

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (WINCHESTER)

School of History

**A History of Japan's National Police Reserve 1950-1952:
Army or Constabulary?**

By

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (WINCHESTER)
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A HISTORY OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE 1950-1952:
ARMY OR CONSTABULARY?

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This work is an empirical study of the history of Japan's National Police Reserve from its creation in July 1950 to its end in October 1952. It is the first ever attempt at a comprehensive and exclusively focused history of the force. The work examines the domestic and international origins of the force, the American Constabulary model upon which it was based, the NPR's character, and its evolution into its successor forces, the National Safety Force and Ground Self Defence Force.

The study also seeks as its first aim, to demonstrate the Japanese influences on the creation of the force, especially that of the Japanese Communist Party, whose policy of violence during the period is a highly neglected area of the historiography.

The second main aim of this study is to reveal the actual organisational character of the NPR. This is required in a field where there is much debate over the character of the force but hitherto little work based on primary sources.

As the NPR has not yet been the exclusive subject of any academic monograph the study makes important contributions in a number of fields. Despite no detailed analysis having been done to date on the nature and organisational character of the force many assumptions are made about its character. By providing this analysis this study contributes significantly to clarifying many misconceptions currently held about the force.

Alongside these major contributions the study also contains many original elements and approaches to specific historiographical issues and problems.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I Thomas William French

declare that the thesis entitled

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and the work presented in the thesis are both my own, and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that:

- this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
- where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
- where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
- where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
- I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
- where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
- none of this work has been published before submission.

Signed:

Date:.....20/12/2010.....

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Glossary

Abbreviation	Meaning
AA	Anti Aircraft
AAA	Anti Aircraft Artillery
ACJ	American Council on Japan
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ASDF	Air Self Defence Forces (Japan)
ATIS	Allied Translation and Interpreter Section (GHQ)
BCOF	British Commonwealth Occupation Force
CAS	Civil Affairs Section (SCAP)
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CHS	Civil Historical Section (SCAP)
CI&E	Civil Information and Education Section (SCAP)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIC	Counter-intelligence Corps (SCAP)
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East (USA)
CIS	Civil Intelligence Section (SCAP)
CLO	Central Liaison Office (MOFA, Japan)
CO	Commanding Officer
CPC	Civil Property Custodian (SCAP)
CPVF	Chinese People's Volunteer Forces (PRC)
CTS	Civil Transport Section
DA	Department of the Army
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ESS	Economic and Scientific Section (SCAP)
FO	Foreign Office (GB)
G1	Planning, Personnel and General Affairs Section(US

Abbreviation	Meaning
	Military General Staff/SCAP)
G2	Intelligence, Security and Censorship Section (US Military General Staff/SCAP)
G3	Military Operations, Law Enforcement and Repatriation Section (US Military General Staff/SCAP)
G4	Budget, Supply, Civil Aviation, Oil Procurement and Rationing, and Disarmament Section (US Military General Staff/SCAP)
GHQ	General Head Quarters
GS	Government Section (GHQ)
GSDF	Ground Self Defence forces (Japan)
Hoantai	Safety Force (Japan)
ICP	Indian Communist Party
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
IMA	Imperial Manchukuo Army
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (USA)
JNR	Japanese National Railways
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
KC	Korean Constabulary (ROK)
Kenpeitai	Military Police (Japan)
KMAG	US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
KMT	Kuomintang Party (China)
KNP	Korean National Police (ROK)
LS	Legal Section (SCAP)
MG	Machinegun
MGT	Military Government Team (SCAP)

Abbreviation	Meaning
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
MPD	Metropolitan Police Department (Tokyo, Japan)
MSDF	Maritime Self Defence Forces (Japan)
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDLT	National Diet Library Tokyo
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
NPR	National Police Reserve (Japan)
NRP	National Rural Police (Japan)
NSC	National Security Council (USA)
PC	Philippines Constabulary
PLA	People's Liberation Army (PRC)
POW	Prisoner of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Public Safety Commission (Japan)
PSD	Public Safety Division (G2)
PSIA	Public Security Investigation Agency (Japan)
ROC	The Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
SCAP	Supreme Commander Allied Powers
SDF	Self Defence Forces (Japan)
SIB	Special Investigation Bureau (Japan)
Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu (or Tokkō)	Special Higher Police (Japan)
Tokujū	Special Procurements
TS	Technical Section (SCAP)
UK	United Kingdom

Abbreviation	Meaning
UN	United Nations
UNF	United Nations Forces
USAFIK	United States Military Forces in Korea
USAMGIK	United States Military Government in Korea
WO	War Office (GB)
Zaibatsu	Large Industrial Combine

A Note on the Text

Adhering to standard conventions, Japanese names will be given in their Japanese style, surname first, except when cited. All other non-western names are presented in their commonly used form. In common with the accepted convention no macrons have been used in Japanese place names. All dates are presented in the British calendar style (day / month / year). American spellings such as 'defense' are employed where sources use them. All references to the SCAP archives held in the National Diet Library Tokyo are cited by their Organisation and call number.

Introduction

Despite recent advances in the study of the history of postwar and occupied Japan, particularly from cultural and social perspectives, many areas of the history of the initial postwar years remain under examined. The history of the Japanese National Police Reserve (NPR) is one such area which is particularly unexplored. Often merely confined to the footnotes during historians' discussions of the 'reverse course' (the alleged abandonment of the Occupation's efforts at democratisation and disarmament in favour of reconstruction and rearmament) or the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the NPR has never been the sole subject of an academic monograph or journal article in English.¹ The absence of a detailed examination of the NPR seems to have led to the widespread assumption by many historians that the force was in fact an army of sorts from its very inception and that it was merely created in order to slake American desire for rearmament, or as a result of the Korean War.² Domestic unrest and most other factors contributing to the creation of the NPR are, like the NPR itself, usually rapidly glossed over, or simply ignored by many authors.

This study seeks to fill these gaps in the scholarship by producing the first complete scholarly history of the National Police Reserve.³ This study attempts to provide the first full picture of the origins, character, operations and evolution of the force. This approach requires both a synthesis of the

¹ M. Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, pp 45-46; E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, Continuum, London, 2002, pp 487-490; J. Dower, *Embracing Defeat, Japan in The Wake of World War II*, Norton, London, 2000, pp 547-548.

² Ibid.

³ An Official History of the force does exist but does not cover the entire life of the force: U.S. Army Center of Military History Historical Manuscripts Collection: *The Korean War*, (YF-A4), Far East, US Army Forces and Eight United States Army Military History Section, *History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1952*, 1955, Reel 14.

existing scholarship on the period with a new exploration of the neglected and marginalised areas of the history of the NPR and its context. In revealing these neglected areas of scholarship this study pursues two principal aims which match the hitherto neglected areas of the history of the force; first to examine the domestic Japanese influences, both from the state and non-state actors (including the JCP), on the creation, character and evolution of the NPR; and second, to reveal the actual organisational character of the NPR. These aims are achieved through the use of an evidence base of primary sources, supported where required, by secondary sources.

The reasons behind the neglect of the NPR by scholars are numerous and include the fact that the subject is still controversial in Japan and that a more nuanced analysis would not be fully compatible with many of the trends in historiography. Furthermore, the subject has been afflicted by the antipathy towards military subjects and the highly critical attitude towards US postwar foreign policy of the Vietnam War protest generation of American scholars who are still influential in the field. In addition to the NPR, the closely related topic of the perceived communist threat to the internal security of Japan is another area which is marginalised in recent scholarship. The 'military policy' of the Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) is often ignored as it does not fit with arguments describing Japan's postwar developmental 'miracle', or the 'reverse course'.⁴ Furthermore, the position of the episode as an embarrassment to both the Right and Left in Japan has resulted in many Japanese historians neglecting the subject, as noted by Hasegawa.⁵ Scholarship on these subjects has also been hampered by a shortage of declassified Japanese source material and a scarcity of published

⁴ C. Johnson, *Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*, Norton, London, 1995, p 8; J. Dower, 'Reform and Reconsolidation', in H. Wray and H. Conway (eds), *Japan Examined, Perspectives on Modern Japanese History*, University of Hawaii Press, 1983, p 350.

⁵ K. Hasegawa, 'Student Soldiers, The Japanese Communist Party's "Period of Extreme Leftist Adventurism"', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, p 43.

recollections of participants, with many being careful to protect their reputations and avoid possible repercussions.⁶

Alongside the actions of the JCP, the influence of the Japanese state is also often neglected in most studies of the NPR. The Japanese government is usually characterised as being cajoled or 'ordered' to create the force when in fact it was a willing, even enthusiastic, supporter of stronger internal security forces.⁷ The influence on the force of other non-state actors such as the Japanese Right has also been largely neglected, with the notable exception of John Weste's 1999 work on Hattori Takushiro.⁸ The nexus of these Japanese influences with the competing American actors has also been neglected, with most studies on the subject focusing solely on the American input into the force, an approach which diminishes the Japanese influence and distorts the picture presented towards that of a top down, American imposed project. This study examines each of these neglected areas in order to address the deficiencies in current accounts of the force.

Examining the contribution of these domestic influences to the creation and evolution of the NPR is the first primary aim of this study. The study also seeks to provide a more complex insight into the competing Japanese and American interests and plans for the Japanese security forces, and examine of the transformation of the NPR into the National Safety Force (NSF) and

⁶ Wakita, a former JCP 'guerrilla' is a notable exception in this regard. K. Wakita, *Chōsen Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken, Sensōshi no Kuhaku wo Umeru (The Korean War and the Suita/Hirakata Incidents, Filling The Gaps in Postwar History)*, Akashi Shoten, Tokyo, 2005.

⁷ R.J. Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children, Leaders & Their Legacies in Italy and Japan*, Cornell University Press, London, 2003, p 206; T. Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, Edition Q, Tokyo, 1995, p 6; H. Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany', in T.J. Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies, One-Party Dominant Regimes*, Cornell University Press, London, 1990, p 138; J. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse, Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System*, The Athlone Press, London, 1988, p 72; J. Weste, 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament, 1945-1960' in M. Iokibe, C. Rose, J. Tomaru and J. Weste (eds), *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s, From Isolation to Integration*, Routledge, Oxford, 2008, p 35; M. and S. Harries, *Sheathing the Sword, The Demilitarisation of Japan*, Heinemann, London, 1989, p 234.

⁸ J.L. Weste, 'Staging a Comeback: Rearmament Planning and Kyūgunjin in Occupied Japan, 1945-52', *Japan Forum*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999.

Ground Self Defence Forces (GSDF), including an analysis of the evolution of its capabilities, organisation and role.

The second central theme of this work, and perhaps its main contribution, is an examination of the character of the NPR based on a range of primary sources. This includes an examination of the NPR's structure and operations and the living conditions of its members. This work is keenly required in a field where there is much debate and many unsubstantiated assumptions are made over the NPR's character. Furthermore, the detailed analyses of the concepts which informed the creation of the NPR which this study also includes, constitute another new contribution to the field.

Aims and Structure

This study provides the first complete and exclusively focused history of the NPR through examining its context, creation, operations and evolution. In order to provide as full a picture as possible of the force, the primary aims of this study are to explore the domestic Japanese influences on the force and to reveal the structure and character of the NPR.

The work also shows the origins of this constabulary model in similar forces created by the US before 1950. The examination of the partial movement away from the constabulary model with the metamorphosis of the NPR into the NSF and GSDF, is another aim of this work. The influence of the international political situation and American conceptions of the Cold War also influenced the creation of the NPR and are therefore also examined in this study. These aims detailed are achieved through the examination of the NPR from various angles under the following chapter headings:

I. The JCP and the Domestic Context of the Creation of the NPR: 1945-1950

In keeping with the first primary aim of showing the domestic influences on the NPR this chapter illustrates the threat the JCP was perceived to represent to the internal security of Japan, a threat which was seen to require the creation of the NPR. This chapter also seeks to reveal the Japanese government's conceptions of security which favoured a constabulary as a defence against the JCP threat and the initiatives undertaken by the Japanese government to create one.

II. The International Context of the Creation of the NPR: 1945-1950

In keeping with the overall rationale of this study of providing a complete history of the NPR, the purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the international factors and events behind the decision to create the NPR. The chapter seeks to broaden the existing knowledge of the origins of the NPR, particularly by exploring the non-Japanese organisations which influenced its development. The chapter focuses on the neglected area of the American sponsored constabularies which preceded the NPR in Europe, the Philippines and South Korea. The chapter also includes an examination of the influence of the outbreak of the Korean War on the final decisions behind the creation of the NPR including the Japanese government's influence on its creation. Some attention is also paid, by way of brief summaries, to the international political situation and American attitudes to strengthening Japan's security forces.

III. The Organisational Character of the NPR

This chapter fulfils the second primary aim of this study by revealing the nature and organisation of the NPR including its structure, posture, training,

capabilities and internal security role. This chapter also details the links between the NPR and the Japanese civil police as these are highly significant in demonstrating the constabulary character of the NPR. The chapter concludes with an examination of the attempts by hawkish elements of GHQ and their Japanese allies to transform the NPR into an army through the induction of high ranking former Imperial army officers into the force, a further example of the Japanese influences on the force.

IV. The Operational Aspects of the NPR

This chapter again contributes to fulfilling the second key aim of this work by further revealing the character of the NPR by exploring its operational aspects. In doing so the chapter illustrates the constabulary character of the force, the battles over its direction and the influence of the JCP on the NPR. The chapter provides a survey of the living conditions and legal position of the NPR's members, the typical duties of the NPR, and an examination of the JCP's 'military campaign' of the period. This analysis provides another perspective on the 'bottom up' attempts by the JCP to seize control of the force and turn it into a tool of the Left, as opposed to the 'top down' attempts by hawks in GHQ to use the force as a tool of the Right. The key question as to why the NPR was never used in its original internal security role is also examined in detail, with the use of 'Bloody May Day' as a case study. Finally, the development of the NPR's role in disaster relief operations are also examined.

V. The Evolution of the NPR

In seeking to provide the first complete history of the NPR, the overall purpose of this study, this chapter explores the end of the force and its evolution into the National Safety Force (NSF) and Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF). The chapter demonstrates that the gradual evolution into the

NSF and GSDF represented a partial departure from the constabulary nature of the NPR. Nevertheless, these moves towards a more externally focused force did not eliminate the entirety of the NPR's constabulary structure and some elements of it survive to this day. The examination of these vestiges of the NPR in the modern GSDF and the other commonalities and differences between the forces forms the secondary aim of this chapter.

Historiography

The English language scholarship on the NPR exists across a chronological and ideological spectrum. The approach many American scholars employ on the subject focuses mostly on the international context of the force.⁹ This strength is an aspect of the existing scholarship which benefits the content of this study, but the general emphasis on the international and American influences on the force tends to obscure other equally powerful influences from within Japan itself. The examination of the domestic influences on the force forms the first main aim of this study, an aim clearly validated by the current neglect of the subject. The second main of this study is to examine the character of the force. This is again required due to the scant amount of attention played to the character of the force until now. The common approach by most English language scholars is to label the force (usually as an army from its very creation) using a very thin source base, with most sharing a single secondary source as the root for their judgements.¹⁰ This

⁹ Some British and Australian scholars are working in the field but it remains largely an American preserve, partly as a legacy of the Occupation itself and the academic careers pursued by former participants from the 1950s onwards.

¹⁰ The single source used is Frank Kowalski's memoir, see below. Dower, *Embracing Defeat, Japan*, p 547; J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, London, 1988, p 384; H.B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War, Americans and the Remaking of Japan 1945-1952*, Kent State University Press, London, 1989, p 252; R. Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-52*, Saltire Press, Brighton, 1983, pp 102-103; R.B. Finn, *Winners in Peace, MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, University of California Press,

seems a gross oversimplification of a force which was influenced by many differing policy actors and events, and whose character evolved over time. This weakness again confirms the requirement for a study such as this which aims to fully explore the character of the force using a broad and varied range of primary sources. The remainder of this section is devoted to a general survey of the scholarship on the NPR followed by specific engagement with a number of key works which make reference to the force.

As Carol Gluck noted in her historiographical essay; 'Entangling Illusions – Japanese and American Views of the Occupation', American scholarship on the period shifted into roughly two ideologically and chronologically distinct groups in the early 1970s, with the earlier, first generation of Occupation historiography being challenged by an emerging second generation.¹¹ The first generation, also sometimes characterised as the 'orthodox' school, mainly argued that the Occupation's reform agenda was largely complete by 1948 and the 'reverse course' (the alleged reversal of GHQ's progressive agenda in the later years of the Occupation), far from being a reversal of policy, was a new initiative adopted to confront the challenges of the emerging Cold War after reform was complete.¹² In this Justin Williams (the former Parliamentary and Political Division Chief of Government Section) and others deny that the 'reverse course' ever actually occurred at all: 'the reverse course concept . . . does not stand up under close scrutiny'.¹³ Gluck argues that the position of the first generation of scholars, particularly in works produced prior to the late 1960s, constructed a historiography which she claims depicted the Occupation as a 'heroic narrative' in which

London, 1992, pp 265-266; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 487-488, Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, pp 22-23; Schaller, *Altered States*, p 268, notes 44-46.

¹¹ C. Gluck, 'Entangling Illusions - Japanese and American Views of the Occupation', in W.I. Cohen (ed), *New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, p 171.

¹² J. Williams, 'American Democratization Policy for Occupied Japan: Correcting the Revisionist Version', *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1988, p 184.

¹³ J. Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur, A Participants Account*, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1979, p 208.

enlightened and benign American reforms were highly successful. Correspondingly, the emphasis of most scholarship of this era centred on the more progressive earlier period of reform, whilst arguing that the later changes in policy were made largely to preserve the earlier reforms and strengthen the Japanese economy.¹⁴ These earlier works do tend to focus on the successes of the Occupation period, which were later further magnified by the success of the Japanese 'developmental model' in the second half of the twentieth century.¹⁵

Despite the first generation of Occupation historians questioning the existence of the 'reverse course' their position on rearmament and the creation of the NPR remains somewhat ambiguous. Williams argues that the internal security risk created by the departure of the US troops for Korea in the late summer of 1950 necessitated the creation of the NPR, but that its establishment was a natural evolution of policy following the completion of the reform agenda.¹⁶ Generally, their position reflects the period in which much of their work was produced and the background of its advocates, many of whom were members of GHQ. Its ideas tend to be evocative of the pre-1960s American self-confidence earned from victory in the Second World War, the elevation of the nation to superpower status and the more optimistic and positive conception of US foreign policy held by much of the American public before the Vietnam War. First generation historians also sometimes fall prey to the overt 'red baiting' and the labelling, as Williams does, of opponents as 'revisionists' or even communists.¹⁷ A further interesting point is that many historians in this group, including Williams, have their own reputations to promote and defend as they were participants in the Occupation. Due to this, these historians are often sensitive to being labelled 'imperialists' or being accused of working solely in the interest of the US.

¹⁴ Gluck, 'Entangling Illusions', p 214.

¹⁵ M. Metzler, 'The Occupation', in W.M. Tsutsui (ed), *A Companion to Japanese History*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007, p 266.

¹⁶ Williams, 'American Democratization', pp 186, 187.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p 184.

In the early 1970s, following the declassification of large amounts of relevant American documents and the unravelling of much of America's Asian policy with looming defeat in Vietnam, US scholarship on the Occupation began to chart a new course.¹⁸ In contrast to the original, first generation approach, which stressed the positive results of the Occupation and the successful changes it instigated within Japan, the second generation of scholars, highly influenced by the pacifism and anti-establishment politics of the Vietnam protest era, sought to stress the continuity of elements of Japanese politics and society and the negative or retrogressive aspects of US policy.¹⁹ The approach of the second generation can be seen, in part, as a reaction to failure in Vietnam, with most scholars of this generation seeking to show the failures of US policy, and attempting to link the Occupation more closely to its Cold War context and the wider context of alleged US imperialism.²⁰

This new approach produced a series of monographs and articles which added considerably to the depth and breadth of scholarship on the period.²¹ The roles of General MacArthur and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida were reduced to a more human scale and the roles of the Japan lobby (groups of interested non-governmental individuals and organisations in Washington) and Washington were further explored. The second generation generally characterised the 'reverse course' as the abandonment of reform in the interests of stability, taken in response to the downfall of the Yalta system and nationalist China, fears of Japanese or global economic collapse, and concern over the possibility of war with the USSR.²²

¹⁸ Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 266.

¹⁹ Gluck, 'Entangling Illusions', p 176.

²⁰ Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 266.

²¹ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*; Schaller, *Altered States*; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*.

²² For more on the Yalta system see: Chapter 2, pp 99-100.

Dower, Schonberger and the Kolkos thus adopted a position more critical of the Occupation, arguing that the 'reverse course' evidenced a self-serving betrayal of earlier reforms by the US and the squandering of a chance for genuine 'peace and democracy' in Japan. As Schonberger argued, American 'policy rested on enlightened self interest more than generosity or good will'.²³ In contrast to the separate approach favoured by the 'orthodox' school, Dower, Schaller and Schonberger sought to link the policies pursued within Japan to the global American perspectives and the onset of the Cold War: 'American policymakers treated Japan not as an isolated experiment in social engineering but primarily within the framework of global economic concerns and Cold War fears'.²⁴ This study employs this element of the second generation's approach in linking US Cold War strategy and concepts such as the constabulary model to the creation and development of the NPR.

The second generation's arguments also seem at least superficially similar to those advocated by many Leftwing Japanese scholars during the same period, which also tended to emphasise the significance of 'reverse course' and argue it represented a betrayal of the early democratic promise of the Occupation.²⁵ Significant amounts of international co-operation between scholars did take place in this period, although, as Gluck states, the historiographical roots of both groups of scholars remained firmly planted in their respective academic communities.²⁶ The general second generation perspective is indeed somewhat similar to the Japanese perspective in its criticism of American policy as anti-communist, anti-fascist, imperialistic and largely self-interested, but is devoid of much of the Marxist ideology and historiographical arguments of some older Japanese scholarship.²⁷

²³ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, p 10.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 266.

²⁶ Gluck, 'Entangling Illusions', p 179.

²⁷ Ibid, p 177.

The second generation's criticism of the 'reverse course', and the renewed conservative hegemony in Japan it precipitated, also extends to the creation of the NPR, often employing the creation of the force as proof of the conservative character of the 'reverse course'. Dower, in his central and prominent position as the leading US historian of the period, is illustrative of most second generation scholars in his argument that the 'reverse course' formed a fundamental shift in US policy which was used by the ruling triumvirate of the Japanese bureaucracy, conservative politicians and big business to reconsolidate their power.²⁸ With regard to the NPR, Dower argues that rearmament had been planned long before the outbreak of the Korean War and the 'reverse course' represented the decisive shift of US policy from 'demilitarization' to 'rearmament'.²⁹

This position does seem misleading as the character of the NPR was far from preordained at its creation and evolved for years after its birth.³⁰ However, the emphasis of some second generation scholars on American concerns over the internal stability of Japan as key to their policy in Asia is useful when attempting to explore the reasons behind the creation and evolution of the NPR. As Schonberger argues, 'the internal economic, political and psychological weakness of Japan was a major threat to the postwar American security in Asia because it enhanced "the possibilities for intrigue, subversion and seizure of power by the Japanese communists" allied to the Soviet Union'.³¹ This emphasis on the internal security aspects of the Occupation is one which has helped inform the first main aim of this study.

Due to the vast expansion of scholarship on the Occupation from the 1970s onwards and the wider variety of perspectives employed by historians, the

²⁸ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p 275.

²⁹ Ibid, p 369-370.

³⁰ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 72.

³¹ H. Schonberger, 'A Rejoinder', *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol.57, No. 2, May 1988, p 210; Schonberger quotes G.F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, Pantheon, New York, 1967, pp 393-394.

term 'reverse course' may have outlived what usefulness it once had and in recent years this trend of broadening the field and the questioning of earlier assumptions has continued with the emergence of a third generation of historians. Headed by a reinvigorated Dower and mostly made up of Japan specialists, the new generation of scholars largely eschewed the 'traditional' high level policy approach, opting instead for a social and cultural emphasis on the period, perhaps typified by Dower's highly influential *Embracing Defeat*.³² Answering a question raised by Gluck in the 1980s over why the Japanese themselves were underrepresented in the history of the period, the third generation adopted an approach which sought to show more Japanese perspectives on the Occupation. Dower is particularly successful in doing this, clearly describing the 'internal Cold War' between the Left and Right within Japan during the period and showing more of a balance between the 'bottom up' day-to-day Japanese perspectives on the Occupation and the American dominated 'top down' approach of the previous two generations.³³ This approach is one which this study seeks to adopt, aiming to both examine the NPR from both 'top down' and 'bottom up' perspectives, looking at both the policy formation process and the living conditions of its members. A good example of this approach in this study is the examination of the two principal attempts to seize control of the NPR. Originating from either side of the ideological divide of Japan's 'internal Cold War', the plot by Japanese Rightists and GHQ hawks represented a 'top down' attempt to convert the NPR into a new Japanese army, whilst the attempt by the Japanese Communist Party to infiltrate the force represented a 'bottom up' approach to turn the force against the Japanese government.

Despite his weighty contribution to the historiography of the period, Dower's work on the NPR does contain several weaknesses. Like many studies, it lumps the NPR, NSF and GSDF together, oversimplifying the evolution and

³² Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 266; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*.

³³ Metzler, 'The Occupation', pp 270, 272, 279; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 553.

character of three distinct forces. In contrast to Dower's approach and in order to counter this common oversimplification, this study focuses principally on the NPR itself, although some discussion of the evolution of the force into the NSF and GSDF and the commonalities and differences between the forces does take place in the final chapter. Dower's work also suffers, like that of many other historians, from a lack of clear definitions and certain weaknesses in those he does employ, particularly that of rearmament.³⁴ Dower's works also contain no mention of the JCP's military policy of the 1950s onwards. This omission may be an honest mistake but in sections such as 'Domestic Peace Keeping and the Political Left' in *Empire and Aftermath* in which claims are made about the Japanese government pursuing oppressive, reactionary policies against the Left, the lack of any mention of the concurrent JCP policy of violent revolution could expose him to accusations of political bias.³⁵ Finally, Dower uses a limited source base in his discussion so the NPR, for example in *Embracing Defeat*, his most significant work on the Occupation, he uses no primary sources, and only cites himself, Hata, Igarashi and his Kowalski manuscript.³⁶

Although there are weaknesses in his approach Dower can be excused these shortcomings somewhat. When producing major studies such as *Embracing Defeat* and *Empire and Aftermath* it is unreasonable to expect large amounts of research and attention to be dedicated to such a relatively small element of the history of the Occupation. This is further underlined by the fact that the NPR had a relatively mild impact on the social, political and cultural history of the Occupation and the political history of Yoshida and postwar Japanese political leadership, that these studies respectively addressed.

The overreliance on a surprisingly narrow number of sources is sadly common to most of the work on the NPR. All tend to choose sources which

³⁴ For more on Dower, rearmament and bases see: Chapter 2, pp 113-114.

³⁵ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp 361-368.

³⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 648, note 1.

usually correspond neatly with their arguments. Most frequently cited is Kowalski's Japanese language memoir (or its English manuscript) of his service as an American advisor to the NPR.³⁷ From this the same single quotation about the supposed use of the term 'special vehicle' to describe a tank is used by almost all scholars seeking to demonstrate the NPR was an army.³⁸

This reliance on a single source is in itself a weakness but Kowalski's memoir also suffers from a number of drawbacks. The work was written twenty years after the event, at the height of the Vietnam War, and during a period in which Japan had again begun to be seen as a threat by some in the US due to the worldwide expansion of Japanese carmakers and other major Japanese companies. This international backdrop may have influenced the memoir's highly critical, cynical and accusatory tone. The original English manuscript, of which Dower holds the only full copy, was written three years after Kowalski lost his seat in Congress, and this decline in his fortunes may have also contributed to the negative tone of the work.³⁹ The work has never been published in English, but with its accusations and assumptions about the NPR it found a more receptive audience in Japan, where it has gone through three editions (1969, 1984 and 1999). This fact and the limited availability of the original manuscript make access to, and hence critical engagement with, Kowalski's work difficult for most scholars. This often extends to the subject covered, with some historians accepting Kowalski's conclusions without comment, analysis or any further supporting sources. This weakness clearly demonstrates the need for this study, which employs a broad base of primary sources, especially when examining the character of the force.

³⁷ F. Kowalski, *Nihon Saigunbi (Japanese Rearmament)*, The Simul Press, Tokyo, 1969.

³⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 547; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p 384, Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, p 252; Driete, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, pp 102-103; Finn, *Winners in Peace*, pp 265-266, Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 48-488; Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, pp 22-23; Schaller, *Altered States*, p 268, notes 44-46.

³⁹ A fragment of the manuscript exists in the Library of Congress: F. Kowalski, *Grace of Heaven (Japan Rearms)*, 1966, Manuscript Fragment, Library of Congress, Frank Kowalski Papers, Box 18, Folder 9.

Kowalski's role as deputy head of the GHQ body which oversaw the NPR also casts some shadows over his usefulness as the sole source upon which to analyse the NPR. First, Kowalski was largely taken up with the central, Tokyo based administrative and liaison duties his role entailed and was not actually in the field with the NPR, with commanders such as Burgheim who publically hailed the NPR as an internal security force.⁴⁰ Much of Kowalski's role also involved close contact with the Japanese leadership of the NPR and the constant struggles with them over the character of the NPR may well have soured his feelings about the force. Kowalski also served happily under the hawkish Shepard, one of the staunchest advocates of rearmament, and despite his eventual disclosure of a plot to install Imperial army officers in the NPR, that Kowalski also recommended the use of nine hundred officers to the same plotters, and was heavily involved in the plans for the massive expansion of the force, reveal his hawkish attitude. A further example of this is his description of himself as 'the man who rearmed Japan' and Kowalski's Right-of-centre political position is further confirmed through his membership of the US Subversive Activities Control Board from 1963 to 1966.⁴¹ Finally, as Kowalski had served in military training roles for the majority of his career, this experience may well have also influenced his views of the NPR, discouraging him from drawing a distinction between an army and a constabulary.

In 1973 James Auer produced an admirable study of the NPR's naval counterpart, the Maritime Safety Agency and its eventual successor, the Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF). Auer argued that the MSDF differed from a navy in a number of ways, many of which are also applicable to the

⁴⁰ Civil Affairs Section (CAS) (A) 1825, Burgheim, Chief, Kyushu Civil affairs Region, speech to NPR enlistees, 1/9/50; CAS(A) 1834, Kowalski to Chief Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, 'Eta Jima Schools Quotas, Weapons Course, Second Class', 12/9/1950.

⁴¹ H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 1: 1947-1952*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (hereafter YF-A16), 1F-139, Conference (Kowalski and Hayashi), 19/4/52. For more on Imperial officers and the NPR see: Chapter 3, pp 209-221; Chapter 5, pp 299-304.

NPR. These included the absence of military law, a national security law and conscription; the fact that overseas deployment is prohibited; and that members of the Self Defence Forces are civilians.⁴² These points are useful to this study in that they assist in helping to assess the character of the NPR in general and the non-military aspects of it in particular. For example, the legal position and civilian nature of the members of the MSDF are identical to those of the NPR and are examined in detail in this study as they represent one of the key pillars of the NPR's constabulary character. However, despite these valid and useful points and his effective analysis of the MSDF, curiously Auer is weaker on the NPR, claiming that it was just a 'disguised army' from the start and using Kowalski as his single source to justify this claim (with no page reference and a mistake in the publisher's name).⁴³ These shortcomings are particularly disappointing because if Auer had applied just some of his own theories on the MSDF to the NPR, rather than simply using Kowalski, he would have produced an effective analysis of the force and could have clearly demonstrated its constabulary character.

In what some historians such as Gallicchio still consider the best work in English on the subject, Weinstein paints a more balanced picture of the NPR.⁴⁴ Weinstein argues that the Japanese government pursued an independent policy on security which predated the militarization of US Asian policy which took place from 1949 to 1951. Weinstein claims that the Japanese government formed the opinion that war between the superpowers was a possibility and could entail either an attempt at armed revolution by communists within Japan and/or a Soviet attack on Hokkaido. Correspondingly, they believed that Japan should pursue a defence agreement with the United States as the best way of ensuring its external

⁴² J.E. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971*, Praeger, London, 1973, pp 110-127

⁴³ *Ibid*, p 61.

⁴⁴ M. Gallicchio, 'Recovery through Dependency: American-Japanese Relations, 1945-1970', in W.I. Cohen (ed), *Pacific Passage*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, p 260.

security.⁴⁵ Citing Japanese documents and using interviews with key actors, Weinstein presents an argument that the Japanese leadership sought to create a constabulary able to maintain internal security. The force was also intended to perform the dual role of a concession to help convince the US to agree to a mutual defence treaty, and a tool of the state to confront the perceived threat from the JCP.⁴⁶ This effort to take on responsibility for internal security also reflects the Japanese elite's desire to avoid becoming an American military satellite and their real fear that internal subversion represented the most significant threat to the survival of the Japanese government.⁴⁷ Weinstein's work is valuable and mirrors the first main aim of this study in attempting to show the influence of Japanese domestic politics and internal security on the force. Nevertheless, in focusing on the policy aspects of the NPR Weinstein is less effective in examining the nature of the force and never really justifies his conclusions through references to the character of the NPR grounded in primary sources.

The British historian Reinhard Drifte argues that the NPR was always destined to become a military force although its true nature was initially concealed.⁴⁸ However, somewhat contradictorily, he maintains that although the US administration abandoned demilitarization as relations with the USSR declined, no unified view had been formed on Japanese rearmament before June 1950.⁴⁹ Drifte also comments on the Japanese administration's concern over internal security and desire for strong internal security forces.⁵⁰ Drifte's argument that the NPR was always destined to become a military is disputed by this study. However, his position on the confused and conflicting nature of

⁴⁵ M.E. Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', in J.H. Buck (ed), *The Modern Japanese Military System*, Sage, London, 1975, pp 42, 49.

⁴⁶ M.E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1971, pp 17, 25, 106.

⁴⁷ Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', p 43.

⁴⁸ Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 102.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, pp 46, 101.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p 71.

the American position on Japanese security during the period is a valid one and one which is explored in more detail in the second chapter of this study.

Welfield offers another position on the NPR, arguing that debate over Japan's future security intensified after the fall of nationalist China in 1949, with the US military and the Japan lobby pressing for rearmament, but with the State Department seeking to avoid such a provocative move in an attempt to maintain a working relationship with the Soviets and America's Pacific allies. Welfield characterises Prime Minister Yoshida as maintaining his distaste for the Japanese armed forces after 1945, but also mentions his belief that Japan would one day need a military of some kind. The Rightwing General Willoughby, head of GHQ's principal intelligence arm (G2), is also portrayed as preserving a clique of former Japanese staff officers in a bid to form a cadre of potential future generals in the event of Japanese rearmament. Attention is also paid to Yoshida's concerns over the questionable ability of the decentralised National Rural Police to deal with serious instability and his corresponding fears of communist insurrection.⁵¹ Welfield describes MacArthur's and Yoshida's view of the NPR as that of a paramilitary constabulary, which they did not want to develop into an army. This fusion of the international and domestic influences on the NPR is one which is adopted by this study in an attempt to show the full range of influences on the force. Furthermore, Welfield's brief examination of the attempts by elements of GHQ and Japanese former officers to seize control of the force is another strong point of his work, and is again one which is examined in more detail in this work, in support of the first primary aim of exploring the domestic influences on the force. Welfield's work also demonstrates the necessity of this study and the validity of its aim of producing a full examination of the character of the force through highlighting the difficulty most historians have in accurately describing the NPR: 'both organisations [the NPR and Maritime Safety Force (MSF)] were rather more ambiguous in character than is often

⁵¹ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp 65-71.

supposed'.⁵² It seems Welfield's brief analysis is also useful in showing that the creation and evolution of the NPR were influenced by a mix of Japanese and American attitudes, ideas aims and interests, which resulted in behind-the-scenes struggles over the character of the NPR. This again is an area that this study seeks to replicate and build upon. However, despite the merits of his argument Welfield again suffers from his limited source base in which he does not use any primary sources and relies very heavily on the *Asahi Shinbun* newspaper and the official SDF yearbook (*Bōei Nenkan*).⁵³

The husband-and-wife team of Meirion and Susie Harries 1989 work *Sheathing the Sword, The Demilitarization of Japan*, in spite of its production by non-specialist journalists, does contain some interesting conclusions. Despite inaccuracies such as the assumption the NPR was an army from the start, that an Imperial Japanese Air Force existed, and that Yoshida was 'ordered' to set up the NPR, the Harries do hint at the internal security role of the NPR and make reference to the role MacArthur and Yoshida had in attempting to preserve the constabulary character of the force.⁵⁴

The misconception that Japanese government was 'ordered' to create the NPR is one which is unfortunately shared by most work on the subject.⁵⁵ This interpretation of the immediate events which led to the creation of the NPR is one that this study challenges through citing Japanese desires for an internal security force like the NPR and the fact that the Japanese government was happy to create the force once authorised to do so by MacArthur.⁵⁶ It seems

⁵² Ibid, pp 72.

⁵³ Ibid, pp 456-457.

⁵⁴ Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, pp 241, 234-235.

⁵⁵ Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children*, p 206; A. Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mosaku (National Security: 50 Years of Postwar Groping)*, Yomiuri Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1997, pp 70-73; Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p 6; Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 138; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 72; Weste, 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament', p 35.

⁵⁶ Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children*, p 206; T. Mikuriya, 'Tanaka Kakuei: Kaihatsu Seiji no Tōtatsuen' (Tanaka Kakuei: the Goals of Developmental Politics), in A. Watanabe (ed), *Sengo Nihon no Saishōtachi (The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan)*, Chūō Kōronsha, Tokyo, 1995, p 56.

that this interpretation is often used as it fits more comfortably with the discussions of the 'Red Purge' or the 'reverse course' within which most studies situate the NPR.⁵⁷ As well as obscuring the Japanese desire for an internal force and the error of characterising the MacArthur letter as a coercive order, this approach also undermines the aims of much current scholarship through reducing the role of the Japanese to that of passive 'victims' of US policy.

In recent years the Australian John Weste has produced several pieces relating to aspects of the character of the NPR: one in 1999 looking at one of the Rightwing plots to seize control of the NPR, and another in 2008 on Great Britain and Japanese security.⁵⁸ These studies, whilst making a useful contribution, have a number of flaws which further work on the subject, such as this study, will help to mitigate. For example, Weste's 1999 paper relies heavily on Kowalski and the Harries and only identifies one of the three plots to install Hattori Takushiro and other purgees into the NPR.⁵⁹ His 2008 paper 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament, 1945-1960' suffers from many of the common oversimplifications of the subject, again arguing that Japan was 'ordered' to create the NPR and that Washington heavily promoted rearmament in 1950.⁶⁰ Weste also makes no reference to the perceived internal security threat from the JCP and the Japanese government's rejection of an external security force. However, both of these elements are picked up on by Shibayama's chapter in the same edited volume and also form key strands of the first principal aim of this study.⁶¹

⁵⁷ For more on the MacArthur Letter see: Chapter 2, pp 142, 144-146; Appendix V. Macarthur to Yoshida, Letter Authorising the Creation of the NPR, 8 July 50'.

⁵⁸ Weste, 'Staging a Comeback'; Weste, 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament'.

⁵⁹ Weste, 'Staging a Comeback', pp 175, 177. For more on the Hattori plots and former IJA / IJN veterans see: Chapter 3, p 214-220; Chapter 5, p 299-304.

⁶⁰ Weste, 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament', pp 35, 38-39.

⁶¹ F. Shibayama, 'The US, Britain, Japan, and the Issue of Casus Belli 1951-52: Could a Soviet attack on Japan justify starting a third world war?', in Iokibe, Rose, Tomaru and Weste (eds), *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s*, pp 13-20.

Another recent work on the Self Defence Forces (SDF) has been produced by Hertrich. Despite some questionable arguments about continuities existing between the virtues and values of the IJA and SDF, and that MacArthur 'ordered' Yoshida to set up the NPR, Hertrich makes some valid and interesting points on the NPR/SDF.⁶² For example, Hertrich correctly argues that that the NPR was created to fill an internal security role, that participation in disaster relief operations has an influence on the identity of the SDF, and that elements of the NPR's character persist in the ambiguous character of the modern SDF.⁶³ These comments about the influence of the internal security and disaster relief roles of the NPR on its character are themes which are also replicated and expanded upon in this work.

The Japanese approaches to the history of the period are useful in complementing this study of the NPR. Nevertheless, like their English language counterparts, the approach of the majority of Japanese scholars to the subject, of focusing on the high level policy process and international context of the force leaves two principal gaps: the domestic, and especially non-governmental, influences on the NPR, and the actual examination of the character of the force. These gaps correspond exactly to the two central aims of this study: to examine the domestic influences on the NPR and its character. A general survey followed by more specific analyses of the Japanese historiography follows, highlighting current issues in the field and how they relate to the aims of this study.

Despite some overlap in recent years Japanese scholarship on the Occupation often differs both in terms of methodology and ideology from that of the United States.⁶⁴ With the Occupation forming such an important phase

⁶² A. Hertrich, 'A Useable Past? Historical Museums of the Self-Defence Forces and the Construction of Continuities', in S. Saaler and W. Schwentker (eds), *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, Global Oriental, Folkestone, 2008, p 185.

⁶³ Ibid, pp 172-173, 185.

⁶⁴ R. Christensen, 'Postwar Politics', in W.M. Tsutsui (ed), *A Companion to Japanese History*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007, p 290.

in postwar Japanese history and with the influence of the United States still looming so large over contemporary Japan, the issues surrounding the Occupation, and particularly those which are considered more controversial, still provoke emotional and often polarised debate. There is also something of a taboo over discussion of the NPR, SDF and security issues in general. In Japan this taboo has two principal origins: pacifism and the country's international position. The widely held 'emotional pacifism' of much of Japan's population has its roots in the demilitarization and educational reform policies of the Occupation, added to the international political position the Japanese state found itself in after defeat in 1945.⁶⁵ As Hata argues, due to US protection after 1945, Japanese citizens, insulated from the realities of international politics, did not feel connected to the Cold War, and often developed unrealistic or even utopian conceptions of security issues.⁶⁶ This long standing taboo over the discussion of defence policy and the overriding pacifist norm in Japanese society made it challenging for many years for Japanese academics to adopt anything other than a critical position on issues such as the NPR without risking their reputations or being labelled nationalistic. Despite a lessening in intensity since the 1990s, this reluctance to adopt controversial or unpopular positions was enhanced by the fact that in Japan even the most methodological Japanese scholars often have a public role, serving on government commissions and contributing to national policy debates, opportunities which would have been jeopardised by controversial or critical opinions on defence issues.⁶⁷

Although the newer generations of Japanese scholars are not as influenced by Marxist ideology, some current scholarship still retains a more political bent than some contemporary American scholarship.⁶⁸ Like many of the

⁶⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 249.

⁶⁶ I. Hata, *Shiroku, Nihon Saigunbi (Historical Record, Japanese Rearmament)*, Bungei Shunjūkan, Tokyo, 1976, p 114.

⁶⁷ Christensen, 'Postwar Politics', p 291.

⁶⁸ S. Asada, 'Recent Works on the American Occupation of Japan: The State of the Art', *Japanese Journal of American Studies*, No.1, 1981, p 176

second generation of American historians, some contemporary Japanese scholars, such as Sakamoto Yoshikazu, tend to view the early Occupation years as something of a socialist utopia, which was snuffed out by reactionary imperialists rather than allowed to bloom into a true 'social democracy'.⁶⁹ As well as the Japanese academic community's legacy of anti-establishment, Marxist historiography, the shortage of available post-1952 declassified Japanese government material gave some Japanese authors in earlier years licence for the inclusion of analyses based on scant evidence.⁷⁰ The current Japanese Left tend to emphasise the significance of the 'reverse course' and the betrayal of the early democratic promise of the Occupation, in order to match Cold War interests. As a result the Japanese Left tend to cherish the earlier period of the Occupation and hold the 1947 constitution, the central surviving element of the Japanese state from this period, in high regard.⁷¹

In contrast, Meltzer argues that Japanese conservative historians tend to view the same early period as one of 'social engineering' and 'victor's justice' which ceased once the US began to understand the danger of the JCP and communism to Japan, which, naturally, the Japanese Right had seen all along. This tilts the Right's emphasis toward favouring and focusing on the latter period of the Occupation. This and the distaste of the Right for the pacifism of the constitution leads many to argue that only once the constitution is redrawn will Japan be once again fully sovereign.⁷²

Despite the seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the two, the Left and Right do sometimes agree on some matters. First of these is a tendency to

⁶⁹ Dower, 'Reform and Reconsolidation', p 350; Y. Sakamoto, 'The International Context of the Occupation', in R.E Ward and Y. Sakamoto (eds), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987, pp 60, 64-66; R.A. Moore, 'The Occupation of Japan as History: Some Recent Research', *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1981, p 320; Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 266.

⁷⁰ Gluck, 'Entangling Illusions', pp 178 - 179.

⁷¹ Metzler, 'The Occupation', pp 267, 275.

⁷² Ibid.

agree that the impact of the Occupation is exaggerated. Although the motivations for saying so vary from a wounded nationalism, to an effort to promote the early JCP, many Japanese accounts are united in claiming that the Occupation mainly served to complete domestic policy efforts or social processes. Second, most Japanese historians seek to emphasise the negative aspects of the American interregnum at the expense of the positive contributions, with conservatives criticising the early years, and the progressives criticising the partial retrenchment of the later years.

One of the regularly referenced works on rearmament and the NPR is Hata Ikuhiko's work, *Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi (Historical Record, Japanese Rearmament)*. In this work Hata takes issue with leading historian Iriye Akira's arguments that throughout the Occupation the US had always wanted to integrate Japan into the Western bloc as a non-militaristic, capitalist partner and that the Cold War was not directly involved in determining the course of US policy for Japan.⁷³ In contrast Hata argues that the influence of the Cold War was the single most significant factor on US policy, ultimately resulting in the 'reverse course'.⁷⁴ On the subjects of the NPR and rearmament Hata argues that Article Nine of the 1947 'Peace Constitution' was developed as the result of a bargain between Prime Minister Shidehara and MacArthur over the preservation of the Emperor on one side and the desire for insurance against re-militarization on the other.⁷⁵ Describing what he terms as the 'drama of the politics of rearmament', Hata asserts that rapid change in Japan's international environment and intensified Cold War pressures resulted in the 'reverse course' and that a complex web of competing Japanese and American interest groups influenced the direction of Japanese security policy. This emphasis on the influence of the complexities and competing interest groups of the Occupation and domestic Japanese

⁷³ A. Iriye, *U.S.-Japanese Relations*, in Y. Nagai and A. Iriye (eds), *The Origins of The Cold War in Asia*, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1977, pp 378-407.

⁷⁴ Hata, *Shiroku*, pp 106, 108.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, pp 58-63; For the text of Article Nine see: Chapter 2, p99, note 19.

politics are elements of Hata's work that this study seeks to replicate. Hata's work also is useful as it provides a slightly differing perspective from that of the majority of Japanese scholarship and is often cited, despite its age and high level policy focus, as one of the better studies on the subject. However, Hata's role as the official historian of the Japanese Ministry of Finance and hence his ties to the Japanese bureaucracy and government could be used to question some of his arguments and motivations.

Takemae Eiji, originally an historian of Japanese labour reform, adopts a position on the NPR very close to that of Dower. Takemae's major English language work, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, an expansion of an earlier work in Japanese, argues, like Dower, that the NPR was an army from the start.⁷⁶ Like Hata, Takemae is good at highlighting the complex and shifting alliances between competing American and Japanese actors in GHQ, the Japanese government and Washington. The influence of these battles, usually between progressive and hawkish American and Japanese groupings, are an element of Takemae's work that this study seeks to employ.⁷⁷ In spite of the merits of this approach, again like Dower, Takemae employs a thin source base in characterising the NPR as an army, using Dower, Kowalski, Maeda, Sebald, and a single primary source (an earlier version of the December 1951 Civil Affairs Section report on NPR used in this study).⁷⁸ Furthermore, in most of his work Takemae makes almost no mention of the JCP violence and his total discussion of the NPR in the 560 page *Inside GHQ* amounts to just over three pages.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ E. Takemae, *GHQ*, Iwanami Shisho, Tokyo, 1983; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*; Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 279.

⁷⁷ Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 273.

⁷⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 660, notes 57-62; Technical Section (TS) 154-155, 'A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951', 1/52; YF-A16, 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 22/12/51.

⁷⁹ Takemae does briefly mention the JCP's policy of violence in his Japanese language works: E. Takemae, *Sengo Rōdō Kaikaku, GHQ Rōdō Seisakushi (Postwar Labor Reform in Japan, History of GHQ Labor Policy)*, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, Tokyo, 1995, pp 368, 386.

One of the most significant Japanese historians of postwar Japan is Masumi Junnosuke. Masumi tends to focus on the domestic politics of Japan and is especially useful in his examination of the JCP in this period. Masumi gives a brief but effective account of the twists and turns of the JCP 'military policy', highlighting the factional problems it generated within the party and using some key JCP documents of the time, such as the 1951 'New Line' and Cominform Directive No. 172.⁸⁰ This approach is one which is also employed in this study which seeks to use original documents wherever possible to give a fuller picture of the JCP in the era of the NPR. Despite strengths in discussing the JCP, Masumi is weaker on the NPR and fails to really link the NPR and JCP, despite the former being created to counteract the latter. This weakness shows the need for a study such as this, which reunites these two fundamentally connected subjects.

Perhaps the most influential scholar currently working in this field in Japan is Ōtake Hideo, the author of several works on the subject and the editor of a three-volume collection of related primary documents. Ōtake is somewhat typical of Japanese academia in adopting a fiercely critical approach to the creation of the NPR and the question of rearmament. In line with many Japanese historians, Ōtake argues that despite his belief that states should possess militaries of some kind, Yoshida and his government were passive in the events leading up to the creation of the NPR, with the force being imposed upon them by the Americans largely as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War.⁸¹ Ōtake asserts that Yoshida wanted to take the time necessary to reform the Japanese constitution and win over the Japanese population before embarking upon rearmament but was forced to follow the 'deception tactics' of GHQ, beginning with the formation of the 'so-called police reserve', and which he was again forced to use in the 1954 creation of

⁸⁰ J. Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1985, pp 224, p 288, note 81.

⁸¹ H. Ōtake, *Saigunbi to Nashonorizumu, Sengo Nihon no Bōeikan (Rearmament and Nationalism, Post-war Japanese Defence Thought)*, Kodansha, Tokyo, 2005, pp 30-32; Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 138.

the SDF, thus perpetuating the 'culture of lies' which Ōtake alleges surrounds the SDF to this day.⁸² Ōtake's work demonstrates that the lasting controversy over the NPR and SDF still appears to restrict the detailed analysis of the issue divorced from the ideological and political attitudes encompassing Japanese academia and parts of the Japanese population. Through his emphasis on Japanese domestic politics Ōtake's approach shares some elements in common with the first primary aim of this study but the absence of any detail on the actual character of the NPR despite his accusations, both lessens Ōtake's contribution and reinforces the need for this study.

Kataoka contributes several interesting concepts to the debate around the NPR, but suffers from a lack of clear definitions of the terminology he uses. Building on the late 1960s work of Kosaka, Kataoka argues that postwar Japan deliberately eschewed military affairs and traditional power politics, preferring to focus on trade and industry, an approach which he uses to characterise Japan as a 'new Venice'.⁸³ Alongside this theory Kataoka offers some interesting reflections on the NPR/GSDF, claiming that due to the confinement of the forces to the territorial space of Japan and their constabulary character, Japan is effectively a protectorate of the United States.⁸⁴ It does seem that in some ways Kataoka overplays his hand, as it is difficult to argue that the modern SDF is entirely a constabulary force. Furthermore, despite actually using the term he offers no explicit definition of what a constabulary actually is, perhaps relying on the implicit, standard North American usage. Again focusing on high level international policy debates, Kataoka's work offers little to this study in terms of approach in general, but his discussions of the constabulary nature of the force and the influence of its territorial confinement are useful starting points for several of

⁸² Ōtake, *Saigunbi to Nashonorizumu*, pp 38-39, 42; Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 137.

⁸³ T. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution, the Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, Crane Russak, New York, 1991, pp 1-10; M. Kosaka, *Saishō Yoshida Shigeru (Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru)*, Chūō Kōronsha, Tokyo, 1968, p 86; this phrase was also used by Chalmers Johnson. Johnson, *Japan, Who Governs?*, p 22.

⁸⁴ Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution*, p 76.

the main strands of the discussion of the character of the NPR undertaken in this work.

A further author useful to a certain degree for historiographical comparison, despite his journalistic writing style, is Maeda Tetsuo. Maeda's work is typical of the popular anti-military, anti-establishment variant of the Japanese approach to security issues. Maeda argues that MacArthur thought up the NPR on a brief visit to the frontline in Korea in summer 1950 and with that idea 'the pacifism and disarmament that MacArthur had so forcefully and tirelessly promoted in Japan soon ended'.⁸⁵ Maeda follows the common argument that the NPR was clearly intended as the first step in rearmament and was forced upon a confused Japanese Cabinet and population. Clearly, Maeda's work is of limited academic value as it neglects vast areas of evidence (again largely relying on Kowalski's work) and pursues a clearly inaccurate and biased ideological line. Nevertheless, the work is useful as an indicator of the passion behind the debate over security in Japan and the ideological motivations informing, albeit to a lesser extent, the arguments of Japanese scholars.⁸⁶ Maeda's omission of the perceived JCP threat and his claims that the NPR was an army from the start, lack a sufficient evidence base and further support the aims of this study.

Masuda Hiroshi, the editor of a two volume collection of documents on security in postwar Japan, also recently produced a major work on the creation of the SDF entitled *Jietai no Tanjō (The Birth of the SDF)*.⁸⁷ In this Masuda argues that most people in Japan believe that the NPR was created as a police force to avoid constitutional problems, and principally came into being due to the pressing need for internal security forces following the emergency dispatch of the US Occupation tactical troops to Korea.⁸⁸ In

⁸⁵ Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, pp 2, 5.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pp 6-7, 22-23.

⁸⁷ H. Masuda, *Jietai no Tanjō (The Birth of the SDF)*, Chukoron Shinsho, Tokyo, 2004.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, pp 5-6.

opposition to what he sees as the prevailing view, Masuda gives his own reasons for the creation of the NPR, providing a detailed and convincing explanation only flawed by the omission of reference to internal security factors and the perceived threat from the JCP.⁸⁹ Furthermore, Masuda's principal argument that MacArthur's personal prestige and influence allowed him to defy Washington's policy and avoid rearming Japan is interesting as it seems to conflict with the opinions of other writers such as Schonberger who claim that MacArthur's personal power declined sharply after the debacle of his failed presidential candidacy campaign in 1948.⁹⁰ Masuda's hints towards the internal security origins of the NPR are an element of his work which is built upon in this study, but interestingly the fact that he does not link the JCP, the biggest perceived internal threat, to these concerns shows a weakness of his work on this subject.

A recent work entitled 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve of Japan: Impact of the US Army's Far East Command on Japan's Defense Capability' by Kuzuhara, a fellow of the Japanese National Institute of Defence Studies, also offers some interesting conclusions. Kuzuhara argues that prior to the Chinese intervention in Korea the NPR was a constabulary but afterwards it assumed more of a military character.⁹¹ This is an accurate conclusion but some flaws in Kuzuhara's analysis, specifically those relating to the capabilities of the NPR and NSF and their assumption of heavy arms, and his lack of a definition of a constabulary weaken his contribution somewhat.⁹² Kuzuhara's emphasis on the character of the NPR complements the second primary focus of this study but his lack of attention to the JCP threat and some shortcomings in his analysis of the NPR's capabilities do weaken his usefulness.

⁸⁹ Ibid, pp 7-8.

⁹⁰ Ibid, pp 9-10; Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, p 81.

⁹¹ K. Kuzuhara, 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve of Japan: Impact of the US Army's Far East Command on Japan's Defense Capability', *NIDS Security Reports*, No. 7, Dec 2006, p 66.

⁹² For more on Kuzuhara and the capabilities of the NPR see: Chapter 3, pp 189-190, Table. XII.

After surveying the existing scholarship on the history of the NPR a number of strengths and weaknesses are clearly evident. The vast majority of the work on the subject is dedicated to the high level policy processes which led to the creation of the force. Some attention is paid to Japanese domestic influences on the force, with historians such as Ōtake and Masumi making contributions in the study of the Japanese government and the JCP. However, little on the domestic influences exists in English and even less on the JCP in this period.

This gap in the scholarship is matched by a similar neglect of the character of the NPR, on which there is virtually nothing written in either English or Japanese. Across the historiography there is a tendency by virtually all historians to characterise the NPR (usually as an army) without reference to its actual character. Furthermore, where such references do exist they are usually justified through reference to a single secondary source (Kowalski). This inadequate approach to the study of the NPR is further compounded by the absence of any mention of the internal security threat posed by the JCP at the time which formed the principal domestic impetus behind the creation of the force. This separation of the NPR from its context and its premature characterisation as an army, makes its creation look like a reactionary part of the 'Red Purge' or 'reverse course' forced needlessly on a reluctant Japan.

These weaknesses underline the need for this study. The twin aims of demonstrating the domestic influences on the force and the true character of the force, target the two weakest areas of the work on the force. This approach validates the aims of this study and demonstrates its contribution by filling an obvious gap in the historiography. Some studies on the subject have good points but all have weaknesses. This study attempts to unify the best elements from the existing scholarship and in doing so attempts to provide as full an analysis as possible of the character of the NPR and all of

the influences upon its creation and evolution. In achieving this aim reference to a firm and broad base of primary sources has been necessary and the following section examines the approach taken by this study to their analysis and use.

Methodology and Sources

This thesis is an empirical study involving the extensive examination of primary sources supported by reference to the relevant secondary literature. As noted above, the initial chapters of the study will describe the domestic influences on the high level policy debate which led to the NPR's creation. The second part of the study will consist of an examination of the NPR from an operational and structural perspective in order to determine its character. The latter portion of the work will employ the bulk of the primary material, due to its aims, originality and the corresponding dearth of secondary literature. This approach, which combines examinations of the executive decision-making process and the structure, character and role of the force, will illuminate the nature, creation and operation of the NPR from a number of differing perspectives. The dearth of primary source based research on the force also make this approach the most effective in contributing to the debate and will also provide the material necessary to provide a clear picture of the character, origins and evolution of the NPR. Whilst challenging some of the specific conclusions of certain second and third generation historians, this work does not seek to entirely reject their approaches to the study of the Occupation. If anything this work seeks to support some of their ideas through linking the NPR to overall US Cold War strategy and by revealing the Japanese influences on the NPR. However, this thesis does seek to reject their key position that the NPR was an army from the start, through reference to primary documents which reveal the true character of the force. In general the value and bias of the specific primary sources employed are individually

addressed in the text but a general review of the respective merits and shortcomings of the archives and collections employed comprises the remainder of this section.

Following from the year of research conducted there, the principal primary source materials employed for all chapters, and especially those dealing with the character of the NPR are the documents found in the *Kensei Shiryoshitsu* (Postwar Japanese Political History Room) of the National Diet Library, Tokyo (NDLT). The NDLT houses both microfiche copies of the GHQ/SCAP archives and the records of the Japanese government as well as numerous other collections related to Japan's postwar history. The GHQ archives contain the complete correspondence of all levels of the SCAP bureaucracy and US military in Japan as well as that of much of the Japanese government and bureaucracy. The material in these archives and collections contributed significantly to the content of this study, particularly in its provision of middle and lower echelon reports and material on both the JCP threat and the NPR. A particular strength of the archives, and the Occupation archives in particular, is the brief period of clarity the Occupation imposed on the Japanese bureaucracy which was previously and subsequently notable for its unaccountable opacity and significant political power.⁹³

Nevertheless, the archives do have some drawbacks in terms of their content, principally in lacking record groups of particular interest to some scholars. For example, the Japanese archives do not contain *RG-6: Records of Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM), 1947-1951*, which consists of material on the military side of the Occupation and the Korean War; mainly comprising intelligence summaries, memoranda, orders and plans related to the operations of the Occupation. These could possibly contain much on the NPR but are inaccessible in Japan. In order to overcome this shortcoming key documents absent from the NDLT were obtained from the MacArthur

⁹³ Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 273.

Memorial Archives, Norfolk Virginia.

A major drawback of the Japanese archives until recently was the lack of a Japanese freedom of information act and a corresponding declassification system. This lack of legislation meant that until 2001 Japanese politicians and bureaucrats could permanently remove sensitive materials from the public domain.⁹⁴ Although not much of an issue during the life of the Occupation due to the liberal American attitude towards the GHQ archives, the following years saw the re-imposition of much of the Japanese reluctance to divulge the inner workings of government. This restriction of access to documents with potentially embarrassing or controversial content was particularly evident amongst the more delicate areas of government, especially materials relating to the SDF, the very existence of which remains a controversial subject even today. After decades of campaigning a freedom of information act was finally passed in 1999 but was not promulgated until 2001, in order to give officials 'time to prepare'. It is probably not a coincidence that the years 1999-2001 saw a vast increase in government waste disposal, as thousands of sensitive documents were shredded or burnt.⁹⁵ This mass deletion of controversial documents has recently been confirmed through the controversy over the existence of an alleged secret 1960 nuclear deal between Japan and the US which violated Japans' postwar non-nuclear principles.⁹⁶ The documents confirming the existence of the pact have been difficult to trace in the Japanese government archives, most likely due to their disposal in 1999-2001, but US documents and a recent government inquiry have confirmed their existence, and deletion at some point in 1999 - 2001.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Asada, 'Recent Works on the American Occupation', pp 189-190.

⁹⁵ J. Kingston, 'Information Disclosure in Japan', Paper presented at the Biennial conference of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia (JSAA), Adelaide, 3-6/7/05, p 6.

⁹⁶ George Packard (an aide to in 1960 to then US Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer) admitted in March 2010 that such a secret deal exists, *Japan Times*, 20/3/10.

⁹⁷ *Japan Times*, 22/11/09; *Mainichi Shinbun*, 10/3/10; In late March 2010 a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told the Diet that the files were destroyed during 1999-2001, *Japan Times*, 20/3/10, 29/3/10.

Despite the freedom of information act coming into existence scholars still face severe obstacles when seeking to access and use certain materials in Japan. Much of the material released has been heavily redacted and the powerful 'Personal Data Protection Law' of April 2005, somewhat hampers freedom of the press, making it much easier for individuals or the government to suppress information or accusations they do not like.⁹⁸ Furthermore, events such as the Defence Agency's investigation of 142 individuals who had filed freedom of information requests, the following bungled cover-up, and the recent arrest of a *Mainichi* journalist who received some sensitive documents just prior to their publication by the government, reveal the extent to which Japan has yet to fully embrace both the letter and spirit of the principle of freedom of information.⁹⁹

One of the principal and most valuable sources, particularly for dealing with the international context of the creation of the NPR, are the volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States*.¹⁰⁰ These volumes cover the correspondence between bureaucrats, diplomats and military officers in the higher strata of the American state. The *FRUS* volumes are effective in their coverage of most of the major policy documents and correspondence between the US policy elite and hence are very useful in examining the policymaking process and in revealing the actors involved in it. The relevant volumes of the *FRUS* are also useful for the examination of those areas of Japan policy, such as the peace treaty negotiations, in which Washington was more directly involved. The broad strategic documents relating to American policy on Japan can also all be found in the *FRUS*, including those relating directly to the shifts in Japan policy which provided the background to the creation of the NPR, such as NSC 13, 48 and 68. The volumes of the *FRUS* also provide a useful window on the attitudes of policymakers in

⁹⁸ *Japan Times*, 3/1/10.

⁹⁹ J. Kingston, 'Information Disclosure in Japan', p 9, *Asahi Shinbun*, 29/5/02.

¹⁰⁰ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, various dates, hereafter cited as *FRUS*.

Washington and Tokyo and reveal the statements, opinions and complex interwoven relationships between the numerous concerned US agencies and individuals both in Tokyo and Washington. The volumes are helpful in revealing these often conflicting and sometimes confused agendas which competed in the policy formation process which eventually resulted in the creation of the NPR.

However, the *FRUS* does have some limitations when used as a source for the study of the NPR. These limitations are principally due to the scope and depth of the content as well as the nature of the *FRUS*. One of the main drawbacks is the absence of the responses and contributions of the middle and lower ranked officials involved in actually executing or administering the decisions taken by their superiors. Due to this the entire narrative of the implementation and adaptation of policy to the available means and resources is largely omitted. This omission has serious consequences for the study of the NPR as the form and function of the organisation itself are rarely explored and the operations and evolution of the force after its creation receive little mention. Furthermore, as the volumes deal with inter-American communication there is almost no Japanese authored content on the NPR. Moreover, as the *FRUS* only deals with the correspondence of the US state, important non-state actors' views are likewise absent. This impediment proves especially telling as it means the *FRUS* does not contain the views and reports of actors such as the highly influential 'Japan lobby' who pressed for the creation of a Japanese constabulary to protect Japan's internal security from the late 1940s and had the ear of many in GHQ, Washington and the Japanese elite.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, as the *FRUS* is primarily concerned with chronicling the foreign policy of the United States, certain areas directly relating to the creation and evolution of the NPR are omitted. Principal amongst these is the nature of the political situation within Japan and the communist unrest within the country around the time of the NPR's creation.

¹⁰¹ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, p 134.

Although some mention is made of the domestic political situation with Japan, the internal politics of Japan are not exhaustively covered and hence other sources must also be consulted.

The usefulness of the *FRUS* also suffers somewhat from the way in which its content is presented. Entries are given in chronological order but are largely unannotated, with minor entries presented next to highly influential and widely read documents, with little indication provided by the editors of how well or widely received the content was. Despite this, the problem can be overcome somewhat through the examination of secondary literature and the content of the *FRUS* itself to see which opinions seem to prevail and how they ultimately influenced policy. As the *FRUS* is an official publication of the United States government, the content of the series is subject to the declassification laws of the United States and hence key content may be absent.

Despite a pretty comprehensive coverage of documents in the volumes covering the Far East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, some doubt has been cast over the content of the later 1950s volumes, particularly the one dealing with Japan and Korea between 1958 and 1960.¹⁰² Although this volume contained some omissions and deletions, nothing it contained, or perhaps did not contain, matched the glaring omission of the CIA sponsored overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq from the 1989 the volume relating to Iran in the years 1952-1954.¹⁰³ The widespread criticism of this volume resulted in 1991 in a new law, in which the US government stipulated that future volumes of *FRUS* needed to contain as full of a record as possible and had to be published within thirty years of the events described.¹⁰⁴ Despite improving transparency these reforms have materially slowed down production of the series, with the volumes currently several years behind

¹⁰² *FRUS* 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII.

¹⁰³ R.L. Garthoff, 'Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2004, p 23; *FRUS* 1952-1954, Vol. X.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

schedule. In using the *FRUS* these limitations are unavoidable and are difficult to negotiate but the material provided is nevertheless highly useful and content which may or may not have been withheld can only be speculated upon.

The shortcomings of the *FRUS* mean it is primarily useful as a source for examining the background to the creation of the NPR, especially in relation to the attitudes towards the Cold War, Korean War and Japan's role within US global policy. To produce a more complete picture of the NPR other sources will need to be employed to augment the content of the *FRUS*, these will need to include the opinions of the Japan lobby and the press, various Japanese perspectives, and GHQ documents dealing with the operational aspects of the NPR.

The collection of primary documents edited by Ōtake also provides a useful source of information but, like the other sources employed for this study, suffers limitations.¹⁰⁵ Ōtake's collection is an edited three-volume Japanese language compilation of documents relating to Japanese security from 1945 to the creation of the SDF in 1954. The volumes contain a wide range of materials including: Japanese and international newspaper articles, documents from *FRUS*, transcripts of interviews with historians and participants, Japanese government documents and official memoranda, policy statements and correspondence from the major Japanese political parties, summaries of speeches, and other materials relevant to the NPR's creation, evolution and historical context.

¹⁰⁵ H. Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimonдай Shiryōshū (Postwar Japan Defence Problem Materials Collection)*, *Daiichikan, Higunjika kara Saigunbi he (Volume 1, From Demilitarisation to Rearmament)*, Sanichishobo, 1991; *Ibid, Dainikan, Kōwa to Saigunbi no Honkakuka (Volume 2, The Realisation of The Peace Treaty and Rearmament)*, Sanichishobo, 1992; *Ibid, Dasanikan, Jietai no Sōsetsu (Volume 3, The Foundation of the SDF)*, Sanichishobo, 1992.

Despite containing a wealth of useful material, Ōtake's collection does have its limitations. In contrast to the largely complete *FRUS*, Ōtake's work seems quite the opposite, the content having been selected by the author to support his arguments and the materials are divided into sections which are introduced with a commentary by Ōtake.¹⁰⁶ This employment of the evidence does not render the primary documents themselves less useful but it casts doubts over how the documents were selected and which, if any, were omitted or edited to avoid the inclusion of content which could question or undermine his arguments.

The inclusion of interviews, mostly conducted in the 1980s, also generates questions over the reliability of Ōtake's work. The interviews were clearly selected by Ōtake to help support his arguments and those being interviewed often had their own motivations and agendas to pursue and were unlikely to portray themselves or their actions in an unsympathetic light. The inclusion of interviews with leading figures such as Ohashi Takeo, former Cabinet minister and Attorney General, demonstrate this.¹⁰⁷ Also in interviewing participants so long after the events in question took place, it is possible that the interviewees could have forgotten much of what they experienced or that their recollections are coloured by hindsight and the knowledge that the NPR eventually shed much of its constabulary character and evolved into the GSDF. This problem seems particularly of note when applied to both the study of the NPR and the communist guerrilla campaign which formed the context of its creation. In 1950 nobody knew that the communist guerrilla campaign would prove a damp squib and the NPR would become the GSDF. It seems that opinions expressed by participants at the time could be more useful than those given fifty years later when the course of events had unfolded, influencing their perceptions of the past.

¹⁰⁶ See above for more on Ōtake's position on the NPR.

¹⁰⁷ Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū*, Vol. 1, pp 450-452.

Ōtake's work can be considered a useful source of primary documents which can prove time consuming and difficult to locate elsewhere. Despite some weaknesses and the influence of Ōtake on the content of the work, it seems that if the documents themselves are employed without reference to Ōtake's commentary they can prove highly useful. Furthermore, as noted above Ōtake's views on the NPR and its context are useful as they help to illustrate the historiographical position of many Japanese scholars, as Ōtake is possibly the most prominent scholar now working in this field in Japan.

Further useful archival sources are the Foreign Office and War Office documents held within the British National Archives at Kew.¹⁰⁸ The archives contain reports, memoranda, documents and general correspondence sent between British diplomats, military officers, politicians and members of the UK Liaison Mission to Japan. The advantage of the British documents is that they provide a somewhat more objective viewpoint on the NPR and its context. This advantage stems from the British being less ideologically influenced than the Americans and simultaneously being separated from both the decision making process and the implementation of policy. Despite this separation, the British were still able to observe conditions and events through the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), and the British representatives in the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. However, due to the British separation from the policymaking process not all information was provided to Britain's representatives, especially on potentially controversial topics upon which the British government might oppose the US. Examples of this include the disputes over Japan's trading relations with the rest of Asia, and the NPR, albeit to a lesser extent.¹⁰⁹ Although some useful documents are present in the National Archives, as British attention was largely focused elsewhere in the immediate postwar years, the amount of material available for the study of the NPR is relatively

¹⁰⁸ Foreign Office files (FO) and War Office files (WO), British National Archives at Kew.

¹⁰⁹ Schaller, *Altered States*, pp 58-59.

sparse. There are more documents available detailing the communist subversive activities in Japan but the materials available for both subjects contain many American-authored documents which are duplicates of those found in the National Diet Library, Tokyo. Furthermore due to the highly restricted nature of the British intelligence archives and the strict penalties which exist for former intelligence officers who reveal state secrets, the British record of events of the era, particularly those relating to security and intelligence, is far from complete.¹¹⁰

Despite some flaws, the British documents provide another perspective on the NPR and prove a useful supplement to the Japanese and American documents. The employment of British documentary sources also helps to free the analysis somewhat from what Gluck and Asada viewed as the often blinkered, exclusively US-Japanese perspective which, in their view, often over-influences the content and approach of many scholars.¹¹¹

The final principal compilations of primary documents employed in this study are the *Rearmament of Japan* microfiche collections edited by Masuda Hiroshi.¹¹² These recently compiled collections contain a mass of relevant primary material, running to over one thousand fiche in total. The collection is almost exclusively presented in English and covers a very broad range of US military, government and media documents. The content of the collection is very useful in the examination of the international context of the creation of the NPR and also contributes somewhat to the material on the operations of the NPR, the Japanese civil police and the JCP. Despite their breadth of content, the collections do not generally extend down to the level of the daily routine of the NPR. Consequently, the material gleaned from the collection is

¹¹⁰ Garthoff, 'Foreign Intelligence', p 26.

¹¹¹ Gluck, 'Entangling Illusions', pp 208, 214; Asada, 'Recent Works on the American Occupation of Japan', p 188.

¹¹² H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 1: 1947-1952*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, hereafter cited as YF-A16; H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 2: 1953-1963*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, hereafter cited as YF-A17.

largely supplementary to that found in the GHQ/SCAP archives and *FRUS*. Again, like Ōtake's collection, this volume is an edited work and suffers from the same editorial influences, strengths and weaknesses, albeit to a lesser extent as Masuda provides almost no commentary. Masuda's collection also suffers from the absence of many of the most significant documents on the NPR such as the 1949 *Gunpowder* Staff Study and the essential July 1950 planning document, *Increase in Japanese Security Agencies*.¹¹³ Even key documents such as the various elements of the Police Reserve Order are hard to find and the collection contains very little from the GHQ/SCAP archives on the living conditions and operational aspects of the NPR.¹¹⁴

Whilst each of these sources has its drawbacks, if taken together they complement each other and their respective weaknesses and shortcomings can be mitigated somewhat. A comparison of the documents gives a better impression of events and especially the perceptions of the individuals and organisations involved. This is especially important in a subject where perceptions of events are central. For example, this emphasis on the impact of perceptions of events and intentions on the character of the NPR actually converts some of the weaknesses of certain sources to strengths in revealing the attitudes of various actors. The intelligence sources employed in this study are a good example of this.¹¹⁵

The use of personal accounts such as memoirs of the key participants also shares this paradoxical strength/weakness. The works of MacArthur, Yoshida, Kowalski and others are useful in that they reveal the authors' perceptions of

¹¹³ Staff Study "Gunpowder", 2nd Edition, GHQFEC to Distribution List, Far East Command, 21/4/49, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen (The Financial History Section of the Ministry of Finance), *Showa Zaiseishi, Sensō Kara Kōwa Made (The Financial History of Showa, From War to Peace)*, Vol. 20, Tokyo Keizai Shinpōsha, 1982, p 234; Staff Study 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 14/7/50, printed in, *ibid*, pp 255-261.

¹¹⁴ Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) (D) 13267, Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order (Cabinet Order No. 271), 24/8/50.

¹¹⁵ For more on the critical approach to intelligence sources in this study see: Chapter 1, pp 54-56.

events (albeit influenced by hindsight) through the defence of their actions and their criticism or praise of others.

This study also employs many documents which were secret or restricted during the period. The influence of these levels of access upon the perceptions of individuals involved in the study is interesting and often is reflected in their opinions of the NPR. The hawkish attitudes of individuals such as Charles Willoughby (head of G2) and the senior members of the US Army are a good example of this. Willoughby's position as head of G2 gave him access to most of the assessments of the USSR and JCP, leading him to occasionally overestimate their capabilities, thus making him even more vociferous in his calls for a new Japanese military.¹¹⁶ The heads of the US Army were also naturally preoccupied by the Soviet military threat and saw little of the material on the perceived internal threat of the JCP. This influenced their attitude, with most preferring a Japanese army capable of assisting in containing or combating the USSR, over a constabulary designed to ensure the internal security of Japan and of little or no use for external security.¹¹⁷ However, when examining, as this study does, the force in its entirety such nuances are of less consequence, except in illuminating the reasons behind the positions taken on the force by certain individuals.

Definitions

Much of the debate over the origins and nature of the NPR stems from the failure of most historians approaching the subject to adequately define the

¹¹⁶ Garthoff, 'Foreign Intelligence', pp 37-38. For more on Charles Willoughby and the NPR: see Chapter 2, pp 140-144; Chapter 3, pp 209-220.

¹¹⁷ For more on the position of the US military on the NPR see: Chapter 2, pp 104-145; Chapter 5, pp 277-296.

terminology they employ.¹¹⁸ Clear and explicit definitions are especially important in a subject area where some have argued that the nature of the NPR is the subject of 'pure sophistry' or even the 'Orwellian misuse of language'.¹¹⁹

These accusations have their roots in the New Year 1950 message given by MacArthur to the Japanese people in which he stated that 'by no sophistry of reasoning can it [article nine of the 1947 constitution] be interpreted as a complete negation of the right to self-defense against unprovoked attack'.¹²⁰ Dower, quoting Kowalski, and perhaps unintentionally MacArthur, uses the phrase to characterise his view that the NPR, NSF and SDF were armies in disguise, shrouded by Yoshida's cloak of false names and what Ōtake calls 'confusing, contradictory and tricky' statements.¹²¹ These accusations are backed up by Dower, Schaller and Takemae through reference to a single line from Kowalski's work in which he criticises as disingenuous the use of the term 'special vehicle' to describe a tank.¹²² This is a translation of the Japanese word '*Tokusha*' (special vehicle) as opposed to the Japanese for tank '*Sensha*' (literally 'war vehicle'). As the explicit use of the term 'war' would have violated the constitutional prohibition on the maintenance of 'war potential' clearly such a name was out of the question, whatever the intended use of the vehicles.¹²³ The fact that these vehicles had uses other than

¹¹⁸ This need for a clear definition of the terminology used was called for as early as 1983 when Drifte argued that confusion over the term 'constabulary' hampered debated on the subject. Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 75

¹¹⁹ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp 378, 384; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 548; S.J. Noumoff, 'The First Phase of the Strategy of Japanese Rearmament: Some Intellectual Arguments', *China Report*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1986, p 108.

¹²⁰ *New York Herald Tribune*, 1/1/50; P.J. Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, Japan Library, Folkestone, 1993, p 223.

¹²¹ Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 141.

¹²² Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p 384; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 547; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 488; Schaller, *Altered States*, p 45.

¹²³ *The Constitution of Japan*, 1947, printed in, G.D. Hook and G. McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution*, Routledge, London, 2001, p 191.

combat and were not really issued to the NPR during its life, lessens the impact of these historians' assumptions about the character of the force.¹²⁴

In order to address these deficiencies and allow future debate within a unified set of concepts, clear and unambiguous definitions are required. Key to any effective set of definitions dealing with the NPR is that of a 'constabulary'. A 'constabulary' is defined in its standard North American usage by Encarta as: 'a military style police force: an armed police force that has been organized according to a military model but is separate from the army'.¹²⁵

In most states, aside from the United Kingdom (where this term conjures up images of the village bobby), a constabulary is considered to be a paramilitary internal security police force. As almost all the policymakers in this study were American or were operating in an American English environment (GHQ) the phrase would have been taken in its American meaning. Also, as is demonstrated in chapter two, the term 'constabulary' was in common use by US military officers and politicians before the NPR was created, in reference to the Philippines Constabulary (PC), Korean Constabulary (KC) and other paramilitary police forces.¹²⁶ Within some of the primary literature the term 'gendamerie' is occasionally also employed with the same meaning, for example in this quotation from George Kennan (a senior State Department official), describing the requirements for internal security in Japan: 'a central, uniformed gendamerie or central constabulary comparable to the French Guard Mobile . . . would seem both desirable and suitable'.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ For more on the NPR's use of tanks see: Chapter 3, pp 188-192.

¹²⁵ Encarta, World English Dictionary [North American Edition], Microsoft Corporation, 2007.

¹²⁶ For more on constabularies before the NPR see: Chapter 2, pp 115-138.

¹²⁷ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) 9/4/1948, Annex: Memorandum of Detailed Comments on the Kennan Report, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI, p 729.

The basic North American definition provides a good starting point but it is necessary to further refine it, taking into account other theorists' ideas, in order to provide a satisfactory definition. This requirement is further enhanced due to certain historians and policing theorists using the term without any explicit definition, presumably relying on the standard American usage given above. Those using the term without a definition include Boot, Kataoka, The Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (History Studies Society), Watanabe and Uemura.¹²⁸ Mawby also gives no precise definition but lists the following identifying characteristics for paramilitary forces (basically identical to constabularies): light armament; police type training elements, uniform and rank structure; tactical deployment; links with the armed services; personnel transfers with the police; domestic ministerial responsibility; and police type disciplinary codes and living arrangements.¹²⁹ Perito builds upon this by defining constabularies as 'armed forces of a state that have both military capabilities and police powers'.¹³⁰ He also provides some characteristics which he sees as common to all constabularies: first the presence of police functions (e.g. traffic control, criminal investigations, public security, border and public order duties), and the assistance of the civil police in times of need, in 'patrolling, providing area security, staffing checkpoints' and intervening directly if events go beyond the capacity of the civil police.¹³¹ Perito also argues that constabularies are trained to function as part of the armed forces of states in wartime but in a secondary, subordinate role to those providing external security (usually the army). Within this situation a constabulary would function

¹²⁸ M. Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, Basic Books, New York, 2003, pp 115, 170, 178-179, 234-235, 244; Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution*, p 76; Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (History Studies Society) (ed), *Nihon Dōjidaishi 2: Sennryō Taisaku no Tennkan to Kōwa (Japan Contemporary History 2: The Peace Treaty and Change of Occupation Policies)*, Aoki Shoten, Tokyo, 1990, pp 100-101; M. Watanabe and H. Uemura, 'Keisatsuyōbitai no Henbō - Konsutabiyurari kara Bōeibutai e' (The Transformation of the NPR – From the Constabularies to the National Defense Corps), *Gunji Shigaku*, Vol. 43, No. 1, June 2007, p 36.

¹²⁹ R.I. Mawby, 'Approaches to Comparative Analysis: the Impossibility of Becoming an Expert on Everywhere', in R. I. Mawby, *Policing Across the World, Issues for the Twenty-first Century*, UCL Press, London, 1999, p 18.

¹³⁰ R.M. Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2004, p 46.

¹³¹ Ibid.

as mobile light infantry, operating behind the lines, on internal security duties.¹³² Building upon these contributions the specific definitions used in this study are as follows:

Constabulary

A paramilitary police occupying a middle tier between the civil police and an external security force (usually an army), tasked with an internal security mission confined to the territory of the state it serves and characterised by close contact and personnel transfers with the civil police, a membership subject to civil and not military law, equipped with light weapons and in possession of a number of clearly police-type characteristics, often including arrest powers.

Rearmament (of ground forces)

The complete political and organisational recreation of an explicitly named army, responsible, and equipped for, external security duties.

External Security

Security concerning direct state versus state conflict, usually conducted on a large scale between the regular uniformed forces of two or more states. Despite the term 'external', external security of a state can be contested both inside (usually defensive) or outside (usually offensive), a state.

Internal Security

Security concerning state versus non-state conflict or unrest, often on a small scale. These include state responses to indirect aggression by other states in

¹³² Ibid, p 47.

the form of guerrilla or irregular incursions, and a state's responses to internal challenges to its security such as demonstrations, rioting, uprisings, rebellion or revolution.

Army

A force with the domestically and internationally recognised function of providing external security for a state, including offensive military operations outside the borders of that state, being also equipped to do so and subject to a system of military justice.

Chapter One:

The JCP and the Domestic

Context of the Creation of the

NPR: 1945-1950

In keeping with the first primary aim of this study of showing the domestic influences on the NPR, this chapter illustrates the threat the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was perceived to represent to the internal security of Japan. This was a threat which was seen to require measures including the creation of the NPR. As noted in the introduction this topic has received almost no attention in English and virtually no studies link the NPR to the key domestic driver behind its creation, the JCP's campaign of violence. Also, in order to further reveal the Japanese influences on the force, the second main aim of the chapter is to show the Japanese conceptions of security which favoured a paramilitary police force or 'constabulary' as a defence against the perceived JCP threat. This examination of two of the central domestic influences on the NPR is split into two sections, the first dealing with the history of the JCP until the adoption of its 'military policy' in 1950, and the second examining the Japanese conceptions of internal security and the corresponding desire for an internal security constabulary. The first section of this chapter is largely contextual and elements of it do not explicitly or directly relate to the creation of the NPR but its inclusion is necessary to illustrate the growth of the perception of the JCP as a threat to the Japanese state; a threat which, to be successfully guarded against, required the creation of the NPR.

The early years of the Occupation of Japan found the country with a shattered economy, few prospects for recovery with a population whose wretched living conditions played into the hands of Japan's Communists. With the growth of the Communist dominated union movement, added to the influence of the Cold War and JCP election gains, the initial toleration of the JCP by GHQ shifted to a policy of outright hostility.¹ Underpinning this change in attitude was the perception amongst the authorities that the JCP threatened the internal security of Japan and that concerted measures were necessary to prevent Japan becoming communist.² Alongside the creation of the NPR, one of the most significant of these measures was the 'Red Purge' of late 1949 onwards.³ The 'Red Purge' remains a highly controversial topic with historians debating its legality and effects, opinions vary, although many historians are highly critical of the purge and its legacy.⁴ However, many of these accounts are flawed in that they neglect or even entirely omit the violent incidents of the summer of 1949 and the JCP's 'military policy' of 1950 onwards. Absence of these incidents in historical accounts gives an incomplete picture of events and simultaneously relieves the JCP of any measure of responsibility for its own fate. Without analysis or documentation of the existence of the incidents of the summer of 1949 and the military policy, the JCP moves from a group many in Japan had begun to see as a serious and active threat to internal security, to that of a 'victim' of 'reactionaries' within SCAP and the Japanese government, a passive actor depicted as having no influence over its own destiny and subject to the whim of its American overlord.

¹ J. Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p 39.

² For more on the value of Japan to the United States see: Chapter 2, pp 95-107.

³ C.H. Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan: It's Creation, 1951-1952*, Brill, Leiden, 2010, p 12.

⁴ T. Hirata and J. Dower, 'Japan's 'Red Purge': Lessons from a Saga of Suppression of Free Speech and Thought', *Japan Focus*, Oct 2003, pp 1-3; J. Dower, 'Reform and Reconsolidation', in H. Wray and H Conway (eds), *Japan Examined, Perspectives on Modern Japanese History*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p 350.

This approach both relieves the JCP of any blame and responsibility for its own actions and neglects the fact that many of the measures of the US were taken in response to the actions of the JCP and that the Occupation of Japan represented a discourse between various Japanese and American actors. Some of this distortion relates to the historiographical approaches of the scholars involved, who often seek to demonstrate the continuities between the pre-1945 and postwar Japanese states and use the 'Red Purge' as a key piece of evidence to justify their claims. These historians, including Dower, argue that the 'Red Purge' signalled the 'suppression of free speech and thought', made a 'mockery of the rule of law' and 'resulted not merely in an attack upon genuine democratic practice but also in a disregard of social well-being'.⁵ Japanese historians are also highly critical of the period, often viewing the 'Red Purge', with its removal of thousands of Left-leaning academics as a betrayal of early democratic promise of the Occupation and a direct attack on their academic freedom.⁶ In a good example of the strength of feeling held by many Japanese academics, Uyehara describes the 'Red Purge' as an 'ideological slaughter', comparing it to the ethnic cleansing of the Balkan wars of the 1990s.⁷

Although it seems that Uyehara and others push the point a little far, the 'Red Purge' was excessive and resulted in the unfair and often arbitrary dismissal of thousands largely on the basis of political affiliation. Nevertheless, as those political affiliations were with a party advocating, and arguable attempting to practice, the overthrow of the government by force the 'Red Purge' raises questions beyond the scope of this work as to whether anti-democratic measures such as mass sackings are justifiable, ethical, or even effective, against such a violent and similarly anti-democratic opponent. Despite the sacking of many genuinely innocent people, the Japanese government was not responsible for the majority of

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ M. Metzler, 'The Occupation', in W.M. Tsutsui (ed), *A Companion to Japanese History*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007, p 266.

⁷ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law*, p 13.

the cuts, with private industry making the largest reductions. In addition large numbers of these reductions were an economic necessity to trim down Japan's artificially inflated staff levels, loosen the paralysing grip of the highly powerful and largely militant union movement and steady a faltering economy.⁸ Moreover, the 'Red Purge' did not go as far as similar anti-Leftwing measures in other countries and did not result in the outright banning of the JCP. With this the full spectrum of political parties, survived in Japan to this day, which is more than can be said of Germany or even the United States.⁹ Furthermore, despite the validity of the claims that the purge disregarded the due legal process, this was often the case with Occupation-imposed directives. Critical historians also rarely mention the simultaneous lack of regard for the democratic process, the law or even the value of human life demonstrated by the JCP through its violent actions. Opinions such as that of Prime Minister Yoshida are instructive in that they also reveal the notion held by many at the time that the 'Red Purge' was necessary in order to prevent a communist revolution in Japan: 'these people were not dismissed because of their ideas or the simple circumstance that they were Communists, but because the policies and activities of the Japanese Communist Party were clearly of a destructive nature, menacing public safety'.¹⁰ These beliefs were also held by many members of the public, shocked by the events of the summer of 1949 and the international situation. For example, a work colleague of the future JCP 'guerrilla' Wakita Kenichi told him that, in his opinion the 'Red Purge' was 'necessary to prevent violent revolution'.¹¹

Clearly, the key to a clear and balanced appraisal of measures such as the 'Red Purge' is an examination of its causes rather than just its events and results. Chief amongst these causes, aside from the international

⁸ C. Johnson, *Conspiracy at Matsukawa*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972, p 50.

⁹ Of course, this did not include the most extreme pre-war Rightwing politicians who had already been purged by GHQ. Hirata and Dower, 'Japan's Red Purge', p 1.

¹⁰ S. Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, Rowan and Littlefield, Plymouth, 2007, p 188.

¹¹ K. Wakita, *Chōsen Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken, Sensōshi no Kuhaku wo Umeru (The Korean War and the Suita/Hirakata Incidents, Filling The Gaps in Postwar History)*, Akashi Shoten, Tokyo, 2005, p 77.

factors, was the threat to internal security the JCP was believed to represent.¹² In the minds of the authorities, this threat was seen to require action to be successfully warded off. Actions undertaken included a package of austerity measures designed to ultimately make the Japanese economy self-sufficient and hence alleviate the economic conditions which had assisted the Communists (the 'Dodge Line'), the 'Red Purge', and the bolstering of Japan's internal security forces, including the creation of the NPR.

The JCP's military campaign and the incidents of the summer of 1949 which preceded it are a highly neglected area of scholarship, especially in the English language, with the only major study of the events of 1949 being produced nearly forty years ago.¹³ The subject and its relation to the creation of the NPR are also marginalized in Japan, with the incidents representing an embarrassment to both the Left and Right. The JCP official history describes the military policy as a result of 'interference' and Stalin's 'great power chauvinist attitude', which forced the adoption of an 'ultra-left adventurist line which stressed the construction of mountain-village strongholds, the self-defense struggle and the self-defense organizations . . . that disregarded the actual Japanese situation'.¹⁴ Presidium Chairman of the JCP and Diet member Fuwa Tetsuo also attempts to distance his party from the military campaign and shift responsibility for it to Stalin and the USSR: 'it was a Stalin-type policy - proposed by him and produced with his participation under his direction'.¹⁵ The prevailing negative depiction of the 'Red Purge' and its eclipse of the JCP military policy coupled with the controversy surrounding the NPR

¹² For more on the international factors behind the NPR's creation see: Chapter 2.

¹³ Johnson, *Conspiracy*.

¹⁴ Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, *Sixty Year History of Japanese Communist Party*, Japan Press Service, Tokyo, 1984, pp 165, 182.

¹⁵ T. Fuwa, *Interference and Betrayal, Japanese Communist Party Fights Back against Soviet Hegemonism*, Soviet Secret Documents, Japan Press Service, Tokyo, 1994, p 474.

make it very difficult for Japanese historians to analyse either, except in highly critical terms, without becoming the subject of public criticism.¹⁶

Likewise, within western scholarship the subject remains neglected. For example, one of the foremost studies of the international context of the Korean War, Stueck's 370-page *The Korean War, An International History*, contains a mere two lines about the JCP military policy.¹⁷ Furthermore, there are very few complete examinations of the JCP between 1945 and 1955, and even fewer written after the 1960s. Moreover, even fewer of these were not produced as part of the wider American anti-communist Cold War effort.¹⁸ Those studies which do exist usually analyse the JCP in the context of other events such as the 'Red Purge' or the labour movement and do not explicitly focus on the JCP itself.¹⁹ Also, as noted by Metzler, even the more contemporary and sympathetic analyses of the JCP often ignore its Leninist character and the role of the Cominform.²⁰ Clearly, any examination of this subject and its connection to the creation of the NPR requires a detailed analysis of the events of 1949 onwards and the responses they provoked from the authorities. This study will do this as it is fundamental to the first main aim of the work.

The availability and use of primary sources on the JCP during this period also present challenges, a fact which also explains some of the neglect of the subject. The first problem, well highlighted by Garthoff is that intelligence material is rarely used by historians. Garthoff cites four clearly unjustified principal reasons behind this deliberate neglect: unfamiliarity with the sources, unfamiliarity with the subject, the view that intelligence represents an overspecialised niche beyond their remit, and the belief that

¹⁶ K. Hasegawa, 'Student Soldiers, The Japanese Communist Party's "Period of Extreme Leftist Adventurism"', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, p 43.

¹⁷ W. Stueck, *The Korean War, An International History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p 35.

¹⁸ Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 271.

¹⁹ R. Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan, International Communism in Action 1919-1951*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1952; H. Oinas-Kukkonen, *Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, Changing U.S. Attitudes towards the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944-1947*, Greenwood Press, London, 2003.

²⁰ Metzler, 'The Occupation', p 271.

the use of such sources is not quite academically respectable.²¹ Perhaps all four are reflected in the scholarship of the NPR and JCP, and the use of, and critical engagement with, intelligence sources from the GHQ archives represents another original aspect of this work.

A further issue with the use of such sources is the nature of the subject matter. At this stage the JCP had begun to become a highly secretive organisation and due to this, much of the material available on this period comes from the Japanese police and Occupation intelligence agencies. The agendas, policies and politics of these security services influenced their positions, and as Jenkins argues, 'it is impossible to understand the problems of unrest or illegality which a particular society encounters unless we know the nature and structure of the agencies assessing such threats and their particular interests in giving the picture they do'.²² Jenkins' point is an apt one and hints at some of the political and personal motivations which may have influenced the portrayal of the level of Communist threat to Japan. Jenkins' argument also helps us appreciate the opposite deduction: that it is impossible to understand the internal security agencies of a state (including the NPR) without reference to internal conditions of that state. This underlines the validity of the first main aim of this study, in that it is impossible to truly know the NPR without reference to its perceived opponent, the JCP.

A further interesting point is raised by Cohen (the head of the labour division of Government Section during the early years of the Occupation) when he states his belief that 'it is the nature of security officers to be suspicious, to think the worst of everyone, and to give more weight to security needs than fairness'.²³ The important question this raises is whether the very nature of internal security forces makes them

²¹ R.L. Garthoff, 'Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2004, p 21.

²² P. Jenkins, 'Policing the Cold War: The Emergence of New Police Structures in Europe 1946-1953', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1988, p 141.

²³ T. Cohen, *Remaking Japan, the American Occupation as New Deal*, Free Press, New York, 1987, p 93.

institutionally paranoid especially when dealing with secretive 'opponents'. Internal security forces often end up seeing threats everywhere and exaggerating them when they do, as a result of their opponents' secrecy, but also to fulfil their mission and hence justify their continued existence, funding and favour. The latter being a particular concern amongst agencies with overlapping jurisdictions such as existed in Occupied Japan (such as CIC, G2 and the CIA).²⁴ Nevertheless, if we attempt to employ an objective perspective on the sources and try to examine the raw intelligence material, free from analysis and editorial influence, much useful information can be drawn from the GHQ documents. Furthermore, the use of intelligence reports on the same subject from rival intelligence services such as the CIA and G2 can also help highlight some of the misleading or erroneous content of such material. This study also seeks to employ actual JCP material as far as possible, as this is a way of largely avoiding some of these pitfalls. Nevertheless despite these drawbacks, it remains true that perspectives, even if inaccurate, inform policy. Policymakers are only able to act on what they know or see, or more accurately, what they think they know or see.

The JCP 1945-1950: 'Peaceful Revolution' to 'Military Policy'

Following Japan's collapse in 1945, the Communist party rose, phoenix like, from the ashes of near political extinction. The removal of its staunchest Rightwing opponents, its legalisation and the release of all political prisoners by SCAP revitalised the Party.²⁵ The dire economic

²⁴ Garthoff, 'Foreign Intelligence', p 37.

²⁵ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directives to the Japanese Government (SCAPINs), (SCA-1), SCAPIN 550, 'Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office', 4/1/1946, Reel 2; SCA-1, SCAPIN 93, 'Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties', 4/10/1945, Reel 2; Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, Washington, Vol. II, 1949, pp 463-5, hereafter PRJ; J.A.A. Stockwin, 'The JCP in the Sino-Soviet Dispute- From Neutrality to Alignment?', *The Disintegrating Monolith*, 1965, in J.A.A. Stockwin, *Collected Writings of J.A.A Stockwin*, Japan Library, London, 2004, p 100; M.E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968*, Columbia University

conditions, booming labour movement and the fact that the Communists were one of the very few political groups which had no links with the previous regime saw membership soar (see table I).²⁶ Under the leadership of Tokuda Kyuichi and guided by the theories of Nozaka Sanzo, the JCP sought to exploit the conditions and discontent it found in Japan by adopting a policy of 'peaceful revolution' and an image of a 'lovable Communist Party'. Under this policy, labour and union activities and an effort to achieve revolution via the ballot box, rather than through violent means, were pursued.²⁷

Table I. Estimated JCP Membership, 1945-55²⁸

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Members</u>
1945	1,000
1949	150,000
1955	20,000

These tactics proved effective and in the elections of 23 January 1949 the JCP won nearly 10% of the total ballot, almost 3 million votes, and saw their seats grow from 4 to 35, an all time peak (see table II and figure I).²⁹ Results in urban constituencies were even more favourable, with, for example, the JCP polling 22% of the vote in Osaka.³⁰ The party had gained huge prestige from the looming Communist Chinese victory across the East China Sea and the unpopular 1947-48 Socialist coalition

Press, New York, 1971, p 34; J.A.A. Stockwin, 'The Communist Party of Japan, The Problems of Communism', 1967, in J.A.A. Stockwin, *Collected Writings of J.A.A Stockwin*, Japan Library, London, 2004, p 125.

²⁶ H.B. Schonberger, 'American Labour's Cold War in Occupied Japan', *Diplomatic History*, Vol.3, No.3, 1979, p 253.

²⁷ H.E. Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo, The Occupation and its Aftermath*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1954, p 278.

²⁸ Based on Figures from, H.N. Kim, 'Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party Under Kenji Miyamoto', *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, p 298.

²⁹ Stockwin, *The JCP in the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, p 101; Elections For the House of Representatives, 1946-55, printed in, J.A.A. Stockwin, *Dictionary of The Modern Politics of Japan*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003, pp 72-73.

³⁰ H.S. Quigley and J.E. Turner, *The New Japan, Government and Politics*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1956, p 271.

government made many on the Left vote Communist in 1949.³¹ Poor economic conditions and rumours about the forthcoming economic stabilisation measures and the mass sackings which would inevitably ensue also pushed many to vote for the only party which seemed to offer a viable alternative.³²

Table II. The JCP in Elections for the House of Representatives, 1946-1953³³

<u>Election</u>	<u>Total Vote (Rounded)</u>	<u>Total Vote %</u>	<u>Seats</u>	<u>Total Seats %</u>
Apr 1946	2,136,000	3.8	5	0.7
Apr 1947	1,003,000	3.7	4	0.6
Jan 1949	2,985,000	9.8	35	4.8
Oct 1952	897,000	2.5	0	0
Apr 1953	600,000	1.9	0	0

One of the key factors in the JCP's election success was the fact that after five years of occupation Japan's economic conditions had hardly improved: inflation, shortages and the general economic malaise continued, with some Occupation measures even worsening conditions. Washington and GHQ both saw that change was needed and in early 1949 Republican senator and president of the bank of Detroit, Joseph Dodge, was dispatched on a special mission to prevent Japan becoming a permanent economic ward of the United States and alleviate the

³¹ Stockwin, *The JCP in the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, p 101.

³² H.H. Baerwald, 'The Japanese Communist Party, Yoyogi and Its Rivals', in RA Scalapino (ed), *The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1969, p 215.

³³ Based on Figures in Kim, *Deradicalization*, p 297. The large number of votes, seemingly not reflected in the percentage of votes in 1946 is due to the very high election turnout (75%), hundreds of small political parties taking part and electoral constituency reform in 1947, see Oinas-Kukkonen, *Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility*, p 53; E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, Continuum, 2002, pp 263-265.

conditions which were proving a boon to the JCP.³⁴ Dodge laid out a rigidly conservative nine-point plan of halting inflation by pegging the yen to the dollar, letting businesses sink or swim on their own merit, halting reparations and *Zaibatsu* (large industrial conglomerates) dissolution, and balancing the government's budget through the shedding of hundreds of thousands of public sector jobs.³⁵ Although most of GHQ hoped for the best, doubt remained whether Japan could ever recover, with a State Department report stating that Japan 'might' attain self supporting status (i.e. not propped up by US aid) in 1954/55, and with Joseph Dodge and General Marquat (head of Economic and Scientific Section) doubting that this would ever be possible due to Japan's vast trade imbalance and rapid population growth.³⁶

The personnel reductions spread to the private sector and around three million people lost their jobs in 1949. The cutbacks were also used to reduce the power of the unions and Communists, with many JCP members jettisoned in the first mass sackings.³⁷ The Japanese National Railways (JNR), with one of the biggest and most radical unions in Japan, was first and hardest hit, losing almost 100,000 staff in ten days in early July.³⁸ Resulting from these reductions, the JCP grassroots' desire for action, and the sense amongst the JCP leadership that the time was right to probe the resolve of the Yoshida government, what later became known as the 'bloody summer' of 1949 began.

³⁴ H.B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War, Americans and the Remaking of Japan 1945-1952*, Kent State University Press, London, 1989, pp 201-205.


³⁵ Schonberger, *American Labour's Cold War*, p 263.

³⁶ Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, (YF-A10), Subject File, 1945-51, *Miscellaneous State Department Material*, 'Japanese Economic Prospects' 4/8/49, Reel 11, pp 10-11.

³⁷ Schonberger, *American Labour's Cold War*, p 263.

³⁸ Johnson, *Conspiracy*, pp 1-2.

Figure I. The JCP in the House of Representatives 1946-1952³⁹



The events of the summer of 1949 marked the beginnings of direct militant action by the JCP. The incidents also heightened perceptions within GHQ and the Japanese government that the JCP posed a threat to Japan's infrastructure serious enough to necessitate further strengthening of the internal security forces. Even before the 'Dodge Line' programme passed in the Diet, some members of GHQ were worried about its potential impact on political stability. Chester Hepler, the acting chief of the Labour Division, warned Dodge of the danger of strikes and the 'dangerous social, political and economic consequences' of the economic stabilisation programme, but Dodge and others ignored his advice and pressed on whilst supporting the 'Red Purge' and the repression of the resulting wildcat strikes.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, Hepler's predictions proved accurate and, as Aldous notes, the programme of economic stabilisation 'provoked social unrest,

³⁹ Based on figures in, Kim, *Deradicalization*, p 298; Elections For the House of Representatives, 1946-55, printed in, Stockwin, *Dictionary of The Modern Politics of Japan*, pp 72-73.

⁴⁰ Schonberger, *American Labour's Cold War*, pp 263-4.

sabotage and subversion'.⁴¹ The initial cuts and the looming threat of more resulted in 'amateur revolution-making' by the JCP's grassroots members.⁴² The Taira incident in particular stressed that the Japanese civil police might be unable to cope if faced with full-scale, organised unrest. The capture of a police station and the town it policed (the Taira Incident), the apparent assassination of a senior government figure (the JNR President), and the destruction of two trains and the resulting deaths and injuries (the Matsukawa and Mitaka incidents) heightened the perception of many in GHQ and the Japanese government of the threat that Japan faced from the JCP.⁴³

The incidents and the heightened perception of the JCP threat also prompted the simultaneous perception of the requirement for the means to cope with similar events in the future through the strengthening of Japan's internal security forces. Alongside calls for a constabulary force, the labour troubles and train wrecking gave further strength to demands from parts of GHQ and the Japanese government for the reversal of the previous policy of police decentralisation through the amalgamation of the new, small and often feeble Municipal Police units into the National Rural Police.⁴⁴

The end of the summer of 1949 did not mark the end of worsening relations between the JCP and the authorities. The JCP had used the waves of discontent triggered by the economic stabilisation measures to attempt to position itself as the champion of nationalism and peace in the face of American and Japanese 'imperialist monopoly capitalism'.⁴⁵ The more radical tone of the JCP's propaganda and its increasingly lawless attitude further added to the concerns of the authorities and prompted moves to clamp down on its activities. In response to the JCP's seemingly

⁴¹ C. Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan, Control, Corruption and Resistance to Reform*, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, London, 1997, p 203.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Appendix I. 'The Shimoyama, Taira, Mitaka and Matsukawa Incidents'.

⁴⁴ Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, p 146. For more on the concerns over the civil police see: Appendix III. 'Yoshida to MacArthur, Letter on Police Reform/Recentralisation, 6 August 1949'; Appendix IV. 'The Weakness of the Japanese Civil Police in Occupied Japan'.

⁴⁵ Stockwin, *The Communist Party of Japan*, p 126.

violent reaction to the Dodge line, at this point more formal anti-Communist moves began to take place, in a phase later christened the 'Red Purge'. Despite the increased pressure on the Communists through police raids and a simultaneous reduction in their control over the unions, the JCP still managed to achieve some successes, such as the April 1950 election to governor of Kyoto of Ninagawa Torazō, who proceeded to vigorously and publicly denounce the conservative politics of the Yoshida Cabinet.⁴⁶

However, the sands within GHQ were shifting and the notion that the JCP was largely independent of Moscow and should be treated as a normal law abiding political party were swiftly eroding.⁴⁷ From the incidents of 1949 onwards there was increasing concern amongst both the Japanese government and GHQ over the links the JCP had to Moscow and whether its new violent tactics were the result of orders from the USSR.⁴⁸ Yoshida was also concerned as to whether the JCP was possibly preparing for a revolution by force, and over the JCP's attempts to create a rift between Japan and the US through increasingly radical and subversive propaganda.⁴⁹

Furthermore, with the departure of most of the progressive or socialist civilians within GHQ from 1946 onwards the vast majority of those who remained in the organisation were either military men or conservative civilians, most of whom shared a deep antipathy to communism.⁵⁰ This shifting balance of political opinion influenced the perception of the JCP within GHQ, helping to frame it as a threat to Japan's internal security.

⁴⁶ K.E. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation, Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988, p 82.

⁴⁷ The Intelligence Series, Vol. 3-2, *Operations of Military Intelligence Section*, GHQ, SWPA/FEC/SCAP, Tokyo 1951, (ISG-1, Vol. 3-2), Documentary Appendices, 'CIS Periodical Summary 1946-48' 15/1/48, p 5.

⁴⁸ The Rastarov incident of 1954 seemed to confirm that the Soviets were financing the JCP in this period, and possibly directing or influencing some of their actions and policies. Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies*, pp 163-164, 295 note 65. For more on the Rastarov incident see: Chapter 4, pp 263-264.

⁴⁹ Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, p 147.

⁵⁰ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, p 93.

The perception of the JCP as a threat can be seen in GHQ documents such as Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) reports which began to claim that 'the Japanese communist party have become a dangerous subversive force operating against the democratisation of Japan'.⁵¹ CIS also characterised the JCP in the same 1949 report as 'well trained, fully indoctrinated obstructionists' and 'a menace to all duly constituted democratic authority'.⁵² The seriousness of the threat the JCP was viewed to pose can also be seen in attempts by the ultra-conservative head of G2, General Charles Willoughby, to prevent the reduction of CIS, and even to expand it, in the face of GHQ cuts.⁵³ Although dating from 1948, a further CIS document reveals the threat to internal security a more militant JCP was thought to present: 'the real danger of communism in Japan does not lie in political success but in the traditional technique of creating disorder, [and] seizing the government by force as in the case of Russia, China, other countries where communists have come to power'.⁵⁴

Plans for a purge of leading Communists from public office were drawn up and swiftly enacted after a group of US soldiers who had been observing and photographing a large Communist demonstration outside the Imperial palace in Tokyo were badly beaten and thrown into the moat on 30 May 1950.⁵⁵ In his memoirs Yoshida cited what he saw as clear links between this event and the JCP's move towards violent revolution:

Japan's communists came out openly for revolution by force, and held what was termed a 'rally for the rising of the people' in the outer grounds of the Imperial palace in Tokyo, in the course of which several officers and enlisted men of the U.S. Occupation forces were injured. This incident seriously alarmed both the

⁵¹ The Intelligence Series, Vol. 9, *Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section*, GHQ, FEC & SCAP, Tokyo, 1949, (ISG-1, Vol. 9), p 140.

⁵² Ibid, p 109.

⁵³ ISG-1, Vol. 3-2, Documentary Appendices, 'CIS Special Report: Security, Surveillance and Public Safety in Japan', p 8.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 'CIS Periodical Summary 1946-48', 15/1/48, p sum 1.

⁵⁵ Calder, *Crisis and Compensation*, p 80, Johnson, *Conspiracy*, p 204; Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law*, pp 11-12.

Japanese Cabinet and General MacArthur's headquarters resulting in a purge of JCP leadership and *Akahata* ban.⁵⁶

On 6 and 7 June SCAP directed that the entire Communist Party central committee and seventeen employees of the JCP newspaper *Akahata* be purged under SCAPIN 550, the directive originally used to remove ultra-nationalists and militarists from office.⁵⁷ Under this and subsequent uses of SCAPIN 550, the JCP also lost thirteen of its Diet seats, as most of its upper echelons were purged.⁵⁸ Under the purge the JCP's leaders were banned from engaging in any form of political activity and had to report to the police regularly. However, the leadership swiftly disappeared underground and many escaped into exile in the USSR and Communist China.⁵⁹

The flight of the JCP's upper strata, despite a series of major police raids aimed at capturing them, cast further doubt in the minds of the Japanese and American authorities over the reliability of the police. This failure also increased fears that the civil police had been infiltrated by the JCP and had tipped off the Communists in advance, as was argued by Occupation reports at the time.⁶⁰ The escape of the JCP leadership again highlighted and strengthened the demand for a centrally directed and reliable constabulary force capable of taking on jobs considered too dangerous or sensitive to be left to the civil police.⁶¹ The disappearance of the leadership also revealed the widespread underground party organisation the JCP had been developing in anticipation of a government crackdown, an organisation based around an espionage style cell structure and one

⁵⁶ Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, p 76.

⁵⁷ Government Section (GS) (B) 1751, MacArthur to Yoshida, 6/6/50; SCA-1, SCAPIN 550, 4/1/1946, Reel 2; *Nippon Times*, 6-10/6/1950.

⁵⁸ L.J. Schoppa, *International Cooperation Despite Domestic Conflict: Japanese Politics and the San Francisco Treaties*, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in New Orleans, 24-27/3/2002, note 17.

⁵⁹ Johnson, *Conspiracy*, pp 204-205.

⁶⁰ Technical Section (TS) 301, District of Tokyo Report 144, 21/7/50; TS 301, District of Tokyo Report 146, 22/7/50; Swearingen and Langer, *Red Flag*, p 251.

⁶¹ For more on the concerns over the civil police see: Appendix III. 'Yoshida to MacArthur, Letter on Police Reform/Recentralisation, 6 August 1949'; Appendix IV. 'The Weakness of the Japanese Civil Police in Occupied Japan'.

designed to maintain secrecy as far as possible. The underground party organisation included thousands of secret members, cells attempting to infiltrate the police (and later NPR), and cells which participated in sabotage operations and guerrilla style attacks.⁶² The perceived threat to internal security from these underground JCP units and the waves of strikes and unrest wracking the country prompted some of the most afflicted prefectures to take measures into their own hands to ensure domestic stability, such as Yamaguchi which created its own constabulary style 'Special Anti-Riot Police' unit to deal with the increasing number of Communist related violent incidents.⁶³

The 'Red Purge' as it came to be known, also encompassed the largely unjustified and excessive removal of tens of thousands of alleged radicals, unionists, and socialists from their posts in both the public and private sectors and was accompanied by promotion of the 'Anti-communist Democratization League' (*Mindō*) and other anti-communist union movements. Unions themselves declined in number by 5,000 and their membership by more than 800,000 in 1949.⁶⁴ Despite the disruption of the purge, the JCP's covert and overt wings kept publishing magazines, wall newspapers and increasingly radical pamphlets. These were produced by the JCP's underground cells and distributed both covertly to other cells, and overtly to the public. As the JCP felt it had little to lose and that its objectives were best served through direct attacks on the Occupation and Japanese government, previous concerns about censorship and legal constraints were ignored and illegal, direct criticism of the Occupation was a principal feature of propaganda in this period.⁶⁵

⁶² GS(B) 4002, Leftist Koreans in Japan and the Underground Organisation of the Japanese Communist Party, 13/3/51; ISG-1, Vol. 3-2, Documentary Appendices, 'CIS Periodical Summary 1946-48', 15/1/48, p 6.

⁶³ J. Shoji, *Chōsen Sensō to Nihon no Taiō - Yamaguchiken wo Jirei to Shite, [The Korean War and the Japanese Response: A Case Study of Yamaguchi Prefecture]*, Bōei Kenkyūsho Kiyo [NIDS Security Studies] Vol. 8, No. 3, Mar 2006, p 42.

⁶⁴ *Nippon Times*, 11/6/50, 9/8/50, 2/9/50, 25/11/50, 6/2/1951; Schonberger, *American Labour's Cold War*, p 264.

⁶⁵ See Figure XXXIII.' Illegal JCP Propaganda Hand Bill, Summer 1950', Chapter 4, p 267.

However, the JCP's mass propaganda effort suffered a serious blow with the suspension of the publication of *Akahata* two days after the outbreak of the Korean War after printing a large photograph of Kim il Sung and text of his radio address calling on South Koreans to support the North's invasion.⁶⁶ Despite the crackdown and purge, SCAP stopped short of outlawing the JCP, a move pressed for by many Japanese and American conservatives. A ban was avoided due to the fear that if one were introduced the JCP would disappear entirely underground, becoming much harder to monitor. GHQ was also unwilling to set the dangerous precedent of banning a political party in a country where it was meant to be resurrecting democracy.⁶⁷

Whilst events in Japan were propelling the JCP towards recourse to violence in the face of the 'Red Purge' and the curtailing of the arenas of politics in which it could participate, the JCP also came under pressure from Moscow to turn to violence.⁶⁸ On 6 January 1950 the Cominform newspapers *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* and *Bulletin* printed an article severely criticising the JCP and Nozaka's peaceful revolution tactics. The text, an editorial penned by the anonymous 'Observer', contained vitriolic condemnation of Nozaka and his 'peaceful revolution' theory:

Nozaka's "theory" has nothing whatever in common to Marxism-Leninism. . . [It] is an anti-democratic, anti-Socialist theory. It serves only the Imperialist occupiers in Japan and the enemies of independence ...The Nozaka "theory" is simultaneously an anti-patriotic and anti-Japanese "theory".⁶⁹

⁶⁶ *Akahata*, 27/6/1950; Swearingen and Langer, *Red Flag*, pp 240-241.

⁶⁷ TS 296, Memorandum: Outlawing the JCP, 6/6/51; H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 1: 1947-1952*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (hereafter YF-A16), 2B-87, Memo of Conversation, Okazaki and Sebald, 13/6/50.

⁶⁸ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law*, p 164.

⁶⁹ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, (Bucharest. Organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties), 6/1/50.

This public rejection of the 'peaceful revolution' approach, which had served the JCP somewhat successfully until 1949, shocked the party leadership who initially refused to recognise or act on the criticism.⁷⁰ However, the call for an adjustment of the JCP's direction was reinforced eleven days later with an article with similar, if slightly milder, content appearing in an editorial in the *Remin Ribao*, an organ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in which the hope was expressed 'that the Japanese Communist Party will take appropriate steps to correct Nozaka's mistakes'.⁷¹ These criticisms, added to a reprint in *Pravda* of a speech by Liu Shaoqi, which stated that the Chinese method of armed struggle was the path of all Asian countries (including Korea and Japan) to communism, amounted to a concerted, public effort by Stalin to decisively shift the policy of the JCP to one of overt violence.⁷² Despite initial disbelief, the JCP leadership accepted the situation and Nozaka issued a 'self-criticism' explaining his actions and errors, confessing that he was wrong to have thought that a people's government could be achieved through the ballot box, and publicly endorsing the new 'military' policy of the JCP.⁷³

This external change of policy triggered a period of factional struggle within the JCP and radical Left in Japan which was to last for decades. The JCP initially split into two factions. The 'Mainstream' faction led by Tokuda and Nozaka accepted Stalin's criticism but wanted to pursue the military policy in moderation, not provoking the US too quickly, allowing themselves time to expand the party's underground wing and to retain some of the gains made during the 'lovable' period. This was opposed by the 'Internationalist' faction, led by Miyamoto Kenji, which advocated a

⁷⁰ H. Wada, 'The Korean War, Stalin's Policy and Japan', *Social Science Japan Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1998, p 16.

⁷¹ *Remin Ribao* 17/1/50; R.C. Thornton, *Odd Man Out, Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War*, Brassey's, Washington DC, 2001, p 83.

⁷² *Pravda*, 4/1/50; Wada, *The Korean War, Stalin's Policy and Japan*, p 15; Appendix II, 'Stalin and the Cominform Criticism'.

⁷³ J.K. Emmerson, 'The Japanese Communist Party after Fifty Years', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 7, 1972, p 569.

hard-line, rigid acceptance of the Cominform programme.⁷⁴ This split, coupled with the 'Red Purge' and the flight of much of the top tier of the party, largely paralysed the overt central party leadership during much of 1950 and 1951. The crisis of leadership and internal factional struggles eventually led to the internationalist faction temporarily seceding from the JCP, although it subsequently returned to the fold under Chinese and Soviet pressure. The internationalists eventually conceded control of the JCP to the mainstream, but in doing so, and through their resistance to Mainstream policy, they succeeded in forcing party policy in a far more radical direction than that it had travelled prior to the Cominform criticism. Nevertheless, this factional struggle consumed much of the energies of the JCP in this period and weakened both the leadership and its central control over the policy of violence.⁷⁵

Following the adoption of the 'military line' (*Gunji Rosen*) laid out in the Cominform criticism, the JCP began to adopt increasingly violent tactics aimed at disrupting the infrastructure and military manufacturing capacity of Japan and eventually aiming at the overthrow of the Yoshida government and the eventual establishment of a Communist government by force. A further short-term aim was to contribute directly to the communist war effort in Korea. This was to be achieved by tying up as many US tactical troops as possible in putting down disturbances in Japan and by impeding the ability of Japan to supply the US/UN troops through disrupting its infrastructure and its ability to manufacture arms and supplies. The contribution they sought to make to the Korean conflict helped recruit and motivate many radical Koreans, who, with students, formed the core of many of the JCP's 'military' units.⁷⁶ One of the principal tactics adopted was that of sabotage, particularly against the railways, the central pillar of Japan's mass transport system. Attempts were also made

⁷⁴ Kim, *Deradicalization*, pp 275-276; Stockwin, *The JCP in the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, p 101.

⁷⁵ J. Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1985, p 224.

⁷⁶ K. Hasegawa, *Zengakuren and Post War Student Radicalism 1945-1960*, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Yokohama National University 2007, p 78.

to disrupt the ports and shipyards supplying materials and shipping for the logistical support of the US/UN war effort in Korea.⁷⁷ Notable incidents of supposed sabotage recorded by the Japanese police and GHQ are numerous. For example they include a reported plan by a Korean JCP cell to derail a train between Haenosaki and Sasebo city stations in Nagasaki prefecture on around 1 May 1950 with stolen dynamite, a move which was apparently thwarted through the authorities discreetly moving all available railway security guards to the area.⁷⁸ A case of suspected train sabotage was reported on 13 July 1950 at Mitsuseki in Yuzawa, Akita prefecture, but, as often occurred, the Civil Transport Section of GHQ (CTS) did not receive official confirmation from the Japanese National Railways (JNR), who dealt with the matter through the local police.⁷⁹

Clearly the authorities believed the supposed sabotage to be a genuine problem. Evidence of the seriousness with which the authorities took the sabotage campaign and the need they felt for an adequately armed constabulary force capable of protecting Japan's crucial infrastructure can be seen through the contact between the Chief of the JNR's security guards and the head of CTS. The Chief of the JNR's security guards, Kitamura, and head of CTS (land) D.R. Changnon met to discuss anticipated sabotage in multiple locations on 1 May 1950.⁸⁰ Kitamura argued that his men only had clubs and no arrest powers and that although their presence could deter possible saboteurs, the fact they would have to wait for the National Rural Police to come and arrest them would mean any who had been caught could probably escape. Kitamura promised to put his men on twenty-four hour watches in the suspected target areas but noted: 'under the present circumstances . . . the security guards of the J.N.R would prove effective only to a very limited degree'. Changnon and later H.T. Miller, head of CTS, agreed that there was a

⁷⁷ S. Yoshida, 'Japan and the Crisis in Asia', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1951, p 176.

⁷⁸ Civil Transport Section (CTS) 1438, G2 to CTS, 'Possible Sabotage Attempt', 27/4/50.

⁷⁹ CTS 1438, Memo of Conference, in Re: Suspected Sabotage at Mitsuseki on the Main Line, 13/7/1950.

⁸⁰ CTS 1438, Memo of Conference, in Re: Anticipated Sabotage – J.N.R, 28/4/50.

need to explore supplying some of the more reliable security guards with firearms.⁸¹ The concerns over the sabotage campaign and the perceived need to take adequate measures to counteract it, including the strengthening of the security forces, were also manifested by a focus on the problem by the GHQ intelligence arms, the Japanese Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) and the police, including the compilation of a monthly report on alleged sabotage activities from the outbreak of the Korean War onwards.⁸²

These reports are instructive in revealing some of the major incidents attributed to the JCP which occurred during the campaign such as the loss of two F80c fighter bombers and their pilots on takeoff and the damaging of another plane from 8 to 15 April at Itazuke Air Force base due to deliberately contaminated water injection mixtures. Other incidents recorded involved the cutting of telephone lines at multiple points and the removal of sixty yards of cable at the US military base Camp Hagen, Aomori, and track damage resulting in the derailment of an engine and baggage car of a ten coach express in Kamigawa, Hokkaido on 17 May 1950.⁸³

A recurring crime, which may or may not have been committed by Communists, was the widespread theft of large amounts of telephone wire due to the inability of GHQ and the police to protect it and the inflated price of copper due to the Korean War.⁸⁴ The theft and sale of such wire on the black market may have proved a boon to the JCP's beleaguered finances, whilst simultaneously contributing to the sabotage campaign.⁸⁵ The CTS reports are useful but the fact that they rely largely upon Japanese press and police sources for much of their information means that some inaccuracies may have crept in. However, this could also mean

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² CTS 1074, *Alleged Sabotage Activities in Japan* (May 1951), 2/6/51.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.


⁸⁵ J.P. Napier, *A Survey of the Japanese Communist Party*, Nippon Times, Tokyo, 1952, p 60.

that the number of minor incidents which were not reported might be even greater, as local police forces were severely overstretched and the production of extra reports and their translation and dispatch to GHQ in Tokyo may have been seen by many as a waste of time. It should also be noted that many of these incidents may not have been sabotage conducted by JCP cells, but as is illustrated in table III and figure II, the authorities believed that they were and hence they still contributed to the policy responses to the alleged sabotage, including the creation of the NPR.

Table III. Number of Alleged Sabotage Incidents Recorded by CTS, July 1950 to May 1951⁸⁶

	Major	Minor	Total
Acts against Allies and Japanese Police	41	141	182
Railway and Railway Communication Sabotage	64	531	595
Telephone and Power Line Sabotage	13	185	198
Miscellaneous	11	44	55
Total	129	901	1030
Grand Total for 11 Months	1030		

Figure II. Total Number of Sabotage Incidents, July 1950 to May 1951



⁸⁶ Statistics taken from CTS 1074, Alleged Sabotage Activities in Japan (May 1951), 2/6/51.

As can be seen in figure II, the number of alleged sabotage incidents recorded by CTS from July 1950 to May 1951 was quite significant, amounting to just over three incidents per day over an eleven month period. The majority of incidents were railway and communications sabotage, actions which ranged from damage to rolling stock to derailments. However, rail sabotage by placing objects on, or damaging of, the track (as was the case at Matsukawa) was one of the biggest crimes and the main areas of activity were Hokkaido and Tokyo.⁸⁷ Combining the railway and power and telephone categories, shows that 77% of the alleged attacks were directed at the infrastructure of Japan. This overwhelming incidence of the supposed targeting of infrastructure would have helped substantiate the belief of the authorities that general orders from the JCP's upper echelons/command cells were issued for the deliberate obstruction of the war effort in Korea through attacks on Japan's ability to transport and manufacture material to support the UN war effort.⁸⁸

As has been demonstrated in this section, the Japanese state believed it faced a real threat from the JCP, especially after the Cominform criticism and the open adoption of violence by the JCP.⁸⁹ It is important to make clear that although Yoshida and others did have genuine concerns over the threat from the JCP, historians such as Dower have highlighted the fact Yoshida occasionally employed the JCP and those he termed 'Leftists' in GHQ as vehicles for blame or to hide his own failures and shortcomings, just as he had in pre-war and wartime Japan by blaming militarists and 'red fascists'.⁹⁰ Indeed, the willingness of Yoshida to use the perceived JCP threat for his own political advantage is well illustrated

⁸⁷ CTS 1074, 'Alleged Sabotage Activities in Japan' (May 1951), 2/6/51.

⁸⁸ E. Takemae, *Sengo Rōdō Kaikaku, GHQ Rōdō Seisakushi (Postwar Labor Reform in Japan, History of GHQ Labor Policy)*, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, Tokyo, 1995, pp 368, 386; Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan*, p 288, note 81.

⁸⁹ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law*, p 21.

⁹⁰ J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, London, 1988, p 9.

through his covert promotion of demonstrations during later peace negotiations, as detailed by Igarashi Takeshi.⁹¹ Despite this, it would be naïve to think that the JCP were seen as simply tools of, or a passive threat to, the Yoshida government.

The JCP were also believed to be trying to exploit the Japanese elite's desire for a rigid anti-communist crackdown and perhaps sought to provoke one in order to win international sympathy and discredit the Yoshida government. The British Attaché to Japan, Esler Denning, argued that the Japanese leadership had an anachronistic conception of Communism which helped some in power advance their reactionary policies, but which if taken to extremes could might play into the hands of the JCP:

There is no evidence the Government really understands the nature of communism to-day or appreciates its subtleties or its manoeuvres. In the past, the Japanese method of dealing with communism was police action and that being so the natural reaction of the government to any manifestations of violence is to give itself more powers to suppress them. It is apparently unconscious of the fact of doing so it is advancing the aims of the Japanese Communist Party [sic].⁹²

The events detailed in this section had a direct bearing upon the creation and initial direction of the NPR, as did the later, more serious stages of the JCP's military policy. These subsequent stages of the JCP 'military turn', including the guerrilla campaign, 'Bloody May Day', their origins, outcomes and influence on the NPR, will be discussed in Chapter Four.

⁹¹ Yoshida used his contacts in the Socialist Party to stage a demonstration during a meeting with Dulles. T. Igarashi, 'Peacemaking and Party Politics: The formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1985, p 350.

⁹² Foreign Office File (FO) 371/99393, Denning to Eden, 'Use of Violence by the Japanese Communist Party to Attain its Ultimate Ends', 19/5/1952.

Japanese Conceptions of Internal Security and the Desire for a Constabulary

The concerns of the Japanese leadership about internal security and their resultant desire for the strengthening of Japan's police, including the creation of a constabulary, can be clearly demonstrated by examining three areas: the Japanese government's conceptions of internal security forces, the content of the Ashida memoranda, and the Higai/Yoshida push for police reform and the establishment of a constabulary.

The conception of the role and capabilities of internal security forces in the thinking of the Japanese elite played a major role in their demands for the creation of a constabulary force. The role of the police forces from the Meiji period until 1945 was close to that of the army in relation to internal security duties, cooperating with the army to put down uprisings and suppress dissent.⁹³ One could argue that the antecedents of this lack of distinction between internal and external security roles could be said to originate in pre-modern Japan where members of the warrior class performed both internal security/policing roles and participated in warfare as part of their duties.⁹⁴ In the pre-war Japanese state the Imperial Japanese army (IJA) formed a reserve force upon which the police could call in cases of rebellion, serious danger to public order, mass rioting or other violent confrontation where the use of deadly force could be required to restore order. Examples of this use of the army to suppress mass protests and uprisings included Saitama in 1884 and the nationwide riots of 1918.⁹⁵ In the face of external and internal threats, the Japanese police system, like many of its continental European counterparts, was designed

⁹³ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 21.

⁹⁴ H. Bolitho, 'The Tempō Crisis' in M.B. Jansen (ed), *The Emergence of Meiji Japan*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp 7-8; J.W. Hall, 'The Bakuhan System', M.B. Jansen (ed), *Warrior Rule in Japan*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p 198.

⁹⁵ A. Gordon, 'The Crowd and Politics in Imperial Japan: Tokyo 1905-1918', *Past and Present*, No. 121, 1988, p 142; M. Lewis, *Rioters and Citizens, Mass Protest in Imperial Japan*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1990, pp 16, 272; Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 21.

primarily as a tool to ensure the internal security of the state, a first-line of defence against subversion, rather than a device for serving and protecting the people. Due to this role the Japanese police system possessed a centralized, government controlled structure, although this was broken up by Occupation reforms in 1947-1948. The removal of the Japanese military increased the dependence of the Japanese state upon the weakened and beleaguered police as the sole Japanese guarantors of the regime's survival.⁹⁶

It should be noted that in cases of serious unrest such as the 1948 Kobe riots and in numerous other smaller incidents throughout the Occupation the Japanese police required the intervention of US tactical troops to maintain order, a reliance which clearly demonstrated its weakness.⁹⁷ These troops were employed as a last resort and their use was both physically and politically hazardous, possibly resulting in both American and Japanese casualties, a fact which could be used by the JCP to stir the embers of Japanese nationalism and bring back uncomfortable memories of the Pacific War. This is exactly what the JCP sought to do during the military turn, as noted above by Denning, Goncharov, Lewis and Litai.⁹⁸ Moreover, American tactical troops could not be relied upon to act directly in the Japanese government's interests in an emergency and were not under the control of the Japanese government. This potential powerlessness in the face of serious unrest strengthened the traditional Japanese conceptions of the need for internal security forces.⁹⁹ For political, security and financial issues it was clearly desirable to create a

⁹⁶ H. Nakajima, 'Chichibu Jiken ni Okeru Keisatsu to Chiikishakai' (The Police and Local Community in the Chichibu Incident), *Rekishigaku Kenkyū*, No. 860, November 2009, pp 13-25; Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 215. For more on the weakness of the civil police see: Appendix III. Yoshida to MacArthur, Letter on Police Reform/ Recentralisation, 6 August 1949; Appendix IV. 'The Weakness of the Japanese Civil Police in Occupied Japan'.

⁹⁷ H. Inokuchi, 'Korean Ethnic Schools, 1945-52', in S. Ryang, *Koreans in Japan, Critical Voices From The Margin*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2000, pp 151 -152.

⁹⁸ Foreign Office File (FO) 371/99393, Denning to Eden, 'Use of Violence by The Japanese Communist Party to Attain its Ultimate Ends', 19/5/1952; S.N. Goncharov, J.W. Lewis and X. Litai, *Uncertain Partners, Stalin, Mao and the Korean War*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003, p 106.

⁹⁹ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, pp 184,213.

local force which could assume these internal security duties, and indeed it was a standard procedure in US occupied countries.¹⁰⁰ The desire for such a force became a necessity with the hasty departure of US tactical troops for Korea in summer 1950, resulting in the creation of the NPR to fill their role.

Events such as the 1948 Kobe riots, the Taira incident and the blatant weaknesses of the police they demonstrated, strengthened the belief of many in the Japanese government that there was a requirement for a Japanese force designed to assist the police in maintaining public order.¹⁰¹ The fact that the decentralised structure of the police also meant that the central government had no control over it was also deeply worrying to a Japanese elite used to having a strong centralised internal security forces at their disposal. This clear appreciation of the pathetic state of the civil police was stated by Yoshida in his memoirs: 'The [civil] police had, in truth ceased to mean much as a force entrusted with the maintenance of law and order'.¹⁰² He also put forward the same belief in a 1949 letter to MacArthur complaining of the lack of influence the Japanese government had over the investigation of the Mitaka case and its inability to defend itself in case of insurrection:

The country's police power has been split up into numerous units, large and small, each of which is independent, isolated and often helpless. Moreover the entire system is detached from the government . . . the government must be prepared for any contingency that may arise any day in these unsettled times.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ United States Marine Corps, Chapter XII 'Armed Native Organisations', *Small Wars Manual*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1940. For more on constabularies before the NPR see: Chapter 2, pp 115-138 .

¹⁰¹ Appendix IV. 'The Weakness of the Japanese Civil Police in Occupied Japan'.

¹⁰² Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, p 145.

¹⁰³ Appendix III. 'Yoshida to MacArthur, Letter on Police Reform/Recentralisation, 6 August 1949'.

In his reply, unwilling to face or admit the shortcomings of SCAP policy, MacArthur argued that he did not believe that the police was inadequate, that he was committed to reform and that, in Social Darwinist tones, that with the development of 'a full consciousness of individual responsibility' by the Japanese that the current system would work properly.¹⁰⁴

As Aldous states, the traditional line of thought on internal security also continued to play a significant role in postwar internal security conceptions:

In the case of the Japanese police the distinction between military and non-military interests was blurred. Whilst there was a commitment to democratization of the civil police there was also a sense of Japan's vulnerability following the dismantling of her war machine, a feeling in certain circles that exceptional circumstances might justify a military-style police force.¹⁰⁵

These exceptional circumstances were judged by many in the Japanese elite to have arrived with the escalation of Communist violence, the adoption of a policy of revolution by force by the JCP, the outbreak of the Korean War and the dispatch of US tactical troops to Korea. In his memoirs Yoshida explicitly makes the link between internal security concerns and the creation of the NPR:

Then came the most noteworthy event of the year 1950 – the outbreak of war in Korea – raising fears that Communist activity in Japan would increase still more . . . and giving further ground for anxiety regarding the ability of our enfeebled police force to maintain order in the country. In these circumstances the Supreme

¹⁰⁴ Letter, MacArthur to Yoshida, 8/8/49, printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen (The Financial History Section of the Ministry of Finance), *Showa Zaiseishi, Sensō Kara Kōwa Made (The Financial History of Shōwa, From War to Peace)*, Vol. 20, Tokyo Keizai Shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1982, pp 316-317.

¹⁰⁵ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 8.

Commander for the Allied Powers issued a directive calling into being a new organization to be called the National Police Reserve, thus providing our government with a police force taking orders directly from the Cabinet.¹⁰⁶

The concern amongst the Japanese elite over internal security and the possibility of Communist revolution predated the Japanese surrender. The most notable example of this was Prince Konoe Fumimaro request to the Emperor to begin peace talks with the Allies in February 1945, stating his fear that although the British and Americans were unlikely to end the Emperor system, a communist revolution was likely if the war continued and, under such conditions, Hirohito was likely to lose his throne.¹⁰⁷ Yoshida also later acknowledged in his memoirs that the fear of revolution was a significant factor behind the termination of hostilities.¹⁰⁸

The concerns about the internal security of Japan in the wake of defeat intensified and the inability of the police to maintain order without the support of the military became increasingly apparent. Even Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko's reasons for resigning as Prime Minister in October 1945 included his feeling of responsibility for the government's inability to maintain internal security.¹⁰⁹ The traditional Japanese conceptions of internal security forces, coupled with the pressure of defeat and the resuscitation of the JCP, led to a growing desire for the creation of a more heavily equipped force able to supplement the police in case of emergency. The initial Japanese desire was to retain a military of some kind and the Cabinet initially proposed on 28 October 1945 that they be

¹⁰⁶ Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, p 147.

¹⁰⁷ The Konoe memorandum is also an interesting early example of the Japanese viewing the perceived internal communist threat a bigger threat than external opponents. 'Konoe ko no Jōsōbun' (Konoe's Report to the Throne), 14/2/45, printed in, Gaimushō, *Shūsen Shiroku (Historical Record of the Cessation of Hostilities)*, Vol. 2, Hokuyōsha, Tokyo, 1977, pp 42-49; H.P Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, HarperCollins, New York, 2001, pp 188, 189, 756; T. Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy, Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan*, Belknap/Harvard University Press, London, 2005, p 37.

¹⁰⁸ Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, p 183.

¹⁰⁹ H. Borton, *Japan's Modern Century*, Ronald, New York, 1955, p 401; R. Driete, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-52*, Saltire Press, Brighton, 1983, p 63.

permitted a police force of 250,000 and an army of 227,000, demands which were later scaled down and eventually abandoned in the face of stiff opposition from SCAP.¹¹⁰ With the traditional military at an end, Japanese politicians across the political spectrum sought to establish strong police forces, including a constabulary of some kind, in order to ensure Japan's internal security. The Japanese elite wished to retain responsibility for their internal security in all but the most serious cases of unrest and not rely on GHQ for their survival in a crisis. As Drifte argues, 'Japanese Cabinets – whether led by the conservative Yoshida or the liberal Katayama – always intended to take the question or responsibility for internal security into their own hands'.¹¹¹ Two further quotations from Prime Minister Katayama from 1947 further underline the importance attached by the Japanese government to maintaining their own internal security and the implications this also had for regaining their national sovereignty:

There is no doubt that the presence of Occupation forces is contributing to the preservation of stability, but the Japanese government realizes that it is the duty and responsibility of the Japanese government to supervise the enforcement of the national and local laws of Japan, except in extreme emergencies.¹¹²

In view of the fact that the public order in Japan without armed forces is solely dependant on the police force, and that we cannot expect and depend upon the situation of complete occupation by the Allied forces, especially when we think of a long future, it is deemed too hazardous for the central government to deprive itself of all its own resources to maintain the public safety [sic].¹¹³

¹¹⁰ I. Hata, *Shiroku, Nihon Saigunbi (Historical Record, Japanese Rearmament)*, Bungei Shunjūkan, Tokyo, 1976, p 44; Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 63.

¹¹¹ Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 65.

¹¹² *PRJ*, Vol. II, 1949, p 699.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p 703.

With American demands for demilitarization rendering the maintenance of their own external security impossible, the Japanese elite realised that they could still possibly assume responsibility for their own internal security and with this a measure of sovereignty and leverage in the future peace negotiations. External security, for the foreseeable future, would have to be left in the hands of the UN or the Allied powers.¹¹⁴ With the increase in the JCP's profile and its creeping control over the unions, the concern amongst the Japanese political elite increased, and as Weinstein states: 'the event that more than any other crystallized the suspicions and fears of the Japanese government over internal security was the [1 February 1947] nationwide general strike'.¹¹⁵ Although the general strike failed due to SCAP's intervention, the possibility of a strike was very real until just before its scheduled date. Without any police forces under its direct control the reality of the helpless position in which the Japanese government would have found itself if the demonstrations had turned violent became starkly obvious. Again Weinstein is useful here: 'The Yoshida Government, with no police forces or military units at its disposal, believed that it was saved from insurrection and possible Communist takeover only by SCAP's intervention'.¹¹⁶ Also of note in this regard is the second Ashida memorandum which acknowledged that MacArthur's intervention had halted the disorder, but argued that such measures would be impossible after a peace treaty, and hence, in Yoshitsu's and Hata's opinion, implicitly stressed the need for a centrally controlled constabulary.¹¹⁷

The general strike and the poor state of the civil police, coupled with the desire of the Japanese for a peace treaty and the return of sovereignty,

¹¹⁴ Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 65.

¹¹⁵ Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, p 33.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ashida Hitoshi (Note to Eichelberger), undated, printed in, H. Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimonдай Shiryōshū (Postwar Japan Defence Problem Materials Collection), Daiichikan, Higunjika kara Saigunbi he (Volume 1, From Demilitarisation to Rearmament)*, Sanichishobo, 1991, pp 305-306; Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, p 25; M.M. Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement*, Columbia University Press, Guildford, 1983, pp 19-20; Hata, *Shiroku*, pp 206-208.

resulted in the drafting of a number of memoranda by the Japanese government which were passed to notable Americans as part of an effort to inform Washington of Japanese thinking on peace and security in Japan. The 'Ashida Memoranda' were three messages delivered to members of GHQ and American diplomats from 1947 to 1948 by Ashida Hitoshi and his subordinates. The memoranda and the process of their production and dissemination are of interest as they reveal the central position the creation of a paramilitary constabulary played in Japanese thinking on internal security, the peace treaty and sovereignty. Ashida, Foreign Minister (in 1947) and later Prime Minister (in 1948), like Yoshida and many Japanese politicians, held a deep antipathy towards Communism, possibly stemming from his experiences whilst serving as a diplomat in Russia during the revolutions of 1917. Spurred on by the close call of the general strike and the desire not to allow Japan to be forced into a forthcoming treaty entirely on Allied terms, Ashida planned to indirectly approach the authorities in Washington, despite the fact that SCAP forbade any direct contact.¹¹⁸

The first of the Ashida memoranda was presented to the State Department advisor to SCAP, George Atcheson Jnr. on 26 July 1947.¹¹⁹ The memorandum presented Japanese government thinking on the terms of a possible peace treaty and of particular note was point five: 'in the event of the withdrawal of Occupation forces from Japan following the peace treaty, the Japanese government should be permitted to have adequate police forces at its disposal to ensure law and order'.¹²⁰ In this memorandum Ashida cut back on the Japanese government's initial postwar demands for an army and compromised on other points in an

¹¹⁸ Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace*, pp 8-9; Driete, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, pp 68, 70.

¹¹⁹ Ashida Hitoshi-Department of Foreign Affairs, Note to Atcheson, Draft of Meeting Regarding Ambassador Atcheson, 24/7/47, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū*, Vol. 1, pp 298-299; Driete, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 70.

¹²⁰ Ashida Hitoshi-Department of Foreign Affairs, Note to Atcheson, Draft of Meeting Regarding Ambassador Atcheson, 24/7/47, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū*, Vol. 1, p 299.

attempt to make its content acceptable to the US. Most significantly for this study, the memorandum distinguished between the internal and external security of Japan, suggesting that after a peace treaty the Japanese could be responsible for their own internal security through expanding the police, with external security being delegated to the UN.¹²¹ On 28 July a further copy of the memorandum was presented to General Whitney, head of GS and a close aide of MacArthur, who said the Supreme Commander was thinking along similar lines, but warned the Japanese that leaks of the memorandum could result in 'unfavourable consequences'.¹²² However, later that day, in a blow to Ashida's plan, both Whitney and Acheson returned their copies of the memorandum, both claiming that it was not in Japan's interest for them to receive it at that time.¹²³ Yoshitsu argues that Acheson feared leaks of the memorandum would have negative repercussions on a future peace treaty as they could have created the impression that the Japanese were trying to dictate terms to the Allies.¹²⁴ Three weeks later, whilst on his way to Washington, Acheson was killed in a plane crash, possibly carrying a further copy of the message. Nevertheless, the swift rejection of the memorandum illustrates the attitude held by many in the US administration who were, at least at that stage, unwilling to enter negotiations or accept even the diluted opinions of the Japanese.¹²⁵ The subsequent leak of these supposedly secret plans to the American press caused severe embarrassment to the Japanese and resulted in the resignation of Okazaki Katsuo, the head of the Central Liaison Office (CLO), and later a key figure in the creation of the NPR. Interestingly, by focusing on what it achieved in reaching the State Department and in bringing the Japanese

¹²¹ Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace*, pp 9-10.

¹²² Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 71.

¹²³ Ashida Hitoshi, Meeting with Acheson and Major General Whitney, Case of the Return of the Memo, 28/7/47, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū*, Vol. 1, pp 299-300; Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan*, p 184; J. K. Emmerson, *Arms, Yen & Power, The Japanese Dilemma*, Dunellen, New York, 1971, p 63.

¹²⁴ Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace*, p 11.

¹²⁵ *World Report* 12/5/47, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū*, Vol. 1, pp 308-309; Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 72.

ideas into the open, Drifte hints that the leak of the memorandum could have been deliberate.¹²⁶

In September 1947, undeterred by the failure of the first memorandum, Ashida sought to contact General Eichelberger, the head of the Eighth Army, with whom Suzuki Tadakatsu had regular contact.¹²⁷ Suzuki was head of the CLO at Yokohama, a regional office of former diplomats, set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to liaise with the lower echelons of the Occupation.¹²⁸ Eichelberger's anti-communist beliefs were well known to the Japanese as was his positive attitude towards rearming Japan and to having it become a non-communist ally of the US. With rumours circulating, that due to the possibility of a peace treaty, initial preparations for a withdrawal could be on the way, Eichelberger had become concerned over the future security of Japan in the face of recent events in Asia.¹²⁹ Eichelberger had genuine concerns over the internal and external security of the country, as he stated in his diary entry of 27 June: 'I can't see how they can take troops out of Japan until the Communist question is settled. We can't afford to let Russian or Japanese Communists get control of this country'.¹³⁰ Believing that using a Japanese opinion on the situation could prove highly useful in his arguments against withdrawal, in a meeting on 5 September Eichelberger asked Suzuki about how long the Japanese thought the US should remain in Japan.¹³¹ Suzuki replied that they would give their answer at their next meeting. Over the intervening five days Eichelberger entered into discussion with MacArthur and others over the question of Japanese rearmament, asking if they should set up a Japanese army if things became 'difficult' with the USSR, an idea which MacArthur firmly rejected, arguing that the UN would

¹²⁶ Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace*, p 22-23.

¹²⁷ Y. Sugita, *Pitfall or Panacea, The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952*, Routledge, London, 2003, p 86.

¹²⁸ R.A. Moore and D.L. Robinson, *Partners for Democracy, Crafting the New Japanese State Under MacArthur*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p 34.

¹²⁹ Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 74.

¹³⁰ Eichelberger Diary 27/6/47, quoted in, Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace*, p 15.

¹³¹ Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan*, p 184; Emmerson, *Arms, Yen & Power*, p 64.

assist Japan in the event of problems. Eichelberger, however, remained unconvinced and believed that the Cold War could rapidly escalate into war between the superpowers.

Over the same period Ashida and Prime Minister Katayama, delighted at the opening Eichelberger had provided, decided to give the memorandum already rejected by Acheson and Whitney to Eichelberger. Upon receiving it Eichelberger seemed interested in its content and suggested he take it with him to Washington. Suzuki also enquired whether he thought a constabulary force might be permitted under a peace settlement.¹³²

A second memorandum was also presented to the General three days later which outlined two possible courses of future events foreseen by the Japanese. First, if superpower relations improved, which seemed unlikely at the time, the UN could take responsibility for Japan's external defence, but if relations remained frosty or deteriorated further the US could take up this role. In either case the Japanese wanted to have exclusive control over their internal security, which would necessitate the creation of a constabulary. The second part of the memorandum stated this desire by Japan to take responsibility for its own internal security, and requested an American external security guarantee, offering Japanese bases for use 'in the case of emergency' i.e. a serious threat to Japan's external security. In terms of internal security both parts of the memorandum stated that Japan would 'build up its domestic police forces, on the ground and on the sea' to maintain domestic stability, including the establishment of a constabulary capable of dealing with threats to internal order.¹³³

Although bases in Japan were offered, it is important to note that Ashida believed at the time that the US would hold on to the Bonin and Ryukyu island chains and therefore would not need to base troops in mainland

¹³² Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace*, pp 16-17; Dufte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, pp 74-75.

¹³³ Ashida Hitoshi (Note to Eichelberger) Printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū*, Vol. 1, pp 305-306; Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan*, p 184.

Japan under ordinary circumstances. By offering these 'emergency' base rights and through the implication that by doing so the Japanese were willing to side with the US in the Cold War, this memorandum attempted to make a separate peace more acceptable to the Americans.¹³⁴ US support was seen as highly important as the Japanese, from as early as 1946, had built up a strong desire to maintain US influence in Asia to counterbalance the USSR.¹³⁵ The decision to seek a separate peace would necessitate American external defence of Japan, as it was anticipated that the USSR would use its veto power at the UN to prevent Japanese membership and possibly to block UN efforts preventing a Soviet military intervention in Japan. Without the possibility of appeal to the UN in a crisis, the only realistic option that remained was for Japan to join the US bloc and seek explicit protection against external threats through recourse to US naval and air superiority.¹³⁶ Here Weinstein argues that the content of the memorandum represented a novel approach to security negotiations, as the Japanese proposed an 'alliance' whilst only offering to maintain their own internal security rather than the normal reciprocal guarantee of external security alliances usually require.¹³⁷ However, citing the fact that Weinstein did not have access to the complete text of the memorandum upon which he based his interpretation, Drifte criticises Weinstein for this interpretation, saying he is mistaken on the alleged Japanese belief in quasi-reciprocity of offering the internal/external compromise to the US.¹³⁸

This memorandum, unlike its predecessor, did reach Washington directly but at this stage the US administration was still not prepared to conclude a separate peace with Japan. It was feared that if a separate peace was concluded that would it prevent them reaching a general security settlement with the USSR, which some, including Kennan and Acheson

¹³⁴ Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, p 26.

¹³⁵ Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, pp 76, 78.

¹³⁶ Sugita, *Pitfall or Panacea*, p 87.

¹³⁷ Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, pp 26-27.

¹³⁸ Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 76.

(leading figures in the US State Department), still thought was possible.¹³⁹ Ashida's efforts continued despite these setbacks, and in a conversation with Sir Alvery Gasgoine, Head of the British Liaison Mission, on 22 September, he argued that, as the USSR could easily attack Hokkaido from the Kuriles, US troops should be stationed in Japan in the future, even in peacetime.¹⁴⁰ Three months later Ashida also offered to hand over a Japanese study on the peace treaty to William Sebald, a senior US diplomat in Japan, but Ashida was once more rebuffed when Sebald refused to accept the documents, claiming that it was too early to discuss the issue and that the peace terms would be settled at a future great power conference.¹⁴¹

By mid-1948 Ashida had become Prime Minister and the Cold War had chilled further. With his return to the United States approaching, Ashida decided to give both memoranda to General Eichelberger to take back with him on 9 July.¹⁴² This seems to have been a successful move as Eichelberger then proceeded to give a number of pro-rearmament speeches after his return to the US.¹⁴³ Furthermore, events seemed to be going the Japanese Prime Minister's way even before his third effort, with the Japanese position converging with that of some highly influential Americans. During his early 1948 visit to Japan, Kennan had also told the Japanese leadership events might be leading to a more favourable US stance on their plans as relations were deteriorating between the superpowers.¹⁴⁴ Evidence of Kennan's support for a constabulary force can be found in a summary of one of his reports from April that year which

¹³⁹ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan [Sebald], 14/1/1948, United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, (FRUS), 1948, Vol. VI, pp 648-49; G.F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, Pantheon, New York, 1967, p 393.

¹⁴⁰ Ashida Hitoshi, Memorandum on Conversation with Gasgoine, 24/9/47, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū*, Vol.1, p 306.

¹⁴¹ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan [Sebald], 14/1/1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. VI, pp 648-49; Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace*, p 22.

¹⁴² Sugita, *Pitfall or Panacea*, p 86.

¹⁴³ P.J. Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, Japan Library, Folkestone, 1993, p 223.

¹⁴⁴ Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 77, Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, p 25.

stated that in order to best preserve security in Japan ‘a central, uniformed gendarmerie or central constabulary comparable to the French Guard Mobile . . . would seem both desirable and suitable’.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, in NSC 13/2 of October 1948 Kennan advocated the strengthening of the Japanese internal security forces through ‘the re-enforcing and re-equipping of the present forces, and by expanding the present centrally directed police organisation’, an implied reference to the creation of a centrally directed internal security constabulary.¹⁴⁶ Kennan had even noted in late 1947 that it was essential that ‘Japan should be permitted to maintain a civil police force, including a constabulary’.¹⁴⁷ It is notable that during this period the Japanese and American positions generally converged, especially over the creation of adequate internal security forces. As Drifte notes, ‘for Kennan, as much as the Japanese government, the prevention of communist subversion and the strengthening of police forces were among the principal concerns’.¹⁴⁸ In terms of the direct influence between the two policy-making processes, historians differ in their interpretations, Drifte arguing that the similarities between the second Ashida memorandum and the 14 October 1947 study by Kennan on the peace treaty are remarkable. The two documents are so similar that Drifte argues that Kennan may have been directly influenced by the Japanese draft.¹⁴⁹ In contrast, Yoshitsu argues that Japanese policymakers accurately predicted State Department thinking in their studies and, consequently, there was no direct link between the two drafts.¹⁵⁰ Whichever of these theories is more accurate is of little consequence as either way, the Japanese were clearly closer to getting what they desired from the US.

¹⁴⁵ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth.) 9/4/1948. Annex: Memorandum of Detailed Comments on the Kennan Report, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI, p 729.

¹⁴⁶ NSC 13/2, 7/10/1948, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI, p 859.

¹⁴⁷ Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) 14/10/47, *FRUS* 1947, Vol. VI, pp 536-543.

¹⁴⁸ Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p 81.

¹⁴⁹ Ashida Hitoshi (Note to Eichelberger) 13/9/1947, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū* Vol. 1, pp 305-306.

¹⁵⁰ Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace*, p 12.

Ashida's efforts to participate in the drafting of the peace and to secure the internal security of Japan were continued by Yoshida after Ashida's resignation on 15 October 1948 in the wake of the Shōwa Denkō corruption scandal. The central theme of the Ashida approach to securing the internal security of Japan was the reliance on the US or UN for external security whilst 'the Japanese government would handle the threat of an internal communist take-over by building national paramilitary [constabulary] forces'.¹⁵¹ This desire to assume the responsibility for internal security by the Japanese government, especially after the US withdrew, is supported by Weinstein: 'following the conclusion of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Occupation forces, Japan would need an effective, centrally controlled police force if it were to prevent a Communist take-over'.¹⁵²

It is important to state that with the outbreak of the Korean War and the dispatch of the US garrison to Korea an identical situation to the one envisaged was created, necessitating the creation of the NPR. This situation also provided the final impetus to overcome the reservations held by the principal opponent of a constabulary force, MacArthur.¹⁵³ Finally, it is also significant that the Ashida proposals closely approximated the basis of the 1951 San Francisco peace and security treaties and could also be termed the 'Ashida Doctrine' in that the focus by the Japanese on maintaining internal security whilst delegating external security to the US largely informed Japanese defence thinking well into the 1960s.¹⁵⁴

A further indication of the desire amongst the Japanese administration for more robust security forces was the Higai/Yoshida plan. From late 1948 onwards, the Yoshida Cabinet was growing increasingly concerned about

¹⁵¹ Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, p 41.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ For more on the short-term events leading up to the creation of the NPR see: Chapter 2, pp 138-151.

¹⁵⁴ Security Treaty between the United States of American and Japan, 8/9/51, printed in D.J. Lu, *Japan, A Documentary History, The Late Tokugawa Period to the Present*, M.E. Sharpe, London, 1997, pp 499-500.

the process of police decentralisation (which had come into force from 3 March 1948) and appointed ministers Kimura Kozaemon and Higai Senzo to investigate the possibility of recentralising the police.¹⁵⁵ The principal figure in subsequent events was Higai who had resigned from his position as Speaker of the House of Representatives in August 1946 over improper conduct during the framing of aspects of the new constitution relating to the Emperor's property.¹⁵⁶ Higai was also unpopular with Whitney and Government Section (GS) due to his close relationship with Harry S. Eaton, of G2's Public Safety Division (PSD).¹⁵⁷ The two ministers proceeded to consult various Municipal and National Rural Police units and the prefectures within which they operated and their efforts resulted in thirty one of forty seven prefectures (66%) petitioning the Diet for recentralisation.¹⁵⁸ The results of the consultation led to Yoshida approaching MacArthur to voice his opinions on the prospect of recentralisation.¹⁵⁹ Details of the meeting were leaked to the press, but even this did little to dampen the Cabinet's enthusiasm for reform.¹⁶⁰ After a House of Representatives special committee also recommended recentralisation, the Japanese were so confident that reform was a distinct possibility that Higai announced the reform process was actually underway.¹⁶¹ Higai informed the press that under the proposed reform plans, which he claimed had been approved by Eaton, it was likely that the Municipal Police forces would be merged with the National Rural Police

¹⁵⁵ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 10/3/1949; *Mainichi Shinbun*, 17/5/1949; *Nippon Times*, 8/7/1949; Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo*, p 189.

¹⁵⁶ J. Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur, A Participants Account*, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1979, p 25; T.H. McNelly, "'Induced Revolution': The Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan", in, R.E Ward and Y. Sakamoto (eds), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987, pp 93-94; H.H. Baerwald, 'Early SCAP Policy and the Rehabilitation of the Diet', in, *ibid*, p 140.

¹⁵⁷ *Osaka Mainichi*, 17/6/1950; Historical Section, GHQ, *Summations of Non-Military Activities in Japan*, Tokyo, Sep/Oct 1945- Aug 1948, 1948, No. 11, August 1946, p 27; Moore and Robinson, *Partners for Democracy*, pp 265-267.

¹⁵⁸ *Mainichi Shinbun*, 26/7/51.

¹⁵⁹ Appendix III. 'III. Yoshida to MacArthur, Letter on Police Reform/Recentralisation, 6 August 1949'; Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 206; *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 1/8/49; *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, 2/8/1949; *Nippon Times*, 6/8/4; Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo*, p 189.

¹⁶⁰ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, pp 204-205.

¹⁶¹ *Tokyo Shinbun*, 11/8/49.

and a 50,000 man paramilitary constabulary would be set up to bolster Japan's internal security and cope with serious riots and disturbances.¹⁶²

Higai's premature announcement about recentralisation and the leaks surrounding it had been preceded by staunch public condemnation of GHQ's programme of police reform by the Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko.¹⁶³ His attacks on police reform, despite containing Soviet propaganda, made some uncomfortable allegations about American desires for the remilitarization of Japan and infringement of Japanese civil liberties. His comments were revealed in the press and attracted public attention as well as agreement and support from the JCP.¹⁶⁴ The combination of Higai's announcement and Derevyanko's condemnation prompted *The Times* to claim that the Japanese government was planning to resurrect the pre-1945 militarist Special Higher Police (*Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu*, or *Tokkō*) and the article created such controversy, that the Yoshida Cabinet felt compelled to swiftly issue a complete denial.¹⁶⁵ Higai also denied that recentralisation was imminent but followed this denial with a claim that 'no concrete discussion had been made in the Cabinet' about plans to reform the police, a blatantly false remark.¹⁶⁶ This quasi-public press campaign took place as the future internal security of Japan seemed increasingly at risk, with the simultaneous events of the 'bloody summer' of 1949, demonstrating to the Japanese authorities that in the face of determined resistance the civil police were unable to cope.¹⁶⁷

Events prompted further demands made in private by Higai and other Japanese politicians for the creation of a constabulary force to guard against Communist unrest as well as more general police reform. Again

¹⁶² *Asahi Shinbun*, 31/8/49; Wildes, *The Postwar Japanese Police*, p 665.

¹⁶³ YF-A9, Verbatim Minutes of the Allied Council For Japan, Records of the U.S. Element of the Allied Council For Japan, 5/1/1949, Reel 17; *Nippon Times*, 13/6/1949.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *The Times*. 6/9/1949, 8/9/1949.

¹⁶⁶ *Nippon Times*, 9/9/1949.

¹⁶⁷ Intelligence (G2) 262, memorandum, G2-PSD, 15/8/49; *Nippon Times*, 31/8/1949; Appendix I. 'The Shimoyama, Taira, Mitaka and Matsukawa Incidents'.

Higai's demands became public, with a major scandal ensuing and Yoshida suggesting his resignation. Higai claimed he was not the origin of the calls for reform and the creation of a constabulary force and that the information was leaked from private discussions between himself and Yoshida. Higai also claimed that his opinions on the subject were milder than those of the rest of the Cabinet, including Yoshida, but in the end offered his resignation anyway.¹⁶⁸

The controversy over this incident ran over into June 1950 when the Korean War created the circumstances within which the Japanese administration was granted its wish, the creation of a centrally directed paramilitary constabulary in the form of the NPR. Yoshida's role in this series of events is an interesting one and the leaks which led to Higai's downfall may have originated from Yoshida himself (a technique he had previously employed). Though supporting the policies Higai announced, Yoshida may have sought to remove him as a political rival, whilst simultaneously testing public support for the policies and distancing himself from any potentially embarrassing repercussions.¹⁶⁹ However, Yoshida's genuine desire to create, and later preserve, the constabulary force he deemed essential to enhance Japan's internal security can be seen through his repeated calls for the strengthening of the police, his later efforts to prevent the assumption by the NPR of greater responsibility for Japan's external defence and the efforts he made to preserve the NPR's constabulary character.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo*, p 190; Wildes, *The Postwar Japanese Police*, p 666.

¹⁶⁹ Moore and Robinson, *Partners for Democracy*, p 266.

¹⁷⁰ For more on this move to preserve the NPR alongside an embryonic military see: Chapter 5, pp 306-307; Appendix XII. 'Japanese Policy Document: 'Initial Steps for Re-armament Program', 3 February 1951'.

Conclusion

This chapter has been devoted to addressing the first principal aim of this study, revealing the domestic influences on the NPR. The chapter has also demonstrated that the Japanese government clearly and actively sought a constabulary force prior to the Korean War and the creation of the NPR. Two of the key influences on the NPR have also been explored in this chapter: the JCP and the Japanese government. In fulfilling its stated aim this chapter has analysed the domestic origins of the National Police Reserve and the importance of the perceived domestic threat in promoting and strengthening the desire amongst various groups for the creation of such a paramilitary constabulary. The first section dealt with the first stage of the JCP's overt moves towards violence and hence illustrated the threat the authorities believed required the establishment of a constabulary. The second section illustrated the motives and initiatives of the Japanese elite that were directed towards the establishment of that constabulary.

Building on the traditional Japanese conceptions of internal security and the weakness of the civil police, the perceived JCP threat was seen to require stronger internal security forces to be adequately guarded against. It is clear that the Japanese government keenly felt that the JCP represented a threat to its survival and considered it essential to establish effective bulwarks against Communist insurrection or revolution, especially the establishment of a centrally directed paramilitary constabulary. As Weinstein notes, the fear of the JCP even eclipsed that of the USSR during the Korean War: 'the danger of an internal communist take-over appeared at least comparable to, and probably greater than, the danger of a direct Soviet attack'.¹⁷¹ This concern prompted efforts to create a paramilitary constabulary, in the form of the Ashida memoranda and the Higai/Yoshida plan. As is revealed in the following chapter, this desire for

¹⁷¹ Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, p 40.

a constabulary before 1950 is significant as it shows there was no need for GHQ to force the Japanese government into creating the NPR, as is argued by some historians.¹⁷² In conclusion, it must be noted that unlike many historians of this period it is important not to marginalise nor ignore the threat the JCP was seen to present at the time through the application of the knowledge of the future failure of the JCP guerrilla campaign. From 1949 to 1952 it was far from clear what the future held. As Jenkins notes: 'it is essential to avoid hindsight when considering these years . . . at the time it seemed very possible that the coming decade [the 1950s] would see a continuation of hardship, shortages, and the unrest and subversion that accompanied these conditions. In this context, police reconstruction might well be a prerequisite of political stability'.¹⁷³

¹⁷² For more on the creation of the NPR see: Chapter 2, pp 138-151.

¹⁷³ Jenkins, 'Policing the Cold War', p 148.

Chapter Two:

The International Context of the

Creation of the NPR: 1945-1950

In keeping with the overall rationale of this study of providing a complete history of the NPR, the purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the international factors and events behind the decision to create the NPR. The chapter seeks to broaden the existing knowledge of the origins of the NPR, particularly by exploring the non-Japanese organisations which influenced its development. In this the chapter focuses on the neglected area of the American sponsored constabularies which preceded the NPR in Asia and elsewhere. The chapter also includes an examination of the influence of the outbreak of the Korean War on the final decisions behind the creation of the NPR including the influence of the Japanese government. Some attention is also paid, by way of brief summaries, to the international political situation and American attitudes towards strengthening Japan's security forces.

This approach combines elements of original research with a synthesis of the best of the existing scholarship on the period. As much of the content centres on the international context of the force and has been covered elsewhere, this study seeks to focus on the key concepts which saw Japan become the central pillar of America's Asian policy. These include Schaller's 'great crescent', Iriye's observations on the failure of the Yalta system and Sarantakes' concept of 'double containment'.¹ The examination presented here of these concepts also reveals that although Japan became central to

¹ See below for a full description of each of these concepts / theories.

US Asia policy, no overall American consensus over Japanese security had been reached by 1950. The exploration of the origins of the constabulary structure offered here is an original contribution to the scholarship and reveals in full for the first time a significant influence on the character and creation of the NPR. Despite much of the chapter adopting an approach similar to that of many second generation US scholars in focusing on the international influences on the force, the final section details how these influences interacted with the Japanese government during the creation of the NPR in early July 1950. This analysis, whilst demonstrating the Japanese influence, also indicates that the Japanese government was not 'ordered' to create the force, as is argued by many historians.

The International Political Context

The international political situation in the immediate postwar years contributed greatly towards the processes which eventually led to the creation of the NPR. The emergence of the Cold War, the threat of communism in Asia, the collapse of the Yalta system and the Korean War were all instrumental in the birth of the NPR. The history of the Cold War in Asia and its impact upon Japan have been effectively and exhaustively studied elsewhere by many historians, notably Schaller, Sarantakes and Iriye.² In the interests of brevity, and in keeping with the aim of this study to focus on the relatively unexplored nature of the NPR rather than the well trodden path of the Cold War in Asia, this section comprises of a brief summary of some of

² M. Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997; M. Schaller, *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, The American Occupation of Japan*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985; N.E. Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*, Texas A & M University press, College Station, 2000; A. Iriye, *Japan and the Wider World, From Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present*, Longman, London, 1997; A. Iriye, 'The United States as a Pacific Power', in G.T. Hsiao, *Sino-American Détente and its Policy Implications*, Praeger, New York, 1974; A. Iriye, 'U.S.-Japanese Relations', in Y. Nagai and A. Iriye (eds), *The Origins of The Cold War in Asia*, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1977.

the major scholarly interpretations of the events that influenced Japan's security policy in this period to which this study ascribes.

Schaller's work plants the roots of the Cold War in Asia firmly within the soil of Japan. Schaller argues that the rise of communism in Asia and the weakness of the European and Japanese economies resulted in American moves to integrate Japan and non-communist Southeast Asia into a trading/security bloc.³ This aim was somewhat ironic as it closely mirrored the 'southern strategy' employed by the Japanese in their drive to create a 'Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere' during the Pacific War. American action in Asia was seen as necessary to alleviate the 'loss' of Japan's traditional markets and sources of raw materials in Manchuria and China and in doing so prevent Japan falling to communism. Schaller argues that the integration of the two areas also helped guarantee the pro-western, anti-communist alignment of both Japan and many of the emerging nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. To bolster and defend this non-communist Asian containment sphere Schaller argues that a 'Great Crescent' of defensive bases and American military outposts was established, running from the Aleutians through Japan, Formosa and the Philippines (see figure III).⁴ Japan, the only heavily industrialised state in East Asia and the location of major US military bases, was considered the key link in this offshore defence perimeter. Japan was vital and as Acheson warned: 'were Japan added to the communist bloc the Soviets would acquire skilled manpower and industrial potential capable of significantly altering the balance of world power'.⁵ In Schaller's opinion America had involved itself in a strategy which positioned Japan as the central tenet of its Asian policy.⁶ Reference to

³ Schaller, *Altered States*, p 4.

⁴ Schaller, *Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, p viii.

⁵ Acheson to British Ambassador Franks, 24/15/49, United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, (FRUS), 1949, Vol. VII, p 927.

⁶ Schaller, *Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, p ix.

contemporary primary documents reveals the accuracy and incisiveness of Schaller's arguments; for example George Kennan's Policy Planning Staff Paper; *Review of Current Trends: US Foreign Policy* states that 'Japan and the Philippines will be found to be the cornerstones of such a Pacific security system' i.e. the 'Great Crescent'.⁷ The 'Great Crescent' concept also won over MacArthur, with the General telling Kennan that US defence required military bases in a 'U-shaped area embracing the Aleutians, Midway, the former Japanese mandated islands, Clark field in the Philippines and above all Okinawa. Okinawa was the most advanced and vital point in this structure'.⁸ MacArthur also repeated his thinking in an interview in Tokyo in early 1949 in which he stated 'our line of defence runs through a chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia'.⁹ A further demonstration of the centrality of the 'Great Crescent' concept to American Asia policy was given in Dean Acheson's 12 January 1950 'defence perimeter' speech to the National Press Club, in which the same message was conveyed but with the explicit omission of Korea from the defence chain, a statement which some historians have since argued contributed to the outbreak of the Korean War.¹⁰

Schaller's interpretation did have its detractors with Finn, for example, arguing that Schaller 'detected in the voluminous staff papers on this subject a U.S. intention to build a "great crescent" of anti communist nations', and countering that 'U.S. policy in that period was actually far less ambitious'.¹¹ These criticisms have made Schaller step back somewhat from the 'great crescent' theory in his more recent work, preferring instead to focus on the economic integration of the American sphere of influence in East Asia.¹²

⁷ PPS 23, 24/2/1948, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. I part II, p 525.

⁸ PPS 28/2, 5/3/48, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI, pp 700-701.

⁹ *New York Times*, 2/3/1949.


¹⁰ United States. Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin*, Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, Vol. 22, 1950, p 114-116; D. Acheson, *Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department*, Norton, London, 1987, p 357.

¹¹ R.B. Finn, *Winners in Peace, MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, University of California Press, London, 1992, p 225.

¹² Schaller, *Altered States*, pp 18-30.

Despite these criticisms of the specifics of Schaller's approach, it remains clear that by 1950 Japan had become the mainstay US policy in Asia, intertwined with a semi-integrated trade and security framework connected to US Cold War strategy.

Figure III. The 'Great Crescent' as Described by MacArthur in 1951¹³



Another historian who contributes greatly to understanding of the security environment in Northeast Asia after World War Two is Sarantakes. Focusing principally on Okinawa, Sarantakes argues that the US role in occupying Japan served both to contain communism in Northeast Asia and to allay the American and Allied fear that Japan might opt for neutrality, or worse, an independent or militarist foreign policy. To serve these ends Sarantakes

¹³ Picture courtesy of: *New York Times*, 20/4/1951.

argues that the US retained bases on Okinawa and in Japan to underline the policy he defines as 'double containment'.¹⁴ With experience of working with the Japanese and the recognition by both sides that their interests lay in co-operation, Sarantakes asserts that the wartime animosity between the two former foes, and the latter half of the dual containment idea, gradually lost some of its credence. With the onset of the Cold War in Asia Sarantakes states that the US opted to retain Okinawa and bases on the Japanese mainland as they were strategically important for the defence of the Pacific. Great value was placed on these bases in several military strategies including defence of a series of strongpoints in the Pacific and defence of a perimeter (i.e. the 'Great Crescent'), and they were also essential in controlling the sea lanes of Northeast Asia, to defend Japan, and simultaneously defend others from Japan.¹⁵

Also of note is the work of Iriye Akira. Iriye's focus on the collapse of the Yalta system and the changes it wrought upon the position of Japan are also highly informative when considering the international origins of the NPR. Iriye argues that at the February 1945 Yalta meeting, the 'Big Three' roughly defined their postwar spheres of influence, with the USA taking responsibility for the western hemisphere and Pacific and the USSR taking on eastern Europe, the Baltic and Northeast Asia.¹⁶ This 'Yalta system' of continued co-operation between the World War Two allies, with each 'policing' its assigned regions, operated for a while after the end of hostilities but soon began to break down, in part over the role of China. The system envisaged China as one of the five 'world policemen', that would, after economically and militarily recovering from its fifteen-year war with Japan, contribute to the collective security of its region. To reinforce its position as one of the pillars of the postwar order, China was also granted a permanent seat on the UN Security

¹⁴ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, pp xv, xviii-xix.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp 64, 41.

¹⁶ Iriye, *Japan and the Wider World*, p 93; Iriye, *United States as a Pacific Power*, p 9.

Council, alongside the other victorious Allied powers and France. The powers at the Yalta conference agreed on a number of measures to help China recover and take its place in the postwar order. These included: the recognition of Chinese territorial sovereignty, agreements on non-intervention in China, recognition of the need for China to develop from its semi-colonial status and the recognition of Chiang Kai Shek as its leader. However, with the outbreak of civil war in China and the emergence of conflicting superpower policies, the Yalta system began to disintegrate.¹⁷ The victory of the communists in the Chinese civil war in late 1949 dealt American wartime visions of the security framework in Asia a fatal blow. With the 'loss' of China to the communists the pre-Cold War Yalta system was swiftly abandoned by the US.¹⁸ With China under communist control, the United States required a new ally in Asia and, with the erosion of the relatively benign security environment in Northeast Asia, Japan concurrently found itself in peril. Japan moved from a state of secondary importance to China, on the path to unarmed neutrality (and which some Americans were considering deindustrialising), to the central focus of American policy in Asia. From 1949 onwards, with the Democratic administration under intense criticism from the Republican dominated congress over the 'loss' of China and with McCarthy's witch-hunts in progress, political pressure, and, in some cases, political survival, obliged many policymakers to adopt a harder and more hawkish approach to Asian affairs.¹⁹ Within this context came calls for a reinvigorated and rebuilt Japan, closely tied to the US, which contributed directly and/or indirectly to the security of the American sphere of influence.

Due to a number of factors and policies, by the late forties, Japan had become the strategic, military, economic and psychological key to Asia in the

¹⁷ Iriye, *United States as a Pacific Power*, pp 11-13.

¹⁸ Iriye, *U.S.-Japanese Relations*, p 402.

¹⁹ R. D. Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p 15.

minds of most American policymakers.²⁰ Sharpening this focus were a number of further factors which heightened concerns over Japan's security. These included the Soviet capture of the Kurile Islands in the closing days of the Second World War, Article Nine of the 1947 Japanese constitution, the disarmament of Japan, the perceived Soviet threat to Japan's external security, the perceived domestic threat of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and finally the dire internal security situation in neighbouring Korea.²¹ All of these events and concern over the intentions of the USSR prompted calls for the strengthening of the internal security forces of Japan. This move can be noted in the content of NSC 49 of June 1949: 'Japan's internal security forces must be adequate not only for the maintenance of order but for protection against sabotage of vital installations. This may involve stronger security forces than were thought essential prior to the current overrunning of China'.²² Much American policy also centred on the belief that all communism was Soviet directed and that once embedded in a society its success through violent revolution was almost inevitable. NSC 7 of March 1948 illustrates these beliefs well:

The ultimate aim of Soviet-directed world communism is the domination of the world. To this end, Soviet-directed world communism employs against its victims in opportunistic coordination the complementary instruments of Soviet aggressive pressure from without and militant revolutionary subversion from within. Both

²⁰ G.F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, Pantheon, New York, 1967 p 374.

²¹ Article Nine forbids the use of war to settle international disputes, the maintenance of armed forces and 'war potential' by Japan: 'Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based upon justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised', *The Constitution of Japan*, 1947, printed in, G.D. Hook and G. McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution*, Routledge, London, 2001, p 191.

²² NSC 49, Strategic Evaluation of United States Security Needs in Japan, 15/6/1949, *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VII part 2, p 776.

instruments are supported by the formidable material power of the USSR and their use is facilitated by the chaotic aftermath of the war.²³

Documents such as NSC 7 stressed the power of domestic communist movements such as the JCP to undermine US policy and friendly governments without directly involving the USSR. In the minds of the US administration communist parties across the globe, including the JCP, constituted a 'world-wide fifth column directed at frustrating foreign policy, dividing and confusing the people of a country, planting the seeds of disruption in time of war, and subverting the freedom of democratic states'.²⁴

With events both inside and outside Asia contributing to the further deterioration of relations between East and West, including the testing of the first Soviet atomic weapon in the summer of 1949 and Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and Berlin, US policy crystallised into the definitive statement of US Cold War strategy: NSC 68. This document identified the aim of the USSR and the 'international communist movement' as the domination of the globe, starting with the Eurasian landmass, and the elimination of the United States, the principal opponent of this policy.²⁵ High amongst its recommendations to counter this alleged Soviet master plan was the rapid rearmament of the United States and its allies, both as a defence against a Soviet attack and to deter such an attack from taking place.²⁶ This reversal of earlier policy was also deemed necessary due to the massive unilateral reduction in arms and men conducted by the US in the wake of World War Two, which had left the American military (especially the army) severely

²³ NSC 7, Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet Directed World Communism, 30/3/48, *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. I part 2, p 546.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ NSC 68, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 14/4/1950, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen (The Financial History Section of the Ministry of Finance), *Showa Zaiseishi, Sensō Kara Kōwa Made (The Financial History of Shōwa, From War to Peace)*, Vol. 20, Tokyo Keizai Shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1982, p 241.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

overstretched and dwarfed in size by its Soviet counterpart.²⁷ This militarization of US policy from mid-1950 also influenced the internal security of Japan as it was hoped that in the future Japan would contribute in some way to its own defence.

Although this universalistic interpretation was adopted by many, some such as George Kennan opposed what seemed an oversimplification of the motivations and intentions of the world's communist regimes.²⁸ As Kennan later noted in his memoirs, the outbreak of the Korean War also served to strengthen these misplaced beliefs and marginalise views such as his own, which argued for a more nuanced analysis:

The North Korean attack came soon to appear to a great many people in Washington as merely the first move in some "grand design" . . . to extend their [Soviet] power to other parts of the world by use of force. The unexpectedness of their attack . . . only stimulated the already existent preference of the military planners for drawing their conclusions only from the assessed *capabilities* of the adversary, dismissing his *intentions*, which could safely be assumed to be hostile. All this tended to heighten the militarization of thinking about the Cold War generally, and to press us into attitudes where any discriminate estimate of Soviet intentions was unwelcome and unacceptable. In addition, it encouraged the military planners in another tendency, against which I had fought long and bitterly but generally in vain: the tendency, namely, to view Soviet intentions as something existing quite independently from our own behaviour [Kennan's italics].²⁹

²⁷ *John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection*, Microfilm Edition, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University Libraries, (JFD-2), A.W. Radford, 1965, Reel 10, p 18.

²⁸ The Secretary of State [Acheson] to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan [Sebald], 14/1/1948, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI, pp 648-49; Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, p 393; J.L. Gaddis, 'Gaddis's Commentary', in E.R. May (ed), *American Cold War Strategy, Interpreting NSC 68*, Bedford/St Martins, New York, 1993, pp 141-143.

²⁹ Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, p 497.

As Kennan noted the outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950 acted as a catalyst, accelerating and deepening the pace of the policy change started in the preceding months. With the outbreak of the first major 'hot war' of the Cold War, Japan and Korea shifted from the periphery of US policy focus to closer to the centre. Japan did indeed move closer to the centre, but not become entirely central, as many policymakers and documents, such as NSC 73, expressed fears that the attack on South Korea could be a feint preceding a major attack or probe in Europe, the Middle East, Pakistan or elsewhere in East Asia.³⁰ These concerns meant that the European theatre still took precedence in US planning, both in political and military terms.³¹

There were also fears that the North Korean attack could possibly be indirectly directed at Japan and that, if South Korea were to fall, Japan would soon follow, and with it American prestige, policy, and plans for defence in the Pacific. Furthermore, with the possible loss of South Korea, the sole remaining 'traditional market' of Japan's former empire and an important source of food imports, the concern over Japan's economic future and political orientation was grave.³² This perception of Korea as a 'dagger' pointing at the heart of Japan was nothing new, having existed for centuries in the Japanese consciousness and having been used to justify Japanese intervention in the peninsula during the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war.³³ Some US policymakers also suspected that the Korean War was indirectly aimed at weakening the US position in Japan. As Acheson stated, the North

³⁰ NSC 73/4, 25/8/50, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. I, pp 375-383

³¹ D.D. Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War*, Greenwood Press, London, 1999, p 19.

³² W. Stueck, *The Korean War, An International History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p 24; Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, (YF-A10), Subject File, 1945-51, *Miscellaneous State Department Material*, 'Japanese Economic Prospects', 4/8/49, Reel 11.

³³ R. Dingman, 'The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan', in WJ Williams, *A Revolutionary War, Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 1993, p 201.

Korean attack 'was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of importance to the security of American-occupied Japan'.³⁴

The war also presented Japan with a great opportunity to rebuild its economy. Although in time 'the special procurements' (*Tokujū*) of the UN forces helped set Japan on course for its postwar economic 'miracle', at the time no one could tell what the future held.³⁵ The fears that the North Korean attack would spark more violence from the JCP and their radical Korean allies, coupled with the internal security vacuum created by the departure of US tactical troops for Korea, created great concern amongst the Japanese and American authorities, and helped to prompt the creation of the NPR. Uyehara sums up this point well:

A sense of anxiety, uncertainty and threat to internal stability, almost an air of national emergency pervaded the Japanese government and society due to the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950 and the continuing violent tactics of the Japanese Communists in the early 1950s.³⁶

Furthermore, Yoshida stated to the Diet in August 1950: 'The Korean War is not a fire across the river, Communist elements in this country are conspicuously baring their characteristics of fifth columnists as well as their traitorous plots. Accordingly, we are determined to take vigorous steps to prevent red disturbances' [sic].³⁷ First and foremost amongst these efforts was the creation of the NPR three days later.

³⁴ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p 405.

³⁵ Finn, *Winners in Peace*, pp 267-269.

³⁶ C.H. Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan: It's Creation, 1951-1952*, Brill, Leiden, 2010, p 21.

³⁷ *Kyodo News Service Release*, 4/8/1950.

In the short term, the NPR's creation and evolution was highly influenced by the fortunes of the UN forces in Korea. With the pressing need for troops following the collapse of the South Korean Army (ROKA) in mid-1950, the US tactical troops in Japan were hastily dispatched. To replace them as an internal security force in Japan and to deal with the JCP, the NPR was created. With the Chinese entry into the war in the winter of 1950/1951 and the wholesale retreat of the UN forces from the Yalu fears of the fall of South Korea, and possibly Japan, again resurfaced and demands for a more heavily armed force for Japan influenced the direction of the NPR.³⁸

As demonstrated above, through the course of the 1940s and under the influence of various international pressures and American perceptions, Japan gradually shifted from a defeated enemy, whose international role, security apparatus and economy were to be constrained, to the mainstay of American policy and defence in Asia. The American government and GHQ clearly perceived a threat to the key 'domino' in the region from the tide of communist revolution spreading across Asia. The strategic value placed on Japan's industrial plant, skilled workforce, and millions of veterans made even the remotest possibility of losing Japan to communism a major concern and made US policymakers hypersensitive to perceived internal and external threats. The efforts made to prevent this turn of events included economic restructuring to make the economy viable, the 'Red Purge' and creating the NPR.³⁹ It could also be argued that the reduction of the authoritarian influences on the Japanese polity through the democratisation, disarmament, land, social and political reform programmes were all, in part and indirectly, also designed to reduce the appeal, influence and threat from the JCP.

³⁸ R.K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea, KMG in Peace and War*, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2005, pp 167, 169. For more on the evolution of the NPR see: Chapter 5.

³⁹ For more on the 'Red Purge' see: Chapter 1, pp 50-54, 60-68.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, Asia became more central to overall US policy, and Japan became very much the keystone of US Asian strategy, or as Dower christened it, the 'Superdomino' or 'linchpin in an iron noose of American containment in Asia'.⁴⁰ Of vital importance to the security of this keystone was Japan's internal security, a fact well acknowledged by US policymakers at the time. As NSC 49 states, 'this [communist economic and political pressure] makes the question of Japanese internal security more important than ever'.⁴¹ The internal nature of the perceived threat to Japan was detailed further in NSC 49/1: 'the denial of Japan to the USSR constitutes a problem of combating, not attack and invasion but concealed aggression. The threat to Japan comes from agitation, subversion and *coup d'état*'.⁴² Thus, the necessity of an internal security force to secure Japan from this threat was long recognised and finally found form in the NPR.

Competing American Visions of Japanese Security

The attitudes towards Japan's security and what, if anything, should be done in order to bolster it were paralleled by, and interconnected with, the debate on American policy on Japan. Amongst the voices which called for the strengthening of Japan's security apparatus there were a range of opinions as to what was required to secure Japan against communism. Although broadly divisible along organisational lines there was great variation between individuals in the US administration, military and press over what was the best course to adopt in relation to Japan's security. The competing visions of

⁴⁰ J. Dower, 'The Superdomino in Postwar Asia: Japan in and Out of the Pentagon Papers', In N. Chomsky and H. Zinn (eds), *The Pentagon Papers*, Vol. 5, Gravel Edition, Beacon Press, 1972, pp 101-103; J. Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the American Lake, 1945-1950', in E. Friedman and M. Seldon (eds), *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian American Relations*, Pantheon, New York, 1971, p 148.

⁴¹ NSC 49, Strategic Evaluation of United States Security Needs in Japan, 15/6/1949, *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VII part 2, p 776.

⁴² NSC 49/1 Department of State Comments on NSC 49, 15/6/1949, *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VII part 2, p 871.

what various policy actors considered most suitable have been examined by a number of historians. One of the most recent, balanced and lucid accounts is that of Sugita Yoneyuki. Sugita argues that three principal interest groups existed among those concerned with Japan's security: 'pro-rearmament', 'anti-rearmament' and those who favoured 'rearmament with some constraints'.⁴³ Sugita's discussion of these groups is informative and his discussion does highlight some important trends and issues but also contains some flaws. Generally speaking, the military, particularly the Department of the Army (and its successor, the Department of Defense) supported the re-establishment of a formal Japanese army i.e. rearmament.⁴⁴ The US Army supported creation of a new Japanese army mainly in its pursuit of its own short-term aims, principally alleviating some of the burden on its own severely overstretched resources.⁴⁵ In contrast, the majority of the State Department opposed rearmament due to its likely international, political and propaganda ramifications. However, these positions varied, with some individuals on either side adopting positions in opposition to their organisations. For example, Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson doubted Japan's commitment to the US camp and feared rearmament due to his memories of the Pacific War, instead favouring a long Occupation to guarantee Japan's political reorientation.⁴⁶ An overall consensus on the issues was never really achieved either prior to the establishment of the NPR, or for years after.⁴⁷ As Sugita notes, some of this confusion, and indeed some of his own inaccuracies, are due to the terminology employed by historians and some participants.⁴⁸

⁴³ Y. Sugita, *Pitfall or Panacea, The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952*, Routledge, London, 2003, pp 78-80.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*; For a full definition of rearmament see: Introduction, pp 43-48.

⁴⁵ I. Hata, *Shiroku, Nihon Saigunbi (Historical Record, Japanese Rearmament)*, Bungei Shunjūkan, Tokyo, 1976, p 108.

⁴⁶ Schaller, *Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, p 276.

⁴⁷ For more on the struggles over the evolution of the NPR see: Chapter 5, pp 305-330.

⁴⁸ Sugita, *Pitfall or Panacea*, p 80.

For the purposes of this study 'rearmament' is defined as the complete political and organisational recreation of a military force, explicitly named an army and responsible for external security.⁴⁹ Sugita and some of the individuals he discusses used the term 'rearmament' interchangeably in reference to both the creation of an internal security constabulary force and a full army. By effectively analysing this term, one can reveal errors in the classification of some individuals made by Sugita. For example, Kennan is cited as being pro-rearmament although the most he ever seriously advocated was the creation of a constabulary force coupled with a regional arrangement with the Soviets. Kennan characterised his as follows:

I had taken the position, ever since I was sent to Japan by General Marshall in the spring of 1948 . . . that it would be better for us not to leave American forces in Japan and not to rearm the Japanese with conventional forces, but to give them a strong, smart, alert, well-armed military police force [a constabulary] which could cope with any attempts at infiltration from the mainland and let it go at that.⁵⁰

For Kennan as well as many others, the perceived internal threat far exceeded the external, and correspondingly, he believed that preparations for Japan's security should be made to reflect this: 'I felt . . . that we should regard whatever danger there was to Japan from the communist side as a political danger primarily and limit the Japanese defense really to the internal political security of the Japanese islands including their protection against infiltration from the mainland'.⁵¹

Omar Bradley, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1949 to 1953, is also cited by Sugita as being in favour of rearmament, despite his opposition

⁴⁹ For definitions see: Introduction, p 43-48.

⁵⁰ JFD-2, G.F. Kennan, 1967, Reel 7, p 7.

⁵¹ Ibid, pp 7-8.

to a full army and his opinion that the US should only reduce its occupation forces if the Japanese were allowed a strong constabulary or police force.⁵²

The hawkish pair of Willoughby, head of GHQ's G2, and Eichelberger, head of the Eighth Army, are correctly identified by Sugita as supporting rearmament.⁵³ Willoughby's several attempts at creating an army on the basis of the NPR are examined in detail in the course of this study.⁵⁴ Eichelberger's position in favour of a full Japanese Army is supported by documents reproduced by Ōtake in which he recommended a bilateral security treaty allowing Japan 200,000 troops and airpower.⁵⁵ Eichelberger's states his position in various other documents including one from a 1949 newspaper interview quoted in Halliday, where the General extols the virtues of rearmament and the Japanese fighting man:

Dollar for dollar there is no cheaper fighting man in the world than the Japanese. He is already a veteran. His food is simple. His uniform can be manufactured in Japan . . . This man, if armed could defend his country from internal uprisings or in the last analysis his country from invasion . . . Japanese soldiers would be a commander's dream. They are the kind who stay on a ridge-top until they die.⁵⁶

This description is also instructive in reflecting that the appreciation of the principal threat to Japan's security, even amongst the more hawkish pro-rearmament policymakers, was of internal communist subversion.

⁵² Sugita, *Pitfall or Panacea*, p 78, F. Kowalski, *Nihon Saigunbi (Japanese Rearmament)*, The Simul Press, Tokyo, 1969, p 32.

⁵³ Kowalski, *Nihon Saigunbi*, p 32, Hata, *Shiroku*, pp 94-99.

⁵⁴ For more on Willoughby and the NPR see: Chapters 2, pp 140-144; Chapter 3, pp 209-220.

⁵⁵ Eichelberger, 14/12/48, printed in, H. Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai Shiryōshū (Postwar Japan Defence Problem Materials Collection)*, Daiichikan, Higunjika kara Saigunbi he (Volume 1, From Demilitarisation to Rearmament), Sanichishobo, 1991, p 257.

⁵⁶ *Osaka Mainichi* 12/2/49, also quoted in J. Halliday, *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism*, Pantheon, New York, 1975, pp 197-198.

Although not included in Sugita's analysis, John Foster Dulles and President Truman, despite their differing political roots, also could be characterised as being in favour of Japanese rearmament, especially after 1950.⁵⁷ However, in both men, this desire was, tempered to some extent by an awareness of the limitations placed on this approach by various factors. These factors included: the Japanese constitution; the scarcity of available resources due to both political and practical reasons; the potential negative influence on wider (particularly Australasian) alliance politics that Japanese rearmament would have; Yoshida's resistance; and the impact of being seen to force the Japanese into rearmament.⁵⁸ Truman's successor, Eisenhower, displayed a greater awareness of these limitations, as evidenced through his administration's policies which de-emphasised the previous push for Japanese rearmament regardless of the political and economic consequences.⁵⁹ In July 1950 awareness of the seeming constraints on rearming Japan also prompted Dulles to briefly consider the creation of a constabulary force based on the civil police, or some sort of UN sponsored Japanese 'volunteer' force.⁶⁰ Despite their merits, these ideas were soon abandoned by Dulles in his efforts to convince Yoshida to contribute more definitively to Japan's external security.

⁵⁷ M. P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power, National Security, the Truman Administration and The Cold War*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1992, pp 347, 430; JFD-2, G.F. Kennan, 1967, Reel 7, p 8.

⁵⁸ J. Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p 190; J. Swenson-Wright, 'US-Japan Diplomatic and Security Relations Post-1945: a *Historical Perspective*', in M. Evangelista and J. Reppy (eds), *The United States and Asian Security*, Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 26, Ithaca, 2002, p 75; T. Nishida, *Origins of U.S. Security Alliances in the Asia Pacific Region: A Comparative Perspective*, Paper Presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 30/8-2/9/07, pp 47-49..

⁵⁹ Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies*, p 190; NSC 5516/1, 9/4/55, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, pp 52-55.

⁶⁰ H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 1: 1947-1952*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (hereafter YF-A16), 2F-90, Memorandum, Dulles to Nitze, 20/7/50.

In his examination of the anti-rearmament camp Sugita limits the effectiveness of his study by focusing principally on State Department officials and by looking mostly at documents created prior to 1948, a year after which positions began to change.⁶¹ John Emmerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs, Saltzman, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, W.W. Butterworth and John Howard, are all cited as being anti-rearmament due to their concerns over the economic feasibility and political wisdom of rearming Japan.⁶² MacArthur is also described as being opposed to rearmament. This is a reasonably accurate portrayal of MacArthur's resistance to creation of armies in both South Korea and Japan.⁶³ In support of this, MacArthur did argue at various times that economically Japan could not rearm for twenty-five years, that he favoured complete disarmament and neutrality, and that maintenance of any force other than the civil police would jeopardise Japan's fragile economic recovery.⁶⁴ However, what Sugita does not recognise is the fact that MacArthur's position vacillated over time, and to win over Defence Department support for a peace treaty, in June 1950 MacArthur dropped his calls for neutrality, and agreed to an alliance, US bases, industrial reconstruction, and other measures, which Schaller argues implied 'rebuilding at least modest armed forces'.⁶⁵ Indeed MacArthur, in late 1949 discussions with Sebald, also said that the creation of a constabulary could be discussed during peace negotiations.⁶⁶ Indeed for his time as SCAP,

⁶¹ Sugita, *Pitfall or Panacea*, pp 79-80.

⁶² Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Emmerson), 9/10/1946, *FRUS* 1946, Vol. VIII, pp 337-39; Saltzman to Butterworth, 9/4/48, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI, p 728; *Records of the US Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan 1945-1949*, (SIJ-3) Butterworth and Howard to Secretary of State, 15/11/49, Reel 12.

⁶³ Y.W. Lee, 'Birth of The Korean Army, 1945-50, Evaluation of The Role of the U.S. Occupation Forces', *Korea & World Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter 1980, p 644; Sawyer, *Military Advisors*, p 10.

⁶⁴ Eichelberger Diary, 13/3/48, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimondai*, Vol.1, p 250; Hata, *Shiroku*, pp 94-95; MacArthur to the Secretary of State, 1/9/47, *FRUS* 1947, Vol. VI, pp 512-513; Conversation among MacArthur, Draper, and Kennan, 21/3/48, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. VI, pp 708-709.

⁶⁵ Memorandum on Concept Governing Security in Postwar Japan, 23/6/1950, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. VI, pp 122-1228; Schaller, *Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, pp 277-278.

⁶⁶ Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Political Advisor in Japan (Sebald), 21/9/1949, *FRUS* 1949, Vol. VII, p 862.

MacArthur remained opposed to an army and favourable towards a constabulary, with the exception of a very brief period in which he supported the militarization of the NPR after the Chinese intervention in Korea.⁶⁷

The final group Sugita identifies are those he believes favoured rearmament with some qualifications although a more effective designation here would be those who favoured establishing an internal security constabulary force. As noted above, this division would have included many who Sugita depicts as pro-rearmament such as Kennan and Bradley as well as some labelled as anti-rearmament including MacArthur after June 1950. A figure which Sugita places in his third category, who fits perfectly in the constabulary bracket, is Harry F. Kern, journalist and head of an influential lobby group, the American Council on Japan (ACJ). In a policy paper for the ACJ, Kern argued explicitly for the need for 'a well-armed and well-trained constabulary of at least 150,000 men . . . entrusted with guarding tunnels bridges and similar installations' to protect against internal revolutionary sabotage, with recourse to rearmament only as a last resort, and then only under heavy US supervision.⁶⁸ This quotation again reinforces the largely internal threat communism was perceived to pose to Japan in the minds of many Americans and Japanese.

Most other historians also falter in their analysis of US attitudes due to the inadequacy of their definitions of rearmament. A prominent example is John Dower, perhaps the most influential scholar of the Occupation working in English. In his principal work on the Cold War and the Occupation of Japan, Dower argues that: 'The Pentagon and the State Department fell into a quarrel over policy toward Japan which was not resolved until September 1950, although both sides were in general agreement before then on the

⁶⁷ For more on MacArthur and the Chinese intervention see: Chapter 5, pp 287-293.

⁶⁸ H. Schonberger, 'The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952', *Pacific History Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1977, p 346.

necessity of Japanese rearmament'.⁶⁹ Dower's argument is undermined by his inaccurate appreciation of the meaning of 'rearmament' to the policymakers involved and his inclusion of US bases in his conception of Japanese rearmament.⁷⁰ This is erroneous as the US bases were not owned by the Japanese state and that as they had effectively existed from the start of the Occupation the Japanese state was never actually disarmed under this definition. Also, as Dingman, Drifte and Welfield note, no consensus was reached by this stage and if anything was gaining acceptance, it was the creation of an internal security constabulary, not rearmament.⁷¹ In addition to the sources cited above, numerous others can be called upon to support this argument. For example, a late 1949 memorandum explaining the State Department's position to the Department of Defense contains the following statements:

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Department of Defense . . . [with] some of the reasons why the Department of State does not regard it as feasible in the [peace] treaty to authorise the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. It is assumed . . . that Japan should be permitted to maintain a well equipped constabulary, including a coast guard, for the purpose of preserving internal order.⁷²

⁶⁹ J. Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia', In J Dower, *Japan in War and Peace, Essays on History, Race and Culture*, Harper Collins, London, 1995, pp 180-181.

⁷⁰ J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, London, 1988, pp 377, 400. Ironically, Dower shares the orthodox historian Dunn's definition of rearmament by including US bases. F.S. Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963, pp 78-80.

⁷¹ R. Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-52*, Saltire Press, Brighton, 1983, pp 46, 101; J. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse, Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System*, The Athlone Press, London, 1988, p 72; R. Dingman, 'The U.S. Navy and the Cold War: The Japan Case', in C.L. Symonds (ed), *New Aspects of Naval History*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1981, p 302.

⁷² YF-A16, 2B-161, Position of Department of State on Reactivation of Japanese Armed Forces, 16/11/49.

Clearly this quotation illustrates the fact that, unlike the Defence Department, which largely supported rearmament, the State Department, whilst supporting the creation of an internal security constabulary, opposed rearmament for political reasons. The quotation also reveals that at the time, the creation of a paramilitary internal security constabulary was not considered to be rearmament, another distinction which Dower ignores. This demonstrates that by using definitions of 'rearmament' and the 'constabulary' which match the meanings used and understood at the time, a more accurate analysis of American attitudes is generated. The model of three groups, those in favour of rearmament, those opposed, and those in favour of a constabulary, provides the most effective depiction of the diverse and shifting range of opinion amongst policymakers.

As mentioned above, these three conflicting groups did not really reconcile their differences before June 1950 or even afterwards. The necessity of speedily providing support for the faltering South Korean Army and the imperative of maintaining internal security against the perceived threat from the JCP, finally forced MacArthur's hand into opting for the latter group and prompting the creation of the NPR in August 1950.

US Constabularies Before the NPR

If the early Cold War context provided the impetus behind the designs for strengthening the security forces in Japan and if these designs were debated between several competing groups, the eventual design adopted, the NPR, was, at least in part, influenced by the historical antecedents of the NPR. There were a number of other contemporary paramilitary constabulary forces highly familiar to many of the American military officers and civilians involved in the struggle over Japanese rearmament. The principal forces which

provided a model for the NPR were the US Constabulary, the Philippines Constabulary (PC) and the Korean Constabulary (KC), also sometimes called the Korean National Police Reserve.

The only Europe based American constabulary to influence the NPR was the US Constabulary.⁷³ This force was a highly mobile and lightly armed unit of the US forces occupying Germany and Austria and served as a third tier force, operating between the civil police and US tactical troops. The force was designed to fulfil a range of internal security functions considered too dangerous for the civil police, but too small or police-like for the US regular forces, ranging from riot control and conducting large raids on organised crime, to use in suppressing insurgencies.⁷⁴ Davis sums up this role well in stating that the US Constabulary was 'designed to take quick and effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellion and other acts prejudicial to the security of the occupation forces'.⁷⁵ The US Constabulary, like the NPR, was organised in a constabulary structure, stationed in company size units throughout the US occupation zones, and principally concentrated near major population centres.⁷⁶ The range of missions the constabulary was designed to fulfil was reflected in its broad array of equipment, which included motorcycles and horses for rural patrols, light aircraft for monitoring borders and the movement of refugees, and small numbers of light tanks, designed to be used to help quell rebellions or serious riots.⁷⁷

⁷³ R.M. Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2004, pp 60-68.

⁷⁴ G3 (Operations, Enforcement, Directives and Repatriate Affairs) Historical Sub-Section, *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary, 3 October 1945 – 30 June 1947*, HQ United States Constabulary, 1947, p 12, hereafter, *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary*.

⁷⁵ F.M. Davis, *Come as a Conqueror, The United States Army's Occupation of Germany 1945-1949*, Macmillan, New York, 1967, p 166.

⁷⁶ *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary*, p 16; Davis, *Come as a Conqueror*, p 163.

⁷⁷ J.S. Brown, 'Combat Cops? The Army as Constabulary: Lessons from Our Past', *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 138, September 2000, p 68.

Despite its similarities in organisation and mission to the other constabularies, the US constabulary had a major difference: it was staffed exclusively by American soldiers. The idea of using US officers and NCOs to lead German men was the original conception for the force, but through a series of debates within the US Army in late 1945, the idea was rejected due to its political ramifications.⁷⁸ It was during this debate that General Marshall contacted MacArthur, his counterpart in the Far East, and a man plagued by the same pressing political and public demands for speedy demobilisation of much of his garrison.⁷⁹ Marshall asked MacArthur for his thoughts on the idea of constabularies for Japan and Korea, staffed by US officers and with Japanese and Korean rank and file.⁸⁰ The following day, seemingly impressed by his idea, Marshall also asked Eisenhower for his opinion on adapting the plan for Germany. Eisenhower replied that he thought the plan was applicable to their theatre, but with appropriate adjustments to the local political situation.⁸¹ The Generals in Europe eventually decided that this prohibited the employment of Germans in the force, principally on the grounds that the move could prove a propaganda disaster if the Soviets accused them of recreating the German army. This decision prompted the creation of an all American constabulary.⁸² MacArthur also allowed the creation of an all Korean constabulary force but rejected the idea for Japan, until 1950 when changed circumstances required the resurrection of this idea, and the creation of the NPR.

⁷⁸ *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary*, pp 22-23

⁷⁹ B.J. Harris, *The United States Zone Constabulary: An Analysis of Manning Issues and Their Impact on Operations*, Unpublished Masters Dissertation, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006, p 19

⁸⁰ Appendix V. 'The 'Constabulary Letter', 2 October 1945'.

⁸¹ *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary*, p 3; MacArthur Memorial Archives, RG-6, Series III, (MMA), W-72324, AGNAR from Marshall to USFET, 2/10/45; MMA, S-27081, USFET Eisenhower to AGNAR for Marshall, 8/10/45

⁸² *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary*, p 4; MMA, W-74194, AGNAR from Marshall to USFET personal for Eisenhower, 9/10/45.

Alongside this direct link, the middle and lower tiers of the US military also contributed to the passing of the knowledge of the constabulary model to Japan before 1950. As numerous officers had served in the US Constabulary the concept of a constabulary used to bolster the internal security of states facing internal and external communist pressure must have been familiar to many of them. The movement and social contact between American military officers must also have brought the idea to Japan before the establishment of the NPR in July 1950. Furthermore, The *Small Wars Manual* a widely read 1940 US military publication on war and reconstruction operations contained almost an entire chapter on the creation, organisation and training of constabularies, and recommended their creation as a standard operating procedure in US occupied countries.⁸³ However, despite the possible influence of developments in Europe on the idea of creating a constabulary force for Japan, there were two other forces much closer at hand and far more prominent in the minds of American military officers in the Far East: the Korean and the Philippines constabularies.

The Philippines constabulary (PC) (also briefly known in the postwar period as the Military Police Command) was the original model of all American constabularies. The force's character, almost identical to that of the NPR, was defined in 1955 by Thomas as follows: 'The Philippine constabulary is a semi-military organization which functions as a national police force. It is equipped and trained to handle insurrections, mass disturbances, and large scale banditry. It is not trained for crime detection, traffic control, and other every day aspects of regular police work'.⁸⁴

⁸³ United States Marine Corps, Chapter XII 'Armed Native Organisations', *Small Wars Manual*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1940.

⁸⁴ M.L. Thomas, 'Philippine Police Systems', *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, Vol. 46, No. 1, May-Jun 1955, p 116.

The PC was officially set up on 8 August 1901 by the US military in an attempt to win popular support amongst a disaffected Filipino population.⁸⁵ The actual creation of the PC was preceded by a number of units of Filipino police set up by General Elwell Otis in 1899, who believed their potential usefulness lay in their knowledge of the archipelago's culture, language and terrain and their potential to free up US soldiers for battle against the ongoing insurgency.⁸⁶ Despite these potential benefits, Arthur MacArthur (father of Douglas), then military governor of the Philippines, doubted the loyalty of the islanders and vehemently opposed the establishment of the PC, principally on security grounds: 'MacArthur was unalterably opposed to creating a Filipino constabulary that would be equal in size to several U.S. Regiments and armed in comparable fashion and to placing that constabulary under the [Philippine] commission's control'.⁸⁷ However, after a bruising and bitter battle between MacArthur and his civilian counterparts the General relented. In December 1900, under heavy pressure from the civilian Philippine commission and its head, Taft, MacArthur assented to a massive expansion of the Filipino auxiliaries including the creation of the PC. The reasons cited for the creation of the PC were very similar to those Otis had used, with the supporters of the force claiming that native police would be useful as auxiliaries for the US troops, as guides, police, intelligence gatherers and as a means of denying manpower to the insurgents.⁸⁸ As Silbey notes, the PC was:

⁸⁵ M. McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft, U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency and Counter Terrorism, 1940-1990*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1992, pp 85,87; R.J. Berthoff, 'Taft and MacArthur: A Study in Civil-Military Relations', *World Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Jan 1953, p 198.

⁸⁶ D.J. Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire, The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902*, Hill and Wang, New York, 2008, pp 113-114. This role in freeing up US forces for the front is identical to that of the NPR, see below.

⁸⁷ K.R. Young, *The General's General, The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur*, Westview Press, Oxford, 1994, p 277.

⁸⁸ Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire*, pp 164-165.

A force whose members instinctively understood the culture and behaviour of those they were fighting because they were usually from the same ethnic group. Native police and soldiers also had access to contacts and intelligence from the community that Americans, hamstrung by their lack of language skills and their racism could not match. In addition, recruiting men of military age for these bodies and paying them a reasonable wage drained the pool of possible recruits for the insurgents.⁸⁹

Figure IV. The Emblem of the Philippines Constabulary⁹⁰



Aside from its practical uses, like the later KC and NPR, the PC also had political value in various spheres. For example, Young speculates that the PC played more than one role in the struggle between MacArthur and the Commission. In Young's view, Taft pushed for the creation of the PC to circumvent the power and influence of MacArthur and the US military, as he knew that the PC would be directly under the control of the Philippine Commission.⁹¹ The original PC handbook of 1901 and manual of 1922 both assert this civilian control of the PC, rendering it distinct from the US military

⁸⁹ Ibid, p 165.

⁹⁰ Picture Courtesy of: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PHillipine_Constabulary_logo.jpg.

⁹¹ Young, *The General's General*, p 277.

command structure.⁹² Furthermore, as a local force manned largely by Filipinos, but acting in support of the government, the PC helped to undermine the racial and nationalist propaganda used by the guerrillas, from which they won much of their support.⁹³ The internal role of the PC was also identical to its successors in Korea and Japan: 'The object was a national, paramilitary force with primary responsibility for internal security and law enforcement', with the American armed forces responsible for external security.⁹⁴ The constabulary character of the PC is confirmed through an examination of its original handbook, which illustrates its semi-military uniform, use of modified US Army drill and quasi-military legal position, subject to elements of both military and civil law.⁹⁵ The PC also used a number of police techniques when performing its duties including surveillance, tracking, the use of disguises and of plain clothes officers.⁹⁶

In fulfilling this internal security role the PC was employed against the rising waves of rural unrest in the Philippines in the 1930s, was used by the occupying Japanese against guerrillas during the Pacific War, against the Huk guerrillas after the war and numerous riots, risings, bandit groups and other perceived threats to the state.⁹⁷ Like the later KC and Republic of Korea Army, but unlike the NPR, the PC had a political role in suppressing dissent and perceived opponents of the ruling regime. This repressive function sometimes resulted in atrocities such the Bud Dajo and Mount Bangsak massacres and the widespread brutality against the Huk rebels in the early 1950s. The PC were also involved other odious practices such as

⁹² *Handbook, Philippines Constabulary*, Philippine Commission, Manila, 1901, p 3, *Manual for the Philippine Constabulary*, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1922, p 9.

⁹³ Berthoff, 'Taft and MacArthur', p 199.

⁹⁴ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p 85.

⁹⁵ *Handbook, Philippines Constabulary*, pp 16-29. Again this approach to the men's training, uniform and legal position were very similar in the NPR.

⁹⁶ J. Kuzmarov, 'American Police Training and Political Violence: From the Philippines Conquest to the Killing fields of Afghanistan and Iraq', *The Asia Pacific Journal*, 15/3/10, pp 2-3.

⁹⁷ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p 85.

extrajudicial detention and executions; instances of torture and numerous other human rights abuses.⁹⁸

In terms of structure and function the PC was stationed in small units throughout the country, and was charged with the responsibilities of controlling the population and maintaining peace and order. The training manual issued to the PC defined their role as follows: 'Members of the constabulary are peace officers authorised and empowered to prevent and suppress brigandage, unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections and other breaches of the peace and violations of the law'.⁹⁹ The PC was also responsible for the training of the civil police, although in practice this training was mainly in military drill, skills not really useful for regular civil police work. Illustrative of its role as an internal security force, the PC had wide-ranging powers in relation to the civil police. When local police forces could not or would not deal with problems the PC could step in and assume control of the situation. To fulfil this role the PC had jurisdiction throughout the Philippines and could enter any area or city without permission of the local forces. The PC could assume direct control of any police unit at the request of local officials, senior PC members or the president, a power often abused for political purposes in later years.

These extensive and intrusive powers often created friction, particularly between the PC and the more powerful civil police units. Chief amongst these was the Manila police department with which the PC came close to armed conflict on several occasions, most notably during the 1953 elections.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ J. Kuzumarov, 'American Police Training and Political Violence: From the Philippines Conquest to the killing Fields of Afghanistan and Iraq', *Japan Focus*, 15/3/2010; A.W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire, the United States, The Philippines and the Rise of The Surveillance State*, the University of Wisconsin Press, London, 2009, p 133.

⁹⁹ *Manual for the Philippine Constabulary*, p 9.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas, 'Philippine Police Systems', pp 116-117; C.T.R. Bohannon, 'Antiguerrilla Operations', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 341, May 1962, p 22.

The PC had limitations in its susceptibility to political influence, its brutality and the fact that the paramilitary character of its training made it unsuited to standard police work. Thomas argued that the PC was inadequate in some of its functions, as the training it provided to the Philippines police was of poor quality and it was unsuited for police work, noting that 'the extremely military character of the constabulary qualifies that organisation only for the function of discouraging, or if need be crushing, insurrections and large scale banditry'.¹⁰¹ This internal security role was the key mission of the PC, just like the KC and NPR which followed it, and any shortcomings the PC might have had in the civil policing arena were outweighed by its usefulness as internal security force. This fact is evidenced by its survival until 1991 (when it merged with the Integrated National Police to form the Philippine National Police) and its use by the US as a model for future constabulary forces, in the 1910s to 1930s in Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Panama.¹⁰²

Perhaps the most influential model for both the organisation and evolution of the NPR can be found in the Korean constabulary (KC), also sometimes called the Korean Police Reserve or by the name of its American advisory body, KMAG (US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea). The geographical proximity and role of MacArthur in overseeing both South Korea and Japan make it certain that knowledge of the KC existed in the minds of those later involved in the creation of the NPR. MacArthur, the man ultimately responsible for the creation of the NPR, clearly had a deep knowledge of both the main forerunners of the NPR, a knowledge which was shared by many of

¹⁰¹ Thomas, 'Philippine Police Systems', p 117.

¹⁰² J. Clarke, 'A United States Perspective', 3rd Session, 2004 Seminar on The Multinational Specialised Units, printed in *Rassengna dell' Arma Carabinieri*, Supplement 4, 2004, McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p 85; A.J. Bachevich Jnr, 'The American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua, 1927-28', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 4, No. 3, July 1980, p 253; M. Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, Basic Books, New York, 2003, pp 115, 170, 178-179, 234-235, 244; Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger*, pp 61-70.

his subordinates. MacArthur's father was directly involved in the creation of the PC and MacArthur himself served for years in the Philippines alongside, and in command of, the PC, both before and during the Second World War.¹⁰³ In his position as Commander in Chief of US forces in the Far East (CINCFE), MacArthur also oversaw both the occupations of Japan and South Korea and thus was involved in creating, and overseeing the operations of, the KC.¹⁰⁴ These facts alongside the evidence of the 2 October 1945 Marshall letter, and MacArthur's later comparisons of the NPR and KC's constabulary nature, clearly show that MacArthur knew the model well.¹⁰⁵ The transfer of the constabulary concept from the Philippines via Korea and Germany to Japan is also noted by some Japanese historians.¹⁰⁶ A good example can be found in the multivolume work *Nihon Dōjidaishi (Japanese Contemporary History)* by the Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (History Studies Society). The argument presented in this work asserts that the concept of the constabulary or 'police reserve' was created by the Americans in their colonies and occupied nations in the early postwar period. The authors argue that the NPR and its precursors in the Philippines and Korea were set up as expeditious and economical adjuncts to US control in the territories. All were comprised of citizens of the state in which they served and were established during conflict to assist the US forces within the country by providing internal security. None of the police reserves were armed with tanks and heavy weapons and were designed to fight as light infantry only armed with rifles and carbines, although heavier weapons were adopted if the constabularies

¹⁰³ D.C. James, *The Years of MacArthur, Volume I, 1880-1941*, Leo Cooper, London, 1970, pp 300-301, 340.

¹⁰⁴ E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, Continuum, London, 2002, pp 64-65; Sawyer, *Military Advisors*, pp 3, 7, 11, 29.

¹⁰⁵ Young, *The General's General*, p 277; W.M. Leary (ed), *MacArthur and the American Century, A Reader*, University of Nebraska Press, London, 2001, p xxiii; Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines, *Report on National Defense in the Philippines, 27/4/36*, printed in, D. MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks*, Praeger, London, 1965, pp 88-95; see Appendix V. 'The 'Constabulary Letter' 2 October 1945'; YF-A16, 1F-42, CINCFE to DEPAR, 8/1/51; D. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, Heinemann, London, 1965, p 328.

¹⁰⁶ M. Watanabe and H. Uemura, 'Keisatsuyōbitai no Henbō - Konsutabiyurari kara Bōeibutai e' (The Transformation of the NPR – From the Constabularies to the National Defense Corps), *Gunji Shigaku*, Vol. 43, No. 1, June 2007, p 36.

evolved to take on an external security role.¹⁰⁷ Despite some inaccuracies, for example the PC was established in 1901 and not in the postwar period, and the neglect of the influence of the US constabulary, the argument presented in the work is compelling and describes the transfer of the constabulary concept faithfully.

As well as confirming the transfer of the constabulary concept, the KC was the second main antecedent of the NPR, and the closest one in terms of geography, time frame and organisational connections. The key factor in the background to the establishment of the KC was the disruption and unrest in South Korea in the aftermath of the Second World War. The rapid collapse of Japanese colonial rule, the ensuing chaos and poor American planning led to widespread lawlessness in southern Korea. This situation and the absence of any unified Korean political leadership led to the creation of a myriad of political groups, many with their own private militias.¹⁰⁸ The increase in crime in the wake of defeat and the battles between these private armies created conditions which overwhelmed the Korean National Police (KNP).¹⁰⁹ Much like the decentralised police in Japan, the KNP struggled to maintain order in the face of serious crime, unrest and corruption.¹¹⁰ The KNP had lost all its Japanese officers, was poorly equipped and motivated and American tactical troops had to accompany its officers on even the most simple patrols and activities. The KNP was likewise unable to cope with the internecine battles between the political parties' private armies and the simultaneous waves of strikes, demonstrations and sabotage. This weakness made them almost

¹⁰⁷ Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (History Studies Society) (ed), *Nihon Dōjidaishi 2: Sennryo Taisaku no Tennkan to Kōwa (Japanese Contemporary History 2: The Peace Treaty and Change of Occupation Policies)*, Aoki Shoten, Tokyo, 1990, pp 100-101.

¹⁰⁸ B. Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume One: Liberation and The Emergence of Separate Regimes: 1945-1947*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981, p 170.

¹⁰⁹ A.R. Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945-1950', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.23, No.4, 1997, p 509.

¹¹⁰ C. Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan, Control, Corruption and Resistance to Reform*, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 1997, pp 184, 198-203.

entirely reliant on US soldiers for support in all but the most benign situations.¹¹¹ As Millet notes, the need for a constabulary was pressing:

So pervasive was theft, robbery, property destruction, and racketeering that in December 1945, Hodge received permission to form a second force, the 'police reserve' or Korean constabulary, initially planned for 25,000 and trained as a mobile provincial force (nine regiments, one for each province) capable of quick reaction to mob violence or guerrilla attacks on KNP substations.¹¹²

To make matters worse the KNP were widely despised amongst the general population with most officers having served in the hated Japanese colonial police. The KNP's wages were also so meagre that officers were often forced into systematic corruption and theft. This conduct earned the KNP a reputation for 'nepotism, corruption, arrogance, brutality and theft'.¹¹³ This popular hatred often escalated into violence, with the KNP and their families often being the target of guerrillas and civil disorder.¹¹⁴ In the face of such difficulties the KNP clearly needed support and with the US tactical troops likely to be withdrawn in the future a Korean force able to support the KNP in maintaining internal security was required.

Despite General Hodge's consistent desire for an army, political constraints and the effect the establishment of an army would have on negotiations with the Soviet Union over the future of Korea, along with pressing internal

¹¹¹ Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. 1, p 369.

¹¹² A.R. Millet, 'The Korean People, Missing in Action in the Misunderstood War, 1948-54' In W. Stueck (ed), *The Korean War in World History*, the University Press of Kentucky, London, 2004, p 27.

¹¹³ J. Merrill, 'The Cheju-do Rebellion', *Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 2, 1982, p 155; Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', p 509.

¹¹⁴ Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. 1, pp 356-357; Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', pp 516-17.

security problems, resulted in the creation of the KC.¹¹⁵ MacArthur, Hodge's superior had also resisted the creation of a Korean army, thinking it beyond his mandate, and opting for a constabulary instead.¹¹⁶

The KC was thus created 'to assist civilian police agencies in the maintenance of civil peace and security and the defence of the rights of the people against civil disorder'.¹¹⁷ Like the NPR and the PC, the KC strengthened the internal security of the government it served, both physically and politically. The KC gradually freed US forces from the potentially embarrassing and increasingly dangerous encounters with the Korean population, and deflecting nationalist attacks, and Korean and international accusations of imperialism.

The KC was also intended to help defuse the arms race between the political parties' private armies by inducting their members into the KC. This recruitment across the political spectrum coupled with Hodge's decision not to allow vetting of recruits on political grounds, and the refusal of the KNP to do any investigation of its own, led to the establishment of large communist cells in many of the KC's regiments (see table IV below) and the eventual mutiny and rebellion of these same units.¹¹⁸ The refusal of the KNP to cooperate in the recruitment and screening of recruits of the KC was just one aspect of the bitter and often violent rivalry between the two organisations. The KNP saw the KC as a threat to its existence and pretensions to become the core of the future armed forces of Korea. The preferential treatment of the KNP in terms of having first access to arms and equipment further enhanced this delusion. With the expansion of the KC and its assumption, often without

¹¹⁵ S.S. Cho, *Korea in World Politics 1940-1950, An Evaluation of American Responsibility*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1967, p 247.

¹¹⁶ Sawyer, *Military Advisors*, p 11.

¹¹⁷ USAMGIK Ordinance No. 28, printed in, Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War, Volume One*, University of Nebraska Press, London, 2000, p 62.

¹¹⁸ Millett, 'The Korean People', p 31; Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', pp 513-514.

authorisation, of many regular police powers, units found themselves in direct professional and social competition with surrounding KNP units for local favours, patronage and supplies from the Americans.¹¹⁹ The Leftwing politics of some of the units of the KC were also unacceptable to the reactionary KNP and the members of both forces often harassed, arrested, intimidated and physically assaulted each other both on and off duty.¹²⁰ The most serious of these early clashes between the forces occurred in June 1947 in the town of Yongnam in southwest Korea. After the arrest of one of their number by the KNP, a whole KC company attacked a KNP police station to free their comrade, the ensuing gun battle left three dead, with the fighting only subsiding when the KC unit ran out of ammunition.¹²¹ Despite the waves of terrorism, murder and mob violence which forced them to grudgingly cooperate, the rivalry between the KNP and KC/Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) persisted even after the North Korean invasion of 1950.¹²²

Despite the Leftwing politics of some of its units, the KC was created as a weapon of the state and was used as such against many perceived and actual opponents of the regime. Although the force did officially eliminate the numerous political private armies which had mushroomed after the Japanese surrender, it effectively replaced them with a single private army in the hands of the Rightwing Rhee government. From 1948 to the official outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 the government proceeded to use the KC, alongside the KNP, against dissent and groups it considered a threat in what Millet and others have described as a brutal, undeclared South Korean 'civil war'.¹²³ These activities often comprised of genuine and necessary internal security

¹¹⁹ Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', pp 514, 516.

¹²⁰ Millett, 'The Korean People, p 27.

¹²¹ Sawyer, *Military Advisors*, p 26, Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', p 516.

¹²² U.S. Army Center of Military History *Historical Manuscripts Collection: The Korean War*, (YF-A4), *Special Problems in the Korean Conflict. (Miscellaneous Problems and Their Solutions)*, 'Chapter VII: Rear Area Security'. HQ Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK), 1952, Reel 14, p 49.

¹²³ A.R Millet, *The War For Korea 1945-1950, A House Burning*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2005, pp 5, 142

missions but also included the torture and arbitrary detention and execution of individuals judged, often without justification, to be threats to the regime.¹²⁴ This period represented a cycle of brutal violence and reprisals in which, as Merrill notes: 'Atrocities were committed by both sides, the guerrilla as well as government forces were often indiscriminate in their use of violence'.¹²⁵ Although Merrill is correct in arguing that both sides were often equally appalling in their behaviour, and despite the complicating difficulties in distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants in the civilian figures, the death toll of 7,235 security personnel compared to the estimates of 30,000 to 100,000 civilian deaths, seems to suggest the violence may have been somewhat one-sided.¹²⁶

The KC was officially established on 15 January 1946, the same date that all political paramilitary groups in southern Korea were formally abolished.¹²⁷ Recruitment began and applicants were accepted after filling in a questionnaire, having a medical examination and a brief interview with a US officer.¹²⁸ With the US emphasis on the selection of 'experienced' recruits, the character of the KC was coloured by the cultures of the foreign militaries of which many of the recruits were formerly members. Despite a few recruits coming from the former Nationalist Chinese army, Korean anti-Japanese guerrilla groups, and some being refugees from north of the 38th parallel, the overwhelming majority had served in the Japanese military. That the bias towards the 'experienced' resulted in the selection of overwhelming numbers of veterans from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Manchukuo Army (IMA) is revealed by the fact that of the first 110 officers, 108 had IJA or

¹²⁴ Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', p 521.

¹²⁵ Merrill, 'The Cheju-do Rebellion', p 171.

¹²⁶ Millet, *A House Burning*, p 142.

¹²⁷ Lee, *Birth of The Korean Army*, p 651.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, p 648.

IMA backgrounds.¹²⁹ This large number of recruits with a Japanese military background inevitably influenced the methods and ethos of the KC.

The Japanese influence was further compounded by the tiny number of US advisors assigned to each KC unit; there were ten in total for the entire force by 1948, with some supervising several regiments, often hundreds of miles apart.¹³⁰ Without adequate supervision, the former IJA and IMA officers and men reverted to many of their former methods and practices including corruption, the wearing of riding boots, the carrying of riding crops and swords, the routine brutalisation of their men, and the adoption of obsolete tactics such as 'banzai' charges.¹³¹ Some of these practices did prove effective in expediting the basic training of the KC but their brutality sparked many of the grievances both inside and outside the force which later flared into rebellion, encouraged the mistreatment of prisoners and civilians, and their anachronistic nature contributed to their lacklustre performance against the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) in June 1950.

The KC was deployed throughout South Korea and its units were both recruited and based in the same region. A regiment was created for each province and local recruitment and local ties both made the KC more susceptible to infiltration but paradoxically more effective in defending their region. The local, dispersed deployment of the KC, with strength often concentrated in areas of domestic communist strength, was identical in concept to that of the NPR and shows the internal security role of both organisations.¹³² As the KC evolved into the South Korean Army and assumed more external security responsibilities, if not the capabilities to fulfil them, the posture of the force was correspondingly adjusted, with many units being redeployed to the 38th parallel, South Korea's only land frontier.

¹²⁹ Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', p 511.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p 514.

¹³¹ *Time*, 5/6/1950; Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. 1, pp 175-176.

¹³² For more on the deployment of the NPR see: Chapter 3, pp 174-182.

Like the NPR would be, the KC was trained to fit the internal security role assigned to it. Weapons training did take place but the primary focus, especially in the early stages, as with the NPR, was riot control, public order training and internal security duties.¹³³ As the South Korean official history states, 'training focused on the maintenance of public security, and emphasised bayonet drills, rifle-handling exercises and riot control. It had little to do with combat training', a description, if deprived of its bayonet drill, which also accurately describes the training of the NPR.¹³⁴

Despite the collapse of the South Korean Army in 1950, the KC/ROKA achieved some successes in the internal security missions for which it was created in during the South Korean civil war of 1948-1950, battling guerrillas, rebels, mutineers and rioters, and in some cases brutality suppressing legitimate and peaceful civilian protest.¹³⁵ Indeed, much like Frank Kowalski (a senior figure in the creation of the NPR) in his vigorous pronouncements on the NPR's efficacy, prior to its downfall in June 1950 many of those involved in the creation of the KC (and Republic of Korea Army) championed it as a highly effective fighting force.¹³⁶ South Korean President Rhee claimed that the ROKA was 'fully capable of meeting any challenge from the Soviet supported North Korean People's Army'.¹³⁷ Also of note are the words of the head of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), Brigadier General William L. Roberts given in an interview for *TIME* magazine just before the outbreak of war, which stated that he believed that the South Korean Army was 'the best doggoned shooting Army outside the United States'.¹³⁸ William

¹³³ For more on the internal security training of the NPR see: Chapter 3, pp 160-171, 192-204.

¹³⁴ Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War, Vol. 1*, pp 66-67.

¹³⁵ Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', p 531.

¹³⁶ Kowalski claimed that 'As battalions of infantry the NPR could have put on a whale of a fight', as quoted in Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 488.

¹³⁷ Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State, 18/4/1949, *FRUS* 1949, Vol. VII, pp 992-993.

¹³⁸ *Time*, 3/7/1950.

Sebald, a senior political advisor to SCAP, also noted this 'nauseating' overconfidence amongst US Army officers in the quality of the South Korean troops, men whom he felt had started to believe their own propaganda.¹³⁹ The virtual destruction of the ROKA at the hands of the NKPA proved the hollowness of these claims.

Like the NPR, the role the KC played was that of an internal security constabulary acting in support of the civil police. As Cumings makes clear, 'instead of training a force that could defend South Korea's borders, the Americans emphasised techniques of riot suppression. The Occupation feared internal disorder and viewed the constabulary as an essential police reserve'.¹⁴⁰ Again identically to the NPR, in critical public order situations where the KNP could not cope, the KC would take up the role previously played by US tactical troops, acting as a mobile reserve, armed more heavily than the police but not to the extent of an army. These situations could be riots, demonstrations, sabotage incidents, insurrections, rebellions, minor border clashes or counter-guerrilla operations. In common with the other constabularies and the NPR, and unlike an Army, the KC was bound to the territory of the state it served and performed an internal security role, with the state's external security supposedly guaranteed by the United States. In addition to its active internal security duties, like the other constabularies, the KC had a passive or deterrent role in guarding key installations, infrastructure and government buildings against sabotage and attack.¹⁴¹

The KC was initially equipped with captured Japanese infantry weapons, mainly the type 99 and 38 rifles and a few light machine guns. Over time some advisors to the KC took advantage of their units' geographical proximity to US bases to familiarise them with US weaponry and equipment. As US

¹³⁹ JFD-2, W.J. Sebald, 1965, Reel 11, pp 21-22.

¹⁴⁰ Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. 1, p 177.

¹⁴¹ YF-A4, *Special Problems*, 'Chapter VII: Rear Area Security', p 48.

units gradually withdrew from the Korean peninsula they left behind much of their equipment, which was inherited by the KC, the notable exception being the US tanks and artillery which left with the US forces.¹⁴² However, again like the NPR, much of the equipment the KC acquired was outmoded and indicative of its internal security role.¹⁴³ The adoption of the entirely obsolete 57mm anti-tank gun and 2.36 inch 'bazooka', as well as the absence of anti-aircraft artillery and any armour other than virtually unarmed light halftracks designed to move materials and men, further illustrate this point.¹⁴⁴ When the ROKA did finally acquire some field artillery it was again obsolete and the crews were hardly trained to operate it prior to the outbreak of war in June 1950.¹⁴⁵ Like the NPR the heavy reliance by the KC on light weapons such as the M1 carbine (see figure V) is also indicative of the role assigned to the organisations. With an effective range and calibre far inferior to that of all comparable frontline infantry small arms, the use of this weapon demonstrates that the KC and NPR were not intended for (at least as long as they were armed with this weapon) frontline external security duties. As Ridgeway later noted, 'the ROK forces were essentially equipped and prepared for internal security and many of them found no way of fighting the disciplined [North Korean] hordes that fanned out grimly through the countryside'.¹⁴⁶ Aside from the role assigned to the KC and the inability of the Republic of Korea's economy to support a more heavily armed security force, further factors limited the equipment given to the KC/ROKA. These included concerns about the ability of Korea's bridges and infrastructure to support armour and, in a move reminiscent of the strategy of double containment,

¹⁴² Lee, *Birth of The Korean Army*, pp 648,651.

¹⁴³ For more on the equipment of the NPR see: Chapter 3, pp 182-192; Chapter 4, pp 229-234.

¹⁴⁴ CG USAFIK to CINCFE, 28/2/48, in p 419-422, *GHQ/SCAP Top Secret Records I, Adjutant General's Section*, Kashiwashobo, Tokyo, 1993; This armament is almost identical to that issued to the NPR, clearly showing the internal security nature common to both Constabularies, see: Chapter 3, pp 182-192.

¹⁴⁵ M.B. Ridgeway, *The Korean War*, Da Capo, New York, 1967, p 17.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p 18.

concerns stoked by private and public comments made by Rhee that he might use heavier weapons to attack the North.¹⁴⁷

Figure V. ROKA Soldiers Moving up to the Front, Pusan Perimeter, August 1950¹⁴⁸



An element of the KC that GHQ sought to avoid in the NPR was infiltration of communists into the force and the rebellions, mutinies and mass desertions which resulted.¹⁴⁹ Due to the scant co-operation between the KNP and the unwillingness of the US forces to screen recruits, the KC was heavily infiltrated by communist agents and cells.¹⁵⁰ The local recruitment of the KC regiments also contributed to the problem. The activities of the cells varied from covert support of local guerrilla units through to outright mutiny and rebellion. The two principal examples of the unreliability and infiltration of the

¹⁴⁷ Sarantakes, *Keystone*, pp xv, xviii-xix; Sawyer, *Military Advisors*, p 100.

¹⁴⁸ Picture Courtesy of: <http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/>. Note lack of equipment and helmets and the heavy reliance on the M1 carbine.

¹⁴⁹ For more on the NPR and infiltration see: Chapter 4, pp 270-281.

¹⁵⁰ Lee, *Birth of The Korean Army*, p 655.

KC were the Cheju and Yosu rebellions. On Cheju, in the face of deeply entrenched resistance to the brutal rule of Rightist governor trying to eliminate all moderate opposition, KC units were involved in a number of incidents, including murdering their officers, purposefully avoiding and supporting the insurgents, and wholesale rebellion.¹⁵¹ In the Yosu rebellion (see figure VI) an entire regiment due to be sent to Cheju mutinied and linked up with local communists and elements of two other KC regiments to capture the towns of Yosu and Suncheon on the southern coast of Korea.¹⁵² Other KC units eventually brutally suppressed the rebellion and a large scale purge of the KC followed. However, the incidents continued, with a mutiny in the 6th Regiment in November 1948 and the defection of most of the 8th Regiment to the North in mid-1949.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War, Vol. 1*, pp 32-33; Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', p 517.

¹⁵² A.R. Millet, *Their War For Korea, American, Asian and European Combatants and Civilians 1945-53*, Brassey's, Washington DC, 2002, p 159.

¹⁵³ Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', p 529.

Table IV. Infiltration of Korean Constabulary Regiments¹⁵⁴

<u>Regiment</u>	<u>Date of Activation</u>	<u>Place of Activation</u>	<u>Heavily Infiltrated</u>
1 st	15/1/46	T'aenung	
2 nd	28/2/46	Taejon	
3 rd	26/2/46	Iri	
4 th	15/2/46	Kwangsan	Elements mutiny and join Yosu Rebellion.
5 th	29/1/46	Pusan	Elements mutiny and join Yosu Rebellion.
6 th	18/2/46	Taegu	Yes. 11/48 small mutiny
7 th	7/2/46	Ch'ongju	
8 th	1/4/46	Ch'unch,on	Yes. 4/5/49 2 battalions cross 38 th Parallel and join NKPA.
9 th	16/11/46	Mosul'po (Cheju)	Yes. Elements defect to guerrillas and assist rebels on Cheju.
10 th	1/5/48	Kangnung	
11 th	4/5/48	Suwon	
12 th	1/5/48	Kunsan	
13 th	4/5/48	Onyang	
14 th	4/5/48	Yosu	Yes. Mutinies-Yosu Rebellion.
15 th	4/5/48	Masan	Yes.

The Cheju and Yosu rebellions, events judged by Millet to signify the beginning of a civil war in South Korea, also saw widespread atrocities committed by both sides.¹⁵⁵ On Cheju government forces killed somewhere between 18,000 and 60,000 civilians and destroyed between a third and a half of all dwellings on the island.¹⁵⁶ The Yosu- Sunchon rebellion saw reprisals against the government and their supporters with at least 1,700 KNP, community leaders, rightist paramilitaries, their families and others executed, often with horrific levels of brutality.¹⁵⁷ These incidents also prompted tens of

¹⁵⁴ Based on information found on p 70, Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War*, Vol. 1, and pp 519, 522, 529, Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman'.


¹⁵⁵ Millet, *A House Burning*, p 2.

¹⁵⁶ Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. 2, p257-258.

¹⁵⁷ A.R. Millet, *Their War For Korea, American, Asian and European Combatants and Civilians 1945-53*, Brassey's, Washington DC, 2002, p 159; Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', pp 523-525 .

thousands of civilians to flee the area, becoming internally displaced within South Korea or escaping across the Tsushima Strait to Japan.¹⁵⁸

Figure VI. Area Taken by Rebels during the Yosŭ Rebellion¹⁵⁹



With the withdrawal by June 1949 of all the United States troops, except the US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (K MAG) and an Army regimental combat team, and the ongoing drift towards separation of the two

¹⁵⁸ Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. 2, p 251; Merrill, *The Cheju-do Rebellion*, pp 165-169; T. Morris-Suzuki, 'Invisible Immigrants: Undocumented Migration and Border Controls in Early Postwar Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 32, No.1, 2006, p 130; Millet, *A House Burning*, p 142.

¹⁵⁹ Based on Map shown on p 260, B. Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume Two: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990.

Korean regimes, the KC's role began to change.¹⁶⁰ With the departure of the US forces and their transfer to the KC of much of their hardware (less artillery and armour), the character and responsibilities of the KC began to expand into providing external security. Another step towards the transformation of the KC into an external security force was taken with the establishment of the Republic of Korea and the creation of the Republic of Korea Army on 15 August 1948.¹⁶¹ In 1950 the South Korean Army consisted of eight divisions, and two separate regiments, of which four divisions and one regiment were stationed on the 38th parallel.¹⁶² The KC became an army in name but its duties and character did not alter overnight and it remained, despite its name change, a lightly armed force equipped and designed to deal with internal rather than external security. The shift of the ROKA to external security duties despite being underequipped and largely untrained to do so, particularly in the face of the highly mechanised and heavily armed Northern forces, largely accounts for its crushing defeat in mid-1950.

The Korean War and the Birth of the NPR

The final and most significant short-term international influence on the creation of the NPR was the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. However, as is demonstrated throughout this work, numerous other processes influenced the creation of the NPR, and to argue, as some historians and official reports do, that the Korean War was the only cause of the creation of the NPR is to oversimplify the origins of the force.¹⁶³ Recent

¹⁶⁰ CG USAFIK to CINCFE, 23/1/48, in pp 457-429, *GHQ/SCAP Top Secret Records I, Adjutant General's Section*, Kashiwashobo, Tokyo, 1993.

¹⁶¹ Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War*, Vol. 1, p 73.

¹⁶² YF-A4, *Special Problems*, 'Chapter I: KMAG', Reel 14, p 67.

¹⁶³ TS 154-155, 'A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951', 1/52 ; YF-A16, 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 22/12/51, p 3; H. Ôtake, 'Defense Contributions and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany', in T.J. Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies, One-Party Dominant Regimes*, Cornell University Press, London, 1990, p 137

scholarship on the NPR has moved away from this position somewhat, with Weste, for example, citing the influence of the Cold War and the foundation of the PRC alongside the Korean War as major causes behind the creation of the NPR.¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the outbreak of the Korean War and the collapse of the Republic of Korea Army which necessitated the dispatch of the American garrison in Japan to Korea was the immediate catalyst which prompted the creation of the NPR and hence deserves special attention in any study aiming to examine the origins and character of the force.

The exact date upon which MacArthur decided to create a constabulary-type force for Japan is difficult to say, but it certainly occurred in the last week of June 1950.¹⁶⁵ Maeda argues that MacArthur came up with the idea for the NPR on his brief visit to the collapsing Korean frontline on 28 June.¹⁶⁶ This date could well be the point at which MacArthur decided on creating the NPR but he had been aware of the concept of a constabulary for many years, as noted above. It seems highly likely that the idea for the NPR was formed through MacArthur reflecting on his service in command of the PC in the Philippines, the Japanese constabulary force suggested in the 2 October 1945 message from General Marshall, and his and his father's reluctant role overseeing the establishment of the KC and PC, respectively.¹⁶⁷ Masuda argues that NSC 13/2 also influenced MacArthur at this point, with the strengthening of the internal security forces which it advocated forming a useful political and practical fallback position in the face of the North Korean

¹⁶⁴ Weste, however, does not mention the influence of the JCP. J. Weste, 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament, 1945-1960' in M. Iokibe, C. Rose, J. Tomaru and J. Weste (eds), *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s, From Isolation to Integration*, Routledge, Oxford, 2008, pp 38-39; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p 400.

¹⁶⁵ I.e. After the North Korean invasion but before the first planning documents surface.

¹⁶⁶ T. Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, Edition Q, Tokyo, 1995, pp 2, 5.

¹⁶⁷ Young, *The General's General*, p 277; W.M. Leary, *MacArthur and the American Century*, p xxiii; Appendix V. 'The 'Constabulary Letter', 2 October 1945'; Sawyer, *Military Advisors*, p 11.

advance.¹⁶⁸ Using his knowledge of the constabulary model, MacArthur decided to create a force along those lines for Japan, which would allow him to commit the US tactical troops at his disposal in a last-ditch defence of South Korea.

The decision to create the NPR must have proved something of a bitter pill to swallow for MacArthur, who Welfield argues, had been, to this point, 'the most enthusiastic American exponent of unarmed neutrality [for Japan]'.¹⁶⁹ MacArthur was reluctant to create the NPR but even more reluctant to have it become an army.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, this position is shown through his later opposition to the use of former Imperial officers in the force, to the massive expansion of the NPR called for by the Department of the Army, and his support of Yoshida's efforts to resist Dulles' demands for rearmament.¹⁷¹

After MacArthur had made the decision to create the NPR, the process of initial planning for the force got under way. The planning was done by a group set up specifically for the purpose, consisting of A.P. Fox (SCAP Deputy Chief of Staff), Edwin K. Wright (head of G3) and Charles Willoughby (head of G2). The group, which was given the nondescript moniker 'Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC' produced an initial plan for the creation of the NPR on 6 July 1950 which went through several revisions over the following days, with the final version, entitled *Increase in Japanese Security Agencies*, being

¹⁶⁸ H. Masuda, *Jietai no Tanjō (The Birth of the SDF)*, Chukoron Shinsho, Tokyo, 2004, p 80; NSC 13/2, 7/10/1948, *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, p 859; Telegram, CSAD to CINFE, 23/11/48, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 231.

¹⁶⁹ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp, 64-65.

¹⁷⁰ Shukanshinbun Shinchoshenshubu (Shincho Weekly Newspaper Editor), *Makkasaa no Nihon (MacArthur's Japan)*, Vol. 2, Shinchosha, Tokyo, 1983, p 256.

¹⁷¹ J.L. Weste, 'Staging a Comeback: Rearmament Planning and Kyūgunjin in Occupied Japan, 1945-52', *Japan Forum*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999, pp 169-177; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 490. For more on MacArthur's role in resisting the inclusion of Imperial officers and the expansion of the force see: Chapter 3, pp 201-213 ; Chapter 5, pp 290-296.

completed on 10 July.¹⁷² This plan was the framework which later formed the basis for much of the actual NPR. For example, these plans contained the idea of using the National Rural Police facilities and personnel for recruitment and initial training and had a distinct emphasis on producing a usable force as speedily as possible, stating: 'training and organisation from inception should be so formed and conducted as to permit immediate commitment of personnel in case of emergency'.¹⁷³ The plan also contained the choice of the M1 carbine as the principal armament of the NPR. The possibility of using available IJA arms for the force was considered but this was rejected as too politically risky by the planners.¹⁷⁴

These early plans also settled the size of the NPR. The size of the units was decided upon by taking the mid-point between the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) battalion which numbered just over 1,000, men and the US battalion, which had slightly fewer. The plan envisaged 15,000 strong division style units based in the same military region system used by the IJA and the US Occupation forces, a system considered by the planners to be 'highly desirable for reasons of overall security', including its focus on internal security. The overall size of the force, 75,000 men, was decided upon due to two factors: the number roughly corresponded to the number of US troops leaving Japan for Korea, and, added to the 30,000 National Rural Police and 95,000 Municipal Police, the additional 75,000 of the NPR totalled 200,000 men the maximum number of police permitted by the Occupation.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² YF-A4, Far East, US Army Forces and Eight United States Army Military History Section, *History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1952*, 1955, Reel 14, p 43, Hereafter *History of the National Police Reserve*.

¹⁷³ Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, pp 256-258, 260, Hereafter, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, p 260.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, p 259; YF-A16, 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 22/12/51, p 3.

Although the committee agreed much of what would become the reality of the NPR, some issues were heavily debated, particularly the position of the NPR and its relation to the National Rural Police. Initially it was decided to name the force the 'National Rural Police Reserve' and have it be part of the National Rural Police.¹⁷⁶ This position was abandoned at some point during 7 or 8 July due to Willoughby's militarist designs for the force, its size (more than double that of the National Rural Police), the fact that it was to be under the Prime Minister's direct control, and its internal security role, all of which did not fit comfortably within the National Rural Police.¹⁷⁷ The name 'National Rural Police Reserve' was also used on a draft of the 8 July MacArthur letter, and despite the abandonment of the idea, the NPR retained strong ties with the National Rural Police.¹⁷⁸

As well as this idea to create a constabulary under the aegis of the National Rural Police, other large portions of these early plans did not survive in the actual NPR. Much of what was dropped from these plans were the hawkish designs of the committee which produced them. For example, that Willoughby sought an army from the start, staffed with his former IJA associates is clear through clauses in the plan stating that it would be 'highly desirable that the NPR be officered by ex military personnel'.¹⁷⁹ The 10 July plan aimed to seek out suitable officers using the Japanese Demobilisation Bureau (a process which would have seen the introduction of many Rightwing officers as it was largely staffed by Willoughby's cronies) and did not even rule out the use of purged ultra-nationalists: 'the employment of any questionable personality in this organisation should be permitted only upon the recommendation of the assistant chief of staff G-2'.¹⁸⁰ As the person

¹⁷⁶ TS 301, Willoughby to Whitney, 7/8/50.

¹⁷⁷ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 43; 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, p 259.

¹⁷⁸ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 43. For more on these links with the National Rural Police see: Chapter 3, pp 204-209.

¹⁷⁹ 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, p 260.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p 258.

ultimately recommending these men would have been Willoughby, and judging by his future backing of Rightwingers for the leadership of the NPR, it seems certain that some highly 'questionable' individuals would have made their way into the force.¹⁸¹ The plan also envisaged an even greater role for Willoughby's G2, with its Public Safety Division (PSD) running the force. This role was ultimately given to Civil Affairs Section (CAS) and in prising the control of the force from Willoughby's grip, the possibility of a return of the IJA was averted. The plans also reflected Shepard and Willoughby's desire for rearmament resulting in a fully equipped army, including tanks and howitzers.¹⁸² The fact that MacArthur and Yoshida resisted these plans as long as they were able illustrates that despite the planning of some hawks in GHQ, the concrete form of the NPR was not set in stone by this initial documents.¹⁸³

A final aspect of this preliminary planning undertaken by Willoughby and the committee was the intention to use the entire NPR project as a 'cover plan' under which a new Japanese army could be created.¹⁸⁴ As the plan of 10 July states: 'any increase in Japanese government forces for any stated purpose, may be construed as military, or quasi military forces, will have internal as well as external implications and therefore must be instituted under a cover plan'.¹⁸⁵ The 'cover plan' envisaged the use of Willoughby's G2 to oversee the force as it quickly became a heavily armed army staffed with IJA/IJN veterans specifically sourced by the Demobilisation Bureau, and hence, by Willoughby himself.¹⁸⁶ The 'cover plan', which represented Willoughby's vision for the NPR as a transitional stage in the resurrection of the IJA, was

¹⁸¹ For more on Willoughby and his other attempts to install IJA officers in the force see Chapter 2, p 132-138; Chapter 3, p 201-213.

¹⁸² 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, pp 258-259.

¹⁸³ For more on Yoshida and MacArthur opposition to heavy armament and Imperial officers in the force see: Chapter 3, pp 209-2221; Chapter 5, pp 299-305.

¹⁸⁴ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 42.

¹⁸⁵ 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, p 257.

¹⁸⁶ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 44.

never realised, and lasted just a few days before being entirely rejected, despite his best efforts.¹⁸⁷ Willoughby's failure was the result of direct opposition from MacArthur and Yoshida, both of whom sought only an internal security force and abhorred the return of the Japanese army and the needless expense and political risk such a move represented.¹⁸⁸ With regard to the NPR being a military from the start, as Dower argues, it is clear that even Willoughby realised that this was politically impossible, as evidenced through his rejection of the immediate issuing of clearly military former IJA weaponry to the NPR.¹⁸⁹ The subject of the cover plan also reveals the inaccuracies in some of the other histories of the period. For example, the official US history of the force argues that Yoshida knew of the 'cover plan' and agreed with the creation of a full military from the start, an obvious inaccuracy, shown through the initial Japanese government confusion over the nature of the NPR and the subsequent staunch opposition of the Prime Minister and his subordinates to the militarization of the force.¹⁹⁰ The presence of this 'cover plan' coupled with the views of Frank Kowalski, a senior member of CAS, prompt many historians such as Dower, Ōtake and Takemae to conclude that the NPR was a military force from the start.¹⁹¹ However, closer examination of the events occurring after the creation of the NPR and the character of the force do not support this argument.

MacArthur informed the Japanese government of his intention to create the NPR through a letter to Yoshida on 8 July.¹⁹² The letter made explicit reference to the internal security role of the NPR, stating that the Japanese police force needed to be 'adequate to the maintenance of internal security

¹⁸⁷ For more on the efforts to transform the NPR into a military see: Chapters 3, pp 204-209; Chapter 5, pp 287-330.

¹⁸⁸ For more on Yoshida's reasons for opposition see: Chapter 5, pp 305-330.

¹⁸⁹ 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, p 260.

¹⁹⁰ *History of the National Police Reserve*, pp 66, 86.

¹⁹¹ Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 138; J. Dower, *Embracing Defeat, Japan in The Wake of World War II*, Norton, London, 2000; p 547; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 487.

¹⁹² Appendix VI. 'Macarthur to Yoshida, Letter Authorising the Creation of the NPR, 8 July 50'.

and order' and that the NPR would act in support of the civil police in maintaining that security and order. MacArthur was keen not to undermine or criticise the police reforms he and GHQ had pursued up to that point, claiming, oxymoronicly, that the success of decentralisation necessitated the bolstering of the civil police with the NPR. Thinly veiled references to Korea and the threat of the JCP were also present in the letter, with MacArthur stating that 'Japan stands out with a calmness and serenity which lends emphasis to the violence, confusion and disorder which exist in other nearby lands', and that:

To insure that this favourable condition [relative domestic tranquillity] will continue unchallenged by lawless minorities [the JCP], here as elsewhere committed to the subversion of the due process of law and assaults of opportunity against the public welfare, I believe that the police system has reached that degree of efficiency in organisation and training which will permit its augmentation to a strength which will bring it within the limits experience has shown to be essential to the safeguard of the public welfare in a democratic society.¹⁹³

The letter created much confusion within a Japanese Cabinet caught in the midst of a reshuffle, not least over its wording which 'authorized' the Japanese government to create the NPR, rather than taking the form of a direct order or instruction.¹⁹⁴ Most historians including Chai, Dower, the Harries, Maeda, Ōtake, Takemae, Welfield and Weste, view the letter, despite its content, as a direct order from MacArthur, forced upon a reluctant Yoshida.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid; *Nippon Times*, 29/6/50; *Kyodo News*, 29/6/50; K. Masuhara, 'Keisatsuyōbitai Kara Jietai Made' (From the NPR to the SDF), in Y. Andō (ed), *Shōwa Keizaishi e no Shōgen (Testimony Towards an Economic History of the Shōwa Era)*, Mainichi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1966, p 390.

¹⁹⁵ S.K. Chai, 'Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalisation', *International Organisation*, Vol. 51, No. 3, Summer 1997, p 397; R.J.

Indeed Yoshida himself, in his first major speech on the NPR in the Diet stated that the letter was an 'order' rather than an authorisation, although this, alongside the measures taken by GHQ detailed below, were part of a ploy aimed at minimising the influence of the Diet on the force, through putting the organisation and control of the NPR beyond its reach.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, the closer examination of the context of the NPR conducted in the preceding chapter has revealed that far from being a reluctant 'victim' of the whims of MacArthur and GHQ, the Japanese government were highly enthusiastic supporters of an internal security constabulary and hence a direct order was unnecessary, as was noted by Whitney at the time.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, as Samuels and Mikuriya note, Yoshida privately admitted he was happy to create the force, and hence did not require 'orders' from SCAP.¹⁹⁸ In fact, an initial draft of the 8 July letter took the form of a directive but once the negative implications of such a move had been realised MacArthur selected the less formal form of a letter.¹⁹⁹

Furthermore, the argument presented by some of the historians cited above seems something of a paradox. The central theme of almost all recent

Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children, Leaders & Their Legacies in Italy and Japan*, Cornell University Press, London, 2003, p 206; A. Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mosaku (National Security: 50 Years of Postwar Groping)*, Yomiuri Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1997, pp 70-73; Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p 6; Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 138; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 72; Weste, 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament', p 35; M. and S. Harries, *Sheathing the Sword, The Demilitarisation of Japan*, Heinemann, London, 1989, p 234. Hughes and Uyehara adopt the more accurate position that MacArthur asked Yoshida to create the force. C.W. Hughes, *Japan's Demilitarisation*, IISS/Routledge, Oxford, 2009, p 23; C.H. Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law*, p 15.

¹⁹⁶ Yoshida to the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, 14/7/50, *Full Text Minutes of the Diet of Japan*, available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_logout.cgi; *Japan Times*, 15/7/50.

¹⁹⁷ YF-A16, 1B-250, Whitney, 'Memorandum concerning legal aspects of the implementation of the supreme commander's letter of 8 July 1950', 14/7/50.

¹⁹⁸ Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children*, p 206; T. Mikuriya, 'Tanaka Kakuei: Kaihatsu Seiji no Tōtatsuen' (Tanaka Kakuei: the Goals of Developmental Politics), in A. Watanabe (ed), *Sengo Nihon no Saishōtachi (The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan)*, Chūō Kōronsha, Tokyo, 1995, p 56.

¹⁹⁹ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 43.

scholarship on the Occupation has been an effort to give greater weight to Japanese influence on policy and move the Japanese people and government away from the role of a passive recipient or 'victim' of US policy.²⁰⁰ This approach seems not to extend to the discussion of the creation of the NPR where many historians seem more focused on criticising the US and portraying the Japanese as being forced to comply, rather than on illustrating the Japanese influence on the policy and their genuine support for the creation of the NPR.

The letter was followed several weeks later with a Cabinet order based upon the SCAP's supra-constitutional authority.²⁰¹ This measure was not a formal SCAP directive (SCAPIN) but a Cabinet order implementing 'instructions' from SCAP.²⁰² As under the 1947 constitution Cabinet orders could be promulgated without consulting the Diet where they did not enact laws, this measure avoided both the Diet and the need for a formal SCAP directive.²⁰³ This compromise itself shows the Cabinet's desire for the force as if they had opposed the move they could have refused to act and forced MacArthur to issue a SCAPIN, bypassing them entirely.

Nevertheless, as the Cabinet order bypassed the Diet, it is another factor used by some of the above historians to criticise the creation of the NPR as an unlawful and unconstitutional move forced upon the Japanese. However,

²⁰⁰ C. Gluck, 'Entangling Illusions-Japanese and American Views of the Occupation', in W.I. Cohen (ed), *New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, p 180.

²⁰¹ *History of the National Police Reserve*, pp 67-68; Keisatsuyōbitai Sechi ni Kansuru Potsudamu Seirei (Potsdam Cabinet Order Pertaining To The Establishment of the NPR), 27/7/50, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimonдай*, Vol.1, p 455; *Asahi Shinbun*, 31/7/50; Keisatsuyōbitairei Seirei Nihyakurojūgo (NPR Order Cabinet Order No. 260), 10/8/50, printed in, Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimonдай*, Vol.1, p 446.

²⁰² *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 67.

²⁰³ Article 73 Clause 6, *The Constitution of Japan*, 1947, printed in, Hook and McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution*, p 199; Article 65, *ibid*, p 197; Article 11, The Cabinet Law (Law No.5 of 1947, as Amended), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government/frame_02.html; R.E. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1978, p 159.

more powerful ordinances such as SCAPINS which bypassed even the Cabinet, were far from uncommon and were used to implement many of the democratising measures the same historians praise as the successes of the Occupation.²⁰⁴ The same historians also fail to recognise that the NPR was created to defend the Japanese state and hence the liberal reforms instituted by SCAP in the face of Soviet backed JCP violence and so could be argued to have protected rather than undermined the constitution. Furthermore, despite the use of a Cabinet order invoking SCAP's authority, MacArthur and Whitney did not chose to avoid the Diet over fears that the measure would fail to pass into law as this was never in doubt due to the situation in Korea and Yoshida's Diet majority.²⁰⁵ The concern on the part of MacArthur and Whitney was that the Diet process would seriously delay the creation of a force which could be urgently required (especially if South Korea collapsed, as seemed very likely at the time), and that Diet and public debates would have given the JCP and USSR a huge propaganda opportunity and chances to interfere in the project.²⁰⁶

In spite of the confusion which followed the creation of the NPR, Yoshida strongly supported the development of a capable internal security force whilst opposing 'rearmament', a phrase taken by him, and this study, to mean the

²⁰⁴ SCAPINS were very common before 1947, but decreased in frequency afterwards. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 114-115. Measures created by SCAPINS included: the purge of the former regime, the release of political prisoners and the almost universally praised land reform campaign: SCA-1, SCAPIN 550, 'Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office', 4/1/1946, Reel 2; SCA-1, SCAPIN 548, 'Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and Other Organisations', 4/1/1946, Reel 2; SCA-1, SCAPIN 93, 'Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties', 4/10/1945, Reel 2; SCA-1, SCAPIN 257, 'Agriculture Program', 9/11/45, Reel 2; SCA-1, SCAPIN 411, 'Rural Land Reform', 9/12/45, Reel 2.

²⁰⁵ J.A.A. Stockwin, *Dictionary of The Modern Politics of Japan*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003, pp 61, 72.

²⁰⁶ YF-A16, 1B-250, Whitney, 'Memorandum concerning legal aspects of the implementation of the supreme commander's letter of 8 July 1950', 14/7/50. For more on the Japanese support for a Constabulary see: Chapter 1, pp 74-92.

resurrection of the Japanese military.²⁰⁷ In pursuance of this goal and in order to deflect criticism or charges of rearming Japan, Yoshida and his Cabinet consistently maintained in all public and private statements that the NPR was to be an internal security constabulary and not the nucleus of a future military.²⁰⁸ This policy began in earnest with Yoshida's first major speech to the Diet on the subject of the NPR on 14 July 1950 during which he argued that US action in Korea had effectively guaranteed the external security of Japan, hence implying that an externally focused military was unnecessary, undesirable, and that the NPR had been created solely to 'maintain the internal peace and order of Japan'.²⁰⁹

Although these statements did receive some criticism in the Diet, the voices of some of the largest opposition parties were largely silent, mostly in support of the NPR programme but also because several of them had been effectively silenced by GHQ.²¹⁰ Justin Williams, the Parliamentary and Political Division Chief of Government Section (GS) and future Occupation historian, visited Asanuma Inejiro, secretary of the Socialist Party (assassinated in 1960) and Tomabechi Gizo, chair of the National Democratic Party on the morning of 12 July. Williams explained to the senior politicians that the detailed matters pertaining to the establishment of the NPR would be laid out in an Occupation directive and therefore the Diet would not discuss them, as this could be construed as opposing the Occupation. Both men agreed and in a final comment, often sidelined or ignored by historians critical of the NPR, the Diet members said that they were relieved that the issue had

²⁰⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 490. For more on Yoshida's desire for an internal security force see: Chapter 1, pp 74-92 . For more on his opposition of rearmament see: Chapter 5, pp 305-330.

²⁰⁸ YF-A16, 1B-65, Memoranda for Record, Prime Minister Yoshida's Statement Concerning NPRJ, Memoranda and Cables, 26/5/51.

²⁰⁹ Yoshida to the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, 14/7/50, *Full Text Minutes of the Diet of Japan*, available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_logout.cgi; *Japan Times*, 15/7/50.

²¹⁰ Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 138; Shukanshinbun Shinchohenshubu, *Makkasaa no Nihon*, p 259; M. and S. Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, p 235.

been removed from the Diet's jurisdiction as they had not relished the idea of a political battles over NPR's control and form, and the chaos it could have created both inside and outside the Japanese parliament.²¹¹ It could also be argued that through this agreement not to make trouble, the men also tacitly approved of the project or at least did not oppose it strongly enough to invoke the wrath of GHQ. Furthermore, despite the criticism this move attracts from some historians, even harsher measures had often been employed in the earlier years to institute most of the measures the same historians praise as positive outcomes of the Occupation.²¹²

In the face of the seemingly imminent collapse of South Korea and an increasingly violent communist party, a large number of Diet members supported the Cabinet's position and the NPR, not least for the internal security benefits the force would provide. The enthusiasm the Japanese government held for the internal security boost the NPR represented is also evidenced through plans made for a large counterintelligence corps for the NPR. Masuhara Keikichi, the civilian Director General of the NPR, and former policeman, along with other senior Cabinet colleagues, planned to create a large intelligence arm aimed at hunting down underground JCP members and other subversives. To finance this and a huge slush fund for bankrolling informants, a secret allocation of ¥100 million was planned for by Finance Minister Ikeda.²¹³ However, Whitney became aware of these plans in the first days of the existence of the NPR and swiftly passed the word to Masuhara that SCAP would not permit the recreation of a 'secret police', or the creation

²¹¹ Justin Williams Papers (JWP), Memo for Record, 13/7/50, File 49:11; Shukanshinbun Shinchohenshubu, *Makkasaa no Nihon*, pp 259-260.

²¹² See note 187 above. Dower, for example, thoroughly praises land reform. J. Dower, 'Reform and Reconsolidation', in H. Wray and H. Conway (eds), *Japan Examined, Perspectives on Modern Japanese History*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p 349.

²¹³ *History of the National Police Reserve*, pp 73, 102-103; *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 29/7/50.

of any secret informer system.²¹⁴ Thus the Japanese plans for a large internal security intelligence component of the NPR were thwarted, although the subsequent and sizable expansions of the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) and its successor, the Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) gave the Japanese government what it sought in terms of domestic intelligence capability.²¹⁵ Also of note is the clearly internal security, police-type function the Japanese sought for the NPR in this effort; few armies have a large domestic network of paid informers as they are useless in almost all non-internal security contexts.

Conclusion

In seeking to contribute to the overall goal of producing the first complete picture of the NPR, this chapter has revealed the international factors behind the creation of the NPR and has examined the constabulary model as an influence on the origins of the NPR. The chapter highlighted the fact that Japan's security, particularly its internal security, gradually became a serious concern amongst US policymakers, directly influencing global Cold War strategy. Also explored were the debates which surrounded American attitudes to the future of Japan's security forces and the three groups (pro-reatmament, anti-reatmament and constabulary) which failed to reach a consensus by 1950 despite helping to inform MacArthur's eventual decision to create the NPR. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 catalysed these processes and prompted MacArthur's final decision to create the NPR. MacArthur fell back on an idea suggested to him by Marshall in 1945, his

²¹⁴ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 103, quoting Government Section (GS), Napier, Memo for Record, 'Prohibition of Secret Police Function within NPR', 29/8/80.

²¹⁵ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p 365; R. Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan, International Communism in Action 1919-1951*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1952, p 251; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 493; P.J. Katzenstein and Y. Tsujinaka, *Defending the Japanese State, Structures, Norms and the Political Responses to Terrorism and Violent Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s*, Cornell East Asia Series, Ithaca, 1991, p 71.

memories of the Philippines Constabulary, and experience overseeing the Korean Constabulary, and created a Japanese constabulary. The creation of the NPR also gave the Japanese what they sought, an effective centrally directed internal security force. In contrast to the arguments used by many, this chapter has shown that the Japanese government neither required nor received an 'order' to create the NPR, but simply treated the authorisation to do so as an order for reasons of political expediency.

The chapter also examined the organisational antecedents of the NPR and their character as internal security constabularies. Through examination of these predecessors of the NPR it was also possible to reveal that rather than an anomalous exception or sophist's ruse manufactured to conceal rearmament, constabularies were common in the time of the NPR.²¹⁶ In Asia, North and South Korea, the USSR, the PRC and the Philippines, all had paramilitary police forces, as did almost all the European colonies in Southeast Asia. If anything, constabulary forces such as the NPR, a third tier of security force, situated between the civil police and the army, were the accepted norm in Asia, not the exception. This chapter has also illustrated that political, material and financial issues; the constabulary model; and the perceived need to address internal security concerns, defined the constabularies examined. Political compromise played a part in the development of the PC, KC and NPR with various actors such as local elites, the US military and State Department (in the case of the KC and NPR) arguing over rearmament, with a constabulary force selected as a compromise on all occasions.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Dower, quoting Kowalski and perverting MacArthur's January 1950 use in affirming Japan's right self-defence, refers to the name of the NPR as 'pure sophistry' and Yoshida's alleged attempts to conceal its military character as a 'sophist's game': Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp 378, 384; *New York Herald Tribune*, 1/1/50; P.J. Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, Japan Library, Folkestone, 1993, p 223.

²¹⁷ Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman', p 510.

In spite of these similarities between the PC, KC and NPR in structure, internal security role and other factors, there was one area of operations in which the NPR did not mimic its predecessors. The NPR was never involved in the suppression of peaceful dissent or the type of state sponsored violence and brutality perpetrated by the KC and PC.²¹⁸ Of course, as the NPR was never actually used in its original role the chance for such incidents to occur never presented itself. Nevertheless, even if such chance had presented itself, and in spite of plans for internment of communists in the case of a major uprising, factors such as: the planned supervision by US advisors of any NPR operation, the stress on 'democratic' and non-authoritarian methods in the training of the NPR, and other influences such as the relatively free position of the Japanese press, would have almost certainly prevented misconduct by the NPR in any but the most desperate circumstances.²¹⁹ Furthermore, the NPR, unlike its predecessors, served a democratic government run by men such as Yoshida, and elected by a population, of which many had had personal experience of the brutality of a police state and were determined to prevent its reappearance. Indeed, in Yoshida's case this concern was a central reason behind his later efforts to prevent the militarisation of the NPR and the induction of former Imperial veterans into its upper ranks.²²⁰

A final point to note is that the constabularies which survived did so where they were seen to be required. In general, it seems that where states perceived or encountered serious threats to their internal security such as fears of infiltration and instability or actual insurgencies (the Philippines), constabularies survived. In the case of other states, where the internal security threat fizzled out, as in Japan with the damp squib of the JCP

²¹⁸ For more on the brutality of the KC and PC see: Chapters 2, pp 121, 128, 131, 134, 136, 153.

²¹⁹ For more on the planned internment of suspected communists and US supervision of NPR operations see: Chapter 3, pp 192-204. For more on the training of the NPR see: Chapter 3, p 160-171.

²²⁰ For more on Yoshida's efforts to preserve the character of the NPR see: Chapter 5, pp 305-330.

guerrilla campaign, the forces developed to meet the other security requirements of their state, which were usually of an external security nature.²²¹

²²¹ For more on the JCP 'guerrilla campaign' see: Chapter 4, pp 251-270.

Chapter Three: The Organisational Character of the NPR

This chapter fulfils the second primary aim of this study by examining the nature and organisation of the NPR including its structure, posture, training, capabilities and internal security role and is the first to do so based on original primary research. The chapter is largely devoted to this aim and in doing so reveals the constabulary character of the force. The chapter demonstrates that elements of its internal security role, logistical and supply, training, deployments and links with the civil police all display this paramilitary character.

The chapter also contributes to the first main aim of the study through demonstrating some of the Japanese influences on the force. In particular, this chapter looks at the attempts by Rightwing elements in GHQ and the former Imperial Japanese armed forces to take control of the force. The influence of the Japanese state and particularly the civil police on the force is also explored and these analyses expose further partially explored areas of the history of the NPR. This effort also demonstrates the efforts which MacArthur and the Japanese government made to preserve the NPR's constabulary character and contributes to the aim of many third generation scholars, in seeking to broaden the awareness of the Japanese perspectives and influences on the period.

Recruitment

Following the creation of the NPR on 8 July 1950 a recruiting programme was swiftly drawn up and advertisements for the force appeared on radio, in newspapers and in poster form.¹ The force, with its attractive terms of

¹ For the standard poster used to advertise the NPR see: Figure XVIII. 'NPR Recruitment

service, generous pay and substantial superannuity attracted many applicants. Following the serious debate over the best way to attract suitable candidates this was something of a success.² So successful in fact that even application forms ran out several times over and generated lengthy queues at the police stations from which they were issued.³ The recruitment selection process which took place from 23 August to 12 October was a vast undertaking.⁴ Of the 382,003 applicants (roughly 5 per place), 325,715 were screened and examined at eighteen recruitment centres throughout Japan, most of which were regional National Rural Police headquarters. 81,949 applicants passed the initial medical, interview and police checks and of these, 74,580 were inducted into the police reserve.⁵ Their backgrounds varied, with previous occupations including carpenters, chauffeurs, civil servants, clerks, factory workers, farmers, fishermen, labourers, merchants, students and technicians.⁶ The greatest number, around 40%, were agricultural workers, a fact confirmed by the almost even spread of recruitment across Japan (see figure VIII), with the combined numbers coming from the rural and sparsely populated Hokkaido and Tohoku almost equalling those from Tokyo. The importance rural areas held in providing recruits is also evidenced through the timing of a supplementary recruitment campaign which was planned for July 1951, a date determined by the end of the rice planting season.⁷ Just over half of the recruits had also seen some service in the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) or Navy (IJN) (see figure VII). However, this is unsurprising as almost all of Japan's male population over the age of twenty four would have been part of the Imperial Japanese armed forces in some capacity.⁸

Poster Entitled: 'Peaceful Japan Needs You', Chapter 4, p 217.

² For more on the pay and conditions of the NPR see: Chapter 4, pp 224-242.

³ *Nippon Times*, 14/8/50.

⁴ Technical Section (TS) 154-155, 'A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951', 1/52; H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 1: 1947-1952*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (hereafter YF-A16), 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 22/12/51, p 3, Hereafter, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve'.

⁵ Intelligence (G2) 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 20/11/50.

⁶ TS 301, Pulliam to G2, 'Sampling of National Police Reserve Applications', 18/8/50.

⁷ YF-A16, 1F-49, Ridgeway to DEPAR, 8/6/51.

⁸ *Ibid*; C. Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 1825-1995*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p 384.

Figure VII. Military Experience of Initial NPR Recruits⁹





Figure VIII. Geographic Source of Initial NPR Recruits¹⁰



In a demonstration of one of the police-type elements of the character of the force, the rules on those eligible for recruitment meant that many

⁹ Based on charts found in, Fig.IX, *U.S. Army Center of Military History Historical Manuscripts Collection: The Korean War*, (YF-A4), Far East, US Army Forces and Eight United States Army Military History Section, *History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1952*, 1955, Reel 14. Hereafter *History of the National Police Reserve*.

¹⁰ Based on Charts found in, fig. IX, *History of the National Police Reserve*.

barred from applying would have been acceptable in most armies of the world. Persons ineligible for service included those deemed 'incompetent', those convicted of serious criminal offences, dismissed by disciplinary decision in the previous two years, and members of political parties 'which advocate the overthrow by force of the constitution of Japan or the government existing there under', i.e. the JCP.¹¹ Interestingly, and most indicative of the constabulary/police-type character of the force, criminality was a bar to recruitment, a situation which was not the case in IJA and most other armies. Moreover, in some countries during this period, notably the United States, criminals were forced to serve in the military as an alternative to imprisonment, with many of these convict-soldiers fighting at the time in Korea. Even Japan itself had employed those with criminal backgrounds in the IJA/IJN during the Pacific War, albeit in desperate circumstances. Nevertheless, these restrictions did not deter those with criminal histories from applying to the NPR, and during the recruitment process just less than 14,000 criminals were discovered and disqualified.¹²

Following their selection from the pool of applicants, the successful candidates arrived on 23 August at six regional National Rural Police schools for initial induction.¹³ This use of National Rural Police personnel and facilities for the initial training and processing of the NPR recruits, instead of the similarly available alternatives of using US or IJA bases and instructors, again demonstrates the close connections between the two forces and the constabulary character of the NPR. After arrival, the recruits spent the following five days being processed and inducted into the force. The recruits were issued with what was available in the way of

¹¹ Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) (D) 13267, Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order (Cabinet Order no. 271), 24/8/50. For more on the role of the NPR in screening the recruits and the role of the JCP see: Chapter 4, pp 273-275.

¹²G2 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 20/11/50; M and S Harries, *Soldiers of the Sun, The Rise and Fall of The Imperial Japanese Army*, Random House, New York, 1991, p 319.

¹³ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 45; Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen (The Financial History Section of the Ministry of Finance), *Showa Zaiseishi, Sensō Kara Kōwa Made (The Financial History of Shōwa, From War to Peace)*, Vol. 20, Tokyo Keizai Shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1982, pp 256-260; Bush to Shepard, Memorandum, 'Establishment of the Advisory and Control Group for the NPR' 14/7/50, printed in, *ibid*, p 255.

uniforms and equipment, were given the necessary vaccinations, had their personal and service records prepared, were assigned to 200 man companies and elected temporary officers from within their ranks.¹⁴ This ‘democratic’ and meritocratic method of selection of NCOs and officers is a further indication that the character of the NPR was closer to that of a police force than that of an army. Moreover, for the majority of the life of the NPR, in a system identical to a police force, all recruits joined at the lowest rank (Patrolman Second Class, see table V below for the full rank structure of the NPR) and had to work their way up through the ranks through being suitably qualified and through competitive examinations.¹⁵

Table V. Rank Structure of the NPR¹⁶

Senior Superintendent
Assistant Senior Superintendent
Superintendent 1 st Class
Superintendent 2 nd Class
Senior Inspector
Inspector 1 st Class
Inspector 2 nd Class
Sergeant 1 st Class
Sergeant 2 nd Class
Sergeant 3 rd Class
Senior Patrolman
Patrolman 1 st Class
Patrolman 2 nd Class

After completing their initial induction into the force two National Rural Policemen were assigned to each 200 man unit and went with them to

¹⁴ G2 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 20/11/50.

¹⁵ ‘Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve’, p 3.

¹⁶ ESS(D) 13267, Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order (Cabinet Order no. 271), 24/8/50.

their regional training centres.¹⁷ These National Rural Police officers oversaw the initial weeks of training and acted as temporary leaders of the NPR units. The National Rural Police also provided most of the senior leadership of the force, at first on a loan basis and then through formal transfers. The finance section of National Rural Police made all contracts and procurements for the manufacture and supply of uniforms, bedding, canteens, equipment, logistics, transport, and food for the NPR, spending a total of ¥2.5 billion during the initial recruiting period.¹⁸ These connections further underline the close links between the two forces and the paramilitary police character of the NPR.

The initial recruiting programme, despite falling slightly behind schedule, was a resounding success, with just over 74,000 men being inducted, processed, dispatched to training centres and partially organised and equipped, all in three months.¹⁹ Two further public recruitment campaigns were undertaken by the authorities in order to keep the personnel of the force at full strength, the first from 13 to 16 December 1950 adding 419 new men and the second from 10 July to 10 August 1951, recruiting 8,463.²⁰

Training and Examinations

Once inducted and assigned to their units the NPR recruits began their basic training. This lasted for thirteen weeks until 13 January 1951.²¹ Training was conducted on the basis of a 48 hour week (six days of eight hours). The recruits rose at 5:30 am and trained until 5 pm, with breaks for breakfast and lunch, being allowed the evenings and all day Sunday as

¹⁷ G2 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 20/11/50.

¹⁸ G2 3266, Enger to Weetman, Memorandum for Record, 12/8/50; G2 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 20/11/50.

¹⁹ Bush to Shepard, Memorandum, 'Establishment of the Advisory and Control Group for the NPR' 14/7/50, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 255.

²⁰ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 3; YF-A16, 1F-49, Ridgeway to DEPAR 8/6/51.

²¹ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 4.

free time.²² From the start the emphasis of the training programme was on producing a force usable for internal security duties as fast as possible. The 10 July plan sums up this aim well in stating: 'training and organisation from inception should be so formed and conducted as to permit immediate commitment of personnel in case of emergency'.²³ This emphasis on the speedy development of a usable force is evident from the content of the training programme, with all the training in the use of the carbine taking place in week one (see table VI).

Table VI. Thirteen Week Basic Training Programme in Order of Emphasis²⁴

Subject	Hours	%	Notes
Riot Training and Field Formations	129	20.7	More hours per week than any other subject
Guard Duty	90	14.4	
Physical Training	84	13.5	
Dismounted Drill	72	11.5	With and without weapons, squad, platoon and company drill. Ceremonies.
Road Marches	60	9.6	
Carbine	48	7.7	All in week one, provided instant readiness, mostly theoretical. If available, 3 hours (1/16 of training time) of shooting practice was to be spent on a 1000" range.
Inspections	48	7.7	
Scouting and Patrol, Cover and Concealment	34	5.4	
Field Fortifications	24	3.8	
First Aid and Sanitation	9	1.4	
Equipment and Clothing Maintenance	7	1.1	
Field Cooking	7	1.1	
Map Reading	7	1.1	
Intelligence Training	5	0.8	Production of combat and police intelligence, handling of prisoners, civilians and repatriates. The processing of seized documents and property. Safeguarding information.

²² *Nippon Times*, 7/10/50.

²³ Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 258.

²⁴ Civil Affairs Section (CAS) (A) 1831, NPR HQ, 'Basic Training Program for National Police Reserve Recruits', 8/50.


Table VI and Figure IX also reveal the internal security focus of the basic training of the NPR and other notable aspects of its character and role. Riot training took up the largest part of the course, forming the biggest overall portion of the training programme and taking up more hours per week than any other subject. When combined with guard duty, another internal security task, these elements took up more than one third of the total programme. Other elements such as road marches, scouting and patrol, cover and concealment all provided the recruits with skills they would need if deployed to counter an insurrection or serious domestic disturbance. The content of the subjects taught to the recruits also helps show this internal security character of the force. For example, the recruits were taught how to set up and maintain police observation posts and gather information; and during riot training, they were taught to segregate and apprehend riot leaders. The recruits were also taught how to safeguard intelligence and confidential information on NPR matters, being instructed not to discuss police matters in public or with non-police personnel.²⁵ Guard duty training also included training in how to deal with scenarios typical of the internal security duties for which the NPR were designed, for example, the recruits were taught how to respond if approached by suspicious groups of men whilst on duty or what to do if a prisoner under their charge escaped.²⁶ The official training programme did not include formal lessons on crime detection, although very similar material was included in the intelligence training course. Nevertheless, some training in this subject appears to have taken place, for example, NPR recruits were observed being taught criminal investigation techniques during a visit to an NPR camp by a Japanese journalist. These lessons were likely to have been given by the National Rural Policemen assigned to the NPR companies in the early stages of the programme.²⁷

²⁵ CAS(A) 1828, NPR HQ, 'Basic Training Test for National Police Reserve Recruits', 12/50.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *Nippon Times*, 7/10/50.

Figure IX. NPR Basic Training



Following the completion of the basic training programme and the testing of the recruits on its content and their physical fitness (see below), the NPR small unit training programme began. The programme again lasted for thirteen weeks, from 15 January to 19 May 1951, although the intensity of the training diminished slightly, with the NPR's working week being cut by four hours, on a Saturday. The programme built on the subjects introduced in the basic training programme and introduced elementary

tactical training from squad up to company level.²⁸ As shown in table VII the training was split into three parts, 576 hours taken by all, 216 hours of specialist courses for medical personnel and engineers and 216 hours for all who were not medics and engineers.²⁹

Table VII. Small Unit Training Programme: January to May 1951³⁰

Part One- Universal			
Subject	Hours	%	Notes
Physical Training	108	18.8	
Dismounted Drill	108	18.8	
Carbine	80	13.9	All in last month.
Riot and Field Formations	80	13.9	1/3 at night. All in first two months.
Interior Guard	36	6.3	
Inspections	36	6.3	
Equipment and Clothing Maintenance	36	6.3	
Marches and Bivouacs	32	5.6	
Map Reading	24	4.2	
Field Firing	16	2.8	All in last month. Includes range estimation.
Communication	10	1.7	
Police Regulations	10	1.7	
Part Two- For Non-Medical/Engineer			
Subject	Hours	%	Notes
Squad Operations	110	50.9	10-12 men.
Platoon Operations	58	26.9	40 men.
Company Operations	32	14.8	200 men.
Battalion Operations	16	7.4	989 men.

As can be seen in table VII and figure X the small unit training programme contained many subjects already covered in basic training. Physical training amounted to one hour per day, which gradually increased in intensity, and included activities such as five mile jogs and athletic games which were varied to prevent boredom. 'Dismounted Drill' mostly consisted of learning to march and 'square bashing' in groups from squad to

²⁸ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 4.

²⁹ CAS(A) 1829, NPR HQ, 'Small Unit Training Program for National Police Reserve', 28/12/50.

³⁰ Ibid.


battalion level, with an emphasis on smartness and precision. This was assessed through a minimum of five parades or reviews during the programme. The NPR men also had to pass weekly clothing, equipment and quarters inspections.³¹

The emphasis on internal security duties continued, with riot training and guard duty making up a significant proportion of the course. Guard duty included theoretical and 'on the job training', with NPR men routinely guarding their own barracks and facilities by this time. Riot training continued and became more sophisticated, including night training and 'operations of controlling riots . . . offensive action [against insurgents/rioters] in a small town or sections of cities, street fighting, house to house fighting, control of demonstrations and restoration of order'.³² Several new subjects were introduced but made up only a small fraction of the curriculum. These new subjects included: 'Communication', which taught the procedures and language to be used over the telephone and with messengers; 'Marches and Bivouacs', which took place in the countryside in a variety of terrain and continued training in establishing roadblocks, security and field fortifications; and 'Police Regulations' which detailed the NPR's uniform, disciplinary and personal regulations.

³¹ Ibid.

³² CAS(A) 1829, NPR HQ, 'Small Unit Training Program for National Police Reserve', 28/12/50.

Figure X. Small Unit Training, Common Subjects



The second part of the small unit training programme saw the NPR divide and undergo separate training. Medical and engineering specialists undertook an additional 216 hours learning their trades while the remainder of the NPR began training in small unit operations. As is shown in table VIII the majority of the training was at squad level, some was done at platoon and company level, but relatively little at battalion level. The content of these training exercises again shows the internal security

mission of the force. Up to company level the training included internal security training as well as the use of guards, outposts, defensive roadblocks and barricades. As detailed in the programme description; at platoon level the emphasis was 'on the platoon's role in quelling riots and other disturbances in cities and villages'.³³ At company level the programme description states that the aim was to train in 'the control of domestic disturbances to include crowd and mob tactics, offensive actions [against rioters or insurgents] in cities, protection of the transportation and utilities system, use of barricades, mopping up and the restoration of order'.³⁴ The two days of battalion training included two simple problems: attacking an organised position and the defence of an area. Clearly, the emphasis was on internal security duties, particularly those relating to the quelling of uprisings or serious riots and the restoration of internal order.

Following the completion of the small unit training programme a further four, thirteen week phases of training were undertaken during the life of the NPR. The third phase beginning on 4 June 1951 aimed at maintaining individual efficiency and fitness and included more battalion level and specialized technical training. This phase saw the introduction of mortar training, although most of it was theoretical at this stage.³⁵ The fourth phase training programme began 8 October 1951 and provided additional weapons and common subject training, battalion level exercises and a basic training programme identical to the first for the intake of new recruits.³⁶ The fifth and sixth phases (4 February to 13 June 1952 and 23 June to September 1952 respectively) took the training level up to regimental level and aimed at integrating the specialised units of the NPR into regimental level field exercises.³⁷ With the departure of MacArthur in April 1951 and his earlier moves to increase the hardware of the NPR

³³ CAS(A) 1829, NPR HQ, 'Small Unit Training Program for National Police Reserve', 28/12/50.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ YF-A16, 1F-49, Ridgeway to DEPAR 8/6/51; 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 4.

³⁶ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 4.

³⁷ K. Kuzuhara, 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve of Japan: Impact of the US Army's Far East Command on Japan's Defense Capability', *NIDS Security Reports*, No. 7, Dec 2006, p 101.

during the Chinese intervention of winter 1950/1951 the training of the NPR took on some external security related content from the third phase onwards, but the emphasis of the training and mission of the force remained one of maintaining the internal security of the Japanese islands.³⁸

Scholars such as Dower and Takemae have sought to characterise the NPR as a military force due to its training with heavier weapons such as bazookas.³⁹ These authors neglect the fact that whilst the NPR was a capable internal security force, (that being the focus of most of their training), the training they undertook with heavier arms was of very limited value for a number of reasons. The training with these was mostly theoretical and included little practical use of the weapons. Meagre supplies of ammunition and the paucity of suitable ranges made anything but demonstrations by US personnel difficult. This shortage of suitable training facilities was particularly marked in the areas required for the demonstration of heavy weapons such as 'Known Distance Ranges', 'Tactical Training Areas' and 'Regimental Tactical Training Areas' (see table VIII).⁴⁰

³⁸ For more on the evolution of the force see: Chapter 5.

³⁹ J. Dower, *Embracing Defeat, Japan in The Wake of World War II*, Norton, London, 2000, pp 547-548; J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1988, p 384; E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, Continuum, London, 2002, p 488.

⁴⁰ CAS(A) 1834, Kowalski to Chief Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, 'Eta Jima Schools Quotas, Weapons Course, Second Class', 12/9/1950.

Table VIII. NPR Training Facilities, December 1951⁴¹

Type	Size	Use	Currently Meeting Minimum Requirements			Additional Number Required	Total Available for Use Dec. 1951
			NPR Bases	Occupation Bases	Under Construction FY 1951-52		
Known Distance Range	300 - 500 yards	Light and Medium Weapons	15%	35%	46%	15	50%
1000" Range	1000"	Light Weapons (Pistols or Carbines)	100%	-	-	-	100%
Drill Square	-	Drill/Parades	100%	-	-	-	100%
Tactical Training Area	3.4 sq miles	All Weapons/Manoeuvr e	20%	30%	-	31	50%
Regimental Tactical Training Area	38.7 sq miles	All Weapons/Manoeuvr e	-	33.33%	-	6	33.33 %

Debate also exists amongst many historians over the dates of introduction of certain equipment to the NPR, for example, training in 1951 was meant to introduce the 2.36" 'bazooka' and .50 calibre heavy machinegun and historians like Kuzuhara record this as the point the NPR received these weapons.⁴² However, during this training period the weapons were not fired by the NPR and the training was entirely theoretical or demonstrative.⁴³ The fact that useful and practical training with most of them did not really occur until very close to, or even after, the end of the life of the NPR is omitted by most historians, as is the fact that actual issue of the weapons to the NPR as standard equipment lagged far behind their introduction and demonstration during training.

⁴¹ Based on chart on p 40, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve'.

⁴² K. Kuzuhara, 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve', p 101.

⁴³ YF-A16, 1F-49, Ridgeway to DEPAR 8/6/51.

A further factor which reduced the quality and value of the NPR's training was the absence of adequate translated equipment manuals. This made effective training very difficult and time consuming, particularly in the later stages of the life of the NPR and amongst the more technical units, such as the engineers. The problems of a shortage of manuals, equipment and facilities had a negative effect on the morale and readiness of many NPR units and contributed to the non-operational nature of virtually all of the NPR's service and technical units in the first year of their existence.⁴⁴ A final significant problem in the training of the NPR, especially with heavy weapons, was the relatively limited number of US advisors. CAS(A) recognised the key need for effective advisory supervision if training was to be successful, as the US training programme notes: 'the quality and thoroughness of the training is directly proportional to the amount of effective and personal supervision, rendered by supervisors and their staffs'.⁴⁵ Provision of effective amounts of supervision proved difficult, as, in similar circumstances to the Korean constabulary, the number of US advisory personnel, especially in the early stages of the NPR's existence, was inadequate for the task (see table IX).⁴⁶ The numbers actually available as advisors and trainers of the NPR were in reality even more limited as a large proportion of the military staff of CAS were stationed in its HQ and not actually in the field with the NPR. The shortage of qualified and experienced advisory personnel was especially keenly felt during the training with the unfamiliar American heavy armaments and within more technical and specialised units.

⁴⁴ YF-A16, 1F-139, Conference (Kowalski and Hayashi), 28/3/52; YF-A16, 1B-48, Warden to Chief of Staff, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 27/10/51.

⁴⁵ CAS(A) 1829, NPR HQ, 'Small Unit Training Program for National Police Reserve', 28/12/50.

⁴⁶ For more on the shortage of advisors for the KC see: Chapter 2, p 130.

Table IX. Military Staff of CAS (A)⁴⁷

<u>Date</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Ratio CAS(A) : NPR</u>	<u>Notes</u>
August 1950	20	0	1:3750	1 per 2 NPR Regiments
June 1951	178	217	1:190	1 per Company
April 1952	322	599	1:81	1 per 2 Platoons

That the training given to the NPR did not effectively prepare it for anything other than internal security duties was widely recognised by even the most pro-rearmament elements within GHQ and CAS(A).⁴⁸ In mid-1951 even Ridgeway, MacArthur's more hawkish successor, remarked that:

The NPRJ is capable of quelling internal disorders and may be considered operational through company size units, is limited by weapons and equipment that can be issued. At present the NPRJ is neither prepared nor are the units equipped for tactical employment in the event of an external attack against Japan [sic].⁴⁹

Another chapter of the history of the NPR which helps to reveal its constabulary character is its system of examinations and tests. As noted in the previous section, recruits were tested and examined medically, physically and for political orientation during the initial selection process. This initial phase of testing was the first rung on a ladder of competitive examinations to be ascended by ambitious members of the NPR.

The basic training test undertaken in January 1951, at the end of the thirteen-week basic training programme, was the first test taken by all members of the NPR. Following the conclusion of the basic training programme, the NPR recruits were given a week to revise and improve

⁴⁷ *History of the National Police Reserve*, pp 108-110, figure IV.

⁴⁸ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 4.

⁴⁹ YF-A16, 1F-49, Ridgeway to DEPAR, 8/6/51.

their physical fitness before taking a series of written and physical tests.⁵⁰ The multiple choice written tests examined the recruits' knowledge of the M1 carbine, riot and field formations, guard duty, scouting and patrolling, field fortification, first aid and sanitation, maintenance of clothing and equipment and military intelligence. The physical test consisted of five aerobic and muscular exercises (see table X). Unlike military basic training tests, which are generally highly demanding and designed to eliminate the weaker recruits, neither the physical nor written parts of the test were particularly taxing, the pass marks being 65% and 50% respectively. Furthermore, if the recruits were not up to standard in either field they were not expelled or even punished, with their trainers merely being advised to 'take corrective action as deemed necessary'.⁵¹

Table X. Basic Training Physical Test, January 1951⁵²

Exercise	Pass Requirement
Pull up	8
Squat jump	34
Push up	27
Sit up	34
300 yard run	51.2 seconds

However, very few recruits failed to meet the required standard. For example, within the Third Regiment of the NPR, 2,336 men took the written test and all passed, 2,293 took the physical test, and 2,235 passed (97%).⁵³ Those who failed were given extra tuition and physical training during the subsequent small unit training programme. Furthermore, in the interests of efficiency, maintaining physical fitness and reminding recruits

⁵⁰ CAS(A) 1840, Toole to Chief CAS(A), Basic Training Test National Police Recruits, 7/12/50.

⁵¹ CAS(A) 1827, NPR HQ, Basic Training Test for National Police Reserve Recruits, 7/12/50.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ CAS(A) 1840, Williams to Chief, Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, 19/1/51.

of the basics, the test was repeated in the last half of the small unit training programme.⁵⁴

The constabulary character of the NPR is also evident in the use of the tests for promotion purposes. In the interests of discipline and for traditional reasons most armies have strictly delineated divisions between officers and the non-commissioned ranks, with both being recruited separately and at different starting ranks. Transition between the two is rare and usually only undertaken on the basis of lengthy professional experience and proven leadership potential. The same is true, although not to so great an extent, of the division between senior NCO ranks such as sergeant and the rank-and-file enlisted man. In contrast, police forces, and most constabularies, recruit all their personnel at the same base rank. The recruits then participate in competitive examinations for promotion on the basis of merit. This police style method of promotion was the one used in the NPR.⁵⁵

In December 1950 the first round of competitive examinations for the rank of sergeant were held within the NPR. The nationwide tests consisted of three parts; a written test weighted at 30%, which examined the candidates' initiative and adaptability; an interview also worth 30% which was structured to demonstrate the character and NPR service history of the applicant; and a recommendation by the candidate's officers, worth 40%. Following the results of these competitive examinations a total of 9,500 NPR men were promoted: 1,000 to Sergeant First Class, 2,500 to Sergeant Second Class and 6,000 to Sergeant Third Class. Those who failed the test were reminded that future opportunities would arise, and subsequent identical tests for promotion to sergeant took place over the following two years.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ CAS(A) 1829, O'Brien to Chief Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, 'Basic Training Test for National Police Reserve Recruits', 23/12/50.

⁵⁵ ESS(D) 13267, Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order (Cabinet Order no. 271), 24/8/50.

⁵⁶ CAS(A) 1829, CAS(A)1805, Hayase to NPR Camp and Region Commanders, 'Outline of the 1st Internal Examination for Promotion to Sergeants', 27/12/50; CAS(A) 3305, Essentials for the Examinations for Promotion to Sergeant, 20/11/50.

NPR recruits could also take part in competitive examinations to become officers. To be eligible to apply to take the written and oral examinations the recruits required one of the following special abilities: experience in the medical or legal professions, in finance, communications, engineering or chemistry. The recruits could also qualify through having one of the following attributes: to be a university or high school graduate, to have served one year or more as a second class official in the civil service, to have been a policeman for one or more years at the rank of Inspector or above (a fact which shows the police connections of the NPR), to have been an officer in the IJA/IJN, or have qualifications or experience considered to be equivalent to the above.⁵⁷

A final police-type form of testing took place within the NPR. Like a police force, and unlike an army, the officers of the NPR were subjected to annual reviews of their performance. These reviews were designed to maintain morale and efficiency, and aimed at promoting the best officers and demoting or dismissing those deemed incapable or incompetent. This is a practice common in many civilian occupations but one generally absent from the military.⁵⁸

Deployment and Logistics

One of the most obvious and easily recognisable indicators of the internal security character of the NPR, and one which is cited by Weinstein, Katzenstein and the Harries, is the spatial distribution or posture of the force.⁵⁹ The common and valid argument made by these historians is that

⁵⁷ CAS(A) 1809, Assistant Director, NPR to Officer in Charge of Every NPR unit, Examination of NPR Personnel who have Special Abilities or Appointment of Staff Officer, 23/9/1950.

⁵⁸ Iseki for Hayashi, 'Regulation for Efficiency Evaluation of NPR Officers', 25/5/51, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51.

⁵⁹ P.J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Cornell University Press, London, 1998, p 133; M.E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1971, pp 49, 106, 109, 112, 116-119, 121; M.E. Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense

the NPR was positioned throughout Japan in a pattern which was designed to speed the suppression of insurrection or unrest. As the Harries note, 'the troops were mainly deployed to counter domestic unrest - in or near the major industrial areas which were the heartland of the Japanese Communist Party'.⁶⁰ As can be seen in figure XI the bases of the NPR were concentrated in the centres of population and industry situated in the Kansai and Kanto regions as opposed to being concentrated in Hokkaido, the island closest to the USSR, and the logical route for Soviet invasion.


Moreover, as can be seen in figure XII the number of NPR men stationed in Hokkaido (just over 9,000) was roughly the same as the number in and around Osaka, and 20% less than the number in the Kanto region, including Tokyo (just under 12,000). This deployment of only around one tenth of the force to Hokkaido, clearly illustrates the NPR was not designed as an external security force, i.e. it would not willingly directly confront an invading force. In relation to the domestic threat to Hokkaido, serious communist-related incidents did occur on the island, but it was believed that the NPR were stationed there in sufficient numbers to deal with anything other than a large scale domestic uprising.⁶¹

Forces', in J.H. Buck (ed), *The Modern Japanese Military System*, Sage, London, 1975, pp 42, 44, 46, 57, 52.

⁶⁰ M. and S. Harries, *Sheathing the Sword, The Demilitarisation of Japan*, Heinemann, London, 1989, p 235.


⁶¹ For more on the JCP and Hokkaido see: Chapter 4, pp 262, 264-265.

Figure XI. Location of NPRJ Installations, 15/9/51⁶²



⁶²History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, fig. III.

Figure XII. Deployment of NPR Tactical Elements 31/12/1951⁶³



⁶³ TS 154-155, 'A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951', 1/52, fig. XX.

A further event which supports and validates the argument that the NPR was not deployed or designed as an external security force was the movement south of 20% of the force in the closing months of 1950. The redeployment of over 15,000 men began in early November with the relocation by road of the 214 men of the 504th Engineer Construction Company from Camp Schimmelpfennig in Sendai to Camp Utsunomiya, near Tokyo. This move was followed on 13 November with the movement of 199 men from the 20th Regiment south down the sea of Japan coast from Camp Younghans in Yamagata to Camp Takada in Niigata.⁶⁴ These moves were followed a month later by the movement south of the vast majority of units stationed in northern Honshu to new homes in Kanto and Kansai, near the major urban and industrial conurbations which held the vast majority of JCP supporters.⁶⁵ This redeployment, as detailed below, in table XI, consisted of shifting of over a fifth of the NPR to the industrial and population centres during the period in which the UN forces were retreating south of Seoul. As this occurred during a period where there was a pressing threat to Japan's external security, it clearly demonstrates that the NPR was not intended to serve as an external security force as it was being moved away from the likely area of operations, rather than towards it.⁶⁶ It could be argued that this movement south represented preparations to repel a possible incursion from Southern Korea, following the evacuation of the UN forces in the face of the Chinese advance during this period.⁶⁷ However, the total Anglo-American Naval superiority in the Sea of Japan, the inadequacy of the communist naval forces and the fact that none of the forces were redeployed to Kyushu or southern Honshu, the logical places for an invasion, refute this theory.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ CAS(A) 1808, O'Brien to Chief Tōhoku Civil Affairs Region, 'Movement of NPR Units', 8/11/50.

⁶⁵ CAS (A) 1807, O'Brien to Chief, Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, 'Movement of NPR units', 12/50.

⁶⁶ X. Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2007, pp 101-102.

⁶⁷ MacArthur Memorial Archives, RG-6, Series III, (MMA) 'Operation Plan CINCFE No. 4-51', 5/4/51, Annex 'A', 'Command Relations', p 1.

⁶⁸ See below for more on the UN naval superiority.

Table XI. NPR Redeployment, December 1950⁶⁹

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Direction</u>
Schimmelpfennig (Sendai)	Toyokawa (Nr Nagoya)	4,179	South
Schimmelpfennig (Sendai)	Fukuchiyama (Nr Kyoto)	853	South
Schimmelpfennig (Sendai)	Utsunomiya (Nr Tokyo)	1338	South
Schimmelpfennig (Sendai)	Mastsumoto (Nagano)	859	South
Fowler (Sendai)	Utsunomiya (Nr Tokyo)	810	South
Fowler (Sendai)	Fukuchiyama (Nr Kyoto)	1375	South
Lanier (Sendai)	Takada (Niigata)	989	South
Younghans (Yamagata)	Toyokawa (Nr Nagoya)	989	South
Younghans (Yamagata)	Takada (Niigata)	394	South
Younghans (Yamagata)	Mastsumoto (Nagano)	1973	South
Matsushima (Miyagi)	Takada (Niigata)	1338	South
Matsushima (Miyagi)	Mastsumoto (Nagano)	805	South
Total		15,092	

A comparison of the later adjustments in the deployment of the NPR is also useful in illustrating the beginnings of its transformation into the National Safety Force (NSF) in 1952.⁷⁰ The NPR's deployment in late December 1951 (see figure XII) shows a force almost entirely consisting of 'Infantry' with a smaller number of 'Artillery' units (something of a misnomer as the NPR possessed nothing heavier than light mortars at this stage), and one Engineer battalion per region.⁷¹ The deployment of the force exactly three months later, as shown in figure XIII, shows the addition of a medical battalion in Kyushu (again distant from Hokkaido and the USSR), and a troop of 'Armour' at Maizuru, a seaport in Kyoto prefecture (again this must have been a training formation as tanks were not issued for a further five months, after the establishment of the National


⁶⁹ Based on information found in CAS (A) 1807, O'Brien to Chief, Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, 'Movement of NPR units', 12/50; *History of the National Police Reserve*, fig. III; H.C. Banks, *1st Cavalry Division: A Spur Ride Through the 20th Century*, "From Horses to the Digital Battlefield", Turner Publishing Company, Paducah, 2003, pp 58-64.

⁷⁰ For more on the transition to the NSF see: Chapter 5, pp 330-340.

⁷¹ See Appendix VII. 'Basic US Military Map Symbols'; TS 154-155, 'A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951', 1/52, fig. XX.

Safety Agency and during the period of transition to the National Safety Force).⁷²

Figure XIII. Deployment of NPR Tactical Elements, 31/3/52⁷³



⁷² History of the National Police Reserve, fig. IV.
⁷³ Ibid.

Figure XIII also shows the small increase of the numbers of NPR men stationed in Hokkaido, a movement which signified a slightly greater assumption of external security duties by the NSF.⁷⁴ Documents show that Kowalski had planned to deploy an additional 35,000 men in Hokkaido if the US plans for a massive increase of the NSF had taken place.⁷⁵ However, even if the Japanese opposition to the expansion had proved unsuccessful it would have been difficult to house such a large number of troops there without a great deal of new construction as sufficient housing and facilities for 35,000 additional men did not exist, even in 1952.⁷⁶ The US push for the assumption of a greater external security role and a correspondingly larger deployment of men and resources to Hokkaido was frustrated for decades after the end of the NPR. Despite a greater emphasis on external defence, as late as the mid-1970s only four of the thirteen Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) divisions were stationed in Hokkaido, with the remaining nine stationed, like their NPR predecessors, close to the major urban and industrial centres, reflecting, as Weinstein claimed, that even in 1974 'the maintenance of internal security remains the basic mission [of the GSDF]'.⁷⁷

A further trait of the internal security character of the NPR was its logistical dependence on the Occupation authorities. Due to a dearth of suitably experienced advisory personnel, equipment and training facilities; unfamiliar Japanese regulations and laws; and difficulties in training personnel, all of the technical and service units of the NPR were not operational in the first year of its existence.⁷⁸ As much as possible of the equipment and supplies required by the force were procured from inside Japan, although by March 1952 only just over a third of the total

⁷⁴ For more on the evolution of the NPR see: Chapter 5.

⁷⁵ YF-A16, 1F-139, Conference (Kowalski and Hayashi), 19/4/52.

⁷⁶ Ibid. For more on Japanese opposition to expansion see: Chapter 5, pp 305-330.

⁷⁷ Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, p 133; Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, pp 49, 106, 109, 112, 116-119, 121; Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', p 52.

⁷⁸ YF-A16, 1B-48, Warden to Chief of Staff, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 27/10/51, pp 43-45.

equipment was supplied from domestic sources.⁷⁹ Most notable amongst the numerous deficiencies of the logistical organisation of the NPR was the weakness of its supply system. A system of depots designed to be capable of storing supplies, as opposed to solely distributing them, was still only in the planning stages when the force became the NSF.⁸⁰ As a result of these deficiencies in trained personnel and adequate facilities the amount of supplies held by each NPR region were quite limited and were prioritised in a manner which again testifies to the internal security character of the force. Hokkaido, northern Honshu and Kyushu, the areas which saw the greatest external threat, were provisioned for only thirty days of operations, whereas the central, more urbanised regions, such as Kanto, had ninety days worth of supplies.⁸¹ A force so reliant on the US for its logistics and one with such a dysfunctional supply system and meagre supplies was clearly incapable of participating independently in external security duties, especially for extended periods, and the concentration of supplies (and troops) in the central, more densely populated areas, confirms the internal security mission of the NPR.

The Capabilities of the NPR

The capabilities of the NPR also help to show its constabulary character. These were of a light, constabulary nature for almost all of the life of the NPR, and certainly for the duration of the Occupation. Some heavier arms did find their way into the hands of the NPR but this mostly occurred during the period of transition to the NSF between 1 August 1952 (the establishment of the National Safety Agency) and 15 October 1952 (the official inauguration parade of the NSF).

⁷⁹ Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, pp 256-257.

⁸⁰ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 43.

⁸¹ YF-A16, 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 22/12/51, p 45.

The principal weapon of the NPR throughout its existence was the American M1 carbine (see figure XIV). The carbine was a short weapon, just less than three feet long and was designed for use by second-line soldiers such as officers, drivers, cooks, clerks, and others who did not fight on the front line but, in an emergency, might need a weapon more capable than a pistol.⁸² The weapon was the most produced personal weapon of the Second World War with over 6.3 million being manufactured and the carbine proved popular, being handy, light and easy to use. However this lightness and small size required the employment of a smaller pistol size bullet (see figure XV). This, when compared to any contemporary rifle, was deficient in range, stopping power and accuracy at anything other than short ranges of around one hundred yards. Clearly, the NPR, exclusively armed with carbines, would have been at a literally fatal disadvantage if it had faced opponents armed with rifles, a fact which illustrates that the NPR was not designed for use in frontline external security operations. A further supporting point which also helps to strengthen the case that the NPR was a constabulary is the wide use of the M1 carbine by constabulary, paramilitary and civil police forces around the world to this day. Most notable of these in the British Isles was the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which extensively employed the M1 for most of the postwar period, instead of a full size rifle, due to its light weight and less lethal and correspondingly 'safer', smaller ammunition.⁸³

Figure XIV. M1 Carbine⁸⁴



⁸² I.V. Hogg, *The Encyclopedia of Infantry Weapons of World War II*, Guild Publishing, London, 1987, pp 39-40.

⁸³ C. Bishop (ed), *The Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II*, Amber Books, London, 2007, p 224.

⁸⁴ Picture courtesy of: http://olegvolk.net/gallery/d/26516-1/M1Cwhole_2866.jpg.

Figure XV. M1 Carbine Ammunition (far right) Shown in Context with Rifle Ammunition⁸⁵



A force entirely armed with the M1 Carbine was clearly unsuitable for external security duties and a more suitable choice, if the NPR had been designed for these duties, would have been given the standard US rifle of the period, the M1 'Garand'. This rifle was used by both the US Army and many of its allies, including the South Korean Army. A study was actually conducted by CAS at the end of July 1951 investigating whether this heavy and cumbersome weapon was suitable for issue to the NPR. In the study, a group of one hundred NPR men, who represented a cross-section of sizes and builds of the men in the force, practised firing and took a ten mile cross-country march with the weapon. Despite complaining about the excessive weight of the rifle the NPR men coped well, helping the US advisory staff conclude that it was suitable for Japanese use. However, the M1 Garand only began to be issued in late 1951 and typified the gradual increase in assumption of external security duties which accompanied the transformation into the NSF.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Picture courtesy of: <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Munit08.jpg>.

⁸⁶ YF-A16, 1F-8, General Group HQ, CAS, 'M1 Rifle. Its Use by Japanese', 11/8/51; *Asagumo Shinbun Henshu Kyukoku (Asagumo Shinbun Editorial Board), Hanran no Hanseiki-Rikujō Jieitai no 50 Nen (A Dramatic Half Century - 50 Years of the GSDF), The History of the JGSDF 50 Years in Photographs, Asagumo Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 2000, p 249.*

Alongside the M1 carbine the NPR also used a number of support weapons. The heaviest weapon possessed by the NPR for all but the final four months of its existence was the American 60mm mortar. This weapon, which was not universally issued until 20 June 1951, had a maximum range of 1,985 yards and fired a range of 3lb shells, the most common being smoke or high explosive.⁸⁷ This mortar was supplemented in the first quarter of 1952 with a number of 81mm mortars which had a maximum range of 3,290 yards and a 6.87lb shell.⁸⁸ Both of the mortars used by the NPR were outranged by the standard Soviet 82mm mortar which had a maximum reach of 3,391 yards (around two miles) and a heavier 7.4lb shell.⁸⁹ In addition to being outclassed by the Soviet mortar, the NPR had no artillery at all for the vast majority of its existence, a deficiency even greater than that faced by the South Korean Army (ROKA) in June 1950 against the North Korean People's Army (NKPA).⁹⁰

Under American pressure the NPR also added some anti-tank armament to its armoury. It could be argued that the presence of these weapons support the argument that the NPR was an army from the start, however, a closer examination of the equipment issued challenges that oversimplified argument. The main anti-tank weapon given to the NPR was the 2.36" rocket launcher, commonly known as the 'bazooka'. This weapon was only issued in very limited numbers to the NPR initially and was entirely obsolete as an anti-tank weapon by the time the NPR received it in full.⁹¹ As with much of the NPR's equipment its unsuitability for external security duties had been clearly demonstrated in June 1950 when, in the hands of the Republic of Korea Army, it proved incapable of penetrating the armour of the T-34 tanks of the NKPA.⁹² Aside from its

⁸⁷ Asagumo Shinbun Henshu Kyukoku, *The History of the JGSDF*, p 249; Hogg, *The Encyclopaedia of Infantry weapons of World War II*, p 107.

⁸⁸ Hogg, *The Encyclopaedia of Infantry weapons of World War II*, pp 108-109.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p 110.

⁹⁰ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 192.

⁹¹ CAS(B) 870, Goodeve to Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, 'Request for Issue of Equipment for Japan National Police Training', 1/9/50.

⁹² C.A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain, *MacArthur 1941-1951, Victory in the Pacific*, Heinemann, London, 1956, p 338.

obsolescent nature relegating it to second line or internal security use, the 2.36” bazooka had a number of other uses besides its original anti-tank role which indicate its potential usefulness in the kind of operations the NPR was envisaged to conduct. These included use against pill boxes or fixed defences, removal of obstacles or barbed wire, demolition of walls or buildings, use against area targets, the clearance of minefields or booby traps and a multitude of other uses.⁹³ Towards the very end of its existence, during the post August 1952 period of transition to the NSF, in the third quarter of fiscal year 1952, the NPR was issued a number of more effective 75mm recoilless rifles (although even these were of questionable value against Soviet tanks) and the 3.5” ‘super bazooka’, although this was only used in limited numbers and in largely theoretical training before the creation of the NSF.⁹⁴

A further type of equipment that the NPR received in its final, transitional sixth phase training programme (June to September 1952) was artillery. The main piece of artillery issued to the NPR was the M2A1 105mm howitzer, a weapon still in use today with the US Army and many other forces. 154 of these guns were issued to the NPR/NSF in August 1952, less than two months before the end of the force and after the creation of the National Safety Agency (NSA) earlier that month.⁹⁵ Although their presence again could be said to show that the NPR was an external security force, the fact that the gun could be used in a variety of roles such as firing teargas and propaganda leaflet shells, demonstrates that the weapon had uses other than that of conventional bombardment.⁹⁶ Again, that this weapon was outranged by all of the comparable Soviet models showed the NPR, whilst able to deal with lightly armed rebels or guerrillas,

⁹³ Bishop (ed), *Encyclopaedia of Weapons of World War II*, p 204.

⁹⁴ YF-A16, 1B-43, G3, Memo for Record, ‘NPRJ Rearmament’, 1/5/51; Ibid, Everett, Draft Message to CINFE, 6/4/51; Kuzuhara, ‘The Korean War and The National Police Reserve’, p 101.

⁹⁵ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan White Paper*, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2007, p 599; M. Royama, ‘Problems of Self-Defense’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 308, Nov. 1956, p 168.

⁹⁶ Bishop (ed), *Encyclopaedia of Weapons of World War II*, p 139, Kuzuhara, ‘The Korean War and The National Police Reserve’, p 101.

was incapable of engaging in direct combat on even terms with a Soviet modelled force.⁹⁷

In early 1952 the NPR was also given a number of anti-aircraft halftracks but these were for training purposes and were few in number, numbering sixty-four vehicles shared between the four divisions and 75,000 men of the force (roughly one vehicle for every 1,200 men).⁹⁸ This tiny number and the fact that these vehicles had often been used in an antipersonnel role and were not generally employed on the frontline in wartime shows that their presence does not indicate that the NPR was an external security force.

Many of the vehicles possessed by the force were used by the NPR's small number of 'engineer' units and the presence of these units could be used by a historian seeking to argue that the NPR was an army from the start. However a number of factors undermine this argument. However, the remote interior of Japan, the poor condition of much of its infrastructure and the unsuitability of many of its bridges for heavy motorised transport made an engineering arm essential to any force seeking to maintain internal security.⁹⁹ Furthermore, the vast amount of construction the NPR project required necessitated a dedicated construction force even before the US Army began its push for the rapid expansion of the force and its facilities from 1951.¹⁰⁰ The engineer units also proved essential in disaster relief operations, although this was not originally envisaged as their main operational role.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless as these units, like the rest of the NPR's specialist and technical units, were

⁹⁷ R.E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, 1992, p 17; C. Bishop (ed), *The Encyclopaedia of Weapons of World War II*, pp 130-131, 146-147, K. Kuzuhara, 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve', p 101.

⁹⁸ Bishop (ed), *Encyclopaedia of Weapons of World War II*, p 81; Kuzuhara, 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve', p 101.

⁹⁹ M.L. Stubbs and S. R. Connor, *Army Lineage Series: CMH Pub 60-1: Armor-Cavalry*, U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington, 1969, part 1; Regular Army and Army Reserve, Korean War, (not paginated).

¹⁰⁰ YF-A16, 1F-139, Conference (Kowalski and Hayashi), 19/4/52.

¹⁰¹ For more on disaster relief see: Chapter 4, pp 281-284.

non-operational in the first year of their existence their value in any argument over the character of the NPR is limited.¹⁰²

A piece of equipment which prompts many to argue that the NPR was an external security force is the tank. It is true that the NPR did receive forty M24 'Chaffee' light tanks (see figure XVI) (roughly one tank per 1,875 men) in the final ninety days of its existence, and after the creation of the National Safety Agency.¹⁰³ However, these were only for familiarisation and training purposes and the first operational tank unit, the 101st Tank Battalion based in Hokkaido, was not set up until 22 November 1952, one week after the inauguration of the NSF and almost four months after the creation of the NSA.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, like so much of the equipment of the NPR, the 'Chaffee' was highly unsuitable for state versus state combat, it having been destroyed in large numbers by North Korean T-34s in the early weeks of the Korean War. The 'Chaffee' was a light tank primarily designed for reconnaissance or second line duties and was incapable of posing a threat to the T-34, the standard Soviet tank. The T-34 dwarfed the M24 in weight (26.5 tonnes vs. 18.4 tonnes) and outgunned the US tank, whose thin armour it could easily penetrate, and to which the Chaffee had no effective response due to its underpowered main gun.¹⁰⁵ Clearly, unless supported by heavier tanks, the M24 tank was not suitable for external security missions against adversaries armed with standard Soviet weaponry. An interesting final point which helps support the argument that the presence of tanks does not automatically indicate an external security force is the fact that tanks, mostly consisting of the 'Chaffee' were used for internal security duties in Japan by the Occupation forces prior to June 1950. These tanks were used in internal security roles such as helping to break up the Tōhō studio strike in 1948, and were

¹⁰² YF-A16, 1B-48, Warden to Chief of Staff, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 27/10/51, pp 43-45.

¹⁰³ J. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse, Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System*, The Athlone Press, London, 1988, p 80.

¹⁰⁴ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan White Paper*, 2007, p 599; Royama, 'Problems of Self-Defense', p 168.

¹⁰⁵ Bishop (ed), *Encyclopaedia of Weapons of World War II*, p 32, Kuzuhara, 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve', p 101.

employed in an identical role by the US constabulary in occupied Germany.¹⁰⁶

Figure XVI. M24 'Chaffee' in Action in Korea¹⁰⁷



A useful exercise to help demonstrate the inadequacy of the NPR in comparison to any potential adversary, and hence also show its internal security role, is a direct comparison between the capabilities of the NPR and its potential opponents and comparable counterpart forces. This comparison is given below in table XII which contains data on the NPR, NSF, early Republic of Korea Army, Soviet, US and IJA divisions of various kinds. In his work on the NPR, Kuzuhara undertakes a similar exercise but only uses the light Soviet sniper division, IJA and US infantry divisions, a frame of reference which makes the NPR look stronger and ignores other heavier, and more likely, opposition. Kuzuhara also manipulates the figures somewhat by including light weapons such as

¹⁰⁶G3 Historical Sub-Section, *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary, 3 October 1945 – 30 June 1947*, HQ United States Constabulary, 1947, pp 33, 45, 115; R.M. Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2004, p 67; Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur 1941-1951*, pp 337-338; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 116, 465; J.S. Brown, 'Combat Cops? The Army as Constabulary: Lessons from Our Past', *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 138, September 2000, p 68.

¹⁰⁷ Picture courtesy of: www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/tanks.htm#m24.

bazookas as antitank weapons and using the complete equipment of the NSF as that of the NPR.¹⁰⁸

When examining the figures it is clear that as it lacked any arms heavier than a carbine for most of its existence the NPR was obviously qualitatively and quantitatively deficient in terms of heavy equipment. Even the NSF appears very weak in comparison to everything except perhaps the IJA Infantry division. The NPR, without any heavy equipment would clearly have crumbled even more speedily than the ROKA in 1950 if faced with Soviet-style divisions. The NPR, like the KC/early ROKA was clearly designed for a different role: that of an internal security force.¹⁰⁹

Table XII. Comparison of NPR with Rival Forces¹¹⁰

<u>Division</u>	<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Artillery*</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>AT Guns/RL⁺</u>
NPR 1950-52	Japan	15,000	0	0	0
NSF	Japan	15,000	72	60L	36
ROK 1950 (Average)	ROK	8,087	11	0	17
Sniper	Soviet	11,943	60	52	60
Mech Inf 1946-51	Soviet	12,500- 14,244	54	176M, 21H	63s
Tank 1947	Soviet/DPRK	11,541	24	208M,44H	84s
Infantry 1950	DPRK	12,092	66**	0	42
Infantry 1950	USA	17,156	72	9L, 17M 123H	120
IJA Infantry 1938	Japan	14,640	36	0	0
* Excludes mortars.		L Light tank (M24 Chafee).			
** Includes 18 120mm heavy mortars.		M Medium tank (T34 / Sherman).			
*Excludes infantry weapons such as the bazooka and anti-tank rifles.		H Heavy tank (IS-2 / M26 Pershing).			
		s Self propelled guns.			

¹⁰⁸ Kuzuhara, 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve', pp 111-112.

¹⁰⁹ The absence of an air arm is also highly indicative of the intern role of the NPR, see: Chapter 5, pp 329-330.

¹¹⁰ Based on data found in: J.M. Minnich, *The North Korean People's Army, Origins and Current Tactics*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2005, pp 41-44; YF-A4, B.R. Alexander, 'Enemy Material', HQ United States Army in Korea, APO 310, undated, Reel 8; Kuzuhara, 'The Korean War and The National Police Reserve', p 111-112; Korea Institute Of Military History, *The Korean War, Volume One*, University of Nebraska Press, London, 2000, pp 89-90; Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pp 15-16.

Without doubt, it could be argued that the presence of even obsolete weapons of the nature possessed by the NPR could identify it merely as an underequipped force designed for an external security mission, i.e. an army. This argument greatly oversimplifies the situation and ignores the fact that for the vast majority of its life (until the first quarter of 1952) the NPR was only equipped with carbines and light mortars, and even after receiving what little other arms it did have in the final days of its existence, was not organised or trained to use them or even operate effectively above company level.

The NPR was also clearly even weaker than the ROKA in June 1950 which raises the question, why create a force for external security which was so inadequate? The answer is that the NPR was not originally designed for external security duties and was equipped and trained as an internal security force designed to deal with domestic communist insurrection, while the US handled Japan's external security. Even the pro-rearmament US Army official history, *History of the National Police Reserve of Japan*, which argues consistently that the NPR was an army, states that even by mid-1952, when the NPR had begun to receive some of the heavier arms for training purposes, it and Japan 'depended heavily on the United States for external security' and oxymoronically 'its army, the National Police Reserve, was only a quasi-military force'.¹¹¹ Heavier and more up-to-date arms were available and were being sent to Europe and nearby Korea in large numbers so availability of these was not really an issue affecting the capabilities of the NPR.¹¹² International political constraints did play a role in the release of the heavier arms to the police reserve but these did not really have an effect until heavier arms were actively pushed for by the US Army from late 1951 onwards.¹¹³

¹¹¹ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 195.

¹¹² Korea Institute Of Military History, *The Korean War, Volume One*, pp 251, 353-354.

¹¹³ *History of the National Police Reserve*, pp 192, 195. For more on the push for heavy arms see: Chapter 5, pp 294-299.

Taking these factors into consideration it is clear that despite some erosion of its character and movement towards more of an external security role in 1952, the NPR was originally envisaged by MacArthur and Yoshida as an internal security force. Like the KC and its earlier constabulary predecessors, the NPR was deliberately not given heavy arms as it was intended for internal security.¹¹⁴ Even when sought by the US Army the resistance of Yoshida and MacArthur limited and delayed the assumption of heavy weapons. The fact that the NPR was neither initially equipped nor designed for external security was clearly stated by MacArthur when he briefly dropped his opposition to the NPR's adoption of heavier equipment in the wake of the Chinese intervention in Korea in the winter of 1950/51. MacArthur, seemingly facing defeat at the hands of the Chinese, clearly noted the weakness of the more powerfully equipped Republic of Korea Army in 1950: 'Against such a force [designed on a Soviet model] an NPRJ lacking medium tanks and at least medium artillery would be utterly inadequate. A most recent and striking case in point was the complete inability of the light south Korean divisions to cope with the tank supported North Korean Forces'.¹¹⁵

The Internal Security Role Envisaged for the NPR

It seems that after examining the recruitment, training and structure of the NPR a discussion of the role and intended purpose of the NPR is necessary to form a complete impression of its character. On the basis of the evidence presented in this study the character of the NPR was clearly that of an internal security force, but the specific roles and missions which the NPR was designed to perform require further examination. This section will attempt to reveal these roles.

¹¹⁴ Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p 17. For more on other constabularies see: Chapter 2, pp 115-138.

¹¹⁵ YF-A16, 1F-42, CINCFE to DEPAR, 8/1/51. For more on MacArthur's request see: Chapter 5, pp 288-290.

As a result of undertaking the prime responsibility for the Occupation of Japan the United States also took on the mantle of Japan's external security from the vanquished Imperial Japanese forces. Throughout the Occupation, and in a move later formalised by the 1951 Security Treaty, the United States effectively guaranteed the external security of Japan.¹¹⁶ The presence of US naval and air formations in Japan acted as a deterrent, thwarting any designs the Soviets might have had on the islands. Although many, including the CIA and US military, believed at times the USSR had the capabilities required, if the Soviets had actually attempted to invade Japan the overwhelming naval superiority of the United States would have meant that a seaborne invasion would have been, at best, a reckless gamble.¹¹⁷ The Soviet Pacific fleet in 1950 consisted of one light and two heavy cruisers, around thirty destroyers and eighty or so submarines. The Chinese and North Korean Fleets were even weaker, consisting of a handful of patrol and torpedo boats and lacking a single capital ship between them.¹¹⁸ Even when compared to the scratch forces available to the UN command at the start of the Korean War, the Communists were helplessly outnumbered. US units available at that time consisted of one aircraft carrier (86 aircraft), two cruisers, twelve destroyers, and three submarines; Royal Navy ships present totalled one carrier (48 aircraft), two light cruisers, three frigates, and two destroyers.¹¹⁹ The weakness of their navy was a fact acknowledged by the Soviet leadership and the naval actions of the Korean War helped underline the need for Soviet naval expansion and modernisation,

¹¹⁶P.J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, p 33; M.E. Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', p 44.

¹¹⁷ CIA, 'Estimate of Soviet Probable Intentions towards Japan', 10/2/51, p i.

¹¹⁸ G.L. Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations and Communist Ground, Naval and Air Forces, 1950-1953*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 2002, pp 170-171; R. Burman, 'China's Naval Capabilities', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 9, No. 5, January 1974, p133.

¹¹⁹ A. Field, *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea*, US Government Printing Service, Washington, 1962, Table 2 and 3; T.J. Cutler, 'Sea Power and Defense of the Pusan Pocket, June – September 1950', in E.J. Marolda, *The U.S. Navy in the Korean War*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2007, pp 14-15; A.D. Muraviev, 'The Russian Pacific Fleet, from the Crimean War to Perestroika', *Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs*, no. 20, Sea Power Institute, Canberra, 2007, p19; CIA, 'Estimate of Soviet Probable Intentions Towards Japan', 10/2/51, p ii.

although this only reached the planning stages during the life of the NPR. As Winkler notes:

American naval actions off Korea at the start of the Korean War only reinforced Stalin's conviction that the USSR needed a large ocean-going navy. The Soviet leader pushed forward a large construction programme that began producing cruisers and fast destroyers at about the time of his death in 1953.¹²⁰

In the unlikely event of a successful seaborne or airborne landing all American war plans of the period called for US troops to undertake the ground defence of Japan, which was to be coupled with an aerial and, depending on conditions, maritime, offensive.¹²¹ With the external defence of Japan in the air, at sea and on land comprehensively within the realm of the US military, it is clear that the NPR was designed to fill another role. Despite their differing ideas of what the NPR should become, both MacArthur and Ridgeway conceded that the NPR was unsuitable for frontline use in its original form.¹²² It was also recognised within GHQ that in the event of war for the NPR to be any use in combat a vast, and almost certainly unavailable, amount of tactical and logistical support and supplies would need to be speedily provided by US forces.¹²³ As most war plans envisaged the US forces in Japan having to hold their own until additional help could be provided, it is extremely unlikely that the already undersupplied US forces in Japan would have been able to render any of

¹²⁰ D.F. Winkler, *Cold War at Sea. High-Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2000, p 10; E. Morris, *The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1977, p 118; A.D. Muraviev, 'The Russian Pacific Fleet', pp 21-22.

¹²¹ GHQ/FEC, Staff Study "Gunpowder", 2nd Edition, 21/4/49, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 236; JCS 1844/13, Brief of Short Range Emergency War Plan (HALFMOON), 21/7/48, printed in, T.H. Etzold and J.L. Gaddis (eds), *Containment, Documents on American Policy and Strategy*, p 316; JSPC 877/59, Brief of Joint Outline Emergency War Plan (OFFTACKLE), 26/5/49, printed in, *ibid* ; NSC 68, 14/4/50, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 241; YF-A16, 1A-155 Jenkins to Ridgeway, Rusk and Johnson, 23/2/1952.

¹²² YF-A16, 1F-42, CINCFE to DEPAR, 8/1/51; YF-A16, 1F-49, Ridgeway to DEPAR 8/6/51. For more on Ridgeway's position see: Chapter 5, pp 294-295.

¹²³ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', pp 8, 45.

this material assistance to the NPR.¹²⁴ The role that the NPR would have performed in wartime would have been concurrent with its capabilities and character i.e. an internal security force. These roles would have been identical to those performed by the KC/Republic of Korea Army before 1950.¹²⁵ The NPR would be operating behind the US lines, assisting the civilian population and refugees, guarding key installations and bases and preventing or subduing strikes, riots, partisans, paratroopers or guerrillas. The secondary support role the NPR would be likely to perform was highlighted in a December 1951 report on the NPR: 'Responsibility of the defense of Japan against an external aggressor force, at present and for an indefinite future period, rests with the US military forces . . . It is envisaged that, in a national emergency involving Japan, the NPRJ could and would be utilized in support of the US forces'.¹²⁶ Katzenstein, a leading scholar on Japanese security, recognises the role of the force accurately: 'in the face of a serious threat from the Soviet Union, and given the deterrent power of US forces, the primary purpose of Japan's armed forces was domestic policing against Communist insurrection'.¹²⁷

This internal role was confirmed by the confinement of the NPR to Japanese territory. Like other constabularies the NPR's zone of responsibility ended at the borders of the Japanese state, hence making it incapable of undertaking external security duties, especially those requiring action outside the borders of Japan.¹²⁸ The political constraints on external operations included the 1947 constitution and the explicitly internal remit of the NPR.¹²⁹ This internal focus was strengthened and

¹²⁴ GHQ/FEC, Staff Study "Gunpowder", 2nd Edition, 21/4/49, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 236; JCS 1844/13, Brief of Short Range Emergency War Plan (HALFMOON), 21/7/48, Printed in, Etzold and Gaddis (eds), *Containment, Documents on American Policy and Strategy*, p 316; JSPC 877/59, Brief of Joint Outline Emergency War Plan (OFFTACKLE), 26/5/49, printed in, Etzold and Gaddis (eds), *Containment, Documents on American Policy and Strategy*, p 328; NSC 68, 14/4/50, Printed Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 241; YF-A16, 1A-155 Jenkins to Ridgeway, Rusk and Johnson, 23/2/1952.

¹²⁵ For more on the Korean Constabulary see: Chapter 2, pp 125-138.

¹²⁶ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 42.

¹²⁷ Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, p 33.

¹²⁸ T. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution, the Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, Crane Russak, New York, 1991, p 76.

¹²⁹ Appendix VI. 'Macarthur to Yoshida, Letter Authorising the Creation of the NPR, 8 July

confirmed through the absence of any power projection capabilities, sea transports or even an air force.

Despite its internal security role plans did exist for the use of NPR in the case of war with the USSR, or a 'general emergency' as World War Three was euphemistically referred to in the documents.¹³⁰ Central amongst these plans was 'Operation Plan CINCFE No. 4-51', of April 1951. As well as the immediate abandonment and evacuation of Korea in the event of Soviet intervention, the plan called for the use of the NPR as an external security stopgap only until US forces returned from the peninsula, a matter of days at most.¹³¹ Once the US troops had been deployed, the NPR would remain in reserve and would be tasked with maintaining internal security. Tellingly, the force would also be retained for internal security duties under the direct control of SCAP and the Japanese government and not the regional military commanders charged with the external defence of Japan. Furthermore, units of the NPR were not to be used in external security duties or be placed under the command of the defending US forces unless on specific orders from SCAP.¹³² Again its role was that of an internal security force, considered incapable of direct state versus state warfare, even in defence of the Japanese islands.

Clearly this wartime role was very similar to the primary peacetime mission assigned to the NPR; supporting the civil police in suppressing uprisings or major domestic disturbances. One of the principal reasons behind the creation of the NPR was the perceived inability of the civil police to cope with organised civil violence or an uprising.¹³³ Despite the abolition of Japan's armed forces the American and Allied planning prior to its surrender asserted Japan's right to maintain a police force in order to

1950'; K. Masuhara, *A Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 1956, p 4.

¹³⁰ MMA, 'Operation Plan CINCFE No. 4-51', 5/4/51, p 1.

¹³¹ Ibid, pp 1-2.

¹³² MMA, 'Operation Plan CINCFE No. 4-51', 5/4/51, Annex 'A', 'Command Relations', p2.

¹³³ For more on the civil police's perceived inability of the civil police to cope with organised civil violence or an uprising see: Appendix I. 'The Shimoyama, Taira, Mitaka and Matsukawa Incidents'; Appendix IV. 'The Weakness of the Japanese Civil Police in Occupied Japan'.

safeguard law and order and protect vital installations from sabotage. The concern that the Japanese civil police were unable to do so in the face of war in Korea, the departure of the US tactical troops and the increasingly militant activities of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) led to the creation of the NPR, as cited in its initial planning:

[The civil police] are inadequate to maintain law and order in Japan without the presence of four United States divisions or some back-up force substituted therefor . . . the Japanese police, as now constituted, have little if any capability for protecting military installations against sabotage nor does any Japanese force exist which has the paramilitary qualifications to perform this function . . . There is an immediate requirement for the establishment of a National Police Reserve to reinforce the Japanese police in case of serious internal disorders or possible rebellion, and also fill the vacuum created by the deployment from Japan of U.S. Army forces [sic].¹³⁴

Prior to the creation of the NPR the role of the more heavily armed support of the Japanese civil police was performed by the United States tactical troops stationed in Japan. Many historians such as Swenson-Wright, quoting MacArthur's later comments to Congress, have argued that the departure of the US tactical troops created a military or security 'vacuum'.¹³⁵ Certainly, a vacuum was created but it was not, as some argue, one of external security. As noted above, the external security of Japan was guaranteed through both the deterrent power and material superiority of US naval and air forces in Japan. This was firmly acknowledged by Yoshida and influenced his opposition to the resurrection of the Japanese military that Dulles and others desired.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhēn, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 257.

¹³⁵ MacArthur to Congress, quoted in, Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 649, note 10; J. Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?: United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p 58.

¹³⁶ H. Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany', in T.J. Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies, One-Party Dominant*

The vacuum created was in fact one of internal security, in which a replacement force for the Occupation tactical troops was required to ensure domestic tranquillity. As Weinstein and Uyehara note, the fear at the time of a domestic challenge to the security of Japan was generally greater than that of an external attack.¹³⁷

Some US Army personnel remained in Japan after June 1950 but they were mainly administrative staff as most combat elements had been rushed to Korea. Furthermore, at times over the next two years, numbers of US soldiers in Japan were very thin, there being less than two thousand in Hokkaido in late August 1950.¹³⁸ Many United States Army units did rotate through Japan on the way into and out of Korea during the life of the NPR, but despite their presence they were largely unsuitable for performing the internal security role of the NPR for a number of reasons. First, Japan served as a staging post for Korea and as a result many of the soldiers moving in and out of Japan were in small groups and virtually all arrived without their weapons and equipment, which were sent directly to, or were left in, Korea. Furthermore, aside from the recuperating, or replacement frontline troops, many of the army personnel stationed in Japan were second line or support troops, who were not useful for internal security or any kind of active duty.¹³⁹

In addition, the political constraints on the use of the US military for internal security during this period were more restrictive than ever. Any use of the US tactical troops against the Japanese population, particularly one which resulted in civilian casualties, could have had very serious political repercussions.¹⁴⁰ The use of US tactical troops could have handed a propaganda coup to the JCP and Soviets, reopened the fresh

Regimes, Cornell University Press, London, 1990, p 140.

¹³⁷ M.E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy*, p 40; C.H. Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan: It's Creation, 1951-1952*, Brill, Leiden, 2010, p 21. For more on the internal threat being seen as exceeding the external see: Chapter 1, pp 56-74.

¹³⁸ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p117.

¹³⁹ Foreign Office File (FO) 371/92523, 'Japanese Communist Party, "Spring Revolution"', 12/3/51.

¹⁴⁰ For more on political repercussions of using NPR see: Chapter 4, pp 265-270.

scars of the memory of the Second World War and convinced many Japanese there was some truth in the communist propaganda about 'American Imperialism' colonising Japan.¹⁴¹ Any internal intervention by the US also infringed upon Japan's already embattled sovereignty and would have weakened the Japanese government and harmed relations between it and the US.¹⁴² Considerations of sovereignty and their importance to the Japanese public and government were paramount in this period as a peace treaty became an increasingly pressing issue and any perceived infringement could have ultimately weakened support for the Japanese government and benefited the JCP.¹⁴³ A study by the headquarters of the Far Eastern Command on the security of Japan produced after the Occupation candidly sums up the dangers of intervention or even the appearance of US advisors during NPR operations:

Riots and civil disturbances are internal problems of the Japanese government and any public appearance of U.S. advisory personnel with their counterparts on occasions when the NPR is quelling riots or other civil disturbances would not only be embarrassing to the governments of Japan and the United States, but might endanger friendly relations between them.¹⁴⁴

Despite their differences over many matters pertaining to the NPR, the Americans in Japan and Washington were almost universal in their opposition to any role for the United States in interfering directly in the internal security of Japan. For example, in a memorandum circulated just

¹⁴¹ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, Bucharest, Organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties*, No. 7 (171), 15/2/52; Stalin's New Year's Message to the Japanese people, 31/12/1951, printed in, R.K. Jane, *The USSR and Japan 1945-1980*, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1981, pp 219-220; J.A.A. Stockwin, 'The Communist Party of Japan', *The Problems of Communism*, 1967, in J.A.A. Stockwin, *Collected Writings of J.A.A. Stockwin*, Japan Library, London, 2004, p 126; FO 371/99393, 'BBC Reports that "Nippon Times" of March 1 carried translation of Communist Party Pamphlet innocently entitled "How to Raise Flower Bulbs"', 10/3/1952; FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52.

¹⁴² FO 371/99393, J.A. Pilcher to De La Mare, 2/5/52.

¹⁴³ For more on Yoshida's sovereignty concerns see: Chapter 5, pp 306-307, 321-328.

¹⁴⁴ YF-A16, 1F-7, HQ FEC, Security Advisory Section, 1/7/52.

prior to the outbreak of the war in Korea MacArthur argued that the United States 'should have neither responsibility nor authority to intervene in the internal affairs of Japan . . . the Japanese police forces would have to be increased to a size and character adequate for internal security', i.e. by possibly creating a constabulary.¹⁴⁵ On the basis of this memorandum Assistant Secretary of State Allison argued during the drafting of the peace treaty, that the NPR and Japanese police should handle Japan's internal security and that 'the United States shall not have, except in time of hostilities or imminently threatened hostilities [war with the USSR], any responsibility or authority to interfere in the internal affairs of Japan'.¹⁴⁶ The position over the non-involvement of the US in the internal security of Japan, except on the express instruction of the Japanese government (a move which would help minimise the damage to both Japanese sovereignty and America's reputation) persisted, but the text of the agreement moved from the peace treaty to the Security Treaty.¹⁴⁷ The policy found its final form in article one of the Security Treaty, which stated that US forces could provide assistance 'at the express request of the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers'.¹⁴⁸ The allusions here to the JCP, the threat it was perceived to represent and the US belief that its military policy was backed by the USSR/People's Republic of China are clear.

The role, character and capabilities of the NPR situated it in a third, middle tier between the civil police and the US military. As argued above this character reflected its internal security mission, but what sort of duties would the NPR have undertaken if it had been used? A system of routine patrols and the guarding of US and NPR bases, key infrastructure and

¹⁴⁵ YF-A16, 2B-172, MacArthur, Memorandum Governing Security in Post-war Japan, 23/6/50.

¹⁴⁶ YF-A16, 2B-245, Allinson to Dulles, 'Draft Security Clauses For a Japanese Peace Treaty', 11/7/50.

¹⁴⁷ YF-A16, 2B-102, Allinson to Secretary, 24/8/50; YF-A16, 2B-104, Fearey to Yingling, 'US Japan Military Agreement', 10/10/50.

¹⁴⁸ Security Treaty between the United States of American and Japan, 8/9/51, printed in D.J. Lu, Japan, *A Documentary History, The Late Tokugawa Period to the Present*, M.E. Sharpe, London, 1997, pp 499-500.

installations would have been the likely principal 'passive' uses of the NPR in the event of serious disturbances.¹⁴⁹ The main 'active' employment of the NPR would have been in suppressing riots, civil disorders, guerrillas or insurgents.¹⁵⁰

The reasons why the NPR was never used even against serious incidents such as 'Bloody May Day' (during which it was held in reserve by Yoshida in case the rioting got out of hand) were complex and were largely a result of political considerations and the ultimate failure of the JCP military campaign to pose a significantly serious threat to the Japanese government.¹⁵¹ However, detailed plans for the use of the NPR in such situations did exist and they are very useful in examining the character of the NPR.¹⁵² The main basis of these plans for the use of the NPR was the document entitled 'Standard Operation Procedures for Riots and Civil Disturbances'.¹⁵³ This plan was the final version of several on the subject and formally established the procedures for using the NPR for dealing with serious public unrest. The plan envisaged five potential situations, each identified with codenames taken from famous generals of the American civil war. Situation 'Sherman' designated a riot being forecast which could require deployment of the NPR to support the civil police, 'Thomas' described a riot which required the use of the NPR as being in progress, 'Custer' was defined as a riot predicted or in progress which required use of the NPR and coordination between the NPR and US Security forces, 'Grant' was an emergency which was forecast or in progress which required coordinated employment of it and US Security forces, and 'Lee' was the 'all clear' signal. The plan envisaged the use of the NPR to quell the disturbances with US advisors assisting through maintaining liaison with the NPR command, coordinating the supply and issue procedures for all equipment necessary, and making coordinated tactical plans with the

¹⁴⁹ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 26.

¹⁵⁰ YF-A16, 1F-7, HQ FEC, Security Advisory Section, 1/7/52

¹⁵¹ YF-A16, 1F-139, Conference (Kowalski and Hayashi), 2/5/52; For more on Bloody May Day see: Chapter 4, pp 267-270.

¹⁵² *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 118.

¹⁵³ YF-A16, 1F-6, 'SOP for Riots and Civil Disturbances', 8/9/52.

NPR in the event of situation 'Grant' (which was likely to be a major incident or rebellion, beyond even the control of the NPR).¹⁵⁴

The central document governing the exact role played by the NPR in the event of major internal unrest was 'Operation Order No. 1' of March 1951. The plan was designed to deal with 'mass protests, insidious propaganda, strikes or open conflict' within Japan in the event of a crisis or after the signing of the peace treaty. The plan broke down this range of possibilities into three categories of 'minor', 'limited' and 'major' emergencies, roughly analogous to situations 'Sherman', 'Thomas', 'Custer' and 'Grant'. In the event of a 'minor emergency' the civil police would deal with all incidents, with the NPR supporting if required, and US forces would remain in reserve, dealing only with direct attacks upon them. A 'limited emergency' was seen as an incident in which the Japanese government, police and NPR were so weakened as to be ineffective. Direct US military government would be imposed and SCAP would declare a state of limited emergency. A 'major emergency' was defined as the outbreak of large scale rebellion and/or guerrilla warfare. If this situation proved beyond the capacity of SCAP and the Japanese government, SCAP would declare that the situation was beyond his control and would initiate full-scale US military operations against the rebels/guerrillas.¹⁵⁵

All of the scenarios saw the gradual, phased increase in the application of force, and the employment of the police and NPR 'to the limit of their capabilities'.¹⁵⁶ This approach consisted of initial use of the civil police, followed by the NPR and then, and only if events overtook the Japanese government, US forces. Tactics such as curfews were to be imposed and the minimum amount of force and offensive action was to be used at all times, with even the use of tear gas requiring central approval. Occupation forces, in all but the most serious situations were largely to be employed in defending their own bases and installations, including the establishment of

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ MMA, 'Operation Order No. 1', 1/3/51, pp 2-3.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p 3.

roadblocks, checkpoints and defensive positions. Nevertheless, Occupation forces were expected to perform surveillance on all disturbances, a part of this plan which was actually employed during the 'Bloody May Day' demonstrations.¹⁵⁷

The fact that the NPR was created to resist the JCP was also clearly stated in the Annexes of 'Operation Order No. 1', with the creation of the force being cited as a 'serious blow to the power of the JCP'.¹⁵⁸ The concerns over the capacity of the JCP to create chaos requiring a Japanese force more powerful than the civil police were also clearly described: 'the Japanese Communist Party, and the Koreans, in the Kanto area, particularly the metropolitan Tokyo area, are capable of expanding civil disturbances beyond the capability of local Japanese police control'.¹⁵⁹

A final and more repressive possible 'active' use of the NPR in the case of serious threats to internal security would have been supporting the civil police in rounding up 'subversives' for imprisonment. Under a plan named 'Toll Booth', those to be detained included Communists, Socialists, labour leaders and Leftwing Koreans. This move although drastic, heavy handed, very politically risky and probably a measure of last resort, was aimed at imprisoning potential insurgents and denying existing guerrillas or rebels material and political support.¹⁶⁰

Despite their firm character the measures detailed above fell far short of those employed by the Philippines and Korean Constabularies.¹⁶¹ The methods designed to be employed by the NPR were of those of a security force of a democratic state defending itself and its citizens with a minimum

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, pp 2-3, 5-7. For more on 'Bloody May Day' see: Chapter 4, pp 267-270.

¹⁵⁸ MMA, 'Operation Order No. 1', 1/3/51, Annex 1, p 1.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, Annex 1, p 2.

¹⁶⁰ MMA, 'Operation Order No. 1', 1/3/51, p 4; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 169; J. Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur, A Participants Account*, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1979, pp 193-195; Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur 1941-1951*, p 322.

¹⁶¹ For more on the brutality and repressive character of the PC and KC see: Chapter 2, pp 121, 128, 131, 134, 136, 153.

amount of force against illegal armed unrest or insurrection. This clearly contrasts with the active and often unprovoked oppression and brutality visited upon opponents, or perceived threats to, the Korean and Filipino regimes by the KC and PC.

The NPR's Links with the Civil Police

The final parts of the history of the NPR which will be examined in this chapter are the close connections between the NPR and the Japanese civil police. These connections are important in several ways: first, as Mawby argues, close links with the civil police and particularly the presence of personnel transfers are one of the defining characteristics of a paramilitary police/constabulary.¹⁶²

The connections between the NPR and the civil police were strong, far more so than is typical of an Army. The links between the NPR and National Rural Police were especially significant. Despite being separated from the National Rural Police during the planning stages and having its name changed from the 'National Rural Police Reserve' to the National Police Reserve, the connections between the forces persisted throughout the life of the force.¹⁶³ The examination of these links between the NPR and civil police also provides an interesting case study by which to compare the NPR to its constabulary predecessors such as the Korean constabulary (KC).¹⁶⁴ This examination helps to demonstrate the common origins of the KC and NPR and the lessons members of GHQ took from the creation and operations of the KC.

The first area in which the civil police was closely connected to the NPR was during the creation and recruitment of the force. The National Rural

¹⁶² R.I. Mawby, 'Approaches to Comparative Analysis: the Impossibility of Becoming an Expert on Everywhere', p 18. For more on Mawby and definitions see: Introduction, pp 43-48.

¹⁶³ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p43; TS 301, Willoughby to Whitney, 7/8/50.

¹⁶⁴ For more on the Korean Constabulary see: Chapter 2, pp 125-138.

Police ran the entire recruiting campaign, investigated applicants for communist, disreputable, criminal or subversive backgrounds, and even the National Rural Police's physical standards were used to judge whether applicants were suitable for service.¹⁶⁵ This close, indeed dominant, involvement by the National Rural Police in the creation of the NPR marks a clear indication that the lessons learned from the creation of the Korean Constabulary had been taken to heart by GHQ. Thus the institutional rivalries and disunity between the Korean National Police and KC, which had allowed vast numbers of communists to easily infiltrate the KC, were not repeated.¹⁶⁶

As detailed in the section on training and examinations above, the central role of the civil police also extended into the training of the NPR. Immediately after their induction and processing, 200 man companies of NPR recruits were assigned two or three National Rural Policemen who acted as temporary officers and began the training of the recruits at the six regional National Rural Police schools across Japan.¹⁶⁷

This sharing of facilities was replicated several further times during the history of the NPR. During its early life the NPR actually had its headquarters within National Rural Police headquarters, and National Rural Police facilities were often used to house and train NPR men (especially during its early phases).¹⁶⁸

The National Rural Police also actually ran significant portions of the NPR. The finance section of the National Rural Police organised and signed all contracts and procurements for equipment, supply, transport, food and clothing, for the NPR, spending over ¥2.5 billion in the first three months of

¹⁶⁵ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 3; Kowalski, National Police Reserve Medical Advisors Instruction No. 1, 30/8/50, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51.

¹⁶⁶ For more on the Korean Constabulary see: Chapter 2, pp 125-138.

¹⁶⁷ G2 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 20/11/50. See above for more on the National Rural Police and NPR recruitment and initial training.

¹⁶⁸ Bōeishō, *Nihon no Bōei, Bōeihakusho (The Defence of Japan, Defence White Paper)*, Konapakuto, Tokyo, 2007, p 599; YF-A16, 1D-190, Conference: Authority of the National Police Reserve, 21/10/50.

the NPR's existence.¹⁶⁹ The financial involvement of the National Rural Police went even further than this, and included the authority to: 'negotiate contracts and assist in the supply of material, labour etc at camps, training areas, and National Rural Police schools, or wherever needed'.¹⁷⁰ The fact that the logistical and technical branches of the NPR did not function during the first year of existence meant that this financial and organisational dependence on the National Rural Police extended for most of the life of the NPR.¹⁷¹

In addition to the other close connections between the civil police and the NPR, and significantly for Mawby's definition, the forces shared large numbers of personnel.¹⁷² Most of the senior leadership of the NPR was made up of police officers transferred in from the National Rural Police and Municipal Police and almost all the senior leadership of the financial and logistical sections were also drawn from the civil police. These transfers were initially on a temporary basis but effectively became permanent over time.¹⁷³ A large number of policemen or former policemen also served in the middle and lower strata of the NPR, where a police background was a valuable asset, with those having served one year in the police at the rank of Inspector or above being eligible to take the examination to enter officer training.¹⁷⁴

These personnel transfers, although significant, were not as great as they could have been due to the fears of the leadership of the civil police of a mass exodus to the NPR, the resistance of pro-rearmament elements of GHQ and the role of the NPR as a support force for the civil police. One of the groups most attracted to service in the NPR were serving members of

¹⁶⁹ G2 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 20/11/50; G2 3876, Engle, Memorandum for Record, 'Expediting production of uniforms and equipment for National Police Reserves', 29/7/50.

¹⁷⁰ G2 2061, Bratton to Ozaki, 21/8/50.

¹⁷¹ YF-A16, 1B-48, Warden to Chief of Staff, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 27/10/51.

¹⁷² For more on Mawby and definitions see: Introduction, pp 43-48.

¹⁷³ YF-A16, 1D-151, Pulliam to Willoughby, 30/11/50.

¹⁷⁴ CAS(A) 1809, Assistant Director, NPR to Officer in Charge of Every NPR unit, 'Examination of NPR Personnel who have special abilities or appointment of staff officer', 23/9/1950. See above for more on training and examinations.

the civil police, many swayed by the superior pay and conditions and the generous bonuses on offer.¹⁷⁵ The clamour for transfers to the NPR, particularly from unmarried men and the lower ranks of the police, became so vociferous that several high level meetings occurred between senior police chiefs and members of G2. At one of these, Chief Tanaka, president of Municipal Police Chiefs Association and Head of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, visited Harrison, a G2/PSD police administrator. Tanaka voiced his concern that the 'propaganda' campaign to which his men were being subjected could see the police stripped of its brightest and best if they were allowed to transfer en-masse to the NPR. Harrison reassured Tanaka that G2 would not support the 'raiding' of the civil police.¹⁷⁶ Despite this assurance the problem persisted and Pulliam, the head of the Public Safety Division of G2, eventually informed a conference of senior Japanese police officials and the leadership of the NPR, that members of the Municipal Police and National Rural Police would not be eligible for direct transfer. However, Pulliam did say that if policemen did want to join the NPR they could resign and do so, and could even return to the police if they failed to qualify or did not like service in the NPR, but would do so at the lowest rank. Pulliam argued that this policy sought to preserve the integrity of the civil police and that they had 'worked too hard and too long to let these forces be prostituted to go into something [the NPR] that will be of no value to us for a long time to come [sic]'.¹⁷⁷ Although ostensibly in the interests of the Japanese civil police, this refusal to transfer large numbers of policemen into the NPR, which was opposed by the leadership of the NPR, also served G2 and Willoughby's aim to create an NPR which was closer to an army than a police force.¹⁷⁸

Despite the political manoeuvring, the argument that the NPR should not denude the civil police of its best men was a valid one as the NPR was

¹⁷⁵ For more on the bonus and the terms and conditions of service in the NPR see: Chapter 4, pp 224-229.

¹⁷⁶ G2 3876, Harrison to Chief PSD, 'NPR Recruiting Police Officers from MPD', 8/8/50.

¹⁷⁷ YF-A16, 1D-190, Conference: Authority of the National Police Reserve, 21/10/50.

¹⁷⁸ For more on Willoughby's designs for the NPR see below and see: Chapter 2, pp 140-144.

designed and established to support rather than replace the civil police. As G2's Bratton remarked to Okazaki Katsuo, Chief Cabinet Secretary, 'it is undesirable to weaken the present police forces while this new force is being organized and trained'.¹⁷⁹ The Japanese press also recognised that strengthening the NPR to the detriment of the civil police was a mistake in terms of preserving internal security, as even without the potential loss of personnel the civil police was 'too weak to maintain the national security' [sic].¹⁸⁰

From the start the NPR had been designed to support the civil police in maintaining internal security and as this and the other chapters of this study reveal, it was equipped and deployed to do so.¹⁸¹ As mentioned above the NPR did receive some informal training in crime detection methods and even in traffic control, but the force never sought to encroach on the everyday role of the civil police.¹⁸² Its ethos, training and equipment were all focused on internal security and public order missions. The force was also often reminded of this role as guarantor of internal security and supporter of the civil police, as in this speech made by a senior US advisor to new recruits in 1950:

As supporters of the National Rural Police you not only strengthen their authority and insure that the rights guaranteed to each and every Japanese citizen under Japan's new constitution remain inviolate, but you also renew the confidence in your nation's security and ability to defend itself against internal sabotage, revolution, and lawless depredation. The maintenance of law and order is a prime requisite to the security of a nation.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ G2 2061, Bratton to Okazaki, 21/8/50; G2 2061, Okazaki to Willoughby, 19/8/50.

¹⁸⁰ *Mainichi Shinbun*, 8/9/50.

¹⁸¹ Appendix VI. 'Macarthur to Yoshida, Letter Authorising the Creation of the NPR, 8 July 50'.

¹⁸² YF-A16, 1D-190, Conference: Authority of the National Police Reserve, 21/10/50; *Nippon Times*, 7/10/50.

¹⁸³ CAS(A) 1825, Burgheim, Chief, Kyushū Civil Affairs Region, 'Speech to NPR Enlistees', 1/9/50.

Other links between the civil police and NPR did exist, such as the basis of the NPR pay structure on that of the National Rural Police, and the role of the National Rural Police in the NPR disciplinary system, and these are examined in more detail in the following chapter.¹⁸⁴

These connections between the civil police and NPR, as well as helping to show the constabulary character of the NPR, also contest the argument made by many historians, such as Hertrich, that the NPR's closest organisational relative was the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA).¹⁸⁵ On the strength of the evidence presented above, it can be shown that the National Rural Police had a much greater influence on the NPR than any other organisation, except perhaps GHQ's Civil Affairs Section (CAS).

The NPR and Former Imperial Officers I

A further highly significant and partially explored dimension of the history of the NPR is its relationship with former Imperial military officers. The battles over the inclusion of high ranking veterans of the IJA and IJN in the force were one of the clearest clashes between the conflicting visions of the NPR's character. During a series of struggles, which first pitted MacArthur and the Japanese government against Willoughby and his stable of former IJA officers, and later the Japanese government against the US Army, key decisions (and concessions) were made which influenced the future direction and role of the NPR.¹⁸⁶ The fact that only one of the three key chapters in this saga (the second, surreptitious attempt by Willoughby to install purgees in the NPR) has thus far been examined in scholarly literature makes an investigation of these events all

¹⁸⁴ CAS(A) 1811, Kowalski to chief, Tohoku civil affairs division, 'Processing Adverse Reports on NPR Personnel', 28/11/50; Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) (C) 133, 'NPR Pay', 17/10/50; ESS (F) 2382, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Outline of Policy Concerning Recruitment of the National Police Reserve', 31/7/50. For more on the Civil police and the NPR pay structure and discipline see: Chapter 4, pp 224-229, 242-250.

¹⁸⁵ R.I. Mawby, 'Approaches to Comparative Analysis', p 18 ; A. Hertrich, 'A Useable Past? Historical Museums of the Self-Defence Forces and the Construction of Continuities', in S. Saaler and W. Schwentker (eds), *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, Global Oriental, Folkestone, 2008, p 185.

¹⁸⁶ For more on the later battles over the NPR's character see: Chapter 5, pp 287-330.

the more important when examining the NPR.¹⁸⁷ The first two of the incidents are detailed below and the third is examined in chapter five due to its significance in the evolution of the NPR. This examination of the 'top down' attempts to seize control of the force by the former Imperial Japanese officers also contributes towards the success of the first of the aim this study in exploring another domestic influence on the force.

The struggles over the inclusion of former high level imperial military men in the NPR began prior even to the creation of the NPR itself. The meetings held from 6 July 1950 onwards laid out the rough plans for the creation of the NPR, including initial views on its structure, posture and character.¹⁸⁸ During this period a series of discussions between Okazaki Katsuo, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Willoughby, and other senior members of GHQ took place.¹⁸⁹ These examined and rejected the use of former Imperial military men in the NPR, a result bitterly resented by Willoughby as it blocked his plans for the extensive use of IJA officers and purgees.¹⁹⁰ Following the meeting, on the day of the announcement of the authorisation to create the NPR, Willoughby wrote to Whitney, his arch rival and head of Government Section (GS), in an attempt to 'clear up any misunderstanding, apparently prevailing now' over what he considered the 'essential principles' in selecting personnel for the NPR.¹⁹¹ These 'essential principles' consisted of the necessity of using purged former IJA officers as the officer corps of the NPR. Willoughby claimed he sought to prevent the infiltration of communists into the force by excluding what he viewed as the 'heavily indoctrinated' former members of the Kwangtung army, but all other repatriated IJA officers were to be given top priority

¹⁸⁷ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 75; J.L. Weste, 'Staging a Comeback: Rearmament Planning and Kyūgunjin in Occupied Japan, 1945-52', *Japan Forum*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999, pp 169-177.

¹⁸⁸ These initial plans recommended the use of IJA veterans and even purgees as the officer corps of the force, see: Chapter 2, pp 140-144.

¹⁸⁹ Okazaki was formerly head of the Central Liaison Office and was involved in contacts with Eichelberger over the Ashida Memoranda, see: Chapter 1, pp 83-84.

¹⁹⁰ For more on the initial planning of the NPR see: Chapter 2, p 140-144. Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, pp 258, 260.

¹⁹¹ TS 301, Willoughby to Whitney, 'Candidates for the National Rural Police Reserve', 7/8/50.

within the force. This use of the former military officers was also considered vital by Willoughby 'in order to expedite the training, formation and internal cohesion of this unit [the NPR]'.¹⁹² Later the same day Willoughby also wrote to Shepard, head of Civil Affairs Section, soon to be head of the NPR's advisors, and a fellow supporter of a new Japanese military. In this letter Willoughby argued that former IJA purgees were essential for all command positions in the NPR if its training and organisation were to be effective. Willoughby stated that, as those officers who had escaped the purge were of junior rank and had no staff level experience (around half of all captains and all higher ranks had been purged), it was impossible to create 'units of the character desired by us' under the purge restrictions.¹⁹³ Citing his fear of JCP infiltration and creating a clear link between the Korean constabulary (KC) and NPR, Willoughby also remarked to Shepard that 'there is a great potential of creating a mob of unqualified jobless without cohesion or to indulge in a training fiction, analogous to that of the South Korean Army'.¹⁹⁴ In a further letter to Whitney of 7 August the connection between the KC and NPR was again stressed in support of the inclusion of purgees in the NPR: 'General Shepard asked my comments on the procurement of trained individuals for the National Rural Police Reserve. You are familiar that the C-in-C [MacArthur] desires trained individuals; we cannot afford to waste time in the type of abortive American training which produced KMAG [the Korean Constabulary]' [Willoughby's emphasis].¹⁹⁵ Despite Willoughby's barrage of messages, Whitney issued a curt, one line response: MacArthur had already decided not to use any purgees, with 'considerable emphasis by the General'.¹⁹⁶ In spite of his claims that efficiency, security and defence against the JCP required purgees, it remains that the central aim of these appeals by Willoughby was to resurrect the IJA.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ TS 301, Willoughby to Shepard, 7/8/50.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ TS 301, Willoughby to Whitney, 7/8/50.

¹⁹⁶ TS 301, Whitney to Willoughby, 7/8/50.

Despite this rebuttal Willoughby remained committed to what he saw as the necessity of including purgees in the NPR. To help provide him with more ammunition in this battle, Willoughby commissioned a study on the reasons why their use was desirable. The threat of the JCP was central to the arguments put forward in this study. Citing recent evidence that the National Rural Police, Tokyo Metropolitan Police (MPD) and Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) had all allegedly been heavily infiltrated by the JCP, the study argued that without the 'patriotic' and 'disciplined' leadership of purgees the NPR would also become 'a mob filled with such elements [JCP members]'.¹⁹⁷ The study claimed: 'it has been a definitive fact in the annals of the Japanese army for the past several decades that the regular army officers, graduates of the military academy (now purged), always constituted, without exception, the strongest bulwark against communism in Japan'.¹⁹⁸ This rather sweeping claim was supported by the ludicrous argument that their patriotism granted the purgees a special ability to spot communists, who were allegedly numerous in the former junior ranks of the IJA. The fact that the ultra-nationalist leadership of the IJA was a guarantor against communism in the past was beyond doubt but the claims of purgees' abilities to spot communists and the alleged communism of much of the IJA were ill-informed fantasy. Furthermore, the desire expressed in the study to appoint purgees to positions of power in the NPR naïvely, or deliberately, ignores any concern that appointing such a nationalistic group to head an armed security force could prove to be the undoing of Japanese democracy, as it had in the 1930s. The study also manipulated information from the Japanese press in an attempt to show that the Japanese government also supported the use of purgees by misquoting an alleged statement by Okazaki in which he had supposedly claimed he wanted the NPR to be as 'strong as possible'.¹⁹⁹ In reality Okazaki had made no public references to the use of purgees and the Cabinet was bitterly opposed to giving them access to power which might

¹⁹⁷ TS 301, GHQ\FEC Military Intelligence Section, Rinalducci to Willoughby, 'Personnel for National Police Reserve Forces', 9/8/50; *Nippon Times*, 13/8/50; TS 301, Tokyo Report No. 146, 22/7/50; *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 7/8/50.

¹⁹⁸ TS 301, GHQ\FEC Military Intelligence Section, Rinalducci to Willoughby, 'Personnel for National Police Reserve Forces', 9/8/50.

¹⁹⁹ TS 301, 'Police Expansion-Daily Intelligence Summary, Press Analysis', 2/8/50.

be used to topple the government. Furthermore, Yoshida and his Cabinet and did not seek anything other than an internal security constabulary and hence swiftly and completely rejected and suggestions of resurrecting the IJA.²⁰⁰

Nevertheless, Willoughby was determined to get his way and took his campaign directly to MacArthur, writing to him on 10 August 1950. Willoughby warned that:

With the colossal success of communism in the Far East those concerned with the creation of an expanded police body, must exercise the greatest care in the selection of personnel to command these units. It is essential that commanders and staff from the lowest to the highest have the moral and patriotic stamina to resist communism and become a real force for law and order. They are not found in the 'non purged categories'.²⁰¹

The letter proceeded to argue against what Willoughby saw as the invalid and arbitrary nature of the purge restrictions and again claimed that without a core of professional officers the NPR would be of low quality and would attract the unemployed and uneducated, who Willoughby judged to be 'wide open to subversive influences'.²⁰² This attempt had no more success than the preceding one but it is highly significant in revealing that the language employed by even the most hawkish in GHQ centred on the perceived threat from the JCP and the internal security character of the NPR. The failure of Willoughby's campaign was an initial defeat for those aiming for the NPR to be a military force and the NPR's constabulary character was preserved through MacArthur's influence, supported by the Japanese government.

²⁰⁰ For more on the Japanese desire for a constabulary see: Chapter 1, pp 74-91.

²⁰¹ TS 301, Willoughby to CINC, 10/8/50; F. Kowalski, *Grace of Heaven (Japan Rearms)*, 1966, Manuscript Fragment, Library of Congress, Frank Kowalski Papers, Box 18, Folder 9, p 70.

²⁰² TS 301, Willoughby to CINC, 10/8/50.

Despite his failure, Willoughby's desire for the inclusion of purgees in the NPR was not slaked and he continued to grumble for weeks about the dangers of not employing them.²⁰³ Nevertheless, it was clear to him that nothing could be achieved through the normal bureaucratic channels of GHQ and a more surreptitious approach was required.²⁰⁴ There followed an incident which is detailed in works by Welfield and Weste in which Willoughby and Shepard attempted to install Hattori Takushiro, a nationalistic former IJA Colonel, as head on the NPR (see figure XVII). In late July 1950 Shepard, at Willoughby's suggestion, introduced Hattori to Frank Kowalski, the deputy head of CAS, as 'the man Willoughby intends to be NPR chief of staff'. Shepard also ordered Kowalski to calculate the number of IJA officers needed to staff the NPR. Kowalski later replied that training would run more smoothly if roughly nine hundred former officers could be recruited. Soon after Kowalski was again visited by Hattori, this time accompanied by Colonel Priam of G2 and six other former IJA staff officers, Priam explained to Kowalski that the six IJA officers expected to be appointed to the six vacancies then available in NPR HQ. Hattori also provided Kowalski with a list of four hundred former officers to lead the NPR (including Hattori as the head) which had clearly been produced in advance of Shepard's original approach. Surprised at the speed and thoroughness of the attempt to install Hattori and his followers into the higher ranks of the NPR, Kowalski contacted an aide of MacArthur, who informed him that neither MacArthur nor GS had any knowledge of the move.²⁰⁵

Despite Kowalski uncovering the origins of the plot, Willoughby's plan continued. In early August, through Shepard, Hattori met with Masuhara Keikichi, a former policeman and the civilian Director General of the NPR. Hattori offered Masuhara his services but during the course of their meeting and subsequent discussion with Attorney General Ohashi,

²⁰³ TS 301, Willoughby to Chief of Staff, 13/8/50.

²⁰⁴ Kowalski, *Grace of Heaven (Japan Rearms)*, p 70.

²⁰⁵ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 75; I. Hata, *Shiroku, Nihon Saigunbi (Historical Record, Japanese Rearmament)*, Bungei Shunjūkan, Tokyo, 1976, pp 165-166; Weste, 'Staging a Comeback', pp 169-177.

Masuhara uncovered the detail of the subsequent stages of Willoughby's plans: that Hattori was to take control of the NPR and marginalise or remove him, his civilian/police staff and the civilian control and constabulary character of the NPR they represented. Masuhara had already been suspicious about Shepard and Willoughby's repeated requests not to inform Yoshida about Hattori, and the discovery of the plans to remove him confirmed his fears that the approach was not legitimate or even in the interests of the Japanese government.²⁰⁶ Masuhara quickly told Yoshida of the plot and the Prime Minister promptly refused to use Hattori in the NPR or even deal with him on any level. Yoshida also sought and won MacArthur's support in his opposition to the appointment of IJA officers, and the change in the character of the NPR it would have represented. Shepard was promptly ordered to inform Hattori that his services were not, and would not, be required and with Hattori's marginalisation Willoughby's second plan thus came to nought.

Figure XVII. Hattori Takushiro in IJA Uniform²⁰⁷



²⁰⁶ K. Masuhara, 'Jieitai no Enkaku to Nihon no Anzen' (The Development of the SDF and Japan's Security) in Kajima Kenjūjo (ed), *Nihon no Anzen Hoshō (Japan's Security Guarantee)*, Kajima Kenjūjo Shuppan Kai, Tokyo, 1964, pp 409-410.

²⁰⁷ Picture Courtesy of the US Department of Defense.

It could be argued that only the second plot directly involved Hattori but it is almost certain he would have been one of the first chosen if Willoughby's initial effort at inducting former military men into the NPR through overt means had been successful. This argument is backed up by Weste's claim that Willoughby actually offered the leadership of the NPR to Hattori in early July 1950, during the first plot.²⁰⁸ A further indication of the involvement of Hattori in the first plot is Willoughby's plan to use Japanese demobilisation bureau records to find suitable candidates to fill the NPR's company and division staffs.²⁰⁹ As Hattori was close friends with Willoughby, had worked for this organisation, and had his own private catalogue of officers he considered suitable, this would have made him the central figure in such a selection and no doubt his own name would have appeared high on any list produced.²¹⁰

When examining these plots a central question is: who was Hattori, and why was his failure significant to the character of the NPR? Hattori Takushiro was a former IJA colonel whose glittering military career included acting as a military attaché to Mussolini's army, a role as a senior operations officer of the Kwangtung army in the 1939 Nomonhan border incidents with the USSR, and vast experience both in command in China and in administrative roles, such as his role as private secretary to Tojo Hideki. Throughout his military career Hattori was highly influenced by the ultra-nationalist views of his superiors and mentors, men such as the ultra nationalists Ishiwara Kanji, Tsuji Masanobu and Tojo.²¹¹ With the collapse of Japan in 1945 Hattori's hitherto distinguished military career lay in ruins and he feared for his safety and freedom in the face of the Allied war

²⁰⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 489; Weste, 'Staging a Comeback', p 174-175; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 75.

²⁰⁹ TS 301, GHQ\FEC Military Intelligence Section, Rinalducci to Willoughby, 'Personnel for National Police Reserve Forces', 9/8/50; Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, p 258.

²¹⁰ R. Guillian, 'The Resurgence of Military Elements in Japan', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 3, September 1952, p 214; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 108, 166; Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, pp, 226-227.

²¹¹ Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan*, p 384; Weste, 'Staging a Comeback', pp 169-170; A.D. Cox, *Nomohan, Japan Against Russia, 1939*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2002, pp 182, 188.

crimes tribunals and purges. However, Hattori's fears were ultimately unwarranted as he soon found employment with Willoughby in G2's historical section, followed by appointments to the Demobilisation and Repatriation Bureaus. This employment protected Hattori from the purge and war crimes proceedings and allowed him to extend his contacts throughout the former military.

Despite Japan's defeat Hattori's hawkish attitude had not mellowed and he was described in a 1952 issue of *Pacific Affairs* as 'probably the most vigorous proponent of a new Japanese army'.²¹² Through these years the Rightwing political views of Hattori became more acute as he grew increasingly impatient at the absence of rearmament. Hattori believed that full-scale rearmament was necessary as he thought war between the superpowers was imminent and a strong Japanese military would be essential if Japan was not to be overtaken by events.²¹³ Hattori's views on the subject are quoted by Weste as follows: '[his] rearmament plans were informed by the imminence of war between the capitalist and communist camps. Complicating this threat, they maintained the Japanese communists sought to wreak havoc within'.²¹⁴ This inclusion of the JCP threat is interesting as it indicates the appreciation of the threat across the political spectrum, even amongst the staunchest advocates of rearmament. Usefully, Hattori and his compatriots found a 'kindred spirit' in the form of Willoughby, their employer and a fellow supporter of the re-creation of the IJA.²¹⁵

As well as engaging in their overt work, the group of retained Japanese military men employed by Willoughby also performed other covert work. Takemae argues convincingly that the principal reason behind the

²¹² Guillian, 'The Resurgence of Military Elements', p 213.

²¹³ Weste, 'Staging a Comeback', p 169.

²¹⁴ Ibid, p 170.

²¹⁵ M. Petersen, 'The Intelligence That Wasn't: CIA Name Files, The US Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan', in ,E. Drea (ed), *Researching Japanese War Crimes Records, Introductory Essays*, NARA for the Nazi War Crimes and Imperial Japanese Government Records Interagency Working Group, Washington DC, 2006, p 201.

retention of Hattori and his colleagues was an attempt by Willoughby to preserve a cadre of officers ready for the recreation of the IJA and IJN at some point in the near future.²¹⁶ Planning for this eventuality and creating the network of contacts it necessitated was the principal employment of Hattori during these years, and it is almost certain that the list of four hundred officers for the NPR which Hattori presented to Kowalski in 1950 was produced during this period.

Alongside their preparations for rearmament, Hattori and his associates undertook intelligence work for Willoughby. In recently released CIA records, it has been confirmed that Willoughby employed many members of the former Japanese military as covert intelligence agents, working across East Asia and even inside Japan, albeit to a lesser extent.²¹⁷ Evidence of their employment does exist in the GHQ archives but it is scant and hard to find as much of the work was conducted informally with few records kept and an even greater proportion proved fruitless.²¹⁸ According to its rival, the CIA, the Japanese employed by G2 often just took the cash and equipment they were given and fabricated the results of their 'operations', principally using their position and income to advance their standing amongst the squabbling factions of IJA/IJN veterans.

It is also evident that some of this work was certainly not undertaken in the interests of the Japanese government. Hattori managed to infiltrate some of his followers into the NSF and recently declassified documents reveal that he was also allegedly involved in planning a coup d'état in mid-1952.²¹⁹ The coup, uncovered by the CIA, was allegedly planned in early July 1952 under Hattori's overall control but using his friend and mentor Tsuji Masanobu as its front man. The plotters envisaged using members of their group both inside and outside the NSF to assassinate Yoshida and replace him with Hatoyama Ichirō (Prime Minister 1954-1956) or Ogata

²¹⁶ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 108,166.

²¹⁷ Petersen, 'The Intelligence That Wasn't', pp 200-201; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 165, Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 66.

²¹⁸ TS 301, Ha-Asa Special Report, 6/8/50.

²¹⁹ Petersen, 'The Intelligence That Wasn't', p 218.

Takekura (a future head of the Liberal Party).²²⁰ These two men, both purgees, were perceived as more sympathetic to the group's aims of rapid rearmament and the return of members of the former regime to power. The plot also reflected Hattori's loathing for Yoshida, initially bred from what he perceived as the Prime Minister's hostility to purgees and nationalists and fed by Yoshida's veto of his leadership of the NPR in 1950.²²¹ Despite planning reaching an advanced stage, the plotters, under Tsuji's influence, decided to postpone their actions until after the forthcoming election and then only to act if a socialist government were elected. Later the plotters considered murdering other senior government figures to warn and intimidate Yoshida, but again this plan was also postponed and then dropped.²²² Whether these postponements were designed to serve Tsuji's interests in the forthcoming election campaign is difficult to determine, but his election to the Diet in October 1952 sunk the final nail in the plot's coffin. This plot, which made front page news in the Japanese press in 2007, clearly illustrates the reactionary politics of Hattori and the threat to the Japanese state and the character of the NPR he represented.²²³

The nadir of Hattori's fortunes came with his connection with the Kaji affair of 1951-1952. Kaji Wataru, a novelist, JCP supporter and suspected Soviet spy was kidnapped by G2 on 25 January 1951 and handed over to the CIA, in the first documented case of direct co-operation between the two organisations. Kaji was held incommunicado and allegedly tortured over an eleven month period. The affair only became public after the author's wife protested to the Japanese authorities, eventually securing her husband's release on 7 December 1952. Press ire over this extrajudicial detention and alleged torture was further stoked by the fact that he had been detained by the Americans for eight months after the

²²⁰ National Archives (NARA), RG 263, ZZ-18, 'Coup d'état Allegedly Being Planned by Ex-Militarists and Ultrationalists, 31/10/1952', CIA Name File, Box 6, Folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. 1.

²²¹ Petersen, 'The Intelligence That Wasn't', p 214.

²²² NARA, RG 263, ZZ-18, 'Coup d'état Allegedly Being Planned by Ex-Militarists and Ultrationalists, 31/10/1952', CIA Name File, Box 6, Folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. 1.

²²³ *Daily Yomiuri*, 27/2/07; *Japan Times*, 28/2/07.

supposed restoration of Japanese sovereignty at the end of the Occupation in April 1952. Resulting press investigations alleged a link between Hattori's clique of former officers and the kidnapping and Hattori was vilified in the press and his organisation disbanded.²²⁴

Despite this seemingly politically fatal incident, Hattori was once again involved in controversy in the mid-1950s. In 1956 the Self Defence Forces' Defence Council required a new member and Hattori's friends Tsuji Masanobu (now a Diet member) and Hatoyama (now Prime Minister) nominated him for the position. However, the proposal was met with swift and firm opposition, both from the bureaucracy and from SDF officers who still questioned Hattori's commitment to civilian control. Also, in a move reminiscent of their pre-1945 inter-service rivalry, the former IJN officers of the Maritime Self Defence Force balked at having an IJA veteran in the post.²²⁵

Clearly the appointment of such an ultra-nationalist as head of the NPR could have been a serious threat to Japanese democracy. With the failure of the Hattori-Willoughby plot the NPR ducked a potential coup de grâce, and the Japanese government dodged a potential coup d'état. General Willoughby's role in the plots clearly shows the seemingly logical, but politically naïve, if not dangerous, commitment to a new Japanese army he shared with many members of the US Army. This commitment is admirably explained by Kowalski:

From a military point of view General Willoughby's position was correct. It was logical. An effective military force, he contented, could not be organised by civilians. A military establishment required professionals, men of military training, experienced career officers.²²⁶

²²⁴A. Dubro and D.E. Kaplan, *Yakuza*, Futura, London, 1987, p 75; H. Kinoshita, 'Echoes of Militarism in Japan', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 3, September 1953, p 249.

²²⁵Weste, 'Staging a Comeback', p 175; F. Kowalski, *Nihon Saigunbi*, The Simul Press, Tokyo, 1969, p 177.

²²⁶Kowalski, *Grace of Heaven (Japan Rearms)*, p 70.

As well as revealing the battles over the NPR's role and character, the episodes detailed above show the lengths to which individuals such as Willoughby could influence Occupation policy: 'His actions demonstrate the extremes to which an influential, determined staff officer can go in an American military headquarters to circumvent his government's directives and even international directives'.²²⁷ The blocking of Willoughby's plans for the NPR by MacArthur and Yoshida underlines their commitment to a NPR of a constabulary character. The plot also indicates MacArthur's weakened, but still present, commitment to earlier Occupation policies through his support of the purge restrictions and disarmament ordinances. Yoshida's opposition also shows his fear of the old military making a political comeback and his determination to prevent the erosion of the civilian supremacy over the security services.²²⁸ The defeat of the purges preserved the constabulary character and police leadership of the NPR for a time, although these were to come under a more sustained assault later.²²⁹ The failure also thwarted an attempt to eliminate the civilian control of the NPR, a principle which survives to this day and remains a central pillar of the SDF.

Conclusion

In support of the second main aim of the study of revealing the nature of the NPR, this chapter has argued that the force was a constabulary and conducted an in-depth examination of the character of the organisation. The recruitment, training, examinations, deployment, logistics, capabilities, internal security role and civil police links of the NPR were all explored and all pointed toward the constabulary character of the force. These examinations also represented an original, primary source based contribution to a field where there is much debate. The chapter also argued that recruitment of the NPR was heavily influenced by and connected to the civil police, another defining characteristic of a

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ For more on Yoshida's opposition to a military see: Chapter 5, pp 305-330.

²²⁹ For more on the evolution of the NPR see: Chapter 5.

constabulary. The training and examinations of the force were also shown to be of an internal security/constabulary nature. The NPR was clearly shown to be intended, equipped and deployed for internal security duties and was so poorly supplied and logistically dependent on the US that it was highly unsuitable for external security duties.

The capabilities of the NPR, while evolving late in the life of the force, were, for the greatest portion of its existence, similarly inadequate for preserving Japan's external security. The chapter has argued that the NPR was clearly designed for an internal security role and to fill an internal, not external, security vacuum. The NPR had wide-ranging and deep-seated ties to the civil police, especially the National Rural Police, which again reveal its constabulary character. This analysis challenges the opinions of many historians who argue that the NPR was an army from the start.²³⁰

The chapter also contributed to achieving the first main aim of the study, by providing evidence of Japanese influence on the force. Those explored in this chapter represented 'top-down' attempts to influence the NPR by both Japanese government and former imperial officers. The unsuccessful attempts by Willoughby and Hattori to induct Imperial officers into the NPR and hence convert it into an army revealed the constabulary character of the force and the determination of MacArthur, Yoshida and others to preserve that character. The defeat of these attempts and the reactionary Rightwing perspectives they represent also marked a significant victory for democracy and civilian control over the security services.

²³⁰ For more on historians opinions on the character of the NPR see: Introduction, pp 7-32.

Chapter Four: The Operational

Aspects of the NPR

As this study seeks to produce the first complete history of the NPR an examination of the intended role and use of the force is essential. This chapter again contributes to fulfilling the second key aim of this work by building on the analysis of the preceding chapter in exploring the operational aspects of the NPR's character. This exploration is required as the subject has not been approached elsewhere and is one which has major implications for any analysis of the character of the force. The chapter illustrates the constabulary character of the force, the battles over its direction, and the influence of the JCP on the NPR. The chapter provides a survey of the living conditions and legal position of the NPR's members, and an examination of the JCP's 'military campaign' of the period. This analysis of the JCP contributes to the first main aim of the study in revealing Japanese perspectives and influences on the force and the examination of the 'bottom up' attempts by the JCP to seize control of the force and turn it into a tool of the Left, provides another new domestic perspective on the force. The key question as to why the NPR was never used in its original internal security role is also examined in detail, with the use of 'Bloody May Day' as a case study. Furthermore, the relations between the JCP and the NPR and the development of the NPR's role in disaster relief operations are also examined in pursuit of both the primary aims of this study.

The Living Conditions of Members of the NPR

As we have seen in preceding chapters there was a range of opinions existed over the proposed character of Japan's security forces and these debates did not cease with the creation of the NPR. Like most aspects of the Occupation, even when faced with a unified front by GHQ (which was a rarity), the Japanese government could still resist demands placed upon it through manipulation of information and the lack of GHQ oversight. As noted by Schaller: 'this lack of oversight allowed the Japanese to ignore or defy many unpleasant demands or, more important, to distort the information on which SCAP relied'.¹ In the case of the debates following the creation of the Police Reserve, members of the Japanese government did practise these obstructive techniques as well as foot dragging and playing the various concerned elements of GHQ off against each other in order to pursue individual political goals and the overall Japanese government goal of maintaining the constabulary character of the NPR.²

One of the first successes of the Japanese in this struggle was over the pay of the NPR. The final monthly wage agreed upon for enlisted members of the NPR was ¥5,000, more than the ¥3,750 given to standard police recruits, and supplemented after two years service with a ¥60,000 superannuity.³ In addition recruits received free medical care, dental care, clothing, accommodation and meals.⁴ These terms featured prominently in the NPR recruitment campaign, being prominently displayed on the main recruiting poster (see figure XVIII). The generous pay and conditions compared to similar kinds of employment (see table XIII), coupled with the superannuation payment which exceeded many recruits' annual salary,

¹ M. Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, p29.

² For more on the Japanese struggle for the constabulary character of the force see: Chapter 3, pp 209-220; Chapter 5, pp 299-330.

³ C. Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 1825-1995*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p 384.

⁴ Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), (E) 7383-7384, Cabinet Order for Partial Amendment to the Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order, 10/8/1950.

made enlistment in the NPR seem a very attractive proposition to many young men.⁵

Figure XVIII. NPR Recruitment Poster Entitled: 'Peaceful Japan Needs You'⁶



As noted in the previous chapter, this was the exact effect desired by both the US and Japanese planners. The package was so attractive as to cause major concern amongst the Tokyo Metropolitan Police (MPD) and National Rural Police that masses of their men might transfer into the NPR. Chief Tanaka, head of the MPD, was so concerned that he protested to G2 that in the first eight days of the existence of the NPR over seven hundred of his officers had already applied to transfer and he expected more. This was an unintended consequence of the NPR's pay and conditions (even the National Rural Police itself had recommended that the NPR get a salary of ¥5,128 per month plus allowances) and Tanaka

⁵ ¥87,000 was the average annual income in 1951. M. Petersen, 'The Intelligence That Wasn't: CIA Name Files, The U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan', in E. Drea (ed), *Researching Japanese War Crimes Records, Introductory Essays*, NARA for the Nazi War Crimes and Imperial Japanese government Records Interagency Working Group, Washington, 2006, p 203.

⁶ Asagumo Shinbun Henshu Kyukoku (Asagumo Shinbun Editorial Board), *Hanran no Hanseiki-Rikujō Jieitai no 50 Nen (A Dramatic Half Century- 50 Years of the GSDF), The History of the JGSDF 50 Years in Photographs*, Asagumo Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 2000, p 3.

was assured by Mulbar, a senior figure in G2's Public Safety Division, that GHQ would not 'rob Peter to pay Paul' as the transfers were counterproductive and would only further weaken the police that the National Rural Police was set up to bolster.⁷

Table XIII. Daily Pay of NPR Personnel and Other Comparable Professions⁸

<u>Rank/Profession</u>	<u>Daily Pay Range/Average (¥)</u>	<u>NPR inc Benefits (¥)</u>
NPR Sergeant 1 st Class	245-280 ^{^*}	328-363 ⁺
NPR Sergeant 2 nd Class	220-240 ^{^*}	303-323 ⁺
NPR Sergeant 3 rd Class	200-220 ^{^*}	283-303 ⁺
NPR Senior Patrolman	180-200 [^]	263-283 ⁺
NPR Patrolman 1 st Class	165-185 [^]	248-268 ⁺
NPR Patrolman 2 nd Class	150-170 [^]	233-253 ⁺
National Rural Police Patrolman	125	-
Navy	227	-
Stevedore (on ship)	423	-
Carpenter	326	-
Clerk	382	-
Nurse	220	-
[^] Excludes value of meals, clothing, medical/dental care, billet and bonus. [*] Excludes ¥45 provided for mess and billet if living off base. ⁺ Approximate (base daily pay plus 33 for bonus, 45 of mess and billet, 5 for medical and dental).		

The final pay and conditions offered to NPR recruits, including the bonus were the result of compromise stemming from a dispute between the NPR's US advisors and the NPR leadership under Masuhara Keikichi, the force's civilian Director General. The Japanese wanted fairly low pay to

⁷ ESS(C) 133, Economic and Scientific Section, NPR pay, 17/10/50; Intelligence (G2) 3875, Mulbar to Chief, PSD, 'Japanese Police and NPR', 16/8/50.

⁸ Data based upon table found in ESS(D) 13267, Cabinet Order for Partial Amendment to the Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order, appendix No.3, Daily salary schedule for sergeant I class and under of the National Police Reserve, 10/8/50; *19-40 Average Daily Cash Earnings of Outdoor Workers by Occupation (1950-2004)* available at: www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/19.htm; *19-39 Average Age and Monthly Contractual Cash Earnings by Occupation (1948-2004)*, Statistics bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2009, available at: Ibid.

discourage men choosing long-term employment with the force, and hence the formation of a 'career' military. In contrast, the US Army advisors and their pro-military leadership wanted a high wage to attract men to a potential 'career in arms' and to form a cadre of highly trained men for the future expansion which the US Army desired. After a struggle between the two authorities a compromise was reached: a relatively high base salary as sought by the US advisors, but with a fixed term of employment and bonus, both pushed for by the Japanese.⁹ The Japanese gave three reasons for the use of the bonus: to assure the success of the recruitment campaign, to obtain the maximum number of applicants and thereby increase the quality of the force, and to discourage the creation of a career military, through the temporary contracts and the likelihood that most would take the bonus and leave - the exact opposite of US advisors' wishes.¹⁰ The Japanese actually pushed for an even more generous bonus structure, with ¥70,000 for those leaving after a two year term, or ¥100,000 for three years. The Japanese planned to give those who stayed on after three years the chance to compete for a very limited number of staff positions.¹¹ Again this structure and the fact that a 'chance to compete', as opposed to a guaranteed ¥100,000, was unlikely to be taken by many, underscores the Japanese desire to avoid the creation of a professional army.¹² In early August in front of the Diet's upper house local administration committee, Attorney General Ohashi further detailed the Japanese plans for this system stating that service with the NPR would be limited to a maximum of ten years, a condition which necessitated payment of the retirement bonus.¹³ Although the sum of ¥60,000 was decided upon after a compromise between the Japanese government and

⁹ *U.S. Army Center of Military History Historical Manuscripts Collection: The Korean War, (YF-A4), Far East, US Army Forces and Eight United States Army Military History Section, History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1952, 1955, Reel 14, p 115. Hereafter, History of the National Police Reserve.*

¹⁰ ESS(C) 133, Economic and Scientific Section, 'NPR Pay', 17/10/50.

¹¹ ESS (F) 2382, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Outline of Policy Concerning Recruitment of the National Police Reserve', undated.

¹² In the end the Japanese were proved right and 28,000 NPR men took the ¥60,000 bonus and left the force in August 1952, necessitating the recruitment of an additional 35,000 men. K. Miyazawa, *Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington, The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949-1954*, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2007, p 70.

¹³ *Nippon Times*, 13/8/50.

GHQ, details of the former Japanese plan appeared during the initial recruiting period in the *Nippon Times* which quoted the bonuses to be paid as ¥80,000 for two years and ¥100,000 for three.¹⁴ This and other contradictory announcements, rumours and the lengthy debates over the wages and the terms and conditions to be offered resulted in some confusion and the resignation of some recruits before they were even inducted into the NPR.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the overall success of the bonus scheme was not in doubt, with many recruits citing it as the main reason they had applied to join.¹⁶ Despite the success in attracting recruits, the wrangling over pay and conditions led to some delays in the payment of the NPR's salary which as noted in the section below on the influence of the JCP, caused some discontent within the force.

It seemed that the encouragement away from forming a career in the NPR by the Japanese government did not extend to the higher ranks, who were awarded high salaries which were justified by claims that they needed to compete with the private sector.¹⁷ Given that all the high ranks were former policemen and home ministry bureaucrats whose loyalty and control of the force was necessary to prevent the NPR from becoming an army, or the force becoming a threat to the Japanese government, this attitude on the part of the Japanese is entirely understandable. The official US history of the NPR, *History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1952*, with its heavily pro-military and pro-US Army bias argues that through this obstruction of US policy and his later battles against the recruitment of purgees Masuhara sought to preserve the NPR as his personal fiefdom in which officer commissions would serve as plums for his loyal friends from the police service and former home ministry.¹⁸ There may be a grain of truth in this analysis but the fact that

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p140; H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 1: 1947-1952*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (hereafter YF-A16), 1D-190, Conference: Authority of the National Police Reserve, 21/10/50.

¹⁶ *Nippon Times*, 7/10/50.

¹⁷ ESS(D) 13267, 'Reasons for the Necessity of High Salary Schedule for NPR HQ staff', 8/50.

¹⁸ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p174.

his actions were also in defence of the constabulary character of the NPR are glossed over, in one of the earliest examples of the hindsight and overemphasis on the US role colouring the analysis of the character of the NPR.

Aside from his remuneration a NPR member also received his uniform and equipment free of charge. The procurement process of the NPR's uniforms and the type of equipment issued are other facets of the NPR which reflect its constabulary character. From the start, and indicative of the paramilitary character of the NPR, senior National Rural Policemen were involved at every stage of the procurement process, initially as temporary appointees, and later permanently, once transferred into the NPR. As noted in the preceding chapter the NPR and National Rural Police were closely connected in a number of ways, especially at senior level. For example, the heads of the service divisions of the National Rural Police along with most of the senior leadership of the National Rural Police were directly involved in the running and command of the equivalent sections of the NPR.¹⁹ The National Rural Police paid for equipment, food and clothing, and signed contracts for the NPR until it was properly staffed by transferring personnel into it from the National Rural Police, Municipal Police and bureaucracy. The National Rural Police also arranged the manufacture of the uniforms, bedding and equipment for the NPR.²⁰ These exchanges represent the close connection and exchange of personnel with the civil police which is one of the defining characteristics of a constabulary.²¹

An examination of the items of equipment issued to the NPR is also indicative of its constabulary character. The official Japanese government document detailing the equipment of the NPR lists the complete set of equipment all members was expected to possess. This included items of a

¹⁹ G2 3876, Desonier, Memorandum for Record, 'National Police Reserve', 24/7/50.

²⁰ G2 3876, Engle, Memorandum for Record, 'Expediting Production of Uniforms and Equipment for National Police Reserves', 29/7/50; ESS (F) 2382, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Interim Procedure of Contracting and Disbursing for NPR', 31/7/50; G2 3266, Enger to Weetman, Memorandum for the record, 12/8/50.

²¹ For a full definition of a constabulary see: Introduction, pp 43-48.


military character such as fatigues and boots, but many more of a police character such as a notebook, arrest rope, alarm whistle and police baton.²² Even the provision of military style boots was partially curtailed and replaced with shoes when it was revealed that Japanese industry would be unable to supply a sufficient number.²³

The NPR's members were provided with three uniforms, a summer uniform of light tan coloured hemp or cotton, a fatigue or work uniform to be worn on 'dirty duty', and a deep navy woollen winter uniform with matching raincoat. The complete impracticability of either of these colours as battlefield camouflage illustrates that the NPR was not intended to operate on the frontline and hence indicates the constabulary character of the force. These uniforms were not obviously military in design and bore a closer resemblance in terms of style to police uniforms, or even, in the case of the light tan variant, the uniforms of factory workers (see figures XIX and XX). The lack of any military-style ceremonial uniform further underlines the non-military character of the force.

²² ESS(F) 2270, Cabinet Order for Partial Amendment to the Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order, Appendix no. 5, 'List of Articles in Lending For the Police Officials', 10/8/50. However, even the inclusion of military boots is not indicative of a military character as much of the civilian population wore them at this time and they were standard issue to the civil police, see figures XXVI and XXIX.

²³ G2 3266, Desonier to Shepard, 'National Police Reserve Equipment on Hand at Regional Schools as of 9 October 1950', 10/9/50.

Figure XIX. NPR Light Tan Coloured Summer Uniform (with IJA/IJN Style Cap)²⁴



Furthermore, the lack of steel helmets, until 1952 (and then their all white paint scheme) again shows the constabulary character of the force.²⁵ Aside from the constraints of practicality and supply, fashion also played its part in influencing the NPRs kit, with recruits overwhelmingly preferring the old style Japanese armed forces cap as they claimed it possessed more 'sex appeal' than the US style 'garrison cap' they were meant to wear when off base (see figures XIX and XX for examples of the rival pieces of headgear).²⁶

²⁴ Asagumo Shinbun Henshu Kyukoku, *The History of the JGSDF*, p 15.

²⁵ The fact that the Japanese civil police also often wore steel helmets at this time also undermines any argument that they represent a military aspect of the NPR's character, see Figures XXVI, XXIX, XXX. Hayashi, NPR Regulation No. 100-1, 'Regulation for Wearing of The Uniform of NPR', 1/2/51, in Civil Affairs Section (CAS)(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51; ESS(D) 13267, Cabinet Order for Partial Amendment to the Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order, Appendix No1, Regulations for Uniform, 10/8/1950; Webb to Executive, 17/12/51, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51.

²⁶ Shukanshinbun Shinchohenshubu (Shincho Weekly Newspaper Editor), *Makkasaa no Nihon (MacArthur's Japan)*, Vol. 2, Shinchosha, Tokyo, 1983, p 263.

Figure XX. NPR Dark Navy Winter Uniform (with US Style 'Garrison Cap')²⁷



Alongside this free clothing, a further significant benefit awarded to NPR members was that of free housing. All single officers and men were billeted on base but those ranked sergeant or above could live off base if they wished, receiving an additional mess and billeting allowance for housing costs and the purchase of meals.²⁸ Nevertheless, conditions on NPR bases were cramped, especially in the early stages, with most men living in a highly confined fifty square feet, the minimum space deemed healthy and hygienic by the US advisors.²⁹ Even for more senior ranks conditions were not much better, with a sixteen by sixteen foot room considered sufficient for eight Inspectors, or six Senior Inspectors in double bunks, or four Superintendents in single bunks.³⁰ Despite the seemingly military connotations of having staff live on base, this is a feature shared with many of the preceding US constabularies and contemporary paramilitary police forces of the era.³¹

²⁷ Asagumo Shinbun Henshu Kyukoku, *The History of the JGSDP*, p 15.

²⁸ CAS(A) 1808, O'Brien to Civil Affairs Region Chiefs, 'Billeting and Messing of NPR Officer Personnel', 16/11/50.

²⁹ Kowalski, National Police Reserve Medical Advisors Instruction No. 2, 'Preventative Medicine Measures', 30/8/50, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51.

³⁰ CAS(A) 1808, O'Brien to Civil Affairs Region Chiefs, 'Billeting and Messing of NPR Officer Personnel', 16/11/50.

³¹ For more on the other constabularies see: Chapter 2, pp 115-138.

Figure XXI. An Initial Batch of NPR Recruits Relax in Cramped Conditions³²



In addition to the barracks given over to the NPR, most of which were former IJA/IJN depots or bases, a number of other items belonging to the former regime found their way into the hands of the NPR. Interestingly SCAP, not the Japanese government, authorised the transfer of significant amounts of reparations material to the NPR from late 1950 onwards.³³ In September 1950 an NPR base in Kyushu received a number of former Japanese military water pumps, boilers, pipes and transformers to provide adequate heating and electricity for the mothballed buildings it occupied.³⁴ Other former IJA/IJN assets such as twenty large rice cookers formerly employed at Sasebo naval base were transferred to the NPR and eventually used in the NPR base in Fukuoka, Kyushu.³⁵ In March 1951 the NPR supply depot in Uji, south of Kyoto received around two miles of rail track and 176 meters of rail points for use in the repair and distribution of

³² Picture courtesy of: Asagumo Shinbun Henshu Kyukoku, the *History of the JGSDF*, p7.

³³ Civil Property Custodian (CPC) 30568, Office of the Civil Property Custodian, Reparations Property Division, Reparations Branch, 'Repatriation Equipment Transferred to NPR Bases', 11/50.

³⁴ CPC 30569, Office of the Civil Property Custodian, Reparations Property Division, Reparations Branch, 'Repatriation Equipment Transferred to NPR Bases', 9/50.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 11/51.

vehicles and supplies.³⁶ The following month a large cache of former IJA/IJN building supplies, medical respirators, kettles, motors, sirens and whetstones were distributed to various bases in Kyushu.³⁷ Alongside these larger items, numerous smaller items such as office furniture and stationery were widely reassigned to the NPR across Japan.³⁸

The transfer of reparations material to organisations other than the NPR also resulted from the force's creation. Due to a shortage of space to house the NPR and its equipment there are several recorded incidents of base space formerly used as storage for industrial plant held as reparations, being transferred to the NPR and plant being returned to its original owners. Some plant was also given to, or returned to, Japanese firms to help them manufacture equipment for the NPR or construct its bases.³⁹ All of this material had been earmarked as reparations for the former Allies and areas invaded by the Japanese during the Pacific War. Despite the various flaws in the 'reverse course' concept, this transfer of reparations material back to its original owners or directly to the NPR does represent a direct reversal of US policy. It is indicative of Japan's postwar international position and also somewhat ironic that some of the same men as during wartime, were again in the service of Japan, on the same bases, eating from the same kitchens, but now in the defence of their homeland against communism and in support of a US led war defending part of their former empire.

A further example of the poor conditions faced by the NPR can be found in its food supply. Despite a heavy training schedule, especially in the first few weeks where physical fitness was the focus, the diet provided to the NPR was inadequate for their needs. The need for extra staple foods in order to give the men of the NPR the extra calories necessary for training had been noted from the inception of the force. Special authorisation was

³⁶ Ibid, 3/51.

³⁷ Ibid, 4/51.

³⁸ CPC 30572, Office of the Civil Property Custodian, Reparations Property Division, Reparations Branch, 'Repatriation Equipment Transferred to NPR Bases', 11/51.

³⁹ Ibid.

given by GHQ to circumvent the normal rationing regulations as it was seen as too time consuming and bureaucratic to use ration cards for each individual NPR member. Initial plans also detailed the recommended daily amount of food the NPR should receive. This consisted of the standard ration of 2.7 go of rice with one go extra (around 560g) plus additional staple goods, sugars, fats and oils.⁴⁰ Even though the standards were above average, within weeks they were shown to be insufficient and the daily rice portion was increased substantially in October 1950 to 4.7 go (about 700g/2,300kcal), still a meagre amount for a physically demanding job.⁴¹ As can be seen in table XIV around this time the Japanese Ministry of Finance released detailed regulations over the costs and content of the NPR's diet. For a daily cost of ¥66.6 per man (a monthly cost of ¥2,000 each) the NPR was meant to provide a suitable diet for its members.⁴²

Table XIV. The Official Diet of the NPR⁴³

Food	Amount (kg)	Cost per kg (¥)	Cost (¥)	Approx Calories
Clean Rice	0.60	45.82	27.49	1,950
Clean Barley	0.19	36.58	6.80	658
Side Dish	0.31	100.00	30.90	618
Total	1.10	182.40	65.20	3,226

If provided exactly as specified, the diet probably would have been sufficient for most NPR members but the small budget provided for purchasing food added to local ad-hoc procurement and highly variable standards of cookery led to many NPR members being undernourished. The problem was seen as so significant that Doctor Pegg of the Public Health Section of GHQ's Kanto Civil Affairs Region, was dispatched to conduct a detailed survey of the diet provided to the NPR in camp Takada

⁴⁰ G2 3266, Engle to Shepard, Memorandum for the Record, 12/8/50.

⁴¹ CAS(A) 1793, Message from Whitten to Toole, 8/10/1950.

⁴² ESS(F) 250, Ministry of Finance, 'Japanese National Police Reserve, Breakdown of Foodstuff Expenses', 1950.

⁴³ Based on data found in ESS(F) 250, Ministry of Finance, 'Japanese National Police Reserve, Breakdown of Foodstuff Expenses', 1950.

in Niigata prefecture and Camp Utsunomiya in Tochigi prefecture. Dr Pegg's findings (shown in table XV below) were far from positive. His study concluded that the amount of calories, fats, vitamins and carbohydrate in the NPR diet were all inadequate. The diet of the NPR was inferior when measured against that of the recommended Japanese guidelines for heavy work and was even less than the spartan standards of the IJA and IJN during the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese war. Pegg also noted that as his calculations of the NPR diet were based upon the nutritional content of raw food and that as up to a fifth of this could be lost during cooking, the deficiencies in the NPR diet were likely to be even greater than he had reported.⁴⁴

Table XV. Daily Nutrition in two NPR Camps in late 1950 in Comparison⁴⁵

	Calories	Protein (g)	Carbohydrate (g)	Fat (g)
Camp Utsunomiya	2,818.6	108.5	484.5	34.5
Camp Takada	2,900	134	529	27
Heavy Work¹	3,500	110	677.5	39
IJA²	3,197	127	738	28
IJN²	3,600	135	650	50
¹ According to National Nutritional Basic Regulations.				
² According to 1938 Basic Regulations.				

In order to rectify this situation Pegg recommended new nutritional standards, longer and more frequent surveys of the NPR's diet and the procurement and provision of more calorific foods.⁴⁶ In the light of these figures press reports of NPR members buying up all the cakes and bread in shops are not surprising, and neither are the accounts of many sleeping through their afternoon leisure time, a measure necessary for men who were not getting enough food to do a full day's work.⁴⁷ Their diet gradually improved but even in 1951 the food provided to the NPR was plain in

⁴⁴ CASA(A) 7365, Pegg, Memorandum for Record: 'Nutritional Survey at Camps Takada and Utsunomiya', 10/1/51.

⁴⁵ Based upon data in CASA(A) 7365, Pegg, Memorandum for Record: 'Nutritional Survey at Camps Takada and Utsunomiya', 10/1/51.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ *Nippon Times*, 7/10/50.

nature, small in quantity and contained little other than staples of bread, rice and barley.⁴⁸

The poor diet of the NPR was also a common feature in JCP propaganda directed at winning over members of the force and probably resulted in the resignation of some members of the force.⁴⁹ Food also played a role in some of the efforts of the JCP to infiltrate the force. In one incident an NPR camp recruited its cooks from the local area and the NPR man placed in charge of hiring the men was a JCP member. He apparently recruited twenty fellow JCP members as cooks, who proceeded to give out propaganda leaflets and urge members to eat and waste as much food as possible, thus creating shortages resulting in dissatisfaction which could be used to their advantage. There were also reports in the Japanese press of local JCP officials inviting NPR members out for dinner and to other evening entertainments in order to try and glean information from them, spread dissatisfaction, propaganda and attempt to win them over to the side of the JCP.⁵⁰

The diet of the force could also be argued to show the constabulary character of the NPR. Unlike all armies, the NPR had few facilities, and even less training, for cooking in the field, revealing its locally based area of operations and hence internal security character.⁵¹ Furthermore, it could be argued that as the NPR were fed less than the wartime level of the IJA and IJN (see tables XIV and XV above) that the Japanese bureaucrats who set the nutritional level may not have envisaged the NPR undertaking prolonged periods of physically demanding work, perhaps including the participation in external security duties.

⁴⁸ CAS(A) 7364, Kirashina (Chief, Liaison Section) to Pegg (Public Health Section, Kanto Civil Affairs Region), 'Survey of Provisions delivered to the National Police Reserve', 9/2/1951.

⁴⁹ G2 3876, Mulbar, Memorandum for Record, 'Communist Party Putting Out Printed Material Concerning the NPR, Reported by Tokyo NRP Guard Section (Nagata)', 21/9/1950; G2 4193, 'Leaflet Number 2', 1950.

⁵⁰ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 14/12/1950.

⁵¹ CAS(A) 1831, NPR HQ, 'Basic Training Program for National Police Reserve Recruits', 8/50.

The meagre diet its members consumed also contributed to ill health in the NPR. However, NPR members were allowed free medical and dental care as part of their employment and a number of precautionary measures were undertaken by the authorities overseeing the NPR in order to minimise the risk of disease amongst its members. These included quarantine, generous use of antibiotics regardless of cost in order to reduce the risk of infection as fast as possible, the free distribution of prophylactics and oral penicillin, and close co-operation with civil authorities to contain or control incidents of disease.⁵² Perhaps the most significant of the measures undertaken to ensure the health of the NPR was the administration of a massive catch-up programme of immunizations against major diseases. According to Japanese government policy all Japanese subjects should have received immunisations against smallpox, typhoid, paratyphoid A and B and tuberculosis before their eighteenth birthday. However, due to the devastation of war and the rural background of many of the recruits of the NPR the status of completion of immunisations amongst the recruits was way below the average for the rest of the population. In order to bring the immunisations of all the NPR up to the required standard a special immunisation programme was instituted and all NPR members received the required immunisations by 1 November 1950.⁵³ Even canine members of the NPR could not escape the immunisation campaign and all dogs living in barracks were immunised against rabies.⁵⁴

Like the rest of Japanese society one of the principal disease which afflicted members of the NPR was tuberculosis, the 'number one killer'

⁵²Kowalski, National Police Reserve Medical Advisors Instruction No. 2, 'Preventative Medicine Measures', 30/8/50, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51.

⁵³ Ibid; Technical Section (TS) 301, Pulliam to G2, 'Sampling of National Police Reserve Applications', 18/8/50; O'Brien to Chiefs, Civil Affairs Regions, 'Correction of Immunisation Deficiencies in the NPR', 26/9/50, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51; Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan*, p 384.

⁵⁴Kowalski, National Police Reserve Medical Advisors Instruction No. 2, 'Preventative Medicine Measures', 30/8/50, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51.

disease in Japan at the time.⁵⁵ A recent work has estimated that in 1950 a significant proportion of the population was infected with TB, and that the disease resulted in around 80,000 deaths per year, partially as a result of the collapse of effective public health provision and immunisations programmes during the war and its aftermath.⁵⁶ This prevalence of TB was reflected in the personnel of the NPR. Despite demanding physical standards and following the creation of a treatment programme in 1951, 1.3% or 1 in 75 of the NPR had medically confirmed cases of TB, and as the discovery of the disease could result in their discharge, many more undisclosed cases are likely to have been present (see table XVI).⁵⁷ The scale of the problem of TB, as illustrated in figures XXII to XXV was significant, dwarfing sexually transmitted diseases and usually exceeding the incidence of sexually transmitted disease and injury combined.

Table XVI. Tuberculosis in the NPR on the 31 July 1951⁵⁸

Status of NPR Member	Number
At Home	631
On Duty	61
Resigned	32
Dead	2
Hospital	110
Discharged	279
Total	1,115


⁵⁵ C.A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain, *MacArthur 1941-1951, Victory in the Pacific*, Heinemann, London, 1956, p 324.

⁵⁶ W. Johnston, *The Modern Epidemic: A History of Tuberculosis in Japan*, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1995, pp 97-98; T. Mori, 'Recent Trends in Tuberculosis, Japan', *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, Vol. 6, No. 6, November-December 2000, p 566.

⁵⁷ CAS(D) 505, 'Tuberculosis as of 31 July 1951', 31/7/1951.

⁵⁸ Data taken from CAS(D) 505, 'Tuberculosis as of 31 July 1951', 31/7/1951.

Figures XXII to XXV. Breakdown of Percentages of NPR Hospital Patients by Region, September 1950 to July 1951⁵⁹



With such a large number of ill men, the very limited number of NPR medical officers struggled to cope.⁶⁰ The problem was so serious that in early November 1950 the NPR began to discharge all men and officers afflicted with TB.⁶¹ This move, pushed for largely by the Japanese, was opposed by the US advisors to the NPR, and senior members of GHQ contacted all the NPR base commanders to demand triplicate copies of all the discharge papers of those dismissed due to TB.⁶² To the Japanese

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, (YF-A10), Subject File, 1945-51, E.D. Johnson, 'National Police Reserve, Notes on Conference With Major General W. P Shepard', 7/2/51, Reel 8; TS 154-155, 'A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951', 1/52 ; YF-A16, 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 22/12/51, p 47, hereafter 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve'.

⁶¹ CAS(A) 1807, Dugas to Chief Tōhoku Civil Affairs Region, 'Anti Tuberculosis Measure for Japanese National Police Reserve', 4/11/50.

⁶² CAS(A) 1793, Phone Message from Toole to Each Camp Cadre Commander,

bureaucracy discharging those with TB seemed a wise move due to several factors: the cost of treating what could be thousands of men was an expense the strained public purse could ill afford, infected men could spread the disease throughout the NPR, and the presence of so many invalids men could reflect poorly on both the NPR and the government. In pursuit of their ambitions for a career military force, and in the interest of morale, Civil Affairs Section (CAS) tried to convince the Japanese government to re-enlist those who recovered, also proposing limiting treatment expenses to ¥6,000 per month per man, and defining more explicitly the pay and allowances the sick men should receive.⁶³ After some debate the Japanese agreed to the American proposals and the NPR Chief of General Affairs, Senior Superintendent Hayase Yoshitaka, wrote to all those who had been discharged due to TB to inform them that they could be reinstated, effective from their date of discharge if they applied by 20 December 1950 and met the specified requirements.⁶⁴ These requirements stated that the recruits would receive treatment at home and would return to duty only after two doctors or NPR medical officers confirmed they were cured. In a manner typical of a police force rather than an army the sick were treated as civil servants, receiving benefits under article thirty of the National Public Employee Mutual Aid Association Law. The sick men were awarded up to ¥6,000 a month to cover examinations, medicine, treatments, operations and hospital accommodation as necessary, plus nursing and transport if approved by NPR HQ. These benefits were awarded on top of their normal full salary, less mess and billet allowances, and were payable for eight months, at which time if they were not cured the men were again discharged from the NPR.⁶⁵

Aside from the incidents described in the previous paragraphs, two other medical aspects of the character of the NPR help to reveal its

22/11/1950.

⁶³ CAS(B) 871, Memo for Record, 5/12/1950; CAS(A) 7365, O'Brien to Civil Affairs Region Chiefs, 'Reinstatement of Certain NPR Personnel Discharged for TB', 15/12/50.

⁶⁴ CAS(A) 7365, Hayase to Each Man discharged TB, 6/12/50.

⁶⁵ CAS(A) 7365, 'Policy Reference, Enlistees Discharged by Reason of Having TB', 6/12/50.

constabulary character. First, in a move showing another of the numerous links between the NPR and National Rural Police, the physical standards of the National Rural Police were used to judge whether recruits were suitable for service in the NPR. As well as illustrating that the duties which the NPR was intended to perform were close to that of the National Rural Police, the fact that US military fitness standards (which were well known to men like Shepard who had served as head of training at Fort Benning in the United States), or a bespoke, and more martial, programme were not adopted illustrates the constabulary role of the NPR.⁶⁶ Secondly, the medical service of NPR was provided by a mix of medical officers within the organisation and civilian doctors, and this mix of military and civilian practices again shows the constabulary character of the NPR.⁶⁷

The Legal Position of the NPR

One of the most useful areas in demonstrating the constabulary character of the NPR is the legal position it occupied. The men of the NPR were required to sign an oath of office immediately after being processed and assigned to their units.⁶⁸ This pledge was also recited daily at 6 am by the entire force.⁶⁹ The oath was seen as a legally and morally binding agreement between the men and the Japanese state and is quoted in full as follows:

I esteem it a great honour to have been appointed the personnel of the National Police Reserve which maintains peace and order of our country and guarantees the public welfare, and I solemnly swear as follows:

⁶⁶ Kowalski, National Police Reserve Medical Advisors Instruction No. 1, 30/8/50, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region, 23/6/51*; E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, Continuum, London, 2002, p 193.

⁶⁷ Kowalski, National Police Reserve Medical Advisors Instruction No. 1, 30/8/50, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region, 23/6/51*.

⁶⁸ CAS(A) 1810, O'Brien to chiefs of Civil Affairs Regions, 16/9/50.

⁶⁹ J. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse, Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System*, The Athlone Press, London, 1988, p 77.

1. I will faithfully protect and defend the constitution of Japan and laws, and observe orders.
2. I will observe fidelity; hold sincerity in high esteem; and with courage, I will perform my duties.
3. I will obey faithfully the command on duty of a superior official.
4. I will not join any public body, organisation, principles of which require me to follow the same in priority to my duties. [sic]⁷⁰

No doubt those who argue that the NPR was a military force from the moment of its creation will find the first point ironic, but a more detailed examination of the oath reveals the true character of the NPR. The confinement of the NPR to Japanese territory meant that the maintenance of 'peace and order' and the guarantee of 'public welfare' were clear references to an internal security role. The fourth point is also useful, revealing the threat the JCP and JCP infiltration (secret JCP members were made to sign similar oaths of loyalty to the JCP) were seen to present. Officers and sergeants were also required to take additional oaths, the principal additional content of which was a promise not to resign without good reason. This freedom to resign at anytime contrasts sharply to a binding army-style contract.⁷¹ The constabulary character of the NPR is clearly noticeable in these oaths and even the hawkish and pro-military Shepard recognised the police character of the force in this dimension: 'service is similar to that of rural police with no definite term of enlistment and the right to resign at any time, all on a voluntary basis, therefore, with no compulsion involved or a minimum term of enlistment, they are handled like civilians more than like military personnel'.⁷²

⁷⁰ CAS(A) 1810, National Police Reserve Order No.1, 'Rules Concerning the Oath of Office by the Personnel of the National Police Reserve', 6/9/50.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² YF-A10, E.D. Johnson, 'National Police Reserve, Notes on Conference With Maj Gen W. P Shepard', 7/2/51, Miscellaneous (Japanese Peace Treaty, Interdepartmental, Jan – Sep 1951, Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan-- Subject File, 1945-51, Records of the Office of the Historian. Japanese Peace and Security Treaties, 1946-1952, Reel 8.

Aside from the oaths of office, NPR members were subject to a civilian code of justice which closely mirrored that of a civil police force. Before the formal system of standard operating procedures was drafted, if criminal charges were brought against NPR members, they were be forwarded to the local National Rural Police HQ for investigation, who then decided upon disciplinary action if necessary.⁷³ This again indicates the close connections between the NPR and the National Rural Police and hence the constabulary character of the force. In a further instance which underlines these connections, during the early stages of the NPR's existence its officers were instructed to hand over any NPR member to the civil police, if the police had a warrant for his arrest.⁷⁴ During the initial months of the NPR, the civilian character of its disciplinary structure was further displayed through the fact that being absent without leave for up to ten days went unpunished and that the most serious punishment, aside from discharge, was a fifteen day suspension on full pay.⁷⁵

The most significant document in defining the responsibilities and disciplinary process of the NPR was the Prime Minister's Ordinance No.34, 'Regulations for Discipline and Punishment of the Personnel of the National Police Reserve'. The document is also important in demonstrating the constabulary character of the force through its various clauses and its creation of a civilian legal position far closer to that of a police force than a military. The ordinance contains clear indications of the NPR's constabulary character, for example, the men of the NPR are defined as 'servants of the people', i.e. civilian civil servants or police officers.⁷⁶ Also, like a police force the NPR members were barred from drinking on duty and to excess when off duty. The clause: 'he shall be quiet, civil and orderly in the performance of duties, he shall be of even

⁷³ CAS(A) 1811, Kowalski to chief, Tohoku Civil Affairs division, 'Processing Adverse Reports on NPR Personnel', 28/11/50.

⁷⁴ CAS(A) 1810, O'Brien to Chief, Tōhoku Civil Affairs Region, 'Disciplinary Action as it Affects NPR Enrolees', 11/9/50.

⁷⁵ CAS(A) 1811, Kowalski to chief, Tohoku Civil Affairs division, 'Processing Adverse Reports on NPR Personnel', 28/11/50.

⁷⁶ CAS(A) 1810, Prime Minister's Ordinance No.34, 'Regulations for Discipline and Punishment of the personnel of the National Police Reserve', 1/9/50.

temper, patience and discretion to persons and he shall refrain from the use of course, profane or insolent language or manner' is again typical of a civilian/police-type organisation.⁷⁷ Another clause which clearly shows the organisation's police connections was the rule instructing the NPR members to 'refrain from keeping company with persons of questionable character and entering places of ill repute unless necessary in the performance of his duties'.⁷⁸ Aside from these clearly constabulary-type regulations, the ordinance also contained some regulations aimed at preventing the force becoming a threat to the civilian government. Foremost amongst these was the instruction that an NPR man 'shall never abuse his authority in any way, nor shall he interfere with the civil liberties and rights of the individual as guaranteed in the constitution of Japan'.⁷⁹ Provisions against the perceived threat from the JCP were also contained in the ordinance. NPR men were permitted to be members of groups allowed by the 1947 National Public Service Law but were prohibited from engaging in political campaigns, and in a direct prohibition of JCP membership: 'any police official who is now a member or becomes a member of or affiliates with any group which promotes, advocates, or takes part in unlawful strikes, lawlessness, or illegal overthrow of local or national government will be dismissed'.⁸⁰

In the event of disciplinary procedures being taken against an NPR member, Prime Minister's Ordinance No. 34 also details the procedures which were to be followed. An alleged disciplinary breach required the establishment of a form of quasi-court, at which the local NPR Commanding Officer, acting as judge and jury, called witnesses and evidence for the defence and prosecution and at which the accused could request an officer to act as his counsel. If convicted, the guilty party was allowed thirty days to appeal to the national NPR appeals board. The powers to pronounce certain punishments were restricted below the rank of Senior Superintendant but the full range of punishments available were

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

as follows: for 'minor' offences NPR men could be docked a maximum of one third of their pay for one month, be suspended for a maximum of fifteen days, or given a reprimand. For 'major' offences an NPR man found guilty could expect dismissal, to be docked two-thirds of his pay for up to one year, or be suspended (with pay) for up to six months. Clearly these punishments and the structure of the tribunals are much closer to those administered by police disciplinary boards than those of military courts which have much harsher sentences at their disposal, including lengthy imprisonment and death. Perhaps most significantly in illustrating the constabulary character of the NPR, these courts and their punishments were entirely separate from, and subordinate to, civil criminal proceedings, although, at his Commanding Officer's discretion, the accused could be tried for same offence at an additional NPR tribunal following a civil trial.⁸¹ In a subsequent document: 'Regulation for the Disposition of Persons Accused of Criminal Offences in the National Police Reserve' clear procedures relating to this point were defined. When prosecuted for a criminal offence NPR members were suspended pending the result of their trial. If they were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment or a suspended sentence they were automatically dismissed.⁸² Interestingly, the same document gave the civilian Director General the right to veto all disciplinary procedures against any officer of the rank of Inspector or above, a policy which could have had ominous results if Rightwing militarists such as Hattori Takushiro had seized control of the NPR.⁸³ These constabulary/police-type legal procedures continue in the SDF of today. Indeed, if a crime is committed by a member of the SDF, either on or off duty, he or she is subject to civil law and faces a civilian criminal trial, not a court martial as is typical of militaries the world over.⁸⁴ Even hawkish members of the US military recognised that this police-type legal system identified the NPR as a constabulary and its reform and reconfiguration to a more military system was necessary if they were to succeed in

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Hayashi, NPR Regulation No. 120-2, 'Regulation for the Disposition of Persons Accused of Criminal Offences in the National Police Reserve', 18/5/51, in CAS(A) 1269-1272, *Advisors Guide, 4th NPR Region*, 23/6/51.

⁸³ For more on Hattori see: Chapter 3, pp 214-220.

⁸⁴ *Japan Times*, 17/4/2007.

‘[changing] the character of the force from a police force to a military-type armed defence force’.⁸⁵

The arrest powers the force possessed are a further feature of the NPR which clearly indicates its constabulary character. As arrest powers are an integral part of a police force, are present in most constabularies, and absent from all armies, this facet of the NPR has a major bearing on the accurate appreciation of its character. Furthermore, this aspect of the NPR is one which had eluded all previous studies on the topic, mostly due to the thin source base employed by most historians.⁸⁶ Like the other issues related to the character of the NPR, such as pay and the inclusion of former officers, the award of arrest powers to the NPR was pressed for by the Japanese police officials running the NPR, and resisted by conservative pro-military elements in GHQ.⁸⁷ This battle, like the others, was one over the character of the force, with the Japanese pushing for an internal security force and the hawkish members of GHQ trying to move the NPR towards becoming the army they desired. In this round of the contest Masuhara, the civilian director of the NPR, a former police chief and home ministry bureaucrat, clashed with Pulliam, chief of G2/PSD, a subordinate of Willoughby and a supporter of a new Japanese army. The principal confrontation between the two took place at a meeting in late October 1950, also attended by senior PSD officials, Chief Tanaka of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Director General Saito of the National Rural Police, NPR Chief of Staff Hayashi and several other senior police officials.⁸⁸ At the opening of the meeting Pulliam stated that he had called it to clarify a ‘misunderstanding’ about the NPR. He continued to argue that the ordinance setting up the NPR did not give it arrest powers, that it was not part of the police and had no authority over the civil police. Pulliam stated, incorrectly, that the NPR only had power over its own

⁸⁵ YF-A16, 1B-48, Warden to Chief of Staff, ‘Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve’, 27/10/51.

⁸⁶ Many historians only use Kowalski’s work as their single source on the NPR, For more on this see: Introduction, pp 7, 14-17, 21, 26, 29, 31, 42, 44.

⁸⁷ For more on the inclusion of IJA officers see: Chapter 3, pp 209-220; Chapter 5, pp 299-305.

⁸⁸ YF-A16, 1D-190, Conference: Authority of the National Police Reserve, 21/10/50.

members, could not arrest civilians and that the civil police could arrest NPR members if required. Masuhara retorted that the NPR did have limited police power, as this was stated in the ordinance establishing the NPR. Masuhara continued to stress that crimes committed by NPR members, and by others against the NPR or involving NPR property were under the criminal jurisdiction of NPR.⁸⁹ The remainder of the lengthy debate centred on Pulliam denying that such functions were possessed by the police reserve, but eventually, grudgingly conceding that in an emergency they could be granted by the Prime Minister. Much of the debate also centred around the competing visions for the force, with Pulliam stating that 'the military does not handle civilians' and Masuhara responding, in a clear expression of the Japanese view of the NPR, that: 'we do not believe that the police reserve is a military force. We believe it is a police force'.⁹⁰ Pulliam also tried to claim that the assumption of arrest powers by the NPR would encroach on the civil police but Masuhara, supported by the heads of the National Rural Police and MPD, stated that it did not, and that GHQ had agreed to arrest powers in the ordinance which created the NPR.

The meeting itself ended in stalemate with the issues unresolved. Due to this and the pivotal influence that arrest powers have in demonstrating the constabulary character of the NPR, a further examination of the documents is necessary to clarify this issue. Under the 'Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order' (Cabinet Order No. 271) referred to by Masuhara, the NPR were given power to police their own ranks and to arrest civilians provided they turned them over to the Municipal Police and National Rural Police as soon as possible after apprehension.⁹¹ The specific circumstances in which the NPR could exercise their police powers were: offences committed by the personnel of the NPR, against the personnel of the NPR and concerning the police reserve by others, offences committed within the facilities of the NPR, and

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ ESS(D) 13267, Enforcement Ordinance of National Police Reserve Order (Cabinet Order No. 271), 24/8/50.

offences against the property of the NPR.⁹² However, in the course of their duties the NPR were also permitted to arrest 'flagrant' offenders or suspects, but had to produce an arrest warrant as soon as possible afterwards and then hand over the arrested persons to the Municipal Police or National Rural Police. If this transfer proved impossible, the NPR were able to process and imprison suspects in accordance with normal civil police procedures. The ordinance also defined members of the NPR at the rank of senior patrolman or above as 'judicial police officials' and the rest as 'judicial policemen'.⁹³ The legal significance of this was unambiguous: 'the [NPR] police officials may arrest, as judicial police officials, besides a flagrant offender, the suspect in accordance with the provision of article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure'.⁹⁴ Article 210 of the code of criminal procedure (Act No. 131 of 1948), covered emergency arrest and applies to persons fleeing the police, emergencies and situations where there was sufficient reason to suspect them of serious crime, or when persons were armed, in possession of stolen goods, or there was distinct evidence of a crime.⁹⁵ The code of criminal procedure itself states:

When there are sufficient grounds to suspect the commission of an offense punishable by death, or life imprisonment with or without work or for a maximum period of three years or more, and in addition, because of urgency an arrest warrant from a judge cannot be obtained, a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer or a judicial police official may arrest the suspect after notifying the suspect of the reasons therefor. In such cases, the procedure of obtaining an arrest warrant from a judge shall be taken immediately. Where an arrest warrant is not issued, the suspect shall be released immediately.⁹⁶

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ C.F. Goodman, *The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003, pp 288-299.

⁹⁶ The Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 131 of 1948), available at www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/COCP_1-2.pdf.

This article highlights the usual requirement for a pre-existing arrest warrant in Japan and has been argued by some to be inconsistent with Article 33 of the constitution which states: 'No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial officer which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is apprehended, [whilst] the offense [is] being committed'.⁹⁷

In reference to the above we can see that the NPR did legally possess the powers of arrest in a number of different circumstances. In practice these included all criminals they encountered in conducting their duties, those who committed crimes against NPR bases or personnel, and NPR men who had committed crimes. The majority of these arrests would have been under article 210 of the 1948 criminal code and would have resulted in the handing over of the arrested persons to the civil police who then would have produced an arrest warrant. This, however, was a legal technicality and the NPR did legally possess the right to arrest. Masuhara was correct in his argument with Pulliam and the NPR did clearly possess arrest powers, a feature common to all police forces, most constabularies and absent from armies. The 'confusion', as the official US reports on NPR called it, over the NPR's arrest powers persisted throughout its existence.⁹⁸ Although, as the NPR was never used in a situation where its arrest powers were required, the 'confusion' over them was only ultimately resolved with the elimination of the powers with the creation of the National Safety Force (NSF) in October 1952.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Article 33, *The Constitution of Japan*, 1947, printed in, G.D. Hook and G. McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution*, Routledge, London, 2001, p 193.

⁹⁸ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 26.

⁹⁹ Hoanchōhō (National Safety Agency Law), 31/7/1952, printed in, H. Ōtake (ed), *Sengo Nihon Bōeimonдай Shiryōshū (Postwar Japan Defence Problem Materials Collection)*, *Dainikan, Kōwa to Saigunbi no Honkakuka (Volume 2, The Realisation of The Peace Treaty and Rearmament)*, Sanichishobo, 1992, pp 391-407.

The JCP 1950-1952: The 'Military Policy' in Action, Attempts at Violent Revolution in Japan

Following the Cominform criticism of January 1950 the JCP adopted a policy of violent revolution.¹⁰⁰ This section details this policy during the life of the NPR, upon which it formed a significant influence. The importance of this policy to the history and development of the NPR should not be understated: the JCP campaign was perceived as the main security threat to Japan in this period and the sight of people being killed regularly on the streets, thousands demonstrating and fighting the police, throwing petrol bombs and trying, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, to start a guerrilla war influenced policymakers significantly.

The description of events provided here is given in order to contextualise the creation and evolution of the NPR by describing the events ascribed to, or actually conducted by, the JCP at the time. As such, the material presented here is not intended to present a case over the extent to which the JCP represented a genuine threat to the Japanese government in this period, an endeavour which would require much more research and more space than that which is available in this study. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to present the information which Japanese and American policymakers had to hand during the life of the NPR and which influenced their perceptions of the JCP 'threat' and their responses to it, including the creation of the NPR.

The 'military' aspect of the JCP's post 1950 programme centred on attacking parts of the Japanese state and making a violent bid for power, but also linked back to the nationalist and anti-militarist themes of its propaganda campaign by attempting to provoke a heavy-handed Japanese government or GHQ response. This section deals with the JCP's attempts at violent revolution in Japan including their campaign of

¹⁰⁰ For more on the Cominform Criticism see: Appendix II. 'Stalin and the Cominform Criticism'.

violent demonstrations, sabotage and attempts at guerrilla warfare. This analysis concludes with an examination of the reasons why the NPR was not used to help quell these disturbances through the use of 'Bloody May Day' as a case study.

Like the NPR, The JCP military campaign is also a highly neglected area of the history of Occupation Japan. This is the result of a number of influences. First is the subject matter. The study of the JCP during this period is the examination of an atomized, semi-covert organisation, with a centre in hiding, issuing policy directives, and regional cells following them to a varying extent depending on their internal politics, capabilities and membership. Moreover, almost the entire organisation was hunted, hounded and monitored by the police, GHQ, and the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB). Internal political struggles within the leadership of the JCP and the flight of much of it to China and the USSR further complicate matters.¹⁰¹ Such an organisation records little of its day-to-day operations and this necessitates the use of other more peripheral materials such as American, British and Japanese intelligence material, press articles and secondary sources. Each of these has its weaknesses and there is a constant need to be sceptical of claims made in the sources and look for common factors, corroborating evidence and patterns in the documents.

Secondary material is also limited as the topic is currently something of an embarrassment to both the Right and Left in Japan, and the American scholarly community.¹⁰² The Right are unwilling to examine the potentially embarrassing police repression and unrest of the period, and the official JCP line condemns the years 1950 to 1955 as a period of 'ultra Left adventurism' during which the party fell victim to Soviet pressure and sacrificed years of gains at the ballot box through a totally unsuitable

¹⁰¹ For more on the flight of JCP leadership and the challenges of using intelligence sources see: Chapter 1, pp 64, 54-56.

¹⁰² For more on reluctance of Right and Left to examine this subject see: Chapter 1, pp 53-54.

policy of violence.¹⁰³ There are a number of somewhat dusty works with material on the subject from the 1950s and 1960s, such as Swearingen and Langer's, *Red Flag in Japan, International Communism in Action 1919-1951*, and until very recently these formed virtually the only material available in English on the subject.¹⁰⁴ Even amongst recent studies of the Occupation and on Leftwing Koreans (who made up some of the JCP 'guerrillas'), many works contain no mention of the subject.¹⁰⁵ This paucity of relevant secondary material recently has been addressed somewhat through the work of Hasegawa and a major work by Wakita, a former participant, which bears the fitting subtitle: *Sensōshi no Kuhaku wo Umeru (Filling The Gaps in Postwar History)*.¹⁰⁶

Objective analysis of the primary sources employed when examining a subject so influenced by ideology, propaganda, rumour and speculation, both informed and otherwise, is essential. To this end the materials of the British Foreign Office form a useful counterweight to the sometimes politicised content of the Japanese and GHQ intelligence material. The changing opinions of British diplomats are also useful in illustrating the seriousness with which policymakers came to view the threat of the JCP to the Japanese state. Despite being highly sceptical at first the diplomats of the Foreign Office rapidly developed a keen interest in, and serious concerns over, the JCP after 'Bloody May Day'.¹⁰⁷ British fears grew to

¹⁰³ T. Fuwa, *Interference and Betrayal, Japanese Communist Party Fights Back against Soviet Hegemonism, Soviet Secret Documents*, Japan Press Service, Tokyo, 1994, p 474; Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, *Sixty Year History of Japanese Communist Party*, Japan Press Service, Tokyo, 1984, pp 165, 182; H.N. Kim, Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party Under Kenji Miyamoto, *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1976, p 275.

¹⁰⁴ R. Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan, International Communism in Action 1919-1951*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1952.

¹⁰⁵ J. Dower, *Embracing Defeat, Japan in The Wake of World War II*, Norton, London, 2000; E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*; D. Chapman, *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity*, Routledge, Oxford, 2008, pp 29-30.

¹⁰⁶ K. Wakita, *Chōsen Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken, Sensōshi no Kuhaku wo Umeru (The Korean War and the Suita/Hirakata Incidents, Filling The Gaps in Postwar History)*, Akashi Shoten, Tokyo, 2005.

¹⁰⁷ The threat of the JCP was initially played down but following May Day 1952 the Foreign Office became deeply concerned over the issues as can be seen in documents such as: Foreign Office File (FO) 371/92523, Comments on Ferguson to Director, Military Intelligence, 'Communist Plans for Japan', 8/5/51; FO 371/92523, J.G. Figgess, 'The Potential of the Japanese Communist Party' as at 30/9/51; FO 371/92523, 'Communist

such a level that they prompted greater co-operation and information sharing on the subject with the US.¹⁰⁸ British Attaché to Tokyo, Esler Denning, became so worried that he even viewed Yoshida as not taking the issues seriously enough, claiming that the Japanese Prime Minister was 'incapable of appreciating the reality of the communist menace' and stating that 'in our view there can be no doubt about the danger which communism constitutes in Japan or about the necessity for bringing Mr Yoshida to a more realistic frame of mind'.¹⁰⁹ That the normally mild and balanced Foreign Office assessments of the JCP had become very concerned in their tone is very useful in illustrating the seriousness with which the JCP threat was perceived at the time.

The JCP's policy of violent seizure of power in Japan constituted an interconnected two prong strategy, a 'carrot and stick' approach of a co-ordinated military and propaganda campaign. Both the military and propaganda elements of the programme were highly influenced by the theories of Mao and the recent victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The propaganda strand of the campaign attempted to appeal to the people of Japan and turn them against the state. This aim was to be achieved through a combination of Japanese nationalism, calls for land reform and through claims to support 'peace and independence' as opposed to alleged US 'imperialism'.¹¹⁰ Direct propaganda attacks were also made upon the NPR and these are dealt with separately in the following section of this chapter.

Invasion of Japan: Japan Communist Party Preparing to go Underground', 19/3/51; FO 371/99393, Denning to Eden, 'Use of Violence by the Japanese Communist Party to Attain its Ultimate Ends', 19/5/1952; FO 371/99393, Denning, 'Communist Inspired Disturbances', 3/6/52; FO 371/99393, J.A. Pilcher to De La Mare, 2/5/52.

¹⁰⁸ FO 371/99393, Steel to Eden, 24/7/52.

¹⁰⁹ FO 371/99393, Comments on Denning, 'Report on Conversation between Mr. Macdonald, The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Jiro Shirasu, Mr. Shigeru Matsumoto and Sir Esler Denning', 15/7/52.

¹¹⁰ J. Swenson-Wright, 'US-Japan Diplomatic and Security Relations Post-1945: a Historical Perspective', in M. Evangelista and J. Reppy (eds), *The United States and Asian Security*, Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 26, Ithaca, 2002, p 78. The JCP rather unrealistically condemned SCAP's land reform programme as a failure, see below.

As well as being the title of one of the JCP's principal underground newspapers, 'peace and independence' served as a slogan across much of the JCP propaganda output during this period.¹¹¹ In the literature produced by the JCP, 'peace' referred to both a rejection of 'rearmament' in the form of the NPR, and of the San Francisco peace settlement in favour of a comprehensive peace treaty including the USSR and PRC. 'Independence' was a term used to express the JCP's desire to eliminate the 'American Imperialism and Japanese reactionary forces' ranged against it and re-orientate Japan towards the communist bloc.¹¹² This centred on the overthrow of the Yoshida government, which was usually depicted as an American puppet, exploiting Japan and preparing it for war in Asia.¹¹³ Both of these terms are highly ironic in that whilst calling for 'peace' the JCP were seemingly attacking the security services, conducting sabotage and planning a full-scale guerrilla war; and were demanding 'independence' whilst clearly acting in the interests, and under the influence, of the USSR and PRC.

The JCP's propaganda also called for a united front with all 'patriotic elements'.¹¹⁴ In language and theory very closely connected to that of the CCP, the JCP argued that the creation of the 'united, national-liberation democratic front' allowed the use of members of the bourgeoisie for a time as long as they supported the JCP's goal of violent revolution.¹¹⁵ However, any realistic chance of a united front with the Socialists and others had long passed and the adoption of a policy of violence had further alienated the JCP from the mainstream of Japanese society and politics. However,

¹¹¹ FO 371/99393, Denning, 'Japan Communist Party's Violence Campaign', 3/4/52; FO 371/99393, Denning, 'Japan Communist Party's Violence Campaign', 3/4/52.

¹¹² C. Lee and G.D. Vos *et al*, *Koreans in Japan, Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation*, University of California Press, London, 1981, pp 238-239.

¹¹³ FO 371/99392, Denning to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19/1/52; *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, Bucharest, Organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties*, No. 7 (171), 15/2/52.

¹¹⁴ FO 371/99392, Denning to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19/1/52.

¹¹⁵ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, Bucharest, Organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties*, No. 7 (171), 15/2/52; J.V. Stalin, 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution' (*Pravda* no. 90, 21/4/1927), printed in, J.V. Stalin, *On The Opposition*, Foreign languages Press Peking, 1974, pp 657-659.

this form of rhetoric is interesting as it was common to almost all post-colonial Marxist movements and shows the altered position and philosophy of the JCP in this era.

Perhaps the most astute and potentially effective part of the JCP's propaganda strategy was its appeal to Japanese nationalism. Key JCP documents of this period such as the *New Programme* and *How to Raise Flower Bulbs* contained repeated use of phrases such as the 'liberation of our race', 'racial emancipation' and armed struggle serving as the 'means of solving racial and class oppositions'.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, one of the principal methods devised by the JCP to convince members of the NPR to join their cause was by heightening their ethnic consciousness.¹¹⁷ Although efforts to employ Japanese nationalism to aid the JCP ultimately failed, this aspect of the propaganda campaign aroused serious concern amongst the Japanese, British and American authorities. Officials in the British Foreign Office clearly noted that the skilful use of nationalist rhetoric over situations where the US clearly influenced Japanese policy could win support for the JCP.¹¹⁸ The concern with which this policy was viewed at the time should also not be underestimated, with Denning arguing that the policy was 'potentially extremely dangerous' and that 'the capture of Japanese nationalism by communism would be wholly unfavourable to us'.¹¹⁹

Another important part of the JCP's propaganda campaign, and one which further demonstrates the connections between the JCP and the USSR was Stalin's New Year Message of 1951. The message was delivered to

¹¹⁶ FO 371/99393, 'BBC Reports that "Nippon Times" of March 1 Carried Translation of Communist Party Pamphlet Entitled "How to Raise Flower Bulbs", 10/3/1952; *Japan Times*, 1/3/52; FO 371/99392, Waterfield, 'New Programme of the Japanese Communist Party, Analysis of Documents', 1/52; FO 371/99392, 'We Must Prepare to Arm and Initiate Action', 3/10/51; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 554.

¹¹⁷ FO 371/99392, 'We Must Prepare to Arm and Initiate Action', 3/10/51.

¹¹⁸ Yoshida to Dulles, 24/12/51, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, pp 263-264; FO 371/99392, Denning to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19/1/52.

¹¹⁹ FO 371/99392, Denning to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19/1/52. For more on the Matsukawa incident, see: Appendix I. The Shimoyama, Taira, Mitaka and Matsukawa Incidents.

the Japanese people through Kyodo news editor Iwamoto Kishii on New Year's Eve 1951. The message was unprecedented in that a Soviet leader had never before directly addressed the people of another state and the content of the message also reveals the connections between the USSR and the JCP. The rhetoric and subject matter of the message exactly matched the JCP's propaganda in attempting to harness Japanese nationalism, calling for land reform, criticising the Occupation and focusing on 'peasant landlessness'.¹²⁰ The message was also coupled with other efforts within the PRC and USSR to influence the Japanese population and generate support for the JCP. These included 'demonstrations' in China and the USSR and press articles criticising Japanese 'rearmament', the Occupation, and events such as the sentencing of the JCP members tried for the Matsukawa incident.¹²¹ Ultimately, despite a concerted effort, the Soviet attempts to assist the JCP's propaganda effort failed and most Japanese still resented Russia. This was hardly surprising with the memories of the August 1945 Soviet land grab and the thousands of 'missing' POWs still fresh in many minds. If anything, the interference by the USSR in internal Japanese affairs actually turned more people against communism, and coloured Japanese government policy towards the USSR for years.¹²²

The final central thrust of the propaganda campaign, and the one which most reveals its Maoist influence, was the position of the JCP on land reform. The JCP argued that SCAP had pursued 'pseudo agrarian reform' as a result of which 'the peasants have been reduced to a position which leads inevitably to loss of their land'.¹²³ In their literature the JCP stated that GHQ's land reform was a deception and that little had actually altered, and the peasants, still oppressed and over burdened with taxes, were

¹²⁰ Appendix VIII. 'Stalin's New Year's Message to the Japanese People, 31 December 1951'.

¹²¹ FO 371/92523, Hutchinson to Bevin, 'Information Regarding Protests Against the Sentences in the "Matsukawa Incident"', 28/2/51.

¹²² E.J. Lewe Van Aduard, *Japan from Surrender to Peace*, Praeger, New York, 1954, pp 245-247; Jain, *The USSR and Japan 1945-1980*, pp 20-28.

¹²³ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, Bucharest, Organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties*, No. 7 (171), 15/2/52.

ready for revolution. As Dore states: 'it followed that the business of the communist party was to organise the depressed lower strata of peasant communities which should prepare for violent revolutionary action and [would] take over control of the villages after the revolution'.¹²⁴ The JCP attempted to win over the peasants through claiming they supported further land redistribution although this argument was weak as virtually all the agricultural land in Japan had already changed hands under SCAP's early reforms.¹²⁵

The JCP military campaign encompassed a number of aims but central to all was the ultimate aim of overthrowing the Japanese government and seizing power. In order to achieve this goal the 'military campaign' aimed at weakening the Japanese security forces through both propaganda and direct conflict. This conflict with the security services was envisaged as taking the form of violent unrest and attempts at the creation of rural guerrilla forces. A further connected aim of the JCP in this regard was the arousal of nationalism through provoking a US response, by attacking Occupation personnel and installations. Notable examples of this include the attacks on Americans during the 'Imperial plaza incident', Bloody May Day, the attack on Itami airbase, the acid bomb attack on Brigadier General Carter Clarke and the placing of bombs under US military vehicles in Yokohama.¹²⁶

Attempts at infrastructural and industrial sabotage were another key dimension of the JCP campaign and as discussed in chapter one, this formed the most widespread incidence of JCP resistance. The sabotage attempts were aimed mainly at Japan's infrastructure and arms production facilities, key to Japan's role as a staging post and supply route for the UN

¹²⁴ R.P. Dore, *Land Reform in Japan*, Athlone, London, 1984, p 461.

¹²⁵ FO 371/99392, Denning to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19/1/52.

¹²⁶ FO 371/99393, Denning, 'Japan Communist Party's Violence Campaign', 3/4/52; *Toledo Blade*, 25/6/52; *The Age*, 25/6/52; FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52; K. Wakita, *Chōsen Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken*, p 271. For more on JCP incidents from 1951-1952 see: Appendix IX. 'Major JCP Related Incidents 1951-1952'.

forces in Korea.¹²⁷ Some sources argue that no such sabotage existed and that the damage and thefts were just 'pranks' or thefts unrelated to the JCP.¹²⁸ However, the large number of such incidents, the subsequent reversal of the opinions of many of those who had argued for this position and the JCP's previous involvement in similar events seem to undermine this theory. Whatever actually occurred the authorities clearly believed the JCP was responsible and hence these events contributed towards the perception of the JCP as a threat, whoever conducted them.¹²⁹ Furthermore, two of the most significant and well documented events in the JCP military campaign, the Hirakata and Suita incidents (see figure XXVI), both involved attacks on targets of the same type: a rail yard used for transporting war materials and a huge ammunition factory.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ FO 371/99392, Waterfield, 'New Programme of the Japanese Communist Party, Analysis of Documents', 1/52; R.H. Mitchell, *The Korean Minority in Japan*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1967, p 118; FO 371/99393, Denning, 'Japan Communist Party's Violence Campaign', 3/4/52.

¹²⁸ FO 371/92523, J.G. Figgess, 'The Potential of the Japanese Communist Party as at 30/9/51', 30/9/51.

¹²⁹ FO 371/99393, Denning, 'Japan Communist Party's Violence Campaign', 3/4/52

¹³⁰ K. Wakita, *Chōsen Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken*, p 271; FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52; Appendix IX. 'Major JCP Related Incidents 1951-1952'.

Figure XXVI. Policemen Burnt by Petrol Bombs during the Suita Incident,
25/6/52¹³¹



The JCP produced a number of ‘manuals’ on terrorist and guerrilla action during this period to both direct and encourage such activities. Perhaps the most influential of these was the innocuously titled *How to Raise Flower Bulbs*. This document, dated 23 January 1952 contained two theses entitled, *Organisation and Tactics of Nuclear Self Defence Corps*, which dealt with the practical elements of ‘nuclear self-defence units’, and, *Let the Entire Party Deliberate upon the National Organizational Council*, which provided the theoretical basis for the policy.¹³² *How to Raise Flower*

¹³¹ Picture courtesy of:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a1/Suita_Incident.jpg.

¹³² FO 371/99393, ‘BBC Reports that “Nippon Times” of March 1 Carried Translation of

Bulbs argued that the masses were the basis of the 'nuclear self-defence forces', which were to be the first units created for armed struggle. The document described the method of organising units of nine or ten JCP members in the factories, rural communities, towns and schools they were to use as bases. Two to three of these units combined to make a 'company' and two to three companies made a 'battalion'.¹³³ All of these units were to be independently organised and capable of independent action, with one leader and one political commissar. The leader was to be in overall command and the commissar co-ordinated relations with the masses and the political aspects of military action.¹³⁴ As well as again showing the Maoist influence on the JCP's military campaign, this dual structure also reflected the combined politico-military strategy of the JCP in this period. These nuclear self-defence units, alongside radical Leftwing Koreans and members of the JCP's 'Youth Action Corps' took part in action against the Japanese and American security forces in a series of violent riots and attacks on installations and individuals.¹³⁵

A detailed description of all the events of this period is beyond the scope of this study but the key incidents are detailed in Appendix IX 'Major JCP Related Incidents 1951-1952'.¹³⁶ These events consisted of riots ranging from minor skirmishes to major battles between thousands of police and JCP supporters, such as Bloody May Day. Attacks on the civil police also took place ranging from minor assaults, to mass attacks on police boxes and planned assassinations of senior officers.¹³⁷ The principal weapons

Communist Party Pamphlet Entitled "How to Raise Flower Bulbs", 10/3/1952; *Japan Times*, 1/3/52.

¹³³ Andrew makes an interesting point in claiming that such military terminology was a propaganda move aimed at convincing the Northern Irish Catholic community in the 1970s that the Provisional IRA was an Army of liberation fighting on their behalf. Andrew, *The Defence of The Realm, The Authorized History of MI5*, Allen Lane, London, 2009, p 618.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ P. F. Langer, 'Communism in Independent Japan' in H. Borton (ed), *Japan Between East and West*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1957, p 48; S. Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan, Language, Ideology and Identity*, Westview, Boulder, 1997, p 89; Public Security Investigation Agency, *Current Phases of The Activities of Korean Residents in Japan*, Public Security Investigation Agency, Tokyo, 1957, p 3.

¹³⁶ See Appendix IX. 'Major JCP Related Incidents 1951-1952'.

¹³⁷ Judgments of the Supreme Court, Judgment on the Significance of Hearsay Statements, 17/10/1963, available at:

used by the JCP during this period were clubs, bamboo spears, acid or 'lemonade' bombs, and the ubiquitous Molotov cocktail, which christened the period in Japanese consciousness as 'the era of the Molotov cocktail'.¹³⁸ Lee admirably sums up the violence of this period as follows: the JCP undertook mostly 'hit-and-run terrorist attacks, not only throwing fire bombs at police stations but sabotaging factories and American military bases'.¹³⁹

The JCP campaign also sought to create guerrilla forces and 'liberated areas' again on a Maoist model.¹⁴⁰ The documented attempts at this occurred mostly in the Kanto mountain villages of Ogouchi, Kori, Hikawa, Ongata, situated to the west of Tokyo, although other attempts at the creation of 'liberated areas' allegedly occurred in Yamagata, Niigata and Hokkaido.¹⁴¹ Following a Maoist guerrilla approach, the JCP first dispatched *Sanson Kōsakutai* ('mountain village mobilisation corps') to the areas to attempt to win over the local population to the JCP cause through political 'education' and cultural activities (see figure XXVII).¹⁴² These units later developed into guerrilla forces although the transformation was largely a name change as the personnel altered little.¹⁴³ Police raids and the inability of the guerrillas to convince the locals to support their cause resulted in the failure of this policy but isolated units maintained their squalid 'mountain bases' until 1955 when the JCP finally abandoned its policy of violent revolution.¹⁴⁴

www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1963.10.17-1960-A-.No.1378.html.

¹³⁸ R.H. Mitchell, *The Korean Minority in Japan*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1967, p 120; Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan*, p 89; Lee and Vos, *Koreans in Japan*, pp 238-239; P.J. Katzenstein and Y. Tsujinaka, *Defending the Japanese State, Structures, Norms and the Political Responses to Terrorism and Violent Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s*, Cornell East Asia Series, Ithaca, 1991, p 9.

¹³⁹ Lee and Vos, *Koreans in Japan*, pp 238-239.

¹⁴⁰ Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 2000, p 107.

¹⁴¹ FO 371/92523, Japanese Communist Party, "Spring Revolution", 5/3/51; K. Hasegawa, 'Student Soldiers', p 50.

¹⁴² Hasegawa, 'Student Soldiers', p 43.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, p 49.

¹⁴⁴ FO 371/99393, Denning, 'Japan Communist Party's Violence Campaign', 3/4/52; FO 371/99393, Denning to Eden, 'Use of Violence by the Japanese Communist Party to Attain its Ultimate Ends', 19/5/1952; K. Hasegawa, 'Student Soldiers, The Japanese Communist Party's "Period of Extreme Leftist Adventurism"', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, p 50.

Figure XXVII. Arrest of a *Sanson Kōsakutai* Member¹⁴⁵



Alongside the indirect and theoretical influence of Chinese communist thought and documents such as the Stalin letter on the JCP, there is evidence which points towards a more direct Soviet role in the guerrilla campaign.¹⁴⁶ One of the most obvious of these is Cominform directive, No 172, which was intercepted by GHQ, and is quoted by Masumi and Takemae. This Soviet authored policy document contains a list of objectives and tasks for the JCP military campaign. The aims of sabotaging Japan's infrastructure, preventing the shipment of military supplies to Korea, the assassination of 'reactionary individuals' and the desire to overthrow the Japanese government were all common to JCP policy, but the extent to which the document was a series of suggestions or a list of orders is hard to ascertain although as the document is a 'directive', the latter seems more likely.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the evidence that the Soviets were bankrolling at least some of the espionage activities of the JCP in this period became clear following the defection of the Yuri

¹⁴⁵ Picture courtesy of:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/Arrest_of_JCP_member.JPG.

¹⁴⁶ YF-A16, 2B-103, Discussion between Mr Honda and Assistant Secretary Rusk regarding recent developments in Japan, 19/9/50.

¹⁴⁷ E. Takemae, *Sengo Rōdō Kaikaku, GHQ Rōdō Seisakushi (Postwar Labor Reform in Japan, History of GHQ Labor Policy)*, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, Tokyo, 1995, pp 368-369, 386; J. Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1985, p 288, note 81.

Rastarov in January 1954.¹⁴⁸ Rastarov, a KGB officer working out of the Soviet embassy in Tokyo revealed that the Soviet Union had given the JCP almost half a million dollars between 1952 and 1953, some of which was almost certainly intended to fund espionage activities against the US forces in Japan.¹⁴⁹

During the JCP military campaign significant amounts of activity occurred in Hokkaido. Rumour circulated of Soviet and North Korean agents operating on the island, alongside reports that the USSR was planning to occupy the island.¹⁵⁰ Press reports and intelligence material also appeared alleging that plans had been developed by the JCP and USSR for the establishment of the 'Northern Japanese People's Republic' after the seizure of Hokkaido by a JCP uprising and/or Soviet intervention.¹⁵¹ The validity of these reports is difficult to judge and they may have been produced to aid the JCP propaganda effort and indirectly encourage the JCP guerrillas.¹⁵² However, the presence of large numbers of Soviet military units in the region, repeated over-flights of Hokkaido by Soviet aircraft, frequent Soviet military exercises and spotlight sweeps of the Japanese coast and the numerous seizures of Japanese fishing craft reveal the tension around this frontier.¹⁵³ The island also hosted some of the best equipped and most radical JCP 'guerrilla' units. A police raid on JCP headquarters in Sapporo uncovered a detailed intelligence operation being conducted by JCP members targeting US units in Hokkaido, including reports on their strengths, organisation, morale and

¹⁴⁸ J. Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, pp 163-164.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p 295 note 65.

¹⁵⁰ *Sangyo Keizai Shinbun*, 14/9/51; FO 371/92523, Japanese Communist Party, "Spring Revolution", 5/3/51; FO 371/92523, Ferguson to Director, Military Intelligence, 'Special Intelligence Report No. 381, Hostile Intentions Towards Japan', 28/2/51; FO 371/92523, Ferguson to Director, Military Intelligence, 'Communist Plans for Japan', 8/5/51.

¹⁵¹ FO 371/92523, 'Secret Soviet Agency Alleged to be Operating at Monbetsu, Hokkaido', 26/9/51; *Sangyo Keizai Shinbun*, 14/9/51.

¹⁵² FO 371/92523, Comments on Ferguson to Director, Military Intelligence, 'Communist Plans for Japan', 8/5/51.

¹⁵³ *New York Times*, 1/3/51, 5/12/51, 9/10/52; *Hokkai Times*, 12/10/51, 31/8/51; *Hokkaido Shinbun*, 12/7/51, 15/10/51, *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 4/10/51; *Hokkai Nichi Nichi Shinbun*, 4/8/51.

equipment.¹⁵⁴ Another JCP guerrilla unit, armed with pistols and in possession of sophisticated explosive devices, assassinated police chief Shiratori Kazuo, head of the Security Division of Sapporo City Police, on 21 January 1952.¹⁵⁵

In the face of these serious, although ultimately unsuccessful, attempts at violent revolution in Japan, why the NPR was not deployed remains a key question. Although the force certainly would have been used if the JCP guerrilla campaign or public unrest had escalated beyond the control of the civil police, the use of the NPR against minor riots and demonstrations was politically risky and the Japanese authorities proved reluctant to do so. The principal reason behind this reluctance was that any use of the force against demonstrators or unarmed civilians would have played into the hands of the JCP. The sight of a constabulary roaming the streets or breaking up demonstrations would have been a perfect piece of propaganda that the JCP and communist powers could have used to back up their accusations of renewed Japanese militarism and a return to the days of a Japanese police state. The international impact of this could possibly have made the conclusion of a peace treaty much more difficult.¹⁵⁶ This in turn could have further strengthened the position of the JCP amongst a people weary after more than six years of occupation. Weinstein also notes that the use of the NPR to settle a domestic crisis during this period was risky and, if badly mishandled, could have caused an insurrection itself. He also states that the use of the NPR/SDF against mass demonstrations could also have been seen as an open admission of the loss of authority by the government, who would have been viewed as reliant on paramilitary forces to stay in power.¹⁵⁷ A further interesting point to note on this issue is the possibly fatal public relations blow the NPR

¹⁵⁴ FO 371/92523, J.G. Figgess, 'The Potential of the Japanese Communist Party as at 30/9/51', 30/9/51.

¹⁵⁵ Judgements of the Supreme Court, Judgement on the Significance of Hearsay Statements, 17/10/1963, available at www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1963.10.17-1960-A-.No.1378.html.

¹⁵⁶ FO 371/99393, Denning to Eden, 'Use of Violence by the Japanese Communist Party to Attain its Ultimate Ends', 19/5/1952.

¹⁵⁷ M.E. Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', in J.H. Buck (ed), *The Modern Japanese Military System*, Sage, London, 1975, p 51.

could have been dealt if it had been used against demonstrators, especially if high numbers of casualties had resulted, as Brendle claims when describing the GSDF:

The GSDF engages in public security training with far more conviction [than external security training], yet the reservation of the government to commit SDF troops to riot control duty is well known . . . The government has expended too much public relations effort on behalf of the SDF to jeopardise public support by committing the SDF against fellow countrymen.¹⁵⁸

The final and perhaps most obvious reason why the NPR was not used was that the activities of the JCP never reached a scale and seriousness which would have justified its use. If the Korean War had continued or expanded, or if the communist powers had extended further support to the JCP in the form of more arms, the situation might have proved different, but ultimately the NPR was never actually used for its original purpose. Clearly, the NPR and its successors, the NSF and GSDF, were the last line of defence against domestic threats to the government, whose possibly risky deployment against public demonstrations could only be considered as a last resort. However, despite these risks, use of the NPR was preferred over the intervention of US troops, which presented greater political risks and also infringed upon Japanese sovereignty.¹⁵⁹ It could also be argued, as it is by Maeda, that the restraint exercised during the protests of this era prevented Japan turning to the Right and further radicalising its student and labour activists, as was the case in South Korea.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ T.M. Brendle, 'Recruitment and Training in the SDF', in Buck, *The Modern Japanese Military System*, pp 94-95.

¹⁵⁹ For more on internal security and sovereignty see: Chapter 1, pp 74-92; Chapter 3, p 192-203.

¹⁶⁰ T. Igarashi, *Nichibei Kankei to Higashi Ajia: Rekishiteki Bunyaku to Mirai no Kōsō (US-Japanese Relations and East Asia: Historical Context and Future Conceptions)*, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, Tokyo, 1999, p 166.

Building on the arguments presented here, the following case study examines the factors behind the non-use of the NPR during the 'Bloody May Day' crisis of 1952. 'Bloody May Day' was certainly the largest violent incident of the JCP military campaign and could be said to be the high-watermark of the communists' attempt at violent revolution in Japan. The traditional labour demonstrations and marches of May Day fell just three days after the restoration of full sovereignty to Japan, following the formal end of the Occupation. The event drew huge crowds, numbering around 400,000, mostly in celebration of the return of Japan's independence.¹⁶¹ However, during the day around 6,000 radical protesters forced their way into the 'People's Plaza', an area in front of the Imperial palace formerly known as the Imperial plaza. The invasion and occupation of this area was a highly symbolic defiance of Imperial authority, the old order and GHQ, which, in concert with the Japanese government, had barred the demonstrators from using the area. The demonstration exploded into a pitched battle between the Tokyo Metropolitan Police (MPD) and the protestors (see figures XXIX and XXX). American cars and symbols of the US were destroyed in direct defiance of the US.¹⁶² Egged on and led by JCP 'military units' and armed with clubs, bamboo spears and petrol bombs, the crowd put the police under such pressure that they had to resort to tear gas and then firing their pistols into the crowds to break up the demonstration.¹⁶³ During the fighting the MPD killed two protestors, shot twenty-two more and arrested over one thousand people, including large numbers of JCP members. Around 2,300 people, including 800 of the 5,000 police present, were also injured in what seemed a very inauspicious birth of post-Occupation Japan.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 494-495; K. Hasegawa, 'Experiencing the 1952 Bloody May Day Incident', *Journal of the International Student Center*, Yokohama National University, No. 11, March 2004, p 97.

¹⁶² FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52.

¹⁶³ FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52; FO 371/99393, Denning to Eden, 'Use of Violence by the Japanese Communist Party to Attain its Ultimate Ends', 19/5/1952; K. Hasegawa, 'Experiencing the 1952 Bloody May Day Incident', pp 98,104.

¹⁶⁴ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp 554-555.

Figure XXIX. Police Being Beaten by Demonstrators during Bloody May Day¹⁶⁵



The Japanese government viewed the incident as a 'terroristic case', clearly pointing the finger at the JCP.¹⁶⁶ The obvious difficulty the MPD had in controlling the crowd, and the lack of direct control he had over the force even during such a major crisis was noted by a nervous Prime Minister Yoshida.¹⁶⁷ The Prime Minister did however have the NPR at his disposal, and the force was on alert, prepared, and waiting for orders to go into action until 2 am of 2 May.¹⁶⁸ The principal reason why the NPR was not used in this case was that the MPD ultimately contained the violence, despite having to use their firearms. However, the highly symbolic nature of the occasion and the location, and possible consequences of the use of the NPR must have also played a role in Yoshida's decision not to commit

¹⁶⁵ Picture courtesy of:

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bloody_May_Day_Incident2.JPG.

¹⁶⁶ Public Security Investigation Agency, *Current Phases*, p 3.

¹⁶⁷ S. Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, Rowan and Littlefield, Plymouth, 2007, p 145. For more on Yoshida's concerns about the weakness of the police and their separation from central government see: Appendix IV. 'The Weakness of the Japanese Civil Police in Occupied Japan'.

¹⁶⁸ YF-A16, 1F-139, Conference (Kowalski and Hayashi), 2/5/52.

the force. The possibly bloody results of the use of a constabulary force in defence of the Imperial palace and old order as soon as Japan began to run its own affairs would have again provided perfect propaganda for the JCP. Also, as noted above, the international ramifications and implications for Japan's attempts to return to full membership of the international community could have been dealt a serious blow. The reluctance to commit his 'final reserve' to the fighting could also have been a concern of Yoshida who may have feared the outbreak of violence elsewhere or the JCP seizing the opportunity of distracted police force to mount more serious attacks or acts of sabotage.

Figure XXX. The MPD in Action during Bloody May Day¹⁶⁹



The boon that the JCP could have won from the use of the NPR on Bloody May Day can be seen through the support some parts of the socialist movement offered to the JCP in their subsequent (but ultimately unsuccessful) legal battle against the state in defence of the protesters'

¹⁶⁹ Note the use of steel helmets. Picture courtesy of:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bloody_May_Day_Incident3.JPG.

rights to freedom of assembly.¹⁷⁰ If the NPR had been used and more deaths had resulted, it is possible that many in the Left wing of the Socialist party could have been radicalised and a united front of the kind pursued by the JCP in the early Occupation could have been a possibility.¹⁷¹ These factors clearly show that the use of the NPR against demonstrations, as opposed to guerrillas or rebels, had the possibility of resulting in a major negative public relations impact. Alongside the fact that the JCP military campaign never reached a level of intensity or public support which triggered mass protest or guerrilla war, this potential impact helps to explain why the NPR were never used in their original role. The role of the GSDF in the 1960 security treaty (ANPO) crisis is another interesting and very similar example relating to the reluctance of the Japanese government to employ its security services against mass demonstrations. Although it is beyond the scope of a work examining the NPR, a brief comparison is made in Appendix X. 'The SDF and the 1960 ANPO Crisis'.¹⁷²

The JCP and the NPR

Further significant and unexplored aspects of the history of the NPR are the relations between the JCP and NPR, and the attempts by the JCP to infiltrate the force. Initially, after the creation of the National Police Reserve, the organisation was praised by the JCP as a tool the people could use to throw off their 'class enemies' and the JCP undertook an organised campaign of infiltration in order to achieve this.¹⁷³ The JCP employed secret and associate members to join the NPR and seek to win control over elements of it and ultimately turn the force against the

¹⁷⁰ E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 494-495; Hasegawa, 'Experiencing the 1952 Bloody May Day Incident', pp 97-110.

¹⁷¹ H. Oinas-Kukkonen, *Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, Changing U.S. Attitudes towards the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944-1947*, Greenwood Press, London, 2003, pp 48-51.

¹⁷² Appendix X. 'The SDF and the 1960 ANPO Crisis'.

¹⁷³ FO 371/99392, Waterfield, 'New Programme of the Japanese Communist Party, Analysis of Documents', 1/52.

state.¹⁷⁴ This aim is clearly voiced in the JCP policy document *We Must Prepare to Arm and Initiate Action*:

Particularly in the National Police Reserves, it is necessary to have them surrender, rebel, in order to have the entire body, excluding a small number of traitorous leaders, to come over to our side at a critical point . . . in addition to fomenting daily insubordination within their ranks. In order to attain this, we must preserve the organization and must enforce systematic guidance over the organisation.¹⁷⁵

A secret pamphlet detailing the JCP's instructions for those about to infiltrate the NPR entitled *The Police Reservists' Struggle*, was delivered to each of the regional committees under the name of the central chairman, and somehow found its way to the *Yomiuri Shinbun* which reprinted it in full. Its contents were as follows:

1. Obey orders in training and try to win positions of leadership.
2. Inform us of the name of your base, its strength, equipment and other details
3. Immediate mission:
 - a. No direct action, but seek out complaints and disaffection.
 - b. Instigate complaints and disaffection.
 - c. Try to ferment confrontation between officers and men. Try to involve the majority. Translate in action after grasping situation.
 - d. Get close to the Municipal Police and National Rural Police.
4. Reservists who were former officers and university graduates will be the future leaders so get close to them.

¹⁷⁴ TS 301, 'Tokyo Report No. 144', 21/7/50; TS 301, 'Tokyo Report No. 156', 5/8/50.
¹⁷⁵ FO 371/99392, 'We Must Prepare to Arm and Initiate Action', 3/10/51.

To Each Party Organ: Present Mission

- a. Inform regional committees of all information gained from infiltrators.
 - b. List all incoming NPR recruits in your area and appoint a leader amongst them from party members in their midst.
 - c. All business/liaison/reports/instructions are to be verbal.
 - d. Avoid liaison etc in JCP offices, meet on the street or outside.
 - e. Form an NPR resistance committee in each prefecture and appoint its leader.
 - f. Instruct and lead the infiltrators actively and often.
 - g. Investigate thoroughly the strength, staff, attitudes and equipment of the NPR.
 - h. Work actively outside and covertly inside the NPR.
5. Precautions: The government is planning to make the NPR the cornerstone of its suppression of the JCP and is very watchful against the saturation of our influences. The plan must be framed very carefully as this struggle will extend over a long period of time.¹⁷⁶

This document shows the espionage style practices which were used by the JCP in its attempts to infiltrate the NPR and reveals the intelligence gathering and subversive role which was to be played by the infiltrators. The fact that the piece appeared in the politically conservative *Yomiuri Shinbun* could be used to question its reliability but the later appearance of accurate copies of other key JCP underground literature in the press, such as the guerrilla manual *How to Raise Flower Bulbs*, seems to show that Japanese journalists had contacts within either, or both, the Japanese police and the JCP.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, the contents of this document were

¹⁷⁶ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 14/12/1950.

¹⁷⁷ FO 371/99393, 'BBC Reports that "Nippon Times" of March 1 carried translation of Communist Party Pamphlet innocently entitled "How to Raise Flower Bulbs"', 10/3/1952; *Nippon Times*, 1/3/1952; K. Wakita, *Chōsen Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken*, pp 97, 798-815.

substantiated by JCP documents seized during Japanese police raids which contained directions to prefectural committees of the JCP to ensure infiltration of JCP members or sympathisers into units being recruited in their local area.¹⁷⁸ G2 subsequently uncovered that almost seven hundred JCP members had tried to join the force, with some applying in different localities several times.¹⁷⁹ The prefectural committees apparently selected ideologically committed secret members or sympathisers to join the force and principally focused on former soldiers from rural areas, the group they correctly assumed would make up the bulk on the NPR's personnel.¹⁸⁰ Those selected were also allegedly made to swear an oath of loyalty to the JCP before entry to the NPR. Aside from these covert JCP recruits, many known communists also applied to join, possibly to distract attention away from the secret members. Even some notable party members such as the JCP Tokushima Regional Committee Chairman applied to join.¹⁸¹

This process had an ominous precedent in the Korean constabulary (KC). In the late 1940s, due to its confrontation and direct competition with the Korea National Police (KNP), the KC received no co-operation from the KNP in vetting its recruits and was so effectively and deeply infiltrated by communists that entire regiments mutinied, killed their officers and seized cities or became guerrillas.¹⁸² Unwilling to repeat these errors, and again indicative of the close connections between the National Rural Police and NPR, GHQ involved the Japanese National Rural Police heavily from the start, investigating the backgrounds of all the NPR recruits.¹⁸³ That the screening process was designed to remove communists from the force was never in doubt, with Attorney General Ohashi announcing it to the

¹⁷⁸ G2 4777, Pulliam to Willoughby, 'National Police Reserve', 20/11/50.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ For more on the rural backgrounds of many in the force, see: Chapter 3, pp 156-157.


¹⁸¹ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 14/12/1950.

¹⁸² A.R. Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945-1950', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.23, No.4, 1997, p 552; B. Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume Two*, pp 259-267. For more on the KC see: Chapter 2, pp 125-138.

¹⁸³ G2 4217-4220. 'Background Investigations', Various dates; CAS(A) 3302, Director of Tokyo District Police School to Chief Commander of Camp Schemmelfennig, 26/10/50.

Diet on 11 August.¹⁸⁴ The focus on the JCP was confirmed when an official report described the screening process as ‘designed to eliminate individuals with communistic, disreputable, criminal or subversive backgrounds’.¹⁸⁵ As a result of the National Rural Police’s background investigations hundreds of the most obvious JCP applicants were rejected during the selection process, but at least one hundred made it through and were recruited into the NPR. However, most of these were also subsequently detected (see figures XXXI and XXXII below) and dismissed from the force.

Figure XXXI. NPR Dismissals, 1950-1952¹⁸⁶



It is interesting to note that in the official 1955 US Army history of the NPR the dismissal statistics in the first months of the NPR, when most of the recruitment and the JCP infiltration campaign took place, are omitted (see figure XXXI). This period up 15 October 1950 saw the largest numbers of


¹⁸⁴ *Nippon Times*, 13/8/50.

¹⁸⁵ CAS(A) 3303, Chief Oichibu Police Station Chief Commander of Saitama District Police, 26/10/50; YF-A16, 1B-48, ‘Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve’, 22/12/51, p 3.

¹⁸⁶ Based on data found in G2 4217-4220. ‘Background Investigations’, various dates; and *History of the National Police Reserve of Japan*, Appendix II, Fig. XI, Fig. XII, Fig. XIII.

communists being caught and expelled, a number which exceeded all other dismissals of any kind at the time (see figure XXXII). The omission of this period from the US statistics may have been due to the reluctance of the US Army to acknowledge their failings in this regard or an unwillingness to link their history of the NPR to the internal security of Japan at a time when they were still campaigning for the Self Defence Forces (SDF) to undertake a greater external security role.¹⁸⁷

Figure XXXII. NPR Dismissals, 30/8/50 - 14/10/50¹⁸⁸




The JCP's attempts to influence the NPR also included a propaganda offensive. Originally this consisted of attempts to win over members of the Police Reserve and foment dissent in its ranks. Later once this effort and the attempts at infiltration had failed, it returned to the standard JCP propaganda of the era, direct and increasingly radical statements condemning the NPR as enemies of the people and pawns of the 'fascist' regime and American Imperialism.¹⁸⁹ Figure XXXIII represents a good example of this kind of illegal directly critical propaganda.

¹⁸⁷ *History of the National Police Reserve of Japan*, Appendix II, Figures XI, XII and XIII.

¹⁸⁸ Based on data found in G2 4217-4220. 'Background Investigations', 8-10/50.

¹⁸⁹ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, Bucharest, Organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties*, No. 7 (171), 15/2/52.

Figure XXXIII. Illegal JCP Propaganda Hand Bill, Summer 1950¹⁹⁰



Caption: NPR Recruitment: Yoshida: 'You've been in the grave for quite a while. Welcome back!'

The JCP propaganda campaign lost little time once the creation of the NPR was made public, with reports of communist demonstrations and agitation speeches even given in NPR recruiting halls. The main method used to attempt to influence members of the NPR by the JCP was through pamphlets and propaganda handbills. Most of these were locally produced and distributed as swiftly and discreetly as possible. This was due to the restrictions on communist publications resulting from the 'Red Purge' and the fact that the often radical and anti-American slant of much of the propaganda would usually result in a prison sentence for anyone caught distributing it.¹⁹¹ Although most of those distributing the material were JCP

¹⁹⁰ Government Section (GS) (B) 3966, 'Communist Anti NPR Propaganda', undated. This illegal hand bill depicts a corpulent Yoshida, overseen by MacArthur warmly welcoming back the decrepit, emaciated spectres of Japan's military into the NPR. A crude and direct attack by the JCP on the government and Occupation typical of many of the illegal pieces of JCP propaganda produced after the suspension of *Akahata*.

¹⁹¹ FO 371/99392, 'We Must Prepare to Arm and Initiate Action', 3/10/51.

cell members operating near the bases of the Police Reserve, some of the JCP members within the NPR also used their position inside the organisation to distribute communist propaganda.¹⁹² This distribution of JCP material was not limited just to the rank and file of the NPR as even a platoon commander of 17th Company in Camp Bofu, was caught spreading communist ideology and pamphlets amongst his men.¹⁹³ As this open distribution of JCP material often resulted in detection and dismissal it is curious why the JCP members adopted the tactic and may indicate the difficulty they had in winning converts to their cause.

Examples of early propaganda aimed at winning over members of the NPR are numerous in number but quite similar in content, with much of it attempting to show recruits that their 'fundamental human rights' were being ignored.¹⁹⁴ The following leaflet was given to NPR members in Sapporo on 17 September 1950 and later a copy was handed over to the National Rural Police:

1. The following is a question and answer given to us from your colleagues.

The person interviewed is from 'Y' prefecture:

1. Q: Would you tell us about your daily life?
A: The life is not like the reports in the newspapers. If I were you I wouldn't enlist.
2. Q: How is the clothing and food situation?
A: These are the only clothes I have and I am not getting my pay until the end of this month. The food is not good either.
3. Q: How is the training?
A: We have gotten as far as handling the rifle.

¹⁹² *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 147.

¹⁹³ G2 4743, Desonier to PSD, 'Communist Infiltration of National Police Reserve', 14/11/50.

¹⁹⁴ FO 371/99392, 'We Must Prepare to Arm and Initiate Action', 3/10/51.

4. Q: Do you think you will get your retirement allowance?

A: Certainly! If not, there will be a riot throughout the country.

5. Q: Do you think they will send you to Korea?

A: No. if they do, about half of the personnel will resign.

2. It was still raining and the figure of the personnel appeared forlorn and helpless as he walked back to the barracks.
3. Those who are intending to enlist, consider the above words, and those who are already enlisted, demand better food and training conditions.

September 1950

Signed

JCP Sapporo Committee. [sic]¹⁹⁵

As can be seen above, much of the content of this document was not far from the truth and tied in with JCP efforts to stir up discontent within the NPR over issues close to the men's hearts, such as food and pay. Indeed, the emphasis on the difficulties in supplying clothing, the uncertainties over pay and especially the bonus which had attracted many recruits, and the inadequate supply of food all seem uncannily well targeted and indicates the successful infiltration of some JCP members into the force. These themes and the idea of the dispatch of the NPR to Korea are repeated in the following handbill, again passed secretly to members of the NPR, who then surrendered it to the Japanese police:

Follow members of the National Police Reserve:

¹⁹⁵ G2 3876, Mulbar, Memorandum for Record, 'Communist Party Putting Out Printed Material Concerning the NPR', Reported by Tokyo NRP Guard Section (Nagata), 21/9/1950.

Demand that they pay you immediately
Make a request for better food
You're not slaves
Make a request for another uniform
Tell them you don't want to go to Korea
Defy them and tell them emphatically that you don't want to kill
people

Even now the treatment is bad - - - you haven't been paid
Do you think they'll give you 60,000 for retirement?
Your officials and Prime Minister Yoshida are treating you just like
the former Japanese soldier
Yoshida and the capitalists of Japan and America are trying to send
you all to Korea by saying "you're going to protect Japan from
invasion by communism"

They want to make cannon fodder out of you
They're trying to start another war
We don't want war again
Demand your rights
Let's not repeat war again

Slogan:

1. We won't go to Korea
2. No war!
3. Give us plenty food!
4. Give us our salary immediately' [sic].¹⁹⁶

The Korean theme is particularly significant in this document but despite playing on some NPR members' fears, the ideas expressed ignore the domestic and international political impossibility of dispatching Japanese security forces to Korea.

¹⁹⁶ G2 4193, 'Leaflet Number 2', 1950.

With the limited success of the JCP's attempts to directly turn the NPR against the Japanese state and the American Occupation, the propaganda campaign shifted tack, and audience, focussing more on direct criticism of the NPR as pawns of the Japanese elite and on their poor conditions of service (see figure XXXIII). It seems the biggest success of the JCP propaganda campaigns against the NPR was in serving to demoralise many of the NPR members to the point of resigning from the force. Although the men (other than the officers and sergeants) did not have to give a reason when they resigned and were unlikely to cite JCP propaganda if they did, the US Army official history seems justified in claiming that: 'communist propaganda no doubt influenced many police reservists to resign, though it is impossible to determine how many'.¹⁹⁷ When considering this point it is interesting to mention that the biggest number of NPR men resigned from late November 1950 to early April 1951.¹⁹⁸ This period saw the Chinese volunteers enter the conflict in Korea and many from MacArthur downwards feared defeat or an expansion of the war, which could have resulted in the deployment of the NPR to help maintain the internal security of Japan or, at worst, temporarily in support of the US in guaranteeing its external security.¹⁹⁹ This period also saw a simultaneous intensification of the JCP propaganda campaign, with much of the material justifying the Chinese intervention against 'American Imperialism' and its 'puppet', the NPR.

Other than the propaganda and infiltration campaigns of the JCP, the NPR was involved in several other incidents connected to the JCP policy of armed struggle. The campaign of rail and infrastructure sabotage conducted by the JCP also extended to NPR bases.²⁰⁰ A well documented

¹⁹⁷ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 147.

¹⁹⁸ Around 7,000 men left the force over this period, *ibid*, p148, Figure X.

¹⁹⁹ D. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, Heinemann, London, 1965, p 379; W. Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964*, Arrow Books, London, 1979, p 564; JCS 9935, JCS to MacArthur 30/12/50; MacArthur to JCS, 30/12/50, printed in, D. Acheson, *Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department*, Norton, London, 1987, p 775. For more on the unlikely use of the NPR for external security duties see: Chapter 3, pp 174-204.

²⁰⁰ For more on the JCP sabotage campaign, see Chapter 1, pp 68-72.

example of this occurred at a NPR base at Funaoka in Miyagi, northern Honshu. The base, which contained a power station as well as a battalion of the NPR, was the victim of sabotage, with the power lines leading out of the base to a nearby water pumping station being severed and having multiple sections removed.²⁰¹ No one was caught but the small quantity of wire removed and the risk involved makes it unlikely the sabotage was undertaken for financial motives.

A further, more serious incident involving two NPR members occurred in Ichikawa in late November 1950. Whilst having dinner in a small restaurant two off duty NPR men plotted to kill General MacArthur with one apparently claiming “I came into the Police Reserve in order to kill one or two American soldiers. I would like to kill MacArthur first”. The men were swiftly arrested and jailed and during the subsequent investigation the influence of JCP propaganda and lingering nationalism is notable in the list of grievances the men had mentioned. These included a belief that America was using Japan to make war on communism, complaints about pay, their commanders (the men considered it a slight to their national pride that they were being advised by Americans) and the death of one man’s brother during the Pacific War at the hands of the Americans.²⁰²

Disaster Relief

The final major operational use of the NPR and the one for which its successor, the GSDF is most frequently used and known for, was disaster relief. In a country as afflicted by natural disasters as Japan it seems logical that a force such as the NPR would be highly useful in disaster recovery and that plans would have been drawn up at the creation of the force for its possible use in such a role. A Department of the Army memo

²⁰¹ CAS(A) 1824, Commander Miyagi prefectural NRP to Chief, LS Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, ‘Break in Power Lines for Occupation Forces Installation’, 28/12/1950.

²⁰² CAS(A) 1825, Toole to Chief CAS(A), ‘Arrest of NPR Members’, 16/12/1950; *ibid*, ‘Han Statement’, 27/11/50; *Stars and Stripes*, 14/12/1950.

to MacArthur about the implementation of NSC 13/2 in early October 1948 actually alluded to this role for a future constabulary in suggesting the 'creation of adequate mobile national police reserves for handling disaster and civil violence'.²⁰³ However, no detailed planning was drawn up in mid-1950 for the use of the NPR in a disaster relief role and this responsibility evolved and grew over time. Initially individual NPR bases and installations developed their own disaster plans which mainly dealt with how the base would deal with damage to itself, with efforts to assist the civilian population outside the base being a secondary concern. A good example of this type of plan is the Camp Schimmelpfennig disaster plan produced in October 1950.²⁰⁴ The plan envisaged the designation of the camp dispensary as the central distribution centre for medical relief, the dispatch of around a quarter of the garrison to the surrounding area to act as fire fighters, and a further tenth for search, rescue and medical duties. The document also contained plans for the supply by the NPR of emergency shelter, food, water, power and transportation to the local population if the normal civilian provision failed.²⁰⁵

The NPR was first used for disaster relief temporarily and on an informal basis in September and August 1951 in Fukuchiyama and Zentsuji, but the first formal use of the NPR occurred in the wake of typhoon Ruth which struck Japan on 14-15 October 1951. Most of the damage caused occurred in Yamaguchi prefecture with 943 killed and 3,400 buildings destroyed. At sea twelve ships were lost and the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney, sailing near Sasebo naval base, suffered serious damage.²⁰⁶ Between 20-21 October the NPR was officially deployed for the first time

²⁰³ Telegram, CSAD to CINFE, 23/11/48, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen (The Financial History Section of the Ministry of Finance), *Showa Zaiseishi, Sensō Kara Kōwa Made (The Financial History of Shōwa, From War to Peace)*, Vol. 20, Tokyo Keizai Shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1982, p 231.

²⁰⁴ CAS(A) 3305, 'Operations Plan Number 1, Disaster Plan', 17/10/50.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Henshūinkai (Editorial Committee), *Jietai Jūnenshi (A Ten Year History of The Self Defence Forces)*, Bōeichō (Defence Agency), Tokyo, 1961, p 355; Asagumo Shinbun Henshukyokoku, *The History of the JGSDF*, p 17.

on a rescue and relief operation to Kita Kawachi village, Yamaguchi prefecture (see table XVII).²⁰⁷

Table XVII. Use of the NPR/NSF/SDF in Disaster Relief Operations 1950-1955²⁰⁸

Fiscal Year	Fire		Flood		Other		Total	
	Incidents	Men Deployed	Incidents	Men Deployed	Incidents	Men Deployed	Incidents	Men Deployed
1950	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1951	0	0	1	2,700	0	0	1	2,700
1952	6	3,298	2	710	1	2,250	9	6,258
1953	27	5,824	27	283,768	5	3,699	59	293,291
1954	34	5,705	44	21,261	10	31,325	88	58,291
1955	54	4,267	15	13,741	10	9,089	79	27,097

The NPR was employed again soon after assisting in the rescue operation during a hospital fire at Kushiro, Hokkaido.²⁰⁹ Due to these deployments the rules over use of the NPR in natural disasters were examined extensively. On 3 March 1952, standard guidelines for deployment for disaster relief were released. These guidelines were tested six weeks later when the NPR was again deployed in fighting the Tottori city fire. Coincidentally the Chief of Staff of the NPR Hayashi Keizo was in the area at the time, on a tour of the third NPR region (Kansai, Chugoku and Shikoku). The fire broke out on 17 April around one hour after Hayashi had left the city. Hayashi promptly called NPR HQ to request the necessary authorisation for use of the NPR from Prime Minister Yoshida. Having received this, around three hundred NPR men were dispatched from the nearby Yonago camp, all arriving by train within three hours. The NPR men proceeded to fight the fire and assist in the rescue and recovery operations. The majority of the men stayed for two days but some communications, logistics and engineering specialists stayed longer to

²⁰⁷ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 8.

²⁰⁸ 'Other' includes earthquakes and typhoons. 'Men Deployed' is the cumulative total of all men deployed for all incidents. Table based on that found on p 356, Henshūinkai, *Jietai Jūnenshi*; National Land Agency, *Disaster Prevention White Paper*, Tokyo, 1995, 'main natural disasters in Japan since 1945', available at www.adrc.or.jp/hanshin/hakusho/english/chapter2/t2-1.htm.

²⁰⁹ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 8.

help the city begin reconstruction.²¹⁰ In the remainder of its life the NPR was used a further five times for disaster relief, including following the 1952 Tokachi-Oki earthquake (see table XVII). The NPR's disaster relief role was further formalised and clarified in the law which created the NSF.²¹¹ Even today the Ground Self Defence Force is most often seen and recognised by much of Japanese the public during disaster relief operations.²¹² This use and the public relations boost it provides to the SDF were first recognised during the life of the NPR. In a similar way to which public relations concerns prevented the use of the NPR for its original internal security mission, the public relations boost the NPR won by participating in disaster relief helped much of its leadership realise the value of such operations in winning support for the force from a largely pacifist population.²¹³ This, in part, was prompted by what Ashida Hitoshi saw as the possible alienation of the NPR and its successors from the Japanese people that the avoidance of Diet control of the force had generated.²¹⁴ However, as demonstrated by the criticism of the GSDF following the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the public relations impact of disaster relief operations could also be negative, if they were mismanaged.²¹⁵

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to fulfil the second primary aim of the study by further revealing the character of the NPR through exploring its operational aspects. In looking at the human dimension of the NPR this chapter revealed previously unexplored elements about the character of

²¹⁰ YF-A16, 1F-139, Conference: Kowalski and Hayashi, 19/4/52.

²¹¹ Henshūinkai, *Jietai Jūnenshi*, p 355.

²¹² National Land Agency, *Disaster Prevention White Paper*, Tokyo, 1995, available at www.adrc.or.jp/hanshin/hakusho/English/default.asp.

²¹³ YF-A16, 1F-139, Conference (Kowalski and Hayashi), 19/4/52; 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', p 8.

²¹⁴ H. Ashida, *Keisatsu Youbitai Bekken* (Reflections on the National Police Reserve), Papers of Ashida Hitoshi, Document # 356, circa 1951. For more on Ashida Hitoshi see: Chapter 1, pp 78-86, Chapter 5, pp 310-312. For more on the NPR's position under the direct control of the Prime Minister and the avoidance of Diet debates during the creation of the force see: Chapter 2, pp 144-151.

²¹⁵ For more on the SDF and the 1995 Hanshin earthquake see: Chapter 5, pp 339-340.

the force. In doing so the chapter demonstrated the constabulary character of the NPR, the battles over its direction and character, and the influence of the JCP on the NPR. This effort both helped achieve the second main aim of the study and argue that the NPR was a constabulary and not an army. The pay and conditions, housing, food, uniforms, equipment, medical care and legal position of the NPR are all previously unexplored areas and all contain evidence that the NPR was a constabulary. The struggles over pay and arrest powers contributed to the first primary aim of this study in showing the Japanese influence on the direction and character of the NPR and the Japanese desire for a constabulary and not an army. The examination of the role of the NPR in disaster relief revealed the only actual operational use of the force and the influence on the public image of the force such operations had.

The JCP's military campaign and propaganda which supported it were also examined in order to contextualise the creation and evolution of the NPR as well as to highlight a highly significant and under examined area of emerging historiography. This effort helped in attempting to rebalance the historiography of the force in showing the domestic influences upon it and, in particular, a major domestic influence originating from outside the Japanese government. The interaction between the JCP and the NPR is another unexplored area to which the content of this chapter makes an original contribution. This contextualisation also reveals the constabulary character of the NPR by showing the internal security threats ranged against it and the threat the JCP was seen to pose to the Japanese state. Supported in through reference to the events of May Day 1952, the chapter also presented the argument that the risks that the use of the NPR carried, and the fact that the JCP military policy never became serious enough, lay behind the fact the NPR was not used in its original role.

Chapter Five: The Evolution of the

NPR

In seeking to fulfil the overall purpose of this study in providing the first complete history of the NPR this chapter explores the end of the force and its evolution into the National Safety Force (NSF) and Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF). The chapter demonstrates that the gradual evolution into the NSF and GSDF represented a partial departure from the constabulary nature of the NPR. Nevertheless, these moves towards a more externally focused force did not eliminate the entirety of the NPR's constabulary structure and some elements of it survive to this day. The examination of these vestiges of the NPR in the modern GSDF and the other commonalities between the forces forms the secondary aim of this chapter. This analysis helps both in achieving the second primary aim of this study, of defining the character of the NPR, in clearly distinguishing the NPR from its successors, an approach not taken by most scholars who examine the forces. This approach helps both clarify the character of the individual forces and highlights their common characteristics, particularly across the elements of the NSF and GSDF which survived from the NPR.

The transition of the NPR to a more external security focused force took place through two processes: the acquisition of heavier armament and the incorporation of former military officers. These processes, intended to make the NPR capable of dealing with external threats to Japan's security, also had external origins. The moves toward the transformation of the NPR into something closer to an army took place in the face of mounting pressure from parts of the US government, coupled with the diminishing influence of opponents of the processes, including MacArthur, Yoshida and Masuhara (the civilian head of the NPR). The examination of these struggles reveals the limitations of the domestic influences on the NPR in

the face of concerted and concentrated American pressure coupled with external factors such as the dismissal of MacArthur and the Chinese intervention in Korea. The confluence of the external pressures with domestic factors also played a role in limiting the effectiveness of domestic influences on the NPR and its successors, with the weakness of Yoshida after 1952 and the combination of GHQ, the US government and of Yoshida's conservative rivals being good examples of this. These influences and limitations are examined here as are their contributions to the evolution of the force.

The Chinese Intervention and The Fall of MacArthur

The first event which significantly challenged the constabulary character of the NPR was the intervention of the Chinese Peoples' Volunteer Forces (CPVF) in the Korean conflict in the winter of 1950-1951.

In October 1950, following the collapse of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) after MacArthur's daring landing at Inchon, it seemed that the UN and South Korean forces were on the brink of victory. However, unbeknownst to the UN command around 410,000 Chinese troops had crossed into North Korea.¹ These forces took the overextended and dispersed UN and South Korean forces by surprise and threw them back from the Yalu river in confusion (see figure XXXIV). General Walton Walker ordered the Eighth Army to retreat on 28 November but in the face of bitter winter conditions and overwhelming odds the retreat soon turned into a rout and within a week the Chinese forces had taken back Pyongyang. The situation became so desperate that the UN called for a

¹ X. Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2007, p 93; J. Chen, 'In The Name of Revolution, China's Road to the Korean War', in W Stueck (ed), *The Korean War in World History*, The University Press of Kentucky, London, 2004, pp 110-111.

ceasefire ten days later, and a state of emergency was declared in the US on 16 December.²

The real possibility of defeat in Korea, the first appearance of Soviet jet fighters over the peninsula and the perceived threat to Indochina and Europe, saw many in the US administration and military fear Soviet aggression elsewhere in the region, or general war with the USSR.³ This threat of a wider conflict and the buckling of his forces under the overwhelming Chinese pressure made MacArthur seesaw from deep depression to 'near panic'.⁴ In order to shore up his position and to stem the deluge of Chinese troops into Korea, MacArthur began to advocate desperate measures. Over the following weeks three interconnected plans were recommended by the supreme commander: a widening of the air war, planning for the possible evacuation of Korea, and urgent requests for more troops.

The first of the measures recommended by MacArthur was the bombing of the bridges and dams on the Yalu, the main Chinese supply route, a plan which almost came to fruition, being blocked only at the last minute by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who were determined to prevent the expansion of the war. This plan added to MacArthur's demands for a naval blockade and bombardment of China, brought MacArthur into direct conflict with Washington and eventually, when repeated, resulted in his dismissal a few months later.⁵ Chillingly MacArthur also recommended using atomic

² Truman Speech, 15/12/50, printed in, M.H. Hunt, *Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, An International History Reader*, Yale, London, 1996, pp 224-225; D. Acheson, *Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department*, Norton, London, 1987, p 475-476, 485.

³ Atlee and Truman Meetings, 4-7/12/50, United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, (FRUS), 1950, Vol. VII, pp 1364-1368; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp 463, 471, 474; C.A. MacDonald, *Korea: The War Before Vietnam*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1986, pp 32-33.

⁴ W. Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964*, Arrow Books, London, 1979, p 575; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p 471.

⁵ MacArthur to JCS, 30/12/50, FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp 1631-1632; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp 463, 468; .D. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, Heinemann, London, 1965, p 379.

weapons against North Korea, evidence of the gravity with which he saw the threats confronting him.⁶

The second measure supported by MacArthur, and, in this case, backed by the JCS and the State Department, was planning for an evacuation of Korea if the situation worsened. With his troops routed, MacArthur actively recommended planning for a complete withdrawal from Korea, and some air squadrons were actually evacuated to Japan in this period.⁷ The JCS agreed with MacArthur's assessment and instructed MacArthur to defend Korea to the fullest extent possible, but also to work out when evacuation might be necessary, suggesting that if he found his troops south of the Kum river, near Pusan (see figure XXXIV), with large CPVF units still in pursuit then he should flee the peninsula. The JCS also reminded MacArthur that his primary mission was the defence of Japan, 'for which only the troops of the Eighth Army are adequate' [Joint Chiefs' emphasis].⁸ The stress here by the JCS on the preservation of the Eighth Army is very useful in demonstrating that even in the largely hawkish JCS's opinion, the NPR was unsuitable for external security duties. Despite an improvement in the situation from February 1951 onwards, the evacuation and abandonment of South Korea remained firmly on the table, agreed as the first measure to be taken in the event of a general war with the USSR.⁹

The final action which MacArthur requested was a vast increase in the numbers of troops in Korea. After a request for reinforcements on 29 November 1950, MacArthur was informed that he would have to cope with what he had as no new units would be available until at least April 1951

⁶ W. Stueck, *The Korean War, An International History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p 62.

⁷ R.K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea, KMAG in Peace and War*, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2005, p 167.

⁸ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p 378; JCS 9935, JCS to MacArthur 29/12/50, printed in, Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p 775.

⁹ MacArthur Memorial Archives, RG-6, Series III, (MMA), 'Operation Plan CINCFE No. 4-51', 5/4/51, p 2; M.B. Ridgeway, *The Korean War*, Da Capo, New York, 1967, p 164.


(and these were likely to go to Europe), and even replacements for his heavy losses would take until the new year to begin to arrive.¹⁰

Unable to broaden the war and not yet ready to evacuate to Japan, increased numbers of troops had been essential in MacArthur's eyes, yet even this had been frustrated. In desperate need of troops but with none available MacArthur foresaw difficulties in simultaneously maintaining the security of Japan and effectively resisting the CPVF. The concerns became even more acute with the opening of the CPVF third phase offensive (1-15 January 1951) which pushed the UN/ROK forces fifty miles south of the 38th Parallel, captured Seoul and thus brought the possibility of evacuation closer even (see figure XXXIV). In the face of this redoubled pressure and in order to remedy both the problems of the security of Japan, and the need for more combat-effective troops, MacArthur decided to partially depart from the constabulary model for the NPR and give the force some heavier armament.¹¹ He believed that this measure would free the remaining reserve US tactical troops in Japan for use on the front in Korea and would also contribute to the external security of Japan. With the CPVF successes, the external security threats to Japan had temporarily become greater than the internal, and even outweighed the political capital MacArthur had invested in creating and preserving the NPR as a constabulary. Furthermore, with the possibility of retreat from Korea, the NPR became more important as it could soon be essential in providing external security if Japan itself came under attack.

¹⁰ MacArthur to JCS, 30/12/50, *FRUS 1950*, Vol. VII, pp 1631-1632; Truman to MacArthur, 13/1/51 *FRUS 1951*, Vol. VII, pp 78-79; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p 471-472.

¹¹ H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 1: 1947-1952*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (hereafter YF-A16), 1F-41, CINCFE to DEPTAR, 'Requirements for National Police Reserve', 3/1/51.

Figure XXXIV. The Chinese Intervention in Korea, 26/10/50 – 25/1/51¹²



These conclusions prompted MacArthur to ask the Department of the Army on 3 January 1951 to equip the NPR with a vast array of heavy equipment, including 399 medium tanks, 2,480 machine guns, 155 4.2” mortars, 816 recoilless rifles and 304 howitzers.¹³ Indicative of his concern about possibly having to evacuate to Japan, MacArthur also insisted that from then on the NPR be considered ‘co-equal’ to the South Korean forces

¹² Based on map found on p 470, Acheson, *Present at the Creation*.

¹³ YF-A16, 1F-41, CINCFE to DEPTAR, ‘Requirements for National Police Reserve’, 3/1/51.

in priority for arms.¹⁴ These substantial requests were clearly unrealistic in the face of overwhelming demands for American hardware for the ongoing global expansion of the US and allied ground forces. As a result the NPR (and even the NSF) only ever received a tiny fraction of this material during its life. Even some of the pro-rearmament heads of the Department of the Army were surprised at the level of armament MacArthur suddenly sought, and informed him that the continuation of the constabulary style organisation might be better for the NPR. Senior army officials expressed doubt that the level of armament would be available, and that for the internal security role of the NPR, a lighter organisation would be more operationally and cost effective, linking it to the Korean Constabulary and stating: 'Analysis here of Korean experiences indicates that possibly a light division . . . would be preferable to divisional organisation you are considering for NPRJ'.¹⁵ MacArthur, focused on the immediate external security threat he faced, defended his request for heavy arms, making explicit reference to the current constabulary structure of the NPR and the failure of the constabulary model of the South Korean military to preserve the external security of South Korea in 1950:

[The] planned NPRJ divisional structure [is] considered sound and entirely suitable for any eventuality including even the all-out aggression against Japan proper by foreign forces equipped and trained with Communist tactical doctrine which experience has demonstrated invariably includes the extensive deployment of tanks and artillery. Against such a force an NPRJ lacking medium tanks and at least medium artillery would be utterly inadequate. A most recent and striking case in point was the complete inability of the light south Korean divisions to cope with the tank supported North Korean Forces.¹⁶

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ YF-A16, 1A-126, Bolto (Depar) to CINCFE, 6/1/51; YF-A16, 1B-139, JCS 1380/97, 30/1/51; YF-A16, 1F-42, DEPAR to MacArthur, 7/1/1951.

¹⁶ YF-A16, 1F-42, CINCFE to DEPAR, 8/1/51.

How convincing MacArthur's argument was is hard to gauge but senior figures in the US military soon saw the opportunity to rearm Japan that this reversal of position by its principal American opponent represented. For example, the head of the US Army General J. Lawton Collins, stated to the JCS that he considered that 'the security of Japan is of such overriding importance that immediate steps must be taken to equip as General MacArthur has recommended' and requested that the NPR should simultaneously be expanded as rapidly as possible to a ten division force (around 300,000 men).¹⁷ This demand for a quadrupling in size of the NPR plus the provision of heavy weapons became central to the Department of the Army's policy towards the NPR from this point onwards.¹⁸

Despite some of the equipment being supplied under the guise of a 'Special Far East Command Reserve', the Defence Department's thrust was parried by State Department opposition due to the move's international and Japanese domestic political ramifications, coupled with Japanese opposition, and the stabilization of the front in Korea. Furthermore, once the Chinese advance had been halted, MacArthur soon reversed his position, once again helping Yoshida resist Dulles' demands for an army and collective security.¹⁹ As a result, only a tiny fraction of the material was ever delivered to the NPR and the American military never achieved the size and character of force it desired.²⁰ Nevertheless, those opposing the militarization of the NPR had been permanently weakened through these events.

¹⁷ YF-A16, 1B-139, JCS 1380/97, 'National Police Reserve – Japan, (NPRJ)', 5/2/51; Ibid, Memo, Chief of Staff, US Army to JCS, 30/1/51.

¹⁸ YF-A16, 1B-138, Gaither to Taylor, 'Unresolved Problems Relative to Security of Japan', 23/2/51.

¹⁹ J. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse, Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System*, The Athlone Press, London, 1988, p 78. For more on MacArthur's return to opposing a Japanese army see below.

²⁰ YF-A16, 1B-142, Bradley (Chair JCS) to Sec of Defense, 9/2/51; YF-A16, 1B-140, JCS 1380/100 19/2/51; C.C. Marshall (Secretary of Defense) to Acheson (Secretary of State), 15/2/51.

The Push for Heavier Armament and Expansion

Those defending the constabulary character of the NPR were further weakened in April 1951 by the removal of MacArthur. Despite his calls for heavier armament for the NPR in January 1951 MacArthur, realising that the external threat to Japan had waned, softened his stance, even helping Yoshida oppose an expansion of the NPR during talks with Dulles. However, MacArthur's departure, the result of renewed public demands for the expansion of the war in the face of another major Chinese offensive, removed a key barrier to Japanese rearmament.²¹ His replacement as SCAP was Mathew B. Ridgeway, a pragmatic, businesslike and down-to-earth character, a sharp contrast with the grandiose and occasionally vacillating MacArthur.²² Ridgeway's term as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) also saw the end of the semi-autonomous status of the office. This was partly to do with greater scrutiny from Washington due to the Korean War and moves towards a peace treaty, and partly due to Ridgeway's personality as both a team player and what Takemae describes as his comparative lack of 'panache and overarching vision'.²³ Career considerations may also have played their part with the 56 year old Ridgeway possibly conscious of the impact of his actions on his future opportunities in a way his septuagenarian predecessor was not.

The appointment of Ridgeway had a major impact on the direction and organisational character of the NPR. Unlike MacArthur, as well as being loyal to the Department of the Army, Ridgeway had no political capital at stake, having taken no part in the drafting of the 1947 Japanese constitution or the creation of the NPR. Elements of Ridgeway's background may also have influenced the direction of his pro-military policy. Ridgeway had served in Nicaragua, overseeing the elections of

²¹ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp 78-79; M. and S. Harries, *Sheathing the Sword, The Demilitarisation of Japan*, Heinemann, London, 1989, p 236.

²² E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, Continuum, London, 2002, p 139.

²³ *Ibid*, p 491.

1928 and the formation of the *Guardia Nacional*, a constabulary force. During this period Ridgeway probably formed a dim view of the Nicaraguan constabulary due to its lacklustre performance against the Sandinista rebels.²⁴ Ridgeway also served as governor of the Philippines in 1930 and hence was also familiar with the Philippines Constabulary. Nevertheless, whatever his opinion of other constabulary forces, Ridgeway certainly did not hold the Korean Constabulary or early South Korean Army in high regard, claiming that they were:

A rather sorry force that we did not even dare call an army. So obsessed was the United States with its aim of disengagement that our people in South Korea were not permitted to use the word “army” in referring to the police force we were endeavouring to build to keep order after our withdrawal.²⁵

Ridgeway had also not seen service in the Far East during the Second World War, which may have resulted in him having a less punitive and more forgiving attitude towards Japanese purgees, hundreds of thousands of whom he swiftly rehabilitated, and several hundred of which he later installed into the upper echelons of the NPR.²⁶

The departure of MacArthur also precipitated other changes in GHQ which had an influence on the future course of the NPR. For example, Whitney, the head of Government Section (GS), retired with MacArthur, being replaced by Frank Rizzo, a former banker with less of the interest Whitney had shown in opposing Willoughby and G2 in preventing a militarization of the NPR.²⁷ Despite these moves towards a pro-military staff in GHQ, two

²⁴ A.J. Bachevich Jnr, ‘The American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua, 1927-28’, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 4, No. 3, July 1980, pp 250, 253.

²⁵ Ridgeway, *The Korean War*, p 10,

²⁶ Technical Section (TS) 154-155, ‘A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951’, 1/52; YF-A16, 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, ‘Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve’, 22/12/51, p 3; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 491.

²⁷ TS 301, Whitney to Willoughby, 7/8/50; Shukanshinbun Shinchohenshubu (Shincho Weekly Newspaper Editor), *Makkasaa no Nihon (MacArthur’s Japan)*, Vol. 2, Shinchosha,

months after MacArthur's departure General Shepard, one of the most hawkish supporters of Japanese rearmament and the head of Civil Affairs Section (CAS), the GHQ body which oversaw the NPR, became Deputy Chief of Staff of FEC/UNC in Korea, being replaced in Japan by Brigadier General Leroy Watson.²⁸ These changes at GHQ also took place against the backdrop of the huge rearmament programme and the global militarization of US policy that NSC 68 had put in motion, moves which resulted in the expansion of the influence of the US military over foreign policy.²⁹ Within this context and the US military's focus on the possibility of a third world war, the desire for a new, sizable Japanese army became acute. The attraction of a rearmed Japan was further reinforced by the relatively low cost of equipping and training Japanese soldiers, an argument made by Ridgeway to Congress in 1952 and previously by Eichelberger, the former head of the Eighth Army, in 1949.³⁰

As described above, these demands for transformation of the NPR into a new Japanese army centred on quadrupling its size to a force of 300,000 men with a full complement of heavy equipment, tanks and artillery. The pace at which the US Army planned to achieve this expansion was highly ambitious, seeking an expansion to a force of eight infantry divisions (121,600 men), and an additional 34,400 HQ and service troops by December 1952. This sizable force was to be doubled again in another year to a 300,000 man army consisting of ten infantry divisions, thirty-seven artillery battalions, forty anti-aircraft battalions, three combat engineer groups, three chemical mortar batteries, three armoured cavalry

Tokyo, 1983, pp 257-258. For more on Whitney and NPR officers see: Chapter 3, pp 210-211.

²⁸ U.S. Army Center of Military History Historical Manuscripts Collection: *The Korean War*, (YF-A4), Far East, US Army Forces and Eight United States Army Military History Section, *History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1955*, Reel 14, p 112. Hereafter *History of the National Police Reserve*.

²⁹ NSC 68, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 14/4/1950, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen (The Financial History Section of the Ministry of Finance), *Showa Zaiseishi, Sensō Kara Kōwa Made (The Financial History of Shōwa, From War to Peace)*, Vol. 20, Tokyo Keizai Shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1982; W. LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1971*, Wiley, London, 1972, pp 123-125.

³⁰ M. Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p 46. For more on Eichelberger and his views on the cost effectiveness of expansion see: Chapter 1, pp 83-84, Chapter 2, 110.

regiments and three medium tank battalions.³¹ The clearly military character to which the Department of the Army sought to change the NPR was also demonstrated in the type of reforms to the structure of the organisation which were proposed in an October 1951 report on the problem. The report argued that there was a need for new Diet legislation and organisational regulations authorising the existence of the NPR and defining its position in the Japanese government structure. These extra regulations would ideally; create a system of military law with definite terms of enlistment and judicial punishment in case of desertion; provide for conscription if the numbers of volunteers were not adequate; and finally, and again indicative of the original constabulary character of the force, reforms to 'change the character of the force from a police force to a military type armed defence force'.³²

However, these grand and wide-ranging plans quickly ran into obstacles as an initial hurdle appeared over the release of heavy armament to the NPR. Some confusion occurred as the terms 'heavy armament' and 'Special FECOM Reserve' were often used synonymously. When the State Department agreed that items from the Special FECOM Reserve could be given to the NPR in May 1951, Ridgeway and likeminded officials thought that permission to give the NPR tanks and artillery had finally been granted.³³ However, the State Department had specified that only small arms, communications equipment and transportation could be given to the NPR, and Ridgeway had only been given authorisation to give the NPR equipment other than 'heavy arms'. The term 'heavy arms' was also quickly clarified, with the term defined from then on as including: tanks, artillery, recoilless rifles, mortars larger than 81mm, and rocket launchers larger than 3.5 inches.³⁴ This restriction of the type of equipment the NPR was allowed to receive was based largely upon the State Department's belief that transforming the NPR into a military prior to the conclusion of a

³¹ YF-A16, 1B-48, Warden to Chief of Staff, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 27/10/51.

³² Ibid.

³³ YF-A16, 1-F48, Ridgeway to DEPAR, 29/5/51.

³⁴ YF-A16, 1-F37, Taylor to Ridgeway (CINCFE), 30/5/51.

peace treaty could seriously undermine support for such a treaty, both within the United States and amongst the former Allies, especially Australia and New Zealand. Despite it delaying their plans, many of the US Army hawks grudgingly agreed and even Ridgeway considered that public discussion of the army's plans for the NPR could prejudice the chances of a peace treaty.³⁵ Thus the plans of Ridgeway and the Department of the Army for a militarized NPR had to be put on hold until after the conclusion of a peace treaty, at which point they expected that permission to transfer the heavy arms would be forthcoming.³⁶

These restrictions preserved the constabulary character of the NPR for the life of the Occupation through limiting its armament and role to that of an internal security force. Several further factors prevented this realisation of the Department of the Army's plans. A shortage of suitable training materials translated into Japanese and training facilities seriously hampered the introduction of new equipment and training in general.³⁷ Japanese opposition, led by Yoshida and Masuhara, also resisted the expansion and militarization for a number of reasons explained in the final section of this chapter. Despite MacArthur and his successor's requests, the shortage of arms from American sources also impacted upon the army's plans, with the US units in Korea, the South Korean Army, and the global build up of US military units all taking precedence over the NPR.³⁸ The decision to source as much of the NPR's equipment as possible from inside Japan also delayed matters, due to delivery and manufacturing delays which were compounded by serious power shortages (resulting from undersupply and industrial action).³⁹ Nevertheless, if the US had fully prioritised the NPR, it could have been easily equipped in whatever

³⁵ YF-A16, 1-F 49, Ridgeway to DEPAR, 8/6/51.

³⁶ YF-A16, 1-F35, Jenkins to Ridgeway, 24/8/51.

³⁷ For more on the shortage of training materials see, Chapter 3, p 162.

³⁸ TS 154-155, 'A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951', 1/52.

³⁹ Ad Hoc Committee, GHQ/FEC, 'Increase in Japanese Security Agencies', 10/7/50, printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, pp 256-257; YF-A16, 1B-48, Webster to Adjutant General Department of Army, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', 22/12/51, p 50, hereafter 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve'.

fashion within a matter of months, but as this study has shown a combination of divisions within the US authorities, Japanese resistance and outside events effectively prevented this.

The NPR and Former Imperial Officers II

Alongside the campaigns for the assumption of heavier arms and the expansion of the NPR a simultaneous push was made by Ridgeway and hawkish elements of GHQ for the induction into the NPR of a number of veterans of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Navy (IJN). Ridgeway and his backers in the Department of the Army saw the introduction of large numbers of former Imperial officers as an essential step if their plans for the quadrupling and simultaneous militarization of the NPR were to come to fruition. As the official US history of the NPR notes, 'such expansion was feasible only if long-experienced, highly trained career officers could be secured to occupy higher echelon command and staff positions'.⁴⁰ Many American officers had desired a military force from the start and had long resented the constabulary character of the NPR and its civilian and police leadership. This is evidenced by reports into the NPR stating that 'the appointment of former police and civilian personnel to key . . . line and staff positions has been a constant block to progress', and that 'the lack of qualified officers for staff and command positions has been a primary factor militating against tactical efficiency'.⁴¹ These officers, led by men such as Willoughby (head of G2) and Shepard (head of CAS), had already attempted to install IJA veterans into the top tier of the force three times in 1950, only to be thwarted by MacArthur and Yoshida's defence of the constabulary character of the NPR.⁴²

With the departure of MacArthur, his replacement with the less independent Ridgeway, and the Department of the Army's push for rapid

⁴⁰ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 160.

⁴¹ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', pp 8, 3.

⁴² For more on Hattori see: Chapter 3, pp 209-220. For more on the creation of the NPR and Willoughby see: Chapter 2, pp 140-144.

expansion and militarization of the NPR, the attempt to turn the NPR over to former IJA/IJN officers was renewed.⁴³ Just over a month after MacArthur's dismissal, Ridgeway contacted the Department of the Army, informing them that he intended to release all purgees from their restrictions except 'former career officers', war criminals and members of extremist organisations. In this Ridgeway sought the release of thousands of IJA/IJN officers commissioned on, or after, 7 July 1937 (the date of the 'Marco Polo Bridge Incident' which triggered the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese War).⁴⁴ However, even this release of around 200,000 purgees was not enough for Ridgeway, who regarded the men, few of whom ranked above Major, as useful but under-qualified to take charge of the NPR and transform it into the large army he had been ordered to prepare for. Correspondingly, Ridgeway argued for a further dramatic relaxation of the purge restrictions to allow him to induct former high ranking Imperial officers into the NPR. Thus, Ridgeway clearly informed the Department of the Army of his support for a militarized NPR, whilst simultaneously expressing his low opinion of the constabulary type model and police leadership of the NPR:

Lacking these [high rank purgees], the ability of the present National Police Reserve units to attain combat effectiveness as divisions as rapidly as our need for them may urgently demand, will be seriously hampered and the expansion envisaged . . . will not be feasible . . . The lack of competent high-level command and staff officers in the army of the Republic of Korea is daily costing the lives of US soldiers. This cost would be paid again and at still higher rates, if within the next two years or so, we should be required to place reliance on forces improperly led and served by incompetent high-level staffs; in other words, if the Soviets attack.⁴⁵

⁴³ Takemae argues that the move was the result of Willoughby's influence, but the departure of MacArthur played a much more significant role. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 489.

⁴⁴ Schaller, *Altered States*, p 38; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p 491.

⁴⁵ YF-A16, 1A-121, Ridgeway to DEPAR, 23/5/51.

Ridgeway, using an identical phrase to Willoughby, argued that the purge was of an excessively strict and 'anomalous character' and that high ranking purgees were essential if the NPR was to be an effective military.⁴⁶ Ridgeway also proceeded to paint a benign picture of those war criminals and purgees remaining under the restrictions of the purge ordinance (SCAPIN 550), claiming many were not actually ultra-nationalist and asking for the release of select high ranking purgees in accordance with his and his staffs' wishes.⁴⁷ However, despite his wishes and the seemingly essential nature of higher rank Imperial veterans for the expansion plans, international political concerns relating to the peace treaty again interfered. Despite anticipating this and arguing that any negative reactions by other governments were of secondary importance to the external security mission to which he sought to turn the NPR, the release of the high rank purgees that Ridgeway desired was not achieved until the final months of the Occupation.⁴⁸ The mass depurges of February to April 1952 released almost all of the remaining purgees and many returned to public life, with 42% of the members of the first post-Occupation Diet being former purgees.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, around 5,500 purgees remained under restrictions and were hence ineligible for service in the NPR right until the end of the Occupation, and many of these were the generals and admirals Ridgeway sought.⁵⁰

Despite not being able to secure the release of all the individuals he wanted from the purge restrictions, Ridgeway and members of GHQ still attempted to install as many former IJA/IJN officers in the NPR as possible. This move was bitterly opposed by Yoshida and the civilian head of the NPR, Masuhara Keikichi. Foot-dragging, delaying tactics and attempts to play off various members of GHQ against each other stalled

⁴⁶ Ibid. For more on Willoughby disputing the validity of the purge see: Chapter 3, pp 209-220.

⁴⁷ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directives to the Japanese Government (SCAPINs), (SCA-1), SCAPIN 550, 'Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office', 4/1/1946, Reel 2; *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 154.

⁴⁸ YF-A16, 1A-121, Ridgeway to DEPAR, 23/5/51.

⁴⁹ Schaller, *Altered States*, p 38.

⁵⁰ H. Kinoshita, 'Echoes of Militarism in Japan', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 3, Sept 1953, pp 245-246.

Ridgeway's plans for months and eventually won Masuhara a grudging role in the eventual selection those to be appointed. However, in spite of these successes Masuhara continued to oppose any inclusion of purgees into the force, attempting to delay the process until after the end of the Occupation, from which point he assumed he would have a greater ability to resist, and could possibly even cancel the policy. In fact, Masuhara's resistance was so dogged that it almost cost him his career, with several senior figures in CAS questioning his 'commitment' and 'reliability'.⁵¹ Nevertheless, Masuhara persisted even until the dying days of the Occupation, pushing for administrative independence from CAS two days before its formal end.⁵² These battles again represented Masuhara's attempt to preserve the constabulary character of the force and its civilian/police leadership. The distinctly pro-military US official history attempts to brush off his resistance as a selfish attempt to protect his 'position and influence and to cater to the desires of his own previous appointees from other walks of life [mostly policemen], who were loyal to him and who may be displaced or subordinated in influence by the new appointees'.⁵³ This is an argument it employs whenever it describes Japanese resistance to the expansion or militarization of the NPR.⁵⁴ Despite the official history's misguided claims, what Masuhara and Yoshida really feared, alongside the loss of the internal security force they desired, were four things: the unaffordable expansion of the NPR into a military, the risk of that military being drawn into conflicts against the wishes of the Japanese government, the political and internal security repercussions of full-scale rearmament and the risk of a military coup or seizure of power by a resurrected Japanese military.⁵⁵

⁵¹ *History of the National Police Reserve*, pp 173-175.

⁵² YF-A16, 1F-139, Conference: Kowalski, Masuhara and Hayashi, 26/4/52.


⁵³ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 174.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pp 115, 156.

⁵⁵ H. Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany', in T.J. Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies, One-Party Dominant Regimes*, Cornell University Press, London, 1990, p 139; M.P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power, National Security, the Truman Administration and The Cold War*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1992, p466; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 80; *Chūōkōron*, 3/1952; National Archives (NARA), RG 263, ZZ-18, 'Coup d'état Allegedly Being Planned by Ex-Militarists and Ultrationalists, 31/10/1952', CIA Name File, Box 6, Folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. 1. For more on the coup plot see: Chapter 3, pp 218-219.

Regardless of Masuhara's concerns, resistance and obstructionism, he was unable to entirely or indefinitely defer the influx of IJA/IJN veterans that the US Army desired.⁵⁶ The first of two groups of four hundred former officers entered the NPR's officer training course at Eta Jima, near Yokosuka, on 1 October 1951.⁵⁷ These 402 recruits of 'field grade' (high rank) undertook short courses in military staff skills and the nature of the NPR (including classes on the 'democratic' nature of the force) and were assigned throughout the force at ranks of Senior Inspector and above based on their previous military education and experience (see figure XXXV).

Figure XXXV. Purgee Appointments to 'Field Grade' Positions in the NPR by Origin and NPR Rank⁵⁸



A further four hundred and ten 'company grade' (middle rank) former officers were inducted on 5 December 1951. Again, they were enrolled on a two-month staff and orientation course and were then integrated into the NPR at ranks of Senior Inspector and below (see figure XXXVI).⁵⁹


⁵⁶ K. Masuhara, 'Keisatsuyōbitai Kara Jietai Made' (From the NPR to the SDF), in Y. Andō (ed), *Shōwa Keizaishi e no Shōgen (Testimony Towards an Economic History of the Shōwa Era)*, Mainichi Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1966, pp 390-391; J. Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1985, p 199.

⁵⁷ R. Guillian, 'The Resurgence of Military Elements in Japan', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Sept 1952, p 220.

⁵⁸ Based on Chart on p 20, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve'. For a more on the rank structure of the NPR see: Chapter 3, p 158-160.


⁵⁹ 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve', pp 8, 3.

Figure XXXVI. NPR Purgee Appointments to 'Company Grade' Positions in the NPR by Origin and NPR Rank⁶⁰



Despite the induction of these 812 former purgees, the new arrivals represented only a relatively small fraction of the officer corps of the NPR, with a total of 4,481 being appointed prior to their appointment (see figure XXXVI).⁶¹ In addition, the highest rank awarded to any of the purgees transplanted into the force was that of Superintendent Class one, the third highest rank in the NPR. This left the two highest ranks (Assistant Senior Superintendent and Senior Superintendent) and the overall authority, command and constabulary character they represented intact and in the hands of the civilians and former policemen Masuhara had helped to appoint.⁶²

Figure XXXVII. Purgees as a Percentage of NPR Officers



⁶⁰ Based on Chart on p 20, 'Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve'.

⁶¹ TS 154-155, 'A Report on the Japanese National Police Reserve for the Period Oct-Dec 1951', 1/52, p 3.

⁶² For a full table of the ranks of the NPR see: Table V. 'Rank Structure of the NPR', Chapter 3, p 159.

This limitation of the number and hence influence of the purgees was a qualified victory for Masuhara and Yoshida, one of a number which would be fought and won over the size and character of the NSF and GSDF in the coming years. The delays achieved by Masuhara helped to postpone the induction of the purgees for as long as possible, severely hampering the US Army's plans for the rapid expansion and militarization of the force. These delays also pushed back much of a process Yoshida and Masuhara opposed until after the end of the Occupation, by which time they knew their powers to resist the Americans would be greatly enhanced. Furthermore, the induction of this small number of men prior to the mass depurges of early 1952 also prevented the later inclusion of some of the most reactionary elements of the former Imperial forces.⁶³ The commitment by the Japanese leadership to limit the power and influence of the former military both inside and outside the NPR is also evidenced through the Japanese initiative undertaken in early 1952 to establish a Japanese Security Academy. This school was designed to provide an educational curriculum, approved by the Japanese government, which would best inform the training of future generations of the NPR officers. This would ensure they were educated with in a manner which helped ensure their loyalty under a curriculum approved of by the Japanese government. This would reduce the need for Imperial veterans, would educate future officers in democratic principles and would help to guarantee that the NPR and its successor organisations would not become a threat to the state.⁶⁴

The NSF, SDF and Japanese Resistance

The peace treaty negotiations which had taken place sporadically and unofficially for years finally found a more concrete and official form in the

⁶³ H. Kinoshita, 'Echoes of Militarism', p 245.

⁶⁴ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 179.

Dulles negotiations of mid-1950 onwards.⁶⁵ These talks, led by hawkish Republican senator John Foster Dulles, are the subject of major scholarly attention, with notable contributions in English made by Schaller, Takemae and Yoshitsu.⁶⁶ Due to this a complete assessment of the negotiations is beyond the scope of this work. The most significant development in the talks in relation to the NPR was the eventual commitment an embattled Japanese government was forced to make to 'increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression', a clause eventually enshrined in the 8 September 1951 Security Treaty.⁶⁷ As noted below Yoshida swallowed this bitter and unnecessary pill in order to regain Japan's sovereignty, his primary objective in the negotiations. However, recent discoveries have shown that Yoshida may also have been playing his diplomatic hand from a marked deck as Waseda University's Arima Tetsuo recently revealed that one of his senior advisors, former IJA General Tatsumi Eiichi, was a paid agent of the CIA, subtly pushing Yoshida towards rearmament and passing secret Japanese policy documents to the Americans.⁶⁸

In the course of the negotiations leading up to the peace treaty Yoshida made one final effort to save the NPR, once more illustrating its value for him and his opposition to its militarization, although perhaps hinting at Yoshida's appreciation that some sort of compromise was becoming necessary in the face of concerted pressure from Dulles.⁶⁹ This took the form of an proposal entitled 'Initial Steps for Re-armament Program' presented to the Americans on 3 February 1951. The note proposed retaining the Maritime Safety Agency and the NPR, in its constabulary

⁶⁵ For more on the Japanese and negotiations before 1950 see: Chapter 1, pp 74-92. For more on US attitudes towards Japan see: Chapter 2, pp 95-107.

⁶⁶ Schaller, *Altered States*, pp 31-40; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp 499-506; M.M. Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement*, Columbia University Press, Guildford, 1983, pp 39-99.

⁶⁷ J. Weste, 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament, 1945-1960' in M. Iokibe, C. Rose, J. Tomaru and J. Weste (eds), *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s, From Isolation to Integration*, Routledge, Oxford, 2008, p 39; Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 8/9/51, printed in, D.J. Lu, *Japan, A Documentary History, The Late Tokugawa Period to the Present*, M.E. Sharpe, London, 1997, p 500.

⁶⁸ *Japan Times*, 5/10/09; Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement*, p 61.

⁶⁹ Y. Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p 7.

form, alongside a combined army, navy and air force totalling 50,000 men.⁷⁰ The proposal, reflecting Yoshida's concerns over sovereignty, proposed the creation a new Japanese defence command structure, an implicit reference to the recent Japanese rejection of US wartime command of their armed forces.⁷¹ Despite putting forward what Tatsumi called a tiny and 'useless number' of 50,000 troops, according to Shibayama and the Japanese minutes of a later meeting, the plan was apparently approved by both Dulles and MacArthur.⁷² If it did actually occur, this agreement must have collapsed or been abandoned at some point as ultimately the NPR did not survive. Nevertheless, this document is important as it represents Yoshida's final effort to preserve the NPR and reveals that he saw the continuing need for an internal security force. The relative strengths of the forces proposed also shows his greater concern over the internal security of Japan, as illustrated in the suggested 50,000 man combined military forces compared to the 75,000 strong NPR.

Although mentioned by many historians such as Finn, Herzog (who uses the incorrect title 'First Phase of Rearmament Programme'), Hosoya, Miyazawa, Schaller, Shibayama and Yoshitsu, all actually fail to cite the original document.⁷³ These historians all employ a description of the document found in a 1977 edition of the *Tokyo Shinbun*, or even use a very brief editorial note from *FRUS* as their only sources.⁷⁴ The document itself was released in 2002 as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Series,

⁷⁰ Appendix XII. 'Japanese Policy Document: 'Initial Steps for Re-armament Program', 3 February 1951'.

⁷¹ Editorial Note, *FRUS 1951*, Vol. VI, Part I, p 849.

⁷² F. Shibayama, 'The US, Britain, Japan, and the Issue of Casus Belli 1951-52: Could a Soviet Attack on Japan Justify Starting a Third World War?', in Iokibe, Rose, Tomaru and Weste, *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s*, p 19.

⁷³ R.B. Finn, *Winners in Peace, MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, University of California Press, London, 1992, p 279; C. Hosoya, 'Japan's Response to U.S. Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida Talks of January-February 1951', *Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics*, No. 10, Dec 1981, p 25; P.J. Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, Japan Library, Folkestone, 1993, p 224; Schaller, *Altered States*, pp 35-36; Shibayama, 'US, Britain, Japan and the Issue of Casus Belli', p 19; Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace* pp 60-61.

⁷⁴ *Tokyo Shinbun*, 13/5/1977; Editorial Note, *FRUS 1951*, Vol. VI, Part I, p 849.

Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Japanese Foreign Relations) and this study is the first to employ the original document.⁷⁵

Despite this final effort to preserve the NPR, Yoshida was eventually forced to concede to Dulles' demands for a more externally focused force and the 'aspiration' towards the assumption of some of the burden of external security this necessitated was expressed in the Security Treaty and found form in the *Hoantai*, or National Safety Force (NSF).⁷⁶ The NSF was formed through the amalgamation of the NPR and the Maritime Safety Agency, coupled with the creation of a unified command structure, the National Safety Agency (NSA). The NSA was established on 1 August 1952 and the NSF inaugurated at a parade in Tokyo on 15 October 1952 (see figure XXXVIII).⁷⁷ The capabilities of the NSF were more suitable for external security and the numbers of its ground arm were increased to 110,000, moves which prompt Welfield to argue that: 'whatever its purpose the NSF was clearly an army'.⁷⁸ The NSF did have a more external focus but, as noted in preceding chapters and below, the NSF was still no match for its potential Soviet adversaries, lacked the air arm the US considered essential for state on state warfare, and retained many of the constabulary features of the NPR.⁷⁹ The NSF also lacked any way of dispatching troops overseas without substantial US support, having no transport aircraft and a maritime arm consisting mostly of ageing minesweepers and patrol boats. Furthermore, the security treaty itself also limited the extent to which the NSF could assume power projection capabilities in stating that Japan would avoid: 'any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security

⁷⁵ 'Initial Steps For Rearmament Program', printed in, Gaimushō (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho: Heiwajōyaku no Teikatsu ni Kansuru Chōsho (Japanese Diplomatic Papers: Protocol Concerning the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty)*, Vol. 2, Gaimushō, Tokyo, 2002, p 182.

⁷⁶ M. Royama, 'Problems of Self-Defense', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 308, Nov 1956, p 170.

⁷⁷ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan White Paper*, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2007, p 599; Royama, 'Problems of Self-Defense', p 168.

⁷⁸ Schaller, *Altered States*, p 46; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 80. For more on the capabilities of the NPR/NSF see: Chapter 3, pp 189-190.

⁷⁹ For more on the NPR's comparative weakness and its internal security role see: Chapter 3, pp 192-204.

in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter'.⁸⁰

Figure XXXVIII. Parade Establishing NSF, 15/10/52⁸¹



The concessions made by Yoshida to Dulles during the peace talks weakened him politically, both within the context of the negotiations and within Japanese domestic politics. Yoshida had been placed in a difficult position, principally due to the secret nature of the negotiations. Due to this the opposition did not know of, or appreciate, his dogged resistance, and his mild concessions in the creation of the NSF infuriated both the Left and Right, who respectively accused him of going too far, and not going far enough.⁸² This unenviable situation was further exacerbated by the

⁸⁰ Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 8/9/51, printed in Lu, *Japan, A Documentary History*, p 500. For the relevant clause of the UN Charter see: Appendix XI. 'UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51, 26 June 1945'.

⁸¹ Picture courtesy of:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/Military_parade_celebrating_establishment_of_NSF5.JPG.

⁸² Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', pp 140-142.

difficult position in which he found himself in the Diet. The Prime Minister, due to the initially secret commitment made to the Americans to create the NSF, was forced to publicly defend the conversion of the NPR into the NSF, a measure he did not want or feel Japan needed, resulting in what Ōtake terms 'confusing, contradictory and tricky' public statements on the subject.⁸³

The House of Representatives elections held on 1 October 1952, fought partially over the issue of rearmament, demonstrated just how much political capital Yoshida had expended to secure a peace treaty. Yoshida's Liberals lost 24 seats, and the Socialists more than doubled their representation, with their Left and Right wings winning 54 and 57 seats respectively.⁸⁴ However, Yoshida did have some good news with which to console himself, the JCP, lost all 35 of the seats it won in 1949, mainly due to its 'Military Policy' and the violence of events such as Bloody May Day.⁸⁵ Despite this cold comfort, the election and the loss of credibility Yoshida had suffered, alongside the return of powerful rivals such as Hatoyama Ichiro meant that, as Miyazawa states, the Yoshida Cabinet had contracted a 'terminal illness'.⁸⁶

This 'terminal illness' was principally induced by the strength of opposition confronting Yoshida after the depurges of 1952. The individual policies of those opposing Yoshida varied but Soeya aptly argues that Yoshida and his opposition in this period fell into three distinct groups: Yoshida and his supporters favoured 'Collaboration', others such as Hatoyama sought 'Autonomy', and finally some desired 'Independence', including many members of the Socialist and Communist Parties.

⁸³ Ibid, p 141.

⁸⁴ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 81; Elections For the House of Representatives, 1946-55, printed in, J.A.A. Stockwin, *Dictionary of The Modern Politics of Japan*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003, pp 72-73; Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, p 237.

⁸⁵ For more on the 1949 election see: Chapter 1, pp 57-58. For more on the 'military policy' and Bloody May Day see: Chapter 1, pp 49-74; Chapter 4, pp 251-270, 267-270; Appendix IX.' Major JCP Related Incidents 1951-1952'.

⁸⁶ K. Miyazawa, *Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington, The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949-1954*, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2007, p 67.

Soeya defines Yoshida's position as one of seeking economic regeneration with minimum security forces within both the 1947 constitution and the United States' sphere of influence. As this work has argued, Yoshida resisted rearmament for as long as possible, due to his desire for internal security and fear of the return of militarism, alongside other reasons cited below. Yoshida pursued a pragmatic policy aimed at what he believed were Japan's national interests, through cooperation with United States where it matched his goals, and the prevailing circumstances. Soeya argues that despite his occasionally intractable resistance to their policies, American policymakers were actually more concerned in this period by the nationalism of his rivals than by Yoshida's occasionally uncooperative attitude.⁸⁷

The rivals which worried the US included Yoshida's major opponents such as Ashida Hitoshi, Shigemitsu Mamoru and Hatoyama Ichiro. These individuals are characterised by Soeya as supporters of an 'Autonomous' approach to Japanese diplomacy and the interconnected issue of rearmament. Broadly, this approach centred on a desire for autonomy in foreign relations (including the freedom to deal with the PRC and USSR as they wished) in order to avoid becoming a passive pawn of US policy, but not to the extent of seeking to withdraw Japan from America's sphere of influence. Some of those put into this bracket by Soeya, particularly Hatoyama and a youthful Nakasone Yasuhiro, also sought to satisfy their nationalist beliefs by rejecting US influence on Japanese domestic policy, and through the pursuit of full rearmament and constitutional revision. However, as Prime Minister, despite unsuccessful efforts towards constitutional revision, Hatoyama made little progress in his push for greater autonomy, with his October 1956 normalisation of relations with USSR being his only notable success in this regard.⁸⁸

Soeya's model is broadly accurate, but the positions of most of the individuals it identifies varied somewhat during the 1950 to 1954, a good

⁸⁷ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy*, pp 5-7.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p 8.

example of this being Ashida Hitoshi, the former Prime Minister behind some of the early attempts at creating a constabulary force in the late 1940s.⁸⁹ Ashida, leader of the Democratic Party until 1952, and hence Yoshida's principal conservative rival during the life of the NPR, adjusted his position on a number of rearmament related policies during the period, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War. Despite being consistently opposed to neutrality, the North Korean invasion forced Ashida to abandon his policy of seeking an overall peace treaty including the Soviet Union and communist China.⁹⁰ Ashida's stance on rearmament also changed over time. Although originally favouring a constabulary force, the Korean War again caused Ashida to alter his position, arguing in an early 1951 policy paper that the NPR was unable to defend Japan as its character and personnel rendered it unsuitable for external security duties.⁹¹ Ashida instead advocated the immediate creation of an additional fifteen division force of 200,000 men armed with 4,000 armoured personnel carriers, 5,000 tanks and an unspecified number of combat aircraft.⁹² These demands later strengthened to include advocacy of the creation of units of 'volunteers' to serve in Korea under UN command, a form of conscription, a system of reservists, and the creation of provisions for the overseas use of the security forces.⁹³ These demands and the influence of the Korean conflict also shifted Ashida's stance on the constitution, with his initial belief that rearmament could be achieved within it, changing into a rejection of article nine and hence the advocacy of constitutional revision.⁹⁴ Clearly Ashida's position shifted over time, but his consistent opposition to neutrality or alignment with the Soviet Union and

⁸⁹ For more on Ashida and his efforts to strengthen Japanese internal security see: Chapter 1, pp 80-88.

⁹⁰ Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, (YF-A10), 'Information Regarding Japanese Views and Attitudes, Feb-December 1950', Sebald to Secretary of State, 28/12/50, Reel 11; YF-A16, 2B-101, Overton to Johnson, Tokyo Despatch no. 220, 8/5/50.

⁹¹ YF-A16, 2F-71 Ashida Hitoshi, 'A Brief Statement of Views on National Security', 2/51, p 3.

⁹² Ibid, pp 2, 4.

⁹³ YF-A16, 2F-86, Japanese Reservations to the Peace Settlement on the Eve of the Special Diet Session, Report, 10/10/51; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 85.

⁹⁴ YF-A16, 2F-71 Ashida Hitoshi, 'A Brief Statement of Views on National Security', 2/51, p 4; L.J. Schoppa, 'International Cooperation Despite Domestic Conflict: Japanese Politics and the San Francisco Treaties', Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in New Orleans, 24-27/3/02, p 11.

his support of a heavily armed Japan able to use its military power to its own advantage, but firmly within the US sphere of influence, place him in the 'Autonomous' group, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War.

Shigemitsu Mamoru (Foreign Minister 1943-1945 and 1954-1956) succeeded Ashida as leader of the Democratic Party after the 1952 depurge and, like his predecessor, can also be placed in the 'Autonomous Nationalist' camp.⁹⁵ Shigemitsu believed that Japan should not be exclusively tied to the United States and that rearmament would give Japan a degree of autonomy from the US, providing a way of normalising relations with the communist powers from a position of strength. This belief probably lay behind his unenthusiastic attitude to Hatoyama's later efforts at normalisation, which took place without what he considered to be an adequate level of prior rearmament. Despite these differences, like Hatoyama, Shigemitsu was also advised on defence issues by Hattori Takushiro and this may have influenced his positive attitude to rearmament and his perception of its value in relations with both the superpowers.⁹⁶ Having strong convictions on the importance of rearmament did not, however, preclude Shigemitsu from compromising over key issues when necessary. For example in the months preceding his eventual agreement with Yoshida, Shigemitsu moved away from Ashida's policies of immediate full-scale rearmament, de-facto conscription, the creation of reservists, and possible overseas use of the NSF. He abandoned these principals in favour of Yoshida's more moderate package of balanced autonomous forces based on the principles of voluntary, and strictly internal, service. These concessions helped him and Yoshida reach their key compromise on security issues in late 1953.⁹⁷

A final figure who could safely be placed in the 'Autonomous Nationalist' group is the former admiral and diplomat, Nomura Kichisaburō. Nomura,

⁹⁵ S.K. Chai, 'Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalisation', *International Organisation*, Vol. 51, No. 3, Summer 1997, p 388.

⁹⁶ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy*, p 10; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 84-85.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p 85.

who also served as an advisor to Yoshida, certainly expressed some pro-rearmament sentiments, was involved in rearmament planning and argued against neutrality. Despite his clear commitment to the rebuilding of Japanese naval forces some of his statements in favour of strengthened internal security forces, and close cooperation with the US, could also be shown to illustrate some affinity with Yoshida's 'collaborative' approach. The fact that Nomura also later declined the post of Defense Agency Director General in order to preserve the principle of civilian control, despite having been a civilian for over twenty years, could also be cited as another example of this.⁹⁸

The final bracket into which Soeya groups the opposition to Yoshida are those he terms as favouring an 'Independent' foreign policy, including many in the Socialist and Communist Parties. This position, championed by men such as the Socialist leader Asanuma Inejiro, was broadly characterised by support of the 1947 constitution and unarmed neutrality, a resistance to the later Occupation reforms, and a belief in that the creation of any type of security forces was likely to result in the return of militarism.⁹⁹ Soeya argues that those who belonged to this group did not see approaching the communist powers as contradictory to neutrality, but as a necessary to free Japan from the American sphere of influence. This contradiction, and what Hata would term its unrealistic, or even utopian, conception of the Cold War made this policy position one which had virtually no chance of being implemented.¹⁰⁰ Soeya summaries this weakness well:

Neutrality was not a well thought-out diplomatic strategy, but just a slogan that allowed them [its supporters] to escape from the

⁹⁸ J. Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p 52; Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, pp 238-241; YF-A16, 2B-81, Memorandum of Conversation, Huston and Nomura, 10/4/50.

⁹⁹ YF-A10, 'Information Regarding Japanese Views and Attitudes, Feb-December 1950', Sebald to Secretary of State, 'Year End Press Conference', 29/12/50, Reel 11.

¹⁰⁰ I. Hata, *Shiroku, Nihon Saigunbi (Historical Record, Japanese Rearmament)*, Bungei Shunjūkan, Tokyo, 1976, p 114.

contradiction between their refusal to deal with the United States and the reality that the United States was almost omnipotent in directing the future of Japan. The independence line, therefore, had no chance of becoming a central diplomatic orientation of postwar Japan.¹⁰¹

These weaknesses did not, however, dampen the appeal of this position, with it forming the future basis for the 1960 security treaty protests, and the principal opposition to Hatoyama, Ishibashi Tanzan and Kishi's 'Autonomous Nationalism' in the late 1950s.¹⁰² This rivalry between the 'Independent' and 'Autonomous' approaches is interesting and hints at the divisions and differences in Japan's postwar nationalism, when compared with the relatively unified pre-1945 state sponsored variety.¹⁰³

Soeya's approach to defining the state of Japanese politics in the 1950s seems an effective characterisation of the three dominant schools of thought in existence at the time although it does suffer some weaknesses. For example, Soeya's account does suffer from some factual errors, such as giving the date of the postwar constitution as 1946 rather than 1947.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, as highlighted above, his interpretation does paint a range of positions which varied over time in rather broad brush strokes, although this is excusable in a study such as his own, and in this work, neither of which aim to provide an exhaustive analysis of post 1952 Japanese domestic politics. Finally, it seems Soeya's final group of 'Independence Nationalists' is rather too broad and could benefit from the addition of a fourth group, perhaps entitled 'Pro-Soviet', which included many members of the JCP, who favoured explicit alignment with the Soviet Union.

Despite the growing influence of the 'Autonomous Nationalists' from 1952 onwards, Yoshida struggled on, believing that with the creation of the NSF

¹⁰¹ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy*, pp 12-13.

¹⁰² G.R. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo, The Security Crisis of 1960*, Princeton University Press, 1966, p 82.

¹⁰³ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy*, p 13.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid*, p 5.

the issue of rearmament was closed and that the Americans were unlikely to ask for more, and that even if they did he would be able to resist their demands more effectively now that Japanese sovereignty had been restored, ideas which Ōtake says were serious errors of judgement on the part of the Prime Minister.¹⁰⁵

Ultimately, Yoshida was indeed mistaken and US pressure for rearmament persisted. Despite a ceasefire in Korea, most American thinking on communism and the threat of the Soviet Union had changed little. In an attempt towards the practical realisation of the policy goals of NSC 68, the US sought to rearm its allies to bolster their capacity to resist and deter Soviet aggression.¹⁰⁶

The concrete form of this effort was Mutual Security Assistance (MSA), also sometimes referred to as Mutual Defense Assistance. This programme of aid made economic support for America's allies conditional on their military contribution, which was explicitly expressed in terms of possessing and expanding a military through reference to 'self-defense', 'military assistance', 'armed forces' and 'defensive armed strength'.¹⁰⁷ The 1949 act aimed to provide 'equipment, materials and services' to America's allies and in doing so sought to enhance their, and America's, defence industries and military power.¹⁰⁸ Another, concealed aim was to stifle 'nationalistic tendencies' in the recipient countries, and hence the policy embodied Sarantakes' theory of double containment; the simultaneous containment of communism and resurgent nationalism within America's allies (especially the former Axis powers).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 81; Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 141.

¹⁰⁶ NSC 68, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 14/4/1950, printed in, Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*.

¹⁰⁷ Mutual Defense Act of 1949, 6/10/49, printed in, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 44, No. 1, Jan. 1950, pp 29-38.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁹ LaFeber, *America, Russia and The Cold War*, pp 78-79; Truman Library, Papers of David D Lloyd, Box 5, Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee, 'Draft, Effect of the MAP on U.S. Security', 22/6/49; N.E. Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*, Texas A & M University Press, College Station, 2000, pp xv, xviii-xix; For more on double containment see Chapter 2, pp 92, 96, 128.

Although originally designed to support NATO, Greece and Turkey, by 1953 the US also sought to use the act to push Japan further towards rearmament. Although supported by some major Japanese industrialists who saw the opportunities for export and modernisation that MSA presented, Yoshida remained sceptical.¹¹⁰ The Prime Minister did see the benefits of the vast amounts of aid he could win for Japan but remained opposed to further militarization of the NSF, and hence sought to make the minimum commitment permissible for the maximum amount of aid possible.¹¹¹

MSA also represented the formal assumption of more of the mantle of external security from the United States.¹¹² Despite the agreements made in the 1951 security treaty to assume more of the burden for external defence, the rationale and mission of the NSF was still largely internal; as Masuhara states, its role was 'to maintain peace and order in our country' [author's emphasis].¹¹³ In order to meet the criteria for MSA Japan needed to reform the NSF to give it an even greater role in external security, or replace it with another force. Either of these options would require new legislation or major reform of the NSA/NSF laws.¹¹⁴

An often cited example of the negotiations over the extent of the external security contribution to be made by Japan at this time are the Ikeda Robertson talks of 1953. The talks began in Washington in July, headed by Assistant Secretary of State Walter S Robertson and Ikeda Hayato, a former finance minister and future Prime Minister (1960-1964).¹¹⁵ In an early meeting on 15 July the US delegation made it clear to the Japanese that in order to qualify for MSA, a full army and navy were required, i.e.

¹¹⁰ M.J. Green, *Arming Japan, Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p 37; J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1988, p 447.

¹¹¹ Green, *Arming Japan*, p 37.

¹¹² Royama, 'Problems of Self-Defense', p 169.

¹¹³ K. Masuhara, *A Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 1956, p 4.

¹¹⁴ S. Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs, The Story of Japan in Crisis*, Heinemann, London, 1961, p 188.

¹¹⁵ Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, pp 227-228.

rearmament.¹¹⁶ The Americans also renewed their push for a ground force of between 325,000 to 350,000 men.¹¹⁷ In response Ikeda and his colleagues claimed that a gradual expansion over five years to 210,000 was the maximum obtainable without bringing in conscription or new taxes.¹¹⁸

Despite being unable to fully resolve these differences a joint declaration was issued at the end of October and in the final agreement Japan accepted military aid and orders for US offshore procurement and was obliged to increase its 'military' as far as its economy permitted. Japanese business was also allowed to sell raw materials and semi-finished goods to the US and the Japanese government also agreed to a trade embargo on the communist bloc.¹¹⁹ The agreement was signed on 8 March 1954 and helped in paving the way for the creation of the SDF on 1 July 1954, almost four years to the day after the creation of the NPR.¹²⁰

The importance of the Ikeda-Robertson talks are stressed by some historians, particularly Miyazawa Kiichi, (Prime Minister 1991-1993), a junior participant in the talks at the time, but others challenge the central position given by him to the negotiations. For example, whilst Miyazawa argues that the talks were: 'interpreted by the public as deciding the basics of Japan-U.S. relations for the future, and indeed, we believed this to be the case as well', Uemura characterises the talks as merely a 'comma' in a series of larger negotiations.¹²¹ Like Uemura, Swenson-Wright argues that the Yoshida-Shigemitsu negotiations of 1953 were far

¹¹⁶ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 83; *Asahi Shinbun*, 17/7/53.

¹¹⁷ Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, U.S. Memo, 21/10/53, printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, pp 267-268, hereafter 'Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, U.S. Memo, 21/10/53'.

¹¹⁸ Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, Japanese Memo, 19/10/53, printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen, *Showa Zaiseishi*, pp 264-266, hereafter 'Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, Japanese Memo, 19/10/53'; Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, p 228.

¹¹⁹ U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 8/3/54, available at: <http://www.learner.org/workshops/primarysources/coldwar/docs/usjapan.html>

¹²⁰ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 82; Masuhara, *A Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, pp 4-5.

¹²¹ Miyazawa, *Secret Talks*, p 97; H. Uemura, 'Ikeda-Robātoson Kaidan to Bōeiryoku Zōkyō Mondai' (The Ikeda-Robertson Talks and the Development of the Defence Forces), *Kokusai Seiji*, No. 105, Jan 1994, p 192.

more significant in determining the eventual form of the Japanese security forces, arguing that: 'the [Ikeda-Robertson] talks were neither an unambiguous diplomatic victory for the Japanese side nor a decisive turning-point in the defence negotiations . . . a September 27 arrangement between Yoshida and Shigemitsu – not the Ikeda mission to Washington – was the critical event in the development of Japan's early post war defense policy'.¹²²

The Yoshida-Shigemitsu negotiations were indeed highly significant, eventually resulting in a compromise between the differing priorities of both men. The agreement can be said to be the point at which Yoshida's 'Collaborative' policy fused with the 'Autonomous Nationalism' of Shigemitsu. This new found cooperation is evidenced in the content of the agreement, with Shigemitsu's desire for a new force (ultimately the SDF) based on new legislation, winning over Yoshida's preference for a reformed NSF, and Yoshida's opposition to a full defence ministry and his commitment to an internal security role and civilian control being maintained in the new force.¹²³ This arrangement could also be said to be the starting point of the relatively heavily armed, but still dependent, Japanese defence policy which persists to this day. The importance of these negotiations also extended beyond defence policy, helping to create the basis for future conservative unity and success, in the face of the electoral gains, and simultaneous, albeit unsuccessful, merger talks of the two wings of the Socialist party.¹²⁴

Both the Yoshida-Shigemitsu and Ikeda-Robertson talks took place during a period in which a large range of official and unofficial discussions took place between groups of Japanese politicians, diplomats and NSF officers and their American counterparts. The opinions expressed in these discussions by the Japanese on the desirable size and character of their future armed forces also varied widely, even within the government,

¹²² Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies*, p 196.

¹²³ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp 85-86.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, p 84.

leading Swenson-Wright to correctly surmise that the 'the Japanese authorities, were not, it seems, speaking with one voice'.¹²⁵

This plurality of discussions continued after the Ikeda-Robertson talks, causing some confusion on both sides but eventually also settling key issues such the exact troop levels to which the Japanese were willing to commit (an expansion from four divisions to six, entailing the addition of 31,000 uniformed, and 10,000 civilian staff).¹²⁶ Furthermore, other events, such as the assumption of the US presidency by Eisenhower and his recognition of more realistic limits to what the US could expect from Japan also contributed to the reduction of US demands.¹²⁷ Thus, it can be argued that the Ikeda-Robertson were not as important as claimed by Miyazawa, being overshadowed by the Yoshida-Shigemitsu agreement and supplemented and amended by later agreements. However, the substantial amounts of aid and investment that the agreement won for Japan should not be discounted, and proved were instrumental in bolstering Japan's defence industry and economy, helping to facilitate the transformation of the NSF into the SDF.

In his struggles with the Americans and his compromises with Shigemitsu, Yoshida had preserved most of his key positions on Japanese security and had won substantial amounts of aid for Japan, but the fact that he did not divulge the details of MSA agreement to the Diet for months resulted in bruising political battles with the opposition and factions within his own party.¹²⁸ The growing unpopularity of Yoshida was evidenced by the loss of more seats to the Socialists and Hatoyama's splinter Liberal Party in the April 1953 elections.¹²⁹ These developments, together with an economic recession for almost all of 1954 and bitter factional battles with political

¹²⁵ Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies*, p 196.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, pp 198-199.

¹²⁷ NSC 5516/1, 9/4/55, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, pp 52-55

¹²⁸ Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, p 228.

¹²⁹ 'Elections For the House of Representatives, 1946-55', printed in, J.A.A. Stockwin, *Dictionary of The Modern Politics of Japan*, pp 72-73.

rivals such as Hatoyama, eventually cost Yoshida his premiership on 10 December 1954.¹³⁰

Throughout these negotiations Yoshida and the Japanese government employed a number of stratagems and arguments to resist the American economic, political and diplomatic pressure brought to bear upon them.¹³¹ Some were new but many of these moves were common to those used during the life of the NPR. The arguments advanced to resist the American demands included worries over the impact on Japan's economy and international trade, concerns over sovereignty, fear of involvement in US military adventures, the belief that an external security force was unnecessary, worries over the impact on domestic security and politics, and doubts over the legal and physical practicality of the vast expansion and remilitarization sought by the US. These complex and often interconnected arguments are given different weights of importance by various participants and historians but one aspect of the negotiations is clear: the Japanese government attempted to oppose the plans of the US as far as possible and sought whatever benefits it could when forced to make concessions.¹³² As Nakanishi notes, this approach was the result of the astute recognition by Yoshida of what powers Japan had left to negotiate with, and his keen appreciation of the realities of the postwar international environment, particularly of the Cold War and the opportunities and challenges it presented for Japan.¹³³

Perhaps the most often cited argument employed by Yoshida and his successors, and that seen by most to underpin the 'Yoshida Doctrine' (see

¹³⁰ Economic Research Association, *Business Cycle in Japan After the World War II*, Economic Research Association, Tokyo, 2002, p 1, available at http://www.zai-keicho.or.jp/english/market_price/50years/cycleen.pdf; R.A. Scalapino and J. Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*, University of California Press, London, 1971, pp 82-83.

¹³¹ Weste, 'Great Britain and Japanese Rearmament', p 39.

¹³² T. Kawasaki, 'The Yoshida Doctrine: A Conceptual Analysis', Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, 1-5/3/05, pp 1-2.

¹³³ H. Nakanishi, 'Haisenkoku no Gaikō Senryaku – Yoshida Shigeru no Gaikō to sono Keishōsha' (The Diplomatic Strategy of a Defeated Nation: Yoshida Shigeru and his Successors), Paper presented at the National Institute of Defence Studies International Forum on War History, Tokyo, 15-16/10/03, pp 122-135.

below), was a rejection of extensive rearmament on the grounds of economic impact.¹³⁴ The impossibility of rearmament due to the fragile state of Japan's economy was repeatedly stressed by Yoshida during the Dulles talks (1950-1953) and other variants of this argument were employed over the years. For example, during the Mutual Security Aid (MSA) negotiations, the argument was made that Japan was unable to afford the proposed expansion of the NSF due to the excessive economic impact of a number of natural disasters which had occurred that year.¹³⁵ The potentially negative political and economic impact of rearmament on Japan's trade and diplomatic relations with its Asian and Australasian neighbours was also linked to this argument.¹³⁶

Economic considerations also played a central part in the MSA negotiations. Seeing there were few direct political or security benefits to be gained in conceding to the US demands for further rearmament, the Japanese government primarily sought MSA in order to secure food aid, US investment in Japan's infrastructure, and arms industry, and the sizeable orders the US intended to place in Japan's arms factories.¹³⁷ The economic argument became deeply ingrained in the Japanese government's attitude to the SDF and even found its way into the official canons of the force, with Masuhara stating in 1956 that 'every possible effort must, of course, be made to increase the defensive strength within a reasonable balance with the nation's resources and people's livelihood'.¹³⁸

A further, and sometimes neglected, issue used by the Japanese government were their concerns over sovereignty.¹³⁹ Nakanishi argues that sovereignty formed the key element of Japan's postwar diplomatic

¹³⁴ Chai, 'Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine', pp 397-398; Miyazawa, *Secret Talks*, p 93; *New York Times*, 9/8/53; Yoshida, *Memoirs*, p 267; S. Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, Rowan and Littlefield, Plymouth, 2007, pp 80, 215.

¹³⁵ Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, Japanese Memo, 19/10/53. For more on natural disasters and the NPR see: Chapter 4, pp 281-284.

¹³⁶ Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, pp 235-236; Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 139; Chai, 'Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine', p 397.

¹³⁷ Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, Japanese Memo, 19/10/53; Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, U.S. Memo, 21/10/53, pp 264- 266, 267-268; Green, *Arming Japan*, p 39.

¹³⁸ Masuhara, *Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, p 1.

¹³⁹ Yoshida, *Memoirs*, p 266; Hosoya, 'Japan's Response to U.S. Policy', p 20.

strategy, with the ultimate objective of Yoshida and his successors up until 1972 being the reinstatement of Japan's position as a full, legitimate member of the international community.¹⁴⁰ The return of Japanese sovereignty through the conclusion of a peace treaty was the principal concern of Yoshida during the Dulles negotiations and was the reason behind the limited concessions he made which resulted in the creation of the NSF. Japan's resistance to combined defence planning with the United States and its reluctance to place the SDF under US command in the case of a crisis also had their origins in Japanese concerns over sovereignty, but also owed something to Yoshida's determination not to become embroiled in another war.¹⁴¹ Moreover, this fear of becoming involved in future conflicts was also linked to the concern held by Yoshida about the revival of militarism and the possible danger of a coup d'état from a more powerful military, or one too close to the United States.¹⁴²

Herzog makes an interesting link between the economic and sovereignty issues. He argues that the two issues were directly linked in the minds of Yoshida and his successors, in that they were concerned about the economic impact of large-scale rearmament on Japan's 'economic sovereignty'. The excessive cost of which could have made the country a permanent economic ward of the United States and hence susceptible to US pressure due to Japan's dependence on aid.¹⁴³ This opinion, although ultimately unjustified, was also shared by some US policymakers, who feared that a Japan stripped of its former empire might not be economically viable.¹⁴⁴

Another major argument made by the Japanese government was that expanded and more muscular security forces were unnecessary from an external security point of view. Unlike some Americans, Yoshida and most of his close associates had long believed that the US military presence in

¹⁴⁰ Nakanishi, 'Haisenokoku no Gaikō', pp 122-135.

¹⁴¹ *History of the National Police Reserve*, p 195; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 80.

¹⁴² Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 139.

¹⁴³ Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, p 227.

¹⁴⁴ YF-A10, Subject File, 1945-51, 'Miscellaneous State Department Material', 'Japanese Economic Prospects', 4/8/49, Reel 11, p 11.

Japan alone was enough to deter direct Soviet aggression.¹⁴⁵ Many of the Japanese population also shared this view and this fact was also used to strengthen Japan's hand during the Ikeda-Robertson talks in 1953.¹⁴⁶ Yoshida and his advisors had always been circumspect on the need for an external security force, even questioning the need for one during the height of the Chinese offensive in Korea.¹⁴⁷ However, Yoshida and his subordinates were unified in their wish for a strong internal security force, believing serious communist aggression against Japan, if it ever occurred, would be in the form of Soviet sponsored guerrillas, linked with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).¹⁴⁸

These internal security concerns also influenced Japanese opposition to the US push for rearmament in other ways. Ōtake argues that Yoshida worried that if he consented to full-scale rearmament, the resulting boost for the Left could threaten his leadership and even result in widespread demonstrations and escalating internal security problems.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Yoshida demonstrated his skill as a negotiator by exploiting the same fears in the Americans by covertly encouraging some Socialist protests during the Dulles talks.¹⁵⁰ As predicted by the CIA in 1951, the concern over the potential public reaction was widely used by the Japanese government to argue against rearmament. However, despite the negotiating tactics it supported, these fears were based on the genuine pacifist sentiment amongst much of the population, and the fact that in conceding further Yoshida could not make political gains and could only lose support and respect, from both the Right and Left.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p 140; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p 428; Shibayama, 'US, Britain, Japan and the Issue of Casus Belli', pp 17-18.

¹⁴⁶ Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, Japanese Memo, 19/10/53, pp 264-266.

¹⁴⁷ Miyazawa, *Secret Talks*, p 31; Shibayama, 'US, Britain, Japan and the Issue of Casus Belli', p 19.

¹⁴⁸ Shibayama, 'US, Britain, Japan and the Issue of Casus Belli', p 19.

¹⁴⁹ Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 139.

¹⁵⁰ T. Igarashi, 'Peacemaking and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1985, p 350.

¹⁵¹ CIA, NIE-19, 'Feasibility of Japanese Rearmament in Association with the United States', 20/4/51, p 1; Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 140; Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, Japanese Memo, 19/10/53, pp 264- 266.

On numerous occasions the 1947 constitution and its 'no war' clause were also cited in opposition to the US plans.¹⁵² Despite its frequent employment and even being termed 'the perfect excuse' by Yoshida, this argument had been weakened by the content of the UN Charter and 1951 Security Treaty, both of which affirmed states' right to self defence.¹⁵³ This position was reinforced by repeated pronouncements by MacArthur, Yoshida himself and others that article nine of the constitution did not preclude Japan's right to self defence.¹⁵⁴

Finally, specific arguments over the feasibility on the practicalities of rearmament on the scale advocated by the United States were fielded. These were especially prominent during the MSA negotiations and included fears that the rapid and sizeable recruitment sought by the US could result in JCP infiltration and possible mutiny or rebellion (in a similar fashion to the Korean Constabulary) and over the legal impossibility of introducing conscription to facilitate rapid expansion.¹⁵⁵

An original and interesting approach to the subject of Japanese resistance is taken by Ōtake Hideo. In opposition to most other historiography on the subject, Ōtake argues that Yoshida's long-term objective was actually rearmament and the return to full sovereignty that it represented, claiming, in common with Dower, that these beliefs stemmed from Yoshida's position and mindset as political survivor of the Imperial Japanese polity.¹⁵⁶ According to Ōtake, Yoshida sought to attain his aim of a rearmed Japan through the preservation and promotion of Japanese

¹⁵² Article 9, *The Constitution of Japan*, 1947, printed in, G.D. Hook and G. McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution*, Routledge, London, 2001, p 191; Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, Japanese Memo, 19/10/53, pp 264- 266; Miyazawa, *Secret Talks*, p 93.

¹⁵³ Appendix XI. 'UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51, 26 June 1945'.

¹⁵⁴ Chai, 'Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine', p 398; *New York Herald Tribune*, 1/1/50; *Asahi Shinbun*, 1/2/52; *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VII, Article 51, 26/6/1945; Appendix XI. 'UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51, 26 June 1945'; Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 8/9/51, printed in, Lu, *Japan, A Documentary History*, p 500; Miyazawa, *Secret Talks*, p 81.

¹⁵⁵ Ikeda-Robertson Consultation, Japanese Memo, 19/10/53, pp 264- 266. For more on the Korean Constabulary see: Chapter 2, pp 125-138. For more on the methods employed to weed out JCP members in the NPR see Chapter 3, pp 157-158; Chapter 4, pp 270-281.

¹⁵⁶ Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', p 141; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p 3.

culture and an emphasis on nationalist education, designed to gradually obscure the pacifism instilled by Occupation reforms and psychologically re-equip the Japanese people for a return to international power politics.

Again in opposition to the prevailing view, Ōtake views the arguments Yoshida made as merely temporary delaying tactics and claims that he secretly supported rearmament all along. For example, Ōtake claims that Yoshida knew that: the economic arguments would eventually become invalid as the Japanese economy grew, neighbouring countries' objections would decline over time as trust was rebuilt, political and popular opposition to rearmament could be eliminated over time through reforming education, and likewise the threat from the military could be removed through 'democratic education'.¹⁵⁷

Dower also argues that Yoshida always secretly planned to rearm Japan.¹⁵⁸ Dower claims Yoshida's opposition was merely a politically expedient way to return Japan to great power status as swiftly as possible through the removal of barriers and opposition to Japan's return to the international community and by ensuring her economic recovery. Extending this theory, Dower believes that for Yoshida the disarmament enshrined in the 1947 constitution was never 'eternal' and that the Prime Minister's policies were a web of lies which resulted in 'moderate . . . creeping rearmament, mendacity in the Diet and a perversion of the constitution', and ultimately in the rearmament which Dower alleges Yoshida sought.¹⁵⁹ An examination of the efforts by Yoshida to preserve the NPR and resist US demands for rearmament, and the political capital he expended in doing so, which certainly contributed heavily to his own downfall, expose some limitations in Dower's interpretation, at least when applied to the period in which the NPR existed.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore,

¹⁵⁷ H. Ōtake, *Saigunbi to Nashonorizumu, Sengo Nihon no Bōeikan* (Rearmament and Nationalism, Post-war Japanese Defence Thought), Kodansha, 2005, pp 33-34; Ōtake, 'Defense Contributions', pp 139-141.

¹⁵⁸ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp 397-400.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 400.

¹⁶⁰ For Yoshida's desire for a constabulary see: Chapter 1, p 88-91.

weaknesses in Dower's definitions of rearmament and his limited source base limit his usefulness on this issue.¹⁶¹

Swenson-Wright is more balanced in his position on Yoshida's long-term intentions, arguing that Yoshida may well have eventually planned to rearm, but aptly noting the difficulty of judging the true stance of Yoshida through his cloak of often opaque and sometimes contradictory statements.¹⁶² The 'black box' (or perhaps 'mirror') which seems to confront historians examining Yoshida's long-term thinking on rearmament is further complicated by both the secrecy of Yoshida and the inaccessibility of much of the Japanese source material, as is also noted by Swenson-Wright: '[Yoshida's] independent style and a tendency to keep close council has made it difficult to interpret his thinking on certain critical diplomatic issues, a problem compounded by the Japanese government's reluctance to open its diplomatic records'.¹⁶³ Notwithstanding these complications, it seems that Yoshida's shifting political fortunes probably influenced his opinions after 1952. Faced with the considerable political challenges detailed above, Yoshida's pragmatism and deft political skill would never have allowed him to entirely rule out any option or any potential future compromise, in order to maintain his grip on power. Examples of Yoshida 'hedging his bets' in this way could be said to be demonstrated through actions such as: his indirect support for groups which were planning for rearmament at the time including one headed by Nomura, and the output of official policy research such as that of the NSA's 'Systems Research Committee' (*Seido Chōsa linkai*).¹⁶⁴

Despite this hints at Yoshida considering having to make concessions to stay in power some of his actions after 1952 do hint at continued opposition to the more traditional type of rearmament favoured by his

¹⁶¹ For more on Kowalski, definitions and Dower regarding bases as part of rearmament see: Introduction, pp 7, 14-17, 21, 26, 29, 31, 42-47; Chapter 2, 113-114.

¹⁶² Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies*, p 52.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, p 51.

¹⁶⁴ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp 443-444; Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies*, p 194.

'Autonomous Nationalist' opposition, and a possible continued preference for constabulary type security forces.¹⁶⁵ A good examples of this can be found in the 1953 security negotiations between Yoshida and Shigemitsu, in which the Prime Minister won concessions over civilian control (aimed at preventing the growth of influence of men like Hattori), and over the placing of the internal security at an equal priority to external security.¹⁶⁶ While these compromises could be said to indicate that after 1952 Yoshida still sought to maintain armed forces rooted in the constabulary model of the NPR, it is difficult to make a definitive judgement, especially without either the full Japanese diplomatic records, or an obviously unobtainable, truthful disposition from Yoshida himself. However, what is not in doubt is the commitment of Yoshida to the constabulary model during the life of the NPR for the reasons cited above, supported by the evidence provided throughout this work, and as recognised by other historians such as Swenson-Wright who also note the pronounced reluctance of Yoshida to rearm in 1950-1951.¹⁶⁷

The above arguments were eventually characterised as elements of the concept known as the 'Yoshida Doctrine', a policy in which postwar Japan deliberately eschewed rearmament and participation in traditional great power diplomacy in favour of an emphasis on economic growth.¹⁶⁸ Clearly the economic arguments cited above formed the core of this policy, especially after 1952, but recent studies have shown that the political and security issues noted above also played their part. Furthermore, prior to the 1951 peace treaty, the return of sovereignty was certainly Yoshida's principal concern, even outweighing economic considerations.¹⁶⁹

Although, through using the above arguments, the Japanese resisted American demands for greater rearmament and a more substantial contribution to Japan's external security as far as they could, some

¹⁶⁵ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy*, pp 8-10.

¹⁶⁶ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp 85-6.

¹⁶⁷ Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies*, p 52.

¹⁶⁸ Kawasaki, 'The Yoshida Doctrine: A Conceptual Analysis', pp 1-2.

¹⁶⁹ Nakanishi, 'Haisenokoku no Gaikō', pp 122-135.

concessions to the Americans were necessary in order to remain on good terms with their former occupiers. Clear examples of these concessions can be found in the 1951 Peace and Security Treaties in which the Japanese government affirmed its right to self defence and committed itself to an increasing contribution to its own defence.¹⁷⁰ This commitment to contribute towards external security was further strengthened by the absence of an explicit reciprocal American commitment to defend Japan and measures such as the 1954 withdrawal of the US 1st Cavalry division from Hokkaido and the corresponding assumption of ground defence of the island by the GSDF.¹⁷¹ The content of Masuhara's 1956 *Review of Japan's Defense Strength* also demonstrates this assumption of external security duties by the NSF and GSDF, in claiming that: 'we must establish a self-sustaining defensive system able to bear up against both direct and indirect aggression'.¹⁷²

Perhaps most indicative of the GSDF's assumption of a greater role in the external security of Japan was the creation of the Air Self Defence Forces in 1954. Clearly, jet fighters such as the American F-86 'Sabre' (see figure XXXIX) were of little value for internal security duties.¹⁷³ However, the absence of aerial refuelling capabilities, aircraft carriers and heavy bombers from the ASDF for many years also demonstrate the defensive nature of the force. This is due to both the lack of power projection the absence of these capabilities reveals, and the post-Korean War American conception of any future major war as being one centring on aerial nuclear bombardment of enemy territory, in which any state lacking a nuclear bomber fleet would play a purely defensive role.¹⁷⁴ The knockout blow dealt to Japan by America's strategic bomber force during the Second

¹⁷⁰ Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 8/9/51, printed in Lu, *Japan, A Documentary History*, p 500; Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, p 236.

¹⁷¹ Royama, 'Problems of Self-Defense', p 168, footnote 1; H.C. Banks, *1st Cavalry Division: A Spur Ride through the 20th Century, From Horses to the Digital Battlefield*, Turner Publishing Company, Paducah, 2003, p 63.

¹⁷² Masuhara, *Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, p 1.

¹⁷³ Green, *Arming Japan*, p 39; Masuhara, *Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, p 14.

¹⁷⁴ *John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection*, Microfilm Edition, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University Libraries, (JFD-2), A. W. Radford, 1965, Reel 10, p 20; *Ibid.*, M.B. Ridgeway, 1964, Reel 10, pp 7-8; A Iriye, *Japan and the Wider World, From Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present*, Longman, London, 1997, p 93.

World War served as a direct reminder of this, and was also occasionally employed by the Americans to remind the Japanese of their subordinate role, most notably by Whitney during negotiations over the constitution in his comment about ‘atomic sunshine’ made to Japanese ministers during a flypast by a B-29.¹⁷⁵

Figure XXXIX. F86-F ‘Sabre’ in Japanese Colours¹⁷⁶



Continuities in the NSF and GSDF

With the transformation of the NPR into the NSF on 15 October 1952 and the creation of the Self Defence Forces two years later, much of the constabulary character of the NPR gradually eroded. Nevertheless, some elements of the NPR’s character still survive in the current GSDF. Furthermore, many of the concepts and trends which have been examined in this study of the NPR continued through the life of the NSF and into the GSDF.

Despite the gradual increase in the external security role of the NSF and GSDF the internal security role for which the NPR was created persisted

¹⁷⁵ J. Dower, *Embracing Defeat, Japan in The Wake of World War II*, Norton, London, 2000, p 397; C. Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1956, p 251.

¹⁷⁶ Picture courtesy of: <http://www.militarypictures.info/airplanes/F-86F.jpg.html>.

in the new forces. The emphasis on external security duties pressed for by the 'Autonomous Nationalist' Hatoyama (1954-1956) and Kishi (1957-60) governments was reflected in the heavier armament and equipment given to the GSDF during the 1958-1960 defence build up plan.¹⁷⁷ However, the events of 1960 renewed the importance of the internal security role of the GSDF. The street protests and rioting surrounding the 1960 Security Treaty and the trouble the civil police had in controlling them clearly demonstrated the GSDF still had a role in maintaining internal security.¹⁷⁸ This is clearly shown as Kishi, worried by the level of protest on the streets, attempted, ultimately unsuccessfully to amend the Police Duties Execution Law, aiming to widening the police powers of the GSDF and its abilities to deal with civil disorder.¹⁷⁹

The 1960 Security Treaty itself also altered Japan's security responsibilities, both internally and externally. The treaty increased the Japanese and the American commitment to the defence of Japan, with both states pledging to 'maintain and develop . . . their capacities to resist armed attack'.¹⁸⁰ The United States, in contrast to the vague assurances that force might be used to defend Japan in the 1951 Security Treaty, explicitly guaranteed Japan's external security, stating its commitment to meeting an attack on Japan with force and an article 51 UN resolution.¹⁸¹ However, these changes in the US-Japan security relationship created a paradox; Japan was to take more of a role in its external security but, simultaneously, that external security was to be guaranteed by the United States, a supreme deterrent, the power of which effectively removed the need for a Japanese external security build up. The treaty also removed the highly controversial 1951 Security Treaty clause which gave the US

¹⁷⁷ Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, pp 6, 8.

¹⁷⁸ Appendix X. 'The SDF and the 1960 ANPO Crisis'.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid; J. Masumi, *Contemporary Politics in Japan*, University of California Press, London, 1995, pp 26-29; M.E. Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', in J.H. Buck (ed), *The Modern Japanese Military System*, Sage, London, 1975, p 49.

¹⁸⁰ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 19/1/60, printed in, T. Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution, the Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics*, Crane Russak, New York, 1991, pp 227-229.

¹⁸¹ Ibid; Appendix XI. 'UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51, 26 June 1945'.

military a role in guaranteeing the internal security of Japan.¹⁸² This change gave the GSDF ultimate responsibility for preserving the internal security of Japan. The assumption of the entire burden of internal security, the external security paradox, and the major domestic disturbances which accompanied the treaty, reinvigorated and refocused the GSDF's approach to internal security.

This renewed regard for internal security was a return to the original basis of the GSDF and indeed NPR. The 1954 Self Defence Forces law, which founded the organisation and laid out its responsibilities, was clear in expressing the internal security role of the force:

The Self-Defense Forces, in order to protect the peace and independence of our country and safeguard its security, shall have as its principal mission to defend our country against both direct and indirect aggression (which includes large-scale internal disturbances and sedition breaking out as a result of instigation or intervention of a foreign country), and to take steps whenever necessary to maintain public order.¹⁸³

The internal security responsibilities of the GSDF laid down in the Self Defence Law were further stressed and clarified through a 1954 agreement with the civil police in which the use of the GSDF to breakup large scale rioting or unrest was formally authorised.¹⁸⁴ The internal security role of the GSDF in the event of insurrection was further clarified in the 1956 *Review of Japan's Defense Strength*:

¹⁸² Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 8/9/51, printed in Lu, *Japan, A Documentary History*, p 500; D.V.V. Hickey, *The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan & the Koreas*, Lynne Rienner, London, 2001, p38. For more on internal security and sovereignty see: Chapter 1, pp 74-92; Chapter 3, pp 192-203.

¹⁸³ H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 2: 1953-1963*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (YF-A17) 1B-307, Self Defense Forces Law, 7/31/55.

¹⁸⁴ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan White Paper*, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2007, p 235.

In the event of an indirect aggression or other emergencies when it is recognised that law and order cannot be maintained by the civil police, the prime minister can, upon his own judgement or when requested by prefectural governors, order the operation of the Self defence forces.¹⁸⁵

This statement also highlights the identical ways in which the SDF and NPR were under the direct control of the Prime Minister and formed the second, and last, Japanese line of defence against civil disorder or armed insurrection, behind the civil police. Despite the moves of the late 1950s towards a greater external security role, Weinstein also argues that the internal security mission remained foremost in the thinking of much of the leadership of the SDF who saw the possibility of a guerrilla war supported by USSR/PRC or major internal unrest, probably in connection with the outbreak of a second Korean war as the most likely future combat role for the GSDF.¹⁸⁶ Certain elements of the GSDF's preparations during this period seem to verify this, with training above battalion level being rare, even into the 1970s, and the value of much external security training being very limited due to its extreme safety consciousness, a watchdog press and limited popular support. The contrast with the much more effective and committed approach to internal security and riot training undertaken during this period seems to support Weinstein's argument.¹⁸⁷ The deployment and posture of the GSDF during this period also reflect its enduring internal security mission and the continuity with the NPR, which shared a very similar deployment pattern, as argued by Katzenstein:

Given the deterrent power of U.S. forces, the primary purpose of Japan's armed forces was domestic policing against Communist insurrection . . . Throughout the first two postwar decades the domestic mission of the GSDF was reflected in its deployment. Of the thirteen GSDF divisions, only four were stationed in Hokkaido,

¹⁸⁵ Masuhara, *Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, pp 5-6.

¹⁸⁶ Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', pp 49-50.

¹⁸⁷ T.M. Brendle, 'Recruitment and Training in the SDF', in Buck, *The Modern Japanese Military System*, p 94.

the most likely point of attack by the Soviet Union. The other nine were deployed quite evenly throughout Japan, close to major metropolitan areas and industrial complexes.¹⁸⁸

It could be argued that stationing 30% of the force in Hokkaido represented adequate provision for the defence of the island but, this is shown to be inaccurate when compared to the catastrophically inadequate deployment of 50% of the strength of the South Korean Army to the 38th Parallel in 1950.¹⁸⁹ Nevertheless, this shift to a deployment of around a third of the force to Hokkaido helps illustrate the assumption of more of the burden of external security when compared to the 10-20% of the force stationed there during the life of the NPR.¹⁹⁰

Whether even this proportion of the force would have been adequate in the face of a Soviet invasion is questionable. Clearly the leadership of the SDF did not think so, as in late 1974 it began calling for an increase in the defence budget in order to make the force capable of independently defending Japan. The extent to which US demands were successfully resisted can also be seen from the fact that the preceding year the GSDF announced its aim to expand to 180,000 men, roughly half of what the US pushed for 23 years before and even 30,000 less than the figure Ikeda had suggested in 1953.¹⁹¹ This is not to say that the result was entirely due to Japanese resistance. Playing a supporting role was the realisation by Eisenhower and Dulles that the pursuit of rearmament at all costs could actually severely harm US-Japan relations, the Japanese economy and even threaten Japan's political stability, and hence the entire rationale for rearmament in the first place. This appreciation of the limits to which Japanese rearmament could be pursued, and the shift in priority to

¹⁸⁸ P.J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Cornell University Press, London, 1998, p 133.

¹⁸⁹ YF-A4, *Special Problems in the Korean Conflict. (Miscellaneous Problems and Their Solutions)*, 'Chapter I: KMAG'. HQ Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK), 1952, Reel 14, p 67. For more on the early Republic of Korea Army see: Chapter 2, pp 125-138.

¹⁹⁰ For more on the posture of the NPR see: Chapter 3, pp 174-182.

¹⁹¹ S.J Noumoff, 'The First Phase of the Strategy of Japanese Rearmament: Some Intellectual Arguments', *China Report*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1986, p 109.

ensuring long term stability, is highlighted in documents such as NSC 5516/1 which stated that the United States should aim to:

Encourage and assist Japan to develop military forces which will eventually be capable of assuming primary responsibility for the defence of Japan. The amount and timing of the build-up of Japanese military forces should be related to the necessity for developing political and economic stability, as well as military strength, in Japan. The United States should avoid pressing the Japanese to increase their military forces to the prejudice of political and economic stability.¹⁹²

Despite the clear dominance of the external security mission in today's GSDF, the internal security mission of the force has seen something of a revival in recent years. With concern over terrorism intensifying, the Defence Agency and the National Police Agency concluded an arrangement in 2000 under which the GSDF would take a greater role in the internal security of Japan in the event of a serious incident, such as guerrilla or large scale terrorist operations.¹⁹³ The 'Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations' allows the GSDF to take the primary role in dealing with a serious internal security crisis, rather than having to wait until the civil police admitted it was unable to cope, as had previously been required.¹⁹⁴ The agreement and the planning which accompanied it centred on preventing the infiltration of either irregular or Special Forces into Japan, and their containment and neutralisation by the GSDF, if able to land. The planning and agreement allowed the SDF to take the lead in eliminating the threat, with the police taking the secondary role of securing surrounding areas, providing road blocks and other non-combat roles. In such a crisis, and in a similar fashion to the plans made by the NPR, the GSDF would also take on the role of providing armed guards for Japan's critical

¹⁹² NSC 5516/1, 9/4/55, *FRUS 1955-1957*, Vol. XXIII, p59.

¹⁹³ D.V.V. Hickey, *The Armies of East Asia*, pp 196-197; *Japan Times*, 18/6/00.

¹⁹⁴ *Defense of Japan White Paper*, p 266, footnote 36.

infrastructure, such as nuclear power stations, airports and other key facilities.¹⁹⁵ From July 2005 onwards various participating police departments and regional GSDF commands took part in tabletop exercises designed to build mutual understanding of the respective agencies' roles and responsibilities, and from October 2005 onwards joint field exercises were held in Fukuoka, Hokkaido, Ibaraki, Kansai, Saitama and Shikoku (see figure XXXX).¹⁹⁶

Figure XXXX. GSDF in Joint Field Exercises with the Police, Shikoku, 2005¹⁹⁷



A number of further elements of the character and structure of the NPR survived into the NSF and GSDF. The police-style legal system of the NPR survives to this day, and if a crime is committed by a member of the SDF, either on or off duty, he or she is subject to civil law and faces a civilian criminal trial, not a court martial as is typical of an army or navy.¹⁹⁸ Civilian control and the primacy of the civilian government over the SDF also remained central to the identity of the NSF and SDF. The system, much like the resistance by the Japanese to the inclusion of former Imperial officers in the NPR, was designed to prevent a return of militarism

¹⁹⁵ For more on the internal security uses of the NPR see: Chapter 3, pp 192-204.

¹⁹⁶ *Defense of Japan White Paper*, pp 232-235.

¹⁹⁷ Picture courtesy of: *Defense of Japan White Paper*, p 235.

¹⁹⁸ *Japan Times*, 17/4/2007. For more on the legal position of the NPR see: Chapter 4, pp 242-250.

and the military's political influence and the coup d'états of the pre-1945 era.

The system of civilian leadership and civilian control over personnel, budget and operational matters which started in the NPR continued in the NSF and GSDF. The fact that many of the senior officers of the SDF are still former policemen also attests to the survival of another vestige of the constabulary character of the NPR in the GSDF.¹⁹⁹ The reins of the SDF also, like the NPR, remained firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister with the National Safety Agency or *Hōan Cho* (NSA) and its successor the Defense Agency (*Bōeichō*) being external organs of the Prime Minister's office, with the organisation only becoming a full Ministry of Defense (*Bōeishō*) in 2007.²⁰⁰ Again, as with the NPR, the Prime Minister also solely holds the power to deploy the GSDF domestically, and although Diet approval is now required, in emergencies it can be sought after deployment, if necessary.²⁰¹

Although civilian control remained in place during the transitions into the NSF and GSDF, the evolution of the force also saw the gradual return of a number of high ranking Imperial officers. Ridgeway's relaxation of the purge restrictions and their removal with the end of the Occupation allowed all the former purgees to return to public life. Furthermore, with high profile purgees returning to power, above all Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro, the attitude of the government to the return of all but the most reactionary former officers grew more lenient. The moves towards a more external focus within the SDF (again under Hatoyama and his successor Kishi) also prompted a re-examination of the inclusion of Imperial veterans in the forces. Even Okazaki Katsuo, Chief Cabinet

¹⁹⁹ C. Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1982, p 77; C. Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 1825-1995*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p 384; Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, p 236; Masuhara, *Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, p 4; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p 79.

²⁰⁰ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp 79- 80; Ministry of Defense, *The Ministry of Defense Reorganised, For the Support of Peace and Security*. Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2007, pp 4-5.

²⁰¹ Masuhara, *Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, p 6.

Secretary during most of the life of the NPR, Foreign Minister from 1952-1954 and initially an opponent of the inclusion of IJA/IJN officers, reversed his position. Okazaki explained in a 1964 interview that with the external mission of the SDF becoming more prominent in the late 1950s, the use of the high ranking former officers, most with battlefield experience, became essential. Okazaki stated: 'gradually we found that we couldn't do without the experience of old military people, if we want[ed] this force to be effective. And gradually we included those professional military people in the forces'.²⁰² As a result of this policy by August 1955 all of the Chiefs of Staff of the three SDF branches were former IJA or IJN officers.²⁰³ Veterans of the Pacific and Sino-Japanese wars continued to play a major role in the leadership of the SDF for many years. For example GSDF Chief of Staff Sugita Ichiji, a former IJA Colonel, played a major role in pushing for GSDF use in suppressing the demonstrations surrounding the 1960 Security Treaty.²⁰⁴ However, with the passage of time and the passing of their generation, the numbers of Imperial veterans in the SDF declined, being replaced by graduates of the Defence Academy, men well schooled in the democratic ways of the SDF and loyal to the postwar Japanese state.

Despite this waxing and waning of the influence of Imperial officers, the constabulary model still influenced the SDF's officer corps. Like the NPR, police officers continued to staff the intelligence arms of the SDF, and the civilian bureau which controls the SDF has almost always been headed by police officers.²⁰⁵ The continuing presence of police officers in these roles also illustrates the enduring internal security mission of the GSDF.

Alongside this continuing internal mission, many of the restrictions on the external use of the SDF have been relaxed, with the force now often

²⁰² JFD-2, Okazaki Katsuo, Dulles Oral History Collection, Reel 9, 1964, p 12.

²⁰³ J.L. Weste, 'Staging a Comeback: Rearmament Planning and Kyūgunjin in Occupied Japan, 1945-52', *Japan Forum*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999, p 175.

²⁰⁴ See Appendix X. 'The SDF and the 1960 ANPO Crisis'.

²⁰⁵ A. Jourdonnais, 'Intelligence in the New Japan', *Studies in Intelligence*, CIA Centre For The Study of Intelligence, Vol. 7, No. 3, Sept. 1995, p 11; Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, p 77.

contributing to peace keeping operations under the aegis of the UN and recently providing support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, almost all these operations are designed so that the SDF has little or no chance of being drawn into combat and usually have a lot more in common with disaster relief operations than external security.²⁰⁶

Following on from the first informal and ad-hoc use of the NPR in disaster relief roles, the use of the NSF and GSDF to provide disaster relief became a central mission in the NPR's successor forces.²⁰⁷ The role of the NSF/GSDF in disaster relief was clarified and strengthened in their founding legislation and was defined for the SDF as follows: 'in the event of natural calamities and other disasters, the director general may dispatch units to protect life and property when requested by the prefectural governors or without waiting for such requests in the case of emergency'.²⁰⁸

The role of providing disaster relief has become the one which much of the Japanese population most closely associates with the SDF due to the relatively rare appearance of uniformed SDF members in public except in this role. Aside from the humanitarian relief and rescue these operations provide, they also give the SDF a public image boost, a fact first recognised and employed during the life of the NPR.²⁰⁹ The role that these positive images have in increasing the support for the SDF amongst a still largely pacifist Japanese population and an occasionally sceptical international community, is significant. However, the potential public relations impact of disaster relief operations was shown to be something

²⁰⁶ P.J. Katzenstein and N. Okawara, 'Japan, Asian Pacific Security and the Case of Analytical Eclecticism', in P.J. Katzenstein (ed), *Rethinking Japanese Security, Internal and External Dimensions*, Routledge, London, 2008, p 33; P.J. Katzenstein and N. Okawara, 'Japan's Security Policy: Political, Economic and Military Dimensions', in *Ibid*, p 65.

²⁰⁷ *Defense of Japan White Paper*, pp 243-254; National Land Agency, *Disaster Prevention White Paper*, Tokyo, 1995, available at: <http://www.adrc.or.jp/hanshin/hakusho/English/default.asp>. For more on the NPR and disaster relief see: Chapter 4, pp 281-284.

²⁰⁸ Masuhara, *Review of Japan's Defense Strength*, p 6.

²⁰⁹ Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, p 155. For more on the public relations impact of disaster relief see: Chapter 4, p 281-284.

of a two-way street following the resounding public criticism heaped upon the SDF for their allegedly sluggish and uncoordinated response to the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake.²¹⁰

Many other opportunities to promote the SDF have been taken over the years and one of the most prominent of these occurred with the use of the SDF at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. The SDF, in a role more suited to police or a constabulary, were charged with providing guides to the event and unarmed, visible, police-type security for the event. The SDF also participated in ceremonial duties, even carrying flags into the Olympic stadium and providing marching bands for the opening ceremony.²¹¹

Conclusion

The primary aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that the gradual evolution of the NPR into the NSF and GSDF represented the partial, but not complete, erosion of its constabulary character. This aim was achieved through reference to three processes; the decline of opposition strength, principally the removal of MacArthur; the increase in US pressure to rearm, especially after the arrival of Ridgeway; and the limited assumption of more equipment and influx of former IJA/IJN purgees, a result of the first two processes.

This chapter also sought to examine the remnants of the NPR's structure and character which still exist in the GSDF. This was done by highlighting the methods of resistance to US pressure employed by the Japanese government which eventually became defined as the 'Yoshida Doctrine', the cornerstone of postwar Japanese security policy. Alongside these

²¹⁰ *Mainichi Shinbun*, 3/2/10; *Japan Times*, 1/9/2000; K.J. Tierney and J.D. Goltz, *Emergency Response: Lessons Learned from the Kobe Earthquake*, University of Delaware Research Centre, Preliminary Paper, No. 260, Delaware, 1997, pp 1-7.

²¹¹ C. Tagsold, 'The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as Political Games', *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, June 2009, p 3; A. Hertrich, 'A Useable Past? Historical Museums of the Self-Defence Forces and the Construction of Continuities', in S. Saaler and W. Schwentker (eds), *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, Global Oriental, Folkestone, 2008, p 177.

methods of resistance which outlived the NPR, other continuities such as the survival of the concept of civilian control, the legal position of the GSDF and its members, and the internal security and disaster relief roles of the GSDF were also examined. The exploration of these commonalities and differences between three often poorly differentiated forces has helped to show their distinct and separate nature and has thus also contributed to the second primary aim of the study by further revealing the character of the NPR.

The chapter also contributed to the first aim of this study, the desire to reveal Japanese influences on the force by both highlighting some of the efforts made by Japanese actors to influence the NPR, NSF and GSDF and through indicating the limits of these domestic influences. The chapter has illustrated that despite its best efforts the Yoshida government found it hard to entirely resist American demands when faced with a combination focused and unified external pressure coupled with unfavourable internal and external events such as the loss of MacArthur, the Chinese intervention and the weakness of Yoshida after 1952. It is perhaps, in part, due to these limitations on the domestic influences which lead many historians to ignore them entirely.²¹²

Another common tendency amongst many historians is to treat the NPR, NSF and GSDF as almost a single, continuous organisation, with little or nothing to distinguish each, except further 'sophistic' name changes.²¹³ This combination of the three forces tends to lead to the overemphasis of international influences on the force at the expense of the domestic. Seen as a single organisation the NPR and successors seem to be defined by the reverses suffered by Yoshida in being unable to resist the Americans as effectively after 1952. This naturally leads to an emphasis on the strength of the Americans and the weakness of the Japanese government. However, this approach is itself weak as it ignores the successes the

²¹² For more on historians and the domestic influences on the force see: Chapter 1, pp 50-56.

²¹³ For more on the lack of distinction between the forces and alleged sophistry see: Introduction, pp 7, 14-17, 21, 26, 29, 31, 42, 44.

Japanese government had up until that point in resisting American pressure and fighting to retain a constabulary force. Furthermore, this conclusion entirely omits the roles and influence of non-governmental actors such as the JCP and former Imperial Officers. These weaknesses of this combined approach validate both the main aims of this study, in seeking to restore the influence of the Japanese on the force and in aiming to reveal the actual character of the NPR, unclouded by hindsight and its future evolution.

In revealing the character of the NPR, the chapter highlighted the continuities and differences between the NPR and its successor organisations. This survival of aspects of the NPR, the failure to give the control of the NPR to former IJA purgees, and the problems transferring heavy armament to the NPR also reveal that the US military never really got everything it wanted from the NPR and its successors. The NSF and GSDF were the hybrid descendants of the NPR, a mix of constabulary and army, with the emphasis shifting from the former to the latter in each successive organisation. This is evidenced by the often cited survival of the 1947 constitution and the forces' non-military nomenclature, such as the use of 'Self Defence Force' instead of 'army'. This hybrid structure also manifests itself in the actual structure of the organisations, such as their internal security roles, command structures employing large numbers of policemen, and the civilian legal position of their members.

This survival of elements of the character of the NPR in the GSDF naturally leads us to the question, is the SDF itself a constabulary or army? With reference to the original definitions employed in this study a answer can be approached.²¹⁴ Like a constabulary, the GSDF has an internal security mission, is generally confined to the territory of Japan, is subject to civilian and not military law and has some personnel transfers between it and the civil police, although not on the large scale of the NPR. However, unlike a constabulary the GSDF does not occupy a middle tier in

²¹⁴ For a full set of definitions see: Introduction, pp 43-48.

the security apparatus of Japan, it being at the top; is not equipped with light weapons; and does not possess arrest powers or clearly police-type characteristics. The SDF is generally, but not universally, recognised domestically and internationally as providing the external security of Japan and is equipped to do so but cannot easily undertake offensive operations due to political considerations. The force's members are also subject to civilian, not military, law. Thus even the GSDF falls a little short of the full definition of an army as detailed in this study, representing, in the words of an SDF officer, a force which is neither entirely 'a police nor an army'.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ NHK Hōdō Kyoku Jietai Shuzaihan, *KaijōJietai ha Kōshite Umareta 'Y-Bunshō' ga Arakasu Sōsetsu no Himitsu (The Secret of the Establishment of the MSDF Revealed by 'Y-Bunshō')*, NHK Shuppan, Tokyo, 2003, p 13-15.

Conclusion

The central purpose of this study has been to provide the first complete history of the National Police Reserve. In achieving this, the study has fulfilled its two principal aims of revealing the domestic context of the force, and fully exploring its organisational character. These aims were successfully achieved, but not at the expense of the examination of the other, better known, influences on the force, such as the international factors, which were also investigated. This approach sought to rebalance the analysis of the force and included neglected areas of the scholarship but not at the expense of the more widely explored aspects, such as the international context of the force.

The first aim was achieved through analysing the three principal domestic groups which influenced the creation and evolution of the NPR: the centre-Right Japanese government led by Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and Rightwing former Imperial officers such as Hattori Takushiro. All three groups influenced the force in different ways, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, and their conflicts and confrontations also contextualised and affected the force. The perceived threat from the JCP, especially after it openly adopted a policy of violence from 1950 onwards, and the longstanding hostility of the Japanese elite to communism helped create and sustain a desire for an internal security force adequate to tackle this perceived threat. However, as this study has shown, this pursuit of a constabulary is not to be confused with that of full rearmament, as much of the Japanese leadership, especially Yoshida, opposed any moves towards creating a new Japanese army. Initiatives made prior to 1950 by Ashida and Yoshida confirm this desire for a constabulary, as do the Yoshida Cabinet and the NPR leadership's efforts to preserve the force in the face of pressure from the US military and Rightwing Imperial veterans. The exploration of the JCP's 'military' campaign assisted in contextualising the adoption of this attitude by the Japanese elite as well as the creation and evolution of the NPR. This

analysis of the JCP also highlighted a highly significant and neglected area of the history of the period which could have a significant impact on many other areas of research on the Occupation if pursued in future studies.

The various attempts to install Imperial army officers into the NPR and convert it into an army also revealed the constabulary character of the force and the determination of MacArthur, Yoshida and others to preserve that character. The defeat of these attempts by the Right marked a significant victory for democracy and civilian control by the Occupation and Japanese government. The struggles over the character of the force and the constant Japanese government opposition to its militarization show the Japanese influence on the direction and character of the NPR and the Japanese desire for a constabulary, and not an army.

The second main aim of revealing the character of the force was achieved through exploration of the organisational character and operational aspects of the NPR. The detailed examination of the force's constabulary character represented an original approach to the history and origins of the force. This full examination of the constabulary character of the force would not have been possible without reference to both the domestic and international influences on the force, such the perceived threat of the JCP and the American constabulary model. This unification of all influences on the force strengthens and supports the study's central effort of creating the first complete history of the force.

In fulfilling this aim of producing the first true picture of the character of the force various aspects of the NPR were examined, including: its recruitment, training, examinations, deployment, logistics, capabilities, civil police links, pay, conditions, housing, food, uniforms, equipment, medical care, and legal position. The internal security and disaster relief roles of the NPR were also explored as were their evolution and political and public relations impact. Of these previously unexplored areas all contained evidence that the NPR was a constabulary. This included the

demonstration of: the NPR's internal security training, role and deployment; close ties to the civil police; the civilian legal position of its members; the presence of arrest powers; and the force's light armament. That the NPR was deployed for internal security and was so lightly armed and poorly supplied as to be close to useless in external security duties was also revealed. This external security burden, including acting as a significant external deterrent, fell on the US forces in Japan, with the NPR occupying the typical constabulary role of providing internal security in support of the civil police and existing in a middle tier between the police and the US forces. Despite intensive training and preparations the reasons why the NPR was never used in its original role were also revealed. These and centred upon the political risks of using the NPR against mass demonstrations and the failure of the Japanese Communist Party's strategy of violent revolution before it escalated to a level of unrest requiring the use of the NPR in its anti-guerrilla, or more controversial, anti-riot role.

Both of these key aims and the research they generated, illuminate previously neglected or marginalised areas of the history of the force. Whilst some scholarship on the force did exist prior to this study no comprehensive attempt had been made to chronicle the force since the US Army's partial official history of the mid 1950s.¹ To date historians have produced various perspectives on the force, but none attempted to examine the force comprehensively and most remained constrained by their ideological or methodological ties. For example, within the English language scholarship of the force the first generation of scholars generally emphasised that the NPR was a continuation of US policy in defence of the already successfully completed reform programme, the second generation linked the force to the Cold War context of the Occupation, and the third generation, although largely avoiding the NPR, offered new methodological approaches to the study of the Occupation through

¹ An Official History of the force does exist but does not cover the entire life of the force: *U.S. Army Center of Military History Historical Manuscripts Collection: The Korean War, (YF-A4), Far East, US Army Forces and Eight United States Army Military History Section, History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, July 1950- April 1952, 1955, Reel 14.*

focusing on Japanese perceptions and influences.² This study has sought to take the best from all three approaches in attempting to produce the first complete history of the force. For example, this approach extended to the inclusion of an examination of the force within both its international (largely Cold War), and domestic contexts. This unifying approach also extended to examining the 'top-down' influences on the force, such as GHQ and the Japanese government, alongside the 'bottom-up' influences, such as that of the JCP.

Alongside taking the best elements from previous scholarship, the study contributed original work in a number of areas. The examination of the domestic angle of the force was one of the most significant of these, and whilst hinted at by some, it is largely ignored by most scholarship.³ The reasons for this neglect included the initial unavailability of many of the sources until the 1970s, and some later historians' unawareness of them, alongside a reluctance by some to explore the subject at all.⁴ Furthermore, some historians lean towards portraying the JCP as victims of GHQ's unjustified political purges, and the Japanese government itself as the beleaguered victim of GHQ 'orders' which forced it to create the NPR.⁵ This study has argued that these assumptions are not really borne out by the evidence, despite having been used in the past to help support allegations about the retrogressive aspects of GHQ policy during the latter Occupation.⁶

² For a full historiographical analysis see: Introduction, pp 7-32.

³ M. and S. Harries, *Sheathing the Sword, The Demilitarisation of Japan*, Heinemann, London, 1989, pp 234-235; J. Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse, Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System*, The Athlone Press, London, 1988, pp 65-71; M.E. Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', in J.H. Buck (ed), *The Modern Japanese Military System*, Sage, London, 1975, p 43.

⁴ R.L. Garthoff, 'Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2004, p 21.

⁵ For more on the creation of the NPR see: Chapter 2, pp 138-151.

⁶ J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, London, 1988, pp 369-370; J. Dower, 'Reform and Reconsolidation', in H. Wray and H Conway (eds), *Japan Examined, Perspectives on Modern Japanese History*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1983, p 350; M. Metzler, 'The Occupation', in W.M. Tsutsui (ed), *A Companion to Japanese History*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007, p 266.

The examination of the character of the NPR based upon primary documentary evidence was another original contribution of this work. The need for this was especially acute due to the fact that whilst the character of the force is often remarked upon by historians, very few of them back up their assumptions with any primary evidence. This requirement for a primary evidence based study to clarify the character of the force was further highlighted by Dower and others who argue that the characterisation of the force often involves the deliberately disingenuous use of language.⁷ Most studies also characterise the NPR as an army from the start and this misplaced belief was shown to be principally due to the very thin source base employed, with most historians relying on a single secondary source, the Kowalski memoir.⁸

Again, that the creation of an 'army' perfidiously disguised as a 'police force' this juncture fits well with many historians arguments about the retrenchment and reaction of GHQ at this time, also seems to have influenced some characterisations of the force. The influence of retrospection also seems to cloud the vision of historians, some of whom lump the NPR in with its successors, the more militarised National Safety Force (NSF) and Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF), often treating them as almost the same continuous organisation.⁹ The fact that the NPR evolved into the SDF, a largely military force (albeit with some constabulary elements) seems to have tainted the NPR by association, and it seems that the portrayal of the NPR as an army is highly influenced by this influence of hindsight. All of these shortcomings further reinforce

⁷ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp 378, 384; J. Dower, *Embracing Defeat, Japan in The Wake of World War II*, Norton, London, 2000, p 548; S.J Noumoff, 'The First Phase of the Strategy of Japanese Rearmament: Some Intellectual Arguments', *China Report*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1986, p 108. For definitions see: Introduction, pp 43-48.

⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 547; Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p 384; H.B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War, Americans and the Remaking of Japan 1945-1952*, Kent State University Press, London, 1989, p 252; R. Driete, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-52*, Saltire Press, Brighton, 1983, pp 102-103; R.B. Finn, *Winners in Peace, MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, University of California Press, London, 1992, pp 265-266; E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, Continuum, London, 2002, pp 487-488; T. Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, Edition Q, Tokyo, 1995, pp 22-23; M. Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p 268, notes 44-46.

⁹ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp 437-438.

the need for this study and validate its second principal aim of providing the first primary evidence based examination of the character of the force.

The independent analysis of the force, grounded in the era in which it existed has also been central to this study. In this efforts have been made to employ the terminology commonly used in the period, alongside an attempt to detail the fears and perceptions of the policymaking elites in Japan and the US. This research has revealed, contrary to many historians' arguments, the force was a constabulary, a term understood as a paramilitary police force at the time.¹⁰ The origins of this constabulary model were also traced across Europe and Asia, with particular attention being paid to the Philippines Constabulary, the original American constabulary, and the Korean Constabulary, the NPR's closest organisational relative. This examination revealed that forces of this type were common in the period, especially in Asia where they were the accepted norm, rather than an anomalous exception.

The study concluded with an exploration of the general movement, with several notable exceptions, away from the constabulary model, with the metamorphosis of the NPR into the NSF and GSDF. This gradual erosion of the constabulary character of the force began with MacArthur's brief push for heavier armament following the Chinese intervention in Korea, and continued with the push by the US Army for heavier arms and the induction of former Imperial army officers into the force. These moves were opposed by the Yoshida Cabinet and NPR leadership for a number of reasons, including their opposition to an army, their concerns over sovereignty and over the economic impact of rearmament. Their efforts managed to stall and mitigate many of the US Army's moves and succeeded in preserving some elements of the NPR's character in the NSF and GSDF. These included its civilian legal structure, internal security mission and some of its ties with the civil police. Although the character of the NPR did evolve over time, the exploration of this process

¹⁰ For definitions see: Introduction, pp 43-48.

showed the commonalities and differences between it and its successors and illustrated that the three forces were distinct in both character and mission.

The study also attempted to demonstrate the full range of influences on the NPR and whilst seeking to rebalance these to better reflect the domestic influences on the force the study has recognised the limitations of the Japanese influences on the force. When faced with unified US pressure coupled with pressing external events such as the Chinese intervention in Korea, and without sympathetic powerful American voices such as MacArthur, the Japanese struggled to entirely resist American demands. Nevertheless, when not faced with entirely unfavourable circumstances the Japanese government could, and did, influence the direction of the NPR to serve their interests and meet their objectives for the force. The study also highlighted that the weakness of the Japanese in the face of concerted US pressure coupled with unfavourable international events prompted many historians to minimise or even ignore the domestic influences on the force. This shortcoming is especially acute in studies which combine the NPR with its successors the NSF and GSDF and retrospectively, and incorrectly, assume that the ultimate failure of Yoshida to resist US pressure from 1952 onwards also applied to the NPR between 1950 and 1952.

This study has also revealed a number of intertwining narratives around the NPR. Central amongst these was the battle over its character, lasting from before its birth until its evolution into the NSF/GSDF. Actors in this struggle included American policymakers both in Washington and Tokyo, elements of GHQ, (especially Willoughby's G2), the JCP, MacArthur, Yoshida, Hattori and numerous other less significant Japanese and American individuals and groups. These battles frequently pitted the Right against the centre-Right, for example in the form of Willoughby and Hattori versus MacArthur and Yoshida, or the Left against the centre-Right, as in the case of the JCP against the Japanese government. These struggles, which took place against the background of the Cold War and Korean War,

also reflect the internal Japanese extension and reflection of the same polarised politics, in what Dower and Yoshida call the 'internal' Japanese Cold War.¹¹

Much like a ship at anchor in a storm, despite being buffeted by the competing winds of the Left and Right the NPR remained anchored in the constabulary model throughout its life. This stability was principally due to Japanese resistance, occasionally aided by MacArthur and others. The continuous pursuit and defence of the constabulary model by the Japanese in the face of largely American pressure to rearm is a central theme of this work and the active pursuit of a constabulary by the Japanese government even prior to 1950 challenge notions that the NPR was 'forced' upon the Japanese government in 1950.

The skill and persistence of the Japanese resistance to US pressure are reminiscent of a man swimming in a tidal river, the flow often changes direction and within it there are counter currents, eddies and holes. If the swimmer remains passive, or the current becomes too powerful, he is at its mercy, but through skilful navigation of the eddies and shallows and through his own exertions he can navigate a course towards his own goal or just stay still. This was the case with the NPR and its successors, the NSF and GSDF.

¹¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p 553.

Appendix I.

The Shimoyama, Taira, Mitaka and Matsukawa Incidents

The 'Taira incident' was the first major event of the 'bloody summer' of 1949. It occurred just prior to the announcement of the first round of mass sackings and demonstrated to the authorities, more than any other event, the weakness of the Japanese police in the face of organised resistance and the need for a constabulary force to support them in times of crisis. The incident itself was one in a series of events in the area and across the Tohoku region (northern Honshu) which also included the Matsukawa incident. Problems began in late 1948 when the local coal mines, one of the principal employers of the region, began to sack workers, triggering clashes between the police and members of the coal miners union (*Tanrō*). These clashes were so serious that frequent interventions by the local American Military Government Team (MGT) were necessary and local police were given special powers under the *Kōan Jōrei* (Public Peace Ordinance). Incidents involving the communist dominated unions in the area escalated both in terms of scale and seriousness, with union members seizing and 'trying' a senior manager at a local industrial plant on 27 June 1949. Two days later a mob of over three hundred occupied the prefectural assembly and hung six large red flags from its exterior.¹

The following day the most serious incident occurred, an event described by Chalmers Johnson as the; 'closest thing to actual insurrection that occurred in Japan in 1949'.² Ostensibly triggered by a dispute over the removal of a communist bulletin board in the economically depressed and restive city of Taira, a group of fifty to sixty communist activists gathered outside the local police station, waving red flags and chanting slogans such as 'all police

¹ C. Johnson, *Conspiracy at Matsukawa*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972, pp 100-102.

² Ibid.

officials who oppress labourers should be killed!'.³ The demonstration degenerated into a general brawl between the communists and the thirty policemen present inside. Despite some initial success the police were quickly overcome after the arrival of around four hundred miners who sided with the communists.⁴ The mob occupied the police station, adorned it with communist banners, released two communists held inside, locked up the police in their own cells and stole a pistol, the only firearm on the premises.⁵ After capturing the police station the mob held it for over seven hours without any attempt by the police to recapture it and free their colleagues. Eventually at around 10 pm, the rioters, becoming restless, abandoned the police station after vandalising it and breaking all its windows.⁶

Upon hearing of the fall of the police station, the Fukushima Military Government Team sent urgent requests to Sendai, Fukushima and other cities demanding armed National Rural Police officers recapture Taira.⁷ Possibly through military style staff planning, as was suspected by some in G2, and / or intelligence provided and acted on at the time, Communists set out to obstruct the police effort to recapture Taira. At Nihonmatsu, a town leading to Taira, rail points were opened in an attempt to divert passing trains; at Koriyama four hundred workers surrounded the police station, trapping its occupants inside; and in Sendai where two hundred armed National Rural Police cadets boarded a train bound for Taira, workers pelted the train with stones and later removed the driver and locked the cadets inside.⁸ After breaking out of the train the cadets were transferred to trucks and set off for Taira only to find all the gates and level crossings along the route closed, blocking road traffic.⁹ Other documents show the communists planned to go even further and sever communications across the region with union members planning to cut telephone lines between the major cities,

³ Government Section (GS) (B) 4131, Report: 'Principal Terroristic Activities of the Ishiki Area Committee', Undated.

⁴ GS(B) 4132, Yoshikawa, Director of S.E.B. Attorney Generals Office, to Napier GS, 5/7/49.

⁵ GS(B) 4131, Report: 'Principal Terroristic Activities of the Ishiki Area Committee', Undated.

⁶ GS(B) 4132, Yoshikawa, Director of S.E.B. Attorney Generals Office, to Napier GS, 5/7/49.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ GS(B) 4131 'Self Criticism of Persons Concerned with Plot: Taira Case' 22/8/51; GS(B) 4131, Report: 'Principal Terroristic Activities of the Ishiki Area Committee', Undated.

⁹ GS(B) 4131, Report: 'Principal Terroristic Activities of the Ishiki Area Committee', Undated.

other prefectures and police units, stop all traffic by rail and road, and 'paralyse and disperse police power'.¹⁰ The seriousness with which the JCP members took the plan was clear, as those with knowledge of the plan were threatened with death if they disclosed its details to the police.¹¹

The gravity of this incident and the weakness of the police it demonstrated to the Japanese elite and GHQ should not be underestimated. The Chief of the Fukushima National Rural Police seriously considered declaring a state of emergency across the whole prefecture and, in the face of further violence, retained significant police reinforcements in the area long after the events of 30 June. Yoshida also threatened to declare a nationwide state of emergency and later cited the incident as a clear demonstration of the weakness of the decentralised police system and its powerlessness to deal with serious threats to public order.¹² The parallel with the capture of several towns in South Korea in 1948 by communists and mutinying constabulary forces and their bloody and lengthy recapture must have been noticed by members of GHQ and the Japanese government and strengthened their desire for adequate internal security forces to prevent this kind of incident happening again.¹³ Indeed, it is surprising that there were no deaths during the incident and that the quasi-insurrection fizzled out, but this was probably only due to the lack of firearms by the demonstrators. Supplies of guns would have made the incident much more serious and could have resulted in numerous deaths.

The second major incident of the summer occurred on 6 July, two days after the first round of sackings was announced. Shimoyama Sadanori, the president of the JNR, disappeared from his office. Shimoyama was probably

¹⁰ GS(B) 4131, 'Self Criticism of Persons Concerned with Plot: Taira Case' 22/8/51.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² S. Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, Rowan and Littlefield, Plymouth, 2007, p 144; Johnson, *Conspiracy*, p 104. For more on the decentralised police system, see: Appendix IV. 'The Weakness of the Japanese Civil Police in Occupied Japan'.

¹³ A.R. Millet, 'Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945-1950', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1997, p 552; B. Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume Two: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990, pp 259-268. For more on the KC mutinies see: Chapter 2, pp 128-131.

kidnapped and subsequently murdered by communists, or badly beaten and left on the tracks to be killed by his own trains. Shimoyama's previous dismissal of protesting tram conductors in Yokohama and his announcement of 37,000 sackings two days previously may have marked him out as a target and the police were so convinced that he had been assassinated that they announced he had been murdered on the same day he died.¹⁴ Shimoyama could have committed suicide but conservative opinion, SCAP, the police, the non-communist press and the public at large all thought he was murdered by vengeful communists.¹⁵ GHQ's intelligence arms, the Japanese police and the JNR all believed he was assassinated, his widow and others claimed he did not appear suicidal on the day of his death and he left no suicide note, as is generally customary in Japan.¹⁶

The third and fourth major incidents of 1949 were two attacks on trains, termed the Mitaka and Matsukawa incidents. On 15 July, a driverless train crashed into the platform at Mitaka Station in the western suburbs of Tokyo, killing six people.¹⁷ Ten people were arrested and charged with rail sabotage. All ten were radical railway union members and nine were prominent communists. However, nine were released following a disorderly trial ending in August 1950 which the communists disrupted with numerous protests and which had been routinely observed by G2 and Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) officers. Despite all but one of the accused walking free, during the year up to their release the incident was seen as a case of communist perpetrated terrorism and even afterwards much of the public still considered the accused responsible for the arrack.¹⁸

Just over a month later, on 18 August, the final major incident of the summer of 1949 took place with the derailling of a commuter train near Matsukawa in northern Honshu and the deaths of three of its crew.¹⁹ The train was derailed

¹⁴ Johnson, *Conspiracy*, pp 1-2, 78, 86-88.

¹⁵ Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) 2715, 'Shimoyama and Mitaka Incidents, Press summaries/Translations', 8/1949.

¹⁶ *Stars and Stripes*, 6/7/49.

¹⁷ Johnson, *Conspiracy*, p 3.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp 88-89.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p 3.

between stations due to a section of rail and a number of sleepers having been removed. Twenty communist union members were apprehended and tried, but were eventually acquitted, despite the prosecutor calling for the death penalty.²⁰ Nonetheless, the sabotage triggered a series of police raids on union offices across Fukushima, which led to the arrests of suspects in this case and many also suspected of involvement in the Taira incident.²¹

Whatever the actual turn of events, the Japanese authorities and press believed that the JCP was responsible for both incidents, with the *Asahi Shinbun* openly accusing the Communist party of responsibility.²² In retort, *Akahata* (Red Flag), the JCP's newspaper, and its sister publications claimed the incidents were a conspiracy hatched to discredit the Communists.²³ *Akahata* also contested whether Shimoyama was murdered and questioned the opinions of the scientists and pathologists involved in examining the evidence. However, in later communist pamphlets such as *The Truth of the Shimoyama-Mitaka Incidents* the JCP did not explicitly deny that communists were responsible for the incidents, and added to the suspicion existing over their motives through simultaneously calling for the overthrow of the government.²⁴ The manipulation of the incidents by the Left continued for years with writers such as the Leftwing crime author Matsumoto Seichō arguing that Shimoyama was murdered and the Matsukawa sabotage was conducted by CIC, possibly in co-operation with the local Japanese authorities in an effort to discredit the JCP.²⁵ Labour movement scholar and JCP member Shiota Shobei also manipulated the case in a similar fashion to suit Marxist rhetoric:

The Matsukawa case was a part of the oppression of the labour unions by American Imperialism in the face of great change in the situation in Asia following the Chinese revolution. American

²⁰ *Nippon Times*, 27/8/50; *Mainichi Shinbun*, 27/8/50.

²¹ Johnson, *Conspiracy*, pp 169-170.

²² *Asahi Shinbun*, 19/8/49.

²³ *Akahata*, 26/8/49.

²⁴ CIS 2716, 'Three Communist Pamphlets', 11/8/1949.

²⁵ S. Matsumoto, 'Saisetsu: Shimoyama Kokutetsu Sōsai Bōsatsuron' (Re-examination: The Murder Theory [of the Death] of JNR President Shimoyama), *Gendai*, Aug 1969.

Imperialism wanted to build an anti-communist military base in Japan by encouraging the revival of Japanese monopoly capitalism and by aiding the militarist reorganisation of the Japanese economy; it regarded the labour unions as a great obstacle to this purpose.²⁶

The incidents resulted in new waves of raids on JCP and union offices and many additions were made to the three hundred arrests made in the wake of the Taira incident. The Diet created a special investigation committee chaired by Hanamura Shirō, which concluded in late July that the incidents had been instigated by the communists and were a field test for new violent tactics aimed at seizing power. The impact on the Japanese government of the incidents of the summer of 1949 was significant in a number of ways; first they highlighted the weakness of the police in the face of organised resistance; and second, they cast serious doubt in the minds of the authorities over whether the JCP could be trusted to continue to operate within the law, or whether it was probing the state's defences in preparation for an armed uprising or revolution.²⁷ It should also be mentioned that the psychological impact of railway terrorism, as Johnson notes, was far more significant than it is now and could be equated with the airline terrorism of later years, in that the attacks struck at innocent travellers in the principal form of mass transportation of the day.²⁸ These incidents demonstrated the vulnerability of the Japanese infrastructure to sabotage and of the Japanese elite to assassination or attack and these conclusions reinforced the perceived need for a strong, adequately armed and sufficiently mobile constabulary.

²⁶ S. Shiota, 'Matsukawa Jiken Tōji no Fukushima Kenka no Roudō Undō' (The Labour Movement in Fukushima Prefecture at the Time of the Matsukawa Case), *Rekishigaku Kenkyū (Journal of Historical Studies)*, No. 224, Oct 1958, p 47.

²⁷ Communist rhetoric at the time even called for a 'September Revolution'. *Sempu*, 1/8/49; *Akahata*, 20/7/49; *Rodo Keizai Jūmpo*, 11/7/49.

²⁸ Johnson, *Conspiracy*, pp 105,108.

Appendix II:

Stalin and the Cominform Criticism

The origins and reasons for the forced change of policy thrust upon the JCP by Stalin are debated by historians. There are two main clusters of arguments as to why the JCP was ordered to openly commit to a policy of violence: the first relates to the plans for the war in Korea, and the second focuses on relations between the PRC and USSR. The Korean War theory is advocated by Stockwin as follows:

It is probably true to say that it [the Cominform criticism] was connected to the coming offensive in Korea and motivated by the desire to tie up American forces in Japan by a series of domestic disturbances. If this was the motive, however, it misfired. The Americans directed the Japanese government to take strong action against the JCP, which was driven underground. The party's attempts to create domestic chaos had little result, except to alienate three-quarters of those who had voted for it in 1949.¹

Packard also briefly mentions this theory in his work on the treaty crisis of 1960: 'Stalin ordered the JCP to adopt a strategy of terrorism and violence, sending guerrilla squads to the hills and causing Molotov cocktails to be hurled at police stations'.² As too does Stueck in his 2002 work on the Korean War:

¹ J.A.A. Stockwin, 'The JCP in the Sino-Soviet Dispute- From Neutrality to Alignment?', *The Disintegrating Monolith*, in J.A.A. Stockwin, *Collected Writings of J.A.A Stockwin*, Japan Library, London, 2004, p 101.

² G.R. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo, The Security Crisis of 1960*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, p 23.

Japan, of course, was part of the U.S. defence perimeter in the Pacific, and Stalin had no intention of openly contesting the American position there. Nonetheless, the communists could create internal turmoil in Japan, which might give Washington further pause in using that country as a forward base for strong action elsewhere in Asia.³

Thornton also argues along similar lines in claiming that the military policy of the JCP only made sense within the context of the Korean War and American use of Japan as a forward base for operations in Korea and that due to this: 'regarding Japan, war in Korea would logically call for an attempt to disrupt American response capability, at least initially, behind the lines'.⁴ Goncharov, Lewis and Litai argue that the JCP military campaign also aimed to drive a wedge between Japan and the US. This was to be achieved through attacks designed to raise tensions within the country and through new propaganda which sought to enflame Japanese nationalism, attacked US 'imperialism' and which portrayed the JCP as the champions of peace, as only they supported a comprehensive (i.e. including the USSR and PRC) peace settlement.⁵

The second main argument for the origin of Cominform criticism is that it was a result of a struggle for power and influence between the USSR and PRC. Goncharov, Lewis and Litai argue that in issuing the criticism Stalin was testing Mao's loyalty to 'communism' (or himself) at a tense time with the US by forcing him to choose sides, and was also examining whether Mao's commitment to communist solidarity was greater than his Chinese nationalism.⁶ Goncharov, Lewis and Litai also cite the Mao telegram which stated the need to support the criticism in the CCP press and the article in *Bulletin* on 27 January 1950 praising Mao, as indicators of Mao's

³ W Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War, A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002, p 77.

⁴ R.C. Thornton, *Odd Man Out, Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War*, Brassey's, Washington, 2001' p 83.

⁵ S.N. Goncharov, J.W. Lewis and X. Litai, *Uncertain Partners, Stalin, Mao and the Korean War*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003, p 106.

⁶ *Ibid.*

compliance and Stalin's gratitude.⁷ Gittings, however, argues that the PRC and USSR were involved in a struggle over control of both the Indian Communist Party (ICP) and the JCP. The battle eventually resulted in a trade-off in late 1949 of a reduction of Soviet support for the anti-Mao ICP in exchange for the use of the Chinese influence over the JCP to help foist the military policy onto it. According to Gittings the deal was successfully concluded, with the ICP being brought into line and the PRC accepting, although in less explicit terminology, the Soviet criticism of the JCP.⁸

It seems that a combination of both of these approaches offers the clearest picture of Stalin's actions. In his relations with Mao, Kim and other communist leaders Stalin was pursuing the dual goals of expanding the Soviet sphere of influence through efforts such as the Korean War, whilst simultaneously seeking to preserve the USSR's dominant position amongst the world's communist parties.

The criticism is also interesting as it represented a number of departures from the previous direction of the JCP. The document and the philosophies it rejected marked a change in the theoretical conception of the application of Marxism to Japan, and not one created within the JCP itself but forced upon it from outside. The longstanding JCP philosophy of gradual revolution within an advanced capitalist society against a domestic enemy changed to one of violent national liberation from foreign imperialism in a 'semi-colonial area', a philosophy identical to that of the Chinese Maoist model.⁹ These rhetorical changes were replicated and further propagated through the '1951 New Line' and 'military policy' which, taking many cues from communist Chinese thought and tactics, continued the portrayal of Japan as a semi-colonial area whose path to communist liberation, like that of China, lay through guerrilla war.¹⁰ The criticism also

⁷ Mao Cable from Moscow re: Supporting the Cominform Bulletin's Criticism of the Japanese Communist Party Politburo Member Nozaka Sanzo, 14/1/50, printed in, Goncharov, Lewis and Litai, *Uncertain Partners*, p 250.

⁸ J. Gittings, *The World and China, 1922-1972*, Eyre Methuen, London, 1974, pp 160-162.

⁹ Stockwin, *The JCP in the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, pp 101-102.

¹⁰ 'Nihon Kyōsantō no Tōmen no Yōkyū – Atarashii Kōryō' (The JCP's Urgent Demand – A New Programme), 21/8/51, printed in, K. Tsuji (ed), *Shiryō Sengo Nijū Nen Shi*

marked the formal transition from 'peaceful revolution' to the open and official adoption of military tactics and armed revolution in place of democratic methods. This formal adoption of military tactics and the revolutionary rhetoric which underpinned them caused great concern amongst the authorities in Japan and greatly strengthened the perceived requirement for a constabulary capable of meeting the threat. However, the submission of the JCP to international pressure and the rejection of the previously successful tactics severely damaged the JCP. The Communists had also moved into the ironic position of decrying and resisting US 'imperialism' whilst simultaneously being a puppet of Soviet sponsored aggression in Korea. Moreover, the JCP, which had previously sought to largely avoid Cold War connections, was now entangled within them and increasingly defined by them in its relations with the authorities.¹¹ It is also important to note that the early warning given by the Cominform criticism and the time wasted by the JCP in squabbling over factional disputes actually gave the Japanese and American authorities the opportunity to take precautions against the policy of violent revolution, including the deepening of the Red Purge, the expansion of the Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) and the establishment of the National Police Reserve.¹²

(*Documents from Twenty Years of Postwar History*), Nihon Hyōronsha, Tokyo, Vol. 1, 1966, p 412-415.

¹⁰ Ibid, p 414; J. Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkley, 1985, p 224; R.A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1967, p 39.

¹¹ Stockwin, *The Communist Party of Japan*, p 126.

¹² *New York Times*, 13/1/1950; Thornton, *Odd Man Out*, p 84, E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*, Continuum, London, 2002, p 493; J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath, Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, London, 1988, p 365; R. Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan, International Communism in Action 1919-1951*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1952, p 251.

Appendix III.

Yoshida to MacArthur, Letter on Police Reform/Recentralisation 6 August 1949

Letter
To: Gen. MacArthur
From: PM Yoshida

August 6, 1949

The ineptitude of our police as has been demonstrated during these past uneventful months is a source of grave concern to my government, with which, after all, rests the ultimate responsibility for public security.

For one thing, the country's police power has been split up into numerous units, large and small, each of which is independent, isolated and often helpless. Moreover, the entire system is detached from the government.

To take the Mitaka runaway train case, the government must keep its hands off. We are kept in the dark as to the progress of investigations by the police, to say nothing of their plans for the future. The national public safety commission takes the position that it is none of my business, although they are ready to let the final responsibility for an occurrence affecting the public peace to fall upon me as the Prime minister.

Clearly something ought to be done. The government is working on the revision of the police law, but this will take time.

Meanwhile the government must be prepared for any contingency that may arise any day in these unsettled times.

What can be done to bring the police into closer liaison with government; to coordinate the various police branches and units, and to place them under unified control and direction, as occasion may demand, for swift, vigorous, effective action? Here is an urgent question which confronts me and my government.

I should be very grateful if you would be good enough to consider the matter and give me your advice or suggestion.¹

¹ Government Section (GS) (B) 2270, Letter, Yoshida to SCAP, 6/8/49.

Appendix IV.

The Weakness of the Japanese Civil Police in Occupied Japan

The severe levels of crime, corruption and gang violence added to the poor state of Japan's infrastructure and a critical lack of equipment made the Japanese civil police struggle to perform even its basic duties from 1945 onwards.¹ The conditions faced by the police, now operating without their military backup, were far worse both in terms of political and non-political crime than anything faced before 1945. Added to these woes of the Occupation introduced a controversial reform programme which even elements of GHQ opposed.

With the end of the Pacific War the Allied authorities sought to thoroughly democratise and demilitarise the Axis powers to prevent their re-emergence as threats to world peace. The role and character of the civil police was seen as crucial to the democratic remodelling of the former Axis powers, almost on a par with the connected issue of rearmament.² Through reform it was hoped that the Japanese police system could be transformed into an independent, responsible and publicly accountable force rather than the pawn of the elite it had been.³ Despite concerns from G2 (intelligence) and parts of the Japanese government over the wisdom of sweeping reform and the diffusion of police power during a time of social unrest, the liberal 'new dealers' in GS (Government Section) pressed on with reform and the decentralisation the civil police was carried

¹ H.E. Wildes, 'The Postwar Japanese Police', *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, Vol. 43, No. 5, (Jan – Feb 1953), p 663; Intelligence (G2) 250, Extract from Press Conference by Eaton, 5/12/1948.

² P. Jenkins, 'Policing the Cold War: The Emergence of New Police Structures in Europe 1946-1953', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 31, No.1, 1988, p 146.

³ C. Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan, Control, Corruption and Resistance to Reform*, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, London, 1997, p 211.

out in March 1948.⁴ The reforms reduced police powers, stripped the police of much of their economic and administrative role, and overall supervision of the police moved from centralised government control to a diffuse network of local Public Safety Commissions (PSC).⁵ Through the reform process the police also lost many of their specialist units and this loss of the internal security agencies assigned to prevent espionage and subversion were particularly galling to the Japanese elite and G2, due to their concerns about internal security.⁶ The police also lost their cabinet representation and decentralised Municipal Police forces totalling 95,000 men were created in all towns with more than 5,000 people. Rural areas and towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants were served by the National Rural Police, which numbered around 30,000 and which was monitored by both national and prefectural PSCs.⁷ The 'democratic' reform of the police filtered down thorough the entire institution, from a purge of much of the pre-war leadership, to a focus on the American-style patrol system rather than the more passive, traditional *Kōban* (police box) based approach to policing.⁸

Far from improving the operations of the police system of Japan, GHQ's reforms actually weakened the police, a feature common to police decentralisation programmes encouraged by the allies in the other former Axis powers.⁹ The purges of individuals judged to have been associated with the wartime regime also hit the police hard with the loss of many experienced and effective officers. From October 1945 to early 1946 the force lost 49 out of 51 prefectural police chiefs, 12% of Superintendents

⁴ G2 2746, Letter, Katayama to SCAP, 3/9/47; Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, pp 148, 154, 178-179.

⁵ H. Nakahara, 'The Japanese Police', *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Dec 1955, p 585; P.J. Katzenstein and Y. Tsujinaka, *Defending the Japanese State, Structures, Norms and the Political Responses to Terrorism and Violent Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s*, Cornell East Asia Series, Ithaca, 1991, p 52.

⁶ Jenkins, 'Policing the Cold War', p 146.

⁷ Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, *Defending the Japanese State*, p 54.

⁸ H. Masuda (ed), *Rearmament of Japan, Part 1: 1947-1952*, Congressional Information Service and Maruzen, Tokyo, 1998, (hereafter YF-A16), 1D-167, Inauguration of American Type Patrol System, Tokyo MPD, 1950; Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 51.

⁹ Jenkins, 'Policing the Cold War', p 153.

and 11% of Inspectors; and the overall number of officers removed by the purge totalled 5.7% of the civil police's total strength.¹⁰ Reductions in shift length reduced the living standards of officers, the force was very under strength, and due to the unpleasant and dangerous character of its work, was seen by many as a job of last resort.¹¹ These difficult conditions led to a high turnover of staff and critically low morale, which further undermined the capabilities of the police and resulted in the loss of many more experienced officers and their replacement by less effective and inexperienced recruits.¹² Police duties were stretching the force to breaking point and with new restrictions on its activities and conduct, it struggled to maintain order, being characterised by Yoshida as 'feeble' and frequently having to rely on American tactical troops to maintain order.¹³ Two incidents which helped to illustrate the inability of the Japanese police to cope without more heavily armed back up were the 1948 Kobe riots and the Taira incident, which clearly demonstrated the weakness of police and its powerlessness to deal with organised, motivated and even partially armed resistance.¹⁴

New regulations and a lack of equipment also reduced the efficacy of the police force. The 'democratisation' of the police had stripped them of many of their pre-1945 powers, some of which were excessive but many of which were common to most police forces across the world. A good example of this, which proved a serious problem in measures to control unrest and rioting, were the rules governing the use of tear gas and the control of demonstrations. The Occupation authorities issued edicts stating that no orderly protest was to be broken up and legally forbade the police from intervening in demonstrations until they erupted into

¹⁰ Historical Section, GHQ, *History of Non-military Activities in Japan*, Tokyo, 1950-1951, 'Monograph 55 Police and Public Safety', p 11.

¹¹ G2 228, Check Sheet, To Pulliam, PSD, 'Standards of Civilian Police', 14/9/46.

¹² Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 58.

¹³ S. Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, Rowan and Littlefield, Plymouth, 2007, p 146; Historical Section, *History of Non-military Activities in Japan*, 'Monograph 55 Police and Public Safety', p 80.

¹⁴ Yoshida, *Last Meiji Man*, pp 144-145; J. Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p 161; Appendix I. 'The Shimoyama, Taira, Mitaka and Matsukawa Incidents'.

violence.¹⁵ This deprived the police of the right to pre-emptively stop protests to protect their own and the public's safety and these restrictions were exploited by the radical left during events such as 'Bloody May Day'.¹⁶ These restrictions and their impairment of the Japanese police's ability to control demonstrators were added to by the restrictions placed upon the use and possession of tear gas. Only the police forces of the six largest cities in Japan were allowed to possess and use tear gas, leaving many of the large industrial centres and much of the critical infrastructure of Japan without police forces fully capable of protecting them against mass demonstrations, sabotage or attack.¹⁷ These legal and technical restraints on the police further called into question their adequacy in the face of strikes and demonstrations of mounting scale and violence which many in the US and Japanese administrations saw as signs of instability and portents of revolution.¹⁸

The capabilities of the police were also constrained due to shortages of equipment and weaknesses in Japan's infrastructure.¹⁹ The police suffered from a critical shortage of vehicles which made performance of their duties, particularly amongst the partially damaged transport infrastructure of Occupied Japan, very taxing. Amongst the vehicles which the Japanese police did possess many were in very poor condition due to excessive use during wartime without proper fuel, maintenance or parts.²⁰ The situation was judged so urgent that G2's Public Safety Division (PSD) looked into giving the Japanese police some worn out US Army trucks. PSD officials found 2,000 large cargo trucks and 1,000 light trucks, although these all lacked radios and were impractical either for use in narrow Japanese streets or for patrol work. Five hundred dilapidated Jeeps were also found but were judged to have required almost a million dollars of work to repair. The plan was rejected, but indicatively of the

¹⁵ I. Morris, 'Policeman and Student in Japanese Politics', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1959, p 8; Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, pp 88-89.

¹⁶ For more on 'Bloody May Day' see: Chapter 4, pp 267-270.

¹⁷ YF-A16, 1D-170, Public Safety Division Memorandum, 6/12/50.

¹⁸ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, pp 88-89; Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, p 277.

¹⁹ Wildes, *The Postwar Japanese Police*, p 663.

²⁰ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 63.

impoverished state of the police, even if all these vehicles had been put into service the number available across the country would have still been about one car or truck for every forty policemen.²¹ Shortages of key equipment extended literally from top to toe with the Osaka Police force even suffering from a critical lack of shoes for foot patrol as late as 1949.²²

The shortage of radios and communications equipment was another major obstacle to effective policing in occupied Japan, with wire and radio telegraph installations and infrastructure heavily bomb damaged in urban areas and badly maintained in rural areas. Furthermore, repairs were not even started in some areas until the late 1940s.²³ A fortnight after the Taira incident and the day before the Mitaka incident a report on acquiring radios for the police found that there were no US Army surplus radios available and that training the police to use them would be too time consuming, but suggested that as there was an 'emergency' the Japanese police telephone lines should be given the same protection as the US military lines to prevent them being cut or tampered with.²⁴

Scarcity of firearms was also a serious concern for the Japanese police and their Japanese and American masters. The police handed in their weapons at the end of war as they thought they were to be disarmed like the Japanese military.²⁵ In January 1946 GHQ informed the Japanese government that the police were indeed allowed to carry arms, but in the preceding months large numbers of weapons had gone missing with only enough remaining to equip 20-25% of policemen.²⁶ Types of weapons and ammunition varied and incompatibilities between them further reduced the usable number. These shortages meant that as late as December 1948

²¹ YF-A16, 1D-137, Memorandum, Graves to Chief, PSD, 'Statistics on Vehicles to be used by Japanese Police', 18/7/49.

²² Historical Section, *History of Non-military Activities in Japan*, 'Monograph 55 Police and Public Safety', p 71.

²³ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 63.

²⁴ YF-A16, 1D-139, Graves to Chief, PSD, Memorandum, 14/7/49.

²⁵ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 61.

²⁶ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directives to the Japanese Government (SCAPINs), (SCA-1), SCAPIN 605, 'Armament of Police Forces in Japan', 16/1/46, Reel 2; G2 250, Extract from Press Conference by Eaton, 5/12/1948.

roughly one gun was shared between five or six officers in the cities and one between three in the countryside.²⁷ This situation was far from ideal and with the dire public order situation and high crime rate, firearm 'supplies were insufficient to ensure effective policing'.²⁸

In October 1948 MacArthur reported to Washington that the police only had 26,000, pistols of which 12,000 were working, and recommended that 125,000 revolvers, holsters, ammunition and spare parts be sent to Japan. A total of 107,000 revolvers of .38 and .45 calibres were sent from January 1949 onwards, which helped strengthen the police somewhat. This move also demonstrated SCAP and Washington's commitment to the maintenance of internal security in Japan and their belief that a more heavily armed, effective police force was necessary to do this.²⁹ Nevertheless, the pressing shortage of firearms and equipment were keenly felt by both the Americans and Japanese and prompted Yoshida to ask SCAP if the police could be equipped with infantry weapons to help maintain order.³⁰

²⁷ G2 250, Extract from Press Conference by Eaton, 5/12/1948.

²⁸ Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 61.

²⁹ YF-A16, 1C-26, Memorandum, Johnson to The Secretary of the Army, 1/7/49; Ibid, Progress Report on the Implementation of NSC13/3, 'Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy Towards Japan', 9/6/49; Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan*, p 62.

³⁰ G2 250, Extract from Press Conference by Eaton, 5/12/1948.

Appendix V.

The 'Constabulary Letter' **2 October 1945**

To General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

From General Marshall

October 2, 1945

Radio No. WARX-72310. Washington, D.C.

Secret

Ultimate composition and organization of occupational forces for Japan, Korea and the Ryukyus is being considered here. WARX 70811 and CAX 52442 illustrate one phase of this problem. Additional suggestions are receiving consideration. One proposal under consideration envisages that the major portion of the occupational force ultimately might be organized along a super military police line with highly mobile tactical units in reserve rather than along the present lines of purely combat organizations. In such an organization, U.S. personnel would be placed in local command staff and other key positions with most subordinate positions held by Japanese for Japan and Ryukyus and by Koreans for Korea. In addition with the establishment of such a police force, it would be necessary that it have the backing of small U.S. combat formations on the order of regimental combat teams located in various strategic areas and capable of rapid movement to threatened points by air or ground. Under this concept, the total of U.S. combat elements might not be greater than the equivalent of one or two divisions.

The type of U.S. personnel to be utilized in this proposed integrated military police organization is also being considered. Over-age or limited duty

personnel might be satisfactory. Special enlistments in high NCO grade for U.S. personnel to be utilized for this purpose might provide inducement to enable the procurement of sufficient personnel. Commissioned rank might be given to outstanding NCO types as we did for [Philippine] Scouts. Some special legislation might be required.

Methods of effecting the integration of such a force might take one of the following forms:

All officers and NCO's to be U.S., the remainder to be natives.

All officers and NCO's and one squad per military police platoon to be U.S., the remainder to be native.

Variations of the above proposal might consist of replacing native personnel in the integrated organization proposed above by Chinese or Filipino personnel.

Will you consider the foregoing and forward your comments with respect to (1) Japan, (2) Korea and (3) Ryukyus [sic].¹

¹ WARX-72310, Marshall to MacArthur, 2/10/45, printed in *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 5, "The Finest Soldier," January 1, 1945 - January 7, 1947, Johns Hopkins University Press, London, 2003, pp. 320-321.

Appendix VI.

Macarthur to Yoshida, Letter Authorising the Creation of the NPR 8 July 1950

Letter

July 8, 1950

To: Premier Yoshida
From: Gen. MacArthur

In keeping with my established policy to re-invest autonomous authority in the Japanese Government as rapidly as the situation permits, I have visualised the progressive development of law enforcing agencies adequate to the maintenance of internal security and order and the safeguard of Japan's coastline against unlawful immigration and smuggling.

By the letter of September 16, 1947 I approved the recommendation of the Japanese Government for an increase in the overall strength of Japan's police force to 125,000 men, making provision for a new national rural police of 30,000 men. It was then the view of the government, in which I fully concurred, that the strength recommended and authorized was not an arbitrary determination of future police requirements but designed to provide an adequate force around which might be built a modern and democratic police system oriented to an effective decentralisation of the police responsibility in harmony with the constitutional principle of local autonomy.

Subsequent action in the recruitment, equipping and training of the police force then authorized has proceeded with commendable efficiency. The concept of autonomous responsibility has been faithfully observed, essential coordination has been carefully developed and the proper relationship between the police and private citizenry has been progressively forged. As a consequence, the Japanese people today may take justifiable pride in this agency for the enforcement of law at all levels of government.

Indeed, it may be credited to both organizational police efficiency and the law-abiding character of the Japanese people that, despite a much lower police strength in relation to population here than is to be found in most of the other democratic states and the general post-war impoverishment and other adverse conditions usually conducive to lawlessness, Japan stands out with a calmness and serenity which lends emphasis to the violence, confusion and disorder which exist in other nearby lands.

To insure that this favourable condition will continue unchallenged by lawless minorities, here as elsewhere committed to the subversion of the due process of law and assaults of opportunity against the public welfare, I believe that the police system has reached that degree of efficiency in organisation and training which will permit its augmentation to a strength which will bring it within the limits experience has shown to be essential to the safeguard of the public welfare in a democratic society.
















Insofar as maritime safety in the harbours and coastal waters of Japan is concerned the Maritime Safety Board has achieved highly satisfactory results but events disclose that the safeguard of the long Japanese coastal line against unlawful immigration and smuggling activity requires employment of a larger force under this agency than is presently provided for by law.

Accordingly, I authorize your government to take necessary measures to establish a national police reserve of 75,000 men and expand the existing authorised strength of the personnel serving under the Maritime Safety Board by an additional 8,000. The current year's operating cost of these increments to existing agencies will be made available from the funds previously allocated in the General Account of the National Budget towards retirement of the public debt. The appropriate sections of this Headquarters will be available, as heretofore, to advise and assist in the technical aspects of these measures.¹





¹ Macarthur to Yoshida, 8/7/50, Printed in Ōkurashō Zaiseishi Shitsuhen (The Financial History Section of the Ministry of Finance), *Showa Zaiseishi, Sensō Kara Kōwa Made (The Financial History of Shōwa, From War to Peace)*, Vol. 20, Tokyo Keizai Shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1982, pp 254-255.

Appendix VII.

Basic US Military Map Symbols¹

Antiaircraft Artillery	
Armoured Command	
Army Air Forces	
Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery	
Cavalry, Horse	
Cavalry, Mechanized	
Chemical Warfare Service	
Coast Artillery	
Engineers	
Infantry	
Medical Corps	
Ordnance Department	
Quartermaster Corps	
Signal Corps	
Tank Destroyer	

¹ Courtesy of: <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/symbols.htm>

Transportation Corps	
Veterinary Corps	
Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing symbol with the arm or service symbol:	
Airborne Artillery	
Airborne Infantry	







Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad	•
Section	••
Platoon	•••
Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight	
Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron	
Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral)	
Brigade, Combat Command of Armoured Division, or Air Force Wing	X
Division or Command of an Air Force	XX
Corps or Air Force	XXX
Army	XXXX
Group of Armies	XXXXX

Examples

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines.

Company A, 137th Infantry	
8th Field Artillery Battalion	
Combat Command A, 1st Armoured Division	
Observation Post, 23d Infantry	
Command Post, 5th Infantry Division	
Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry	

Weapons

Machine gun	
Gun	
Gun battery	
Howitzer or Mortar	
Tank	
Self-propelled gun	

Appendix VIII.

Stalin's New Year's Message to the Japanese People **31 December 1951**

I have received your [Chief Editor of the Kyodo News Agency, Iwamoto Kiishi] request to send a New Year's message To the Japanese people.

It is not a tradition with Soviet leaders that the premier of a foreign State should address his wishes to the people of another State. However, the profound sympathy of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the Japanese people who are in straits owing to foreign Occupation impels me to make an exception to the rule and meet your request.

Please convey to the Japanese people that I wish them freedom and happiness, that I wish them full success in their gallant struggle for the independence of their homeland.

In the past the peoples of the Soviet Union themselves experienced the horrors of foreign occupation in which the Japanese imperialists also took part. Therefore the fully understand the sufferings of the Japanese people, deeply sympathise with them and believe that they will achieve the regeneration and independence of their homeland as the peoples of the Soviet Union achieved it in the past.

I wish the Japanese workers deliverance from unemployment and low wages, elimination of high prices of consumer goods and success in the struggle for the preservation of peace.

I wish the Japanese peasants deliverance from landlessness and land shortage, elimination of high taxes and success in the struggle for the preservation of peace. I wish the entire Japanese people and their intelligentsia full victory of the democratic forces of Japan, revival and advance of the country's economic life, the flowering of national culture, science and art and success in the preservation of peace.¹

¹ Stalin's New Year's Message to the Japanese people, 31/12/1951, printed in, R.K. Jain, *The USSR and Japan 1945-1980*, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1981, pp 219-220.

Appendix IX.

Major JCP Related Incidents 1951-1952¹

Incident	Location	Date	Notes
'Second Kobe Riots'	Kobe, Kyoto and Ōtsu	11-12/1950 ²	
Killing of Policeman	Nerima police station	27/12/1951	Pistol also stolen. ³
Assassination of Police Chief	Sapporo	21/1/1952 ⁴	
Mass demos	Tokyo and across Japan (21 other locations)	21/2/52	'Anti Colonialisation Day'. 3,000 demonstrate, 20 police injured, 30 demonstrators arrested. ⁵
Raid on police station	Arakawa	28/2/1952	
Bomb Attempt	Yokohama	30/3/52	A number of small bombs placed under US Officers' cars. ⁶
Major strike	Nation wide	1/4/52	250,000 participate. ⁷
Major Strike	Nation wide	18/4/52	18 million participate. ⁸
Bloody Mayday	Tokyo (Other minor disturbances in Osaka and Kyoto)	1/5/1952	13 US and 60 Japanese cars destroyed. 800 police, 2,300 people, 12 US military and 6 US civilians injured. Two killed. ⁹

¹ Excludes sabotage, see: Chapter 1, pp 66-70.

² E. Takemae, *Inside GHQ, The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*, Continuum, London, 2002, p 498.

³ *Japan Times*, 28/12/51.

⁴ A. Dubro and D.E. Kaplan, *Yakuza*, Futura, London, 1987, p 74; Foreign Office File (FO) 371/99393, Denning to Eden, 'Use of Violence by the Japanese Communist Party to Attain its Ultimate Ends', 19/5/1952; Judgements of the Supreme Court, Judgement on the Significance of Hearsay Statements, 17/10/1963, available from: <http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1963.10.17-1960-A-No.1378.html>.

⁵ FO 371/99393, Denning to Eden, 'Use of Violence by the Japanese Communist Party to Attain its Ultimate Ends', 19/5/1952; E.J. Lewe Van Aduard, *Japan from Surrender to Peace*, Praeger, New York, 1954, p 245-246; FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52.

⁶ FO 371/99393, Denning, 'Japan Communist Party's Violence Campaign', 3/4/52.

⁷ Lewe Van Aduard, *Japan from Surrender to Peace*, p 246.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52.

Incident	Location	Date	Notes
Anniversary of 'Imperial Plaza Incident'	Raids on Police boxes and tax offices	30/5/1952	3 killed and 80 injured. ¹⁰
Osu Incident	Nagoya	6/7/52	269 arrested, 70 police, 2 firemen, 4 civilians, 19 demonstrators injured, 1 killed.
Anniversary of Korean war	114 incidents including large scale demos and violence in Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya and Tokyo.	25/6/52	21,000 participate in demos and attacks police, US vehicles and installations. 43 police, 21 demonstrators, 4 press and 7 civilians injured. ¹¹
Acid Bomb Attack	Osaka	25/6/52	Damages car and Brigadier General Carter Clarke suffers acid burns to face.
Hirakata Incident	Hirakata Arsenal, Osaka	24-25/5/52	Attack on arsenal and employees. ¹²
Attack on Itami base	Itami, Osaka	25/6/52	Raid on US housing complex.
Suita Incident	Suita Rail Yard, Osaka	24-25/5/52	Attack on rail Yard. ¹³
'Molotov Cocktail Incident'	Eastside police box, Shinjuku station	25/6/1952	
Plot to Destroy Hirakata Arsenal	Hirakata	5/12/52 ¹⁴	
Attempts at the Creation of Liberated Areas	Ogouchi, Ongata Kohi, Hikawa (mountain villages west of Tokyo) and other locations.	1951-1955 ¹⁵	

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹ FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52; *New York Times*, 31/5/52.

¹² FO 371/99393, Acting Secretary, Department of State Bruce to Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayburn, 3/7/52.

¹³ K Wakita, Chōsen Sensō to Sugita-Hirakata Jiken, Sensōshi no Kuhaku wo Umeru (The Korean War and the Suita/Hirakata Incidents, Filling The Gaps in Postwar History), Akashi Shoten, Tokyo, 2005, p 271.

¹⁴ Ibid, p115.

¹⁵ K. Hasegawa, 'Student Soldiers, The Japanese Communist Party's "Period of Extreme Leftist Adventurism"', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp 43, 46-51.

Appendix X.

The SDF and the 1960 ANPO Crisis

The role of the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) in the 1960 security treaty crisis is another interesting case study relating to the reluctance of the Japanese Government to employ its security services domestically. Although it involved the GSDF and not the NPR, many of the individuals involved were the same, such as Hayashi Keizo, the Chief of staff of the NPR in 1950, and the Joint Staff Council head in 1960. Furthermore, the issues involved were very similar to 'Bloody May Day' 1952 and are useful in illustrating the difficulties which existed in the use of the NPR.

After returning from the United States in January 1960 the Japanese Prime Minister Kiishi Nobusuke (a former purgee) faced recurrent mass protests over the revision of the 1951 US-Japan security treaty and the forthcoming visit of US President Dwight Eisenhower. Concerned about the rising tide of protest, Kishi gave directions to leading Liberal Democratic Party politicians to study the possibility of deploying the SDF against demonstrations.¹ GSDF Chief of Staff Sugita Ichiji, took Kiishi's concerns further, fearing that a full scale revolution is at hand as the demonstrations were becoming increasingly violent.² Preparations undertaken by the GSDF for their possible use included a large 'police exercise' on 1 April and national scale public security 'war games' three weeks later.³ Twenty thousand troops were also deployed to the capital, who fortified their positions with sand bags and barbed wire.⁴ The troops were issued live ammunition and were supported

¹ Y. Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji (Postwar Japan and World Politics)*, Chūō Kōronsha, Tokyo, 1988, p 425.

² Sugita, a former senior IJA officer, was both present at the British surrender of Singapore in 1942 and the Japanese surrender on USS Missouri in 1945. I. Sugita, *Wasurerarete Iru Anzen Hoshō (Forgotten Security)*, Jiji Tsushinsha, Tokyo, 1967, p 56.

³ T. Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, Edition Q, Tokyo, 1995, p 121.

⁴ C. Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 1825-1995*, Oxford University press, Oxford, 2000, p 386.

by fifty tanks and sniper detachments on the roofs of buildings near the protests.⁵ Their commanders maintained close liaison with the civil police and continued their preparations for a showdown with the protestors.

Soon the stage appeared to be set for this showdown, as following the passing of the new security treaty by the lower house of the Diet on 19 May, violence erupted across Tokyo.⁶ Street battles took place between leftwing demonstrators and Rightwing vigilantes led by men such as Kodama Yoshio. Eight thousand members of the radical communist student movement *Zengakuren* attacked the Diet building.⁷ The police eventually restored order but the incident resulted in forty-three injuries, 182 arrests and one death.⁸ During this unrest Eisenhower set off for Japan, despite the fact that his press secretary James Hagerty had been attacked in his car by protestors and needed be evacuated by military helicopter.

Concerned about the mounting violence and defiance of the protestors and over the safety of Eisenhower, Kishi became resolved to call in the SDF to restore order on the streets of the capital.⁹ Senior members of the LDP and then Kishi himself pressed the Director General of the Defence Agency, Akagi Munenori, for a commitment to use the SDF to defend the Diet during Eisenhower's visit.¹⁰ Akagi strongly opposed the idea. In a move mirroring the events of Bloody May Day, eight years earlier, Akagi knew that the use of the SDF in this case would seriously harm its public image and could have even prompted further and more serious violence.¹¹ In his meeting with Kishi, Akagi voiced his extreme reluctance to use the SDF unless the police lost control of the situation or a genuine insurrection broke out. Akagi also

⁵ Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p 122; M.E. Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', in J.H. Buck, *The Modern Japanese Military System*, Sage, London, 1975, p 49.

⁶ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1960, printed in, D.J. Lu, Japan, *A Documentary History, The Late Tokugawa Period to the Present*, M.E. Sharpe, London, 1997, p 513.

⁷ Kodama, a former purgee and underworld figure, was a close associate of the man Willoughby pushed for the leadership of the NPR, Hattori Takushiro, see: Chapter 3, pp 214-220.

⁸ Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p 123.

⁹ Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji*, p 427; Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p 121.

¹⁰ Y. Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji*, p 426.

¹¹ Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power*, p 386.

stressed the high numbers of deaths which could have resulted if the SDF had been used.¹²

Sensing that Akagi would not be swayed to use SDF in what could be seen as a political role, Kishi backed down, Eisenhower's visit was postponed and the Prime Minister subsequently resigned. The protestors and much of the opposition to the treaty correctly noted that concerns over the public image of the SDF and the possibly bloody results of their use resulted in Kishi's climb-down. A disappointed Sugita, head of the GSDF, also felt that the retreat from the use of the SDF was a victory for the communists and a loss of a good training opportunity for the SDF. The crisis also prompted the production of 'Public Security Mobilisation Guidebook' by the SDF later that year, which when discovered by the press also caused major controversy.¹³

¹² T. Igarashi, *Nichibei Kankei to Higashi Ajia: Rekishiteki Bunyaku to Mirai no Kōsō (US-Japanese Relations and East Asia: Historical Context and Future Conceptions)*, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, Tokyo, 1999, p 166; Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', pp 51-52; Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p 123; Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji*, p 426.

¹³ Maeda, *The Hidden Army*, p 124; Weinstein, 'The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces', p 52; Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai*, pp 426-428.

Appendix XI.

UN Charter **Chapter VII, Article 51** **26 June 1945**

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.¹

¹ *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VII, Article 51, 26/6/1945.

Appendix XII.

Japanese Policy Document: 'Initial Steps for Re-armament Program', 3 February 1951

(Tokyo) February 3, 1951

[unsigned]

Simultaneously with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty and the Japanese-American Security Cooperation Agreement it will be necessary for Japan to embark upon a program of rearmament. The following are the principal features of this program contemplated by the Japanese government.

(a) Security forces, land and sea, totalling 50,000 will be created apart from the existing police forces and the National Police Reserve. These security forces will be specially trained and more powerfully equipped, and placed under the proposed Ministry of National Security. The 50,000 men will mark the start of Japan's new democratic armed forces.

(b) What might be termed a 'Security Planning Headquarters' will be set up in the National Security Ministry. Experts, conversant with American and British military affairs, will be assigned to this Headquarters; they will participate in the activities of the Joint Committee to be established under the Japanese-American Security Cooperation Agreement, and they will constitute the nucleus for the future General Staff of Japan's democratic armed forces. The government will seek the advice of American military experts (soldiers).¹

¹Initial Steps For Rearmament Program' printed in, Gaimushō (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho: Heiwajōyaku no Teikatsu ni Kansuru Chōsho* (Japanese Diplomatic Papers: Protocol Concerning the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty), Vol. 2, Gaimushō, Tokyo, 2002, p 182.

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