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The Netflix Effect: Examining the Influence of Contemporary Entertainment Media Consumption Patterns on Political Attitudes and Social Perceptions

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THE NETFLIX EFFECT

EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF CONTEMPORARY ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA

CONSUMPTION PATTERNS ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS

by

ALEXANDRA C. PAULEY

Under the Direction of Lakeyta Bonnette-Bailey, PhD

ABSTRACT

In the past two decades, media consumption has changed not only in terms of breadth and amount, but also in terms of availability and accessibility. Shows that once could only be viewed at their scheduled time on their scheduled network may now be streamed across several platforms at almost any time. Further, audiences have begun to connect with characters beyond the shows and films they inhabit, building websites, following related social media pages, recording podcasts and more to continue and expand these parasocial relationships. The social scientific community has only begun to scratch the surface of how these changes affect audience members and society at large—particularly regarding the political impact of entertainment

media. Through focus groups, a survey experiment, media content analysis, and a laboratory experiment, I explore the impact of entertainment television media on political attitudes and social perceptions within the context of contemporary media consumption patterns. In particular, I examine the efficacy of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact within the context of single exposure, accumulated exposure to outgroup members, and binge watching. I find that mediated intergroup contact appears to have a much stronger impact on audience members than narrative persuasion, regardless of exposure amount. I also find that binge watching episodic shows—watching multiple episodes back-to-back in one sitting—leads to different media effects on political attitudes and social perceptions in viewers than watching the same episodes in the traditional weekly format. Overall, my findings suggest that contemporary consumption patterns of entertainment media render it less influential in terms of narrative persuasion of political attitudes, but the regular consumption of entertainment media may still have lasting effects from mediated intergroup contact regardless of whether the contact is positive or negative.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to the incredible support system that kept me going through the long, arduous process of earning my Ph.D. To my mother and father, to my stepmother and stepfather, to my grandparents, and to my family and friends who supported me. Thank you for your patience, your encouragement, and your support. I truly could not have made it without you all. I am especially grateful to my colleagues and peers who served as sounding boards, tension relievers, shoulders to cry on, and fellows-in-arms—thank you Adnan Rasool, Ivanka Bergova, Rebekah Dowd, Tahmina Rahman, Bailey Fairbanks, and Greg Hodgin.

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1 INTRODUCTION

In the first quarter of 2020, the video content streaming platform Netflix gained nearly 16 million new subscribers, bringing them to a global total of 182.8 million subscriptions (Lee 2020). While the 2020 pandemic led to unprecedented numbers of individuals staying home and out of work beginning during this time period, the numbers overall point to a major shift in recreation over the past few decades toward entertainment—specifically streamed entertainment television. The Nielsen Company (2020) reports: "Year-over-year, streaming among people 25-54 has increased almost 100%." Even before shelter-in-place orders popped up around the U.S., Nielsen reported that American adults over 18 spend more than 11 hours per day connected to linear and digital media (Nielsen 2018). Nearly four of the approximately six hours American adults spend each day watching video content is dedicated to watching live and time-shifted television (Spangler 2020). Additionally, consumers used a streaming platform for 19 percent of all TV viewing in the fourth quarter of 2019—up from ten percent in the first quarter of 2018— and Netflix made up 31 percent of all connected-TV viewing (Spangler 2020).

Put simply, Americans watch a lot of video content, and they increasingly watch that content online and through streaming services like Netflix, Amazon Prime, and Hulu. While some streaming platforms offer access to news programming via live TV (e.g. Hulu 2020), Netflix and others only provide entertainment shows and movies. Not only are consumers watching more media overall and watching more entertainment than news content, they are also increasingly engaging in binge watching multiple episodes of a show in one sitting (Netflix 2017). A 2018 Morning Consult survey of 2,044 TV watchers indicates rates of "73 percent of TV watchers ages 18-29 and 69 percent of those ages 30-44 binge-watching television at least once a week" (Sabin 2018). How does this shift toward greater consumption of entertainment

media over news media, and especially the shift toward binging on entertainment media, affect its influence over our social and political attitudes?

Markus Prior (2005) observed that increased choice in media would also increase the gap in political knowledge between those with interest in politics and those without. He argued that entertainment media has little to offer its viewers in terms of political information. Matthew Baum (2004) rejected this notion, pointing to non-traditional, "soft" news programs that do include political information. Not only do soft news programs like daytime and late night talk shows garner much higher viewership, they can influence viewers on public policy and vote choice (Baum and Jamison 2006). As Baum and Jamison (2011) point out, "television allows individuals to learn passively," and "individuals are more likely to accept information presented in a non-conflictual manner that does not arouse excitement"—a much different scenario from the arguing pundits we see on entertainment news and infotainment shows (124-125; see also Otto, et al. 2017).

Because more individuals engage with non-news/entertainment media, and because these media hold significant influence over their viewers, researchers must continue to explore entertainment media effects and dramatic narrative persuasion. The communication field has spent decades understanding the causal mechanisms behind narrative persuasion, but only a small percentage of these studies—either in communication or political science—are dedicated to understanding how entertainment media affects political attitudes. Political science, in particular, has been slow to examine the effects of entertainment media on political attitudes. Entertainment media effects research in other fields provide clear evidence of priming (Holbert 2003; Holbrook and Hill 2005), framing (Holbert, et al. 2005; Lane, et al. 2013; Mulligan and Habel 2011; Slater, et al. 2006), and behavioral influence (Gierzynski and Eddy 2013; Hether, et

al. 2008; Paluck and Green 2009) over political attitudes and values. However, only a few of these studies have been published by political science journals (e.g. Paluck and Green 2009 in the American Political Science Review).

Following the trailblazing efforts of political scientists such as Donald P. Green, who worked with psychologist Elizabeth Levy Paluck to study the effects of dramatic, fictional radio programming on political behavior in post-genocide Rwanda (Paluck and Green 2009), and Anthony Gierzynski, who published *Harry Potter and the Millennials* with help from sociologist Kathryn Eddy (Gierzynski and Eddy 2013), this manuscript seeks to further our knowledge of how dramatic narratives in fictional entertainment influence political attitudes in the contemporary media environment. As a culture, Americans are no longer limited to a few programs on the radio or television. We are no longer limited, even, to a specific provider or to accessing programs from a single device. As the media landscape available to consumers, namely the American electorate, grows and diversifies, it becomes increasingly important to understand the effects these changes have on public opinion. Furthermore, to understand the full breadth of media's influence today, we must include the effects of entertainment media and dramatic narrative persuasion.

1.1   Why Dramatic Entertainment Media?

I use the term *dramatic entertainment media* to refer to non-news media consumed for entertainment purposes that would be categorized in the drama genre. Entertainment media covers the gamut of genres and motivations for engaging with media—from escapist media like action movies and first-person-shooter video games to mood-boosting media like music and situational comedy shows. However, the literature provides greatest evidence for dramatic shows and films influencing their audience members through *narrative persuasion*, which Hamby,

Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) conceptualize as a process by which a dramatic narrative, or story, may alter audience members' beliefs, attitudes, and/or intentions.

Deictic shift theory states that absorption into the narrative and reflection following the narrative are necessary for narrative persuasion to occur (Hamby, et al. 2018; Hamby, et al. 2017). Further research provides evidence that certain perceptions of the media, such as identification with a character and high perceived realism of the story, also play key roles in increasing both absorption and reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and counterarguing, which are forms of resistance to messaging embedded in storylines (Hamby, et al. 2018; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). However, individuals do not engage with dramatic entertainment media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their screens not only with specific motivations for engaging with media but also with personal circumstances, current mindsets, and myriad potential distractions (Oliver and Raney 2011). They may leave their media experience with certain impressions to reenter their own lives, often moving straight into engagement with other narratives and other media formats.

What is the key component to holding a viewer's attention and inducing enough retrospective reflection to evoke narrative persuasion? More importantly, which factor will encourage a lasting attitude change? While examining the extant literature, I notice that many studies reveal statistical results with small coefficients, and very few studies look at lasting change (e.g. Bahk 2010; Hether, et al. 2008; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; Slater, et al. 2006). Moreover, we tend to examine specific attitudes rather than perceptions of social norms; one exception being Paluck and Green's (2009) longitudinal study of a dramatic radio program's effects on Rwandans' acceptance of dissident behaviors in a political context. This provides

evidence that exposure longer than a single episode or two, as with Paluck and Green's (2009)

study, may be key to understanding greater, accumulative effects.

1.2   Mediated Intergroup Contact

In addition to inducing reflection and decreasing reactance to narrative persuasion,

dramatic narratives in entertainment media may diminish prejudice through facilitating mediated

intergroup contact. Building upon Allport's social contact hypothesis and the subseuent

intergroup contact theory, contemporary social scientists have begun to examine intergroup

contact depicted in entertainment media for its potential to diminish intergroup bias. This

mediated intergroup contact has been shown to decrease intergroup prejudice in majority

members who watch a dramatic narrative that depicts a fellow ingroup member having positive

interactions with an outgroup member (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). Moyer-Gusé and Ortiz (2019)

find that mediated intergroup contact both reduces anxiety toward interacting with an outgroup

member and increases empathy toward the depicted outgroup.

This manuscript examines two potential benefits of understanding the impact of mediated

intergroup contact to political science research. First, I explore whether political attitudes toward

policies that affect a specific outgroup may also be affected by mediated intergroup contact.

Second, I explore the impact of contemporary consumption patterns on narrative persuasion and

mediated intergroup contact: Accumulative effects and binge effects.

1.3   Contemporary Consumption Patterns

One episode of a show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers

very little, though including an epilogue may increase immediate effects (Lane, et al. 2013).

Continued messaging in one show or across multiple shows increases the likelihood that

narrative persuasion will occur, as evidenced by studies of accumulative effects (e.g. Hether, et al. 2008). What happens, though, when you watch multiple episodes at once?

Binge watching, that is consuming audio-visual media for greater than two hours in one sitting and/or watching an entire season of a multi-episode program in less than seven days, has become increasingly popular—especially with young consumers (Netflix 2017). In 2013 Netflix, which considers itself an "internet television network" (Neflix 2016), revealed survey results that indicate 73 percent of users have favorable views toward and engage in *binge watching*, which survey respondents collectively defined as "watching between 2-6 episodes of the same TV show in one sitting" (Netflix 2013). By 2016, Netflix could pinpoint the average watch-times of bingers for entire seasons, noting that bingers consume sci-fi and horror shows like "American Horror Story" or "Breaking Bad" in four days, while political thrillers such as "House of Cards" or "Homeland" take six days (Neflix 2016). In a more extreme example, the Nielsen Company confirmed that 824,000 Netflix users binged the eight one-hour episodes of the third season of sci-fi show *Stranger Things* on the first day it was released (Tassi 2019).

Although the literature offers insight to explain the effects on political attitudes of engaging regularly with episodic dramas (i.e. cultivation theory or "drip, drip" effects; e.g. Hether, et al. 2008; Paluck and Green 2009) or engaging with high-impact media (i.e. the drench hypothesis: e.g. Bahk 2009; Slater, et al. 2006), we have yet to explore the impact of these theories in a contemporary media context. Do bingers demonstrate the same accumulative effects reported in traditional weekly watchers? Do they report the same levels of absorption, reflection, and identification? If there is evidence of narrative persuasion after binge watching, do these effects last? These questions are imperative to understanding how the contemporary media environment affects consumers' social and political attitudes.

1.4   Dissertation Layout

This dissertation seeks to use empirical research to more deeply understand the relationship between narrative persuasion, the way we consume entertainment media, and our sociopolitical attitudes. The next chapter discusses the interdisciplinary literature related to my theory of binge effects. Much of the research on narrative persuasion, even as it relates to political attitudes, lies in the communication literature. I explore the previous research of the interdisciplinary literature and tie the theories and assertions made in communication, social psychology, and other social sciences to similar concepts in political science. In Chapter 3, I build upon the deictic shift theory and cultivation theory to explore accumulative effects and consumption type effects regarding entertainment media and present my theory of binge effects. I posit that binge watching episodic dramas (television and streamed shows) is the *least* likely method to induce lasting attitude change on viewers, making Prior's forecast of a public with a steadily increasing political knowledge gap ever more prophetic.

To examine the effects of dramatic entertainment media in the contemporary media environment, I begin by exploring the findings from two focus groups to assess the internal process of narrative persuasion and its effect on intergroup bias (Chapter 4). These findings inform the design and analysis of two experiments I conduct to investigate the impact of mediated intergroup contact, accumulative effects, and binge watching on sociopolitical attitudes related to counterterrorism policies and perceptions of Muslims. The first study (Chapter 5) surveys the broader effects of dramatic entertainment media consumption—via cultivation theory—on political attitudes and social perceptions. The second study, a seven-week laboratory experiment (Chapter 6) scrutinizes the more specific effects of dramatic shows depicting outgroup members on individual attitudes and perceptions over time. This experiment features

random-assignment of participants to four groups with two conditions: Watching one of two treatment shows and watching episodes weekly vs. binge watching.

  Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the combined efforts of these studies and offers recommendations for continued research. This manuscript presents a very small step in understanding the importance of consumption method and time spent engaging with dramatic, entertainment media. It is but the first piece of a rapidly expanding puzzle that is media consumption in contemporary society. However, it is an incredibly important piece of that puzzle and could serve to unlock a multitude of research pathways moving forward.

2   Reviewing the Interdisciplinary Literature

Markus Prior (2005) made an astute observation in the early years of the massive changes in technological advancement in the 21st century: As media choice grows, interest in—and, therefore, knowledge of—political information wanes. Although his own initial study offered marginal results, his overall premise may prove frighteningly true, albeit due to a slightly different causal mechanism. Rather than simply more channels distracting Americans from watching the news, the growing choice in types of media and in means of consuming said media make it less likely for Americans either to seek out political information from reputable news sources or to absorb political information from news and non-news sources alike. This manuscript focuses on how dramatic, fictional media affects political attitudes, which contemporary changes in media consumption patterns may alter most.

When I note that the types of media and means of media consumption have changed, I refer to the fact that Americans—really, most of the world—can now access news and non-news media through many formats on multiple devices. Nielsen's (2019) Total Audience Report for 2018 notes that U.S. adults have maintained an average of ten-and-a-half hours of media usage per day for several years. Around 40 percent of that usage is spent watching live and time-shifted television (Nielsen 2019). However, an additional 34 percent is spent engaging with media on tablets, smartphones, and other internet-connected devices through streaming services and applications. In fact, in the past year, time spent watching live television has decreased while engaging with internet-connected devices and smartphones has increased to seven and 14 percent, respectively (Nielsen 2019).

2.1   Why Does Media Matter?

As a mediator of information, news media can have strong effects on audiences by highlighting some pieces of information while ignoring others, and by framing that information in a certain way (see Iyengar and Kinder 2010). The introduction of Fox News Channel, for instance, increased voter turnout and raised Republicans' share of the vote in towns across America at the end of the twentieth century (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). In another example, news media's use of abstract frames and unfavorable language to discuss U.S.-Mexico immigration encourages unfavorable attitudes toward Latinos (Mastro, et al. 2014). As Iyengar and Kinder (2010) put it, the press "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about*" (2). These agenda-setting and framing effects influence the political attitudes and perceptions of social norms of their audience members. Yet, we live in a world where traditional hard news media are not the only purveyors of information.

Strömbäck, Falasca, and Kruikemeier (2017) explain how using mixed media to shape one's news repertoire influences political participation. This is similar to Prior's (2007) description of the differences between "news junkies" and the rest of the populace. And both theories are reflected in Djerf-Pierre and Shehata's (2017) evidence that high-choice media environments have decreased the ability of news media to influence the political agenda in Sweden. However, this does not render news media's influence entirely impotent. Far from Bennett and Iyengar's (2008) prediction that the stratification and fragmentation of the American public through selective exposure in a newly high-choice media environment would lead to a "new era of minimal effects," we see instead an active, polarized public (Prior 2013). Mass media remains influential at the societal and individual levels (see Shehata and Strömbäck 2013).

Prior pointed out early on that consumers would decrease the number of news programs they watched on television as the number of entertainment media options increased. However, he had no way of knowing just how many forms of non-traditional news and entertainment media options there would be. Nor did he recognize the impact of these media formats on Americans' political knowledge and attitudes. Non-traditional, soft news programs like daytime and late-night talk shows can encourage voter turnout and consistency (Baum 2004; Baum and Jamison 2006), increase political knowledge (Baumgartner and Morris 2006), and influence voters' opinions of candidates (Baumgartner, et al. 2012). Primetime fictional shows can affect viewers' political and sociopolical attitudes (Hether, et al. 2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Quick 2009; Quick, et al. 2013) and even inspire political activism (Kearns and Young 2017).

Why examine dramatic, fictional media? Though political science has largely focused on news in its media research, other social science fields have found that dramatic, fictional media shows an impressive ability to persuade audiences (see Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018; Moyer-Gusé 2008b; Moyer-Gusé 2015). Similar to news media, dramatic narratives use priming and framing to impact audiences (e.g. Holbrook and Hill 2005; Mulligan and Habel 2011). In contrast to news media, dramatic narratives display increased evidence of diminished counterarguing in viewers (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). I use the term *dramatic media effects* throughout this manuscript to refer to media effects present in audiovisual programming that is viewed primarily for entertainment and classified within the drama genre. Although the term could apply more broadly, I choose to limit this term as a subclassification of entertainment media effects, which include all media accessed for the purpose of entertainment. The literature includes both terms when addressing the attitudinal effects of dramatic films and shows, the key concept in my theory. More regularly, however, neither are used, as many authors opt instead to

speak around this concept instead of giving it a term. I choose to utilize the term to simplify its discussion. As such, I am condensing "entertainment media effects present in dramatic audiovisual programming" to "dramatic media effects," and provide context throughout explaining to which dramatic media I am referring. I find it imperative to separate first news from non-news media, and then to narrow non-news media into the subcategory entertainment media. While all media can affect attitudes, political science offers news media studies with greater depth and breadth than non-news media, giving even less attention to entertainment media. Considering individuals are far more likely to select a news program when looking for political information, this not only makes sense, but it also means entertainment media effects on political attitudes are more likely to be altered by these changes in media consumption patterns.

Television viewing comprises the bulk (40 percent) of media consumption (Neilsen 2019), news audiences have long been declining (Djerf-Pierre and Shehata 2017), and evidence indicates that dramatic shows are particularly adept at persuasion (see Hamby, et al. 2018). Because of this, my dissertation focuses on the media effects present in dramatic, fictional audiovisual programming, which I refer to as *dramatic media effects* or entertainment media effects in dramatic narratives. This situates the term within the political science literature on media effects while making clear connections to the study of narrative persuasion in communication and social psychology. This review of the interdisciplinary literature delves into the known effects of dramatic, fictional media consumption on political attitudes and political knowledge, and it exposes the need for deeper exploration of the role consumption patterns play. In particular, this chapter provides key background information from the political science, communication, and social psychology fields exhibiting important persuasive effects present in dramatic, fictional shows and films that may be lost when binge watched.

2.2   Dramatic Media Effects

Much like news media effects, entertainment media effects present in the dramatic narratives within films and shows impact viewers by exposing them to specific topics in a specific context, thereby making the information accessible (agenda-setting and priming) and then providing a way to apply that information in a real-world context (framing). Whereas the news media does this through compelling fact-based stories, dramatic film and shows provide fictional narratives that viewers may relate to situations in their own lives. Both affect viewers through three basic models: *Agenda-setting*, which describes how when media highlight certain a topic, the topic becomes a primary talking point in the public arena; *priming*, which refers to when the media highlights a certain topic, it can become the standard the public uses to evaluate a political actor or group; and *framing*, which explains how the context provided by media when discussing a certain topic can shape viewers' opinions on that topic (see Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Scheufele 2000; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). These models are examined in depth in the news media effects literature (see Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), but have also begun to be studied in non-news media content like satirical or humorous political content, various entertainment media like video games and music, and dramatic narratives present in films and television.

2.2.1   *News Media Effects*

In their updated edition of *News That Matters*, Iyengar and Kinder (2010) look back over more than two decades of advancements in political communication since their ground-breaking 1987 book of the same title, and they affirm that "agenda-setting, priming, and framing seem to be thriving" (135). These primary concepts used to describe media effects models can be categorized in terms of how individuals process the mediated information provided and how they

store it in their memory (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). This section on news media effects looks at the first piece of the puzzle: How individuals process mediated information—or, information previously sorted through, repackaged, and delivered by the news media to the public. The second piece of this assertion will be discussed at greater length in the section on attitude change, which covers how new information is compared with previously held beliefs before being stored in one's memory.

Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), in an introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Communication, examine agenda-setting, priming, and framing as belonging to models of either accessibility or applicability, which provides a deeper understanding of how the processes these models portray actually work in an individual's mind. Although scholars in political science, communication, and psychology may use these terms differently, there is general agreement that the underlying mechanisms of media effects are accessibility and applicability (Druckman and Bolsen 2011; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Because this manuscript builds upon models situated in the communication literature, I will be using definitions for these terms provided by communication scholars as well as political science scholars. Where these two fields differ, I will explain to the best of my ability their differences as well as my decisions to prefer one context to another.

2.2.1.1 *Accessibility: Agenda Setting and Priming*

Accessibility models assume memory-based information processing, meaning that people will express opinions based on what they can remember about the topic at a given point in time (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Iyengar and Kinder (2010) consider that "a person's judgment depends in part on what comes to mind—on considerations that are, for whatever reason and however briefly, accessible" and that "what information is accessible… and what is not is a

matter of circumstance" (65). In other words, whatever information is cognitively accessible to an individual in a given moment will have greatest priority when they express an opinion (Zaller 1992). Television news makes such information accessible through frequent coverage and context. Because of this, television news can play an important part in what happens to be circumstantially on a citizen's mind (Iyengar and Kinder 2010). News media affects this circumstantial information through setting the agenda and priming (i.e. Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Pfau, et al. 2001; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).

Agenda-setting, put simply, explores how "the content that we are most exposed to shapes our view about the world around us (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018, 58). More specifically, it is "the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues… and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences" (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). Agenda setting is grounded in memory-based models of information processing, like that of Zaller's (1992) RAS model. The RAS (Receive-Accept-Sample) model asserts that people will receive new information, accept or reject it based on whether it complies with their predispositions, and then provide an opinion on a given topic based on information at the "top-of-the-head" that they can readily sample from their memory at the given moment. Like Zaller's RAS model, agenda-setting influences the information an individual will recall from memory by first bringing up the topic and second continuing to address it. By focusing on a certain topic and continuing to address it, media makes it easier for the individual to recall more information about some topics than others (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).

What we are exposed to through the media, much like exposure through experience, affects what we believe about the world. For example, the more news media covers crime stories,

the more likely audiences are to believe crime is on the rise in America (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018). While other factors do influence individual opinion (i.e. personal life circumstances, where the story is placed in the news hour, and how detailed or vivid the story is), the stories that news media choose to focus on versus those they choose to ignore influence what the American public believes is most important on the political agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 2010).

Priming, while similar to agenda setting in its capacity to affect the focus of audience attention, is discussed in the field of communication as pertaining specifically to the standards by which individuals may evaluate a political actor or group. Political scientists Iyengar and Kinder (2010) reflect this perspective when they define priming as referring to "changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations" (63). They note that the topics on which television news choose to focus influence the standards individuals will use when judging governments, presidents, public policies, and political candidates (63).

The media, therefore, may set the agenda by continually discussing certain topics over others. In doing so, they may also prime audiences to judge political players based on how well they believe those players are handling that topic. To continue using the crime example, media may set the public agenda through continually reporting on crime—either locally or nationally. Alitavoli and Kaveh (2018) presume that the media's focus on crime stories has influenced Americans into believing that crime in the country has increased when in fact crime rates have decreased. However, when an issue—in this example, crime—becomes the most frequently mentioned problem area in the news, audiences are then primed to "incorporate what they know about that problem into their overall judgment of the president" or other political entity (Iyengar and Kinder 2010, 65).

In a natural experiment studying the difference in voter turnout and choice between presidential elections in 1996 and 2000, when the Fox News Channel became available in 20 percent of the U.S., DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) found that "Fox News exposure induced a generalized ideological shift, as opposed to a candidate-specific effect" (1217). Their study compared changes in voting patterns between districts who did not have access to the Fox News Channel and those that did. They saw significant shifts in favor of the Republican Party in districts who had received access to Fox News. They used recall rates of media viewing to provide evidence that their results depict not only more previously Republican voters coming out to vote but also persuasion in three to eight percent of the Fox News audience, shifting from previous voting patterns toward the Republican Party (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007, 1223). These results would appear to show both agenda setting, in that more voters went to the polls following their exposure to Fox News Channel, and priming, in that what they saw on Fox News led them to evaluate candidates in a way that favored Republicans.

Exposure alone cannot account for these shifts, however, nor for a willingness in some voters to change party preference. Miller (2007) asserts that in order to set the agenda, individuals also must be paying attention to the content of news stories, and "to the extent that the content arouses negative emotions, national importance judgments follow" (689). Miller points to what she calls importance judgments as a key factor in whether individuals give importance to a topic. These judgments come from whether an issue is given importance by a politician in the story or the journalist relating the story, a cue to audience members as to whether the issue is worth their attention (Miller 2007). Iyengar and Kinder (2010) similarly point to placement of the story as a key factor in garnering audience members' attention, claiming that placement is a cue for how important editors believe a story to be. Emotion

(Bartsch, et al. 2014; Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Miller 2007) and personal circumstance

linking an issue to one's own situation (Iyengar and Kinder 2010) play arguably the largest roles

in whether a story will set the agenda or prime its audience. In the epilogue added to their

updated edition of *News That Matters*, Iyengar and Kinder (2010) admit that "Priming effects are

augmented when television news coverage *frames* problems in such a way as to imply that an

official or institution is responsible either for causing a problem or for failing to solve it" (135).

2.2.1.2 *Applicability: Framing*

Once news media have made a topic accessible to the public, they may also affect how

individuals apply this new information. By providing a specific context, or frame, they make

certain aspects of the topic or pertaining to the topic more salient. Framing "is based on the

assumption that how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is

understood by audiences" (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). Framing is applied in media by

using existing schemas to portray complex ideas, and is used by individuals to break down

information to form an impression of the complex topic (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). In

other words, at the macrolevel the way journalists characterize an issue influences their

audience's understanding of it. At the microlevel, framing occurs when individuals consider

various aspects of an issue, giving more weight to a particular aspect, before expressing an

opinion.

Chong and Druckman (2007a) state that framing effects occur "when (often small)

changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of

opinion" (104). It is not necessarily that media induces a change in its audience members'

values, but that framing affects the weight, or priority, they may give to different aspects of an

issue (Chong and Druckman 2007b). The way an issue is framed may evoke certain

considerations. Chong and Druckman (2007a) give the example associated with Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley's (1997) study in which participants are asked about whether a hate group should be allowed to hold a political rally. In the study, 85 percent of respondents said yes when the question was associated with free speech, but only 45 percent said yes when the question was associated with public safety. Depending upon which frame the question is set within—free speech versus public safety—respondents answer with that frame in mind (Nelson, et al. 1997).

To put it very simply, agenda setting effects demonstrate the media's ability to shape what we think about, but framing effects model the media's ability to shape how we think about something. Priming has been linked by communication scholars more closely with agenda-setting (see Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), while it is often conflated with framing by political scientists (see Chong and Druckman 2007a). When first used in political science, however, priming was linked to agenda setting in that both affect issue accessibility (Iyengar and Kinder 2010). Because of this, and because the study of dramatic media effects occurs largely within the communication field up to this point, I also link priming more closely with agenda setting while keeping the terms distinct. To put it very simply, then, priming effects exhibit the media's ability to shape what we use to evaluate our political leaders and groups.

2.2.2   *Moving Beyond Traditional News Media*

Considering the current hyperpolarized American political climate (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Levendusky 2013; Prior 2013), and the ambivalence of young voters in the Millennial generation (Maniam and Smith 2017), addressing media effects in entertainment, particularly dramatic television, could represent an important step in understanding how media on the whole affects change in individual political attitudes. Traditional news media are not the only means by which Americans receive political frames. Between 2013 and 2017, the average

American aged 15 and older watched 2 hours and 46 minutes of television per day, making up more than half of time spent on leisure activities(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). Yet, Prior (Prior 2005) notes that the upsurge in media choices has pushed many Americans to opt out of news entirely, especially with regard to political news.

Baum and colleagues argue that political content does not only come in the form of traditional news media, however, but also in what he terms soft news (Baum 2004; Baum and Jamison 2006). Soft news media refers to talk shows like *Oprah* and infotainment like *The Daily Show* that bring political information into the public eye through avenues that either are not usually political (e.g. *Oprah*) or are satirical (e.g. *The Daily Show*). However, even non-news media is increasingly important for understanding political attitude formation and change.

2.2.3 Entertainment Media Effects

Similar to news media effects, entertainment media primes its audiences using non-verbal cues and frames complex topics through dialogue and narrative. Unlike news media, however, consumers turn to entertainment media for very different motivations and with very different expectations. Where news is expected to provide real-world information, entertainment is expected to offer an escape, a thrill, a shift in mood, or food for thought. This does not, however, mean that entertainment avoids affecting its audience. Quite the opposite, in fact. Many narratives are written and produced specifically to be though-provoking and/or to critique societal and political norms (e.g. George Orwell's *1984* or Jordan Peele's *Get Out*). Yet, research indicates that even media produced solely for entertainment purposes may still affect social and political attitudes.

2.2.3.1 *Priming Effects in Entertainment Media*

Taber and Lodge (2016) see priming as the "key mechanism" to activate the deliberation process that informs our conscious and unconscious choices. Primes are the spark for the considerations the audience thinks about during engagement with a piece of media. Primes can influence generalized feelings toward the government (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Holbert and al 2007) or a particular office or administration (Holbert 2003; Holbert, et al. 2005)They can also influence more specific concerns about public policy (Holbrook and Hill 2005; Pfau, et al. 2001).This is evident across several forms of entertainment (and dramatic) media with regard to influencing political attitudes in myriad ways.

For instance, *The Daily Show* is a satirical soft news show with a cynical outlook on the government, its policies, and the traditional news media that covers it. Baumgartner and Morris (2006) executed an experiment which asked participants to watch a news clip of the 2004 presidential campaign, either from the traditional hard news source, *CBS Evening News*, or the soft news source, *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*. They found that although the coverage was edited to be very similar in time and content, the group who watched *The Daily Show* had a significantly higher likelihood of cynicism toward the electoral system (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). Pfau, Moy, and Szabo (2001) saw similar correlations between watching various television genres and perceptions of the federal government. For example, they saw a consistent negative correlation between individuals who watched science fiction shows, like the conspiracy-filled show *The X-Files*, and confidence in different arms of the federal government.

The dramatic fictional show *The West Wing*, which ran for seven seasons in the early 2000s and depicted the lives of key figures in the Bartlet[1] presidential administration, inspired

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[1] Josiah Bartlet is a fictional character on the show *The West Wing* played by Martin Sheen. During the seven-year run of the show, Bartlett is elected to the American presidency and serves two terms as president. Other key offices

quite different effects on viewers who watched a single episode (Holbert 2003). Holbert et al.

(2003) asked participants to take a pretest questionnaire the morning of the original airing of an

episode before attending the viewing treatment that evening. Directly after watching the episode,

participants completed a posttest questionnaire designed to compare responses to their pretest

questionnaire regarding their thoughts on character traits of the fictional president, the real-life

sitting President George W. Bush, and former President Bill Clinton. The authors found that the

positive images of fictional President Bartlet primed audience members to view the real-life

presidents more positively. However, these effects were not only related to political leaders.

Scholars have also noted the impact of these types of shows on increasing trust and positive

perceptions of health professionals. For instance, repeated viewing of medical dramas correlates

with more positive perceptions of medical personnel in real life (Quick 2009). However, as

Holbert et al. (2003) point out, the priming effect observed toward characters only relates to

personality traits and not to actual policy.

Slater, Rouner, and Long's (2006) study of two dramas gives mixed evidence for priming

effects on policy attitudes. The experiment involved participants watching either one episode of

the crime drama *Law and Order* or the short feature film *If These Walls Could Talk II*, which

primed its audience to consider the death penalty or same-sex marriage, respectively. The

authors saw an increase in support for the death penalty among participants who watched *Law

and Order* relative to those who watched *If These Walls Could Talk*. However, the results were

more nuanced regarding views on same-sex marriage, where ideology was a stronger indicator

than if the participant watched *If These Walls Could Talk*. The authors submit that suppression of

ideology could be key in producing a persuasive effect. The results themselves do not discount

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portrayed are that of the White House chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, press secretary, communications directors and speechwriters, national security advisors, aides, etc.

the priming effects of both dramas, but rather support the theories of attitude change as a complex process with various pathways of persuasion (see Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Hamby, et al. 2017; ; Slothuus 2008; Milton Lodge 2013).

Chory-Assad (2004) explains that verbal aggression depicted on a show can influence aggressiveness in members of the audience, similar to the study of Rwandans emulating the political discourse they heard on the radio program (Paluck and Green 2009). This prime serves as an activation of aggressive thoughts, but does not necessarily result in aggressive behaviors. Holbrook and Hill (2005) see a comparable priming effect in their examination of exposure to the crime drama *Law & Order*. They find that being exposed to a single episode alters participants' opinions on crime in America, believing it is more prevalent than do participants who were not exposed to the show.

2.2.3.2   *Framing Effects in Entertainment Media*

As previously discussed, framing effects are similar to priming in that both shape how we think about a topic at the individual level. A key example of framing effects in dramatic narratives on political attitudes is Mulligan and Habel's (2011) experiment on frames in the film *Cider House Rules*. In the experiment, participants were asked to watch the film *Cider House Rules*, which depicts several points in a man's life where he takes firm stances regarding abortion. As a boy, an aspiring physician is taught that life is sacred, and upon learning that his mentor performs illegal abortions to ensure the safety of the mothers, he is appalled and vows to never perform an abortion under any circumstance. However, as a young adult he is faced with the difficult situation of a young woman who becomes pregnant after repeated incestuous encounters with her father. After much deliberation, he decides that this is an extenuating circumstance and performs the abortion himself. The authors refer to this explicit message as the

abortion frame. Throughout the film, there is also what they call the *morality frame*, which is a more implicit message about needing to follow one's own conscience in making day-to-day moral decisions—moral relativism as opposed to moral absolutism. Mulligan and Habel (2011) find that views in favor of legalized abortion were 17 percent higher in the treatment group over the control group. Views in favor of moral relativism were 11 percent higher in the treatment group over the control group. In all, both frames showed a significant impact on the audience. This is especially noteworthy because abortion is a deeply entrenched political issue and one that is not easily swayed.

Although framing effects in dramatic narratives have not been extensively examined in political science, the Mulligan and Habel (2011) study provides clear evidence that framing effects in dramatic narratives are important to the study of political attitudes. Furthermore, the Slater, Rouner, and Long (2006) study demonstrates the importance of understanding why certain frames and primes are more influential than others. Mechanisms discussed in the psychology and communications literatures could be used to examine why, for example, the abortion frame in *Cider House Rules* was more effective than the same-sex relationship prime in *If These Walls Could Talk*.

2.2.4   Dramatic Media Effects: TV and Film

This dissertation manuscript looks more specifically at the role of media effects in dramatic narratives, using episodic shows as the primary context to examine the factor of time. Up to this point, television shows—I prefer the term episodic shows as many are watched online through streaming platforms rather than on a television set—are discussed in the literatures in their capacity to have immediate effects on attitudes toward America's most important problem (typically crime: e.g. Holbrook and Hill 2005), perceptions of political roles (Holbert 2003;

Holbert, et al. 2005), or specific policy issues (Kearns and Young 2017; Mulligan and Habel 2011; Quick, et al. 2013; Slater, et al. 2006). They examine the potential for attitude shifts in individuals who have been exposed to messaging through dramatic shows and films.

Dramatic media effects make up a large part of communication's study of how entertainment affects attitudes because dramas are more likely to induce this change than other forms of entertainment, and possibly even news media. To fully examine this assertion, this literature review continues on to briefly address the attitude change literature in political science and the entertainment-education literature on decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion in communication.

2.3   Attitude Change

This manuscript centers on the idea that dramatic narratives can influence audience members to change their attitudes toward a topic or object. First, however, it is important to relay the definitions and developments involved in this process as they are discussed in both the political science and communications literatures regarding attitude formation and attitude change. As with many concepts in this dissertation, the two fields are very similar in their study of attitudes and attitude change, but they are not identical and, at times, use different terminology for akin concepts.

While the study of attitudes goes back much further, I will begin this discussion in the field of psychology with Martin Fishbein's theory of reasoned action, which political science built upon in more recent decades. Fishbein's theory of reasoned action, expanded from expectancy value theory (EVT), avers that attitudes are a factorial function of an individual's beliefs and values; or, as Palmgreen (1985) explains, they are the result of an individual weighing their expectations that a given object or behavior will provide a certain result against

their positive or negative affective evaluations of those results. Fishbein and Azjen (1972) build

upon the EVT to assert that it is not simply a matter of evaluations, but of behavioral intentions

toward potential action. This theory of reasoned action (TRA) states that an individual's

intention to execute a certain behavior is comprised of both their own attitude about that

behavior and their perception of social norms regarding the behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 2008).

The intention is further determined by the weight, or significance, the individual assigns to

each—attitude vs. norm.

In political science, Chong and Druckman (2007b) build on the EVT assertion to say that

an attitude is the sum of all considerations regarding the topic times the weight the individual

gives to each consideration. Much like Fishbein's TRA, the authors claim that the weight, or

significance, given to a specific consideration is a key factor in the opinion that will be

expressed. *Attitudes*, which I will use interchangeably with *opinions*, are therefore a collection of

EVT's considerations (expectations considered with affective evaluations/predispositions) times

the weight that the individual gives to each of these considerations available at the "top of the

head" (see: R-A-S Model, Zaller 1992) based on the present information externally provided.

Combined, these theories could be depicted as the following attitude formula:[2]

$$Attitude = \Sigma(expectation * evaluation) * weight$$

where weight is

$$f(n) = external\ information * internal\ predisposition$$

More plainly stated, an attitude is a function of the collection of previously held values

and beliefs on a subject added to the current information being considered and how important

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[2] This formula is a combination of the aforementioned theories on attitude formation, but its key basis comes from Chong and Druckman's (2007b) preference formation model ($A = \Sigma v_i w_i$) with the factor of weight (w) broken down to reflect Zaller's (1992) explanation of attitudes as a combination of information and predisposition.

each consideration is to the individual at the moment they are providing the attitude. Political attitudes, then, are attitudes that relate to the role of government and other political topics, objects, and actors.

2.3.1 Attitude Formation

Zaller (1992) states that opinions are "a marriage of information and predisposition" (6). Each attitude or opinion presented by an individual is the result of combining the incoming information that the individual has been given with their predisposition toward the topic at hand. Zaller's work maintains that opinions are given based on information available at the "top of the head" at the time of producing the opinion. Attitudes, then, are not stable tenets that individuals carry with them from conversation to conversation, but are instead nuances of stable values and are subject to change based on the current conversation.

The formation of an attitude, political or otherwise, is "the initial change from having *no* attitude toward a given object to having *some* attitude toward it, either positive or negative" (Oskamp and Schultz 2005, 161). Theories on political attitude formation center on the idea that political socialization begins in the years of childhood and is primarily absorbed through exposure to the attitudes of close family members (Oskamp and Schultz 2005). This exposure and acceptance of new attitudes extends to political values, party identification, and interest in politics in general. Beyond the family unit, schools offer additional exposure to new political attitudes, as do a child's peers and community. In the formation stage of political socialization, it is these first instances of exposure that may result in initial political attitudes. However, exposure to political attitudes that differ from those already held cannot result in attitude *formation*, as an initial attitude has already been formed.

2.3.2   Attitude Change

Attitude *change*, on the other hand, requires first that an individual holds an existing attitude toward the given object, and second that something occurs which causes the attitude to become a different one. Druckman and McGrath (2019) state that there are three potential reactions to receiving new information: "no effect (that is, no movement of belief), persuasion/learning that involves updating in the direction of the information… or a back-lash effect, where belief moves in the direction opposite to the new information" (111). This resembles Zaller's (1992) RAS model in that Zaller posits that new information will be accepted (persuasion) or rejected (no effect), but adds the additional layer of the potential for a "back-lash effect. This stipulates that the recipient not only rejects the new information but also updates his current belief to be stronger/closer to the previous information. Bonnette (2015) extends Zaller's model to entertainment media, specifically music. She notes that incoming information via lyrics may either bolster a previous attitude when the new information concurs or invoke Zaller's accept-or-reject step to attitude change, wherein the listener may choose to override their prior beliefs by accepting the new or to reject the new information in favor of prior beliefs.

As Oskamp and Schultz (2005) explain, the processes of attitude formation and attitude change are often discussed synonymously, and indeed the processes can be similar. However, the literature on attitude change includes methods and theories quite distinct from attitude formation. Theories of attitude change include consistency theories, dissonance theory, and reactance theory. Consistency theories are cognitive-based and center on the presumption that people try to maintain consistent attitudes. New, inconsistent attitudes are likely to be met with skepticism and criticism because attitude inconsistencies tend to make individuals feel uncomfortable (Oskamp and Schultz 2005) This is not to say that individuals only hold congruent attitudes. Converse

(1964) explores the erratic nature of belief systems in the American public, asserting that most Americans hold logically inconsistent attitudes within their political ideology. Whereas the highly politically sophisticated hold belief systems largely unidimensional along the traditional left-right spectrum, mass attitudes tend to be more complex and less constrained by liberal and conservative ideologies (Lupton, et al. 2014).

Cognitive dissonance theory, first proposed by Leon Festinger in 1957, states that when individuals hold two or more differing—*dissonant*—thoughts about a given object, they will feel discomfort; however, CDT does not imply that individuals will always revert back to initial attitudes. Instead, they will "resolve this state by altering their cognitions"—either compromising or changing their initial attitudes (Hinojosa, et al. 2016, 171). Individuals may also resolve this state by complying with new cues from party elites (Converse 1964) or softening under influence from their social network (Lupton, et al. 2015). Reactance theory, on the other hand, insists that when cognitive dissonance arises from multiple contradictory explicit attitudes, it will only bolster the individual's initial attitude. Psychological reactance theory was initially developed to explain why individuals are attracted to those things that are "forbidden" to them (Van Petegem, et al. 2015). However, reactance theory has since been used to examine why individuals resist outside pressure toward attitude change, even in cases where the new information may be highly beneficial (Andersen, et al. 2017; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011; Taber and Lodge 2016).[3]

In political science, reactance is discussed instead within the context of *motivated reasoning*. Taber and Lodge (2016) discuss motivated reasoning as the process underlying

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[3] Reactance theory later fed into self-determination theory, which claims that individuals push back against new information out of a need for autonomy (Van Petegem, et al. 2015). However, the studies foundational to my theory reference *reactance* and not SDT, so I chose to omit it from this paper.

confirmation and disconfirmation biases. When processing new information, individuals may be influenced not only by their previous attitudes and opinions related to the information, but also their attitudes and opinions about where the information is coming from. Taber and Lodge (2006) note that individuals form opinions about new information—whether as part of attitude formation or attitude change—with either a *directional* or an *accuracy* goal. Motivated reasoning involves a directional goal, in that individuals perceive the new information through a lens that pushes them toward a specific direction, like aligning with their favored party; whereas an accuracy goal involves individuals seeking to find the "right" answer (Bolsen, et al. 2013; Druckman and Bolsen 2011).

Further, Taber and Lodge (2006) see rational skepticism as being different from motivated reasoning, questioning the tipping point between skepticism and irrational bias. It is this irrational bias, as motivated by political partisanship, which has most captivated political scientists. Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014) explain that partisan motivated reasoning happens when "individuals interpret information through the lens of their party commitment" (235). A democrat may not trust new information when it is relayed by a member of the Republican Party, or a republican may not trust new information when it is heavily associated with the Democratic Party. As is noted in studies of reactance, Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014) find that overt cross-partisan endorsement of a particular policy leads individuals to disagree with the policy. Their solution was to trigger an *accuracy* motivation to cancel out the *directional* goal, and their results led them to acknowledge that "the motivation driving opinion formation clearly matters and this has been a topic lacking in study" (Bolsen, et al. 2013, 252).

The topic is not lacking in study in other social sciences, however. Entertainment-education studies have shown success in reducing reactance through dramatic narrative (e.g.

Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010; 2011), for example, found that teens who watched a video portraying a dramatic narrative that included negative consequences for the protagonist's risky sexual behavior were more likely to express intent toward safe sex practices than those who watched an informational video on the consequences of risky sexual behavior. Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung (2012) show evidence that individual who viewed a dramatic television program with implicit messages to discourage drinking and driving did not express reactance to these messages. Furthermore, the authors note reactance remained diminished even after the explicit appeal made in a PSA following the program. It is this potential for reducing reactance, thereby potentially reducing directional motivated reasoning, that makes dramatic narratives a key conduit to consider when studying media effects on political attitudes.

2.4   Narrative Persuasion

Dramatic narratives in films and shows can play a pivotal role in influencing political attitude change through the weight factor of the attitude formula. Chong and Druckman (2007a) make the case that framing effects change the weight of this formula by placing a specific frame around the communication, thereby making certain associated thoughts more important in that given moment. Dramatic narratives, like news media, frames the messages it contains (Bahk 2009; Bartsch, et al. 2014; Mulligan and Habel 2011). Through frames and the use of narrative techniques that decrease reactance, dramatic narratives can affect attitudes through narrative persuasion.

One of the primary reasons for examining dramatic narratives for their persuasive effects is that explicit persuasive messages—like those discussed by Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2011) in educational videos—can elicit reactance and promote motivated reasoning in viewers. The

advantage of dramatic narratives regarding persuasion is the difference in how individuals engage with the media and process the messages therein. Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard's (2018) thorough examination of narrative persuasion explains the framework through which attitude change is possible. They use the psychology and communication literatures to build a model of the narrative persuasion process. Within this process, two deictic shifts occur: One of the viewer placing himself into the story via absorption (strongly related to the concepts of transportation, narrative engagement/parasocial interaction, and identification) and one of the viewer removing himself from the story to reflect upon it within his own life (which is enhanced by the perceived realism of the narrative). Much like news viewers need to be able to relate a campaign speech to issues they care about in order to be moved by the speech (Iyengar and Kinder 2010), it is the act of reflection that allows narrative persuasion to induce attitude change (Hamby, et al. 2018).

A *deictic shift* occurs when "readers shift their deictic center from themselves to a locus in the narrative in order to comprehend and be absorbed by the story" (Hamby, et al. 2018); a *deictic center* is a reference point for understanding context, "typically the present time, location, participant role, and so forth of the speaker" (SIL International 2005). An individual's primary deictic center, or deixis, is herself at the exact location and moment in time she is currently experiencing. Shifting her deictic center into a narrative involves imagining herself as being a particular character (identification) or being in the time and place where the story is set (transportation). In American colloquial terms, this is sometimes called "putting yourself in someone else's shoes."

Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) suggest that the deictic shift into the story (absorption) and then back into one's own life while relating the two deictic centers (reflection) is the key process for inciting persuasive outcomes. In their model *absorption*, or losing oneself

in the narrative, is necessary for comprehension of the story and requires a "willing suspension of disbelief" (3). This "uncritical approach," they note, decreases the desire and ability to "scrutinize messages in the narrative and to generate counterarguments" (Hamby, et al. 2018, 3). In other words, people turn to entertainment as a means of escape or with the motivation of feeling deeply (Oliver and Bartsch 2010; Oliver and Raney 2011), not with the desire to mentally argue against explicit, or implicit, messages embedded in the narrative. Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) aver that the first step, absorption, occurs via three potential mechanisms: Transportation, identification, and narrative engagement. Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably and are represented by different terms in different fields and subfields, I will maintain use of the word *absorption* to refer to the deictic shift of an individual into a narrative.

For additional terms, I refer to Moyer-Gusé's (2008b) definitions, as they relate specifically to audio-visual narratives (movies, shows, etc.). She maintains Green and Brock's definition that *transportation*, or narrative involvement, refers to the "notion of being swept up into the storyline" when an individual's mental capacity is fully focused on the events within the story (Moyer-Gusé 2008b, 409). *Identification*, on the other hand, is one form of involvement with characters in the narrative. In a later study, Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010) break down the broader category of involvement with characters into identification (with a chosen character, often the protagonist), wishful identification (with a preferred character), perceived similarity (between himself and a certain character), and parasocial interaction (PSI, in which a viewer feels as personally connected to a character as she might feel connected to a friend). In each version of identification, the viewer's deictic shift allows him to cognitively and emotionally associate himself as a specific character in the narrative. He will perceive the storyline through

what he imagines as the lens of that character (Bahk 2009; Hamby, et al. 2018; Lather and Moyer-Guse 2011; Moyer-Gusé 2008a; 2008b; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2011; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011).

The second deictic shift, back into one's own life in the real world, ignites reflective processes in the viewer's mind. Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) are firm that absorption is the starting point of the persuasion process; absorption alone—even long-term memory of a story—does not inherently result in persuasion. *Narrative reflection*, the authors posit, is the potential result of narrative processing, "drawing inferences from actors engaged in goals, and then extrapolating to one's life," and finding meaning from those inferences in one's own life (Hamby, et al. 2018, 7). It is this intentional reflection, relating the messages of the narrative to one's own life, that creates space for persuasion (Bartsch, et al. 2014; Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018; Oliver and Bartsch 2010).

This explanation of deictic shifts into the narrative (absorption) and back into reality (reflection) is directly comparable to much of the work on narrative persuasion. For example, Bartsch, Kalch, and Oliver (2014; see also Oliver and Bartsch 2010) note that the two processes of absorption into a dramatic narrative and of reflection afterward are imperative to spark the cognitive elaboration process and potentially elicit attitude change. Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010; 2011; see also Moyer-Gusé 2008a) use similar concepts within their updated Elaboration Likelihood Model to show an extensive breakdown of how absorption into a narrative and reflection after viewing can affect attitudes toward risky sexual behaviors in teens. Furthermore, engaging in this process of absorption and reflection has been noted for its potential to affect politically-relevant attitudes (Bahk 2010; Slater, et al. 2006) and may reduce stigma toward marginalized groups (Igartua, et al. 2014; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019).

2.5 Mediated Intergroup Contact

Mediated intergroup contact is discussed in two primary ways: As vicarious intergroup contact in which the viewer observes an onscreen member of their ingroup interacting with an outgroup member, or as mediated intergroup contact in which the viewer identifies with an onscreen member of the outgroup through parasocial interaction/parasocial contact. This can be an interaction based in reality or part of a fictional narrative. The interaction may be positive, negative, or mixed. It also matters whether the onscreen outgroup member interacts with a member of their own group, a majority group member, a member of the viewer's ingroup, or a member of a different outgroup. Sometimes the viewer is only able to reduce their prejudice toward the outgroup character, considering them an exception, but other times the viewer is able to expand that decreased prejudice to the entire real-world outgroup.

2.5.1 Building on Contact Theory

Social cognitive theory (SCT) claims that humans learn not only through personal experience, but also through observation (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). This observation is not confined to the immediate world of the observer, but extends to the world as portrayed through media (Bandura 2001). In terms of diminishing intergroup bias or conflict, SCT would assert that continued exposure to seeing ingroup and outgroup members engaging in positive contact and relationships will shift their view toward accepting these interactions as the societal norm. It would also posit that viewing these positive interactions will decrease prejudice toward the outgroup member and allow the viewer to generalize their positive perception of the outgroup member to the entire outgroup.

Intergroup contact theory, based on Allport's contact hypothesis, instead suggests that engaging with an outgroup member will be far more effective in diminishing prejudice than

simply observing intergroup interactions. Early intergroup contact research indicates that intergroup contact may reduce or exacerbate prejudice; however, Pettigrew et al (2011) instead attribute the mixed results of early research to "[1] Their incomplete samples of relevant papers, [2] their absence of strict inclusion rules, and [3] their non-quantitative assessments of contact effects," further noting that several studies used intergroup proximity, and not intergroup contact, as their independent variable (274). More recent examinations of intergroup contact theory show promising evidence that intergroup contact more regularly diminishes anxiety and prejudice toward outgroup members than was previously believed, sometimes allowing positive beliefs toward an outgroup member to be generalized to the entire outgroup (Pettigrew, et al. 2011).

Indirect intergroup contact—when you have an ingroup friend who has an outgroup friend—can also serve to make this intergroup interaction more "normatively acceptable" (as suggested by SCT), but does not show as strong effects as direct intergroup contact (Pettigrew et al 2011). The authors suggest indirect intergroup contact may be an important step toward direct intergroup contact. As such, indirect ntergroup contact mediated through dramatic narratives in television and film could offer another such helpful stepping stone. Whereas direct intergroup contact has been criticized in places of extreme intergroup contact as difficult and dangerous (Pettigrew et al 2011), mediated intergroup contact is relatively safe and easy, especially given the wide array of options and the entertainment industry's growing desire to present more inclusive material.

2.5.2   *Facilitating Mediated Intergroup Contact*

Two primary purposes of examining dramatic narrative as a means of influencing sociopolitical attitudes are 1) understanding its ability to reduce resistance to embedded messages and promote narrative persuasion and 2) understanding its ability to reduce anxiety and

increase empathy toward an outgroup through mediated intergroup contact. In both cases, identification plays a key role in fostering attitudinal change in the viewer. In the case of narrative persuasion, parasocial interaction reduces reactance in the viewer, especially for implicit messages, and cognitive-emotional identification reduces active counterarguing (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). In the case of mediated intergroup contact, identification with an outgroup character—especially through empathy and perspective taking—increases empathy and decreases anxiety toward the outgroup in the real-world.

Mediated intergroup contact refers to exposure to indirect intergroup contact through media, often entertainment media and dramatic narratives. This mediated contact can occur either as vicarious contact, in which the viewer identifies with an ingroup character who has an onscreen interaction with an outgroup character, or as parasocial contact, in which the viewer identifies with an onscreen member of the outgroup. Parasocial interaction can affect the viewer both when based in reality—through a documentary or unscripted program—or as part of a fictional narrative (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019). Either way, identification seems to serve as the primary mechanism in mediated intergroup contact for reducing anxiety and increasing empathy toward the outgroup character—and toward the real-world outgroup (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019; Ortiz and Harwood 2007).

Similar to Allport's contact conditions, Ortiz and Harwood (2007) suggest that mediated contact requires identification with a character in order to "vicariously participate" in the interaction. However, the particular definition the authors provide for identification, "when viewers perceive themselves as similar to a character and vicariously participate in the character's experiences," may be more specifically termed perceived similarity and parasocial interaction (Ortiz and Harwood 2007, 618). Although both are forms of identification, perceived

similarity refers to the recognition of traits in a character that the viewer perceives as being similar to themselves, and parasocial interaction (PSI) refers to the feeling of being a part of the experience, as though the onscreen characters could be your friends (see Moyer-Gusé 2008). This idea of "vicariously participat[ing] in the character's experiences" could also be described more simply as transportation, the feeling of being absorbed and mentally transported into the scene. The authors further describe identification as occurring "when individuals view themselves as the character within the program; adopt the character's perspective; experience and understand the character's emotions; and understand how and why the character acts the way he or she does" (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). Again, these can be labeled more specifically as cognitive-emotional identification—viewing oneself as the character or experiencing and understanding the character's emotions—or empathy and perspective taking—adopting the character's perspective or understanding the character's actions (see Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005).

Ortiz and Harwood (2007) assert that mediated intergroup contact may serve as a step toward real-world intergroup contact (see also Pettigrew et al 2011). Because it is not so severe as to expect viewers to fully embrace the outgroup character's views and emotions, as with cognitive-emotional identification, or to see them as a friend, as with group identification or parasocial interaction, empathy is likely easier to achieve with an outgroup character, especially toward the beginning of viewing. As Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) point out, however, empathy with an onscreen character may serve as a precursor to cognitive-emotional identification. Relatedly, identification with the ingroup character who is experiencing intergroup contact onscreen may be more important, especially at the beginning, for producing eventual parasocial interaction (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019). Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz (2019) also find

that identification through parasocial interaction and simply liking the outgroup character—in their study, non-Muslim viewers liking an onscreen Muslim character—can evoke feelings of guilt, which "can motivate an individual to develop more favorable attitudes and behaviors toward the outgroup" (9).

2.5.2.1 *Negative vs. Positive Mediated Intergroup Contact*

In addition to identification, Ortiz and Harwood (2007) state the onscreen intergroup interaction must be positive to serve as mediated contact, and the character must represent group typicality, which they describe as meaning "the more the outgroup character is perceived as representative of his or her group, the more likely exposure to positive intergroup contact will translate into positive intergroup attitudes" (618). However, an extensive review of intergroup contact studies suggests that both positive and negative intergroup contact may invoke positive results (Pettigrew et al 2011). Furthermore, there are other factors that influence the impact of negative intergroup contact. Voluntary intergroup contact that skews negative is not likely to increase prejudice, and may even decrease prejudice; however, involuntary positive intergroup contact, on the other hand, may not decrease prejudice (Pettigrew et al 2011).

As many other aspects of in-person intergroup contact seem highly relevant to mediated intergroup contact, the nuances of contact type (positive or negative) and conditions (voluntary, history, etc.) may impact mediated intergroup contact similarly. Given that entertainment media consumption is largely voluntary, for example, even depictions of negative intergroup contact may induce positive results such as decreasing anxiety of the outgroup (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). However, positive depictions of intergroup contact, and especially teamwork, serve most strongly to reduce anxiety toward the outgroup (Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020). The results discussed in Chapter 5 indicate that shows depicting the Muslim terrorist stereotype may not

simply offer either a negative mediated intergroup experience or a positive one, but many shows instead portray nuanced characters and intergroup relationships.

2.5.2.2 *Decreasing Resistance to Narrative Persuasion*

Several factors of narrative persuasion increase the likelihood of an embedded message in entertainment media influencing audience members beyond the initial narrative exposure. Although identification plays an essential role, absorption and reflection must still be experienced by the viewer to produce real-world results (Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018). Absorption refers to an individual shifting their own deictic center—or point of view/perspective—to that of the story, meaning they begin to experience the narrative from within it. Reflection refers to the individual experiencing elaborative processing by relating elements of the narrative to their own life once they have shifted their perspective—deictic center—back into their own reality.

Identification occurs in tandem with absorption when an individual shifts their deictic center into a story and also takes on the perspective of a specific character or understands a character or characters in relation to themselves within the story. As described above, there are multiple forms of identification, each of which increase the potential for narrative persuasion via various mechanisms. Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010) find evidence that cognitive-emotional identification with or perceived similarity to an onscreen character can decrease feelings of perceived vulnerability, which can diminish reflection in audience members. Cognitive-emotional identification, when the viewer takes on the emotions and perspective of the character, showed an immediate decrease in viewers' perceived vulnerability, while perceived similarity showed a lagged effect (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). They also found evidence that parasocial interaction, or feeling that one has a face-to-face relationship with a character, may decrease

reactance to embedded messages, especially when the message is implicit rather than explicit (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010).

2.6   Benefits to Political Science Research

Perhaps one of the most significant factors that dramatic narratives in films and shows lend to the study of political behavior is their potential to lessen or even bypass directional motivated reasoning. Druckman and McGrath (2019) posit that information input versus prior held beliefs is not a sufficient description of the preference formation process. The authors argue credibility plays a key role in motivating individuals toward acceptance or rejection. It is not simply that an individual weighs new and prior information objectively, but that the "strength of an individual's confidence in the new information relative to her strength of confidence in the prior best guess determines both the extent to which belief moves in response to the new information, and the strength of the confidence in that new belief" (Druckman and McGrath 2019, 112). Given three potential outcomes—no effect, persuasion, or backlash—confidence in the validity of new information may be what makes new information more or less likely to shift one's prior beliefs.

Identification with a fictional character in a dramatic narrative—in the form of perceived similarity to that character, of liking the character strongly, of wishful identification or wishing to be like them, or of parasocial interaction (PSI), which allows audience members to relate to a character similar to a real-life friend—has been shown to reduce reactance (Hamby, et al. 2018; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2011; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). Similarly, Andersen et al. (2017) find that exposure to a news story with exemplars similar to the respondents "triggered an empathic concern and increased political participation intentions," while stories with dissimilar exemplars "decreased empathic concern, which in turn decreased political participation intentions" (490).

Communication scholars may label this type of identification as "perceived similarity," and find it to be a significant condition for decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011).

Indeed, each of the directional motivated reasoning mechanisms discussed in political science can be seen in patterns of resistance to explicit messages in dramatic narratives explained by communication scholars in the entertainment-education literature. The confirmation bias, defined by Druckman and McGrath (2019) as the "tendency to seek out information that confirms one's own beliefs" is also referred to by both political science and communication as *selective exposure* (113). The *prior attitude affect*, which places the strength of new information as being relative to one's prior belief, may account for weak absorption and identification in a dramatic narrative. When one's prior attitudes are too far from those portrayed onscreen, it may shatter the illusion created and diminish one's ability to "connect" with the material. When messages in a dramatic narrative are explicit, this can also elicit counterarguing (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011), or a *disconfirmation bias*, which Druckman and McGrath (2019) describe as "greater scrutiny and counter-argumentation of information contrary to one's prior beliefs" (113).

Examinations of entertainment-oriented, soft news demonstrate the strong ability of non-traditional sources to influence political knowledge and voting patterns, especially in non-politically oriented viewers (Baum 2004; Baum and Jamison 2006; Baumgartner and Morris 2006). Soft news can be described as non-traditional, information-oriented media characterized by specific characteristics, namely "the absence of a public policy component, sensationalized presentation, human-interest themes, and emphasis on dramatic subject matter, such as crime and disaster" (Baum 2004, 92). Unsurprisingly, these characteristics are what tie them closely with

entertainment media, the dramatic presentations and endearing hosts being far more appealing than traditional news broadcasts. Yet, these shows do provide compelling information that reaches audiences. Viewers of *The Daily Show*, for example, are more likely to feel confident in their political knowledge (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). When exposed to Tina Fey's impersonation of then-vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin, individuals self-reporting as Republican and Independent were afterward less approving of Palin as an appropriate running mate for Republican presidential candidate John McCain (Baumgartner, et al. 2012). Baumgartner and Morris (2008) even found evidence that Stephen Colbert's spoof character of himself as a staunch conservative ideologue on his popular late-night show *The Colbert Report* increased affinity of Republicans in viewers.

Given the role that communication scholars see of identification in decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion, it is likely no small wonder that these characters can influence attitude shifts in their audience members. However, soft news media still does not have nearly the viewership numbers of shows watched purely for entertainment. Further, shows like those Baumgartner and Morris have examined for political influence—*The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* (2012), *The Colbert Report* (2008), and *Saturday Night Live* (2012)—suffer from selective exposure in that they are more likely to be watched by individuals who are younger and more liberal (Baumgartner and Morris 2006).

However, entertainment-education studies note that dramatic narratives are more likely to induce attitude shifts (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010) and reduce resistance (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011) than their information-oriented counterparts. Watching crime shows like *CSI* or *Law & Order* can prime audiences to believe crime is a much larger problem in America than it actually is (Holbrook and Hill 2005; Pettey and Bracken 2008). Mulligan and Habel (2011) show that

both the implicit frame (morality) and explicit frame (abortion is a choice) can affect attitude shifts in viewers of dramatic feature film *The Cider House Rules*. Viewing scenes from *The West Wing*, which depicts a strong, fair economist-turned-politician in the democrat President Josiah Bartlet, can influence not only how individuals view the many roles of the president (Holbert, et al. 2005), but also their approval of real-world presidents and their success (Holbert 2003). Kearns and Young (2019) note greater expressed interest in political action after exposure to a torture scene from popular TV show *24*, and note that individuals watching the scene depicting torture as unsuccessful in coercing the character to give up information were more likely to sign a petition against using torture for interrogation than individuals watching the scene where torture is shown as successful. This evidence altogether suggests that political and sociopolitical messages in dramatic narratives are effective in decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion—in different terms, overcoming directional motivated reasoning—especially within the low-political knowledge population.

3   UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA CONSUMPTION PATTERS ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Entertainment media, through narrative persuasion, can have significant, lasting effects on the social and political attitudes of viewers. While we understand the components of narrative persuasion and its effects relatively well, its role in mediated intergroup contact has only recently come to the fore. Mediated intergroup contact occurs as a form of vicarious contact between members of two social groups, typically a majority ingroup and minority outgroup, without the added anxiety of a real world interaction (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). As such, this mediated contact could work to not only greatly diminish cultural intergroup conflict, but also interparty conflict. Further, in conjunction with narrative persuasion, it could diminish the prejudice and biases that impact certain policy attitudes in the American public. However, contemporary consumption methods, such as binge watching, may hinder these potentially very positive effects. In this chapter, I begin to explore how mediated intergroup contact theory might be extended to influence interparty prejudice and policy attitudes. Then, I explore two theories: 1. Accumulative effects of negative mediated intergroup contact may increase prejudice and approval of public policies that negatively affect an outgroup, and 2. Binge effects may decrease the impact of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. In each section of the chapter, I link the concepts in question to the three empirical chapters of this manuscript and the studies therein, culminating in an extended explanation of binge effects theory.

3.1   Mediated Interparty Contact

In the past, contact theory has largely been used to examine how certain conditions of social contact between members of differing social groups can diminish prejudice. Typically, this has referred to social groups differentiated by their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or

religion. However, recent evidence from a study by Iyengar and Westwood (2015) notes that

political party, rather than race, may serve as the most divisive social identity in America. How,

then, may social contact—and my more particular interested, mediated intergroup contact—serve

to diminish interparty prejudice?

In Chapter 4, I explore the impact of narrative persuasion on policy attitudes as well as

social attitudes. Much of my findings reflect current understanding in the literature regarding the

importance of identification and absorption. However, I find that very little narrative persuasion

can be evidenced by participant discussions. Instead, I discover the potential for a new path of

examining mediated intergroup contact beyond the typical exploration of racial, ethnic,

gendered, or sexual orientation identities. The main finding of this chapter suggests that

behaviors and opinions of the political "other," rather than policy attitudes, are more likely

affected by onscreen political disputes. As such, this chapter begins to ask whether mediated

intergroup contact can be extended to a very different type of social group: Political identity.

3.2   Accumulative Effects on Narrative Persuasion and Mediated Intergroup Contact

Does mediated intergroup contact increase in efficacy with accumulation of exposure?

Mediated intergroup contact may lessen anxiety and increase empathy toward outgroup members

in the real world. However, political science studies up to this point have focused on single-

episode exposure or observational correlations between shows watched and beliefs. One political

science study, conducted in Rwanda by Paluck and Green (2009), examines the effects of

consistent exposure to certain behaviors in a dramatic, fictional radio program using a

longitudinal, year-long experiment in sites across the country. They find that this consistent

exposure does impact audience perceptions of social norms, as well as intended behaviors. This

may indicate that narrative persuasion shifts behaviors with extended exposure, but do the effects

of mediated intergroup contact increase or strengthen with extended exposure, as well? In other words, are there accumulative effects with mediated exposure to indirect intergroup contact?

3.2.1   Cultivation Theory

Gerbner (1998) describes mass media cultivation of social reality a "gravitational process" rather than a "unidirectional" one, explaining that mass media will alter the social reality perceived by various groups in society based on their relationship to mainstream television (180). "The angle and direction of the 'pull' depends on where groups of viewers and their styles of life are with reference to the line of gravity, or the 'mainstream' of the world of television" (Gerbner 1998, 180). Mainstream television creates this "line of gravity" by establishing certain norms within their programming. The more individuals consume mainstream television, the more they will assume these norms within their concept of social reality.

Gerbner's cultivation theory, also referred to as "drip, drip effects," has both served as foundation for media research and been thoroughly critiqued (see Potter 2014). However, scholars today are more likely to focus on viewership of specific media genres rather than total television viewing, which Potter (2014) notes may not examine cultivation effects, but selective exposure. I also find that very few political scientists endeavor to examine the accumulative effects of dramatic media, though dramatic media effects on political attitudes have been studied at length for their immediate influence. Priming in dramatic media, for example, can influence views toward the real-world president (Holbert et al 2005) and perceptions of crime rates in America (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Mulligan and Habel (2011) examine how frames in the dramatic film *The Cider House Rules* affect attitudes toward abortion laws (79). Each of these studies look at immediate effects of dramatic media, rather than lasting effects.

Several impressive studies that do examine accumulated dramatic media effects, however, do not discuss the underlying mechanisms of these effects using the vocabulary outlined in this manuscript. Gierzynski and Eddy (2016) use extensive survey data to examine the lasting influence of the Harry Potter franchise on Millennials' political and social values. Hether et al (2009), who opt for a quasi-natural experiment, collect survey data at multiple times over a television season to find evidence that similar breast cancer storylines in two primetime shows may affect policy beliefs. Paluck and Green's (2009) study in post-genocide Rwanda includes a year-long experiment to examine whether listening to a dramatic, fictional radio program could alter perceptions of sociopolitical behaviors and listeners' willingness to alter their own behaviors.

However, streaming services and the surge of new material they bring in terms of amount, story and character diversity, and availability may change the strength of that gravity. Harmon et al (2019) find that streaming service users do not show the same "affluenza symptoms" of materialism and life dissatisfaction associated with watching too much television. The authors posit that audience program selectivity translates to audience message selectivity, thereby eliminating the connection cultivation theory makes between increased television viewing and greater expression of specific social norms. Similarly, binge watching may lessen the gravitational effects Gerbner describes by lessening the persuasive impact of message outliers.

3.2.2   *Accumulative Impact*

I posit that increased exposure to certain norms through entertainment media will accumulate to impact perceptions of real-world social norms. When these depictions include members of an outgroup, they will impact not only social perceptions of the outgroup and its

members, but also viewers' attitudes toward policies that impact the marginalized outgroup. Portrayals of positive intergroup contact could decrease prejudice toward outgroup members and decrease approval of policies that negatively affect the outgroup. However, the opposite is also true: Portrayals of negative intergroup contact could increase prejudice toward outgroup members and increase approval of policies that negatively affect them. As exposure to the new social norm accumulates, so does its impact on sociopolitical attitudes.

However, streaming services and the surge of new material they bring in terms of amount, story and character diversity, and availability may change the strength of that gravity. Harmon et al (2019) find that streaming service users do not show the same "affluenza symptoms" of materialism and life dissatisfaction associated with watching too much television. The authors posit that audience program selectivity translates to audience message selectivity, thereby eliminating the connection cultivation theory makes between increased television viewing and greater expression of specific social norms. Similarly, binge watching may lessen the gravitational effects Gerbner describes by lessening the persuasive impact of message outliers.

In Chapter 5, I explore the potential for accumulative entertainment media effects. In particular, I examine the impact of increased, accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype present in many popular television shows. I observe whether increased exposure has a greater impact as it accumulates across programs, and whether some character depictions are more influential than others. I study these effects on social attitudes toward Muslims and on policy attitudes toward counterterrorism policies and policies affecting people from Muslim-majority countries.

3.3   Media Consumption Method Effects

The contemporary media environment includes many platforms, mediums, and screens. The Nielsen Company (2018) reports that the average American spends nearly 11 hours per day looking at screens—nearly half the entire day! Television viewing comprises nearly 4.5 (40 percent) of those hours, and 20 percent of overall American television viewing is done via a streaming platform rather than a television set. In 2014, only 75 percent of Americans owned a smartphone, up from 60 percent in 2013, and only 40 percent subscribed to some type of video-on-demand service, up from 21 percent in 2013 (Nielsen 2014). Just six years later, in the first quarter of 2020, Nielsen (2020) reports that on average Americans spend nearly four hours per day accessing the Internet or an app via their smartphone, and more than 2.5 hours on a tablet, computer, or Internet-connected device. Another four hours is spent viewing live or time-shifted television (Nielsen 2020), with nearly 19 percent of all television viewing occurring through a streaming platform (Spangler 2020). Needless to say, the way Americans consume media has drastically changed since 2000, when the hottest new trend was upgrading physical DVDs to HD and Blu-Ray (Nielsen 2014).[4]

Nielsen (2020) does admit, however, that "some amount of simultaneous usage may occur across devices," indicating that some of their measurements may overlap (for example, the Smart TV app would also be considered an Internet connected device), but also alluding to the fact that many Americans interact with more than one screen at a time. While only 28 percent of Americans say they "sometimes" use their phone or tablet while watching television, a whopping 45 percent say they "very often" or "always" use a second screen (Perez 2018). Daniel

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[4] DVD, or digital versatile disc, is form of digital optical disc storage developed in 1995 and widely used for viewing films and show series. Video storage upgrades to this medium include HD, which stands for high definition, and Blu-Ray, which can store larger quantities of HD video than a DVD.

Kahneman (2011) describes four different conditions that make "thinking slow," or using more elaborative thinking processes, even harder. One of these conditions is switching between tasks, not unlike diverting attention from watching a show to responding to a text message, or even looking up something the show bring up. This increased cognitive load during viewing can diminish absorption, reflection, and attitude effects (Hamby, et al. 2017). Additionally, the elevated number of input signals increases the likelihood of audience members to process incoming information according to their confirmation bias, focusing on the information that aligns with strong prior beliefs and dismissing the rest (Leung 2020). This selective information processing already poses an obstacle to diminishing partisan and directional motivated reasoning prior to the introduction of multiple stimuli, predisposing individuals to agree more strongly with partisan messaging with which they already agree while observing bias in messaging that aligns with the opposing party's viewpoint (Feldman 2010)

In Iyengar and Kinder's (1987) seminal work on media effects, they address the issue of experimental research being in contrast with mundane realism, asserting that while experiments are important to the field of political science and especially to political communication, observational research is still necessary. The real world problem of the inattentive audience is one that does not often translate to laboratory experiment conditions, yet it remains a key factor diminishing the connection "between the supply of information, on the one hand, and its consumption, on the other" (Iyengar and Kinder 2010, 143). In the case of entertainment media effects research, the attentive experimental audience may exhibit increased absorption, which may overinflate results of narrative persuasion. Some efforts have been made in media effects experimental research to increase the perception of mundane realism through experimental

settings that resemble living rooms or through online studies that mimic natural online behavior (see McDermott 2002).

3.3.1   *The Drench Hypothesis*

The question of whether high impact or frequent viewing more deeply impacts television audiences has long been discussed but seldom studied in a political science context. There are, indeed, two prevailing explanations in the communications literature that describe the most impactful factors of dramatic narrative: Quantity or quality. Again, cultivation theory asserts that continued exposure to similar messages and themes in media—entertainment or otherwise—will shift audience perceptions of social norms toward those depicted in the media. The more prevalent the depiction of society, the more likely it is to be seen as typical by the majority—an effect of quantity (Gerbner 1998). Continued exposure to a stereotype, for example, will increase viewers' beliefs that the stereotype is typical of the group the character represents. Ortiz and Harwood (2007) find that mediated intergroup contact, in which a majority member views a program with an outgroup member and in some way empathizes with that character, can reduce anxiety toward the outgroup as a whole. While this particular theory has not yet been observed over time, Reep and Dambrot (1989) observed that the more frequently an individual watched a show, the more likely they would be to list recurring characters as stereotypical.

The drench hypothesis, on the other hand, expects that a single instance of high-impact exposure will have greater lasting effects on viewers—an effect of quality (Bahk 2009; Reep and Dambrot 1987). Reep and Dambrot (1989) look to Greenberg's "drench" hypothesis, which states that "viewers may not be influenced by continual repetition of images, but rather some particular characters or programs may have an intense and significant impact on viewers and, thus, are far more influential than the accumulated images of numerous other characters and

programs" (543). Frequency, they claim, is therefore less significant than a high-impact

characters and images. Bahk (2001a) takes a similar stance, arguing that high-impact films like

Outbreak about a brutal global pandemic greatly influence sociopolitical beliefs about health and

safety. Returning to the stereotype example, if an episodic show depicts a non-stereotype

character that viewers strongly identify with, viewers will instead begin to reject the original

stereotype in favor of the new character type (Reep and Dambrot 1987). This result is also

reflected in mediated intergroup contact research, in which researchers find that a single instance

of exposure to an outgroup character with which viewers empathize positively affects their views

of the outgroup as a whole (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). As Reep and Dambrot (1987) point out,

however, these theories are not mutually exclusive—especially, I would argue, outside the

laboratory where a single episode depicts many characters with varying degrees of what may be

deemed stereotypical traits and behavior.

3.3.2   Binge Watching

Does binge watching decrease the efficacy of narrative persuasion and mediated

intergroup contact in entertainment media? Where we once had to wait an entire week—or

more—in between episodes of our favorite primetime series, many people now opt to watch

them all at once. Binge watching, and even binge racing, has become a popular pastime for

adults across the globe. The popular streaming service Netflix defines binge-watching as

"watching between 2-6 episodes of the same TV show in one sitting" (Netflix 2013). This means

binge watching can entail as little as spending one to six hours viewing episodes of a show one

right after another in a single sitting. Or, in the case of binge racing, it can entail watching every

single episode in a season back-to-back with few to no breaks, even when the season is more

than ten hours in length. How does the consumption shift from watching a show once weekly to watching multiple episodes at once alter dramatic media effects?

I believe the heart of this question begins in the drip, drip vs. drench controversy and can be answered within the context of deictic shift theory. Each of these theories originates outside the field of political science, yet are vital to explaining the underlying mechanisms at work in binge effects. Binge effects modulate dramatic media effects by decreasing the opportunity for narrative persuasion in at least three key ways. Deictic shift theory states that the necessary components for narrative persuasion are absorption and reflection, both of which may be diminished by this new consumption pattern. First, more time spent watching the same show may mean deeper absorption or, more likely, it may lead to dips in attention as the hours drag on. Decreased absorption not only diminishes the opportunity for narrative persuasion, but also diminishes viewer identification with characters and perceived realism, both of which decrease resistance to messaging in dramatic media.

Second, waiting each week for a new episode may increase reflection time, as individuals often turn after each viewing to peers, online forums, and blogs to keep talking and thinking about the show while they wait for new content. This accumulation of input over time ties closely with cultivation theory, which describes how mass media helps cultivate the social reality of our society. In this sense, binge effects may lessen the impact of ground-breaking shows or non-mainstream messaging in shows because the reflection time between exposures is shortened or erased.

Third, binge effects may mimic drench effects, regardless of the level of impact provided by imagery and storyline. In contrast to cultivation theory, the drench hypothesis asserts that high-impact imagery and storylines can have stronger effects on individuals than more mundane

audiovisual programs consumed over time—essentially, a high-impact movie will leave a more lasting impression than a lower emotional impact show viewed over several weeks or months. Viewing all episodes at once, when absorption levels remain high, may create similar effects in viewers immediately after binge watching and show increased rates of narrative persuasion.

Based on the literature—drawing from studies examining deictic shift theory, reactance, cultivation theory, and the drench hypothesis—I theorize that binge watching will decrease the overall potential for narrative persuasion of dramatic media content as well as decrease the potential for mediated intergroup contact to diminish prejudice, specifically for episodic shows. I assert that while the immediate influence of binge watching a show may be similar to—or even stronger than—watching the same number of episodes of the show weekly, these effects will diminish faster due to decreased absorption and reflection time. Overall, I predict binge watching dampens any lasting persuasive effects in dramatic media.

3.3.2.1 *Binge Effects: Drip, Drip or Drench?*

Binge-watching, at first glance, seems to join the considerations of cultivation theory and the drench hypothesis. The sustained viewing of high-impact images—particularly those of contemporary shows with large budgets—should, in theory, be most influential. However, the sustained viewing in a single day (or even a couple days) cannot be considered equal to that of regular viewing over multiple weeks. Simply pitting binge watching against weekly watching the exact same show assumes comparative accumulative effects. More than television happens in any given week. People are influenced by their personal circumstances, by the other news and non-news media they encounter, and by world events (like the current pandemic increasing the binge watching phenomenon). In addition to the previously mentioned ways binge watching may shape dramatic media's influence on its audience, the shortened time span removes potential life

distractions that could occur in the longer time span of weekly viewing. for example, if a weekly viewer breaks up with their significant other eight weeks into a ten-week romantic story arc, they may feel not very absorbed and unable to identify when the two protagonists finally get together in episode ten. However, if the viewer had binged the entire season before the breakup, they may have felt very absorbed and connected to the show, leading to a stronger opportunity for overall narrative persuasion.

Cultivation theory, on the one hand, dictates that the more time spent with a particular media, the stronger the impact will be. According to deictic shift theory, narrative persuasion is the result of two essential factors: Absorption and reflection. Together, they assert that the more time spent absorbed in media with similar messaging and spent reflecting on that messaging increases the likelihood of narrative persuasion. Increased time and absorption in dramatic media can also allow for greater identification with characters, which further increases the potential for narrative persuasion. Identification and perceived realism play key roles in increasing both absorption and reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and counterarguing (Bahk 2001b; Moyer-Gusé 2008; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011). The traditional cable television format of spacing show episodes out to one per week, for example, provides an hour of engagement plus a full seven days in between each episode for reflection. On the other hand, binge-watching the same number episodes only provides the increased time for absorption and identification. Binge watching multiple episodes back-to-back results in much less reflection time than that provided by weekly watching. Even if absorption remained at optimal levels throughout all binged episodes of a show, which is unlikely given varied attention spans, the reflection time between episodes is severely shortened from days to mere minutes. If reflection is

the time period during which attitude change occurs, then shortening this time will inevitably dampen the potential for narrative persuasion.

In this sense, binge effects cannot be considered the sum of cultivation theory and the drench hypothesis. First, watching multiple episodes of a show at once does not equate to high-impact imagery and visualizations. Some shows, especially those with larger budgets, may provide these components, but they are not by definition an essential part of binge watching. Sustained high absorption levels in binge watchers may increase the likelihood that effects will mimic drench effects; however, high levels of absorption may also indicate the show includes high-impact imagery and/or visualization. This means the stronger effects immediately following a binge session could indicate actual drench effects rather than binge effects. Second, individuals do not engage with dramatic media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their screens not only with specific motivations for engaging with media but also with personal circumstances, current mindsets, and myriad potential distractions. They will leave their media experience with certain impressions to reenter their own lives, often moving straight into engagement with other narratives and other media formats.

Unfortunately, I cannot hold time still, nor can I split time into two dimensions where individuals binge or watch weekly in their parallel timelines; therefore, I cannot fully separate out all the additional interferences weekly watchers may experience. However, I can examine the factors associated with narrative persuasion as they interact with these different consumption patterns: Absorption, identification, and perceived realism.

3.3.3   Binge Effects Theory

In Chapter 6, I use a longitudinal laboratory experiment to examine the effects of consumption method on narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. One episode of a

show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers very little. Continued messaging in one show or across multiple shows increases the likelihood that narrative persuasion will occur, as evidenced by education-entertainment research and studies of accumulative effects (e.g. Hether et al 2008). However, individuals are increasingly likely to watch series on their own time rather than during the original broadcast, and binge watching is on the rise (Nielsen 2019). These consumption shifts, particularly the trend toward binge watching, will affect the potential for dramatic media to induce narrative persuasion. I expect, based on deictic shift theory, that binge-watching will overall result in a diminished capacity for narrative persuasion. While the drench-like experience may heighten dramatic media effects on viewers' attitudes immediately after bingeing, decreased reflection will diminish these effects over time. My binge effects theory can be condensed to three main ideas:

1. Binge watchers are more likely than weekly watchers to experience lower levels of absorption.
2. Binge watchers who do not experience lower levels of absorption than weekly watchers will likely exhibit drench effects.
3. All binge watchers are less likely to experience lasting attitude change than weekly watchers.

I postulate the immediate effects after binge-watching will mimic those of drench effects, showing a sizeable shift in political attitudes and social perceptions. This effect may only be true, however, for individuals who identify in some way with one of the show's main characters and those who maintain high absorption beyond the initial two hours of viewing. Further, because the reflection time is greatly reduced for binge-watchers and is not sustained through a weekly return to the program, lasting effects are less likely than what is suggested by cultivation theory. In sum, binge-watchers who maintain a high level of absorption may exhibit greater attitudinal effects immediately following their viewing session, but these effects are less likely to last than those shown by weekly watchers.

What does this mean for dramatic media effects on political and sociopolitical attitudes? It means that binge-watching may decrease the impact of narrative persuasion overall. On one hand, this could decrease the influence of non-mainstream media, making it more difficult to encourage diversity of ideas via messaging and casting. On the other hand, it could increase the effects of selective exposure and solidify as normal the messages of mainstream media by dampening the impact of any new messages. To clarify, by "new messages" I mean any non-mainstream ideas or concepts included in the narrative. For example, Slater, Rouner, and Long (2009) indicate minimal effects on viewers' attitudes toward same-sex relationships after watching a short film that depicts a healthy, loving same-sex relationship. At the time this study was done, there were few examples of same-sex relationships in television, and many carried a negative frame (Slater, Rouner, and Long 2006). Had the program been longer and viewed weekly, stronger attachments to these characters may have grown and encouraged greater attitudinal effects. Had the program been longer and binged, viewers with high absorption may still have built stronger attachments to the characters, but there would be no lasting attitudinal effects.

In particular, binge effects on narrative persuasion may diminish the potential for dramatic media to bypass directional motivated reasoning, which can be particularly strong for political attitudes (see Bolsen and Palm 2019; Druckman and McGrath 2019). Although this manuscript focuses on dramatic media's attitudinal effects, binge effects may also diminish the capacity of any media to educate viewers. Furthermore, because young adults are more likely to binge watch, binge effects could have lasting repercussions for Millennials, members of Gen Z, and generations to come.

3.4   Moving Forward

In sum, the next three chapters examine how narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact affect social perceptions of outgroup members and political attitudes toward the public policies that affect the outgroup. More specifically, they explore 1. The effects of mediated intergroup contact on policy attitudes and interparty prejudice (Chapter 4); 2. The effects of accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype on perceptions of Muslims and approval of policy attitudes that negatively affect Muslims and individuals from Muslim-majority countries (Chapter 5); and 3. How binge effects alter the impact of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact on sociopolitical attitudes (Chapter 6). Overall, I assert that mediated intergroup contact can affect perceptions of an outgroup and policy attitudes. More specifically, I observe the conditions at work in narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact through an onscreen debate on gun ownership. I move on to argue that nuanced depictions of Muslims in TV and film will increase identification with the outgroup characters, thereby decreasing viewers' prejudice toward Muslims and decreasing viewers' approval of public policies that affect Muslims negatively. I finally posit, however, that current the consumption habit of binge watching may limit entertainment media effects.

4   UNDERSTANDING THE CONDITIONS OF NARRATIVE PERSUASION ON POLICY ATTITUDES

"Personally, I have been a proponent of gun ownership for a long time," remarks a young, African American man and self-proclaimed news-lover in my "Pop Culture and American Politics" seminar. He explains, "I do however believe that change is needed in our policies regarding guns… Americans are losing their lives in senseless mass shootings every year." This sentiment resonates with the small group of students in my senior seminar class in spring of 2019. It is still early in the semester, and the jovial seniors spend the minutes leading to the start of class discussing current events and their work in other, shared classes. Without knowing one midsemester topic for discussion will be gun rights, they chat openly about their views while I listen, welcoming them to prolong their discussion into our class time as I note their stances. He continues amidst a few nods, while other students quietly direct their focus elsewhere: "people should be able to live their lives going to a place of worship, to school, or simply publicly enjoying time out with friends without the thought of someone bringing in a gun to kill people being in the back of their heads."

Nearly two years after Governor Nathan Deal signed Georgia HB 280, commonly known as a "campus carry" bill, into law, my students are still talking about the changes happening around them. From one perspective, campus carry laws like Georgia's HB 280 are intended to address the potential dangers of school shootings and the more mundane robberies that occur on or near college campuses. As Governor Deal stated in 2017, "At the present time, assailants can, and do, target these students knowing full well that their victims are not permitted to carry protection… we've witnessed college students fall victim to violent attacks in or while traveling to libraries and academic buildings" (Downey 2017). From another perspective, these laws have

been accused of creating a hostile learning environment that may "chill" free speech (Arnold 2019) in opposition to prior Supreme Court rulings like that of *District of Columbia v. Heller*, which indicates the current interpretation of the second amendment allows for such limitations as "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms into sensitive places such as schools and government buildings" (Bennett 2020). There has also been some confusion as to when and where firearms are allowed, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution noting 15 violations cited in the University System of Georgia within the law's first year on the books (Stirgus and Prabhu 2018). Further evidence indicates that while laws allowing individuals to legally "carry firearms onto college campuses are unlikely to lead to fewer mass shootings or fewer casualties in those mass shootings," increased "gun availability in campus environments could make far more common acts of aggression, recklessness, or self-harm more deadly" (Webster, et al. 2016).

As political science majors and senior undergraduates, I first believe my students are probably poised to speak more eloquently than others their age on this or other controversial political topics. However, in a pre-class survey, my students scored an average of 5.13 out of nine on a set of political knowledge questions. Their score is comparable to that of the 5.19 average score of 144 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory political science class who were polled in a pre-treatment survey for the experiment discussed in Chapter 6 of this manuscript. It is less than the 5.75 average score of 1088 participants in the national survey detailed in Chapter 5 of this manuscript. Many of these political science seniors share that they have rarely even thought about the issue of gun rights, one young African American woman noting, "unless it was being brought up on a national level with school shootings." Shootings like the 2007 event at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) were the impetus for campus carry laws that now exist in 11 states—including the Georgia law my students discuss, for 16

state laws banning campus carry policies, and for multiple advocacy groups on both sides of the

issue (Hassett, et al. 2019). Even so, this young woman and other seniors in my class express

ambivalence or neutrality, such as the sentiment asserted by one student that, "I could understand

both sides." What could push ambivalent Americans like these students toward aligning with one

side or the other, especially those Americans who are not news-lovers?

Can entertainment media, broadly enjoyed by adults across America, affect policy

attitudes? More specifically, can narrative persuasion decrease interparty prejudice and

motivated reasoning? During the fall 2018 and spring 2019 semesters, I conducted two focus

groups within my political science senior seminar classes on "Pop Culture and American

Politics."[5] The readings and activities in these classes exposed students to media effects research,

the concepts and conditions for narrative persuasion, and multiple forms of popular media with

sociopolitical messages. Understanding the concepts of narrative persuasion was necessary for

students both to engage in class discussions and also to discuss these concepts and their reactions

to media screenings as part of the focus group. Engaging with these concepts allowed

participants to use precise language when describing the impact of the media we screened in

classes. After each media screening, students were asked to respond to a writing prompt sharing

their thoughts and discussing connections to the literature. In conducting these focus groups, I

hope to better understand the key factors that influence whether an embedded message in a

dramatic narrative will impact audience attitudes. Simply, could watching a show that explicitly

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[5] These focus groups were approved by Georgia State University's Institutional Review Board in March 2019. All students in Ms. Pauley's senior seminar classes during the 2018 to 2019 academic year were provided the option to allow their discussion comments and written submissions be used as part of these focus groups. Only the submissions of those students who signed the informed consent document expressly giving this permission have been used by the researcher.

debates gun rights and gun control laws move my ambivalent students toward taking a policy stance?

4.1   Narrative Persuasion of Political Attitudes

Narrative persuasion refers to the internal process through which a dramatic narrative may influence audience opinions and attitudes. This process may occur through explicit messages in the narrative inducing central information processing in the audience, thereby encouraging the audience to reconsider prior attitudes toward the message topic. It may also occur through implicit themes and messages depicting social circumstances that are absorbed by the audience through peripheral information processing, thereby affecting their overall perceptions of social norms. One of the leading theories regarding narrative persuasion is deictic shift theory, which asserts that absorption, or deictic transportation into the storyline, is necessary for narrative persuasion and that reflection upon the narrative afterward increases the likelihood of persuasion (Hamby, et al. 2017). Further research provides evidence that identification with at least one character plays a key role in increasing absorption and encouraging reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and counterarguing in the audience (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). However, individuals do not engage with dramatic media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their screens not only with specific motivations for engaging with media but also with personal circumstances, cognitive load, and myriad potential distractions (see Hamby, et al. 2018).

What is the key component to holding a viewer's attention and inducing reflection enough to evoke narrative persuasion? More importantly, which factor will encourage a lasting attitude change? In reviewing the literature, I noticed that many studies use clips from a show or film (e.g. Kearns, et al. 2019), though few include full-episode treatments (e.g. Slater, et al.

2006). One episode of a show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers very little, which is evidenced by the mixed results of survey data collected in these experiments (e.g. Holbert 2003; Holbert, et al. 2005; Slater, et al. 2006). Continued messaging in one show or across multiple shows increases the likelihood that narrative persuasion will occur, as evidenced by education-entertainment research and studies of accumulative effects, or cultivation theory (e.g. Hether, et al. 2008; Quick 2009). In each of these instances, however, results are drawn from quantitative, not qualitative data. Few studies even discuss lasting change (see Hether et al 2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Quick, et al. 2013). Moreover, we tend to examine specific, explicit attitudes rather than implicit perceptions of social norms, one exception being Paluck and Green's (2009) study of a dramatic radio program's effects on acceptance of dissident behaviors in post-genocide Rwanda.

To better understand the components of narrative persuasion qualitatively, I conducted two focus groups. In these focus groups, I exposed 24 total participants to several forms of popular media as part of my senior seminar class on "Pop Culture and American Politics," essentially assigning absorption. I then required participants to respond to a discussion prompt regarding the media, thereby assigning reflection. Because absorption and reflection were largely required of the participants, as part of their work as students for a class, this allowed me to hold these essential components of narrative persuasion constant. Holding these conditions constant further permitted me to better understand the remaining variables of the narrative persuasion formula: Identification and the explicit or implicit nature of the message. Because these participants were also my students in a course to examine media effects in popular culture, they understood the basic components of narrative persuasion. This understanding bestowed participants with the means to discuss the nuances of narrative impact in great detail using

precise language. The discussion prompts provided to participants asked them not only about their views on the related sociopolitical issue prior to and after the experience, but also about three main components[6] of narrative persuasion: Absorption, identification, and how the message was presented (explicitly or implicitly).

4.1.1 Absorption

Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) describe the process of narrative persuasion first through the lens of deictic shift theory: "the reader creates a mental model of the story world first by shifting her deictic center into that model, and then continuing to relate the information given in each successive sentence in the narrative to an understanding of the narrative as a whole" (115). The deictic center can be described as one's personal vantage point or point of perception (Hamby, et al. 2018). When a deictic shift occurs, the individual will shift this vantage point from perceiving the world from their own life to perceiving the world from inside the narrative. This may also be described as the experience of *absorption* or transportation into a story. This transportation allows individuals engaging with narrative media to experience "intense emotions similar to the emotions we have in response to equivalent situations in our daily life" (Hamby, et al. 2018, 115). For example, we may feel frustrated when a character refuses to cooperate, or our heartrate may increase during a particularly harrowing scene.

The second piece of the deictic shift, returning to one's original vantage point in the self, cannot by itself induce persuasion. Retrospective reflection, during which the individual considers their experience of the narrative within the context of their own life, is necessary (Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018). Therefore, the two together—absorption and

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[6] I asked participants about absorption to best gauge their level of interest and absorption in the material. I do not ask about reflection because they are clearly engaging in reflection to respond to the prompt.

reflection—are required for narrative persuasion. However, they are not always sufficient to induce lasting attitude change. Individual and contextual factors like cognitive load, which affects attention and absorption, environment, and especially resistance to embedded messaging can limit a narrative's effectiveness (Hamby, et al. 2018). Absorption, as well as identification with one or more characters and the way in which a message is delivered—implicitly or explicitly—discussed below, can affect the level of resistance in audience members (Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010).

4.1.2 Identification

In the context of social cognitive theory, Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) assert that viewer identification with a character increases that character's influence on the viewer. However, multiple forms of character identification and association exist. Some characters may serve as evaluative standards, not unlike priming effects (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005). Others may push a viewer to feel that a character is like a close friend or relative, whose actions can deeply affect the emotional state of the viewer (DeGroot and Leith 2018; Lather and Moyer-Guse 2011; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012). Still others may simulate indirect intergroup contact, in which a viewer observes intergroup contact but does not participate, thereby lessening prejudice by providing examples of cross-group friendship and nonstereotypical behavior (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019). Identification also plays a key role in facilitating *mediated intergroup contact*, in which members of a majority group identify with characters in a narrative that includes positive depictions of outgroup or minority group members—meaning the media serves as the form of contact. Viewers who experiences this identification through mediated intergroup contact are more likely to view outgroup members positively in the real world (Ortiz and Harwood 2007, Park 2012, Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020).

Moyer-Gusé (2008a) identifies five forms of involvement with a character: Identification, perceived similarity, wishful identification, liking, and parasocial interaction (PSI). She establishes *identification* with a character as "an emotional and cognitive process whereby a viewer takes on the role of a character in a narrative." In this case, absorption occurs as a shift into the deictic center of a specific character as opposed to the narrative as a whole (Moyer-Gusé 2008a, 410). This form of identification is also referred to as *cognitive-emotional identification*, when viewers choose to interpret the media through the lens of a specific character (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005). I will use the term cognitive-emotional identification for the remainder of the chapter to better differentiate the specific concept from its umbrella term. *Perceived similarity* occurs when the viewer perceives that a character is similar in some way to themselves, such as demographic similarities, physical attributes, personality, or values and is often considered a precursor to cognitive-emotional identification (Moyer-Gusé 2008). *Wishful identification* entails the viewer wanting to be like a character or wanting to emulate the character in their own life. Moyer-Gusé (2008a) considers *liking* as simply holding positive evaluations of a character, similar to *parasocial interaction* (PSI). She describes PSI as the viewer feeling as though they have a "face-to-face relationship" with a specific character.

Other forms of identification include group identification, empathy, and affective orientation. Similar to PSI and perceived similarity, *group identification* involves the viewer seeing similarities between their friends and family and the onscreen characters, and then the viewer identifying with those characters based on those similarities (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005). Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) consider empathy toward an onscreen character as another prerequisite for cognitive-emotional identification, stating that viewers must first be able to understand the perspective of a character before taking on their viewpoint. The authors

describe *empathy*, or perspective-taking, as both an appreciation for a character's well-being (empathic concern) and as experiencing emotions that correspond with the character's emotions (emotional contagion). *Affective orientation*, though not necessarily a form of identification, gauges an individual's sensitivity toward experiencing emotional contagion. Individuals with high levels of affective orientation toward a character are more likely to experience cognitive-emotional identification (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005).

4.1.3   Implicit vs. Explicit Messaging

Another purpose of this study is to examine whether implicit or explicit messages are more effective for narrative persuasion. Individuals come to their screens with specific motivations, typically to escape or feel a thrill, or to feel or think deeply (Bartsch, et al. 2014; Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Oliver and Bartsch 2010). This motivation is bi-directional, meaning the artists and producers of entertainment media create with specific motivations in the same way consumers select that media based on their own motivations, often corresponding with one another (Oliver and Bartsch 2010). When Quentin Tarantino writes and directs a thrilling screenplay, for example, he knows that people will watch his film with the motivation to feel thrilled.

In addition to the primary themes of a film or show—like the genre and plot—dramatic narratives impart nuanced messages to their audiences through story details and character relationships. Explicit messages are often aimed at addressing specific issues, but implicit messages address core beliefs about how the world works. Explicit messages may be expressed through dialogue or even an epilogue at the end of an episode or film for specificity (Lane, et al. 2013; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012). Mulligan and Habel (2011), for example, provide evidence that explicit, central frames in fictional media shape how we think about politics by influencing

politically-relevant opinions such as whether abortion should be a legal procedure in the case of incest. Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung (2012) note that individuals exposed to an explicit persuasive appeal in addition to a dramatic narrative on driving under the influence of alcohol led to the desired effect of negative attitudes toward drinking and driving. However, individuals who did not receive the explicit persuasive appeal showed an increase in favorable attitudes toward drinking and driving, which the authors believed was evidence of a boomerang effect in which a dramatic narrative normalizes behaviors it intends to scorn (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010).

Implicit messages, often imparted through characters' actions and relationships, influence viewers' perceptions of social norms, potentially updating their socially constructed reality (see Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018). Slater, Rouner, and Long (2006), for example, find that implicit messaging decreases counterarguing in viewers, meaning viewers are less resistant to messages counter to their prior beliefs when the message is implicit rather than explicit (see also Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). However, the authors note that suppression of counterarguing is not sufficient to induce attitude change, especially in deeply controversial, politicized issues like marriage equality. While exposure to one implicit theme in a fictional drama (support for the death penalty) shows evidence of persuasion in its audience, another implicit theme in a second fictional drama (support for rights of gay partners) does not (Slater, et al. 2006). Mulligan and Habel (2011) also note mixed effects on their implicit frame in the fictional film *The Cider House Rules* about whether it is more important to follow one's conscience even when something is illegal or to remain morally absolute.

The literature shows mixed results as to whether an implicit or explicit message in entertainment media is most effective. Lane et al (2013) find evidence that using an implicit

message in a show episode followed by a public service announcement made by one of the main characters shows the most promise for inducing the intended narrative persuasion. Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung (2012), on the other hand, show that similar results may have additional gendered effects (see also Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011). The final purpose of this study is to examine the responses of participants who have been educated on implicit and explicit appeals when asked to describe the effects of those messages.

4.2   Mediated Intergroup Contact

In addition to reducing reactance, identification can facilitate mediated intergroup contact. *Mediated intergroup contact*, as explained by Ortiz and Harwood (2007), argues that when individuals are "exposed to TV images of positive intergroup contact, for example, viewers may extract a rule that such interaction is open and friendly. They may then extrapolate this rule and use it to guide their behaviors and judgments in future situations where this rule might be applicable (i.e., other intergroup interactions)" (617). Similar to reducing reactance in viewers, mediated intergroup contact may reduce anxiety in viewers toward intergroup interaction in the real world and diminish prejudice toward the outgroup as a whole (Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020; Ortiz and Harwood 2007; Park 2012). Mediated intergroup contact is a theory typically used in studies regarding race, gender, sexual orientation, religion and other categories often associated with social intergroup conflict or prejudice. While the primary focus of this study was originally to examine the impact of narrative persuasion on attitudes toward the explicit debate of gun control and gun rights, a secondary focus was to understand the impact of narrative persuasion regarding the implicit message of healthy, nontraditional relationships. Because the depicted nontraditional relationship occurs between two women of color, mediated intergroup contact could also play a role in the narrative's impact.

4.3 Methods

During the 2018 to 2019 academic year, I conducted two focus groups within my senior seminar classes on "Pop Culture and American Politics" to more deeply understand the components of narrative persuasion and their importance to the attitude change process prior to running a survey or experiment. Participants were exposed to the concepts of narrative persuasion and its components in a classroom setting. They watched or listened to several programs together and separately over the span of an academic semester, and they came together each week in class to discuss concepts in the media effects and political science literatures pertinent to the media with which they had recently engaged. In addition to discussions, participants responded, in writing, to prompts provided after each program. Providing participants with a deeper understanding of the concepts of narrative persuasion allowed them to more effectively explain their experiences using precise, relevant language. Their discussions and written responses offer qualitative insight into narrative persuasion and the role its components play in media-influenced attitude change.

I find evidence of the important roles that identification and implicit messaging play in narrative persuasion. While the literature explores various types of identification and their ability to reduce counterarguing (see Moyer-Gusé 2015) the focus group participants' responses indicate that empathic identification with any character in a narrative may be sufficient to encourage absorption and reflection—the key components of deictic shift theory. However, the prompted reflection did not deliver the expected form of persuasion by altering opinions on an explicit or implicit message. Instead, Paluck and Green's (2009) assertion appears more likely: People will accept and begin to mimic the relationships they are exposed to in a dramatic narrative.

4.3.1 Participants and Recruitment

In total, 24 students agreed to participate in the focus groups. The group of 24 participants, as well as the classes themselves, were predominately female (18 participants, the other six identifying as male) and mostly minorities (22 participants). Of the 24 students who agreed to participate, 16 were from one class and eight from the other. Because the focus groups were exploratory and took place within real-world classes, the two groups were not set up identically. One class (with 16 participants) was more structured and rooted in class discussions, while the other (eight participants) relied more heavily on individual effort and written work. The classrooms themselves were different, as well: The first being larger, more conducive to moving the desks into a circle for discussions, and brighter with windows; and the second being darker and without windows, smaller in size, and located in a building with frequent technical difficulties. Regardless of these differences, however, participants' responses and discussions in each class often mirrored one another.

Table 1 Focus Group Race/Ethnicity Demographics

Participants	Female	Male	Total
White, non-Hispanic	2	0	2
White, Hispanic	2	0	2
African American or Black	10	4	14
Hispanic	3	2	5
Asian	1	0	1
Total	18	6	24

Responses to the writing prompt of a particular show episode screened in both classes displayed sentiments strikingly similar to on another. The episode, "Betsy" from Freeform's *The*

Bold Type, portrays two friends arguing about gun ownership, giving equal time to each woman's perspective. Simultaneously, their other best friend contends with her feelings about her new girlfriend's request to try nonmonogamy. What struck me most about the responses was that the individual explanations provided in these essay responses bucked against a key point in the literature regarding attitude change and the role of identification while bolstering the assertion that implicit messaging is often more effective than explicit messaging. Upon further analysis, I also found it intriguing that the implicit message affected was not the one I had originally intended to study, but instead involved the gun rights/gun control debate and how it was carried out by the characters.

4.3.2   Writing Prompt

In the middle of each semester, students were asked to watch an episode from the second season of the television show *The Bold Type* while in class. They knew they would be asked to complete a related writing assignment after watching the episode, but were not informed about what the writing prompt would specifically entail. In both classes, the students had previously completed a similar assignment in response to either a collection of music or a film. I posted the writing prompt for "Betsy" online immediately after class, providing students at least five days to complete the assignment.

After the episode, I provided my students with the following writing prompt:

How did watching the episode "Betsy" from season two of The Bold Type affect your views on either (pick ONE) a) gun rights/gun control or b) nontraditional romantic relationships?

In your response, be sure to include the following:

- *your views prior to watching the episode*
- *how the show did or did not affect your views based on:*
  - *various forms of identification*
  - *level of absorption*

        ○   *level of implicitness or explicitness of the message(s)*
        ○   *reflection*
- *at least two different citations from the articles we've read for class*
- *any other views you feel may have been affected by this episode*

Both classes had previously been assigned to read journal articles about identification, absorption, and reflection; however, one class was significantly more likely to have read the material, while the other often had trouble during discussions with several students openly admitting they had not read the material before class. Regardless, most students in both classes clearly articulated their identification with a specific character (or none), their level of absorption and interest in the show, and their views toward their chosen topic and the potential impact the show had on these views.

The writing prompt responses were written by students prior to their knowledge of the opportunity to participate in the focus group. Throughout each class, students were encouraged to speak and write freely. Written assignments were graded on word count, answering all aspects of a prompt, and providing citations to support their perspective. After students agreed to participate in the focus group, their survey and written responses were downloaded, their names were replaced with a study number, and all materials were set aside for at least one semester to diminish researcher ability to link a specific student to a particular response.

4.3.3   *Show Analysis*

"Betsy" is the name of episode seven of season two of Freeform's hit show *The Bold Type*, which stars three young women who are best friends and work at the same women's magazine in New York City. "Betsy" is also the name of a shotgun owned by one of these fictional characters, Sutton Brady. During this episode, Sutton and her best friend and roommate Jane Sloan argue over Sutton's right to keep her beloved shotgun in their apartment. Both

women are Caucasian and in their early twenties, but with somewhat different backgrounds that

provide fodder for the frames they give this issue. Sutton grew up in rural Pennsylvania, where

she joined the high school shooting team to avoid her alcoholic mother's benders. Jane grew up

in Colorado not far from where the Columbine High School shooting occurred when Jane was in

elementary school, which proved a traumatic event for her character.

In addition to the main plot of this episode, a secondary storyline involves a

nontraditional relationship between the third protagonist, Kat Edison, and her girlfriend, Adena

El-Amin. Kat is a biracial woman also in her early twenties who works with Sutton and Jane, and

the three are clearly very close friends. Adena is a Muslim lesbian woman and is Kat's first

lesbian relationship. During this episode, Adena addresses an incident from a previous episode in

which Kat has kissed another woman. Adena explains that she is upset, but that she also

understands Kat's need to explore her sexuality. The two decide to try an "open relationship"

where they are allowed to date other women on certain days of the week, allowing Kat to explore

this new same-sex aspect of her sexuality without putting her relationship with Adena in

jeopardy. While the writers dedicate some dialogue to Kat and Adena's decision to try

nonmonogamy, [7] most of the frames surrounding the normalization of homosexual relationships

are implied, rather than stated explicitly. Kat speaks openly with Jane and Sutton about the

positive and negative aspects she perceives of nonmonogamy, and the three women frame their

opinions on open relationships regardless of sexuality. The frame surrounding the lesbian

relationship itself is one of complete acceptance and normalcy. When Kat flirts with their

rideshare driver in one scene, for example, they joke that the "lesbian version" of flirtatious

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[7] I use the term "nonmonogamy" rather than "polyamory" because the two women discuss an open relationship that will be short-term and only physical outside their couple. Kat is allowed to explore her physical sexuality, but not to become emotionally attached to another woman.

physical contact equates to the same flirtatious physical contact in a heteronormative situation. This explicit normalization of homosexuality represents an ongoing implicit normalization throughout the episode. Kat may bring up her sexuality on occasion, but Jane and Sutton have clearly fully accepted Kat as homosexual and do not mention it.

4.3.3.1 *Framing "Betsy"*

Frames are the context given to an issue either within our own thoughts or by someone communicating information about an issue, like a journalist. Although framing effects are primarily discussed in the political science literature in relation to news media (see Scheufele 2000), framing and other media effects are also present and effective in dramatic media (e.g. Holbert, et al. 2005; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Mulligan and Habel 2011). In the first scene of "Betsy," we discover that Sutton keeps her shotgun in a locked case that Jane believes holds a clarinet. Sutton goes along with this assumption at first, but then reveals the truth, and two frames are immediately introduced surrounding how each woman views the issue of Sutton's shotgun. Jane first introduces a *trust frame*, expressing anger toward Sutton for lying to her about keeping a firearm in their apartment. Later in the episode, this frame is flipped when Sutton accuses Jane of not trusting Sutton to be safe with the weapon. Jane also introduces the *safety frame*, stating that all guns are dangerous and that she does not feel safe with the gun in her home. Again, Sutton provides the opposite aspect of this frame when she explains and then displays her expertise with using and storing the firearm safely.

As there are no existing, publicly-available copies of the show's scripts, content analysis was completed by the researcher watching the episode on three separate occasions. The first viewing allowed me to prepare the writing prompt for my classes and establish clear frames: Trust versus safety. The second viewing allowed me to evaluate the distinctions of these frames:

Mistrust due to omission, mistrust due to lack of faith, personal safety, and general safety. In the third viewing, I assigned these frames to each mention by one of the characters (leads Jane, Sutton, or Kat or recurring character Ryan). I additionally noted whether the frame was explicit or implied. For example, Sutton assuring Jane that "we are very safe right now" is an explicit safety frame, whereas Jane asking Sutton why she would hide the shotgun from Jane implies a trust frame. In total, a trust frame was referred to explicitly and implicitly three times for each type, while a safety frame was invoked 13 times total, only three of which were implicit.

Establishing frames for the nontraditional relationship between Kat and Adena is a similar process. In the first viewing, I established two overall frames of nonmonogamy: Acceptance and efficacy. The efficacy frame can be further broken down into a morality frame and a trust frame.

4.3.3.2   Explicit Message

The main plot of the episode "Betsy" involves two white women in their early twenties who are friends, coworkers, and roommates. The first scene of the episode reveals that one of these women, Sutton, owns a shotgun and has kept it in a locked case in their apartment without notifying her roommate, Jane. Because Jane is vehemently opposed to all guns, she immediately demands that Sutton get rid of the shotgun. The shotgun, which Sutton named Betsy, holds deep significance and sentimental value for Sutton in addition to playing a key role in her once-favorite hobby of skeet shooting. Sutton refuses to get rid of the shotgun Betsy, and the two women spend the rest of the episode at odds. Their discussions about the gun become even more heightened when Jane decides to write an article for the magazine they work for entitled, "I Love Everything About My Best Friend, But Not Her Gun."

Throughout the episode, we watch these women take firm stances on gun rights as well as open up about the reasons behind their stances. Through discussions with each other and with their fellow coworker and friend Kat, a biracial and newly lesbian woman in her early twenties, the two women are finally able to see each other's point of view by the end of the episode and find a resolution.

4.3.3.3   Implicit Message

The third leading character, Kat, spends most of the episode exploring her sexuality through meeting a new female partner with the permission of her girlfriend, Adena. Adena expresses that she wants Kat to explore her new identity as a lesbian while maintaining an open relationship together. While Sutton and Jane battle out the explicit messages of the right to gun ownership and the need for gun control through pointed dialogue, Kat works through her feelings about her own sexuality and her open relationship with Adena through some dialogue but mostly actions. Kat is initially unsure about looking for physical intimacy outside her relationship with Adena, but eventually tries online dating. She flirts with the rideshare driver taking Kat, Sutton, and Jane to the skeet shooting range as part of Sutton's entreaty to Jane, and Kat and the driver do go out together. Kat shows her discomfort turn to excitement about learning more about herself.

4.3.4   Results

The literature is clear that absorption, reflection, and identification are the key factors encouraging narrative persuasion. The literature also debates whether an implicit or explicit message is more persuasive. The responses I gathered from focus group participants offer qualitative insight into the roles of these factors not present in previous quantitative and experimental studies. The preliminary analyses provide evidence that absorption was present for

most participants and reflection was present for all included participants. However, absorption

and reflection were also essentially assigned conditions, as the participants needed to pay close

attention to the material to write a reflection response for a grade. Because of this, I am most

interested in participants' discussions of identification and whether they were persuaded by the

implicit or explicit messages in the episode.

4.3.4.1   Analysis Protocol and Measures

I analyzed the student responses similarly to the way I approached the show analysis. The

first readthrough of all essays was done for the sake of grading, but it is also when I recognized

the similarity in responses to this particular prompt. Once informed consent was provided

following student grade submissions, participant essays were downloaded, student names were

removed, and responses were set aside for one semester. The first focus group was completed in

fall 2018, and so I knew already during the spring 2019 semester that I may obtain more of the

same responses. Although essays responses to other writing prompts differed from those of the

2018 class, the responses to "Betsy" in my 2019 class were very similar to those from students in

my 2018 class. Informed consent was collected again, and the second focus group essays were

set aside. In summer 2019, I began to analyze the first focus group's responses. By spring 2020, I

had read all responses a second and third time, noting participants' viewpoints, their use of

frames, their explanations of identification, and their acknowledgment of absorption and

reflection.

Of the 24 students who opted to participate in the focus groups, only 21 participants

responded to this writing prompt. Two additional participants did not follow instructions, nor did

their essays provide any information about the narrative persuasion factors, leaving 19 essays for

analysis. Two of the remaining participants chose to write about the show's implicit message on

nontraditional relationships, and the other 17 participants wrote about the show's explicit message on gun rights. Therefore, I will focus almost entirely on the analysis of responses related the explicit message regarding gun rights. However, I believe the responses provided by the two participants who wrote about nontraditional relationshilps are still worth noting with regard to message implicitness. I include a brief analysis of these responses in the section on explicit vs. implicit messaging.

Because the participants were senior undergraduates taking a course on the impact of popular culture and media on political attitudes, they were familiar with narrative persuasion and its components by name. I measure their absorption and identification first by explicitly asking them in the prompt to discuss these factors in their essay responses. However, very few essays expressed high levels of absorption or strong identification, two key conditions the literature lists for narrative persuasion. One likely reason for this is the lack of perceived similarity between the primarily non-white participants and the two white female characters at the center of the gun rights debate that most participants chose to discuss. Another is that they may have chosen to use other terminology to express this experience. After initial notation of participants' explicit statements of absorption and identification, I looked for language that expressed similar experiences and concepts. Some participants did not mention the words "absorption" or "identification" at all in their essays, for example, yet they did discuss feeling a connection in some way to the material (absorption) or a character (identification).

4.3.4.2 Absorption

Of the 17 participants who wrote about the gun rights messages, only 11 expressed clear absorption into the episode. One of the participants who wrote about nontraditional relationship expressed high absorption, while the other expressed none. Levels ranged from two participants

who explicitly said they experienced high absorption to those who did not mention absorption explicitly but explained some level of investment in the outcomes of the show. One participant wrote, "I was invested in the topic and the conflict," while two others explained they only felt absorbed after the gun rights topic was introduced. Five of the 18 participants did not mention absorption, reflection, or a similar experience at all, and two expressed "no interest" and "no deictic shift" while watching the episode.

Table 2 Participant Absorption

Experienced Absorption	Participants
High	4
Moderate	9
Low	3
None/No Mention	3

Of participants who did not explicitly express high absorption, a few expressed little interest in the topic at all, but most described the process of transportation using other terms and phrases. "I was invested in the topic and conflict," wrote one student. Another explained that they only felt absorbed after one character shared a story from her childhood about living close to Columbine High School when the school shooting happened there. A third student simply admitted they "wanted to know more about the relationship each of the three leading characters had with one another." These essays do not use the words "absorbed" or "transported," but they express thoughts that indicate the participants felt some deictic shift into the narrative.

4.3.4.3 Identification

The three participants who opted out of this assignment reported their demographics as a white female and two Black males, leaving only one remaining white female in the focus group

and three males, two Hispanic and one Black. These demographics decreased the likelihood of participants identifying with the show's characters based on perceived similarity, as the primary characters are two young white women and one young biracial woman, and the secondary characters are a white middle-aged woman, a young white man, and a young Black man.

In my initial analysis of participants' identification, I looked for and tallied the keywords for identification type. Eleven participants wrote that they felt some form of identification with Jane, the "anti-gun" character, while seven identified in some way with Sutton and only two participants identified in some way with Kat. Unsurprisingly, only one participant indicated a feeling of perceived similarity to one of the white female characters. This participant was also one of the only four participants to identify as white and female. More surprisingly, only one participant expressed perceived similarity with Kat, who is biracial with a Black father and white mother. This participant identifies as an African American or Black female and stated she "felt a sense of similarity to [Kat] due to the fact that her beliefs felt similar to mine and some of her physical attributes reminded me of myself as well."

In my second analysis of identification in these essay responses, I noticed more participants expressing a similar sense that their beliefs were similar to one character or another—perceived similarity based on shared values. After compiling the responses who wrote about shared beliefs or values with a character, I updated my count for perceived similarity from only two participants explicitly stating they felt this type of identification to nine. Noticing this sharp difference—even though the participants had some understanding of the terms and their meanings—caused me to shift my analysis from a keyword search to a more detailed substantive analysis. Between these analyses, I noticed a similar sharp difference between the many who expressly wrote they experienced empathy and those whose language reflected the term's

technical definition. The participants who wrote about feeling empathy toward Sutton and Jane, most described this as a connection with the characters' arguments and emotional states rather than with the characters themselves.

Table 3 Participant Identification with Characters

Identification Type	Experienced	Sutton	Jane	Kat
Cognitive-Emotional ID	4	2	2	0
Perceived Similarity	9	2	5	2
Wishful Identification	0	0	0	0
Parasocial ID	2	0	0	2
Empathy*	9	3	5	1
Group identification	5	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Low	**High w/ Sutton**	**High w/ Jane**	**High w/Kat**
Affective Orientation**	7	6	4	2

This table reflects the 19 participants' responses that were analyzed.
*One participant expressed empathy for both Sutton and Jane, while another expressed empathy for individuals whose lives have been affected by gun violence.
**One participant expressed high affective orientation for both Sutton and Jane, while another expressed none at all.

Similarly, while several participants explicitly wrote that they experienced cognitive-emotional identification, only four participants' use of the term matched its technical definition. Other participants instead described their identification in a manner more reminiscent of perspective-taking, the cognitive dimension of empathy, rather than the emotionally-involved experience of cognitive-emotional identification. Still other participants' explanations of their identification pointed to an agreement with a character's stance on gun rights, which may be better categorized as perceived similarity based on shared values, though some also express empathy for the character in opposition to the character with which they most identified. In

particular, two participants state they only feel empathy for Jane after she explains the trauma she experienced as a child living down the street from Columbine High School when the school shooting occurred there. This could explain why six of the 19 participants felt empathy for this character, though one participant notes that while she agrees with Jane's point of view on gun control, "I would disagree with the way she handled the situation… thus negating the potential for me to experience true empathic identification with her."

My final understanding of the substantive analysis of these essay responses is presented in Table 3. Five participants expressed perceived similarity—either through shared demographics or shared values—with Jane. Two participants expressed similarity with Jane, and two participants expressed similarity with Kat. Nine participants also expressed feeling empathy: Five toward Jane, three toward Sutton, and one toward Kat. Two participants noted that they felt as though they could be friends with Kat, voicing their parasocial identification (PSI). Five noted feeling as though the main characters reminded them of their friends, family, or other social group—group identification—with one participant admitting he identified with the "age group of these characters" and the way they talked about gun rights. No participants reported they felt wishful identification with one of the characters—either explicitly or implicitly. Four participants articulated their cognitive-emotional identification with one of the characters, two identifying with Sutton and two with Jane. Finally, 12 participants' descriptions of their identification pointed to high affective orientation with Sutton (6 participants), Jane (7), or Kat (2).

4.3.4.4   Explicit Messaging

Admittedly, most of the students who spoke up during the impromptu discussion of Georgia's campus carry law seemed to agree that while they approve of the constitutional right to own firearms, the government also has a duty to its citizens to enact some measures of gun

control. In particular, students were keen on banning assault rifles and other weapons that may be used to inflict a great deal of damage in a short amount of time. This trend did not shift in their responses to the writing prompt on gun rights. One student even noted his views were strengthened saying, "the media viewed in class has even further advanced my stance for more legislation to be passed on gun control." Only two participants who responded to the gun rights topic firmly stated they felt a shift in opinion regarding gun rights or gun control.

Instead, nine participants expressed what one participant termed a "softening" of opinion. For several participants, this meant adopting a better understanding of why an individual may own a gun and accepting new perspectives they had not previously considered. One participant's opinion shifted from "I held the view that those who were adamant on possessing a gun did so with every intention of using it" to "This episode changed my stereotypical opinion on gun owners." Others recognized the need for better communication on divisive topics. One participant wrote that her "views on communication for political topics such as gun control opened a little in watching this episode," and another stated the episode "affected how I view others [sic] reasoning and opinions on situations that might differ from my own opinions." This participant went on to say she "also realized that you never really know why someone may feel as strongly as they do about something, mainly when they're in opposition with you. You want them to see your point of view so bad that you reject their feelings and ideas prematurely."

These and other responses do not report a shift in policy views, but rather a shift in views of the "other" side of the argument—the other side typically being Sutton's viewpoint that guns are not always violent and can be used safely. One explanation may be that while more participants identified with Jane in some way—11 participants, as opposed to Sutton's seven—several expressed a preference for Sutton's behavior during the friends' argument and a dislike

of Jane's behavior. For much of the episode, Jane is dismissive of Sutton's feelings and somewhat rude to her friend, while Sutton appears more cool-headed and open to listening and helping Jane. Several participants expressed dislike for Jane, with one explaining that Jane reacted to Sutton's beliefs in a "childish close-minded way." Another noted that Sutton is framed to make "her argument more acceptable and relatable," and that this framing "made it harder for me to completely dismiss or ignore [Sutton's] opinion and reasoning." This same participant rightly acknowledges how this likability could lessen counterarguing in viewers.

4.3.4.5 Implicit Messaging

Conversely, the responses regarding the implicit message supporting nontraditional relationships offered two very different experiences. One participant, who identifies as a Hispanic woman and a Christian, admitted that her strong religious identity kept her from either feeling absorbed in the story or identifying with one of the characters involved in the nonmonogamous lesbian relationship between Kat and Adena. She explained that because she believes "relationships and marriage should be between one man and one woman… this episode did not affect my views on nontraditional relationships." She also rightly points out that because she does "not watch shows with same sex relationships… the chances of my views being changed are minimal according to [the] chronic accessibility hypothesis." This hypothesis states that repeated exposure to the same themes in entertainment programs alters the information that is chronically accessible to an individual (Holbrook and Hill 2005). According to the literature, this participant's failure to feel moved in any way toward this implicit message results from her lack of absorption, identification, or exposure to similar themes.

The second participant who responded to the implicit message prompt, who identifies as a white female, expressed quite the opposite experience as the first. This participant stated that

she felt a high level of absorption and experienced some perceived similarity with Kat because she "found myself to have a similar personality, as well as a[n] experience with needing to branch out and explore my own sexuality." However, she noted primary identification through parasocial interaction with and empathy for Kat, explaining that "although I saw similarities, I cannot fully relate to the pursuance of an open relationship." The participant expressed that while she began with more of a neutral stance on nonmonogamy, "this episode has shone a light on why one might choose to pursue [an open relationship] and that the reasoning may not be as selfish or sexually driven as I may have previously thought." She goes on to acknowledge that the implicit message of the episode exposed "a healthy aspect of open relationships," noting that by the end of the episode, "Kat and her partner were not only able to come to an agreement, but they were able to grow closer which helped me to see how an open relationship can be healthy."

These two anecdotes do not provide new insight on the impact of implicit messages in dramatic narratives. They do bolster previous studies regarding selection bias and mediated intergroup contact. Given a wide array of media choice, individuals regularly select media and information that aligns with their prior beliefs (Stroud 2007). The first participant I discussed regarding implicit messaging clearly stated she avoids exposure to homosexual relationships in entertainment media. However, the endogeneity presented in this choice does not altogether remove persuasion effects in the media itself. Instead, Stroud (2007) suggests that individuals choosing such media may strengthen their prior beliefs, leading to an overall attitudinal polarization (426). The second participant indicates increased understanding of homosexual and nonmonogamous relationships, in line with findings from studies on mediated intergroup contact. Viewing a healthy relationship between two outgroup characters (homosexual women), in addition to vicarious contact through ingroup characters (heterosexual women), can lead to

increased empathy toward the outgroup in real life (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005; Kim and Harwood 2019; Li 5019).

4.4 Discussion

When I first read the responses, I keyed in on several statements in which students admitted they did not believe their overall opinion on gun laws had changed but that they understood better the complexity of the issue. As one participant explained, "I've attempted to view both sides of the story by watching various media outlets such as Fox News and CNN, but [found] more and more issues with the comments and remarks," noting that his frustration with how news media covers this issue diminishes his willingness to hear out those with viewpoints different from his own. However, entertainment media does not influence its audience members in exactly the same way as news media, and narratives can decrease this kind of reactance. Another participant shared that "after watching the show it gave me greater insight into the different perspectives and more of an understanding of individual views." The change is not occurring after one episode, but the seeds are planted for further discussion.

4.4.1 Implicit Behavior Cues

Neither the intended explicit message nor the intended implicit message seemed to have much effect in influencing participants' policy attitudes. However, one unintended implicit message did have an effect: Behaviors during an argument within friendly relationships. The most interesting finding from the responses was not found in the students' indications of attitude change, but in their willingness to hear and consider both sides of the issue. One participant recognized that "after watching the show it gave me greater insight into the different perspectives and more of an understanding of individual views." Another noted that they "feel more sympathetic as to why people with the opposite view have those views," reflecting a newfound

respect for individuals whose views stand in opposition to their own. Only two participants stated they felt a potential shift in their views. One participant wrote that the episode "definitely affected my view on gun-rights," and another said "I experienced a shift in opinion when I saw guns used in a different manner than violence." The attitude that the episode "softened my overall opinion and perspective on ownership" was much more frequent. The same participant explained this softening as "[changing] my stereotypical opinion on gun owners," though the participant's "attitude towards gun rights and gun control is very much the same."

Across the essays, this sentiment rang out: "my view on gun rights was not changed; however, I feel more sympathetic as to why people with the opposite view have those views." This same participant went on to write that "rather than the issue itself, the show showed me the importance of understanding why one has a particular view on an issue." Eight participants expressed very similar sentiments that while their views of gun rights and laws had not changed, their understanding of the other side had deepened. This sentiment supports the findings of Paluck and Green (2009) that repeated exposure to new social norms will shift behaviors toward those norms. While these participants did not experience attitude change, they did experience a shift in how they perceive the situation.

4.4.2   Combined Factors

In addition to examining the factors of narrative persuasion by themselves, I also looked for patterns in the responses. Which type of identification is most closely associated with high absorption? Or, with increased empathy, considering more than half of participants expressed this shift? Do identification and absorption combined have stronger effects? How about identification combined with affective orientation, as suggested by the literature? Table 4 displays how each type of identification correlates with absorption and expression of increased

empathy or understanding of the opposing viewpoint. For each participant who expressed one type of empathy, I took note of whether they also expressed these conditions and found that empathy or affective orientation, when combined with high absorption, showed the greatest potential to increase real-world empathy for members of the opposition.

Table 4 Impact of Identification on Absorption and Empathy

Identification Type	Participants	Absorption	Increased Empathy
Cognitive-Emotional ID	4	4	2
Perceived Similarity	9	7	5
Parasocial ID	2	2	1
Group Identification	5	6	3
Empathy	9	7	7
Affective Orientation	11	10	7

Of the ten participants who expressed increased empathy toward the opposing viewpoint or increased understanding of both sides, 9 expressed moderate to high levels of absorption. The one participant who expressed low absorption also had little to say in their essay overall. Three of these participants expressed pro-gun rights views, four expressed strong pro-gun control views, and two expressed views somewhere in between. The remaining participant expressed ambivalent views toward nontraditional relationships. Eight of the ten participants also expressed some form of identification, though there seemed to be no defined pattern in type of identification, while the other two participants simply did not discuss identification in their essays. The most common form of identification, though, was empathy (seven participants), which seems also to be associated with higher levels of affective orientation and moderate to high levels of absorption.

Of the nine participants who expressed empathic identification with one of the main characters, seven indicated moderate to high levels of affective orientation; of these seven, six also expressed moderate to high absorption. All six of these participants also expressed increased empathy toward the opposing viewpoint or increased understanding of one or both sides. As previously mentioned, two of the essays that expressed increased empathy or understanding did not provide information on how they may have identified with the characters. One of the remaining two essays that expressed increased empathy or understanding and moderate to high absorption, but not empathy toward a specific character, indicated strong cognitive-emotional identification with Sutton. Empathy can be considered a precursor to this form of identification (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005). The final essay indicated both group identification with the three protagonist friends and perceived similarity to Jane based on similar viewpoints regarding gun control.

Most interesting of these patterns, however, is that five of the six respondents who fit this pattern of empathy, absorption, and increased understanding expressed empathy identification with the character who expressed the viewpoint they came to better understand. For example, the participant who professed ambivalent attitudes toward nontraditional relationships and empathized with Kat, the character entering her first lesbian and open relationship, expressed that she now feels more understanding about why individuals would choose a nontraditional relationship. The participant who expressed cognitive-emotional identification with Sutton was also originally very pro-gun control. Two other participants, who were initially strongly pro-gun control and then expressed deeper understanding of the pro-gun rights side of the debate, chose the pro-gun rights character, Sutton, as the character with which they most empathized. The two participants who expressed increased understanding and identified as pro-gun rights actually

empathized most strongly with Jane, the anti-gun character. Finally, the participant who expressed increased understanding and identified as moderate on gun rights expressed empathy with both Jane and Sutton.

This pattern does not strongly align with our current understanding of narrative persuasion. Neither the implicit nor explicit messages appear to affect policy attitudes. Instead, the combined factors of empathic identification, increased affective orientation, and moderate to high absorption increased empathy toward people holding opposing policy beliefs in the real world. This pattern seems to align more closely with mediated intergroup contact, traditionally observed as increased empathy toward a societal outgroup. However, the conflicting characters are both young, white, heterosexual American women—hardly the typical case study for intergroup bias. In this episode, these characters differ solely in this one belief about gun rights in America. The evidence provided by these focus groups suggests the impact of mediated intergroup contact may extend to interparty contact, as well. [8]

4.4.3   Limitations

In any political communication study where a treatment is provided, researchers must account for selection effects, causal direction, and decreased environmental realism (see Iyengar 2011; Pettigrew, et al. 2011). The primary limitations of this study are that participants self-reported their experiences and they were aware of the type of questions that may be asked of them following the treatment. One participant even noted they "knew immediately what kind of question we would be asked" when the treatment episode began. Such conditions decrease researcher ability to systematically measure attitudinal effects or accurately determine causality.

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[8] While both characters express liberal leanings in other episodes, neither character states affiliation with a political party or ideology in this episode beyond taking a stance on the issue of gun control and openly accepting Kat as a member of the LGBTQ+ community. Jane's argument for gun control aligns closely with Democratic beliefs, while Sutton's statements for gun rights align with Republican beliefs.

However, the open-ended prompt, paired with participants who were adequately able to discuss their experiences, allowed for deeper understanding at an individual level of the identification types present and their presentation in the participants.

The study also used too few subjects with too many ideal conditions, such as assigned absorption and using participants familiar with the persuasive effects at work. Many media effects studies with treatments often suffer from heightened absorption rates due to the nature of subjects knowing they will be asked about the material later (Iyengar 2011), and using student responses to a class assignment likely heightened this phenomenon. However, participants expressly indicated their level absorption and interest. Because this level was explained in more detail as part of a prompt, as opposed to a numerical measurement, I was better able to understand whether they were absorbed for the sake of the assignment or genuinely interested in the episode and its characters. This explanation also allowed me to compare absorption levels with affective orientation and the various types of identification to gain a clearer picture of how these conditions work together in narrative persuasion.

4.5   Implications for Future Research

This exploratory study into the components of narrative persuasion in fictional, entertainment shows highlights much of what the extant literature already recognizes. Absorption is imperative, and identification is key to reducing directional motivated reasoning (reactance). Explicit messaging is clearer to identify, but less likely than implicit messaging to affect viewers. Mediated intergroup contact can increase empathy in the real world. A single episode will not persuade someone in a major way, but it can open an individual to entertaining ideas that differ from their prior beliefs.

Although the study was not groundbreaking, it did reveal that political scientists still have much to uncover in how dramatic, fictional media can affect political attitudes. The explicit message of the episode regarded gun rights, but a key implicit behavior made a statement about how we discuss deeply divisive political issues with one another. The study suggests that interparty and interbelief prejudice could also be reduced through dramatic, fictional narrative exposure. Further research should dive deeper into this aspect of political attitudes and the ability of dramatic, fictional narratives to encourage depolarization in the electorate. Additional focus groups could be conducted to gain deeper qualitative insight on this. To better understand the impact of mediated interparty contact, empirical evidence must be gathered and analyzed further.

5   ASSESSING THE ACCUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF MEDIATED INTERGROUP CONTACT ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS

Since 2014, the number of terrorist attacks has been decreasing both globally and in the United States (Miller 2020). Yet, terrorism still accounts for a significant portion of news coverage. Of the attacks reported in the U.S., those with Muslim perpetrators make up a disproportionate amount of that coverage (Kearns, et al. 2019), although more recent years have shown increases in terrorist acts by individuals with far-right and white supremacist ideologies (Miller 2020). As mediators of information, the news media plays a significant role in helping shape social norms as perceived by its audience (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018; Igartua, et al. 2014; Bennett and Iyengar 2008). News media influences the public's opinion not only on crimes like terrorism, but also our perceptions of the marginalized peoples associated with these crimes (Khan and Bruschke 2016; Mastro, et al. 2014; Shaheen 2009; Zúñiga, et al. 2012). However, news media makes up a small portion of the television and internet-streamed content consumed in America (Nielsen 2019). Does this media influence extend to entertainment media like dramatic, fictional television shows?

Television viewing comprises the bulk (40 percent) of media consumption (Nielsen 2018). News audiences have long been declining (Djerf-Pierre and Shehata 2017), and evidence indicates that dramatic shows are particularly adept at persuasion (see Hamby, et al. 2018). Much like news media effects, entertainment media effects present in the dramatic narratives within films and shows impact viewers by exposing them to specific topics in a specific context, thereby making the information accessible and then providing a way to apply that information in a real-world context. Whereas the news media does this through compelling fact-based stories, dramatic films and shows provide fictional narratives that viewers may relate to situations in

their own lives. Over time, repeated themes and messages in entertainment media can shift

viewers' perceptions of the world (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2008), and stereotypes can become

perceived as the norm (Reep and Dambrot 1987).

I employ data from an original survey using a national sample of (how many) people[9] to

examine correlations between dramatic, fictional media exposure and perceptions of

marginalized peoples, in this instance, Muslims, Arabs, and Muslim Americans. In particular, I

explore individuals' viewing habits of popular fictional shows, their beliefs about

counterterrorism policies and beliefs about who is likely to commit a terrorist act. The results

indicate that even with a vast array of media options, there is still a connection between the

fiction shows we watch and our beliefs about the crimes they depict and the people portrayed as

their perpetrators.

5.1   Dramatic Media's Influence on the Social Construction of Reality

Although discussed using different terms by different fields, social scientists tend to

agree that individuals construct their reality through both personal experiences and what they

observe of the world around them. Political scientist John Zaller (1992) states that opinions are

"a marriage of information and predisposition" (6). Each attitude or opinion presented by an

individual is the result of combining the incoming information that the individual has been given

with their predisposition toward the topic at hand, often in favor of prior opinions (Krosnick

1988, McGuire 1966, Zaller 1992). Zaller's work maintains that opinions are given based on

information available at the "top of the head" at the time of producing the opinion. Attitudes,

then, are not stable tenets that individuals carry with them from conversation to conversation but

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[9] This survey was approved by Georgia State University's Institutional Review Board in 2019. The survey was conducted through Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform and is therefore a national sample, but is not nationally representative.

are instead nuances of stable values and are subject to change based on the current conversation. Zaller (1992) explains that when individuals receive new information through experience or observation they compare this information with their previously held beliefs before deciding whether to accept or reject the new information.

The social construction process identified in communication works similarly, but with the added understanding that during the competition between previous and new information about reality, the media acts as a filter to position one version as more likely than another (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2008). Individuals construct their reality, then, through personal experiences; through information relayed via significant others, social groups, and organizations; and through interaction with media (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2008). Alitavoli and Kaveh (2008) distinguish between experienced reality, which is gained through "everyday interaction with the world around us," and symbolic reality, "which is gained from three other sources namely peers, institutions and the media" (3). Media plays an especially large role in building symbolic reality today as people increasingly spend their time looking at a screen. In 2018, the average American adult spent more than eleven hours per day engaging with some form of media; nearly six of those hours are spent accessing video content through TV, computer videos, and video focused apps or web content on a smartphone or tablet (Nielsen 2018).

5.1.1 Accumulative Effects

Cultivation theory states that continued exposure to similar messaging and mediated versions of reality can induce viewers to reshape their ideas of reality to be more in-line with what they are absorbing from media (Reep and Dambrot 1987). For example, the more frequently an individual watches a crime drama, the more likely they are to list crime as America's most important problem (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Similarly, health messages in

dramatic shows may also influence whether individuals are more likely to become organ donors

(Quick 2013) or look into preventative options for breast cancer, even when the message comes

from more than one show (Hether et al 2008). Gierzynski and Eddy's (2015) groundbreaking

work on the effects of sustained engagement with a dramatic narrative with a particular message,

Harry Potter and the Millennials, examines the accumulative influence of anti-authoritarian

messaging on political values. The more chronically accessible an issue is in entertainment

media, and the more consistent the message is, the more likely it is to shape an individual's view

of society (Holbrook and Hill 2005).

Stereotypes in dramatic television shows—and the occasional character who breaks

them—offer prime examples of this sustained media influence on symbolic reality (Reep and

Dambrot 1987). News media is more likely to report terrorist attacks when the perpetrator is

Muslim (Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux 2019), and these stereotypes are mirrored in popular

dramatic media (see Shaheen 2009). Historically, Muslims and people of Arab descent have been

depicted in Western media as one of a handful of negative stereotypes: The terrorist, the oil

sheikh, the belly dancer, or the oppressed wife (Khan and Brushke 2016). As cultivation theory

suggests, this routine exposure to stereotypes keeps them salient and foundational to our social

constructive reality (Reep and Dambrot 1987). In essence, information saturation dictates

information acquisition (Elenbaas, et al. 2012).

Conversely, when a show presents a character from a marginalized group who does not

fit into the typical stereotypes, audience members are more likely to take notice in a positive way

(Gillig, et al. 2017). Gillig et al (2018) find evidence that increased visibility of transgender

individuals, especially through dramatic narrative, positively influences attitudes toward

transgender people and related policy issues. The authors credit this shift largely to identification

with characters in the dramatic narrative and the elicitation of emotions, which Moyer-Gusé,

Dale, and Ortiz (2018) describe as form of mediated contact.

5.2   Entertainment Media Exposure as Mediated Intergroup Contact

Social contact theory asserts that intergroup, or intercultural, contact can diminish

prejudice, or ethnocentrism, between members of different social and ethnic groups. Americans

who exhibit high levels of ethnocentrism are more likely to experience increased perceptions of

threat after reading a news article about a Muslim terrorist, while those with previous intergroup

contact with a member from a cultural minority mediates the effects of perceived threat (Khan

and Bruschke 2016). Gillig et al (2018) and Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz (2018) suggest

entertainment media as a conductor for this intergroup contact, largely due to its ability to foster

identification between the viewer and one or more onscreen individuals. When identifying with

an onscreen individual who is also an outgroup member, or with an ingroup member who has

contact with an outgroup member, viewers can indirectly experience social contact through

parasocial interaction (Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz 2018).

However, what happens when depictions of out-group members are largely negative?

This study argues that increased exposure to Muslims/Arabs as terrorists/villain stereotypes in

dramatic media has significant, detrimental influence over viewers' perceptions of Muslims and

Arabian people, as well as their attitudes toward related public policies. Although some shows

depict Muslims in protagonist roles, several scholars note it is more likely they will be cast in

antagonist roles, specifically as terrorist characters (e.g. Saleem 2017; Shaheen 2009). Based on

this literature, I expect the negative stereotype to negatively affect perceptions of Muslims,

increase the likelihood that individuals will associate terrorism with Islam, and influence

individuals' attitudes toward related public policies. Furthermore, increased exposure through

watching multiple shows with a Muslim terrorist antagonist and watching multiple episodes of those shows will deepen this impact. To explore this theory, I hypothesize:

H_1: Increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as terrorists will increase viewers' prejudice toward Muslims/Arab people.

H_0: Increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as terrorists will have no effect on viewers' prejudice toward Muslim/Arab people.

H_2: Individuals with increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as terrorists will be more likely to support public policies that negatively affect people from majority-Muslim countries.

H_0: Individuals with increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as terrorists will be no more likely to support public policies that negatively affect people from majority-Muslim countries than individuals with less exposure to these shows.

H_3: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as the primary antagonist will heighten viewers's support of these policies.

H_0: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as the primary antagonist will have no greater effect than exposure to shows where the Muslim/Arab character is not the primary antagonist.

H_4: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as a protagonist will lessen viewers' support on these policies.

H_0: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as a protagonist will have no effect on viewers' support of these policies.

To appropriately examine these hypotheses, I conduct a two-part study that first examines the available popular shows through substantive content analysis, and then second evaluates their accumulative impact on viewers using an online survey.

5.3   Study Part 1: Show Selection and Analysis

When deciding which shows to include in my study, I began by selecting recent shows that had aired in the last five years. I wanted to find shows that reached a large audience and met

the following criteria, based on results from key studies examining narrative persuasion (namely

Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018; Moyer-Gusé 2008b; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011):

1. Has a runtime of at least 40 minutes per episode,
2. Contains at least 8 episodes per season,
3. Falls within the drama genre,
4. Avoids a serialized format in favor of a season-length story arc (i.e. no crime or medical dramas),
5. Involves crime, politics, and/or terrorism.

I leaned toward choosing shows that aired on one of the top networks (ABC, CBS, FOX,

and NBC) and platforms (Amazon, Hulu, and Netflix) and either ran more than one season

(denoting high viewership) or was considered a "most watched" or "top rated" show. I used

multiple popular, high-traffic entertainment sites to verify these criteria, including

TVGuide.com, TVLine.com, and Deadline.com. Once the initial shows were selected from these

lists, I used the synopses provided by Google as well as details listed on the International Movie

Database (IMDb) and Wikipedia for each show to determine whether they fit the required

criteria.

5.3.1   Show Synopses Analysis

This list was further shortened to include only shows whose Google and/or IMDb show

synopsis included at least one of the following keywords: Politics, political, government, trust,

crime, criminal, criminal justice, terror, and terrorism. I eliminated procedural crime dramas (e.g.

NCIS) and medical dramas (e.g. Grey's Anatomy), as these appear in previous studies and have

already been shown to produce priming and framing effects (see Holbrook and Hill 2005; Quick

2009), as well as period shows, science fiction shows, and shows centered on the supernatural or

extra-human abilities because they may be less relatable, thereby diminishing perceived realism

(Bahk 2011). After all of these considerations I acquired a list of 35 shows that aired and/or

streamed from 2013 to 2018. I chose a five-year window to provide a large enough sample of

shows for participants to choose from, and I ended the show selection in 2018 because I wanted

to ensure the entire current season of each show had aired prior to running the survey in fall of

2019, as the typical season of most network dramas runs from fall of one year to spring of the

next year.

Table 5 Dramatic Shows Chosen for Terrorism and/or Crime Content Analysis

24: Legacy (FOX)	Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime)	Shots Fired (FOX)
Allegiance (NBC)	Jane the Virgin (CW)	State of Affairs (NBC)
American Crime (ABC)	Madame Secretary (CBS)	Taken (NBC)
Bodyguard (Netflix)	Mr. Robot (USA)	The Americans (FX)
Containment (CW)	Odyssey (NBC)	The Blacklist (NBC)
Crisis (NBC)	Orange is the New Black (Netflix)	The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC)
Designated Survivor (ABC)	Ozark (Netflix)	The Crossing (ABC)
FBI (CBS)	Power (Starz)	The Informer (Amazon Prime)
Gang Related (FOX)	Quantico (ABC)	The Night Of (HBO)
Homeland (HBO)	Scandal (ABC)	The Passage (Fox)
House of Cards (Netflix)	Seven Seconds (Netflix)	Valor (CW)
Hostages (CBS)	Shades of Blue (NBC)	

From this list of 35 shows related to crime, politics, and/or terrorism (Table 5), I studied

each show's Wikipedia and IMDb pages for season and episode synopses. I read these to find

whether the show includes any mention of terrorism, terrorists, or terrorist-like attacks. For

example, some episodes of *The Blacklist* feature discussion about terrorism surrounding an event

but later label the attack otherwise. I also read the synopses with close attention paid to the

characters, their descriptions, and their relationships. I specifically looked at the antagonist

characters for signs of racial and religious profiling, as well as whether or not they were painted

as the primary antagonist in opposition to the show's main protagonist.

5.3.1 *Character Analysis*

To examine the prevalence of Arab, Arab-looking, and/or Muslim men as terrorist antagonists in these 19 shows, I line read the same episode synopses to determine whether the terrorist character served as an antagonist, sometimes called the villain, to the main characters. Somewhat unsurprisingly, I discovered all terrorist characters served as antagonists.[10] To continue my examination of terrorist characters, I learned whether each was described as being Muslim or of Arab descent, at times needing to look up the actor's biography to verify Middle Eastern or South Asian descent when the character's background is implied but not explicit. Finally, I determined whether each show used their Muslim/Arab terrorist character(s) as a primary antagonist, meaning the character was featured opposite the protagonist(s) in the show' story arc for at least one season. Table 6 displays my findings, which are again not entirely surprising.

Only five out of 19 shows featured terrorist activity not directly associated with a Muslim and/or Arab character as the perpetrator, meaning two-thirds of the shows with some terrorism storyline depict a Muslim/Arab perpetrator. While all Muslim/Arab terrorist characters are portrayed as an antagonist, nine of the 12 shows use a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as their primary antagonist. That is half of all shows portraying terrorism and three-fourths of those shows with a Muslim/Arab perpetrator. Conversely, only five of the 19 shows depict a Muslim/Arab protagonist. Of these shows, all depict some iteration of a Muslim/Arab terrorist character, and only one, *Quantico,* does not have a Muslim terrorist as its primary antagonist.

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[10] I intentionally make the distinction here between "villain" and "antagonist." Although often used interchangeably in the vernacular, the term "villain" further connotes evilness, whereas "antagonist" simply refers to a character's position in relation to the main character, or protagonist. I prefer to maintain this neutral term as several antagonists—even as terrorists—exhibit a complex backstory that does not always portray them as an evil villain.

Table 6 Show Analysis of Muslim/Arab Characters

Shows with Terrorism Story Arc	Muslim/Arab as Terrorist Antagonist	Muslim/Arab Terrorist as Primary Antagonist	Muslim/Arab Character as Protagonist
24: Legacy	Yes	Yes	No
Bodyguard	Yes	Yes	Yes
Containment	Yes	Yes	No
Designated Survivor	Yes	Yes	Yes
FBI	Yes	No	No
Homeland	Yes	Yes	Yes
House of Cards	Yes	No	No
Jack Ryan	Yes	Yes	No
Madame Secretary	Yes	No	No
Mr. Robot	No	No	No
Odyssey	Yes	Yes	No
Quantico	Yes	No	Yes
Scandal	No	No	No
State of Affairs	Yes	Yes	No
Taken	No	No	No
The Americans	No	No	No
The Blacklist	Yes	No	No
Blacklist: Redemption	No	No	No
The Informer	Yes	Yes	Yes

However, the plots and characters are often more complex than these dichotomous variables suggest. As I explained that not all antagonists are evil villains, neither are all Muslim/Arab terrorist characters all portrayed in the same way. In two instances, a season spent framing the antagonist as likely to be Muslim and/or Arab would not be categorized as having a Muslim/Arab terrorist antagonist, but could impact viewers differently depending on whether individuals watched enough of the show to discover the true antagonist. For example, *Designated Survivor* and *Quantico* both include story arcs where Muslim/Arab characters are framed as terrorists at several points throughout the first season, although the actual terrorists are revealed at the end of the season as being white characters. An individual who watched the full first season of either show may be affected differently than an individual who watched only several episodes, perhaps continuing to believe the Muslim/Arab character to be the primary suspect.

Similarly, *Homeland*'s first season portrays a white man with mental health problems as the primary antagonist, while its later seasons feature Muslim and Arab terrorist and non-terrorist characters. News media effects studies note the discrepancies in coverage between terrorist acts committed by Muslims and those committed by whites (Kearns, et al. 2019; Saleem 2017). Even *State of Affairs*, which depicts both a Muslim Arab terrorist as its primary antagonist and South American terrorists in a multi-episode story arc, discusses the Arab as a terrorist but refers often to the South American antagonists as war lords or rebels.

5.4   Study Part 2: Survey

5.4.1   Survey Questions

Based on my analysis of show synopses and characters, I compiled and devised survey questions to examine potentially key dependent and independent variables in my continued

research on narrative persuasion of political attitudes. Responses to these questions hopefully

reveal information about how an individual perceives and interacts with a specific entertainment

media, how they interpret certain societal norms, and how they observe themselves. I looked to

the literature and studies examining similar attitudes for insight into question choice and

creation. When choosing and creating unique survey questions to use in the MTurk

questionnaire, I focused on three primary purposes: Identification, media use, and sociopolitical

attitudes related to terrorism and perceptions of Muslims. I did not need to create entirely new

questions for many aspects I wanted to examine; however, there were areas where I needed to

either tweak an existing question or create a new one. Below, I explain my choice of questions

for each purpose.

5.4.1.1 *Demographics and Identification*

In keeping with other political science studies, I employed demographics questions

regularly used on the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey to illuminate the

personal identities of my participants (see ANES 2016). These questions include political

identification, religion, education, marital status, employment, and income. For race, ethnicity,

and gender, however, I looked to newer versions of these questions to better capture the

contemporary, diverse identity landscape portrayed in today's entertainment media. The gender

question includes male, female, and a third choice of "non-binary/other." The race and ethnicity

question, taken from Hughes et al (2016), allows respondents to check multiple boxes and

provides more choices than previous questionnaires: American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian;

Black or African American; Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin; Middle Eastern or North

African; Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander; White; or Other. This form of the race and

ethnicity question was particularly important for its inclusion of the "Middle Eastern or North

African" option, as distinguished from the "Asian" option, because it allows better differentiation for participants' potential identification with a character presented as being Middle Eastern and/or Arab. I also included a question on travel, asking whether respondents had traveled outside of the country in the past five years, which can indicate a greater openness to new cultures (Saleem 2017).

These demographics questions are not only important for understanding why respondents may hold certain sociopolitical attitudes, but also for exploring their similarities to the characters portrayed in the popular dramas I'm studying. Perceived similarity, as a way of identifying with a fictional character, remains the strongest influence on decreasing counterarguing, a form of resistance to embedded messages in dramatic fictional media similar to directional motivated reasoning (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). It also remains the only form of identification that can be externally verified, to a degree, by comparing the demographics of the character to the viewer. Therefore, certain demographics questions may serve as control variables or even covariates for the dependent variables of this study.

5.4.1.2 Media Use

I asked participants about their media use to determine either an explanatory/independent variable or a lurking or blocking variable. For example, the more politically aware someone is, the less likely they are to be swayed by new information (Lupton, et al. 2015). Querying respondents about how often they watch and how much attention they pay to the news each week, as well as asking several political knowledge questions, provides insight into how persuasive a narrative may be for that individual. These questions were also gleaned from the regular ANES survey. Similarly, the literature provides evidence that watching crime serials like *Law & Order* or *CSI* increase the likelihood that an individual will perceive crime as a major

problem in America (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Thus, I created a question similar to those the ANES asks about how many days each week an individual is exposed to news content, non-news content, or social media.

As the consumption method and amount remain the key explanatory variables I am observing, I created two new questions for my research. First, I directly ask respondents whether they prefer to watch shows as they air on television, typically once per week, or if they prefer to binge-watch shows after they have finished airing, watching many episodes in one sitting. Next, I returned to the list of shows that fit my criteria for narrative persuasion of views toward counterterrorism policies and perceptions of Muslims. For each show, I decided to ask participants how much they had watched: Never watched, watched one to three episodes, watched more than three episodes but not one season, or watched at least one full season. These questions could help me to better understand the accumulative effects of these shows.

5.4.1.3   *Key Attitude Variables*

My key dependent variables include policy views and social attitudes. The policies I was most interested in were those on sending troops to the levant to fight Islamic militants, allowing Syrian refugees to immigrate to the U.S., and approving the use of drone strikes to target terrorists abroad. For each of these policies, I chose questions with a range of answers to indicate favorability on a seven-point likert scale. I selected the questions regarding sending U.S. troops and accepting Syrian refugees from a survey that examines how news media affects these attitudes (Saleem 2017), and I created a drone strike approval question to fit the same format. Lastly, I included a dichotomous question about the relationship between sacrificing freedoms and safety from terrorist attacks.

For social attitudes, I wanted to examine perceptions about Islam and Muslims in association to violence and terrorism. I chose questions about whether respondents are worried a terrorist attack will happen in the near future in the U.S. and whether they are worried a terrorist attack will happen in their area (Saleem 2017). Pulling again from Saleem et al (2017), I chose to include a grid question on how likely members of certain social groups are to engage in an act of terrorism. I created a similar grid question on how likely members of certain social groups are to experience discrimination in the U.S. for comparison. Finally, I chose a dichotomous question asking respondents whether they believe Islam is more or less likely than other religions to promote violence.

To examine overall social prejudice against Muslims, I created a new bias variable from the responses to two grid questions regarding Muslims. First, I created new measurements from the spectrum of responses to the two grid questions asking for an evaluation of various social or political groups. The first grid question asked respondents how likely they felt that a member from each group would be to commit a terrorist attack on the United States in the near future (Blacks, Whites, Muslims, Christians, Left-wing Radicals, Right-wing Radicals, Russians, and Chinese). Because I am more interested in prejudice against Muslims than whether the individual is overly concerned about terrorism in general, I compared each individual's response to whether a Muslim would commit an attack to the individual's average response across all eight groups. I subtracted the averaged response from the response specific to Muslims, and then I converted these measurements to a spectrum from zero to one. I repeated this process for a second grid question regarding discrimination. The question asked respondents to evaluate how much discrimination members of each group (Black, Whites, Women, Men, LBTQ Persons, Transgender Persons, Muslims, and Christians) face in the U.S. from none to a great deal.

Because prejudiced individuals are less likely to perceive discrimination against the group about which they are prejudiced, I took the final measurements and subtracted them from one to achieve a percentage that reflects a higher number for individuals less likely to perceive prejudice against Muslims than against members of other groups. To create the bias dependent variable, I added together the final percentage measurements created from the two grid questions, and then I divided by two to obtain a single set of measurements reflecting overall bias against Muslims.

For political policy attitudes, I chose to examine two different, salient policies that affect Muslim-majority countries. First, I asked respondents whether they favor or oppose "sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, like ISIS, in Iraq and Syria," providing a seven-point response scale. My assumption is that individuals with greater bias against Muslims will be more likely to favor sending troops. Second, I asked respondents whether they favor or oppose accepting refugees from Syria, again providing a seven-point response scale. My assumption is that individuals with greater bias toward Muslims will be less likely to favor accepting Syrian refugees.

5.4.1.4   Key Independent Variables

Using the list of 35 shows that include the themes or keywords crime, politics, and/or terrorism (Table 5), I presented each show one-by-one in a survey question that asked whether respondents had seen the show: never (0), 1-3 episodes (1), more than 3 episodes and up to one season (2), or at least one season (3). From these questions, paying particular attention to the shows listed in Table 6, I created three new variables that measure exposure to terrorism storylines with Muslim perpetrators and storylines with a Muslim terrorist as the primary antagonist. These variables—Muslim terrorist (MT) exposure, Muslim terrorist antagonist

(MTA) exposure, and Muslim protagonist (MP) exposure—are an aggregation of participants' responses to how much they watched of a specific set of shows. The MT exposure variable aggregates participants' responses to the exposure question for the 14 shows that depict a Muslim/Arab terrorist, and the MTA exposure variable aggregates responses for the nine shows with a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as the primary antagonist. The MP exposure variable aggregates responses for the five shows with a Muslim protagonist.

The variation in exposure of these three conditions (MT, MTA, and MP exposure) is provided as an aggregation of the responses to the initial show exposure questions, which place responses on a scale from 0 to 3. The gross exposure variables express a percentage (0 to 1) of the initial aggregation of these responses to the shows of each category. For example, if a participant watched two episodes of *Jack Ryan* (measured as 1 in the original show exposure variable), ten episodes of *Madame Secretary* (measured as 2), more than one season of both *Quantico* and *Taken* (measured as 3), and no episodes of any of the other shows that depict a Muslim terrorist stereotype, their initial MT exposure measurement would be 9. However, because only *Jack Ryan* depicts a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as a primary antagonist, their MTA exposure would measure as 1. These aggregations are then converted into a percentage of possible responses. Because there are 14 shows depicting a Muslim terrorist stereotype, continuing with this example, the individual's MT exposure percentage measurement would be 0.214 or 21.4 percent of the total exposure measurement possible.

By aggregating the responses to these show exposure questions, I am better able to understand the potential impact of watching shows that use terrorists, and especially Muslim terrorist stereotypes, as an antagonist. For example, a show that uses a white, left-wing radical terrorist in one episode and a Muslim jihadist in another episode, like *FBI*, will probably have

less impact on a viewer's belief that Muslims are more likely than other groups to commit a terrorist act than a show where an entire season is based on a storyline that uses a Muslim terrorist character as its primary antagonist, such as *State of Affairs*. By converting the aggregated responses to percentages, I am better able to compare these responses across varying measurements.

5.4.2 Methods

In October 2019, I conducted a survey experiment using Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform. The survey included 118 questions covering demographics, views on public policy, political knowledge, beliefs about various social groups, trust in governmental institutions, and news and dramatic media consumption patterns (Appendix B). A total of 1088 participants responded and were provided $2.00 as compensation for their time, which was approximately 30 to 45 minutes. Data was collected in less than 24 hours using this method, and participants were compensated within two business days.

5.4.2.1 Participants

Of the 1088 participants, 652 (60.04%) identified as male, 431 (39.69%) identified as female, and 3 (0.28%) identified as non-binary or other. Approximately 70% of participants self-identified as age 35 or younger, with the youngest participant at 18, the mean age at 34, and the oldest participant at 74 years of age. More than half of participants (54%, 587 participants) identified as White, while 23% (250) identified as Asian, and 11.32% (123) identified as Black or African American. Only 4.23% (46 participants) identified as Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin as their sole identification, though 72 participants in total listed this as one of their identities. A total of 61 participants (5.61%) listed more than one identity, with 16 participants listing American Indian or Alaskan Native, 21 listing Asian, 18 listing Black or African

American, 26 listing Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin, seven listing Middle Eastern or North

African, 10 listing Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and 46 listing White as one of

multiple identities. There were also 15 participants who identified solely as American Indian or

Alaskan Native, and five participants (0.46%) identified as Middle Eastern or North African.

Considering the marginalized identity being observed concerns a globally popular

religion, I included nine choices for the religion question and also a question about the level of

importance of participants' religion (Appendix B). The majority of respondents identified as

Catholic (343, 31.53%), Hindu (162, 14.89%), and Protestant (160, 14.71%) with 292

participants (26.84%) claiming no preference. The remaining 5.98% of participants associated as

Pagan (3 participants), Jewish (11), Muslim (32), and another religion (66) with 19 participants

preferring not to say. Participants' responses as to how important their religion is to them was

somewhat bipolar with 30.91% (336 participants) claiming their religion is not at all important

while 23.46% (255) claim it to be very important and 22.17% (241) claim it to be extremely

important. This places nearly 46% of participants as feeling their religion (likely Catholicism,

Hinduism, or Protestantism) is very or extremely important to them. Only 8% (87) reported their

religion was slightly important and 13.52% (147) claimed it to be moderately important. The

remaining 21 participants (1.93%) reported they were undecided. Unsurprisingly, those who

reported their religion was of little importance were more likely to claim no religious preference

(250 participants). Those who claimed their religion to be very important were predominately

Catholic (110, or 32% of those who reported to be Catholic), Protestant (50), and Hindu (70).

Those who claimed their religion was extremely important to them were also predominately

Catholic (129), Protestant (42), and Hindu (39). Those who identified as Muslim were more

likely to report their religion as very important (34.38% of Muslim respondents) or extremely important (31.25%).

Interestingly, 40.63% of respondents reported to align with the Democratic Party, while 31.25 aligned with Republicans. Yet, 44.12% reported they disapprove of how President Donald Trump is doing his job, while 47.95% said they approve. Many respondents also agreed with the statement that they generally trust the federal government to run the United States, with 57.72% saying they agree in some capacity and only 32.72% saying they disagree.

5.4.2.2 Shows

A surprising 141 participants (12.96%) reported having never seen an episode of any of the 19 shows depicting a terrorism storyline, and 198 (18.2%) had never seen an episode of one of the 14 shows depicting one of the terrorist characters as Muslim. Nearly one-third of participants (30.15%) had never seen an episode of one of the nine shows depicting a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as the primary antagonist. A similar 33.09% had never seen one of the shows with a terrorism storyline depicting a Muslim protagonist—not surprising considering four out of the five shows with a Muslim protagonist also include a Muslim antagonist.

5.4.3 Results

My first hypothesis states that increased exposure to the Muslim terrorist (MT) stereotype will negatively influence viewer perceptions of Muslims. To examine this hypothesis, I ran a linear regression comparing the correlation between aggregated exposure to shows depicting a Muslim/Arab terrorist character and the bias dependent variable (Table 7). Unsurprisingly, individuals with higher education and those who have traveled outside the US in the past five years appear less likely to express bias against Muslims. Surprisingly, higher political knowledge

significantly correlates with greater bias. Against my expectations, greater aggregated exposure to the MT stereotype negatively correlates with bias against Muslims, indicating that increased exposure lessens bias.[11] This may indicate that any increased mediated exposure—positive or negative—to an outgroup member (mediated intergroup contact) can facilitate empathy and/or decrease anxiety toward the outgroup, as suggested by the focus group responses in Chapter 4 of this manuscript.

Table 7 OLS Regression on Bias Against Muslims

	Bias Against Muslims			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
MT Stereotype	-0.101***	0.018	-5.61	0.000
White	0.025***	0.008	3.25	0.001
Female	0.006	0.007	0.83	0.410
Education	-0.007**	0.002	-2.79	0.005
Pol ID/Republican	-0.001	0.004	-0.30	0.761
Pol Knowledge	0.007***	0.001	5.28	0.000
Travel Outside US	-0.020**	0.007	-2.91	0.004
Constant	0.582	0.019	31.08	0.000

N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

My second hypothesis claims that increased exposure to the MT stereotype influences views toward favoring public policies that may negatively affect Muslims and people from Muslim-majority countries. To test this hypothesis, I looked at responses to two salient public

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[11] See Appendix C for additional models that measure the relationship between aggregated exposure and the raw responses from the questions I used to create this bias variable. While these models provide greater evidence for my hypothesis, I believe this is a more adequate measurement of bias against Muslims through association with terrorism, whereas the raw answers only provide evidence for bias against Muslims or fear of terrorism in general.

policy questions in the survey. The first question asked respondents whether they favor or oppose sending U.S. ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria. The second asks whether they favor or oppose accepting Syrian refugees to the United States. Both questions offer a 7-point response scale from "favor a great deal" to "oppose a great deal." Table 8 shows the results of these linear regression analyses, providing the coefficient for each correlation with the standard error in parenthesis.

Table 8 OLS Regressions on U.S. Public Policy Beliefs Related to Muslim-Majority Countries

Public Policy Beliefs

	Send Troops to MidEast	Accept Syrian Refugees
MT Stereotype	2.434 (0.265)***	1.545 (0.263)***
White	-0.115 (0.113)	-0.441 (0.113)***
Female	0.129 (0.103)	0.214 (0.103)*
Education	-0.032 (0.036)	0.135 (0.036)***
Pol ID/Republican	0.152 (0.062)*	-0.503 (0.062)***
Pol Knowledge	-0.028 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)
Travel Outside US	0.268 (0.104)**	0.209 (0.103)*
Constant	-0.257 (0.278)	0.577 (0.275)*

N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001
Standard errors in parenthesis.

There is a strong correlation between accumulated exposure to the MT stereotype and approval of both policies, which supports the assumption that increased exposure would increase support of sending troops but refutes the assumption it would decrease favor of accepting Syrian refugees. However, the latter result of a positive correlation between accumulated exposure to the MT stereotype and favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. may indicate increased

empathy toward Syrian refugees *and* increased bias against Muslim terrorists in particular, as opposed to Muslims in general. The question regarding sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants specifies "in Iraq and Syria," which could lead many respondents to instead interpret the question regarding accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. to mean accepting individuals to the U.S. who are escaping from Islamic militants.

Both models also show correlations between political identification and the policy attitudes; however, the data reports that Republicans are more likely support sending troops but less likely to accept Syrian refugees. Having traveled outside the U.S. within the previous five years also appears to favor toward both policies. Approval of accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. also correlates with being female and more highly educated, while individuals who identify as white are less likely to approve this policy. The mixed results signify there is likely a deeper explanation for these specific beliefs rather than a blanket correlation between stereotype exposure and policy attitudes. An additional factor that may affect these policy attitudes in particular, but also all the models depicted, is that a significant percentage of respondents identify as Hindu and Asian. This shows there may be a large portion of the sample that is Indian, rather than American. As these policy attitudes are specific to the United States, non-Americans are likely to answer very differently than Americans.

My third and fourth hypotheses consider the impact of having a Muslim as the primary antagonist or as a protagonist in a show with a terrorism storyline. I predict that having a Muslim terrorist character as the primary antagonist will further increase the negative influence of this stereotype on viewers' political attitudes and social perceptions, while having a Muslim protagonist will diminish these effects. To evaluate these hypotheses, I examine again the bias and policy dependent variables using my aggregated exposure variables for shows that include a

Muslim terrorist character as the primary antagonist and shows that include a Muslim

protagonist. Table 9 displays OLS regressions on the bias and policy attitudes including the

aggregated variable for exposure to MT antagonists.

Table 9 OLS Regressions on Bias and Policy Attitudes Regarding Muslims

	Bias Against Muslims	**Policy Attitudes**	
		Send Troops	*Accept Refugees*
MT Antagonist	-0.106 (0.017)***	2.298 (0.257)***	1.472 (0.255)***
White	0.023 (0.008)**	-0.099 (0.114)	-0.429 (0.113)***
Female	0.005 (0.007)	0.131 (0.103)	0.216 (0.103)**
Education	-0.007 (0.002)**	-0.032 (0.036)	0.135 (0.036)***
Pol ID/Republican	-0.001 (0.004)	0.150 (0.062)**	-0.504 (0.062)***
Pol Knowledge	0.007 (0.001)***	-0.023 (0.021)	0.014 (0.021)
Travel Outside US	-0.019 (0.007)**	0.268 (0.104)**	0.208 (0.103)**
Constant	0.582 (0.019)***	-0.214 (0.277)	0.601 (0.275)**

N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001
Standard errors in parenthesis.

In all three models, the correlation between the substantive independent variable and the

dependent variable is statistically significant (Table 9). The results indicate that increased

exposure to shows with a Muslim terrorist character as the primary antagonist will decrease an

individual's bias against Muslims. The full model regarding bias against Muslims is the same for

aggregated exposure to Muslim terrorist antagonists as to the Muslim terrorist stereotype. Also

similar, aggregated exposure to Muslim terrorist antagonist characters is positively and

significantly correlated with both policy stances. Travel and political party identification are

again statistically significant, with Republicans being more likely to favor sending troops but less

likely to favor accepting Syrian refugees, and those having traveled being less likely to express

bias but more likely to favor both policies. In the regression on favor toward accepting Syrian refugees, again the only non-significant factor is political knowledge.

Table 10 OLS Regressions on Beliefs that a Muslim will Corry out a Terrorist Attack in the U.S. in the Near Future

	Bias of Muslims		Bias of Muslims
Muslim Protagonist	-0.069 (0.016)***	**No Muslim Protagonist**	-0.104 (0.018)***
White	0.027 (0.008)***	**White**	0.025 (0.008)***
Female	0.008 (0.007)	**Female**	0.005 (0.007)
Education	-0.008 (0.002)**	**Education**	-0.007 (0.002)**
Pol ID/Republican	-0.002 (0.004)	**Pol ID/Republican**	-0.001 (0.004)
Pol Knowledge	0.008 (0.001)***	**Pol Knowledge**	0.007 (0.001)***
Travel Outside US	-0.023 (0.007)***	**Travel Outside US**	-0.020 (0.007)**
Constant	0.577 (0.019)***	**Constant**	0.583 (0.019)***

N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001
Standard errors in parenthesis.

I ran the same three models using exposure to shows with a Muslim protagonist as the substantive independent variable. Interestingly, the results of these regressions were extremely similar, likely because four of the five shows with a Muslim protagonist also include a Muslim antagonist. To better understand the difference between having a Muslim antagonist and protagonist and having only a Muslim protagonist, I created a fifth aggregated exposure variable using responses for the shows that depict a Muslim terrorist character but with no Muslim protagonist. I compare the two results in Table 10 on the bias dependent variable. Even separating the shows, I still find the same correlations. Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim protagonist negatively correlates bias against Muslims, as does exposure to shows with a

Muslim terrorist character but no Muslim protagonist. In both models, education level and political identification also show correlations with statistical significance.

5.5   Discussion

All four exposure variables exhibit similar results regarding beliefs about Muslims and public policies regarding Muslims and Muslim-majority countries. Increased exposure to the MT stereotype in any capacity may influence viewers' ideas about Muslims—both in America and abroad. However, evidence does not support my initial projection that negative stereotypes would correlate with bias. Instead, aggregated exposure to onscreen Muslims correlates with decreased bias against Muslims. In one interpretation, the correlations are arbitrary. In another, there is perhaps an endogenous, underlying factor that indicates individuals less likely to express prejudice toward Muslims are also more likely to watch shows that include Muslim characters. In a third view, the correlation supports previous studies, like that of Ortiz and Harwood (2007; see also Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019), who find that any voluntary, mediated intergroup contact increases empathy toward the outgroup.

With regard to policy attitudes, increased exposure significantly correlates with favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria, but also correlates with favor toward accepting refugees from Syria, a Muslim-majority country. While this refutes my initial assumptions that increased exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype will increase favor of policies that negatively affect Muslims and Muslim-majority countries, it may instead indicate the exact opposite. Increased empathy toward Muslims, as is evidenced in the social bias models, would understandably correlate with favor of accepting refugees from a Muslim-majority country. In another interpretation of the question regarding sending ground troops to Iraq and Syria, respondents empathic to the plight of victims in these countries may see U.S. intervention

against Islamic militants as positive for the majority-Muslim countries impacted by militant violence. These relationships may actually provide deeper evidence that mediated intergroup contact—even those of negative portrayals—increase empathy toward the outgroup (see Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019; Ortiz and Harwood 2007).

5.5.1   Limitations

It is important to note several key limitations of this study. Namely, using the Mechanical Turk platform allows for a large sample, but not one that is nationally representative. Considering the large ratio of individuals identifying as Asian and Hindu, this sample likely includes a significant number of Indians. This may partially account for the overall favor toward policies that would send American troops to fight Islamic militants and would accept Syrian refugees to American, as non-Americans may be more willing to risk American lives and resources. However, it may provide greater evidence for mediated intergroup contact decreasing prejudice, considering the long history of religious animosity in India which pits Hindus against Muslims. The deep divide between these groups led to the 1948 partition of India and the creation of a new, Muslim state, Pakistan. Should the sample include a large number of Hindu Indians, the negative correlation between accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype and prejudice against Muslims is even more striking.

Further, the proxies provided to account for stereotype exposure accumulation cannot account for varied frames within a show. It is one thing to understand that many shows will delve deeper into character histories later in a season and, therefore, to expect audience stereotype acceptance to increase in the introductory episodes and decrease thereafter. However, it is quite another to comb through every single show available for this tipping point. That level of detail is neither a good use of time nor a necessarily desirable collection of data. Regardless of where the

show makes this tipping point, there are many other factors in play, such as primacy and recency

effects (McGuire 1992), personal attention and circumstance (Bennett and Iyengar 2008),

perceived realism and identification (Hamby, et al. 2017), etc.

6   EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF BINGE EFFECTS ON NARRATIVE PERSUASION AND MEDIATED INTERGROUP CONTACT

Do contemporary media consumption habits like binge watching alter the impact of entertainment media effects on social and political attitudes? When Gerbner and colleagues developed cultivation theory, which asserts that extended exposure to similar messaging across mass media influence social norms, they had no way of knowing the vast changes the Internet and the information revolution would bring. Harmon et al (2019) present evidence that the contemporary media environment diminishes the accumulative effects described by cultivation theory, positing that selection bias pushes individuals to seek out media—both news and entertainment—that matches their current perceptions of social norms. While this certainly comprises part of the explanation for the results they find that messaging in media has null effects in the contemporary media environment, it is not the full story.

In addition to selection bias, the very methods of media consumption have changed quite drastically since the 1960s conditions in which Gerbner made his first assertions. Where television shows and films were once strictly monitored and even scarce, today the media market is saturated at all times with easily-accessible audio-visual material that Americans consume in rather large quantities. In the 1960s, television, film, and advertising were not new, but they did command a far lesser percentage of Americans' daily attention. Today, Americans have access to video content across a wide array of devices and platforms at any time of the day in nearly any location. American adults spend, on average, 11 hours per day looking at a screen, using more than four of those hours to watch live or streamed television (Nielsen 2019). In addition to cable and network television, subscription-based platforms offer full of hundreds of thousands of hours

of entertainment content. Unlike the 20st century in which cultivation theory was developed, today we have Netflix.

Video streaming platforms like Netflix have transformed the entertainment media market, not only raising the sheer amount of easily-accessible content, but also transforming the methods through which we consume it. In the 1960s television news and a few shows were available at certain times of the day, limiting the possibilities of consumption. Now, American adults report not only watching more television, but bingeing on it. *Binge watching* refers to the practice of consuming at least two to six episodes of the same show in one sitting (Netflix 2013). Netflix (2016), which makes up 31 percent of television streaming, reports approximately 73 percent of its users engage in binge watching on a weekly basis. With the ever-growing supply and ever-changing demands of the entertainment media market, does cultivation theory still have merit?

6.1   Evaluating Media Consumption Method Effects

In this chapter, I evaluate the effects of binge watching on narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact through a longitudinal laboratory experiment. To do this, I build upon the survey results in Chapter 5, which suggest a relationship between watching shows that include Muslim characters—even as antagonists—and shifting attitudes toward Muslims and policies related to Muslim-majority countries. In addition to examining the accumulative effects of exposure to nuanced mediated intergroup contact and persuasive messages embedded in the narrative, I use this experiment to study how binge watching further alters these effects on viewers' social perceptions and political attitudes. The laboratory experiment also allows me to control for selection effects and evaluate causal direction.

Over seven weeks, 144[12] undergraduate students from a large, diverse, university

screened the first three episodes from one of two popular, fictional dramas. Within each of these

groups, approximately half of the participants binged all three episodes in one sitting, screening

them back-to-back with only short breaks in between each episode. The other half of each group

came in once per week for three weeks to watch each episode, mimicking the conventional

weekly television broadcasting format. Thus, the two by two treatment design produced four

groups: Show 1 binge watchers, show 1 weekly watchers, show 2 binge watchers, and show 2

weekly watchers. All participants completed pre- and post-treatment surveys to determine

attitude shifts, and 112 participants (77.8 percent) completed an additional follow-up survey two

weeks after the final episode was screened for weekly watchers to track any lasting effects. I

used two treatment shows to compare effects between material as well as between consumption

methods. The first three episodes of Amazon Prime's *Jack Ryan* served as the counterterrorism

treatment show, intended to influence audience attitudes toward American counterterrorism

policies and perceptions of Muslims and crime. I used ABC's *This Is Us* as a comparison show

with a tolerance treatment, as it neither discusses terrorism nor depicts a Muslim character but

does portray explicit and implicit messages of acceptance regarding marginalized groups.

This chapter describes the experiment in full. First, I revisit my theory of binge effects in

the context of mediated intergroup contact and my expectations for its effects on social

perceptions and political attitudes. Next, I expound upon the details of designing and carrying

out the study. Finally, I share the results of the experiment and discuss the evidence these results

provide. This innovative design builds upon exceptional previous studies, and I hope it will

prove the first of many in this vein.

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[12] In total, 159 participants began the first treatment, but only 145 completed all three treatment sessions and filled out the pre- and post-treatment surveys.

6.2 Binge Effects Theory

The entertainment media effects literature does not currently consider the impact of what is popularly referred to as "binge watching." The term "bingeing" is vernacularly related to the act of gorging oneself on food and/or drink. This is where we get the term "binge drinking," which alludes to the act of drinking alcoholic beverages to excess in a short period of time. In contemporary parlance, one may binge on books, movies, video games, and television shows in the same manner. Binge watching typically describes the act of watching multiple episodes of the same show in one sitting (Conlin, Billings, and Averset 2016; Netflix 2013). An entire season of a show may even be binged in a day or two, depending on the number and length of episodes.

I coin the term *binge effects* to describe changes to the impact of narrative persuasion on individual attitudes that may occur as a result of the consecutive consumption of lengthy media over a relatively short period of time. This can refer to a film and its sequels or to many episodes or a full season of an episodic show. As Conlin, Billings, and Averset (2016) point out, "the content of the narrative does not shift, yet the amount of narrative one watches can be rapidly accelerated when compared to past media release models" (152, emphasis removed). However, the act of bingeing on a specific media—in which each consumed item of media is part of a series or is highly related in some thematic way, such as by genre or topic—is different from the acts of consuming a single media item such as a film or show episode or of consuming multiple media items over a longer time period such as a week, month, or season. As such, it deserves different terminology from cultivation theory.

Because the media is consumed all at once, I expect it to have greater initial persuasive effects, not unlike the drench hypothesis suggests. In other words, after watching multiple episodes in one sitting, persuasive effects will be greater than the same effects measured at the

end of watching the same episodes week-by-week. I formed this expectation based on my understanding of narrative persuasion, and the probability that binge watching may keep viewers in a state of absorption longer.[13] Sitting for multiple episodes of a show implies there will be fewer interruptions to viewers' narrative engagement, indicating that any deictic shift of absorption (transportation and/or identification) will last longer. I aver that the longer a viewer is absorbed in the narrative, the more likely they are to experience full transportation and identification, which increases the likelihood of reduced reactance and of message acceptance.

However, I also expect binge-watching to have fewer lasting persuasive effects than those associated with cultivation theory because there is less likelihood that viewers will have a continued engagement with the exact theme, or message, of the binged show. Without regular engagement, the effects are likely to wear off faster than if the media was continuously watched over a longer time period, as with cultivation theory. Furthermore, without the regular and continued sessions of reflection—bypassed by beginning the next episode immediately and staying absorbed—an individual who has binge-watched a show rather than watching it at regular intervals is less likely to receive the full effects of reflection. The reflection process of considering the narrative concepts as they relate to one's own life in the real world is imperative to inducing attitude change; fewer opportunities to reflect mean fewer opportunities for the individual to consider how the narrative relates to his own beliefs.

Therefore, I posit that binge-watching a show with politically-relevant themes and/or characters will have a strong initial effect on viewers' attitudes. However, watching the same show regularly over a longer period of time will have more lasting effects on viewers' attitudes.

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[13] An opposing assumption may be that continuous watching could lead to decreased absorption through distractions or multitasking. I try to limit this potentiality in my design, described later thin this chapter, by limiting the binge session to three hour-long episodes.

In this study, I look specifically at the impact of exposure to three episodes of two different shows. The counterterrorism show includes a terrorism storyline as its main plot with a Muslim terrorist character as the show's primary antagonist. In line with mediated intergroup contact theory, I expect the negative portrayal of an outgroup member—the Muslim terrorist character—to negatively affect perceptions of Muslims. In accordance with cultivation theory, I expect the narrative to influence attitudes toward favoring counterterrorism policies that target terrorists, Muslims, and Muslim-majority countries. The tolerance show details the struggles of several marginalized social groups and includes a storyline of familial bond and acceptance of outgroup members. In line with mediated intergroup contact theory, I expect the positive intergroup contact consistently portrayed in these episodes will increase tolerance of outgroup members in viewers. As per my binge effects theory, I expect that viewers who binge the episodes will exhibit these effects strongly immediately following the screening, and I also expect that these effects will diminish more quickly for binge watchers than for weekly watchers.

6.3   A Longitudinal Experiment of Binge Effects

Several entertainment media effects studies provide evidence that contemporary fictional television shows influence our political attitudes (e.g. Holbert 2003; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Kearns and Young 2017; Gillig, et al. 2017; Pettey and Bracken 2008) and social perceptions (e.g. Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020; Gillig, et al. 2017; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019; Ortiz and Harwood 2007; Wojcieszak and Kim 2016). However, very few examine these effects over time (see Hether, et al. 2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Paluck and Green 2009; Slater, et al. 2006). So far, none examine how binge watching these shows affects their ability to influence us.

6.3.1   Experiment Design

To study how binge watching alters entertainment media effects, I created a six-part

longitudinal experiment with a pre/posttest and two-factor design. The experiment begins with a

pre-treatment survey, to be completed online by all participants. Participants who complete the

questionnaire must then complete three sessions of exposure to one of two treatment media. Half

of participants complete the sessions in the same day to simulate bingeing, whereas the other half

complete one session each week for three weeks to simulate traditional weekly watching.

Immediately following their third session, participants fill out a post-treatment survey. For binge

watchers, this occurs on the same day they watch episodes one, two, and three. For weekly

watchers, this occurs on the day they watch only episode three. The final, sixth part of the

experiment consists of a follow-up survey sent to all participants at a later date. Figure 1 depicts

the six components of this process.

Figure 1 Experiment Components and Process

The two-factor design examines a specific media, episodes from a television show, as one

treatment and mode of consumption, binge versus weekly watching, as the second treatment.

This results in four participant groups: Binge counterterrorism, weekly counterterrorism, binge

tolerance, and weekly tolerance (Table 11). I choose to use television shows for the media

treatment to best account for current binge practices, which typically involve episodic shows as

the preferred media. To ensure internal validity, all subjects are randomly assigned to one of the four participant groups upon signing up for the experiment.

Potential participants are informed they will be randomly assigned to either come in for approximately four hours on a single day or for approximately three and a half hours on three separate days. To minimize attrition, the days are specified in the call for participants, and participants are notified of their particular expectations prior to the first media session. The signup period lasts two weeks, during which participants sign an informed consent document and take the pre-treatment questionnaire online, and then day and time assignments are sent to participants at least 24 hours prior to the first media session for scheduling purposes. Participants are not told which show they will be watching until they arrive at the first media session.

Table 11 Experiment Groups

	Counterterrorism Show	**Tolerance Show**
Binge Sessions	Counterterrorism Binge	Tolerance Binge
Weekly Sessions	Counterterrorism Weekly	Tolerance Weekly

The three media sessions account for three episodes of either the counterterrorism show or the tolerance show, each of which are approximately 50 to 60 minutes long. Therefore, one session is equal to one episode, and three sessions allow participants to watch all three episodes of their assigned show. Participants assigned to the Binge Groups complete all three sessions in the same day, allowing for breaks in between each session. Following the third session, which is the third episode, binge participants take a post-treatment questionnaire online using their smart device or on a hard copy. This means the binge participants complete Sessions 1 through 3 all

during Week 2 of the experiment. They also take the post-treatment questionnaire during Week 2 of the experiment.

Participants assigned to the Weekly Groups complete only one session per week. This means that in Week 2 of the experiment, they complete Session 1, during Week 3 they complete Session 2, and in Week 4 they complete Session 3. Like the binge participants, weekly participants are asked to take the post-treatment questionnaire on their smart device or on a hard copy immedialy following their third session. However, unlike the binge participants, this means weekly participants take the post-treatment questionnaire during Week 4 of the experiment.

To examine lasting attitudinal effects, the follow-up questionnaire is sent out two weeks following the final media session for all participants. All participants may take the follow-up questionnaire during Weeks 6 and 7 of the media sessions, which is approximately four weeks following exposure for the binge participants and two weeks following final exposure for the weekly participants.

Figure 2 Model of Binge Effects Longitudinal Experiment Process

I expect the statistical means of questionnaire responses to specific dependent variable questions will change in relation to the treatments. Prior to any treatment, means between groups should be relatively equal. Immediately following treatment exposure, during Week 2 of the

experiment for binge participants and in Week 4 for weekly participants, I expect these means will differ between participants assigned to the counterterrorism show and those assigned to the tolerance show, as well as between the binge and weekly groups within those groups. At the follow-up point, I expect only the weekly groups' means to differ from those of the binge groups, indicating the diminished effects of bingeing.

Two key issues with any observational study of entertainment media effects are selection effects and causal direction (Pettigrew et al 2011). Considering mediated intergroup contact, for example, individuals less likely to express prejudice are also more likely to interact with intergroup members and watch shows portraying intergroup relationships (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). Conversely, individuals more likely to experience prejudice are less likely to engage in intergroup contact or view shows with mediated intergroup contact. Random assignment controls for selection effects, allowing me to better examine causal direction.

Another issue with experimental studies, however, lies in the decreased realism of a laboratory setting. To increase the mundane realism of this study, I incorporated both a familiar setting and online tools. All surveys were taken by participants online using a computer, tablet, or smartphone—participants chose their preferred device. As part of the treatment procedures, participants were told to try and view the show as they would normally view a show. Participants were allowed to bring in food, breaks were taken in between sessions for the Binge Groups to allow for movement and using the restroom, and the only discouraged activity was talking loudly so as not to disturb other participants.

6.3.2   *Show Selection and Hypotheses*

The linchpin of the experiment lies in selecting appropriate treatment shows for evaluating the effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact on participants in

each group. In Chapter 5 of this manuscript I establish 18 popular television and streamed shows that aired between 2013 and 2018 that depict terrorism, 12 of which depict a Muslim terrorist character and nine that contain a Muslim terrorist character as the show's primary antagonist. To select the counterterrorism treatment show for my binge effects experiment, I more deeply examined these nine shows (Appendix A). To select the tolerance show, I reviewed the most popular shows that did not make my original list and, therefore, did not cover topics relating to terrorism, crime, and politics.

6.3.2.1 *Counterterrorism Treatment: Jack Ryan*

I chose *Jack Ryan* as the counterterrorism treatment show primarily because it depicts a Muslim terrorist character as the show's only antagonist in the first three episodes and depicts no non-Muslim antagonists.[14] It is also ideal because this antagonist arrives in the first episode and because there is a Muslim protagonist. The humanization of the antagonist offers an additional layer to the study pertaining to mediated intergroup contact theory. The inclusion of a Muslim protagonist and the humanization of the Muslim antagonist may offer insight into the role identification plays in facilitating narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. For instance, participants who identify in some way with one or more Muslim characters, like Hanin Ali, may present very different attitudes than those who identify in some way with counterterrorism agents, like Sandrine Araud or Victor Polizzi (see Appendix A for analysis).

First, I expect the counterterrorism treatment show, *Jack Ryan*, will influence audience members' social perceptions of Muslims as a result of mediated intergroup contact. More specifically, I hypothesize:

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[14] In episode one, the terrorist group who arrives at Suleiman's compound does include a white man who seems to be European. However, he receives very little screen time and acts solely in a subordinate role. His brief interaction with Hanin explicitly brings attention to him being different from the others. Neither myself nor my colleague listed this character as an antagonist vital to the storyline in our content analysis of the first three episodes.

1. Bias against Muslims will shift following exposure to the counterterrorism treatment show.
   a. Bias will increase for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as fighting Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan, Sandrine Arnaud, or Victor Polizzi.
   b. Bias will decrease for viewers who identify with Muslim protagonists, like Hanin Ali or Jim Greer.

Further, I expect exposure to the treatment show will affect audience members' policy attitudes through narrative persuasion. I hypothesize:

2. Favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria will increase.
   a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with military characters portrayed as fighting Muslim antagonists, like UAV operator Victor Polizzi.
3. Favor toward accepting Syrian refugees into the U.S. will decrease.
   a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with Syrian Muslim protagonist Hanin Ali.
   b. Favor will decrease for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as fighting Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan or French intelligence agent Sandrine Arnaud.
4. Favor toward using drone strikes to target Islamic militants will increase.
   a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with UAV operator Victor Polizzi.
   b. Favor will increase for viewers who dislike Muslim terrorist characters, like Mousa bin Suleiman or Yazid.

6.3.2.2 Tolerance Show: This is Us

I chose *This is Us* as the tolerance treatment show and as a comparison to the counterterrorism treatment show. It does not contain any characters or storylines likely to influence counterterrorism policy attitudes. It contains no overtly Muslim characters, nor does it discuss terrorism or foreign policies. After selecting this show, I also found that it depicts a great deal of intergroup contact. The main characters comprise three siblings—a white man, a white overweight woman, and a Black man, who was adopted. The Black man, Randall, meets his biological father, who spent many years abusing drugs, and they begin to build a relationship in the first three episodes. These episodes also follow the obese woman, Kate, as she navigates her emotions and struggles with her health. Their mother, Rebecca, has remarried a Latino man,

Miguel. This show provided a clear mediated intergroup contact treatment, but one very different from the counterterrorism treatment.

As such, I expect that exposure to the tolerance treatment show, *This Is Us*, will influence audience members' overall outgroup tolerance as a result of mediated intergroup contact. I hypothesize:

5. Bias toward outgroup members will decrease following exposure to the tolerance show.

6.3.2.3 *Binge Effects Hypothesis*

However, for those exposed to a treatment show in a binge watching group, I expect these attitude shifts to appear immediately following exposure and then to diminish or disappear over time. Specifically, I hypothesize:

6. Attitude shifts that appear after exposure to any treatment will fade more quickly in audience members of the binge groups than those of the weekly groups.

Overall, I assert that exposure to the counterterrorism show or the tolerance show will provide mediated intergroup contact, and that exposure to mediated intergroup contact in the counterterrorism show in particular may increase bias against Muslims. Further, participants exposed to the counterterrorism show will be more likely to favor counterterrorism policies that target Muslims or Muslim-majority countries than participants exposed to the tolerance show. However, these attitude shifts will diminish or disappear for participants in the binge group after several weeks. One condition that may alter these effects is identification, which may cause some participants in the treatment group to exhibit less bias toward Muslims than participants in the control groups. This is because identification may increase the effects of mediated intergroup contact, regardless of the harmful stereotypes of Islamic militants included in the counterterrorism treatment.

6.4   Data and Methods

In February and March of 2020,[15] 144 undergraduate students[16] at a diverse university with over 54,000 students took part in a seven-week laboratory experiment consisting of six components—three surveys and three treatment sessions. I chose undergraduate students for this case study because young adults report the highest levels of binge watching (Sabin 2018) and, therefore, may be most likely to exhibit binge effects as the new "normal" for entertainment consumption patterns. As detailed earlier in this chapter, participants completed an online pre-treatment survey during the week prior to the first treatment session. All participants proceeded to attend three treatment sessions, during which they watched one episode of their assigned show per sessions. Participants assigned to either binge group (71 participants) completed all three treatment sessions in one day during Week 2 of the study. Participants assigned to one of the weekly groups (73) completed their first treatment session during Week 2, their second session during Week 3, and their third during Week 4. As such, binge group participants took the post-treatment survey after their third session in Week 2, whereas weekly group participants took the post-treatment survey after their third session in Week 4. Participants received a follow-up email in Week 7 to complete the follow-up survey. For their time, participants were provided three points of extra credit to an introductory political science class grade, a $5 Amazon gift card for completing the post-treatment survey, and an additional $5 Amazon gift card for completing the follow-up survey.[17]

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[15] All treatment sessions were completed prior to the university lockdown and the shelter-in-place orders carried out due to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Participants completed the follow-up survey online.

[16] Originally 226 students agreed to participate and took the pre-treatment survey, but only 159 participants showed up for the first session. Session two received 155 participants, and during session three attendance dropped to 147 participants. Of these 147 participants, two did not complete the post-treatment survey, and one had not completed the pre-treatment survey, leaving 144 participants who completed all but the follow-up survey.

[17] The gift cards were funded by an internal research grant awarded by the Georgia State University Political Science Department.

6.4.1   *Recruitment and Participants*

Recruitment was conducted using a political science research pool, which provides

undergraduates students enrolled in introductory political science classes to participate in

political science research studies for extra credit in those classes. The call for participants was

posted online on the Sona System platform during week one of the study. After attrition, 144

students participated in the full study up to the follow-up survey, and 112 participants also

completed the follow-up survey (Table 12). The sample was predominately female (102

participants, approximately 71%), with 41 participants identifying as male and one participant

identifying as non-binary or other. However, this was evenly distributed across the four groups

with males as 9, 10, or 11 participants in each group (Appendix C). Approximately 92% of

participants (132) are aged 18 to 21, with 10 participants aged 22 to 27, one participant aged 39,

and one participant aged 45. Unsurprisingly, 124 participants indicated that they often prefer to

binge watch shows rather than watch them weekly, with only 20 participants saying they prefer

to watch weekly. The weekly watchers were slightly more likely to be assigned to a binge group,

with seven of these participants randomly assigned to each binge group and three randomly

assigned to each weekly group.

Table 12 Experiment Participants by Group

	Counterterrorism (*Jack Ryan*)	Tolerance (*This Is Us*)
Binge Group	35	36
Weekly Group	41	32

Of the eight religion options, approximately 60% responded they either had no preference

(43 participants) or selected "other" (45). Four preferred not to say, another four identified as

Hindu, and 14 identified as Muslim. Of these 14 Muslims, the weekly group watching the control

show contained 2 participants, while the three other groups contained 4 Muslim participants each. No participants identified as Jewish or pagan. Christians made up approximately 24% (34) of participants, with 18 identifying as Catholic and 16 as Protestant. The sample was largely non-white, with the largest group identifying as Black or African American (54 participants, 38%). Only 24 participants identified as white (17%), with 31 identifying as Asian (22%), 15 identifying as Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin (10%), three identifying as Middle Eastern or North African, and two identifying as Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. Fifteen participants (10%) indicated some combination of these identities or selected "other." These factors—age, religion, and race/ethnicity—demonstrate that the sample is not nationally representative. However, this study is not looking to represent American beliefs, but is instead intended to examine the effects of entertainment media exposure and the contemporary consumption method of binge watching on narrative persuasion. As such, the results provided by this sample are still useful for understanding these effects.

Overwhelming, 78% of participants indicated they are likely to vote in the 2020 elections, with 73 participants saying they are extremely likely to vote. Only seven participants said they are extremely or moderately unlikely to vote, with five participants indicating neutrality. The majority of the sample identifies as democrat (82 participants, 57%), with 38 undecided participants (26%), 6 republicans, 12 independents, 4 libertarians, and 2 claiming "other." Participants also listed their parents as largely democrat (69 participants, 48%), with 43 claiming they "don't know" their parents' political affiliation (30%), 19 listing their parents as republican (13%), three as independent, two as libertarian, three as "other," and five claiming their parents identify with different parties. I include parental indicators as an additional

understanding of my young sample. While university students may lean liberal, more specific policy attitudes can sometimes align more closely with familial beliefs.

Most participants claimed they engage with social media every day (110 participants, 76%), but their responses were less patterned for news media. The majority of participants (83 participants, 58%) indicated they engage with news media one to three days per week, with only 14 participants indicating they never engage with news media and 15 indicating they engage with news media every day. More participants, however, reported that they only pay attention to the news a little (67 participants) or a moderate amount (45). As with social media, participants were more likely to say they engage with non-news media every day (67 participants). They also indicated they much prefer to binge watch an episodic show than to watch one episode per week, with 124 participants (86%) preferring to binge. However, these participants are spread across the four groups, with seven participants in each of the binge groups and three participants in each of the weekly groups who prefer to watch weekly.

6.4.2   Surveys

In addition to demographics questions in the pre-treatment survey, I include social and political attitudes questions on all three surveys, and I include show-specific questions on the post-treatment survey. The social and political attitude questions are intended to measure the effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact by examining views toward Muslims and approval of counterterrorism strategies that target Muslim-majority countries. I used the same questions from the survey study discussed in Chapter 5, which ask about whether Islam is more likely to promote violence than other religions, whether they are concerned about a terrorism attack on the U.S. in the near future, whether they believe a member from several groups is likely to carry out a terrorist attack on the U.S. in the near future—one of the eight

groups being Muslims. I asked the same two policy questions from the survey in Chapter 5, how much participants favor allowing Syrian refugees to come to American and how much they favor sending U.S. troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria. Because the *Jack Ryan* episodes include the side story of a UAV operator, I also included a question that asks participants how much they favor using drone strikes to target terrorists in other countries.

For the show-specific questions, I aim to measure two key aspects of narrative persuasion: Absorption and identification. I directly ask participants to report how absorbed or "sucked in" they felt to the storyline. However, most Americans have little to no knowledge about the differences between the types of identification—namely cognitive-emotional identification, perceived similarity, wishful identification, and parasocial interaction. To gain better responses to an identification question about the main characters of a show, I decided to first briefly explain identification and then to use general language to describe the meaning behind each type rather than provide their technical terms. For example, rather than asking whether participants experienced wishful identification toward a character, I asked whether they might "want to be more like this character" (Appendix B).

6.4.3   Results

The key relationships I examine are the differences between the four groups over time regarding social bias toward Muslims and regarding counterterrorism policy attitudes. Differences in the pre-treatment and post-treatment survey responses between the groups that viewed the tolerance show, *This is Us*, and those that viewed the counterterrorism show, *Jack Ryan*, should evidence the effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact embedded in the treatments. Differences in the post-treatment and follow-up survey responses between the binge groups and the weekly groups should indicate whether binge watching altered

these effects in some way. In particular, I look at four dependent variables: Association of Muslims with terrorism (social bias) and favor toward sending U.S. ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria, accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S., and using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists abroad (policy views). Each of the four variables were calculated on a 7-point scale.

I begin my evaluation of the experiment's results by examining whether there were indeed differences between participants exposed to the counterterrorism show (*Jack Ryan*) and those exposed to the tolerance show (*This Is Us*). I used t-test analyses to compare the means between the counterterrorism and tolerance treatment groups prior to the treatment, immediately following the treatment, and at the follow-up point in Week 7 of the experiment. Table 13 displays the results of these analyses, and I observe several notable shifts in the differences between them.

Table 13 Comparison of Differences of Means Between Tolerance and Counterterrorism Groups
Survey Results Over Time

Social Variable			Tolerance	CT Show	*t*-value	*p*-value
Bias	Pre-treatment	Mean	4.104*	3.579*	1.786	0.076
		(SD)	(1.793)	(1.723)		
	Post-treatment		3.881	3.618	0.832	0.407
			(2.033)	(1.736)		
	Follow-up		3.455	3.526	-0.232	0.817
			(1.698)	(1.582)		

Policy Variables			Tolerance	CT Show	*t*-value	*p*-value
Troops	Pre-treatment	Mean	-0.338	-0.039	-1.085	0.280
		(SD)	(1.617)	(1.677)		
	Post-treatment		-0.059	0.066	-0.489	0.625
			(1.185)	(1.561)		
	Follow-up		-0.182	-0.175	-0.022	0.983
			(1.657)	(1.453)		
Refugees	Pre-treatment	Mean	1.015**	1.697**	-2.971	0.004
		(SD)	(1.511)	(1.244)		
	Post-treatment		1.015**	1.474**	-1.994	0.048
			(1.321)	(1.428)		
	Follow-up		1.018*	1.509*	-1.958	0.053
			(1.269)	(1.377)		
Drones	Pre-treatment	Mean	-0.338	-0.342	0.014	0.989
		(SD)	(1.681)	(1.621)		
	Post-treatment		-0.397*	0.158*	-1.956	0.052
			(1.631)	(1.759)		
	Follow-up		-0.4	-0.193	-0.621	0.536
			(1.791)	(1.737)		

T-Test Difference of Means Analysis
N=76 for pre- and post-treatment and n=57 for follow-up counterterrorism groups.
N=68 for pre- and post-treatment and n=55 for follow-up tolerance groups for policy variables.
N=67 for pre- and post-treatment tolerance groups for bias variable.
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Namely, I observe only five points of statistically significant treatment effects between

participants exposed to the counterterrorism show and those exposed to the tolerance show. The

first statistically significant difference of means occurs between participants in the tolerance versus the counterterrorism groups at the pre-treatment point for bias against Muslims. While this should have been addressed through random assignment, which occurred at the pre-treatment point when participants signed up for the study, the small sample could decrease the effects of this randomization. I continue to take this into account when moving forward with my analysis. The specific survey question used as a proxy for the social bias dependent variables measures participants' association of Muslims with terrorist activity. Here, I find the probability value reflects that after exposure to the treatment shows, it becomes less likely that the social bias means of the counterterrorism and tolerance groups are statistically different. While the pre-treatment correlation between these groups could be termed statistically significant within a 90% confidence interval, this probability entirely diminishes at the post-treatment and follow-up points. Given that participants in the tolerance groups begin with a higher level of bias, meaning they were more likely to associate Muslims with terrorist activity than participants in the counterterrorism groups, this shift could indicate a several causes. First, it is possible that the samples are biased and no treatment effects are actually present. However, it could also indicate either that participants in the tolerance groups' bias lessened during the experiment or that participants counterterrorism groups' bias increased, or both, as was the expectation.

Regarding the policy variables, the statistically significant differences in means between participants exposed to the counterterrorism treatment show and those exposed to the comparison show, the tolerance treatment show, occur at all time points for the refugees dependent variable and at the post-treatment point for the drone strikes dependent variable. They do not occur at all for the troops variable. In my hypotheses, I state that exposure to the counterterrorism show will likely increase favor toward the troops and drone strike variables and decrease favor toward the

refugee variable. I further hypothesize that character identification may influence these effects.

In the t-test results, the troops variable shows no statistically significant difference between the

counterterrorism and tolerance groups at any point in the experiment, while the Syrian refugees

variable shows statistically significant correlations at all three survey points in the experiment.

The drone variable shows no significance at the pre-treatment point, statistical significance at the

post-treatment point, and no significance at the follow-up point. This indicates that the

counterterrorism show likely had an impact for attitudes toward using drone strikes, but that

effects on the other policy dependent variables are either null or nuanced.

6.4.3.1 Social Bias

My first and fifth hypotheses suggest that exposure to either one treatment show or the

other will affect social bias. More specifically, I hypothesize:

H_1: Bias against Muslims will shift following exposure to the counterterrorism show.

H_{1a}: Bias will increase for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as

fighting Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan, Sandrine Arnaud, or Victor Polizzi.

H_{1b}: Bias will decrease for viewers who identify with Muslim protagonists, like

Hanin Ali.

H_5: Bias toward outgroups will decrease following exposure to the tolerance show.

As a proxy for measuring social bias, I created the bias dependent variable from a survey

question asking participants how likely they think it is that a member from one of eight social

groups will commit a terrorist attack on the U.S. in the near future. The social groups were

Blacks, whites, Muslims, Christians, right-wing activists, left-wing activists, Russians, and

Chinese, and responses were provided on a 7-point scale from "extremely unlikely" to

"extremely likely." Because I expect the counterterrorism treatment to influence bias toward

Muslims, I keyed in on responses solely addressing how likely participants were to associate Muslims with an imminent terrorist attack in the U.S.

To better evaluate my hypotheses regarding bias against Muslims, I ran several OLS regression models using post-treatment bias, change in bias between the pre- and post-treatment points, and change in bias between the pre-treatment and follow-up points as my dependent variable. In each model, I controlled for treatment show, consumption type, party identification, race, religion, and having recently traveled outside the U.S. Using post-treatment bias as my dependent variable, I found that being white negatively correlated with bias with 90 percent confidence. However, including pre-treatment bias in this model erased this correlation. Running the same two models separately for participants exposed to each show, I found that identifying as Christian correlated with 95 percent confidence for participants exposed to the counterterrorism treatment.

When using change between the pre- and post-treatment points as my dependent variable, I found a positive correlation with identifying as Christian with 95 percent confidence for participants exposed to the counterterrorism show. When examining change between the pre-treatment and follow-up points, I found a negative correlation with identifying as Democrat with 90 percent confidence for participants exposed to the tolerance show and a positive correlation with identifying as Christian with 90 percent confidence for participants exposed to the counterterrorism show. I also found a positive correlation between exposure to the counterterrorism show and increased bias between the pre-treatment and follow-up points. These results indicate treatment effects are at work in one or both of the treatment shows, with individuals exposed to the counterterrorism show displaying greater bias than those exposed to the tolerance show over time.

Table 14 Pairwise Comparisons for Two-way Repeated Measures ANOVA for Social Bias

	Mean Difference	Standard Error	*p*-value
All Participants			
Pre- to Post-Treatment	0.066	0.168	1.000
Post-Treatment to Follow-up	0.279	0.151	0.201
Pre-Treatment to Follow-up	0.345	0.170	0.135
Tolerance Treatment			
Pre- to Post-Treatment	0.207	0.237	1.000
Post-Treatment to Follow-up	0.418	0.240	0.265
Pre-Treatment to Follow-up	0.625*	0.232	0.029
Counterterrorism Treatment			
Pre- to Post-Treatment	-0.072	0.232	1.000
Post-Treatment to Follow-up	0.139	0.186	1.000
Pre-Treatment to Follow-up	0.067	0.244	1.000

*p<0.05

To better understand these results, I ran three two-way repeated measures ANOVA models using binge effects and identifying as Christian as the control variables. The three models included 1. all participants, 2. participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, or 3. participants exposed to the tolerance show. All three two-way repeated measures ANOVA models passed Mauchly's test of sphericity at p=0.321 (all participants), p=0.075 (counterterrorism), and p=0.964 (tolerance).

Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: christian = .28

Error bars: 95% CI

Figure 3 *Estimated Marginal Means of Bias for Tolerance Groups Derived from Repeated Measures Two—Way ANOVA*

Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: christian = .25

Error bars: 95% CI

Figure 4 *Estimated Means of Bias for Counterterrorism Groups Derived from Repeated Measures Two—Way ANOVA*

In reviewing the three sets of pairwise comparisons for each time period, I found only one statistically significant shift with 95 percent confidence, which occurs for participants exposed to the tolerance show between the post-treatment and follow-up points (Table 14). However, none showed statistically significant differences between weekly and binge watchers. Figures 3 and 4 provide visual depictions of the estimated marginal means from these two-way repeated measures ANOVA models. I include these figures because they provide additional information about directionality. Although the statistically significant shift occurs only between the pre-treatment and post-treatment points for participants exposed to the tolerance show, there is additional information to be gleaned from the direction of this shift and the non-statistically significant shifts in other groups. For both weekly and binge watchers exposed to the tolerance show, there is a steady decline in bias across all three points (Figure 3). What makes the shift particularly interesting is where it occurs: From above 4 to around 3.5. Given the response options in the survey question used to measure bias against Muslims, the number 4 denotes the point of neutrality between "slightly likely" at 5 and "slightly unlikely" at 3.

This shift from above the point of neutrality to below the point of neutrality over the length of the experiment, in conjunction with statistical significance, could support the assertion of Hypothesis 5 that exposure over time to the positive intergroup relationships depicted in the tolerance show will lead to decreased bias toward outgroups in real life. The results could also indicate stronger mediated intergroup contact effects than previously discussed in the literature. No Muslim, Middle Eastern or Arab, or terrorist characters exist in the tolerance show episodes, nor is there any discussion of Islam or terrorism. Yet, the overt intergroup relationships depicted between whites, African Americans, and persons from other marginalized groups seem to evoke a mediated effect on overall tolerance toward members from any outgroup.

Participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, however, exhibit little to no shift in their responses between the pre-treatment and post-treatment points—statistically significant or otherwise. Both the binge and weekly watchers exposed to the counterterrorism show provided averages responses below the point of neutrality at all three time points, indicating they were already less likely to associate Muslims with terrorism than their counterparts in the tolerance groups. The slight increase exhibited by weekly watchers visible at the post-treatment point could instead indicate some form of demand bias, in which respondents became aware of the research agenda to some extent and were more likely to respond to this question with neutral attitudes rather than an indication of true attitudes.

As a final test of mediated intergroup contact effects on counterterrorism group participants, I used linear regression analyses to examine whether identifying with different characters affected the social bias dependent variable (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). Hypothesis 1a suggests that viewers who identify in some way with characters portrayed with fighting terrorism would be more likely to associate Muslims with terrorism; whereas, Hypothesis 1b asserts that viewers who identify in some way with Muslim protagonist characters would by less likely to exhibit this bias. The original question regarding identification provides laymen descriptions for four different types of character identification: Cognitive-emotional identification, wishful identification, parasocial interaction, and an inverse identification type of whether participants disliked the character. I dichotomized individual characters into whether participants expressed one of the positive forms of identification versus whether they expressed dislike or no identification, and I ran an OLS regression on post-treatment bias including all dichotomous identification variables and the control variables of pre-treatment bias and identifying with the Christian religion (Table 15).

Table 15 OLS Regression on Association of Muslims with Terrorism for Counterterrorism Show

Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism

	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	*p*-value
Pretest Bias	0.534**	0.101	5.27	0.000
Christian	1.202*	0.428	2.80	0.007
Jack Ryan	0.790	0.962	0.82	0.415
Victor Polizzi	0.712*	0.354	2.04	0.049
Sandrine Arnaud	0.496	0.396	1.25	0.215
Jim Greer	0.113	0.421	0.27	0.789
Hanin Ali	0.058	0.747	0.08	0.939
Fathi al-Abbas	-0.477	0.486	-0.98	0.330
Ali bin Suleiman	-0.554	0.432	-1.28	0.204
Mousa bin Suleiman	1.105	0.683	1.62	0.111
Yazid	-2.673*	1.127	-2.37	0.021
Constant	0.357	0.937	0.38	0.705

N=74, Prob>F=0.0000, R-squared=0.4681
*p<0.05, **p<0.001

In addition to the two control variables, I found identification with two characters, Victor and Yazid, to be statistically significant with 95 percent confidence. Yazid is one of the few speaking Muslim characters who does not receive a detailed background story and who is featured in a solely villain-like role. He is also killed via drone strike by the character Victor, a UAV operator portrayed in episodes two and three in a subplot only related to the main story through this killing. While the show does not expose Victor's background in the same way it does lead characters, like Jack Ryan, the subplot does explore his clear aversion to the work at

hand through self-destructive behaviors. In the third episode, Victor goes against his commanding officer to shoot down Yazid as Yazid attempts to rape the Muslim female protagonist, Hanin. Interestingly, Victor and Yazid are two characters who are given only one valence: Yazid is presented in a negative valence as a typical "bad guy" villain and as the more typical Muslim terrorist stereotype character, as described in Chapter 5. Victor is portrayed in a positive valence as a "good guy" military type, a hero who protects women, and as a winner—having won $35,000 in a single night at a casino. Though we are shown his contempt for this money and the work he does, the final scenes of episode three show him clearly placed in the hero trope taking down Yazid, who has been framed in solely negative terms.

Identification with the Muslim terrorist character, Yazid, negatively correlated with association of Muslims with terrorism, indicating that a lack of identification with Yazid increased association of Muslims with terrorism. Identification with Victor, as expected, positively correlated with associating Muslims with terrorism. These results could point to the mixed frames of the lead characters having a mixed impact on bias toward Muslims in the counterterrorism treatment groups. The results confirm my Hypothesis 1a, which asserts that identification with a character portrayed as fighting Muslim terrorists, e.g. Victor, will increase participants' association of Muslims with terrorism. While the results do not directly confirm Hypothesis 1b, which suggests that identification with a Muslim protagonist character will decrease bias, they do support an inverse of this assertion: Failing to identify with a character who fits the Muslim terrorist stereotype, e.g. Yazid, correlates with increased association of Muslims with terrorism.

Overall, the results provide evidence to support Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 5, but fail to support Hypotheses 1 and 6. In sum, mediated intergroup contact appears evident in participants

exposed to the tolerance show (Hypothesis 5), but may be more nuanced in participants exposed to the counterterrorism show (Hypothesis 1). Identification appears to play a key role in determining the effects of mediated intergroup contact (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). However, binge effects do not appear to greatly affect the influence of mediated intergroup contact within these contexts (Hypothesis 6).

6.4.3.2 *Policy Attitudes*

The policy attitudes I use to examine narrative persuasion are favor toward sending U.S. ground troops to fight Islamic militants such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, favor toward accepting Syrian refugees into the U.S., and favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other countries. In Chapter 5, I observed a statistically significant positive correlation between accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype and favor toward sending ground troops. I chose to also include a question regarding drone strikes because of the drone operator subplot included in episodes two and three of *Jack Ryan*. Responses to all three questions were measured on a 7-point Likert scale from "oppose a great deal" to "favor a great deal."

6.4.3.2.1 Sending U.S. Ground Troops

My second hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria. More specifically, I hypothesize:

> H_2: Favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria will increase following exposure to the counterterrorism show.
>
> > H_{2a}: Favor will increase for viewers who identify with military characters portrayed as fighting Muslim antagonists, like UAV operator Victor Polizzi.

Although no statistically significant differences were apparent for this variable in my
initial t-test results, I examined the pre- and post-treatment points further to assess possible binge
effects. I conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA for the binge and weekly
counterterrorism groups on favor toward sending U.S. ground troops to fight Islamic militants in
Iraq and Syria at three points in time (pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up). Again, no
correlations were statistically significant, but the graph produced provided additional evidence of
potential demand bias in participants at the post-treatment point (Figure 5).

Figure 5 Favor Toward Sending U.S. Ground Troops to Fight Islamic Militants

While the pre-treatment and follow-up attitude means are distinctly different regarding
the troops policy, the post-treatment attitude means are nearly the same, converging at the point
of neutrality not unlike the results of the bias variable. Participants in the binge counterterrorism
group were more likely to express opposition to this policy at the pre-treatment and follow-up
points, while those in the weekly counterterrorism group were more likely to express opposition
at these points. The means of both groups, however, converge at the point of neutrality at the

post-treatment point, indicating mixed treatment effects or, more likely, some form of demand bias. Because participants responded to the post-treatment survey immediately after screening episode three, respondents likely gleaned some understanding of the research agenda. As such, the lack in opinion shift between the pre-treatment and follow-up points indicates little influence of the treatment on attitudes toward sending group troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria, thereby rejecting Hypothesis 2. Additional regression models reviewing potential identification influence showed no statistically significant correlations, thereby also rejecting the sub-hypotheses for this dependent variable regarding identification. Furthermore , as there were no statistically significant differences between the binge and weekly groups, this dependent variable offers no evidence to support Hypothesis 6 regarding binge effects.

6.4.3.2.2 Accepting Syrian Refugees into the U.S.

My third hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. More specifically, I hypothesize:

H_3: Favor toward accepting Syrian refugees into the U.S. will decrease following exposure to the counterterrorism show.

H_{3a}: Favor will increase for viewers who identify with the Syrian Muslim protagonist Hanin Ali.

H_{3b}: Favor will decrease for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as fighting Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan or Sandrine Arnaud.

Because the initial t-tests showed statistically significant differences between the counterterrorism and tolerance groups at all three time points (Table 13), I ran a series of linear regressions to determine which factors were likely influencing this policy attitude. For all participants within the experiment, race and party identification showed statistically significant

correlations with change in the refugees variables between the time periods, indicating these identities may have been influenced by either the counterterrorism or the tolerance show. In these models, individuals who identified as white or as Democrat were more likely to exhibit decreased favor toward the refugee policy over time (Appendix C). When examining these factors in the counterterrorism and tolerance groups separately, I find distinct differences within each group and across time points.

For participants exposed to the tolerance show, being a Democrat negatively correlated with increased favor toward the refugee policy between the pre- and post-treatment points with statistical significance at 90 percent confidence. Identifying as Democrat, white, or Christian showed the same negative statistically significant correlation between the pre-treatment and follow-up points with 90 percent confidence. Though my initial hypothesis considered only the impact of the counterterrorism treatment on attitudes toward the refugee policy, the tolerance show may have influenced attitudes toward this variable through triggering these identities. Regarding participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, however, only being Christian showed a positive statistically significant correlation with 95 percent confidence on attitude change between the pre- and post-treatment points, but not between the pre-treatment and follow-up points. In other words, Christians exposed to the counterterrorism show were more likely to exhibit increased favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. between the pre- and post-treatment points. Christians, Democrats, and whites exposed to the tolerance show, however, were more likely to exhibit decreased favor toward this policy across the experiment. This could indicate that while the means between the two treatments are statistically different across the span of the experiment, treatment effects may still be at work in either or both shows.

As this hypothesis was initially created to explain treatment and binge effects in participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, I continued testing on these participants only. I ran another linear regression to examine the impact of identification with key characters, and I found evidence supporting my sub-hypothesis 3b, which asserts that identification with characters depicted as fighting Muslim antagonists would decrease favor toward the refugee policy. In this case, identifying with the French intelligence agent Sandrine Arnaud negatively correlated with a positive change in favor between the pre-treatment and follow-up points toward accepting Syrian refugees. This means individuals who identified with Sandrine were more likely to exhibit decreasing favor toward the refugee policy across the span of the experiment. In episode three, Sandrine discusses with Jack Ryan her opinion regarding Paris's issues with Muslim immigrants. She describes her perception that French people generally do not accept social identifications other than French nationality. Many Muslim immigrants, she explains, cling to their identity as Muslims over their new identities as being French. This discussion could factor into why identification with Sandrine seems to influence participants' opposition to accepting Syrian, likely Muslim, immigrants into the U.S.

To best understand the relationship of these factors with the dependent variable, I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA model including identification with the Christian religion or with the character Sandrine as covariates (Table 16). The model passes Mauchly's test of sphericity with a significance level of $p=0.099$. While attitudes toward the refugee policy in the binge and weekly counterterrorism groups do not show statistically significant differences in means over time, $F(2,104)=0.42$, $p=0.658$, I do find that the main effects of the model show approach significance for the interaction of the dependent variable over time for both covariates with 90 percent confidence. Identifying as a Christian significantly correlates with attitudes

toward the refugee policy over time, $F(2,104)=2.867$, $p=0.061$, and identifying with the character

Sandrine also correlates significantly with attitudes toward the refugee policy over time,

$F(2,104)=2.785$, $p=0.066$.

Table 16 Simple Effects for Two-Way Repeated Measures ANOVA for Counterterrorism Show

Favor Toward Accepting Syrian Refugees to the U.S.

CT Participants	*p*-value	F-value	df	
Time Period	0.658	0.420	2	
Time*Christian	0.061	2.867	2	
Time*Sandrine	0.066	2.785	2	
Time*Binge	0.709	0.345	2	
Error			104	cont. next pg.
CT Weekly Group	*p*-value	F-value	df	
Time Period	0.659	0.421	2	
Time*Christian	0.225	0.528	2	
Time*Sandrine	0.586	0.538	2	
Error			64	
CT Binge Group				
Time Period	0.916	0.088	2	
Time*Christian	0.198	1.692	2	
Time*Sandrine	0.095	2.510	2	
Error			36	

In reviewing the simple effects of this model across consumption type, I find that the

weekly counterterrorism group (n=35) and the binge counterterrorism group (n=21) pass

Mauchly's test of sphericity at p=0.216 (weekly) and p=0.086 (binge). The simple effects show only a statistically significant correlation for identification with the character Sandrine in the binge group with 90 percent confidence (Table 16). This indicates that binge watching the episodes could have allowed this character to have a stronger effect on audience members.

Results of the between-subjects tests suggest the same conclusion. While no difference exists in policy attitudes between the binge and weekly groups, $F(1,52)=0.388$, $p=0.536$, there does appear to be significant difference between the groups in terms of identifying with the character Sandrine, $F(1,52)=3.444$, $p=0.069$. This suggests that while binge effects may not directly alter narrative persuasion, they could interfere with identification, a key factor both in diminishing reactance to narrative persuasion and in fostering mediated intergroup contact effects.

In sum, the results provide neither evidence to support Hypothesis 3, which asserts that exposure to the counterterrorism show would decrease favor toward the refugee policy, nor Hypothesis 3a, which suggests the counterterrorism show may increase favor in participants who identified with a Muslim protagonist. Further, it does not provide evidence of binge effects (Hypothesis 6). However, it does provide evidence to support Hypothesis 1b, which asserts that exposure to the counterterrorism show would decrease favor toward the refugee policy in participants who identified with one of the characters portrayed as fighting Muslim terrorists, e.g. Sandrine.

6.4.3.2.3 Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists Outside the U.S.

My fourth hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists outside the U.S. More specifically, I hypothesize:

H_4: Favor toward using drone strikes to target Islamic militants will increase following

exposure to the counterterrorism show.

> H_{4a}: Favor will increase for viewers who identify with UAV operator Victor
>
> Polizzi.
>
> H_{4b}: Favor will increase for viewers who dislike Muslim terrorist characters, like
>
> Mousa bin Suleiman or Yazid.

Initial t-tests of treatment effects on the drone strikes policy variable show statistically

significant differences between the counterterrorism and tolerance groups only at the post-

treatment point, potentially indicating diminished effects at the follow-up point. To better

understand these differences, I ran a series of linear regression analyses to determine potential

demographic influences on change in attitudes toward the drone policy variable. I confirmed the

statistically significant difference with 95 percent confidence in attitudes at the post-treatment

point between participants exposed to the counterterrorism show and those exposed to the

tolerance show, which those exposed to the tolerance show being more likely to favor using

drone strike to target terrorists. Using change in attitude as the dependent variable, I also found

that consumption type displayed a statistically significant correlation with 95 percent confidence

between the pre- and post-treatment points, which binge watchers being less likely to exhibit and

increase in favor toward the drone policy.

Given that identification with the two characters most deeply affected by the drone strike

subplot in episode three, Victor and Yazid, also significantly correlated with the social bias

dependent variable, I ran a second set of regressions to determine whether the same was true for

the drone policy variable. In my initial regression, I find that identification with neither of these

characters correlates with the drone policy variable. When I include consumption type as a

control variable in this model, however, I find that identification with Ali Suleiman, brother to

the primary antagonist Mousa bin Suleiman, negatively correlates with favor toward using drone

strikes with 90 percent confidence. This result could indicate that increased empathy or

sympathy toward this character, who is injured in episode two by a raid and whom we learn more

about in episode three, decreases favor toward the drone policy. Episode three reveals more

information about Ali's backstory, his desire to be an artist and his kindness and empathy toward

an old friend who takes Ali in when he is injured. This humanization could play a role in

decreasing favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists. In either case, treatment

effects and binge effects appear to be present.

I conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the influence of consumption

method of the counterterrorism treatment on favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill

terrorists abroad at the pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up time points. I ran a two-way

repeated measures ANOVA model, including covariates for being Christian and for identifying

with the characters Victor, Yazid, or Ali. This model passed Mauchly's tests of sphericity with a

p=0.290 significance level. In reviewing the main effects, there was again statistical significance

for binge effects over time, $F(2, 98)=4.408$ and p=0.015. Identification with Yazid also showed

significance with 90 percent confidence, $F(2, 98)=2.557$ and p=0.083, though neither the religion

nor the other identification covariates correlated with the drone policy variable with statistical

significance.

Table 17 Pairwise Comparisons of Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes for Counterterrorism Treatment Groups

	Mean Diff.	**Standard Error**	***p*-value**
Counterterrorism Participants			
Pre- to Post-Treatment	-0.314	0.234	0.559
Post-Treatment to Follow-up	0.191	0.203	1.000
Pre-Treatment to Follow-up	-0.122	0.196	1.000
CT Weekly Group			
Pre- to Post-Treatment	-0.886*	0.265	0.006
Post-Treatment to Follow-up	0.543*	0.240	0.091
Pre-Treatment to Follow-up	-0.343	0.221	0.388
CT Binge Group			
Pre- to Post-Treatment	0.136	0.391	1.000
Post-Treatment to Follow-up	-0.045	0.305	1.000
Pre-Treatment to Follow-up	0.091	0.335	1.000

I then split the consumption groups to separately analyze the simple effects for binge and weekly watchers, both of which pass Mauchly's text of sphericity at p=0.467 (weekly, n=35) and p=0.401 (binge, n=22). However, only the weekly group shows statistically significant effects for the drone strike policy variable over time, $F(2,68)=6.778$, p=0.002. The pairwise comparisons across time for each consumption type bear out this finding, indicating that only the weekly counterterrorism group experienced the expected counterterrorism show treatment effects (Table 17).

Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: victor1 = .49, ali1 = .25, yazid1 = .04

Error bars: 95% CI

Figure 6 Drone Policy Attitudes by Consumption Type for Counterterrorism Treatment

Participants in the binge group at all three time points provided a mean response lower than the point of neutrality, indicating opposition to the drone strike policy. Interestingly, participants in the weekly group exhibit a mean at the pre-treatment and follow-up points below the point of neutrality, but exhibit a mean above the point of neutrality at the post-treatment point, indicating a shift toward favor of the drone strike policy. This may reveal drench effects related to episode three of the counterterrorism show, which portrays a successful drone strike made by a likable American, Victor, against a decided foreign villain, Yazid, in its final scenes. These drench effects could have been diminished for binge watchers experiencing fatigue after having watched two episodes immediately prior to viewing the same episode three that affected weekly watchers so significantly. It could also indicate some type of demand bias in either the weekly or binge group. Either way, there remains a significant difference in attitudes toward the

drone policy across the experiment between the weekly and binge groups, indicating some form of consumption method effects.

Overall, the results provide evidence that supports Hypothesis 4, which asserts that exposure to the counterterrorism treatment will affect attitudes toward the drone strike policy. Hypothesis 4a suggests that identification with a Muslim protagonist would decrease favor toward the drone policy, whereas Hypothesis 4b asserts that identification with a dislike or lack of identification with a Muslim antagonist would increase favor toward the drone policy. However, the related sub-hypotheses have no direct evidentiary support. While no statistically significant shifts occurred in policy views for participants in the binge counterterrorism group, participants in the weekly counterterrorism group exhibited the effects expected of the binge group in Hypothesis 6, which suggests that treatment effects will increases significantly at the post-treatment point, but diminish back toward original levels at the follow-up point (Figure 6). As such, Hypothesis 6 regarding binge effects is likewise not fully supported, though the results do indicate consumption method effects, as much lesser effects appeared in the binge group as opposed to the weekly group.

6.5 Discussion

The data and models presented in the results section of this chapter seek to test six main hypotheses regarding the impact of the two treatment shows on social bias, of regarding the impact of the counterterrorism treatment show on three policy attitudes, and regarding the effects of binge watching as a means of media consumption. The tests also consider the influence of character identification in enhancing these effects. However, as this experiment did not take place within a vacuum—and was designed to increase external validity by using full-length

episodes and increased mundane realism—there are several limitations of the experiment and the data to consider.

6.5.1   Limitations

First, there is little evidence of strong treatment effects between the counterterrorism and tolerance groups, with only the social bias and drone policy variables exhibiting statistically significant evidence of treatment effects aligned with my first four hypotheses (see Table 13). Although great care was taken to select the treatment shows based on their ability to directly affect the key dependent variables, this does not mean these shows were without caveat. The counterterrorism show, *Jack Ryan*, depicts multiple Muslim and terrorist characters with myriad frames and contexts. This nuanced portrayal could weaken treatment effects of mediated intergroup contact on the dependent variables. Alternately, the tolerance show, *This Is Us*, may not depict or discuss terrorism or Muslims, but it does portray positive interracial, interethnic, and other relationships that could increase mediated intergroup contact effects to include the Muslim outgroup. Together, the two effects likely led to diminished differences between the two groups regarding the social bias dependent variable.

Second, the sample itself may have been biased. The participants were largely individuals from minority groups and did not associate themselves strongly with any conservative political views. All participants were undergraduate students enrolled in either an Introduction to American Government or Global Issues course during the span of the experiment. Although the experiment took place during the first half of the semester, regular discussion of political topics—especially international political topics, which may have included immigration, global security, or the Israel-Palestine conflict—could have influenced participants' responses to survey questions about terrorism and counterterrorism policies. Further, taking the post-treatment survey

immediately following screening the third episode, and with no distractor task, likely led some participants to exhibit demand bias. This might especially be true for the binge groups, who would have been heavily immersed in the subject matter and have only taken the pre-treatment survey in the week prior to their lengthy media session.

Any one of these factors may have influenced participants' views in a more impactful way than three episodes of a show. However, this experiment was set up with the intention of inducing mundane realism for participants with the expectation that any potential results would have a significant degree of external validity. Considering participants approximately spent only three hours in a theater-like classroom watching a fictional, entertainment show, and considering other influences that potentially affected participants during the seven-week long study, any results are impressive.

6.5.2   Social Bias and Policy Attitudes

Overall, bias across all four groups decreased both at the post-treatment and follow-up points, with the only statistically significant difference in the means of the counterterrorism and tolerance groups occurring at the pre-treatment point. The only statistically significant difference in the means of these groups across time occurs within the tolerance groups between the pre-treatment and follow-up points. Together, this could indicate that the significant shift does not occur as an increase in bias in the counterterrorism groups, but as a decrease in bias in the tolerance groups. The counterterrorism show offers a nuanced depiction of Muslims and terrorists, and it also only depicts terrorist activity as occurring outside the U.S. These factors may have diminished any potential treatment effects in the counterterrorism groups regarding participants' association of Muslims with terrorist activity in the U.S. Furthermore, the overarching message of intergroup acceptance in the tolerance show for multiple social

outgroups (e.g. African Americans, drug abusers, and obese persons) likely increased tolerance of the Muslim outgroup through mediated intergroup contact effects. The results also suggest that identification plays a key role in treatment impact.

In reviewing results related to the three policy variables, there is evidence of treatment effects from the counterterrorism show. Although no effects were present for the troops variable, identification appears to interact with treatment effects on the refugees variable, particularly for participants in the binge counterterrorism group. Favor toward the drone strike policy shows the most promise not only in terms of exhibiting treatment effects on the drone variable but also regarding binge effects. Based on the literature, I had expected the an attitude shift for both weekly and binge watchers at the post-treatment point followed by a sharp decrease at the follow-up point for binge watchers. However, this attitude shift appears to only have occurred within the weekly counterterrorism group, with no statistically significant effects on the binge group. This provides evidence of narrative persuasion only for the weekly group.

Even still, this is enough evidence to support my claim that binge watching may lead to decreased entertainment media effects. Most participants, across all four groups, ranked their absorption and interest in the material as being moderate to high at the post-treatment point. However, the stark difference in treatment effects on the drone policy attitude between the binge and weekly counterterrorism watchers indicates there may be more nuanced effects at work. It could be that binge watchers were less absorbed in the material by episode three. Watching three episodes containing intense action scenes back-to-back may have saturated or inured the binge watchers' sensitivity so that the final storyline, which depicted Victor's drone attack on Yazid, made a far lesser impact. Demand bias may also have played in role in one of these groups.

6.5.3   Developing a Binge Effects Theory

While my initial hypothesis regarding binge effects does not appear to hold up under scrutiny, the results of this experiment do provide evidence that consumption method, and especially binge watching, does play a role in entertainment media effects. Binge watching may have diminished narrative persuasion of attitudes toward the drone strike policy, for example. Binge watching may also have intensified the impact of some forms of identification—binge counterterrorism watchers who identified with Sandrine were more likely to oppose the refugee policy—while diminishing the effects of other forms of identification—dislike of Yazid in weekly counterterrorism watchers increased favor toward the drone strike policy. These results may not have been expected, but they provide the first step toward better understanding the impact of entertainment media, and how we engage with it, on social and political attitudes. Future research can build on this study to better understand the effects of binge watching and how it affects the conditions of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact.

7 CONCLUSION

The Information Revolution of the 21st century has brought many changes to the lives of Americans and, with those changes, reshaped the very fabric of society through influencing social norms and introducing new conversations about the role of government and media within those norms. Not only has the media landscape vastly expanded, so too has Americans' response. Hundreds of thousands of hours of entertainment media content exist at our fingertips, leading to blogs, forums, fan sites, social media, podcasts, and other forms of entertainment reflection and parasocial interaction that would amount to millions of hours of related content. Comparatively, very little research has been done to understand how these changes affect the complex relationship humans have with entertainment media.

Markus Prior (2013) was right when he posited that increased entertainment options would decrease news consumption. Though social media has begun to fill some of those gaps in recent years, most Americans prefer to spend a quarter of their waking hours engaging with entertainment, not news media. However, Matthew Baum (2004) was also correct in asserting that even passive viewing of politically relevant soft news can influence political attitudes and behaviors. So, too, can exposure to entertainment media influence our political attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Holbert, et al. 2005; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Kearns and Young 2017; Mulligan and Habel 2011; Paluck and Green 2009). Yet, most of the research that has been done to understand the influence of entertainment media—or that of hard and soft news media—does not account for the vast and drastic changes to Americans' daily media consumption patterns that epitomize the contemporary media environment.

Contemporary media consumption patterns can be characterized by selection bias, inattentive viewing, multitasking and bingeing. Given these habits, do entertainment media

effects understood through narrative persuasion, cultivation theory, and mediated intergroup contact still exist? With this manuscript, I sought to examine the conditions and effects of contemporary entertainment media consumption patterns in the American context. I found that identification with characters, especially empathic identification, plays a much larger role in entertainment media effects than previously believed. Viewers who experience high affective orientation and empathic identification with a character involved in an onscreen intergroup relationship may express empathy toward an outgroup in real life. In Chapter 4, focus group participants discussed this effect of mediated intergroup contact not regarding social outgroups previously studied, but in relation to public policy views. They expressed increased understanding of views regarding firearm policies they had previously deemed categorically repugnant or unconscionable. Participants in the longitudinal experiment in Chapter 6 evidenced the impact of character identification on social and policy attitude shifts following exposure to the counterterrorism treatment. Identification with different characters during exposure to the counterterrorism treatment showed evidence of influencing participants' association of Muslims with terrorism, favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S., and favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists outside the U.S.

The studies all provide evidence that mediated intergroup contact evokes strong, nuanced effects, and these effects appear to accrue over time and across narratives. The focus group responses indicate that mediated intergroup contact can influence political intergroup bias in addition to other social intergroup conflicts. The longitudinal experiment results suggest that mediated intergroup contact with any outgroup may influence tolerance in viewers toward all outgroups. Responses to the survey evidence that the shift in entertainment media toward nuanced depictions of Muslim terrorist characters may decrease bias toward Muslims in real life,

regardless of whether the mediated intergroup contact portrayed is overall negative or positive. The survey and experiment results also support the assertion that mediated intergroup contact effects may accrue, demonstrating that cultivation theory still holds a place in the entertainment media effects literature regardless of increased selection effects.

While this manuscript did not develop a complete theory of binge effects, it does provide a much-needed stepping stone toward understanding the impact of this consumption method. The experiment data present evidence that binge watching can diminish narrative impact on political attitudes. Furthermore, binge watching can change the way viewers identify with characters and storylines. This manuscript provides evidence that attention, absorption, identification, and reflection must all be included in developing a complete theory of binge effects to determine the full impact of this increasingly popular method of consuming entertainment media.

The studies reveal no small amount about identification, accumulated media exposure, and binge watching. Narrative persuasion may be diminished through inattentive binge watching, low absorption created by selection bias, or low levels of affective orientation. Though mediated intergroup contact shows the highest lingering efficacy in the contemporary entertainment media environment, identification and absorption are still required to produce an impact on viewers. Cultivation theory, through accumulative effects, still matters in the media effect literature; however, its effects remain tempered by selection bias and consumption method effects. The evidence supports my assertions that contemporary consumption patterns are altering the impact of entertainment media on political attitudes and social perceptions, but there is a long way to go before we can uncover the full story.

7.1   Future Research

This manuscript begins a broader discussion of how contemporary consumption patterns affect the efficacy of entertainment media's influence on political attitudes and perceptions of social norms. Inattentive binge watching, as this dissertation evidences, appears to decrease the impact of narrative, while having little effect on the efficacy of mediated intergroup contact. The studies presented in this manuscript highlight the importance of understanding the impact of consumption method in addition to the influence of what media we consume. Furthermore, it begins a new line of research that will help political scientists better understand the political attitude and behavior changes of American adults who spend a quarter of their waking hours passively watching entertainment media.

Future research should build upon this line of inquiry by examining the conditions and mechanisms present in contemporary entertainment media consumption patterns with greater specificity. Qualitative, experimental, and mixed method approaches will be most helpful in targeting personal variance in media selection, exposure effects, and consumption method effects in the contemporary media environment. Understanding this individual variance through detail-oriented studies designed to increase internal validity will allow for better specificity in designing large-n, quantitative studies of the specific conditions and mechanisms at work.

Future research should include better understanding consumption methods such as binge watching, multitasking or using multiple screens, the role of attention, and selection bias. It should focus more distinctly on understanding the impact of absorption and attention, but also differing amounts and methods of engaging in retrospective reflection. Contemporary forms of reflection continue to take place in the mind and in person through conversations, but has expanded to continue through blogs, forums, podcasts, social media, conventions, and more.

Future research regarding entertainment media effects and media consumption method effects must take these components of the contemporary media environment into account to fully understand the impact of media on individual political attitudes, social norms, and the broader public opinion.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Content Analyses

Appendix A.1: Focus Group Essay Analysis

After establishing which topic each participant selected, I first reviewed the essay responses looking for the following keywords:

- Absorbed/absorption

- Cognitive-emotional identification

- Perceived similarity

- Wishful identification

- Parasocial identification (PSI)

- Group identification

- Liking

- Empathy

- Affective orientation

- Trust

- Safety

Also reviewed whether they noted a shift in opinion, as well as what their prior attitudes were toward their chosen topic, the gun debate or nontraditional relationships. When they mentioned a specific type of identification, I marked down with which character they associated some type of identification. I also noted their pre-treatment attitude toward the issue at hand. For gun ownership, I ranked them as pro-gun ownership, anti-gun ownership, or somewhere in between. For nontraditional relationships, I also ranked them in favor, opposed, or in between.

Participant	gun topic	absorbed	anti (1) to pro (3)	increased empathy
1	1	1	1	0
2	1	1	2	1
3	1	0	1	0
4	1	0	0	0
5	1	0	2	0
6	1	0	2	1
7	1	0	2	0
8	1	1	1	0
9	1	0	2	0
10	1	0	1	1
11	1	1	0	1
12	1	0	2	0
13	1	1	3	1
14	1	0	2	0
15	1	1	0	1
16	1	1	2	0
17	1	1	1	1
18	1	1	2	0
19	1	1	1	1
20	0	0	1	0
21	0	1	2	1

Participant	Jane	Sutton	Kat	c-e ID	similarity	wish ID	PSI	group ID	empathy	AO
1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
5	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
7	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
8	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
10	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
12	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
13	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
16	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
19	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0

However, because the identification explanations several participants provided did not match up with the identification labels they used, I reviewed the essays again—not looking for keywords, but matching their descriptions of how they identified with the storyline and characters. From this analysis I created a second, more detailed, table of responses. When participants did not mention absorption, for example, I looked for similar terminology that would express their level of absorption—transportation, level of interest, sucked in, etc. For identification, I paid closer attention to their descriptions of how they connected to each character rather than the terminology. For example, a description of feeling similar in values to one of the characters would be "perceived similarity," or saying one of the characters reminded them of their friends would be "group identification." I also paired the character with the type of identification more clearly. In particular, I marked for whom each participant expressed empathy by writing that in the empathy section.

participant	gun topic	absorbed	anti (1) to pro (3)	safety	trust
9	0	high	2		
37	0	none	1		
5	1	moderate	1		
10	1	moderate-high	1	1	
11	1	moderate	1		
12	1	low	2		
13	1	moderate	2		
14	1	moderate	2		
17	1	high	1	1	
18	1	moderate	1	1	
19	1	high	2		
22	1	high	3		

23	1	n/a	2		1
26	1	moderate	1	1	
28	1	n/a	3	1	
30	1	low	2	1	
34	1	low	2	1	
36	1	moderate	3		
38	1	moderate	3	1	Cont.

Jane	Sutton	Kat	Cogn.-Em. ID	Similarity	Wish ID	PSI	Group ID	Empathy	Increased empathy	Change?
		1		Kat		1		Kat	1	
				Jane						
1			Jane	Jane			1			
	1		Sutton						1	
1	1			Sutton			1	Jane		
1			Jane							
		1		Kat		1				
								Sutton	1	Yes
1				Jane			1		1	
1	1							Jand & Sutton	1	
			Sutton				1	Jane	1	
1								Jane	n/a	
				Jane				Sutton	1	
1				Jane			1			Yes
									1	
	1			Sutton				Jane	1	
								People affected by gun violence	1	

Appendix A.2: Show Synopsis Analysis

For each of the 35 shows whose synopses mentioned one or more of the keywords terrorism, terrorist, politics, or crime, I content analyzed the Wikipedia and International Movie Database (IMDb) season and episode synopses to determine the potential impact for the terrorist

character(s) and storyline. In particular, I took notes on the intended ethnicity of the antagonists and protagonists, and I reviewed how much time the terrorism story arc took up.

Show Name	Terrorism?	Muslim/Arab Villain?	Notes
24: Legacy	1	1	
Allegiance	0	0	Russian villain
American Crime	0	0	
Bodyguard	1	1	Most villains white, many Asian good guys
Containment	1	1	
Crisis	0	0	
Designated Survivor	1	1	Asian terrorist was a patsy, all others white
FBI	1	1	Arab protagonist
Gang Related	0	0	
Homeland	1	1	S1 white terrorist
House of Cards	1	1	S4 & 5
Hostages	0	0	
Jack Ryan	1	1	
Jane the Virgin	0	0	
Madame Secretary	1	1	
Mr. Robot	1	0	

Odyssey	1	1	
Orange is the New Black	0	0	
Ozark	0	0	
Power	0	0	
Quantico	1	0	Many Asian good guys
Scandal	1	0	Small plot in S3
7 Seconds	0	0	
Shades of Blue	0	0	
Shots Fired	0	0	
State of Affairs	1	1	
Taken	1	0	
The Americans	1	0	
The Blacklist	1	1	Mostly white villains
Blacklist: Redemption	1	0	
The Crossing	0	0	
The Informer	1	1	Protagonist also Asian desc.
The Night Of	0	0	Framed Asian male
The Passage	0	0	
Valor	0	0	

Appendix A.3: Experiment Show Analysis

Two coders evaluated the primary treatment show for its potential to induce certain attitude changes in viewers. The researcher and a second graduate student in the Georgia State

University Political Science Department, Adrien Halliez, evaluated the substantive content of the first three episodes of season one of *Jack Ryan*. Below are the materials provided to the coders to direct their analysis. The researcher created these materials more than a month prior to carrying out the analysis to diminish bias.

Content Analysis

Character Content Analysis Template

Show	Title
Episode	1.1 (i.e. Season One, Episode One)
Absorption	1-5
Character	Name
Gender	Male/Female/Trans
Race	Asian/Black/White
Ethnicity	Hispanic/Non-Hispanic
Nationality	American/French/Lebanese/etc.
Religion	Christian/Jewish/Muslim/NA
Age	Young/Adult/Old
Overall Likeability	1-5

Is this character described/depicted in this episode as a(n) _____?

Gov Official	Y/N
CIA Agent	Y/N
Military	Y/N
UAV Operator	Y/N
Terrorist	Y/N

Active—Y/N Are they acting in an active role like leadership?

Passive—Y/N Are they acting in a passive role, where they are just helping?

UAV Target   Y/N   UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle (drone)

Sane   Y/N   Just whether or not they are clearly in control of their faculties

Is the character given the following frame in this episode?

Victim Frame   Y/N   Are they portrayed as a victim?

Perpetrator Frame   Y/N   Are they portrayed as having committed a crime?

Adept Frame   Y/N   Are they good at their job?

Corrupt Frame   Y/N   Are they bad at their job or acting in a corrupt manner?

Humanizing Frame   Y/N Are they portrayed in a sensitive way as a human with flaws?

Criminalizing Frame Y/N   Are they portrayed as a hardened criminal?

Episode Content Analysis Template

Show   Title

Episode   1.1

Absorption   1-5

For each episode, answer the following questions:

1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode?
10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?

12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you felt.
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?

Jack Ryan Content Analysis: Alexandra Pauley

Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 1

18. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
   a. Jack Ryan
   b. James Greer
   c. Mousa bin Suleiman
19. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
   a. Jack and James are CIA officials. Jack is very smart, described often as a boy scout. He does go around his boss, James, when he thinks James is not listening and is overlooking the next 9-11.
   b. James is gruff and has been described as potentially incompetent. He has been severely demoted, which one rumor attributes to a war crime.
20. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
   a. Not yet.
21. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
   a. Mousa bin Suleiman
22. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
   a. He is heavily humanized in this first episode. The flashback to his home being bombed, presumably by Westerners, establishes motive for his terrorism. He is also shown as being caring and emotionally connected to his brother.
23. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
   a. Yes. He nearly lost his brother in the bombing, and we don't know what all he did lose.
24. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
   a. They don't explicitly address Islam in the episode, though the crime James is rumored to have committed was clearly against Muslim terrorists in Karachi, Pakistan (another analyst says James ordered pig's blood poured on all terrorist bodies so they could not get into heaven).
   b. In another instance, Hanin speaks up against the visiting terrorist leader. He is framed as being shady and up to no good, and she is shown as being a loving mother of three children.

    c.   Several of Suleiman's escape team are shown as killers and fighters, but without a uniform like the American soldiers.
25. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
    a.   Christianity is not discussed
26. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode?
    a.   Judaism is not discussed
27. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
    a.   Latin culture is not discussed
28. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
    a.   Race is not discussed
29. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
    a.   Race is not discussed, though the one Black man in the episode is shown as being disagreeable and with a chip on his shoulder, easily angered and quick to lash out (as with the first scene where he almost hits Jack with his car, but takes the time to fully stop, roll down his window, and call Jack a shithead).
30. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
    a.   The female characters take a clear backseat in the episode. Jack even manipulates a woman who likes him at the office to go against his orders from James.
31. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
    a.   Yes. Words like shithead, asshole (spoken by a young Mousa), etc.
32. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
    a.   Listen to your superiors
    b.   Westerners are partially to blame for Middle Eastern terrorism
    c.   Terrorists will do anything for their leaders, even kill and then maim dead bodies
33. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you felt.
    a.   The final scene where it flashes back to after the bombing when Mousa saves his litter brother and scars his hands in the process. We see his brother rescue him in the present, and they share a moment together in both times where they are touching foreheads in clear gratitude for each other.
34. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
    a.   Joe Mueller is an ass for trying to get state secrets from Jack
    b.   Nathan Singer doesn't seem like he's going to be a nice guy based on his tone when talking with James
    c.   I'm really curious about Hanin and how she got where she is – she doesn't fully fit into the docile wifely role media typically depicts of Muslim wives, especially wives of terrorists

Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 2

1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
    a.   Jack Ryan
    b.   James Greer
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?

    a. Jack is getting cockier.

    b. James is shown with a softer side, going through a divorce and questioning his faith.

3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?

    a. I feel sympathy for James because he is having a hard time both with his divorce and with having been severely demoted. It's clear something big happened.

    b. There are moments that point to Jack having PTSD from something major when he was a marine in Afghanistan, but we don't know what. The moments he shares with Cathy are cute because he's just a man who likes a woman, and she makes him nervous.

4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?

    a. Mousa

    b. Ali bin Suleiman

5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?

    a. It's hard to call them antagonists at times because they are shown to be so kind and loving to one another, and then also Mousa with his wife and children. Yet, they're still clearly criminals who are okay with people dying for their cause – whatever it is.

6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?

    a. Sympathy is a strong word. I am more sad that they have ended up here, because they seem to be good people at their cores, but again they are still involved with terrorism, money smuggling, and deaths – albeit up to this point they have only killed officers.

    b. We find out Mousa was in jail, but without any deep explanation.

7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?

    a. We begin to see how Muslims are treated poorly in France through Sandrine's commentary and the massive SWAT team they bring into the district.

    b. We see two men who do not appear to be Arab talking about Islam in a positive, peaceful way. One of these men is James.

    c. There seems to be a demarcation between the Suleiman family and "other Muslims," as expressed by Hanin. She is upset at these men being in her home.

    d. We also see one man coming onto her daughter in a really creepy way. This scene and the scene where Mousa takes Hanin to bed show a clear male dominance. Hanin is asking her husband why these men are in her home, and she says to him that she has never asked anything of him before, as though this would be a violation.

8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?

    a. The opening scene shows two Arab men kill a Catholic priest in an alley for his wallet. This frames Arabs as criminals and Christians as victims of their crimes.

9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode?

    a. Judaism is not addressed in this episode

10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. Latin culture is not addressed in this episode
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. Being white is not addressed in this episode
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. Being Black is not addressed in this episode
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. n/a
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
    a. Yoga helps build core muscles
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
    a. Women are inferior in Muslim culture
    b. Muslims are more likely to commit crimes
    c. Non-Arab Muslims are more peaceful
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you felt.
    a. The scene with James and his Muslim friend in the diner is very sweet. James is vulnerable, and we learn more about his history. His friend implores him to come back to prayers and gives him a prayer bead necklace as a reminder that Allah has not given up on James even if James has "taken a break" from his faith. It makes me feel loving toward the Islamic faith and those who practice it in a peaceful way.
    b. The raid scene is disturbing for several reasons. The kid playing dice as the group's lookout was sad and a bit revolting – clever to use a kid, but also awful to bring a kid into that mess. The group in the apartment is playing cards and smoking (maybe weed?), generally being shown as degenerates. Then, there are guns and explosives everywhere. Ali forces one of them to wear a suicide vest, and the only woman of the group, who looks very small and terrified, volunteers to wear it. They start shooting even before the SWAT team burst through the front door. The scene is very disturbing. Neither side looks innocent, though they do make the Muslims look dirtier and criminal.
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
    a. I definitely like James more now that I understand his background more.
    b. I do not like Nathan, who keeps trying to drag James down, even though he said he went to bat for him. I don't trust him.
    c. Yazid is a total creep! He makes young, greasy, Muslim men look like evil villains.
    d. I worry for Hanin. She seems so unsure of her place in the world, or her children's.

Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 3

1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
    a. Jack and James

      b. Hanin
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
      a. Hanin comes to light as a minor protagonist. She is meek, but strong. She loves her children and defies her husband first by getting passports to take them away from Syria. Then, after Mousa finds and burns the passports, she takes her girls and runs anyway.
      b. Victor becomes a protagonist, but in an antihero kind of way.
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
      a. So much sympathy for Hanin! She cares for her husband, but is deeply devoted to her children and giving her daughters a better life than she had. She did not choose her life path up to this point, but in this episode, she decides to change her life path drastically.
      b. I have some sympathy for Victor, but he chose the path he is on. He seems stuck and sad, but unwilling to make any real changes.
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
      a. Mousa
      b. Ali
      c. Yazid
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
      a. Mousa grows darker with each episode. He is becoming a scary character.
      b. Ali is still running, more in a passive role and not so much an antagonist anymore as someone being chased by the protagonists.
      c. Yazid is the antagonist to Hanin as she and Sara run away. He is just despicable.
6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
      a. We know Mousa is angry about the bombings when he was a kid. We know he was in a French jail for several years. We do not know his exact vendetta. My sympathy for him wanes with each episode.
      b. I do have some sympathy for Ali, especially when he ignores his brother's orders to kill Omer and his sons. Ali doesn't seem like he wants to be a terrorist, but just wants to do right by his older brother.
      c. Zero sympathy for Yazid.
7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
      a. Largely, Muslim men are vilified in this episode, while Muslim women are shown as lesser in their community and in need of protection.
      b. Captain Arnaud points out the difficulties faced by Muslims in France. She acknowledges that they are forced into poorer neighborhoods, often refused employment, and seen as lesser because they do not fully accept being French and only French.
8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
      a. Christianity is not discussed in this episode
9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode?

a.   Judaism is not discussed in this episode
10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
a.   Ava "Riot Grrl" Garcia is the first presumable Hispanic character we see in the series. Her ethnicity is not directly pointed out, nor is it discussed.
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
a.   Being white is not explicitly discussed
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
a.   Being Black is not explicitly discussed
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
a.   Garcia makes a transgender slur when she asks Victor if he "accidentally picked up another tranny" when he comes in with a black eye
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
a.   Muslims are not treated fairly in France
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
a.   Muslim men are misogynist, and Islam is likely misogynist
b.   White men are godlike heroes
c.   Women need to be protected by men
d.   America must protect the world
e.   Drone strikes are good
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you felt.
a.   The scene when the Suleimans play Monopoly and Mousa tells his children how he married their mother is chilling. I am touched he chose to marry Hanin rather than bed her as a gift from her poor father, but that is a very inappropriate story to tell small children. When he mentions Hanin was only a little older than Sara, it felt like a threat that he might sell/marry off Sara the way Hanin's father sold her. Then, when he burns the passports, I was scared for Hanin and furious with Mousa for being so cruel.
b.   When Hanin is leaving with her children and her son Samir refuses to leave, she tells her youngest daughter Rama that Samir will be okay because their father loves him. It was a sad reminder that Hanin feels unsafe and that her husband does not love their daughters the way he loves their son.
c.   I was so scared for Hanin when Yazid was attacking her. I cried when Victor killed him.
d.   When Victor kills Yazid, I was so grateful, but the frame is a dangerous one. There is an implicit message that white American men will always be the heroes and the rest of the world, especially beautiful Muslim women, need their help.
e.   The scene where Victor tries to gamble away the money he "earned" shooting targets is depressing. He is clearly miserable. When he wins and keeps winning is like a slap in the face, but also an implicit message that being a white American male soldier means killing makes him a hero who deserves big rewards.
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?

a. I was relieved when Yazid was killed. They completely villainized this character to the point where I had no negative feelings about his death.
b. Victor unsettles me. He seems like a nice enough guy, and I was glad when he stood up to his superior officer and killed Yazid anyway, but there is still something off about that storyline. He is troubled by the deaths he inflicts, but also glorified for them.

Character Analysis: Alexandra Pauley, Part 1

Show	Ep	Absorb	Character	Gend.	Race	Hisp.	Nationality	Religion	Age
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Jack Ryan	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Cathy Mueller	Female	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	James Greer	Male	Black	No	American	n/a	adult, 40s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Mousa bin Suleiman	Male	Arab	No	Lebanese	Muslim	adult, 40s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Nathan Singer	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 50s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Hanin Suleiman	Female	Arab	No	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Joe Mueller	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 60s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Teresa	Female	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Patrick	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Tarek	Male	South Asian	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Uncle Fathi	Male	Arab	No	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 60s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Matice	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Leader of visiting forces to Suleiman compound	Male	Arab	No	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 50s
Jack Ryan	1.1	4	Ansore	Male	White	No	Scandanavian?	n/a	adult, 40s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Jack Ryan	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s

Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Cathy Mueller	Female	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	James Greer	Male	Black	No	American	Muslim	adult, 40s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Mousa bin Suleiman	Male	Arab	No	Lebanese	Muslim	adult, 40s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Nathan Singer	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 50s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Hanin Suleiman	Female	Arab	No	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Noreen	Female	East Asian	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Patrick	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Tarek	Male	South Asian	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Sara	Female	Middle Eastern	No	Middle Eastern	n/a	adolescent
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Yazid	Male	Middle Eastern	No	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 20s
Jack Ryan	1.2	5	Matice	Male	White	no	White	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Jack Ryan	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	James Greer	Male	Black	No	American	Muslim	adult, 40s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Mousa bin Suleiman	Male	Arab	No	Lebanese	Muslim	adult, 40s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Hanin Suleiman	Female	Arab	No	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Sara	Female	Middle Eastern	No	Middle Eastern	n/a	adolescent
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Yazid	Male	Middle Eastern	No	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 20s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Victor "Tombstone"	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 20s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	"Riot Grrl" Garcia	Female	Non-white	Yes	American	n/a	adult, 20s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	UAV Target	Male	Arab	No	Syrian	Muslim	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Blanche DuBois	Female	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 40s

Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Stanley Kowalski	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 50s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Omer, Ali's friend	Male	Arab	No	French	Muslim	adult, 40s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Ibrahim, techie hipster terrorist	Male	Arab	No	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Capt. Sandrine Arnaud	Female	White	No	French	n/a	adult, 30s
Jack Ryan	1.3	5	Uncle Fathi	Male	Arab	no	Middle Eastern	Muslim	adult, 50s

Part 2

Ep	Character	Likeability	Gov Official	CIA Agent	Military	UAV Operator	Terrorist	Active/ Passive	UAV Target
1.1	Jack Ryan	4	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Cathy Mueller	5	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	James Greer	3	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Mousa bin Suleiman	3	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
1.1	Nathan Singer	3	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Hanin Suleiman	5	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Joe Mueller	1	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Teresa	4	Y	Y	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Patrick	3	Y	Y	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Tarek	3	Y	Y	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Uncle Fathi	4	N	N	N	N	Y	Passive	N
1.1	Matice	5	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.1	Leader of visiting forces to Suleiman compound	1	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
1.1	Ansore	2	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
1.2	Jack Ryan	4	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N

1.2	Cathy Mueller	5	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.2	James Greer	4	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.2	Mousa bin Suleiman	2	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
1.2	Nathan Singer	2	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.2	Hanin Suleiman	4	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.2	Noreen	5	Y	Y	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.2	Patrick	4	Y	Y	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.2	Tarek	4	Y	Y	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.2	Sara	5	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.2	Yazid	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
1.2	Matice	5	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.3	Jack Ryan	5	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.3	James Greer	5	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
1.3	Mousa bin Suleiman	2	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
1.3	Hanin Suleiman	5	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.3	Sara	5	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.3	Yazid	0	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	Y
1.3	Victor "Tombstone"	4	Y	N	Y	Y	N	n/a	N
1.3	"Riot Grrl" Garcia	5	Y	N	Y	Y	N	n/a	N
1.3	UAV Target	4	N	N	N	N	Y	Passive	Y
1.3	Blanche DuBois	3	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.3	Stanley Kowalski	2	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.3	Omer, Ali's friend	5	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
1.3	Ibrahim, techie hipster terrorist	2	N	N	N	N	Y	Passive	N

| 1.3 | Capt. Sandrine Arnaud | 4 | Y | N | N | N | N | n/a | N |
| 1.3 | Uncle Fathi | 5 | N | N | N | N | Y | Passive | N |

Part 3

Ep	Character	Sane	Victim	Perpetr ator	Adept	Corrupt	Human izing Frame	Criminal izing Frame
1.1	Jack Ryan	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.1	Cathy Mueller	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
1.1	James Greer	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N
1.1	Mousa bin Suleiman	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
1.1	Nathan Singer	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
1.1	Hanin Suleiman	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.1	Joe Mueller	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.1	Teresa	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
1.1	Patrick	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
1.1	Tarek	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
1.1	Uncle Fathi	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.1	Matice	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.1	Leader of visiting forces to Suleiman compoun d	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
1.1	Ansore	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
1.2	Jack Ryan	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.2	Cathy Mueller	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.2	James Greer	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.2	Mousa bin Suleiman	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

1.2	Nathan Singer	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
1.2	Hanin Suleiman	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.2	Noreen	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N
1.2	Patrick	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N
1.2	Tarek	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
1.2	Sara	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
1.2	Yazid	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
1.2	Matice	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
1.3	Jack Ryan	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
1.3	James Greer	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.3	Mousa bin Suleiman	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
1.3	Hanin Suleiman	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.3	Sara	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.3	Yazid	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
1.3	Victor "Tombstone"	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N
1.3	"Riot Grrl" Garcia	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.3	UAV Target	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
1.3	Blanche DuBois	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
1.3	Stanley Kowalski	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
1.3	Omer, Ali's friend	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.3	Ibrahim, techie hipster terrorist	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
1.3	Capt. Sandrine Arnaud	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
1.3	Uncle Fathi	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N

Jack Ryan Content Analysis: Adrien Halliez

Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 1

For each episode, answer the following questions:

1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
   a. Jack Ryan, Jim Grear
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
   a. Jack: Prototypical hero with past demons, a drive to follow his gut instincts, brave, independent, a bit of an egghead, slightly awkward socially, workoholic, lonely, can be scheming to get what he thinks is right as with Theresa, defiant of hierarchical commands and a bit preppy-looking.
   b. Jim: Antipathetic initially (I had written asshole and shithead…) but emotionally hurt, depressed, work as a refuge, competent through anticipation, bossy but trusts his team. A field person grounded in an office longing to return to the field. Fighting spirit with tactical smarts.
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
   a. Jack is sympathetic for his current personality + past trauma. Jim starts as the least sympathetic but makes it up in the rest of the episode.
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
   a. Suleiman: Smart. Very Prototypical life story for a terrorist in this kind of show. Sympathetic for his attachment to Ali and drive despite his past. Strategic mastermind.
   b. Ali: Action person. A bit less sympathetic to me as a viewer because he is a follower and because of the gory plan he executed. I suspect he might be easily manipulated by Suleiman because of the debt he perceives he owes him.
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
   a. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
   b. Suleiman's backstory also makes him pretty sympathetic and we understand both of their paths. I am more reserved about Ali.
6. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
   a. Split between backstories of victimhood and violent actions. The family portraits in the Lebanon flashbacks humanize them greatly but the schemes and actions they deploy at the military base male them bloodthirsty and ready to do whatever it takes presumably to retaliate against the perceived invader.
7. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?
   a. N/a because we can only assume that some characters are Christian due to the fact that they are Americans.
8. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? N/a
9. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? N/a
10. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?

      a. Whites as generally depicted under a positive light. Most of them due to their role on the 'hero' side of the story. Two characters are more negative: Joe Mueller, the stereotypical wealthy guy indulging in splurging and putting his bling on display and Matice Who is generally seen as nice but perhaps too nice, possibly deceiving and overly proud of his Americanness (remember I am not American myself so this may be more salient to me). The tower soldier also depicted as a cocky asshole (jack ryan himself has a cocky aspect to him.) Most whites as overconfident in this episode.

11. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
      a. Only Jim is a black character and his depiction is ambivalent but this has to do more with his position and current mood due to life events than his race in my perception. (+ the soldier who warns jack of Ali's entrance who is a hero through his valiant sacrifice)

12. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
      a. Muslims are shown as having normal family relations before being victims of hardships which then lead them to act for retaliation.

13. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
      a. I perceived strong dualism between the agents and the terrorists even despite the terrorists backstory. There was something more visibly despicable in the terrorists' means of action than in the ones used by the bombing planes in Lebanon.

14. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?

15. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you felt.
      a. The flashback scenes to Ali and Suleiman's childhoods are moving. They made me feel pity and I contemplated accepting their motivations as legitimate but the rest of the episode counterbalances these feelings of forgiveness.

16. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
      a. I think Suleiman is an intriguing character. Made me feel curious and anxious at times. He's the kind of mastermind acting from behind the scenes in cold-blood. He's the most genuinely moving character to me in this episode. Ali has even a greater potential to be moving but for now I only felt strong disgust at the cadaver and gun episode.
      b. I also felt compassion for the glimpses of Jim's story that I got in the episode. Some pride/enthusiasm in seeing that he had followed up in his own way on Jack's red flags.

Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 2

For each episode, answer the following questions:

1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
      a. Jack Ryan: Slight trauma, smart, irreverent to authority, Macho men (no pain), obsessive.
      b. Jim Grear: Straight-to-the-point., not buying it, Muslim

    c.   Suleiman/Mousa: Grateful to his brother, strong family bonds, although risk of Suleiman manipulating Ali and family?, religious zealot? Has followers who seem devout,

    d.   Ali: Foot soldier for Mousa, blinded by his love for his brother?, reckless, driven by his mission, blurred moral compass

2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?

3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?

    a.   Jack Ryan described as even more flawless than in the first episode but humble as well (scene with the operative who offered him to bypass Jim)→ More sympathetic in this episode also because of the love story with Cathy.

    b.   Jim: Interesting development in his life story with the discovery that he may be Muslim. However, storyline not developed enough yet + very tough on Jack after having sided with him. Only looks out for himself.

4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?

    a.   Suleiman, Ali, Yazid, and a few others whose role isn't clear yet.

5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?

6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?

    a.   A bit less sympathy for Suleiman after this episode. Seems a bit manipulative. His past might drive him but makes him insensitive to people who are dear to him in the present.

    b.   Slightly more sympathy for Ali who could be the victim of that manipulation but not clear yet. Still depicted mostly as a heartless perpetrator in the events in Paris.

7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?

    a.   Most of them are violent in this episode except for the women back at Suleiman's headquarters. Difficult to say that the acts of the brothers are driven by their religion for now.

8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode?

    a.   Opening of the episode pointing to Christianity as the enemy of Islam with the stabbing of the priest. Not yet developed enough though.

9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? n/a

10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? n/a

11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?

    a.   Whites in positions of command as a bit arrogant and losing sight of their main duties. Jack Ryan as redeeming Whites of course by being the super hero who's incredibly smart, brave, and nice. Less cracks in his personality in this episode. Losing sight of his potential trauma/PTSD.

12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?

    a.   A bit impulsive and limited. Good for action but not for command in the words of the operative who talked to Jack. A pretty negative portrayal continued with the French SWAT commander who is seen as a hurdle to Jack's mission at the end.

13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?

a. White women in the episode as all strong and benevolent (Cathy volunteering in Africa, the French commander as strong-willed and unwilling to cave in to the American team.)

14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
    a. More Manichean episode than the first one. No redeeming storyline for the actions of the terrorists. Clash of civilizations mediated through religion.
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you felt.
    a. The scene with Sara and Yazid seems to be an attempt at moving the public but the storyline needs more development for it to be really moving. We just got introduced to both characters when Yazid starts his borderline sexual harassment.
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
    a. Suleiman's wife as an interesting character. Made me feel empathetic and curious about how the relationship is going to evolve. Seems strong-willed at times but awestruck or fearful of her husband.

Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 3

For each episode, answer the following questions:

1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode?
    a. Jack Ryan, Victor, Hanin, Mousa, Ali, Yazid, and Fatih
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)?
    a. Hanin: Strong-willed, trying to escape, poor background, committed to her kids, likeable character with determination.
    b. Uncle Fatih: Generous, disinterested, aware of risk for Hanin but also obeying Mousa's orders. Dual allegiance although his family ties with Hanin seem to have come first.
    c. Mousa: Wary of Hanin, heartless, does not value human life outside of his own relations, loves his wife, tries to keep her with him, went to war, moving story accepted by his son not necessarily by his daughter, strong hold over his family (soft tyrant). First time his character becomes that obviously evil. Manichean figure.
    d. Omer: Generous, not inquisitive, considerate neighbor for Ali, great person, Innocent, dragged into it because of his good heart. Likeable character.
    e. Ali: Drawing as making him more human, dreamer, artistic, emotional, successful, smart, Opposite dynamics from Mousa Suleiman. More backstory = more likeability whereas the first two episodes only showed him as a tool for his brother who was ready to do anything.
    f. Jack: More of a secondary character in this episode. Still showing signs of shock of what he witnesses on the ground, but conversation with Sandrine implying that he likes being on the frontlines. Connecting the dots quicker than his colleagues.

g. Yazid: Foot soldier devoted to Mousa but also out for himself if the opportunity arises. Gets his comeuppance at the end of the episode which is everything I asked for as a viewer. Most unlikeable character in the series so far.

3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
    a. Sympathy for Omer, Hanin, and Fatih for this episode. Omer as a wholesome person. Prime example of integration in France and good heart. Hanin as the dedicated mother who is aware of the danger that Mousa represents and is brave enough to risk it all to escape. Fatih as an ambivalent character who seemed committed to help but constrained by his allegiance to Mousa's movement.
    b. Very little change on the side of the "good" (police forces) in terms of sympathy. Only Jim elicited a little bit more sympathy with his interactions at the mosque but still an ambivalent character for now.

4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?
    a. Mousa Suleiman and Yazid as pure villains. Ali as a villain provided with a little bit of a backstory that rehabilitates him very slightly.

5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)?
    a. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have chosen this life path?
    b. Yazid and Mousa depicted as very evil. Even though episodes one and two did make me feel more sympathy for Ali than Mousa, this episode establishes Mousa as the arch-villain in the series without a doubt. Very manipulative with Hanin and his kids as well as Ali. Not sure that the brotherly bond seen in their backstory in episodes 1 and 2 is reciprocal. Feeling like Ali is being fooled by Mousa which made Ali himself a bit more sympathetic (although his backstory led to clichés about integration in France that are egregious simplifications that made me mad but that's off topic.)

6. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. Very negative image of male Muslims in general in this episode. Paternalistic and male-dominated vision of Muslim private lives. A few references to Muslims as impossible to integrate to the body politic in Western countries as long as they retain their 'Muslim allegiance' (in Jack and Sandrine's discussion in the car.) Muslim women depicted as oppressed (embodied by Hanin and her daughters) and falling prey to men's predatory behavior. Need to escape that.

7. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? n/a

8. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? n/a

9. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. Only a glimpse of a Hispanic character with Ava who is not really likeable so far but nothing representing being Hispanic for now.

10. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. Whites took a backseat in this episode except for the character of Victor. No generalizable patterns about whites in this one. Victor's character as a mess.

> Probably nothing to do with his race but epitomizes aimless characters who go with the flow.

11. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. Jim as again the only Black character. More likeable in this episode. Seems spiritual when it comes to his Muslim faith.
12. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode?
    a. Strong portrayal of women in this episode through Hanin and Sandrine. Strong-willed, not afraid to assert themselves in front of men (Sandrine) or to take the steps necessary to escape their grip (Hanin). More agentic and positive than in episode 1 and to a lesser extent 2.
13. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode?
    a. This episode is much more dualistic/Manichean. Strong good v. evil dichotomy at both the explicit and implicit level.
14. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode?
    a. Implicit message about the need to free women from the yoke of Muslim traditionalism. Simplistic account.
15. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you felt.
    a. The final scene to an extent. Yazid shooting Fatih and the drone strike on Yazid. I wasn't really moved because I don't feel any attachment for the characters yet but the tension was high and I was hoping to see a punishment for Yazid.
16. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why?
    a. I felt anger at the prospect of Ali killing Omer and relief when I realized he did not. Still feeling a lot of empathy for Hanin's situation and she is the character I would like to see achieve her goal most.
    b. I felt strongly about a topic: As a Frenchman, I felt quite upset at some of the quick discussions of minorities in France, especially the allusion to the benefits of hyphenated identities in the US compared to our dichotomous acceptance v. rejection of minorities in France. I feel like the whole discussion was very short-sighted and it was absolutely not necessary to develop the scenario.

Character Analysis: Adrien Halliez, Part 1

Ep	Absorb	Character	Gend.	Race	Hisp.	Nationality	Religion	Age
1.1	5	Jack Ryan	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
		Jim Grear	Male	Black	No	American	n/a	adult, late 40s
		Suleiman	Male	White (no Census category for middle eastern)	No	Lebanese	Muslim (assumed)	adult, 30s

		Ali	Male	White	No	Lebanese	Muslim (assumed)	adult, late 20s
		Suleiman's Wife	Female	White	no	?	Muslim (assumed)	adult, 30s
		Cathy Mueller	Female	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
		Joe Mueller	Male	White	no	American	n/a	adult, late 50s
		Theresa	Female	White	no	American	n/a	adult late 20s
		Matice (?)	Male	White	no	American	n/a	adult 40s
1.2	3	Jack Ryan	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
		Jim Grear	Male	Black	No	American	n/a	adult, late 40s
		Ali	Male	Middle Easterner	No	Lebanese	Muslim	adult, late 20s
		Mousa Suleiman	Male	Middle Easterner	No	Lebanese	Muslim	adult, 30s
		Yazid	Male	Middle Easterner	No	?	Muslim (assumed)	adult, late 20s
		Sara	Female	Middle Easterner	No	?	Muslim (assumed)	teenager/adult, ~18-20
		Cathy Mueller	Female	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
		Sandrine Arnaud	Female	White	No	French	?	adult, early 40s
1.2	5	Jack Ryan	Male	White	No	American	n/a	adult, 30s
		Mousa Suleiman	Male	Middle Easterner	No	Lebanese	Muslim	adult, 30s
		Hanin	Female	Middle Easterner	no	?	Muslim	adult, 30s
		Ali	Male	Middle Easterner	No	Lebanese	Muslim	adult, late 20s
		Omer	Male	Middle Easterner	No	French/Lebanese	Muslim (assumed)	adult, early 50s
		Yazid	Male	Middle Easterner	No	?	Muslim (assumed)	adult, late 20s
		Victor	Male	White	No	American	?	adult, early 30s

		Fatih	Male	Middle Easterner	No	?	Muslim	adult, late 50s
		Jim Grear	Male	Black	No	American	Muslim	adult, late 40s
		Sandrine Arnaud	Female	White	No	French	?	adult, early 40s
		Ava	Female	Hispanic	Yes	American	?	adult, late 20s

Part 2

Episode	Character	Likeability	Gov Official	CIA Agent	Military	UAV Operator	Terrorist	Active/Passive	UAV Target
1.1	Jack Ryan	4	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
	Jim Grear	2	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
	Suleiman	3	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
	Ali	2	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
	Suleiman's Wife	4	N	N	N	N	Y	Passive	N
	Cathy Mueller	4	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
	Joe Mueller	1	N	N	n	n	n	n/a	n
	Theresa	5	Y	Y	n	n	n	n/a	n
	Matice (?)	3	Y	unsure	Y	n	unsure	if yes, active	n
1.2	Jack Ryan	5	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
	Jim Grear	1	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
	Ali	2	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
	Mousa Suleiman	2	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
	Yazid	1	N	N	N	N	Y	not sure	N
	Sara	4	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
	Cathy Mueller	4	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
	Sandrine Arnaud	4	Y	N	N	N	N	n/a	N

1.2	Jack Ryan	4	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
	Mousa Suleiman	1 (0 if lowest level)	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
	Hanin	5	N	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
	Ali	3	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	N
	Omer	5	N	N	N	N	Y	Passive (aiding and abetting)	N
	Yazid	1 (0 if lowest level)	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	Y
	Victor	2	Y	N	Y	Y	N	n/a	N
	Fatih	4	N	N	N	N	Y	Active	Y
	Jim Grear	3	Y	Y	Y	N	N	n/a	N
	Sandrine Arnaud	4	Y	N	N	N	N	n/a	N
	Ava	3	Y	N	Y	Y	N	n/a	N

Part 3

Episode	Character	Sane	Victim	Perpetrator	Adept	Corrupt	Humanizing Frame	Criminalizing Frame
1.1	Jack Ryan	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Jim Grear	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
	Suleiman	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N
	Ali	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Suleiman's Wife	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
	Cathy Mueller	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Joe Mueller	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Theresa	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
	Matice (?)	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
1.2	Jack Ryan	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N

	Jim Grear	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Ali	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Mousa Suleiman	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	Yazid	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
	Sara	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Cathy Mueller	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Sandrine Arnaud	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
1.2	Jack Ryan	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Mousa Suleiman	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
	Hanin	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
	Ali	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N
	Omer	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N
	Yazid	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Victor	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
	Fatih	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
	Jim Grear	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
	Sandrine Arnaud	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
	Ava	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N

Appendix B: Surveys

      Appendix B.1: Mechanical Turk Survey

    1. Informed Consent

I.   Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of fictional media consumption on individual attitudes. You are invited to participate because you are over the age of 18 and represent a portion of the adult population. A total of 800 participants will be recruited for this study. Participation will require around 30 to 40 minutes of your time for a single online session.   II.   Procedures: If you decide to participate, you will fill out a questionnaire. The survey will take approximately 30 to 40 minutes and the compensation for this time will be $2.00.   III.   Risks: In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. You should be aware that data sent over the Internet may not be secure. As with any online study, data sent over the Internet may not be secure even though the site is encrypted. You are free to discontinue participation at any time without adverse consequence.   IV.   Benefits: Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about how individual consumption of and interaction with fictional media affects social and political attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a whole.   V.   Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Participation in research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.   VI.   Confidentiality We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. The research team will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)). We will use a study number rather than your name on study records. The information you provide will be stored in password- and firewall-protected computers and encrypted USB drive. The key code used to identify subjects will be stored separately from the data to protect privacy. Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified personally.   VII.   Contact Persons: Contact Alexandra Pauley at apauley1@gsu.edu if you have questions, concerns, or complaints about this study. You can also call if you think you have been harmed by this study. Contact Susan Vogtner in the Georgia State University Office of Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu if you want to talk to someone who is not part of the study team. You can talk about questions, concerns, offer input, obtain information, or suggestions about the study. You can also call Susan Vogtner if you have questions or concerns about your rights in this study.   VIII.   Copy of Consent Form to

Subject: Each participant can print a copy of this consent form for his/her records.   If you agree to participate in this research, please click "I Agree" to continue with the survey.

      a. Yes, I agree to participate in this research. (1)

2. **Please enter your MTurk user ID number below**. At the conclusion of this study, you will create a unique confirmation code to enter on the MTurk website. This confirmation code will be necessary to receive payment.

_____

3. Are you 18 or older?
      a. Yes (1)
      b. No, I am under 18 (2)

4. Thank you for agreeing to participate in our survey. Your participation is very important to the study, and we appreciate you taking the time to answer our questions. Please answer each of the questions carefully and honestly. Your responses are anonymous. There are three sections in this study. In the first section, you will be asked some demographic questions. In the second section, you will be asked about some social and political issues, then some about your background. If you are not sure about your response, please make your best guess. In the final section, you will be asked about your media consumption.
      a. Continue to Section One (1)

5. What is your gender?
      a. Male (1)
      b. Female (2)
      c. Nonbinary/Other (3)

6. What is your age?

_____

7. What, if any, is your religious preference?
   a. Catholic (1)
   b. Protestant (2)
   c. Muslim (3)
   d. Hindu (4)
   e. Jewish (5)
   f. Pagan (6)
   g. Other (7)
   h. No preference (8)
   i. Prefer not to say (9)
8. How important is your religious affiliation to you?
   a. Extremely important (1)
   b. Very important (2)
   c. Moderately imporant (6)
   d. Slightly important (3)
   e. Not at all important (4)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (5)
9. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
   a. Extremely likely (1)
   b. Moderately likely (2)
   c. Slightly likely (3)
   d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
   e. Slightly unlikely (5)
   f. Moderately unlikely (6)
   g. Extremely unlikely (7)
   h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
10. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
    a. Elementary school (1)
    b. Middle school (2)
    c. High school/GED (3)
    d. Some college (4)
    e. Associate's degree (5)
    f. Bachelor's degree (6)
    g. Some graduate work (7)
    h. Completed Master's or professional degree (8)
    i. Advanced graduate work or Ph.D. (9)
11. Which of the following best describes your marital status?
    a. Single, never married (1)
    b. Married (2)
    c. Divorced/separated (3)
    d. Widowed (4)
    e. Prefer not to say (5)
12. Have you traveled outside of the country in the past five years?
    a. Yes (1)
    b. No (2)
    c. Prefer not to say (3)

13. How would you describe yourself?
    (Select all that apply)
      a. American Indian or Alaska Native (1)
      b. Asian (2)
      c. Black or African American (3)
      d. Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin (4)
      e. Middle Eastern or North African (8)
      f. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (6)
      g. White (5)
      h. Other, please describe: (7)

         _____

14. How would you best describe your current employment status?
      a. Employed full-time (1)
      b. Employed part-time (2)
      c. Unemployed/looking for work (3)
      d. Student (4)
      e. Homemaker (5)
      f. Retired (6)
15. What do you expect your 2019 family income to be before taxes (from all sources)?
      a. Under $25,000 (1)
      b. $25,000-$39,999 (2)
      c. $40,000-$49,999 (3)
      d. $50,000-$74,999 (4)
      e. $75,000-$99,999 (5)
      f. $100,000-$124,999 (6)
      g. $125,000-$149,999 (7)
      h. Over $150,000 (8)
16. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
      a. Democrat (1)
      b. Republican (2)
      c. Independent (3)
      d. Libertarian (4)
      e. Other (5)
      f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
17. How important is your political party affiliation to you?
      a. Extremely important (1)
      b. Very important (2)
      c. Moderately important (3)
      d. Slightly important (4)
      e. Not at all important (5)
      f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
18. Do your parents associate with one of the following parties?
      a. Democrat (1)
      b. Republican (2)
      c. Independent (3)
      d. Different Parties (7)

       e. Libertarian (4)

       f. Other (5)

       g. Don't know/Undecided (6)

19. How important is your parents' political party affiliation to them?

       a. Extremely important (1)

       b. Very important (2)

       c. Moderately important (3)

       d. Slightly important (4)

       e. Not at all important (5)

       f. Don't know/Undecided (6)

20. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?

       a. Always (1)

       b. Most of the time (2)

       c. About half the time (6)

       d. Some of the time (7)

       e. Never (8)

21. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
   (Choose one)

       a. Abortion (1)

       b. National debt (2)

       c. Environment and climate change (3)

       d. Gay rights (4)

       e. Gun control (5)

       f. Health care (6)

       g. Immigration (7)

       h. Poverty (8)

       i. Income inequality (9)

       j. Unemployment (10)

       k. Economic growth (11)

       l. Military strength (12)

       m. Morality and religion in society (13)

       n. Racism (14)

       o. Social security (15)

       p. Taxes (16)

       q. Women's rights (17)

       r. Crime (18)

       s. Foreign policy (19)

       t. Education (20)

       u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)

22. What should be the priority for dealing with **illegal immigration** in the U.S.?
    a. Better border security and stronger enforcement of our immigration laws (1)
    b. Creating a way for immigrants already here illegally to become citizens if they meet certain requirements (2)
    c. Both should be given equal priority (3)
    d. None of these (4)
    e. Don't know/No opinion (5)
23. All in all, would you favor or oppose building a wall along the entire U.S. border with Mexico?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (7)
    c. Favor a little (8)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (9)
    e. Oppose a little (10)
    f. Oppose moderately (11)
    g. Oppose a great deal (12)
24. Do you favor or oppose the current use of detention centers at the U.S. border with Mexico?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (7)
    c. Favor a little (8)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (9)
    e. Oppose a little (10)
    f. Oppose moderately (11)
    g. Oppose a great deal (12)
25. Do you favor or oppose making it a crime to seek asylum at the U.S. border with Mexico?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (7)
    c. Favor a little (8)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (9)
    e. Oppose a little (10)
    f. Oppose moderately (11)
    g. Oppose a great deal (12)
26. When it comes to **asylum seekers** coming to the U.S. which comes closer to your view—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Asylum seekers usually come to this country legally and should have access to the best social, legal, and health care possible (1)
    b. Asylum seekers do not always come to the country legally and should not be given special treatment at the expense of U.S. tax dollars (2)
27. When it comes to **asylum seekers** coming to the U.S. which comes closer to your view—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. In general asylum seekers should be treated with caution and some suspicion upon entering this country (1)
    b. In general asylum seekers should be taken at their word and assumed innocent upon entering this country (2)

28. When it comes to **undocumented immigrants** currently in the U.S. which comes closer to your view—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. are more likely than American citizens to commit serious crimes (1)
    b. Undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. are NO more likely than American citizens to commit serious crimes (2)
29. When it comes to **undocumented immigrants** currently in the U.S. which comes closer to your view—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Undocumented immigrants mostly fill jobs that American citizens would like to have (1)
    b. Undocumented immigrants mostly fill jobs American citizens don't want (2)
30. When it comes to **undocumented immigrants** currently in the U.S. which comes closer to your view—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. In general undocumented immigrants are as honest and hardworking as American citizens (1)
    b. In general undocumented immigrants are not as honest and hardworking as American citizens (2)
31. Should the number of people who are allowed to **legally** move to the United States to live and work be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now?
    a. Increased a lot (1)
    b. Increased a moderate amount (2)
    c. Increased a little (3)
    d. Kept the same (4)
    e. Decreased a little (5)
    f. Decreased a moderate amount (6)
    g. Decreased a lot (7)
32. When people from other countries **legally** move to the United States to live and work, is this generally good for the U.S., generally bad for the U.S., or neither good or bad?
    a. Extremely good (1)
    b. Moderately good (2)
    c. A little good (3)
    d. Neither good nor bad (4)
    e. A little bad (5)
    f. Moderately bad (6)
    g. Extremely bad (7)
33. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents (1)
    b. Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care (2)
34. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near future?
    a. Extremely worried (1)
    b. Very worried (2)
    c. Slightly worried (3)

      d. Not at all worried (4)

35. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
      a. Extremely worried (1)
      b. Very worried (2)
      c. Moderately worried (3)
      d. Slightly worried (4)
      e. Not at all worried (5)

36. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of the following groups in the near future?
(**Select one answer for each group listed**)

	Extremely likely (1)	Moderately likely (2)	Slightly likely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly unlikely (5)	Moderately unlikely (6)	Extremely unlikely (7)
Blacks (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Whites (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Muslims (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Christians (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Left-wing radicals (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Right-wing radicals (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Russians (7)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Chinese (8)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

37. Do you favor or oppose allowing **Syrian refugees** to come to the United States?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
38. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
39. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from terrorism (1)
    b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from terrorism (2)
40. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its believers (1)
    b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (2)
41. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. The obstacles that once made it harder for women to get ahead are now largely gone (1)
    b. There are still significant obstacles that make it harder for women to get ahead than men (2)
42. How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups?
    (**Select one answer for each group listed**)

	A great deal (1)	A lot (2)	A moderate amount (3)	A little (4)	None at all (5)
Blacks (1)	○	○	○	○	○
Hispanics (2)	○	○	○	○	○
Whites (3)	○	○	○	○	○
Gays & lesbians (4)	○	○	○	○	○
Women (5)	○	○	○	○	○
Men (6)	○	○	○	○	○
Transgender people (7)	○	○	○	○	○
Muslims (8)	○	○	○	○	○
Christians (9)	○	○	○	○	○

43. In general, does the **federal government** treat whites better than blacks, treat blacks better than whites, or treat them both the same?
    a. Treats whites much better (1)
    b. Treats whites moderately better (2)
    c. Treats whites a little better (3)
    d. Treats both the same (4)
    e. Treats blacks a little better (5)
    f. Treats blacks moderately better (6)
    g. Treats blacks much better (7)
44. In general, do the **the police** treat whites better than blacks, treat blacks better than whites, or treat them both the same?
    a. Police treat whites much better (1)
    b. Police treat whites moderately better (2)
    c. Police treat whites a little better (3)
    d. Police treat both the same (4)
    e. Police treat blacks a little better (5)
    f. Police treat blacks moderately better (6)
    g. Police treat blacks much better (7)
45. Should **federal spending on crime** be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
    a. Increased a great deal (1)
    b. Increased a moderate amount (2)
    c. Increased a little (3)
    d. Kept the same (4)
    e. Decreased a little (5)
    f. Decreased a moderate amount (6)
    g. Decreased a great deal (7)
46. Do you favor or oppose using private, for-profit prisons in the U.S.?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (4)
    c. Favor a little (5)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (6)
    e. Oppose a little (7)
    f. Oppose moderately (8)
    g. Oppose a great deal (9)
47. Do you favor or oppose reforming the criminal justice system to **reduce the number of people incarcerated** in the U.S.?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (4)
    c. Favor a little (5)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (6)
    e. Oppose a little (7)
    f. Oppose moderately (8)
    g. Oppose a great deal (9)
48. Do you favor or oppose having the **death penalty** for persons convicted of murder?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)

    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)

49. Who is the current Secretary of State?
    a. Mike Pompeo (1)
    b. John Kerry (2)
    c. Rex Tillerson (3)
    d. Scott Pruitt (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

50. Who is the current President of France?
    a. Emmanuel Macron (1)
    b. Justin Trudeau (2)
    c. Malcolm Turnbull (3)
    d. Theresa May (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

51. Neil Gorsuch is...
    a. a Senator (1)
    b. the Solicitor General (2)
    c. a Supreme Court Justice (3)
    d. the head of the EPA (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

52. Who is led the Justice Department's investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016 election?
    a. James Comey (1)
    b. Sean Spicer (2)
    c. Sally Yates (3)
    d. Robert Mueller (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

53. The tap water in Flint, Michigan is unsafe because it contains too much...
    a. Lead (1)
    b. Arsenic (2)
    c. Asbestos (3)
    d. Mold (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

54. Many conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives are members of which of the following groups?
    a. The Tuesday Group (1)
    b. The Lincoln Group (2)
    c. The Freedom Caucus (3)
    d. The Blue Dogs (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

55. Which of the following countries has officially started the process of leaving the European Union?
    a. Greece (1)

b. Germany (2)
c. Hungary (3)
d. The United Kingdom (4)
e. Don't know (5)

56. Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?
    a. Paul Ryan (1)
    b. Nancy Pelosi (2)
    c. Jason Chaffetz (3)
    d. Mitch McConnell (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

57. The national unemployment rate as reported by the government is currently closer to...
    a. 4% (1)
    b. 7% (2)
    c. 12% (3)
    d. 17% (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

58. How much would you say you agree with the following statement?
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully.
    a. Strongly agree (1)
    b. Agree (2)
    c. Somewhat agree (3)
    d. Neither agree nor disagree (4)
    e. Somewhat disagree (5)
    f. Disagree (6)
    g. Strongly disagree (7)

59. How much would you say you trust the **federal government**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

60. How much would you say you trust **Congress**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

61. How much would you say you trust the **court system**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

62. How much would you say you trust **law enforcement**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)

    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

63. How much would you say you trust the **executive branch**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

64. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?
    a. Approve (1)
    b. Disapprove (2)
    c. Don't know/No opinion (3)

65. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly?
    a. Very strongly (1)
    b. Not so strongly (2)
    c. Don't know (3)

66. Do you disapprove very strongly, or not so strongly?
    a. Very strongly (1)
    b. Not so strongly (2)
    c. Don't know (3)

67. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today?
    a. Satisfied (1)
    b. Dissatisfied (2)
    c. Don't know/No opinion (3)

68. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
    a. Very favorable (1)
    b. Mostly favorable (2)
    c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
    d. Very unfavorable (4)
    e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)

69. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
    a. Very favorable (1)
    b. Mostly favorable (2)
    c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
    d. Very unfavorable (4)
    e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)

70. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?
    a. Smaller government, fewer services (1)
    b. Bigger government, more services (2)
    c. Depends (3)
    d. Don't know/No opinion (4)

71. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient (1)
    b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (2)
72. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest (1)
    b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (2)
73. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to **news** on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet, not including sports?
    a. None (1)
    b. One day (2)
    c. Two days (3)
    d. Three days (4)
    e. Four days (5)
    f. Five days (6)
    g. Six days (7)
    h. Seven days (8)
74. How much attention do you pay to **news about national politics** on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet?
    a. A great deal (1)
    b. A lot (2)
    c. A moderate amount (3)
    d. A little (4)
    e. None at all (5)
75. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to **NON-news** on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet?
    a. None (1)
    b. One day (2)
    c. Two days (3)
    d. Three days (4)
    e. Four days (5)
    f. Five days (6)
    g. Six days (7)
    h. Seven days (8)
76. During a typical week, how many days do you engage with social media?
    a. None (1)
    b. One day (2)
    c. Two days (3)
    d. Three days (4)
    e. Four days (5)
    f. Five days (6)
    g. Six days (7)
    h. Seven days (8)
77. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a crime or legal drama, like *Law & Order* or *CSI*?

   a. None (1)
   b. One day (2)
   c. Two days (3)
   d. Three days (4)
   e. Four days (5)
   f. Five days (6)
   g. Six days (7)
   h. Seven days (8)
78. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a medical drama, like *Grey's Anatomy*?
   a. None (1)
   b. One day (2)
   c. Two days (3)
   d. Three days (4)
   e. Four days (5)
   f. Five days (6)
   g. Six days (7)
   h. Seven days (8)
79. During a typical week, how many days do you watch unscripted dramas, often called reality shows?
   a. None (1)
   b. One day (2)
   c. Two days (3)
   d. Three days (4)
   e. Four days (5)
   f. Five days (6)
   g. Six days (7)
   h. Seven days (8)
80. Which genres do you typically choose when you watch shows or films?
   (**Choose up to three**)
   a. Action/Adventure (1)
   b. Comedy (2)
   c. Sci-fi/Fantasy (3)
   d. Suspense (4)
   e. Based on comic books (5)
   f. Animation (6)
   g. Horror (7)
   h. Drama (8)
   i. Romantic comedy (9)
   j. Kids & family (10)
   k. Romance (11)
   l. Re-releases (12)
   m. Musicals (13)
   n. Art house/Indie (14)
81. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?

a. I prefer to watch shows as they air on television—watching one episode per week. (1)
b. I prefer to wait and binge-watch shows after they have aired—watching many episodes in one sitting. (2)

How much have you watched of the show **24: Legacy (Fox)**?
c. Never watched (1)
d. 1-3 episodes (2)
e. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
f. At least 1 season (4)

82. How much have you watched of the show **Allegiance (NBC)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

83. How much have you watched of the show **American Crime (ABC)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

84. How much have you watched of the show **Bodyguard (Netflix)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

85. How much have you watched of the show **Containment (The CW)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

86. How much have you watched of the show **Crisis (NBC)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

87. How much have you watched of the show **Designated Survivor (ABC)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

88. How much have you watched of the show **FBI (CBS)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

89. How much have you watched of the show **Gang Related (Fox)**?
a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

90. How much have you watched of the show **Homeland (HBO)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

91. How much have you watched of the show **House of Cards (Netflix)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

92. How much have you watched of the show **Hostages (CBS)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

93. How much have you watched of the show **Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

94. How much have you watched of the show **Jane the Virgin (The CW)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

95. How much have you watched of the show **Madam Secretary (CBS)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

96. How much have you watched of the show **Mr. Robot (USA)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

97. How much have you watched of the show **Odyssey (NBC)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

98. How much have you watched of the show **Orange is the New Black (Netflix)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

99. How much have you watched of the show **Ozark (Netflix)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

100. How much have you watched of the show **Power (Starz)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

101. How much have you watched of the show **Quantico (ABC)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

102. How much have you watched of the show **Scandal (ABC)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

103. How much have you watched of the show **Seven Seconds (Netflix)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

104. How much have you watched of the show **Shades of Blue (NBC)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

105. How much have you watched of the show **Shots Fired (Fox)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

106. How much have you watched of the show **State of Affairs (NBC)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
       d. At least 1 season (4)

107. How much have you watched of the show **Taken (NBC)**?
       a. Never watched (1)
       b. 1-3 episodes (2)
       c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

      d. At least 1 season (4)

108.   How much have you watched of the show **The Americans (FX)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

109.   How much have you watched of the show **The Blacklist (NBC)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

110.   How much have you watched of the show **The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

111.   How much have you watched of the show **The Crossing (ABC)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

112.   How much have you watched of the show **The Informer (Amazon Prime)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

113.   How much have you watched of the show **The Night Of (HBO)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

114.   How much have you watched of the show **The Passage (Fox)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

115.   How much have you watched of the show **Valor (The CW)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

116.   We are interested in whether you actually take the time to read directions; if not, some results may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about your favorite

color and choose yellow as your answer. Again, please answer the question as we have instructed rather than choosing your favorite color.

What is your favorite color?

    a. Red (1)
    b. Pink (2)
    c. Orange (3)
    d. Yellow (4)
    e. Green (5)
    f. Blue (6)
    g. Purple (7)
    h. None of the above (8)

117.   Finally, to confirm you have completed the survey, please enter a confirmation code of your choosing in the text box below. It should include the term PAWS and a number (for example: "PAWS1234"). You will need to also enter the same code in the box on the Mechanical Turk HIT. We will use this code to verify that you have completed the survey and approve your payment. Your answers will not be linked with your personal information in any way.

Thank you for participating in our survey!

_____

Appendix B.2: Experiment Surveys

  Pre-treatment Survey

1. Please provide your 5-digit **SONA ID number** so that you may be compensated:

 _____

2. Are you 18 or older?
      a. Yes (1)
      b. No, I am under 18 (2)
3. Please review the following Informed Consent information before continuing to the rest
    of the survey.
    <u>Introduction and Key Information</u> You are invited to take part in a research study. It is
    up to you to decide if you would like to take part in the study. The purpose of this study
    is to examine the effects of fictional media consumption on individual attitudes. Your
    role in the study will last approximately 4.5 hours over the span of 5 weeks. You will be
    asked to do the following: 1) Take a pre-treatment survey; 2) Watch three episodes of a
    popular dramatic show by EITHER attending one long session that lasts 4 hours OR
    attending three sessions that last approximately 1 hour each; 3) Take a post-treatment
    survey; and 4) Take a follow-up survey in the fifth and final week of the study.
    Participating in this study will not expose you to any more risks than you would
    experience in a typical day. However, please be aware that some episodes may contain
    adult content. This study is not designed to benefit you. Overall, we hope to gain
    information about how interaction with fictional media affects social and political
    attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a whole. If you do
    not wish to take part in this study, you may choose another study available to the Political
    Science Research Pool through the SONA system. **<u>Purpose</u>** The purpose of the study is
    to learn how binge-watching a show and watching it weekly affect long-term individual
    attitudes differently, if at all. You are invited to take part in this research study because
    you are taking an introductory political science class and are therefore part of the Political
    Science Research Pool. A total of 240 people will be invited to take part in this study.
    <u>Procedures</u> If you decide to take part, you will be asked to participate in several
    research activities. First, you are asked to take the pre-test survey online. Next, you will
    be asked to attend screenings of three episodes of a popular dramatic show. This will be
    either a single screening of all three episodes in one day or three separate screenings of
    each episode. After you have watched the episodes, you will be asked to take a post-test
    survey to complete your in-person participation. Four weeks after the first session, you
    will receive an email asking you to complete a follow-up survey for additional
    compensation. You can expect to fill out all surveys online using a computer or
    smartphone. For individuals who do not have a computer or smartphone available, you
    can request a paper copy to fill out. Each screening session will take place on the GSU
    campus. **<u>Future Research</u>** Researchers will remove information that may identify you
    and may use your data for future research. If we do this, we will not ask for any
    additional consent from you. **<u>Risks</u>** In this study, you will not have any more risks than
    you would in a normal day of life. You will be asked to watch episodes from a dramatic

show. Be aware that the show may contain adult content, including adult language, violence, and sexual situations. Please know that you may discontinue your participation at any time without adverse consequence. No injury is expected from this study, but if you believe you have been harmed, contact the research team as soon as possible. Georgia State University and the research team have not set aside funds to compensate for any injury.   **Benefits**   This study is not designed to benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about how interaction with fictional media affects social and political attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a whole. **Alternatives** As part of the Political Science Research Pool, you have access to multiple studies over the course of the semester. If you do not wish to participate in this study, you may choose another.

    Select CONTINUE to continue reading this document.

4. **Please review the following Informed Consent information before continuing to the rest of the survey.   Compensation**   You may receive up to 3 points of extra credit and $10 in the form of an Amazon digital gift card for participating in this study. However, this compensation is based upon how long you stay in the study. Participants who only complete the pre-test survey will only be eligible to receive 0.5 extra credit point on their final grade. If you continue with the study, you will be compensated per episode. Participants who only come in for episode 1 will be compensated with 1 extra credit point total.   Participants who come in for episodes 1-2 will be compensated with 2 extra credit points total.   Participants who come in for episodes 1-3 and complete the post-test survey will be compensated with 3 extra credit points total and a $5 Amazon digital gift card.   Participants who come in for episodes 1-3, take the post-test survey, and take the follow-up survey will be compensated with an additional $5 Amazon gift card, bringing total compensation to 3 extra credit point and a $10 Amazon digital gift card.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal   You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. You may refuse to take part in the study or stop at any time. This will not cause you to lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You will be compensated for all participation up to that point (see above compensation scale). **Confidentiality**   We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. The following people and entities will have access to the information you provide: Researchers Dr. Lakeyta Bonnette-Bailey and Alexandra Pauley   GSU Institutional Review Board   Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)   We will use a study number rather than your name on study records. The information you provide will be stored in a locked cabinet (paper copies) and password- and firewall-protected computers (electronic data). All paper copies will have identifying information removed and replaced with the study number. A key of study numbers will be stored separately from the data to protect privacy. When we present or publish the results of this study, we will not use your name or other information that may identify you. **Contact Information**   Contact Alexandra Pauley at apauley1@gsu.edu or 6788969488:   If you have questions about the study or your part in it If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study   The IRB at Georgia State University reviews all research that involves human participants. You can contact the IRB if you would like to speak to someone who is not involved directly with the study. You can contact the IRB for questions, concerns, problems, information,

input, or questions about your rights as a research participant. Contact the IRB at 404-413-3500 or irb@gsu.edu.   **Consent**   We recommend you print out a copy of this page for your records. Upon request, we will give you a copy of this consent form to keep.   **If you agree to participate in this study, please select "I Agree" to continue with the pre-test survey.**

    a. I Agree (1)
    b. I do not wish to participate (2)

5. What is your gender?
    a. Male (1)
    b. Female (2)
    c. Nonbinary/Other (3)

6. What is your age?

---

7. What, if any, is your religious preference?
   a. Catholic (1)
   b. Protestant (2)
   c. Muslim (3)
   d. Hindu (4)
   e. Jewish (5)
   f. Pagan (6)
   g. Other (7)
   h. No preference (8)
   i. Prefer not to say (9)
8. How important is your religious affiliation to you?
   a. Extremely important (1)
   b. Very important (2)
   c. Moderately imporant (6)
   d. Slightly important (3)
   e. Not at all important (4)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (5)
9. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
   a. Extremely likely (1)
   b. Moderately likely (2)
   c. Slightly likely (3)
   d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
   e. Slightly unlikely (5)
   f. Moderately unlikely (6)
   g. Extremely unlikely (7)
   h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
10. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
   a. Elementary school (1)
   b. Middle school (2)
   c. High school/GED (3)
   d. Some college (4)
   e. Associate's degree (5)
   f. Bachelor's degree (6)
   g. Some graduate work (7)
   h. Completed Master's or professional degree (8)
   i. Advanced graduate work or Ph.D. (9)
11. Which of the following best describes your marital status?
   a. Single, never married (1)
   b. Married (2)
   c. Divorced/separated (3)
   d. Widowed (4)
   e. Prefer not to say (5)
12. Have you traveled outside of the country in the past five years?
   a. Yes (1)
   b. No (2)
   c. Prefer not to say (3)

13. How would you describe yourself?
   (Select all that apply)
   a. American Indian or Alaska Native (1)
   b. Asian (2)
   c. Black or African American (3)
   d. Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin (4)
   e. Middle Eastern or North African (8)
   f. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (6)
   g. White (5)
   h. Other, please describe: (7)

   _____

14. How would you best describe your current employment status?
   a. Employed full-time (1)
   b. Employed part-time (2)
   c. Unemployed/looking for work (3)
   d. Student (4)
   e. Homemaker (5)
   f. Retired (6)

15. What do you expect your 2019 family income to be before taxes (from all sources)?
   a. Under $25,000 (1)
   b. $25,000-$39,999 (2)
   c. $40,000-$49,999 (3)
   d. $50,000-$74,999 (4)
   e. $75,000-$99,999 (5)
   f. $100,000-$124,999 (6)
   g. $125,000-$149,999 (7)
   h. Over $150,000 (8)

16. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
   a. Democrat (1)
   b. Republican (2)
   c. Independent (3)
   d. Libertarian (4)
   e. Other (5)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (6)

17. How important is your political party affiliation to you?
   a. Extremely important (1)
   b. Very important (2)
   c. Moderately important (3)
   d. Slightly important (4)
   e. Not at all important (5)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (6)

18. Do your parents associate with one of the following parties?
   a. Democrat (1)
   b. Republican (2)
   c. Independent (3)

    d. Different Parties (7)
    e. Libertarian (4)
    f. Other (5)
    g. Don't know/Undecided (6)

19. How important is your parents' political party affiliation to them?
    a. Extremely important (1)
    b. Very important (2)
    c. Moderately important (3)
    d. Slightly important (4)
    e. Not at all important (5)
    f. Don't know/Undecided (6)

20. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (2)
    c. About half the time (6)
    d. Some of the time (7)
    e. Never (8)

21. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
(Choose one)
    a. Abortion (1)
    b. National debt (2)
    c. Environment and climate change (3)
    d. Gay rights (4)
    e. Gun control (5)
    f. Health care (6)
    g. Immigration (7)
    h. Poverty (8)
    i. Income inequality (9)
    j. Unemployment (10)
    k. Economic growth (11)
    l. Military strength (12)
    m. Morality and religion in society (13)
    n. Racism (14)
    o. Social security (15)
    p. Taxes (16)
    q. Women's rights (17)
    r. Crime (18)
    s. Foreign policy (19)
    t. Education (20)
    u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)

22. Who is the current Secretary of State?
    a. Mike Pompeo (1)
    b. John Kerry (2)
    c. Rex Tillerson (3)
    d. Scott Pruitt (4)
    e. Don't know (5)

23. Who is the current President of France?
    a. Emmanuel Macron (1)
    b. Justin Trudeau (2)
    c. Malcolm Turnbull (3)
    d. Theresa May (4)
    e. Don't know (5)
24. Brett Kavanaugh is...
    a. a Senator (1)
    b. the Solicitor General (2)
    c. a Supreme Court Justice (3)
    d. the head of the EPA (4)
    e. Don't know (5)
25. Who led the Justice Department's investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016 election?
    a. James Comey (1)
    b. Sean Spicer (2)
    c. Sally Yates (3)
    d. Robert Mueller (4)
    e. Don't know (5)
26. The tap water in Flint, Michigan is unsafe because it contains too much...
    a. Lead (1)
    b. Arsenic (2)
    c. Asbestos (3)
    d. Mold (4)
    e. Don't know (5)
27. Many conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives are members of which of the following groups?
    a. The Tuesday Group (1)
    b. The Lincoln Group (2)
    c. The Freedom Caucus (3)
    d. The Blue Dogs (4)
    e. Don't know (5)
28. Which of the following countries has officially started the process of leaving the European Union?
    a. Greece (1)
    b. Germany (2)
    c. Hungary (3)
    d. The United Kingdom (4)
    e. Don't know (5)
29. Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?
    a. Paul Ryan (1)
    b. Nancy Pelosi (2)
    c. Jason Chaffetz (3)
    d. Mitch McConnell (4)
    e. Don't know (5)
30. The national unemployment rate as reported by the government is currently closer to...

      a. 4% (1)
      b. 7% (2)
      c. 12% (3)
      d. 17% (4)
      e. Don't know (5)

31. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near future?
      a. Extremely worried (1)
      b. Very worried (2)
      c. Slightly worried (3)
      d. Not at all worried (4)

32. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
      a. Extremely worried (1)
      b. Very worried (2)
      c. Moderately worried (3)
      d. Slightly worried (4)
      e. Not at all worried (5)

33. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of the following groups in the near future?
(**Select one answer for each group listed**)

	Extremely likely (1)	Moderately likely (2)	Slightly likely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly unlikely (5)	Moderately unlikely (6)	Extremely unlikely (7)
Blacks (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Whites (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Muslims (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Christians (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Left-wing radicals (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Right-wing radicals (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Russians (7)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Chinese (8)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

34. Do you favor or oppose allowing **Syrian refugees** to come to the United States?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
35. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
36. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other countries?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
37. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from terrorism (1)
    b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from terrorism (2)
38. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its believers (0)
    b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (1)
39. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (0)
    b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (1)
40. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to **news** on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet, not including sports?
    a. None (1)
    b. One day (2)

      c. Two days (3)
      d. Three days (4)
      e. Four days (5)
      f. Five days (6)
      g. Six days (7)
      h. Seven days (8)

41. How much attention do you pay to **news about national politics** on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet?
      a. A great deal (1)
      b. A lot (2)
      c. A moderate amount (3)
      d. A little (4)
      e. None at all (5)

42. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to **NON-news** on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet?
      a. None (1)
      b. One day (2)
      c. Two days (3)
      d. Three days (4)
      e. Four days (5)
      f. Five days (6)
      g. Six days (7)
      h. Seven days (8)

43. During a typical week, how many days do you engage with social media?
      a. None (1)
      b. One day (2)
      c. Two days (3)
      d. Three days (4)
      e. Four days (5)
      f. Five days (6)
      g. Six days (7)
      h. Seven days (8)

44. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a crime or legal drama, like *Law & Order* or *CSI*?
      a. None (1)
      b. One day (2)
      c. Two days (3)
      d. Three days (4)
      e. Four days (5)
      f. Five days (6)
      g. Six days (7)
      h. Seven days (8)

45. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a medical drama, like *Grey's Anatomy*?
      a. None (1)
      b. One day (2)

    c. Two days (3)
    d. Three days (4)
    e. Four days (5)
    f. Five days (6)
    g. Six days (7)
    h. Seven days (8)

46. During a typical week, how many days do you watch unscripted dramas, often called reality shows?
    a. None (1)
    b. One day (2)
    c. Two days (3)
    d. Three days (4)
    e. Four days (5)
    f. Five days (6)
    g. Six days (7)
    h. Seven days (8)

47. Which genres do you typically choose when you watch shows or films?
   (**Choose up to three**)
    a. Action/Adventure (1)
    b. Comedy (2)
    c. Sci-fi/Fantasy (3)
    d. Suspense (4)
    e. Based on comic books (5)
    f. Animation (6)
    g. Horror (7)
    h. Drama (8)
    i. Romantic comedy (9)
    j. Kids & family (10)
    k. Romance (11)
    l. Re-releases (12)
    m. Musicals (13)
    n. Art house/Indie (14)

48. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. I prefer to watch shows as they air on television—watching one episode per week. (1)
    b. I prefer to wait and binge-watch shows after they have aired—watching many episodes in one sitting. (2)

49. How much have you watched of the show **24: Legacy (Fox)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)

50. How much have you watched of the show **Allegiance (NBC)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

51. How much have you watched of the show **American Crime (ABC)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

52. How much have you watched of the show **Bodyguard (Netflix)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

53. How much have you watched of the show **Containment (The CW)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

54. How much have you watched of the show **Crisis (NBC)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

55. How much have you watched of the show **Designated Survivor (ABC)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

56. How much have you watched of the show **FBI (CBS)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

57. How much have you watched of the show **Gang Related (Fox)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

58. How much have you watched of the show **Homeland (HBO)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

    d. At least 1 season (4)

59. How much have you watched of the show **House of Cards (Netflix)**?

    a. Never watched (1)

    b. 1-3 episodes (2)

    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)

      d. At least 1 season (4)

60. How much have you watched of the show **Hostages (CBS)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

61. How much have you watched of the show **Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

62. How much have you watched of the show **Jane the Virgin (The CW)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

63. How much have you watched of the show **Madam Secretary (CBS)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

64. How much have you watched of the show **Mr. Robot (USA)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

65. How much have you watched of the show **Odyssey (NBC)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

66. How much have you watched of the show **Orange is the New Black (Netflix)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

67. How much have you watched of the show **Ozark (Netflix)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

68. How much have you watched of the show **Power (Starz)**?
      a. Never watched (1)
      b. 1-3 episodes (2)
      c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
      d. At least 1 season (4)

69. How much have you watched of the show **Quantico (ABC)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
70. How much have you watched of the show **Scandal (ABC)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
71. How much have you watched of the show **Seven Seconds (Netflix)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
72. How much have you watched of the show **Shades of Blue (NBC)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
73. How much have you watched of the show **Shots Fired (Fox)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
74. How much have you watched of the show **State of Affairs (NBC)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
75. How much have you watched of the show **Taken (NBC)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
76. How much have you watched of the show **The Americans (FX)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
77. How much have you watched of the show **The Blacklist (NBC)**?
    a. Never watched (1)
    b. 1-3 episodes (2)
    c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
    d. At least 1 season (4)
78. How much have you watched of the show **The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC)**?

a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

79. How much have you watched of the show **The Crossing (ABC)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

80. How much have you watched of the show **The Informer (Amazon Prime)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

81. How much have you watched of the show **The Night Of (HBO)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

82. How much have you watched of the show **The Passage (Fox)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

83. How much have you watched of the show **Valor (The CW)**?
a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (2)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (3)
d. At least 1 season (4)

Thank you for participating! **Remember to sign up for PART 2 of this study in SONA. Once you sign up**, you will receive an email by **Wednesday 2/12** with further instructions about your participation.
Please **continue** to submit your survey.

Post-treatment Survey: Control Groups

1. Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number:

   _____

2. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
   a. Extremely likely (1)
   b. Moderately likely (2)
   c. Slightly likely (3)
   d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
   e. Slightly unlikely (5)
   f. Moderately unlikely (6)
   g. Extremely unlikely (7)
   h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
3. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
   a. Democrat (1)
   b. Republican (2)
   c. Independent (3)
   d. Libertarian (4)
   e. Other (5)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
4. How important is your political party affiliation to you?
   a. Extremely important (1)
   b. Very important (2)
   c. Moderately important (3)
   d. Slightly important (4)
   e. Not at all important (5)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
5. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
   a. Always (1)
   b. Most of the time (2)
   c. About half the time (6)
   d. Some of the time (7)
   e. Never (8)
6. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
   (Choose one)
   a. Abortion (1)
   b. National debt (2)
   c. Environment and climate change (3)
   d. Gay rights (4)
   e. Gun control (5)
   f. Health care (6)
   g. Immigration (7)
   h. Poverty (8)
   i. Income inequality (9)
   j. Unemployment (10)
   k. Economic growth (11)
   l. Military strength (12)

      m. Morality and religion in society (13)
      n. Racism (14)
      o. Social security (15)
      p. Taxes (16)
      q. Women's rights (17)
      r. Crime (18)
      s. Foreign policy (19)
      t. Education (20)
      u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)

7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near future?
      a. Extremely worried (1)
      b. Very worried (2)
      c. Slightly worried (3)
      d. Not at all worried (4)

8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
      a. Extremely worried (1)
      b. Very worried (2)
      c. Moderately worried (3)
      d. Slightly worried (4)
      e. Not at all worried (5)

9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of the following groups in the near future?
(**Select one answer for each group listed**)

	Extremely likely (1)	Moderately likely (2)	Slightly likely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly unlikely (5)	Moderately unlikely (6)	Extremely unlikely (7)
Blacks (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Whites (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Muslims (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Christians (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Left-wing radicals (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Right-wing radicals (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Russians (7)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Chinese (8)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

10. Do you favor or oppose allowing **Syrian refugees** to come to the United States?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
12. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other countries?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
13. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from terrorism (1)
    b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from terrorism (2)
14. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its believers (1)
    b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (2)
15. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (2)
    b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (3)
16. How much would you say you agree with the following statement?
    I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully.
    a. Strongly agree (1)
    b. Agree (2)

    c. Somewhat agree (3)

    d. Neither agree nor disagree (4)

    e. Somewhat disagree (5)

    f. Disagree (6)

    g. Strongly disagree (7)

17. How much would you say you trust the **federal government**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

18. How much would you say you trust **Congress**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

19. How much would you say you trust the **court system**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

20. How much would you say you trust **law enforcement**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

21. How much would you say you trust the **executive branch**?
    a. Always (1)
    b. Most of the time (8)
    c. Some of the time (9)
    d. Rarely (2)
    e. Never (3)

22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?
    a. Approve (1)
    b. Disapprove (2)
    c. Don't know/No opinion (3)

23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly?
    a. Very strongly (1)
    b. Not so strongly (2)
    c. Don't know (3)

24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today?
    a. Satisfied (1)

     b. Dissatisfied (2)

     c. Don't know/No opinion (3)

25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?

     a. Very favorable (1)

     b. Mostly favorable (2)

     c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)

     d. Very unfavorable (4)

     e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)

26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?

     a. Very favorable (1)

     b. Mostly favorable (2)

     c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)

     d. Very unfavorable (4)

     e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)

27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?

     a. Smaller government, fewer services (1)

     b. Bigger government, more services (2)

     c. Depends (3)

     d. Don't know/No opinion (4)

28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?

     a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient (1)

     b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (2)

29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?

     a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest (1)

     b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (2)

30. While you were watching the show, how interested did you feel about what was going on?

     a. Very interested (1)

     b. Somewhat interested (2)

     c. A little interested (3)

     d. Not at all interested (4)

31. Q196 How absorbed/"sucked in" did you feel by the show?

     a. Very absorbed (1)

     b. Somewhat absorbed (2)

     c. A little absorbed (3)

     d. Not at all absorbed (4)

32. Did you feel like the show was realistic?

     a. Very realistic (1)

     b. Somewhat realistic (2)

     c. A little realistic (3)

     d. Not at all realistic (4)

33. Were there any characters that you felt you identified with while watching the show? This could mean you personally identify with the character, you want to be more like the character, you could see yourself being friends with the character, or you just generally like the character.
    a. Yes, I identified with at least one character (1)
    b. No, I didn't identify with any of the characters (3)

Post-treatment Survey: Treatment Groups

1. Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number:

   _____

2. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
   a. Extremely likely (1)
   b. Moderately likely (2)
   c. Slightly likely (3)
   d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
   e. Slightly unlikely (5)
   f. Moderately unlikely (6)
   g. Extremely unlikely (7)
   h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
3. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
   a. Democrat (1)
   b. Republican (2)
   c. Independent (3)
   d. Libertarian (4)
   e. Other (5)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
4. How important is your political party affiliation to you?
   a. Extremely important (1)
   b. Very important (2)
   c. Moderately important (3)
   d. Slightly important (4)
   e. Not at all important (5)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
5. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
   a. Always (1)
   b. Most of the time (2)
   c. About half the time (6)
   d. Some of the time (7)
   e. Never (8)
6. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
   (Choose one)
   a. Abortion (1)
   b. National debt (2)
   c. Environment and climate change (3)
   d. Gay rights (4)
   e. Gun control (5)
   f. Health care (6)
   g. Immigration (7)
   h. Poverty (8)
   i. Income inequality (9)
   j. Unemployment (10)
   k. Economic growth (11)
   l. Military strength (12)

     m. Morality and religion in society (13)
     n. Racism (14)
     o. Social security (15)
     p. Taxes (16)
     q. Women's rights (17)
     r. Crime (18)
     s. Foreign policy (19)
     t. Education (20)
     u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)

7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near future?
     a. Extremely worried (1)
     b. Very worried (2)
     c. Slightly worried (3)
     d. Not at all worried (4)

8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
     a. Extremely worried (1)
     b. Very worried (2)
     c. Moderately worried (3)
     d. Slightly worried (4)
     e. Not at all worried (5)

9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of the following groups in the near future? (**Select one answer for each group listed**)

	Extremely likely (1)	Moderately likely (2)	Slightly likely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly unlikely (5)	Moderately unlikely (6)	Extremely unlikely (7)
Blacks (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Whites (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Muslims (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Christians (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Left-wing radicals (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Right-wing radicals (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Russians (7)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Chinese (8)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

10. Do you favor or oppose allowing **Syrian refugees** to come to the United States?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
12. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other countries?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
13. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from terrorism (1)
    b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from terrorism (2)
14. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its believers (1)
    b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions (2)
15. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (2)
    b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe (3)
16. How much would you say you agree with the following statement?
    I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully.
    a. Strongly agree (1)
    b. Agree (2)

      c. Somewhat agree (3)
      d. Neither agree nor disagree (4)
      e. Somewhat disagree (5)
      f. Disagree (6)
      g. Strongly disagree (7)

17. How much would you say you trust the **federal government**?
      a. Always (1)
      b. Most of the time (8)
      c. Some of the time (9)
      d. Rarely (2)
      e. Never (3)

18. How much would you say you trust **Congress**?
      a. Always (1)
      b. Most of the time (8)
      c. Some of the time (9)
      d. Rarely (2)
      e. Never (3)

19. How much would you say you trust the **court system**?
      a. Always (1)
      b. Most of the time (8)
      c. Some of the time (9)
      d. Rarely (2)
      e. Never (3)

20. How much would you say you trust **law enforcement**?
      a. Always (1)
      b. Most of the time (8)
      c. Some of the time (9)
      d. Rarely (2)
      e. Never (3)

21. How much would you say you trust the **executive branch**?
      a. Always (1)
      b. Most of the time (8)
      c. Some of the time (9)
      d. Rarely (2)
      e. Never (3)

22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?
      a. Approve (1)
      b. Disapprove (2)
      c. Don't know/No opinion (3)

23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly?
      a. Very strongly (1)
      b. Not so strongly (2)
      c. Don't know (3)

24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today?
      a. Satisfied (1)

b. Dissatisfied (2)
c. Don't know/No opinion (3)

25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
    f. Very favorable (1)
    g. Mostly favorable (2)
    h. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
    i. Very unfavorable (4)
    j. Can't rate/No opinion (5)

26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?
    a. Very favorable (1)
    b. Mostly favorable (2)
    c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)
    d. Very unfavorable (4)
    e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)

27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?
    a. Smaller government, fewer services (1)
    b. Bigger government, more services (2)
    c. Depends (3)
    d. Don't know/No opinion (4)

28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient (1)
    b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (2)

29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
    a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest (1)
    b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (2)

30. While you were watching the show, how interested did you feel about what was going on?
    a. Very interested (1)
    b. Somewhat interested (2)
    c. A little interested (3)
    d. Not at all interested (4)

31. Q196 How absorbed/"sucked in" did you feel by the show?
    a. Very absorbed (1)
    b. Somewhat absorbed (2)
    c. A little absorbed (3)
    d. Not at all absorbed (4)

32. Did you feel like the show was realistic?
    a. Very realistic (1)
    b. Somewhat realistic (2)
    c. A little realistic (3)
    d. Not at all realistic (4)

33. **Abbas al-Fathi**
    a. I personally identify with this character (1)
    b. I want to be more like this character (2)
    c. I could be friends with this character (3)
    d. I do NOT like this character (4)
    e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
34. **Ali bin Suleiman**
    a. I personally identify with this character (1)
    b. I want to be more like this character (2)
    c. I could be friends with this character (3)
    d. I do NOT like this character (4)
    e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
35. **Dr. Cathy Mueller**
    a. I personally identify with this character (1)
    b. I want to be more like this character (2)
    c. I could be friends with this character (3)
    d. I do NOT like this character (4)
    e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
36. **Hanin**
    a. I personally identify with this character (1)
    b. I want to be more like this character (2)
    c. I could be friends with this character (3)
    d. I do NOT like this character (4)
    e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
37. **Jack Ryan**
    a. I personally identify with this character (1)
    b. I want to be more like this character (2)
    c. I could be friends with this character (3)
    d. I do NOT like this character (4)
    e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
38. **James Greer**
    a. I personally identify with this character (1)
    b. I want to be more like this character (2)
    c. I could be friends with this character (3)
    d. I do NOT like this character (4)
    e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
39. **Victor Polizzi**
    a. I personally identify with this character (1)
    b. I want to be more like this character (2)
    c. I could be friends with this character (3)
    d. I do NOT like this character (4)
    e. No opinion/Don't know (5)
40. **Sandrine Arnaud**
    a. I personally identify with this character (1)
    b. I want to be more like this character (2)
    c. I could be friends with this character (3)

       d. I do NOT like this character (4)

       e. No opinion/Don't know (5)

41. **Mousa bin Suleiman**

       a. I I personally identify with this character (1)

       b. I want to be more like this character (2)

       c. I could be friends with this character (3)

       d. I do NOT like this character (4)

       e. No opinion/Don't know (5)

42. **Yazid**

       a. I personally identify with this character (1)

       b. I want to be more like this character (2)

       c. I could be friends with this character (3)

       d. I do NOT like this character (4)

       e. No opinion/Don't know (5)

43. Were there any other characters that you felt you identified with other than those already mentioned?

       a. Yes (1)

       b. No (4)

Follow-up Survey

1. Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number:

   _____

2. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election?
   a. Extremely likely (1)
   b. Moderately likely (2)
   c. Slightly likely (3)
   d. Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
   e. Slightly unlikely (5)
   f. Moderately unlikely (6)
   g. Extremely unlikely (7)
   h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election. (8)
3. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
   a. Democrat (1)
   b. Republican (2)
   c. Independent (3)
   d. Libertarian (4)
   e. Other (5)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
4. How important is your political party affiliation to you?
   a. Extremely important (1)
   b. Very important (2)
   c. Moderately important (3)
   d. Slightly important (4)
   e. Not at all important (5)
   f. Don't know/Undecided (6)
5. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?
   a. Always (1)
   b. Most of the time (2)
   c. About half the time (6)
   d. Some of the time (7)
   e. Never (8)
6. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?
   (Choose one)
   a. Abortion (1)
   b. National debt (2)
   c. Environment and climate change (3)
   d. Gay rights (4)
   e. Gun control (5)
   f. Health care (6)
   g. Immigration (7)
   h. Poverty (8)
   i. Income inequality (9)
   j. Unemployment (10)
   k. Economic growth (11)
   l. Military strength (12)

      m. Morality and religion in society (13)
      n. Racism (14)
      o. Social security (15)
      p. Taxes (16)
      q. Women's rights (17)
      r. Crime (18)
      s. Foreign policy (19)
      t. Education (20)
      u. Terrorism and homeland security (21)

7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near future?
      a. Extremely worried (1)
      b. Very worried (2)
      c. Slightly worried (3)
      d. Not at all worried (4)

8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live?
      a. Extremely worried (1)
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9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of the following groups in the near future?
(**Select one answer for each group listed**)

	Extremely likely (1)	Moderately likely (2)	Slightly likely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly unlikely (5)	Moderately unlikely (6)	Extremely unlikely (7)
Blacks (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Whites (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Muslims (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Christians (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Left-wing radicals (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Right-wing radicals (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Russians (7)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Chinese (8)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

10. Do you favor or oppose allowing **Syrian refugees** to come to the United States?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria?
    a. Favor a great deal (1)
    b. Favor moderately (2)
    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
    e. Oppose a little (5)
    f. Oppose moderately (6)
    g. Oppose a great deal (7)
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    a. Favor a great deal (1)
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    c. Favor a little (3)
    d. Neither favor nor oppose (4)
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    I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully.
    a. Strongly agree (1)
    b. Agree (2)

     c. Somewhat agree (3)

     d. Neither agree nor disagree (4)

     e. Somewhat disagree (5)

     f. Disagree (6)

     g. Strongly disagree (7)

17. How much would you say you trust the **federal government**?

     a. Always (1)

     b. Most of the time (8)

     c. Some of the time (9)

     d. Rarely (2)

     e. Never (3)

18. How much would you say you trust **Congress**?

     a. Always (1)

     b. Most of the time (8)

     c. Some of the time (9)

     d. Rarely (2)

     e. Never (3)

19. How much would you say you trust the **court system**?

     a. Always (1)

     b. Most of the time (8)

     c. Some of the time (9)

     d. Rarely (2)

     e. Never (3)

20. How much would you say you trust **law enforcement**?

     a. Always (1)

     b. Most of the time (8)

     c. Some of the time (9)

     d. Rarely (2)

     e. Never (3)

21. How much would you say you trust the **executive branch**?

     a. Always (1)

     b. Most of the time (8)

     c. Some of the time (9)

     d. Rarely (2)

     e. Never (3)

22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?

     a. Approve (1)

     b. Disapprove (2)

     c. Don't know/No opinion (3)

23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly?

     a. Very strongly (1)

     b. Not so strongly (2)

     c. Don't know (3)

24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today?

     a. Satisfied (1)

     b. Dissatisfied (2)

     c. Don't know/No opinion (3)

25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?

     a. Very favorable (1)

     b. Mostly favorable (2)

     c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)

     d. Very unfavorable (4)

     e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)

26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?

     a. Very favorable (1)

     b. Mostly favorable (2)

     c. Mostly Unfavorable (3)

     d. Very unfavorable (4)

     e. Can't rate/No opinion (5)

27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?

     a. Smaller government, fewer services (1)

     b. Bigger government, more services (2)

     c. Depends (3)

     d. Don't know/No opinion (4)

28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?

     a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient (1)

     b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (2)

29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?

     a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest (1)

     b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good (2)

30. Which show were you assigned to watch in this study?

     a. Jack Ryan (Amazon) (1)

     b. This is Us (NBC) (2)

31. Had you seen that show BEFORE this study?

     a. Yes (1)

     b. No (2)

32. Did you watch any more episodes of that show AFTER this study?

Remember, this survey is anonymous, and your honesty is important.

     a. Yes (1)

     b. No (2)

33. How much have you watched of the show **Jack Ryan** in total?

     a. Never watched (1)

     b. 1-3 episodes (7)

     c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (8)

     d. At least 1 season (9)

34. How much have you watched of the show **This is Us** in total?

a. Never watched (1)
b. 1-3 episodes (7)
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season (8)
d. At least 1 season (9)

Appendix C: Additional Models

Appendix C.1: Chapter 5 Models

The following models compare raw data from specific questions measuring IVs.

	Believe Islam More Likely to Promote Violence than Other Religions			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
MT Stereotype	0.003	0.002	1.54	0.124
White	0.047	0.032	1.46	0.144
Female	-0.081	0.029	-2.74	0.006
Education	-0.001	0.010	-0.09	0.925
Pol ID/Republican	0.117	0.018	6.57	0.000
Pol Knowledge	-0.017	0.006	-2.88	0.004
Travel Outside US	0.047	0.030	1.57	0.117
constant	0.403	0.079	5.12	0.000

	Believe Islam More Likely to Promote Violence than Other Religions			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
MT Stereotype	0.012	0.008	1.52	0.128
White	0.198	0.142	1.40	0.162
Female	-0.348	0.129	-2.71	0.007
Education	-0.002	0.045	-0.04	0.968
Pol ID/Republican	0.502	0.079	6.38	0.000
Pol Knowledge	-0.075	0.026	-2.86	0.004
Travel Outside US	0.202	0.132	1.53	0.127
constant	-0.415	0.344	-1.21	0.227

Log likelihood = -697.27569

	Believe a Muslim Terrorist Attack on the US is Likely in the Near Future			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
MT Stereotype	0.015	0.007	2.26	0.024
White	-0.063	0.121	-0.52	0.604
Female	0.045	0.110	0.41	0.684
Education	-0.113	0.038	-2.94	0.003
Pol ID/Republican	0.211	0.066	3.18	0.002
Pol Knowledge	0.022	0.022	1.01	0.313
Travel Outside US	-0.143	0.111	-1.29	0.196
Constant	0.492	0.294	1.67	0.095

Public Policy Beliefs		
	Send Troops to MidEast	Accept Syrian Refugees
MT Stereotype	0.058 (0.006)***	0.037 (0.006)***
White	-0.115 (-0.113)	-0.441 (0.113)***
Female	0.129 (0.103)	0.214 (0.103)*
Education	-0.032 (0.036)	0.135 (0.036)***
Pol ID/Republican	0.152 (0.062)*	-0.503 (0.062)***
Pol Knowledge	-0.028 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)
Travel Outside US	0.268 (0.104)**	0.209 (0.103)*
Constant	-0.257 (0.277)	0.577 (0.275)*

Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

Level of Discrimination in US Against Muslims				
	Coefficient	Std. Error	z-score	p-value
MT Stereotype	-0.015	0.004	-3.49	0.001
White	-0.092	0.078	-1.18	0.239
Female	0.096	0.071	1.35	0.178
Education	-0.010	0.025	-0.41	0.685
Pol ID/Republican	-0.312	0.043	-7.28	0.000
Pol Knowledge	0.041	0.014	2.83	0.005
Travel Outside US	-0.112	0.071	-1.57	0.116
Constant	3.06	0.191	16.05	0.000

	Social Perceptions		Policy Attitudes	
	Terrorist Attack	Discrimination	Send Troops	Accept Refugees
MT Antagonist	0.022 (0.010)*	-0.025 (0.007)***	0.085 (0.010)***	0.055 (0.009)***
White	-0.058 (0.121)	-0.105 (0.078)	-0.099 (0.114)	-0.429 (0.113)***
Female	0.045 (0.110)	0.092 (0.071)	0.131 (0.103)	0.216 (0.103)*
Education	-0.113 (0.038)*	-0.009 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.036)	0.135 (0.036)***
Pol ID/Republican	0.210 (0.066)**	-0.309 (0.043)***	0.150 (0.062)*	-0.504 (0.062)***
Pol Knowledge	0.024 (0.022)	0.038 (0.014)**	-0.023 (0.021)	0.014 (0.021)
Travel Outside US	-0.144 (0.111)	-0.105 (0.071)	0.268 (0.104)**	0.208 (0.103)*
Constant	0.503 (0.294)	3.062 (0.190)***	-0.214 (0.277)	0.601 (0.275)*

Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

	Likely Muslim Terror Attack		Likely Muslim Terror Attack
Muslim Protagonist	0.034 (0.017)*	No Muslim Protagonist	0.023 (0.01)*
White	-0.07 (0.121)	White	-0.069 (0.12)
Female	0.031 (0.109)	Female	0.049 (0.11)
Education	-0.109 (0.038)**	Education	-0.113 (0.039)**
Pol ID/Republican	0.214 (0.066)***	Pol ID/Republican	0.213 (0.066)***
Pol Knowledge	0.021 (0.022)	Pol Knowledge	0.022 (0.022)
Travel Outside US	-0.134 (0.11)	Travel Outside US	-0.139 (0.11)
Constant	0.513 (0.294)	Constant	0.496 (0.294)

Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

Regression 1	Discrimination Against Muslims	Regression 2	Discrimination Against Muslims
Muslim Protagonist	-0.026 (0.011)*	No Muslim Protagonist	-0.025 (0.007)***
White	-0.072 (0.078)	White	-0.092 (0.077)
Female	0.112 (0.071)	Female	0.088 (0.071)
Education	-0.016 (0.025)	Education	-0.008 (0.025)
Pol ID/Republican	-0.319 (0.043)***	Pol ID/Republican	-0.311 (0.043)***
Pol Knowledge	0.043 (0.012)**	Pol Knowledge	0.04 (0.014)**
Travel Outside US	-0.133 (0.071)	Travel Outside US	-0.109 (0.071)
Constant	3.02 (0.191)***	Constant	3.07 (0.19)***

Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001

The following models compare different versions of combined DV measurements.

	Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
MT Stereotype	-0.056	0.025	-2.28	0.023
White	0.034	0.011	3.21	0.001
Female	0.008	0.010	0.78	0.425
Education	-0.010	0.003	-3.01	0.003
Pol ID/Republican	0.019	0.006	3.26	0.001
Pol Knowledge	0.007	0.002	3.42	0.001
Travel Outside US	-0.016	0.010	-1.66	0.097
Constant	0.507	0.026	19.68	0.000

	Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
MT Antagonist	-0.064	0.024	-2.66	0.008
White	0.032	0.011	3.04	0.002
Female	0.007	0.010	0.73	0.467
Education	-0.010	0.003	-2.95	0.003
Pol ID/Republican	0.019	0.006	3.33	0.001
Pol Knowledge	0.006	0.002	3.30	0.001
Travel Outside US	-0.015	0.010	-1.56	0.120
Constant	0.508	0.026	19.75	0.000

	Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
Muslim Protagonist	-0.041	0.022	-1.87	0.062
White	0.035	0.011	3.31	0.001
Female	0.009	0.010	0.92	0.360
Education	-0.011	0.003	-3.14	0.002
Pol ID/Republican	0.019	0.006	3.20	0.001
Pol Knowledge	0.007	0.002	3.51	0.000
Travel Outside US	-0.017	0.010	-1.79	0.074
Constant	0.505	0.026	19.61	0.000

Appendix C.2: Chapter 6 Models

The following are linear regressions on the DV measuring association of Muslims with terrorism.

Pre-treatment Survey Results					
Variable		Control (n=68)	Treatment (n=76)	*t*-value	Probability
Bias*	Mean	4.104	3.579	1.786	0.076
	Std. deviation	(1.793)	(1.723)		
Troops	Mean	-0.338	-0.039	-1.085	0.280
	Std. deviation	(1.617)	(1.677)		
Refugees	Mean	1.015	1.697	-2.971	0.004
	Std. deviation	(1.511)	(1.244)		
Drones	Mean	-0.338	-0.342	0.014	0.989
	Std. deviation	(1.681)	(1.621)		

*For this variable, the control group n=67.

Post-treatment Survey Results					
Variable		Control (n=68)	Treatment (n=76)	*t*-value	Probability
Bias*	Mean	3.881	3.618	0.832	0.407
	Std. deviation	(2.033)	(1.736)		
Troops	Mean	-0.059	0.066	-0.489	0.625
	Std. deviation	(1.185)	(1.561)		
Refugees	Mean	1.015	1.474	-1.994	0.048
	Std. deviation	(1.321)	(1.428)		
Drones	Mean	-0.397	0.158	-1.956	0.052
	Std. deviation	(1.631)	(1.759)		

*For this variable, the control group n=67.

Follow-up Survey Results					
Variable		Control (n=55)	Treatment (n=57)	*t*-value	Probability
Bias	Mean	3.455	3.526	-0.232	0.817
	Std. deviation	(1.698)	(1.582)		
Troops	Mean	-0.182	-0.175	-0.022	0.983
	Std. deviation	(1.657)	(1.453)		
Refugees	Mean	1.018	1.509	-1.958	0.053
	Std. deviation	(1.269)	(1.377)		
Drones	Mean	-0.4	-0.193	-0.621	0.536
	Std. deviation	(1.791)	(1.737)		

I created a more complex measure of social bias toward Muslims using responses to three survey questions. First, I created a variable comparing participants' beliefs on how likely it is that a Muslim will commit a terrorist attack on the U.S. to that of all groups included on the survey. Responses to eight groups were measured on a 7-point Likert scale from "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely." I took the difference between the average of their answer for all eight groups and their answer for Muslims and

then converted it into a percentage of the spectrum of responses. This produced a preliminary bias variable. Second, I combined this preliminary variable with responses to two dichotomous questions that inquire whether Islam is more likely than other religions to promote violence and whether jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe. I again converted this combined response to a percentage of the spectrum of responses, which produced my social bias dependent variable.

	Pre-Treatment	Post-Treatment	Follow-up
Binge Treatment	0.246	0.294	0.185
Binge Control	0.302	0.322	0.235
Weekly Treatment	0.290	0.298	0.208
Weekly Control	0.289	0.335	0.215

The next two tables include the responses of all 144 participants for the pre-treatment and post-treatment measures.

	Pre-Treatment	Post-Treatment	Follow-up
Treatment Groups	3.592	3.498	3.676
Control Groups	3.765	3.572	3.475

*Groups: Blacks, Whites, Muslims, Christians, Right-wing Activists, Left-wing Activists, Russians, Chinese

	Pre-Treatment	Post-Treatment	Follow-up
Treatment Groups	1.158	1	0.786
Control Groups	1.206	1.029	0.855

I broke down identification by the category of character with which participants identified, and I sorted the lead characters into three categories: agent fighting terrorism, Muslim protagonist, and Muslim terrorist character. While several of the lead characters could be seen as falling into more than one category (for example, Jim Greer is both an agent fighting terrorism and a Muslim) I sorted the characters according to how identification may induce the greatest affect. I sorted the characters as follows—Agents: Jack Ryan, Victor Polizzi, and Sandrine Arnaud; Muslim Protagonists: Jim Greer, Hanin Ali, and Fathi al-Abbas; and Muslim terrorists: Mousa bin Suleiman, Ali bin Suleiman, and Yazid. None of these identification categories significantly correlated with the social bias dependent variable. Again, the treatment seems to have had little to no effect on social bias.

Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism				
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
Pretest Bias	0.515	0.100	5.18	0.000
Christian	1.050	0.412	2.55	0.013
Agent	0.305	1.490	-0.20	0.839
Muslim Protagonist	0.938	0.773	1.21	0.229
Muslim Terrorist	-0.200	0.380	-0.53	0.601
Constant	1.00	1.704	0.59	0.559

Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
Pretest Bias	0.521	0.100	5.21	0.000
Christian	1.127	0.431	2.32	0.011
Jack Ryan	0.222	0.228	0.97	0.335
Victor Polizzi	0.181	0.141	1.28	0.204
Sandrine Arnaud	0.200	0.168	1.19	0.237
Jim Greer	0.201	0.187	1.08	0.285
Hanin Ali	-0.153	0.182	-0.84	0.404
Fathi al-Abbas	0.107	0.175	0.61	0.544
Ali bin Suleiman	-0.068	0.197	-0.34	0.732
Mousa bin Suleiman	0.317	0.274	1.16	0.252
Yazid	-1.115	0.652	-1.71	0.092
Constant	1.076	0.785	1.37	0.176

Posttest Favor Toward Sending U.S. Troops to Fight Islamic Militants			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
Pretest Favor	0.546	0.095	5.74	0.000
Agent	0.298	1.310	0.23	0.821
Muslim Protagonist	1.003	0.701	1.43	0.157
Muslim Terrorist	-0.463	0.337	-1.38	0.173
Constant	-1.003	1.473	-0.68	0.498

Posttest Favor Toward Sending U.S. Troops			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
Pretest Favor	0.542	0.098	5.56	0.000
Christian	0.375	0.410	0.91	0.364
Jack Ryan	0.496	0.916	0.54	0.590
Victor Polizzi	0.101	0.338	0.30	0.765
Sandrine Arnaud	-0.207	0.382	-0.54	0.589
Jim Greer	-0.034	0.402	-0.08	0.933
Hanin Ali	0.320	0.730	0.44	0.662
Fathi al-Abbas	0.342	0.457	0.75	0.456
Ali bin Suleiman	-0.430	0.409	-1.05	0.297
Mousa bin Suleiman	-0.212	0.653	-0.33	0.746
Yazid	-0.802	1.076	-0.75	0.459
Constant	-0.825	0.807	-1.02	0.311

Posttest Favor Toward Accepting Syrian Refugees to the U.S.			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
Pretest Favor	0.749	0.103	7.25	0.000
Christian	0.766	0.292	2.63	0.011
Agent	-0.013	1.066	-0.01	0.991
Muslim Protagonist	-0.201	0.553	-0.36	0.717
Muslim Terrorist	0.046	0.274	0.17	0.868
Constant	0.201	1.179	0.17	0.865

	Posttest Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists			
	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-score	p-value
Pretest Favor	0.638	0.107	5.97	0.000
Christian	-0.500	0.342	-1.46	0.148
Agent	1.007	1.456	0.69	0.492
Muslim Protagonist	1.132	0.762	1.48	0.142
Muslim Terrorist	-0.434	0.370	-1.17	0.245
Constant	-1.270	1.677	-0.76	0.452

The following is a pairwise comparison for treatment groups split by consumption type from a repeated measures two-way ANOVA model on the drone strikes DV.

	Mean Difference	**Standard Error**	**p-value**
Weekly Group			
Pretest & Posttest	0.200	0.192	0.912
Posttest & Follow-up	-0.029	0.146	1.000
Pretest & Follow-up	0.171	0.169	0.951
Binge Group			
Pretest & Posttest	0.190	0.220	1.000
Posttest & Follow-up	0.143	0.203	1.000
Pretest & Follow-up	0.333	0.298	0.836

In reviewing the within-subjects simple effects of the more defined models, both pass Mauchly's test of sphericity at p=0.392 (weekly) and p=0.456 (binge). However, the only statistically significant interaction occurs for weekly watchers who identify with Yazid.

	Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists		
	p-value	F-value	df
Weekly Treatment Group			
Time Period	0.143	2.009	2
Time*Christian	0.435	0.843	2
Time*Victor	0.583	0.544	2
Time*Yazid	0.071	2.770	2
Time*Ali	0.492	0.718	2
Error			60
Binge Treatment Group			
Time Period	0.309	1.219	2
Time*Christian	0.752	0.288	2
Time*Victor	0.218	1.600	2
Time*Yazid			0
Time*Ali	0.715	0.340	2
Error			32

The remaining models are linear regressions that use change as the dependent variable.

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Bias DV (Tolerance Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	-0.217	0.449	-0.48	0.630
Democrat	-0.632	0.434	-1.46	0.150
White	0.130	0.602	0.22	0.830
Christian	-0.291	0.483	-0.60	0.550
Travel	0.028	0.451	0.06	0.951
Constant	0.258	0.507	0.51	0.612

N=66, Prob>F=0.7244, R-sq=0.0452

Change from Prettest to Follow-up for Bias DV (Tolerance Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	0.024	0.479	0.05	0.960
Democrat	-0.896	0.474	-1.89	0.065
White	0.508	0.666	0.76	0.449
Christian	-0.040	0.515	-0.08	0.938
Travel	-0.117	0.503	-0.23	0.817
Constant	-0.199	0.565	-0.35	0.726

N=54, Prob>F=0.4512, R-sq=0.0910

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Bias DV (CT Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	-0.229	0.390	-0.59	0.559
Democrat	-0.285	0.410	-0.69	0.489
White	-0.351	0.514	-0.68	0.497
Christian	1.263	0.475	2.66	0.010
Travel	0.210	0.412	0.51	0.612
Constant	-0.024	0.484	-0.05	0.960

N=76, Prob<F=0.1456, R-sq=0.1084

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Bias DV (CT only)			
	Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	0.246	0.499	0.49	0.624
Democrat	-0.416	0.506	-0.82	0.415
White	-0.622	0.669	-0.93	0.357
Christian	1.015	0.559	1.82	0.075
Travel	-0.718	0.532	-1.35	0.183
Constant	0.446	0.591	0.75	0.455

N=57, Prob>F=0.3295, R-sq=0.1041

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Troops DV (Tolerance Only)			
	Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	0.361	0.387	0.93	0.354
Democrat	0.093	0.372	0.25	0.802
White	-0.277	0.524	-0.53	0.599
Christian	-0.235	0.419	-0.68	0.498
Travel	-0.034	0.392	-0.09	0.930
Constant				

N=68, Prob>F=0.8871, R-sq=0.0266

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Troops DV (Tolerance Only)			
	Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	0.132	0.474	0.28	0.782
Democrat	-0.045	0.469	-0.10	0.924
White	0.624	0.660	0.09	0.925
Christian	-0.446	0.512	-0.87	0.387
Travel	-0.168	0.499	-0.34	0.738
Constant	0.233	0.561	0.41	0.680

N=55, Prob>F=0.9648, R-sq=0.0191

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Troops DV (CT Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	-0.532	0.352	-1.51	0.135
Democrat	-0.003	0.370	-0.01	0.994
White	-0.254	0.464	-0.55	0.586
Christian	0.269	0.428	0.63	0.532
Travel	0.342	0.372	0.92	0.360
Constant	0.228	0.436	0.27	0.788

N=76, Prob>F=0.5360, R-sq=0.0557

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Troops DV (CT Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	-0.156	0.432	-0.36	0.720
Democrat	0.155	0.439	0.35	0.726
White	-0.789	0.581	-1.36	0.180
Christian	0.928	0.485	0.06	0.954
Travel	0.771	0.462	1.67	0.101
Constant	-0.579	0.513	-1.13	0.264

N=57, Prob>F=0.4210, R-sq=0.0902

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Refugees DV (Tolerance Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	-0.095	0.291	-0.33	0.745
Democrat	-0.535	0.280	-1.92	0.060
White	-0.400	0.394	-1.02	0.314
Christian	-0.075	0.315	-0.24	0.812
Travel	0.117	0.295	0.40	0.694
Constant	0.310	0.331	0.94	0.352

N=68, Prob>F=0.4234, R-sq=0.0749

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Refugees DV (Tolerance Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	0.020	0.276	-0.07	0.941
Democrat	-0.516	0.273	-1.85	0.070
White	-0.663	0.383	-1.73	0.090
Christian	-0.556	0.297	-1.87	0.067
Travel	0.145	0.291	0.50	0.621
Constant	0.428	0.326	1.31	0.196

N=55, Prob>F=0.0831, R-sq=0.1755

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Refugees DV (CT Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	-0.130	0.240	-0.54	0.590
Democrat	-0.389	0.253	-1.54	0.129
White	-0.302	0.317	-0.95	0.343
Christian	0.790	0.293	2.70	0.009
Travel	-0.373	0.254	-1.47	0.147
Constant	0.206	0.298	0.69	0.492

N=76, Prob>F=0.0688, R-sq=0.1335

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Refugees DV (CT Only)			
Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	-0.091	0.320	-0.28	0.777
Democrat	-0.331	0.325	-1.02	0.313
White	-0.707	0.430	-1.65	0.106
Christian	0.241	0.359	0.67	0.506
Travel	-0.379	0.342	-1.11	0.273
Constant	0.341	0.380	0.90	0.373

N=57, Prob>F=0.4236, R-sq=0.0898

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Drones DV (Tolerance Only)

	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value
Binge	-0.075	0.364	-0.21	0.838
Democrat	-0.096	0.350	-0.27	0.785
White	0.142	0.493	0.29	0.775
Christian	0.400	0.394	1.01	0.314
Travel	0.492	0.369	1.61	0.113
Constant	-0.486	0.414	-1.17	0.246

N=68, Prob>F=0.5983, R-sq=0.0561

Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Drones DV (Tolerance Only)

	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value
Binge	-0.187	0.382	-0.49	0.627
Democrat	0.030	0.377	0.08	0.937
White	-0.091	0.531	-0.17	0.864
Christian	0.321	0.411	0.78	0.438
Travel	0.339	0.402	0.84	0.403
Constant	-0.436	0.452	-0.97	0.339

N=55, Prob>F=0.9238, R-sq=0.0274

Change from Pretest to Posttest for Drones DV (CT Only)

	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value
Binge	-0.808	0.372	-2.17	0.033
Democrat	-0.205	0.391	-0.52	0.602
White	0.328	0.491	0.67	0.506
Christian	0.261	0.453	0.57	0.567
Travel	-0.004	0.393	-0.01	0.992
Constant	0.888	0.462	1.92	0.059

N=76, Prob>F=0.2992, R-sq=0.0814

	Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Drones DV (CT Only)			
	Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t-value*	*p-value*
Binge	-0.445	0.398	-1.12	0.269
Democrat	-0.127	0.404	-0.31	0.755
White	-0.489	0.534	-0.92	0.364
Christian	0.577	0.446	1.29	0.201
Travel	0.266	0.425	0.63	0.533
Constant	0.171	0.472	0.36	0.718

N=57, Prob>F=0.5509, R-sq=0.0732