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> A study of user experiences and network analysis on anonymity and traceability of bitcoin transactions

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A study of user experiences and network analysis on anonymity and traceability of bitcoin transactions

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Abstract

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This paper investigates the anonymity of bitcoin transactions and the significance of awareness of the technology by bitcoin users, alongside their experiences in tracing transactions. Bitcoin enables users to carry out transactions anonymously with the virtual currency they possess without unveiling where the real-world source of the income has come from. These transactions may occur without revealing the location or any personal identifiable information of the person who is sending or receiving bitcoin. While there are existing surveys which test bitcoin user's awareness of the technology, they do not focus on bitcoin user's own experience using the technology in terms of tracing transactions and use of anti-forensic tools to increase the level of anonymity. This paper reports significance of user opinions on tractability and anonymity of bitcoin transactions and compare the user viewpoints from the survey with experimental observations using network analysis.

Keywords: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Crypto-currency, Digital Currency, Privacy, Security.

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1. Introduction

Bitcoin offers its users a virtual currency which can be transferred to any bitcoin wallet in the world with little effort and small transfer fees, it allows their user to do it with anonymity [1]. Bitcoin wallets and some bitcoin exchanges do not require identifiable information to use them. A Bitcoin user does not explicitly require personal identifiable information to perform transactions [2]. What makes Bitcoin anonymous is the lack of accompaniment between the public key and any requirements of identity data [3]. As a result, these functions give bitcoin its anonymous element. There is a debate that bitcoin may not be completely anonymous, such cases of accidental disclosure of a person's public key or even voluntary disclosure links identity data with a public key [2]. There is also the choice for bitcoin users to use anti-forensic tools to increase their anonymity. The introduction of "mixing services" or dark wallets allow for multiple people to contribute to a movement of bitcoins, which can expertly disguise a transaction by mixing it with other transactions, and then sending that "mixed" transaction at a different time within that day [4]. This stops analysis being done on the time and amount that was sent on a transaction. In addition to mixing services the use of VPN's and a TOR browser, makes it more difficult to track a transaction [1], although it does not make it impossible or a momentous barrier to tracing transactions.

While there are surveys [5][6] which test bitcoin user's awareness of the technology ,they do not focus on bitcoin user's own experience using the technology in terms of tracing transactions and use of anti-forensic tools. The survey is used to assist in monitoring bitcoin user's awareness of the main concerns that come with using bitcoin, as well as finding statistical data on the bitcoin users experience levels and success with tracing transactions. This paper will compare results of the survey with experimental finding using network analysis. Subjective user opinions and objective measures from experiments will be compared to report findings on tractability and anonymity of bitcoin transaction.

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The remainder of the paper will be organised as follows: Section 2 will discuss existing research in relation to analyse the literature surrounding the traceability of bitcoin transactions. Methodological approaches for experiments and surveys will be detailed in Section 3. Section 4 will present the experimental results and analysis from the survey. Finally, Section 5 will conclude the paper and mention possible future work.

2. Literature review

Literature review will discuss what already has been reported on bitcoin crimes, traceability of bitcoin using tools and findings from surveys in relation to users' opinions on anonymity and traceability of bitcoin.

2.1. Bitcoin related crimes

Prior studies have identified a link with bitcoin and criminal activity. Reference [7] declares a number of highprofile investigations into the criminal underground suggest that bitcoins are becoming the currency of choice for many criminals. Money laundering, transferring of funds between bad actors and payment for illegal services have all been reported practices used by criminals in hand with bitcoin [8]. An FBI report on Bitcoin anticipates seeing increased Bitcoin money laundering activities [9]. Criminals have been found to exhibit increased interest in using cryptocurrency to launder money and fund their illicit activities. The same report depicts the challenges that will face the FBI in the future for deterring illicit activity that comes with the use of Bitcoin by criminals, revealing that Bitcoin could become a frequent payment method used by bad actors, and could be used to fund their illegal activities. In November 2015, a computer hacktivist group known as Ghost Security Group claimed to locate Bitcoin wallets that are used by ISIS. They disclosed that there was between \$4.7m and \$15.7m within ISIS Bitcoin wallets, these figures were shown to represent between one to three per cent of ISIS annual income within 2015 [10]. There is evidence that Bitcoin has already been used to fund terrorism. In 2015, in Jakarta an individual rogue terrorist inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria had knowledge of cryptocurrency, demanding it from the owners of a shopping mall he had planted a bomb in [11]. Although there is no guarantee that bitcoin will be used as a major source for funding terrorist groups and other criminals, it is likely that the cryptocurrency medium used by bad actors will only increase.

2.2. Traceability of bitcoin

Hiding personal identifiable information (PII) on the internet is a difficult task, as a person quite often leaves a digital footprint of their online activity. The methods of tracking users through IP address is limited considering that a bad actor could implement technology such as TOR

or a VPN to cloak their activities [1]. Reference [12] highlights methods which could be used to trace bitcoin transactions, but criticizes aspects of the tracing process, questioning that linking pseudonyms to an address during analysis is circumstantial, stating that the "trail is noisy and deniable". In Ref. [13], experiment was conducted to test how bitcoin transactions work, how the bitcoin protocol operates over the network and what bitcoin artefact can be examined from a digital forensics' perspective. The results concluded to shows that the tools like Wireshark, Blockchain.info and a bitcoin client can be used to trace transactions through the bitcoin blockchain, meanwhile the findings show that tracing pseudonymous bitcoin addresses (addresses that may be linked to an online pseudonym or verified account on social media) did not yield PII that is free from doubt on who is sending or receiving transactions [1]. Other approaches to tracing transaction come through the form of using the 'Sybil' method of attack, which can potentially be used to map IP addresses to public keys of users [14]. Although this method may not be one-hundred percent accurate, unless insignificant pairings are eliminated. Bitcoin users are generally encouraged to create a new bitcoin address for every transaction, which if implemented will decrease the times allowing for patterning of parings and reduce the likelihood of associating PII with a bitcoin addresses [15]. In conclusion, there are methods that trace transactions and links actors with their PII, the dilemma is they do not guarantee success due to actors clouding the trace by using pseudonyms linked with bitcoin addresses, irregular timings of transactions and software which can obfuscate the tracing process. Bitcoins platform is based on anonymity making the tracing process a problematic task, in most cases it relies on the actor "slipping up" and revealing an aspect of their bitcoin address.

2.3. Surveys on bitcoin

A survey carried in [5] obtained measurements on the use of digital currency in Canada using an omnibus method, their findings marked out certain categories within the population on usage, awareness and adoption rates. Similarly other surveys put forward questions on the security and regulations of cryptocurrencies, asking their participant pools how they approach security issues of their own personal transactions using virtual currencies, or how they would prefer regulations to be handled on cryptocurrencies, survey conducted by the IEEE [6] was put out to participants in the wake of bitcoin technology grabbing attention of government bodies due to the increase of malicious actors using it to bypass legal controls. Seemingly the survey designs being used for the topic of cryptocurrencies bolstered simple questions such as "Have you heard of Bitcoin" with a YES or NO answer, focusing on descriptive statistics. Participant pools on the two surveys [5][6] ranged in thousands but did report on considering that they anticipated a smaller sample of Bitcoin users.

3. Methodology

The experimental research used for the study draws upon some of the methodology used in previous literature such as [13] [15] [16] in the attempt to trace a transaction and de-anonymise the actor through the means of analysing network activity. However, the other focus of the study surrounds bitcoin users' awareness and use of tracing transactions plus their own use of tools to increase anonymity of Bitcoin transactions

3.1. Tools used

To uncover traces on transaction a number of tools were used. For the tracing process: Exodus, blockchain.info, Wireshark, Tunnelbear and Maltego were used. Exodus is a top-rate desktop and mobile wallet for multiple digital currencies, allowing users to send and receive digital currencies. It is very easy to use with an intuitive GUI layout (Fig. 1). It was picked over bitcoin core, which is considered bitcoin reference implementation. Unlike the core, it does not require the full 200+ GB download of the whole bitcoin blockchain, which is used to verify payments.




Figure 1. Exodus (Bitcoin wallet send/receive funds menu).

Exodus's main menu of the bitcoin wallet, presents a screen that allows the user to send or request funds. Fig. 1 shows that the funds are being prepared to be sent to a bitcoin address. To verify the transaction occurred, the

website blockchain.info was used to query if the funds were taken out of the sending address and sent to the receiving address. Fig. 2 presents the number of transactions that have occurred on the address (no. transactions: 1), the amount of bitcoin received, the balance (0.0011837 BTC) and most importantly the transaction history which in this case does verify the addresses and the amount that was sent except the fees.



Figure 2. Blockchain.info verifying that the transaction occurred.

Maltego is a visual link analysis tool, which uses plugin called "transforms". This tool offers information gathering and represents any information using a node-based graph. In the event that a bitcoin address or transaction code is found Maltego will be used to visualise the transaction and mine information related to the address, it can then be used to scan websites for information related to an address which may lead to personal identifiable information of a bitcoin user.

TunnelBear, a secure VPN service, was launched at the beginning of the experiment, to bypass the geographic location and to see if the use of this tool can be used as antiforensic software to restrict the transaction from being traced. The location of TunnelBear was set as Japan. Japan's law on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies are not as restricted in comparison to other countries and remains a friendly environment to conduct such experiments on cryptocurrencies, using Japan as the geographic location does not go against their laws [17].

While using VPN, a similar payment was sent to the alternative bitcoin address, with a different amount of currency being sent to differentiate from the previous payment. Blockchain.info was used again to verify the funds were received from the Bitcoin wallet address stored by Exodus (the number of transaction was one and the amount sent was 0.00089608 BTC which correlates to the amount minus fees which was sent to the address. Exodus transaction history also verified the transaction was sent.

Wireshark offers its users a platform to carry out a deep inspection of hundreds of protocols, including offering the use of bitcoin dissector to analyse the bitcoin protocol. During the analysis of what tools to use, Wireshark seemed to be the distinct option in comparison to other packet sniffing tools, due to the features it offers its users. In comparison to other tools, such as SmartSniff or Microsoft Message Analyser, Wireshark came across as the superior option due to its features and easy to use GUI.

3.2. Survey design

The survey was created and hosted by google forms, which offers the user the ability to download all data from the survey results if they require a more in-depth analysis using statistical software like SPSS. SPSS offers a comprehensive set of statistical tools which are easy to use when generating statistical analysis from the data.

Table 1. Survey questions

Questions	Justifications			
What is your age?	Asking the participant's age was used to see if a certain category of age is more likely to be invested in using Bitcoin technology.			
What is your gender?	To see if there is a higher division of a certain gender that is more likely to use Bitcoin.			
What is the highest level of education you have completed?	Analysing for clear demographic to a category of completed education and a link towards Bitcoin experience.			
What area do you work or study in?	To gather information of the socio- economic status the user is in.			
What level of experience have you had in using bitcoin?	To explore if there is a correlation between experience level with other information such as tracing success rate, use of anti-forensic software etc.			
How important are these factors as advantages for bitcoin?	Enquiring about the participants opinions on certain features that come along with using bitcoin technology, to test if there is a pattern towards people's viewpoints on these features.			
Have you ever tracked/traced a bitcoin transaction?	To gather user experience on traceability			
Which methods have/would you use to trace a bitcoin transaction?	To investigate traceability success specific to methods used.			
Do you believe the use of bitcoin dissectors used by packet sniffers are a good option for network analysis?	The method of using network analysis tools are common in the industry for cyber security. The bitcoin protocol is not always covered by these technologies, implementing bitcoin dissectors into network analysis tools is asked to participants to gain their viewpoint on the use of these within the software.			
Do you agree with the use of chain- analysis to track transaction?	Chain analysis is a new tool for forensic investigation on cryptocurrencies. These tools have been proven to help on investigations related to cryptocurrencies. The participant is			

Questions	Justifications
	asked on their opinion on the use of this technology. Analysis of which will be carried out if significant results are found.
What was your success rate in tracking/tracing the transactions?	To investigate if there is a higher increase of success through using a specific tool.
Have you used software to increase the anonymity of your transactions?	To get an estimate on the number of users that try to increase their anonymity it is an important statistic to know, it may impact the results of tracing their transactions. Software such as VPN's, PGP encryption and Wallet Mixing services are options for a participant. They can include more than one software if they have used multiple applications.
Has this affected the traceability of your own transactions using software to increase your anonymity?	Is there a correlation between using the previous questions tools and increasing the success rate of tracing a transaction?

Survey involved the research collected data from participants who have some experiences of using bitcoin, this ranges from beginner entry level of sending and receiving transactions to participants who are proficient using bitcoins. The survey consisted of fourteen question asking personal information to more detailed descriptive question. The table below specifies the questions used as well as the justification for using such questions. The number of participants was 27. The survey was handed out to associates that have had experience with Bitcoin and was also posted out to bitcoin community via bitcoin forums.

4. Results and discussion

The results cover the key findings from the analysis described in the previous section. The results are presented with regards to the three categories: traceability using tools and survey results.

4.1. Traceability of bitcoins using tools

Fig. 3 shows Wireshark analysis on the bitcoin packets that were captured during the time of the transactions. There is a huge amount of data to surf through on the initial analysis, but from previous literature [16] that has followed similar procedures in their investigation, it was made clear that the bitcoin packets containing the 'TX' information, would be the place to start the investigation. As bitcoin is a state collection of all coins, any unspent coins or "unspent transaction outputs" (UTXO) which have a certain denomination and an owner defined by the 20-byte address generated as a bitcoin address and assigned to the user. Bitcoin transactions work on TX functions in relation to the protocol, which require a signature when initialized, if the signature does not match the owner of the UTXO, it will return an error. If the signature is correct the UTXO is removed from the address and output to the receivers address (after going through the mining process).

No.		Time	Source		Des	tination			Protocol	Length	Info		
	482	4.969195	192.16	8.1.151	185	5.145.	131.55		Bitcoin	1514	getdata	a, getdata	, getdata,
	483	4.969197	192.16	8.1.151	185	5.145.	131.55		Bitcoin	58	getdata	9	
1	485	4.985948	192.16	B.1.151	185	5.145.	131.55		Bitcoin	176	getdata	a, getdata	
	486	4.986184	185.14	5.131.55	192	2.168.	1.151		Bitcoin	137	tx		
	493	4.997784	185.14	5.131.55	192	2.168.	1.151		Bitcoin	919	tx		
	496	4.997926	185.14	5.131.55	192	2.168.	1.151		Bitcoin	191	tx		
		4.998061		5.131.55			1.151		Bitcoin				
•		5.009406		5.131.55		2.168.						, tx, tx, †	
		5.010894		5.131.55		2.168.						, tx, tx, †	
		5.011305		5.131.55		2.168.						, tx, tx, †	tx, tx
		5.011522		5.131.55		2.168.			Bitcoin	744	tx, tx	, tx	
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Figure 3. Wireshark analysis on the bitcoin packets.

Table 2. Wireshark logs

Field Size	Description	Comments
1+	Input count	The number of transactions
		inputted
1+	Script Length	The length of the signature
		script (This is the signature that
		needs to be authorized so the
		funds can be sent.)
N/A	Signature	The script for confirming
	script	transaction authorization.
4	Sequence	Transaction version which is
		defined by the sender. This
		creates details of the transaction
		before being included into a
		block.

Table 2 shows Wireshark logs depicting the information it received about the transactions via the TX info. The table below lists some of the key information that can be gathered from the transaction. These four fields indicate how many transactions took place, the length of the signature and the signature script and the sequence, which is all relative information connected to the sender. The problem with this information, while it may be relative to the sender or receiver of the payment, it does not yield PII results. However, the results of the information are useful for further investigation, knowing the amount of transactions that took place and the signature can be critical to linking a suspect to evidence of the transaction. The signature cannot link back to PII because inherently it is generated from a hash (of something that has to be signed) plus the private key. The private key goes through the process of the elliptic curve digital signature [18] algorithm to mask its identity. The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm at this point in time has no algorithm to crack it with [18].

The use of a VPN did not mask the discovery of the bitcoin protocol being found over the network, and that the TX information did not lead to the discovery of any personal identification information. All attempts with TunnelBear failed to hide the discovery of the protocol. Nonetheless, when verifying blockchain.info on the transaction that occurred on the second experiment, the results show the payment did not go to the address input, even though the account had the funds attached to the correct address as shown in Fig. 4.

			2019-05-02 21:19:12
1JuDJ2qfKv1AHcBdWj882XTUHsbg45fsan	-	3Fpka4BHSxaqZhcJheLUrwLMbp6vgLcji4 bc1q4h4tv4ec3n648r389lrjs5v0paya2u2c9f5taf	\$ 6.84 \$ 6.14

Figure 4. Blockchain.info verifying the transaction occurred.

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	*
	3LHHWNW/PidiCU5HynHPMVVjkcsWiLDsCH9z
ps	t - Transform Output
Г	Transform To BTC Address details [Blockchain.info] returned with 0 entities (from entity " <u>bclqth4fv4ec3n640r3051rjs5v0paya"</u>)
L	Transform To BTC Address details (Blockchain.info) done (from entity "bclq4h4fv4ec3n64873891rjs5v0paya") Running transform To Outbound BTC Transaction (Blockchain.info) on 1 entities (from entity "lJuDJ2qfKv1AHcBdWj802XTUWsbg48fsan")
L	Augming transform to Outpound Bit transaction (Blockhaim.info) on intitles (from entity <u>Loubourgaviakousomyourivakousogettam</u>) Transform To Outpound BTC Transaction (Blockhaim.info) returned with 1 entitles (from entity "LoubJaffkviAHCBdM)9812TUH5bd945faa
L	Transform To Outbound BTC Transaction [Blockchain.info] dome (from entity "lJuDJlgfKvlAHcBd#j002XTURsbg45fsam")
L	Running transform To Destination BTC Address [Blockchain.info] on 1 entities (from entity <u>"lJuDJ2qfKvlAHcBdWj002XTUHsbq45fsan"</u>)
L	Transform To Destination BTC Address [Blockchain.info] returned with 1 entities (from entity "JJuDJ2qfKvl2AcBdBj002XTUHebq45fsan"
ſ.	Transform To Destination BTC Address [Blockchain.info] done (from entity "1JuDJ2qfKv1AHcBdW)002XTUHsbq45fsan") Running transform To Destination BTC Address [Blockchain.info] on 1 entities (from entity "4c2c5f3f1044044b5d75a52a5f*)
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н.	Transform To Destination BTC Address [Blockchain.info] desting acting the state of

Figure 5. Maltego created visual node diagram.

The diagram in Fig. 5 shows how Maltego created a visual node diagram of the bitcoin address and transactions that occurred when the digital currency was sent. From the diagram, it can be found that the fee for mining the block containing this transaction was sent to the first address

before the amount without the fees was sent to the correct bitcoin address.

4.2. Survey analysis

Survey was conducted amongst participants of bitcoin users from varied experience level. They were representative of wide range of professions and studies from both STEM (Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) and non-STEM background. Survey results showed difference between males and females that were in the STEM or Non-STEM areas of works and studies. Majority of the participants (70%) were aged 18-25. It was found that males were likely to be STEM orientated areas of work in comparison to females who were likely to be in Non-STEM areas of work as seen in Fig. 6. Amongst the participants those reported some level of success in tracing bitcoins, STEM related participants had a higher rate of success in comparison to Non-STEM users. This has been illustrated in Fig. 7.




Figure 6. STEM and Non-STEM Gender.




Figure 7. Success in tracing bitcoin.

There were statistically significant correlations on participants' opinions on the governance for bitcoin transactions with anonymity and traceability as a disadvantage to bitcoin transactions. Participants viewed in favour of central control for bitcoin transactions, also viewed strongly that transactions should be anonymous and not traceable. A Spearman's correlation was run to determine the relationship between participants' views on governance and anonymity and traceability as a disadvantage to bitcoin transactions. There was a strong, positive monotonic correlation observed (r=.624, n=27, p<.0001).

Amongst the half of the participants who reported use of tools in tracing bitcoins, 69.2% used only heuristic method, while 15.4% used only packet sniffing software. Packet sniffing tools can be used while a user is on a network and interacting with any cryptocurrency. Depending on the bitcoin protocol used, it may limit what data can be received. Heuristic method on the other hand can give evidence on users if they are not careful enough to hide their identity. For example, bitcoin addresses of a user found on a forum or media channel can be linked to a criminal activity and this can be used as an evidence to prosecute a suspect in the court.



Figure 8. Tracing success.

It was also observed that participants who believed they had higher level of experience in using bitcoins, were more successful in tracing bit coin transactions. Pearson's score for participants views on their experience level in using bitcoins and their ratings of success in tracing bit coin transactions was statistically significant (r=.383, p<.05), also regression analysis showed statistically significant positive linear relationship (r2=0.147, p<0.05) as shown in the Fig. 8. The mean plot of Fig. 9 suggests that there was a positive correlation between participants experience level and success rate on anonymity with anti-forensics tools, but the relationship was not statistically significant (r=.343, p=.12).




Figure 9. Increased anonymity.




Figure 10. Mean plot of Theft and hacking with anonymity and traceability.

The mean plot in Figure 10 shows users who ranked higher for importance on anonymity & traceability as advantage also ranked higher for importance on theft or hacking as a disadvantage for bitcoins. While bitcoins are preferred to be traceable and being anonymous, international transactions are favourable; participants' views on this were statistically significant (r=0.43, p=0.02).

4. Conclusions

The design philosophy of Bitcoin shows how intricate it is to allow a trace on locating data on a specific user with the adoption of network analysis. On the other hand, the information from the survey results show that Bitcoin users tend to have similar experiences. Survey was representative to the samples and responses captured bitcoin user's own experience using the technology in terms of tracing transactions and use of anti-forensic tools. Several statistical significant results were found from user's opinions. Statistical significant relationship was found between self-rated positive attitude towards anonymity & traceability and self-rated negative attitude towards theft and hacking for bitcoin. Relationship between participants' views on governance and anonymity and traceability as a disadvantage to bitcoin transactions was statistically significant. Statistical analysis shows that the users who used combination of at least two antiforensic tools were in favour of their increase of anonymity compared to the the groups who did not use any tool at all. The large majority of users do not have success in tracing transactions. Wireshark ability to output enough information on transactions which could lead to uncovering personal identification number, does not exist, although this may be down to the infrastructure of Bitcoin and how integral it is to keep a user anonymous.

Bitcoin users already have a high degree of anonymity while using the technology, which is only increased if they incorporate software such as VPN's, and bitcoin mixing services. Although Wireshark did not disclose any personal identification information over the Bitcoin protocol, it did display source/destination IP addresses, which would be useful information to have within an organisation, in tracing who sent or received the virtual currency over the network. This might entail further investigation into how they managed to do so (if against policy to do so), or if certain tools are being used to disguise the transactions. While there are tools to create visual diagrams and use big data analysis to find evidence of the identity of Bitcoin users, they are not yet readily available to the public. During the initial phase of researching the tools available for this purpose, Maltego was the only option that was easily available. Although, creating a database of known bitcoin users linked to addresses may be a useful tool, it requires further investigation into the feasibility of its' usefulness. Companies like CypherTrace have already started this process of monitoring transaction for unusual payment times and amounts, while investigating where these payments are going to, linking them to certain criminal organisations evading anti money laundering and know your client policies.

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