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Rhetoric at Work : A Discursive Approach to the Rhetorical Notion of Allegory

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Rhetoric at Work

A Discursive Approach to the Rhetorical Notion of Allegory

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1. Introduction

This study explores the rhetorical notion of allegory, based on the methodology of discourse analysis. Before beginning data analysis and discussion, this first chapter specifies the scope, objectives and methods of this endeavor, and outlines how arguments will proceed.

1.1 Scope, Aim, and Method

The topic of this study is the rhetorical notion of allegory, which can be informally sketched as a strategy of analogical comparison (a technical definition will be provided in Chapter 2). In order to make it easy to grasp the concept, let us look at the example below, taken from a science-fiction novel by Robert J. Sawyer, *Flashforward*. As an unintended consequence of a scientific experiment, everyone on Earth blacks out for two minutes, during which they experience a glimpse of their own lives a few decades in the future. After the incident, Michiko begins to believe that what she saw during the blackout was her future destiny and that it would be pointless to keep going along the fixed path of her life. Her partner Lloyd argues against this view, claiming that her life is still meaningful even if its course is predetermined.¹

(1) Michiko frowned. “I don’t know. I’m not sure. I mean, (a)what’s the point of going on if it’s all already fixed?”

“(b)What’s the point of reading a novel whose ending has already been written?”

She chewed her lower lip.

“The block universe concept is the only thing that makes sense in a relativistic universe,” said Lloyd. (Sweyer, *Flashforward*)

In response to Michiko’s pessimistic question (1a), Lloyd asks the same question in reply, analogically comparing the situation they are in with reading a novel (1b). Importantly, his argument is essentially based on the analogy drawn. That is, just as reading a novel is not usually recognized as meaningless even though the story is already predetermined from the beginning to end, Lloyd claims that living a fixed life cannot be pointless. In this way Lloyd strategically tries to convince his partner. In addition to conversations in fictional works like (1), the strategy of allegory is also utilized in everyday discourse. In an attempt to

¹ If not otherwise noted, the underlining in the examples in this thesis are all mine.

communicate something to others in casual talk, for example, speakers sometimes compare what they want to say with something similar, and by talking about this ‘something similar’ they attempt to effectively achieve their communicative purpose—just as Lloyd does in (1) above. Allegory is thus a rhetorical strategy that is used as a discursive means to achieve certain purposes through analogical comparison in ordinary language use.

So far, however, the notion of allegory has not been satisfactorily investigated. First, in traditional studies, it has not even been treated as a rhetorical strategy used in actual discourse but rather employed to characterize various genres of texts: proverbs, parables, fables, and a kind of novels (Abrams, 1999: 5-8; Reboul, 2000: 81-85). This may be because each genre has a common textual shape, which makes it easier for analysts to collect homogeneous data, and consequently identify the features shared among the texts. Proverbs have a sentential, idiomatic structure, and convey conventionalized social wisdom (Yanakh, 1994: 3386); parables take the form of a story and carry religious messages (Barton and Hudson, 2004: 149-150); fables are anecdotes that teach moral lessons (Drabble ed., 2000: 344); and allegorical novels are stories that represent certain events in the real world (Barton and Hudson, 2009: 7). Although these four text types are characterized as allegorical genres, their functions in discourse are still not clear. Previous research tended to focus on interpreting what the texts represented, i.e., without looking at what speakers and writers were attempting to do by deploying the analogical strategy. To put it differently, traditional studies of rhetoric have approached these genres by extracting them from actual contexts of use, putting out of focus, as a consequence, how the texts were produced and interpreted in discourse. Since people actually do things with the allegorical strategy as briefly seen in (1), however, it is important to understand in detail what they communicate with it. In line with this, moreover, traditional studies have ignored the fact that conversational talk-exchange can be constituted with the strategy of allegory. It is true that conversational use of allegory is difficult to approach, since speakers can deploy the strategy by various means, which causes the resultant allegorical utterance(s) to appear as a diverse set. Still, this is not a sound reason to exclude this type of allegorical phenomenon from the scope of analysis. In fact, conversational talk-exchange can offer fruitful data to observe how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is used in detail. Thus, refusal to acknowledge allegory in conversational interaction cannot be supported. Finally, whereas previous research has examined proverbs, parables, fables, and allegorical works of fiction in detail, it has not explained how these genres are related to each other. In addition to providing insights into each of them, it is also possible to integrate the findings about each genre and clarify their relationship. This would be a valuable direction of investigation. Such integrative discussion may also contribute to a deeper understanding of the concept of allegory itself.

To sum up, prior research on the concept of allegory leaves room for improving our comprehension of this phenomenon.

Given the insights and problems of earlier work, this study aims to investigate the mechanisms and workings of allegory as a rhetorical strategy. My objective is two-fold: (i) examining in detail how each of the five discourse genres are composed by using the allegorical strategy; (ii) integrating the specific insights of their characteristics and revealing what the core concept of allegory is more clearly. Pursuit of these goals will bring about a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the concept of allegory.

In examining allegorical phenomena, we adopt the methodology of discourse analysis—one accepted method for studying language in use. More specifically, it is a close, systematic analysis of written texts or records of speech that pays systematic attention to the reasons for the shapes and functions that they have (Johnstone, 2000:126-127). One important point to note here is that discourse analysts start by carefully observing the many things that transpire in the discourse situation. Only through thorough observation can one systematically interpret why the discourse has the shape and function that it does. The methodology used in discourse analysis enables scholars to answer multiple kinds of questions such as “In what way do people use language?”, “For what purpose do they do it?”, and in some cases “Why do they do it in that way?” (Tannen, Hamilton & Schiffrin eds., 2015; Schiffrin, 1994; van Dijk ed., 1985). In their investigations, discourse analysts have developed specific tools and concepts that delve deeply into various sorts of text and talk, which can be used to better understand in detail how allegorical discourse is realized. This study thus employs the methodology of discourse analysis to scrutinize the rhetorical strategy of allegory, and as such can be characterized as a discourse analytic rhetorical study.

In addition to the specific arguments regarding allegory, we discuss possible directions for the study of rhetoric in general. Rhetoric is a very complex notion and has been confronted in multiple ways. Ancient philosophers and rhetoricians (including the notorious sophists) prescriptively listed and classified a large number of schemes for persuasion that can be effectively employed in political and legislative speeches (Aristotle, 330BC; Cicero, 84BC, 55BC, 46BC, 44BC; Quintilian, 95). Logicians and researchers of argumentation have stated that such persuasive schemes may even be logical fallacies which people are inclined to make in actual discussions and debates. They go on to show how they can be manipulated in critical thinking and claim-making (Adachi, 1984; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Walton, 1987). Literary critics have described and analyzed how figures of speech serve to beautify, craft and interpret prose and verse (Lausberg, 2001; Suzuki, 1996). Psychologists have conducted experiments to discover how and why rhetorical expressions influence people’s thinking and emotion (Dillard & Pfau, 2002: part 4; Gentner &

Bowdle, 2005; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006). At the same time, linguists have considered the resources and mechanisms, whether of linguistic or of other sorts, that enable or constrain the figurative use of language (Komatsubara, 2016; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Thus, a variety of approaches has revealed different dimensions of rhetoric.

Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to how rhetorical schemes and figures are pragmatically used in actual discourse. Somewhat surprisingly, scholars of rhetoric have not been inclined to include conversational talk-exchange in their analytical purview. This is a serious omission because conversational interaction may be the most primitive, hence perhaps the most basic context in which people speak rhetorically. It may turn out that conversation is the best context for clarifying how rhetorical strategies work, through observing their processes and effects. Direct interaction between interlocutors in conversational talk-exchange can be quite transparent, enabling analysts to show how a rhetorical strategy is utilized and what effects it has. For these reasons, conversational interaction seems like a promising source of data for a pragmatic rhetorical analysis even though it has largely been excluded from traditional research.

Along with arguments concerning the direction of rhetorical studies, the discussion will focus on the concept of 'rhetoric' itself. So far I have used expressions such as "using of the strategy of allegory in discourse" and "people speaking rhetorically" fairly casually. The former might seem to entail the latter since, generally speaking, if someone uses a certain rhetorical strategy, it will usually (or almost inevitably) be recognized that s/he is speaking rhetorically. Likewise, it may be natural to think that rhetorical schemes or figures are characterized as such simply because they function rhetorically. This is not always the case, however, because any single rhetorical strategy can fail and often does. Recall the classical definition of rhetoric as "the art or the discipline that deals with the use of discourse, either spoken or written, to inform or persuade or motivate an audience, whether that audience is made up of one person or a group of persons" (Corbett & Connors, 1999: 1). What this means is that the true nature of rhetoric is nothing more than the technique of utilizing these particular strategies. Put another way, the mere use of a rhetorical device does not always constitute a rhetorical utterance; rather, the rhetorical status of an utterance is only truly realized by how skillfully it is shaped and what effect(s) it has achieved. In short, rhetoric is not just the use of strategies but the skill of using them in discourse. Even this does not tell the whole story, however. If a speaker builds up his/her talk with a certain scheme or figure—no matter how skillfully they do it—it does not automatically 'count' as rhetorical. In order for an utterance to be rhetorical, it needs the interlocutor's evaluation as rhetorical as well. The same is true in written discourse: a passage in a literary work cannot successfully portray beautiful scenery without being recognized as such by the reader. In this sense then,

rhetoric—or rhetorical status of talk and text—is only achieved through negotiation between speaker and hearer or writer and reader. Along this line of argument, the study aims to re-define the notion of rhetoric as a discursive phenomenon.

1.2 Overall Structure

Given the objectives, scope, and methodology of the proposals above, the thesis proceeds as follows.

Chapter 2 reviews how previous research has defined allegory, and points out that the concept has been applied too narrowly to some literary works such as John Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress*, Johnathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, and George Orwell's *Animal Farm*. Written discourse is not the only environment where the allegorical strategy can be employed, however. In fact, allegorical discourse can be observed both in different contexts and in a variety of shapes. This chapter illustrates variations of allegorical discourse and explains why they are considered allegorical. The forms of discourse to be analyzed include allegorical argumentation, proverbs, parables, fables, and a kind of fictional work. It attempts to provide a rough sketch of the relationship among these kinds of discourse to serve as a basis for the more detailed analysis of each form in following chapters.

Chapters 3 through 7 examine each of the five genres of allegorical discourse, respectively. Close investigation reveals how speakers manipulate the allegorical strategy to shape diverse kinds of discourse.

Chapter 3 observes allegorical utterances occurring spontaneously in conversational talk-exchange. As mentioned above, traditional rhetorical studies have focused mainly on monological (and often preplanned) talk and text such as oral speeches and literary narratives in their attempts to identify rhetorical strategies (Eisenhart & Johnstone, 2008: 4). The analysis in this chapter illustrates the importance of dialogical uses of rhetorical strategies, showing how powerfully allegory contributes to the construction of dialogue. Observations of how speakers compose allegorical utterances through a variety of resources in face-to-face talk are reason enough for rhetorical analysts to pay special attention to interactional discourse and understand the mechanisms and functions of rhetorical strategies in detail. The analysis of allegorical argumentation in this chapter points to a basic methodology which is subsequently adopted in following chapters, and which should arguably be part of rhetorical studies in general.

Chapter 4 focuses on the deployment and interpretation of proverbs in conversational discourse. Several reasons for using proverbs have been offered in previous studies (Drew & Holt, 1988, 1998; Norrick,

1985: ch.2; Takeda, 1999b), but one has surprisingly gone unnoticed. In this, speakers display how they receive an assertion of their interlocutor by using a proverb. It is significant in that it sheds light on the receptive aspect of conversational interaction; previous studies, on the other hand, had focused only on the assertive uses of proverbs. The chapter then classifies proverb use in conversational talk-exchange into three types, including this particular receptive one. The taxonomy reveals that conversational uses of proverbs reflect the structure of conversation, where two or more people interact in a reciprocal manner.

Chapter 5 looks at parables, i.e., “[stories] designed to convey some religious principle, moral lesson, or general truth” (Shaw, 1972: 274). In the Gospels, Jesus often narrates parables to help his interlocutors understand the religious doctrines of Christianity. We examine how these allegorical stories are constructed, and in what way they contribute to conveying the message to his audience, as well as to readers of the Gospels. In analyzing the structure and function of parables, it becomes apparent that this rhetorical strategy complements another one, namely *aposiopesis* (i.e., “Stopping suddenly in midcourse, leaving statement unfinished; Lanham, 1991: 20). In recounting scenes where Jesus interacts with a variety of people, the Gospels systematically avoid describing how his interlocutors respond to him, even though it was clearly possible to do so. This way of describing conversation in the Gospels—i.e., through the use of *aposiopesis*—serves to portray Jesus as an authoritative figure, and invites the reader to actively imagine how his words are received. Given its functions, *aposiopesis* can thus deliver Jesus’ doctrinal message more effectively to the reader. By observing the interplay between parables and *aposiopesis* in detail, we can better understand how the Gospels carry Jesus’ message to readers.

Chapter 6 concentrates on structural variation in the discursive genre of the fable, traditionally defined as a story which exemplifies a moral lesson at the end (Abrams, 1985: 6; Barton & Hudson, 2004: 80; Cuddon, 1980: 256; Drabble ed., 2000: 344; Lanham, 1991: 77; Shaw, 1972: 154). This description is insufficient, however, as in fact fables exhibit various structures in exemplifying the lesson. Conversely, in conversational interaction, exemplification with a story is achieved through a standard procedure. Why then does the fable have multiple ways of exemplification? The answer to this question concerns the context in which a fable is realized, i.e., written discourse. Whereas speakers in conversation must anchor an exemplary story in ongoing talk with another certain interlocutor, the fabulist is free of this constraint. Through the written word, they can perform the act of exemplification in more ‘elliptical’ ways, resulting in fables with a variety of different structures. The various forms of the fable thus arise from the freedom of written discourse.

Based on the findings and analyses presented in chapters 3 through 6, Chapter 7 explores some of the

theoretical and methodological implications that this study has for the study of rhetoric in general. This thesis can be characterized as a rhetorical study in that it focuses on a particular rhetorical strategy, i.e., allegory. It is different from traditional rhetorical studies, however, in shedding analytical light on the functions of the strategy in discourse — i.e., from a discourse analytic perspective. Against the backdrop of research in multiple disciplines, we propose a new direction for rhetorical studies in terms of methodology. In addition, Chapter 7 explicates our understanding of the concept ‘rhetoric’ and offers some prospects for future research. Since the age of Aristotle, many scholars from a variety of backgrounds have contributed to the study of rhetoric. Nevertheless, they have more or less seen rhetoric as individual schemes and figures such as metaphor, irony, hyperbole, dilemma, and argumentum ad hominem. Our central thesis, however, is that rhetorical schemes and figures are not ready-made building blocks to be used in actual communication, but rather a creative manner of constructing discourse itself. Put another way, rhetoric is not the use of schemes and figures but a part or dimension of composing discourse, of any kind. We thus re-define the concept of rhetoric as a technical dimension of language use, a view that arguably opens up a new direction of discourse analytic rhetorical study.

2. Revealing Allegory: An Overview

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reveals how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is employed in different contexts of use.² There are three problems confronting allegory. First, four kinds of discourse are traditionally described in connection to the notion, but their discursive aspects are not sufficiently delineated. Second, how those allegorical genres are related to each other has not yet been explained. Third, even though the strategy of allegory is employed in conversational talk-exchange, little attention has been paid to this type of allegorical discourse in previous studies. This chapter thus aims to characterize allegory not just as a rhetorical strategy of putting forward one's perspective, but as a method for shaping discourse of various kinds. To this end, we examine in detail how each kind of allegorical discourse is actually realized.

The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 reviews previous research on allegory, specifically looking at how the concept of allegory is traditionally defined in the study of rhetoric with the goal of locating problems to tackle later on. Sections 2.2 through 2.5 focus on four genres of discourse: proverbs, parables, fables and satirical novels which have been traditionally characterized as examples of allegorical texts in previous studies. Through detailed data analysis, we show how these kinds of text are constructed using allegory. Section 2.6 focuses on how the strategy can also be deployed in conversational talk-exchange, illustrating the particular characteristics of such constructions. Based on theoretical evidence, it is further claimed that conversational allegory should be recognized as the most basic, primitive domain of the strategy. Section 2.7 integrates the findings of the preceding sections, concluding that the diversity of allegorical forms is rooted in three aspects of the five genres.

2.2 Previous Studies

In attempting to communicate to others, speakers sometimes analogically compare it with something else with the goal of achieving their communicative purpose by talking more about this 'something else.' For example, textbooks of science sometimes explain the structure of the atom by drawing an analogy with that of the solar system, which is supposedly more familiar to readers. Let us take a look at a concrete instance of this way of talking in order to pin down the target of the investigation. Example (2) below is taken from an

² The analysis and discussion in this chapter is based on Hirakawa (2010, 2015).

interview with the American actress Cloë Grace Moretz about a film in which she co-starred with Nicolas Cage (*AERA English*, February 2011).

(2) Interviewer: The scenes with you and Nicolas Cage were so emotional and dramatic.

Moretz: He's a phenomenal actor. So, it was like ping pong: you return the serve. If you play with a good player, you work hard at it so that you can be on the same level. With an amazing actor like him, emotion just flows. (*AERA English*, February 2011)

Here Moretz compares acting in a scene with Nicolas Cage to playing ping pong. What she says about ping pong analogically represents how she conceives of her own acting: playing with a good player — in particular returning a serve — corresponds to her acting with Cage; working hard at the game corresponds to working hard at acting; and being “on the same level” as the opponent translates as the emotion that flows in her performance. Moretz signals this correspondence coherently by employing equivalent syntactic structures in talk about table tennis and the acting experience. “With an amazing actor like him” naturally corresponds to “with a good player” and this serves to relate the parts of talk that follow, hence “emotion just flows” and “you work hard at it so that you can be on the same level.” Notice also that a conditional relationship concerning ping pong is also mapped onto her acting performance: “With an amazing actor like him” can be paraphrased as ‘If you play with an amazing actor like him’ in the overall matching between the two sentences. Note too how Moretz designs her analogy as a reply to the interviewer’s comment with the term “emotion” — a morphologically linked form of “emotional” in the interviewer’s utterance, anchoring her remark in the talk-exchange within which she is engaged. In short, she characterizes the ping pong analogy as reason for the scenes with Cage being so emotional, as the interviewer has pointed out. Thus in reply to the interviewer’s comment she strategically illustrates what it was like to play her role with a great actor, not by talking directly about her acting experience itself, but through an analogy with ping pong.

In the terminology of rhetoric, such an analogical way of shaping discourse is called ‘allegory.’ Technically, it is defined as “a method of representation in which a person, abstract idea, or event stands for itself and for something else” (Shaw, 1972: 12). This simple definition includes several notable points. First, the use of this strategy establishes two levels of meaning: (i) what the words and phrases literally refer to; and (ii) what the literal referents represent. In the example in (2) above, the words and phrases about table tennis describe how a game is played with a good opponent. As a whole, this works as a representation of what it was like for Moretz to act with Cage. Second, the relationship between the literal referents and what

they represent is one of similarity. In the above instance, in introducing the ping-pong analogy, Moretz uses the phrase “it was like,” claiming that her acting experience was similar to playing ping pong with a good player. Third, the similarity that the use of allegory constitutes is systematic, and has structural properties of its own (Sato, 1992b: 198-204; Sato et al, 2006: 498-499). In (2), the actors and their relationship in the game of ping pong have a counterpart in the topic of acting: “a good player” corresponds to Cage; “ping pong” for acting; “return[ing] the serve” to responses to Cage’s performance, “play[ing] with a good player” to acting with Cage; the level of play to the level of performance; and the positive result of hard work to the natural flow of emotion. In this way she describes what it was like to play a role with Cage in a film by drawing on the structure that underlies talk about what it would be like to play table tennis with a good opponent. That is how the strategy of allegory can be characterized as an analogical way of communication. The fourth point is that structural similarity between two semantic levels in allegorical discourse is not a ready-made relationship, but rather part of what the speaker builds in discourse. That is, allegory is a way of systematizing the topic at hand by comparing it with the structure of something different. In the case of (2), the correspondence between the two activities is not something ‘out there’ but a systematic product of Moretz’s sense-making activity. The essence of the strategy of allegory lies in performing an act of structural imprinting. To sum up, the rhetorical strategy of allegory can be characterized as a method of talking about a topic analogically by drawing on the structure of something else.

In defining allegory, it is important to note that traditionally, it has been characterized in relation to metaphor. Examples of such a characterization include Sato’s, “allegory is after all ‘a strip of discourse organized as a sequence of metaphors belonging to the same group’” (1992b: 197) and Sloane’s, “[allegory] differs from metaphor in that the substitution does not involve one lexeme but a series of lexemes” (2001: 18).³ The term ‘metaphor’ refers to “an implied comparison between two things of unlike nature that yet have something in common” (Corbett & Connors, 1999: 396), e.g., talking about someone’s idea in terms of eating: cf. “I just can’t swallow that claim” (Kövecses, 2002: 5). The metaphorical use of words and phrases overlaps with the allegorical strategy in that it also establishes two levels of meaning. In fact, Moretz’s utterance in (2) can be seen as consisting of a chain of several metaphors like “ping pong” for acting and “a good player” for Nicolas Cage. Seen this way, viewing allegory as a method to form a verbal sequence of metaphorical expressions might seem appropriate. Still, the allegorical strategy is not always reducible to sequences of metaphorical words and phrases. First, in Cognitive Linguistic terms, a metaphorical expression

³ Similar characterizations are also found in Baldick (1990: 5), Drabble (2000: 18), Komatsubara (2016: 303), Lanham, (1991: 4), Semino (2008 : 64-65), and Shaw (1972: 12).

necessarily links two intrinsically different fields of meaning, or “conceptual domains” (cf. Kövecses, 2002: 4), like Ideas and Foods in the above example,⁴ and for this reason, it is different from a literal comparison (Pragglejaz Group, 2007). In contrast, allegory does not necessarily require a relationship between the two levels of meaning to be metaphorical. Instead, the essence of allegory lies in the function that it serves, i.e., drawing a structural comparison in discourse, and not in the kind of relationship it establishes. Second, defining allegory as a sequence of metaphors would exclude some important phenomena that are closely related to it. For example, proverbs like *birds of a feather flock together* or *where there’s a will, there’s a way* are both allegorical in that their semantic structure is mapped onto a discursive topic.⁵ Only the former works as a metaphor for people, however, whereas the latter does not; the second one is synecdochical in actual contexts of use, where the *will* and the *way* are specified.⁶ A narrow definition of allegory bound to the concept of metaphor would fail to capture how these seemingly different proverbs work in similar ways. Third, what the speaker does with the allegorical strategy is structurally compare the topic at hand with something else, and whether the comparison is metaphorical or not is not essential to its use. If the metaphorical-or-not distinction can have any relevance at all, it would only be of interest to analysts, and not for speakers. Thus although allegory is often characterized alongside the notion of metaphor, this study defines it as a rhetorical means of structural comparison between two semantic levels in discourse.⁷

Whereas allegory is a way of shaping discourse, it has not been recognized as such in the study of rhetoric. Instead, it is conceived of as a literary concept which is “applied to a work of fiction in which the author intends characters and their actions to be understood in terms other than their surface appearances and meanings” (Shaw, 1972: 12). Examples of such fictional works that mirror (often satirically) an event or situation in the real world are *The Pilgrim’s Progress*, *Gulliver’s Travels* and *Animal Farm* (cf. Barton & Hudson, 2009: 7; Sloane, 2001: 20). In the same vein, previous studies also characterize fables, (sometimes by well-known authors like Aesop and La Fontaine) as examples of allegorical texts. Technically, the term ‘fable’ refers to literary stories with animals as central characters that exemplify a moral lesson (Drabble ed., 2000: 334). The parable is another genre of text that is traditionally considered as an example of allegorical discourse. Typical examples in this category are analogical stories that Jesus in the Gospels narrates to get his religious message across (cf. Barton & Hudson, 2004: 149-150), e.g., the Good Samaritan and the Prodigal

⁴ Following the convention of Cognitive Linguistics, “the names of domains are [...] capitalized” in my discussion (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2008: 14).

⁵ A more detailed analysis of proverbs as allegorical texts will be offered in Section 2.3.

⁶ Synecdoche is a trope that forms a genus-species relationship (Seto, 1997: 49).

⁷ The significance of defining allegory in this way will be further discussed in Section 2.7.

Son. Finally, proverbs — idiomatic one-liners that convey social wisdom (Yankah, 1994: 3386) — are also regarded as an allegorical text genre (Reboul, 2000: 82) in that they establish an analogical relationship with a situation to which they are applied (Lieber, 1994: 102). Thus have previous studies employed the concept of allegory as a means of characterizing and classifying different genres of texts, and not necessarily as a strategy for shaping discourse. Past researchers of allegory have, in other words, focused on ‘allegory as product’ rather than ‘allegory as strategy.’

Identifying allegory in text genres does not shed any light on the discursive process that generates the texts, however: i.e., allegorical novels, fables, parables and proverbs. Whereas rhetorical researchers have found that the four genres contain instances of allegory, they have not revealed how the allegorical strategy contributes to the realization of those genres. That is, they have proceeded no further than cataloguing of proverbs, parables, fables and certain literary works as genres of allegorical discourse. Thus it is still unclear how each of these so-called allegorical genres shapes and is shaped in discourse. Another consequence of viewing allegory as a means for classifying genres is that the four genres have been treated separately, without taking into consideration that they are in fact end-products that employ a common feature. In other words, previous studies have discovered nothing more than that the allegorical strategy can be employed in various ways, which is an obvious conclusion that one could reach even without rigorous examination of actual data. What remains to be discovered is how the four genres of allegorical texts are related to each other. These two issues need to be addressed.

Given the state of affairs mentioned above, we need to observe in detail how the rhetorical strategy of using allegory contributes to the composition of various types of discourse, and find out how the four genres of allegorical discourse are related to each other. Our examination begins with examples like (2) above, where use of allegory in conversational talk-exchange appear to be productive. As mentioned, previous studies have paid little attention to the fact that people do talk allegorically in conversation. There is no sound reason for this oversight. Moreover, this type of allegorical discourse has a certain descriptive value in itself: conversational interaction is a good context for observing what people do with language, in what ways, and for what purposes (e.g., Cameron, 2001; Johnstone, 2008: ch.4; van Dijk, 1997). A detailed analysis of the conversational use of allegory will thus provide us with a guideline to follow in examining the other ‘traditional’ genres.

2.3 Conversational Allegory

This section describes how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is deployed in conversational interaction. A detailed analysis will reveal how this strategy is used, for what purpose it is employed, and what sort of relationship it may shape between the interlocutors.

The first text to be observed is an excerpt taken from the film *Ocean's 11*. In the scene from which it is taken, the audio-visual junkie Livingston is seen working as an AV assistant in an FBI investigation. He is writing something in his notebook in a surveillance van, while two other officers are staring at the monitors.

(3) OFFICER #1: [*To OFFICER #2, pointing to a man in one of the monitors*] See if we can move in on this man.

[*OFFICER #2 reaches to adjust a monitor*]

LIVINGSTON: [*waving his head and his hand*] ^(a)D- d- don't- don't- don't... touch that.

OFFICER #2: [*reluctantly*] ^(b)Why not?

LIVINGSTON: Uh, ^(c)do you see me, grabbing the gun out of your holster and [*waving his arm*]
waving it around?

OFFICER #1: ^(d)Hey, Radio Shack, relax.

[*LIVINGSTON dejectedly goes back on his notebook.*]

(Soderbergh, *Ocean's 11*)

Livingston makes a claim about how the FBI agents should behave by superficially asking a question about his own possible actions in (3c). Specifically, “me” corresponds to the officers, “grabbing the gun” to the agents’ touching the monitors, and “pulling out” the firearm, “waving it around” to the officers’ potential for controlling the monitors in the van. This correspondence shows how Livingston designs his utterance with an allegorical method.

The most important features of Livingston’s utterance (3c) are (i) that it is made in the midst of conversational talk-exchange, and (ii) that as a consequence of its construction and understanding, it both orients to the preceding sequence of utterances and influences the design of the next utterance — discussed below. The interaction in (3) begins with Livingston’s hesitant order for officer #2 in (3a), which then triggers the investigator to make a retort by asking for a reason in (3b).⁸ The interactional ‘slot’ after (3b) is thus established as a place where Livingston’s answer to the (argumentative) question is expected. In this

⁸ To the audience of the film, Livingston’s hesitant style may serve as a clue of his timid character. The officer’s utterance (3b) cannot be a mere question, for if he were willing to accept Livingston’s order he would simply say “OK” (or something similar) and refrain from touching the monitor. The fact that he actually asks for reason clearly indicates his reluctance to obey an assistant.

sequence, then, Livingston's allegorical utterance is designed as a claim providing him with a reason for the claim.

Let us now look at how Livingston builds up his utterance in more detail. First, the sentence has an interrogative structure, which requires the FBI officers to answer it. The answer must obviously be "No," however, since Livingston is not touching either of the officer's guns at all. (3c) occupies an interactional position after the agent #2's question asking for the reason behind Livingston's order (3b). As such, it functions as a rationale for his initial assertion (3a), even though it takes the form of an interrogative sentence. Livingston's utterance in question can thus be paraphrased as 'I'm not grabbing the gun out of your holster or waving it around, (am I?)' and from this his reasoning is clear: the FBI agents should not touch the monitors because Livingston is not grabbing for their guns. His wording carries an important implication: not only do "the guns" belong to the officers, but they are also obviously too dangerous for a non-expert like Livingstone to "[wave] them around." Based on this allegorical correspondence, then, he argues that the monitoring equipment likewise belongs to him and not the officers, and it is too dangerous for non-experts — even FBI agents — to touch. The claim supporting utterance (3c) can be further paraphrased as this: the officers should not touch the monitors, both because they do not belong to them but also because Livingston is not touching *their* guns, which are extremely dangerous for a non-expert like him to handle. In this way, Livingston shapes his utterance allegorically in order to persuade the two officers.

Livingston's allegorical gambit also posits a certain relationship between himself and the FBI agents. He claims that the officers must not touch his monitor based on the fact that he is not touching their guns. This line of argumentation presupposes a kind of equal, complementary relationship between Livingston and the officers. Livingston may be an audio-visual expert but a layman in weaponry, but the officers are also amateurs of electronic devices even though they are specialists in firearms. From his point of view, his knowledge of the surveillance cameras is just as important as the agents' expertise in handling guns. Such a relationship further entails that Livingstone has a vital role in the investigation. Because Livingston and the officers both have specialist's knowledge and experience, they should respect each other's expertise. In the same vein, (though in a hesitating manner) Livingston is able to give an order to the officers (3a), which clearly signals that he sees himself as being in a position where he is allowed to control the use of the monitoring equipment. The allegorical strategy in (3c) thus contributes to advancing Livingston's view of the relationship between himself and the FBI investigators.⁹

Whereas Livingston tries to persuade the two officers by carefully crafting an allegorical utterance, his

⁹ In rhetorical terms, Livingston is attempting to strengthen his *ethos*.

attempt is defeated by officer #1 in (3d). What is important to note here is that his retort is guided by Livingston's reason-giving interrogative allegory (3c). Against Livingston, officer #1 redefines their relationship by calling him "Radio Shack." This label casts Livingstone simply as a person hired by the FBI to monitor activities, not a surveillance expert as Livingston implies through his allegory. Moreover, the imperative form "relax" signals the officer's assessment that the monitors would not be as dangerous for non-experts as firearms. What officer #1 does with his words is to deny the expertise and status of Livingston posited in (3c). In this sense, this negative utterance is founded on his preceding allegory. Thus, not only is Livingston's use of allegorical strategy shaped by the preceding utterances, it is also influential in the composition of the next utterance.

To sum up, the analysis of the text above shows several important characteristics of allegory. First, it constitutes an interactional move in conversational talk-exchange. An allegorical response materializes in the context of preceding discourse, while pointing to possible directions that upcoming utterances will take. Second, it draws an explicit analogy. Both the current topic and sequential organization of the talk-exchange serve to construct the structural correspondence of allegory. Third, the allegorical strategy puts forth an argument, and speakers can get their interlocutor(s) to accept their perspective on the topic at hand. Thus can the rhetorical strategy of allegory in conversation be characterized as interactive, explicit and argumentative.¹⁰

This proposed function of allegorical discourse also sheds light on a problem that previous studies had regarding this rhetorical strategy, which did not clarify the discursive aspect of allegorical genres (proverbs, parables, fables, and certain types of literature). More specifically, previous studies could still explain how the allegorical strategy composes texts of those genres, what the goals of these texts are, or what sort of generalizations there are between speaker/writer and hearer/reader. Underlying this problem is the analytical perspective that previous studies have taken in dealing with allegorical phenomena. Oftentimes, data is isolated from contexts of use, and focus is solely on the formal and/or semantic dimensions of the texts involved. Dundes (1975), for instance, discloses that many proverbs have a quadripartite structure. Literary critics describe the analogy between the characters and happenings depicted in *Animal Farm* and the key figures and events in the Russian Revolution (Fowler, 1995: ch.9; Frye, 1986; Meyers, 1991: ch.7). Although an exploration of these aspects of allegorical texts is valuable, these studies have focused their analysis too narrowly on superficial dimensions. Accordingly, it is not clear what sort of sense-making activity such texts

¹⁰ Here, the term 'argument' is used in a broad sense to mean 'inviting one's interlocutor(s) to understand and accept the speaker's opinion or point of view.' It is not intended to mean "a situation in which two or more people disagree, often angrily" (*LDOCE*).

constitute. Observing discursive functions of allegorical talk and texts is another valuable direction of research.

With this in mind, we will take a discursive approach to the analysis of proverbs, parables, fables and allegorical novels. The following four sections will examine how each of the four genres of allegorical texts is realized in actual discourse.

2.4 Proverbs

The first type of allegorical domain we consider is that of proverbs, which can casually be defined as “short, pithy statements of widely accepted truths about everyday life” (Abrams, 1999: 8). Let us first look here at how they are employed in conversation.¹¹ Cited below is an excerpt from the film *Some Kind of Wonderful*. In it, a high school student, Keith, strives for a date with the most popular girl in school, Amanda. His best friend, Watts, claims that it is a lofty dream, however.

(4) WATTS: You couldn't score her in a million years. A: you're too shy and closed up to her to even approach her. And B: she'd kill you. (a)Chicks like her have one thing on their mind. (b)And you don't make enough of it to matter to her.

KEITH: (c)Like, you can't judge a book by its cover.

WATTS: (d)Yeah, but you can tell how much it's gonna cost.

KEITH: That's deep.

WATTS: You want shallow, call Amanda Jones. (Deutch, *Some Kind of Wonderful*)

In response to Watts' stereotypical evaluation of Amanda (4a) and assessment of the low likelihood of success of her friend's attempt to win her (4b), Keith quotes a proverb (4c). The proverb “you can't judge a book by its cover” literally means that no matter how good the cover of a book looks, it does not necessarily portend good reading. The description of the relationship between the cover of a book and its contents corresponds to the relationship between Amanda's outer appearance and her inner personality. By using it, Keith intends that it would be wrong to assess the kind of person Amanda really is based on what kind of

¹¹ Conversational interaction is not the only context in which people cite proverbs. Still, it is regarded as the most basic context of proverb use (Norrick, 1985: 12).

person she looks to be. In the analogy drawn here, the contents of a book corresponds to the true nature of Amanda, and its cover to her appearance. In that the structure of description of the book is impressed upon the current topic (i.e., Amanda) the proverb (4c) constitutes an allegorical utterance.

One important feature of proverbs is that they are idiomatic. On one hand, they are “preformed, inventorized linguistic units,” and on the other “traditional items of folklore” (Norrick, 1985: 25). Individual proverbs have a fixed, sentential form of their own, in which they encapsulate time-tested wisdom of the linguistic community.¹² For this reason, speakers can “[fall] back on on the store of preformed utterances” (Norrick, 1985: 26). In this sense, proverbs are quoted, rather than formed spontaneously by individual speakers in discourse.¹³ Importantly, just as quoting a proverb entails citing “the linguistic community itself” (ibid), since they are a part of, hence inseparable from the shared knowledge of the social group. In this regard, we note that Keith initiates his proverb with the word “Like,” which can be understood as a fragment of a formulaic phrase like *Like they say*, or *Like it's said*. With this marker, Keith communicates that what he is about to say is a shared idea, not a personal opinion. By drawing on the authority of a socially shared opinion, he claims that Watts too should accept it. Thus by citing the proverb “you can't judge a book by its cover” Keith attempts to ‘authorize’ his opinion of Amanda. As shared items of folklore, proverbs serve as a valuable resource for persuasion.

Not surprisingly, the shared status of proverbs makes it difficult to argue against them.¹⁴ Still, Watts successfully deflects the casual argument in (4). It is important to note here that her way of resisting Keith's attempt at persuasion is tightly connected to the allegorical aspect of the proverbial utterance. In (4d), she acknowledges the ‘truth’ that the proverb carries (“Yeah”), but then with a contrastive connective (“but”) pushes the allegory in a slightly different direction, focusing on the cost of the “book.” In accordance with Keith's analogy between Amanda and a book, the cost of paying for the latter is aligned with the effort that is needed for Keith to be successful with Amanda. In making this counter-argument, Watts strategically composes the central part of her utterance (“you can tell how it's gonna cost”). On one hand, she deploys the same sentence-initial structure as seen in Keith's proverb: with a second-person pronoun *you* plus the auxiliary verb *can*. On the other hand, her utterance is a positive one, making her contrastive stance more

¹² Though the form of each proverb is fixed, speakers can change it in practical use, aiming at certain expressive effects. In this regard, see Seto (1988: 119-120) and Takeda (1992: ch. 7). It should also be noted that proverbs often have allomorphs. For example, *Little things please little minds* has as its variants *Little things affect/attract little minds*, *Little things attract light minds*, and *Small things please small minds* (Toda ed., 2003: 225).

¹³ The fact that proverbs are often introduced with an expression such as *(as) they say* or *as the proverb goes* indicates that they are quoted (Takeda, 1999a; Yankah, 1994).

¹⁴ This ‘resistance-proof’ feature of proverbs is shared with other kinds of idiomatic expressions (cf. Kitzinger, 2000).

obvious (“you can’t” vs. “you can”). This design not only displays an opposing attitude to Keith’s positive evaluation of Amanda, but also helps re-claim her initial assessment, i.e., that Keith cannot make enough of what girls like Amanda are after (money). In this way, Amanda resists the authoritative power of the proverb by extending it allegorically.

So far we have seen that proverbs can function as a resource for advancing the speaker’s perspective on a topic. Looking once again at (4), Keith’s proverb efficiently counters Watts’ stereotypical judgement of Amanda. It is quoted for an argumentative purpose in the context of the preceding talk-exchange, and at the same time affects the force of upcoming utterance. In this way, proverbs can be seen as an idiomatic textual format for hosting allegorical argumentation.

In conversational use of proverbs, analogies are drawn explicitly. In this regard, a proverb’s status as an idiomatic expression also determines how the analogy is interpreted. Since proverbs are taken as a linguistic resource inventorized and shared in a given society, members of the community are expected to be aware of how they can be applied in actual discourse. For English speakers, it is obvious that a book, its cover, and the relationship between them represent a similar one between Amanda’s appearance and her personality. The appropriate use of proverbs is therefore partly based the interlocutors’ knowledge. At the same time, the interactional slot in which a proverb appears also contributes to identifying the target of analogy. In the example above, Keith’s proverbial utterance (4c) follows Watts’ stereotypical remark about Amanda. Here, the proverb is naturally heard in relation to the preceding assertion. Other linguistic devices may also be employed to cue analogical interpretation. In (4c), Keith initiates his utterance with “Like” in order to juxtapose the content of the proverb with Watts’ evaluation of Amanda. Keith’s statement about a book thus invites analogical interpretation. In short, the analogy that proverbial utterances engender is evident in conversational talk-exchange.

In summary, the use of proverbs in conversational interaction has the following characteristics. First, proverbs can serve as a resource for shaping interaction between speakers. Used in conversational talk-exchange, they constitute an interactional move. Second, the use of a proverb constitutes an argument in a broad sense. Speakers can advance an opinion on a current topic by drawing on the time-tested wisdom encapsulated in the proverb they quote. Third, an analogy is evident in proverbial utterances. The analogy is usually clear, based on an expectation of knowledge about the proverb usage — with some linguistic markers attached. Proverbs in conversation can thus be characterized as an interactive, argumentative and clear realization of the allegorical strategy.

2.5 Parables

Next, let us examine the parable, traditionally formulated as “a story designed to convey some religious principle, moral lesson, or general truth” (Shaw, 1972: 274). Well-known examples are those that appear in the Gospels, as the one below from Luke 15: 1-7 (*Holy Bible: Contemporary English Version*):

- (5) Tax collectors and sinners were all crowding around to listen to Jesus. So the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses started grumbling, “(a)This man is friendly with sinners. He even eats with them.”

(b)Then Jesus told them this story: (c)If any of you has a hundred sheep, and one of them gets lost, what will you do? (d)Won't you leave the ninety-nine in the field and go look for the lost sheep until you find it? (e)And when you find it, you will be so glad that you will put it on your shoulder and carry it home. (f)Then you will call in your friends and neighbors and say, “Let's celebrate! I've found my lost sheep.”

Jesus said, “(g)In the same way there is more happiness in heaven because of one sinner who turns to God than over ninety-nine good people who don't need to.”

(Luke 15: 1-7, *Holy Bible: Contemporary English Version*)

In reply to the grumbling of the Pharisees and teachers of the Law of Moses (5a), Jesus gives the reasons for his willingness to be friendly with sinners through a story of “a lost sheep” (5c-f).¹⁵ He concludes his turn with a statement (5g) that serves as a literal retort to the criticism, and which amounts to a Christian truth.

The most prominent feature of Jesus' defense is that a story (cf. (5b)), in accordance with the description of a traditional parable given above. According to Labov (1972), a narrative (story) typically consists of “a verbal sequence of clauses” corresponding “to the sequence of events which (it is inferred)

¹⁵ The criticism of the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses comes from the fact that tax collectors as well as sinners were despised in the society of those times (Kato, 2006: 107; Takahashi et al. eds., 1991: 343). The sentence-initial particle “So” presupposes this.

actually occurred” (Labov, 1972: 359-360).^{16, 17} In the example above, the clauses that constitute the story (5c-f) each describe a hypothetical event in chronological order. The speaker first establishes a hypothetical situation with an *if*-clause, and asks his interlocutors what they would do in that situation (5c). Then he asks them to justify what they would do in a similar situation (5d). Finally, he states what they would do in the end (5e-f). By asking questions along the way, he suggests what one would normally do when one of his sheep got lost.¹⁸

The story in a parable is a vehicle for talking about a topic. In (5), the narrative of a lost sheep reflects a principle of Christianity. Specifically, Jesus portrays a religious truth in the story (5c-f) which he then articulates (5g): the entire story — including “you” as shepherd, sheep, and the relationship between them — is projected onto his view of sinners and their need to turn to God. Notice how he uses the phrase “In the same way” to link the narrative to the topic.¹⁹ Jesus thus characterizes the principle as something similar to what he has narrated. Given this holistic connection, connection between constituent parts also become clear: one lost sheep out of one hundred corresponds to one sinner out of many; the other ninety-nine sheep correspond to most good people; and the discovery and return of the lost sheep and the consequent joy correspond to the sinner’s turn to God and the resultant happiness. What the narrative structurally illustrates (5c-f) equals a religious truth (5g). Because parables typically build this kind of structural relationship between literal description and representative meaning, they conform to the allegorical strategy.

In the discourse of parables, such an analogy is not drawn completely, however. In (5) for example, the analogical counterpart of “put[ting] it [=the sheep] on your shoulder” and “call[ing] in your friends” has not been clearly established. Not every entity or action of the allegorical story corresponds to an entity or action in the topic being discussed. This does not mean that it is impossible (or valueless) for readers of the Gospels to try to find counterparts of seemingly ‘empty’ entities or actions, however. Still, it is important that the

¹⁶ Labov’s formulation of a narrative is of course not the only one that has been used to describe the genre (cf. De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: 86). The Labovian model aims to capture the typical form-function chain found in full-fledged narratives with a definite beginning and end (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: 32). His model is useful here because the genres of allegory (i.e., parables, fables and allegorical novels) take such a typical, full-fledged shape.

¹⁷ Although Labov formulates his model based on narratives of past experience collected through interviews (Labov, 1972: 355-359; Labov & Waletzky, 1997: 5-12), narratives can also be told for other purposes, in other situations (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: ch.4).

¹⁸ Jesus changes his stance several times during telling of the story: from interrogative (5c), through confirmative (5d), to affirmative (5e-f). These changes invite the Pharisees and the teachers to accept Jesus’ perspective on tax collectors and sinners.

¹⁹ The end of the story is doubly marked: (i) by quoting a (hypothetical) remark that his interlocutors might use on finding the lost sheep; and (ii) by starting a new paragraph with the phrase “Jesus said.” In this way, the talk is collaboratively designed, both by Jesus and the writer of the Gospels.

parable texts are partly opened up for such interpretive work. In this sense, the discourse of parables is interpretive.

It is also significant that parables in the Gospels constitute an interactional move between Jesus and the other characters. In the excerpt above, the story of a lost sheep is triggered by — hence directed toward — a critical utterance made by the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses (5a). The initial linking adverb “Then” in (5b) signals that Jesus opposes their attitude, hence his story and his statement about sinners turning to God shape a counter-argument against their viewpoint. The concluding statement of his own view (5g) in particular serves as the very reason for him to spend time with tax collectors and sinners — the very target of his interlocutors’ censure (“I’m with them, because there is more happiness in heaven because of one sinner who turns to God than over ninety-nine good people who don’t need to”). The allegorical story (5c-f) is thus retroactively characterized by the final remark (5g) as a build-up phase from which to draw the literal explanation.²⁰ The parables that Jesus employs in the Gospels thus contribute to his arguments in talk with his interlocutors.

While Jesus’ parables take shape in interaction, it is also important to note that such talk as a whole constitutes a large part of description in the Gospels. Through the text of the Gospels in which talk is embedded, Jesus communicates his religious message to readers. The Gospels are written texts, populated by characters that appear in the world created in the texts.²¹ In this mode of discourse, Jesus’ talk is primarily directed toward his immediate interlocutors where parables are fundamentally realized in talk-exchange.. Readers, on the other hand, interact with Jesus, but rather just ‘overhear’ the conversation between Jesus and other people. In (5), Jesus’ words are all addressed to the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses, while readers just observe how the interaction goes from Luke’s description. Thus, the parable can be characterized as a type of allegorical discourse that takes the form of a narrative in order to communicate a religious message. It is realized through indirect interaction between the text and the reader.

To sum up, parables have the following characteristics. First, they are shaped in the form of a story. At the same time, however, the discourse is not completely oriented to narration; rather, it is embedded in select

²⁰ The effect that Jesus’s utterance in (5) has on the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses is not described in the text. In fact, the Gospels generally avoid portraying how people respond to Jesus’ words. In the study of rhetoric, this way of describing talk-exchange is called *aposiopesis*. Importantly it serves to deliver a doctrinal message effectively to readers. We will see how the rhetorical strategy of *aposiopesis* works in collaboration with parables in chapter 4.

²¹ The Gospels to allow for different approaches, however. Some researchers aim to spot their origins, while others focus on their sociological, cultural, and/or religious backgrounds; still others recognize the Gospels as self-contained stories (Asano et al., 2016). This study focuses on the fact that the Gospels choose a story form to describe how Jesus lived his life and preached to people. It thus aims to clarify their discursive aspects, not their historical accuracy or their theological significance.

talk-exchanges between Jesus and his listeners. The interpretation of parables is thus based on preceding interactional context, and how subsequent utterances are affected. In this sense, parables are both narrative and interactional. Second, there is usually some analogy. While the plot of the story is being impressed on the discursive topic, corresponding aspects of entities and actions are being developed under cover. This leaves room for the reader to interpret the analogy on their own. Thirdly, the stories of a parable are narrated for argumentative purposes. Jesus tells them to his immediate interlocutors to advance his religious opinions, while the Gospels direct his message to the reader. The parable is thus both narrative and interactive; it is a partly explicit, argumentative and interpretive kind of allegorical discourse.

2.6 Fables

Like parables, fables are a type of allegorical vehicle that takes the form of a narrative. According to traditional rhetorical studies, a fable is “a short narrative, in prose or verse that exemplifies an abstract moral thesis or principle of human behavior” (Abrams, 1999: 6). Let us first look at the text below cited from *Fables of Aesop*, edited by Handford and Robb:

(6) The Fox and the Mask

(a)A fox entered an actor’s house and rummaged through all his properties. (b)Among other things he found a mask representing a hobgoblin’s head — the work of a talented artist. (c)He took it up in his paws and said: ‘What a fine head! A pity it has no brain in it!’

(d)¶ This fable reminds us that some men of impressive physical appearance are deficient in intellect. (Handford & Robb eds., *Fables of Aesop*)

Fables consist of two parts: a story and a moral lesson. First, the example above tells a story (6a-c), and then it states a lesson (6d). Let us observe how each of the two parts are composed.

In the discourse of the fable, focus is placed on narration itself. The main part is realized in typical narrative form: a string of clauses describes an action or event, and their sequence implicates the chronological order of events. The story in (6) begins with the fox entering an actor’s house and his rummaging through his belongings (6a). Then he finds a mask (6b), whose detail is also specified with a

positive evaluation — “the work of a talented artist”.²² The next sentence (6c) is a direct quote: its appearance is evaluated positively (“a fine head”), while its lack of brain is evaluated negatively (“a pity”). Note that the title concerns only the characters that appear in the story, although this is not the sole option. It does emphasize the story, however, rather than the epigram that follows. In the case above, it would also have been possible to assign it a more general title like ‘Good Appearance without Good Content.’ The real title refers to the story without mentioning what comes after it. By doing so, the discourse of a fable can be characterized as a kind of narrative discourse.

After the story-part of a fable, a general idea is presented (Abrams, 1985: 6).²³ In (6) above, the end of the story is marked by the start of a new line with a paragraph symbol (“¶”). The phrase “This fable reminds us that” characterizes what follows as something we (the reader) already know. In the first part, the story of the fox is told in the past tense (e.g., “entered,” “rummaged,” etc.), but in the second, the present tense is chosen (“reminds”). The shift indicates that while the story concerns past events, the concluding remark is a timeless, general idea which may trigger the reader to interpret it as a universal lesson. Thus, fables extract a general view from a story.²⁴

The story and the epigram of fables combine to form an allegorical relationship. In (6), the mask is described and evaluated both in terms of appearance and ‘inner content.’ The structure of the mask is connected to the concluding remark through its great appearance and lack of brain which correspond to men of great physical appearance and their lack of intellect. The linkage between the evaluation of the mask and the author’s assessment of certain people is linguistically structured in a loose way with the expression “This fable reminds us that.” A closer reading gives an even more specific matching: the fine appearance of the mask corresponds to the impressive physical appearance of some men, and the mask’s lack of brain to a perceived deficiency of intellect. The mask’s fine appearance with “no brain” is structurally impressed onto people who have an “impressive physical appearance” but “are deficient in intellect.” The fable thus assumes a form of allegorical discourse with a story that represents a timeless, general idea.

The words and phrases that connect the story and the epigram in fables are also seen as a building rapport with readers. Whereas they are almost universally realized in a written form of discourse, they do

²² It is natural enough to infer from this phrase that the mask itself is well-made. In this sense, the latter half of (6b) serves to assess the mask positively.

²³ On the face of it, this characterization of the organization of fables is an oversimplification: fables can take several different forms in terms of the location of the lesson. The structural variation of fables will be explored in detail in Chapter 6.

²⁴ To put it in rhetorical terms, the story and the general idea forms a synecdochical (i.e., genus-species) relationship. That is partly why this study avoids defining allegory as a metaphorical strategy. Confining the strategy strictly to metaphorical ways of realizing discourse would exclude synecdochical fables such as (6) from my data set, which would unreasonably tear apart the genre of fable.

contain some fragments of direct interaction. The linking phrase in (6) above (“This fable reminds us that”) is designed as if the writer were actually articulating the final statement to an audience, as in a story-telling event. Note the presence of a deictic expression (“This fable”) and the inclusive first-person plural form *us*. In oral discourse, deictic expressions are used to refer to entities in situations where the speaker and the hearer are both present (cf. Huddleston & Pullum, 2002: 1451). The first-person plural pronoun *we* is appropriate when talking about the speaker and the hearer (or in some cases several others) as members of the same group.²⁵ Given these general functions, their use in written discourse gives the impression that the writer is talking directly to readers. Together, “This fable” and “us” act as if the narrator were telling a story about a fox first-hand, much like a conversational talk-exchange. With such linguistic devices, a general idea takes shape whereby the story is directed toward the reader. In this sense, the discourse of fables is perceived as interactional.

On the other hand, fables also leave interpretive room for readers. Realized in written mode of discourse, they are not exactly embedded in an ongoing talk-exchange with real-time interlocutor(s), which means there is no preceding context that directs interpretation. Their beginning is only marked by the title. Accordingly, how one interprets the concluding remark depends on each individual reader. In (6) above, the phrase “This fable reminds us that” introduces the epigram, but it does no more than explain the ‘point’ of the preceding story, not expecting readers know it already. In other words, it does not specify that the passage “some men of impressive physical appearance are deficient in intellect” is a moral lesson, thus allowing the words to serve as a ‘mocking reminder’ of that some people with good looks are intellectually.²⁶ In simple terms, fables just draw a general, timeless principle from an animal story with no directive as to how to take it. Still, they do so allegorically. Fables thus partly rely on the reader’s interpretive work. In this sense, the discourse of fables is interpretive.

In summary, the discourse of fables can be characterized as follows. First, they are narratives. Although the epigram may be introduced with linguistic devices that suggest the interactional stance of the writer, the main focus is put on narration, not on using the story to make a certain claim. Any analogy which is drawn implicit rather than explicit. The structural correspondence between the story and the epigram is only loosely stated. Finally, the discourse of a fable is interpretive, not argumentative. How to link the story and the epigram is partly left up to the reader. Fables therefore constitute a narrative, somewhat implicit and

²⁵ When used in this way, the first person plural pronoun is called ‘inclusive *we*’ (cf. Quirk et al., 1985: 341).

²⁶ The traditional definition of fables as stories that convey a moral lesson is therefore not completely accurate. Most fables cast their epigram as nothing more than a general idea, although some do indeed use the term ‘lesson’ to introduce the concluding remark.

interpretive type of allegorical discourse.

2.7 Allegorical Fiction

The last type of discourse realized with the allegorical strategy is a literary form that is traditionally recognized as a typical instance of allegory (Shaw, 1972: 12). Various works of fiction fall in this genre which as a whole represent particular events or situations in the real world. Classic examples include Johnathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* — critically mirroring the corruption of English society in the 18th century, and George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, which satirizes the Russian Revolution, and so forth.²⁷ In addition to novels, this type of allegorical discourse also includes works of different formats and media: poems, songs, pictures, films, etc. These can be analyzed as allegorical works in the same way. In this section, let us examine *The Pilgrim's Progress* as an example.²⁸

The official title — *The Pilgrim's Progress from this World to that which is to Come: Delivered under the Similitude of a Dream* — is a religious novel written in 1678 by John Bunyan (Greenblatt & Abrams eds., 2006: 2142).²⁹ The first part of the story is narrated as a dream sequence in which the protagonist, Christian, undertakes a journey from his hometown — “the City of Destruction” — to the Celestial City.³⁰ Its overall plot can be summarized as follows:

- (7) Christian sets out on his journey for the Celestial City, warned by Evangelist. On his laborious journey, he meets characters with names such as Hopeful, Faithful and Giant Despair, and passes through places like the Slough of Despond, the Valley of the Shadow of Death and Vanity Fair. Christian eventually reaches the Celestial City, where he is welcomed by angels.

(Abrams, 1985: 5; Semino, 2008: 65; Yokoyama & Ishido eds., 2006: 128-130)

Initially, the story of *The Pilgrim's Progress* can be viewed as a simple narrative. Let us look at an

²⁷ For allegorical interpretation of these and other novels, see Abrams (1999: 5), Cuddon (1982: 26), Kawabata (2009), Shimizu (2006), and Wales (1989: 17).

²⁸ The choice of this novel as the target of analysis here is totally arbitrary. The discussion presented in this section is applicable to other novels and allegorical works of other formats and media.

²⁹ Literary critics traditionally refer to the novel as *The Pilgrim's Progress*, and I follow this tradition here.

³⁰ The second part of *The Pilgrim's Progress*, which was published in 1684, deals with the journey of Christian's wife and children (Greenblatt & Abrams eds., 2006: 2142).

excerpt from the novel below:

- (8) Then Christian fell down at his foot as dead, crying, ‘Woe is me, for I am undone,’ at the sight of which Evangelist caught him by the right hand, saying, ‘All manner of sin and blasphemies shall be forgiven unto men; be not faithless, but believing.’ Then did Christian again a little revive, and stood up trembling, as at first, before Evangelist. (Bunyan, *The Pilgrim’s Progress*)

Each of the clauses in this excerpt describes an action of the characters, and their sequential order indicates the temporal order in which the events occurred: first Christian fell down, then Evangelist catches him by the hand, and finally Christian revives and stands up. The correspondence of clausal sequences and temporal order matches the Labovian definition of a narrative (Labov, 1972: 359-360). As in this excerpt, the rest of the story of *The Pilgrim’s Progress* is shaped in the form of a narrative.

Christian’s journey in *The Pilgrim’s Progress* is usually taken to represent a Christian worldview (Baldick, 1990: 5; Greenblatt & Abrams eds., 2006: 2142-2143; Semino, 2008: 65; Sloane, 2001: 20). As Semino (2008: 65) puts it, “Christian and his experiences exist literally in the fictional world (or, rather, in the narrator’s dream within the fictional world). However, the entities and experiences within this fictional world can be systematically mapped onto [...] the life and experiences of human beings within Bunyan’s particular Christian view of the world.” To illustrate, consider the excerpt below from the beginning of the novel:

- (9) I dreamed, and behold I saw a man clothed with rags, standing in a certain place, with his face from his own house, a book in his hand, and a great burden upon his back (Isaiah lxiv.6; Luke xiv.33; Psalms xxxviii.4; Habakkuk ii.2; Acts xvi.31). (Bunyan, *The Pilgrim’s Progress*)

In this passage, “the ‘Man clothed with rags’ is normally interpreted as corresponding to a man affected by sin; the ‘Burden upon his back’ is interpreted as corresponding to human beings’ tendency to sin; and the book from which the man reads is identified as the Bible” (Semino, 2008: 65). Similarly, the protagonist Christian is understood as representing people who believe in Christianity. Characters like “Worldly-Wiseman” and “Giant Despair” stand for people with the attributes indicated by their names. Place-names such as “the Slough of Despond” and “Vanity Fair” are likewise intended to be taken as symbols for situations which people may experience in their lives. Most importantly, Christian’s laborious journey from

the City of Destruction to the Celestial City signifies the process that believers must go through in the process of Christian salvation. Inasmuch as this corresponds to religious process in the real world, *The Pilgrim's Progress* can be characterized as an allegorical novel.

The matching between the fictional world and the real one is facilitated by elements embedded within the story itself. The names of both characters ("Evangelist," "Christian," etc.) and places ("the City of Destruction," "the Celestial City," etc.) signal that the novel intends to be more than a literal description of Christian's journey. References to the Bible such as in (9) explicitly add to the story's potential for intertextual reading. An allegorical interpretation of *The Pilgrim's Progress* is thus suggested in the story itself.

Although it is impossible to ignore the allegorical signals in it, *The Pilgrim's Progress* only qualifies as an allegorical narrative for readers who successfully recognize its references to aspects of the world outside the story. That is to say, its status as an allegorical work is not intrinsic to the story itself, but rather depends on how each reader interprets it (Crisp, 2001: 7; Semino, 2008: 65-66). According to Crisp (2001: 7), "[an] absurdly literal-minded person might read *The Pilgrim's Progress* as being about some oddly named people going on a journey." Such a person would merely enjoy Christian's spectacular journey without paying any attention to the allegorical signals, making no connection to the process of salvation in the Christian worldview. In essence, *The Pilgrim's Progress* only attains the status of an allegorical novel through the reader's interpretive work.

To sum up, allegorical works of fiction can be characterized as being narrative oriented. Only a narrative text is provided, with no prior context. Second, analogies are implicit: the allegorical signals are embedded within the story with no explicit guidance on how to interpret them outside the story framework. Allegorical fiction is thus interpretive, not argumentative. How to take (the point of) story largely depends on the interpretive work of individual readers.

2.8 Allegory and Allegorical Genres

In this chapter, we have shown how the rhetorical strategy of allegory works as a resource to realize different kinds of discourse. Let us now integrate our findings and consider how the different domains of five can be positioned in a single picture.

The five allegorical genres of discourse differ along three dimensions: (i) whether they are oriented to

discourse. It is narrative-oriented inasmuch as the whole text consists of one long story; it is implicit in that nothing outside the narrative leads to an analogical interpretation. As a result, its status as an allegorical text depends on how individual readers interpret it. All five genres of allegorical discourse can thus be characterized one set of three dimensions. Figure 1 graphically represents their features.

The discussion so far has focused on the inter-genre relationship of allegorical texts without regard to intra-genre variation — i.e., texts or strips of discourse — in each of them. In fact, there are divergent instances with various characteristics, as we will see in the following chapters. Proverbs are deployed and interpreted in a variety of manners in conversational talk-exchange, for instance (Chapter 4), and fables diverge structurally in how they relate an animal story and a moral lesson (Chapter 6). Nor can the borders between allegorical genres be drawn in a clear-cut way — rather, they overlap at the edge. In some fables, for example, only a story is narrated without a lesson at the end. Because they are narrative-oriented, implicit and interpretive, such fables are equivalent to works of allegorical fiction (6.4). Moreover, just as the allegorical strategy makes a claim in conversational talk-exchange, it is also possible to characterize parables as an allegorical argument. This chapter therefore serves only to sketch an overall picture of allegorical discourse in terms of three consistent measures: (i) whether they are oriented to talk-exchange or to story-telling; (ii) to the extent that analogies are made explicitly or implicitly; and (iii) whether analogies are aimed at argumentation or leave some room for interpretation.

With this in mind, let us now consider each of the five discourse genres in more detail. The following four chapters examine how each rhetorical discourse genre is realized.

3. Drawing an Analogy in Conversation: Allegorical Argumentation

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to investigate how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is employed in conversational interaction.³¹ As outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), previous studies have mainly paid attention to allegorical texts that are realized in the form of a story, in written discourse (parables, fables, allegorical novels). In fact, however, the story form is not the only format that shapes allegorical discourse, nor is written discourse the only context in which the strategy can be utilized. Conversational talk-exchange also offers a setting for allegory. This chapter focuses on this long-neglected domain of allegorical discourse, and specifies two central ways of talking allegorically in conversational settings.

The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes how allegorical talk is shaped in different ways of conversation: (i) with the form of a story (3.2.1); and (ii) through dynamic talk-exchange with an interlocutor (3.2.2). Section 3.3 attempts to understand how those two options are available in conversational settings, referring to the basic working mechanisms of conversation itself. Section 4 sums up the chapter and provides some future prospects for rhetorical research in general.

Before detailed analysis and discussion, it should be noted that the data used in this chapter are taken from two-party conversations from films and novels. There are two reasons for this choice. First, these media are a useful source for allegorical talk in that all one needs to do is to watch or read them. Second, they provide crucial background information necessary for understanding the dynamics of a given scene. Simply put, everything needed to analyze a conversation is offered in the movie/novel. On the other hand, if records of naturally occurring conversation were used, there would be huge difficulties in gathering instances of allegorical talk. One could never be sure whether speakers would produce allegorical utterances before recording. Focusing on natural conversation is thus quite difficult for collecting proper data. Although fictional conversations are somewhat different from those that occur in the real world, but it does not necessarily mean that such talk will not suffice for present purposes. The focus here is on the different ways of realizing allegory, and their relationship with the basic mechanisms of conversational talk-exchange. Conversational scenes sufficiently fulfill these basic requirements. Still, one could argue that the various ways of realizing allegorical utterances in fictional conversation are different from those in natural conversation, and hence cinematic data might seem inappropriate. Such potential differences do not make our proposed investigation valueless, however. Rather, if we find that fictional allegorical talk is produced in

³¹ The analysis and discussion in this chapter is based on Hirakawa (2018b).

distinct manners from the real world, it would be natural to pose the question: Why do such differences exist? In a sense, our analysis is a starting point for a broader study of conversational allegory. This idea will be further developed in the final section (3.4).

3.2 Two Ways of Talking Allegorically

As defined in the introduction, allegory is a method of talking about a certain topic by analogically drawing on the structure of another concept. Even though the notion itself does not specify the context in which it is utilized, it has traditionally been exemplified with literary texts in story form, such as *The Pilgrim's Progress* and *Gulliver's Travels*. The rhetorical strategy of allegory is employed in conversational interaction, however. Allegorical utterances are in fact constructed in two ways in this type of setting. This section offers a detailed analysis of how speakers use each way of “talking allegorically.”

3.2.1 Monological Direction

The first line of constructing allegorical talk is monological: the speaker builds his/her utterance allegorically by him/herself. This type of allegorical construction of talk is achieved through various means.³²

One major resource for shaping allegorical talk in conversational interaction is narrative.³³ According to Labov (1972: 359-360), narratives can be typically characterized as “[a] method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred.”³⁴ Consider the example below:

³² Note that this section does not attempt to present an exhaustive list of resources for monological realization of allegorical talk. Because allegory is not confined to particular sorts of resource, it is theoretically expected that allegorical discourse is constructed with a variety of devices. What is presented in this section is a couple of procedures for allegorical production of talk with some kinds of resource.

³³ This suggests affinity between allegorical talk in conversation and written, allegorical novels, because both discourse genres are equivalently realized in the narrative format.

³⁴ Whereas Labov (1972) observes interviewed narratives of personal experience in defining the concept, reporting past experience is one of many different goals of story telling. Stories are sometimes told with hypothetical settings as in (6) below, or in order to create a fantasy world with imaginary characters and events. The Labovian definition is, therefore, not the only option for formulating narrative. For a variety of definitions given from different perspectives, cf. De Fina & Georgakopoulou (2012: ch.1).

(10) (What was the most important fight you remember?)

When I was in fourth grade—no—it was third grade—there was this boy, he stole my glove.

He took my glove, and say that his father found it downtown on the ground. I told him that he—it's impossible for him to find downtown, 'cause all those people were walking by, and just his father is the only one that find it? So he get all upset.

Then I fought him. I knocked him all in the street. So he say he give. And I kept on hitting him. Then he start crying and run home to his father.

And his father told him, he ain't find no glove. (Labov & Waletzky, 1997: 10-11)

Asked to tell a story of his most important fight, the narrator begins by describing his experience, setting the scene in the initial paragraph. At the outset, the time, place, persons, and their activities and/or situation are usually identified to allow the hearer to properly understand the description of events that follows (Labov, 1972: 364). Such a set-up is essential, because a narrative concerns events that happened apart from the 'here and now' of the story-telling (Yamaguchi, 1998: 137-138).³⁵ In other words, it is quite hard to understand what is narrated without a set-up. After the "orientation" (Labov, 1972: 364-365), the story-teller produces several clauses in sequence, which signal the chronological order of what happened. In the above instance, the time shift is indicated with devices such as "Then," "So," and "And." A narrative thus mainly consists of two parts: a set-up and a sequence of events/actions.³⁶

This way of discourse realization is sometimes employed to shape allegorical talk. Let us consider the example below, cited from the film *The Dark Knight*. The billionaire Bruce Wayne has a secret identity as a masked vigilante, Batman, to protect his hometown, Gotham City, from mobs and criminals. As Batman, he successfully cuts off the gangs' money supply, but it urges them to strive to bring a corrupt city back again by terminating him. For that purpose, they decide to use a psychopath with crown-like makeup, Joker. He threatens Batman to reveal his true identity through a video footage where he brutally murders a police officer and declares to keep on killing one person of legal profession a day until the vigilante takes off his mask. Given the situation, Wayne talks about how to deal with Joker with his long-serving butler, Alfred.

³⁵ In Chafe's (1994) term, story-telling shapes the "displaced mode" of discourse.

³⁶ In fact, orientation and a sequence of events/actions (which Labov (1972) calls "complicating action") are not the only components of a full-fledged narrative. For more details of narrative structure, cf. Labov (1972), Labov & Waletzky (1997), and De Fina & Georgakopoulou (2012: ch.2).

(11) [WAYNE and ALFRED are watching video screens. Each plays the JOKER's video with different image treatments and sound tunings.]

WAYNE: Targeting me won't get their money back. I knew the mob wouldn't go down without a fight, but this is different. They've crossed a line.

ALFRED: *You* crossed the line first, sir. You squeezed them, you hammered them to the point of desperation. And in their desperation, (a)they turned to a man they didn't fully understand.

[WAYNE stops his monitors and walks toward the bat-cabinet.]

WAYNE: (b)Criminals aren't complicated, Alfred. (c)We just need to figure out what he's after.

ALFRED: (d)With respect, Master Wayne, perhaps this is a man you don't fully understand either.

[Looks at WAYNE.] (e-1)A long time ago, I was in Burma. [Starts walking slowly toward

WAYNE.] (e-2)My friends and I were working for the local government. They were trying to

buy the loyalty of tribal leaders by bribing them with precious stones. But their caravans

were being raided in a forest north of Rangoon by a bandit. [Faces WAYNE.] (e-3)So we went

looking for the stones. (e-4)But in six months, we never met anyone who traded with him.

(e-5)One day I saw a child playing with a ruby the size of a tangerine. (e-6)The bandit had been

throwing them away.

WAYNE: (f)So why steal them?

ALFRED: (g)Oh, because he thought it was good sport. (h)Because some men aren't looking for

anything logical, like money. [WAYNE looks at JOKER in the monitor.] (i)They can't be

bought, bullied, reasoned or negotiated with. [Leans forward slightly. WAYNE looks back.]

(j)Some men just want to watch the world burn.

[WAYNE stares at JOKER who is insanely smiling in the monitor.] (Nolan, *The Dark Knight*)

In order to demonstrate that Joker is a man whom Wayne cannot fully understand, Alfred tells a story from his past, marking its beginning with a tense shift from the present to the past (“is” in (11d); “was” in (11e-1)). He sets up the scene — spatially as well as temporally (11e-1) — and describes the situation that he and his friend were facing (11e-2). He recounts what happened logically, in chronological order (11e-3-6).³⁷ The initial “So” in (11e-3) signifies that the raid by the bandit not only preceded their search but also caused them to go on it. This implies that the failure of the bribes is unacceptable. “But” in (11e-4) likewise characterizes

³⁷ The term “logically” is used here loosely. It roughly captures the fact that Alfred clarifies why the characters in his story (including himself) took particular actions that they did.

the search as a failure, equating the length of time spent (“six months”) to the amount of effort. Alfred brings the story to an end with the news that he had unexpectedly found one of the stones stolen by the bandit (11e-5). In the final clause (11e-6), he reveals why he and his friend could never follow their tracks. Alfred effectively realizes his utterance (11e) in the form of a narrative, as it consists of a set-up and a logical/temporal sequence of events.

The story of the bandit is allegorical in that it functions as a basis for drawing structural correspondences. The relationship between Wayne and Joker is analogically captured through that between Wayne and the bandit. In the former, Joker is claimed to be a criminal whom Wayne cannot completely understand (11d); in the latter, the bandit turns out to be beyond Wayne’s understanding when he asks about the robber’s reasons for stealing the valuable stones (11f). Joker and the bandit are characterized as the same in that both are equally incomprehensible to Wayne. Their equivalence is even further specified after the story-telling (11g-j). Alfred answers Wayne’s question (11f) by referring to the bandit’s mindset in order to disclose his motivation for stealing the jewels (11g). He then explains why the bandit thought that way (11h) by pointing to a certain characteristic of criminals. This move contradicts Wayne’s characterization of criminals in general (11b-c, f). Alfred then elaborates criminal characteristics in more detail (11i), eloquently describing the principles that such criminals follow (11j). Although Alfred does not mention Joker explicitly in the post-narrative talk (11g-j), the phrase “some men” includes Joker as well as the bandit. Wayne’s gaze at the psychopath in the monitor clearly corroborates this. Joker and the bandit are thus both portrayed as two ‘chaos-loving’ criminals, ones whom Alfred argues are difficult for Wayne to understand. With this common feature, Wayne’s relationship with the bandit analogically corresponds to his relationship with Joker.

As told in an ongoing talk-exchange, the allegorical story constitutes an interactional move. Against Wayne claiming that criminals are simple enough to understand (11b-c), Alfred argues allegorically that he cannot understand Joker well enough, as he cannot understand the bandit in the story. The point here is that Alfred executes the narrative with a little twist: in the end, the precious stones unexpectedly lose their status as a target in the raid without further explanation (11e-6). Alfred designs his utterance (11e) in a way that leaves vague what the thief was after. Consequently, it invites Wayne’s question about the bandit’s true intentions (11f), which entails a failure to grasp the principle which the robber followed. The initial “So” indicates an assumption of the stones themselves as the practical aim of the robbery. This way of conceiving crimes or criminals coordinates well with his standpoint in (11b-c), which Alfred argues against (cf. (11d)). As a consequence, Wayne doubts the reason for stealing the jewels if indeed they were not the target, and provides a clear-cut example of criminals acting on a ‘strange’ principle. Realizing this, Alfred points out that

some men just enjoy bringing chaos to the world for its own sake, i.e., without any practical purpose (11g-j). By so doing, he demonstrates that he has a wider, deeper knowledge of criminals than Wayne, thus establishing some authority on the subject. Moreover, he does not verbally elaborate the relevance of this statement to the topic prior to the story-telling. The analogical correspondence between the two culprits underling the discourse implies that Alfred is talking about Joker via the bandit — as justified by Wayne's gazing at the psychopath in the monitor. Alfred arguably points out that Joker is someone who commits a crime just for fun, not unlike the bandit he once tried to deal with. It is therefore incomprehensible to Wayne, based on the latter's failure to grasp the bandit's aim (11f). This is in clear contradiction to Wayne's position concerning Joker (11b-c), and supports Alfred's position (11d). A narrative allegory thus serves to show Wayne's failure to grasp the bandit's aim, supporting the authority of the narrator's argument.

It is also important to understand *how* Alfred connects the narrative to his opinion of Joker. First, his claim (11d) is difficult to prove in a logical way: He has as little information as Wayne does about the culprit at this point, and 'proof' would logically require him to define what a full understanding of Joker really is. This would take the argument from the current topic to a more complex, abstract discussion. What Alfred does instead is skillfully connect his opinion and the narrative, using a typical strategy of initiating and closing a story.

Initially, he provides no explicit introduction to the narrative (11e-1). The position after expressing an opinion (11d) does, however, offer some support to his argument (cf. Canary & Sillars, 1992: 746). This means of initiating narrative starkly contrasts with cases that have an explicit preface, as in (12) and (13) below:

(12) (Were you ever in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger of being killed?)

I talked a man out of—Old Doc Simon I talked him out of pulling the trigger. (Labov, 1972: 363)

(13) ROGER: *Speakin about forties*. I worked on a k-o::n *Morganelli's Forty*. (Jefferson, 1978: 221)

In (12), the story-teller provides a sequence which encapsulates the point of the story in reply to the interviewer's question (Labov, 1972: 363). In (13), the narrator links the upcoming story to the previous talk: *speaking about X*. Oral stories are often prefaced with such sequences to establish relevance in current talk (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: 87-88; Labov, 1972: 370; Ochs, 1997: 194-195). This starkly contrasts with Alfred's way of launching the story (11e-1). Hiding his true intentions leads Wayne to focus on the

story, obscuring the non-logical transition from the claim to the narration.

After finishing the story, Alfred states a general principle about criminals (11h-j), derived from the bandit's case (11g). Notably, however, Alfred does not explain how he knows the bandit's aim. It is unlikely that he even has such knowledge, as he would not have a chance to ask the raider himself.³⁸ The statement (11g) thus amounts to nothing more than speculation, even though it is portrayed as a fact in the simple past tense ("he thought"). All along, his status as the narrator keeps his thoughts to seem reasonable enough. Alfred further classifies the bandit as the kind of criminal who "[isn't] looking for anything logical" (11h) as a means of explaining why he "thought" that way. He then proceeds to elaborately describe the character of such a criminal (11i). This classification preempts Wayne's belief that criminals usually have a practical goal (11b-c). Even so, it lacks a proper foundation.³⁹ Ending his turn, Alfred paraphrases more concisely the principle in a metaphorical expression (11j). The expression "watch the world burn" represents the joy of seeing people struggle in chaotic situations. With this destructive image, the sentence vividly illustrates what such criminals aim for in committing their crime, giving a strong impression of their abnormality. Thus although principle (11h-j) may seem to derive from the story of the bandit, it actually lacks a proper foundation. Nevertheless, with the authority he has gained by questioning the bandit's goal (11f), Alfred effectively advances his perspective on criminal types, supporting his evaluation of Joker (11d).

The example above shows how a narrative can encompass allegorical talk, providing a basis for allegorical correspondences, and the characters and events described in the story are designed to have an allegorical effect. Based on its correspondences, an allegorical story can then function as an argumentative device in the ongoing talk-exchange: it is not narrated for its own sake, but is rather aimed at persuading the hearer in a broad sense; it expresses the speaker's perspective on the topic, but also at urging the hearer to accept it.

Whereas a story of the teller's own experience may provide a basis for allegorical argumentation, its narrative format can also be utilized for different purposes.⁴⁰ Consider the following example from the film

³⁸ In a similar vein, the bandit throwing away the jewels he raided is not the only option possible to explain how the child got the giant ruby (2e5), from a logical point of view. In addition, it is not logically inevitable to recognize the ruby as one of the stolen stones, either. This obviously indicates that Alfred shapes the closing of the narrative for the argument's sake.

³⁹ In order to make a logically appropriate classification, Alfred needs to enumerate other examples of such 'illogical' criminals. In addition, it would be necessary to clarify the relation between their illogicality and the impossibility of buying them, bullying them, reasoning with them, or negotiating with them. Third, he would also need to explain how he could argue that such criminals cannot be treated in those ways based on the bandit's case, and how it is applicable to Joker.

⁴⁰ In fact, although Labov (1972) defines narrative as a method to recapitulate one's past experience, it is not confined to recounting actual events that the story-teller underwent. Stories in fact vary in content and structure (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: ch.2; Hyvärinen, 2015; Norrick, 2000).

Red Lights. In this film, the physicist Tom Buckley works as an assistant for a veteran paranormal researcher, Margaret Matheson. One day, his student Sally asks him about his job.

(14) SALLY: So why do you do this?

TOM: Do what?

SALLY: Investigate fake paranormal stuff. Don't you think it's a bit weird?

TOM: I just try to help Margaret.

SALLY: I mean, what for? (a)If someone claims to have powers and actually don't, who cares? Why bother?

TOM: Why bother? (b)If your mom was one of those people who went to see a psychic because, um, her stomach was bothering her and (c)the psychic told her that it was nothing, that it was just a, a touch of gastritis. (d)But then later on, you find out it was stomach cancer and it's too late to treat. (e)Do you think then you'd say "Why bother?"

SALLY: Did, did that happen to you?

(Cortés, *Red Lights*)

Here we see that Sally supposes that dealing with a psychic is not a physicist's business, as the word "someone" implies (14a). In response to her question, Tom establishes a hypothetical setting (14b-d), aligning Sally's mother with a bothersome stomach with a believer of a psychic (14b). He then addresses the ability of the psychic's 'diagnosis' to relieve her trouble (14c). The choice of her mother as the main character in this narrative serves to make Sally take the situation seriously as her own problem, which is further enhanced by the casual wording "your mom" instead of "your mother." In addition, specifying a seemingly minor ailment as a reason to see the psychic, Tom implies that anyone could be in that position. With a time shift ("then later on"), Tom then discloses the 'real' cause of her condition (14d), contrasting it with Sally's initial evaluation of a psychic through the use of "But." Having said all this, Tom asks Sally if she would still not consider claiming to have 'powers' in this setting (14e). Through his narrative, Tom structurally compares the relationship between himself and believers of psychics with the one between Sally and her mother, offering his perspective on them, and answering her question about why he took this job. All of this is based on allegory.

In the above instance, the speaker (Tom) does not literally narrate a story, yet his utterances do share important features with typical story-telling. As previously noted, he establishes a certain setting in (14b-c), briefly characterizing the people involved: Sally's mother with a bothersome stomach, and a psychic, and

their corresponding relationship (her mother's faith in the psychic, and his 'diagnosis'). A time shift is also indicated in the setting. Crucially, the sequential order of the two clauses (14c-d) correlates with the chronological order of the events they describe, i.e., Sally's mother first going to the psychic, and afterwards to the doctor. In an allegorical way, Tom's final question (14e) is positioned after her serious medical condition is made clear. At the same time, however, (14d) can be interpreted as a part of the hypothetical situation, i.e., it can be included in the preceding *if*-clause. Nevertheless, as a whole, Tom's utterance is like a narrative in that he constructs it in accordance with the time line of the events. As such, he draws on typical story-telling style as a resource for building the allegorical talk. A narrative format can thus be partially utilized in allegorical construction of talk.

Consider next a similar example where allegorical talk is realized in conversation, taken from the film *Swordfish*. Here, a US senator, Reisman aims to make his fortune by cooperating with an underground terrorist, Gabriel. He realizes that the FBI has detected their secret relationship. He calls Gabriel in order to shut down their plan and hide for a while, but Gabriel rejects it and declares his determination to achieve their original goal. The following excerpt is from a scene in which Reisman talks to his secretary Kaplan after hanging up the phone.

(15) REISMAN: Son. (a)Let's just say you've got a 200-pound Rottweiler. (b)Now he loves you. It's his job to protect you. (c)But if he ever bites you, even once, you gotta put him down. (d)You can never tell who he might bite next. You understand?

KAPLAN: Yes, I do understand, Senator.

REISMAN: I think we got a team on the West Coast. Uh, Fort MacArthur. Maybe they should pay our friend a visit. (Sena, *Swordfish*)

In the scene, Reisman tells a story about a hypothetical hound, Rottweiler. He mostly constructs the narrative in the second-person, inviting the listener, Kaplan (as well as the audience) to imagine the setting. Using this strategy, Reisman first introduces the Rottweiler as Kaplan's servant (15a). A Rottweiler is known to be a strong and dangerous type of dog, often used as a guard dog (*Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*, 5th ed.). Moreover, it is stocky and strongly built, standing at approximately 22 to 27 inches (56 to 68.5 cm) and weighing between 90 and 110 pounds (41 and 50 kg).⁴¹ Given this, a 200-pound Rottweiler would be quite exceptional in size and accordingly very powerful and dangerous. Reisman adds some other

⁴¹ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online (<https://www.britannica.com/animal/Rottweiler>).

characteristics (15b) to this hypothetical hound: it has affection for its master, and will use its strength to protect him. In this constructed scene, however, the hound turns against his master. Reisman then states what Kaplan would do in such a case (15c). The dog's bite would likely cause severe injury, putting him down sounds reasonable and acceptable, even if it is the only time it ever happened. Reisman further offers a reason for this treatment (15d): if a dog attacked the master he had once loved, there is no reason to assume that he would not do the same to other people — in which cases it is the owner who is responsible for any injury. In this way, Reisman shapes his talk through story-telling, designing it to enhance the listener's involvement.

The concise, imaginary story of a giant hound describes through allegory how Reisman wants to deal with Gabriel and why. The narrative comes after an unsuccessful conversation with Gabriel, hence the link between the story of the dog and what it means for terrorists is easy to discern. In his role as a 'protector,' the Rottweiler corresponds to Gabriel, whom Reisman expects to be loyal. The fact that the Rottweiler is a male (e.g., "he" in (15b)) also hints at the parallelism. In the overall correspondence, the inferred strength and danger of the Rottweiler is mapped onto Gabriel, suggesting that he too is potentially dangerous. The parallel mapping also serves as a resource on which to draw in interpreting the following sentence where the senator had to put down his otherwise faithful guardian just as the previously loyal Rottweiler bit his master (15c). Note that the senator's break with Gabriel following the latter's 'rebellion' is still not quite like a dog 'bite' in that it has not yet caused any actual damage the latter would result in instant carnage. The correspondence between Gabriel and the Rottweiler creates the impression that their separation really caused harm to their relationship, implying that quick, appropriate retaliation may be necessary. In line with this, the stated reason for putting down a defiant dog (15d) thus works as an unstated one for terminating Gabriel. However, whereas a vicious dog might bite people at random, Gabriel will not likely cause any harm to people with no intent, because hurting people is not the main objective. Terrorist though he is, he does not commit unnecessary crimes. Reisman's use of allegory skillfully hides this fact, and gives the impression that he is responsible for preventing his guardian from harming innocent people. The allegorical matching of a 200-pound Rottweiler with Gabriel is really just a clever way of dealing with him in a subtle manner.

The examples above clearly show that a story does not have to be told in complete form for allegorical utterances in conversational talk-exchange. Rather, its core features can be only partially exploited. Nor does the speaker have to tell a true story: instead s/he can establish a setting with imaginary characters to qualify as allegorical talk. It is also possible to describe a stative situation allegorically, i.e., without narrating a chain of events in chronological order. The narrative format is thus quite flexible in shaping allegorical talk.

The narrative format is a useful framework, but it is not the only option for shaping allegorical talk in conversational discourse. Allegorical talk can be launched with similes and metaphors, too. Consider (16) below, taken from Chris Karlsen’s novel, *Heroes Live Forever*. Set in 1356 Poitiers, France, two English knights, Basil and Guy, are making a small talk while preparing for battle.

(16) Guy broke the silence. “Do you think the battle will be as bad as Crecy, or worse?” he asked, as he studied their enemy who continued to form up on the opposite plateau.⁴²

“We’ll be lucky if it’s only as bad as Crecy. I imagine it will be much worse. You shouldn’t worry too much,” Basil said, eyeing the favors decorating Guy’s arm. “Half the ladies at court have lit candles for your safe return.”

“I’m not worried, not about the French. (a)I worry about the ladies. When I return, I must pace myself and some are bound to be disappointed.” Guy said with a broad grin.

(b)You’re like a fine gardener. (c)You go from flower to flower, cultivating the ladies. (d)I envy you and your garden. At least there’ll be one who will weep for you.”

“You speak as though there are none who would mourn you.”

“Only my brother,” Basil said. “I’m not like you. I never saw women as delicate flowers for me to gather. I gave them a rousing tumble or two and then put them from my mind.”

(Karlsen, *Heroes Live Forever*)

In reply to Guy’s remark about the ladies (16a), Basil compares him — allegorically — to a good gardener. He starts with a simile, “You’re like a fine gardener” (16b), establishing a correspondence between Guy and a kind of caretaker. He then specifies in what sense Guy is similar to a gardener (16c), focusing on his manner of treating ladies at the court. This line both elaborates and supports the prior statement with detailed correspondences. The one in (16b) evokes the image of Guy visiting a group of ladies, and “cultivating” them implies that he takes good care of them. This in turn gives rise to the image of Guy maintaining intimate relationships with many women of the court. To this, Basil adds another allegorical detail (16d), where “garden” stands for the ladies waiting for Guy to return safely. Even a simple simile thus can serve to launch allegorical talk by establishing an overarching correspondence followed by elaborative and/or

⁴² Crecy is the place where “a battle between the English and the French in 1346 near the village of Crécy-en-Ponthieu in Picardy, at which the forces of Edward III defeated those of Philip VI. It was the first major English victory of the Hundred Years War” (*Oxford Dictionary of English*, 2nd ed.).

supporting remarks.⁴³

Like similes, metaphors can also launch allegory in a copular construction. Consider the following passage, taken from the film *Mission: Impossible: III*. In it, Ethan Hunt, an agent of the Impossible Mission Force, gets caught by an underground arms dealer, Owen Davian. After Davian finishes torturing Ethan, the IMF's chief officer Musgrave shows up and reveals that Musgrave has betrayed the intelligence unit, secretly cooperating with Davian. The chief officer explains his intentions to Ethan.

- (17) MUSGRAVE: You grab Davian like he wanted, then what? (a) Davian's a weed. (b) You cut him out, two or more spring up just like him the next day. Arrest him? Then what? You use him. Collaborate with him. And it's Christmas. (Abrams, *Mission: Impossible: III*)

In explaining why he has collaborated with Davian, Musgrave portrays him as a weed, asserting that it is pointless to grab him (17a). He characterizes Davian as a weed-like person at an abstract level, leaving aspects of comparison vague. He then refines his definition, claiming that Davian is merely one of many criminals of the same kind by using phrases related to weeds: “cut out” and “spring up.” Given this characterization (17a), “cut[ting] him out” stands for isolating him from underground activities by arresting him, and “two or more spring up just like him” implies that similar arms dealers will take over his position. “[T]he next day” further illustrates how quickly and effortlessly he can be replaced by other dealers. Such elaboration makes the initial assertion more specific: grabbing Davian will lead to nothing because he is not the only agent contributing to the underground arms market, hence it is better to collaborate with him than take him down. (17b) thus serves both to enhance allegory and support the metaphor (17a). Allegorical talk thus arises from a copular metaphor establishing an overall correspondence, followed by elaboration of the

⁴³ This pattern of allegorical talk can be described with a central focus on the simile as a construction. Cuenca (2015: 163) concludes, based on a survey of a Catalan corpus for similes, “A [copulative] simile is a three-slot comparative construction, including a target and a source belonging to different conceptual domains, and an optional but frequent and highly significant elaboration.” In a similar vein, Dancygier & Sweester (2014: 145) state, “The primary feature of broad-scope [i.e., copulative] similes is that the simile statement itself does not provide enough information to let the hearer/reader identify the selected aspect of the frame. The nature of the projection is typically explained in the following discourse.”

analogy involved.⁴⁴

In addition to establishing similarity, metaphors and similes also contribute to the speaker's opinion on the topic at hand. Arguments in conversation often follow a basic pattern. According to Canary & Sillars (1992: 746), "[a] primary development sequence [occurs] when an agreement or a potential arguable (i.e., assertion or proposition) is immediately followed by support of the initial statement." Consider (3) below, where a wife (W) asserts that she and her husband (H) do not communicate well with each other:

- (18) 1 W: (a)That's a big problem too.
2 (b)We don't have good communication, probably none at all.
3 H: I would disagree. (adapted from Canary & Sillars, 1992: 747)

The wife first states her opinion in (18a) and supports it in (18b). The claim-support sequence becomes clearer if we paraphrase her utterance with a conjunction: "That's a big problem too, *because* we don't have good communication, probably none at all." It is possible to connect the two sentences causally, as *because* serves as a reason for the former. The claim-support sequence is a basic pattern of conversational talk-exchange. It is followed in monological allegorical argumentation, too. In (17), Musgrave tries to persuade Ethan to collaborate with Davian, first by casting him as "a weed." In (16), Basil evaluates how his friend treats ladies by characterizing him as a gardener. In each case, the following elaboration supports an initial metaphor or simile which can be demonstrated through simple paraphrase: Davian is a weed, because you can cut him out, and two or more will spring up just like him the next day; You're like a fine gardener, because you go from flower to flower, cultivating the ladies. The causal conjunction *because* naturally

⁴⁴ Previous studies have focused on the difference between simile and metaphor. Dancygier & Sweetser (2014: 146) states, "we could not use these similes as metaphorical predicative constructions, without *like* (*Life is a box of chocolates* or *Living is opening a tin of sardines*). It appears that expressions such as *Life is a journey* [...] trigger the connections between the source and the target without much contextual support, but *Life is a box of chocolates* does not." In a similar vein, Cuenca (2015: 147) says, "Similes are preferred to express unfamiliar analogies, while "A is B" metaphorical expressions tend to equate more conventionally related entities." Although they highlight differences between the two strategies, their functions are not so easy to distinguish. Compare (8) with (i) below, taken from the film *Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice*, where the speaker talks about a type of person in terms of a weed.

- (i) WAYNE: Criminals are like weeds, Alfred. Pull one up, another grows in its place. This [=the fight with Superman] is about the future of the world. It's my legacy. You know, my father once sat me down right here. Told me what Wayne Manor was built on.

Whereas the initial copulative sentences function as a similarity establisher in both cases, they differ in the choice of metaphor/simile. Metaphor and simile are, therefore, not always distinct in function. The relation between the two strategies would be an important and interesting topic in future research.

connects two sentences: the second one backs up the initial presentation of the first. Allegorical talk involving metaphors and similes thus draws on the basic pattern of argumentation.

It is necessary for some elaboration to follow a metaphor or simile in order to specify which aspect of analogy the speaker is focusing on. The absence of elaboration or further specification may cause the hearer to miss the intended meaning of the speaker. Consider an example of this below, a scene from the film *(500) Days of Summer*. Here, Tom and Summer (a female character) have been dating for a while. One day while waiting for dinner, Summer suddenly suggests that they stop seeing each other, claiming that all they do is argue.

(19) SUMMER: This can't be a total surprise. I mean, (a)we've been like Sid and Nancy for months.

TOM: Summer, (b)Sid stabbed Nancy seven times with a kitchen knife. (c)We've had some disagreements but I hardly think I'm Sid Vicious.

SUMMER: (d)No. I'm Sid.

TOM: [*Beat*] (e)Oh so I'm Nancy?

[*The waitress comes out with the food. TOM and SUMMER stop their discussion until the meal is served and the waitress leaves. SUMMER starts to eat.*] (Wbb, *(500) Days of Summer*)

Summer compares their relationship to that of the punk-rock bassist, Sid Vicious and his girlfriend, Nancy Spungen to support her suggestion (19a). That is to say, she references the destructive relationship of the rock-star couple to illustrate their own. This correspondence makes her talk allegorical. Tom reacts with admonition, stating what he knows about the couple (19b). He claims that he is not the same to Summer as Sid is to Nancy (19c). Summer then reveals that it is she — not Tom — that corresponds to Sid in her view (19d), much to Tom's surprise (19e).

In this scene, Summer's intended meaning and Tom's mis-interpretation of the allegorical matching turn out to be inconsistent with each other. It is important to note that the misunderstanding occurs because the analogy is only roughly drawn in (19a). Summer's allegorical construction offers two open positions to fill with an NP referent, but it is not followed by further elaboration as with the ones seen in (16-17). Such underspecification entails that Tom (and the audience) must figure out which NP refers to Sid or Nancy. Based on gender, Tom pairs himself with Sid and Summer with Nancy (19b), but fails to see how he could be like Sid (19c), as he has done nothing as brutal as stabbing his partner seven times (even though they did have some disagreements). On her intended meaning, however, Summer matches herself with Sid and Tom

with Nancy; her analogy does not align with gender, but rather to a relation of abuse between them. She states that she is Sid (19d), but does not address the issue of Sid's violence (19b). From her own point of view, she has hurt her partner in a way that is similar to what the bassist did to his girlfriend: that is what she intends to claim with the allegory. Perhaps because she did not elaborate or specify the correspondence, Tom misunderstands the intended analogy. This example clearly shows that elaboration is needed after a simile or metaphor to ensure that an allegory is properly interpreted.

In this section, we have observed how a speaker can realize allegorical talk in monological ways through various linguistic devices. Metaphors and similes with elaboration and the method of narrative are two useful resources for allegorical construction of talk. The former serves as a simple format for launching an allegorical utterance in a top-down manner, while the latter provides a structural framework that invites the hearer to allegorically 'experience' a situation or event. These patterns of allegorical talk are designed by the speaker alone, but the intended effect is always anchored in ongoing interaction, as will be discussed in Section 3.3.

3.2.2 Interactive Direction

So far, we have observed a couple of examples of allegorical talk which speakers shape in a monological manner in their own words. It is not the only way to talk allegorically, however. Allegorical talk can also be formed more interactively.⁴⁵ This section analyzes how speakers invite their interlocutor to engage in allegorical construction of talk in conversational discourse.

The first example is taken from a movie, *Shallow Hal*. Hal evaluates women based exclusively on their physical appearance. One day, he is put into a hypnosis that makes him see others' inner personality as appearing on their looks and falls in love with Rosemary, an amazingly beautiful lady to his eyes. Although he does not realize it due to the hypnosis, Rosemary is in fact quite flabby, a type of women he normally would never fall in love with. In order to show him the true figure of Rosemary, his best friend, Mauricio, gets him out of the hypnosis. Forced to be unable to see the beautiful Rosemary, Hal becomes furious at Mauricio.

⁴⁵ This does not mean, however, that allegorical talk is shaped non-interactively in the monological way. In fact, we observed dialogical aspects in the examples in the previous section: the use of *you* in (6-8) and interrogatives in (5-6). The interactive nature of the monological realization of allegorical talk will be further discussed in Section 3.3.

(20) HAL: You screwed me, man! I had a beautiful, caring, funny, intelligent woman, and you made her disappear!

MAURICIO: Oh, no, I didn't. I just made Rosemary appear. There's a difference. It's called reality.

HAL: Hey, (a)if you can see something and hear it and smell it, what keeps it from being real?

MAURICIO: (b)Third-party perspective. Other people agreeing that it's real.

HAL: (c)OK, let me ask you a question. (d)Who's the all-time love of your life?

MAURICIO: (e)Wonder Woman.⁴⁶

HAL: (f)OK. Let's say Wonder Woman falls in love with you, right? (g)Would it bother you if the rest of the world didn't find her attractive?

MAURICIO: (h)Not at all. (i)Cos I know they'd be wrong.

HAL: (j)That's what I had with Rosemary! I saw a knockout! I don't care what anybody else saw!

MAURICIO: Jeez, I never thought about it that way. Hey, I guess I really did screw you, huh?

(Farrelly & Farrelly, *Shallow Hal*)

At the core of the argument is the difference in the definition of 'reality' between the two. Against Mauricio's claim that he merely disclosed the 'real' Rosemary, Hal asks him what defines the reality apart from first-person experience (20a). Behind this question lies his view that one's own feeling defines what s/he perceives as 'real' for him/her. Mauricio answers the question by stating third-party perspective is crucial, which starkly contrasts with Hal's belief.

Given the opposition, Hal compares his relationship with Rosemary to Mauricio's relationship with Wonder Woman. Notice that he establishes allegorical correspondences not by himself but through continuous interaction with his interlocutor. He first briefly accepts Mauricio's opinion with "OK" and a preliminary imperative (20c) (cf, Schegloff, 1980, 2007: 120-123), and asks him his "all-time love" (20d). The question elicits Mauricio's words (20e), inviting him to contribute to the allegorical talk. When his friend replies (20e), Hal accepts it ("OK") and establishes a fictive setting based on it: Mauricio and Wonder Woman fall in love (20f). He then asks him another question to see if he wants others to share his evaluation of her (20g). Mauricio confidently denies that he would care what others say about his lover (20h), and adds that it is because he is right in properly finding Wonder Woman attractive (20i). The reasoning obviously suggests that Mauricio places more importance on his own feeling about his love than on agreement of other people as he initially insisted (20b). Hal quickly captures this and restates how he feels about Rosemary (20j).

⁴⁶ Wonder Woman is a female superhero that appears in comic books and graphic novels by DC Comics.

In this way, Hal invites Mauricio to the allegorical construction of talk through taking turns with a chain of asking (strategically designed) questions and accepting answers. Since Hal composes his talk of Mauricio's own words, he cannot resist his argument.

The persuasive force of Hal's talk also comes from his wording. In the first question (20d), the choice of the phrase "all-time love of your life" not only narrows down possible answers for Mauricio to give, but also assigns a special value to it: the answer could not be someone he just love in an 'ordinary' degree but must be someone he has always been in love with in his whole life. In addition to this, in the second question (20g), the intensive phrase "the rest of the world" most sharply contrasts Mauricio's evaluation of Wonder Woman with others'. From a logical point of view, the question could be answered either positively or negatively. It actually guides Mauricio to a negative reply within the allegorical framework, however, because Wonder Woman is characterized as the special one for him. A positive answer to the question would downgrade the special status attached to her, even though it does not lead to a logical contradiction. Since Wonder Woman is the all-time love of his life, it is consequently quite hard for Mauricio to admit that the disagreement with others would bother him. The lexical design of interrogative utterances of Hal, thus, rhetorically serves to frame Mauricio for accepting the subjective criterion of reality.

Let us look at another instance of this highly interactive way of realizing allegorical talk. The excerpt below is cited from Dan Brown's novel, *Angels and Demons*. In Vatican City, a new Swiss Guard, Lieutenant Chartrand comes across the camerlengo on a stroll. Invited to accompany him, the young guard starts a casual talk with the clergyman.

(21) "Father," Chartrand said, "may I ask you a strange question?"

The camerlengo smiled. "Only if I may give you a strange answer."

Chartrand laughed. "I have asked every priest I know, and I still don't understand."

"What troubles you?" The camerlengo led the way in short, quick strides, his frock kicking out in front of him as he walked. His black, crepe-sole shoes seemed befitting, Chartrand thought, like reflections of the man's essence... modern but humble, and showing signs of wear.

Chartrand took a deep breath. "I don't understand this *omnipotent-benevolent* thing."

The camerlengo smiled. "You've been reading Scripture."

"I try."

"You are confused because the Bible describes God as an omnipotent and benevolent deity."

"Exactly."

“Omnipotent-benevolent simply means that God is all-powerful *and* well-meaning.”

“I understand the concept. It’s just...there seems to be a contradiction.”

“Yes. The contradiction is pain. Man’s starvation, war, sickness...”

“Exactly!” Chartrand knew the camerlengo would understand. “Terrible things happen in this world. Human tragedy seems like proof that God could not possibly be *both* all-powerful and well-meaning. (a)If He loves us and has the Power to change our situation, He would prevent our pain, wouldn’t He?”

The camerlengo frowned. “Would He?”

Chartrand felt uneasy. Had he overstepped his bounds? Was this one of those religious questions you just didn’t ask? (b)Well...if God loves us, and He can protect us, He would *have* to. It seems He is either omnipotent and uncaring, or benevolent and powerless to help.”

(c)Do you have children, Lieutenant?”

Chartrand flushed. (d)No, signore.”

(e)Imagine you had an eight-year-old son... (f)would you love him?”

(g)Of course.”

(h)Would you do everything in your power to prevent pain in his life?”

(i)Of course.”

(j)Would you let him skateboard?”

Chartrand did a double take. The camerlengo always seemed oddly “in touch” for a clergyman. “Yeah, I guess,” Chartrand said. (k)Sure, I’d let him skateboard, (l)but I’d tell him to be careful.”

(m)So as this child’s father, you would give him some basic, good advice and then let him go off and make his own mistakes?”

(n)I wouldn’t run behind him and mollycoddle him if that’s what you mean.”

(o)But what if he fell and skinned his knee?”

(p)He would learn to be more careful.”

The camerlengo smiled. (q)So although you have the power to interfere and prevent your child’s pain, you would *choose* to show your love by letting him learn his own lessons?”

(r)Of course. (s)Pain is part of growing up. It’s how we learn.”

The camerlengo nodded. “Exactly.”

(Brown, *Angels and Demons*)

The conversation between the two characters pivots around a question Chartrand poses (21a-b). He doubts

that God is both omnipotent and benevolent, because there are a lot of painful events and situations in human society. His skepticism, consisting of three key terms as its crucial components: *love*, *power* and *pain*, is rooted in his recognition of the God-human relationship only from the humans' side, which is apparent in his use of *us* to refer to humans (21b). Aiming to dissolve the doubt, the camerlengo analogically compares the relationship between God and humans with that between a father and his eight-year-old son. That is, the camerlengo resolves Chartrand's confusion by talking allegorically. The allegory is constructed strategically in terms of three dimensions.

First, the camerlengo builds up the allegory in a way that makes Chartrand shed light on the topic in question from a different angle. His suspicion is rooted in the perspective he takes to see the relationship between God and humans, i.e., humans' perspective.⁴⁷ Given this, the camerlengo makes Chartrand see the God-human relationship from God's perspective by placing him in the father's position (cf. (21e)). In this regard, the camerlengo's choice of the age of eight plays a significant role of evoking an immature image of the child. This naturally invites Chartrand to "do everything in your power to prevent pain in his life." In contrast, if he portrayed him as, for example, 18 years old, the camerlengo would be unable to ask Chartrand whether he would do such a thing to his son, because an 18-year-old child would normally be expected to be matured enough to act more or less independently of his parents (moreover, it seems unconventional to call such a person a 'child'). Consequently, as a hypothetical father, Chartrand "would *choose* to show [his] love by letting [his son] learn his own lessons" (21p) even if it may cause pain to him, which means that he would not always prevent his son's suffering just because he loves him. In other words, he admits that the son's pain does not necessarily prove that his father has either no power to help him or no affection for him. Together with the overarching correspondence between the God-human relationship and the father-son relationship, it follows that the same is true about human tragedy and God's benevolence and omnipotence. Chartrand thus ends up solving his own question (21a-b) by seeing it through the allegory. Put differently, the camerlengo successfully invites the Swiss guard to take into consideration God's intention of letting humans learn their own lessons through undergoing painful experience, and thereby convinces him that the deity's benevolence and omnipotence are compatible with each other, even given the fact that humans experience a lot of pain (21p & r). Through the father-son allegory, the camerlengo thus changes Chartrand's vantage point from which to understand humans' relationship with God.

Second, the camerlengo does not draw the father-son analogy by himself in his own words alone, but

⁴⁷ The comparison of the God-human relationship with the father-son relationship would also be familiar to most readers of the novel, especially those with a certain familiarity with the Bible, where God is repeatedly described and called as "Father in Heaven" or simply "Father" (e.g., Matthew, 6: 9; Luke, 23: 34).

realizes it step by step through interacting with his interlocutor. After a preliminary question-answer sequence (21c-d) and an initial set up of the imaginary scene (21e), the camerlengo asks a couple of questions (21f & h), to which Chartrand gives a positive reply (21g & i). Thus he establishes cooperatively with Chartrand a bond of love between the guard and his imaginary son, and confirms that he would be willing to use the power he has to prevent his child from suffering. Based on the setting, the clergyman further asks Chartrand if he would let his son skateboard (21j). Though with a double take, the Swiss guard gives a positive answer again (21k), adding that he would give some practical advice (21l). Behind the specification lies his supposition that skateboarding may likely cause him injury. The camerlengo then asks another question about letting the child skateboard (21m), characterizing it as a summary of what his interlocutor has said up to this point, with the initial “So.” Chartrand in reply puts a restriction on how the camerlengo takes his prior utterances (21n), separating what he *could* do to his child and what he *would* actually do to him. Given that his summary is basically accepted, the camerlengo asks still another question (21o) to point out the possibility that allowing Chartrand’s son to skateboard might cause him to suffer a certain pain. The Swiss guard replies that skinning his knee would lead to learning to be more careful (21p), referencing the advice he would give to his son (21l). Then again, as in (21m), the camerlengo asks a summarizing question about Chartrand’s attitude to his son’s skateboarding (21q). Chartrand readily accepts it (21r) and makes a complementary comment (21s). At this point, he evaluates pain positively in regard to the process of learning/growing up in general, although it was the very cause of his confusion (cf. (21a & b)). Thus, Chartrand ends up dissolving his own doubt, in the lead of the allegorical interrogation by the camerlengo. To put it differently, he was guided by the clergyman to a new understanding of the contradiction between God’s omnipotence and benevolence, and as a result to understand that they are compatible with each other. In this way, the camerlengo incrementally makes his interlocutor understand the topic at hand from a new perspective through asking him a series of questions and summing up his answers, i.e., through inviting him to shaping the allegorical interaction.

Third, the camerlengo’s wording also plays a crucial role in persuading his interlocutor through the allegory-shaping utterances (questions and summaries). Most importantly, he employs the three key concepts in Chartrand’s doubt in his utterances. He constructs the first question (21f) with *love*, which serves to create an intimate relationship between Chartrand and his imaginary son with the bond of love. Also, he shapes the second question (21h) with *power* and *pain*, which attributes watchful attitude to Chartrand as an affectionate father to his immature child. In addition, the camerlengo asks him if he would do “everything” to prevent his child from suffering. This tacitly presupposes that he *could* do everything, in other words that he is powerful

enough to protect his child. Since a father is normally expected to love his child and do what he can to prevent him from suffering, Chartrand has no other option but gives a positive reply to the questions (21h). The father-son relationship constructed through the talk-exchange up to this point clearly suggests the basic relation between the deity and humans as typically described in the Bible. That is to say, Chartrand is positioned as a counterpart of God in the backdrop of the allegorical matching. On this foundation, the camerlengo proceeds to “skateboarding” (21j). The question also shows preference for a positive answer, because it is unlikely to lead to deadly consequences and hence it would usually be hard for a father to find a reasonable reason to forbid his child to enjoy such an activity. As a consequence, Chartrand cannot help but confirm that he would let his son skateboard (21k), only with some cautious advice (21l). In this regard, “skinn[ing] his knee” is a functional choice as possible injury Chartrand’s child might have. Although the scrape works in the allegory as a representative of the cause of pain humans experience, the counterparts are logically different on other aspects. In particular, a skinned knee may usually cause only a little bit of pain and heal up quite easily, whereas the human tragedy Chartrand mentions in the beginning, namely “starvation, war, sickness” will definitely cause a lot of pain and vital consequences. Given this, “skinn[ing] his knee” functions to avert his eyes away from those severe situation and put them under the simple term of ‘pain,’ thereby allegorically characterizing the tragedy in human society nothing more than a little cost to pay for learning. Following this, in the end, the three key concepts in Chartrand’s suspicion are referenced again when the camerlengo sums up his stance toward his son (“the power,” “your child’s pain” and “your love” in (21q)). By so doing, while superficially talking only about a father-son relationship, the clergyman lexically connects what Chartrand has said about how he would treat his child with his doubt to God’s benevolence and omnipotence. Here, he uses the term *choose*. It serves to confirm that letting his son make mistakes, even with the power to protect him, is Chartrand’s intentional choice. In addition, he characterizes the choice as an act for the sake of his love to him (“*choose to show your love*”). Here, the camerlengo indicates that a son’s pain is the result of his father’s choice and therefore compatible with being both powerful and affectionate, which provides an allegorical claim that humans are let suffer by the omnipotent and benevolent God. In this way, the camerlengo equips his utterances with devices that serve for persuading Chartrand through the allegorical talk-exchange.

So far, we have examined how speakers invite their interlocutors in the realization of allegorical talk. This may be accomplished by asking questions, but it is not the only option. Questions require the interlocutor to answer as the second part of a Q-A adjacency pair (Levinson, 1983: 303). This makes it easy

for the listener to participate in producing allegorical utterances.⁴⁸ From a rhetorical point of view, questions represent an effective strategy in that the interlocutor can be held partly responsible for any allegorical talk that may ensue. This is only possible in contexts where participants are taking turns. It is therefore not surprising that simple exchanges are excellent places to look for allegorical talk.

3.2.3 The Relation between the Two Directions

This section has observed how the rhetorical strategy of allegory can be deployed in a conversational talk-exchange. It turns out that there are two general directions in which this type of allegorical talk is produced. In one, the speaker can choose to talk allegorically using his/her own words alone, without asking the interlocutor for substantial commitment to it. The method of narrative and the copulative similes or metaphors with elaboration that follows are useful in this regard. It is also possible for the speaker to elicit words from the interlocutor that can be employed as a resource for drawing allegorical correspondences. In this direction, asking questions is a major method for drawing the interlocutor into an allegory construction of talk.

These two directions can be clearly differentiated in terms of their working mechanisms. They are rooted in various aspects of the context in which the speaker employs the strategy: conversational talk-exchange. This type of discourse has two basic features: (a) it is initiated and maintained by the reciprocal interaction between participants (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974); and (b) the course of interaction depends on what the speakers say in each turn and how they say it (cf. Johnstone, 2008: 157). Of these, the latter (b) is deployed in a monological direction. Because the speaker is allowed to speak freely in each turn, even being influenced by the preceding discourse, s/he can choose to build up an utterance with the strategy of allegory.⁴⁹ On the other hand, the former aspect of conversation (a) is drawn on in the interactive way. Since the speaker can expect a certain response from the interlocutor in the course of talk-exchange, it is possible to invite him/her to contribute to the allegorical construction of talk. The two directions of

⁴⁸ More accurately speaking, an interrogative utterance constitutes the first part of the question-answer adjacency pair, and hence contextualizes the next turn as relevant to it (Schegloff, 2007: 13-14). This means that the next speaker does not necessarily have to answer it. The next speaker can instead choose to refuse to answer or counter-ask a question, for example (cf. *ibid*: 16-19). Nevertheless, a direct answer is normally expected when a question is made.

⁴⁹ The content and composition of utterances are freely chosen not only in conversation but also in any occasion of language use. The freedom therefore pertains to how the other allegorical discourse are realized, and more generally, to the nature of rhetoric. The issue of choice of expressions and creativity will be further discussed in the final chapter.

allegorical construction of talk is thus licensed by the discursive characteristics of conversation in different manners. In addition, they also differ as to how they contribute to argumentation/persuasion. In the monological direction, it is easy for the speaker to draw exact correspondences as s/he aims. The speaker can totally regulate the process of association, as well as the whole argument. The interactive direction has stronger argumentative/persuasive force in that in the process of allegorical construction of talk, it utilizes the words elicited from the hearer as an (often pivotal) constituents in the whole association (cf. Wonder Woman in (20)). It does not mean, however, the speaker can always get the words or responses from the interlocutor exactly as s/he attempt. Since the interlocutor's reply is intrinsically independent of the speaker's rhetorical intention, it is certainly possible that an attempt to draw a specific response may fail, and an elicitation failure could possibly lead to a failure in the whole argument — as will be discussed in the next section. The two directions in shaping talk allegorically in conversational discourse are thus basically different from each other in discursive functioning.

On the other hand, the two are not completely disconnected. Rather, they overlap in that a certain situation, whether actual or imaginary, is depicted as a foundation of drawing allegorical correspondences. In Section 3.2.1, we observed that the situation establishment is achieved in the form of a story. A full-fledged story — with a setting and events/actions in it — can be told as an allegorical basis (cf. (11)), and it is also possible to draw on the narrative method merely as a resource to establish a situation (cf. (14-15)). The establishment of a situation as an allegorical basis is not peculiar to the monological direction. The questions the speaker asks in the interactive production of allegorical talk concerns the (often cardinal) components of the setting s/he is attempting to create. In (20), Hal's question about the all-time love of his friend seeks the counterpart of Rosemary, the love for his life, in the whole correspondences. In (21), similarly, the sequence of the camerlengo's questions focuses on the attitude and action Chartrand would take to his imaginary eight-year-old son, which allegorically represents human beings in the relationship with God. Thus, the monological and interactional directions are not separate but intersect with each other in that both establish a certain situation as an allegorical foundation.

3.3 Allegory and Interaction

An essential feature of allegorical talk is that it is, in any case, a product of joint action between interlocutors. In order for a use of the strategy to succeed, not only does the speaker use it, but also the hearer

needs to recognize his/her words as allegorical in the way that speaker intends, even when the monological direction is taken.⁵⁰ Whereas this works as a constraint for the speaker to talk allegorically, the interactive nature of conversational discourse allows him/her to monitor in the course of interaction whether his/her talk fails to gain a proper allegorical understanding by the hearer, and if it does, s/he can correct the misunderstanding. Recall the scene from *(500) Days of Summer*, where Summer insists that she and Tom should stop seeing each other, which surprises him:

(22) (=19))

SUMMER: This can't be a total surprise. I mean, (a)we've been like Sid and Nancy for months.

TOM: Summer, Sid stabbed Nancy seven times with a kitchen knife. We've had some disagreements but (b)I hardly think I'm Sid Vicious.

SUMMER: (c)No. I'm Sid.

TOM: [Beat] Oh so I'm Nancy?

[*The waitress comes out with the food. TOM and SUMMER stop their discussion until the meal is served and the waitress leaves. SUMMER starts to eat.*] (Webb, *(500) Days of Summer*)

Summer's initial simile (22a) provides two slots to fill in: Sid and Nancy. Tom associates the former with himself and the latter with Summer, with which he disagrees (22b), while her intention is that Sid should be seen as Summer, but not Tom (22c). The point is that the manifestation of the misunderstanding and the repair of it both take place right in the course of the talk-exchange between the two. Summer noticed that her partner fails to get the initial remark as she intended, when he showed disagreement with it (22b), and Tom realized his mistake when his girlfriend pointed it out (22c). It is characteristic of conversational discourse that the speaker can immediately monitor how his/her words are interpreted by the interlocutor and repair the wrong understanding if necessary (Schegloff, 2007: 100ff). In typical written discourse, on the other hand, such monitoring is not possible, because the writer is "more detached and impersonal" (Jahandarie, 1999: 139), and hence does not have an instant way to check if his/her words get across to the reader properly (cf.

⁵⁰ As is mentioned above (footnote 14), any utterance in conversation intrinsically has an interactive aspect. For more general discussion about the interactional nature of conversation, see Du Bois (2010), Jacobs (1987), Mazeland (2013), Nishizaka (2005a, 2005b), Schaeffer & Maynard (2005), Schegloff (1996), etc.

Chafe, 1994: ch.4).⁵¹ As a consequence, engaging in real-time interaction makes it possible to spot and correct understandings immediately. In this way, the use of the allegorical strategy in conversational talk-exchange is accomplished through cooperative sense making activities between speaker and hearer.

Another consequence of allegorical talk in conversational discourse is that it is open for denial, extension, or modification by the interlocutor. The excerpt below is cited from the film, *A Dangerous Method*. Two famous psychologists, Freud and Jung, talks about their analytic method and devastating criticisms it has caused:

(23) JUNG: But, might that [=criticisms to their psychoanalysis] not be caused by your insistence on the exclusively sexual interpretation, of the clinical material?

FREUD: (a)All I'm doing is pointing out what experience indicates to me must be the truth. (b)And I can assure you that in a hundred years' time, our work will still be rejected. (c)Columbus, you know, had no idea of what country he'd discovered. (d)Like him, I'm in the dark. (e)All I know is I've set foot on the shore and the country exists.

JUNG: (f)I think of you more as Galileo. (g)And your opponents as those who condemned him, while refusing to put their eye to his telescope.

FREUD: (h)In any event, I simply opened a door. (i)It's for the young men like yourself to walk through it.

JUNG: (j)I'm sure you have many more doors to open for us. (Cronenberg, *A Dangerous Method*)

The seminal point in the sequence above is that Freud uses the allegorical strategy in his talk. In reply to Jung mentioning the possibility that Freud's interpretive attitude might be the cause of the criticisms to them, the founder of psychoanalysis states that he simply derives the 'truth' from the materials based on experience (23a), and points out with confidence (cf. "assure") that the situation will be the same even after as long as 100 years later (23b). Following this, Freud refers to Columbus, focusing on the well-known fact (cf. "you know") that he believed that he had finally reached India, although in fact he had reached different land

⁵¹ This applies to traditional modes of written communication in which the writer and the reader are separate both spacially and temporally such as books and letters. This will require the writer to craft allegorical sentences more carefully than in conversation. Meanwhile, in modern electronical media such as e-mail and SMS, interlocutors are able to interact with each other quite as in real-time conversation, even though they are spacially separate (cf. Maynor, 1994; Miyake, 2005, 2012). This will allow the speaker to talk allegorically in more interactive manners.

(23c).⁵² He then describes himself as being “in the dark” (23d). The initial comparison marker (“Like him”) bases this on the similarity between him and the historical explorer, while leaving it unspecified what exactly being in the dark represents, on the other hand. In this similarity framework, he further claims to know that he reached “the country” that actually exists (23e). Even though the allegorical counterparts of “the shore” and “the country” is unclear, the psychoanalyst obviously maintains that he did find something new that no one had never even noticed, whatever it is. The claim is characterized as a mere fact with the verb *know*, which basically requires a factual object clause (cf. Huddleson & Pullum, 2002: 1008-1009). In addition, the verb in the formulaic phrase “All I know” suggests his confidence that he has at least discovered something new. In short, Freud thus puts forward his opinion about himself as a reasonable analyst while he may not be aware of what he has inferred from his materials, based on the allegorical correspondence between himself and Columbus.

In response to this, Jung provides a different allegorical perspective to see him, though not directly denying his allegory. He says Freud is more similar to Galileo than to Columbus (23f), and in the same vein, compares his critics with the people against the astronomer (23g). Here, the term *opponent* manifests his view about the hostile attitude of the people who criticizes Freud, and *condemn* calls to mind his quarrel with the Roman Church (cf. Minois, 2011: chs. 3-4). In the comparison, Jung mentions the condemners’ refusal to “put their eyes to his telescope” (23g). Note that the personal pronoun *his* is chosen here. With it, the phrase not only points to the fact that they did not literally look through the telescope as a scientific instrument Galileo developed (cf. Ito, 2013: ch.1), but also signifies that his condemners refused to observe the stars in the same way as he did, which clearly demonstrates that they criticized him and the results of his research without even considering his methodology. Simply put, their criticisms were inadequate. Given the correspondence between the astronomer and Freud, the claim applies to the psychoanalyst. That is to say, his opponents criticize him without even considering his analytic methodology in a scientifically proper way, and therefore their arguments lack reasonable basis. Jung thus portrays the relationship between Freud and his opponents in allegorical comparison with the relationship between Galileo and his condemners.

The counter-allegory is in turn evaluated by Freud in the next turn (23h). With the phrase “In any case,” he affirms it, though only reluctantly in the sense that it does not deny the similarity. In addition, he further describes his achievements allegorically with an image of the door. In the literal sense, the door works as a kind of barrier for those who want to get to the other side, especially when it is locked, and

⁵² For the general functions of *you know* as a discourse marker, see Erman (1987), Holmes (1986), Östman (1981), and Schiffrin (1987: ch.9).

therefore opening it makes it possible to pass through it. Given this, the door symbolizes a methodological obstacle in the field, and hence opening it evokes an image of a breakthrough that can lead to new directions of research. The adverb *simply* signals Freud's view that what he has done is no more than opening up new possibilities in the field of psychology, in accordance with the previous remark (23e). Following this, he leaves the task of walking through the door, i.e., developing his methodology and gaining new insights, to young researchers including Jung (23i). Through the door image, Freud thus expresses his attitude toward his position as a psychoanalyst.

His suggestion, however, is not accepted by Jung, drawing on the metaphorical image of the door. The young researcher insists with confidence (cf. "I'm sure") that Freud should open more doors for young researchers (23j). In other words, he should continue to show them further directions of analysis. Such an extension is possible as a consequence of the fact that it is produced in conversational talk-exchange, as described in recent research (e.g., Cameron, 2008, 2010, 2011; Musolff, 2011; Sugimoto, 2014; Sugimoto & Nabeshima, 2015; Sugimoto et al., 2017, etc). Seen from a rhetorical perspective, drawing on the metaphorical image created by the conversation partner constitutes a kind of argument by quotation (Mullholand, 1994: 297-299).⁵³Jung borrows the image Freud created and extends it, it is difficult for Freud to deny the extension. His attempt of denial would make him inconsistent, because he is the one who launched the metaphor, and there is no sound reason to forbid Jung to employ the same image. He cannot deny the young researcher's quotation of the metaphorical image, because speakers are generally required to be consistent in their argumentation (cf. Walton, 1996: 56; Walton et al., 2008: 134). Jung's request to Freud to continue research for young people like him is thus rooted in the basic principle of argumentation as well as the reciprocity of conversational interaction.

The example above obviously shows how an allegorical remark made by one speaker can be received by another in conversational discourse. It is not closed within the turn(s) of the speaker, but rather, once an allegorical utterance is produced, it is open for evaluation by the hearer. That is to say, s/he is required to show his/her stance on it (acceptance or rejection), if not in an extreme manner. S/he could modify or extend the given allegorical talk, or introduce a different allegory on the same topic. How the strategy of allegory works in each context, therefore, depends on how the hearer makes a response to it. In this sense, the use of it in conversational discourse is necessarily interactional.

To summarize, there are two consequences in the use of the rhetorical strategy of allegory in

⁵³ The argument by quotation of the metaphorical image created by the interlocutor can also be characterized as a weak version of what Kozai (2000:180) calls the "argument by drawing the opponent's claim to absurdity."

conversational discourse. Since talk-exchange is intrinsically interactional, an allegorical utterance is necessarily evaluated by the other participant(s). It may sometimes be understood and accepted as the speaker intends, while it may also be rejected in other cases. On the other hand, the speaker can immediately monitor how his/her allegorical talk is received by the interlocutor, and make amendments if necessary, exactly through the talk-exchange, which is beneficial for persuasive purposes. In any case, allegorical talk is realized on the fundamental mechanisms of conversational talk-exchange in which it is shaped.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter described how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is utilized in realization of talk in conversational discourse, based on fictional dialogues as data. It turned out that the speaker has two general directions to follow: (i) to complete an allegorical utterance in his/her own words alone; and (ii) to elicit certain responses with which to draw allegorical correspondences. The ways are equivalent in that (a) both are rooted in the basic mechanisms of conversation, where participants exchange talk, taking turns, and (b) they realize allegorical talk by establishing a certain situation as a basis for the correspondences.

The description and analysis contribute to the study of rhetoric in general, in that it focused on the use of the strategy in conversational discourse. The traditional rhetorical study has prioritized written texts as a central target of investigation. It is inevitable, however, to observe how rhetorical strategies are used between two (or more) speakers in order to sufficiently grasp their relationship with argumentation and persuasion, acts that intrinsically presuppose and are oriented toward communication with another person. Indeed, it must be admitted that the data examined in this study, i.e., dialogues in films and novels, are not conversational in the true sense, because novels are obviously a typical example of written genres, and films are created based on written scripts. Although these sorts of discourse may not provide ideal data, however, this does not mean that they are not conversational at all. As long as characters engage in talk-exchange with each other, the scenes *are* conversational and therefore, analysts can approach the aspect. The insight gained in this chapter should therefore be recognized as a first step to understand the functioning and mechanisms of allegory in conversational discourse. Though as such, this study is valuable in that it opened up a new field of rhetorical research by focusing on the conversational use of the strategy.

4. Citing a Conventional Wisdom: Proverbs⁵⁴

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the deployment and interpretation of proverbs in conversational discourse. In previous studies, several ways of using proverbs have been offered, but there is one kind of proverb usage that has gone unnoticed. This chapter refers to it as the ‘receptive use,’ and explores its characteristics from a rhetorical point of view. To take a brief grasp of the new usage, let us look at an example.

Below is an excerpt taken from *Goldfinger*, a film in the *007* series. The boss of an underground organization, Goldfinger, captures James Bond, a British secret service agent, who infiltrated his syndicate. While talking with his right-hand subordinate, Pussy, about the money he and his organization are planning to gain, he receives a report that a few of Bond’s associates are maintaining surveillance over them. Goldfinger orders her to pretend to be spending some enjoyable time with the spy, in order to send them away by showing them as if his infiltration were going fine:

(24) GOLDFINGER: We were quite right to spare Mr. Bond’s life in Switzerland. If those gentlemen are his friends, let us convince them he needs no assistance. For their benefit, Pussy, let’s make him as happy as possible. I suggest you change into something more suitable.

PUSSY: [*smiling*] Certainly. Business before pleasure.

[*PUSSY stands up to leave. GOLDFINGER chortles.*] (Hamilton, *Goldfinger*)

Citing the underlined proverb, Pussy indicates that she understood Goldfinger’s instruction. In conversation, proverbs can be used in such a receptive way, i.e., to show how the speaker has received the opinion or assertion of the interlocutor.

The receptive use starkly contrasts with other usage types that have been described in previous studies, which all display the speaker’s own perspective on the situation or discursive topic. To reach a fuller understanding of proverbs’ functioning in conversation, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of this new usage, and its relation to the existent types. The main features of this usage are: (i) that the speaker applies a proverb to his/her interlocutor’s utterance/opinion in order to demonstrate how s/he received it; (ii) s/he attributes the social authority of the proverb to the utterance/opinion; and (iii) the proverb use is further evaluated by the producer of the original utterance/opinion as to whether the speaker’s understanding of it is

⁵⁴ An earlier version of this chapter were presented in Hirakawa (2017).

appropriate. Significantly, it sheds light on the receptive aspect of talk-exchange, in contrast to earlier studies focusing almost exclusively on the speaker of the proverb. This clearly illustrates how different ways of proverb use reflect different dimensions of conversational discourse, where two or more people interact interchangeably in real time on a certain topic in a particular situation.

The discussion proceeds as follows. The next section (4.2) reviews previous research on how proverbs are used in conversation. Section 4.3 describes the receptive use through detailed data analysis, pointing out that the usage type is different from the ones previously illustrated. Section 4.4 shows the relationship between the receptive use and the others, presenting a schematic model to characterize all the usage types that appear in conversational discourse. Section 4.5 discusses the significance of the receptive use to paremiology (the study of proverbs) and the study of rhetoric in general. The final section sums up the whole analysis and discussion, and provides future prospects.

4.2 Literature Review

Before examining the receptive use, this section reviews what is known about the use of proverbs in conversational discourse. Overall, proverbs pertain both to the expression of the speaker's perspective on the situation or the discursive topic, and to the organization of the talk-exchange the speaker is engaging in. Focusing on the former aspect, Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 illustrate two existing usage types in order to demonstrate that the receptive type does not belong to either of them. In the process, it is also discussed what allows for those ways of proverb use, as a preparation for clarifying the relationship between the receptive use and the other two. The final section shows, with the focus on the latter of the two aspects, that the receptive use leads to the same discursive structure.

4.2.1 Affirmation with Proverbs

The first class of proverb use in conversational discourse is what Norrick (1985: ch.2) calls "direct application." It refers to cases where the speaker applies a proverb to the situation at hand, without putting an emphasis on evaluating it (Norrick, 1985: 16). By quoting a proverb without evaluative tone, the speaker points out that the specific situation s/he is facing corresponds exactly to the proverb's "base meaning"

(Kirshenblatt-Gimblet, 1973/1981: 119). Below is an example that Norrick (1985: 17) cites from Hain (1951: 52):⁵⁵

(25) Das Bauernmädchen M. tritt in das Haus der Freundin, wo gerade einige Mädchen zusammensitzen und allerlei Dorfneuigkeiten austauschen. Soeben hat man von M.'s Liebschaft erzählt und empfängt nun die Ahnungslose mit schallendem Gelächter. Auf ihre Frage tönt es ihr mehrstimmig entgegen: Wammer vom Hoas schwätzt, kimmt er aus de Hegge. (Wenn man vom Hasen Schwätzt, kommt er aus der Hecke.) (Hain, 1951: 52)

[Farm girl M. enters the home of a girl-friend, where several girls are sitting together exchanging the newest gossip from the village. They had just been talking about M.'s current liaison and now greet her with resounding laughter. Her question is answered in chorus with: Speak of the hare and he comes out of the hedge.] (Norrick, 1985: 17)

The underlined proverb corresponds to the English proverb, *Speak of the devil, and he will/shall appear* (Norrick, 1985: 17; Takeda, 1992a: 52). “speak of the devil” corresponds to the girls’ talk about M, and “he comes out of the hedge” to her appearance on the spot, with “and” signifying the temporal order between the two events. Their proverbial utterance shows that their laughter was triggered by the emergence of a situation to which the proverb is typically applicable. That is, they laughed because M showed up exactly while they were talking about her. In the process, the proverb is referenced as a framework to construe the situation that emerged in front of the speakers. The girls recognized — maybe coincidentally — the appearance of M through the same proverb as a cognitive lens, and that is why they were able to cite it in chorus. The focus is thus on affirming the proverb’s applicability to the situation at hand. Given this, let us call this type of proverbial utterance the “affirmative use.”

The applicability of proverbs in general is rooted in their status as a kind of resource to classify situations. The essence of proverbs is that they “serve to interpret situations that are reasonably complex, equivocal, and either adversarial or potentially so, resolving their ambiguities by classifying them as being of a certain sort. Proverbs, thus, are used to disambiguate complex situations and events” (Lieber, 1994: 101).

⁵⁵ Italicization in the German data originates in Hain (1951), while the English translation is by Norrick (1985). With the help of the translation, however, Norrick’s illustration of the usage types is in fact quite difficult to understand. This is because he cites conversational data in German with his English translation, without providing any further contextual information or supplementary comments on the proverbs in the data. The following review and discussion on Norrick’s classification, therefore, inevitably depends on my own interpretation of the data and his brief commentary.

In this sense, they are typological “strategies for dealing with *situations*” (Burke, 1973: 296-297; emphasis original).⁵⁶ This works as the foundation for their applicability to new situations. It allows for the characterization of a particular situation as one of many other cases of the same kind, rather than as a unique, one-time-only event. By applying a proverb to the situation in front of him/her, therefore, the speaker can describe it as “one of many other cases under a more general principle” (Sato, 1987: 238). The affirmative use is a way to typologically recognize and characterize the situation with proverbs.

4.2.2 Assertion with Proverbs

The general applicability of proverbs can also be deployed for assertion with various degrees of persuasive force. This usage type includes, first of all, what Norrick calls “evaluative comment,” cases where proverbs are applied to the situation or the interlocutor’s remark in order to display the speaker’s evaluation (Norrick, 1985: 13). The following is an example of this usage that Norrick (1985: 14-15) cites from Hain (1951: 32-33):

- (26) Zwei ältere Bäuerinnen unterhalten sich über den Junglehrer des Dorfes, seine Leistung in der Schule und sein karges Gehalt. Besonders Frau X. weiß Bescheid, sie kennt ihn und seine bescheidenen Verhältnisse. X.: *Er ess hoard gescheit!* (Er ist sehr klug.) K. lauscht zunächst nachdenklich und sagt dann langsam: *Aich saan als, wer de Hoawwern vvedint hot, kritt en näid.* (Ich sage immer, wer den Hafer verdient hat, kriegt ihn nicht.) Darauf X. lebhaft zustimmend: *Joa, so ess!* Das Thema ist damit endgültig abgeschlossen, der Einzelfall ist ins Allgemeine erhoben.

(Hain, 1951: 32-33)

[Two elderly farm women are talking about the new teacher in the village, what he has accomplished in the school and his meager wages. Especially Mrs. X. is informed. She knows him and is familiar with his modest living conditions. X.: *He’s very bright!* K. listens at first reflecting and then says slowly: *I always say, he who earns the oats doesn’t get them.* X. agrees energetically: *Yeh, that’s right!* The topic is thus closed for good, the individual case has been raised to the general level.]

(Norrick, 1985: 14-15)

⁵⁶ The proverbs’ status as a framework for typological recognition of situations is also discussed by Goodwin & Wenzel (1981: 142), Seitel (1981: 130) and Takeda (1992b: 213).

The underlined proverb seems to mean that working harder may not necessarily lead to a wealthier life. In this interpretation, “he who earns the oats” corresponds to the new teacher in the village, and “doesn’t get them” to K’s comment that he receives a pitiful salary in spite of his brilliant academic career. By using the proverb, “K. makes an evaluative comment with didactic tone on the topic of conversation” (Norrick, 1985: 15). Proverbs can thus allow the speaker to make an evaluation.

In addition, it is also possible to use proverbs as a support for an argument. This sort of proverb use is one sub-type of Norrick’s “evaluative argument.” Look at the example Norrick (1985: 16) cites from Hain (1951: 48):

(27) Familienehre verteidigt die alte Großmutter D., die von der “Mußheirat” eines Mädchens erzählt, dessen Eltern den Schwiegersohn ablehnen. *Däi Aale schenn. Däi wenn den ned huu. Mr derf sech näidd uffs Maul haje. Des batt naud. Bei uns woar’s aach suu.* (Die Alten schimpfen. Die wollen den nicht haben. Man darf sich nicht selbst aufs Maul schlagen. Das nützt nichts. Bei uns war’s auch so.) (Hain, 1951: 48)

[Old grandmother D. defends the honor of the family; she is talking about the “shotgun wedding” of a girl whose parents reject the son-in-law. *The parents grumble. They don’t want to have him. You shouldn’t hit yourself in the mouth. That doesn’t help. The same thing happened to us.]*

(Norrick, 1985: 16)

The underlined proverb seems to mean that you should avoid doing things that may be likely to bring about negative results to yourself. In this interpretation, “You” corresponds to the bride’s parents who rejects the bridegroom, and “shouldn’t hit yourself in the mouth” to the speaker’s claim that the denial will not bring peaceful results to them, respectively. Based on the allegorical correspondences, D employs it as a support for her claim that if the pregnant girl’s parents refuse to welcome him into their family, it will not help them lead a happy life. Proverbs can thus be employed to back up the speaker’s opinion, displaying his/her stance.

Moreover, proverbs are available for putting forward an opinion, as well as just a support for an opinion. Consider (28) below, an excerpt from the film *Some Kind of Wonderful*. Keith wants to get close to Amanda, the most popular girl at his high school, and talks to Watts, his closest friend, about his affection for her. She states that it is impossible for him to have such a relationship. In fact, Watts is in love with Keith, but he does not even imagine her feeling. Against Keith claiming that Watts would never know how he feels

about Amanda, she argues back that she does:

(28) WATTS: I know how you feel.

KEITH: Oh, you do, really? You've been in love before?

WATTS: There's a lot of things you don't know about me.

KEITH: Really? ^(a)Who have you ever been in love with?

WATTS: ^(b)Huh! You want to abuse yourself, be my guest.

KEITH: Hey, Watts, ^(c)nothing ventured, nothing gained, right?

WATTS: Keith, ^(d)once a fool, always a fool, right? (Deutch, *Some Kind of Wonderful*)

Keith tries to find Watts' past love (28a), but she warns that it will hurt him (28b). Still attempting to make her confess the guy, he cites a proverb (28c). In reply, Watts also employs another proverb to counter-argue him (28d).

Keith's proverb is aimed at persuasion of Watts, in which "nothing ventured" corresponds to avoiding the risk that she warns he has to take to hear her romantic experience, and "nothing gained" to the failure to know the name of the guy in question. That is, his proverbial remark can be paraphrased like this: if he avoids taking the risk of getting hurt as Watts warns, he cannot make her speak. Based on the allegorical matching, Keith claims to be willing to know her past love and ready to get hurt as a consequence. To counter-argue, Watts employs another proverb, which is allegorical in two ways. First, "once a fool" corresponds to her confession of her romantic experience (and its results), and "always a fool" to the future conditions it will likely produce. In addition, the first half represents Keith's taking the risk of getting hurt, and the second stands for her opinion that the wound will not heal quite long. On this doubly-allegorical foundation, she resists changing her mind, suggesting that it is also better for him that she keeps silent.⁵⁷ Thus, the two proverbs (28c & d) crucially contributes to claim-making itself, rather than just supporting each speaker's opinion. Like this, proverbs are available as a persuasive device.

The three examples above are different in how forcefully the speaker attempts to make the interlocutor accept his/her perspective by using proverbs. In (26), the proverb merely displays K's stance, with little or almost no persuasive force. In (27), the proverb is used to support D's opinion, as a part of the whole argument. In (28), each proverb is cited in conflict to put forward the speaker's claim, in an attempt to

⁵⁷ Together her previous remark (12b), Watts' proverb (12d) serves not only to make a claim to her immediate interlocutor, but also to provide the audience with an interpretive cue to notice that she is teasing him about his insensitivity to her feeling, suggesting that "a fool" in fact refers to Keith.

persuade the opponent to change his/her mind and accept the speaker's opinion. This does not mean, however, that they should be recognized as distinct usage types. Rather, all of them can be grouped in the same group because in all of them, proverbs equivalently serve to display the speaker's perspective (i.e., stance, evaluation, or opinion) on the situation or discursive topic. The apparent difference between them can be seen as a matter of degree: how strong persuasive force proverbs carry. In the most persuasive cases, proverbs forcefully contribute to the persuasion of the hearer to accept the speaker's view, while in less persuasive contexts, they function as an evaluative frame of reference to express the speaker's stance. Given the same basic function, this study categorizes all such uses as a single usage type, the "assertive use."

The foundation of the assertive use resides in intimate relationship between proverbs and social authority. Proverbs are unlike simple constatives in that their utterances invoke an authority beyond that of individual speakers (Cram, 1994: 86). As noted above, in general, proverbs are applicable to various situations as a frame of reference through which to typologically recognize and characterize them, based on the presupposition that similar situations have occurred countless times before. They are not just a cognitive lens, however. As "traditional item[s] of the folklore of the community" (Norrick, 1985: 149), they encapsulate traditional wisdom to deal with typological situations that regularly occur (Burke, 1973: 296-297; Takeda, 1992a: ch.2). More generally, proverbs recommend accepting what happened with resignation, claiming "That's just the way things are, and that's all there is to it" (Cram, 1994: 90; also cf. Seto, 1988: 115-120). Simply put, proverbs "serve as secular past precedents for present action" (Arewa & Dundes, 1964: 71).⁵⁸ As such, proverbs are assumed to "carry the force of time-tested wisdom, and the speaker can draw on this traditional authority" (Norrick, 1994: 149), and treated as permanent truisms in actual use (Barajas, 2010: 104; Sacks, 1992: 110; Yankah, 1994: 3386). Citing proverbs therefore allows the speaker to "add authority and credibility to his [/her] utterance by identifying himself [/herself] with traditional wisdom, beliefs and prejudices of the community at large" (Norrick, 1985: 28), thereby placing him/her in "a one-up position vis-à-vis his [/her] hearer" as a consequence (Norrick, 1994: 150). The assertive use of proverbs is, therefore, a way of showing the speaker's perspective on the situation on the basis of their social authority.⁵⁹

One significant consequence of the authoritative character of proverbs is that they are fundamentally

⁵⁸ This is why the use of proverbs counts as the argument by precedent, or *argumentum ad verecundiam* (Lanham, 1991: 21).

⁵⁹ Note, however, that "the logic or message in the speaker's viewpoint and that in the proverb may not necessarily be identical, but the speaker here exploits the traditionality of the proverb, its flexibility and metaphorical character; he in fact exploits the wisdom of many to assert his personal wit" (Yankah, 1994: 133).

irresistible.⁶⁰ Since proverbs are recognized as carrying “‘anyone’s knowledge,’ part of the stock of ordinary taken-for-granted common sense,” to question or argue against them is “to run the risk of challenging the shared cultural membership” (Kitzinger, 2000: 128; also cf. Mullholland, 1994: 287). For example, consider the following excerpt from *(500) Days of Summer*. In the scene, McKenzie and Paul attempt to soothe their best friend, Tom, when they heard from him that his girlfriend wanted to leave him:

(29) MCKENZIE: So, you’ll meet somebody new. Point is, you’re the best guy I know. You’ll get over her.

PAUL: (a)I think it’s kind of like how they say. It is uh, (b)there’s plenty of other fish in the sea.

TOM: (c)No.

PAUL: (d)They say that.

TOM: (e)Well, they’re lying. I don’t want to get over her. I want to get her back.

(Webb, *(500) Days of Summer*)

In the process of soothing Tom, Paul cites a proverb (29b), in which “fish” represents women and “the sea” symbolizes the society or the world at large. Based on the matching, he points out that his girlfriend is not the only woman in the world with whom Tom could have a relationship. Notice that he prefaces the proverb with the phrase “how they say” (29a), attributing the statement to general public.⁶¹ That is, Paul is attempting to convince his friend that it is possible for him to start a new relationship with another woman, with the authoritative support of the proverb. His attempt does not succeed, however: Tom simply rejects his proverbial assertion (29c). Paul then emphasizes the proverb’s trueness, showing it is what ‘they’ say but not his personal, idiosyncratic opinion, and that it is a general statement in the present tense (29d). Given this, however, Tom still does not accept the proverbial wisdom, insisting that it is a lie (29e), and tacitly restrain himself from committing to the time-tested knowledge. Although Paul’s assertion with the proverb might seem to be resisted, Tom’s insistence does not count as a substantial resistance against it. What Tom does in the sequence above is nothing more than stating that the proverb tells a lie. He denies the trustworthiness of the statement, but does not provide support for the negative claim. Tom’s attempt to resist Paul’s proverb is, therefore, not successful. It is important to notice at this point that Tom’s failure is inevitable. In order to

⁶⁰ Resisting proverbs is not impossible in any way, however. One, or perhaps the only, way is to employ another, as in (28).

⁶¹ Other discourse markers for proverb use include ‘they say’ ‘as the saying goes’ ‘it is said’ ‘you know’ etc. (Takeda, 1999a; Yankah, 1994a: 3388).

deny the proverbial assertion, it is required to prove that Tom cannot fall in love with any other women in the world, providing compelling reasons for each woman. This is impossible, of course. The general assumption that proverbs encapsulate true knowledge thus makes it impossible to resist assertion supported with them.

4.2.3 Proverb Use and Discursive Structure

In conversation, proverbs can be utilized to organize talk-exchange. In the following instance from Hain (1951: 33, (2), b) quoted in Norrick (1985: 15), a proverb is cited to conclude a story:

- (30) Die etwa fünfzigjährige Kleinbäuerin B. erzählte, wie sie viel Unglück mit den Kühen hatte. Als aber im letzten Jahr wiederum eine verkalbte, wurden alle Tiere versichert. Sie schloß ihre erregte Erzählung ruhig, fast resigniert: Wann's Kend gehowwe ess, gitt's Gevadderlaut! (Wenn das Kind aus der Taufe gehoben ist, gibt's Gevatterleute.) (Hain, 1951: 33, (2), b)

[The approximately fifty year old farm woman B. was talking about the trouble she had had with her cows. But when last year another lost its calf, she had had all the cattle insured. She ended her narrative quietly, almost resignedly: Once the child's been baptized there are godparents!]

(Norrick, 1985: 15)

The underlined proverb seems to mean that anything signals the cause of it. In this understanding, “the child's been baptized” corresponds to the fact that B insured all her cattle, and “there are godparents” to the trouble she had faced before that, respectively. Given the allegorical matching, B seems to illustrate that she had insurance on her cattle exactly because she had trouble that caused her to make such a decision, just as a child has a baptized name exactly because s/he has godparents. By quoting the proverb at the end of the story-telling, B not only evaluates her experience but also close the narration up to the point. Proverb use thus contributes to sum up a narrative.

More generally, proverbs as well as idiomatic expressions in general are cited for closing current topic

and move to a next one.⁶² Consider the example below:⁶³

- (31) 01 P: .hhh But I think it'll iron itself out,
02 Q: I sure hope [so.
03 P: [I'll see you Tuesday. (Drew & Holt, 1988: 506)

In the first line, P summarizes what she has narrated so far by using a figurative expression, “it’ll iron itself out” (“it” refers to P’s trouble), evaluating the recounted event. Her evaluative summary is accepted by Q (line 02). The agreement with the evaluation/summary suggests that she has nothing to offer to the topic (Drew & Holt, 1998:505). Given this, P closes the topic (i.e., the trouble she has talked about up to this point) and turn the interaction to the end (line 03). Idiomatic expressions including proverbs, thus, are available for topic closure and transition (Drew & Holt, 1998: 502).

In general, the closure and transition of topics is done in the following procedure:

- (32) 1→ Speaker A: Figurative summary
2→ Speaker B: Agreement (or other expression of contiguity)
3→ Speaker A: Agreement/confirmation
4→ Speaker A/B: Introduces next topic (Drew & Holt, 1998: 506)

(32) schematically represents how interaction proceeds when an idiom or proverb is used. Speaker A uses an idiomatic phrase as an evaluative summary (arrow 1), detaching from the specific details of the topic (Drew & Holt, 1998: 503-504). B’s agreement with A’s assessment (arrow 2) does not develop the prior talk. This, together with A’s confirmation, draws the topic to a conclusion. The prior topic is thus left, and then either speakers can introduce a new one (arrow 4).⁶⁴

⁶² It might seem unreasonable to treat proverbs and idioms in the same manner. Indeed, Drew & Holt (1998) focus on idiomatic, figurative expressions in general. Their description, however, naturally applies to proverbs. First of all, they categorize proverbs as a kind of figurative expressions (Drew & Holt, 1988: 398; Drew & Holt, 1998: 497). In addition, proverbs and idioms are equivalent in that both of them are figurative, evaluative, and generic in meaning (Takeda, 1999b: 24). They can be employed as a resource to detach from specific details of talk, and display assessment to them. Given these commonalities, their analysis can be extended to proverbs.

⁶³ In (3), “.h” represents inhalations, underlining (I) indicates emphasis, a comma (,) symbolizes a continuing intonation, not necessarily between clauses of sentences, a period (.) indicates a stopping fall in tone, not necessarily the end of a sentence, and a left-hand bracket (I) marks the point at which an ongoing utterance is joined by another (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984: ix-xvi).

⁶⁴ It is possible for Speaker A to confirm B’s agreement (arrow 3) by moving to a next topic, as P does in (31).

The sequence above illustrates how participants organize conversation through interaction when an idiom or proverb is introduced in ongoing discourse. The use of these devices, though itself is the speaker's act of summarizing current topic, leads the talk-exchange in a certain direction, involving all the participants. This does not mean, however, that the use of idiomatic phrases always contributes to topic closure/transition. Because conversation develops and proceeds based on the participants' actions on the spot due to its interactive nature (Schegloff, 2007, 2015), one of the participants may change the course of talk even when an idiom or proverb is provided. For instance, P could have continued to stick to the same topic after line 03, after Q's agreement to her assessment in line 02 in (31). In addition, the use of idioms or proverbs may fail to lead current topic to the end, due to disagreement between the interlocutors (Drew & Holt, 1998: 510-518). The formulation above captures a standard procedure for topic closure/transition by using figurative expressions (Drew & Holt, 1998: 506). On the other hand, (32) can also be recognized as a structure that appears in discourse as a result of following the basic procedure. The schemata can thus be doubly characterized as a procedure that brings about a certain structure in discourse, and as the structure that emerge from the procedure.⁶⁵

Topic closure/transition with proverbs, however, should not be recognized as a distinct usage type from the affirmative use and the assertive use. Rather, the sequence emerges as a consequence of the use of the device carrying social wisdom. In the figurative summary of current topic with proverbs (arrow 1 in (32)), is not neutral but evaluative, displaying the speaker's perspective on the subject. In (31), for instance, P makes a prediction — her opinion about what things will go — with an idiomatic summary (“it'll iron itself out”). That is to say, topic summarization is achieved through assertion. Put differently, if the speaker cites a proverb to make an assertion or to affirm the situation at hand, it may lead ongoing topic to an end. In fact, in (25), the girls' collaborative proverb answers M.'s question about their laughter, affirming its applicability. Their utterance shapes the second pair part of the Q-A adjacency pair, which seems to conclude the topic, i.e., the reason why they laughed on the appearance of M. In (28), an argumentative exchange of proverbs leads the conflict to an end.⁶⁶ Since proverbs are recognized as permanent truism as noted in the previous section, both affirmation and assertion with the proverb requires the hearer to agree with it. An

⁶⁵ This does not mean, however, conversation is the only context in which proverb use is connected to discursive structure. According to Takeda (1999b), proverbs appear in the structural position where current topic is summarized in the readers' column in the newspaper and TV interviews.

⁶⁶ This does not mean that the use of the proverbs resolved the disagreement between the interlocutors (Keith and Watts). In addition, the proverbs used here (*nothing ventured, nothing gained* and *once a fool, always a fool*) are not conflicting or contradictory in themselves. They are deployed to advance opposing views in this specific discourse. For more detailed analysis of the relationship between proverbs, see Yankah (1994).

agreement by the hearer gives the topic a shared evaluation, and thereby leads it to a conclusion. The closure and transition of current topic is thus a consequence of the affirmative and assertive uses of proverbs, rather than a different way of proverb use.

This also applies to the receptive use of proverbs. That is, using proverbs to receive the interlocutor's opinion serves to initiate the topic closure/transition sequence as described in Drew & Holt (1988, 1998). Recall (24) in the previous section:

(33) (=24)

GOLDFINGER: We were quite right to spare Mr. Bond's life in Switzerland. If those gentlemen are his friends, let us convince them he needs no assistance. For their benefit, Pussy, let's make him as happy as possible. I suggest you change into something more suitable.

PUSSY: Certainly. ^(a)Business before Pleasure.

[*PUSSY stands up to leave.* ^(b)GOLDFINGER chortles.] (Hamilton, *Goldfinger*)

Pussy's proverbial utterance (33a) is located in the position at the end of a topic (and a scene). By summarizing Goldfinger's order with the proverb, she shows that she has understood his intention, i.e., she agrees to act upon the command. Her reaction provokes him to chortle (33b), which indicates that he is satisfied with her acknowledgment. The two characters thus agree on what she should do, thereby closing the ongoing talk. In this way, the receptive use of proverbs contributes to closure and transition of current topic, and therefore this new usage type is not different from other ones in terms of the organization of interaction and the resultant discourse structure. Given this, the following discussion compares the receptive use with the affirmative use and the assertive use.

4.3 Receptive Use: A New Usage Type

So far, we have seen that the use of proverbs in conversational discourse is categorized into two different types. By citing them, the speaker can frame the situation at hand into a certain typology (the affirmative use), or assess the situation with more or less persuasive force toward the hearer through the framing (the assertive use). In both ways, proverbs contribute to advance the speaker's own view on the situation s/he is facing. Given this, they are characterizable as 'subjective' usage types.

Neither of the subjective types does not include examples like (33), where the speaker shows how s/he understood the interlocutor's utterance. In the affirmative use, proverbs are deployed as a cognitive frame through which to characterize the situation typologically, affirming their applicability. Pussy, however, clearly does not aim to describe Goldfinger's order with the proverb, or point out that the event matches its base meaning. Rather, she accepts it with the proverb. Her utterance is therefore different from the affirmative use. In addition, it is also distinguished from the assertive use, where proverbs are employed to advance the speaker's opinion on the situation, leading the hearer to accept it, especially for persuasive purposes. In (33), Pussy does not show her view. In the first place, she does not evaluate Goldfinger's command from her own point of view. Hence, her utterance in question is not classified as an assertive use. The proverb use in (33), an example of the receptive use, is thus different from both the affirmative and assertive uses.

Given this, a more detailed description is necessary in order to characterize this new usage type. This section then analyze it in detail, describing three aspects of it. In addition, it is also discussed what allows for this way of proverb use.

4.3.1 Demonstration of Understanding

Let us begin our analysis by focusing on the instance from *Goldfinger* again. In the scene, while Goldfinger is talking with Pussy about the money they are planning to get, he receives a report that they are still under surveillance by Bond's colleagues. To send them away, Goldfinger orders Pussy to pretend as if Bond's infiltration has been successful:

(34) (= (24) & (33))

GOLDFINGER: We were quite right to spare Mr. Bond's life in Switzerland. If those gentlemen are his friends, let us convince them he needs no assistance. For their benefit, Pussy, let's make him as happy as possible. I suggest you change into something more suitable.

PUSSY: ^(a)Certainly. ^(b)Business before Pleasure.

[*PUSSY stands up to leave. GOLDFINGER chortles.*]

(Hamilton, *Goldfinger*)

Given Goldfinger's order, Pussy shows that she has understood it in a quick reply (34), and quotes a proverb

(34b). Seeing her going to prepare for the camouflage, Goldfinger chortles.

The point in the example is that Pussy cites the proverb to trace Goldfinger's intention. In (34b), "business" corresponds to the camouflage, and "pleasure" to the money they are planning to eventually obtain. The conjunction "before" matches the priority of the disguise to their success. This apparently accords with what Goldfinger has just told her: to deceive the agents into believing that Bond's espionage is proceeding properly, in order to prevent them from disturbing their plan for a big money. The proverb (34b) does not represent the speaker's perspective, but the interlocutor's. In short, Pussy attributes the proverb along with the persuasive force it carries to Goldfinger. By putting the proverb into his mouth, Pussy "demonstrates" (Sacks, 1992, vol. 2: 141-142) that she has properly understood Goldfinger's intention. The receptive use is thus the way of attributing a proverb to the interlocutor to demonstrate how the speaker has accepted what s/he said.⁶⁷

The receptive use of proverbs is different from receiving the interlocutor's opinion in other ways. Recall that proverbs — or the wisdom encapsulated in them — are accepted and guaranteed by a countless number of people, and socially authorized as a result (cf. sec.4.2.2). By attributing a proverb to the interlocutor, therefore, the speaker not only demonstrates how s/he understood his/her view, but at the same time acknowledges that it is compatible with traditional wisdom. Put differently, the proverb's authority is granted to the interlocutor. This becomes clear when it is compared with simple replies. Suppose that Pussy only said "Certainly" in response to Goldfinger's command. Although it also makes clear that she accepted the order, it would neither display how she understood it nor authorize it in any way. It would be just a claim of understanding, but not a demonstration of it. The demonstration of understanding through the receptive use of proverbs thus characteristically attributes their social authority to the interlocutor.

As such, this usage type contrasts with the subjective uses in terms of management of proverbial authority. In the gradient cases from the assertive use to the affirmative use, the speaker subjectively deploys a proverb to represent his/her own perspective, attributing the proverb's authority to him/herself as a basis of his/her assessment. Such licensing with a proverb works most obviously when the speaker cites proverbs for persuasive purposes: it contributes to make the interlocutor accept his/her opinion. The authority of proverbs functions as a foundation for the speaker's claim-making. In the receptive use, in contrast, the speaker cites proverbs to capture the interlocutor's perspective, not to advance his/her own. By so doing, s/he demonstrates that s/he has willingly accepted his/her opinion, adding that it is also compatible with the

⁶⁷ It is significant to distinguish between "demonstration" and "claim" of understanding (Sacks, 1992, vol. 2: 141-142; also cf. Heritage, 2007: 255), in relation to the quality of our data. For further discussion, cf. sec.4.

traditional wisdom carried by the proverb. The authority of proverbs works as a symbol of agreement. The receptive use of proverbs is thus clearly different from the subjective uses in that their authority is attached to the interlocutor.

4.3.2 Evaluation by the Interlocutor

As we saw in (34), the receptive use is a way to demonstrate how the speaker understood the interlocutor's utterance. It is important to note in this regard that what is demonstrated with proverb use is nothing more than the speaker's way of understanding. That is to say, his/her understanding may not be correct, from the point of view of the interlocutor.

Consider the following scene from the movie *It's a Wonderful Life*. In it, George is in love with Mary, but hesitates to pursue her in the belief that she prefers Sam to himself. Being aware of this, his mother (Mrs. Bailey) implies that Mary adores George, not Sam:

(35) MRS. BAILEY: Well, I've got eyes, haven't I? Why, (a)she lights up like a firefly whenever you're around.

GEORGE: Oh...

MRS. BAILEY: And besides, (b)Sam Wainwright's away in New York, and you're here in Bedford Falls.

GEORGE: And (c)all's fair in love and war?

MRS. BAILEY: [*primly*] (d)I don't know about war.

GEORGE: (e)[laughs] Mother, you know, I can see right through you. To right back to your back collar button. Trying to get rid of me, huh?

MRS. BAILEY: Uh-huh.

[*They kiss. MRS. BAILEY puts GEORGE's hat on his head.*] (Capra, *It's a Wonderful Life!*)

Mrs. Bailey explains why she thinks that Mary is in love with George (35a & b). To her estimation, George responds with a proverb (35c), linking it to her utterance with the conjunction "And" and in a rising intonation. Designing his utterance in this way, he attempts to confirm his mother's intention. That is to say, he invites her to judge whether it is acceptable for her to understand her opinion according to the proverb.

The reason for the invitation is that Georges is not so much confident of the appropriateness of his interpretation. If he were sure of it, such an attempt for confirmation would not be necessary. What is demonstrated in the receptive use of proverbs is thus nothing more than the speaker's own understanding, which may possibly be different from the interlocutor's intention.

One important consequence of this is that the receptive use of proverbs derives an evaluative response from the interlocutor. When a proverb is cited receptively, the understanding demonstrated in the utterance is evaluated by the interlocutor. It varies how individual receptions with proverbs are perceived. In (11), Goldfinger's chortle indicates that he is satisfied with Pussy's response with the proverb ("Business before pleasure.") which appropriately captures the intention behind his command. In (35), on the other hand, Mrs. Bailey partly accepts George's proverb (35d), noting that she does not know about war, whereby implying that all is fair as to love indeed. In addition, as is the case in (36) below, an interpretation shown through the receptive use of a proverb is sometimes rejected by the interlocutor. Since the receptive use of proverbs demonstrates how the speaker understood the interlocutor's opinion, the understanding draws an assessment from him/her as a consequence.

The receptive use is different from the subjective uses at this point. When the speaker advances his/her opinion with a proverb (the assertive use), or when s/he characterizes the situation at hand as an instance of proverbial typology (the affirmative use), the proverbial utterance does not require the interlocutor to judge its appropriateness. The receptive use provokes the interlocutor to evaluate it, because it displays the speaker's understanding of the interlocutor's utterance/opinion.⁶⁸

4.3.3 Critical Exploitation of the Receptive Use

In the above examples of the receptive use, the speaker cites a proverb to agree with his/her interlocutor. The usage type, however, is not necessarily confined to such cases where the speaker shows a favorable stance. It is also available when s/he attempts to confront and criticize the interlocutor.

Let us consider an instance of such critical receptive use. Cited below is an excerpt from *Murder on the Orient Express* by Agatha Christie. One man is murdered on the Orient Express, a sleeper express bound for Paris. Hercule Poirot, a Belgian private detective who happened to be on the train, begins to interrogate

⁶⁸ The evaluation from the interlocutor corresponds to Arrow 2, "Agreement (or other expression of contiguity)" in Drew & Holt's (1988; 1998) description (9). This indicates that the receptive use contributes to the closure and transition of topics.

the passengers to help find the murderer(s). As he enters the cabin of a British lady, Mary Debenham, for investigation, he gets Greta Ohlsson, a woman who has been there with her, out of the room.

(36) Miss Debenham had put her book down. She was watching Poirot. When he asked her, she handed over her keys. Then, as he lifted down a case and opened it, she said:

“(a)Why did you send her away, M. Poirot?”

“I, Mademoiselle! (b)Why, to minister to the American lady.”

“(c)An excellent pretext — but a pretext all the same.”

“(d)I don’t understand you, Mademoiselle.”

“(e1)I think you understand me very well.” She smiled. “(e2)You wanted to get me alone. Wasn’t that it?”

“(f)You are putting words into my mouth, Mademoiselle.”

“(g)And ideas into your head? No, I don’t think so. The ideas are already there. That is right, isn’t it?”

“(h)Mademoiselle, we have a proverb —”

“(i)Qui s’excuse s’accuse — (j)is that what you were going to say? (k)You must give me the credit for a certain amount of observation and common sense. (l)For some reason or other you have got it into your head that I know something about this sordid business — (m)this murder of a man I never saw before.”

“(n)You are imagining things, Mademoiselle.”

“No, I am not imagining things at all. But it seems to me that a lot of time is wasted by not speaking the truth — by beating about the bush instead of coming straight out with things.”

(Christie, *Murder on the Orient Express*)

When asked by Debenham why he get Ohlsson out of her cabin (36a), Poirot replies that it is to have her look after Mrs. Hubbard (“the American lady”), who is feeling ill (36b). She does not accept it, and calls it “a pretext” (36c). As Poirot says he is unable to understand her intention (36d), Debenham asserts that he must have intended to make her alone in the cabin (36e). In reply to this, the detective retorts that she is trying to make him say what she wants him to say (36f). The woman, however, argues that he actually had the exact intention as she identified (36g). As Poirot is about to cite a proverb in response (36h), but Debenham interrupts the utterance (36i).

Qui s'excuse s'accuse is a French proverb which can literally translate into “he who excuses himself accuses himself” and usually used to point out “making excuses reveals a guilty conscience” (Merriam-Webster.Com, s.v. *Qui s'excuse s'accuse*). In this scene, “Qui s'excuse” corresponds to Debenham’s words that she has uttered to Poirot, and “s'accuse” to (what she claims to be) Poirot’s opinion that her hostility to him comes from her guilt.

Notice that Debenham cuts in on Poirot’s turn (36h-i), and “preemptively completes” (Lerner, 2004: 226-229; Kushida, 2007: 160) his utterance.⁶⁹ Although she superficially attempts to confirm that the proverb she has just cited matches what he actually wanted to say (36j), she continues to talk without giving him the floor (36k-l). By shaping her talk in this way, Debenham attributes the proverb (36i) to Poirot. The proverbial utterance is, therefore, characterized as a receptive use in that a proverb is cited as if on behalf of the interlocutor. On the other hand, Debenham does not aim to agree with Poirot, but rather to claim that she knows his ‘true’ intention. In her view, the detective sent Ohlsson to Mrs. Hubbard because he wanted Debenham alone with him in her cabin (36e), and her utterances should have sounded to be a “pretext,” given that he hides such intention. This is what she argues for with the proverb (36i), which is also transparent in the fact that she explains why she can be so sure (36k). A reason or support being given right after a claim is a typical pattern in everyday argument (Canary & Sillars, 1992: 746). In this way, the proverb Debenham utters by taking the floor from Poirot serves to make a claim that she can read his mind, and not a demonstration of agreement with him.

Subsequent to the proverb, Debenham further elaborates her argument about Poirot’s ‘true’ intention. After claiming her ability to identify the proverb that (she believes) he was actually about to say (36k), and then explains why she arguably knows that Poirot wants to make her alone for interrogation (36l). That is, she argues here that he must be attempting to make her tell him what she knows of the man’s death. Note that the woman strategically insists not only that he suspect her of the murder, but also that his doubt has no firm grounds (“For some reason or other”). In addition, she also adds another claim to her description of the event (“this sordid business”), a claim that she has never seen the victim before he was killed (36m). In this way, citing the proverb by taking the floor from Poirot, Debenham maintains that she has nothing to do with the murder — her innocence. At the same time, the claim also works as a retort to (what she believes to be) Poirot’s doubt for her that she captured with the proverb (36i). To sum, her proverb is characterized as a first step for her to criticize the opponent, Poirot. In this sense, Debenham’s proverbial utterance counts as an

⁶⁹ An utterance is not always preemptively completed in such a critical attitude. For examples in which the conversational move is done as a cooperative act, cf. Hayashi (2017).

example of the critical receptive use.

The receptive use of the proverb can be exploited in this way, because it is indeed based on attributing a proverb — or the evaluation or argument with a proverb — to the interlocutor. The attribution of the proverb is equivalently done in the cases where the speaker takes a sympathetic stance towards the interlocutor, where the focus is on demonstrating how s/he has accepted his/her opinion. Recall that, in (34), Pussy first simply accepts Goldfinger's order by saying "Certainly," before citing a proverb, "Business before pleasure." When the receptive use is exploited in a critical manner, in contrast, the speaker expresses his/her own view of the interlocutor's opinion as if it were a given fact that s/he thinks that way. That is, the focus is on attributing (the evaluation or argument carried by) the proverb to the interlocutor itself. In (36), Debenham not only cuts in on Poirot's utterance (36h-i), but also, after citing the proverb, explains why she is so confident that it *is* his true intention (36k-l). Since the proverb is uttered on behalf of the interlocutor in the receptive use, it is also possible to make use of the usage as a strategy for criticism. It does not mean, however, that it is the only way to put one's evaluation or opinion into the interlocutor's mouth; the same is possible with quotatives (cf. Ihara, 2017: 32-36; Yamaguchi, 2009: 54-57). The critical exploitation of the receptive use of proverbs is, therefore, one of several ways to speak in others' voice.

Among the ways to attribute a judgment or claim to the interlocutor, the use of proverbs exhibit a special characteristics which comes from one of proverbs' general features. As we discussed in Section 4.2, proverbs are a kind of idiom that has been repeatedly used and shared in society, as means to typologically capture and show attitudes to situations (Burke, 1967: 296-297; Takeda, 1992b: 213). Being typological can mean, from a different point of view, to be stereotypical and platitudinous (Sato, 1987: 239-240). The critical deployment of the receptive use of proverbs is thus a rhetorical strategy to characterize the interlocutor's opinion as platitudinous, while keeping a distance from it. This rhetorical feature is most obvious in (36), in which Debenham chooses a French proverb, even though she is talking in English. Whereas she is an English, Poirot is from a French-speaking society in Belgium. "Qui s'excuse s'accuse" is therefore what the French-speaker would be likely to say, and by imprinting such a stereotypical image on him, she skillfully keep distant from the attitude it encapsulates. The strategy of utilizing the receptive use to criticize the interlocutor's opinion, thus, serves to negatively characterize it as stale, which is the strength of the

technique.⁷⁰

It is now apparent that the receptive use has two facets. In the standard, sympathetic receptive use, such as (34), the speaker attributes the authority carried by proverbs to the interlocutor — or his/her opinion — without evaluating it as stereotypical or platitudinous. In contrast, when exploiting the usage for argumentation, the speaker negatively characterizes it as a platitude, instead of giving the interlocutor the proverbial authority. The two cases differ in which of the two aspects of the proverb the speaker connects with the interlocutor, its authority or its banality. The two ways of employing the receptive use stem from the different ways of characterizing the time-tested ideas that proverbs generally carries.

This section analyzed how proverbs are deployed as a means to receive the interlocutor's opinion. In this usage type, the speaker employs a proverb to demonstrate how s/he has received the interlocutor's opinion. As the proverb represents the interlocutor's (and not the speaker's own) opinion, the social authority — or the banality — of the proverb is added to him/her.

4.3.4 Summary

This section clarified how proverbs are employed and interpreted in receptive manners. The most basic feature of the receptive use is that the speaker attributes proverbs to the interlocutor, demonstrating how the former understood the latter's utterance/opinion. Such attribution associates the interlocutor with the social authority — or stereotypical or platitudinous attitude — of proverbs. In addition, the speaker's interpretation through the proverb use derives from the interlocutor a reaction as to whether the proverb appropriately captures his/her original intention.

4.4 A Systematic Model of Proverb Usage Types⁷¹

⁷⁰ On the other hand, the critical exploitation of the receptive use also has a disadvantage which is rooted in attributing a proverb that accords with the speaker's opinion to the interlocutor: the interlocutor can immediately deny the attribution — or the attributed voice. In (13), right after Debenham's utterance with a proverb (13i-m), Poirot refuses to accept it as true at once (13n). This disadvantage is simple to understand from the viewpoint of the receiver of the proverb. Suppose your opponent in a dispute claimed with a proverb, "You must be thinking that way." Even if it was much to the point, you would not willingly choose to admit it. If you did, it could probably lead you to defeat. The argumentative attribution of an opinion with a proverb, thus, does not necessarily make the interlocutor accept it. This is a negative aspect of the rhetorical deployment of the receptive use.

⁷¹ The discussion in this section is based on Hirakawa (2014).

Given the detailed characteristics of the affirmative use, the assertive use, and the receptive use, it is now possible to consider how they are related with each other. Overall, the three usage types can be characterized as extremes of two convergent continua, with the assertive use at the intersection.

The first continuum consists of the affirmative use and the assertive use. As I call them subjective usage types, in these usage types, proverbs are cited to advance the speaker's view on the situation s/he is facing. On the other hand, they are distinguishable as to how persuasively proverbs are employed. At the affirmative end, the speaker exclusively focuses on portraying and characterizing the event or situation before him/her according to proverbs. This type of proverbial utterance characterizes the event or situation as "one example under a general principle," based on the proverb's "extensive applicability to a variety of events and situations" (Sato, 1987: 238). Simply put, the speaker names the situation with proverbs. Persuasion is therefore little, or almost not intended in that proverbs are referred to as a framework through which to construe and characterize the situation. At the assertive extreme, the focus is on convincing the interlocutor of his/her judgment. That is to say, s/he aims to advance an opinion and persuade the interlocutor with proverbs. The persuasive force of this usage type is rooted in "a tacit approval by a countless number of people" (Sato, 1987: 239). These cases are highly persuasion-oriented, in that proverbs serve to change his/her mind and perceive the situation in the same way as the speaker does. Between the two extremes lies a variety of intermediate cases that vary as to how strongly the speaker attempts to make the interlocutor accept his/her evaluation of the situation at hand by applying a proverb to it. In these cases, proverbs are cited to display a certain evaluation of the situation. They are persuasive insofar as the assessment is expected to be understood by the hearer who may have a different opinion. The first continuum thus captures the diversity in persuasive force exerted in proverb use.

Affirmation and assertion might seem so different that it is not adequate to place the affirmative and assertive uses of proverbs on a single cline. There are cases, however, where a single use of a proverb serves both speech acts at the same time. For example, look at (37) below, an excerpt from the movie *The Dark Knight Rises*. In the scene, an entrepreneur Daggett plans to take over Wayne Enterprises, in collaboration with the masked villain, Bane. Bane betrays him, however, and consequently Daggett's rival Tate grasps the track on the board instead of him. Daggett gets fierce and orders his secretary Stryver to bring Bane to him:

(37) DAGGETT: How the hell did Miranda Tate get the inside track on the Wayne Board? I mean she been meetin with him? She been sleeping with him?

STRYVER: Not that we know of.

DAGGETT: Clearly you don't know much of anything, do you? ^(a)Where's Bane?

STRYVER: ^(b)We told him it was urgent.

DAGGETT: ^(c)Where is that masked...

BANE: ^(d)Speak of the devil, and he shall appear.

DAGGETT: What the hell is going on?

BANE: The plan is proceeding as expected.

DAGGETT: Oh, really? Do I look like I'm running Wayne Enterprises right now?

(Nolan, *The Dark Knight Rises*)

Right at the moment when Daggett and Stryver are arguing about Bane (37a-c), the villain shows up, uttering a proverb (37d). His proverbial utterance captures his timely appearance on the spot, which accords exactly with the “base meaning” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblet, 1973/1981: 119) of the proverb, *Speak of the devil, and he shall appear*: “If you discuss someone when they are not present the chances are that they will unexpectedly appear” (Pickering, 1997: 262).⁷² Here, “Speak of the devil” corresponds to Daggett and Stryver’s preceding talk about Bane and “he shall appear” to his appearance on the spot. The conjunction with “and” corresponds to the temporal sequence of the two events, connecting them as if the former caused the latter.

Speak of the devil, and he shall appear would normally be uttered by the ones who have been talking about the timely appearer, welcoming him/her into the talk by suggesting that s/he was the topic of the preceding conversation (Speake, 2017: 438; Toda, 2003: 689; also cf. (2)). In (37), it would be possible for Daggett or Stryver to cite the proverb when Bane shows up. In that case, the proverbial utterance would constitute an affirmative use, with the focus on portraying the situation as exactly the same as the proverb’s base meaning. On the other hand, in the scene, the proverb is cited by the one who comes into the scene (i.e., Bane), which means that he exploits its normal usage, or alternatively as he preempts a proverb that the other two could quote. The function of (37d) is therefore based on the possible affirmative use by Daggett or Stryver. Through quoting the proverb in this way, Bane shows his attitude to the businessmen. Although Daggett is most clearly furious at his betrayal, Bane shows himself in front of him with the proverb, as if he had shown up just because Daggett wanted him there (cf. 14a-c). His appearance in this way indicates his readiness to face the man in a rage. Simply put, Bane asserts that Daggett’s anger is no great concern to him. Bane’s proverbial utterance (37d) thus contributes to both affirmation and assertion.

⁷² As is often mentioned in paremiology, it is usual for proverbs to have several different ‘versions’ (Smith & Wilson eds., 170: iv; Takeda, 1992a: 196-198). Other such versions of *Speak of the devil, and he shall appear* include *Talk of the Devil and he is bound to appear*, *Speak of the devil and he always appear*, *Think of the devil and he appears*, etc. (Pickering, 1997: 262; Toda, 2003: 689).




Figure 2 Two-Continuum Model of Proverb Use

In order to properly capture proverbial utterances like (37d) which serve both affirmation and assertion at the same time, the two usage types should be seen as two extremes of a continuum with various strength of persuasive force. While in all the uses placed along the cline, proverbs carry the speaker's own perspective on the event or situation s/he is dealing with, individual cases differ as to how persuasively proverbs are cited.

The second continuum consists of the assertive use and the receptive use. The two usage types are basically contrastive in terms of the management of the persuasive force that proverbs encapsulate. In the assertive use, what proverbs display is the speaker's perspective, and their persuasive force is directed toward the interlocutor. In the receptive use, on the other hand, proverbs are cited in accordance with the interlocutor's opinion. Through receptive proverb use, the speaker shows that s/he has accepted the interlocutor's view. In other words, s/he declares that s/he was persuaded. Given that the receptive use is available for argument as well as for display of one's understanding (cf. (36)), however, it should be continuously linked to the assertive use. Even though typical cases of the receptive use are clearly opposite the assertive use, cases like (36) where the receptive use is exploited for persuasive purposes pertains to both assertion and reception. It follows from this that the two usage types should be related to form a continuum, rather than seen as opposing directions of persuasion. The assertive use and the receptive use are therefore placed at the two ends of a persuading vs. persuaded continuum.

The two continua converge at the assertive use. It is related to both the other two types, though in different ways. Together with the affirmative use, the assertive use forms a cline that captures various degrees of persuasive force exerted in proverb use. With the receptive use, on the other hand, it is contrastive as to whether proverbs are used to persuade or to be persuaded. Still, the two usage types are the same in that they are closely connected to the act of persuasion. The three usage types of proverb in conversational talk-exchange can thus be represented as a two continua crossing at the assertive use, as in Figure 2.

Characterizing the ways of proverb use in this way reveals that the assertive use, the receptive use, and the affirmative use reflect different aspects of conversational discourse. The most fundamental mechanism of this context is that participants exchange words with each other, taking turns one after another (Sacks et al.,

1974). In the course of interaction, each speaker shows the interlocutor his/her opinion, evaluation, or stance. Meanwhile, s/he also hears the interlocutor's remarks, showing his/her opinion, evaluation, or stance. Proverbs are available for either direction of the exchange of utterances. The assertive use is the cases where they are used to put forward an opinion, serving as an authoritative resource to support the speaker's perspective. The receptive use is when proverbs are employed to accept the other's perspective, serving as a resource to ascertain the plausibility of the interlocutor's opinion. The assertive use and the receptive use thus emerge in the backdrop of opinion exchange between participants in conversation. As such, the two usage types are closely tied to communication with others. Unlike these two, in the affirmative use, the focus is on the perception of the situation. In conversation, participants may want or need to topicalize the event or situation around them, for which proverbs are an option. In such cases, proverbs function as a device for typologically construe and characterize the situation. The affirmative use is thus rooted in the fact that conversation takes place in a particular environment.⁷³ The tripartite classification of proverb use clarifies how each usage type is rooted in the characteristics of conversational discourse.

4.5 The Receptive Use and Rhetoric

The significance of this study lies in the fact that it has discovered and described the receptive use, a new usage type of proverbs in conversational discourse which has gone unnoticed in previous research. This section argues that the present investigation also has several important implications.

The first concerns the methodology of proverb research. A massive amount of inquiries have been conducted concerning how the allegorical units are used.⁷⁴ Most of the previous studies, however, focus on

⁷³ One consequence of the situation reference of the affirmative use is that it can appear in monologue. For example, look at the following excerpt from the film *White House Down*. Here, the US president talks to himself as the helicopter he is in is landing in front of the White House:

(i) PRESIDENT SAWYER: [*Looking out the window*] Be it ever so humble.

His remark comes from a proverb, *Be it ever so humble, there's no place like home*. It affirms that he is feeling exactly as the proverb says. The affirmative use is thus possible without an interlocutor, because it is not oriented to communication or opinion exchange unlike the other two usage types.

⁷⁴ Traditionally, central attention has been paid to the formal structure and semantic contents of proverbs (e.g., Dundes, 1975a; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1973; Milner, 1969; Rothstein, 1969; Silverstein-Weinrich, 1978; among others), while noting several features of them shared with other idiomatic expressions (cf. Drew & Holt, 1988, 1998; Kitzinger, 2000; Takeda, 1999a). Based on this, in fact, the proverb can be defined as a genre of verbal art by comparing it with some related genres such as jokes, curses, clichés, riddles and aphorisms (Barajas, 2010: sec.3.5; Norrick, 1985: ch.3).

the relationship between proverb use and static social structure, based on data collected in particular linguistic communities, mainly from anthropological and/or ethnographical perspectives (e.g., Agbájé, 2002; Arewa & Dundes, 1975b; Barajas, 2010; Briggs, 1985; Finnegan, 1970; Gossen, 1973; Kuusi, 1967; Lister, 1874; Parker, 1963; among many others). Those studies have revealed general features of proverb use across languages and societies. For instance, Seto (1988: sec.3.3) states that proverbs are basically used by older members against younger ones in society, recommending accepting the situation as it is — i.e., resignation. Yankah (1994: 3387) points out that proverbs are recognized in several communities as devices used by elders for didactic purposes. Arewa & Dundes (1964) describe that in Yoruba society, different proverbs are available depending on the speaker's status in the society and his/her relationship with the hearer(s) in a given context, while Lieber (1994) illustrates how social ranking determines the proverbs available for each member in Ponape tribe. Previous studies, thus, have paid central attention to the social context in which proverbs are used.

It is possible to approach the receptive use in the same way. For instance, it could be analyzed in reference to the “‘from superior to inferior’ rule” (Seto, 1988: 116). According to the rule, proverbs are fundamentally utilized to teach inferior people — most typically, children. In (34) and (35) in contrast, inferior speakers (a henchwoman; a son) use proverbs against superior hearers (her boss; his mother). Given this, those instances might seem to be exceptions to the rule. What the speakers do here, however, is ascertain their interlocutor's utterance and opinion, rather than advance their own claim and persuade them. In that the proverbs represent the superior's opinion, the examples are the same as the cases where the superior speaker argue with proverbs against the inferior hearer. The receptive use is, therefore, characterized as a way of following the “‘from superior to inferior’ rule” from the standpoint of the inferior. This way of description is valuable to some extent. It properly reveals the unique feature of the receptive use, i.e., the rule still holds although the inferior speaker cites proverbs for the superior interlocutor. The traditional approach, however, cannot provide a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) as we gained in Section 4.3. Even though it is possible to describe the receptive use by referring to the social structure in which proverbs are used, therefore, that method is insufficient for satisfactory, detailed analysis.

This study, in contrast, adopted a discourse analytic approach in examining how proverbs are deployed and interpreted. We paid central attention to the dynamic process when the speaker uses proverbs for certain purposes in ongoing discourse, rather than regard proverb use just as a consequence of static environment surrounding the speaker (i.e., his/her status in the society and the relationship with the interlocutor). What we have discovered as to the receptive use is nothing but a product of our discourse analytic approach. This

study therefore contributes to the methodology of proverb studies in general.

In addition, this investigation also has an implication for the study of rhetoric. Rhetoric is, partly, the art or technique of language use for argumentation and persuasion (Nouchi, 2002: 5-6; Yanagisawa et al., 2004: i-ii; Reboul, 2000: 12-13). To advance opinions in an attempt to change others' mind is quite ordinary and pervasive, which indicates that it is essential to unveil mechanisms of rhetorical strategies as argumentation/persuasion techniques in actual discourse. Despite its importance, discursive functioning of the tactics, however, has not been a central target of previous research. Traditional rhetorical studies have mainly focused on figures of speech in literary texts (Sato, 1992a: 47-50; Seto, 1992: 250). Cognitive linguists have been increasing their significance in the field of rhetoric, but their focus is predominantly on the relationship between human beings' cognitive abilities and figurative expressions like metaphors and metonymies (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2014: 1-3), without considering rhetoric as argumentative and persuasive strategies. Informal logicians and argumentation theorists recognize the use of rhetoric as patterns of claim-making. Still, they tend to illustrate the patterns' strengths and weaknesses from somewhat prescriptive point of view, rather than describe how the strategies are deployed and interpreted in actual discourse (e.g., van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren et al. eds., 1987; Walton, 1987, 1995). Previous studies, thus, have not paid sufficient attention to the discursive functions of rhetorical strategies. To thoroughly observe and specifically describe how people talk rhetorically is a valuable direction in the study of rhetoric.⁷⁵ The analytical stance taken in this study to approach proverb use can therefore be taken in investigating rhetorical strategies in general.

Regarding the direction and methodology in the study of rhetoric, the receptive use of proverbs sheds new light on argumentative talk and text. Previous research, defining rhetoric as the art of argumentation and persuasion (e.g., Aristotle, 1991; Kozai, 2010, 2016; Perelman, 1982; Prelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Cockcroft et al., 2014), have catalogued a variety of schemes and devices with their strengths and weaknesses. Although they have provided a lot of insights into the strategies, the focus has always been on the speaker's command of them, i.e., how s/he should control the strategies in order to accomplish successful persuasion. This is clearly reflected in the fact that previous studies have often, if not exclusively, analyzed discourse genres in which the speaker is more or less detached from audience, such as political speech, print advertisement, and newspaper articles (e.g., Borchers & Hundley, 2018: ch.5; Cavender & Kahane, 2010; Corbett & Connors, 1999; Leith, 2011; Walton, 2017). Simply put, traditional rhetoric deals with one-way

⁷⁵ The interest in "rhetoric in action" (Hayashi & Kuno, 1974: ch.13) is beginning to be shared by some researchers (e.g., Cameron, 2008, 2010, 2011; Musolf, 2004, 2011; Musolf & Zinken eds., 2009; Semino, 2008).

argumentation. In the monological genres, the speaker is not usually exposed to immediate criticisms from audience, which allows him/her to focus on how s/he devise his/her own talk or text. Carefully designing one's speech is indeed vital for changing the hearer's mind. Those with poor skill in constructing persuasive talk could not be successful arguers. In argumentative talk-exchange, however, the production of talk is only half of what the speaker is required to do. S/he also needs to deal with the interlocutor's utterances. Just as the speaker attempts to persuade the interlocutor, the interlocutor strives to make the speaker accept his/her claim. Given the interactive nature of conversational discourse, it is inevitable for the speaker to respond to the interlocutor. That is, it is impossible for him/her to focus only on the design of his/her own speech. In order to persuade the interlocutor successfully, the speaker needs not only to advance and support opinions of his/her own but also to counter-argue the interlocutor, in sufficient ways. In other words, both 'offense' and 'defense' are equally required in interactive arguments. This type of discourse, however, is not targeted in previous studies (cf. ch. 2 & 3). As a consequence, little — or almost nothing — is known about the defensive aspect of argumentation. In addition, given that rhetoric is originally a system of techniques for persuasion (Nouchi, 2002: 5-6; Yanagisawa et al., 2004: i-ii; Reboul, 2000: 12-13), it is essential for the study of rhetoric to search conversational talk-exchange for data to analyze. The dynamic development of the most basic context (cf. Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2015) will be a fruitful source for new insights into rhetorical phenomena. The analysis of the receptive use of proverbs is a good example of this direction in rhetorical research. As a way to deal with the interlocutor's opinion (cf. sec. 4.3, esp. sec. 4.3.3), it sheds light on the receptive aspect of talk-exchange. The analysis of the receptive use of proverbs therefore marks the beginning of the defensive rhetoric, demonstrating the value of this line of research.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter described the receptive use, a kind of proverb usage that has gone unnoticed, from a rhetorical point of view. The main characteristics of this usage are: (i) that the speaker applies a proverb to his/her interlocutor's utterance/opinion in order to demonstrate how s/he received it; (ii) s/he attributes the social authority of the proverb to the utterance/opinion; and (iii) the proverb use is further evaluated by the producer of the original utterance/opinion as to whether the speaker's understanding of it is appropriate. Based on the insight into this usage, this chapter also provided a two-continuum model for systematic understanding of various ways of proverb use in conversational talk-exchange by classifying them into three

basic types with sufficient characterization. In addition, it was argued that the receptive use sheds light on the defensive side of conversational arguments, in contrast to earlier studies focusing almost exclusively on the offensive aspect of the interaction.

In addition to the findings, it should be noted that the data analyzed here is not fully authentic, thereby limiting the generality of the results. The analysis of the receptive use is based on conversations between fictional characters, i.e., artificial discourse. This does not deny the possibility that the way of proverb use only appears in fictional conversation, but not in natural, everyday talk-exchange.⁷⁶ According to Sacks (1992, vol.2: 141-142), the speaker can choose between claiming that s/he has understood what the interlocutor said and demonstrating that s/he has. Heritage (2007: 255-259) argues against this, however, claiming that people rarely choose the latter option in daily conversation, because the demonstration of understanding interrupts the natural progress of ongoing interaction. It is generally preferred, according to Heritage, to proceed talk-exchange to demonstrating their understanding, suspending the flow of conversation. The receptive use of proverb therefore may not be dispreferred option, and hence not observable so frequently, because it is a way of demonstration of understanding (cf. sec.4.3.1). This refutation is stimulating in regard to our analysis of the receptive use. It is true indeed that there is a great gap between participating in actual conversation and constructing fictional interaction between characters. The criticism above is therefore unavoidable as long as we employ fictional data.

Still, the description and discussion in this study are not valueless. It is a fact that proverbs serves as a resource for demonstrating how the speaker has received the interlocutor's opinion, even if such receptive uses can only be observable in fictional discourse. In addition, if understanding is not often demonstrated in daily conversation, this does not entail that demonstration of understanding is impossible in the context. Rather, it *is* possible for the speaker to utilize proverbs receptively in everyday talk-exchange. Given this, our endeavor to describe the 'minor' usage type of proverbs as well as its mechanisms is also significant. Although based on fictional data, this study remains valuable for providing the insights into the receptive use.

⁷⁶ The following objection comes from a reviewer of *the Japanese Journal of Language in Society*, as to an unpublished manuscript. The critical comment greatly helped me improve my thinking about the validity of my data and description.

5. Narrating a Story to Teach: Parables

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines parables as an allegorical genre from a discourse analytic perspective, focusing on the ones that appear in the Synoptic Gospels.⁷⁷ To grasp the phenomenon, consider the example below from Mark (4: 1-10):

- (38) Again Jesus began to teach by the lake. The crowd that gathered around him was so large that he got into a boat and sat in it out on the lake, while all the people were along the shore at the water's edge. He taught them many things by parables, and in his teaching said: “(a)Listen! A farmer went out to sow his seed. As he was scattering the seed, some fell along the path, and the birds came and ate it up. Some fell on rocky places, where it did not have much soil. It sprang up quickly, because the soil was shallow. But when the sun came up, the plants were scorched, and they withered because they had no root. Other seed fell among thorns, which grew up and choked the plants, so that they did not bear grain. Still other seed fell on good soil. It came up, grew and produced a crop, some multiplying thirty, some sixty, some a hundred times.”
- Then Jesus said, “(b)Whoever has ears to hear, let them hear.”
- (c)When he was alone, the Twelve and the others around him asked him about the parables.

(Mark, 4: 1-10)

In this scene, Jesus explains his religious view by telling the story of seeds that fell on four kinds of ground (38a). It seems that the seeds represent Jesus' words, and each ground symbolizes different types of people who take different stances to his teachings. The whole story cannot be taken simply as a recount of certain events, but as an allegory that forms part of the explanation. The Synoptic Gospels describe several scenes like the above where Jesus narrates stories in conversations and arguments with other characters. Those narratives are the topic of this chapter, parables.

Widely recognized as a key feature of Jesus' preaching, parables have been studied by a huge number

⁷⁷ The Synoptic Gospels are the first three books in the New Testament, i.e., Matthew, Mark, and Luke. They each portray Jesus' origin, his journey of preaching, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, in the form of a story. The books are “so similar in structure, content, and wording that they can easily be set side by side to provide a synoptic comparison of their content” (Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s.v., ‘Synoptic Gospels’). For further details about the texts, see e.g., Burnet (2005), Johnson (2010), Nakamura (2010), and Tagawa (1997).

of scholars, mainly in theology (e.g., to name only a few, Dodd, 1935; Drury, 1973; Iverson, 2012; Jeremias, 1972; Kato, 2006; Thiselton, 1985). Those studies have focused on the interpretation of parables, i.e., what Jesus, or the Gospels, is attempting to say through the allegorical stories. Since their interpretive endeavor is unavoidably anchored in the specific details of the text, it is valuable to reveal how these stories are shaped in the Synoptic Gospels. Given the objective, this chapter will shed light on how Jesus builds up the allegorical narratives in order to convey his message to the audience in the text world, and how those scenes contribute to deliver his words over to readers of the religious text.

The starting point of our exploration is the fact that parables are not composed in reader-friendly ways. In (38), for example, even though what happened in the sower story is quite transparent, it requires efforts to figure out what Jesus meant by narrating it. One reason for such interpretive work to be needed is that Jesus provides no explicit cues to be referenced for interpreting the analogies.⁷⁸ In addition, in recounting Jesus' parables, the Synoptic Gospels use a rhetorical strategy, namely *aposiopesis*, which is roughly characterized as a method of "Stopping suddenly in midcourse, leaving statement unfinished" (Lanham, 1991: 20). In the above example, after Jesus finishes talking (38b), no reaction of the audience is shown before the next scene begins (38c), even though it seems quite likely for the preacher's utterance to have drawn a certain response(s). This way of describing conversation — i.e., the use of *aposiopesis* — also obscures the point of the allegorical stories. Thus the text of parables apparently attempt to restrain easy understanding.

Why, then, are parables realized in such a way? What effect does that composition have on readers? This chapter aims to reveal what Jesus does with parables, how the Synoptic Gospels describe those scenes, and what effects it can have on the reader's interpretation, through detailed examination of the texts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 defines the parable with its basic characteristics, and observes in detail how the allegorical stories are presented in the Synoptic Gospels. The analysis demonstrates how they are demanding for the readers of the texts. Section 5.3 focuses on the use of *aposiopesis*, and reveals what effects it bears in the discourse of the Synoptic Gospels. Given the function of the strategy, Section 5.4 explicates how the parables shapes the relationship between Jesus and the reader. Section 5.6 concludes the whole discussion in this chapter, and considers the relation-building function of rhetorical strategies in written discourse in general.

Before starting concrete discussion, we must note that the texts analyzed in this chapter are taken from the *New International Version* on the BibleGateway.com (<https://www.biblegateway.com>), with the section

⁷⁸ Jesus explains to "the Twelve" what he means by this parable in the scene that follows (cf. (39) below). His deciphering is not completely comprehensive, however. The details of the scene is further examined in Section 5.2.2).

titles and verse numbers omitted to make the excerpts simpler to read. The arbitrary choice of the version does not mean that this edition should be used in parable research, or any kind of study that deals with the scripture. What is important in this regard is that different versions of the Synoptic Gospels vary in textual features including wording, spelling, punctuation, and paragraph style. Moreover, though originally written in Koine Greek (Johnson, 2010: 5; Tagawa, 1997: 314-315), they (as well as the New Testament as a whole) are now available in a number of different languages. The specific analysis offered in this chapter based on the *New International Version*, just one of many English translations, therefore should not directly be applied to other editions. The generality and significance of the present investigation will be discussed further in the final section.

5.2 Fundamentals of Parables

This section examines how the parables are realized in the Synoptic Gospels. Section 5.2.1 defines the genre, clarifying some of its fundamental features. Section 5.2.2 illustrates that the parables require intensive work for interpretation.

5.2.1 Definition and Basic Characteristics

The term ‘parable’ is loosely used to cover different phenomena found in Jesus’ preachings, such as aphoristic metaphors, exemplifying anecdotes, and allegorical stories (Black, 1960; Crossan, 1972, 1992; Kyuyaku Shin-yaku Seisho Daijiten Henshu Iinkai ed., 1989). It is certainly interesting and valuable to delve into each of them, and consider the relationship among them. With the general interest in allegorical discourse, however, this study specifically aims at the allegorical, narrative kind of parable.

The parable of this type is traditionally formulated as “a story designed to convey some religious principle, moral lesson, or general truth” (Shaw, 1972: 274). Consider the excerpt from Luke (15: 1-7):

(39) Now the tax collectors and sinners were all gathering around to hear Jesus. But the Pharisees and the teachers of the law muttered, “^(a)This man welcomes sinners and eats with them.”

Then Jesus told them this parable: “^(b)Suppose one of you has a hundred sheep and loses one of

them. (c)Doesn't he leave the ninety-nine in the open country and go after the lost sheep until he finds it? And when he finds it, he joyfully puts it on his shoulders and goes home. Then he calls his friends and neighbors together and says, 'Rejoice with me; I have found my lost sheep.' (d)I tell you that in the same way there will be more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need to repent. (Luke, 15: 1-7)

Tax collectors and sinners were recognized as sinful people to avoid in the first-century Jewish society (Kato, 2006: 107; Takahashi et al. eds., 1991: 344, 689). For this reason, the Pharisees and the teachers of Law of Moses make a critical grumble, seeing Jesus having a meal with them (39a). In reply, Jesus tries to explain the reason why he is willing to be friendly with them by telling the story of a lost sheep (39b-c). He concludes the narrative with a statement (39d) which serves as a literal retort to his interlocutors' criticism.

The example shows the basic features of parables (also cf. Sec. 2.5). First, they take the form of a story. In Labov's model, a narrative is realized in "a verbal sequence of clauses" that is matched "to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred" (Labov, 1972: 359-360). In (39), the clauses that constitute the imaginative story (39b-c) each describe an event in the chronological order. Jesus begins the story by establishing a suppositional situation, asking his interlocutors for justification for it (39b). Then he illustrates how one would likely to deal with the circumstances (39c). Second, the story of parables works allegorically. In the above example, the narrative of a lost sheep is analogically matched with Jesus' view. The linking phrase "in the same way" lays the analogical foundation on which specific correspondences are made: the lost sheep stands for the sinner; the other ninety-nine for over ninety-nine good people; and the discovery and return of the lost one and the consequent joy represent the sinner's turn to God and the resultant happiness. In this way, what the narrative superficially illustrates (39b-c) structurally represents the topic in question, which manifests Jesus' religious view (39d). Finally, the parables are told in written texts. While Jesus first and foremost interacts with other characters, their talk as a whole forms part of the description in the Synoptic Gospels. Realized in this mode of discourse, the parables that appear in the talk-exchange in the story world are delivered to the reader indirectly. In the case of (39), Jesus' words are addressed to the audience in front of him, and readers just observe how their interaction goes along from the description of Luke such as (39b). In sum, the parables are allegorical stories that Jesus tells to other characters in the written text of the Synoptic Gospels.

5.2.2 Interpretive Difficulty of Parables

The parables in the Synoptic Gospels might seem fairly plain at first glance. However, clues to understand the allegorical stories are not provided sufficiently, which requires intensive interpretive work to be done. They contain several kinds of obstacles for allegorical interpretation. This section demonstrates that the parables are difficult to understand because (i) some of the elements in the parables do not have a clear allegorical counterpart; (ii) some of them deal with abstract topics; (iii) the topic is not clarified.

First, some of the characters and events that appear in the parables lack clear allegorical counterparts. That is to say, not all allegorical correspondences are easy to draw in parable discourse. In (39) above, for example, who the shepherd represents is not shown in the text. Consequently, although the character brings the lost sheep back home, this does not make clear who it is that will lead sinners to God. He could possibly stand for a holy one such as an angel, or Jesus. The story also leads us to wonder what is represented by the act of “joyfully put[ting] it on his shoulders.” Shepherds do not usually carry sheep on his/her shoulders; that is, the herdsman treated the lost sheep in a special manner. This suggests that the one who makes sinners turn to God — no matter who it is — would act towards them in such a special, perhaps considerate way. This further gives rise to another question: how would s/he ‘carry’ wrongdoers to God, which is difficult to answer. In addition to these, there is another line of questions. What does the shepherd’s home correspond to? Is it meant to represent Heaven? If so, who are the friends and neighbors of the one who leads sinners to God? If we consider the shepherd’s home to refer to Heaven, the allegorical counterparts of his friends and neighbors could not be those who belong to the place, since neither one’s friends nor neighbors are normally supposed to live with him/her. Given this, who are the people who will be invited to Heaven, when a sinner is celebrated into the kingdom of God? As this observation clearly shows, although the parables may seem simple at a first glance, some of the allegorical correspondences required to understand them are unclear in the text.

This is not only true in longer parables. In fact, shorter parables are also allegorically complex. In the scene below, Jesus heals a woman in a synagogue on a Sabbath day. Because the Jewish law forbids work on the Sabbath day, the synagogue leader criticizes him for his act of healing. In reply to the attack, Jesus refers to the kingdom of God (Luke, 13: 18-19):

(40) Then Jesus asked, “(a)What is the kingdom of God like? What shall I compare it to? (b)It is like a mustard seed, which a man took and planted in his garden. (c)It grew and became a tree, and the

Jesus begins with clarification of the topic that he is about to discuss (40a). At the same time, he is obviously attempting to illustrate the concept of the kingdom of God by comparison (cf. “like” and “compare”). In addition, he does this in the form of a question, thereby inviting the audience in the scene as well as the reader of the Synoptic Gospels to think about the topic. This way of initiation clarifies the target of the upcoming parable (40b-c). On the other hand, this does not make the allegorical story easy to understand. Right after (40a), the kingdom of God is first described as a particular seed in an aphoristic simile (40b). Along with some characterization (cf. the modification with the relative clause), the simile juxtaposes God’s kingdom with the seed, and thereby founds the basis for comparison (cf. ch.2; Cuenca, 2015; Dancygier & Sweetser, 2014: sec.6.5; Israel, et al., 2004). Then Jesus narratively shows what the seed becomes in the end (40c), and the illustration here evokes the image of a lively tree with birds in its branches. Based on the overall correspondence between the seed and the kingdom of God, the latter is apparently required to be understood through this tree image. And yet, this only provides readers with a rough guideline for interpretation. It is not clarified in what way the story is supposed to illustrate the God’s kingdom. In the same vein, the allegorical counterparts of the story elements are similarly unclear. Jesus’ talk above therefore gives rise to questions such as who does the sower stand for, what does his garden symbolize, and what do the birds represent? Thus, even concise parables are not simple to understand, just like longer ones such as (39).

The allegorical complexity of the Synoptic parables can exhibit more clearly by comparing them with an example of allegorical argumentation in the form of a story. Example (41) is an excerpt from *Swordfish* we analyzed in Chapter 3. The US senator Reisman collaborates with an underground terrorist, Gabriel, to steal some of the government’s dormant assets. When he notices that their relationship is known to the FBI, the senator directs Gabriel on the phone to suspend their plan and hide out for a while, but he rejects the order and hangs up. After putting the phone, Reisman tells a hypothetical story to his secretary, Kaplan:

(41) REISMAN: Son. (a)Let’s just say you’ve got a 200-pound Rottweiler. (b)Now he loves you. It’s his job to protect you. (c)But if he ever bites you, even once, you gotta put him down. (d)You can never tell who he might bite next. You understand?

KAPLAN: Yes, I do understand, Senator.

REISMAN: I think we got a team of the West Coast. Uh, Fort MacArthur. Maybe they should pay

Right after the phone call, Reisman's intention is transparent. He is clearly talking about Gabriel, even though the allusion is not made explicit in his talk. Each entity and event in the short, imaginary story has a clear allegorical counterpart. The Rottweiler represents Gabriel, with its exceptional size implying its strength and danger, and its master, Kaplan ("you"), stands for Reisman himself (41a). The relationship between the hound and his master indicates the one between the senator and the terrorist (41b). The "bite" represents Gabriel's revolt, and putting down the dog corresponds to the necessary disposal of him that the senator is suggesting (41c). The warrant for the treatment of the Rottweiler also justifies the annihilation of Gabriel (41d). Based on the whole correspondence, Reisman argues that Gabriel should be terminated, as a dog should be killed if it bites his/her master even once. Allegorical stories are thus simple to understand and persuasive when constructed with specific allegorical counterparts of narrative entities and events.

The transparent allegory helps spot what makes the parables difficult to understand. In simple story allegories, in general, the story usually contains as sufficient particularities as necessary to understand it allegorically, just like we saw in (41). In contrast, the stories of the parables are filled with details. Seen from an antagonistic point of view, they might even seem to be in much more detail than necessary. The highly detailed description results in a number of candidates for allegorical reading, and hence more work is required to specify what those entities and events represent in the narrative. Thus, the parables are stuffed with narrative details in a way that demands intensive interpretation by readers of the Synoptic Gospels.

Second, the Synoptic parables prevents easy understanding due to their abstract topics. This also becomes clear by comparing them with allegorical stories. Simple allegorical stories usually concerns particular people and actions, mirroring them in the narrative characters and events. The concrete topic makes it relatively easy to interpret the story allegorically, with the particular persons and actions in the context serving as possible 'nodes' for allegorical correspondences. For example, in (41), how to treat Gabriel is the topic in question, which is explained through comparison with the expected treatment of the defiant Rottweiler. As particular people and actions are compared to a concrete story, every characters and events in the story has a clear counterpart (the hound corresponds to Gabriel, the bite matches his betrayal, etc.). In addition, the particularity of the situation at hand makes it understandable itself, even without the help of the allegorical matching. Given this, allegorical stories functions as a perspective from which to recognize the situation. In (41), what happened between Reisman and Gabriel is obvious on its own, and the Rottweiler allegory provides an interpretive framework for Kaplan (and the audience of the film as well) to

see Gabriel as an ‘defiant hound’ as Reisman claims. Allegorical stories are thus easy to understand when dealing with particular situations. In the Synoptic parables, however, the topic is usually a religious concept that Jesus attempts to explain, such as the kingdom of God (cf. (40)). Such abstract topics do not have — or seem to lack at first glance — a specific structure of its own, and hence they cannot be clearly explained as they are. The parables are thus provided as a required framework through which to systematically understand the conceptual topics in the teachings of Jesus. Even with the help of them, the abstract concepts are still difficult to grasp, because they do not offer possible nodes for allegorical interpretation. The stories of the parables are the only material to be referenced to understand what Jesus says. The difficulty of the parables in the Synoptic Gospels thus partly emerges as a result of concerning abstract topics.

The third obstacle that keeps the parables from simple interpretation is that they are sometimes started without the topic being identified. Consider the following excerpt (Mark, 4: 1-10):

(42) (=38))

Again Jesus began to teach by the lake. The crowd that gathered around him was so large that he got into a boat and sat in it out on the lake, while all the people were along the shore at the water’s edge. (a)He taught them many things by parables, and in his teaching said: “(b)Listen! A farmer went out to sow his seed. As he was scattering the seed, some fell along the path, and the birds came and ate it up. Some fell on rocky places, where it did not have much soil. It sprang up quickly, because the soil was shallow. But when the sun came up, the plants were scorched, and they withered because they had no root. Other seed fell among thorns, which grew up and choked the plants, so that they did not bear grain. Still other seed fell on good soil. It came up, grew and produced a crop, some multiplying thirty, some sixty, some a hundred times.”

Then Jesus said, “(c)Whoever has ears to hear, let them hear.”

(d)When he was alone, the Twelve and the others around him asked him about the parables.

(Mark, 4: 1-10)

In this scene, Jesus tells the story of a sower to a multitude. The story is initiated as one of the parables he deployed to show his religious view (42a), which obviously requires readers to take the following story as a reference frame on a certain topic. What the topic is, however, is not clarified in the text. Also, the parable is located at the beginning of the scene. No contextual information, such as prior conversation between Jesus and other characters, is therefore available up to this point to reference in order to discover the topic in

question. In addition, Jesus does not pinpoint what the story is about, either. He just begins the narration with an attention-getting vocative (42b), and finishes it by declaring for whom it is meant (42c). After his talk, a new scene is introduced (42d), which provides no helpful hints about the previous story. Thus, without substantial clues for allegorical interpretation, what the story represents is kept under cover in the text, whereas it is explicitly launched as a parable. As in this case, some of the Synoptic parables are presented without a clear topic.

This section has revealed that the Synoptic parables are not allegorically simple to interpret, because they are constructed in ways that require readers' involvement in discovering the allegorical correspondences offered in the parable discourse in order to firmly grasp Jesus' view encoded in them.⁷⁹ In short, the parables seem to be intentionally "designed make the audience think" (Cockcroft et al., 2014: 281). Why, then, are they realized in such a way? What function does it fulfill to disrupt easy understanding? In order to answer these questions, the next section observes how the Synoptic Gospels are constructed.

5.3 The Use of Aposiopesis in the Gospels⁸⁰

While the use of parables can be recognized as a typical feature of Jesus' way of preaching, the Gospels also employ a noticeable strategy — i.e., aposiopesis, a method of "stopping suddenly in midcourse, leaving statement unfinished" (Lanham, 1991: 20) — in illustrating the scenes where Jesus interacts with interlocutors. They invariably avoid describing how the audience respond to him, even when their response of some sort is expected. What function does the use of aposiopesis fulfill in the Gospels, then? To answer the question, let us observe the texts of the Gospels in detail.

5.3.1 Lack of Responses to Jesus

Jesus teaches his doctrine to a variety of people such as Jesus' disciples, the Pharisees, and the locals.

⁷⁹ There is a debate over how strictly the Synoptic parables should be interpreted as allegories (Crossan, 1992: 150; McNeile, 1915: 186; Ohnuki et al. eds., 2002: 64; Piercy, 1908: 645). Some scholars argue that it is unnecessary to figure out the allegorical counterpart of every single element in the allegorical stories (e.g., Jüricher, 1976). Others attempt to analyze analogical correspondences in parable discourse quite in detail, paying close attention to specific entities and events described in the stories (e.g., Kato, 2006).

⁸⁰ The analysis and discussion presented here is based on Hirakawa (2018).

His teaching starts in interaction with a certain interlocutor(s). That is, his words are directed toward the specific audience in each situation. On the other hand, how the audience respond to Jesus is not portrayed, even though it is apparently possible. Consider several examples. The one below is a scene in which Jesus responds to a question by the Pharisees about the law on the sabbath day (Mark, 2:23; 3:1):

- (43) One Sabbath Jesus was going through the grainfields, and as his disciples walked along, they began to pick some heads of grain. The Pharisees said to him, “(a)Look, why are they doing what is unlawful on the Sabbath?”

He answered, “(b)Have you never read what David did when he and his companions were hungry and in need?⁸¹ In the days of Abiathar the high priest, he entered the house of God and ate the consecrated bread, which is lawful only for priests to eat. And he also gave some to his companions.”

Then he said to them, “(c)The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath. So the Son of Man is Lord even of the Sabbath.”

Another time Jesus went into the synagogue, and a man with a shriveled hand was there.

(Mark, 2: 23-28; 3: 1)

Although the Pharisees’ utterance (43a) takes the form of a question, they clearly aim to criticize him, based on the Jewish laws. In reply, Jesus’ retort to it (43b-c). The text of Mark, though, does not reveal how his response is received by the Pharisees, and instead starts recounting the next scene. Therefore, it is unclear whether Jesus’ argument is persuasive enough to the censors.

This way of portraying Jesus’ conversation is likewise observable in the next example, which is cited from Matthew (10: 1-5). The Pharisees and the Sadducees attempt to test Jesus’ status as a holy figure.

- (44) The Pharisees and Sadducees came to Jesus and (a)tested him by asking him to show them a sign from heaven.

He replied, “(b)When evening comes, you say, ‘It will be fair weather, for the sky is red,’ and in the morning, ‘Today it will be stormy, for the sky is red and overcast.’ You know how to interpret the appearance of the sky, but you cannot interpret the signs of the times. A wicked and adulterous

⁸¹ David is a king of Israel, and the seeming author of Psalm in the Old Testament. Abiathar is his friend.

generation looks for a sign, but none will be given it except the sign of Jonah.”⁸² (c)Jesus then left them and went away.

When they went across the lake, the disciples forgot to take bread. (Matthew, 10: 1-5)

Against the Pharisees and the Sadducees who suspect that Jesus is not a true saint (44a), Jesus counter-argues to their critical view, evaluating them as “hypocrites” at the same time (44b). Nothing is shown as to how his words are taken by the Pharisees and the Sadducees, and the only thing that is clarified in the text is that Jesus left them (44c).

This omissive method is invariably employed to illustrate scenes where Jesus mentions a variety of topics in one preaching. Consider the following example taken from Matthew (5: 1-2; 7: 28-29):

(45) Now when Jesus saw the crowds, he went up on a mountainside and sat down. His disciples came to him, and (a)he began to teach them.

He said:

[...]

(b)When Jesus had finished saying these things, (c)the crowds were amazed at his teaching, (d)because he taught as one who had authority, and not as their teachers of the law.

(Matthew, 5: 1-2; 7: 28-29)

In the preaching that follows (45a), Jesus mentions as many as 19 different topics: “The Beatitudes,” “Salt and Light,” “The Fulfillment of the Law,” “Murder,” “Adultery,” “Divorce,” “Oaths,” “Eye for Eye,” “Love for Enemies,” “Giving to the Needy,” “Prayer,” “Fasting,” “Treasures in Heaven,” “Do Not Worry,” “Judging Others,” “Ask, Seek, Knock,” “The Narrow and Wide Gates,” “True and False Disciples,” and “The Wise and Foolish Builders”.⁸³ During his speech, no description is inserted of how the audience reacted to his words. Their reaction is finally portrayed (45c), only when he finishes the long utterance (45b). Notice how brief and equivocal it is: what is clear in the text is just that they were “astonished.” There is no information provided as to how astonished they were, or which part of Jesus’ doctrine astonished them. In addition, the audience were surprised, Matthew illustrates, at the way Jesus has been preaching, and not at his message

⁸² Jonas is one of the books in the Old Testament.

⁸³ The titles are all taken from the *New International Version*. It is necessary to note that the counting criterion varies in different versions of the Gospel of Matthew. The number of 19 should therefore be understood as a rough indicator of how long and how many topics Jesus talks about in the scene.

itself (45d). In this way, even though a certain reaction is offered to Jesus' teaching in the above scene, it is still far from providing details of the reaction.

To summarize, the Gospels portray how Jesus tells religious message to a variety of people. In the description, they systematically avoid showing the response of the audience to Jesus, even though it is a possible option. This noticeable feature gives rise to two questions: (i) what function does this way of realizing conversation fulfill?; and (ii) what motivates it in the Gospels?

5.3.2 Definition of Aposiopesis

The omissive way of describing Jesus' conversation adopted in (43-45) is called 'aposiopesis' in the rhetorical terminology. It is a strategy to signal in some way that there may be something unstated in the text, in order to invite the reader to actively participate in meaning construction of the text (Sato, 1992b: 47).⁸⁴ For example, consider the following conversational scene between the narrator "I" and an old man in "Aobeka Monogatari (The Story of a Beka Boat)", a novel by Yamamoto Shugoro (Sato, 1992b: 24).

- (46) (a)「いい舟があんだが」と老人は二百メートルも向うにあるひねこびた松の木にでも話しかける
ような、大きな声でどなりたてた、(b)「いい舟で値段も安いもんだが、買わねえかね」
(c)私が答えると、老人は初めからその答えを予期していたように、なんの反応もあらず、
吸っていたタバコを地面でもみ消し、残りを耳に挟んでから、手漬をかんだ。

(山本周五郎『青べか物語』)

[(a)“I have a boat for you.” The old man shouted at me loudly as if he was talking to a crooked

⁸⁴ This is not a standard definition of aposiopesis in the study of rhetoric, however. It is traditionally characterized as in (ii) based on examples such as (i):

- (i) What cause withholds you then, to mourn for him? / O judgment! thou art fled to brutish beasts, / And men have lost their reason. Bear with me, / My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar, / And I must pause till it come back to me
(Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, 3.2.105-107)
- (ii) a pragmatic figure, signifying a sudden disruption of discourse by omitting the expected end of a clause or sentence, as if the speaker/writer were unable or unwilling to proceed. (Sloane, 2001: 29)

In many studies, aposiopesis is understood in connection to the the speaker's emotional state such as anger, sadness, and hesitation (Nouchi, 1998: 295; Lanham, 1991: 20; Sloane, 2001: 29). The standard conceptualization is quite different from that by Sato (1992). Given this till, this study adopts Sato's view because we equivalently focus on written discourse. Nevertheless, it is indeed a theoretical problem that a single phenomenon receives separate definitions. I would like to discuss the matter in a different opportunity.

pine tree which stood as far as two hundred meters away. (b)“It’s a nice boat, and it’s cheap. Don’t you wanna buy it?”

(c)When I replied to him, he gave no response like he had anticipated how I would answer. And after stubbing out his cigarette on the ground and putting the remainder behind his ear, he did a farmer’s blow.]

In contrast to the old man’s remarks (46a-b), the words of “I” are not quoted. It is only stated that “I” reacted to his offer (46c), with no specific detail of it (the following conversation is portrayed in the same way). This omission requires readers to imagine what “I” said, and invites them to actively participate into the meaning construction (Sato, 1992b: 24-25). The use of aposiopesis in the above example tightly connects the text to the reader. Aposiopesis is thus a rhetorical strategy that devise the text with some cues to indicate that there is something more than what is obviously stated so as to trigger the reader to visualize and ‘restore’ it (Nouchi, 1998: 295; Sato, 1992b: 46-47; Sato et al., 2006: 405).

Given this, let us go back to the Gospels. Recall that they systematically avoid illustrating how Jesus’s interlocutors respond to his teachings. This way of describing conversational scenes is viewed as instances of aposiopesis just like (46), because their reply is not provided in the interactional positions where it is sufficiently expected. It can serve to trigger the reader to imagine how Jesus’ words are received. Put another way, the use of aposiopesis in the Gospels leaves how his doctrine is received in each scene to readers’ interpretive work, provoking them to respond to his utterances themselves. Jesus’ preachings, therefore, are strongly oriented toward the reader (in addition to other characters), even though they are initiated in conversations in the world realized in the text. The strategy serves as a rhetorical means to carry his religious messages to the reader, rather than confine them in the text world.

5.3.3 Description of Responses to Jesus

As shown in the above two sections, the Gospels frequently use aposiopesis, which plays the role of directing Jesus’ words to the reader. This may suggest that his teachings are invariably described with the strategy, and that individual readers can freely decide how to understand his message. In fact, however, these are not true. There are several conversations in which the reaction of Jesus’ audience is explicitly shown. Also, the reader’s interpretive work is not totally unrestricted, but rather given a certain orientation by those

scenes depicted without employing aposiopesis. The point to note here is that there are only two types of reactions made to Jesus' preaching.

5.3.3.1 Positive responses to Jesus

One types of reactions to Jesus is that audience positively accepts his words. Cited below is an excerpt from Mark (12: 35-37):

(47) While Jesus was teaching in the temple courts, he asked, “(a)Why do the teachers of the law say that the Messiah is the son of David? David himself, speaking by the Holy Spirit, declared:

“The Lord said to my Lord:

“Sit at my right hand

until I put your enemies

under your feet.”⁸⁵

David himself calls him ‘Lord.’ How then can he be his son?”

(b)The large crowd listened to him with delight.

(Mark, 12: 35-37)

In this scene, Jesus' questions (47a) is received by the people gladly (47b). This response indicates that they view Jesus' words as the cause of such delight. That is to say, it evaluates his utterance as something positive.

A similar reaction is seen in the next example, taken from Matthew (9: 1-8):

(48) Jesus stepped into a boat, crossed over and came to his own town. Some men brought to him a paralyzed man, lying on a mat. When Jesus saw their faith, he said to the man, “Take heart, son; your sins are forgiven.”

At this, some of the teachers of the law said to themselves, “This fellow is blaspheming!”

Knowing their thoughts, Jesus said, “Why do you entertain evil thoughts in your hearts? Which is easier: to say, ‘Your sins are forgiven,’ or to say, ‘Get up and walk’? But I want you to know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.” So he said to the paralyzed man, (a)“Get up, take your mat and go home.” Then the man got up and went home. (b)When the crowd saw this,

⁸⁵ This is quoted from Psalm (110: 1).

they were filled with awe; and they praised God, who had given such authority to man.

(Matthew, 9: 1-8)

When Jesus heals a paralyzed man only with words (48a), the people around are amazed and pray for God, accepting him as a saint (48b). Their reaction characterizes Jesus as an authoritative figure. In this way, positive evaluation is attached to Jesus' words and acts. It characterizes him as well as his teachings as 'right' and 'authoritative' in the text.

5.3.3.2 Failure of opponents against Jesus to retort him

Another type of reaction given to Jesus is observed in the scenes where he argues with critical opponents. The excerpt below is taken from Luke (14: 1-6):

(49) One Sabbath, when Jesus went to eat in the house of a prominent Pharisee, he was being carefully watched. There in front of him was a man suffering from abnormal swelling of his body. Jesus asked the Pharisees and experts in the law, “^(a)Is it lawful to heal on the Sabbath or not?” ^(b)But they remained silent. So taking hold of the man, he healed him and sent him on his way. Then he asked them, “^(c)If one of you has a child or an ox that falls into a well on the Sabbath day, will you not immediately pull it out?” ^(d)And they had nothing to say. (Luke, 14: 1-6)

Jesus asks the lawyers and Pharisees a question of how can one justify healing someone on the sabbath day (49a). To this, however, they say nothing (49b). Given their silence, Jesus heals the man with the dropsy in front of them although it is a sabbath day, and asks them the same question again (49c), this time by giving a different instance of working on the sabbath day. Again, the lawyers and Pharisees cannot answer it (49d).

In fact, the lawyers and Pharisees had no other option than keep silent to the question, because they could not say either “Yes” or “No.” Since work on the sabbath day is forbidden by the Jewish law, they are supposed to answer “No” to the first question (49a). On the other hand, the second one (49c) would naturally be answered “Yes,” because leaving the fallen ox in a well will likely lead to a serious consequence. Since it is impossible to answer a single question by “Yes” and “No” at the same time, the lawyers and Pharisees could do nothing but keep their mouths shut. As long as his religious opponents cannot counter-argue, Jesus'

view is ‘right’ and theirs — i.e., the Jewish law — ‘wrong.’ In this way, illustrating the scenes where Jesus wins an argument with critics contributes to proving him as well as his doctrine to be right.

Consider another example. Below is a part from Matthew (22: 15-22):

(50) Then the Pharisees went out and laid plans to trap him in his words. They sent their disciples to him along with the Herodians. “Teacher,” they said, “we know that you are a man of integrity and that you teach the way of God in accordance with the truth. You aren’t swayed by others, because you pay no attention to who they are. ^(a)Tell us then, what is your opinion? Is it right to pay the imperial tax to Caesar or not?”

But Jesus, knowing their evil intent, said, “^(b)You hypocrites, why are you trying to trap me? Show me the coin used for paying the tax.” They brought him a denarius, and he asked them, “^(c)Whose image is this? And whose inscription?”

“^(d)Caesar’s,” they replied.

Then he said to them, “^(e)So give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s.”

^(f)When they heard this, they were amazed. So they left him and went away. (Matthew, 22: 15-22)

The Pharisees’ disciples and the Herodians demand Jesus’ opinion about tax payment to Caesar (50a). Jesus replies with a negative evaluation of them (“ye hypocrites”), and makes a seemingly irrelevant request (50b). After confirming that the emperor’s profile is carved in the coin (50c-d), he claims to give what belongs to Caesar to him (50e), which also constitutes a reply to the initial requirement (50a). Being astonished by the remark, the Pharisees’ disciples and the Herodians leaves him without counter-arguing any more. Their reaction suggests that they could not retort to Jesus’ reasoning, and hence retroactively characterizes it as ‘right.’

In the Gospels, no conclusive criticism is given to Jesus as clearly shown in the above two examples. That is, he always wins arguments with those against him. It is important to note that this contributes to characterizing Jesus’ teachings to be ‘right’ — or at least ‘righter’ than any other doctrine. Veiling responses to Jesus can fulfill the same function. In general, silence in an argument is normally regarded as a sign of admission with no objection (Kozai, 2010: 79; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 108). As such, the use of aposiopesis signals Jesus’ win and demonstrates he and his doctrine is right.

5.3.3.3 An exceptional case: Jesus is rejected

We have seen so far that the Gospels systematically portray Jesus and his doctrine as ‘right’ and ‘authoritative’ through textual evaluation. On the other hand, however, there is one case which seems to be an exception. Consider the excerpt below, which is taken from Luke (4: 21-32). Jesus preaches people in his hometown.

(51) He began by saying to them, “Today this scripture is fulfilled in your hearing.”

All spoke well of him and were amazed at the gracious words that came from his lips. “Isn’t this Joseph’s son?” they asked.

Jesus said to them, “Surely you will quote this proverb to me: ‘Physician, heal yourself!’ And you will tell me, ‘Do here in your hometown what we have heard that you did in Capernaum.’”

“Truly I tell you,” he continued, “(a)no prophet is accepted in his hometown. I assure you that there were many widows in Israel in Elijah’s time, when the sky was shut for three and a half years and there was a severe famine throughout the land. Yet Elijah was not sent to any of them, but to a widow in Zarephath in the region of Sidon. And there were many in Israel with leprosy in the time of Elisha the prophet, yet not one of them was cleansed — only Naaman the Syrian.”

(b)All the people in the synagogue were furious when they heard this. They got up, drove him out of the town, and took him to the brow of the hill on which the town was built, in order to throw him off the cliff. But he walked right through the crowd and went on his way.

Then he went down to Capernaum, a town in Galilee, and on the Sabbath he taught the people.

They were amazed at his teaching, because his words had authority. (Luke, 4: 21-32)

In this scene, Jesus maintains that prophets are unwelcom in their hometown (51a), and this causes the locals to get angry and try to kill him (51b). This definitely seems to be a negative response. Nevertheless, it still contributes to Jesus’ ‘rightness’ in the end, because their reaction itself realizes and exemplifies what he has just pointed out about prophets. That is to say, the rejection of him consequently makes Jesus a prophet. The whole scene in (51) thus works to prove that his assertion is right. In this way, Jesus is invariably characterized as a ‘right’ one, which obviously indicates that this scene is not an exception.

5.3.3.4 The Gospels and the reader

In the Synoptic Gospels, responses to Jesus are only described when they are positive ones. This serves to evaluate him and his teachings as ‘right’ and establish his authority in the text. The texts of the Synoptic Gospels are entirely oriented toward positive characterization of Jesus.

This means that aposiopesis is employed in the middle of the evaluative orientation. As far as the Gospels are understood to be coherent texts, the teachings of Jesus are biased to be received affirmatively, even when his interlocutors do not explicitly react to him.⁸⁶ Therefore, the reader of the Gospels is not completely free in how to understand Jesus’ words. The use of aposiopesis functions as a means to make Jesus right and give him authority, reflecting the evaluative stance of the Gospels.

5.3.4. The Gospels and Aposiopesis

So far, we have clarified that the use of aposiopesis in the Gospels suggests that Jesus is ‘right’ and ‘authoritative,’ and provides his words with a certain power to appeal to the reader, in the backdrop of the evaluative orientation in the whole texts. This function has some advantages in the Gospels.

In terms of positively evaluating Jesus, it might seem to be more advantageous to explicitly and continuously show that his words are affirmed by a variety of audience. This method would enable the Gospels to obviously characterize Jesus as a ‘right’ and ‘authoritative’ figure, indeed (cf. Sec. 5.3.1). On the other hand, however, this way of description cannot direct his words to the reader, but rather ends up confining them in the story world. Since Jesus is a character who lives in the text of the Gospels, he first and foremost talks to other characters. The reader only hears his words indirectly, as if s/he is eavesdropping. As a consequence, it is impossible for the text to directly carry his doctrine to the reader and get him/her to think about it.

The use of aposiopesis, in contrast, directs Jesus’ utterances to the reader, and invites them into active engagement in text comprehension. Through giving no explicit remark that evaluates Jesus or his teachings in the text, it will trigger the reader to form an opinion of him. That is, the rhetorical strategy make the reader ‘directly’ face and receive Jesus and his words. This manner of communication between Jesus and the reader

⁸⁶ Silence in argument can generally be considered as the arguer cannot retort the opponent’s claim any any more (Kozai, 2010: 79; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 108). This supports our view that the interpretation of the absence of the counter-argument by Jesus’ antagonists as they cannot support their stance is motivated to be considered as such.

cannot be realized by explicitly illustrating reactions to his utterances. The use of aposiopesis thus connects Jesus as well as his words containing his doctrine ‘straight’ to the reader. Given this function, moreover, aposiopesis is also valuable in terms of Christianity. The nucleus of the religious doctrine is the acceptance of Jesus as Christ (Messiah) or the Son of God (Nakamura, 2010: 12-14; Matsumoto ed., 2009: 5; Yamaga, 2014: 61-63). Consequently, bringing his words ‘directly’ to readers through aposiopesis means letting them face the religious nucleus. The use of the strategy, thus, contributes to textual realization of the core of Christianity.

Now, we are ready to answer the couple of questions we posed in Section 5.3.1. The questions and answers are summarized below:

(52) (i) Q: What is the function of aposiopesis in the Gospels?

A: Aposiopesis directs Jesus’ utterances to the reader
establishes Jesus’ rightness and authority in the text

(ii)Q: What motivates the use of aposiopesis in the Gospels?

A: Aposiopesis can get the reader to directly face Jesus, the core of Christianity

With the use of aposiopesis, the Synoptic Gospels continuously invite the reader to hear the authoritative voice of Jesus and deeply think about his message.

5.4 The Interplay between Parables and Aposiopesis

Aposiopesis is also deployed in the scenes where Jesus tells a parable. Together with allegory with insufficient clues for interpretation, it contributes to shape a certain relationship with the reader of the Synoptic Gospels. For example, consider the passage below from Luke (13: 1-11):

(53) Now there were some present at that time who told Jesus about the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mixed with their sacrifices. Jesus answered, “Do you think that these Galileans were worse sinners than all the other Galileans because they suffered this way? I tell you, no! But unless you repent, you too will all perish. Or those eighteen who died when the tower in Siloam fell on them — do you think they were more guilty than all the others living in Jerusalem? I tell you, no! But

unless you repent, you too will all perish.”

(a)Then he told this parable: “A man had a fig tree growing in his vineyard, and he went to look for fruit on it but did not find any. So he said to the man who took care of the vineyard, ‘For three years now I’ve been coming to look for fruit on this fig tree and haven’t found any. Cut it down! Why should it use up the soil?’

“‘Sir,’ the man replied, ‘leave it alone for one more year, and I’ll dig around it and fertilize it. If it bears fruit next year, fine! If not, then cut it down.’”

(b)On a Sabbath Jesus was teaching in one of the synagogues, and a woman was there who had been crippled by a spirit for eighteen years. (Luke, 13: 1-11)

The parable is introduced (53a) in the context where Jesus is talking about repentance and death. Although it pivots around a conversation between a vineyard owner and the caretaker on the treatment of a fruitless fig tree, the point of the narrative is clearly not the literal plot. Rather, given the context, Jesus is showing his view on repentance and death through the story. His talk is thus allegorical. Allegorical correspondences between the story and the ongoing topic are not sufficiently clear, however. The allegorical counterparts of the entities and events in the story are not provided in the text. This way of allegorical talk provokes the reader to find the answers to questions like, “Who do the owner and the caretaker of the vineyard represent?” “What do the fig tree and its fruit symbolize?” and “What do digging around the tree and fertilizing it stand for?” Thus, with insufficient clues for allegorical understanding, the parable discourse invites the reader into active interpretation. Meanwhile, the parable is also devised with aposiopesis. It is crucial to note that the allegorical story forms part of a response to those who told Jesus about the Galileans whose blood was mixed with sacrifices. When a speaker receives a response from the interlocutor, it is naturally expected for him/her to take turn and make a certain reply. In the above scene, however, how the people “present at the time” acted in response to Jesus’ utterance is not illustrated, even though it is likely for them to say something in response to the parable. Instead, the scene is closed right after the parable, and the next one begins (57b). This effectively directs Jesus’ words to the reader, inviting him/her to think about his message. The use of the two rhetorical strategies — allegory and aposiopesis — thus functions as effective means to deliver Jesus’ words to the reader of the Synoptic Gospels.

The combination of allegory and aposiopesis could seem disadvantageous, because they function as a kind of obstacle for clear understanding of Jesus’ messages. In other words, it might seem unreasonable to leave room for interpretation of his words, especially if one thinks that the purpose of the Synoptic Gospels

is to guarantee firm understanding of his views. Indeed, it could have been possible for the writers and editors of the Gospels to compose the text in a way that makes it quite simple to understand. Such ‘kind’ composition — i.e., with detailed explanation of allegory and no use of aposiopesis — would fail to ensure the reader’s engagement to interpretation. Put differently, whereas the parables would be plain to understand, it would make Jesus merely one of the characters in the story world, without triggering the reader to figure out allegorical correspondences or his intention. Then, the Synoptic Gospels would be nothing more than just a record of Jesus’ remarks. On the other hand, by preventing easy understanding through the use of allegory with insufficient clues and aposiopesis, the Synoptic Gospels effectively encourage the reader to communicate with Jesus himself/herself. The text thus rhetorically presents mysteries in order to shape an intimate relationship between Jesus and the reader. The use of allegory and aposiopesis is, therefore, beneficial for the Synoptic Gospels.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter focused on parables, i.e., allegorical stories told by Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels. An important characteristic of them is that they are not so easy to understand. Some do not offer sufficient clues for understanding allegorical correspondences, while others are told without a clear topic. The design leaves more or less room for the reader to interpret the message in the parables. In addition, the Gospels consistently employ the rhetorical strategy of aposiopesis when describing conversations between Jesus and other characters. Through hiding reactions to his words, it invites the reader to face Jesus, hear his voice as if he talks to him/her, and think about his message. The strategy also contributes to authorize Jesus and his teachings. Together with the use of aposiopesis, the Synoptic parables function as a means to effectively deliver Jesus’ messages to the reader through inviting him/her to what he attempts to teach, thereby tightly connecting Jesus and the reader.

The use of allegory and aposiopesis in the Synoptic parables has important implications for rhetorical studies. Traditionally, rhetorical strategies have been recognized as means to help and/or enhance the hearer’s or reader’s understanding. For example, in arguments, a variety of schemes are utilized to clearly advance one’s opinion and persuade the opponent. In literary works, various figures of speech are used to give a detailed account of scenes and characters’ feelings. In this view, rhetoric is for firm understanding of talk or text, and interpretive difficulty is expected to be avoided in general. However, recall that in the Synoptic Gospels,

allegory and aposiopesis contribute to provide some interpretive puzzles to solve. This obviously indicates that rhetorical strategies can be employed to obscure the intended meaning. In addition, the puzzles are not offered as unnecessary barricade but for a relationship-building effect. It follows from this that even though the talk and text presented in such a challenging manner requires the hearer or reader to put more labor for interpretation, it is rhetorical as long as it contributes to function with certain effects. Given this, exploring how skillfully a text or talk avoid transparency and what effects it has can be a direction of rhetorical studies. The analysis and discussion in this chapter can be characterized as one example of the direction.

While centrally focusing on a kind of written discourse, i.e., the Synoptic Gospels, this chapter has discussed the relationship the text shapes with the reader. As a consequence, our analysis might seem to aim at clarifying how individual readers actually understand (or, how they should understand) the Gospels. Interpretive work by actual readers is not the target of this study, however. With the focus on such particular aspect of text comprehension, we would have ended up reaching an analytical dead end, because every reader can (and probably will) understand more or less different ways. Some readers may be sensitively aware that there is a limited kind and number of responses shown to Jesus in the text, for example, while others may not even notice at all the possible interactional slots in which the audience could react to him. It is extremely difficult — or perhaps almost impossible — to shed light on such particularities. Instead, our focus has been on how the text of the Gospels is constructed, and what sort of interpretation can emerge from the way they are shaped. Part of the significance of this section lies in the this analytical attitude.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ For the expression and function of silence in written discourse, also cf. Ohnuma (1973).

6. Exemplifying a Moral Lesson with a Narrative: Fables

6.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the discursive genre of the fable⁸⁸. As we saw in Chapter 2, in general, the fable seems to be considered as a moral story such as (54):

(54) The Fox and the Bunch of Grapes

A famished fox, seeing some bunches of grapes hanging [from a vine which had grown] in a tree, wanted to take some, but could not reach them. So he went away saying to himself:

‘Those are unripe.’

Similarly, certain people, not being able to run their affairs well because of their inefficiency, blame the circumstances. (Aesop, *The Complete Fables*)

The stereotypical understanding of the genre is often found in the literature: previous studies define the fable as a story that exemplifies a lesson stated either by the narrator or by one of the characters at the end. The traditional formulation might apparently seem to capture the fable’s characteristics adequately.

The traditional view, however, does not provide a comprehensive description, because the fable actually takes several different organizations in terms of presenting a lesson. First, the sequence of a story and a lesson is not fixed. While the majority of fables first narrate a story and then draw a lesson from it, there are some which first state a lesson and then tell a narrative to substantiate it. Moreover, there are even a small number of instances which present a lesson both before and after narration. Second, whereas the narrator may present a lesson as in (54), one of the characters may state it inside the story frame. Although this divergence is already mentioned in earlier research, it is not seen as a significant difference within the genre. Third, not all fables present a moral lesson obviously. In some fables, neither the narrator nor any of the characters states it explicitly but rather the fabulist leave the labor of extracting a lesson from the story to the reader’s interpretive work. In this way, the genre of the fable is not as simple as is traditionally recognized.

The three observations presented above lead us to a question: why does the fable take different patterns? To confront this, this chapter employs a discourse analytic perspective. Our starting point is that the fable is related to the act of exemplifying a moral lesson. Exemplification is a rhetorical strategy in which the

⁸⁸ The analysis and discussion in this chapter is based on Hirakawa (2012, 2017a).

speaker supports a claim by giving an instance of it. In conversation, supporting a claim by narrating an exemplary story requires it to be anchored in an ongoing interaction with an interlocutor: the story needs to be initiated and concluded as an instance of the claim. This procedure for exemplification can be drawn on in composing fables. On the other hand, fables are realized in the context of written discourse. Since they are not engaging in an ongoing interaction with the reader, the writer can depart from the procedure in conversation and perform exemplification in more ‘elliptical’ ways, which results in different structures. This chapter argues that the structural variation of the fable is thus generated as a consequence of different ways of exemplifying a lesson in written discourse.

The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 explores previous studies on the fable and points out that the fable has more structures than is traditionally acknowledged. Section 6.3 reviews a conversational analytic research that describes the procedure for exemplification in conversational argument and claims that this procedure is drawn on in realizing some fables. Section 6.4 shows how the context of written discourse triggers fables to take more ‘elliptical’ patterns. The last section sums up the whole discussion and presents the significance of this study.

6.2 Various Patterns of Fables

Though the fable is a widely recognized genre, it has received little attention that it takes several different structural patterns with regard to providing a moral lesson, reflecting different ways of linking the story and the lesson. This section reviews the previous research on the fable (6.2.1), observes that it takes multiple structures (6.2.2), and raises a question to confront in this chapter (6.2.3).

Before starting my discussion, the data set used in my analysis consists of randomly selected eight compilation books of fables: six of them are Aesopic and the other two are English translations of French fables by La Fontaine.⁸⁹ The fables analyzed amount to 1,567 in total. Note that the research interest here lies in qualitative variation found in the genre in question rather than in quantitative distribution of different structures, although how many tokens are found in each structural type is parenthetically noted.

6.2.1 Patterns Traditionally Described

⁸⁹ Cross-linguistic comparison on fables from different cultural backgrounds would be an interesting (and perhaps fruitful) direction of research.

The fable is traditionally formulated as follows:

- (55) A fable (also called an apologue) is a short narrative, in prose or verse, that exemplifies an abstract moral thesis or principle of human behavior; usually, at its conclusion, either the narrator or one of the characters states a moral in the form of an epigram. Most common is the beast fable, in which animals talk and act like the human types they represent. (Abrams, 1985: 6)

Here, the term “narrative” is meant to refer to “a story, whether told in prose or verse, involving events, characters, and what the characters say and do” (Abrams, 1985: 173). As (55) and many other descriptions (e.g., Barton & Hudson, 2004; Cuddon, 1980; Drabble ed., 2000; Lanham, 1991; Shaw, 1972) point out, the central features of the fable are that it consists of a story (often with animals as its characters) and that the story serves to convey a moral lesson.

As the underlined part in (55) describes, though it does not recognize them as such, the fable has two structural patterns to present a lesson: it may be stated outside the story by the narrator, or inside it by a character. First, let us look at the former pattern.

(56) The Fox and the Mask

A fox entered an actor’s house and rummaged through all his properties. Among other things he found a mask representing a hobgoblin’s head - a work of a talented artist. He took it up in his paws and said: ‘What a fine head! A pity it has no brain in it!’

¶ This fable reminds us that some men of impressive physical appearance are deficient in intellect. (Handford & Robb, *Fables of Aesop*)

This pattern is two-fold: a story is first narrated with the introduction by a title and then a lesson is presented. Importantly, the lesson is sometimes stated with some devices that mark its relationship with the preceding narrative. In (56), starting a new line and the paragraph symbol (“¶”) indicates the end of the narrative, and the underlined phrase characterizes what follows as something we should know. The introductory phrase also serves to extract the following lesson from the story. In addition, while the story of a fox is consistently narrated in the past tense (e.g., “entered,” “rummaged,” etc.), the present tense is chosen after the paragraph symbol. This indicates that while the story concerns past events, the concluding remark is a timeless, general statement, which may urge the reader to interpret this part as presenting a lesson. Moreover, the initial deictic

phrase “This fable” and the use of an inclusive *we* (“us”) collaboratively give an impression as if the narrator is talking to the reader face-to-face, like in conversation. In this way, this pattern of the fable, sometimes equipped with devices which contribute to differentiating and relating the story and the concluding remark, generalizes a moral lesson from the story.

On the other hand, in the latter pattern, one of the characters that appear in the story provides a moral lesson. Let us look at (57):

(57) The Wolf Proud of His Shadow, and the Lion

One day a wolf was wandering in some uninhabited regions at the hour when the sun sinks low down towards the horizon. Seeing his elongated shadow, he said:

‘Look at that! With my stature, should I fear the lion? With such an immense size, should I not become the king of all the animals?’

And as he was fully given up to pride with this thought, a lion of great strength suddenly leapt upon him and devoured him.

(a) The wolf changed his opinion and cried:

(b) ‘Presumption brings us misfortune.’

(Aesop, *The Complete Fables*)

In this example, the fabulist does not provide a concluding remark to present a lesson outside the narrative about an arrogant wolf but rather pulls the strings behind him. Consequently, the wolf asserts a lesson he learned at the expense of his life inside the story.

In this pattern, the fabulist equips the final part of the narrative with some devices to signal that the last words by a character express a lesson. In (57), first, the introductory sentence to the wolf’s final words (57a) implies that the following line (57b) may be something contrastive with the wolf’s ridiculous thought of becoming “the king of all the animals,” namely something ‘wise.’ Second, (the fabulist has) the wolf chooses the present tense to construct his final utterance (57b), generalizing his personal experience and claiming that the same thing he has just experienced may happen to other arrogant people. In this situation, he could instead choose the past tense or the present perfect. However, with either of these options, the wolf’s final utterance would refer only to his own experience and consequently he could not generalize his experience. Third, the wolf selects the first-person plural pronoun (“us”) rather than the first-person singular pronoun (*me*). Since it is the wolf alone that was devoured by a great lion for having an inflated pride, it would be possible to use *me* to mourn his “misfortune.” However, it could not show the applicability of his

experience to others, because it would refer only to the wolf himself. The use of “us” signals the general applicability of the wolf’s experience. In this way, the fabulist implicitly presents a moral lesson through the wolf’s last words. This is how this pattern of the fable is typically designed.

The two fables we have observed (56-57) instantiate the traditional formulation (55). Although it is not adequately recognized, they are obviously distinctive in terms of how a lesson is presented to readers. Whereas (56) consists of the story of a fox and a lesson derived from it by the narrator, (57) consists of the story of a wolf in which his experience is generalized into a lesson by the animal character. This difference is, though vital, underestimated, or almost neglected, in the literature, but gives rise to an important question: why does the fable take different patterns to state a moral lesson? Before starting to answer this, however, let us continue our search for other patterns that the fable takes.

6.2.2 Patterns Newly Observed

The traditional description says that a story in the fable comes before a moral lesson. However, the sequential order between those two components is not always fixed that way. Let us examine the following example:⁹⁰

(58) (a) TIT FOR TAT

(b) Do not do an ill turn to anyone. But if someone injures you, he deserves, according to the fable which I am going to relate, to be paid back in his own coin.

The story is that a stork which had arrived from foreign parts received an invitation to dinner from a fox, who served her with clear soup on a smooth slab of marble, so that the hungry bird could not taste a drop of it. Returning the invitation, the stork produced a flagon filled with pap, into which she stuck her bill and had a good meal, while her guest was tormented with hunger. ‘You set the example,’ she said, ‘and you must not complain at my following it.’

(Handford & Robb, *Fables of Aesop*)

This fable is totally distinct from the ones we have seen, which first narrate a story after a title and end with a lesson. The above fable does begin with a title (58a), but it is qualitatively different from the ones in (56-57)

⁹⁰ A fable structurally equivalent to (5) is mentioned in Olmos (2015: 202). However, she does not recognize that fable as an instance of a distinctive structural pattern.

in that it does not mention the names of the animals that appear in the narrative that follows but implies its resolution. Directly after the title comes a moral lesson (58b). This part is designed in a way that makes it clear that it is a general statement: the expressions “anyone,” “someone,” and “you” refer to a person in general, and the use of the imperative (“Do not do”) and the present tense (“deserves”) indicates that this sentence expresses a timeless idea. Evidently, this lesson is told by the narrator, as the use of “I” clearly indicates. Then following (58b), a narrative is told at last. At the same moment as it comes to its end, the entire fable also reaches its conclusion.

Importantly, the functional relationship between the moral and the story is crucially different from that in narrative-first fables. This is explicitly indicated by the word “relate” in (58b). Because the initial imperative concerns a general attitude while the subsequent story (it is called a “fable”) depicts a particular event, the word “relate” substantially means ‘to give an example’ here. That is, the lesson is no longer generalized from the narrative, but rather it is substantiated with the following story. The story is characterized as an example proactively by the preceding lesson but not retroactively by a lesson after it. On this point, this pattern differs starkly from the above two (56-57).⁹¹

Furthermore, there are fables in which a lesson is stated both before and after a story. For instance, look at (59):⁹²

(59) THE HEN WHO LAID THE GOLDEN EGGS

(a) *Greed loses all by trying for too much.*

(b) To put this maxim to the touch,

(c) Take but the Fool whose hen, as we are told,

Laid once a day an egg of gold.

Thinking she hid a treasure in her breast,

He killed and cut her open - when behold!

Inside she was exactly like the rest

Whose eggs but fetched the market price:

Himself had spoilt the best of his estate.

⁹¹ Fables like (58) are a minor pattern. In my collection, three compilations out of eight contain this pattern and it amounts to 41 instances (2.62%) in 1567 fables in total. This does not, however, makes it valueless to deal with this pattern, because this chapter focuses on the fact that the fable display variation. What counts in this study is not quantitative facts but qualitative difference observed among fables.

⁹² A fable structurally equivalent to (59) is touched on lightly in Kitagaki (1970: 83, 86). However, he does not treat it as an example of a distinct pattern.

(d)A lesson here for Avarice!

(e)Many the Get-Rich-Quicks we've seen of late,

Warm men at dawn, by dusk church mice.

(La Fontaine, *La Fontaine's Fables*)

This fable states a moral lesson twice in different ways. First, it is presented after the title (59a) as a general statement in the present tense. Here, it expresses common inclination of greedy people, signaling its qualitative distinction from the following narrative by italicization. The italicized phrase is obviously supposed to be read as a lesson in that it is called “this maxim” in (59b). In addition, the expression “put this maxim to the touch” clarifies that the upcoming narrative substantiates the lesson. Then, the story about a fool and his precious hen starts to be narrated with an orientation (59c). Second, after the story the lesson is presented again in (59e), with an announcement of the lesson explicitly extracted from the story (59d). This time, the lesson is composed so as to tell the reader how “Get-Rich-Quicks” end up for their greedy nature. The “church mice,” which refers to them figuratively, is a metaphor for extremely poor people. The position after the narrative signals that the lesson is generalized from the narrated events, and the narrative in turn is retroactively characterized as an example of the lesson. In this way, the story about a fool and his hen is doubly designed as an example. The sequential and functional organization of the fable like (59), therefore, is different from that of others that presents a lesson only once.⁹³

So far, we have observed that the fable takes multiple structures. The traditional study does not describe them as distinctive patterns and accordingly fails to account for how they are generated. In short, the previous research is unsuccessful both in description and in explanation of the structural variation of the fable. The observation in this section therefore contributes to elaborating the scope of the fable study.

6.2.3 Summary

This section reviewed the traditional description of the fable (6.2.1) and observed that the fable takes several structures with distinct sequential and functional organization that are out of the attention of the previous study (6.2.2). These patterns can be represented schematically with a name after their structure as follows:

⁹³ This is also a minor pattern in my data set: three books out of eight contain this pattern and it amounts to 64 instances (4.08%) in 1567 fables in total. But still this pattern should not be undervalued because what we are looking at is not a statistical tendency but qualitative variation found in the genre of the fable.

(60) Generalization Pattern

a. [TITLE] b. [STORY] c. [LESSON]

e.g., (56) “The fox and the mask”

(61) Embedding Pattern

a. [TITLE] b. [STORY [LESSON]]

e.g., (57) “The wolf proud of his shadow, and the lion”

(62) Substantiation Pattern

a. [TITLE] b. [LESSON] c. [STORY]

e.g., (58) “Tit for tat”

(63) Substantiation-Generalization Pattern

a. [TITLE] b. [LESSON] c. [STORY] d. [LESSON]

e.g., (59) “The hen who laid the golden eggs”

Though the genre of the fable is widely known, it is not commonly recognized that it takes those various patterns in exemplifying a moral lesson by telling a story. Given this, then, what enables the fable to state a lesson before, after, or both before and after the narration? This question may be difficult to answer by examining written, literary fables alone because the communicative activity between the writer and the reader is not evidently observable in the context of written discourse. So, let us analyze the process of conversational exemplification, where it is transparent how people exemplify their claim, in order to obtain some insights applicable to our analysis of written fables.

6.3 The Narrative as a Persuasive Device

In the rhetorical study, the fable is counted as a device for exemplification (Sloane, 2001: 395; Olmos, 2015: 194) in that it makes an assertion about how or how not we should behave by instantiating it with a story.^{94, 95} Whereas the fable is a written genre, exemplification with a narrative is not a rhetorical strategy intrinsic to written discourse. Importantly, exemplification with a narrative is in effect done in conversational argument through a certain procedure, and following it results in a certain discursive pattern.

⁹⁴ This does not mean either that exemplification is always achieved by telling a story or that narrating a story always contributes to exemplification.

⁹⁵ The status of the fable as a rhetorical tool for exemplification can also be found in the description of the genre as in (1).

This section reviews a conversation analytic research that reveals how the act of exemplification with a story is performed in oral talk-exchange (6.3.1) and clarifies that one of the structures of the fable (i.e., the Substantiation-Generalization Pattern) is realized in the same procedure (6.3.2).

6.3.1 The Procedure for Conversational Exemplification

Müller & Di Luzio (1995) describes a pattern that recurrently occur in conversational claim making, based on data taken from “a 90-minute Italian radio phone-in program” (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 116-117). In this program, “[l]isteners are stimulated to call in, give a report and argue for a position. The question opened and to be answered [...] is [...]: Are our memories of the past something we should hang on to and accept as a guide for the future, or are they a burden we should rather get rid of to be open for new experience? Should we go back to revisit the places and people familiar from our childhood, or rather avoid this?” (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 118)

Cited below is a fragment of interaction between a caller, Fernanda (F), who thinks that one’s memories are useless, and the moderator of the program (A).^{96,97}

(64) (From FERNANDA call; last part of an extended turn)

- 01 F: il nostro passato siamo noi e non i nostri ricordi
‘it is we who are our past and not our memories’
- 02 siamo quelli che siamo: e:h (.) nel presente (.) e niente h
‘we are what we are e:h (.) in the present (.) and nothing h’
- 03 dobbiamo vivere nel presente e guardare: in avanti
‘we must live in the present and look ahead’
- 04 A: perché ta:nta rigidità nei confronti del proprio passato?

⁹⁶ The transcription conventions adopted by Müller & Di Luzio are as follows (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 118):

- (.) short pauses (under 0.5 sec.)
e: h prolongation of a sound
h audible in- or outbreath
h (or multiples of this) laughing
tanti strongly accentuated syllable
(? ?) questionable or unidentifiable element
= (between turns) latching of turns
/ audible break within ongoing utterance

⁹⁷ The English translation from original Italian is by Müller & Di Luzio (1995).

- ‘why so much rigidity against confronting one’s own past?’
- 05 F: perché penso
‘because I think’
- 06 che non serva (.) non serva perché veramente
‘it does not serve any purpose (.) it does not serve any’
- 07 io penso che venga sempre: mh/io ricordo per esempio
‘purpose because really I think it will a:lways mh/I’
- 08 quando andai in villeggiatura da bambina in una certa
‘remember for example when I went to vacation as a child’
- 09 Civitella (.) (?c’è?) un torre:nte che mi sembrava
‘to a place called Civitella (.) (?there is?) there was a’
- 10 tanto bello (.) ci sono tornata verso i vent’anni (.)
‘stre:am that seemed to me so beautiful (.) I returned to it’
- 11 era: (.) affare maledorante =
‘when I was twenty (.) it wa:s (.) a stinking affair =’
- 12 A: =m::h
‘=m::h’
- 13 F: una cosa proprio veramente che faceva ribrezzo (.)
‘a thing that really and truly made you nauseated (.)’
- 14 e per me invece quel ruscello era chissà che cosa (.)
‘and yet for me this stream had been god knows what (.)’
- 15 per cui insomma mh: un insegnamento di più che
‘therefore in sum mh: one more lesson that’
- 16 i ricordi non sono mai fedeli e non essendo fedeli
‘memories are never reliable and not being reliable’
- 17 non se:rvono
‘they don’t serve any purpose’ (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 119-120)

Answering the moderator’s question (line 04), the caller continues to clarify her position (05 through 07), and then starts recalling her experience about Civitella (line 08). Note that she introduces her story with the phrase “io ricordo per esempio” (“I remember for example”). With this, she positions the upcoming story to

be nothing but an example to support her claim (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 122). That is, this way of initiating a story characterizes it as something substantiating her assertion. F's narration extends from line 08 to 14, with the moderator's brief response in line 12. In conclusion, the caller evaluates what she learned from revisiting a memorable place (lines 16 and 17), positioning this evaluation as "insegnamento" (a "lesson") derived from the story (line 15). Because the narrative is designed as a piece of evidence to support her assertion, the lesson drawn from it functions not only as an evaluation of the preceding story but also a re-statement of the claim (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 124). In effect, the caller repeats the same phrase "non serva/servono" ("[memories don't] serve any purpose") before and after the story, emphasizing the same syllables. In addition, the lesson also "close[s] her extended turn" from line 06 to 17, and "[b]y moving (back) to genericness, speakers can signal that they have — at least for this turn — exhaustively treated their topic" (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 124). In the final line (17), Fernanda closes her argumentative step (i.e., an assertion by exemplification) by repeating the same phrase she uttered in the initial line of her extended turn ("not serve any purpose" in 06), and this repetition marks the end of her extended turn. The lesson thus functions as "closure of the narrative, closure of a step in argument and closure of an extended turn at talk" (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 124-125). Müller & Di Luzio (1995) finds in their data set that exemplification in conversational claim making proceeds in this way.

The recursive pattern in argument in conversational discourse like (64) can be "represented schematically as a three-step procedure" (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 141) as follows:

(65) a. [CLAIM]

Making a generic claim

b. [STORY]

Narration of a story as an example

c. [EVALUATION/CONCLUSION]

Re-statement of the generic evaluation as if it were derived from the story

(Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 141; De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2010: 98)

This schema captures, first of all, the sequential organization of exemplification of a claim with a story in conversational argument. The arguer first clarifies his/her position in a generic manner in interaction with an interlocutor (65a) and starts to tell a story as a piece of evidence that supports that position (65b). In closing the narrative (65c), the arguer extracts his/her opinion from the narrative through displaying his/her

evaluation to the narrated events. Through this procedure, the arguer makes obvious the genus-species relation between the claim and the story.

Significantly, Müller & Di Luzio (1995) also reveals that the three steps in the procedure are functionally related to each other. The initial generic claim (65a) characterizes the following story to be an example that backs it up, and narrating the story (65b) conditions the subsequent evaluation as a re-statement of the arguer's claim. In addition, the re-statement (65c) in turn characterizes retroactively the preceding narrative as an instance supporting the arguer's position. Thus, "[t]he functional embedding of the story, its ancillary relation to prior talk and, more specifically, its status as an example to support a prior generic claim in an argument is displayed not only in the sequential proximity and the internal organization of the story. It is also explicitly invoked here by the speaker, who gives the story a frame and relates it, both at its beginning and at its end, to the preceding claim [...]" (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 120-121). The above structure thus reflects "how everyday narrators display the narrative work of a story as work that serves to substantiate a claim in argument" (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 140-141).

Müller & Di Luzio (1995) says that in exemplification by telling a story in conversational argument, the arguer doubly characterizes his/her narration as instantiating a generic claim s/he is attempting to make. Importantly, the arguer does so because the act of exemplary story-telling is embedded in an ongoing claim-making (Müller and Di Luzio, 1995: 122, 136). Since the arguer starts narrating a story as an argumentative step, s/he needs to relate his/her narration to the ongoing act of assertion when starting it and connect the story to the initial argument after finishing it.⁹⁸ Without such tying, the arguee might not license the arguer to start narrating or might not get the point of the narration. It follows that exemplifying a claim with a story in conversation requires the arguer to doubly characterize the story both before and after narration. The three-step procedure for exemplification with a story in conversation, therefore, is motivated by performing the act of instantiating one's claim by narrating a story in the context of conversational talk-exchange. Given that conversation is the most basic context of language use, the three-step procedure is characterized as a standard for narrative exemplification.

6.3.2 Fables as Exemplification

⁹⁸ The transition from interactional claim-making to story-telling, and the one from the narration back to the initial claim-making respectively correspond to the "abstract" and the "coda" in the structure of the narrative modeled by Labov (1982: 364-366).

Now, it would be easy to see that a pattern of the fable that we observed in Section 2 mirrors the three-step procedure (65).

(66) (=63))

Substantiation-Generalization Pattern

a. [TITLE] b. [LESSON] c. [STORY] d. [LESSON]

The first lesson (70b) corresponds to the initial generic claim (69a), the animal story (70c) to the instantiating story (69b), and the post-narrative lesson (70d) to the evaluation/conclusion (69c). Let us look at an example:

(67) (59) with modifications

THE HEN WHO LAID THE GOLDEN EGGS

(a)Greed loses all by trying for too much.

(b)To put this maxim to the touch,

Take but the Fool whose hen, as we are told,

Laid once a day an egg of gold.

[STORY]

(c)A lesson here for Avarice!

(d)Many the Get-Rich-Quicks we've seen of late,

Warm men at dawn, by dusk church mice.

(La Fontaine, *La Fontaine's Fables*)

The fabulist first makes a claim about greedy people (67a) and characterizes the following story to serve as an example to substantiate the claim, initiating it with some metalinguistic introductory expressions (67b). After the narration (the end of which is marked with (67c)), the fabulist asserts the initial claim again, this time as a comment on the narrated events (67d). This concluding remark is characterized by the preceding narrative as a generalization about desirable behavior and at the same time characterizes it as an instance from which the lesson is extracted. The sequential and functional organization of fables like (67) thus explicitly demonstrates the process of exemplification, i.e., substantiation of the initial lesson with a story and generalization of the narrated events into a conclusion.

This indicates that this pattern is realized and may be interpreted by following the three-step procedure of conversational exemplification with a narrative (65) in written discourse. Because s/he employs a

narrative as a means to exemplify a lesson, the fabulist can draw on that procedure even with the contextual difference, generating the same textual pattern as a result, and because this same pattern is realized in the text, the reader can interpret it as a product of exemplification. That is, the discourse of the Substantiation-Generalization Pattern is circulated by drawing on the exemplification procedure represented in (65) as a resource.

6.3.3 Summary

Müller & Di Luzio (1995) reveals that a pattern is repeatedly observed in exemplification with a story in conversational argument and clarifies that it emerges as a consequence of the act of exemplifying a claim by narrating a story in conversational interaction. This pattern is shared by the Substantiation-Generalization Pattern of the fable and the exemplification procedure in conversation serves to be a resource for the fabulist to generate, and for the reader to consume, this pattern. Hence, it is now clear how the Substantiation-Generalization Pattern is constructed and why it takes the shape that it does. Then, how are the other patterns of the fable composed? Let us confront this question in the next section.

6.4 The Fable and its Context: Written Discourse

In fact, most fables do not present the same lesson twice; they state a lesson only once, either before or after narration.⁹⁹ Let us look at the former:

(68) (=62))

Substantiation Pattern

a. [TITLE] b. [LESSON] c. [STORY]

(69) One Master as Good as Another

Poor men generally find that a change of government simply means exchanging one master for another — a truth which is illustrated in the following little anecdote.

A timid old man was grazing his donkey in a meadow when all of a sudden he was alarmed by

⁹⁹ See the footnote 4 above for the (fairly rough) statistics of the substantiation-Generation Patter.

the shouting of some enemy soldiers. ‘Run for it,’ he cried, ‘so that they can’t catch us.’ But the donkey was in no hurry. ‘Tell me,’ said he: ‘if I fall into the conqueror’s hands, do you think he will make me carry a double load?’ ‘I shouldn’t think so,’ was the old man’s answer. — ‘Then what matter to me what master I serve as long as I only have to bear my ordinary burden?’

(Handford & Robb, *Aesop’s Fables*)

(70) The Mighty Fallen

When a man loses the prestige that he once had, he becomes in his misfortune the plaything even of cowards.

A lion worn out with age and feebleness lay breathing his last. First came a boar and with a blow from its flashing tusks took revenge on him for an old injury. Then a bull lowered its horns and gored its enemy’s body. An ass, seeing these attacks delivered with impunity, started kicking the lion’s forehead with its heels. The lion was on the point of expiring. ‘It was hard enough to bear,’ he said, ‘when those brave animals triumphed over me. But as for you, you shameful blot on creation, to be at your mercy as I die is like dying twice over.’ (Handford & Robb, *Aesop’s Fables*)

In this pattern, a moral statement (68b) precedes a story (68c), characterizing the narrative proactively as an instance that substantiates it. In (69), this functional relationship between these two components is stated by the underlined parenthetical phrase. This does not mean, however, that a narrative always accompanies such a remark when put after a lesson. Still, even without such an explicit linkage, it is natural to understand a story after a general statement as an exemplar of it based on their sequential order, as in (70). Whether or not a lesson and a story are explicitly linked, the sequence between them parallels the first two steps of the three-step procedure for conversational exemplification (65a-b).

The latter pattern, on the other hand, shows a different sequential and functional relationship between the story and the lesson.

(71) (=60))

Generalization Pattern

a. [TITLE] b. [STORY] c. [LESSON]

(72) The Ass, the Raven and the Wolf

An ass who had a sore on his back was grazing in a meadow. A raven landed, perched on the ass's back and started pecking at the sore. The ass, believing it was the sore that caused him such pain, began to bray and buck. The ass-driver, who saw this from some distance away, burst out laughing. A wolf who was passing by saw him and said to himself:

‘How unfortunate we are! It’s bad enough that when we are seen we are driven off, but when one of those comes near them they just laugh at it.’

This fable shows that mischievous people are recognized for what they are at first sight.

(Aesop, *The Complete Fables*)

(73) The Mule

A mule had grown fat and wanton from his huge daily rations of corn, and one day, as he was jumping, kicking, and gamboling about the fields, he thought to himself, “My mother must surely have been a thoroughbred racer, and I’m quite as good as she ever was!”

But he was soon exhausted from the galloping and frisking, and all at once he remembered that his sire had been nothing but an ass.

Every truth has two sides. It is best to look at both before we declare where we stand.

(Zipes ed., *Aesop’s Fables*)

In this pattern, the story (71b) sequentially precedes the lesson (71c) and the narrated events are generalized into a lesson. While in (72), the underscored introductory phrase to the lesson implies this relationship, such introduction is not necessary as exemplified in (73). The story is thus functionally characterized as an example to support the lesson retroactively by the subsequent moral statement. This way of exemplification parallels the last two steps of the exemplification procedure in conversation (65b-c).

Those two patterns of the fable thus partly share the procedure of exemplification with a story in conversation. To put it differently, one of the steps is omitted from the procedure: the Substantiation Pattern leaves out the EVALUATION/CONCLUSION step (65c); and the Generalization Pattern the CLAIM step (65a). As a result, the moral lesson characterizes the story as exemplifying it in only one way, proactively in the former and retroactively in the latter. The discursive structure of the above two patterns is therefore a consequence of partial employment of the procedure for exemplification with a story in conversation (65).

Then, why is it that in the construction of fables the exemplification procedure can be drawn on partially? To tackle this question, it is helpful to consider the difference in context between conversational

exemplification with a story and exemplification in written discourse (i.e., the fable).

In conversational discourse, the arguer needs to anchor a story in the ongoing talk-exchange in which s/he is engaging, characterizing it both pro- and retroactively as an exemplar of a claim. On the other hand, in exemplification by telling a story in the context of written discourse, the writer is not participating in a real-time interaction with the reader. This frees him/her from the burden of anchoring his/her narration to an ongoing interaction because in this context there is no such ‘ongoing interaction’ with the reader before (nor after) the story-telling.¹⁰⁰ That is to say, written discourse makes it unnecessary to doubly characterize an exemplary story as such in the process of exemplification. It follows that the fabulist can choose ‘elliptical’ ways to exemplify a lesson: s/he can state it only once before or after telling a story. Thus, the Substitution Pattern and the Generalization Pattern are realized as a consequence of performing the act of exemplification in the context of written discourse, while drawing on the procedure for exemplification by telling a story in conversational argument.

Moreover, the context of written discourse triggers the Embedding Pattern to be generated.

(74) (=61))

Embedding Pattern

a. [TITLE] b. [STORY [LESSON]]

(75) The Charger & the Miller

A horse, who had been used to carry his rider into battle, felt himself growing old and chose to work in a mill instead. He now no longer found himself stepping out proudly to the beating of the drums, but was compelled to slave away all day grinding the corn. Bemoaning his hard lot, he said one day to the miller, ‘Ah me! I was once a splendid war-horse, gaily caparisoned, and attended by a groom whose sole duty was to see to my wants. How different is my present condition! I wish I had never given up the battlefield for the mill.’ The miller replied with asperity, ‘It’s no use your regretting the past. Fortune has many ups and downs: you must just take them as they come.’

(Rackham, *Aesop’s Fables*)

In this pattern a lesson is not explicitly stated outside the story but uttered in the final remark of a character.

¹⁰⁰ The context of written discourse, however, provides the writer with another option for initiating a story: the title. Intuitively, it may not be so common to begin to tell a story only by showing its title in conversation.

That is to say, the moral lesson is embedded in the narrative, rather than juxtaposed after it, with signals that may enable the reader to take the character's final words as stating a lesson. In the above instance, the present tense is chosen ("is," and "has") with *you* that can be taken to refer not only to the charger but also people in general. In the Embedding Pattern, thus, a story is narrated without being characterized as an example of a lesson with the three-step procedure for exemplification (65) in any way. The lesson is presented as such less explicitly than in the other patterns of the fable.

This way of organizing the fable leaves the process of extracting a lesson from the story to the interpretive work of the reader. In written discourse, with no need for anchoring it in interaction with the reader, the fabulist can tell a story just for its own sake, rather than design it as an exemplar of a moral lesson.¹⁰¹ The Embedding Pattern, as well as the Substantiation Pattern and the Generalization Pattern, is thus motivated to occur by the context of written discourse in this way.

To make it more explicit that the genre of the fable is rooted in the context of written discourse, let us observe further examples with a lesson stated with lesser clarity. Look at (76):

(76) The Flies and the Honey Jar

After a jar of honey was knocked over in a kitchen, the flies were attracted by its sweet smell and began eating the honey. Indeed, they swarmed all over it and did not budge from the spot until they had devoured every drop. However, their feet had become so clogged that they could not fly away, no matter how much they tried. Stymied by their own voracious appetites, they cried out, "(a)What foolish creatures we are! (b)We've thrown away our lives just for the sake of a little pleasure."

(Zipes, *Aesop's Fables*)

This fable is equivalent with (57) and (75) in that the character(s) do something foolish and make a regretful remark about it at the end. In contrast, while (57) and (75) carry several devices to signal that a character expresses a lesson, (76) does not. In their last utterance, the flies attribute the vital consequence of their devouring honey to their own characteristic (76a), and regretfully look back at what they have done (76b). Importantly, the flies construct their utterance with first-person plural pronouns ("we" and "our") in the present perfect tense ("We've thrown"). This indicates that they do not claim general applicability of what they have done but only regret it. Designed in this way, the whole narrative can be taken as a story of a vital

¹⁰¹ In conversational discourse, story-telling of any sort usually requires the narrator to anchor the story in the interaction at hand (Jefferson, 1978), and initiating and finishing narration without such anchoring would probably invites the interlocutor's negative response.

mistake.

This does not, however, prevent the reader from understanding the story as exemplifying a moral lesson. For instance, in the process of comprehension, a reader may transform the flies' last words of regret into something like 'It is ridiculous to throw away your life for the sake of a little pleasure' or 'Don't throw your life away for the sake of a little pleasure,' generalizing their experience. Reading (76) in such a way, s/he can recognize the story as an example of a lesson as in fables with a lesson obviously presented. In this sense, even though fables like (76) do not explicitly state a moral lesson, they still bears traces of it.

Leaving the labor of deriving a lesson from the story to the reader's inference, furthermore, may result in a fable in an even vaguer way. Consider the instance below:

(77) The Old Woman & the Wine Jar

An old woman picked up an empty wine jar which had once contained a rare and costly wine, and which still retained some traces of its exquisite bouquet. She raised it to her nose and sniffed at it again and again. 'Ah,' she cried, 'how delicious must have been the liquid which has left behind so ravishing a smell.'

(Jones & Rackham, *Aesop's Fables*)

This fable shares the same features as (76): a narrative is told in the end of which a character makes a remark. However, it seems highly difficult to read her utterance as stating or even implying a moral lesson because it does not sound regretful. The woman admires the good quality of the smell on the empty wine bottle that she sniffed and makes a guess about its former contents. Her words thus constitute her ridiculous act rather than display her regret about something she has done. This makes her utterance (and the whole story) rather difficult to comprehend as instantiating a lesson. Due to this, the above fable may seem to fail to convey a moral lesson, but this does not mean that any reader cannot inferentially draw a lesson of any kind from it. Importantly, whether a reader extracts a lesson from (77) depends on his/her interpretive work and this is the consequence of how the text is designed.

The two fables we have just observed clearly illustrates that what enables the fabulist to build such indeterminate fables is the context of written discourse. Because the fabulist is free from the contextual requirement for explicit orientation to the reader, s/he can choose to tell a story for the story's sake, whereby making vague the point of the story. The above 'moralless' fables are clear examples that indicate that written discourse enables the fabulist to depart from the act of exemplification in telling a story.

Now, we are ready to answer the questions we have been confronting: what motivates the various

patterns of the fable to be generated? What gives rise to various patterns is different degrees of how completely the fabulist draws on the procedure for conversational exemplification with a story in writing fables. The degree is highest in the Substantiation-Generalization Pattern with the total equivalence in discursive structure with conversational exemplification, and the lowest in the Embedding Pattern, which structurally parallels the exemplification in conversational argument only in that a lesson is derivable from the story. The remaining two patterns (i.e., the Substantiation Pattern and the Generalization Pattern) are placed between those two, as they partly activate the exemplification procedure. Thus, the four patterns of the fable can be characterized in terms of different levels of how explicitly the fabulist draws on the exemplification procedure in conversation in constructing fables (and the reader in interpreting them). That is, the procedure to support one's claim in conversational argument by telling a story as an example serves to be a procedural resource for the fabulist, and they can choose how much to depend on the procedure in realizing fables.

The different degrees of the fabulist's dependence on the procedure for conversational exemplification with a story is, in turn, motivated by the context in which they realize fables: written discourse. Written discourse enables the fabulist to exemplify a lesson more elliptically, whereby generating the Substantiation Pattern, the Generalization Pattern, and the Embedding Pattern. Seen this way, written discourse serves to be a contextual resource for the fabulist to step away from strictly following the procedure for conversational exemplification in composing fables. To summarize, the structural variation of the fable is motivated by performing the act of exemplification by narrating a story in the context of written discourse.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter pointed out that the genre of the fable has different structural patterns, and revealed what motivates the variation. To summarize, the structural variation of the fable stems from two facets of this genre: (i) it performs the act of exemplification; (ii) it is realized in written discourse.

This insight is obtained due to the focus on the structure of the fable. Previous research on this genre tend to analyze it in terms of personification — or more broadly, in terms of metaphor and analogy (Seto, 1992, 1997; Olmos, 2015). Indeed, the use of personification is a crucial feature of the fable, but it is not everything about the genre. This inclination to focus on personification may have distracted analysts' attention from the structural aspect of the fable. In addition, previous research does not take a systematic

approach to the fable in describing its characteristics, which seems to be a methodological flaw. Data collection (as broad as possible) is a vital step in descriptive research. Each of the structures of the fable analyzed in this chapter has been mentioned in different studies (Kitagaki, 1970; Olmos, 2015; Preminger & Brogan, 1993) but only separately, and those accounts have not been integrated into one. Hence, this study, first and foremost, has a descriptive significance.

Another importance of this study lies in the perspective that it takes to investigate the fable. One of the crucial steps was connecting conversational exemplification and written fables. Although exemplification is recognized as a persuasive strategy in the rhetorical study (Lanham, 1991; Sloane, 2001; Walton et al, 2008), and although the fable is generally recognized as a genre that exemplifies a moral lesson (cf. (55)), it is not analyzed with regard to that rhetorical strategy. That is, the fable is traditionally separated from exemplification in actual analysis. As has been revealed in this chapter, however, it is valuable to shed analytical light on the fable in terms of exemplification, because it clearly accounts for the fact that the fable takes multiple structures.

A third significance of this study concerns the stance on the notion of genre in general. A discourse genre is usually defined as “a group of texts that share specific discursive features” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 163), where the “specific discursive features” is to be taken to refer to “a conventionalized purpose or occasion” (Johnstone, 2008: 183). As this way of definition implies, genre studies tend to treat the genre as a simple, unitary class of texts or talks and put their central focus on generic commonality among the texts or talks that they consider. Every text that is categorized in a genre, however, is not the same in every respect; rather, instances of a genre are, as has been demonstrated with fables, more or less different from each other while having identical features. Given this, a possible direction of genre studies is to focus on such variation as well as commonalities among genre tokens. The present study exemplifies the validity of this way of conception of the genre and this direction of genre study.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

Based on the basic view of allegory as a rhetorical strategy to shape discourse as outlined in Chapter 2, Chapters 3 through 6 scrutinized four allegorical genres of discourse (allegorical arguments, proverbs, parables, and fables) by adopting the philosophy and methodology of discourse analysis. The detailed analysis and discussion, first and foremost, have provided specific insights into how the allegorical genres are shaped with the strategy of allegory. This final chapter shows that the investigation so far has theoretical and methodological implications for rhetorical studies in general.

In what follows, Section 7.2 briefly reviews how we approached the data and what we discovered in each of the preceding chapters. On this foundation, Section 7.3 reveals how the philosophy and methodology of discourse analysis contribute to the study of rhetoric. Section 7.4 considers the concept of ‘rhetoric’ itself, providing some prospects for future research.

7.2 Overall Summary

Chapter 2 established the theoretical and analytical foundation, showing that allegory is employed in various ways in different contexts of use. The starting point of our discussion was the fact that the strategy is employed in conversational interaction, although no attention was paid to this type of allegorical discourse in previous studies. Utilized in talk-exchange, allegory functions as an argumentative resource for persuasive goals. The analysis of allegorical talk in conversation led us to elaborate the traditional, insufficient description of the four kinds of discourse that are shaped with the strategy (proverbs, parables, fables, and allegorical novels), with a new focus on their discursive dimensions. Through examining in detail how each kind of allegorical discourse is actually realized, Chapter 2 then clarified the characteristics of the allegorical strategy as a method to shape discourse of various kinds. In addition to the details of those kinds of allegorical discourse, their relationship was also illustrated. That, is, the genres differ along three dimensions: (i) whether they are oriented to talk-exchange or to story-telling; (ii) to the extent that analogies are made explicitly or implicitly; and (iii) whether analogies are aimed at argumentation or designed to leave some room for interpretation. Chapter 2, thus, showed how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is flexibly utilized in order to realize a variety of discourse genres.

Based on the insights obtained in Chapter 2, Chapters 3 through 7 examined allegorical argumentation, proverbs, parables, and fables, respectively, specifically focusing on how each of them shapes, and is shaped in discourse. Each chapter not only revealed the details of its target discourse, but also carried implications for the functioning of rhetorical strategies in general.

Chapter 3 observed allegorical utterances in conversation. In an attempt to clarify how allegory is deployed and interpreted in conversational interaction, we observed in detail several conversational scenes in films and novels. As a consequence, it turned out that when allegory is used for argumentation in conversation, that there are two general directions for the speaker to follow in allegorical construction of talk: (i) to complete an allegorical utterance in his/her own words alone; and (ii) to elicit certain responses from the interlocutor in drawing allegorical correspondences. Both directions are rooted in the basic mechanisms of conversation, where participants exchange talk, taking turns. As a consequence of the reciprocity, allegorical talk in this context may sometimes be extended, modified or rejected by the interlocutor. Against the traditional definition of allegory as a concept to refer to a literary genre, Chapter 3 thus revealed how the strategy contributes to argumentation and how it is a resource for the construction of talk in conversation

Chapter 4 focused on the deployment and interpretation of proverbs in conversation. This chapter first described in detail the Receptive Use, a usage type that had gone unnoticed in previous research, in which the speaker displays how s/he receives an assertion of the interlocutor with a proverb. The Receptive Use contrasts with the other usage types — i.e., the Affirmative Use and the Assertive Use — in that proverbs reflect the interlocutor's, but not the speaker's perspective. In the Affirmative Use, the speaker illustrates the situation at hand according to proverbs, affirming their general applicability, while in the Assertive Use, proverbs are employed as authoritative resource so as to advance opinions. Given the details of the three uses, a two-continuum model was proposed for systematic understanding of proverb use in conversational talk-exchange. The model clearly illustrates that the three types of proverb uses in conversation reflect different aspects of conversational interaction.

Chapter 5 scrutinized parables in the Synoptic Gospels. An important characteristics of the parables is that they are not so easy to understand. They are designed in a way that leaves more or less interpretive room for the reader, without exhaustively showing what the entities and events in the story represent. In addition, they often collaborate with aposiopesis, the strategy of describing the scene only partially: When Jesus narrates parables, the Gospels consistently avoid describing how his interlocutors understood and responded to the stories, even though it is possible to do so. Through hiding reactions to his words, aposiopesis invites

the reader to hear his voice as if he talks to him/her, and think about his message on his/her own. The strategy also contributes to authorize Jesus and his teachings. Together with the use of aposiopesis, the Synoptic parables function as a means to effectively deliver Jesus' messages to the reader by inviting him/her to what he attempts to teach, thereby tightly connecting Jesus and the reader.

Chapter 6 concentrated on structural variation of the fable. Although it is traditionally defined as a story that exemplifies a moral lesson stated at the end, the fable in fact takes several different structures in terms of exemplifying a lesson. On the other hand, the act of exemplification with a story has a standard procedure to achieve it in conversational talk-exchange. Given this, this chapter argued that the structural multiplicity of fables is rooted in the context in which they are realized: written discourse. Whereas the speaker in real-time conversation is usually expected to anchor an exemplary story in the ongoing talk-exchange s/he is engaging in with the interlocutor, the fabulist is free of such a contextual constraint. This allows them to tell exemplary stories in more elliptical ways, resulting in fables in a variety of structures. The structural variation of the fable is thus motivated by performing the act of exemplifying a lesson in written discourse.

7.3 Theoretical and Methodological Implications

In addition to the specific insights into the allegorical genres of discourse obtained in the previous chapters, this study has theoretical and methodological implications for the study of rhetoric in general. Focusing on allegory from a discourse analytic perspective, this study is distinguished from traditional rhetorical studies in shedding analytical light on the discursive functioning of the strategy. Against a backdrop of a great amount of research in multiple disciplines, this study can point to a new direction of the rhetorical study in terms of methodology.

Rhetoric is a very complex notion and hence has been approached in multiple ways. Earlier rhetorical studies can be classified into four types: oratory rhetoric, argumentative rhetoric, literary rhetoric, and cognitive rhetoric (cf. Sato, 1987: ch.1).^{102, 103}

¹⁰² Needless to say, this classification is not meant to classify all the previous rhetorical studies in a mutually exclusive and collaboratively exhaustive way. Rather, it specifically aims to gain a certain understanding of the divergent field.

¹⁰³ As Perelman (1982: 1) appropriately points out, it is essential to pay comprehensive attention to the relationship of rhetoric with adjacent fields such as grammar, logic, poetics, philosophy, and dialectics, in order to understand its disciplinary status appropriately. For fuller pictures of the discipline, cf. Sato (1987: ch.1), Barthes (1979) and Leith (2014); and for a historical overview, cf. Kennedy (1994), Seto (1992), Nouchi (2002: ch.1), Reboul (2000: ch.1), and Senge (1986: pt.1), among others.

Oratory rhetoric is organized and developed as an integrated, systematic discipline for oratory (Sato, 1987: 36-38; also cf. Aristotle, 1968: book1 ch.2 sec.1; Quintilian, 1981: book2 ch.15 sec.38). This type of rhetoric aims to provide detailed directions for orators to reference in making effective, in particular persuasive, speech in any occasion (Sato, 1987: 18; Seto & Nouchi, 2009: 25). Given the purpose, first, it divides the whole process of oration into five steps, with specific guidelines and explanations: Invention, discovery of all the possible arguments that can be brought in support of a thesis; Disposition, the most effective ways to organize arguments in the introduction, body, and conclusion of a speech; Elocution, expressing the ideas and arguments in clear and vivid language; Memory, various mnemonic devices for remembering the ideas and language of the speech; and Delivery, the strategies for effective verbal and non-verbal presentation, including vocal pitch, rate, and volume as well as gestures and movement (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 158).¹⁰⁴ Second, oratory rhetoric divides different occasions of oration into three genres: Deliberative (legislative), to exhort or dissuade; Judicial (forensic), to accuse or defend; and Epideictic (ceremonial), to commemorate or blame (Lanham, 1991: 164). They explain in detail what sort of preparation and performance is necessary and effective in each genre, in order to help the orator know how to deal with different purposes and occasions of speech to make. Third, it points to three ways to be persuasive: Ethos, establishing the persuader's good character and hence credibility; Pathos, putting the audience in an appropriate mood, by playing on its feelings; and Logos, proving, or seeming to prove the case (Lanham, 1991: 166). Oratory rhetoric, in this way, aims to offer an integrated system of techniques that enables orators to generate effective speech in a variety of occasions.

Argumentative rhetoric pertains to persuasive claim-making. According to Perelman (1982: 5), "The theory of argumentation [= argumentative rhetoric], [...] covers the whole range of discourse that aims at persuasion and conviction, whatever the audience addressed and whatever the subject matter." In contrast to oratory rhetoric, which covers the whole process and different genres of speech-making, it puts specific focus on rational dimension of persuasive discourse. Argumentative rhetoric centrally focuses on the process of "proof" of the speaker's opinion (Sakisaka, 1985: 19-20). Note, however, the 'proof' here means argumentative, and not logical, one. "Therefore an argument that is successful in a debate — successful in the sense of attaining its rhetorical objective of persuasion — may be logically incorrect and fallacious in itself. [...] In fact, there are sound reasons for believing that there is considerable divergence between rhetorically effective debating technique and correct logical reasoning" (Walton, 1987: 49). As such, argumentative rhetoric describes and classifies a variety of argumentative patterns observed in actual

¹⁰⁴ The five steps are originally attributed to Cicero (1942).

discourse, such as argumentum ad hominem (“abuse of your opponent’s character / basing your argument on what you know of your opponent’s character”) and argumentum ad vercundiam (“an appeal to reverence for authority, to accepted traditional values”) among others (Lanham, 1991: 21). In the process, researchers in the field point out the strengths and weaknesses of the argumentative patterns, characterizing some of them as logical fallacies for arguers to avoid. Argumentative rhetoric, thus, aims to examine how actual arguments are shaped in terms of reasoning, and provide guidelines for persuasive arguments.

Literary rhetoric examines how rhetorical devices are deployed and interpreted in literary proses and verses. The rhetoric in this sense generally contributes to the analysis and interpretation of literary works, and therefore forms part of literary studies and criticism (Le Groupe µ, 1981: 32-33). As such, it particularly focuses on what roles figures of speech play in the construction of literary texts, and how the use of them provides readers with the foundation and possibilities for creative interpretation (Suzuki, 1996: 51).

Cognitive rhetoric, or rhetorical research in the framework of Cognitive Linguistics, explores rhetorical devices, especially figures of speech, in relation to the cognitive activity of human beings. It recognizes rhetoric not merely as verbal skills for persuasive speech or literary crafts but as a window into human thought (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2014: sec.1.1; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Sato, 1992a: 11-12; Seto, 1988: i-ii, among many others). Researchers in this endeavor see the use of verbal metaphors, for example, whether in everyday language or literary texts, as a linguistic manifestation of metaphorical thought (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2014: ch.2; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1984). In the same vein, they employ metaphor, metonymy, and sometimes synecdoche as mental processes/mechanisms to analyze other ordinary, pervasive phenomena such as lexical polysemy and semantic change (Arizono, 2017; Evans & Green 2006: ch.10; Seto et al., 2007; Yamaguchi, 2001; Yamaizumi, 2017). Furthermore, cognitive rhetoricians point out that figurative language as a manifestation of mental process also plays a crucial role in the grammar of language (Komatsubara, 2016: 61; Langacker, 1987: 1). For instance, metonymy (or metonymic thought pattern) underlies and motivates Cognitive rhetoric, in this way, aims to reveal the cognitive foundation for the use of rhetorical devices.

Whereas each of the four classes of previous rhetorical studies has brought a variety of insights into the workings and mechanisms of rhetorical schemes and tropes, earlier research has only paid insufficient attention to how those devices shape, and are shaped in actual discourse. That is to say, rhetorical researchers have not asked some important questions which seem valuable to confront: how do people actually use rhetorical schemes and figures in communicating with others, what do they do with those strategies, and why in the first place do they speak rhetorically? As a consequence, for most strategies, we are still far from a

comprehensive understanding of “rhetoric in action” (Hayashi & Kuno, 1974: ch.13).

In a similar vein, scholars of rhetoric have been inclined to put conversational talk-exchange out of their analytical interest. Traditional researchers only focused on the speaker or writer does with rhetorical devices, putting his/her audience (i.e., the hearer or reader) out of consideration. By so doing, they basically recognize the use of rhetoric as a result of the speaker’s independent act, and hence analyze how s/he shapes his/her words alone. This is reflected in data collection in traditional studies. They usually analyze monological texts such as literary works, opinion articles, and political speeches, sources that do not necessarily require analysts to take the audience into consideration. Although it might possibly be a reasonable choice for their purpose, it makes quite difficult to sufficiently observe the resultant effect(s) of the use of rhetoric (Komatsubara, 2016: 41). In addition, the exclusion of conversation from the analytical purview is a serious problem because, as in language use in general (Fox et al., 2013: 729; Levinson, 1983: 284), conversational interaction may be the most basic context in which people speak rhetorically. Thorough analysis of how rhetorical strategies work in discourse is inseparable from the observation of the processes and effects of using them, and conversation is the best context for this purpose. If one attempts to investigate how the use of rhetorical figures and schemes can influence hearers, written discourse will not suffice since the interaction between writer and reader is often quite indirect (Chafe, 1982: 45-49, 1994: 44-45; Jahandarie, 1999: 139-141), and hence their workings and effects may be essentially difficult to identify. In conversational talk-exchange, in contrast, interlocutors directly interacts with each other in a reciprocal manner, taking turns and monitoring the other interlocutor(s)’s response in real time (Schegloff, 2007: 1). This will make quite transparent to analysts how a rhetorical strategy is utilized and what it causes. In fact, we saw how the use of allegory affects the process of conversation in Chapter 3, and how different ways of proverb use are closely connected to different aspects of the structure of conversational interaction in Chapter 4. For these reasons, conversational interaction is a promising data source for a rhetorical analysis though it has long been excluded in the traditional rhetorical research.

This does not, however, mean that the study of rhetoric should deal with conversational data alone. Though talk in interaction provides fruitful data for rhetorical analysis, we definitely cannot ignore the bare fact that it is not the only communicative environment where people use language rhetorically. The point here is that rhetorical strategies can possibly be used in different contexts in different manners. Given that rhetorical schemes/figures are utilized differently in a variety of contexts, a possible approach to the strategies is observing how those uses are different and considering what gives rise to those differences. This direction of research was demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 6. Chapter 2 pointed out that the rhetorical strategy

of allegory shapes several different genres of discourse, and revealed how they are related to each other through detailed analysis of their discursive aspects. Chapter 6 compared exemplary stories in conversation and written fables, arguing that the context of written discourse leads the latter to take several different structures. In previous studies, however, little light was shed on this kind of flexibility in employing rhetorical strategies. Given the fact that rhetorical strategies are deployed flexibly in a variety of discourse, it is productive and valuable to focus on the flexibility.

The focus on the flexibility of rhetoric leads to the integration of different fields of rhetorical research. On the linguistic aspect, the study of rhetoric is traditionally split in two major orientations: argumentative orientation and literary orientation (Nouchi, 1998, 2002). The first is related to invention and disposition (or arrangement) divisions of the canonical model of rhetoric.¹⁰⁵ That is, it concerns the discovery of “all the possible arguments that can be brought in support of a thesis” and “explains the most effective ways to organize arguments in the introduction, body, and conclusion of a speech” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 158). Researchers in this orientation focus on schemes for argumentation, such as *argumentum ad populum* (an appeal to the crowd) and *argumentum ad hominem* (abuse of the opponent’s character), as devices and heuristics for reasonable claim-making, and analyze how they can contribute to compose and counter arguments. Meanwhile, the second orientation concerns the division of elocution (or style), which originally “focuses on expressing the idea and arguments in clear and vivid language” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 158). In this orientation, researchers pay attention to figures of speech, such as alliteration and tautology, as creative and analytical means for poetic expression in literary texts. Although those two orientations of rhetorical studies are usually recognized to be isolated from each other with exclusive aims and objects, the distinction between them should not be taken for granted because rhetorical strategies, if not all of them, can in fact serve for both argumentative and literary purposes (Nouchi, 2002: 26-27). In fact, for example, metaphor serves for both poetic construction of literary texts (Humma, 1990; Semino, 2008: ch. 2) and persuasive claim making in disputes (Cameron, 2011; Semino, 2008: sec. 3.2), and argumentative schemes can sometimes contribute to portraying characters’ personality in literary works (Kozai, 2007: 76-84, 2010: 178-193). This clearly shows that the split between the two orientations of traditional rhetorical studies is not inevitable and hence points to a possibility of mending it. Accordingly, it would be beneficial to take a ‘connective’ perspective and examine how the same strategy can be utilized for different purposes in discourse.

¹⁰⁵ For the details of the five divisions, see Lanham (1991: ch.2) and Sato (1987: 21-24), for example.

7.4 What is 'Rhetoric'?

As already noted above, conversational talk-exchange is both a basic context in which rhetorical strategies are used, and a fruitful resource for analysts. Rhetorical phenomena in this setting lead us to reconsider the definition of rhetoric itself. Whereas rhetorical studies have been conducted in a variety of disciplines since the age of Aristotle, rhetoric is invariably recognized as the use of individual schemes and figures inventorized and classified in the long history, such as metaphor, irony, hyperbole, dilemma, argumentum ad hominem, etc. In conversational talk-exchange, however, an utterance is not necessarily rhetorical whenever it is devised with one of those strategies, because whether an utterance is rhetorical or not partly depends on how it is received by the hearer.

For example, consider the following two excerpts. The first one is taken from the film *Star Trek: Into Darkness*. In the scene, in order to deal with a looming threat, the captain of a spaceship, Kirk orders the main pilot Sulu to take the conn on behalf of him. Seeing this, Doctor McCoy claims that Sulu is not the right person to take the position:

(78) KIRK: Mister Sulu, you have the conn. Once we're en route, I want you to transmit a targeted comm burst to Harrison's location. You tell him you have a bunch of real big torpedoes pointed at his head and if he doesn't play nice, you're not afraid to use them. Is that a problem?

SULU: No, sir. I've just never sat in the chair before.

KIRK: You're gonna do great.

MCCOY: [*sotto*] Jim, wait. ^(a)You just sat that man down at a high stakes poker game with no cards and told him to bluff. Now Sulu's a good man, but he is no captain.

KIRK: [*sotto*] For the next two hours, he is. ^(b)And enough with the metaphors, all right? That's an order. [*normal*] Mister Sulu, make sure that K'normian ship is ready to fly.

(Abrams, *Star Trek: Into Darkness*)

McCoy criticizes Kirk's command through allegorically comparing having Sulu take the conn with putting him in a hopeless poker game (82a), attempting to persuade the captain to reconsider his decision. It may be possible to characterize the utterance as rhetorical, based on the fact that the strategy of allegory is used.

McCoy's allegorical evaluation, however, is rejected by Kirk (82b). In fact, he shows a negative attitude to McCoy's use of the strategy itself (here, he uses the term *metaphor* to refer to it), rather than to what he attempted to say through it. That is to say, although the allegorical utterance is aimed at persuading Kirk, it not only failed to reach the intended goal but also ended up (unintentionally) provoking a negative response exactly for its allegorical quality. Given the result, then, the utterance in question can also be seen as no longer rhetorical, because it could not function rhetorically on the hearer.

The second instance is cited from the film *Star Trek*. In it, Spock exiles Kirk from their spaceship as a result of arguing about the policy of the ship after barely averting a crisis, and McCoy condemns him for it:

(79) MCCOY: Permission to speak freely, sir.

SPOCK: I welcome it.

MCCOY: Do you? Okay, then. Are you out of your Vulkan mind? Are you making a logical choice, sending Kirk away? Probably. But the right one? You know, back home we got a saying.

(a) "If you're gonna ride in the Kentucky Derby, you don't leave your prize stallion in the stable."

SPOCK: (b) A curious metaphor, Doctor, as (c) a stallion must first be broken before it can reach its potential.

MCCOY: My God, man, you could at least act like it was a hard decision! (Abrams, *Star Trek*)

McCoy criticizes Spock's decision by quoting a saying about horse racing (83a). In this context, the Kentucky Derby represents the difficult situation they are facing, and the "prize stallion" corresponds to Kirk. Through the matching, he is claiming that they need Kirk in the ship in order to successfully deal with the situation, just as a racer needs to ride his/her prize stallion so as to win the big race. In reply to this, Spock evaluates the saying as interesting (83b), referencing knowledge he has about horse training (83c). Given the allegorical correspondences, breaking a stallion clearly means gaining command of Kirk by getting him away from the ship. Thus, Spock argues that he is just attempting to 'tame' Kirk in order to develop his full potential and make him as valuable for the ship as the prize stallion for a racer. Put differently, Spock skillfully extends the allegorical idiom in a direction that justifies his treatment of Kirk, thereby successfully counter-arguing him. This downgrades the rhetorical quality of McCoy's utterance (83a). On the one hand, the allegorical saying can be seen as rhetorical itself in that it consists of the allegorical strategy, as is apparently admitted by Spock (83b). On the other hand, it is not *fully* rhetorical,

simply because it ends up failing to achieve the intended purpose. McCoy's rhetorical attempt to persuade Spock is defeated by Spock's technique of counter-argument (83c). The rhetorical quality of the allegorical utterance in question is thus lowered by the hearer.

The two examples above clearly shows that in conversation, rhetorical strategies does not simply function rhetorically once they are used. Rather, whether those persuasive devices is rhetorical or not is crucially dependent on how they are received by the hearer in each usage event. They only work fully rhetorically when they successfully influence the interlocutor. In this sense, strategies are not rhetorical by themselves; they *become* rhetorical in actual use.

7.5 Future Prospects

This final chapter discussed that the analysis of the allegorical genres has several theoretical and methodological implications. The insights further points to possible directions of future research. First, it is essential for the study of rhetoric to pay more attention to conversational talk-exchange as a field of research. In addition, given that rhetorical schemes and figures are flexibly utilized for different purposes in a variety of settings, it is valuable to consider how they are used in each context, comparing different usages with each other. Third, given that the rhetoricality of schemes and figures resides in usage events, the study of rhetoric should focus on how they are used in actual discourse. Indicating these analytical directions, this study is thus a starting point for several directions of research.

Recently, some researchers are beginning to consider rhetorical strategies, mainly metaphor, as useful tools for the analysis of a variety of discursive phenomena (e.g., Cameron, 2008, 2011; Deignan, 2012; Ferrari, 2018; Johnstone & Eisenhart eds., 2008; Semino, 2008). These studies have elucidated different functions and mechanisms of various schemes and figures. For example, Cameron (2011) describes in detail how metaphorical expressions are employed in a series of dialogues between a former IRA bomber and the daughter of one of the victims of the bombing. Her analysis reveals that their metaphorical talk crucially contributed to the process of reconciliation between the two participants over time. Musolff (2017) investigates the interplay between metaphor, irony and sarcasm in political debate in Britain. He illustrates how participants follow and counter-argue figurative expressions used by other participants, through ironical and/or sarcastic allusions or quotations, in order to criticize the original version and/or draw a new, contrarian conclusion from it. Even though such discourse analytic rhetorical studies have been increasing,

we are still distant from comprehensive understanding of how rhetoric works in language use. There is a lot more to discover in the field of rhetoric at work.

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