THE SINGLE DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM AND

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

CASE STUDIES OF INDIA AND JAPAN

(Ph. D. Thesis)

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ABSTRACT

This is an attempt to compare the processes of
political development in India and Japan. The two states
have been chosen because of some common features: these two
Asian countries have preserved their own cultures despite
certain degrees of modernisation; both have maintained a
system of parliamentary democracy based on free electoral
competition and universal franchise; both political systems
are characterised by the prevalence of a single dominant
party system.

The primary objective of this analysis is to test the
relevance of Western theories of political development.
Three hypotheses have been formulated: on the relationship
between economic growth and social modernisation on the one
hand and political development on the other; on the
establishment of a "nation-state" as a prerequisite for
political development; and on the relationship between
political stability and political development. For the
purpose of testing these hypotheses, the two countries
serve as good models because of their vastly different
socio-economic conditions: the different levels of
modernisation and economic growth; the homogeneity-
heterogeneity dichotomy; and the frequency of political
conflict.

In conclusion, Japan is an apoliticised society in
consequence of the imbalance between its political and
economic development. By contrast, the Indian political
system is characterised by an ever-increasing demand for

participation, with which current levels of
institutionalisation cannot keep pace. The respective
single dominant parties have thus played opposing roles,
i.e. of apoliticising society in the case of Japan while
encouraging participation in that of India.

The results of this comparative study indicate that a
high rate of economic growth does not necessarily lead to
political development, that legitimacy is a more important
factor in achieving national integration, and that the
frequency of political conflict is in some cases a sign of
an increase in participation.

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India

Japan

Indian Political Parties

INC: Indian National Congress, Indian National Congress(I)

SOC: Socialist Party

KMPP: Kisan Mazdoor Mandal

CPI: Communist Party of India

BJS: All India Bahartiya Jan Sangh

BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party

HMS: Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha

RRP: Akhil Bhartiya Ram Rajya Parishad

SCF: All India Scheduled Caste Federation

SWA: Swatantra Party

PSP: Praja Socialist Party

RPI: Republican Party of India

CPM: Communist Party of India (Marxist)

SSP: Samyukta Socialist Party

NCO: Indian National Congress (Organisation)

LD: Lok Dal

INCU: Indian National Congress (Urs)

BLD: Bhartiya Lok Dal (Janata Party)

JNP: Janata Party

JNPS: Janata Party (Secular)

TDP: Telugu Desam Party

AIADMK: All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

INCS: Indian National Congress (Socialist)

JKN: Jammu & Kashmir National Conference

JNPSR:Janata Party (Secular Raj Narain)

JNPSC:Janata Party (Secular Charan Singh)

Japanese Political Parties

LDP: Liberal Democratic Party

JSP: Japan Socialist Party

DSP: Democratic Socialist Party

LFP: Labour-Farmer Party

JCP: Japan Communist Party

NLC: New Liberal Club

SDF: Social Democratic Federation

INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to compare the processes of
political development in India and Japan. The two
countries have been chosen for various reasons. Firstly,
both countries are part of Asia and even after achieving a
certain degree of modernisation, they still preserve their
own cultures. Therefore, the case studies of these two
countries show the applicability and limitations of Western
theories. Secondly, India and Japan are among the few
countries in Asia which have been able to maintain
parliamentary democracy based on free electoral competition
and universal franchise. Thirdly, both political systems
are categorised as single dominant party systems, which at
least provides a common ground for comparison.

The fourth reason is the different levels of
modernisation and economic growth of the two countries.
One is a post-industrial society with a literacy rate of
virtually one hundred percent while the other is still a
developing country in many respects with forty percent of
the population living under the poverty line. How these
levels of modernisation correspond to political development
is one of my main concerns. The fifth reason is that the
two countries are at the two extreme ends of the
homogeneity-heterogeneity spectrum. If national
integration is an important aspect of political
development, this dichotomy should present a significant
contrast in examining the ways in which integration is

achieved.

It is generally believed that because of Japan's miraculous economic growth, high level of education, cultural homogeneity and political stability, its political system has achieved a remarkable degree of development. The Liberal Democratic Party, which is the most important political engine of Japan's postwar prosperity, is often counted as one of the most successful political parties in the world since the Second World War. By contrast, Indian politics appear to be in a state of confusion. Moreover, India is a diverse country with a low literacy rate of 36.23 percent,[1] the "Hindu rate" of economic growth, recurring ethnic conflicts and lacking even a common language. Because of these socio-economic conditions, the political development achieved by India so far is considered negligible. It is feared that the Indian nation is disintegrating, that increasing violence threatens the integrity of the nation and that, moreover, India is not prepared for political development because of its low level of modernisation.

Such is often the first impression of outside observers. Deeper involvement with the two societies, however, makes some such observers wonder if political development is so simple that it can be measured by such indices as economic growth, literacy rate and the number of conflicts. The level of political consciousness does not always correspond to that of modernisation or economic growth in these two countries. Japan's high level of education - nearly forty percent of the population has

university education - has, far from awakening the nation
politically, produced instead an apoliticised society. The
Japanese people, especially the younger generation,
carefully avoid mentioning politics, while working
uncritically and quietly in pursuit of private interest
and, consciously or unconsciously, in the interest of the
"Japan Incorporated."

On the other hand, politics occupies a large part of
day-to-day conversations in India. Despite the relatively
low level of economic achievement, political awareness at
least, if not the level of development, seems to be
extraordinarily high. It is true that India has witnessed
a considerable number of conflicts. Ethnic groups are
pressing for self-government within the Indian polity if
possible but at the same time not hesitating to break out
of the Indian Union if their aspirations are not met. The
low level of law and order often becomes a synonym for the
low level of political development.

A question arises as to whether or not conflicts are
always dysfunctional. It might be possible to see in such
a situation some potential for political development. This
is where my first motivation in choosing the theme of the
present study lies. Of course, the amount of political
debate is not the only indicator of political development,
but at least it should be explained in terms of political
development. Between a general evaluation (of the Japanese
political system as being a successful case and the Indian
counterpart a failure), and the attitudes towards politics
of the two peoples, there lies a gap which has to be

filled. In order to make a bridge between the two opposite views, the very concept of political development needs to be reviewed.

It should be clear by now that some basic assumptions about the concept of political development have to be questioned. Those to be reconsidered are: firstly, the relationship between economic growth and social modernisation on the one hand and political development on the other; secondly, the concept of "nation-state"; and thirdly, political development and political stability. It is almost taken for granted that a developed political system is economically advanced, socially modernised, culturally integrated into a nation-state and politically stable. I intend to challenge all of these assumptions throughout this study. The following chapters, especially the first and the concluding chapters will discuss these problems in detail.

In addition to my first motivation mentioned above, India presents a new model for experiment both in terms of development of its own political system and political science in general. Firstly, India is challenging the notion of "nation-state," in that the direction of political development for India may not be towards a homogenized and centralised nation-state. Secondly, for all the recurring conflicts, India has shown extraordinary resilience. It is conceivable that India will develop into quite a different type of nation from what many of us believe a nation should be. Thus, the emphasis of the present study is on India's political development and not

Japan's. I have introduced the Japanese case primarily to show the different paths of development and not to examine it for its own sake, as can be seen from the amount of data and materials I have collected.

This study will focus on the role in political development of the single dominant parties, the Indian National Congress and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. There are three reasons for dealing almost exclusively with the two parties. Firstly, input process is considered to be more important than output process for political development, since the latter is mainly concerned with administrative and judicial functions. Secondly, political parties play a crucial role in making a bridge between the people at large and decision-makers. Other political agencies like the bureaucracy and pressure groups sometimes have a strong influence on policy-making, but in order to exercise their influence they must have close contact with the ruling party. Therefore, these actors can be taken into consideration by examining their relationship with the ruling party. Thirdly, new political elements which have emerged on the political scene recently, e.g. citizens' organisations, environmental movements and grassroots activists, are important but have not yet acquired relevance. Their importance lies in their non-political character. Thus political parties which have established their undeniable role in a political system are more important for political development than any other bodies already in existence.

The data used here are drawn from official documents

of the two parties, academic works, and interviews which I have carried out both in India and Japan. The field work has caused innumerable problems. Acquiring a research visa for India has become extremely difficult recently in the wake of escalating internal conflicts, although it seems to contradict the openness of Indian society. A research work on politics without a proper visa always scares any researchers. Yet, thanks to the openness and hospitality of the Indian people, I eventually managed to obtain a reasonable number of interviews in India. More serious problems, however, arose in Japan, which made it almost impossible to continue my interviews. The first difficulty was avoiding political involvement myself. An MP urged me to stand for election to the Upper House, while others wanted me to help them in their own election campaigns. Keeping a distance from actual politics practically meant failing to collect any important materials. The second difficulty lay in Japanese culture. Japanese people by and large speak very little in the first place, and even if they do, they usually do not express themselves very explicitly. As a result interviews were often conducted in vain. The number of interviews both in India and Japan corresponds to the efficacy of interviews in the respective cases.

The following chapters, after having presented a theoretical framework, will discuss the processes of political development in India and Japan with a special focus on the respective ruling parties. However, apart from being single dominant parties, the two parties do not

have much in common. The LDP is basically a parliamentary
party with strong fixed factionalism. Its weak
organisational basis is supplemented by the supporters'
associations of individual Diet Members. On the other
hand, the Congress Party claims itself to be a mass-party
deriving its strength from the historical role it played
during the nationalist movement. Factionalism does exist
but it is fluid. Such immense differences in character
make a strict comparison unmanageable. Therefore, in the
following chapters, the two cases will be discussed
separately and in the concluding chapter a broad comparison
will be made from the point of view of political
development.

Notes

(1) According to the 1981 census, the national average
literacy rate of India is 36.23 percent, as compared to
16.67 percent in the 1951 census (Research and Referenece
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
Government of India, India 1987: A Reference Annual,
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Government of India, December 1988, p. 72).

PART ONE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter 1: Comparative Politics and Political Development

The history of comparative politics goes back at least as far as Aristotle's The Politics, if not beyond, in which he classifies governments of 158 Greek city-states in terms of numbers of rulers and the interests the rulers serve. The method used in this study is essentially comparative, classificatory, typological and relativistic. Although Europe has produced some comparativists like Niccolo Machiavelli and Montesquieu, it would be misleading to say, as Gabriel A. Almond rightly points out, that the Aristotalian relativistic approach to comparison has continued as a dominant intellectual construct into present-day political science.[1]

One of the main obstacles to the comparative method was the belief in "democracy" by Western, and especially American scholars. This belief was particularly strong in the United States at the turn of the century, when political science developed as a distinct academic discipline. "On the eve of the development of American political science as a university-based professional discipline, the theory of democratic progress dominated the field and justified a loss of interest in the classifi-cation and comparison of types of political systems or in the general theory of political change."[2] This was mainly due to the ethnocentric conviction that Americans had little to learn from the rest of the world, and to their belief in the superiority of U.S. institutions.

However, the old tradition of comparison survived in formalistic and legalistic works by scholars of European origin. Carl Friedrich's Constitutional Government and Democracy deals with different forms of government, and Herman Finer's The Theory and Practice of Modern Government focuses predominantly on constitutional, democratic systems.[3]

Thus in the United States, the general belief in the superiority of their own democratic system prevented the development of comparative politics, while in Europe political science was dominated by those trained in law, and consequently formalistic and institutional approaches in comparative politics were predominant. It was not until the end of the Second World War that comparative politics as a movement in political science gained momentum.

1. Comparative Politics Movement

During the 1950's and 1960's, comparative politics gradually established a firm position in political science. Comparative politics before then was strongly criticised by Roy Macridis as exclusively Western-oriented, formalistic, legalistic and descriptive.[4] The new movement emerged both from the pressure of systemic and environmental changes and the stimulation of intellectural achievements in the social sciences. Three environmental factors are considered particularly important to the development of comparative politics.

First, the Second World War had a profound effect on

the development of political science in general and comparative politics in particular. The Nazi and the Japanese atrocities had given a great shock to the world. The memories of the extreme policies and activities pursued by the Nazis as well as the Japanese militarists compelled postwar political scientists to turn their eyes to more informal aspects of political behaviour rather than simply legal, institutional forms of government. It is also understandable from this background that their approach was moral and ethical. Efforts were made to analyse root causes of fascism and study totalitarianism so as to prevent any similar forms of government from ever emerging again.[5] The war had also changed the global balance of power. With the decline of the European powers save for the USSR, the war finally broke down the isolationism of the United States and their indifference to European affairs. The Americans were made aware of the need to study foreign countries. Thus, it was the American scholars who played an important role in the new comparative politics movement after the Second World War. Behind this academic role lurked a faith in America's manifest global destiny.

A second environmental factor is the Cold War. The severe competition between the capitalist and communist camps both in terms of military power and ideology urged the United States, the leader of the "free world," to present an alternative model of development to those newly emerging countries in order to prevail over the socialist forces that were spreading with the decline of the colonial

powers both in their metropolitan and overseas territories.
It was natural, therefore, that the new movement was
strongly motivated by the ideological concerns of the
Americans. Now Soviet totalitarianism was to replace
fascist totalitarianism as the object of resistance.

A third factor is the emergence of non-Western states
as actors in international politics. They were no longer
objects to be ruled by the imperial powers although their
freedom was somewhat limited because of their economic, and
in some cases military, dependency. In the 1950's young
political students rushed into Asia and Africa and brought
back a considerable amount of data on these new states.
New types of work such as David Apter's Ghana in
Transition, Lucian Pye's Guerrilla Communism in Malaya and
Myron Wiener's The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure
and Response in India enriched the field of comparative
politics.[6] The mere comparison of consitutional
institutions could no longer satisfy young political
scientists, who began to search for new approaches and
concepts to analyse and explain the politics of new states.

With the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa,
"political development" became a focus of study in
comparative politics. Earlier theories of comparative
politics did recognise different forms of government, but
little need was felt for conceptualising political
development when the universe was comfortably confined to
Western societies. To Western eyes, Afro-Asian countries
were still underdeveloped and therefore the way in which
traditional societies could and should develop had to be

designed.

Meanwhile, there was a remarkable intellectual achievement in various fields of social sciences which stimulated the development of comparative politics. Firstly, the new movement was strongly influenced by the behavioural movement. The behaviouralists were critical of the institutional tradition and shifted their unit of analysis from institutions to individuals and groups, and at the same time emphasised the informal aspects of political processes and behaviour. Empirical studies were made on electoral behaviour, pressure groups, public opinion and political parties.[7] Their method was more quantitative than qualitative and scientific method was stressed.

Secondly, the "Parsonian revolution" in sociology had a great impact on the development of comparative politics. Talcott Parsons's systems analysis was introduced to the field of political science by David Easton.[8] He replaced the notion of "the government" with that of "the political system." The latter is a much wider concept covering not only formal institutions but also informal actors and aspects of political processes. The concept of system was particularly useful when applied to developing countries, where governmental institutions were less specialised or developed. The political process is a never-ending process of input, output and feedback. In other words, the relationship between government (decision-makers) and society is the central concern of Eastonian systems analysis, and organisations such as pressure groups and

political parties play a crucial role in forming a bridge between the two.

The Parsonian structural-functionalism and "pattern variables" also contributed a great deal to the development of comparative politics.[9] According to Parsons, any system has a structure which is defined by the relationship between the different elements of the system. In this respect, the structure differs from one system to another. However, some recurring patterns can be found in various social systems, and Parsons sets up a dichotomy of traditional and modern societies using five pattern variables; 1) affectivity v. affective neutrality, 2) collectivity-orientation v. self-orientation, 3) particularism v. universalism, 4) ascription v. achievement and 5) diffuseness v. specificity. The first concept in each category refers to traditional society and the latter to modern society.

Functions, on the other hand, cut across all the systems irrespective of structure. In other words, there are certain functions to be performed by any system, be it system maintenance, role differentiation or social communication. The two principal notions of Parsons, the system and structural-functionalism, did not stay within the domain of sociology, but were borrowed by political scientists. Thus, as a result of the international environment and the intellectual achievements in social sciences, the ground was set for a great leap forward in comparative politics.

2. Political Development: Participation and
   Institutionalisation

It was Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman who
produced the trail-blazing work, The Politics of the
Developing Areas.[10] Almond had been strongly influenced
by Parsons's structural-functionalism, although he
criticised the pattern variables as overemphasising the
differences between Western and non-Western societies. He
lists the following seven political functions which he
claims any political system performs;

　　　1) Political socialization and recruitment

　　　2) Interest articulation

　　　3) Interest aggregation

　　　4) Political communication

　　　5) Rule-making

　　　6) Rule application

　　　7) Rule adjudication

The first four are called input functions of the political
system and the latter three output functions.

The structure is defined by Parsonian pattern
variables, namely particularism v. universalism, ascription
v. achievement and diffuseness v. specificity. Almond
argues that as a society develops, the structure changes
and consequently the way in which political functions are
performed also changes from traditional to modern. Take
for example the first function, political socialisation and
recruitment. Modern social education, it is thought,
breaks primordial ties within small traditional communities

and generates people's loyalty towards the state. Hence particularism is ultimately replaced by universalism in a modern society.

Almond later introduced another concept of political development. In his Comparative Politics, he suggests a four-stage development process: state-building (integration and control), nation-building (group identity and loyalty), participation (the involvement of members of the society in the decision-making of the system) and distribution (the allocation of goods, services, and other values by the political system). He describes the four stages on the basis of Western European experience, implying that development is most likely to occur along this line.[11]

His biggest contribution to the development of comparative politics is that, unlike previous institutional Western models, Almond presented a model of political development with which to compare political systems of different social structures, especially between Western and non-Western societies. "Development" became a central core of the field in the 1960's, around which field research and a series of theories were accumulated. However, the very concept of development sets a limit to his theory. The function of political socialisation and recruitment, which he regards as the most important of all the functions, is closely related to the problem of nation-building. He says that nation-building should occur at an early stage of political development,[12] and that the goal of nation-building is the creation of a nation-state. Experiences in the West may reflect this, but as discussed in detail

later, this is a highly dangerous assumption which has in fact misled the observers of non-Western, multi-ethnic states like India.

Another criticism of Almond's theory is that he puts too much emphasis on participation. Almond romanticises the political process as if an increase of participation will automatically result in the creation of a modern institutionalised political system. However, as Samuel Huntington points out, an increase of participation without institutionalisation destabilises a society. Participation is only one of the two important aspects of political development, and the other aspect, institutionalisation, should not be overlooked.[13]

Despite some problematic assumptions in Almond's developmental theory, a group of scholars further developed different aspects of political process within Almond's framework. A series of studies in political development were published in the 1960's and 1970's: Joseph LaPalombara (1963); Lucian W. Pye (1963); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (1965); Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (1966); Leonard Binder (1971).[14] These scholars were rather optimistic in assuming that new nations which had acquired independence would develop their political systems to a modern style along the lines that Western states had pursued. What happened actually in most of the new nations, however, was not the creation of modern, rational, institutionalised political systems but a plethora of military dictatorships or anarchical situations with more and more violence, with some exceptions of relative order

and stability.

Samuel Huntington begins his argument from where
Almond's theory fails. He maintains that the so called
developmental theories are in fact the theories of
political modernisation characterised by the emphasis on
mobilisation or participation. What he sees as common in
the definitions of different developmental theories are 1)
rationalisation explained by "pattern variables," 2)
integration, of which the goal is the creation of a nation-
state, and 3) democratisation, which emphasises the
importance of competitiveness. He argues that although
modernisation is inevitable and irreversible, political
development does not necessarily result from modernisation,
nor is it irreversible. Thus, according to Huntington,
political systems may develop or decay.

In order to separate development from modernisation,
Huntington defines political development as the
institutionalisation of political organisations and
procedures. Then he classifies four types of political
system in terms of mobilisation and institutionalisation.
The first type is one with high levels of both political
institutionalisation and social mobilisation. This type is
called a "civic" polity, examples of which are the United
States and the Soviet Union. The second type of polity is
highly institutionalised but has low levels of
mobilisation. This is a "contained" polity, India being an
example of this type. The third type of polity is
described as a "corrupt" polity. It is modernised with
comparatively high indices of literacy, per capita national

income, and urbanisation. In other words, it has a high
level of mobilisation. But the level of institution-
alisation is relatively low, and therefore it remains
politically underdeveloped. Many Latin American countries
belong to this type. The last type is a primitive polity
which has low levels of both institutionalisation and
mobilisation. Huntington emphasises institutionalisation
as an essential factor of political development and even
goes as far as suggesting a slow down of the modernisation
process so as to prevent an excessive increase in
mobilisation.[15] For him, "the most important political
distinction among countries concerns not their form of
government but their degree of government."[16]

Thus, the two important aspects of political
development, participation and institutionalisation, were
explored by Almond and Huntington respectively. As a
result of their achievements, comparative politics
flourished throughout the 1960's with "development"
becoming an integrating theory for the field. However,
newly emerged countries not only failed to follow the
Western path as developmental theorists had expected, but
moved even further away. Traditional, primordial ties such
as caste identities and religious communalism appeared to
have been strengthened as the society proceeded to
modernisation, resulting in ethnic conflicts. In the
meantime, U.S. prestige was being damaged, with its
dominant position declining and its superiority challenged
by a series of events including the Vietnam War, the
student movements, the Watergate scandal and above all the

growing distrust of all institutions and forms of
authority.

With these trends in the Third World, the United
States and elsewhere, the dominant developmentalist
paradigm began to be criticised. Firstly it was criticised
for being ethnocentric and thus parochial and biased. The
theories had been exclusively based on Western experience
and had assumed that non-Western societies would develop in
the same way.[17] They were also attacked by Marxists, for
whom developmental theories lacked a class element and an
analysis of the dependency of the peripheral Third World on
the Centre of the world market.[18] Area specialists were
not happy either about the simplistic generalisation of the
developmental theories.

In a way, Almond was too optimistic and romantic about
the future development of the Third World, while Huntington
was rather over-pessimistic in predicting political decay
and degeneration of political systems in inverse proportion
to political mobilisation.

Given these criticisms, a more fundamental
consideration has been deemed necessary of the basic
assumptions of the developmental theories. There are three
assumptions that need to be questioned. The first one is
the relationship between socio-economic development and
political development. As Huntington rightly points out,
it is usually assumed that both socio-economic development
and political development occur either simultaneously or
with some time-lag. For instance, it is expected that a
rise in the level of education will produce new groups of

people with entrepreneurship which in turn will help economic growth. It is also assumed that those "modern" people should become politically aware and be able to contribute to political development.[19] When Huntington wrote this in the 1960's he was thinking of newly independent countries, but history thereafter shows that his warning was applicable not only to the Third World but to some of the highly modernised countries as well.[20] Therefore, the developmental theory based on the above mentioned assumption is persuasive only to the extent to which some Western experiences have followed this course. Other experiences show that a high rate of economic growth can and sometimes does justify a delay in political development as in the case of Japan since the Second World War.

The second assumption to be questioned is the very concept of a nation-state. It presents two questions. First, does the concept of a nation-state have any relevance to the real world? Although the nation-state has long been the central concern in the field of international politics, this type of state can be found nowhere. Even European states, where the notion was developed, can no longer be qualified as such in view of the "ethnic revival,"[21] not to mention the states which acquired independence after the Second World War. These are mixed nations in terms of race, ethnicity, culture and language.

The second question is whether nation-building must always aim at the formation of a nation-state. As mentioned earlier, developmental theories assume that a

nation-state is supposed to emerge at an early stage of political development. In other words, within the territorial boundary of a state, ethnic differences should disappear and the nation be homogenized and integrated by means of a common language and "civic culture."[22] From this point of view, a multi-ethnic nation, where different languages are still spoken, where different religions still give people different identities and where communal or ethnic ties are yet to be dissolved, is considered to be a traditional, "underdeveloped" society. The direction of the nation-building process is thus predetermined, and its end-form is a nation-state. Only from this stage do other aspects of political development start. In my view, however, nation-building is an ever-lasting, endless process in which all nations must make constant effort, and yet there is no fixed, predetermined goal for its course. In other words, nation-building, like many other relationships, has to be constantly renewed and reviewed in the light of changing conditions, or it is bound to weaken. It is also important to note that real progress in nation-building comes not from cultural homogenization but legitimisation of the state. This last point will be elaborated later. What should be stressed here is that we have to depart from the "myth of the nation-state."

The third assumption to reconsider is the problem of political stability. A political system is regarded as stable when it is institutionalised to such an extent that a change of government takes place in accordance with certain rules. This is also the politics of a developed

society. However, the concept of stability raises a number
of questions especially about developing countries. In
most of these countries the social base of the ruling class
or the ruling elite is narrow. Society itself is highly
stratified with great inequalities and disparities of
wealth. The politics of a developing country, therefore,
carries systemic causes for conflicts and very often these
conflicts provide the dynamics of change. Rigid preference
for stability would almost always amount to preference for
the status quo which can be maintained by military or other
authoritarian regimes, thus preventing orderly incremental
changes. Democratic regimes may often appear to be more
unstable precisely because the process of political
development gets freer play in these polities. Stability
sometimes means stagnation, particularly so in developing
countries. Therefore, the two terms, stability and
development of political systems should be strictly
distinguished, and should not be confused with each other.

3. A New Trend in Comparative Politics

Because it has not been possible in comparative
politics to erect enduring models and theories of
development and because most of the theories and models
built in the 1960's were found to be predominantly drawn
from Western experiences and therefore not applicable to
most of the non-Western countries, there has been a
tendency in recent years of a proliferation of theories,
leaving each scholar to build his own theoretical models

and paradigms. The result has been a fragmentation and
dispersal of the field of comparative politics into what
one scholar has called "islands of theory."[23] Various
approaches have emerged and yet there has not been a single
concept which could constitute the central core.

There has been a revival of corporatism. In the
1920's corporatism was associated with fascism and for that
reason had a negative image. It has, however, since gained
a new meaning in advanced capitalist societies as a
reaction to pluralism. While pluralism disregards the
importance of the state, corporatism starts with the role
of the state and defines group interests in terms of their
relations to the state. Philip C. Schmitter explains
corporatism as follows;

> Corporatism can be defined as a system of
> interest representation in which the constituent
> units are organized into a limited number of
> singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically
> ordered and functionally differentiated categories,
> recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state
> and granted a deliberate representational monopoly
> within their respective categories in exchange for
> observing certain controls on their selection of
> leaders and articulation of demands and supports.[24]

Thus, corporatism is based on the recognition that in
advanced societies, groups such as business organisations
and labour unions are first organised into a single
representation, then given recognition by the state and
finally act within the existing state system.

The biggest contribution of the corporatists to

comparative politics is their critical attack on the
pluralist developmental approach which dominated the field
in the 1960's. It drew attention to the dominant aspect of
political life in the late twentieth century, the
intertwining, interpenetrating network of state-society
relationships. However, the approach does have
limitations. First, in the corporatist approach it is
assumed that each unit is monolithically integrated, but in
reality it is a well-known fact that any interest group may
have built-in factional conflicts and those out of power
often revolt. In this respect corporatism is over-
simplistic. Secondly, in political life, new issues are
constantly raised and demands put forward, but they are not
always absorbed into the corporatist system, and those
outside the corporation may be recruited by political
parties or organised as mass movements or environmental
movements. In this way, corporatism confines its territory
to already influential groups and the state apparatus.
Thirdly, the new approach of corporatism to the political
economy based on the interests of different groups
overlooks the importance of more genuinely political
activities and conflicts such as ethnic conflicts,
communalism and religious fundamentalism. In short, it
would be only fair to say, as Douglas Chalmers concludes,
that corporatism is not, and may never be, a genuinely
powerful research and theory-constructing paradigm,
although it is full of interesting ideas and
suggestions.[25]

Another new approach was presented by neo-Marxists,

and became known as dependency theory. Marxists adapted
their theories to the developing world. Dependency theory
shifts the focus of study from the socio-political aspect,
which earlier developmentalists emphasised, to that of
economics, and explains the underdevelopment of the
peripheral Third World in terms of the international
economic system, imperialism or neo-colonialism. From this
Marxist point of view, Huntington's <u>Political Order in
Changing Societies</u> is criticised as having no economic
perspective and therefore as an unacceptably narrow
approach to political development.[26]

Another characteristic which is common in dependency
approaches is that it requires the international capitalist
system as a single analytical framework. In Samir Amin's
words, "all contemporary societies are integrated into a
world system" and "not a single concrete socio-economic
formation of our time can be understood except as part of
system."[27] The same view is expressed by André Gunder
Frank and illustrated by Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul
Baran.[28]

Dependency theories make us aware of the fact that
the international system, under the huge influence of the
advanced capitalist countries, has had an impact on the
internal development of technologically backward areas of
the world during the last two centuries or more, first
under direct colonial rule, and then through the activities
of multinational corporations. They tell us how intense
and complex these interactions were and still are.
However, the emphasis on "the tyranny of the whole over the

parts"[29] does not give much scope for analysing local factors in the underdevelopment of the South. As Tony Smith comments, the dependency theory has systematically underestimated the real influence of the South over its own affairs.[30] More recently, dependency theorists have come to recognise the diversity of the Third World. But to emphasise local factors in turn weakens the essence of the dependency theory itself.[31]

A second problem of dependency theory is the confusion of economic growth with political development. Because the international economic factor is over-emphasised, political phenomena, such as the emergence of authoritarian regimes, ethnic politics, military coups and corruption, are explained in terms of the needs of the international system and the leaders' adaptation to their external environment. Thus the momentum for political development at the cost of economic growth tends to be underestimated, and by the same token the economic growth which justifies the delay in political development does not receive due attention within this framework. Politics is not simply a dependent variable but also interacts autonomously with economics.

A third wave in comparative politics came from the Third World itself. Third World political scientists criticise Western developmental theories not only as ethnocentric, parochial and biased but as damaging. They offer their own indigenous models of development.

Latin America is a birthplace of some important recent theories. Though the theories are not necessarily made by Latin American scholars themselves, at least Latin American

societies have provided Western scholars with experiences
different from those of the West. Corporatism and
dependency theory have been developed through studies of
Latin American countries, at least partially so.[32]

Challenges also came from the Islamic world. The
Iranian Revolution had a great impact on the shift from the
Western model of development to a more indigenous "Islamic"
model. Special attention is paid to the relationships
between state and society in order to rejoin politics,
ethics and economics in an integrated organic manner.[33]

One more model should be added to the "islands of
theory." That is the consociational democracy presented by
Arend Lijphart. According to Lijphart, there is a
difference between "the plural society" and "the
pluralistic society." The former is structured along
ethnic, religious, or class lines. The social cleavages
are clearly defined, and in each social segment the
identity, ascription and loyalty of the individuals are
fixed. Whereas a pluralistic society has a differentiated
social structure characterised by overlapping memberships.
The individuals belong to plural groups and yet there is a
final sense of belonging directed towards the state.
Developmentalists obviously refer to this category as a
modernised society. According to Lijphart, however, some
societies like the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria are
so rigidly divided into social segments that a pluralistic
democracy which values majority rule can never work.
Lijphart advocates that the state should live with social
cleavages rather than strive to overcome the differences.

In this kind of society, he argues, the cooperation between the elites of different segments is essential.[34] This consociational model is placed inbetween the British type of unidimensional society and international society. The concept is in many ways similar to federalism, but the stress is on the attitude of the elites. This is an alternative model to pluralism which was once so popular in Western societies. The weakness of this model is that it regards each social segment as absolutely fixed, but in reality, social cleavages do get strengthened or weakened under certain political circumstances, especially in developing nations. Moreover, each segment is not always monolithically united. In this respect, this model is again applicable only to relatively stable and small-size European countries, although he claims that this model is suitable for many developing plural societies.[35]

4. Search for a New Model

The present stage of comparative politics is thus fragmented and dispersed with interesting and stimulating suggestions and implications in each model but without an integrating concept as development once was in the 1960's. With the inapplicability, contradictions and the irrelevance of much of developmental theory, the very concept of development seems to have been abandoned altogether. Instead, the term "change" is used as a safer synonym.[36] In my view, however, to give up "development" threatens the raison d'être of political science itself.

It is not the concept of development itself but some basic assumptions of developmental theory that need to be questioned and criticised. Therefore, based on the criticism of developmental theory already mentioned, we need to revise the developmental model.

The biggest alteration to be made to Almond's theory is the relationship between the first and the second functions, i.e. political socialisation and recruitment and interest articulation. As mentioned earlier, social education is supposed to break primordial ties within a small traditional community and produce people's loyalty towards the state. However, this has not occurred in most developing nations. The problem here is that Almond separates the first function from the other functions and treats it outside of the political process, which for him is basically a social process. What should be noted here is that political socialisation and recruitment is also a process of demand formation, for political recruitment without an issue or leaders is inconceivable. The two cannot be separated from each other. From another perspective, people become politically aware by realising that they have political rights and therefore they can make demands. The term "demand" is used here instead of "interest," because the former is more comprehensive and more political than the latter which is somewhat more economic. Thus, in the present study, demand formation is defined as the first political function.

The second function is demand manifestation. Once certain demands are formed and shared by a substantial

number of people, the demands must be aggregated and manifest themselves in a political form. A movement or actions are organised by a political party in most usual cases or by a pressure group if the issue involved is specific, though there have emerged in recent years movements like environmental movements which do not involve any traditional political agencies. The political agencies provide people with a route through which their demands reach the decision-makers. The first and the second functions are categorised as political participation.

The third and the fourth functions concern the decision-makers. The third function is called demand accommodation, and it is closely related to the attitudes of those in power; how they perceive the demands and incorporate them into government decision-making. The fourth function is the result of the first three functions. Since demands are expected constantly to be fed into the system, the political system itself needs continuous adjustment to its ever-changing environment. Otherwise, if the demands are too intense and the attitudes of the decision-makers are too rigid, the political system is forced to change drastically. This last function is called system adjustment, and these two functions together can be categorised as institutionalisation. Participation and institutionalisation are the two important concepts in studying political development.

The relationship between the two concepts, participation and institutionalisation, needs to be considered. For the political system to develop,

participation is necessary but not sufficient. Whereas institutionalisation without participation is like an empty house. Political development is unthinkable without participation. The ideal process would be a balanced development of the two, which means that participation takes place within a flexible framework of institutions. In reality, however, there is always a time-lag. What should be analysed carefully, therefore, is whether the time-lag will be overcome. In other words, whether institutionalisation occurs in such a way as to cope with the increase of participation is the central concern. If it does, then the political system is legitimised, and as a result of the legitimisation, nation-building can proceed. Nation-building, therefore, is not homogenization and centralisation of the nation but legitimisation of the political system. For instance, if the society is characterised by diversity, nation-building may mean de-centralisation of the political system. Moreover, people's loyalty need not be exclusively directed towards the state, but can be directed towards their immediate community. And yet if the state is legitimised, the question of secession does not come up, and the nation, or more properly the state can be strengthened by weakening the centre. Thus, the sovereignty of the state may not be as indivisible as usually expected.

Notes

(1) G. A. Almond, "Comparative Politics," in Paul G. Lewis, David Potter and Francis G. Castles, eds., The Practice of Comparative Politics, 2nd ed., London: Longman, 1978, pp.20-21.

(2) <u>Ibid.</u>, p.22.

(3) Carl Friedrich, <u>Constitutional Government and Democracy</u>, Boston: Ginn, 1941; Herman Finer, <u>The Theory and Practice of Modern Government</u>, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1954 (first published in 1932).

(4) Roy C. Macridis, <u>The Study of Comparative Government</u>, New York: Random House, 1955.

(5) An example is; Hannah Arendt, <u>The Origins of Totalitarianism</u>, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951.

(6) David E. Apter, <u>Ghana in Transition</u>, 2nd rev. ed., Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972 (first published in 1955); Lucian W. Pye, <u>Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning</u>, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956; Myron Weiner, <u>The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India</u>, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962.

(7) For example, H. W. Ehmann, <u>Organized Business in France</u>, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957; Weiner, op.cit.; J. G. LaPalombara, <u>Interest Groups in Italian Politics</u>, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.

(8) David Easton, <u>The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science</u>, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953 and "An Approach to the Study of Political Systems," <u>World Politics</u>, No.9, April 1957.

(9) Talcott Parsons, <u>Towards a General Theory of Action</u>, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.

(10) Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., <u>The Politics of the Developing Areas</u>, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960.

(11) Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, <u>Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach</u>, Boston: Little Brown, 1966, p.314.

(12) G. A. Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," <u>American Behavioural Scientist</u>, VI(June 1963), pp.3-10.

(13) Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," <u>World Politics</u>, vol.17, No.3, 1965.

(14) A series of Studies in Political Development by Social Science Research Council: Joseph LaPalombara, ed., <u>Bureaucracy and Political Development</u>, 1963; Lucian W. Pye, ed., <u>Communications and Political Development</u>, 1963; Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., <u>Political Culture and Political Development</u>, 1965; Joseph LaPalombara and Myron

Weiner, eds., <u>Political Parties and Political Development</u>, 1966; Leonard Binder et.al., <u>Crises and Sequences in Political Development</u>, 1971; Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

(15) Huntington, <u>op.cit.</u>.

(16) Samuel P. Huntington, <u>Political Order in Changing Societies</u>, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968, p.1.

(17) Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," <u>Comparative Studies in Society and History</u>, No.9, April 1967; Clement H. Dodd, "Political Development: The End of an Era," <u>Government and Opposition</u>, No.8, summer 1973.

(18) Ronald H. Chilcote, <u>Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm</u>, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.

(19) Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay."

(20) Huntington later applied this theory to the American society. (Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, <u>Minshushugi no Touchi Nouryoku</u> (The Governability of Democracies), Tokyo: The Simul Press Inc., 1975.)

(21) Anthony D. Smith, <u>The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World</u>, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

(22) Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, <u>The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations</u>, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963.

(23) Howard J. Wiarda, ed., <u>New Directions in Comparative Politics</u>, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985, p.xiii.

(24) Philip C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Thomas Stritch and Friedrick Pike, eds., <u>The New Corporatism</u>, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974, pp.93-94.

(25) Douglas A. Chalmers, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics" in Wiarda, ed., <u>op.cit.</u>, pp.56-79.

(26) Tony Smith, "The Dependency Approach," in Wiarda, ed., <u>op.cit.</u>, p.118.

(27) Samir Amin, <u>Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment</u>, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974, p.3.

(28) André Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," in James D. Cockcroft et.al., <u>Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy</u>, New York: Anchor Books, 1972; Immanuel Wallerstein, <u>The</u>

Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York: Academic Press, 1974; Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, 2nd ed., New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962.

(29) Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory," World Politics, vol.31, No.2, 1979, p.254.

(30) Ibid., p.249.

(31) Tony Smith, "The Dependency Approach," p.117.

(32) Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World Politics, vol.25, January 1973, pp.206-235; Samir Amin, op.cit.; James D. Cockcroft, op.cit.; Susan Eckstein, The Poverty of Revolution: The State and Urban Poor in Mexico, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977.

(33) G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, New York: Free Press, 1975; Anwar Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, New York: Praeger, 1982.

(34) Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, vol.1, 1968, and Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977.

(35) He made a policy recommendation based on this model, which he named "consociational engineering." (Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp.223-238.)

(36) Samuel P. Huntington, "Change to Change," Comparative Politics, April 1971; G. A. Almond, Crisis, Choice and Change, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1973; D. E. Apter, Political Change: Collected Essays, London: Frank Cass, 1973; S.N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973.

Chapter 2: An Analytical Framework of Political Parties
and Party Systems

1. Origins and Development of Parties

A large part of the study of political parties and
party systems has been devoted to the analysis of the
origins and development of political parties and typologies
of party systems. The political party is a relatively
recent phenomenon. The term in the sense that we are using
it originated in eighteenth-century England. Moreover, it
was not until the eighteenth century that the concept of
the political party, distinguished from the faction, was
given a positive meaning. Edmund Burke defined a political
party as "a body of men united, for promoting by their
joint endeavours the national interest, upon some
particular principle in which they are all agreed."[1]

The emergence and development of political parties was
closely associated with the development of parliamentary
democracy, at least in the West. In fact, the historical
development of political parties in Western countries was
parallel to that of parliamentary democracy, which itself
was almost a synonym for political development at least
until the mid-twentieth century. Parliamentary
institutions were demanded as a means of political
participation by new social classes such as the
bourgeoisie, whose emergence was a consequence of larger
socio-economic changes. In other words, rapidly changing

economic conditions and the rise of entrepreneurship
produced a new social class whose demand for political
participation led to the development of parliamentary
institutions, although the ways in which the parliamentary
system was introduced differed according to whether the
attitude of the ruling class was accommodative or
repressive.[2]   It was within this context that political
parties, as we use the term at the present time, emerged to
represent interests of different classes.[3]

The early political parties which emerged were by and
large the preserve of local groups of notables and the need
for a larger-scale party organisation was not strongly
felt.[4]   The extension of suffrage, forced by structural
changes in society, produced a new type of party, the mass
party. Fundamental changes occurred in the organisation
and activities of parties. From a historical point of
view, Maurice Duverger gives a detailed account of the
early development of political parties and the
organisational differences between the cadre party and the
mass party, in which the establishment of parliamentary
institutions and the evolution of electoral systems are the
important factors.[5]

However, as Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner point
out, such an explanation can hardly be applied to most
developing countries, since the development of political
parties and party systems in these countries did not
coincide with that of parliamentary democracy. Even in
countries like India, where parliamentary institutions did
develop under British rule, albeit with strict restraints,

the main political party, the Indian National Congress, was
essentially a movement which often refused to operate
within the framework of the existing political
establishment.[6][7] LaPalombara and Weiner have broadened
Duverger's rather limited analysis and classified three
types of crisis situation out of which political parties
emerge, namely participation, legitimacy and national
integration. The history of European parliamentary
democracy is now treated as only one of the various types
of historical setting in which political parties have
emerged.[8] Underlying their theory is a strong belief in
modernisation, typified by the importance of a nation-wide
communication network as one of the most essential
preconditions for the emergence of political parties. This
kind of study of the origins of political parties may be
important if the origin of parties itself lies in an
outgrowth of political development, as illustrated by
European history, or in a situation where political parties
have yet to emerge, such as in some areas in Asia and
Africa, where a competitive party system has not been
established.[9]

In our particular cases of India and Japan, however,
adult suffrage was imposed from above with the
establishment of their Constitutions. In India the people
of the lowest social strata were formally admitted to the
competitive political system at a time when they were still
struggling for their very survival and had yet to be
mobilised through agitations of one political party or
another. At the same time in Japan, the National Diet was

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given enormous power in the new Constitution imposed by the Allies. Thus both in India and Japan the democratic system was introduced either from outside or from above before demands were put forward from within.[10] In both countries a competitive party system was a given from which the political system was to develop. Therefore, tracing the origin of political parties does very little to explain the process of political development in the two countries. In addition to representing the people, one of the most important roles of political parties in such systems is to act as an agitator for the creation of demands among them, and viewed in this way, they are causes of political development rather than results of it.[11]

2. Typology of Party Systems

Another genre of study of political parties is the typology of party systems. Duverger's classic work categorises party systems according to the number of political parties, i.e. the two-party system, multi-partism and the single-party system.[12] Several attempts were made after Duverger to analyse such systems more theoretically. LaPalombara and Weiner set up broader categories, i.e. non-party political systems, competitive systems and non-competitive systems, so that they could be applied to developing countries,[13] while Wiatr classified party systems more systematically into the mono-party system, the hegemonic party system, the dominant party system, the two-party system and the multi-party system,

with a special focus on one-party systems.[14]

Sartori formulated a more comprehensive typology using such criteria as competitiveness, the number and size of political parties, ideological distances between parties and change of governments.[15] His basic assumption is that a party system can exist only in plural societies or states of plurality. In such a strict sense, he claims that the one-party system should not be counted as a party system, although he still deals with it in his typology. He claims that the one-party system provides the society with only one-way "channelment" of communication, i.e. from the top downwards, whereas political parties "in the plural" are "channels of expression" providing the society with two-way communication. Thus the competitive/non-competitive dichotomy is his first criterion.

Secondly, he maintains that a numerical criterion needs careful consideration. According to him, not all the existing parties deserve our attention, but that the only parties which should be regarded as relevant are those with either "coalition potential" or "black-mail potential." Thus he emphasises the need to take the quality of parties into consideration. Only after such "intelligent counting" can typology of party systems become meaningful. Thirdly, the ideological distance between parties is an important determinant of the type of party system.

Sartori sets up seven classes of party systems based on these categories: 1) the one-party system comprising one-party totalitarian, one-party authoritarian and one-party pragmatic systems, 2) the hegemonic party system

which is further divided into ideological and pragmatic ones, 3) the predominant-party system, 4) the two-party system, 5) moderate (limited) pluralism, 6) polarized pluralism, and 7) the atomized system. The first two are categorised as non-competitive systems and the rest as competitive.

Thus Sartori successfully relates party systems to broader political ones. The predominant party system is now given a proper place in his theoretical map. "A predominant-party system," Sartori defines, "is such to the extent that, and as long as, its major party is consistently supported by a winning majority (the absolute majority of seats) of the voters, ... with the exception of countries that unquestionably abide by a less-than-absolute majority principle." Concerning the duration, he says four consecutive legislatures would be a standard of measurement. In addition to the majority clause and the duration, he gives other conditions: that the dominant party must be significantly stronger than others; and that free electoral competition must be ensured.[16] According to his typology, the party systems of India and Japan clearly fall into the type of predominant-party system.

The purpose of the present study is to compare the two single dominant party systems (which Sartori calls predominant party systems) from the point of view of political development. For that purpose, however, Sartori's typology is useful only as a starting point. The different roles that the two single dominant parties, the Indian National Congress and the Liberal Democratic Party

of Japan, have played in the process of political development in the respective countries should therefore be compared by means of a new theoretical framework of party systems. Some device is needed to link the concept of political development and the study of political parties and party systems. A keynote for this linkage seems to lie in the levels of analysis.

3. Levels of Analysis

To make the study easier, political parties can be analysed at four levels, though these levels are of course inter-related; 1) the political system level, 2) the inter-party level, 3) the party level and 4) the sub-unit level. The first level is that of the political system as a whole. It provides a framework within which political parties function. The subjects to be dealt with within the segment of political structure at this level are a constitutional framework, political culture, historical heritage and other social and economic forces. If a system does not permit free competition among different political parties and can therefore be classified as authoritarian or totalitarian, the second, third and fourth levels need no consideration. Maurice Duverger pays attention to the number of parties but does not make a distinction between an authoritarian system and a competitive single dominant party system,[17] while Sartori's typology does distinguish the two as mentioned above. However, Sartori does not seem to realise clearly that the former belongs to a different dimension.

The difference between authoritarian and competitive systems, which has traditionally been dealt with as inter-party relations, should in fact belong to this level. If demands manifest themselves to such an extent that decision-makers in one-party or non-party systems can no longer suppress them, the system may transform itself into a competitive one. Only then should the other levels be considered.

If a political system is competitive, then the other three levels need examination along with the first three functions of the political system, i.e. demand formation, demand manifestation and demand accommodation. Who plays an important role and in what way depends on the given structure at the inter-party level, i.e. the level of party systems. Thus the second level of analysis deals with the number of parties, their interactions, their relative size and strength and ideological distances between parties. The role of opposition parties is crucial in determining the nature of the party system. A large number of studies of party systems belong to this level.[18]

The third level deals with political parties themselves. It includes their typology, characteristics of each type of party, their ideological stances, and their origins and transformation. Another important factor is their support bases. Whether a party derives its support from a particular social class, communal, ethnic groups or particular regions obviously influences the way in which functions are performed.[19]

The last level analyses the party from within. It is

not easy to draw a line between the third and the fourth levels, though it is extremely important to disentangle the two. The main difference is that the party level deals with the relationship between the party and the electorate, whereas the sub-unit level concentrates on the inside of the party and treats it as if it is a "miniature political system."[20] Organisational aspects are one of the main foci at this level of analysis. Factions,[21] field organisations, inner-party democracy[22] and party-hierarchy are the main subjects.[23] Political parties are never monolithic, but are sometimes dominated more strongly by factional conflicts than inter-party competition. This level is especially important in studying single dominant party systems, since the political system owes a large part of its functions to the ruling party. No study of political parties can be complete without paying attention to this level.

The four levels mentioned above constitute a political structure. They explain how a political system is institutionalised and what role is assigned to political parties within the system. A political system thus composed performs the four functions as defined in the last chapter. The functions performed by the Indian and Japanese systems at different levels will be analysed in detail in the following chapters, indicating the significance of the sub-unit level. However, the last function will not be sufficiently dealt with since in neither case can much sign of system adjustment be observed. Therefore, it needs some elaboration here.

As a result of the three functions being performed or not performed, the system is forced to undergo self-adjustment. The need for this adjustment becomes stronger in proportion to the amount of dissent. The amount of dissent in turn depends on how well the political system performs the functions. Self-adjustment occurs at all levels. At the lowest level, a leader or a dominant faction may be replaced by another to meet the new requirements of the system and the adjustment may not affect the other levels. The dramatic change of leaders within the LDP, as witnessed in the case of the departure of Shigeru Yoshida and Kakuei Tanaka, illustrates this type of contained adjustment.

In the long process, political parties have been forced more or less to "shed their old skin." Duverger's work on the cadre-party/mass-party distinction draws a clear picture of this kind of adjustment.[24] The transformation of ideology-oriented parties to "catch-all parties"[25] is perhaps the best example of this self-adjustment. Huntington's functional adaptability of political parties deals with the same problem.[26] "Awakening of people" in a country characterised by diversity may produce demands of a local character, such as the setting up of states based on linguistic unity in India. Accordingly, Indian opposition parties have strengthened their regional bases as a response. Revitalisation of a party is a conscious effort made by parties in an attempt to survive.

Failure in self-adjustment at this level pushes the

solution up to the next level. If a ruling party fails to fulfill new demands, dissent mounts to a point where replacing the government by another party or a coalition of other parties becomes inevitable. Under the two-party system the peaceful change of government from one party to the other has been institutionalised, while under the single dominant party system this is far from being the case. This means that coalition-making is particularly important in the latter case since it is the only alternative government to the ruling party.[27] Thus in India after the "Emergency" a coalition government was formed to replace the long Congress rule. However, power soon reverted to the Congress Party when the coalition government proved to be ineffective. The political system of India has managed to maintain parliamentary democracy based on free competition, but extra-parliamentary conflicts have intensified in frequency and violence.

Finally, if a change of government through elections still cannot satisfy increasing demands, the breakdown of institutions ensues and the whole political system undergoes a drastic change. The most extreme case is a revolution but smaller changes, such as the emergence of new types of party (e.g. single-issue or ecological parties), mass movements, environmental movements, and sometimes even terrorism, challenge the existing political system. In the case of new parties, their emergence should be examined at this level since it is a proof of the existing party system having failed to accommodate new demands. This illustrates Charles Tilly's view that

political parties have their origin in a crisis situation.[28] Upon their establishment, however, the level of analysis shifts down to the second, or inter-party, level. By the same token, movements by extra-parliamentary means or even extra-constitutional means should not be regarded as merely dysfunctional from the point of view of law and order but viewed rather as a failure of the party system, the entry into which is often their demand. Thus, those parties which lead such extra-parliamentary movements should be analysed at the system level, but as soon as the parties take part in inter-party competition through elections, they should be dealt with at the inter-party level. What is required for the survival of the party system is to incorporate such movements into the prevailing political system, in other words, party politics and parliamentary democracy.

This last function of system adjustment is extremely important in developing countries, where in most cases institutionalisation has failed to keep pace with participation. Also, it should be clear by now that what is important is not how long a party stays in power but at what level system adjustment takes place and in what way. The durability of a government may be desirable from the point of view of implementation of policies, but a long rule by one party could result in the stagnation of political development. Therefore one of the essential requirements for a single dominant party system, which is characterised by free competition and improbability of change of governments, is flexibility and adjustability.

The self-adjustment of this kind of party system is most likely to occur at the sub-unit level, the failure of which could lead to the decay of institutions at all levels.

There are some limitations to this approach, the first being the assumption that efforts to mobilise the masses are always functional in terms of political socialisation. As will be seen in the Japanese case, however, a certain degree of mobilisation is achieved by apoliticising the masses. The success in mobilising the electorate and the consequent stability of the conservative government may be dysfunctional from the point of view of political development. Therefore, the process of political socialisation and the demands created thereby need careful consideration.

The second limitation is the treatment of external pressures. In this modern world no country can escape from external influence and if a country has been under foreign rule, the influence is all the more strong. In this study, however, external pressures are treated as given, and the question is one of how the system copes with them and adjusts itself to such an environment. In this way, it makes no distinction between indigenous development and that caused by foreign pressures.

Notes

(1) Edmond Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), in The Works of Edmund Burke, Boston: Little, Brown, 1839, vol.1, pp.435-6, quoted from Giovani Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.9.

(2) Hans Daalder analyses different patterns of the

development of parties. ("Parties, Elites, and Political
Developments," in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., Political
Parties and Political Development.)

(3) Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their
Organization and Activity in the Modern State, translated
by Robert North, London: Methuen, second English edition,
1964.

(4) For example, Samuel H. Beer, "Great Britain: From
Governing Elite to Organized Mass Parties," in Sigmund
Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1956 and Dankwart A. Rustow, The Politics
of Compromise: A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in
Sweden, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.

(5) Duverger, op. cit.. See also Stein Rokkan, Citizens,
Elections, Parties, Oslo: Universitersforlaget, 1970, Part
two.

(6) Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and
Development of Political Parties," in LaPalombara and
Weiner, eds., op. cit., pp. 12-13.

(7) Cf. Ceylon's case. (Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemma
of a New Nation, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1960.

(8) LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of
Political Parties," pp. 14-21.

(9) Rubert Emerson explains the difficulty in establishing
a competitive party system in Africa. (Political Modern-
ization: The Single Party System, Denver: University of
Denver Press, 1963.)

(10) A competitive party system within the National Diet
marked a certain degree of development in Japan even before
the war. However, the power of the legislature was
strictly limited and policies were made by and large by the
bureaucracy. (Robert Scalapino, Democracy and the Party
Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953.)

(11) Weiner and LaPalombara do mention the role political
parties play in political development. According to them
there are four aspects of political development in which
political parties play a predominantly important role.
They are: 1) national integration; 2) political
participation; 3) legitimacy; and 4) the management of
conflict. However, their main concern lies in
modernisation, i.e. political socialisation and the
establishment of democratic institutions. Their basic
assumptions as early developmentalists on the concept of
political development are highly doubtful as mentioned in
chapter 1. In addition, their theory may have some
relevance to explaining the political development of India
but cannot be applied to the Japanese case since the Second

World War. (Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., op. cit., pp. 399-435.)

(12) Duverger, op. cit., pp. 206-280.

(13) LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," pp. 21-41.

(14) Jerzy Wiatr, "One-Party Systems: The Concept and Issue for Comparative Studies," in Erik Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, Helsinki: Westermack Society, 1964.

(15) Sartori, op. cit., Part Two.

(16) Ibid., pp. 192-201.

(17) Duverger, op. cit..

(18) In addition to the literature on the typology of political parties mentioned in this chapter, I list some more as examples: S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds., Party System and Voter Alignments, New York: Free Press, 1967; Robert Dahl, ed., Political Opposition in Western Democracies, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966; Laurence Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976; and Giovani Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., op. cit..

(19) Apart from Duverger's classic work, a number of studies have been made on political parties: K. Janda, Political Parties: A Cross-national Survey, New York: Free Press, 1980; Klaus von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies, translated by Eileen Martin, Hants, England: Gower Publishing Co., 1985.

(20) Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, p.1.

(21) Factions have been studied mainly on single dominant party systems. V. O. Key paid attention to the factions of "the one-party states" in southern part of the United States (Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, New York: Crowell, 1958) and Raphael Zariski further developed the study of factions ("Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations," Midwest Journal of Political Science, vol.4, No.1, February 1960.) More recently Belloni and Beller made a comprehensive study with case studies (Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, eds., Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective, Santa Barbara,: Clio Press, 1978.) Case studies have also been made (Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," Political Studies, February 1964; Kenzou Uchida, Habatsu (Factions), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983; and Paul R. Brass, Caste, Faction and Party

in Indian Politics, vol.1, Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1984.)

(22) Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Original Tendencies of Modern Democracy, Translated by Eden & Cedar Paul, New York: Free Press, 1958 (first published in 1915.)

(23) Cf. Sartori, who does not approach the party from within by either the issue of intra-party democracy or organisational approach, but concentrates on what he calls fractions which are generally known as factions. (Parties and Party Systems, pp.71-72.)

(24) Duverger, op. cit., Book One.

(25) Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., op. cit., pp.177-200.

(26) Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," pp.396-8.

(27) The problem of coalition government has been a subject of discussion in Japan since the late 1970's when the LDP failed to secure an absolute majority (Hajime Shinohara, Rengou Seiji:Democracy no Antei wo Motomete (Coalition Politics: In Search of the Stability of Democracy), Tokyo: Iwanami, 1984.

(28) Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

PART TWO: THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA

Chapter 3: The Emergence of an Indian Polity and the

Role of the Indian National Congress

1. The Structure of the Indian Political System

(1) Indian Political Culture

If a political system and political institutions are
founded on a long tradition of political culture, they have
a far greater chance of stability and orderly and
evolutionary growth. According to Sidney Verba, "The
political culture of a society consists of the system of
empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which
defines the situation in which political action takes
place."[1] Of course political culture can not be
separated from the societal aspects of a political system,
but for the purpose of the present study, we have to give
political culture a narrower definition. Verba says that
the study of political culture focuses on the process by
which values, cognitions, and emotional commitments are
learned. "The study of political culture leads invariably
to the study of political socialization, to the learning
experiences by which a political culture is passed on from
generation to generation and to the situations under which
political cultures change."[2]

Indian civilisation has four thousand years of
history. But it was not before the British brought the
country together under a single imperial administration

that India began to develop a systematic political culture
of representative government. Before that there were long
political discontinuities in India. In fact for the first
two thousand years India did not establish political order.
For another two thousand years there were three large
empires that ruled India, but none the whole of India.
None of the empires in northern or southern India, neither
Hindu nor Muslim, developed a political system which was
rooted in the will and consent of the people, and since all
the empires vanished before or after the British came,
India was left without what can be called a political
culture.

One of the important aspects of political culture is
the relationship between the government and people. A very
important characteristic of Indian polity is that the state
and nation, or the government and people, did not meet face
to face until after independence. During a thousand years
of Muslim rule, society turned its back on government.
Society here means Hindu society, as the Hindus constituted
more than 90 percent of the population during Islamic rule.
The Islamic policy of forcible conversions, particularly
conversions at the point of the sword increased the number
of Muslims and threw the Hindus into the shelter of their
ancient and highly stable and strong social institutions,
the caste system. Between the government and people,
therefore, there were no linear relationships. Some
enlightened Muslim leaders, especially Emperor Akbhar,
adopted certain Hindu elements into the government. But
this did not touch the masses of Indian society. Nor did

it create a direct political relationship between the people and the state.

The British changed this system by introducing representative government. But very soon, within twenty years of the introduction of representative government, the distance between the demands of the Indian nationalist elements and what the British were prepared to give was increasingly widening. So there were no relationships of large-scale cooperation between the Raj and the people. This distinguishes India from European countries, where there has been a direct relationship of cooperation and contradiction between the society, the state and the church. India has been a much more fragmented society. Morris-Jones says that it is only after independence that government and society met face to face.[3]

And this is still a problem in India. After all these forty years of independence, the process of integration of government and the people is still going on through parliamentary democracy, through the electoral system, through participation. However, the process is far from complete. A great deal of Indian society lives quite independently of the government, and a large part of India, especially village India is hardly governed at all. Even now, the Indians regard government and governmental institutions as something hostile, especially the police who for the vast number of Indians represent the face of the government. Whether it be the police, the court or any other governmental bodies, such institutions are not regarded by ordinary Indians as friendly institutions.

Part of this is the colonial legacy, but much more is due
to the long tradition of separation of the people from the
government.[4]

(2) Pre-British Period

Rajni Kothari describes traditional Indian society as
an "apolitical society," by which he means "a loose
accommodation between a remarkably stable social order and
a transient and unstable political order."[5] While social
security and a sense of order was provided by the caste
system, the polity was characterised by its inability to
erect a political authority, a coherent and persistent
centre. Politics in traditional India embodied village
dominance, local cleavages and factions. Thus, Rajni
Kothari concludes that although on the whole this system
settled the conflicts and relationships between groups at
various levels, "its principal failure was in evolving a
united political framework."[6]

It was the foreign powers, therefore, that first
provided India with a political centre, and as a result
generated Indian nationalism. The Muslims in India, who
began invading India in the eighth century, had founded the
Delhi Saltanate by 1206 and established the long rule of
the Moghul dynasty in 1526. They developed a dominant
political style and an authoritative centre supported by an
extensive and efficient administration across the country,
although their power was somewhat confined to North India.
Another characteristic of Muslim rule was the hard core

military character resulting from a long period of continuous fighting. It should be noted at the same time, however, that this development of political authority, militarism and a hierarchically organised administration had little impact on local institutions and village life. Dynasties rose and fell, empires spread and collapsed, and yet Indian society based around village life remained largely unaffected, and "the task of creating a political identity with a single centre was by and large left unaccomplished."[7]

(3) The Legacy of British Rule

British colonial rule had a much greater impact on the nature of development of the Indian political system. The impact was both direct and indirect; it was direct in the sense that the British brought India certain political, administrative and social institutions and indirect in the sense that Indian nationalism emerged as an anti-British movement, through which the Indian National Congress was able to strengthen its organisation, broaden its support base and produce political leaders.

The British, having established direct rule in India after the "mutiny" of 1857, set up their own administrative system, which was hierarchically structured from the centre to village level, with provinces, divisions, districts, and Tehsils or Taluks at different levels inbetween. Morris-Jones expresses his doubts about the effectiveness of the Indian indigenous tradition of local democratic self-

government by village panchayats and emphasises the
importance of the British administrative system, the focal
unit of which, he claims, was districts.[8] This
administrative system covered the whole population and was
carried over to the new regime. The Indian Civil
Service(ICS) was recruited by competitive examination at
first only in England, but later also in India, producing
increasing numbers of Indian ICS officers. ICS men usually
had a provincial base from which to start their careers and
to which they would eventually return.

It is also interesting to note that the ICS men not
only functioned as district officers but also as district
magistrates who administered justice. As far as personnel
was concerned, therefore, there was no rigid separation
between administrative and judicial functions, at least at
the earlier stages. A.S. Narang argues that the powers of
the executive were considerably augmented and that the
entire emphasis of codification was on limiting the scope
of judicial discretion. He stresses that it was only
within the framework of despotism, that a free judiciary
emerged.[9] In any case, this was the first introduction
of modern judiciary into India. At a later stage, a new
system of courts was created and this institution played a
mediating role between the British government and the
independence movement. According to Morris-Jones, the
values implied in its rules and procedures have enjoyed a
prestige despite political attacks on the established
institutions.[10]

The most important creation of the British Raj with

regard to development of the political system, and in particular the party system in India, was the parliamentary system and "responsible government." To meet the increasing demand for self-government from Indian nationalists, the British government introduced a mild measure of reform in the form of the Indian Councils Act of 1909. The Act introduced the principle of direct elections, providing a certain number of elected members both at the centre and in the provinces, although the powers of the councils were strictly limited.[11] It also adopted the principle of communal representation to meet the Muslim demands. This policy later turned out to be a crucial factor in the development of the Indian 'nation' and polity.

The next major step taken by the British government was the Government of India Act of 1919, generally known as the Montford (Montagu-Chelmsford) reforms. Under the pressure of the First World War and the escalating nationalist movement, the Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, declared at the House of Commons on 20th August 1917 that the object of the British policy in India was the development of Indian self-government within the Empire along parliamentary lines. Thereafter nationhood for India was to be fought for. Montagu, with the Viceroy Chelmsford, produced proposals for the reforms in July 1918, and the Government of India Act became law in 1919.

The Act, recognising self-government as the goal of British policy in India, greatly enlarged the legislatures. At the centre, a bicameral legislature was instituted and

to both the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State, majority members were now elected.[12] The provincial councils were also greatly enlarged and their powers largely increased.[13] However, less radical change was made in the executive sphere. There was hardly any change at the centre, with the Viceroy still enjoying predominant power in the absence of "responsible government." At the provincial level, "responsible government" was partially introduced. Here the principle of diarchy was adopted, by which the executive authority was divided into two parts. One was controlled by councillors responsible only to the governor and ultimately the Secretary of State, and the other by ministers responsible to the provincial councils.[14] In this way, greater participation was allowed in provincial governments and councils. Looked at from a different point of view, any reforms towards self-government tended to be moves towards federalism.

Along with the parliamentary system, a new electoral system was set up. The constituencies were divided into two categories, "general" and "special." The "special" constituencies represented special interests such as universities, industries and landholders. Among the "general" constituencies, communal, and especially Muslim constituencies were increased. Thus communal representation had come to stay and was to further strengthen communal sentiments and demands. The franchise also greatly expanded now that the general qualification was based on property ownership.[15]

The last reform by the British was embodied in the

Government of India Act of 1935 after the lengthy process of the Simon Commission report of 1930, three sessions of the Round Table Conference, the communal award of 1932, the Government White Paper of 1933 and consideration by a joint select committee of both Houses. Three major alterations were made in this Act. Firstly, the federal principle was adopted to the whole of India, including the princely states. Secondly, the principle of diarchy was introduced to the central government, and thirdly in the provinces, diarchy was replaced by "responsible government" though partially. As an extension of the previous act, the franchise was extended to some 30 million voters including women, and communal representation was further reinforced.

The gradual introduction of the parliamentary system, "responsible government" and the electoral system gave Indian people, particularly nationalists, opportunities to participate in the political process even before independence. It is true that the policy and actions of the Indian "political parties" were only responses to the British policy but under the circumstances, by responding, positively or negatively, to the British policy, the Indian parties gained experience of parliamentary democracy and strengthened their organisational structures.

Thus, it was the foreign powers, especially the British Government, that brought nation-wide, integrative, political, administrative and social institutions to the essentially apolitical Indian society. However, the greatest impact of the 200 years of British rule was the emergence of Indian nationalism as an anti-British

movement, the main product of which was the foundation and
the growth of the Indian National Congress.

   2. The Nationalist Movement and the Emergence

      of the Indian National Congress

   (1) The Establishment of the Indian National Congress

      The Indian National Congress had a modest start in
1885. The brainchild of a retired British officer, Allan
Octavian Hume, for the first three decades represented a
microscopic minority of an English-educated Indian elite,
who met once a year in a city and made resolutions. The
demands they made in the first two decades were basically
two-fold: the setting up of representative institutions;
and the abolition of discrimination against Indians in
recruitment to the civil service.

      Although it was a British creation, British official
policy was to not recognise the Congress but to watch its
activities. Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, who had insisted
that the Congress was a political organisation rather than
a social one, had charged the Congress with disloyalties as
early as 1888. The Government of India continued to
distrust the Congress after Dufferin, and official
hostility and contempt for the Congress became evident
during Lord Curzon's period.[16]

      The Congress in its first phase was characterised by
its nation-wide scope, a Hindu dominance and a tone of
moderation. No matter how inadequate it was in terms of

representation of the Indian "nation," the Congress Party was a nation-wide organisation from the very beginning, cutting across linguistic boundaries, facilitated by its English education. The first annual session of the Congress was held in Bombay(1885) attended by 72 prominent citizens, the second in Calcutta(1886) and the third in Madras(1887). In each session English was used as the common language. However, it failed to attract the Muslims and therefore was basically a Hindu organisation.[17] Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the founder of the Aligarh Muslim College, reiterated that "there can be no such thing as a national congress, nor can it be of equal benefit to all peoples."[18] Thus he refused to participate in the Congress and urged the Muslims not to participate. He believed that Muslim interests would be best safeguarded by the British Government, and for that reason he was against the establishment of a separate Muslim organisation. Nor did the English-educated Congress "gentlemen" try to mobilise farmers or industrial workers.

Despite the hostile attitude of the British Government, the Congress largely remained a moderate gentlemen's club until the extremists appeared on the scene in the first decade of this century. The British response to the demands made by the Congress was rather slow. The Indian Councils Act of 1892,[19] a negligibly mild compromise, disappointed the younger elements of the Congress represented by Bal Gandadhar Tilak, Bepin Chandra Pal and Lajpat Rai, and gave rise to radicalism within the Congress Party. The difference between the moderates and

the extremists lies not only in the use of violence as a
means to their ends but also in fundamental attitudes to
British rule itself. Whereas the moderates sought reforms
that maintained cooperation with the British, the
extremists decided that British interests and Indian
interests were essentially incompatible. For the
extremists, the moderates who had led the Congress were
political beggers.

The partition of Bengal in 1905 accelerated the
radicalization of the Congress. The Bengal Presidency of
78 million population was divided into Muslim dominant East
Bengal and more prosperous West Bengal which was mainly
Hindu. This "divide and rule" policy of Lord Curzon, the
Viceroy, set fire to the anti-British movement. Protests
grew into heated agitations led by Suredranath Bannerjea
and Bepin Chandra Pal. Even moderate Congress President,
G.K. Gokhale stated in his presidential address at the
annual session of the Congress in 1905;

> The tremendous upheaval of popular feeling, which
> has taken place in Bengal in consequence of the
> partition, will constitute a landmark in the history
> of our national progress.... Bengal's heroic stand
> against the oppression of a harsh and uncontrolled
> bureaucracy has astonished and gratified all India,
> and her sufferings have not been endured in vain,
> when they have helped to draw closer all parts of
> the country in sympathy and in aspiration....[20]

The protests against the partition of Bengal led to the
Boycott-Swadesh movement, which was to boycott foreign
goods and promote indigenous Indian industry. This

movement was given recognition and encouragement at the next annual session of the Congress.[21]

However, the consequent oppressive measures taken by the British Government and the rather ambiguous and ambivalent resolution on "self-govenment" adopted at this session led to a split in the Congress in 1907, when the extremists walked out and the moderates, by restricting themselves to only constitutional methods shut the door on the extremists. It was not until the First World War that the extremists were welcomed back to the Congress.

Although the radicalization process had a short life, the impact of the extremists was not insignificant. Firstly, they certainly pushed the Congress a step forward. The moderates had to admit that just making petitions was not enough to attain their goal. Secondly, the movement for the first time turned to the people instead of begging the rulers, although their target was still largely confined to the middle-classes. Now efforts were made to mobilise people. Thirdly, the extremists did not recognise the need for social reforms, which the 'enlightened' moderates had emphasised. This reactionary attitude was a consequence of their tilt to Hinduism. The Congress refused to entertain any question of social reform until the end of 1917, and the depressed classes including the "untouchables" were not involved until 1920. In this sense, the extremists were political radicals but social "Tories".[22] Fourthly, the extremists' nationalism was based to a large extent on Hindu tradition. They stressed 'national education' which in effect was Hindu education,

and often appealed to Hindu sentiments. The Swadesh
movement also encouraged the newly emerging capitalists who
were predominantly Hindu. The Hindu revivalism inevitably
provoked Muslim emotions, and with the encouragement of
Viceroy Minto,[23] it led to the creation of a Muslim
communal political organisation, the Muslim League, in
1906.[24] The Muslim demand, as mentioned earlier, was
fulfilled to a large extent by the Morley-Minto reforms.

The development of self-governing institutions in
India was a joint product of British rule and Indian
response. The Indian Councils Act of 1909, a mild gesture
of the British, led to a demand for more representation.
"Home Rule" became their demand especially after Tilak
joined the Home Rule League established by Annie Besant.
The death of a moderate Congress leader, Gokhale, gave
Tilak a dominant position in the Congress. Different
nationalist forces were consolidated among the moderates,
the extremists and even the Muslims.[25] The war-time
policy of the British Government also generated hopes and
expectations on the part of Indian nationalists. However,
none of the British concessions satisfied the Indians, and
even the Government of India Act of 1919 was rejected by
the Congress as "inadequate, unsatisfactory and
disappointing."[26]

The repressive Rolatt Act of 1919 and the British
massacre of hundreds of Indians in Amritsar in the same
year unwittingly contributed to the further alienation of
the Indians. However, there was very little that could be
done if the authorities refused to grant greater

concessions. Neither the moderates nor the radicals had
any real solution to offer. The weakness of the Congress
lay in the fact that it had no substantial organisational
base in the country from which to mobilise strength. The
urban middle-class organisation lacked widespread following
and support. Both liberal constitutionalism and extremist
militancy failed in providing the necessary leadership,
resulting in a deadlock.

   (2) Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party

   This deadlock was broken by the remarkable leadership
of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who brought to Indian
politics depth and an indigenous base. The essence of the
movement led by Gandhi was named satyagraha (moral
persuasion) by Gandhi himself. It stressed non-violence,
self-discipline and sacrifice. After touring widely around
the country, he saw that the task ahead was to penetrate
the masses. First, he engaged himself in local disputes,
such as peasants' problems in rural Bihar, the land revenue
issue in the Kheda district and the Ahmedabad labour
strike.[27] With these experiences, he came now to the
national front. Having established his firm leadership at
the Congress's annual session of 1920 in Nagpur, he led
powerful campaigns of "non-violent non-cooperation" with
the government in 1921, 1930 and 1932. In addition to
leading the movements of civil disobedience, Gandhi himself
undertook several fasts including "fasts unto death." By
adopting such unprecedented methods, Gandhi succeeded both

in generating strong emotions in the country and in drawing attention from abroad.

Gandhi's ability and skill was shown in his technique of mobilising the masses. There are three factors of his success: the combination of political movement with social work; symbolism; and reorganisation of the party. Gandhi provided his followers inbetween the anti-British campaigns with the "Constructive Programme." Gandhi urged Congress workers to alternate political task with social work such as spinning khadi (hand-spun and hand-woven cloth), village uplifting, social work among the "untouchables" and the underprivileged, educational work, and work for women, youth, labour and the backward classes. Rajni Kothari points out that "such a program of 'constructive work' proved to be an intelligent strategy for keeping the 'army' of Congress workers constantly mobilized so that when the next campaign of civil disobedience came, a country-wide force was already available to join it."[28]

Gandhi introduced strong symbolism into Indian politics. When he started a movement to abolish the untouchability of the outcaste masses, he gave the name of Harijans (children of God) to the "untouchables" and even went as far as changing the title of his journal of Young India to Harijan. Charkha (the spinning wheel) and Khadi also became powerful symbols of the movement, symbolising the uniformity of the nationalists. Hindustani, a combination of Hindi and Urdu, was a symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity. Gandhi mobilised tens of thousands of people through the Salt March from Ahmedabad to the sea to protest

against the tax on salt. His life style itself was a model

for the nationalists and the way he demonstrated through

his own way of life was extremely effective. In this way,

his brilliant technique of making and using symbols was

successful in recruiting the passive rural population that

had long been alienated from the political field. The

intermediary castes and even some lower castes, who were

pushing into the modernised sectors of the economy and

getting educated in vernacular languages, became

politically active in response to Gandhi's leadership.[29]

However, Gandhi's charisma and new symbols alone could

never have brought such remarkable results. Nor could the

Congress in its original state have been prepared for

governing independent India in 1947. Gandhi as a political

man is best illustrated in his achievement of restructuring

the Congress organisation. Upon assuming leadership of the

Congress in 1920, he took up the task of reorganising the

party. The resulting amendments to the Congress

Constitution were adopted at the Congress Cocanada Session,

1923.[30]

A striking change occurred in the composition of

Provincial Congress Committees (PCCs). Until 1920, the

twelve PCCs were organised along the administrative

boundaries of British India. The British administrative

boundaries, however, did not coincide with the linguistic

regions. The boundaries, therefore, "imposed knowledge of

English as an implicit qualification for membership,"[31]

and the members were drawn almost exclusively from the

professional and business classes. After 1920, the

Provincial Congress Committees were reorganised along the existing linguistic boundaries (Article V). For instance, Bombay Presidency was divided into three: the City of Bombay (Marathi and Gujarati), Maharashtra (Marathi) and Gujarat (Gujarati). Madras was also divided into Telugu-speaking Andhra, Cannada-speaking Karnatak, Malayalam-speaking Kerala and Tamil-speaking Tamil Nadu.[32] The new boundaries were very close to the present administrative boundaries re-drawn on a linguistic basis in 1956. The PCCs were increased in number from twelve to twenty. The linguistic reorganisation of the party consequently enabled the PCCs to recruit large numbers of new members. Hence, a remarkable increase in membership.[33]

The sudden increase of membership brought a shift in the composition of the All India Congress Committee (AICC). In 1919, 59 percent of the AICC delegates were from major cities and 41 percent from district towns. By 1923, the proportion was reversed: 35 percent came from cities and 65 percent from towns.[34] Although the new constitution did not change the caste and occupational compositions immediately - the Congress was still largely dominated by upper-caste Hindus and professionals- at least it penetrated into the rural areas which had not been covered previously. Women also started entering the Congress at this stage. In the 1920's, many small landholders were recruited, and from this class the leaders of the Indian states would be chosen after independence. The recruitment base was expanded to lower, non-brahmin castes during the decade from 1932-1942.[35] The advantage of increased

membership was doubled by the introduction of an annual membership fee of four annas[36] per person (article VII), which gave the party a permanent source of revenue.

The Congress hierarchy was firmly established at this time. Gandhi instituted at the apex of the party organisation a powerful national executive committee, the Congress Working Committee. The Working Committee, which was, and still is, generally called the "Congress High Command," represented the national consensus, commanded much authority, worked under collective leadership and enjoyed superior power to the larger representative body, the AICC.

Gandhi's uniqueness as a politician is seen in the way he dealt with the High Command. He was never a formal member of the Working Committee, and yet he would get his decisions confirmed by the High Command. When Subhas Chandra Bose was duly elected Congress President at the AICC against Gandhi's will, the High Command refused to cooperate with Bose, who was forced to resign. As this example shows, with his authoritarian way of conducting Congress affairs, Gandhi always retained power.[37] Once elected leader, Gandhi demanded from his disciples unquestioning obedience. "But he chose not to act as a dictator, but rather to rely on the authority of the High Command," which in the process acquired its own prestige and legitimacy. Thus, for the first time in Indian history, a nation-wide institution representing the whole nation and with full authority was finally created .[38]

Gandhi placed special emphasis on local organisation

of the Congress. The Provincial Congress Committees were given a considerable amount of autonomy. It was in their power to organise District, Sub-Divisional, Taluqa or Tahsil, Firka or other local Congress Committees. Moreover, the PCCs "shall have the power to frame rules laying down conditions of membership and for the conduct of business not inconsistent with this constitution" (Article VI). The PCCs were also made responsible for the election of delegates to the Congresss (Article VIII). Thus there was an undeniable tendency towards decentralisation of the party organisation. Gandhi made the District Congress Committees (DCCs) the bases of mass organisation and recruitment.

To this political skeleton of the Congress hierarchy, with the Working Committee as the skull, the PCCs as the chest and the DCCs as arms and legs, he added flesh with social flavour. He set up various units to undertake "Constructive Work" in special sectors for women, youth, Harijans, the tribals and labour. Such organisations have been carried over to the present day as "cells." The merits of having these organisations were more than merely being able to carry out constructive social work. These units offered the bases on which to mobilise an otherwise apolitical population. In addition, the Congress was able to keep its cadres engaged even inbetween the non-cooperation actions.

In many ways, Gandhi's influence over the Congress party, and especially its organisation was overwhelming and has lasted to this day. Present Congress leaders, such as

Natwar Singh, the State Minister of External Affairs,
Kamrapathi Tripathi, former Working President of the party,
R.L. Bhatia, General Secretary of the Congress and
Manvendra Singh, Member of Parliament all mentioned the
freedom struggle and the name of Mahatma Gandhi in
describing the strength of the Congress Party during
interviews with me.[39] The Congress Party has created
many more units and agencies since Gandhi's time, but as
Rajni Kothari points out, it was the pattern established by
Gandhi that provided the Congress with starting points and
that still dominates the Congress organisation.[40]

For all these achievements, the extraordinarily strong
leadership of one man had its price to pay. Basically
there are two negative aspects to Gandhi's legacy. The
first one results from his over-emphasis on the moral
aspect of politics rather than realistic political tactics.
By using symbols such as "Harijans" and "Hindustani," he
inevitably set goals which could never be realised in real
politics. "Harijans," for example could never be "children
of God," nor could Hindustani bring Hindus and Muslims
together. His tendency was to combine moral and strategic
issues and to use immediate issues for national
mobilisation. The "Salt March" is a good example. The
success of the Salt March could not directly lead India to
independence.

With the passage of time, the gap between idealistic
slogans and reality widened, and the "awakened" masses as
well as other political leaders began to feel frustrated.
Many of these problems and frustrations could, however, be

contained so long as this political process was that of a
movement and not of a government. The manifestation of
most of the problems arising from this style of
mobilisation could wait until the movement was over, and
indeed they did. Independent India, therefore, would
witness a gradual surfacing of these problems one after
another.

But there was one issue that could not wait until
after independence and that is the Hindu-Muslim communal
problem. Despite all his efforts to resolve this problem,
Gandhi failed to maintain communal harmony and national
integrity. One of the main reasons for his failure lies in
his political style. He paid more attention to symbol
manipulation, such as Hindustani, than coalition-making.
Here, Gandhi missed an essential element of democratic
politics, and the cost was indeed enormous - the partition
of the country and his own assassination.

The second negative legacy of Gandhi is his
limitations in dealing with class problems. Gandhi, fully
aware of the class contradictions in India, saw class
struggle methods as unfitting under Indian conditions.
S.R. Chakravarty sees the connection between the Congress -
Gandhi and his company - and bourgeois and landlord
interests. He argues that "Gandhi and others deceived the
masses only to protect the bourgeois and landlord
interests."[41] However, it seems more reasonable and
fair to blame Gandhi's political realism here. Frankel
attributes Gandhi's rejection of class struggle to his fear
of breaking up the nationalist movement. "There is no

doubt" she says, "that class-based nationalist organization would have splintered the independence movement. There was even the prospect that the propertied classes would join forces with the British to oppose the Congress."[42]

According to Frankel, the peasants actually frightened Gandhi, who thought that millions of peasants, impoverished, ignorant and degraded could, once aroused, overwhelm their tormentors and take a terrible revenge. Thus, Gandhi feared that the class issue, once raised, would release explosive forces in the country that Congress might not be able to control. Therefore, instead of raising class issues, Gandhi pleaded with the landlord class and tried to persuade them to voluntarily surrender their interests for the good of the whole. His trusteeship doctrine was thus a form of class conciliation.[43]

Whether Gandhi represented bourgeois interests or had no choice but to go for class conciliation is not the point here. What is important is that Gandhi chose the most economical way in terms of time and casualty rate for all the achievement of national independence. For that purpose, the most fundamental socio-economic problems had to be put off until after independence. The ruling Congress Party, therefore, had to start governing India still faced with all the dilemmas inherent in Indian society: the pattern of mobilisation established by Gandhi, the class contradictions which could not manifest themselves directly, and the shock of the partition of the Indian sub-continent. On the other hand, India inherited a positive legacy in the form of the British-made

administration, parliamentary democracy and responsible
government, and above all the well organised Congress Party
and its outstanding leaders.

3. Independence and the Issue of Federalism

India won freedom on the 15th of August 1947 at a high
cost and through great suffering, the worst of which was
the partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and
Pakistan. The constitution adopted in January 1950
determined to a large extent the direction of the political
development of India, even though the Indian Constitution
was made much more flexible than most others and a large
number of amendments have since been made to adapt to the
times and changing situations. India was one of the few
states which enjoyed a high level of institutionalisation
at the time of independence, as Huntington rightly points
out.[44] The Indian Constitution was drafted smoothly and
rapidly. In many ways it was a continuation of the
previous British constitutional settings, and based largely
on the Government of India Act of 1935. What had been
designed by the British for the Constitution of pre-
partition Indian subcontinent was refitted for the
independent, smaller India with only minor alterations.
The Constitution adopted a Westminster-style parliamentary
democracy, universal franchise and federalism. Whereas the
former two directly influence the process of political
development itself, the latter frames the way it occurs.
In other words, the former deal mainly with political

functions, and the latter political structure and political culture.[45]   Analysing political functions without understanding political structure would result in putting all political systems into one category, i.e. political development within the framework of nation-states, and categorising them into developmental stages.   In order to avoid misunderstanding, therefore, the issue of federalism in the Indian context should be examined first.

One of the crucial factors in determining the direction of the political development of India is federalism.   The size and the diversity of the Indian nation calls for a federal structure and the decentralisation of political structures and institutions, though certain forces have been working towards unification and centralisation of the Indian state.   The Indian Constitution was federal in form but unitary in character. Various limitations are imposed on the power of states. Firstly, the creation and boundaries of the states are subject to the power of Parliament at the centre.   An example of an earlier stage is the reorganisation of the linguistic states which began in 1953 with the creation of a separate Telugu-speaking Andhra state from multi-lingual Madras and was realised to a great extent in 1956.

Secondly, the President of India, who is supposed to be a titular head, was given enormous emergency powers in the event of a breakdown in law and order in the states, and this power has been frequently exercised.   Also, when a national "emergency" is declared at the centre, as happened in 1975, the powers of the Prime Minister are greatly

extended. As Ursula K. Hicks claims, this is a direct inheritance of the Act of 1935.[46] The President, likely to be a nominee of the Prime Minister, also appoints the Governors of the states, who in turn function as long as they enjoy support of the President.

Thirdly, the states have to depend on the centre to a large extent for their financial resources. The financial dependency of the states increased with the establishment of the Planning Commission which had no constitutional status but decided the allocation of resources to the states.[47] All this was designed to strengthen the authority of the centre.

It is generally agreed that the Congress was not inclined towards federalism or decentralisation, and that if the Congress agreed to a federal system, it was in response to pressure from the Muslim League and therefore only a compromise. Hicks argues that the Congress opposed any sort of federation and demanded a completely unitary constitution at the later stage of the freedom struggle.[48] It is true that the Congress has always been against communalism. When the Congress accepted the principle of communal parity for the Simla Conference in 1945, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) gave instructions to their representatives that the principle was only on an interim and temporary basis and that the arrangement was only to the centre.[49] And even at the time of the drafting of the constitution, when some concessions were given to scheduled castes (the untouchables), tribals and backward classes, the Congress

refused to give any concessions to religious minorities. The Congress has always stood for secularism, which is still one of the three principles of the Congress together with socialism and democracy.

However, this is a rather simplistic view. Firstly, Hicks refers only to communal representation when talking about federalism. She does not mention the linguistic divisions of India, but on this point the Congress has been showing a more accommodating attitude. In 1942, the CWC passed a resolution on the draft proposal of the British Government that read, "Each territorial unit should have the fullest possible autonomy within the Union, consistently with a strong national State." At the same time, it warned the British Government that the proposal which "has been made to meet a communal demand ... will have other consequences also and lead politically reactionary and obscurantist groups among different communities to create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country."[50] Also the fact that the Congress organisation itself was restructured on a linguistic base shows that the Congress leaders did recognise the need to create an organisation which was to absorb diversities.

Secondly, she seems to overlook the environmental factors of Congress policy. It would be fair to say that the insistence on the unitary system by the Congress was a reaction to the escalating Muslim demands for, firstly the autonomy of state units, then a kind of confederation and finally a partition. Of course, the Muslim demands can

on the other hand be interpreted as running counter to Congress policy. It was a process of escalation or a vicious circle which was further accelerated by an increase in communal riots, bloodshed and atrocities all over the country.

The shock of the partition made the Congress leaders strongly aware of the need for a strong centre, national unity and consolidation. Therefore, while the Congress did recognise the need for the formation of linguistic provinces,[51] the leadership was not inclined to implement this decision. When the Linguistic Provinces Commission appointed by the Constituent Assembly made a proposal rejecting the creation of linguistic states, the Congress government decided to adopt a scheme of territorial organisation which did not coincide with the linguistic boundaries. This was certainly a setback for the principle of federalism. However, the increasing and intensifying demands for linguistic states forced the Government to start accommodating these demands in the 1950's. The acceptance of linguistic states pacified those who had resorted to violence on this issue. In this regard the policy was functional despite some doubts expressed by scholars like Selig S. Harrison and Morris-Jones.[52] This process is still going on.[53]

Associated with the issue of linguistic states is the status of official languages. Linguistic diversity was accepted in the Constitution which recognised the major regional languages. The Constitution laid down that by 1965 Hindi would become the official language of the Union

as well as the medium of inter-state communication. However, faced with serious objections from non-Hindi states, the Government has not yet enforced this. Instead, both English and Hindi are still being used as the medium for inter-state communication.

The question of federalism has always been one of the main issues in Indian politics, a country characterised by its diversities. At the time of independence, the pendulum swung towards the unitary system in the wake of the shock of the partition and the euphoria that independence evoked. After the Constitution was adopted in 1950, however, as ethnic and regional demands were increased and intensified, the pendulum began swinging back towards decentralisation, and the Congress Government was forced to gradually accept these demands. Of course, as the pendulum swung back, the political situation had changed, and the traditional apolitical society was gone forever. Now there was a new development of the Indian political system, unity in diversity.

Notes

(1) Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., op. cit., p.513.

(2) Ibid., p.515.

(3) W. H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India, New Delhi: B. I. Publications, 1964.

(4) One of the interesting things pointed out by the Congress workers, especially those at lower levels such as village level or block level, in answer to my question, is that they consider that one of their important tasks is to provide a check on police conduct. (Interviews held at Urva Block, Hardua village and some other towns in Karchana constituency and Jhagarpur village near Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh in December 1986.) The data show that the police

are alienated from the people, giving plenty of scope for party workers to prove their contribution to the masses.

(5) Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1970, p.25.

(6) Ibid..

(7) Ibid., p.31.

(8) Morris-Jones, op.cit., p.22.

(9) A. S. Narang, Indian Government and Politics, 2nd ed., New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1987, p.22.

(10) Morris-Jones, op.cit., pp.39-42.

(11) Under the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which is generally known as the Morley-Minto reforms, the Imperial Legislative Council consisted of 60 members with the Viceroy presiding, as compared with 25 under the Act of 1892. Out of the 60 members, 28 were nominated officials and 32 non-officials, of whom 27 were now elected. In the provinces, the non-official elected members occupied the majority of the councils. However, both Viceroy's and Governors' Councils at the centre and in the provinces respectively still possessed far from full parliamentary powers. (Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History of India, 4th ed., edited by Percival Spear, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1958, pp.774-5.)

(12) The Legislative Assembly consisted of 106 elected and 40 nominated members and the Council of State had 61 members, majority of whom were elected.

(13) At least 70 percent of the members of the provincial councils were elected.

(14) The administrative matters belonging to councilors were called 'Reserved' and those belonging to ministers 'Transferred.'

(15) The new franchise system gave over five million people the right to vote in the provincial council elections as compared to 33,000 previously, nearly one million in the Legislative Assembly and 17,000 in the Council of State. (Smith, op.cit., pp.788-9.)

(16) Lord Curzon wrote in 1900, "My own belief is that the Congress is tottering to its fall, and one of my great ambitions while in India is to assist to a peaceful demise." (Ibid., p.759.)

(17) K. T. Telang, one of the secretaries of the Congress, reluctantly admitted that the Mohameddan community was not adequately represented at the Bombay Congress in 1885. (Y. D. Phadke, "Congress Before Gandhi," in Ram Joshi and P. K. Hebsur, eds., Congress in Indian Politics: A Centenary

<u>Perspective</u>, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1987, p.23.)

(18) Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to Badruddin Tyabji, 24 January 1888, in B. N. Pandey, ed., <u>The Indian Nationalist Movement 1885-1947: Selected Documents</u>, London: The Macmillan Press, 1979, p.15.

(19) The Act opened a way for an electoral system in India. However, the word 'election' was carefully avoided and only representatives from various institutions such as universities, business associations and landholders' associations were to be recommended to the Councils.

(20) Presidential address by Gopal Krishna Gokhale at the 21st session of the Indian National Congress, Benares, December 27-30, 1905, A. M. & S. G. Zaidi, eds., <u>The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress</u> (Henceforth shortened as <u>Encyclopaedia</u>), vol.4: 1901-1905, New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1978, p.694.

(21) Resolutions adopted by the Congress at the 22nd annual session, Calcutta, December 26-29, 1906. (<u>Ibid.</u>, vol.5: 1906-1910, p.153.)

(22) Phadke, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp.28-29.

(23) Muslim address to Lord Minto, 1st October 1906 and Lord Minto to Sir Arthur Godley on the value of the Muslim Address, 17th October 1906 in Pandey, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.16

(24) Viqar-ul-Mulk stated in his inaugural address, "The resolution which I have the honour of moving to-day has been so framed that the object of our League is frankly the protection and advancement of our political rights and interests, but without prejudice to the traditional loyalty of Musalmans to the Government, and goodwill to our Hindu neighbours..." ("The Formation of the All-India Muslim League: Inaugural Address by Viqar-ul-Mulk," 30th December 1906, in <u>Ibid.</u>, pp.17-18.)

    The aims of the Muslim League are;

1. To promote and maintain among Indians feelings of loyalty towards the British Crown;
2. To protect and advance the political and other rights and interests of the Indian Musalmans;
3. To promote friendship and union between the Musalmans and other communities of India; and
4. Without detriment to the foregoing objects, the attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India by bringing about, through constitutional means, a steady reform of the existing system of administration; by promoting national unity and fostering public spirit among the people of India, and by co-operating with other communities for the said purposes.

(The resolution passed at the meeting of the Council of the

All-India Muslim League on December 31, 1912, <u>Ibid.</u>, p.19.)

(25) The Congress and the Muslim League reached an agreement of cooperation under the Lucknow Pact of 1916. The Congress agreed to accept separate electorates for Muslims. They further strengthened their cooperation in developing the Khilafat Movement after the First World War.

(26) Resolutions adopted by the Congress at the Thirty-Fourth Session, Amritsar, December 27-30, 1919 (<u>Encyclopaedia</u>, vol.7: 1916-20, p.530.)

(27) A good account of Ghandi's experiences is given in Francine R. Frankel, <u>India's Political Economy 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution</u>, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978, chapter two.

(28) Kothari, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.52.

(29) Stanley A. Kochanek, <u>The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy</u>, Princeton, new Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968, p.329.

(30) The amended constitution is given in <u>Encyclopaedia</u>, vol.8: 1921-1924, pp.628-636.

(31) Frankel, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.2.

(32) Although the amendments of the Congress Constitution appear in the document of the 38th session in 1923, the structural change had taken place in 1921. The difference in the composition of the members of the Subject Committees in 1920 and 1921 shows the change. (<u>Encyclopaedia</u>, vol.7, pp.703-712 and vol.8, pp.59-67.)

(33) The Congress membership before 1920 is not available. However, the total number was so small that no ceiling was needed on the number of delegates to the annual session. In 1920, not more than 15,000 attended the annual session. In 1921, the membership was increased to some two million. (Gopal Krishna, "The Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-23," <u>The Journal of Asian Studies</u>, XXV, May 1966, p.420.)

(34) <u>Ibid.</u>, pp.422-424.

(35) Kochanek, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.332.

(36) About eight cents in 1920.

(37) Kothari, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.55.

(38) <u>Ibid.</u>, pp.55-56.

(39) At the central level, I interviewed eleven Congress leaders who were, at the time of the interview, either ministers, MPs or office bearers of the AICC. The interviews were held in December 1986, March-April 1987 and

February 1988.

(40) Kothari, op.cit., p.56.

(41) S. R. Chakravarty, "National Struggle in Indian Sub-Continent 1914-1935," Ram Pande, ed., Congress 100 Years, Jaipur: Jaipur Publishing House, 1985, p.40.

(42) Frankel, op.cit., pp.43-44.

(43) Ibid., pp.44-45.

(44) Huntington, "Political Development and political Decay."

(45) Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp.3-64.

(46) Ursula K. Hicks, Federalism - Failure and Success: A Comparative Study, London: The Macmillan Press, 1976, pp.102-103.

(47) A good account is given in Ibid., pp.103-109.

(48) Ibid., pp.93-99.

(49) Congress Working Committee, Bombay, June 21 & 22, 1945. (Encyclopaedia, vol.12, p.476.)

(50) Congress Working Committee, Delhi, March 29-April 11, 1942. (Ibid., vol.12, p.460.)

(51) Congress Working Committee, New Delhi, October 4 & 5, 1949. (Ibid., vol.13, p.493.)

(52) The fear was based on the assumption that the creation of Andhra would produce a new Telugu-speaking elite, who would challenge the existing English-speaking ruling class and threaten the integration and integrity of the nation. (Selig S. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades, Madras: Oxford University Press, 1960 and W. H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957.)

(53) The following is a conspectus of the reorganisation legislation;

    1. The Andhra State Act, 1953;
    2. The States Reorganisation Act, 1956;
    3. The Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960;
    4. The State of Nagaland Act, 1970;
    5. The Punjab State Reorganisation Act, 1966;
    6. The State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970;
    7. The North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971;
    8. The Assam (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1951;

9. The Andhra Pradesh Madras (Alteration
   of Boundaries) Act, 1959;
10. The Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (Alteration
    of Boundaries) Act, 1968;
11. The Bihar and West Bengal (Transfer of
    Territories) Act, 1956;
12. The Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh
    (Transfer of Territories) Act, 1959;
13. The Andhra Pradesh and Mysore (Transfer
    of Territories) Act, 1968;
14. The Madras State (Alteration of Name)
    Act, 1968; and
15. The Mysore State (Alteration of
    Territory) Act, 1973.

(M. C. Jain Kagzi, The Constitution of India, 4th ed., New
Delhi: Metropolitan Book, 1984, vol.1, p.97.)

Chapter 4: The Emergence of a Competitive Party System

and the Development of a Single Dominant

Party System

1. Parliamentary Democracy and Universal Franchise

Whereas there have always been controversies over the
federal-unitary dichotomy or the choice between
centralisation and decentralisation, there seems to have
been a general agreement on parliamentary democracy and
universal franchise. The demand for independence was
always accompanied by the demand for more power for the
Parliament. As mentioned before, India had experienced
parliamentary democracy though with limited powers by the
time of independence. The Congress had also advocated
adult franchise even before independence. The Karachi
Resolution of the Congress in 1931 declared fundamental
rights of the people which included adult franchise.[1]
The resolutions adopted at the Lucknow session of the
Congress in April 1936 declared, "a constitution must be
based on the independence of India as a nation and it can
only be framed by a constituent assembly elected on adult
franchise or a franchise which approximates to it as nearly
as possible."[2]

In most Western countries, the development of
representative government and the extension of suffrage
have taken place as a result of the change in social
structure. In these countries, socio-economic change came

first, resulting in the creation of a new social class who put forward their demands for political participation. Hence the political development that occurred was characterised by increased participation and institutional adjustment.

In the case of India and many other new nations in Asia and Africa, however, universal adult franchise was imposed before the demands were made, before the vast majority became "citizens" and therefore "qualified" to participate in the political process. Elections and universal franchise are generally identified with democracy and the voting pattern with the legitimacy of the authority or the ruling party. The question naturally arises, therefore, as to whether this assumption based on the Western experience is applicable in the Indian context.

Many observers have expressed their doubts about the effectiveness of universal franchise in a country where the literacy rate was 16.6 percent in 1951 and still 36.23 percent thirty years later. The illiterate majority of the population has also been forced to live under or just above the poverty line. It is this vast number of people who have the majority share of votes in Indian politics. Sucheela Kaushik describes the scene as "Poor, illiterate, superstitious with a sense of belonging only to the caste or religion, and with no access to proper communication, except occasionally the government-run broadcasting system, (thanks to the transistor revolution), this enormous human wave is being driven to the polling station, every now and then, to cast its sovereign will."[3] She says that the

number game of elections and its quantitative outcome
depend on this section of the population, which merely
serves as a reservoir of votes in India. She emphasises
that it is important to examine the class nature of society
before attempting any analysis of the electoral system.[4]

If an egalitarian society is a prerequisite for the
success of parliamentary democracy, India is no doubt
disqualified. However, India opted for a parliamentary
democracy based on universal franchise. So the question
should not be whether India was qualified or unqualified,
but how India has developed its political system under
these conditions. In other words, this predicament was the
starting line of political development in India. When
India started off on the long road to political development
all by itself, the vehicle was equipped with two wheels: on
the one hand, formal, legal participation was assured by
the Constitution and on the other hand, there were highly
institutionalised political and administrative organi-
sations at the top. The task was, therefore, to combine
the two by realising active participation of the "awakened"
and politically conscious masses. This task was assigned
largely to the political parties.

Given the prevailing social conditions, observers of
India are tempted to interpret Indian politics in terms of
class struggle. The Communist Parties of India often draw
undue attention. Even ethnic conflicts are analysed along
class lines.[5] However, the political parties which have
been assigned to mobilise the illiterate masses did not
start from the bottom but worked from the top downwards,

and it is not until recently that attempts have been made
to mobilise the scheduled castes and poor peasants.[6] In
Indian politics, it is usually the newly emerging middle-
classes - middle and small landowning classes in Andhra,
students in Assam, and affluent farmers in Punjab - who
have played the most active role, making demands and often
causing conflicts. Robert Hardgrave observes:

> It is not in the most backward regions and among
> the most depressed classes that discontent is
> most likely to manifest itself. Rather, the
> sources of social unrest are most likely to be
> found in those regions and among those classes
> experiencing more rapid change. This change may
> involve improvement or decline (real or imag-
> ined), either in absolute or relative terms.
> ...(C)onflict occurs along social fault lines,
> between groups in competition for the scarce
> goods of prosperity and power. It occurs most
> sharply between those groups who are rising and
> those who feel themselves threatened.[7]

Looked at from a different point of view, those who
actively participate in politics have been increasing
substantially in number from the top downwards. Those new-
comers resort to violence from time to time and hence
conflicts occur. But conflicts should not always be
regarded as dysfunctional.

This last point leads us to the next characteristic of
Indian politics, i.e. extra-constitutional movements as a
means to protest. Some social elements who have failed to
find access to the institutional channels resort to extra-
constitutional means, such as street agitations, fasts and

violence. According to Rajni Kothari, such protests have not only been important in Indian politics, but also have enjoyed a certain amount of legitimacy. The reasons he gives for such legitimacy are, first, the legacy of the nationalist movement which exercised some extra-constitutional means and second, the ambivalent concept of democracy which leaves room for justification of such protests in the name of the masses.[8] In addition to these two reasons, the fact mentioned earlier that the society has always turned its back on the state may be another reason. It is quite understandable that in a country where the degree of penetration of state authority into villages is relatively low, extra-constitutional means command more legitimacy. It is the governments who have learned to be sensitive to them and deal with them accordingly. Agitation groups have often been brought to the negotiation table for talks with government authorities to settle problems, as seen in the case of Assam and Golkhaland. Moreover, in most cases conflicts are localised and goals limited. Such protest movements, barring a few extremist ones, do not challenge the existing system itself, but are rather directed towards finding an entry into it.[9][10] Conflicts may destabilise the polity, but at the same time they can be functional to the development of the political system. Bloodshed is the major price that this kind of development has had to pay. Revolutions cost much. Wars cost even more. Localised conflicts are not without cost either. Nevertheless, this functional aspect of conflicts in the Indian political

system should not be overlooked.

It should be clear by now that the way in which such political functions as mobilisation, demand formation and demand manifestation are performed is to a large extent different from that in Western countries. But the system functions in a peculiarly Indian way. Moreover, the poor, illiterate, deprived masses may be politically more aware than generally imagined. For instance, at the sixth general elections which were held after the "Emergency" period, the voters rejected the Congress regime and invited a non-Congress government as an alternative, until they realised that the coalition government was incapable and welcomed back the Congress government. More recently, the voters seem to have learned to distinguish their votes to the Parliament at the centre and to the State Assemblies in their respective states. The same voters who had cast their Parliament votes for the Congress in December 1984 voted for the Janata Party in the Karnataka State Assembly elections only three months later. Ramakrishna Hegde, Janata Chief Minister (the State counterpart of the Prime Minister) of Karnataka State described the electorate as "sophisticated,"[11] and even Natwar Singh, Congress Minister, used the same expression.[12][13] The illiterate masses may not participate in the political process actively, but they have at least learned to exercise their veto, and no political party can ignore their existence any longer.

2. A Competitive Party System

From the constitutional framework of parliamentary democracy emerged a competitive party system though the Constitution does not refer to political parties at all. India is one of the few developing countries which has been able to hold general elections regularly. This democratic process was interrupted by a two year state of emergency period but, nevertheless, India rightly claims to be the "largest democracy" in the world.

The role of political parties is particularly important where other political agencies are rather weak. Unlike in Japan, interest groups in India have not established themselves firmly so as to get their demand conveyed to top decision-makers systematically. Stanley Kochanek defines the role of interest groups as follows:

> Having articulated its demands, an interest group must actively seek to gain access to decision-makers in order to influence policy outcomes by changing the perceptions of policy-makers who otherwise might not accept the group's point of view, in whole or in part. Assuredly, the effectiveness of an interest group depends on its ability to organize, to articulate real demands in unambiguous terms, and to gain access to relevant decision-makers. But ultimately the test of efficacy is the degree to which the group demonstrably influences public policy.[14]

Based on this definition of the role of interest groups, Kochanek observes interest groups in India as neither impotent nor omnipotent:

(Business) is the only group in India capable of
sustained action and continuous day-to-day contact
with both the Parliament and ranking heads of
government. Nevertheless, although business enjoys a
high level of access to government decision-makers,
its ability to convert this capital into influence is
substantially held in check by a variety of internal
organizational and external systemic restraints.
Individual business houses have been successful in
gaining specific, individual, distributive benefits,
but business collectively has not been able to
influence the broad outline and direction of public
policy in India.[15]

In sum, interest groups or the business community as a
whole does not have systematic influence on policy-making,
though individual entrepreneurs may be able to influence
specific decisions through a personal contact with an
influential politician. Thus, channels between decision-
makers and the people, or the state and the nation are
largely left in the hands of political parties.

   (1) The Elections

   The results of the eight general elections are shown
in Table 1. In terms of numbers of seats, the Congress has
enjoyed a comfortable majority in all elections but 1967
and 1977. In terms of percentage of votes, however, the
Congress did not command more than fifty percent in the
first seven elections. The combined strength of the non-
Congress parties always exceeded that of the Congress. The
Congress Party under the single dominant party system has
never held a monopoly of power. There have been constant

Table-1
Party-Wise Distribution of Seats and Percentage of Votes
in Lok Sabha Elections (1952-1984)

Year	Results	Total	INC	SOC	KMPP	CPI	BJS/BJP	HMS	RRP	SCF	SWA	PSP	RPI	CPM	SSP	NCO	LD	DNCU	BLD/JNP	JNPS	TDP	AIA-INCS	DMK	State Parties	Other Parties	Independents	Vacancies	Total=Non-DNC seats
1952	Seats	489	364	12	9	16	3	4	3	2														32	6	38		125
	Seats(%)	100.0	74.4	2.5	1.8	3.3	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.4														6.5	1.2	7.8		25.6
	Votes(%)	100.0	45.0	10.6	5.8	3.3	3.1	0.9	2.0	2.4														8.9	2.2	15.9		55.1
1957	Seats	494	371			27	4					19												26	5	42		123
	Seats(%)	100.0	75.1			5.5	0.8					3.8												5.3	1.0	8.5		24.9
	Votes(%)	100.0	47.8			8.9	5.9					10.4												6.1	1.4	19.4		52.1
1962	Seats	494	361	6		29	14	1	2		18	12	3											20	8	20		133
	Seats(%)	100.0	73.1	1.2		5.9	2.8	0.2	0.4		3.6	2.4	0.6											4.0	1.6	4.0		26.9
	Votes(%)	100.0	44.7	2.7		9.9	6.4	0.7	0.6		7.9	6.8	2.8											4.8	1.6	11.1		55.3
1967	Seats	520	283			23	35				44	13	1	19	23									37	7	35		237
	Seats(%)	100.0	54.4			4.4	6.7				8.5	2.5	0.2	3.7	4.4									7.1	1.3	6.7		45.6
	Votes(%)	100.0	40.8			5.0	9.4				8.7	3.1	2.5	4.4	4.9									6.6	1.1	13.7		59.4
1971	Seats	518	352			23	22				8	2		25	3	16								40	13	14		166
	Seats(%)	100.0	68.0			4.4	4.2				1.5	0.4		4.8	0.6	3.1								7.7	2.5	2.7		32.0
	Votes(%)	100.0	43.7			4.7	7.4				3.1	1.0		5.1	2.4	10.4								10.2	3.6	8.4		56.3
1977	Seats	542	154			7								22		3			295					49	3	9		388
	Seats(%)	100.0	28.4			1.3								4.1		0.6			54.4					9.0	0.6	1.7		71.6
	Votes(%)	100.0	34.5			2.8								4.3		1.7			41.3					8.8	1.0	5.5		65.4
1980	Seats	542	353			11								36				13	31	41				34	1	9	13	176
	Seats(%)	100.0	65.1			2.0								6.6				2.4	5.7	7.6				6.3	0.2	1.7	2.4	32.5
	Votes(%)	100.0	42.7			2.6								6.1				5.3	19.0	9.4				7.7	0.8	6.4		57.3
1984	Seats	542	403			6	2							22			3		10		30	12	4	21		29		110
	Seats(%)	100.0	74.4			1.1	0.4							4.1			0.6		1.8		5.5	2.2	0.7	3.9		5.4		20.3
	Votes(%)	100.0	51.9			2.9	7.8							5.8			5.9		7.0		4.1	1.9	2.0	10.7		20.3		48.1

Sources : 1952-1980 : V.B.Singh and Shankar Bose eds., Elections in India : Data Handbook on Lok Sabha Elections 1952-1980, New Delhi; Sage Publications, 1984.
1984 : Times of India, 2nd January, 1985.

tensions and oppositions both from within and outside the Congress Party. This is the basis of the competitive party system in India.

In 1952 over a hundred million voters, or 45.7 percent of the total electorate of 173 million,[16] turned out at 196,000 polling booths to cast their votes. The Congress Party won 74.4 percent of the number of seats and emerged as a dominant political force at the centre. The Congress also proved its strength by winning a majority in most states (Table 2). Helped by the weakness of the opposition parties, the Congress continued to rule both at the centre and in all states until 1967, except for a short interruption in Kerala. While there was no real threat to the dominance of the Congress Party at the centre, the position of the Congress in states was never a comfortable one. At each election the Congress has failed to win an absolute majority in some states. Although the reorganisation of the linguistic states helped to strengthen the position of the Congress in Andhra Pradesh and Madras at the following elections in 1957, the Congress was forced to enter into a coalition in Orissa after the second elections,[17] and finally lost to the Communist Party of India (CPI) in Kerala (Table 2).

The fourth general elections in 1967 changed the electoral scene. Although the Congress managed to obtain a thin majority of seats at the centre, it lost power in five states: Madras, West Bengal, Bihar, Punjab and Orissa (Table 3). After the elections, moreover, defections from the Congress Party made the Congress unable to form

Table 2: Party-Wise Distribution of Seats in Vidhan Sabha Elections in 1952 and 1957

Party	INC 52	INC 57	NCO 52	NCO 57	CPI 52	CPI 57	CPM 52	CPM 57	SOC 52	SOC 57	SSP 52	SSP 57	PSP 52	PSP 57	KMPP 52	KMPP 57	BJS 52	BJS 57	SWA 52	SWA 57	JNP 52	JNP 57	LD 52	LD 57	RPI 52	RPI 57	State Parties 52	State Parties 57	Other Parties 52	Other Parties 57	Independents 52	Independents 57	Total 52	Total 57
Haryana																																		
Himachal Pradesh	24														3														1		8		36	0
Jammu & Kashmir																																		
Punjab	96	120			4	6								1				9									13		4	5	9	13	126	154
Rajasthan	82	119				1			1					1	1		8	6											33	17	35	32	160	176
Delhi	39								2								5												1		1		48	0
Maharashtra	269	234			1	13			9					36				4									14	31	4	14	18	64	315	396
Gujarat																																	0	0
Madhya Pradesh	194	232				2			2					12	8			10												5	23	20	232	288
Goa, Daman & Diu																																	0	0
Assam	75	71			1	4			4				8		1												1		8		15	25	105	108
West Bengal	150	152			28	46							21		15		9										13	7	4		19	28	238	252
Orissa	67	56			7	9			10				11														31	51		1	24	13	140	140
Tripura																																	0	
Nagaland																																	0	
Meghalaya																																	0	
Manipur																																	0	
Mizoram																																	0	
Sikkim																																	0	
Arunachal Pradesh																																	0	
Bihar	240	210				7			23					31	1												44	53	9		13	17	330	318
Uttar Pradesh	390	286				9			19					44	1		2	17										3	1		14	74	430	430
Andhra Pradesh		187				15								14														22		29		34		301
Karnataka	74	149			1	1			3					18	8													2	2	2	11	36	99	208
Kerala		43				60								9																		14		126
Pondicherry																																		
Tamil Nadu	150	151			62	4			13				2		35												27		24		84	48	375	205
Total	1,850	2,010			104	177			86				208		73		24	46									146	166	97	79	254	416	2,634	3,102
% of seats 1952	70.2				3.9				3.3				6.7		2.8		0.9										5.5		3.7		9.6		100.0	
% of seats 1957		64.8				5.7												1.5										5.4		2.5		13.4		100.0

This table is prepared by the present writer based on the data provided in V.B. Singh and Shankar Bose eds., State Elections in India: Data Handbook on Vidhan Sabha Elections 1952-85, in 5 Vols., New Delhi; Sage Publications, 1987.

Table 3: Party-Wise Distribution of Seats in Vidhan Sabha Elections in 1967 and 1971-72

Party	INC 67	INC 71-2	NCO 67	NCO 71-2	CPI 67	CPI 71-2	CPM 67	CPM 71-2	SOC 67	SOC 71-2	SSP 67	SSP 71-2	PSP 67	PSP 71-2	KMPP 67	KMPP 71-2	BJS 67	BJS 71-2	SWA 67	SWA 71-2	JNP 67	JNP 71-2	JKN 67	JKN 71-2	RPI 67	RPI 71-2	State Parties 67	State Parties 71-2	Other Parties 67	Other Parties 71-2	Indep. 67	Indep. 71-2	Total 67	Total 71-2
Haryana	48	52		12													12	2	3						2			3		1	16	11	81	81
Himachal Pradesh	34	53						1									7	5	1									2			16	7	60	68
Jammu & Kashmir	61	58															3	3					8					5			3	9	75	75
Punjab	48	66			5	10	3	1				1					9									3	26	24			9	3	104	104
Rajasthan	89	145		1	1	4						8					22	8	48	11											16	11	184	184
Delhi		44		2		3												5														2		56
Maharashtra	203	222			10	2	1	1	3	4			8				4	5							5	2	19	8		4	16	23	270	270
Gujarat	93	140		16		1	1	1			4		3				1	3	66												5	8	168	168
Madhya Pradesh	167	220			1	3			7	10	7	10	9				78	48	7											2	22	18	296	296
Goa, Daman & Diu		1							4	4			5														28	28			2	1	30	30
Assam	73	95			7	3			4	4	4	7	5						2	1										9	25	10	125	114
West Bengal	127	104	2		16	13	43	114			7		7	3			1	1	2	1							13	6	34	24	31	12	280	279
Orissa	31	51		1	7	4	1	2			2		21	4					49	36							26	38			3	4	140	140
Tripura	27	41			1	1	2	16																								2	30	60
Nagaland																																		
Meghalaya		9																										32				19		60
Manipur	16	17		1	1	5			3		4																	15			9	19	30	60
Mizoram		6																														24		30
Sikkim																																		
Arunachal Pradesh																																		
Bihar	128	168		30	24	35	4	1	33		68		18				26	25	3	1					1		13	1		9	33	16	318	318
Uttar Pradesh	199				13		1				44		11				98		12						10						37		425	
Andhra Pradesh	165	219			11	7	9	1			1						3		29	2					1			1			68	57	287	287
Karnataka	126	165	24		1	3	1		3	6							4		16						1					1	41	20	216	216
Kerala	9				19		52				19		20														19				15		133	
Pondicherry																																		
Tamil Nadu	50		15	15	2	8	11					2	4	4					20	6							138	193			7	8	234	234
Total	1,694	1,876		104	121	102	128	136	57	57	180		106	11			268	105	257	57			8		23	2	282	356	45	40	374	284	3,486	3,130
% of seats 1967	48.6		3.3		3.5		3.7		1.8		5.2		3.0				7.7		7.4				0.2		0.7		8.1		1.3		10.7		100.0	
% of seats 1971-72		59.9		3.3		3.3		4.3		1.8				0.4				3.4		1.8						0.1		11.4		1.3		9.1		100.0

This table is prepared by the present writer based on the data provided in V.B. Singh and Shankar Bose eds., State Elections in India: Data Handbook on Vidhan Sabha Elections 1952-85, in 5 Vols., New Delhi; Sage Publications, 1987.

governments in three more states, i.e. Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The defeat of the Congress opened the way for united front governments, a serious turning point for the opposition parties. The experience of responsible government could have promoted the "parties of pressure"[18] to "political parties," but what happened was that further defections occurred from the united front governments. These governments were amorphous and heterogeneous groups, highly vulnerable to interventions from the centre and thus with the backing of the Congress, these defections led to the collapse of the united front governments. Thereafter, the defection-toppling game became common practice in Indian politics at state level, and the opposition parties as well as the Congress Party had to gradually learn the strategy of coalition-making. Because state governments were going through a period of instability and confusion, the establishment of "alternative government" had become a realistic goal for the opposition.

Some noticeable changes occurred in both the ruling and opposition parties. The defections as well as the succession crisis began to threaten the integrity of the ruling party. Intra-party factionalism, which had functioned as a source of criticism, change and diversified recruitment, preventing the Congress from becoming stagnant, had now become a disintegrative force. Faced with this crisis, the Congress Party decided to develop a more cohesive character and take more disciplinary measures.[19] The need was felt to centralise the party

organisation. The party of consensus was now being
replaced by a party of open competition and confrontation.
Thus the party changed its organisational character from a
loose alliance of diversified factions to become a more
monolithic, cohesive and rigid party.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties as a whole were
becoming closer to "catch-all" parties. Putting aside
their ideological differences and communal stances, the
small, regional and even some communal parties were
learning how to form coalitions. In Punjab, for instance,
the Akali Dal, which represented the Sikh interest, had
aligned with the BJS (All India Bharatiya Jan Sangh) which
had a strong Hindu communal tendency. Hence, the
secularisation of the political process. Another major
change on the part of the opposition was the strengthening
of their regional bases. The successful united front
governments were those led by a party which had a firm
regional base. The CPI(M) in West Bengal had a symbolic
success at the mid-term polls in 1969. In Punjab, the
Akali Dal further strengthened its position from 1967 to
1969. The CPI(M) had enjoyed a strong support base in
Kerala since the 1950's even though the united front
government had been toppled, whereas the ad hoc alliances
of various parties and defectors from the Congress proved
to be more fragile and vulnerable, as seen in Madhya
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Thus the major changes
in the party system during the late 1960's took place more
in terms of the character of the parties than in terms of
popular votes.

In the run-up to the next general elections, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi continued to centralise Indian
politics. She sought to create "national issues" which
would cut across the traditional social cleavages -
religious, caste and linguistic. Her slogan, garibi hatao
(remove poverty) which urged the whole nation to make a
united effort to develop the national economy was meant to
symbolise national integration. Then came the nationali-
sation of the banks, the attack on the princely order and
victory in the Bangladesh War against Pakistan. Mean-
while, the intra-party fighting between the Indira group
and the "syndicate" led to the split of the Congress Party
into the Congress(R) and the Congress(O) in 1969. Indira
Gandhi's strategy was proved effective in her triumph in
the fifth general elections in 1971 and the State Assembly
elections held separately in the following year (Table 3).
It appeared as if the linguistic, regional, cultural and
caste cleavages were being replaced by a class struggle.

This apparent change in the electoral scene, however,
was not deep-rooted and did not last long. The social
support base of the regional parties could not be easily
undermined. As some case studies show, the Jat peasant
proprietors remained a major political force in western
U.P., caste identities and factionalism still played an
important role in Karnataka and U.P., and religion-based
parties were fighting amongst each other in Punjab.[20]
The diversity of India created by thousands of years of
history, could not be overridden by class divisions over-
night. Regionalism still persisted as a force which would

reveal itself again within a few years.

The old patterns of the 1950's and 1960's had already reappeared in the 1974 elections. The centralisation of political issues with a special emphasis on class and economic issues which cut across primordial ties was not particularly significant in the minds of the people. The modernisation theory, based on the assumption that modernisation would bring a homogenized and centralised nation-state, was manifesting its weaknesses. So, on the contrary, Indian politics in the 1980's could be largely characterised by the confrontation between the centralising efforts at the centre and decentralising forces from various regions and communities. Regionalism and communalism seem to have acquired their momentum from this centralising policy.

Having failed in centralising Indian politics, Mrs. Gandhi decided to exercise the very last, extreme power provided for by the Constitution, i.e. the declaration of a state of emergency. Elections were suspended, opposition suppressed and state politics controlled by an authoritarian central leadership. Garibi hatao was diverted to the issue of population control, leading to forcible sterilisation of the poor whose life Mrs. Gandhi had promised to "uplift." All these attempts created the conditions for the formation of the Janata Party. The five opposition parties, i.e. the Congress(O), the Jan Sangh, the Bharatiya Lok Dal, the Socialist Party and the Congress for Democracy were merged into the Janata Party. The electorate passed a severe verdict on Indira Gandhi by

defeating her party, giving it 28.4 percent of the seats
(Table 1). It was Indira Gandhi herself who lost the
election.

The Janata Government, in order to consolidate its
victory, dissolved the state assemblies to stage fresh
elections in most states in 1977-1978. The Janata and
other non-Congress parties, most of which were regional
parties, won decisively in as many as eighteen states out
of the twenty which held elections during that period
(Table 4). The Congress managed to hold power only in two
states in the south, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. The
defeat of the Congress resulted in another split of the
party in 1978. One of the Congress Parties now carried the
leader's name, Congress(I) which stood for Indira.

Despite its landslide victory, the Janata Party could
not remain united. The party itself was divided in 1979,
even before it had completed a half term in Parliament.
One of the important consequences of the brief, chaotic
rule of the Janata coalition was the decentralisation of
state politics. The central government, preoccupied with
its own fragmentation, left the state governments with less
intervention from the centre. The state governments,
whether progressive or corrupt, enjoyed more state autonomy
than ever before.

The disappointed and disillusioned electorate brought
Indira Gandhi's Congress back to power in 1980 giving
Congress(I) 353 seats out of 542, or 65.1 percent of the
seats. Congress(I) also regained its power in most states
(Table 4). Indira Gandhi was determined to continue what

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Table 4: Party-Wise Distribution of Seats in Vidhan Sabha Elections in 1977-78 and 1979-80

Party	INC 77-78	INC 79-80	INCU 77-78	INCU 79-80	CPI 77-78	CPI 79-80	CPM 77-78	CPM 79-80	SOC 77-78	SOC 79-80	JNPSR 77-78	JNPSR 79-80	PSP 77-78	PSP 79-80	KMPP 77-78	KMPP 79-80	BJP 77-78	BJP 79-80	BLD 77-78	BLD 79-80	JNP 77-78	JNP 79-80	JKN/JNPSC 77-78	JKN/JNPSC 79-80	RPI 77-78	RPI 79-80	State Parties 77-78	State Parties 79-80	Other Parties 77-78	Other Parties 79-80	Independents 77-78	Independents 79-80	Total 77-78	Total 79-80
Haryana	3																				75						5				7		90	
Himachal Pradesh	9																				53										6		68	
Jammu & Kashmir	11																				13		JKN 47				1				4		76	
Punjab	17	63			7	9	8	5										1			25 UNPJP						58	37			2	2	117	117
Rajasthan	41	133		8	1	1												32			151	8		7							6	12	200	200
Delhi	10																				46 UNPJP												56	
Maharashtra	131	186		47	1	2	9	2										14			99	17		JNPSC 2			13	9	5	1	28	10	288	288
Gujarat		141																9				21		1								10		182
Madhya Pradesh	84	246				2												60			230	2		1						1	5	8	320	320
Goa, Daman & Diu	10																				3						15	7			2	3	30	30
Assam	34				5		11														53								8		15		126	
West Bengal	20		6		2		178														29 UNPJP						46		9		10		294	
Orissa	26	118			1	4	1	2													110	3		13							9	7	147	147
Tripura							51																				5		2		2		60	
Nagaland	15																										1		35		9		60	
Meghalaya	20																										30				10		60	
Manipur	13			6	5			1													10 UNP	2						4		2	8	19	60	60
Mizoram			5			1																2					22	18			8	5	30	30
Sikkim																												11		20		1		32
Arunachal Pradesh		13		13																	17 UNPJP		UNPSC				8	13		4	5	4	30	30
Bihar	57	169		14	21	23	4	6				1						21			214 UNPJP	13		42			2		2	12	24	23	324	324
Uttar Pradesh	47	309		13	9	7		1				4						11			352	4		59						1	16	17	425	425
Andhra Pradesh	205				6		8														60										15		294	
Karnataka	151				3																59 UNPJP				1						10		224	
Kerala	38	17		21	23	17	17	35												6		5					38	34	9	6	9	5	140	140
Pondicherry	2	10				1															7	3					17	14			3	2	30	30
Tamil Nadu	27	30			5	10	12	11													10	2					179	167		6	1	8	234	234
Total	958	1,453		129	85	80	301	62				5						148		6	1606	90	47	123		3	440	314	71	53	206	132	3,723	2,589
% of seats 1977-78	25.7				2.3		8.1				0.2						0.7				43.1		1.3				11.8		1.9		5.5		100.0	
% of seats 1979-80		56.1		5.0		3.1		2.4				0.2						5.7		0.2		3.5		4.8		0.1		12.1		2.0		5.1		100.0

This table is prepared by the present writer based on the data provided in V.B. Singh and Shankar Bose eds., State Elections in India: Data Handbook on Vidhan Sabha Elections 1952-85, in 5 Vols., New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987.

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she had been doing before she lost power - her
centralisation policy. This time, moreover, the interven-
tional measures were taken not only in opposition-ruled
states but also in states run by Congress(I). However, the
opposition parties were now learning how to manipulate this
central intervention for their own benefit, and gradually
set up regional bases in different states. Centre-state
relations became an important issue in Indian politics.
Opposition parties came together in chorus to demand
decentralisation and more power to the states. The ruling
party criticised state governments for their "anti-
national" claims and activities saying that they were
threatening the unity and integrity of the nation. In the
process some outstanding leaders emerged including
Ramakrishna Hegde, a Janata leader from Karnataka,who is
also a strong national figure, and N. T. Rama Rao, a unique
film-star-turned local leader. Ironically, the two states
in the south, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, which
Congress(I) maintained even during the Janata period, fell
into the hands of the opposition parties: Telugu Desam
Party in Andhra Pradesh and the Janata Party in Karnataka.
M. G. Ramachandra and Jyoti Basu also had strong regional
bases in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal respectively. Although
Indira Gandhi's populist appeal was universalistic and
humanitarian, as John R. Wood points out, the reality in
most states was a politics which was more frankly
particularistic and brutally self-interested than ever
before.[21] Paul Brass also claims that despite periodic
appearance to the contrary, the long-term tendency in India

is towards pluralism, regionalism and decentralisation.[22]
Indira Gandhi's political performance inevitably produced
dissidence, alienation and violent opposition. And towards
the end of her life, even Indira Gandhi herself had to rely
on traditional structures of local power. Politics in
India in the early 1980's was characterised by recurrent
conflicts, communal violence and escalating secessionist
movements, the culmination of which was her own
assassination.

Faced with the sudden death of the leader, Indira's
son, Rajiv Gandhi, and Congress(I) appealed to the nation at
the eighth Lok Sabha elections;

> Indira Gandhi is not amongst us, but her
> immortal spirit will inspire succeeding
> generations. ...The country faces, as never
> before in its post-independence history, a
> serious threat to its unity and integrity.[23]

The elections held in December 1984 gave Rajiv Gandhi
a massive mandate. Congress(I) won more seats as well as
more votes than ever before. However, the task was by no
means over. The governmental as well as organisational
tasks now awaited the new, rather inexperienced, young
leader, Rajiv Gandhi.

(2) Opposition Parties

At the time of independence, now that the main
opposition to the Congress, the Muslim League, had gone to
Pakistan, no opposition parties existed in India in the

strict sense except for the Communist Party of India (CPI)
which was better organised and whose well-trained cadres
were more disciplined than any other opposition parties
existing in India at the time. However, the CPI had failed
in broadening its support base in the 1940's. Whether or
not it was because of its support of the British war
effort, which to most Indians meant support of the anti-
national imperialist forces, is a matter of debate,[24] but
in any case, the CPI was far from being in a position to
challenge the dominance of the Congress Party. Other
opposition parties were more or less branches of the
Congress Party. They had emerged out of the Congress
centre and their policies and strategies were centred
around those of the Congress Party.[25] In terms of
ideology also, the Congress was placed at the centre, and
yet it contained inside a wide range of factions from right
to left. After forty years of independence, the position
of the opposition parties has remained by and large the
same.

One of the main factors in the failure on the part of
the opposition parties to establish and consolidate
themselves firmly can be found in the characteristics of
Indian society. Indian society is often compared to a
mosaic art. The components of the mosaic are first
religions, second castes, third linguistic groups and
fourth classes. The former three are traditional elements,
while the latter modern. However, the comparison does not
represent the real situation of Indian society. Indian
society is more complex than a mere collection of small

segments. The difference is that no clear boundaries can
be drawn between one group and another. Religious, caste
and linguistic groups cut across each other's boundaries
not to mention the polarisation of the classes. The
territorial boundaries are drawn more or less on linguistic
bases, especially after the reorganisation of the
linguistic states, as we have seen. However, none of the
states is single-lingual, nor can it prevent "migrants" or
"foreigners" from coming in from other states. All the
states are mixed in terms of religions. Moreover, caste
identities are still prevailing. It is understandable,
therefore, that the overlapping social cleavages weaken
class identities and the primordial ties often become
obstacles to class formation.

The second characteristic of the diversity of India is
the difficulty in defining the majority group. Although
the Hindus constitute more than eighty percent of the
population, and the term "minority" usually refers to
religious minority groups, especially Muslims, the Hindus
are divided by castes and languages, as mentioned above.
Hence there is no majority group.

These characteristics of Indian society create
difficulties in setting up opposition parties based on
social divisions, and in operating on the articulated
support structures on a long-term basis. Instead, the
opposition parties often try to enhance their influence by
taking up one kind of demand or another, such as the demand
for a linguistic state. One of the consequences is that
once this limited goal is attained, the raison d'étre of

the opposition party which has succeeded in mobilising the
dissent group is immediately lost, while the "awakened"
group is absorbed into the "mainstream" of Indian politics
(such as Tamil Nadu), or at least when the role to mobilise
people is taken over by another party some years later
(Andhra Pradesh). The results are peculiar linkages of
dominant and dissident structures and a fluidity of party
alignment. In short, the role of the opposition party is
that of a movement rather than a political party.

The other consequence of the difficulties that the
opposition parties face is that the opposition parties
identify themselves with one region or another and set up
regional bases rather than expand their influence across
the linguistic boundaries. Thus, the strength of the
Communist Party of India (Marxist) is basically confined to
West Bengal and Kerala, Janata to Karnataka and BJP and Lok
Dal to North India. Along with the change of these
"national" opposition parties,[26] there have emerged a
large number of regional parties: Telugu Desam in Andhra
Pradesh, Asom Gana Parishad in Assam; Sikkim Sangram
Parishad in Sikkim, the Mizo National Front in Mizoram, DMK
and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and Akali Dal in Punjab.

All this is not to say that the opposition parties
have no role to play or have no functions to perform. It
merely means that unlike the two-party system or the
Continental style multi-party system, the opposition
parties in the single dominant party system of India do not
present an alternative government at the national level.
They tried once, but the non-Congress coalition government

disappointed the electorate and was short-lived. So far,
therefore, their function has been different.

The Congress Party, being the single dominant party in
a country as diverse as India, represents a wide range of
opinions, ideologies and interests. It also carefully
represents a variety of religious, caste and regional
groups. The party contains different factions, both
dominant and dissident, which can be described almost as a
ruling party and opposition parties within a single party.
This tendency was particularly strong in the 1950's and
1960's.

One of the roles of the opposition in this system,
therefore, was that of a pressure group. In fact some
opposition parties represent specific interests: Lok Dal
mobilises support from backward classes (not the scheduled
castes)[27] and Swatantra used to appeal to landowning
class. The strength of these parties influences the
internal balance of power among the factions of the
Congress. The leftist parties, especially socialist
parties, had a great influence on the improvement of the
position of the leftists within the Congress in early days.
Thus, Rajni Kothari presents a model in which several
"parties of pressure" operate upon a single "party of
consensus" and influence the internal balance of the
latter.[28] This model is extremely useful at least to
explain the Congress "system" in the 1950's and early
1960's. The opposition parties became almost an extension
of the ruling party, not confronting but putting pressure
on it.

Secondly, the opposition parties have in the past offered shelter to dissident Congress members either temporarily or permanently. The dissident elements waged their battles against the ruling group of the Congress from outside the party. Defections used to be common practice in Indian politics until the Anti-Defection Law was passed in January 1985.[29] The law has certainly stabilised Indian politics, but at the same time reduced the flexibility of the system by removing this function from the opposition parties.

The third function of the opposition parties is to draw attention to issues which are otherwise neglected. The opposition parties played a vital role in the reorganisation of the linguistic states. However, this function also imposes its own limitations. As mentioned earlier, this kind of "one-issue party" by definition cannot last long. It has to either find another issue or accept a short life-expectancy.

Fourthly, small-size, regionally-based opposition parties may be better suited to meeting local demands. Raoof Valiullah, a Congress MP, compared the Congress organisation to a "dinosaur whose body is 200 feet long and tail another 200 feet, but the head is a nut, so small." "If something happens at the tail," he continued, "it takes two or three months to come to its head."[30] In comparison to the huge organisation of the Congress, the Telugu Desam is a relatively small new party, and far from being well organised. When I visited the party office in Hyderabad in Fabruary 1985, I found the office completely

empty. Everybody was at the Chief Minister, N. T. Rama Rao's residence, even though the State Assembly elections were coming up. There seemed to be some lack of organisation. Asked about the membership of the party, one of the party workers answered, "The whole population of Andhra Pradesh is a member. So we have 60 million members!"[31] Apparently there was no such thing as party registration. However, enthusiastic party workers went deep into villages to assist poor villagers with government facilities. The same party worker said, "The Congress workers never go to villages. We don't even get paid for this kind of work."

Also each state devises new policies. The Andhra government made rice available at Rs.2.00 per Kg. to the weaker sections where family income does not exceed Rs.6,000 per annum. Also, "a wide coverage of school children numbering over 60 lakhs (six million) is proposed under mid-day meals programme during 1983-84 with the twin purpose of providing nutritious food as well as increasing enrolment."[32] The Congress local organisations like PCCs and DCCs can perform the same functions, but regional parties are often more flexible and in a better position to meet the local requirements since the performance of the PCCs and DCCs depends on the policy at the centre and is directed by the High Command. With the centralising orientation of the Congress Party, the range of activities of the local organisations of the Congress have become narrower, which works in favour of the regional parties. Thus, the functions of the opposition parties depend on and

are sometimes even determined by the policies and functions

of the dominant party.

Notes

(1) Resolutions adopted by the Indian National Congress,
Karachi, March 29-31, 1931 (Encyclopaedia, vol.10, p.150).

(2) Encyclopaedia, vol.11, p.117.

(3) Susheela Kaushik, Elections in India: Its Social
Basis, Delhi: K. P. Bagchi & Co., 1982, p.20.

(4) Ibid., pp.17-21.

(5) The tendency is particularly strong among the Japanese
"India specialists." The Punjab problem, which in my view
is a conflict between the state authority and a newly
emerging affluent middle-class, is interpreted as a class
struggle (Heiji Nakamura, "Gendai Sekai no Hunsou to
Ethnicity" (Conflicts and Ethnicity in the Contemporary
World), Shisou, July 1987, pp.4-22.)

(6) In Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) and some parts of North India,
the scheduled castes have been being mobilised and
organised under the leadership of the Bahujan Samaj Party
(BSP) led by Kanshi Ram. The BSP, less than three years
old, made remarkable progress in the by-elections in U.P.
in early 1987. Although the BSP did not gain any seats, it
certainly threatened the Congressmen in U.P.. Similarly,
Bharatiya Kizan Union under the leadership of Mahendra
Singh Tikait led a remarkable revolt of farmers in U.P. in
February 1988, which had an undeniable impact on U.P.
politics. But Tikait claims his organisation is non-
political.

(7) Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India Under Pressure:
Prospects for Political Stability, Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1984, p.25.

(8) Kothari, op.cit., p.163.

(9) Ibid., pp.163-164.

(10) However, this kind of conflicts have escalated in
recent years. Whether the Punjab problem is going to be
solved within this permissive framework or not is still to
be seen.

(11) In an interview with Ramacrishna Hegde, Chief Minister
of Karnataka, in his car to the the airport, Delhi on 29th
March 1987.

(12) In an interview with Natwar Singh, State Minister of
External Affairs, at his residence in New Delhi on 27th

March 1988.

(13) In fact this tendency had already begun in the 1960's.
At the general elections and State Assembly elections in
1967, as many as 33 percent of the voters voted differently
at the parliamentary level than at the assembly level.
(Kothari, op.cit., pp.188-189.)

(14) Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development:
Business and Politics in Pakistan, Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1983, p.x.

(15) Stanley A. Kochanek, Business and Politics in India,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, p.323.

(16) The number of double member constituencies was 86 in
the 1952 general elections. However, the North Bengal
constituency in West Bengal had three members. As each
elector had a right to exercise his/her vote as many times
as there were seats, the number of electors in such
constituencies was multiplied by the number of seats
assigned to that constituency. As a result, the votes in
contested constituencies in 1952 numbered 231,996,701, and
the votes polled were 45.7 percent of these votes, i.e.
105,944,495. (V. B. Singh & Shankar Bose, eds., Elections
in India: Data Handbook on Lok Sabha Elections 1952-1980,
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984, p.24.)

(17) In Orissa, the Congress Party obtained only 56 seats
out of 140 for the State Legislative Assembly (Vidhan
Sabha), and formed a coalition government with its
principal opponents, Gantantra Parishad, which had won 51
seats.

(18) "Parties of pressure" will be discussed later in this
chapter. See note (28).

(19) A detailed analysis of the changes in Congress Party
policy is offered in W. H. Morris-Jones, "The Indian
Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance," Modern Asian
Studies, vol.1, No.2, 1967.

(20) Myron Weiner and John Osgood Field, eds., Electoral
Politics in the Indian States: Party Systems and Cleavages,
Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975.

(21) John R. Wood, ed., State Politics in Contemporary
India: Crisis or Continuity?, Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1984, p.14.

(22) Paul R. Brass, "Pluralism, Regionalism and Decentral-
izing Tendencies in Contemporary Indian Politics," in A.
Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton, eds., The State of
South Asia: Problems of National Integration, Honolulu: The
University of Hawaii Press, 1982, pp.223-264.

(23) Indian National Congress(I): Election Manifesto, 1984,
New Delhi: All India Congress Committee(I), pp.1-2.

(24) V. M. Sirsikar and L. Fernandes, Indian Political Parties, Meerut, Uttar Pradesh: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1984, pp.84-86.

(25) Even the CPI had a close association with the Congress before independence. There was a substantial number of dual memberships between the Congress and the CPI. The CPI also held conferences in the places where the Congress annual sessions were held. (Ibid., pp.81-82.)

(26) Political parties have to be approved by the Election Commission either as national parties or state parties.

(27) Roderick Church defines caste divisions as follows; the "upper" castes, the "high" castes, or the "twice-born" castes are the Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Banias. They are landlords in the countryside and businessmen and professionals in the city who have been the dominant castes. The "middle" castes are the principal farming castes (Jats, Yadavs and Kurmis in the north and Marathas in Maharashtra). They are Sudras, placed below twice-born castes. The "scheduled" castes are the bottom of society but have special constitutional protection and privileges. They are agricultural labourers. The "lower" castes are placed in between the "middle" castes and the "scheduled" castes. They are marginal farmers, sharecroppers and landless labourers. Roderick Church argues that the lower castes are the last stratum to be brought into politics. (Roderick Church, "Conclusion: Pattern of State Politics in Indira Gandhi's India," John R. Wood, ed., op.cit., pp.230-231.)

(28) Rajni Kothari, "The Congress 'System' in India," Asian Survey, IV, No.12, December 1964.

(29) Under the Anti-Defection Law, a member of parliament who has left the party under whose ticket he contested the election and won a seat, should resign the seat in Parliament or State Assembly together with a membership of the party.

(30) In an interview with Raoof Valiullah, MP, at his residence in New Delhi on 26th March 1987.

(31) In an interview with Telugu Desam Party workers during the election campaign for the State Assembly elections in Andhra Pradesh on 6th February 1985.

(32) N. T. Rama Rao, Speeches of Sri N. T. Rama Rao, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, January 1983 to May 1984, Hyderabad: The Department of Information and Public Relations, Government of Andhra Pradesh, May 1984, p.11.

Chapter 5: The Organisation and Functions of the

            Congress Party

    The forty years since independence has seen the
development of a competitive political system in India. In
fact the competitiveness can even be traced to the pre-
independence period. It cannot be denied that the Congress
Party has played the major role, while the opposition
parties, although indispensable in the competitive system,
have played a "marginal" role, as mentioned in the last
chapter. Thus, the functioning of the Indian competitive
political system has almost exclusively depended on the
nature and the functioning of the Congress Party. The
study of such factors as the inner-party structure, intra-
party factionalism, party-government relations, and the
social base from which the party derives its support and
recruits political leaders would provide a reasonably
comprehensive understanding of the Indian political system.

    Samuel Huntington, who emphasises functional
adaptability as a prerequisite of a developed organisation,
argues that the Congress Party withdrew the anti-colonial
slogan upon achieving independence for the country and
quite rapidly adapted itself to the task of governing.[1]
Since his remark, the transformation of the Congress Party
from movement to party has been one of the major subjects
of study in Indian politics. India in the first two
decades of independence is an exemplary success story due
in large part to the successful switch on the part of the

Congress Party from one set of functions to an entirely different set.

However, this kind of "black and white" approach is dangerous and misleading. In fact, a popular but oversimplified dichotomy approach e.g. government - party, centralisation - decentralisation, tightly disciplined party - loose coalition, often misses the essence of the role that the Congress Party has played in India's political development. The centralisation of party organisation can lead to authoritarianism, while decentralisation can result in "bossism", groupism, factionalism and power struggles between local leaders. Factionalism itself can be functional or dysfunctional. A shift in the locus of power from party to government does not mean that the role of the party can no longer be defined. Discipline is always required to some extent, but at the same time it should not prevent criticism from within the party.

As mentioned earlier, the strength of the Congress Party still derives, at least in part, from the nationalist movement in the minds of many present-day Congressmen. This "movement" aspect of the "party" is not only a legacy of the freedom struggle which essentially belongs to the past, but is still the life force of the Congress Party. Unfortunately, however, attempts to revitalise and reactivate the party have often been reduced to factional competitions. And instead of emphasising the importance of the movements themselves, the issues which seem to be given more importance are party-government relations, the

centralisation or decentralisation etc. Some scholars,

disappointed and disillusioned, have come to reject party

politics almost completely.[2] It is extremely important,

therefore, that all the aspects and issues mentioned above

are analysed in terms of how they actually function.

Otherwise, the analysis itself will be easily reduced to an

explanation of the balance of power between the different

factions within the Congress Party.

1. Party-Government Relations

Analyses of the Indian National Congress after

independence often begin with such phrases as "the

completion... of the long and eventful chapter of the

Congress as a movement."[3] "Movement" simply refers to

the movement for achieving India's political independence.

It is thought that the independence of India was also a

milestone in the history of the Congress Party. The first

stage of transformation of the Congress Party is thus

defined as the transformation from movement to party. It

is generally acknowledged that this was a key to the

institutionalisation of the political system of independent

India, and it is also agreed that the Congress Party showed

remarkable adaptability in this transformation.

However, this view misses one very important point,

i.e. the continuity of the Congress Party before and after

independence both in terms of movement and organisation.

The Congress was a party even before independence. It was

an organisation with a hierarchical structure, aiming at

gaining power. It also had a constitution, membership and communication networks. It was even recognised by the authorities. The Congress was an exceptionally well-organised party from top to bottom and from centre to local units. This organisational aspect was overshadowed by the dramatic nationalist movement, but nevertheless should not be overlooked.

To define it as a movement limits the role of the Congress in the pre-independence period to that of achieving independence. However, the interpretation by Congress leaders of the role of the Congress as a movement was much wider. The Congress had already committed itself to the achievement of social and economic freedom along with political independence. The resolution adopted at the Karachi session of the Congress in 1931 reads, "In order to end the exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include real economic freedom of the starving millions."[4] Nehru further developed this concept into socialism in his presidential address at the Lucknow session in 1936.[5] Thus, it was a movement, but the movement was not for achieving political independence alone but included the improvement of the social and economic situation of the people. This aspect of the movement was to be carried over to the "new" Congress after independence. It was in this context that Gandhi insisted that the Congress should be dissolved as a political machine and be kept out of unhealthy competition for power. He proposed that it be converted into a non-political institution to engage in social service and constructive

work. For him, the movement had not ceased and must be carried on. Rajni Kothari finds this idea of Gandhi's too romantic and highly unrealistic, and that that was the reason it was ignored.[6]

If Gandhi was at one extreme, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was at the other extreme as far as movement-party relationship was concerned. He wanted to make the Congress a political party with a single ideology and tight discipline. He persuaded the Congress Working Committee to amend the Congress Constitution so that "no member...will be a member of any other political party which has a separate membership, constitution and programme."[7] The main purpose of this proposal was the removal of the leftists, particularly the Congress Socialist Party. There was thus an ideological competition between Patel and Nehru. Nevertheless, Kothari argues that the effect was that the Congress shifted from being an all-embracing party and turned into a close-knit party of disciplined cadres. He concludes that this idea of transforming the Congress "showed a lack of understanding of the eclectic role that the Congress, as a government, was to be called upon to perform in the decades to follow."[8] Kothari thinks that Nehru's openness and conciliatory attitude was one of the major features of the inner-party democracy of the single dominant party.[9]

This was the first issue concerning the transformation of the Congress Party that arose with the achievement of independence. The party started paying more attention to the organisational aspects and around this time discussions

were held and consideration given to the constitutional change of the Congress Party.[10] The party recognised the importance of the organisation but at the same time urged the Congressmen to continue the movement and social service work.[11] Therefore, it would be too simplistic to conclude that the Congress adapted itself from a movement to a political party with the achievement of its principal goal, national independence. There was a substantial amount of continuity both in terms of the movement and the organisation.

It should be noted, however, that a change did occur in the objectives of the movement. Once the political goal had been attained, the main objectives of the movement were confined to social aspects. And for that very reason, in other words, because the movement was basically non-political, it was extremely difficult for the Congressmen, once in power, to carry on the movement despite the wide recognition of its importance. Perhaps it was in this area that discipline was required, and indeed the attempts to revitalise the party always stressed the importance of the movement aspect of the party, as will be mentioned later. However, when Patel insisted on the necessity of tight discipline, he did not go beyond the scope of a political organisation. His emphasis was on ideological uniformity and loyalty of the members to the organisation. This tendency was balanced out by Nehru's orientation towards a loose coalition type of party. At this stage, therefore, the movement aspect was not an issue. It was put aside for a while, to sporadically appear at later

stages.

The recurrent movements to revitalise and reactivate
the party can be better understood in terms of the
relationship between party (organisation) and government.
The party-government relationship was not an entirely new
issue. In 1937 when the Congress took power in some state
governments, the party and the governments had to set up a
workable relationship. At that time, the main objective of
the Congress Party was to achieve national independence,
and therefore the governmental offices in the provinces
were of secondary importance. The powerful leaders stayed
with the party, and the party obviously enjoyed a dominant
power over the governments. Thus when the party decided to
drop out of power in 1939, all the ministers resigned.[12]
However, the foundation of the Interim Government was to
change the whole picture. Now that the function as an
opposition force had been accomplished and there were no
rulers above them, the power struggle between the party and
government came to the surface. It was basically the
problem of the allocation of decision-making power between
the two bodies. This battle was best illustrated in the
conflict between the Prime Minister and the Party
President.

Stanley Kochanek has done an extensive study on party-
government relations in the first two decades of
independence. He divides the two decades into three
periods: a period of transition and conflict from 1946 to
1951, one of centralisation and convergence from 1951 to
1963 and the last period from 1963 to 1967 one of

divergence.

During the first period, the Congress had four Presidents out of whom two posed severe challenges to the supremacy of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The first challenger was Acharya J. B. Kripalani who became the President after senior leaders had been selected for Cabinet Ministers. Failing to realise that the locus of power had shifted from party to government, Kripalani insisted that all important decisions by the Congress members of the Interim Government should be made in consultation with the Congress President and the Working Committee. By contrast, senior Congressmen such as Nehru and Patel argued that the party executive should play a role in shaping long-range goals, but the government could not be expected to consult the party on the whole range of immediate and specific issues.[13]

Kripalani strongly resented the government decisions on Kashmir, Pakistan and other foreign policies and the way they were made. His wide-ranging differences with the government made him eventually decide to resign, a decision to which Gandhi agreed.[14] Kochanek summarises the conflict and Kripalani's failure;

> Kripalani, as the first post-independence Congress
> President, had envisioned a dominant decision-
> making role for the party organization. He failed
> to recognize the significance of the formation of
> the Interim Government and the shift in the locus
> of power implicit in the decision of the old High
> Command of the the Congress to join that govern-
> ment. The uniqueness of the new role of the

Congress as government left Kripalani with no clear
boundaries setting the limits of his office.
Acting on his own assumption that the Congress
organization and its President would be playing the
supreme role, Kripalani came into conflict with the
leaders of the new government. Having lost the
battle, Kripalani had no choice but to resign. In
doing so, he established a precedent for the
supremacy of the Congress government over the mass
organization.[15]

The next challenger was Purshottamdas Tandon, the
fourth Congress President of post-independence India. This
time factional politics was directly involved, as he
attempted to reconstruct the Congress with party bosses at
the central and state levels. Tandon attempted to remind
the Prime Minister that the latter could hold office only
if he had organisational support. However, Tandon's
"undemocratic" way of conducting party affairs was
criticised by his opponents, Kripalani and Rafi Ahmed
Kidwai. Kripalani, together with his followers, left the
party and formed a new party, Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
(KMPP). Nehru now began to try and preserve Congress unity
by keeping the door open for the return of the dissidents.
When his conciliatory approach met with resistance from
both Tandon and Kidwai, Nehru finally forced Tandon to
resign by submitting his own resignation to the Congress
Working Committee.

Tandon's resignation marked the end of the first
period of transformation and conflict. The challengers had
failed. The supreme power of the Prime Minister was
confirmed and the boundaries of the office of the President

of the Congress were confined to organisational affairs with no special responsibility for policy-making. Moreover, the programme of social and economic reform of the Nehru government was accepted by the party as a guideline for united Congress action.[16] To give the final blow, Nehru awarded himself the dual post of Prime Minister and Party President in 1951.

Kochanek describes the second period as that of centralisation and convergence. After Nehru relinquished the post of Party President, relatively minor figures were brought to the centre to fill this post with the consent of the Prime Minister. Presidents acted under his guidance. Kochanek calls this tendency "centralization," but in fact what he describes as "centralization and convergence" was not the tightening of the hierarchical structure of the Congress Party so much as the establishment of the supremacy of the Prime Minister.

As far as the centralisation-decentralisation question is concerned, Nehru gave considerable autonomy to the state governments. Morris-Jones attributes this to Nehru's political career. Unlike many of his colleagues who had established themselves in their own state first and then came to the centre, Nehru had been a national leader from the outset of his political career. In addition, his charismatic leadership contributed to the decentralisation. One leader alone could not comprehend the details of group politics on a state level. It is understandable, therefore, that "he was relieved when he could rely upon certain strong men to keep difficult regions under stable

management"
/ and "was reluctant to disturb them or interfere with
their methods."[17] In this respect Kochanek seems to
confuse two different dimensions. What Nehru attempted was
a concentration of decison-making power on the government
side. He believed that "It is generally the government
policy and the implementation of that policy that affects
the people. The Congress comes in not only broadly
affecting that policy or pushing it in this direction or
that, but much more so in carrying the message of that
policy to the people."[18] As a result, the bulk of the
party started looking to the Prime Minister rather than the
President for political guidance.

During the period 1951-1963, Nehru established his
position of unquestionable leadership in the Congress. This
is not to suggest, however, that no attempt was made to
revitalise the party. In this respect, Nehru had his own
limitations imposed by his post as Prime Minister. As
Morris-Jones points out, "his concerns were with general
party policy - especially the fight against communalism -
and with establishing a properly complementary role for the
party organisation in relation to the party's ministerial
representatives, with exhortation rather than with
reconstruction."[19] Thus the organisational work was to be
taken up by his successor, U. N. Dhebar, who stressed the
importance of organisational reconstruction. In his
Presidential address in 1955 he said:

> ... power or no power, the organisation must
> continue to play its role outside the frameworks of
> administrative responsibility by identifying itself

with the masses in a spirit of sacrifice and
service.

Elections have to be fought.... But elections
are means to an end. Their real purpose is to
educate the masses about the functions of
democracy.... That healthy atmosphere is possible
if we ourselves realise that elections are not the
Congress's only concern, not even the first.... In
the final analysis, the work of social education and
social service must continue unabated so that when
elections come, they would also get their proper
place in the Congress programme and not assume an
exclusive place of honour and prestige.

... It is only a strong organisation that can
give strength to a popular government.[20]

Based on the Avadi resolution on "the purity and

strengthening of the organisation" in 1955, a fresh and

thorough thinking on the issue of organisation began.

After a long discussion and extensive communications

between the centre and the PCCs, the party constitution

amendments were made in 1957.[21] Now the Mandal

Committees (each covering the area of about 2,000

population with at least 25 primary members) were firmly

established as the base unit, upon which the upper units -

DCCs and PCCs - were built. Primary members were given the

right to vote on Mandal Committees, if not at higher

levels. The Mandal Committees were assigned an educative

and service role in the party to reach the masses.[22] The

movement aspect of the party was to be restored. The

Congress Party was to be revised as a field organisation.

It was also an attempt to decentralise the party

organisation.

The implementation was postponed due to the second
general elections in 1957. But when it was implemented,
the outcome was rather disappointing. The Annual Report
for the Year 1958 reveals a poor performance. The central
leadership could not even grasp the exact number of Mandal
Committees in existence. It vaguely mentions "over
15,000." Based on the idea to have a cadre of trained
full-time workers, a Training Camp was organised, but only
44 trainees had been actively working in their Pradeshes,
"the remaining having either ceased to function or not
regularly reporting their activities to the AICC
Office."[23] Dhebar was frustrated. His attempt to
revitalise and purify the organisation faced "bossism,"
groupism and the entrenchment of local bosses, especially
Chief Ministers, and failed. Still more attempts were made
after Dhebar, but little changed.

The third period starts with the Kamaraj Plan, which
was submitted to the Working Committee on 9th August 1963.
Kamaraj made a proposal that "leading Congressmen who are
in Government should voluntarily relinquish their
ministerial posts and offer themselves for full-time
organisational work."[24] The plan was placed before the
AICC meeting the next day and adopted. Accordingly the
Chief Ministers and Central Ministers offered their
resignation, out of whom Nehru accepted the resignations of
six Central Ministers and another six Chief Ministers.[25]

The difference between the Kamaraj Plan and preceding
attempts lies in the simple fact that the former was
actually implemented. Although the published purpose of

the Kamaraj Plan was to revitalise the party, to set right
the balance between the party and government, and to
restore the Gandhian spirit of service and self-abnegation,
this "bloodless purge" benefited Nehru to a great extent.
"He used the opportunity to send out many of those either
reputed to be inefficient or rumoured to be corrupt or
known to disagree with him on basic policies.... The
Finance Minister, Morarji Desai, in particular, Nehru
wished to see out of office."[26] Consequently, Morarji
Desai bitterly criticised Nehru by saying that
"Jawaharlalji went to Hyderabad soon after the plan was
first mooted. There he discussed it with Shri Kamaraj and
Shri C. Subramaniam. Nobody had told me anything about
these dicussions. I suspected some hidden purpose in
them."[27] "Actually this was the second step taken by
Jawaharlalji to prevent me from succeeding him whenever
such a contingency arose.... It soon became clear that he
wanted Indiraji to succeed him."[28] In contrast, Kamaraj
was rewarded with the post of Congress President. As Party
President, Kamaraj was soon to play an important role in
deciding the successors of both Nehru and Lal Bahadur
Shastri, Nehru's successor. It seemed as if the Party
President was establishing supremacy over the Prime
Minister who was to a large extent the creation of Party
President. It turned out, however, that with both Shastri
and Indira Gandhi, it was the Prime Minister who had the
ultimate power.

The relationship between party and government, or more
concretely between Party President and Prime Minister was

established during the first two decades of independence.
Although Kochanek saw after 1963 a trend of divergence and
a new equilibrium between the two, it would have to be
concluded from the history thereafter that the established ·
pattern was the supremacy of the latter over the former.
It was much more a transformation of the Congress Party
necessitated by its assumption of power than an achievement
of the independence movement. And in this transformation,
the Congress showed a remarkable functional adaptability.

What is more important is that during this period of
transformation, some attempts were made to revitalise and
reactivate the party by restoring the movement aspect of
the party. The fact that most of these attempts were
either reduced to mere factional conflicts or met obstacles
of strong "bossism" and groupism is another matter. They
in fact bore little fruit. But at least the necessity was
felt by many Congressmen and the attempts worked as a
restraint and basic discipline. The Congress "system"
managed to contain these fights and conflicts within a
wide, loose and all-embracing system.

After Indira Gandhi assumed power, however, factional
conflicts took a more overt form. The Congress could no
longer accommodate dissidents, which resulted in the party
splits in 1969 and 1978. Indira Gandhi started
centralising Indian politics with the populist slogan
garibi hatao (remove poverty). However, her centralisation
policy was not accompanied by the kind of movement
witnessed in the two previous decades. Instead, power was
centred around Indira Gandhi and a handful of her

"loyalists." And now, the party-government relationship no longer seems an issue after her assassination, now that one man is monopolising the two main posts, able to appoint not only General Secretaries and the members of the Working Committee but PCC Presidents as well. Decision-making power lies neither with the government nor with the party, but with Rajiv Gandhi and his close affiliates.

2. The Organisation of the Congress Party

The Party Constitution [29] prescribes three main items; membership, organisation and organisational elections. Additional rules are supplemented to some of the articles separately. However, actual practice cannot always be expected to follow the Constitution. The following is an examination of the Congress organisation and operation at the centre and in Uttar Pradesh based on the Congress documents and data I have collected mainly from interviews with Congressmen at various levels.

(1) Membership

The Constitution provides two kinds of members, Primary Members and Active Members. A Primary Member is any person over eighteen years old, who accepts Article I (Object of the Congress), pays one rupee (about five pence) and is not a member of any other political party (Article V-A-i). Thus the Primary Membership is practically open to anybody who pays Re.1. This is how the Congress is

designed in order to broaden its mass bases. The permanent register of the Primary Members should be kept by a subordinate Committee such as the Block Committee and copies sent to the District Congress Committee (Article V-A-iv).

Qualification for active membership derives from various sources. The first category is a person who has been a Primary Member for two consecutive years (at least 365 days - Rules[30]), the second, freedom fighters, the third, members of local bodies such as _Panchayats_, Block Development Committees and Central and State Legislatures, the fourth, those who are actively connected with the organisations recognised by the Working Committee, and the fifth any other person approved by the Congress President. Every Active Member has to be aged 21 or over and a habitual wearer of _Khadi_. He should abstain from alcoholic drink and intoxicant drugs.[31] Moreover, he should not own any property in excess of the legal ceiling and should work for promoting the principles of secularism, socialism and democracy.[32] Nor should he adversely criticise the accepted policies and programmes of the party except through party forums (Article V-B).[33] The Congress Party imposes some disciplinary conditions on its Active Members while trying to maintain its broad mass bases.

The Rules of the Congress Party prescribe the minimum tasks for Active Members, which include enrolment of Primary and Active Members, collection of Congress Funds (out of which his biennial membership subscription of Rs.25 is deducted), a minimum of one week's manual labour and

training programmes for political and ideological study.

Training camps are also organised from time to time. An AICC Joint Secretary, D. P. Ray, organised a Training Programme in 1986, and six AICC-run Zonal Camps were held all over the country. One young Congressman from each District Congress Committee took part.[34] In the case of UP, the trainees who received eighteen days training went back to their DCC and organised 7-day DCC Training Camps for five members from each Block. The trainees from this course in turn were to select two people from each village and train them for another five days. Thus the Congress ideology, principles, socio-economic history and the sacrifices of the freedom fighters were intended to penetrate as far as the grassroots. Moid Ahmad, Joint Secretary in charge of training in the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee explained that most of the time from 5:00 am to 10:00 pm was spent on lectures, and that the District Trainer had to raise funds from local leaders not only monetary but in the form of food and accommodation. He was proud of the success of the course, but was not clear about how many District and Block training courses had taken place.[35] At the Centre, D.P. Ray, Joint Secretary, said it was highly successful, but his office was packed with people asking for posts for those who had completed the training course.[36] Raoof Valiullah, a young MP, is disappointed, "The training programme has been going on for twenty years, but never succeeds. The course is run at a five-star hotel in Delhi!"[37]

The permanent register of Active Members should be

maintained by the DCCs. Copies are sent to the PCC, which
should send the permanent register within its jurisdiction
to the AICC office (Article VII-1). In practice, however,
it does not work this way. At lower levels, such as the
Block Congress Committees, the office-bearers promptly gave
me the figures. For example, the Karchana Block Congress
Committee in Allahabad[38] had 50,000 Primary Members and
2,000 Active Members out of a total population of 114,000.
Sarva Town, with a population of 20,000 in the Urva Block
had 250 Active Members out of whom 50 were women and 6,250
Primary Members. The General Secretary of Urva Block, Rama
Kand Upadhyay said the Block had 1,200 Active Members out
of a 72,000 population.[39] Allahabad City Congress
Committee (CCC) had 10,000 Active Members (125 women) and
250,000 Primary Members (1,000 women). Allahabad CCC
consists of 41 Ward Congress Committees, the biggest of
which, Badshahi Mandi Ward with a 10,000 population, had
3,000 Primary (100 women) and 120 Active (5 women)
Members.[40] In this way, although the figures were rough,
the leaders of these units had a fairly clear idea to what
extent their "territories" were organised by the Congress
Party.

In Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh, however, a
PCC General Secretary, Jagat Pal Singh, gave me the figures
of six million Primary and fifty to sixty thousand Active
Members, although the figures are supposed to include a
large number of bogus members.[41] And there was no
register maintained. According to Singh, "the DCCs
maintain the permanent resisters."[42] According to Rama

Kand Upadhyay, Urva BCC President, an application for membership comes to the BCC first. The BCC then sends it to the DCC, which forwards it to the PCC, and the PCC accepts or rejects the application. Only the list comes back to the DCC and the BCC. So where the application forms are kept and who is responsible for maintaining the permanent register, nobody knows.

At the centre, the AICC Secretary in charge of organisation, K.N. Joshi, told me there were about five crores (50 million) Primary Members and 17 lakhs (1.7 million) Active Members on 25th November 1986, but the figures were corrected by him to 23 million Primary and 16 lakhs Active Members the very next day.[43] The General Secretaries' Reports have given the total enrolment of Primary and Active Members for the purpose of organisational elections. Recently figures were given in 1967 and 1972, the years when the organisational elections were held. 11,041,847 Primary Members and 208,954 Active Members were reported in 1967 and 9,358,747 Primary and 262,885 Active Members in 1972.[44] Since then no organisational elections have been held nor have any membership figures been given in official documents. It is understandable that a huge organisation like the Congress Party which is not computerized cannot ordinarily maintain a register of its membership unless it is necessitated by organisational elections. This raises the problem of bogus members, whose names are given on the list and whose fees are paid by a Congress member who has recruited them for the purpose of organisational elections. This problem of

bogus membership will be dealt with below.

(2) The Field Organisation

The field organisation of the Congress Party consists
of Pradesh Congress Committees (PCCs - at the state level),
District Congress Committees (DCCs) and subordinate
Committees such as Block or Constituency Congress
Committees determined by the Pradesh Congress Commiittee
concerned. Primary Members of a basic unit (previously
known as Mandal or a unit of about 2,000 population -
Article XIII) will elect its President, who "shall be an
Active Member" and on the Executive Committee. The Primary
Members are "entitled to vote in elections to the
subordinate Congress Committee" (Article VIII - a). This
in practice means that 2,000 people and 25 Primary Members
constitute a basic unit and out of the 25 Primary Members
one Active Member is elected and sent to the Block
Committee (BCC).[45] In other words, the most usual and
perhaps the easiest way to become an Active Member is to
recruit 24 Primary Members,[46] or rather to pay Rs.25 and
enlist 24 other names. Thus from Block level upwards, only
Active Members can become members. This arrangement was a
compromise arrived at in the 1960's. In order to eliminate
bogus membership, which increases tremendously at the time
of the organisational elections,[47] it was suggested that
the party should consist of only Active Members.[48] But
this would mean the abandonment of the mass basis of the

party. Therefore, at the Bombay AICC meeting in 1964 an amendment was made to the effect that a Primary Member may elect members of the Block Congress Committee (with a population of about 60,000) only, and for higher bodies only Active Members have the right to vote.[49] However, the problem of bogus membership was not solved by this amendment. On the contrary, it is still a huge problem which has long prevented the party from holding organisational elections until now. As Morris-Jones says, "To be many and yet pure is to have the cake and eat it."[50]

A DCC consists of 1) four members elected by the immediate subordinate Committees, 2) ex-Presidents of the DCC, 3) members of PCC who reside in and have been elected from the district, 5) members of the Legislature Congress, both Central and State level, from that district, 6) Leaders of the Congress Parties in local bodies such as Municipal Corporations and District Boards, and 7) members co-opted by the DCC Executive (Article IX).

A PCC consists of 1) members elected from constituencies which have about 100,000 population each, 2) ex-Presidents of the PCC, 3) Presidents of the DCCs, 4) AICC members who reside in the Pradesh, 5) members elected by the Congress Legislature Party and 6) members co-opted by the PCC Executive from special elements not adequately represented. The PCC should coordinate the activities of frontal organisations and ordinarily function through the DCCs. It is subject to the general supervision and control of the AICC, and it should submit an annual report and

audited balance sheets to the Working Committee and pay to the AICC its due share of membership fees. On the failure of a PCC to function properly, the Working Committee may suspend the existing PCC and form an ad hoc Committee to carry on Congress work in the Pradesh (Article X). The DCCs and PCCs elect from amongst their own members the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Treasurers and members of their Executive Committees. The Presidents should appoint Secretaries from the members of the Executive Committees.

In the Party Constitution, PCCs are given power to frame the local structures within the territories under their jurisdiction. Office-bearers are elected from below. The DCCs, whose activities are essential for the functions of the Congress Party, have representatives from subordinate Committees. At the bottom of the local structures the masses are entitled to vote to select their own leaders. Thus, it is designed to absorb requirements and demands from below, to implement party programmes and convey party policies down to grassroots levels.

In practice, however, the autonomy of the PCCs has been largely reduced since Indira Gandhi's time. The Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee has no constitution, but only Rules. Jagat Pal Singh, PCC General Secretary, said, "The last Rules was published in 1958, but we don't bother. It is out of print now. We follow AICC Constitution and Rules. The only thing we have is Election Rules."[51] The PCC itself which had consisted of elected members was dissolved and an ad hoc Committee with Laxmi Shankar Yadav as President was appointed by the Congress President on

20th February 1975.[52]

Moreover, the PCC President, Mahavir Prasad was brought to the Centre and made a State Minister in February 1988.[53]   Prasad had told me during an interview, "For me, the post of PCC President is more important than any other post. For, PCC President means that he covers the whole of U.P.. An MP represents only one constituency. Also an organisational post is better than a government post."[54] He said he spent only 2-3 days a month with his family, living most of his time in the State Guest House in Lucknow. "My work is more important and usuful to the people,"[55] was his explanation.

In this way, the centre interferes with party affairs in states mainly through appointing PCC Presidents and other office-bearers. As a result, the higher the echelon one reaches, the more centre-oriented one becomes. Thus, the job description of the PCC is "to implement the Government=AICC Twenty-Point Programme" and the centre-state relations become very simple: "The centre is more powerful, and it must be so. We have no difficulties in relation to the centre."[56]

(3) Organisational Elections

Although there have been no official organisational elections, some lower level Committees have held elections. Ramyash Shukla was elected President of the Karchana Block Congress Committee in 1981 and has been President since. He is an ex-officio member of the DCC which meets twice or

three times a year. According to him, the Block meets once
a month. The elected President has been making demands for
organisational elections. The demands go from BCC
President to DCC, then presumably to PCC.[57] In a similar
way the Allahabad City Congress Committee (CCC) has been
making demands for organisational elections. K. N.
Malviya, President of the Allahabad CCC said, "Organi-
sational elections are not likely to be held in the near
future. We (President and Vice-President of the CCC) asked
at the PCC, but the reason given was because there are some
unstable states like Pubjab and Assam, it is impossible to
have elections. I think it's a pity, but we can't have
elections in UP alone. The elections must be held in all
India at one time."[58] At a higher level, a PCC General
Secretary explained the reasons why organisational
elections had not been held. "Due to some technical
difficulties, elections have been delayed. In 1981/82
elections were going to be held, but due to some
difficulties like Punjab, it was not possible.
Administration is under the federal system, but the party
is not. It is impossible to hold elections only in some
states. As far as UP is concerned, everything is complete.
In 3-5 months' time, elections should take place."[59]
However, Uttar Pradesh is one of the states where bogus
membership is supposed to be phenomenal. The PCC
President's answer was, "It's for the Centre to decide. We
have been making demands."[60]

The enthusiasm for holding organisational elections
was certainly stronger at lower levels of the Congress

hierarchy. The Presidents of the BCC and CCC mentioned the elections without even being asked. The PCC General Secretary had an embarrassing smile on his face, while the PCC President did not even hide his embarrassment and shouted, "Oh... that's a good question!" All the office-bearers in the higher echelons have been appointed and the organisational elections might take their posts away.

The official explanation was given by K. N. Joshi, Organisational Secretary at AICC:

> To have organisational elections, you must have electoral rolls. We fixed the date. So those who were enroled as Active Members between 1st April, 1984 and 31st March, 1986 are entitled to vote. we made a preliminary list of members, which District Scruitiny Committees have gone through. Before the list is finalized, persons who are not satisfied can appeal to PCC, and it usually takes ten days. The Working Committee should announce that this procedure is done. We are waiting for this. After it is done, then persons who are still not satisfied can appeal to AICC,[61] which takes another ten days. So the elections will be held 3-4 weeks after the announcement."[62]

Against his expectations, however, the elections have not been held by the time of writing.

In fact, there is nothing new in this postponement of organisational elections. In 1973 the enrolment campaign was ordered. The General Secretary's letter dated 19th December 1973 fixed the last date of enrolment for the years 1973 and 1974 on 31st December 1973, and the target was set for one crore (ten million). Then in the letter

dated 29th December 1973 the last date was extended to 31st
March 1974. Again on 28th March 1974, it was further
extended to 30th June, and then the next day again till
30th September. The letter dated 17th August 1974 informed
that a further extention was granted until 31st October.
On 21st August, the PCCs were informed that organisational
elections would be held on the basis of the enrolment going
on at that time. Again on 1st November, the enrolment date
was extended to 31st December 1974. Finally it was closed,
but organisational elections were not held.[63]

Organisational elections bring about a big enrolment
drive, including a large number of bogus members. The
final result of the enrolment for the years 1973/74 cannot
be found in the official documents. "General Secretaries's
Report (July 1974 to December 1975)" simply says,
"Membership for the years 1973 and 1974 was closed on 31st
December 1974. The organisational elections on the basis
of this membership have still not been held, so far. In
the meantime all the PCCs were instructed to launch
campaigns for the enrolement of members for the years 1975
and 1976."[64] Elections were never held. Instead, PCCs
were dissolved and ad hod Committees were appointed one
after another: in 1974, Andhra on 1st January, Mizoram on
24th January, Tamil Nadu on 12th November, Dadra and Nagar
Haveli (Centrally Supervised DCC) on 26th September and
Gujarat on 12th June; and in 1975, Jammu and Kashimir on
27th September, Manipur on 17th February, Orissa on 21st
July, Tripura on 28th January and Uttar Pradesh on 20th
February.[65]

The year 1976 was characterised by a massive campaign
for the Party's Twenty-Point Programme under the National
Emegency. "Organisational elections" disappeared
altogether. The circulars from the AICC to PCCs and DCCs
stress the importance of mass mobilisation and various
cells, especially Minority Cells, Youth Congress and
Women's Cells and the urgent necessity to establish
implementation committees of the Twenty-Point Programme,
but no mention is made of organisational elections. On
21st July 1976, Permanent Secretary, K. N. Joshi sent a
letter to Presidents of all PCCs, informing them of the
party decision to distribute states among General
Secretaries of the AICC. In other words, each state was
now under the direct supervision of one of the General
Secretaries at the centre.[66]

(4) Rajiv Gandhi and his Party

When Rajiv Gandhi became Party President as well as
Prime Minister after the assassination of his mother,
Indira Gandhi, in 1984, he found the Party in an extremely
unhealthy state. In his inaugural speech at the Congress
Centenary Session in Bombay on 28th December 1985, he
described the Congressmen as follows:

    Millions of ordinary Congress workers throughout
    the country are full of enthusiasm for the Congress
    policies and programmes. But they are handicapped,
    for on their backs ride the brokers of power and
    influence, who dispense patronage to convert a mass
    movement into a feudal oligarchy. They are self-

perpetuating cliques who thrive by invoking the
slogans of caste and religion and by enmeshing the
living body of the Congress in their net of
avarice.[67]

In this lengthy speech, he criticised the corruption of his
fellow party men.

We talk of high principles and lofty ideals needed to
build a strong and prosperous India. But we obey no
discipline, no rule, follow no principle of public
morality, display no sense of social awareness, show
no concern for the public weal. Corruption is not
only tolerated but even regarded as the hallmark of
leadership....[68]

Thus Rajiv wanted to purify the party and restore the
mass movement. "The revitalisation of our organisation is
a historical necessity,"[69] he said. Not only he but many
others including scholars and journalists expected that
organisational elections would bring in fresh air to the
party. However, it did not take him long to realise that
holding elections to the party was next to impossible. A
competition of making bogus members began. Elections on
the basis of bogus membership would only get the present
office-bearers re-elected, and he would not bring about any
change. Meanwhile intra-party fighting intensified all
over the country. As in 1975, the elections were postponed
again and again.

In 1987 Rajiv asked a veteran party leader, Uma
Shankar Dixit, to go into the question of how to hold
organisational elections. Dixit made a study of the
organisation and submitted a report which has not been

published. According to reliable sources, Dixit
recommended that the Constitution of the Congress Party
should be re-written because a great deal of it had ceased
to be relevant. In addition to the abolition of wearing
Khadi and abstaining from alcoholic drinks mentioned
earlier, Dixit recommended that the membership fee should
be increased and that the election of the Party President
should be indirect.[70] However, Dixit does not believe
that his recommendation will be accepted, and that
elections are likely to be held before the next Lok Sabha
poll which is due in December 1989, simply because
elections will lead to factional fighting in the party.[71]

Despite his initial intentions, Rajiv Gandhi has not
been able to revitalise the party organisation. His
accommodative policy towards his opposition seems to have
ended with the Punjab and Assam Accords in 1985. The
Punjab Accord has not been implemented. The Punjab
Government was dissolved and the state was put under
Presidential Rule. The Congress started losing State
Assembly elections and also by-elections.

Moreover, the unprecedented number of reshuffles of
Cabinet Ministers and changes in Chief Ministers and party
leaders imposed on party men a sense of insecurity. During
his first 39 months in office, Rajiv Gandhi changed twelve
Chief Ministers, sixteen AICC General Secretaries, six PCC
Presidents and reshuffled his Cabinet 22 times affecting 60
MPs.[72]

In the meantime, Rajiv Gandhi created a new extra-
constitutional post of Vice-President of the Congress Party

and entrusted it to Arjun Singh, who was to clash with Kamrapati Tripathi, Congress Working President, another extra-constitutional post which Indira Gandhi had created. The intra-party fighting along caste lines with these two pitted against each other[73] paralysed the entire organisation. The intensifying factional fighting finally led Rajiv to say that "the Working President never worked."[74] And so, Tripathi was discharged from the post. When I interviewed him soon after that, Tripathi said he was a devoted Congressman and was prepared to dedicate all his life to the party and the country. However, during the whole interview at his residence in Delhi, he was accompanied by his secretary and was too careful to say anything about the party except the grand ideas and principles of the Congress and the great achievement of the freedom fighters.[75] His views had been expressed in the interview in the Illustrated Weekly of 25th January 1987. It was probably the last opportunity Tripathi could convey his opinions to the public. Although he has criticised the party on a few occasions since then, he has not drawn much attention. In this way, his political life practically ended in early 1987. He was a "power-broker" (his faction recruited as many as 400,000 members, most of whom it is claimed are bogus) and he might have had a reason to be punished, but the way he was pushed out of his post intimidated other members.

Those suspected of presenting a challenge to Rajiv Gandhi's leadership, whether real or imaginary, were forced to resign or were expelled from the party on charges of

"anti-party activities." The most eminent among those included Arun Nehru, Rajiv's cousin, and V. P. Singh, former Defence Minister. V. P. Singh was investigating the defence deals and foreign assets of the Bachchan brothers,[76] Rajiv's close friends. In the midst of the investigation of the defence deals, V. P. Singh was expelled from the party, arousing suspicion about the corruption of Rajiv and his coteries.[77] As a result, Rajiv Gandhi's image as "Mr. Clean" was badly tarred.

With unstable governments and party organisation both at the centre and state level caused by ever-changing personnel, factional fighting within the party and the expulsion of influential leaders from the party, uncertainty and insecurity are all growing among the Congressmen. The relationship between government and party is no longer an issue, since all the power is concentrated on one person. The government and party posts are interchangeable. The Congress leaders, whether party or government, whether at the centre or in states, look to one leader for guidance and patronage. Visiting Chief Ministers often have to wait for days before they can manage to meet the Prime Minister. The democratic procedure of the party is almost completely destroyed.[78]

2. The Functions of the Congress Party

(1) The Party Activities

Almost all attempts to revitalise the party since

India won its independence have stressed the importance of the movement aspect of the Congress Party. The question arises, therefore, as to whether the Congress has lost touch with grassroots people and social activities disappeared completely. The research in Uttar Pradesh shows that social activities still remain but mainly on an individual basis. The Congress workers at lower levels, in describing their role and activities, have given three types of activities: firstly, strictly party activities directed by the centre, secondly, semi-party activities and thirdly, social activities.

The first category includes election campaigns and recruitment of new members during the period of recruitment campaigns determined by the High Command. In Allahabad, for example, the Congress workers recruited a considerable number of new members during the recruitment campaign in May/June 1986. A. N. Mishra recruited as many as 500 Active Members, Ram Shiromani Tiwari 25 Primary Members (the rest went to Mishra's list), Basant Lal Tiwari 100 Active Members and so on.[79] Their achievement counts a great deal when the DCCs and PCCs decide on the candidates for a State Assembly election.[80] In fact, their busiest time is during the election campaign. Apart from that, they sometimes organise public meetings when an important politician comes to their area.[81] These strictly party activities are thus, in essence, power-seeking activities. To make matters worse, those Congress workers who have recruited a large number of new members for the purpose of organisational elections are constantly let down by the

constant suspensions.

The second type of job is semi-party work, which means the work is along the broad line of party policy but specific programmes are made by local party leaders. For instance, the Allahabad City Congress Committee held an anniversary ceremony for Subash Chandra Bose's birthday on 23rd January 1986, when they gave five sewing machines and 200 saries to women. Their programmes are social and educational.[82]

The third type, and probably the most important, is the redress of grievances by individual party workers. The best example is Bhagwati Singh Visharad, President of Unnao DCC and MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) from Bhagwant Nagar, U.P.. He was 66 years old (at the time of the interview in 1986) and has been an MLA for six terms since 1957. He sits at home every Sunday to meet people with problems even while the Assembly is in session. According to him, he meets 100 to 200 people every week - people come in groups - and takes a dozen applications on average each time. The applications vary, but most of them are highly personal. A few examples would be enough to show the nature of these grievances. The first one is a letter addressed to the Health Minister, U.P. government. The letter reads as follows:

Sir,
   The applicant, Buddilal, son of Shri (Mr.)
Ramprasad is a resident of Nandulan Kheda, post Bara,
district Unnao. He belongs to the Paasi Biradari
(caste) of Scheduled Caste.
   The applicant's son, Arvind Kumar aged three has

developed some ailment in the eye and has lost his
eye-sight. Doctors in Unnao and Kanpur have
recommended that he obtains treatment at Sitapur.

Therefore, you are requested to order that the
applicant's son be admitted and treated at the
Sitapur Hospital free of charge.

16th November 1986.   Yours faithfully,

                                 Buddilal, son
                                 of...

Visharad took up the application and submitted his
reccommendation on 1st December 1986 that "The application
may be considered favourably and arrangements for the eye
treatment be made," and sent it to the Health Ministry.

A second example is about an old village woman who
cannot walk and therefore cannot work. She is "starving
for want of food. Therefore you are requested to give
generous financial help for her survival." Apparently the
applicant is illiterate and her friend wrote the letter.
Visharad recommended the case promptly.[83] For Visharad,
this practice is his most important job. He said "Outside
the Legislative Assembly, we work under PCC and DCC. For me
party organistion is the most important." However, this is
not even party work, but his personal practice. The party
does not organise it systematically, and therefore, not
many party workers do it regularly except very special
people like Chief Ministers. "Younger generations are not
actively associated with the party, but they are gradually
coming closer."[84]

For Chief Ministers, it has become almost usual

practice to meet the public regularly to redress their
grievances. The Chief Minister of U. P., Bir Bahadur
Singh, meets the public every morning from Monday to
Saturday as long as he is in Lucknow. Depending on the
sources, the average number of people who come to meet the
Chief Minister differs. An officer at CM's residence said
he meets about 2,000 people and a junior secretary of CM
said 150 to 300. I witnessed about 100 people on Monday
8th December 1986. The garden of the CM's residence is so
designed as to accommodate nearly 200 people. Among the
100 people who had gathered that morning, those in the
first row were apparently from the lowest social strata
without sufficient food to eat. Their demands were purely
personal, such as supply of food, money or medical
treatment. In the second row the people were better
dressed. Most of them were in groups, with demands of a
more public concern: water supply, electricity, the setting
up of a school and so forth. The Chief Minister met all of
them and gave instructions to the officers, but he did not
have to spend hours with them since the officers had
started examining each application at eight o'clock, one
and half hours before the CM turned up.

Thus, there is an Indian style of channeling the
grassroots people's demands to the government offices,
although no data are available on how many of these demands
are met. It is conceivable that some people have to be
satisfied with the simple fact that they have met the Chief
Minister even if their demands are not fulfilled. This
practice is not confined to Congress Party workers. Now

most Chief Ministers, irrespective of the party they belong to, have to do it because it has become institutionalised, and expectations can no longer be just ignored. The Telugu Desam Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, N. T. Rama Rao, does it even more vigorously and Janata Chief Minister of Karnataka, Ramakrishna Hegde, also adheres to the practice.

Congress Party workers at lower levels also help people in the event of floods, fires and police cases. In the Badshahi Mandi Ward Congress, which covers a population of approximately 10,000, fifteen to twenty incidents occur every month. The incidents range from individual quarrels to hospital, criminal and fire cases. The President of the Ward Congress Committee, with about five party workers, helps people on such occasions in addition to his regular duties such as water supply, electricity and road repairing.[85] Similar activities are reported also at village level.

In this way, a considerable amount of social work is done by individual Congress workers. All these activities are no doubt important for the party and for a large, diverse country like India with a large proportion of the population living under the poverty line. However, the whole organisation of the Congress Party which has been institutionalised in Indian society cannot depend for its vitality on the goodwill of individuals. What is worse is that the higher of the ladder they move, the more centre-oriented the party workers become. As a result, the "system" loses touch with the grassroots.

It is in this context that attempts have been made to

revitalise the party organisation. In early days, such attempts manifested themselves as party-government confrontations. In other words, voices were raised from the organisational side against the government, the leadership ultimately lying in the latter. The need was constantly stressed in Nehru's time, and Indira Gandhi's slogan of <u>garibi hatao</u> can be also interpreted as an attempt to restore the movement aspect of the party. In doing so, however, Indira uprooted the organisational basis of the party and reduced her policy to a mere populist slogan. Orders were directed from the top downwards for the implementation of the Twenty-Point Programme," instead of new demands being channeled to the top decision-makers. <u>Political</u> demands are thus suppressed.

It is only natural, therefore, that Rajiv Gandhi's determination to revitalise the party by getting rid of the "power-brokers" should have been welcomed. However, faced with obstacles caused by the old Congress "culture" and corruption charges of his close affiliates, Rajiv Gandhi was forced to withdraw his initial intentions and rely again on the old system. Thus the Congress "system" took over. But this time the "system" no longer means the same as what Rajni Kothari once described as the Congress system. Criticism within the party is regarded as an "anti-party activity." The suspension of organisational elections is causing disillusionment and disappointment among the rank and file party workers. Inner-party democracy seems to be going through a period of decay.

(6) The Functions of the Single Dominant Party

After the independence of India, the Congress Party emerged as the single dominant party on the stage of Indian politics. It has stayed in power, or rather has held office, during the whole of the forty years of independence, except for a short period during the Janata rule. The factors which have enabled the Congress to enjoy such long term dominance can be summed up based on the opinions of both the Congress and opposition leaders.

The strength of the Congress party derives firstly from the role it played during the freedom struggle. As mentioned earlier, this was not only in terms of the achievement of India's political independence but also in terms of the institutionalisation of the Congress Party itself. The Congress had established a hierarchical structure and firm organisational bases in the process of the freedom struggle. It had also produced eminent leaders who were to become leaders of an independent India. But what is perhaps more important is its commitment to social and economic freedom. Most people, including opposition leaders, agree that the main source of the Congress Party's strength is its achievement during the freedom struggle.[86] Thus, at the time of independence, India was left with a highly institutionalised political party which enjoyed comfortable legitimacy.

The second source of strength is the symbol of one leader, from Mahatma Gandhi, through Nehru, Indira Gandhi to Rajiv Gandhi. D. P. Ray, Joint Secretary of the

Congress Party said, "The Congress has always been centred around one man, and there is nothing wrong with that. If you have a nice piece of furniture you need people to look after it. General Secretaries, Joint Secretaries, Ministers and MPs are there to look after it."[87] Ray does not seem to realise, however, that a piece of furniture, no matter how nice it may look, does not think or speak. Hegde interprets it from the opposite point of view. He claims that the strength of the Congress Party derives from a psychological blackmail which projects through the mass media that the Prime Minister is the only person who can run the country and, therefore, that the Congress is the only party which can deliver the goods.[88]

Thirdly, the Congress Party is an all-India party based on secularism. The 1984 election results were regarded as a "Hindu backlash"[89] and the Congress is said to have drawn considerable support from middle-class Hindus, especially in North India. Nevertheless, its support base is still largely confined, apart from the business classes and landowners, to the Scheduled Castes, minorities and women. These people from the lowest social strata, however, are highly vulnerable to populist slogans, such as garibi hatao before they become aware of their real political rights. Also, the middle-classes, especially the newly emerged lower middle-classes, are often alienated from mainstream politics. And yet the fact remains that they are the people who play a vital role in India's political development simply because they are the new elements of the political system. In other words, the

emergence of a new middle-class inevitably creates new
demands, since these people will no longer let themselves
be manipulated and mobilised for the purpose of somebody
who has alienated them. They have gained some economic and
social status. Their demand now is for political
participation. Thus they form a political group often
based on an ethnic or communal identity and challenge the
existing power structure. Most ethnic conflicts which
often resort to extra-constitutional means have to pay a
high price before they are accepted as political
participants. Thus, the all-India character and secularist
tendencies of the Congress have a built-in weakness vis-a-
vis accommodating the new demands of a newly emerging
class.

Fourthly, and most significantly, the strength of the
Congress Party lies in the weakness of the opposition
parties. "The opposition in this country has been divided
from the very beginning. Even today, unfortunately, it is
divided at the national level."[90] Efforts have been made
from time to time to unite the opposition parties but in
vain. Recently the Jan Morcha, started by V. P. Singh,
Arun Nehru and other people who were either expelled from
the Congress Party or resigned, have been trying to make a
united front as an alternative to the Congress at the
national level. Their strategy is to first set up a
central core comprising the centre and centre-to-left
parties, i.e. the Jan Morcha, the Janata Party, the Lok
Dal(A), and the Congress(S), then to absorb regional
parties such as Telugu Desam, then ideologically more

extreme parties such as the Communist Parties and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).[91] However, they have already faced some obstacles at the first stage and face difficulties in merging the Janata and the Lok Dal(A).[92] This is in stark contrast to the Congress Party for whom power is a cementing factor.

These sources of strength of the Congress Party in turn may be sources of its weakness. The stress on the importance of the freedom struggle also reflects its poor performance since independence and its failure in adjusting itself to meet the ever increasing demands. The charismatic leadership of one person indicates a lack of enthusiasm in others and their dependence on and subordination to one man. The "catch-all" character of the Congress reduces party politics to mere number games, and hence populism prevails. As a result, the important sectors of the society which should give stimuli and incentives to the development of the political system are not properly channeled. The weakness of the opposition parties have made the Congressmen "complacent and arrogant."[93]

A general tendency with regard to the ambivalence of these Congress characters has been that the sources of strength have turned into sources of weakness. One of the major factors in this shift is the decline of inner-party democracy in the Congress organisation. As mentioned earlier, the functioning of the single dominant party system in India owed a great deal to the coalition character of the Congress Party in terms of its relations

to the opposition parties, Centre-State relations and ideologies. However, the split in the party in 1969 killed one ideological faction, the rightist elements of the old Congressmen. The Congress Party became ideologically more monolithic, with the socialist ideology dominating the party. Under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, the Congress became increasingly intolerant of the dissidents within the party and opposition.

The centralisation of the party structure brought about another significant change in the communication flow within the party. Organisational elections were an important means of communication from the bottom upwards. Even with bogus membership, they were still an instrument to absorb public opinion, general sentiments and present the will of the partymen at lower levels to the top of the Congress hierarchy. Factionalism was to absorb not only already existing diverse interests but new elements of the society.[94] Excessive corruption or anti-democratic tendencies were to be checked and the clashing of diverse interests was to be dissolved within the party. Even the poor performance of the government received warning and criticism. It was expected, therefore, that the legitimacy of both the party and government, once lost, could be restored under the single dominant party system. This was the essence of the Congress "system." Now the whole scenario has changed: organisational elections have been suspended, all the office-bearers are appointed and criticism is regarded as anti-party activity. It has even been demanded by an opposition party that political parties

should be de-recognised if they have not held elections for years, or violated their own constitution and therefore lack internal democracy.[95] V. P. Singh says that a dichotomy has been created by the suspension of organisational elections. He says that the Congress structure has been polarised between the nominated elite and those in villages and cities, resulting in the demoralisation of Congress workers. Moreover, Rajiv Gandhi has destroyed the party institutions. V. P. Singh claims that AICC meetings or Congress Sessions are no longer important. Rajiv chooses people to discuss with, be it party or government policy.[96] Michels's "iron law of oligarchy" seems to prove its relevance here.[97]

In the meantime, people have become more articulate, which means that demands have grown phenomenally. "They no longer need guardianship. Their demand is for participation."[98] This demand, now with no proper channel through which it can be incorporated into the prevailing Congress system, is now put forward by "extra-Congress" means. It either goes to opposition parties, as demonstrated in the results of the State Assembly elections, or manifests itself in the form of extra-constitutional activities, such as violent ethnic and communal conflicts, massacres and terrorism. The Congress "system" is in crisis.

Notes

(1) Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," pp.396-398.

(2) Rajni Kothari's recent works show this tendency. For

example, "Towards Intervention," Seminar, January 1982 and "The Non-Party Political Process," Economic and Political Weekly, 4th February 1984.

(3) Ramashray Roy, "Congress: Premises and Performance," in Joshi and Hebsur, eds., op. cit., p.270. It should be added, however, that Roy himself does not think that the Congress succeeded in adapting to the new task.

(4) Encyclopaedia, vol.10, p.150.

(5) Ibid., vol.11, pp.83-112.

(6) Kothari, Politics in India, p.155.

(7) The recommendation by the Congress Working Committee to the AICC (The Resolution adopted by the AICC, New Delhi, February 21 & 22, 1948, Encyclopaedia, vol.13, p.253.)

(8) Kothari, Politics in India, p.156.

(9) Ibid., p.157.

(10) The Congress Party was seriously thinking about the nature of the constitution for the new Congress Party. A general secretary, Jugal Kishore sent a questionaire to Pradesh Congress Committees about the role and functions of the Congress Party in independent India on 16th December 1947. After a range of debates at the Working Committee, a new constitution was adopted at the Jaipur Session on 19th December 1948 (Encyclopaedia, vol.13, pp.245-246.)

(11) Ibid., vol.13, pp.242-243.

(12) Kishori Mohan Patra, "The Fist Congress Ministries: Problems and Prospects (1937-1939)," in B. N. Pande, ed., A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress, vol.3, All India Congress Committee(I), New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985, pp.146-217.

(13) The note from Shri Jawaharlal Nehru to the Congress President (18th July 1947) and the note by the the Congress President Acharya Kripalani (Date unstated, but soon after the Working Committe which took place on 19th and 20th July 1947). (A. M. Zaidi, ed., Aloud and Straight: Frank Talks at Party Meetings, New Delhi: Indian Institute of Applied Political Research, 1984, pp.192-199.)
     Nehru also complained about the disclosure of the information he had given at the Working Committee meetings and warned Kripalani that it would become impossible for him to say anything at the Working Committee meetings if the situation did not improve. (Letter from Nehru to Kripalani on 2nd May 1947, in S. Gopal, ed., Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984, vol.2, pp.614-615.

(14) Kripalani strongly criticised the government about the deteriorating relationship between the party and the

government in his Presidential Address on 15th November 1947 (Zaidi, ed., op. cit., pp.200-205.)

(15) Kochanek, The Congress Party of India, pp.11-12.

(16) Ibid., pp.27-53.

(17) W. H. Morris-Jones, "The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance," p.131.

(18) Nehru, "General Elections and the Congress," AICC, Economic Review, IX (May 1957), (Quoted from Kochanek, The Congress Party of India, p.57.)

(19) Morris-Jones, "The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance," p.116.

(20) Encyclopaedia, vol.15, pp.49-51.

(21) The Annual Report for the Year 1957, Encyclopaedia, vol.15, pp.626-627.

(22) The decisions taken by the Working Committee based on the recommendation of the Constitution Sub-Committee on 21 July 1957 (Ibid., vol.15, pp. 584-585.)

(23) The Annual Report for the Year 1958, Ibid., vol.16, pp.285-288.

(24) Ibid., vol.18, p.371.

(25) The names of the ministers whose resignations were accepted by Nehru are;
    Centre: Morarji Desai, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Jagjivan
           Ram, S. K. Patil, B. Gopala Reddy and K. L.
           Shrimali;
    States: K. Kamaraj (Madras), B. Patnaik (Orissa),
           Binodanand Jha (Bihar), Bakshi Ghulam Mohd
           (Jammu and Kashmir), C. B. Gupta (UP) and
           C. A. Mandloi (Madhya Pradesh).
(Ibid., vol.18, p.201.)

(26) Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984, vol.3, p.245.

(27) Morarji Desai, The Story of My Life, New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1974, vol.2, p.200.

(28) Ibid., p.204.

(29) All India Congress Committee, The Constitution of Indian National Congress (as amended at the Delhi Session of the AICC on July 21, 1974), September 1983.

(30) All India Congress Committee, Rules of the Indian National Congress (as in force from October 15, 1977), March 1986.

(31) In India today, hardly anybody wears Khadi any more, and these conditions have ceased to be relevant. So an octogenarian leader of the party, Uma Shankar Dixit, having gone through the Constitution recommended that these should be abolished. (A talk given by Dixit to the Saturday Lunch Group meeting in Delhi. No records of this talk are maintained, but this information was given by a member of the group who requested not to be named.)

(32) This is a new disciplinary code introduced in 1974. The Congress Active Membership had been looser and more open (Encyclopaedia, vol.23, pp.35-36).

(33) The Congressmen had fought against each other through press statements, which was strongly criticised by the Congress High Command. A Congress General Secretary, Chandrajit Yadav "warned on behalf of the Congress High Command that factional and unprincipled moves within the Party would not be tolerated." ("General Secretaries' Report, June 1972-August 1973," Encyclopaedia, vol.22, p.623.)

(34) All India Congress Committee, A New Training Programme: Aims, Objectives, Activities, New Delhi: Department of Political Training, Indian National Congress, January 1986.

(35) In an interview with Moid Ahmad, MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) and Joint Secretary of PCC on 7th December 1986 at the PCC office in Lucknow.

(36) In an interview with D. P. Ray, on 21st November 1986 at the AICC office, New Delhi.

(37) In an interview with Raoof Valiullah.

(38) It should be noted that Allahabad is a special area for the Congress. Nehru, Shastri, Indira Gandhi were all from Allahabad and it can be easily imagined that the Congress Party is much more active in Allahabad than in rest of the country. Therefore, the data should be interpreted within this limitation.

(39) In interviews with local Congress leaders in Karchana Constituency on 3rd December 1986.

(40) In interviews with the office-bearers of Allahabad CCC on 2nd December 1986 at the CCC office. The figures were given by the President of Badshahi Mandi Ward Congress Committee, Basant Lal Azad.

(41) U.P. politics has always been characterised by factional politics based on caste (Paul R. Brass, Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, in two volumes.) Recently caste rivalries have intensified in the competition to recruit bogus members. In Varanasi, the home town of the former Working President, Kamrapati

Tripathi, 700,000 members were registered by two rival
factions, 400,000 by one and 300,000 by the other (The
Statesman, 21st January 1987).

(42) In an interview with Jagat Pal Sigh on 6th December
1986 at the PCC office in Lucknow.

(43) In an interview with K. N. Joshi at his residence in
Delhi. The correction was made by telephone.

(44) Encyclopaedia, vol.19, p.611 and vol.22, p.645.

(45) Neither The Constitution nor The Rules mentions "25
Primary Members," but Joshi confirmed this at the
interview.

(46) (Prof.) A. N. Mishra of the Allahabad Agricultural
Institute became a Primary Member in 1966 and immediately
enroled another 24 members and became an Active Member.
For one reason or another the two year Primary Membership
rule was not applied (In an interview on 3rd December
1986).

(47) The Congress Party itself officially admits this. The
"Annual Report for the Year 1960" states "Election year is
the time when there is a big drive for membership. As the
last organisational elections were held on the basis of the
membership list of 1958, the membership of the year 1959
was not as high as that of the year 1958." (Encyclopaedia,
vol.17, pp.228-229.)

(48) S. K. Patil's suggestion at the Subjects Committee
Meetings, Bhubaneshwar, 6th January 1964. (Ibid., vol.18,
pp.407-408.)

(49) Resolutions adopted by the AICC, Bombay, May 15-17,
1964. (Ibid., vol.18, p.529.)

(50) Morris-Jones, "The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of
Dominance," p.128.

(51) In the interview with Jagat Pal Singh.

(52) "General Secretaries' Report (July, 1974 to December,
1975)," Encyclopaedia, vol.23, p.582.

(53) Rajiv Gandhi made this decision as part of his
favourite habitual reshuffle of not only ministers but also
change of party posts.

(54) In an interview at the PCC office in Lucknow on 7th
December 1986.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Ibid.

(57) In an interview with Ramyash Shukla at the Allahabad City Congress Committee office on 2nd December 1986.

(58) In an interview with K. N. Malviya at the Allahabad City Congress Committee office on 2nd December 1986.

(59) In the interview with Jagat Pal Singh on 6th December 1986.

(60) In the interview with Mahavir Prasad, PCC President, on 7th December 1986.

(61) The Party Constitution states that "The Executive of the District Congress Committees and Pradesh Congress Committees shall arrange for periodical scrutiny and disposal of complaints regarding the enrolment of active members ..., but when complaints of a grave nature are reported to the Working Committee, it may enquire into such complaints and take such action as may be deemed necessary (Article XXII).

(62) In the interview with K. N. Joshi on 25th November 1986.

(63) Circular letters issued from the AICC office, All India Congress Committee, Congress Marches Ahead, vol.9 (September, 1973-June, 1974), pp.183-189 and vol.10 (July, 1974-May, 1975), pp.316-335.

(64) Encyclopaedia, vol.22, p.580.

(65) "General Secretaries Report (September, 1973 to June, 1974)" and "General Secretaries Report (July, 1974 to December, 1975)," Encyclopaedia, vol.23, pp.538-539 and pp.581-583.

(66) AICC circulars in 1976 (Encyclopaedia, vol.24, pp.173-208).

(67) Rajiv Gandhi, Inaugural Speech by Congress President Shri Rajiv Gandhi and the Centenary Resolve, (Congress Centenary Session, Bombay, December 28, 1985), New Delhi: AICC(I), p.13.

(68) Ibid., p.14.

(69) Ibid., p.14.

(70) According to the present Party Constitution, the President of the Congress Party is the President of the AICC, who is elected directly by all the delegates to the Plenary Session. All the members of the PCCs are delegates (Articles XI and XVIII).

(71) See note (31).

(72) India Today, 29th February 1988.

(73) Tripathi's interview, <u>Illustrated Weekly of India</u>, 25th January 1987, pp.10-17.

(74) <u>Statesman</u>, 21st January 1987.

(75) In an interview with Kamrapati Tripathi at his residence on 26th March 1987.

(76) Amitab Bachchan from Allahabad was a film-star, but was elected an MP in the 1984 general elections. His brother Ajitab was suspected of buying property in Switzerland in violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulations and the brothers are suspected of corruption.

(77) V. P. Singh's interview, <u>India Today</u>, 15th August 1987.

(78) I. K. Gujral, "Prime Minister's Office: Emergence of a Power Centre", <u>The Hindustan Times</u>, 14th August 1987.

(79) In interviews with A. N. Mishra, Basant Lal Tiwari and Ram Shiromani Tiwari on 3rd December 1986 in Karchana Block, Uttar Pradesh.

(80) Mishra in fact wants a party ticket for the State Assembly election. That is the main reason why Tiwari's recruitment was registered as Mishra's.

(81) Krishna Dutta Shukla, Congress worker in Karchana Block, said, "At election time, it's a full-time job. But otherwise there is not much work. I sometimes advertise party programmes and hold public meetings. When Rajiv Gandhi came, the meeting was attended by one lakh (100,000) people." (In an interview on 3rd December 1986.)

(82) In interviews with office-bearers of Allahabad CCC on 2nd December 1986.

(83) The copies of these applications were given by Visharad himself. The original letters were in Hindi and were translated by Pradeep Bhargava, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.

(84) In an interview with Bhagwati Singh Visharad on 6th December 1986 at the PCC office in Lucknow.

(85) In an interview with Basant Lal Azad, President of the Badshahi Ward Congress Committee,

(86) Even Ramakrishna Hegde, Karnataka Chief Minister of the Janata Party admits this, but he also claims that "the present Congress is not that Congress." (In the interview in his car from the Parliament Annexe to the Airport on 29th March 1987.)

(87) In the interview with Ray.

(88) In the interview with Hegde.

(89) J. D. Sethi, "Hindu Backlash," Indian Express, 4th
January 1985.

(90) In the interview with Hegde.

(91) Since the time of writing these Indian chapters, the
centrist parties have merged into the Janata Dal with V. P.
Singh as the President, National Front has been formed with
regional parties such as Telugu Desam, and finally a
coalition government has been formed with the cooperation
of the BJP and Communist Parties from outside. What V. P.
Singh was planning in early 1988 has materialised though
the process has been plagued by factional conflicts.

(92) In an interview with V. P. Singh in the car from his
residence to the Airport and in the VIP room at the Airport
in Delhi on 29th February 1988.

(93) Raoof Viliullah, a Congress MP, in the interview.

(94) Non-existence of factions is one of the criticisms of
the Congress Party by V. P. Singh (in the interview).

(95) The demand was made by Krishan Lal Sharma, General
Secretary of BJP, on 7th April 1988 (The Statesman, 8th
April 1988).

(96) In the interview with V. P. singh.

(97) Michels, op. cit..

(98) Nirmal Mukerji, "Loosening of the Steel Frame," The
Hindustan Times, 13th August 1987.

PART THREE: THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

Chapter 6: Post-War Political Reforms and the Emergence of
a Competitive Party System

1. The Constitutional Revision

On 15th August 1945, Japan was defeated militarily,
economically and psychologically. Despite some anxieties,
no resistance was reported against the Emperor's decision
on Japan's unconditional surrender bar the small number of
civilians and military personnel who committed suicide. It
was literally an unconditional, total surrender. The only
concern on the part of the Japanese decision-makers was not
the future of the people but whether Japan would be allowed
to "preserve the structure of the imperial state (Kokutai
Goji)." But even that was left at the mercy of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Japan had to begin
reconstruction of state and nation from ashes and ruin.
Thus, whereas there was a considerable amount of continuity
in the history of India before and after independence,
Japanese history experienced a complete change after defeat
in the Second World War, even though some prewar elements
were revived after the Occupation period ended.

In the political field also, there was more change
than continuity. Many Japanese scholars argue that there
is more continuity than change, attacking the conservative
and "reactionary" attitude of the Liberal Democratic
Party.[1] In terms of political development, however,
especially that of the constitutional framework, there was

certainly a great leap forward soon after the war ended.
Japan today is not prewar Japan. Militarism has been
forced out, at least in principle, the imperial sovereignty
has been largely reduced and the rights of the people -
above all freedom of speech - are now guaranteed by
constitutional provisions.

This drastic change of the constitutional framework,
however, from the Constitution of the Empire of Japan
(1889) to the Constitution of Japan (1947) was not brought
about by the Japanese themselves. The scope of change
imposed by SCAP was far beyond the imagination of Japanese
decision-makers. The final drafting of the Constitution
was executed by General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers, and his staff. This is
not to say, however, that no attempts were made on the
Japanese side to revise the Constitution. Ayamaro Konoe,
Deputy-Premier in the Higashikuni Cabinet, and Joji
Matsumoto, a prominent jurist and Cabinet Minister in the
Shidehara Government, submitted their own drafts to SCAP,
but these were either ignored or rejected.

Konoe's case was rather complicated, messy and tragic.
On 4th October 1945, Konoe visited General MacArthur and
had a long talk. During the meeting, MacArthur told Konoe
that first the Constitution should be revised and secondly
the Diet was too reactionary and therefore the Election Law
should be reformed. Konoe expressed his willingness to
serve the state if need be. MacArthur then suggested that
Konoe, who was young, cosmopolitan and well-acquainted with
world affairs, make suggestions for constitutional reform.

It is still not certain whether MacArthur made this
suggestion specifically to Konoe[2] but, in any case, Konoe
was desperate to escape charges of war responsibility and
therefore wanted to show that he could still contribute to
the state-building of postwar Japan and interpreted that he
had been chosen by MacArthur. On 8th October Konoe and his
staff members met Dean Acheson, U.S. Assistant Under-
Secretary of State, who gave his personal, informal
comments on constitutional revision.[3]

On 11th October, Konoe received from the Emperor a
commission to have the Office of the Lord Keeper of the
Privy Seal to investigate the need for constitutional
revision.[4] It was only then that protest came from the
Shidehara Cabinet, who insisted that constitutional
revision was a matter of state and therefore should be
handled by the Cabinet and not by the Office of the Lord
Keeper of the Privy Seal. After that the two groups
carried out the task of constitutional drafting separately;
one group led by Konoe within the Office of the Lord Keeper
of the Privy Seal and the other, the Cabinet Committee
headed by Joji Matsumoto. Prime Minister Kijurou Shidehara
did not at first recognise the need for any constitutional
revision but was forced by his Cabinet members to appoint
this committee.[5]

On 23rd October, <u>Asahi Shinbun</u> carried an article
about Konoe's opinions on constitutional revision, where he
mentioned the abdication of the Emperor. This aroused
strong criticism among Japanese leaders. Kouichi Kido,
Lord Keeper of the Privy Council, no longer wanted Konoe to

handle the details of the constitutional revision, a task
which he thought should be handed over to the Cabinet
Committee,[6] and Shidehara and Matsumoto urged Konoe to
withdraw the problematic expressions.[7] In the meantime,
his involvement in the task of constitutional revision was
being criticised in the United States because of his
alleged war responsibility. On 1st November, the SCAP
Headquarters issued a statement denying its sponsorship of
Konoe's efforts.[8] But Konoe still continued and three
weeks later submitted a report carrying his recommendations
to the throne. This report was not formally published and
had no direct influence on subsequent constitutional
drafts.[9] It was completely ignored. In the early
morning of 16th December, the day he was due to be
imprisoned by the Allies as a suspected war criminal, Konoe
committed suicide.

While Konoe's efforts were rejected by SCAP, MacArthur
directly intervened in the Cabinet Committee (the Matsumoto
Committee) drafting. On 7th January 1946, the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee in Washington responsible for
American Occupation policy adopted a policy on "Reform of
the Japanese Governmental System (SWNCC-228)," which was
sent to the SCAP Headquarters on 11th January. The policy
made it clear that any constitutional revision should
ensure that the executive branch would not be responsible
to the Emperor, and that the military branch would be under
civilian control. The question of the preservation of the
Emperor was left open, but even in the case that the throne
would be retained, it was stipulated that the Emperor

should be permitted to act only on the advice of the Cabinet, which would be responsible to the Legislature. It also emphasised that the policy should not be imposed as an order since it would lessen its legitimacy and consequently discourage the Japanese people from maintaining it in the future.[10]

SCAP started playing an active role in guiding the Japanese Government on this matter in late January. An important factor of this change in SCAP's attitude is its relation to the Far Eastern Commission (FEC). The latter was a body formed by the Allied powers to decide Occupation policy. The FEC had shown keen interest in the Japanese constitutional revision and was to take up its work in late February. MacArthur, knowing that once the FEC began its work, his freedom would be greatly limited, directed his Government Section (GS) to draft a model constitution to guide the Shidehara Cabinet. On 3rd February MacArthur gave instructions to the Government Section of SCAP that the draft would have to be completed by 12th February and that it should be based on three principles: 1) that the Emperor should be head of state but his power exercised only within the the principle of popular sovereignty, 2) that war should be renounced and 3) that the Japanese feudal system should be terminated.[11]

The objective of MacArthur's policy was to force the Japanese Government to draft a constitution along what SCAP considered to be democratic lines. Matsumoto's statement in the Diet on 28th December 1945 and one of his constitutional drafts leaked by Mainichi Shinbun on 1st

February 1946 had failed to satisfy MacArthur. It was
therefore clear by then that the ideas of the Matsumoto
Commission fell far short of SWNCC requirements. And time
was limited. They had to submit a clear guideline to the
the Shidehara Cabinet on 13th February, when they were
scheduled to meet. The draft prepared by the Government
Section was presented to the Japanese Cabinet with comments
that the Japanese acceptance of its basic principles would
make it easier for MacArthur to save the Emperor from trial
as a war criminal and that it would also allow Japan to
become independent earlier.[12] The Japanese Government
had no choice but to accept it. After further high-level
negotiations and an overnight joint session of translating,
negotiating and drafting between the Government Section and
Japanese officials, a Japanese draft Constitution based on
the model presented by SCAP was completed. Although it was
far different from the previous Matsumoto proposals, the
Shidehara Government announced it on 6th March as its own
creation, to which MacArthur expressed his wholehearted
support. After deliberations at the Privy Council and the
Imperial Diet, the Constitution of Japan was finally
promulgated by the Emperor on 3rd November 1946 and became
effective on 3rd May 1947.

There were three major changes made to the Meiji
Constitution: 1) the role of the Emperor was made as the
symbol of the state, 2) the sovereignty was given to the
people and democratic government established and 3) the
nation had to renounce war. None of these changes had been
proposed by the Japanese Government and MacArthur said that

the renunciation of war had been Shidehara's idea, expressed at their meeting on 24th January,[13] which Shidehara himself did not deny.[14] Masumi expresses some doubt about this: "Shidehara," he said "must have been surprised to read MacArthur's draft." It was only after March that Shidehara started talking about the renunciation of war being "my idea."[15] After the war, almost all the Japanese decision-makers believed that the throne should be preserved at any cost, and it was only for that purpose that the Japanese Government could be persuaded to accept the renunciation of war. And for that very reason Japanese opinion over the continuation of Article IX was divided after Japan regained its independence in 1952. In this way, the most drastic political change experienced by Japan since the Meiji Restoration was imposed by foreign powers.

2. The Political System of 1955

(1) The Re-emergence of Political Parties

As soon as the war ended, prewar political leaders on both the right and the left began to quickly re-establish political parties. The Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyousantou) was the first one to be reinstated, in October 1945, by those leaders who had been released from prison, released not by the people, not by workers, but by order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Next to emerge, in November, was the Japan Socialist Party (JSP - Nihon Shakaitou) headed by Tetsu Katayama. This was a

coalition of prewar non-communist proletarian groups with different ideological orientations, the leadership being with the right faction. The conservatives were absorbed into two parties, the Japan Liberal Party (Nihon Jiyutou) and the Japan Progressive Party (Nihon Shinpotou). The former was headed by Ichirou Hatoyama and consisted mainly of prewar politicians who had not been active collaborators with the military rule during the war. On the other hand, the latter contained a large number of members of the Imperial Diet elected in 1942 with the support of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai). The first and most important objective of these two conservative parties was to preserve the structure of the imperial state. They believed they still had an important role to play in reconstructing party politics in postwar Japan.[16]

However, before the first postwar general elections, (first scheduled for January 1946 but postponed until April by SCAP), SCAP ordered the removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office. This caused a critical damage to the Progressive Party. Only fourteen members survived out of the 274 registered at the time of the establishment of the party. Of the remaining fourteen, twelve were elected but two more were purged after the elections. The Liberal Party also suffered, though to a lesser degree, losing 30 out of 43 but again after the elections the top leaders, including Hatoyama, Party President, Ichirou Kouno, Secretary-General, and Takekichi Miki, Chairman of the Executive Council, were disqualified.

In a desperate effort to save the party, Shigeru Yoshida, Foreign Minister in the Shidehara Cabinet was brought in to fill the vacated top post. Even the Socialist Party could not escape the purge. It lost ten out of 17. The only party which benefited from this Occupation policy was the Communist Party, most members of which had been either in prison or out of the country during the war. The Communist Party perceived SCAP as a "liberation force." Sanzou Nosaka who had just returned from China declared that the Communist Party should become a "lovable party" and proceed along a parliamentary road to power.[17] The party system in Japan was undergoing a process of rapid and major transition.

(2) Land Reform

A major objective of early Occupation policy was the demilitarisation of Japan. For that purpose, the democratisation of Japan was considered of utmost importance. The main product of this "progressive policy" was the establishment of the Constitution of Japan, which was followed by radical reforms in four major fields, i.e. peasantry, labour, bureaucracy and business. Landlords, high-ranking bureaucrats, and zaibatsu (business combines usually based on family ties) were considered to have been collaborators of the military and therefore had to be eliminated. As illustrated by the process of of the constitutional revision, the Japanese Government was reluctant to take reformist measures. It was the

Occupation forces, therefore, that played an active role in restructuring the postwar system of Japan. From 1948, however, Occupation policy began a "reverse course," a radical shift from reformist policies to conservative policies, the object of the latter being to avoid a possible communist takeover. The biggest influence in this shift was of course the Cold War.

In the agricultural field, land reform was the most urgent problem. The necessity for land reform had been felt by the Japanese even before the war and was accelerated by terrible food shortage during the war. Some moderate measures had been taken before and during the war, but it was not until SCAP intervened that any drastic reform was carried out. Having rejected the first proposal prepared by the Japanese Government, SCAP forced the Yoshida Cabinet to adopt their own radical plan,[18] which passed the Diet on 21st October 1946 and became law in the form of the Land Reforms of 1946. This second land reform act effected a basic and far-reaching change in the structure of agricultural areas. It permitted the government to buy the land of absentee landlords, and resident farmers to own limited amounts of land, ranging from 1.8 to 12 hectares depending on the region of the country, and to lease out an additional 0.5 to 4 hectares to tenants, under strict rent control and tenants' rights legislation.

By the end of 1948 the transfer of land was almost completed. The percentage of land cultivated by tenants decreased from 46.3 percent to 11.7 percent through this

reform period. Although no further steps were taken, the land reform policy was never reversed, unlike other policies such as the Labour Laws and dissolution of zaibatsu. In this way, the Occupation policy had uprooted feudal landlordism within a very short period after the war.

What should be noted is that land reforms were implemented before demands manifested themselves as active peasant movements. Peasant movements in postwar Japan followed the reforms. The Japan Farmers' Union (Nihon Noumin Kumiai, commonly called Nichinou) was established in February 1946 by leaders of prewar peasant movements. A considerable number of its members joined the Socialist Party and some the Communist Party. Interestingly enough, the movement gained momentum in response to government policy on land reform. Membership increased from some 100,000 at the time of its foundation to over two million by 1947. However, as the land reforms were implemented the movement lost its purpose and had "fallen asleep" by the end of 1947. With land reform accomplished, the union could not hold itself together. Two factions led by the Socialist Party and the Communist Party respectively held separate conventions in 1949. In this way, the land reforms promoted the activization of peasant movements and the growth of the Farmers' Union, but the successful execution of the reforms in turn led the movements into a period of decay.[19]

In the meantime, agricultural production grew remarkablly with large assistance from the government. The

Staple Food Control Act by which the government established

price support programmes, particularly for rice, and the

introduction of public enterprises such as irrigation and

the readjustment of arable land all helped raise

productivity. The Farmers' Cooperatives (Nihon Nougyou

Kumiai = Noukyou) was formed in 1947 with strong backing

from SCAP. They dealt not only with the purchase of

fertilisers and agricultural machines and the marketing of

their products but also finance. All these factors

combined produced new, and yet traditional and conservative

communities in the rural areas. A sense of harmony was

generated in the villages and the tradition of bloc voting

for conservative candidates began. New political leaders

emerged who, unlike traditional landlords who depended for

their support on their own ascription and family heritage,

derived their power from the posts they had captured in

organisations such as cooperatives.

The Occupation policy thus achieved its initial

objective of destroying the traditional landlord class.

But even when the objective changed from the

demilitarisation of Japan to economic rehabilitation, SCAP

had little to change since the radical land reform served

both purposes.

(3) The Dissolution of the Zaibatsu

The situation was different with regard to the

zaibatsu, or business combines. It began to be realised

that the dissolution of the zaibatsu which SCAP had forced

so enthusiastically would delay Japan's economic recovery and that the delay might make Japan more vulnerable to a socialist revolution. This policy, therefore, underwent a drastic change.

The zaibatsu had grown steadily since the Meiji Restoration and especially during the war. By the end of the Second World War, the "big four" i.e. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda, had increased their share of Japan's total capital to as much as one quarter. They grew as conglomerates and each zaibatsu, belonging to a particular family group, controlled a wide range of industrial, commercial and financial sectors of the economy. It was widely recognised that they had contributed to Japanese militarism during the war, no matter how reluctant they had been. Zaibatsu dissolution, therefore, at first was considered vital to the democratisation of the Japanese economy.[20]

The four major companies were dissolved in 1947. In the case of Mitsubishi Corporation, it was not two weeks before the SCAP order actually came that the top execusive started thinking "SCAP might make a decision to dissolve the zaibatsu." They had been having business with SCAP and their efficient service was fully appreciated by SCAP. Therefore, they had been convinced that the dissolution of zaibatsu would also affect SCAP badly.[21] Nevertheless the order came. Accordingly, the holding companies were broken up into hundreds of small companies. The Mitsubishi Corporation ceased to exist. The employees of Mitsubishi Corporation, having lost their job, started new,

small companies, with the capital of ¥195,000.[22] SCAP

had imposed strict regulations about the reconstruction of

the firm or even the establishment of a new firm: zaibatsu

family members were prohibited from employment; not more

than two managers could work for one company; not more than

100 people from the Mitsubishi could be employed by one

company.[23] Along with the zaibatsu dissolution, the

Anti-Monopoly Law and the Elimination of Excessive

Concentration of Power were introduced in 1947.

Occupation policy, however, underwent a drastic change

in 1948 as Japan's economic rehabilitation became their

primary concern. The Deconcentration Review Board loosened

the definition of "excessive concentration," and the

deconcentration policy had been practically terminated by

1949. The economic purge was also rescinded in 1951.

Dissolved zaibatsu were again brought back to life and

innumerable zaibatsu subsidiary companies were

reintegrated. Mitsubishi Corporation was re-established

out of 139 subsidiaries in 1954 and some 200 Mitsui

subsidiary companies were integrated into two in 1955 and

finally Mitsui & Company was established in 1959.

There was not, however, a total revival of the

zaibatsu. Firstly, the released zaibatsu owners and top

executives were not able to resume their previous posts;

the management had been handed over to younger experts,

although "the zaitatsu owners were still widely

respected."[24] This makes an interesting contrast to the

political world where prewar politicians, e.g. Hatoyama,

Shinsuke Kishi and Mamoru Shigemitsu, were able to firmly

re-establish predominant positions over those who had assumed office in their absence. Secondly, there was no family dominance of holding companies. Ownership was fragmented, and ownership and management were separated. In the new companies, even presidents were "employed presidents." Thirdly, in the process of mergers through severe competitions among small companies, only efficient people suvived and got promoted. Thus the new companies had acquired modern management, "which would have occurred anyway, but was made easier because of the dis-solution."[25] Fourthly, six big business complexes were formed around the six major banks. Fifthly, the ties and communications among companies belonging to the same group were strengthened. Although there was a lot of competition and rivalry within the same groupings in the earlier days, at a later stage presidents of companies belonging to the same groupings started having regular meetings, e.g. the Monday Meetings of the Mitsui group and the Friday Meetings of Mitsubishi.

The zaibatsu thus lost the original character, and the term zaibatsu was gradually replaced by zaikai (business circle), the latter usually refering to leading businessmen who represent the business community as a whole. This change in terminology reflected a new tendency in the business community. Big enterprises and business complexes were loosely organised into four main business associations, i.e. the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keizai Dantai Rengoukai, commonly called Keidanren), the Japan Federation of Employers' Association (Nihon Keieisha

Dantai Renmei = Nikkeiren), the Japan Committee for
Economic Development (Keizai Douyukai) and the Japan
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nihon Shoukou Kaigisho =
Nisshou). Keidanren has been playing the most important
role not only in terms of business and management but also
in a political sphere. For instance, when the Ashida
Cabinet was formed in 1948, Keidanren issued a statement
demanding that political parties avoid excessive power
struggling which would lead to destabilisation of the
political situation or create a political vacuum.[26] They
also expressed their opinions on the terms and conditions
of the peace treaty to John Foster Dulles, U.S. Special
Envoy.[27] The zaikai resented the unstable political
situation and was critical of the divided and fragmented
political parties steeped in mutual and often personal
antagonism. What the business community required was a
stable, strong and united conservative party which could
run the country.

(4) The Bureaucracy

The Japanese bureaucracy was also considered to have
had some responsibility for Japanese militarism before and
during the war. The centralised administrative machinery
was directly involved in the war-time National
Mobilisation. The initial Occupation policy to democratise
the bureaucracy, therefore, was directed towards
decentralising this powerful machine. Again, it was SCAP
who took the initiative, as the Japanese Government was

slow and negative in its response to SCAP's directive to
work out this process. SCAP's decentralisation policy had
two focal points - the dissolution of the Home Ministry and
the public election of prefectural governors, designed to
give more autonomy to local governments and to weaken the
centralised bureaucracy.

To what extent this policy was effective is a matter
of debate. Kiyoaki Tsuji argues that it made only a small
contribution to the democratisation of the bureaucracy, and
therefore of Japan, since he considers that Japan was still
by and large dominated by the old bureaucrats ten years
after its defeat.[28] He gives three reasons for the lack
of success of this reform: 1) SCAP adopted an indirect rule
and for that purpose the bureaucracy was of use to them; 2)
there was an illusion among the people about the neutrality
of the bureaucracy; and 3) political parties lacked
administrative ability.[29]

The bureaucracy as a whole, however, was never
weakened as a new group of bureaucrats emerged with strong
backing from SCAP - an "economic bureaucracy." As the
Occupation policy underwent the fundamental change from the
democratisation of Japan to economic rehabilitation, new
importance was attached to the economic bureaucracy. The
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Tsusanshou)
was created as part of the Dodge Plan in 1949.[30] Its
function was to promote rapid economic growth through the
private sector. It was responsible for introducing new
technology and heavy industry into Japan and the regulation
of exports and imports. Rapid economic rehabilitation also

required economic planning. The Economic Stabilisation Board was established on the order of SCAP in 1946 to supervise and coordinate the activities of various economic ministries. With the end of the Occupation, this was replaced by the Economic Deliberation Agency, a purely advisory body, later renamed the Economic Planning Agency. Although it met with opposition from ministries and Prime Minister Yoshida who opposed any economic planning for ideological reasons, it was strengthened after 1955 under Prime Minister Hatoyama.

The economic bureaucracy enhanced its influence in the vacuum created by the elimination of the military bureaucracy, the abolition of the Home Ministry and the dissolution of the zaibatsu. The successful economic rehabilitation and the rapid economic growth of the 1950's, taking off with the Korean War, and the phenomenal growth in the 1960's further strengthened the position of the economic bureaucracy.[31]

The importance of the bureaucracy, and the economic bureaucracy in particular, was not confined to the economic field. The bureaucracy provided the ruling party with important human resources. Some top bureaucrats were starting to look for an opportunity to become members of the National Diet. They had the advantages of expertise, experience, career status and personal connections. As many as 25 percent of the Diet Members belonging to conservative parties in the 1950's had previously been bureaucrats.[32] The conservative parties strengthened their power with the absorption of these talents. These

bureaucrat-turned politicians have occupied important
cabinet posts in the successive LDP governments. Some
retired bureaucrats have also been appointed to responsible
positions in private firms, a phenomenon commonly known as
amakudari. These flows of personnel served to bind
together the three important communities, i.e. the
bureaucracy, the zaikai and the conservative parties,
reinforcing the strength to the conservative government, a
phenomenon often called "Japan Incorporated."

(5) Labour

   Labour reform was an important part of the overall
democratisation of Japan's social, political and economic
structure under the Occupation. There, the Japanese
Government did not delay in the enactment of Labour Laws,
which passed the Diet in December 1945 and were enforced in
March the following year. The Labour Laws guaranteed three
fundamental rights to all workers: the right to organise
labour unions, the right to engage in collective bargaining
and the right to strike. Just as peasant movements
followed the land reforms, the labour union movement was
given momentum by this legislation. As Table 5 shows, both
the number of unions and union membership increased
dramatically within a few years.
   Among the huge number of labour unions, two competing
national labour federations emerged, the Japan
Confederation of Labour(Soudoumei) and the Congress of
Industrial Labour Unions (Sanbetsu). The former was a

Table 5: The Number of Unions and Membership Figures
(1945-50)

Year	No. of Unions	Total Union Membership
1945 (June)	0	0
(Dec.)	707	378,481
1946 (June)	11,579	3,748,952
(Dec.)	17,265	4,849,329
1947 (June)	23,323	5,692,179
(Dec.)	28,014	6,268,432
1948	33,926	6,677,427
1949	34,688	6,655,483
1950	29,144	5,773,908

Source: Nihon Tokei Nenkan (Japan Statistical Yearbook),
1954, 1955-56, quoted from Masumi, op.cit.
Appendixes, p.19.

revived version of the same federation that had existed in
the prewar period led by moderate socialists like Komakichi
Matsuoka and Suehiro Nishio. Its first convention was held
in August 1946 and consisted of some 2,600 company-based
unions with a total 860,000 membership. This moderate
federation, however, never received active support of SCAP
and therefore did not fit into the mainstream of the labour
movement immediately after the war. Sanbetsu was a much
more radical organisation led by communists and left-wing
socialists. Also formed in August 1946 with 21 industrial
unions embracing some 1,570,000 workers, it benefited from
the unstable socio-economic situation and the full support
of SCAP. It managed to strengthen its organisational bases
up to 1947. Then, however, an ever-radicalizing labour
movement began to pose a threat to SCAP and Japanese

conservative leaders, and a general strike which had been
scheduled for 1st February 1947 was banned the night before
by General MacArthur. Fragmentation resulted.[33]

The reaction of SCAP to the "2.1 General Strike" was
to modify labour union rights. It prohibited general
strikes and most importantly excluded government workers
from the rights guaranteed by the Labour Laws. It placed
an explicit ban on the right of public employees to strike
and to engage in collective bargaining. Attempts were made
to unite the two federations by excluding the radical left-
wing leadership of the Sanbetsu and the right-wing of the
Socialist Party. The right-wing elements of the Soudoumei,
however, sought a way to form a united front in alliance
with the right-wing of the Socialist Party. A united front
seemed a far-off goal. The labour forces were divided.[34]

Meanwhile, a large number of unions, embracing more
than half of the total union membership, remained neutral
and would not affiliate with either of the two federations.
These were new unions led by postwar leaders who feared
being dominated by ideology. They were the ideal targets
for SCAP, which was trying to form an alternative labour
front to be sent to the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) due to be established as a cold war
counter-weight to the communist-dominated World Federation
of Trade Unions (WFTU). Under pressure from SCAP, Souhyou
(the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) was finally
formed in July 1950.[35] Soudoumei split and the left-wing
joined Souhyou, the right-wing remaining with a membership
of some 310,000. Sanbetsu also split but neither factions

joined Souhyou, and the splinter group formed Shinsanbetsu
(New Sanbetsu).

SCAP, however, which had given Souhyou its blessing
and full support at the outset, was soon to be
disillusioned as Souhyou rapidly moved towards the left.
One of the main factors of this shift was the Korean War,
in which Souhyou opposed United Nations military action,
adopting a position of neutrality.[36] Souhyou, which had
started as a strictly labour, and therefore non-political
organisation, had rapidly turned into an anti-American
political body. It opposed the idea of a separate US-Japan
Peace Treaty. It decided finally not to join the ICFTU as
an organisation. At the second convention held in March
1951, it adopted "Four Principles of Peace" i.e. an all-out
peace treaty, positive neutrality, opposition to any
military bases in Japan and opposition to Japanese
rearmament. SCAP's policy to form a "democratic" labour
front as a counter-weight to both fascism and communism in
the cold war world situation was full of contradictions in
the Japanese context. Souhyou's policy was more radical
than that of the Socialist Party, and the former's pressure
on the latter led to a split of the party in 1951,
resulting in closer ties developing between the left-wing
Socialist Party and Souhyou, or rather the subordination of
the former to the latter.

Before a close relationship between the Socialist
Party and Souhyou was established, the Socialist Party had
not been able to mobilise any organisational votes for
elections, although it managed to capture a considerable

amount of votes and seats.[37] For the first time in its

history, the Socialist Party, whose organisational basis

was rather weak, was now able to rely for its votes and

political funds on a huge organisation. Souhyou also

functioned as a recruitment base. Union leaders with a

Socialist Party endorsement won elections.[38]

These close ties between a huge union federation and a

socialist party inevitably changed the nature of the latter

and consequently of the party system as a whole to a

considerable degree. The dependence of the Socialist Party

on Souhyou meant a loss of autonomy and flexibility. A

coalition with a conservative party which materialised

under the Katayama and Ashida Governments from 1947 to 1948

was no longer an alternative for the Socialist Party. The

alliance with Souhyou may have been a comfortable one for

the Socialist Party, because it was now assured of a vast

number of solid votes but the JSP may not have realised

that the alliance had forced the Socialist Party into a

position of "permanent opposition." Thus, a road was paved

for the establishment of the "political system of 1955."

(6) The Establishment of Political System of 1955

The Liberal Democratic Party was a creation of the

environment and not of the will of leaders. The

conservative parties were divided and fragmented by

defections, splits and mergers. Within a large framework

of conservative politics, they were fighting amongst each

other, and political stability did not seem possible in the

foreseeable future.

One of the major divisions within the conservatives in the early 1950's was between Prime Minister Yoshida and those prewar political leaders who had been released from the purge. Important among those was Ichirou Hatoyama who had handed the office to Yoshida when he was purged, assuming that Yoshida would vacate the office again upon his release. However, having succeeded in concluding the Peace Treaty with Western powers and the US-Japan Security Treaty, Yoshida was now prepared to devote himself to the consolidation of the domestic structure of Japan, and thus had no intention of relinquishing his post. Hatoyama won the battle, bringing Yoshida's political life to an end, although the "pupils of the Yoshida school," most of whom were postwar economic bureaucrats like Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Satou, were to emerge in the 1960's. Thus in the political field, unlike any other fields mentioned so far, i.e. the bureaucracy, labour, the peasantry and the zaikai, prewar leaders were revived and able to reassume power. The political leadership never shed its old skin.[39]

It was external pressures, therefore, that ultimately gave birth to a united conservative party, the Liberal Democratic Party. There were two important pressures from outside of the conservative parties - the united Socialist Party and the zaikai. The Communist Party, under Cominform, switched its strategy to armed revolution, and was consequently forced underground. It challenged the existing political system of parliamentary democracy itself, but did not threaten the existing parties fighting

within the system. The Socialist Party, however, had a
direct impact on the formation of the LDP. Both wings of
the Socialist Party were being reunited under the pressure
of the powerful Souhyou. A united Socialist Party
supported by Souhyou, it was feared, would certainly impose
a threat to divided conservative parties.

The other major force which pressurized the creation
of a single conservative party was the zaikai. As
mentioned earlier, the zaikai, and Keidanren in particular,
would express their opinions on the political situation at
critical strategic points, such as before and after the
elections. They attacked the fluctuating political parties
and emphasised their desire for a stable government. Their
opinions, however, would not have had such a compelling
effect without their financial power. To avoid getting
involved in any scandals, zaikai in early 1955 started
supplying political money collectively. In February 1955
zaikai as a whole donated 100 million yen to the two
conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Democratic
Party, and both wings of the Socialist Party. The amount
was increased to 1.4 billion yen in 1960, making an
accumulated total of 3.7 billion yen, 92 percent of which
went to the newly formed Liberal Democratic Party and its
predecessors.[40] What the zaikai demanded was that minor
differences of opinion within the conservative parties must
be ironed out in the common interest and in the national
interest. The zaikai is said to have put pressure on
Hatoyama in 1952 to stop anti-Yoshida activities and to
support Yoshida for Premiership.[41] Fed up with the

unstable conservative government, zaikai, after the 1953

general elections, mediated a secret meeting between

Yoshida and Shigemitsu, then President of the Progressive

Party.[42] When Yoshida had lost not only popularity but

also support from his own partymen, zaikai saw no

alternative but to unite the conservative forces without

Yoshida.[43] To what extent pressure from the zaikai

affected the decision of the Liberal Party is still not

clear, but Yoshida was forced out at the meeting of the top

leaders of the Liberal Party on 8th December 1954.[44] On

6th May 1955 Keidanren made a resolution appealing to the

conservative parties that they take responsibility for

meeting the requirements of the nation, achieving Japan's

full independence and solving immediate problems by

resolving differences of opinion among the conserv-

atives.[45]

The Liberal Democratic Party was created on 15th

November 1955 through a merger of the Liberal Party and the

Democratic Party as an anti-Yoshida alliance founded in

1954. The zaikai gave its wholehearted support to this

merger but at the same time maintained that both the LDP

and the JSP should adjust themselves to the newly created

situation and maintain and strengthen the functioning of

parliamentary democracy. Self-restraint and efforts to

improve itself on the part of the conservative ruling party

and adoption of a realistic approach by the opposition

party were, it claimed, musts. It was like parents or

school teachers trying to control their children.

Finally the political system of 1955 was created.

Somewhat later the system was dubbed the "one-and-a-half-party system"(46) and comprised the Liberal Democratic Party and the re-united Socialist Party. The main factors of the creation of this system were the ever-increasing pressures from outside the party system and the Diet. Pressures from Souhyou and the zaikai had direct impact on the creation of the JSP and the LDP respectively. These groups could be categorised as interest groups. The pressure they exerted, however, was more concerned with the creation and maintenance of a certain type of political system as a whole rather than securing specific interests. In this sense, they were political actors who enjoyed overwhelming power yet behind the scenes. While the Indian opposition parties in Nehru's era were called "parties of pressure," the Japanese pressure groups would be better defined as "political groups." The Indian opposition parties functioned as pressure groups, while the Japanese pressure groups were more political rather than just pursuing their own interests. Moreover, these political groups were, as already mentioned, the creation of the Occupation policy in the first place. In this way, the most significant factor of the establishment of the political system of 1955 was the Occupation policy, originally designed to "democratise" Japan, and then to rehabilitate the Japanese economy.

The new political system was in many ways polarised. Firstly, both parties derived their support from different social groups. As Table 6 shows, the LDP's support base was the newly created peasantry centred around the Farmers'

Cooperatives and the business community, while the
Socialist Party derived its support mainly from workers -
both blue and white collar. Secondly, their recruitment
bases were different. A large number of the LDP Diet
members had previously been bureaucrats, farmers or
businessmen. In contrast, those who had been leaders of
either labour or peasant movements took up more than fifty
percent of the total seats of the Socialist Party (Table
7). Thirdly, the system was polarised in terms of ideology
and policy. The differences were mainly on three issues:
Japan's rearmament, foreign policy and constitutional
revision. Now that Yoshida had lost power, the LDP started
openly advocating constitutional revision with the aim to
rearm Japan while maintaining the US-Japan Security Treaty.
The Socialist Party, held to the "Peace Constitution,"
opposed the Security Treaty and advocated "unarmed
neutrality." The LDP needed a two-thirds majority in both
Houses of the Diet to initiate constitutional amendments.
In other words, the Socialist Party had to secure one-third
to prevent the constitutional revision. Any speech
concerning or move towards constitutional revision met with
vigorous opposition from the People's League to Protect the
Constitution backed by the Socialist Party, Souhyou and the
Communist Party and in the 1960's the LDP withdrew its
initial policy of constitutional revision. No
constitutional amendment has been proposed during the 40
years since the inception of the constitution.

Table 6: Occupation-Wise Party Support

Party	Percentage in Population	LDP	JSP	Other Parties	No Party	No Answer
November, 1955	100%	48%	31%	2%	4%	15%
Office Workers	16	37	50	2	5	8
Industrial Workers	20	36	51	2	2	9
Businessmen	19	62	21	1	5	11
Farmers	41	52	19	1	4	24
Others	4	49	23	0	6	20
June, 1956	100%	42%	34%	3%	5%	16%
Office Workers	17	32	54	4	3	7
Industrial Workers	22	29	49	3	5	14
Businessmen	17	59	21	2	5	13
Farmers	40	46	25	3	5	21
Others	4	37	24	2	10	27

Source: Junnosuke Masumi, Sengo Seiji (Postwar Politics), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1983, Appendix p.22.

Table 7: Previous Occupations of Diet Members

Party / Previous Occupation	1955 Election					1958 Election		
	Total	Liberal Party	Democratic Party	JSP (Right)	JSP (Left)	Total	LDP	JSP
No. of Seats	467	112	185	67	89	467	287	166
Members of Prefectural Assembly	98	19	38	21	18	103	58	44
City Councillors	63	10	22	19	11	63	33	30
Bureaucrats	78	28	41	4	3	83	76	7
Businessmen	187	52	101	16	14	177	148	29
Farmers	39	12	18	3	6	44	33	11
Leaders of Peasant Movements	36	1	0	17	17	33	1	32
Leaders of Labour Movements	59	2	0	18	36	57	1	56
Professional and Others	132	26	54	26	24	119	73	45

N.B.) Previous occupations sometimes overlap. For example a member of Diet who was originally a farmer but became a member of Prefectural Assembly is registered on both columns. Therefore, the total number of previous occupations is larger than the numbers of seats.

This list is made from tables III-A, IV-A-3~10, Ibid., Appendix pp.23-31.

(1) There was a big debate on the conservative and reactionary tendencies of the Nakasone Government between Yasushi Yamaguchi and Hideo Ootake. "Sengo Nihon no Hoshu Seiji" (Conservative Politics of Postwar Japan), Shosai no Mado, Yuuhikaku, No.350, December 1985.

(2) It is possible that Konoe's interpreter, Katsuzou Okumura, misinterpreted Konoe's words, "Institution of Government" as "Constitution" and only then did MacArthur mention that the Constitution should be revised. "Kenpou Seitei ni Kansuru Shou-Iinkai Houkoku (A Report of the Committee on the Process of Establishing the Constitution)," Kenpou Chousakai, ed., Kenpou Chousakai Dai 56-kai Soukai Houkoku (A Minute of the 56th General Meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Constitution), 13th September 1961 (henceforth shorted to Minute), pp.136-7.

(3) Acheson's comments do not refer to the status of the Emperor (Ibid., pp.137-41).

(4) Kido Kouichi Nikki (Diary), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966, vol.2, pp.1241-2.

(5) Minute, pp.146-8.

(6) Kido Kouichi Nikki, vol.2, pp.1245-6.

(7) Tatsuo Satou, Nihonkoku Kenpou Seiritsushi (History of the Establishment of the Constitution of Japan), Tokyo: Yuuhikaku, 1962, vo.2, p.200.

(8) Minute, pp.153-4.

(9) Konoe's report was later discovered. The whole text of his draft is in Minute, pp.157-9. In many ways it was more progressive than Matsumoto's draft, since it had absorbed MacArthur's ideas more carefully.

(10) U.S. Department of States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, vol.VI, p.833, quoted from Junnosuke Masumi, Sengo Seiji: 1945-1955 (Postwar Politics), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1983, vol.1, p.108.

(11) Kenzou Takayanagi et. al., eds., Nihonkoku Kenpou Seitei no Katei (The Process of Establishing the Constitution of Japan), Tokyo: Yuuhikaku, 1972, vol.1, pp.101-5.

(12) Masumi, op.cit., pp.107-114.

(13) Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, Japanese Translation by Kazuo Tsushima, Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1964, vol.1, pp.164-5.

(14) Shidehara only vaguely mentions "It was some invisible

force which dominated my thinking" (Kijuro Shidehara, Gaikou Gojunen (Fifty Years of Diplomacy), Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1951, p.213).

(15) Masumi, op.cit., vol.1, pp.125-7.

(16) Even Konoe, encouraged by MacArthur (or so he thought), started thinking of forming a new political party and was prepared to assume governmental office again when Higashikuni Governemnt resigned (Yoshitake Oka, Konoe Ayamaro, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1972, pp.218-9).

(17) Hirotake Koyama, Sengo Nihon Kyousantoushi (Postwar History of the Japan Communist Party), Tokyo: Haga Shoten, 1966.

(18) Keisuke Otake, Maboroshi no Hana: Wada Hiroo no Shougai (A Phantom Flower: The Life of Hiroo Wada), Tokyo: Rakuyu Shobou, 1981, pp.345-51.

(19) Masumi, op.cit., p.310-313.

(20) Kazuo Shibagaki, "Zaibatsu Kaitai to Shuchu Haijo" (The Zaibatsu dissolution and Deconcentration), Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyusho Sengo Kaikaku Kenkyukai, ed., Sengo Kaikaku (Postwar Reforms), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974, vol.7.

(21) In an interview with Gorou Chikaraishi, former Vice-President of Mitsubishi Corporation at Nihon Kougyou Club, Tokyo on 29th September 1989.

(22) According to the SCAP order, a highly complicated procedure was required to set up a new company with a capital of over ¥200,000. That is why the capital of new companies was ¥195,000 (Manabu Hirota, ed., Ryouwa: Mitsubishi Shouji 25 Nen no Ayumi (25 Years of Mitsubishi Corporation), Tokyo: Mitsubishi Corporation, 1980, p.6.)

(23) op.cit., pp.5-6.

(24) In the interview with Chikaraishi.

(25) Ibid..

(26) Hideo Akimoto, Keidanrenshi (The History of Keidanren), Tokyo: Sekkasha, 1968, vol.1, p.42.

(27) Ibid., p.217.

(28) The balance of power between the ruling party and the bureaucracy has always been one of the subjects of study in Japanese politics. (See next chapter.)

(29) Kiyoaki Tsuji, "Kanryou Kikou no Onzon to Kyouka" (The Preservation and Strengthening of the Bureaucracy), Yoshitake Oka, ed., Gendai Nihon no Seiji Katei (The Political Process of Contemporary Japan), Tokyo: Iwanami

Shoten, 1958, pp.109-125.

(30) MITI is the direct bureaucratic descendant of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (Noumushou, 1881-
1925), the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Shoukoushou,
1925-43, 1945-49) and the Ministry of Munitions (Gunjushou,
1943-45).

(31) Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the
Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1982.

(32) In the 1952 general elections, the Liberal Party won
240 seats, out of which 66 were won by former bureaucrats.
Likewise, former bureaucrats took 19 of the 85 seats won by
the Progressive Party. In 1953, 59 out of 234 Liberal
seats and 16 out of 76 Progressive seats and in 1955, 28
out of 112 Liberal and 41 out of 185 Progressive seats were
won by former bureaucrats. (See Table 7 in Chapter 7.)

(33) Mikio Sumiya, "Roudou Undou ni Okeru Hiyaku to
Renzoku" (Leaps and Continuity in the Labour Movement),
Oka, ed., op.cit., pp.398-99.

(34) In both federations, divisive forces had been at work.
On the part of Sanbetsu, Matsuta Hosoya who had been
expelled from the Communist Party because of his "self-
criticism" following the failure of the General Strike, had
organised Sanbetsu Minshuka Undou (Democratisation Movement
of Sanbetsu), while in Soudoumei, attempts had been made to
eliminate the rightist elements from the federation, and
the leftists had established a predominant position.

(35) Regarding SCAP's involvement, see Eiji Takemae,
Amerika Tainichi Roudou Seisaku no Kenkyu (A Study of U.S.
Labour Policy to Japan), Tokyo: Nihon Hyouronsha, 1970.

(36) Masumi claims that one of the major factors of the
change of Souhyo's attitude is the Korean War (Masumi,
op.cit., p.327). Whether the external factor alone brought
about such a drastic change of the huge organisation,
however, is highly doubtful.

(37) Until the 1947 general elections, the Communist Party,
although it could successfully organise trade unions, could
not win many seats, whereas the Socialist Party did.
Kyuichi Tokuda, General Secretary of the Communist Party,
described this situation as "The Communist Party for
struggles and the Socialist Party for elections." (Sumiya,
op.cit., p.417.

(38) The proportion of those involved in the labour
movement out of the total seats won by the Socialist Party
was approximately 26 percent until the 1949 general
elections. It went up to 32 percent in 1952.

(39) Some people emphasise Yoshida's achievements. They
argue that he successfully transferred the traditional

authoritarian government to a modern democracy, converted
bureaucrats to efficient politicians, and above all gave
confidence to people both within and outside Japan
(Masataka Kosaka, ed., Yoshida Shigeru, Tokyo: TBS
Britanica, 1982). However, these people seem to attach too
much importance to the personality aspect of one man rather
than environmental factors. Yoshida's achievements, if
any, were largely due to the Occupation policy. His
ability to manoeuvre the supreme foreign power should not
be overestimated. Manoeuvring is not the same as
initiative.

(40) Masumi, op.cit., p.437.

(41) Keizai Dantai Rengoukai Junenshi (Ten Year History of
Keidanren), Tokyo: Keizai Dantai Rengoukai, 1962, vol.1,
pp.288-89. Also Masumi, op.cit., pp.411-412.

(42) Kiichi Miyazawa, Tokyo-Washinton no Mitsudan (Secret
Talks Between Tokyo and Washington), Tokyo: Bikoukai, 1975,
pp.196-200.

(43) Masumi, op.cit., p.431.

(44) Shigeru Hori, Sengo Seiji no Kakusho (Reminiscences of
Postwar Politics), Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun, 1975, pp.90-95.

(45) Keizai Dantai Rengoukai Junenshi, vol.1, p.294.

(46) Yoshisato Oka, "Seitou to Seitou Seiji" (Political
Parties and Party Politics), in Oka, ed., op.cit., p.103.

Chapter 7: The Organisation and Functions of the Liberal
        Democratic Party

    1. Postwar Japanese Political Culture

        The origin of the long conservative rule in postwar
Japan lies in the establishment of "the political system of
1955 (Gojugonen Taisei)." At first it looked as if a two-
party system had emerged in Japan. Then it was realised
that it was not a two-party system but a one-and-a-half-
party system, with the Liberal Democratic Party securing an
almost two-thirds majority and the Japan Socialist Party
approximately half the strength of the LDP. The
establishment of the system, with the two major parties
polarised in terms of ideology, policy and support and
recruitment bases, in fact meant the establishment of a
single dominant party system with the Socialist Party
reduced to the position of a permanent opposition party
(later one of the multiple opposition parties).

        There are several interpretations of the meaning of
the establishment of the political system of 1955. Yasushi
Yamaguchi classifies them into seven categories.[1] The
first one is the ideological interpretation that the system
was divided into "conservative" and "progressive"
ideologies. A typical example is a study by Jirou
Kamishima.[2] The second one is the one-and-a-half-party
system hypothesis of Yoshisato Oka mentioned in the last
chapter. The third is Y. Ide's interpretation to regard it

as the beginning of the golden age of the long conservative
rule.[3] Fourthly, Masumi says it was the establishment of
a domestic system to correspond to the masterpiece of
Yoshida's foreign policy finalized by the conclusion of the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.[4] However, this
interpretation is rather vague. It is not clear what
importance he attaches to the establishment of this system
and what he means by "domestic system." Fifth, R.
Shiratori considers it as the establishment of a two-party
system consisting of the LDP and the JSP playing their
respective roles on the same ground.[5] In other words,
the opposition party is supplementary in the sense that it
provides legitimacy to the ruling party rather than
competing with it. Sixth, M. Takabatake regards it as the
beginning of a real parliamentary democracy and party
politics in Japan.[6] Seventh, T. Inoguchi interprets it
from the point of view of political economy. He considers
that the political system is largely determined by economic
need. In other words, the industrialisation of Japan
started in the 1930's and continued throughout the war and
the postwar period. Industrialisation requires
concentration of power and a strong leadership at the top;
the role was fulfilled by the bureaucracy and the role of
politicians in this system was confined to handling
grassroots petitions. Inoguchi maintains that the
political system remained mostly unchanged even after the
war, though a larger power was given to the Diet and
political parties.[7]

Each category emphasises a different aspect of the

system, but they are not necessarily contradictory to or
exclusive of others. The one-and-a-half-party system and
the two-party system hypotheses appear to contradict each
other, but in fact they refer to different dimensions of
the system. The two parties firmly established their own
roles within the system but differed in terms of strength.
Unlike the British two-party system, in which the
opposition party offers an alternative government, the LDP
and the JSP had different roles, one as a ruling party and
the other as a permanent opposition party. This role
differentiation occurred partly because one was a
"realistic" party and the other "idealistic." The two
parties were complementary and the system itself provided
(and still does) "unbalanced stability." The role of the
Socialist Party was, in Sartori's words, one with a
"blackmail potential."[8] In this sense the establishment
of the political system of 1955 was the beginning of the
long conservative rule. This was the institutional
framework of the parliamentary system established in the
political system of 1955. How it functioned largely
depended on the political culture created somewhat later,
in 1960.

Jirou Kamishima in his later work finds the origin of
the long conservative rule in the establishment of the
Ikeda Cabinet in 1960 after the political "turmoil" created
by the Ampo Soudou (anti-U.S.-Japan Security Treaty mass
movement).[9] He argues that the late 1950's was a
political period characterised by large debate and argument
about policy alternatives both in domestic politics and

foreign policy, but people's attention was deliberately diverted by Prime Minister Ikeda's "Income Doubling Policy."[10] The Government declared that the people's income would be doubled in ten years. Ikeda's policy was to enlarge the cake, of which everybody would get a share no matter how small their proportion might be. The Socialist Party's response was the declaration that they could increase the national income by 50 percent in four years. By doing so, the Socialist Party joined the game prepared by the LDP,[11] rather than present their own policy alternative.

Economic growth in the 1960's was phenomenal but brought a high inflation. The easiest way to solve that problem was to raise salaries, which was not difficult under the rapidly growing economy. Trade unions were able to prove their usefulness. As a result, the Socialist Party backed by Souhyou managed to maintain its strength despite the popularity of the Ikeda Government. Both the LDP and the JSP firmly established their own role within this system. The nation was reintegrated by mutual interests, and therefore around economic issues.

Kamishima maintains that in this economy-oriented system, politics was put aside or forgotten altogether. Firstly, contradictions and problems inherent in rapid economic growth were ignored. Regional imbalances in terms of development, excessive urbanisation, the destruction of the environment, pollution - all these problems were to be taken up only after the high rate of economic growth had reached a plateau in the 1970's. During the decade in

which Japan was enjoying its economic growth, they were regarded as a necessary evil. Secondly, "the system of 1960" decisively lacked what Kitaoka calls public norms.[12] Social injustice was not rectified. Nor were demands made. Welfare was sacrificed for the sake of "national" economic growth. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, as a result of this economy-oriented policy, the nation was apoliticised. People now enjoying a share of the enlarged cake were pursuing their private interests. Pressure groups became influential. Private enterprises, farmers' cooperatives and other pressure groups approached influential politicians to air their private grievances. Hence there was a kind of privatization of politics, which in fact meant the stabilisation of the political system through apoliticisation.[13] This tendency was accelerated by Kakuei Tanaka's Nihon Rettou Kaizouron (remodeling of the Japanese islands), a geographical redistribution of Japanese industry. In line with this plan, Tanaka introduced industry and construction of railways and roads into his own constituency. The induction of interests into certain organisations or specific areas in order to secure votes is still a major concern of most politicians.

The apoliticisation and privatization of the Japanese nation was one of the main features of the long conservative rule in Japanese politics. As seen above, this tendency started with Ikeda's income doubling policy. It is for this reason that Kamishima puts the origin of the LDP's long rule in 1960. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the institutional framework was

established in 1955 out of a long process of institution-building initiated by a foreign power. What was created in 1960, therefore, should be called the postwar Japanese political culture. Part of it may have been rooted in Japanese traditional society, but was recreated after the political decade in which modern and progressive elements overruled the traditional elements. The organisation and functions of the LDP should be analysed and understood within this broad framework.

2. Elections and Supporters' Associations

As Table 8 shows, the LDP has been securing absolute or almost absolute majorities in successive Lower House elections. Even when the LDP could not obtain a majority of seats, it survived by making a coalition government with the Sin Jiyu Club (New Liberal Club), a splinter group of the LDP, and thus the LDP has continued to rule the country ever since its formation in 1955.

A large number of studies have been made on the support bases of the LDP. There are three major approaches with regard to electoral behaviour. The first focuses study on the population flow from agricultural areas to urban areas and relates it to the decline of support for the LDP.[14] The second approach focuses on the LDP's adjustment and transformation into a catch-all-party.[15]

The third approach mainly analyses "new middle class" or the "new middle mass" which cannot be defined in terms of old concepts of social structure or social class.[16]

Table 8: Party-Wise Distribution of Seats in Elections for the House of Representatives (1955-86)

Year	Results	Total	LDP Liberal	LDP Democratic	JSP (Left)	JSP (Right)	LP	JCP	Komei P	NLC	SDF	Other Parties	Indepen-dents
1955	Seats	467	112	185	89	67	4	2				2	6
	Seats(%)	100.0	24.0	39.6	19.1	14.3	0.9	0.4				0.4	1.3
	Votes(%)	100.0	26.6	36.6	15.3	13.9	1.0	2.0				1.3	3.3
1958	Seats	467	287		166	DSP		1				1	12
	Seats(%)	100.0	61.5		35.5			0.2				0.2	2.6
	Votes(%)	100.0	57.8		32.9			2.6				0.7	6.0
1960	Seats	467	296		145	17		3				1	5
	Seats(%)	100.0	63.4		31.0	3.6		0.6				0.2	1.1
	Votes(%)	100.0	57.6		27.5	8.8		2.9				0.4	2.8
1963	Seats	457	283		144	23		5				0	12
	Seats(%)	100.0	60.6		30.8	4.9		1.1				0.0	2.6
	Votes(%)	100.0	54.7		29.0	7.4		4.0				0.1	4.8
1967	Seats	486	277		140	30		5	25			0	9
	Seats(%)	100.0	57.0		28.8	6.2		1.0	5.1			0.0	1.9
	Votes(%)	100.0	48.8		27.9	7.4		4.8	5.4			0.2	5.5
1969	Seats	486	288		90	31		14	47			0	16
	Seats(%)	100.0	59.3		18.5	6.4		2.9	9.7			0.0	3.3
	Votes(%)	100.0	47.6		21.5	7.7		6.8	10.9			0.2	5.3
1972	Seats	491	271		118	19		38	29			2	14
	Seats(%)	100.0	55.2		24.0	3.9		7.7	5.9			0.4	2.9
	Votes(%)	100.0	46.8		21.9	7.0		10.5	8.5			0.3	5.0
1976	Seats	511	249		123	29		17	55	17		0	21
	Seats(%)	100.0	48.7		24.1	5.7		3.3	10.8	3.3		0.0	4.1
	Votes(%)	100.0	41.8		20.7	6.3		10.4	10.9	4.1		0.1	5.7
1979	Seats	511	253		107	36		41	58	4	2	0	10
	Seats(%)	100.0	49.5		20.9	7.0		8.0	11.4	0.8	0.4	0.0	2.0
	Votes(%)	100.0	44.6		19.7	6.8		10.4	9.8	3.0	0.7	0.1	4.9
1980	Seats	511	284		107	32		29	33	12	3	0	11
	Seats(%)	100.0	55.6		20.9	6.3		5.7	6.5	2.3	0.6	0.0	2.2
	Votes(%)	100.0	47.9		19.3	6.6		9.8	9.0	3.0	0.7	0.2	3.5
1983	Seats	511	250		112	38		26	58	8	3	0	16
	Seats(%)	100.0	48.9		21.9	7.4		5.1	11.4	1.6	0.6	0.0	3.1
	Votes(%)	100.0	45.8		19.5	7.3		9.3	10.1	2.4	0.7	0.1	4.9
1986	Seats	512	300		85	26		26	56	6	4	0	9
	Seats(%)	100.0	58.6		16.6	5.1		5.1	10.9	1.2	0.8	0.0	1.8
	Votes(%)	100.0	49.4		17.2	6.4		8.8	9.4	1.8	0.8	0.1	5.1

Sources: Asahi Shinbun,
29 Feb 1955, 24 May 1958, 22
Nov 1960, 23 Nov 1963, 31
Jan 1967, 29 Dec 1969, 12
Dec 1972, 7 Dec 1976, 9 Oct
1979, 24 June 1980, 20 Dec
1983 and 8 July 1986.

As a result of the economic growth, nine out of ten people started considering themselves as belonging to the middle class.[17] A large proportion of the new middle mass does not consistently support any particular party. They either change their vote at each election (floating voters) or do not vote. The trend of these floating voters and non-voters has drawn increasing attention from scholars on Japan.[18] In most cases it is assumed that the increase in floating voters and non-voters is a recent phenomenon, and some people even argue that those who vote if the elections seem interesting but do not vote otherwise think about the issues each time elections come along and therefore their political consciousness is high.[19] Certainly they do not blindly support one party, but it is too early to say that they are "politically conscious." They do not always have a general political awareness, but are basically indifferent, elections for them being a kind of game. They are thus vulnerable to one kind of campaign or another put out by the mass media. In this sense, it would be safer to say that this phenomenon is a product of an apoliticised society resulting from the economy-oriented policy of the LDP.

Although these "non-party masses" (or masses with no fixed support for a particular political party) have recently become more conservative and most of them vote for the LDP if they vote at all, the strength of the LDP does not derive from them but more from their organised support in the form of supporters' associations (koenkai). Koenkai is a peculiarly Japanese invention. Each koenkai is

organised by a politician for the purpose of winning elections.

It is not possible to say when the first koenkai was created as private groups actively supporting one candidate is not unusual practice. But koenkai as an institution drew wide attention in the 1958 elections, and since then has been steadily strengthened. Now it is so powerful that maintaining the koenkai is often more important than anything else. For example, once a koenkai has been established, its survival as an organisation becomes so important that when the politician dies or retires, his successor is determined by the koenkai's requirements. The initial investment is so high that the organisation has to survive the departure of the leader. How a koenkai is organised and how much money it costs depends on various conditions. The type of constituency, the severity of competition, regional characteristics and local requirements determine the make-up and the cost. The following is only one example of the formation of a koenkai by one politician.[20].

The first step was to mobilise friends and acquaintances. Not only kinship but local, occupational and school ties were all used. This was a rather easy step and the cost was low. Cakes, cookies or the like were handed over as complimentary gifts. The second step was to find local influential people who were potential supporters. Mr. A and his group approached the heads of villages, towns and cities and Mr. A obtained not only their personal cooperation but also necessary information

through them about who else to contact. Rewards were
considerably high. The third step was to contact these
influential people and persuade them to give their names
and cooperation as promoters of a branch. A dinner party
was held and some hundreds of thousand yen was given to
each person for "transportation costs." A few more dinner
parties were given and the process was finalized when 20-30
people attended a party. Wine and dinner was served and a
souvenir with ¥1,500 worth was given to everyone. The
fourth step was to hold a first general meeting of the
branch with 120-200 people introduced by the promoters.
Wine and a lunch-box type of meal together with a souvenir
worth ¥1,000 was given to each person. This is how
branches were set up. Likewise Mr. A established 51
branches a year at the rate of a branch every 20 days. The
cost was about ¥500,000 per branch and 25,500,000 for 51
branches. To this was added the cost to charter coaches
and to print pamphlets, and the whole thing finally cost
Mr. A ¥30 million. In addition, some ¥10 million was paid
to influential politicians and local bosses to prepare the
ground.

   After the branch was founded, ¥150,000 yen was given
to each branch to start operation. This was done twice
that year. The number of branches increased to 80 in the
first year, so the total cost was ¥24 million. Also, some
3,000 active members were given various presents worth
¥1,000 on average. Presents were given six times in three
years, costing six million yen in all in the first year.
Thus for Mr. A to organise his koenkai ¥40 million was

required plus another ¥30 million to get it started.

The "maintenance fee" for koenkais has been increasing geometrically. Kitaoka guesses that it went up from half a million yen a month in 1965 to ten million yen in 1974.[21] A big item of expense is food and drink. For example, all the branches have a new year's party in January/February and the stronger the support base, the cheaper the food. The cheapest would be a lunch-box type of meal and a small bottle of sake. If the average cost per person is ¥1,500, each branch has 30 active members and the koenkai consists of 60 branches, the total cost would be ¥2.7 million and the politician would have to attend at least three parties a day. This is an enormous cost in terms of money and energy. In addition to regular active members' dinners, koenkai holds various parties, such as parties for women or young people. Important people have to be constantly entertained. The expenditure on food and drink for Mr. B was approximately two million yen a month in 1975.

Other entertainment and social expenditure is also high, including money and flowers to be sent on special occasions like funerals, wedding parties and the opening of new shops. The total amount is as high as that on food and drink. The koenkai also offers various entertainment programmes such as baseball games, tournaments of "Go" and "Shogi" and cooking schools for women. The biggest event is a package tour. Mr. C planned a coach tour for 5,000 members of his koenkai (50 from each branch) to prepare for the coming elections. What he planned was a one-night-two-day trip to an onsen (hot spring). The actual cost was

¥18,000 per head, out of which ¥8,000 was to be paid by the participants. But after complaints in some areas it was cut down to ¥6,000. This would cost Mr. C more than ¥50 million.[22]

In the case of Shin Sakurai's koenkai, called Isshinkai, in the third Niigata constituency, each branch organises a trip either in spring or autumn in which 100 to 400 take part. But according to Masagorou Sakurai, chairman of Isshinkai's Tokyo office, the koenkai does not offer much financial assistance but only provides food and drink. And each branch holds a general meeting at least one more time and Shin Sakurai, Diet Member, tries to attend all the meetings and trips. A women's meeting was also scheduled for the 10th July where more than 10,000 women were expected to attend.[23][24]

All these programmes are pure entertainment and have nothing to do with politics. Koenkai is not founded on the basis of common ideology or policy orientation. It is an artificially created community where ascription plays a central role in cementing the members. For example, Katsumi Murata, professor in Political Science and a Waseda University O.B., belongs to several koenkais of both LDP and JSP Diet Members. He is an enthusiastic supporter of Shin Sakurai (LDP) as well as Sanji Mutou (JSP). At the time of elections, he travels around Japan to make speeches for these politicians belonging to different political parties. Waseda is the only affiliation he attaches importance to.[25] If group identity and ties are to be maintained and strengthened, entertainment is a must. The

money and energy spent there is a necessary cost to draw
political support through a non-political organisation.

Apart from entertainment, a politician has to handle
petitions, both private and public. Private petitions may
concern university entrance, finding a job, hushing up
traffic accidents or sometimes even criminal cases. It is
the patron's duty to protect his clients. Public petitions
are mainly for drawing government subsidiaries. The
politician resorts to governmental offices at both central
and local levels. Whether a constituency prospers or not
largely depends on the "talent" of its representative.[26]
Sometimes it is difficult to draw a line between private
and public petitions. For instance, Sakurai was asked to
find a wife for the son of a koenkai member. This was a
private petition. But agricultural areas in general have
been suffering a shortage of young women and so when he was
asked by the mayor to create jobs for young women to solve
this problem, it was no longer a private petition but taken
up as a serious social problem that all rural areas
face.[27] Sakurai receives more than 300 petitions a year,
some of which come through koenkai branches in his
constituency but many of which come from villages, towns
and cities directly to his Tokyo office. "We cannot say no
to anybody, but whether we can meet their demands or not is
a different matter."[28] Sakurai is a rare example in the
way he elevates local issues to nation-wide public policy,
at least in his thinking. His uniqueness probably comes
from the way in which he entered into national politics.
Not many people would have dared to challenge the power of

Kakuei Tanaka.[29]   In most cases, public petitions are

purely local and parochial. The LDP is decisively

different from Burke's definition of political parties.[30]

Also a large amount of money is often involved and it is

hard to draw a line between these activities and

corruption. Koenkai, then, has developed in this way

within the whole process of privatization of Japanese

politics.

A non-political organisation, however, turns into an

effective tool for election campaigning. In the case of

Shin Sakurai, LDP Diet Member from the third Niigata

constituency, his koenkai members were considered to be his

solid votes. The general headquarters was set up

consisting of 19 people - the chief, secretaries and those

in charge of arranging cars. The koenkai turned into an

election machine. The headquarters and the koenkai jointly

set schedules. They were provided with a campaigning car

equipped with microphone and a hard roof from which to

address the public. Sakurai's car toured about 200

kilometres a day shouting his name repeatedly and stopping

at 15 places to deliver a speech for 10-15 minutes. Every

evening, public meetings were organised at about five spots

in places like school gymnasiums. The audience was

mobilised through the koenkai organisations. His strong

supporters were called from Tokyo and other places. These

people were university professors, writers and other

professionals. They were grouped into five and went around

from one place to another to give speeches so that

everywhere had somebody speaking. The audience was made to

wait, and when the candidate finally turned out, he was
enthusiastically received like a famous film-star. He
delivered a speech for fifteen minutes and rushed out to
the next place.[31]

The third Niigata constituency had an electorate of
570,000, out of which 150,000 to 200,000 votes were secured
for former Prime Minister Tanaka despite the Lockheed
Scandal. Sakurai's campaigners' target was to gain 120,000
votes[32] through over 33 koenkai branches.[33] koenkai
members fell far short of the target, and therefore they
had to mobilise more votes.[34] How many people turned up
at the public meeting was their utmost concern. He finally
gained 62,189 votes and won a seat.[35]

At the time of its foundation, the LDP adopted a
resolution on the organisation and performance of the party
which emphasised the need to "shed the old skin" of the
party as an election machine and rebuild a strong
organisational base with a common "political awareness,"
since the LDP was a parliamentarian party, a "naked party"
alienated from the masses. Therefore, it claimed, the
masses should be organised from "kitchens," offices and
factories.[36]

Table 9: Published LDP Membership Figures (1975-1987)

1975	1,157,811	1981	1,167,303
1976	437,862	1982	2,578,054
1977	455,000	1983	2,477,833
1978	1,405,995	1984	1,902,814
1979	3,210,000	1985	3,645,843
1980	1,423,045	1986	2,516,734
		1987	1,992,998

Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1976-88.

Nevertheless, as Haruhito Fukui points out, the LDP has remained essentially a parliamentarian group with no substantial, stable or active grassroots membership. As Table 9 shows, the published membership figures have widely fluctuated. "These figures reflect the continuing difficulties which the party faces in recruiting and maintaining a loyal, disciplined, and dependable membership at the grass roots."[37] To mobilise votes at election times, therefore, the party has always relied on the work of the election machine, the koenkai. However, the koenkai in turn is basically a community with ascriptive ties which have to be constantly strengthened through entertainment and private interests. Moreover, loyalty towards a particular koenkai leader does not automatically transfer to the party itself. In other words, the expansion of koenkai all over the country indicates the weak grassroots support for the LDP.

3. The Factions

Sartori emphasises the need to study sub-units or "the next units" of a party, by which he means "the major and most significant breakdown immediately below the party-unit level." He considers that "whatever the organisational - formal and informal - arrangement, a party is an aggregate of individuals forming constellations of rival groups. ...(T)hese inner-party divisions, along with the kind of interactions thus resulting, are in themselves a distinct and crucial area of concern. The issue is then how the

unit 'party' is articulated or disarticulated by its sub-
units."(38)

Since its foundation, the LDP has always been divided
into several factions competing for party presidentship and
other party and cabinet posts. Unlike the factions in the
Indian National Congress, these factions of the LDP are
rigidly integrated, so much so that they are sometimes
called "parties within a party."(39)

There are several factors involved in this prevailing
factionalism in the LDP. First, the way the LDP was born
gave rise to factions from the beginning. As mentioned
earlier, the LDP was formed as a result of the merger of
the Liberal and the Democratic Parties. The former
Liberals were grouped into the Yoshida, Ogata and Oono
factions while the Democrats created the Hatoyama, Kishi
and Takekichi Miki factions. In addition, those Democrats
who had previously belonged to the Kaishintou (Progressive
Party) were divided into three; the conservative (Oasa and
Muramatsu), the progressive (Takeo Miki and Kitamura) and
the centrist (Ashida) factions. Thus there were already
eleven factions within the LDP at the time of its
inception.

The second factor is the electoral system. The
electoral system for the Lower House (the House of
Representatives) is based on the medium-size constituency
with three to five seats allotted to each. Voters cast
their votes for only one candidate but there are multiple
winners in each constituency.(40) As a result, the LDP,
except in certain metropolitan constituencies where it does

not have a strong and wide support base, runs multiple candidates. The candidates cannot rely on the local LDP office when intra-party competition is more fierce than inter-party competition.[41]

In the third Niigata constituency, for example, seven candidates stood for the elections for the House of Representatives in 1986: Kakuei Tanaka who was officially independent, three LDP candidates (Hideo Watanabe of the Nakasone faction, Tatsuo Murakami of the Suzuki faction and Shin Sakurai with no factional affiliation), Tomio Sakagami (JSP), one from the Communist Party and one real independent. According to Satou, secretary of Sakurai's election office, the first five candidates were assured of a seat, since the Communist and the independent were minor candidates and stood no chance of winning. Among the five candidates Tanaka was leading by far, and Sakagami (JSP) had a "reserved seat" about whose votes there was very little that the LDP candidates could do. So the real competition was among the three LDP candidates. All the energy of Sakurai's campaigners was spent to steal votes from the other two.[42] The final results were just as expected.[43]

The third factor is money. Money works in the intensification of factionalism in two ways. Elections have become so expensive that individual candidates do not have enough resources to finance election campaigns through their koenkai. It is said that in the early 1970's ¥200 million would give you a good chance of winning but ¥100 million would give you no chance (Ni-tou-Ichi-raku).[44]

These figures went up to ¥500 million and ¥300 million at
the 1986 elections. Under such circumstances, the rank and
file politicians have to depend on their faction leaders
for their financial support. The latter in turn buy their
members' loyalty. Hence another level of the patron-client
relationship.

Money also accelerates factionalism in another way.
Apart from the financial support to the LDP as a whole from
the zaikai, each faction has its own sponsoring
corporations. I do not intend to go into detail of how
money flows from the zaikai and individual corporations to
different factions, since a considerable amount of studies
have already been made.[45] Suffice it to mention one
point. Official records of political money are never
reliable, but nowadays it should be estimated in terms of
billion yen. Tachibana estimates that the LDP factions
altogether drew ¥90 billion in 1972.[46] Some leaders had
their own resources. Former Foreign Minister Fujiyama sold
up almost all his property, worth five billion yen,[47]
while Tanaka made a fortune by "rolling pieces of land"
(buying and selling land from one dummy company to another)
making up to ¥600 million within a few hours.[48] Thus one
of the conditions to become a faction leader is the ability
to raise "sufficient" political funds.

Fourthly, the power of the Prime Minister was largely
enhanced by the Constitution of Japan. Since the President
of the LDP is automatically Prime Minister, the
presidenship of the LDP has become an extremely attractive
post and consequently the power struggle is centred around

the position of Party President. A comparison with the
factionalism within the JSP will illustrate this. The JSP
is divided by ideology, while LDP factionalism is basically
power struggle. Sanji Mutou, a Socialist Diet Member
accurately describes this pattern:

> The formation of the factions in both parties is
> similar, i.e. present day factions have their roots in
> older parties. The difference is that the LDP
> factions concentrate on obtaining power; JSP factions
> are ideological factions.... Basically there are two
> groups within the JSP. The difference lies in the
> attitude towards Marxism-Leninism: one group regards
> it as a kind of textbook of socialism; the other
> doesn't. That is not to say that power struggle for
> top positions does not exist. Of course it does. But
> it is not as fierce as in the LDP. In the case of the
> LDP, when you become president of the party, you
> automatically become PM. In the JSP you don't become
> anything really. Becoming leader is OK but it is not
> like becoming PM. If it were not for the PM post then
> the LDP struggle might be less fierce - president of
> the LDP would mean nothing - it's the PM post they are
> after.[49]

Factional competitions at the top level become most
intense at the time of the election for Party President.
According to LDP Party Rules, the President is to be
elected by party members, at first exclusively Diet
Members,[50] and then the party primary was introduced in
the mid-1970's.[51] All other officials continue to be
appointed. It was as early as the first presidential
elections in 1956 that most members were rigidly grouped
into factions. Since then, some factions have gone and new

ones have appeared but, as Fukui examined, an overwhelming majority of LDP Diet Members have remained loyal to the factions of their original affiliation.[52]

During Ikeda's time, there were eight major factions, one main division being between the ex-bureaucrats (kanryou-ha) and those who had made their careers within the party, rising from local assembly members to Diet members (toujin-ha), with the former enjoying predominant power. This tendency continued throughout the 1960's and when Satou left office previous occupations became less important and factional politics entered a new phase. In this phase, there was only one important factor, the search for the presidentship. The fate of factions - whether they were born, strengthened, weakened or even finished - was determined largely by the balance of power among the different factions or by the likelihood of producing the Party President.

The Tanaka faction was the largest among the five major factions, even after Tanaka relinquished his post as Prime Minister and Party President. The Tanaka faction, now called Mokuyou-kai (the Thursday Group) increased its strength even without the leader remaining within the party. By August 1985 its strength had been increased to 120, and after the 1986 elections was further strengthened to 140. The strength of the major five factions is shown in Table 10.

In the meantime, Tanaka was arrested in 1976 on charges of having received bribes from the Lockheed Corporation. He is currently being tried in the Supreme

Table 10: The Faction-Wise Distribution of Seats
(Lower and Upper Houses) in 1975, 1980,
1985 and 1986

Factions	1975	1980	1985	1986
Tanaka faction	94	99	120	140
Fukuda faction	79	80	72	85
Ohira(Suzuki) faction	64	82	80	89
Nakasone faction	42	49	55	81
Miki(Koumoto) faction	47	42	34	33
Other factions	48	11	0	0
No faction	31	59	28	19
Total LDP strength	405	422	389	447

(Sources: Asahi Nenkan, 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1987.)

Court having been found guilty in the lower courts. He
survived the Lockheed Scandal in the sense that he
continued to control his faction from outside the party and
that his faction has become more powerful than ever before.
However, his faction has become too big to remain
united.[53] It is generally believed that there is a
comfortable size for a faction in the dynamism of factional
conflicts. Three factors are involved here: first, money
(the leader has to assist his members financially); second,
a sense of identity based on personal contact; third, the
rules of the balance of power game among the factions,
especially the way a particular faction is prevented from
establishing hegemony. From these points of view a
suitable size is considered to be about fifty,[54] but with
the disappearance of minor factions and the recent increase
in the LDP seats in the Diet, the number has increased.
Even so, more than hundred members, with over fifty members

more than any other factions must have threatened other
factions. The possibility of getting the top position
seemed to be getting smaller. A revolt occurred, though
not openly. The then Finance Minister, Noboru Takeshita,
formed a "study group" known as the Souseikai (Future
Creative Society) within the faction on 7th February 1985.
It was at that time that Tanaka suffered a stroke and
became paralysed. Takeshita gradually absorbed his fellow
members from the Tanaka faction into his "study group."
The then Deputy Secretary-General of the LDP, Keizou
Obuchi, was quite frank in answering our questions in an
interview on 14th November 1985:

Question: On 7th February this year (1985), you
participated in the first Souseikai meeting. You are
one of the principal members of Souseikai. The
Souseikai started out as a study group. What do you
study?

Answer: We don't study anything. It is a group aiming
at capturing the presidential post. As a result of
the Lockheed Scandal, the Tanaka faction has not put
forward a presidential candidate for the last ten
years. We wanted to put forward Mr. Takeshita as a
candidate, but Mr. Tanaka did not agree.

Question: After the formation of the Souseikai, Mr.
Tanaka is quoted as saying, "It's still ten years too
early. He (Takeshita) needs to succeed in another two
or three elections." But he is now 61, and in ten
years he will be 71. For a prime minister that's a
little too old, don't you think?

Answer: That means Mr. Tanaka is not ready to support
Mr. Takeshita. It's not a question of age but
experience. We think Mr. Takeshita is ready.

Question: We read in the newspapers that the Souseikai
consists of 52 or 53 members at present. Is that

right?

Answer: One person has died, but actually there are 84 people on the register.

Question: Then what's the point of staying within the Tanaka faction if you have more than half?

Answer: We want the other forty. We are out to get the other forty. If they don't join us they will join somebody else, and we won't be able to capture the presidency.[55]

Within two years Takeshita captured the presidency and Obuchi climbed a step further to capture the post of Chief Cabinet Secretary. Thus, one of the biggest advantages of leading or belonging to a faction is that it is the most effective and in fact about the only way to capture the presidentship and cabinet and party posts.[56]

The factionalism of the LDP is characterised by its well-defined membership and durability. The patron-client relationship by and large works quite well. Factional conflicts are over the rules of the game, in which the balance of power is one of the most important consider-ations. The factionalism in the LDP, however, has been repeatedly criticised and attempts have been made to dissolve factions,[57] but since factions were necessary and most effective means for power struggle, none of the attempts worked. Thus the LDP is constantly engaged in power struggle at the top, while at the bottom individual Diet Members draw political support, giving the party its strength by apoliticising the society through the koenkai organisations. Japanese politics is largely determined by private interests. The role of political parties or "political men" is reduced to that of pressure groups. The

only difference is that the former have decision-making
power. But the decision-making power has been more often
exercised by somebody else - the bureaucrats.

4. Decision-Making and the Bureaucracy

It is universally agreed that the bureaucracy has been
playing an important role in policy-making in Japan.
According to M. Muramatsu's survey, political parties and
the bureaucracy are almost exclusively the two decision-
making bodies as perceived by high- and middle-echelon
bureaucrats and party politicians (Table 11).

Table 11: The Most Influential Groups in Policy-Making

Interviewees	High-Echelon Bureaucrats (%)	Middle-Echelon Bureaucrats (%)	LDP (%)	Opposition Parties (%)
Political Parties	47.3	44.9	68.0	43.1
Bureaucracy	45.5	40.3	30.0	41.2
Courts	-	-	-	-
Zaikai	-	5.1	-	13.7
Labour Unions	-	-	-	-
Pressure Groups*	-	3.1	-	-
Mass Media	3.6	3.6	2.0	-
Intellectuals	-	-	-	-
Religious Groups	-	-	-	-
Civil Movements	-	0.5	-	-
Others	-	2.0	-	2.0
No Answer	3.6	0.5	-	-
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*)   Pressure groups include Farmers' Associations
        and Doctors' Association
Question: Which of the above groups do you think is the
        most influential in the making of national
        policies?
Source: Michio Muramatsu, "Policy-Making Process," Miyake
        et. al., op. cit., p.191.

In innumerable studies on the LDP, as soon as
decision-making becomes the topic of study, the bureaucracy
attracts the most attention. The main concern there is
which, the bureaucracy or the party, is more influential in
making decisions. Decision-making is the final stage of
the political input process and therefore essential in
analysing the functions of political parties. If, it is
argued, decisions are made by some organs other than
political parties, that should be a sign of the limited
functions of political parties, especially the single
dominant party or "a party perennially in power (mannen
yotou)." This was in fact the point raised by Tsuji who
argued that the continuing strength of the bureaucracy lay
in part in the incompetence of political parties.[58]

There are two types of arguments concerning the power
of the bureaucracy; one is the relationship between the
bureaucracy and political parties and the other is the
position of bureaucrat-turned politicians within the LDP.
As mentioned earlier, the bureaucracy survived the war and
the Occupation although the powerful Home Ministry was
replaced by the economic bureaucracy. Until the end of the
1960's the economic bureaucracy enjoyed predominant power

in policy-making and proved to be most efficient. MITI in industrial policy, the Finance Ministry in budget making and the Economic Planning Agency in long-term economic planning exemplify the overwhelming power of the bureaucracy in those days.

The significance of the bureaucracy in policy-making was connected with the lack of ability on the part of the LDP. The party, which had neither sufficient information nor expertise, had to rely for its policy-making function on the bureaucracy. The only exception was in the field of foreign policy which required more political decisions than bureaucratic, routine types of decisions.[59] Criticism of the LDP for its lack of policy-making ability grows louder when the dominant power of the bureaucracy is associated with the prewar experience. Japan's modernisation was carried out by the state from above with the bureaucracy supervising industries and local governments, the Imperial Diet and political parties playing only a minor role in making decisions.[60] The modernisation policy initiated by the state bureaucracy ultimately contributed to the strengthening of Japanese militarism to the point of no return. It is for this reason that the dominance of the bureaucracy over the party is almost always seen in a negative light.

The question now arises as to how much the postwar political system resembles the prewar system. It is easy to find similarities between the two and to criticise based on past experience. This attitude, however, is as dangerous as non-critical blind obedience to the existing

system, both of which tend to ignore the reality and deny
opportunities for conscious debate and argument. Total
rejection is as dysfunctional as unconditional acceptance.
Similarities do exist. So do differences. What should be
noticed is the nature of the differences. As mentioned
earlier, there has been noticeable development in the
Japanese political system since the war ended. However,
the development has two weaknesses: that it has been
confined to only negative aspects and that it has been
extraneous. That is, it has been negative in the sense
that new kinds of restraints have been imposed on the
political system which have prevented the revival of prewar
militarism in a "liberated" Japan, and it has been
extraneous because large-scale surgery was performed after
the war by a foreign power. The largest operation was on
the Constitution - the Diet was given enormous decision-
making power and sovereign power shifted from the Emperor
to the people. What the bureaucracy could do within the
new constitutional framework, no matter how influential it
was, therefore, was considerably limited. Moreover, the
emergence of the economic bureaucracy itself had been
promoted by SCAP's policy of economic rehabilitation. The
goal had been clearly set forth by SCAP which consequently
determined the functions of the economic bureaucracy. The
bureaucracy no doubt served this limited purpose as shown
by Japan's unprecedented achievement of economic growth.

It is not surprising, therefore, that no politically
important policy was made. Once the framework was rigidly
established, the constitutional revision, which was one of

the major objectives of the LDP at its inception, was

rejected as "reactionary." Constitutional revision in fact

meant not a revision but the revival of the old system. In

any case, such a drastic change was not permissible within

the system. Even electoral reform was no longer possible.

The best the LDP government could do was to change the

system by "an installment payment system." The Self-

Defence Force was created and defence expenditure has been

gradually but steadily increased without serious discussion

on the defence problem itself, while Article 9 which

renounces war still remains unchanged. As already

mentioned, politics was untouched, partly deliberately but

also from a lack of ability to do so.

Another point regarding the power of the bureaucracy

is the role of the bureaucrat-turned politicians. It was

Prime Minister Yoshida who started recruiting a large

number of high-level bureaucrats into his party, and then

immediately into his cabinet.[61] The existence of a large

number of such former bureaucrats in the LDP and their

occupancy of important cabinet and party posts is often

used as proof of the dominance of the bureaucracy over the

party. However, this view is rather simplistic. Once a

bureaucrat becomes a politician, his role expectations

should change accordingly. His survival as a politician

depends on his success in elections, his promotion now

depends to a great extent on his faction leader and his

behaviour is restrained by the rules of the game within the

party. Although his contact with the bureaucracy is of

great use to the LDP, the number of former bureaucrats

within the LDP is not even evidence of the dominance of the bureaucracy over the party.[62] It simply means that the party needed that quality of people, and cabinet and party posts attracted certain bureaucrats who lacked legitimacy as well as authority in terms of policy-making.

In the 1970's the relationship between the bureaucracy and the party underwent a change and the LDP started playing a more active role in making policies. Hideo Ootake's case study on the textile negotiations between the United States and Japan shows that the Prime Minister's (Satou's) decision ultimately prevailed despite strong resistance from MITI and the enterprises concerned. Ootake says that the Prime Minister's considerable amount of autonomy is due to three factors. Firstly, individual firms did not have direct access to the Prime Minister, the zaikai being the obstacle inbetween. Secondly, the LDP was highly centralised and pressures from rank and file members could not influence the top decision. Thirdly, the government was also centralised. The decision-making power was concentrated in the Cabinet.[63]

The party also enhanced its power through the committee system in the Diet. The Diet Members, including those belonging to opposition parties, acquire knowledge and experience through various standing and special committees which are organised parallel to ministries. The LDP's Political Affairs Research Council also has various special sub-committees beneath it. The day to day life of ambitious LDP Diet members is in fact very busy as they have to attend one meeting after another. For example,

Katsuhiko Shirakawa, LDP Diet Member, starts his weekdays
by attending early morning study meetings at eight o'clock.
He attends a variety of official committees and unofficial
study group meetings organised by the party. The committes
and meetings he attends range from agriculture,
construction to communication, education, law, security and
the budget. He explains that it is not obligatory but a
high level of knowledge on policy is required for a high
level position, and that strong desire for power urges most
politicians to attend as many meetings as possible.[64]
The LDP Diet Members are also allowed to belong to more
than one committee, which gives them the advantage of
representing diversified interests rather than a special
interest in a specified field, as the bureaucrats.

Through activities in such committees both in the Diet
and the LDP, what are called zoku giins have been born. A
zoku giin is a Diet Member who exercises enormous
influence, both formal and informal, on policy-making in a
specific field.[65] These politicians have stayed in
committees of one field for a considerable length of time
and acquired sufficient knowledge and expertise so as to
compete with the bureaucrats of a ministry corresponding to
that specialised field. They share common interests with
the bureaucrats of the corresponding ministry when an issue
involves more than one ministry, but otherwise they
exercise their influence through investigations and debates
at committee meetings so that the policies made by
bureaucrats may reflect specific interests they are
supposed to represent. By doing so zoku giins benefit in

terms of money, votes, ideological fulfillment and expansion of political influence.[66] Therefore, no zoku giin is born out of such fields as law or the environment where no specific interests are involved. In contrast, the most popular fields are commerce and industry, construction and agriculture. In short the role of zoku giins is to pass the pipe between interest groups and policy-makers. They are the "watch-dogs" who act only within a limited territory.[67]

The dominance of the bureaucracy over the party was illustrated by the role that the Finance Ministry played in making budgets. It was almost a sacred territory where even the LDP politicians could not intervene. According to John Campbell, who closely analysed the budget-making process, the most important principle is to keep the balance not between revenue and expenditure but giving equal treatment to all the ministries, an attitude he called incrementalism.[68] This typically bureaucratic style of decision-making was highly effective as long as the cake was increasing in size. When economic growth began to curve downward after the oil crisis, however, friction among various ministries was inevitable. Conflicts of interests around the scarce resources could no longer be dissolved merely by incrementalism of the bureaucracy where there was little horizontal communication and each territory was clearly and rigidly demarcated. Some coordinating body was required outside the bureaucracy.

This function was to be fulfilled by the Policy

Affairs Research Council of the LDP. It is a well-known
fact that the last stage of policy negotiations is brought
to the Council and if no agreement can be reached there,
the task of coordination is brought to the highest level of
the LDP, the "Big Three," comprising the Secretary-General,
the Chairman of the Executive Council and the Chairman of
the Policy Affairs Research Council. Factional politics is
deeply involved in such negotiations. Some ministers
intentionally refuse to agree until the negotiations reach
a high-level stage where their faction leaders are expected
to settle the negotiations in their favour.[69] T.
Inoguchi's case studies have led him to the conclusion that
there has been some degree of shift in the 1970's of
decision-making power from the bureaucracy to the party and
the Political Affairs Research Council has come to play an
increasingly important role. However, he does not deny the
dominant position of the bureaucracy. Moreover, he finds
that the behaviour of party politicians has come closer to
that of bureaucrats.[70] In other words, the the same
function is performed by different actors.

This last point can be applied to the party as a
whole. The long LDP rule has bureaucratized the party
organisation. Nowadays the cabinet and party posts are
delivered according to seniority rule, not by age but by
the number of terms partymen have served as Diet Members.
For example, three terms of service in the Diet would give
a post of parliamentary vice-minister and at least six
terms is required for a ministerial post. Under such
circumstances, bureaucrats become politicians in earlier

stages of their careers who have to climb up the ladder of the party hierarchy.[71]

For all this increased power of the LDP, the bureaucracy still "rules if not reigns."[72] What is more important is that despite its increased power, the party does not perform the political decision-making function that it is assigned to. The role differentiation between the bureaucracy and party politicians has not been made. What has happened instead is the bureaucratization of the party in two ways: on the one hand, certain politicians have specialised so as to compete with the bureaucrats (the zoku giin); and on the other, closer linkages between the party, the bureaucracy and pressure groups have developed, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as "Japanese Corporatism," an elitist system of corporate organisations and the state without the participation of labour.[73] The strong linkages, however, do not form an integrated decision-making body. The party is divided by factions and politicians compete with each other within the party rather than with opposition parties. The sphere of competence of each ministry is so rigid that cross-ministerial policies are bound to face strong opposition from one ministry or another. The interests of different pressure groups do not always find a common link. The only common interest shared by all of them is the maintenance of the conservative political system.

The only exception is in the field of foreign policy, in which the party is said to have taken political initiatives. In this case, however, external factors are

often more important. In the domestic field the LDP is

criticised for its lack of policy-making ability, while in

the international field Japan is criticised for its lack of

political initiative.

Notes

(1) Yasushi Yamaguchi, "Sengo Nihon no Seiji Taisei to
Seiji Katei (The Political System and Political Process of
Postwar Japan)," I. Miyake et.al., Nihon Seiji no Zahyou
(The Dimensions of Japanese Politics), Tokyo: Yuuhikaku,
1985, pp.83-5.

(2) Jirou Kamishima, "Introduction," The Annals of the
Japan Political Science Association, 1977, pp.1-4.

(3) Y. Ide, "Hoshu Chouki Seiken no Touchi" (Government
under the Long Conservative Rule), Ibid., pp.5-62.

(4) Masumi, op.cit., vol.2, pp.463-76.

(5) Rei Shiratori, Nihon no Seitou Chizu (A Map of
Political Parties in Japan), Tokyo: Gakuyousha, 1980, p.27.

(6) M. Takabatake, "Taishu Undou no Tayouka to Henshitsu"
(Mass Movements: Changes and Diversities), The Annals of
the JPSA, 1977, pp.324-59.

(7) T. Inoguchi, Gendai Nihon Seiji Keizai no Kouzou (A
Structure of the Political Economy of Contemporary Japan),
Tokyo: Touyou Keizai Shinpousha, 1983, and Inoguchi and T.
Iwai, "Zoku Giin"no Kenkyu (A Study of "Zoku Giin"), Tokyo:
Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1987.

(8) Sartori, op.cit., p.123.

(9) Concerning the Ampo Soudou see Rokurou Hidaka, ed.,
1960 Nen 5 Gatsu 19 Nichi (19th May 1960), Tokyo: Iwanami,
1960.

(10) Jirou Kamishima, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kouzou (The
Political Structure of Contemporary Japan), Kyoto: Houritsu
Bunkasha, 1985.

(11) Ikeda's brain trust, M. Itou confessed later that he
thought the LDP had won over the Socialist Party when the
latter declared that statement (Ikeda Hayato: Sono Sei to
Shi (His Life and Death), Tokyo: Shiseidou, 1966, p.90.)

(12) S. Kitaoka, "Jiyu Minshutou: Houkatsu Seitou no
Gourika" (The Liberal Democratic Party: The Rationalisation
of a Catch-All Party," in Kamishima, Gendai Nihon ...,
p.34.

(13) Ide, op.cit., p.59.

(14) H. Ishida, "Hoshutou no Vision" (A Perspective of the Conservative Party), Chuo Kouron, January 1963 and Masumi Ishikawa, Sengo Seiji Kouzoushi (History of the Postwar Political Structure), Tokyo: Nihon Hyouronsha, 1978.

(15) Scott C. Flanagan and Bredley M. Richardson, Japanese Electoral Behaviour: Social Cleavages, Social Networks and Partisanship, London: Sage Publication, 1977.

(16) Y. Murakami, S. Koubun and S. Satou, "Datsu 'Hokaku' Jidai no Seiji Vision" (A Political Perspective of the Post-'Conservative-Progressive' Era), Chuo Kouron, February 1977.

(17) The question was "Where does your life style belong to - the upper, upper-middle, middle-middle, lower-middle or low-class?" The survey was carried out by the NHK in 1975 (Yasusuke Murakami, Shin Chukan Taishu no Jidai (A Period of the New Middle Mass), Tokyo: Chuo Kouronsha, 1984, p.167). The Japanese language has three words which correspond to "middle-class" in English. Chusan refers to the class based on property, chukan and churyu mean middle-position and middle-life-style respectively. In this survey the question was about the life-style. But, as Yamaguchi points out, Murakami makes no distiction between the three (Yamaguchi, op.cit., p.146.)

(18) For example, Michel J. Cozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy, New York: New York University Press, 1975 and Ishikawa, op.cit..

(19) Masumi Ishikawa in Asahi Shinbun, 12th April, 1983. Also Masayuki Fukuoka maintains that there is a basic agreement on fundamentals such as nuclear policies and the limit on defence expenditure (less than one percent of the GNP). He thinks that as long as these fundamentals are secured, the dissent of the new middle mass is contained and that these people with their amazing sense of "balance" are watching that politicians do not cross the permissible line. However, defence expenditure actually exceeded one percent of the GNP and even the amazing sense of balance could not prevent it ("Mutouhasou no Seitou Sentaku" (Choice of Parties by Non-Party Masses)," Jurist, No.35, summer 1984, pp.38-43.

(20) A. Tonooka, "Seijika ni okeru Kane no Kenkyu" (A Study of a Politician from the Point of View of Money), Bungei Shunju, June 1975, quoted from Kitaoka, op.cit., pp.53-55.

(21) Ibid., pp.55-56.

(22) Ibid., pp.56-60.

(23) A telephone interview with Masagorou Sakurai on 12th April 1988.

(24) Shin Sakurai has three Koenkai organisations in Tokyo: one for enterprises and firms called Jiyu Kenkyukai (Study Group on Liberty), Toushinkai for Waseda O.B.s and Tokyo Koenkai for individual members. The memberships are 100-200, 400 and 100-150 respectively. They hold a study meeting once every two-three months but their main role is their financial support (in the interview with M. Sakurai).

(25) In an interview with Katsumi Murata, professor of Politics, Daito Bunka University at his office, Tokyo on 20th June 1986.

(26) K. Shirakawa, "Jimintou Daigishi no Nichijou Katsudou" (Daily Activities of an LDP Member of Diet), Jurist, No.35, summer 1984, pp.105-6.

(27) Shin Sakurai, Waga Chousen (My challenges), Tokyo: Touho Keizai Shinpousha, 1985, pp.13-15.

(28) In the interview with Masagorou Sakurai.

(29) Shin Sakurai is a unique politician in that he did not join any faction for many years. He stood for elections against opposition from Kakuei Tanaka. He described his own experience as follows:

    At first I meant to help Tanaka, but they were worried that Tanaka's prestige would be damaged if I stood in elections. I didn't say anything bad about Tanaka but people thought I was trying to compete with him. I was like a time bomb. You never know when it's going to explode. So I was not invited to join any other factions. Once I was invited by Ichirou Nakagawa (since deceased), but later he withdrew the offer because he was so afraid of Tanaka. It has been a difficult situation. In times of war, food is essential to keep the troops moving. Likewise, in times of elections supporters are essential to get the politician elected. So the tactics of the other LDP members was to starve me of supporters. Many of my supporters couldn't find a job. This is the biggest problem I have faced in my constituency.
    In my first elections, I stood as an independent, and I failed to get elected. The second time I also stood as independent and I was successful. As soon as the result came through, the LDP enticed me to join them. The third time I received party endorsement.
(In an interview with myself and Donna Weeks, a student of mine from Australia working on the LDP. We jointly interviewed Sakurai on 18th November 1985 at his Parliamentary office.)

(30) See chapter two.

(31) Sakurai's election campaign in Muikamachi, Niigata in

June 1986.

(32) In an interview with Satou, secretary of the headquarters of Sakurai's election campaign on 30th June 1986 at the office in Muikamachi, Niigata.

(33) The third Niigata constituency consists of 33 administrative units, either cities, towns or villages, and each unit has at least one branch but there are so many other semi-formal Koenkai branches that even Masagorou Sakurai could not decide which groups should be called Koenkai branches (in the interview with M. Sakurai).

(34) M. Sakurai did not give me the exact membership figure. Instead, he said Etsuzankai (Kakuei Tanaka's koenkai) had a membership of 90,000, and drew nearly 180,000 votes. Calculated at this rate, Isshinkai (Sakurai's koenkai) is estimated to have 30,000 to 40,000 members and won another 30,000 votes or so from non-members.

(35) Asahi Shinbun, 8th July 1986. See note (43) of this chapter.

(36) Resolutions adopted at the first convention of the LDP on 15th November 1955 (The Liberal Democratic Party, ed., Jiyu Minshutoushi, Shiryouhen (History of the LDP: Documents - hereafter shortened to Shiryouhen), Tokyo: the LDP, 1987, p.98.

(37) Haruhiro Fukui, "The Liberal Democratic Party Revised: Continuity and Change in the Party's Structure and Performance," The Journal of Japanese Studies, vol.10, No.2, Summer 1984, p.391.

(38) Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.72.

(39) Ronald J. Hrebenar, The Japanese Party System: From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government, Boulder, Corolado: Westview Press, 1986, p.248.

(40) This electoral system of medium-size constituencies did not work in the LDP's favour. Therefore, Prime Minister Hatoyama, who wanted to revise the Constitution of Japan imposed by the Occupation, tried to change it to a small-size constituency system. However, he wanted to do it so hurriedly that he met with opposition and was forced to withdraw it (Ichirou Hatoyama, Hatoyama Ichirou Kaikoroku (Memoirs), Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1957, pp.187-188.

(41) Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, Japanese translation by Seiji Yamaoka, Daigishi no Tanjo, Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1971, p.137.

(42) In the interview with Satou.

(43) The election results for the House of Representatives
held on 6th July 1986 in this constituency are as follows;

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Kakuei Tanaka    (independent) ......... 179,062   elected
Tomio Sakagami (JPS) .................. 72,729   elected
Hideo Watanabe (LDP, Nakasone faction). 63,554   elected
Shin Sakurai    (LDP, no faction) ...... 62,189   elected
Tatsuo Murakami(LDP, Suzuki faction)... 49,692   elected
Hisaaki Maruyama (JCP) ................ 16,332
Kou Nishikawa (independent) .......... 3,758
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(Source: Asahi Shinbun, 8th July 1986)

(44) Takashi Tachibana, "Tanaka Kakuei Kenkyu" (A Study of
Kakuei Tanaka), Bungei Shunju, November 1949, in Bungei
Shunju ni Miru Showashi (History of Showa Era Illustrated
in Bungei Shunju), Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1988, vol.3,
p.120.

(45) Teiko Kihira, "Seitou to Seiji Shikin" (Political
Parties and Political Money), Jurist, No.35, Summer 1984,
Naoki Kobayashi, "Seitou no Houteki Kisei" (Legal
Restraints on Political Parties), Ibid., Tachibana,
op.cit., and Masumi, Gendai Seiji, vol.2, pp.353-78.

(46) Tachibana, op.cit., p.120.

(47) A. Fujiyama, Seiji Waga Michi (Politics: My Way),
Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1976, pp.244-8.

(48) Masumi, Gendai Seiji, vol.2, pp.363-7.

(49) In an interview with Sanji Mutou at his parliamentary
office on 21st November 1985.

(50) The Party Rules of the LDP adopted on 15th November
1955 (Shiryouhen, pp.55-6.)

(51) The introduction of the primary system was the
brainchild of Takeo Miki who assumed office after Tanaka
was forced to relinquish his post due to the Lockheed
Scandal, but it was materialised under the presidency of
Fukuda in the form of an amendment of the Party Rules
adopted on 25th April 1977 (Shiryouhen, pp.56-59). It
never occurred to Fukuda, however, that he himself was
going to be the first victim. He lost the primary to Ohira
in November 1978 and decided to withdraw from the second-
round election by Diet Members. Like in India there was an
enormous number of bogus members including "the names of
male housewives, dogs and cats" (Masumi, Gendai Seiji,
vol.1, pp.304-6 and vol.2, p.352.)

(52) Fukui, op.cit., p.399.

(53) The Tanaka faction finally split into the Takeshita
faction and the Nikaidou group in 1987 in the wake of the
election for party president in which Takeshita
successfully contested.

(54) Masumi, Gendai Seiji, vol.2, pp.344-9.

(55) In an interview with Keizou Obuchi at his parliamentary office on 14th November 1985.

(56) The government and party posts are allotted according to the balance of power among the factions. The faction leaders recommend certain people but it is up to the Prime Minister to choose whoever he likes as long as a reasonable number of posts are allotted to each faction.

(57) The first attempt was made by Kishi in August 1957, a month after he formed his first cabinet. Accordingly, the Oono, Yoshida and Kouno factions declared themselves dissolved but the very next month the factions were revived. In November 1961 the Kuraishi Committee submitted an interim report insisting on the dissolution of factions. Likewise, the Miki Committee under the Ikeda Government made recommendations. Prime Minister Satou, and more recently Prime Minister Miki also tried. But none of them worked.

(58) See chapter 6.

(59) Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal Democrats and Policy Making, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.

(60) Inoguchi, op.cit..

(61) For example, Ikeda was elected a Diet Member for the first time in 1949 and was immediately given the post of Finance Minister in the Yoshida Cabinet. Satou was appointed Chief Cabinet Secretary in 1948, and he was first elected a Diet Member the following year.

(62) Muramatsu raises a question about the assumption that previous occupation dominates the behaviour of politicians. He thinks that the power of the Diet and political parties attracts even the top bureaucrats (op.cit., p.209).

(63) Hideo Ootake, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku (Political Power and Economic Power in Contemporary Japan), Tokyo: Sanitsu Shobou, 1979.

(64) Katsuhiko Shirakawa, "Jimingtou Daigishi no Nichijou Seikatsu" (An LDP Diet Member's Ordinary Life), Jurist, No.35, summer 1984, pp.102-107.

(65) T. Iwai, "Nihon ni okeru Seitou to Kanryou" (Political Parties and the Bureaucracy in Japan), in Y. Iizaka et. al., Seitou to Democracy (Political Parties and Democracy), Tokyo: Gakuyou Shobou, 1987, p.289.

(66) Inoguchi and Iwai, op.cit., p.165.

(67) Iwai, op.cit., p.285.

(68) John C. Campbell, <u>Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics</u>, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

(69) Kenzou Uchida, "Mou Hitotsu no Seifu - Jimintou (Another Government: The LDP)," <u>Jurist</u>, No.35, summer 1984, pp.18-20.

(70) Inoguchi, <u>op.cit.</u>.

(71) Iwai, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.288.

(72) Johnson, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.316.

(73) T. J. Pempel, <u>Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism</u>, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982.

1. A Comparative Framework

     In developing a theoretical framework for comparing
the processes of political development of India and Japan,
there have been four stages: (1) three basic assumptions;
(2) an operational definition of political development; (3)
the focus of study; and (4) four levels of analysis. The
first stage is to formulate the hypotheses on the basic
assumptions of the concept of political development, which
will determine the direction of the study. In the second
stage the foundation for a new operational framework is
established through an analytical examination of the
literature of political development and comparative
politics. In the third stage the main actors of political
development are identified, in the present case, the single
dominant party. The last stage links the concept of
political development and the functions of political
parties within a larger political system.

     (1) Three Basic Assumptions

     Three hypotheses have been formulated about the basic
assumptions of political development, from which a
comparative study can be developed. Testing these
hypotheses is in fact the ultimate purpose of the present
study. The first hypothesis concerns the relationship

between economic growth and social modernisation on the one
hand and political development on the other. There is a
general tendency among political scientists, especially
Western scholars, to assume a direct relationship between
the two, and consequently to measure the level of political
development of a certain country by such indices as its per
capita income, level of industrialisation, literacy rate
and the like. This view seems rather simplistic and in
some cases might be irrelevant as well as misleading, for a
high rate of economic growth could even justify the absence
of political development. Whether or not, or in what
cases, there is a direct relationship between the two has
therefore had to be tested through this study.

The second hypothesis concerns the concept of "nation-
state." There has long been a myth of a "nation-state,"
according to which the building of a "nation-state" is
considered a prerequisite for political development. It is
understandable that state leaders try to strengthen the
basis of a "nation" through centralisation and
homogenization. It does not mean, however, that a nation-
state should be established for the survival and
development of a state. A state may achieve political
development through a constant process of legitimisation.

The third hypothesis concerns the relationship between
political stability and political development. A static
view that a developed political system should be stable
often misses the dynamics of political development. In
particular, the politics of a developing country carries
systemic causes for conflicts, as mentioned in chapter one.

Stability could mean stagnation. History has witnessed a number of cases of dictatorship characterised by apparent stability. On the other hand, conflicts can, and sometimes do, provide the momentum for political development, since those demands which cannot be met through a recognised political procedure do, from time to time, manifest themselves in the form of conflict. Whether conflicts become functional or dysfunctional depends to a large extent on the attitude of decision-makers.

For the purpose of testing the three hypotheses mentioned above, India and Japan have served as good models. The two countries present a striking contrast in terms of levels of modernisation, the homogeneity-heterogeneity dichotomy and the frequency of political conflicts. A detailed examination of the two cases, therefore, would indicate at least in part the relevance of my basic assumptions and challenge the generally held assumptions on which most existing theories of political development have been built.

(2) An Operational Definition of Political Development

The second stage provides an operational definition of political development and sets up a theoretical framework for comparison. A considerable amount of work has been carried out in the field of comparative politics during its history of over two thousand years, especially in the postwar period, as I have traced in the first chapter. Some of these theories are found relevant to explaining

specific cases. For instance, neo-corporatism explains in some degree the nexus of the Liberal Democratic Party, zaikai and the bureaucracy in Japan,[1] at least in the elitists' behaviour, while the consociational model is useful in discussing the centre-state relationship in India.[2] On the other hand, the dependency theory, which stresses economic factors and the interdependence of centre and periphery across state boundaries, could not be applied to either case.[3]

The biggest difficulty arises when applying the existing theories to a comparative study of the two political systems concerned here. The difficulty is caused by three factors. Firstly, those theories which are useful tools for describing certain aspects of the political systems of the respective countries are too specific to be used as a comparative framework. A framework for the present comparative study has to be broad enough to embrace the vastly different socio-economic conditions of the two countries. Secondly, most theories arise from Western experience and therefore have limitations in an Asian context. Thirdly, Western scholars' efforts to avoid ethnocentrism as a reaction to the second factor have led to the complete abandonment of the concept of political development, once a dominant concept in the field of comparative politics, whereby a key factor for comparison has been lost.[4]

A comparative framework must meet at least two requirements. Firstly, it must be based on the concept of political development, since a mere description of

similarities and differences of specific cases can lead us nowhere. In other words, the theoretical framework of the present study must deal directly with political development. At the same time, a comparative framework has to be relativistic. The two requirements are not necessarily incompatible, for political development does not aim at a single goal. Nor does it have to follow the same process as the one pursued by Western European countries. Therefore, as long as the basic assumptions mentioned earlier remain open for testing, the concept of political development should allow for relativistic approaches. At this point, Almond's developmental theory regains importance, though it requires some modification. Huntington's remarks contribute a great deal to this modification.[5] The stress on the aspect of participation which Almond advocates has now been reduced and balanced out by the importance of institutionalisation. With some other minor modifications, political development has been defined as a continuous process whereby demands 1) are formed, 2) manifest themselves, 3) are accommodated and 4) force the political system to adjust itself accordingly. The former two are categorised as participation and the latter two institutionalisation. It should be remembered, however, that the basic assumptions on which Almond's theory was built are now left open only to be answered after the case studies have been completed.

(3) Main Actors

The third stage is to define the actors in the political systems. This is a step to fill the gap between a general theory of political development and the empirical work of collecting data. The questions to be asked here are how, in what way and by whom an increase of participation is brought about and institutionalisation achieved. It is generally acknowledged that political parties play a crucial role in promoting political participation. Under the party systems of both India and Japan, the respective single dominant parties, the Congress Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, have been almost exclusively responsible for encouraging participation and promoting institutionalisation. Political development in each system, therefore, depends largely on the functioning of the ruling party. Thus the focus of study is clear - the single dominant party.

(4) Levels of Analysis

Traditional approaches to political parties and party systems focus mainly on the origins and development of political parties which result from the institutional development of parliamentary democracy, as illustrated in European history;[6] inter-party competition as an essential requirement for democracy;[7] and the durability of governments.[8] How the achievements in these fields of study can be utilised in my comparative study of political development imposes another question. This is the last stage in the construction of a theoretical framework.

Various problems arise in this process. Firstly, in both India and Japan, where universal franchise was imposed from above at the time when the respective constitutions were established, the developmental process has not followed the same course as in Europe. In the two Asian countries, the constitutional framework of parliamentary democracy was not an outgrowth of political development but was rather a given from which each political system was to develop. Therefore, existing studies on the origins and development of political parties have only limited relevance.

Secondly, under the single dominant party system, the amount of inter-party competition is not as important as inner-party democracy. It is true that the single dominant party system is considered as one of the democratic forms of government. What distinguishes the single dominant party system from the one-party totalitarian or authoritarian system is the existence of competition, actual or potential.[9] In addition, intra-party factional competition is often considered to supplement a relatively low degree of inter-party competition.[10] However, in order for this system to function democratically, the ruling party must be able to accommodate criticism and different opinions of dissident groups from within the party as well as those of opposition parties. In short, while inter-party competition is one requirement for democracy, flexibility and adjustability on the part of the ruling party is another essential condition especially under the single dominant party system.

Thirdly, the durability of governments, which is often regarded as a parameter of political stability, seems to have drawn undue attention recently. If a parliamentary system has been achieved as a result of increasing demands from below, and yet the system is characterised by the instability of governments, stability is certainly one of the most interesting and important themes of study. However, in most developing countries, where the majority of the population is yet to be mobilised into taking part in the actual political process, a different set of questions should be asked. As has been repeatedly stressed in the previous chapters, an increase of participation, often leading to political instability, is sometimes more essential than stability. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish whether stability is a result of successful accommodation of political demands or a sign of the lack of increase in participation. The former case shows that the system has adjusted itself to the new environment through the functions of a political party or parties within the system, whereas the latter simply means that the system has stagnated.

Thus a new approach to political parties and party systems is needed so that they may be dealt with within a framework of political development. As a device to combine the concept of political development and an analysis of political parties, four levels of analysis have been used: the system level; the inter-party level; the party level; and the sub-party level. The analysis of the functions of the single dominant party system, characterised by the

predominantly important role of the ruling party should first concentrate on the sub-party level. The functions of demand formation and demand manifestation can be analysed through party activities at this level. The difficult task of measuring the degree of participation has been carried out through the indirect method of examining the strictly political activities of the single dominant parties instead of a behavioural, quantitative approach to voting behaviour. For instance, political awareness, which is supposedly generated in the processes of demand formation and demand manifestation, is not measured by direct questionnaires but rather by the types of activities used by political parties to mobilise the masses and by the kind of demands that are put forward, as political awareness is considered to be a consequence of these activities. It is important, therefore, to distinguish political activities from non-political ones.

In a similar way, organisational matters are extremely important in measuring the degree of institutionalisation. In order to accommodate new demands, the party must always make sure there are communication routes from below. Party elections are a means of achieving such communication. In fact, communication within the party is of particular importance within the single dominant party system, since the function of demand accommodation almost exclusively depends on one party. Successful accommodation of new demands inevitably leads to system adjustment, which in turn compels organisational changes. The level at which system adjustment occurs becomes a parameter of the degree

of political institutionalisation.

The upper three levels become important when dealing with the last function, system adjustment, which is a dynamic process, as opposed to system maintenance, a static concept often leading to conservatism. System adjustment occurs as a result of the system's performance of the first three functions. The extent to which system adjustment is needed is determined by two factors: the kind of demand that has manifested itself; and the extent to which previous demand has been accommodated (or not, as the case may be) into the existing system.

The second factor is often more important than the first one for two reasons. Firstly, if the political system has successfully accommodated previous demands, the system undergoes incremental self-adjustment, which is most likely at the sub-party level. This might involve such features as a change of leader, the creation of different cells or strengthening of regional bases. It can be assumed that in such a system any new demands that are put forward are likely to be relatively moderate, whereas demands which have not found a route to the decision-makers are bound to escalate, and consequently force the system to change more drastically. In this sense the system's past performance by and large determines both the kind and the intensity of new demands.

Secondly, even if new demands are extremely radical, the question of changing government does not arise as long as the ruling party successfully accommodates them, since it is within the ruling party that the system adjustment

takes place. The ruling party may have to abandon its
ideology and thereby change its original character while
still maintaining power. It is when the ruling party fails
in this accommodation that dissent mounts to a point at
which a drastic system change is needed, and this applies
with special force in the case of a single dominant party.
A failure of the single dominant party to accommodate new
demand necessitates system adjustment at a higher level,
namely the inter-party level. The ruling party is forced
to renounce its role as the single dominant party and this
gives rise to a two-party or multi-party system.
Coalition-making is essential at this stage. In the event
of a failure of any party in functioning, parliamentary
democracy may be faced with a crisis. This is the stage at
which system adjustment at the highest level takes place,
i.e. the system level. At this level a new type of party
may be created, extra-constitutional conflicts may even be
legitimised, or a revolution may be called for. Examining
system adjustment is particularly important insofar as it
indicates how well the system has been performing the first
three political functions, and the four levels of analysis
are useful tools for that examination.

 2. Empirical Findings

    The processes of Indian and Japanese political
development have been analysed separately in the preceding
chapters by using the broad framework of political
development mentioned above. The four aspects of political

development have been examined with a special focus on the organisation and functions of the respective single dominant parties.

(1) The Settings

A comparison of political systems should start by examining the structures of the political system as a whole, part of which constitute party systems. The core of an analysis at this stage is the constitutional framework, since its principal provisions stipulate basic political institutions, while the way in which it was established enables us to understand the social, historical and cultural settings of the polity. The Constitutions of India and Japan bear some resemblance with regard to parliamentary democracy. Both provide for free electoral competition and universal suffrage, which have still not materialised in many non-Western countries.

The ways in which the two constitutions were established, however, were vastly different. Firstly, whereas the Indian Constitution was in many respects a continuation from the pre-independence Indian political system, the establishment of the new constitution in Japan marked a drastic break in the country's history. Secondly, the post-independence Indian political system was to a large extent a product of the nationalist movement. The Indian polity, integrated by a strong sense of nationalism, was born out of the anti-British movement. In this sense, it was an indirect product of British rule, but the

initiative was taken by the Indian leaders. Traditional
Indian society characterised by its apolitical nature was
"awakened" by nationalist slogans and was further
politicised after independence through electoral
competition among political parties.

In contrast with its Indian counterpart, Japan's
Constitution was imposed by the Occupation Forces. The
extent of the changes made to the Meiji Constitution was
far beyond what any Japanese decision-makers had ever
imagined. Thus, the most significant political development
since the Meiji Restoration in 1868 was introduced by
foreign powers, and since its inception the new
constitution has never been revised.

Out of these constitutional frameworks there emerged a
single dominant party system in each country. The Indian
National Congress owed a large part of its legitimacy and
organisational bases to the nationalist movement, while the
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan was formed by two major
pressures from outside, i.e. the threat posed by the
establishment of a united Socialist Party and pressures
from the zaikai, who demanded a stable conservative
government. The Congress Party was originally an
"externally created political party" whose origin is found
outside of parliament whereas the LDP was basically an
"internally created political party," motivated by the need
for securing power in parliament.[11]

(2) Participation

Being single dominant political parties, the Congress
Party and the Liberal Democratic Party are both essentially
"catch-all parties".[12]   However, the former is a mass-
party with organisational bases beginning at the grassroots
level, into which the original elitist party evolved
through the nationalist movement, especially under the
leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, while the latter has remained
a parliamentary party with relatively weak organisational
bases.   For all the structural differences between the two,
both parties depend on their field organisations for their
functional performance.   Being such a mammoth organisation
(with a membership of some 23 million), the Congress Party
has to entrust its functions to local organisations.   The
LDP is a loose organisation which has neither mass nor
cadre bases of its own and consequently depends for its
support almost exclusively on the supporters' associations
(koenkai) of individual Diet Members.   The activities at
the sub-party level of both parties, therefore, are vital
for the survival and development of the single dominant
party systems.

The first and most important aspect of political
development is participation comprising demand formation
and demand manifestation.   As has been seen in the
preceding chapters, a remarkable increase in participation
has taken place in India during the last four decades.   The
major political demands that had been put forward before
independence, i.e. the national independence of India and
the creation of Pakistan, were met through the partition of
the Indian sub-continent in 1947.   The demands that have

been formed since independence, therefore, are of a different kind. There has been a call for the creation of new states based mainly on linguistic identity and for more autonomy to be granted to states or to administrative units at even lower levels. In other words, there has been a demand for decentralisation in one state after another.

One of the characteristics of Indian politics is that demand manifestation has often taken place outside the parliamentary system. India has witnessed a considerable number of what can be called ethnic conflicts. As mentioned in chapter four, earlier conflicts were in many respects legitimised, and those newly emerging middle-classes were absorbed into the mainstream of the Indian political system through extra-parliamentary conflicts. This was one of the essential elements of what Rajni Kothari called "the Congress system,"[13] in which sub-units of the party played the most important role. After Indira Gandhi appeared on the main stage of Indian politics, the system, having lost its flexibility, became a more coercive governing body. Dissidents were expelled from the party and differences of opinions were suppressed, which led to two splits of the party. Furthermore, the opposition was not tolerated. The activities of the Congress workers were limited to factional fighting in efforts to woo the "High Command" who would then nominate the office-bearers. The electorate, deprived of a channel through which to put forward their demands under the Congress system, finally opted for an alternative government. When this non-Congress government failed to

function, some people began searching for an alternative to the parliamentary system. Now the demands have come to manifest themselves in the form of radical, violent conflicts. It still means, however, that participation has been steadily increasing.

Japan's political development has taken a reverse course in the sense that participation, which increased dramatically soon after the war, gradually lost its political nature. The Japanese population, released from the suppressive fascist rule of the prewar period and later protected by a democratic constitution, burst into political activity in the late 1940's and continued throughout the 1950's. It should be noted, however, that most political activities mentioned in chapter six, especially those of labour and peasants' movements, were determined by the major reforms initiated by the Occupation Forces. The Communist Party, legalised thanks to a benevolent Occupation policy, was the first to lead such movements. After the Communist Party changed its policy to one of violent revolution, it was the Socialist Party which came to represent progressive forces. The focus of demands shifted away from narrowly class-based issues in favour of higher state-level political issues, such as the peace treaty and the security treaty. Thus Japanese politics in the first one and a half decades after the inception of the new Constitution was characterised by the politicisation of the nation, which resulted in a substantial increase in participation.

The shift in Occupation policy from democratisation to

economic rehabilitation began to impose restraints on political activities. This tendency was accentuated by the termination of the Occupation, after which the conservative forces of prewar Japan once more emerged on the public stage. Efforts by the leftists to mobilise the nation against the conservative party did not survive beyond the mass movement against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. Faced with a people now politically awakened, Prime Minister Ikeda succeeded in diverting their attention and energy towards the economic sphere. The nation was mobilised for the successful realisation of Ikeda's "double income policy." The Socialist Party was trapped in the territory of the Liberal Democratic Party by competing as to who could better implement the same policy. After this point, the Socialist Party had to be content with its position as a perennial opposition party.

Meanwhile LDP members developed supporters' associations called koenkai based in their own constituencies. The koenkai is possibly the only grassroots contact that the party maintains with the electorate. However, the function of political socialisation does not form part of their activities. The activities of the koenkai are basically to render the electorate apolitical in order to secure their political support. Entertainments such as group tours, baseball games and parties are the major features. The functions of demand formation and manifestation are reduced to the mere induction of private interests into particular companies or the constituency that "the owner of the koenkai"

represents. An extreme example is Kakuei Tanaka, thanks to whom Niigata prefecture has prospered, with the shinkansen stopping at his home town, and with highways, industries and a new state university established in his constituency. It is not surprising, therefore, that even now Tanaka, physically paralysed and faced with corruption charges in the Supreme Court, still collects the vast majority of votes.[14] This political poverty stems from Prime Minister Ikeda's income doubling policy.

(3) Institutionalisation

Institutionalisation in response to increased participation is a dynamic process. Institutionalisation of a political system, consisting of demand accommodation and system adjustment, should be examined based on the analysis of participation, for the latter is the first requirement for political development, which necessitates institutionalisation. The first step in demand accommodation is for demands to be perceived. For that purpose, the nation-wide party organisation has to put its antennae down into grassroots. The second step is to convey demands to higher ranks of the party hierarchy, and finally one type of party decision or another is made by those party members with adequate power. Thus, a study of the process of institutionalisation requires an examination of the party organisation and the flow of communication within the party.

In the first decade of independent India, the Congress

Party managed to accommodate the demands raised in various parts of the country for the creation of states based on linguistic unity. The reorganisation of such states started with the creation of the state of Andhra Pradesh in 1953 and was carried out in large measure in 1956. During this period of decentralisation, the Congress Party itself was decentralised. It embraced such a wide range of ideologies that it was said to contain opposition parties within one party. The first Prime Minister, Nehru, paid due attention to opposition parties as well as dissident groups within the party. Organisational elections were held regularly so that demands from below could be channeled upwards, at least in part, and the party hierarchy would not allow dictates from the top, from the "High Command" as it were, alone. Constant criticisms were conveyed to the top echelon of the party as to organisational matters, the loss of enthusiasm for social movements and the neglect of the party itself in favour of its government functions. The strength of the Congress Party was thus derived from the decentralised nature of its organisation and its loose coalition character.

With Indira Gandhi in power and the two splits in the party having taken place, the Congress Party lost these characteristics and thereby its flexibility. Dissidents were not tolerated and the opposition parties were regarded as enemies. The slogan of garibi hatao (to remove poverty) had a populist appeal for the masses but was designed rather to centralise the national policy. It also meant that economic growth was to be attained at the cost of

political development, since most political demands were based on regional, ethnic and communal interests, which obviously contradicted Indira Gandhi's centralisation policy.

At the party level, organisational elections were suspended, office-bearers were appointed one by one, and the party, now highly monolithic and populated by "power-brokers," gradually lost its ability to accommodate demand, and consequently lost legitimacy. The party is now controlled by one man. Demands for organisational elections made by party workers at lower levels cannot reach the top, as we have seen in chapter five. The national goal, however, cannot keep forcing the people to sacrifice their political demands. The system can no longer cope with the increasing demands raised by a politicised population, especially the newly emerging middle-classes, who have become economically better-off and consequently better educated.

Some kind of system adjustment was required. Having failed at the inner-party level, adjustment took place at the party system level. The electorate cast their votes against the Congress Party in 1977 which gave birth to the first non-Congress coalition government. However, it was not long before the Janata Party broke down as a result of its inner-party, factional conflicts, which led to the Congress revival, since there was no other alternative available. The Congress Party returned to power, but its original coalition character was never restored. On the contrary, the centralisation of the party organisation as

well as that of the whole political system was further
accelerated. The opposition parties, including regional
parties like the Akali Dal in Punjab, which had
participated in the Janata government, had to disappear.
Deprived of a route along which it could be channeled into
the mainstream of the Indian political process, dissent has
manifested itself in various violent ethnic conflicts, the
extreme example of which is the Punjab problem. Violence
calls for counter-violence. This is the predicament in
which the Indian political system finds itself and as a
result the legitimacy of the Congress Party and even
parliamentary democracy itself is in danger. It is yet to
be seen whether the function of system adjustment will be
performed at the party level. If it is, the Congress Party
will be forced to adopt a much more accommodating attitude.
If system adjustment takes place at the party system level,
another and more effective coalition government will be
needed. System adjustment at the highest level, i.e. the
political system level, will require an alternative to
parliamentary democracy[15]

In the case of Japan, the population has become
apolitical since 1960 in great part as a consequence of the
miraculous rate of Japan's economic growth. In fact the
argument about political development in Japan could be
concluded simply by saying that the LDP has performed the
task of rendering the nation apolitical, or that Japan has
failed to meet the first requirement of political
development, i.e. an increase in participation. However, a
few points need to be added with regard to the

institutionalisation of the Japanese political system.

At the highest level of the party hierarchy, factional conflict is a permanent phenomenon. Conflict is not over policy matters, but over personnel, especially the post of party president-cum-prime minister. Money and posts are the ends as well as the means. Under such circumstances, the policy-making function had to be left in the hands of the bureaucracy, which has in fact long dominated the party. Only recently has the LDP produced some specialist politicians known as zoku giin. Many claim that with the emergence of the zoku giin, the balance of power between the party and the bureaucracy has changed in favour of the former,[16] but what it actually means is that the role which should be and has been played by the bureaucracy has now partly been taken over by the partymen. The "political" role of decision-making is still left largely unfulfilled. Policy-making in Japan is basically the coordination of various private interests. The most important factor affecting policy-making is external pressure. The textbook issue, Japan's defence policy, the Yasukuni Shrine state patronage bill - all these policies are strongly and instantly influenced by external pressures from the United States, China, Korea and Southeast Asian countries, though interestingly, not by domestic pressure.

Since the latter half of 1988, the LDP's monopoly of power has been challenged with unprecedented seriousness as a result of the Recruit scandal, the introduction of the consumption tax (contrary to an election pledge), and Prime Minister Uno's geisha scandal. The LDP lost the elections

Table 12: Party-wise Distribution of Seats in the Election
for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, 1989

Parties	No. of seats
LDP	43
JSP	36
Komei Party	26
JCP	14
DSP	5
Shimpo (Progressive)	1
Other Parties	2
Independents	1
Total:	128

Note: The number of seats gained includes those with a
party recommendation as well as official party
endorsement.

(Source: Asahi Shinbun, 3rd July 1989.)

Table 13: Party-wise Distribution of Seats in the
Elections for the House of Councillors in
1989 and the Resulting Total Number of Seats

Parties	No. of seats elected	Proportional Represent- ation	Constitu- ency-base seats	Total no. of seats*
LDP	36	15	21	109
JSP	45	19	26	65
Komei	10	6	4	20
JCP	4	3	1	13
Rengo**	11	–	11	12
DSP	3	2	1	8
Sara-Shin***	0	0	0	1
Zeikin***	2	1	1	3
Niin Club***	1	1	–	2
Other parties	1	0	1	1
Independents	10	–	10	15
Total:	123	47	76	249

Notes: * Elections for the House of Councillors are held
every three years for half the number of seats
each time.

** Rengo(Federation) is a new association of trade
unions.

*** Sara-Shin (New Party for Salaried men), Zeikin
(Tax) and Niin Club (The Club in the Two Houses)
are the so called "mini-parties" which have
emerged recently.

(Source: Asahi Shinbun, 24th July 1989.)

for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly and the House of
Councillors in 1989 as tables 12 and 13 show. The
electorate almost for the first time since 1955, has voted
against the ruling party which has provided the nation with
political stability and economic prosperity for more than
three decades. The LDP failed to secure a majority in both
cases. Some may argue that the Japanese nation has finally
been awakened, and that system adjustment at the inter-
party level is occurring. It is not impossible, though not
likely, that the LDP will lose its majority at the next
election for the House of Representatives, which is due to
be held in February 1990. It should be noted, however,
that the miserable performance of the LDP at the recent
elections has not been caused by its failure in debates on
policy matters. The opposition parties' slogan of "abolish
consumption tax" has simply appealed to the electorate and
created a "mood" unfavourable to the LDP, but presents no
realistic alternative policy. Japan may have to go a long
way before real inter-party competition starts and debates
on national policies are generated, which is probably more
important than which party wins an election.

Two more points should be discussed here concerning
certain approaches to Japanese politics in general. One
way of explaining the absence of any mass participation in
a real sense from the Japanese political process would be
from the point of view of Japanese culture. Some argue
that Japanese history has never witnessed large-scale
participation from below or a new class of people entering
into politics, except for sporadic uprisings. It is true

that modern Japanese politics has a history of just over a hundred years, and that it was not until Japan was occupied by foreign powers that its politics experienced a major change. It was natural, therefore, that the power of the prewar politicians was restored soon after foreign elements disappeared from the political scene, and with their restoration the original culture of Japanese politics was revived. According to this argument, the political change brought about by foreign powers was a deviation from the normal historical course. It is the culture that largely determines the characteristics of Japanese politics.

To be sure, the political process of any country is strongly influenced by its culture. At the same time, however, political development should be capable of occurring in any political system. The probability of its occurrence either by internal factors, i.e. by increased participation, or by external factors, e.g. by a crisis imposed from outside against the nation's own will, depends partly on the culture of that society. However, a cultural approach to politics has two disadvantages. Firstly, culture, which may be one of the major factors in determining the characteristics of a political system, is too particularistic to be dealt with scientifically. Secondly, culture isolated from other social, economic and political factors can easily become a shelter in which political scientists can escape from detailed analyses of political processes. Therefore, it is safer not to put too much emphasis on the cultural aspects of political processes. What in the Japanese case is interesting is the

manipulation of the population by the ruling party to prevent an increase of participation, and, by extension, political development.

The second argument is that Japanese politics should not be subjected to much criticism since it has provided the society with stability and economic growth, which the nation should be content with. The absence of debate means the absence of dissent. Indeed, Japanese politics looks perfect insofar as other socio-economic conditions are favourable to the maintenance of the political status-quo. These types of political system are bound to reveal its weaknesses once a crisis occurs. The real test of the degree of political development, therefore, is not stability at a time of economic prosperity, even though the ruling party may have been one of the strong political engines of the economic prosperity itself, but the ability to cope with a critical situation, be it economic, social or international, for only a legitimised political system with a politicised population will be able to face up to such critical situations. In conclusion, the Japanese political system is highly fragile, bolstered by remarkable success in the economic field, but not sustained by solid political participation from below.

3. Political Development - Three Basic Assumptions
   Reviewed

The three hypotheses concerning the concept of political development have been tested through the two case

studies of India and Japan. Although the hypotheses

concern fundamental questions, the present study does not

attempt to formulate a general theory of political

development. Whatever results can be drawn from the

testing of the hypotheses are only relevant to limited

contexts since the discussion is not meant to be

exhaustive. One contribution might be that the following

results will point out certain dangerous, misleading, and

even damaging consequences to which most existing theories

and the basic assumptions behind them inevitably lead.

The first assumption concerns the relationship between

economic growth and social modernisation on the one hand

and political development on the other. The two cases

indicate opposite tendencies. Some correspondence between

the two can be found in the case of India. The people of

the lowest social strata, including a huge number of the

scheduled castes who are still struggling for their very

survival, are by and large left outside the Indian

political process. Romantic and optimistic observers,

especially Marxists, claim that those at the bottom should

be the main actors, that is to say, those who put forward

new demands to the establishment because the most evidently

observable social contradictions in India lie in the

polarisation in Indian society of the rich and the

poor.[17] However, real participants in the political

process with a demand for a larger share of political power

are the newly emerging middle-classes, who having first

acquired economic power, then use it to acquire adequate

education. They are also the main protagonists in India's

recurring ethnic conflicts. Here is a case in which a socio-economic factor acts as a promoter of political development.

While one type of middle-class is being rapidly politicised in this way, another type of middle-class is being rendered apolitical in another part of Asia. Unlike India, Japan's economic prosperity and social modernisation have justified the "political poverty" of the country. The high rate of economic growth has had an apoliticising effect on the Japanese population, whose concerns, if any, have gradually been confined to their immediate private interests. It is no coincidence, therefore, that their political activities have withered away. Hence, an increase in participation, the first momentum for political development, is decisively lacking in Japan, and this lack is in no small way attributable to Japan's miraculous economic growth.

As the two cases show, it is dangerous to assume unconditionally a direct relationship between economic growth, social modernisation and political development. This contention has two implications: firstly, economic success does not necessarily raise the level of political development; and secondly, political development does not always go hand in hand with a remarkable achievement in the economic field. In other words, neither can economic growth always be regarded as a cause of political development, nor can the stage of economic growth be a parameter of political development. A temptation then would be that in a developing country, modernisation will

stimulate entrepreneurship, which will simultaneously

awaken new classes of people politically. However, it is

not even clear that economic growth in a developing

country, from which new middle-classes are bound to emerge,

will lead to political development, since, as history

shows, a successful economic policy could support even a

military regime for a certain period of time.

The second hypothesis, which concerns the "nation-

state myth," can be tested mainly by examining India's

political development, since Japan is one of the best

examples of a nation-state, with practically all the

population speaking the same language and sharing a common

culture and history, and therefore a country where the

question of "nation-state" rarely arises. In contrast,

India is such a diverse country that national integration

and the way to achieve it have always been a focus of

discussion. An examination of the Congress Party

illustrates that efforts to achieve integration by means of

centralisation and homogenization have led to institutional

decay, which could result in the disintegration of the

nation itself. I have maintained instead that legitimacy

is one of the most important cementing factors of a diverse

country like India, and that legitimacy depends on the

functional performance of the system, which could imply,

depending on the kind of demands, a policy of

decentralising the political system and allowing more

autonomy to sub-units of the nation.

The third hypothesis concerning the relationship

between political development and political stability is

more difficult to test, as our minds often become blurred as a result of our fear of and hatred for bloodshed, violence and conflict. Stability certainly guarantees a society without them. An analysis of a conflict is almost without exception accompanied by the fear that in finding a functional aspect of conflict we are therefore giving a positive evaluation to violence. It should be remembered, however, that development cannot always avoid cost, be it an economic setback, social instability or casualties.

Stability is disturbed when a political system fails to ensure balanced development between participation and institutionalisation, especially when the latter cannot keep pace with the former. This is the predicament into which the political system in India has fallen, where an increase in participation and the breakdown of the "Congress system" have caused political instability. The current instability, however, does not necessarily mean that the Indian political system has de-developed, since it has met the first requirement of political development, namely an increase in participation. On the other hand, the political stability of Japan has been brought about by the apoliticisation of the nation, in which case the degree of participation has decreased. A fundamental question should be, therefore, whether stability is a result of a balanced development of the system, or whether it is maintained largely by the lack of increase in participation. Only the former case can be classified as political development.

India and Japan, two Asian countries which have

managed to maintain parliamentary democracy over the last

forty years, seem to have contributed to a better

understanding of the essence of political development in

the sense that the two case studies have found the traps

which most existing theories have fallen into. It should

be clear by now that the assumptions on which these

theories have been built are not as universal and absolute

as have been generally believed. Even two case studies

have provided opposite answers to the questions. The only

conclusion that can be drawn from this rather limited

comparative study is that a study of political development

of any country should start with open assumptions about the

three basic questions. A substantial number of case

studies might be necessary in order to find some fixed

patterns in the relationship between political development

and these three factors.

Notes

(1) See chapter 1 - 3, note (24).

(2) See chapter 1 - 3, notes (34) & (35).

(3) See chapter 1 - 3, notes (26), (27) & (30).

(4) See chapter 1 - 4.

(5) See chapter 1 - 2, note (13).

(6) For example, Hans Daalder, op.cit., Klaus von Beyme,
op.cit. and Duverger, op.cit..

(7) A typical example is Sartori, Parties and Party
Systems.

(8) The durability of governments is often discussed in
relation to coalition governments. (C. Browne and J.
Dreijmanis, eds., Government Coalitions in Western
Democracies, New York: Longman, 1982 and Hajime Shinohara,
ed., op.cit..)

(9) Sartori, <u>Parties and Party Systems</u>, pp.192-201.

(10) For example, Hrebenar, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp.16-18.

(11) Duverger, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. xxiv-xxxvii.

(12) Otto Kirchheimer, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp.184-194.

(13) See chapter 4, note (27).

(14) Tanaka's daughter finally announced in October 1989 that Kakuei Tanaka would not stand for the election to the Lower House scheduled to be held in February 1990. During his last term he did not attend any parliamentary debates.

(15) The Indian electorate opted for an alternative government at the ninth Lok Sabha elections held in November 1989. The new coalition government led by V. P. Singh has been working hard to bring about some changes deemed necessary, while dissident groups of the Congress state units are demanding organisational restructuring of the party.

(16) See chapter 7 - 4.

(17) See chapter 4, note (5).

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<u>Nihon Keizai Shinbun</u>

<u>Asahi Journal</u> (Weekly)

<u>Bungei Shiunju</u> (Monthly)

<u>Chuo Kouron</u> (Monthly)

<u>Sekai</u> (Monthly)

(The post mentioned is the one at the time of the interview.)

1. India

   (1) Congress Party

    A. Centre

Kamrapati Tripathi, former Working President, All India Congress Committee(I), at his residence in New Delhi on 26th March 1987.

Najma Heptulla, MP (Rajya Sabha) & General Secretary, AICC(I), at her residence in New Delhi on 3rd April 1987.

R. L. Bhatia, MP & General Secretary, AICC(I), at the AICC(I) office in New Delhi on 31st March 1987.

Deba Prasad Ray, MP (Rajya Sabha) & Joint Secretary, AICC(I), at the AICC(I) office in New Delhi on 21st and 27th Novermber 1986.

Krishna Nand Joshi, MP (Rajya Sabha) & Coordinator, Organisational Elections of AICC(I), at his residence in New Delhi on 25th November 1986 and by telephone on 26th November 1986.

Hari Krishna Shastri, MP (Lok Sabha) & Member of Executive Committee, Congress(I) Parliamentary Party, at his residence in New Delhi on 28th March 1987 and at the Parliamentary office on 30th March 1987.

Natwar Singh, MP (Lok Sabha), State Minister of External Affairs, at his residence in New Delhi on 27th February 1988.

Raoof Valiullah, MP, at his residence in New Delhi on 26th March 1986.

Manvendra Singh, MP (Lok Sabha), at the Parliamentary office on 30th March 1988.

Premalabai Chavan, MP (Lok Sabha), at Parliamentary office on 30th March 1988.

Jai Prakash Agarwal, MP (Lok Sabha), at the Parliamentary

office on 30th March 1988.

       B. Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee(I)
         - Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC),
           District Congress Committees (DCCs),
           City Congress Committee (CCC) and
           Ward, Block & Primary Congress Committees

       a. In Lucknow

Mahavir Prasad, President, Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee(I), at the PCC office in Lucknow on 7th December 1986.

Jagat Pal Singh, General Secretary, PCC, at the PCC office, Lucknow on 5th, 7th and 8th December 1986.

Santosh Tripathi, General Secretary, PCC, at the PCC office in Lucknow on 7th December 1986.

Ram Kawal Pandey, State Convener, PCC, at the PCC office in Lucknow on 7th December 1986.

Moid Ahmad, MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) & Joint Secretary in charge of training, PCC, at the PCC office in Lucknow on 7th December 1986.

Vichar Vibhar, Congress Worker, Intellectual Section, at the PCC office in Lucknow on 7th December 1986.

Bhagwati Singh Visharad, MLA & President of Unnao DCC, at the PCC office in Lucknow on 6th December 1986.

Moid Ahmad, MLA and Joint Secretary, PCC, at the PCC office in Lucknow on 7th December 1986.

Bir Bahadur Singh, Chief Minister, U.P., at the Chief Minister's office in Lucknow on 6th December 1986, and at his official residence in Lucknow on 8th December 1986.

Ram Lal, MLA from Sidhauli (scheduled caste reserved seat), at the PCC office in Lucknow on 8th December 1986.

Gauri Shankar, MLA & Minister for Revenue, at the Chief Minister's residence in Lucknow on 8th March 1986.

Ranjeet Singh Judie, ex-Minister, U.P., at the Chief Minister's residence in Lucknow on 8th March 1986.

       b. In Allahabad

K. N. Malviya, President, Allahabad City Congress Committee(I), at the Allahabad CCC office on 2nd December

1986.

Shayam Bahadur Verma, Vice-President, Allahabad CCC, at the
CCC office on 2nd December 1986.

Yajya Narain Misra, General Secretary, Allahabad CCC, at
the CCC office on 2nd December 1986.

Chottey Lal Gupta, General Secretary, Allahabad CCC, at the
CCC office on 2nd December 1986.

Niyaz Ahmad Siddiqui, General Secretary, Allahabad CCC, at
the CCC office on 2nd December 1986.

Ramesh Chandra Jaisal, General Secretary, Allahabad CCC, at
the CCC office on 2nd December 1986.

Naseem Ahmad, General Secretary, Allahabad CCC, at the CCC
office on 2nd December 1986.

Pearay Mian, Organisational Secretary, Allahabad CCC, at
the CCC office on 2nd December 1986.

Basant Lal Azad, President, Badshahi Mandi Mandal (Ward)
Congress Committee, at the CCC office on 2nd December 1986.

Ram Kissore Shukla, ex-MLA (now lecturer), at the CCC
office on 2nd December 1986.

        c. In Karchana

A. N. Mishra, Professor, Allahabad Agricultural Institute,
Congress Worker, former President of District Youth
Congress Committee, all the way between Allahabad and
Karchana on 3rd December 1986.

Ramyash Shukla, President, Karchana Block Congress
Committee, in Karchana town on 3rd December 1986.

Krishna Dutta Shukla, school teacher & Congress Worker,
Karchana Block, in Karchana town on 3rd December 1986.

Ram Shiromani Tiwari, Congress Worker, Karchana Block, in
Karchana town on 3rd December 1986.

Basant Lal Tiwari, farmer & Active Member, Karchana Block,
in Karchana town on 3rd December 1986.

Ranga Raj Singh, Social Worker & Congress Worker, Meja
Tahesil, Urva Block, Karchana Constituency on 3rd December
1986.

Amar Singh, Congress Worker, Meja Tahesil, on 3rd December
1986.

Jagdish Prasad Dwivedi, lecturer, R. P. College & Congress

Worker, in Sarva town, Urva Block on 3rd December 1986.

Rama Kand Upadhyay, General Secretary, Urva Block Congress Committee, in Sarva town on 3rd December 1986.

Chandrika Prasa Dwedi, Villege President & Congress Worker, Hardua village, Karchana.

(2) Opposition Parties

Ramakrishna Hegde, Janata Party, Karnataka Chief Minister, in his car from the Parliament Annexe to the Airport in Delhi on 29th March 1987.

Sikkandar Bakht, Vice-President, Bharatiya Janata Party, at the BJP office in New Delhi on 30th March 1987.

Ajit Singh, President, Lok Dal(A), at the Lok Dal(A) office in New Delhi on 30th March 1987.

V. P. Singh, President, Jan Morcha, in the car from his residence to the Airport and in the VIP room of the Airport in Delhi on 29th February 1988.

Telugu Desam Party Workers during the election campaign in Andhra Pradesh on 6th February 1985.

(3) Others

Nirmal Mukarji, former Cabinet Secretary, Government of India, at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi on 24th March 1987.

I. K. Gujral, former Minister, at his residence in New Delhi on 1st April 1987.

Kurdip Nayar, journalist, at his residence in New Delhi on 24th March 1987.

Rajni Kothari, political scientist, at the Centre for the Studies of Developing Societies in Delhi on 18th December 1986.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, political scientist, at the Centre for Policy Research on 22nd, 23rd and 28th March 1987.

D. P. Kumar, editor, The Statesman, at the office in New Delhi on 28th March 1987.

Pran Chopra, journalist at his residence in New Delhi on

1st April 1987.

George Vergese, journalist, at the Centre for Policy
Research in New Delhi on 1st April 1987.

2. Japan

   (1) The Liberal Democratic Party

Keizou Obuchi, MP & Deputy Secretary-General of the LDP, at
his parliamentary office on 14th November 1985.

Shin Sakurai, MP, at his parliamentary office on 18th
November 1985.

Satou, Secretary of the headquarters of Sakurai's election
campaign on 30th June 1986 at the office in Muikamachi,
Niigata.

Masagorou Sakurai, chairman of Isshinkai (Shin Sakurai's
koenkai)'s Tokyo office by telephone on 12th April 1988.

   (2) The Japan Socialist Party

Sanji Mutou, MP, at his parliamentary office on 21st
November 1985.

   (3) Others

Gorou Chikaraishi, former Vice-President of Mitsubishi
Corporation, at Nihon Kougyou Club on 29th September 1989.

Katsumi Murata, Professor in Politics, Daitou Bunka
University and a member of the koenkais of Shin Sakurai,
Keizou Obuchi, Sanji Mutou and others, at his university
office, Tokyo on 20th June 1986.