THE EFFECTS OF ELITE DECISION MAKING

A Dissertation

by

MORGEN STEENHAGEN JOHANSEN

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2009

Major Subject: Political Science

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ABSTRACT

The Effects of Elite Decision Making. (May 2009)

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Decision making is a central concept in the study of both politics and organizations. Although much research has examined how individuals make decisions, there has been substantially less work on the consequences of these decisions. My dissertation focuses on two groups of decision makers, candidates running for office and public managers, and the effect of their decisions on the electorate and organization, respectively.

The dissertation explores the impact of candidates' decisions regarding their campaigns on the electorate by examining campaign advertising during the 2000 Presidential Election. I focus on two candidate decisions. The first is to focus on certain issues as a way to prime the public to see the candidate as having certain traits, namely empathy, morality, and leadership ability. The second is to show voters that the candidate is like them by activating (i.e. priming) feelings of social identity among women, African-Americans, and Latinos. Using campaign advertising data and public opinion data, I analyze the effect of campaign advertising on voters' evaluations of the candidates

to determine the effectiveness of these strategies. Results find that an effective strategy was for the candidates to air ads describing themselves as having certain traits. Talking about issues does not have much of an effect on voters' candidate evaluations. Appeals to women were not effective. Appeals to African-Americans were only effective for the Democratic candidate, and appeals to Latinos were only successful for the Republican candidate.

I examine the decisions of public managers by focusing on middle level bureaucrats and the consequences of their decisions on their agencies. The agencies are public schools in Texas and the middle managers are principals. From a dataset of over 1,000 Texas school districts, I create a measure of principal quality which I then use to explore the impact of middle management on multiple school performance measures and to compare the influence of principals and superintendents on performance. I also examine the effect of principals within in the organization, namely how principals affect the turnover of the workers under them. Results find that principals have a direct and beneficial influence on organizational performance measures such as standardized test scores, college readiness, and turnover.

To summarize the results more generally, the dissertation finds that the decisions actors make within the political process matter in important and significant ways.

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responsible for leading me to such great mentors; she sent me to Don at Kansas and to Ken at Texas A&M and in doing so lead me to Dave, Mark, and all of the other people who have influenced my path along this journey.

I am grateful for the friends I've made along the way. Jose Villalobos, Sadé Walker, Dwight Roblyer, Belinda Bragg, Claudia Avellaneda, Erin Melton, Meredith Walker, Justin Tucker, Jim Stoutenborough, and Mahalley Allen have made the journey more enjoyable than I thought possible. When I needed them to they listened, they distracted, they stimulated, they cheered me on, and they reminded me always of the importance and necessity of friendship. Our talks, lunches, girl's days outs, and excitement for each other's achievements and support for each other's set backs mattered so much to my sanity during this process. The profession is so much better with them in it.

And when I needed to get away from political science my friends Audrea Elliott, Brandon Shirley, Sean Eary, and Jillian Lee were there with books, conversation, and silliness. I miss them all so much but know that the bond we forged during our time at Texas A&M will continue as we follow our separate paths. My dissertation buddy Jeff Osgood was there for me every single day as we wrote, revised, and waited to hear back. By cheering each other on, we reminded each other of our greatness.

Each of you have helped me to grow as a scholar and as a person and for that I am so lucky to have you in my life. Thank you so very much.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF DECISION MAKING

The study of politics is about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell 1950). In other words, politics is about decisions and the consequences of those decisions. The goal of the dissertation is to explore the consequences of decision making within the political process by focusing on the effect of political actors' decisions on their respective institutions. This is a fundamental topic to the study of political science because the decisions of political actors such as political candidates and bureaucrats have consequences for electoral outcomes, policy, and the overall condition of government and the state.

Chapters II and III examine the impact of candidates' decisions regarding their campaigns on the electorate. Specifically, I argue that candidates use campaign advertising to prime voters to perceive the candidate in a specific and favorable way. Chapter II examines the candidate decision to focus on certain issues in campaign advertising as a way to prime the public to see the candidate as having certain traits, namely empathy, morality, and leadership ability. Chapter III examines the candidate decision to show voters that the candidate is like them. I argue that candidates use campaign advertising to activate (i.e. prime) feelings of social identity and this decision influences voters' general feelings toward the candidate.

This dissertation follows the style of *American Political Science Review*.

Chapters IV and V focus middle level bureaucrats and the consequences of their decisions on their agencies. Specifically, these two chapters examine the impact of middle managers on their organization. Chapter IV creates a measure of middle manager quality and uses this measure to explore the impact of middle management on multiple performance measures and to compare the influence of middle and upper-level management on performance. Chapter V looks at the effect of middle managers within in the organization, namely how middle managers affect the turnover of the workers under them.

CHAPTER II

ISSUES AND IMAGE: THE INFLUENCE OF ISSUES IN CAMPAIGN

ADVERTISING ON CANDIDATE TRAIT PERCEPTIONS

Overview

Candidates behave as if the issues they emphasize affect how the public

perceives their personal traits such as morality, empathy, and leadership quality. There

is, however, no empirical evidence that this behavior is effective. The aim of this

chapter is to determine if there is a link between issues and candidate image. I explore

the relationship between issues and image by looking at campaign advertising during the

2000 presidential election. Data for the cross-sectional time series analysis comes from

the Wisconsin Advertising Project and the National Annenberg Election Survey. The

analysis reveals that the theoretically hypothesized link between certain issues and image

does not exist. A discussion of the implications of these findings concludes the chapter.

Introduction

Candidates behave as if campaign advertising influences perceptions of

candidates' personal qualities such as their leadership ability or their compassion.

Researchers who have explored the effect of campaign advertising on voter perceptions

of candidates have found that candidates are right. Political advertising provides voters

with information, such as policy stances and personal qualities (Gilens, Vavreck, and

Cohen 2007; Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004; Patterson and McClure 1976); it

influences voters' evaluations of candidates (Atkin and Heald 1976; Kahn and Geer 1994; West 1994-1995; Atkin et al. 1973) and helps to solidify that impression (Atkin and Heald 1976).

Within the general belief that advertising influences perceptions of candidates is the more specific belief held by candidates that they can shape the way the public perceives them by the issues they focus on. In other words, candidates can influence how the public perceives them. Indeed, beginning in the 1950's and 1960's, campaigns began to focus on a candidate's image as well as the candidate's issue positions (Nimmo 1976; see also Simon 2002). Thus, in order to make a successful bid for president, a candidate must not only strategize about how best to use political advertising to convey his campaign messages and issue positions, the candidate must also be mindful of his image.[1]

This chapter explores the relationship between issues and candidate trait perceptions (or image). Specifically, this chapter asks: can candidates control their image by focusing on issues? Although researchers have demonstrated that candidates strategically select issues to focus on in their campaigns in order to project a certain candidate image (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004) they offer no empirical evidence that such a strategy is effective. Indeed, the fundamental part of this theory and the underlying assumption made by campaign

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[1] I use the terms image and trait perceptions interchangeably. By candidate image, I refer to attributes of candidates' character rather than the candidate's appearance. For example, attributes of a candidate's character is morality or honesty whereas a candidate's appearance refers to such things as the height or weight of the candidate.

strategists—that focusing on certain issues affects candidate trait perceptions—has never been tested.

This chapter explores this relationship between issues and image by focusing on the candidate traits of morality, empathy, and leadership and the issues linked to these traits. According to the theory of trait ownership, Republican issues such as taxes, defense, and family values are linked with leadership and morality (Hayes 2005). Democratic issues such as social welfare and social group relations are linked to empathy and compassion. The theory of trait ownership, by offering a linkage between issues and traits, provides a means to test the relationship between issues and trait perceptions, namely to see if candidates can control their image with the issues they focus on in their campaign.

Candidate Strategy: Issues and Traits

Campaign strategists and candidates believe candidate image to be important which is why part of a candidate's campaign strategy is to shape a winning image (Simon 2002). A candidate's image comprises the character traits of the individual such as leadership ability, compassion, and honesty. According to the literature, candidate traits fall into two broad categories, competence and integrity (Funk 1999; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Kinder 1986). Competence includes specific traits such as leadership ability and previous professional experience. Integrity is how honest, trustworthy, hard working, down to earth the candidate is. Three candidate traits matter to voters: leadership, integrity, and empathy (Funk 1999; some add morality to this list,

see Hayes 2005). These candidate traits influence candidate evaluations (Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Kinder 1986; Nimmo 1976; Shyles 1984; Kiousis, Bantimaroudis, and Ban 1999; Markus 1982), which in turn affect the vote (Bartels 2002; Goren 2002; Hayes 2005; Funk 1999; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; although see Bartels 2000); more favorable evaluations increase the likelihood of voting for a candidate (Markus 1982).

A candidate's image matters and candidates attempt to control their image. One strategy is stress the character traits they would bring to the office. Simply, the candidate focuses on his leadership experience, honesty, or compassion. However, this strategy is limited in that there is little a candidate can do to persuade voters to see a candidate as honest when the candidate is Nixon after Watergate. What candidates can do is try to show voters the traits they do have, thereby influencing voters' trait perceptions of candidates.

Another way to demonstrate character traits is by focusing on issues that make the candidate appear to be compassionate, tough, honest, experienced, etc. John F. Kennedy's campaign strategy was to project an image of a person who was bold, competent, and focused on moving the country forward (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, 536). The strategic objective was to highlight a few policies—policies selected by polling Americans on what they considered the most important problem facing the country—by increasing the frequency, strength, and extensiveness of the candidate's statements. By doing this, the Kennedy campaign hoped to construct an image of Kennedy that was different from and more appealing than Nixon (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994).

Nixon's presidential strategy in 1972 was similar to Kennedy's (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004). Nixon selected issues to focus on in his campaign that would favor his image. Nixon would monitor how voters perceived him with polls and when the public negatively evaluated his competence and strength, he devoted more attention to an issue that highlighted Nixon's ability to bring peace to America and to handle international problems—foreign policy. Thus, Nixon's strategy was to use issues as a means to affect how the public evaluated his personal characteristics.

The strategy is to talk about issues as a way to signal that the candidate cares about the issue (JFK in 1960) or has the necessary traits to deal with the issue (Nixon in 1972). This strategy assumes that issues and candidate image are linked, specifically that voters use issues to infer traits. Research on the relationship between specific issue positions and specific traits found that citizens are more likely to infer a candidate's traits from the candidate's issue position than they are to infer from the traits of a candidate to the candidate's issue positions (Rapoport, Metcalf, and Hartman 1989).[2]

However, although they are linked, conceptually traits are separate from issues. Trait perceptions are judgments of a candidate personally, which is separate from politics (i.e. political ideology, they would like to see government changed, etc.) (Peterson 2005). Character traits such as morality or empathy are equally valued among the population; everyone wants an honest president. In regards to political judgments, voters and candidates disagree about whether a candidate from one party is more

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[2] However, this is only when both the candidate and respondent agreed on the issue (government providing jobs).

desirable than a candidate from the other party (Peterson 2005). Trait perceptions are about the candidate as a person, not their politics.

By talking about issues, candidates focus voters' attention on certain issues, which leads voters to place more weight on those issues when evaluating a candidate or the President (Johnston et al. 1992; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Druckman 2004).   In other words, candidates prime citizens to use those issues when choosing among candidates (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Petrocik 1996; Druckman and Holmes 2004). They affect vote choice by changing the importance of the issue and by sending signals to voters that a candidate cares about an issue (Simon 2002). The literature on campaign strategy shows us that candidates use this strategy and the literature on priming tells us how it would work.

The purpose of this chapter is to determine if candidates can affect their image with the issues they focus on in their campaign. Looking to the research on the relationship between issues and image reveals three things. First, although it tells us that candidates try to shape perceptions of their image by focusing on certain issues during the campaign (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994), it does not tell us if such a strategy is effective. Second, although it tells us that voters infer traits from issue positions, it does not tell us how trait perceptions are affected when candidates talk about an issue. Last, although it tells us that voters can be primed to focus on certain issues when evaluating a candidate, it does not tell us how focusing on certain issues affect trait perceptions. In sum, we do not know if candidates can control their image with the issues they talk about.

Influencing Trait Perceptions

Trait perceptions are formed in two ways. One way is direct; the candidate simply states he has a trait and voters either believe him or not. The second way trait perceptions are formed is indirectly; traits are derived from the candidate's focus on specific issues. Specifically, since candidate traits are not directly observable, they must be inferred from the behavior of the candidate (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Since voters rarely see the candidate's behavior in person, they must gather this information from sources such as televised speeches and campaign advertising. Campaign advertising provides voters with a way to observe candidate behavior and thereby infer candidate traits.

Recall that the strategy is to focus on issues that lead voters to infer certain traits (such as Nixon focusing on foreign policy to affect perceptions of his competence). If this theory is correct, then we should see a correlation between trait perceptions and issue ads. However, in order to determine which issues lead voters to infer certain trait perceptions, we need to understand the connection voters make between issues and traits. By this, I mean how voters connect an issue such as healthcare with empathy (Hayes 2005). The theory of trait ownership provides a means to link specific issues with specific traits.

The theory of trait ownership posits that each political party owns traits that are associated with the issues each party owns. This theory arises from the theory of issue ownership which argues that each party owns those issues that they have handled well in the past (Petrocik 1996). Democrats own issues of social welfare and social group

relations and Republicans own issues related to defense, taxes, and family values. According to the theory of trait ownership, these issues create and reinforce candidate trait perceptions (Hayes 2005, 909). Republican issues are linked to leadership and morality and Democratic issues are linked with empathy. Because a party owns certain issues, the public perceives candidates from that party as having certain traits associated with those issues.

The link between issues and traits occurs because of candidate behavior that is a function of the candidate's political party. The party of the candidate exerts an enormous influence on the issues a candidate focuses on. Democrats are the party of the elderly, the worker, and the less fortunate and have a history of supporting policies to expand social welfare programs. Given this, Democratic candidates campaign at nursing homes, hospitals, factories, and daycare centers to demonstrate that they care about their constituency and their concerns. While campaigning at these places, the candidate discusses social welfare issues such as improving Medicare and social security. This behavior allows the voter to infer that the candidate is concerned with helping those who need it—that the candidate is empathetic. The result is a link between social welfare issues and empathy.

For Republicans, the party is comprised of business interests, the upper and middle classes, and social conservatives. Republicans, therefore, favor policies regarding law and order, tax cuts, military and defense spending, and family values. When campaigning, Republican candidates hold events on military bases, at churches, and business councils (Hayes 2005). This behavior, in addition to the rhetoric

Republican candidates use that stresses individualism and toughness, leads voters to infer that the candidate is moral and a strong leader; voters link Republican issues with leadership and morality.

Thus, due to the issues owned by the parties, Republicans are perceived to be stronger leaders and more moral. Democrats are seen as more compassionate and empathetic than Republicans (Hayes 2005). Although Hayes (2005) does not perform a direct test of this link between specific issues and specific traits, the theory of trait ownership provides a theoretical link between certain issues and traits that allows for a more direct test. According to the theory of trait ownership, we would expect voters to connect family values, defense, and monetary issues (Republican issues) with leadership and morality (Republican traits) and connect social welfare issues (Democratic issues) with empathy (Democratic trait).

Hypotheses

To explore the relationship between issues and image, I focus first on the direct way trait perceptions are formed: the candidate states they have a trait and the voter believes the candidate or not. For example, candidates may advertise themselves as being a strong leader or as being caring in an effort to shape voter perceptions of them on those traits. If this is accurate, we would expect that when candidates use their campaign advertising to describe themselves as having certain traits, voters will perceive the candidates as having those traits. The first hypothesis is that candidates can affect their image by advertising themselves as having particular traits.

Hypothesis 1: When campaign advertising focuses on certain traits, voters will perceive the candidate as having those traits.

In other words, campaign advertising describing the candidate's personality traits influences voter trait perceptions of the candidate.

However, we are ultimately interested in knowing if candidates can affect trait perceptions with the issues they choose to focus on; we want to know if there is a linkage between particular traits and particular issues. Relying on the theory of trait ownership, we would expect that when candidates focus on social issues such as education, health care, and social security in their ads, voters would perceive the candidate as being empathetic. When candidates focus on monetary issues such as taxes and the budget, we would expect voters to perceive the candidate as being a strong leader and moral.

Hypothesis 2a: When campaign advertising focuses on social welfare issues, voters will perceive the candidate as having empathy.

Hypothesis 2b: When campaign advertising focuses on monetary issues, voters will perceive the candidate as being a strong leader and as having morality.

These hypotheses explore the ways candidates can affect trait perceptions with their campaign advertising: by describing themselves as having certain traits and with specific issues to influence certain trait perceptions.

Campaign 2000

The 2000 election offers an opportunity to test these hypotheses. In the 2000 election, the Republican candidate attempted to take over typically Democratic issues, most notably education and social security, but in a manner consistent with Republican values (Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004). In 2000, the candidates attempted to project a certain image (Bush and his compassionate conservatism) or overcome a negative image (Gore and his honesty). Gore was trying to distance himself from Clinton and, while experienced and intelligent, was perceived as being dishonest. While the media saddled Bush with an image of a man who was not very bright and lacked competence, Bush succeeded at being the candidate people would most like to sit around and have a beer with.

Each candidate in the 2000 election had positive and negative candidate images and made efforts to shift their image.[3] The candidates attempted to shape their images with their behavior and speeches at the conventions and during the debates (Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004). Gore tried to overcome his stiffness by passionately kissing his wife on stage. Bush tried to overcome his dimness by emphasizing his compassionate side and focusing on his morality in speeches and during the debates, while also challenging Gore's untrustworthiness (Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson 2004).

Another candidate strategy was to focus on issues in campaign advertising to affect their image. The most numerous issues discussed in the campaign were taxes, the budget, the environment, education, health care, social security, Medicare, and

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[3] Of course, during the campaign, Bush was creating his image while Gore already had a public image and thus was faced with the task of changing his image.

children's issues. If the candidates believe that issues affect image, candidates who want to appear empathetic or caring will talk about issues such as education, health care, the environment, and social security in their ads. This is exactly what Bush did in trying to project his image of a compassionate conservative. Indeed, although he didn't 'own' these social welfare issues, his image benefited from focusing on those issues (Hayes 2005). Candidates who want to appear as a strong leader will talk about issues such as taxes, foreign policy, and law and order (i.e. crime) in their ads (Hayes 2005). However, by virtue of the party they are representing, the candidates come with a set of traits that are associated with their respective party although candidates may try to co-opt the other candidate's traits (Hayes 2005). Except for the issues of foreign policy and crime, both candidates focused on all of these issues in their campaign ads.

Data and Methods

This chapter combines two datasets to explore the connection between issues and candidate image. The data has two dimensions, a temporal dimension and a spatial dimension. The time series is a weekly time series. The spatial dimension is the media market the respondent lives in and the market in which the ads were aired. There are 47 weeks in the time series and 62 markets. The combined dataset is a pooled cross-sectional time series in which multiple values exist for each week because the data is grouped by media market and week. There could potentially be 62 values for week 1 because there are 62 media markets that can have a value for each week.

Trait Perceptions

The first part of the dataset comes from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey.[4] This dataset features a national rolling cross-sectional survey that ran from December of 1999 through the last day before the election. I constructed the dependent variables from this dataset. The dependent variables are the mean weekly trait perceptions for each media market of both Bush and Gore on three traits: morality, leadership, and empathy. To get these measures, I aggregated the individual level responses by media market and by week to the following prompts to get the dependent variables. For empathy, respondents rated how well the word 'cares' describes the candidate. For morality, respondents rated how well the word 'honest' describes the candidate.[5] For leadership, respondents rated how well the word 'strong leadership' describes the candidate. Values range from 1 through 4; higher values mean the public perceived the candidate as having more of that trait. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 present the trend over time in the average trait perceptions for each candidate for all media markets combined.

As shown in Figure 2.1, average trait perceptions of empathy for Gore were higher during the election than Bush, which is expected. Both candidates drop in empathy around week 22 (starting May 19th) and trait perceptions of Gore jump during the Democratic National Convention during week 35. It is interesting to note that there were points during the election when Bush was perceived as having slightly more

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[4] For more information on this dataset, (i.e. survey methodology and coding) see Romer et al. 2004.
[5] The closest adjective to 'moral' in the survey was 'honest'.

empathy; Bush's attempts to be seen as a compassionate conservative may have been effective.

Figure 2.1: Weekly Average Perceptions of Empathy

Figure 2.2 illustrates the variance in perceptions of Bush and Gore's leadership. Bush started with high perceptions of leadership but, by time of the election, the candidates were about even in terms of perceptions of their leadership (although perceptions of Gore's leadership were slightly lower than Bush's). Leadership trait perceptions for Bush increased during the time of the first debate (week 43). There are weeks when Gore came close to Bush, but as expected, Bush was the leadership candidate.

Figure 2.2: Weekly Average Perceptions of Leadership

Figure 2.3 shows average trait perceptions of morality for Bush and Gore. At the beginning of the campaign, morality perceptions of both candidates were fairly similar. Candidate trait perceptions of morality track each other until week 22 (starting May 19th) when Bush starts to lead in morality as perceptions of Gore's decreased. By the Election, perceptions of Gore's morality were lower than Bush; Bush ended up as the morality candidate.

In sum, at the time the election occurred, the public perceived Bush as being more moral and having slightly more leadership whereas Gore was perceived as having slightly more empathy. This is not surprising given that Republicans are perceived as being strong leaders and more moral and Democrats are seen as being more empathetic

generally (Hayes 2005). There is variation in trait perceptions of the candidates. In order to determine how campaign advertising influenced the variation in candidate trait perceptions, I need data about campaign advertising.

Figure 2.3: Weekly Average Perceptions of Morality

Campaign Advertising

The second part of the dataset comes from the Wisconsin Advertising Project.[6] This dataset contains all of the ads aired during the 2000 presidential election that favor

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[6] The data was obtained from a project of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, under Professor Kenneth Goldstein and Joel Rivlin of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and included media tracking data from the Campaign Media Analysis Group in Washington, D.C. The Wisconsin Advertising Project was sponsored by a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, Professor Goldstein, Joel Rivlin, or The Pew Charitable Trusts.

either Bush or Gore. There are almost 250,000 ads aired between December 1999 and November 7, 2000. Fifty-two percent of the ads favored Bush while 48% of the ads favored Gore. The main independent variables of interest come from this dataset and fall into two categories. The first category comprises ads that describe the candidate as having empathy, leadership skills, or morality.[7] These variables are simply the number of ads aired each week in each media market for each candidate that describe the candidate as being empathetic, having morality, or being a strong leader.

The second category contains the issue ads. The main issues discussed in the campaign were taxes, the budget/deficit, education, the environment, health care, social security, Medicare, and children's issues. Table 2.1 presents the percentage of ads Bush and Gore each aired that provided candidate traits and focused on the eight issues named above.

As shown in Table 2.1, there are some issues that a candidate tried to claim and others that both were trying to control. Gore had more ads about taxes, the environment, and health care than Bush while Bush had more ads about the budget/surplus, education, and social security. Bush and Gore had relatively the same percentage of ads about children's issues and Medicare. Both candidates attempted to co-opt the other's issues (Gore and taxes and Bush and social security and education).

The theory of trait ownership does not link specific issues with specific traits but rather links types of issues with traits. Theoretically, it is more appropriate to focus on

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[7] In regards to morality, due to the lack of ads that used the adjective of 'moral' to describe the candidate, this measure includes the adjectives 'committed' and 'principled'.

the effect of certain types of issues on image rather than specific issues.[8] The issues are

divided into two categories: social welfare issues and fiscal issues. The social welfare

issues measure is the weekly number of ads on social welfare issues aired for each

candidate in each media market. The fiscal issues measure is the weekly number of ads

on taxes and the budget/deficit aired for each candidate in each media market.

**Table 2.1: Percent of Ads about Traits and
Issues Aired in the 2000 Election**

	Bush	Gore
Empathy	0%	0.40%
Leadership	7%	3%
Morality	7%	2%
Taxes	16%	28%
Deficit/Budget	21%	12%
Education	48%	16%
Health Care	23%	39%
Medicare	10%	12%
Social Security	38%	15%
Children's Issues	10%	8%
Environment	3%	18%

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[8] I did run the models with measures for the separate issues. These models are presented in tables A-2.1 and A-2.2 in the appendix.

Statistical Method

As previously mentioned, I combined these two datasets by market and by time to create a dataset to test the assumption that issues affect candidate trait perceptions. A lagged dependent variable was also included in each model to account for past trait perceptions. I estimate the models using Beck and Katz's (1995) recommended method for analyzing pooled cross-sectional time series data, ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors.[9] Table 2.2 presents the results from the three models predicting candidate trait perceptions of Bush. Table 2.3 presents the results from the three models predicting candidate trait perceptions of Gore.

Results

Bush

For Bush, the most successful strategy was airing ads describing his morality. Campaign advertising only affected morality perceptions of Bush. Ads describing Bush as having morality had a significant and positive effect on perceptions of Bush's morality. This means that as more ads were aired describing Bush's morality, perceptions of Bush's morality increased. This result provides some support for hypothesis 1.

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[9] The data meet the necessary requirement of no autocorrelation.

Table 2.2: Models Predicting Average Weekly Trait Perceptions of Bush

	Empathy		Leadership		Morality	
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
Traits						
Leadership	-0.068	0.081	-0.080	0.080	-0.038	0.030
Morality	0.125	0.095	0.042	0.168	**0.143**	0.047
Issues						
Social Welfare Issues	0.024	0.014	-0.004	0.016	**-0.017**	0.007
Fiscal Issues	-0.027	0.021	0.017	0.024	0.023	0.019
Controls						
Republican Convention	0.043	0.046			**0.092**	0.010
Democratic Convention	0.068	0.049	**-0.192**	0.053	-0.004	0.016
1st Debate	-0.011	0.069	0.017	0.053	-0.015	0.034
2nd Debate	**-0.165**	0.078	0.006	0.093	-0.033	0.030
3rd Debate	**0.097**	0.037	-0.082	0.107	0.010	0.038
Lagged D.V.	**0.214**	0.017	**0.360**	0.038	0.270	0.020
Constant	**1.965**	0.042	**1.908**	0.138	1.89	0.050
N	2286		775		2283	
Number of Groups	61		61		61	
Wald Chi-square	459.89		654.99		645.60	
Prob. Of Chi-square	0.001		0.001		0.001	

Note: Dependent Variable is average weekly trait perceptions of Bush's traits. Values range from 1-4. Method is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). Bolded coefficients are significant at $p > 0.05$

In regards to hypothesis 2, according to the theory, we should see a clear link between social welfare issues and empathy and fiscal issues and leadership. Unfortunately, there is not one. The fiscal issues should also have an effect on morality perceptions. This too is not the case. There is a link, however, between social welfare issue ads and morality, although the relationship is negative. When Bush aired more ads about social welfare issues, perceptions of his morality decreased. Bush's focus on

typically Democratic issues negatively affected the Republican stereotype of being more moral. Perhaps because there was relatively no mention of family values or moral issues during the campaign, voters were unable to infer morality from issues for Bush. These results provide little support for hypothesis 2.

Table 2.3: Models Predicting Average Weekly Trait Perceptions of Gore

	Empathy		Leadership		Morality	
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
Traits						
Leadership	0.001	0.104	**0.263**	0.039	**0.048**	0.119
Morality	-0.176	0.273	**0.251**	0.107	**0.268**	0.047
Empathy	0.301	0.542	-0.124	0.185	-0.113	0.134
Issues						
Social Welfare Issues	-0.005	0.006	0.019	0.025	0.019	0.013
Fiscal Issues	0.018	0.015	-0.026	0.037	**-0.048**	0.017
Controls						
Republican Convention	**0.073**	0.031			-0.016	0.027
Democratic Convention	-0.052	0.036	**0.150**	0.014	**0.066**	0.023
1st Debate	-0.002	0.056	-0.029	0.055	**-0.143**	0.025
2nd Debate	0.040	0.077	-0.096	0.068	**-0.142**	0.029
3rd Debate	-0.041	0.074	**0.108**	0.046	**0.130**	0.010
Lagged D.V.	**0.285**	0.018	**0.274**	0.039	**0.209**	0.016
Constant	**1.709**	0.042	**1.748**	0.086	**2.014**	0.040
N	2288		775		2287	
Number of Groups	61		61		61	
Wald Chi-square	459.89		16798.77		8670.55	
Prob. Of Chi-square	0.001		0.001		0.001	

Note: Dependent Variable is average weekly trait perceptions of Gore's traits. Values range from 1-4. Method is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). Bolded coefficients are significant at $p > 0.05$.

Gore

For Gore, the most successful strategy was airing ads about his leadership and morality. Ads describing Gore's leadership and morality had a positive and significant influence on perceptions of Gore's leadership; as more ads were aired that focused on Gore's leadership, perceptions of Gore's leadership increased. Perceptions of Gore's morality increased by ads describing Gore's morality and leadership. This result provides support for hypothesis 1.

In regards to hypothesis 2, again if we look to the issues and traits that have the clearest connection (empathy and leadership), there is no relationship. For Gore, airing fiscal issue ads did have an effect on morality, which accords with the theory. However, this relationship is negative which means that as more ads were aired about fiscal issues, perceptions of Gore's morality decreased. There is little support for hypothesis 2.

Conclusions

The most effective strategy for both candidates was to air ads describing themselves as having certain traits (Bush and morality, Gore and leadership and morality). This supports the first hypothesis that ads describing the candidate's traits influences trait perceptions. This strategy was likely more effective for Gore than Bush because he was the better known candidate. He was able to remind voters of his qualities whereas Bush had to persuade voters of his character.

Hypothesis 2 tests the assumption that specific issues influence specific trait perceptions. If this assumption were true, we would have found a strong relationship

between social welfare issues and empathy. Instead, we found relationships not predicted by the theory. Specifically, we found that perceptions of both candidates' morality was hurt by focusing on their opponent's owned issues. For Bush, this was talking about social welfare issues and for Gore this was talking about fiscal issues. In addition to challenging the assumption of the issues to image link, this result suggests that co-opting the other party's issues may not be as beneficial as Hayes (2005) supposes it to be.

These results demonstrate that the relationship between issues and image is more complex than the literature describes. Perhaps issues can only affect perceptions of candidate traits when both candidates are found lacking in regards to that trait. Campaign advertising had the most influence on perceptions of both candidates' morality. Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson (2004) write that both candidates' credibility and trustworthiness were called into doubt at different times during the campaign. Since both candidates were considered lacking in morality, the candidates may have made more of an effort to be the 'moral' candidate. Since voters did not receive a clear message about the candidates' morality, they needed ads to infer morality. Ads about family values were not available so they made inferences with the ads available.

Candidates behave as if the issues they focus on affect their image and political scientists assume that this is the case. This underlying assumption that issues affect candidate image is not true, at least according to this study. Perhaps candidates have insider information about the link between issues and image that political scientists do not. Nevertheless, while it is reasonable to make assumptions from time to time in order

to theorize about how people make decisions or behave in regards to politics, it is necessary to test these assumptions at some point. This chapter illustrates that sometimes our theories and assumptions are not as simple as we wish them to be. Only by testing assumptions can we ascertain that our theories about the way politics works are indicative of what happens in the real world.

CHAPTER III

TRIGGERING SOCIAL IDENTITY WITH CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING:

THE CUES CANDIDATES USE AND THEIR EFFECT ON VOTERS'

CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS

Overview

Although there is much work on social identity theory, there is relatively little research that explores the connection between social identity and campaigns. This chapter proposes that candidates use campaign advertising to trigger voters' feelings of social identity. Specifically, this chapter examines the cues candidates provide in their ads to trigger social identity and how well those signals influence candidate evaluations. This chapter focuses on two social identities candidates may emphasize in their ads to influence how voters perceive them: race and gender. The relationship between social identity cues and candidate evaluations is explored with multilevel models that allow for an individual level focus. Results are discussed within the social identity literature and more broadly within the literature on how campaigns, and campaign advertising, affect voters and their evaluation of candidates.

Introduction

Political campaigns are important because they are attempts by candidates to influence how citizens see the political world (Schmitt-Beck 2007). Candidates believe they can influence voters with the campaign, namely by persuading and motivating

voters. However, although political science research has focused on motivation (turnout) and persuasion (vote choice), we do not know much about the process that makes these attempts to motivate and persuade successful. Indeed, fundamental to the study of campaigns is how candidates attempt to influence voting behavior and how successful those attempts are (Hillygus and Shields 2008; Sulkin and Swigger 2008; Shea and Burton 2006; Schaffner 2005). A focus on the influence that candidate strategy has on voters allows us to gain a greater understanding of the campaign process and how and why the campaign shapes how voters perceive candidates.

The literature on campaign strategy examines the different variables candidates take into account when putting together a campaign. The candidate must be aware of what the voter expects a candidate to act and sound like. Voters expect that Democrats will talk about Democratic issues and Republicans will talk about Republican issues (see Petrocik 1996 and his theory of issue ownership). The candidate also must strategize on ways to get media coverage and how to get the media to portray them in a way that is consistent with the image the candidate wishes to portray. Another strategy, and the one this chapter focuses on, is the strategy to influence how voters perceive the candidate, specifically how favorable voters find the candidate. This strategy relies on providing cues to voters.

Candidates want to provide cues to voters because voters rely heavily on shortcuts (cues, signals, and symbols) to make political decisions (Valentino, Traugott, and Hutchings 2002; Vavreck 2001). Given the limited amount of time voters give to politics, cues are necessary to help voters deal with the barrage of information they face

during a campaign. Indeed, political cues have a significant affect on voter's perceptions of candidates (Conover 1981). Thus, candidates send signals or cues to voters that are meaningful to voters—cues that result in beneficial outcomes for the candidate.

The most influential cues are those that reflect the characteristics of the voter. Social identity, such as one's partisanship, race, gender, religion, or occupation, has a significant influence on how people see the world and politics. Candidates can influence how voters evaluate them by providing cues that the candidate is like them, leading to a more favorable evaluation of the candidate (Kern 1989). This chapter examines the use of racial and gender social identity cues by candidates and the effect of these cues on voters' evaluations of the candidates. First, I explain the theory of social identity and why providing social identity cues would benefit the candidates. Second, I discuss the three social groups candidates may try to appeal to (women, African-Americans, and Latino/as) with social identity cues and my expectations on how voters in these social groups would respond. Next, I present the data and methods followed by the results of the models. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how to further incorporate social identity theory into the study of campaigns and why the study of campaigns would benefit from doing so.

Social Identity Theory

Candidates strategically use campaign advertising to provide symbols of group identification to alert the voter that the candidate is one of them. Campaigns are essentially about communication—communication of information to voters about the

candidates and policy. Televised campaign advertising provides a means to communicate with voters. In addition, campaign advertising allows candidates to make a connection with the voter. The use of symbols in campaign advertising creates a bond by signaling to the voter that the candidate is like the voter, which leads to a favorable rating of the candidate by the voter (Kern 1989). Candidates can affect how they are evaluated by voters with cues that identify the candidate as like the voter—someone who belongs to the voter's in-group.

Social identity theory posits that people see themselves as members of various groups that they feel they identify with; these groups are in-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Fiske and Taylor 1991). Such things as a person's partisanship, ethnicity, gender, class, and occupation all comprise a person's social identity. People in the in-group are favored over those in the out-group (those who are not members of the in-group). This in-group favoritism occurs even when there is no personal advantage or even when there is a disadvantage to doing so (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979). Moreover, in-group favoritism can occur when social identity is not entirely salient or conscious (Fiske and Taylor 1991).

This in-group/out-group dynamic is extremely powerful in influencing an individual's attitudes. Indeed, voters respond more favorably to candidates that are in the in-group and respond less favorably to those in the out-group (Judd and Downing 1995) and these evaluations are stronger (Conover 1981). Thus, candidates can use cues to show the voter the candidate is like them (i.e. part of the in-group). The candidate can do this by providing social identity cues. In other words, candidates use social identity

cues in campaign advertising in an attempt to identify himself with various groups in order to gain favor with those groups.

These social identity cues can be things such as the candidates' party identification, endorsements from various groups, or even a setting or location like a church or a school (Kern 1989). This is because it does not take much to activate in-group/out-group feelings. Something as simple as the presence of someone from the social group can be enough of a cue to trigger social identity. Such a cue would signal to someone in the social group that the candidate is an in-group member. The person in the ad is a signal to the voter that the candidate considers the in-group an important part of his constituency. For example, an ad where the candidate is shown speaking in front of a group that includes Latinos shows that Latinos make up the candidate's constituency, which associates the candidate with the in-group.

A stronger cue that the candidate is like the voter is if an in-group member is speaking in the ad. Having someone from the targeted social group speaking in the ad not only demonstrates to the voter that the social group is part of the candidate's constituency but that an in-group member supports and speaks in favor of the candidate. The result is an association of the candidate with the in-group. Because of the positivity bias in-group members have for others in their social group, we would expect the cues will be effective in showing the voter that the candidate is an in-group member and that the use of these cues by the candidates will lead to more favorable evaluations of the candidates.

Social Identities: Gender and Race

In regards to politics, the most important and influential social identity is partisanship (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). However, in the past few decades, the rise in the importance of gender and race to electoral outcomes reveals that these social identities also matter (Mueller 1988; Dawson 1994; DeSipio 1996).

Women

Women, as a voting bloc, have played an important role in national elections since 1980 (Schaffner 2005). At 56% of voters, they comprise more than half of the voting population. Although women are more likely to vote Democratic, their support for Democratic candidates varies depending on the issues the candidates discuss during the campaign. In addition, women are more likely to be persuaded by campaigns since they are less likely to have a favored candidate until right before the election; the importance of gender on electoral outcomes is affected by campaigns. Thus, candidates strategically target women to influence how women perceive them and women respond to these appeals (Schaffner 2005).[10]

Since women are more persuadable, we would expect equal amounts of cues from both Democratic and Republican candidates. Moreover, we would expect that women would respond to these cues. However, although one's sex comprises one's social identity, women may have less of a collective identity than other social groups (Gurin 1985). Therefore, appeals to gender identity may not be effective. Nevertheless,

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[10] Moreover, since most candidates are male, women have to rely on other cues besides candidate sex to evaluate a candidate. However, male candidates can still signal to women that they are like them.

I hypothesize that gender social group cues will lead to women rating both candidates more favorably.

African-Americans

African-Americans overwhelmingly vote Democratic (Dawson 1994). Candidates from either party may not include black social identity cues because such a strategy will likely not affect candidate evaluations much—blacks are not likely to vote for a Republican candidate and Democrats can count on their vote regardless. In addition, there is another dimension to using signals to trigger black social identity— priming racial attitudes. When white voters' racial attitudes become criteria to evaluate candidates, racial resentment toward blacks leads to negative feelings toward the candidate most closely tied with blacks—the Democratic candidate (Mendelberg 2001;Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Thus, black social identity cues can affect black attitudes about candidates and non-black attitudes as well.

Since the African-American social group is very cohesive group (they share a linked fate (Dawson 1994)), candidate appeals to black social identity should be effective but only if they come from the Democratic Party. Although there is little reason for Republican candidates to appeal to black social identity,[11] doing so may lead to slightly higher, albeit still low, favorability ratings. I hypothesize that black social group cues will lead to blacks rating the Democratic candidate more favorably but not the Republican candidate.

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[11] Republican candidates may use black social identity cues to affect the few African-Americans who do not always vote Democratic (i.e. black Republicans).

Latinos

Latinos are a 'new electorate' (DeSipio 1996). Indeed, political pundits hailed the 1980's as the 'decade of the Hispanic' due to the increasing population of Latinos in the United States. Although Latinos have historically voted primarily Democratic, increases in Latino's socioeconomic status and social conservatism have led to increasing numbers of Latinos preferring Republican candidates (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). Moreover, the increase of Latino participation in the electorate has only just recently occurred and the parties do not yet know how much they may matter for the election.

Thus, we would expect that candidates from both parties will make a concerted effort to use cues to show Latinos the candidate is like them. A Republican candidate's attempt may be greater than that of a Democratic candidate in an effort to attract more Latinos to the Republican candidate and the party. Conversely, Democrats may send Latino social identity cues in an effort to keep them voting Democratic. However, Latinos do not form a cohesive social group. The classification of Latino comprises three main groups (those of Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto-Rican ancestry) and there is variation in political ideology among them. Nevertheless, we would expect Latino social identity cues from both candidates and their effect to be beneficial to both candidates. Latino social group cues will lead to Latinos rating both candidates more favorably.

Data and Methods

To explore the use of social identity cues by the candidates and their effect on voter's evaluations of the candidates, I look at the 2000 presidential election. I focus on this election for two reasons. First, the 2000 election provides an instance of strategic attempts by both candidates to attract Latino voters (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). These attempts were unprecedented. Thus, the 2000 election is a unique opportunity to explore the use of social group cues on a group that is persuadable in that they are less tied to party as other social groups.

Second, the 2000 election has some advantages in terms of data. In order to explore the effect of candidate strategy on voter's evaluations of the candidates, I need campaign advertising data and public opinion data. There is great campaign advertising data available from the Wisconsin Advertising Project. This dataset contains all of the aids aired in the top 100 media markets during the 2000 election. The appropriate level of analysis when studying campaign advertising is the media market rather than the state. This is because campaigns buy advertising by the media market the air is going to be aired in. Since the dataset features storyboards of each ad, the dataset allows for an analysis of what is said in the ad and what is seen in the ad. This data is ideal for looking at social identity cues because I can analyze the images in the ads as well as phrases or words that evoke the in-group. There were almost 250,000 ads aired between December 1999 and mid-January 2001. Because I am only interested in the ads that are likely to provide social identity cues, I only include those ads from the candidate or the

candidate's party that promote the candidate. This makes the total number of ads almost 174,000. Forty-two percent of ads favored Gore and 58% percent favored Bush.

In regards to good public opinion data to measure individual level data on demographics and candidate evaluations, there is rolling cross-sectional data available from the Annenberg National Election Studies for the 2000 election.[12] Rolling cross-sectional survey data is better than other data sources such as the National Election Studies (NES). This is because I have data throughout the campaign that allows for the exploration of the dynamics of the campaign. Moreover, because the Annenberg data starts in December before the election, I am able to incorporate not only the general election but the earlier stages of the campaign as well. This is extremely important because by the time the general election occurs, evaluations of the candidate and voter preferences are already formed and are difficult to change (Bartels 1993; Kern 1989). To explore the effects of campaign strategy, I need to look at a time when candidate evaluations still vary. Furthermore, the primary season is when the candidates themselves are still trying to figure out the best strategy: which issues to emphasize, which cues to use, and how to present themselves to voters (Ridout 2004). Thus, there is variation not only in voter evaluations but in candidate strategies as well. The Annenberg rolling cross-sectional data offers the best data for exploring the entire campaign and its dynamics in terms of candidate evaluation.

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[12] From Romer et al. 2004.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables I use to examine the effect of candidate strategy to prime social identity are voters' general evaluations of Bush and Gore. These measures are the respondent's general favorability ratings of each of the candidates. Values range from 0-100, where higher values indicate higher favorability. Gore's average favorability rating is 55 and Bush's average favorability rating is 56. Figure 3.1 presents the trend over time of both candidates' favorability ratings.

Figure 3.1 illustrates how the favorability of each candidate varied over the course of the campaign. Bush maintained a higher favorability rating than Gore for most of the campaign. Gore had higher favorability ratings than Bush during the Democratic primary debate in March and also in September.

Independent Variables

The first group of independent variables of interest are the individual level demographics of the respondent, specifically the race and sex of the respondent. The measures for these variables are dummy variables. The sex measure is coded a 1 if the respondent is female, and a 0 otherwise. The sample is 55% female. To measure race, I include three variables, where a 1 means the respondent is white/black/Latino and a 0 means the respondent is not. The base categories for these variables are those respondents who are Asian, Native American, or responded 'other'. Ten percent of the sample is black and 8% are Latino. The majority of the sample is white (80%). The remaining 2% makes up the base category.

Figure 3.1: Weekly Average Favorability Ratings

The second group of independent variables of interest are the cues provided in campaign advertising. One set of measures is the number of ads aired each week that feature women, African-Americans, and Latino/as. The second set of measures is the number of ads aired each week that have a female, black, or Latino/a speaker. Table 3.1 presents the percentages of ads aired by each candidate that include social identity cues.

Gore aired more ads with female cues and Bush aired more ads with black and Latino/a cues. Both candidates aired an equal amount of ads with female and Latino/a speakers although Gore did not have any ads with a black speaker. This is interesting given that the close ties the Democratic party has to the black community. In addition, scholarship notes the effort of both candidates to appeal to Latino voters, with Bush making more of a concerted effort. While Bush certainly did so by featuring Latinos in

his ads, both candidates had the same percentage of ads in Spanish featuring at least one Latino/a.

Controls

I control for other individual level factors that influence candidate evaluations. The standard individual level demographics, in addition to race and sex, are party identification, ideology, and education (Peterson 2005). The party identification measures are coded 1 if the respondent is Republican/Democrat and 0 otherwise. The base category is independents. The ideology measure is a scale from -2 to 2, where -2 is very liberal and 2 is very conservative. Education is a nine-point scale, where higher values mean the respondent completed more schooling (9 is graduate or professional degree).

Table 3.1: Percentage of a Candidate's Ads with Social Identity Cues

	Bush	Gore
Ads with Women	24%	28%
Ads with Blacks	21%	11%
Ads with Latinos	18%	9%
Ads w/Female Speaker	2%	2%
Ads w/Black Speaker	1%	0%
Ads w/Latino Speaker	1%	1%

I also control for campaign events, such as the debates and party conventions, since they can also influence candidate evaluations. To control for this influence, I include variables for these events. The variables are coded 1 for the week the event happened and every week after, and a 0 for each week prior to the event. In addition, I

also control for the effect of candidate B's advertising on candidate A, and vice versa. Therefore, in each model, I include the other candidate's campaign advertising, namely the number of ads aired each week that have social identity cues.

Estimation

To examine how social identity cues in campaign advertising influence voters' evaluations of candidates, I estimate four models using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) or multilevel modeling. HLM is especially suited to studying campaigns because candidates do not campaign the same everywhere nor is the beginning of the campaign the same as the end of the campaign. HLM recognizes that individuals are clustered within some higher level of aggregation. For this chapter, individuals are clustered within the media market and week of the campaign the respondent is answering the survey in.

With HLM, I can explore the effect of individual level factors (i.e. race and sex) on candidate evaluations and I can examine the effect of being in a group (i.e. media market and time of the campaign) has on candidate evaluation as well. Competitive races have more advertising; candidates advertise in places where it matters (Goldstein and Strach 2004; Goldstein and Freedman 2002). Thus, a voter in one media market may be exposed to a different campaign than a voter in another media market—there is variation in campaign information across media markets.

Moreover, the campaign environment changes over the course of the campaign— over time. The campaign at the beginning of the rolling cross-sectional survey is different from the campaign during the conventions, which is different from one month

before the election. HLM allows me to account for what point in the campaign the respondent is in.

Thus, HLM allows for the examination of both individual level factors like race and sex and upper level factors like campaign advertising. With HLM, I can examine the influence that being in a certain market at a certain time of the campaign has on candidate evaluation. However, HLM is not much different from regression (Gelman and Hill 2007). Rather than including all of the explanatory variables at one level (i.e. the individual level), HLM accounts for the fact that individuals are clustered within groups. Being in these groups influences the effect of the individual level variables on the dependent variable. This model specification allows me to determine how social identity cues in campaign advertising influence voters' evaluations of candidates.

Models

The first set of models are models of Bush and Gore favorability with the individual demographic variables, campaign advertising variables, and campaign event controls. Also included is an interaction term to determine if an in-group respondent responds differently to ads with the respective social identity cue than someone who is not in the in-group. Table 3.2 presents the results of the models with the ads that use a simple cue—the presence of an in-group member in the ad. Table 3.3 presents the results of the models with the ads where the social identity cue is an in-group member speaking in the ad.

Table 3.2: The Effect of Social Identity Cues (Presence of a Social Group Member) on Candidate Favorability Ratings

	Bush		Gore	
	Parameter	Std. Error	Parameter	Std. Error
Fixed Effects				
Constant	56.52*	0.91	49.40*	0.91
Individual Level				
Female	-0.90*	0.42	3.71*	0.42
White	0.81	0.69	-2.33*	0.70
Black	-7.65*	0.93	8.46*	0.94
Latino	4.98*	0.79	6.92*	0.81
Republican	18.46*	0.47	-15.32*	0.47
Democrat	-12.70*	0.44	16.89*	0.44
Ideology	6.66*	0.21	-6.55*	0.21
Education	-0.32*	0.08	0.27*	0.08
Upper Level				
Bush Ads				
Ads w/Women	-0.09	0.93	-0.24	0.89
Female*Ads w/Women	-0.15	0.90	-0.39	0.90
Ads w/Blacks	0.73	0.58	-0.03	0.55
Black*Ads w/Blacks	-1.56	1.25	-1.02	1.26
Ads w/Latinos	-0.48	0.81	0.51	0.77
Latino*Ads w/Latinos	1.49	1.71	-0.08	1.72
Gore Ads				
Ads w/Women	-1.49*	0.90	0.61	0.87
Female*Ads w/Women	-0.77	0.80	0.26	0.81
Ads w/Blacks	1.83	1.45	-1.06	1.39
Black*Ads w/Blacks	-4.51	3.49	8.36*	3.43
Ads w/Latinos	1.37	1.21	-1.79	1.15
Latino*Ads w/Latinos	-0.86	2.46	0.09	2.46
Campaign Events				
RNC	2.24*	0.88	1.23	0.84
DNC	-2.85*	0.91	4.03*	0.86
Debate 1	0.66	1.22	-0.39	1.15
Debate 2	1.26	1.53	-3.35*	1.44
Debate 3	-1.63*	1.18	1.05	1.10
Variance Components		std. dev		std. dev
Individual Level	695.38	26.37	706.97	26.59
Upper Level	10.93	3.31	4.75	2.18
-2 X Log Likelihood	202664		202713	
N	21571		21556	
Number of Groups	2741		2743	

Note: Dependent variable is favorability rating of the candidate (0-100), * p<.10.

Table 3.3: The Effect of Social Identity Cues (Speaker is a Social Group Member) on Candidate Favorability Ratings

	Bush		Gore	
	Parameter	Std. Error	Parameter	Std. Error
Fixed Effects				
Constant	56.64*	0.90	49.31*	0.90
Individual Level				
Female	-1.06*	0.37	3.72*	0.38
White	0.75	0.69	-2.34*	0.70
Black	-8.19*	0.90	8.69*	0.90
Latino	5.00*	0.76	6.94*	0.77
Republican	18.43*	0.47	-15.31*	0.47
Democrat	-12.72*	0.44	16.88*	0.44
Ideology	6.66*	0.21	-6.54*	0.21
Education	-0.32*	0.08	0.27*	0.08
Upper Level				
Bush Ads				
Ads w/Female Speaker	-1.04	15.29	-6.74	14.68
Female*Fem. Spkr. Ad	-2.32	3.97	0.38	3.98
Ads w/Black Speaker	-2.39	15.22	6.96	14.62
Black*Black Spkr. Ad	-4.66	7.81	6.98	7.82
Ads w/Latino Speaker	-6.88	4.51	2.60	4.36
Latino*Lat. Spkr. Ad	8.83*	4.89	0.11	4.97
Gore Ads				
Ads w/Female Speaker	-3.62	2.72	2.66	2.68
Female*Fem. Spkr. Ad	-1.70	3.39	-2.13	3.43
Ads w/Latino Speaker	4.53*	2.54	2.60	4.36
Latino*Lat. Spkr. Ad	-4.52	4.47	-1.46	4.50
Campaign Events				
RNC	2.27*	0.88	1.19	0.83
DNC	-2.98*	0.90	4.06*	0.85
Debate 1	0.41	0.35	-0.77	1.09
Debate 2	1.43	0.93	-3.02*	1.44
Debate 3	-1.33	1.14	1.15	1.09
Variance Components		std. dev		std. dev
Individual Level	695.46	26.37	707.21	26.59
Upper Level	10.68	3.27	4.60	2.14
-2 X Log Likelihood	202662		202719	
N	21571		21556	
Number of Groups	2741		2743	

Note: Dependent variable is favorability rating of the candidate (0-100), * p<.10.

Results

As shown in both tables, individual factors have the greatest influence on favorability ratings of both Bush and Gore. Not surprisingly, Republicans rate Bush more favorability and Gore less favorably. Democrats rate Gore more favorably and Bush less favorably. The same relationship exists for ideology. Those with more education rate Gore more favorably and Bush less favorably. There is no significant difference between the favorability ratings of white and non-white respondents for Bush but there is a significant difference for Gore. White respondents rate Gore less favorably than non-white respondents do.

Campaign events also have a significant influence on favorability ratings. For Bush, the most important (i.e. statistically significant) events are the conventions. The Republican National Convention had a positive impact on Bush's favorability ratings and the Democratic National Convention had a negative effect on his ratings. Gore benefited from the Democratic National Convention and suffered from the second debate. The next sections discuss the effect of social identity and social identity cues in ads on the candidate's favorability ratings.

Women

As shown in both tables, women significantly rate Bush less favorably than men, and rate Gore more favorably than men do. The difference between men and women is greater for Gore than Bush (a three point difference for Gore and a one point difference for Bush). This is in agreement with the literature. In regards to the ads where the cue is the presence of a woman in an ad, Bush's ads do not have a significant influence on his

favorability ratings. Gore's ads do not have a significant influence on his favorability ratings either. However, they do have a significant and negative effect on Bush's favorability ratings. For the ads where the cue is a woman speaking in the ad, none of the ads have a significant effect on either candidate's favorability ratings.

The interaction terms allow me to determine if ads with social identity cues aimed at women were effective in increasing women's favorability ratings of the candidates. A significant interaction term tells me that the effect of the ads on favorability is different for men and women. The interaction terms are not significant which means that there is not a significant difference between men and women in the effect of the ads with female social identity cues on candidate evaluations. For women, it seems, social identity cues were not effective.

One explanation is that other identities may be more important than one's gender. For example, race trumps gender (Mansbridge and Tate 1992; Gay and Tate 1998). Moreover, women as a social group are not as cohesive as other social groups. One cleavage has to do with marital status. Research has shown a 'marriage gap' among women; there are differences in the political behavior and attitudes of women who are married and those who are not (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Lin 2004). Due to these reasons, social identity cues may not work as well for women as they may for other social groups.

African-Americans

According to both tables, unsurprisingly, African-Americans significantly rate Bush lower than non-blacks and significantly rate Gore higher. The difference is about

the same (-8 points for Bush and 8 points for Gore). This is in agreement with the literature. Ads where the cue is an African-American in the ad do not have a significant effect on either candidate's favorability ratings. The same null findings apply to the ads where the cue is an African-American speaking in the ad.

The interaction term is not significant except in one case. The interaction of African-American and Gore's ads, where the cue is the presence of an African-American, has a significant and positive effect on Gore's favorability ratings. This means that the effect of black social identity cues in Gore's advertising on his favorability ratings is different for blacks than non-blacks. Gore ads featuring African-Americans appear to trigger social identity among African-Americans, leading to in-group favoritism. These results would likely be similar (and perhaps larger) if Gore had ads where the cue is an African-American speaker. The results for African-Americans are not surprising; they conform to the literature on black political identification and voting behavior.

Latinos

The results regarding Latinos is probably the most interesting since there are more appeals on both sides to Latino/a voters and the likelihood that such appeals may be successful in persuading Latino/a voters. Latinos rate each candidate more favorably than non-Latino respondents, although they rate Gore slightly higher than Bush. Ads that simply featured a Latino/a did not have an effect on either candidate's favorability rating. However, the ads that featured a Latino/a speaker (usually in Spanish) benefited effect on Bush's ratings, even though these ads were not Bush's ads but Gore's. Gore's

ads featuring a Latino speaker had a significant and positive effect on Bush's ratings. The effect of Bush's ads featuring a Latino speaker on his ratings was significantly different for Latinos and non-Latinos.

I believe the reason for the results is language. Although both candidates aired equal percentages of their campaign ads in Spanish (around 2%), a greater percentage of Bush's ads aimed at Latinos were in Spanish than Gore's ads. Twenty percent of Bush's ads aimed at Latinos were in Spanish compared to 10% of Gore's ads. It is probable that Gore's ads helped Bush in that they illustrated to Latinos that Bush was more like them than Gore because Gore's ads did not literally speak to them.

Also interesting in these findings is that the candidates were not hurt by their appeals to Latino voters. Research on priming racial attitudes (about blacks) finds that activating racial attitudes has negative consequences for the candidates (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). It seems that it is not the case for Latinos. Indeed, this is somewhat surprising given a seemingly increasing resentment towards Latinos and especially immigrants of Hispanic ethnicity.

Discussion

This chapter explored the use of social identity cues by candidates and their effect on social group members' evaluations of the candidates. This chapter finds that appeals to women do not result in significant differences between men and women's candidate evaluations, although appeals to women by one candidate (Gore) can decrease the other candidate's ratings (Bush). Appeals to African-Americans were only effective

for Gore; the effect of ads with black social identity cues significantly influences blacks' ratings of Gore. Appeals to Latinos were only successful for Bush and Gore's appeals helped Bush as well.

The results demonstrate two things. First, candidates do use social identity cues in their campaign advertising. Strategically, Latinos offer the candidates the chance to gain the support of a constituency that is increasing in population and is 'shopping around' for a new party (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). By providing a more effective cue, which in this case is a Latino Spanish speaker, Bush was able to persuade Latinos that he was like them.

However, these findings are not particularly conclusive. In order to understand how candidates strategically use social identity and how it affects voters, a better medium to focus on may be direct mail. With direct mail, it is easier to tailor messages to individual voters (Hillygus and Shields 2008). Direct mail offers candidates a way to really show voters the candidate is like them.

Nevertheless, social identity theory provides a way for researchers to examine how campaigns affect voters, by examining how candidates strategically provide cues to take advantage of in-group favoritism. Moreover, research on campaigns also benefits social identity theory by allowing researchers to address the intersectionality of identity. Specifically, people have many social identities. The key to understanding social identity is to discover which identities are more important and why. Studying campaigns and social identity together provides researchers with a way to explore the

complex relationships between social identity, political attitudes, and politics more generally.

Secondly, this study demonstrates that we need to expand how we study campaigns. Much can be gained from examining additional ways in which the campaign affects voters. Campaign research predominantly focuses on general behavior such as how campaigns affect turnout or political knowledge. We miss an important piece of the story about how campaigns affect voting behavior when we study campaigns in this way. If we want to understand the effect of campaigns on voters, we cannot treat campaigns as if they exist outside of the political world in which they were created. We need to consider that there are strategic choices behind a campaign that have an impact on voters and that these strategies are not *just* about increasing turnout or political knowledge. They are about affecting how voters see the candidates, the electoral process, and politics.

CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECT OF UPPER AND MIDDLE LEVEL MANAGERS AND THEIR

RELATIONSHIP ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

Overview

Research on public management presents an incomplete picture about the relationship between management and performance because only one level of management is studied at a time. Organizations have more than one level of management and in considering this, we can learn more about how management matters. This chapter looks at both the effect of not just middle and upper level managers on performance, but how their interactions with each other have an impact as well. This chapter creates a measure of middle manager quality and uses that measure to determine the effect of middle management on performance. This measure is then used to explore how management at the top and middle of an organization interact to affect performance. Results show middle management has a significant influence on performance and that upper and middle level management interact to influence performance. The conclusion of the chapter is that current research underestimates the impact of management and that the study of middle management offers a way to complete our understanding of how management matters for organizational performance.

Introduction

The goal of public management scholars is to determine how management affects public organizations. A rich body of empirical research on the impact of top managers on organizational performance has shown that management matters by introducing a large n dataset to the study of public management (O'Toole and Meier 1999; Meier and O'Toole 2002). Another body of public management literature focuses on *how* public managers affect performance (Riccucci 1996, 2005; Lynn 1996). This literature provides a theory of public management generated from 'best practices' research (i.e. case studies) as well as organization theory and traditional public administration. This body of work focuses largely on the career civil servant—the middle manager—and how she can affect an organization.

However, both of these bodies of public management research—how public managers manage and if public managers affect organizational performance—when considered together form an incomplete picture of the relationship between management and performance. The incomplete picture occurs because on the one hand, the case study literature tells us how public managers—namely middle managers—matter to an organization without empirically demonstrating that middle management matters. Thus, we believe middle managers to matter, but we do not have empirical evidence to support this belief. On the other hand, research that does empirically determine the impact of management only focuses on management at the top of an organization. This is especially troublesome given that organizations have more than one level of

management (Mintzberg 1979). Thus, the picture is incomplete because we do not know about the impact of management at levels other than the top.

However, more is needed to complete the picture than just determining the impact of various managerial levels on an organization. Although management at each level can directly affect the organization, the levels of management should also influence each other and in the process have a further influence on performance (Riccucci 2005). In order to complete the picture about management, therefore, we need to consider how managers influence managers at other levels and how their relationships with one another influence the organization and its performance.

Because scholars have examined only the direct impact of management at one level on performance without considering middle management or how the combined effects of multiple management levels matter, scholars maybe underestimating the impact of management. This chapter adds to what we know about public management by seeking answers to two questions. One, what effects do middle managers have on organizational performance? Second, how does the relationship between upper and middle managers interact to affect organizational performance?

Middle Managers: Who They Are and Why They Matter

When we consider an organization, there are two main parts. The first part is the operating core. Those in the operating core are front line workers or street level bureaucrats. Their job is to carry out the basic work of the organization; they produce the services and products of the organization. The second part is management and in

most organizations, there is more than level of management (Mintzberg 1979). Upper-level managers are at the very top of an organization, the strategic apex (Mintzberg 1979). Those in the strategic apex are responsible for ensuring that the organization serves its purpose effectively and that it serves the needs of those who control or have power over the organization (Mintzberg 1979).

Middle managers are different from top managers in two ways. They are unique because of their location in the organization. Middle managers belong to the worker level and to the managerial level (Barnard 1938); they are both executives and front line workers. Middle managers are the connection between upper level managers and street level bureaucrats; they inform both levels about what the other level is doing (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001; Mintzberg 1979; Lipsky 1980). Specifically, they collect feedback on their unit's performance and pass this information to upper management, and they communicate the directives of upper management to front line workers. They are the primary means of communication within the organization, which is an integral and important part of an organization (Mintzberg 1979).

The second way middle managers differ is due to their role in the implementation of policy. Although middle managers work below a policy making level (which occurs at the strategic apex), they are largely responsible for how policy is implemented. Those at the top of the organization pass down directives, and middle managers decide how those directives are best achieved. They are responsible for getting what top management wants done and do so by implementing and communicating the policies, missions, and goals of the organization (Rainey and Watson 1996; Lumsden 1982). Due

to the input they have in the implementation of policy, middle managers can have a large

impact on the organization and its outputs.

In the implementation of policy and organizational goals, middle managers

perform the roles of those in the strategic apex but in the context of their own unit

(Mintzberg 1979). According to the case study literature, middle managers are the direct

supervisors of the workers in their unit and are responsible for the hiring, evaluation, and

improvement of those workers. They allocate resources; create budgets, schedules and

reports; and set rules and guidelines for those below them in the organization. They

build networks with those higher up in the organization and with other middle managers.

They are responsible for creating a sense of teamwork within the unit and for motivating

employees (Rainey and Watson 1996; Rainey 2003). Middle managers are held

accountable for the performance of their unit, and how well middle managers handle

these tasks affects organizational performance (Hayes 2004).

In addition to their direct impact on the organization, middle managers indirectly

affect the organization by influencing top-level managers, whom the literature tells us

have a positive and significant effect on organizational performance (O'Toole and Meier

1999; Meier and O'Toole 2002). By this, I mean that the actions taken at one level are

going to affect the actions of all of the other levels of an organization (Riccucci 2005).

Understanding how the levels of an organization interact with one another allows us to

understand more generally how management as a whole works (Kettl 1990). This is

because management matters depending not only on the level you are at in the

bureaucracy (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001; Riccucci 2005) but because each level of

management does not exist independently of the rest of the organization. Indeed, an organization is more than the sum of its parts (Smith 1776). By coordinating with each other, managers at each level affect the organization more together than they do separately. An examination of the direct impact of upper and middle management on performance is not enough; we need to consider how the relationship between top and middle managers matters as well if we are to understand how management matters.

Hypotheses

Up to this point, I have defined who middle managers are and what their role is in an organization. I have also made a case for why it is important to look at more than one level of management and at the interaction of these levels. The goal of this chapter is to better understand how management matters to an organization. By focusing on middle managers, we can better understand the impact of management as a whole because we gain two new insights—about management at a different level and how the relationship between management at the top and the middle affects the organization.

The first insight is an empirical determination of the impact of middle managers on an organization. The case study literature tells us that what middle managers do is important to an organization, and the large n dataset literature tells us that management (at the top) matters. Based on this, middle managers, due to the tasks they perform, matter to an organization. Thus, my first hypothesis posits that as the quality of the middle manager increases, so too will performance. Specifically,

H1: Better middle managers will have a positive impact on an organization.

The second insight is how managerial levels interact to affect performance. There are two possible scenarios. The first scenario is that top and middle managers complement each other's efforts. The result being that management as a whole has an even greater impact on performance than if we just looked at the direct effects of each management level. The reasoning behind this is that quality managers will work together to improve performance and by doing so their impact on performance will be greater than if they did not work together. The complementing hypothesis proposes that:

H2a: The effect of management on performance is greater and positive when both levels of management are good.

In other words, the impact of management will be greater when both managers are of high quality.

The second scenario is that good management at one level will compensate for poor management at the other level. For example, when one level of management is not very good, the other level of management steps in to ensure that the organization is not too adversely affected. The compensating hypothesis posits that:

H2b: Good management at one level will compensate for poor management at the other level so that performance is not negatively affected.

The reasoning behind this is that a good manager will recognize that there are things that are not being done that need to be and will take action. Regardless of the scenario, exploring the relationship between managerial levels will reveal how management works. The methods used to test these hypotheses are presented next.

Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, I have three data requirements. The first requirement is a measure of middle management. Moreover, I need a measure of middle management that can be compared to a measure of upper level management for the same organizations. The second requirement is consistent performance measures for those same organizations. The last requirement is these measures over time so that I can establish causality between management and performance.

Data

Given these data needs, I use a dataset of the most common public organization in the United States—school districts. Specifically, the dataset includes information on more than 1,000 school districts in Texas. School districts are independent local governments with their own taxing powers, are highly professionalized with certification processes for various occupations, and are fairly decentralized; there is discretion at each level of the organization, with the most discretion at the street-level. Due the size of Texas, there is diversity in the location (urban, suburban, and rural), size, race, and class of the school districts. There is variation in this diversity as well. Some school districts are homogenous in terms of race and class and other are extremely heterogeneous.

This dataset provides me with the necessary measures to test my hypotheses. First, the dataset provides information about district managers so that comparable measures of top and middle managers can be created. Second, the advantage to using Texas public school data is the availability of performance measures that are comparable across institutions and that are meaningful to the organization and to the community it

serves. The main performance measure is student scores on the state standardized test,

the TAAS until 2002 and the TAKS starting in 2003. Lastly, the time period of the

dataset is from 2000 through 2005, which provides me with multiple time points.

The unit of analysis is the school district. The structure of the school district is

hierarchical with a superintendent at the top of the organization, principals in the middle,

and teachers serving as street level bureaucrats. In order to test the hypotheses the whole

organization must be considered since one of the hypotheses focuses on the managerial

levels within an organization. Performance measures, organizational characteristics

(size, location, resources, etc.), and managerial and worker data (i.e. superintendents,

principals and teachers) are provided at the district level by the Texas Education Agency

(TEA).

Middle Manager Quality

To test these hypotheses, we need to create a measure of middle management. In

school districts, principals are middle managers (Hayes 2004). The tasks they perform

are the tasks of management, and they reside in the middle of the school district

organization, between the superintendent and teachers. They have to consult with the

rest of the district team (i.e. teachers, staff, and upper levels of management) as well as

the community, parents, and students when making administrative decisions regarding

budgets, schedules, and the implementation of new policies. They are responsible for

hiring, evaluating, and developing parallel staff. Principals also issue school status

reports that district administrators and the community care about. Principals are

responsible for student academic performance in ensuring that teachers are following the

appropriate curriculum. They set the academic tone of the school by setting expectations and standards and by organizing the school around school achievement (i.e. goal setting and motivating employees) (Hayes 2004; Smith and Andrews 1989; Sergiovanni 2001). Principals, because of the tasks they perform and because they bridge those at the top of the district (superintendents) with those at the lower level of the district (teachers), are middle managers.

Any measure of middle management, to test these hypotheses, needs to allow for the identification of good and bad middle management —a measure of managerial quality. What we know about managerial quality usually comes from anecdotal evidence and case studies, and this research usually links managerial quality with leadership (Riccucci 1996; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Beam 2001). To create a quantifiable measure of management quality, we can use salary as a proxy for quality. The assumption behind this approach is that better principals will have higher salaries.

Such a measure of managerial quality relies on the idea that the market drives principal salaries; districts will pay more for quality principals in an effort to attract and reward talented managers. Indeed, there are no pre-negotiated or base salaries for principals. Although not all principals may participate in the market (i.e. they may just accept what other principals in the district are getting), what is important is that at the margins there is a market for principals. Marginal consumers (i.e. those districts or schools that gather information and seek out quality principals) can drive the market.

Moreover, those in charge of setting principal salaries are upper level managers.[13] This

means that professionals—those who know the worth of a quality principal—are the

ones who set salaries. Thus, those districts that wish to attract quality middle managers

and are able to identify them should generate a market that keeps the salary of all middle

managers competitive (Schneider, Teske, and Marschall 2000). The average principal

salary is $58,469 with a standard deviation of $8,230.

There are two steps to creating a measure of middle manager quality. The first

step is to predict a district's average principal salary. This variable has been logged to

account for extreme values. There are multiple factors that affect salary such as the

wealth of a district or if a principal has an advanced degree. The second step is to take

the residuals of the model and standardize them. The idea behind this method is that

what is left (i.e. what is not explained by these factors) is principal quality. For example,

a principal with the reputation of turning schools around will be paid more because

districts with poor schools will try to attract the principal to turn their school around.

The part of the principal's salary that is above and beyond what similarly qualified

principals would make is the factor responsible for turning schools around; this is

quality. The standardized residuals of the model predicting average principal salary is

the measure of middle manager quality.

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[13] The principal hiring process starts with the school board and the superintendent, who get together to determine their ideal candidate. They may also form a search committee to advertise the job opening, review applications, select candidates to interview, and interview candidates. When there is not a search committee, central administration performs these tasks. Finalists, determined from the first round of interviews, visit the district and meet with administrators, teachers, and sometimes the school board. The school board, based on the recommendation of the superintendent, makes the final decision. The superintendent meets with the successful candidate to discuss the job and salary. In states without contracts and unions, such as Texas, individual negotiations occur (Hayes 2004). This process occurs even if the candidate is from another school in the district.

Step 1: Predicting Average Principal Salary

To create a middle manager quality measure, it is necessary to identify the factors that influence a principal's salary. According to a common salary model from the literature, these factors fall into four categories—district characteristics, human capital factors, personal characteristics, and past performance (Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1988a,b). The first category comprises district characteristics, namely district resources. The measures for these factors are the district's total expenditures, the tax rate, and the average revenue per student, all of which are logged. All things being equal, we would expect districts with more resources to pay higher salaries.

The second set of factors are human capital factors such as principals' education and experience. These measures may be problematic for predicting principal salary because we cannot include individual level measures of experience, education, and training since there are multiple principals in a district. Therefore, the human capital factor measures will have to be averages of these factors, specifically, average principal experience, average principal degree and average principal age. We would expect districts to pay higher salaries for more experienced principals and those with more education.

The same problem exists for the third set of factors—personal characteristics. Personal characteristics are things such as race and gender. Unlike the human capital factors, having an average, percentage, or ratio measure of race or gender may not be particularly useful for predicting a district's average principal salary. Nevertheless,

including a percent female and percent white variable may account for the effect of personal characteristics on average principal salary.

Minority principals may have a higher salary because of a district's desire to increase diversity and hire quality minority principals. Minority principals may then increase the average principal salary in a district. Female principals may make either more or less money. In order to be a principal, one must have spent time in the classroom. Female principals may make less money because there are more women in the ranks to choose from since women comprise a large majority of teachers. On the other hand, women are less likely to move into administrative positions and so districts may pay more for female principals because they are scarce.

The fourth factor is the relationship between salary and performance. Better performing districts reward principals and quality principals are more likely to be in better performing districts. My past performance measure on the TAAS/TAKS has been purged via an instrumental variables technique to eliminate any reciprocal influence between past performance and managerial quality.[14] Table 4.1 presents the results of the model predicting logged average principal salary.

The model accounts for 51% of the variability in average principal salary. The resources of the district have the largest influence on principal salary, and the relationship is in the expected positive direction. The human capital measures are all significant and in the expected direction. In regards to personal characteristics, race and sex are not significant predictors of principal salary. Although the relationships revealed

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[14] The instrumental variables are the district's previous year's performance on the TAAS/TAKS, revenue per pupil, and the percent of black, Latino, and low-income students in the district.

in Table 4.1 are interesting, they are not the focus of this study. The purpose of this part

of the analysis is to remove as many non-quality factors from the principal's salary as

possible and to take what is not explained by salary determinants as an indicator of

quality.

Table 4.1: Predicting Average Principal Salary

	Coef.	t-score
District Characteristics		
Logged Total Expenditures	0.06	44.45
Logged Tax Rate	0.05	3.23
Logged Revenue/pupil	0.04	5.82
Personal Characteristics		
Avg. Degree	0.04	7.44
Avg. Experience	0.003	11.35
Avg. Age	0.00003	4.69
Percent Female	0.00008	1.57
Percent White	-0.00003	-0.45
Purged Past Performance	0.02	10.07
Adj. R-squared	0.51	
Root MSE	0.09	
F	390.82	
N	4874	

Note: Dependent variable is the logged average principal salary.
Coefficients for individual years not reported.

Step 2: Standardize the Residuals

The middle manager quality measure is the standardized residuals from the

model presented in Table 4.1. The residuals are centered on the mean of the residuals.

A value of 0 means a district has average middle manager quality. Values range from -3

to 3 where -3 is very low quality and 3 is very high quality. In districts where middle

manager quality is 1 (i.e. a 1 standard deviation change from 0), the average principal

salary is around $3,000 more than in those districts where middle manager quality is

average (i.e. a value of 0). This measure allows for the testing of the first hypothesis

about the effect of middle managers on organizational performance. To test hypothesis

2, we need a measure of upper level management that is comparable to the measure of

middle manager quality.

Upper Management Quality

The measure of upper level management is also a measure of quality. As with

principals, better superintendents are rewarded in a competitive labor market with higher

salaries. The measure of superintendent quality is created by first predicting

superintendent salaries with variables that measure district financial resources, past

performance, and the personal and professional characteristics of superintendents.

Values of superintendent quality range from -5 to 5, where positive values mean above

average superintendent quality. The measure has been validated in research on the effect

of superintendents on performance (Meier and O'Toole 2002).

Since both measures are standardized, they are on the same scale and therefore

are comparable. To test the hypotheses about the relationship between upper and middle

management, the measures also need to be distinct.   It is possible that the middle and

top managerial quality measures are not distinct but rather the result of a salary pattern

where districts that pay more/less for superintendents pay more/less for principals. If

this were the case, the two measures would be correlated. They are not. The correlation

between the two quality measures is 0.09. Now that we have measures of middle and top manager quality, we can proceed in testing the hypotheses about how middle managers and the relationship between middle and top-level managers affects performance.

Performance

There are many ways to evaluate school district performance. In Texas, the most important and salient performance measure is student performance on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS).[15] The federal 'No Child Left Behind' policy is based on Texas' experience with this test. It is a basic skills test designed to measure student success and teacher effectiveness. All students in grades 3-8 and 10 must take the test. Students in tenth grade must pass the test in order to graduate from high school. These test scores are used to rank districts and are widely reported in the news media; the TAAS/TAKS is the most visible indicator of school performance and the quality of schools. This performance measure is the percentage of students in a district who pass all (reading, writing, and math) sections of the TAAS/TAKS. The mean of this measure is 76 with a standard deviation of 14.

Although the standardized test is important, there are other tasks on which managers place importance. In addition to teaching students basic skills, schools are responsible for preparing students for higher education. The standardized test measures basic skills, but schools also care about more advanced skills that students can use in college. The TEA defines students as college ready if they score at or above 1110 on the

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[15] This test was the TAAS until 2002 and then the name changed to the TAKS starting in 2003.

SAT or its ACT equivalent.[16] A score of 1110 on the SAT (or its ACT equivalent) would rank in the top 20% nationwide and is usually sufficient to get into a quality college. The college ready performance measure is the percentage of students who took the test that scored at or above 1110 on the SAT (or its ACT equivalent). The mean of this measure is 21 and the standard deviation is 12.

On a more basic level, before students can be taught basic or more advanced skills, they must be in the classroom. Thus, a very simple and yet important task of managers is student attendance. This measure is the district's average daily attendance. The mean of this measure is 96 with a standard deviation of 0.85.

Control Variables

More than just management influences school performance. According to education research on school performance, resources matter—schools with more resources perform better (Wenglinsky 1997; Hanushek 1996; Hedges and Greenwald 1996). Resources are also important because they can make the manager's job easier; resources enable the manager to address problems and implement and fund needed programs. Monetary resources are measured with average teacher salary and the amount of state aid the district receives. Human resources are measured with a district's average years of teacher experience and the percentage of teachers with an advanced degree.

The degree of difficulty of the manager's job is also related to school performance. Difficulty is defined here in terms of resources and the heterogeneity of

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[16] The SAT and ACT are standardized tests designed to measure critical thinking skills. Colleges and universities use the SAT or ACT, in addition to a student's high school record, to determine success in college. The SAT is more popular among colleges on the west and east coasts and the ACT is more popular in the Midwest and the South.

the district. Homogenous districts are less difficult to manage than heterogeneous

districts. For example, a homogenous district with a wealthy student body (i.e. the

students are all the same class and race) is likely to have high performance no matter

what management does (Burtless 1996). A district with a poor and a highly diverse

student body will have greater difficulty in attaining high performance scores because

the schools will have to make up for a less supportive home environment and deal with a

more varied and complex learning environment (Jencks and Phillips 1998). The three

measures that control for task difficulty are the percent of black, Latino, and low-income

students in a district. These variables measure task difficulty because they reflect the

homogeneity or heterogeneity of a district. Thus, all three task difficulty measures will

have a negative influence on performance.

In addition to controlling for resources and task difficulty, the size of the district

also matters. This is measured with the logged total enrollment of students in a district

and the average class size. The model also controls for past performance with a lagged

dependent variable and dummy variables for individual years although the coefficients

for the individual year dummy variables are not reported.[17]

Results

The two hypotheses presented in this chapter focus on what effect middle

managers and the interaction between top and middle managers have on organizational

performance. The first hypothesis is tested with the model presented above. The second

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[17] I also ran a two-way fixed effects model. The results are similar.

hypothesis is tested with the same model but with the inclusion of an interaction term, where superintendent quality is interacted with principal quality.

Hypothesis 1: The Effect of Middle Manager Quality on Performance

To determine the effect of middle manager quality on organizational performance, the standardized residual measure from the model presented in Table 4.1 is included in a model predicting performance. Table 4.2 presents the results of the models predicting performance on the TAAS/TAKS, the percent of college ready students, and attendance rates.[18] According to Table 4.2, middle manager quality exerts a positive and significant influence on two of the three performance measures.

Standardized Tests

The impact of middle management quality is positive and significant for TAAS/TAKS pass rates. Substantively, this means a one standard deviation change in middle manager quality increases performance on the TAAS/TAKS the next year by 1.04 percentage points. Therefore, an above average middle manager increases performance on the standardized test by 4%. Although this may not seem like a large impact, there is a distributive lag effect. For example, let us say the district pass rate in the first year (year 0) is 10. The next year (year 1), if we hold everything else constant except for the effect of middle management, the pass rate will be 11.04. In the third year

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[18] In examining the effect of middle manager quality, it is important to relate it to a variety of performance indicators. If middle manager quality matters for more than just one or two performance measures, then confidence in the measure and conclusions about the importance of middle managerial quality to performance is justified. Moreover, the quality of middle management may matter less or more depending on the task because the ability of management to solve problems may be limited. The effects of middle manager and managerial quality on additional measures of performance are provided in table A.3 in the appendix. The models are the same as in Table 4.2, the control variables are simply not reported.

(year 2), the pass rate will be 11.04 (year 1 performance) plus 1.04. Thus, over five

years (year 0 to year 5), a one standard deviation change in middle management quality

increases pass rates from 10 to 15.2—a difference of 5.2 percentage points. Moreover, if

the middle manager gets better over time (i.e. a two standard deviation change instead of

one), the effect of the middle manager on TAAS/TAKS performance would be even

greater.

Table 4.2: The Effect of Middle Management on Performance

Independent Variables	Stdized Test		College Ready		Attendance	
	Coef.	t-score	Coef.	t-score	Coef.	t-score
Management						
Middle Manager Quality	1.04*	3.85	2.60*	4.67	-0.01	-0.25
Superintendent Quality	0.33*	4.31	0.62*	4.07	0.01*	2.05
Control Variables						
% Black Students	-0.05*	-6.10	-0.05*	-3.18	0.001	1.41
% Latino Students	-0.01*	-2.75	-0.01	-1.19	0.001*	2.77
% Low Income Students	-0.07*	-9.42	-0.19*	-12.84	-0.003*	-5.74
Avg. Teacher Salary	0.57	1.38	-2.58*	-3.22	0.06	1.65
Avg. Teacher Experience	0.05	1.29	0.39*	4.89	-0.002	-0.54
Teachers w/Adv. Degrees	0.001	0.15	0.05*	2.58	-0.0004	-0.57
Class Size	-0.08	-1.46	-0.58*	-5.00	-0.01*	-2.66
State Aid	-0.0006	-1.56	-0.002*	-2.39	0.00005	1.45
Logged Enrollment	-0.49*	-2.50	0.71	1.71	-0.03	-1.60
Past Performance	0.77*	73.59	0.35*	24.40	0.81*	97.87
Adj. R-square	0.87		0.44		0.75	
Root MSE	4.92		8.94		0.41	
F	2016.08		211.00		878.77	
N	4780		4324		4783	

Note: Coefficients for individual years not reported.

Now lets compare the effect of middle management quality on the TAAS/TAKS

with the effect of superintendent quality. A one standard deviation change in

superintendent quality increases performance on the TAAS/TAKS by 0.33 percentage

points. Over five years, the effect of superintendent quality will be 1.65. Compare this

to the five year effect of middle management quality (5.45) and we see that middle manager quality has a greater (and significantly different effect (p-value<0.01)) on TAAS/TAKS pass rates than upper-level managers.

In regards to the control variables, enrollment has a significant and negative effect on TAAS/TAKS performance; larger districts have lower pass rates. The task difficulty measures also have a significant and negative influence on TAAS/TAKS performance. The resource measures do not have a significant influence although much of the influence of resources may already be reflected in the lagged dependent variable. Resources do not seem to matter for performance on the TAAS/TAKS as much as management and the challenges managers face.

College Readiness

The effect of middle management quality on the percentage of college ready students is also significant and positive. A one standard deviation change in middle manager quality increases the percentage of college ready students 14% or, by 2.60 percentage points the next year. This effect by itself is quite large but taken over time the effect is even greater. Over five years, middle management quality can increase the percent of college ready students by 6.2 percentage points. This is an increase of 30%. This is a big effect and this is for only a one standard deviation increase in quality.

When comparing the effect of middle management quality (2.60) to the effect of managerial quality (0.62), we see that middle manager quality has a significantly greater effect on the percentage of college ready students than superintendent quality (p-value<0.001). The difference between the effect of superintendent quality and middle

managerial quality is even more pronounced when comparing the 5-year effects. Superintendent quality, over five years, can increase performance by 3.1 percentage points compared to the five-year effect of middle managerial quality (13 percentage points).

The size of the district does not have a significant influence on the percentage of college ready students in a district. All of the task difficulty measures are in the expected negative direction but only the black and low-income student variables are statistically significant. Districts with better human and fiscal resources have a positive influence on the percentage of college ready students.

Attendance

The effect of middle management quality on attendance rates is not significant. The effect of superintendent quality is significant, albeit very small. The results for the control variables in this model are unlike those for the other two models. Perhaps this is because, unlike academic performance, the expectations about the task difficulty measures (percent black, Latino, and low-income students) and attendance rates are unclear. The percentage of black students in a district does not have a significant effect on attendance rates but the percentages of Latino and low-income populations do. The low-income measure is negative, which means that as the population of low-income students increases, attendance rates will decrease. The Latino student measure is positive, which means that as the population of Latino students increase, attendance rates increase. Enrollment is significant and negative; districts with more students are likely

to have lower attendance rates. Human and fiscal resources do not have a significant influence on attendance rates.

Summary of Hypothesis 1 Results

The results presented in Table 4.2 demonstrate that middle managers matter for overall performance (TAAS/TAKS) and for high-end performance (college ready students). In addition, the effects of middle management quality on these two performance measures are substantially larger than the effects of superintendent quality. It is important to note that the impact of management on performance exists above and beyond district resources, especially wealth. This means that good managers (both middle and upper level) can overcome at least some of the resource constraints. However, the results also demonstrate that middle manager quality does not have an influence on low-end performance such as school attendance rates, but then neither do human and fiscal resources; the significant factor for attendance rates is task difficulty.

The conclusions so far are three. The first is that hypothesis 1 is supported, good middle managers have a positive effect on performance. The second conclusion is that this effect is significantly different and larger than the effect of top managers on performance. What this means then is that past research has underestimated the effect of management on performance. This is the third conclusion, namely that when middle managers are considered, management has a much greater influence on performance than the literature tells us.

Hypothesis 2: The Interaction of Top and Middle Management

The model to test the second hypothesis is the same as in Table 4.2, with the addition of an interaction term between superintendent and principal quality. By examining the three performance measures, it allows us to see if there are different relationships between managerial levels depending on the task. Recall that there are two possible relationships. The first relationship (hypothesis 2a) is that there is a complementing relationship between the two managerial levels, where performance is even better when both levels of management are good. The second relationship (hypothesis 2b) is that there is a compensating relationship, where good management at one level makes up for bad management at the other level. The relevant coefficients are presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: The Interaction of Management

	Performance Measures					
	TAAS/TAKS		College Ready		Attendance	
Management Variables	Coefficient	t-score	Coefficient	t-score	Coefficient	t-score
Middle Manager Quality	1.03	3.83	2.67	4.80	0.01	0.48
Superintendent Quality	0.33	4.34	0.45	2.85	0.01	1.84
Middle Manager Quality X Superintendent Quality	-0.03	-0.51	0.53	3.86	0.01	2.28
Adj. R-square	0.87		0.44		0.75	
F	1897.21		200.01		878.31	
N	4780		4324		4783	
Joint F-Test (Prob>F)	6.14	0.01	14.73	0.001	0.00	0.95

Note: All equations control for all variables in Table 4.2: logged enrollment, average teacher salary, the percent of teachers with advanced degrees, average teacher experience, percentages of black, Latino, and low-income students, and the percentage of state aid a district receives, class size, past performance, and yearly dummies.

The coefficients and t-scores themselves do not have a substantive interpretation (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Rather, the information from Table 4.3 is used to calculate the marginal effects of principal quality contingent on superintendent quality and vice versa.

Standardized Tests

Column 1 in Table 4.3 shows that, for performance on the TAAS/TAKS, the effect of middle manager quality for any value of superintendent quality is:

Slope = 1.03 – 0.03 x Superintendent quality

Using this formula, the effect of middle management quality on performance when superintendent quality is low (one standard deviation below the mean), average (the mean), and high (one standard deviation above the mean) can be calculated. The marginal effects of middle manager quality depending on various levels of superintendent quality are presented in Table 4.4.

The effect of middle management quality on TAAS/TAKS pass rates changes from 1.07 to 1.01 as superintendent quality goes from low to high. This means that as the quality of the superintendent decreases, the effect of principal quality on performance increases around 3%. As superintendent quality increases, the effect of principal quality on performance decreases. Although middle manager quality matters more when superintendent quality is low, the impact of superintendent quality on this relationship is still very small. Figure 4.1 illustrates this relationship.

Table 4.4: The Marginal Effects of Principal Quality at Various Levels of Superintendent Quality

Performance Measure	Superintendent Quality		
	Low	Medium	High
TAAS	1.07	1.04	1.01
College Ready	2.14	2.69	3.20

Note: A quality score that is one standard deviation below the mean is low quality, medium quality is the mean, and high quality is one standard deviation above the mean.

Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects of Middle Manager Quality on TAAS/TAKS Pass Rates

The effect of superintendent quality for any value of principal quality is:

$$Slope = 0.33 - 0.03 \text{ x Principal quality}$$

The marginal effects of superintendent quality depending on various levels of middle manager quality are presented in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: The Marginal Effects of Superintendent Quality at Various Levels of Principal Quality

Performance Measure	Principal Quality		
	Low	Medium	High
TAAS	0.36	0.33	0.30
College Ready	-0.08	0.45	0.98

Note: A quality score that is one standard deviation below the mean is low quality, medium quality is the mean, and high quality is one standard deviation above the mean.

Figure 4.2: Marginal Effects of Superintendent Quality on TAAS/TAKS Pass Rates

The impact of superintendent quality on performance changes from 0.36 to 0.30 as principal quality goes from low to high. This means that as principal quality decreases, the effect of superintendent quality on performance increases by 11%. Figure 4.2 illustrates this relationship. As show in Figure 4.2, the impact of superintendent

quality is no longer significant when principal quality is high (more than 1 standard deviation above the mean). This means that when principal quality is high, superintendent quality does not have a significant impact on performance.

These results, taken together, reveal an interesting relationship between upper and middle level management. First, the interaction of principals and superintendents can result in diminishing returns for TAAS/TAKS pass rates. When management quality at both levels has a positive impact on performance separately, their combined impact on performance may not lead to an even greater impact. Rather, they may undercut each other's efforts and end up hurting performance instead of helping it. This happens when quality at one level is high—the effect of the other level does not matter so much for performance. However, when the quality of one managerial level is low, the effect of the other managerial level matters more to an organization. This means that quality managers compensate for low quality managers. For standardized test scores, there is support for hypothesis 2b.

College Readiness

As presented in Table 4.4, the effect of middle management quality on the percentage of students who are college ready changes from 2.14 to 3.20 when superintendent quality goes from low to high—an increase of 44%. In other words, the effect of principal quality increases as superintendent quality increases; superintendent quality increases the effect of middle management quality on performance. Figure 4.3 illustrates this relationship.

In regards to the marginal effects of superintendent quality, the impact of superintendent quality changes from -0.08 to 0.98 when principal quality goes from low to high. The effect of superintendent quality increases as principal quality increases. Figure 4.4 illustrates the effect of superintendent quality on performance as middle manager quality increases. Note, as shown in Figure 4.4, that superintendent quality only has a significant impact when principal quality is at least average.

Figure 4.3: Marginal Effects of Middle Manager Quality on College Ready Students

The results for this performance measure indicate that the interaction of principal and superintendent quality can have an even bigger impact on performance if they are quality managers. Indeed, this impact can be quite large, where the effect of manager

quality on performance changes from no effect to a positive effect as middle manager quality moves from low to high. The interaction of middle and upper level management can make the impact of management on performance even greater. For college readiness, there is support for hypothesis 2a; there is a complementing relationship.

Figure 4.4: Marginal Effects of Superintendent Quality on College Ready Students

Attendance

According to the results presented in Table 4.3, the impact of management quality at both levels on attendance rates is very small. The impact of management quality at either level on attendance rates does not change as the quality of the other level changes. For this performance measure, neither of the relationships presented in hypothesis 2 are supported.

Summary of Hypothesis 2 Results

When testing hypothesis 2, the expectation was that either compensation or complementing would occur for all performance measures. Instead, a compensating relationship was found for the standardized test measure and a complementing relationship for college readiness. While this is unexpected, it is not surprising when we consider the differences between the two performance measures. Performance on the standardized test is the focus of all districts. Districts care about standardized test scores because their funding and reputation rely on them. Since standardized test scores are a priority, district procedures, goals, and resources are all aimed at test scores and do not change much. Moreover, since the procedures remain the same, when one level of management is not doing their job well, the other level of management knows enough to step in to prevent performance from slipping too much.

College readiness, on the other hand, is a priority only if the district makes it one. If the district does make college readiness a priority, it requires additional resources (i.e. time and money) because teaching students the skills they need to succeed in college is different from teaching kids the basic skills the standardized test covers. Communicating with parents and students about the importance of taking the test takes time and effort on the part of the organization. Moreover, managers will need to work with teachers, the community, and parents to gain additional resources. These additional resources include resources for after school prep classes such as the teachers to teach them and classroom space to teach them in, and funding so low-income can afford to take the test. The task is not just preparing students for college and all that entails, it is

also ensuring students continue to perform well on the standardized test. Such a task requires teamwork.

When the task is considered, the results are not surprising. When the performance measure is the main task of the organization, the goals and the procedures used to reach those goals are ingrained in the organization—the majority of resources (both human and financial) are spent on them. When the task is not the main goal of the organization, however, the organization needs to work together to gather and effectively utilize the necessary resources to succeed.

An examination of the relationship between top and middle managers demonstrates that managers at one level influence managers at another level, and that this has an impact on organization performance. Moreover, depending on the task, the interaction of management can affect performance in an even bigger way (college ready students), it can result in diminishing returns, or it can lead to compensation by one level of management for poor management at another level (standardized test pass rates). The relationship between management levels is complex and the results show that how we study management can lead to different conclusions about the effect of management on performance.

Conclusions

This chapter makes three contributions to the public management literature. First, it is the offers the first empirical study of the impact of middle managers. It demonstrates that middle manager quality has a significant and positive impact on two

out of three organizational performance indicators. The measure of middle manager quality presented in this chapter allows researchers to actually explore empirically for the first time the myriad ways middle managers affect an organization. Although a large body of research has stressed the importance of quality upper level management to organizational performance and the many ways that upper level management matters to an organization, the research presented here demonstrates the significant impact of middle management on organizational performance.

Middle managers have an even larger impact on organizations than upper level management for several reasons. Intuitively, this makes sense for several reasons. The first reason is problem solving. Upper level managers are tasked with solving big problems that are oftentimes unsolvable. If a problem does have a solution, the real impact comes not from the solution but from those who implement the solution—middle managers. Conversely, mid-level managers get smaller—and more likely solvable—problems. The decisions middle managers make about the solutions to these small problems and the implementation of solutions from upper level management can have a greater cumulative impact on an organization than those decisions made at the upper levels of government. This is because middle managers are more involved with the day-to-day operations of the organization than upper level managers are. Middle managers affect the organization on a weekly or daily basis by solving small problems and implementing solutions.

The second reason middle managers have a greater impact on an organization than upper level managers is the relationship middle managers have with front-line

workers. Front line workers are the 'producers' of the organization; they create/provide the organization's products/services. So, middle managers have a greater impact on the organization than upper level managers not only because they solve more immediate and important problems, but because they have more contact with, and thus a greater impact, on the front line workers who are directly responsible for organizational performance.

The third reason middle managers matter more to an organization is politics. Superintendents have to deal with politics to garner constituency support in order to continue to be effective in providing services and to maintain the necessary support of political actors. As a result, they have less time for management. The responsibility for management falls to middle managers who pick up the slack. Middle managers have a greater impact on organizational performance than superintendents simply because they manage the organization more than superintendents.

These three reasons for why middle managers can have a greater influence on an organization than upper level managers illustrates that the expansion of public management research to include middle managers is possible, essential, and beneficial to understanding the complex ways in which management affects organizational performance. The effect of management on performance is more complex than scholars have envisioned. When management at one level is poor, management at the other level can compensate. When the quality of both management levels is high, middle and upper-level managers both have a larger impact on performance (although there is a chance of diminished returns).

Management matters more than we think and in interesting ways. By looking at more than one level of management, the results in this chapter reveal that only examining one level of an organization understates the importance of management in an organization. Moreover, the relationship between the managerial levels can lead to even better performance. The question is no longer simply if management matters but how and when it matters. The inclusion of middle managers in the study of public management helps answer that question.

CHAPTER V

HOW MANAGEMENT MATTERS:

THE EFFECT OF MIDDLE MANAGERS ON TURNOVER

Overview

The literature on public management explores the roles of public managers and their effect on public organizations. Although this research tells us that management matters, it does not demonstrate how management affects the organization; it simply argues that it does. This chapter examines the effect of upper and middle level managers on street level bureaucrats' decisions to stay with the organization—a decision that affects organizational performance. Specifically, using a large n dataset of the most common public organization in the United States—school districts—I show that management at only one level of an organization—the middle level—has a significant and negative effect on teacher turnover; upper level management does not have an effect on turnover. Moreover, middle management continues to have an effect on turnover when organizational size is taken into account. Except for very large districts, middle management has a negative effect on turnover. The results and their implications are discussed within the public management literature.

Introduction

Those who study public management are interested in "the interactions between managers and workers and the effects of management on workers and work outcomes"

(Frederickson and Smith 2003, 98). However, the majority of research on public management research focuses on the effect of management on work outcomes (i.e. organizational performance) and not so much on the effect of management on the workers themselves (Meier and O'Toole 2002, 2001; Goerdel 2006; Brewer and Selden 2000; Walker and Boyne 2006; Moynihan and Pandey 2005; see also Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001; although see Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003). This lack of attention to the effect of management on workers is puzzling because in order to understand the effect of management on performance, we need to understand its effect on workers since the workers are ultimately responsible for those work outcomes that comprise organizational performance.

Therefore, in order to understand the effect of management on performance—or *how* management affects performance—we need to focus on the relationship between management and the workers. One of the core functions of management is human resources management (Daley 2005). Human resources management involves determining how to fulfill workplace needs, acquiring the necessary people, developing their skills, and motivating and rewarding employees (Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003). Essentially, human resources management is about the hiring, improvement, and motivation of employees. Human capital is one of the most significant resources an organization has and its effective management positively influences organizational performance (Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003; Daley 2005).

The literature tells us that the management of human capital matters for performance. However, we know little about its effect on those being managed. If we

want to fully understand the interaction between management and work outcomes, we need to focus on the missing link—the workers. Thus, in determining *how* management matters, the question becomes, what effect does management have on workers?

To answer this question, I focus on the effect of management on the turnover of street level. Turnover is highly correlated with job satisfaction and job satisfaction is essential to organizational effectiveness and performance. When job satisfaction is low, workers are more likely to leave the organization. Turnover is considered to be mostly a bad thing for organizations and something that must be managed (Mobley 1982).

Management in this chapter is multilevel, where both top and middle level managers each affect turnover. This distinction is important because the effect of management differs depending on the level one is at in the organization (Riccucci 2005). The next section discusses the consequences and causes of turnover. This is followed with a discussion of the tasks managers perform that affect turnover and how a characteristic of the organization—organizational size—can affect the ability of management to impact turnover.

Consequences and Causes of Turnover

To determine the effect of management on workers, we can look to how management affects workers' job satisfaction as measured with the retention (turnover) rate of street level bureaucrats in the organization. Indeed, high turnover negatively affects performance (Meier and Hicklin 2008; Brill and McCartney 2008). Turnover is important because it leads to significant costs in terms of lost recruiting, interviewing,

training, and socialization investments (Mobley 1982). Turnover also affects the morale of the organization (Rainey 2003) and disrupts its social and communication patterns (Mobley 1982). Turnover disrupts an organization by taking time away from its core goals by diverting its resources—both of which has an impact on the effectiveness of the organization.

The causes of turnover can be external, organizational, or personal. External causes are beyond the control of the manager. They include the state of the economy, inflation, and the composition of the labor force. These factors do not determine who leaves or for what specific reasons. Instead, they are correlated with turnover as a sign of the economic times. Simply, when economic times are good, it is easier to find another job if one is unhappy with the current job.

Turnover is also affected by organizational factors such as the size of the organization, the size of the department, the job task, and salary (Mobley 1982). Organizational size affects turnover because larger organizations have more opportunities for advancement, more competitive pay systems, and human resources departments dedicated to turnover. The size of the department matters because of the sense of belonging, personalization, and communication that occurs. In this case, smaller departments are likely to have lower turnover. The characteristics of the job, which includes task repetitiveness, job autonomy, and responsibility, all affect job satisfaction, which affects turnover.

The compensation workers receive is a strong predictor of turnover (Mobley 1982; Moynihan and Pandey 2008; Selden and Moynihan 2000; Theobald 1990). More

importantly, however, is not so much the pay itself but satisfaction with pay. Satisfaction with pay is a function of how much a worker is paid in comparison to the area. Satisfaction with pay relates to cost of living; it occurs in areas where worker salaries are on par with others in the surrounding area.

There are other fiscal resources besides pay that influence turnover, namely the fiscal resources of the organization. The fiscal resources of an organization matter because an organization with more resources is more likely to provide supplies, training, and other resources that better enable workers to do their jobs. Resources for job training, technology, and even office supplies affect job satisfaction and satisfaction with working conditions, which affects turnover (Mobley 1982).

In addition to organizational and external factors, there are individual level factors that are associated with turnover. These factors relate to the level of satisfaction workers have not only with their jobs overall but with pay, the job, coworkers, and the boss (Mobley 1982). The opportunity for advancement and employee development affects job satisfaction, as does the way workers are treated by the organization generally. Job satisfaction is a reflection of worker perceptions about how they are treated by the organization (Moynihan and Pandey 2008). Managers are responsible for the working conditions that affect job satisfaction and thus turnover (Nigro, Nigro, and Kellough 2007). These conditions include establishing clear goals, providing advancement opportunities, and assigning challenging tasks to workers. Managers influence turnover because they can affect the individual and organizational factors associated with turnover.

Turnover and Management

Turnover is something that must be managed (Mobley 1982). Human resources management influences organizational performance because it affects the job satisfaction of street level bureaucrats. This is important to organizations because it heavily influences the effectiveness of an organization and effective organizations perform well (Mobley 1982; Riccucci 2005). So why look at job satisfaction and turnover? Some research argues that managers should not affect front-line workers' behavior because their behavior is defined in large part by organizational norms and shortcuts (Riccucci 2005). As such, to determine the influence of management on workers, we have to look at something managers can impact. Management does, however, have an impact on job satisfaction because, while management may not be able to affect what workers do, they can prevent workers from being dissatisfied with their jobs (Riccucci 2005). Managers, in how they interact and work with those lower in the organization, have an influence on job satisfaction and turnover.

As already noted, the most important factor associated with turnover is job satisfaction (Mobley 1982; Morrell, Loan-Clarke, and Wilkinson 2001). Job satisfaction is a subjective attitude about how the organization treats its workers. This includes satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with the opportunity for advancement, with the job (in terms of job support, autonomy, and challenge), goal clarity, and satisfaction with supervisors (Mobley 1982), all of which management influences.

Managers influence turnover in several ways. One way managers affect job satisfaction (and thus turnover) is by hiring well (Pynes 2004; Mobley 1982). Hiring

workers who fit with the organization goes a long way to ensure that the worker is satisfied with the job and the organization and has the necessary skills (both technical and communicative) to keep the worker in the organization. Moreover, managers are responsible for the professional development of workers. Managers can have an impact on job satisfaction by providing workers with the training and opportunities that allow workers to advance in an organization. Moreover, the support workers have from management (Parker 2002; Moynihan and Pandey 2008) also matters. All of these tasks comprise human resources management.

Another core function of management—budgeting—also affects job satisfaction (Donahue et al. 2004). There is a strong relationship between pay levels and turnover rates (Mobley 1982; Moynihan and Pandey 2008; Selden and Moynihan 2000; Theobald 1990). Moreover, the effective management of an organization's resources also matters because it allows workers to better able to get the job done. Managers have an influence on this factor because they are responsible for budgeting and distributing organizational resources, including worker salaries, raises, and certain necessary worker supplies (Gulick 1937; Mintzberg 1979; Donahue et al. 2004).

In addition to human resources management and budgeting, managers affect turnover because they are responsible for setting tasks and coordinating workers (Barnard 1938; Allison 1983; Gulick 1937). Managers determine the level of autonomy workers have. They can offer direction to workers by micromanaging or by letting workers have the discretion to do their job; the way managers direct workers affects job satisfaction and turnover. Moreover, the organization and coordination of tasks affect

the size of the work unit (the size of the worker's immediate work community) (Brill and McCartney 2008). In addition, managers affect the tasks workers perform because managers are responsible for setting the policies of one's organization (Selden and Moynihan 2000; Mobley 1982; Nigro, Nigro, and Kellough 2007).

Managers are also responsible for setting goals and motivating employees (Rainey 2003). Goal clarity is important to workers' job satisfaction (Mobley 1982). Managers have an impact on turnover by ensuring the goals of the organization are clear and in motivating employees (via either incentives or leadership or both). The tasks managers perform within the organization (i.e. internal management) affect the causes of turnover related to the nature of the job.

Multi-level Management

We would expect management to have an impact on turnover for the reasons outlined above. Human resources management, budgeting, internal management, and goal setting affect worker perceptions of how an organization treats them. However, the relationship between management and turnover is not so simple when we consider that governance systems are multilevel. In multilevel systems, there are managers at different levels who have different effects on an organization (Riccucci 2005; Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001). Thus, to really determine if management affects workers, we need to look at managers at more than one level and their effect on street level bureaucrats.

The influence of management on turnover varies depending on the managerial level. For example, managers at the top of the organization have more power over

budgets, especially salaries. This affects not only salary but also satisfaction with salary.

This may also affect money budgeted specifically for other benefits and incentives for

workers such as raises, professional development, new technology, etc. Upper level

managers set the goals of the entire organization and not just one unit and thus can affect

turnover that way. This leads me to my first hypothesis namely, that upper level

managers will have an effect on turnover. Specifically,

Hypothesis 1: Upper level managers will have an impact on turnover.

In addition, upper level managers have an effect on turnover through middle managers in

that they are responsible for hiring lower level (i.e. middle) managers and in determining

their power and autonomy in the organization.

Middle managers are obviously closer to workers since they are the workers'

direct supervisor (Mintzberg 1979; Barnard 1938). Since middle managers are closest to

the workers, what middle managers do is likely to have a more direct influence on

workers' overall job satisfaction with the organization. My second hypothesis is that

middle level managers will have an effect on turnover. Specifically,

Hypothesis 2: Middle level managers will have an impact on turnover.

Middle managers are likely to be better at motivating workers and ensuring that the

workers know the goals of the organization (and the work unit) and that the goals are

clear. Middle managers are responsible for human resources management; they

implement the professional development and training of workers and hire the workers.

In directing workers, they affect the tasks workers perform.

Organizational Size

This chapter hypothesizes that each level of management affects turnover. However, to better understand how management affects an organization, it is important to explore the conditions under which it may matter more or less. Organizational size may affect the importance of management. This is because larger organizations are more structurally complex, which increases the division of labor (Rainey 2003). In larger organizations, the selection and placement of employees and their training, socialization, and supervision are routinized through a specialized department like human resources (Williamson 1975; Barber et al. 1999; Aldrich and Auster 1986) whereas smaller organizations rely on management (Barber et al. 1999; Aldrich and Auster 1986). Thus, we would expect management to matter to turnover in smaller organizations but not larger ones. This leads me to my third hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 3: Management will have an impact on turnover in smaller organizations but not in larger organizations.*

However, in larger organizations the routinization of processes—the human resources division—still needs to be managed. Thus, management may still matter in large organizations (i.e. hypothesis 3 is not supported). If hypothesis 3 is not supported and management matters to turnover in both small and large organizations, then there is an additional hypothesis about the relationship between organizational size, management, and turnover. Specifically, for large organizations:

> *Hypothesis 4a: In large organizations, upper level management will have an impact on turnover.*

Upper level managers are responsible for putting into place and maintaining the organization-wide system of human resources. Thus, in larger organizations, if management matters to turnover, the upper level managers are the ones that matter.

In smaller organizations, the human resource function is still performed by management. Since there is less routinization of the human resources function in smaller organizations, management at both levels should matter to turnover. Specifically,

> *Hypothesis 4b: In small organizations, upper level and middle level management will have an impact on turnover.*

The purpose of this chapter is to not only to determine if upper and middle management affects turnover of street level bureaucrats but also how the effect of management may change depending on organizational size. In order to do so, the next step is to come up with a way to test my hypotheses about management, turnover, and organizational size.

Data and Methods

To determine the effect of management on turnover I require three things in terms of data. The first requirement is that the dataset have comparable measures of both upper and middle level management across many organizations. The second requirement is that the dataset have a measure of street level bureaucrat turnover for the same organizations. The third requirement is that these measures of management and

turnover exist for the same organizations over time so that I can establish causality between management and turnover.

With these requirements in mind, I use a dataset that focuses on the most common public organization in the United States—school districts. Specifically, the dataset includes information on over 1,000 school districts in Texas from 2000 through 2005. School districts are local independent government organizations that provide free public education for grades K-12. A locally elected school board oversees school districts, sets overall policies and budgets, and hires a professionally trained superintendent to manage the district. School districts have a fairly decentralized hierarchical organizational structure with a superintendent at the top, principals in the middle, and teachers serving as street-level bureaucrats. Those working in the school district organization are highly professional with certification in many occupations.

There is discretion at each level in the school district, with the most discretion at the street-level. Superintendents have the authority to establish district and school-level policies including the hiring and firing of principals in the district, budgets, and policies and programs. Due to weak teacher unions in Texas, principals have the ability to hire and fire teachers. For their part, teachers have the ability to leave at the end of the year for any reason. The average district turnover is 17% per year with a standard deviation of 8.18. Annual turnover rates range from 0 to 100%.[19] Although the average turnover for school districts is slightly higher than the turnover rate for the U.S. federal

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[19] This district had only four teachers.

government (16.1%), it is still similar to turnover rates in other public organizations (Office of Personnel Management 2008).

The advantage to using this dataset is that it provides variation across organizations and across time as well. Texas is a diverse state and so too are its school districts. There is variation in terms of location (rural, suburban, and urban), racial makeup (multiracial to one race), income, and size (less than 1,000 students to more than 200,000 students). The average school district employs 533 full time employees, with a range of 6 to 29,711. Having data for the same organizations over time allows me to explore the relationship between management and turnover. Moreover, the dataset includes measures of management at both the top (superintendents) and the middle (principals).

Management

I argue that managers have an affect on turnover. Specifically, good managers will reduce turnover and bad managers will face higher levels of turnover. Since organizations have more than one level of management, to determine the effect of management on turnover, I need to consider managers at multiple levels. In this chapter, I look at upper-level managers and middle managers.

Upper-level Management

Superintendents affect teacher turnover directly and indirectly. Directly, superintendents set the goals of the district and ensure that principals have what the school, and by extension, what teachers need to do their job. They are also responsible for the school district budget, which has an impact on teacher salaries. Indirectly,

superintendents have an impact on teacher turnover because they are responsible for hiring the principals who are in charge of and in direct contact with teachers.

The measure of upper management is superintendent quality. This measure was created from the residuals of a model predicting superintendent salary. Superintendents participate in a competitive labor market where the market rewards better (i.e. quality) superintendents with higher salaries. To get at this managerial quality component, Meier and O'Toole (2002) predicted the logged superintendent salaries with variables that measure district financial resources, job size, past performance, and the personal and professional characteristics of superintendents. Values of superintendent quality range from -5 to 5, where positive values mean superintendent quality is high. This measure has been used to determine the effect of management on school performance (Meier and O'Toole 2002).

Middle Management

Middle managers in school districts are principals (Hayes 2004). They reside in the middle of the organization, between the superintendent and teachers. The tasks they perform are management tasks. They coordinate with the rest of the district (i.e. teachers, staff, other principals, and the superintendent), the community, parents, and students when making decisions regarding budgets, schedules, and the creation and implementation of new policies. They are responsible for hiring, evaluating, and the improvement of teachers and staff. They report to the community and district administrators on the performance of their school. They set the tone of the school, provide goals, and ensure that teachers have what they need (in terms of supplies,

information, and skills) to do their job well (Hayes 2004; Smith and Andrews 1989; Sergiovanni 2001).

The measure of principal quality is constructed in the same way as superintendent quality (see Meier and O'Toole 2002); I created a measure of middle management with a residual-based model explaining the average salary of principals in a district. There are two steps to creating this measure. However, before creating the measure, it is important that the idea behind the superintendent quality measure—that there is a competitive labor market for superintendents where good superintendents are rewarded—also exists for principals. Although not all principals participate in the market, there is a market for principals in the margins. These marginal consumers (i.e. districts) drive the market. Those districts that want to attract quality principals and identify them will create a market for principals that keeps the salary of all principals competitive (Schneider, Teske, and Marschall 2000).

The first step in creating a measure of principal quality is to model logged average principal salary. Average principal salary is used here because the unit of analysis is the district. There are four groups of factors related to the job that affect salary (Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1988a,b). These factors are district characteristics (such as the district tax rate, expenditures, and revenue), human capital factors (such as education, experience, and age), personal characteristics (such as race and gender), and past performance. Nine measures of these factors are included in the model predicting logged average principal salary.

The second step in creating a measure of principal quality is to predict and standardize the residuals from the model predicting principal salary. By standardizing, the residuals are converted to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The standardized residuals range from -3 to 3 where a value of 0 is average. Negative values are associated with below average middle manager quality and positive values are associated with above average middle manager quality. Because both principal quality and superintendent quality are standardized, they are directly comparable. The management quality variables allow me to determine the effect of management at multiple levels on turnover.

Turnover

Management affects both voluntary and involuntarily turnover. The assumption is that good managers would not need to fire workers (because they hired good workers to begin with) and that workers would not want to leave because they are satisfied with their jobs. High turnover signals several things. First, high turnover is a sign of poor hiring (i.e. bad management) in that managers end up firing bad workers, or workers leave because they are a bad fit for the organization. Second, turnover may be a sign that teachers are unsatisfied or unhappy with management. Regardless of the scenario, good management should decrease turnover while bad management should increase turnover.

To understand how management affects an organization, we need to determine how managers affect those who are responsible for organizational performance. In the case of school districts, these street level bureaucrats are teachers. Teachers perform the

work that leads directly to organizational outcomes. The measure of teacher turnover is the percentage of teachers who were not working for the district at the start of the current year but were employed by the district at the start of the previous year. Simply, this measure is the percentage of teachers who leave the school district in a given year. It includes all of those teachers who left for any reason. By measuring turnover this way, it prevents growing districts that hire a large number of new teachers from inflating the measure. Higher numbers indicate higher turnover.

Organizational Size

To explore the effect of organizational size on the effectiveness of management on turnover, I split the sample into large and small organizations. The number of teachers in a district ranges from 2 to over 12,000. I log this measure due to the extreme variation in the number of teachers in districts.[20] Large organizations are those districts that fall above the median value of teachers in the district and small districts are those that fall below the median. This allows me to compare the effect of management on turnover in small and large organizations.

Control Variables

It is possible that turnover in one year will affect turnover the next year. For example, a district with bad management brings in new managers to improve things Those new managers come into the organization and change things by firing bad teachers and hiring new teachers. The next year, not many people may have to be let go. In this example, high turnover one year may mean lower turnover the next year, and

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[20] The average number of teachers in a district is 270 with a standard deviation of 750.

even lower turnover the next year as managers learn how to hire well and bad teachers leave. To control for this, I include a lagged measure of teacher turnover in the model. In addition, because of the time series nature of the data, I include dummy variables for individual years.

As previously mentioned, there are other factors besides management that affect turnover. I include measures of these factors to control for their effect on turnover. The measures fall into three categories. The first category includes fiscal resources. Fiscal resources are important because they determine teacher salary and the resources available to teachers in the classroom. These measures are the average teacher salary in the district and the amount of money spent per student on instructional spending. In addition to salary and resources, the work environment outside of the organization matters. If there are jobs available to teachers outside the organization that pay more, teachers may be more willing to leave the organization. To account for this, I include a measure of the median family income for the district. For these three measures, the relationship with turnover should be negative.

A second category of factors is characteristics related to job satisfaction. In addition to the resources available to teachers in the classroom, job satisfaction relates to job support, the challenge of the job, and the autonomy workers have. Job support is measured with average class size and the number of teacher's aides per 100 students. Smaller classes allow teachers to have more personal contact with their students and makes class discipline easier. Teacher's aides support teachers in doing their job by providing an extra person in the classroom to ensure students get one-on-one attention,

to limit in-class disruption by students, and generally make teaching easier. Moreover, having a large bureaucracy to deal with administrative tasks allows teachers to focus on their teaching instead of spending time on paperwork. Conversely, a large bureaucracy may create more work for teachers in that larger bureaucracies are more likely to have formal and bureaucratic procedures (Blau 1972). To control for the size of bureaucracy, I include a measure of the number of bureaucrats per 100 students.

In addition to the effect of job support on job satisfaction, a job where there is a sense of accomplishment that comes from making a difference in students' lives matters. Student diversity in regards to race and class present teachers with a challenge in that they have to find effective ways of teaching students who face obstacles either in the form of parents who do not stress education at home or health problems that affect education (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Although teachers value a challenge, if a job becomes too difficult (or 'impossible'), job satisfaction is negatively affected. The job challenge variables are indicators of student diversity. These three indicators are the percentages of students who are eligible for free or reduced price lunches, the percentage of black students, and the percentage of Latino students in the school district.

Also associated with the challenge of the job is the experience of the teacher. Teachers with more experience will have ways of effectively helping students and so their job may not be as challenging. Moreover, the longer a teacher is in a district, the more ties that teacher has to the district and the community. Although the challenge of the job may not be as great, because of the connection they have with the district, experienced teachers will be less likely to leave. There are less likely to be dissatisfied

because dissatisfied workers would have already left the organization. This variable is the percentage of teachers in a district with more than six years of experience.

The performance of the district also matters. Performing a job well done brings with it a sense of accomplishment that is important to job satisfaction. Thus, teachers in well performing districts are less likely to be dissatisfied and leave the organization. Thee most salient performance measure in Texas is student performance on the state standardized test. This measure is the percentage of students in a district who passed the standardized test.

Results

The Effect of Upper and Middle Management on Turnover

Recall that hypothesis 1 posits that upper level management will have an effect on turnover and hypothesis 2 posits that middle management will affect turnover. The results of the model testing these two hypotheses are presented in Table 5.1.

The main variables of interest are the measures of management. The argument presented in this chapter is that management has an affect on teacher turnover but that the effects of management on turnover may differ depending on the management level. The results of the model provide support for hypothesis 2 (middle management) but do not support hypothesis 1 (upper management). Middle manager quality has a negative and significant effect on teacher turnover. A one standard deviation increase in middle manager quality decreases turnover by 1.66 percentage points. This is a large effect; principal quality reduces turnover by 11 percent. Conversely, the effect of

superintendents on turnover is not a significant predictor of turnover. Middle managers

have an effect on turnover and upper level managers do not.

Table 5.1: The Effect of Upper and Middle Level Manager Quality on Teacher Turnover

	Coefficient	Std. Error
Management		
Superintendent quality	-0.004	0.103
Middle manager quality	**-1.66**	0.175
Resources		
Avg. Teacher salary	**-2.56**	0.593
Median family income	**0.03**	0.007
Instructional funds	**0.001**	0.0002
Job Support		
Avg. Class Size	**0.647**	0.109
Teachers aides	**-0.071**	0.025
Ratio of Staff to Students	**-0.686**	0.182
Job Challenge		
% Black students	**0.074**	0.011
% Latino students	**0.022**	0.007
% Low-income students	**-0.032**	0.011
Avg. Teacher experience	**-0.678**	0.055
Performance		
TAAS/TAKS pass rate	**-0.127**	0.013
Lagged turnover	**0.257**	0.014
Constant	**25.58**	4.231
N	4779	
Adj. R-square	0.288	
F	102.71	
Root MSE	6.6115	

Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of teachers who left the school district.
Bolded coefficients are significant at $p > 0.05$. Coefficients for individual year dummies
are not reported.

The effect of the control variables on turnover is also notable. The factor with the largest influence on turnover is average teacher salary. As expected, as average salary increases, turnover decreases. Conversely, as the median family income in a district increases, turnover increases. This makes sense because teachers who live in wealthier districts may find another position outside the organization where the pay is better. Surprisingly, the percent of instructional expenditures spent in each district on students has a positive impact on turnover. This is because resources spent on instruction mean fewer resources for other important things such as teacher salary.

The measures of job support are in the expected direction. As class size increases, turnover increases. Larger classes make teachers' jobs harder. When there are more teachers' aides, turnover decreases because teacher's aides make teacher's jobs easier. When the size of bureaucracy increases, turnover also decreases. This is because teachers can spend less time doing paperwork and navigating the bureaucracy and focus on just doing their job. When teachers have job support, they are less likely to leave the organization.

The job challenge variables are not as expected. A challenging job is important for job satisfaction but the three main measures do not show this to be case. The percentage of low-income students has a significant and negative effect on turnover. However, the variables measuring black and Latino students are significant and positive. Oddly, while low-income students (and the challenge they pose to teachers) decrease turnover, black and Latino students appear to increase turnover. Perhaps for these

students, the job is too challenging. Last, as expected, teacher experience has a negative

effect on turnover.

The effect of performance on turnover is significant and negative. The effect of

performance on turnover is not very large. A one-percentage point increase in test

scores decreases turnover by less 0.13 percent. In regards to the lagged dependent

variable, the effect of the previous year's turnover rate on turnover in the current year is

significant and positive. This means that districts with high turnover in one year are

likely to have higher turnover the next year. This indicates that there are chronic

problems that the organization has not dealt with. This could be management related,

the challenge of the job, or fiscal resources. However, the model explains less than 30%

of the variance in teacher turnover. There may be other factors that affect turnover that

could explain why the relationship between lagged turnover and turnover is positive.

The Effect of Management on Turnover in Large and Small Organizations

As Table 5.1 demonstrates, middle management matters for turnover but upper

level management does not. However, due to the differences in large and small

organizations, specifically the routinization of human resource management in large

organizations, the impact of upper and middle management may vary depending on the

size of the organization. Hypothesis 3 posits that management will matter for smaller

organizations but not for large organizations. Hypothesis 4a posits that upper level

management affects turnover in large organizations and hypothesis 4b posits that both

levels of management affect turnover in small organizations. To test these hypotheses,

recall that I split the sample by the median to get large and small organizations and ran

the same model as discussed above. The results of these models are presented in Table 5.2.

In regards to hypothesis 3, management matters in both small and large organizations. In small organizations, a one standard deviation increase in middle manager quality decreases turnover by 1.1 percent. In large organizations, a one standard deviation increase in middle manager decreases turnover by almost 1.5 percentage points. With these results, I can reject hypothesis 3. Management matters to turnover regardless of the size of the organization. Given this, hypothesis 4a is not supported; upper level management does not affect turnover in large organizations. Hypothesis 4b is partially supported—only one level of management affects small organizations. In both large and small organizations, middle management has a significant influence on turnover.

There are a few differences in the results of the two models presented in Table 5.2. As in Table 5.1, average teacher salary has a significant and negative effect on teacher turnover. Median family income is significant in larger districts but not in small districts. This makes sense because in larger districts there are more external job opportunities if a teacher decided to leave the organization, in smaller districts there are likely to be less jobs for teachers to move to. Instructional funds have a positive and significant effect on turnover in small organizations but not in large organizations. I have no explanation for this finding.

Table 5.2: The Effect of Upper and Middle Level Management on Turnover in Small and Large Organizations

		Small		Large
		Std. Error	Coef.	Std. Error
Management				
Superintendent Quality	-0.123	0.19	0.093	0.090
Middle Manager Quality	**-1.142**	0.45	**-1.444**	0.162
Resources				
Avg. Teacher salary	**-3.616**	1.18	**-2.244**	0.489
Median family income	0.003	0.017	**0.037**	0.006
Instructional funds	**0.0008**	0.0003	0.001	0.0002
Job Support				
Avg. Class Size	**1.105**	0.209	**0.540**	0.098
Teachers aides	**-0.128**	0.041	**-0.037**	0.025
Ratio of Staff to Students	**-1.6**	0.37	-0.203	0.142
Job Challenge				
% Black students	**0.096**	0.022	**0.04**	0.009
% Latino students	**0.041**	0.012	-0.003	0.006
% Low-income students	**-0.058**	0.019	0.011	0.011
Avg. Teacher experience	**-0.644**	0.099	**-0.607**	0.055
Performance				
TAAS/TAKS pass rate	**-0.141**	0.021	**-0.106**	0.055
Lagged turnover	**0.208**	0.021	**0.388**	0.019
Constant	**35.69**	6.36	**22.54**	2.68
N	2283		2487	
Adj. R-square	0.2171		0.4850	
F	34.31		131.05	
Root MSE	8.6183		3.8536	

Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of teachers who left the school district.

Small districts are those that fall below the median number of teachers in the district. Large districts are those that fall above the median number of teachers in the district.

Bolded coefficients are significant at p>0.05. Coefficients for individual year dummies are not reported.

In regards to the measures of job support, as in Table 5.1, average class size has a significant and positive effect on turnover. Teachers' aides have a significant and negative impact on turnover. When the size of the bureaucracy increases, turnover decreases in smaller organizations but does not have a significant impact on turnover in larger districts. Perhaps this is because in smaller organizations, an increase in bureaucracy makes it easier for teachers to do their jobs whereas in large districts a large bureaucracy already exists and thus any changes in the size of bureaucracy do not matter.

The results about the importance of the job challenge variables are different for large and small organizations, except for the percentage of black students in the district. In both models, and in Table 5.1, the percentage of black students in a district has a significant and positive effect on turnover. The percentage of Latino students has a positive and significant effect on turnover in small districts but has no significant effect on turnover in large districts. The percentage of low-income students in a district has a significant and negative effect on turnover in small districts but has no significant effect on turnover in large districts. These results for small organizations are similar to those in Table 5.1 but in large districts the percentage of Latino and low-income students are not significant predictors of teacher turnover. Perhaps this is because in smaller districts the necessary programs and resources to help Latino and low-income students that are available in larger districts are not available in smaller districts. Thus, teachers in smaller districts face a greater challenge in teaching them. Moreover, as in Table 5.1,

average teacher experience has a significant and negative effect on turnover in both small and large districts.

The effect of district performance on turnover is significant and negative in both small and large districts. As in Table 5.1, this effect is not very large. For both large and small districts, a one percentage point increase in test scores decreases turnover by little more than 0.1 percent. Lagged turnover has a positive and significant effect on turnover in both large and small organizations, just as in Table 5.1. One large difference between the two models presented in Table 5.2 are the adjusted R-square statistics for the two models. The statistic for the model with small districts is 0.22 whereas the statistic is 0.49. This means that the model is a better fit for large districts than for small organizations. Recall that the adjusted R-square statistic for the full sample is 0.29.

Discussion and Conclusions

These results are contrary to what the public administration literature tells us about organizational size. Although in large organizations, the human resources department takes away the manager's task of staffing, professional development, and addressing factors related to job satisfactions such as opportunity for advancement and the job task, management still exerts an impact on turnover.

The findings of this study also have implications for what we know about public management and how it affects an organization. Different levels of management have different effects on an organization (Riccucci 2005) and in the case of turnover, it is middle managers that matter not upper level managers. In other words, by looking at

management at different levels, I demonstrate that managerial quality matters for turnover at the middle but not at the top. This illustrates the importance of considering multiple managerial levels when exploring any effect of management on the organization or organizational performance. Otherwise, we miss important information about the effect of management.

Accordingly, we need to be mindful of the big picture when looking at the effect of management. Specifically, we need to consider the structure of the governance system and how the levels interact with one another. Although there is not a significant direct effect of upper level management on turnover, there is an indirect effect of upper level management quality on turnover. Upper level managers are responsible for the hiring and firing of middle managers and quality upper level managers hire quality middle managers. Therefore, while middle managers have a direct effect on turnover, upper level managers affect turnover because of the people they place into middle management.

This study demonstrates that management, specifically middle management, has a negative and significant impact on worker turnover. Only one factor has a larger effect on turnover than management and that is teacher salary. Moreover, the effect of middle management persists even in large organizations where managing should not matter due to the routinization of the human resources management function.

Middle managers are crucial to the welfare of organizations. They have an effect on organizational performance (Brewer 2005) and within the organization itself. We know now how management affects an organization by focusing on its effect on

workers. We also better understand the effect of management on an organization by looking at management at different managerial levels and its impact on an organization. Moreover, by studying management in this way, we are able to understand not only whether management matters but how it matters as well.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Decision making is often studied in political science but the consequences of those decisions are studied less so. Perhaps this is because there are many actors and institutions involved in the political process. There are political institutions such as Congresses and parliaments, bureaucracies, and the position of the executive. Voters, legislators, political candidates, bureaucrats, and lobbyists are all actors involved in the political process. The study of decision making is even more difficult when we consider the political process as a whole. There are several stages in the political process. There is the initial stage where potential legislators are making decisions to positively influence citizens. Only by making decisions that have positive consequences can political candidates formally engage in politics. There is the policy making stage where legislators and institutions make decisions about laws and policies. And there is the stage where the decisions of bureaucrats determines how laws and policies are implemented.

This dissertation focuses on two sets of actors. First, it focuses on those actors at the start of the political process—the persons campaigning to become legislators—and the effect of their decisions on the electorate. Second, the dissertation examines the effect of actors at the implementation stage, namely the effect of bureaucrats on their organizations. In regards to political candidates, the results presented in the dissertation

find that candidate decisions affect voter perceptions of the candidates. In regards to bureaucrats, the findings of the dissertation indicate that middle managers matter.

Although the dissertation finds that the decisions' actors make within the political process have intended and positive consequences, it also finds that the consequences are not always what decision makers think they will be. Specifically, we see evidence of this in Chapters II and III. Candidate decisions to influence voters either backfired (Gore's appeals to Latino voters in Chapter III) or had negative consequences as we see in Chapter II when the candidates attempted to co-opt the other candidate's issues.

The dissertation also tells us that who the decision maker is matters when studying consequences. This is because there is rarely one decision maker and by omitting other decision makers, the true consequences of decision making may be missed. Therefore, it is important to consider other levels of decision makers. Chapters IV and V look at the consequences of multiple decision makers. The dissertation finds that the impact of management on performance changes when multiple levels of management are considered. Additional work on the consequences of candidate decision making can take into account other decision makers by incorporating campaign managers into the analysis.

In addition to highlighting the importance of considering multiple decision makers, the results of the dissertation demonstrate that outcomes depend not only on decision makers but on contextual factors as well. Context includes factors such as organizational size, the nature of the job, the structure of the organization, how good

other decision makers are, and organizational resources among other things. Context matters because although decision makers utilize the same levers within their organizations (i.e. expertise, resources, communication skills, staff, etc.), the effectiveness of those levers changes depending on context. This is demonstrated most clearly in Chapters IV and V.

However, the differences in context are also visible when comparing Chapters II and III with Chapters IV and V. The structure of the campaign organization is more defined than in school districts. There are differences in necessary expertise. In school districts, principals do a little bit of everything but in campaigns the job is more specialized (although this changes depending on the size of the campaign i.e. local vs. national). The external environment is different as well, which occurs because of different incentives. In Chapters II and III, a campaign is a competitive environment in which two forces (i.e. candidates) are working against each other to win the election. In Chapters IV and V, everyone involved, including external actors, is working together for a common goal—educating students. These contextual factors explain why two groups of decision makers, political candidates and bureaucrats, are less effective and more effective respectively.

The study of politics is the study of the decisions of political actors and the consequences of those decisions. As this dissertation shows, the study of politics is not easy or simple; there are multiple actors across and within political organizations making decisions within varied contexts. However, despite the difficulty, studying multiple

decision makers within varying contexts offers political scientists a greater

understanding of how and why we have the political outcomes we do.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1: Models Predicting Average Weekly Trait Perceptions of Bush with Individual Issue Ads

	Empathy		Leadership		Morality	
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
Traits						
Leadership	-0.016	0.062	0.011	0.010	0.017	0.038
Morality	0.054	0.060	0.106	0.189	**0.207**	0.043
Issues						
Taxes	0.046	0.046	0.111	0.072	**0.076**	0.028
Deficit/Surplus	0.006	0.026	-0.020	0.066	0.036	0.026
Education	-0.015	0.011	-0.018	0.022	-0.030	0.021
Environment	-0.061	0.077	0.138	0.125	-0.038	0.020
Health Care	0.033	0.040	-0.021	0.074	-0.008	0.029
Social Security	-0.030	0.026	-0.047	0.069	**-0.073**	0.013
Children	0.029	0.035	0.016	0.046	-0.016	0.027
Medicare	-0.042	0.053	0.062	0.102	0.035	0.037
Controls						
Republican Convention	0.087	0.036			**0.096**	0.010
Democratic Convention	-0.071	0.040	**-0.137**	0.055	-0.021	0.016
1st Debate	0.009	0.060	0.031	0.065	-0.008	0.027
2nd Debate	0.045	0.086	-0.012	0.092	-0.046	0.025
3rd Debate	-0.032	0.094	-0.029	0.151	0.072	0.038
Lagged D.V.	0.285	0.018	**0.354**	0.039	**0.269**	0.019
Constant	1.709	0.042	**1.86**	0.119	**1.89**	0.049
N	2286		775		2283	
Number of Groups	61		61		61	
Wald Chi-square	404.57		2092.80		1133.00	
Prob. Of Chi-square	0.001		0.001		0.001	

Note: Dependent Variable is average weekly trait perceptions of Bush's traits. Values range from 1-4. Method is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). Bolded coefficients are significant at $p > 0.05$

Table A.2: Models Predicting Average Weekly Trait Perceptions of Gore with Individual Issue Ads

	Empathy		Leadership		Morality	
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
Traits						
Empathy	0.301	0.542	-0.038	0.315	0.150	0.385
Leadership	0.001	0.104	**0.326**	0.072	0.016	0.071
Morality	-0.176	0.273	0.204	0.233	0.100	0.308
Issues						
Taxes	-0.073	0.056	-0.053	0.055	**-0.091**	0.037
Deficit/Surplus	0.124	0.082	0.023	0.089	0.057	0.102
Education	0.063	0.057	-0.004	0.062	-0.042	0.047
Environment	-0.037	0.049	-0.032	0.061	0.034	0.058
Health Care	0.037	0.032	0.044	0.034	0.043	0.026
Social Security	-0.007	0.069	0.017	0.098	0.022	0.070
Children	0.023	0.097	0.052	0.090	-0.017	0.084
Medicare	0.048	0.066	0.025	0.054	0.021	0.061
Controls						
Republican Convention	0.072	0.049			-0.020	0.044
Democratic Convention	0.047	0.050	0.128	0.038	**0.079**	0.040
1st Debate	-0.054	0.084	-0.026	0.091	**-0.170**	0.054
2nd Debate	-0.153	0.089	-0.095	0.092	**-0.122**	.048
3rd Debate	0.111	0.049	0.099	0.056	**0.098**	0.025
Lagged D.V.	0.213	0.017	0.274	0.039	**0.208**	0.016
Constant	1.966	0.042	1.769	0.081	**2.019**	0.040
N	2288		775		2287	
Number of Groups	61		61		61	
Wald Chi-square	3196.08		117274.44		6405.88	
Prob. Of Chi-square	0.001		0.001		0.001	

Note: Dependent Variable is average weekly trait perceptions of Gore's traits. Values range from 1-4. Method is OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). Bolded coefficients are significant at p > 0.05

Table A.3: The Effect of Middle and Upper Level Management Quality on Other Performance Measures

Performance Measure	Middle Manager Quality		Superintendent Quality			
	Coefficient	t-score	Coefficient	t-score	Adj.R-sq.	N
Latino Pass Rate	**1.96**	4.00	**0.30**	2.20	0.72	4461
Black Pass Rate	**3.26**	3.92	**0.73**	3.53	0.69	2963
Anglo Pass Rate	**1.04**	3.46	**0.29**	3.41	0.78	4719
Low Income Pass Rate	**1.62**	4.66	**0.32**	3.25	0.82	4762
Avg. ACT Score	**0.26**	3.44	**0.05**	2.52	0.54	3999
Avg. SAT Score	6.52	1.68	**2.59**	2.61	0.59	3206
% Taking SAT/ACT	**4.30**	5.69	0.18	0.89	0.40	4350
Dropout Rate	-0.26	-1.54	**-0.09**	-2.01	0.46	4556

Note: All equations control for logged enrollment, average teacher salary, the percent of teachers with advanced degrees, average teacher experience, percentages of black, Latino, and low-income students, the percentage of state aid a district receives, average class size, past performance, and yearly dummies. Coefficients in bold are significant at $p<0.05$.

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