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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the University's requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy by Portfolio

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The research on armed non-state actors in southern Africa that comprises this portfolio started in 1984-85 while in Mozambique and becoming intrigued by conversations with key Mozambican government officials, such as the late Fernando Honwana and Aquino de Bragança (advisers to President Machel but killed in 1986 with Machel in the air crash) – and with diplomats who struggled to explain the spreading Mozambican civil war. This convinced me that the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) was more than solely a puppet of South African destabilisation and required research. Encouraged by Landeg White (Director of the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York), I began researching on RENAMO in 1986, trying to understand why this rebel group was becoming so successful militarily in Mozambique and how it was evolving overtime. This took me to Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, Portugal, Italy and the United States. I received small grants from the Centre for Southern African Studies, the Catholic Institute of International Relations (now Progressio), the Refugee Studies Programme at Oxford University, Africa Watch (now Human Rights Watch), the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the British American Security Information Council.

I interviewed RENAMO leaders, refugees, intelligence and policy makers, diplomats, NGO workers, faith leaders, journalists and academics during the period 1987-91 and am fluent enough in Portuguese to not use interpreters. In 1992, I joined Human Rights Watch and continued to visit Mozambique, working on post-conflict justice issues and DDR and in 1994 I served as an election observer in Gaza province for Mozambique's first presidential and parliamentary elections for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ).

After 1992, though continuing to follow RENAMO, my professional focus shifted to Angola. I first visited Angola in September 1992 for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) to monitor the presidential and multiparty elections. I had already experienced the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), including meeting its leader Jonas Savimbi and his

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delegation in 1991 in London following the Bicesse accords. Human Rights Watch in 1994 sent me to Angola to write a report on violations of laws of war and this resulted in time in UNITA controlled areas. I subsequently specialised in Angola's civil war for Human Rights Watch and to this day regularly visit the country and meet with government, UNITA and civil society.

In addition to Human Rights Watch, the Catholic Institute of International Relations, Ford Foundation, DFID, the Danish government, the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University and the Department of War Studies at King's College, London, funded research on Angola that included UNITA. I was intensively engaged on Angola research from 1992 to 2000. My appointment to the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia in 2001 was due to my publications on the failure of UN sanctions on Angola. From 2001-08 my focus was mostly on West Africa for the UN but I continued to oversee research and meetings of the Angola Forum at Chatham House. I was commissioned by the Department of War Studies, King's College to produce papers on UNITA's post-conflict reintegration in Angola (drawing on field work in Angola in 2005 for DFID) and on RENAMO's post-conflict reintegration (also drawing on additional field work in Mozambique in 2010 for DFID).

A chronological description tracing the development of the portfolio of evidence

My interest in armed non-state actors started in Mozambique in 1984, when I witnessed the spread of RENAMO and was forced to drive in armed convoy because of rebel attacks. By 1990 RENAMO were attacking regularly the suburbs of Mozambique's capital Maputo and I witnessed attacks for Africa Watch. My interest deepened during my first visit to Angola in 1992 for the elections there and my sense that post-Cold War these movements (UNITA and RENAMO) were changing and could not be dismissed as solely puppets of apartheid. I was interested in their agency, their ambitions and following the 1994 elections in Mozambique and the Lusaka Peace Accord in Angola, how these rebel groups might transform and become non-armed opposition parties.

My analysis on RENAMO and UNITA was helped by being a member of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia from 2001-03 and from 2005-07, Chair of the UN Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire. During this sojourn in West Africa, I saw at first hand armed non-state actors such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in Liberia, in addition to the Charles Taylor regime and the Forces Nouvelles (FN) in Côte d'Ivoire. This provided an empirical comparison to what I have observed in southern Africa in Angola and Mozambique, confirming that there are greater similarities between the development of RENAMO and UNITA due to Rhodesian and apartheid South African support, rather than the primarily resource driven predatory warlordism of the Mano River Union. This raised the overall question as to whether armed rebel groups can successfully be transformed into peaceful democratic opposition parties. With the end of the Angola and Mozambique civil wars, research became easier, although the resumption of limited conflict in Mozambique in 2013-14 highlighted the fragility of peace. The August 2014 agreement between RENAMO and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) is a reminder that Mozambican politics differs from that of Angola. In this portfolio I seek for the first time in my published work to draw out methodological and empirical learning from both countries.

> **An evaluative description of the contribution made by the portfolio of evidence to the subject or discipline area and any subsequent developments since the work was completed, including published reviews of any of the submitted works and/or evidence of citation frequency of the submitted works**

My portfolio consists of:

- one single authored book (two editions – 2nd was updated);

- two single authored published peer reviewed journal articles;

- one single authored published monograph;

- a joint authored peer reviewed book chapter (which was updated from a published peer reviewed journal article).

1a*. * Vines, A. *(1991) Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique.* London: James Currey, 176pp.

This is the only comprehensive study of the rebel movement from its creation in 1977 and 1991. It was the first publication to fully demonstrate that RENAMO was Mozambican even if it was originally created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Office (CIO) in 1977 and was foster parented by apartheid South Africa's Directorate of Special Tasks (DST) in 1980. A 2nd edition of this book was published in 1996 (now out of print) and benefitted from adding an analysis of RENAMO's transformation from rebel group to opposition party in Mozambique and the 1994 multiparty election results. It also drew on the author's freedom to travel in Mozambique, including as an UN official in 1994.

The 1st edition challenged the popular thesis at the time that Mozambique's civil war derived predominately from external destabilisation through RENAMO as a proxy force. It also tried to explain that RENAMO was a successful rebel movement, that it had limited secure government presence to the towns even if it used widespread violence and that it had limited popular support.

The book was widely used by policy makers and academics to understand RENAMO structures and ambitions. The UN Special Representative to Mozambique (1993-95) Aldo Ajello acknowledged to me in September 2008 at a Center for Conflict Resolution Seminar in Stellenbosch that this book assisted him in designing his strategy to dismantle RENAMO's command and control structure and was the first thing he read when accepting his appointment. According to Google Scholar the 1st edition of *Renamo* enjoyed 229 citations, many in key peer-reviewed academic journal articles. The second edition, had a further 120 citations, many also in peer-reviewed journals.

Paul Moorcraft in the *Journal of Southern African Studies* in 17 (4), 786 highlighted how this book broke new ground and challenged existing academic orthodoxy. He wrote:

> *Recently, the academic community, increasingly and grudgingly, has come to accept Renamo's credentials. Now Alex Vines's new book, Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique cuts through the centre of lumbering dinosaurs. His account is one of the most balanced to emerge in recent years: a one–stop handbook on all you ever wanted to know about Renamo.*

James Sidaway in the *Third World Quarterly* 13 (3), 567-*568* also highlights this paradigm shift:

> *Vines' book is a statement of what has effectively been a wider paradigm shift in Mozambican studies. Much greater emphasis is now placed on the prior internal factors which external destabilisation catalysed to produce such a destructive and protracted war. Vines however keeps this in perspective*.

Meanwhile *Foreign Affairs* 17 (2), 214 in a review by Gail Gerhart highlights the book's contribution, but recognises it is not definitive:

> *Vines' non polemical history of the murderous Renamo rebels pulls together many of the factual strands that must eventually form part of a balanced assessment, although he concedes that he has not fully fathomed the sociological reasons for the movements durability.*

William Gutteridge, in his review in the *Conflict Bulletin of the Research Institute for Study of Conflict and Terrorism*, in July 1991 highlighted the tension in the book trying to understand the use of violence and how RENAMO had become so successful:

> *[it] contains much new information about Renamo, in particular its internal structure and dimensions. His range of sources, including personal interviews with rebels, is impressive. He attempts to reconcile the two views of Renamo that on the one hand it depends on terror and has little in the way of ideology but at the same time is a military organisation with up to 20,000 combatants with a centralised leadership. It is not just an alliance of bandits and warlords.*

Margaret Hall in *African Affairs* 91 (363), 285 likewise highlighted the book's contribution to understanding RENAMO's structure and coherence but also the group's handicap of lacking any real political identity:

> *Vines stresses that external destabilization on its own is insufficient explanation for Mozambique's problems and seeks in his own words to demonstrate that Renamo is a real military-based organization and not – as is sometimes depicted – a loose collection of warlord bands. However, the message that comes through from the facts presented is slightly different. While these do demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt Renamo's coherence as a military force inside Mozambique, the theme of external direction and external interference runs strongly throughout two of his three main chapters. Clearly Renamo's failure to develop a political identity of any substance is intimately linked to the actions of these external forces and the internal tensions they have generated.*

Anthoni van Nieuwkark in the *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 10 (2), 97-98 also focussed on this aspect of the book, but draws out that RENAMO's only motivation is to force an elite negotiation for power-sharing:

Vines tries to put a perspective on his work. As previously mentioned, he argues that

Renamo is a real military-based organisation, not an umbrella for numerous groups

of uncoordinated "armed bandits", or loosely aligned warlords. However, Renamo is

devoid of a clear, well-thought-out political philosophy. These are important points

because of their implications for the current efforts to negotiate an end to the

war….Nor is Renamo a coherent political force. Although its external wing has in the

past formalised a political agenda, the Renamo set-up inside Mozambique has been

little concerned with the wider issue of politics, conceptualising them within a

localised rural context. The one issue uniting Renamo, Vines argues, has been the

search for a share of power with Frelimo.

Keith Somerville in *International Affairs* 68 (1), 198 is more negative in his review finding the research detail overwhelming. He writes:

the author also gets so minutely involved in day-to-day events and individuals that it

is hard in the absence of clear conclusions, to piece the whole puzzle together. But

for determined academics and researchers it is a mine of information, if they have

the time to sift through the debris

Kathleen Sheldon in *Africa Today* 39 (1/2), 139-141 disagrees with the book's main thesis that there is a Mozambican spine to RENAMO and says it is an 'incomplete analysis' as it misunderstands apartheid South Africa's agenda and tactics via its proxy:

the book appears to be a rebuttal to analyses that have focused on the central role

of the apartheid regime in fomenting strife in Mozambique. Thus while Vines does

provide the history of South African involvement, his emphasis is on how Renamo

found support in the villages of Mozambique. The unanswered question is this: if

Renamo has so much support in the rural areas, why must they kidnap and recruit forcibly? Why use the tactics of terror if they have a political agenda that Mozambicans might accept? A serious analysis of Renamo must deal with these issues….A second serious analytical problem is that Vines does not make the connection between Renamo attacks on schools and health posts (in fact he barely mentions these attacks) and South Africa's desire to control the regional economy. This can best be explained by recognizing "imperialism as a system articulating external and internal forces".

William Minter in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 28 (3), 613-617 saw the book's strength mainly for its empirical contribution. He writes:

The strength of the Vines' work is his diligent and energetic fact-gathering. There are a few minor lapses, likely to be corrected in the promised second edition.

The South African press also highlighted the book. The *Sunday Times* on 27 October 1991 in a review by Mike Miller and Hilary Anderson in the *Weekly Mail*, November 22 to 28, 1991 wrote that *'this encyclopedic little book is remarkable for both its honest approach and its density. It fully deserves the title which it is earning in Britain and America – "the handbook to Renamo"'*. And Gerald Shaw in the *Cape Times* on 29 January 1992 wrote *'although an unpretentious preliminary study, this is a good book, balanced and measured in its judgements. It should be read by all South Africans who believe in accountable government – as an object lesson in what can happen when a cult of military secrecy and clandestine operations goes out of control.'* António De Figueiredo in Portugal's *Jornal de Noticias* in January 1992 highlighted the books objectivity and that those wanting peace in Mozambique needed to read it. The UK's *Africa Analysis* on 26 July 1991 in its review concludes, *'Vines..provides a uniquely useful light on Renamo's murky origins and the means by which it manages to sustain itself'*.

1b. Vines, A. (1996) Renamo: from terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? **2**nd **edn. Oxford: James Currey, 209 pp.**

This 2nd edition benefited from additional archival and field research including in RENAMO controlled zones. It contains two new chapters and updates. The key argument of this second edition is that RENAMO was far better disciplined than the government forces and that its success as an armed rebel group drew on regional and ethnic identities. It also highlighted the difficulties that RENAMO would face in peace time, lacking skilled cadre and resources to effectively challenge the governments hegemony.

René Pélissier in a review article, 'Amazing Travellers, Strange Countries', in the *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22 (4), 665 concludes that the book highlighted the puzzle that Renamo did well in the 1994 elections despite its violent record. He wrote:

> *Vines' book is honest and that it goes well beyond propaganda to explain that – despite its recent past and the weaknesses of its organisational perspectives – it is not by chance that Renamo won the majority of seats in five out of eleven provinces in the October 1994 elections.*

Richard Synge in the *Journal of Refugee Studies* 10 (2), 213 concluded that in the second edition the analysis demonstrated that international mediation and particularly the UN played a vital role in ensuring peace continued. He wrote:

> *The beginning of Renamo's conversion into a more respectable political entity can be traced through the negotiating process, whereby churches, business interests and interested governments (both in the region and in the West), encouraged the movement to express itself in terms that elevated it from the bush context in which it had previously operated. Vines shows how this conversion was intensified and encouraged by the United Nations' peace operation between 1992 and 1994,*

particularly through financial incentives offered to Renamo leaders for their

compliance.

Steve Kibble in his review in *International Relations* 13 (3), 78-80 also highlighted the central paradox that RENAMO was centralised, violent and yet won significant votes in the 1994 elections. He wrote:

At the heart of this revised edition there is an interesting paradox. This is that the

centralisation of Renamo was understated in the first edition while, simultaneously,

insufficient regard was paid to the profound local differences in practice that characterised

(and continue to characterize) Renamo's operations. The first is illustrated by the fact that

the insurgency stopped everywhere almost immediately in 1992. For the second we are

directed to Renamo's very different practice in terms of terror and destruction or acceptance

of local customs in northern, central and southern areas of Mozambique. A further aspect

concerns the very localized election results. These do not necessarily correlate with differing

Renamo practice and certainly cannot be subsumed by simplistic ethnic explanation.

2. Vines, A. (1998) 'Disarmament in Mozambique'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24 (1), 191-205

This paper took the research beyond the civil war in Mozambique to the immediate post-conflict disarmament phase. Based on field research in Mozambique in 1994 and 1995 it focused on the UNOMOZ's main failure during its mandate to conduct meaningful disarmament. This paper benefitted from my interviews with ex-combatants in Assembly Areas describing how they saw their weapons as insurance policies and also highlighted the lack of trust in local institutions, especially the police.

The paper argued that to disarm all individuals would have been impossible but the UN should have destroyed the weapons it had obtained and earmarked for decommissioning. Its analysis

found that UNOMOZ's failure was linked to its weak mandate that did not spell out what disarmament required and the criteria for success. However it concluded that post UN-disarmament was more successful since mine action organisations and faith groups played an important role. It found, further, that over this period whereas hidden arms caches became less of an internal threat, transit smuggling of small arms and light weapons to South Africa became a greater problem. The paper demonstrated that disarmament is an open-ended process and should not just be seen, as was typical at that time as a technical intervention and that its success depends on politics and communities sense of security.

This article was cited according to Google Scholar in over 20 peer-reviewed journal articles and monographs and books.

With hindsight it became apparent that though the article correctly identified that disarmament was a political process, it assumed like others that over time the weapons from the conflict would degrade and not pose a renewed threat in Mozambique. Only later did I assess poor stockpile management (Vines 2007). Nor did I or others then anticipate that in 2013 RENAMO would remobilize and that hidden stockpiles provided the ex-rebels weapons to conduct limited conflict.

3. Vines, A. (1999) Angola Unravels: the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process. New York: Human Rights Watch, 205pp

Having researched Mozambique's civil war and post-conflict interventions it was a natural progression to consider the parallel processes going on in Angola. This 200 page monograph covering the 1995-8 peace process is based primarily on fieldwork in Angola, Zambia and South Africa between 1995 and 1999. Additional field work was gathered in Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, France, the Netherlands and the US in 1998 and in South Africa and Zambia in 1999. It included interviewing government officials, UNITA rebels, refugees in Zambia and internally displaced in Angola. It also included visiting areas controlled by UNITA, and the quartering areas.

Angola Unravels also investigated why both sides returned to all-out war despite significant international support including by two UN peacekeeping missions, UNAVEM III and its successor, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). It concluded that the failure was not simply, as others had claimed, due to the bad faith of UNITA. Rather, it offered an alternative analysis that suggested that the UN's strategy of refraining from disclosure of public action against violations of the accords, its lack of transparency, and its failure to implement UN embargoes undermined any respect that UNITA or the government had to observe the Lusaka Protocol.

This research fed into several processes – one was the tightening of UN embargoes on UNITA, another was the creation of the Kimberley process on conflict diamonds – which Human Rights with Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada were encouraging. When the monograph was published, it attracted widespread media attention. In the feature, 'Making Money out of Angola', *The Economist* – 18 September 1999 - highlighted that the monograph '*documents the multiple failings of the UN peace process, putting forward more sophisticated theories about who is to blame for the resumed fighting. The rebels and the government are roundly condemned. But the UN itself comes in for quite a pasting*'.

While Gail M. Gerhart in *Foreign Affairs* 79 (4) stated that:

> *sustained by bountiful deposits of oil and diamonds and prolonged by inept politicians and their corrupt international accomplices, Angola's civil war now lurches into its 26th year*. This *report recounts the failures of the Angolans and the United Nations to consolidate the peace process begun by the Lusaka accord of November 1994, detailing the abuses committed by the warring parties since that date. Although rightly placing most of the blame for Angola's nightmare on Jonas Savimbi, the report also underscores the repeated inability of the U.N. to intervene decisively, take human rights violations seriously, or enforce its own sanctions. After backing Savimbi's ruinous ambitions for a decade and a half, the United States changed sides in the early 1990s and has since supported the peace effort. The report finds that had*

foreign governments and the U.N. done less to placate elites and more to encourage civil

society, Angolans would have suffered less.

René Pélissier in the *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26 (3), 573-582 noted that:

the reader can at least be assured of a work based on an extensive exploration and

exploitation of all (or most) the sources of information, both oral and written, which the

author has been able to collate from ten different countries (but not including Portugal) from

1995 to 1999. Vines works like a vacuum cleaner, but he is sufficiently up on his subject

material to provide the necessary coherence to this unrivalled collection of source materials.

From his classification of the materials and from his conclusions, the picture which emerges is

that of colossal failure on the part of both Angolan politicians and generals on the one hand,

and of the international community on the other.

Patrick Chabal in his review for *Portuguese Studies* 16, 301-302 observed that:

These chapters are clearly written and highly informative, based as they are on first-hand

accounts or identifiable documents. They provide much useful information about the

unravelling of the peace process.

Despite some general reservation he believed:

The greatest strength of Angola Unravels is the meticulous attention devoted to the clear

presentation of properly documented evidence. It is particularly impressive in the detail it

provides on the range of atrocities perpetrated by both sides and on the sanction busting as

well as embargo violations that have taken place. The data presented in the book makes it

clear that the war is continuing in Angola primarily because neither side believes that peace

is a better alternative.

Meanwhile Norrie MacQueen in the *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39 (1), 173-174 questioned the central thesis of the monograph that human rights violations '*by both sides in the conflict – and more especially their disregard by the international community – have been a major factor in the failure of the peace process*'. Nevertheless he concedes that:

> *the report provides an excellent narrative history of a situation, the unfolding of which has been as complex as it has been horrific….Inevitably, some fundamental questions are suggested, but remain unanswered (and are probably unanswerable). Perhaps the most fundamental is simply whether or to what extent the Angola situation is amenable to externally driven resolution.*

Chester Crocker writing in *The World Today* 56 (1), 23 echoed these concerns over being over reliant on a human rights methodology to analyse the collapse of the Lusaka peace process writing that the monograph:

> *sheds welcome light on the dismal human rights picture in a country controlled by birth by factional elites who are unaccountable to anyone. Approximately half of the volume eloquently documents the human rights and humanitarian results of their leadership…. While it sharply criticises the human rights conduct of both sides, the book clearly treats UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi as the party that has done the most to block peace. Other observers might point to a more complex history involving an imposed peace, an imperfectly implemented or enforced set of external constraints, and an increasingly tilted playing field. Those factors have had the sad but predictable consequence of driving the weaker side into isolation and irrational behaviour.*

Steve Kibble though in his review in *International Relations* 63 (6), 63-65 highlighted that:

> *Vines' account is well-researched particularly on the details of the violations of arms embargoes and human rights including sexual oppression and media censorship, and the regional dimensions of the conflict…. Vines is perhaps more useful for a broader understanding, not least*

in bringing out the negative lessons to be learnt - the cost of ignoring human rights violations, of

failures to ensure compliance with the peace agreements and of the distrust of both sides for

each other.

4. Vines, A. and Oruitemeka, B. (2009) 'Beyond bullets and ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola'. In *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict.* ed by. Berdal, M. and Ucko, B. Abingdon: Routledge Studies in Intervention and Statebuilding, 199-224

(This peer reviewed book chapter is updated from a peer reviewed journal article of Vines, A. and Oruitemeka, B. (2008) *Conflict, Security and Development* 8 (2), 241-265.

From the peace process in Angola my research turned to the political transformations in the new post-conflict democracy. Based on field work in Angola in 2005, this article charted the fortunes of the former rebel movement UNITA and assessed how successfully it had transformed itself from a rebel movement into the leading opposition party and what its future prospects are. This research entailed analysis of government documents interviews with UNITA demobilised and built upon earlier publications especially the work of Porto, Parsons and Alden (2007). Its primary aim was to see how successfully UNITA ex-combatants had reintegrated.

The paper argued that following military defeat UNITA faced problems similar to other political opposition parties in Africa. It found few signs that UNITA is particularly disadvantaged by its violent past, though the lost seats in the 2008 legislative elections did mean lost revenue. This paper showed that despite the length of the conflict and military defeat, UNITA ex-combatants re-integrated surprisingly successfully into their communities and that the Angolan government needed NGO support to assist their efforts. It did not however predict that UNITA would regain seats in the 2012 elections and make electoral gains in Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) territory.

The original article in *Conflict, Security and Development* has been cited in a number of peer reviewed journals.

5. Vines, A. (2013) 'Renamo's Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique'.
***International Peacekeeping* 20 (3), 375-393**

To conclude the research I returned to Mozambique to review the years following the disarmament period to see how the reintegration process of RENAMO had fared. It found that in Mozambique a 'pay them and scatter' approach to demobilization and reintegration had actually worked well. Notwithstanding a patchy and incomplete disarmament process, some 20 years after the civil war ended the research found that, 'many RENAMO combatants have successfully reintegrated', and the group 'does not have the capacity to return to war' (Vines 2013: 390).

During those years RENAMO contested four presidential and parliamentary elections, becoming the largest opposition party in Africa until 2002. However, since then, it has been less successful due to exclusion politics by the party of government FRELIMO and because of tactical mistakes by Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO's leader since 1980. The research found that Dhlakama's leadership was critical in bringing an end to the conflict and delivering RENAMO's demobilisation, but that he was unable to tactically change from a guerrilla mentality. It concluded that Dhlakama's decision to return to rural central Mozambique in late 2012 and the armed violence that followed in 2013 was out of political desperation. The analysis suggested that RENAMO lacks the support or resources to return to civil war, and a splinter party, Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM) has benefitted. This paper is the first to contextualise and explain RENAMO's tactical decision to return to limited armed conflict in 2013-14 and to explain not only leadership deficiencies and poor elite re-integration, but the political challenge from MDM.

Between its publication date on 7 November 2013 and 7 August 2014, the article has been viewed 176 times. Chris Cramer from SOAS tweeted on 15 November 2013, 'Alex Vines' piece on

Renamo and politics of reintegration in Mozambique - interesting in light of recent clashes'(Cramer 2013). The article generated significant debate in Mozambique following a feature about it by Gustavo Mavie, 'Académico britânico denuncia Dhlakama' in the main daily state-owned newspaper, *Notícias* on 10 June 2014 (Mavie 2014). This article took a pro-Frelimo slant and was used to buttress the government's negotiating position with RENAMO. It resulted in a significant debate on blogs and in the social media such as on Face Book and an increase of requests for the article including from negotiators, mediators of the peace talks, diplomats, business people and academics.

A description, synthesis and evaluation of any links between the outputs and the development of the portfolio of evidence.

The topic of African rebel movements in general has attracted a body of academic writing but much of the theorizing and analysis has drawn from the Horn of Africa, West Africa and Central Africa rather than Angola and Mozambique, and most of it has ignored their relationship to the democratic process.

An early key text was Clapham's edited volume on *African Guerrillas* (Clapham 1998: 7). There he sought to define four broad groups, liberation insurgencies, separatist insurgencies, reform insurgencies and warlord insurgencies. He categorises UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique as warlord insurgencies. Unlike in West Africa, or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), one can distinguish UNITA after Angola's independence in 1975 and RENAMO on ideological grounds from the governments they opposed, both offering pro-Western, capitalist and democratic credentials that were designed to attract external backing. As my work records, however, Clapham is wrong in arguing that this handicapped them. UNITA in 1992 won significant votes and forced an arranged presidential run-off (though it never occurred) and RENAMO had surprisingly good results up to the 1994 and 1999 elections and in 1999 came within a small margin of winning the presidential vote (some believe they actually won).

There has in recent years been a growing body of research building on the work of scholars such as Duffield (1998), MacKinlay (2000), Reno (2000), who foremost have focused their attention on explaining the appearance of warlords and other scholars who have examined what characterises such military leaders and the possibilities of using them as an alternative form of governance in failed states (Jackson 2003 and MacKinlay 2000). Many of these scholars have focused on war-to-peace transitions, but they have not included the democratic process into their analysis. Much of the recent literature has focused on warlords as military spoilers (Beswick 2009), how peacemakers can induce or force such elites to support peace (MacKinlay 2000; Martern 2013; Peake et al 2005) and the difficulties of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combtants (DDR) in societies where warlords continue to hold power (Bhatia and Muggah 2009).

Analysis of what has occurred in Angola and Mozambique in particular is scarce in this literature although Manning (2002: 19) has argued that post-conflict democratization in Mozambique is in effect 'a process of protracted elite bargaining that occurs within and outside of formal democratic institutions'. In Mozambique the decision to introduce multi-party politics was the result of elite bargaining between the party of government, the FRELIMO and RENAMO, incentivised by a number of factors, such as conflict fatigue and especially international donor pressure.

In addition, the trajectories of RENAMO and UNITA are also different from one another, again showing the limitations of using Clapham's categories. UNITA leader Savimbi rejected the multiparty election results in 1992 and returned to war before being forced by battlefield setbacks to seek a further truce and power sharing in 1994. He was later to return to war and was killed in conflict in March 2002. Savimbi tried through armed conflict to take over the recognized governments, but failing this created a quasi-government that tried to replicate the state. My research for *Angola Unravels* but also more recent field research by Pearce (2013) has shown Clapham to be correct in this regard. Savimbi believed also that he could capture the Angolan state through returning to war, very different from RENAMO's Dhlakama – who saw violence as a tool to

facilitate elite bargaining. Hence despite the peace agreement that RENAMO signed in 1994 and its participation in elections, it returned to limited armed conflict in early 2013 in order to extract concessions during 74 rounds of talks with the Mozambican government that has resulted in a new agreement in August 2014.

My contribution to this scholarship has been to show how UNITA and RENAMO have adapted their strategies over time as opposition parties within the democratic processes. This is not a linear process and as highlighted above there are significant differences between RENAMO and UNITA. My research in particular illustrates the agency of both armed groups to determine their political future by the early 1990s and the limitations on international engagement to support the end of both conflicts. My research in Angola and Mozambique also highlights that within the literature on post-war democratization and peace building there has been an analytical failure to assess whether and how ex-guerrilla leaders can become peaceful democrats. Although much is written about post-war democratization, scholars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Manning 2004; Söderberg Kovacs 2007) have overlooked the possibility of using individual leaders such as warlords and the informal networks that they possess as a unit of analysis. In the case of Mozambique a key question remains why and how RENAMO after twenty years was able to remobilise its ex-combatants, what incentivised this and what does this tell us about post-conflict peace building?

My writings on Angola and Mozambique also contrast significantly with the findings from the West Africa academic literature of Utas (2012) on Big Men networks and Reno's (2000) pessimistic conclusion that the destruction of war time militia networks has failed and leads to criminal networks that do not provide long term stability. I demonstrate that this has not been the experience of Angola and Mozambique post-conflict and illustrates that we should not over generalise from the West African and Central African examples as Reno (2000) and Clapham (1998)

have done. There is also a danger of over generalising about Angola and Mozambique when in fact significant differences exist in how both conflicts developed and ended.

Mozambique

My analysis on RENAMO in the 1990s stand up well when tested by recent research on RENAMO during the period 1977-1992. In the first comprehensive study of RENAMO since my 1996 book Emerson agrees with my thesis that RENAMO became addicted to Rhodesian and later South African Defence Force support (Emerson 2013). He concludes that RENAMO's military effectiveness for much of its existence was largely rooted in its Rhodesian and South African patrimony, adherence to a guerrilla warfare strategy, strong command and control and a steady source of war material.

Emerson confirms what the reviewers of my book questioned, that RENAMO only tried to define its own political identity in the late 1980s, once it had to survive largely on its own. Likewise he follows my interpretation that attempts by the South Africans to hand-pick and manipulate the political leadership stymied the natural growth of a strong political leadership within RENAMO's guerrilla ranks – which is a handicap to this day. It also meant that the insurgents were never able to mobilize and politicize the population until after the Rome General Peace Accord in 1992 (Vines 2014).

With hindsight I can now see that though in 1991 I identified the importance of radio equipment for RENAMO's command and control, I missed that when their batteries failed in 1989, RENAMO's battle field success also suffered and that this provided an opening for mediation - like the offer of satellite phones by the Italian mediators in 1991 in exchange for progress in the Rome peace talks.

My *International Peacekeeping* article also highlighted that post-conflict interventions should not be seen as solely technical processes, but need to be deeply political. The success of the UN in Mozambique, as I show was due to the UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello's political reading

of the situation in 1993-94 and an understanding of his limitations. What I did not forsee is that twenty years on RENAMO could still access stocks of weapons and draw upon a network of ex-combatants that were able to resume limited armed conflict in 2013-14.

My book on RENAMO and the paper on disarmament in Mozambique was (one of) the first to make clear that especially conflict fatigue but also the UN DDR strategy successfully degraded RENAMO's military command and control structures through a 'pay them and scatter' approach to demobilization. In short reintegration actually worked rather well in Mozambique and ex-combatants have successfully reintegrated and the group did not have the capacity to return to full war.

What neither I nor others have yet understood is the post-war relationships of RENAMO's low – and mid -ranked veterans and their relationship to RENAMO's leadership. Studies in West Africa, show that long-after conflict is over military networks are involved in a myriad of activities such as election campaigning, illicit trade, private security, mining and criminality. These studies suggest these structures are not just based on former military structures but are shaped by patronage relationships (see Christensen and Utas 2008; Themnér 2012) but this has yet to be tested in the Mozambique context.

I argue in my *International Peacekeeping* article that RENAMO has been incompetent as a political party and has not been able to adapt to peacetime Mozambican politics. The personality and paranoia of Dhlakama has contributed to this – with his expulsion of talent. My future research may well benefit from the Big Man network analysis from West Africa in deepening my explanation as to why despite rapidly degrading fortunes Dhlakama could still remobilize ageing ex-combatants, 20 years after the Mozambican conflict ended because of patronage politics. Nikkie Wiegink (2015 forthcoming) argues that I have downplayed the relationships of dependency between Dhlakama and his followers. Wiegink says there are some 3,000 RENAMO ex-combatants living in Maringue district in central Mozambique (although this actually should be described as all of Sofala province) and they have been 'waiting' for the party to provide them benefits. This may be true and if so confirms that

Mozambique's politics are localised and that whilst RENAMO was unable to return to full conflict, its structures remained intact enough in central Mozambique to return to limited violence.

Beyond frustrated ex-combatants why did, despite its inability to deliver, RENAMO win 37.8 percent of the vote in 1994 and 38.8% in the 1999 elections? There are even suggestions that Dhlakama may have won the presidential vote in 1999 (but denied through electoral fraud), giving FRELIMO the fright of its life and explaining the subsequent closing of democratic space in Mozambique. Carrie Manning (2002), as I cite in my *International Peacekeeping* article, already noted the decline of RENAMO in 1995, so it maybe that this vote was more of a protest vote against FRELIMO, rather than support for Dhlakama and RENAMO. My work has however identified the likely future challenges for RENAMO. When I interviewed Dhlakama in September 2010 in Nampula, his greatest concern was not FRELIMO, but MDM. It seems that Mozambique is moving gradually from liberation politics and the growing urban middle classes are seeking an alternative to vote for. As happened in Zimbabwe with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and in Angola with the emergence of the Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola - Coligação Eleitoral (CASA-CE), are we seeing the slow decline of Liberation Movements?

My understanding is that RENAMO has probably calculated that it will continue to decline and that its best chance of slowing that decline is to seek agreement with FRELIMO and thereby jointly challenge MDM. After 74 rounds of talks since late 2012, RENAMO in late August 2014 finally signed a new ceasefire and Dhlakama returned to Maputo in early September 2014 to endorse the agreement with President Guebuza. Dhlakama has obtained concessions over politicisation of the electoral system and additional jobs in the military. There will be international observers to monitor the peace and RENAMO has obtained an amnesty for crimes committed during recent fighting backdated to March 2012. Although this agreement provides the basis for RENAMO to campaign for the 15 October 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections, the negotiations will still continue.

Unresolved is the transfer of 'residual forces of Renamo' into the army and the police, funds for RENAMO and reducing FRELIMO party influence in the state.

This agreement accords with a recurrent pattern that I highlighted in my publications on RENAMO – namely that Dhlakama has been unable to adapt to non-violent pluralistic politics. As he has tried to maintain Big Men linkages, he has needed to extract concessions through targeted violence, bluster and threats. This in the short term will have strengthened Dhlakama's position but the key test will be the presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2014 and how strong RENAMO's vote is, or whether there continues to be a swing towards MDM.

The municipal elections of 2013 were boycotted by RENAMO resulting in MDM winning four of the 53 contested municipalities and also securing 40 per cent of the votes both in the capital, Maputo and Matola. The emergence of MDM in the south in this manner is something RENAMO never achieved. Why RENAMO has been so inept at building itself up, especially at local government level remains a research question to be answered. What also needs further research is why RENAMO felt it needed to tactically return to limited armed conflict in October 2012. My initial conclusions have suggested that the answer lies in its leadership, growing frustration of its ex-combatants in central Mozambique, fuelled possibly by rising national expectations of natural resource endowments windfalls but also the introduction in 2011 of new legislation in which the government recognised the right of war veterans to a pension. Although in typical fashion RENAMO voted against this in the National Assembly, RENAMO veterans in theory benefit but obtaining the pension is a lengthy and frustrating process that can take several years – heightening a sense of discrimination, as RENAMO veterans are often lacking even the basic education to navigate such processes.

My analysis is that the re-integration of RENAMO ex-combatants should be seen as an open-ended long-term process that is not just technical and includes political inclusion. This, I argue, suggests that there is a need for strategies to accommodate clusters of combatants that remain

structured around mid- low level commanders. Helping the Mozambican government to effectively distribute veteran pensions (such as 600 Meticais per month – about £14), could be one of those.

My unique contribution among scholarship is that I have regularly interviewed key players in Mozambique over twenty years, including Presidents Chissano and Guebuza, Afonso Dhlakama, Raul Domingos, Aldo Ajello, Bishop Sengulane, Mario Raffaeli, José Pacheco and many others. This has provided insights to test other scholars and commentators work. I have come to conclude that Dhlakama was a good tactical commander for RENAMO during the civil war but never a strategic one and that he became increasingly insecure in peacetime. The role of individual high-level commanders and their inability to accept elite peaceful re-integration needs scholarly attention. There is a body of research now on mid and lower level commanders but we lack sufficient methodological tools to assess the role of elite individuals and their potential to spoil post conflict agreements. My article in *International Peacekeeping* suggests that elite level reintegration is equally important to ensure lasting peace.

 Angola

My publications on Angola, likewise show how UNITA has evolved over time from being fully supported by apartheid South Africa and the second largest recipient of covert aid from the US government to having by the mid- 1990s to survive on its own.

On the one hand UNITA is different from RENAMO, in that it was a nationalist movement in the 1960s, and it was led by a charismatic leader - Jonas Savimbi. On the other hand it shared with RENAMO significant covert support which in its case only ended in the late 1990s, when it had to become increasingly predatory. My interviews with Angolan refugees and internally displaced from 1995-99 illustrate this shift, with UNITA becoming increasingly dependent on the diamond trade to fund its operations. These field work insights complement the work of Reno (2000) who also noticed a shift to predatory behaviour in West Africa as Cold War sources of support dried up.

My monograph *Angola Unravels* highlights the horrors of civil war in Angola – which I witnessed at first hand - and the international efforts to mediate but also encourage and finally force an end of the conflict through UN sanctions. Though researching in a hot war zone is never easy, it enabled me to observe first- hand the limitations of international mediation. My conclusion was then and still is (see Guyot C. and Vines, A. chapters in *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, forthcoming 2015) that the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) only worked because there was Angolan political will for it. On reflection I believe a weakness of *Angola Unravels* was that it tried to place a neo-liberal human rights thesis to the Angolan conflict as some reviewers have suggested. As Marcus Power (Power 2001: 499) observed: 'Four decades of conflict would seem to suggest, however, there is no 'key' to this particular conflict'. Yet Power drew on the research and recommendations of my monograph to highlight that complexity and argue for a much more detailed study of the political economy of Angola (Power 2001: 499). Such a book has yet to be written.

The analysis of *Angola Unravels* drew upon field data gathered from 1995-99 and was widely cited by scholarship and policy makers trying to understand the dynamics of the Angolan conflict. I provided a detailed account of the collapse of the Lusaka peace process, its drivers and the return to war. The academic journal reviews of the monograph all recognised this important contribution including my primary source access to policy makers, government and rebel officials, NGOs and refugees and internationally displaced. I also wrote a series of further scholarly contributions that built upon research in this monograph, such as on civil society in Angola (Kibble and Vines 2001), on the failure of UN sanctions in Angola (Vines 2004); showing that Paul Colliers' greed theory is not applicable to Angola (Ganesan and Vines 2004) and on the limitations of UN operations in Angola (Guyot and Vines, forthcoming 2015).

No one else conducted field work including in rebel controlled areas and published primary data in this manner. My monograph remains an important source of primary data on the Angolan

conflict and Stephen Weigert (2011) in his account of Angola's thirty years of war cites my work extensively on the post 1992 period. Weigert argues that Savimbi got caught trying to merge revolutionary ideology with pragmatic military and political goals and is one of the few other scholars with Guimarães (2002) to evaluate the importance of Jonas Savimbi for UNITA. From this perspective of ours it was no surprise that after Savimbi was killed by government forces on 22 February 2002, the government quickly made a unilateral declaration of truce and offered to allow UNITA to reorganize and integrate into national political life and enjoy an amnesty. On 4 April 2002 the Luena Memorandum of Understanding was formally signed in Luanda – officially ending the war.

As quickly as May 2002 – some 85 percent of UNITA's military had gathered at demobilisation camps. This was in stark contrast to previous attempts at DDR in Angola. In the *Angola Unravels* monograph and in the chapter I wrote on reintegration of UNITA in Angola I show that it is not only about getting DDR mechanics right. Political will is essential. My research highlighted that plenty of resources were given to UNAVEM III, when it was deployed in 1995 to assist the Lusaka Protocols, nevertheless the operation still failed and repeated the mistakes of 1991-1992. It was only the death of Savimbi and UNITA's effective military defeat that the war came to an end. I show in my chapter 'Beyond Bullets and Ballots' on the Angola DDR process that it was 'dogged with logistical problems', disarmament was patchy and reintegration difficult, but it was successful because returning to war is no longer an option. This chapter remains the most up-to-date academic assessment on Angolan DDR and reintegration.

As Berdal and Ucko (2009: 6) concluded about my research on UNITA DDR and reintegration, this case study offers a critical lesson that DDR programmes, however well designed and resourced, can never carry 'peace processes' on their own but must, if they are to be successful, form part of wider political process'. One implication of this highlighted in both my work on Mozambique and Angola is that effective political integration of armed forces is necessary after any cessation of hostilities.

A critical reflection using an appropriate methodology, model or theory on the candidate's development as a research practitioner

My understanding of the insurgencies of Angola and Mozambique developed over time. My field work in Angola from 1992 to 2002 and in Mozambique from 1985 to 1992 was conducted during armed conflict. Although this allowed me to observe the conflicts at first hand, and see both armed groups in operation, only with peace and time have I been able to place these groups in a broader theoretical context. My professional experience in West Africa has also assisted this, and the growing academic literature on War Lords and Big Men networks that have increasingly been used to examine the limitations of DDR.

My research was greatly assisted by moving from an NGO advocacy organisation that tried to explain politics through a liberal democracy, human rights paradigm. Political accountability and social justice are important but understanding the political economy, incentives, networks and trading for peace processes and settlement more so as De Waal has argued (2009).

I have been advantaged by having access to many leadership level interviews in Angola and Mozambique, but although I visited Nampula, Mozambique in 2010 and central Angola in 2004 – the rest of my interviews have been in Maputo and Luanda or outside both countries. *My International Peacekeeping* article on RENAMO failed to interview RENAMO ex-combatants in central Mozambique and hence failed to spot the regional variation that Wiegink (2013) has analysed.

My research on Mozambique could have benefited from looking more deeply at elite habituation and examining how formal electoral contests are supplemented by informal interactions. It does seem that twenty years after the end of the civil war RENAMO has not wanted to drop the rough parity it enjoys as an armed group. RENAMO has consistently sought to benefit through informal networks as it is singularly ill equipped to compete in formal political structures. The game changer is that the growing middle class and urban poor is challenging this logic – and support is

shifting to MDM (and CASA-CE in Angola). How this breaks the dualistic political norm that has

determined Mozambique and Angolan politics since 1992 needs to be further researched.

Full statements on the extent of the contributions of all other persons where some or all of the

outputs submitted are collaborative

The research was carried personally and these publications except for submission 4 ('Beyond bullets

and ballots') are single authored. Bereni Oruitemeka was the second author. She was an intern at

Chatham House and I commissioned her to review my past writings on Angola and provide a

template from that material to write a journal article. I then crafted it and conducted the research. I

was fully responsible for the updated book chapter as she had left Chatham House for employment

elsewhere.

Conclusion and suggestions for future work

Already in May 1997 RENAMO used protests in five provinces to intimidate the government

and seek concessions. RENAMO's core problem is that it has failed to deliver promises made to the

public during war time and has no independent source of funding to maintain itself. RENAMO was ill

prepared for peace and as my research showed, has been poorly equipped to compete in a formal

political process. If it had changed leader, could this have been different? As has been demonstrated

recently in Zimbabwe with the dramatic decline of the MDC, quality of leadership and strategy in the

competition against a dominant party counts (until the MDC won 99 seats in the 2009 elections,

RENAMO was the largest opposition party in Africa).

Afonso Dhlakama has likened RENAMO's struggle for power to the pain of a woman in birth

– but twenty years is a long time to wait. The recent violence in Mozambique was a desperate ploy to

seek compensation through an elite bargain. The August 2014 agreement will in the short term

strengthen Dhlakama's hand, but this could be weakened if RENAMO loses significant seats in the

October 2014 elections. The rise of MDM and the threat it poses to both the established parties

requires further research. The question now arises as to whether this alternative actually encourages greater democratic _reversal_ in Mozambique?

Angola has shown a different trajectory from Mozambique. When UNITA's leader was killed in 2002 it looked as if UNITA subsequently would become a marginalised force. Indeed the hegemony of the dominant party (the MPLA) has not yet been challenged, but the 2012 legislative elections do suggest a small UNITA rebound. Defeated on the battlefield (unlike RENAMO), UNITA has acknowledged it needs to re-craft itself and also create its own networks and businesses to sustain itself.

Similar to the MDM in Mozambique, a new political coalition (CASA-CE) is also starting to erode the support base of the MPLA and attract youth and urban middle class voters. It is too early to assess what this means longer term and the failure of MDC in Zimbabwe is a salutary lesson, but the research question for Angola is whether we are seeing the slow death of liberation movements that Southall (2013) believes is occurring?

In the near future I intend to use this research base to write a journal article comparing the fortunes of RENAMO and UNITA and adding to the academic debate on War Lord Democrats – as the West Africa and DRC models do not match my findings. I have also drafted a chapter on RENAMO for a forthcoming book on _War Lord Democrats_ edited by Anders Themnér (forthcoming 2015).

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