When two tribes go to law: the moral foundations theory and the Brexit negotiations.

SMITH, D.S.

2021

When two tribes go to law: The Moral Foundations Theory and the Brexit negotiations

David S. Smith

School of Applied Social Studies, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, United Kingdom

A R T I C L E   I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Complex negotiations are done by people and are often carried out in pursuit of culturally ingrained ideas such as international unity or national sovereignty. As such, they may be subject to the sorts of adaptive biases and reasoning heuristics that are present at the level of individual or collective decision making. The following commentary applies an influential model of intuitive ethics, The Moral Foundations Theory, to the Brexit negotiations. This framework suggests that moral intuitions reflect five adaptive psychological systems shaped by our evolutionary history. Focusing on the three most relevant foundations of Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, I explore how both parties' red lines and priorities are consistent with this criterion. In doing so, I hope to provide insight into how innate cognitive biases can inform legal processes with wide-ranging ramifications.

1. Introduction

On Christmas Eve, 2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson[1] announced that the United Kingdom[2] government and the European Union (EU) had agreed upon a free trade deal. An event, he claimed, resolved a question that had "bedeviled (British) politics for decades" (Guardian News, 2020): the relationship between Britain and the EU.[3] It has been a fraught alliance, historically characterized by skepticism and mistrust on the British side since they first joined the forebearer: the European Common Market (Carl et al., 2019). An ongoing push towards ever-greater political integration exposed the fault lines between a more isolationist Britain and the integrated EU. Tensions reached their zenith in 2016 when the UK electorate voted, by a small electoral majority, to leave the EU. Since the union's creation, following the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty, they are the first country to do so.

That agreement, and the indivisibility of the four freedoms (goods, capital, services, and labor), legally guaranteed to member states since 1986, marked a move towards a centralized European power. The expansion of which has been consistently opposed by conservatives in the UK (Lynch & Whitaker, 2013). As the second half of the twentieth century marked the birth of a united European continent, it also saw the decline of Britain's Empire: an aspect of the nation's history many of the public, predominantly English voters, are still proud of (Smith, 2019). (Smith, 2020) During this period, a once-dominant force that had invaded all but 22 of the recognized countries in the international community (at time of writing for Laycock, 2012) and controlled a quarter of the world incrementally surrendered or gave up the vast majority of its foreign territories.

Because of this contrast, some researchers have interpreted British Euroscepticism through a postcolonial lens (Bachmann & Sidaway, 2016; Dorling, 2019; Manners, 2018; Weale, 2016). They suggest the seismic shift in power relations has left much of the British public with a melancholic revanchism (Menon & Wager, 2019; Valluvan & Kalra, 2019). Seeing the EU gain the global economic privileges and pre-eminence the UK once enjoyed may partially explain the reluctance of successive UK governments and large swathes of its population to

---

[1] Before entering politics, and going on to become Mayor of London in 2008, Foreign Secretary in 2016 and later Prime Minister in 2019, Boris Johnson had a successful career in journalism. During which he became known for sensationalist stories about EU bureaucracy, which made him popular among the public and Conservative politicians alike. For example, his former friend and colleague Peter Oborne (2021) recalls him fabricating that the EU wanted to standardise condom sizes because Italians have small penises. The decision was about safety vs. size, and carried out by The European Committee of Standardization, which is not a part of the EU. Oborne suggests his rise was due to his "narcissism" (p 62) and "superstar" charisma (p 137).

[2] For accessibility, I will be using the terms United Kingdom and Great Britain synonymously. However, I am utilising the definition of the former, meaning both are used to refer to the union comprising England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

[3] For accessibility, the labels UK and EU will be used to refer to their respective negotiating teams, along with the various institutions that they represent.

accept customs unions and regulations. Particularly when its centralized machinations, bestowing policy-making powers to bureaucratic institutions, make it seem less accountable than the British state: an often-raised comparison during the campaign (Smith, 2019). From this perspective, the Brexit negotiation process represents a test of British identity and the imposition of a European one.

The EU is a democratic internationalist institution built around a shared ideology of political integration and shared sovereignty (Etiubon & Ibietan, 2018; Weale, 2016). They have become increasingly open to differentiated integration over time, with the legal and political structures allowing for a more socioeconomically heterogeneous membership. Holzinger and Tosun (2019) cite the European Monetary Union (EMU) as an example since some member states refused to join and the EU did not permit others. The authors note that other non-member states have unilaterally chosen to adapt their national laws or been induced by the EU to do so, such as Switzerland or countries in the European Economic Area. Still, institutionally the EU's core commitments emphasize consistently between the constituent members. Demonstrating this, Matthijs et al. (2019) show how the EU's two flagship policy areas, namely the Single Market and the Eurozone, are more inflexible than other federal arrangements such as the United States of America. The EU's philosophy of agreement underlies the gradual development of a single market and the principled standardization of trade, product regulations, and economic policy.

The pooled sovereignty approach, in which each member state reduces its power in exchange for representation at an institutional level, necessitates unanimity and cooperation (Peterson, 1997). Although the narrative of the UK as an 'awkward partner' can sometimes be exaggerated (Daddow & Oliver, 2016), these values are antithetical to their ideals that include self-governance and independence. Concepts that are entrenched in the country's neoliberal economic framework and culturally reinforced through a prevailing narrative of an outsider state prevented from being a truly global influence by an oppressive European superpower (Daddow, 2015; Smith, 2019). Consequently, the UK has been granted various allowances over the years in exchange for their continued participation. They have had the highest number of concessions in the past of all states and had the most significant examples of special treatment (Duttle et al., 2017). These have included an opt-out from the single currency, not being a part of the Schengen Zone and an annual rebate of £4.9 billion, described by the European budget commissioner Günther Oettinger as "the mother of all rebates" (Delcker, 2017).

The tumultuous relations between the UK and EU represent deep geopolitical divisions. But they also signify fundamental psychological differences, including attitudes towards power and a sense of collective identity. I do not deny the significant socioeconomic considerations that will have informed the tactics taken by both sides – others have comprehensibly discussed them elsewhere. But I do suggest differences in mindset could have influenced the attitudes and behavior of the people doing the negotiations, on both sides, and the populations they would be accountable to afterward. In that respect, though the talks were primarily a political process, they were a personal one on some level. As Hughes (2019) outlines, British prosperity, and by extension Brexit, is a mindset. Thus, it is potentially helpful to consider biases and decision-making processes that may underlie them.

1.1. The Moral Foundations Theory

Though people often consider the implications of his research in terms of how a species' physical traits have been subject to evolutionary change, Charles Darwin (1859) envisioned his work extending to the human mind. Natural selection, he argued, did not stop at the most complex organ: the brain. As such, the way that it operates should reflect nature's criterion. He envisioned that, over time, his new foundation would extend to psychology. Through this evolutionary perspective, our decision-making mechanisms can be conceptualized as adaptations,

attuned towards resolving ancestral selection pressures, i.e., those which limit survival or reproductive fitness (Buss, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). As a species with few natural defenses or physical advantages, humans potentially took up joint action for the mutual security benefits of having a community (Stevens & Hauser, 2004), e.g., strength in numbers or redistributing resources. Dawkins (2016) distinguishes between humans being naturally benevolent, which he does not believe they are, and being calibrated towards communal living to aid individual fitness. However, codependent tribes could not thrive without a shared moral sense to enable their cooperation (Haidt, 2012). For example, they could not sustain themselves if antisocial acts had become commonplace.

Psychologists have since sought to identify the kinds of moral codes that could have emerged as adaptations to survival challenges in ancestral times. Perhaps the most popular model of intuitive ethics is the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), which several fields have adopted, including personality, decision-making, and political science (Graham et al., 2013). Developed by Haidt and Graham (2007), this multi-layered framework understands moral intuitions through nativism, cultural learning, intuitionism, and pluralism. At its core, the authors suggest our history as a tribal species has resulted in a reflexive reasoning style that stems from evolved psychological systems.

These also represent dimensions different formal and informal groups can delineate themselves by, depending upon the narratives and constructs they establish around each. Haidt (2012) borrows Marcus' (2004) metaphor of a book getting redrafted in real-time. Some chapters in this book may be subject to heavy revisions in a given context, and for others it may be light. But provided there is evidence of a moral sense organized in advance of the editing, and it appears to be universal, he suggests it can be considered innate. Following extensive reviews of psychology, anthropology, and philosophy, he and colleagues suggest people derive their moral sense from five canonical foundations which prepare us to learn values, norms, and behaviors: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation (for a review, see Graham et al., 2013).

Members of a social species, such as humans, should invest in the welfare of group members. Care/harm is associated with protecting others, particularly at-risk parties. All mammals face the adaptive challenge of protecting offspring and potential allies for prolonged periods. The MFT predicts this drive manifests in emotions and virtues such as kindness, gentleness, compassion, and nurturance. Fairness/cheating is similarly oriented towards welfare, though related to the evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism, i.e., when individuals make sacrifices in the expectation of similar treatment in the future. Loyalty/betrayal stems from coalitions competing for finite resources. It results in preferential treatment to ingroup members, manifesting in patriotism or nationalism. Authority/subversion is about preserving the honor of the ingroup through conserving traditional institutions and structures that give it power. Lastly, purity/degradation relates to fears of physical or abstract contamination, i.e., conservative attitudes towards behavior deemed to be deviant or taboo. A foundation commonly manifested in religious beliefs and traditions.

Iyer et al. (2012) proposed Liberty/oppression as a sixth foundation, based upon concerns about coercion and freedom. I do not include it here because, at present, it is still a candidate rather than a canonical Foundation ("MoralFoundations.org," n.d.). However, given the rhetoric surrounding emancipation during the campaign and one side negotiating for the economic benefits of membership with reduced responsibilities, it is reasonable to expect this would be more relevant to the UK (Smith, 2019).

The MFT argues that we see situations as ethical to the extent that they relate to these foundations. Each represents a means by which individuals negotiate conflicts between protecting their welfare against that of their groups or others, i.e., inter or intra-tribal conflict. To Haidt (2012), the tribal mindset is an indelible part of human nature and an innate desire to seek out allies underlies affective polarization and

identity politics today. Tribes can be defined locally or globally, ranging from different cultures within the same neighborhood to party politics, individual nations, or international organizations, depending upon the type of collective identity individuals align themselves to, i.e., are they drawbridge up or drawbridge down people (TED, 2016)? Where there are considerable differences in moral reasoning, we tend to see poor intergroup relations (Graham et al., 2013). In the example above, the UK's nationalist vision of independent states is contrary to the EU's internationalist visions of ever closer union towards a politically integrated European continent. Even an awareness of alternative worldviews and moral norms can be seen as an existential threat, triggering retaliation against what the outgroup represents (Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 2011). It is on this abstract, emotional level that questions relating to sovereignty make the most sense. As per Auer (2017), provided the state had the authority to withdraw its ascent, the EU could not compromise the sovereignty of Britain's parliament: the paradox of the Brexit referendum.

The model's five-factor structure has been highly influential and, as suggested by tests of measurement invariance, universally stable (Doğruyol et al., 2019). It can, therefore, partially explain why people have ideological preferences or express different political identities. How individuals respond to MFT questionnaires predicts a vast amount of other attitudes including their political orientation (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2020), how they think public restrooms should be segregated (Cox et al., 2021), cooperative vs. militant approaches to foreign policy (Kertzer et al., 2014) and, most relevant to this paper, how they voted in the Brexit referendum (Harper & Hogue, 2019). There are also consistent patterns relating to political stances, with those on the left tending to prioritize care/harm and fairness/betrayal foundations, the individualizing foundations. In contrast, more conservative people place a higher value on the other three, known as the 'binding' foundations, which promote order and cohesion (Graham et al., 2009; Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2020).

The MFT argues that divergent approaches to socio-political topics lead to a range of reasoning styles. Between individuals or groups formed around particular values, different ways of seeing the world can cause an empathy gap. As Haidt (2012) says, reasonable people are easily divided by politics and religion because those on opposing sides do not feel the same way or have the same emotional responses to situations. As such, they do not always identify with each other's intuitions. Particular moral profiles appear to be relevant to the ideology guiding Leave, including the public mandate to carry it out along with the UK's contemporary political norms (Harper & Hogue, 2019; Smith, 2019). Likewise, distinct profiles may have contributed to the EU's development and enabled it to function in relative harmony for decades. It is, therefore, reasonable to think that differences between UK and EU moral styles may have informed how the two of them conducted negotiations in public or private.

This is not to imply that the EU is a homogenous entity. Arguably, it is more politically diverse and heterogeneous than the UK since it comprises a larger coalition of nations with distinct historiographies, priorities, and values. Member states have been at war with each other far more recently than parts of the UK. They also have a greater disparity in the political ideologies they have previously adopted, with 11 member states being post-communist countries. The EU practices both intergovernmentalism, where decisions follow widespread consensus and cooperation between member states, and supranationalism, where institutions independent of governments can prepare or make decisions (Schmidt, 2016; Preitz, 2018). So, while there exist significant differences between nations, it has been argued a common morality, which exists at an institutional vs. state level, recognizes and celebrates them (Eleftheriadis, 2011). Or, as their motto says, "united in diversity" ("The EU motto," n.d.). This dedication towards reconciliation and democracy underpins the organization winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 (Le Cacheux & Laurent, 2014).

1.2. The present article

Smith (2019) wrote a commentary exploring the Brexit campaign from an MFT perspective. The present article provides a follow-up, looking at the negotiation process that followed, during which the UK and the EU would translate the relatively abstract concepts of Brexit and sovereignty into concrete legal agreements with far-reaching ramifications (Menon & Wager, 2020). As with Smith (2019), I do not imply that the MFT is integral to understanding Brexit negotiations. After all, no psychology model, no matter how intricate, can explain a prolonged geopolitical process involving socioeconomic realities, political considerations, and the inputs of thousands of people engaging in conscious deliberation. When making significant political decisions, parties may also make decisions pragmatically rather than sticking rigorously to their principles, which it may be reasoned has happened with some compromises, including over the Northern Irish border.

However, primarily negotiations are carried out by people, who are prone to bias, on behalf of different ingroups, who also are (Haidt, 2012). Therefore, differences in values and moral styles should be present in aims, concessions, and red lines raised. Politics is personal, and identification with ingroups can impact members emotionally (Evans & Schaffner, 2019). Since those carrying negotiations are not doing so from a position of political neutrality, then the social intuitionist MFT can give us insight into why representatives approached them as they did. Therefore, it can provide us with a means of understanding why the two organizations involved in Brexit chose the red-lines they did and why finding a compromise took four and a half years.

In the following sections, I aim to explore the negotiation stance of both parties as a function of the Moral Foundations Theory. I concentrate upon three that are especially critical to this sort of negotiation: Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, and Authority/subversion. There is often substantial crossover, with issues that trigger one foundation applying to others, meaning their significance is not mutually exclusive (Haidt, 2012). For example, though I include debates about immigration in the section on Loyalty/betrayal, they are also relevant to Fairness/cheating. I will also briefly reflect on the significance of the other two foundations: Care/harm and Sanctity/degradation. In doing so, I aim to explore how the representatives of each side's apparent behavior and public statements suggest there may have been a difference in moral reasoning between the UK and EU negotiating teams. I also aim to show that the Moral Foundations Theory may help us better understand what happens when two political tribes, with different aims and values, negotiate legislation.

2. The Brexit negotiations and the Moral Foundations Theory

2.1. Fairness/cheating

As social animals, humans likely encountered many opportunities to participate in exchanges to forge relationships (Trivers, 1971). A recurring selection pressure, that ought to have calibrated us to recognize and respond to instances in which others are taking from a community without giving back. This foundation relates to intuitive concerns about unfair treatment and inequality so that individual members of a population can reap the benefits of two-way partnerships (Graham et al., 2013). Original triggers consist of cheating, cooperation, and deception, resulting in emotions such as anger, gratitude, and guilt that inform notions of justice, inequality, and reciprocation. Hyman (2014) argues these are inherent to mediated deal-making where parties negotiate competitively to meet their conflicting goals and desires.

An example of the fairness foundation informing the negotiations was what became known as the Brexit "divorce bill": Britain's outstanding liabilities of £39 billion, calculated by the UK's Office for Budget Responsibility, agreed before the referendum (Sánchez-Barrueco, 2018). This payment was an aspect of the withdrawal bill negotiated before the trade deal, following the EU insisting

that the UK pay existing commitments as a matter of justice. In line with the EU's redistributive approach towards conceptualizing fairness, the EU's chief Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier[4] originally stipulated that Britain should pay regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, saying delivering commitments for participation was a responsibility for all countries. Although he also played to the UK's reluctance, hinting the debt could be the basis for a link between the initial withdrawal settlement and the political/economic agreements to be made later (Ferguson, 2018).

Barnier might have taken this accommodating tone because the EU Financial Affairs Lords sub-committee (2017) had given a precedent for not paying, claiming the UK was not bound to doing so if it were to leave the EU without an arrangement. In support, Dominic Raab[5] (2018), then Brexit Secretary, wrote that Britain would not pay the terms of the financial settlement in the event of no deal. Likewise, Boris Johnson declared that there would not be any money owed in the absence of an agreement (Waugh, 2019). In both cases, they imply that the EU would be cheating the UK if they got it, portraying the financial settlement as Britain going beyond their obligations. Maybe this was a hard-negotiating tactic, which I will be returning to in the Authority/subversion section – to make it appear the UK was doing a favor. Regardless, the final withdrawal agreement resulted in the UK agreeing to scheduled payments. It would not be easy to envisage a deal with good terms if they had not agreed to this.

Throughout the Brexit campaign, the Leave side highlighted a trade deficit between the EU and the UK: that the EU exports more to the UK than the other way round ("Briefing: trade, investment and jobs will benefit if we Vote Leave," n.d.). A discrepancy that may explain why pollsters YouGov found that, during the negotiation, more British voters thought that the EU needed the UK more than the other way round (Smith, 2017). In theory, new trade barriers put a more significant amount of exports at risk for the 27 countries in the EU than for the UK. Hence former Brexit Secretary David Davis[6] European claiming car manufacturers would "be knocking down Chancellor Merkel's door demanding that there be no barriers to German access to the British market" within minutes of a vote for Brexit (Walker, 2018).

While it was true, at the time of Brexit, there was a trade surplus favoring the UK, the relative lack of kickback from EU companies may have been because it contributed to a considerably smaller portion of the remaining EU nations' combined economy than Britain's (Gasiorek et al., 2018). In the 12 months before September 2016, the trade surplus value was about £60 billion: UK imports were £302 billion worth of goods and services from the EU, vs. £242 billion worth of exports. Yet UK exports to EU countries were valued at approximately 13% of the economy vs. the 3–4% for the EU (Dhingra et al., 2017). The distinction came up when the then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson insulted Italian

minister Carlo Calenda by insisting his country would lose sales of Prosecco wine. A claim that was met with the qualifier Italy would lose sales to one country while the UK lost "fish and chips" exports to 27 (Mason et al., 2016).

The critical point is that the UK representatives appeared to view the relationship through the lens of equity: an arrangement that would acknowledge their contribution. They pushed for an unfettered free trade deal without the perceived costs of trading with the EU: the free circulation of people and the same regulations. Something Michel Barnier said the organization would "never, never, never" compromise on (Ellyatt, 2020) - which they did not. The EU side's insistence the UK would receive the same treatment as other third countries, regardless of its input to date, exemplifies their commitment to interpretations of fairness, focusing on equality vs. proportionality (Graham et al., 2009). They must be subject to European Law and could not access the EU on a tariff and quota-free basis. In other words, to have free movements in goods, the then President of the European Council, Donald Tusk,[7] stated that the UK must accept the other freedoms that all other states are bound to, including people's free movement (Jensen & Kelstrup, 2019).

In line with this commitment to unity, they sought a cohesive approach to negotiations – done with the cooperation of national governments. Through a combination of subtle instrumental and overt political maneuvers, they created a withdrawal agreement all member states signed up to (Schuette, 2021). They are a collective body and so argued that individual contributions of constituent states could not provide the basis for preferential treatment. Data shows that citizens who internalize the EU's identity see a responsibility to help members that contribute less, indicating they are willing to pay the price to preserve this sense of equality (Verhaegen, 2018). A very different mindset from Britain focused on their contribution relative to other members, i. e., proportionality (Haidt, 2012). On a related note, following the collapse of some Eurozone economies (that is to say, countries which use the Euro), EU law required Britain to be compensated, immediately and in full, for any losses caused by the union bailing out a member who adopted that currency (Mason, 2015). An economic concession other member states agree to make.

As the eventual deal grew closer, there was an increasing focus on preserving a level playing field between the UK and the EU. Trade policy would need to be standardized, resulting in common rules/practices to avoid businesses in one country gaining a competitive advantage over those in others. Typically, the European Court of Justice would enforce these. For the EU, the idea of an ex-member state extracting open access to the market while simultaneously being able to undercut their common high standards would be unfair (Kotsonis, 2020). This slant may also act as a strategic means of ensuring other countries, particularly recently ascended states, do not start to seek out concessions of their own from the EU obligations that they are less fond of (de Ruyter, 2020): a concern I will be returning to in the Authority/subversion section. For the EU, their priority was to protect members of the single market and control access to it.

Of course, the consensual approach represents a problem since the Leave campaign Boris Johnson fronted was won with an emancipatory narrative, depicting the EU as a fundamentally corrupt body of unelected bureaucrats reigning Britain in with needless laws (Smith, 2019). Ergo, allowing practices to be determined abroad to the advantage of the remaining member states could compromise the fairness

---

[4] Michel Barnier was the chief negotiator for both the withdrawal agreement and the free trade deal. He had previously been appointed a special advisor for defence and security, by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, following his time as French Foreign Minister. During the European financial reforms, which he oversaw, he built a reputation as a mediator, able to find agreement between diverse parties with competing interests (Barker & Spiegel, 2014).

[5] Dominic Raab was appointed Brexit Secretary in 2018, following the resignation of David Davis, and left the post later the same year after failing to negotiate a deal he could support. A dedicated Leaver, Raab had built a reputation as a loyal minister who was also willing to take a strong stance against the EU in support of a "full fat Brexit", such as previously calling his interlocutor Michel Barnier "unprofessional" (Drury & Buchan, 2018).

[6] David Davis served as Brexit Secretary between 2016 and 2018, resigning because he thought Theresa May's withdrawal agreement gave away "too much and too easily" (Cooper, 2018). Since the 1990s he had habitually bridled plans to transfer powers to the EU. A self-described "charming bastard", the former SAS reservist developed a reputation for machismo and enjoyed his nickname of "Monsieur Non" among EU members (Parker & Barker, 2018).

[7] Donald Tusk is a former Polish Prime Minister and served as President of the European Council between 2014 and 2019. He has frequently supported stronger political and economic integration within the continent. Hence, he famously said "we already miss you" on the day Theresa May triggered Article 50 to begin the negotiation process, lamenting it as not a "happy day" (Stone, 2017). As a crucial voice to the EU, it has been suggested he was integral to the decision to let the UK extend Article 50, rather than crashing out of the EU with no deal, and also the need for avoiding a hard border in Ireland (Craig, 2017).

foundation by limiting sovereignty. Aside from a level playing field potentially restricting Britain's ability to pursue deregulation or trade with other less restricted partners, the UK public's frustration with decisions that impact them getting made elsewhere is no small part of why they backed Brexit. During her time as Prime Minister, Theresa's May negotiated an ill-fated agreement committing the UK to EU rules on workers' rights, safety standards, and the environment in exchange for unfettered trade. Boris Johnson quickly pledged to scrap it after taking office following her resignation (Rayner, 2020).

The final deal saw a compromise both sides could reasonably claim as a victory. Between them, they negotiated an arrangement that would see the UK following EU rules for state aid and competition, though being able to set its standards on other areas within fixed parameters (Warrell, 2020). Should they deviate too far, then the EU could restrict access to the European market with tariffs. In effect, this means that they successfully negotiated protections that the UK agreed to follow, including areas such as environmental protection, transport, energy, and state aid. However, if these were too constraining, the UK could unilaterally withdraw from them later, and the European Court of Justice would have no jurisdiction. So, this deal is also in line with the UK achieving independence, as their continued cooperation is voluntary. To an extent, this was always true. As Auer (2017) points out, provided the UK had the authority to withdraw its ascent, which it did, then the EU never compromised the sovereignty of its parliament. Still, having this agreement offers a symbolic victory to both institutions.

While the latter was initially reluctant to compromise, it is worth mentioning that both Theresa May and Boris Johnson had previously agreed to some level playing field provisions. In each case, they had decided Northern Ireland would need to comply with some single market rules to avoid regulatory checks on the border with the Republic of Ireland, which is in the EU (Stojanovic, 2020). I will be returning to this controversial aspect of the negotiation more in the next section.

2.2. Loyalty/betrayal

This foundation is considered an adaptive response to forming cohesive coalitions (Haidt, 2012). In-groups need to be able to respond to perceived threats or challenges. It is thought to be behind grouping emotions such as pride and distrust of outgroups, with relevant virtues being patriotism and loyalty. Viewed on an evolutionary timescale, only recently have individuals been able to make contact with members of different races or cultures on a day-to-day basis (Navarrete et al., 2010). Instead, we have spent most of our time within small wandering clans and isolated communities. Haidt (2012) and colleagues would suggest that a hang-over from this era may be an inherent preference for one's ingroup, identity, and values foraged from shared historiography, narratives, and culture.

Haidt (2016) suggests nationalists tend to view their ingroups, and by extension their culture, as unique, so pursue policies to preserve it against alternatives. This viewpoint is similar to Anderson (2006), who explored nationalism as a function of imagined communities. He suggests customs and traditions enable people to establish commonality and group membership within the same population across generations. As the world has become increasingly globalized, nations represent an example of a socially constructed community of people who identify with each other. This identification could take different forms within the same communities, depending upon the aspects of a local culture and history people respond to.

For some, UK identity might be based upon its labor movement or its colonial tradition. This matter is further complicated by the gradual succession of the UK into its constituent elements via nationally entrusted devolved parliaments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Post-nationalists, or cosmopolitans, may also feel little sense of national pride or nationalism (Heath & Tilley, 2005). However, a sense of "Englishness" built around the Empire's achievements was a significant predictor of people supporting Brexit (Henderson et al., 2017;

Smith, 2019). Negative views of immigrants are also more common in Brexit vs. Remain favoring towns (Springford et al., 2016).

With common consensus, culture, and a pro-federal political system, identity can transcend borders. Many interlinking regional identities can coexist multidimensionally with a common societal identity. For the EU, modernity, cosmopolitanism, and social justice may define its cultural and political identity (Delanty, 2004). In contrast to a nationalist UK identity, meaning a sense of national superiority and desire for dominance, support for the EU correlates with the closely linked concept of patriotism, i.e., a sense of pride in one's country (Huddy et al., 2021).

Identification with an ingroup appears to have a powerful influence on people's attitudes and feelings (Evans & Schaffner, 2019). While specifics vary both between and within cultures, depending upon the values of communities, evidence shows paraphernalia associated with nationhood can increase feelings of nationalism (Kemmelmeier & Winter 2008) and increase nationalists' hostility towards outgroup members (Becker et al., 2011). In the UK context, prejudice against immigrants was a reliable predictor of people voting Leave but not Remain (Golec et al., 2019; Meleady et al., 2017). This pattern is not surprising since concerns about freedom of movement were among the main reasons people backed Brexit (Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017) and the Leave campaign's most persistent topic (Swales, 2016). Hence immigration would inevitably be a big part of the negotiations to follow.

As an ingroup, the EU values an apparent commonality and equality between citizens, with unrestricted travel being so fundamental to be one of the four freedoms. Thus, a country retaining economic unity in the absence of offering this freedom goes against their red lines. However, to not prioritize an end to freedom of movement would go against the UK's. Preserving or stopping freedom of movement could be seen as a violation of ingroup loyalty (Haidt, 2012), albeit to different ingroups.

Both Brexit Prime Ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson guaranteed an ending to unrestricted freedom of movement as a priority. But, as their predecessor David Cameron[8] found out when trying to renegotiate the UK's position in the EU before the referendum, a general opt-out is not something states could do while retaining free access to the European market (Weiss & Blockmans, 2016). The EU has become increasingly restrictive in the last decade, with freedom of movement typically subject to communitarian conditions at the national level rather than absolute. For example, there are restrictions for receiving residence permits or social assistance in many EU countries (Martinsen & Pons Rotger, 2014). Nevertheless, its legislative branches, the European Commission and the European Parliament, conceptualize the ability to move freely between countries as an individual right (Roos & Westerveen, 2020). The European Council is an exception, tending not to frame freedom of movement as a right unto itself, but pragmatically seeing mobility as an essential part of establishing a common EU labor market. Thus, the UK negotiators got the promised end to unrestricted immigration. By opting out of the four freedoms, though, the UK could no longer take on the Norwegian or Swiss models since each necessitates freedom of movement. Meaning they would have to fight to preserve the economic benefits and opportunities that come with membership.

There were further complications involving immigration, such as the prospect of the UK repatriating 3 million EU citizens living in Britain. Despite the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee stating that EU citizens should not be bargaining chips in negotiations, clarifications were slow, with many worried about being deported following a newly

---

[8] David Cameron was UK Prime Minister between 2010 and 2016. As Conservative Party leader, he famously said they needed to stop "banging on about Europe" (Kettle, 2016). Ironically, it was losing the Brexit referendum that ended his career. It has been suggested that Cameron's biggest flaw was being reactive, and putting out fires, rather than having a coherent plan. Hence the decision to hold an EU referendum being portrayed as an attempt to appease his own divided party than satisfying a public demand (Seldon & Snowdon, 2015).

introduced criminal check (Bulat, 2018; Henley, 2019). During the referendum campaign, the Brexit side had offered indefinite leave to remain to 3 million EU citizens already legally residents of the UK. However, in her capacity as Prime Minister, Theresa May said their right to settled status depended on the rights of 1 million UK citizens in Europe (Cowburn, 2016). A tit for tat arrangement consistent with proportionality interpretations of the fairness foundation, implying a threat should the EU not reciprocate the UK position. Unlike EU institutions, they did not see travel as a right per se but a deal component. Both sides later agreed to guarantees, but this attitude may be one part of why emigration from the UK among EU citizens increased substantially during the negotiation period (Lomax, 2019).

On a related point, the then French economic affairs minister Emmanuel Macron suggested his government would pull out of the Le Touquet agreement if Brexit went ahead (Henley, 2016). This agreement is a bilateral arrangement that places part of Britain's border with France in the port town of Calais. Since a likely consequence of France opting out would be reduced border security on their side, Macron used the prospect of more refugees as a tactic to put people in Britain off Brexit. Another way of appealing to the Loyalty foundation, but this time through a warning. Potentially, he was triggering the Care/harm foundation too. In the months before the Brexit referendum, the Leave side campaigned on the perceived risk of Angela Merkel's decision to allow undocumented refugees into Europe, facilitating the movement of terrorists (Abbas, 2019; Smith, 2019).

A tactic in step with the "could be terrorists" schema in the European discourse surrounding Muslims (Goldberg, 2006). The conflation between refugees and terror suspects is based on the fear that a lack of systematic checks in the EU Schengen Zone could offer an unperturbed passage to the English Channel. In that respect, the French government was priming the possibility that a divisive Brexit would leave the UK vulnerable to terror. I will return to this theme in the section about other moral concerns. However, once again, we see an example of an outgroup used as leverage. These threats did not amount to anything and were likely more posturing in a way that treated people in outgroups as pawns.

A more sustained concern relating to border control focused on the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. If the UK were to leave the Customs Union, as planned, then theoretically, a barrier would need to rematerialize on the island of Ireland to check goods going between countries. On a practical level, new infrastructure would present a major hindrance to unfettered trade. However, more importantly, it would risk inflaming tensions between communities (Durrant & Stojanovic, 2018). The island of Ireland is split between a republic south with 26 counties, which is in the EU, and six northern counties ruled from Westminster and a devolved parliament in Belfast.

There is not space to give a comprehensive explanation as to the nature of the British and Irish relations. But at its most basic, tensions in Northern Ireland come from a struggle between parties that intend to reunite the island and others that want to keep the six counties as part of the UK. Ongoing tensions in the north revolve around numerous societal, religious, political, economic, and psychological factors (Cairns & Darby, 1998). Therefore, the resultant Troubles are deeply rooted in the Loyalty foundation suggested by Haidt (2012), stemming from ingroup within a common region, delineated by loyalty to historically opposed institutions. The concern was that a border separating parts of Ireland, or separating Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK, could lead to political unrest. Possibly even reigniting the violence in Northern Ireland that had lasted decades.

One solution was the Irish backstop: something Theresa May negotiated and later lost her job over, and something her successor Boris Johnson initially supported (Belam, 2019). It meant that for the duration of a transition period, as they developed the technology for an invisible border, the UK would be beholden to the single market and customs union as part of a single customs territory until another arrangement was agreed. From the UK perspective, this solution was not sustainable

in the long term since the supposedly temporary agreement would lock them into an existing structure indefinitely: unable to forge new trading relationships with non-EU nations. A far cry from the independent, global trader envisioned during the Brexit campaign (Smith, 2019).

As a negotiating objective, both Prime Ministers agreed Brexit could not mean membership of the single market, yet legally leaving this would necessitate a border (Hayward, 2019). However, placing one in the Irish sea, which Boris Johnson eventually agreed to, would misalign Northern Ireland with the rest of the United Kingdom (Murphy, 2021). An arrangement that would be particularly undesirable because the people of Northern Ireland voted against Brexit. Something that they probably did because they recognized the importance of retaining a free trade relationship with the Republic of Ireland and how leaving could impede this (Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, 2017).

Members of the UK government, including Home Secretary Priti Patel said and Boris Johnson said violating the unity of the UK would be 'unacceptable' (Hossein-Pour, 2019). The latter said the sea trade border he later agreed to would be over his 'dead body' (McHugh, Young & Black, 2020). However, a range of factors, potentially including the democratic nostalgia of Britain as a sovereign state (Weale, 2016), the political cost of not securing a free trade deal and with the EU, and the pressure to counteract a move towards Irish unity, appeared to push them towards accepting a variant of this proposal. Within months of the Brexit deal, violence broke out in Northern Ireland. Commentators, and Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis, argued identity issues from the introduction of a border and customs checks, economically moving Northern Ireland away from Britain and toward Ireland, were among several causes (Blevins, 2021; Cameron-Chileshe & Brunsdel, 2021). A tragic example of both the polarizing nature of the loyalty foundation and the cost of ignoring it.

2.3. Authority/subversion

The Authority/subversion foundation has its origins in communal living: the pressure of forging beneficial relationships within a hunter-gatherer context consisting of dominance hierarchies (Haidt, 2012). The original triggers would include a recognition of rank, provoking emotions of respect and fear. Today it manifests in a concern for the status quo, deference to authority figures, and respecting the legitimacy of modern institutions (Graham et al., 2013). It is, therefore, central to a complex process consisting of two such institutions negotiating policy in their self-interest.

This foundation appeared to be of the utmost importance to EU negotiators. Figueira and Martill (2020) argue that the UK failed to understand the EU position. They thought the UK government expected the unity between member states would not hold, so they would get a bespoke relationship to match their unique position as a member state. These assumptions represent a fundamental misunderstanding of EU values, including the indivisibility of the four freedoms mentioned above. A day after the 2016 referendum, the presidents of the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission made a statement about the "survival" of the EU, reinforcing the importance of common symbolic and economic values (Laffan, 2019). Patel (2018) suggests their negotiators were opposed to a No Deal outcome and wanted to manage the extent of the foreseeable damage to the EU economy. As Donald Tusk repeatedly stated, there could be no winners – only losers (Brunsden, 2016). However, their key priorities were not necessarily financial ones. Instead, their principal concern was to counter deference by preserving the integrity of the EU and ensuring the UK's departure would not act as a source of inspiration for other Euro-sceptic movements.

Following the Brexit referendum, throughout Europe radical left and right parties alike defied the further transfer of budgetary/economic authority towards the EU (Carrieri & Vittori, 2021). Questions about European integration, particularly regarding existing policies, also received a new focus in the press (Bijsmans, 2021; Bijsmans et al., 2018).

Across the continent, survey data suggests most voters believe the EU may fall apart within 10–20 years, and over a quarter (including over 50% of young people in some samples) think a war between member states is a possibility (Dennison et al., 2019). There are also individual countries, such as Italy, in which Eurosceptic parties have recently outpolled their pro-EU counterparts (Conti et al., 2020). Survey data shows citizens in 'the big four' economies (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) mostly support remaining in the EU. However, they are more likely to support leaving if the UK economy is in a good state five years later (Walsh, 2020). Thus a positive outcome for Britain may have further encouraged representatives from other governments to renegotiate their membership terms and conditions. A unique arrangement granting favorable conditions to third countries would have therefore been out of the question.

Despite negotiating as the junior partner, the UK pursued hard-bargaining. They took a distributive vs. problem-solving approach, perceiving negotiations in competitive zero-sum terms. For example, representatives frequently reminded 'opponents' they were willing to walk away from the table and 'no deal is better than a bad deal' (Frennhoff Larsén & Khorana, 2020). It was a dangerous adversarial strategy Martill and Staiger (2018) considered atypical of those in a position of comparative weakness. The authors argue the positioning reflected a belief the UK would naturally be in the driving seat. This outlook is consistent with Britain's nostalgia as a superpower that informed the referendum result (Henderson et al., 2017; Smith, 2019).

Many leavers understood this hard-bargaining with references to Britain's past, considering the process to represent a glorious second revolution that would restore British liberties and self-confidence (Gamble, 2018). Several big speeches from Theresa May,[9] Boris Johnson, and other cabinet members sold the vision of a post-Brexit Global Britain no longer neutered by the EU: leading the world in trade, science, and foreign policy, among other things (Daddow, 2019). None of which they argued could be achieved with a "Brexit in name only." Chair of the Brexit-backing European Research Group, Jacob Rees-Mogg, likened Brexit to past military battles, including Waterloo and Agincourt (Walker, 2018). Several high-profile members of the UK government compared Britain leaving with the existential threat faced during World War 2. This list included Brexit Secretary David Davis – who suggested the same civil service who coped with the war could manage Brexit – and Mark Francois, who said his veteran father "never submitted to bullying by any German and neither will his son." The comparison was also meaningful because the vision of an integrated Europe arose from the trauma of the post-war era. And the long-term goal of finding peace, ending the history of bloodshed from the continent's many wars. It's an integral part of the European Union still proudly shared on the organization's website ("The history of the European Union," n.d).

Boris Johnson previously walked out from his appointment as Foreign Secretary to Theresa May after declaring that his leader was pursuing a "semi Brexit" which would leave the UK with "the status of a colony" (Buchan, 2018). This sort of rhetoric was consistent with his ongoing attitude towards Brexit. During the campaign, he urged people of the UK to adopt Winston Churchill's defiance, likening what he saw as the EU's attempts to create a European superstate to Hitler and Napoleon (Ross, 2016). Despite apologizing for this parallel, as both Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, he continued to pepper his language with

allusions to conflict and dominance. Including when he compared French President Francois Hollande[10] to a Prisoners of War camp guard, administering "punishment beatings" in a statement likening Brexit to movies such as The Great Escape (Murphy & Cecil, 2017). Or when he suggested that May had made a "stealthy retreat" on her early promises, claimed he would rather "die in a ditch" than extend the Brexit deadline, and said legislation designed to avoid a no-deal scenario was a "surrender bill" (Honeyman, 2019).

Even the motto "take back control," repeatedly said during the campaign and the negotiation, is in line with democratic nostalgia, hinting at freedom taken from the UK (Weale, 2016). Like Donald Trump's mantra "make America great again," the allusion to better times from before is essential. Combined with a focus on the UK's imperial past, it emotively speaks to the authority foundation by priming anxieties surrounding invasion, occupation, and a loss of sovereignty (Stratton, 2019). To view a negotiation in this way, even as posturing, could make reaching agreements harder and give the impression that changes to their negotiating stance would be a sign of weakness (Frennhoff Larsén & Khorana, 2020). The focus on empowering UK institutions also severely limited the flexibility of their negotiating partners. By insisting the UK leaves the Single Market, the Customs Union and is free from the European Court of Justice jurisdiction, the UK ruled out the sorts of deals Norway and Switzerland had (Keating, 2021). Ironically, the harder-won bespoke arrangement has come with the types of administration and legal protocols that had once provided a rationale to leave.

One specific example of Authority/subversion entering negotiating was fishing: an industry in which the UK and EU are symbiotic. The EU trade relies on the North and Irish Seas for a large share of its catch, while the UK's biggest markets are in the EU. Hence Phillipson and Symes (2018) argued that of all the issues to be negotiated during Brexit, fishing would be among the most complex and contentious. The authors suggest that the best solutions involve cooperation: a shared vision and approach. As a percentage of the UK economy, the industry contributes a fractional amount worth just 0.02% in 2019 (Morris & Barnes, 2021).

Yet, the symbolism of the UK claiming sovereignty over its waters seems to have carried a lot of weight since it was the final hurdle for securing a free trade deal. UK representatives, including Boris Johnson, may have been thinking about the symbolism of the win vs. the real-world considerations. Hence, he said "no sensible government" could agree to a deal that did not put the seas under UK control (Boffey & Stewart, 2020). Fishing is a point of national pride for coastal communities. Along with the quotas, there was a tangible example of a concession that may mean more to the public than relatively abstract financial arrangements: a 200-mile exclusive economic zone.

The EU conceded, giving UK fishers a relatively higher quotient than before. However, they only reached this compromise after the UK Ministry of Defense had put gunboats on standby (Sabbagh, 2020). Potentially this was done for show though it was a hostile response nonetheless. Although if the EU's climbdown represented a victory, as the UK presented it, then it was a pyrrhic one. Industry leaders and boat owners said new customs processes and formalities would make fishing sales significantly more challenging (Morris & Carroll, 2020). In a particularly memorable parliamentary moment, the Speaker of the House of Commons had to follow up Jacob Rees-Mogg's claim that fish are "better and happier" being British by saying that there was no empirical evidence for it (Osborne, 2021). Their exchange took place against the backdrop of lorry loads of seafood getting destroyed. The Scottish Fishermen's Federation claimed the industry was making losses of a million pounds per day due to new paperwork requirements

---

[9] Theresa May served as Prime Minister between 2016 and 2019. Biographer Anthony Seldon (2020) notes that she was detail oriented and cautious, but lacked the strategic clarity, charisma and intellectual confidence to complete Brexit. She later stood down, after failing to get her withdrawal agreement through parliament three times.

---

[10] Francois Hollande was French President between 2012 and 2017. An opponent of Brexit, he warned "there must be a threat, there must be a risk, there must be a price" to preserve the principles of the EU: consistent with concerns surrounding the Authority/subversion foundation (Chrisafis, 2016).

resulting in unprecedented waiting times (Johnson, 2021). The UK government reinforced its institutional authority, though potentially at the risk of its credibility and the livelihoods of people it claimed to empower.

2.4. Other MFT considerations

Although she would be the first Prime Minister to take the first stab at negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU, Theresa May was a Remainer. Albeit not an especially visible one: her rare interventions earned her the nickname 'Submarine May' from colleagues on the same side (Oliver, 2016). However, her rationale for supporting continued membership was in line with her role as the then Home Secretary: security. She was concerned that data sharing could be compromised. The Care/harm foundation is tied to safety and protecting vulnerable people (Haidt, 2012). Consequently, during of her most prominent speeches, May (2017) said she wanted to ensure a "comprehensive framework for future security, law enforcement, and criminal justice cooperation." As the possibility of a no-deal outcome loomed, complications were surrounding this issue. Yet, there are signs the UK is now seeking to strengthen international policing arrangements instead of adopting the insular approaches many feared they would (Jaffel & Pearson, 2021). For issues as sensitive as national security, pooled resources are desirable even to a state intent on self-governance.

The MFT suggests the Sanctity/degradation foundation came from a fear of contamination. However, it has also been generalized to respond to corrupting ideas that can contaminate a society, i.e., an ethical immune system that underlies religious values (Graham et al., 2013). Some researchers have drawn parallels between the marketing of Brexit before and the referendum with religious dogma (Kettell & Kerr, 2021), arguing that the Leave campaign framed leaving the EU in quasi-religious terminology. Similarly, others have used the idea of ideological purity to explain the EU's dogmatic commitment to preserving the integrity of the four freedoms (Kohler & Müller, 2017; Matthijs et al., 2019). It has even been labeled as "political Messianism" (Weiler, 2012). Still, the most explicit reference to religion came from Boris Johnson, who told his predecessor Theresa May to invoke the spirit of Moses and say, "let my people go" (Johnson, 2019). A comparison that aligns the complicated withdrawal process from a voluntary membership to the Israelites enslavement and immodestly positions himself as a prophet.

3. General discussion: Brexit means Brexit

Theresa May's infamous tautology exposes one of the biggest challenges of leaving the European Union. In an age in which trade and economics have become increasingly globalized, it is not clear how leaving the EU would look. The present commentary explores some of the problems that can arise when translating idealism into concrete legislation. Combined with Smith (2019), it argues that the Brexit referendum, and the subsequent negotiation, were partly based upon relatively abstract ideas, such as freedom, fairness, and authority. These would need to be actualized, resulting in concrete pacts that would satisfy collective units driven by feelings and virtues such as group pride, deference for their institutions, and interpretations of justice, as underlined by their own cultures and historiographies (Graham et al., 2013). These complications were exacerbated by the already strained relations between the two parties negotiating.

Some may regard the free-trade deal as a failure in diplomacy. Others may see it as a success story or politicians making the best of difficult circumstances. There are pragmatic considerations that go into this kind of negotiation: when realpolitik necessitates a climbdown or compromise. For example, it is unlikely that the UK representatives would voluntarily give the EU £39 billion unless they saw a benefit. Likewise, the economic forecasts predicting reduced economic growth in the UK, regardless of the deal (Tetlow & Stojanovic, 2018), perhaps encouraged

their negotiators to compromise where they ideally would not have. A possibility that could be owed to the Care Foundation, and the desire to protect the public from harm, or the fear of an electoral backlash of not doing so. It is also improbable that the EU would have compromised on fishing as much as they did were it not the last hurdle to a deal. There are also many other competing interests for both sides. EU and UK leaders are influenced by lobby groups, stakeholders, and their populations (Coen & Katsaitis, 2021; James & Quaglia, 2019). The British Conservative party leaders are also subject to the often contradictory demands of a divided party that mutually supports cosmopolitanism and communitarianism (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020; Shipman, 2017). Even within the same political party, there can be a diversity of opinions and moral profiles (Haidt, 2012). It was these intra-tribal issues that eventually pushed May to resign from her post.

These considerations are outside the scope of this paper, which is looking broadly at the role of moral psychology. Yet Haidt (2012) notes foundations offset the importance of each other along with broader political concerns. In other words, while the MFT hypothesizes evolution has calibrated humans to respond to tribal tensions via innate ethics, present before experience, these are enacted upon via our environments and unique situations. Therefore, it is tough to know how much of the negotiation comes from firmly held moral positions and how much comes from political realities.

There is also the possibility that some of those negotiating Brexit were making it up as they went along (Hanning, 2020), rather than abiding by a set of scripts or tactics. Without witnessing events first-hand, it is impossible to say how genuine the account communicated through the media has been or how much of what we saw has been showmanship. Alan Duncan (2021), former deputy to Boris Johnson, dismissed him as an "embarrassing buffoon" (p227) with little understanding of EU laws and minimal plan. He depicts negotiations as a slapdash process both Theresa May and Boris Johnson went into naively. This interpretation is consistent with the MFT idea of emotions vs. rationality driving political decision making, leaving it open to interpretation how much of the outcome was down to luck and improvisation: we are perhaps only seeing the tip of the iceberg through controlled media reports. It also, of course, unclear the extent to which we can rely upon the public statements of partisan actors like Duncan, who left the government because he disagreed with both Brexit and the way it was handled (Pickard & Samson, 2019). His accounts could well be accurate, though they could also be subject to exaggeration and distortion.

At present, we have little insight into the individual contributions of each actor or how their unique personalities impacted the negotiation process. On the one hand, their portfolios sometimes comprise extensive departments, who work on their behalf, so they may be little more than figureheads. However, to the extent that they are personally responsible for setting these departments' direction, their personality may be a factor. Sharma et al. (2018) show how personality traits, such as dominance and likeability, can predict individual negotiating performance in field research. They suggest that these psychological dimensions are integral to understanding how people manage/fail to compromise. For instance, for the hard-bargaining style adopted by the UK representatives, disagreeableness may be an asset. Whereas for a more problem-oriented one, it may be less appropriate (Dimotakis et al., 2012).

Biographies and personal accounts can shed light on how the people in them shape negotiations. There are likely political dimensions that informed the roles which different people were given. Michele Barnier's selection as the European Commission's chief negotiator follows his time as European commissioner for financial services. During this period, he gained a reputation as a tough negotiator, spearheading a new approach to EU banking laws, including putting caps on banker bonuses and restricting short selling. His commitment to the vision of the EU as 27 countries speaking in a united voice, rather than a federation, would be seen as a strength when a country risked subverting the consensus between member states (Watt, 2016). It also seems likely that Theresa May

was motivated to give Brexiteers Boris Johnson, David Davis, and Liam Fox prominent positions to avoid further in-party tensions. Each had credibility with the party's right wing, and by putting them in charge of the discussions, they would have ownership of the results (Seldon, 2020).

Beyond practical considerations, each appointment should have an appropriate person-job fit (Kristof-Brown & Guay, 2011). For example, May placing Davis in charge of the newly established Department for Exiting the European Union could have also been because his uncompromising bluster and bravado were consistent with the hard-bargaining tactics (Shipman, 2017). Likewise, Labour MP KevinBrannan (2016) dismissed Boris Johnson heading the foreign office as "the most remarkable appointment since the Emperor Caligula appointed his horse a senator" (Brennan, 2016). But May's advisor Nick Timothy recalls her praising her "gobsmacked" former leadership rival for his robust intellect and political effectiveness (Seldon, 2020, p. 74). In addition to his popularity within the party, she appears to have considered his boisterous personality and salesmanship vs. statesmanship as an asset (Stewart, 2016).

Insights into the psychological profiles of the people in charge of the negotiations can help us to understand how they got the roles they did and how they operated when in them. Candidates for consideration include The Big Five: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (John & Srivastava, 1999). These traits correspond to individual political ideologies and participation (Gerber et al., 2011) e.g., Openness being associated with liberl attitudes and Conscentiousness being associated with conservative attitudes. Regional differences in the Big Five also predict people's attitudes towards Brexit (Garretsen et al., 2018) By extension, they may also indicate how those responsible for negotiating fulfilled their roles. Similarly, oppositional attitudes towards supranationalism are an even more reliable predictor of attitudes towards Brexit than other established factors such as national identity and the extent to which people perceive immigration as a threat (Peitz et al., 2018).

The final deal allowed both sides to present it as a win: the UK had protected its national sovereignty. The EU had retained a free-trade agreement with the UK without forfeiting its unity or integrity. At the moment, the signs point towards Brexit, confining the UK's economic ambitions for at least the short term. Overall exports to the EU, still their largest trading partner, dropped by over 40% in the month following Brexit (Casey, 2021). However, a part of this may also be due to heightened security during the Covid-19 pandemic. There also exists the possibility of the UK making up the shortfall with the other international trade deals presently negotiated ("UK trade agreements with non-EU countries," n.d).

What is certain is that the implications of this process will go on for some time yet. Not least because of how divergent Brexit preferences throughout the UK's four nations raises many constitutional and political problems, including a reinvigorated push for Scottish independence fueled by the possibility of re-entry (McEwen & Murphy, 2021). Brexit is a process rather than an event, and the ongoing affiliation between the UK and the EU will undoubtedly be subject to geopolitical developments. Successive UK governments will inevitably wish to renegotiate, or alter, aspects of their relationship with the EU. Hence this story, which potentially reflects priorities as old as humanity, is far from over.

Funding

Declaration of competing interest

The author has declared no competing interests exist.

Acknolwdgements

References

Abbas, M. S. (2019). Conflating the muslim refugee and the terror suspect: Responses to the Syrian refugee "crisis" in Brexit Britain. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 42*(14), 2450–2469. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1588339

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.* London, United Kingdom: Verso Books.

Auer, S. (2017). Brexit, sovereignty and the end of an ever closer union. *Brexit: Sociological Responses*, 41–53.

Bachmann, V., & Sidaway, J. D. (2016). Brexit geopolitics. *Geoforum, 77*, 47–50.

Barker, A., & Spiegel, P. (2014, September 28). *Michel Barnier urges MEPs to give UK's Lord Hill a fair hearing.* Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/23a8624a-4 6fb-11e4-8c50-00144feab7de.

Becker, J. C., Enders-Comberg, A., Wagner, U., Christ, O., & Butz, D. A. (2012). Beware of national symbols. *Social Psychology, 43*(1), 3–6. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000073

Belam, M. (2019, March, 29). *Leading brexiters: What they said ... And how they voted.* The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/29/leading-brexite rs-what-they-said-and-how-they-voted.

Bijsmans, P. (2021). The Eurozone crisis and Euroscepticism in the European press. *Journal of European Integration, 43*(3), 331–346. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1740698

Bijsmans, P., Galpin, C., & Leruth, B. (2018). Brexit' in transnational perspective: An analysis of newspapers in France, Germany and The Netherlands. *Comparative European Politics, 16*(5), 825–842. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-017-0104-z

Blevins, D. (2021, April 9). *Northern Ireland: Broken Brexit promises threaten to turn back the clock on fragile peace.* Sky News. https://news.sky.com/story/broken-brexit-pr omises-threaten-to-turn-back-the-clock-on-northern-irelands-fragile-peace-12270938.

Boffey, D., & Stewart, H. (2020, December 18). *Michel Barnier seeks to end Brexit deadlock with fresh fishing proposal.* The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/polit ics/2020/dec/18/barnier-fishing-row-obstacle-final-hours-brexit-talks.

Brennan, K. (2016, July 27). Boris Johnson appointment is the most remarkable since Caligula's horse. http://www.kevinbrennan.co.uk/2016/07/boris-johnson-appoi ntment-is-most.html.

Briefing: Trade, investment and jobs will benefit if we Vote Leave (n.d). http://www.vot eleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_trade.html.

Brunsden, J. (2016, October 13). *'Hard Brexit' or no Brexit, Donald Tusk warns UK.* Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/df4885fa-9160-11e6-8df8-d377 8b55a923.

Buchan, L. (2018, July 09). Boris Johnson warns 'Brexit dream is dying' in scathing resignation letter. The Independent https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/polit ics/boris-johnson-letter-resignation-latest-theresa-may-brexit-statement-a8439346. html.

Bulat, A. (2018). The rights of non-UK EU citizens living here are not a'done deal'. This is why. *LSE Brexit.* http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88608/1/brexit-2018-02-27-the-rights-of-non-uk-eu-citizens-living-here-are.pdf.

Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for psychological science. *Psychological Inquiry, 6*(1), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0601_1

Cairns, E., & Darby, J. (1998). The conflict in Northern Ireland: Causes, consequences, and controls. *American Psychologist, 53*(7), 754–760. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.53.7.754

Cameron-Chileshe, J., & Brunsden, J. (2021, April 13). *Brexit trading laws contributed to Northern Ireland unrest.* Lewis says. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/b2 c6fd29-b134-4999-90cb-8a35c371f8ed.

Carl, N., Dennison, J., & Evans, G. (2019). European but not European enough: An explanation for Brexit. *European Union Politics, 20*(2), 282–304. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116518802361

Carrieri, L., & Vittori, D. (2021). Defying Europe? The euroscepticism of radical right and radical left voters in western Europe. *Journal of European Integration*, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.1882454

Casey, A. (2021, March 12). *UK trade: January 2021.* Office for National Statistics. htt ps://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/bulletins/uktrade/january2021.

Chrisafis, A. (2016, October 7). *UK must pay price for Brexit, says François Hollande.* The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/07/uk-must-pay-price-for-brexit-says-francois-hollande.

Clarke, H. D., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Why Britain voted for Brexit: An individual-level analysis of the 2016 referendum vote. *Parliamentary Affairs, 70*(3), 439–464. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx005

Coen, D., & Katsaitis, A. (2021). Lobbying Brexit negotiations: Who lobbies Michel barnier? *Politics and Governance, 9*(1), 37–47. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag. v9i1.3666

Conti, N., Marangoni, F., & Verzichelli, L. (2020). Euroscepticism in Italy from the onset of the crisis: Tired of Europe? *South European Society & Politics*, 1–26. https://doi. org/10.1080/13608746.2020.1757885

Cowburn, A. (2016, July 27). Theresa May says she has an 'open mind' over Brexit negotiations. Independent https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/brexit-there sa-may-negotiations-eu-referendum-result-leave-europe-a7158516.html.

Cox, J., Stanziani, M., Coffey, C. A., Bownes, E., Holliday, S. B., & Meaux, L. T. (2021). "Your rights end where mine begin": A mixed-methods study of moral foundations theory and support for bathroom bills. *Sexuality Research and Social Policy*, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13178-021-00559-w

Craig, P. P. (2017). *The process: Brexit and the anatomy of article 50. The Law and Politics of Brexit*. Oxford University Press. *2017*.

Daddow, O. (2015). Interpreting the outsider tradition in British European policy speeches from thatcher to Cameron. *Journal of Communication and Media Studies: Journal of Common Market Studies, 53*(1), 71–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12204

Daddow, O. (2019). GlobalBritain™: The discursive construction of Britain's post-brexit world role. *Global Affairs, 5*(1), 5–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2019.1599297

Daddow, O., & Oliver, T. (2016). A not so awkward partner: The UK has been a champion of many causes in the EU. LSE Ideas http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66177/8/blogs.lse.ac.uk_A_not_so_awkward_partner_the_UK_has_been_a_champion_of_many_causes_in_the_EU.pdf.

Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or, the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. *J. Murray*.

Dawkins, R. (2016). *The selfish gene*. Oxford university press.

Delanty, G. (2004). Is there a European identity? *Global Dialogue, 5*(3/4), 76–86.

Delcker, J. (2017, June 1). Oettinger wants to scrap all rebates in post-Brexit EU budget. *Politico*. https://www.politico.eu/article/oettinger-wants-to-scrap-all-rebates-in-post-brexit-eu-budget/.

Dennison, S., Leonard, M., & Lury, A. (2019). *What Europeans really feel: The battle for political system*. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/what_europeans_really_feel_the_battle_for_the_political_system_eu_election/.

Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G. I., Sampson, T., & Reenen, J. V. (2016). *The consequences of Brexit for UK trade and living standards*. London: LSE.

Dimotakis, N., Conlon, D. E., & Ilies, R. (2012). The mind and heart (literally) of the negotiator: Personality and contextual determinants of experiential reactions and economic outcomes in negotiation. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 97*(1), 183–193.

Dorling, D. (2019). *Rule britannia: Brexit and the end of Empire*. Biteback Publishing.

Doğruyol, B., Alper, S., & Yilmaz, O. (2019). The five-factor model of the moral foundations theory is stable across WEIRD and non-WEIRD cultures. *Personality and Individual Differences, 151*, 109547. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109547

Drury, C., & Buchan, L. (2018, July 09). Dominic Raab: Who is the man tasked with leading Brexit after David Davis' resignation? The independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/dominic-raab-brexit-david-davis-secretary-exiting-eu-a8438546.html.

Duncan, A. (2021). In *The thick of it*. HarperCollins Publishers.

Durrant, T., & Stojanovic, A. (2018). *The Irish border after Brexit*. Institute for Government.

Duttle, T., Holzinger, K., Malang, T., Schäubli, T., Schimmelfennig, F., & Winzen, T. (2017). Opting out from European union legislation: The differentiation of secondary law. *Journal of European Public Policy, 24*(3), 406–428. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1149206

Eleftheriadis, P. (2011). The moral distinctiveness of the European Union. *International Journal of Constitutional Law, 9*(3–4), 695–713.

Ellyatt, H. (2020, January 28). EU warns UK it will 'never, never, never' give way on its single market ahead of trade talks. *CNBC*. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/28/eu-warns-uk-it-will-never-never-never-give-way-on-single-market.html.

Etiubon, A., & Ibietan, J. (2018). European union and Brexit nationalism: A historical review. *International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences & Humanities Research, 6*(2), 26–39.

EU Financial Affairs Lords sub-committee. (2017). Brexit and the EU budget: Summary. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/125/12503.html.

Evans, G., & Schaffner, F. (2019, January 22). Brexit identities: How leave versus remain replaced conservative versus Labour affiliations of British voters. *The conversation*. https://theconversation.com/brexit-identitieshow-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-ofbritish-voters-110311.

Ferguson, K. (2018, September 7). Brexit breakthrough as Michel Barnier concedes for the first time that the £40bn divorce bill could be 'linked' to striking a trade agreement after MPs warn they will not back a deal otherwise. Mail Online https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6143613/Michel-Barnier-says-40bn-EU-divorce-bill-linked-trade-deal.html.

Figueira, F., & Martill, B. (2020). Bounded rationality and the Brexit negotiations: Why Britain failed to understand the EU. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1810103

Frennhoff Larsen, M., & Khorana, S. (2020). Negotiating Brexit: A clash of approaches? *Comparative European Politics, 18*, 858–877. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-020-00213-6

Gamble, A. (2018). Taking back control: The political implications of Brexit. *Journal of European Public Policy, 25*(8), 1215–1232. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1467952

Garretsen, H., Stoker, J. I., Soudis, D., Martin, R. L., & Rentfrow, P. J. (2018). Brexit and the relevance of regional personality traits: More psychological openness could have swung the regional vote. *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 11*(1), 165–175.

Gasiorek, M., Serwicka, I., & Smith, A. (2019). Which manufacturing industries and sectors are most vulnerable to Brexit? *The World Economy, 42*(1), 21–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12757

Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., Raso, C., & Ha, S. E. (2011). Personality traits and participation in political processes. *The Journal of Politics, 7*(3), 692–706. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611000399

Goldberg, D. T. (2006). Racial europeanization. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29*(2), 331–364. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870500465611

Golec de Zavala, A., Guerra, R., & Simão, C. (2017). The relationship between the Brexit vote and individual predictors of prejudice: Collective narcissism, right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation. *Frontiers in Psychology, 8*, 2023. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02023

Goodwin, M., & Milazzo, C. (2017). Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 19*(3), 450–464. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117710799

Gormley-Heenan, C., & Aughey, A. (2017). Northern Ireland and Brexit: Three effects on 'the border in the mind. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 19*(3), 497–511. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117711060

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. In *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 47, pp. 55–130). Academic Press.

Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96*(5), 1029–1046. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0015141.

Guardian News. (2020, December 24). *Boris Johnson: Brexit deal 'resolves question that has bedevilled politics'*. [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mC63zuQTzR0.

Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. Vintage.

Haidt, J. (2016). When and why nationalism beats globalism. *Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas, 32*(3), 46–53. https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/ielapa.405917723085484.

Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. *Social Justice Research, 20*, 98–116. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z

Hanning, J. (2020). Making it up as they go along. *British Journalism Review, 31*(1), 19–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956474820910064

Harper, C. A., & Hogue, T. E. (2019). The role of intuitive moral foundations in Britain's vote on EU membership. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 29*(2), 90–103. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2386

Hayward, K. (2019). Northern Ireland's concern about the Brexit deal. *UK in a changing Europe*. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-irish-border-and-the-brexit-deal/.

Heath, A. F., & Tilley, J. R. (2005). British national identity and attitudes towards immigration. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 7*(2), 119–132.

Heinkelmann-Wild, T., Kriegmair, L., Rittberger, B., & Zangl, B. (2020). Divided they fail: The politics of wedge issues and Brexit. *Journal of European Public Policy, 27*(5), 723–741. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1683058

Henderson, A., Jeffery, C., Wincott, D., & Wyn Jones, R. (2017). How Brexit was made in England. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 19*(4), 631–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117730542

Henley, J. (2019, December 12). *'Politically we don't count': EU citizens fear for future in UK*. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/12/politically-we-dont-count-eu-citizens-fear-for-future-in-uk.

Henley, J. (2016, March 3). The calais border treaty and Brexit: What is France saying? *The guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/03/calais-border-treaty-brexit-what-is-france-saying.

Holzinger, K., & Tosun, J. (2019). Why differentiated integration is such a common practice in Europe: A rational explanation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics, 31*(4), 642–659. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875522

Honeyman, V. (2019, October 2). Research shows Boris Johnson hardly ever mentioned the war before Brexit. The Conversation https://theconversation.com/research-shows-boris-johnson-hardly-ever-mentioned-the-war-before-brexit-124518.

Hossein-Pour, A. (2019, October, 13). Priti Patel says differences between Northern Ireland and UK in Brexit deal 'unacceptable. Politics Home https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/priti-patel-says-differences-between-northern-ireland-and-uk-in-brexit-deal-unacceptable.

Huddy, L., Del Ponte, A., & Davies, C. (2021). Nationalism, patriotism, and support for the European union. *Political Psychology*, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12731, 0(0).

Hughes, B. M. (2019). *The psychology of Brexit*. Springer International Publishing.

Hyman, J. M. (2014). Beyond fairness: The place of moral foundations theory in mediation and negotiation. *Nev. LJ, 15*, 959.

Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Graham, J., Ditto, P., & Haidt, J. (2012). Understanding libertarian morality: The psychological dispositions of self-identified libertarians. *PloS One, 7*(8), Article e42366. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0042366

Jaffel, H. B., & Pearson, J. (2021, February 26). Intelligence, law enforcement and Brexit. *UK in a changing Europe*. https://ukandeu.ac.uk/intelligence-law-enforcement-and-brexit/.

James, S., & Quaglia, L. (2019). Brexit, the city and the contingent power of finance. *New Political Economy, 24*(2), 258–271.

Jensen, M. D., & Kelstrup, J. D. (2019). House united, house divided: Explaining the EU's unity in the Brexit negotiations. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 57*(S1), 28–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12919

Johnson, B. (2019, March 24). Theresa May is a chicken who's bottled Brexit. The only way forward is to come out of the EU now. *The Telegraph*. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/03/24/theresa-may-chicken-bottled-brexit-way-forward-come-eu-now.

Johnson, S. (2021, January 15). Government must 'get a grip' of what is now a full-blown crisis in the fishing industry, say fishermen. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2021/01/15/government-must-get-grip-now-full-blown-crisis-fishing-industry.

John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). *The Big-Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspectives* (Vol. 2, pp. 102–138). Berkeley: University of California.

Keating, M. (2021). Taking back control? Brexit and the territorial constitution of the United Kingdom. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1876156

Kemmelmeier, M., & Winter, D. G. (2008). Sowing patriotism, but reaping nationalism? Consequences of exposure to the American flag. *Political Psychology, 29*(6), 859–879. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00670.x

Kertzer, J. D., Powers, K. E., Rathbun, B. C., & Iyer, R. (2014). Moral support: How moral values shape foreign policy attitudes. *The Journal of Politics, 76*(3), 825–840. https://doi:10.1017/s0022381614000073.

Kesebir, P., & Pyszczynski, T. (2011). A moral-existential account of the psychological factors fostering intergroup conflict. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5* (11), 878–890. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00397.x

Kettell, S., & Kerr, P. (2021). The Brexit religion and the holy grail of the NHS. *Social Policy and Society*, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746420000561

Kohler, W., & Müller, G. (2017, November 8). *Brexit, the four freedoms and the indivisibility dogma.* LSE Blogs. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/27/brexit-the-four-freedoms-and-the-indivisibility-dogma.

Kotsonis, T. (2020, March 18). *Long read: The problem of the level playing field – and how it might be overcome.* LSE Blogs. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/18/long-read-the-problem-of-the-level-playing-field-and-how-it-might-be-overcome/.

Kristof-Brown, A., & Guay, R. P. (2011). Person–environment fit. In *APA handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (Vol. 3, pp. 3–50). American Psychological Association. Maintaining, expanding, and contracting the organization.

Laffan, B. (2019). How the EU27 came to be. *Journal of Common Market Studies, 57*, 13–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12917

Laycock, S. (2012). *All the countries we've ever invaded: And the few we never got round to.* Stroud: History Press.

Le Cacheux, & Laurent, E. (2014). *Report on the state of the European Union: Is Europe sustainable.* Springer.

Lomax, N. (2019, November 29). What's happened to UK migration since the EU referendum – in four graphs. *The Conversation.* https://theconversation.com/whats-happened-to-uk-migration-since-the-eu-referendum-in-four-graphs-127891.

Lynch, P., & Whitaker, R. (2013). Rivalry on the right: The conservatives, the UK independence party (UKIP) and the EU issue. *British Politics, 8*(3), 285–312.

Manners, I. (2018). Political psychology of European integration: The (re) production of identity and difference in the Brexit debate. *Political Psychology, 39*(6), 1213–1232. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12545

Marcus, G. F. (2004). *The birth of the mind: How a tiny number of genes creates the complexities of human thought.* Basic Civitas Books.

Martill, B., & Staiger, U. (2018). September). Cultures of negotiation: Explaining Britain's hard bargaining in the Brexit negotiations. In *Disponible en.* www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Cultures-of-Negotiation-3.pdf.

Martinsen, D. S., & Pons Rotger, G. (2017). The fiscal impact of EU immigration on the tax-financed welfare state: Testing the 'welfare burden' thesis. *European Union Politics, 18*(4), 620–639. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116517717340

Mason, R. (2015, July 16). *George Osborne backs down on use of EU bailout fund in Greece crisis.* The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/16/george-osborne-backs-down-eu-efsm-bailout-greece-crisis.

Mason, R., Walker, P., & Wintour, P. (2016). *Boris Johnson ridiculed by European ministers after prosecco claim.* The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/16/european-ministers-boris-johnson-prosecco-claim-brexit.

Matthijs, M., Parsons, C., & Toenshoff, C. (2019). Ever tighter union? Brexit, grexit, and frustrated differentiation in the single market and Eurozone. *Comparative European Politics, 17*(2), 209–230. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00165-6

May, T. (2017, September 22). *PM's florence speech: A new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU.* Gov.uk. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu.

McEwen, N., & Murphy, M. C. (2021). Brexit and the union: Territorial voice, exit and re-entry strategies in Scotland and northern Ireland after EU exit. *International Political Science Review*, 0192512121990543 https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512121990543.

McHugh, M., Young, D., & Black, R. (2020, August 13). *Irish Sea trade border 'over my dead body', says Johnson.* Belfast Live. https://www.belfastlive.co.uk/news/irish-sea-trade-border-over-18767164.

Meleady, R., Seger, C. R., & Vermue, M. (2017). Examining the role of positive and negative intergroup contact and anti-immigrant prejudice in Brexit. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 56*(4), 799–808. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12203

Menon, A., & Wager, A. (2020). Taking back control: Sovereignty as strategy in Brexit politics. *Territory, Politics, Governance, 8*(2), 279–284. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2019.1702895

MoralFoundationsorg (n.d.) https://moralfoundations.org/.

Morris, C., & Barnes, O.. Brexit trade deal: What does it mean for fishing?. January 20 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/46401558.

Morris, S., & Carroll, R. (2020, December 28). *'Betrayed': UK fishing industry says Brexit deal threatens long-term damage.* The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/dec/28/betrayed-uk-fishing-industry-says-brexit-deal-threatens-long-term-damage.

Murphy, M. C. (2021). Northern Ireland and Brexit: Where sovereignty and stability collide? *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1891027

Murphy, J., & Cecil, N. (2017, January 18). Boris Johnson sparks uproar as he compares French president Francois Hollande to PoW guard in Brexit row. Evening Standard. https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/boris-johnson-sparks-uproar-as-he-compares-french-president-francois-hollande-to-pow-guard-in-brexit-row-a3443701.html.

Navarrete, C. D., McDonald, M. M., Molina, L. E., & Sidanius, J. (2010). Prejudice at the nexus of race and gender: An outgroup male target hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98*, 933–945. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0017931.

Oborne, P. (2021). *The assault on truth: Boris Johnson, Donald Trump and the emergence of a new moral barbarism.* London, United Kingdom: Simon & Schuster.

Oliver, C. (2016). *Unleashing demons: The inside story of Brexit.* London, United Kingdom: Hodder & Stoughton.

Osborne, S. (2021, January 14). Jacob Rees-Mogg says fish are 'happier' now they're in British waters. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jacob-rees-mogg-fish-brexit-b1787271.html

Parker, G., & Barker, Al (2018, March 15). *Meet the Brexit negotiators: David Davis and Michel barnier.* Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/e79a735c-2715-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0.

Patel, O. (2018). *The EU and the Brexit negotiations: institutions, strategies and objectives.* UCL European Institute.

Peitz, L., Dhont, K., & Seyd, B. (2018). The psychology of supranationalism: Its ideological correlates and implications for EU attitudes and post-Brexit preferences. *Political Psychology, 39*(6), 1305–1322. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12542

Peterson, J. (1997). The European union: Pooled sovereignty, divided accountability. *Political Studies, 45*(3), 559–578. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00096

Phillipson, J., & Symes, D. (2018). A sea of troubles': Brexit and the fisheries question. *Marine Policy, 90*, 168–173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.12.016

Pickard, J., & Samson, A. (2019, July 22). Alan duncan quits as foreign office minister. Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/02611d60-ac5f-11e9-8030-530adfa879c2.

Raab, D. (2018, September 12). Britain need not be afraid of a no-deal Brexit - we stand ready to rise to the challenges ahead. The Telegraph https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/09/12/britain-need-not-afraid-no-deal-brexit-standready-rise-challenges

Rayner, G. (2020, February 26). Boris Johnson to tear up Brexit deal ground rules. The Telegraph https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/02/26/boris-johnson-set-ditch-political-declaration-agreements-eu.

Roos, C., & Westerveen, L. (2020). The conditionality of EU freedom of movement: Normative change in the discourse of EU institutions. *Journal of European Social Policy, 30*(1), 63–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928719855299

Ross, T. (2016, May 15). Boris Johnson: The EU wants a superstate, just as Hitler did. The Telegraph https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/14/boris-johnson-the-eu-wants-a-superstate-just-as-hitler-did/.

de Ruyter, A. (2020). Musings on the latest in Brexit negotiations. *Centre for Brexit Studies Blog.* https://centreforbrexitstudiesblog.wordpress.com/2020/05/22/musings-on-the-latest-in-brexit-negotiations/.

Sabbagh, D. (2020, December 11). *Four navy ships to help protect fishing waters in case of no-deal Brexit.* The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/dec/11/four-navy-ships-to-help-protect-uk-waters-in-case-of-no-deal-brexit.

Sánchez-Barrueco, M. L. (2018). June). Leaving the EU budget: Brexit and mutual financial claims. In *ERA forum* (Vol. 18, pp. 453–468). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 4.

Schmidt, V. A. (2016). The new EU governance: New intergovernmentalism, new supranationalism, and new parliamentarism. In *Istituto affari internazionali IAI working papers* (p. 11).

Schuette, L. A. (2021). Forging unity: European commission leadership in the Brexit negotiations. *Journal of Communication and Media Studies: Journal of Common Market Studies, 1–18.* https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13171

Seldon, A. (2020). *May at 10: The verdict.* Biteback Publishing.

Seldon, A., & Snowdon, P. (2015). *Cameron at 10: The inside story, 2010-2015.* London: William Collins.

Sharma, S., Elfenbein, H. A., Foster, J., & Bottom, W. P. (2018). Predicting negotiation performance from personality traits: A field study across multiple occupations. *Human Performance, 31*(3), 145–164. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2018.1481407

Shipman, T. (2017). *Fall out: A year of political mayhem.* HarperCollins UK.

Smith, M. (2017). Most Brits think the UK needs the EU at least as much as the UK needs the EU. YouGov https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/02/08/most-brits-think-eu-needs-uk-least-much-uk-needs-e.

Smith, D. S. (2019). Shaping the modern world with a stone-age brain: The Brexit referendum and the moral foundations theory. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 7*(2), 863–889. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v7i2.1032

Smith, M. (2020). How unique are British attitudes to Empire? *YouGov.* https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/11/how-unique-are-british-attitudes-empire.

Springford, J., McCann, P., Los, B., & Thissen, M. (2016, June 13). *Brexiting yourself in the foot: Why Britain's eurosceptic regions have most to lose from EU withdrawal.* Centre for European Reform. https://www.cer.eu/insights/brexiting-yourself-foot-why-britains-eurosceptic-regions-have-most-lose-eu-withdrawal.

Stevens, J. R., & Hauser, M. D. (2004). Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8*(2), 60–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.003

Stewart, D. (2016). Why making Boris Johnson Britain's foreign secretary is a smart move. July 14Time https://time.com/4405783/boris-johnson-foreign-secretary-theresa-may/.

Stojanovic, A. (2020, December 16). *UK–EU future relationship: Level playing field.* Institute for Government. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/future-relationship-level-playing-field.

Stone, J. (2017, March 29). EU council president Donald Tusk tells Britain: 'We miss you already'. The independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-article-50-donald-tusk-eu-president-we-miss-you-already-happy-day-brussels-a7655966.html.

Stratton, J. (2019). The language of leaving: Brexit, the second world war and cultural trauma. *Journal for Cultural Research, 23*(3), 225–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/14797585.2019.1633073

Swales, K. (2016). *Understanding the leave vote*. NatCen Social Research.

TED. (2016, November 8). Can a divided America heal?. Jonathan Haidt [Video]. YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D-_Az5nZBBM.

Tetlow, G., & Stojanovic, A. (2018). *Understanding the economic impact of Brexit*. London: Institute for Government.

The EU motto (n.d.). https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/motto_en#:~:text=%22United%20in%20diversity%22%2C%20the,different%20cultures%2C%20traditions%20and%20languages.

The history of the European Union (n.d.). https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en.

Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2005). Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), *The handbook of evolutionary psychology* (pp. 5–67). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. *The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46*(1), 35–57. https://doi.org/10.1086/406755

Turner-Zwinkels, F. M., Johnson, B. B., Sibley, C. G., & Brandt, M. J. (2020). Conservatives' moral foundations are more densely connected than liberals' moral foundations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 0146167220916070 https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220916070.

Valluvan, S., & Kalra, V. S. (2019). Racial nationalisms: Brexit, borders and little englander contradictions. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 42*(14), 2393–2412. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1640890

Verhaegen, S. (2018). What to expect from European identity? Explaining support for solidarity in times of crisis. *Comparative European Politics, 16*(5), 871–904. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-017-0106-x

Walker, A. (2018). Does the EU need us more than we need them? BBC news. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-46612362.

Walsh, D. (2020, 10 August). How likely are the 'big four' European economies to vote to leave the EU if Brexit works out? *Euronews*. https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/10/nearly-half-of-italians-would-support-leaving-the-eu-if-brexit-is-successful-according-to.

Warrell, H. (2020, December 25). *Brexit trade deal explained: The key parts of the landmark agreement*. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/bd71fda3-0a34-4b52-ae98-4769848cb628.

Waugh, P. (2019, August 25). Boris Johnson admits chances of no-deal Brexit now 'touch and go'. Huffington Post. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/johnson-admits-chances-of-no-deal-brexit-touch-and-go_uk_5d629e8fe4b0dfcbd48f054a.

Weale, A. (2016). Nostalgic democracy triumphs over democratic internationalism. *The Political Quarterly, 87*(3), 352–354. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12289

Weiler, J. H. (2012). Europe in crisis-on political messianism, legitimacy and the rule of law. *Singapore Journal of Legal Studies*, 248–268.

Weiss, S., & Blockmans, S. (2016). The EU deal to avoid Brexit: Take it or leave. *Centre for European Policy Studies*.