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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

SYSTEM VULNERABILITY TO TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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To Professor Sarkesian and Dean Everhart with thanks

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty-five years, the security threat posed by terrorism has increased dramatically. In just the past fifteen years Americans have witnessed the U.S. hostages in Iran, the bombing of the American troops in Lebanon, the seizure of numerous hostages in Lebanon, the Achille Lauro incident, the bombing of the Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight over Scotland, numerous Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacks, and other terrorist events too numerous to mention.

These events raise several key questions. Why did terrorism increase as it did? Can national and international security measures decrease the threat of terrorism? Who are the targets of terrorism and why?

Purpose of the Study

Many scholars have written and researched such questions. Some of their findings are based on the assumption that democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism than other types of systems. In other words, many assume that some system qualities lend themselves to terrorist activity. If this is the case, then methods to combat terrorism must be developed with that in mind. If open systems are most vulnerable, then methods must be developed

to reduce the vulnerability while preserving the basic openness of the system.

The relationship between the system and terrorism has never been quantitatively examined. This paper will attempt to do that. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is a quantitative study of the system and its relationship to terrorism. This will be accomplished by first establishing definitions of basic terminology, then examining the relevance of the issue in the literature, next defining a systematic procedure for researching the questions raised by the literature, and finally, concluding with the results and analysis.

If this study reveals that open systems are more vulnerable to terrorism this would not be earth-shattering news. However, quantitative studies when and where possible are important. Face validity and assumptions, even if based on sound reasoning, are not sufficient when a quantitative study is possible.

In addition, if this study reveals that unstable or weak systems are more vulnerable to the political affects of terrorism than are stable or strong systems, regardless of system type, this will have implications for security studies. If weak systems are more vulnerable to the effect of terrorism, then international security arrangements to combat terrorism must include such systems and must be developed with them in mind. If weak open systems are most

vulnerable, this has particular relevance in the ever changing post-Cold War era where newly opened systems are already struggling with a myriad of security issues.

The potential implications demonstrate the importance and relevance of this research. A quantitative study of this nature is missing in the literature on terrorism. Such a study would, without a doubt, contribute to future research in the field.

This research will begin by first defining and identifying key components, second presenting the method of research, third, presenting the results of the research, and finally, fourth, developing conclusions from the research. Chapter One begins this process by defining and identifying political systems. Chapter Two continues this process by defining and identifying terrorism. Chapter Three identifies the links between political systems and terrorism and begins development of the research hypothesis. Chapter Four moves to the second part of this research by operationalizing the concepts and presenting the research hypotheses. Chapter Five takes the reader to the third step by presenting results and analysis. Finally, Chapter Six draws conclusions from the research.

Defining Basic Terminology

The focus of this paper then will be to analyze the relationship between the political system and terrorism. To do so, a basic understanding of terminology is required.

Before proceeding with the study, the meaning of such terms as "political system", "open system", "closed system", "weak system", and "strong system" will be defined.

What is a "Political System"?

The term "political system" gained prominence in political science during the late 1950s and 1960s. The term, however, as Spiro notes, can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan.¹ During the 1950's and 1960's, the height of the behavioral revolution in political science, the term "political system" replaced the term "state".

The behavioral revolution was, among other things, a reaction against the institutional approach to political science. The institutional approach focused on the legal institutions. For example, a state could be defined as a democracy based on the existence of an elected legislative body. Clearly, this was not a satisfactory approach. The term "political system" emerged during the behavioral revolution as scholars such as Easton and Almond sought to replace the term "state", a term tied to the institutional approach, with a term giving a wider understanding of the phenomena of politics.²

¹Herbert T. Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 164.

²David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953); Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman,

In addition to rejecting the term "state" because of its tie to institutionalism, the behavioralists found the term to be too ambiguous. In his discussion of this, Easton cites a 1931 article that found 145 definitions of the term "state".³

Finally, the behavioralists rejected the "state" concept because it was too narrow. The term suggests legal institutions or institutions which are legally founded.⁴ Further, the term has been frequently limited by applying the concept of governance of territory to it.⁵ Such limitations fail to address pre-state societies or societies that do not fit such a "legal" model.

Having examined the behavioralists rejection of the concept of "state", the "political system" concept can now be examined. An overview of three definitional variations will provide the basis for developing the definition utilized in this research.

Almond defines the political system based on functions. According to this approach, all political

eds, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

³C.H. Titus, "A Nomenclature in Political Science," American Political Science Review 25 (1931): 45-60; as cited in Easton.

⁴Oran R. Young, Systems of Political Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 2-3.

⁵C.C. Rodee, T. J. Anderston, and C. Q. Christal, Introduction to Political Science (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957).

systems perform similar functions and have political structures.⁶ Almond defines the term "political system" as "the legitimate, order-maintaining or transforming system in society."⁷

In Kaplan's definition of the political system, the system factor is emphasized more. He defines the political system as a subsystem that acts "as the ultrastable regulator of the larger system in which it functions."⁸ Like Almond, Kaplan emphasizes the order-maintenance role of the political system.

Spiro takes a much broader view of the political system. For him, "political systems can exist wherever the people are concerned about common problems and are engaged in cooperation in their solution."⁹ What is common to all of these definitions is a focus on the observable behavior and activities of the political system as a whole.

A political system can then be defined both by what it is and by what it is not. A political system is not what is commonly thought of as government. It is not simply institutions, such as the House of Representatives. The political system encompasses the political society in a much

⁶Almond and Coleman, 10-11.

⁷Ibid, 7.

⁸Morton A. Kaplan, "Systems Theory," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 161.

⁹Spiro, 172.

broader sense. A political system is, however, the process of politics. The political system focuses on the observable political behavior of the society as a whole.¹⁰

The term political system is used in this research for two reasons. First, the nature of the research requires such a term. This research will attempt to examine factors that exist on a broad scale across a society. It will attempt to examine the system level components that contribute to vulnerability to terrorism, not merely a system's institutions. Second, on a more practical level, the term "political system" has become generally accepted among scholars and as such employing such a term brings to mind a generally understood concept.

How are Political Systems Distinguished?

Having defined in general "political systems", it is important to define the specific types of systems. Over the years scholars have come to identify two types of system that can generally be referred to as "open systems" and "closed systems".¹¹ A brief overview of the literature on system typologies along the open-closed dimension will provide the basis for developing a solid definition.

¹⁰David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. x.

¹¹This, of course, is only one dimension of system type. Other dimensions exist, such as the traditional v. modern dimension, but these will not be analyzed in this particular research.

The definitions of the term "open system" fall under a variety of names. For example, Rummel uses the term "libertarianism", Small and Singer use the term "bourgeois democracies", Chan uses "political freedom", Dahl uses "polyarchy", and both Bollen and Gastil use "liberal democracy", to name a few.¹² Despite the diversity of terms, these various definitions share some common features as follows (see figure 1): political participation and/or elections, competition, freedom, and limited government.

Political participation and/or elections is the most common feature among the six scholars examined here. Though they all include some concept of participation, their concepts differ substantially. The divisions between these scholars can roughly be classified in three ways. First, some scholars emphasize the existence of elections. For example, for Rummel, political participation is defined in terms of the existence of free elections for the top

¹²R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 1 (1983): 27-71; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (1984): 617-48; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); Kenneth Bollen, "Liberal Democracy -- Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures," American Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4 (1993): 1207-30; Raymond D. Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom." Freedom at Issue 17 (1973): 2-23; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4 (Summer 1976): 50-69.

	Participation/ Elections	Political Competition	Freedom/ Individual Rights	Limited Government
"Libertarianism" Rummell	X	X	X	
"Bourgeois Democracy" Small and Singer	X	X		X
"Political Freedom" Chan	X	X		X
"Polyarchy" Dahl	X			
"Liberal Democracy" Bollen	X		X	
"Liberal Democracy" Gastil	X	X	X	X

Figure 1. -- Elements of System Type used in various definitions.

political leaders.¹³ For Small and Singer, a "bourgeois democracy" holds periodic elections.¹⁴ Similarly, political participation for Chan is evidenced by an elected executive and lower legislature.¹⁵

Second, some scholars emphasize the right to participate. For Dahl such a right is key to defining the system type.¹⁶ Bollen also sees the freedom to form and participate in political groups as a critical feature.¹⁷

¹³Rummell, "Libertarianism and International Violence," 1208.

¹⁴Small and Singer, 54.

¹⁵Chan, 630.

¹⁶Dahl, 67-90.

¹⁷Bollen, 1208.

However, the legal right to participate does not mean that individuals can actually participate in a meaningful way. As Huntington notes, popular participation does not equal popular control.¹⁸

Third, some scholars emphasize that participation and elections cannot be examined separately. They are elements which must be taken together. Gastil contends that elections should be examined in terms of the number of regional and local level elections. Further, for Gastil, participation goes beyond the right to participate or the percentage that participate (though he certainly considers these factors) to also include what exclusions exist in the system, both institutionally and behaviorally. Of the three approaches, this appears to be the most holistic.

Competition within the political system is viewed by four of the scholars as a key element with which to distinguish among political systems. Here again, while the authors agree on the component, the specific meaning of competition differs. For Rummel, competition is analyzed at the party level. How much competition is there among parties?¹⁹ Similarly, Small and Singer look for the

¹⁸Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 89.

¹⁹R. J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 3 (1985): 426.

existence of opposition parties.²⁰ In both cases the focus is on two-party or multi-party systems.

Chan looks at the competition element differently. He focuses on competitive nominations and the permissibility of political opposition. Political opposition does not necessarily exist, it is merely permissible.²¹

Gastil takes a different approach. While he does focus on the number of political parties that a system contains, this is not the crucial point in determining openness. He specifically addresses this issue contending "the existence or non-existence of multiple parties is evidence of democracy, but it is not absolutely conclusive."²² He thus leaves open the possibility that his "liberal democracy" can exist in a single-party system.

Freedom or individual rights is a third component found in system type classifications. Among those who use this component to distinguish systems some agreement exists as to the criteria. All three include a criteria for freedom of expression, though to varying degrees. Rummel and Gastil take the broadest approach as both add the

²⁰Small and Singer, 54.

²¹Chan, 630.

²²Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions," in On Measuring Democracy, ed. Alex Inkeles (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 29.

component of individual rights.²³ They view the ability of the individual to exercise rights as a key element.

A fourth component, limited government, is included by three scholars in their criteria for distinguishing between systems. Small and Singer require a parliament with either parity or control over the executive in defining a "bourgeois democracy".²⁴ Much like the institutional approach, this is based on the structure of the system more so than on the behavior of the system. Similarly, Chan emphasizes the need for a legislature with the power to check the executive.²⁵ For Gastil, the concept of limited government takes a different shape in what he calls a "defined sphere of government."²⁶ As with his other components, Gastil takes a very broad approach, less institutionally based than any of the other approaches.

Thus, six different scholars provide six different means by which to define the openness of a system. Of the definitions offered, Gastil's is the only one which takes into account all four factors. Further, Gastil's definition focuses less on the institutions and more on the actual

²³Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence"; Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," 3.

²⁴Small and Singer, 54.

²⁵Chan, 630.

²⁶Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," 20.

behavior.²⁷ His definition then fits well with the definition of political system presented earlier.

The term "closed system" in contrast refers to systems that lack the qualities of open systems. Closed systems limit participation and restrict competition. Freedom of expression and individual rights are suppressed within such systems. Further, they do not demonstrate "limited government". Generally, the legislative body, if such exists, is the weakest element of the political system with little or no control over the executive body. Closed systems, then, fail to exhibit the key characteristics of open systems in their behavior.

Throughout this paper, the terms "open system" and "closed system" will be employed, rather than any of the alternatives offered by the scholars above. These terms will be used for two reasons. First, the term "openness" does not carry with it the ideological baggage that "democracy" does. Further, as will shortly be demonstrated, much of the research that contends that system type is related to terrorism does so based on the openness of such systems in terms of their access to targets and the freedom of movement both into the system and within the system. Overall the term "openness" is broader than the term "democracy", carrying the connotation of involving more than merely the institutions of the system; for it includes in

²⁷Gastil, "Experiences and Suggestions," 22.

it a connotation of the whole system.

In addition to classifying systems as open or closed, systems can further be classified as weak or strong. The weak political system is constantly struggling to maintain control. If elections do occur, the results are frequently challenged, tainted by fraud, or controlled. Because of the untenable position of the governments in weak systems, individual rights may be suppressed. Such systems are neither entirely limited nor completely authoritarian. Various parts of the government struggle to maintain control of other parts. A precarious balancing act characterizes weak political systems, regardless of whether they are open or closed, as they struggle to achieve or maintain their legitimacy.

In contrast, strong systems have achieved legitimacy, either by force or by consent. Regardless of whether they are open or closed, the system itself is rarely challenged directly. In a nutshell, strong political systems maintain legitimacy and order.

Summary

This research proposes to examine the relationship between the political system (both its openness and its strength) and terrorism. It will examine what elements of the political system increase its vulnerability to terrorism. The examination will involve more than merely looking at the institutional structures. In distinguishing

between system types, the research will focus on the actual behavior of the system. Having defined what a political system is and how systems are distinguished, the terms relating to terrorism must clearly be defined. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING

Terrorist scholars have devoted a great deal of time and writings to defining transnational terrorism. They have tried to answer such questions as: What makes an act a terrorist act as opposed to a revolutionary or criminal act? What distinguishes a group as a terrorist group? From the past research and debate, a definition of terrorism based on the group's objective and the group's method emerges.

Defining Terrorism

The terrorist group strives to induce political change. Rowe describes the objective of the terrorist as:

. . . a form of coercion . . . to induce change in the control or responses of organizations, bodies or governments, vested with the power to determine policy issues.¹

His definition is directed at the association that the terrorist group is attempting to influence. By emphasizing the power and policy making aspects of the organizations targeted by terrorism, Rowe's definition emphasizes the political nature of the terrorist's target. Further,

¹Dennis Rowe, Considered Responses to Contemporary Terrorism in Democratic Societies (Chicago, IL: Office of International Criminal Justice, The University of Illinois at Chicago, 1988), 2.

terrorists want recognition in a political light, not a criminal light. Netanyahu notes that terrorists in jail want the same status of prisoners of war.² They themselves recognize and articulate political objectives.

A criminal group may seek power and may employ similar tactics as a terrorist group. Both criminals and terrorists take hostages; however, the criminal's ultimate objective and the terrorist's ultimate objective differ substantially. The terrorist ultimately seeks political change.

The political objective may be based on ideology in the sense that the terrorist may justify his actions based on his perception of an ideology. Much debate exists about this aspect of terrorism. One side of the debate sees ideology as an important factor of terrorism. For example, Cline and Alexander view left-wing ideologies as the fuel for terrorism.³ Similarly, Netanyahu claims, "Totalitarianism is the major ideological source of modern terrorism."⁴

The other side of the ideology debate views terrorism as essentially non-ideological. Becker contends that

²Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1986), 11.

³Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1984).

⁴Netanyahu, 39.

terrorism is "a method...not an ideology."⁵ Ideology, according to Crenshaw is functional to the terrorist. Ideology is "used to escape a disconcerting reality rather than to guide actions."⁶ Indeed, evidence exists to support the argument that terrorist groups lack systematic belief structures.⁷ Others see terrorists as primarily anti-statists who are more idealistic than ideological. Terrorists are, as a whole, idealists who seek to serve a higher cause.⁸ While terrorist groups are distinguished by their political objective, they are not necessarily ideological groups.

Not only does the objective defines terrorists, their method also defines them. Terrorist acts are not random (although they often appear to be). Rather, terrorist acts are calculated, deliberate, and systematic acts.⁹ Terrorist attacks are "premeditated", as Enders and Sandler note.¹⁰

⁵Jillian Becker, "The Most Important Question," Terrorism: An International Journal 4, no. 1-4 (1980): 316.

⁶Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989), 16.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Frederick Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Times (New York: Norton, 1976), 8.

⁹See Netanyahu.

¹⁰Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-

Not only are terrorists systematic in their method, their method focuses on innocent victims. As Enders and Sandler note, terrorists "often direct their violence...at a large target group, not immediately involved in the political decision-making process that they intend to influence."¹¹ Frequently, terrorists victimize third parties and innocent civilians.¹² Although the victims are usually innocent civilians, they are not random victims. Rather, terrorists chose their victims based on their prominence and their value to their country.¹³

Terrorists use innocent victims to achieve their intermediary objective of fear. Terrorists methodically use fear to achieve their ultimate political objectives. They design their method of choosing innocent victims in acts that appear random "to create an atmosphere of fear."¹⁴ Through fear they strive to change the public's attitudes.¹⁵ The terrorist does not seek to physically defeat his enemy; rather, "the terrorist seeks to

Intervention Analysis," American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 829.

¹¹Ibid., 829.

¹²See Netanyahu.

¹³Hacker, 10.

¹⁴George P. Shultz, "The Challenge to Democracies" in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986), 17.

¹⁵Hacker, 3.

demonstrate that his opponents are powerless to protect."¹⁶ To accomplish this, he only needs to diminish the oppositions' "authority and morale."¹⁷ Terrorists manipulate the public's fear using it as an impetus for political change.

In summary, terrorism is the systematic, premeditated threat or use of violence directed at non-military targets to inspire fear and through fear to ultimately achieve political changes. Terrorists are distinguishable from common criminals by their objectives and methods.

Identifying Terrorism

Terrorism is a form of political violence, but it is not the only form of violence used to promote political change. Other types of political violence short of war also exist. How then is terrorism distinct from other forms of political violence such as guerrilla movements and state terror? The victims targeted and the perpetrators involved make terrorism distinct from other forms of political violence.

Some scholars have lumped guerrilla movements and terrorists together. For example, Halperin identifies revolutionary and guerrilla movements in Latin America with

¹⁶Ernst Halperin, Terrorism in Latin America, The Washington Papers, vol. iv, no. 33 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), 7.

¹⁷Ibid.

terrorism.¹⁸ Other scholars struggle with classify such groups as the IRA and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Are they revolutionary movements or terrorist organizations?

Guerrillas and revolutionaries are not the same as terrorists. A simple distinguishing characteristic can be made. Guerrillas and revolutionaries primarily wage war on military forces. They attack other combatants, not civilians. Terrorists are distinct from guerrillas based on their victims.

McFarlane shows this distinction in his description of the terrorist attack:

The Nation is not in any immediate sense threatened. Attacks are short; they do not occur on a battlefield or in enemy territory; they are likely instead to occur in a city street of a friendly country. The adversary usually remains hidden and undeclared until after the attack.¹⁹

Simply put, terrorists violate the rules of just war by attacking illegitimate targets.²⁰

¹⁸See Halperin.

¹⁹Robert C. McFarlane, "Foreward," in Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism, eds. Neil Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986).

²⁰For an overview of "just war" see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977). For a counter position on the legitimate use of political violence see David Miller, "The Use and Abuse of Political Violence," Political Studies (Great Britain) 32, no. 3 (1984), 401-19.

State Terror, State Terrorism and Terrorism

As terrorism and guerrilla warfare are distinct forms of political violence, state terror and terrorism are also distinct acts. State terror and terrorism are distinct based on the perpetrator. State terror is the use of political violence from above, whereas terrorism is an "attempt by the powerless to exert control."²¹ They both believe that the use of fear will aid them in accomplishing political objectives. States, however, most often use fear to prevent change while terrorists use fear to promote change.

Further, state terror and state-sponsored terrorism are not the same. State terror involves political leaders "acting within or under the color of the law."²² State-sponsored terrorism is a subset of state terror whereby states use terrorist groups to promote their political objectives either internally or externally. State-sponsored terrorism is often difficult to identify due to the lack of clear linkage between the state and the terrorist group's actions. State terror, state terrorism, and terrorism are

²¹John M. Gleason, "Third World Terrorism: Perspectives for Quantitative Research," in Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, eds. Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 243; see also Hacker.

²²Samuel Hendel, "The Price of Terrorism in the USSR," in International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, ed. Marius H. Livingston (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), 122.

similar in their use of force and fear, but they are different forms of political violence. Terrorism is a distinct form of political violence.

Defining Transnational Terrorism

While terrorism is a distinct form of political violence, various types of terrorism exist. Roughly speaking, terrorism can be distinguished between transnational or international terrorism and internal or national terrorism. This research will focus on transnational terrorism because, as will be demonstrated later, this type of terrorism is viewed as a threat to both closed and open systems.

Transnational terrorism encompasses the definition of terrorism with further specificity. Terrorism is defined as "transnational" when it involves "participants, property, or territory from two or more nations."²³ Wilkinson uses the term "international terrorism". He defines it as an attack against the citizens and property of another state or internal terrorists acting against foreign citizens or property in their country.²⁴ "International terrorism" is that terrorist activity directed at foreigners.

²³Walter Enders, Gerald F. Parise and Todd Sandler, "A Time-Series Analysis of Transnational Terrorism: Trends and Cycles," Defence Economics 3 (1992): 305.

²⁴Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2d ed. (Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1986), 181.

An illustration will demonstrate the difference between these definitions. A car bomb planted by an Iraqi terrorist kills an Iraqi citizen in Jordan. Such an attack is considered a transnational attack because it occurs on Jordanian territory. It is not, however, considered an international attack because it involves two Iraqi citizens.

International terrorism, as defined by Wilkinson, misses a crucial aspect of terrorist actions -- the effect on their audience. In the above example, the Jordanian citizens are part of the audience. The fear invoked by such an act is not limited to Iraqi citizens. The Jordanians also feel fear and intimidation. The effect of the act is felt by citizens of another nation, not just the immediate victim and perpetrator. Transnational terrorism overcomes this difficulty by factoring in the psychological aspect of the audience affected at the location of the act. "Transnational terrorism" encompasses a more complete definition than does "international terrorism".

Summary

By clearly defining transnational terrorism a better understanding of the nature of the phenomena is achieved. Terrorism is not merely criminal activity. Terrorists commit their acts with a political objective in mind. Terrorism is not a form of warfare. Terrorists break the rules of just war by attacking victims. They methodically and systematically create an atmosphere of fear in an

attempt to manipulate the political system from the bottom up. Terrorism is thus both clearly definable and distinguishable.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Having defined what is meant by the term "transnational terrorism", we can now move on to the heart of the matter at hand -- the relationship between terrorism and the system. Are certain systems more vulnerable to terrorism? The literature spans three topics in the debate over the relationship between terrorism and the system: open systems and terrorism, closed systems and terrorism, and system strength and terrorism.

Open Systems and Terrorism

Throughout the literature on terrorism the argument is raised that open systems are more vulnerable to terrorism. Wilkinson contends that Western liberal states are vulnerable to terrorism due to their tradition of civil rights and individual freedom combined with an open media.¹ This basic argument is proposed by a number of scholars.²

¹Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2d ed. (Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1986), p. 303.

²George P. Shultz, "The Challenge to Democracies," in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986), 18; Dennis Rowe, Considered Responses to Contemporary Terrorism in Democratic Societies (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice,

To the basic argument, Bell adds that terrorism is a threat to the stability of democratic governments.³ He bases this on the view that democracies are more responsive to pressures from citizens. Netanyahu further adds that the rule of law in open systems inhibits "a powerful response."⁴ Terrorism, thus, may pose a threat to the stability and security of open systems.

At face value, the argument is strong: Open systems are more vulnerable to terrorists because they are open. Open systems provide maximum exposure producing wide-spread fear. In open systems, public opinion plays a greater role in policy making. Thus, open systems provide the terrorist group with maximum opportunity to achieve the goals. This

The University of Illinois at Chicago, 1988); Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1984); Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold, "Democracy Under Attack," in Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism, ed. Neil Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986); Frederick Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Times (New York: Norton, 1976); Edward F. Mickolus and Edward Heyman, "ITERATE: Monitoring Transnational Terrorism," in Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, ed. Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981); Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981); For an overview of this argument, see Peter C. Sederberg, "Terrorism and Democracy," in Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality, ed. Peter C. Sederberg (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989).

³J. Bower Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978), 106.

⁴Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1986), 6.

argument, of course, assumes that the terrorist is a rational individual who attempts to maximize benefits while minimizing costs. It also assumes that the transnational terrorist can achieve his ultimate political objective through an open system and that closed systems can deal with terrorism more effectively.

In response to this widely held view, Dror argues that while democracies may be vulnerable to terrorist incidents, they are able to successfully handle the adverse effects of terrorism.⁵ Specifically, Dror argues:

Few Western democracies have stumbled or faltered because of terrorism...No central policy...[has been] abandoned to accommodate terrorist demands. The...costs and...inconveniences of protecting targets...seem bearable....The human costs of terrorism are small.⁶

Further, open systems usually enjoy greater legitimacy, further strengthening the system. So, while open systems may be vulnerable to a higher number of terrorist incidents, the systems themselves are not necessarily vulnerable to the destabilizing affects of terrorism.

Closely tied to the open system vulnerability perspective is the international conspiracy perspective. This position was particularly widespread during the Cold War, but still retains a following in this post-Cold War

⁵Yehezkel Dror, "Terrorism as a Challenge to the Democratic Capacity to Govern," in Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The consequences of political violence, ed. Martha Crenshaw (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983).

⁶Ibid., 70-71.

era. The conspiracy perspective takes the open system vulnerability argument a step further. Not only do the proponents of this idea contend that open systems are more vulnerable, they also contend that terrorist groups particularly target open systems.

Within this perspective varying degrees exist. Authors such as Shultz claim that whenever terrorism occurs it attacks democracies by attacking democratic norms and principles.⁷ Others contend that an international terrorist network particularly targets the United States and its allies.⁸ During the Cold War, some advocates of this perspective viewed the Soviet Union as the force behind such a network. Today, some of these same advocates view Islamic fundamentalism as the force behind the network of terrorism.

The conspiracy advocates generally give two reasons to support their perspective. First, during the Cold War some contended that the Soviet Union sponsored and controlled international terrorism. To support his claim of such sponsorship, Wilkinson points out that terrorist organizations used Soviet weapons and the evidence of

⁷Shultz, 18.

⁸See Netanyahu; Cline and Alexander; Shultz; Becker; James Berry Motley, "Target America: The Undeclared War," in Fighting Back: Winning the War against Terrorism, eds. Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986); Alex Peter Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases and Literature (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983); Livingstone and Arnold; and Wilkinson.

training activities for terrorists within the Soviet Union and its allies.⁹ Cline and Alexander cited evidence of support for terrorist organizations by what they term "surrogates" of the Soviet Union, including Bulgaria, Cuba, East Germany, and Vietnam.¹⁰

Others took the Soviet conspiracy notion even further charging that the Soviet Union was using terrorism as a form of warfare against the West. Livingstone and Arnold contended that "World War III has already begun."¹¹ McFarlane asserted that the way to fight terrorism was by "persuading the Soviet Union and its allies to stop using support for low-level violence as an instrument of warfare against the West." (Italics added)¹²

While evidence exists to support this contention, evidence also exists to counter such claims. Sederberg, Crenshaw, and Golan offer the strongest such evidence. Sederberg and Golan both note that open societies are not the only victims of terrorism.¹³ Specifically, Golan cites

⁹See Wilkinson.

¹⁰Cline and Alexander, 6.

¹¹Livingstone and Arnold, 2-3.

¹²Robert C. McFarlane, "Foreward," in Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism, eds. Neil Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. x.

¹³Peter C. Sederberg, "International Terrorist Conspiracies," in Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality, ed. Peter C. Sederberg (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989), 110; Galia Golan, Gorbachev's "New

the example of Soviet citizens kidnapped in Beirut in October 1985.¹⁴ Crenshaw takes a different approach, contending that linking financial and logistic support to control of actions of groups is difficult to assess. She argues that state affiliation does not equal state control of a terrorist group.¹⁵

The second reason given for a conspiracy perspective is the contention that the targets of the conspiracy are the democratic societies of the West because of the ideological threat they pose to the ideologies of the terrorists.¹⁶ Advocates of this argument primarily link terrorism with left-wing ideologies.¹⁷ Further, they contend that Marxist-Leninist ideology justifies terrorism. Cline and Alexander assert:

To a greater and lesser extent, the founders [of communism] all advocated employing confrontation tactics -- including terrorism -- for achieving Communist aims.¹⁸

To support this assertion, Cline and Alexander cite Marx,

Thinking" on Terrorism (New York: Praeger, 1990).

¹⁴Golan, 85.

¹⁵Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 12.

¹⁶See Alexander and Cline; and Netanyahu.

¹⁷Recently, some scholars have shifted their focus to right-wing ideologies that are associated with Islamic fundamentalism.

¹⁸Cline and Alexander, 9-10.

Lenin, Trotsky, and Krushchev.¹⁹ They call Soviet Communism the "philosophical justification of violence."²⁰

In contrast to this argument, several authors cite evidence of a different Soviet attitude towards terrorism. Some contend that Marxist-Leninist thought does not justify terrorism. Rather, it condemns the use of terrorism by individuals. Revolution by classes is the only justified violence.²¹ Laqueur notes that the Soviet's have presented a negative attitude towards terrorism. The Soviets, however, made exceptions; they viewed terrorism as "legitimate in national liberation movements."²²

Others contend that the Soviets have not held a consistent ideologically based position on terrorism. Crenshaw cites the Soviet responses to the 1985 Achille Lauro incident and the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya as evidence of a changed attitude. In the Achille Lauro incident the Soviets called the U.S. anger "understandable and just" and called for the punishment of Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) terrorists. In the bombing of Libya, the Soviets did not warn Libya of the impending attack and they did not give Libya the military assistance they

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid, 12.

²¹Walter Laqueur, "Foreward," in Gorbachev's "New Thinking" On Terrorism, by Galia Golan (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. viii.

²²Ibid, p. vii.

requested.²³

Golan contends that the Soviet policy towards terrorism changed over time becoming less supportive. As evidence of the change in Soviet policy towards terrorism, Golan cites pressure by the Soviets on terrorist groups to seek political settlements beginning in 1986 and a new willingness to cooperate to combat terrorism.²⁴ Such a body of evidence countering the contentions of the conspiracy perspective cannot be ignored.

Closed Systems and Terrorism

Most of the literature on terrorism supports the notion that closed systems are less vulnerable to terrorism than are open systems. Closed systems are less vulnerable because of the closed nature of the societies. Most closed systems employ tight security within the country and closed borders. Further, they strictly control the media.²⁵ As Wilkinson notes, closed systems "can ensure that news of any attack is suppressed."²⁶ Such arguments are closely tied to the arguments previously noted in support of open system vulnerability to terrorism.

While a great deal of literature exists to support

²³Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 32-34.

²⁴Golan, p. xvi.

²⁵Sederberg, "Terrorism and Democracy," 162.

²⁶Wilkinson, 104.

open system vulnerability to terrorism, some literature does exist to support closed system vulnerability to terrorism. Such arguments are based on identifying "vulnerability" in terms of the political effects, not based on the number of incidents. Horowitz presents such a view. He contends that terrorism is most damaging to totalitarian regimes because of an increased chance of disrupting the government process.²⁷ Closed systems, therefore, attempt to decrease this vulnerability to terrorism through their control mechanisms.

Crenshaw asserts that closed systems are vulnerable to terrorism since terrorists do sometimes target them. As examples, Crenshaw cites the 1985 kidnapping of Soviet officials in Beirut and the 1986 hijacking of an Iraqi airliner.²⁸ Golan cites similar examples, as was previously noted. As interesting as this argument is, the literature seems to support the conclusion that open systems experience increased vulnerability to terrorism.

System Strength and Terrorism

Having examined the relationship between the system type and vulnerability to terrorism, our attention must turn

²⁷Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Routinization of Terrorism and Its Unanticipated Consequences," in Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The consequences of political violence, ed. Martha Crenshaw (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 41.

²⁸Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 20.

to the relationship between system strength and terrorism. Evidence in the literature suggests that system openness may not be sufficient to understand system vulnerability. Some scholars contend that regardless of system openness, weak systems are more vulnerable to terrorism.²⁹ Dror argues that weak democracies are the most vulnerable systems.³⁰ Sederberg takes this further arguing that any weak state is vulnerable, regardless of system openness.³¹

Crenshaw argues that third world regimes, which are frequently weak systems, are more vulnerable to change due to terrorism whether they are democratic or authoritarian.³² As evidence, Crenshaw cites a number of regimes that fell after spurts of terrorism, including Nicaragua, Iran, Uruguay and Argentina.³³ Cline and Alexander add to this view of weak system vulnerability contending that Americans are most at risk in regions with ongoing revolutions.³⁴ Any system with ongoing revolutions is anything but stable and strong.

Not only does Sederberg argue that weak systems are

²⁹Wilkinson, 83; See also Dror; Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation.

³⁰Dror, 71.

³¹Sederberg, "Terrorism and Democracy," 162.

³²Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Cline and Alexander, 1.

vulnerable, he further argues that strong democracies are the least vulnerable to terrorism because of their openness, rules of law, and representative institutions. These all combine to "ensure legitimacy of the state."³⁵ This leads to isolation of terrorists who then fail to gain public support for their political objectives. Crenshaw supports such a view, contending that terrorism has not weakened established liberal states.³⁶ This position is in contradiction to the open system vulnerability perspective previously discussed.

System vulnerability to terrorism based on type narrows down to two basic propositions. Weak systems are more vulnerable to the internal political effects of terrorism than are strong systems, regardless of system openness. Strong, open systems are least vulnerable to the internal political effects of terrorism.

Summary

The conflicting literature on the relationship between the system and vulnerability to terrorism demonstrates the necessity of a systematic, empirical study. On the one hand, some scholars contend that open systems are more vulnerable to transnational terrorism than closed systems due to nature of the system. On the other hand,

³⁵Sederberg, "Terrorism and Democracy," 162.

³⁶Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 21.

scholars argue that closed systems are more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Still other scholars question whether the issue is merely one of system type, suggesting, rather, that the system strength is key to understanding the vulnerability of a system. Such conflicting views necessitate further empirical study.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRORISM AND THE SYSTEM:

HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODS

To understand transnational terrorism at a system level, the relationship between the system and terrorism will be examined systematically through quantitative research. The literature suggests four general concepts necessary for an understanding of such a relationship: the type of system, the stability of the system, the strength of the system and the level of transnational terrorism. In this chapter, these four concepts will be operationalized, the research hypotheses will be formed and the method for analyzing the relationship will be developed.

Operationalizing the Concepts

To analyze the relationship between political systems and transnational terrorism, this research project requires variables for the incidents of transnational terrorism, the system type, the system strength, and the system stability. In the process of operationalizing the concepts, sources of data must also be identified.

Measuring Terrorism

The terrorism variable will be measured using the ITERATE2 data set.¹ The ITERATE2 data set includes information on the number of transnational incidents per year that began in a given country (INCIDENT). ITERATE2 includes data from 1968 - 1977 and contains information on 3,329 incidents of terrorism.

The ITERATE data sets were created to analyze terrorist incidents at a global level. The key name behind the ITERATE projects is Edward Mickolus, a former analyst for the CIA.² The data sets are based on a content analysis of more than 200 separate sources. Of those 200 sources, seven are key to ITERATE, as follows: AP, UPI, Reuter tickers, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Washington Times and the Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Daily Reports.³

¹Edward F. Mickolus, International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-1977 (ITERATE2) (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1982).

²Three ITERATE data sets now exist: ITERATE2 (1968-1977), ITERATE3 (1978-1987), and ITERATE4 (1988-1993); see Walter Enders, Gerald F. Parise and Todd Sandler, "A Time-Series Analysis of Transnational Terrorism: Trends and Cycles," Defence Economics 3 (1992): 305-20; Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis," American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 829-44. Only ITERATE2 is available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

³Enders and Sandler, 833.

The major drawback of data sets, such as ITERATE2, is their reliance on publicly reported incidents. This may not be a complete source of information, especially in closed systems. As Burgess and Lawton note,

If important aspects...are not public and do not appear in the public press, then the validity of the model can be called into question.⁴

Thus, events based data sets can pose significant validity problems. Reliance on limited sources of information can create a source bias in such data sets threatening the validity.⁵ Further, research has demonstrated that reliance on a single data source is inappropriate.⁶

Both the number of sources and the validity of the major sources used by ITERATE2 increase the validity of the data set.⁷ ITERATE2 is based on over 200 sources of data,

⁴Philip M. Burgess and Raymond W. Lawton, "Evaluating Events Data: Problems of Conception, Reliability, and Validity," in International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood and Richard A. Skinner (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), 111.

⁵See Alex Peter Schmid (1983), Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases and Literature (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983); M.D. Carpinì and B.A. Williams, "Television and Terrorism: Patterns of Presentation and Occurrence, 1969-1980," Western Political Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1987): 45-64; and Burgess and Lawton.

⁶J.H. Sigler, "Reliability Problems in the Measurement of International Events in the Elite Press," in Applications of Events Data Analysis, ed. J.H. Sigler, J.O. Field and M.L. Adelman (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).

⁷Using multiple sources increases validity of data. See Robert W. Jackman and William A. Boyd, "Multiple Sources

including regional data sources. This large number of sources reduces the bias that reliance on a single source creates. In addition, inclusion of regional sources to supplement global sources increases the validity of the data set, though it does not eliminate the problem posed by event data in a closed system.

The validity of ITERATE2 is further enhanced by the major sources. The New York Times, one of ITERATE's major sources has been established as a valid source of global information. In a 1971 study, Gamson and Modigliani established the validity of the New York Times as a global source by comparing it to regional sources in India. They found that the New York Times recorded 97% of all events recorded by the regional sources.⁸ In other research, Burrowes, Muzzio, and Spector found that for events in the Middle East, the New York Times yields one of the highest percentages of events reported.⁹

in the Collection of Data on Political Conflict," American Journal of Political Science 23 (1979): 434-58; see also Schmid; and Burgess and Lawton.

⁸W.A. Gamson and A. Modigliani, Untangling the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).

⁹Richard Burrowes, D. Muzzio and B. Spector, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall...: a source comparison study of international events data," in Comparing Foreign Policies, ed. James N. Rosenau (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974). In other research, Sophia Peterson, "A Case-Study of 3rd-World News Coverage by the Western News Agencies and the Times," Studies in Comparative International Development 15, no. 2 (1980): 62-98, found that Western news agencies tend to underreport Third World events; while Burgess and Lawton found

In contrast, other scholars have called into question the validity of the newspaper as the basis for international events data sets.¹⁰ To counteract problems associated with reliance on the New York Times, ITERATE2 relies on other strong sources, including Reuter's and FBIS Daily Reports. Indeed, the FBIS "draws from hundreds of world print and electronic media resources and is the best single source of material on foreign coverage."¹¹

Other scholars view ITERATE itself as a strong data set that is based on methodologically sound techniques. Carpini and Williams state, "it [ITERATE] provides as accurate a view of the actual patterns of international terrorism as is available today."¹² Through its use of both local and regional sources, ITERATE2 employs the sound techniques to counteracts the U.S. bias.¹³

that they tend to over-report "English-language sources". See also M.D. Carpini and B.A. Williams, "Television and Terrorism: Patterns of Presentation and Occurrence, 1969-1980," Western Political Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1987): 45-64.

¹⁰Peterson, 62-98; R.F. Smith, "On the Structure of Foreign News: A Comparison of the New York Times and the Indian White Papers," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 1 (1969): 23-26.

¹¹Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis," American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 833.

¹²Carpini and Williams, 51.

¹³See Carpini and Williams.

Through reliance on numerous global sources supplemented with numerous regional sources, ITERATE reduces validity problems. All of the potential problems are not eliminated, for the data set is still only based on reported events, but it does decrease the amount of error due to poor data collecting techniques. Use of the ITERATE data sets as the source of data on terrorism will provide the best source available and, thus, provide a strong basis for obtaining the most valid results possible.

Measuring the System

Data on system type, system strength and system stability will come from Gastil's Comparative Survey of Freedom (1973-1978).¹⁴ The Comparative Survey was first compiled in 1972 and has been compiled annually since.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom is not a events data set in the same sense as is ITERATE2. The Comparative Survey of Freedom was developed in an attempt to "give the public a tool to place international events in perspective."¹⁵ Specifically, the developers of the survey wanted to provide a means to analyze the level political

¹⁴Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue, 18 (1973): 4; idem, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue 23 (1974): 8; idem, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue 29 (1975): 5; idem, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue 34 (1976): 15; idem, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue 39 (1977): 9; idem, Freedom in the World, 1978 (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1978).

¹⁵Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1978, 4.

freedom of a system apart from the fluctuations of the media. Gastil himself emphasizes that the survey was designed primarily to be a comparative tool facilitating analysis of the relative freedom levels.¹⁶

In the Comparative Survey, Gastil measures the level of political rights (PR) and civil rights (CR). He defines political rights as "legal rights to play a part in determining who governs or what the laws of the community are."¹⁷ In judging the level of political rights, Gastil focuses on the behavior of individuals and governments during and following elections. For example, he examines the such elements as extent of competition in elections, the level of replacement of leaders, and the participatory levels. Gastil differs here from others who have measured freedom or democracy. He does not simply count any participation as an indication of political rights, but rather his emphasis is on "rights to participate meaningfully in the political process."¹⁸

However useful a measure of political rights may be, political rights alone does not sufficiently measure freedom. For political rights to be meaningful individuals

¹⁶Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89, 7.

¹⁷Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1978, 7.

¹⁸Raymond D. Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89 (New York: Freedom House, 1989), 7.

must also possess civil rights. Gastil defines civil rights as:

...rights of the individual against the state, rights to free expression, to a fair trial; they are what most of us mean by freedom.¹⁹

As with political rights, Gastil focuses on behavior patterns.

Gastil contends that a subjective tool such as employed in the measure of civil rights is necessary. Merely counting the human rights violations can be misleading. A single case of a rights violation may be more critical in a small country than in a large country. Further, counting incidents does not measure the behavior. Finally, Gastil argues, a subjective measure of civil rights is necessary to balance the good behavior against the bad rather than merely focusing on the bad.²⁰

To compare nations at this level, Gastil utilizes a variety of sources including the annual editions of the Political Handbook of the World and the Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations. These two main sources are supplemented by press reports, background investigations, and articles from journals such as Foreign Affairs and the Middle East Journal.²¹ The information from these sources

¹⁹Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1978, 7.

²⁰Raymond Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89 (New York: Freedom House, 1989).

²¹For more information on sources of information, see Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1978, 9.

is analyzed by Gastil with a standard questionnaire that is applied to all nations. The information recorded on the questionnaire is then used to determine both the level of political rights and civil rights in a nation.

Gastil's Comparative Survey of Freedom has not been without critics. Criticism of this work has been raised at two levels. Ideologically, the Comparative Survey has been criticized as having a bias due to the close affiliation with Freedom House. Interestingly it has been criticized as having a conservative bias and a liberal bias²². In contrast, McCamant contends that "...the scoring does not have any obvious geographical or ideological bias."²³ In response to the criticisms, Gastil contends that such critics select pieces of information that fit their particular argument without looking at the whole context. Further, he contends that sponsorship of the survey by

²²Hartman and Hsiao (1988), p. 797; John D. Nagle, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Systems and Performance in Three Worlds (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1985); Adda Bozemann, review of Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1978 by Raymond D. Gastil, Orbis 23 (1979): 213-20; Richard F. Feen, review of Freedom in the World: Political and Civil Liberties, 1984 - 1985 by Raymond Gastil and Country Reports on the Human Rights Practices for 1984 by the U.S. Department of State." Washington Quarterly 8 (1985): 237-41.

²³John F. McCamant, "A Critique of Present Measures of 'Human Rights Development' and an Alternative," in Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO Strategies, ed. Ved P. Nanda, James R. Scarritt and George W. Shepherd, Jr. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), 132.

Freedom House does not equal control.²⁴

Methodologically, Gastil has been criticized for using subjective measures. Specifically, McCamant contends that due to Gastil's vagueness in operationalization, the Comparative Survey measures cannot be evaluated for reliability or validity.²⁵ Having said that, McCamant goes on to say:

Though the reproducibility of the scores is nil, the margin of error may not be too large. The data might be good enough to make crude correlations on a large sample...²⁶

How can McCamant claim that the "margin of error may not be too large" if he is unable to evaluate the data?

In response to questions regarding the validity of measures of democracy in general, Bollen conducts a series of tests on a number of such measures including Gastil's Comparative Survey. He finds that Gastil's political rights have the highest overall validity.²⁷ Further supporting the validity of Gastil's measures is research conducted by Banks in which he finds that Gastil's civil rights measures correlate well with the objective human measures developed

²⁴Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89, 79-80.

²⁵McCamant, 130.

²⁶McCamant, 132.

²⁷Kenneth Bollen, "Liberal Democracy -- Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures," American Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4 (1993): 1219-1220.

separately by Charles Humana.²⁸ Further, as Bollen argues, the subjective measures carry an advantage over objective measures because "they can gauge key traits of liberal democracy that escape detection."²⁹ Thus, research demonstrates that although Gastil uses a subjective measure, his results have a strong degree of validity. In addition, the Comparative Survey provide the time-series measure necessary to establish the relationship between the system and transnational terrorism. This being the case, the Comparative Survey provides a strong foundation for operationalizing the variables of system type, system strength, and system stability.

The system type will be measured using Gastil's measures of political rights (PR) and civil rights (CR). To operationalize the measurement of political rights and civil rights, Gastil uses a scale ranging from 1 to 7. To calculate the score, Gastil employs a four step method, as follows:

- 1) comparison of civil liberties, 2) comparison of political liberties, 3) balancing of these to establish the relative status of freedom, 4) establishing current trends in freedom.³⁰

²⁸David L. Banks, "Patterns of Oppression: A Statistical Analysis of Human Rights," Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association, 1985; see also Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide, (London: Hutchinson, 1983).

²⁹Bollen, 1210.

³⁰Raymond D. Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," Freedom at Issue 17 (1973): 20.

To receive a ranking of 1 in political rights, a political system must exhibit both the right and the opportunity for widespread participation in the electoral process, both in terms of voting and running for office.³¹ Thus, the most open systems have scores of 1. Tyrannies -- the most closed systems -- receive a ranking of 7 in political rights.³² Systems which hold elections but experience "coups, massive interference with results, or other non-democratic procedures" sit at the midpoint of the political rights rankings.³³

Civil rights are calculated following a similar pattern. Political systems receive a score of 1 if "freedom of expression is both possible and evident" and the "rule of law is unshaken."³⁴ These are the systems which are most open. In contrast, political systems receive a ranking of 7 in civil rights if criticism is rarely heard and if citizens have no rights. These are the most closed systems. Systems that provide some individual liberties, but such liberties are frequently suppressed or broad areas exist where free expression is illegal lie at the midpoint of the civil rights ranking.³⁵ Combined together, Gastil's Comparative

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid, 21.

³⁵Ibid.

Surveys provide a measure of the openness of the system, with the most open systems receiving a ranking of 1 in both political rights (PR) and civil rights (CR).

The political rights and civil rights measures have been found to have a great deal of collinearity, but, as Gastil argues, they are interdependent.³⁶ Therefore, to reduce problems of collinearity these two measures will be added together to build an overall score of openness (FREE) ranging from 2 to 14 with 2 being the most open and 14 being the most closed system.

System strength (STRENGTH) will be derived from Gastil's measures of political rights (PR) and civil rights (CR). The strong systems are classified as those systems at either extreme of the FREE scale (2 or 14) while the weaker systems are those in the middle. Gastil contends that those systems to which he gives a score of 3 are plagued by either "extreme threats to the state or unresolvable political deadlock" and, further, though there are elections for representatives, those elections are constantly being challenged.³⁷ These systems are struggling to maintain

³⁶Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions," in On Measuring Democracy, ed. Alex Inkeles (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 24; David L. Banks, "The Analysis of Human Rights Data Over Time." Human Rights Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 654-80; see also R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 1 (1983): 27-71.

³⁷Gastil, "New Criteria for Freedom," 20-21.

legitimacy and order; these are the weak political systems.

Further, examination of the classification of systems at the extremes (2 or 14) gives credence to utilizing the scores to measure system strength.³⁸ A political system with a political rights score of 7 and a civil rights score of 7 is governed through tyranny and complete suppression of individual rights. At the other extreme, a political system with a political rights score of 1 and a civil rights score of 1 is governed through popular participation and widespread individual rights. In either case, the legitimacy of the system is not under attack. Further, the systems perform their order-maintaining functions.

System strength (STRENGTH) will be classified as follows: (1) Very strong systems are those which have a FREE score of either 2 or 14; (2) Moderately strong systems have a FREE score of either 3 or 13; (3) Somewhat strong systems have a free score of either 4 or 12; (4) Somewhat weak systems have a FREE score of either 5 or 11; (5) moderately weak systems have a FREE score of either 6 or 10; and (6) very weak systems have a FREE score of either 7, 8, or 9. Thus, by manipulating these scores, the system strength can be measured.

Finally, the political effects of terrorism on the stability of a system (STABLE) will also be measured using

³⁸Ibid.

Gastil's measures. The literature suggests that systems become more closed over time as a result of terrorism. These political effects can be measure by analyzing the difference between the freedom scores of a particular nation from year to year. Systems which increase their combined score over time are becoming relatively more closed. Systems which decrease their score over time are those which are becoming relatively more open. Gastil's scores, then, will differ over time for unstable systems. For example, a system might receive a combined score of 7 in 1973 and a combined score of 12 in 1974. Such a dramatic change in the system demonstrates that the system has been dramatically altered in some way. In contrast, a movement from 2 to 1 may not demonstrate instability in the system. Overall, however, instability should be reflected in changes in Gastil's scores over time.

The empirical data discussed above will be utilized to test the research hypotheses over the period of 1972 through 1977. 1972 is the first year for which the Comparative Survey of Freedom is available while 1977 is the last year in ITERATE2. Further, a six year span should provide a good sample for making generalizations about the relationship in question.

Thus, two sets of data will be used to operationalize the proposed hypotheses: the ITERATE data set and Gastil's Freedom in the World measures. Both of

these sources of data have been found to be relatively good sources of data, both in terms of validity and reliability. They also both provide the necessary time-series data for operationalizing the stability variable. These two sources are the best available to examine the proposed research.

The Hypotheses

The literature underpins the three hypotheses to be analyzed. First, the literature suggests that open systems are more vulnerable to terrorism than closed systems. Vulnerability can be assessed in terms of number of incidents. The more transnational terrorist events which target citizens of open systems, the more vulnerable such systems are.

H₁: A lower Freedom House score (FREE) is directly related to the number of transnational terrorist incidents (INCIDENT).

Second, we expect to find that increased political instability will result from increased terrorist activity.

H₂: An increase in the Freedom House score from time₁ to time₂ (STABLE) is positively related to the number of transnational terrorist incidents (INCIDENT) at time₁.

Not only does the literature suggest a relationship between system type and terrorism, it also suggests a relationship between system strength and terrorism. Hypothesis 3 addresses this.

H₃: System strength (STRENGTH) is negatively related to the incidents of transnational terrorism (INCIDENT).

These first three hypotheses relate to the bivariate relationships. The final hypothesis draws these three components together into a system-level explanation for terrorism.

H₄: System type (FREE), system strength (STRENGTH) and system stability (STABLE) are related to incidents of transnational terrorism (INCIDENT).

These research hypotheses, then, attempt to determine the relationship between terrorism and the system. They take into account the system variables of system type - - open v. closed -- system strength -- weak v. strong -- and system stability -- stable v. unstable. These hypotheses should lead to a better understanding of the relationship between the system and terrorism.

Summary

Empirical research requires that concepts be operationalized and that research hypotheses be established. This chapter has specified how the key concepts -- system type, system strength, system stability and transnational terrorism -- will be operationalized. The hypotheses relationships between these concepts have also been established. The relationship between systems and transnational terrorism remains to be analyzed. This will be accomplished in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRORISM AND THE SYSTEM

Analysis of the research hypotheses was conducted in two steps and will be presented in that order. The first level of analysis involved separate bivariate analysis between the three independent variables -- FREE, STRENGTH, STABLE -- and the dependent variable, INCIDENT. The second level of analysis involved multivariate analysis of the variables. A summary of the results follows.

Bivariate Analysis

Bivariate analysis is accomplished through two techniques: regression and correlation. These two statistical tools allow analysis of the strength and the direction of the relationships between the variables. The results of the bivariate analysis will thus be used to begin to develop an understanding of the relationship between the political system and transnational terrorism.

INCIDENT with FREE

Hypothesis 1 suggests that a direct relationship exists between the system type (FREE) and the number of transnational terrorism incidents (INCIDENT). Thus, we


expected to find that systems with lower FREE scores would see higher incidents of terrorism. The results indicate that such a relationship exists, but the strength of the relationship is not as high as the literature suggests. Indeed, the results show an r of $-.29$ and an r^2 of $.08$.¹ While this indicates an important relationship, it does not indicate a strong relationship. Indeed, given the likely pro-open system bias in the data, the relationship is likely to be less than that exhibited here.

The plot of the data proves insightful into this apparent anomaly (see figure 2). What is quickly obvious from that plot is that both open and closed systems have cases with no terrorism or low levels of terrorism. This cumulation of zeros and ones pulls the overall regression line down. Further examination reveals that the highest incidents of terrorism are found in the open systems. Thus, this plot indicates that openness is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for transnational terrorism incidents.

To further examine the hypothesized relationship, a regression and correlation between the system type and the number of transnational terrorist incidents was analyzed on a year by year basis (see figure 3). Specifically, this was an attempt to analyze if the relationship changed over time or if a particularly high year skewed the results.

¹ $n=917$; Significance= $.00$.

PLOT OF INCIDENT WITH FREE



917 cases plotted. Regression statistics of INCIDENT on FREE:
 Correlation -.28678 R Squared .08224 S.E. of Est 8.07397 2-tailed Sig. .0000
 Intercept(S.E.) 7.81566(.64327) Slope(S.E.) -.60019(.06628)

Figure 2 -- Plot of INCIDENT with FREE (n=917)

Year	Correlation	R Squared	Significance
1972	-.26	.07	.00
1973	-.26	.07	.00
1974	-.30	.09	.00
1975	-.28	.07	.00
1976	-.32	.10	.00
1977	-.35	.12	.00

Figure 3. -- Regression of INCIDENT with FREE by YEAR

The data suggests that the relationship did change slightly over the years. Between 1972 and 1977 the correlation increased from $-.26$ to $-.35$ while the r^2 increased from $.07$ to $.12$. While the results may indicate a slight trend towards an increased relationship between system type and terrorist incident, overall they indicated continuity and consistency especially given validity and reliability problems with the data. In sum, the data mildly supports the assertions that open systems are more vulnerable to transnational terrorism.

INCIDENT With STRENGTH

Hypothesis 2 proposed that as a system becomes stronger, it sees fewer incidents of transnational terrorism. The results indicate that this is not the case. Indeed, as a system becomes stronger (closer to 1), it becomes more vulnerable to terrorist incidents. However, the relationship is weak at best. Based on 917 cases, the


results show an r of $-.09$ and an r^2 of $.01$ (see figure 4). However, as with the first hypothesis, the high number of zero's and one's pulls the regression line down. Though the results are statistically significant, the relationship does not appear to provide much by way of explaining the level of terrorist incidents in a political system.

Further analysis reveals some rather interesting results. Initial examination of the first plot raised the question: Is there any difference between the relationship strength and incidents in open systems and that same relationship in closed systems? To answer this question the bivariate relationship between STRENGTH and INCIDENT was examined separately by open systems (FREE less than or equal to 7) and by closed systems (FREE greater than 7). The results are quite interesting.

The relationship between INCIDENT and STRENGTH in open systems is a negative relationship, similar to that found overall (see figure 5). That is, as system strength approaches 1, transnational terrorism incidents increase. In contrast, the relationship between INCIDENT and STRENGTH for closed systems indicates that as system strength approaches 1, transnational terrorism decreases (see figure 6). In both cases the relationship is weak. Further, the case of open systems lacks significance.


Even so, such findings raise interesting questions. Among open systems, why are the strongest systems most

COUNT OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST EVENTS




917 cases plotted. Regression statistics of INCIDENT on STRENGTH:
 Correlation -.08530 R Squared .00728 S.E. of Est 8.39725 2-tailed Sig. .0098
 Intercept(S.E.) 3.88591(.59772) Slope(S.E.) -.42109(.16261)

Figure 4 -- Plot of INCIDENT with STRENGTH (n=917)



318 cases plotted. Regression statistics of INCIDENT on STRENGTH:
 Correlation -.13468 R Squared .01814 S.E. of Est 13.06490 2-tailed Sig. .0163
 Intercept(S.E.) 8.65905(1.45582) Slope(S.E.) -1.05752(.43770)

Figure 5 -- Plot of INCIDENT with STRENGTH for all FREE less than or equal to 7 (n=318)



599 cases plotted. Regression statistics of INCIDENT on STRENGTH:
 Correlation .13118 R Squared .01721 S.E. of Est 2.97195 2-tailed Sig. .0013
 Intercept(S.E.) .06144(.27702) Slope(S.E.) .23272(.07198)

Figure 6 -- Plot of INCIDENT with STRENGTH for all FREE greater than 7 (n=599)

vulnerable to terrorism? These are precisely the systems that should see lower incidents of terrorism. Among closed systems, why are the weakest systems most vulnerable to terrorism? The answer may lie in other variables not examined in this study.

INCIDENT With STABLE

The third hypothesis suggests that the stability of a system is negatively related to incidents of terrorism. As terrorism increases, we expect the stability of the system to decrease. Thus, systems are destabilized following incidents of terrorism. However, a system that experiences a terrorist attack at time₁ will not see the effects on the system until time₂. Time lags, then must be used to examine this relationship.

Since Gastil's measures are annual increments, years had to be employed in the time lags. Of all the combinations tried, the two year lag showed the most statistically significant results and even they were not significant (sig.=.41). Tests of this hypothesis employed only 585 cases due to emerging new countries during this period. Further, the number of years available for analysis is reduced by the lag itself. When a time lag of two years is employed, the number of years available to examine is reduced to four combinations, as figure 7 demonstrates.

Overall, the test resulted in an r of .03 and r^2 of .001. The plot indicates that the relationship between

STABLE Year	INCIDENT Year
1974	1972
1975	1973
1976	1974
1977	1975

Figure 7. -- Correspondence of STABLE year with INCIDENT year for a two year lag.

stability and terrorist incidents is not linear (see figure 8). Indeed, the plot suggests that terrorist events do not have a destabilizing effect on the systems in which they occur. Rather, systems with high incidents of terrorism frequently are the most stable systems.

This may be due in part to the manner in which stability is operationalized. For systems that have a FREE level of 7, according to the description provided by Gastil tend to be unstable regardless of whether they move up or down the scale. These are the systems that frequently lack legitimacy and cannot maintain order.² Further, only a move towards the middle is a destabilizing change. Movement towards either extreme solidifies the system. Finally, Gastil himself emphasizes that these are relative and not absolute measures; they are comparisons between systems in a

²Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions," in On Measuring Democracy, ed. Alex Inkeles (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991).


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585 cases plotted. Regression statistics of INCIDENT on STABLE:
 Correlation .03442 R Squared .00118 S.E. of Est 9.08429 2-tailed Sig. .4060
 Intercept(S.E.) 2.57571(.37643) Slope(S.E.) .20690(.24881)

Figure 8 -- Plot of INCIDENT with STABLE (2-year lag; n=585)

given year.³ Thus a change up or down may not signify a change in the specific system, but rather signifies a change in the relative status compared to other systems.

Multivariate Analysis: Explanatory value of the Model

Hypothesis 4 indicates that three variables, system type, system strength, and system stability, explain the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a political system. To test this hypothesis, multiple regression was employed. The results are summarized in figure 9.

Multiple R	=	.28
R Squared	=	.08
Adjusted R Squared	=	.07
Standard Error	=	8.7
Signif F	=	.00
F	=	16.77

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
STRENGTH	-.36	.22	-.07	-1.70	.09
STABLE	-.05	.25	-.01	-.19	.85
FREE	-.62	.09	.27	-6.78	.00

Figure 9. -- Multiple Regression results of FREE, STRENGTH, STABLE and INCIDENT (n = 585)

Overall the hypothesized system level explanation for terrorist incidents explains less than 10% of the variance.

³Raymond D. Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1988-89, (New York: Freedom House, 1989).

Indeed, the only relationship which appears to contribute significantly to the explanation is FREE. While explaining 7% of a heretofore untested phenomena is noteworthy, it certainly is less than was thought to exist based on the literature.

Because of the overall weakness of the STABLE variable, a second regression was computed using only STRENGTH and FREE as the independent variables. The results are listed in figure 10.

Multiple R	=	.30
R Squared	=	.09
Adjusted R Squared	=	.09
Standard Error	=	8.0
Signif F	=	.00
F	=	44.97

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
STRENGTH	-.42	.16	-.09	-2.72	.01
FREE	-.60	.07	.29	-9.09	.00

Figure 10. -- Multiple Regression results of FREE, STRENGTH, and INCIDENT (n = 917)

These findings indicate a slightly stronger relationship with both variables statistically significant. The overall picture, however, remains the same. The model does not explain much of the variance in either case.

Summary

Overall, the findings were a little disappointing. At the bivariate level, transnational terrorism and system openness are clearly related, but not as strongly as expected. System strength and transnational terrorism are only weakly related, with little to establish whether the overall direction of the relationship. System stability and transnational terrorism show no significant relationship. This could be the result of not operationalizing the variable correctly.

At the multivariate level, less than 10% of the variance in incidents can be accounted for by the three system level variables. Indeed, only the system type (FREE) contributes substantially to the resulting relationship. In both levels of analysis, the system type (FREE) proved to be the strongest variable.

The question then remains, "What does this all mean?" This question will be examined in the next chapter and will no doubt raise more questions than it answers.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of this project, an understanding of the relationship between the system and transnational terrorism was pursued. Specifically, this research sought to identify system qualities that lend themselves to terrorists activity. The literature suggested three system level variables that were thought to contribute the problem. The relationships have been tested and the results summarized. The system level variables analyzed in this research do not substantially contribute to an overall explanation of the phenomena of transnational terrorism. This result, however, does not mean that the research was in vain. This research has important implications for future research on terrorism.

The first set of implications relate specifically to the system level variables: system type, system strength, and system stability. The findings on system type indicate that too much emphasis has been placed on this variable. This emphasis was, no doubt, fueled by the ideological battles of the Cold War. This research demonstrates that the strong relationship assumed to exist did not exist, even during the Cold War period. Further, considering that media

control in closed systems is high, the data may underestimate the level of terrorism in closed system. If such is the case, then the observed relationship becomes more suspect.

The findings on system strength indicate that this variable is not a key factor. The relationship is extremely weak. Further, analysis which distinguishes between open and closed systems indicates that the direction of the relationship is different depending on the system's openness. This could be in part due to a bias in data used in this research. Even the best events data is skewed by the reporting of information. Future research should seek another angle from which to probe this relationship.

Finally, the findings on system stability demonstrate the problems of operationalizing this variable - a problem that plagues social scientists at large. Future research needs to re-examine the relationship between terrorism and the system by finding another way to operationalize stability. Further, other variables that contribute to instability should be controlled for in future research. Additional research should also compare the effect of transnational terrorism with the affect of internal terrorism; for transnational terrorism may not destabilize systems.

Not only does the research have implications that relate directly to the system level variables, it also has

implications for terrorist research at large. First and foremost this research emphasizes the need for more research. Researchers need to look at other variables that might have been confused for "system type." Such geo-strategic elements as ease of entrance (immigration policies), available distribution channels, and local support structures should be examined empirically.

Second, terrorist research in general needs to be more rigorous. Why has the assumption that system type increases vulnerability to terrorism not been examined in such a manner before? The assumption can be traced back over twenty years. The data used in this research has been available for fifteen years. Scholars assumed that system type mattered because it seemed intuitively obvious. As noted in the introduction, face validity and assumptions, are not sufficient, even if based on sound reasoning, when a quantitative study is possible.

Terrorism continues even today. Research on terrorism matters. Researchers must strive to increase the understanding of the phenomena. The need cannot be more urgent. The international community must find a means of minimizing the threats posed by terrorist organizations. The real urgency of this research lies at a level often forgotten by researchers: people's lives are at stake.

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I plan to pursue a Ph.D. in Political Science at Loyola University Chicago. I plan to continue research in international security issues with the ultimate goal of acquiring a position at a Ph.D. granting institution. At such an institution, I plan to teach both undergraduate and graduate courses in International Relations and Comparative Studies while continuing an active research agenda.

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis committee and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval by the committee with reference to content and form.

The thesis is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

12/5/94

Date

Peter M. Sanchez

Director's Signature