UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

HONOR IDEOLOGY AND PERCEPTIONS OF COERCED FALSE CONFESSIONS

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

AARON POMERANTZ
Norman, Oklahoma
2021

HONOR IDEOLOGY AND PERCEPTIONS OF COERCED FALSE CONFESSIONS

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

BY THE COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF

Dr. Mauricio Carvallo, Chair

Dr. Scott Gronlund

Dr. Hairong Song

Dr. Ryan P. Brown

Dr. Stephanie Burge

To my wife, Katherine:

אשת היל מי ימצא ורחק מפנינים מכרה בטח בה לב בעלה ושלל לא
יחסרץ גמלתהו טוב ולא רא כל ימי הייה

To my parents, Drs. Jeffrey Pomerantz and Trudy Carswell-Pomerantz:
"All that is good in me began with you."

I owe unpayable debts of gratitude to Dr. Kevin Bell, Marie Altgilbers, Austin Collins, Jennifer Shadle Klicker, and most especially my sister Leah, all of whom have been sounding boards for ideas, shoulders to cry on, and sources of support and encouragement throughout my graduate school career.

Finally, to Dr. Collin Dallas Barnes:
Like it or not, this is all your fault.

"He has told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord demands of you. Act justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with your God."
Micah 6:8

SDG

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Abstract

Within the field of psychology and law, a great deal of research has investigated issues of jury decision-making. It is well-documented that, in addition to the formal legal restrictions and guides placed upon their behavior, jurors will also attend to (legally speaking) irrelevant factors when making determinations of guilt or sentencing. While several specific constructs have been investigated for their influence on jurors' decision-making processes, there is a paucity of research examining the influence of culture. The four studies described herein represent an attempt at such an examination by investigating perceptions and judgements of coerced false confessions through the lens of honor ideology, a cultural framework centering around maintaining and upholding personal reputation. It is well-established that confessions, even when potentially coerced, are perceived as indicating guilt. It is also well-established that individuals coerced into falsely confessing are more likely to be convicted and, upon exoneration, stigmatized, both by juries and the public at large. Because of honor's central value of reputation, honor endorsers might be less likely to find the idea of coerced false confessions plausible, as a coerced false confession would be perceived as voluntarily harming ones' own reputation, and thus utterly incompatible with honor norms and worthy of stigmatization. Study 1 examines the relationship between different facets of honor and specific attitudes and beliefs about coerced false confessions and the interrogation techniques that elicit them. Study 2 examines honor's influence on perceptions of coerced false confessors as compared to those who do not confess or those who are factually guilty. Studies 3 and 4 examine honor's influence on perceptions and judgements of coerced false confessions in both criminal and civil jury decision-making paradigms. Results indicate honor to drive effects previously examined in the literature, including perceiving coerced false confessions as being less likely to occur and uniquely stigmatizing coerced false confessors.

Introduction

The right to a trial by a jury of one's peers is fundamental to most Western legal systems, enshrined both in English Common Law and the United States' Constitution (Brooks, 2009; Maitland & Montague, 1915). The importance of studying juries comes from the fact that juries are the only opportunity most individuals will have to interact with the legal system, and it is therefore unsurprising that so much psychological research has focused upon jury decision-making (Arkes & Mellers, 2002; Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Devine et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2002). Unfortunately, jury-members in a courtroom will be subject to the same biases and flaws that affect decision-making in non-courtroom contexts. Indeed, juries can be even more prone to flawed decision-making, due to the specific circumstances in which they operate (for reviews, see Kovera, 2017; Levett et al., 2005; Sherrod, 2019).

It has been well-documented that jurors rely on extra-legal factors when making decisions, even when they are specifically prohibited from doing so, and especially when presented with ambiguous evidence. Given that almost every trial relies on ambiguous evidence (as non-ambiguous cases are almost always handled by plea bargaining, itself a severe, albeit separate problem of the justice system, Arkes & Mellers, 2002; Boyll, 1991; Butterfield & Bitter, 2019; Edkins & Redlich, 2019; Greene et al., 2004; Henderson & Levett, 2018; Redlich et al., 2017; Ruva & Guenther, 2015; 2017), psychological research has attempted to examine and identify just what type of extra-legal information jurors use in their decision-making process.

Some of this research has investigated individual features of jurors themselves, such as their gender, punitiveness, and political ideology (Bray & Noble, 1978; Butler & Moran, 2002; 2007; Chadee, 1996; Clark & Wink, 2012; Daudistel et al., 1999; Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984; Klein & Kastorin, 1999; Narby et al., 1993; Rodriguez et al.,

2018; Thompson et al., 1984; Vitriol & Kovera, 2018). However, this research has often produced inconclusive and/or contradictory results, especially when considering the predictive power of ideology on determining the guilt and deciding on the punishment for the accused. While some ideologies, such as authoritarianism, seem to possess predictive power for certain juror preferences and decisions (e.g., bias towards the prosecution, presumptions of guilt, etc.), other ideologies, such as political orientation or religiosity, have shown a less consistent impact, indicating the relationship between these ideologies and decision-making preferences to be dependent on other relevant variables (Devine et al., 2001). In order to further elucidate the study of juror decision-making, it would be beneficial for psychologists to consider other variables and constructs, such as culture, that might help to further explain precisely how jurors make decisions.

The paucity of research investigating the potential influence of culture on jury decision-making is somewhat surprising. Since juries are often the "consciences of [their] community," it is very likely that they will be influenced by and reflect cultural values and beliefs (Clark & Wink, 2012, p. 131). It is further surprising that cultural influences have not been considered, as culture contains a number of implications for models of jury-decision-making that have long been used within the literature.

Theoretical Models of Jury Decision-Making

Two complementary models have emerged to explain how and why juror decision-making makes use of extra-legal information when attempting to decide upon a defendant's guilt: the Liberation Model (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966) and the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992; 1993).

The Liberation Model

The Liberation Model (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966) states that jurors will rely on the legal norms and standards designed to limit their decision-making when the evidence in a case is clear (i.e., "open and shut"). However, when evidence is ambiguous, jurors are more likely to feel "liberated" from legal constraints and restrictions, and thus feel free to rely on other beliefs, assumptions, and sentiments about the defendant and the case. Unfortunately, most "open and shut" cases with clear evidence never make it to a full trial, but are instead handled via plea-bargain (Boyll, 1991; Henderson & Levett, 2019). Thus, it is likely that most cases that jurors encounter will involve ambiguous evidence. This, in turn, makes it more likely for jurors to abandon legal norms and safeguards on their decision-making in favor of their own beliefs, expectations, and attitudes when making determinations about culpability and sentencing.

Empirical research on the Liberation Model has revealed a number of important findings relevant to jury decision-making. Jurors have been found to rely more on emotions and sentiments when presented with ambiguous evidence (Devine et al., 2009; Reskin & Visher, 1986) and place greater weight on specific traits and features of the defendant, even if these are irrelevant to the facts of the case (Bjerregaard et al., 2017; Chaffin et al., 2016; Guevara et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2012; Ugwuegbu, 1979). Thus, in many trials, the determination of a defendant's guilt is made and guided not according to legal standards designed to uphold the fundamental rights of the accused (such as the presumption of innocence), but instead by the personal beliefs of the twelve legally-uneducated community members who make up the jury. Indeed, juries have been observed, both in the field and in experimental simulations, to often suspend or even actively defy legal norms and instructions in order to ensure that their own personal definitions of "justice" are upheld (Sommers & Kassin, 2001). Due to its widespread

use in both experimental (Bjerregaard et al., 2017; Chaffin et al., 2016) and field-based studies (Devine et al., 2009; Hester & Hartman, 2017; Keil & Vito, 1989), the Liberation Model remains influential for its explanation of why juries so often base their decisions on extra-legal factors, rather than the facts of the case.

The Story Model

The Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1986; 1992; 1993) is another well-known and well-researched model of juror decision-making. The Story Model describes jury decision-making as a narrative construction process (i.e., "create a story") that jurors use when trying to understand and make sense of information presented at trial, specifically focusing on causality and intentionality. By creating a story, jurors facilitate their comprehension of the evidence, thereby allowing them to reach a pre-deliberative decision (i.e., a decision of guilt or innocence before all jurors come together to deliberate on their final verdict). The Story Model divides the process of narrative construction and decision making into three components: evidence evaluation, representation of decision options, and classifying the resulting story into the best-fitting verdict category.

Human comprehension is an inherently constructive process (Collins et al., 1980; Kirtsch, 1974; 1988). By constructing a series of cause-and-effect relationships, we are able to make sense of the world around us without expending too much cognitive effort. Story construction is thus highly adaptive (Costabile, 2016). Given that a jury's primary task is to process, comprehend, and utilize information presented at trial, and given that there is often an unwieldy amount of evidence presented in a non-linear temporal order, jurors' use of narrative processing and organization is thus to be expected.

However, by constructing a story to aid in evidence evaluation, jurors are likely to rely not only on factual matters of evidence, but also on their knowledge and beliefs about similar events, and generic expectations about what does and does not make a complete story (e.g., likelihood of motive, plausibility of explanations, perceived cause-and-effect, etc.). Once a story is "under construction," it will begin to affect the interpretation of subsequently presented evidence as well as inferences about potential ambiguities. The story will be used to "fill in the blanks," with personal attributions and interpretations being made based on prior knowledge and beliefs, rather than on the facts of the case. Stories that are perceived as better explaining the evidence are more likely to be preferred by the juror. The problem is that jurors' expectations about a story's completeness, as well as their knowledge of what they perceive to be similar events, may not be necessarily objectively relevant to the facts of the case. These personal preferences and ideas of similarity may be based on personal experience or cultural expectations, and thus may end up working against fundamental legal structures like the presumption of innocence (Huntley & Costanzo, 2003; Kassin, 2012).

Once a story has been constructed, jurors will construct representations of their decision options: guilt, innocence, or (rarely) nullification. These options might be thought of as potential "boxes" into which a story will be "sorted." At the conclusion of a trial, jurors will then classify their constructed story by placing it into the best-fitting "box" for a verdict and/or sentence. While this process may involve legal and prescriptive norms such as the judge's instructions, it will also involve personal decision-making about whether or not the story fits into each "box" for innocence and guilt. This decision will rely upon which precise elements of the trial and personal interpretations and representations of the evidence and related factors are considered central to

the story under question. Thus, guilt/innocence determinations will be functions of the individual perceptions of the trial's "story," rather than purely of the facts of the case.

Attorneys understand this phenomenon and seek to utilize it by crafting their opening/closing statements, presentation of evidence, and examination of witnesses to facilitate jurors' creation of stories to fit more closely with each attorney's preferred outcome (Costanzo & Peterson, 1994; Schrager, 1999). Further, the story model has been observed to be more likely to take effect when jurors are asked to make holistic (as opposed to incremental) judgements, as is the norm in a trial, as seen in the jury instruction "The jury will **now** deliberate…," with the implication being that no decisions should have been made before the trial's end (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Thus, the Story Model remains widely used in psychological research on jury decision-making, precisely because it reflects the inherent construction of legal procedures.

Research shows that differences in jurors' stories can lead to vastly different interpretations of the same evidence (Huntley & Costanza, 2003; Olsen-Fulero & Fulero, 1997), that more coherent stories are more likely to be accepted by jurors (Stuart et al., 2019), and that individual jurors will use their stories, even if based entirely on extra-legal factors, to fill in the gaps in a narrative presented at trial (Ruva & Guenther, 2015). However, perhaps one of the most telling and impactful demonstrations of the power of the Story Model was put forth by Appleby and Kassin (2016).

Appleby and Kassin's (2016) research was inspired by the wrongful incarceration and subsequent exoneration of Juan Rivera (Martin, 2011), who was convicted for the rape and murder of an 11-year-old after he confessed to the crime whilst under coercive police interrogation. Despite DNA evidence indicating Rivera's innocence, the prosecutor made use of narrative construction to present a case for Rivera's guilt that the jurors found coherent. The

prosecutor made the case that even though the DNA found on the victim's body belonged to someone else, the most likely scenario was that the victim (again, it must be stressed, an 11-year-old girl) had engaged in consensual sex with another male prior to the alleged rape, and that Rivera had failed to ejaculate, and subsequently murdered her in an impotent rage. Despite the sheer implausibility, bordering on impossibility, of this scenario, the prosecutor was able to instill a story-based organization onto the facts of the case that explained away the DNA evidence. This story was accepted by the jury, who found Rivera guilty, most likely due to their acceptance of the prosecutor's story over the "gold standard" of DNA evidence (Thompson, 2006).

Juan Rivera was eventually exonerated, after several years and numerous retrials. However, upon his exoneration, it was readily apparent that a grave injustice had occurred, and that the jury, a supposed "last line of defense" against just such an occurrence, had failed to adequately attend to evidence that should have exonerated Rivera, and instead had placed undue weight upon Rivera's confession. In an attempt to understand just how this had occurred, Appleby and Kassin (2016) simulated a similar trial scenario, finding that mock jurors would readily disregard evidence such as DNA in favor of explanations that conformed to their personal stories about the trial. This process was strengthened even more when a prosecutor provided an alternative explanation that allowed the jurors' stories to discount the DNA evidence that should have exonerated Rivera, illustrating the power that jurors' stories can have.

Utilizing Both Models of Jury Decision Making

Both the Liberation and Story Models are widely used within the psychology of jury decision-making and can be considered compatible with one another. Taken together, they parsimoniously explain the current state of jury research by suggesting a process for jury

decision making. Jurors will construct stories by narratively processing and organizing the facts presented at trial, as well as other scripts and schemas perceived relevant to the matter at hand. The liberation model suggests that when evidence is ambiguous, jurors will feel even more free to rely on these constructed stories, which they will have created to fill in the "holes" resulting from said ambiguity and use more extra-legal factors in story construction. When evidence is unambiguous, it is likely that stories will conform far more to the facts of the case, and thus verdict options are more likely to be guided by legal norms and standards.

Both models place the impetus for the decision-making upon the individual juror. It is the juror who will, at least to an extent, decide what counts as "ambiguous" evidence, and it is the individual traits of each juror which will dictate what socio-cognitive tools they utilize to construct their story for evidence interpretation. While previous research has examined individual traits like gender and political ideology, very little research has focused on the influence that individuals' subscription to cultural norms might play in jurors' decision making. Culture is an enormously important influence on how individuals perceive and respond to the world around them. Thus, the study of culture contains a great deal of potential to inform both the Liberation and Story Models of juror decision-making.

Bringing a Cultural Perspective to Jury Decision-Making

Research on culture has revealed it to possess massive implications for our everyday lives, including information processing and decision-making. The Universal Mechanisms, Specific Cues model (UMSC; Oyserman, 2015) of culture goes so far as to state that culture instills, limits, and primes different associative networks of knowledge, norms, scripts, and schemas, thereby making certain outcomes and options for judgements and behavior more salient, depending upon the specific cultural framework in place. Indeed, one of the very

purposes of cultures' existence, according to the UMSC, is to facilitate meaning-making, as culture is "the set of meanings that a group in a time and place come to adopt or develop, and these meanings facilitate smooth social coordination, clarify group boundaries, and provide a space for innovation" (Oyserman, 2017, p. 435). In other words, culture can shape, define, and limit the way we process, react, and respond to our experiences. From this perspective, culture can be conceptualized in three different ways.

First, culture can be conceptualized as the specific and particular practices of a group which allow for perceived predictability in everyday life, and allows more economic use of cognitive resources (Hinsz et al., 1997; Mossi, Chiu, & Liu, 2015; Mourey et al., 2015; Zou et al., 2009). In other words, culture shapes individuals' automatic processing of information by providing a framework for decision-making via social cues, scripts and norms for behavior, and schemas for interpreting the behavior of others. From norms of polite behavior, such as shaking hands or holding the door, to expectations of appropriate behavior such as choices in language and address of others, to even more abstract concepts like definitions of moral or ethical behavior, cultural practices take away uncertainty from unfamiliar situations, providing a script that can be automatically relied upon for decision-making, as opposed to having to devote cognitive resources to every social situation we encounter.

Second, culture can be conceptualized as a central or core theme around which processing and behavior are scaffolded, such as individualism, collectivism, or honor (Oyserman, 2011; 2017). By organizing and relating perceptions to these core themes, individuals can make sense of ambiguous situations by being able to assign them labels like "right" and "wrong," and respond accordingly. Culture's core themes have been seen to have strong influences on perception, especially for the inclusion, exclusion, and ordering of novel

information, as this information is contrasted and organized in relation to core cultural themes as it is encoded (Miyamoto, 2013; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). When novel information is disfluent with a core cultural theme, individuals may either stop processing the information and seek an alternate perspective, attempt to force the information into a core cultural theme in which it might not naturally "fit," or may simply not attend to the information at all (Oyserman, 2011).

Thirdly, culture can be conceptualized as a set of core themes which differ in their accessibility, depending on the situational cues present. Certain cues may or may not activate a core theme (e.g., individualism or honor), depending on the precise context in which it is presented, meaning that the activation of a core theme is probabilistic in nature (Oyserman, 2015; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Because cultures and sub-cultures do not generally exist in a vacuum, individuals from said cultures may also have other processing methods or behavioral responses at their disposal beyond those related to the core theme. Thus, they may not always act in an individualist/collectivistic/honor-oriented way; it is the situational cue which provokes the salient cultural themes, thereby causing information to be processed according to them.

Thus, culture is both dynamic regarding the activation and application of norms, values, and concepts, but also stable in how it enables us to make sense of the world around us. Both elements must be considered when studying cultural influences on decision making. Cultural norms, themes, values, and scripts are often consulted (consciously or unconsciously) when we are faced with ambiguous scenarios and can thereby dictate how we interpret and respond to cues around us. Thus, what might be considered individual decisions may often be informed influenced, or even dictated by the individual's culture, and any research attempting to understand decision-making should take cultural influences into account.

The study of culture has an enormous potential for application to the study of the legal system. Cultures will shape legal systems' specific forms, norms, and expectations (Clark & Wink, 2012; Cohen, 1996). Culture will also be an important influence on actors within a legal system; these actors will rely on culturally derived beliefs, scripts, and schemas for interpreting information and guiding behavior within the legal system. For the study of juror decision-making, culture has implications for both the Story and Liberation Models.

The Liberation Model (Kalven & Zeissel, 1966) states that jurors will abandon legal norms and prescriptions for decision making when faced with ambiguous evidence. Culture can help us to understand the decision-making process of jurors in such a situation, as cultural scripts are likely to be consulted under circumstances of ambiguity (Oyserman, 2017). Beyond this, however, culture may also possess its own implications for what will be considered "ambiguous." For instance, research has indicated that the same confession-based evidence is weighted more heavily (i.e., was perceived as less ambiguous) when the crime in question matches stereotypes of the defendants' race, religion, or social class (Nisbet et al., 2009; Smalarz et al., 2018). The perception of "stereotypicality" might very well be dictated by cultural norms and definitions of ingroups and outgroups, as well as expected behaviors from outgroups, which will, in turn, dictate whether an individual perceives a scenario as "ambiguous."

Similarly, research has indicated that "liberated" jurors will often attend to extra-evidentiary concerns in order to reach a decision, such as perceived severity of the charge or the pursuit of "justice" (Devine et al., 2009; Sommers & Kassin, 2001). "Severity" is likely to be a concept dictated by culture, as different crimes and motives may be perceived differently. For example, in Western cultures, sexual promiscuity may be perceived negatively, but is not generally seen as something worthy of capital punishment. However, in many Middle Eastern

cultures, sexual promiscuity, especially by females, is considered worthy of being punished by death, either by state-sanctioned execution or by private honor-killing. Culture will likewise dictate what a "just" decision is, as well as potentially moderate how willing individuals are to abandon legal restrictions on their behavior in the pursuit of said "justice." In many Eastern cultures, such as Pakistan, honor killings over promiscuity or religious conversion may be illegal, but these laws have been seen to have had little effect on the rates of honor killing, as individuals would rather hold to the culturally dictated norms of "justice" than uphold the law (Ijaz, 2017).

Culture possesses similar implications for the Story Model. The Story Model states that story construction will involve knowledge and beliefs about similar events, as well as generic expectations for what makes a story complete, all of which are likely to be culturally dictated (Oyserman, 2015; 2017; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Previous research (Olsen-Fulero & Fulero, 1997) has shown that individuals presented with the exact same evidence may construct different stories, and thus reach different verdicts. By influencing how we process information and limiting our perceived options for response, culture may dictate just what "tools" are available for crafting a story, as well as what kinds of stories are preferred.

Bearing this in mind, social psychologists studying juror decision-making should turn their attention to the study of culture and how cultural norms, scripts, schemas, and beliefs influence and shape juror decision-making. One particular context in which the relationship between culture and jury decision-making should be examined is the issue of coerced false confessions.

Coerced False Confessions

One of the longest and most widely-researched topics in the psychological examination of the criminal justice system is the issue of police interrogation eliciting false confessions,

pioneered forty years ago by Dr. Saul Kassin. Research has focused on this issue from numerous angles and perspectives, including the specific features of interrogation methods that make them likely to elicit false confessions, the ability of those acting within the legal system (such as police, prosecutors, judges, and most especially, jurors) to determine the risks of whether or not a confession is false or not, the comparative efficacy of different interrogation methods at eliciting true confessions while protecting against false ones, and the effects that false/coerced confessions have in the construction and presentation of a case by a prosecutorial team, as well as how the same will be received by the judge and jury (for reviews, see Kassin, 2012; 2014; Kassin et al., 2010b; Leo, 2008; Scherr et al., 2020b).

Although the issue of coerced false confessions involves actors from all stages of the legal process, it is an issue that is of particular utility to examine from a jury decision-making perspective. This is because ultimately, the jury is supposed to be the last line of defense against a coerced false confession being used to wrongfully incarcerate a defendant, and the Supreme Court has even issued rulings to this effect (Scherr et al., 2020b). The assumption is that a jury will be able to objectively assess whether or not a confession was coerced, and thus whether or not this coercion means that the confession should be disregarded. Unfortunately, a rich body of research suggests that jurors are an inadequate last line of defense against false confessions leading to wrongful incarceration (Henkel et al., 2008; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1980; Leo & Liu, 2009; Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 1995). Rather than weighing the credibility of a confession in light of other evidence (such as DNA or eyewitness testimony), and then reaching a decision based upon that evidence, research shows that jurors view confessions as the most important piece of evidence, and as highly indicative of guilt, even when they recognize that the circumstances in which the confession was elicited are highly coercive (Kassin

& Sukel, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1980; Redlich et al., 2008; Redlich et al., 2008; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). This results in a highly increased wrongful conviction rate for those who are coerced into falsely confessing, even when other evidence should have exonerated them (Appleby & Kassin, 2016; Drizin & Leo, 2004). Indeed, legal experts have gone so far as to say that the presence of a confession can be enough to outweigh any other evidence that might be presented at a trial (McCormick, 1972).

The Elicitation and Effects of False Confessions via Coercive Interrogation

The specific ways in which accusatorial interrogation techniques, such as the "Reid technique" (Inbau et al., 2013) that remains the most widely-used method within American contexts, risk eliciting false confessions is well-documented. Accusatorial interrogation refers to approaches, relying on psychologically manipulative and coercive tactics in the pursuit of the singular goal of eliciting a confession from the suspect (for reviews, see Kassin, 2012; 2014; 2017; Perillo & Kassin, 2011; Swanner et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2017).

The goal of accusatorial interrogation strategies such as the Reid technique, the most commonly utilized method of interrogation in America (Inbau et al., 2013), is not to determine whether or not a suspect is guilty. Instead, guilt is presumed by the interrogator, who is taught to rely on certain behavioral and verbal "cues" for guilt during a pre-custodial interview (Scherr et al., 2020b). Unfortunately, research paints a poor picture of "trained" interrogators' ability to do this, as they have been empirically demonstrated, numerous times, to be no better at detecting guilt or falsehood than naïve college students (Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Hartwig et al., 2005; Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Vrij et al., 2019). However, defenders of such strategies insist that the police can be trained to detect guilt (Blair, 2005; Inbau et al., 2013), so that by the time a suspect enters interrogation, they are presumed to be guilty.

Because a suspect under interrogation is already presumed to be guilty, the goal of interrogation is not to determine the truth, but simply to elicit a confession. This makes interrogations little more than an exercise in confirmation bias (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2019; Lidén et al., 2018; 2019; Nickerson, 1994). Interrogators therefore make use of a number of psychologically coercive strategies designed to "break" the suspect by making the interrogation so aversive that they perceive no other option but to confess (Alceste et al., 2018; Leo, 2008; 2009; Yang, Guyll, & Madon, 2017).

Interrogations almost always take place in isolation; the suspect is placed in an unfamiliar environment where they are unlikely to perceive themselves as possessing power of agency, and even deprived of easy access to necessities like food, water, and sleep, thereby leaving them susceptible to influence by authoritative figures such as police officers (Jackson, 1987; Kassin, 1997; 2005; Kassin et al., 2010a; Kassin et al., 2010b; Redlich et al., 2019). Additional interrogation strategies are designed to further disorient and wear down the suspect, including interrupting and refusing suspects' denials, bluffs and even outright lies about evidence linking the suspect to the crime, and de-emphasizing and minimizing the seriousness and potential consequences of the crime. All of these strategies have been empirically demonstrated to make false confessions more likely (Kassin et al 2010b; Klaver et al., 2008; Leo, 2009; Mindthoff et al., 2018; Russano et al., 2005; Scherr et al., 2020b), despite contrary claims by defenders of the *status quo* of accusatorial interrogation (Blair, 2005; 2006; Inbau et al., 2013).

Adding to this problem is the "phenomenology of innocence," (Kassin, 2005), meaning that innocent suspects are actually more at risk for falsely confessing during interrogation than guilty suspects. This is because innocent suspects are more likely to cooperate with the police, waive their Miranda rights, and trust that their innocence will protect them, even if they do

falsely confess (i.e., that "the truth will out") (Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Hartwig et al., 2005). Such innocent individuals are therefore at more risk of being coerced into confessing, not realizing that this essentially guarantees their conviction, as a confession will confirm the interrogators' biases and shape the prosecution's case at their trial (Appleby & Kassin, 2016; Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Kassin et al., 2010b; Kassin, 2005; Scherr et al., 2020b).

Coerced False Confessions and the Jury

Ultimately, the jury is supposed to be the "last line of defense" against coerced false confessions resulting in a wrongful confession, and reflecting this, the Supreme Court has even dubbed the admission of potentially coerced false confessions into evidence as a "harmless error" (Kassin, 2012, Kassin et al., 2012a; 2012b; Scherr et al., 2020b). However, jurors confronted with coerced false confessions often fall prey to the fundamental attribution error and correspondence bias, ignoring the power of the situation and viewing confession as a trustworthy indication of guilt – even when they acknowledge that the circumstances of the confession were highly coercive (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1980; Henkel et al., 2008; Ross, 1997; 2018). Even when instructed to ignore confession-based evidence, juries demonstrably do not do so, either because they feel "liberated" from such legal restrictions on their decision-making (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966), or simply because the confession becomes a central part of their "story" of the case, whether they consciously realize it or not (Pennington & Hastie, 1993).

Without an intimate knowledge or experience with coercive interrogations, jurors tend to believe that they themselves could not be coerced into falsely confessing, and that they can thus rely on the confession because there would be no other reason for it other than the suspect being guilty (Henkel, 2008; Henkel et al., 2008; Kassin, 2017; Leo & Liu, 2009; Mindthoff et al., 2018; Scherr et al., 2020b; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). Many jurors also believe that they

could intuitively tell if a confession was false; however, just as with the police, this is a demonstrably spurious assumption (Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005).

Beyond jurors' inability to adequately account for the coercive power of interrogation situations, two other factors impede their ability to adequately discount a coerced false confession. The first, as already remarked upon, is the prosecutors' often relying on narrative framing of their case to explain away evidence contradictory to the suspect's, now the defendant's, false confession (Appleby & Kassin, 2016; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). The second is that, especially in the case of coerced-internalized false confessions, the false confession may appear, on the surface to be not only voluntary, but objectively powerful and convincing evidence. During interrogation, police often surreptitiously feed information to the suspect, so that by the time a confession is heard by the jury, the confession contains details that, seemingly, the suspect could not possibly know unless they had committed the crime (Kassin, 2012; Perillo & Kassin, 2011). As many interrogations are not videotaped, or at least not videotaped fully, the jury can understandably believe that the confession cannot be taken as anything other than an indication of guilt, not realizing that the police, intentionally or not, have aided an innocent individual in constructing a confession that will likely result in their conviction by providing them with information that, prior to the interrogation itself, they did not know.

Thus, despite their supposed role as a "last line of defense" against such an eventuality, juries are extremely likely to convict false confessors. While much can (and should) be made of the police, prosecutors, and judges who coerce such confessions, shape their cases around them, discount evidence that contradicts them, and allow them before a jury, the ultimate "culprit," as it were, for convicting false confessors is the jury itself. It is the jury members who fail to account for the coercive power of the situation, who incorporate the confession into their narrative

structures to process trial information, who likewise attend to prosecutorial constructed narratives that discount evidence contradictory to the confession, and who feel liberated from heeding judicial instructions to ignore potentially coerced confessions. Unfortunately, the jury's involvement in the case of a false confessor does not cease upon conviction, but can potentially continue all the way until after exoneration.

Even after exoneration, coerced false confessors face greater stigma than other exonerees, and sometimes even more than actual criminals (Clow & Leach, 2015a; 2015b; Scherr et al., 2020a). Part of this might simply be because they are associated with criminals, who (again, understandably) face their own stigma, especially if their crime was serious, and because the exoneree falsely confessed, others may simply doubt their innocence the same way that the jury did, especially if they were accused of especially egregious crimes like rape or murder (Campbell & Denov, 2004; Clow et al., 2012; Westervelt & Cook, 2008; 2012).
However, false confessors face additional stigma beyond simply being associated with criminals. Coerced false confessors are uniquely perceived as mentally incompetent, unintelligent, or otherwise non-neurotypical, and thus face not only a lack of belief in their innocence, but also lessened job opportunities, and a lack of support for reintegration efforts (Hoskins, 2019; Petersilia, 2005; Scherr et al., 2018a). Thus, jurors in civil trials determining wrongful imprisonment settlements are much less likely to award coerced false confessors suitable fiscal compensation, or to penalize legal actors whose actions led to the incarceration, as opposed to individuals who did not falsely confess but were wrongfully imprisoned anyway (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019). Thus, a coerced false confession does not only bias the investigators, prosecutors, and jurors of a formal criminal investigation and trial, but also the "jurors" of the court of public opinion, whose decision-making is affected by the same biases and narrative construction of

events as formal jurors are. Given this, it is no surprise that the issue of coerced false confessions has received the attention it has within the psychological study of the justice system.

However, while specific psychological processes like the fundamental attribution and confirmation biases have been identified as playing a role in how jurors interpret and respond to coerced false confessions, there is a paucity of research attempting to identify specific ideological and/or cultural antecedents and influences on the decision-making process. Given the importance that both narrative construction (i.e., the story model, Pennington & Hastie, 1993) and potential inability of jurors to suitably discount confession-based evidence (i.e., the liberation model, Kalven & Zeisel, 1966), and given the aforementioned importance that culture is likely to play in such decision-making processes, it is necessary to consider culture's impact for the study of coerced false confessions. One cultural framework especially worthy of examination is honor ideology.

Honor Ideology and Legal Decision-Making

Honor is a cultural framework that places central value and focus upon the garnering and maintenance of reputation, specifically reputation and worth in the eyes of others, as opposed to dignity cultures where worth is more self-contained and self-granted (for review, see Brown, 2016; see also: Cross et al., 2013; IJzerman & Cohen, 2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011; Welden, 2010). Honor emerges as an effective survival strategy in response to key environmental features, namely a harsh, difficult to survive environment with low or nonexistent law enforcement (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Nowak et al., 2016). In such environments, loss of material goods (such as livestock) seriously threatens survival potential, and many individuals (as well as their related family or in-group, their "honor circle," Brown, 2016) must become their own form of protection. In order to do this, individuals must make themselves appear strong,

tough, competent, and intolerant of disrespect, in order to discourage any potential encroachments on themselves, their honor circle, or their property. In honor societies, then, any disrespect to the reputation of oneself or one's honor circle must be met with extreme, often violent retaliation, via the "rule of retribution," or *lex talionis*. This is most commonly conceived as the masculine facet of honor (Cihangir, 2013; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

Honor likewise contains a feminine facet, equally focused on the cultivation and maintenance of reputation, but based upon that reputation being for devotion, loyalty, purity, and propriety, rather than toughness and strength (Barnes et al., 2014; Brown, 2016, Rodriguez Mosquera, 2016, Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002). While men in an honor culture must defend their reputations by violent retaliation, women are often called to "stand by their man," even in the face of danger, disloyalty, and even outright abuse at the hands of family members (Brown et al., 2018; Vandello & Cohen, 2003; Vandello et al., 2009).

To members of an honor culture, their reputation is of supreme importance, in what has been called "honor supremacy" (Bowman, 2006; Pomerantz & Brown, 2019). Nothing can be more important than one's reputation in the eyes of others, and no action must be taken that might compromise one's personal honorable reputation, nor the reputation of one's honor circle. Because of honor's supreme value to its adherents, it has unsurprisingly been seen to exert influence across a variety of diverse behavioral domains. Thus, the study of honor has been studied in the context of interpersonal violence, such as physical assaults (Cross et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 1996; Vandello et al., 2008), school shooting (Brown et al., 2009), risk-taking (Barnes, Brown, & Tamborski, 2012), support for military action (Barnes et al. , 2012; Barnes et al., 2014), stigmatization of mental healthcare (Brown et al., 2014), perceptions of and responses to others' behavior (O'Dea et al., 2017; Shafa et al., 2014), political attitudes (Barnes et al.,

2016), attitudes and behaviors surrounding suicide (Crowder & Kemmelmeier, 2017; 2018; Bock et al., 2019), and even religious beliefs (Pomerantz & Brown, 2019).

Ironically, the study of honor began with, and to a large part continues to focus on, the study of crime, especially violence, whether interpersonal assaults, homicides, or "honor killings" and similar phenomena (Gastil, 1971; Brown, 2016; Nisbett, 1993; Rodriguez Mosquera, 2013; Günsoy et al., 2015; Uskul et al., 2015). However, despite honor being believed to emerge in circumstances without a strong legal system, little research has been done examining how honor interacts with the legal system outside of the crimes it can potentially drive its adherents to commit. However, the literature on how honor drives the perceptions of others (e.g., O'Dea et al., 2017; Shafa et al., 2014), does serve as an important indicator of how honor endorsers might behave in legal contexts, especially as jurors.

Despite the use of violence as a tool for the defense of their reputations, honor endorsers are not indiscriminately violent, nor are they more violent people overall. However, they do approve of violence, and those who use it, when said violence is done for "honorable" reasons (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). Indeed, although there is some cultural variation in what specific behaviors may count as "honorable" in certain contexts (Cross et al., 2013; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002), honor endorsers generally perceive other individuals if they uphold honor norms, especially for behaviors demonstrating reputation defense (O'Dea et al., 2017).

This effect also works inversely; dishonorable behaviors, and any individual who practice them, are stigmatized, with that individual suffering devalued or derogated social status (Crocker et al., 1998). Any behavior that explicitly contradicts honor norms, or even suggests a betrayal of the same, will decrease one's value in the eyes of honor endorsers. This effect has been especially witnessed in the realms of mental and physical healthcare. Honor endorsers avoid

seeking mental health treatment, out of a fear that doing so would make them appear "weak," compromise their reputations, and thus lead to stigmatization (Brown et al., 2014). Similarly, honor endorsers who perceive themselves to uphold honor norms, even if simply by growing older and, by necessity, physically less strong, are more likely to commit suicide (Bock et al. 2019; Crowder & Kemmelmeier, 2017; 2018). In the realm of physical healthcare, honor endorsers are even less likely to give their daughters HPV vaccinations, out of a fear that receiving such a vaccination might imply that their daughters are sexually promiscuous, and thereby compromising the reputation of themselves and their honor circle (Foster et al., 2020). Even something as seemingly innocuous as seeking treatment for erectile dysfunction is less likely for an honor endorser, as doing so would imply that they are not sexually virile, and thus weak (Foster et al., *Under Review*).

Because reputation is the fundamental and supreme social good to honor endorsers, we can expect that honor norms will be a central part of the culturally dictated perspectives, norms, scripts, and beliefs of honor-oriented jurors. As stated, however, little research has been done to examine how honor beliefs impact the legal spheres within honor societies. Given the fundamental role that legal systems (or the lack thereof) play in the formation of honor, as well as the importance that culture plays in shaping legal systems and influencing individual responses to them, the lack of research in this area is surprising, and should be addressed (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Nowak et al., 2016).

Although there is a paucity of research explicitly applying the study of honor to the law, there are key findings about honor that do yield some assumptions regarding how honor might influence jury decision-making. Honor endorsers, although not more violent overall, exhibit more favorable attitudes towards the use of violence for self-protection, reputation management,

and social control, and these honor norms are reflected in the legal systems within honor societies. Legal systems within honor cultures are were more likely to endorse less restrictive gun control, freer self-defense laws, lessened laws against and penalties for domestic abuse, more acceptance of corporal punishment, and higher support for the death penalty, demonstrating legal codes reflecting cultural values (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, 1996). However, legal codes are not perfect mirrors of cultural values, and the two can sometimes come into conflict. When this happens in an honor culture, such as in the case of a murder for the purpose of honor defense such as retaliating against a trivial insult, honor endorsers are unlikely to convict the defendant, or at the very least, will perceive the defendant more positively than if honor defense were not a part of the crime (Brearley, 1934; Carter, 1950; Wyatt-Brown, 1982). Indeed, research even indicates that honor endorsers will perceive crimes committed in the pursuit of honor as being more understandable, more worthy of sympathy, and less worthy of punishment (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997).

Given these findings, as well as the already-noted phenomenon of "honor supremacy," it seems clear that that honor ideology will affect its adherents' attitudes, biases, and other decision-making processes when they serve on juries. Thus, it is both important and necessary to bring honor "into the jury box" and evaluate just how these effects manifest. The issue of coerced false confessions is one specific area of jury decision-making research in which honor can be expected to exert an effect.

Honor and Coerced False Confessions

Given the supreme valuation of reputation by honor endorsers, studies considering honor's effects in the legal system could provide insights into the behaviors of numerous actors within it, from police officers to attorneys to judges. However, there is a specific utility to

examining the intersection of honor ideology and jury decision-making. As stated previously, jury service is the most widely-accessible opportunity for individuals to take place in the legal decision-making process. It is also the place where the "everyman" has the chance to enter the legal process; jury members need not have legal training as a law enforcement officer or attorney in order to serve. Given this, the jury box is the place where cultural ideologies such as honor have their chance to "shine," as it were, in their purest, most widespread societal forms, unaffected by membership in specific subcultures such as law enforcement (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Workman-Stark, 2017). The issue of coerced false confessions is a specific jury decision-making issue that a consideration of honor culture might help to elucidate.

As stated previously, criminals, and even those accused of being criminals, are stigmatized, and are thus often avoided due to a fear of "contagion," i.e., being tainted by association with them (Clow & Leach, 2015). An honor endorser, ever mindful of their reputation, might therefore be more likely to automatically side with the prosecution, and thus be more likely to attend to prosecutorial theories and narratives attempting to discredit evidence that contradicts false confessions (Appleby & Kassin, 2016; Findley & Sales, 2012), in order to avoid any such contagion (i.e., personal harm to their reputation) that might result from siding with a potential criminal. However, honor also has specific implications for how jurors will react to defendants who claim that their confession was coerced.

The idea that an individual could be coerced into falsely confessing, for any reason, is likely to be unthinkable to an honor endorser. According to honor norms, reputation is to be upheld and defended at all costs (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), including the risk of physical harm, be it by a man fulfilling the *lex talionis* and seeking violent revenge for an insult (Nisbett, 1993), a woman "standing by" an abusive husband (Vandello et al., 2009), or simply by increased

personal risk-taking to demonstrate one's strength (Barnes et al., 2012; Cross et al., 2013). Thus, the idea that any circumstances, no matter how aversive, could be enough to make one voluntarily invite dishonor upon one's self by confessing to a crime one did not commit is not a scenario an honor endorser is unlikely to find plausible. Therefore, honor endorsers are even more likely to fall prey to making fundamental attributions about a false confessor, assuming their guilt to be the cause of the confession, rather than appreciating the vastly coercive power of the situation present in an accusatorial interrogation.

Therefore, when confronted with a defendant who has been coerced into falsely confessing, honor-endorsing jurors will be less likely to construct stories that account for this information, but will instead be more likely to construct a story that accounts for this fact by painting the accused in an even more negative light. Not only has the accused attempted to "weasel out" of a crime they have clearly committed, but they are doing so by actively pleading that they engaged in a dishonorable act by inviting dishonor upon themselves. Thus, honor-endorsing jurors are more likely to believe that a coerced false confessor is guilty. Similarly, honor endorsing jurors are less likely to perceive accusatorial interrogation techniques as coercive. Again, to an honor endorser, no amount of pain or discomfort should be sufficient to justify an individual inviting dishonor upon themselves by voluntarily compromising their reputation. Thus, honor-endorsing jurors are more likely to subscribe to and endorse prosecutorial theories that discredit confession-contradicting evidence. Even when a coerced false confession is admitted to evidence as a "harmless error" and the jurors are instructed by the judge to ignore the confession, it is likely that honor-oriented jurors will be unable to truly do so, as such a "dishonorable" claim will negatively dispose them towards the accused (Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Scherr et al., 2020b; Wallace & Kassin, 2013).

Honor is also likely to exert an influence on its adherents' attitudes and behaviors to coerced false confessors beyond the initial trial. Just as honor will bias jurors in a criminal trial, so too will it bias opinions towards coerced false confessors upon their exonerations. Honor endorsers will be more likely to stigmatize exonerated coerced false confessors for a number of reasons. First of all, it has already been observed that coerced false confessors are stigmatized as being somehow "mentally unwell," as non-neurotypicality is generally perceived as the only explanation for why one might falsely confess (Scherr et al., 2018a; 2018b). Given that honor endorsers have already been demonstrated to stigmatize any sign of non-neurotypicality as a sign of weakness (Brown et al., 2014; Crowder & Kemmelmeier, 2017), they will thus be likely to stigmatize coerced false confessors for this reason.

However, coerced false confessors will face an added stigma in an honor society. Given that honor places supreme value on reputation, and that this reputation is to be upheld at all costs, a coerced false confessor, even upon being decreed innocent from any legal wrongdoing, will still be perceived by honor endorsers as having done something worth of stigma; they have invited dishonor upon themselves by their weakness. Thus, honor endorsers will be more likely to blame coerced false confessors for their own woes, and thus be less likely to award compensation to a coerced false confessor in a civil trial, or to support or provide aid in reintegration efforts (Hans et al., 2018; Kuckuka & Evolo, 2019; Scherr et al., 2018b).

The study of how coerced false confessions are perceived and responded to is, as has been stated previously, a rich and robust sub-field of psychology (Kassin, 2017). However, this sub-field currently has a paucity of research into the reasons why coerced false confessions have the power that they do, and why those who are coerced into falsely confessing are stigmatized both before and after their conviction. Considering these issues through the lens of honor

ideology might be able to elucidate these issues further by providing a reason for why these effects have been observed, and why they are so powerful.

Overview of the Present Studies

The studies presented and proposed herein are an attempt to begin the study of honor's effect on jury decision-making by focusing on the issue of coerced false confessions. Study 1 examines the relationship between different facets of honor ideology and specific attitudes towards coercive interrogation techniques, using measures drawn from previous research on the attitudes of potential jurors. Study 2 examines the relationship between different facets of honor and perceptions of a coerced false confessor, specifically whether or not honor predicts the stigmatization of a coerced false confessor upon their exoneration. Studies 3 and 4 expand upon the first two studies by assessing not only attitudes towards false confession and stigmatization of coerced false confessors, but also perceptions of guilt and the perceived deservedness of punishment of coerced false confessors within a criminal (Study 3) and civil jury paradigm (Study 4).

Study 1

As a part of the examination of attitudes towards coerced false confessions, numerous studies have sought to assess potential jurors' attitudes towards false confessions and specific coercive police interrogation techniques (Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008; Jones & Penrod, 2016; Leo & Liu, 2009; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). The most recent of these studies was carried out by Mindthoff and colleagues (2018), and assessed a variety of beliefs about false confessions, potential risk factors for the same, the admissibility of potentially coerced evidence, and the perceived coerciveness of interrogation techniques that have been identified as potentially eliciting false confessions.

This study was then followed up by Perez and colleagues (2019), who sought to not only provide a "state of the field" regarding potential jurors' attitudes towards these issues, but also to identify the effects that key ideological variables (namely death penalty support and political conservatism) might exert towards the same. The items used in both studies were either derived from previous research, or were novel items constructed for the studies themselves, drawing on the 40 years of research in this area. In order to assess base-level associations between honor ideology and perceptions of coerced false confessions, a selection of items were chosen from Mindthoff and colleagues' (2018) and Perez and colleagues (2019) studies. Specifically, we assessed whether or not participants believed that criminal suspects might falsely confess as a result of coercive interrogation, whether or not participants believed that they might personally confess as a result of coercive interrogation, the perceived coerciveness of accusatorial interrogation techniques, the perceived risk of such techniques resulting in a false confession, and whether or not participants believed that potentially coerced confessions should be allowed for jury consideration.

Masculine and feminine honor are different facets of the same cultural framework, and both share a central valuation of reputation. Thus, we predicted that both honor facets would negatively predict beliefs that criminal suspects might falsely confess as a result of coercive interrogation, beliefs that the participants themselves might confess as a result of coercive interrogation, the perceived coerciveness of interrogation techniques, and the perceived risk of such techniques eliciting a false confession. We predicted that both honor facets would positively predict allowing potentially coerced confessions for jury consideration.

Perez and colleagues (2019) performed follow-up analyses on Mindthoff and colleagues' (2018) data, using single-item measures of death penalty attitudes and political conservatism to

identify these ideological variables' effects on beliefs about coerced false confessions. Death penalty attitudes were seen to predict a lack of belief in false confessions occurring, as was political conservatism. In addition, political conservatism was seen to predict a lessened perception of accusatorial techniques' coerciveness and a lessened belief in coercive techniques potentially eliciting a false confession. We opted to include these variables as covariates in our analyses, hypothesizing that honor would predict our outcomes either comparably or more strongly than these ideological variables.

Because of the gender-specific nature of honor norms, as well as previous research finding gender to have an effect on jury decision-making, we included gender as a control variable in all studies (Barnes et al., 2012; 2014; Devine et al., 2001; Rodriguez Mosquera, 2016).

Method

Participants

Participants consisted of undergraduate students enrolled at a large, public university in the Southwestern U.S. Participants were recruited via the university's online research participation system, and were compensated with class credit.

Our initial sample consisted of 191 participants, but 25 of these participants had their data excluded due to failing at least one attention check included in our study packet, resulting in a final sample size of 166 (42 male, 124 female; *M* age = 18.46, *SD* age = 1.52; 124 White, 7 Black, 6 Native American, 4 Pacific Islander, 5 Asian, 6 Latino/a/Hispanic, 1 "other"). A priori power analysis revealed this sample size to be sufficient for achieving suitable power (.80) under the assumption of small to medium effect sizes, as recommended by Cohen (1988). Study measures were administered using Qualtrics.

Measures

Participants completed demographic measures, political belief measures, and measures of honor endorsement during departmental mass-testing at the beginning of the semester. Their scores on measures relating to false confessions and interrogations techniques were assessed later in the semester.

Demographics. Participants' age, gender, and ethnicity were assessed via a standard demographic questionnaire.

Honor Ideology. Subscription to honor norms was assessed using the Honor Ideology for Manhood (HIM; Barnes et al., 2012) and the Honor Ideology for Womanhood (HIW; Barnes et al., 2014) scales. The HIM consists of 16 items (α = .94) that assess beliefs about masculine honor norms, especially those regarding the importance of reputation (e.g., "A real man is seen as tough in the eyes of his peers") and the justifiable use of retaliation in response to an honor threat (e.g., "A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who calls him an insulting name"). The HIW consists of 12 items (α = .90) reflecting beliefs about feminine honor norms, especially loyalty and purity (e.g., "A good woman is always truthful, even when it hurts her"). Both measures were rated on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 7 ("strongly agree").

Conservatism. Parallel to Perez and colleagues' analyses (2019), political conservatism was assessed via a single item ("To what extent do you identify as liberal versus conservative?"), rated on a 1 to 7-point Likert Scale (1 = "very liberal," 7 = "very conservative").

Death penalty attitudes. Perez and colleagues (2019), using ANOVA methodology, trichotomized their death penalty attitudes measure to assign their participants into one of three categories: supportive, opposed, and unsure. Because we had planned to use regression

methodology, death penalty attitudes were assessed with a single item ("what is your attitude towards the death penalty?"), rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "strongly oppose," 5 = "strongly support"), taken from Mindthoff and colleagues' materials (2018).

Perceptions of Coercive Interrogation and False Confession. We used a selection of items taken from Mindthoff and colleagues' (2018) original study in order to assess participants' perceptions of coercive interrogation techniques and false confessions (see Appendix 1 for list of items).

Six items in the original study referred to the perceived likelihood of false confessions due to three different motives, representing a voluntary, a coerced-compliant, and a coerced-internalized confession (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985). Three items referred to the perceived likelihood of "a criminal suspect" falsely confessing for these motives, and three items referred to the perceived likelihood of the participant themselves confessing for the same motives. We used these items to create two different scales representing the perceived likelihood of a criminal suspect falsely confessing (α = .69) and the perceived likelihood of the participant themselves falsely confessing (α = .74). All items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "not at all likely," 5 = "extremely likely").

We also utilized a selection of items to construct a measure of the perceived coerciveness of interrogation techniques. The original study had referenced seven different coercive interrogation techniques: confronting the suspect with true evidence of guilt, confronting the suspect with false evidence of guilt, bluffs about evidence, rejecting suspect's denials, promising leniency, the threat/use of physical harm, and building rapport with the suspect. Participants in the original study were then asked to rate the perceived coerciveness of these techniques and the likelihood of these techniques producing false confessions. We opted to exclude the items

referencing confronting the suspect with true evidence of guilt and building rapport with the suspect, as we believed that these two items would be viewed as less blatantly coercive than the others, as confrontation with true evidence could mean that the confession would not be perceived as "false," and building rapport, while a potential risk for coercion, is generally perceived as more typical of information-gathering, as opposed to accusatorial, interrogation approaches (Evans et al., 2013; Swanner et al., 2016). Thus, we also excluded these items in order to ensure that our measures referred only to explicitly accusatorial interrogation strategies. This resulted in two five-item measures, one measuring the perceived coerciveness of these interrogation techniques (α = .69), and one measuring the perceived likelihood of these techniques eliciting a false confession (α = .74). Both scales were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (perceived coerciveness, 1 = "not at all coercive," 5 = "extremely coercive"; likelihood of a false confession, 1 = "not at all likely," 5 = "extremely likely").

Finally, Mindthoff and colleagues included 12 items, each describing a coercive condition under which confession-based evidence might be obtained, and asked their participants to rate whether or not this evidence should be allowed in front of a jury. Two of these items referred to circumstances in which interrogators confronted suspects with true evidence of their guilt and in which interrogators had built rapport with the suspect. Thus, these two items were eliminated from our aggregate measure, for the reasons stated above, resulting in a 10-item (α = .96) measure (all items available in Appendix 1), scored on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "definitely do not allow," 5 = "definitely allow").

Results

Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess all zero-order relationships between variables (Table 1). The HIM correlated significantly with both death penalty attitudes

($r = 0.33$, $p < .01$) and conservatism ($r = 0.39$, $p < .01$). The HIW was also significantly correlated with death penalty attitudes ($r = 0.23$, $p < .01$) and conservatism ($r = 0.37$, $p < .01$). The HIM and the HIW were also significantly correlated with each other ($r = 0.50$, $p < .01$).

Our correlational findings supported our hypotheses. The HIM was significantly and negatively correlated with all of our dependent variables except for allowing potentially coerced evidence to be considered by a jury ($r = 0.14$, $p > .05$). The HIW was significantly and negatively correlated with all of our dependent variables, except for allowing potentially coerced evidence to be considered by a jury, with which it was positively and significantly associated ($r = 0.26$, $p < .01$), and believing that a criminal suspect might falsely confess, with which the HIW did not significantly correlate ($r = -0.15$, $p > .05$).

We next performed a series of regressions in which we regressed each of our outcome variables onto our honor variables, using separate regression series for the HIM and the HIW, as well as our measures of conservatism and death penalty attitudes, alongside gender (effect coded) as a covariate. All variables were mean-centered prior to analysis.

The results of these regression analyses provided mixed support for our hypotheses as well. Full results can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. The HIM significantly and negatively predicted the belief that a criminal suspect might falsely confess, in a model that explained 12% of the total variance ($\beta = -0.19$, $p < .05$; $R^2 = .12$, $F(9.01, 76.85) = 5.31$, $p < .01$). The HIM likewise significantly and negatively predicted the belief that the participant might personally falsely confess, in a model that explained 21% of the total variance ($\beta = -.19$, $p < .05$; $R^2 = .21$, $F(38.94, 188.78) = 9.74$, $p < .01$). In this model, both conservatism ($\beta = -.16$, $p < .05$) and death penalty attitudes ($\beta = -.17$, $p < .05$) were also significant predictors. The HIM significantly and negatively predicted the perceived coerciveness of interrogation techniques in a model that

accounted for 9% of the total variance ($\beta = -0.24$, $p < .01$; $R^2 = .09$, $F(7.51, 86.84) = 3.76$, $p < .01$). The HIM did not significantly predict perceptions that coercive interrogation techniques could elicit false confessions. The HIM significantly and positively predicted allowing potentially coerced false confessions to be considered by a jury, in a model that explained 5% of the total variance, but in which the total model was insignificant ($\beta = 0.21$, $p < .05$; $R^2 = .05$, $F(10.90, 243.83) = 1.78$, $p > .05$).

The HIW did not significantly predict the belief that a criminal suspect might falsely confess or the belief that the participant might personally falsely confess. The HIW significantly and negatively predicted the perceived coerciveness of interrogation techniques in a model that accounted for 7% of the total variance ($\beta = -0.19$, $p < .05$; $R^2 = .07$, $F(6.32, 86.84) = 3.12$, $p < .05$). The HIW significantly and negatively predicted the perception that coercive interrogation techniques could elicit false confessions, in a model that accounted for 8% of the total variance ($\beta = -0.23$, $p < .05$; $R^2 = .08$, $F(8.50, 108.37) = 3.40$, $p < .05$). The HIW significantly and positively predicted allowing potentially coerced false confessions to be considered by a jury in a model that accounted for 10% of the total variance ($\beta = 0.34$, $p < .01$; $R^2 = .10$, $F(23.95, 243.83) = 5.99$, $p < .01$).

Discussion

We had predicted that both of our honor facets, sharing the same central beliefs about the value of reputation and hat reputation must be defended and maintained at all costs, would all significantly predict all our outcome variables at least as strongly, if not more so, than the covariates derived from Perez and colleagues (2019). Our predictions were supported by our results. We found that the HIM significantly predicted all of our outcome variables, except for the belief that coercive interrogation techniques could potentially elicit false confessions. It is

also worth noting that even though the HIM positively predicted allowing potentially coerced confessions to be considered by juries, the overall regression model was insignificant. The HIW, meanwhile, did not significantly predict the perception that either a suspect or the participant would falsely confess. It is worth noting that the only outcome for which the covariates of conservatism and death penalty support were significant alongside honor was when predicting belief in personal false confessions alongside the HIM, and in this model, the HIM was equally as strong as death penalty support and stronger than conservatism.

One potential reason for the difference in results between the HIM and the HIW might be the specific norms for honorable behavior that are implicit in each gender's honor facet. Masculine honor specifically prizes strength, toughness, and resilience, and while feminine honor encourages a certain degree of toughness in specific situations (such as believing that a woman should "stand by her man" even in the face of abuse; Brown, 2016; Vandello et al., 2009), it might be that masculine honor is the more relevant facet when considering attitudes towards coerced false confessions.

Taken together, however, we believe that these findings do indeed indicate that honor ideology produces specific attitudes, beliefs, and biases in its adherents regarding false confessions and coercive interrogation techniques. Specifically, we believe that these findings support the belief that honor has the potential to uniquely contribute to our understanding of how coerced false confessions are perceived and responded to both in formal jury decision-making scenarios and in the court of public opinion.

However, Study 1 primarily focused on attitudes regarding false confessions themselves, not perceptions/judgements regarding individuals who falsely confessed. Therefore, in Study 2,

we sought to examine how honor endorsement motivated specific perceptions and judgements of coerced false confessors.

Study 2

The primary goal of Study 2 was to examine if and how honor produces specific biases and perceptions of coerced false confessors, especially regarding the issue of stigma. In the literature, it has been observed that, upon exoneration, false confessors are more stigmatized (i.e., believed to be more dangerous, believed to be less worth affiliating with, or believed to be mentally incompetent/different than "normal" people) than either individuals who consistently maintain their innocence or guilty individuals who have "served their time" (Clow & Leach, 2015a; 2015b; Scherr et al., 2018a). We therefore opted to examine if honor ideology would predict stigmatization of an individual who is coerced into falsely confessing, as opposed to an individual who maintains their innocence or who honestly confesses and "serves their time."

Because of honor's previously demonstrated relationship towards stigmatization of individuals who "dishonor" themselves either by seeking mental healthcare (Brown et al., 2014), taking preventative healthcare measures (Foster et al., 2020), or failing to engage in retaliatory aggression in defense of their honor (O'Dea et al., 2017), we believed that a similar effect would emerge in this study. Being coerced into falsely confessing is likely to be perceived by an honor endorser as inviting dishonor upon oneself, as one has failed to defend one's honor "at all costs" (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) by resisting interrogation, and has then further dishonored oneself by admitting this weakness in a public setting, such as a courtroom. Because such conduct is utterly at odds with the norms and values of honor culture, we predicted that honor would uniquely predict stigmatization of an individual who is coerced into falsely confessing and admits it before the court, and that the stigma for a coerced false confessor would be greater than for an exoneree

who had not falsely confessed. We further predicted that the stigma for a coerced false confessor would be comparable to that for an actual convicted criminal.

We also sought to examine which particular facet of honor might underlie this effect. While masculine honor and feminine honor are reasonably closely related, they have been observed to have differential impact on behavior across a variety of domains (Brown, 2016), and so we sought to examine whether the two facets of honor would behave similarly or differently. We predicted that masculine honor would predict stigmatization of a false confessor, due to the high value that masculine honor places on strength, toughness, and the willingness to defend one's reputation at all costs. However, as feminine honor, while still placing primary value on reputation, does not share masculine honor's specific valuing of strength and toughness, and because of the HIW demonstrating somewhat less utility than the HIM in Study 1, we were less sure as to whether feminine honor's effects would be as strong.

Method

Participants

Participants came from the same sample pool as Study 1 but had not participated in Study 1. Our initial sample consisted of 396 individuals. After eliminating 36 individuals who had failed attention checks, our final sample consisted of 360 individuals (147 male, 213 female; *M* age = 20.17, *SD* age = 1.91; 250 White, 16 Black, 8 Native American, 38 Pacific Islander, 38 Asian, 9 Latino/a/Hispanic, 1 "other"). A priori power analysis revealed this sample size to be sufficient for achieving suitable power (.80) under the assumption of small to medium effect sizes, as recommended by Cohen (1988). Study measures were administers using Qualtrics.

Participants were randomly assigned into one of three experimental conditions (see below) with condition 1 having 120 participants (57 male, 63 female), condition 2 having 122 participants (47 male, 73 female), and condition 3 having 118 participants (43 male, 74 female).

Measures

Study measures were administered using Qualtrics.

Demographics. Demographics were assessed using the same questionnaire as in Study 1.

Conservatism and death penalty attitudes. Both of these measures were assessed the same as in study 1. The conservatism measure exhibited acceptable reliability (α = .81).

Honor. Masculine and feminine honor were assessed using the HIM (Barnes et al., 2012) and the HIW (Barnes et al., 2014), as in study one. Both the HIM (α = .93) and the HIW (α = .80) exhibited acceptable reliability.

Experimental manipulation. We presented participants with one of three vignettes (see Appendix 2), each about a man named "Cory," who had been recently released from incarceration. Participants were randomly presented with one of the three conditional vignettes, with random assignment administered via Qualtrics. In each vignette, Cory had been initially convicted for attempted murder in the area local to the research site. We created three versions of this vignette, each giving a different reason for Cory's release. In our "innocent, no false confession" (condition 1) condition, Cory had not confessed to the police and had pled innocent at his trial, and had only recently been released thanks to the efforts of the Innocence Project ensuring that he received a new trial. In the "guilty" condition (condition 2) Cory had confessed to the police, pled guilty, and been paroled due to good behavior during his incarceration. In the "false confession" (condition 3) condition, Cory had confessed to the police, but pled innocent at his trial, stating that he had been coerced into confessing, and had only been recently released

due to the Innocence Project finding that yes, he had been coerced into confessing, and thus ensuring a retrial that resulted in Cory's release.

Stigma. Stigma is conceptualized as the perception that an individual lacks social value (Crocker et al., 1998). Stigma against false confessors has been measured a number of ways in the literature, with the core general themes of affiliation desire, perceived mental competence, and dangerousness consistently emerging as commonalities across different studies (Clow & Leach, 2015; Chojnacki et al., 2008; Henkel et al., 2008; Scherr et al., 2018a). We opted to adapt Hirai and Clum's (2000) Beliefs about Mental Illness scale (BMI; see Appendix 3) to measure stigmatization.

We believed the BMI to be a suitable measure of stigma not only because it reflects beliefs about mental illness, a specific stigma that is closely linked with stigmatization of coerced false confessors (Scherr et al., 2018a), but also because it captures affiliative desire and perceived dangerousness of mentally ill/non-neurotypical individuals. The original BMI consisted of 24 items, divided into three sub-factors: dangerousness, poor interpersonal and social skills, and incurability. We opted to use the first two factors to construct a version of the scale that referred explicitly to Cory, as opposed to "a mentally ill person," that participants filled out after being randomly assigned to view their condition-dependent version of our vignette. We removed one question, which originally read "Mental disorder would require a much longer period of time to be cured than would other general diseases," from our measure, as we did not believe this specific item could be suitably adapted for our purposes. The total version of the scale, derived from all 11 items, exhibited acceptable reliability (α = .95), as did the four-item danger subscale (α = .93) and the seven-item poor interpersonal and social skills subscale

(α = .90). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = "completely disagree," 7 = "completely agree"). completely disagree," 7 = "completely agree").

Results

Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess all zero-order relationships between variables (see Table 4 for conditional correlational results and descriptive statistics). The two sub-scales of our stigma measure were correlated so highly with each other as to provoke concerns about them truly representing different aspects of stigma (innocence condition, $r = 0.89$, $p < .01$; guilty condition, $r = 0.81$, $p < .01$; false confession condition, $r = .87$, $p < .01$), and so we opted to focus on results regarding the total measure representing perceived dangerousness, perceived competence, and willingness to affiliate.

We then performed a series of regression analyses in which we separately regressed stigma onto the HIM and the HIW, our condition variables, and then conservatism, death penalty attitudes, and gender. For our conditional manipulation, we used dummy coding, as per the recommendation of Aiken and West (1989), to establish the effects. We used the false confession condition as a reference group and generated two dummy-coded variables, D1 and D2, to contrast the false confession condition with the other two conditions. The D1 variable contrasts the false confession and guilty conditions, and the D2 variable contrasts the innocence condition with the false confession condition (see Table 4 for a full report of our regression models).

In the model regressing stigma onto the HIM and the other variables, which accounted for 24% of the total variance ($R^2 = .24$, $F(8, 344) = 13.52$, $p < .01$), our dummy coded variable comparing the plea-change and guilt conditions was significant ($\beta = 0.38$, $p < .01$) as was our variable comparing the plea-change and innocence condition ($\beta = 0.12$, $p < .05$). As expected, the HIM predicted stigmatization ($\beta = 0.36$, $p < .01$) and significantly interacted with both of our

dummy-coded variables comparing the plea-change with the guilt condition (β = -0.48, $p < .01$) and the innocence condition (β = -0.46 $p < .01$), meaning that the plea-change's conditional difference could be attributed to the HIM. Simple slopes analyses (see Figure 1) revealed that as masculine honor levels increased, so too did stigmatization of the (innocent) false confessor, with high levels of masculine honor predicting the false confessor to be stigmatized almost as much as the guilty individual.

In the model regressing stigma onto the HIW and the other variables, which accounted for 21% of the total variance ($R^2 = .21$, $F(8, 344) = 11.62$, $p < .01$), both our dummy-coded variable comparing the plea-change with the guilty condition (β = 0.39, $p < .01$) and innocence condition (β = 0.12, $p < .05$) were significant,. The HIW also exhibited a main effect for stigmatization (β = 0.20, $p < .05$), but did not significantly interact with either dummy coded variable computing the plea-change condition with the guilt condition (β = -0.08 $p > .05$) or the innocence condition (β = -0.04 $p > .05$), indicating that the HIW's effect did not significantly differ across conditions.

Discussion

We had predicted that honor would uniquely predict stigmatization of a coerced false confessor, and that this stigma would be greater than for an exoneree who had not falsely confessed. We had further predicted that the stigma for a coerced false confessor would be comparable to that for a factually guilty individual. We were unsure if this effect would be as strong for the HIW as it was for the HIM. Our hypotheses were supported by our results, as we found that masculine honor had a conditionally-moderated effect, with endorsement of masculine honor driving increased stigmatization of a coerced false confessor, above and beyond the effects of other relevant variables. This result indicates that honor might very well explain the findings

in the literature that coerced false confessors face unique levels of stigmatization when compared to non-confessors or factually guilty persons (e.g., Clow & Leach 2015b).

It is worth noting that similar effects were not seen for the HIW. This might be because, as mentioned previously, feminine honor does not explicitly value toughness and resilience as norms for honorable women to uphold. However, it might also simply be because the protagonist of our experimental vignettes was a male, and thus masculine honor norms were more salient to participants' judgements. Future research would benefit from examining whether the feminine facet of honor might have different effects than the ones observed here if the coerced false confessor were female.

Although we believe that our explanation for honor's effects on stigmatization of false confessors is the most likely one, there is an alternative explanation worthy of consideration. Criminals and convicts are both generally stigmatized (Clow & Esses, 2007; Hirschfield & Piquero, 2010), and it is possible that falsely confessing individuals are stigmatized not because of their confession, but because they are associated with incarcerated individuals and have this stigma spread to them as a form of contagion (Clow & Leach, 2015a; 2015b; Clow et al., 2012). It is possible that honor simply drives stigmatization of all individuals associated with incarceration simply because honor endorsers are aware of reputational threats and wish to avoid this contagion. However, given the unique challenge to honor norms presented by a coerced false confession, and given the significant difference between our obtained slopes, we do not believe this explanation to be as plausible as the one we have previously stated.

Although we believe the results of Study 2 make the case for the consideration of honor as a cultural framework possessing implications for jury decision-making, especially for the issue of coerced false confessions, there are still limitations to this study worth addressing. This

study dealt only with a general perception of stigma that did not specifically differentiate between affiliation desire, perceived mental competence, or perceived dangerousness. Research attempting to more clearly differentiate these aspects of stigma might help to clarify if honor's effects are different for each element of stigma. Study 2 also did not include measures such as belief in the exoneree's continuing guilt, perceptions regarding the deserved punishment of the defendant, specific perceptions of the exonerated individual (i.e. seeing them as weak, having sympathy for them), support for reintegration efforts, or perceptions of the exoneree's deserved financial compensation, all of which are areas in which falsely-confessing exonerees have been observed to face increased hardship (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019; Scherr et al., 2018a). Additionally, participants in Study 2 were making judgements of an exonerated individual in a non-jury context, and were not evaluated about their specific perceptions and judgements that might play a role in jury decision-making. Study 3 was therefore conceived to examine the potential effects of honor on perceptions and judgements of coerced false confessors in a criminal jury decision-making paradigm.

Study 3

The goal of Study 3 was to experimentally examine if honor ideology biases its adherents against coerced false confessors in the context of a criminal trial. In criminal trials, juries are required to evaluate the evidence and make determinations of guilt and appropriate sentencing (although the same jury might not make both decisions). There is thus an element of uncertainty to a criminal jury's decision-making when a coerced false confession is involved. The only absolute fact that criminal jurors will have to rely upon is that a crime was committed. The jurors will subsequently (in theory) weigh evidence and testimony in order to determine if the case persuades them beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's culpability, and if found guilty, the

defendant's deserved punishment (although the same jury does not always determine both). Both the story model (Pennington & Hastie, 1993) and the liberation model (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966) have implications for this process. The jurors will have to make use of narrative processing (and the culturally dictated "toolbox" that aids it) in organizing the facts and using them to create potential outcomes for decision-making. Jurors will also potentially be liberated from the objective facts of the case by their perceptions and evaluations of the defendant in the light of cultural norms and values.

Honor uniquely predicted the stigmatization of false confessors in Study 2, using a measure of stigma that simultaneously measured perceptions of an exoneree as dangerous, having poor social and interpersonal skills, and a desired for social distance from the exoneree. These results suggested that honor might exhibit unique effects in a criminal trial scenario, not only for stigmatization of the defendant, but also potentially for perceptions related to that stigma, e.g. perceptions of the defendant as being guilty. Thus, we predicted that when honor-oriented jurors are faced with a coerced false confession (as opposed to a defendant who has maintained their innocence), we hypothesized that honor would motivate jurors to more negatively evaluate a claimed false confessor in the light of honor norms, to perceive the evidence/legal case against a claimed false confessor to be stronger, be more likely to perceive a claimed false confessor as guilty, and perceive a claimed false confessor as deserving harsher punishment. We also predicted that honor would significantly and uniquely predict a disbelief in the claim of coerced false confession, due to the incompatibility of such behavior with honor norms.

We also sought to partially replicate and expand on the findings of Study 2 regarding stigmatization of coerced false confessors. While a criminal jury deals with an inherent amount

of uncertainty in their decision-making (i.e., the defendant has not yet been declared guilty or not guilty), they will still be forming personal perceptions and evaluations of the defendant, including beliefs about the defendant's dangerousness and potential willingness to affiliate with/socially distance from the defendant, in line with previous literature (Clow & Leach, 2015; Chojnacki et al., 2008; Henkel et al., 2008; Scherr et al., 2018a). We thus exploratorily investigated honor's relationship to stigmatization of the defendant and predicted that honor endorsers would stigmatize a claimed coerced false confessor more, both as a matter of desired social distance from and perceived dangerousness of the defendant, using more clearly-differentiated measures of stigma than in Study 2.

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. Participants were recruited for an advertised study on jury decision-making, and were compensated $3.00 for their time. Upon consultation with an attorney, we opted to screen potential participants to ensure both their jury eligibility and their likelihood of serving on a criminal jury. Thus, only participants who were 18 years of age or older, were U.S. Citizens, had no felony records, no personal history of interrogation by the police (as this demonstrably changes evaluations of and decisions regarding police behavior, e.g., Arndorfer et al., 2015), and had no close family members working in the criminal justice system.

263 Participants were recruited. Of these, 37 participants were eliminated for failing at least one attention check, and two participants, at debrief, did not consent to have their data used, leaving a final sample of 219 (126 male, 92 female, 1 failed to answer; *M* age = 37.59, *SD* age = 10.26; 161 White, 23 Black, 3 Native American, 16 Asian, 14 Latino/a/Hispanic, 3 "other"). A

priori power analysis revealed this sample size to be sufficient for achieving suitable power (.80) under the assumption of small to medium effect sizes, as recommended by Cohen (1988). Study measures were administers using Qualtrics.

Participants were randomly assigned into one of two experimental conditions (see below), with the "maintained innocence" condition having 106 participants (59 male, 47 female) and the "coerced confession" condition having 112 participants (67 male, 45 female, 1 participant with missing information).

Measures

Study measures were administered using Qualtrics.

Demographics. Demographics were assessed using the same questionnaire as Studies 1 and 12.

Masculine Honor. Because of the HIW's previous lack of utility, we opted to utilize only the HIM, which exhibited good reliability in this sample (α = .96).

Conservatism. Conservatism was assessed in the same way as Studies 1 and 2. The conservatism measure exhibited acceptable reliability (α = .86).

Due process orientation. Rather than continue solely with a single-item measure of attitudes towards the death penalty, especially given the more explicitly jury-focused paradigm at use in Study 3, we opted instead to use the Due Process/Crime Control scale (DPCC; Liu & Shure, 1993) as a potential moderator of honor's effects. Our reasons for doing so were twofold.

First, the DPCC measures death penalty attitudes, but also a variety of other theoretically-relevant attitudes all related to due process, and so the DPCC can serve to expand upon our previous findings regarding death penalty attitudes from Studies 1 and 2. The potential utility of examining the specific effects of due process beliefs on perceptions of coerced false confessions

in both the legal (Mannheimer, 2002; McGowan, 2016) and psychological literatures (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Scherr et al., 2020b). However, to our knowledge, due process beliefs have not been empirically assessed for their influence on jury decision-making. While numerous social and cultural forces might lead one to support the death penalty, the DPCC is specifically designed to assess how attitudes towards punishment and criminal penalties relate to beliefs about legal procedures designed to respect the rights of defendants and suspects. By controlling for this construct instead of simply death penalty attitudes alone, we hoped to demonstrate more clearly the utility of examining honor as a potential bias regarding legal decision-making above and beyond (as well as potentially moderated by) previously identified, explicitly law-related constructs.

Secondly, both our experimental vignette and the issue of coerced false confessions being used for jury decision-making, specifically deal with issues of due process. Out of necessity, a defense attorney whose client has falsely confessed and had this confession presented to a jury will be making appeals to due process, such as stating that the confession should not be heeded and that the jurors should maintain the presumption of innocence. This was the case made in our vignette (see below), and so we opted to specifically assess participants' due process beliefs due to their immediate relevance to our decision-making paradigm. In other words, participants' specific beliefs about due process were likely to directly and powerfully impact their perceptions of and responses to the case made by the defense attorney in our vignette (see below), as much as the culturally-derived beliefs and norms of honor. It therefore seemed prudent to assess not only whether or not honor exhibits an effect on jury decision-making above and beyond support for due process, but whether there is a potentially moderated relationship between these two variables.

The DPCC consists of ten items rated on a 7-point Likert Scale (1 = "disagree strongly," 7 = "agree strongly") that assesses specific beliefs about due process via items including "How do you feel towards the death penalty?" (reversed) and "A person would not be brought to trial unless he or she were guilty of a crime" (reversed), so that higher scores on this measure represent greater levels of support for due process. This measure exhibited acceptable reliability (α = .85).

Experimental manipulation. We presented participants with one of two vignettes (see Appendix 3), each described as a summary of a court case entitled "Oklahoma vs. David Peterson." These vignettes were explicitly constructed to mirror those previously utilized in this literature (e.g., Kukucka & Evelo, 2019). Participants were told that these vignettes were summaries of real events and legal proceedings but were told that they would not be told about the trial's events. In both versions of the vignette, the defendant, David Peterson, was accused of having assaulted a man named Justin Hodge using an aluminum baseball bat. In both cases, the only evidence that the prosecution had was David Peterson being of a similar size to the attacker, owning a similar coat to the attacker, owning a mask similar to the one owned by the attacker, and having no corroborated alibi. In both conditions, the prosecution made the case that David Peterson had assaulted Justin Hodge in retaliation for a public argument that had occurred three months earlier, during which Peterson had yelled "You're dead, [expletive]!" at Mr. Hodge. In both conditions, Peterson's defense attorney noted the highly circumstantial nature of the physical evidence and offered reasonable explanations for each piece of it and argued that the presumption of innocence meant that Peterson should be found not guilty.

In the maintained innocence condition, David Peterson maintained his innocence through nine hours of being subjected to accusatorial interrogation strategies, including denying him food

and water, threats against Peterson, and constantly denying or ignoring Peterson's protestations of his innocence, after which he was arrested. In both this and coerced confession condition, participants were informed that there was video-recorded evidence of this treatment. In the coerced confession condition, Peterson confessed to the crime after nine hours of accusatorial interrogation strategies, which were described the same way as in the maintained innocence condition. At trial, Peterson described his interrogation, highlighting the coercive nature of the interrogation, and said that he only confessed because of these coercive circumstances. Peterson's defense attorney therefore, in addition to the same arguments made in both conditions, stated that because Peterson's confession had been given "after he had been coerced and threatened," that it should not be considered as evidence of his guilt.

These vignettes were evaluated by and edited according to the recommendations of an attorney in order to ensure the maximum amount of realism possible while balancing the needs and constraints of the experimental paradigm.

Perceived honor of the defendant. Previous research (e.g., O'Dea et al., 2017) indicates that honor endorsers will evaluate others in the light of honor norms – i.e., how "honorable" other people are, and thus how much worth they possess. These perceptions and evaluations of others in the light of honor norms in-turn have implications for how honor endorsers will behave towards them. It therefore seemed relevant for us to assess the degree to which the defendant was an "honorable" person. Thus, to measure participants' evaluations of the defendant in light of honor norms, we constructed a measure, similar to measures previously utilized in the literature (Awale et al., 2018; Clow & Esses, 2007; Clow & Leach, 2015b; Fiske, 2002; MacLin & Herrera, 2006) that measure personal perceptions of a target. Our measure asked participants to rate how much they felt six adjectives (e.g., "Resilient," "Upright," "Honorable") described the

defendant on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = "not at all," 7 = "very much"). This measure was constructed so that higher scores could be interpreted as more positive perceptions of the defendant in the light of honor norms. This measure demonstrated acceptable reliability (α = .79).

Perceived likelihood of the defendant's guilt. Participants' perceptions of the defendant's guilt were assessed with a single-item, 7-point Likert scale (1 = "not guilty," 7 = "definitely guilty") that asked "how likely to you think it is that the defendant, David Peterson, is guilty of attempted murder?"

Punishment. Participants rated what they perceived as an appropriate punishment for the defendant using a 13-point Likert scale item, as is standard in studies of jury decision-making, with a range of potential verdict options represented, from no liability to the death penalty (e.g. Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2001; Carlsmith, 2008; see Carlsmith & Darley, 2008 for review; see Appendix 3 for the measure).

Evaluation of the evidence against the defendant. Participants' assessments of the strength of the case against the defendant was assessed via four items (α = .75) that asked participants to rate how strong they felt the prosecution's case was, how strong they felt the defense's case was (this items was reversed), their trust in the defendant's "not guilty" plea (also reversed), and their belief that the evidence supported the defendant's guilt. All of these items were rated on 7-point Likert scales (1 = "not at all strong," 7 = "very strong" for the first two items; 1 = "not at all," 7 = "very much" for the last two items).

Trust in coercion claim. Participants who had been randomly assigned into the coerced confession condition were specifically asked about their trust in the defendant's claim that he had been coerced into falsely confessing via a single, 7-point Likert scale item that read "how much

do you trust David Peterson's claim that he was coerced into falsely confessing," (1 = "not at all," 7 = "very much").

Stigma. To replicate/expand upon the findings of Study 2, we utilized two measures of stigmatization. We utilized the adapted BtMI (Hirai & Clum, 2000) subscale representing beliefs about perceived dangerousness that we had utilized in Study 2, which exhibited good reliability (α = .94).

We also wanted to explicitly measure participants' desired social distance from – i.e., the degree to which they would be comfortable socially affiliating with – the defendant. We used an adapted social distance measure originally constructed to determine attitudes towards non-neurotypical individuals (Tillman et al., 2018). Participants were asked to evaluate, on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "very uncomfortable", 5 = "very comfortable") how comfortable they would feel engaging with the defendant in a variety of scenarios. Four items (e.g., "Having the defendant as my neighbor") of the scale make up a "social contact" subscale (α = .91), while another four items (e.g., "Recommending the defendant for a job") make up a "close personal relationship" subscale (α = .92).

Results

Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess all zero-order and conditional relationships between variables (see Tables 6, 7, and 8 for full correlational results and descriptive statistics). The two sub-scales of our adapted social distance measure (Tillman et al., 2018) correlated so highly with each other that we did not consider it appropriate to represent them as truly representing different aspects of stigma (maintained innocence condition, r = 0.78, p <.01; guilty condition, r = 0.86, p <.05). We thus abandoned the use of these subscales as

distinct subscales and instead utilized the total measure, which demonstrated good reliability (α = .96).

We also opted to examine if our outcome variables differed significantly across conditions, using Welch's *t*-test (i.e., not assuming equal variances), in-line with the recommendations of Delacre and colleagues (2017). These results (Table 9) indicated that there were simple conditional differences present for the perceived honor, punishment, case evaluation, and stigma (perceived danger) variables.

The HIM did not exhibit conditional differences in its correlations with perceived guilt ($z = 0.34$, $p > .05$), punishment ($z = 0.40$, $p > .05$), case evaluation ($z = 0.5$, $p > .05$), or stigma (danger) ($z = 01.46$, $p > .05$; see Table 8 for full correlational results).

To evaluate our hypotheses, we performed a series of regression analyses in which we separately regressed our outcome variables onto the HIM, the DPCC, and our condition variable while controlling for the effects of conservatism and gender.

In the model assessing the perceived honor of the defendant (i.e., evaluation of the defendant in the light of honor norms) which accounted for 16% of the variance ($R^2 = .16$, $F(9, 215) = 4.31$, $p < .01$), a three-way interaction emerged for the HIM, DPCC, and condition variables ($\beta = -0.22$, $p < .01$). We therefore stratified by condition to determine if the HIM's effects were moderated by the DPCC. While no moderation effects emerged, a differential pattern of significance did emerge between conditions. In the maintained innocence condition, the HIM was not a significant predictor of perceiving the defendant as honorable, but the DPCC was ($\beta = 0.28$, $p < .05$). However, in the coerced confession condition, the DPCC was not a significant predictor ($\beta = 0.09$, $p > .05$), while the HIM was ($\beta = 0.24$, $p = .05$).

In the model assessing the perceived likelihood of the defendant being guilty, which accounted for 20% of the variance (R^2 = .20, F(9, 215) = 5.65, p < .01), main effects emerged for the HIM (β = 0.19, p < .05), the DPCC (β = -0.26, p < .01), and condition (β = 0.16, p < .015, but no interactions emerged.

In the model predicting punishment of the defendant, which accounted for 27% of the variance (R^2 = .20, F(9, 215) = 8.27, p < .01) main effects emerged for the HIM (β = 0.24, p < .01), the DPCC (β = -0.32, p < .01), and condition (β = 0.19, p < .01), but no interactions emerged.

In the model predicting the evaluation of the case evidence, which accounted for 29% of the variance (R^2 = .29, F(9, 215) = 9.19, p < .01), the HIM was not a significant predictor (β = 0.08, p > .05), but the DPCC (β = -0.46, p < .01) and condition (β = 0.16, p < .05) were.

In the model predicting belief in the defendant's specific claims about coercion, which accounted for 24% of the variance (R^2 = .294 F(5, 110) = 6.73, p < .01), and was only administered in the coerced confession condition, the DPCC (β = 0.55, p < .01) significantly predicted belief in the coercion claims, while the HIM had a similar significant effect (β = 0.55, p =.05).

For our model predicting stigmatization of the defendant based on the belief that he was dangerous, which accounted for 25% of the variance variance (R^2 = .25, F(9, 215) = 7.64, p < .01), a three-way interaction between the HIM, the DPCC, and condition emerged (β = 0.16, p < .05). We again stratified by condition in order to determine if moderation effects existed for the HIM and the DPCC. While no moderation effects emerged, a differential pattern of significance existed between conditions. The HIM did not significantly predict stigmatization in the maintained innocence condition (β = 0.24, p > .05), but did in the coerced confession condition

(β =0.34, $p < .01$). The DPCC likewise did not predict stigmatization of the defendant in the maintained innocence condition (β = -0.21, $p > .05$), but negatively predicted stigmatization in the coerced confession condition (β = -0.22, $p < .05$).

Our model predicting stigmatization as desiring lessened social distance from the defendant, which accounted for 5% of the variance, was insignificant and had no significant effects ($R^2 = .05$, $F(9, 215) = 1.09$, $p > .05$). The same was true for our model predicting stigmatization as willingness for personal contact ($R^2 = .03$, $F(9, 215) = 0.81$, $p > .05$).

Discussion

We had hypothesized that the HIM would predict more negative evaluations of the defendant in the light of honor norms, stronger beliefs in the defendant's guilt, more punishment of the defendant, evaluating the evidence against the defendant as being stronger, disbelief in claims about coercion, and greater stigmatization, both for beliefs about dangerousness and desired social distance from the defendant, when a defendant was represented as a coerced false confessor than when they had maintained their innocence. Our hypotheses received both modest support and potential contradiction from our results.

The HIM was a significant predictor both of viewing an allegedly falsely-confessing defendant as more honorable and of believing a supposed false confessor's claim that they only confessed because they were coerced. These results directly contradict our hypotheses, and could be interpreted as indicating that somehow, a defendant who claims that they were coerced into falsely confessing is **not** perceived as dishonorable, contradictory to our expectations. It is certainly possible that, in a criminal trial scenario, an individual's asserting their innocence after being coerced into falsely confessing might be seen as trying to re-assert their honor after the "insult" of being subjected to accusatorial interrogation techniques, with their plea of "not

guilty" potentially being perceived as akin to retaliation. This possibility certainly merits potential future examination in a more direct and explicit way than has been done here. However, given the pattern of our other results (see below), we are hesitant to interpret these results in too in-depth a manner.

Similarly, while the HIM significantly predicted perceptions regarding the defendant's guilt and punishment of the defendant, the HIM's effects were not moderated by either condition or the DPCC, contrary to our expectations. However, these results do suggest the utility of considering honor in legal contexts, including legal decision-making. Our results demonstrate honor to effect relevant perceptions regarding legal decision-making above and beyond the effects of specific attitudes about due process. This suggests that cultural forces like honor could manifest not only in specific instances of legal decision-making like juries, but might also have broader effects, as has been suggested previously by honor researchers demonstrating honor to have sociological impact on societal attitudes regarding the use of violence for social control (Cohen, 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1994). Similarly, research on honor's effects in the political sphere have clearly demonstrated that, as a cultural variable affecting worldview, judgements, and perceptions of others, honor can exhibit effects on phenomena like punishment of others, support for warfare, and expectations regarding foreign policy (Barnes et al., 2012; 2014; 2016). Examination of how individuals' endorsement of honor could produce specific expectations, beliefs, and decisions from a legal perspective beyond merely jury decision-making might prove equally fruitful.

The only significant results from Study 3 that conformed to and supported our hypotheses was participants' endorsement of masculine honor predicting stigmatizing the defendant as dangerous only in the coerced confession condition. These results elaborate and expand on the

results of study 2, showing that even in a specific jury decision-making paradigm, honor motivates its adherents to perceive defendants who claim false confession to be more likely to be dangerous. Previous research has demonstrated that beliefs about the dangerousness of a defendant are linked to conviction tendencies and the support for utilitarian justice systems that focus less upon the perceived deservedness of a penalty as opposed to simply punishing/incarcerating out of a desire to avoid potential future danger (Darley et al., 2000; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002). Our correlational results support this interpretation with the stigma (danger) variable being more highly correlated with guilt perception ($r = 0.77$, $p < .01$) in the coerced confession condition than in the maintained innocence condition ($r = 0.65$; Fischer's $z = 1.79$, $p < .05$). Similar results were found with the correlation between the stigma (danger) variable and evidence evaluation in the coerced confession ($r = 0.72$, $p < .01$) and maintained innocence ($r = 0.57$, $p < .01$; Fischer's $z = 1.90$, $p < .05$). While only correlational results, they still, when taken together with the literature, indicate the potential importance of honor's relationship with perceiving coerced false confessors as more dangerous, as this perception might in turn influence other decisions. Future research might benefit from taking an explicit mediation or modelling-based approach to examine this relationship.

Study 3 possesses other limitations beyond its merely moderate support for our results. As with many jury decision-making tasks, it suffers somewhat from a lack of ecological validity, in that it simply involves reading and responding to a vignette within a short timeframe, rather than listening to testimony in a courtroom situation over a period of days or potentially longer. However, a great deal of previous research on jury decision-making has shared this limitation and yet still proved impactful, and so we do not believe this limitation to be too severe, although

examining these effects in a paradigm that more closely parallels the circumstances of actual jury decision-making would doubtlessly be beneficial.

Similarly, our study did not possess any of the deliberative elements of actual jury decision-making. Most notably, it lacked any sort of social deliberation as would take place in an actual jury trial. While again, this limitation is shared by many jury studies, it could be immensely beneficial to examine honor's effects on jury decision-making in the context of social deliberations. A wealth of literature has indicated the importance of this social element of jury decision-making to how evidence in interpreted and applied, and thus how verdicts are reached (Bruschke et al., 2016; Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Peter-Hagene, 2019; Ruva et al., 2007; Ruva & Guenther, 2015; 2017; Ruva & LeVasseur, 2012). Honor, as a cultural framework, is a shared set of meanings, beliefs, and values, and its effects might vary in intensity depending on the presence of other honor endorsers and their individual reflected self-appraisals in such circumstances (Oyserman, 2017). Thus, future research might benefit from examining how honor affects jury decision-making in criminal trials as a function of various jury deliberation-related factors.

Finally, while our study was nationally representative, only 127 out of 219 participants came from honor states or considered honor states to be their "home" states. While honor ideology can be measured on an individual level by scales such as the HIM, it is possible that, given our accessing a national sample rather than stratifying based on honor/non-honor regions, that honor endorsers were simply underrepresented in this sample, as opposed to in Studies 1 and 2, where the majority of participants came from honor states[1].

[1] Exploratory analyses on the subset of participants who came from honor states did indeed reveal a differential pattern of findings for the perceived honor, guilt likelihood, case evaluation, and stigma (danger) variables. However, according to a priori power analysis, this sample was not large enough for these analyses, and so these results are not reported. However, future research might benefit by utilizing targeted sampling strategies to ensure a better representation from honor states.

Overall, despite these limitations and the only modest support for our hypotheses, we do believe that Study 3 makes a valuable contribution to the attempt to examine jury decision-making from an honor perspective because it extends the results of Study 2 to an explicit jury decision-making context, demonstrates honor's effects to go above and beyond more in-depth measures of legal attitudes than merely conservatism or death penalty support, and shows that honor will predict negative attitudes towards coerced false confessors that might explain the negative outcomes such individuals face within the American criminal justice system.

However, Study 3 examined jury decision-making in a criminal trial scenario. As stated previously, criminal trials contain a great deal of uncertainty, with (usually) the only certainty being that a crime was committed. However, coerced false confessors have been shown to suffer negative outcomes in the context of civil trials as well, which take place under much less ambiguous (although not entirely *un*ambiguous) terms, namely that the defendant (now the plaintiff) has been exonerated and officially declared "not guilty," and the only decisions that the jury must make regard attribution of responsibility and whether or not/how much compensation is owed to said plaintiff. In such a context, honor-motivated stigma might have severe impact for falsely-confessing exonerees, as the culturally-derived stories about a false confessor's "weakness" might lead to them being perceived as having "caused their own problems" by their weakness and thus being unworthy of any assistance or compensation. Thus, Study 4 was conducted to examine how the link between honor and the stigmatization of coerced false confessors manifests in the specific context of a civil trial.

Study 4

While Study 3 attempted to expand and apply the results of Study 2 in a criminal trial context, Study 4 attempted to do the same in the context of a civil trial. When a civil jury is

confronted with the issue of a coerced false confession, they start from a very different place. Though they might harbor doubts about the defendant's guilt (Scherr et al., 2018b; Vollen & Eggers, 2005), the former defendant has already been exonerated, and is now the plaintiff seeking financial recompense for wrongful incarceration (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019). Therefore, a civil jury will not be making explicit determinations of guilt. Instead, they will be determining how much they believe the victim has been wronged, how much money the victim is owed, and how severely the state should be penalized for a wrongful conviction/incarceration.

Both the story (Pennington & Hastie, 1993) and liberation models (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966) have implications for how a civil jury will respond to claims of coerced false confessions. As in a criminal trial, the jury will make use of culturally-derived beliefs, values, scripts, and schemas (a "toolbox") when constructing their "story" that will aid them in decision-making. Jurors' perceptions and judgements surrounding the exonerated defendant-turned-plaintiff might also be influenced by cultural forces (i.e., perceptions of the plaintiff as "dishonorable") that might "liberate" the jurors from adhering to the legally-defined limits designed to curb their decision-making.

The vignette used in Study 4 was an expansion of the one in Study 3, in order to maximize parallelism across the studies. Study 4's vignettes were merely extended to have the defendant-turned-plaintiff have been exonerated and subsequently seek financial compensation for their wrongful incarceration. Deciding precisely how much compensation a plaintiff is owed, as well as determining punitive damages as a punishment of the state agent(s) whose actions led to the wrongful incarceration is the primary duty of a civil jury in such circumstances (Mandery et al., 2013; Scott, 2010; Simms, 2016). Thus, measures of compensatory and punitive damages served as two of the outcomes of interest.

Research (Greene et al., 2016; Kukucka & Evelo, 2019) has also indicated that, although coerced false confessions should make no difference, from a legal perspective, in the awarding of damages, coerced false confessors often are awarded less in civil trials than individuals who did not falsely confess.

However, as has been remarked previously, exonerated false confessors often face a great deal of stigma upon returning to "the outside world," as they are viewed as somehow non-neurotypical, dangerous, or simply responsible for their own actions (Clow & Leach, 2015a; 2015b). These perceptions often lead to a lack of social support, as individuals are reluctant to affiliate with such an individual. Thus, desired personal evaluations of the defendant, personal desire for social distance from the defendant, perceived responsibility of both the plaintiff and the defendant, and support for reintegration efforts will also be assessed.

Although civil jurors do not necessarily make determinations of the plaintiff's guilt for the crime of which they were exonerated, research indicates that plaintiffs who confessed under interrogation are perceived as being more likely to have been initially guilty (Kukucka & Evolo, 2019; Scherr et al., 2018a). Thus, guilt-confidence was also assessed.

We predicted that, based on the results of Study 2, honor-endorsing civil jurors would perceive a falsely-confessing defendant-turned-plaintiff as having caused their own problems. Thus, we hypothesized that masculine honor ideology would positively predict greater confidence in the plaintiff's guilt, lower personal evaluations of the plaintiff, greater desire for social distance from the plaintiff, increased blaming of the plaintiff for his incarceration, lessened blaming of legal actors like police or prosecutors for the plaintiff's incarceration, lessened support for reintegration efforts, and lessened compensatory & punitive damages. We hypothesize that this effect will be moderated by condition, with the effects being stronger when

the plaintiff is depicted as a coerced false confessor, as opposed to someone who maintained their innocence.

Method

Participants

Participants were drawn from the same MTurk population as Study 3 but had not completed Study 3. Of 216 participants, 27 were eliminated for failing attention checks, resulting in a final sample of 189 (105 male, 84 female; *M* age 39.54, *SD* age = 11.61; 137 White, 27 Black, 1 Native American, 9 Asian, 15 Latina/a/Hispanic).

Participants were randomly assigned into one of two experimental conditions (see below), with the "maintained innocence" condition having 88 participants (49 male, 39 female) and the "coerced confession" condition having 101 participants (56 male, 45 female).

Measures

Demographics. Demographics were assessed in the same way as Studies 1 – 3.

Masculine honor. Masculine honor was assessed via the HIM, which exhibited goo reliability in this sample (α = .94).

Conservatism. Conservatism were assessed in the same way as Studies 1 – 3. The conservatism measure exhibited acceptable reliability (α = .83).

DPCC. The due process/crime control (DPCC; Liu & Shure, 1993) was administered, as in Study 3. It exhibited acceptable reliability in this sample (α = .84).

Experimental Manipulation. The same manipulation was used as in Study 3, with all conditions then seeing an addendum after their conditional vignette (see Appendix 4). This addendum stated that the jury found David Peterson guilty of the attempted murder of Justin Hodge and sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. After six

years, David Peterson was able to negotiate his release after the examination of DNA evidence cleared him, and participants were then told that he was seeking financial compensation in the form of a civil suit. As with Study 3's vignette, this vignette was reviewed by an attorney familiar with trial procedures and settings, in order to balance experimental control with ecological validity.

Perceived honor of the defendant, guilt likelihood, coercion belief, and stigma. Perceptions of the plaintiff's honor were assessed using the same measure as Study 3, which exhibited acceptable reliability (α = .77). The same single-item variables as in Study 3 were used to assess perceptions of the plaintiff's guilt and the belief that (in the coerced confession condition) he truly was coerced into a false confession. The same measures of stigma were used as in Study 3, with the stigma (danger) variable (α = .96), stigma (social contact) variable (α = .89) and stigma (personal contact) variable (α = .90) all exhibiting sufficient reliability.

Compensatory and Punitive Damages. Compensatory and punitive damages were rated on an 11-point (0 – 10; 0, no damages; 1, less than $12,000; 2, $12,000–$25,000; 3, $25,000–$50,000; 4, $50,000–$100,000; 5, $100,000–$250,000; 6, $250,000–$500,000; 7, $500,000–$1 million; 8, $1 million–$2 million; 9, $2 million–$4 million; 10, more than $4 million) scale (Greene et al., 2016). Participants were able to award compensatory damages via one item, and punitive damages against both the police department and the state attorney's office via another item. These measures were provided with a clear explanation of the meaning of compensatory and punitive damages being part of the questions (see Appendix 4).

Perception of Responsibility. Participants separately rated the degree to which the justice system and the plaintiff were responsible for the plaintiff's wrongful incarceration on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "not at all," 5 = "very"; Kukucka & Evelo, 2019).

Support for Reintegration. In addition to having the chance to award compensatory and punitive damages, participants were assessed for their willingness to support state-sponsored reintegration efforts for psychological counseling, career counseling, and job training (Clow & Leach, 2015a; 2015b; Scherr et al., 2018a). Support for these reintegration efforts will be assessed by four single items: The plaintiff is entitled to government-sponsored psychological assistance/counseling/career counseling/job training. which were be rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = "strongly disagree," 7 = "strongly agree;" Scherr et al., 2018a). This measure demonstrated good reliability (α = .93).

Results

Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess all zero-order and conditional relationships between variables (see tables 11, 12, 13, & 14). As in Study 3, we opted to utilize Welch's *t*-tests to check for simple conditional differences for our outcome variables (Delacre et al., 2017). These results (Table 15) indicated that there were simple conditional differences present for our perceived honor, stigma (danger) and blame (plaintiff) variables.

Our correlational analyses did reveal a differing pattern of results between the HIM and our explanatory variables (Table 14). The HIM significantly and negatively correlated with perceived honor in the innocence condition, contrary to our expectations. Likewise contrary to our predictions, the HIM's correlation with the perceived guilt variable did not significantly differ between the maintained innocence (r = 0.37, p < .01) and coerced confession condition (r = 0.39, p < .01; Fischer's z = 0.17, p > .05). The HIM's correlation with the stigma (danger) variable likewise did not significantly vary between the maintained innocence (r = 0.44, p < .01) and coerced confession condition (r = 0.46, p < .01; *Fischer's* z = 0.16, p > .05), which again went against our expectations. The HIM was significantly and positively related to stigma

(personal contact) in the coerced confession condition (r = 0.26, p < .05), in-line with our predictions. The HIM was significantly related to awarding compensatory damages in the coerced confession condition (r = -0.27, p < .01). Again, contrary to our expectations, the HIM's conditional differences in correlation were insignificant for the punitive damages variable (Fischer's z = 0.21, p > .05), blaming the justice system for the plaintiff's incarceration (Fischer's z = 0.24, p > .05), blaming the plaintiff for his own incarceration (Fischer's z = 0.5, p > .05), and reintegration support variables (Fischer's z = 0.44, p > .05).

To evaluate our hypotheses, we performed a series of regression analyses in which we separately regressed our outcome variables onto the HIM, the DPCC, and our condition variable while controlling for the effects of conservatism and gender, as in Study 3 (see Table 16 for full regression model results).

In the model assessing the perceived honor of the plaintiff (i.e., perceptions of him according to honor norms), which accounted for 19% of the variance (R^2 = .19, F(9, 188) = 4.56, p < .01), the interaction between the HIM and our condition variable was significant (β = 0.21, p < .01), with the HIM significantly (and negatively) predicting perceiving the plaintiff as honorable in the maintained innocence condition (β = -0.28, p < .05), while failing to achieve significance in the coerced confession condition (β = 0.13, p > .05), contrary to our expectations (see Figure 2).

In the model predicting perceptions regarding the plaintiff's being guilty of the crime for which they had been incarcerated, which accounted for 20% of the variance (R^2 = .20, F(9, 188) = 5.06, p < .01), the HIM was a significant predictor (β = 0.29, p < .01), but its effects were not conditionally moderated, contrary to our expectations.

The model predicting participants' belief that the plaintiff had been coerced into falsely confessing, which accounted for 8% of the variance, (R^2 = .08, F(5, 100) = 1.61, p < .01), had no significant predictors.

In the model predicting stigmatizing the plaintiff out of the belief that he was dangerous, which accounted for 28% of the variance (R^2 = .28, F(9, 188) = 7.79, p < .01), both the HIM (β = 0.33, p < .01) and our conditional manipulation (β = 0.19, p < .05) exhibited main effects, but the HIM's effects were not moderated by condition, contrary to our expectations and to the results of Study 2.

In the model predicting acceptance of social contact with the plaintiff, which explained 10% of the variance (R^2 = .10, F(9, 188) = 2.09, p < .05), the HIM's effects were moderated by levels of due process belief as measured by the DPCC (see Table 16, Figure 3), with the HIM's effects changing direction between high and low levels of the DPCC, but overall failing to achieve significance at either level.

In the model predicting acceptance of personal contact with the plaintiff, which explained 13% of the variance (R^2 = .13, F(9, 188) = 2.98, p < .01), there was a main effect of condition (β = -0.16, p < .05), and the HIM's effects were again moderated by the DPCC (β = -0.27, p < .01). The HIM significantly predicted acceptance of personal contact with the plaintiff at high levels of the DPCC (β = 0.38, p < .01), but was insignificant at low levels of the DPCC (β = -0.18, p > .05).

The models predicting compensatory damages (R^2 = .07, F(9, 188) = 1.50, p > .05), and punitive damages (R^2 = .97, F(9, 188) = 1.84, p > .05) were both insignificant. Although the HIM did significantly negatively predict awarding compensatory damages (β = -0.18, p < .05),

the overall lack of significance in the model means that this result should be interpreted with care, if at all.

In the model predicting blaming the justice system for the plaintiff's wrongful incarceration, which accounted for 19% of the variance (R^2 = .19, F(9, 188) = 4.68, p < .01), the HIM was a significant negative predictor (β = -0.26, p < .01), but its effects were not moderated by condition or the DPCC.

In the model predicting blaming the plaintiff for his own wrongful conviction, which accounted for 27% of the variance (R^2 = .27, F(9, 188) = 7.20, p < .01), the HIM was a significant positive predictor (β = 0.33, p < .01), but its effects were not moderated by condition or the DPCC.

In the model predicting support for reintegration, which accounted for 16% of the variance (R^2 = .16, F(9, 188) = 4.95, p < .01), The HIM exhibited no significant effects (β = 0.16, p > .05), but the DPCC interacted with the condition variable (β = -0.18, p < .05), and the HIM significantly predicted reintegration support in the innocence condition (β = 0.41, p < .05), but not in the coerced confession condition (β = -0.13, p > .05).

Discussion

As with Study 3, the results of Study 4 provide modest support for our hypotheses while simultaneously challenging our expectations and suggesting that the relationship between honor, jury decision-making, and coerced false confessions is a complex one.

Contrary to our expectations honor predicted perceiving an individual who had maintained their innocence under interrogation as less honorable. Given the significance level and effect size, this finding warrants further exploration. If anything, we expected the inverse, as the coerced false confessor might be considered to have behaved dishonorably by admitting to

his having "broken" under pressure, which the simple conditional effects (Table 15) seemed to imply. One possible explanation is that it is the supposedly "unthinkable" nature of admitting to having been coerced that made honor endorsers trust the coerced false confessor more than the plaintiff who had maintained their innocence. An honor endorser might think that the only reason someone might admit to this is because it was true; otherwise, why invite such shame upon yourself? Therefore it might be that, directly contradicting our expectations, the plaintiff who was depicted as having maintained their innocence was perceived by honor endorsers as less honorable, because of continued doubts about his guilt, in line with the negative perceptions of exonerees more broadly (Clow et al., 2012; Kukucka et al., 2020; Scherr et al., 2018a; Zannella et al., 2020). However, given that the HIM's prediction of believing the exoneree to be guilty was not a conditionally modified effect, further investigation is necessary to clarify this finding.

Honor did predict ongoing doubt about the defendant's guilt, without conditional moderation. Honor ideology is theorized to emerge from dangerous environments, thereby imbuing honor endorsers with a heightened sensitivity and awareness towards potential threats (Cohen & Nisbett, 1996; Cohen et al., 1996), both to their personal wellbeing and to their reputation. This is part of what is believed to underlie the stigma-aversion of honor endorsers when it comes to decisions related to physical and mental healthcare (Brown et al., 2014; Foster et al., 2020). Given that many exonerees face continued doubts about their guilty (Clow et al., 2012), it is possible that honor's lack of conditional moderation represents this effect. However, it is also worth noting that in both conditions, participants, on average, rated the plaintiff's potential guilt very low on a 7-point Likert scale (M = 2.18 in the coerced confession condition, M = 1.95 in the maintained innocence condition; $t(185.38) = 1.24$, $p > .05$), it is possible that the significance of this result should not be confused with the impact of this result. In other words,

although the difference between the conditional means for guilt are statistically significant, and this difference seems to be driven at least partially by honor, participants did not overall explicitly rate the defendant as especially likely to be guilty in either condition, and so this result should be interpreted with caution. However, it might also indicate that honor simply produces stigma against exonerees more broadly, and thus might underlie numerous social issues related to the reintegration of exonerees, and thus future investigation is needed.

A similar interpretation could be given to the stigma (danger) variable. Although there was a conditional effect (Table 15) indicating that yes, the coerced false confessor was viewed as significantly more dangerous than the plaintiff who did not falsely confess, the effect size for this comparison was small (Cohen's $d = 0.23$), and both conditional means fell below the midpoint of the 7-point Likert scale. Again, this could simply be a low-impact result, or it could indicate that honor's significant prediction of stigmatizing exonerees as dangerous, regardless of specific circumstances like the presence/absence of a confession, underlies the already-observed stigmatization faced by exonerees, and future research on this issue is warranted and necessary.

Our results showing that, at high levels of the DPCC, masculine honor significantly predicted acceptance of close personal contact with exonerees, regardless of the presence of a false confession. In terms of the story model (Pennington and Hastie, 1993), honor will not be the only "tool" in the "toolbox" for story construction, either in a formal court or in the court of public opinion. Thus, it is important for us to understand not only how honor functions as an individual "tool" for story construction and utilization, but also how it works alongside other "tools," which include more specific beliefs about legal phenomena such as due process. Individuals high in honor who also valued due process acted precisely the opposite from how we expected them to behave – and contradictory to expectations from the literature surrounding the

treatment of exonerees, both false confessors and non-false confessors alike (Clow et al., 2012; Kukucka et al., 2020; Scherr et al., 2018a; 2018b; Zannella et al., 2020). It is possible that such honor endorsers perceive the civil suit as a form of retaliation against the "insult" of a wrongful incarceration, and thus view the exoneree more positively. It might also indicate that, depending on the other values an honor endorser holds, as well as how specific exonerees and the issue of exoneration itself is presented to honor endorsers, honor might have potential impact on reintegration efforts for exonerees, regardless of whether they falsely confessed. Future research should absolutely investigate this potential, as well as investigating the relationships between honor and other legal attitudes and beliefs.

While honor did not significantly predict participants' awarding either compensatory or punitive damages, it did significantly and negatively predict blaming the justice system and positively and significantly predict blaming the victim – again, regardless of condition. It is possible that this is because of the specific facts of the case, e.g. the fact that David Peterson was depicted as having threatened Justin Hodge before the actual crime, and so his being suspected by the police, questioned, and wrongfully convicted was seen as his own fault. The use of a vignette that did not contain such an instance might have produced different results. However, it is worth noting that many jurors possess anti-defendant and/or pro-prosecution biases (e.g., "people who get arrested and sent to court are generally guilty") regardless of the facts of the case (Lecci & Meyers, 2008). We do not therefore believe this result to be as much an artefact of our specific vignette as simply an indication that honor endorsers might simply be less inclined to disapprove of governmental use of violence (including less-blatant uses of violence such as incarceration) for "social control," and being willing to accept the risks of such an arrangement

when it "goes wrong" in the case of a wrongful conviction, as has been suggested (albeit in a different context) in previous honor literature (Cohen, 1996).

As with Study 3, Study 4 contains limitations worth remarking upon. Like many jury decision-making studies utilizing vignettes, it suffers somewhat from a lack of ecological validity in its time frame, lack of deliberation with other jurors, and lack of different types of testimony. However, as these limitations are typical of numerous studies, we do not believe that these limitations harm the validity of Study 4 any more than they did Study 3.

Study 4 also suffered from similar sampling issues, with many of our participants not coming from honor states, leading to our overall sample not potentially providing an adequate representation of honor endorsers. Future research might benefit from attempting to specifically access participants from the "honor belt" or other more honor-endorsing regions of the country (Brown, 2016).

Overall, however, we believe that the results of Study 4, while only modestly supporting our hypothesis, still provide important insight into the potential effects of honor on jury decision, as well as the relationship between honor endorsement and perceptions of coerced false confessions. However, these results indicate that that honor's relationship to both issues of coerced false confessions and the criminal justice system more broadly might be more complex than we had initially hypothesized.

On the one hand, honor endorsers viewed the non-confessing individual more negatively (according to honor norms) and demonstrated a willingness to personally have close associations with exonerees more generally. On the other hand, honor predicted doubts about exoneree innocence, the belief that exonerees were more dangerous, and not blaming the justice system for the exoneree's wrongful incarceration, but the exoneree themselves. To clarify these findings,

future research might benefit from more in-depth comparisons regarding false confessors, including the use of different vignettes, accessing different measures of stigma, and examining honor's relationship to other personal judgements and perceptions of both falsely confessing and non-confessing exonerees.

Future research might also benefit from examining these questions outside the area of jury decision-making, but instead assessing how honor affects participants' willingness to support exonerees as matters of community reintegration, personal support, and more specific forms of personal contact.

General Discussion

The links between jury decision-making and cultural forces like honor ideology has been hitherto unexamined, despite the utility of doing so. Well-established models of jury decision-making, like the story model (Pennington & Hastie, 1993) and the liberation model (Kalven & Zeisel, 1997) indicate that when serving as jurors, individuals will rely on their beliefs, values, and expectations regarding their decision-making as much as (and sometimes more than) they will rely on specific legal restrictions or principles. Given that culture is a mechanism for meaning-making, reducing uncertainty, and aiding in decision-making (Oyserman, 2017), it is likely, if not essentially guaranteed, that cultural forces will influence how individuals' process and respond to information as jurors.

In these four studies, we demonstrated the utility of considering honor ideology, a specific cultural framework placing central value on reputation, for its influence on perceptions of and responses to the issue of coerced false confessions. In Study 1, we found that honor predicted specific beliefs about the occurrence of coerced false confessions, as well as specific attitudes towards the interrogation methods that make such confessions more likely. In Study 2,

we demonstrated that honor might help to explain the previously-observed phenomenon that coerced false confessors face greater levels of stigma than non-confessors. In Studies 3 and 4, we examined honor's effects in jury decision-making paradigms, both civil and criminal, and found that honor's effects on the perceptions of and judgements regarding coerced false confessions were more subtle, and were moderated by other legal attitudes and beliefs, as well as by the specific context in which judgements took place. We further found that the relationship between honor and stigma depended on which specific element of stigma was being considered.

While we believe that these results indicate the utility of examining jury decision-making from a cultural perspective, as well as the potential specific utility of considering honor norms when doing so, we also believe that more research is needed to further elaborate and expand upon these findings, both for issues of jury decision-making and for issues regarding the criminal justice system more broadly.

Within the realm of jury decision-making, further research regarding how honor affects jurors' perceptions and weighing of evidence, especially in the light of prosecutorial theories, might be beneficial. As research has already indicated that prosecutorial theories can outweigh even DNA evidence that might otherwise exonerate an individual (Appleby & Kassin, 2016), it is possible that jurors might attend more towards prosecutorial theories that conform to honor norms (e.g., "what kind of man would falsely confess?") as opposed to evidence (e.g., eyewitnesses supporting an alibi, contradictions in testimony, etc.).

Research regarding honor and jury decision-making might also benefit from examining specific ways that honor might interpret courtroom proceedings, e.g. the idea of a post-confession innocence plea or a post-exoneration civil suit as methods of regaining honor. Given the importance of communication and popular awareness to producing better-educated jurors

who will make better decisions (Mindthoff et al., 2018), it is important to understand how honor will affect its adherents' perceptions of legal proceedings, as well as how those proceedings can be framed in communicating with honor endorsers about these issues.

Beyond the issues of coerced false confession, research might benefit from examining other specific ways in which honor might "liberate" its adherents (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966), as well as identifying specific "tools" (Pennington & Hastie, 1993) that it provides for its adherents to construct stories. For instance, will honor-oriented jurors be less willing to convict crimes done for "honorable" purposes, even when the evidence clearly indicates a defendant's guilt, potentially leading to honor endorsing jurors making use of jury nullification (Niedermeier et al., 1999)? Will honor endorsing jurors sentence a "dishonorable" crime more harshly than an "honorable" crime? Will they be more likely to attend to "honorable" or "dishonorable" characteristics of defendants or attorneys or cases that do not relate to the facts of the case?

There is also utility in examining honor's effects legal judgements and decision-making beyond jury-related contexts, as has been done with recent work regarding perceptions of police brutality (Pomerantz et al., 2021). Given honor's well-demonstrated link to stigmatization, it is certainly worth investigating how honor affects reintegration efforts, both for exonerees and formerly convicted persons. It might similarly be worth examining how honor endorsers behave when they themselves are in interrogation, plea-bargaining, or reintegrative situations, as recent studies have demonstrated the importance of personal experience for individuals in these situations (Alceste et al., 2018; Arndorfer et al., 2015; Edkins & Dervan, 2018; Henderson & Levett 2018). It would also be worth examining how honor cultures more broadly speaking approach issues of criminal justice, such as in how crimes are reported on, as has been touched on briefly in previous research (Cohen et al., 1996; RUva et al., 2007; 2011), or specific

expectations, beliefs, and values surrounding topics of law enforcement and criminal policy, including the idea of "violence for social control" (Cohen, 1996). This might manifest in specific laws, practices, and pursuits such as mandatory minimum sentencing, "broken windows" policing, support for the war on drugs, and other, similar policies whose outcomes have proven to lead to negative criminal justice outcomes (Roeder et al., 2015).

Overall, however, we believe that cultural variables like honor should be considered when investigating issues of psychology and law, including issues of coerced false confessions. Doing so will not only allow for a better understanding of how individuals perceive, judge, and respond to specific legal circumstances and scenarios, but will also allow for a deeper understanding of the numerous ways that cultural forces allow us to make sense of the world around us.

Works Cited

Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions*. SAGE Publications, Inc.

Alceste, F., Luke, T. J., & Kassin, S. M. (2018). Holding yourself captive: Perceptions of custody during interviews and interrogations. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 7*, 387–397.

Appleby, S. C., & Kassin, S. M. (2016). When self-report trumps science: Effects of confessions, DNA, and prosecutorial theories on perceptions of guilt. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *22*(2), 127–140.

Arkes, H. R., & Mellers, B. A. (2002). Do juries meet our expectations? *Law and Human Behavior*, *26*(6), 625–639.

Arndorfer, A., Malloy, L. C., & Cauffman, E. (2015). Interrogations, confessions, and adolescent offenders' perceptions of the legal system. *Law and Human Behavior*, *39*(5), 503–513.

Awale, A., Chan, C. S., & Ho, G. T. S. (2019). The influence of perceived warmth and competence on realistic threat and willingness for intergroup contact. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *49*, 857–870.

Barnes, C. D., Brown, R. P., Lenes, J., Bosson, J., & Carvallo, M. (2014). My Country, my self: Honor, identity, and defensive responses to national threats. *Self and Identity, 13*, 638–662.

Barnes, C. D., Brown, R. P., & Osterman, L. L. (2012). "Don't tread on me": Masculine honor ideology in the U.S. and militant responses to terrorism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *38*, 1018–1029.

Barnes, C. D., Pomerantz, A., & Yashko, L. (2016). Children cover your eyes: Masculine honor and the role of blind patriotism in teaching national allegiance to posterity. *Political Psychology, 37*(6), 817–834.

Bjerregaard, B. E., Smith, M. D., Cochran, J. K., & Fogel, S. J. (2017). A further examination of the liberation hypothesis in capital murder trials. *Crime & Delinquency, 63*(8), 1017–1038.

Blair, J. P. (2005). What do we know about interrogation in the United States? *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 20*(2), 44–57.

Bock, J. E., Brown, R. P., & Green, K. (2019). Aging with honor: Examining ambivalent ageism and interpersonal risk-factors for suicide as explanations for the honor-suicide link. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 38*(9), 721–750.

Bornstein, B. H., & Greene, E. (2011). Jury decision making: Implications for and from psychology. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *20*(1), 63–67.

Bowman, J. (2006). *Honor: A History*. Encounter Books.

Boyll, J. R. (1991). Psychological, cognitive, personality, and interpersonal factors in jury verdicts. *Law & Psychology Review, 15*, 163–184.

Bray, R. M., & Noble, A. M. (1978). Authoritarianism and decisions of mock juries: Evidence of jury bias and group polarization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *36*(12), 1424–1430.

Brearley, H. C. (1934). The pattern of violence. In *W.T. Couch (Ed.) Culture in the South*. University of North Carolina Press.

Brooks, T. (2009). The right to a trial by jury. In T. Brooks (Ed.), *The Right to a Fair Trial*. Routledge.

Brown, R. P., Baughman, K., & Carvallo, M. (2018). Culture, masculine honor, and violence toward women. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *44*(4), 538–549.

Brown, R. P., Imura, M., & Mayeux, L. (2014). Honor and the stigma of mental healthcare. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *40*(9), 1119–1131.

Brown, R. P., Osterman, L. L., & Barnes, C. D. (2009). School Violence and the culture of honor. *Psychological Science*, *20*(11), 1400–1405.

Brown, Ryan. P. (2016). *Honor bound: How a cultural ideal has shaped the American psyche*. Oxford University Press.

Butler, B. M., & Moran, G. (2002). The role of death qualification in venirepersons' evaluations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials. *Law and Human Behavior*, *26*(2), 175–184.

Butler, B.M., & Moran, G. (2007). The impact of death qualification, belief in a just world, legal authoritarianism, and locus of control on venirepersons' evaluations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, *25*, 57–68.

Butterfield, M. E., & Bitter, A. N. (2019). A social judgment? Extralegal contrast effects in hypothetical legal decision making. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *25*(1), 30–37.

Campbell, K., & Denov, M. (2004). The burden of innocence: Coping with a wrongful imprisonment. *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice*, *46*, 139–163.

Carlsmith, K. M., & Darley, J. M. (2008). Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 40, pp. 193–236). Elsevier.

Carlsmith, K. M., Darley, J. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2002). Why do we punish?: Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83*, 284–299

Carter, H. (1950). *Southern legacy*. New Orleans, LA: LSU Press.

Chadee, D. (1996). Race, trial evidence, and jury decision making. *Caribbean Journal of Criminology & Social Psychology, 1*(1), 59–86.

Chaffin, M., Chenoweth, S., & Letourneau, E. J. (2016). Same-sex and race-based disparities in statutory rape arrests. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, *31*(1), 26–48.

Chojnacki, D., Cicchini, M., & White, L. (2008). An empirical basis for the admission of expert testimony on false confessions. *Arizona State Law Journal*, *40*, 1–45.

Clark, J. W., & Wink, K. (2012). The relationship between political ideology and punishment: What do jury panel members say? *Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 8*, 130-146.

Clow, K. A., & Esses, V. M. (2007). Expectancy effects in social stereotyping: Automatic and controlled processing in the Neely paradigm. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue Canadienne Des Sciences Du Comportement*, *39*(3), 161–173.

Clow, K. A., & Leach, A.-M. (2015a). After innocence: Perceptions of individuals who have been wrongfully convicted. *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, *20*(1), 147–164.

Clow, K. A., & Leach, A.-M. (2015b). Stigma and wrongful conviction: All exonerees are not perceived equal. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, *21*(2), 172–185.

Clow, K., Ricciardelli, R., & Cain, T. L. (2012). Stigma-by-association: Prejudicial effects of the prison experience for offenders and exonerees. In *The Psychology of Prejudice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Contemporary Issues* (pp. 127–154).

Cohen, D. (1996). Law, social policy, and violence: The impact of regional cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*(5), 961–978

Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1994). Self-protection and the culture of honor: Explaining Southern violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *20*(4), 551–567.

Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1997). Field experiments examining the culture of honor: The role of institutions in perpetuating norms about violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *23*(11), 1188–1199.

Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Bowdle, B. F., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the southern culture of honor: An" experimental ethnography.". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*(5), 945.

Costabile, K. A. (2016). Narrative construction, social perceptions, and the situation model. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *42*(5), 589–602.

Costanzo, M., & Peterson, J. (1994). Attorney persuasion in the capital penalty phase: a content analysis of closing arguments. *Journal of Social Issues*, *50*(2), 125–147.

Cowan, C. L., Thompson, W. C., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1984). The effects of death qualification on jurors' predisposition to convict and on the quality of deliberation. *Law and Human Behavior*, *8*(1–2), 53–79.

Crocker, J., Major, B., & Steele, C. (1998). Social stigma. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (4th ed., pp. 504–553). McGraw-Hill.

Cross, S. E., Uskul, A. K., Gerçek-Swing, B., Alözkan, C., & Ataca, B. (2013). Confrontation versus withdrawal: Cultural differences in responses to threats to honor. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *16*(3), 345–362.

Darley, J. M., Carlsmith, K. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2000). Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment. *Law and Human Behavior*, *24*(6), 659–683.

Daudistel, H. C., Hosch, H. M., Holmes, M. D., & Graves, J. B. (1999). Effects of defendant ethnicity on juries' dispositions of felony cases. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *29*(2), 317–336.

Delacre, M., Lakens, D., & Leys, C. (2017). Why psychologists should by default use Welch's t-test instead of Student's t-test. *International Review of Social Psychology, 30*, 92-101.

Devine, D. J., Buddenbaum, J., Houp, S., Studebaker, N., & Stolle, D. P. (2009). Strength of evidence, extra-evidentiary influence, and the liberation hypothesis: Data from the field. *Law and Human Behavior, 33*(2), 136–148.

Devine, D. J., & Caughlin, D. E. (2014). Do they matter? A meta-analytic investigation of individual characteristics and guilt judgments. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *20*(2), 109–134.

Devine, D. J., Clayton, L. D., Dunford, B. B., Seying, R., & Pryce, J. (2001). Jury decision making: 45 years of empirical research on deliberating groups. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *7*(3), 622–727.

Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. A. (2004). The problem of false confessions in the post DNA world. *North Carolina Law Review, 82*, 891–1007.

Edkins, V. A., & Dervan, L. E. (2018). Freedom now or a future later: Pitting the lasting implications of collateral consequences against pretrial detention in decisions to plead guilty. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *24*(2), 204–215.

Edkins, V. A., & Redlich, A. D. (Eds.). (2019). *A system of pleas: Social science's contribution to the real legal system*. Oxford University Press.

Evans, J. R., Meissner, C. A., Ross, A. B., Houston, K. A., Russano, M. B., & Horgan, A. J. (2013). Obtaining guilty knowledge in human intelligence interrogations: Comparing accusatorial and information-gathering approaches with a novel experimental paradigm. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition*, *2*(2), 83–88.

Findley, J. D., & Sales, B. D. (2012). *The science of attorney advocacy: How courtroom behavior affects jury decision making*. American Psychological Association.

Foster, S. D., Carvallo, M., Lee, J., Fisher, R., & Traxler, H. (2020). An implication of impurity: The impact of feminine honor on HPV screenings and the decision to authorize daughter's HPV vaccinations. *Stigma and Health*.

Gastil, R. D. (1971). Homicide and a regional culture of violence. *American Sociological Review*, *36*(3), 412.

Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. *Psychological Bulletin, 117*(1), 21–38.

Greene, E., Chopra, S. R., Kovera, M. B., Penrod, S. D., Rose, V. Gordon., Schuller, R. A., & Studebaker, C. A. (2002). Jurors and juries: A review of the field. In *James R.P. Ogloff (Ed.) Taking psychology and law into the twenty-first century*. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishing.

Greene, E., Sturm, K. A., & Evelo, A. J. (2016). Affective forecasting about hedonic loss and adaptation: Implications for damage awards. *Law and Human Behavior*, 40, 244–256.

Guevara, L., Boyd, L. M., Taylor, A. P., & Brown, R. A. (2011). Racial disparities in juvenile court outcomes: A test of the liberation hypothesis. *Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice*, *9*(3), 200–217.

Hans, V. P., Helm, R. K., & Reyna, V. F. (2018). From meaning to money: Translating injury into dollars. *Law and Human Behavior*, *42*(2), 95–109.

Hartwig, M., & Bond, C. F. (2011). Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie judgments. *Psychological Bulletin, 137*(4), 643–659.

Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Vrij, A. (2005). Detecting deception via strategic disclosure of evidence. *Law and Human Behavior*, *29*(4), 469–484.

Hasel, L. E., & Kassin, S. M. (2009). On the presumption of evidentiary independence: Can confessions corrupt eyewitness identifications? *Psychological Science*, *20*(1), 122–126.

Henderson, K. S., & Levett, L. M. (2018). Investigating predictors of true and false guilty pleas. *Law and Human Behavior*, *42*(5), 427–441.

Henkel, L. A. (2008). Jurors' reactions to recanted confessions: Do the defendant's personal and dispositional characteristics play a role? *Psychology, Crime & Law*, *14*(6), 565–578.

Henkel, L. A., Coffman, K. A. J., & Dailey, B.A., E. M. (2008). A survey of people's attitudes and beliefs about false confessions. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, *26*(5), 555–584.

Hester, R., & Hartman, T. K. (2017). Conditional race disparities in criminal sentencing: A test of the liberation hypothesis from a non-guidelines state. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, *33*(1), 77–100.

Hinsz, V. B., Tindale, R. S., & Vollrath, D. A. (1997). The emerging conceptualization of groups as information processors. *Psychological Bulletin*, *121*(1), 43–64.

Hirai, M., & Clum, G. A. (2000). Beliefs Toward Mental Illness Scale [Data set]. *Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment* (Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp. 221–236).

Hirschfield, P. J., & Piquero, A. R. (2010). Normalization and legitimation: Modeling stigmatizing attitudes towards ex-offenders. *Criminology*, *48*(1), 27–55.

Horowitz, I. A. (1985). The effect of jury nullification instruction on verdicts and jury functioning in criminal trials. *Law and Human Behavior*, *9*(1), 25–36.

Hoskins, Z. (2019). *Beyond punishment? A normative account of the collateral legal consequences of conviction.* Oxford University Press.

Huntley, J. E., & Costanzo, M. (2003). Sexual harassment stories: Testing a story-mediated model of juror decision-making in civil litigation. *Law and Human Behavior*, *27*(1), 29–51.

Ijaz, S. (2017, September 25). 'Honor' Killings Continue in Pakistan Despite New Law. *Human Rights Watch*. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/25/honor-killings-continue-pakistan-despite-new-law

Ijzerman, H., & Cohen, D. (2011). Grounding cultural syndromes: Body comportment and values in honor and dignity cultures. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *41*(4), 456–467.

Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. C. (2013). *Criminal interrogation and confessions* (5th ed.). Jones & Bartlett.

Jones, A. M., & Penrod, S. (2016). Can expert testimony sensitize jurors to coercive interrogation tactics? *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice*, *16*(5), 393–409.

Kalven, H., & Zeisel, H. (1966). *The American jury*. University of Chicago Press.

Kassin, S. M. (1997). The psychology of confession evidence. *American Psychologist*, *52*, 221–233.

Kassin, S. M. (2005). On the psychology of confessions: does innocence put innocents at risk? *American Psychologist*, *60*(3), 215–228.

Kassin, S. M. (2012). Why confessions trump innocence. *American Psychologist*, *67*(6), 431–445.

Kassin, S. M. (2014). False confessions: Causes, consequences, and implications for reform. *Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *1*(1), 112–121.

Kassin, S. M. (2017). False confessions: How can psychology so basic be so counterintuitive? *American Psychologist*, *72*(9), 951–964.

Kassin, S. M., Appleby, S. C., & Perillo, J. T. (2010a). Interviewing suspects: Practice, science, and future directions. *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, *15*(1), 39–55.

Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. A., Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. (2010b). Police-induced confessions: Risk factors and recommendations. *Law and Human Behavior*, *34*(1), 3–38.

Kassin, S. M., Dror, I. E., & Kukucka, J. (2013). The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and proposed solutions. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition*, *2*(1), 42–52.

Kassin, S. M., Goldstein, C. C., & Savitsky, K. (2019). Behavioral confirmation in the interrogation room: On the dangers of presuming guilt. *Law and Human Behavior*, *27*(2), 187–203.

Kassin, S. M., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (2008). The Psychology of confessions: A review of the literature and issues. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, *4*(1), 193–217.

Kassin, S. M., Meissner, C. A., & Norwick, R. J. (2005). "I'd know a false confession if I saw one": A comparative study of college students and police investigators. *Law and Human Behavior*, *29*(2), 211–227.

Kassin, S. M., & Neumann, K. (1997). On the power of confession evidence: An experimental test of the fundamental difference hypothesis. *Law and Human Behavior*, *21*(5), 469–484.

Kassin, S. M., & Norwick, R. J. (2004). Why people waive their Miranda rights: The power of innocence. *Law and Human Behavior*, *28*(2), 211–221.

Kassin, S. M., Scherr, K. C., & Alceste, F. (2019). The right to remain silent: Realities and illusions. In R. Bull & I. Blandón-Gitlin (Eds.), *The Routledge International Handbook of Legal and Investigative Psychology* (pp. 2–19). Routledge.

Kassin, S. M., & Sukel, H. (1997). Coerced confessions and the jury: An experimental test of the "harmless error" rule. *Law and Human Behavior*, *21*(1), 27–46.

Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1979). On the requirements of proof: The timing of judicial instruction and mock juror verdicts. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *37*(10), 1877–1887.

Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1980). Prior confessions and mock juror verdicts. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *10*(2), 133–146.

Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1985). Confession evidence. In S. M. Kassin & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), *The psychology of evidence and trial procedure* (pp. 67–94). Sage.

Keil, T. J., & Vito, G. F. (1989). Race, homicide severity, and application of the death penalty: A consideration of the Barnett scale. *Criminology*, *27*(3), 511–535.

Klaver, J. R., Lee, Z., & Rose, V. G. (2008). Effects of personality, interrogation techniques and plausibility in an experimental false confession paradigm. *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, *13*(1), 71–88.

Klein, K. S., & Klastorin, T. D. (1999). Do diverse juries aid or impede justice? *Wisconsin Law Review*, *No. 3 (Special Issue)*, 553–569.

Kovera, M. B. (Ed.). (2017). *The psychology of juries*. American Psychological Association.

Kukucka, J., Applegarth, H. K., & Mello, A. L. (2020). Do exonerees face employment discrimination similar to actual offenders? *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, *25*, 17–32.

Kukucka, J., & Evelo, A. J. (2019). Stigma against false confessors impacts post-exoneration financial compensation. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, *37*(4), 372–387.

Leo, R.A. (2008). *Police interrogation and American Justice*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

Leo, Richard A., & Liu, B. (2009). What do potential jurors know about police interrogation techniques and false confessions? *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, *27*(3), 381–399.

Leung, A. K.-Y., & Cohen, D. (2011). Within- and between-culture variation: Individual differences and the cultural logics of honor, face, and dignity cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *100*(3), 507–526.

Levett, L. M., Danielsen, E. M., Kovera, M. B., & Cutler, B. L. (2005). The psychology of jury and juror decision making. In *In* N. Brewer & K. D. Williams (Eds.) *Psychology and law: An empirical perspective* (pp. 365–406). The Guilford Press.

Lidén, M., Gräns, M., & Juslin, P. (2018). The presumption of guilt in suspect interrogations: Apprehension as a trigger of confirmation bias and debiasing techniques. *Law and Human Behavior*, *42*(4), 336–354.

Lidén, M., Gräns, M., & Juslin, P. (2019). From devil's advocate to crime fighter: Confirmation bias and debiasing techniques in prosecutorial decision-making. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, *25*, 494–526.

Liu, J. H., & Shure, G. H. (1993). Due process orientation does not always mean political liberalism. *Law and Human Behavior*, *17*(3), 343–360.

MacLin, K., & Herrera, V. (2006). The criminal stereotype. *North American Journal of Psychology*, 8, 197–208.

Maitland, F. W., & Montague, F. C. (1915). *A sketch of English legal history*. Putnam's Sons.

Mandery, E. J., Shlosberg, A., West, V., & Callaghan, B. (2013). Compensation statutes and post exoneration offending. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 103, 553–584.

Mannheimer, M. J. Z. (2002). Coerced confessions and the fourth amendment. *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 30*, 57.

Martin, A. (2011, November 27). The prosecution's case against DNA. *The New York Times*.

McCormick, C. T. (1972). *Handbook of the law of evidence* (2nd ed.). West.

McGowan, C. (2016). The threat of expulsion as unacceptable coercion: Title IX, due process, and coerced confessions. *Emory Law Journal, 66*, 1175.

Mindthoff, A., Evans, J. R., Perez, G., Olaguez, A. P., Klemfuss, J. Z., Carlucci, M. E., Meissner, C. A., Russano, M. B., Vallano, J. P., Woestehoff, S. A., Normile, C. J., Scherr, K. C., Carol, R. N., & Michael, S. W. (2018). A survey of potential jurors' perceptions of interrogations and confessions. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *24*(4), 430–448.

Miyamoto, Y. (2013). Culture and analytic versus holistic cognition. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 47, pp. 131–188). Elsevier.

Mourey, J. A., Lam, B. C. P., & Oyserman, D. (2015). Consequences of cultural fluency. *Social Cognition*, *33*(4), 308–344.

Mueller, C. B., & Kirkpatrick, L. C. (1995). *Modern evidence: Doctrine and practice*. Little, Brown, & Company.

Narby, D. J., Cutler, B. L., & Moran, G. (1993). A meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and jurors' perceptions of defendant culpability. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *78*(1), 34–42.

Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. *Review of General Psychology*, *2*(2), 175–220.

Niedermeier, K. E., Horowitz, I. A., & Kerr, N. L. (1999). Informing jurors of their nullification power: A route to a just verdict or judicial chaos? *Law and Human Behavior, 23*(3), 331–351.

Nisbet, E. C., Ostman, R., & Shanahan, J. (2009). Public opinion toward Muslim Americans: Civil liberties and the role of religiosity, ideology, and media use. In *A. Sinno (Ed.) Muslims in Western Politics* (pp. 161–199). Indiana University Press.

Nisbett, R. E. (1993). Violence and US regional culture. *American Psychologist, 48*(4), 441–449.

Nisbett, R. E., & Cohen, D. (1996). *Culture of honor: The psychology of violence in the south*. Westview Press.

Nowak, A., Gelfand, M. J., Borkowski, W., Cohen, D., & Hernandez, I. (2016). The evolutionary basis of honor cultures. *Psychological Science, 27*(1), 12–24.

O'Dea, C. J., Castro Bueno, A. M., & Saucier, D. A. (2017). Fight or flight: Perceptions of men who confront versus ignore threats to themselves and others. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *104*, 345–351.

Olsen-Fulero, L., & Fulero, S. M. (1997). Commonsense rape judgements: An empathy-complexity theory of rape juror story making. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *3*(2/3), 402–427.

Oyserman, D. (2011). Culture as situated cognition: Cultural mindsets, cultural fluency, and meaning making. *European Review of Social Psychology, 22*(1), 164–214.

Oyserman, D. (2015). Culture as situated cognition. In *R. Scott, S. Kosslyn (Eds.) Emerging trends in the social and behavioral sciences: An interdisciplinary, searchable, and linkable resource.* John Wiley & Sons.

Oyserman, D. (2017). Culture three ways: Culture and subcultures within countries. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *68*(1), 435–463.

Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. S. (2008). Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. *Psychological Bulletin*, *134*(2), 311–342.

Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1986). Evidence evaluation in complex decision making. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*(2), 242–258.

Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992). Explaining the evidence: Tests of the story model for juror decision making. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *62*(2), 189–206.

Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1993). *The story model for juror decision-making*. Cambridge University Press.

Perez, G., Mindthoff, A., Evans, J. R., Woestehoff, S. A., Olaguez, A. P., Klemfuss, J. Z., Normile, C. J., Scherr, K. C., Carlucci, M. E., Carol, R. N., Meissner, C. A., Michael, S. W., Stocks, E. L., Vallano, J. P., & Woody, W. D. (2019, March). *Examining juror demographics and beliefs as predictors of interrogations and confessions perceptions* [Poster Presentation].

Perillo, J. T., & Kassin, S. M. (2011). Inside interrogation: The lie, the bluff, and false confessions. *Law and Human Behavior*, *35*(4), 327–337.

Petersilia, J. (2005). Hard time: Ex-offenders returning home after prison. *Corrections Today*, *67*, 66–71.

Pomerantz, A. L., & Brown, R. P. (2020). The cross and the sword: A multidimensional investigation of the links between gendered facets of honor and religiosity among American Christians. *Self and Identity*, *19*, 521–545.

Pomerantz, A. L., Bell, K., Green, K., Foster, S., Carvallo, M., & Schow, P. (2021). “Badge of honor”: Honor ideology, police legitimacy, and perceptions of police violence. *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology*.

Redlich, A. D., Bibas, S., Edkins, V. A., & Madon, S. (2017). The psychology of defendant plea decision making. *American Psychologist, 72*(4), 339–352.

Redlich, A. D., Shteynberg, R. V., & Nirider, L. H. (2019). Pragmatic implication in the interrogation room: A comparison of juveniles and adults. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*.

Reskin, B. F., & Visher, C. A. (1986). The Impacts of evidence and extralegal factors in jurors’ decisions. *Law & Society Review, 20*(3), 423–438.

Rodriguez, L., Agtarap, S., Boals, A., Kearns, N. T., & Bedford, L. (2018). Making a biased jury decision: Using the Steven Avery murder case to investigate potential influences in jury decision-making. *Psychology of Popular Media Culture*.

Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M. R. (2013). In the name of honor: On virtue, reputation and violence. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *16*(3), 271–278.

Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M. R., Manstead, A. S., & Fischer, A. H. (2002). Honor in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *33*(1), 16–36.

Roeder, O. K., Eisen, L.-B., Bowling, J., Stiglitz, J. E., & Chettiar, I. M. (2015). What caused the crime decline? *SSRN Electronic Journal*.

Ross, L. (1997). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 10, pp. 174–221). Academic Press.

Ross, Lee. (2018). From the fundamental attribution error to the truly fundamental attribution error and beyond: My research journey. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13*(6), 750–769.

Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Narchet, F. M., & Kassin, S. M. (2005). Investigating true and false confessions within a novel experimental paradigm. *Psychological Science*, *16*(6), 481–487.

Ruva, C. L., & Guenther, C. C. (2015). From the shadows into the light: How pretrial publicity and deliberation affect mock jurors' decisions, impressions, and memory. *Law and Human Behavior*, *39*(3), 294–310.

Ruva, C. L., & Guenther, C. C. (2017). Keep your bias to yourself: How deliberating with differently biased others affects mock-jurors' guilt decisions, perceptions of the defendant, memories, and evidence interpretation. *Law and Human Behavior, 41*(5), 478–493.

Ruva, C. L., Guenther, C. C., & Yarbrough, A. (2011). Positive and negative pretrial publicity: The roles of impression formation, emotion, and predecisional distortion. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, *38*(5), 511–534.

Ruva, C. L., & LeVasseur, M. A. (2012). Behind closed doors: The effect of pretrial publicity on jury deliberations. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, *18*(5), 431–452.

Ruva, C., McEvoy, C., & Bryant, J. B. (2007). Effects of pre-trial publicity and jury deliberation on juror bias and source memory errors. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, *21*(1), 45–67.

Scherr, K. C., Normile, C. J., & Putney, H. (2018a). Perpetually stigmatized: False confessions prompt underlying mechanisms that motivate negative perceptions of exonerees. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 24*(3), 341–352.

Scherr, K. C., Normile, C. J., & Sarmiento, M. C. (2018b). Reluctant to embrace innocence: An experimental test of persevering culpability judgments on people's willingness to support reintegration services for exonerees. *Journal of Experimental Criminology,* 14, 529–538.

Scherr, K. C., Normile, C. J., Luna, S., Redlich, A. D., Lawrence, M., & Catlin, M. (2020a). False admissions of guilt associated with wrongful convictions undermine people's perceptions of exonerees. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *26*(3), 233–244.

Scherr, K. C., Redlich, A. D., & Kassin, S. M. (2020b). Cumulative disadvantage: A psychological framework for understanding how innocence can lead to confession, wrongful conviction, and beyond. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *15*(2), 353–383.

Schrager, S. (1999). *The trial lawyer's art*. Temple University Press.

Scott, L. (2010). "It never, ever ends": The psychological impact of wrongful conviction. *American University Criminal Law Brief*, 5, 10–22.

Shafa, S., Harinck, F., Ellemers, N., & Beersma, B. (2014). Who are you calling rude? Honor-related differences in morality and competence evaluations after an insult. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, *7*(1), 38–56.

Sherrod, D. R. (2019). *The jury crisis: What's wrong with jury trials and how we can save them*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Simms, T. (2016). Statutory compensation for the wrongly imprisoned. *Social Work*, 61, 155–162.

Smalarz, L., Madon, S., & Turosak, A. (2018). Defendant stereotypicality moderates the effect of confession evidence on judgments of guilt. *Law and Human Behavior*, *42*(4), 355–368.

Sommers, S. R., & Kassin, S. M. (2001). On the many impacts of inadmissible testimony: Selective compliance, need for cognition, and the overcorrection bias. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *27*(10), 1368–1377.

Spencer-Rodgers, J., Williams, M. J., & Peng, K.. (2010). Cultural differences in expectations of change and tolerance for contradiction: A decade of empirical research. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *14*(3), 296–312.

Stuart, S. M., McKimmie, B. M., & Masser, B. M. (2019). Rape perpetrators on trial: The effect of sexual assault–related schemas on attributions of blame. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, *34*(2), 310–336.

Swanner, J. K., Meissner, C. A., Atkinson, D. J., & Dianiska, R. E. (2016). Developing diagnostic, evidence-based approaches to interrogation. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition*, *5*(3), 295–301.

Taylor, A., Guevara, L., Boyd, L. M., & Brown, R. A. (2012). Race, geography, and juvenile justice: An exploration of the liberation hypothesis. *Race and Justice*, *2*(2), 114–137.

Thompson, W. C. (2006). Tarnish on the "gold standard": Recent problems in forensic DNA testing. *The Champion*, *30*, 10–16.

Thompson, W. C., Cowan, C. L., Ellsworth, P. C., & Harrington, J. C. (1984). Death penalty attitudes and conviction proneness: The translation of attitudes into verdicts. *Law and Human Behavior*, *8*, 95–113.

Ugwuegbu, D. C. E. (1979). Racial and evidential factors in juror attribution of legal responsibility. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *15*(2), 133–146.

Vandello, J. A., Cohen, D., Grandon, R., & Franiuk, R. (2009). Stand by your man: Indirect prescriptions for honorable violence and feminine loyalty in Canada, Chile, and the United States. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *40*(1), 81–104.

Vandello, J. A., Cohen, D., & Ransom, S. (2008). U.S. Southern and northern differences in perceptions of norms about aggression: Mechanisms for the perpetuation of a culture of honor. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *39*(2), 162–177.

Vitriol, J. A., & Kovera, M. B. (2018). Exposure to capital voir dire may not increase convictions despite increasing pretrial presumption of guilt. *Law and Human Behavior*, *42*(5), 472–483.

Vollen, L., & Eggers, D. (2005). *Surviving justice: America's wrongfully convicted and exonerated.* San Francisco: McSweeney's Books.

Vrij, A., Hartwig, M., & Granhag, P. A. (2019). Reading lies: Nonverbal communication and deception. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *70*(1), 295–317.

Wallace, D. B., & Kassin, S. M. (2013). Harmless error analysis: How do judges respond to confession errors? *Law and Human Behavior*, *36*, 151–157.

Welden, B. A. (2010). Restoring lost 'honor': Retrieving face and identity, removing shame, and controlling the familial cultural environment through 'honor' murder. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, *2*(2), 380–398.

Westervelt, S., & Cook, K. (2012). *Life after death row*. Rutgers University Press.

Westervelt, S. D., & Cook, K. J. (2008). Coping with innocence after death row. *Contexts*, *7*(4), 32–37.

Woestehoff, S. A., & Meissner, C. A. (2016). Juror sensitivity to false confession risk factors: Dispositional vs. situational attributions for a confession. *Law and Human Behavior*, *40*(5), 564–579.

Yang, Y., Guyll, M., & Madon, S. (2017). The interrogation decision-making model: A general theoretical framework for confessions. *Law and Human Behavior, 41*(1), 80–92.

Zannella, L., Clow, K., Rempel, E., Hamovitch, L., & Hall, V. (2020). The effects of race and criminal history on landlords' (un)willingness to rent to exonerees. *Law and Human Behavior*, *44*, 300–310.

Zou, X., Tam, K.-P., Morris, M. W., Lee, S., Lau, I. Y.-M., & Chiu, C. (2009). Culture as common sense: Perceived consensus versus personal beliefs as mechanisms of cultural influence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *97*(4), 579–597.

Table 1. *Correlations and descriptive statistics for Study 1*.

		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1.	HIM	-								
2.	HIW	0.50**	-							
3.	Death Penalty Attitudes	0.33**	0.23**	-						
4.	Conservatism	0.39**	0.47**	0.37**	-					
5.	False Confession – Criminal Suspect	-0.29**	-0.15	-0.14	-0.26**	-				
6.	False Confession – Personal	-0.36**	-0.27**	-0.31**	-0.32**	0.44**	-			
7.	Perceived Coerciveness	-0.29**	-0.23**	-0.14	-0.16*	0.29**	0.30**	-		
8.	Likelihood of False Confession	-0.16*	-0.27**	-0.11	-0.19*	0.28**	0.21**	0.36**	-	
9.	Allowing Coerced Evidence	0.14	0.26**	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.06	-0.16	-0.08	-
	M	3.71	4.84	2.93	3.96	4.09	2.76	3.86	3.71	2.82
	SD	1.28	1.20	1.00	1.75	0.68	1.08	0.73	0.82	1.25

$N = 166$, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Table 2. *Regression table for Study 1 using the HIM as the primary predictor*.

	B (SE)	95% CI for B	β	t	R^2
OV: False Confession – Criminal Suspect					.12
HIM	-0.10 (0.05)	[-0.19, -0.01]	-0.19	2.11*	
Conservatism	-0.07 (0.03)	[-0.13, 0.00]	-0.17	1.97	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.00 (0.06)	[-0.11, 0.11]	-0.00	0.04	
Gender	-0.16 (0.13)	[-0.41, 0.09]	-0.10	1.28	
OV: False Confession – Personal					.21
HIM	-0.16 (0.07)	[-0.30, -0.02]	-0.19	2.24*	
Conservatism	-0.10 (0.05)	[-0.20, -0.00]	-0.16	2.03*	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.18 (0.08)	[-0.35, -0.02]	-0.17	2.16*	
Gender	-0.33 (0.19)	[-0.70, 0.05]	-0.14	1.74	
OV: Perceived Coerciveness					.09
HIM	-0.14 (0.05)	[-0.24, -0.04]	-0.24	2.69**	
Conservatism	-0.02 (0.04)	[-0.09, 0.05]	-0.04	0.46	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.03 (0.06)	[-0.15, 0.09]	-0.04	0.51	
Gender	-0.08 (0.14)	[-0.35, 0.19]	-0.05	0.58	
OV: Likelihood of Coercive Techniques Eliciting a False Confession					.05
HIM	-0.05 (0.06)	[-0.17, 0.06]	-0.09	1.00	
Conservatism	-0.07 (0.04)	[-0.15, 0.01]	-0.15	1.67	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.02 (0.07)	[-0.16, 0.11]	-0.03	0.74	
Gender	0.01 (0.16)	[-0.30, 0.31]	0.00	0.04	
OV: Allowing Potentially Coerced Evidence for Jury Consideration					.05
HIM	0.20 (0.09)	[0.03, 0.38]	0.21	2.25**	
Conservatism	0.00 (0.06)	[-0.12, 0.13]	0.00	0.04	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.05 (0.11)	[-0.26, 0.17]	-0.04	0.43	
Gender	-0.48 (0.24)	[-0.97, 0.00]	-0.17	1.98	

$N = 166$, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Table 3. *Regression table for Study 1 using the HIW as the primary predictor*.

	B (SE)	95% CI for B	β	t	R^2
OV: False Confession – Criminal Suspect					.09
HIW	-0.01 (0.05)	[-0.10, 0.09]	-0.01	0.11	
Conservatism	-0.08 (0.04)	[-0.15, -0.01]	-0.21	2.33*	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.03 (0.06)	[-0.14, 0.09]	-0.04	0.46	
Gender	-0.25 (0.12)	[-0.49, -0.01]	-0.16	2.06*	
OV: False Confession – Personal					.19
HIW	-0.10 (0.07)	[-0.25, 0.04]	-0.11	1.39	
Conservatism	-0.10 (0.05)	[-0.21, 0.00]	-0.16	1.90	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.21 (0.08)	[-0.38, -0.05]	-0.20	2.51*	
Gender	-0.45 (0.18)	[-0.80, -0.09]	-0.18	2.47*	
OV: Perceived Coerciveness					.07
HIW	-0.12 (0.05)	[-0.22, -0.01]	-0.19	2.19*	
Conservatism	-0.01 (0.04)	[-0.08, 0.07]	-0.02	0.22	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.05 (0.06)	[-0.17, 0.07]	-0.07	0.89	
Gender	-0.17 (0.13)	[-0.43, 0.09]	-0.10	1.31	
OV: Likelihood of Coercive Techniques Eliciting a False Confession					.08
HIW	-0.15 (0.06)	[-0.27, -0.04]	-0.23	2.62*	
Conservatism	-0.03 (0.04)	[-0.12, 0.05]	-0.07	0.80	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.03 (0.07)	[-0.16, 0.11]	-0.03	0.38	
Gender	-0.01 (0.15)	[-0.29, 0.28]	-0.00	0.04	
OV: Allowing Potentially Coerced Evidence for Jury Consideration					0.10
HIW	0.37 (0.10)	[0.18, 0.56]	0.34	3.79**	
Conservatism	-0.07 (0.07)	[-0.20, 0.07]	-0.09	1.00	
Death Penalty Attitudes	-0.04 (0.11)	[-0.25, 0.17]	-0.03	0.37	
Gender	-0.39 (0.23)	[-0.84, 0.05]	-0.14	1.75	

$N = 166$, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Table 4. *Conditional correlations for Study 2*.

Condition 1 – Innocent

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. HIM	-						
2. HIW	0.41**	-					
3. Conservatism	0.43**	0.38**	-				
4. Death penalty attitudes	0.31**	0.21*	0.39**	-			
5. Stigma (Total)	0.03	0.20*	0.23*	0.29**	-		
6. Stigma (Danger)	-0.00	0.16	0.22*	0.29**	0.96**	-	
7. Stigma (Skills)	0.06	0.22	0.23*	0.29**	0.98**	0.89**	-
M	3.70	4.21	3.82	3.71	3.87	3.80	3.91
SD	1.17	0.86	1.51	1.50	1.28	1.45	1.24

N = 120, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Condition 2 – Guilty

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. HIM	-						
2. HIW	0.41**	-					
3. Conservatism	0.35**	0.37**	-				
4. Death penalty attitudes	0.13	0.05	0.34**	-			
5. Stigma (Total)	0.02	0.18*	0.11	0.19*	-		
6. Stigma (Danger)	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.11	0.93**	-	
7. Stigma (Skills)	0.03	0.18*	0.17	0.23*	0.97**	0.81**	-
M	3.48	4.06	3.79	3.78	4.63	4.76	4.56
SD	1.21	0.93	1.33	1.47	1.01	1.16	0.99

N = 122, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Condition 3 – False confession

		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1.	HIM	-						
2.	HIW	0.53**	-					
3.	Conservatism	0.30**	0.44**	-				
4.	Death penalty attitudes	0.15	0.23*	0.32**	-			
5.	Stigma (Total)	0.38**	0.28**	0.34**	0.08	-		
6.	Stigma (Danger)	0.33**	0.27**	0.31**	0.05	0.95**	-	
7.	Stigma (Skills)	0.40**	0.27**	0.35**	0.09	0.98**	0.87**	-
M		3.49	4.14	3.58	3.31	3.49	3.40	3.54
SD		1.17	0.97	1.45	1.49	1.34	1.52	1.30

$N = 118$, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Table 5. *Regression table for Study 2*

Model 1: Predicting stigma from the HIM						R^2
						.24
	B (SE)	[95% CI for B]	β	*t*	*p*-value	
HIM	0.40 (0.10)	[0.21, 0.59]	0.36	4.20	.00	
D1	1.03 (0.15)	[0.74, 1.34]	0.38	6.84	.00	
D2	0.32 (0.15)	[0.02, 0.62]	0.12	2.09	.04	
HIMXD1	-0.48 (0.13)	[-0.74, -0.23]	-0.26	3.80	.00	
HIMXD2	-0.46 (0.13)	[-0.72, -0.21]	-0.24	-3.58	.00	
Conservatism	0.17 (0.05)	[0.07, 0.26]	0.19	3.48	.00	
Death penalty attitudes	0.09 (0.04)	[0.00, 0.18]	0.10	1.98	.05	
Gender	-0.17 (0.13)	[-0.43, 0.10]	-0.06	1.23	.22	
Model 2: Predicting stigma from the HIW						.21
HIW	0.28 (0.12)	[0.05, 0.51]	0.20	2.41	.02	
D1	1.08 (0.15)	[0.78, 1.38]	0.39	6.99	.00	
D2	0.32 (0.16)	[0.01, 0.62]	0.12	2.05	.04	
HIWXD1	-0.18 (0.16)	[-0.50, 0.13]	-0.08	1.14	.26	
HIWXD2	-0.10 (0.17)	[-0.43, 0.23]	-0.04	0.57	.57	
Conservatism	0.13 (0.05)	[0.03, 0.23]	0.15	2.56	.01	
Death penalty attitudes	0.09 (0.05)	[-0.00, 0.18]	0.10	1.94	.05	
Gender	-0.11 (0.13)	[-0.37, 0.15]	-0.04	0.83	.41	

N = 360

Table 6. *Correlations and descriptive statistics for explanatory variables for Study 3*

	1.	2.	3.
1. HIM	-		
2. DPCC	-0.54**	-	
3. Conservatism	0.34**	-0.37**	-
M	4.77	4.39	3.48
SD	2.09	1.20	2.04

N = 219, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Table 7. *Conditional intercorrelations for outcome variables in Study 3*

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1.Perc. Honor	-	-0.38**	-0.24**	-0.39**	0.55**	-0.33**	0.57**	0.55**
2. Guilt	-0.57**	-	0.61**	0.73**	-0.53**	0.65**	-0.24**	-0.12
3.Punish	-0.46**	0.61**	-	0.76**	-0.54**	0.55**	-0.09	-0.00
4. Case Eval	-0.62**	0.78**	0.68**	-	-0.75**	0.59**	-0.36**	-0.26**
5. Coer. Belief	¶	¶	¶	¶	-	-0.41**	0.44**	0.41**
6. Stigma (Danger)	-0.62**	0.77**	0.62**	0.72**	¶	-	-0.23*	-0.17
7. Stigma (Social Contact)	0.70**	-0.51**	-0.44**	-0.61**	¶	-0.50**	-	0.86**
8. Stigma (Personal Contact)	0.49**	-0.28*	-0.24*	-0.32**	¶	-0.31**	0.78**	-

N = 219, 113 in coerced confession condition, 106 in maintained innocence condition * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$. Correlations above the diagonal represent the coerced confession condition, correlations below the diagonal represent the maintained innocence condition. The coercion beliefs variable was only presented in the coerced confession condition, as indicated by ¶.

Table 8. *Conditional correlations between explanatory and outcome variables in Study 3.*

	Perc. Honor	Guilt	Punish	Case Eval	Coer. Belief	Stigma (Danger)	Stigma (Social Cont.)	Stigma (Pers. Cont.)
HIM								
Innocence Condition	-0.16	0.31**	0.38**	0.32**	¶.	0.35**	-0.03	0.12
Confession Condition	0.11	0.36**	0.41**	0.32**	-0.06	0.51**	0.01	0.08
DPCC								
Innocence Condition	0.24*	-0.25*	-0.35**	-0.37**	¶.	-0.31**	0.19	-0.04
Confession Condition	0.12	-0.45**	-0.54**	-0.59**	0.45**	-0.42**	0.24*	0.13
Conservatism								
Innocence Condition	0.09	-0.03	0.05	-0.06	¶.	0.03	0.13	0.12
Confession Condition	-0.15	0.16	0.16	0.28**	-0.20*	0.21*	-0.08	-0.07

N = 219, 113 in coerced confession condition, 106 in maintained innocence condition * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$. The coercion beliefs variable was only presented in the coerced confession condition, as indicated by ¶.

Table 9. *Descriptive Statistics and Welch's t-tests between conditions for outcome variables in Study 3.*

	Coerced Confession Condition		**Maintained Innocence Condition**			
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	t-test	*p*-value
Perceived Honor	4.08	1.08	4.64	1.07	3.98	.00
Guilt Likelihood	4.56	2.20	4.08	2.15	1.65	.10
Punishment	4.56	3.66	3.47	3.52	2.30	.02
Case Evaluation	3.52	1.53	3.10	1.65	2.04	.04
Coercion Beliefs	6.36	1.81	--	--	--	--
Stigma (Danger)	3.99	1.61	3.52	1.76	2.08	.04
Stigma (Distance)	3.02	1.01	3.14	0.94	0.98	.33
Stigma (Personal)	2.58	1.13	2.65	1.01	0.53	.60

N = 219, 113 in coerced confession condition, 106 in maintained innocence condition. The coercion beliefs variable was only presented in the coerced confession condition, which is why no t-test is reported.

Table 10. *Regressions for Study 3 using the HIM as the primary predictor*

	B (SE)	95% CI for B	β	t	R^2
OV: Perceived Honor					.16
HIM (maintained innocence condition)	-0.00 (0.07)	[-0.14, 0.14]	-0.00	0.02	
(coerced confession condition)	0.12 (0.06)	[0.01, 0.24]	0.24	2.09^	
DPCC (maintained innocence condition)	0.29 (0.12)	[0.05, 0.52]	0.28	2.44*	
(coerced confession condition)	0.08 (0.10)	[-0.12, 0.27]	0.09	0.75	
Condition	-0.39 (0.08)	[-0.55, -0.23]	-0.35	4.73**	
HIMxCond	0.06 (0.04)	[-0.02, 0.15]	0.12	1.55	
DPCCxCond	-0.05 (0.08)	[-0.21, 0.09]	-0.06	0.75	
HIMxDPCC (maintained innocence condition)	0.08 (0.05)	[-0.01, 0.18]	0.17	1.73	
(coerced confession condition)	-0.06(0.04)	[-0.14, 0.02]	-0.16	1.52	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.09 (0.03)	[-0.15, -0.03]	-0.22	2.80**	
Gender	-0.10 (0.08)	[-0.25, 0.06]	-0.08	1.19	
Conservatism	-0.00 (0.04)	[-0.09, 0.07]	-0.02	0.20	
OV: Guilt Likelihood					.20
HIM	0.20 (0.09)	[0.03, 0.37]	0.19	2.35*	
DPCC	-0.47 (0.15)	[-0.76, -0.17]	-0.26	3.12**	
Condition	0.34 (0.16)	[-0.04, 0.65]	0.16	2.20*	
HIMxCond	-0.07 (0.08)	[-0.23, 0.08]	-0.07	0.93	
DPCCxCond	-0.19 (0.14)	[-0.47, 0.10]	-0.11	1.31	
HIMxDPCC	-0.02 (0.06)	[-0.14, 0.10]	-0.03	0.35	
Three-Way Interaction	0.11 (0.06)	[-0.01, 0.23]	0.15	1.89	
Gender	0.16 (0.15)	[-0.14, 0.45]	0.07	1.06	
Conservatism	-0.11 (0.08)	[-0.26, 0.04]	-0.10	1.42	
OV: Punishment					.27
HIM	0.43 (0.14)	[0.16, 0.69]	0.24	3.12**	
DPCC	-0.96 (0.24)	[-1.43, -0.49]	-0.32	3.05**	
Condition	0.67 (0.25)	[0.18, 1.16]	0.19	2.69**	
HIMxCond	-0.12 (0.13)	[-0.37, 0.13]	-0.07	0.95	
DPCCxCond	-0.30 (0.23)	[-0.75, 0.15]	-0.10	1.31	
HIMxDPCC	-0.02 (0.10)	[-0.21, 0.17]	-0.02	0.24	
Three-Way Interaction	0.11 (0.09)	[-0.07, 0.29]	0.09	1.17	
Gender	0.01(0.24)	[-0.46, 0.47]	0.00	0.03	
Conservatism	-0.20 (0.12)	[-0.44, 0.05]	-0.11	1.58	
OV: Case Evaluation					.29
HIM	0.06 (0.06)	[-0.06, 0.18]	0.08	1.04	
DPCC	-0.61 (0.10)	[-0.81, -0.40]	-0.46	5.83**	
Condition	0.26 (0.11)	[0.04, 0.48]	0.16	2.38*	
HIMxCond	-0.08 (0.06)	[-0.19, 0.04]	-0.10	1.35	
DPCCxCond	-0.15 (0.10)	[-0.35, 0.05]	-0.11	1.51	
HIMxDPCC	-0.03 (0.04)	[-0.11, 0.06]	-0.04	0.64	

Three-Way Interaction	0.06 (0.04)	[-0.01, 0.15]	0.12	1.62	
Gender	0.11 (0.11)	[-0.10, 0.31]	0.07	1.01	
Conservatism	-0.07 (0.05)	[-0.18, 0.04]	-0.09	1.32	
OV: Coercion Beliefs					.24
HIM	0.19 (0.09)	[0.01, 0.37]	0.22	2.03^	
DPCC	0.77 (0.16)	[0.46, 1.09]	0.55	4.83**	
HIMxDPCC	0.01 (0.06)	[-0.12, 0.13]	0.01	0.11	
Gender	0.04 (0.18)	[-0.32, 0.39]	0.02	0.19	
Conservatism	-0.03 (0.09)	[-0.21, 0.14]	-0.04	0.35	
OV: Stigma (Danger)					.25
HIM(maintained innocence condition)	0.21 (0.11)	[-0.00, 0.43]	0.24	1.98	
(coerced confession condition)	0.25 (0.08)	[0.10, 0.41]	0.34	3.31**	
DPCC (maintained innocence condition)	-0.34 (0.19)	[-0.71, 0.03]	-0.21	1.84	
(coerced confession condition)	-0.28 (0.14)	[-0.54, -0.01]	-0.22	2.04*	
Condition	0.32 (0.12)	[0.09, 0.55]	0.19	2.70**	
HIMxCond	0.03 (0.06)	[-0.09, 0.15]	0.04	0.55	
DPCCxCond	0.01 (0.11)	[-0.20, 0.23]	0.01	0.11	
HIMxDPCC (maintained innocence condition)	-0.15 (0.08)	[-0.30, 0.00]	-0.18	1.96	
(coerced confession condition	0.02 (0.05)	[-0.09, 0.12]	0.03	0.34	
Three-Way Interaction	0.10 (0.04)	[0.01, 0.18]	0.16	2.16*	
Gender	0.22 (0.11)	[-0.00, 0.44]	0.13	1.96	
Conservatism	-0.02 (0.06)	[-0.13, 0.10]	-0.02	0.31	
OV: Stigma (Social Distance)					.05
HIM	0.05 (0.04)	[-0.03, 0.13]	0.11	1.22	
DPCC	0.14 (0.07)	[-0.00, 0.29]	0.18	1.96	
Condition	-0.11 (0.08)	[-0.26, 0.04]	-0.11	1.42	
HIMxCond	0.01 (0.04)	[-0.07, 0.08]	0.01	0.14	
DPCCxCond	-0.00 (0.07)	[-0.14, 0.14]	-0.00	0.01	
HIMxDPCC	-0.01 (0.03)	[-0.07, 0.05]	-0.04	0.45	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.02 (0.03)	[-0.08, 0.04]	-0.06	0.72	
Gender	0.06 (0.07)	[-0.08, 0.21]	0.07	0.87	
Conservatism	0.04 (0.04)	[-0.04, 0.11]	0.08	0.95	
OV: Stigma (Personal Contact)					.03
HIM	0.06 (0.05)	[-0.03, 0.15]	0.12	1.35	
DPCC	0.08 (0.08)	[-0.08, 0.24]	0.09	1.01	
Condition	-0.10 (0.08)	[-0.27, 0.07]	-0.09	1.20	
HIMxCond	0.00 (0.04)	[-0.08, 0.09]	0.01	0.06	
DPCCxCond	0.03 (0.08)	[-0.12, 0.19]	0.04	0.43	
HIMxDPCC	-0.01 (0.03)	[-0.07, 0.06]	-0.02	0.27	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.02 (0.03)	[-0.09, 0.04]	-0.06	0.74	
Gender	0.07 (0.08)	[-0.09, 0.23]	0.07	0.90	
Conservatism	0.02 (0.04)	[-0.07, 0.10]	0.03	0.42	

N = 219, 113 in coerced confession condition, 106 in maintained innocence condition * .05 ≥ *p* ≥ .01; ** *p* < .01; ^ *p* = .05. The coercion beliefs variable was only presented in the coerced confession condition.

Table 11. *Correlations and descriptive statistics for explanatory variables for Study 4.*

	1.	2.	3.
1. HIM	-		
2. DPCC	-0.45**	-	
3. Conservatism	0.30**	-0.38**	-
M	4.55	4.48	3.93
SD	1.71	1.10	1.75

N = 189, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Table 12. *Conditional intercorrelations for outcome variables in the maintained innocence condition in Study 4.*

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1.Perceived Honor	-									
2.Guilt Likelihood	-0.63**	-								
3.Stigma (danger)	-0.75**	0.73**	-							
4. Stigma (Social Contact)	-0.65**	0.44**	-0.60**	-						
5. Stigma (Personal Contact)	0.41**	-0.15	-0.40	0.78**	-					
6. Compensatory Damages	0.36**	-0.34**	-0.39**	0.26*	0.17	-				
7. Punitive Damages	0.43**	-0.36**	-0.42**	0.29**	0.21	0.80**	-			
8.Blame (Justice System)	0.55**	-0.59**	-0.59**	0.50**	0.32**	0.46**	0.55**	-		
9. Blame (Plaintiff)	-0.65**	0.66**	0.82**	-0.44**	-0.24*	-0.38**	-0.47**	-0.72**	-	
10. Reintegration Support	0.30**	-0.21*	-0.31**	0.32**	0.25*	0.44**	0.49**	0.49**	-0.38**	-

N = 189, 88 in the maintained innocence condition, 101 in the coerced confession condition. * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$

Table 13. *Conditional intercorrelations for outcome variables in the coerced confession condition in Study 4.*

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
1.Perceived Honor	-										
2.Guilt	-0.22**	-									
3.Coercion Belief	0.31**	-0.70**	-								
4.Stigma (danger)	-0.35**	0.63**		-							
5. Stigma (Social Contact)	0.49**	-0.19	0.27**	-0.35**	-						
6. Stigma (Personal Contact)	0.50**	0.01	0.13	-0.23*	0.70**	-					
7. Compensatory Damages	0.17	-0.48**	0.50**	-0.41**	0.20	0.02	-				
8. Punitive Damages	0.24*	-0.43**	0.45**	-0.36**	0.26**	0.09	0.73**	-			
9.Blame (Justice System)	0.23*	-0.69**	0.74**	-0.57**	0.25*	0.02	0.61**	0.55**	-		
10. Blame (Plaintiff)	-0.23*	0.58**	-0.48**	0.55**	-0.26**	0.01	-0.53**	-0.48**	-0.60**	-	
11. Reintegration Support	0.26**	-0.52**	0.64**	-0.45**	0.31**	0.13	0.65**	0.64**	0.68**	-0.52**	

N = 189, 88 in the maintained innocence condition, 101 in the coerced confession condition. * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$. The coercion belief measure was only administered in this condition.

Table 14. *Conditional correlations between explanatory and outcome variables in Study 4.*

	Innocence Condition			**Coerced Confession Condition**		
	HIM	DPCC	Conservatism	HIM	DPCC	Conservatism
1.Perceived Honor	-0.31**	0.03	-0.18	0.03	0.08	-0.20
2.Guilt	0.37**	-0.15	0.33**	0.39**	-0.18	0.09
3.Coercion Belief	¶	¶	¶	-0.25*	0.13	0.01
4.Stigma (danger)	0.44**	-0.21*	0.27*	0.46**	-0.28**	0.16
5. Stigma (Social Contact)	-0.21	0.22*	-0.15	0.04	0.14	-0.22*
6. Stigma (Personal Contact)	-0.11	0.17	-0.02	0.26*	-0.03	-0.19
7. Compensatory Damages	-0.20	0.09	-0.10	-0.27**	0.24*	-0.05
8. Punitive Damages	-0.21*	0.15	-0.13	-0.24*	0.26**	-0.03
9.Blame (Justice System)	-0.36**	0.22*	-0.39**	-0.39**	0.22*	-0.15
10. Blame (Plaintiff)	0.45**	-0.22*	0.34**	0.45**	-0.37**	-0.04
11. Reintegration Support	-0.31**	0.43**	-0.28**	-0.25*	0.19	-0.04

N = 189, 88 in the maintained innocence condition, 101 in the coerced confession condition. * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$. The coercion belief measure was only administered in the coerced confession condition, as indicated by ¶.

Table 15. *Descriptive Statistics and Welch's t-tests between conditions for outcome variables in Study 4.*

	Coerced Confession Condition		**Maintained Innocence Condition**				
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	t-test	*p*-value	Cohen's *d*
Perceived Honor	4.47	0.97	5.06	0.96	4.14	.00	0.63
Guilt	2.18	1.27	1.95	1.21	1.28	0.20	
Coercion Belief	5.96	1.16	¶	¶	¶	¶	
Stigma (danger)	3.13	1.71	2.49	1.62	2.63	.01	0.23
Stigma (Social Contact)	3.52	0.84	3.67	0.79	1.28	.20	
Stigma (Personal Contact)	2.89	0.97	3.14	1.02	1.70	.09	
Compensatory Damages	7.41	2.23	7.55	2.29	0.42	.67	
Punitive Damages	7.18	2.62	7.65	2.32	1.31	.19	
Blame (Justice System)	6.03	1.19	6.06	1.39	0.14	.89	
Blame (Plaintiff)	3.07	1.63	2.40	1.87	2.62	.01	0.22
Reintegration Support	5.83	1.14	5.70	1.31	0.71	.48	

N = 189, 88 in the maintained innocence condition, 101 in the coerced confession condition. * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$. The coercion belief measure was only administered in the coerced confession condition, as indicated by ¶.

Table 16. *Regressions for Study 4 using the HIM as the primary predictor*

	B (SE)	95% CI for B	β	t	R^2
OV: Perceived Honor					.19
HIM	.08 (0.06)	[-0.05, 0.20]	0.13	1.19	
Coerced Confession Condition					
HIM	-0.17 (0.07)	[-0.30, -0.03]	-0.28	2.41*	
Maintained Innocence Condition					
DPCC	-0.09 (0.08)	[-0.25, 0.07]	-0.10	1.07	
Condition	-0.29 (0.08)	[-0.44, -0.14]	-0.29	3.78**	
HIMxCond	0.12 (0.05)	[0.04, 0.21]	0.21	2.68**	
DPCCxCond	0.13 (0.08)	[-0.02, 0.28]	0.15	1.70	
HIMxDPCC	-0.07 (0.04)	[-0.15, 0.01]	-0.13	1.67	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.01 (0.04)	[-0.10, 0.07]	-0.03	0.30	
Gender	-0.13 (0.07)	[-0.27, 0.01]	-0.03	0.30	
Conservatism	-0.10 (0.05)	[-0.20, -0.01]	-0.18	2.12*	
OV: Guilt					.20
HIM	0.25 (0.07)	[0.11, 0.40]	0.29	3.49**	
DPCC	0.01 (0.12)	[-0.23, 0.25]	0.01	0.08	
Condition	0.17 (0.11)	[-0.05, 0.40]	0.12	1.55	
HIMxCond	0.03 (0.07)	[-0.10, 0.16]	0.03	0.45	
DPCCxCond	0.02 (0.12)	[-0.20, 0.25]	0.02	0.20	
HIMxDPCC	-0.01 (0.06)	[-0.13, 0.12]	-0.01	0.13	
Three-Way Interaction	0.08 (0.06)	[-0.04, 0.20]	0.11	1.27	
Gender	0.27 (0.11)	[0.06, 0.47]	0.18	2.51*	
Conservatism	0.14 (0.07)	[0.00, 0.28]	0.17	2.02*	
OV: Coercion Beliefs					.08
HIM	-0.14 (0.08)	[-0.31, 0.02]	-0.21	1.74	
DPCC	0.01 (0.13)	[-0.24, 0.27]	0.01	0.09	
HIMXDPCC	-0.06 (0.08)	[-0.21, 0.10]	-0.08	0.70	
Gender	-0.12 (0.12)	[-0.36, 0.12]	-0.11	1.02	
Conservatism	-0.02 (0.08)	[-0.19, 0.14]	-0.03	0.27	
OV: Stigma (Danger)					.28
HIM	0.33 (0.08)	[0.18, 0.49]	0.33	4.17**	
DPCC	-0.11 (0.13)	[-0.27, 0.25]	-0.01	0.08	
Condition	0.31 (0.12)	[0.07, 0.56]	0.19	2.55*	
HIMxCond	0.01 (0.07)	[-0.13, 0.16]	0.01	0.16	
DPCCxCond	-0.07 (0.12)	[-0.32, 0.17]	-0.05	0.58	
HIMxDPCC	0.06 (0.07)	[-0.07, 0.20]	0.06	0.89	
Three-Way Interaction	0.05 (0.07)	[-0.09, 0.18]	0.06	0.69	
Gender	0.28 (0.11)	[0.06, 0.51]	0.17	2.53*	
Conservatism	0.17 (0.08)	[0.01, 0.32]	0.17	2.15*	
OV: Stigma (Social Contact)					.10
HIM	0.10 (0.05)	[-0.01, 0.20]	0.21	1.85	
(High DPCC)					

HIM (Low DPCC)	-0.08 (0.06)	[-0.20, 0.05]	-0.16	1.24	
DPCC	0.06 (0.07)	[-0.08, 0.20]	0.08	0.86	
Condition	-0.10 (0.07)	[-0.23, 0.03]	-0.12	1.51	
HIMxCond	0.06 (0.04)	[-0.02, 0.13]	0.12	1.44	
DPCCxCond	0.03 (0.07)	[-0.11, 0.16]	0.04	0.41	
HIMxDPCC	-0.08 (0.04)	[-0.15, -0.01]	-0.18	2.19*	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.03 (0.04)	[-0.10, 0.04]	-0.08	0.85	
Gender	-0.05 (0.06)	[-0.17, 0.07]	-0.06	0.80	
Conservatism	-0.05 (0.04)	[-0.13, 0.03]	-0.11	1.22	
OV: Stigma (Personal Contact)					.13
HIM (High DPCC)	0.22 (0.06)	[0.10, 0.35]	0.38	3.53**	
HIM (Low DPCC	-0.11 (0.08)	[-0.26, 0.04]	-0.18	1.42	
DPCC	0.01 (0.08)	[-0.16, 0.18]	0.01	0.12	
Condition	-0.16 (0.08)	[-0.32, -0.01]	-0.16	2.07*	
HIMxCond	0.09 (0.05)	[-0.00, 0.18]	0.16	1.96	
DPCCxCond	-0.03 (0.08)	[-0.18, 0.13]	-0.03	0.31	
HIMxDPCC	-0.15 (0.04)	[-0.34, -0.07]	-0.27	3.46**	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.05 (0.04)	[-0.14, 0.04]	-0.10	1.16	
Gender	-0.04 (0.07)	[-0.19, 0.10]	-0.04	0.57	
Conservatism	-0.01 (0.05)	[-0.11, 0.09]	-0.02	-0.18	
OV: Compensatory Damages					.07
HIM	-0.24 (0.12)	[-0.47, -0.01]	-0.18	2.08*	
DPCC	0.11 (0.19)	[-0.27, 0.50]	0.06	0.59	
Condition	-0.05 (0.18)	[-0.41, 0.31]	-0.02	0.27	
HIMxCond	0.00 (0.11)	[-0.21, 0.22]	0.00	0.03	
DPCCxCond	0.17 (0.19)	[-0.19, 0.54)	0.08	0.93	
HIMxDPCC	-0.03 (0.10)	[-0.23, 0.17]	-0.02	0.26	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.01 (0.10)	[-0.21, 0.19]	-0.01	0.10	
Gender	-0.06 (0.17)	[-0.40, 0.27]	-0.03	0.37	
Conservatism	-0.06 (0.12)	[-0.29, 0.17]	-0.05	0.53	
OV: Punitive Damages					.09
HIM	-0.19 (0.13)	[-0.44, 0.06]	-0.13	1.49	
DPCC	0.27 (0.21)	[-0.15, 0.69]	0.12	1.26	
Condition	-0.18 (0.20)	[-0.57, 0.22]	-0.07	0.87	
HIMxCond	0.01 (0.12)	[-0.22, 0.25]	0.01	0.10	
DPCCxCond	0.21 (0.20)	[-0.19, 0.61]	0.09	1.05	
HIMxDPCC	0.05 (0.11)	[-0.17, 0.27]	0.03	0.42	
Three-Way Interaction	0.04 (0.11)	[-0.18, 0.26]	0.04	0.39	
Gender	-0.02 (0.19)	[-0.39, 0.35]	-0.01	0.11	
Conservatism	-0.12 (0.13)	[-0.37, 0.13]	-0.09	0.97	
OV: Blame (Justice System)					.19
HIM	-0.19 (0.06)	[-0.32, -0.07]	-0.26	3.10**	
DPCC	-0.02 (0.10)	[-0.22, 0.19]	-0.02	0.17	
Condition	0.02 (0.10)	[-0.17, 0.21]	0.02	0.20	

HIMxCond	0.00 (0.06)	[-0.11, 0.12]	0.00	0.05	
DPCCxCond	0.04 (0.10)	[-0.16, 0.23]	0.03	0.35	
HIMxDPCC	-0.00 (0.05)	[-0.11, 0.10]	-0.00	-0.05	
Three-Way Interaction	0.01 (0.05)	[-0.10, 0.11]	0.01	0.12	
Gender	-0.10 (0.09)	[-0.28, 0.08]	-0.08	1.12	
Conservatism	-0.19 (0.06)	[-0.31, -0.07]	-0.26	3.08**	
OV: Blame (Plaintiff)					.27
HIM	0.34 (0.08)	[0.18, 0.50]	0.33	4.16**	
DPCC	-0.15 (0.14)	[-0.41, 0.12]	-0.09	1.07	
Condition	0.27 (0.13)	[0.02, 0.52]	0.15	2.12*	
HIMxCond	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.22, 0.08]	-0.07	0.90	
DPCCxCond	-0.18 (0.13)	[-0.43, 0.08]	-0.11	1.39	
HIMxDPCC	-0.05 (0.07)	[-0.19, 0.09]	-0.05	0.66	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.03 (0.07)	[-0.17, 0.11]	-0.03	0.43	
Gender	0.14 (0.12)	[-0.10, 0.37]	0.08	1.15	
Conservatism	0.15 (0.08)	[-0.01, 0.31]	0.15	1.89	
OV: Reintegration Support					.16
HIM	-0.09 (0.06)	[-0.21, 0.03]	-0.13	1.56	
DPCC (coerced confession condition)	0.07 (0.13)	[-0.18, 0.32]	0.06	0.52	
(maintained innocence condition)	0.46 (0.15)	[0.17, 0.75]	0.41	3.10**	
Condition	0.03 (0.09)	[-0.15, 0.22]	0.03	0.33	
HIMxCond	-0.02 (0.06)	[-0.13, 0.09]	-0.03	0.35	
DPCCxCond	-0.20 (0.10)	[-0.38, -0.01]	-0.18	2.06*	
HIMxDPCC	-0.02 (0.05)	[-0.12, 0.09]	-0.02	0.28	
Three-Way Interaction	-0.06 (0.05)	[-0.16, 0.04]	-0.10	1.14	
Gender	-0.14 (0.09)	[-0.31, 0.03]	-0.12	1.63	
Conservatism	-0.05 (0.06)	[-0.16, 0.07]	-0.07	0.77	

$N = 189$, * $.05 \geq p \geq .01$; ** $p < .01$.

Figure 1. *Predicted stigmatization as a function of masculine honor endorsement and condition in Study 2*



Figure 2. *Predicted perception of the defendant as honorable as a function of masculine honor endorsement and condition in Study 4.*



Figure 3. *Predicted stigma – social contact as a function of masculine honor endorsement and DPCC in Study 4.*



Figure 4. *Predicted stigma – personal as a function of masculine honor endorsement and DPCC in Study 4.*



Appendix 1. *Materials used in Study 1*

Honor Ideology for Manhood Scale (HIM) (Barnes et al., 2012)

Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the provided scale

1 -------- 2 -------- 3 -------- 4 -------- 5 -------- 6 -------- 7 -------- 8 -------- 9
Strongly Disagree — Neutral — Strongly Agree

1. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who calls him an insulting name.
2. A real man doesn't let other people push him around.
3. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who slanders his family.
4. A real man can always take care of himself.
5. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who openly flirts with his wife.
6. A real man never lets himself be a "door mat" to other people.
7. A real man doesn't take any crap from anybody.
8. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who trespasses on his personal property.
9. A real man can "pull himself up by his bootstraps" when the going gets tough.
10. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who mistreats his children.
11. A real man will never back down from a fight.
12. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who steals from him.
13. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who vandalizes his home.
14. A real man is seen as tough in the eyes of his peers.
15. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who insults his mother.
16. A real man never leaves a score unsettled

Honor Ideology for Womanhood Scale (HIW) (Barnes et al., 2014)

Rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the provided scale.

1 -------- 2 -------- 3 -------- 4 -------- 5 -------- 6 -------- 7 -------- 8 -------- 9
Strongly Disagree — Neutral — Strongly Agree

1. A respectable woman knows that what she does reflects on her family name.
2. A good woman is loyal to her family members, even when they have behaved badly.
3. A good woman stands by her man at all times.
4. A respectable woman avoids any behavior that might bring shame on her family.
5. A good woman never flirts with a man who is not her husband or boyfriend.
6. A good woman teaches her children the importance of family traditions.
7. A good woman never tolerates disrespect.
8. A good woman is always truthful, even when it hurts her.
9. A respectable woman never wants to be known as being sexually permissive.
10. A respectable woman never betrays her husband.
11. A good woman always puts her family first.
12. A good woman is willing to die for her family.

Measures taken from Mindthoff et al., (2018) used in Study 1

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the provided scale.

Perceived likelihood of a false confession – criminal suspects

1. Criminal suspects might confess to crimes they know they did not commit to protect someone else (e.g., family member, fellow gang member).
2. Criminal suspects might confess to crimes they know they did not commit because they are pressured or manipulated by police.
3. Criminal suspects might confess to crimes they did not commit because they come to believe (at least for a little while) that they actually did commit the crime.

Perceived likelihood of a false confession – personal

4. I personally might confess to a crime I know I did not commit to protect someone else (e.g., family member, fellow gang member).
5. I personally might confess to a crime I know I did not commit if I was pressured or manipulated by police.
6. I personally might confess to a crime I know I did not commit because I might come to believe (at least for a little while) that I actually did commit the crime.

Perceived coerciveness of interrogation techniques

Please rate the extent to which you think the following tactics are coercive. Something is coercive if it tends to remove an individual's perception of their freedom to make a meaningful choice. In other words, the less a suspect feels s/he has a choice as to whether or not to do what is being asked (i.e., confess) the more coercive an interrogation method is.

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all coercive				Extremely coercive

1. Confronting the Suspect with False Evidence of Guilt (e.g., providing false information regarding forensic evidence, eyewitness evidence, surveillance footage, and negative polygraph results).
2. Bluffs About Evidence (i.e., pretending to have evidence, but not explicitly stating that this evidence confirms the suspect's guilt – e.g., "we found DNA at the crime scene that we are going to test" or "there is surveillance footage we haven't been able to watch yet").
3. Rejecting the Suspect's Denials (e.g., repeated accusations, cutting off denials of guilt, telling suspects his/her alibi is false).
4. Promises of Leniency (e.g., suggesting/implying suspect will receive a lenient charge and/or sentence for confession, or explicitly promising suspect will receive a lenient charge and/or sentence for confession).
5. Threat and Use of Physical Harm (e.g., explicitly threatening to beat or assault the suspect, implying the suspect will be beaten or assaulted, or actually beating or assaulting the suspect).

Perceived likelihood of interrogation techniques eliciting a false confession

Please rate the likelihood that each of the tactics will elicit a FALSE confession.

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all likely				Extremely likely

1. Confronting the Suspect with False Evidence of Guilt (e.g., providing false information regarding forensic evidence, eyewitness evidence, surveillance footage, and negative polygraph results).
2. Bluffs About Evidence (i.e., pretending to have evidence, but not explicitly stating that this evidence confirms the suspect's guilt – e.g., "we found DNA at the crime scene that we are going to test" or "there is surveillance footage we haven't been able to watch yet").
3. Rejecting the Suspect's Denials (e.g., repeated accusations, cutting off denials of guilt, telling suspects his/her alibi is false).
4. Promises of Leniency (e.g., suggesting/implying suspect will receive a lenient charge and/or sentence for confession, or explicitly promising suspect will receive a lenient charge and/or sentence for confession).
5. Threat and Use of Physical Harm (e.g., explicitly threatening to beat or assault the suspect, implying the suspect will be beaten or assaulted, or actually beating or assaulting the suspect).

Allowing potentially coerced evidence to be considered by a jury

A suspect signed a written confession during interrogation but later claims they are innocent and their confession was false. Under what circumstances do you think the confession should be allowed, or not allowed, as evidence for the jury to hear?

1	2	3	4	5
Definitely do not allow				Definitely allow

1. The interrogators continually rejected the suspect's denials of guilt throughout the interrogation.
2. The interrogators explicitly lied about having evidence indicative of the suspect's guilt.
3. The interrogators bluffed by pretending to have evidence (e.g., a fingerprint on the murder weapon) that hadn't been analyzed yet.
4. The interrogators explicitly stated that the suspect would receive a lenient charge/sentence if he or she confessed.
5. The interrogators suggested, but never explicitly stated, that the suspect would receive a lenient charge/sentence if he or she confessed.
6. The police threatened and intimidated the suspect during the interrogation but never physically harmed him or her.
7. The suspect was physically assaulted/beaten.
8. The suspect was denied food or water.
9. The suspect's request for an attorney was denied during interrogation.
10. The suspect was not read his or her *Miranda* rights (the right to remain silent, have an attorney, etc.).

Appendix 2. *Additional materials used in Study 2*

Guilty Condition

Cory Jackson has recently been let out of prison. Cory was accused, tried, and convicted of attempted murder in 2010, and has recently been paroled for his good behavior during his sentence.

Cory had, while living in Oklahoma City, had been accused of assaulting another man on the street after an argument, and Cory used a blunt weapon to violently attack the man, beating him with the weapon both during the fight and after the man had been knocked unconscious. Both eyewitnesses and security camera evidence spoke to his guilt, and Cory pled guilty during his trial. While in prison, however, Cory was a "model inmate," to use a phrase from his parole hearing, and so was eligible for release this past month.

Innocence Condition

Cory Jackson has recently been let out of prison. Cory was accused, tried, and convicted of attempted murder in 2010, but has recently been released from prison thanks to the Innocence Project.

Cory had, while living in Oklahoma City, been accused of assaulting another man on the street after an argument, and then using a blunt weapon to violently attack the man, beating him with the weapon both during the fight and after the man had been knocked unconscious. Though eyewitnesses testified that they thought they had seen Cory at the scene of the crime, Cory protested his innocence and pled "not guilty" during his trial. However, this did not convince the jury, and they found him guilty.

Recent efforts by the Innocence Project led to Cory receiving another trial, during which it was demonstrated that there was not enough evidence to place Cory at the scene of the crime, and that the circumstantial evidence that led to his conviction should have been considered insufficient, and so Cory was released.

False Confession Condition

Cory Jackson has recently been let out of prison. Cory was accused, tried, and convicted of attempted murder in 2010, but has recently been released from prison thanks to the Innocence Project.

Cory had, while living in Oklahoma City, been accused of assaulting another man on the street after an argument, and then using a blunt weapon to violently attack the man, beating him with the weapon both during the fight and after the man had been knocked unconscious. Eyewitnesses testified that they thought they had seen Cory at the scene of the crime, and Cory later confessed to the crime while under police interrogation. However, during his trial, Cory protested his innocence and pled "not guilty," saying that he had only confessed under duress, and that the police had pressured him into confessing. However, this did not convince the jury, and they found him guilty.

Recent efforts by the Innocence Project led to Cory receiving another trial, during which it was demonstrated that the police had indeed forced Cory to falsely confess, that there was not enough evidence to place Cory at the scene of the crime, and that the circumstantial evidence that led to his conviction should have been considered insufficient, and so Cory was released.

Stigma measure used as the dependent variable in Study 2, adapted from Hirai and Clum (2000). Items are divided by theorized sub-factors, but the total scale was utilized in analysis.

Factor 1: Dangerousness

1. Cory is more likely to harm others than a normal person.
2. It might be a good idea to stay away from people like Cory because their behavior is dangerous.
3. Cory is more likely to be a criminal than other people.
4. I am afraid of people like Cory because they might harm me.

Factor 2: Poor interpersonal and social skills

5. Someone like Cory should have a job with minor responsibilities.
6. I would be afraid of what my boss, friends, and others would think of me if I'd acted like Cory.
7. I would be embarrassed if people knew that I dated someone like Cory.
8. A person like Cory is less likely to function well as a parent.
9. I would be embarrassed if a person in my family was someone like Cory.
10. Most people would not knowingly be friends with someone like Cory.
11. I would not trust the work of someone like Cory if he was assigned to my work team.

Appendix 3. *Materials used in Study 3*

Due Process/Crime Control Scale (DPCC; Liu & Shure, 1993)

1 -------- 2 -------- 3 -------- 4 -------- 5 -------- 6 -------- 7

Disagree strongly Agree Strongly

1. How do you feel towards the death penalty?*
2. How do you feel towards rehabilitation of criminals?
3. Harsher treatment of criminals is not the solution to the crime problem
4. Even the worst criminal should be considered for mercy
5. It is better for society to let some guilty people go free than to risk convicting an innocent person.
6. All laws should be strictly enforced, no matter what the results
7. For a horrible murderer like Charles Manson, it would have been better to have killed him on the spot*
8. The plea of insanity is a loophole allowing too many guilty people to go free*
9. A person who does not take the witness stand to deny the crime is probably guilty*
10. A person would not be brought to trial unless he or she were guilty of a crime*

Note. High score = support for due process. * = Reverse Score.

Experimental Manipulation

Next, we are going to have you read a selection from a court case. This selection will involve a description of the crime, a review of the evidence, and selections of testimony and Attorney statements. However, you will NOT be told what the outcome of the trial was.

After reading the description of the case, we will ask you to complete some decision-making tasks. The goal of these tasks is to evaluate how effective you would be as a juror. Thus, we ask that you read the facts of the case SLOWLY and CAREFULLY.

The Case: Oklahoma vs. David Peterson

The Crime:

On November 10, 2012, Justin Hodge did not come home after work. His wife was worried and called the police, asking them to check her husband's workplace.

At 10:30 PM, police officers found Mr. Hodge in the parking garage of his office building. Mr. Hodge was bleeding and had suffered numerous wounds to his head and throat. Mr. Hodge was taken to the hospital, where a medical examination confirmed that Mr. Hodge was the victim of blunt-force trauma, and had suffered a broken nose, a bruised windpipe, and a concussion as the result of his attack.

After a few days in the hospital, the police questioned Mr. Hodge about the attack. Mr. Hodge said that he had worked late that night to finish a project and was the last person to leave the office. Mr. Hodge said that his attacker had ambushed him in the parking garage. Mr. Hodge described his attacker as approximately six feet tall, wearing a non-descript black coat and an OKC Thunder Ski Mask, and wielding an aluminum baseball bat. Mr. Hodge said that the attacker did not speak during the attack, and that he was unable to make out or remember any other details. Mr. Hodge said that he had fought back, but the attacker had struck him several times in the face and throat with the bat, after which Mr. Hodge lost consciousness.

The Investigation:

Local police investigated the crime and identified Mr. David Peterson as a suspect. Mr. Peterson works in an office building near to Mr. Hodge's, and the two were known to frequent the same bar after work. Three months earlier at that bar, Mr. Peterson and Mr. Hodge had gotten into a loud argument that witnesses had described as "heated" and "very personal," during which each had insulted the other, and had resulted in Mr. Peterson being asked to leave the bar by management after screaming "You're dead, mother****er!" at Mr. Hodge.

Mr. Peterson is 6'1" tall, owns a black pea coat, and was found to own an OKC Thunder Ski Mask in his apartment. Mr. Peterson had an alibi for the night of the attack, saying that he had been at home watching television, but no-one could corroborate his claim. Mr. Peterson stated

that the ski-mask had been bought for a Thanksgiving ski trip he had planned in Colorado, and that he had bought it at the local Walmart a few weeks ago.

(False Confession Condition)

The Interrogation of Mr. Peterson

On November 19th, the police sought to interview Mr. Peterson, and asked him to come to the station to answer a few questions about the investigation. Mr. Peterson agreed, and arrived at the station after work at 6 PM. After arriving at the police station, Mr. Peterson signed a waiver of his right to have an attorney present during the interview. He also agreed to have his interview with police recorded.

The videorecording of Mr. Peterson's interrogation revealed that while questioning him, the interrogators denied Mr. Peterson food and water, consistently ignored his denials of the crime, threatened him with the death penalty, including a graphic description of how painful lethal injection would be, and even unholstered their firearm as an implied threat to Mr. Peterson's wellbeing if he did not confess.

After nine hours of being questioned in a windowless interrogation room, Mr. Peterson produced and signed a written confession at approximately 4 AM describing how and why he had assaulted Mr. Hodge.

In his confession, Mr. Peterson stated that he was angry that Mr. Hodge had had him thrown out of the bar and that he had wanted to "teach Hodge a lesson." He said that he had gone to Mr. Hodge's workplace, hidden in the parking garage, and then ambushed Mr. Hodge when he was going to the car. Mr. Peterson said that he had struck Mr. Hodge several times with a baseball bat in the face and the throat, and that he had just wanted to hurt Hodge as badly as possible. He then said he had immediately left the parking garage and gone home.

In light of Mr. Peterson's confession, the police arrested him on December 20th and the state charged him with attempted murder. Mr. Peterson pleaded not guilty to the charge. He was then transported to a detention center where he awaited trial.

The Trial

In January 2013, Mr. Peterson went on trial in the Oklahoma County Circuit Court.

At trial, the prosecutor presented the evidence that Mr. Peterson matched the general description of the assailant, that he owned both a black coat and an OKC Thunder Ski Mask, and that he had publicly threatened Mr. Hodge at the bar. However, the primary piece of evidence against Mr. Peterson was his confession statement. The prosecutor made the case that given the confession and the circumstantial evidence, Mr. Peterson should be found guilty of the attempted murder.

Mr. Peterson also testified at trial and claimed that his confession was false and had been coerced by the interrogating police officers. When asked why he falsely confessed, Mr. Peterson said that the detectives had put words into his mouth, rejected his denials, and threatened him. During his testimony, Mr. Peterson described his interrogation, highlighting that the police kept him in a dark, windowless room for nine hours while they questioned him, during which time he did not have access to food or water. Mr. Peterson also emphasized that the police routinely ignored or contradicted Mr. Peterson's claims of innocence, saying things such as "we know you did it," and "stop lying, we know you're guilty." Mr. Peterson also testified to the fact that the police misrepresented their case, implying several times that they had "proof" that Peterson had attacked Mr. Hodge, and that all they needed was Mr. Peterson to confess to "seal the deal." Mr. Peterson stated that the police threatened him several times with the death penalty, even going to the point of saying "We'll have the executioner make it slow and painful" if Mr. Peterson didn't confess.

The video recording of Mr. Peterson's interrogation confirmed that the interrogating detectives had acted in the way that Mr. Peterson claimed.

Peterson's defense attorney stated that since Mr. Peterson's confession was given after he had been coerced and threatened, that it should not be considered evidence of Mr. Peterson's guilt. Peterson's defense attorney also noted that the prosecution's evidence was highly circumstantial. Numerous men owned black pea coats that matched Mr. Hodge's description of his assailant. The ski mask was sold at numerous stores in the area, and was for a popular local basketball team, so there would have been numerous reasons Mr. Peterson might have such a mask. Further, Mr. Hodge had not been able to positively identify Mr. Peterson as his assailant. Given all of this, Peterson's attorney argued that the prosecution had failed to meet the burden of proof; they had not proved Mr. Peterson's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and so Mr. Peterson should be presumed innocent and found Not Guilty.
(Maintained Innocence Condition)

The Interrogation of Mr. Peterson

On November 19th, the police sought to interview Mr. Peterson, and asked him to come to the station to answer a few questions about the investigation. Mr. Peterson agreed, and arrived at the station after work at 6 PM. After arriving at the police station, Mr. Peterson signed a waiver of his right to have an attorney present during the interview. He also agreed to have his interview with police recorded.

The videorecording of Mr. Peterson's interrogation revealed that while questioning him, the interrogators denied Mr. Peterson food and water, consistently ignored his denials of the crime, threatened him with the death penalty, including a graphic description of how painful lethal injection would be, and even unholstered their firearm as an implied threat to Mr. Peterson's wellbeing if he did not confess.

After nine hours of being questioned in a windowless interrogation room, Mr. Peterson was released from interrogation at 4 AM, having maintained his innocence the entire time.

During his interrogation, Mr. Peterson denied having any involvement in, or any knowledge of, the assault upon Mr. Hodge. He explained that he had left the downtown area that houses both his and Mr. Hodge's workplaces and gone home to eat dinner and have an early night before an important meeting the next day.

Despite Mr. Peterson maintaining his innocence, the police arrested Mr. Peterson on December 20th and the state charged him with attempted murder. Mr. Peterson pleaded not guilty to the charge. He was then transported to a detention center where he awaited trial.

The Trial

In January 2013, Mr. Peterson went on trial in the Oklahoma County Circuit Court.

At trial, the prosecutor presented the evidence that Mr. Peterson matched the general description of the assailant, that he owned both a black coat and an OKC Thunder Ski Mask, and that he had publicly threatened Mr. Hodge at the bar. The prosecutor that made the case that given this evidence, and given Mr. Peterson's lack of an alibi, Mr. Peterson should be found guilty of the attempted murder of Mr. Hodge.

During his testimony, Mr. Peterson described his interrogation, highlighting that the police kept him in a dark, windowless room for nine hours while they questioned him, during which time he did not have access to food or water. Mr. Peterson also emphasized that the police routinely ignored or contradicted Mr. Peterson's claims of innocence, saying things such as "we know you did it," and "stop lying, we know you're guilty." Mr. Peterson also testified to the fact that the police misrepresented their case, implying several times that they had "proof" that Peterson had attacked Mr. Hodge, and that all they needed was Mr. Peterson to confess to "seal the deal." Mr. Peterson stated that the police threatened him several times with the death penalty, even going to the point of saying "We'll have the executioner make it slow and painful" if Mr. Peterson didn't confess.

Peterson's defense attorney noted that the prosecution's evidence was highly circumstantial. Numerous men owned black pea coats that matched Mr. Hodge's description of his assailant. The ski mask was sold at numerous stores in the area, and was for a popular local basketball team, so there would have been numerous reasons Mr. Peterson might have such a mask. Further, Mr. Hodge had not been able to positively identify Mr. Peterson as his assailant. Given all of this, Peterson's attorney argued that the prosecution had failed to meet the burden of proof; they had not proved Mr. Peterson's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and so Mr. Peterson should be presumed innocent and found Not Guilty.

Perceived Honor Measure

Please rate how much you think the following adjectives describe the defendant, David Peterson:

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not at Neutral Very Much

All

1. Reliable
2. Upright
3. Resilient
4. Weak*
5. Cowardly*
6. Honorable

Social Distance Measure (Tillman et al. 2018)

How comfortable would you be in the following situations? Please rate your answers using the provided scale:

1 - Very uncomfortable

2 – Uncomfortable

3 – Neither Comfortable nor Uncomfortable

4 – Comfortable

5 – Very Comfortable

1. Having a conversation with someone like David Peterson.
2. Having someone like David Peterson as a neighbor.
3. Collaborating with someone like David Peterson on a work project.
4. Being friends with someone like David Peterson.
5. Dating someone like David Peterson.
6. Having someone like David Peterson take care of your children when you are away.
7. One of your children marrying someone like David Peterson.
8. Recommending someone like David Peterson for a job.

Items 1 – 4 : Social Contact. Items 5 – 8: Close personal relationship.

Evidence Perception Items

Please rate your agreement with the following items using the provided scales

How strong do you think the prosecution's case against David Peterson was?

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not at All Strong | Neither Strong nor weak | Very Strong

How strong do you think the defense's case for David Peterson was?

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not at All Strong | Neither Strong nor weak | Very Strong

The evidence supports David Peterson's guilt.

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not at All | Neutral | Very Much

How much do you trust the claim of the defendant, David Peterson, that he is not guilty?

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not at All | Neutral | Very Much

Guilt Likelihood Measure

How likely to you think it is that the defendant, David Peterson, is guilty of attempted murder?

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not guilty | Might Be guilty | Definitely Guilty

Punishment inventory (Darley, Carlsmith, & Wilson, 2001).

What do you think is an appropriate punishment for the defendant?

1 – no liability

2 – Liable, no punishment

3 – One day of incarceration

4 – Two weeks of incarceration

5 – Two months of incarceration

6 – Six months of incarceration

7 – One year of incarceration

8 – Three years of incarceration

9 – Seven years of incarceration

10 – Fifteen years of incarceration

11 – Thirty years of incarceration

12 – Life in prison

13 – The death penalty

Coercion Belief Measure

How much do you trust David Peterson's claim that he was coerced into falsely confessing?

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not at All Neutral Very Much

Appendix 4. *Materials used in Study 4*.

Final part of the vignette (i.e., presented after the conditional vignettes identical to those in Appendix 3)

After deliberating for two hours, the jury found Mr. Peterson guilty of attempted murder with a deadly weapon, and sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison, with the possibility of parole. Mr. Peterson attempted to appeal the ruling but his appeal was denied.

Post-Conviction Appeal and Exoneration

Four years after his conviction, Mr. Peterson was able to contact Peter Douglass, an attorney affiliated with the Innocence Project, to review his case. Mr. Douglass, upon review of the case and the evidence, found that there had been DNA evidence gathered from Jordan Hodge's fingernails where he had scratched his opponent, but that this DNA evidence had not been tested against Mr. Peterson's DNA to see if it matched. The analysis revealed that Mr. Peterson's DNA did not match that of Jordan Hodge's attacker.

In light of this new evidence, Mr. Douglass filed a motion for a new trial for Mr. Peterson. On June 21st, 2017, Judge Alan Greeley granted this motion and ordered a new trial.

Mr. Peterson's new trial began on January 17th, 2019. At this trial, testimony highlighted that Jordan Hodge had scratched his attacker and the attacker's DNA did not match that of Mr. Peterson, and on January 20th, 2019, the jury acquitted Mr. Peterson of murder and, having spent six years in prison, he was released. Soon after his exoneration, Mr. Peterson filed a lawsuit against the state of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma County Police Department, seeking financial compensation for his five years of wrongful imprisonment.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Imagine that you are a juror in the second phase of the trial of *Peterson vs. Oklahoma*. In the first phase of the trial, the Court determined that the defendants (i.e., the State of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma County Police Department) were liable for the wrongful conviction of the plaintiff (i.e., Mr. Peterson), which resulted in Mr. Peterson being imprisoned for six years.

As a juror in the second phase of the trial, your job is to determine whether the defendants should be required to pay Mr. Peterson a financial damage award, and if so, to determine the appropriate type and amount of this award.

Below, you have the option to award *compensatory* and/or *punitive* damages to Mr. Peterson. You may choose to award one or both types of damages, or you may choose to award neither. First, please read the instructions below, which explain the difference between *compensatory* and *punitive* damages, and the factors you should consider in awarding them.

Compensatory damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff (i.e., Mr. Peterson) for losses incurred as a result of the defendant's actions. Compensatory damages seek to make a plaintiff whole – that is, to compensate him for the damage that he has suffered. In determining such damages, you shall consider the following:

(1) any non-economic losses or injuries incurred to the present time, or which will probably be incurred in the future, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress, and impairment of the quality of life.

(2) any economic losses incurred to the present time, or which will probably be incurred in the future, including loss of earnings or impairment of earning capacity, and reasonable and necessary medical, hospital, and other expenses.

Punitive damages are awarded for the sake of example and by way of punishment. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish the defendant for their conduct and to set an example that will deter him and others from committing similar acts in the future. In arriving at an award of punitive damages, you are to consider the following:

(1) the reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant.

(2) the amount of punitive damages that will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in light of the defendant's financial condition.

1) Using the scale below, select the total amount of **compensatory** damages that you feel Mr. Peterson should receive. Remember that compensatory damages are meant to compensate the plaintiff for the damages he has suffered. Please check the box next to the dollar amount that you find appropriate.

- ☐ $0 (no damages should be awarded)
- ☐ Less than $12,000
- ☐ $12,000 – $25,000
- ☐ $25,000 – $50,000
- ☐ $50,000 – $100,000
- ☐ $100,000 – $250,000
- ☐ $250,000 – $500,000
- ☐ $500,000 – $1 million
- ☐ $1 million – $2 million
- ☐ $2 million – $4 million
- ☐ More than $4 million

2) Using the scale below, select the total amount of **punitive** damages that you feel Mr. Peterson should receive. Remember that punitive damages are meant to punish the defendant (the State of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma County Police Department) for their conduct and to deter future misconduct. Please check the box next to the dollar amount that you find appropriate.

- ☐ $0 (no damages should be awarded)
- ☐ Less than $12,000
- ☐ $12,000 – $25,000
- ☐ $25,000 – $50,000
- ☐ $50,000 – $100,000
- ☐ $100,000 – $250,000
- ☐ $250,000 – $500,000
- ☐ $500,000 – $1 million
- ☐ $1 million – $2 million
- ☐ $2 million – $4 million
- ☐ More than $4 million

To what extent do you feel that **the state of Oklahoma (the police and prosecutors)** was *responsible* for Mr. Peterson's wrongful conviction?

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not at all Very

5) To what extent do you feel that **Mr. Peterson** was *responsible* for his own wrongful conviction?

1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7

Not at all Very

Support for Reintegration (Clow & Leach, 2015; Scherr et al., 2018)

1) Mr. Peterson is owed governmental assistance to help him reintegrate into society.
2) Mr. Peterson is owed government -sponsored psychological counseling to help him reintegrate into society.
3) Mr. Peterson is owed get government-sponsored career counseling to help him reintegrate into society.
4) Mr. Peterson is owed get government-sponsored job training to help him reintegrate into society.