlement following the November 2015 terrorist attack in Paris, with opposition to Syrian refugees used by Republican presidential primary candidates in 2016 to "establish their anti-Muslim, pro-national security, pro-border control *bona fides*" (Nagel, 2016, p. 285). Despite fears following the Paris terrorist attack, which was later found not to have been committed by refugees, Democratic voters remained united on pro-immigration and pro-refugee issues (Noel, 2016, p. 174). By the 2016 campaign, Bartles (2018) found that Republicans were united around social and

cultural conservatism, with little consideration for the economic conservatism that previously defined the party, and Democrats were primarily united around an “activist government” while being divided on cultural issues (2018, p. 1483).

Refugee Policy and the Trump Administration

Restrictions on immigration in general, as well as on refugees specifically, became central to Trump’s campaign, even before he secured the Republican nomination (Scribner, 2017, p. 263). Muslim immigrants and refugees, in particular, were highlighted as threats to the United States, according to Trump, who also linked immigration to criminals and refugees to “terrorists-in-waiting” (Scribner, 2017, p. 265, 327). During his campaign as well as after taking office, Trump pointed to refugees as threats to national security (Ferwerda et al., 2017), while also arguing that the country could not absorb more refugees and that refugees were unwilling to assimilate into American culture. (Kerwin, 2018). Trump’s opposition to the USRAP, however, is part of a broader opposition to immigration (Kerwin, 2018), as demonstrated by orders issued early in his administration.

One week after taking office, Trump issued his first executive order impacting the USRAP. Executive Order No. 13,769, commonly referred to as “the Muslim ban” (Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fullerton, 2017), on January 27, 2017, banned entry into the United States of all citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries for 90 days, suspended all refugee resettlement for 120 days, suspended Syrian refugee resettlement indefinitely, reduced the FY17 admissions ceiling from 110,000 to 50,000, and stated that the USRAP would give preference to religious minorities once refugee resettlement

resumed (Executive Order No. 13,769). The Trump administration based its authority to issue the executive order on § 212(f) of the INA which reads, in part:

Whenever the president finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, may by proclamation, and for such a period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012)).

More than 50 legal challenges were filed against Executive Order No. 13,769 (Scribner, 2017, p. 266), with multiple temporary restraining orders issued by January 28, 2017, and a nationwide temporary restraining order issued on January 30, 2017, in *State of Washington v. Trump* (2017). With the nationwide restraining order in place, refugees, including Syrian refugees, continued to be resettled in the United States over the next five weeks (Fullerton, 2017).

On March 6, 2017, Trump rescinded Executive Order No. 13,769 and issued Executive Order No. 13,780 in its place. Similar to the order that it replaced, Executive Order No. 13,780, commonly referred to as “the Muslim ban 2.0” (Fullerton, 2017), suspended refugee resettlement for 120 days, suspended all entry from six Muslim-majority countries for 90 days, and lowered the admissions ceiling from 110,000 to 50,000 (Executive Order No. 13,780, 2017). Like Executive Order No. 13,769 before it, more than 50 lawsuits were filed against Executive Order No. 13,780 (Fullerton, 2017), and like the previous order, a temporary restraining order was issued against Executive

Order No. 13,780, this time in the case of *International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump* (2017). The Trump administration appealed the *International Refugee Assistance Project* (IRAP) decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower court's decision. The Trump administration, again, appealed the decision. The Supreme Court issued an unsigned per curiam opinion on June 26, 2017 in *Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, et al.* (2017), allowing many of the provisions of Executive Order No. 13,780 to move forward, including the 120-day ban on refugee admissions to the U.S., excepting those refugees with close family connections in the United States who were allowed entry during those 120 days. This 120-day suspension of most refugee admissions through the USRAP lasted into the following fiscal year. For FY18, the admissions ceiling was set by the Trump administration at 45,000 the lowest refugee admissions ceiling since the passage of the Refugee Act (International Rescue Committee, 2017). In FY19, the admissions ceiling was lower, still, set at 30,000 (International Rescue Committee, 2019b, p. 1). The UNHCR would go on to report that 2019 set new records of refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2021b).

Factors Affecting Partisanship and Refugee/Immigration Policy

As recently as 2014, the literature on immigration policy held that “[i]mmigration policy is not generally viewed as the nation’s most important problem” (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, p. 775). By 2018, however, a Gallop Poll showed that “immigration” tied with “dissatisfaction with government” as the “most important problem facing the country” for Republicans (Reinhart, 2018). Strong opposition to refugee admissions and immigration was central to the Trump campaign in 2016, with support for Trump showing substantial

increases among those with anti-immigrant attitudes (Lachman, 2019; Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 32; Sides et al., 2018). Trump framed immigrants and refugees as the other preventing America from being “great” (Young, 2017, p. 218). This echoed populist campaigns in Europe that focused on a “glorious past” and the uncertainty of the future to other immigrants and gained support among voters (Saldaña et al., 2018, p. 793). While Republican lawmakers and members of the Republican political elite opposed Trump (Sides et al., 2018), at least during the presidential primary, Johnson (2018) argued that he generally reflected the existing opinions among rank file Republican voters (p. 16).

Many scholars have noted the increasing partisanship and polarization in U.S. politics (Drometer & Méango, 2017; Fennelly et al., 2015; Fussell, 2014; Kaufmann et al., 2012). Not only do political parties shape the opinions of the public, often functioning as “aggregators” of political and policy information (Pearson-Merkowitz et al., 2015, p. 313), but public attitudes also shape the behavior of policymakers (Adida et al., 2019). While party preferences affect the public’s attitudes towards immigration, so too does the attitude of the native-born public affect the party’s responses to immigration (Homola & Tavits, 2018).

Given the impact of the public’s opinion on party positions, it is relevant to review the literature examining reasons why individuals voted for Trump and how these reasons fit within the party’s history. Themes in the literature explanation voting for Trump include populism, Islamophobia, economic grievances, and racism/ethnocentricity with particular attention to White Evangelical voters (Gest et al., 2018; Kaufmann et al., 2012; Tsai, 2019; Tucker et al, 2019; Whitehead et al., 2018). Populism is always against

something (Biegon, 2019, p. 520), and Trump's populism often frames the people against immigrants as their adversaries. Magcamit (2017) argues that Trump was elected by "people who felt that they had become strangers in their own land" (p. 16) who were not able to achieve the American dream and often found immigrants to be the reason (Magcamit, 2017).

Islamophobia

For some Americans, Muslim refugees and immigrants to the United States pose economic, security, and cultural threats (Breshnahan et al., 2018, p. 564). In September 2015, the world woke up to images of a Syrian toddler who had washed ashore a beach in Turkey after drowning in the Mediterranean as his family was fleeing war (Richard, 2019). Shortly after, Obama announced his intention to increase the admission of Syrian refugees, only to have public support waiver following the terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015 (Nagel, 2016). The Trump campaign capitalized on the fear generated by the Paris attack the stoke negative attitudes toward refugees and immigrants (Saldaña, 2018, p. 793).

During the campaign, Trump suggested creating a database to track Muslims in the United States., banning all foreign Muslims from entering the United States, and characterized Muslims as likely to commit acts of terror (Doucerain et al., 2018, p. 225; Magcamit, 2017, p. 18). Trump was not alone in this framing of Muslim refugees. Candidate Ben Carson referred to Syrian refugees as "rabid dogs" while Trump referred to them as "Trojan horses" for terrorism (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017, p. 87). Trump would make similar statements later, when he referred to "unknown Middle Easterners"

traveling as part of an immigrant caravan from Central America to the southern border of the U.S. (Béland, 2020, p. 171). These statements echo WWII-era concerns that Nazis or Nazi supporters may be hiding among Jewish refugee groups and Cold War-era concerns that communists may be hiding among those fleeing persecution in communist countries.

Multiple studies conducted in 2016 and 2017 showed that Republicans, conservatives, and Trump-supporters were significantly less likely to support Syrian refugees than other U.S. adults (Newman, 2018, p. 776). Having a Republican voting record has also been associated with support for policies hostile toward Muslim immigrants, including support for reducing the number of Syrian refugees admitted to the U.S. (Doucerain et al., 2018, p. 235). Following Trump's efforts to restrict refugees from the Middle East and prioritize Christian refugees (Schmidt, 2019), one poll showed that 73% of Republicans agreed that "banning people from Muslim countries is necessary to prevent terrorism," while only 19% of Democrats agreed (p. 225). While anti-Muslim bias is significantly lower among Democrats, non-Whites, and non-Christians, Americans, overall, preferred Syrian refugees who are female, high-skilled, English-speaking, and Christian (Adida et al., 2019).

Economic Anxiety

One theory for Trump's success is that his economic rhetoric gained support among economically struggling segments of the public (Manza & Crowley, 2018). Gest et al. have shown that support for Trump among Republicans is related to perceived economic deprivation compared to others (2018, p. 1710). Trump frames immigrants as taking jobs from U.S.-born workers and lowering overall wages (Finley & Esposito,

2020; Magcamit, 2017). While immigrants and U.S.-born Americans tend to compete for different low-skilled jobs rather than the same low-skilled jobs (Finley & Esposito, 2020, p. 190), a sense of powerlessness amid economic struggles has led working-class and low-skilled workers to support Trump (Gest et al., 2018, p. 1697).

This sense of powerlessness has led not only to support for Trump among Republican voters but has also led many working-class Whites to leave the Democratic Party (Gest et al., 2018). Continued upward economic mobility and the protections provided by union membership were once core to White working-class support of the Democratic Party (Reny et al., 2019, p. 97). Losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector have disproportionately impacted middle class and low-skilled workers (Gest et al., 2018), stunting upward mobility and reducing union membership (Reny et al.), and these losses have led many working-class Whites to leave the Democratic Party and support Trump (p. 1697). Economic concerns, along with racial matters, led to vote switching in 2016, comparable to the Southern realignment following the Civil Rights Movement (Reny et al., 2019, p. 109).

Racism and Ethnocentricity

An alternative view is that Trump was able to galvanize existing racist and anti-immigrant sentiments to his advantage in the campaign (Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 29). Analysis by Sides et al. showed that dominant factors in supporting Trump included concerns about liberalism and “racial and ethnic out-groups,” but not economic concerns (2018, p. 148). Concerns about liberalism were also found to be less significant than fears of “racial and ethnic out-groups” (p. 148). This may be because many White Americans

view race, and by extension immigration, as a “zero-sum” scenario in which gains for any one group mean losses for another group (Wilkins & Kaiser, as cited in Major et al., 2018, p. 932).

Trump tapped into this anti-immigrant sentiment and into bias against racial, ethnic, and religious minorities groups, using “us versus them” rhetoric that resulted in “othering” immigrant groups and playing to fears that White Americans will lose to immigrants (Breshnahan et al., 2018; Disney, 2017; Heyer, 2018). Multiple studies have drawn connections between attitudes toward immigrants and refugees and predispositions to ethnocentrism and prejudice (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, p. 775). Among those most likely to respond to ethnic or racial appeals from candidates or lawmakers in the United States are Republicans (Sides et al., 2018, p. 137).

Shifts in the racial makeup of the United States and shifts toward more significant percentages of the U.S. population being immigrants have been used in political rhetoric to play into anxieties about American cultural identity and White dominance in American culture (Gest et al., 2018, p. 1697; Jiang & Erez, 2018, p. 9). Studies in Europe have shown a direct link between the size of a country’s immigrant population and support in that country for right-wing parties (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, p. 774). Over the past half-century, the United States has become increasingly diverse, with Latinx immigrants representing the largest minority group in the country. In contrast, the White population has fallen from around 90% to 65% of the U.S. population (p. 773). During those same years, the U.S. immigrant population grew from 9.7 million in 1960, representing 5.4% of the U.S. population, to 44.4 million in 2017, representing 13.6% of the population

(Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). Immigrants as a percentage of the U.S. population was at its lowest in the 1960s-1970s, however (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). From the 1860s through the 1920s, the immigrant population fluctuated between 13.2% and 14.8% of the overall U.S. population, only to drop between the 1930s and 1970s before increasing again in the 1980s (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.; Young, 2017, p. 219). Hajnal & Rivera (2014) argued that large-scale immigration has partisan consequences for Whites in America, and partisan choices are linked to racial attitudes in the United States (p. 774).

Manza and Crowley (2018) noted that the partisan ethnonationalism seen in the 2016 presidential campaign is reminiscent of the southern White response to the Democratic Party in the 1960s (p. 30). Those who did not believe that they benefited from the liberal policies of the Civil Rights Act (1964) or the changes to immigration quotas reacted negatively to the “others” who they perceived to be receiving benefits that they did not, including ethnic and religious minorities, women, immigrants, and refugees (Magcamit, 2017, p. 16). After the passage of the Civil Rights Act, southern Democrats for whom race was an important issue left the Democratic Party and joined the Republican conservatives (Jeong, et al., 2011, p. 513). This “southern realignment” (Hill, & Tausanovich, 2018), or large-scale movement from affiliation with the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, increased the number of social conservatives among Republicans. Growing numbers of Republican caucuses passed from business conservatives to social conservatives between the 1960s and the 2000s (Jeong et al., 2011, p. 513).

According to Post (2017), the Republican Party has been mostly White, middle-class, suburban, and professional since the 1960s (p. 100). During the 2016 election cycle, however, this capitalist group was replaced by a what Post called a “radical, right-wing, middle-class insurgency” (2017, p. 100). Reny et al. argued that this was not only working-class White voters but also non-working-class White voters who switched their votes to the Republican Party in 2017 based on racial and immigration-related positions (2019, p. 92). While party-switching has been closely associated with views on immigration policy (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 60), evidence also shows that White Americans view the Democratic Party as a party of and for minorities, while seeing the Republican Party as a party for Whites (Reny et al., 2019, p. 95).

By the 2016 election, the Democratic Party was seen by many Republicans as a means for non-Whites (minorities, immigrants, refugees, etc.) to “jump the line” over White Americans (Hochschild, 2016, as cited in Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 30). Factors affecting how the Democratic Party is seen include the growing Latinx support, the public face of elected minority and Latinx representatives, the majority of whom are Democrats, and the decreasing proportion of the Democratic Party made up for White Americans (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, pp. 715-716). Obama’s election was also significant, in that the Democratic Party had not only pushed for civil rights for minorities during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s but had also seen a Black man elected to the presidency (Reny et al., 2019, p. 94). In all, studies have shown a stronger relationship between vote switching to Trump and measures of racial and immigration attitudes than with economic fears (p. 108).

White Evangelicalism

In the United States, political party affiliation is associated with one's church, denomination, and place of residence (Kaufmann et al., 2012, p. 54). White Evangelical to Republican Party affiliation in 2011 was 2:1 and had risen to 4:1 by 2018 (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 60). While views on immigration are shaped by multiple factors, not only religion or theology, Whites affiliated with Evangelical churches were found to have the most conservative positions on immigration policy than any other U.S. ethnoreligious group (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, pp. 50-51). Disney (2017) noted that this may be because they are less likely to be immigrants themselves or to have parents who are immigrants; 73% of U.S. Evangelicals have an immigration status of a third-generation or higher (p. 69).

The idea of Christian nationalism also affects political affiliations in the United States. Studies of American identity have shown strong associations between being American and being White and Christian (Heyer, 2018, pp. 153-154). Christian nationalism is the belief that the United States was founded as a Christian nation (Barrett-Fox, 2018). This belief has led to a tradition among many conservative Evangelicals that White Christians built the United States and that immigrants are outsiders or even enemies of this tradition (Whitehead et al., 2018, p. 146). For many right-wing Evangelical Christians, there is also a belief that the United States is abandoning its Christian heritage, making it vulnerable to losing the special blessings and protection that God has granted the country (Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 506). One study by Whitehead et al. (2018) pointed to the belief that the United States is a Christian nation and belief in

Christian nationalism as a basis for supporting Trump (p. 148), as Trump promised to protect the country's Christian heritage (Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 518).

While Evangelicals are often portrayed solely as a right-wing group, there is, in fact, a diverse range of beliefs among Evangelicals, ranging from what Melkonian-Hoover and Kellstedt (2019) referred to as "right-wing populist" to "liberal internationalist" (p. 50). Right-wing populist Evangelicals have had long-standing nationalist worries related to national security and racial and cultural shifts in the United States. In contrast, liberal internationalists have had a focus on global missions and development, addressing issues that include human trafficking, HIV/AIDS treatment, refugee resettlement, and immigration reform (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, pp. 50-51, 52). This bifurcation in Evangelical beliefs can be seen going back to the 1800s when conservative protestants pushed against increasing Catholic immigration and for restrictions on immigration from China and other Asian countries (p. 52), while more liberal protestants were among the prominent opponents to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act and were active in advocating for its repeal (p. 52).

These different strains of Evangelical thought were again seen in 2015, early in the presidential primary race, and when many Americans became aware of the Syrian refugee crisis. Many religious leaders, including Evangelical religious leaders, made faith-based arguments for bringing more Syrian refugees to the United States (Newman, 2018, p. 775). The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) and World Relief, NAE's development organization, were outspoken proponents of increasing Syrian refugee resettlement, as well as supporters of immigration, refugee resettlement, and

comprehensive immigration reform (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 56). In 2013, the NAE had founded the Evangelical Immigration Table (EIT) to support comprehensive immigration reform, uniting immigrant families, ensuring safe borders, and promoting comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 56). In a review of 59 U.S. Evangelical denominations, 17 signed onto the EIT, 14 did not sign but made positive or supportive statements about the EIT, 28 did not comment the EIT, and no Evangelical denomination made negative comments about the EIT (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 55).

White Evangelical leaders in support of refugee resettlement and immigration have been largely unsuccessful in winning over Evangelical laity. In 2016, only 31% of White Evangelicals supported resettling Syrian refugees in the U.S., despite support among Evangelical leaders (Newman, 2018, p. 776). Those with higher othering attitudes towards refugees and Muslims are also more likely to identify as Christian (Disney, 2017, pp. 68-69), and White Evangelicals are among the most anti-refugee groups in the U.S. (Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 508). Clergy have shown a limited ability to influence Evangelical laity, who may be more influenced by peers, informal gatherings, or political affiliations (Newman, 2018, p. 776).

Gaps in the Literature

There are several related gaps in the literature I addressed in this study. The first gap is in presidential action versus Congressional action. Much of the literature addresses legislation enacted by Congress, examining motivations for legislation, results of legislation, and partisan voting records on immigration laws (Akbari & MacDonald,

2014; Brown & Scribner, 2014; Fussell, 2014; Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017; Steil & Vasi, 2014; Teitelbaum, 1980; Triadafilopoulos, 2010; Welch, 2014; Zolberg, 1998). Refugee admissions to the United States, however, is based on presidential determination, rather than on Congressional legislation. Although sources have reviewed the Trump administration's executive actions related to refugee admissions, these have addressed executive orders (Breshnahan et al., 2018; Brown & Brown, 2017; Doucerain et al., 2018; Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Kerwin, 2018; Richard, 2019; Schmidt, 2019; Scribner, 2017) with little attention to annual admissions determinations. The results of this study show the effects of political party affiliation on the unique process of refugee admissions determinations by presidents, rather than Congressional legislation or executive orders.

A second gap in the literature is between political rhetoric on refugee policy and the implications of that rhetoric on refugee admissions. Extant research discusses political rhetoric, both by candidates and by elected officials, with particular attention to recent election cycles (Fussell, 2014; Gratton, 2018; Homola & Tavits, 2018; Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019; Schmidt, 2019; Tsai, 2019). While attention is paid to fulfilling campaign promises related to immigrant or refugee policy, specifically in the case of Trump's election in 2016, little attention has been paid to the relationship between rhetoric and legislation on immigration policy. Even less attention has been given to refugee policy or rhetoric's impact on refugee admissions determinations. Knowing that campaign and political rhetoric does not necessarily indicate policy choice

(Callander & Wilkie, 2007; Panova, 2017), this study addressed this gap by looking beyond rhetoric and promises to actual refugee admissions decisions.

As discussed by both Adida et al. (2019) and Homola and Tavits (2018), the opinion of the electorate is as important as the positions of the political elite, as each impact the other. While research has shown that politicians' positions and behavior on immigration policy (Homola & Tavits, 2018), researchers have not looked at refugee-specific policy, nor have they examined the impact of the public's opinion on the president's annual refugee admissions determinations. The third gap is between the pro- or anti-refugee sentiment of voters on the actions on refugee admissions taken by the politicians they elect to office. Although scholars have detailed the impact of voter opinion on the policy positions taken by elected officials, this study looked at the actions taken by elected officials once they have been elected to office.

The final gap in the literature I addressed in this study is the focus in recent literature on the refugee policy and admissions decisions of the Trump administration with little focus on the history of refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980. With Executive Order No. 13,769 (2017) used to lower the refugee admissions ceiling in FY17 from 110,000 to 50,000, Trump took a dramatic step that garnered significant attention (Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fullerton, 2017; Kerwin, 2018; Scriber, 2017). Scholars looking at earlier refugee policy (Barkdull et al., 2012; Brown & Scriber, 2014; Bruno, 2015; Fennelly et al., 2015; Gonzalez Benson, 2016; Magner, 2016; Scribner, 2017; Vialet, 1999) have largely focused on legislative policy, rather than refugee admissions determinations. These studies have also failed to examine partisan

trends in refugee admissions, leaving open the question of whether the current political divisions related to refugee admissions are part of a historical partisan trend or an anomaly under the current administration. This study examined the effect of partisan affiliation on refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which highlight trends by party affiliation and place the refugee admissions determinations of the Trump administration within a broader historical context.

Summary and Conclusions

Refugees are a subset of the larger populations of immigrants; as such, partisan positions on broad immigration policy, as well as specific refugee policy, are salient. Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century immigration policy focused both on U.S. labor needs and on maintaining cultural homogeneity (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Triadafilopoulos, 2010). Congress began addressing immigration for those fleeing persecution in the 1880s, although these provisions largely benefited European groups while still excluding groups such as the Chinese (Zolberg, 1988). Following WWII, Congress passed a series of measures to address the refugee crisis in Europe as well as refugees from subsequent conflicts (Brown & Scribner, 2014; Gonzalez Benson, 2016; Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017; Scribner, 2017; Welch, 2014). The passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 created a more comprehensive refugee admissions program, replacing the patchwork of measures passed to address individual refugee crises (Brown & Scribner, 2014) and aligning U.S. law with international law under the Protocols Relating to the Status of Refugees in defining a “refugee” as an individual who is outside their country of nationality, or for those without a nationality outside of their country of

habitual residence, who is unable or unwilling to return to or to avail themselves of the protection of that country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.

While Republican lawmakers have traditionally favored more restrictive immigration policies and been more conservative on immigration, positions among Democrats have also shifted over time (Johnson, 2018, p. 16; Pearson-Merkowitz et al., 2015, p. 314). president George H. W. Bush, a Republican, was the president who established temporary protected status, also known as TPS, for those fleeing natural disasters or wars in their country of nationality until it was safe for them to return (Lachman, 2019, p. 16). President Clinton, a Democrat, was the president signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which made it easier for the federal government to deport undocumented immigrants, even for minor offenses (Johnson, 2018, p. 16). These examples demonstrate more moderate positions from both Republican and Democratic presidents. Still, over the past quarter-century, party leaders and lawmakers have become more distinct, polarized, as well more internally uniform (Druckman et al., 2013, p. 57). Trump's election in 2016 pushed Republican lawmakers to more conservative positions on immigration that reflected the positions of the Republican electorate (Johnson, 2018, p. 16).

This increased polarization among political elites has changed how the electorate forms opinions, with voters relying more heavily on partisan positions than substantial arguments (Druckman et al., 2013, p. 57). This has created a feedback loop of sorts, in which the electorate is influencing the Republican Party toward more restrictive

immigration positions while also getting information about immigration from Republican elites. Despite that fact that little consideration has been given the differences in types of immigrants (undocumented, refugees, asylum-seekers, etc.) in political rhetoric allowing for limited in-depth discussion, party preferences remain strongly tied to their attitudes toward immigration, with negative views toward immigration and immigrants among conservative and right-wing voters (Homola & Tavits, 2018, p. 1749).

Trump's campaign played up economic and cultural fears, particularly among White Americans. Support for Trump has been tied to perceived economic deprivation, as Trump framed immigrants as taking jobs from American workers while lowering wages (Finley & Esposito, 2020; Magcamit, 2017; Manza & Crowley, 2018). These economic fears overlap with cultural fears of a racially and ethnically changing nation, as both are perceived as being related to downward mobility among White Americans (Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 31). Changes to immigration quotas in the 1960s were closely tied to the broader Civil Rights Movement, which shifted immigration to the United States from western European immigrants to those from developing countries (Saldaña et al., 2018, p. 789; Tsai, 2019, p. 528). Immigration served to tie together two groups supporting Trump – those who feared cultural changes to the United States and those with economic anxieties (Tsai, 2019, p. 538).

This study addressed multiple gaps in the literature. First, the literature focuses on Congressional legislation, rather than on presidential actions. As refugee admissions are determined by the president annually, presidential actions are particularly salient in discussing refugee policy. Next, the literature addresses political rhetoric related to

refugee policy, with particular attention to rhetoric during the 2016 presidential election but provides limited insight into how that rhetoric translates into practice. The third gap is in the influence of the electorate on legislators, which is discussed in multiple studies. These studies, however, have not addressed the extent to which this influence has extended to refugee admissions determinations. Lastly, there is a heavy focus on the Trump administration's refugee policy and admissions determinations, with little attention to the historical trajectory of refugee admissions. This study focused on presidential determination on refugee admissions while considering the moderating effect of Congressional partisanship. It placed the Trump administration's policy within a broader framework of refugee admissions decisions since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.

Historical institutionalism, first discussed by Steinmo et al. in 1992, is the theoretical framework for this study. Historical institutionalism looks both at current institutional practices and positions but also the origins of those practices and positions (Thelen, 1999), holding that these practices and positions shaped by organizational context (Steinmo et al., 1992). Historical institutionalism focuses on gradual organizational change rather than punctuated or radical change while holding that radical change can result from the accumulation of gradual changes over time (Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen, 2015) or external shock (Fioretos, 2011). This study identified whether the dramatic reductions in refugee admissions determinations under the Trump administration result for incremental organizational change or represent an external shock to the Republican position on refugee admissions to the United States. In Chapter 3, I

discuss how this study was designed, the methodology for conducting the study, and the data analysis plan.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which the president's political party affiliation affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions while controlling for global refugee totals. I also sought to determine the extent to which these effects are moderated by the party affiliations of the House and Senate. In this chapter, I discuss the research design and rationale, the study methodology, the data analysis plan, and threats to validity. I used a nonexperimental, correlative research design and relied on analysis of existing federal data on the admissions ceiling, regional allocations, and admissions, as well as UNHCR data on global and regional refugee totals, to examine the effect of political party affiliation on refugee admissions.

Research Design and Rationale

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The RQs and hypotheses for this study were as follows:

RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H₀1: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

H_a1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H_02 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

H_a2 : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_03 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on USRAP regional allocations.

H_a3 : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on USRAP regional allocations.

RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_04 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on USRAP regional admissions.

H_a4 : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on USRAP regional admissions.

RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

*H*₀₅: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

*H*_{a5}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?

*H*₀₆: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

*H*_{a6}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

*H*₀₇: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations.

H_a7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations.

RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H₀8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions.

H_a8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions.

Variables

This study included one independent variable, one moderating variable, multiple dependent variables, and multiple controlling variables.

Independent Variable

The independent, or explanatory, variable was the political party affiliation of the president of the United States. For RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 the political party affiliation of each president who issued the final presidential determinations for FY81-FY19 was recorded as the independent variable, as the admissions ceiling (RQ1 and RQ5) and regional allocations (RQ3 and RQ7) are included in the presidential determination. The exception is FY17, in which the final admissions ceiling was set by

executive order, rather than presidential determination; for FY17, the party affiliation of the president issuing the executive order setting the final admissions ceiling was used.

For RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the political party affiliation of the president who held office for all or the majority of FY81-FY19 was recorded as the independent variable. In election years, the presidency may pass from one party to another midway through the FY on January 20, pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1). In such instances, the political party affiliation of the president who held office for the majority of the FY (January 20–September 30) was recorded as the independent variable.

Moderating Variable

The moderating variable in this study was the political party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities. This variable was represented as Senate majority x House majority. For RQ5 and RQ7, the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities were recorded for the date on which the final presidential determination was signed by the president. For RQ6 and RQ8, the affiliation of the party that held the majority in the Senate and House for all or most of FY81-FY19 was recorded. In election years, when the Senate or House majority may change when newly elected members are sworn in (Congressional Research Service, 2018a, p. 6, 2018b, p. 2) in January, pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 2), the party that held the majority in each chamber for the majority of the FY (January–September) was recorded for the moderating variable.

Dependent Variables

This study included multiple dependent, or outcome, variables. The dependent variable for RQ1 and RQ5 was the admissions ceiling, as set in the final annual presidential determination for each FY for FY81-FY19, with the exception of FY17 when the final admission ceiling was set by executive order. The dependent variable for RQ2 and RQ6 was the total refugees admitted during each FY for FY81-FY19, as reported by PRM. The dependent variables for RQ3 and RQ7 were regional allocations as set in the final annual presidential determination for each FY for FY81-FY19, and the dependent variables for RQ4 and RQ8 were regional admissions for each FY for FY81-FY19, as reported by PRM.

Controlling Variables

This study included multiple controlling variables. The controlling variable for RQ1, RQ2, RQ5, and RQ6 was the total number of refugees, globally, as reported by the UNHCR. The controlling variables for RQ3, RQ4, RQ7 and RQ8 were the total number of global refugees by region, as reported by the UNHCR. The UNHCR reports on global refugee numbers on a calendar year basis, with reports issued early- to midyear of the following calendar year (UNHCR, 2021a). For RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7, the controlling variables represent the global refugee numbers available from the UNHCR at the time that the final presidential determination or executive order was issued. For RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the controlling variables represent the global refugee numbers available from the UNCHR at the end of the federal FY, which is the calendar year that overlapped the start of the federal FY.

Research Design

For this quantitative study, I used a nonexperimental correlative design and performed secondary data analysis. Secondary data are data that have been collected by someone other than the researcher, often by a government, and made available for public use (Salkind, 2010). Secondary data analysis was chosen for this study because the federal government's data included the total population of refugees admitted to the United States and UNHCR's data included the total population of known refugees worldwide. When the entire population is included in research, more about the population can be known as a certainty, which can be preferable to making inferences based on a sample of the population (Salkind, 2010).

A nonexperimental study is one in which the independent variable is not manipulated and there are no random group assignments associated with the study (Glasofer & Townsend, 2020). As this study involved the use of secondary data, there was neither manipulation of variables nor random group assignments, making this study a nonexperimental design. This study's RQs focused on the effect of presidential party affiliation on refugee admissions. A correlational research design was appropriate, as correlational research is used to measure how factors or variables are related and the extent to which the variables change in an identifiable pattern (Privitera, 2017, p. 240). Identifying correlations between political party affiliations and refugee admissions addressed the RQs put forward in this study.

Methodology

Population

The primary target population for this study was refugees who have been admitted to the United States through the USRAP from the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 through FY19. This included refugees who arrived in the U.S. FY81-FY19. According to Refugee Council USA (2017), more than 3 million refugees have been resettled in the United States between the passage of the Refugee Act and the end of FY16 (p. 1), with approximately 95,000 additional refugees resettled between FY17 and FY19 (International Rescue Committee, 2019a). PRM makes public data on the total population of refugees admitted annually through the RPC. As a result of the publicly available data, sampling of the refugee population was not required.

To control for global and regional refugee numbers, the worldwide refugee population was also included in this study. The UNHCR makes public the total population of refugees globally as well as by country of nationality and country of first asylum. These data are available by calendar year beginning in 1951, with data for each year made public early- to midyear the following year (UNHCR, 2021a). This study included worldwide and regional UNCHR data from 1979 through 2018. As a result of the publicly available data, sampling of the refugee population was not required.

Additional populations included in this study were presidents who held office FY81-FY19 and Senate and House majorities during FY81-FY19. The total population of presidents, as well as Senate and House members and majorities, was publicly available, and sampling was not necessary.

Use of Archival Data

I primarily relied on archival data. The archival data included the entire population of all groups studied, providing greater confidence in the study's outcomes than a sample (see Salkind, 2010). Data from federal agencies have been shown to have high quality and reliability (Salkind, 2010), which is another advantage that the data provided. The admissions ceiling and proposed regional allocations are formalized annually by presidential determination, pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980. These presidential determinations are published in the Federal Register. For this study, presidential determinations for each fiscal year from FY81-FY19 were retrieved electronically from the Federal Register at www.federalregister.gov or www.archives.gov/federal-register, where current and historical publications have been digitized and are publicly available.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and USCIS publishes an annual Yearbook for Immigration Statistics, available online through the department's website or through USCIS's History Office and Library website. Data from each yearbook lists final admissions ceilings and final regional allocations, identifying any FY in which either was changed through use of the unallocated reserve or through presidential determination or executive order. Yearbooks for FY81-FY19 were reviewed to detect any midyear changes and ensure that final ceilings and regional allocations were used in data analysis.

PRM publishes refugee admissions data online through the RPC at www.wrapsnet.org. The data for FY81-FY19 were publicly available and did not require

permissions to access. Data from the RPC included annual refugee admissions numbers, both in aggregate and by region. For this study, annual admissions totals and annual regional admissions were retrieved from the RPC for each FY from FY81-FY19.

The UNHCR publishes global refugee data online at www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics. The data since 1951 were publicly available and did not require permissions to access. Data from the UNCHR included total global refugee numbers, as well as by region. For this study, annual global refugee totals, annual total refugees by country of nationality, and annual total refugees by country of first asylum were retrieved from the UNCHR for calendar years 1979-2018.

The political party affiliations of the president, the Senate majority, and the House majority were publicly available through their respective websites (U.S. House, n.d.; U.S. Senate, n.d.; White House, n.d.). The political party affiliation of the president for each FY from FY81-FY19 was retrieved from the White House's website, www.whitehouse.gov. The Senate majority for each FY from FY81-FY19 was retrieved from the Senate's website, www.senate.gov. The House majority for each FY from FY81-FY19 was retrieved from the House's website, www.house.gov. No permissions were required to access the data.

Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs

Presidential Party Affiliation

Presidential party affiliation was the independent variable for all RQs in this study. Presidential party affiliation is defined as the political party with which the elected president has affiliated themselves. With the exception of George Washington, all U.S.

presidents have been affiliated with a political party (Jamison, 2014). The party affiliation for each president from FY81-FY19 was identified using publicly available information at the White House website. All presidents during that period identified as either a Democrat or Republican, and each president had their party affiliation coded as “Democrat” or “Republican”. These records were then dummy coded in order to conduct regression analysis. For RQ1 and RQ5, the political party affiliation of each president who set the final admissions ceiling was recorded as the independent variable. For fiscal years in which the admissions ceiling changed midyear (FY88, FY89, FY99, and FY17), the party affiliation of the president issuing the final ceiling was used as the independent variable for RQ1 and RQ5.

For RQ3 and RQ7, the political party affiliation of each president who set the final regional allocations was recorded as the independent variable. For fiscal years in which regional allocations changed midyear through presidential determination (FY88, FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the president issuing the final regional allocations was used as the independent variable for RQ3 and RQ7. For FY88, FY89, and FY99, the party affiliation of the president setting the initial regional allocations and the party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocations were the same. Only for FY17 was the party affiliation of the president setting the initial ceiling and the president setting the final ceiling different. For fiscal years in which regional allocations changed due to use of the unallocated reserve (FY90, FY91, FY92, FY93, FY94, FY97, FY98, FY00, FY01, and FY04), the party affiliation of the president issuing the initial

presidential determination was used, as no secondary presidential determination was made.

For RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the political party affiliation of the president who held office for all or the majority of FY81-FY19 was recorded as the independent variable. In election years, when the Presidency may pass from one party to another midway through the fiscal year on January 20, pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1), the political party affiliation of the president who held office for the majority of the fiscal year (January 20–September 30) was recorded as the independent variable.

Senate and House Majority Party Affiliation

Senate and House majority party affiliation was the moderating variable used in RQ5, RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8. Senate and House party affiliation is defined as the political party holding the majority of seats in each chamber of Congress, as identified by the party affiliation of the Majority Leader in each chamber. The party affiliation of the Majority Leaders of the Senate from FY81-FY19 is publicly available on the U.S. Senate website. The party affiliation of the Majority Leaders of the House from FY81-FY19 is publicly available on the U.S. House of Representatives website. All majorities during that period were identified as either a Democrat or Republican, and each Senate and House majority had their party affiliation coded as “Democrat” or “Republican”. These records were then dummy coded in order to conduct regression analysis. This moderating variable was expressed as Senate majority x House majority for regression analysis.

For RQ5 and RQ7, the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities were recorded for the date on which the presidential determination was signed by the president, setting the admissions ceiling and regional allocations. For fiscal years in which the admissions ceiling changed midyear through presidential determination (FY88, FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the time of the final presidential determination was recorded for RQ5. For fiscal years in which the regional allocations changed midyear through presidential determination (FY88, FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the time of the final presidential determination was recorded for RQ7.

Although presidential determinations require consultation with Congress, the executive orders issued in FY17 lowering the admissions ceiling did not require Congressional consultation (Bolton & Thrower, 2016, p. 649). For the sake of consistency with midyear changes by presidential determination in FY88, FY89, and FY99, however, the Senate and House majorities at the time of the Executive Orders was recorded for RQ5 for FY17. Unlike the presidential determinations in FY88, FY89, and FY90, which modified the regional allocations for the respective FYs, the executive orders lowering the FY17 ceiling did not address regional allocations. Therefore, the Senate and House majorities at the time of the original FY17 presidential determination were recorded for RQ7 for FY17.

For RQ6 and RQ8, the affiliation of the party that held the majority in the Senate and House for all or most of FY81-FY19 was recorded. In election years, when the Senate or House majority may change when newly elected members are sworn in

(Congressional Research Service, 2018a, p. 6; 2018b, p. 2) in January, pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 2), the party that held the majority in each chamber for most of the fiscal year (January–September) was recorded for the moderating variable.

Dependent Variables

This study involved multiple dependent variables, including annual admissions ceilings (RQ1 and RQ5), annual total admissions (RQ2 and RQ6), annual regional allocations (RQ3 and RQ7), and annual regional admissions (RQ4 and RQ8).

Admissions Ceiling. The refugee admissions ceiling is the maximum number of refugees permitted to enter the United States in a given fiscal year, as set annually by presidential determination (Martin & Yankay, 2013). Admissions ceilings were recorded in whole numbers for each FY (FY81-FY19). For fiscal years in which the admissions ceiling was changed midyear by presidential determination (FY88, FY89, and FY99) or by executive order (FY17), the final admissions ceiling for the fiscal year was recorded. For those fiscal years in which the federally funded admissions ceiling differed from the overall admissions ceiling (FY88-FY95) due to the Private Sector Initiative (PSI) launched under the Reagan administration, the federally funded admissions ceiling was used. Not only was the PSI program discontinued due lack of interest and limited use (Barnett, 2002, p. 164), but the portion of the admissions ceiling designated for PSI was often not tied to a specific region and the national and/or regional information for the limited number of refugees admitted through the PSI is not available through PRM,

making the inclusion of PSI data irrelevant to this study. Exclusion of PSI admissions is not uncommon in studies related to U.S. refugee admissions (Teitelbaum, 1998, p. 471).

Regional Allocations. The regional allocations are the maximum number of refugees permitted to enter the United States from specific geographic regions of the world in a given fiscal year. These allocations are subsets of the overall admissions ceiling (Martin & Yankay, 2013). PRM currently categorizes regions as East Asia, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Near East & South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, and Africa. Regional allocations for each of these categories were recorded in whole numbers. In FY90, when PSI designated slots were included in regional allocations, only federally funded slots were included.

“East Asia” has been consistently used as a region since FY83. In FY81 and FY82, this region was referred to in presidential determinations as “Asia” and was distinguished from the “Near East”, which was also used only in FY81 and FY82. In this study, the “Asia” regional allocation in FY81-FY82 was listed as “East Asia”. In FY85-FY90, “East Asia” included the two subcategories “East Asia – First Asylum” and “East Asia – Orderly Departure Program”. Both subsections of “East Asia” were combined for FY85-FY90 as “East Asia”.

“Eastern Europe & Central Asia” has been listed as a region since FY04. In FY81-FY82 and FY90-FY92, this region was represented as the two regions of “Eastern Europe” and the “Soviet Union”. From FY83-FY89, this was a single region referred to as “Soviet Union & Eastern Europe,” which became the “Former Soviet Union & Eastern Europe” from FY94-FY96. In FY97-FY99, this region was simply referred to as

“Europe”, but in FY00 was divided into “Former Yugoslavia”, “Kosovo Crisis”, and “Newly Independent States/Baltics”. In FY01-FY03 and in FY93, this region was represented as the two separate regions of “Eastern Europe” and the “Former Soviet Union”, before becoming “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” in FY04. Despite the history of diverse regional names, Congressional Reports are clear that these regions are now represented as “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” (Bruno, 2018, p. 12) and have been combined on an annual basis and listed as “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” in this study.

“Near East & South Asia” has been consistently used as a region since FY83. In FY81-82, this region was known as simply as “Near East”. All regional allocations for the “Near East” are listed as “Near East & South Asia” in this study.

“Latin America & Caribbean” has been listed as a region each year except for FY85, when only “Latin America” was listed; in this study, “Latin America” was included as “Latin America & Caribbean”. In FY81, “Latin America & Caribbean” had two subsections, which included “Latin America & Caribbean – Cuba” and “Latin America & Caribbean – Other”. Both of these FY81 subsections have been combined into “Latin America & Caribbean” for this study.

“Africa” has been used as a single category in every presidential determination since FY81, and no reclassification of previous names for this region were required.

Total Admissions. Total admissions refer to the total number of refugees admitted to the United States in a specific fiscal year. Total refugee admissions numbers were retrieved from PRM and recorded as whole numbers. For fiscal years in which

refugees were admitted through the PSI program (FY88-FY93), PSI admissions were not included in the total refugee admissions in this study.

Regional Admissions. Regional admissions refer to the total number of refugees admitted to the United States from specific regions in a given fiscal year. PRM reports regional admissions in the same regional categories as regional allocations were made in that fiscal year. Due to the changing names of regions between FY81-FY19, reclassifications were required for refugee admissions by region, and these were done in the same manner outlined for Regional Allocations, above. Regional admissions were retrieved from PRM and recorded as whole numbers. In FY90, when PSI designated slots were used for regional admissions, only federally funded admissions were included.

Controlling Variables

This study involved multiple controlling variables, including the global refugee totals (RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7) and global refugee totals by region (RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8).

Global Refugee Totals. Global refugee totals refer to the total number of refugees in the world under the UNHCR's mandate, as published by the UNHCR. The UNHCR publishes calendar year data for the previous calendar year early- to midyear the following year. Global refugee levels were represented in whole numbers.

For RQ1 and RQ5, the most recent data available at the time the final admissions ceiling was set, generally the year prior to the start of the fiscal year. For FY88, FY89, FY99, and FY17, in which the admissions ceiling was modified midyear, UNHCR data

from the year overlapping the start of the fiscal year was available and this data was used for controlling variables for RQ1 and RQ5.

For RQ2 and RQ6, the most recent data available by the end of the fiscal year was used, which was the calendar year that overlapped the start of the fiscal year.

Global Refugee Totals by Region. Global refugee populations by region refers to the total number of refugees by region, corresponding with the regions outlined by PRM, namely East Asia, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Near East & South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, and Africa. Numbers for each region were represented in whole numbers.

The UNHCR's annual data reports include refugees by country of nationality but does not divide refugees into specific regions. In order to categorize refugees by regions that correspond to PRM's regions, each country producing a refugee was designated into a specific region. As PRM is a Bureau within the U.S. Department of State, the regional designations of countries, as outlined by specific Bureaus overseen by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, were used to categorize countries into the appropriate region. For nationalities listed by UNHCR that were not accounted for by one of the Bureaus, geographic location and dependency information from the U.S. Department of State were reviewed to determine the most appropriate regional categorization.

For a complete list of countries and areas classified as East Asia, along with country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix A. For a complete list of countries and areas classified as Eastern Europe & Central Asia, along with country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix B. For a complete list of countries and

areas classified as Near East & South Asia, along with country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix C. For a complete list of countries and areas classified as Latin America & Caribbean, along with country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix D. For a complete list of countries and areas classified as Africa, along with country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix E.

In addition to the countries of nationality listed for refugees by the UNHCR, many refugees were listed as being stateless or having an unknown nationality. Stateless individuals are those who “under national laws, [do] not enjoy citizenship – the legal bond between a government and an individual – in any country” (U.S. Department of State, n.d.i). In order to include the entire global refugee in a specific geographic region, an alternative means of categorization was needed for individuals listed as stateless or having an unknown nationality. Along with listing the country of nationality in their data reports, the UNHCR also lists each refugee’s country of first asylum. Studies show that the vast majority of refugees fleeing their country of nationality, or for those without a nationality their country of habitual residence, flee to neighboring countries (Van Hear, 2006, p. 9). Given this tendency to flee to geographically proximate countries, the country of first asylum was used to identify the most appropriate regional category for refugees with a nationality listed as stateless or unknown. For example, if a refugee’s nationality was listed as unknown, but their country of first asylum was identified by the UNHCR as Thailand, that refugee was counted as part of East Asia, based on Thailand being part of the East Asia region.

For RQ3 and RQ7, the most recent data available at the time final regional allocations was set, generally the year prior to the start of the fiscal year. For FY88, FY89, and FY99, in which regional allocations were modified midyear, UNHCR data from the year overlapping the start of the fiscal year was available and this data was used as controlling variables for RQ3 and RQ7.

For RQ4 and RQ8, the most recent data available by the end of the fiscal year was used, which was the calendar year that overlapped the start of the fiscal year.

Data Analysis Plan

Hierarchical regression analysis was used to explain the effect of the president's political party on refugee admission and moderating effects of the Senate and House majorities. Data analysis was completed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 25.

Statistical Tests

Hierarchical regression was used to answer all RQs in this study. Hierarchical, or sequential, regression is a form of multiple linear regression in which variables are entered in separate steps, or "blocks," and is often used to analyze the moderating effects of a variable (IBM, n.d.b). Hierarchical regression identifies variance in a specific dependent variable after accounting for all other variables (Kim, 2016, para. 1). This was an appropriate statistical test, as RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 sought to identify the variance accounted for by presidential party affiliation, after accounting for global refugee totals, and R5, RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8 sought to identify the variance accounted for

by Senate and House majority party affiliations, after accounting for both global refugee totals and presidential party affiliation.

For RQ1 and RQ2, global refugee totals were entered into the first block, and presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block. The model significance was reviewed by examining the F -change (ΔF) significance. If the model was significant with a p -value of <0.05 , the coefficient of determination, R^2 , was interpreted. The R^2 change (ΔR^2) was particularly significant in this analysis, as it indicates the effect of presidential party affiliation, after controlling for global refugee totals. In reviewing the coefficients output, the constant, a , and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b , were used in the regression equation of $\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$ for predicting the admissions ceiling and total admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee totals.

For RQ3 and RQ4, global refugee totals by region were entered into the first block, and presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block. The model significance was reviewed by examining the F -change (ΔF) significance. If the model was significant with a p -value of <0.05 , the coefficient of determination, R^2 , was interpreted, with specific attention to ΔR^2 . In reviewing the coefficients output, the constant, a , and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b , were used in the regression equation of $\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$ for predicting regional allocations and regional admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee totals by region.

For RQ5 and RQ6, global refugee totals were entered into the first block, presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block, and Senate and House

majority party affiliation into the third block as Senate majority x House majority. The model significance was reviewed by examining the F -change (ΔF) significance. If the model was significant with a p -value of <0.05 , the coefficient of determination, R^2 for the third block was interpreted with specific attention to ΔR^2 . In reviewing the coefficients output, the constant, a , and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b , were used in the regression equation of $\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3$ for predicting the admissions ceiling or total admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee totals, as moderated by the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities.

For RQ7 and RQ8, global refugee totals by region were entered into the first block, presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block, and Senate and House majority party affiliation into the third block as Senate majority x House majority. The model significance was reviewed by examining the F -change (ΔF) significance. If the model was significant with a p -value of <0.05 , the coefficient of determination, R^2 for the third block was interpreted with specific attention to ΔR^2 . In reviewing the coefficients output, the constant, a , and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b , were used in the regression equation of $\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3$ for predicting regional allocations and regional admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee totals by region, as moderated by the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities.

Threats to Validity

Internal Validity and Credibility

Credibility and internal validity are ways of considering the extent to which research is truthful (Mills et al., 2010, p. 243). Strategies to enhance credibility include the use of established research methods, triangulation, addressing sampling bias, and examination of previous findings (Shenton, 2004, pp. 64-69). The use of secondary analysis of data provided by the federal government and the United Nations is a well-established and widely accepted method of conducting research (Babbie, 2017; Orzes, et al., 2018). Because the entire population of refugees admitted, global refugees, presidential majority parties, and Senate and House majority parties were included in this study, no sampling took place in which bias could have been present. Triangulation was done by comparing annual admissions numbers, in aggregate and by region, using PRM's data and the annual Yearbook for Immigration Statistics; data from annual presidential determinations and the annual Yearbook for Immigration Statistics were also triangulated. This triangulation identified the years in which secondary presidential determinations had been issued and admissions ceilings and regional allocations had been adjusted midyear. The conclusions drawn in this study were also compared to findings in previous studies and were found to be in line with prior findings; findings are discussed in the following chapters.

Internal validity involves the possibility that the conclusions drawn from the results may not reflect what actually occurred (Babbie, 2017, p. 243). The threat to internal validity in this study was related to instrumentation, or the manner in which

variables were measured (Babbie, 2017, p. 243). PRM's regional groupings changed over time, although current regional designations have remained the same since FY04. For each FY (FY81-FY03); however, some level of recategorization of regions was required in order to align with current regional groupings. In addition, the UNHCR does not designate refugees by region, but by country of nationality only. Consequently, country groupings were established to correspond with PRM's regional categories. These groupings were made based on U.S. Department of State regional designations, as PRM is part of the department.

External Validity

Transferability

Transferability both related to the generalizability of findings, which are based on samples of a population in most studies, to the total population being studied (Babbie, 2017, p. 245; Shenton 2004, p. 69). This study relied on the entire population of all groups being studied, rather than a sample of any of these populations. As a result, there are no concerns related to transferability for this study.

Dependability and Reliability

Dependability and reliability refer to the ability to achieve the same results if another researcher were to duplicate the study (Babbie, 2017, pp. 418-419; Shenton, 2004, p. 71). Methods that can be employed to increase dependability and reliability include clear presentation of the research design and implementation and detailed descriptions of operationalization (Shenton 2004, pp. 71-72). In this chapter, I have presented a clear description of the sources for each data point collected, the methods of

operationalizing the data, and additional descriptions for the data analysis are presented in Chapter 4. Sufficient data has been provided to ensure that this research study can be duplicated by another researcher.

Confirmability and Objectivity

Confirmability and objectivity are both related to the neutrality of the researcher in relation to the data (Stumpfegger, 2017) and the distance the researcher is able to keep from the study subjects (Shenton, 2004). Triangulation can play an important role in confirming objectivity and confirmability (Shenton, 2004, p. 72). Triangulation was completed in this study for annual admissions, regional admissions, annual ceilings, and regional ceilings. This study secondary data analysis, ensuring that there was no interaction between the study subjects and the researcher. In operationalizing the data, operational decisions were guided by the definitions and explanations provided by the secondary data source to ensure the neutrality of the operational decisions.

Summary

This non-experimental correlative study examined the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the admissions ceiling, total admissions, regional allocations, and regional admissions after controlling for global refugee totals, and also assessed the moderating effect of the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities. SPSS was used to conduct hierarchical multiple regression analysis to address the RQs presented in this study. Chapter 4 details the data collection undertaken to conduct this study as well as the study's results.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which the president's political party affiliation affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions while controlling for global refugee totals. I also sought to determine the extent to which these effects are moderated by the party affiliations of the House and Senate. In this chapter, I discuss the data collection process, provide descriptive statistics of the data, and detail results of the data analysis.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The RQs and hypotheses for this study are as follows:

RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H_01 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

H_{a1} : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H_02 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

H_{a2} : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_{03} : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on USRAP regional allocations.

H_{a3} : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on USRAP regional allocations.

RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_{04} : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on USRAP regional admissions.

H_{a4} : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on USRAP regional admissions.

RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H_{05} : The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

H_{a5}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H₀₆: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

H_{a6}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H₀₇: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations.

H_{a7}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations.

RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_08 : The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions.

H_a8 : The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions.

Data Collection

I obtained IRB approval (no. 12-01-20-0670738) from Walden University in December 2020 and collected all preliminary data that month. Political party affiliation data included the presidential party affiliation of each president (FY81-FY19) from the White House website, the party affiliation of each Senate majority (FY81-FY19) from the U.S. Senate website, and the party affiliation of each House majority (FY81-FY19) from the U.S. House of Representatives website. Political party affiliation data were available for all presidents as well as Senate and House majorities for each year FY81-FY19. Data on refugee admissions, both in aggregate and by region, were retrieved from PRM's RPC website at www.wrapsnet.org. Data were available for total and regional refugee admissions for all years FY81-FY19. Data on the global refugee totals, global refugee totals by country of nationality, and global refugees totals by country of first asylum for calendar years 1979-2018 were retrieved from the UNHCR's Refugee Data Finder

website at www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics. Data were available for total global refugees, refugees by country of nationality, and refugees by country of first asylum for all years 1979-2018. Data on annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, published in the presidential determination FY81-FY19, were retrieved from the Federal Register at www.federalregister.gov and/or www.archives.gov/federal-register. All presidential determinations with admissions ceilings and regional allocations were available for each year FY81-FY19.

After operationalizing the data and conducting data analysis, I noticed that the total number of refugee admissions in 3 fiscal years exceeded the admissions ceiling, suggesting that a change had been made to the admissions ceiling subsequent to the ceiling set in the presidential determination at the start of the fiscal year. I submitted a request to amend the data collection plan to the IRB to include review of USCIS's Yearbook for Immigration Statistics FY81-FY19, to review final admissions ceilings and regional allocations on February 12, 2021; the request was approved the same day. Between February 13-14, 2021, I retrieved all USCIS Yearbooks for Immigration Statistics FY81-FY19 from U.S. Department of Homeland Security's website (FY96-FY19) or from USCIS's Historical Office and Library (FY81-FY95).

Yearbooks for FY88, FY89, and FY99 indicated that admissions ceilings were increased during the FY. I retrieved each updated presidential determination (FY88, FY89, and FY99) indicating the increased admissions ceilings and adjusting regional allocations from the Federal Register. Yearbooks for FY90, FY91, FY92, FY93, FY94, FY97, FY98, FY00, FY01, and FY04 showed adjusted regional allocations through the

distribution of the unallocated reserve to specific regions, not through the issuance of a secondary presidential determination. The executive order issued in FY17 lowering the admissions ceiling was identified during the literature review and was the source of FY17's final admissions ceiling number. After collecting data for final admissions ceilings and regional allocations, data were operationalized, as outlined in Chapter 3, and data analysis was completed.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

The independent variable in RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 was the political party affiliation of the president who set the final admission ceiling (RQ1 and RQ5) and final regional allocations (RQ3 and RQ7) for the FY (see Table 1). The moderating variables were the political party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the time the final admissions ceiling (RQ5) and the final regional allocations (RQ7) were set. As shown in Table 1, 17 of 39 (43.5%) of admission ceilings were set by presidents affiliated with the Democratic Party, while 18 of 39 (46.2%) of regional allocations were set by presidents affiliated with the Democratic Party, resulting from the FY17 executive order issued by Trump lowering the admissions ceiling without addressing regional allocations. At the time that admissions ceilings and regional allocations were finalized, 20 (51.3%) of Senate majorities were Republican and 19 (48.7%) were Democratic. House majorities at the time admissions ceilings and regional allocations were finalized were 48.7% (19) Democratic and 51.3% (20) Republican.

Table 1*Final Admission Ceilings and Regional Allocations by Party Affiliation*

	Presidential party	Senate majority party	House majority party
FY81	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY82	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY83	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY84	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY85	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY86	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY87	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY88	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY89	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY90	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY91	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY92	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY93	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY94	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY95	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY96	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY97	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY98	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY99	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY00	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY01	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY02	Republican	Democrat	Republican
FY03	Republican	Democrat	Republican
FY04	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY05	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY06	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY07	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY08	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY09	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY10	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY11	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY12	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
FY13	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
FY14	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
FY15	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
FY16	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY17 – regional allocations	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY17 – admissions ceiling	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY18	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY19	Republican	Republican	Republican

Note. Regional allocations for FY17 were set under the Obama administration (Democrat) and were not addressed in the executive order setting the final admission ceiling for FY17 under the Trump

administration (Republican); this is the only fiscal year in which the admissions ceiling and regional allocations were set by different administrations.

The independent variable for RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8 was the political party affiliation of the president who held office for all or the majority of the FY, with the Senate and House majority party affiliations for the party holding the majority of the chamber for all or most of the FY serving as the moderating variable for RQ6 and RQ8. As shown in Table 2, Republican presidents held office for 51.3% (20) of FYs (FY81-FY19), with Democratic presidents holding office for 48.7% (19). Republicans held the Senate majority in 53.8% (21) of FYs, with Democrats holding the majority in 46.2% (18). Republicans held the House majority for 51.3% (20) of FYs, with Democrats holding the majority in 48.7% (19).

Table 2*Party Affiliations During the Fiscal Year of Admissions*

	Presidential party	Senate majority party	House majority party
FY81	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY82	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY83	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY84	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY85	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY86	Republican	Republican	Democrat
FY87	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY88	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY89	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY90	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY91	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY92	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY93	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY94	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY95	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY96	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY97	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY98	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY99	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY00	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY01	Republican	Democrat	Republican
FY02	Republican	Democrat	Republican
FY03	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY04	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY05	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY06	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY07	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY08	Republican	Democrat	Democrat
FY09	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY10	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat
FY11	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
FY12	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
FY13	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
FY14	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
FY15	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY16	Democrat	Republican	Republican
FY17	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY18	Republican	Republican	Republican
FY19	Republican	Republican	Democrat

Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 are found in Table 3. The dependent variable for RQ1 and RQ5 was the final refugee admissions ceiling ($M = 86941.03$, $SD = 31590.078$), which ranged from a high of 217,000 in FY81 to a low of 30,000 in FY19. The dependent variables for RQ3 and RQ7 were the regional allocations (RA) for each of the following regions: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa. Regional allocations for East Asia ($M = 30824.36$, $SD = 31280.316$) ranged from

Table 3

Annual Ceiling and Regional Allocations

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Annual Ceiling	39	30000	217000	86941.03	31590.078
RA – East Asia	39	4000	168000	30824.36	31280.316
RA – Eastern Europe & Central Asia	39	1000	64300	23943.59	21544.761
RA – Near East & South Asia	39	2500	40000	13835.90	12555.545
RA – Latin America & Caribbean	39	1000	9000	3865.90	1640.168
RA – Africa	39	2000	35000	12138.46	8429.916

a high of 168,000 in FY81 to a low of 4,000 in FY02, FY03, and FY19. Regional allocations for Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($M = 23943.59$, $SD = 21544.761$) ranged from a high of 64,300 in FY92 to a low of 1,000 in FY14 and FY15. Regional allocations for Near East and South Asia ($M = 13835.90$, $SD = 12555.545$) ranged from a high of 40,000 in FY17 to a low of 2,500 in FY05. Regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 3865.90$, $SD = 1640.168$) ranged from a high of 9,000 in FY94 to a low of 1,000 in FY84 and FY85. Regional allocations for Africa ($M = 12138.46$, $SD = 8429.916$) ranged from a high of 35,000 in FY17 to a low of 2,000 in FY89.

Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8 are found in Table 4. The dependent variable for RQ2 and R6 was total number of refugees admitted annually ($M = 74031.03$, $SD = 29583.081$), which ranged from a high of 159,252 in FY81 to a low of 22,517 in FY18. The dependent variables for RQ4 and RQ8 were the regional admissions for each of the following regions: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa.

Table 4

Total Admissions and Regional Admissions

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Total Annual Admissions	39	22517	159252	74031.03	29583.081
East Asia Admissions	39	1724	131139	27423.23	25594.904
Eastern Europe & Central Asia Admissions	39	580	64312	21650.21	20788.995
Near East & South Asia Admissions	39	2801	38280	11901.36	11439.865
Latin America & Caribbean Admissions	39	131	7629	2686.8	1826.111
Africa Admissions	39	1322	31624	10369.38	7964.187

Regional admissions for East Asia ($M = 27423.23$ $SD = 25594.904$) ranged from a high of 131,139 in FY81 to a low of 1,724 in FY03. Regional admissions for Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($M = 21650.21$, $SD = 20788.995$) ranged from a high of 64,312 in FY92 to a low of 580 in FY13. Regional admissions for Near East and South Asia ($M = 11901.36$, $SD = 11439.865$) ranged from a high of 38,280 in FY09 to a low of 2801 in FY19. Regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 2686.8$, $SD = 1826.111$) ranged from a high of 7629 in FY95 to a low of 131 in FY86. Regional admissions for Africa ($M = 10369.38$, $SD = 7964.187$) ranged from a high of 31,624 in FY16 to a low of 1322 in FY86.

Descriptive statistics for the controlling variables in RQ1, RQ2, RQ5, and RQ6 are found in Table 5. The controlling variable in RQ1 and RQ2 was the total number of global refugees as reported by the UNHCR ($M = 12519568.49$, $SD = 3080538.951$) most recently available at the time the annual ceiling was finalized, which ranged from a high of 19,940,568 in FY19 to a low of 6,279,912 in FY81. The dependent variables for RQ5 and RQ6 were the regional number of refugees reported by the UNHCR most recently available at the time the annual ceiling was finalized for each of the following regions: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa. Regional refugee totals for East Asia ($M = 929942.82$, $SD = 184007.398$) ranged from a high of 1,753,408 in FY19 to a low of 669,494 in FY88.

Table 5

Total Global and Regional Refugees at the Finalization of Admissions Ceilings and Regional Allocations

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Total Global Refugees	39	6279912	19940568	12519568.49	3080538.951
UNHCR – East Asia	39	669494	1753408	929942.82	184007.398
UNCHR – Eastern Europe & Central Asia	39	3660	2495562	892524.72	802644.522
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia	39	600670	9994746	5288832.67	1904669.045
UNHCR – Latin America & Caribbean	39	83710	1243412	415288.69	347076.332
UNHCR – Africa	39	2630703	7190809	4079546.38	1246806.487

Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($M = 892524.72$, $SD = 802644.522$) ranged from a high of 2,495,56 in FY98 to a low of 3,660 in FY81.

Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ($M = 5288832.67$, $SD = 1904669.045$) ranged from a high of 9,994,746 in FY19 to a low of 600,670 in FY81.

Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 415288.69$, $SD =$

347076.332) ranged from a high of 1,243,412 in FY91 to a low of 83,710 in FY02.

Regional refugee totals for Africa ($M = 4079546.38$, $SD = 1246806.487$) ranged from a high of 7,190,809 in FY19 to a low of 2,630,703 in FY010.

Descriptive statistics for the controlling variables in RQ3, RQ4, RQ7, and RQ8 are found in Table 6. The controlling variable in RQ3 and RQ4 was the total number of global refugees as reported by the UNHCR ($M = 1282287.33$, $SD = 3105752.987$) for the calendar year overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year, which ranged from a high of 20,359,556 in FY19 to a low of 8,454,917 in FY81. The dependent variables for RQ7 and RQ8 were the regional number of refugees reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year for each of the following regions:

Table 6

Total Global and Regional Refugees for the Calendar Year Overlapping the Fiscal Year

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Total Global Refugees	39	8454917	20359556	1282287.33	3105752.978
UNHCR – East Asia	39	669494	1753408	943836.00	229083.859
UNCHR – Eastern Europe & Central Asia	39	15734	2495562	910385.64	807439.054
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia	39	1836452	10440189	5521419.10	1896562.065
UNHCR – Latin America & Caribbean	39	83710	1243412	400088.18	318127.744
UNHCR – Africa	39	2630703	7190809	4188248.82	1319980.553

East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa. Regional refugee totals for East Asia ($M = 943836.00$, $SD = 229083.859$) ranged from a high of 1,753,408 in FY19 to a low of 669,494 in FY88.

Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($M = 910385.64$, $SD = 807439.054$) ranged from a high of 2,495,56 in FY98 to a low of 15,734 in FY88.

Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ($M = 5521419.10$, $SD =$

1896562.065) ranged from a high of 10,440,189 in FY19 to a low of 1,836,452 in FY81.

Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 400088.18$, $SD = 318127.744$) ranged from a high of 1,243,412 in FY91 to a low of 83,710 in FY01.

Regional refugee totals for Africa ($M = 4188248.82$, $SD = 1319980.553$) ranged from a high of 7,190,809 in FY18 to a low of 2,630,703 in FY09.

Research Question 1

RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H_0 1: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

H_a 1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. The final refugee admissions ceiling ($M = 86941.03$, $SD = 31590.078$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. The total number of global refugees as reported by the UNHCR at the time the admissions ceiling was finalized ($M = 12519568.49$, $SD = 3080538.951$) was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final admissions ceiling (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d scores from the hierarchical regression analysis. The Mahalanobis d value indicates the degree to which a value is an outlier (Warner, 2013, p. 1097) and follows a Chi-square (χ^2) distribution (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, 2012) in which df is equal to the number of explanatory variables in the regression (Brereton, 2015, p. 10). In the analysis for RQ1, the critical value for Mahalanobis d was 13.816 (at $\alpha = .001$). No value exceeded the Mahalanobis d for RQ1.

I also generated Cook's d scores to screen for outliers. A value is considered an outlier if the Cook's d is greater than $4/(n - k - 1)$, where k is equal to the "number of terms in the model" (American Psychological Association, n.d., para. 1). In the analysis for RQ1, the critical value for Cook's d was .111. The Cook's d was 1.038 for FY81. Data for FY81 were removed, and a hierarchical regression was conducted for FY82-FY19.

After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY19, I reviewed variance inflation factors. Variance inflation factors were well below the 10.0 threshold that would indicate multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2015, p. 423) for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.000) and for total global refugees (VIF = 1.000). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals (Gignac, 2019, pt. 14.13). The Pearson correlation was $r = .355$ ($p = .029$), indicating heteroscedasticity. A bootstrapped regression analysis is an appropriate method for addressing issues of heteroscedasticity in

general (Hartl, 2010, p. 3) and, as in this RQ, in “the case of regression models with heteroscedastic residuals fit to small samples” (IBM, n.d.a, para. 1). The so-called wild bootstrap method, specifically, has been established as a model to address heteroscedastic errors of unknown forms in linear regression models (Flachaire, 2005, p. 362; Gignac, 2019, pt. 14.55).

I conducted a bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap

Table 7

Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ1

Model	B	Bootstrap ^a				
		Bias	Std. Error	Sig. (2-tailed)	BCa 95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower	Upper
2 (Constant)	73898.220	-14487.749	36170.000	0.036	10855.737	106808.581
UNHCR Total Global Refugees – At Final PD/EO	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.815	-0.004	0.008
PresPartyPD	-2134.887	2131.784	7731.085	0.789	-19162.099	18143.061

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

method, with confidence intervals based on the bias corrected accelerated (BCa) method, which more accurately identifies the upper- and lower-bounds of the confidence interval when bootstrapping (IBM, n.d.a, para. 9). I reviewed the bootstrap for coefficients, and presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to the model ($\beta = -2134.887$, $p = .789$, 95% CI: -19162.099 and 18143.061) (see Table 7). The model was not found to be significant ($\Delta F(1, 35) = .071$, $p = .791$, $\Delta R^2 = .002$), so

the model was not interpreted (see Table 8). The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ1.

Table 8

Model Summary for RQ1^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.108 ^a	.012	-.016	23758.057	.012	.427	1	36	.518
2	.117 ^b	.014	-.043	24070.530	.002	.071	1	35	.791

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At Final PD/EO

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

c. Dependent Variable: Annual Admissions Ceiling

Research Question 2

RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H_01 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

H_{a1} : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on annual admissions through the USRAP. The total number of refugees admitted annually ($M = 74031.03$, $SD = 29583.081$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. The total number of global refugees as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of the federal FY ($M = 12519568.49$, $SD = 3080538.951$) was entered into the first block as the controlling

variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president in office during the fiscal year for refugee admissions (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value of Mahalanobis d for RQ2 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. No values exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d , but FY81 exceeded the critical value of Cook's d at .371. Data for FY81 were removed, and a hierarchical regression was conducted for FY82-FY19.

After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY19, VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.000) and for total global refugees (VIF = 1.000). I reviewed the normal P-P plot to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .195$ ($p = .241$), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 35) = 2.502$, $p = .123$, $\Delta R^2 = .062$ (see Table 9). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ2.

Table 9

Model Summary for RQ2^c

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.269 ^a	.072	.047	25786.092	.072	2.805	1	36	.103

2	.366 ^b	.134	.085	25264.333	.062	2.502	1	35	.123
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a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At End FY

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At End FY, PresPartyFY

c. Dependent Variable: Total Annual Admissions

Research Question 3

RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_03 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on USRAP regional allocations.

H_a3 : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on USRAP regional allocations.

I conducted a separate hierarchical regression analysis for each of the following regions to assess the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on annual regional allocations: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa.

RQ3 – East Asia

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for East Asia. The regional allocations for East Asia ($M = 30824.36$, $SD = 31280.316$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for East Asia ($M = 929942.82$, $SD = 184007.398$) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocations (0.0 for

Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value of Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. FY19 exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d at 24.641. Both FY19 and FY82 exceeded the critical value of Cook's d at 2.247 and .113, respectively. FY19 and FY82 were removed from the dataset.

I conducted a hierarchical regression for the remaining 37 fiscal years, then VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.576) and for total global refugees from East Asia (VIF = 1.576). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .114$ ($p = .503$), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 34) = 1.089$, $p = .304$, $\Delta R^2 = .031$ (see Table 10). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ3 for East Asia.

Table 10

Model Summary for RQ3 for East Asia

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.063 ^a	.004	-.025	30001.712	.004	.138	1	35	.217
2	.187 ^b	.035	-.022	29963.575	.031	1.089	1	34	.304

- a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO
- b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

RQ3 – Eastern Europe and Central Asia

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The regional allocations for Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($M = 23943.59$, $SD = 21544.761$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($M = 892524.72$, $SD = 802644.522$) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d or Cook's d . Variance inflation factors were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation ($VIF = 1.234$) and for total global refugees from Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($VIF = 1.234$). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = -.102$ ($p = .538$),

indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 36) = .046, p = .831, \Delta R^2 = .001$ (see Table 11). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ3 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 11

Model Summary for RQ3 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.316 ^a	.100	.075	20717.811	.100	4.094	1	37	.050
2	.317 ^b	.101	.051	20990.176	.001	.046	1	36	.831

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO


b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

RQ3 – Near East and South Asia

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for the Near East and South Asia region. The regional allocations for Near East and South Asia ($M = 13835.90, SD = 12555.545$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ($M = 5288832.67, SD = 1904669.045$) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

Figure 1

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Regional Allocation for Near East and South Asia)



To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d , but values for FY19 exceeded the critical value for Cook's d at .114. FY19 was removed from the dataset and hierarchical regression was conducted for the remaining FY81-FY18 fiscal years. After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY81-FY18, VIFs were reviewed and were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.011) and for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.011). The normal P-P

plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed (see Figure 1). To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .479$ ($p = .002$), indicating heteroscedasticity.

Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, a bootstrapped hierarchical regression was conducted using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence intervals based on BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to the model ($\beta = -11111.761$, $p = .008$, 95% CI: -17725.682 and -4447.079) (see Table 12).

Table 12

Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ3 for Near East and South Asia

Model	B	Bias	Std. Error	Sig. (2-tailed)	Bootstrap ^a	
					Lower	Upper
2						
(Constant)	4744.414	-42.275	4918.768	.303	-3797.139	13364.171
UNHCR Near East & South Asia – At Final PD/EO PresPartyPD	.003	-7.537E-6	.001	.002	.001	.005
	-11111.761	126.147	3682.325	.008	-18057.781	-3294.171

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

The model was also found to be significant ($\Delta F(1, 35) = 10.016$, $p = .003$, $\Delta R^2 = .192$) and was interpreted (see Table 13).

Table 13

Model Summary for RQ3 for Near East and South Asia Regional Allocation

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.368 ^a	.135	.111	11970.692	.135	5.636	1	36	.023
2	.572 ^b	.328	.289	10704.999	.192	10.016	1	35	.003

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

ΔR^2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 19.2% of variance in regional allocations set for Near East and South Asia. In addition, $\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$ can be used to determine the difference in the expected regional allocation for Near East and South Asia between a Democratic president and a Republican president using the β -values of presidential party affiliation ($\beta = -11111.761$, $p = .008$, 95%CI: -18057.781 and -3294.171) and regional refugee totals Near East and South Asia ($\beta = .003$, $p = .002$, 95%CI: .001 and .005). The equation for the expected Near East and South Asia regional allocation by a Democratic president was constructed and simplified as follows:

$$(\hat{Y}|\text{Democrat}) = 4744.414 + .003(\text{global regional refugees}) + -11111.761(0)$$

$$(\hat{Y}|\text{Democrat}) = 4744.414 + .003(\text{global regional refugees})$$

The equation for the expected Near East and South Asia regional allocation by a Republican president was constructed and simplified as follows:

$$(\hat{Y}|\text{Republican}) = 4744.414 + .003(\text{global regional refugees}) + -11111.761(1)$$

$$(\hat{Y}|\text{Republican}) = 4744.414 + .003(\text{global regional refugees}) - 11111.761$$

$$(\hat{Y}|\text{Republican}) = 4744.414 + .003(\text{global regional refugees}) - 11111.761$$

$$(\hat{Y}|\text{Republican}) = -6367.347 + .003(\text{global regional refugees})$$

From these equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican president setting regional allocations predicts a 11,112 lower regional allocation for Near East and South Asian refugees than a Democratic president.

RQ3 – Latin America and Caribbean


I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Latin America and Caribbean. The regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 13835.90$, $SD = 12555.545$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 415288.69$, $SD = 347076.332$) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d , but values for FY94 and FY95 exceeded the critical value for Cook's d at .459 and .130, respectively. Both FY94 and FY95 was removed from the dataset and hierarchical regression was conducted for the remaining 37 fiscal years.

I conducted a hierarchical regression for the FY81-FY19 excluding FY94-FY95, then VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation ($VIF = 1.050$) and for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean ($VIF = 1.050$). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed (see Figure 2).

Figure 2

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Regional Allocation for Latin American and Caribbean)



To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .852$ ($p = .032$), indicating heteroscedasticity. Having met the

necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 34) = 10.348$, $p = .003$, $\Delta R^2 = .231$ (see Table 14). Because the model was significant, the model was interpreted.

Table 14

Model Summary for RQ3 for Latin America and Caribbean

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.104 ^a	.011	-.018	1263.096	.011	.379	1	35	.542
2	.491 ^b	.242	.197	1122.107	.231	10.348	1	34	.003

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

ΔR^2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 23.1% of variance in regional allocations set for Latin America and Caribbean. The equation $\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$ can be used to determine the difference in the expected regional allocation for Latin America and Caribbean between a Democratic president and a Republican president using the β -values of presidential party affiliation ($\beta = -1238.343$, $t(34) = -.492$, $p = .003$, 95% CI: -2020.676 and 456.009) and regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean ($\beta = 1318E-5$, $t(34) = .004$, $p = .981$, 95% CI: -.001 and .001) (see Table 15).

Table 15

Coefficients for RQ3 for Latin America and Caribbean

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
2	(Constant)	4345.805	339.836		12.788	.000
	UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean – At Final PD/EO	1.318E-5	.001	.004	.024	.981
	PresPartyPD	-1238.343	384.960	-.492	-3.217	.003

The equation for the expected Latin America and Caribbean regional allocation by a Democratic president was constructed and simplified to $(\hat{Y}|\text{Democrat}) = 4345.805 + 1.318e-5(\text{global regional refugees})$, while the equation for the expected Latin America and Caribbean regional allocation by a Republican president was constructed and simplified as $(\hat{Y}|\text{Republican}) = 3107.462 + 1.318e-5 (\text{global regional refugees})$. From these equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican president setting regional allocations predicts a 1,238 lower allocation to Latin America and Caribbean refugees than a Democratic president.

RQ3 – Africa

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Africa. The regional allocations for Africa ($M = 12138.46$, $SD = 8429.916$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Africa ($M = 4079546.38$, $SD = 1246806.487$) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. No fiscal years had values exceeding the critical value of Mahalanobis d at

24.641, but FY17 exceeded the critical value of Cook's d at .321 and was removed from the dataset. I completed a hierarchical regression for the remaining 38 fiscal years, and VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.003) and for total global refugees from Africa (VIF = 1.003). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = -.121$ ($p = .428$), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 35) = .628$, $p = .433$, $\Delta R^2 = .017$ (see Table 16). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ3 for Africa.

Table 16

Model Summary for RQ3 for Africa

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.198 ^a	.039	-.012	7600.072	.039	1.465	1	36	.234
2	.237 ^b	.056	-.002	7639.609	.017	.628	1	35	.433

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At Final PD/EO

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

Research Question 4

RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H_04 : The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant effect on USRAP regional admissions.

H_{a4} : The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant effect on USRAP regional admissions.

I conducted a separate hierarchical regression analysis for each of the following regions to assess the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on regional admissions: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa.

RQ4 – East Asia

I conducted hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on regional admissions for East Asia. The regional admissions for East Asia ($M = 27423.23$ $SD = 25594.904$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Global refugee totals for East Asia ($M = 943836.00$, $SD = 229083.859$) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the federal fiscal year were entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ4 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. Values for FY18 and FY19 both exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d at 14.414 and 14.255, respectively. Values for FY18 and FY19 also exceeded the critical value of Cook's d at .301 and .261, respectively, as did FY81 at .3169. FY81, FY18, and FY19 were removed from the dataset, and I conducted hierarchical regression for the

remaining 36 fiscal years. After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY17, VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.635) and for total global refugees from East Asia (VIF = 1.635). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .619$ ($p < .001$), indicating heteroscedasticity.

Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for

Table 17

Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for East Asia

Model	B	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap ^a		
				Sig. (2-tailed)	BCa 95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower	Upper
2 (Constant)	19336.773	-20356.318	50812.576	.785	-105977.106	27355.102
UNHCR East Asia – At End FY	.040	.021	.052	.057	-.051	.171
PresPartyFY	17366.612	4698.957	12227.092	.195	-5022.551	49820.407

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

coefficients was reviewed, and presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to the model ($\beta = 17366.612$, $p = .195$, 95% CI: -5022.551 and 49820.407) (See Table 17). The model was found to be significant ($\Delta F(1,$

33) = 4.774, $p = .036$, $\Delta R^2 = .126$) and was interpreted (see Table 18). Presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to refugee admissions from East Asia in RQ4.

Table 18

Model Summary for RQ4 for East Asia

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.015 ^a	.000	-.029	19535.816	.000	.008	1	34	.929
2	.356 ^b	.127	.074	18534.140	.126	4.774	1	33	.036

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At End FY

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

RQ4 – Eastern Europe and Central Asia

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The regional admissions for Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($M = 21650.21$, $SD = 20788.995$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia ($M = 910385.64$, $SD = 807439.054$) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the federal fiscal year was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ4 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value

was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d or Cook's d . Pearson's r was generated to screen for multicollinearity. Variance inflation factors were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.336) and for total global refugees from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (VIF = 1.336). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .066$ ($p = .699$), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 36) = .297$, $p = .589$, $\Delta R^2 = .007$ (see Table 19). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ4 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Table 19

Model Summary for RQ4 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.421 ^a	.177	.155	19113.470	.177	7.954	1	37	.008
2	.429 ^b	.184	.138	19297.787	.007	.297	1	36	.589

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At End FY

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

RQ4 – Near East and South Asia

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the political party affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Near East and South Asia. The regional admissions for Near East and South Asia ($M = 11901.36$, $SD = 11439.865$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent


variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ($M = 5521419.10$, $SD = 1896562.065$) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the federal fiscal year were entered into the first block as the controlling variable.

Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d , but values for FY19 exceeded the critical value for Cook's d at .185. FY19 was removed from the dataset, and I conducted a hierarchical regression for the remaining FY81-FY18 fiscal years. After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY81-FY18, VIFs were reviewed and were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.007) and for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.007). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed (see Figure 3).

Figure 3

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Near East and South Asia Admissions)



To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .355$ ($p = .029$), indicating heteroscedasticity.

Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and presidential party affiliation was found to be a statistically significant contributor to the model ($\beta = -11886.197$, $p = .002$, 95% CI: -19246.045 and -4094.144) (see Table 20). The

model was also found to be significant ($\Delta F(1, 35) = 14.752, p < .001, \Delta R^2 = .270$) and was interpreted (see Table 21).

Table 20

Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for Near East and South Asia

Model	B	Bootstrap ^a			BCa 95% Confidence Interval	
		Bias	Std. Error	Sig. (2-tailed)	Lower	Upper
2 (Constant)	6932.176	-2133.886	6827.585	.391	-4813.157	14302.155
UNHCR Near East & South Asia – At End FY	.002	.000	.001	.057	.000	.005
PresPartyFY	-11986.187	364.281	3384.019	.002	-19246.045	-4094.144

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

Table 21

Model Summary for RQ4 for Near East and South Asia

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.297 ^a	.088	.063	11126.383	.088	3.485	1	36	.070
2	.599 ^b	.359	.322	9464.504	.270	14.752	1	35	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

ΔR^2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 27.0% of variance in regional allocations set for Near East and South Asia. The equation $\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$ can be used to determine the difference in the expected regional admissions for Near East and South Asia between a Democratic president's term and a Republican

president's term, using the β -values of presidential party affiliation ($\beta = -11986.197$, $p = .002$, 95%CI: -19246.045 and -4094.144) and regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ($\beta = .002$, $p = .057$, 95%CI: .000 and .005). The equation for the expected Near East and South Asia regional admissions under a Democratic president was constructed and simplified to $(\hat{Y}|\text{Democrat}) = 6932.176 + .002(\text{global regional refugees})$, while the equation for the expected Near East and South Asia regional admissions under a Republican president was constructed and simplified as $(\hat{Y}|\text{Republican}) = -5054.021 + .002(\text{global regional refugees})$. From these equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican president's term will predict 11,986 fewer admissions from Near East and South Asia than a Democratic president's term.

RQ4 – Latin America and Caribbean


I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean. The regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 2686.8$, $SD = 1826.111$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 400088.18$, $SD = 318127.744$) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the federal fiscal year were entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value

was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d , but values for FY05 and FY95 exceeded the critical value for Cook's d at .217 and .155, respectively. Both FY05 and FY95 was removed from the dataset, and I conducted a hierarchical regression for the remaining 37 fiscal years. After conducting the second hierarchical regression, VIFs were reviewed and were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.010) and for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean (VIF = 1.010). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed (see Figure 4).

Figure 4

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Latin America and Caribbean Admissions)



To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = -$

.049 ($p = .774$), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 34) = 13.238$, $p = .001$, $\Delta R^2 = .278$ (see Table 22). Because the model was significant, the model can be interpreted.

Table 22

Model Summary for RQ4 for Latin America and Caribbean

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.093 ^a	.009	-.020	1542.783	.009	.303	1	35	.585
2	.535 ^b	.286	.244	1327.989	.278	13.238	1	34	.001

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

ΔR^2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 27.8% of variance in regional allocations set for Latin America and Caribbean. The equation $\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$ can be used to determine the difference in the expected regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean between a Democratic president's term and a Republican president's term using the β -values of presidential party affiliation ($\beta = -.530$, $p = .001$, 95%CI: -2533.884 and -717.689) and regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean ($\beta = .001$, $p = .327$, 95%CI: -.001 and .002) (see Table 23).

Table 23

Coefficients for RQ4 for Latin America and Caribbean

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
2	(Constant)	3125.422	431.082		7.250	.000
	UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY	.001	.001	.145	.995	.327
	PresPartyFY	-1625.786	446.845	-.530	-3.638	.001

The equation for the expected Latin America and Caribbean regional allocation under a Democratic president was constructed and simplified to $(\hat{Y}|\text{Democrat}) = 3125.422 + .001(\text{global regional refugees})$, while the equation for the expected Latin America and Caribbean regional allocation under a Republican president was constructed and simplified as $(\hat{Y}|\text{Republican}) = 1499.636 + .001(\text{global regional refugees})$. From these equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican president's term predicts 1,450 fewer admissions per fiscal year from Latin America and Caribbean than a Democratic president's term.

RQ4 – Africa

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Africa. The regional admissions for Africa ($M = 10369.38$, $SD = 7964.187$) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Africa ($M = 4188248.82$, $SD = 1319980.553$) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of the fiscal year was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook's d values. The critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook's d critical value was .111. No fiscal years had values exceeding the critical value of Mahalanobis d , but

values for FY16 and FY04 exceeded the critical value of Cook's d at .168 and .122, respectively, and were removed from the dataset.

A hierarchical regression was completed for the remaining 37 fiscal years, then VIFs were reviewed and were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.005) and for total global refugees from Africa (VIF = 1.005). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = -.327$ ($p = .045$), indicating heteroscedasticity.

Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to the model ($\beta = -3019.932$, $p = .181$, 95% CI: -6485.009 and -500.106) (see Table 24).

Table 24

Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for Africa

Model	B	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap ^a			
				Sig. (2-tailed)	BCa 95% Confidence Interval		
					Lower	Upper	
2	(Constant)	11683.376	1475.680	4239.065	.009	3344.971	23409.619
	UNHCR	.000	.000	.001	.897	-.002	.001
	Africa - At End FY						
	PresPartyFY	-3019.932	-464.780	2129.120	.181	-6485.009	-500.106

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

The model was found to be significant ($\Delta F(1, 35) = 14.752, p < .001, \Delta R^2 = .270$) and was interpreted (see Table 25). Presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to refugee admissions from Africa in RQ4.

Table 25

Model Summary for RQ4 for Africa

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.012 ^a	.000	-.028	6684.901	.000	.005	1	35	.943
2	.228 ^b	.052	-.004	6604.767	.052	1.854	1	34	.182

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At End FY

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

Research Question 5

RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?

*H*₀₅: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

*H*_{a5}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.

In RQ1, no effect of presidential party affiliation was found on the annual admissions ceiling, meaning that there is no effect to test for the extent of moderation by the Senate and House majorities. Therefore, no statistical tests were conducted for RQ5.

Research Question 6

RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?

H₀6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

H_a6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions through the USRAP.

In RQ2, no effect of presidential party affiliation was found on the annual refugee admissions through the USRAP, meaning that there is no effect to test for the extent of moderation by the Senate and House majorities. Therefore, no statistical tests were conducted for RQ6.

Research Question 7

RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H₀7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations.

H_{a7}: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional allocations.

In RQ3, presidential party affiliation was found to effect regional allocations only for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. I conducted separate hierarchical regression analyses for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean to determine the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on regional allocations for each of these regions. As RQ3 found that party affiliation of the president had no effect on regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Africa, no statistical analyses were performed for these regions, as there was no effect to moderate.

RQ7 – Near East and South Asia

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Near East and South Asia. The regression was conducted with data from FY81-FY18, as FY19 data was removed from the dataset in RQ3 for exceeding the critical value for Cook's *d*. The regional allocations for Near East and South Asia ($M = 13963.16$, $SD = 12698.567$) (see Table 26) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ($M = 5164992.84$, $SD = 1763953.167$) (see Table 26) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the

final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the Senate majority at the time regional allocations were set (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) and party affiliation of the House majority at the time regional allocations were set, expressed as Senate majority x House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the third block as the moderating variable.

Table 26

Regional Allocations and Regional Refugee Totals for Near East and South Asia, Excluding FY19

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
RA – Near East & South Asia	38	2500	40000	13963.16	12698.567
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia – at Final PD/EO	38	600670	8979185	5164992.84	1763953.167

Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.071), for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.015), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.068). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .530$ ($p = .001$), indicating heteroscedasticity.

Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and

Senate majority x House majority was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to the model ($\beta = -6265.272$, $p = .074$, 95%CI: -12247.629 and -897.508) (see Table 27).

Table 27

Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ7 for Near East and South Asia

Model	B	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap ^a		
				Sig. (2-tailed)	BCa 95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower	Upper
3 (Constant)	8247.286	467.284	4176.299	.090	-949.584	17927.591
UNHCR Near East & South Asia – At Final PD/EO PresPartyPD	.003	-5.757E-5	.001	.002	.002	.004
	-	-143.177	3413.530	.002	-19367.446	-6041.229
	12528.370					
Senate x House Majority at PD	-6265.272	-259.552	3065.433	.074	-12247.629	-.897.508

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

The model was not found to be significant ($\Delta F(1, 34) = 2.892$, $p = .098$, $\Delta R^2 = .053$) and was not interpreted (see Table 28). Senate and House majority party affiliations were not shown to be significant for Near East and South Asia in RQ7.

Table 28

Model Summary for RQ7 for Near East and South Asia

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.368 ^a	.135	.111	11970/692	.135	5.636	1	36	.023
2	.572 ^b	.328	.289	10704.999	.192	10.016	1	35	.003
3	.617 ^c	.380	.326	10426.954	.053	2.892	1	34	.098

- a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO
- b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD
- c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD, Senate x House Majority at PD

RQ7 – Latin America and Caribbean

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Latin America and Caribbean. The regression was conducted with data from FY81-FY19 with FY94-FY95 excluded, as FY94-FY95 data was removed from the dataset in RQ3 for exceeding the critical value for Cook's *d*. The regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 3614.86$, $SD = 1252.157$) (see Table 29) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was used as

Table 29

Regional Allocations & Regional Refugee Totals for Latin America and Caribbean, Excluding FY94-FY95

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
RA – Latin America & Caribbean	37	1000	6000	3614.86	1252.157
UNHCR – Latin America & Caribbean – at Final PD/EO	37	83710	1243412	407596.62	343399.162

the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 407596.62$, $SD = 343399.162$) (see Table 29) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19; FY94-FY95 excluded)

was entered into the second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the Senate majority at the time regional allocations were set (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) and party affiliation of the House majority at the time regional allocations were set, expressed as Senate majority x House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the third block as the moderating variable.

Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.089), for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean (VIF = 1.275), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.305). To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .779$ ($p = .048$), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 33) = .010$, $p = .919$, $\Delta R^2 = .000$ (see Table 30).

Table 30

Model Summary for RQ7 for Latin America and Caribbean

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.104 ^a	.011	-.018	1263.096	.011	.379	1	35	.542
2	.491 ^b	.242	.197	1122.107	.231	10.348	1	34	.003
3	.492 ^c	.242	.173	1138.802	.000	.010	1	33	.919

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD, Senate x House Majority at PD

Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ7 for Latin America and Caribbean.

Research Question 8

RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?

H₀8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions.

H_a8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional admissions.

In RQ4, presidential party affiliation was found to effect regional admissions only for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. I conducted separate hierarchical regression analyses for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean to determine the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on regional admissions for each of these regions. As RQ4 found that party affiliation of the president had no effect on regional admissions for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, nor Africa, no statistical analyses were performed for these regions, as there was no effect to moderate.

RQ8 – Near East and South Asia

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional admissions for Near East and South Asia. The regression was conducted with data from FY81-FY18, as FY19 was excluded from the dataset for exceeding the critical value of Cook's *d*. The regional admissions for Near East and South Asia ($M = 12140.84$, $SD = 11493.928$) (see Table 31) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ($M = 5391977.789$, $SD = 1738693.374$) (see Table 31) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year.

Table 31

Regional Admissions and Regional Refugee Totals for Near East and South Asia,

Excluding FY19

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
RA – Near East & South Asia	38	2854	38280	12140.84	11493.928
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia – at End FY	38	1836452	9994746	5391977.789	1738693.374

Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the Senate majority for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) and party affiliation of the House majority for all or most of the fiscal year, expressed as Senate majority party x

House majority party, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the third block as the moderating variable.

Variance inflation factors were well below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.041), for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.010), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.037). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = .592$ ($p < .001$), indicating heteroscedasticity.

Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and Senate majority x House majority was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to the model ($\beta = -6265.272$, $p = .074$, 95%CI: -12247.629 and -897.508) (see Table 32).

Table 32

Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ8 for Near East and South Asia

Model	B	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap ^a			
				Sig. (2-tailed)	BCa 95% Confidence Interval		
					Lower	Upper	
3	(Constant)	10628.218	-1767.141	5797.885	.129	632.677	16603.817
	UNHCR Near East & South Asia – At End FY	.002	.000	.001	.040	.000	.005

PresPartyFY	-	327.139	3237.317	.002	-19816.634	-5325.222
	13132.978					
Senate x House Majority at FY	-6451.501	567.017	3127.111	.063	-13078.613	1456.577

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

The model was found to be significant ($\Delta F(1, 34) = 4.469, p = .042, \Delta R^2 = .075$) and was interpreted (see Table 33). Senate and House majority party affiliations were not shown to be significant for Near East and South Asia in RQ8.

Table 33

Model Summary for RQ8 for Near East and South Asia

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.297 ^a	.088	.063	11126.383	.088	3.485	1	36	.070
2	.599 ^b	.359	.322	9464.504	.270	14.752	1	35	.000
3	.658 ^c	.433	.383	9027.657	.075	4.469	1	34	.042

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY, Senate x House for FY

RQ8 – Latin America and Caribbean

I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the president on the annual regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean. The regression was conducted with data from FY81-FY19 with FY95 and FY05 excluded from the dataset as they exceeded the critical value of Cook's *d*. The regional admissions

for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 2444.84$, $SD = 1527.785$) (see Table 34) for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was used as the dependent variable.

Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean ($M = 414221.03$ $SD = 320506.664$) (see Table 34) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was entered into the first box as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was entered into the second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the Senate majority for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) and party affiliation of the House majority for all or most of the fiscal year, expressed as Senate majority x House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was entered into the third block as the moderating variable.

Table 34

Regional Admissions and Regional Refugee Total for Latin America and Caribbean, Excluding FY94-FY95

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
RA – Latin America & Caribbean	37	131	6156	2444.84	1527.785
UNHCR – Latin America & Caribbean – at End FY	37	83710	1243412	414221.03	320506.664

Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.041), for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean (VIF = 1.270), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.310). The normal P-P plot was

reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was $r = -.085$ ($p = .616$), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, $\Delta F(1, 33) = .787$, $p = .382$, $\Delta R^2 = .017$ (see Table 35). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ8 for Latin America and Caribbean.

Table 35

Model Summary for RQ8 for Latin America & Caribbean

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.093 ^a	.009	-.020	1542.783	.009	.303	1	35	.585
2	.535 ^b	.286	.244	1327.989	.278	13.238	1	34	.001
3	.550 ^c	.303	.240	1332.174	.017	.787	1	33	.382

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY

b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY, Senate x House for FY

Summary

Regression analysis of RQ1, the effect of presidential party affiliation on the annual refugee ceiling, failed to disprove the null hypothesis that presidential party affiliation has no significant effect on the annual refugee ceiling. Likewise, analysis of the regression model for RQ2, the effect of presidential party affiliation on total annual admissions, failed to disprove the null hypothesis that presidential party affiliation has no

significant effect on annual refugee admissions. With no effect of presidential party affiliation on the refugee ceiling or total annual admissions found in RQ1 and RQ2, no effect existed to moderate and RQ5 and RQ6 were rendered moot.

Analysis for RQ3, the effect of presidential party affiliation on regional allocations, showed mixed results. Analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis for regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Africa that presidential party affiliation has no effect on regional allocations. A significant effect was shown for Near East and South Asia, with analysis finding that a Republican president setting regional allocations predicts a regional allocation 11,112 lower for the Near East and South Asia than a Democratic president. A significant effect was also shown for Latin America and Caribbean, with analysis finding that a Republican president setting regional allocations predicts a regional allocation 1,238 lower for Latin America and Caribbean than a Democratic president.

Mixed results were also found for different regions in RQ4, the effect of presidential party affiliation on regional admissions. Analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis that presidential party affiliation has no effect for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Africa. Analysis also found that a Republican president's term predicts 11,986 fewer admissions from Near East and South Asia than a Democratic president's term. Similarly, a Republican president's term was found to predict 1,450 fewer admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean than a Democratic president's term.

Moderation analysis was conducted for RQ7 on regional allocations for Near East and South Asia as well as Latin America and Caribbean, the two regions in which significant effect for presidential party affiliation was found in RQ3. In analyzing the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on the effect of presidential party affiliation on regional allocations, analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis that the Senate and House majorities do not moderate presidential party affiliation on regional allocations.

For RQ8, moderation analysis was conducted to examine the moderating effect of Senate and House majorities on presidential party affiliation on regional admissions from Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean, the two regions in which significant effect for presidential party affiliation was found in RQ4. In analyzing the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on the effect of presidential party affiliation on regional admissions, analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis that the Senate and House majorities do not moderate presidential party affiliation on regional admissions.

In Chapter 5, I will discuss these findings as they relate to the literature presented in Chapter 2 and analyze these findings within the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism. Chapter 5 will also include discussion of limitations in this study with recommendations for future study and will conclude with a discussion of the implications of this study for positive social change.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the president's political party affiliation on proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP, while controlling for global refugee numbers, in aggregate and by region. I also sought to determine the moderating effect of the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities. This quantitative study was nonexperimental and correlative in design, relying on hierarchical regression analysis to answer the study's RQs, with the intention of assisting resettlement agencies in anticipating and preparing for future refugee admissions.

I found that presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the annual admissions ceiling or on total annual refugee admissions. Presidential party affiliation also had no significant effect on regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, or Africa. Having a Republican president set regional allocations, however, predicted a regional allocation 11,112 lower for the Near East and South Asia and a regional allocation 1,238 lower for Latin America and Caribbean. Likewise, a Republican president's term predicted 11,986 fewer admissions from Near East and South Asia and 1,450 fewer admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean.

I analyzed the moderating effect of the party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities only for those regions for which presidential party affiliation was shown to have a significant effect that could potentially be moderated. Senate and House majority

affiliation was shown to have no significant moderating effect on regional allocations for Near East and South Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean. Similarly, Senate and House majority party affiliation was also shown to have no significant moderating effect on admissions from Near East and South Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean.

Interpretation of the Findings

Resettlement agencies and human rights organizations have long held that the USRAP holds bipartisan support (Human Rights First, n.d.; USCRI, 2017). This contention was supported, at a macrolevel, in this study in that presidential party affiliation was found to have no significant effect on the annual admissions ceiling or on annual refugee admissions in the aggregate. When looking at regional allocations and admissions, however, bipartisan support waned. Democratic presidents were found to have greater levels of support for refugees from Near East and South Asia as well as Latin America and the Caribbean, as having a Democratic president predicts a 11,112 higher ceiling and 11,986 more admissions from Near East and South Asia and a 1,238 higher ceiling and 1,450 more admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean than a Republican president. It is not inaccurate, then, to state that the USRAP has bipartisan support, but the caveat is that the regional makeup of refugees admitted through the USRAP has statistically significant differences under presidents of different parties.

When the Refugee Act of 1980 was first proposed to Congress, opponents of the Refugee Act argued that it would undermine the existing immigration policies that favored Europeans (Scribner 2017, p. 268). This study found that an average of 74, 031 refugees were admitted annually between FY81-FY19. This average constitutes less than

8% of all legal immigrants to the United States in those same years (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020). At these admissions levels, the refugee program is unlikely to tip the scales of immigration in any significant direction related to European versus non-European immigration overall.

Proponents of the Refugee Act praised the act as a mechanism for giving “greater and more explicit power...with regard to the numbers and nature of refugees to be admitted to [the United States]” (H.R Rep. No. 69-2, at 4500 (1980)). In this study, I specifically examined the extent to which Congress moderated the effect of presidential party affiliation on refugee admissions, rather than all possible ways in which Congress could affect “the numbers and nature of refugees” admitted to the United States. Within the parameters of this study, however, Congress was not shown to moderate the effect of presidential party affiliation on proposed or actual refugee admissions.

I noted in Chapter 2 that much of the literature on refugee policy and admissions addresses legislation enacted by Congress, examining motivations for legislation, results of legislation, and partisan voting records (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Brown & Scribner, 2014; Fussell, 2014; Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017; Steil & Vasi, 2014; Teitelbaum, 1980; Triadafilopoulos, 2010; Welch, 2014; Zolberg, 1998), despite the fact that refugee admissions to the United States are based on presidential determination rather than on Congressional legislation. This study has demonstrated that presidential party affiliation does not affect the annual admissions ceiling or annual admissions, but does affect regional allocations and admissions, with Democratic rather than Republican

presidents predicting increased allocations to and admissions from the Near East and South Asia region and the Latin America and Caribbean region.

Another gap in the literature identified in Chapter 2 was the difference between political rhetoric on refugee policy and political actions that affect refugee admissions. In spite of the restrictionist rhetoric among Republican politicians (Fennelly et al., 2015; Fussell, 2014), the overall admissions ceiling and annual refugee admissions were not significantly affected by the party affiliation of the president, meaning that Republican presidents had no significant effect on reducing the admissions ceiling or refugee admissions to the United States. In line with Republican rhetoric against Latinx immigrant and Muslim immigrants, however, Republican presidents predict lower regional allocations and fewer refugee admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean and Near East and South Asia. Although the overall refugee program maintained integrity regardless of the president's political affiliation, refugees from specific regions were significantly affected by the president's party. These results aligned with the rhetoric of each party.

Reny (2017) demonstrated that Republican candidates are more likely to rely on anti-immigrant appeals to gain support than Democratic candidates (p. 736). The Democratic Party has shown greater support for Latinx immigrants (Hajal & Rivera, 2014) and Muslim immigrants (Doucerain et al., 2018; Newman, 2018) than the Republican Party. It is noteworthy, then, that Republican presidents are a predictor of lower regional allocations and admissions from both Latin America and the Caribbean and Near East and South Asia. Although not all countries in Near East and South Asia are

Muslim-majority countries, 81% are, which is the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries in a single region, compared to 33% in both Africa and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 9% in East Asia, and 0% in Latin America and Caribbean, according to the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

This reduction of immigrants from the Near East and South Asia, the region with the greatest percentage of Muslim-majority countries, aligns with positions held by both rank and file Republicans, as well as Republican politicians. Long before opposition to Muslim refugees became a talking point for Republican presidential primary candidates in 2016 (Nagel, 2016; Scribner, 2017), Muslim and other Middle Eastern refugees had been a security concern to Republican politicians since the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Barkdull et al., 2012; Disney, 2017). One study showed that 73% of Republicans agreed that banning Muslim immigrants was needed to prevent terrorism (Schmidt, 2019) and for certain Americans, Muslim refugees pose economic, security, and cultural threats (Breshnahan et al., 2018). The reductions in refugee admissions from the Near East and South Asia region under Republican administrations highlights one way in which these views of Muslims are carried out in a tangible form.

Recent literature has focused on refugee policy under the Trump administration, with cuts to the admissions ceiling drawing significant attention (Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fullerton, 2017; Kerwin, 2018; Scriber, 2017). Despite cuts to the admissions ceiling and refugee admissions under the Trump administration, only FY81, under the Carter (D) administration for the setting of the refugee ceiling and Reagan (R) administration for the majority of the fiscal year of arrivals, was found to be a statistical outlier when

conducting regression analyses for RQ1 and RQ2. Historical institutionalism views radical changes within institutions, such as political parties, as either resulting from the accumulation of gradual changes over time (Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen, 2015) or as the result of an exogenous shock (Fioretos, 2011). Trump's approach to U.S. refugee policy has largely been treated as an exogenous shock by the existing literature. The findings of this study, however, indicate that Trump's admissions ceilings FY17-FY19 and refugee admissions FY17-FY19 were not statistical outliers and show that, even when accounting for FY17-FY19, presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the admissions ceiling or refugee admissions.

Trump's regional allocations were, generally, not found to be outliers, either. Only the regional allocations for Near East and South Asia in FY19 and East Asia in FY19 were found to be outliers when both values exceeded the critical value for Cook's *d*. After excluding these outliers, however, only regional allocations for Near East and South Asia were found to be significantly affected by presidential party affiliation, with lower allocations predicted by a Republican president. The predictive value of a Republican presidency on Near East and South Asian refugee allocations indicates that Trump's outlier for that specific regional allocation in FY19 was not a total departure from the history of the Republican Party. Although the FY19 Near East and South Asia regional allocation was an outlier, a history of significantly lower allocations to the Near East and South Asia by Republican presidents points to the accumulation of actions over the history of the USRAP as the cause for Trump's outlier of an allocation to that region, rather than a radical change in direction.

Regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Africa were all found to be unaffected by presidential party affiliation, even when accounting for allocations by the Trump administration. Although regional allocations for Latin America and the Caribbean were affected by presidential party affiliation, none of Trump's regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean were found to be outliers. When considering the whole of the USRAP's history, Republican presidents were correlated with lower allocations to Latin America and the Caribbean, and Trump is not found to be anomalous.

FY18 and FY19 admissions from Near East and South Asia, both under the Trump administration, were outliers, as they exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis *d*. Even without including these years of the Trump administration, however, Republican presidents were correlated with lower arrivals from Near East and South Asia. Like the outliers for regional allocations found under the Trump administrations, these outliers in regional admissions follow a pattern of lower admissions under Republican administrations, rather than a shift in direction under the Trump presidency.

Limitations

This study was limited to the Senate and House majorities, rather than looking at individual members of the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary and their relative influence on their respective committees. I also did not account for the nature of the relationships between individual members and the president. This study was also limited in that its analysis was of Congressional majorities as Senate majority x House majority rather than the Senate and House independently.

This study was also limited to the analysis of the effect of political party affiliation. I did not consider external political factors that could be confounding variables, such as U.S. military engagement, which has shown to affect global refugee situations and U.S. refugee resettlement (Berman, 2011). The use of global refugee levels and the number of total refugees by region as control variables in this study does partially address changes to the global climate related to refugees but does not address political events specifically. By taking data from each year since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, FY81-FY19 and each year of global refugee data for calendar years 1979-2018 from the UNHCR, outcomes of this study are valid as the entire population being studied was available rather than a sample of the population.

Because PRM's regional groupings of countries changed over time, each FY (FY81-FY03) required some level of recategorization of countries into regional in order to align with current regional groupings. Additionally, the UNHCR does not categorize countries into regions in their annual data, and countries of nationality and countries of first asylum were grouped into regions corresponding with Department of State regional designations. These categorizations and recategorizations into groupings that could be compared over time are a potential threat to internal validity in this study (see Babbie, 2017). In discussions of the relationship between the Trump administration, it should be noted that the FYs included in this study only account for a portion of the years of the Trump administration and do not include presidential determinations for FY20 nor FY21 and do not include arrivals for FY20.

Recommendations

There are several potential areas for future research to build on this study. I used a single moderating variable of Senate majority x House majority, but future researchers could examine the influence of the Senate and House majorities separately. By doing so, they could identify whether a specific chamber of Congress has more influence on moderating the annual ceiling, regional allocations, total admissions, or regional admissions than the chambers combined.

This study controlled for changing global refugee levels, both in the aggregate and by region. Refugee situations are often caused by armed conflict (Simeon, 2017, p. 2), and conflicts in which the United States has military involvement are known to affect refugee admissions to the country (Berman, 2011). Including either military conflicts in general or U.S. military conflicts specifically in future studies could provide insight into additional causes for the variance in regional allocations and regional admissions.

Previous researchers (Barkdull, et al., 2012; Brown & Scribner, 2014; Gonzalez Benson, 2016) have mostly focused on the effects of Congressional legislation on refugee arrivals. This study's findings highlighted that presidential party affiliation predicts regional allocations and arrivals for Near East and South Asia, as well as Latin America and Caribbean. There is room for additional study to be done on other ways in which presidential administrations affect refugee arrivals through the USRAP.

For a more thorough analysis of the extent to which the Trump administration constituted a continuation of or departure from prior Republican administrations, a study that includes data from all FYs impacted by the Trump administration would be useful.

President Trump issued presidential determinations in FY20 and in FY21. Additionally, admissions in FY20 were conducted under the Trump administration. Adding these data to a study would provide a more comprehensive picture of Trump's impact on refugee admissions to the United States.

Implications

I conducted this study with the intention of assisting resettlement agencies in anticipating and preparing for future refugee admissions. Being able to anticipate the backgrounds of the refugees they will be serving allows resettlement agencies to prepare for culturally and linguistically appropriate service provision, which may involve changes in staffing, securing interpreters, translating documents and materials, and training staff on the cultural backgrounds of the refugees arriving to the United States. Being able to anticipate the overall number of refugees allows agencies to prepare overall staffing levels, according to the anticipated number of clients to be served.

This study informs agencies that the admissions ceiling and annual admissions are not significantly affected by the president's political party. This study also finds that resettlement agencies may expect higher Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean admissions during a Democratic presidency. Despite the effect of presidential party affiliation on regional admissions, the effect on Near East and South Asia admissions accounts for 27.0% of the variance in admissions and the effect on Latin America and Caribbean admissions accounts for 27.8% of the variance in admissions. As the remaining 73% and 72.2% of the variances, respectively, have not been accounted for by presidential party affiliation, it is not recommended that resettlement agencies make

staffing decisions or other costly organizational changes on the basis of presidential party alone.

This study also provides resettlement agencies, human rights organizations, and advocacy groups with ways in which they can focus their advocacy and lobbying efforts. As presidential party affiliation has been shown to have no significant effect on the admissions ceiling nor annual admissions, advocacy on increasing the admissions ceiling, often a focus of resettlement agency advocacy (Feliz, 2015; Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services, 2018; Refugees International, 2020; USCRI, 2001), need not be partisan focused. This study suggests that presidents exert more influence over the distribution of refugee arrivals across global regions, which would indicate that the president, rather than members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, is a more appropriate focus of advocacy on regional allocations. Likewise, this study suggests that the president is the most appropriate focus for advocacy on the overall admissions ceiling, rather than Senate and House Judiciary Committee members.

Conclusion

In spite of increasing polarization between Democrats and Republicans on issues of immigration and refugee policy, presidential party affiliation has no significant effect on the annual admissions ceiling or annual refugee admissions. Resettlement agencies can be confident, based on the findings of this study, that refugee admissions are not significantly affected by the party affiliation of the president. Effects of presidential party can be seen, however, in higher numbers of refugees from the Near East and South Asia as well as Latin America and Caribbean under the administrations of Democratic

presidents. While presidential party may affect the distribution of refugee slots between regions, they do not account for the majority of the variance in admissions from any region and do not provide a full accounting for the variances in regional admissions and the majority of variances in regional allocations (76.9% - 80.8%) and regional admissions (72.2% - 73.0%) is due to factors other than presidential party affiliation that can be the focus of future study in this area.

The rhetoric of Donald Trump's presidential campaign and Presidency related to immigrants in general and refugees in specific resulted in an explosion of literature on Trump's takes on refugee policy, with many articles characterizing admissions ceilings, regional allocations, and refugee admissions under the Trump administration as anomalies when compared to the rest of the USRAP's history since FY81. Contrary to these characterizations, no admissions ceiling nor annual admissions total was found to be an outlier when considered within the FY81-FY19 dataset, and the only outlier among regional allocations was for Near East and South Asia in FY19. In terms of regional admissions, admissions from East Asia in FY18-FY19 and admissions from Near East and South Asia in FY19 were all found to be outliers during the Trump administration. These outliers, however, paint a narrower picture of anomalies under the Trump administration than his own rhetoric might lead one to believe.

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Appendix A: Countries Categorized as East Asia

I categorized countries as being part of East Asia if they were included in the countries and areas served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (U.S. Department of State, n.d.b). These countries and areas include

- Australia
- Brunei
- Burma (Myanmar)
- Cambodia
- China
- Fiji
- Indonesia
- Japan
- Kiribati
- Laos
- Malaysia
- Marshall Islands
- Micronesia
- Mongolia
- Nauru
- New Zealand
- North Korea
- Palau

- Papua New Guinea
- Philippines
- Samoa
- Singapore
- Solomon Islands
- South Korea
- Taiwan
- Thailand
- Timor-Leste
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu
- Vietnam

The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR's list of refugee nationalities and were included in East Asia, despite not being listed as a country or area served by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Tibet and Niue.

The U.S. Department of State (2019a) noted that Tibet is the Tibet Autonomous Region and categorizes it as part of China. Tibet was included in East Asia because China is included in this region. Niue is a territory of New Zealand U.S. Department of State, 2020) and is geographically located between New Zealand and Solomon Islands. Based on Niue's geographic location and relationship with New Zealand, it was included in East Asia.

Appendix B: Countries Categorized as Eastern Europe and Central Asia

I categorized countries as being part of Eastern Europe & Central Asia if they were a country or area served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. I excluded Western European countries or former Soviet countries served by the Bureau of South and Central Asia. Countries and areas served by the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, excluding Western European countries, include:

- Albania
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Belarus
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Czechia
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Hungary
- Kosovo
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Moldova

- Montenegro
- North Macedonia
- Poland
- Romania
- Russian Federation
- Serbia
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Turkey
- Ukraine (U.S. Department of State, n.d.c)

Former Soviet countries served by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

include:

- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Tajikistan
- Turkmenistan
- Uzbekistan (U.S. Department of State, n.d.e)

In fiscal years prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the UNHCR reported refugees from the Soviet Union. As former Soviet countries are included in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Soviet Union was also included.

Appendix C: Countries Categorized as Near East and South Asia

I categorized countries as being part of the Near East & South Asia if they were a country or areas served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, or a country or area served by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs that was not already included as part of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Countries and areas served by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs include

- Algeria
- Bahrain
- Egypt
- Iran
- Iraq
- Israel
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Morocco
- Oman
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Syria
- Tunisia

- United Arab Emirates
- Yemen (U.S. Department of State, n.d.d)

Countries or areas served by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and not already included as part of Eastern Europe and Central Asia include

- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh
- Bhutan
- India
- Maldives
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Sri Lanka (U.S. Department of State, n.d.e)

The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR's list of refugee nationalities and were included in Near East & South Asia, despite not being listed as a country or area served by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs or the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs: Palestine and Western Sahara.

According to the U.S. Department of State (2016), Israel includes "areas subject to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority" (p. 69), so refugees identified as Palestinian by the UNHCR were included in Near East & South Asia. Western Sahara is a disputed area in northern Africa and claimed by Morocco, which administers the majority of the territory (U.S. Department of State, 2019b, p.1).

Appendix D: Countries Categorized as Latin America and Caribbean

I categorized countries as being part of Latin America & Caribbean if they were a country or area served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, excluding Canada (U.S. Department of State, n.d.f). These countries and areas include

- Antigua and Barbuda
- Argentina
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Belize
- Bolivia
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Cuba
- Dominica
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- El Salvador
- Grenada
- Guatemala
- Guyana

- Haiti
- Honduras
- Jamaica
- Mexico
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Saint Kitts and Nevis
- Saint Lucia
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
- Suriname
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Uruguay
- Venezuela

The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR's list of refugee nationalities and were included in Latin America & Caribbean, despite not being listed as a country or area served by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs:

- Cayman Islands
- Curaçao
- French Guiana
- Turks and Caicos Islands

The U.S. Department of State (2020) lists both the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands as territories of the United Kingdom. Despite their relationship with the UK, however, both territories are geographically located in the Caribbean Sea and were, therefore, included in the Latin America & Caribbean region. Likewise, although Curaçao is a Dutch territory (U.S. Department of State, 2020), it was included in the Latin America & Caribbean region due to its location in the Caribbean Sea. French Guiana is a “first-order administrative [division] of overseas France” (U.S. Department of State, 2020, para. 5). As French Guiana is located in South America, it was included in the Latin America & Caribbean region.

Appendix E: Countries Categorized as Africa

I categorized countries as being part of Africa if they were a country or area served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs (U.S. Department of State, n.d.a). These countries and areas include

- Angola
- Benin
- Botswana
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cabo Verde
- Cameroon
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Comoros
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Djibouti
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Eswatini
- Ethiopia
- Gabon

- Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea-Bissau
- Kenya
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Republic of the Congo
- Rwanda
- São Tomé and Príncipe
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- South Africa
- South Sudan

- Sudan
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Uganda
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe