

Brynin, C.M. (1983). Conflict and communication in the Third World : A study of class and ethnic bases of conflict, and relationship between these and the mass media in Pakistan and Nigeria.

(Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London)



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CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATION IN THE THIRD WORLD

A Study of the Class and Ethnic Bases of
Conflict, and the Relationship between
these and the Mass Media in Pakistan and
Nigeria

by

Christopher Malcolm Brynin, B.Sc., M.A.

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Social Science
& Humanities
The City University
London

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For Ninnikins

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the importance of conflict in the Third World. It stresses ethnic conflict; conflict within classes, particularly within the bourgeoisie; and the role of the 'professional' component in this middle-class struggle. It looks at these in respect of Pakistan and Nigeria, both of which have suffered major civil wars. Conflict is an inseparable part of the process of 'development'. It is argued in this thesis that the nature of conflict changes as societies develop. Third World societies tend to be riven by communal, especially ethnic divisions, while the class structure is ill-defined. Conflict is therefore often ethnic in nature. As the importance of these divisions recedes and the class structure begins to develop, the nature of conflict changes. However, classes are still little more than clusters of 'class fragments', not fully fledged classes in the Western sense.

Each class fragment finds itself in competition, not with 'distant' class fragments but with similar class fragments; resources are so scarce that fragments even within a single class 'group' fight over access to them. Conflict is, therefore, 'intra-class' (i.e. within broad clusters). This competition occurs all the way through the social hierarchy but reaches its climax at the top. Because of the scarcity of resources one of the main means of access to them is through power. The struggle for power between the various 'elite' (but basically bourgeois) fragments is, therefore, intense.

Business, bureaucracy, the army and politics all form bases for different class fragments in their struggle against each other to control resources. Central to intra-class conflict is the 'professional' component of the bourgeoisie. In its struggle for supremacy over the military, the bureaucracy, and businessmen, it seeks an expansion of democracy, politics being its only source of power against these other, stronger, elites. This struggle is carried over into the mass media, which are manned largely by this professional component of the middle class. The press in particular reflects both ethnic and intra-class struggle. This thesis describes in detail the connection between the press and conflict. Only as Third World societies develop more fully is class struggle likely to become 'inter-class', i.e. between classes. Then the various middle-class fragments might combine against the rising proletariat, and unite in their control and use of the mass media. The research incorporated into this thesis did not concern itself with this long-term possibility.

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PART ONE: THE SOCIOLOGICAL NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

Despite early attempts to prove otherwise, it appears that it is not possible to understand development on the basis of any single sociological formula. Such simplification, however congenial, cannot account for the enormous variety of developing societies. Nevertheless, it does help to try to establish some sort of basic framework from which to operate. For instance, assumptions have to be made on the meaning of development. In fact, it seems preferable to use such assumptions rather than some theoretical formula as a basis for empirical study. Assuming that the minimum economic and political conditions needed to define what developing countries are can be ascertained without too much difficulty - most of them are very poor relative to the West, with a small industrial base, and only recently (or fairly recently) free of colonial rule - it is much harder to say with any certainty what the sociological condition of these societies might be. Fairly clearly it must derive from the minimum economic and political conditions just described, for these determine whether a country is a 'developing country' or not. I consider the following to be the fundamental sociological condition of developing countries: that they are governed by a struggle between various social groups for access to scarce resources. All societies, of course, contain struggles between different groups for a greater share of economic welfare, but the scarcity of resources in developing countries intensifies and also alters the character of this struggle in very particular ways. I shall be describing these conflicts throughout this thesis.

My own approach to the understanding of development is informed by the general sociological condition just described, rather than by a comprehensive theoretical framework. However, I consider theorising rather than mere empirical comparison - if development is to be understood at all - to be absolutely necessary. Two general theoretical frameworks that have been very important in the sociology of development are functionalism and Marxism. Both of these theories

are the type that propose a formula for the understanding of developing societies that can be applied across the board (however much variation these formulae are subjected to in practice). Apart from their particular weaknesses, both theories leave too much out. They are simply too general. It seems to me that theories more varied and flexible than functionalism and Marxism are needed if a genuinely coherent and comprehensive basis for the understanding of development is to be achieved. Though both theories have serious deficiencies in their application to development - far more marked in the case of functionalism, which is becoming an increasingly redundant school of thought - it is possible, through comparison of these two totally antithetical theories, to see the way to a more flexible framework of ideas.

The major deficiency in functionalism is its inability to give emphasis to the idea of conflict. Even a casual look at events in many Third World countries is enough to show the absurdity of this fault (one quite fundamental to the theory). In discussing theories of development I shall start with functionalism and add greater and greater slices of conflict until the Marxist position is reached. The analysis will, thereby, also become more concerned with class. But this reduction of a vast array of social forces to those solely defined by class reveals the major deficiency of Marxism in its application to development. Traditional class analysis is not particularly relevant to the study of Third World society, which usually lacks a developed class structure in the Western sense (whether one looks at the West now or in the past). Concomitantly, Marxism tends to ignore other bases of conflict than that provided by class - in particular, differences of *community* (whether these divisions are defined by race, religion, language or territory).

In my own theoretical discussion, then, I shall be emphasising the role of conflict in development, and the role of both *community* and class in the generation of conflict. Because of the importance of *communal* conflict I have incorporated a good deal of discussion on nationalism. My analysis, therefore, goes wider than the

development process itself. However, I also decided to analyse one sector of society in greater depth, thereby narrowing the discussion as well. Another reason for doing this was to incorporate some more purely sociological analysis. Much of my discussion is taken up with the political-economies of the countries I have studied. In order to get closer to society itself I could have chosen to look at education, or the family, and observed how they related to the broader political and economic nature of these societies. I decided, in fact, to study the mass media, as these have a more obvious and natural link with questions of political-economy.

As I have said, my argument is informed by the notion of struggle over scarce resources. This thesis is essentially a study of the communal and class bases of conflict in developing countries. I shall be looking at these questions with reference to nationalism, development itself, and the mass media. The struggle over scarce resources starts before independence. It does not, therefore, seem sensible to view the nationalist period as a totally separate affair from the post-independence period. I shall analyse the struggle over scarce resources in both these phases, and then go on to see how this struggle is reflected in the mass media. How the media reflect society varies according to the theory you hold. Both functionalism and Marxism - my theoretical parameters - have particular views on the role of the media in society. Media images are either a direct reflection of society (functionalism), or a distortion of it (Marxism). In looking at the nature of this relationship I too shall view the media as a part of society influenced by its political and economic structure in particular ways, but different ones from those proposed by either of the above theories.

The nub of my overall argument is that competition for access to scarce resources sparks off a mixture of communal and class conflict. This starts before independence; in this sense, then, there is little difference between the nationalist and post-independence periods. In fact, I shall be arguing that nationalism is a continuous process. Before independence there is anti-colonial

nationalism, but after independence (sometimes even before this) ethnic divisions occur within the new state, resulting in smaller nationalisms and sometimes pronounced secession attempts, which are naturally opposed by the groups in control. The new states thus become the seeding-beds of new imperialist and nationalist forces. This does not mean that this conflict is purely cultural in nature. It is, in fact, a part of the continuing struggle over access to scarce resources. Economic factors are clearly of importance: natural differences in the distribution of resources, discrimination or plain exploitation play an overwhelming part in creating ethnic tensions. However, not all socio-economic groups within an ethnic community will be equally affected by these factors. Assessment has to be made, therefore, of the relationship between the society's ethnic structure and its class structure, however weak and fragmented the latter might be.

Functionalism is totally incapable of explaining these complex relationships, while Marxism offers only partial explanations. Conflict is primarily communal. Nevertheless, there is class conflict too. However different the class structure of developing countries might be from that in the West, it exists: there are traditional classes, and there are incipient 'modern' classes in the Western sense. - what I, in fact, call "class fragments". I argue that, in developing countries the means for economic advance are so limited that they are insufficient for even a single class. Conflict tends to be between class fragments. Moreover, as resources are so limited, class fragments with broadly similar socio-economic backgrounds find themselves in competition for the same resources (whether these are petty trading opportunities, industrial assets, or power). Instead of classes it seems more appropriate to talk in terms of clusters of class fragments. Different fragments within each cluster compete against each other over the same set of resources. Class conflict is, therefore, within classes, i.e. "intra-class" rather than "inter-class". Conflict is horizontal rather than vertical.

Most developing countries have severe communal divisions of one sort or another, but usually ethnic. For convenience, I shall

generally speak of ethnic conflict, though it should not be forgotten that other communal divisions also exist. However, it is not possible for entire ethnic groups to oppose each other. They each have their own social hierarchies. Conflict tends to be between equivalent socio-economic groups from different ethnic communities over (for the same reasons as discussed just above) the same set of resources. Thus traders from one ethnic group compete against traders from another group. The same goes for workers, industrialists, and the political elite. In other words, ethnic conflict occurs all the way down the social hierarchy. Or, to put it another way, it is between equivalent class fragments from different ethnic groups. As the class structure develops, the cultural aspects of this conflict recede and it becomes more purely intra-class in nature. (This is also the case in those societies that do not contain severe communal divisions). As the class structure develops further class conflict becomes increasingly similar to that which occurs in the West, i.e. it becomes increasingly inter-class. In sum, I propose a broad scheme of development, going from ethnic (or other communal) conflict, to intra-class and then, finally, inter-class conflict. Thus it is only the last phase which is of relevance to traditional Marxist class analysis. Finally, it should be said that none of these phases are mutually exclusive. Elements of each are bound to exist at all times in all societies. They are, in fact, "ideal types". At a particular time one type will be the predominant one, but it will always overlap with the other types of conflict.

If ethnic and intra-class conflict - the types that characterise developing countries - occurs all the way up the social hierarchy, it reaches its climax at the uppermost level, that of the political elite. I say political elite because the scarcity of economic resources, the important influence of which has already been made clear, means that power is of primary value. The state, as the major accumulator of wealth, a function it receives through its control of the economy, becomes the main economic resource, the primary avenue to individual wealth. Control rather than ownership is the source of economic well-being. Power is the source of

wealth, not vice versa. For this reason, those groups which have an advantage in the power struggle - the military and the bureaucracy (which I call "functionary groups") - often find themselves as much an economic as a political elite. It seems useful to consider such groups to be class fragments in their own right (or at least their leaderships). Intra-class conflict at the level of the elite is, therefore, determined in large measure by differences of function. Finally, as peasants are in general quiescent, and as different ethnic groups and class fragments tend to come across each other only in cities, conflict tends to be an urban phenomenon. For this reason, but also because conflict tends to be intra rather than inter-class, and, at the uppermost level, over power rather than over economic resources, it results not in revolution but simply in changes of regime.

It is because conflict is generally limited to urban areas and because the supreme struggle is between different elites that the mass media can assume some importance. The media in developing countries are not powerful but, insofar as they can influence events, it is in just such circumstances. They might at times have the power to influence urban conflicts sufficiently to unbalance the current regime. So the media (though more usually just the press) can become a part of the power-game, and because of this potential they are usually heavily controlled. Though it is impossible to estimate with any accuracy the influence of the press in conflict situations, there is no doubt that the press is itself very dependent on conflict for its own development. It has an intimate relationship with conflict. Nevertheless, the press has in general limited influence. I shall, in fact, argue that the media as a whole have very limited influence. They do not reflect society, or necessarily even a distortion of it. They simply reflect a very small part of it. They are elite rather than mass media. Nevertheless, in these two very important respects - the intimate connection with conflict and their largely elitist nature - the media, in a general sense, accurately reflect the sort of society they derive from. It is

often assumed that the mass media play an important part both in nationalism and in development. The functionalists in particular lay great stress on this. But, far from promoting integration or development, the media reflect only a narrow part of society and, insofar as they do stretch down towards the masses, they tend, if anything, to promote conflict. They reflect rather than heal social divisions. These divisions are usually communal. For this reason, and because the media are largely an elitist affair, they are able to become an instrument of class control only to a small extent. The media are simply not mass media. Marxism, therefore, is not very relevant either.

I shall be looking at the above questions with particular reference to two case-studies: Nigeria and Pakistan (including Bangladesh). I went to Pakistan and Bangladesh for research purposes in 1978. I did not go to Nigeria as there is a far more extensive literature on this country - on both the political-economy and mass media - than there is on Pakistan and Bangladesh. Moreover, in this area of analysis these latter countries offered a far more complex field of study, one which really required close first-hand examination. Overall, my research has been wide-ranging in technique, incorporating economic and political analysis of both areas (i.e. Nigeria and Pakistan/Bangladesh), a study of politicians' backgrounds and of parliamentary debates (in order that greater sociological insight could be cast on the nature of politics in these areas), a content-analysis of the press and interviews with or questionnaire returns from a number of journalists (and also a few politicians) in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

I chose Nigeria and Pakistan for study because both countries have, since independence, suffered severe internal conflicts. It could be said that this thesis is in large part a sociological examination of the causes of these intense conflicts. Though both countries are extreme cases, such conflict in varying degrees of intensity is or has been prevalent in a large number of Third World areas (the Congo, the Horn of Africa, Uganda, Turkey, Iran, Cambodia and Malaysia - to name but a few). From an academic point of view it is not the intensity of the conflict that is important, but rather its nature and its causes.

CHAPTER ONE: CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter I will try to show that development, sociologically speaking, should be understood primarily in terms of conflict and that, though this conflict is essentially economic in nature, it depends on the opposition of cultural identities for its expression. As cultural identities are usually permanent this conflict is a never-ending principle, with ethnic groups struggling to dominate and to avoid being dominated. Developing countries are often characterised by a continuous flow of internal imperialism and nationalism. Moreover, this conflict, at its climax, as economic resources are scarce and as government is the main accumulator of wealth, becomes a struggle for power. What we have, then, is conflict over access to scarce resources, which is eventually expressed by a struggle between different cultural groups for control of government.

1.1. Nationalism: The First Phase of Internal Conflict

A study of nationalism is crucial to this thesis as I wish to show that internal conflict is not an accident of development. It has its seeds in the so-called 'nationalist period' - so much so that it can be said there is no essential difference between the nationalist and development periods. The conflicts present in incipient form in the former phase flower in the latter. In this section I hope to show that the current theoretical understanding of nationalism is far too limited, and to a certain extent illogical insofar as it misses the following basic point: that nationalism is a continuous process. There will always be communal groups which seek to be free from other communal groups, whether these are colonialists from thousands of miles away or neighbouring tribes.

1.1.1. The Economic Basis of Nationalist Conflict

There are, broadly speaking, two very distinct sets of theories about nationalism. One sees it as an ideological movement. The other, the Marxist approach, sees it as a reaction to economic exploitation. Neither cultural nor purely political factors

can be the cause.

"The rise of a new phenomenon like nationalism can clearly not be explained by the existence of relatively permanent factors like geography, race, religion, or a common culture or tradition, which had existed for centuries without producing nationalism".¹

The desire for political autonomy is an obvious motive, but foreign economic control has a greater effect on the population, in Kautsky's view, than mere political control, which affects only a minority (the indigenous leaders). "Anti-colonialism, then, must here be understood as opposition not merely to colonialism narrowly defined but also to a colonial economic status".² As the colonial masters are capitalist countries, this economic status reflects a relationship between capitalism and colonialism.

This colonialism has a profound effect on the subjected countries. All socio-economic groups - peasants, workers, artisans, traders, indigenous capitalists, the aristocracy, and the intelligentsia - are in different ways, which Kautsky is careful to delineate, adversely affected by outside economic exploitation and political control. The upshot is that all classes are, in varying degrees, motivated to root out foreign capitalism from their society.

"The social tensions which modernisation and industrialisation produce everywhere and which in Europe were necessarily turned inward, resulting in conflicts dividing societies, are, in underdeveloped countries, largely turned outward..., the result being, not internal conflict, but that internal unity of anti-colonialism which is the basis of nationalism in underdeveloped countries." ³

Thus colonialism produces a sort of classlessness (at least of feeling), through uniting the opposition. This is led by the intelligentsia, which Kautsky sees as being the most classless,

1 Kautsky (1962), p.30

2 Ibid, p.39

3 Ibid, p.39

and therefore free to lead. However, the intelligentsia is itself the product of the modernisation brought by colonial rule. Kautsky borrows from Marx when he concludes that colonialism has its own internal contradictions. It produces its own 'grave-diggers', the seeds of its own destruction.

Another left-wing writer, Worsley, also rejects the idea that nationalists are united by culture. They are united by economic oppression.

"Reduced to infantile dependence, reduced to uniformity, a sense of common fate united peoples divided by older social barriers of ethnicity, class, rank, culture, religion. People drew together, and were forced together!"¹

If nationalism is to unite such disparate groups it must have a very broad appeal. The result of this need is a style of politics which Worsley calls 'populism'. This becomes especially important after independence. I will discuss populism later on, but the essence of the ideology is the assertion "that there are no divisions in the community, or that if they are discernible, they are 'non-antagonistic'."² This populism Worsley sees as a flexible sort of socialism seeking to bring people together and to encourage them to accept themselves as a community. The overall argument is similar to Kautsky's, differing mostly in Worsley's direct linking of nationalism to socialism and in his vision of nationalist movements led by 'populist' leaders rather than by the intelligentsia (not that the two are mutually exclusive).

The crux of the argument is that nationalism is more than a revolt against colonial political rule. It is also a revolt against capitalist exploitation. The main trouble with this presentation is, in fact, the crucial burden placed upon the role of capitalism. It seems the reason for emphasising the role of capitalism is its apparently widespread effect on the colonial economy and, therefore, on the general population. But there are many reasons for opposing foreign rule. Earlier forms of economic exploitation - sheer plunder, trading monopolies, slavery, could be more devastating in the short and long-term than slowly developing capitalism.

1 Worsley (1964), p.84

2 Ibid, p.165

It seems the reason for emphasising the role of capitalism is its apparently widespread effect on the colonial economy and, therefore, on the general population. But there are many reasons for opposing foreign rule. Earlier forms of economic exploitation - sheer plunder, trading monopolies, slavery, could be more devastating in the short and long-term than slowly developing capitalism. (The Spanish devastations of Central and South American Indian societies are a clear example). Religious resentment is important when the newcomers are seen to ride over what is considered by the indigenous people to be sacred. Loss of political power may not affect the majority, but it does affect the previous elite, as well as those dependent on them for patronage, and those followers who remain loyal. Conscription into an occupying army is another possible cause of resentment, even where the soldiers are volunteers, joining to make a living. (The Indian 'Mutiny' of 1857 shows all these features). It seems, then, that capitalism is not a primary cause of nationalism. Colonial rule in any form is likely to bring a nationalist reaction. This does not mean capitalism has no effect, merely that any effect it does have is secondary.

Kautsky and Worsley are very keen to see nationalism as a united force, which leads them to underestimate ethnic divisions, or sub-nationalisms, within the community. Worsley does make some allowance for this, but defers ethnic strife until after independence. Yet ethnic (or other cultural) differences have had a crucial effect on nationalist movements themselves, i.e. before independence - for example, in India, Nigeria, and Ireland. In these and many other cases the nationalist movement contained different cultural groups which opposed each other as much as they opposed colonial rule. Fears of domination by neighbouring ethnic groups have been a powerful factor within nationalist movements.

Kautsky and Worsley, then, over-simplify nationalism first by making it a reaction to foreign capitalism and then by vastly underestimating the importance of internal ethnic divisions. Paradoxically, in their eagerness to make of nationalism a united front against foreign capitalist rule, they also underestimate the importance of class divisions. There is a difference between forgetting class

divisions during the nationalist struggle, and merely not letting them get in the way of the struggle. Different classes have different uses for nationalism. This, in fact, comes out of their own analysis. They analyse the reasons for each class overlooking its class interests in the cause of nationalism; but, by the same token, these different interests do exist. In fact, the very point of their analysis is to show why each class joins the nationalist movement (for instance, traders want better trading opportunities). Thus each class, or fragment of a class, uses nationalism for its own ends. Class is often not a major differentiating factor, given the overwhelming proportion of peasants in most developing countries; but vested interests certainly exist - landowners, traders, some industrialists, certain professional groups; they each have a different vision of nationalism and the future nation-state, and different uses for them. This becomes especially important after independence, when these interests come to the fore. The stress that these writers lay on the different reasons various socio-economic groups might have for joining the nationalist movement is very useful, even if they fail to take their ideas to the logical conclusion. They are right to emphasise the economic factors, but are wrong in their simplification of nationalism, its reduction to a simple, united stand against foreign capitalism.

1.1.2. The Cultural Basis of Nationalist Conflict

The other two theories I shall discuss see nationalism as an ideological force rather than as a reaction to economic exploitation. As Kautsky and Worsley emphasise the latter cause, they view nationalism favourably. They see it as unifying and progressive. Kedourie's view is the opposite. To him nationalism is destructive. Moreover, he entirely discounts economic exploitation not only for nationalism but for colonialism too. Sometimes, for instance, worthless territories were taken over (at great expense), for strategic reasons, prestige, or simply to prevent other countries from getting them.¹

For Kedourie nationalism is not a general ideology but a specific ideology developed in a particular time and place - Western Europe in the late 18th century. It concerns the individuality of different cultures and their expression as 'national will' in independent

1 Kedourie (1970)

nation-states. Herder, one of the thinkers Kedourie takes to be the founders of the nationalist ideology, took this notion to extremes and argued that individuals were defined, morally and otherwise, by their nationality. Furthermore, he laid great stress on nationality itself being defined by culture, in particular by language.

And you German alone, returning from abroad
Wouldst greet your mother in French?
O spew it out, before your door
Spew out the ugly slime of the Seine
Speak German, O you German.¹

Perhaps the poem sounds better in German too. For Herder, and later nationalists, those who speak a common language form a nation. This language is not simply a convenience. It expresses the thoughts, beliefs, customs, even the 'soul' of the nation.

However, Kedourie argues that the ideological basis of nationalism in culture and language is false. Nationalism, as ideology, masks fact. People are not in reality neatly divided into national categories either by language or culture. People are grouped into various collectivities largely through historical accident.

"In certain localities in Hungary, for instance, the landed gentry were Magyars, the urban middle class German-speaking, the peasants Croat or Slovak natives... If this Central and East European society were refashioned into national territorial sovereignties, great conflicts were bound to arise....."²

Thus, rather than being a cohesive force, nationalism can be divisive and destructive. This is even more the case in developing countries fragmented by language, tribe and religion.

Those who import the nationalist ideology - into situations where it is hopelessly out of context - are intellectuals influenced by Western ideas but confused and dislocated by the modernisation process. Their nationalism is then supported by the mythological

1 Herder (To the Germans), quoted in Kedourie (1960), p.59

2 Ibid, p.119

and religious symbols of their own culture. The result is a frightening mixture of political activism and millennial prophesy. The individual is now totally lost in the whole. This combination of national purity, religious fervour and political manipulation can be highly destructive.

Here, then, is a radically different approach to nationalism. Kedourie's theory is intellectual, conservative, and pessimistic. Its intellectualism comes from the theory's foundations in the study of the writings of nationalist writers. Kedourie says very little about the objective conditions - social, economic or political - surrounding nationalism. We are given nothing more than crude psychological assumptions - and they are nothing more than assumptions - on the spiritual dislocation of the intellectuals and their ability to control their followers, who become "plastic" and "malleable" in their hands. Despite these major defects, Kedourie does a service in his realistic assessment of the negative side of nationalism. This is a worthwhile approach (and the reason for the inclusion of Kedourie in this discussion). More important than this perhaps is the applicability of his argument to all types of freedom movement. He correctly sees nationalism as a continuous process. There will always be ethnic groups seeking autonomy from other ethnic groups, whatever the logical weakness of their cultural underpinnings.

Though nationalism is not a specific reaction to capitalist exploitation, and can be a highly divisive force, it is not necessarily as irrational as Kedourie claims. Smith also holds that nationalism is an ideology, but is similar to Kautsky and Worsley in endowing it with positive functions. He complains that Kedourie has concentrated on a sort of German 'organic' nationalism, ignoring the liberal form espoused during the French Revolution. The latter is concerned with economic and social well-being, and can accept cultural diversity. Its vision is one of freedom, equality, progress, and the sovereignty of the people, rather than of some mystical 'union'.

"The key to my analysis is the concept of the 'scientific state'... What matters is the new 'interventionist' role of the State - on the grounds that it alone can raise the living standards of the population, educate them, unify

them, give them a sense of pride and well-being, and administer public affairs in a 'rational' and calculative manner."¹

This idea is similar to Kautsky's and Worsley's in its optimism, and the belief that colonialism modernises. However, Smith refuses to narrow down the reaction to this modernisation to a reaction to capitalism. The reaction is to Western rational administration and the West's vastly superior technology. The critical reaction occurs amongst the intelligentsia, because they see the 'superiority' of the Western system, admire it, want to adopt it, but have also been socialised by their own traditional system. Many writers, including Kautsky and Kedourie, lay great emphasis on the strains that the intelligentsia undergoes during modernisation, but Smith differs in his description of this ambivalence (which he calls 'dual legitimation'). The difference lies in the addition of a spiritual conflict, a crisis of religious faith. Some of the intelligentsia look back to traditional ways as a reaction to these contradictions, some seek membership in a brotherhood of modern states ('assimilationists'), while some transfer their religious impulses from God to the new nation, thus spiritualising it (seeking an extreme national purity). These 'revivalists' and the 'assimilationists' form the backbone of nationalism.

"What I think the model helps to explain is the Janus-faced posture of so many ethnic nationalisms. Nationalism is both integrative and divisive, because the 'assimilationist' stresses the vision of fraternity among equals, but the elitist-minded 'revivalist' underlines the cultural differentiae. so necessary to the renovation of the community and the restoration of dignity through secession"².

This analysis is clearly Weberian in style - in the general emphasis on culture, in the use of certain terms such as 'status', 'authority', and religious 'value', and also in particular parallels with the 'Protestant ethic' thesis. However, I doubt that religion is as important as Smith claims. It is hard to believe most

1 Smith (1971), p.231/2

2 Ibid, p.256

nationalist leaders are anything other than hard-headed nationalists who, if they use religious symbols, do so to gain mass support. In fact, a further problem with Smith's theory is his concentration on nationalist leadership. He shares this weakness with Kedourie, though Smith deliberately limits his theory this way for the sake of clarity in a complex area. Nevertheless, it has been left largely to Marxist writers to consider society as a whole when examining nationalism - surely a necessity.

The major asset of the theory is the important argument that nationalism is both divisive and integrative. This is a significant improvement over the other theories, which see it simply as one or the other. Nationalism contains continuously opposed centrifugal and centripetal forces. There are those who have a wide vision (Smith's assimilationists) and those who have a restricted vision (the revivalists). This must surely always be the case. Equally, it is possible to say there will always be those who will use their cultural groups to dominate others, and those that will seek to avoid this domination. However, reactions to the 'scientific state' cannot adequately account for such conflicts. Deeper economic factors - the struggle over scarce resources - are present.

Implicit in the above analysis of four writers is that nationalism is a mixture of both economic and cultural factors. I have also tried to indicate that these factors are to a large extent internal. All four of the above writers place the main source of reference externally (capitalism, European ideology, or the idea of the modern 'scientific state'), while one 'pair' of writers (Kautsky and Worsley) stress economic factors and the other 'pair' (Kedourie and Smith) cultural factors. In the case of both 'pairs' I shall now give the 'internal' versions of both the economic and cultural arguments. The 'internal economic' element concerns the struggle for control over scarce economic resources (through the gaining of power). The 'internal cultural' element concerns sub-nationalism, which I will discuss second.

1.1.3. The Struggle for Power

Nationalism, whatever else it may be, must also be a struggle between rival groups for power after independence. However fervent the nationalist ideology, however fervent the hatred of colonial rule and exploitation, each nationalist group (or subgroup) wants to be the ruling group. Each nationalist leader says to himself: "I want freedom for my country. But I want to rule it when it is free, because I know what is best for it". (Or, "I will gain enormous power and wealth".) This does not explain nationalism, but it makes of it a completely different animal. It is, of course, also possible to see the ideology of nationalism as an ideology in the original Marxist sense of deception, i.e. a cover for gain.

"the benefits from the gratification of nationalist sentiment are of two sorts, particular and general, or tangible and intangible. The particular benefits are the incomes and prestige that accrue to those nationals who acquire the property rights or the offices and employment opportunities in which nationalism invests. The general benefits consist of the psychic satisfaction derived by the community at large from gratification of the taste for nationalism"¹.

Power and wealth do not simply accrue to the nation. They accrue to particular members of it. Even the most socialist of Third World states suffer severely from 'elitism'. It is interesting that Marxists are willing to see nationalism in the West as a false ideology - helping to create an unreal unity between classes whose interests are really opposed - but have been unwilling to apply this idea elsewhere.

I would not claim that nationalism is such a 'false' ideology. But I do think there must eventually be a trade-off between nationalism and the struggle for power such that when the latter becomes critical, nationalism (its symbols, its following and its ideology) will be caught up in the struggle for power. It will be used and manipulated, however sincerely nationalist the rivals for power are.

1 Johnson, H.G. (1965), p.177

Ultimately, power and access to resources are at stake. It seems obvious to me that different groups will have an eye on these good things. Thus, the struggle for them during the nationalist movement can be intense. The rivalry between the various parties contending for power in Rhodesia when it was, finally, to become Zimbabwe, is an example of this. The speed with which independence (from white rather than colonial rule) was to come, and the nature it would take, depended largely on the relationships between the main contenders for power. Some groups (for example, the emirs of Northern Nigeria and the Moslems of India) even went as far as to try and slow down the race to independence in order to put themselves in a better position, either to take over the reins at independence, or to protect themselves against others who might take over the reins. Nationalism, i.e. the ideology of the nation, is not at the basis of all national movements. It is only one factor. Greed and lust for power are others.

Very often, then, vested interests have their own uses for nationalism. An example of such a group were the 'Bhadralok' ('gentlemen' or 'respectable people'), a Hindu elite of Bengal comprising the top three castes of that area. In the early part of the 20th century they began to see their control over Bengal threatened both by Muslim nationalism and by Gandhi's attempts at mass agitation. They quickly indulged in their own form of nationalism in order to try and retain control. Paradoxically, this led many young Bhadralok to adopt a Marxist ideology (thus rejecting "electoral political systems in which an elite was likely to be outnumbered"¹) and to get involved in terrorism, which they preferred to mass agitation.

"They were apprehensive that mass agitation would lead to violence, and that violence against the foreigner might quickly change to violence against the socially privileged."²

To assume that nationalism is cultural or ideological (Kedourie and Smith) means ignoring the economic side of nationalism. To assume that the economic side of nationalism consists entirely of

1 Franda (1970), p.592

2 Broomfield (1968), p.154

a (united) stand against capitalist colonialism means ignoring the role of indigenous vested interests in the nationalist movements.

1.1.4. Sub-nationalism

None of the above theories can cope adequately with secession movements that come after national independence. The theories of Kautsky and Worsley are particularly inapposite. If nationalism describes the struggle of colonies to break free from capitalist exploitation, then what are the struggles for secession that occur in many countries after independence? Are we to maintain the notion of 'anti-capitalist' nationalism simply by defining nationalism so that it cannot include secession bids? And how on earth could the conflict between Muslims and Hindus as India gained independence be described as a movement against Western capitalism? Smith, in a brief theoretical paper, suggests that sub-nationalism arises out of economic frustration felt by regional groupings after independence, while

"the inability of the new states to distribute resources efficiently and equitably, in the judgement of peripheral ethnic groups, hastens their politicisation."¹

The vehicle of protest is, again, a "thwarted and mobile"² intelligentsia. As in the nationalist phase, the intelligentsia is facing a "crisis of legitimacy", of ambivalence between modernity and tradition. As before, they seek a return of the ethnic past. Regional economic inequalities, neglectful bureaucratic centralisation, and lack of economic growth, push the intelligentsia into ethnic separatism.

Suggestive though this analysis is, it is too sketchy to provide a thorough basis for understanding sub-nationalism. Anyway, surely we cannot lay all nationalist (and sub-nationalist) movements at the feet of the (apparently ubiquitously) disgruntled intelligentsia? Elsewhere Smith does have something further to say on this.³ He distinguishes between two basic types of nationalism, an 'ethnic' variety and a 'territorial' variety. The main form of ethnic nationalism is the secessionist movement seeking autonomy for an ethnic group. Territorial nationalisms try to unite heterogeneous groups within a particular territory - the case in many developing

1 Smith (1979), pp.34/5

2 Ibid, p.34

3 Smith (1976), pp.4/5

countries incorporating different tribes. This is an important distinction as it describes two very real, and conflicting, nationalisms: one, positive and constructive (the latter); the other divisive. (This, to me, also parallels his description of two different types of nationalist - the revivalist and the assimilationist). I would argue, however, that these types of nationalism are all part of the same process. They do not describe movements in different eras or countries as Smith suggests, or even necessarily phases of the same movement. Both types of nationalism are present in most societies. Most societies contain both imperialists and nationalists.

The lack of difference between nationalism and sub-nationalism can be made clearer if nationalism is not seen solely in relation to colonialism, at least not in the normal sense. Some have applied the term colonialism to describe political and economic relationships between different cultural groups within the same society. This 'internal colonialism' has been described as follows:

"The uneven wave of industrialisation over territorial space creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups, and therefore acute cleavages of interest arise between these groups.... The superordinate group, now esconced as the core, seeks to stabilise and monopolise its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalisation and perpetuation of the existing stratification system.... Let this stratification system be termed the cultural division of labour: it assigns individuals to specific roles in the social structure on the basis of objective cultural distinctions."¹

The uncertainty of boundary definition and the difficulty of distinguishing between nationalism and sub-nationalism is brought out well in Nigeria's early history. When the British established themselves in Lagos they showed little interest in taking over the Yoruba hinterlands. When the Ijebu closed the main trade route from Ibadan to Lagos the British came under a lot a pressure from indigenous interests to take over the area. When they did go in,

1 Hechter (1975), p.39

the British had the support of Yoruba businessmen in Lagos, the Ibadans, and other Africans. The Ijebus, who saw Ijebu-land as their country, were as much opposed to Ibadans and African Lagosians as to the Europeans.

"Though the great majority of West African peoples cherished their independence, they were invariably faced with a series of potential threats to their independence.....at times the European seemed less of an immediate threat to that independence, and was, as we have seen, called in as an ally, or was joined in his support of a mutual enemy."¹

After independence these tribal loyalties severely weakened Yoruba unity, and political alliances were made by some Yoruba groups with Ibo or Hausa interests outside Yoruba-land. What were the boundaries of nationalist forces in that area over the whole period of Nigerian history? Egba-land, Ibadan-land, etc.? Or Yoruba-land? Western Nigeria? Or Nigeria? All these boundaries were of importance in a confused, conflicting medley of nationalisms.

The problem of boundary definition is especially acute in the Middle East where there is a conflict between Islamic nationalism, Arab nationalism, and State nationalism. The boundaries of nationalism are fluid. Which boundaries will be chosen depends on the degree and type of foreign penetration. Thus Arabs have stressed their 'Arabness' when struggling against Turkish domination, but their Islamic identity when opposing the power of the West. They only become 'nation-state' nationalists when the Arab States themselves come into mutual opposition.

Theories of nationalism tend to treat sub-nationalism as a peripheral thing. It is 'parochialism', 'localism', 'tribalism', or 'regionalism'. This conception is artificial. Every 'parochial' group sees itself as a nation. It fixes some limit beyond which it considers people to be foreigners. My own view, then, of tribalism and such movements, is that they are essentially nationalistic. A group becomes nationalistic when it feels itself under threat or when it wishes to expand. I will concentrate on

1 Crowder (1971), p.13.

the former case. If a colonialist country invades (for example) an African country, as it penetrates it it sparks off a number of independent nationalisms by various tribal groups, each seeing their particular nation under threat. Nationalism is all a question of boundaries. These only become concretely defined when a group is under attack. If the subsequent occupation is sufficiently long it can meld various neighbouring groups together. Thus group boundaries are extended and the nationalist struggle widened. This process continues until nationalism fills up the whole area which the colonising country has designated as the new (but colonial) nation-state. 'Nationalism', as most theories see it, suddenly erupts. But all that has really happened is that smaller nationalisms have grown and coalesced until they have reached accepted state boundaries. If there are periods of quiescence before this, it is because of the danger of protest. As the tribal or regional groups are brought together by colonial rule, the more people there are to throw into the struggle, and the greater the justification for demanding a free nation-state.

Of course, not all people who see their 'national boundaries' thus changing identify with this ever-increasing national image. Cultural boundaries expand more slowly than economic or political boundaries. Here the above discussion of the struggle for power and resources again becomes relevant. The bigger the nation that the colonial rulers have defined, the greater the power and resources that the new incumbents in government after independence will have access to. The larger the country, the more there is at stake, and the more intense the struggle within the nationalist movement. This helps explain the ethnic or regional conflicts that occur after independence. Many groups will be ambivalent between different national boundaries - that of their own tribe or region, and those of the new nation-state. They fluctuate between acceptance of the new boundary and affirmation of the old - or hover round some intermediate boundary. Whether or not they accept the new one depends in large measure on what they (or their leaders) stand to gain in the struggle for power and access to resources. A group's nationalism is likely to contract to within its own boundaries

when it sees it is doing badly in the competition for power and resources. Thus, tribal (or other ethnic) groups support state-nationalism in order to be rid of colonial rule, but often then become 'smaller' nationalists when independence has been achieved, in order to win yet greater autonomy. Nationalism can be a uniting force, but it also acts as the reverse.

"A great number of successor-states to the empires are polyethnic societies and here the dogma of nationality, successful in uniting the various communities against the imperial power, soon acts as a dissolvent. For these communities begin to become conscious of themselves as nations, and to demand self-determination. Why not? Where is the principle of self-determination to end?"¹

1.1.5. Conclusion

Nationalism is both cultural and economic. Economic advantage and disadvantage, real or perceived, are defined culturally. When resources are scarce there has to be a way of defining others as ineligible for access to these resources. The way to do that is to show that they are not the same as you, i.e. 'foreign'. In my view there is no essential difference between 'nation-state nationalism', 'tribal nationalism', 'regional nationalism', or any other group nationalism. What is of importance is the group boundary. What boundary a group wishes to defend depends on the nature and extent of outside influence or control within that boundary. Nationalism consists in large measure of a struggle by a community for power and access to scarce resources. What sort of power and which resources are sought by the community will determine which boundaries will be chosen as the vehicle for this nationalism. Developing societies often contain a number of ethnic groups undecided and in competition over which boundaries to accept as their national boundaries - some seeking control over others, others seeking to avoid this control. These societies, then, become the setting for a fluctuating contest between internal imperialist and nationalist forces.

1 Finer (1962), p.225

The power of ethnic identity means it often becomes the primary basis for the competition over access to scarce resources. This affects all levels of the social hierarchy: traders and workers from one ethnic group try to restrict the economic opportunities of traders and workers from other ethnic groups. But this competition becomes most crucial at the uppermost level, that of the elite. As the major gateway to wealth is through power, and as ethnicity is the basis of competition over access to scarce resources, nationalism, i.e. ethnic competition for political control, can often be seen as a means of competing for such economic opportunities. To summarise: nationalism is a struggle for power and wealth waged against 'foreigners', whether these foreigners are overseas colonialists or next-door neighbours. These themes - ethnic conflict, competition for access to scarce resources, and the culmination of these in the struggle for power - will be continued in the next section.

1.2. The Importance and Nature of Conflict in Development

In the introduction I argued that conflict should be a central issue in the study of developing countries, and that intense conflict is not an accident of development. It starts in the nationalist phase. In the above section I argued that it makes little sense to view nationalism without regard to internally generated conflict, and, further, that nationalism is a continuous process. The 'development phase' is not necessarily essentially different from the pre-independence 'nationalist phase'. The internal conflicts always present, once the colonial power has gone simply come more into the open. These, as I have just described, are economic in nature but are based on cultural differentiation. What I tried to show above is that in most, if not all, developing societies there are tendencies towards fragmentation. Within most developing and even in many developed countries there are groups with nationalist urges. These are supported by strong economic imperatives. What I wish to argue in this section on development is that, in a situation of scarce resources, the main means of achieving economic advancement is the gaining of power (something that has so far only been hinted at), and that community (especially ethnic community), despite the

economic element, provides a far more important basis for this than class. However, classes (or at least class fragments) do exist, and it is the particular relationship between these and various communal identities that is of most interest.

1.2.1. The Centrality of Conflict

I argued above that conflict (i.e. internal conflict) is an important part of nationalism. It is, too, in the 'development phase'. The seeds of this conflict, i.e. of the struggle for access over scarce resources, are generally sown in the nationalist period. However, idealistic views of nationalism are often carried over into the study of development. Conflict is treated as a peripheral matter, as a mere accident of development. Functionalism has got closest to arguing this. In fact, this (or, more correctly, structural-functionalism) has been until recently one of the most influential theoretical bases for the study of development. The theory builds on the idea of the progressive unification and development of society, processes which are seen as concomitants of modernisation. As economic modernisation proceeds, new social and political needs arise; new institutions and processes develop to meet them. Unity - the increasing mutual interaction of the various components of an increasingly complex society - is a necessary part of this development. Modernisation compels 'nation-building'. It hardly needs pointing out that the abundance of coups, riots, and civil wars in developing countries since the decline of colonialism have made mincemeat of the theory of nation-building and the general theory of functionalism as it is applied to the Third World. (Unless it is considered that civil wars, etc. are in some way functional). It is equally clear that social and economic development has in general been very limited, in some cases non-existent.

Criticisms of functionalism, e.g. that it is ahistorical (refusing to see Western-type development as being possibly a specific, historical unrepeatable phenomenon); ethnocentric (viewing the countries of the Third World as struggling in a chrysalis of traditionalism, preparing to burst out as shining new Americas); and, as just indicated, incapable of taking adequate account of conflict - these are so

well known that there is little point in going into them. However, functionalism has undergone considerable change and it is worthwhile reviewing the attempts it has made to come to grips with the real world. I shall do this mainly by comparing two works by the same writer, Gabriel Almond (in conjunction with other writers), separated by a number of years.

In The Politics of the Developing Areas¹, Almond categorises a number of functions a system must perform if it is to be called a polity - regardless of its specific structure. The categories together form an input-output model. The input functions include such things as 'interest articulation', the output functions such things as 'rule-making'. These minimum conditions are used in a number of case-studies as guide-lines for cross-national comparisons. The emphasis on interest articulation (and aggregation) allows some room for the analysis of conflicts of interest, and is in that respect an improvement over standard systems theory. Nevertheless, Almond does not venture far from the well chewed postures of functionalism. The input-output model is a clear example of this. Though Almond is flexible in his definition (on the input side) of what includes interest articulation - it includes for instance, "anomic interest groups" such as riots and demonstrations - there is something Parsonian and unreal about the analysis of such interest articulations: for instance,

"a high incidence of anomic interest articulation will mean poor boundary maintenance between the society and the polity, frequent eruptions of unprocessed claims without controlled direction into the political system. It will affect boundary maintenance within the political system by performing aggregative, rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication functions outside of appropriate channels and without benefit of appropriate process"²

When diametrically opposed interest groups are struggling over scarce resources, what is "appropriate process", what are "appropriate channels"? One interest group will invariably find that the "appropriate channels" have been appropriated by an

1 Almond and Coleman (1960)

2 Ibid, p.35

opposed group. The whole framework of analysis breaks down when faced with reality, for which the concepts were not designed. The notion that politics builds on society as a whole rather than on its divisions is functionalism at its worst.

Almond's later book, "Crisis, Choice, and Change"¹, reflects a considerable decline in the role of structural-functionalism. Almond starts with an apologia for earlier development theory. Specifically including his earlier book amongst earlier theories, he says

"we were quite sure that these models and classification schemes....were not developmental or causal theories. We were also aware of the fact that we were comparing non-Western political systems according to Western categories and from a Western perspective. After all, we were Westerners, beginning with the knowledge and concerns of the West...."²

Despite this academically rather feeble excuse, the unwillingness to tackle the analysis of developing countries wholeheartedly continues in the second book, only two of whose seven case-studies are on currently developing countries.

Almond accepts the main criticisms of functionalism - that it is not explanatory, and that it puts excessive emphasis on equilibrium and, therefore, tends to be "ideologically conservative"³. The task now, in Almond's view, is to pay more attention to change and conflict. Almond et al combine a number of theories in combination with a much reduced functionalist framework in an attempt to supply these deficiencies. The starting point of the new format is to say that at a particular (selected) time a society can be found to be 'in equilibrium'. Then a disturbance to this functioning system occurs (a "systemic crisis") from an external or internal source, which alters power relationships and patterns of access to resources. The various contenders for power then try and form new coalitions to redress the balance or make the best of a new balance. The result is a new equilibrium containing a different balance of power and resources (even if the contenders are the same as before).

1 Almond, Flanagan and Mundt (1973)

2 Ibid, p.2

3 Ibid, p.7

This new theory shows a greater emphasis on change and conflict, yet we still have a process of transition separating two equilibrium states. Thus, though there is a greater concentration on the transition period, the basic functionalist paradigm has not changed. Almond confirms as much when, while admitting that "our fingers had been burned by earlier theoretical experimentation", he goes on to repeat the old functionalist adage "of the obvious point that any theory which seeks to explain change or development must be the same theory that explains stability"¹. I disagree. All societies, but especially those in the Third World, are in a state of continuous flux. It is the nature and intensity of this flux that requires examination. What one calls 'stability' and 'conflict' is to some extent a matter of definition. But conflict is a process, while stability is not. Short of social processes stopping (e.g. after a massive nuclear war) it would be difficult to say what 'stability' is. There is always process and flux. There is always conflict at some level. That is what needs study. Conflict cannot simply be shunted to one side of an equation as an unfortunate but calculable side-effect of other processes (and when Almond et al try to analyse political change literally in terms of mathematical formulae they seem to be living in another world).

Almond's later theory, clearly a rearguard action, is possibly the functionalists' equivalent of Custer's Last Stand. Rajni Kothari, who reviewed a UNESCO conference on "nation-building", during which a full-scale attack was made on functionalism, believed that

"the systemic methodological-empirical critique of it, plus the fact that no rebuttal of this critique was forthcoming, appeared to put to rest the oft-attacked theory of structural functionalism".²

Functionalism has made some attempt to take account of change and conflict, however inadequately. It continues to be a very influential theory, however indirectly, and however much theories influenced by functionalism have progressed beyond it. Samuel Huntington's important theory³ seems to have been influenced by

1 Ibid, p.27

2 Kothari in Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973), p.100

3 See Huntington (1968)

functionalism though he makes conflict a central part of his argument. Huntington takes as his starting-point not political development but political decay. He distinguishes two concepts which functionalism assumes to be inseparable - political development and economic modernisation. The latter, in fact, tends to bring political decay, not development. It has brought (in the Third World) neither democracy nor a process of "nation-building", but military rule, coups and civil wars.

Huntington's model is in a broad sense another input-output model but, in this case, an unbalanced one: in developing societies the inputs tend to exceed the outputs. Economic modernisation impels emergent groups to demand power commensurate with their economic standing. As developing countries are unable to institutionalise such participation, conflict is invariably the result. Huntington's description is not dissimilar from Almond's "unprocessed claims". Huntington calls societies characterised by such systems "praetorian societies". In praetorian systems socio-economic forces are directly involved in politics, i.e. various social forces are highly politicised. The main such group tends to be the army. However, this is only

"one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies.....Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labour unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is out-of-joint....."¹

The central characteristic, then, of such societies is that in them "social forces confront each other nakedly".²

There are only two groups, in Huntington's view, which can promote development - the military and the politicians. The former have the greatest opportunity early on in modernisation, before society becomes too complex, before the compromise, wheedling and bargaining only politicians can manage is needed. However, it is wrong to see the military merely as guardians of power during a temporary emergency. The conditions of a praetorian society are such that an emergency is unlikely to be temporary.

1 Ibid, p.194

2 Ibid, p.196

Praetorianism can only end when politics is restricted to the political party. The party, in Huntington's view, is the vital modernising institution. Only parties, because of their need to obtain support, reach out to the people (in particular, the rural masses). It is important to note that Huntington does not believe political development (as he defines it) is inevitable. He merely outlines the only way he believes it can occur.

Huntington's analysis, when looked at from the political angle only, makes a great deal of sense, but his faith in politics is misplaced. In fact, his notion of the party is rather abstract. This is because he is influenced by systems theory, despite his great stress on conflict and political decay. An institutionalised organisation or procedure, for instance, is one that is "adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent". These categories are clearly related to Parsons' pattern variables (and therefore to Almond's categories). A political party made up of lawyers and teachers might be adaptable, complex and coherent, but if power lies with other interests such as landlords or mine-owners, this makes little difference. Huntington's functionalism is at times quite clear.

"The questions "What is the interest of the Presidency? What is the interest of the Senate? What is the interest of the House of Representatives? What is the interest of the Supreme Court? are difficult but not completely impossible to answer. The answers would furnish a fairly close approximation of the 'public interest' of the United States"¹

The crucial functionalist weakness of emphasising society as a whole rather than its divisions, survives intact. Fundamental economic differences are apparently of little importance, political representation is everything. Huntington is a functionalist but one with a pronounced sense of the 'dysfunctions' allowed by later versions of the theory.

It seems it is very difficult to get away from the idea of transition between two equilibrium states, from the concept of tradition and modernity (with an 'unfortunate' period of change and flux between the two), from the belief in cohesion and integration.

1 Ibid, p.25

In Heeger's view it gets us nowhere to assert that societies are underdeveloped because they lack some 'modern' quality such as institutionalisation. "Underdeveloped states, to restate this argument, are underdeveloped"¹. Huntington is as guilty as systems theorists of this fault. We must analyse developing countries for what they are. "Defining underdeveloped states in terms of what they are not reveals very little about politics as it actually occurs in such states"². The simple dichotomy of tradition and modernity, the latter inevitably replacing the former, is equally unilluminating. "In some ways, the argument is unchallengeable. Just as some day we shall all be dead, so some day most things will be different"³.

Heeger starts off from a position of conflict and stymied progress. That is what must be explained as that is what exists. The fundamental reason, it would appear, is the scarcity of resources in developing societies. Governments themselves should not be analysed with reference to their willingness to develop their societies, but to their capacity to survive.

"Their resources are few. The economic pie is small and limits patronage; coercive means are costly and scarce. The result is chronically weak institutions which hinge on fragile bargaining relationships between elites in the centre and periphery."⁴

Politics in developing countries depends less on institutionalisation than on the building-up of precarious chains of patron-client linkages. The process is almost feudal.

Heeger is skeptical of all the social forces usually thought of as being vehicles of modernisation and nation-building, such as nationalism, party politics, and the military. Certain groups might well be nationalistic, but modernisation has a differential impact on various social and economic groups, and it is their different grievances which form the basis of nationalist movements.

"The nationalist movement may not mark the beginnings of a national social system and a surge of national consciousness so much as an orchestration of protests -

1 Heeger (1974), p.2

2 Ibid, p.2

3 Ibid, p.3

4 Ibid, p.9

urban, rural, messianic, tribal and nationalist....
In constructing a nationalist movement, nationalist
elites have, in a sense, constructed a fiction...."¹

This is one of the things I argued in the previous section. Parties are 'shoe-string' affairs, often no more than agglomerations of already existing organisations such as tribal or caste associations, labour unions, etc. In many developing countries too, the military tend to be small, poorly trained and perhaps riven by communal rivalries (as in Nigeria). Military rulers have the same problems as civilian ones in a fragmented society and often have to use patronage to try to hold it together to gain support.

Heeger seems, in some respects, much influenced by Huntington, but he takes the latter's arguments further. The problem is deeper than one of economic modernisation causing problems in political development. "Rather than being the consequence of breakdowns or political decay, the politics of instability is inherent in the segmentary political process itself"². Huntington complains that there is not enough political power in the system to promote economic modernisation; Heeger that there are not enough economic resources in the system to promote political development. Heeger makes the scarcity of economic resources, and the conflicts that arise from this, central to his thesis. This idea is also central to my own thesis. However, like Huntington, Heeger is a political determinist. Both writers tend to dwell on the form of politics rather than its content. Heeger, while recognising the general importance of scarcity of resources, pays little regard to the specific economic and social bases of politics. We need to know something of the role of land-owners, of unions, of ethnic groups, etc., and also how all these inter-connect.

1.2.2. The Economic Basis of Conflict

The progress of this theoretical account so far has increasingly emphasised the need to understand conflict, but I have also indicated that it is necessary to understand the economic determinate of this conflict. The above writers see everything through political eyes. Huntington, for instance, is perceptive in his analysis of the roles the various socio-economic classes play in development, but nevertheless

1 Ibid, pp.22/3

2 Ibid, p.99

plays down purely economic demands as relatively unimportant. What people want is to participate in politics. Huntington rejects Marx but applauds Lenin.

"Lenin was not a disciple of Marx, rather Marx was a precursor of Lenin. Lenin made Marxism into a political theory and in the process stood Marx on his head....(Lenin recognised) the transcendence of political goals over economic ones."¹

Huntington's admiration for Lenin stems from a great concern for political stability, almost Hobbesian in nature. But are political goals really transcendent over economic ones? The assumption behind this must be either (i) that political power or participation is an end in itself, which cannot be more than partially true as it would be meaningless unless it enabled people to order their lives better, and that is largely an economic question, or (ii) that political power is necessary to effect economic change, in which case the economic backgrounds and needs of the various contenders, and the differential effect of economic change on these, are clearly crucial. It is the fact that developing countries lack economic progress, not that they lack political participation, that makes them so unstable.

Heeger takes more note of underlying economic factors, ones, indeed, that I have laid great stress on (the scarcity of resources and, therefore, of access to them), but treats them only in very general terms. However, the notion of patron-clientism is a useful one. Gamer is another 'patron-clientist', with an approach similar to Heeger's, but he goes further than Heeger on the economic side by adopting a broadly Marxist outlook. Gamer specifically eschews the political approach. For instance, referring to Almond's theory, he approves its emphasis on the articulation of interests and on bargaining between elites, but declares the need to go further.

"His is the politician's bias: he is interested in an issue only up to the point where it quiets down.

1 Huntington (1968), pp.336/7

At that point there is a balance between inputs and outputs, because the elites who made the demands are satisfied and the rest of the populace (who have little subsystem autonomy or free articulation) can do little about what has been agreed upon."¹

We must know "who gets what, when and how".

Like Marx, Gamer puts at the centre of the picture the destructiveness of economic exploitation and the way the state becomes a vehicle for this. Due to commercialism men are alienated, in Gamer's view, from what were once "stable personal environments". For instance, they increasingly work to grow cash crops instead of their own food. The growth of trade destroys the power of traditional authorities. Real power lies with the merchants. Traditional authority is gradually overtaken by patron-client networks. Such networks occur when resources are scarce.

"In an atmosphere of scarce resources, an individual who is not a client must devise some service he can perform which will be needed by the major network if he expects the total network to extend out to benefit him."²

The "major networks" contain the bureaucratic, political, military and business elites. The "minor networks" feed these. Patron-clientism appears to fill the gap between integrated, self-sufficient village life and full-scale commercialism, coming before the farmer has completely disappeared but also before economic modernisation has got very far. "In short, patron-clientism thrives in a situation of scarce resources";³ though the system is not a feudal one, it is redolent of feudalism. Of course, the system is very unequal. Those on the lowest rungs, as in feudalism, gain little but some security, the minimum they can manage on. Nor does it make any difference which particular elite is in power, as the basic patron-client relationships remain the same. "What counts is the informal relationships that emerge."⁴

1 Gamer (1976), p.251

2 Ibid, p.102

3 Ibid, p.107

4 Ibid, p.164

Gamer, then, goes some way to incorporating a fuller account of the economic nature of conflict, of patterns of exploitation. However, it is not going far enough merely to say there are patron-client networks. These are still rather surface patterns. A deeper, more incisive picture of the economic sub-structure is needed, and one that will differentiate between different types of society, which patron-clientism fails to do. It is, in fact, a very vague concept, and not a particularly explanatory one. It describes the cell structure of the animal but not the animal's physical articulation. Though we now have sufficient acceptance of conflict, and some account of its economic nature, it is necessary to go further in the latter direction. Marxism is an obvious avenue.

1.2.3. The Role of Class

Marxism is an obvious avenue, yet it possibly presents more problems than solutions when applied to the Third World. One reason for this is Marx's pre-occupation with industrialised society. It cannot be said he ignored pre-industrial, or partially industrialised society. His 'Eighteenth Brumaire', for instance, is a detailed analysis of the problems different classes have establishing political rule in a society where they are not fully developed, or are in economic decline.¹ Nevertheless, in societies where industry has not made much headway the peasants are by far the largest class, and Marx had little time for peasants (or for 'traditional' society). While regretting the misery caused by the destruction of craft industries in traditional India, Marx warns that

"we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass..... We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence evoked on the other part, in contradistinction, wild aimless, unbounded forces of destruction, and rendered murder itself a religious rite in Hindustan."²

1 Marx: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1869)
in Fernbach (1973), pp.143-249

2 Marx: The British Rule in India (1853), in Fernbach (1973), p.306

As the peasantry is the most numerous class in the Third World, as Communist revolutions have so far occurred in peasant societies, and the urban class structure is usually not well developed, Marx's concept of the peasantry is hardly helpful.

"It seems imperative in our day to purge Marxism's traditional contempt for the 'idiocy of rural life'... Even if peasant society is due to perish ultimately under socialism, a political practice based on expediting this process is bound to be elitist, terroristic, and self-defeating."¹

While idealising certain aspects of Indian society, and the Indian's "calm nobility"², and acknowledging the destructiveness of colonialism, Marx believes the destruction of traditionalism to be necessary. Colonialism destroyed, but it also modernised. Marx quotes Goethe:

"Should this torture then torment us
Since it brings us greater Pleasure?"³

It was, however, left to later writers, including Lenin, to incorporate modern imperialism into the formal Marxist analysis of capitalism, as necessary not to traditional, developing societies but to capitalism itself. Imperialism becomes the means whereby the capitalist order can stave off the inevitable collapse predicted by Marx.

One of the major writers responsible for incorporating the Third World into the international capitalist order is Paul Baran. His basic thesis is that the imperial powers prevented the development of indigenous industry in the colonies. The result was that the lower classes in these societies were exploited by their own upper class as well as by the ruling class of the invading power.

"Thus the peoples who came into the orbit of Western capitalist expansion found themselves in the twilight of feudalism and capitalism enduring the worst features of both worlds, and the entire impact of imperialist subjugation to boot. To oppression by their feudal lords, ruthless but tempered by tradition, was added domination by foreign and domestic capitalists, callous and limited only by what the traffic would bear."⁴

1 Aidan Foster-Carter, in de Kadt and Williams (1974), p.93

2 Marx: The Future Results of the British Rule in India (1853), in Fernbach (1973), p.324

3 Marx: The British Rule in India (1853), in Fernbach (1973), p.307

4 Baran (1973), pp.276/7

The development of a class structure in the way predicted by Marx was stunted by the imposition of a foreign bourgeois order. The result is, as just indicated, a double misallocation and misuse of the economic surplus - a concept central to Baran's theory. In his view underdeveloped countries are not necessarily short of capital; an economic surplus is squeezed from the peasant wherever he is, but in these countries this surplus is absorbed by the wrong people (and wasted) - the landlord class, merchants, money-lenders and other middle-men, indigenous capitalists, and foreign enterprise. Despite the dominance of foreign commerce, none of the above indigenous groups, not even business interests, desire to change things. The merchants gain easy profits from merchandising goods produced abroad; the indigenous capitalists depend on restrictive government-aided monopolies, and do not want their own positions to be undermined by a large expansion of native industry; the landlords simply want their land rights left intact.

"What results is a political and social coalition of wealthy compradors, powerful monopolists, and large landowners dedicated to the defence of the existing feudal-mercantile order.... this coalition has nothing to hope for from the rise of industrial capitalism which would dislodge it from its positions of privilege and power."¹

The final consumer (and waster) of the economic surplus is the state, which the above interests control.

"Waste, corruption, squandering of vast sums on the maintenance of sprawling bureaucracies and military establishments the sole function of which is to keep the comprador regimes in power, characterise all of the countries in question."²

It is clear from the above that Baran sees the underdeveloped countries as distorted images of the developed world's past: but for colonialism they would have developed along the same lines as the West, Japan, or Russia. In my view this is very doubtful, and certainly beyond proof. The one major difference between the

1 Ibid, p.338

2 Ibid, p.362

developing countries now and the developed countries before industrialisation is the very existence of the developed countries. Regardless of colonialism the now-developed countries face a very different situation from that faced by the West at the start of its industrialisation. Similarly, Baran makes naive assumptions about the effect of colonialism on the nature of exploitation in the Third World. If it pays the bourgeoisie of the Third World to take on a comprador rather than a productive role in their own societies, why should it be any different without the past or present existence of colonialism or neo-colonialism? It would still be easier, and profitable, for the bourgeoisie to merchandise the products of outside capitalism than to create this capitalism itself. The bourgeoisie, the feudal class, and the state, would still prefer to import foreign goods, expertise, and capital, than to disturb the status quo by rapid industrialisation.

Though Baran gives some useful insights into the nature of the political-economies of the developing states, this is secondary to his overall placement of these within the world structure of Western capitalism. It is a constant Marxist tendency to treat the developing countries solely in the context of an international class structure. Yet the developing countries have their own class structures, their own political mechanisms, their own internal systems of exploitation - and these should be examined for what they are. The developing countries are not simply stunted versions of the developed countries. It should not be forgotten that at the start of the West's major colonial expansion the European powers were economically far ahead of the rest of the world. How else could imperialism occur? Their relationship with their colonies was fundamentally exploitative, and the West did little for its colonies; but it did not cause the latter's backwardness. Even Europe's poor were more advanced than the poor of the colonies-to-be. Surely no-one would compare the wretchedness of the British working class in the 19th century with the primitiveness of the African tribes. Even now literacy rates in India are much lower than they were in Britain 100 years ago.

Barrington-Moore argues convincingly that, in terms of exploitation, little changed in India between pre-British times and independence (possibly even thereafter). Both 'Zamindar' and emperor gained their profit from taxing the peasant, so there was little incentive for commercial farming. As the taxes were proportional to output, there was a particularly strong disincentive. The British merely allowed this destructive system to continue.

"The point deserves stressing since Marxists and Indian nationalists generally argue that Indian society was on the point of bursting through the fetters of an agrarian system when the advent of British imperialism crushed and distorted potential developments in this direction. This conclusion seems quite unwarranted on the basis of the evidence, which gives strong support to the opposite thesis: that neither capitalism nor parliamentary democracy could have emerged unaided from seventeenth-century Indian society."¹

Whatever the relations of the developing countries with the West, they are politically independent. Who holds power and how it is used is, except in rare instances, entirely an internal matter. Their structures of domination and exploitation might be affected by outside forces but, with or without these forces, they would still be there. Developing countries are not, as some Marxists appear to think, mere appendages in the Western-dominated capitalist order. "After fifteen years, the 'frozen left' is at long last prepared to admit that India is actually, meaningfully 'independent'."²

Worsley is more sensitive to internal structures, but even his 'populist' politics is defined by foreign domination, it being a reaction to the latter. As nationalist movements need mass support (or so Worsley believes) there was a natural inclination to some sort of socialism. This combination of nationalism and socialism had to have mass appeal.

1 Barrington-Moore (1973), p.321

2 Worsley (1967), p.265

"the populist asserts that there are no divisions in the community, or that if they are discernible, they are 'non-antagonistic'. Thus class-divisions can then be dismissed as external ('imperialist') intrusions, alien to the society. Ethnic differences can equally be dismissed as consequences of 'divide and rule' or as vestigial, disappearing legacies of the past.... Since the society is undifferentiated, organic, undivided, it needs only one single political organisation to express its common interest, only one party.... Finally, a mystical top dressing of quasi-religious appeal to the unity of people, land, and society is not unusual."¹

How does this creed, which Worsley calls a "rural idiom in a modern world"², arise? It exists because, despite the fairytale sound of populist ideology, the conditions it describes are, according to Worsley, broadly true. Class divisions in particular are relatively unimportant (as a consequence of the low level of development). As I suggested in the section on nationalism, Worsley vastly overplays the populist image. Nkrumah, when he fell, fell with a crash. Developing countries are riven with social divisions, over which populist ideologies provide little more than a superficial veil. Even in the case of class, as I have already indicated, Worsley plays down the extent of social division. (He entirely discounts the traditional class structure, for instance).

Marxism, if it is to be relevant to the study of development, must not only begin to look at developing countries in their own right but must also look at their internal class structures, if not to the exclusion of the international economic order. There seems to be no reason why Marxism should not be able to incorporate such features. It is possible to draw a much more varied picture than that which rigorous Marxism allows, whilst still using ideas related to Marxism. There are numerous means and outcomes of development. Barrington-Moore³, with his analysis of the relationship between types of rural economy (and the economic relations based

1 Ibid, pp.165-7

2 Ibid, p. 164

3 Barrington-Moore (1973)

on these) and different combinations of industrial and political revolution, seems to me to offer the right sort of flexibility needed to take account of the enormous variety of societies in the Third World.

1.2.4. Power as an Economic Resource

Class is not as important in developing countries as in the West. This is so because of the relative scarcity of economic resources and their consequent inability to support fully developed classes. In such circumstances power becomes the main economic resource. The creation of a new state (at independence) and the centralisation of power and control over economic resources this brings, creates with it a new political elite. Where there is no economic sub-structure on which significant class divisions or class-based political system can form, the state itself becomes the sub-structure of a new type of exploitation. Worsley is one left-wing writer who seems to recognise this, if reluctantly.

"As it penetrates into every area of social life, the Party becomes the principal avenue of advancement for the ambitious, who climb on to the bandwagon. Everything depends on securing its favour. Party membership, party office, party influence, and patronage, are the high-road to power, wealth and prestige.... Wealth derives from political power, it does not create it. Other means of acquiring wealth, prestige, and power, both for individuals and as groups, are strictly limited."¹

It is in the following passage that Worsley comes closest to asserting the possibility of a power-based class structure.

"Although the leading politicians normally do not privately own really major economic assets, their de facto control over the whole society, including powerful controls over the foreign-controlled sector of the economy, does place them in a special 'relationship to the means of production'..... the class struggle here will not be the classic Marxist one between socio-economic classes whose antagonisms

1 Worsley (1967), pp.192/3

stem from the contradiction between private ownership and social production, but from the antagonisms between a political elite controlling the society as a whole, and the rest of the population. This is the 'new class' situation."¹

These are very important arguments. Nevertheless, Worsley treats the power-based wealth of the new elite as an unfortunate side-effect of the one-party state, merely "dangers inherent in this kind of political system"². For me the state is the central component in the structure of exploitation in the Third World. It is the main source of economic accumulation. Power is the source of wealth, and of a "new class situation". Its basis is economic control rather than ownership, and this is dependent on power. The emphasis on the state, in my view, is Worsley's central contribution.

1.2.5. The Communal Basis of Conflict

The major deficiency of Marxism as applied to the Third World is its failure, indeed inability, to take proper account of communal bases of conflict. These are, in fact, of primary significance. Where resources are scarce competition for access to these becomes crucial. I have suggested that the state, through its ability to concentrate resources, is often the major avenue for personal economic advancement. The main economic resource is power. Different groups therefore find themselves, in seeking access to resources, in competition against each other for power. But community, rather than class (the class structure being relatively undeveloped), is the main basis for this conflict.

One writer who has managed to place this conflict in a central position is Cynthia Enloe. Why, she asks, has ethnicity been treated merely as a vestige of traditionalism? It was the result of an inherent bias in American systems theory, which equates 'system' with the nation-state and, therefore, 'system maintenance' with political stability.

"Most political scientists are sensitive to the pitfalls of American and democratic assumptions and try to guard

1 Ibid, p.222

2 Ibid, p.199

against them in comparative studies. However, a basic nation-state bias persists. It relegates ethnic groups to the status of dependent variables or policy problems."¹

As I argued in the previous section, nationalism does not have to mean loyalty to the nation-state. There are other forms of nation than the nation-state. To a member of a tribe, the tribe is his nation. Ethnic groups provide

"a basis of social relationship more enduring and less instrumental than occupation, status and legal right....thus ethnicity survives long after its traditional functions have been taken over by more impersonal, secular groups."²

The idea that patriotism to a tribe or some other ethnic group is somehow 'parochial', while patriotism to a nation-state, however jingoistic, is 'broad-minded', is itself an ethnocentric and narrow idea. It is certainly not based on impartial analysis. Even in some Western countries there are powerful communal antagonisms. The Irish conflict, the protests of Blacks and Indians in the U.S.A., Basque separatism, Flemish/Walloon antagonism in Belgium - all these conflicts evince this fact.

In developing countries such conflicts are far more intense. Modernisation, far from reducing these, as both functionalists and Marxists believe, brings them more into the open. Contact with outside groups, and the increased competition this engenders, increases ethnic awareness and ethnic conflict. Moreover, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation disorientate people and induce them to cling to what they know will give them support - their various ethnic groups. Ethnic competition has a highly rational basis. If, for instance, one ethnic group is sitting on certain scarce resources (oil, perhaps, or highly arable land), or has an initial advantage in education and therefore job opportunities, ethnic awareness of such economic differentials is likely to be intense. At the same time the economically advanced ethnic group will probably provide the bulk of the ruling elite and will demand

1 Enloe (1973), p.7

2 Ibid, p.268

manifestations of nationalism from other ethnic groups. The latter will feel they are being exploited under a false ideology (populist or not), and conflict is very likely.

In sum, ethnicity is a powerful and ever-present factor in developing societies. It is a cultural matter but becomes crucial when fired by economic competition. Where class is not highly developed it cannot act as the major basis for conflict over access to scarce resources. Ethnic conflict occurs even in developed countries but it is far more powerful in ethnically fragmented developing countries, which are also politically far less capable (having a much weaker and less stable political structure) of containing the social conflict that ensues. In developing countries ethnicity is the major form of identity, and is, therefore, the major source of social division. It becomes for this reason the prime basis of economic competition.

1.2.6. Intra-Class Conflict

I have just indicated that class in developing countries is far from being irrelevant. But it consists of a number of disparate "class fragments" rather than a clear and well developed class structure. Those class fragments that bear some broad relation to each other form a loose "class cluster". As resources are scarce and the means for achieving access to them (usually through power) limited, different class fragments in the same cluster find themselves competing against each other for such access. They compete against each other (i) because class clusters do not as yet form a consistent class hierarchy, (ii) because roughly equivalent class fragments find that they are interested in the same type of resources (be it power, industrial assets, petty trading outlets, or job opportunities) which, being limited, are insufficient to go round every segment of the cluster. They are not really in competition with those lower down or those higher up. In other words, conflict is within rather than between classes. It is "intra-class". It is horizontal rather than vertical.

Though ethnic conflict has primacy it is not unconnected with intra-class conflict. If ethnic rather than class identity is the main criterion of social differentiation but different class

fragments compete against each other for access to the same type of resources, then they are likely to do so on the basis of their ethnic identity, i.e. a class fragment in one ethnic group competes against its equivalent class fragment in other ethnic groups. This occurs all the way down the social hierarchy. Thus politicians use ethnicity as a weapon in political competition while, at the other end of the scale, petty traders from one ethnic group try to exclude traders from another from economic opportunity. It is rare that one ethnic group as a whole is in a superior class position to another. In other words, ethnic conflict tends to follow intra-class lines. But when ethnic conflict recedes (if it does), or where it is not very intense in the first place, conflict becomes more directly intra-class, i.e. between class fragments not ethnically differentiated. Only much later, as society develops, is conflict likely to be inter-class, i.e. the sort described by Marx.

Though intra-class occurs all the way down the social hierarchy it reaches its climax at the level of the elite. The concept of the elite does not fit in well with the Marxist framework - an elite is not a class - but it does fit well with the patron-client framework of analysis. Both theories are concerned with the nature of exploitation but, while patron-clientism describes the general mechanism without saying how this exploitation is articulated in precise socio-economic terms, Marxism has a precise conception of such articulation, that of class conflict, which is at best only partially relevant to the Third World. More particularly, power is not a direct reflection of class position; government is not "a committee for managing the common affairs"¹ of any particular class. All sorts of groups - ethnic, commercial, military, feudal, etc. - might gain out of government. There is, on this account, a tendency to talk of an elite, even amongst Marxists. It is here that an understanding of the patron-client system helps, as it is through this that the elite has contact - political and economic - with those below. In my view, then, class analysis and patron-clientism supplement each other.

1 Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Taylor, A. (1967), p.82

The theory of patronage is bound up with the concept of the elite, which is a useful concept in application to the Third World. It is, however, about as vague as the concept of patron-clientism itself. To say that a few people rule at the top for their own benefit is saying little. Elite theory (deriving from Pareto) says nothing about the basis of this power or how it fits in with the socio-economic structure.

"Thus, when we ask, who has power in a particular society, the reply is, those who have power, i.e. those who occupy the specified positions. This is scarcely illuminating."¹

It is scarcely illuminating when applied to the West, where there is a pronounced class structure. This is not so much the case in the developing countries; there, as Bottomore points out, there is a significant elite/mass divide, with a small ruling group on one side, and the masses, largely peasant, more or less passive, and totally powerless, on the other. While 'class' is a socio-economic concept 'elite' is political, and it is politics which has primacy in the Third World. Wealth is acquired through power more than power is through wealth.

A number of writers, including, above, Heeger and Baran, have tended to dismiss differences between different types of regime as secondary to the structure of domination. It does not greatly matter whether the government is military or civilian, feudal or bourgeois. For Heeger it is just a matter of an elite at the top of the patron-client system. For Baran there is a broad alliance of such interests, so it does not matter which rules. Certainly, if one looks at political and economic control in terms of an elite, the nature of the elite is not of primary significance. But, even if it is accepted that the class basis of such elites in the Third World is not so important, bureaucratic, military or political regimes cannot simply be dismissed as elites. They function in different ways, even if the fundamental nature of elite rule does not change. More specifically, if class cannot be used to differentiate different types of regime, then

1 Bottomore (1966), p.32

some other basis has to be sought. If one of the above groups can become the elite, then it does so by virtue of its function. The bureaucracy and the military are the major examples. If either, or both, gain control, they do so specifically on account of the function they hold in society. These functions, legitimately or not, enable them to acquire control. To make this clear I shall call these 'functionary groups'.

It has to be recognised that power is a value in its own right. The military, for instance, might have many reasons for intervention (the need to 'save the country', or whatever) but it also has many things to gain as a group. As Finer points out, the army might represent a class but this is not often the case. It is just one possibility. It might also represent an ethnic or regional group (for instance, the Pakistani army is largely Punjabi). But on top of these motives there is the "corporate self-interest" of the forces to consider, and, on top of these, the individual interests of its membership.

"It is also noticeable that in many if not most of the countries which have undergone a military coup, the military budget and the rewards and conditions of the military are sharply increased."¹

This exemplifies the nature of the 'functionary group'. Though segments of it usually gain more than others, often it benefits as a group. In the case of the military rank-and-file, it at least finds guaranteed employment when its leaders are in power. In the case of the bureaucracy, control over the flow of scarce resources between public and state (in both directions) presents it with enormous opportunities for corruption. There is no shortage of evidence that all ranks take these opportunities, from Permanent Secretaries to the lowest clerks. Where everything is in short supply this is inevitable.

Functionary groups are, of course, only one of the contenders for power. When they meet opposition it is usually from the political elite, which has a vested interest in purely political processes. The opposition between politicians and bureaucratic or military control is very common. It is possible, then, to see

1 Finer (1962), p.56

this struggle between different types of elite as an aspect of intra-class conflict. This is broadly true, but it must be said that the political elite sometimes itself approximates to a functionary group. Insofar as it attempts to eliminate conflict, to establish a one-party state, to spread the influence of the party throughout society (including the bureaucracy), and to make political control a routine affair, then it itself takes on the characteristics of a functionary group; but, doing so, it often loses a lot of political support.

This description of intra-class division is very broad in nature. It is possible to go into more detail. Though both the military and bureaucratic leaderships have traditionally been upper-class in origin, they are, as a result of the steady decline of the aristocracy, in combination with a great increase in the size of the army and of the civil service, becoming increasingly bourgeois in origin. As segments of the bourgeoisie these functionary groups find themselves in competition for power and access to resources with other bourgeois elements, in particular the business element and the substantial 'professional' element (lawyers, teachers, doctors, journalists, etc.). The business elite has little power but its economic influence is resented by the functionary groups once they achieve power. The latter oppose their economic control to the ownership of the businessmen. The 'professional' element has no direct access either to power or to economic resources. It has education, professional experience and urban influence. The only way it can gain power or economic access is through politics. The professional class (or class fragment) is often the core of the political party. There is, thus, a strong professional-political link. Businessmen will also seek political connections but often, though they have to take a secondary place to the functionary groups (and to their economic control) they prefer to ally with these, as they can provide the stability and strength that business interests usually need for their own promotion.

We thus have a bourgeoisie split into two: a business side and a professional side. The former support the functionary

groups, the latter support the politicians. The professional, 'liberal' side wants democracy, the business side wants strong rule. It is clear enough from this that the professional/political element has a strong weakness. It has no inherent class strength. The businessmen have their control over economic assets, the bureaucratic elite its control over the administration, while the military elite has the most powerful force. All the politician, and the professional man seeking influence through politics, has is his public. But this, though a loose and not easily controllable force, can also be potent. The politician's weapon is discontent (and nearly always discontent in the cities, where it is easier to inflame), in particular the urban riot - often led by students (from whose ranks the professional class is drawn), supported by the professional bourgeoisie, and making use of the discontents of the urban poor.

In sum, intra-class conflict occurs all the way down the social hierarchy, but reaches its culmination in the struggle between various largely bourgeois elites. These are differentiated mainly in terms of either function or occupation, the main groups being the military elite, the bureaucratic elite, and the business and 'professional' elements of the bourgeoisie. In general loose alliances are formed: the businessmen support the functionary groups, the professional element the politicians. As these are all broadly urban groups, as the countryside is generally quiescent while urban discontent is relatively easy to provoke, conflict between these groups is usually an urban phenomenon. In fact, the only way that the politicians can hope to oust the much stronger functionary groups is usually through inciting intense urban violence. The outcome is never revolution, merely a change in regime.

1.3. Conclusion

Development is about scarce resources and the struggle for control of these. As ethnicity is a more important source of group identification in underdeveloped countries than is class, this struggle frequently follows ethnic lines. This leads to various forms of nationalism. As resources are scarce, it is

difficult to make headway through direct involvement in the economy. Indirect control, through involvement in the apparatus of state, offers by far the best prospects. The state is the main accumulator of wealth. Power, then, is the basis of wealth, not wealth of power. The struggle for power frequently follows ethnic lines.

However, ethnic conflict is not only between the elites. Where ethnic differentiation is strong conflict occurs between equivalent class segments of different ethnic groups all the way down the social hierarchy. The conflict over resources in developing countries primarily takes this form. The class structure, unlike the ethnic structure, tends to be undeveloped. There are a variety of class fragments some of which, at best, together form loose class clusters, but not established classes in the Western sense. The conflict over economic resources is not, therefore, between economic classes. In fact, resources are so scarce, and the means of their enjoyment - the attainment and retention of power (in the case of the elite) - so limited, that different class fractions within the same class cluster compete against each other for access to these resources. Thus, where ethnic differentiation is not especially important, or where it has declined in importance, conflict still tends to be within particular classes. It is "intra-class" in nature. Only later, as the society develops, is it "inter-class", i.e. between classes. A very rough outline of conflict can thus be drawn, as follows:

Ethnic (with incipient intra-class conflict)
↓
Intra-class (with elements of ethnic and inter-class conflict)
↓
Inter-class (with vestiges of ethnic and intra-class conflict)

This schedule is not a necessary sequence, nor, as the above indicates, are the various stages mutually exclusive. Ethnic competition, because equivalent class segments from different ethnic groups compete against each other, also has an intra-class element. Certain societies might have very little ethnic (or other communal) conflict. All three stages are no more than "ideal types". Each contains

elements of the others. The basic idea is clear though. In the least developed societies conflict tends to be communal, and, though I have said this might be limited, every society has some communal conflict, whether this is based on ethnicity, language, religion, or merely cultural tradition. Eventually class fragments develop and these inevitably find themselves competing against each other for power. Finally, class conflict in the Marxist sense is only likely to occur in developed societies. Thus, as societies develop, conflict is not between a succession of changing classes but between a succession of changing types of group - first ethnic groups, then class fragments, and only finally developed classes.

CHAPTER TWO: DEVELOPMENT, CONFLICT & COMMUNICATION

So far the discussion has been entirely in terms of political-economy. I said at the start that I would also try to engage in a more sociological analysis. I chose to do this by studying one of the main ways the political-economy is considered to be linked to society - the mass media. It is the media's connection between these two things, society and its political-economy, that makes the media interesting. It is the nature of this bridge with which I am concerned. Too much is taken for granted. We talk of charismatic leadership, of mass appeal (or of class appeal), of ideology, of populism, of political movements; yet we make little assessment of one essential element in all these, namely communication. It could be that the mass media promote development, or impede it; that they facilitate integration, or fuel conflict; that they help link the elite to the masses, or that they act to keep them further apart.

2.1. The Marxist and Functionalist Approaches

Both Marxism and functionalism - the two main theoretical parameters of this thesis - have their answers to the above problems. For Marxists the media are a part of the super-structure of society, determined by the economic sub-structure and the class relations this engenders. The media are an element of class domination.

"The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is the dominant material force in society is at the same time its dominant intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that in consequence the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are, in general, subject to it."¹

Some later Marxists have rejected the crudity of this assumption while retaining its core meaning. It has been subjected to a great deal of refinement,² and though one of the most fruitful avenues of approach to the subject, it is still beset by problems of proof and

1 Marx, The German Ideology, in Selected Writings, ed. Bottomore (1963), p.

2. See Hall, in Curran et al (1977), pp.315-48.

explanatory power, the central problem being the theory's excessive determinism. These problems have themselves generated an ever greater sophistication of analysis, which, in the study of language etc., seems to be getting further and further away from orthodox Marxism. However, this sophistication is aimed at the Western media. It is not appropriate to the Third World's often highly unsophisticated media.

Whilst I believe the relationship between the class structure of a society and that society's mass media to be a very relevant concern in the West, in the case of most developing countries it is either too limiting, or simply irrelevant. In the West the 'super-structure' is highly developed. The cultural or 'ideological' elements of the superstructure, such as education and the mass media, play a powerful role in social processes, and much Marxist analysis has been concerned with this area. In Third World countries the relative lack of development means that these components of the superstructure are also underdeveloped, while the sub-structure, lacking a coherent class system such as exists in the West, is a much more fragmented affair. As a consequence the media in the Third World are less fully integrated with society than in the West. This does not mean the relationship between society and the mass media is arbitrary, but it is a far less determinate one than in the West. The main determining factor in the developing countries is, quite simply, the government. The media are usually strongly government-controlled. The interesting question is less this relationship than that of both the government and the media to the rest of society, treating the media as a bridge between society and political-economy.

Functionalism has a completely different idea of the nature of this bridge from that provided by Marxism. The media reflect society as a whole rather than its divisions. They act as a full and natural link, not a distorting one, between society and polity. More specifically, they have a wholesome value, and promote both development and integration. The various functionalist-related theories which have this view of the media's role in the Third World have at their centre cultural and psychological variables.

By integrating men psychologically into a new, modernising society, the media help to promote this modernisation. These theories, all broadly similar, purport to show how 'traditional' man becomes 'modern'.

The pioneer in this field is Daniel Lerner. His main thesis is that

"the Western model of modernisation exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global. Everywhere, for example, increasing urbanisation has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting)."¹

The crucial mechanism for the transition from tradition to 'modernity' is a psychological variable Lerner calls 'empathy', which he defines as "the capacity to see oneself in the other fellows situation"². This quality is critical for social and 'psychic' mobility, the latter consisting, as it turns out, of the desire to emulate the living patterns of modern people. The mass media enable this to occur by inspiring or reinforcing empathy in 'traditional' people, who then become 'vehicles of change'.

The major fault (one of the many) of this theory is its unwarranted determinism. A peasant surely does not need to be inspired to consume. He simply needs the money. At the root of this determinism is the excessive burden the theory puts on the potency of psychological variables. This comes out even in two writers, disciples of Lerner, who are aware of this problem. Writing about 20 years after Lerner, Inkeles and Smith aim to validate Lerner's centre tenets, but with some qualification.

"We are not unaware that a modern psychology cannot alone make a nation modern...nevertheless, we believe a change in attitudes and values to be one of the most essential pre-conditions for substantial and effective functioning of those modern institutions which most of the more 'practical' programs of development hope to establish."³

1 Lerner (1958), p.46

2 Ibid, p.50

3 Inkeles and Smith (1975), p.313

In fact, their model of modernisation requires a significant degree of overt modernisation, i.e. the acquisition of certain structural elements like factories and schools, before the crucial element, psychic modernisation, can develop. In such an environment the media teach people to be ready for new experiences, to plan, to aspire, etc.

Despite the recognition by these writers that a growing 'modern' environment might alter people's attitudes (who would wish to quibble with that?) it cannot be proved that this psychological change then causes further structural change. It merely shows that the former is a concomitant of the latter. The jump cannot be made from changes in individual psychological attributes to changes in social structure.

This does not mean that social-psychological variables are unimportant. Weber clearly thought they were important, as, for example, his theory on the origins of capitalism shows. However, Weber's fundamental correlation was between two broadly social-psychological variables: the 'Protestant ethic' and the 'spirit of capitalism'.¹ Once this correlation is seen to exist, the next step, the founding of capitalist undertakings (i.e. structural change) is seen as a likely consequence. Weber makes no crude jumps from psychological to structural variables. Another important point is that Weber's claim is only that capitalism started in this way. Once established it could spread across the world by direct imitation, without the transplantation of the 'Protestant ethic'. In the same way there seems to be no reason to believe that Western economic modes and institutions cannot be transferred to the developing countries without the installation, alongside, of the Western 'modern man'. This 'modern man' will arise within and around the new institutions, which is, in the end, all Inkeles and Smith really show. "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life".² (By no means a contradiction of Weber). The above diffusion theorists base their ideas on Weber's social-psychological approach while omitting his analysis of the structure of society. If Marx could say he is not a Marxist, Weber could say he is not a Weberian.

1 Weber (1930)

2 Marx: German Ideology, in Selected Writings, ed. Bottomore (1963), p.90

Not only is the theoretical basis of the psychological approach largely fallacious, but its empirical nature is very weak too. It is interesting to note some criticisms made of McClelland's concept of 'achievement motivation', as applied to Africa. According to Lloyd, McClelland's ranking of the Yoruba and other African tribes in terms of 'achievement motivation' would

'mystify most anthropologists as his conclusions do not agreed with what is known about them. With such a distribution among peoples that one knows, one wonders what quality, if any, is being measured.'¹

In other words, these psychological tests merely skim the surface of social reality.

The ethnocentric nature of these American psychologically based enquiries, which always seem to be comparing 'traditional man' with some conception, real or otherwise, of 'modern American man', prevents real understanding. An example of the sort of question Lerner asked in order to elicit the degree of empathy with modern living was one asking if the respondent was able to "imagine living in the United States". 100% of those on high incomes, etc., said they could. These people Lerner called 'moderns'. 74% of those on low incomes said they could not. Rather than see this not particularly low percentage as reflecting a realistic assessment by the respondents of their ever living in America, Lerner chooses to view this reaction as representing a lack of 'empathy' with modern living. The ethnocentric bias of Lerner's work is as clear as it is unpleasant, but other writers of the same ilk are equally paternalistic, for instance, Wilbur Schramm.² and Lucian Pye³.

The sense of ideology is strong: developing countries should copy the American political model; furthermore, they should invest in politics (the spread of information), using resources for this that others might say would be more fruitfully spent on industry, agriculture, or the social services; economic modernisation, it is claimed, depends on democracy for its progress. Such ideological

1 P.Lloyd, (1966), p.44

2 Schramm (1964)

3 Pye (1963)

strains in a supposedly academic field would not matter if this functionalist-based approach to the mass media did not continue to find official support. Despite Third World participation in an important recent communications study undertaken by UNESCO (with which Schramm and others like him have been connected), and despite some variety of opinion appearing in the report as a result of this, the same Western-oriented arguments appear. For instance:

"Obstacles to freedom and distortions of democracy are dangerous symptoms in any society.There are no justifiable reasons or excuses for violations of freedom and democracy."¹

It also makes the usual tendentious recommendations.

"communication should be considered a major development resource, a vehicle to ensure real political participation in decision-making, a central information base for defining policy options, and an instrument for creating awareness of national priorities."²

Related to this ethnocentric bias is the major problem, inherent in the functionalist-diffusionist theory, of the fundamental stress it lays on stability (the functioning of the system), and its concomitant denial of the importance of social divisions or of conflict. Schramm, who even goes as far as to resurrect the biological model, is fairly explicit about this. The communication network is compared to the "sensory and nervous systems" of the individual". It

"passes back and forth the danger signals of rising strain, the need signals, the opportunity signals of ways to satisfy needs, the decision signals by which the organism tries to maximise its derived functioning, minimise the associated stress and strain, and maintain a satisfactory working balance inside and outside. At any moment in the history of society the function of communication is to do whatever of this is required by society."³

1 MacBride et al (1980), pp.141 and 144

2 Ibid, p.258

3 Schramm, in Pye (1963), p.32.

The actual socio-economic structures of the developing countries hold little interest for the above writers. As regards the media themselves, in reality they are only a vehicle, which can as well be used to support the status quo as for change, which can divert as well as teach or inspire, agitate as well as integrate. The above writers ignore such things as the content of the media, and the motives of those who own and control them. It is assumed that the media's inherent nature is to promote the "social good", not the interests of particular groups, however powerful.

In sum, neither of the two major theoretical approaches to the study of the mass media in development provides an adequate base for analysis. (The neo-Marxist theory of cultural imperialism will be discussed later). The idealism of the functionalist argument, in particular, seems grossly unrealistic. It is necessary, in my view, to show what the media in developing countries actually do, not what some people think they should do. They have, in fact, a very limited capability to inspire change. They are largely an elitist instrument, by-passing most of society (both as subject and as object); insofar as they do have any practical effect, it is more likely to be one of exacerbating the intense social divisions I described in the previous chapter than one of their solution. Divisions, after all, are what society consists of. I shall consider the nature of the media's connection with conflict in the next section and then go on to describe the elitist aspect.

2.2. Conflict and the Development of the Press

The press is the original 'mass medium'. Yet in underdeveloped countries it can hardly be said to be a mass medium at all. The press (and other media, which will be discussed later) in the Third World is subject to overwhelming constraints that severely limit its effectiveness. Illiteracy, low GNP, and relatively low levels of urbanisation have a critical effect on the press. The effect of high levels of illiteracy is obvious, but this problem is exacerbated by language fragmentation. A large rural population inhibits the spread of newspapers. Low per capita income restricts

the purchase of papers by the public, and also limits advertising revenue. Poor transport and technical communication make things yet worse.

These economic problems are vital to an understanding of the press in the Third World. They affect all aspects of it, including the careers of those engaged in it. Salaries tend to be low, except in a few major papers; professional status tends to be uncertain. But the overriding problem the press faces is its inability to stay independent. Financial support is sought, usually from government or from a political party, both by the newspapers and their journalists. The market alone is insufficient to support them. In addition, the conflictual political climate of developing countries already described, means that the press finds it very hard to avoid a strong relationship with politics, even if it wants to.

What I wish to argue is that the necessity of subsidy, in combination with the nature of the political market, makes the press highly dependent on politics and political conflict for its growth. The press is highly partisan in its origins. However, when a political party becomes sufficiently established in power it attempts to control the press and to make it dependent upon it. The press then becomes 'government-oriented'. Only as the economy grows and political conflict subsides can the press rely on the general market without other support. It then becomes 'market-oriented'. The history of the press across the world, in fact, seems to show that the press originates and grows through partisanship at some relatively early stage of development, then emerges into either a government or a market-oriented stage. The processes involved will now be discussed in more detail.

2.2.1. A Framework for the Development of the Press

a) Partisanship

There are two causes of partisanship in the press. The first is the obvious demand on the part of competing political parties for a public mouthpiece. As a country is developing (or changing) the press is bound to go through such a phase. Social divisions are often severe; the various competing interests use every means

available to become dominant. The second cause is economic: the social divisions just mentioned split the reading audience into camps according to political affiliation. Newspaper content is geared to appeal to a particular camp, thus restricting its readership and making it more dependent on political subsidy. But it is a reciprocal process. Each political readership offers a restricted but guaranteed market. In other words, this political readership does at least offer a market, but it is a limited one. Papers might find it hard to appeal beyond partisan lines partly because conflict might be very important and neutrality a difficult position to adopt, partly because in a developing country a large market is not usually available anyway. To capture a limited but guaranteed political market could be a great advantage. Partisanship, therefore, by offering the press markets and subsidies, is very important to the press. The press thus grows through conflict. However, the individual papers, appealing to limited markets, would always be small. The press grows but the individual newspapers hardly do at all; they merely increase in number.

✓
b) Government-orientation

A government that has got some sort of firm footing after a period of intense conflict will not wish to see itself opposed by a partisan press. It might also wish to put forward a development programme that will require public support, again incompatible with a partisan press. It is often, at least in its own eyes, compelled to take the press in hand. Its exact reaction depends on what type of government it is. Two types of government-orientated press are possible: positive and negative. If the government tries to establish a sweeping programme of change, government-orientation will be positive (hortatory). If it is an autocracy simply interested in maintaining the status quo, this orientation is negative: news might be required to be non-political and the press is often severely cut down. It is not 'used'.

c) Market-orientation

As a country develops economically and becomes more stable politically the press is likely to emerge from partisanship into the market rather than the government-orientation stage. This has

been the case in most Western countries, though the press might go through the latter phase before becoming orientated to the market. Then, instead of relying on government for support it turns to the public. It goes for a higher readership by appealing beyond partisan lines. The expense of running a modern newspaper inhibits direct government involvement in the industry; public feeling and the prestige of the press inhibit its indirect involvement. Newspaper organisations are big; the press is of high quality; the journalist is relatively free, and well-off. He is also credited with more of a professional status arising out of a certain amount of training, a general ethical code and certain 'professional' perceptions of how a journalist should work (e.g. of 'news values').

The media in all countries will tend to acquire market-orientation characteristics as the country develops, even if government or political parties have the primary influence. This can lead to considerable internal conflict in the press. There are, as I have just indicated, two aspects of a demand-orientated press: the first is a content geared for the general public market, the second is the 'professional' status of the journalist. Sometimes there can be a disjunction between the two. The press in the Third World (and in Communist countries) frequently remains under government control while the journalists seek the status and rewards usually available in the market-orientated press. This conflict of interests will be referred to in detail in the empirical sections of this thesis.

Before going on to describe the development of the press in a number of countries, in the light of the above scheme, such a format seems to find general support in an analytical study of the press in Scandinavia, by Høyer, Hadenius and Weibull, who also posit three simple stages of development, the determinants of which are market size and size of optimal plant. These they call the initial, expansion, and consolidation phases. In the first, optimal capacity is low, the market is limited and so is competition. The second of these phases is equivalent to what I have called the partisan stage, which the press needs in order to break out of its minimal beginnings. From the history of the Norwegian press, for instance,

it can be seen that

"electoral support, as judged by the party commitments of papers, through the early period of operation was contributing both to survival and to a present market leadership."¹

Subsidies from parties have also been common in Scandinavia. Thus both political markets and political aid have been important for press development. In fact the writers see the press and the party as engaged in a 'transaction', both aiming at the same market (the press at sales, the party at votes). There is, to put it another way, an "overlap of clientele"². This phase ends in time because, as described above, strict market boundaries, defined by political loyalties, "limit the possibilities for expansion to certain segments of the market"³. The press at this period is highly fragmented. The writers show that in the U.S.A. and France the fastest expansion in numbers of papers was in highly partisan periods.

In the "consolidation" (market-orientated) phase, things are different. The press becomes too expensive to subsidise and the public less partisan; there is no longer so much of an "overlap of clientele". The market becomes more open and the papers need larger markets as their investments become more technologically advanced. The result is increasing concentration in the press and a more popular, less politically partisan style. Those papers with small circulations fail. Advertising rather than political subsidy now becomes the most important source of revenue.

2.2.2. The History of the Press

A brief historical review of the press in several countries in both the West and the Third World will bring out these processes more clearly. In England a fully partisan press occurred as early as the civil war. One of the most well-known of the political organs was the Royalist paper, the Mercurius Aulicus. Its rabid attacks on the Puritans led to the establishment of an anti-Royalist paper, the Mercurius Britannicus. This came to be run by Marchamont Nedham, one of the most famous of Interregnum journalists. The

1 Høyer et al (1975), p.13

2 Ibid, p.31

3 Ibid, p.27

following is an example of the sort of writing the partisan press of the time could bring forth. Nedham, addressing in his paper the editor of the Aulicus, writes:

"all the world knows thou art an underling pimper to the whore of Babylon, and thy conscience an arrant prostitute for base ends."

Conscious of the need for objectivity Nedham adds:

"This is truth, not railing."¹

With the Restoration the press, as it had been before the civil war, became heavily controlled (negatively oriented to government). During the 18th century, with the growth of party politics, the press developed further, and again became highly partisan. But it was only during the 19th century that some papers became economically secure enough to begin to do without political subsidy.² Indeed, the establishment of newspapers became sufficiently expensive to deter the parties, concerned to find reliable propaganda outlets, from setting up their own party organs. Thus, after alternating between partisanship and government-orientation, the press was beginning to become oriented to the market. (This does not mean, of course, that papers have lost all their political leanings).

In France, as in England, political struggle enabled a partisan press to appear. This occurred first during the power struggle of Louis XIV's minority. The "feebleness of government permitted a real freedom of information from which the journalists profited."³ The press came subsequently under strict royal control. Partisanship, and therefore the press, flowered again during the revolutionary period, firstly between monarchists and revolutionaries and, within the latter, between Girondins and Jacobins. The partisan papers had restricted but guaranteed markets. Analysis of readers' letters to the Girondin Patriote Francais indicates that most of its readers were in fact from Girondin areas.⁴ Despite revolutionary belief in the freedom of the press, the conflict was far too great for partisanship to continue. During the Reign of Terror editor after editor went to the guillotine. The press became strongly government-oriented. This process went further under Napoleon. Since then,

1 Frank (1961), p.76

2 Aspinall (1949), p.379

3 Translated from Trenard e Godechot (1969), p.99

4 Ibid

of course, the French press has become oriented primarily to the market.

Partisanship has been just as important for the development of the American press.

"That there was a close alliance between the party papers and the politicians often extending to aid and patronage, no observer doubted... Indeed, the whole period of 1801-1833 was in many respects disgraceful - a kind of 'Dark Ages' of American Journalism. Few papers were ably edited; they reflected the crassness of the American society of the times. Scurrility, assaults, corruption, blatancy were commonplace. Journalism had grown too fast."¹

To put it less moralistically, partisanship makes journalism thrive. However, by the 1830s this period was coming to a close. The penny press was starting, appealing to the lower classes which had previously not been part of the newspaper-reading public. America was now entering the era of market-orientation, exemplified in particular by the muckrakers and the yellow press.²

In Spain the press has fluctuated between partisanship and government-orientation.³ Under the monarchy it was negatively oriented to government. In 1791 all papers but two, including an official gazette, were banned. The press began to grow with the political factionalism of the nineteenth century. By the end of the century there were 500 papers. But, as is usual in the partisan period, the papers themselves were small; average circulation was only 2,000. Finally, under Franco the press, as it had been before under the unprogressive monarchy, was stripped down to its bare minimum. Franco had no positive political programme; a negatively oriented press was sufficient for him.

In Japan the press began to develop with the partisanship of the Meiji era, reflecting the conflict between the Meiji followers and the old Tokugawa Shogunate. The papers became attached to parties. When these collapsed in the 1880s, their papers suffered badly.⁴ The press became market-oriented with economic development,

1 Mott (1962), pp.253 and 169

2 See Filler, in Harrison and Stein (1973)

3 See Schulte

4 Lent (1968), p.15

except for the substantial interruption of the fascist period.

The same principles apply to the Third World now as to the developed world in the past. In their case, though, partisanship usually started as anti-colonialism, i.e. it had an international component.

"The press everywhere - including Africa - is intimately involved with politics, government and efforts to attain political power. ...Nationalism gave to the press its principle message, its 'raison d'etre', in extending its circulation."¹

Whereas in the West the press went from partisanship to market-orientation, in the Third World it has usually become oriented to government. However, there are exceptions (usually only partial ones).

India, during the nationalist period, had a strongly partisan press. This led to considerable, if intermittent, government repression. Some journals were clearly dangerous. "We find in these pages instructions on manufacturing bombs, organising secret societies...."². And no doubt other educational material. These papers were mostly political in function, some living only for politics. As argued in chapter one, nationalism is rarely a united force. Different groups see different ways of gaining independence; and the nationalist struggle is also a competition for power after independence. These divisions are reflected in the press, so partisanship gets a further boost. "The most important development in the Indian press is the growth of the party press"³. This occurred especially after the founding of Congress in 1885. There were now not just nationalist papers, but Moslem nationalist papers, Hindu nationalist papers - and newspapers of other persuasions.

After independence the press changed, becoming increasingly market-oriented. "Instead of relying upon the favours of individuals or political parties, they have developed advertising as their primary source of revenue. They have also built up circulations giving more attention to news and entertainment."⁴

1 Hachten (1971), pp.143/4

2 Natarajan (1962), p.153

3 Agrawal (1970), p.149

4 Murthy (1966), p.342

Nevertheless, the highest circulation ever reached by a paper in India prior to 1965 was 120,000. The press was, in these circumstances, simply not strong enough to support itself, even with advertising. With the dominance of Congress and the concomitant decline in partisan support, the press increasingly turned to business interests for the support it needed. The press was, therefore, not an independent market-oriented one of the normal sort, depending on the market through sales and advertising.

This trend has, according to Banerjee, increased rather than declined since 1954.¹ With advertising and circulations as limited as they are (total circulation in 1970 was only 6.3 million) this very direct relationship between capitalist interests and the press is likely to remain for a long time.

In all cases, then, it seems the press develops through conflict, until this is either suppressed by government or dissipates with economic growth. However, even in the latter case, partisanship can persist in certain circumstances. In Japan, partisanship continued in the provincial press while the major papers became market-oriented. This is also a characteristic of the Swiss press. The underlying reason is probably that the provincial papers tend to be small and less capable of self-sufficiency; but in Switzerland another reason is the great importance of local politics. For this reason most papers are very political but, having very limited political markets, they are also very small. In the early 1970s some had circulations of only 1,000 or so.² In France and Italy, where politics is much more polarised than in the U.K., the role of political ownership and influence in the press is of greater significance too, though the overall orientation is certainly to the general market.

Though the situation is more complex than the simple scheme of partisanship, government-orientation and market-orientation outlined above, as exemplified by the Indian and Swiss cases for instance, it is clear enough from the general account just given of the development of the press across the world, that it has its origins in conflict and that it develops through this connection with conflict.

1 Banerjee (1973)

2 See Sandford (1976)

The same applies in the Third World as, historically speaking, in the West, but with even more force. The endemic poverty of the developing countries makes the press even more dependent on subsidy and on political or government support, as does the generally greater importance of social and political conflict. The press in the Third World rarely achieves full market-orientation. The market is simply too limited. For this reason, the press - indeed the media as a whole - remains essentially an elitist affair.

2.3. Elite Media

The media in developing countries are elite rather than mass media. They are elitist in three ways: they are produced (or controlled) by an elite, they are produced for the elite, and are about the elite. (I am using this concept in a very general sense, not trying to say anything, through my use of the term, about the class structure). Claiming that the media are an elite affair is perhaps putting the argument in too extreme a form. The media, some more than others, extend down the social hierarchy in a number of ways. All I wish to claim is that they are primarily elite media.

2.3.1. The Elite as Subject

The media are about the elite partly out of political necessity. Government, in particular its leading stars, takes up a large amount of content. In much of the Third World this is not only the result of the importance accorded to government, nor even the status of government members, but of sheer force too. Both government and its individual members use the media to project themselves. "Journalism, and especially television news, is the last refuge of the great man theory of history." Golding exaggerates the argument when he claims that the consequence of this is that "individual authority rather than the exertion of entrenched power is seen to be the mover of events,"¹ but it is possible that the concentration on elite individuals, or even the elite as a whole, helps obscure deeper social processes.

1 Golding, in Katz and Szecskö (1981), p.77

2.3.2. The Elite as Object

The media are also produced primarily for the elite. It is this fact more than any other that makes them elite media. Access is the crucial factor. Only the well-off can afford television sets. They will certainly all have radios (probably more than one), and not just a share of a communal set. They can read, and they often read in a Western language (often used in broadcasting too). Furthermore, access to media confers status. Owning TV sets, radios and hi-fi, reading English or French-language papers - such things provide prestige for individuals, while national possession of media systems provides prestige for the elite as a whole, both nationally and internationally.

That the media in developing countries are not mass media is clear enough from comparisons with developed countries. The following figures come from a UNESCO survey published in 1975.¹ According to this, while the U.K. had a total daily newspaper circulation of 437 per 1,000 population and 671 non-daily, in Africa it was 17 per 1,000 population for daily and non-daily circulations combined. For 36 Asian countries (excluding Japan and China) it was 34 per 1,000. In the U.S.A. there were estimated to be 1,695 radios per 1,000 population! In both Africa and Asia it was 56 per 1,000. There were 472 television sets for 1,000 population in the U.S.A., 7 in Asia and 6 in Africa (counting only those countries which had TV then.)

At this time 55 countries in Africa and Asia had invested in television despite the enormous cost and the tiny coverage, reaching only the elite. In 1963 Kenya had some 5,100 TV sets, most of them owned by European officials, Asian traders and a few farmers within range. The average price of a set was £85. The estimated price that would have been within the means of the "average" citizen was at the most £10. Of the 31½ hours per week broadcasting, 26¾³ were in English, and the major proportion of the time was taken up with British and American films and television series. While licence fees brought in £15,400 in 1963 and advertising revenue £32,600, the total cost of the service in that year was £140,000.²

1 UNESCO (1975)

2 Ainslie (1966), p.177

The data applies to nearly 20 years ago, but when one is looking at the rationale behind such investments, that hardly matters; the situation is even now not substantially different in most developing countries. In the above case this poor country subsidised a service put out nearly entirely for the elite, and carrying largely Western trivia, by nearly £100,000 for one year alone.

Newspapers also cost money which the poor of the Third World, as individuals, can ill afford. They might be a marginal household cost in the West, but not in developing countries. Illiteracy, therefore, is not the only constraint. India had 114 million literates in 1964, yet newspapers had a combined circulation of only 5.5 million. In the Philippines the figures were 28 to 0.5 million.¹ If large numbers in developing countries are illiterate in their vernaculars, only tiny numbers are literate in English. Yet a large proportion of newspapers in the Third World are in English. There are several reasons for this. One, of course, is historical - the influence of colonialism. English is also often used as a 'lingua franca' in linguistically fragmented societies in political and administrative institutions. Whatever the reasons, the strength of the English-language papers in the Third World far exceeds what would be expected from the tiny number of those capable of reading them. More than 50% of the circulation of all periodicals in the Philippines is in English.² In India English papers numbered 1,843 in 1969, just lower than the 1,931 papers in Hindi. In 1963 total English-language daily circulation (56 papers) came to 1,526,000, higher than that of any other language (of which there were many). Next came the 799,000 circulation of the 49 Hindi dailies.³ Though the latter was growing much more quickly than the English-language circulation⁴, in 1969 the latter was still far ahead.

Despite tiny readership the English-language papers have continued to thrive. The overwhelming reason for this is prestige (which underlies the successful advertising policies of these papers). In Kenya, though many more people speak Swahili than English, in Hachten's view this vernacular was treated by Kenyans largely as

1 Chowdhury, in Head (1974), pp.5/6

2 Pickerell (1966), p.3

3 Ibid, pp.16/17

4 Mishra (1971), p.249

a 'stepping-stone' language.

"Once their English was good enough, Africans began reading the more prestigious English-language press. Swahili papers had a continuing problem of holding on to educated readers."¹

For those aspiring to join the elite there are good reasons for this.

"the English-language newspaper is a symbol of status to some people, and perhaps especially to the reader himself. It is also one means of furthering his education, and especially his knowledge of English."²

From a world survey of 61 editors in 52 countries Lee found that in

"varying degrees, most indicated that their English-language publications enjoyed a definite advantage over vernacular papers in readership, prestige and influence."³

The most important economic reason for the continued success of the English-language press in the Third World, is its connection with advertising. This is itself connected with the question of status. As those who can read English are, on average, far wealthier than those who cannot, these papers not only receive a large amount of advertising, but can charge high rates for it. A Press Commission study in India found (in 1960) that the advertising revenue received by English-language papers was over double (per copy) the highest received by a vernacular paper.⁴ There is a strong link, as I shall further show, between elitism, westernisation and commercialism.

As regards television and the press, then, it is impossible to say they constitute mass media in the Third World. The Indian government (as have most others, in different ways) have claimed it would make television a truly mass medium through the use of community sets. Yet no significant provision has been made for this. On the other hand, a satellite was completed in 1967, even though the number of TV sets in India was minute. "The operational

1 Hachten (1971), p.213

2 Condon (1967), p.339

3 Lee, in Lent (1971), p.20

4 Pickerell (1966), p.33

dynamics of India's communications institutions are related to the nature and structure of elitism....."¹

One medium of communication that is considered by many to be a truly mass medium in the Third World is radio. But even this has not lived up to its promise. Its advantages are that it is relatively cheap, does not require literacy, and, unlike television, can be broadcast over long distances. Radio is believed to be an effective means for bridging the major gap - that between the rural areas and the cities. But there are several reasons for doubting the efficacy of radios as a medium of information:

- i) statistics show that radio (56 sets per 1,000 population in Africa and Asia in 1974) is far from widespread. It is still mostly concentrated in urban areas.
- ii) different media overlap. Those that use one medium often use others too; the statistics therefore obscure large 'pockets of unreachables'.²
- iii) much, if not most, radio output is entertainment. There is no guarantee that educational programmes would even be listened to; music is far more popular.
- iv) radios are not that cheap. Even where poor people have sets these are often poorly made and break-downs are common. Getting repairs or replacement batteries is often not easy, nor cheap. Research shows that a high proportion of sets reported to be in existence are inoperative.³
- v) many people do not have their own sets. Communal listening schemes (such as the farm forum) are no doubt beneficial, but they are limited in purpose and programme time.
- vi) the most important problem with radio in the Third World is the multi-lingual nature of many of these countries. Creating new channels to cater for these languages is expensive. Different languages are rotated on the same channel, none receiving much time, and some none at all. In Zambia in 1972 even with 2 channels only 7 of the 10 main language groups received broadcast time, getting

1 Head, in Gerbner (1977), p.153

2 Frey, in Pool and Schramm (1973), p.364

3 Defever, in Teheranian (1977), p.218 on Dahomey, and Mytton (1972), p.27 on Zambia.

only 59.5% of broadcasting time between them. English got 38.4% (the small remainder was external)¹. Thus, while radio can overcome the barrier of illiteracy, it is very much limited by the barrier of language.

Furthermore, for this reason, the colonial language is often used as a 'lingua franca', thus adding to the already strong elitist tendencies in the media. At the time Head looked at radio in Ghana, radio there had three channels; one broadcast in six vernaculars while the other two broadcast in English, and one of these played mostly pop music.²

(vii) even where radio or other media are used educationally they often benefit those who need it least. They are in a position to take advantage of information (and to hear it and understand it in the first place) and of any facilities (e.g. agricultural subsidies) offered through this information.³

In sum, probably no medium in the Third World, not even radio, can be called a truly mass medium. The elite has by far the greatest, sometimes, almost exclusive, access to the media. So far, in talking about the elite as the object of the media, I have only discussed access. I have hardly mentioned the elitist content of the media, i.e. content geared largely for the satisfaction of the elite. This I shall do a little later, under the heading of 'westernisation', this being a substantial topic in its own right.

2.3.3. The Elite in Control of the Media

The media are often controlled, directly or indirectly, by the political elite, i.e. government; but even in terms of professional management the media can be considered to be under the spell of elitism. The media 'professionals' in general see themselves as part of the elite, and are usually as westernised as this elite. Rao writes that the editorial staff of papers in developing countries "have continued, generally speaking, as the Westerners did. They have continued to belong to an elite group which is invariably far removed from the mass of the people.... This has left the newspapers catering only

1 Mytton (1972), p.12

2 Head (1974), p.90

3 Beltran, in Rogers (1976), p.137

to a small minority, however important that minority may be in the decision-making process."¹

The search for professional status applies to all levels of media production. It affects technical personnel as well as the journalists and broadcasters. Many broadcasting engineers from the Third World are trained in the West. They are often influenced, in choosing equipment (or media systems) for their countries, by foreign standards not necessarily consonant with their countries' needs.

"The technology of broadcasting is almost without exception imported by developing countries, designed for production systems as they grew up in response to metropolitan needs and markets."²

The following quotation, though it applies to a different professional group, describes the various influences involved in the quest for professionalism extremely succinctly.

"Professional allopathic medicine in India.... has, in Weberian terms, a carrier status group for its style of life and its concept of status honour; it has, in Marxist terms, a class base internally in the emerging petty bourgeoisie and in the bourgeois ruling class; it has an international class base in the structure of both the international medical economy and the international pharmaceutical industry."³

Much of this also applies to journalism - the need to feel part of an elite status group, both nationally and internationally; the linking of journalism with the power structure and with the business class; and the role of the media in advertising Western goods.

However, there are two dissonant factors here for the media professional, and one of these is in fact the state. While he has learnt the Western norms of the 'Fourth Estate', his government is more interested in censorship. The other is the fact that his professional status is insecure. As a civil servant he is lower paid than those in the private sector. More important, he is not a member of a traditional liberal profession. He does not have the

1 Rao, in Wells (1974), p.252

2 Cruise O'Brien (1976), p.11

3 Frankenberg (1978), p.32

professional autonomy of the lawyer, for instance. In fact, this relatively low professional status is not unconnected with the government control of broadcasting just mentioned.

"This conflict and subordination in ideology and identification is one of the explanations for the relatively low status of broadcasting as compared to other professional channels for graduates in developing countries."¹

As I shall be arguing later, the problems of the 'professional' part of the bourgeoisie are important to an understanding of the nature of this class in the Third World and its relations with the rest of the elite. I shall be looking at media-people very much in this light.

2.3.4. Westernisation

I have tried to show in the above paragraphs that the media in developing countries are elitist in a number of ways: the elite itself usually receives a disproportionate share of media attention, it has a vastly disproportionate access to the media, and is in large measure in control of the media; even where it is not a matter of control, media content is produced by people in or on the periphery of the elite, or aspirants to it. One theme running through this discussion so far is that of westernisation. In fact, these two aspects, elitism and westernisation, are closely connected. Not only is the elite highly westernised, so is much media content. Not only does the elite have greatly superior access to the media but what it reads, hears, and sees is largely geared to its own westernised tastes, though, as with much else to do with the media there are economic causes to take account of too.

I have described how economic constraints are one reason why the press became dependent on politics for its development. The effects of such constraints on other media are different. The difficulty of maintaining viable media applies to television as well as the press. This problem is world-wide. The production of programmes which, moreover, cannot be sold directly to the public, is expensive, and for this reason many countries are heavily

1 Cruise O'Brien (1976), p.13

dependent on imports.

"Even economically and artistically strong nations like Sweden, complete with its own national language, depended by state subsidies to the arts and media, and surrounded by its own circle of smaller Scandinavian states, even Sweden could not continue with its current level of media consumption without large imports of films, television series, international news, music, comics and so on."¹

The main media exporter in the world, by far, is the U.S.A., with Britain second.

If European countries are dependent on imports from America, how much more so must be the developing countries, with their low resources and greatly inferior media infrastructure and experience. This dependence affects all aspects of the media: hardware and content, television and the press, news and entertainment. Perhaps the reliance on foreign news sources is the most serious effect of economic weakness. As is well known, most of the exporting of news and features is done through the five big international news agencies (two European, two American and one Russian), with two television news-film companies, Visnews and UPITN, in which Britain has, all told, the major interest. In the case of these organisations most news they gather is fed through headquarters, with one version going out for all users. Though developing countries use this news, some of which might indeed be about them, the news is generally shaped for Western clients, who are, economically speaking, the most important consumers. This problem has been recognised for a long time. The Asian Conference of the International Press Institute, for instance, looked at the news flow problem, in detail, as far back as 1956.²

In some cases the control of the agencies is much tighter and more direct than even the above indicates. In ex-French colonial Africa, which had been treated by France as an extension of the 'mother-country', France set up news agencies which were bound by contract with Agence France-Presse (AFP) "to distribute automatically and immediately, without omission or qualification the radio-teletype

1 Tunstall (1977), p.17

2 International Press Institute (1956)

service received from AFP."¹ This problem of control over news flow becomes even more overt where western interests actually own media in the Third World. The British, for instance, have been strong in the West African press and are still so in the press of East Africa. U.S.A. interests have had considerable but variable direct stakes in the media of Latin America.²

Though the influence of the West in the flow of news is perhaps the most crucial, its influence in entertainment is more pervasive. The cowboy television series Bonanza at one time had an estimated audience of 350 million in 59 countries. Such programmes also take up a large amount of viewing time in the importing countries. A summary of studies on this covering 85 countries (57 of them in the Third World) showed 47 of them had imports of foreign material taking up over 40% of their total television programming with 27 of them having over 60% foreign material.³

2.4. Elitism and Westernisation in Perspective

As I have mentioned, there is a strong connection between elitism and westernisation. The elite has by far the greatest access to the media and a considerable amount of media output is westernised in nature. To this must be added the Western education and style of living of the elite, and their consumption of the few, expensive Western goods in the shops. The media accentuate the great division between the elite and the masses.

"Even those who have no contact with foreign persons or Western education are exposed constantly to westernising influences through popular media - newspapers, radio, motion pictures, books, magazines, billboards....."⁴

Far from having, therefore, a process of media-inspired development, working through the magic ingredient 'empathy', what we might be witnessing is what some call a process of 'media-imperialism' (an element of 'neo-colonialism'). This is described, simply, as follows:

"The international media system is one mechanism by

1 Quoted in Ainslie (1966), pp.206/7

2 Beltran and de Cardona, in Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979), pp35/6

3 Lee, Chin-Chuan (1980), p.76

4 Smythe, H. and M. (1960), p.70

which developing countries are brought within the common cultural hegemony of western capitalism."¹

One of the major proponents of this theory is Herbert Schiller. He links up American media exports (and the rapid spread of commercial media across the world) with the great volume of overseas advertisements for American goods, with, finally, the overseas sale of these goods. This advertising is also connected with America's huge foreign investments.

"The advertising men follow their manufacturing clients wherever the potential markets lead, generally where the capital investment is set down.... the mass media, wherever United States manufacturing companies operate, have been summoned to promote the global expansion of American consumer goods, sales and services."²

In 1969, 23 out of the top 25 international advertising agencies were American. 39% of the total billings of the biggest of these agencies, J.Walter Thompson, originated outside the U.S.A. in 1969, bringing in \$292 million. It operates in 28 countries, including Latin America, India and Pakistan.³ One of the top five global agencies, Ogilvy Benson and Mather had, in 1972, 42 offices in 24 countries. Four of these were in India, where the agency (according to a booklet published by them in India) had been established for 44 years. In the introduction they claim that

"The closest bond exists between OBM offices worldwide: the entire network is one agency indivisible, inspired by unanimity of purpose."⁴

Possibly then, Schiller is right to stress the role of advertising in the process of 'media imperialism'. Yet strangely, advertising in developing countries is just the thing the functionalist (diffusionist) writers try to whip up enthusiasm for.

"A function of advertising is to 'create a want' in the consumer.... This is part of the 'raising aspirations' role of the mass media. Bicycles, bright clothes, aluminium cooking pots, torches, transistor radios in the hands of other villagers or advertising in the

1 Elliott and Golding, in de Kadt and Williams (1974), p.230

2 Schiller, in Merritt (1972), pp.301 and 319/20

3 Ibid.

4 Ogilvy Benson and Mather (1972), introduction

newspapers help induce a discontent with poverty, stimulate a desire for ownership and become an incentive for harder or better directed work and greater production....Advertising is an integral part of economic development, in which the media play an essential part."¹

This mixture of Victorian morality, simplistic psychology, and what is virtually a plea for Western commercial expansion, makes ludicrous reading.

'Media-imperialism' is made up of numerous closely connected elements - including media infrastructure sales, aid and advice, training facilities, programming, perhaps even, as the above quotation might suggest, an academic element. The connecting link is, of course, a commercial one. By 1965 television systems in over 50 countries were at least partly controlled by private interests, and only a few of the 95 television systems in the world did not carry commercial advertising. According to Dizard, the U.S.A. had a "direct stake" in this expansion.

"we have set its standards and its pace. Television abroad is often a reflection, or at least a caricature, of our own....(American programme exports) send out a forceful image of ourselves and of our society."²

Or, as others might put it:

"Commercially produced entertainment and recreation are the chief channels that convey internationally the values and life-styles of United States corporate capitalism."³

It seems impossible, from the evidence, to doubt the penetration of the West, particularly America, in the media of the Third World, and in all stages of media production, from infrastructure to content. The 'media-imperialism' thesis is tempting but it contains major faults; the thesis rests on too many assumptions, in particular, those to do with the effects of this 'imperialism'. It can be shown that the West is strong in the Third World in media investment, production, advertising and exports. But its strength is highly

1 Sommerlad (1966), p.64

2 Dizard (1966), p.3

3 Schiller, in Merritt (1972), p.336

variable, being particularly strong in only limited sectors of the media and in limited areas. It cannot be shown that all these variable influences combine to have some overwhelming effect on developing countries. The implicit assumption of a vast mechanism of control and influence is exaggerated.

A more misguided assumption concerns the supposed effects of media imperialism. Central to this is the assumption that Third World media are mass media. As I have argued above, Third World media tend to be very weak and their diffusion through society extremely limited. It is, in fact, limited largely to the elites of these societies. By concentrating on media outflow from the West, Schiller and others neglect the actual nature of the societies that receive these influences. It is only the elite that is influenced; moreover, it is unlikely that it resents this influence. The elite is usually highly westernised. Furthermore, it is probably only the elite that the 'media-pushers' and advertisers are interested in. In the words of an advertising man, talking about selling in the Third World:

"In the absence of a middle class, it is often tempting to the advertiser to intensively cultivate the small segment of the market which can presently afford what he has to sell rather than to go about the thankless and long-range task of building a mass market for his products."¹

In their assessment of both the supply of and demand for Western media output the media imperialist writers have overestimated the truth of the case.

There are also, as I mentioned at the start, economic reasons for the dependence on the West. In fact, the lack of resources, infrastructure, experience, etc., are basic to this dependence. Just as in the case of the press, where there was a political pull and economic push behind its dependence on politics, so in the case of broadcasting there is the pull of westernisation, and the economic push to the West provided by its superior economic position. Even where countries try to resist the Western influence

1 Bogart (1959), pp. 160/1

they might find it hard to do so. The Saudi Arabians, out of religious scruples, for a long time rejected television. Eventually it came. The authorities subsequently tried to make it 100% a "public service" vehicle. Yet, by 1970 or so, 40% of its programming was imported, mostly from the U.S.A. and U.K. Some programmes came from Lebanon, but at \$1350 per series, compared to perhaps \$600 for a Western series¹, it is not surprising the latter were preferred.

To put it another way, if the elites of developing countries want media systems they have to import the infrastructure, expertise, and programming material to make them operational. The problem, as I have indicated, "is as much one of demand as supply."² Western media institutions, advertisers, even governments, might encourage developing countries to invest in modern media systems, and participate themselves in such investments, but the demand is also there - from those in control who want to make their countries, on the surface at least, a part of the international community of advanced nations, and from the wider elite which wants, too, to feel a part of this community (but also to have access to a greater level of information and entertainment). The media are primarily for this generally highly westernised elite. Other groups are marginal to this. Thus, the elite becomes a part of the international order, and actively seeks to, while the masses are ignored. If there are commercial and industrial "compradors", there are "media compradors" too. Salinas and Paldan argue similarly.

"Despite the non-existence of a powerful industrial bourgeoisie, the local dominant class is supported by activities centered on industry and finance, commerce, transport, communications, and advertising... The sector of the national bourgeoisie that owns the media is closely tied to the industrial bourgeoisie and constitutes a central link to metropolitan interests."³

2.5. Conclusion

I have tried to show in this chapter that in developing countries the media are firstly tools of conflict, secondly playthings of the

1 Shobaili (1971), pp.241-7

2 Katz, in Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979), p.70

3 Salinas and Paldan, in Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979), pp.89/90

elite. The first mass medium is the press, and this develops through its connection with conflict. As the media grow and develop, in particular with the advent of broadcasting, they tend to lose their link with conflict, either coming under government control or becoming primarily commercial in orientation. Either way, as they follow this change, they become instruments of the elite, providing it with both information and entertainment, while at the same time incorporating it, but not the masses, into the international order of 'advanced peoples'.

I have undoubtedly put this statement in extreme form; it is in need of some qualification. Part of the media, in particular radio and film, have a degree of mass reach. In fact, it is possible to argue that there are two levels of informational media coverage, one elitist (newspapers and television), one with a certain reach into the masses (radio). In more general terms, though, we have the bulk of the population at best intermittently and superficially touched by the media, and an elite saturated by them.

In general, the media have played a negative, or at best very limited role in developing societies. Other means of communication are often more important. Wall posters and personal dissemination of information through party members have been important means of communication in China.¹ The mosque has had a powerful influence in a number of Moslem countries. Asghar Fathi has shown that the mosque has been an important source for the generation of conflict in Iran and Egypt and more recent events in Iran, Egypt and also Pakistan (the downfalls, respectively, of the Shah, Sadat and Bhutto) bear this out. In Fathi's view, probably in all Moslem countries the mosque "performs at least some of the functions of mass media".² Though personal and other forms of communication are possibly often of greater significance in the Third World than the mass media which often, in fact, tend to be elitist, some countries have made significant attempts to use the media for social purposes, though not necessarily with great success. Tanzania is one example.³

1 Liu (1971)

2 Fathi (undated), p.13

3 See Wedell and Pilsworth (1975)

The mass media in developing countries have nowhere near the structural importance that either the functionalists or Marxists suggest. They are neither a source of development and integration, nor a powerful class weapon. Mostly urban, elitist and westernised, they have little structural impact in Third World society. Where they do have an impact it is quite likely to be a destabilising one. It is in the major urban centres - just those areas where ethnic and intra-class conflict is usually generated - that the media have their greatest sway. This is not to say the media cannot be involved in inter-class conflict. Major conservative papers, for instance, probably played a role in bringing down leftist governments in Jamaica, and Chile, (Manley's and Allende's respectively), through helping to create an atmosphere of fear and instability.¹ The conservative press in Sri Lanka probably helped to bring down the leftist regime of Mrs. Bandaranaike in 1965. However, in this case the press was under threat of nationalisation. It was able to gain the support from the 'professional' part of the bourgeoisie - even a large part of Mrs. Bandaranaike's parliamentary support.² In the view of one writer "it is not an exaggeration to say that the attempt to fetter the press was the single most important and most immediate factor in the government's downfall."³

It is impossible to deny the potential power of the media to destabilise regimes, whatever the nature of this power. Sometimes its basis might be a class, at least partially. More often, as the rest of this thesis will hopefully show, it will be an ethnic group or a part of a class. As I argued in chapter one, classes should be seen as "class clusters", consisting of a number of "class fragments" which often find themselves in competition with one another. Within the bourgeoisie intra-class conflict takes place between the professional, commercial, military and bureaucratic elites, and this conflict affects the media.

"There are many types of elites: government elites, commercial elites, intellectual elites, religious elites, and so forth, whose concerns and interests may coincide at times but may diverge at other times. They all participate in the politics of the media."⁴

1 New Internationalist, No.100 (June 1981), pp.14-18

2 Gunaratne (1970), p.536

3 Vickery (1967), p.437

4 Lee, Chin-Chuan (1980), p.39

It is better, Lee argues, to talk in terms of "class coalitions" rather than of united classes. Salinas and Paldan, explicitly referring to the commercial differences of interest between strong government and professional media-owners, call these "contradictions between sectors of the dominating groups in society."¹

1 Salinas and Paldan, in Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979), pp.96/7

PART ONE : OVERVIEW

It is impossible to view society in the Third World without reference to the importance of conflict. As ethnicity rather than class forms the main type of social identity this conflict is primarily ethnic in nature. But as class grows in significance it develops into conflict between different fragments within the growing classes and, finally, into conflict between these classes themselves. Conflict reaches its culmination in the struggle for power. As the economy is very poor the means of becoming rich through direct ownership of resources are highly limited: for the elite, therefore, power which offers control of substantial parts of the economy, becomes the main economic resource.

These conflicts are reflected in the media. In general the media are for the information and entertainment of the elite, but they also, in particular the press, reflect the struggle between different elites for power. This does not necessarily affect the content of the media. It can affect all aspects, as different elites with different roles in the media (politicians, media-owners, journalists, etc.) struggle to make the media truly their instrument. Where conflict is ethnic in nature such intra-class divisions are unlikely to be of importance. This is the case in Nigeria. The Nigerian press has been overtly partisan. Before the civil war most papers wholeheartedly supported their particular ethnic causes. In Pakistan conflict has had a strong intra-class element, and this has been reflected by divisions within the press, i.e. struggles between partisanship, government-control and orientation to the market. The following chapters will examine these two countries in detail.

PART TWO: THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF NIGERIA

Introduction

In the following chapters I shall be looking at Nigeria, a country where ethnic conflict has been of paramount importance. The major event of Nigerian history is the civil war of the late 1960s. The popular explanation of this as simply the result of tribal hatred is sociologically inadequate, and is rejected by those who have studied the build up to the war and the nature of Nigerian society. What they reject is the irrationality implied in the explanation. Certainly the war was the outcome of tribal antagonisms, but these had a rational basis. The answer lies in the political-economy of Nigeria, not in its cultural diversity; cultural fragmentation alone does not create wars. Nor necessarily does the struggle for political power. A lot depends on what economic consequences hang on the power balance. The use of economic variables to elucidate the nature of the political conflict of the 1960s does not mean that this conflict can be accounted for in Marxist terms. The civil war was clearly not a war between different economic classes. Ethnic rather than class differences were primary. Yet some accounts of this period take cognisance of classes (or elites) within each ethnic group. The suggestion is that some sectors of society had more to gain from ethnic competition than others. It is only one step and a generalisation from this position to argue that in developing countries class conflict, insofar as it exists, is structured ethnically. Conflict in Nigeria has been primarily ethnic, but within this was germinating a strong core of intra-class conflict.

CHAPTER THREE : THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

I shall argue in this chapter that the Nigerian economy had, around the time of independence, little to offer native Nigerians in the way of substantial advancement. Such a condition I believe to be common to developing countries (as a result of the general scarcity of resources), but the circumstances vary between them. In the Nigerian case the two main sectors of the economy were, in effect, closed to up-and-coming Nigerians. The 'feudal' route had never existed; land was fairly equitably distributed, and there were few big landowners. Industry, and even large-scale trade, were monopolised by outside interests. Some Nigerians were prepared to take on a 'comprador' role in this industrial and commercial system, but the most attractive route to economic advancement was through the acquisition of power. Power became the main economic resource.

3.1. Agriculture and Industry: The Lack of Opportunity

Nigeria's economic development before and after independence was uninspiring but, until the civil war, at least continuous. Estimates vary, but GDP seems to have grown at just over 4% per annum from 1950-57 and at 4.8% p.a. from 1962-66, with rates in between being more doubtful. Agriculture, when population growth is taken into account, was at best stagnant. It grew at 2.9% per annum from 1950-57 and at 2% p.a. from 1962-66. There are no accurate figures but population was probably growing at about 2.5% p.a. Nevertheless, agriculture dominated the economy. In 1950 it contributed 66% to GDP, in 1966, 55%.¹ By Third World standards Nigeria had no serious food problem, it being, despite the predominance of cash crops, more or less self-sufficient in food. When its cash crops began to decline Nigeria was lucky enough to find oil.

As far as distribution was concerned, there was no substantial inequality on the land.

1 Data from Wells, J. (1974), pp.17-19

Table 3.1 : Size Distribution of Farmers' Holdings 1964/65¹

Size of farm in acres	East %	Mid-West %	West %	North %
0.25 - 1.0	64.1	33.0	50.4	16.0
1.0 - 5.0	33.4	62.4	45.6	59.1
5.0 - 20.0	2.4	4.6	4.0	24.3
20.0 +	<0.1	nil	nil	0.6

The North had the least equality on the land, but even here only 0.4% of farmers in 1972 had holdings of between 25 and 50 acres.² Most of Nigeria's farmers were independent, but their holdings were generally very small.

The income available from cash crops, the relative self-sufficiency in food, and the lack of any great land inequality might suggest that the average peasant farmer was, in Third World terms, in a relatively favourable position. The state ensured this was not to be. As there was no powerful landowning class to siphon off the agricultural surplus the state introduced its own means of doing this - the Marketing Boards. These were set up by the British, one for each major export crop. Their task was to buy the crops from farmers at fixed prices and then export standardised products at the best export price, partly in order to stabilise prices for the producer, partly to use their surplus profits to invest in national development. This latter, initially subsidiary role, soon came to take primacy over the former. From 1962-66 the farmer's share of the export value of crops grown by him but exported by the Boards was 63% for cocoa and groundnuts, 49% for palm kernels and 48% for palm oil. These shares, except for cocoa, were significantly lower than those applying from 1958-61.³ The Western State government was dependent on its Marketing Boards for nearly 50% of its current revenue from 1961-71.

Olatunbosun blames Nigeria's agricultural stagnation in large part on governmental expropriation of a large part of the peasants' labour. Investment in new plantings was low and production declined. Groundnut production fell by 13.7% from 1963 to 1965, cotton production by 11.8%. Furthermore, the Boards were not very successful in

1 Re-arranged from Wells, J. (1974), p.52

2 Calculated from Olatunbosun (1975), p.11

3 From Wells, J. (1974), pp.204/5

stabilising producer prices. In some cases, it seems, the Boards' activities actually destabilised prices.¹ It should be added that little of the extracted surplus made its way back to the rural areas, either for welfare or for agricultural improvements. Olatunbosun estimates that less than 10% of Marketing Board funds were spent on the rural areas.² Only about 7% of total government spending went into agriculture from 1962/3 to 1966/7.³

In sum, agriculture was left broadly to its own devices both before and after independence. It seemed to provide enough food, and also gave an impetus to development through the export of cash crops. The government could then happily siphon off the agricultural surplus through taxes and the Marketing Boards. Agriculture was neglected. It was not a profitable avenue for the individual. Moreover, what profits it offered were appropriated by the government, as has just been explained. Finally, there was no feudal class; nor, with the system of ownership that existed, could the rising urban bourgeoisie become big landowners (though no doubt some did). For these reasons agriculture offered no significant access to wealth.

Though Nigeria was heavily dependent on trade and the export-import business was a lucrative one, there were limited openings in even this field for indigenous Nigerians. This trade was controlled by monopolistic interests, one of which was the government!

"The export field was pre-empted by the setting-up of statutory Marketing Boards and trade in controlled imports was very largely monopolised by foreign firms."⁴

In 1949, 95% of the import trade was in the hands of Europeans, Levantines or Indians (mostly the first of these). This meant that, in trade, openings for Nigerians were limited primarily to internal wholesaling, petty retailing and service activities (especially transport).

Industry was also dominated by outsiders (in particular, the British). In this field, Nigerians rarely extended beyond small processing operations. Nigerian firms were in baking, sawmilling, rubber crêping, furniture, printing and textiles. Foreign ownership

1 See Ibid, pp.64/5

2 Olatunbosun (1975), p.53

3 Wells, J. (1974), p.165

4 Aker edolu-Ale (1975), p.53

was mostly in mining, oil, and large and medium-scale manufacturing. In 1964, British firms owned 63.6% of foreign-owned industrial share capital.¹ British investment was 50.2% of all industrial investment.² Private Nigerian investment was only a fraction of this. Moreover, Nigerian firms were generally very small. In 1961 a survey of over 10,000 firms in Eastern Nigeria revealed an average size for these of 2.7 workers. 91% of the firms lacked a power-driven machine.³

Nigerians faced considerable difficulties establishing themselves industrially, even in sectors where foreign competition was slight. Some writers argue that Nigerians lacked ability and experience, and so could not absorb what capital was available from state or private lending agencies. Of all Nigerian firms aided by the Federal Loans Board from 1956 to 1963 "only about one third functioned successfully."⁴ On the other hand, whatever their problems once established, Nigerians clearly had difficulty obtaining credit to get established. One study of 52 Nigerian industrialists in Lagos found that 50% of them started with capital of less than £N2,000.⁵

"to argue that applicants without sufficient collaterals have no genuine or effective demand for capital, is the counterpart of the contention that famishing survivors of a shipwreck are not really hungry because their demand for food is not backed by adequate purchasing power."⁶

Whatever the arguments on either side, the difficulties of new men lacking in experience and resources breaking into a field dominated by rich, well established foreign interests is clear enough. The same applied when Nigerians tried to enter the field of finance themselves. Nigerians started 14 banks from 1945 to 1951 but only one survived much beyond then.⁷

The government's attempts to increase the Nigerian share of industry were pretty feeble. The government's own industrial investments were much larger than private Nigerian holdings but still much smaller than those of private foreign interests. In 1965, 61% of total paid-up capital in all industrial firms was foreign-owned, 12% was private Nigerian investment, and 27% government-owned.⁸ Most government ventures were, anyway,

1 Kilby (1969), p.21

2 Hakam, in Teriba and Kayode (1977), p.160

3 Kilby (1969), pp.18/19

4 Schatz in Teriba and Kayode (1977), p.285

5 Akeredolu-Ale (1975), pp.77/8

7 Oni (1966), p.388

6 Diaku (1972), p.138

8 Schätzl (1973), p.45

in partnership with foreign firms. When the opposition leader, Awolowo, suggested in the House of Representatives that there should be more nationalisation, the Federal Minister of Finance, Okotie-Eboh (later assassinated), answered "We all know that nationalisation of industry is akin to communism."¹

The government's main intervention was, in fact, through the private sector. At the centre of this policy was a high tariff system. However, its original purpose was less to boost industry than to provide revenue for the government. In fact, the secondary motive was to try and control imports. It was for this very reason that the tariffs probably encouraged investment from foreign firms, as the system virtually invited them to invest and get behind the barriers. The big British companies, especially those already dominating trade in Nigeria, protected their dominance by initiating major industrial investments.² Foreign firms benefited from government aid as well. Amongst those foreign companies receiving tax relief as protected industries were Glaxo, Raleigh, I.C.I., Michelin, Dunlop and Metal Box.³

British and other foreign interests were dominant not only in ownership. They predominated, too, in management, even in many indigenous firms, while Western firms took on few Nigerians. A government labour force survey of 1966/7 found that 55% of commercial management and other staff in senior positions were foreigners. This percentage went as high as 73% in the Northern Region.⁴ This study showed that foreigners received 2.5 as much pay as indigenous management. In 1968, 25% of the country's industrial pay-roll went to foreign skilled manpower. One study, taking account of wages, profits and interest, calculates that 70% of industrial value added was transferred abroad in 1963.⁵

The above discussion has shown that for most up-and-coming Nigerians large-scale trade and industry were, broadly speaking, a closed shop. The best that could be hoped for against government monopoly (the Marketing Boards) and strongly established foreign competition was an opening on the periphery of the major areas of activity - a small business linked to, rather than competing with, the big foreign firms. Insecurity was a constant factor, and

1 Quoted in Blunt, in Teriba and Kayode (1977), p.81

2 Kilby (1969), pp.63-71

3 Report of Proceedings of House of Representatives, P.Q.answer (5.8.63)

4 Schätzl (1973), p.136

5 Ibid, p.44

large profits or salaries rare. A study of small indigenous firms with 20 workers found average annual salaries for their entrepreneurs of £N180 in the East and £N300 in the North. In firms of less than 5 workers the entrepreneurs could be nearly at subsistence level. By comparison, in 1965 a typist could get £N240, a driver £N200 and a nurse £N200.¹ Those who ended up in business were likely to come from fairly lowly backgrounds; after all, they might be able to earn more in even rather lowly jobs outside private business. One study of Nigerian industrial entrepreneurs found 18% of those in 225 small firms had no education, 29% a partial primary education, while another 39% had achieved a full primary education.² The occupational backgrounds of these and other entrepreneurs, by size of firm, is given below. Kilby compares his sample to one by Harris.

Table 3.2: Occupational Backgrounds of Entrepreneurs (%)³

	Kilby sample (298 firms)	Harris sample (54 firms)
Farmer	5	-
Trader	14	22
Craftsmen	69	45
Clerical-administrative	4	} 33
Teaching	3	
Professional	1	
Domestic	4	-
Total	100%	100%

Kilby's sample was mostly of small, Harris' of fairly large firms. The overall picture is pretty clear. Most Nigerian industrial entrepreneurs of this time had a poor educational background and had previously, i.e. before entering industry, been either craftsmen or (mostly petty) traders. 73% of the fathers of businessmen in Imoagene's sample were illiterate. While most businessmen started as apprentices in a skilled or semi-skilled trade, the majority of their fathers had an even lowlier start, as small farmers or lowly employees in trade.⁴

1 Nafziger (1977), p.82

2 Kilby (1969), p.336

3 Ibid, p.336

4 Imoagene (1976), p.96 and Nafziger (1977), p.176

The above data show that after independence Nigeria's businessmen generally came from rather humble backgrounds. It seems clear enough from the earlier discussion that the chances of Nigerians wanting to get on directly through trade or industry must have been daunting (and we have seen that agriculture offered no better hope). The prospects of obtaining capital and then succeeding with it must have seemed slim. Far better, and easier, to get into a position where resources could be controlled, or at least to attach oneself to someone in such a position, than to actually own and operate such resources. The way to do that, for the ambitious, was through politics. Direct meddling in business could be left for the more lowly.

3.2. The Politicians' Socio-Economic Background

It has just been shown that Nigeria's early businessmen had rather humble backgrounds. The politicians also had somewhat lowly backgrounds, but significantly higher than those of the businessmen. To some extent they can be considered to have been the modern indigenous elite waiting for independence to rise from their relatively modest positions (i.e. modest compared to the real elite of Nigeria - the expatriates - and the elites of many other countries) to stations of wealth and power. Politics, rather than direct intervention in the economy, offered the most profitable route to success.

I have described these politicians as an elite, but obviously only a small number of them attained to positions of real power. The term 'elite' is, as has been mentioned, a very vague term. Perhaps it would be best to consider the Members of Parliament to be a 'sub-elite', while those actually controlling things - the ministers, governors, premiers, etc. - were part of the elite itself. Some idea of the wider nature of the sub-elite can be obtained by looking at the backgrounds of electoral candidates rather than just the M.Ps. themselves.

Post found that of 633 candidates in the 1959 federal elections, 26.1% were Northern Native Authority functionaries (councillors, officials, etc.), or court functionaries from the East (only a very few of these); 25% were businessmen; the third biggest category were teachers (11.2%).¹ The Native Authority (NA) system was a

1. Post (1963), pp.278/9

local administrative structure largely under the control of the Northern aristocracy, and applicable exclusively to the North. Many of the NA functionaries, though, were teachers, so the proportion of teachers attempting to enter parliament was significantly higher than the above 11.2%. There were clear differences between regions. The main recruiting ground for candidates in the South (i.e. the Western and Eastern regions) was the professions (mostly education and the law), with business a close second. In the North it was the NA structure, again with business coming a close second. In general the businessmen were small-scale, most big businessmen being foreigners. Politics for these men, too, then, was a means of increasing access to scarce resources. Manual workers, company employees (mostly clerks) and trade union officials between them comprised only 6.4% of candidates, farmers a mere 8.4%.

Whereas 30% of Southern candidates in 1959 were businessmen, only 22.5%¹ of M.Ps. actually elected from the South were businessmen. The latter was also a lower figure than the 1951 figure of 28.2%² of Southern M.Ps. coming from business. Business ambitions apparently did not find quite the political outlet they sought. In 1959 a mere 2.2% of Southern federal M.Ps. were trade unionists, and another 2.2% were farmers.³ In terms of education the Southern M.Ps. in the Federal House were, by Western standards, modestly educated, but substantially better than most of the rest of Nigerian society, including its business class. 41.9% had a primary or post-primary education, 28.3% education up to secondary level or teacher-training, and 24.4% a university education.⁴

The Northern M.Ps. in the Federal House in 1959 were very different from the Southerners, both occupationally and educationally. Instead of lawyers and teachers we have Native Authority functionaries. It is important to note that some of these had rather lowly positions in the NAs. 35.2% of these Northern federal M.Ps. were or had been NA teachers; another 19.2% were NA clerks or other relatively lowly NA employees.⁵ The education of the Northern federal M.Ps. was clearly inferior to that of the Southern members.

1 Mackintosh (1966), p.91

2 Post (1963), p.45

3 Mackintosh (1966), p.91

4 Ibid, p.91

5 Ibid, p.90

So far I have said nothing about the regional assemblies, or about the differences between those actually holding power and the bulk of the M.Ps. There, in fact, seems to have been little difference between the backgrounds of federal and of regional M.Ps. I have extracted the following information from the biographical data given by the Eastern Region's government on its politicians, and I have divided this into mere M.Ps. and those in real positions of power. The latter can be considered to be the elite, the former the 'sub-elite'.

Table 3.3: Occupational Backgrounds of Politicians in Eastern Nigeria House of Assembly & Government, 1963 (in %)

	Elite ^a	Other M.Ps.	Total
Teachers	52.9	58.3	56.5
Lawyers	5.9	5.2	5.4
Other professional ^b	13.8	2.1	6.1
Businessmen	7.8	12.5	10.9
Administrators ^c	3.9	1.0	2.0
Clerks ^c	9.8	5.2	6.8
Army	-	2.1	1.4
Farmers	-	8.4	5.4
Manual	2.0	1.0	1.4
No occupation given	3.9	4.2	4.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(Numbers)	(51)	(96)	(147)

Source: Know Your Legislators: Biographical Notes of Members of the Eastern House of Assembly and Chiefs, 1963, Enugu.

Notes: a 23 Ministers, 11 Provincial Commissioners and 17 Parliamentary Secretaries

b Apart from 1 accountant, all medical

c Both mostly either civil service or Local Authority

It can be seen that there is very little difference between M.Ps. and the more powerful politicians in terms of occupational background. Some of the politicians had had more than one job. At least 17% of the entire sample had been clerks at one time, at least 21% had, or had had, business interests (however small).

All in all, there is no big difference between the regional and federal M.Ps. As far as education is concerned, 23% of these Eastern politicians had a university background, again making them very similar to their federal counterparts.

The same lack of difference between regional and federal M.Ps. applies to the North. 80% of M.Ps. in the Northern House were from the NAs. Most of these were from quite high positions, but over 40% of those from the NAs were teachers, clerks or other fairly lowly employees. 13% of the M.Ps. were businessmen. There were none from manual occupations.¹ One sample of 92 M.Ps. in the Western House of Assembly (the only one of the three original regional assemblies not so far mentioned) in 1965 shows that six out of every seven M.Ps. started as either clerks or teachers.² (The clerks were largely of urban origin, the teachers rural). This suggests a considerable amount of social mobility. Most of these politicians had, in fact, held several previous jobs (the mean number being five). Furthermore, about a third of these M.Ps. ended up with some government office. Thus, from low middle-class rankings (the rural teachers were particularly lowly), positions of considerable power (and wealth) were reached. When the occupations of the fathers of these M.Ps. are examined this becomes even more apparent. 56% of the fathers of M.Ps. in the Western Region's House of Assembly in 1965 were, or had been, farmers. Another 23% were petty traders. 80% of these fathers were "non-literate".³

In sum, M.Ps. in Nigeria in the 1950s and early 1960s were drawn from a wide variety of occupations. These were mostly, by Western occupational standards, of a lower middle-class nature. Absent are big landed interests and close to absent are manual workers. The professions are the most represented group in the regional and federal assemblies, especially teaching; however, teaching is a rather lowly profession, with poor pay and fairly low status. Thus, the politicians came from higher backgrounds, as a rule, than most of Nigeria's indigenous businessmen, but, nevertheless, still had in the main modest beginnings.

1 Whitaker (1970), pp.319 and 323

2 Imoagene (1976), pp.81 and 85

3 Ibid, pp.77/8

Power opened up great opportunities.

The second most important entrants into politics were, in fact, businessmen. These tended to be small businessmen (and traders rather than industrialists). Moreover, Nigerian businessmen themselves tended to have rather low status backgrounds, as shown above. The entry of these businessmen into politics was less a reflection of an economic class attempting to dominate government than of the control of government over the economy. In other words, politics was a business; businessmen were dependent on government, not vice versa.

"In Northern Nigeria the government was the largest source of contracts. Government and quasi-governmental agencies provided a variety of economic services, formulated policies, and laid down economic regulations all vital to businessmen."¹

The same applied to all the governments. Some bigger businessmen achieved positions of power, though they were still politically dependent; in the North, for instance, they found it "politically advantageous to support the old ruling class."²

In the South what we have is a collection of 'new' men from a variety of occupations broadly 'bourgeois' in nature. In no way did this 'class' hold a dominant economic position before independence. There was no feudal class, and large-scale trade and industry were in the hands of expatriates or the marketing boards. The politicians were men who had worked their way into moderate positions in society - through teaching, law, middle or even low-ranking administrative positions, small or medium sized businesses and farms. The situation was different in the North. Here there was a dominant class - the aristocracy, whose local power had been left untouched by the British. However, the introduction of a political party, the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), to represent the interests of those in control of the local power structure in the North, brought with it a widening of that power outside purely aristocratic bounds. Those who represented the party were the functionaries of the Native Authorities, many of them quite lowly (including a large number of teachers). It would be wrong to view the NPC merely

1 Whitaker (1970), p.334

2 Dudley (1968), p.151

as an extension of aristocratic power. It included a large number of relatively 'small' men, and it often clashed with the aristocracy. These men used the NPC to maintain the system of power as it existed in the North, but also to wean some power away from the aristocracy. Politics opened a way for relatively 'small' men in the North to break into the power structure, up until then in the control solely of traditional authority.

In the whole of Nigeria, then, though less so in the North, politics represented a means of getting on for those seeking to increase their wealth and prestige, means which were unavailable, or extremely difficult, in other spheres. Most direct access to substantial economic wealth was foreclosed. Politics offered new horizons for the control of economic resources. Finally, the above data seems to be extraordinarily well replicated in other African countries. Worsley summarises results from a number of African countries. For our purposes we can just compare his results for Nigeria (the federal plus the three regional assemblies) with those of several other African states (seven of them). 31.8% of Nigerian M.Ps. were teachers compared to 32.3% for the seven other countries. The figures for lawyers were 6.4% and 6.3% respectively, 7.2% and 8% for various other professions, 16.1% and 14.4% for traders, 22.9% and 15.9% for civil servants (the biggest difference).¹

3.3. Power as a Basis of Wealth

I have shown that the economy offered no easy direct benefits for those Nigerians seeking substantial advancement. Land was moderately well distributed, and what surplus it was able to offer was largely siphoned off by the state. Indigenous trade and industry were not, in general, a very lucrative affair, and were left largely to the lowly. Prospects were better through politics, the means whereby resources could be controlled. I have also shown that politicians were, as a rule, neither as lowly as the bulk of Nigeria's indigenous businessmen, nor at the top of the social heights - a place usurped mainly by the expatriates. They were of fairly modest background, poised for the openings independence

1 From Worsley (1967), p.148

would offer. Their spring-board was in education (in the South) and the local power structure (in the North).

The benefits that politics offered were enormous. In 1965 a Cabinet Minister in any of the Nigerian governments received £N2,700 p.a., plus various benefits and allowances. A parliamentary secretary received from £N1,350 to £N1,800.¹ It was very much worthwhile becoming even an M.P., for the salary alone.

"Some indication of the status of an M.P. and the desire to be nominated for election appears when it is appreciated that for teachers (including headmasters), and Native Authority officials, the salary scale runs from about £200 to £300 p.a."²

Federal M.Ps. got £900 p.a. plus a car allowance of £266, and mileage.

There could also be numerous secondary awards through patronage and corruption, and there often were. For instance, in the North

"regionalisation of power produced a prodigious new concentration of wealth, opportunity and perquisites - access to and control of which persons enjoying disproportionate political power in the emirates also had a disproportionate share...."³

In return for jobs, as is well known, the beneficiaries of political patronage were expected to pay 10% of their salaries to their parties. In return for contracts, businessmen, who found it paid to support the government, gave a similar cut. Politicians who profited from their control of resources could then set up in business themselves, or expand what were initially only small businesses. Each regional government also owned or controlled a bank on which the party could rely for support. In 1937, Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), later Premier of the Eastern Region and the President of Nigeria, started speculating in Lagos real estate. In 1948 he founded the African Continental Bank. By 1956 he was dealing in property, commodities, transport, printing and the press (he owned a number of newspapers). But in 1956, while he was Premier of the Eastern Region, the British set up a tribunal to investigate his business activities. It was found

1 Nafziger (1977), p.91

2 Mackintosh (1966), p.89

3 Whitaker (1970), p.461

that Azikiwe was making illegitimate use of the bank to finance his other companies which, by 1955, had lost £98,000. 56% (£321,000) of the bank's total funds had been lent to these companies. In 1955 the bank was insolvent. The Eastern Region Finance Corporation (a regional government body) invested £800,000 of Marketing Board money in the bank. This action, the cause of the investigation, raised the value of the bank's shares from nil to 14s.10d.

The bank also gave money to the party. An NCNC report stated (in 1960) that the NCNC spent £1.2 million between January 1957 and July 1960, but received only £500,000 from all sources, other than the bank. In 1959 the bank was taken over by the Eastern Region Development Corporation - that is, under direct control of the government.¹ Over one third of all the money this corporation disbursed was lent to a real estate concern in Lagos, the chairman of which was also the chairman of the Development Corporation.²

A similar story applies in the Western Region. The Coker Commission, set up by the federal government as part of its attempt to break the Action Group (AG) party, found that of the £64 million disbursed by the Western Region Marketing Board between 1954 and 1962, all but £10 million went to the Western government or its corporations. This £10 million went to seven organisations, four of which were in the hands of AG politicians. £6 million of it went to the National Investment and Properties Co.Ltd. (NIPC) and £3 million to the National Bank; both were then in the hands of AG men. The chairman of the Western Region Development Board (a government organisation) was a director of NIPC which, by 1962, had paid over £3.5 million to the AG.

More detail in this field is hardly required; most writings on Nigerian politics are replete with such data. It is clear enough that politics was a crucial source (I would say prime source) for the accumulation of capital, of access to the country's scarce resources. Ownership of the country's assets through trying to work directly in the economy without political intervention was a difficult and not very promising business. All that was needed

1 Post (1963), pp.58-60.

2 Helleiner (1964), pp. 108-17

was to control these resources.

"For in the last years of colonial rule the largest accumulation of capital was made not by the foreign firms, which repatriated the bulk of their profits, nor by the Nigerian bourgeoisie, but by the State itself, through the various Marketing Boards...

This was State Capitalism with a vengeance, and from about 1957 onwards these funds came increasingly under the control of the Nigerian bourgeoisie."¹

This describes well the pre-eminence of government-controlled resources. The reference to 'State Capitalism' is, however, misleading. The Marketing Boards did not represent state intervention aimed at supporting a capitalist economy. Nigeria had then, and still largely has, a peasant economy. The Boards represented 'state capitalism' only in a very literal sense; they were the state's means of accumulating capital; as such they could have been used in exactly the same way in a socialist economy.

There is a danger in applying Marxist categories too rigorously to developing countries. For instance, Post argues that

"attention must be drawn to the way in which the State in Nigeria conforms with the classic formulation of Marx and Engels. It is in the most literal sense the instrument of the ruling class."²

This is confusing. If there is a ruling class then, by definition, the state is its instrument. Marx and Engels claim that those who control the state manage "the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie"³ and the basis of this class lies in its control over a particular economic force - industrial capital. In Nigeria the 'bourgeoisie' was in control of no major economic force before it came to control the state. Indeed, Post himself suggests as much:

"there is the contradiction of the fact that in the colonial period no Nigerian class controlled the means of production and thus formed the ruling class per se."⁴

Though Post adapts Marxism to Third World conditions, he does not go far enough. Dudley argues that for the Nigeria bourgeoisie

1 Post (1964), p.175

2 Ibid, p.174

3 Marx and Engels: The Communist Manifesto, ed.Taylor (1967), p.82

4 Post (1964), p.170

the state was "nothing more than a committee for the administration of their consolidated affairs."¹ However, Dudley (elsewhere)² and other writers have to admit that

"political power is the primary force that creates economic opportunity and determines the pattern of social stratification."³

The bourgeoisie had no real economic base. It was a disparate group of men, a mixture of professional men, small businessmen, and people with lowly administrative backgrounds. It had little unity and become even less united when in control of the state. But the state was clearly enough the source of their economic pre-eminence. The reverse was not the case.

3.4. Social Inequalities and the Class Structure

I have argued that power in Nigeria is a source of wealth, wealth not a source of power. To put it another way, power is not determined by the class structure. This does not mean class was of no significance, despite the overriding importance of ethnicity, nor that there were not severe social inequalities.

3.4.1. The Nature of the Inequalities

Looking at Nigerian society as a whole, one study (for the year 1967/8) ranks the incomes of various occupational sectors as follows:

Table 3.4.: Indices of Wages by Occupational Sector

Total labour force	1
Industrial sector as a whole	3.9
Unskilled workers	1.9
Skilled and semi-skilled workers	2.8
Clerical and other staff	4.7
Nigerian professional, admin. and management	16.4
Foreigners	40.9

The average annual income of farmers was ₦34-72, while the minimum wages of urban workers was ₦84-108.⁴ This compares to £3,900 p.a. (plus generous allowances) for the highest public service post in 1965, and £8,625 for a minister.⁵

1 Dudley (1964), p.162

2 Dudley (1973), p.162

3 Sklar (1965), p.204

4 Schätzl (1973), pp.152/3

5 Kilby (1969), p.305

The public sector in fact did little to reduce inequalities. It added to them rather. Even though top civil servants, like the politicians, had rather modest origins, their positions of power turned them into a distinctive elite. One study of a small sample of civil servants (mostly higher grades, but including a few clerks) showed that 63% of their fathers were illiterate, while 59% of the fathers were farmers; another 21% were petty traders and another 11% clerks, tailors or craftsmen.¹ About 60% of the civil servants themselves started as clerks, about 25% as teachers. Only two had degrees. How much top civil servants had improved their own circumstances can be seen from the fact that, while in 1963/4 the top Nigerian in the Eastern Region public service got £3,900 p.a., plus allowances, the lowest official got £172 p.a., and daily paid public sector employees the equivalent of less than £60 p.a.² In 1963/4 those in the highest grade in the Nigerian civil service (supervisors) got 33 times as much as daily paid workers in the public service.³

Inequalities in Nigerian society were (and still are) very great. They seem to reflect a clear distinction between an elite comprising politicians, top civil servants, Nigerian management and top businessmen, and the expatriates; a sub-elite, going down to clerical level; and the masses. Within the latter the rural poor form a huge bottom rung. The tax structure did little to alter this. From Western government statistics⁴ it can be calculated that, in 1966/7, the top 1.09% of income earners who paid income tax had 15.3% of the total income of the region's tax-payers before tax, and exactly 15.3% after tax. The reason was the very generous tax allowances given for the well-off, including a life-assurance allowance, and a special allowance for the education of children overseas! Allowances (including the latter) were even more generous in federal territory.⁵

In 1957/8 the Smythes analysed what they called an elite (156 Nigerians considered to be members of the elite by others) and also a much broader elite of 956 Nigerians listed in 'Who's Who in Nigeria', which can be taken to include a part of the 'sub-elite' too.⁶ Though a detailed break-down of occupations

1 Imoagene (1976), pp.88-90

2 Eastern House of Assembly Proceedings, PQ Answer (1963)

3 Akeredolu-Ale (1975), p.69

4 Given in Teriba and Philips (1971), p.92

5 Adedeji (1965), pp.168/9

6 Smythe, H. and M. (1960)

revealed that the 156 elite members came from 15 occupations, 113 of these were government officials or politicians.¹ This is partly explained by the way the sample was selected, but the dependence on government and politics is clear enough.

Though old elite status was of some value, mobility was very high. As the Smythes put it, 65.4% of the 156 were of "ordinary stock"². Many had at one time been clerks or teachers. The rapid change in the nature of power, the expansion of government, the departure of most expatriates, and the greatly increased need for educated people stemming from these changes, made this mobility possible. And the most rapid mobility for those seeking elite positions was through government. "The government, their experience had taught them, can provide the surest means to their goal."³

Nigerian society contained great inequalities, but, as it is possible to isolate a relatively small number of people, of generally modest background, who reached the top primarily through the acquisition of power or some link with the power structure (achieved mainly through educational advantage or, in the North, this in combination with traditional authority), and who became vastly richer than the bulk of the population because of their access to power, it seems more appropriate to characterise them by the term 'elite' rather than the term 'class'.

3.4.2. The Role of Class Conflict

There was very little political representation of lower class interests. The only radical party was the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), which never achieved any great standing and also had a strong pro-Northern ethnic bias.⁴ Representation through labour unions was more significant. However, industrial labour in Nigeria was not a powerful force. Its numerical strength was rather small, as is to be expected in a developing country. In 1961 there were 423,000 people employed in establishments of 10 or more people. Most workers in such establishments were in the construction and service sectors. In 1962 only 10% of them were in manufacturing or processing.⁵ In the same year there were about 300,000 in trade unions. There were unions only in

1 Ibid, p.79

2 Ibid, p.87

3 Ibid, p.120

4 O'Connell (1961), p.182

5 Kilby (1969), pp.202/3

the civil service, public corporations and European firms. Moreover, most unions were very small. 195 out of 360 unions in 1961 had 250 members or less. In that year only eight unions had 5,000 or more members, though these took up 46% of total union membership. Not all these unions were in the industrial field. The largest of them was the Teachers' Union with 54,000 members. The largest industrial union was that of the Northern Mine-Workers, with 12,000. Only three of the bigger unions were in the private sector.¹

The unions were thus small and atomised. The few relatively big ones were in limited sectors. They were mainly non-industrial and government was (directly or indirectly) the main employer. Even the bigger unions were fragmented as they covered establishments separated by huge distances and included a multitude of different types of worker. They were also severely affected by ethnic and other internal rivalries. Though these facts mean that the unions were not a powerful force in Nigerian society, they have had significant strikes and some notable successes. In 1955/6, 900,000 man-days were lost when workers struck to get a public pay award applied in the private sector. In 1964 there was a general strike in which 722,000 man-days were lost.²

The latter instance is a rare case of an over-arching unity. If the unions are as separate entities not very united, the difficulties of creating an all-embracing union structure have been horrific. The Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN) was formed in 1943. In 1948 the TUCN split into two, partly on ethnic, partly on ideological lines. In 1963 there were three moderate and two radical central labour organisations, but they came together for the general strike of 1963/4.³ This was aimed at the government - as employer. There was a great deal of resentment at the very large inequalities of pay in the civil service, and the new Joint Action Committee (JAC) demanded both a pay rise for the low-paid and a restructuring of the salary scales. The government conceded the Morgan Commission, whose recommendations for large increases the government refused to publish. The general strike started on 31 May, 1964. The government offered

1 Ibid, pp.271/2

2 Ibid, pp.274/5

3 Ibid, p.286

half the Morgan recommendation on 3 June, but this was rejected. The government issued an ultimatum which persuaded the two Northern components of the JAC to order a return to work. Eventually an overall agreement was reached across the whole federation.

A strong element of ethnic politics was clear enough. A Federation of Labour leader from the North, for instance, said that he was supporting "our Loving Premier" against the "Southern-based Trade Unions". He was protecting the "father-land" and "the interest of the workers of the North according to our tradition instead of allowing some Southerners to come and dictate to us how to run our affairs".¹ Most unions in the North were in fact branches of federal unions, the headquarters of which were in the South (Lagos). When the Northern branches broke the strike they were also breaking away from what they saw as the ethnic and political control (and politics was ethnic) of the Southern unions. A Northern M.P., in an "open letter" to the NCNC leader, complained of what he saw as an Ibo/NCNC attempt to infiltrate the Northern mines through the Southern-based Nigerian Mine-Workers' Union. According to him the attempt failed because the NCNC could not find enough Northern agents to "sell" the region "to what I can describe as barbarous Region made up of diabolical and fierce-looking greedy brutes".² Under these circumstances even a genuinely radical attempt by the Southern-based unions to stoke up the North would be bound to fail. The North was certainly conservative, but ethnic and political confrontation increased this conservatism. Ethnic divisions have been a constant problem in Nigerian labour affairs. A more specific example is that of the Northern mine-workers of the Jos area; most of these were from Northern ethnic groups but some were Southern and they were all (in the early 1950s) incorporated in two unions under Southern leadership. Through political interference there were by 1961 three completely different unions each with its own ethnic membership and leadership.³

Industrial workers, then, suffered from pronounced ethnic divisions. They were also divided off from the bulk of the rest

1 Nigerian Citizen, Zaria (26.9.64)

2 Ibid, (5.12.64)

2 Dudley (1968), pp.239/40

of the lower classes through being in a position of relative privilege. This does not mean they were not very poor or that the urban conditions they lived in were pleasant. A government study found in 1961 that 67% of all residents in Lagos shared a 10-foot square single-room dwelling with an average of two other people.¹ A government survey of the late 1960s put urban unemployment at 8% but reaching 20% in some instances. It put underemployment at about 20% of the labour force.² Nevertheless, the cities were far better off than the rural areas. From 1953 to 1965 real urban wages grew at least twice as fast as per capita GDP.³

For this reason Kilby argues that "rather than being an exploited group, organised labour is already a highly privileged minority".⁴ This is a gross exaggeration. One writer argues convincingly that the pay rises the government has ensured for workers, and its general control over wages, reflect exploitation rather than paternalism and protection, or even a policy of stability. Wage awards have been spaced very far apart and are often given for special reasons - e.g. war inflation.⁵ However, the relative privilege of the workers (comparing them to the peasantry and the urban unemployed) in conjunction with other factors: weakening labour (already discussed), made it very unlikely labour would be a radical force. It gained most by integration into the political system - at the cost of its independence.

To conclude this section on class: those in positions of power and influence were an elite rather than a class based on an economic division of labour. Workers had little effective union or political representation. They were also severely ethnically divided, competing within themselves on ethnic lines. The unions became integrated into the political system and its leaders into the patronage structure. The ethnic divisions in the labour force meant that what class conflict there was was mostly "intra-class" in nature.

1 Kilby (1969), p.221

2 Falae (1971), p.65

3 Kilby (1969), p.281

4 Kilby (1969), p.282

5 Weeks (1971), p.332

3.5. The Motivations of the Politicians

I have argued that ethnic conflict, such as that which has occurred in Nigeria, is likely to affect every level of the social hierarchy. Equivalent socio-economic groups of different ethnic identities compete against each other; in other words, ethnic conflict has a built-in intra-class element, at least in potential. This reaches its greatest intensity, or at least its greatest significance, at the highest level - that of the power struggle; this is because it is here that most is at stake, and it is from the heights that ethnic conflicts lower down often receive their encouragement. I shall try to throw further light on the motivations involved here-of the elite and the sub-elite - by looking more closely (I have already examined their socio-economic backgrounds), at the country's politicians. I have done this by examining their activities in the various Houses of Assembly.

However pointless the Assemblies were as decision-making units, they were important for two reasons. Firstly, they were public institutions, and as such they necessitated the explanation by government of its actions and policies. The M.Ps., too, had to justify themselves. Their activities were scrutinised by their constituencies. The M.Ps. were very concerned to show their local supporters they were doing what was required of them. In that sense they became important sources of communication, if not of action. Secondly, though the Assemblies lacked power, they were battle-fields where the power struggle was verbally fought out (but literally fought out in the case of the Western House in 1962 when the House was closed down after the M.Ps. become involved in physical conflict. What happened in the Assembly at that time played a crucial part in the political crisis of the time, and was a stepping-stone in the sequence of events that led to the civil war).

In my analysis of the proceedings of the Nigerian Assemblies I have attempted to see what weight was given to various topics, and then, from this, to say something about the motivations of the participants. This assumes that there is some correlation between the M.Ps.' statements and their real interests. That this was so is very likely because there was little reason for the M.Ps. to

behave differently. Though the Assemblies' were formally public, they were still chambers. They were not at the fore-front of the propaganda battle. I am not suggesting that analysis of Assembly proceedings can determine what the M.Ps. actually believed in. Interests are more apparent than beliefs. (Indeed, they often contradict each other). The analysis is not of subjective categories. The Assemblies gave their members the opportunity to express their political and economic interests, even if they forced them to suppress their real beliefs. The futility of the Assemblies as legislative institutions makes this more rather than less likely. Their very weakness meant that the M.Ps. could express their interests freely. There was very little at stake in real terms.

The weight given to various topics is assessed by the amount of time spent on them. But it is impossible to estimate the amount of time actually spent on any subject. As a substitute I have used the amount of space occupied by these topics in the very detailed government records of proceedings (the equivalent of the British Hansards) - in which even laughter is noted. Even then, little can be gained from study of the formal schedules of the proceedings. I have assessed themes as actually spoken, whatever the formal subject under discussion. In formal terms, the budgets took up by far the most time in the Assemblies, but within this numerous subjects would be referred to, many not even economic. Little in the way of other legislation was enacted, and those Bills that were enacted received in general very little discussion. This is not surprising given the time these Assemblies sat for. The Federal House of Representatives sat in all for 42 days in the year studied (1963/4). The Western House sat for 16 days (in 1961/2), the Eastern House for 30 days (in 1963/4), and the Northern House for 14 days (in 1964). The choice of years for the analysis was determined by availability, and the need to avoid events which might make the sample unrepresentative.

As I have said, the Assemblies were not important as decision-making units. Each was completely dominated by a single party, (in the case of the Federal House a coalition of two parties) and

each party was completely dominated by its leadership. I shall concentrate mostly on the three regional assemblies as these more 'domestic' Houses seemed to show less restraint, and therefore more of interest, than the Federal House. Each Regional House was dominated by one party, and in each case this party was dominated by a single ethnic group. In the Northern Region the party was the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) representing two ethnic groups that had become virtually merged in the upper regions of the power structure - the Hausa and the Fulani. The Eastern Region was dominated by the Ibos and their party, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the Western Region by the Yoruba and their party, the Action Group (AG). The Federal Government consisted of a coalition of the NPC and the NCNC, with the AG very weak in opposition.

I have divided the data on Assembly proceedings into broad categories such as 'political' and 'economic' in order that certain key factors would not be lost in vast tables of figures; I have then analysed these broad categories individually. The key factors that stand out are mostly concerned with various communal conflicts. At the lowest level this was reflected in demands by M.Ps. for facilities for their local constituencies (nearly always their home town or village). These demands were for such things as water facilities, roads, local industry, schools, hospitals, etc., and were only the first level of a whole system of communally based competition which, going from such local demands, went through to a higher level to claims by minority ethnic groups which considered themselves both politically and economically deprived by the large ethnic groups in power in each of the regions, and finally on to the conflict between the regions themselves (i.e. between the major ethnic groups in power in each region) which led to the civil war. The representative of the local communities at the first level were the nation's M.Ps. They channelled local demands, which were occasionally satisfied by the government; in exchange for at least the prospect of obtaining facilities for their constituencies they brought the government local political support. These two things were the opposite sides of the same coin, the coin

being the patron-client system. In mediating political support upwards and (hopefully) economic gains downwards the M.P. not only hoped to take his share of these economic rewards, but to build up his own local power base as well, with its concomitant economic and social influence. But the elements of communal competition for resources is also clear. As one M.P. put it "Tribalism does not begin here (in parliament). It starts right from home, village against village."¹

The representatives at the next level, i.e. of the ethnic minorities, were the subordinate political parties. They pressed their claims through overt political competition, trying to weaken the power of the dominant groups in their regions through alliances with major groups in other regions. They paid a price for this; opposition to the regionally dominant parties resulted in exclusion from economic facilities, or in outright repression. Some groups, especially the smaller ones for whom opposition offered no real hope, could possibly gain more by joining the majority; their leaders, by becoming 'clients' of those who controlled the region, certainly could.

At the next level came the three major ethnic groups who were represented by the three main political parties. It would be impossible to formally separate this representation of the major ethnic groups from regional representation, as these parties in effect spoke for both; each party's ethnic group was the basis of its control of the region and the representation of its interests at federal level. The major ethnic groups had to fight through wider territories - the regions, in effect little empires - to achieve dominance.

Another key area to which I pay much attention is that of government jobs, to which I have devoted a whole category. I have broken this up into four items: the M.Ps.' pay and conditions of work, the public service, corruption and Nigerianisation. Sometimes a considerable amount of time was spent on the first of these, including such things as arguments by M.Ps. over their travel allowances. More significant was a continuous antagonism between ministers and other M.Ps. (not always from the opposition),

1 Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (18.3.63)

the latter often complaining about the elite living-style of the ministers and comparing it to their own (relatively) hum-drum existence. Politics and administration were together the most promising sector for up-and-coming Nigerians. The public service received a good deal of attention. For instance, in the Federal House it received more discussion than agriculture (the pay and conditions of M.Ps. achieving only a little less attention than this). The core of this was concern for the availability, pay, prospects and conditions of government employment, though the efficiency of the service was a further (lesser) concern.

Nigerianisation was directly related to this. Surprisingly little concern was shown about this despite the fact that it was one area - the replacement of expatriates by Nigerians in the public service - that offered substantial employment prospects. One parliamentary question (PQ) in the Federal House elicited the information that in 1963 there were still 542 expatriate officers in the Federal Public Service, 142 of them in 'super-scale' posts.¹ Despite this fact far more interest was shown in the distribution of government jobs between the various indigenous ethnic groups.

Corruption is the 'underside' of all the above factors. In a situation of scarce resources extensive corruption is inevitable. The extra income to be earned from corruption can be very substantial. Because of this it is the thing that makes many a job in politics or the civil service so attractive. This led, of course, to continuous accusations and counter-accusations. Implicit in this was a great deal of envy. One M.P. in the Federal House, for instance, went as far as to name the "millionaires" and "near-millionaires" in the Federal government. When another M.P. complained that he was "talking very badly of our Ministers" the Deputy-Speaker defended the accuser as he had not "gone to the extent of describing the sources of their wealth". To this the first M.P. replied, "Thank you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I am also working very hard so that I can become a millionaire some day."² (The humour of this exchange and the honesty of the Speaker's Chair were typical of the proceedings of the Federal House).

1 Proceedings of the Nigerian House of Representatives (31.7.63)

2 Ibid, (23.9.63)

The most spectacular accusation of corruption in the period reviewed was in the Federal House against the Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, who was an unsavoury character indeed, at least until his assassination in the first coup. The Minister was accused of raising the duty on imported shoes in order to help his own shoe factory, which he was in the process of setting up. The Minister's self-defence was quite frank.

"If an increase in duty is justifiable in the interests of protecting Nigerian industry, it surely does not cease to be justifiable because a Minister has an interest in one of the twelve individual concerns to be protected."¹

The Minister's raw defence of his actions - that what is good for business is good for Nigeria, even if it is exceptionally good for him - expresses well enough the attitude of those in power to their business interests. It also shows how power could be used either to establish or further such interests.

One other category worthy of mention before looking at the data on the regional assemblies is what could be called 'slanging matches'. This was closely connected with the communal disputes and accusations of corruption just mentioned. There was very little ideological discussion, and even practical discussion of policies was often replaced simply by the hurling of insults. In order to concentrate on other material more effectively I have separated out all material consisting solely of either pure praise or pure abuse of government (i.e. unrelated to any concrete discussion of policy). I have nevertheless included these categories, which I have called 'pro-government' and 'anti-government' respectively. Finally, as well as analysing the content of debates, I have counted the number of parliamentary questions (PQs) asked by M.Ps. broken down according to subject-matter. These I consider to be a more accurate reflection of their interests as they are totally voluntary and, if they do have a political purpose, they nevertheless do not form a part of the antagonism of political debate.

1 Ibid (11.4.63)

3.5.1. The Eastern and Western Houses of Assembly

I have taken the same year (1963/4) for the analysis of the Eastern House as I have for the Federal House, but I have chosen 1961/2 for the Western Assembly for it was shortly after this that both the region and the government of the region were broken up by the federal government. The following table shows all political discussion, which, in whatever context it occurred, took up 17% of debating time in the Eastern House and 40% in the Western House. The figures for PQs were 7% and 8% respectively. Most political discussion had little to do with particular policies, but consisted of the hurling of insults or the bestowal of praise - at least in the Western House. Noticeable is the importance of regionalism and the minorities, important certainly by comparison with the themes of nationalism and federal unity. In the Federal House the latter took up 10.4% of political discussion while the minorities and regionalism together took up 16.2%.

The category regionalism is concerned with the regional claims of the majority ethnic groups in power in each region against the majority ethnic groups in power in the other regions. The category on minorities reflects the claims of the minorities in each region against the ethnic groups in power in their respective regions.

Table 3.5: Breakdown of Political Discussion in the Eastern House, 1963-4, and the Western House, 1961-2

	Debating time (%)		PQs (number)	
	West	East	West	East
Constitution	0.4	16.0	-	-
Pro-government	34.4	23.2	-	1
Anti-government	28.2	6.8	9	2
Federal unity/nationalism	1.3	7.3	-	1
Minorities	19.0	8.7	4	2
Regionalism	0.4	7.2	1	-
Chiefs	7.5	6.5	-	9
Other political	8.8	24.3	3	5
Total	100.0	100.0	17	20

One of the major grievances of the minorities was that resources, including government jobs, tended to go to ruling party men or areas, to the exclusion of the minorities opposing the party of the ruling ethnic group. For instance, one member from the Mid-West (later to be made independent of the Western Region) complained in the Western House that

"You deny us all things. Our only economic crop - rubber - is today now relegated to the background while you boost your cocoa."¹

Economic affairs took up 44% of debating time in the Eastern House, 34% in the Western House, and 62% and 51% of all PQs respectively. Again there are certain similarities with the Federal House. For instance, industry gets rather limited coverage, even though it was in fact primarily a regional subject.

Table 3.6: Breakdown of Economic Discussion in the Eastern House, 1963-4, and the Western House, 1961-2

	Debating time (%)		PQs (number)	
	West	East	West	East
International trade/aid	0.9	7.3	-	2
Industry	6.8	8.2	6	4
Agriculture/rural amenities	19.9	20.2	18	12
Trade and commerce	6.3	5.6	2	2
General development	4.7	9.1	-	2
Government finance	40.0	17.8	1	1
Workers/industrial relations	0.5	0.4	1	-
Unemployment/poverty	3.9	4.0	6	-
Local facilities	15.0	25.0	65	153
Other economic	2.0	2.4	8	3
Total	100.0	100.0	107	179

Interest in poverty and unemployment was extremely limited, while discussion of labour and industrial relations was virtually non-existent. Some idea of governmental concern for unemployment, and of governmental understanding of the problem, can perhaps be gauged from the following extraordinary cure for it proposed by the Eastern premier.

¹ Proceedings of the Western House of Assembly (28.3.61)

"If all these people loafing about in the cities could go home to help their parents with the farm there would be less unemployment. As soon as we have the resources all such loafers will be sent to farms to work for a decent living. Honourable members can all help by having at least a five-acre farm in their villages."¹

In the Federal House unemployment/poverty took up 8% of economic debating time, workers/industrial relations 1.3%. Out of the 374 PQs on economics only 20 were on these two subjects.

The great concern for government finance gives a further indication of the conservative nature of the politicians. Saving (rather than investment) was itself considered to be fruitful. Thus, in the Western House discussion of government finance took up more time than discussion of industry, agriculture, trade and general development matters combined. One Eastern M.P. proposed that "we should give bonus to any Ministry that saves money at the end of each financial year."²

Most noticeable of all is the very large amount of time absorbed by demands for local facilities. In the Federal House these took up 12.3% of economic discussion, which was half as much again as that spent on poverty or unemployment. 196 PQs were in the form of demands for local facilities - over half of all economic PQs and 28% of all PQs asked in the House. In the Eastern House such demands took up 25% of economic debating time and 11% of all debating time in the House. 85% of economic PQs - 54% of all PQs - consisted of requests for local facilities. In the Western House such requests took up 63% of economic PQs and 31% of all PQs. The distribution of PQs reflects best the real interests of the M.Ps. In the Western House less debating time was spent on such demands, but this seems in part to have been the result of deliberate suppression of them by the Speaker and the government, who evinced considerable cynicism over the matter, as the following statement from the Minister of Economic Planning shows.

1 Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (28.3.63)

2 Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (8.4.63)

"I do not propose to comment on such matters as requests for the tarring of named roads or the supply of water and electricity to named places and villages. Honourable Members must be given some opportunity of playing to the gallery, particularly when they receive information that a Member of their constituency is around. I do not wish to diminish the air of importance which honourable Members may thus acquire in their local areas."¹

Below is the table for discussion of and PQs on social matters. These took up 25% of debating time in the Eastern House and 16% in the Western House (26% and 35% of PQs respectively).

Table 3.7: Breakdown of Discussion of Social Matters in the Eastern House, 1963-4, and the Western House, 1961-2

	Debating time (%)		PQs (number)	
	West	East	West	East
Socio-economic	8.7	2.6	2	2
Police/crime/justice	31.6	18.4	18	13
Higher education	7.3	10.9	-	10
Primary & secondary education	16.4	22.2	23	18
General education	8.6	12.3	15	11
Health	15.2	13.1	12	13
Other social	12.2	20.5	5	7
Total	100.0	100.0	75	74

Of special note is the priority given to education, which took up 45% of all discussion on social matters in the Eastern House and 32% in the Western House, with about half of all 'social' PQs being on this in both cases. It received far more attention than health matters. It is interesting to note that while only 1.3% of all debating time in the Western House was spent on unemployment or poverty, and 1.8% in the Eastern House, the former spent 5.2% of all debating time on education, and the latter 11.3%! The reason, I suggest, is the important relationship between education and access

1 Proceedings of the Western House of Assembly (10.4.61)

to jobs, especially government jobs. Such access, to the Nigerian M.P., was probably more important than health, unemployment or poverty. To him welfare seemed to depend on access to government employment.

In both Houses nearly a quarter of the time spent on education was concerned with higher education, and a significant amount of this was on foreign scholarships. In the East a quarter of PQs were on higher education (though none in the West were), and half of these were to do with foreign scholarships. It should be pointed out that at independence it had been intended that higher education should be primarily a federal subject. The combination of elitism and regional rivalry induced the regional governments to make higher education largely their own business. Each made huge investments in universities.

The importance accorded to government jobs comes out in the following table too. In the Eastern House these subjects together took up 12% of total debating time, in the Western House 9% (4% and 6% respectively for PQs). In the Federal House they took up 9% of debating time, 7% of all PQs. The public service and corruption together take up most of this time in the two regional assemblies, in fact taking up more time in the Western House than demands for local facilities (and about the same time in the Eastern House). The public service and corruption should be looked at in tandem. Corruption is possible when a government job is acquired. A job in government service is a highly sought after career, and the possibility it offers of increased means of income, from whatever source, is often a strong additional attraction.

Table 3.8: Breakdown of Discussion of Government jobs in the Eastern House 1963-4 and the Western House 1961-2

	Debating time (%)		PQs (number)	
	West	East	West	East
M.Ps. pay and conditions	16.6	12.3	4	-
Public service	16.3	45.2	4	4
Corruption	63.3	37.9	3	5
Nigerianisation	3.8	4.6	1	2
Total	100.0	100.0	12	11

One Eastern M.P. gave a list of 11 properties supposedly owned by a civil servant by virtue of his position. Over 50% of the time spent discussing the public service was explicitly concerned with it as a career. The importance of the public service can be gauged by the fact that 24% (£9.4 million) of the Western government's total proposed budget for 1961-2 (including capital expenditure) was for general administration. Obviously there was also administrative expenditure under particular budgetary heads; for instance, in 1959-60 10% of educational spending was on administration. The public service absorbed a huge proportion of the government's resources. The pay and working conditions of the M.Ps. got less discussion but were the subject of some bitter debate. One Western M.P., for instance, complained to ministers in the House that "when an ordinary man like myself gets £11 car consolidation allowance, you get £75."¹

3.5.2. The Northern House of Assembly 1964

As in the other Assemblies the budget dominated proceedings, in this case taking up 65% of parliamentary time. The Northern House was far more of a rubber stamp than the other Houses, in which the governments usually made strong attempts to justify their policies while meeting genuine criticism from the opposition parties. In the Northern House there was little genuine discussion; yet it is in the analysis of its proceedings that lies the greater sociological significance.

The discussion of political topics in the House is represented below. These took up about 18% of total debating time, only 3% of all PQs.

Table 3.9: Breakdown of Political Discussion in the Northern House, 1964

	Debating time (%)	PQs (number)
Pro-government	53.0	-
Anti-government	4.7	-
Constitution	1.0	-
Federal unity/nationalism	0.5	-
Regionalism	21.5	-
Minorities	11.1	3
Chiefs	0.5	-
Other political	7.7	2
Total	100.0	5

¹ Ibid (11.4.61)

Political topics, then, did not have as much place in the Northern Assembly as in the others, and over 50% of this consisted merely of eulogies of the government. Most of the rest consisted of some form of communal antagonism-denunciation of the other regions (and their dominant tribes) and claims by the minorities of the North of Hausa/Fulani oppression. There had been extremely violent riots in Tiv-land that year in which, possibly, hundreds were killed. The core of the trouble it seems had been attempts by the NPC to gain total control of the Middle-Belt area. The reason for this attempt was probably the fear that one of the other major parties, based outside the North, would be able to use minority dissension in the North to break up the region, and thereby weaken the political and economic power of the NPC.

This is reflected in the Premier's summing-up at the end of the session, in which he refers to the Tiv riots.

"They thought that they will be able to get a slice out of the North. God has not allowed them to do that and I do not think He is in sympathy with them."¹

It seems He was not in sympathy with the Premier either, as He allowed him to be assassinated shortly after. This conflict between the Hausa/Fulani and the Tiv was only a shadow of the conflict to come between the Hausa/Fulani and the Ibos from the Eastern Region. Though a minority in the North, the Ibos represented to the Northerners a threat from another region. Much of the 'pro-government' category was concerned with support in the political struggle against the Ibos and 'their' party.

Economic discussion is given in the following table. This took up 50% of total debating time and 53% of all PQs.

1 Proceedings of the Northern House of Assembly (18.3.64)

Table 3.10: Breakdown of Economic Discussion in the Northern House, 1964

	Debating time (%)	PQs (number)
International Trade/Aid	1.1	1
Industry	4.8	9
Agriculture/rural amenities	26.1	20
Trade and commerce	7.6	15
General development	2.5	-
Government finance	13.7	5
Workers/Industrial relations	0.1	-
Unemployment/poverty/low wages	1.3	1
Local facilities	41.6	55
Other economic	1.2	-
Total	100.0	106

Of the top six subjects in the table (the major elements of the economy) agriculture easily takes priority, using up nearly five times as much time as industry. The reason for this is probably fairly simple. The North was less industrialised than the South, and its M.Ps. had a more rural background. Northern M.Ps. were established in the local power structure. Southern M.Ps. tended to come from the 'middle' classes rising in the urban areas.

Demands for local facilities reach extraordinary proportions in this House. They take up nearly 42% of time spent on economic matters and 21% of total debating time, nearly 52% of economic PQs and 27% of all PQs. Northern M.Ps. show far greater interest in their own local areas, and their own positions in these areas, than they do in either regional or national affairs. The interest shown in workers, industrial relations, unemployment and poverty is absolutely minimal. These M.Ps. saw economic development in local terms. The following exchange exemplifies the simple logic of these demands and of their denial.

Speaker: "It is not correct for an honourable Member just to say that he wants a hospital for his area. He should state the reasons why a hospital is necessary for his constituency."

M.P. "Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. The reason why a hospital is necessary is because we have no hospital near us."¹

The constant reiteration and denial of these simple requests led to considerable frustration in this House as well as the others. One M.P., who saw the M.P. as an 'ambassador' from his constituency had this to say on the problem!

"Everybody has complaints of his Division or district. In my constituency, we are being accused of not saying something when we come here but we do say something. We find that our complaints are not heard."²

The discussion of social matters is represented in the following table. These took up 20% of total debating time, and 40% of all PQs.

Table 3.11: Breakdown of Discussion of Social Matters in the Northern House, 1964.

	Debating time (%)	PQs (number)
Social-economic	6.8	1
Higher education	5.6	5
Primary & Secondary education	13.1	14
General education.	11.9	16
Police/crime/justice	16.3	12
Health	22.3	21
Other social	24.0	11
Total	100.0	80

Again education takes precedence, with 30.6% of time on social matters and 44% of social PQs. In the case of this Assembly, higher education takes a small proportion of M.Ps.' time. Unlike the South, the North did not hold that a degree was important for progress in the power structure, based as it was on tradition. Of the Northern M.Ps. discussed above, it was shown that none had degrees. Nevertheless, 30% of time spent on higher education concerned foreign scholarships, as did four of the five PQs on higher education. So, in the North too, there is a certain elitist slant to the M.Ps. interest in education. The M.Ps. more direct interests are represented below.

1 Ibid (5.3.64)

2 Ibid (9.3.64)

These subjects took up nearly 10% of total debating time and nearly 5% of all PQs.

Table 3.12: Breakdown of Discussion of Government Jobs in the Northern House, 1964

	Debating time (%)	PQs (number)
M.Ps' pay and conditions	9.1	2
Public service	38.3	1
Corruption	7.3	-
Northernisation	44.1	6
Nigerianisation	1.2	-
Total	100.0	9

The extra category here - Northernisation - is the Northern version of Nigerianisation. Extremely relevant to the job situation, it concerned the policy of the Northern government of eliminating Southern Nigerians, particularly Ibos, from the Northern public service, which prior to independence they had dominated. The policy tacitly acknowledged the following order of priority for selection or retention of regional civil servants: Northerners first, expatriates second, Southerners third. The table shows that Northern M.Ps. were apparently little concerned with the power of expatriate administrators in their bureaucracy. Only 1.2% of time spent on social questions (about 0.1% of total time) was spent on Nigerianisation. Their attention was turned on the Ibos. Removing Southerners from the public service, and more general concern about the service, together take up 82.4% of time under the above classification and about 8% of total debating time in the House. Nearly 50% of the time spent on discussing the public service itself was explicitly concerned with it as a career. These facts indicate the great importance attached to this job sector by Northerners - for whose bourgeoisie there was little scope for advancement elsewhere.

If one puts all the 'communal' categories together - that is, regionalism, minorities, local facilities and Northernisation - they take up 31% of total debating time in the House and 32% of all PQs. By comparison the six major economic categories - from

international trade to government finance in the economic table - took up 27% of total debating time. The communal interests can also be compared to what are possibly the M.Ps.' 'class' interests, namely 'middle-class' jobs and higher education which (consisting of table 3.18 above and higher education from table 3.17) take up 10.9% of total debating time. Questions of social welfare - labour, unemployment, poverty, rural amenities and health - together take up 6.2% of debating time. Looking at these under such broad heads gives the following results. (There is an overlap between communal demands and 'middle-class' jobs because Northernisation is included in both).

Table 3.13: Community and Class in the Northern House, 1964

	Total debating time (%)	Total PQs (%)
Communal demands	31.1	31.7
'Middle-class' jobs	10.9	7.3
Major economic concerns	27.1	23.8
Social welfare	6.2	11.9

Communal demands certainly seem to be of greater concern to the M.Ps. than what might be considered to be their class interests. But both these together take precedence over economic affairs and social welfare.

There is no doubt that communal questions are uppermost, in particular that of the Ibos. Unlike the territorial minorities such as the Tiv this migrant minority did not threaten to split away from the North. The argument was over government jobs and private trading opportunities. In a poor country such things are precious resources. Government is often the main employer, but there are nowhere near enough government jobs for everyone; and in trade competition is fierce. These were the two main sectors open to up-and-coming Northern Nigerians. Finding that those who dominated these sectors were ethnically different (i.e. came from elsewhere and spoke a different language), their economic fears turned into intense racial hatred. There can be no doubt as to the depth of this hatred, even amongst the Northern leadership. It was not simply a prejudice of the uneducated masses coolly

whipped up by the region's leaders for political purposes, as some writers have claimed. Many of these leaders were themselves infected with this hatred; many of them were, anyway, relatively uneducated men, 'small' men from the periphery of the traditional power structure, who felt that their type, even their 'class', was directly threatened by the Ibo 'intrusion'.

The core source of antagonism was competition for government jobs. The following request from one M.P. in the House was typical of many M.Ps.' expressed concerns.

"I would like to appeal to the Honourable Premier to cross-check all the Ministries in order to find out and clear all the Non-Northerners from the services of Northern Nigeria, and this should be effective as soon as possible." (Prolonged applause).¹

The same feelings applied to private trading opportunities, but here a good deal of irrationality creeps in, as the role of Ibos in trade could not be statistically confirmed as easily as could their holdings of government posts. Great exaggeration, probably given some mild colour of truth by a few local cases of Ibo success in trade, was inevitable. The following quotations from different M.Ps. displays this paranoia. The first is from an M.P. who complained that the Ibos own too many petrol stations.

"Mr. Speaker, Sir, It is really high time we stand against our black imperialists. Our black imperialists are the Ibos who are trying to dominate us in all fields."²

Another M.P. claimed that the Ibos are penetrating the North "to have all the natural resources of the North and absorb it to their own region."³ According to another "about nine tenths of Sabon Gari Market stalls in Kano are owned by the Ibos."⁴ And, for another:

"the Ibos in general are trying to underrate the IQ of the Northerners... I think it is because they are allowed too much in the North - in market places, in our public services and in many other fields. They have plenty to eat....they are very bad people."⁵

1 Ibid (4.3.64)

2 Ibid (9.3.64)

3 Ibid (9.3.64)

4 Ibid (12.3.64)

5 Ibid (12.3.64)

The complaints of Ibo domination of trade continued despite the fact that, as the Minister of Trades and Industry confirmed in answer to a PQ, "the great majority of trading companies are, however, owned by Northerners." Despite this, even those owned by non-Northerners would vanish "as a result of government's policy to Northernise the wholesale and retail trades."¹

No-one complained about the domination in both the bureaucracy and large-scale trade of the expatriates, for so long accepted as masters and who could not be oppressed as could the Ibos. In fact, the Government itself made quite clear where the outside influence lay, in answer to a PQ asking for the origins of senior civil servants in seven Northern ministries. The answer was as follows.²

Table 3.14: Employment by Ethnic Group in 7 Northern Ministries (1964)

Northerners	451
Non-Northern Nigerians	198
Expatriates	1112
Total	1310

The reason for the nature of the prejudice was partly that it was the lower government posts and small trading opportunities that the Northern sub-elite could realistically aim at, and it was here they faced most Ibo competition.

The fear created by competition for jobs and trade, however irrational, extended to a much more general antagonism.

"For instance, in Sokoto, there is an Iboman with five houses or seven whereas the indigenous people of this place have little or no houses."³

He then complains about an Ibo in Makurdi with 29 houses! Whatever fragments of distorted truth such complaints might have contained, they flew in the face of statistical facts. Existence in the ghettos of the Sabon Garis was by no means pleasant for the vast majority of Ibos. The concern over housing extended further, to fear over Ibo land-holdings. One M.P. even wanted Ibo farming rights to be withdrawn. He did not mind Christians as long as

1 Ibid (11.3.64)

2 Ibid (12.3.64)

3 Ibid (17.3.64)

they were non-Ibo Christians.

However, not all members contributed in this fashion. One or two - no more than that - bravely stood up for the Ibos. One ironically thanked the Premier for allowing that

"people from different parts of Nigeria have come to live in the North, especially from Eastern Nigeria, and for the good example that the Premier has set before his people in the North, the Northerners have also accepted Easterners to stay here in the Region."¹(sic)

Some M.Ps. were aware of the economic and administrative damage the North would suffer if the Ibos were removed wholesale. This M.P's . thanks were, of course, pointless, as the government was doing what it could to eliminate Ibos from all fields; it also seemed to be doing something to fan the hatred against the Ibos. When one M.P. demanded that the current government regulation that 80% of vacant land be allocated to Northerners should be altered to 100% for Northerners, the relevant minister replied:

"I have directed that not more than 20% of any of the vacant plots should be granted to Non-Northerners in any one area. The last speakers said that 20% was too much; if it is the wish of the honourable Member, it can be changed." (Applause)²

The Premier himself contributed to the process by emphasising the political danger to the North of the Ibos. The danger of NCNC victory at the polls is deliberately confused with their supposed economic domination of the North.

"Now to those who are bent on making the Northern Region their Colony I will say that, that will never happen in their life-time."³

For the average member, however, this political message (of the danger to the North of the NCNC) was unnecessary. Fear of Ibo success - in business, in the administration, or in the professions - was enough. It is from such fear, with its element of economic realism, that irrationality grows.

1 Ibid (4.3.64)

2 Ibid (17.3.64)

3 Ibid (4.3.64)

"This point is about the Ibos who obtain licences to administer medicine. After they have obtained these licences they inject sick people and by so doing many people lost their lives. The Ibos do not like us. They hate us, and, for that reason, they would gladly employ ways, by these licences they have obtained, to administer medicine to kill most of our people."¹

It would be difficult in fact to say there was any real distinction between the government benches and the rest of the House as far as 'bashing' the Ibos is concerned. It is with government exhortation that this, in the following words of one M.P. reaches its verbal climax.

"But of all the insults I received in my life, I was never hard hit as by the statement by a little head of state - Chief Dennis Osadebay (NCNC Premier of the Mid-West) - that Northerners were ignorant. (Applause). Is it not a shame for a man who is uncultured, uncouth, very cantankerous like the Ibo man to call Northerners ignorant? People who have no history beyond 65 years? People who before the advent of the White-men had nothing to be associated with, people who have not even completely come out of their last metamorphosis as human beings!" (Applause and shouts of FIRE! FIRE!)

Government Bench: "Apes...and monkeys and such creatures..."

M.P. "...And they were in fact referred to by great historians as half-beasts and half-something else..."²

To sum up on the House of Assembly and their members: it seems possible to point to two broad types of interest - the first associated with community, the second with 'class'. The former are far more significant, and are represented by regional antagonism (or tribalism), complaints by minorities about the unequal distribution of resources, demands by local areas for more facilities, and, in the North, for the exclusion of Southerners from the administration (even from the economy) of the North. The 'class' interest, less

1 Ibid (14.3.64)

2 Ibid (12.3.64)

easily defined, concerned educational opportunities and career prospects, both political and administrative.

Very few interests were espoused which could be considered to have specifically represented those of the business community. Even as regards general economic concerns, agriculture received significantly more attention than industry, and trade and commerce broadly about the same as industry. Nigerian M.Ps. tended to be farmers and traders rather than industrialists - and above all they tended to be people with professional or administrative backgrounds, hence their class interests were often directed towards education and career prospects. On the other hand the 'business ethic' of free competition was never opposed (even if it existed more in theory than practice). The ethic was accepted as given. But, whether the M.Ps'. class interests originated in business or the professions, these men showed very little interest in the miseries of those lower down than themselves. Whatever the cultural divisions of Nigeria's politicians they certainly formed a distinctive elite.

3.6. Conclusion

I have tried to show in this chapter that conflict in Nigeria has been based primarily on ethnicity rather than class. Nevertheless, this conflict was essentially economic in origin. The struggle over scarce resources followed ethnic lines. But, despite its ethnic base, this struggle affected all socio-economic groups, from traders to politicians. The latter are in fact crucial, as this struggle, though economic in origin and working through communal antagonisms, reached its greatest intensity in the struggle within the elite for power. In an economy where direct economic profit, whether from agriculture or trade or industry, was difficult for a native Nigerian to achieve, it was power that offered the greatest access to resources. Even those perforce left to derive benefit solely from their place in the economy, such as workers and traders, found that political attachments could be as important to them in their competition with equivalent class fragments from other ethnic groups as their economic activity itself. The analysis of parliamentary proceedings showed that this communal competition starting from the smallest village

and rising to the regions themselves, was fully reflected at the level of the elite and sub-elite. In the next chapter I shall go on to discuss the nature of the communal conflict, and its culmination in the civil war.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PROCESS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

4.1. Nationalism or Regionalism?

The history of politics in Nigeria is essentially the history of regional and tribal conflict. 'Regional nationalism' rather than 'nation-state' nationalism has dominated Nigerian politics from well before independence in 1960. How these nationalisms developed depended on the nature of Nigeria's constitutional development. The first constitution allowing a measure of autonomy was the Richards Constitution of 1946. This hardly allowed any real independence, or any real regional authority.

It aroused much antagonism, before ending in failure. The objections to it were directed as much against the lack of regional autonomy as the lack of national autonomy. Nigerian nationalists were quick to realise that their individual sources of power and wealth lay in the regions rather than in the nation as a whole. As I argued in chapter one, what 'space' nationalism fills depends on what its boundaries have to offer. In this case the 'regional' boundaries had certain rewards, the national boundary inviting but doubtful rewards - as well as risks of domination by other regions.

"After independence it became fashionable for young nationalists to say that federalism was imposed on the country by the British in order to keep it weak and divided. But at this stage the Richards Constitution was unitary with regional elements and it was now up to the Nigerian leaders to decide which aspect they wished to emphasise."¹

They opted for federalism, with the regions as the dominant sources of power.

The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 allowed a great deal more regional autonomy, though still not enough for the regional leaders. The constitution was again radically changed. The politicians were quick to realise that their power-bases would have to be their ethnic communities. Initially politics was restricted to Lagos. A party, the National Youth Movement (NYM) was formed to gain control there.

1 Mackintosh (1966), p.23

In 1941 this party split along ethnic lines. The eventual result was two new parties - the NCNC, led by Azikiwe, and the Action Group (AG), led by Awolowo. The NCNC relied on the Ibo members of the NYM for its initial support. The AG relied on the Yoruba members, but it also drew support from a Yoruba cultural organisation, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (EOD), and was formed as a direct response to the creation of the NCNC.

The Northern People's Congress (NPC), the major party of the North, like the AG, had its origins in a cultural organisation. It was formed after the other two parties. Just as the AG was formed to protect the Yoruba from the Ibo-based NCNC, the NPC was formed as a reaction to the creation of these latter parties to protect the North from the South. The NPC did not join the nationalist movement; in fact, in its attempts to protect the North, it tried to slow it down. I have already argued that the struggle for power between rival factions could severely dampen the expression of nationalism. In India, the Muslims, in a weak and backward social (and political) position, deliberately slowed down the nationalist movement in order to place themselves more favourably *vis-à-vis* the Hindus. The eventual result was Pakistan. The Muslims of Northern Nigeria were in a similar position. Most clerks in both government and commerce in the North were Southerners. Southerners were also doing well in the Northern economy, and the Southern political parties were much better organised. The NPC wanted time to redress this balance. It threatened the secession of the North if the move to independence was not delayed.

In all the regions the major parties clearly built on ethnic foundations. They each came into power through the support of a major ethnic group. More important than this, though, is the fact that the parties could extend this power beyond this immediate support. Being in control of a region a party held both political and economic power over the minorities in the region. In 1952/3 there were about 4,300,000 Yoruba in the Western Region, but the AG, through Yoruba support, could wield power over a total Western population of about 6 million. In the Eastern Region there were

about 4,900,000 Ibos - the NCNC's support - enabling the party to rule over 7,200,000. In the North the NPC was essentially Fulani-Hausa. These two groups together comprised about 8,500,000 people, the next biggest being the Kanuri (1,300,000), which was also pro-NPC. This enabled the party to rule over more than 16,800,000 people.¹ In fact, as this base was sufficient to enable the NPC to dominate the federation, it effectively ruled over the entire Nigerian population.

In each region there were many minorities. Most of them found it to their advantage to knuckle under and support the party in power. Within each region there was, thus, a sort of 'mini-imperialism'. Electoral results over the years (both federal and regional) show this clearly. The Western Region was somewhat more ethnically fragmented than the other regions, largely because the Yoruba themselves contained a number of significant divisions. The Western Region also contained a large number of Ibos (over 340,000 in 1952/3). For these reasons the AG had the hardest job of the three major parties in consolidating its power. In a 1954 election with only limited suffrage the AG got only 18 of the 42 seats in the West, while the NCNC got 23 seats and over 50% of the votes. In 1956 the AG got 48.3% of the votes to the NCNC's 45.3%, in 1959 49.6% to the NCNC's 40.3%, and in 1960 53.6% to the NCNC's 36.2%. The AG, thus, slowly acquired full sway over the region. More important is the nature of its ethnic support.² In 1954, 10 of the NCNC's 23 seats were from non-Yoruba areas. In 1956, 50% of its seats came from non-Yoruba areas, while the AG got only four non-Yoruba seats.³ Thus, the Yoruba looked to the AG, while the minorities looked to the NCNC for protection from the Yoruba. However, gradually the minorities were forced to face up to reality and support the AG.

The same processes applied to the Eastern and Northern Regions, but in the former the NCNC had an easier job than the AG because the Ibos were highly homogeneous. By 1965 the NCNC was getting 75% of the votes in the region.⁴ In the minority areas of the region the votes of the opposition parties (the AG in alliance with parties representing the minorities or other groups) fell from

1 Figures taken from the Population Census of Nigeria, 1952-3

2 Mackintosh (1966), pp.509/10

3 Post (1963), p.105

4 Mackintosh (1966), p.516

45.8% in 1957 to 13% in 1965.¹ However, the process is seen most clearly in the case of the Mid-West region, carved out of the Western Region by the NPC/NCNC federal government shortly after independence. The region was largely Ibo and Edo. In elections in this area in 1956 the AG got 31.1% of the votes, the NCNC 63.5%. By 1960, with the AG firmly in power in the Western Region, despite the small number of Yoruba in the Mid-West, the AG's share of the votes was up to 46.6% and the NCNC's down to 50.9%. Had the Mid-West not been given autonomy it is likely the AG would have been able to win the area over completely in time. However, in 1964, after the creation of the new region, its share of the votes had gone down to 3%, the NCNC's up to 65%.²

We have, then, a picture of 'mini-imperialism' by the major ethnic groups and of 'mini-nationalism' by the minorities. This nationalism was expressed primarily through the minorities' own political parties. In the early 1960s seven of the 13 small parties represented the interests of ethnic minorities, five of the others relied to some extent on communal differences within the major ethnic groups.³ The most important of all the smaller parties was one representing an ethnic minority; this party, the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) sought autonomy for the pagan and Christian 'Middle-Belt' enclave in the Muslim North. More important, the area was not part of the Hausa-Fulani emirates and its people were Tivs, Birom, and from several other small tribes. However, being in the Northern Region, these groups came under overall NPC control.

The UMBC derived from two small parties, one basically Birom, the other basically Tiv. In 1957, J.S. Tarka, a Tiv, gained control of the UMBC. In alliance with the AG it opposed the NPC and demanded a Middle-Belt state. The UMBC did well in the 1959 elections, but the Birom and other small ethnic groups feared Tiv domination and, therefore, supported the NPC. The Tiv, meanwhile, had both secessionist and expansionist leanings.

"The peculiar internal balance of forces among the Tiv seems to have decided their political alignment with UMBC and AG, along with the belief that they could dominate a Middle-Belt state."⁴

1 Ibid, p.527

2 Ibid, p.516

3 Post (1963), p.90

4 Ibid, p.83

The Birom, and other tribes, sought protection from the Tiv in the NPC. The Tiv had no-one to turn to against NPC domination. In 1960 and 1964 the Tiv acted, through rioting, in defence of their interests as a minority. In the North the Tiv NA was one of the few almost exclusively elected Councils, and it was controlled by the UMBC.¹ The NPC tried to gain control of the NA and, through this, control over the Tiv. This caused the riots on both occasions it was tried. In September 1960 at least 50,000 Tiv went out in gangs burning the houses of the chiefs, tax collectors, court members, and supporters of the NPC. Nearly 30,000 houses were burnt, though only five people were killed by the rioters, who themselves lost twenty lives.² The February 1964 riots were again caused by the NPC, trying to control the NA through injecting traditional members into it, but also by arbitrary government taxation and the closing down of markets in Tiv-land.³ These riots led to several hundred deaths. They could only be put down with the use of the army.

This case indicates the myriad pulls and pushes of different ethnic groups within the political system. Imperialist and nationalist strains are felt at all levels: the Hausa-Fulani, through the NPC, seek to dominate the whole Middle-Belt area and to incorporate it properly into their empire. The Tiv, through the UMBC, seek to escape this but to dominate at the same time the minority groups within their own area. These groups seek to avoid this through alliance with the NPC. At the same time the Yoruba, through the AG, ally with the UMBC in an attempt to break NPC domination of the whole federation.

It is obvious enough that Nigeria's political conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s were ethnic in nature. It is more important, though, to see the economic struggle underlying this.

"Communities that look like being condemned to perpetual opposition to the ruling regime - condemned to more exigent imposition of taxes, to the absence of certain social services, to seeing distinctions of one kind or another being awarded to rival areas and to perpetual vexations that include the removal of

1 Dudley (1968), p.190

2 Dent in Mackintosh (1966), p.46

3 Dudley (1968), p.190

traditional leaders and the imposition of a disliked pattern of rule - quickly come to heel."¹

As power is the main economic resource, control of territory and people, through which power is expanded, is crucial. It is equally necessary to endangered groups to try to avoid becoming subject to such control. The result is a fluctuating pattern of internal imperialisms and nationalisms.

4.2. The Civil War

I shall now describe how the civil war was the culmination of a deep and continuous conflict rather than merely an accident of bad leadership or of a failure in political bargaining. This does not mean the war was inevitable; I simply wish to show that the underlying antagonisms described are a continuous principle, and must be so in any communally divided society.

4.2.1. The Background to the Civil War

In developing countries the struggle to gain most from the distribution of resources tends to fall along ethnic lines. Individuals in one ethnic group compete against individuals in other ethnic groups for government jobs, business opportunities in the gift of government (whether legally so or not), and for other facilities. In Nigeria this struggle occurred at all levels: between local communities, between tribes, and between entire regions. Even within one small area there could be cultural differences, and this could have political effects even within the same party. Communal differences were especially prominent amongst the Yoruba, represented politically by the Action Group. Cultural differences within the Yoruba were one of the causes of the eventual split of the Action Group. One account describes local cultural differences which caused a pronounced struggle within the Action Group even over candidature for a single constituency.²

An ethnic group that dominated the political structure of an area, a region, or the Federation, even if it barely had a majority of the population, would nevertheless also control the economic resources of that territory. It was, of course, those in control and those near those in control - the elite and the sub-elite -

1 O'Connell (1961), p.183

2 Oyediran (1972), p.206

that had most to gain. For these the acquisition of government jobs was of vital importance. The greatest struggle for government jobs occurred in the Northern Region; it was there that most ethnic friction existed. The competition for government jobs in the North was one of the major underlying causes of the massacres of Ibos in the North, and therefore of the civil war. Competition from the generally successful Ibos in the Northern Region was greatly feared by the less educated indigenous majority Hausa population.

The 1952 census showed that just over 2,300,000 out of an estimated population in Nigeria of 31,000,000 were settled outside their regions of origin (or were foreigners). Most of these, nearly 850,000, were in the Western Region (excluding Lagos). Almost as many were in the Northern Region.¹ To the figure of 2,300,000 can be added nearly 1,000,000 migrations (after taking account of people returning) over the next 10 years, i.e. up to 1963.² This includes migrations across the borders of the new Mid-Western Region. The civil war was finally triggered off by the massacres of Ibos in the North. There were a large number of Ibos in the Northern Region, yet they were still a tiny minority - hardly a substantial threat to the region. However, the important point is this: they were a threat not to the whole region but to a small part of it, itself rather a small minority - those most in need of government jobs and also of trading opportunities - those who had most to fear from 'outside' competition.

First of all it should be noted that the Ibo migrations were themselves the result of acute pressure on the land in Eastern Nigeria, where there was a very high density of population. Ibos did well in the North partly because the North's Islamic social and political system had resulted in Northerners being educationally backward relative to Southerners (as it had at one time amongst Moslems vis-à-vis Hindus in India). The breakdown of migrations by region shows several important things:

- i) by 1952 most migrants had been Westerners (about 770,000 compared to about 650,000 Easterners);
- ii) in 1952 there were three times as many Westerners as

1 Eleazu (1977), p.97

2 Schätzl (1973), p.146

Easterners in the North (about 548,000 against 179,000).

- iii) though migrations by Easterners easily outstripped those of Westerners over the next 10 years, three times as many Easterners (and not all of them Ibos) went to the West and Mid-West as went to the North (347,000 against 111,000).

Yet it was in the North, and against Easterners in the North, that the pogroms were carried out. That severe anti-Ibo pogroms did not occur in the Western Region despite some incitement to this by politicians there was because the Yoruba, on average at least as well educated as the Ibos, did not fear Ibo competition so much, while, additionally, the West was not so culturally self-enclosed as the North. That Ibos rather than Yoruba suffered in the North, despite the size of the Yoruba community there, was largely because most recent migrants to the North were Easterners. (111,000 Easterners from 1952 to 1963 against 14,000 Westerners and Mid-Westerners). These new 'intruders' would be blamed by Northerners for loss of jobs and trading opportunities in the North, and it was, after all, for these that Easterners moved there. (There were a small number of Hausa in the South, but they were usually engaged in a limited range of economic activity where they did not come into competition with Southerners)¹.

As I have argued above, neither land nor large-scale business offered substantial opportunities to up-and-coming Nigerians. Opportunities lay in politics and administration. Competition for government jobs was, therefore, intense. Government was by far the biggest employer and it functioned at three levels: federal, regional and local. Government, in fact, became the honey-pot of the economy. It does not matter how poor that economy might be. What we are concerned with is the centralisation of resources, much as Baran emphasises surplus value rather than GNP.²

Regional government in particular was a fast growth sector. From 1953 to 1960 the revenues of the three regional governments grew over 180%, compared to 74% for the federal government.³ It is important to note, though, that when looking at the growth of the government job sector, the rate of growth in the Northern Region

1 See Lloyd, P. (1972), pp.202/3

2 Baran (1973), pp.132-4

3 Dudley (1968), p.269

was the slowest: 94% compared to over 200% for the East and West.¹ Thus, the North's capability for providing jobs was relatively restricted. When it is also considered that Ibos had got many of the jobs available it is not surprising Ibo competition was resented. This was, of course, the basis of the policy of Northernisation.

After independence there was an expansion of government, and an additional increase in the number of jobs available in the civil service through the departure of expatriates. But the expansion could not last for ever.

"By the middle of the 1960s, the scramble for the few remaining posts was very intense, and communal competition for these contributed to the enmity and bitterness which sparked off the crises of 1966 and 1967."²

The conflict was, in fact, a long-standing one. As early as 1953 there were riots in Kano - the result of Northern fears of Ibo domination of job chances. The number of Southerners (mostly Ibos) in the 'sabon gari' of Kano had gone up from 2,000 in 1921 to 21,000 in 1954.³ 36 people died in these riots. Nkemdirin estimates that 7,000 people - over 40% of Kano's labour force - took part in them.⁴ The riots were apparently spontaneous, rapidly escalating as fear and prejudice took over, absorbing artisans, industrial workers, merchants, traders, casual labourers, etc. But in origin the conflict was essentially political, caused by a fear that Southern parties might be able to gain independence for Nigeria before the North was ready to defend itself against Southern competition.

"the Northerners rioted because they perceived that they would be overwhelmingly disadvantaged by the distribution of power and wealth in an independent Nigeria in 1956."⁵

The riots in fact started with a major clash between supporters of the NPC and supporters of the Action Group.

The intense conflict that developed during the 1950s and 1960s

1 From figures in Imoagene (1976), p.69

2 Ibid, p.71

3 Nafziger (1977), pp.67/8

4 Nkemdirin (1975), p.92

5 Ibid, p.92

was not primarily over regional but over individual benefits, i.e. over access to jobs, to positions in the patron-client network, and to business opportunities. There were differences between the regions in terms of resources, but these were not substantial and they worked both ways. There were occasional complaints in the South of economic exploitation by the North (through its control of the Federal government), yet the North was very poor. Adedeji gives figures for per capita GDP (in 1965) as follows: Western Region, £25; Mid-West, £31; East, £20; North, £19.¹ Despite the conflict between Ibos from the East and Hausa from the North they were equally poor. The regions all had a roughly equal share of industry (though not in per capita terms): in 1964 the North had 22.3% of Nigeria's industrial employment, the East 21.4%, the West 19.9% and the Mid-West 12.2%.²

Government revenues were distributed with rigorous fairness. Export duties and income tax stayed with the regions. Import duties were the most important source of revenue, accounting for just over half of all government income. The federal government kept 70% of this income. The rest was distributed between the regions on the basis of population. In 1962/3 the total tax revenues, from all sources, were £18.1 million for the Northern Region, £14.6 million for the East, and £18.9 million for the West.³ The Federal Government's total income was £41.4 million. It is possible that the North, as the prime political power, did manage to swing more federal resources its way than it otherwise would have been able to. The North's Niger Dam, for instance, took 10% of the federal government's total spending during the period of its construction. However, it must be remembered that the North was the biggest region by far, had over half of Nigeria's population, was more poorly endowed with resources, and had the lowest per capita tax revenue. Whatever inequalities there might have been in the distribution of national resources, they were clearly not great. The South was not exploiting the North, nor was the North exploiting the South. The conflict was over access to jobs controlled by government and to business opportunities.

1 Adedeji, in Teriba and Philips (1971), p.81

2 Government survey, in *ibid*, p.83

3 Calculated from Adedeji (1965), p.161

4.2.2. The Start of the Crisis

It is common to view Nigeria's crisis of the 1960s as political in origin, as a reflection of the struggle within the elite for power. I have tried to explain, contrary to this, that the political conflict was the result of much deeper social processes (of more interest to the sociologist than to the political scientist), of which it was merely the culmination. The above description of the anti-Ibo antics of members of the Northern House of Assembly gave an idea of the intense antagonism felt by a large part of the political sub-elite to the apparent threat of Ibo competition in a region of very poor resources. It is also clear from the expression of this antagonism that numerous underlying interests were being reflected - those of traders, lower and higher civil servants, professional people, etc. The Ibos were seen as a common threat. Ethnic antagonism was not manipulated from above, though it was certainly utilised. It is also of importance that the civil war itself occurred during the period of military rule. In fact, the underlying ethnic antagonism was not essentially affected by the change from political to military rule.

Another explanation given for the conflict, understandably enough, is that it represented a struggle by one ethnic group (the Ibos) to be free of oppression from another (the Hausa-Fulani). Frederick Forsyth, for instance, romantically portrays the Ibos as the innocent victims of virtually an evil power.¹ In reality, it is difficult to see in what way the North can have been exploiting the East that could have made such a bloody civil war so necessary.

Though the war can be seen as having been essentially between the North and the East (given that the North was the major actor in the Federation), it was, in my view, over the Western Region that the war was triggered off. This region was culturally the least homogeneous and politically the weakest of the three. As such it was a temptation to the political rulers of the other two regions. Not only did it offer them vastly increased sources of patronage, but it could add to the political strength of each of these two regions in their struggle against each other. Both the North and the East, then, had their reasons for ending the political autonomy of the West.

1 Forsyth (1977)

The crisis in the Western Region started with the federal election in 1959, when Action Group leader Obafemi Awolowo abandoned his premiership of the region in order to contest the elections and, therefore, have a chance of becoming Prime Minister of the Federation. After failing to become Prime Minister (becoming only leader of the opposition in the Federal House) Awolowo, still leader of the AG, continued to try to control events in the West, thereby coming into considerable friction with the new Premier there, S.L. Akintola. Akintola was unpopular, and was willing to collude with those in power at the centre (the NPC, to which the AG was opposed). Because of this, despite his poor following, Akintola was assured of his maintenance in power. Awolowo and other AG leaders opposed to Akintola were charged with treason by the Federal government, the party was broken into two and a new region (the Mid-Western) carved out of the territory of the Western Region. This, containing many Ibos opposed to the AG, became associated with the NCNC in the East. The remainder of the Western Region, under a regime dependent for power upon repression and corruption (in 1964, five out of every six M.Ps. on the government side had a government post),¹ became a dependency (through Akintola) of the North. Thus, within a few years of independence, the two biggest parties had crushed the third, while the regions controlled by the former devoured the carcass of the region controlled by the latter. The trend of internal imperialism had extended beyond regional borders. The non-Yoruba tribes of the Mid-West area were now no longer a minority. They now had a region of their own. By contrast, at Federal level, the Yoruba had become politically speaking more a minority than ever. The Yoruba empire had significantly diminished, while the empires of the other two major tribes had significantly grown. On this basis there were now (in 1964) only two parties: the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) on the one hand consisting on the one hand of the NCNC, some minor allies, and the NCNC's old enemy, the AG! On the other hand was the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), comprising the NPC, some minor allies, and the NNDP, the new party formed by Akintola to rule in the West.

1 Mackintosh (1966), p.517

Though the fundamental clash was between the North and the East, the conflict started in the West, which was the "cockpit of Nigerian politics".¹ The events just described quickly brought chaos to the region. Akintola's regime was only in power through trickery, corruption and repression. This led to considerable street violence in which many people were killed. It is believed that the federal government, at Akintola's request, was at that time considering bringing in the army, in order to control an increasingly explosive situation. Eventually, the army brought itself in, killing Akintola, the Prime Minister of the Federation, (Abubakar), the leader of the NPC and premier of the Northern Region (Sir Ahmadu Bello), and some others. The coup only served to exacerbate this growing violence.

An inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this saga is that if the NPC and the NCNC had not attacked the Western Region, the whole crisis might not have started. That they did attack is an indication of the very simple mechanism of aggrandizement applicable to an ethnically based, as opposed to a class-based, society, i.e. control over other ethnic groups. Each major ethnic group practised a 'mini-imperialism' in its own region, but extending this imperialism to federal level led to chaos.

4.2.3. The Military and the Civil War

The earlier political struggle had been fundamentally ethnic, so was the military struggle of the civil war. In other words, little changed with the imposition of military rule. The army itself was ethnically highly divided. The following data on the army comes from Dudley (1973).

To avoid domination of the army by one ethnic group a quota system of recruitment was adopted in 1962 (50% from the North, 25% from each of the other two regions), but by then the army had already become divided into ethnic layers. At the top (Colonel and above) were mainly Westerners (largely Yoruba), then, a layer down, the Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors were mostly Easterners (mainly Ibo). Northerners (mostly Middle-Belters) were the Second Lieutenants and Captains of the army, and the rank-and-file. There were, thus, very powerful cleavages in the army, which were

1 Ibid, p.550

not counterbalanced by professionalism or experience.¹

The first coup was led by Ibos. Six out of the seven leading officers were Ibos. In all, 27 people were killed, including most of the top political leaders and army command. However, the coup leaders did not take control of the government. Through a quirky set of circumstances Major-General Ironsi, who had not played a part in the coup, became the country's new leader. Dudley concludes that there possibly was a partisan (ethnic) motivation behind the coup. But the main intention of the coup-leaders was to root out increasing opposition and corruption epitomised by the growing violence in the Western Region.²

Ironsi is generally considered to have been incompetent. Of several, his biggest blunder was his Unification Decree. His solution to the ethnic conflict was to abolish the regions, and the regionalisation of the civil service, i.e. to have a unified administrative structure. He made this decision very abruptly, before any decisions on the constitution had been made. The point of this is that it critically affected elite and sub-elite jobs. According to Dudley there was general agreement that it was right to amalgamate the administrative class (to facilitate uniform policies). This would mean the whole of this class would be open to people from any part of Nigeria. But there was intense concern over open competition to the executive class. Northerners, less educated by far than Southerners, greatly feared the loss of protection that regionalisation of the service offered to those seeking a place in it. It is noteworthy that the greatest fear was felt at executive class (or sub-elite) level. Up until then, due to Northernisation, there had been in the North more vacancies than people to fill them. Now job chances in the public service would be nil. As for the Federal service, taking all grades together, Northerners comprised less than 3% of its staff.³

The next coup of July 1966, entirely an intra-military affair, was certainly ethnically motivated. It was undertaken by Northern soldiers against what they saw as Ibo domination. It was planned

1 Dudley (1973), pp.88-95

2 Ibid, pp.101-109

3 Ibid, pp.116-123

to kill only a few of the army leaders, but the officers lost control of their men, who started random killing of Ibo soldiers. General Ironsi, also Ibo, was killed. Again, the new leader of the nation was not one of the coup-leaders. The choice was Lt.Colonel Gowon, from a minority tribe in the North. Gowon's first major action was to revoke the Unification Decree and restore the regions.¹

Instead of military intervention acting to calm the growing ethnic conflagration, it had thrown oil on its flames. This was because of its greater, more arbitrary, power and its consequently greater ability to affect people's well-being (e.g. through Unification). The political rulers had generally to move more slowly, through compromise (which was negotiated chiefly through the patron-client system).

In September 1966, during constitutional discussions between the regions, huge massacres of Ibos began. Those responsible were soldiers (in a limited area) and 'marginal' people - the urban unemployed, street-hawkers and "rootless migrants". All in all perhaps seven to eight thousand people died.² In Dudley's view (and that of others too) the massacres were instigated by the North's politicians and senior civil servants, who were afraid of the break-up of the North (as Gowon seemed to be considering the creation of more states) - in other words of the Hausa-Fulani 'empire'.

The East under Ojukwu started making moves towards secession. In April 1967 Gowon made a crucial move. In order to "remove the fear of domination"³ he abolished the regions and created twelve states. Thus, as Dudley points out, exactly one year after Ironsi's Unification Decree came completely the opposite solution to the problems of federalism - the breaking up of the regions into small units in which the minorities (or most of them) would be free from the major ethnic groups. This decree, which promised to break the East into three (and therefore to end the Ibo empire) was the final straw for Ojukwu. He promptly declared independence, a move which got nowhere but killed an estimated one million people.

1 Ibid, pp.136-143

2 Ibid, pp.165/6

3 Quoted in Ibid, p.192

Why did the war go on so long? And why did the Biafrans continue it long after it was a lost cause? Why was it felt necessary to sacrifice a million lives in order to protect Ibos from further pogroms (unlikely, anyway, as most Ibos had left Northern Nigeria by now), which, however terrible, had killed seven thousand people - a minute fraction of the war losses? The East was not being exploited by the North, even if the North had been the dominant political power. Nigeria had only been independent for six years, and it was the Western Region that had suffered most in this time, and then politically more than economically. The earlier regions had had a very substantial autonomy, and the Aburi Decree, negotiated by Ojukwu, Gowon and other leaders, whatever the arguments over the original agreements, would have made this very much greater. What the Eastern leaders were afraid of was the break-up of the Ibo empire, not the position of the East relative to the rest of the federation. Gowon had suggested as early as November 1966 the possible creation of more states.¹ Northern fears of this had been at least a partial cause of the Ibo massacres.

Acceptance of the 12 states would have meant for Ojukwu and his supporters the loss of 60% of the region's agricultural revenues and 95% of its oil income.

"Cut off from Calabar, Ogoja, and Port Harcourt provinces the overpopulated Ibo heartland would thus become land-locked, underfed, and relatively impoverished."²

By creating the new states, Gowon gave Nigeria's minorities, 40% of the population, freedom from domination by the major ethnic groups, and got the loyalty of non-Ibos in the East.

"As later events would show, nothing contributed more to the isolation of the Ibo-led rebellion than the disaffection of the Eastern minorities."³

The secession attempt had little to do with the massacres in the North as cause, however terrible they were. The importance of oil and the possibility of secession based on this had been realised at least as far back as March 1963, when Dr. Chike Obi,

1 Panter-Brick (1978), p.17

2 Stremmlau (1977), p.60

3 Ibid, p.55

leader of the small opposition Dynamic Party, said in the Eastern House of Assembly:

"What has this Region gained by being a member of the Federation of Nigeria? That is the question I want to ask. My answer is, nothing. Other members keep their groundnuts, other members keep their cotton, but share our oil and coal with us..... Eastern Nigeria, because of its oil and other resources, is viable; it can run by itself."¹

Just as the Hausa-Fulani feared the loss of their empire in the North (and had already with the coups, lost it in the Federation as a whole) and the Yoruba had lost theirs in the West, so Ibo leaders feared the loss of their Eastern empire. In 1959 oil comprised only 1.7% of exports. By 1965 the figure was already 25.9%,² (and by 1975 92.9%). The loss of the "COR" area of the East would have meant the loss of these oil resources altogether. The granting of independence in states of their own to the minorities of the East would have left the Ibos with a very small, densely populated area, also poor in natural resources. Thus Ibo imperialism rather than Biafran nationalism might have been the deciding factor behind the secession bid. Having lost the chance to govern the Federation, the leaders of the East were certainly not going to be left merely with the tiny Ibo heartland.

4.3. After the Civil War

In many respects fundamental features of the Nigerian political-economy remained the same, despite coups, counter-coups, and, finally the return of democracy. During military rule only one major element changed: the power of the military. This was merely an inevitable reflection of the general ability of functionary groups in developing countries to achieve access to scarce resources.

The armed forces expanded from a strength of 10,500 in 1965 (before the civil war) to 250,000 in 1971. The ratio of military personnel to total population rose from 1 : 5,500 to 1 : 220.³ 80-90% of the huge military budget of this time went on salaries. The following table shows the proportion of central government spending on military personnel for certain years in the 1970s.

1 Report on the Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (22.3.63)

2 Dudley (1973), p.67

3 Rimmer, in Panter-Brick (1978), p.150

I have calculated these from government accounts of actual expenditures for all the departments. Where actual expenditure for a department's staff is not given I have used either the previous or following year's actual expenditure, or the planned (i.e. provisional) expenditure for that year. The number of staff employed is also given. The figures include pensions and gratuities. Given, too, are figures for the other functionary group - the civil service.

Table 4.1 : Federal Government Spending on Emoluments*(million)

	1971/2	1972/3	1973/4	1974/5 ¹	1975/6	1976/7 ¹
Forces	179.9	189.6	239.4	227.9	474.6	474.6
Civil Servants	90.1	106.6	119.2	184.4	269.7	347.6
Total	270.0	296.2	358.6	412.3	744.3	822.2
Forces as % of total	66.6	64.0	66.8	55.3	63.8	57.7

Note:¹ Provisional figures; all other actual

Source: Calculated from the Recurrent and Capital Estimates (Approved) of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1973/4, 1974/5, 1975/6, 1977/8.

As can be seen, expenditure on military emoluments (actual spending) was about two thirds of total federal government spending on emoluments in the early 1970s. But the wages bill of both the military and the civil service grew enormously in this period - military emoluments by 164%, those of the civil service by 199%, from 1971-2 to 1975-6. The forces stood at a membership of about 250,000 in 1971, compared to 90,000 other government employees in 1972-3. But this latter figure was up to very nearly 140,000 in 1974-5.¹

The other functionary group, then, the civil service, was also a large growth sector (as can be seen from the above table). This is even more the case when the regional services are also taken into account. Provisions for establishments in the federal service alone increased by 157% in the four years from 1972-3 to 1976-7. The great, almost desperate, value placed on government jobs can be seen from the fact that the East-Central State Public Service Commission received 41,000 applications in 1970-1 for a mere 197 positions.²

1 Calculated from Recurrent and Capital Estimates of the Federal Government (1973-4 and 1975-6).

2 East-Central State Public Service Commission: Annual Report (1970-1), pp.10 and 22.

While the first two coups were concerned with the regional distribution of power, they established the army as the prime beneficiary of power. The army now had access to national resources. The second two coups reflected the result of this clearly. They were both concerned with struggles between different sectors of the army for the most favourable access to resources. A huge network of corruption had been built up under Gowon (not by him), which he had done little to control. There was particular anger at the way oil money was being squandered; it was this that gave the deepest thrust to the coup against Gowon. But this anger included a great deal of resentment over the way the benefits were distributed.

"The coup-makers were primarily concerned with the greedy manner in which officials were appropriating oil money..... The coup-makers were not likely to question, much less eliminate, the triangular and bi-lateral relationships. Rather, by seizing power they could henceforth participate in them."¹

The coup against Gowon was motivated partly by genuine horror at the scale of corruption in the country. The 'Dimka' coup of February 1976, in which Murtala Mohammed, Gowon's successor, was killed, seems to have been motivated by less altruistic reasons. Mohammed had conducted massive purges in the administration in order to weed out corruption. 11,000 civil servants lost their jobs. At the same time the government planned to demobilise a large part of the army, still the size it had been in the war, as well as to weed out incompetent officers promoted during the war (the 'conversion exercise'). The coup was directly the result of these policies.

"Those entrusted with its execution, for the most part junior and middle-ranking officers, seem to have been prompted mainly by fears regarding individual career prospects, inspired by the 'conversion exercise'; and the threat of demobilisation; by antipathy to the aggressively 'professional' approach of the new army commanders...."²

1 Turner (1976), p.77

2 Campbell, in Panter-Brick (1978), p.87

The leaders of the coup also had the tacit support of the large number of civil servants displaced by the government.

Some Marxist writers see the military take-over simply as an alternative way for the bourgeoisie to retain control once the politicians had made a mess of things. This is taking the meaning of class so loosely that it would make genuine class analysis next to impossible. There was never any danger of a 'lower' socio-economic group taking control. The army did not support the politicians, allowing some of them only a secondary role in the power structure, and was more concerned with feathering its own nest than that of the wider bourgeoisie - a very disparate group, as I have already argued. The military take-over, whatever patriotic motives were involved, also represented a conflict between the military and the politicians. The third and fourth coups represented a struggle within the military itself. In both cases the conflict was clearly intra-class in nature, i.e. always within the bourgeoisie - firstly between the politicians and a functionary group, secondly between different segments of the functionary group itself.

The exchange of political for military rule merely meant that the incumbents at the head of the patron-client network had changed. Little else of fundamental importance was different. One such area was foreign domination in the industrial and commercial economy. In 1969 60.4% of paid-up share capital was expatriate. Expatriate board members had majority or total share-holdings in 62.8% of firms.¹ In order to try and increase the role of Nigerians in business the military government introduced in 1972 the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. This prohibited foreign participation in 22 types of enterprise (half of them industrial) and limited it in others. The range of the decree was extended in 1977.

However, not all of even Nigeria's entrepreneurs wanted any radical change. Association with foreign firms was easier than direct investment in the economy. Middle-men find it easier in developing countries, as I have argued above, to trade rather than to produce.

1 Teriba, Edozien, Kayode in Teriba and Kayode (1977), p.94

"They find little incentive to produce when middle-manship requires little capital, complements and facilitates but does not compete with foreign capital, and most important offers easy profits."¹

Government officials are also happy to co-operate with foreign enterprise, finding it profitable to act as compradors. The same also applies to those in political control. Again, as I argued above:

"State control stems mainly from its role as a major buyer, but also from its regulatory power over other commercial activities. Because the state controls opportunities to profit through commerce, politics becomes a struggle for positions in the state or for access to those who have influence over government decisions."²

While indigenisation has reduced the role of individual foreign interests in Nigeria, the West owns or controls a predominant part of Nigeria's industrial assets in toto. Indeed, British investment in Nigeria is estimated to be worth £1,000 million³. (This does not mean, though, that outside interests are in control of the Nigerian economy. "Though the economic influence of... foreign firms is considerable, their political influence is negligible."⁴)

While there was some increase in indigenisation in Nigerian industry, no change occurred in its structure. The position of industrial workers remained the same. The working class was, in fact, weak and undeveloped, as indeed was the class structure as a whole. This does not mean industrial workers were entirely lacking in class consciousness. Adrian Peace studied industrial relations in two expatriate-owned companies near Lagos after the Adebo Commission had (in 1971) recommended an interim cost of living award (COLA), the result of the inflation caused by the civil war. Companies tried to avoid giving the award. In one factory Peace studied there were stoppages of work, despite the existence of an anti-strike law, and an assault on the personnel

1 Turner (1976), p.65

2 Ibid, p.64

3 The Guardian (2.8.79)

4 Bhambri (1964), p.187

manager. Eventually the award was conceded. A consideration in the decision was a fear that expensive equipment would be damaged by the workers. This also became a consideration in the other factory, which similarly conceded.

Peace argues that

"This was not a protest by industrial workers solely against their position within the industrial system as such, but was against the prevailing inequalities within Nigerian society at large."¹

Peace is right to argue that class relations pertinent to an industrial society can exist in an industrially undeveloped society: they can exist in small areas simultaneously with class relations pertinent to earlier modes of production. Yet it is not possible to conclude from Peace's evidence that workers in Nigeria are likely, or even potentially able, to participate in significant class conflict. Their actions are sporadic, essentially instrumental, and generally poorly organised.

Another writer² has examined worker reaction to the Adebo award, this time in firms in Kano owned by non-Europeans. There were hardly any multinationals in Kano, most industry being owned by Levantines, Asians etc., Nigerians, or the government. These treated the workers far more harshly than did the Europeans, and at that time there were no factory trade unions. The three factories Lubeck studied all refused to pay the award or hedged it about. In each case there was violence and the management, the worst being Hausa rather than foreign, responded with bribery of strike leaders, sackings, and lock-outs. The workers were weak and fatalistic. Even when, in one factory, they struck for two weeks, they were unsuccessful. The worst employers were indigenous Nigerians, even where the state or its politicians were involved in ownership.

Industrial workers are just one small element of urban economic life. Probably more important, at least numerically, are the innumerable craftsmen and petty traders. Williams, studying these in Ibadan (an important city), found that they were basically accommodating. They saw their future in the patron-client system.

1 Peace, in de Kadt and Williams (1974), p.158

2 Lubeck (1975)

"Throughout the trading hierarchy, advancement is seen to require privileged access to clients or suppliers...."¹ These small businessmen do not oppose the system, merely try to improve their individual positions within it. The most famous case of organised protest that has occurred in Nigeria has in fact come from the peasants rather than from urban groups (except for the workers' general strike discussed above), though they are in general quiescent. This was the Agbekoya rebellion of 1968, which occurred during the civil war in what was then the Western Region. The basic causes of the rebellion were declining income from cocoa, years of exploitation by the Marketing Boards, and new heavy taxes to finance the war against Biafra. Many people were killed during the riots, which were not spontaneous but appear, rather, to have been well organised.²

The class structure, then, was not affected by military rule. This is reflected, too, in the continued elitist nature of Nigeria's education. At independence there had been only one university. Each of the three regions then built its own one. There are now 13 and four more states plan to have one. There are also at least 8,000 Nigerians at universities in the U.K. (many others in other countries).

"The universities are an annex to wider Nigerian society slotting graduates into the world of car allowances, pensions, and Western style homes."³

The establishment of universities by individual states is, of course, as much an aspect of regionalism as it is of elitism. Underlying regional tensions are still there, and still powerful, despite the civil war and military rule. The three regions had become even before the start of the civil war 12 states. But this was not the end of the process. Between October and December, 1974, 19 advertisements publicising demands for the creation of particular states appeared in the New Nigerian.⁴ During the first half of that year

"administration throughout much of Nigeria was seriously impaired, and in some cases paralysed, by agitation for

1 Williams, in de Kadt and Williams (1974), p.118

2 Ibid, pp.123-134

3 Guardian Special Report (30.3.81)

4 Yahaya, in Panter-Brick (1978), p.204

the creation of new states - a campaign in which civil servants were especially prominent."¹

The influx and progress of Ibos outside their own area is still being impeded.²

Gowon's 12 states were increased to 19 in 1976 but this has not stopped the demand for more. Such a process is an underlying principle of the Nigerian political economy. Not only does the creation of new states give minorities political freedom, it gives the elites of these minorities increased economic opportunities by allowing them access to and control over resources.

"The movements for a realignment of state boundaries are primarily movements by elites seeking to consolidate their influence in their own localities. Leaders of state movements, especially those which emerged between 1967 and 1975, saw the Government's commitment to create states as an opportunity to share booty."³

In many respects post-military Nigeria is much the same as before - in fact, remarkably similar to the earlier democratic period. The same political set-up has returned - a Northern party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), in power in alliance with a party under Azikiwe (still going strong), and poor old Awolowo still in opposition. The political system (a presidential one) is different but the contenders broadly the same. The new ruler, Shehu Shagari, had been parliamentary secretary to Nigeria's first Prime Minister, and a minister in several departments, both before and after the coup.⁴

The fact that the NPN could get in largely through the Northern vote, despite changes in the rules designed to mitigate the regionalisation of politics (presidential candidates had to gain 25% of the votes in two thirds of the now 19 states), indicates the continuing importance of ethnicity. Shagari gained the required proportion in 12 states (what is two thirds of 19?) while the NPN won in the states and federally but did not have a clear majority at either level. The continuing importance of ethnic rivalry is obvious enough. Since Shagari became President he

1 Campbell, in Ibid, p.76

2 Schätzl (1973), p.140

3 Yahaya, in Panter-Brick (1978), pp.220/1

4 Nigerian Government advertisement in The Guardian (16.3.81)

apparently received requests from representatives of different ethnic groups for at least 12 more states.

4.4. Conclusion

Ethnic antagonisms have existed (and will exist, whether on or below the surface) throughout Nigeria's history - during colonial rule, during the First Republic, during military rule, and after the restoration of democracy. These antagonisms reached their climax in the struggle between the elites for access to scarce resources, which could only be obtained through power. The result was a continuous ebbing and flowing of ethnic imperialism and ethnic nationalism. The civil war itself reflected both Ibo nationalism (the struggle against more powerful ethnic neighbours) and Ibo imperialism (the attempt to retain control over nearby minorities).

In many fundamental respects no essential change was caused either by the military take-over or by the later return to democracy. The nature of underlying ethnic competition, of the class structure, of the patron-client system, and of foreign commercial influence - all these remained broadly the same. Changes in the political-economy have reflected little more than changes in the elites: first the military displacing the politicians, then one element of the military displacing another. This, then, reflected a process of change from ethnic to intra-class conflict. It is possible to be more specific and say the first military coup was the result of ethnic conflict while the later coups were intra-class in nature.

PART TWO: OVERVIEW

Nigerian history clearly shows the primacy of ethnic over class conflict. This principle is relevant to most developing countries. Naturally Nigeria had its own special conditions - for instance, the political arrangements left by the British (regions dominated by major ethnic groups) and the pre-eminence in the economy of foreign interests; but these hardly created the antagonisms that were to appear. They merely determined the intensity and form of these antagonisms. I have tried to show that communal competition is present throughout Nigerian society: at the lowest level it was reflected in local competition for resources (expressed through representation in the Houses of Assembly), then in conflict between minorities and majority ethnic groups in one region, and finally in conflict between the major ethnic groups across the whole federation. Changes in the nature of political rule have affected the expression of ethnic competition but not its essence.

The primacy of ethnic conflict does not mean class conflict is not important; in particular ways I think it is. The nub of my argument as regards class can be put as follows: in a situation of scarce resources class conflict is likely to be within rather than between classes. The Marxist theory of class conflict presupposes a developing economy in which new economic forces bring into existence new economic relations. A new class based on the new economic forces eventually arrives to challenge the dominance of the old economic class. In developing countries these new economic forces develop in dribs and drabs. They do not bring whole new classes into existence even over a long period of time - just fragments of classes. Development does bring into existence a small class of educated people, with some capital in trade or land perhaps (which are hardly new economic forces), but there are no new economic forces on which their rise is based or that they can take control of - except governmental resources. In all societies with modern, centralised governments an economic surplus can always be generated through government, however poor these

countries may be. Access to governmental resources provides the main opportunity for economic advancement; they are in a sense the new 'economic force'. The productive power of this force comes through control of the patronage structure, which becomes the means by which economic benefits and political support are mediated. The superficially feudal nature of the patron-client network, control of which depends wholly on control of government resources, reflects a system of economic relations appropriate to the nature of this new 'economic force'.

In a situation of scarce resources it is especially impossible that there can be enough positions of control to satisfy everyone. Both controlling and inferior positions in the patronage structure have to be fought for. As ethnicity is the main basis of social identity in most developing countries, the basis of the struggle is usually the ethnic group. Ethnic conflict has been described in detail above. However, this conflict is usually not between ethnic groups as a whole but between equivalent socio-economic sections of different ethnic groups. This is because they are competing for similar resources: ethnic elites compete against each other for political control, traders for trading opportunities, manual workers for jobs, etc. Various aspects of this intra-class conflict have also been described above. Conflict was initially ethnic but intra-class elements gradually became of more significance. As resources were so limited only a fragment of a class at best could be satisfied. Thus fragments of classes fought each other for economic benefit. Inter-class conflict was of little importance.

In conclusion, Nigeria's political-economy both before and since independence has been characterised in the main by intense ethnic competition for scarce resources. This conflict has centered on access to government resources - the main source of economic surplus available for exploitation. The struggle for control of central resources led to ethnic imperialism and to ethnic nationalism, both flowing and ebbing against each other. There was no significant conflict between classes for control of central resources. The class structure was little more than a set of tenuous clusters of loosely related class fragments. The dominant cluster is the bourgeoisie, but even this is little more

than a loose group of disparate interests (professional, business, functionary, political) only related at the analytical level. Its various elements have no more in common than a vaguely similar socio-economic background. They are too busy fighting each other to unite. None of these elements sees itself as part of a class. Each hopes to be a controlling class in itself. This aspect of conflict is intra-class in nature.

A possible picture of socio-economic change in Nigeria, seen in terms of conflict, is as follows:

- (1) Ethnic (with incipient intra-class conflict)
- ↓
- (2) Intra-class (with elements of ethnic and inter-class conflict)
- ↓
- (3) Inter-class (with vestiges of ethnic and intra-class conflict)

According to Marx, conflict in all societies is based on class. As societies develop the nature of class conflict changes. I have tried to show an alternative way of looking at socio-economic change. As societies develop the nature of conflict changes. It does so with changes in the nature of its base - from ethnic groups to parts of a class to developing classes. Nigeria before and during the civil war was firmly locked in the ethnic stage. Conflict since then has been of an intra-class nature, with elements of ethnic and inter-class conflict.

PART THREE : ETHNICITY, CLASS, AND COMMUNICATION IN NIGERIA

Introduction

In the following two chapters I hope to throw further light on the ubiquity and depth of conflict in Nigeria, and on the country's highly elitist social structure, through a study of communication in the country (mostly the press). In doing so I shall be looking at 'process' rather than 'structure', and hopefully thereby obtaining a more purely sociological insight into these elements of Nigerian society.

Marx believed that socio-economic change takes place through changes in the class structure. I have argued, by contrast, that it takes place through changes in the type of group involved in conflict, of which class is only one. As regards the mass media, in Marx's view they are vital means for the transmission of ideology: they are under the control of the bourgeoisie and reflect its interests. I do not believe things are quite as simple as that in the West, let alone in the Third World. It cannot be argued that conflict in developing countries is based on class antagonisms, nor can it be argued that the media simply reflect particular class interests. But the media in the Third World do reflect the socio-economic structure of their countries in very broad ways.

The press in developing countries has a far stronger political connection than do the electronic media. At various times in its history it often strongly reflects the nature of political conflict. But this conflict is not necessarily reflected in content. The power of government often prevents this. However, the press can reflect conflict in other ways, less publicly - for instance, in antagonism between owners of the press and its journalists. The press contains numerous interests and influences: those of business, of government, of political parties, and of the journalists themselves. In times of ethnic conflict these interests might be united: i.e. the business, political and professional elites in one ethnic group combine against those of another. In a period of intra-class conflict these particular elites might oppose each other. For instance, political parties (often supported by the 'professional'

part of the bourgeoisie, including the journalists) vie for power with the functionary groups. This is, in fact, often the main form of intra-class conflict. As business interest usually support functionary groups (for stability), the professional bourgeoisie also finds itself opposed to the 'business' bourgeoisie. As journalists can generally be considered part of the former group and the owners of newspapers part of the latter, a conflict of interests arises between the two.

In periods of ethnic (or nationalist) conflict the press is highly partisan. All members of one ethnic group generally oppose those of another. This conflict is often directly reflected in newspaper content. In times of intra-class conflict the press is likely to be government-oriented (though partisanship is always under the surface). The government gains strength and uses this to keep opposition groups out of power. One weapon it uses to maintain its power is control of the press. In this case there is often a broad conflict between the personnel of the press (supporting politics, freedom, and market-orientation) and the government (representing a functionary group or an autocratic party). The owners of the press split in opposite directions. The big commercial ones often find it pays to support the government (thereby coming into conflict with their own journalists); the small, political ones - remnants of partisanship - often oppose the government and show little interest in the market. Of the two countries I shall be analysing, Pakistan reflects the phase of intra-class conflict just described, while Nigeria, which I shall be discussing now, reflects the simpler case of ethnic conflict.

CHAPTER FIVE : THE COMMUNICATION OF CONFLICT

The press in Nigeria has from the start had a strong connection with conflict. I argued in Chapter 2 that it is through such a connection that the press develops. In the case of Nigeria this conflict, and its communication, has been almost wholly ethnic in nature. I am not arguing that the press necessarily promoted the growth of conflict, though I would find it hard to believe it had no effect in this respect; my interest is, rather, simply in the expression of this conflict. If the media reflect in some way or other the structure of the society they exist in, then the importance of ethnic confrontation is bound to be reflected in the press. I also argued in Chapter 2 that the media in developing countries have a fragmented connection with their social environment. I do not think it possible to say that the media are 'determined' by any particular element of the social structure (though they are usually heavily controlled by government, whatever the nature of this government). Rather, the media reflect underdeveloped society in very general ways: they reflect conflict, the clash of ethnic identities, the elitist structure of society, and the overpowering primacy of politics and the state - all the elements I have laid great stress on above.

5.1. Conflict and the Origins of the Nigerian Press

Though the first newspaper in Nigeria appeared in 1859 the press did not gain a firm footing until the 1880s. It was an indigenous press; its initial partisanship took the form of antagonism to the British. One paper wrote in 1898 that "a black Englishman is an absurdity not only in Europe but also in Africa".¹ This did not stop the Nigerian press from using English as their medium of expression: it was a westernised elite that was speaking. Though only about 5,000 out of the Lagos population of 86,000 or so spoke English, most newspapers published there were in this language. The press did not develop in the interior of Nigeria until the 1920s.

Though the newspapers of the 19th century frequently opposed the increasing European domination of Africa, where the interests of the newspapers themselves or of their localities were concerned

1 Omu (1978), p.7

the tune could change. In 1877 a long war broke out in the Yoruba interior between different Yoruba tribes, seriously affecting trade between Lagos and the hinterland. Lagos and the indigenous press established there not only wanted trade restored but viewed an extension of British power as an extension of the influence of Lagos. When two areas adjoining Lagos were annexed to it the Lagos Weekly Record saw this as "highly politic and satisfactory", and a suitable way of "dealing with the surrounding native tribes". The Lagos Times, before military action to open up trade again was decided upon, described the British policy of non-intervention as "altogether ruinous and suicidal".¹ The press can reflect 'internal nationalist' just as well as 'state nationalist' aspirations.

Press opposition to the colonial government began to be of some significance in the early 20th century. But, while nationalism was growing, so were conflicting interest within the nationalist movement. These too the press reflected. The first political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, was founded (in 1923) by two newspapermen, Herbert Macaulay, journalist-owner of the Daily News, and Thomas Jackson, who similarly owned and ran the Lagos Weekly Record. Macaulay, his faction, and his paper, were strongly opposed by another political faction represented by the Daily Times. The press began to thrive on partisanship. The interdependence of the press and politics was very close, but there was also

"the natural disposition of the newspapers to exploit political excitement for commercial ends. The polemics inevitable in electioneering gave a boost to newspaper sales."²

The first really successful paper in Nigeria was Nnamdi Azikiwe's West African Pilot. As the title implies, Azikiwe had a pan-African outlook. His paper, founded in 1937, was the first major journalistic offensive against colonialism in Nigeria. The paper was at the same time highly market-oriented, designed to appeal in both style and content. It quickly became the leading paper, stripping past the Daily Times, and forcing it to compete

1 Ibid, pp.120/1

2 Ibid, pp.233/4

fiercely. (By the end of the 1940s Azikiwe owned six papers, spread across the entire Federation). Ultimately the latter paper sold a controlling interest to the British Daily Mirror Group who duly turned out a vastly improved paper, forcing the Pilot, in turn, to compete even harder. However, partisanship was the main pattern.

5.2. Conflict Between Partisanship and Market-Orientation

During the build-up to the civil war Nigeria was in the peculiar position of having a press that was firmly partisan but a best selling paper that certainly was not partisan. In 1966, this paper, the Daily Times, sold nearly as many copies as all the other major papers put together. I have argued that partisanship is necessary for the development of the press, but that does not mean it is necessary for the development of an individual paper, or that papers are always founded for political purposes; nor, indeed, that partisan papers must lack any concern for a wider market.

Papers often suffer what eventually become conflicting aims: the maximising of political support, or of profits. There can thus be a conflict between partisanship and market-orientation; in fact, if a political paper really wants to expand, this must happen. Another possibility is that a paper might be partisan at the same time as oriented to government. This can, of course, happen when the government allows some press freedom; and such freedom is, in varying degrees, fairly common. It can also happen where there is a federation of states, each with its own government. Each government might control the press in its own state, thus making the press government-oriented. But, if these states are in conflict within the federation, then the press, across the country as a whole, is a partisan press. This was the case in Nigeria. The original trichotomy of partisanship, and government and market-orientation, is therefore too simple. Though the broad developmental pattern is correct, there are numerous complexities and contradictions to be taken account of.

Nigeria has had papers of all the above types. The West African Pilot is an example of a paper founded for a mixture of

partisanship and market-orientation. A 1958 editorial claimed "We support 100% all that the NCNC stands for. But we cannot live and eat politics all the time. We are a commercial organisation.... This paper must survive either as a commercial concern or political enterprise. But we are the former - at the moment at least - and being so, we intend to maintain our independence whilst upholding the principles of the party."¹

Yet the Pilot had an essentially partisan market. It "reached only NCNC members and Ibos".² Nevertheless, this political and ethnic constituency offered a limited market. The Pilot started declining when it faced competition from the truly market-oriented Daily Times.

The Times could only be a successful market-oriented paper with foreign support. It was one of three papers owned by the Daily Mirror Group in West Africa. The other two were in Ghana and Sierra Leone. (In Chick's view the Mirror Group started their West African venture solely out of a profit motive. No inducements were offered by the government and the Group was not interested in supporting the government).³

When the Daily Times came under the control of the Mirror Group it received by far the best equipment of any paper in Nigeria, as well as experienced expatriate management, an extensive distribution system (including its own fleet of lorries), while its staff got salaries one third higher than those of its competitors. It was successful for these reasons. It was also politically cautious. Despite its success, though, and its relatively large circulation, the Times was bought in the main "by members of a small elite".⁴ The English-speaking population itself was a very small percentage of the total population.

The Times was not the only expatriate-owned newspaper in Nigeria. The Thomson organisation also had an interest; it owned the Daily Express in partnership with an organisation controlled by the Action Group. Thomson had been invited to participate in a paper by the AG because it wanted a well-run paper to support

1 Grant (1975), p.29

2 Ibid, p.64

3 Chick (1967), p.158

4 Ibid, p.230

its interests. Thus, in this case, the origins of foreign participation lay in partisanship. But Thomson wanted a neutral market-oriented paper, the AG a partisan paper. Trying to be both, the paper failed. It could hardly avoid being partisan, especially during the crisis of the AG's split. It had to support either Akintola or Awolowo. Thomson closed the paper in 1965.

How was a market-oriented paper, the Times, able to survive in a partisan situation? First of all, of course, the market was hardly a mass market. The Times' public came in large measure from the elite. As was made clear by the failure of the Express there was not room, anyway, for two such papers. In developing countries the market is too small to support a demand-oriented press, even if it can support a solitary paper of this nature. Secondly, there are always those in any conflict situation who do not want to be involved. The Times skimmed off the politically uncommitted, or not-so-committed, from around the rocks of political conflict. Thirdly, even the politically committed, especially where there is no question of ideology (it would be difficult to call the ethnic conflict ideological) might want a full (or relatively full) account of events, as well as the views that appeal to him. Fourthly, the demand for partisan papers certainly did exist, and this limited the market greatly; the demise of the Express, unable to make the transition from a partisan to a market-orientated paper, exemplifies this well. Fifthly, it took outside resources to create such a paper as the Times. The Nigerian economic and political environment was unable to create or maintain such a paper itself. Finally, all the foreign-owned papers in West Africa eventually gave up. In Sierra Leone the Mirror's paper, the Daily Mail, found the market too small, and increasingly encroached upon by government papers. It sold out in 1965. In Ghana the political environment was such that the Mirror's paper, the Daily Graphic, could hardly say a word without offending Nkrumah. It sold out to the government in 1962, and the press there quickly become entirely government-oriented. In Nigeria the Daily Express just could not cope; even the Times

eventually found the political environment too much and sold out, leaving no politically independent paper on the scene.

While there was one successful market-oriented paper, the rest of the Nigerian press was entirely partisan. I hypothesised in Part One that, in a partisan situation, the main growth would not be in the size of the individual papers but in the numbers of newspapers competing against each other. This was certainly the case in Nigeria. Moreover, while it is true that in a politically and socially fragmented market, a partisan paper could not make a mass appeal, a neutral paper could skim off readers in all the nooks and crannies of such a fragmented market, but even then it could hardly make a mass appeal. For this it would need large-scale literacy (in English in this case) and some political tranquillity. The above arguments indicate that it is very difficult to maintain a successful market-oriented paper in a developing country, and probably impossible to have an entire press of this nature.

The table below summarises the various orientations of some of the more important papers of this period (between which, though, there were very big differences in circulation and resources).

Table 5.1: Orientations of Nigeria's Major Newspapers

	Partisan	Partisan/ market- oriented	Partisan/ government oriented	Market- oriented	Government- oriented
Times				*	
Express		*			
Pilot		*			
Post					*
Gaskiya			*		
Citizen			*		
Outlook			*		
Sketch			*		
Tribune	*				
Telegraph	*				

In the case of the Tribune and the Express their orientations changed over time. For a while their party, the Action Group, was in power in the Western Region. When Akintola took over the reins with a new party these papers were no longer oriented to government. The table shows that most of the papers were partisan in one form or another. The only paper oriented solely to government was the Nigerian Morning Post, though even this position was qualified. The Post was owned by the federal government. As this government was a coalition of opposed parties the paper avoided overt partisanship.

Partisanship was even more intense than the above table indicates, because it could occur within parties, between different factions. This occurred with the Action Group. Both the Express and the Tribune had great problems when Akintola and Awolowo split up (both these men had previously worked on the Tribune); the factional dispute became the primary concern. Eventually these papers remained with the AG (though the Express tried to keep a foot in both camps), while Akintola, in government, established his own paper, the Sketch. Such factionalism also occurred, to a much lesser degree, in the NCNC. The Pilot, founded before the NCNC, was Azikiwe's paper. It supported the NCNC, but always Azikiwe's view of the NCNC. He did not refrain from using it to criticise the NCNC. The Nigerian Outlook was established by the Eastern Region government to represent the NCNC itself.

5.3. The Economic Foundations of the Political Press

I have given some indication of the dependence of the Nigerian press on political and government support, and of the difficulty of establishing an even partially market-oriented press. There were both political and economic reasons for this. In this section I shall examine the latter.

5.3.1. The Income of the Press

Partisanship does not guarantee profitability; profits are probably rare. Many of Nigerian's partisan papers only managed to survive with regional government support. The table below clearly indicates that the Nigerian press was overall a loss-making affair. Inclusion of other papers would have made this even more

apparent. Even if the profits of the Times were spread out over all the leading papers the press would still be a loss-maker as a whole.

Table 5.2: Newspaper Ownership, Scale and Profitability, 1964¹

Newspaper	Owner	Investments ^a	Assets ^a	Employees	Profit/loss p.a. ^a
Times	IPC	525	1,000	600	+112
Pilot	Azikiwe	10	60	100	-20 ^b
Tribune	AG members	20.4	10	100	-
Post	Fed.govt.	1,000	545	800	-200
Outlook	East.govt.	-	200	200	-47.3
Citizen	North.govt.	-	>50	100	-50
Sketch	West.govt.	-	-	-	-80
Express	Thomson's/ AG	371.4	196	-	-46

Notes: a £1,000's

b For January and February only

Government patronage became much more important, of course, with regional and national autonomy. As the above discussion suggests, such patronage was necessary. In 1962/3 the Outlook, with a circulation of 16,500, got a subsidy of £50,000. In 1963/4 (its circulation now at 21,000) it received from the Eastern Government £47,000² (probably over 60% of the revenue it received from sales, advertising and job printing).³ In 1964/5 the Sketch received a subsidy of £84,000 from the Western government, the next year £72,500.⁴ Its circulation came to no more than a few thousand.

In a number of ways, as I have already indicated, the press reflects the political and economic structure of Nigeria. It also became, along with so many other institutions, a part of the patron-client network. Any participation in government, or a government organisation, could be a profitable affair. It meant a finger in the pie. The same applied to government newspapers. It applied to all government papers, but in particular to the Post and the Nigerian National Press, of which the Post was part.

"From the beginning the Nigerian National Press had been open to plunder in its function as one piece of the national cake."⁵

1 Grant (1975), p.15

2 Ibid, p.257

3 Ibid, p.380

4 Ibid, p.389

5 Ibid, p.261

Even without corrupt sources of income the top editorial and management staff were extremely well paid. On the other hand, the lower workers were very poorly paid. Thus the elitist nature of Nigerian society was also reflected in the press. In the 1960s

"While editors had the status and salary of senior civil servants, reporters started at a maximum salary of £20 per month with most earning the equivalent of a cook-steward."¹

I described in Part Two the strong links between the regional governments, the regional public corporations, the banks, and the parties. One final element in this was the press. The money that came from the banks and the marketing boards was used not only to prop up the parties and its individual members, but the party papers too. By 1955 the African Continental Bank, owned by Azikiwe, NCNC leader and Eastern Premier, had loaned Azikiwe's large commercial organisation, Zik Enterprises, of which the West African Pilot was part, £321,000. The Pilot's share of this was an overdraft of £68,051. The Bank itself relied largely on funds from government corporations. Zik Enterprises lost money and the bank became insolvent. The bank's managing-director, A. Blankson, was also managing-director of the Pilot and its editor-in-chief.² There were also strong links in the Western Region between the Action Group, the National Bank (in which the biggest share-holder was the Western Regional Marketing Board), and the Action Group's newspaper organisation, the Amalgamated Press, which included the Tribune.

5.3.2. Circulation and Distribution

Grant³ gives the circulations of the major newspapers, derived from a British advertising agency and other sources, as follows. (I have selected only certain years).

1 Ibid, p.50

2 Ibid, p.115

3 Ibid, p.403

Table 5.3: Newspaper Circulations

	1960	1961	1964	1965	1966
Times	94,250	106,570	108,960	111,880	141,110
Express	50,000	40,000	52,220	47,000	Closed
Pilot	40,000	-	23,100	35,000	20,000
Tribune	15,000	-	5,000	10,000	7,000
Post	-	30,000	16,000	32,000	37,800
Citizen	20,000	-	8,100	New Nigerian	42,410
Outlook	13,000	-	21,100	30,360	34,650
Sketch	-	-	2,000	3,550	1,000

The total circulation of these papers in 1964 was a mere 236,480. Readership, of course, is likely to have been considerably higher, probably over one million - still a tiny proportion of the population. In addition to this, readership was distributed very unequally across Nigeria. It was limited by and large to a few urban centres, in particular Lagos. Most of the early papers were established in Lagos; it was the commercial and administrative centre of Nigeria, and politics too was for a long time limited to Lagos.

I have calculate the geographical distribution of the papers according to their own locations using data from Grant.

Table 5.4: Regional Daily Circulations of Nine Newspapers by Location (in March, 1964)

Circulation in:	Lagos papers	Western papers	Eastern papers	Northern papers	Total
Lagos	80,800	2,250	1,620	300	84,970
West	57,260	4,750	150	200	62,360
Mid-West	17,490	-	420	-	17,910
East	39,740	-	15,660	80	55,480
North	23,050	-	150	7,520	30,720
Total	218,340	7,000	18,000	8,100	251,440

Source: Grant, pp.27,47 and 62.

The domination of the press by Lagos is clear enough. 87% of the combined circulation of the nine papers (the eight listed in Table 5.3.

plus the Telegraph) is contributed by the Lagos newspapers, (218,340 out of 251,440). Only 17.4% of the circulation in the four regions (i.e. excluding Lagos) was contributed by papers established in those regions. The circulation of newspapers in the North would be considerably higher, about equal to that of the other two major regions, if the only vernacular paper of any significance, the Gaskiya Ta Ti Kwabo (Hausa), were taken into account. In 1947 the circulation of this vernacular weekly was 24,000 (going down to 19,000 in 1949).¹

The regional distribution of individual papers is more interesting. The two big papers, the Times and the Post, were fairly evenly distributed across the Federation, but the smaller more political papers were more localised and also, in some cases, suffered an apparent disjunction between their economic and political markets. Of these papers, the Pilot, with some pretensions to being a market-oriented paper, sold fairly equally across the Federation. Nevertheless, though its political constituency was in the Eastern Region, in 1964 25% of its sales were there, compared to 31% in Lagos.² Nearly half of the Tribune's circulation of 5,000 was in Lagos though the paper was published in Ibadan. The Express, another AG paper whose political constituency was in the Western Region, sold marginally more in Lagos than it did in this region (even including the Mid-West).

Despite the dominance of Lagos in sales, and of the relatively widespread sales of the non-partisan Times and Post (less non-partisan) throughout Nigeria, the regions had a strong partisan component. In the Eastern Region, the Outlook sold about 15,500 to the Times' 21,500. In the North, the Citizen had half the circulation of the Times; Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo might have excelled the Times. In the Western Region, the Express sold 18,500 to the Times' 24,000. Thus, in all regions there was a very significant partisan outlet. Broad confirmation of the importance of partisan papers comes from a readership survey (of over 12,000 people) carried out in 1962 by a market research organisation on behalf of 49 firms. (Circulation figures say nothing about actual readership). In the Western Region 63% had read the Times 'yesterday', 30% the Express.

1 Post (1963), p.321

2 Grant (1975), p.106

In the Eastern Region, 35% had read the Times, 26% the Outlook. In the North, 51% had read the Times, 22% had read the Citizen and 39% Gaskiya (both bi-weeklies) in the 'last seven days'.¹ The Post, shortly before its demise, was also widely read.

There are no circulation figures for individual towns (apart from Lagos), but some indication of local circulations, however vague, can be gained from analysis of the origin of letters and classified advertisements printed in the papers. (My samples were of 15 issues, generally over a period of a year or six months, or the period of an election campaign). Again there seems to have been a disjunction between economic and political centres: a number of Lagos papers printed classified advertisements, mostly from Lagos (the main economic centre), but had a much wider distribution of letters, coming in particular from regions where the papers had their 'political constituencies'. However, it appears that this tendency might have decreased with the growth of political conflict, the 'political constituency' gaining ascendancy over the economic market. For instance, in the case of the Tribune, an Ibadan paper, whereas in 1950 Lagos was apparently not far behind Ibadan as a source of letters, by 1958 it was a significantly lower source both of letters and of classified advertisements. By the 1959 general election Lagos had become of negligible importance in this respect. However, it should be added that such data is of uncertain value. (Political letters, for instance, might not be genuine, and the selection of all letters must be influenced by the newspaper's policy).

I will now discuss the newspapers' areas of coverage by content, which was as geographically limited as their distribution. The following figures are in average daily column inches (height of article by width). The Pilot, in a 1950 sample of 15 issues, split its domestic coverage as follows

Table 5.5: Domestic Coverage of the Pilot's Content, 1950 (in col.inches)

National	132
Northern Region	15
Eastern Region	35
Western Region	45
Lagos	60

1 Report of an Enquiry into Advertising Media in Nigeria: 1962/3, Research Bureau Ltd., 1003, Nigeria, September 1963.

Clearly the national coverage is strongest. The East had not yet become the political constituency it was later to become, but, as Eleazu¹ shows, the regional distribution of content did not change much in the 1960s, when the Pilot's political market was in the East. Though, in terms of circulation the Pilot had moved somewhat out of Lagos by the 1960s, it was still an essentially Lagos-bound paper.

The domestic coverage of the Action Group's Ibadan-based paper, the Nigerian Tribune, was as follows for three separate years.

Table 5.6: Domestic Coverage of the Tribune's Content for Three Years (in col-inches)

	1950	1958	1959
National	114	68	163
Northern Region)	45	30	56
Eastern Region)		12	13
Western Region	132	149	96
Ibadan	90	78	30
Lagos	68	3	17

In 1950 the Tribune was very much a local paper. I have separated coverage of Ibadan out from the Western Region. Taking the Western Region, Ibadan and Lagos together, 290 column inches were on the Western area of Nigeria, compared to 114 on national affairs. In the politically 'peaceful' year of 1958 national coverage was much lower, but in the general election period of 1959 national coverage shoots up and local news dives. The reporting of the other regions went up slowly, but this was mostly negative (about crime, corruption, political violence, etc.). The most interesting result is the relative decline in importance of Lagos. In 1950 Lagos takes 23% of the coverage of the Western area of Nigeria, in 1958 it is negligible, in 1959 it takes exactly half of its 1950 proportion.

The most extreme case of a split between market and political base occurred with the Daily Telegraph, a Lagos paper and the organ of Mbadiwe's DPNC. Mbadiwe's base was in the East - not even the whole region, but a part of it (Mbadiwe's home town, Orlu). He had been in the NCNC but left and opposed it with his own party.

1 Eleazu (1977), pp.214/5

The NCNC was in firm control in the East, which might partly be why Mbadiwe published from Lagos. It appears that nearly all the paper's sales were in Lagos (according to Grant¹, about 6,200). In 1959, out of 23 letters received 20 came from the Western Region (including Lagos), only three from the Eastern Region. Yet its regional coverage was mostly of the East.

Table 5.7: Domestic Coverage of the Telegraph's Content, 1959
(in col-inches)

National	201
Northern Region	14
Eastern Region	159
Western Region	37
Lagos	41

Of the Eastern coverage over half was what I call 'negative'. Mbadiwe was seeking to criticise the Eastern government, and, in particular, to stoke up communal differences within the East but in a thoroughly Lagos-bound paper!

To sum up so far; the Nigerian press, in its origins and development, was clearly bound up with politics. In terms of circulation and resources it was very small, largely restricted to a few urban centres, and mostly loss-making. It depended on political parties and governments for support. In doing so, many of the papers became a part of the patronage system. General appeal to the market was of some significance, but only one paper was successfully market-oriented. Even this could only be so with foreign support, and that did not last. The press was basically partisan, and each region had a significant partisan outlet. But the contradiction between economic and political orientations applied not only across the press but within particular papers too. While politics was 'in the regions', economic life was dominated by Lagos. The press was largely based in Lagos, yet Lagos only had a tiny proportion of the population, and was politically (in terms of voting) insignificant. Some papers based in Lagos, and reliant on the commercial side of Lagos, nevertheless had their 'political constituencies' elsewhere. The economic foundation of the press was clearly very poor, driving most of it towards political dependence

1 Grant (1975), p.47

(even if it had wanted to be non-political). There was both an economic push and a political pull. The disjunction between economic and political centres, at which I have little more than hinted, is just one indication of this.

5.4. The Extent and Nature of Partisanship

5.4.1. The Importance of Politics

In my content analysis of the Nigerian press I have distinguished between particular periods of the press, in particular two general election periods, the first in 1959, which determined who would rule Nigeria after independence, the second in 1964, which was the start of the conflict leading to the civil war. The figures are of percentage total space after subtraction of advertisements. They include all coverage, including editorial and letters-to-the-editor. The sample of fifteen issues for each paper was taken from the last month of the general election campaign, which makes it a concentrated sample (the period for bi-weeklies was longer). The aim is to see partisan papers at their most partisan.

Table 5.8: Coverage of Politics and Government in Two General Elections (%total space less ad's.)

	1959				
	Service	Telegraph	Tribune	Citizen	Outlook
Politics	32.4	49.3	50.7	37.4	54.3
Government	3.3	4.4	5.0	6.2	13.5
Total	35.7	53.7	55.7	43.6	67.8
	1964				
	Sketch	Citizen	Outlook		
Politics	39.4	40.5	41.1		
Government	9.1	7.0	7.1		
Total	48.5	47.5	48.2		

It can be seen from the above that on average about half of total space (less advertisements) was taken up by political/governmental content. Most of the above papers were the organs of parties in power at the regional level and, for some, at the federal level;

so, much of the reporting of government was also indirectly of the party. More important, though, is that party and other political news overwhelms government news. During an election period especially, whether the paper is a 'government' paper or a 'party' paper, the party is the thing.

The next thing to do is compare this coverage with that in non-election periods, and when there was no major controversy raging. I shall do this by comparing two newspapers, the Tribune and the Outlook, over several periods.

Table 5.9: Coverage of Politics and Government in Two Newspapers (% total space less ad's.)

	Tribune			Outlook			
	1950	1958	1959	1954	1959	1961	1964
Politics	12.6	26.6	50.7	14.0	54.3	11.4	41.1
Government	2.9	16.3	5.0	22.1	13.5	20.6	7.1
Total	15.5	42.9	55.7	36.1	67.8	32.0	48.2

In 1959 and 1964 there were elections. It can easily be seen that total political/governmental content goes up very substantially in these years, especially the political content. In fact 'government' declines drastically at these times, so that a clear trend is discernible. In non-election times government content is high (1950 must be excluded here as only the colonial government existed then), and political content low or moderate. In election times the former plummets and the latter increases enormously. The Outlook exhibits these swings most clearly. Government content is higher than political content in non-election times, political content is higher than government in election times. (In the Tribune of 1958 politics is higher than in either paper earlier because of the imminence of independence).

What these samples show then are swings between partisanship and government-orientation, which are determined by the political circumstances of the time. The papers were always highly partisan; in non-election times they were orientated to government, in election times to their party. Although government and party were the same thing it was only during elections that the parties, each in government in its own region, came into conflict with each other.

So far I have said nothing about how coverage of politics and government was distributed within the papers. The following example shows the various types of coverage for the 1964 sample. (This was not different from the 1959 sample in any particular way as far as distribution is concerned). I have made a broad distinction between news and other material: political features, political advertisements, political cartoons, and editorials and letters on politics. I have also divided news into straightforward reporting on parties, political analysis/comment, and other political matters not explicitly connected with particular parties (for example, local politics or electoral arrangements). The distinction between comment/analysis and editorials is a little artificial; the idea is to separate out analysis or comment within the body of the paper, or even within an article, which need not necessarily be opinion.

Table 5.10: Political Coverage in the 1964 General Election
(% total space, less ad's.)

	Sketch	Citizen	Outlook
Parties	23.8	11.3	18.4
Comment } news	5.5	10.7	9.3
Other political	2.0	14.0	1.8
Features, ads., cartoons	3.1	1.8	5.2
Editorial	4.6	0.8	3.2
Letters	0.4	1.9	3.2
Total	39.4	40.5	41.1

It can be seen from this that all parts of the paper contributed a significant amount to total political coverage. This tends to be the case in periods of intense partisanship. It is the sum total of all types of political coverage that makes these papers so overwhelmingly political and overwhelmingly partisan.

5.4.2. The Importance of the Parties

So far I have shown how important politics were to these papers. Now I shall describe the importance of the parties themselves. It is clear enough that coverage of politics is very large, especially

during periods of political tension. Within this political reporting the parties played an increasingly very large part. The main indication of the increasing part played by the party within all political news is the comparison of the increase of party news, and comment, with the decline of 'other political' news. This can be seen by looking across the Nigerian press as a whole over three periods: 1950-4 (three newspapers), the 1959 election campaign (five papers) and the 1964 election campaign (three papers). The figures are averages for the samples of each period, and are percentages of total space less advertisements.

Table 5.11: Types of Political Coverage over Three Periods
(% total space less ad's.)

	1950-4	1959	1964
Parties	4.0	25.8	17.8
Comment	1.6	4.5	8.5
Other political	7.3	7.5	5.9

In 1950-4 'other political' news is greater than party news and political comment together. In 1959 it is the second largest category, but well below party news. By 1964 it is the smallest component, while political comment shows a significant increase, as it does over the entire period. There was only one 'deviant' paper in this respect, the Nigerian Citizen. Without this exception the figures would have shown the trend even more clearly. (The press as a whole in the North was less partisan than in the South. The government was more autocratic and did not bother to make that much use of the press. The press was negatively oriented to government, i.e. its function was less to positively boost the government than to ensure no criticism should appear of it.) The trend, however, is of a clear increase in news on political parties in the press at the expense of other sorts of political news. As the party comes to dominate political news, the papers are used more and more as vehicles of comment.

5.4.3. The Importance of Partisanship

I have shown the increasing importance of political news in the period studied, and within this, of general party coverage.

Individual papers were, of course, increasingly partisan too. In times of political crises-and Nigeria has not been short of these - the political papers spring to life, they become fully geared for battle, and their circulations shoot up. Without politics there would have been very little in the way of Nigerian press. Most papers in Nigeria were born for and lived for politics.

The concern of the individual papers, of course, is usually for a particular party. Moreover, the party takes over the whole paper - news, comment, editorial, letters, features, cartoons. The following tables will show the extent of this partisanship. The figures are of average number of column inches per day (height of articles by width), not percentages of space. Naturally, the labels 'favourable', 'unfavourable' and 'neutral' incorporate a good deal of artifice and some subjectivity. Yet such judgements have to be made. On the other hand, in the case of the Nigerian press, the extreme partisanship of the press means that one's judgement is rarely tested. In addition, I took a very simple standard to define 'favourable' news: I called news favourable which the party would probably like. This could be overt propaganda, or a simple party statement, or a 'factual' account of violence done at a party-gathering 'apparently' caused by another party (if both sides are not given), however neutral in tone. In other words, I tried to minimise the subjective component.

The following table shows the distribution of all party coverage (news, editorials, letters, etc.) in a sample of 2 different newspapers in 1950 (in average daily column inches).

Table 5.12: Distribution of Party Coverage (in col.inches)

	Pilot (1950)			Tribune (1950)		
	Favourable	Neutral	Unfav.	Favourable	Neutral	Unfavourable
NCNC and allies	43.9	3.7	4.5	4.1	3.3	-
Egbe Omo Oduduwa	-	--	1.5	14.6	3.2	-

There was little in the way of party politics at this stage. The Action Group had not yet been founded and the NCNC, as can be seen, was associated with a number of other organisations. Even then,

the Pilot is clearly partisan to the NCNC and its associated organisations. It hardly mentions the Egbe Omu Oduduwa. This was a Yoruba cultural organisation on which the later Action Group was largely to be based. The Tribune hardly mentions the NCNC and is clearly partisan towards the EOO, in which it certainly saw the beginnings of political representation for the Yoruba. In May 1950, the Tribune explained the reasons for the existence of the EOO, as follows

"The spirit of Yoruba Nation was sick before the great Egbe Omo Oduduwa came into being. Our tradition was being trampled on, our Native Authorities have no authority... Our tradition is no more sacred and honourable and those who are placed over us revel in our disunity. It is the duty of Egbe Omo Oduduwa to preserve all that is wholesome in our law and customs, tradition and usage."¹

Coverage of government (at that time only the colonial government existed) was also limited, in particular that of the Tribune, which had a daily average of only 25.3 column inches to do with government. Nearly all of this was neutral or favourable to the government. However, the paper did manage to offend the colonial government once, suffering the banning of a few issues as a response and several police raids. This led the paper to print in a substantial space on the front page of one issue a large crucifix and the words

"Obituary. Freedom of the Nigerian Press Is Dead. May It Be More Fulminating In Its Resurrection Than It Was Before Its Death. So Mote It Be."²

The Pilot was much more consistently nationalistic. Of its average daily 71.8 column inches on the colonial government about 50% was unfavourable to it, only 12% favourable.

The coverage of the various governments in the mid-1950s by the Outlook and the Tribune is given below in average daily column inches. (There was no indigenous federal government in 1954).

1 Nigerian Tribune (26.5.50)

2 Tribune (4.9.50)

Table 5.13: Governmental Coverage in the 1950s (in col.inches)

	Outlook (1954)			Tribune (1958)		
	Favourable	Neutral	Unfavourable	Favourable	Neutral	Unfavourable
East govt.	21.1	95.8	1.0	-	-	-
North govt.	-	0.4	-	-	1.3	7.0
West govt.	-	-	-	8.3	79.8	0.3
Colonial govt.	18.5	34.4	-	-	1.3	11.2
Federal govt.	Not applicable			-	9.3	-

Most reporting of government is neutral. As regards the use of the description 'favourable', this is defined somewhat differently from its use in relation to the parties. As a government can expect to get much of what it wants said published in a newspaper (it might, for instance, be an announcement of a new law) I have called 'favourable' anything which positively, however weakly, supports the government. It can be seen that the Outlook treated the colonial government about as favourably as its own government in the East. It would hardly appear to have been a nationalistic organ. The Tribune was more critical, but it concentrated its main attention on speaking for its own government in the West, albeit at this stage in neutral terms.

Coverage of the parties by these two papers is given below (in average daily column inches).

Table 5.14: Party Coverage in the 1950s (in col.inches)

	Outlook (1954)				Tribune (1958)			
	Favour.	Neutral	Unfav.	Total	Favour.	Neutral	Unfav.	Total
NCNC	21.1	4.9	-	26.0	11.4	2.1	41.4	54.9
NPC	0.3	-	-	0.3	-	-	8.1	8.1
AG	0.4	-	-	0.4	32.0	7.1	-	39.1
UMBC	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	0.8
Others	3.8	-	1.0	4.8	0.9	-	-	0.9

Notes: NCNC = National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
 NPC = Northern People's Congress
 AG = Action Group
 UMBC = United Middle Belt Congress

Partisanship is very clear in the case of the Outlook. 82.5% of its party coverage was devoted to the NCNC. (The Eastern Regional Government, which owned the paper, was an NCNC government). Most

of this coverage was favourable, but the paper made little use of unfavourable reporting of the NCNC's opponents. The Tribune, by contrast, made great use of unfavourable reporting of the AG's main opponent of the time, which was the NCNC. This is because the AG was much weaker in the Western Region (where the Tribune published) especially under the threat of the NCNC, than the NCNC was in the Eastern Region (where the Outlook was published).

So far we have seen highly partisan reporting of political parties combined with largely neutral coverage of governments, though there is also some partisan reporting of the government with which each paper was associated. Even then, most reporting was neutral. In the 1959 election campaign, in the samples of five newspapers I analysed (the Service, the Telegraph, the Tribune, the Citizen and the Outlook), 60% of all coverage of the governments of Nigeria, whether colonial, federal (now an indigenous government), or regional, was neutral; 30% was favourable, only 10% unfavourable. More of this government coverage was of the 'non-news' type (features, editorial, cartoons, etc.) than in earlier samples which had contained a negligible amount. In 1959 the proportion of 'non-news' coverage was up to 13%.

The proportion of neutral coverage in party news, as the following table (which is in average daily column inches) shows, is much lower (less than 10% of all party news). For the sake of convenience I have devised 'rates of partisanship' which enable one to see how partisan a paper is at a glance. I have defined these as proportions (in percentage terms) of total party news in a paper favourable to that paper's party or to its allies, or unfavourable to its opponents. For the Outlook of 1954 this partisanship rate was 67%, i.e. that amount of all party news was either directly or indirectly favourable to the paper's party. For the Tribune of 1958 the rate was 74%. For the Tribune of 1959 it was 89.5%. Other partisanship rates are given at the bottom of the table. The Outlook's rate of 67% has now gone up to 87.4%. There are, thus, significant increases in partisanship over time, reaching a crescendo in this crucial general election. The only low rate is that of the Citizen. This is another example of the

Table 5.15: Party Coverage in the 1959 Election Campaign
(in col.inches)

		Service	Telegraph	Tribune	Citizen	Outlook	Total
NPC	F ¹	11.3	1.1	0.4	70.0	-	82.8
	N ²	5.0	-	-	13.9	-	18.9
	U ³	8.5	0.2	9.4	1.2	-	19.3
NCNC	F	1.6	0.5	0.1	13.5	342.2	357.9
	N	5.8	2.5	2.6	0.8	43.1	54.8
	U	13.5	15.6	15.5	0.3	1.7	46.6
AG	F	245.0	28.3	133.9	-	0.2	407.4
	N	12.0	0.7	11.1	-	0.5	24.3
	U	-	0.5	0.6	3.9	4.4	9.4
NEPU	F	0.6	-	-	8.1	0.9	9.6
	N	1.0	-	-	1.3	-	2.3
	U	-	-	-	3.8	-	3.8
UMBC	F	1.6	-	-	0.6	-	2.2
	N	-	-	-	1.1	-	1.1
	U	-	-	-	1.0	-	1.0
DPNC	F	3.1	115.2	0.5	-	2.3	121.1
	N	0.6	5.2	0.9	-	2.2	8.9
	U	-	-	-	-	7.1	7.1
Others	F	2.4	7.5	3.0	2.6	0.2	15.7
	N	-	-	-	-	0.8	0.8
	U	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.4
TOTAL		312.4	177.3	178.0	122.1	405.6	1195.4
P.RATE ⁴		86.4%	89.8%	89.5%	61.6%	87.4%	

Notes: ¹ Favourable
² Neutral
³ Unfavourable
⁴ Rate of Partisanship

NEPU = Northern Elements Progressive Union
DPNC = Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons
(For other parties - see previous table)

negative government-orientation of this Northern paper. The government was less interested in projecting itself than in simply maintaining the status quo. The above table is for news coverage. 'Non-news' coverage of the parties is now very high. This is a sign of increasing partisanship. All parts of the paper are used to support the party. Such a trend, though slight, had been noticed before (the Tribune of 1958), and it applied to some extent to government news in the 1958 samples. Now non-news coverage of the parties is 26% of total party coverage. Partisanship rates for non-news is as follows:

Service	Telegraph	Tribune	Citizen	Outlook
100%	99%	100%	88.3%	100%

It should be added that the amount of non-news party coverage in the Citizen and Outlook was very small, so the last two figures mean little. But in the case of the other three papers we have a very large amount of non-news space devoted to the parties (over 50% of all party coverage in the case of the Telegraph and Tribune), and this is entirely given over to support of their associated parties.

A clear trend is discernible so far of an increasing intensity of partisanship. This is reflected in increased use of non-news items in the political battle, in increased support for the appropriate regional governments, in increased political news over time (already discussed), and within this, the growing domination of party news. Finally, there are increasing rates of partisanship. The Tribune's total party coverage in 1950 was a mere 17.8 inches per day. In 1958 it was 103.8 inches and its partisanship rate (for news) was 74%. In the 1959 election campaign its total party coverage was nearly 330 inches and its partisanship rate for news was 89.5%, and for non-news 100%. The proportion of total newspaper space (less ad's.) absorbed by the political parties in the Outlook of 1954 was a mere 4.1%. 'Other political news' took up 9.9%. In 1959 the parties took up 49.6% of the paper's total space, while 'other political' took up only 2.5%. It is interesting to compare this to the Outlook of 1961, a year after independence, when, for a

while, there was political 'peace'. Then a mere 7.1% of its total space was given over to the political parties (though the partisanship rate, 86.7% was high). The relationship between party and government coverage and between news and non-news is given below, in average daily column inches.

Table 5.16 : Coverage of Parties and Government in the Outlook, 1961 (in col.inches)

Party news	61.8
Party non-news	4.9
Government news	175.1
Government non-news	10.8

It can easily be seen that government news is now significantly more important (by about three times) than party news, while non-news is now of hardly any significance in coverage of either party or government. Moreover, while the rate of partisanship for party news was high little government news was overtly partisan.

The situation changes dramatically again with the general election of 1964, though not in coverage of government. In fact, this coverage is even more neutral than it had been previously. In the sample issues (again, 15 issues over the period analysed) of the three papers analysed (the Sketch, the Outlook and the Citizen) 70% of total coverage of the five Nigerian governments (four regional ones plus the federal government) and of the President was neutral. Only 5% was unfavourable.

The position was very different in the case of party coverage. In 1964, the party position was even more intense. and entrenched than it had been in 1959. Several parties had coalesced, until two broad coalitions existed, which between them incorporated all the political parties. The coalitions were formed around the NCNC on one hand and the NPC on the other. This meant that the reporting of party conflict became simplified. In the following table I have treated the major party and the coalition as one, except where the minor parties were separately treated. Often NNA (Nigerian National Alliance) was used synonymously for NPC, and UPGA (United Progressive Grand Alliance) for NCNC, while the lesser parties were simply ignored. In other words, the Outlook would talk sometimes of the UPGA, sometimes of the NCNC, as if they were interchangeable terms, but only very occasionally did

it give the AG separate status. The Sketch was the organ of the NNDP, ally of the NPC. It is to be noted that partisanship rates in this table, which is for news only, are even higher than in 1959. While the Citizen had the lowest rate in 1959 (61.6%) it is now up with the rest, with a rate of 87.2%. The Outlook's rate is the same as in 1959. The Sketch, a new paper, has an amazingly high 94.6%.

In addition to this, the amount that 'non-news' sections of the papers were used in the party battle was once again significantly larger. In 1959 26% of all party coverage was of the 'non-news' type. Now it is 48%. In other words, non-news is nearly as important in the party struggle as news, so much so that the distinction between the two now barely exists; it is only nominal. The whole newspaper is a propaganda outlet. Whereas in 1959 two papers had had low non-news party coverage, the Citizen with 13.7 inches per day and the Outlook with 14.4 inches, these papers, the main media outlets for the two coalitions, now had 272 and 283 inches respectively of non-news coverage of the parties. Moreover, partisanship rates for non-news party coverage were also very high: 91.2% for the Sketch, 96.5% for the Outlook, and 98.3% for the Citizen. The latter paper, slow in becoming fully involved in the party battle, was now involved up to the hilt.

The above discussion has shown the increasing importance of political reporting, of party reporting within this, of partisanship within this again, during the process of escalating political conflict. It hardly seems possible that the Nigerian papers could have gone further along this path. In the next section I will examine the regionalist and tribalist nature of partisanship.

5.5. The Ethnic Nature of Newspaper Partisanship

In the following discussion I have labelled content which could be described as 'tribalist' or 'regionalist' (or, more broadly, as simple 'ethnic') under the single term 'tribalism'. However, I have split this up according to degree as follows: 'tribalism', 'discussion of regions', 'unity-regionalism' and 'unity'. The latter category is also associated with another category 'independence'; together these two categories denote some sort of (nation-state) nationalism.

Table 5.17: Party Coverage in 1964 Election Campaign (in col.inches)

		Sketch	Outlook	Citizen	Total
NPC/NNA	F	53.1	0.8	167.2	221.1
	N	0.8	2.2	7.8	10.8
	U	-	11.3	2.2	13.5
NCNC/UPGA	F	6.8	180.9	5.8	193.5
	N	5.1	14.0	5.0	24.1
	U	37.9	0.7	18.4	57.0
AG	F	-	7.8	3.5	11.3
	N	-	1.7	0.2	1.9
	U	-	-	0.3	0.3
NNDP	F	205.5	-	4.9	210.4
	N	3.3	-	0.4	3.7
	U	0.8	0.4	-	1.2
NEPU	F	-	0.8	1.6	2.4
	N	-	-	0.5	0.5
	U	-	0.2	1.4	1.6
UMBC	F	-	5.6	1.0	6.6
	N	-	0.8	-	0.8
	U	-	-	4.4	4.4
DP	F	-	-	4.7	4.7
	N	-	-	-	-
	U	-	0.9	-	0.9
Others	F	-	5.1	-	5.1
	N	-	0.7	-	0.7
	U	-	4.7	-	4.7
Total		313.3	238.6	229.3	781.2
Partisanship rates		94.6%	86.7%	87.2%	

Notes: NNA = Nigerian National Alliance UPGA = United Progressive Grand Alliance
 DP = Dynamic Party
 NNDP = Nigerian National Democratic Party
 (For other parties see earlier tables).

'Tribalism' applies to apparent incitement of tribal hatred. There can be some objection to this in that one of the major ethnic groups at least (the Hausa) could not be called a tribe, if this vague term is to retain any meaning. Perhaps other terms, such as 'linguistic' or 'cultural' group, would be more appropriate. On the other hand, the conflict that occurred between these groups can be called tribalist; this was a term often used by Nigerians themselves at the time, in the press and elsewhere; furthermore, the main 'reference group', the Ibos, are generally considered a tribe. So, whether it is Northerners speaking against Ibos, or Ibos denouncing Northerners, 'tribalism' enters into the conflict. Whatever the accuracy of the term to denote ethnic conflict, it can conveniently be used to describe the most intense forms of ethnic antagonism. 'Discussion of regions' refers to content which lacks overt tribalism but which dwells on the same subject matter: for instance, content which discusses tribal or regional differences. 'Unity-regionalism' describes content which pleads for national unity but in the process emphasises the regional conflict, often by blaming other regions for tribalism. There is an inherent ambivalence in this category. Often the call for unity is a disguise for the further incitement of tribal hatred. 'Unity' applies to content expressing a plea for unity unambiguously. The following figures are in average daily column inches.

Table 5.18: Tribalist Content in Individual Newspapers (in col.inches)

	Tribalism	Discussion of regions	Unity-Regionalism	Unity	Independence
Pilot '50	2.3	10.4	1.7	4.0	58.6
Tribune '50	12.5	19.6	1.6	4.1	23.6
Outlook '54	0.3	1.5	1.3	3.7	-
Tribune '58	43.4	4.7	7.1	9.5	2.9
Outlook '59	3.8	20.0	0.7	13.7	11.7
Tribune '59	11.3	61.3	0.7	1.6	-
Service '59	21.2	16.9	8.3	8.1	2.3
Telegraph '59	27.8	4.5	13.7	7.0	-
Citizen '59	4.9	1.9	0.7	1.2	2.3
Outlook '64	57.7	-	22.5	41.3	0.3
Citizen '64	37.3	21.9	6.6	16.8	-
Sketch '64	104.0	-	-	17.8	-
Total	326.5	162.7	64.9	128.8	101.7

First of all, it is quite apparent that, as would be expected, the role of nationalism in the press declined as independence drew near. It is of some significance in 1950, especially in the Pilot, but of little significance thereafter; independence was granted, it was not struggled for. The press was far more interested in the struggle between the various ethnic groups.

Over the whole period 'tribalism' is clearly the most significant category. Moreover, it increases over time. There is an addition to be made to this picture which increases the 'tribalism' pole even more. This is the Citizen's coverage of the Northern government's policy of Northernisation, which, in the way it was publicised, supported, and carried out, and in its effects on the build-up of conflict, was highly tribalistic. The figures for this, with the other figures for the 1959 and 1964 samples of the Citizen, are given below.

Table 5.19: Tribalist Content in the Citizen (in col.inches)

	Tribalism	Northernisation	Discussion of regions	Unity-Regionalism	Unity	Independence
1959	4.9	14.1	1.9	0.7	1.2	2.3
1964	37.3	7.6	21.9	6.6	16.8	-

The Citizen's rabid support of the Northernisation programme significantly added to the tribalist-nature of the paper.

The picture for the press as a whole can be simplified by adding the two categories at the tribalist end of the scale together (along with the Citizen's Northernisation coverage) and, at the other, unity and independence (calls for unity replacing calls for independence after it was gained in 1960). The totals are averaged over each period. This simplified picture can be seen below. It emerges as a 'see-saw' pattern, with the intermediate variable 'unity-regionalism' acting as a fulcrum.

Table 5.20: Average Tribalist Content in the Press (in col.inches)

	Tribalism/ Discussion of regions	Unity-Regionalism	Unity/ Independence
1950 ²	22.4	1.6	45.6
1954/8 ³	24.9	4.2	8.0
1959 ⁴	37.5	4.8	9.6
1964 ⁵	76.2	9.7	25.4

- Notes: 1 Including Northernisation
 2 Two newspapers
 3 Two newspapers
 4 Five newspapers
 5 Three newspapers

The trend to greater tribalism comes out more clearly here. In 1950 the balance is towards unity/independence. By the mid-1950s it has tipped significantly in the other direction, dipping even further that way in 1959. By 1964 the weights had increased at both ends.

The same trend can be seen within individual papers over time. In the table below I have included the Outlook of 1961, not incorporated in the above table.

Table 5.21: Tribalist Content in Three Newspapers over time
(in col.inches)

	Tribalism ¹ / Discussion of regions	Unity- Regionalism	Unity/ Independence
Tribune			
1950	32.1	1.6	27.7
1958	48.1	7.1	12.4
1959	72.6	0.7	1.6
Outlook			
1954	1.8	1.3	3.7
1959	23.8	0.7	25.4
1961	0.3	-	3.4
1964	57.7	22.5	41.6
Citizen			
1959	20.9	0.7	3.5
1964	66.8	0.6	16.8

Notes: ¹Including Northernisation in the Citizen.

The Tribune is a very clear case. The tribalist content of the paper increases substantially and consistently over the period, while content appealing for independence or unity declines even more substantially. The tribalist content of the Outlook shoots up over the years 1954, 1959, and 1964, but calls for unity increase too. Moreover, in 1964 it has a significant amount of coverage in the intermediate category, unity-regionalism. The ambivalence of such content in this paper must have been extreme, with its propinquity both to overtly tribalist content and to content which appealed less ambiguously for unity. The dependence of partisanship in the press on ethnic antagonism in times of severe political conflict can be seen from the Outlook of 1961, perhaps Nigeria's politically most peaceful year ever. Now there is virtually no tribalist

content at all. The Citizen shows the same trend as the Outlook for the two election periods.

It is clear enough, then, how regionalism and tribalism increasingly became a central part of press partisanship. But it is not correct solely to contrast the amount of space in a paper which is tribalistic with the amount that apparently appeals for unity. Such a contrast is important, but it is equally important to see these themes as closely interconnected; the one is obviously the inverse of the other, and for that reason the two are fully inter-dependent. Though most of the content expressing these themes was extremely crude, there was sometimes a subtle interplay between tribalist content and calls for unity, expressed most neatly in the ambivalent category 'unity-regionalism'. Pleas for unity, even if genuine, were used as a tool in the regional struggle. Fear of escalating tribalism and of being the loser in this often accompanied political dependence on the tribalist appeal.

More important than this, because of the reciprocal dependence of 'tribalism' and 'unity', appeals to the latter could not help but stoke up tribal fears. By stressing the need for unity and the growing dangers of tribalism, a paper unavoidably added to the tension. Thus, even the Daily Times, however accurately and blandly it might have reported the political statements of the time, contributed to the increasingly ugly climate. In other words, conflict was inherent in the political (and social) situation, and any reference to this, positive or negative, became a part of it. Thus, that the Outlook of 1964 had nearly as much content appealing for unity as it did tribalistic content, and half as much content ambivalent between unity and regionalism, does not mean this paper was likely to have a more integrative effect than, say, the Tribune of 1958, with about five times as much tribalistic content as appeals for unity. The point is that the Outlook had nearly twice as much content (in column inches) connected with all these themes, i.e. with conflict, as did this earlier Tribune.

Just as Nigeria had been subject to an interplay of the two related but contradictory forces, nationalism and sub-nationalism, since well before independence, so the press too had for long been

subject to the same contradictory pulls, reflected in ambivalence between unity and tribalism. I have already indicated how the Tribune of 1950 combined anti-imperialism with antagonism to the North. On occasion it made this very clear, for instance when it spoke of a "grand alliance between the representatives of British imperialism in Nigeria and the unyielding, narrow-minded politicians of the North."¹ In fact, it was, it would seem, more concerned with the danger of domination by the North than with the continued rule of the British; in other words, its primary concern was for the Yoruba, whether in the Western Region or outside. Thus the West

"will not rest until the Yorubas under the Northern yoke are emancipated and grouped with their kith and kin in the West for administrative purposes, even if it is necessary to do so on the dead bodies of the Northern people."²

Ethnic competition reached its climax in the anti-Ibo riots in the North in the mid-1960s. But attempts to arouse hatred of the Ibos occurred elsewhere in much the same way, even before independence, and as usual the concern was often over elite jobs. For instance, in an editorial in Western Nigeria's Tribune of 1958 headed 'Ibo-Imperialism', concerning evidence given to the Minorities Commission, the paper stated that the evidence from people

"vehemently protesting against being left in the same camp with the Ibos, goes to prove that the NCNC is simply an Ibo cult, aiming, with the help of a handful of misguided, disgruntled or food-seeking quislings from other tribes, to achieve the complete domination of this country."³

Sometimes the oppressors were Ibos, sometimes the Hausa and Fulani. A certain degree of artifice in these journalistic attacks is apparent.

It was surprisingly, in a Northern paper (the Citizen) that one of the few convincing appeals for unity occurred.

1 Nigerian Tribune: editorial (20.9.50)

2 Ibid, editorial: (20.9.50)

3 Nigerian Tribune: (14.1.58)

"It has come to my notice that some Northern boys in the Survey Department of the Ministry of Land & Survey have petitioned against the retention of Southern trainees... This petition against the Southern trainees, in my humble opinion, is uncalled for and characterises the type of Northerner who is too lazy to work hard for himself, but takes refuge in the Northernisation policy which, in any case, is not designed for dullards."¹

Despite the support that one columnist in the Citizen gave to Southerners in the North, as the content analysis showed the usual stance was totally the reverse. Sometimes, though, the expression of ethnic competition was merely local, as for instance, in the following letter.

"It is very discouraging and disgraceful (please my dear government) to see that throughout the length and breadth of Argunga Division there is not even a single general hospital... If this inconvenience could be remedied by building a general hospital for these strong NPC believers it will save their every-day death which decreases the population of Northern Nigeria which is a loss to NPC politically, and I hope the time for this will never come."²

The local nature of genuine political representation, and of the distribution of economic benefits, was made even clearer by the paper itself - however exaggeratedly. In an election commentary "Know Your Candidates", a journalist claimed that the readers' M.Ps. had "brought tarred and better roads, hospitals, and dispensaries, television and radio stations, electricity supplies, schools and colleges, pipe water and improved wells, industries of different kinds.... Your constituencies need more amenities and these will certainly not come if you do not vote for the right person. The right candidates are none other than those presented to you by the NNA."³

Most communal demands and complaints in the paper, however, were ethnic and anti-Ibo, and they were often concerned with jobs (usually elite-jobs), as in the following front-page editorial, which complained

1 Nigerian Citizen (4.11.59)

2 Ibid (12.9.64)

3 Ibid (2.12.64)

that the federal government's Nigerian National Press Ltd. had only ten Northerners in a staff of 300. The editorial claimed that "Northern Nigeria has been cheated. The Region has paid an expensive price for Nigerian unity." It criticised the "neglect and ineptitude"¹ of the federal government under Sir Abubakar as if he, belonging to the NPC, had a primary duty to help Northerners acquire federal jobs! In the same issue the 'political correspondent' in a half-page article head-lined "Scandalous! Treacherous!! Wicked!!! North's infinitesimal Role, a dangerous abnormality," complained that there were only six Northerners in the 433 senior staff of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, and no more than 50 out of 4,000 permanent junior staff. He also claimed (untruthfully) that the North contributed over 70% of federal revenues, but got back less than 35% in development spending.²

Ethnic antagonism was also reflected in the letter columns. One, for instance, from a clerk in a building firm, demanded that only Northerners should be staff managers in private firms.

"Unless this is done, the Ibos will be conspiring with and dictating to the foreigners who have given their whole hearts to the Ibos and who are enslaving the Northerners to Ibos. I can say I am doing my utmost best to the company, but still I am regarded as inferior to my Southern counterparts."³

Southerners accused the British of favouring the North politically. Northerners accused the British of favouring Southerners for employment. Both were right. The pathetic tone of the above letter expresses well the fear felt by Northerners of Southern competition for employment. While such feeling was widespread, and it itself encouraged the Northern government's racial propaganda, this does not mean everyone accepted this propaganda. Indeed, as the Citizen was one of the main vehicles of this propaganda, the following letter does at least indicate a certain degree of openness in the paper.

1 Ibid (22.4.64)

2 Ibid (22.4.64)

3 Ibid (16.9.64)

"Your article about the Ibo occupants of our region is almost unbelievable. I do not seem to agree with all the views you expressed therein. Temperamental traits of a few individuals should not be extended to all... Moreover, this is a time when even the empty wind can stir up feelings."¹

Dissidents certainly existed, as was shown in the Northern House of Assembly, but they could rarely freely express their views.

Though, perhaps, ethnic conflict per se does not have the conceptual logic of class conflict, it does, as I emphatically argued in Part One, have a very strong practical logic. Economic resources were competed for ethnically, and such competition took precedence over class conflict. This was reflected in the press as well as in the Federal and Regional Assemblies.

The above quotations from the Citizen of 1964, mostly from the period of the general election campaign of that year, show how deeply that paper was committed in the battle of ethnic propaganda during this crucial period (not long before the military coups and the subsequent massacres of Ibos in the North). The Outlook was not so intensely tribalist, and much of its propaganda was of the curious sort which was ambivalent between unity and tribalism. The content analysis showed that the Outlook was more concerned with unity than the other papers. This is because the Ibos were under the most genuine threat. Anti-Ibo feeling was being stoked up in both the West and the North; moreover the NCNC were likely to lose to the NPC in the elections. It was quite possible that the East would then be subject to division (through the power of the NPC at the centre), as the West had been (largely due to the collusion of the NCNC with the NPC). The Outlook's accusations against the NNDP and NPC of tribalism were no doubt the result of a full understanding of the dangers of this tribalism, especially to the Ibos. But these accusations must inevitably have further inflamed the Ibo's own tribal feelings.

"Singing the songs of sectional and tribal hatred is not a new exercise for the old and new crop of politicians

1 Ibid (2.12.64)

who are running the show at Ibadan.... People in Akintola's position must realise the great harm they are doing to the cause of unity and peace by fanning tribalism."¹

This served not only to express the genuine fear of escalating conflict, but to arouse the Ibos for the coming battle. Its ambivalence is clear. So, again, the ambivalent nature of nationalism and sub-nationalism is seen in Nigeria's newspapers. Both politics and the press fluctuate between these two alternatives, between unity and tribalism; but always the latter wins. The UPGA, with the aid of the Outlook, could portray itself as an enemy to tribalism, as, for instance, in a cartoon showing an NNA camel watching a UPGA elephant uproot a tree labelled 'tribalism' (in which the camel asks 'Why are you uprooting the precious tree under which I always take shelter?'); but in doing so it unavoidably made use of a tribalistic appeal and increased the temperature of the ethnic climate. Another example of this is the following statement from an editorial: "Once more, we deprecate the attempt of any political party to seek the annihilation of any tribe in the Republic,"² or, again, in the following statement from a political commentary:

"Where are all of you Ibo people?... You may not know it but you are 'wanted persons'. Wanted by intensely pathological and incurable tribalists, namely the NPC and (more so) the NNDP."³

The paper that relied most of all on tribal appeal was the NNDP's Daily Sketch. It indulged in extreme anti-Ibo propaganda. Akintola himself expressed the ambivalence between tribalism and unity very well.

"I am not a tribalist... It is not sufficient to pay lip service to national unity... There must be practical demonstration. Why is it that people who are cheated and therefore complain are referred to as tribalists when the man who cheats does so with impunity without accusing fingers being pointed at him?"⁴

1 Nigerian Outlook (25.11.64)

2 Ibid (27.11.64)

3 Ibid (16.12.64)

4 Daily Sketch (30.11.64)

This justification of tribalism achieved religious sanctity in a political commentary elsewhere in the same issue.

"Self-love is not a sin. It is, in fact, according to the gospels, the yardstick by which one's affections for his brother must be measured. 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself', writes St. Matthew. It is a sacred duty, for individuals no less than for the groups to which they belong, to fight for self-preservation which is said to be the first law even in heaven. This is the spiritual basis of tribalism as a 'pragmatic instrument of national unity'...."¹

Just as in the North, the core of tribalism was the concern for jobs, especially elite jobs. One article, for instance, claimed that

"Barely nine months since the Management of the Nigerian Railway Corporation rocked Nigeria with shocking and glaring acts of nepotism and Ibo preferential treatment in making appointments into the top cadre of the Railway Service, darker and more frightening scandals have now been exposed in the Nigerian Railways.....the Nigerian Railway Corporation is the seat of Ibo tribalism in Nigeria."

The article lists the management and other posts apparently held by Ibos and then quotes the Ibo chairman of the Railway Board as saying "This is my kingdom and I rule it as I like."² As I have already mentioned more than once, this concern for elite jobs was also associated with a concern for elite education; thus an NNDP leader claimed in the paper that 400 out of 700 recent federal government scholarships had gone to the Ibos, "leaving 300 to the rest of the country."³

The anti-Ibo propaganda of the paper achieved an intensity comparable to the savage anti-Ibo behaviour of the Northern legislators, which has already been described. The onslaught was master-minded by Akintola - "the great apostle of Yoruba family unity"⁴ - who warned the Yoruba against trusting the Ibo:

1 Ibid (30.11.64)

2 Ibid (3.12.64)

3 Ibid (3.12.64)

4 Ibid (4.12.64)

"Immediately the unsuspecting Yorubas gave them the support, the Ibos would come out in their true wolf's clothing devouring the Yorubas and getting every good thing for themselves."¹

The paper called for the unity of the Yoruba against the Ibo.

"For how long will the Yorubas vegetate in the cesspool of internecine squabbles and perennial stagnation?....The NNDP is a party for the Yorubas and other suppressed peoples... Today the Yoruba man needs unity and reconstruction more than anything else"²

for, according to an NNDP member quoted in the paper, "the NCNC had no other plan than the total annihilation of the Yoruba West."³ Student supporters of the NNDP spoke of "Iboism, Ibocrazy, and Ibophism."⁴

The most extreme anti-Ibo statements came not from outside sources but from one of the paper's regular columnists, Ejon'gboro, who had an effective, if rather repulsive, style.

"Them Ibo boys've been talking....They ain't got no fight with Yoruba people... How come 300 jobs open in the New Railways and them non-fighting, non-tribalist Ibo-boys just manage to corner 259?"⁵

In another article, in which he refers to members of the UPGA as "Ibo-jerks" the same writer, as had one or two already quoted, brings in religion again.

"The Lord God, He likes to build.... All God's children they like to build. But them UPGA fellows, like Satan... they like to SACK....All they know is SACK! Evict, oust, dislodge, dispossess....(Oh my, where is my lexicon? ah, here are some more UPGA favourites) displace, kick downstairs....fire, blast, can, break, bust.... They do the real thing. They fight. That means fists and cudgels. And matchets, guns, and dynamite. And pistols, shot-guns and pine-apples. The more dead the better. Like they used to say in them story-books,

1 Ibid (2.12.64)

2 Ibid (2.12.64)

3 Ibid (2.12.64)

4 Ibid (11.12.64)

5 Ibid (2.12.64)

dead men don't tell no tales. Simple dead candidates don't win no flipping elections."¹

5.6. Conclusion

I have described in Part Two the ethnic nature of political and economic conflict in Nigeria. Just as the press in developed countries might reflect the class structure of these societies, the press in Nigeria reflected the country's ethnic foundations. This was so because of the great power of the political conflicts of the time, which were ethnic in nature, and because of the economic weakness of the press. The latter made the press dependent on those involved in the ethnic battle (the political parties, whether out of power or in government). Only one paper - the Daily Times - was economically strong enough to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. Even then the intensity of conflict was so great that the paper could not retain its neutral position and survive. Sometimes it was possible to see a clear disjunction between the economic and political needs of the papers; inevitably these needs would reflect contradictory motives at some stage (the political market being a secure but limited economic market), but, before the civil war at least, the political motive easily won through.

As the political conflict increased, culminating in the civil war, the press became more and more political, more partisan and more tribalistic. However, unlike the tribalist conflicts expressed in the chambers of the Houses of Assembly, we are dealing here with overt, calculated propaganda designed to influence the general public. Thus, much of the intense anti-Ibo content of the Daily Sketch served to cover up the absurdity of Akintola's new political alliance with the anti-Ibo NPC and his estrangement from his former party, the Action Group, which was now pro-Ibo (i.e. pro-NCNC). However, it cannot be doubted that this and other papers fed on a real sense of tribal rivalry. There was some expression of more local competition for resources - the equivalent of demands for local facilities made in the Houses of Assembly - but this was very limited. The press was the tool of a higher level of communal conflict - the political struggle between the major ethnic groups. That this

1 Ibid (30.11.64)

struggle was over access to scarce resources, in particular, elite jobs - was also reflected in the press.

The press could not help but be partisan; indeed, partisanship was its justification for existence. Without conflict most of the papers would have disappeared. As the political conflict of the time was ethnic in nature, so was the political propaganda of the press, and it engaged itself in the ethnic battle with extraordinary intensity. Indeed, whether tribalism was openly exploited, was merely justified as self-defence, or was denounced in favour of unity, such was the power of ethnic competition that this, with every word, was inevitably invoked. It could not be avoided. Even the most impartial paper, simply by describing the political conflict going on around it, would have contributed to the growing ethnic tension.

CHAPTER SIX: COMMUNICATION FOR THE ELITE

6.1. Introduction

I showed in the last chapter that the press in Nigeria has developed through an intimate connection with political conflict, in particular ethnically motivated political conflict. This does not mean, though, that the press had a mass appeal. In the previous chapter I also showed that the press had a narrow market basis. It was essentially an urban phenomenon, and even then mostly restricted to a few major cities. As far as the connection with conflict is concerned, this does not matter, as the major conflicts themselves generally occurred in a few major cities. The connection was, therefore, quite intense.

Another aspect of the limited reach of the press - in a sense a corollary of it - is the pronounced factor of elitism. There are several elements involved here: elitist content and readership, westernisation, and professionalism, all of which I shall discuss below. But, before doing this, it is worthwhile getting a broad picture of overall newspaper content, at least from a number of the more important or interesting papers. I have included in these, two samples from an election period but all the other samples are from non-election periods. I have concentrated on the latter in order to show the press as it 'normally' is. (This can then also be compared to overall election output). The figures are percentages of total space after subtraction of advertisements.

The first thing to note is the increasing amount of political coverage, especially that of the political parties, upto the general election of 1959, when it reaches a climax. It then falls in the one issue represented for the period immediately after independence. The general importance given to politics can be seen from the fact that average political coverage (including all political categories) is 22.5% of total space while economic questions together occupy only 7.7% of space, and social questions 3.5%. The difference is much less in non-election years, but even then political questions take up significantly more space

Table 6.1: Breakdown of Entire Content of a Number of Newspapers (% of total space less ad's.)

	Pilot '50	Trib. '50	Outlook '54	Trib. '58	Trib. '59	Tel. '59	Outlook '61	Average
Pol. parties	5.4	2.5	4.1	11.9	24.6	26.0	7.1	11.7
" comment	0.8	4.1	-	1.8	15.4 ¹	8.8	-	4.5
" other	6.7	5.4	9.9	10.2	3.7	4.4	3.8	6.3
Military	-	-	0.4	-	-	0.1	-	0.1
Social	3.8	2.4	6.7	5.1	2.6	1.3	2.9	3.5
Economic ²	6.5	6.8	11.5	5.4	4.5	11.2	7.9	7.7
Sub-total	23.2	21.2	32.6	34.4	50.8	51.8	21.7	33.8
For. relations	0.3	0.2	0.5	1.0	-	1.0	3.0	0.9
Africa	5.8	1.7	2.1	1.1	2.8	1.5	7.7	3.2
U.K.	2.0	1.5	0.5	1.0	1.4	0.3	2.0	1.2
U.S.A.	0.9	1.0	0.4	2.3	0.5	0.1	0.6	0.8
USSR/E. Europe	0.6	0.4	-	-	0.4	-	0.7	0.3
Rest West	1.1	0.3	0.2	1.8	0.2	-	0.5	0.6
Rest World	2.8	2.9	0.2	0.2	0.2	-	0.7	1.0
U.N.	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	1.1	0.4
Sub-total	14.4	8.1	4.0	7.6	5.7	3.0	16.3	8.4
Local	12.8	20.4	15.6 ³	6.7	1.3	4.2	6.9	9.7
Information	5.9	4.2	9.1	2.3	0.6	2.7	3.6	4.1
Religion	1.7	0.6	0.3	2.7	0.6	-	1.4	1.0
Justice/crime	4.9	6.2	0.9	6.5	3.4	3.4	2.6	4.0
Disasters	0.5	0.9	0.1	0.9	0.2	0.2	1.2	0.6
Sub-total	25.8	32.3	26.0	19.1	6.1	10.5	15.7	19.4
Features	5.0	18.7	20.8	9.5	7.0	9.6	19.9	12.9
Sport	8.8	5.8	5.3	17.1	17.1	3.9	13.4	10.2
Radio, TV, etc. ⁴	4.5	4.9	4.4	3.2	4.5	6.2	3.3	4.4
Sub-total	18.3	29.4	30.5	29.8	28.6	19.7	36.6	27.5
Editorial	12.0	3.8	2.3	5.0	5.3	9.7	3.2	5.9
Letters	6.3	5.2	4.6	4.0	3.5	5.1	6.5	5.0
TOTAL⁵	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

- Notes:
- ¹Includes political advertisements (6.7 inches)
 - ²Includes international trade and aid (0.4 inches)
 - ³Includes Cameroons before becoming separate from Nigeria (6.9 inches)
 - ⁴Radio, TV, weather and newspaper title.
 - ⁵Percentages do not tally because of rounding.

than either economic or social matters. The 'state of the country' is apparently seen in largely political, rather than economic or social terms.

Another thing to note is the relatively small amount of space given to international news, an average overall of only 8.4%. Two papers go as low as 3 or 4%. Moreover, in the case of the Outlook of 1961, which has the highest proportion of space on international news, over three fifths of this is concerned with Africa, or with Nigeria's own foreign relations. The largest proportion of the Pilot's relatively high international news is on Africa. The same goes for the sample as a whole. Out of 8.4% of space on international news 3.2% is concerned with Africa - compared to 2.6% on Western countries (in which the U.K. predominates).

The papers do not seem, either, to have been influenced by Western modes of reporting. Apart from the obvious factor of partisanship, they are also less sensationalist than Western papers. In length and visual style they are like the British 'popular' papers, but, whereas in the latter 'law, police and accidents' took up (in 1975) 12% of the Daily Mail's space (after subtraction of ad's.) with the same for the Daily Express, and 11% of the Daily Mirror's space,¹ 'justice, crime and disasters' took up an average of 4.6% of space in the above Nigerian papers from 1950 to 1961. The U.K. papers also had more international news - 17% in the Express, 16% in the Mail, and 10%² in the Mirror. In these two respects then - coverage of international news and reliance on sensationalist types of news - the Nigerian papers would not appear to have been particularly westernised.

Another feature of note in the above table is the declining importance of local news over time. (This means news about any local area, not just news about the town of publication). The papers were becoming increasingly regional in scope over this period. Initially their content had a lot to do with the major town of publication and a few adjacent areas, and, as I have shown, their sales and influence were restricted to these places. Their scope widened in all respects during the 1950s.

1 Royal Commission on the Press, Analysis of Newspaper Content, Research Series Volume 4, p.17 (Cmd.6810-4)

2 Ibid, pp.17/18

Keeping this overall analysis in mind, I will now look in more detail at the nature of these newspapers, concentrating on the themes I have already discussed in general terms in Part One, namely, elitism, westernisation, and professionalism.

6.2. Elitist Content

One aspect of elitism is an interest in higher education. As I have shown in the case of the proceedings of the Houses of Assembly, much of the interest there in education was in the education of the elite. The same applies to the press. The following table is in average daily column inches.

Table 6.2: Coverage of Education (in col.inches)

	Primary	Secondary, technical, teacher training	Higher	General
Pilot '50	-	0.8	12.1	-
Tribune '50	-	-	5.8	-
Outlook '54	3.2	8.1	10.9	8.6
Tribune '58	0.4	3.6	13.5	4.6
Outlook '59	1.8	14.7	4.8	12.7
Tribune '59	0.7	9.5	28.3	3.9
Service '59	2.0	3.2	5.2	0.8
Telegraph '59	0.3	0.8	7.2	5.2
Outlook '61	0.6	14.1	40.5	2.1
Total	9.0	54.8	128.3	37.9

It should first of all be stated that the total amount of space devoted to education is not large, but, within this coverage, there is clearly a very strong bias towards higher education - a distinctly elitist tendency. The papers were very much aiming at an elite public. Most of the coverage on higher education seems to be attributable to the newspaper's own resources (or to paid contributors). Over 66% of it appeared to be of that nature - i.e. not specifically attributable to government, a party, or to letters from the public; but virtually all the letters which were not on general education were on higher education. It would thus seem that the bias towards higher education in these papers is less due to any bias in the presentation of party or government statements, etc. than to the letters the papers receive, and even more, to their desire to allocate space - mostly in the form of features and comment - to matters of higher education.

More light can be thrown on the elitist or general class nature of the press by looking at a number of other categories, which are represented in the following table (in average daily column inches).

Table 6.3: Elitist Coverage of Various Topics (in col.inches)

	Education	Agriculture/ Industry	Businessmen	Unions	Unemployment Poverty
Pilot '50	12.9	10.4	2.9	35.9	6.1
Tribune '50	5.8	29.4	-	10.7	-
Outlook '54	30.8	71.5	-	14.9	-
Tribune '58	22.1	12.8	3.3	13.4	-
Outlook '59	34.0	1.1	-	-	0.2
Tribune '59	42.4	11.1	-	26.7	1.4
Service '59	11.2	21.8	3.7	17.5	0.3
Telegraph '59	13.5	4.2	15.2	79.7	-
Outlook '61	57.3	30.9	-	-	2.3
Total	230.0	193.2	25.1	198.8	10.3

As before I have excluded 1964 and most of the 1959 samples in order not to concentrate on periods when conflict was intense. In the above period, leading up to independence, one would expect considerable airing of policies to do with the above themes.

Table 6.1 showed that a rather small proportion of average total space (7.7%) in these papers was concerned with economic matters. This was mostly taken up with the areas covered by the four last columns (i.e. excluding education) in the above table. A surprisingly small amount of space is devoted to agriculture and industry (just over half of which was on agriculture). These are areas one might expect to have a primary interest for the people of a developing country just approaching independence. Moreover, over half the coverage of agricultural matters came from one paper - the Outlook of 1954. This consisted of very useful development-oriented informational articles on agricultural techniques, stemming almost undoubtedly from expatriate sources in the government.

Little space was given to the activities of businessmen - only 25 inches per day between the above nine papers - while the unions got nearly 200 inches a day. This does not mean the governments

and the parties, to whom most of the above papers belonged, were in any way radical or interested in the welfare of the working class. Far from it. The point is that these things were seen politically. The function of the papers was political rather than to propagate a particular economic ideology. The indigenous business interests in the newspapers, which were minor, and of Nigeria as a whole, succeeded in business largely through politics. Their interests - the interests of the papers, and naturally of their political owners - were in the acquisition or retention of political power. Economic wealth could, for most, only be achieved through politics. The unions were seen primarily as collections of people which could be organised politically. The newspapers were not the tools of businessmen (either direct or indirect) used against the unions in a propaganda battle, or in favour of a particular economic ideology. They were the tools of politicians, one of whose interests was to get the unions on their side. Hence, a large part (nearly half) of newspaper coverage of union affairs was favourable to the unions (i.e. it openly expressed union views). I could define only one fifth as unfavourable, with the rest as neutral. Neither the indigenous businessmen nor the industrial workers formed an economically powerful class. Their interests were largely expressed through politics.

The only paper in the above table which individually gave substantial coverage to the unions was the Telegraph. In the 1959 sample this had a daily union coverage of 79.7 inches. Nearly all of this I classified as favourable. The paper was very much involved in union factionalism and seemed to be making an appeal to workers in particular unions. The attempt to link the unions with the paper's party (the DPNC) failed wretchedly. The party did not win a single seat in the 1959 elections, not even its leader, K.O. Mbadiwe. The unions were an insufficient basis; it was the regional or ethnic appeal that counted. It seems likely to me that the Telegraph was concerned to forge a link between its party and the workers because the party had a very small communal base. Mbadiwe had left the NCNC, and was

trying to gain support by stoking up local communal rivalries in the East in favour of the DPNC and against the NCNC; but this meant the DPNC's total political constituency was tiny. Furthermore, the paper was based in Lagos, making a communal appeal in the East yet more difficult. There was thus some reason to try to appeal to the workers, and it was Lagos that had the largest proportion of unionised workers. But this appeal, as I have said, failed.

It would seem, then, that the moderately high coverage of the unions in the newspapers in the above table did not make them 'workers' papers'. They were elitist in nature. This comes out even more in the papers' coverage of things to do with poverty or unemployment - a mere 10.3 inches per day between all the nine samples of newspapers. Thus, the main problems of Nigeria (as they are of any developing country) went virtually unregarded in the press. The powerful appeal in these papers to communal interests did not in any way reflect a concern for the masses; they were far more concerned with the communal distribution of elite jobs.

6.3. Elitism Through Westernisation

The above discussion has highlighted certain aspects of elitism in the press - a strong bias towards higher education in educational coverage, and a great lack of concern for questions of unemployment and poverty. The nature of these papers seems more explicable in terms of politics and ruling elites than in terms of class. Another aspect of elitism is westernisation. I shall look at this in two ways: through examination of the reporting of international news and through analysis of the influence of the West on advertising. One major aspect of westernisation, of course, is the very existence of a predominantly English-language press. The vernacular press was never, relatively speaking, of any great importance. There were only two vernacular papers of any significance, Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo (Hausa for 'Truth is Worth More than a Penny'), and Irohin Yoruba. Furthermore, both these vernaculars only appeared weekly. The Citizen, which was established after Gaskiya, as its sister-paper, appeared from the start at twice the frequency (bi-weekly), and also took some of Gaskiya's circulation, which dropped from 24,000 in 1947 to 19,000 in 1949. In 1948 the Citizen had a circulation

of 8,000¹. Thus, the extension of the English-language press apparently actually damaged the already limited vernacular press.

Only two of the above papers devoted over 10% of their total space (less advertisements) to international news. Furthermore, only 31% of international news over the entire sample was concerned with the West; there would thus appear to have been no bias in this direction. But the influence of the West can be seen in other aspects of the papers - e.g. in features and sports coverage. In the case of the Pilot of 1950 and Outlook of 1961 inclusion of these elements multiplied by two or three times the coverage given to the West. Overall, though, the press did not give especially great attention to Western countries.

The not particularly great importance of the West does not apply to news sources. All of the Outlook's international news in 1961, for instance, came from Reuter's. Exactly half of that of the Pilot of 1950 came from Reuter's (though over half of the remainder came from George Padmore, a coloured, strongly anti-colonialist correspondent domiciled in the West). This only refers to 'hard' international news. 18% of all the Pilot's Reuter articles and 30% of all the Outlook's Reuter articles were of the 'soft' variety. These were mostly features and sports items, but included a few articles on crime and disasters. About 10% of the Pilot's total space and 17% of the Outlook's was attributable to Reuter's.

The above two papers were the only two from my sample in which both international news and material from Reuter's was substantial. (I chose not to examine the Daily Times as I was interested in the indigenous press and the Times was essentially a foreign paper). So, on this score, westernisation in the Nigerian press was not particularly significant. I will now look at advertising. I defined 'westernised advertisements' as display ad's. that represented in picture-form: Europeans, Nigerians in 'high-class' European dress (suits, ties, evening dress), or Nigerian women with straightened hair. (There might be some doubt whether all pictures of Nigerian women with straightened hair necessarily reflect western values; however, there were nearly

1 Grant (1975), p.106

always other indications of such values in the advertisements to make the inference highly plausible). In addition to calculating the percentage of advertising space which could be considered westernised according to the above criteria, I counted the number of figures represented in all advertisements and categorised these according to dress. These figures are given in the bottom half of the following table. The figures on advertisements (in inches and percentages) are daily averages over the fifteen issues in each sample. The figures for figures (as it were) are totals for all the fifteen issues of each sample.

A number of things stand out in the following table. Firstly, the papers were all clearly commercial, or had a strong commercial content. There was no attempt to manage without advertising, as many partisan papers in the Third World have to do. Secondly, the amount of advertising received varied considerably between papers and over time. 43% of the Outlook's space was taken up by ad's. in 1959, only 21.7% in 1961. In absolute terms, its average daily advertising content fell from 615 to 250 column inches. The Citizen suffered a similar loss. This appears to have been the immediate result of independence, when many British firms were doubtful as to the future. The Outlook had picked up somewhat by 1964. Then its advertising space (not given below) was 409 inches (24% of total space). (In Britain in 1975, the Express had 41.6% of its total space taken up by advertising, the Mail 34.7%, and the Mirror 37.2%)¹.

Table 6.4: Elitist Advertising in the Press

	Pilot 1950	Out- look 1954	Trib. 1958	Out- look 1959	Trib.. 1959	Service 1959	Citizen 1959	Out- look 1961	Citizen 1964	Ave.
<u>Advertisements</u>										
Inches	412.3	401.2	208.4	615.0	220.7	660.0	738.0	250.0	343.6	427.7
% space	37.6	34.1	22.3	43.1	23.6	27.2	40.0	21.7	14.6	29.3
<u>Westernised ad's.</u>										
Inches	104.1	135.9	41.6	201.7	59.9	115.4	171.3	30.6	59.8	102.2
% of ad's.	25.2	33.9	20.0	32.8	27.1	17.5	23.2	12.2	17.4	23.2
<u>Westernised figures</u>										
Number	88	86	20	92	23	54	94	13	11	53.4
% total figs.	73.3	44.6	32.8	43.8	31.9	34.2	40.0	68.4	50.0	46.5

¹ Royal Commission on the Press, Research Series 4, p.23 (Cmd.6810-4)

It must also be considered that these papers got low rates for much of their advertising space. Given the cost of newsprint, this means that the marginal profit on advertising was probably not very high. No paper could hope to compete with the Times, which in 1965 had an advertising revenue of £325,000, nearly as great as its sales revenue of £329,000 (in 1964 its advertising revenue exceeded its sales revenue by £39,000). The Times had a further revenue of £425,000, mostly from printing.¹

Despite the variations in advertising, all the papers had a strong element of advertising, and a substantial proportion of this was in the form of what I have called 'westernised ad's.'. Nearly one quarter (23.2%) of advertising space consisted of such advertisements. The Outlook (before independence) had the highest proportion of westernised advertisements - about one third of all advertising space in 1954 and 1959. The latter, of course, includes non-display ad's. (such as classified advertisements). In other words, a very high proportion of all advertisements containing pictures were westernised - reflected in the fact that 46.5% of all figures appearing in these pictures were either Europeans or westernised Africans. This means that readers of these newspapers were faced with a great amount of westernised imagery.

It needs to be said that Western firms were mostly responsible for the bias towards Western images in advertising. (For instance, BOAC, Lux, Guinness.) However, though expatriate firms would, a priori, be more likely to place advertisements that reflected western values than indigenous firms, they would be unlikely to do so unless they thought such an appeal was likely to be successful. In other words, they must have felt sure their westernised appeal would find an effective response.

The papers (as did TV) appealed primarily to the elite; so too, therefore, did the advertisements in these media. And, as I have shown, there was a strong element of westernisation in these advertisements. There is, thus, a link between elitism, commercialism, and westernisation.

1 Chick (1967), p.312

"The prestige given to Western ways inevitably exalts those who epitomise these ways, and the elite receives prestige from the masses as well as from each other... Even those who have no contact with foreign persons or Western education are exposed constantly to westernising influences through popular media - newspapers, radio, motion pictures, books, magazines, billboards.....Their advertisements exhort their readers to purchase gasoline, soap, furniture, bicycles, beer, or insecticide of Western origin."¹

Such westernisation is readily apparent in the pages of Nigeria's main papers, even those fully engrossed in political warfare. I have shown that this was not so much apparent in the reporting of international news as in total coverage (i.e. including features, sports articles, etc.), reliance on Western news sources, and advertisements. For the Citizen this was particularly so. The following extract from an editorial in this paper was head-lined 'Thanks to Britain'.

"The close link between Britain and Nigeria was given much emphasis last week, when the Sardauna opened the new Flying Doctor Service in Northern Nigeria. The link between Nigeria and Britain is one which has brought great benefits to the people of this country in several ways apart from the tutelage which Britain was circumstanced to have undertaken up to the stage of independence over a period of fifty years."²

This humble adulation was in response to a gift from the British. In other cases such favourable coverage was more gratuitous. For instance, the papers used embassy hand-outs freely because of their own poor resources. Free information would not be turned down, however useless. Western institutions, both embassies and business firms, could easily take advantage of the weakness of the Nigerian papers. Company hand-outs might work out, in effect, as free advertisements. We are familiar in the West with promotional coverage in the press of fashions and the motor industry,³ but in

1 The Smythes (1960), pp.70/1

2 The Citizen (26.8.64)

3 See Tunstall (1971) pp.92-4

this instance such coverage was not an instance of commercial influence in a rich country, but of a rich country's commercial influence in a poor country.

Sometimes this influence appeared rather sinister, as, for instance, when the Citizen blandly printed, under the head-line 'NTC Contributes to Our Progress', a statement by a PRO of the mostly British firm, the Nigerian Tobacco Company, that "tobacco farmers were happy with the prices being paid by the NTC for their products."¹ There was no confirmation of this from the farmers. On another occasion an apology appeared in the same paper addressed to EMI (Nigeria) Ltd. for saying EMI had sacked six workers on account of a fall in demand, which EMI denied they had done. Hence the apology: "We very much regret the error and extend our unreserved apology to Mr. Scanlon and his Company for the embarrassment that would have been caused by the story." Though the original offending article was on page two and was only 2.5 inches high, the apology was 5.2 inches high and was on page one.² However, the Citizen was a Northern paper, and the relationship in the North between the British and Nigerians was particularly cosy. This did not apply to quite the same degree in the South though.

The other main aspect of the reliance on Western sources was the use of material from international news agencies. I do not know if Nigerians could in the 1950s and 1960s enter the British pools competition, but even if they did, and it does not seem likely, this does not explain why Nigerian papers should have had photographs of action from English football matches! The irregularly appearing English football results were probably a space-filler. Whatever the reason for the football forecasts, they were certainly an aspect of westernisation. Most Northern Nigerians must have found it strange to read in their newspaper, the Citizen, that "with Arsenal at home, Chelsea must have to work very hard to make this match a draw", or that "Manchester City is in a position to win this match if she still retains her usual striking force."³

Light articles and features could be even more incoherent or trivial than that. For instance, readers of the Tribune could

1 The Citizen (19.12.64)

2 Ibid, (29.4.64)

3 The Citizen (29.9.64)

learn of a fire at Jesus' College, "discovered by an undergraduate Mr.C.A.F. Rainbow, 20, of Glyn Mansions, London."¹ Readers of both the Sketch and the Outlook (I found the article in both papers in exactly the same form) could learn of a man in London who had false teeth down his throat for four years without knowing it.² And readers of the Daily Service discovered, from a feature attributed to Reuter's, a

"Mrs.Abigail Cox, celebrating her hundredth birthday (and) quoted today as saying firmly that she has never believed those stories that the people on the television screen cannot see into your room. That is why Mrs.Cox, a devoted television fan for the past seven years, always puts on her best dress and gives her silver hair a careful brush before allowing the set to be switched on. Mrs.Cox of Hitchin, Hertfordshire, has one worry: that those T.V. people 'must be sick of seeing me in the same old dress'."³

The essential point is that these papers had very poor resources, and were dependent on filler material of Western origin; this not only served the purpose of using space the papers themselves found difficult to fill, but did it with material which brought readers into contact with the West. Such material, however trivial, might be interesting; but above all, it offered the newspapers and their readers a feeling of prestige, of being in contact with the rich, modern world of the West. Though these papers were primarily political, politics cannot fill a paper. So they became a strange combination of intense political partisanship and incoherent western trivia. The contrast was most striking in the Sketch. In the midst of the paper's rabid tribal abuse, which I have already described, it was possible to follow a most moving love-story, in a cartoon serial distributed by 'King Features Syndicates, Inc.'. This, 'The Heart of Julie Jones', was, of course, about a white couple. Dancing with his loved one, the man makes a confession:

"There's such a sudden quickening of my pulse.Such an unexpected and wonderful thrill just being near you... Julie, do you know what I'm trying to say? Julie - I

1 The Tribune (24.2.50)

2 The Sketch (14.12.64)

3 Daily Service (9.11.59)

don't expect miracles to rain down on me like a summer shower, but if there's hope, give me a sign. Any old sign will do."

The response was disappointing.

"Oh, Mike - It's not as easy as that. This is a dream....the music, the night... the sheer pleasure of being together. But, Mike - Life isn't like that. It's so full of unexpected surprises."

Mike did not have long to wait for the final put-down. It came in the next instalment, when Julie tells him that

"A woman looking for love isn't looking for perfection, Mike. She's searching for some kind of magic... And when it strikes it's like lightening! She knows - He knows."¹

6.4. The New Journalism : Orientation to the Market

The press in Nigeria is still primarily a mixture of partisanship and government-orientation. But market-orientation has made significant strides, particularly since the establishment of The Punch, a racy, popular-style newspaper which is Nigeria's biggest-selling independent paper, next only to the Daily Times (which is no longer independent). The Punch is owned by a businessman, and is certainly a commercial enterprise. I analysed a sample (of the same size as my other samples) from early in 1980 and found that over 40% of total space was taken up with advertisements. The paper is also distinctly western in style. Very much modelled on the British "popular" newspaper, it also contains a number of regular features and other light material from the West, such as cartoons, crosswords, and, more spectacularly, large photographs of nude ladies. The extent to which the British press, or particular British papers, were taken as a model can be seen from the fact that Punch's regular nude appears on page three. Most interesting of all, these nudes are not Nigerian, but white. Thus hundreds of thousands of Nigerian readers are faced nearly every day with almost half a page of naked white flesh. It would seem from this that Nigerians are unaffected by the feeling that 'black is beautiful'.

1 Sketch (30.11.64 and 2.12.64)

Total Western features (mostly from the West, but some were specifically about the West too) took up an extremely large proportion - nearly 20% of total newspaper space (after subtraction of ad's.). If it is considered that most advertisements are of products made by western companies and, also, that a large amount of economic news is of western companies operating in Nigeria, it can be seen how much the paper is in the grip of western commercialism.

The paper, like the British popular papers, concentrated heavily on domestic concerns. It had little international news, and this was often treated as ephemera, as, for instance, in a column called 'Last Week: The World Briefly' in which items extended no further than the concise 'British auto-industry imports supercede auto exports'.¹ It would be difficult to be briefer than that. However, much of the paper's foreign news was of Zimbabwe, and some of its international news had a nationalistic slant. Unlike earlier Nigerian papers, The Punch contains a great deal of sensationalised crime news. Its political news is highly populist. When it is critical of the government, it is 'for the people', not for a particular political party.

Despite the highly populist style of the paper, there was in it a strong streak of elitism, evinced particularly in wide coverage given to students in higher education. For instance, in a Sunday issue of 24 pages the federal government took up 12½ pages with a list of 1,444 students who had been awarded federal government post-graduate scholarships. The countries where the awards were tenable were also listed. I counted 400 - nearly 28%-which were tenable in Western countries (mostly the U.K. and U.S.A.).²

One last aspect of the paper's westernisation is the presence in the U.K. of a foreign correspondent - a rare event. In fact Gordon Tialobi, the correspondent in question, seems to have become a journalist because of his residence in Britain. He has had no other experience of journalism.³ The fruits of his work for Punch can be seen from a typical article, headlined 'And now the M5 Rapist', which starts off: 'They caught the Cambridge Rapist two years ago. They are still searching for Jack the Ripper (Jack!). But now the nation's attention is being drawn to the sexual activity of

1 Ibid (4.2.80)

2 Ibid (3.2.80)

3 From a personal interview

of another sick citizen, the M5 Rapist'. Included is an artist's impression of the rapist, in case, perhaps, a Nigerian in Lagos would be able to identify him?¹

The new Nigerian magazines are full of elitist, westernised imagery, showing rich Nigerians enjoying a swinging, modern, and highly western life-style, totally unencumbered by the problems of their country (still one of the poorest in the world, in per capita terms). Nudity, plush ad's. with Europeans or Nigerians in expensive suits, bow ties, evening dresses; romance; western fashions; letters on love problems; light features - these are the staple diet of these magazines. In Drum, in a whole page advertisement for Benson and Hedges' cigarettes, you can at last see Europeans and Nigerians actually mixing - in an expensive bar and extremely elegant dress - as equals.² In another magazine, Sadness and Joy, this process goes one step further. In a long and trite 'photo-story' a Nigerian secretary wins a large sum of money in a competition, including the use of a chauffeur-driven limousine for a day's shopping. The story is set and photographed in England (though the prize is in dollars!) and the chauffeur is white.

"Could we go back to the first store, please, Parker?"

"Certainly, madam, Your wish is my command."

"You are very kind, Parker."

"Yes, ma'am, it's my pleasure."³

The ethnic roles are now reversed.

6.5. Westernisation and Elitism in Broadcasting

Broadcasting in Nigeria, as in developing countries generally (and not only these), is very much under government control - for technical, economic and historical reasons. The technical and economic resources needed make private ventures very unlikely; furthermore, most broadcasting organisations in developing countries require considerable government subvention. Broadcasting also lacks the fragmented political history of the press. Nigeria did not produce its own radio programmes until 1951, when the colonial government set up the Nigerian Broadcasting Service.

1 The Punch (5.2.80)

2 Drum (October, 1979)

3 Sadness and Joy, No.85

Nigeria is one of those rare examples of a country where broadcasting, both radio and television, has been partisan (some Latin American countries supply other examples). This was caused directly by regionalisation. Each region (upto the civil war) had its own broadcasting organisation. Within each region these institutions followed the normal pattern in developing countries - they were perfectly government-oriented. By contrast, at the federal level, they were partisan, supporting the ruling party in each region against the ruling parties in the other regions. The development of these organisations was itself the result of regional rivalry, as each regional government wanted to be in the lead in broadcasting. This rivalry produced an extraordinary race, the results of which were i) that two of the regional governments had established television in their regions before the federal government had set up its own national service, while the third region, the North, started its service in the same year (1962) as the federal government; ii) that the Western Region had the first fully operational TV service in Africa; iii) that this region had television in 1959, a year before it had its own radio service, while the Eastern Region acquired radio and television in the same year (1960).

This latter fact is remarkable when it is considered that many believe that radio is the best medium of communication for development in the Third World, because of the ease and cheapness with which radio signals can be both widely broadcast and received. Television, on the other hand, reaches only a few, is very expensive, and remains invariably solely a medium of entertainment. This rivalry of the three regions, then, was particularly elitist, and also considerably increased the westernisation of the media. The infrastructure, equipment, and much of the management of the new TV systems came from commercial Western broadcasting companies, apart from the amount of programme content imported. The Federal Government's TV venture was set up by NBC of America in 1962. It was managed by NBC until 1967. Western Nigeria's system was set up by the U.K. firm, Overseas Redifusion Ltd., and run in partnership with them. However, the clash between the regional government's political and Redifusion's

commercial objectives resulted in the former acquiring full ownership in 1961. The Northern government had two partners, Granada TV and EMI. It bought out these U.K. firms in 1970.¹

These services are reliant on foreign news agencies for their international news. At the time of Golding and Elliott's study 86% of NBC TV's foreign news came from three Western news agencies (Visnews, Reuters, and AP), 81% of NBC Radio's foreign news came from Reuters and AP. Furthermore, most reported news was of foreign events - a direct result of setting up TV stations before establishing an effective news-gathering capability. In the opinion of Golding and Elliott

"in Nigeria the relative simplicity of dealing with foreign news contrasts with the difficulties of local news-gathering, particularly in television, where foreign news is two-thirds of the total."²

As with the press a large proportion of this is of events in other African countries (about 30% of NBC TV's and 38% of NBC Radio's foreign news stories). The coverage of Western Europe and the U.S.A. was about 21% on television and 17% on radio.

Nigeria's other television programmes were also very dependent on Western sources. An NBC quarterly programme schedule for 1974 shows that about 40% of total evening programming (from 6 to 11 p.m.) was of foreign origin. (There were also two hours of educational programming per day, completely separate from the rest of the programmes - one in the morning, one in the early afternoon).³ Nigerian television was thus highly westernised and, by its very limited nature, extremely elitist. For this reason, there was some opposition to its establishment, as certain exchanges in the various Houses of Assembly show. One M.P., for instance, said:

"We want this money for water, roads and for drugs and machinery for agriculture..."⁴

There is no doubt that the costs of television were very high. In 1971-2 the federal government gave a subsidy of ₦2.2 million to the NBC (radio and television). In 1973-4 it was ₦5 million, in 1975-6 over ₦11 million, with a further provision of over ₦15 million to other Nigerian television stations.⁵ In 1972 the

1 Golding and Elliott (1979), p.43 2 Ibid, p.155

3 NBC -TV programme schedule for January-March, 1974

4 Proceedings of the Eastern House of Assembly (10.4.63)

5 Recurrent and Capital Estimates (approved) of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1973-4, 1975-6, 1977-8.

Western broadcasting services' expenditure on radio was ₦520,000, but on television it was ₦602,000. Its revenue from radio advertisements was ₦803,000, while its revenue from TV ad's was only ₦157,000. Thus radio made a profit of ₦283,000, television a loss of ₦445,000. In the North television took up about three quarters of recurrent expenditure, costing about ₦1 million p.a., while providing a mere ₦60,000 in income.¹

All in all, television in Nigeria is expensive, wasteful (taking away resources from radio and partly subsidised by it, to the extent that "television is a millstone around radio's neck")² and elitist. Only about 0.1% of the population owns sets, and at most 1% of the population can see television. In 1973 there were only 75,000 sets. Ownership of these is thought

"to be concentrated in the urban middle and upper-classes professional men, academics, the more prosperous businessmen, etc."³

6.6. Professionalism

Another aspect of both elitism and westernisation I consider to be the ethic and structure of professionalism. I shall look at this with respect to broadcasting as the only study I know on the profession of journalism is on broadcasting. Broadcasting does not have its origins in political partisanship; it is also the most technological of the media. For these reasons professionalism is likely to be strongest in this medium. The sense of professionalism is not only an aspect of elitism and westernisation; it is also a major element of market-orientation. A professional journalist justifies the standards of his occupation (realistically or not) by reference to the market. He resents government or political interference. He sees his occupation in terms of career rather than political commitment. At the same time, the standards he judges his profession by tend to derive from the West - the original source of so much to do with the media. It is in this respect, and in the implicit aim of building a respectable, even enviable career, that the sense of professionalism can be seen to contain a certain elitism.

1 Wedell and Pilsworth (1974), pp.19,30 and 39

2 Ibid, p.84

3 Ibid, p.79

A westernised journalistic profession in broadcasting in the Third World is nearly inevitable insofar as broadcasting institutions, career structures, journalistic training and practice, were all often established by the colonial powers, whose influence declined rather than disappeared after independence. But the supply of this influence is matched by a strong demand. Many Nigerian journalists study in the West and many more do correspondence courses with Western institutions. Golding and Elliott found that British schools of journalism were well endowed with subscriptions from Nigerian students.¹ The link between career and elitism was strong. For many of these writers' respondents, journalism "was just one of a variety of possible ways of exchanging their general educational qualifications for entry into the elite occupations in government or industrial administration."²

Aspiring journalists paid a lot for the chance to enter the professional career structure. At the time of the above study a 2-year course in journalism in Nigeria might cost £600.³ Taken abroad this would be a great deal more.

The journalists' growing sense of professionalism has altered their conceptions of the nature of their jobs. Government interference - "harrassment, intimidation, threatening phone calls, arbitrary arrest, abuse of office, corruption and dictatorial requests"⁴ - was strong but greatly resented. The same applied to any political connection. Golding and Elliott found that the broadcasting journalists they studied felt some disgust at the highly partisan press of the pre-civil war period. They saw themselves as part of a Fourth Estate and complained that the authorities did not understand the nature of news production, which should be left solely to the 'professionals.'⁵ They also felt that news should be rigidly separated from current affairs. The journalist's job was to report, not to comment.⁶

This does not mean partisanship is dead. It has merely been suppressed, both by the desire for professional status and by government control. The underlying antagonisms of Nigerian society cannot be completely avoided.

1 Golding and Elliott (1979), p.181 2 Ibid, p.173
3 Ibid, p.181 4 Ibid, p.68
5 Ibid, p.132 6 Ibid, p.81

"Just as Nigerian political life more generally lies dormant, but very much alive beneath the wintry crust of military rule, so the party press and political commitments were often not far below the surface."¹

The relative decline of partisanship has, as has been indicated, run parallel with an increase in market-orientation and the professional status of the journalist.

"Instead of working for small entrepreneur proprietors or shoe-string political party papers, journalists in Nigeria now work for large, mostly government corporations, with intricate career and salary structures and well defined, if contentious, grading schemes and entry and seniority requirements."²

In the early days of the Nigerian press newspapers had been little more than one-man concerns. In a list of 41 Lagos newspapers given by Omu in operation between 1880 and 1937, 34 can be seen to have had editor-owners.³ The role of the proprietor did not stop there.

"Normally, the proprietor had to act as editor, reporter and printer... The journalist's status in society was low, and this made it difficult to attract good recruits and to build up a sense of professionalism."⁴

(As against this, the political and social influence of the actual editor-owners, or at least some of them, could become considerable).

Golding and Elliott found, by contrast with the early days, that a large number of broadcasting journalists came from a fairly 'respectable' background. However, the alteration in the status of the journalist has not been universal. It has affected only an elite within the profession. Elliott and Golding found that 30% of the fathers of their sample of modern broadcasting journalists had been civil servants, teachers, journalists (or from other professions) or politicians, (civil servants were over half of this group), while 24% had been farmers, 12% had been in business, and only about 9% had held manual jobs. This suggests a fairly respectable, middle-class background for many journalists, but

1 Ibid, p.196

2 Ibid, p.180

3 Omu (1978), pp.252-4

4 Chick (1967), p.43

still a rather lowly one for at least a third of them, probably much more (most of the civil servants will have been clerks). Only 7.2% of the journalists had degrees (though another 16.9% of them had a technical or professional qualification).¹

This analysis is probably also relevant to modern newspaper journalists in Nigeria. Though the status of broadcasting journalists was in general probably higher than that of newspaper journalists, 64% of Golding and Elliott's sample had previously been journalists in indigenous newspapers or magazines, and some others might have worked for foreign publications; only 10% had been in broadcasting alone.² Their sample would therefore seem, to a certain extent at least, to describe both press and broadcasting journalists.

In both broadcasting and the press there was a highly unequal salary structure. A junior reporter in the Northern broadcasting corporation earned only £310 p.a. (though this was probably double the earnings of a manual worker). A chief sub-editor in the WNBC got £876; his counterpart in the NBC got £1,020. The maximum pay for NBC editors was £2,380. The editor of the Daily Times got a reported £6,000 p.a. There is, then, within the journalistic world, a highly elitist structure of rewards, with the top men actually becoming a part of the wider social elite. But even the lower paid could view the occupation as the first rung in the climb to professional status - as indeed, it appears they did.

In sum, the growth of the press has offered new 'professional' opportunities to up-and-coming Nigerians, but these openings are not of a high status. Nigerian newspapers have grown from 'tin-pot' enterprises to sometimes large, and, in one or two instances, almost bureaucratic concerns. But the

"growth and occupational differentiation in fact lowered the status of journalists. From a battlefield surveyed by a few generals the press became a crowded arena of foot soldiers."³

This is a very interesting statement. The old political owner-editors were, or became, a part of the elite. Their tiny newspapers offered no scope to anyone else to rise in the profession. As

1 Golding and Elliott (1979), p.171/2

2 Ibid, p.174

3 Ibid, p.30

papers have expanded those who control them have remained a part of the elite, but others now do the 'donkey-work'. They are looking for professional status but end up in routine, almost clerical jobs. The papers are far too limited to offer greater professional opportunities.

6.7. Professionalism Against Partisanship

The press, since its inception, has been fundamentally linked to the development of conflict in Nigeria. With the decline of political partisanship since the end of the civil war the press has become more market-oriented and more 'professionalised'. The professional instinct did exist, though, before the civil war. This is evinced by the press reaction to the Newspaper (Amendment) Bill, 1964, which prohibited publication of material considered "prejudicial to the defence of Nigeria or public safety, order, morality and health". It also required newspapers which sold in Lagos to establish offices there, even if they were published elsewhere. Another clause prohibited material which affected "adversely any right, reputation, or freedom of a person which is entitled to protection". Censorship was not proposed, but penalties for infringement against this vague and arbitrary legislation were severe. The federal government, which had proposed the Bill, was both NPC and NCNC. But several NCNC M.Ps. opposed it. Eventually the NCNC leader and Eastern premier, Dr. Okpara came out against the Bill. While the federal government's Morning Post supported the Bill, the Eastern Region's Outlook opposed it.

"Last Tuesday, the Post under the guise of criticising Dr. Okpara for his opposition to the Newspaper (Amendment) Act tried to be mischievous in the extreme... the Post has ceased to serve the whole country by whose grace it is in existence at all. It has now put the Nigerian Citizen in the shade in its unreasoning support for the NPC."¹

But the Citizen also lambasted the Bill.

"In short, the way I look at it is that within barely

1 Outlook (8.10.64)

a year of our becoming a Republic - for which we all rejoiced - the Nigerian press is now being made by law to descend from its exalted position of the freest in Africa to the most guillotined in the democratic world."¹

Later articles and editorials in the Citizen were more cautious, or tried to blame the introduction of the legislation solely on the NCNC (much as the Outlook blamed it on the NPC). But this defence of the press implicitly against the paper's own party (as the main actor in the federal government) is quite startling. Of course, by press freedom the paper meant the freedom to be partisan. Most papers were so closely connected with the parties that they could hardly have been considered to have been free. But they were free to criticise other parties, and it was that right that they were defending.

It is possible to say, then, that a certain sense of professionalism existed before the civil war (and is much stronger now), but political partisanship was still quite clearly the primary orientation in this period. Even the Times, which did much to try to encourage a sense of professionalism at this time, could do little to alter this. In times of political non-crisis the Times thrived. It had comprehensive news coverage while the party papers were stereotyped, dull, somewhat 'in limbo'. In periods of crisis the circulation of the Times and the Post (a federal government paper which tried to avoid extreme partisanship), papers which lack credibility in times of crisis, declines; by contrast the "political party papers experience a sharp increase in circulation at times of political crisis when they become papers of cause, and at times of non-crisis their circulation declines".² In periods of political crisis the Times "practised abdication",³ but in no way could the paper avoid contributing to the climate of tension. Those seeking a rational way out of the growing tension would not have been able to find it in the above papers. The Times could not overcome the power of partisanship.

"the Times' withdrawal and its imposition of Western interpretations on what was going on in Nigerian politics did not create a cogent statement about Nigerian political events, and it was no match for the very strong and

1 Citizen (26.8.64)

2 Grant (1975), p.422

3 Ibid, p.41

divisive forces in other sectors of the press."¹

The Post, a government but not a party paper (as the government was a coalition one), suffered most from circulation losses as the political crisis progressed. Its circulation in 1961 was 30,000 while in 1964, at the height of the crisis, it was 16,000. That of the Outlook, a government and a party paper, rose from 13,700 in 1961 to 21,000 in 1964.² Looking in more detail at a period within the crisis of the following year, that of the Western Region, the circulation of the Times fell from 137,000 in September 1965, to 97,100 in November 1965. That of the Post fell from 52,000 to 10,000 over the same period, during which the circulation of the Pilot went up from 25,000 to 45,000, the Tribune's from 7,000 to 20,000 and the Outlook's from 27,000 to 30,500.³

This indicates well enough the importance of partisanship to the press. In times of non-crisis the more market-oriented papers dominated the scene and the partisan papers had to rely largely on government or party subsidies. In times of political crisis the latter papers had thriving sales. Partisanship could be maintained because of the fragmented nature of political power. In fragmented societies where a number of different groups have the power to express their interests, they also have the power to create a partisan press. This is why the press has been relatively free in Nigeria. When the government becomes significantly stronger than its rival groups it is then "able to suppress many of the inter-group conflicts which are the determinants of Press freedom".⁴ The press then becomes government-oriented.

The press in the 1960s, then, was highly partisan, and it was clearly deeply involved in the intense political conflict of the time; it is difficult, though, to say how far the press contributed to the escalation of the conflict. It is equally hard to imagine that it did not. Apart from its general inflammatory role, there were also particular instances when it is very likely the press played a specific part in the build-up of tension.

One major instance of a possible direct contribution by the press to political conflict occurred during the vital Western

1 Ibid, p.422

2 Ibid, p.41

3 Ibid, p.406

4 Chick (1967), p.461

Region elections of 1965, when Akintola's NNDP was struggling against the UPGA (AG and NCNC) for control of the region. There was great violence during the election campaign, in which many people were killed. After the election Western Radio and NNDP papers gave one set of results, showing that the NNDP had won, while UPGA papers gave another set of results claiming the reverse. This itself gave an impetus to further violence. The Tribune claimed in January 1966, that over 560 people were killed in the crisis.¹ It seems likely that the media played a role in this (the extreme anti-Ibo content of the Sketch should also be borne in mind) even if it did not create it.

"Because information about the election rigging and violence, and particularly printed information, was so central to the events of the crisis and to people's sense of justice the newspapers took on especial importance."²

Newspapers of the time were attacked. The editor of the Tribune was beaten by police, and both the East and the West banned several papers from entry into their regions, including the Times.

Though the press became substantially government-oriented after the first military coup it continued to give expression to ethnic antagonisms.

"Contributions to the New Nigerian, and in the vernacular Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, played a key role in rallying the shell-shocked, rather than somnolent, public of the North in resistance to what was seen as a threat from the South. Articles headed 'Federalism Is Good for Nigeria', 'Unitary System Not for Us', 'Leave the North As It Is', and 'Smouldering Fires', along with warnings that 'to force a unitary type of government on people without an impartial referendum is setting the clock backward' were all messages, as clear as the Bauchi highlands after a rainstorm, to those who cared to read them."³

Even after the civil war the papers continued to express ethnic interests. As I have already mentioned, nineteen advertisements

1 Grant (1975), p.336

2 Ibid, p.338

3 Panter-Brick (1978), p.15

appeared in the New Nigerian between October and December 1974 publicising demands for new states.¹ Because its owner, Azikiwe, at first supported the Biafran secession, the offices of the Pilot, once "Africa's most vociferous and successful newspaper", were burnt and looted.²

I have shown how the newspapers of Nigeria contributed very significantly to the expression of conflict, and therefore, possibly to the build-up of conflict itself. I have enumerated some particular instances where such an effect might have been possible. More generally, it is possible that the press as a whole did significantly contribute to the conflict situation before the civil war. This is so because conflict in developing countries is mainly urban; urban centres tend to be small, literacy higher in towns than in rural areas, and, though most newspaper circulations are small, they are concentrated in a few towns; also readership is many times greater than newspaper sales. Thus, Grant calculates that most urban literates were being reached by newspapers in the post-independence period.³ For instance, the population of the three main towns of the Eastern Region was very roughly (there are no reliable figures) 500,000 in 1963.⁴ Urban literacy in English was probably about 36% (49% for men and 23% for women)⁵. There were thus probably very roughly 180,000 urban literates in the Eastern Region. Total newspaper circulation in the region was about 55,000, most of which was in the towns. With a readership of several people per single issue of a newspaper, this means that probably most urban literates did read a newspaper, even if the figure for urban literates is a significant underestimate.

In sum, there is reasonable evidence that the press probably did play some role in the escalation of conflict in Nigeria in the 1960s. It is difficult to believe it played none at all. Most violence occurred in the cities, most newspaper readership was in the cities (covering a large proportion, if not most of those able to read in the cities), and a large proportion of newspaper content was not only intensely partisan, but also sometimes directly inflammatory. Only since the civil war has the press become significantly market-oriented and 'professionalised'.

1 Yahaya in Panter-Brick (1978), p.204

2 Ugboajah (1976), p.17

3 Grant (1975), p.64

4 Wedell and Pilsworth (1974), p.8

5 Report on an Enquiry into Advertising Media (1963)

6.8. Conclusion

The media in Nigeria, as in many other developing countries, are less mass than elite media. The content of the media has an elitist flavour - it dwells on such matters as higher education rather than the education of the masses, and virtually ignores the over-riding social and economic problems of poverty and unemployment; media content is also, in a number of significant respects, highly westernised: it contains a certain amount of news and tittle-tattle about or from the West (though not an excessively large amount in many cases), is heavily dependent on Western news sources, and conveys a great amount of westernised imagery in its advertising, as well, of course, as displaying a wide variety of Western goods (which only the elite could afford). Such content was aimed not at the Nigerian masses but at the Nigerian elite and a somewhat wider sub-elite.

In the previous chapter I described in detail the close association between the press and conflict, in particular, the strongly partisan basis of the press. The elitist nature of the press was limited, at least in some respects, by its political function, which one would expect to require a mass readership. However, the press never achieved this mass readership, not even remotely. In fact, it was not even necessary. The press did reach a large proportion of urban literates (who were a small proportion of the total population), and that was all that was needed to create the social turmoil the various political parties needed in their mutual power struggle. The elites of Nigeria did not want to engage the whole of society in the struggle; that would have been far too dangerous to their joint position.

With the decline in importance of political conflict after the civil war the press has become less partisan and increasingly market-oriented (though it is still weak, and subject on and off to strong government control). Associated with this change has been an increase in the journalists' sense of professionalism, which is an important aspect of market-orientation. This professionalist motivation is itself flavoured by both elitist and westernised tendencies. This stems from journalists' growing

concern for career and 'getting on' (to the detriment of political commitment) and from their acceptance of Western standards of journalism, from which the quest for professional status inevitably takes its inspiration. The media, in particular television, are becoming increasingly westernised and 'professional'. Some parts of the press seem now simply to be a plaything of the elite. Television is even more of an elite plaything - an expensive one and largely paid for by taxes on the bulk of the people, to whom it means nothing.

PART THREE : OVERVIEW

Politics, in the period I have studied, were the main ingredient of the Nigerian press, particularly ethnic politics. There was little in the press specifically to do with class. The papers were owned by or run for different political parties all with their own political interests at stake, which were primarily ethnic in nature. It was political power they wanted, not class domination. The papers were concerned with power. The press will not be able to become a class weapon until mass circulations are possible. Through it the elite does not speak to the masses but to itself (and a somewhat broader sub-elite). It is a readership which is very politically conscious.

If the papers did express any non-political interests, they were those of expatriate business. The very economic dominance of the latter ensured a considerable press dependence on these foreign interests. Nevertheless, this was an indirect influence and an indirect benefit. It resulted in favourable publicity - through advertising, a general purveying of Western life-styles, and more directly through favourable news coverage. However, this was as much an aspect of the elite's westernisation as an expression of the 'class' interests of these foreign concerns. The papers reflected the latter's economic influence but they were also designed to appeal to a highly westernised elite, which did not in any way reject the influence of these Western companies. It welcomed it.

In sum, the press reflected very well the conflicts and interests described in Part Two. It contributed to the intense political and ethnic battle of the 1960s, and did this wholeheartedly. The reflection of underlying ethnic antagonisms in the press was quite straight-forward. Parties, publics, and papers fought against each other quite simply as entire ethnic units. There was none of the political or journalistic fragmentation which comes with intra-class conflict, which I shall describe in the following discussion of Pakistan. The media also reflected the interests of the Nigerian elite, in large measure by-passing the bulk of

the population. Only in times of political crisis do the media (the press particularly) take on a wider significance. The press strongly reflects political and social divisions and has at least the potential to play a role in the escalation of conflict. It only takes some extension of newspaper readership beyond the politically committed in a few major urban centres for this to be possible. Though the media, with their narrow base, cannot play any role in major social change, they are able to promote urban conflict and thereby to bring about changes in regime, an alternation of elites.

PART FOUR: THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN

INTRODUCTION

Both Nigeria and Pakistan suffered civil wars involving a secession attempt by a region with a different ethnic make-up from the rest of the country. The similarity goes much further: firstly, in both cases the war occurred during a period of military rule; secondly both wars started after a general election of great importance, which was in each case a crucial stepping-stone in the escalation of conflict; thirdly, political conflict in each country became so intense that it even reached into the legislatures, and in both cases this parliamentary violence was itself an important event in the process of violent political change.

Despite such similarities there were fundamental differences in the nature of the political-economies of these two countries. Nigeria was in a sense more 'primitive' than Pakistan. Its bourgeoisie was less developed than Pakistan's: India had been a great deal longer under British rule and had, as a consequence, a more developed bureaucratic and professional class than Nigeria had. Furthermore, there was in Pakistan only a very limited foreign presence in industry and commerce. Its indigenous business class was, therefore, much more substantial than Nigeria's. Pakistan, too, had a powerful land-owning class, which Nigeria lacked. For these reasons Pakistan had a considerably more distinct class structure than had Nigeria. The class element in the growth of conflict in Pakistan was, on that account, also stronger than in Nigeria. At the same time, the communal element was weaker. Pakistan is riven by linguistic differences but its social structure is not predominantly tribal. Tribes only play a significant role in the sparsely populated areas of the country under the Northern frontier.

In Part One I suggested a rough outline for social conflict as follows: ethnic→ intra-class→ inter-class. I also suggested, though, that each stage of conflict would be affected by adjacent stages. Thus, conflict in Nigeria was primarily ethnic but with a strong intra-class element. Conflict in the early part of

Pakistan's history had been ethnic in nature (especially that between Moslems and Hindus around the time of the creation of Pakistan). It became increasingly intra-class after independence, while retaining a powerful ethnic element.

In the following two chapters I shall be analysing mostly the intra-class nature of conflict in Pakistan. Though there are powerful groups which have held sway in the country, on and off, for many years, Pakistan's society is a delicate balance which numerous social forces are on occasion able to disturb. Rather than powerful communal groups or socio-economic classes locked in straightforward struggle, what we have is a complex inter-play of numerous conflicting class fragments.

Though the civil war was apparently a struggle between opposed ethnic groups (Bengalis against the rest) it is not possible in discussing this to avoid reference to class. Writers who do refer to class not surprisingly speak in what I have called 'inter-class' terms. To do so, though, is to indulge in gross simplification and to pay little regard to important contradictions. The various class fragments of Pakistan never managed to develop into substantial classes in their own right. (The old landlord class has to be excluded from this generalisation). Instead, they coalesced in loose and shifting alliances which broke up and reformed according to circumstances; they also often incorporated apparently opposed elements which, with the fluctuating nature of these alliances, means we cannot possibly consider them to have been classes in the normal sense. The end result is opposition between unstable alliances of various class fragments, which is overlaid by communal antagonisms and given added strength by the intrusion of incipient inter-class conflict.

Despite the rapid and violent political changes Pakistan underwent from the time of its secession from India in 1947 to the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, its economic development and the policies associated with this were remarkably stable. In the following chapter I shall describe Pakistan's economic development up until the civil war as well as the policies that supported this development

and the socio-economic background to both these factors. This socio-economic analysis of Pakistan's economic policy-making and of the social effects of economic development will be followed up in the succeeding chapter by an analysis of political conflict. It will be shown that the struggle over who should benefit from economic development was fundamentally intra-class in nature. This is why economic policy over this period was so consistent in its goals: the struggle was purely political (as intra-class conflict tends to be, given that it is not based on substantial socio-economic differences). It was only after the civil war that inter-class elements (at least in the newly truncated Pakistan) came to be of any significance. Then economic policy at last underwent significant change.

As a guide to the following discussion I give below a summary of the major political events that have occurred in Pakistan in the period under study. This can perhaps be divided into three separate periods: the first was political but not democratic (there was no general election based on universal suffrage in this period); the second was military; the third occurs after the civil war, when Pakistan was divided into two new countries, West Pakistan becoming Pakistan and East Pakistan, Bangladesh.

1947 : Independence from Britain and Partition of India into India and Pakistan.

1947-56: Rule of the Muslim League (which had led the nationalist struggle for Pakistan) in various governments.

1956 : Pakistan adopts a Republic constitution after years of debate

1956-7: 13 months of rule by an East Pakistani party, the Awami League, under Suhrawardy.

1957-8: More Muslim League regimes.

1958 : Military coup by Ayub Khan (in power for next decade).

1968 : Start of mass disturbances against Ayub, who hands over power to the military under Yahya Khan in 1969.

1970 : Pakistan's first general election. The East Pakistani party, the Awami League (under Mujibur Rahman), wins overwhelmingly.

- 1971 : Civil war. Bangladesh created through Indian intervention.
- 1975 : Mujibur Rahman, leader of Bangladesh, assassinated. The military take over.
- 1977 : Pakistan's leader, Bhutto, deposed by military after widespread disturbances; later executed for alleged murder.

CHAPTER SEVEN : ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN

In this chapter, I shall describe Pakistan's economic development and economic policies from 1947 until the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. As is commonly accepted, some of the most important results of Pakistan's economic development in the first two periods above (i.e. up to the civil war) were rapid industrialisation, the creation of a new elite of industrialists, and the widening of inequalities between East and West Pakistan. (The new business elite was largely West Pakistani and the most rapid industrial development occurred there). Of course, industrialisation was not the only factor of concern here, but, as it is one of the prime aspects of development and was certainly the main goal of the Pakistani government in the period under study, I shall concentrate mostly on this. I shall argue that the inequalities between the two wings were less the result of differences in industrialisation than in control of government resources and, further, that the argument that West Pakistan was exploiting East Pakistan for the sake of rapid industrial growth in the former is at best only partially true. More accurate would it be to say that a small urban elite was exploiting the rural areas (excluding the rich landlords: these were kept reasonably sweet) - a process which happened to benefit West more than East Pakistan.

7.1. Development Policies

At partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 Pakistan found itself with very little in the way of developed resources. Both wings (East and West Pakistan) of the new country were nearly enough completely agricultural. Each produced a major cash crop: East Pakistan - jute, West Pakistan - cotton. These crops had before independence been processed either in India (mostly by Hindus) or in Britain. Thus, none of the value added by the processing of these raw materials accrued to the areas that grew them.

Very soon after independence, Pakistan successfully began to create industrial capacity for the processing of its raw materials; India began to increase its production of the same raw materials to replace those lost, and so feed its already established factories.

The two countries became increasingly competitive.

People in both wings of Pakistan desperately needed cloth, wherever produced, so the increased production of cloth in West Pakistan, the main cotton growing area, found a ready market in both regions. East Pakistan's jute, by contrast, is a product useful to industry rather than households. Its great potential was in exports. Thus, though trade between the two regions came to be substantial, it was by no means reciprocal. East Pakistan exported jute to the outside world and imported cotton from West Pakistan. The implications of this for future relations between the two wings were considerable.

The main plank of Pakistan's development policy was rapid industrialisation. This itself is hardly surprising. More remarkable was the single-mindedness with which this goal was pursued, and the obstinacy with which the same methods were retained despite the increasingly apparent high social costs which they engendered. As far as rates of industrialisation are concerned, however, the government was very successful, as the following table shows.

Table 7.1: Gross Domestic Product & Population in Pakistan

Sector	Absolute Amounts (Rupees, in crores, at 1959-60 market prices)				Annual Rates of Growth (Percent)		
	1949-50	1954-55	1959-60	1964-65	1949-50 to 1954-55	1954-55 to 1959-60	1959-60 to 1964-65
	Agriculture	1,439	1,536	1,639	2,000	1.3	1.3
Manufacturing	30	110	192	382	29.6	11.8	14.7
Other	1,027	1,217	1,403	1,996	3.5	2.9	7.3
Total	2,496	2,863	3,234	4,378	2.7	2.5	6.2
Population(m)	78.9	88.3	98.9	112.5	2.3	2.3	2.6
Income per head (Rs)	316	324	327	389	0.5	0.2	3.5

Source: Papanek (1967), p.7

Note: One crore = 10 million (1 crore rupees = roughly \$2m. after 1955).

The contribution of industry to gross domestic product was nearly thirteen times higher in 1964-5 than it had been in 1949-50.

Though the overall performance of the economy during the 1950s was desultory, significant gains in income per head began to show themselves in the 1960s, under Ayub Khan.

For some time during the 1960s Pakistan was held to be a model of economic development. Under Ayub Khan there was a relatively long period of political stability. The government pursued its development policies vigorously. Its chosen vehicle for the rapid industrialisation it wanted was private enterprise. The government would control and guide the movement of the economy, but would only indulge in a small amount of direct participation in it. This policy entailed a considerable shifting of income to the private sector, about which the government was quite explicit. It paid much more attention to agriculture in the 1960s, but this is how it described the earlier years:

"There was a considerable transfer of savings from the agricultural to the industrial sector.... as terms of trade were deliberately turned against agriculture through such policies as licensing of scarce foreign exchange earned primarily by agriculture to the industrial sector, compulsory government procurement of foodgrains at low prices to subsidise the cost of living of the urban, industrial workers, generous tax concessions to industry and lack of similar incentives for commercial agricultural investment."

(from page seven of the Planning Commission's 'The Third Five-Year Plan').¹

The sum result of these policies was that the industrialist was able to buy his inputs at highly subsidised prices (including the price of credit), indirectly paid for mostly by the peasantry, and then sell its manufactures at uncompetitively high prices (as no competition was allowed). "With high produce, then, annual profits of 50-100% on investment were possible."²

The result of these policies was a new industrial elite. This industrial elite, it can almost be said, was the deliberate creation of government policy. Initially the government was

1 Quoted in Griffin and Khan (1972), pp.36/7

2 Papanek (1967), p.33

solely concerned with political survival and the fruits of office. It needed industrialisation because with partition India got the industrial assets of the sub-continent; now Pakistan had to compete with India and also process its own raw materials. With politics being its main concern the government did not want to be directly involved in the economy. It left it to private businessmen. Only later did politicians become aware of the opportunities they had created. They then joined in the industrial bandwagon themselves. At the same time the government always retained strong control over the economy and over the favours the industrialists received. However, it was only in the 1960s (and then even more so in the 1970s) that the government began to participate directly in the economy. In the 1950s even the government's investment agencies were used to help private business - a role that diminished in the 1960s but which still remained.

The most important of the agencies was the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), not fully operational until 1952. Its main function was to invest in projects which were considered necessary but which private investors found either too large or too complex (or simply unlikely to give the huge profits they could get elsewhere). The creation of government agencies did not represent a great commitment to public enterprise. The PIDC's policy, laid down by government, of selling its investments to the private sector once the projects were established is evidence of its aims. The stated principle was that the agency would then be able to recoup funds and invest them in other neglected areas. But, at the same time, the extraordinary advantages to the private sector of this PIDC policy of selling investments already made good by it, so that private buyers could get the profits without the risks, are obvious, whatever the rationale behind the policy. With its re-selling policy, the PIDC's holdings were not that large - in 1959 they were about 10% of total industrial assets.

This still leaves undiscussed the role of the government in agriculture. This was neglected in the 1950s, and its surplus expropriated for the sake of industrialisation. In the 1960s policy changed; the rural sector began to receive back a part of

what it had given. Fertiliser, water and new, highly productive seeds were well subsidised and their distribution increased substantially. A rural works programme was started in 1962/3 to increase employment in rural areas. This mostly affected East Pakistan. A total of Rs.925m was spent there under the programme from 1962 to 1968.¹ This Thomas estimates to have created over 227m man-days of employment. These policies had their effects and, according to Falcon and Stern², agriculture grew by 3.4% per annum from 1959/60 to 1968/69 (though most of the improvement occurred in West Pakistan).

7.2. Development Performance

Pakistan's success in attaining rapid industrial growth has been summarised above, in Table 7.1. Yet even a cursory look at the other figures in the table hints at a far less sanguine picture. While the industry's contribution to GDP was nearly 13 times higher in 1964/65 than it had been in 1949/50, it still only contributed 8.7% to gross product. Though industry grew three times faster than agriculture in the first half of the 1960s, the latter still made a far bigger contribution to the undoubted increase in per capita income of that period, as the industrial base was still small. It would seem, therefore, that Pakistan's rapid industrial growth did little to raise the living standards of the bulk of the population, despite the shifting of a large amount of resources to this sector. For this reason it is worth examining the main tenets of the government's policies, and the effects of these, in more detail.

7.2.1. Private Savings, Investment and Taxation

As stated above, the central thread of the government's policy was to shift income to the better-off sections of society (especially the business class) in order to raise the rate of savings and investment. "High incomes are more acceptable, politically and morally, because they are used chiefly for investment, rather than for conspicuous consumption."³ Papanek makes a rough estimate of industrial returns saved in one year (1958) of Rs.770m - just over half of that year's total gross private savings of Rs.1,430m. However, Griffin estimates that total productive investment based on private

1 Thomas in Falcon and Papanek (1971), p.230

2 Falcon and Stern, in Ibid, p.2.

3 Papanek (1967), p.243

savings was only from 1% to 3.3% of GNP during the Second Plan (1960-65). While private savings to the value of Rs.6,677m were invested in directly productive investment during the plan period, investment in private housing amounted to Rs.2,525m - spending on which the Planning Commission not surprisingly stated was most impressive in the upper income groups.¹

While the government attempted to restrict consumption through its controls on imports, it encouraged investment with a very low interest rate. As Khan points out², cheap credit either discourages savings or deflects them into non-productive assets such as gold; it also boosts profits, making it increasingly likely that a part of borrowed credit, being so cheap, would be consumed. Griffin informs us of a case-study carried out in Dacca (East Pakistan) in the early 1960s, which showed that as much as 42.5% of personal savings in the urban sector was in the form of gold, ornaments, consumer durables and housing.³ "Income inequalities have not ensured markedly high rates of private savings - they have mostly led to privilege."⁴ Papanek too is aware that any austerity that there might have been occurred only in the early days.

"Imports of such goods as cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, rayon yarn and cosmetics more than doubled between 1958 and 1960, and have continued their rapid increase since... The relaxation seems to have been largely in goods bought by the middle-class - the civil servants, military officers, professionals and businessmen - whose support was important to a military government."⁵

There is also evidence that those from whom the resources were taken, mostly the rural masses, could themselves significantly contribute to the nation's savings effort, and that pumping resources into the agricultural sector might have increased savings more than did the diversions of resources to the cities. Papanek himself estimates agricultural savings in 1958 as Rs.340m, compared to industrial returns saved of Rs.770m, of which only Rs.510m was re-invested in industry.⁶ Bergan estimates that the rural areas had a higher personal savings rate (10.9%) than urban areas (7.4%).⁷

1 Griffin and Khan (1972), pp.42/3

2 Ibid, p.14

3 Ibid, p.40

4 Ibid, p.55

5 Papanek (1967), p.218

6 Ibid, p.203

7 In Griffin and Khan (1972), p.220

If even a part of these arguments is valid, the inequalities in income deliberately fostered by the government did not do all that much for savings (and, therefore, for investment based on these). Where, then, did the money come from for Pakistan's industrialisation? A large part came from foreign aid. In 1959/60 the proportion of investment funded by foreign aid was 31%, going up to 38% in the mid-1960s.¹ A rapidly increasing share of Pakistan's export effort had to be used to service the debt - according to Griffin and Khan 3.8% of foreign exchange earnings between 1955 and 1960, going up to 19.2% in 1969/70.²

Though the businessman got his credit at interest rates kept low by the government (about 7 or 8%) the effective rate of interest that Pakistani society had to pay on aid (taking into account the effects of tied loans) Griffin and Khan estimate to have been at least 10%.³ On top of this, because of the deliberately overvalued rupee, the entrepreneur imported his capital equipment and raw materials at substantially subsidised prices. "In other words, private businesses were acquiring resources at less than half their real costs."⁴ At the same time there were low levels of taxation - a deliberate part of which was designed to create 'incentives' in the upper income brackets. Tax allowances for the well-off, especially the business sector, were so broad as to make a nonsense of the basic tax structure. Only incomes above Rs.6,000 were liable to tax. There were very significant exemptions for dividend income, capital gains, and certain rents. Allowances even went as far as permitting the deduction of Rs.900-1,500 per annum for a car and Rs.360 for a motor-bike.⁵ All in all, very few people paid taxes. In 1964-65 only 113,826 people paid personal income tax, and a mere 4% of non-agricultural GNP was subject to income tax. All income from agricultural sources was exempt.

It can be concluded that the government did little to save through the public sector, while its attempt to save through the private sector not only required the creation of severe inequalities of income, but was also not very effective. Replacing private by public savings (i.e. through increased taxes) would, in the opinion

1 Ibid, p.188 and Papanek (1967), p.220

2 Griffin and Khan (1972), p.188

3 Ibid, p.188

4 Ibid, p.192

5 White (1974), p.162

of Griffin and Khan, have increased savings (by cutting down the consumption of the well-off) at the same time as being more equitable.

7.2.2. The Effectiveness of Industrial Development

The above paragraphs have described what happened to the income that was shifted up the income scale. That resources went in this direction was an inevitable result of a number of policies including the maintenance of high tariffs. Tariffs provide a protected market for growing industries but they also raise prices and profits, thereby producing a shift in income from the masses to the business sector. Lewis and Guisinger found, taking into account the effects of the tariff structure and the scarcity prices that could be charged for goods subject to import restrictions, and therefore for their home-produced substitutes too, that the median industry of a sample of 32 industries obtained 78.5% of its value-added from the overall protection system in 1963-64.¹ Soligo and Stern found that some of Pakistan's largest and most profitable firms were highly inefficient, receiving their profits entirely through protection. Sometimes "the net subsidy received through tariff protection exceeds the total value added."² Islam found, though, that at least a substantial core of Pakistan's industry was probably efficient.³ A number of observers mention that the low prices of capital equipment brought about by the government through the overvalued rupee and low interest rates resulted in an excessively capital-intensive industrial base. Thus, industrial growth was not able to soak up any of Pakistan's huge pool of unemployed. Furthermore, due to inefficiency, there was enormous excess capacity in some sectors.

7.2.3. Concentration in Industry and Finance

If the government in Pakistan was unwilling to attempt to achieve social goals directly, through the use of its own resources, the rewards it had or felt it had to give to the private sector to achieve them were very substantial. In a situation of scarce resources needing very careful allocation, the channelling of huge rewards to the private sector was bound to result in a great deal of industrial concentration. Those few lucky enough to get licences (through which resources were allocated) got the rewards. Even by the later 1950s industrial and financial concentration had become an important

1 See discussion in White (1974)

2 See Griffin and Khan (1972), p.139

3 Islam, in Ibid, pp.149-68

political question which, by the late 1960s had become acute, reaching boiling-point in April 1968 with the announcement by the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission that economic power in Pakistan was concentrated in the hands of 20 families.

A very careful study of the problem has been made by Lawrence White, who studied the period up to 1968. Rather than the 20 or so families which came to be of such political significance, he took as his sample 43 groups, 39 of which could be identified with particular families. Though the degree of concentration was not as great as the government's political opponents claimed at the time, it was nevertheless very substantial. The top 43 groups controlled over two-fifths of all manufacturing assets. Concentration was even greater as the top tenth or so of this group controlled over one quarter of the assets of the 43 groups.¹ This degree of concentration becomes more acute when banking is included. At the end of 1968, 65.9% of deposits were with private Pakistani banks, 24.2% with government banks, 9.9% with foreign banks. Out of the four largest banks three were private. These three had 55.3% of all deposits and also happened to be controlled by three of the big industrial families. In all, seven of the 43 industrial groups controlled banks, with 60.3% of all deposits.²

These facts show that there was a great deal of overlap in concentration between industrial and financial companies, enabling the big groups to extend their resources but also to keep them 'within the family'. It is very important to see how this degree of concentration came about. It has already been mentioned that it depended very much on the allocation by government of scarce resources. The mechanism used was the licensing system. A licence was required for the initial investment, and for the subsequent importation of capital goods and raw materials necessitated by the investment. A licence meant very favourable treatment. This system of restrictions and incentives was highly profitable to industrialists, but they also acted as effective barriers to entry, and thus as a powerful mechanism for concentration. "Small wonder, then, that entrepreneurs who were within the licensing system, despite their claimed ideological commitments to a 'free enterprise system', were the most ardent

1 White (1974), p.65

2 Ibid, p.75

supporters of the licensing system."¹

The final picture is one of an industrial base artificially bloated, inefficient to a large extent, but highly profitable to a small sector of society, and established at great cost to the rest of society. In some degree such economic changes might be inevitable in any developing country trying to industrialise at a fast pace, but there is no doubt that the government's policies brought about an unnecessarily high degree of inequity, with what was in reality only a partially successful industrialisation programme. While on the one hand a small sector of society became extremely rich (businessmen and politicians, military officers, and civil servants - and their relatives - who left their careers to join the business bandwagon), the rest of society remained economically stagnant or even became economically worse off. I will now briefly describe the situation of the masses over this period.

7.3. The Social Costs of Pakistan's Economic Development

7.3.1. Poverty in Town and Country

Though Pakistan's industrial sector grew well from the time of independence, by the end of the 1960s the rural population was probably worse off than it had been at independence. Most of Pakistan's population was rural, more so in East than in West Pakistan. Swadesh Bose (with the usual qualifications about the limitations of the data) shows that rural income per capita in East Pakistan probably declined during the 1950s (from Rs.271 to Rs.238 p.a.) It went up to Rs.279 in 1963/4². Rural income per head was consistently about 40% of urban income per head.

The decline in agriculture during the 1950s hit agricultural labourers the hardest (i.e. those with little or no land). Census data for East Pakistan show that the proportion of the agricultural labour force taken up by this group increased from 14% in 1951 to at least 17% in 1961. Bose estimates too that the real income of this group declined over the period.³ Thus, even with the considerable agricultural improvements of the 1960s, the agricultural labourer - the poor of the poor - was probably worse off in 1966 than he had been at independence, and saw the 'subsistence' level being pushed

1 Ibid, p.121

2 In Griffin and Khan (1972), p.254

3 Ibid, p.267

down to its lowest possible limits. Griffin calculates that the consumption per head of foodgrains was about the same in 1963/4 (15 ounces per day), as it had been in 1948/9 (16 ounces per day). "The conclusion of all this is that the vast majority of the Pakistani population probably has a lower standard of living today, than when the country achieved its independence in 1947."¹

Nevertheless, even though the urban sector was the main beneficiary of the government's policies, not all urban dwellers gained. The benefits accrued solely to the elite. In fact A.R.Khan believes "that a very large majority of the rural population in each region is better off than an average industrial worker." Industrial workers did not benefit from rapid industrialisation. The industrial sector was still small even by the late 1960s. It was not growing sufficiently, in absolute terms, to absorb Pakistan's great labour surplus, much of which comprised rural workers and farmers forced off the land by agricultural decline in the 1950s. This enabled industrialists to pay subsistence wages. A.R. Khan estimates that the industrial wage index (in real terms) declined by 3.6% from 1954 to 1962/3 in East Pakistan and 11.6% in West Pakistan.² Griffin extended the analysis to include later years, using the same methods. He found that in West Pakistan in 1966/7 the real wage index was 88.8, about the same as in 1962/3, while in East Pakistan it was in 1967/8 101.1, showing a small rise over the 1962/3 level.³ Thus, as Griffin points out, in a period of rapid industrial growth, the average industrial wage declined or sometimes, at best, stagnated.

These facts indicate that the benefits of industrialisation accrued solely to the industrialists and allied elites. This can be seen more clearly in labour's (factor) share of value-added. Khan estimates that in East Pakistan labour's share fell from 46.3% in 1954 to 28.8% in 1962/3. In West Pakistan it rose slightly from 30.3% to 33.8%.⁴ White refers to figures in the West Pakistan Census of Manufacturing Industries showing that labour's share in 1967/8 was only 26.4% of value-added, the rest going to capital.⁵

The benefits that accrued to the top industrial families through the government's economic policies have already been described.

1 Ibid, p.38

2 Ibid, p.235

3 Ibid, p.205

4 Ibid, p.247

5 White (1974), p.31

Though the government did all it could to extract a surplus from the masses for this purpose, it paid little attention to welfare problems.

"For example, over the entire period of planned development, that is, since 1954-55, the percentage allocation of development resources devoted to education never exceeded 6 percent; for health services only 2 percent; and for housing 20 percent (the latter even includes sizeable expenditures on the new capital at Islamabad and the second capital at Dacca)."¹

7.3.2. Regional Inequality: East against West Pakistan

A large part of the inequality implicit in the discussion so far was reflected in inter-wing disparities, as East Pakistan was more rural than the Western wing, and it was the rural areas that bore most of the burden of development. Economic disparity between the two wings was the country's overriding political problem. It is commonly accepted that it was the cause of East Pakistan's secession. I shall be qualifying this argument somewhat, but there is no doubt that significant disparities existed, that government policies played some part in exacerbating them, and that the gap between the two wings was a contributory factor in the conflict that finally led to the break-up of Pakistan.

It is difficult to be certain how much of the crucial disparities were the result of conscious exploitation by West Pakistan of East Pakistan, or how much, by contrast, they were the reflection of the exploitation by the urban sector of the rural sector. (East Pakistan, as I have said, being the more rural of the two areas). That West Pakistan urbanised at a faster rate was itself the result of government policies, but it has to be said that the two regions were at the outset not the same; West Pakistan was somewhat more developed right from the start and always probably had greater economic potential. My own belief is that the direction of exploitation was not primarily inter-regional. The urban elite and the landlords exploited the rural masses wherever they were. The West Pakistan urban elite and landlord class were as happy exploiting the West Pakistani as they were the East Pakistani rural masses. There just happened to be more rural poor to exploit in the Eastern than in the Western wing.

1 Falcon and Stern, in Falcon and Papanek (1971), p.6

The elite in West Pakistan would, moreover, have been quite happy to share this exploitation with the East Pakistan elite, and such co-operation more than once (right up to the very last moment) nearly came off; but these elites were very different in background, as will be shown, and this made co-operation difficult.

The lynch-pin of the government's policy of rural exploitation was the consistent overvaluation of the rupee. Shortly after independence, less than a year after the government decided not to devalue the rupee (after a number of competitive currencies had devalued), the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Nurul Amin, complained in the Constitutional Assembly that "there is no doubt that the major burden of the non-devaluation had to be borne by the East Bengal (East Pakistan) jute growers."¹ Though the non-devaluation decision probably hit East Pakistan most (because of its greater dependence on exports), exports of West Pakistan's raw cotton were also substantial; that region's poor cotton-growers therefore suffered too. However, the effects on West Pakistan became of decreasing importance as cotton was increasingly used to supply internal demand. Eventually, the government was forced to concede; it devalued in 1955. But even then the currency remained significantly overvalued. By this time, East Pakistan, less industrialised than its sister wing, and more dependent on exports, was certainly suffering more. "This is due to the fact that overvaluation involves a transfer of real income from exporters to importers, and thereby... from (East Pakistan's) exporters to (West Pakistan's) importers." It seems very likely to me that the non-devaluation decision, and related policies, were designed to squeeze the peasants in general, not merely East Pakistani peasants.

The goal of the rural squeeze was, of course, rapid industrialisation. Here, too, there was inequality. Though East Pakistan's industry was less concentrated than West Pakistan's, the structure of ownership there became a far more volatile political issue because of the extent of 'outside' ownership. The big industrialists were primarily based in West Pakistan, but they also had a large stake in the East Pakistani economy, as the following table shows.

1 Report of Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, Legislature (3.10.50)

2 Rahman, M.A. (1963), p.52.

Table 7.2: Control of Manufacturing Assets, East & West Pakistan, 1968 (Rs.m)

	Assets Controlled by leading 43 families (1)	Total Manufacturing Assets (2)	Total Assets of Privately Controlled Firms (3)	(1) as a % of (2)	(1) as a % of (3)
East Pakistan	1,740.8	5,581.8	3,859.9	31.2	45.1
West Pakistan	4,563.8	9,477.2	8,405.1	48.3	54.4
Total	6,314.6	15,059.0	12,265.0	41.9	51.5
E.Pak.as a % of Total	27.6	37.1	31.5		
W.Pak. as a % of Total	72.4	62.9	68.5		

Source: White (1974), p.67

Most of the big firms were controlled by groups based in West Pakistan (which does not mean the owners were indigenous West Pakistanis; most were refugees from India). It is clear from the above table that the top 43 groups had a substantial stake in East Pakistan. It is also clear, however, that this interest can only have been of secondary importance to them. 72.4% of their assets were in West Pakistan, where they controlled nearly half (48.3%) of total assets. They controlled less than one-third (31.2%) of East Pakistan's assets. Furthermore, a much higher proportion of industry (the difference between columns 2 and 3 in the above table) was owned by government agencies in East Pakistan than in the West wing, especially from the early 1960s, largely because the political danger of letting 'outside' ownership go any further in East Pakistan than it had.

Another factor to take into account was inter-wing trade. What the big firms could not make in East Pakistan was exported there and often at high prices. This was one of the most important elements in West Pakistan's advantageous relationship with its sister province. This comes out clearly from an official study, carried out just after the loss of East Pakistan, on the problems this loss would cause to West Pakistani industry.

"The East Pakistan crisis starting from March 1971 and culminating in the complete closure of East Pakistan market

on West Pakistan producers by December 1971 has come to cause the most serious set-back to the country's efforts for economic development."¹

Manufactures took up on average about half of the East wing's imports from West Pakistan. In 1954/5 the exact figure was 56.3%, in 1964/5 60%, in 1970/1 45.1%. On the other hand the proportion of West Pakistani manufactures exported to East Pakistan was never overwhelming and, at least in percentage terms, it declined consistently over time. In 1954/5 18.1% of West Pakistani manufacturing output went to East Pakistan. In 1959/60 this was 12.7%, and by 1964/5 the figure was down to 10.9%.²

This official study, dealing, after all, with the loss of a major market, is extremely frank. After showing that West Pakistan's textiles exports to East Pakistan as a proportion of total textiles exports had fallen from 99% in 1954/5 to 30% in 1970/1, it goes on to point out that

"inter-wing exports took place at much higher prices inclusive of internal excise taxes, than the prices fetched by overseas exports... the East Pakistani market was far more important for West Pakistan's cotton textiles than the overseas market from the point of view of value-added in manufacturing; including the provision of employment and the generation of income."³

Though the significance of West Pakistan's advantageous trading relationship with its 'sister-wing' is clear enough here, it is equally clear that the East Pakistani market was of declining importance to West Pakistan.

Having described the ways in which East Pakistan's resources were used, whether deliberately or not, to help develop West Pakistan, what were the effects of this process? East Pakistan's per capita income was about 91% of West Pakistan's in 1949/50. By 1959/60 it had fallen to about 74%. From 1949/50 to 1959/60 West Pakistan's per capita income by 13%; in East Pakistan it fell by 5.6%. From 1959/60 to 1964/5 per capita income grew by 24.4% in West Pakistan, by 13.5% in East Pakistan.⁴

1 National Institute of Social and Economic Research:
Need of the Hour (May, 1972), foreword.

2 Ibid, pp.30/1

3 Ibid, pp35/6

4 From Papanek (1967), p.20

Some of the above inequality may have been the result of natural economic factors, but it was certainly exacerbated by government policy, some of which was quite overt in its apparent discrimination. Perhaps some bias towards West Pakistan followed 'naturally' upon its establishment of a greater industrial base than existed in East Pakistan. But even in the public sector, i.e. through the government investment agencies, West Pakistan was allocated more resources. According to Papanek¹ by 1958 almost two-thirds of net government investment made by the PIDC was in West Pakistan. (East Pakistan protests then led to the establishment of a separate PIDC for each wing). Figures for the other two agencies are as follows:

Table 7.3: Regional Distribution of Industrial Aid from Two State Agencies

	PICIC		IDBP	
	1961/2	1963	1961/2	1963
West Pakistan	67%	61%	67%	42%
East Pakistan	33%	39%	33%	58%

7.3.3. The Social Costs of Development: Summary

Pakistan's economic development entailed a considerable shift in income from the countryside to the cities, in particular to the urban elites. The rural masses in both wings of Pakistan suffered from this shift in income, but East Pakistan suffered more because it had a much larger rural population. Significant economic disparities existed between the two wings of Pakistan. It seems that there were in part the result of natural differences between them (apart from anything else, West Pakistan was many times larger than East Pakistan, and yet had a slightly smaller population to feed), but they were exacerbated by government policies that favoured the more urbanised and commercial areas. From quite early on West Pakistan was able to take advantage of East Pakistan's relative weakness in inter-wing trade and investment. However, the political dangers of this were recognised in the 1960s; government agencies tried to increase investment in East Pakistan, while much rural aid was also pumped in. At the same time, import substitution in East Pakistan went far enough

1 Ibid, p.90

to lead to a decline in West Pakistan's dominant trading position. There was some overt discrimination in favour of West Pakistan in the distribution of government investment spending and of foreign aid, but efforts were made to alter this, as can be seen from the creation of the EPIDC and from the IDBP's distribution of aid in 1963 (see the above table). The discrimination was, as I have said, in favour of the cities against the countryside, and the rich against the poor. This did not, though, reflect the workings of an established class structure, as I shall show in the next section.

7.4. Economic Development: The Political Background

It can be argued that the issue of industrialisation and the means used for achieving this were, to some extent at least, a red herring. The greatest growth in the period under study was not in the industrial but in the tertiary sector (see table 7.4) - and a large part of this was under the control of government (in particular, spending on military personnel and the civil service). Government jobs were somewhat less important in Pakistan than in Nigeria because of the greater opportunities in agriculture and business, but they were still a very valuable source of opportunity as well as being the means of influencing policy in agriculture and business.

Though the economic superiority of West Pakistan over its sister wing came to be large, surprisingly this was only to a minor extent due to the success of industry there.

Table 7.4: Regional Per Capita GDP in 1959-60, Market-prices (in Rupees)

	1949-50		1954-55		1959-60		1964-65	
	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Agriculture	197	165	184	161	174	156	188	165
Manufacturing	3	5	6	20	9	32	13	59
Other	104	161	106	173	105	185	124	240
Total	304	330	297	354	288	372	326	464

Source: Papanek (1967), p.318

Though the contribution of industry in West Pakistan to income per capita went up from barely anything in 1949/50 to nearly 13% in 1964/5, the tertiary sector continued to contribute the most - about 50%. Its contribution to GDP per head was still four times bigger than that of industry in 1964/5. He who controlled government had access to resources, as well as control over industrial policy and over who should gain from this. Numerous class fragments were involved in the struggle for control. These class fragments were more substantial (and less communally influenced) than those in Nigeria.

Despite rapid changes of nearly indistinguishable regimes in the 1950s, and the drastic change to a completely different type of regime in 1958 (in power until 1969), the fundamental tenets of Pakistan's economic policy never changed. This policy - the emphasis on rapid industrialisation and the continued insistence on achieving this through the private sector - was laid down from the very beginning, and retained. Why was this so? In Papanek's view, "inequalities in income contribute to the growth of the economy, which makes possible a real improvement for the lower-income groups."¹ Pakistan's industrialists were just tough-minded businessmen ("robber-barons") who took advantage of the opportunities the government gave to them. They did not pull the strings.

"Contrary to some simplified neo-Marxist analyses, the civil service and therefore the government were neither subservient to nor allied with either landlord or business interests. Nor were they drawn from these groups."²

This might apply to the original formation of Pakistan's economic policies, but, as Papanek himself points out, during the period of rapid development businessmen moved into the power structure and politicians and civil servants into business. Other writers look less benignly on the policies that brought the latter situation about.

"The government has created a small class of privileged industrial monopolists who reap enormous profits on a small turnover... this policy has been carried to such an extreme

1 Ibid, p.242

2 Ibid, p.139

that the standard of living of the majority of the population has declined, despite the fact that national income per capita has grown."¹

Both Papanek and Griffin suggest that the government 'created' the industrial elite, but while the former sees this as a result of chance Griffin sees it as the result of conspiracy. I shall be arguing that the 'conspiracy' theory is somewhat too fanciful. On the other hand, I do not think it right to let everything be explained simply by chance. The creation of an industrial elite and very substantial inequalities was certainly deliberate, but the regional distribution of these inequalities was to some extent a matter of chance. There were conspiracies and alliances (between various class fragments), but these were created in order to exploit the masses, wherever they were; they were not created explicitly to exploit East Pakistan.

The masses in both East and West Pakistan suffered from the inequalities produced in the name of development. East Pakistan suffered more because it had a larger rural population. But, more important than this, East Pakistan lacked an elite capable of receiving the fruits of this exploitation. If there was ethnic discrimination it was against this weak East Pakistani elite. There was no Moslem landlord or business elite to take advantage of the structure of exploitation, nor as yet a powerful political elite. However, as the East Pakistani elite lacked any significant economic foundation, it could only hope to achieve progress through politics. Despite the existence of pronounced class fragments in Pakistan, their fortunes were still largely dependent on politics. What we have, then, is a struggle between various class fragments which was carried out at the political level.

Put as briefly as possible, Pakistan's political history can be summarised as an alternating sequence of political and military rule: first political then military, and then the same sequence over again. Only the second of the two political periods was democratic. The first political rulers were meant to establish a constitution and machinery for a fully democratic system. They never quite got that far. Though there were many changes of government in this period,

1 Griffin and Khan (1972), p.13.

those in power at any one time were always drawn from a small pool of politicians. The political struggle was intense, but until the encroachment of the military the struggle was always within this small pool of people. There was no general election based on universal suffrage until 1970. The political process in this first period was one of a continuous reshuffling of a limited pack of picture cards.

During this period the conflict was entirely political in nature. There was little discussion of the direction that the economy should take. Indeed, there was little disagreement over this. The nature of the country's economic development was largely taken for granted. Politics was given primacy. This is because, as I have argued above, in developing countries power is the main economic resource. The struggle was between a limited number of groups for power, and the economic benefits that went with it. The political procrastination and the lack of disagreement over, or even concern for, the nature of economic development bespeak this clearly enough. There was no economic threat from outside the oligarchy. The threats were internal and political. In other words this was a period of intra-class rather than inter-class struggle.

This oligarchical rule was, though, based primarily, but not entirely, in West Pakistan. There was a substantial difference in the background of the politicians of East and West Pakistan. The basis of this distinction lay in the nature of land-ownership. The landlords of West Pakistan were mostly Moslems, and land-ownership there was highly unequal. East Pakistan, a very densely populated area, was characterised by small holdings. Moreover, most large land-owners were Hindus, and these were easily dispossessed by the Muslim League government after partition in 1947. The results of the process can be seen from the following table, which applies to the 1950s.

Table 7.5: Distribution of Land-ownership

West Pakistan			East Pakistan		
Acres	% owners	% landlords	Acres	% owners	% landlords
0-5	64.5	15.0	0-5	77.0	42.0
5-25	28.5	31.7	5-25	22.0	52.0
25-100	5.7	22.4	25-40	-	3.0
100-500	1.1	15.9	40plus	-	2.0
500 plus	0.1	15.0			

In East Pakistan 94% of land-ownership is in holdings of upto 25 acres only. In West Pakistan less than 50% of the land is held in such small holdings. There over 30% of land is held in units of over 100 acres, and by a mere 1.2% of all land-owners.

The consequences of the distribution just described were a set of politicians based on wealth in West Pakistan (the large land-owners), and a set of middle-class politicians in East Pakistan based on positions of professional influence. The following table makes this clear enough. The bulk of Pakistan politicians had a foundation in land-ownership

Table 7.6: Membership of the Constituent Assembly of 1955¹

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Landlords	-	28
Lawyers	20	3
Retired officials	9	5
Businessmen	3	4
Miscellaneous	8	-
Total	40	40

(which did not make them a substantial or united class in their own right; they were a fragmented group whose power had been diminished greatly by the urban migrants from India). There was at the same time a growing industrial elite in West Pakistan and also a powerful bureaucracy. The elite in East Pakistan, by contrast, relied solely on politics. That the three West Pakistan elites just mentioned - politicians, businessmen and civil servants - all had a role in the determination of Pakistan's economic development, does not mean they in any way acted as a united class. In order to throw further light

¹ Jahan (1973), pp.15 and 19

on this I will in the next section take a closer look at the backgrounds of those involved in Pakistan's economic development.

7.5. Economic Development: The Protagonists

West Pakistan's greater industrial development was the result neither of chance nor of conspiracy. I shall show that the three elites most involved in Pakistan's industrial development - the politicians, the civil service, and the industrialists themselves - had little socio-economic or geographical background in common, and in fact had different, even conflicting, interests. If there was no conspiracy, at least in the building of the foundations of Pakistan's development, nor was chance a factor. As regards regional disparities, West Pakistan always had greater potential and that is sufficient, in my view, to explain its faster economic development. However, that does not explain why particular people gained more from development than others, and that is what I am interested in. West Pakistan's industrial base did not develop faster because it had more industrialists (as Papanek argues); West Pakistan's industrialists grew rich because of West Pakistan's industrial growth and because the government greatly favoured the private sector. There was growth in East Pakistan too, but East Pakistan lacked a business elite which could take advantage of this. Had one existed, the government would have been happy to share the fruits of development with it. The three elites which I shall now be taking a closer look at were simply interested in squeezing the rural poor. They were not especially interested in squeezing East Pakistan.

7.5.1. Pakistan's Businessmen

There is no doubt that West Pakistan had a stronger business elite than East Pakistan, but the bulk of it was not indigenous. Most Moslem businessmen fleeing India at the time of partition went to West Pakistan rather than the East. Neither wing had at the outset many industrialists. The industrial class was fashioned by the government. Papanek's 1959 survey of 255 firms¹ (9% of all firms but responsible for 58% of value added by manufacturing) shows that the largest number of industrialists had originally been in trade. For 45% of the sample trade had been the primary occupation before 1947, and for many others the secondary occupation. Only 17% had

1 Papanek (1967)

been industrialists before 1947. Furthermore, only 6% of current industrial assets were owned by businessmen whose fathers had been in industry. Not only had most of Pakistan's industrialists initially been in trade, they also tended to come from religious or geographical communities with strong traditions of trade.

To shed further light on the origins of the business elite I analysed the geographical backgrounds and migrations of 172 businessmen (mostly in industry), described in a Pakistani 'Who's Who' for 1959/60. As with Papanek's sample, this probably covered the most important firms in Pakistan.

Table 7.7: The Origins of 172 Pakistani Businessmen

Born in	Now based in		Total
	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	
India	67	22	89
West Pakistan	53	1	54
East Pakistan	-	16	16
Elsewhere (Moslem)	2	-	2
Europe (ex-patriates)	7	-	7
Not specified	2	2	4
Total	131	41	172

Source: Pakistan Trade Directory and Who's Who, 1959-60, Barque and Co.Ltd., Lahore.

The table shows that of the 89 businessmen who had been born in India 67 (75%) went to West Pakistan and 22 (25%) to East Pakistan. (However, East Pakistanis might be under-represented in the 'Who's Who' as it was published in West Pakistan; as against this, the figures seem to fit the known circumstances). Of more interest than this is that West Pakistan had nearly as many indigenous businessmen as it received from India (53 against 67); so did East Pakistan, but at a considerably lower level (16 against 22 ; it is unlikely on the face of it that this proportion would be affected by any under-reporting of East Pakistanis). This also means that nearly two-fifths of the total sample of 172 were indigenous West Pakistanis. I also managed to obtain additional information on 53 of the 89 who were born in India. Nearly 20% of these 53 had

some business interests in what was to become Pakistan before partition. Only one of these men had interests in the Eastern wing before this time. Before partition, then, a large proportion of Pakistan's future businessmen already had a considerable nexus with West Pakistan.

For those that migrated to either wing of Pakistan on or after partition, proximity (or relative proximity) seems to have determined their choice. 97 out of the 172 businessmen migrated from India to Pakistan (i.e. including a number not born in India). If a line were to be drawn mid-way through India, somewhere to the East of Delhi (running from North to South), it can be seen that 60 (62%) of these 97 men went from the Western half of India to West Pakistan, 17 (18%) went from Eastern India to East Pakistan; small but equal numbers went from West to East and East to West, and there were a few more roundabout migrations.

It seems reasonable to conclude from the above data that migrations were probably based on simple geographical proximity or traditional ties. West Pakistan had a huge border with India and many large Moslem communities lived fairly near this border. East Pakistan had a very small border and was isolated in a mostly Hindu part of the sub-continent. That West Pakistan attracted more men already established in business than East Pakistan was, therefore, not a matter of chance or conspiracy; there were cultural and geographical reasons for it. The same goes for the fact that West Pakistan already had a relatively large number of businessmen prior to partition. The simple fact is that in East Pakistan Hindus dominated business.

7.5.2. Pakistan's Politicians

As has already been indicated, the industrial class was actively created by the government; the government controlled nearly every aspect of the economy. "Even the most self-confident industrialists saw their position vis-à-vis the government as that of supplicant, rather than master."¹ As Papanek points out, the businessmen had different class backgrounds from both the politicians and the civil servants. University education was very important for the latter groups, especially for civil servants. Many entrepreneurs had no

1 Papanek (1967), p.138

more than a basic education, and only 27% of Papanek's sample had some sort of college education.¹ Both of the other two groups tended to view a career in industry as a matter of 'dirtying ones' hands'. The career structures of politicians and civil servants were entirely different.

Out of 31 ex-politicians, who had been in power before the 1959 coup, mentioned in the 'Who's Who' for 1959/60 just referred to, 13 had started off in the legal profession, four had been administrators, two teachers and one had been in the military; three were land-owners and three were important businessmen. (The occupational backgrounds of the remaining five are not indicated). No doubt some landed or business interests are unstated; nevertheless, the contrast with the backgrounds of Pakistan's businessmen is clear enough. 19 out of the 25 politicians whose occupational past is given had been in the professions. The same applies to the politicians in power after the coup. Of the 14 described in the 'Who's Who', three were military men, five came from the administration, and five had been in the legal profession. Thus, out of the total sample of 40 politicians for whom backgrounds are specified 29 had at some time had professional (including administrative) careers; another four came from the military.

Another interesting factor is the difference in place of origin between businessmen and politicians. Of the sample of 31 politicians in power before the 1959 coup, place of birth is given for 26. 23 of these had been born in Pakistan. Of the five whose birth-place is not given, four had been educated in India, one in Pakistan. Three of the four educated in India had gone on to work in Pakistan. The same goes for the politicians in power after the coup. Putting these together with the pre-coup politicians makes a total sample of 45. Only four of these have somewhere in India specified as their place of birth. The Pakistani political elite was, therefore, largely indigenous. No doubt immigrants from India, apart from the founding fathers of the main party, the Muslim League, found it relatively difficult to get political support in the new country.

There were, thus, striking differences between the political and industrial elites. Their occupational backgrounds were very different;

1 Falcon and Papanek (1971), p.240

perhaps more important, most politicians were natives of Pakistan, most businessmen were immigrants from India. It does not seem likely that politicians had any reason to become the spokesmen of the industrialists, at least in class terms. Later on, as the latter group progressed, this was less so.

"Now that they owned newspapers and financed political groups, their support was increasingly valuable in political life... Leading industrial families began to intermarry families important in the civil service, the military, and in the landed aristocracy...Some of the leading civil service, military, and political families began to invest in industry."¹

But in the beginning, when the main foundations of economic policy were being laid, this state of affairs did not exist.

The initial stress on private enterprise was in part due to the sheer inadequacy of the state apparatus at the time of independence and the desperate need for someone to develop the commercial and industrial possibilities of the country. In 1947 the government barely had the wherewithal to run the machinery of state, even its day-to-day affairs. It was happy to let anyone who could develop commerce or industry on their own initiative do so, and to encourage them with financial assistance. The nationalist government had no concrete economic ideology. Its nationalism was based entirely on independence from India, and the need to establish industries was for a long time seen in terms of competition with India, who before partition had processed the raw materials produced in the area to become Pakistan. So important was this need seen to be that the nationalist leader, Jinnah, had done much to persuade some Moslem businessmen to establish industries even before partition.² It seems entirely reasonable to view these efforts in terms of nationalism rather than as early collusion between political and business interests. In fact, Hannah Papanek points out that few of the businessmen who later became powerful in Pakistan had had this early association with politics. (On the other hand, though there were calls from some members of the early Muslim League for nationalisation and progressive taxation, the party could hardly be said to have had much time for

1 Papanek (1967), pp.140/1

2 See Papanek, Hannah (1972)

socialism. As 163 out of the 503 members of the Muslim League Council were landlords and another 145 lawyers, this was hardly surprising.)¹

7.5.3. Pakistan's Civil Servants

There is no doubt that the civil service in Pakistan is very powerful. Some consider that Pakistan has at times virtually been ruled by the upper reaches of the service. Most senior bureaucrats are 'career' civil servants. They enter at a young age through competitive examinations and work their way up on the basis of seniority. Like the politicians, in terms of background they have little in common with the business elite. The following table makes this clear.

Table 7.8: Occupational Backgrounds of 432 Public Servant's Fathers

	%
Government service ¹	61.2
Military	3.1
Private from employees	2.1
Land-owners	14.9
Businessmen	10.8
Legal practitioners	3.2
Medical	1.9
Other/No response ²	2.8
Total	100.0

Notes: ¹ This includes 42 (out of the total 264) employees in the railways, semi-government agencies, and princely states.

² 'Other' includes a few politicians and religious notables

Source: Ahmad, Muneer (1964), p.53

Ahmad ranked 46% of the above sample as having 'high status' backgrounds, with an equal number from 'low status' backgrounds (the rest being undetermined). His data was acquired from interviews of 432 gazetted civil servants based in Lahore (of which 31 were officers from the elite corps, the Civil Service of Pakistan, or CSP). It can be seen from the above that three-fifths of them came from civil service families. In fact 65.7% of the sample had themselves been in government service before coming to Pakistan.² But only 97 out of the total 3,121 public servants who migrated from India

1 Ibid, p.9

2 Ahmad, M. (1964), p.39

had held high administrative posts in India.¹ Coming to Pakistan, then, allowed them considerable mobility. This is confirmed by the fact that nearly half of Ahmad's sample of gazetted (i.e. high status) officers had low status backgrounds. A large number had fathers who were by no means very well off, though there was much variation here. The mean income of fathers was Rs.532.5 per month. 28.2% earned less than Rs.300, 10% above Rs.1,000.² 28% of the fathers had degrees, while 79.4% of the civil servants themselves, had degrees.³ Clearly, the educational background was strong. So was the urban background; 81.2% of the sample came from urban areas.

To get some idea of the regional origins of Pakistan's early civil servants I examined the backgrounds of 163 top Pakistani bureaucrats (using data given in the 1955/6 edition of the Biographical Encyclopedia of Pakistan⁴). Of these, 28 were employed in East Pakistan, 135 in West Pakistan. This itself is not surprising as the capital (Karachi) was in West Pakistan. 79 of these civil servants had come from India, 66 from West Pakistan and 18 from East Pakistan. This clearly indicates the advantage that civil servants born in West Pakistan had. Their proximity to the capital meant that they were bound to dominate the upper reaches of the administration. Of the 79 who came from India, 68 went to West Pakistan and 11 to East Pakistan. There were also a few migrations between the two wings.

Table 7.9: Origins of 163 Top Pakistani Civil Servants (upto 1955)

From	Working in		Total
	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	
India	68	11	79
West Pakistan	63	3	66
East Pakistan	4	14	18

Of the 63 civil servants born in and working in Pakistan, 39 came from the Punjab. Thus nearly 30% of all of the civil servants in the above sample working in West Pakistan in the early 1950s came from the Punjab (and over half of these from in or around Lahore). This suggests a core of Punjabi influence over, though not domination of, a crucial sphere of activity.

1 Ibid, p.44

2 Ibid, p.57

3 Ibid, pp.48 and 57

4 Published by International Publishers, Ltd., Lahore.

In sum, the civil servants were similar to the businessmen in terms of regional background. The dominant proportion came from India, and most of these went to West Pakistan, but this wing, in particular the Punjab, contained a significant core of indigenous businessmen (most of the indigenous businessmen in my sample were from the Punjab) and civil servants. However, these two groups were unlike in class terms. They had very distinct class origins, the businessmen coming generally from families traditionally involved in small-scale trade, the civil servants from much more highly educated 'career' families with long traditions in administration. The latter had some class similarities to the politicians at least in terms of education and status. But they had dissimilar regional origins. Moreover, the politicians, being mostly indigenous, were much more closely connected to land in West Pakistan (that was their power-base) than were the civil servants, most of whom were migrants; the latter, meanwhile, had a greater attachment to career than did the politicians. There were, thus, considerable differences between the three elites just described.

This still leaves undiscussed the core of West Pakistani, particularly Punjabi, members of all three elites. It is unlikely that these native West Pakistanis came to dominate the scene. Pakistan's peculiar history must not be forgotten. The major cities were swamped by migrants from India on and after partition. In 1951 46.3% of the nearly 4,000,000 inhabitants of the major cities were such migrants. In Karachi, the figure was 57.1%¹. Power in Pakistan had been in the hands of a small number of landed families. Now it fell into the hands of migrants who had led the Pakistan Movement. The distinction was profound.

"Whereas the indigenous population of Pakistan was mostly rural, the migrants were mostly urban. And since the migrants had spearheaded the Pakistan Movement, they not only moved into the new country but also took over the command of its political, social and economic life."²

This is not exactly so, as, though the political leadership went to migrants, the indigenous land-owners held traditional political influence

1 Burki, (1980), p.12

2 Ibid, p.14

in their areas, and they remained in powerful political stratum . Moreover, as Burki argues, they managed to maintain considerable political power in the succeeding decades. But, as Burki indicates, and as I have shown in section 7.5.2., the politicians through the 1950s were becoming increasingly middle-class and, in particular, increasingly connected with the professions. Comparison with Table 7.6 makes this clear enough. It might seem odd that a class of politicians based on the land should barter away considerable economic power by actively encouraging the creation of a powerful industrial elite; for a class not used to industrial investment, though, this was necessary. It had to get its raw materials processed.¹

In sum, it would be difficult to claim, as some writers do, that these various elites formed a cohesive class. It is unlikely that they could from the outset, with their clear differences of geographical and social background (made even greater by the distinction between natives and migrants) and what must have been substantial differences of interest (land-ownership/bureaucratic control/private sector industrialisation), have coalesced as, or even cooperated as, a united class. There was considerable fragmentation, which receded only slowly. From the start there were clear conflicts of interest between what could be called little more than class fragments. That does not mean different class fragments did not gain differently from development. Though West Pakistan did not develop faster than East Pakistan simply because of its greater endowment of entrepreneurs, the latter certainly gained out of development, and gradually asserted enough influence over policy to at least protect their interests. East Pakistan simply lacked an elite which could gain from development in the same way. As the industrial elite was the creation of political decision it is worth looking at the motivations of the politicians in more detail. This I shall do in the next section, in which it shall be seen that the politicians in fact gave very little heed to industrial development.

1 Personal interview with Mian Mumtaz Daultana, a big land-owner and ex-Premier of the Punjab.

7.6. The Motivations of the Political Elite

To throw further light on the balance of power in the first political period (1947-58) I have analysed one year's proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (later, after the eventual adoption of a constitution, the National Assembly). As there was no legislature before the 1956 constitution apart from the Constituent Assembly, it was responsible for law-making as well as for formulation of the constitution. It is only in the former role, as legislature, that I have examined the Assembly. Though I have analysed only one year's proceedings, I have examined the entire proceedings for that year, so the distribution of subjects discussed in that year should say something about the motivations of the politicians; this is especially so as a large part of the discussion concerned the budget, thus giving scope for the debates to cover a wide range of economic topics. But what the analysis in fact shows is that politics rather than economics was the primary interest of Assembly members. Rather little attention was paid to such major areas of the economy as industry or agriculture. The politicians were concerned with power, the regional bases of this, and the fruits of office.

There is no doubt that the Assembly was not an effective legislative instrument, but in terms of Pakistan's power struggles it was exceedingly important, more so than the Nigerian assemblies were (but these were also more important in the power struggle than they were as legislatures). This was so because the Muslim League, the party that had led the Pakistan Movement, began to suffer a drastic decline in influence a few years after partition, until the point was reached where no party or faction had certain control over the Assembly. The intensity of the power struggle in the legislatures can be gauged from the fact that, as in Nigeria, violence occurred in one of the Assemblies (that of East Pakistan, not analysed below). 30 members of the Assembly were removed by the police. A few days later the Deputy Speaker died, ostensibly as a result of injuries received in the Chamber.¹ Because of their importance in the balance of power, analysis of Assembly proceedings is a useful way of gaining insight into the motivations of the political elite of the time.

1 Feldman (1967), p.29

There is a clear difference between the apparent concerns of the M.Ps. in Pakistan in its first political period and those of the M.Ps. of Nigeria in its first political period. Relatively little time was spent on praise or condemnation of government for its own sake. More significantly, very little time was spent on demands for local facilities, even though most discussion was on budgetary matters. The amount of space taken up by these categories in the year examined (1956) is given below (in percentages). The Constituent Assembly dissolved itself in 1956 and became the National Assembly, holding two sessions that year.

Table 7.10: The Constituent Assembly and National Assembly of 1956, selected categories (%)

	Constituent Assembly	National Assembly	
		1st session	2nd session
Pro-government	2.2	1.9	2.2
Anti-government	2.2	1.2	2.0
Local facilities	0.5	0.8	-

A mere 21 out of 677 PQs in the National Assembly's first session, and two out of 193 in its second session, consisted of demands for local facilities. The Nigerian M.P's. routine of praising the government and then asking for special consideration for his constituency is absent from the Pakistani parliament of this period. The reason for this is quite simple. The small number of M.Ps. in the Pakistani assembly of this time were not elected by universal suffrage. It was an elitist organisation. It did not contain the vast sub-elite of locally elected M.Ps. that the Nigerian assemblies held. As they had managed to stay at the centre since partition without calling a general election, they had no need to see any local area as their power-base, and there was more at stake than mere local influence. Being at the centre, unencumbered, they saw their interests elsewhere.

7.6.1. The Constituent Assembly, 1956

The crucial focus of interest was not local, but regional. The final session of the Constituent Assembly, before it became the National Assembly, though formally taken up nearly entirely with the budget, in fact spent the most substantial part of its time talking about the concerns of East Pakistan. This was the case

even though East Pakistani affairs were only formally tabled and taken up for discussion. Discussion of East Pakistan took up 43% of total Assembly time in this session.

Altogether economic affairs took up 27.8% of Assembly time. Table 7.11 shows how this was split up (using the same technique as in my analysis of the Nigerian assemblies). There were no PQs at all in this Assembly.

Table 7.11: Discussion of Economic Matters in the Constituent Assembly, 1956 (%)

International Trade and aid	4.3
Agriculture	7.2
Industry	15.8
Trade and commerce	1.1
Government finance	11.9
General development	18.0
Unemployment/poverty	40.3
Industrial relations/labour	-
Other economic	1.4
Total	100.0

There were one or two socialist-inclined members in the House, and interestingly, questions of poverty and unemployment were uppermost, though workers and industrial relations were disregarded.

Social questions took up a mere 2.2% of total Assembly time, partly because health and education were provincial responsibilities. All political discussion took up 55.2% of total Assembly time. This was dominated by the East Pakistan question.

Table 7.12: Political Discussion in the Constituent Assembly 1956 (%)

Constitution	0.4
Pro-government	4.0
Anti-government	4.0
Nationalism	0.5
East Pakistan regionalism	77.9
Other regionalism	0.8
Minorities	9.0
Other political	3.4
Total	100.0

'Minorities' include groups like Hindus and Christians who were minorities in society as a whole. They were not geographical communities, nor was there minority dissent within regions as there was in Nigeria. The regions were linguistically and ethnically fairly homogeneous. (There were five regions; East Pakistan counted as one while West Pakistan contained four).

The discussion of East Pakistani complaints was so overwhelming that this itself can be divided into categories. Though the relationship of East Pakistan to the centre was a political question, naturally this revolved around economic matters.

Table 7.13: Discussion of East Pakistan in Constituent Assembly
1956, (%)

Industry	22.5
Agriculture	8.7
Government finance	3.3
Government jobs	11.7
Military	10.3
Education	0.9
Food shortages	29.4
Unemployment/poverty	1.0
Other	12.1
Total	100.0

The disparities between East and West Pakistan dominated debating time even though the government had hoped that the new constitution, granting increased power to the provincial governments and soon to be brought into effect, would have satisfied the East Pakistanis. It was not to be so, at least not until the latter gained power later in the year.

Notable in this Table is the interest in government and military jobs (most of the concern with the military was for employment in it). There are two sides to this: i) East Pakistan wanted to gain more representation in the bureaucracy and the military in order to swing more power and influence in favour of the East, ii) the elite wanted jobs in these prestigious areas to swing more power and influence in favour of themselves. Both motivations were present, but there can be no doubt, from reading the long discussions in the Assembly

on these questions, of the frustration felt by Bengalis at the domination of these important job sectors by West Pakistanis or other non-Bengalis. Altogether, the concern of East Pakistani M.Ps. over (mostly elite) jobs for Bengalis took up about 10% of the total debating time of the House. The question of poverty in East Pakistan received little attention. The current food shortages there, which the government had done its best to alleviate, were used (by both sides throughout the year) simply to score political points.

What we have in this period is a demand for a general decrease in regional disparities between the two wings, and for more jobs for East Pakistanis - mostly for the elite. Other regional (i.e. non-Bengali) demands are negligible, and there is not much expression of minority interests. Demands for local facilities were virtually non-existent. The communal structure of the political-economy of Pakistan was, thus, significantly different from that of Nigeria. In the latter country political competition built up from the local level up through tribes and sub-tribes to the regional level. In Pakistan communal conflict was entirely at the regional level. This is a factor of great significance.

One similarity with Nigeria is the significant amount of time spent discussing corruption, the public service and the M.Ps' own interests, which I have in the Nigerian case considered together as being concerned with the rewards and career opportunities of the elite. In the Constituent Assembly these took up about 6% of total debating time. Two-thirds of this was taken up with the public service. However, some of this was concerned with pay, conditions and career opportunities in the lower reaches of government employment, not solely with the prospects of the elite.

7.6.2. The National Assembly, 1956 (First Session)

In the first session of the National Assembly, convened only three days after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, East Pakistan took up a great deal less debating time - less than 10% of total debating time. However, a massive number of PQs were asked in this session, and nearly half of these (305 out of 677) were on East Pakistan and the disparities between the wings. Nationalism

and the various forms of communalism together took up 14.5% of all debating time and 48.7% of all PQs. Internally these items were distributed as follows.

Table 7.14: Nationalism and Communalism in the National Assembly (First Session)

	Debating Time (%)	PQs (Number)
Nationalism/unity	2.6	-
East Pakistani regionalism	64.1	305
Other regionalism	-	-
Minorities	33.3	25
Total	100.0	330

No clear picture emerges from the rest of the Assembly's proceedings. 7.3% of debating time was devoted to other political affairs apart from those just mentioned. 27.2% was spent on economic matters and 14.4% on social matters. The distribution of economic discussion and PQs is given below.

Table 7.15: Discussion of Economic Matters in the National Assembly (First Session)

	Debating time (%)	PQs (Number)
International trade/aid	2.7	12
Trade and finance	2.1	7
Agriculture	34.9	3
Industry	2.1	7
Government finance	18.5	26
General development	4.1	-
Industrial relations/labour	15.7	9
Unemployment/poverty	14.4	33
Local facilities	5.5	21
Other economic	-	4
Total	100.0	122

As in Nigeria, industry receives remarkably little time, infinitely less even than industrial relations. The latter, in fact, gets far more attention than it does in Nigeria, as do unemployment and poverty; though the latter receives here less time than in the previous Constituent Assembly, it does absorb over a quarter of all economic PQs. (33 out of 122). Local facilities make some minimal showing,

more in PQs than in debates. So far, then, in comparison with Nigeria, there is significantly greater concern for the general problems of poverty and unemployment, far fewer (in fact, very few) demands for local facilities, while communal competition is expressed at the regional rather than at the local or other sub-regional level.

A substantial amount of time was spent on things related to the career concerns of the elite. These took up 8.6% of all debating time and 11.1% of all PQs. The only other category to stand out is foreign relations, which took up about 23% of total debating time (in the Constituent Assembly it had been minimal) and 8.3% of all PQs. It was, thus, at least in debates, the dominant theme. (A very large part of the discussion of foreign affairs was introduced by a private motion on the conflict with India over Kashmir).

So far I have not shown the distribution of discussion and PQs on East Pakistan. This is given below.

Table 7.16: Discussion of East Pakistan in the National Assembly (First Session)

	Debating time (%)	PQs (%)
Government finance	5.6	5.3
Industry/trade	5.8	12.8
Agriculture	2.5	0.9
Food shortages	7.2	-
Unemployment/poverty	9.5	-
Government jobs	16.4	67.1
Military jobs	6.5	2.9
Education	-	1.3
Other/general	46.4	9.7
Total	100.0	100.0

The largest category here, by far, is that concerned with government jobs, in both debate and PQs. This, added to the interest in (mostly senior) military jobs, indicates a very significant concern for elite and sub-elite employment. I have argued that PQs reflect more accurately the interests of M.Ps. than does the distribution of debating time - largely because the formal nature of the debates

is out of the control of individual M.Ps., whereas they are entirely responsible for which PQs they might choose to ask. While less than 10% of debating time was spent on East Pakistan and East-West disparities, 45% of a very large number of PQs was concerned with these matters.

That 70% of this vast number of PQs was concerned with government and military jobs for East Pakistanis is a sufficient indication of the career interests of the East Pakistani elite. As an example, in one PQ an East Pakistani M.P. asked how many East Pakistani heads of consulates and diplomatic missions there were. (The answer was three out of 31 in 1950 and 11 out of 43 in 1955 - an increase from 10% to 25%)¹. It is difficult to see precisely how getting a few more East Pakistani diplomatic chiefs could help anyone other than the East Pakistani elite. Nor could it be said that these posts were important in terms of the balance of power, or the relative well-being of the East Pakistan masses. Yet this matter so concerned one East Pakistani leader that he seems to have convinced himself that jobs for the elite were of crucial importance to the Bengali masses. Told that under the new constitution there would be parity of senior diplomatic posts between East and West Pakistanis, but that the whole process would take time (as it depended upon the retirement rate of current senior diplomats) the M.P. responded to the government's statement that it would be impossible to state precisely how much time, in the following terms.

"When will the Government exercise its brain for calculating this?... Is not the Minister aware that the whole country is asking the Government to exercise its brain?"² (My emphasis)

7.6.3. The National Assembly, 1956 (Second Session)

The final parliamentary session of 1956, the second of the new National Assembly, was unique. For the first time the East Pakistanis, under Suhrawardy, were in power. The Muslim League's power at the centre had indeed been fragile. In this session thirteen pieces of legislation and one private motion were introduced. Some were exceedingly minor. Apart from two bills concerning the property of both emigrants and immigrants, the only other legislation of

1 National Assembly Debates (26.3.56)

2 Ibid (26.3.56)

importance was the Electorate Bill. This was of major significance. Formally, 58% of the time of the Assembly was taken up with this bill. Another 26% was taken up with a private motion, which was again about the food shortages in East Pakistan. In terms of themes, there are really only two: constitutional discussion which took up 45% of parliamentary time, and East Pakistan, with 17%. By contrast, industry took up 1.2%, agriculture 1.3%, industrial relations 0.1%, unemployment and poverty 1%, general development 1.1%, and all social matters 3.6% of the Assembly's time. All attention was focused on political questions, and the food shortages.

The Electorate Bill, which dominated the Assembly, reflected similar circumstances to those discussed in the case of Nigeria. It reflected the process of regional conflict, but also the struggle for power between various elites. The question was whether Moslems and Hindus should vote as joint or separate electorates. The Awami League (the leading East Pakistani party) wanted joint, the Muslim League separate electorates. The latter had tradition on their side, a tradition of separation from Hindus, which they saw as fundamental to Pakistan. Ideology, on both sides, masked concrete political pros and cons. The West Pakistani elite feared that joint electorates would mean the Hindus in East Pakistan, no longer able to guarantee returning Hindu M.Ps. from their areas, would then vote for the Awami League. East Pakistan would then become politically homogeneous while West Pakistan was becoming increasingly politically fragmented. With a somewhat larger population than West Pakistan, East Pakistan would then provide a superior power base for its politicians. The Awami League said that the Hindus simply wanted to consider themselves as Bengalis and did not therefore need any electoral protection. Hypocrisy was readily apparent on both sides. But it is the only instance in the Assemblies of a minority within a region coming into the political battle.

So dominant was the constitutional discussion that hardly any other themes, apart from East Pakistani regionalism, cropped up in debate. Altogether political questions took up 91.4% of all debating time and 37.8% of all PQs. Thus hardly any attention was paid to economic and social matters in the debates of the House.

Discussion and PQs on political questions were distributed as follows.

Table 7.17: Political Discussion in the National Assembly, (Second Session)

	Debating time (%)	PQs (Number)
Nationalism	5.8	-
East Pakistani regionalism	14.5	56
Other regionalism	-	-
Minorities	5.7	16
Constitution	67.4	-
Pro-government	3.3	-
Anti-government	3.0	1
Other political	0.3	-
Total	100.0	73

The large number of PQs asked on East Pakistan and disparities between the two wings were a left-over from the previous session, i.e. they were in the main asked then, before the Awami League came into government, but were due for answer in the current session.

In sum, the above analysis of one year's Assembly proceedings reveals a broad concentration on only a few subjects. They were dominated by the growing conflict between the two wings, East and West Pakistan, culminating in the final session in the great political wrangle over the communal nature of the electorates. The main theme was, thus, political, and in the final session the debates were almost entirely concerned with the political struggle between the two camps. All in all, the fundamental nature of economic development received little attention. Its direction was rarely questioned. There were no significant debates on the road that economic development should take. Industry and agriculture, for instance, received little discussion throughout the year. The East Pakistani-based government, which came into power towards the end of the year, offered no significant economic proposals in its thirteen months of rule. The short tenure of the governments of this period is one reason for this neglect. Power was highly precarious. It was difficult enough surviving. But the point is that economic factors did not form the basis of the political battle. There were no substantial differences in economic

ideology between the main parties - except in terms of regional competition. The Assemblies were primarily concerned with the battle between East and West Pakistani politicians over the economic disparities between the two wings. But there is some evidence, as I have shown, that the concerns of the East Pakistani politicians were largely to do with elite and sub-elite job opportunities. This suggests that economic competition between the two wings was, at this level, largely of an intra-class nature. However, unlike in Nigeria, communal differences were not concerned with lower middle-class opportunities. Pakistan had a much more pronounced elite, and its interests were elite interests.

As against this, one aspect of the economy which did receive significant attention, at least significantly more than in Nigeria, was the condition of the poor. Poverty, unemployment, and also labour, were not neglected, even if they were hardly dominant themes. This suggest a greater recognition than in Nigeria of class factors, and, indeed, there were certain mildly socialist elements in the Assembly. Inter-class conflict was at least of some, if very minimal, significance. It became completely irrelevant during the political wrangles of the final session, when poverty, unemployment and labour made negligible showings during debates.

There is little in the proceedings of the above Assemblies that speaks strongly of particular class interests. The major conflict is entirely communal. But this communal antagonism is very different from that of Nigeria. It lacks the local element. It is not built up from small localities, through sub-tribes, to major tribes, and finally to the regions. The conflict, as expressed in the Assemblies at least, was between two major regional blocs - East and West Pakistan. Their leaders did not depend on communal support of a local nature. They represented their regions as a whole. They were cut off from the masses, acting as independent elites. And their elite interests are suggested by the nature of their complaints. about regional disparities, complaints which were centred primarily on job opportunities, in particular job opportunities of an elite and sub-elite nature. Though some of the general economic discussion touched upon the problems of poverty and unemployment, the East

Pakistanis were little concerned with this. Their interest was in the East-West disparity in high level career opportunities rather than in the condition of the masses of the two wings. In fact, certain of the West Pakistani politicians showed more concern for the fundamental problems of the country.

7.7. Conclusion

Some tentative conclusions can be drawn on the nature of Pakistan's political-economy from the above account of Pakistan's 'first period' (its political but non-democratic period). The battle over scarce resources was as powerful in Pakistan as it was in Nigeria, and initially at least it was communal in nature. The communal strife between Moslems and Hindus upto and around the time of partition was quite savage. The fight over who should get what was clearly based on this major religious distinction. (There were other religions and ethnic elements too, of course). This receded after partition, but is still a powerful factor in many parts of the sub-continent. It was certainly a factor in Pakistan. The distinction between East and West Pakistanis (or Bengalis and non-Bengalis) was crucial to Pakistan's political history.

It is not possible to deny the communal element of this confrontation. But Pakistan was acquiring an increasingly class based social structure. It had a quite substantial professional group and a fairly well established land-owning elite; the business class grew rapidly; and it also had a powerful bureaucracy. However, these could hardly be taken to comprise a clear part of an established modern class structure. They were merely class fragments (except for the land-owning class, a powerful relic of a more feudal age). There were considerable differences of interest between them, and none of them by themselves could hope to dominate the power structure. The political history of Pakistan has been largely one of intra-class conflict between these various groups. But, as one of these elites (the professional politicians of East Pakistan) was ethnically different from the other (West Pakistani) elites, this also had a powerful communal element.

There were particular reasons for the socio-economic differences between the elites of the two wings. In West Pakistan the lack of foreign control over industrial and commercial assets meant that there was vast opportunity for West Pakistani businessmen to profit out of economic development (not as in Nigeria). In East Pakistan Hindus dominated the business sector. The land-owning class in West Pakistan was not in competition with these businessmen; in fact it had everything to gain from cooperation with them. It needed an industrial base to process its cash crops. (Eventually, these land owner-politicians became directly involved in industry themselves). In East Pakistan there were no opportunities of profit on the land, land-ownership being much more fragmented. The Western wing also had certain inherent economic advantages.

For these reasons opportunities for advancement were very limited in East Pakistan. The elite, based on the professions, could only hope to progress through gaining power and altering the structure of rewards by fiat. What this elite wanted was the right to exploit its own people (the Bengalis) and not let this be done by outsiders (West Pakistanis or Biharis). I do not believe West Pakistan was exploiting East Pakistan. Land-owners and industrialists joined hands to exploit the masses in both wings of the country, but East Pakistan had no significant land-owning or business class to join in the exploitation, so the exploitation appeared to be by West Pakistan of its Eastern counterpart.

One of the elites which gained out of Pakistan's development policies was the business elite. It was, in fact, the newest of the elites, positively jacked into that position by decision of the government, which desperately needed rapid industrial expansion but lacked the initial wherewithal to play a significant direct role in this. Eventually all the West Pakistani elites gained from this industrial and commercial expansion - all became directly or indirectly involved in it. But the East Pakistani elite found itself left out of the picture; lacking a power-base of its own this elite sought communal backing in its competition against the elites of West Pakistan. As there was no significant local or minority communal backing to be found (though the Awami League

sought and obtained the support of the Hindu elite), the lowest-level communal boundary that could be used as a 'defence' against opposed class fragments was that of the region. The actual nature of the conflict between these class fragments, and the effect of the communal element and of the intrusion of inter-class elements on this conflict, will be described in the next chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT : A DELICATE POLITICAL BALANCE

So far I have described the economic background to Pakistan's major crisis, and the interest groups who had different things to gain from development but lacked either solid communal backing or a solid class backing to support their claims. In the West the landlord politicians had some traditional influence and authority but lacked any united communal support. They were a powerful class from an earlier age facing increasing competition from various middle-class fragments. In the East the elite was a tiny class fragment with no strong class basis, but it eventually managed to build up powerful communal support. In this chapter I shall examine the conflicts that arose when the delicate balance in which the above groups figured broke down. However, I have not described all the forces involved in this, such as religious groups or the 'lumpen proletariat'. Most developing countries are highly fragmented not only economically but socially.

Most developing countries are also delicately balanced systems. It takes only a small force, whatever its nature, to upset the balance and set in motion a chain of events which might culminate in major conflict. The religious fanatics in Pakistan have twice played such a role. In seeking to bring down a secular government they created religious disturbances, which brought down the government but did not change its secular nature. This event, the climax of which was the rioting in the Punjab against the Ahmediya sect, also helped strengthen the hand of the Governor-General and the bureaucracy against the Prime Minister and the politicians. With such a delicate balance of forces such indirect effects are inevitable. Islamic fundamentalists played a big role in the downfall of Bhutto. The military regime which followed then proceeded to Islamicise the constitution.

Pakistan's history has been a series of crises of ever-increasing magnitude. One crisis has generated the next. The death of Jinnah and the assassination of his successor Liaquat Ali Khan, both occurring early on in Pakistan's history, were not such crises. They were merely misfortunes which removed the only people who could perhaps have

maintained some initial stability. The first real crisis where a conspicuous clash between rival social forces can be discerned, and which significantly affected the balance of social forces, was the anti-Qadiani (or anti-Ahmediya) riots of 1953. But these (and other) disturbances, had no radical effect on the social structure. Revolutions are rare. Lesser movements, though, often lead to a change of regime, and are more common. Such disturbances tend to be urban and are often manned largely by middle-class people (or people with middle-class aspirations), particularly students. Often the particular cause of the disturbances is peripheral both to the underlying motivations of those involved and to the final outcome.

In this chapter I shall describe a number of serious disturbances including the period of the civil war. In the case of four of these the disturbances were sufficiently great to lead to a break-down of the political balance, resulting in a change of regime, a change in the type of regime, or, in the case of the civil war, in the break-up of the country. In the case of one of these, the anti-Ahmediya riots, I shall spend little time in description as it has already been well reported. The riots occurred in early 1953. The Ahmediyas (or Qadianis) are a minority sect which orthodox Moslems consider to be heretical. The movement, which was aimed at persuading the government to support the claim that the Ahmediya sect was not a part of the Moslem faith, was a very powerful one, and it was used by various political factions, both within the ruling Muslim League and outside it, for their own purposes. The Muslim League Chief Minister of the Punjab, Daultana, is said to have given the rioters implicit support, at least at the start. Certainly those within the Muslim League opposed to the Prime Ministership of Khwaja Nazimuddin hoped to see him toppled by the disturbances.

This is in fact what happened. The death toll mounted and it became increasingly clear that the secularly inclined central government did not know whether to support or act against the fundamentalists. Eventually it called in the army to quell the riots, but both Daultana and Nazimuddin were forced to resign. Nazimuddin was simply replaced by another Muslim League man. These

were not the only heads that should have rolled. A number of religious leaders (including the famous Maulana Maudoodi) were sentenced to death for their part in the riots, but the fear of further disturbances was so great that these sentences were later rescinded. Though the fundamentalists failed to usher in a new Islamic government (one of their underlying aims) they had shown that they could upset the political balance.

8.1. The Karachi Disturbances of January, 1953

These disturbances started just a month before the anti-Ahmediya troubles. They are the only example that I shall discuss where no change of regime occurred as a result. Yet the ingredients were essentially the same. The disturbances started very simply, with a demonstration by local students in support of improved facilities, and it ended with eleven deaths, 80 demonstrators and 163 policemen hurt, and 400 arrests.¹ Rioting lasted three days, during which time the army was called in, but only after the police had killed a number of people. Though specifically a student matter to start off with, other interests became closely involved as the disturbance escalated. Protest demonstrations also occurred in Lahore and Dacca, in sympathy with the dead of Karachi. One report puts the number of participants in the Lahore demonstration at 10,000, and the number in Dacca at 20,000, though there was no violence in either case.²

The Chief Commissioner of Karachi blamed student communist elements for the disturbances. That 'other elements' were involved seems likely especially from the fact that only two of the eleven killed were students. But that the riot was not a communist student plot seems clear from the fact that certain right-wing elements stated afterwards that they were either themselves involved in the student demonstration from the start, or that they supported it once it had started. The Islami Jamiat Tuleba (IST), a right-wing Islamic student organisation, itself explicitly denied the Commissioner's claim. It firmly linked itself to the student cause per se, as the following statement issued by the IST, makes clear.

1 Dawn newspaper, Karachi (11 and 12/1/53)

2 Dawn (11.1.53)

"The very fact that the workers of the Islami Jamiat Tuleba (an opponent of both Capitalism and Communism) braved the repression of the police shoulder to shoulder with other students is sufficient to convince that there was nothing Communist about the students' demands."¹

Furthermore, the students received verbal support from a number of Centre and Right-wing politicians, including some from the ruling Muslim League, and more significantly perhaps, Maulana Maudoodi, Pakistan's leading Islamic fundamentalist (and who was to play an important role in the anti-Ahmediya riots).

One final bit of evidence on the right-wing contribution to the disturbances comes from the nature of some of the damage done. Several wine stores were looted, with many bottles of alcohol being either removed or destroyed. The Commissioner implied, but could not confirm, a possible connection with the Islamic fundamentalists. No doubt some of the looting was nothing more than looting. But four wine stores were wrecked or partially wrecked, one had its furniture burnt, and in the case of three shops much alcohol was deliberately poured away; in the case of the burning, alcohol was used to set fire to the furniture.² This strongly suggests an Islamic element in the disturbances. In fact, the shooting was supposed to have started when rioters refused to let the fire-brigade put out the fire in the one liquor store which was burnt. The first death occurred during this incident and it was from this point that the struggle escalated.

The co-operation of Islamic, right-wing elements does not mean that left-wing elements were absent. Far from it. The students also had the support of the left-wing newspaper publisher and Member of Parliament, Mian Iftikharuddin, who had left the Muslim League to form his own party. The government was certainly concerned at the left-wing involvement in the riots as it subsequently arrested a number of trade union activists.

I have already implied that there was some political involvement in the disturbances too. Both Mian Iftikharuddin and Maulana Maudoodi, from opposite sides of the political spectrum, gave

1 Dawn (13.1.53)

2 Dawn (11.1.53)

verbal support to the students, the former becoming somewhat more directly involved. Apparently eighteen members of the Jinnah Awami League resigned from the party because, according to them, party workers had infiltrated the student demonstration in order to "create trouble".¹ Eye-witnesses also apparently said people from a number of political parties were in the crowd.

Other support came from groups having a close (middle-class) link with the students; namely journalists and the legal profession. The journalistic contribution came from the fairly extensive reporting of the riots and of its causes, as well as from editorial condemnation in more than one paper of the actions of the police and the attitude of the authorities. The following is from a Dawn editorial.

"The state of education in Karachi has been chronically disgraceful. In the editorial and correspondence columns of this newspaper we have repeatedly dealt with the subject. The students were justified in seeking to ventilate their grievances in a spectacular manner...."²

The other group which supported the students after the event was the legal profession. The President of the Bar Association put out the following statement after the initial violence.

"After a thorough inquiry into the facts and the circumstances leading to the incidents of today's firing, I am confident that the action of the firing was most inopportune, uncalled for, and illegal. It betrays a hopeless state of affairs on the part of those who were at the helm of the affairs... I have gone through the demands of the students and I am convinced that they are genuine and cannot be denied by any right thinking man."³

The importance of such support is the prestige it confers on the actions of the students and the 'professional' nature of its condemnation of the government.

An important, more direct impetus was provided by local 'ruffians', the lumpenproletariat of Karachi and jobless migrants, etc. - what are simply called 'goondas' (trouble-makers) in Pakistan. There is no doubt that these played a significant part in the disturbance.

1 Dawn (14.1.53)

2 Dawn (9.1.53)

3 Dawn (9.1.53)

It does not help that all those arrested were officially labelled as 'goondas' by the police, but undoubtedly many of them were of the sort I have described; not many of those arrested were students, and only eighteen students remained in police custody after the riots.¹

It is the presence of this volatile lumpenproletariat, and of a number of disaffected groups, including political elements trying to turn things their way, that make such disturbances so significant. The students themselves are a very important force, as they have proved in many developing countries. The conflict, though, was not of a class nature; the wide variety of very different groups participating in or reacting to the riots makes this clear enough. Some were students, some jobless migrants, some were from right-wing some from left-wing parties, some were Islamic fundamentalists, some from the liberal professions. Nor were the disturbances part of a concerted movement against the government. They were too haphazard, and too many different groups were involved, for that to have been the case. There were numerous different motivations and levels of spontaneity. Some groups joined the disturbances with foresight, some joined spontaneously, but all tried to make capital out of them by airing their particular grievances.

Three groups I have laid particular stress on - students, lawyers, and journalists - have in common a middle-class background, liberal beliefs, and professional aspirations. There is a certain element of bourgeois elitism implicit here. This is quite well exemplified by the editor of Dawn in another editorial on the subject.

"On the proper education of the future leaders and administrators of this country depends the well-being of Pakistan much more than even industrialisation and economic progress."²

This extraordinary statement helps reveal the strength of the class connection between the students, journalists and lawyers. The students are seen (by both of the latter groups in fact) as the future 'professionals' of the country. What the country needs, apparently, is professional leadership, not radical political, economic and social policies.

1 Dawn (15.1.53)

2 Dawn (11.1.53)

This would-be triumvirate is important, and was especially so in the early period of democratic (or semi-democratic) rule. It is of great significance that the government was very quick to concede the students' demands (or most of them) after the disturbances, even during them. Early on in the trouble-period Karachi's Islamia College announced a 15% cut in tuition fees. This is interesting as Islamia Colleges, responsible for Quranic instruction, were not part of the liberal establishment of higher education in general. But the class connection was strong. The founder of the College said that he was

"convinced that most of the grievances of the students are correct and I am sorry to find that the educational authorities have treated them not as students but as mill-hands."¹

It would be interesting to know how he thought mill-hands should be treated. Later in Pakistan's history, other groups were to be of more importance than the middle-class 'triumvirate' of students, lawyers and journalists - in particular the military. The role of another group, the Islamic fundamentalists, who participated in the above disturbances, was to be of great significance during the anti-Ahmediya riots, already described.

The above descriptions of two major disturbances in Pakistan I hope indicate the delicate balance of forces which characterised Pakistani society at that time. What they above all show is the importance of urban conflict in affecting the polity. In both cases disturbances in one urban centre triggered off either protests or further disturbances in other urban centres, thus putting more strain on the political system. The urban nature of these conflicts is very important. Groups opposed to the government do not need to appeal to rural interests, which are very difficult to invoke, in order to bring down the regime. In all big cities in developing countries there are many disaffected groups, including many unemployed (often migrants from other parts of the country). Various political and other interests latch on to disturbances which become inflamed by the involvement of the above disaffected groups (even if they are not involved at the start). The political parties hope, by contributing to the activity, to trigger off something bigger.

1 Dawn (9.1.53)

The interests involved might be revolutionary, they might be reactionary. Frequently both are involved.

The situation is, thus, very complicated, and urban disturbances in the Third World can have very unpredictable effects. In Pakistan there were a very large number of interests which might contribute to such disturbances, but it is possible to discern two very general categories: on the one hand there are the more conservative forces, including the religious mullahs, reactionary political parties (either right-wing or religious), certain right-wing student bodies and a large part of the poorer urban population (often migrants from rural areas: conservative, uneducated, and deeply religious). On the other hand there are the 'liberals' - most students, the professional groups such as lawyers and journalists, and the other political parties.

These latter groups also contain strong left-wing and right-wing elements, but the liberal strain predominates by far, and this to some extent cuts across the left and right wing boundaries. Religious students and right-wing newspapermen might still see themselves primarily as students and journalists, and stand for the generally accepted interests of these groups (e.g. demands for better job prospects for students, or freedom of the press for journalists). But the basic antagonism is between religious/right-wing forces and liberal/left-wing groups. It is extremely interesting that in the case of the two democratic (or at least political) regimes ultimately brought down by disturbances (the early Nazimuddin regime and Bhutto's government) the main opposition forces were religious and right-wing. In the case of the downfall of Ayub Khan's essentially military regime, the liberal/left-wing (but mostly liberal) 'triumvirate' of students, lawyers and journalists, was the most important force. It is this event I shall describe next.

8.2. The Rise and Fall of Ayub Khan

So far I have discussed the first 'political' (but not democratic) period. From 1958 on the functionary groups became increasingly powerful. Uptil 1958 the bureaucracy had been extremely influential behind the scenes, managing to influence policy, even political events, in its favour for some time. From 1958 the military became the

pre-eminent power. Most of the military's actions can be seen in terms of struggle against the politicians; it was a struggle between two types of elite, essentially an intra-class struggle. Both groups had in the past stemmed mainly from the land-owning class, but had become increasingly middle-class in origin, especially the military. Though the influence of the still significant number of landlord-politicians appeared to bring in an inter-class element, their interests as landlords were never seriously damaged by the regime. It was far more interested in breaking the political parties per se. In other words the military was acting as a class fragment and saw opposition primarily in intra rather than inter-class terms. The politicians' power-base was the professional class and the landlord class. Ayub, the military leader, tried to by-pass both, but he hurt the urban professional people most. It was they who in the end brought him down.

It is not possible to see the military intrusion, or opposition to it, in inter-class terms. Nor is it possible to view it in ethnic terms. The military coup was not aimed, as many argue, at the suppression of East Pakistan. Ayub did a lot to help East Pakistan economically (vastly increasing rural aid to the area and doing much to encourage industrial investment). It was in the political sphere that he kept East Pakistani interests down. What he damaged was not East Pakistan but the East Pakistani professional elite and its political representatives. The conflict was intra-class in nature, representing differences between a functional group and the professional segment of the middle-class. As I shall show, it was the whole professional middle-class which brought Ayub down, not just the East Pakistani segment of it. The professional middle class in both wings suffered. But the East Pakistani elite considered itself to be more hard done by as East Pakistan did not contain an elite with an economic base in either agriculture or industry; it thus saw most of the fruits of development going to West Pakistani elites.

8.2.1. The Rise of Ayub

I have so far concentrated (except in the purely economic discussion) on Pakistan's first political period. In 1958 came

the first military coup, a totally peaceful affair, which saw the military in power (in the later stages in the guise of a political party) for a decade. The coup was the culmination of a process of gradual elimination of the power of the politicians. The bureaucrats had been gaining more and more influence which emerged, by a fairly natural extension, into military rule. The military period ended in fiasco, with the break-up of Pakistan, but it started promisingly, with a clamp-down on corruption and the formation, for the first time, of a concrete economic plan. The regime provided political stability in order to obtain economic development. Ayub also introduced some land reforms, and increased the allocation of funds to East Pakistan in an attempt to reduce inter-wing disparities. Finally, he established an entirely new political system based on indirect elections.

The purge against corruption in the bureaucracy was initiated in 1959 through the establishment of scrutinising committees. The task took less than six months, by the end of which 1,662 Central Government officials, of all ranks, were found guilty of misconduct of varying degrees of culpability.¹ Some were compulsorily retired, some merely admonished. The land reforms concerned only West Pakistan, which had a much more unequal distribution of land-ownership than East Pakistan. The reforms were a qualified attack on the political, land-owning class. In all about 5% of West Pakistan's total cultivable area was surrendered; less than half of this had been redistributed by March 1964, five years after the institution of the reforms.² Many of the big land-owners wielded enormous local power and considerable national influence.

"The political implications were weighty and, although by no means extinguished as a class, the great landed magnates no longer represented the same vast and sometimes inert agglomerations of power."³

Nevertheless, the effects were clearly by no means radical. Ayub himself is quoted as saying, in 1964, that "We did not want punitive land reforms...."⁴

1 Feldman (1967), p.74

2 Ibid, pp.57-60

3 Ibid, p.60

4 Quoted in Ibid, p.62

Ayub's final major reform was in the political sphere. Clearly the land reforms affected the politicians to some extent, as many of them were big land-owners. They suffered too from the screenings for corruption (under separate legislation from public servants).

The politicians were certainly hit by these measures, but they were far more drastically affected by the main plank of Ayub's military reforms - the introduction of the Basic Democracies. The intention of these, according to Ayub, was to make those elected more genuinely representative of the people than the previous oligarchical politicians had been. The way to do this, he claimed, was to have very tiny constituencies so that candidates would be closer to the people who elected them, and then have several tiers of electoral colleges, each tier forming the basis for the next tier up (and each level up representing a wider geographical area).

There are several additional factors to take into account. Firstly, political parties were banned. Secondly, each council, at whatever level, had at least some function as government and was responsible, directly or indirectly, for the spending of local development funds which were fed down through the system from the central government. Thirdly, each level of administration had a number of nominated officials which increased in proportion higher up the scale.

Ayub believed that with this scheme he had created a more truly representative system. But equally, he was hoping through this system to completely by-pass the power of the old politicians, both urban and rural. Essentially he was appealing to the 'small man' in rural areas for support against the big land-owning politicians and the lawyer-politicians of the towns. The linking of development funds with the system (power filtered up through it and money filtered down) ensured considerable patronage for those Basic Democrats (the politicians at the lowest level, the basis of the whole system) who would toe the line. The intrusion of nominated officials at each level also ensured considerable official control. The old politicians themselves would have no time for the system - to get anywhere they would have to become lowly Basic Democrats as only these, by becoming

Chairmen of their local councils, could go up to higher levels.

This new system was clearly a powerful attack on the political elite. (Ayub did not hide his contempt for the politicians). At the same time it gave legitimacy to the new military regime. This is not to deny that the system itself might have had considerable inherent value. However, looking at the rural side alone for a moment, while it cut out the big land-owners from politics, it brought in a whole new level of small and medium land-owners. Between one-third and one-half of the members of the first National Assembly elected under the new system by the 80,000 Basic Democrats were landlords.¹

The politicians did not give in easily. Ayub was under a lot of pressure to allow the re-introduction of political parties. When he relented the politicians and other wealthy or influential people found it worthwhile to try and 'work' the system. A big inducement was the control of development funds that union council membership, or membership of higher level councils, would provide. In its first year there was little interest in the new system.

"By 1964, however, the situation had changed. The tremendous economic and political patronage of the Basic Democracies had been clearly demonstrated. Elections in 1964, therefore, were keenly contested, and traditional political alliances and methods were involved."²

However, this still did not mean the return to influence of the old political elite.

"Though the 1964 elections saw the return to power of a higher income group, the new rural elite was different from the past elite in one significant way. While the old elite had been the landed aristocracy - the zamindars (landlords) and talukdars (petty landlords) - the Basic Democrats were generally from non-traditional nouveau riche families. They were rich farmers, not landlords."³

The new system also affected the politicians of the urban areas. New groups took their chance to enter the system, to the detriment of the old. The following, referring explicitly to East Pakistan,

1 Siddiqui (1972), p.104

2 Jahan (1973), p.122

3 Ibid, p.122

also applies broadly to the Western wing.

"The Basic Democracies system alienated nearly every powerful group in East Pakistan. First, it alienated the urban groups (the intelligentsia, the students and the urban salaried workers) which prior to 1958 had played a leading role in East Pakistani political movements. Making the Basic Democracies the electoral college meant limiting the political participation of these groups.... In the 1964 elections, 73.61% of the urban Basic Democrats were businessmen and contractors. The old middle class therefore felt threatened and isolated under the Basic Democracies system."¹

It was, in particular, the urban 'professional' middle class which lost out. The implications of intra-class conflict are very clear here.

The effects of these changes on the National Assembly itself (this having been elected through an indirect electoral system of which the Basic Democrats were the foundation) were also quite significant. Comparison with Table 7.6 shows that the role of both lawyers and land-owners in the main legislature had declined considerably over the last 10 years.

Table 8.1: Backgrounds of Members of the National Assembly, 1965 (%)

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Lawyers	19.7	7.2
Businessmen	13.2	6.6
Landholders	4.6	21.1
Miscellaneous	12.5	11.8
Unknown	1.3	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Rashiduzzaman (1969), pp.489/90.

Nevertheless, they were easily still the two most prominent groups and the distinction between the two wings (land-owners from the West, lawyers from the East) was as clear as ever. But neither group was now in a position to dominate.

1 Ibid, p.124

The army itself, of course, represented particular interests, which I have so far not discussed. I have described how the government's economic strategy developed quite consistently despite numerous changes of regime and, eventually, the advent of a military dictatorship. The latter intensified but did not substantially change the previous economic policies. In adopting this strategy it does not seem, to me at least, to have been representing the interests of any particular class. The coup itself does not appear to have had anything to do with class. The industrial strategy of the country had already been set and the military did not oppose this. Nor did it seem to be in any danger from opposition from elsewhere. It seems unlikely that the military was representing the interests of the land-owners, as even if they only had a moderate effect, there was no need to institute the land reforms.

It is possible that the coup reflected the interests of the Punjab - the largest, richest area of West Pakistan, and the main supplier of military personnel - both rank and file. There is no doubt that East Pakistan, with its larger population, was in the 1950s becoming a political threat and it did seem possible that East Pakistani politicians might win the first general elections, which were forthcoming. However, there are several reasons for thinking that the coup was not simply aimed at keeping the Eastern wing down. The new regime did make significant attempts to remove the disparities between the two wings (attempts that were partly vitiated by other policies). Such a notion also implies collusion between Pakistani landlords etc. and the military (the latter acting in the interests of West Pakistan, or of the Punjab, at the request of the landlords, when the East Pakistani danger reared its head).

Such self-sacrifice by these landlords is very unlikely. They were politically powerful. They would not barter their freedom and power merely to keep out a possible rather than probable Bengali-based central government. After all, they had suffered one such government already without great loss. And, anyway, any such government was bound to be weak and temporary, while the military government was far from that.

If the army acted as an 'interest' it did so as a 'functionary group'. It had plenty to gain from taking control of the country, and the means to do so easily. It was, unlike the Indian army, a fairly united force - all Moslem, and predominantly Punjabi. There was no strong political force to oppose it (again, not as in the Indian case). No-one would miss the squabbling unrepresentative political factions which, so the army reasoned, were almost asking to be swept aside. The benefits - control of the economy, of the resources to be allocated to the military, of patronage - were enormous. Had the army waited until after the forthcoming general elections the political system would have been permanently established and intervention much harder. Why should the military have represented the interests of a class or a region when its own interests were so apparent?

So far I have concentrated on only one functionary group - the military. Politicians are just as scathing about the bureaucracy, accusing it, especially the CSP, of continued plots against the existence of democracy. The CSP is very much a bureaucratic elite, comprising a mere 0.07% of the total bureaucratic population of Pakistan in 1969¹. However, Burki has put some arguments against this thesis of bureaucratic conspiracy. In the first place, it was only political weakness that enabled the bureaucrats to increase their power. The political chaos of the 1950s allowed the CSP to assert itself.

"However, the Service was not able to gather enough strength to directly challenge the politicians. This task was left to another highly organised group, the army."²

Nevertheless, an alliance between these two functionary groups did not occur immediately. In fact, the first military coup was detrimental to the civil service. It removed the political weakness the bureaucracy had so far relied upon, and the army was strong enough to charge the civil service with corruption, as well as initiate a substantial purge. Moreover, military men took over senior administrative posts. In fact, the regime attempted significant reform of the service. However, despite this, the CSP eventually persuaded Ayub of its value, and he became more reliant on it.

1 Burki (1969), p.239

2 Ibid, p.247

8.2.2. The Fall of Ayub

The imposition of military rule drastically altered the balance of power and seriously affected the well-being of various groups. Basically there had been a shift in power from the 'professional middle-class fragments' to 'functionary group middle-class fragments'. The landlords survived broadly intact, though they lost much of their political power. Those that suffered most were the middle-class, professional, urban politicians and their supporters (the professional element of the urban bourgeoisie). The politicians suffered directly. Lawyers suffered through the introduction of military orders and edicts, supported by administrative justice and military tribunals. Furthermore, Ayub had even transferred some of their influence to the Basic Democrats, allowing them to try local disputes. The legal profession "felt the President had betrayed them by devising a system which denied them their 'day-in-court'".¹ The foundation of the legal profession was in danger. Rigid press laws and the introduction of the National Press Trust (which instituted indirect government control over a number of newspapers) did much the same to the journalists. Furthermore, all these urban groups suffered from the swing of influence to the rural areas.

All in all, under Ayub, while the professional middle class lost out and the landlord class was left broadly unharmed, the military, the industrialists, and the rural sub-elite all gained. In fact, as regards the latter, the army seemed to be trying to establish a sort of rural "middle class". Ayub himself said he expected his policies to antagonise most of all the intellectuals, politicians, landlords, and "religious obscurantists".² (The latter he had no time for). He wanted an efficient, middle-class society, but with this class in the countryside. He believed that both concentrated land-ownership and radical land redistribution were wrong.

"And this notion that everybody must own land just does not make sense. We do not have enough land to give to everybody. You can broaden the base of ownership but you must have a class of people interested in investing in land and working it on a sound economic and progressive basis. If you destroy this class you are just killing the goose...."³.

1 Ziring (1971), p.181

2 Khan, Ayub, (1967), p.203

3 Ibid, p.92

But it was necessary, too, to eliminate absentee landlords.

"The disintegration of large land-holdings would tend to consolidate the smaller holdings of the new middle-class and this would be an incentive to better farming and higher production."¹ (My emphasis)

It is dangerous to alienate urban areas. Burki, who supports his arguments with figures of numbers of arrests (per 1,000 people), argues that the anti-Ayub troubles started in small towns and then shifted to the cities. The latter had gained some industry, and the rural areas some material and political benefits, but the rural towns, in particular their middle-class residents, had seen these benefits pass them by.

"This is why the towns played such a prominent role in the anti-Ayub Khan movement. The towns that had not participated in the province's rapid industrialisation and had large numbers of students and lawyers became vortices of political unrest. ...The middle-class residents of the towns of West Pakistan were the real victims of the cyclical pattern of economic growth registered by West Pakistan."²

Newspaper reports confirm that the troubles started in the smaller towns.

The 'professional' middle class was, thus, suffering particularly badly under Ayub, and students are the foundation of this class. It was amongst the students of Karachi that the anti-Ayub disturbances started, spontaneously, in October 1968. What was simply a local student protest spread to Lahore and other West Pakistani cities. The protests were inflamed by the arrest of Bhutto, who Ayub believed to be stirring the students against him. When a student was killed by police in Rawalpindi the protests turned into a violent movement.

Muneer Ahmad is the only person to have given detailed study to the composition of the protesting groups. The student protest, much like the one in Karachi fifteen years before, was specifically concerned with student matters (though including demands for greater academic freedom). One of the most significant groups involved in the protests was the lawyers. After the shooting of the student in Rawalpindi in

1 Ibid, p.90

2 Burki, (1972), p.211

November 1968, thirteen politicians supporting the students were arrested. This seems to have triggered off the lawyers, with whom the politicians have a close connection.

"The lawyers' procession in Lahore on November 15 (two days after the political arrests) led by some of the most prominent jurists of the country, undoubtedly saved the mass movement from withering away."¹

Moreover, district Bar Associations invited politicians to address them as a way of evading the government's ban on public meetings.

Students, politicians and lawyers were joined in the second month by journalists (demanding freedom of the press). At the same time religious leaders (Ulema) called for the introduction of laws based on Islam. In the third month came professional groups in government employment (doctors, engineers, teachers, etc.) demanding improved salaries and promotion prospects. They were joined in the fourth month by low-paid government employees also seeking more money, and by high-level civil servants, with their own career grievances. Finally, in the same month, industrial workers demanded the repeal of anti-union laws, more money, and security of employment. Over the five month period of the movement the number of demands increased. A greater militancy and radicalism crept in, though there were also further demands in tune with the various groups' own particular interests. Some of the industrial unions, including some who were in government employment (e.g. that of the railway workers), were more consistently radical in their demands - going beyond their immediate economic interests - than most of the professional groups. The Railway Workers' Union, for example, called for the end of capitalism and feudalism, the nationalisation of agriculture (and the formation of a united front of workers, farmers, students and the middle class!)"²

One last protesting group not yet mentioned but of special significance to this thesis, a group which liked to consider itself one of the professions, was the journalists. The Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists organised demonstrations to demand freedom of the press. They were supported in this by a number of other agitating groups, in particular the students. As several newspaper

1 Ahmad, M. (1978), p.12

2 Ibid, pp.32/3

proprietors and virtually the entire journalistic profession (including the editors) opposed the regime (largely because of its control of the press), several agitating groups found the press increasingly active on their behalf. There was, thus, reciprocal support between the journalistic profession and these other groups, especially the students and the politicians. Though the latter contained bitterly opposed elements, together they represented freedom - and that is what the middle-class professional groups, and the students, were seeking. The demand for freedom of the press was not confined to the journalists.

"Freedom of the press was the fourth most important demand of agitating groups. The politicians had all along complained of Government control of the press."¹

There were, thus, strong connections between the individual professional groups and between these, the students, and the politicians.

The various middle-class groups discussed above played a vital role in initiating and sustaining the movement, but it could not have reached the intensity it achieved without the addition of the workers, and, probably more significant, the 'lumpenproletariat' - the very poor, jobless, often migrant, people living on the economic margins of the major cities, whom I discussed when describing the Karachi disturbances of 1953. The extent of the violence is summarised in the following table, at least as regards deaths.

Table 8.2: Pattern of Violence in Anti-Government Agitation in Pakistan, November 1968 - March 1969²

	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	Total
Killed by police firing	41 ¹	88 ²	129
Killed in mob violence	2	108 ³	110
Total	43	196	239

Notes: ¹ Mainly students and labourers from Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore

² Primarily students in Dacca

³ Mostly elected local government officials closely identified with the regime, but including five policemen.

1 Ibid, p.16

2 Ibid, p.14

This violence was initiated and maintained by the professional middle class of both wings, but particularly that of West Pakistan as the West Pakistani segment of this class was larger than its East Pakistani counterpart; also, as most business, landlord and military interests were in West Pakistan, the professional middle class felt the rivalry of these other groups more keenly. Ayub's attempt to establish his own rural 'middle class' fragment had failed.

8.3. The Civil War

8.3.1. The Social and Political Background

In the face of rapidly escalating social unrest, in February 1969 Ayub announced his resignation. Shortly afterwards he handed over power back to the army. Yahya Khan was the new ruler of the country. He immediately announced that his regime would only be temporary, and that Pakistan's first general election with universal suffrage would be held under his auspices. He was true to his word.

Though Ayub had continued the earlier regimes' economic policies (only with greater intensity) he had changed the economic balance of power, pushing to the fore-front what he called a rural 'middle class' and, in the cities, a new business elite. Politically speaking the functionary groups had become the dominant force. They now, with the military in the lead, held absolute sway. The main group to have lost out is what I have called the middle-class 'triumvirate' (lawyers, journalists and students) with their general support in the professional sector of the middle class and also with their political representatives. Religious fundamentalists, socially very influential (as has been seen), were waiting in the wings as ever. But, though numerous groups were involved, the main actor in the movement against Ayub was the middle-class 'triumvirate'. Its power-base in the political parties having been in effect removed, it took to the streets.

It was, in fact, in West Pakistan that this group started the movement which toppled Ayub, though it became highly active in both wings. With the change-over to Yahya and with a clear promise of a general election, it was the turn of the East Pakistani middle-class 'triumvirate' to take over. It had similar grievances to its counterpart in West Pakistan in that it greatly resented the power

of the military and the growth in economic power of the industrialists, but it more particularly objected to the fact that both of these groups were based primarily in West Pakistan. The promise of a general election (to be Pakistan's first) opened up the chance for the East Pakistani elite to achieve power through use of its natural power-base, the electorate; lacking a military or industrialist elite, this East Pakistani middle-class group could only hope to promote its interests through politics. The election at last gave this middle-class fragment its chance.

It is wrong, I have argued, to view the East-West Pakistani relationship as simply one of exploitation. Rather, various West Pakistan middle-class fragments had gradually acquired power (taking over from the previous landlordly class) and gained a rapacious hold on both wings of the country. But the East Pakistani elite had not had a share in this. The West Pakistani-based government had for long been aware of this, and had tried to induct this elite into the sphere of influence, to make this East Pakistani middle-class fragment economically powerful in its own right (though this attempt was resented by other parts of the West Pakistani power structure). So economically weak was this elite that the government had to support it through the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (EPIDC).

"it is essential to note that EPIDC became a prime instrument of the government policy to create a class of big capitalists or bourgeoisie from amongst the Bengali petty bourgeoisie traders."¹

In fact, the EPIDC and other government institutions went out of their way to help this group, primarily through joint ventures.

Sobhan and Ahmad give as one such example of aid to a Bengali the following data:²

	Rs. (million)
i) cost of project	20
ii) loans from financial institutions (banks etc.)	15
iii) EPIDC investment (50% of equity)	2.5
iv) Bengali owner's equity share	2.5
v) Black market value of converting 7.5% of machinery cost at 100% premium on official rate (i.e. overstating costs and selling extra foreign exchange)	2.5

1 Sobhan and Ahmad (1977), pp.57/8

2 Ibid, p.58

This means that the businessman had to provide a mere Rs.2.5 million out of the Rs.20 million needed, and even this was made up by a clear Rs.2.5 million to be made by selling foreign exchange on the black market. The same goes for disinvestment of public companies. The EPIDC did not find it easy to get Bengali buyers. It therefore made things easy for whatever potential Bengali buyers there were. When the government sold the Muslim Cotton Mills (500 looms) to a Bengali for Rs.24.7 million, the buyer put up less than Rs.5 million of the finance.¹

It would not seem, then, that Bengalis were being excluded from East Pakistan's industrial and commercial expansion, though the process of inclusion was a slow one.

"By the early 1960s, however, some Bengalis began to show entrepreneurial interest... They had very limited financial resources and managerial abilities. But the EPIDC vigorously encouraged and supported them."²

With EPIDC assistance these men began to make headway. By the time of Liberation Bengalis owned about 34% of the fixed assets of the jute industry and 53% of those of the cotton industry. They owned about 20% of the assets of the smaller-scale industries. Public ownership, which was mostly in heavy industries, was about 36%.³ This means that most industrial assets in East Pakistan were in the hands either of private East Pakistani citizens or of East Pakistan government agencies.

The small, somewhat weak East Pakistani elite found it rather hard to get on even with the support it (or a part of it) was getting. Far greater openings lay through political control, with which the whole East Pakistani economy would be within its command. It is not surprising that the Awami League (AL) under its leader Mujibur Rahman (often called Mujib), opted for secession. Only then could typical AL members - teachers, lawyers, small businessmen - have a real hold over the commercial economy. Thus the bourgeoisie "backed Mujib to the extent that he could give them more resources and power through the pressure of his mass movement"⁴ That the AL was a middle-class party, coming particularly from the professional

1 Ibid, p.62

2 Q.K. Ahmad (1978), p.390

3 Ibid, pp.390-396

4 Sobhan and Ahmad (1977), p.126

sector of that class, is clear from the following table.¹ This compares the backgrounds of 155 AL candidates in the 1970 general elections (there were 162 candidates, 160 of whom won seats - all in East Pakistan) with 70 Executive Committee members of a more left-wing party, the East Pakistan National Awami Party. (The difference between candidates and Executive Committee members was not of great significance).

Table 8.3: Occupational Backgrounds of EPNAP Executive Committee Members (1968) and AL Election Candidates (1970) in %

	EPNAP	AL
Lawyers	30.0	49.7
Doctors	2.9	4.5
Journalists/writers	10.0	3.2
Lecturers/teachers	15.7	10.3
Civil servants/military	-	3.9
Businessmen	12.9	20.0
Trade union workers	10.0	0.6
Peasant leaders	14.3	-
Student leaders	-	1.9
Other	4.2	5.8
Total	100.0	100.0
Number	70	155 ¹

Note: ¹ Maniruzzaman gave the total wrongly as 162 and calculated the percentages from this figure. I have given the individual totals as percentages of 155.

About half of the AL's candidates were lawyers while less than one-third of the EPNAP sample were. 67.7% of the AL were in the professions (the first four categories), compared to 58.6% of the EPNAP. In addition, 20% of the AL were businessmen, while less than 13% of the EPNAP were. While no AL member had lower class origins, 24.3% of the NAP were either trade union workers or peasant leaders. It would seem, then, that the AL was a solidly middle-class party, while the NAP contained a considerable lower class element. (However, the differences in education were much smaller: both parties had a remarkably high proportion of graduates - the AL 81% and the NAP 76%. Clearly both parties were educationally a part of the elite).

1 Re-arranged from Maniruzzaman (1975), pp.19 and 40

The 1970 election was won by the Awami League (AL) under the leadership of Mujibur Rahman (or 'Mujib'). All the 160 seats the AL won were in East Pakistan. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) under Bhutto came second with 81 seats. Though the AL did not get a single seat in West Pakistan (it did not try to) it gained an absolute majority (53.3% of the seats). Once the result was known Yahya Khan asked Mujib to negotiate with Bhutto on the formulation of a new constitution (which he was, in fact, entitled to do). Mujib demanded to be left in supreme and unqualified control of the country and of the creation of a new constitution. There is little doubt that Bhutto was making it very difficult for Yahya to accept Mujib's demands, by threatening trouble if he did. There is equally little doubt in my mind that Mujib was angling for an excuse to secede. It seems to me that Yahya, however foolishly he went about it, was trying to reconcile a number of highly antagonistic forces (including his own more hawkish military colleagues). The delays were sufficient to give Mujib his excuse. He in effect seceded. Yahya responded with savage military repression, which gave India the excuse it had been seeking to intervene. India gave Bangladesh the freedom its nationalist movement had failed to gain for itself. In fact, the nationalist movement in exile in India was really a rather paltry affair. As I have just said, AL members came from a fairly narrow range of backgrounds. Possibly this applied even more to the leadership of the AL forced into exile in India after Yahya's military crack-down in East Pakistan. 18 of the 32 members of the exiled leadership were from the professions. Most of its supporters in exile were academics or students.¹

The restricted nature of the backgrounds of AL members and direct supporters has led some writers to view the motives of the AL-led secession movement with skepticism. There are two basic theories concerning this movement. According to the standard nationalist theories (and I myself have in Part One treated nationalism with some skepticism) Mujib was an arch-autonomist - fighting against a West Pakistani military regime, intent on keeping East Pakistan

1 Rashiduzzaman (1972), pp.188/9

as a sort of colony. The other major theory says that Mujib did not represent the interests of East Pakistan as a whole, but simply of the East Pakistani bourgeoisie. According to this theory, the military were prepared to sacrifice some control over East Pakistan in order to keep the left-wing (Bhutto and the PPP in West Pakistan, Bhashani and the EPNAP in East Pakistan) out of power.

The proponents of the first theory say that there was a conspiracy to keep Mujib out of power. According to this theory the military had expected an unclear electoral result, enabling them either to remain on the political scene as a presiding force, or to cobble up a government made up of parties which were to its liking. When the AL, apparently unexpectedly, won the elections by an overwhelming margin, the military delayed handing over power, pushing Mujib into an extreme position which would justify his removal by force. According to Choudhury, a government adviser who was at the centre of things (but who nevertheless is a severe critic of both Yahya, whom he calls a "grotesque mediocrity"¹, and of the army actions in East Pakistan), there was no such conspiracy.

"I became convinced that he intended a genuine political settlement between two parts of Pakistan by giving the Bengalis a real share in the decision-making process within a loose federal or even a confederal system."²

Yahya not only allowed Mujib a lot of freedom, but he could have manipulated any other party of his liking into power if he had wished, or at least tried to. The actual election results show that he did not even attempt such a manipulation. Why, after all, go through an elaborate general election, openly and fairly conducted (and with a good deal of international publicity), with Mujib and the Awami League from quite early on tipped to win (if not by as substantial a margin as proved to be the case) if all along Yahya intended to disregard the results should they not suit him?

Proponents of the second theory in fact argue that the government wanted Mujib to win, the reason being the government's desire to

1 Choudhury, (1974), p.47

2 Ibid, p.84

keep out the left-wingers. According to Siddiqui

"By mid-March 1969 the uprising against Ayub Khan had turned into a full-scale revolutionary situation in which the urban industrial workers, the white-collar workers, the peasants, and the dissatisfied intellectuals were in revolt against the entire bourgeoisie."¹

Siddiqui reports that even in this period the country was riven by industrial strikes. He went through the Sind Industrial Trading Estate in Karachi in August 1969 and found twenty factories shut by strikes or lock-outs. He also went to the Karnaphuli Industrial complex near Chittagong in East Pakistan in February 1970, and found that 10,000 jute workers had been on strike for two weeks.²

According to this theory Mujib and his advisers were part of the "affluent bourgeoisie".

"Their economics was more relevant to a Hampstead set than to the actual needs of East Pakistan... The Awami League's predominant interest was to wrest power from the military and to prevent it from passing to the Left. Mujib used the standard bourgeois tactics of identifying an easily identifiable 'out-group' as the enemy."³

Siddiqui's description of the motives of Mujib and the rest of the Bengali leadership exactly fits the sort of motives that I argued, in Part One, are frequently part of the impulse behind nationalist movements.

"All he was seeking was the fruits of office, patronage, and opportunities for the Bengali bourgeoisie which it had been denied by the West Pakistani elite. The struggle for 'regional autonomy' for East Pakistan was a struggle to replace the non-Bengali middle-class with a Bengali middle-class."⁴

This was a case, then, of intra-class struggle.

It is at this point, however, that Siddiqui's argument becomes somewhat contrived. According to him, the labour unrest and general discontent in Pakistan was likely to bring Bhashani to power in the East and Bhutto to power in the West. Both were socialists (at least in name). Mujib asked Yahya for time in order to gain

1 Siddiqui (1972), p.129

2 Ibid, p.132

3 Ibid, p.136

4 Ibid, p.137

the chance to work up nationalist feeling in East Pakistan which he could then use to overwhelm the appeal of Bhashani's socialism. Siddiqui then argues that it was only the intensity of this rivalry which induced Mujib to go as far as he did in the cause of nationalism.

Though this intra-nationalist rivalry agrees with my theoretical argument in Part One (Bhashani was a Bengali nationalist too), Siddiqui's argument makes the typical Marxist mistake of underplaying the genuineness of nationalism by virtually ignoring it, and considerably overplaying the extent of class conflict. There is no doubting the surge of Bengali nationalism of the time (or even the intensity of Mujib's own nationalism). This widespread national feeling was not simply something created by Mujib out of thin air. At the same time Siddiqui exaggerates the popularity of Bhashani. No-one seriously predicted a possible victory for him. The eighty-year-old Bhashani had been more successful in inspiring local agitation than in building an organised party with a solid, mass following. Siddiqui also underestimates the sanity of Yahya and his advisers. Would they in effect encourage Mujib in a campaign of disaffection against West Pakistan, and even the danger of the break-up of the country, in order to avert the mere possibility of a socialist state? That there was labour unrest was one thing - there was unrest everywhere - but to assume an imminent socialist take-over or revolution, is fanciful. Such a thing the military could easily have coped with - the working-class was small and very weak. A violent nationalist campaign by a vast mass of people in the East wing, a thousand miles from the rest of Pakistan, would be an entirely different kettle of fish.

It is not fanciful, though, to suppose that Mujib, undoubtedly a nationalist, had in mind the interests of the Bengali elite, rather than those of the Bengali masses, in his campaign for regional autonomy - as Siddiqui suggests in the first half of his theory. Other writers, for instance Rounaq Jahan, also see the Awami League as largely a middle class concern (as has been shown) with distinct interests of its own.

The desire of a member of the Bengali elite to replace a West Pakistani in an elite position would appear both to him and to the people as a nationalist desire. The fact that the people themselves were largely irrelevant in the thinking of the Bengali elite does not alter this fact.

It is impossible to doubt the depth of hatred between the various ethnic groups on the Indian sub-continent. There was certainly considerable antagonism in East Pakistan between Bengalis and non-Bengalis. (The latter were called Biharis). As in Nigeria the resentment was based on fear of economic competition. The political conflict with West Pakistan was skillfully converted into hatred of all 'Biharis' by the AL. The 'Biharis' were the Jews of Germany or the Ibos of Northern Nigeria.

There is no doubt that the civil war was fundamentally ethnic. Hence (as in Biafra) the AL were only too keen to accuse West Pakistan of genocide during the clamp-down. There is no doubt that the military action was very severe, something many Pakistanis are still ashamed of, but we will never know the exact truth: victory in war is followed by victory in propaganda. What I suspect occurred was in fact an extremely unpleasant war with much brutality on both sides. Brutality on one side inspires brutality on the other. It seems to be the case that the first massacres were by Bengalis of non-Bengalis, before the army arrived. There is also evidence that those most responsible for the counter-massacres were not the well-trained Pakistani army (though I am not saying it was not involved) but the 'Bihari' irregular recruits (Razakars). These, living in East Pakistan, were rather like the Ibos in Northern Nigeria - a successful but insecure minority. When Bengalis saw the chance they began to murder these 'Biharis' who, inducted into the forces, took their revenge.

Much of the more brutal killing, then, was probably caused by ethnic rivalry. The Pakistanis claim that many thousands of Biharis and West Pakistanis were killed between the time Mujib declared East Pakistan 'independent' and the war (though the killing occurred during and after the war too). It is claimed that 'slaughter houses' were set up for this purpose, and that in Chittagong alone 10,000 to 12,000 non-Bengalis were killed in this way in March 1971. Less spectacular

claims were of seventeen West Pakistani workers tortured and killed at a glass-works on 27th March, about 150 workers burnt to death in a jute-mill on 27th April, and 3,000 to 5,000 Biharis killed by rebel East Pakistani Rifles personnel at Jessore on 29th/30th March. In all, West Pakistan claims that 72,000 to 78,000 non-Bengalis were killed in March and April 1971, as well as making accusations of torture and rape.¹

It is impossible to test the validity of these claims. However, I cannot see that they are necessarily less likely to be true than the obviously exaggerated claims put forward by the Awami League and India, at the time of the war, of huge Pakistani atrocities. The following account is from a Minority Rights Group report on the post-war condition of Biharis in Bangladesh and the background to this. The MRG is an independent British Charity.

"After Yahya Khan on 1 March 1971 postponed the promised National Assembly, Bengalis turned on the Biharis as Urdu-speaking targets that were readily available as symbols of the Pakistani domination. Over 300 of them were killed by extremist mobs at Chittagong in early March 1971. There were other attacks at Jessore, Khulna, Rangpur, and Saidpur. A further slaughter at Mymensingh caused a large influx of Biharis into the Mirpur suburb of Dacca. The Urdu-speaking community claim that in all several thousand of their people were killed by pro-Bengali supporters of secession prior to (My emphasis) the Pakistani army's ruthless intervention on 25 March, 1971. Further reprisals against the Biharis followed when Yahya Khan arrested Sheikh Mujib and outlawed the Awami League.... when civil bloodshed broke out on a large scale in 1971 there is no doubt that numbers of the Razakar Biharis seized the opportunity to take their revenge on the Bengalis."²

The ethnic element in the secession was of some significance. The Biharis had already been the victims of ethnic hatred as most of them had fled from India to East Pakistan during the Hindu-Muslim massacres around the time of partition of India. Forming a

1 Rushbrook Williams (1972), pp.133-140

2 The Biharis in Bangladesh, p.8.

Muslim minority in Bihar (in India) tens of thousands of them were massacred at this time. But in East Pakistan, though Muslims, they were now an Urdu-speaking minority in a Bengali country. In fact all Urdu-speaking refugees, and other immigrants, were called Biharis by Bengalis. To them they were simply non-Bengalis.

After the civil war 'Biharis' in Bangladesh were either isolated in ghettos or put into camps. They were an unwanted minority, and in constant danger. In the Mohammadpur camp

"There was almost an average of one incident reported daily of a Bihari being attacked or robbed, and few Biharis had the courage to venture outside even to contact the authorities.At Mirpur Awami League members seized many Bihari homes, and there were continued subsequent reports of looting and harassment."¹

There were also reports of killing and abduction of women. The worst case was a reported massacre of over 1,000 Biharis at Khulna on 10th March 1972.²

The role of ethnic rivalry and hatred seems then to have been of considerable significance. But it is very important to note that the actual objects of Bengali resentment were less West Pakistanis than migrants from India. The total number of Biharis believed to be in enclaves in Bangladesh in 1972 was about 735,000. Yet a census by the International Red Cross showed that only 25,000 of these came from, or had close ties with, West Pakistan. The crux of my argument is that the secession movement was fundamentally an ethnic affair. It was not fuelled by common resentment of central government control residing in West Pakistan but by hatred of ethnic outsiders, and few of these outsiders were West Pakistanis. Secession for the Awami League and its supporters meant the dispossession of Biharis of their jobs and business opportunities.

It seems clear to me from accounts of the time that Mujib had decided to try and secede (with Indian help) quite early on. It is also possible he only used the elections to gain public support for the attempt. But, why secede when power over the whole of Pakistan was in the offing? Mujib made no attempt to see if the immediate

1 Ibid, pp.13/14

2 Ibid, p.16

delays in the handing-over of power were temporary. The reason, I think, is quite simple. In Nigeria there had always been a strong ambivalence between the desire for regional autonomy and for central control. Gradually the parties decided that control of the centre was a worthwhile goal. This was because there were very few possibilities of gaining wealth outside politics. Most industry and commerce was foreign-owned. Wealth could only be acquired through politics - it gave access to patronage. In Pakistan foreign business interests were minimal. But in East Pakistan 'foreign' - i.e. West Pakistani or 'Bihari' business interests were powerful. By declining power at the centre, the Bengali elite was rejecting the greatly increased power over patronage this would have offered (elite jobs at the federal level for Bengalis), but it could totally displace the 'foreign' business interests if it gained independence for East Pakistan. It could also then set up its own entirely independent patronage system - a whole new government, a greatly expanded administration, a new set of quasi-government bodies, and a new diplomatic staff. Furthermore, as power at the centre could not offer any control over West Pakistan - it was too strong - and as there was always the danger of another military coup, the secession strategy must have been very tempting.

8.3.2. Summary

Ever since 1954, when the (East Pakistani) United Front beat the Muslim League in provincial elections in East Pakistan by 210 seats to nine, gaining 64% of the vote to the League's 27%¹, it was clear that the regionalist political leaders had mass support for their demands for greater autonomy. Nevertheless, I have tried to show that the relationship between the two wings was not intrinsically exploitative. For a start, it is difficult to doubt East Pakistan's greater inherent weakness.

"As a result of its dense population and the amount of land under jute cultivation, East Bengal is a food deficit area, and in general the standard of living is lower than that in West Pakistan."²

The Pakistani's claimed with some justice (in defence of their policies at the time of the secession crisis) that

1 Rashiduzzaman (1970), p.577

2 Lambert (1959), p.52

"with the best will in the world and all the resources of nature you cannot undo in a decade or two the neglect of centuries."¹

I doubt there was "the best will in the world" but significant attempts were made to reduce disparities. But how far should this go? Should West Pakistan slow down its own growth in order to raise East Pakistan's? Such problems have no obvious solution. But under Ayub, and even before him, clear efforts were made to increase development spending in East Pakistan relative to West Pakistan. The same applied to East Pakistani representation in the civil service elite, which was virtually nil at independence (obviously through no fault of West Pakistan).

"In 1957, ten years after independence, 65 of the 267 officers in the Civil Service of Pakistan were from East Pakistan. The proportion of East Pakistanis, then, was 24.3%. By 1967, this had increased to 139 out of 467 serving officers, or 34.1%. This increase was made possible by the recruitment of servants according to a 'quota system' adopted in 1949, which provided that 20% of all vacancies in the CSP be filled on merit as a result of the Central Superior Services Competition Examination. Of the remaining vacancies, half were to be filled by East Pakistanis and half by West Pakistanis. This system was changed in 1967 to allow even more East Pakistanis to join the Service."²

There is even some evidence that some members of the West Pakistani elite believed the secession of East Pakistan would be the best thing for them; they feared the Western wing would end up subsidising East Pakistan (as, in fact, it had done over a number of years in the case of food supplies). I have already given figures showing the gradual decline in relative importance of the East Pakistani market to West Pakistani manufacturers. Pakistan's economic performance after the break-away of Bangladesh, which was much superior to that of the latter country, confirms the significance of this.

"The export sectors' performance in 1972/3 was significant for two reasons. It demonstrated that the health of the Pakistani

1 Ali, Chapter 2.

2 Burki (1969), p.253

economy was not dependent on the markets that had been lost in Bangladesh; in fact, it could now be argued that during the latter part of the 1960s the Eastern wing had become an economic burden for the Western wing."¹

I do not believe that West Pakistan was exploiting East Pakistan as such, at least certainly not as much as is claimed. Nor do I believe Mujib was forced to secede. He did so because he represented a professional middle-class fragment that could gain only from total political support. Mujib represented neither a class nor an ethnic group, but an ethnically based class fragment.

8.4. Bangladesh After the Secession: Nothing Altered

I will argue in the final two sections that the civil war did nothing to alter the fundamentals of the political-economies of the areas that had been West and East Pakistan. Most of the elements of the delicate political balance remained. The immediate post-Liberation period in Bangladesh also tells us something about the motivations behind the leadership of the secession movement. The proof of the pudding, we are often told, is in the eating. What the Awami League did once in government and what happened in Bangladesh under the League tells us something about the secession itself.

8.4.1. The Meaning of the Secession for Bangladesh

With secession Bangladesh swapped an inferior (but decreasingly so) relationship with Pakistan for a markedly inferior relationship with India. The economies of Bangladesh and India become much closer together; indeed, for a while the former became India's client state. One of the major advantages for East and West Pakistan in 1947 had been that they had complementary economies (both producing different things), whereas before 1947 these areas had been dependent on India for the processing of their raw materials, while India also competed with them in the production of these raw materials (mainly jute and cotton).

That the Indian and Bangladeshi economies are competitive is obvious enough. This was especially so in the case of jute, on which Bangladesh was greatly dependent. In 1969/70 India produced 936,000 tons of jute goods to Bangladesh's 561,000. The effects of

1 Burki, (1980), p.111

the civil war pushed production in Bangladesh down to 315,000 tons in 1971/2. This loss was nearly all made up by India, whose production went up to 1,120,000 tons. By 1973/4, when Bangladesh was producing 500,000 tons, it did so at India's expense; India's production in that year fell to 921,000 tons.¹ Yet, despite the earlier complaints of the unequal trade relationship between East and West Pakistan, Bangladesh, once trade reopened with Pakistan, retained a pronounced deficit in its trade with Pakistan, as the following table shows. These two economies were complementary.

Table 8.4: Bangladesh's Trade with Pakistan (million taka)

	1974/5	1975/6	1976/7
Exports to Pakistan	0.1	99.1	-
Imports from Pakistan	111.5	242.4	83.4

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (1979), Dacca, p.270.

It is widely acknowledged that India, as soon as it had helped free Bangladesh, rapidly formed an exploitative relationship with the new country. Many Bangladeshis consider the relationship of their country to India to have been of a "semi-colonial status".² This exploitation extended from straightforward plunder by the Indian army during its stay in Bangladesh to the formulation "of unequal treaties, to allow penetration of Indian monopoly capital through trade and other channels."³

Bangladesh's misfortunes do not seem to have diminished since the secession. This is not altogether surprising considering the enormous problems the country started with, in particular those stemming from the war.

"These losses cannot be expected to be made up overnight".⁴

Immediately after Liberation real per capital income, not surprisingly, fell. It appears to have risen significantly after a few years. Taking the index of real income as 100 in 1969/70, in 1972/3 it was 87, but by 1975/6 it was 107.⁵ This improvement seems to have been largely due to an increase in agricultural output. The performance of industry was very poor. Given indices for agricultural and industrial output in 1969/70 of 100 by 1975/6 these were 104 for agriculture and 83 for industry.⁶ As can be seen from the following

1 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (1979), p.240

2 Alamgir (1978), p.81

3 Ibid, p.81

4 Ranis (1974), p.855

5 Alamgir (1978), p.7

6 Ibid, p.10

table the position of the poor had improved somewhat during the 1960s (even if the improvement had been greater in West Pakistan) but after Liberation it plummeted drastically.

Table 8.5: Index of Real Wage Earnings of Unskilled Agricultural and Urban Labourers in Bangladesh¹

	Agricultural Labourers	Unskilled Urban Workers
1958	101.7	n.a.
1962	113.4	96.2
1966	100.0	100.0
1970	122.4	104.3
1972	96.1	59.2
1973	93.4	55.1
1974	91.0	50.3
1975	85.7	43.8

(Naturally these figures, given the problems with the collection of data in that part of the world, must be treated with a certain skepticism, but they are likely to be very broadly correct). The earlier inferiority of East Pakistan to West Pakistan had not been the result of exploitation. The inferiority of the economy of Bangladesh relative to Pakistan's continued even after Liberation, and the situation of the bulk of the people declined absolutely. This was exacerbated by dreadful mismanagement of the economy.

In the agricultural sphere, strangely enough, there was little departure from the policies of the previous central government in Pakistan.² There were further land reforms but, as only a small proportion of land in Bangladesh is held in large holdings, they had little impact.³ The new government's industrial policy was, on the face of it, more radical than its agricultural policy. The government very quickly nationalised 67 jute mills, 64 cotton mills and 15 sugar mills.⁴ Not much later all indigenous banks were nationalised. By 1974 about 85% of industrial assets were under public ownership or management.⁵ (Though even by 1978 the manufacturing sector contributed only a little over 10% to GDP, and absorbed a mere 6% of the labour force⁶). What was the purpose of the post-Liberation nationalisation programme? One of the motives was negative in character. Many industrial enterprises - 725 in fact⁷ -

1 Ibid, p.12

2 Abdullah (1976, Vol.IV, No.1)

3 Abdullah et al (1976, Vol.IV, No.2), p.216

4 Ahmad, K. (1978), p.104

5 Ahmad, Q. (1974), p.677

6 Ahmad, Q (1978), p.385

7 Sobhan & Ahmad (1977), p.151

had been abandoned by non-Bengalis during the war. Someone had to do something with these, and quickly. Of necessity, the government took them over, formally only to manage them but in effect bringing them into state ownership. But the level of nationalisation was never reduced thereafter, and, in fact, has been extended greatly.

Left-wing critics of the Awami League regime, surprised at the extent of the nationalisation undertaken by this 'petty bourgeois' government, put it down to left-wing elements who joined the AL during the civil war period and subsequently forced the government to a more socialist programme than it really wished to adopt. Yet it is noticeable that even with the military coup of 1975 no fundamental change in industrial policy occurred. There are other motives behind nationalisation than socialist ones. Moreover, Mujibur Rahman, the AL leader, was immensely popular - a nationalist hero (the "father of the nation"). He was not riding on the back of a repressed socialist revolution, even if socialists formed a significant part of the nationalist movement.

The point is that nationalisation is not socialism. There were at first simply not enough Bangladeshis with sufficient private resources and business experience to take over the industries abandoned by non-Bengalis. (I have described in an earlier section the vain attempts of the Ayub regime to find private Bengali businessmen to take over industry in East Pakistan). Awami League members and supporters did not, in general, have the resources and experience to take over and run large businesses. I have shown the backgrounds of AL members before Liberation in Table 8.3. The nature of the AL after Liberation can be seen from the following data collected by Rounaq Jahan at Dacca University, which is on 283 M.Ps. elected in 1973 (most of whom were from the AL).¹

These M.Ps'. family and own occupational backgrounds lie in the professions, business and in land. The businessmen were perforce rather small-scale, and most of those primarily dependent on the land were farmers rather than land-owners. Most M.Ps. owned some land, but only 10.1% owned over 40 acres. 24.7% of the M.Ps. owned less than 6.5 acres. (Most Bangladeshis have some land-holdings, however small).

1 Jahan, undated paper presented at Dacca University

Table 8.6: Occupational Background of Bangladeshi M.Ps.1973 (%)

	Fathers	M.Ps.
Lawyers	5.0	26.5
Teachers	7.5	9.9
Doctors	2.5	5.3
Civil servants	15.0	0.7
Businessmen	14.6	23.7
Land-owners	18.2	2.8
Cultivators	35.7	14.8
Politicians	0.7	12.4
Other	0.7	3.9
Total	100.0	100.0
Number	280	283

Comparison with their fathers' occupations shows a considerable move away from land as a source of income to the professions (primarily), to politics as a full-time job, and to business. The M.Ps. were more urban, more bourgeois. In terms of income the M.Ps. were comfortable but not many could be considered to be rich. About 36% of them had incomes of over T.30,000 p.a. (about £1,050), less than one-third of these having an income of over T.50,000 (£1,750). 32.1% had an income of between T.14,000 and T.20,000 (£490-£700). These men were considerably better-off than their fathers, less than one-half of whom had incomes of over T10,000 (T350).

This data indicates that the moderately well-to-do sought and achieved progress through politics. The M.Ps. themselves were better-off than their fathers, so politics also, perhaps, provided a means of advancement. Politicians were not the scions of rich families. But nor were they from lowly backgrounds. Yet, though from an educational elite, by comparison with many of the earlier politicians of Pakistan (in particular West Pakistan) they were relatively 'small' men. It is also interesting to note that, by this time, businessmen had almost caught up lawyers. Comparison with Tables 7.6 and 8.3 shows that this had been a gradual process. This is a very significant trend, indicating the value of a political

career to business. Where resources are scarce attachment to power is often the best means of gaining at least some access to these resources.

Awami League members were relatively 'small' men with, in general, insufficient resources (and experience) to take over and run large businesses. They had wanted to eliminate West Pakistani (or Bihari) competition, but did not have the means to take up the latter's assets once abandoned. The government, it should be added, was not opposed to disinvestment should suitable candidates appear from the private sector. In fact, a requirement was made that nationalised firms with assets below a certain level (taka 1.5 million) should be sold to the private sector. This level was quite low and the amount of denationalisation was very slight.

"Nationalisation of industries in such a situation will only enable the bourgeois national government to strengthen its position by distributing patronages."¹

As I argued in Part One, access to positions of economic control in developing countries is often the main path to personal fortune. Where there are few opportunities to become rich, because there is little in the way of profit to be made on the land (the case in Nigeria and in Bangladesh), because industry is highly undeveloped and/or is foreign-owned (the Nigerian case), or because the individual resources of the up-and-coming are limited (as was the case in Bangladesh), the main access to resources must be through the state. The Awami League, in particular, represented the middle-class 'have-nots', part of the educational elite which had not made it economically.

"The essential feature of the Awami League however was that it had been excluded from power since 1957. This meant that the special benefits of patronage which served to single out elements in various tiers of the petty bourgeoisie and enable them to enjoy a life-style above their class without necessarily graduating beyond the confines of the class was denied most members of the Awami League. To this end, within their peer group, they were have-nots."²

Especially interesting in the above statement is the sense of a class fragment trying to reach beyond the confines of its related class

1 Ahmad, K. (1978), intro.p.xii

2 Sobhan and Ahmad (1977),p.122

fragments. They did this partly by becoming what Alamgir seems to call "bureaucratic capitalists".

"These individuals who had been brought in, through political manoeuvring, to manage nationalised industries were usually inexperienced and performed poorly. Many of them added to their fortunes through pilferage and misappropriation of funds. Again, political patronage helped many to accumulate assets in various forms...."¹

8.4.2. The Return of the Military

The hold of the party and its supporters over the economy increased until Mujib tried to make this total with the formation in 1975 of the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants', Workers' and Peoples' League) - BAKSAL. With this new organisation he not only made Bangladesh a one-party state, but made the party, through enforced association, the 'spokesman' for a multitude of interests, indeed, the whole population. BAKSAL had a labour front, a students' league, etc. Apart from this, politicians, managers, union leaders, journalists, even civil servants, 'voluntarily' joined the new party. Mujib was now a de facto dictator. However, this attempt to bolster what was a dying regime did not last long as not many months later (in August 1975) Mujib and his family were murdered in an army coup. But this did not happen before he had succeeded

"in carrying out a large number of political murders, imprisoning thousands without trial, and forcing many to go underground."²

This coup, and the later coups, had nothing to do with class conflict. The difference between the various disgruntled groups was one of function rather than class, though underlying all was a deep frustration with Bangladesh's continuing economic immiseration, and also with the total control of political power and economic resources by the Awami League. Two of these groups - the bureaucracy and the military - are constant opponents of political regimes. They are primarily 'functionary groups' rather than representatives of a particular class. This is especially so in Bangladesh, where class differences between the different elite groups are virtually non-existent. These two groups opposed the regime partly because

1 Alamgir (1978), p.83

2 Ibid, pp.81/2

their functions had been undermined, partly because the rewards they expected to derive from these functions had been limited, severely so in comparison with the beneficiaries of political patronage.

The military had a number of reasons for intervening, the most pressing one being the abysmal economic and social decline of the country in the hands of the Awami League. But the military also stood to improve its own economic and social position. What the military gained from the coup can perhaps be inferred from an observation of the progress of defence expenditure over the period, which I have compared to spending on certain other sectors.

Table 8.7: Government Spending on the Military & Other Sectors
Revenue Expenditure (Taka millions)

	1972/3	1973/4	1974/5	1975/6	1976/7	1977/8	% Increase
Gen.admin	172.9	322.1	351.4	246.5	506.3	424.0	145
Defence	201.6	419.6	708.5	1109.3	1702.2	2001.2	893
Education	450.5	648.2	822.1	834.5	1020.9	1352.8	200
Health	108.8	153.1	181.4	273.0	311.3	436.9	302
Agriculture	29.8	36.5	50.5	56.8	48.1	63.2	112
Industry	5.1	5.9	7.8	7.2	7.9	18.1	255

Development Expenditure

	1973/4	1974/5	1975/6	1976/7	1977/8	% Increase
Education	184.1	206.2	353.3	438.5	555.6	202
Health	140.0	169.1	361.1	377.1	476.4	240
Agriculture	359.2	491.2	1065.3	1270.2	1584.2	341
Industry	201.9	643.8	662.1	1055.6	1341.5	564

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (1979), pp.300 and 302.

I have shown development expenditure (the lower table) as well as current expenditure (for those sectors which had development spending) in order to get a proper comparison. As can be seen, in 1977/8, defence had the highest expenditure of all the above sectors, even including development spending; it also showed the greatest rate of increase over the period 1972/3 - 1977/8. Just before the coup, in 1974/5 it received less funds than education and not much more than industry. By 1977/8 it had easily outstripped them. In fact about one-tenth

of total government spending that year was on defence (though some of the figures of government expenditure were doubtful, being estimates rather than actuals).

While the military certainly improved its own well-being after the coup, it did not make substantial alterations in the socio-economic structure. Above all, it did not initiate a programme of denationalisation, despite strong demands from businessmen, now willing to expand their assets, for such a programme. The coup, then, had nothing to do with the structure of ownership. Control over public assets was as useful to the new military regime, in every respect, as it had been to the Awami League regime. Limited denationalisation was considered in 1980 (in textiles and jute, and possibly banking and insurance)¹ but little was done about it.

Like Ayub over ten years earlier, General Ziaur Rahman, the new leader, thought he could strengthen his tenuous position and increase political stability, if he formed a new party. This party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), as far as I know, has not been the subject of study as have the earlier major parties. However, while in Bangladesh I interviewed a BNP M.P., Nazim Kamran Choudhury, who spoke frankly, and at length, on the party. Roughly one-third of BNP members were new to politics. It also seems that its composition was different from that of other parties. Upto one-third of them were businessmen, many of these being those new to political life. The presidents of the three main chambers of commerce were BNP M.Ps. For the first time in a party in that part of the world there appear to have been more businessmen than lawyers - which were the next most numerous group. The trend towards this position, starting from 1947, has already been noted. (This predominance of businessmen was confirmed to me by an ex-BNP minister, Enayatullah Khan). However, despite the predominance of businessmen (mostly small businessmen), they were less concerned with possible denationalisation than with gaining from their place in the patron-client network.

Ziaur Rhaman did a good job in providing political stability for Bangladesh and the basis for a measure of economic improvement. But even this did not last. In 1979 there were reports of famine (on a small scale) in the north of Bangladesh. In 1980 there were

1 The Guardian (16.6.80).

widespread strikes by low-paid government employees. Over 500,000 went on indefinite strike in support of a large number of demands.¹ Eventually Ziaur Rahman himself was killed by a small number of army officers. Apparently there were 14 coups and counter-coups in the ranks of the army in the three years after Mujib's assassination² - a clear case of intra-class conflict. The various conflicts that have occurred in Bangladesh since Liberation reflected the same processes that occurred in Pakistan before Liberation: the struggle between the military and the politicians continues, as does the struggle within the military itself. These conflicts have continued also since Ziaur Rahman's death. Liberation made no difference to the intra-class conflict, only to its geographical distribution:

8.5. Pakistan After the Secession: The Delicate Political Balance Remains

8.5.1. The Economy

Bhutto, head of the new Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government, called himself a socialist and his programme 'Islamic Socialism'. His slogan 'roti, kapra, mekan' (bread, clothes, housing) had a radical ring and populist appeal. For the first time a political platform was apparently being built on the needs of the masses. However, Bhutto's socialism became increasingly limited towards the end of his regime. The party, on the face of it, was unlikely to be a radical force anyway. Bhutto himself was a rich landlord, as were many of the party's leaders.

The nature of Pakistan's industrial policy was broadly similar to that of Bangladesh. The public sector was chosen as the prime medium. Over the years there was a substantial amount of nationalisation. The extent of the growth of the public sector can be gauged from the fact that while 46% of new industrial investment in 1973/4 came from the public sector, this was the source of 77% of new investment in 1976/7. Public investment grew six-fold in this period; private investment actually fell.³

It is clear, as it was in Bangladesh, that nationalisation was a prime source of patronage. The largest of the public groups was BIM Enterprises. Though some of the firms within this were quite profitable, overall profitability was low. One of the reasons for this was overmanning. In 1972/3 BIM employed 40,817 staff. By

1 The Guardian (24.3.80)

2 The Guardian (1.12.78)

3 Waseem (1978), p.78 (There were errors in addition, or printing errors, in his table; I corrected these to get the above totals).

1976/7 this was 61,731. Waseem estimates, very crudely, that perhaps half of this 50% increase was unnecessary.¹ According to the White Paper put out by Zia's regime on the performance of the economy under Bhutto

"The selection of ineffective, inefficient and unqualified management and over-staffing of enterprises was done purely for political expediency."²

In agriculture change was sought through land reform. In this respect too Pakistan's path was similar to that of Bangladesh. The 1972 reforms were hardly radical, at least in effect.

"The actual reforms which the government carried out... by being applicable to individual rather than family holdings meant that little land was in fact resumed and that which might have been available had already been transferred to other members of the family since most people knew that the reform was forthcoming."³

Furthermore, there were so many permissible exemptions that only a very small minority of those formally owning too much land actually had to surrender land. However, further reforms in 1977 did more to reduce rural inequalities.

General economic performance under Bhutto was reasonably, if not particularly, impressive. GDP grew by 4% per annum from 1972/3 to 1976/7. Industrial output grew by 2.9% p.a. Furthermore the position of the industrial worker, to whom the PPP had a political commitment (which they to some extent honoured), improved. This was the first time the workers had received such benefits.

Table 8.8: Index of Real Wages in Large-Scale Manufacturing
(1959/60 = 100)⁴

1954	103
1959/60	100
1964/65	108
1967/68	102
1969/70	124
1972/73	143
1973/74	163
1974/75	159

1 Ibid, p.97

2 Government of Pakistan: White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime (1979), Vol.IV, p.43

3 Amjad (1978), pp.10/11

4 Ibid, p.21

Real wages increased most from 1969/70.

"This increase is mainly due to the introduction of the minimum wage in 1969 and the February 1972 reforms which extended workers' participation in management, made compulsory the payment of annual bonus, and set minimum standards of education, life insurance, and medical benefits."¹

There was little, but some, reduction in inequality in the public sector. For instance, while the difference between the lowest and highest paid civil servants in 1959/60 had been 22:1, by 1975/6 it had fallen to 15:1.²

This review of economic management and of the economic welfare of the people during the period of PPP rule suggests that some moderate improvement was made, especially in the position of the industrial workers. At the same time the economic power of the industrialists, built up by Ayub, was broken. But political power also allowed groups access to patronage which had been blocked by the military for a decade.

8.5.2. The Political Balance Breaks Down Again

Broadly speaking, three types of group resented the PPP. First of all there was the class Bhutto had been trying to eliminate - the big industrialists and their allies in the lower reaches of business. Included here were the small businessmen in cities and small rural towns affected by recent nationalisations of certain 'agro-industries' (industries processing agricultural products): ghee (cooking oil) production, cotton ginning, rice husking, and flour milling. The important thing about these industries is that they were fragmented into small units and controlled by a myriad of small businessmen, not by a tiny elite of rich industrialists. Nearly 3,000 units were taken over. In doing so, then, Bhutto antagonised a large segment of the 'petty bourgeoisie'. More important than this, the nationalisations created widespread fear amongst small businessmen of all sorts that Bhutto was about to take them over too. They were encouraged to think this, and even pressurised into action, by the big industrialists who had already been dispossessed by Bhutto.³ Urban retailers - a substantial element throughout Pakistan's towns and cities - were a significant element in the disturbances that brought down the PPP government.

1 Ibid, p.23

2 Qureshi and Bilquees (1977), p.331

3 Personal interview with Hamid Mehmood, a senior PPP man.

Bhutto was, thus, strongly opposed by the 'business middle class'. The second group to oppose him was the professional sector of the middle class. This had been Bhutto's main source of support in his opposition to Ayub and his subsequent rise to power, but his growing policy of political repression seriously alienated large sections of this class. (His take-over of small industries also upset many of these people as this threatened to obstruct the business aspirations that many of them had¹). In power the PPP had become increasingly like the functionary groups (both the army and the civil service) they had set out to control. One of the professional groups to turn against Bhutto was the lawyers. They had gained under Bhutto and had a close connection with the PPP, as they generally do with political parties. This connection between politics and lawyers, which I have often referred to, has been well described by the White Paper.

"In the agitation that toppled the Ayub regime at the turn of the decade, and in which Mr.Z.A. Bhutto himself played an effective role, the community of lawyers took an active part. Another reason why some of the people in power were keen to ensure a submissive Bar was that a large element in national politics was drawn largely from the lawyers community and elections to the various Bar Associations tended to influence parliamentary elections. The regime, therefore, sought to win over members of the Bar through the vast patronage that it enjoyed, and to punish and victimise those who did not toe the line, through the enormous power that it commanded."²

Lawyers were important for two reasons: firstly, for their strength in political recruitment, secondly because their cooperation would be needed for the constitutional changes Bhutto was seeking (to strengthen his power). But these measures backfired to some extent. Those lawyers supporting other parties or, possibly more important, not gaining out of the patronage system (or not wanting to), were alienated. Competent lawyers saw less competent lawyers progressing beyond them. The lawyers became increasingly politicised and polarised. A similar process occurred with the journalists as he maintained close control over the press and victimised a number

1 Personal interview with Bhutto's daughter, Benazir.

2 Government of Pakistan: White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime (1979), Vol.II, p.99

of journalists. Both groups helped inflame the disturbances of 1977, just as they had both helped to topple Ayub. Bhutto also significantly affected the educational sector by taking over a large number of private schools and colleges (education having until then been largely in the private sector). The aim was to help the poor and to improve education, but in doing so he also affected the pay and job prospects of teachers.

"Therefore, while Bhutto regarded the educational reforms as one of the finest accomplishments of his regime, dissatisfaction with them was one of the several reasons that brought the urban middle-classes out in the streets in such large numbers in the 1977 agitation against his regime."¹

The third main group which had suffered under Bhutto was, of course, the military, which had been kept out of power by the growing strength of the PPP (which showed no signs of diminishing) for nearly six years. (The civil service had also suffered from PPP manipulation of the service). Though the military did not start the disturbances it certainly took advantage of them. The disturbances were deliberately and overtly started by the parties in opposition to the PPP, temporarily joined together under a united front which called itself the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Firmly shut out of power for a considerable time by the results of the 1977 elections (which gave the PPP 155 National Assembly seats to 36 for the PNA), these parties saw no future for themselves unless they did something drastic. The PNA claimed that the elections were rigged and demanded a completely new round of elections. Bhutto offered to negotiate but the PNA decided to take to the streets, knowing it could not win otherwise. The agitation started in Karachi and spread from there to Lahore and other cities. Bhutto called in the army which created the stability needed for negotiations to make progress. The army then took the chance it had been waiting for, ousting Bhutto and keeping power for itself.

The subsequent promises by the military regime to hold elections, its continued recession from these promises, the juridically doubtful conviction of Bhutto for the murder of a political rival, and his

1 Burki (1980), p.129

subsequent execution, are too well known to require elaboration. The result of these proceedings was simply that a military regime has remained in power with no known political or economic programme, (apart from its reactionary attempt to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state) for many years. The PNA who initiated Bhutto's downfall have, after a temporary flirtation with the military government, gained nothing but the death of their rival.

Why was the PNA able to create so much agitation on the streets? The election results, even with some rigging, indicated that the government still had a great measure of popular support. The reason is that, as I have stated before, cities in Third World countries always contain large numbers of discontented people. In this case even supporters of the government had their grievances, and some of these, after going on the streets to protest against the PPP government, later supported the PPP when the military had forced it into the position of an underdog. It only takes a few disgruntled groups, with the ever present, wretched lumpenproletariat, to ignite the cities. The disturbances themselves exacerbate urban discontent, impelling others into the mêlée, who thus aggravate the problem yet further.

"With the participation of students and labourers who were most affected by the closure of educational institutions and disruption of civic and economic life, the PNA's struggle entered into a decisive phase."¹

The most significant factor in the disturbances, however, was probably religious. The Islamic leaders of Pakistan had never had political power, but religion was a very potent force - more powerful on the streets (witness the Karachi disturbances and the Ahmediya riots described above, and similar anti-Ahmediya violence during Bhutto's reign) than in the election booths. In this case the religious reaction was based on propaganda, put out by the PNA and transmitted through the 'ulema' in the mosques and through the anti-Bhutto press, that Bhutto was a 'kafir' - an infidel. The propaganda claimed that Bhutto drank and gambled and that because of this Pakistan was becoming increasingly westernised and un-Islamic. The reaction this caused was different only in scale from the religious and anti-western disturbances that were to topple the Shah in Iran. The

1 Ali, Mehrunnisa (1977), p.84

power of the religious factor induced Bhutto to suddenly introduce, while the disturbances were still going on, certain Islamic laws, especially the banning of the sale of alcohol in Pakistan, which he hoped would pre-empt further trouble. But it was too late.

The same actors that had appeared in earlier disturbances here reappeared to dislodge Bhutto, but included was a substantial section of the 'business' middle class, brought into the fray through fear of Bhutto's socialist policies. At the head of the insurrection were the two main branches of the middle class: the business element and the professional element. These two middle-class fragments are usually antagonistic to each other. While the former always opposed Bhutto's socialism, the latter were initially Bhutto's main ally. But his increasingly oppressive regime made him more and more like the functionary groups (the army and the civil service) he had either displaced or weakened, and so the professional middle class began to oppose him; their own liberties had been too much curtailed. But the disturbances did not really become insurmountable until the religious element and the urban 'lumpenproletariat' became involved.

Like Ayub, Bhutto was toppled in the melting-pot of urban discontent. The mixture was slightly different but the principle the same. The result of this opportunity of numerous groups to express their dissatisfaction was a movement of considerable proportions.

"The magnitude of the movement is discernible from the number of protest rallies and casualties during the period from 14 March to 27 May 1977. According to the official figures placed before the Supreme Court by the then Attorney-General, 4,653 processions were taken out by the public including 248 by women, 92 by advocates, 18 by 'ulema', 248 by students and 57 by boys and children. The figures relating to the destruction of property were 1,622 vehicles on the road (excluding those burnt in the Republic Motors, Karachi), 18 installations, 74 shops, 58 banks, 7 hotels, 11 cinemas, 56 offices, and 27 railways."¹

Hundreds of people died and thousands were injured during the disturbances.

1 Ibid, p.92

Who gained from the coup? Only the military. The Islamic politicians have gained the death of Bhutto and the Islamicisation of the country, but no political power for themselves. Pakistan's businessmen have gained the elimination of a 'socialist' regime, but as in Bangladesh, the military have not denationalised substantially, though they seem less unwilling to do so than the Bangladeshi regime. The fifth five-year plan (1978-83) promised to limit the public sector to a number of large, basic industries such as steel and ship-building, and also the possibility of minority private share-holdings in these;¹ but this programme of even partial denationalisation has not yet been fulfilled, and Pakistan's businessmen continue to invest heavily abroad. There is a clear difference of interest between the military and the businessmen on this question. If the government denationalises it loses significant economic power and a vast amount of its total patronage system, including lucrative jobs for current and retired military personnel. In retaining most nationalised industries the military was acting not as an ally of the business class, but as a functionary group.

8.6 Conclusion

In Chapter Seven I described the various class fragments that have been involved in and either gained or lost from Pakistan's economic development. In this Chapter I have shown how conflicts between these have resulted in considerable political instability. But, at the same time, political changes have not been determined simply by these conflicts. Pakistani society is even more fragmented than the discussion in Chapter Seven indicated. There are many social groups that may have their own grievances (and an interest in political change) apart from the various elites that chapter is taken up with. Particularly important are what I have called the 'middle-class triumvirate' of students, lawyers, and journalists; the religious fundamentalists; and the 'lumpenproletariat'. All these came together in the cities and disturbances initiated by any group, for whatever reason, however harmless on the face of it, can become so inflamed as to lead to the toppling of a regime.

All sorts of conflicting interests are represented in these disturbances - so much so that it is not possible to say they are structured on any clear class or ethnic lines. The results

1 Baqai (1979), p.20

of these disturbances are, at the most, changes in regime; being fragmented and no more than briefly explosive affairs they do not bring in their wake any major restructuring of the political-economy. However, it is possible to discern two broad groups: one liberal/leftist, the other religious/rightist. These can either separately or jointly bring down any regime, whether political or military. But these are just general urban forces and are not a central part of intra-class conflict, though they affect its outcome considerably.

The class fragments which head this conflict are the 'professional middle class', the 'business middle class' and the functionary groups. (The latter are also mostly middle-class). It is no use treating these groups in inter-class terms. They had no solid class foundation. They were different groups that coalesced into makeshift alliances for the sake of convenience. Mujibur Rahman had the support of certain big West Pakistani businessmen, supposedly his sworn enemies. Bhutto also had the support of some big businessmen and land-owners, at the same time as gaining much from the support of professional groups and from industrial workers and peasants. His political enemies allied with the military in bringing him down, while before, in 1969, these political groups had all come together in order to bring down the military! In the same way land-owners had actively aided an industrial elite through the former's political control of the economy in order to get its raw materials processed.

There is some sort of patterned connection between the confusing mêlée of social forces involved in urban disturbances and the class fragments that head the major conflicts. The professional middle class tends to seek the support of the liberal/leftist forces, and usually seeks advancement through the expansion of political processes; the business middle class tends to seek support from religious/rightist forces, and it often allies with the functionary groups in pursuit of stability and the restriction of political processes. But these are only very broad alliances; the urban hotch-potch is so mixed that conflagrations often include all groups and usually have unpredictable results, as well as being unpredictable in themselves. Nevertheless, the pattern just described is just about discernible: the main groups responsible for bringing down political regimes (those of Nazimuddin

and Bhutto) were religious and rightist, while the 'professional middle class', with its student and political allies, were mainly responsible for bringing down Ayub's essentially military regime (and most opposition to Zia's current military regime comes from just these forces).

All of the conflicts described in this chapter can be seen in intra-class terms. Even the fundamentally ethnic conflict between East and West Pakistan had a powerful intra-class element. More important than any flow of exploitation there might have been from the Western to the Eastern wing, the elite in the latter, lacking any strong foundation in land, business, administration, or the military, saw itself pitted against the landed, industrialist, administrative and military elites of West Pakistan; while all these had gained from the fruits of development (through direct profit or patronage) the weak East Pakistani elite had been left behind. Its only chance of progress was through politics and the only power-base it had was its own ethnic group, by far the largest in Pakistan. The activities of this elite once in power in Bangladesh confirm the intra-class nature of its interests. It concentrated on boosting both its power and its sources of patronage. Little it did before or after Liberation indicated a concern for the condition of the Bengali masses; after Liberation it presided over a radical decline in their well-being.

PART FOUR : OVERVIEW

At around the time of partition in 1947 conflict in the Indian sub-continent was primarily ethnic in nature. This was reflected in savage war between Hindus and Moslems. Ethnic confrontation continued in Pakistan, reaching its greatest intensity in conflict between East and West Pakistan and culminating in the civil war of 1971. Since then, though ethnic conflict has continued in West Pakistan between the tribal areas of NWFP and Baluchistan and the central government (comprising people mainly from the Punjab but also from Sind), it is enormously subdued compared to earlier ethnic conflicts. In other words, ethnic simplification (through secession or increased central control) has proceeded far enough to make ethnic conflict in that part of the world a much less significant factor. Bangladesh itself is particularly fortunate in that it contains little ethnic differentiation.

I have argued in the last two Chapters that conflict in Pakistan has not been in any important sense inter-class in nature. Initially it was ethnic but it has subsequently developed into intra-class conflict. It has often been argued that the rise to economic power and political influence of the West Pakistani industrialists was an aspect of class domination. This was not the case. I have shown that this industrialist elite was virtually the creation of those in political power, and it was created out of what was considered to be economic and nationalist necessity. Politics and power have always been primary. Businessmen have depended on government favour rather than created it. Furthermore, as I have shown, there was little in the way of either class or geographical linkage between the three elites involved in Pakistan's industrialisation: the industrialists themselves, the politicians, and the civil servants. It took some time for some coalescence to occur, and even then politics always determined economics rather than the other way round.

It is impossible to talk of solid classes in the Western sense. For instance, the middle class contains two major elements which often choose different political options. The business sector allies

with the functionary groups, the professional segment with the politicians. The land-owners - a powerful but diminishing political force - hover between the two. Both the business/functionary and professional/political alliances try to restrict the power of the land-owners through land reforms, while avoiding antagonising them excessively by keeping the reforms at moderate levels.

These alliances are necessarily fragmentary, uncertain and weak. Both sections of the middle class lose out. The businessmen lose out when the 'functionary groups' interest in them fades, and they do not get the denationalisation they had hoped for; the functionary groups are too concerned with the benefits they themselves can gain from control over state resources. The professional group loses out because it becomes increasingly hedged in by the powerful functionary groups. And the politicians, many of whom are allies of the professional middle class themselves, start to act like a functionary group when in power. Because of endemic political instability they try to develop a dictatorial, one-party system whose function is government rather than representation.

It is difficult, then, to talk of distinctive class differences. This is even more the case when, realising its weakness, the professional middle class seeks support from the lower classes in its battle against the functionary groups. This is another example of 'cross-class' alliance, now at the other end of the scale from the earlier alliance between land-owners and businessmen. My basic point is that these alliances are fluid and uncertain, and this is itself the result of a society made of class fragments rather than of powerful and united classes. What we have, then, is a continued, muddled, intra-class conflict which, as I have shown, takes place in the heat of the cities. Even the civil war, which was overtly ethnic in nature, can be seen in intra-class terms. The professional middle class of East Pakistan, which was an elite if a rather weak one in its own province, found itself embattled with the various elites of West Pakistan to gain from the fruits of development. Much of the nationalist movement, and of subsequent events in Bangladesh, can be explained by this fact.

The main type of conflicts in Pakistan since 1947 and in Pakistan and Bangladesh since 1971 has been intra-class in nature. Essentially this represented a struggle between various middle-class fragments

for the right to gain most of the fruits of development (i.e. the right to gain most from the squeeze of the rural poor). First of all these middle-class fragments fought against the land-owners for a share of these rights, but, as the land-owning class has declined and the middle-class fragments become more distinctive, the struggle has increasingly been between the latter fragments. However, with the rise of certain socialist elements (which has occurred partly because fragments of the middle class have needed lower-class support in their mutual struggle) and the growing absorption of businessmen into politics (a trend I have pointed out, but one which so far still shows the primacy of politics), the beginnings of an industrial class system on the Western model can be seen. But these are only beginnings.

PART FIVE : CLASS AND COMMUNICATION IN PAKISTAN

In Part Four I argued that conflict in Pakistan is broadly intra-class in nature. It culminates in a struggle between a number of different elites: the professional middle class, the business middle class, the functionary groups, and the politicians. The functionary groups are largely middle-class in origin, but the politicians represent a variety of interests - those of the professions, of business, and of the big land-owners. However, there is a strong traditional link between politics and the professions. Furthermore, for professional people who lack the substantial means to economic advancement with which businessmen and land-owners are favoured, politics provides the only real economic opening. The conflict between these various elites is therefore largely between different segments of the middle class. The press generally reflects these various clashes of interest, if not directly (in content) then indirectly (within the organisation of the press). These clashes can be represented as conflicts between the various press orientations discussed in Part One: partisanship, government-orientation and market-orientation.

I hope to show in the following chapters that the press in Pakistan is essentially a middle-class affair, reflecting primarily intra-class conflict. It represents professional, business, political and governmental influences. None of these predominate absolutely, but the political element is certainly the weakest. It is, in fact, overwhelmed by the other factors: government control and commercial interest. The latter is an aspect of market-orientation but an equally important part of the latter is the journalists' sense of professionalism. 'Professional' journalists refer to the market rather than to government or to political patronage. The press in Pakistan is therefore divided between government and market-orientation, while partisanship declines in influence. It is these processes that I shall be describing in the next two chapters.

I showed in Parts Two and Three that in Nigeria conflict is largely ethnic and that the press reflects this conflict. It is a highly partisan press. Conflict in Pakistan is primarily

intra-class, between various segments of the middle class. The press in Pakistan reflects these antagonisms, but in a different way from the Nigerian press - less directly. The conflict is contained in a battle over the nature of the press between forces leading to government-orientation and those leading to market-orientation. These forces represent different sections of the middle class. They are caught in a struggle not so much over the content of newspapers but over the very nature of the press.

In what follows, though, I shall of course be referring to pre-civil war Pakistan as Pakistan and to the post-war countries as Pakistan and Bangladesh, some confusion is inevitable - as for instance, in the title to this part, which refers to both periods. However, this is only a minor problem. It should be borne in mind that journalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh has the same origins and traditions. I shall in effect be treating the press in these two countries as a whole.

CHAPTER NINE : THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF THE PRESS

In this chapter I shall start off by showing that the press in Pakistan is a limited affair. It reaches a very small proportion of the potential market and the central core of this, the educated elite, is even smaller. The press now depends largely either on government subsidy or on the market (both sales and advertising). The continuing existence of the English-language press, despite the tiny number of English-speaking in the country shows the strength of the elite market. The press in Pakistan is essentially a 'middle-class' matter, though it is gaining wider acceptance.

Despite its limitations the press, as I shall go on to show, is not dependent on partisanship. The strength of the middle class in Pakistan means that the press has received substantial advertising and this has helped it develop. However, partisanship still exists. The press in Pakistan is not strong: neither government, nor the market, nor the political parties, have control of the press, but the latter are clearly in the weakest position. The government is, of course, in a position to command, but the market has played a strong countervailing role; so, too, have the professional inclinations of the journalists, who in general oppose both government control and political influence. This tendency is very powerful. The journalists see themselves as a liberal profession, and as part of the professional middle class. I shall conclude this chapter by indicating the power of this professional inclination and showing how (albeit with the unwanted assistance of government controls) it has pushed political partisanship into a clearly inferior role.

9.1. The Economic Foundations of the Press

The press in Pakistan before the civil war and in Pakistan and Bangladesh since the war is a small-scale affair when compared to the press in developed countries, but it has expanded enormously, and also proliferated in variety, since its establishment. Though economically weak the press is a significant social force. However, its limitations mean that its influence has been confined largely to the middle class.

9.1.1. The Scope of the Press

The history of the Pakistan press starts in 18th century India. The press in India developed largely through nationalist partisanship. But, as I have already emphasised, there was a great deal of intra-nationalist rivalry, or rivalry of groups with different nationalist aims. The strongest antagonism was between the Hindus and the Moslems. The press clearly reflected these nationalist divisions. The Hindu press was by far the strongest, but even by 1925 there were 220 Moslem newspapers.¹

By the 1960s West Pakistan had 78 dailies and 257 weeklies, East Pakistan 24 dailies and 78 weeklies. Eighteen of West Pakistan's dailies were in Karachi, fourteen in Lahore. As for language, taking all periodicities together, West Pakistan had at this time 715 Urdu papers, and 448 English-language papers; East Pakistan had 410 Bengali and 108 English-language papers. The combined circulation of the Urdu dailies was about 250,000; it was 150,000 for the English-language dailies (in both wings) and 45,000 for the Bengali dailies. Total daily circulation was about 500,000 (of which Karachi had about 200,000). In 1980 Pakistan had 115 dailies, 88 of them in Urdu, 12 in English, 12 in Sindhi, 3 in other languages. Bangladesh had 30 dailies, 24 in Bengali, 6 in English. 13 of these dailies were in Dacca 7 in Chittagong. The total circulation of dailies in Pakistan was probably somewhat over one million in Bangladesh about 350,000. It should be added that all these figures are probably exaggerated. As regards numbers of newspapers, many papers officially registered are in fact 'dummies'. They do not actually function as newspapers but are kept open in order to remain on the register. Circulation figures are also unreliable, though the general picture is clear enough: total circulations are very small; most papers are tiny, while the greatest concentration of newspapers is in a few major cities.²

There has not been a published audited estimate of individual circulations since the 1960s. More recent estimates rely, therefore, on the claims of the newspapers themselves. Below I give figures for papers in Pakistan before the secession of the

1 Kurian (1982), p.707

2 The above information is extracted from Al-Mujahid (1956); Ali, Amjad (1963); Wilbur (1964); Pakistan Publications (1967); Government of Pakistan (1980); and Kurian (1982).

Eastern wing, and in Pakistan and Bangladesh since secession. The 1959 and 1965 figures are government figures. Others I have assessed from a variety of sources, but mostly the claims of editors and management staff whom I interviewed in 1979. I have tried to filter out the least reliable estimates by comparing them to estimates I gained from other sources. All in all, I think the English-language figures are the most reliable. They indicate only moderate growth over the years, so exaggeration is unlikely. The Urdu circulations are, I think, somewhat excessive. The least reliable are those of the political papers, Musawaat, Amn and Elan. But they were certainly popular in 1979 during the early period of military rule. The Bengali figures are, I think, fairly reliable.

Table 9.1: Individual Newspaper Circulations

	Ownership	Circulations		
		1959	1965	1979
<u>Pakistan</u>				
Dawn	Private	36,655	38,632	60,000
Pakistan Times	Government	35,470	42,311	65,000 ¹
Morning News	"	18,882	39,074	18,000
The Moslem	Private	-	-	14,000
Jang (Urdu)	"	49,889	158,477	325,000 ²
Nawa-I-Waqt "	"	16,307	50,000	175,000 ²
Mashriq "	Government	-	63,554	100,000 ²
Imroze "	"	17,124	26,101	60,000 ¹
Musawaat "	Political pty	-	-	70,000 ¹
Amn "	Private	-	-	45,000
Elan "	"	-	-	18,000
<u>Bangladesh</u>				
Pakistan/Bangladesh Observer ³	Government	11,129	19,119	51,000
Bangladesh Times	"	-	-	24,000
Ittefaq (Bengali)	Private	-	-	97,000
Sangbad "	"	-	-	27,000
Dainik Bangla "	Government	-	-	38,000

All Pakistani papers 1979 - 950,000
 All Bangladeshi papers 1979 - 237,000
 All English-language papers 1979 - 232,000
 All Vernacular papers 1979 - 955,000

Notes: ¹ Two editions
² Three editions
³ The Pakistan Observer (and privately owned) until the secession of Bangladesh.

This table shows only the more important dailies but the total circulation of all dailies (which I have already given) was not much greater. The figures for the three political papers Musawaat, Amn and Elan (the latter two were privately owned but closely connected with a political party) are the least meaningful. They sold well in 1979 because of the recent execution of Bhutto whom they supported. To a certain extent these were 'windfall' sales.

The table shows that the total circulation of the major daily papers of both countries combined in 1979 was less than 1½ million. Taking the seven papers for which there are circulation figures for 1959 and 1979, which together show a growth in circulation from 185,000 in 1959 to 754,000 in 1979, if this is representative of the press as a whole, then it would seem circulation growth has been substantial; nevertheless, in absolute terms the figures are still very small. Most of the growth has been in the vernacular press. Jang's circulation especially does just about put it in the 'mass circulation' range. However, in 1959 the major English-language papers were at least the equal in circulation terms of the larger vernaculars. Though they have lost out to the rapidly growing vernacular press, the circulation of the top four English papers doubled in twenty years; considering that most if not all of their readers can also read a vernacular paper (and probably do) this indicates a very significant element of westernisation and elitism in the newspaper-buying market.

The buying public, though, is much smaller than the reading public. Naturally, this is not something that can be estimated with any degree of certainty, but four readers for each English-language paper sold and five for each vernacular would seem to be in line with most estimates.

Table 9.2: Overall Newspaper Readership

All Pakistani papers	4,600,000
All Bangladeshi papers	1,110,000
All English-language papers	928,000
All vernacular papers	4,775,000

These figures are clearly very rough. The circulation figures themselves are unreliable. Above all, the figures exclude minor papers and papers of other periodicities. Some of these are quite significant. Nevertheless, one thing is very clear: the level of readership is well below the level of literacy in both countries. There are roughly 22 million literates in Bangladesh and 18 million in Pakistan¹ (though these must also be unreliable figures).

The scope of the press in Pakistan is limited in another sense. Examination of the distribution of places of origin of letters and classified advertisements in the papers I have used in my content analysis suggests (with all the previous qualifications on the reliability of such data) a strong dependence of newspapers on the cities of publication. Most newspapermen confirm that this is broadly so; though the larger newspapers sell throughout Pakistan the bulk of their circulations is in or near their towns of publication.

The geographical distribution of content, obtained by analysis of 15 issues of each newspaper, indicates the reverse of the above. In terms of content the papers are hardly local at all. For instance, Dawn in 1951 had only 17% of its domestic news on its town of publication, Karachi, or on the areas near Karachi. 60% of its content was devoted to national news. In the Morning News in 1968, 13% of domestic coverage was on the town of publication, Dacca, or its environs. However, the paper was more parochial than Dawn. It devoted exactly the same amount of its domestic coverage (41%) to news about East Pakistan as it did to national news. Very broadly, all the main papers are economically local, but in terms of coverage they have much greater provincial or national ambitions.

Though even the vernacular papers have a very small circulation, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the relatively large difference in circulation between the two types of paper makes the English-language press the equivalent of the 'quality' press in the U.K., and the vernacular papers the equivalent of the popular press. This is in fact broadly the case. The vernacular papers are

1 Kurian (1982), pp.133 and 707

read mostly by poorer, less educated people. But this parallel requires some qualification: Pakistan and Bangladesh are socially conservative countries. Papers do not deal in sexual scandal or in any sensationalism, as do the popular papers in the West. The English-language papers are more elitist than our quality press, the vernacular papers more sober than our popular press.

There is a big difference between the English-language papers and vernaculars in terms of types of readership, but there is also significant variation within the latter. The English-language papers are the preserve of the elite, but some of the more respectable vernaculars achieve a similarly respectable readership. The editor of Imroze (sister paper to the Pakistan Times), for instance, described his readers as 'teachers, trade unionists, intellectuals, liberals, advocates'. The editor of Hurriyet, sister paper to Dawn, claimed 'intellectuals, labour leaders, and political workers'. Dainik Bangla in Bangladesh is similar. Lower down (but with a higher circulation) comes Mashriq, a popular-style but government-owned paper, which apparently appeals to such people as small shop-keepers. Lower down still come the political papers. Musawaat the official organ of the PPP, described its readers as of 'low income' - for example, very small shop or stall-keepers, and low government servants. Jesaret, the organ of the Islamic party, Jamaat-E-Islami, has a more general but much smaller readership than Musawaat's. The left-wing paper, Amn (smaller than Musawaat), appealed to the 'less-educated working-class'. The editor of Elan, a similar paper, claimed the same. However, going right across the board, were the big three vernacular papers: Jang and Nawa-I-Waqt in Pakistan and Ittefaq in Bangladesh. These, combining a popular style with soberness of content, are read by all classes.

This rough and ready 'market analysis' indicates big differences in types of readership for the various papers. At the top end of the scale is the English-language press. The vernacular sister-papers to English-language papers come next. These papers are, perhaps, the 'quality' vernaculars. At the bottom of the social scale are the political papers - small, with

a very limited range of information, and a simple style of appeal. Going right across the social spectrum are the three big independent vernaculars (Jang, Nawa-I-Waqt and Ittefaq). Many who read an English-language paper also read one of the latter.

9.1.2. The Funding of the Press

Seeing how the press is funded is central to an understanding of the social and political nature of the press. There are four ways a newspaper can fund itself: through sales revenue, through selling advertising space, through public subsidy, or through private subsidy (or, of course, any combination of these). Survival of sales and advertising with no subsidy indicates a successfully market-oriented paper. Public subsidy implies government-orientation. Private subsidy is usually associated with political partisanship (in developing countries). The different types of paper discussed above are funded in different ways, but the power of the market is primary. The press is by and large a commercial enterprise, even where government is the owner.

The following table shows the percentage of total space taken up by advertisements in Pakistan's main papers. The 1963 figures are from Amjad Ali's content analysis¹, the figures for other years from my own.

Table 9.3: Percentage of Newspaper Space taken by Advertising

<u>Dawn</u> 1951	<u>Dawn</u> 1953	<u>Morning News</u> 1968 (Dacca)			
34.4	22.9	25.3			
1963					
<u>Dawn</u>	<u>Pakistan Times</u>	<u>PakistanObserver</u>	<u>Jang</u>	<u>Nawa-I-Waqt</u>	<u>Ittefaq</u>
32.8	27.5	18.9	20.7	16.1	16.9
1970					
<u>Dawn</u>	<u>Pakistan Times</u>	<u>Morning News</u> (Dacca)			
35.8	30.4	25.4			

It can be seen that, in terms of volume at least, most of Pakistan's papers received a substantial amount of advertising. The average amount of space taken up by advertising in the Pakistani press in 1980 is about one-third, but in Dawn the proportion is now apparently up to nearly 47% and in Pakistan Times up to 44%.²

1 Amjad Ali (1963), p.16

2 Kurian (1982), p.710

It is clear that the English-language papers in general got considerably more advertising than the vernacular papers. Overall, even from the early 1950s the commercial nature of Pakistan's main papers has been very solid.

The difference between the vernacular and English-language papers is even greater when advertising revenue is taken into account. The latter are much more dependent on advertising revenue than the vernaculars, which rely mostly on sales revenue. In this economic sense the language-split does follow the quality-popular split in the U.K. The following table gives figures I obtained from newspaper organisations in 1979 (few papers, though, could give me precise figures), as well as some earlier government figures. Also shown is the proportion of advertising revenue which came from government or government agencies and companies.

Table 9.4: Advertising Revenues

	% Revenue from ad's.		% ad's. revenue from government
	1962 ¹	1979	1979
<u>Pakistan</u>			
Morning News	16.8	75	60
Dawn	38.9	75-80	39.4 ²
Pakistan Times	30.4		65.4 ²
Moslem		Over 50	None
Jang	15.2	40	30
Nawa-I-Waqt		46	Over 50
Hurriyet		About 50	
Imroze		34	
Musawaat		5-10	None
Amn		Negligible	"
Elan		"	"
<u>Bangladesh</u>			
Bangladesh Times		75	
Bangladesh Observer		70-80	Over 50
Ittefaq		60	Less than 50
Dainik Bangla		60	Over 50
Sangbad		40	

The increase in dependency on advertising between 1962 and 1979 is a sign of increasing market-orientation. This applies even to government papers, but much of their advertising revenue

1 Pakistan Publications (1967)

2 Kurian (1982), p.710

comes from government itself (as can be seen from Pakistan Times and Morning News). The political papers (Musawaat, Amn and Elan), by contrast, hardly get any advertising. Most important of all is the clear difference in dependency on advertising revenue on the basis of language. The English-language papers live off advertising, the vernaculars are far more dependent on sales alone. Even where the circulations of English and vernacular papers are about equal, as is the case with Dawn and Imroze, there is a big difference in sources of income. In 1979 these papers both had a circulation of roughly 60,000, yet Imroze got 34% of its revenue from advertising, while the figure for Dawn was 75-80%.

The cause of this clearly lies in differences in advertising rates. The English-language papers get much more money per column inch of advertising than vernaculars. One figure quoted was a ratio of ten to one! This might be an exaggeration but certainly the difference is substantial, stemming both from the nature of the reader (a member of the elite in the case of the English-language papers) and of the advertiser. The editor of Dawn, for example, said that while Jang relied mostly on toothpaste (or similar) advertisements, his paper gets big, quality advertisements which are very expensive (e.g. from airlines). This difference in advertising rates is another parallel of the economic quality/popular distinction in Britain. The English-language, as do our 'quality' papers, appeal to a small, highly educated well-off sector of society. While this limits their circulation, this is more than made up by the high advertising rates they can charge to companies who can, through these papers, reach those with money. Commerce therefore plays an important role in maintaining the elitist English-language press.

Also conspicuous in the above table is the strong dependence of some papers on government advertising (including advertisements from various government agencies and the nationalised industries). It is generally acknowledged that in many cases as much as 70-80% of advertising revenue comes directly or indirectly from government. In the late 1970s government accounted for over 30% of the advertising revenue going to the press.¹ This obviously gives the government an enormous amount of indirect power over the press, which it can

1 Kurian (1982), p.710

use without resort to overtly repressive measures. The bigger independent papers are the most able to avoid excessive dependence on this source of finance. (The political papers have no choice when 'in opposition').

It is possible to reconstruct the economic nature of some of the main Pakistani newspapers by using the above, and further, data. Very crude estimates can be made of sales revenue by multiplying circulations by the prices of the newspapers, with some qualifications. An example of the calculations that can be made is shown by the following instance of the Pakistan Times using information given to me by the paper. In 1979 this paper cost 60 paise a copy. 25-30% of this went to the selling agents (street hawkers, etc.). The Lahore circulation was roughly 50,000 (at its maximum I should think), of which 5,000 were wasted copies (free copies, returns, etc.). So, daily income from sales was roughly Rs.20,250 (about £1,100). Advertising revenue can be worked out using data already given. I shall use the Pakistan Times agency and wastage percentages for all four papers in my example.

The table below uses data from different years. Firstly, I shall use Amjad Ali's figures for total newspaper space and space taken up by advertisements, which date from 1963. Figures for advertising rates, circulations, and newspapers prices refer to 1979. However, I do not think this is a crucial problem as I am interested in the relative differences between the papers, in particular, between the English-language and vernacular papers. I am not interested in the economic state of the press, or of any paper, in a particular year. (One factor to note is that this table only applies to the main edition of each newspaper).

Table 9.5: Hypothesised Finances of Four Major Newspapers

	Dawn	Lahore Pak.Times	Karachi Jang	Lahore Nawa-i-Waqt
Col.inches per page	164	168	168.6	133
Col.inches ad's.per page	53.9	46.2	34.9	21.4
Govt.ad's.as proportion of ad's.	20%	20%	30%	50%
Col.inches govt.ad's.per page	10.8	9.2	10.5	10.7
Govt.ad's.revenue per page ¹	410.4	349.6	399	406.6
Col.inches commercial ad's. per page	43.1	37	24.4	10.7
Commercial ad's.revenue per page ²	4,310	3,700	976	428
Total ad's.revenue per page	4,720.4	4,049.6	1,375	834.6
Number of pages per issue	12	12	10	8
Total ad's.revenue per issue	56,645	48,595	13,750	6,677
Price per issue	75p	60p	75p	75p
Circulations	60,000	50,000	150,000	100,000
Sales Revenue per issue ³ (Rs)	28,350	18,900	70,875	47,250
Total Revenue per issue (Rs)	84,995	67,495	84,625	53,927

Notes: ¹ At Rs.38 per column inch

² At Rs.100 per column inch for English language and
; Rs.20 for vernacular papers

³ Allowing for 30% loss of sale price to agents and
10% wastage of copies.

Both the Karachi papers do somewhat better than the Lahore papers, being based in a bigger more commercial city. But the biggest difference is between the English and the Urdu papers, with their very distinct revenue structures. We see Jang with a circulation for its Karachi edition over twice as great as Dawn's, earning a revenue per issue not much greater than Dawn's. Dawn is certainly one of Pakistan's most profitable papers, and it has been claimed that it is the most profitable.¹ Circulations are so important to vernacular papers that eventually they approach saturation point in their own cities and can only increase

1 Kurian (1982), p.709

by founding new editions elsewhere. In 1979 Nawa-I-Waqt had four editions, Jang three (now four) and Musawaat two. The Pakistan Times was the only English-language paper to have two editions, the second of which ran at a loss. By increasing the number of editions, fixed costs rise substantially, so smaller extra editions are unlikely to be all that profitable, and they often make losses. The English-language papers do not gain so much from an increase in sales. They are virtually forced to remain elitist, and in fact gain from being so. For many years it had been predicted that the English-language press would disappear. This prediction took no account of the elite readership of the English-language papers, and the advertising revenue this could generate.

The English-language papers have a considerable advantage over vernacular papers in advertising revenue. They have a further advantage in that the vernaculars suffer important costs which the English-language papers are not subject to. The Urdu papers have high calligraphy costs. Urdu news is not type-set but written by hand and then photo-printed. In Jesaret I was told that one calligrapher can write at most 45 inches a day. These papers thus need a large number of calligraphers. In 1979 Amn and Jesaret both employed about 40, Imrose 65. Urdu papers also have high translation costs as all news coming through the news agencies arrives in English. Many of the sub-editors in the Urdu papers are really translators.

The great dependence of the press on the private sector makes radicalism extremely unlikely; as one editor said "newspapers can't flourish without the private sector". Papers that benefit from no (or hardly any) advertising subsidy are the political papers. On the other hand, they can gain enormously from their partisanship in times of political conflict. At such times it is possible they are profitable. In 1979 the circulations of these papers was very large (for political reasons). At the same time they keep costs to a minimum. In 1979 Musawaat, Amn and Elan each charged 75 paisa per issue, yet provided only four pages each, compared to ten or so for Jang and Nawa-I-Waqt (the number of pages varies considerably) for the same price.

Whereas these last two papers had about 90 journalistic staff for three editions, Hurriyet forty for one edition, and Imroze even more than this for one edition, Amn had twelve and Elan 15. Whereas Imroze has 25 reporters, Amn had only four. Musawaat is the only one of the political papers that cannot be considered to be a 'shoe-string' affair. Though it too had then only four pages and charged 75 paisa, the main edition at Lahore had 28 journalists. (This paper is the PPP's official organ). However, all these papers were housed in ramshackle buildings while the editors of Amn and Elan did not even have offices to themselves.

All in all, it would not appear that the political papers are generally profitable. Elan certainly was not. Amn usually broke even, but sometimes made a small loss, while Musawaat more often than not made losses. (I am using the past tense as the current government has closed down two of these papers). Yet many journalists, from a variety of papers, insisted that these 'dissenting' papers existed for commercial reasons. The explanation, I think, is fairly simple. In times of political turmoil, political news is very valuable. All papers can benefit from this by purveying such news. The market-oriented papers that give a balanced, but probably dry and certainly uncommitted account of current events, benefit moderately. Government papers do badly. Those that support the popular parties do the best. Political papers blossom at such times. There are many papers in Pakistan which grow and die within a few months, all trying to thrive in the heat of politics. They are not viable in the long-term because of the strength of the market-oriented press and because of government controls. If they oppose the government they become popular but the government bans them. If they support government they lose their popularity. When their own party comes to power, they become routine, government-oriented affairs, and the same thing happens.

Though there are big differences between the different types of newspaper so far described, all the papers suffer to some extent from a lack of resources. Even the biggest has not exactly a huge circulation. For this reason the actual journalistic

activity of the papers is rather limited. Their full-time reporting staffs are small and they rely heavily on agency material, hand-outs from parties and other organisations. They also have a large number of 'stringers' (correspondents not in the full-time employ of the papers). For these reasons, while the papers have few reporters, they do employ a large number of sub-editors. These are the people who edit the incoming material (under supervision) - a routine, rather bureaucratic job.

The information I was given on staffing was occasionally sketchy, but the following less sketchy examples give a reasonable picture for 1979. This shows that there is a strong stress on the sub-editing role and the editorial/feature writing/columnist role. The day-to-day reporter is a relatively minor figure. Of course, within the organisation as a whole, all journalists are relatively minor. The Moslem had a journalistic staff of 26, out of a total staff of 210 (printers, proof-readers, administrators, etc.). For Ittefaq it was apparently 58 out of 450.

Table 9.6: Distribution of Journalistic Staff in Certain Newspapers

	Reporters	Sub-editors	Features/ Editorial	Other ¹	Total
<u>Pakistan</u>					
Dawn	9	16	10	2	37
Moslem	6	14	6	2	28
Nawa -I-Waqt ²	18	72	5	-	95
Imroze (Lahore)1976	10	13	11	3	37
<u>Bangladesh</u>					
Bangladesh Observer ³	20	25	18	-	63
Bangladesh Times	12	21	9	3	45
Ittefaq	12	16	30	-	58
Dainik Bangla	22	21	27	-	70

- Notes: 1 Usually photographers
 2 For all four editions
 3 Staff in Dacca only

If the reporter is rather a minor figure he is partially substituted by the news agencies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the agencies have comparatively large total journalistic staffs (reporters, sub-editors, editors, etc.), as well as a large number of stringers. The two news agencies in Pakistan had between them 200 full-time journalists in 1979, while the largest ten newspapers (three of them with several editions) had only 452. In Bangladesh the two agencies had 127, the top five papers 301 full-time journalists.

It can be seen directly from newspapers content that the papers are very dependent on agencies. Below is given a break-down of the main types of news and features in the Morning News of 1968 (a sample of fifteen issues spread over one year) in terms of agency items and items from the paper's own reporters (at least as attributed in the paper). The figures are for total items over the 15 issues, and include all agency items, i.e. foreign ones too. As can be seen, the paper's own reporters are left largely with local and crime news.

Table 9.7: Amount of Agency News in the Morning News 1968

	Political	Social/ Economic	Crime/ Disaster	Local	Other Domestic	International ¹
Agencies	45	67	18	53	110	533
Own reporters	24	27	44	175	150	2

Note ¹Including foreign relations. 188 of these items were of the 'soft' news variety - mostly foreign features.

The editors of a number of papers categorically stated that they were very dependent on agency news. Dainik Bangla had made an estimate of this dependence, and put it at 60% of all their news content. In Nawa-I-Waqt, according to its owner, 40% of domestic news (and virtually all international news) comes from agencies. The staff of one of the two agencies in Pakistan, PPI, made a count of all agency material used in one month (August 1979) for a number of papers. This shows that all types of paper, whatever their language or ownership, make considerable use of the agencies. Even a party paper like Jesaret, which one might

think would wish to rely largely on independently acquired material, uses a great deal of agency material. BSS claimed that at least 60% of newspaper material in Bangladesh comes from that agency.

Not only, as the above shows, does agency material take up a substantial proportion of newspaper space, but the take-up of the total amount of stuff the agencies send out is also quite high. In Pakistan APP claimed to put out 30 to 40 thousand words a day, of which two-thirds is used. PPI claimed that over 50% of its items were used. That it pays newspapers to make good use of agency material is fairly obvious. But, to prove it, APP charged (in 1979) Rs.6,000-7,000 per month to "A" class papers (Dawn, Jang, etc.) - the cost of about three journalists (with allowances); any amount of material can be used for this cost. (These rates, in all cases, are fixed by government). Moreover, actually getting payment for the service is not, it seems, easy. APP claimed only 25% of newspapers pay its bills. All the agencies make a financial loss. Much of the loss even for the private agencies is probably made up by government (whether directly or indirectly), or other organisations wanting favourable coverage. The result is that in both countries the agencies subsidise the newspapers. They represent a cheap way of 'pooling' information for an industry which cannot really afford to rely mostly on its own resources, and much of the cost of this is subsidised by government.

9.1.3. The Economics of the Press : Concluding Comments

The press in both Pakistan and Bangladesh is a small-scale affair. It developed through partisanship but, though most papers are small, locally limited, and unprofitable, the bulk of the press is now oriented to the market. The press in these two countries contains a good deal of variety (at least until this is suppressed by government), which reflects different motives, markets and sources of finance. All papers, though, suffer from some economic weakness, and this limits their journalistic capacity.

Financial losses are made up by individual owners seeking prestige or political influence, or by government, which owns a large number of papers in both countries. The largest papers though tend to be private, market-oriented, and broadly profitable. So the press is oriented both to the market and to government, but even some papers owned by government are distinctly market-oriented. Orientation to the market is exemplified particularly well by the continued existence of the English-language press, which is very much dependent on prestige advertising. Nothing can be more geared to the market than advertising. The large sales of the vernacular papers are the other side of market-orientation. It should be fairly clear from this that the English-language and the vernacular papers are not in competition. They appeal to different types of market (with only some overlap) and, as I have shown, are differently financed. The market, in particular the elite market, plays an important role in the economics of the press.

9.2. The Political Foundations of the Press

At the end of the last section I made brief references to the different political backgrounds of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi newspapers and showed these were connected with different economic structures. Government papers, confident of subsidy and therefore not reliant on the market, are different from fully market-oriented papers. But the primary difference is between both these types of paper and the political press. I argued that in both countries partisan papers are now neither economically nor politically viable. But some of the major papers had their origins in partisanship. The most important papers of the pre-Independence period were partisan - often the organs of political parties. Two of Pakistan's most important papers, Dawn and Nawa-I-Waqt, were founded with Muslim League encouragement in order to promote the Moslem cause in the run-up to Independence. Dawn was actually founded by the Muslim League's leader, Jinnah. The origins and development of the press are closely connected with politics.

9.2.1. The Press and Political Conflict

In the case of Nigeria I showed that the press became very much a part of the violent environment which preceded the civil war, and possibly played some part in the escalation of the conflict. In Pakistan this was not the case. The press - almost deliberately one could say - stood outside the conflict. This is not to say that it has had no connection with conflict; given the nearly constant presence (or threat) of conflict, this is not surprising. The press can hardly avoid becoming involved with it. This violence has been mostly communal in nature.

The first major instance involved Hindus and Moslems and an international boundary. In December 1949, a minor communal clash occurred in East Pakistan involving the police. One policeman was killed. This was reported one month later in Calcutta by a newspaper (Amrita Bazar Patrika) in terms of 'police atrocities'.¹ Disturbances occurred in Calcutta as a result. These were then reported in highly exaggerated form in East Pakistan. Both rumour and the press aggravated the conflict until it reached awful dimensions. This was added to by official radio. Altogether, on both sides of the border, several hundred people were killed (Hindus in East Pakistan, Moslems in India).

"The Pakistan Radio announced that 10,000 Muslims had been killed in Calcutta; the official Indian version was 23 deaths and 123 injuries. 'Official sources' in India were quoted as estimating 3,500 killings in East Bengal; Pakistani estimates are 229... Meanwhile, the press on both sides continued to report as fresh news details of events which usually turned out to have occurred a month or more previously."²

Peace was eventually obtained through negotiations between the two governments.

The above conflict was exacerbated by the international dimension; truth crosses international boundaries less well than other boundaries. But serious communal disturbances based

1 Lambert (1950), pp.320/1

2 Lambert (1950), pp.323/4

on provincial differences, in which the press has played a role, have also occurred. When the Muslim League government refused to accept Bengali as a national language, riots broke out in East Pakistan. The Language Movement there received support from certain newspapers, for instance, from the Pakistan Observer. During the movement, in which a number of Bengalis were killed, the Morning News was burned down for speaking against Bengali, and Azad, another Muslim League paper, was stoned. Eventually, Bengali was accepted, but this period was a significant step in the deterioration of the relationship between East and West Pakistan. Papers in West Pakistan, including Jang and Nawa-I-Waqt, promoted the cause of Urdu.

The most famous example of partisanship, and of the ability of the press to actually contribute to political conflict, is that of the anti-Ahmediya riots in Punjab Province in 1953 (already described in Part Four). According to the Court of Inquiry called to investigate the troubles, four Urdu dailies (none of the major ones) were partially responsible for fomenting the disturbances. They were banned for one year. It was also revealed that the Punjab government had given 203,000 rupees to these papers out of an Adult Literacy Fund in excess of the objects of the fund.¹

The above are examples of direct partisanship, but not all instances of press involvement in situations of conflict reflect partisanship. As I shall be showing in the rest of the chapter the Pakistani press contains a powerful tendency towards professionalism and market-orientation. Conflict continues to exist in abundance, though. There is a difference between a partisan and a political press. Though there are only a few overtly partisan papers remaining in Pakistan which are of any significance, the press as a whole is highly geared towards politics. Most papers might report on politics in a professional market-oriented way, but there is no doubt that politics are their life-blood. This is so much the case that it is impossible, in my view, for the press in Pakistan to have no effect on the political situation, even given rigid attitudes to professional impartiality.

1 Dawn (7.8.53)

This is exemplified well by the Morning News in the period leading up to the civil war. This was a National Press Trust (i.e. government) paper. However, the government under Yahya Khan allowed the press considerable freedom in the build-up to the 1970 elections. The Morning News could freely support the cause of East Pakistan, if it wished to do so. In one issue just before the election, the News devoted about 100 column inches, most of its party coverage in that issue, to Mujib and the Awami League. Half of this consisted of a statement given at a press conference in which Mujib virtually called for the creation of Bangladesh. Most of what he said, some of it very emotional and provocative, was reported verbatim. Coverage of Mujib and his party took up about one-fifth of total space (i.e. excluding advertisements) in that issue.

It is possible that the Morning News played a significant role during this period in building up support for the Awami League. Especially important in this respect might have been a series of articles by an outside contributor attempted to prove that peasant support for Pakistan in the years preceding Indian independence was based on economic need, not on the peasants' belief in Islam (they were being exploited by Hindus). This same precedence of economic necessity over Islamic fervour still existed, the writer argued (with obvious implications for Pakistan, whose uniting force was Islam). This intellectual argument culminated, at the end of the series, in pure propaganda.

"The 1968-69 movement against Ayub regime is yet another instance of the rebellious character of the Bengali Muslim peasantry. There was practically no official government, the people organised themselves into committees and performed summary justice, killed the local oppressors in broad daylight with great relish. But all the same the 1968-69 movement...only due to absence of organised leadership.... failed to become a revolution. The manner of deliverance of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from Ayub's prison can be compared with the breaking of the walls of the Bastille."¹

1 Morning News (23.11.70)

It is hard to believe that the mixture of fact, pseudo-fact, and nationalist fervour in these articles could have had no effect on the readers (especially students) of the Morning News. The reference in the above quotation to killing "with great relish" is echoed in the following report of an East Pakistan student League meeting attended by the Vice-President of the Awami League, in which the President of the former body

"told his audience that the blood of the martyrs was haunting the people to carry on the struggle for the elevation of the sufferings of the common masses. We all owe blood debts to the martyrs, and we must repay them on December 7 (election day), he remarked."¹

This does not mean the paper had become the mouthpiece of the Awami League. Its party coverage, as I shall show, was possibly the fairest of the three major English-language dailies. It reported whatever was said, regardless of what it was, without comment or alteration.

The use the Awami League made of communal prejudice and hatred is obvious enough. The dreadful cyclone and tidal wave of 1970 in the Bay of Bengal, one of the world's worst natural disasters, was also used for this purpose. The Awami League promoted the idea that West Pakistan had happily left East Pakistan to the mercy of the cyclone and its aftermath. Thus, at a famous press conference, Mujibur Rahman asked.

"Aren't you ashamed of yourselves that friends from foreign lands should come to bury our dead while we stand and stare?"²

All papers reported these denunciations, but not all accepted them at face-value. The Pakistan Times, while reporting Mujib's speech, also pointed out that a huge number of events (including a great number of programmes on the government-run radio service) were devoted to rousing "our people to make an all-out effort for providing relief and sustenance to the survivors of this calamity".³ Surrounded by devastation and hundreds of thousands of dead and injured, it is impossible to think that the welter

1 Morning News (11.11.70)

2 Pakistan Times (27.11.70)

3 Pakistan Times (3.12.70)

of emotive denunciations of the "callous" behaviour of the central government in West Pakistan callously and calculatedly made by numerous East Pakistan politicians, and printed by most newspapers without qualification or comment, could have had no effect on the population of East Pakistan.

Politics was violent in both speech and action. By transmitting news of this in unadulterated form the press, not just the Morning News and not just in East Pakistan, helped generate tension. In West Pakistan, for instance, the Jamaat-e-Islami (an Islamic party) claimed

"that the killings of innocent human lives and shedding of blood of the poor labourers had become the object of beastly pleasure to the Awami Leaguers".¹

It is difficult to believe this could have had no effect on the fears and prejudices of the conservative and deeply committed supporters of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Bhutto harped continuously on violent topics, as he did throughout his political career. The following are a few excerpts from a television broadcast of his as reported in the press. (Each party leader was allowed one broadcast during the 1970 election campaign).

"riots and tension...chaotic conditions... We stand on the edge of catastrophe...tormented generation... fratricidal carnage...reform or annihilation."

The press has possibly also had an effect in conflict where there was no communal element. It probably played a part in the disturbances which brought down Ayub and Bhutto, though in neither case a leading one. Certainly many journalists I spoke to believed this to have been so. In the case of Ayub the effect was general: simply by giving expression to antagonism and violence - by letting people in one part of the country know that violent opposition to Ayub had occurred in other parts - the press facilitated and possibly amplified the disturbances. In the case of Bhutto a number of the more conservative papers played a deliberately inflammatory role, promoting the image of Bhutto as an un-Islamic, westernised, play-boy. The religious

1 Dawn (18.11.70)

element in the disturbances was pronounced. Bhutto himself, writing in prison, said that Nawa-I-Waqt, for instance, "was fanning the flames of agitation, calling for 'jihad' (holywar) against the 'kafirs' (pagans)."¹

In all these cases the circulations of particular newspapers rose enormously. The Pakistan Observer achieved its highest ever circulation, about 65,000, during the anti-Ayub disturbances. A few years earlier, in 1965, the circulation had been 19,000. An ex-news editor and the current editor (in 1979) of Dainik Bangla both claimed the paper reached its highest circulation (100,000) during the cyclone period. Hurriyet achieved its biggest sales opposing Bhutto while Jang, which did not overtly oppose him until the anti-PPP disturbances were well under way, declined. The political papers, in particular, are highly dependent on the existence of political conflict. They decline when their party is in power (becoming excessively government-oriented) and blossom in opposition. The circulation of the Lahore edition of Musawaat has fluctuated from 80,000 down to 5,000 and then up to 100,000 or more, according to political circumstances.

9.2.2. The Decline of Partisanship

Partisanship still exists in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but in much more limited form than in 1947. More important than partisanship is a general connection with politics. This is inevitable in societies riven by political conflict. The influence of politics in the press (not on the press) in the early period is examined closely in a study of five papers - Dawn, Pakistan Times, Morning News, Pakistan Observer, and Nawa-I-Waqt - from 1947 to 1958, by Inamur Rehman. In this he analyses, qualitatively, coverage of a number of crucial political issues and events. The Pakistan Times, Nawa-I-Waqt and Pakistan Observer could be termed opposition papers, the latter two also representing provincial interests (the Punjab and East Pakistan respectively). The Morning News was also an East Pakistani paper but was owned by a Muslim League politician. Dawn was political centrist, the Pakistan Times somewhat to the left, Nawa-I-Waqt to the right.

1 Bhutto (1979), p.41

The political issues examined by Rehman were all concerned with different aspects of constitutional development, recently discussed in an Interim Report on the future constitution. On certain questions the papers were more-or-less unanimous. They strongly opposed the ideas of presidential rule, strong central government (at the expense of regional autonomy), and of a constitution based on Islam. Only Dawn gave some favour to the option of a strong centre and Nawa-I-Waqt to an Islamic constitution. In other words, these papers wanted a directly elected parliament with no interference either from a president or from the mullahs.

Rehman's analysis was only of editorials and was, therefore, rather limited and certainly highly qualitative. Nevertheless, certain responses stood out clearly. For instance, as regards suggestions for the curtailment of regional autonomy and for far greater emergency powers to be given to the Head of State, the Pakistan Times said these would allow

"the virtual abolition of provincial autonomy, the creation of conditions for a dictatorship of the political party in control of the Executive and the absence of sufficient guarantees to safeguard the liberty of the citizen".¹

Nawa-I-Waqt said the Head of State would have a status "higher than that of Caesar and the Czar".²

Presidential rule eventually came into 'de facto' if not into 'de jure' existence. The Governor-General (later to become the President) simply began to assert power (with the implicit support of the bureaucracy and military). The very uncertain legal and political tussle between parliament and the Governor-General was a problem for the press. It supported democracy but the Constituent Assembly was undemocratic. When the Governor-General dissolved the Constituent Assembly (in October 1954), all papers but Dawn gave him enthusiastic support. The Pakistan Observer called his act "a triumph of the democratic forces".³ Yet when the Governor-General failed to institute more democratic processes (despite a great deal of legal pressure from the Courts), and then took extra emergency powers, the papers began to turn against him. The Pakistan Times said the Governor-General had "virtually assumed the powers of an absolute

1 Rehman, I. (1976), p.76.

2 Ibid, p.78

3 Ibid, p.259

ruler and the Government over which he presides is responsible to nobody".¹ There followed a strong campaign by the political parties, courts, and newspapers against the dissolution. This mixture of legal, political, and journalistic pressure - a combination I have laid great stress on in earlier chapters - got the Constituent Assembly restored within seven months.

All of the papers Rehman examined were strong proponents of democracy and the liberal cause, whatever their political leanings. Some papers, in particular Dawn, even found themselves acting against their own political allegiances. In Rehman's view

"News coverage was extensive; editorial comment was intelligent, free, mostly unbiased, patriotic, bold and unsparing. The approach was mostly national."²

The sense of professionalism and market-orientation was strong even in these early days. More important than partisanship was political freedom and the right to report on politics freely.

9.2.3. Conflict between Partisanship and Orientation to Government or the Market

There are party papers, government papers, and private commercial papers in Pakistan. There are only a few party papers of any significance. The bulk of the press is either government or market-oriented. These forces are perhaps equally powerful. The government has ultimate control but the market cannot be ignored; it is difficult to force people to read newspapers. The extent of commercial influence can be seen in the amount of advertising in the press, in the growth of newspaper chains (Dawn, for instance, is one of several papers in a larger group), and in the proliferation of editions of particular papers in separate towns. However, even government papers are strongly influenced by the market, as I have indicated. Some of these are also organised in larger groups which put out other, purely commercial papers. One government-owned group, for instance, puts out a sporting publication as well as important daily newspapers (Pakistan Times and Imroze, each in two editions).

The press in both Pakistan and Bangladesh contains elements of partisanship, and both government and market-orientation. No element is dominant, though partisanship has taken second place to the power

1 Ibid, p.279

2 Ibid, p.411

of government and of the market. Politics, government, and the market exert a complex set of influences on the press. Each is still struggling to take the lead in directing which way the press will go. Though the owner of Dawn strongly opposed Bhutto's government and Bhutto reacted by cutting government advertising in Dawn, it was believed in Dawn that Bhutto would not have dared close the paper down. In doing so he would have offended a large section of his middle-class support. He did, however, jail the editor of Dawn's Urdu sister-paper Hurriyet (described to me by the same editor as being "largely for businessmen").

The owner of Dawn is himself a politician (ex-Muslim League and also having served in Zia's government), but the editors of both Dawn and Hurriyet firmly claim that he does not try to use the papers as a political mouthpiece. He did oppose Bhutto but eventually a 'modus vivendi' was reached with him. The owner, Haroon, does however lay down broad policy guidelines. The papers are really there to provide him with prestige, some political influence, and profits. He interferes with the papers less than the government in which he serves. Both papers are very much market-oriented (the market being the elite). The owner of the newest English-language daily, the Moslem, probably has similar motivations to Haroon. A businessman, he wanted, in his own words, to "get involved in political expression". The paper is slightly to the left as are its journalists, but the owner has no specific political allegiance. His motives appear to be profits and prestige, and the distant possibility of a future in politics.

The above cases indicate the uncertain relationship between market and government-orientation. This is even clearer in the case of Jang, Pakistan's biggest vernacular. Jang never criticises a government until it is down; in the words of a number of journalists it "goes with the wind". This policy of voluntary attachment to government has allowed the owner, who was once a stenographer, to build up the paper from its pre-1947 state of four tiny pages with war news taken from the radio (Jang means 'war') to one of the biggest papers on the whole sub-continent. The paper supports government whatever its colour.

Though Jang is undoubtedly conservative it even gave support to the socialist government of Bhutto. From 1972/3 to 1976/7 Jang got Rs.14,097,488 in advertising from the government, compared to Dawn's Rs.8,639,244 and Rs.4,209,662 for Nawa-I-Waqt¹ (which strongly opposed Bhutto). Clearly Jang must have done little to incur the government's displeasure, despite the owner's intense dislike of the Bhutto regime. Jang is the most commercial paper in Pakistan. Both the owner and his son expatiate on the commercial merits of their paper - its variety, speed of operation, willingness to innovate, broad appeal, etc. The owner now has extensive business interests outside journalism. Jang's support of government is clearly related to its strategy of market-orientation.

The case of Jang and its support of Bhutto suggests that the application of the distinction 'left-wing' and 'right-wing' to the press in Pakistan might not be very useful. Nawa-I-Waqt is another example of the difficulty of classification. It is a conservative paper which is supposed to support the army and bureaucracy; yet its owner-editor, Majid Nizami, in answer to my question, "What, in your view, has been the main cause of the past problems of Pakistan?", gave as the cause the "utter failure of political leadership due to intrigues by white collar and khaki bureaucracy". Perhaps the paper's 'right-wing' nature comes out more in Mr.Nizami's description to me of the editorial policy of his paper.

"Nawa-I-Waqt has always been able to pursue an independent nationalistic line. It believes in the ideology of Pakistan, and alone ideology of Pakistan, which includes Islamic way of life, Islamic system of government and Islamic social justice."

Nawa-I-Waqt is a conservative, nationalist paper with strong Islamic tendencies. The owner's individualistic views have put the paper in opposition to all types of government - those prior to Ayub, Ayub's military government, and Bhutto's socialist government. Bhutto found the paper a lot of trouble.

1 Government of Pakistan White Paper on Misuse of Media, Annexure 40.

"This newspaper has done our Government the greatest damage and yet it gets the maximum advertisements from the Government both Provincial and Federal, BIM, Banks, and the whole lot. What is the logic behind this brutal discrimination...?"

If we can deal with Jesaret, Outlook and some others, why is it not possible to deal with Nawa-I-Waqt? Who is protecting this arsenal of the Opposition? Is it out of simplicity or are the motives deeper? We must have a clear-cut policy. The policy of appeasement and inducement has failed."¹

This continuous oppositional role of Nawa-I-Waqt gives the paper a certain air of radicalism despite its obvious conservative tendencies. In Pakistan opposition to government often brings popularity even while it courts danger. Nawa-I-Waqt is a market-oriented paper with a strong political direction though no political affiliation. (It supports the current government, however). Nawa-I-Waqt is not a party paper, nor even unequivocally partisan. It takes much account of the market, and that is how it has survived. The party papers have much more varied fortunes. 'In power' they decline enormously in popularity, but gain from government support. According to staff in the Lahore edition of Musawaat the circulation of the paper went as low as 5,000 during Bhutto's period of rule. But it received very substantial financial support - according to Zia's White Paper over Rs.12 million in government advertising from 1972/3 to 1976/7, second only to Jang's Rs.14 million.²

In terms of popularity the switch from partisanship to government-orientation does not do party papers much good. Close government control might even in itself do harm. There are numerous instances of clashes between parties and the papers that support them. This is another instance of the uncertainties the press faces in respect of its three possible orientations - political parties, the market and government. In 1973 the PPP government caused 16 journalists to be sacked from its own paper, Musawaat. According to the editor of that time this was the result of internal rivalries and differences

1 Ibid, pp.17/18

2 Ibid, Annexure 40.

of opinion. The result was a long and bitter campaign for reinstatement on the part of the journalists' union. Over 100 journalists were arrested (though very briefly) before part of the apparent injustice was righted. Other papers which supported the PPP government, and benefitted from its patronage, though they were not party papers, sometimes opposed the PPP. Amn, for instance, criticised the PPP regime for not going far enough with land reforms, as a result of which the editor was jailed and the paper deprived of government advertising.

None of the papers in Pakistan has been able to devote itself wholeheartedly to the market, to government, or to a party. The press is sufficiently strong to prevent the government taking total control, but the government is sufficiently strong to prevent the press from devoting itself solely to the market. The parties, when in opposition, are the weakest of all, and even their relationship with their own papers is not wholly determinate.

The Pakistani press, if allowed by the government, contains a great deal of variety, as the above account has indicated. Bangladesh also has a varied press, if a much smaller one. The government owns both major English-language dailies and one of the vernaculars. The other vernaculars are privately owned, the largest one, Ittefaq, by a wealthy man with strong political inclinations, and the other, Sangbad, by a politician. Both owners also edit their papers. There are a number of other political papers but they are weeklies.

Sangbad is an example of a paper which had found it difficult maintaining itself as a partisan paper and had, as a consequence, gradually gone for a wider market. It is a 'progressive' paper belonging to a politician but not to a political party. The owner is an independent M.P. The paper's market-oriented policy increased the circulation from 5,000 in 1961 to 27,000 in 1979. The paper now breaks even whereas before it had made losses. Though the paper has leftist tendencies the owner, Ahmed-Ul-Khabil, is a businessman who says he believes in a mixed economy. He does not try to use his paper as a political mouthpiece, though he is critical of government. His views are not necessarily shared by his journalists.

Sangbad, then, is an independent, politically sensitive paper, which is gradually climbing out of the relatively narrow market provided by political partisanship through offering a more balanced output. It is run by its politician-owner, but not being a 'big politician' he uses the paper more as a source of political prestige than as a political mouthpiece. Ittefaq's history is similar to Sangbad's in some respects, though at all stages on a larger scale. The founder was the leftist leader, Maulana Bhashani. It had a long association with the Awami League, giving the party valuable support during difficult times - for which reason it was closed by Ayub for two years. The paper is now Bangladesh's largest. It is a successful market-oriented paper with strong political leanings. The weakness of its partisanship can be seen from the paper's eventual break from the Awami League, made when the party began to take on dictatorial tendencies, and also to follow policies the paper did not like.

Like the owners of Jang and Nawa-I-Waqt, the owner of Ittefaq, Anwar Hussain (who again like the former two also edits his paper), has expanded from the newspaper world into other fields of business. Ittefaq is a conservative paper. It represents the interests of Bengali businessmen. When Mujib nationalised a large number of industries Ittefaq turned against him. It opposed the military regime of Ziaur Rahman for the same reason. As with Nawa-I-Waqt such opposition can give an air of radicalism, however conservative its intentions. It takes courage to oppose a dictatorial regime. Anwar Hussain in fact promotes two clear policies through his pages - the return to private enterprise and the restoration of a true democracy. "We want a liberal society based on a democratic system" i.e. 'laissez-faire'.

This paradox, which highlights the difficulties posed by the simple distinction between right and left-wing, was stated quite openly by Anwar's brother, Mainu Hussain. He had been an Awami League M.P., but, like his brother, had turned against the party. He started a weekly paper called New Nation in order to promote the same twin beliefs in democracy and denationalisation. Mainu,

while calling himself a 'rightist', said his anti-government stance gave him the appearance of being progressive - even (in his words) a 'leftist'. As I have often argued, nationalisation in developing countries is often only a means of increasing the economic power of a party. In Mainu's view nationalised industries in Bangladesh are not agencies of socialism, but sources of power and of funds for the government (and its incumbents).

Ittefaq has opposed the pseudo-leftist Awami League and the subsequent, more conservative military regime. In doing so it has even joined hands with the more genuinely left-wing Sangbad. During my stay in Bangladesh in 1979 there were reports of deaths from starvation in the north of the country. The press expanded what were initially just rumours until the government found itself faced with a crisis. Sangbad reported a minister as saying that there had been no deaths through starvation, but there "might have been some deaths due to malnutrition".¹ Ittefaq then printed a statement by a professor saying that starvation and malnutrition are the same thing. Two days later both Ittefaq and Sangbad reported 15 dead of hunger in Mymensingh. On 12 October Ittefaq printed the addresses of eight others who were said to have died of starvation. In the same issue were reported the deaths of 188 people from cholera in Sylhet.² The campaign came to a head when Ittefaq sent a correspondent to Rangpur, from where he reported that one or two people were dying from hunger every day, and that people were selling land to buy food.³ A photograph was also shown of the bodies of an adult and child who had supposedly died of starvation, and had been found by the correspondent.

The press having given the lead, the politicians then joined in. By reporting what the politicians said the papers augmented the campaign. In the issue of 14 October was a report from the paper's correspondent, now in Mymensingh, of a statement by the local M.P. that nine people had recently died of starvation in one area. Three days later Ittefaq reported another five deaths. In the same issue the paper's editor-owner discussed the famine and the government's reaction to it in a signed editorial, concluding by praying for a leadership to emerge which could "tell the nation

1 Sangbad (9.10.79)

2 Ittefaq (12.10.79)

3 Ibid (13.10.79)

boldly about realities".¹ Sangbad, meanwhile, had reported 320 deaths from diarrhoeal diseases in North Bangladesh². On 19 October it reported the chief of the Muslim League as saying that when the hungry people rose against Zia "nothing would be able to keep him in power."³

These extracts show how the press can build up an effective, even explosive, campaign against the government. Two papers with very strongly opposed political outlooks cooperated in this campaign, along with other papers and a number of different parties. These papers printed statements from parties they could hardly be sympathetic to (e.g. Sangbad and the Muslim League) in order to augment the campaign. Though both papers are broadly market-oriented, they both have strong political tendencies. These are more overt in the case of Sangbad. Anwar Hussain is careful to ensure that Ittefaq remains a broad source of information and that commentary is restricted to editorials. That does not inhibit Ittefaq from being a powerful political influence.

Far less inhibited though, are the weekly newspapers like New Nation (part of the Ittefaq organisation). These are often overtly political, concentrating on analysis rather than reportage. The most famous of these is Holiday - another paper edited by a politician (but not owned by a political party). The name Holiday, rather as with the Moslem, was invented to belie the political commitments of the paper, which now has a strongly leftist reputation. Holiday was founded in 1965 by the current editor Enayatullah Khan. It has always had a clear political line, supporting pro-China left-wing groups (whereas Sangbad is pro-Moscow), in particular Bhashani's NAP. It has strongly opposed the influence of India and the U.S.S.R. in Bangladesh.

The political nature of the paper can be seen from the number of times it was closed - three times in four years (in 1971, 1973, and 1975); for long the paper only broke even and often makes a loss. The circulation has never been high, never above 25,000. In 1979 it was only 15,000. With a consistent left-wing stance it does not get much advertising. However, the paper has become much more commercial in its approach and also currently supports

1 Ibid (17.10.79)

2 Sangbad (15.10.79)

3 Ibid. (19.10.79)

the government, making it more attractive for both government and private advertising. Of course, choosing to publish in English is a restriction - and it is interesting that Mainu Hussain also chose to publish his new weekly in English (though Mr. Khan hoped to be starting a Bengali weekly soon). Weeklies of this sort are intellectual, analytical papers. They appeal to educated people, especially students. Printing in Bengali and attempting to expand circulation means aiming at a less educated public. Of course, it could be equally intellectual in Bengali, but on the whole sub-continent there is a strong tradition of writing for the masses in the vernacular and for the most educated in English. Though Holiday is a radical paper, its radicalism is of an elitist nature.

The most concrete expression of the paper's policies has been opposition to the Awami League. To stand against the Awami League, a party which had achieved a genuine mass support and which was headed by a popular, charismatic leader, not only took courage, but could hardly be politically profitable, except in the long term. Right from the start the paper had seen that there was little behind the party's nationalism - no socio-economic policy that would offer the poor of Bangladesh real hope.

"Supposing that these six points have been realised, is there any guarantee that vested interests under a different garb will not again strangulate the economic and political life of the people of East Pakistan?"¹

Holiday retained this courageous stance even at the height of Mujib's popularity.

"The struggling masses should keep in mind that they have a very strong adversary in those who have of late coined the term 'Bengali Nationalism' to grind their own axe and who are represented very forcefully by the new Fuehrer of Chauvenism."²

Despite the overwhelming popularity which swept Mujib to power, within one year of this Holiday was talking of 'flames of fascism sweeping Bangladesh'³, and of the use of terror to wipe out all opposition. Mujibism was a new religion, devoted

1 Holiday (20.2.66)

2 Ibid. (14.9.69)

3 Ibid. (11.2.73)

to "God (Mujib) and his revelations".¹ However, on the economic side, Holiday could not accuse the AL of seeking to expropriate Bangladesh's industry for the would-be entrepreneurs in its ranks, as most industries were nationalised. Instead, they were accused of corruption and smuggling - i.e. using their power over these industries to make profits, rather than ownership of them. After Mujib's downfall Holiday claimed that the "public sector industries lost 5,500 million takas during 1974-5 in terms of production due to managerial inefficiency and corruption".²

Holiday was unusually bold, but it became less so when it began to support the BNP (in whose government Enayatullah Khan served as a minister). The BNP, which was anti-Awami League, anti-India and anti-Russia, answered some of Holiday's demands. But the BNP can hardly be considered to have been radical.

9.2.4. The Political Foundations: Concluding Comments

The origins of the press in Pakistan lie in partisanship. The Pakistani press has had a strong association with political conflict and there are a number of instances of involvement of the press in violent conflict. Politics is still very much the life-blood of the Pakistani press, but it has been gradually moving away from partisanship; however, partisanship is still of significance. The forces that have pushed in this direction are the power of government control and the temptations of the market. The latter includes not only sales and advertising but the market for 'professional' competence, and all the rewards that people who consider themselves as part of a profession deem they deserve. The result of this development is a conflict between two orientations: government and market/professionalism. 'Professional' journalists, a part of the 'professional middle class', demand political and editorial freedom; they support democracy and freedom of the press. The government demands support.

The result of this is that the government is the primary determining influence over the press, but that this is limited by the professional middle class, strong enough to significantly qualify government control but not strong enough to become the primary influence itself. There is also the further influence

1 Ibid. (6.5.73)

2 Ibid. (18.1.76)

of party political journalism. The result, it could be said, is a 'mixed press' - a parallel perhaps to Pakistan's mixed economy. This is not necessarily a disadvantage for the government. Just as leaving part of the economy in the private sector helps the government (by reducing the burden on it, and allowing an outlet for those with money), a 'mixed press' also has advantages from the government's point of view. It has direct control over part of the press, while control over its totality would result in a considerable strain on government funds, and on public credibility. Better to allow private ownership, but to keep this under broad control. The outcome is a mixture of ownership - governmental, commercial and political. Government involvement in the press is certainly restrictive, but it has led to a new type of competition rather than to its elimination.

9.3. The Rise of Professionalism

I have argued that the press in Pakistan was at one time much more partisan than it is now. There is a core of partisanship in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, but it has declined considerably since 1947. In its place has come government control and general market demand. Associated with the latter is a strong sense of professionalism. (I am only saying sense of professionalism; I am therefore using the word 'profession' loosely, not wishing to get embroiled in the question of what is a profession and what is not, a question which is not relevant here). Partisanship was quite pronounced before 1947 and during the 1950s, but even then it was already countered by a strong sense of professionalism. Both partisanship and the professional instinct were crushed by the military coup, but have revived since.

I have discussed the Pakistani press as a whole, both past and present. I have laid great stress on the journalists' growing sense of professionalism (of their role, as they see it, as part of the professional middle class). This reaches its epitome in the journalism of the English-language newspapers. This does not mean, of course, that the English-language press seeks mass appeal. Its market is a narrow one, consisting of the educated and well-to-do.

It is an elitist market. Because the English-language market is middle-class - comprising in large measure professional people, administrators, and other members of the intelligentsia, such a press is never likely to be radical as long as middle-class interests are not threatened. This press seeks stability that stops well short of tyranny, and freedom that stops well short of equality. There has never been any danger in Pakistan of a proletarian or peasant revolution.

The press is manned by the professional part of the middle class. If this group has an enemy it is dictatorship - control by the functionary groups. As the latter are themselves essentially middle-class the conflict is fundamentally of an intra-class nature. The 'professional middle class' seeks freedom - political, journalistic, and educational. Ranged against this are the rest of the middle class: businessmen (who seek stability rather than freedom, government support rather than laissez-faire), administrators, and the military. The upper class (land-owners) can live with any non-radical middle-class rule, but prefer the stability of the military to the uncertainties of democracy. The conflict is, thus, between liberal democracy and authoritarianism. It is not between economic classes but between different segments of the same class - the professional sector which has no specific vested interest, and those who have - businessmen and the functionary groups (supported in some measure by the land-owners).

The English-language press reflects this broad conflict. It supports democracy at all times, but does not get involved in class antagonisms. It seeks stability, but not through autocratic rule. It is more interested in supporting political processes per se rather than any particular party (hardly any of which had a significant class basis). The only parties it clearly opposed were the illiberal, right-wing Islamic parties. The professional middle-class has no time for the 'mullahs'.

9.3.1. Political Coverage in the 1950s.

These general attitudes stand out clearly in Pakistan's (historically) most important English-language paper, Dawn. For long considered just a mouthpiece of the Muslim League, it can be seen on closer analysis that it was really (and increasingly so)

a mouthpiece of the professional middle class. In its early days Dawn certainly gave most of its party coverage to the Muslim League (and most of this was favourable). In one 1942 issue of 12 pages five whole pages were taken up with speeches by Jinnah. But, even then, it upheld the right to criticise the Muslim League government, as the following editorial statement (from 1951) shows.

"We invite the attention of the Prime Minister, and indeed the Central Cabinet, to an article from a special correspondent which appears elsewhere on this page. It discloses a very serious state of affairs in the Central Government's accounts... Usually governments are prone to react unfavourably to public disclosures of this kind which put them on their defensive. It is to be hoped, however, that a more responsible view will be taken and a serious attempt made to discover where the fault lies."¹

The biggest clash between Dawn and the Muslim League occurred in 1953. The conflict started with Dawn's impatience with the desultory investigation of the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan (Pakistan's first Prime Minister). He had been assassinated in 1951. The assassin had been set upon by those present at the murder and killed. Over a year after this Dawn began a campaign to speed up the investigation - principally by calling for the involvement of Scotland Yard. The assassination itself, the instant killing of the assassin, and the subsequent lack of success in finding who or what might have been behind the murder, together gave the event a very murky appearance.

The government was very unhappy about Dawn's insistence that it was not doing enough to find the plotters, and various political parties were taking advantage of Dawn's campaign to discredit the Muslim League government. The latter's reaction was inspired by a number of articles by Dawn on the affair from one of which the following is an extract.

"The few persons, who are opposing the popular demand (for Scotland Yard), are only trying to deceive the

1 Dawn (1.1.51)

people... Let them face the people in public meetings and free popular elections and they shall soon see where they stand... The rising tide of popular feelings shall soon sweep them away...."¹

The government took action against Dawn (and a smaller paper, the Evening Star) through various indirect measures, the worst of which was the withdrawal of government advertising. What followed was a remarkable publicity campaign by Dawn against the government's action, and a flood of support for Dawn from opposition parties, other organisations, and other newspapers (including some from East Pakistan), many of which did not normally see eye-to-eye with Dawn. That Dawn was prepared to seek out such support is remarkable, because it shows the paper was willing to turn to the opponents of the party with which it was associated, and also to rival newspapers, in order to retain its freedom. Its professional concerns came above partisanship.

In its new campaign for freedom from government action Dawn solicited letters from the public, as well as statements from the various bodies just mentioned. It gave huge coverage (often front-page) to these letters and statements. The following, an example of how Dawn utilised this support, is a quotation printed in Dawn from a leader of one of the Islamic parties.

"The whole nation is indebted to Dawn for the able championing of the cause of the people in opposition to a few persons who seem anxious to make Pakistan a police or Nazi State defying all canons of democracy, justice, Quran and Sunnah. THE BATTLE OF DAWN IS THE BATTLE OF DEMOCRACY."²

This support is especially interesting as Dawn had consistently opposed such Islamic parties, holding them to be reactionary and undemocratic.

The following is an example of support from a major politically opposed newspaper, the Pakistan Times.

"the three-pronged Government attack on Dawn and its associate is in our opinion both undemocratic and

1 Ibid (10.11.53)

2 Ibid (18.11.53)

ill-advised... nor can our differences with Dawn - which include that newspaper's hostile attitude towards the victims of executive action under an earlier regime - persuade us to condone what amounts to restriction of press freedom by executive fiat".¹

It is of note that Dawn did not try to excise those parts critical of it.

Though this conflict brought some political and journalistic unity in support of Dawn, it also gave opposition parties a chance to exploit a propaganda advantage over the government, and certain newspapers a chance to favour their particular Muslim League faction. This is indicated clearly in the same Pakistan Times editorial quoted above and reprinted in Dawn. The editorial emphatically denounces overt or excessive partisanship.

"But when vitriolic abuse and wild defamatory allegations replace arguments and facts, when newspaper editors intrigue against one another on the lowest possible level, when public meetings are sponsored by them and copies of newspapers are ceremoniously burnt by rival factions, the newspapers concerned may be said to have abdicated their proper function."²

This not only suggests the extent of partisanship in the Pakistani press, and its direct political importance, but shows how the major English-language papers wished to turn their backs on such behaviour.

As I have mentioned, in addition to normal news coverage and editorials, Dawn also used letters-to-the-editor as a means of attacking the government. Whereas these letters might normally occupy from fifteen to thirty column inches of space, in certain editions during this period it was boosted to several times this amount. In one issue there were 105 inches of letters critical of the government. Below is represented the overall coverage of central government in Dawn in the 1953 sample.

1 Ibid. (18.11.53)

2 Ibid. (18.11.53)

Table 9.8: Coverage of Central Government (Average Daily Column Inches)

	Favourable	Neutral	Unfavourable
News	4.4.	81.5	44.4
Editorial	1.1	2.6	3.7
Letters	0.7	-	20.1
Total	6.2	84.1	68.2

This represents a considerable attack on the government. In the end Dawn won. The Prime Minister issued an order (from his sick-bed) rescinding the measures taken against the two papers.

It seems clear from this episode that Dawn put its own well-being and its belief in democracy and the freedom of the press before support of its party. It painted itself in rather heroic terms. There was a certain element of melodrama in this as, compared to what might happen in many other developing countries, the measures the government took were mild. But Dawn was comparing itself to Western, not to Third World, newspapers.

The initial sensitivity of the government to Dawn's criticism (over the murder investigation) indicates, perhaps, a degree of autocracy. Yet it is remarkable that the government did not try to directly stop Dawn's campaign against it, and that it tried to publicly justify its arbitrary (and possibly illicit) actions against Dawn. This implies two things: firstly the government was sensitive to (middle-class) public opinion, which Dawn was very quick to arouse; secondly, the government itself, however undemocratic its power base, did not envisage totalitarian rule for itself. It merely wanted to restrict criticism. It had introduced certain restrictive measures against the press in 1951, but had not gone far up that road. Totalitarianism would come with the military.

Dawn's wishes were different from those of the government. It wanted a Muslim League government, but it wanted it to be democratic. With every change of regime Dawn welcomed the incoming government as a breath of fresh air, as a sign of a new democratic order. But disillusion followed fast. The press, in general, saw social conflict more in terms of government against the people than of

struggle between different sectors of the people. The disillusion of Dawn found its acutest expression in March 1954, with the total defeat of the Muslim League in East Pakistan.

"The Province's erstwhile leaders, and also the Central League leadership, were completely out of touch with the current sentiments of the people in East Pakistan. ...If those persons still remain wedded to their selfish ambitions and continue to exploit the League for their personal or factional ends, the League will soon be repudiated in West Pakistan in the same way as it has been repudiated in East Pakistan."¹

The headline of the article is 'The Awful Majesty of the People's Will'.

Dawn saw the Muslim League dissolving in factionalism, greed, and power-seeking. Above all it feared the end of democracy and the imposition of a dictatorship on the part of the President. It seemed to prefer the total demise of the Muslim League whose weakness was allowing the President to gain in strength, to this latter possibility. Apart from anything else, there were dangers to the press in a dictatorship. This became clear in October 1954, when the President interfered yet more deeply in the political system by dissolving the Constituent Assembly, declaring a State of Emergency, and instituting pre-censorship of the press. Dawn managed to make the following rapid editorial response.

"What we write now is our considered honest opinion and the truth, and if this passes censorship, our readers will see it in print...power, long exercised without effective democratic checks, gradually corrupted most Muslim Leaguers in office..."²

This love of democracy and the 'people' did not comprehend any notion of division of the people by class. Dawn saw on one hand an apparently homogeneous people and, on the other, an autocratic elite which did not have the interests of the people at heart. Ultimately, with its loss of faith in the Muslim League, it hoped for a broadly based coalition, whichever parties were incorporated in it.

1 Ibid. (18.3.54)

2 Ibid (27.10.54)

"Nothing would please the overwhelming majority of the people of the country better than to see the Muslim League become again what it once was - a truly national organisation functioning freely and democratically. But it cannot become so if it remains continually in the pockets of the great... To say today that the Muslim Leaguers alone are the only true representatives of the nation and the only true patriots, is itself an untruth and an affront to other parties who are no less representative and patriotic."¹

Dawn did not represent particular vested interests, whether based on class or ethnicity. It never spoke for the business community, but nor did it speak against it. It rarely involved itself with the problem of unequal land-ownership. It did not support West Pakistani interests against those of East Pakistan. In fact, it spoke up for East Pakistan. For instance, it welcomed the participation of the East Pakistani parties in central government and it positively lauded the defeat of the Muslim League in East Pakistan. In November 1954, when it was agreed that East and West Pakistan would have electoral parity (thus reducing East Pakistan's natural majority, by virtue of its larger population, in favour of West Pakistan), Dawn demanded that this should be accompanied by the "equal distribution of the country's total wealth and resources", equal distribution of foreign aid and government spending between the two wings.²

The above makes clear, I think, Dawn's consistent and committed belief in freedom and democracy and, at the same time, its lack of understanding of the underlying economic structure of the country. It envisaged a cohesive, classless society, which it believed could be created solely through the extension of democracy. But its liberalism and its optimism could not stand up to the encroaching power of conservatism. It was a weak voice, which, in its appeal to liberal middle-class opinion had its moments of glory. But the small, liberal intelligentsia, in which Dawn placed so much faith, was a hopelessly weak power-base.

1 Ibid. (24.6.54)

2 Ibid. (12.11.54)

Dawn was not the only paper that put democracy and the freedom of the 'professional' journalist above allegiance to government or party (as the discussion in section 9.2.2 has already hinted). I shall exemplify these points more concretely in the remainder of this section through content analysis of political reporting in the English-language press during the 1950s, during the period of political rule in the 1960s and, finally, during the crucial election campaign of 1970.

In this content analysis, I have represented the categories as percentages of space after subtraction of advertising, or in average daily column inches. Coverage of both parties and government is divided into 'favourable, 'neutral' and 'unfavourable' (using the same criteria as in my analysis of the Nigerian press), and refers to news coverage (excluding editorials, for instance). In all cases the samples are of 15 issues spread over a year or over the period of an election campaign.

Coverage of government is, in general, rather neutral. Insofar as it was rarely very critical it can be said to have been government-oriented, but it was not excessively so. In 1951 83% of Dawn's coverage of the central government could be considered to have been 'neutral' (i.e. not laudatory in any way). Though 64% of its reporting on government was on the central regime it also reported on the five provincial governments. Exactly the same proportion (83%) of its coverage of these governments (taken together) was neutral. Most of the remainder was favourable, in all cases. In 1953, because of the quarrel between Dawn and the central government which I have already described, the picture was a little different. Only 62% of the paper's coverage of central government was neutral, while as much as 44% was unfavourable. Furthermore, 77% of its entire governmental coverage was on the central regime. As in 1951 exactly 83% of its reporting on the provincial governments was neutral. In general, then, Dawn's reporting on government in the early days was dry, matter-of-fact, and not excessively government-oriented. The paper could even be strongly critical of government especially in the cause of political and professional freedom.

In the case of parties I have less stringent criteria for defining 'favourable' news than in the case of governments. A government can expect its own announcements to be publicised; whether propaganda or not what it says and does needs to be part of public knowledge. Coverage therefore needs to be especially laudatory to be considered favourable rather than neutral. A party cannot automatically expect what it says to appear in the press, so any expression of a party view in the press is implicitly favourable to it. In 1951 Dawn had a daily average of a mere 27 column inches (height multiplied by width of column) on the parties, compared to 104 inches on government. Its own party, the Muslim League, was in government. Dawn treated it, the Muslim League, as a government rather than as a party; to this extent it was certainly partisan. Moreover, 72% of its party coverage was on the Muslim League, and 84% of this was favourable to the party. The paper was at that time clearly partisan. But it is of note that partisanship was limited to positive support of the Muslim League. There was negligible unfavourable coverage of the eight other parties reported on. They simply got individually very little coverage, though this was, for what it was worth, fairly distributed between them.

By 1953 the Muslim League's share of party reportage is down to 63% and only 39% is favourable. Another 35% was concerned with factional divisions within the League; this 'washing of its dirty linen in public' can hardly be considered to have been favourable to it. Dawn's partisan foundations were dissolving in front of its very eyes, leaving it in a difficult, uncertain position. Again, hardly any coverage of the other parties was unfavourable, and what there was was distributed fairly evenly between the ten other parties mentioned. Naturally most of these parties got very little coverage but the two given most prominence after the Muslim League between them got 20% of party reporting.

It has to be added that reporting of politics as a whole in these years was rather limited. This is indicated in the table below. Even in the election campaign of 1970 (the 1970 sample

was taken solely from that period) political reporting, and especially that part of it explicitly on the parties, was quite limited - certainly very much underplayed in comparison with party reporting in the Nigerian press.

Table 9.9: Dawn's Total Political Coverage (Average Daily % Space less ad's.)

	1951	1953	1970
Political parties	2.4.	2.9	12.1
Political analysis	0.4	0.1	0.1
Other political	3.6	4.8	6.0
Total	6.4	7.8	18.2

In all years, but amazingly most of all in the year of the election, the amount of political analysis /commentary (excluding editorials) is negligible. The preference is for other, more neutral political reporting. All in all, the neutral (and sometimes unfavourable) coverage of government, the limited space given over to politics (especially the parties), the avoidance of political analysis or commentary within the news, and the decline in the Muslim League's share of party coverage (as well as the division of some of this between various Muslim League factions), together suggest that Dawn was a partisan paper at best only in a very limited sense.

9.3.2. Political Reporting under Military Rule

With the military coup of 1958 by Ayub Khan came overt government control of the press. A number of papers were also taken over by a government-inspired organisation, the National Press Trust (NPT). Anjad Ali has analysed the content of every issue of a number of daily papers for a whole month (July 1963), in the period of Ayub Khan's rule. These were Dawn, the Pakistan Times, Jang, Nawa-I-Waqt, the Pakistan Observer, and Ittefaq. The last two were East Pakistan papers. The Pakistan Times was an NPT paper. Ali calculated the distribution of content without first subtracting space taken by advertisements. In order to make his categories compatible with mine I have re-calculated them as percentages of space after subtraction of advertisements. The table below represents a selection from and also combination of a large number of categories, again in order to make them broadly compatible to mine.

Table 9.10: Coverage of Government and Politics in 1963

	Dawn	Times	Observer	Jang	Nawa-I-Waqt	Ittefaq
Government	7.3	7.3	4.0	4.3	3.9	5.6
Assemblies	10.4	15.8	3.0	2.3	8.9	7.0
Politics	2.6	2.8	5.5	4.9	3.5	14.9

It can be seen from this table that coverage of government was not a particularly dominating factor in these papers even during a period of government rule. Ali does not describe the nature of this coverage, but excessive government-orientation does not stand out in his figures. At the same time there is not a great deal of reporting on politics, except in Ittefaq, which is highly political. There was, by contrast, considerable coverage of the proceedings of the provincial and national assemblies. This concentration on official political channels suggests a 'safe' approach to political reporting. The overall impression is one of cautious, broadly routine coverage of politics and government, avoiding both excessive government-orientation and any distinct sign of partisanship - except in the case of the highly political Ittefaq.

One important paper Ali did not analyse was the Morning News. I analysed a sample of this from near the end of Ayub's reign, in 1968; unlike Ali I broke down coverage into 'favourable', 'neutral', and 'unfavourable' categories. At this time there was a daily average of 365 column inches on the central and provincial governments - in percentage terms far smaller than in Ali's 1963 samples of other papers, but quite a lot greater than in the 1950s sample of Dawn. Nearly all this governmental coverage was on the central government but only 6% of all governmental coverage was on President Ayub himself. Though all of this personal coverage was favourable, this rather discreet handling of Pakistan's first dictator suggests he did not make much use of the press to build up a charismatic image 'à la Nkrumah'. Moreover, 78% of all reporting on government I rated as neutral in tone. This paper, however matter-of-fact and restricted in its ability to criticise, does not seem to have been very significantly and directly government-oriented. Most

coverage of government is routine, neutral stuff. The government was not as dictatorial as it could have been; it shied away from total control of the press, however resentful journalists now feel about Ayub. According to Ayub's ex-head of information, Altaf Gauhar, newspapers could criticise the government and individual departments, and Ayub might act on this, but they could not criticise him. However, minor government people were often able to seek protection against the press under the overall umbrella of control.¹ Journalists probably resented such abuses most of all.

Coverage of the political parties is similar to that of the 1950s Dawn samples discussed above. The party of government gets by far the most attention (this party being a faction of the Muslim League Ayub adopted in order to strengthen his political support), while coverage of the other parties is equally distributed and is either favourable or neutral; only a negligible amount of reporting on the other parties was unfavourable to them. By this time, however, these principles have been taken further. The Muslim League got 72% of total party coverage in 1951, 63% in 1953. In the Morning News of 1968 Ayub's Muslim League got 59%. Thus all the other parties got as much as 41% of party reportage between them, but as there were nine of these the amount of space they each got was very limited.

The overall impression given by these facts is that the Pakistani press, even under military rule (whatever its political dressing), had a strong sense of 'fair' reporting, but that this was undermined by the requirement to over-report the party of government. This 'professional' sense of impartiality even began to show itself in Dawn in the 1950s, when it was essentially a party paper. The party connected with the paper is given most attention but all other parties are reported, fairly equally, and with little unfavourable coverage. Moreover, the amount of attention given to the main party seems to decline over time. Though coverage of other parties remained highly fragmented, taking them in their entirety as opposition to government the amount of such opposition given expression in these papers became more and more considerable.

1 Personal interview

9.3.3. Coverage of the General Election of 1970

Prior to the civil war there was only one general election in Pakistan based on universal suffrage. How the papers covered the campaign (quantitatively) is given below - for three major English-language papers - Dawn, the Pakistan Times, and the Morning News. There are two very special factors to take into account in this case. Firstly, the government was not itself directly involved in the elections, and made no show of taking sides. It was a 'caretaker' army government handing over power to whichever party won. Secondly, largely due no doubt to the above fact, the press was perhaps freer than it had ever been. The papers were free to report the parties as they wished.

Table 9.11: Party Coverage, Election Campaign of 1970(%)

	Dawn	Pakistan Times	Morning News
Awami League	10.9	6.1	20.4
Pakistan People's Party	10.9	12.1	3.9
Muslim League (Council)	15.2	20.5	9.9
Pakistan Muslim League	4.6	1.4	6.0
Quayyum Muslim League	10.0	8.4	4.7
Pakistan Democratic Party	5.5	8.5	9.6
National Awami Party (Wali)	7.8	5.2	6.7
National Awami Party (Bhashani)	5.3	8.2	11.7
Tehrik-e-Istiqlal	6.7	5.3	5.7
Jamaat-e-Islami	16.3	15.7	10.3
Others (7)	6.8	8.6	11.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 9.11 shows the distribution of news-space between the various parties reported on in the last five weeks of the election campaign. The next table shows the distribution of this, in overall terms only, between favourable, neutral and unfavourable coverage.

Table 9.12: Favourability of Party Coverage, 1970 (Ave.daily col.inches)

	Dawn	Pakistan Times	Morning News
Favourable	287	271	266
Neutral	5	8	8
Unfavourable	11	26	5
Total	303	305	279

These two tables reveal a remarkably different picture from that given by the previous samples. 17 parties are given coverage and this is very widely spread. No party gets more than about one-fifth of a paper's party coverage. Thus, given the chance to report the parties as they like, the papers choose to be balanced, impartial, without showing excessive support to any particular party. In other words, in the right conditions, partisanship apparently has no place in the English-language newspapers of Pakistan. This balanced reporting is the sort to be expected in a market-oriented press.

There are two other noticeable facts: firstly, the tiny amount of neutral and unfavourable coverage. This does not mean the papers lacked neutrality; they showed an excessive amount of it. As I defined 'favourable' reporting as that which tells what the party wants the public to hear, it is clear that the papers did just that - acting as notice-boards, as it were, for public statements issued by the parties. Secondly, the table shows a remarkable similarity between the papers in overall coverage. Each, in fact, gave nearly the same amount of space, in absolute terms, to the parties as a whole. Each spread this coverage over a wide number of parties, according some extraordinarily similar amounts of coverage.

The similarity does not stop there. The distribution of political coverage between party reporting, political analysis, and other political coverage, is broadly the same in all three cases.

Table 9.13: Total Political Coverage (% total space less ad's.)

	Dawn	Pakistan Times	Morning News
Political parties	12.1	10.7	11.9
Political analysis	0.1	1.8	0.5
Other political	6.0	4.0	3.0
Total	18.2	16.5	15.4

The space devoted to the parties is small when compared to electoral coverage in the Nigerian press. Furthermore, 'other political' news is relatively large - half the size of party news in the case

of Dawn. In Nigeria in election times 'other political' news went down and 'political analysis/commentary' went up. In these Pakistani papers the amount of political analysis was negligible. There is, then, a very big difference between these papers and the intensely partisan press of Nigeria during a similar period.

This approach to political reporting - the balanced coverage, the avoidance of commentary - seems less 'proper' than 'prim and proper'. Pakistan editors seem to have taken their first real opportunity to report a general election - one of extreme importance - as an occasion to stay in the background, to inform rather than influence and, some might say, to be passive rather than positive. Some journalists I spoke to considered this to be the result of poor and negative journalism. Others put it down to ingrained fear of the authorities. The latter is not a convincing explanation (while the former is not an explanation at all). Certainly Ayub's ten-year rule had had a depressing effect on journalism in Pakistan. But, towards the end of this decade, when the Ayub regime showed signs of crumbling, the press had shown considerably more aggression and verve than it did in this election campaign, when the army was not involved, showed no political preference, and when no contending party had any particular power or influence it could bring to bear on the newspapers. This was the ideal opportunity, after so many years of government control, for the press to weigh in on the political scene. A number of journalists I spoke to, in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, admitted the press was unusually free at this time. One called it the "golden period of the Pakistan press". Clearly, fear of government could not have been a factor in inducing the papers to try and spread their political coverage over all the parties; nor can it explain the virtually non-existent amount of political analysis, which did not in any way need to be critical of government, or in any way upset it. That the press chose to 'stay out of politics', was due to a professional ethos of neutrality on the part of those responsible within the press. It was not considered 'cricket' to try to influence the political process.

If the editors and other journalists of the above newspapers split their coverage of the parties widely and in a broadly balanced fashion, was this done in a random fashion, or on the basis of certain implicit criteria? There are obviously many factors which influence newspapers in this regard - their perceptions of the real importance of individual parties, the popularity of the various leaders, historical factors, etc. One factor which I consider might more consistently influence a newspaper's electoral coverage was party size, i.e. that they might give larger coverage to the larger parties. In testing this hypothesis I took as a criterion of size the number of candidates the parties were putting up for election. From the newspapers' point of view, any parties which are prepared to go to the trouble and expense of putting up candidates for all seats, might be considered worthy of reasonable coverage. Nevertheless, I would expect only a moderate correlation between party size and press coverage. Undoubtedly, other factors - such as individual perceptions of a party's likely success, the popularity of the leaders, and the preferences of the papers, must have some effect. The question is, how much?

I correlated the percentage share of party news each party received with each party's percentage share of total candidates in the election. Using simple regression analysis I obtained the following results.

Dawn	Pakistan Times	Morning News
0.35	0.41	0.66

This indicates that, on average, the number of candidates a party was putting up in the election weighed about as heavily as other factors in the newspapers' decisions on party coverage. This was least so for Dawn, explaining only about a-third of the paper's party coverage; but it seems to explain about two-thirds of the coverage of the Morning News.

It seems unlikely that newspapers had any conscious intention of allocating space according to party size in any absolute sense. It is far more likely that the link was more inexact, i.e. that papers might have simply ranked the parties in some rough hierarchy of importance according to their apparent prominence (in terms of the number of candidates put up for election). The best measure

of this is Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, which correlates rankings rather than specific values. This means, in this case, that a party which put up twice as many candidates as another would not necessarily get twice as much space, but simply more space than the smaller party. The results of this correlation were as follows.

Dawn	Pakistan Times	Morning News
0.56	0.56	0.52

It would seem, then, that the papers were more concerned with using size to determine a rough hierarchy of importance as a basis for the distribution of space, than with deliberately allocating space in proportion to party size.

I said above that other factors apart from party size must have been important, and that only moderate correlations could be expected. In fact, the correlations turned out to be larger than I had expected. It would seem that editors and other journalists had a pronounced sense of 'fairness', and that they were guided by this. Certain biases and preferences had an effect, but they did not substantially determine the nature of coverage. Given the chance, unusual in a developing country, to act freely and politically, the newspapermen chose to be free but not political.

9.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to show how the Pakistani press, in particular the English-language press, has moved from partisanship to market-orientation. This has reached the stage where it attempts to treat politics 'from the outside', as an onlooker only, scrupulously avoiding getting directly involved. It has a liberal, laissez-faire attitude to the relationship between politics and the press. It believes in democracy and the free flow of information, and seems to think that if these two conditions alone are met, then the country's problems would begin to recede. It looks at problems and solutions in political rather than economic terms. It hopes, by contributing to the free flow of information, to help people find a national political solution to the country's problems.

Its liberalism is possibly admirable, but it is irrelevant to Pakistan's crushing social problems. In the struggle of the press to guide itself from partisanship towards the market and away from government control can be seen the journalists' strong sense of 'professionalism'. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TEN: PROFESSIONALISM IN THE PRESS

In the last chapter, I described the political and economic nature of the press in what was Pakistan (and is now Pakistan and Bangladesh). I argued that the press there had changed from a broadly partisan press to one subject to pressures from several sources: parties, government, and the general market. I also argued that the latter two now predominate and that there is considerable conflict between these two orientations. The emphasis is on appeal to the general market and this is associated with a sense of professionalism which eschews both political partisanship and government control (though in the latter case it has no choice of course). The strength of the ethic of professionalism derives from the position the journalists feel they occupy in society, i.e. as part of the professional middle class. Their understanding of the nature of their role is itself derived in part from their conception of the nature of the profession of journalism in the West. These ideas will be given support in this chapter.

10.1 The Professional Attitudes of the Journalists

In what follows, at the same time as looking into the journalists' sense of themselves as a profession, I shall be giving support to the findings of the content analysis. One of the major problems with content analysis is that the results say nothing about the motivations of the journalists. Content analysis by itself is not enough. It is necessary to try to get 'behind' the content and ask those directly responsible for it questions related to their profession. For this reason I submitted a questionnaire to a sample of journalists in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and interviewed a number of editors and others involved in the media. This research was undertaken in the last quarter of 1979. I obtained 51 completed questionnaires: 23 in Bangladesh and 28 in Pakistan. This is a fairly reasonable sample from what is a small population (full-time journalists on the major papers of both countries). The questionnaire responses were in general very consistent. The results of these, of the interviews, the content analysis and other material, all seem to 'hang together'.

10.1.1. The Personal Backgrounds of the Journalists

It is worth noting first of all (from the table below) that over two-thirds of the total sample were aged over 30 (and exactly one-third were over 40). The majority, then, one could expect to be fairly well established in their careers, or at least beginning to be so. Most of the journalists had had a substantial education; over four-fifths had been educated beyond the age of 20. (The question referred only to full-time education). 17 of the Bangladeshi sample had been to university (Dacca University in all but one case) and another five to various colleges. 18 of the Pakistani sample had been to university (mostly Karachi and Punjab Universities), and another eight to various colleges. Many of those who had been to Karachi University had M.As. in journalism.

After finishing with their full-time education (some continued with part-time study) most of the sample (35 out of 51) went into journalism without entering any other full-time job. This was especially so in Bangladesh, where eighteen out of 23 had had no other career. It is possible that Pakistan, being more urbanised and having a major commercial centre in Karachi, had wider employment prospects. Nevertheless, even there, three of those who had started work outside journalism had been involved with other media, and another four directly related to the media through jobs in government information departments. Most journalists had entered their journalistic careers by the time they were 25 years old (38 out of 51), and all but three by the time they were 30. These facts make it clear that for most journalists journalism was their entire career. Few had had much experience outside journalism, or the general field of the mass media, and most had been in journalism for some time. In many cases this early involvement with journalism had not been full-time, but started when the respondents were still students, or possibly in other jobs. Some had started as stringers. That eleven of the sample had had such an association with the profession by the time they were twenty, and another 27 by the age of 25, suggests that these people had a considerable career commitment to journalism.

Table 10.1: The Backgrounds of Journalists in Pakistan and Bangladesh

	PAKISTAN	BANGLADESH	TOTAL
AGE IN 1979			
Under 25	7	6	13
Over 25	21	17	38
AGE COMPLETED EDUCATION			
20 or less	6	2	8
21 - 25	18	20	38
26 - 30	4	1	5
AGE STARTED IN JOURNALISM			
20 or less	7	4	11
21 - 25	16	11	27
26 - 40	5	8	13
PREVIOUS OCCUPATION			
None outside journalism	17	18	35
Other media	3	-	3
Public relations ¹	4	-	4
Teaching	3	2	5
Other	1	3	4
FATHERS' OCCUPATION²			
Lawyers	4	1	5
Teachers	2	3	5
Journalists	3	1	4
Other professions	2	-	2
Government employees	9	11	20
Businessmen	3	3	6
Agriculture	2	4	6
Army	2	-	2
SAMPLE	28	23	51

Notes ¹ All four were government posts

² One unknown (in the Pakistan sample)

From the nature of their fathers' careers and their own early careers it would seem that most journalists have a middle-class background, though probably lower middle-class. The fathers came from a variety of largely middle-class occupations, especially the professions and government service. Many of those from the latter had, though, been in relatively lowly jobs, or in the less prestigious areas of the service such as the railways. Few of the fathers had been in business, politics, or journalism itself. Very few had a rural background (and then they were small-scale farmers rather than big land-owners). None of the journalists had what could be described as either a working-class or upper-class background. Few of the journalists had moved to journalism from a job either lower or higher in prestige than their current one. Most had simply moved horizontally, from one media institution to another (though they might have been climbing the journalistic career ladder at the same time). In fact, many had worked for several newspapers by the time they had come to work for their current one.

In Pakistan and Bangladesh, as for India and many other Third World countries, the middle class is thirsty for opportunities, which are expanding at only a slow rate. The sons of these lower middle-class fathers were in fact widening the range of middle-class careers, if at the lower end of the range, by moving into journalism. The family backgrounds, education and career patterns of the journalists all support this general conclusion.

10.1.2. The Editors' Backgrounds

I interviewed nearly all the editors of the major Pakistani and Bangladeshi daily papers. Some of the editors I interviewed were also the proprietors of their papers. Another owner-editor, whom I was unable to see in Pakistan, allowed me to 'interview' him through the post, by means of a fairly lengthy questionnaire. In addition, I interviewed in a less structured manner three union-leaders, several other journalists, the editor of the London edition of Jang, a few people involved with other media, and some people with a finger in both politics and journalism

(including the ex-head of Information under Ayub Khan). Some of the editors (in particular the editor-owners) had strong political connection or had even been (or still were) politicians.

The editors were different from the other journalists in a number of respects. A greater proportion of the editors were born in India (no doubt because they were older). Exactly half of the Pakistani journalists were indigenous to Pakistan; only two Bangladesh journalists had their origins in India. 11 out of 14 Pakistani editors came from India; two had been born in Pakistan and one in Beirut. Five out of the six Bangladeshi editors were indigenous to the country. All the editors had been to university whereas about one-sixth of the journalists had not. Eight out of the fourteen Pakistani editors had had no previous career outside journalism; for the Bangladeshi editors it was two out of seven. Thus a higher proportion of editors had had jobs outside journalism than of the journalists. Below is given the occupations of the editors' fathers and, underneath this, the previous occupations of those editors who had at one time worked outside journalism.

Table 10.2: Occupations of Some Editors' Fathers

Pakistan	Bangladesh
Three senior civil servants	Post-master (middle-ranking civil servant)
District Judge	Doctor
Post-master	Lawyer/politician
Two teachers	Journalist/newspaper-owner
Low ranking railway official	Businessmen (book publisher)
Engineer	
Two minor commercial employees	Total 5
Soap manufacturer	
Journalist/newspaper-owner	
Total 13	

Table 10.3: Previous Occupations of Some Editors

Pakistan	Bangladesh
Commercial employee/school admin.	Government PRO
Stenographer	Civil servant/writer
Teacher	Politics (M.P.)
Middle-ranking civil servant (Information dept.)	Teacher
Low-ranking civil servant (Information dept.)	Total 4
PRO/Company labour officer	
Total 6	

The most common previous occupations of the editors - government service and PRO - makes them similar to the journalists. But they seem to have a slightly higher family background than the bulk of journalists. A number of them had fathers in relatively high occupations, especially in the civil service. In both cases, journalists and editors, a large proportion of fathers were or had been in the civil service (where most of the early pre-Independence career opportunities had been), but in the former case they were middle or low-ranking, in the latter mostly middle or high-ranking.

A number of the editors, then, seem to have a higher socio-economic background than the journalists. However, all the editors who did not own papers had worked their way up in journalism, mostly fairly slowly. None joined as editor, though in some cases they entered as assistant editors or columnists. Even those working on the political (left-wing) papers were journalists of long-standing and had worked on a variety of newspapers, some conservative, some leftist. The editor of Elan, for instance, had worked on four papers: Nawa-I-Waqt, a Jang weekly, Musawaat, and Meyar (a progressive weekly). Even the owner-editors had to some extent worked their way up. Khalil-Ur-Rahman started his paper from very little indeed, and at first ran it virtually single-handed. Before this he had worked on a student paper and then become a stenographer. Majid Nizami started on his brother's paper Nawa-I-Waqt in 1950 as a columnist, becoming editor in 1962.

There is certainly, then, no evidence of direct outside 'intrusions' into editorship of Pakistani newspapers, but the Bangladeshi editors had less journalistic experience. Only one of the editors had worked on more than one other newspaper, whereas several Pakistani editors had worked on a number of papers. Fewer of the Bangladeshi editors had worked their way up in journalism too. Not only were three of them editor-owners, but some of the others had joined high up. Two editors had joined as editors, another as joint-editor. One more had started in his organisation as an assistant editor. The politician-editor and editor-owners had also come into journalism at the top level. The important role of political connections, and the sparser journalistic experience of the Bangladeshi editors, suggest a somewhat weaker professional background than that which had moulded editorship in Pakistan. But, apart from this, journalists in both countries appear to have both a strong middle-class and largely professional background.

10.1.3. Attitudes to Journalism

The content analysis showed that the Pakistani press has apparently been replacing its early partisanship with an orientation to the market. When able to it has become liberal, 'stand-offish', committed not to a particular party but to freedom and democracy. It has been constrained from following its principles by government controls. Underneath these constraints would appear to be a belief in a type of journalism, and a political environment appropriate for this, which journalists perceive to be the sort that exists in the West, and which in Pakistan flowers momentarily in times of relative freedom (as in the general election campaign of 1970). The journalists apparently have a strong professional attitude to their job (in the sense of seeing this job as a profession). The questionnaire goes some way to support the conclusion I reached from the content analysis by inference.

The table below shows that journalists in Pakistan and Bangladesh fairly consistently supported the liberal notions of impartiality and objectivity.

Table 10.4: Journalists' Attitudes to News Reporting

	PAKISTAN	BANGLADESH	TOTAL
	4	7	11
A Discuss facts	17	15	32
Report facts as they are	7	1	8
Intermediate position	1	-	1
B Express different party views	24	22	46
Several party views	3	1	4
Intermediate position	8	8	16
C Criticism in report	15	15	30
Criticism in editorial	4	-	4
Intermediate position			
SAMPLE	28	23	51

Taking B first, virtually all the journalists (46 out of 51) said they believed that each paper should express several party views, not a single party's views. Four opted for an intermediate position (not allowed for in the questionnaire). Only one journalist, therefore, held the reverse attitude to the majority. This evinces a clear rejection by the journalists of partisanship in the press, i.e. of political journalism.

This evidence is reinforced by the answers to the two questions on attitudes to styles of journalism. 32 of the 51 journalists said that journalists should not 'discuss the facts' but should report them as they are. Eight chose an intermediate position, while eleven opted for 'discussion of the facts'. This suggests a fairly strong belief in objectivity, or 'stand-offishness'. Most journalists believe that the facts should be left alone. That this represents a very specific viewpoint can be seen from the equally tenable possibility that facts are meaningless unless they are analysed or explained by the reporter. Three-fifths of the journalists also believed that criticism of government should be left entirely to the editor rather than be broached in the news columns themselves. Most Pakistani journalists, therefore, have rigid views on the separation of news from comment.

These views were even more strongly held by the editors. 15 out of 17 emphasised, even explicitly favoured, the reporting of facts alone. One of them, for instance, said 'I want nothing but facts'. Asked whether criticism of government should appear

in the text of a newspaper article or be left to the editorial, 12 out of 14 (I did not ask this of agency editors as it was irrelevant to them) stressed editorials in varying degrees. All in all, then, editors have an even more restricted view of the 'correct' style of journalism than do journalists themselves.

Such attitudes are not the only cause of the 'notice-board' effect I discussed in Chapter Nine. Another major cause is the poverty of the press. The result of this combination of factors is that the journalist becomes a sort of clerical figure, doing a daily routine which requires little skill, while the real journalism is left to the editorial staff. Newspapers in Pakistan and Bangladesh cannot afford much in the way of actual journalism. A large proportion of their material comes from agencies, and the agencies themselves, based on Reuters, have a strict sense of impartiality. But they too have poor resources, and most of what they do is to distribute statements they have obtained from various organisations. Often a reporter's work is simply to collect statements from particular organisations. Much of a sub-editor's work is the sifting, editing or translation of statements sent in to the paper.

Poor resources are certainly a major factor in limiting the role of journalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Connected with the newspapers' poor resources and the routine nature of journalism is a strong lack of specialisation. Very few papers have any specialist reporters at all. In all cases reporters cover several 'beats', so that a reporter could be covering a political meeting in the morning, a crime story mid-day, and a burst sewer in the evening. (Rarely, however, is life so eventful). Even the bigger papers cannot afford to have journalists covering a single field. In Nawa-I-Waqt, for instance, there is no specialisation at all. There, in the owner's words, "reporters change subject by rotation". Not one daily non-specialist newspaper has an economic correspondent.

Another important factor ensuring the dependence of the papers in these countries on the straight-forward printing of statements

is their weak political position. One editor said he "can't refuse" statements. Even people not in government who want something printed in the press might have a friend in government. The papers do not like to turn anyone influential down (though many journalists also accept money from their 'clients' for providing such a service). In one newspaper I saw a sub-editor sifting through a mass of statements sent in to the paper by various organisations. Some of these had circulation lists with the names of several newspapers on. One started simply by saying "Would you please print the attached statement in your newspaper". A journalist on this newspaper told me it does not print all the statements it receives - it does not have room! Statements from outside sources usually only receive sufficient alteration to make them sound journalistic. As I have said, many of these statements come via the agencies. The editor of the news agency PPI said 75% of the material PPI sends out is in the form of statements. More than one agency editor said the items they send out are printed in the papers with very little alteration.

Many newspaper editors were aware of this problem (some said that as much as 60-90% of news printed in their papers consisted of little more than other people's statements), but did not believe they had the right to refuse a statement. They saw their papers as impartial vehicles for the flow of information. Any analytical or critical writing should be left solely to the editorial staff (and some outside contributors). These normative beliefs are very strong but there are journalists who resent it. In an article in a souvenir pamphlet put out by the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, Dacca University, the contributor complains of "shirt-front type of objective news writing". The writer would like a more interpretative journalism but, for reasons of tradition, political control, and lack of resources, the press in Bangladesh cannot achieve this. It merely prints statements.

"if a reporter is to provide the needed flesh and blood to a news event he must write what the readers ordinarily do not see. It is here that a journalist can hardly

say things in truer perspective if they remain glued to objectivity in a puritan way.... But in a developing country like ours, even objective news writing is a far cry. Most of the journalists are given to deal with canned information. And canned information is full of redundancy."

The result of the split between the creativity and responsibility of senior journalists and the routine, hum-drum world of the average journalists is a major one. It is far greater than it is in the West, though it is similar to the 19th century distinction in the U.K. between Oxbridge editors/leader writers and reporters who were simply shorthand note-takers of speeches. The implication is that reporting itself is a minor occupation. If journalism is essentially the printing of statements then there is little need of reporters. They are little more than clerks doing a routine job of ferrying "canned information". They are limited not only by the economic and political weakness of the press, but by rigid norms of 'professional' behaviour. The distinction between creative, responsible journalists and the rest of the journalists (the bulk of them) is reminiscent of Braverman's¹ description of the control of labour in developed countries.

10.1.4. Attitudes to Politics

I have emphasised in the above discussion the liberal, professional attitude of journalists to the nature of their work. Few of them would appear to have a more radical stance with respect to their role. The same seems to broadly apply to their political attitudes. I asked the journalists to rank certain national goals in order of importance (i.e. in accordance with their own views of their relative importance). Three of these goals were purely political in nature, three economic. The three political goals were political stability, freedom of the individual, and democratic political participation. The three economic ones were rapid industrialisation, rural development, and greater economic equality.

1 Braverman (1974)

Table 10.5: Journalists' Ranking of National Goals

	PAKISTAN	BANGLADESH	TOTAL
Political stability	7	12	19
Individual freedom	4	1	5
Democracy	6	2	8
Total political	17	15	32
Industrialisation	--	-	-
Rural development	3	5	8
Equality	6	3	9
Total economic	9	8	17

Sample: 50 (one failed to answer correctly)

Apart from wishing to see which single goal most journalists would give primacy to, I was hoping to see if there would be any significant difference between political and economic goals in terms of importance allocated. It is impossible to note any goal in the Pakistani sample which has any clear primacy. One goal is certainly accorded little importance - rapid industrialisation. it gets no first places; the same applies to Bangladesh. Both countries are still predominantly rural (especially Bangladesh), which is why politicians feel rapid industrialisation is necessary. It is interesting that the journalists do not agree with this national priority. Not only did less than one-third of the journalists in both countries (14 out of 50) put this goal in the top three places but 17, more than for any other goal, put it last.

While the Pakistani journalists showed no preference for any single goal, the Bangladeshi journalists did. Twelve of the 23 put political stability first - a very clear preference. When we come to look at the overall distinction between political and economic goals, we find a clearer picture in the case of Pakistan than before, and this time the result is very similar to that for Bangladesh. In both cases, nearly twice as many journalists put political rather than economic goals first (in total, 32 against 17).

Finally, comparison of various possible 'alternative' policies shows one or two distinctive results. In Pakistan some preference is shown for political stability over individual freedom, and rural

development receives more favour than rapid industrialisation. This contrast is significantly more pronounced in the case of Bangladesh: 19 journalists put rural development in the first three places, only five rated rapid industrialisation so high.

All in all, the replies to this question imply a belief in the precedence of political over economic variables. This does not suggest satisfaction with politics in these countries of course. Only five of the journalists (all in Pakistan), in answer to the question 'How well do you think the political parties reflect the full range of public attitudes in Pakistan/Bangladesh?' answered 'Very well'. 16 said 'Moderately Well', 29 said 'Not very well'. Though political goals were accorded priority over economic goals no particular ideology is apparent in the above answers; they evince, rather, a practical concern with political stability, especially in Bangladesh. This, considering the country's past (and continuing) political turmoil is not that surprising, but it does suggest a non-ideological, non-radical attitude to the problem of how to tackle the country's problems. In the view of the journalists, it would seem a prerequisite of any development is political stability.

I also asked the journalists to choose one of four possible causes of the problems of their country: political instability, economic inequality, Western interference, non-Western interference. It is interesting that few availed themselves of the latter options. Only six of the 50 that responded to this question chose 'Western interference', while no more than one in each country selected 'non-Western interference'. The latter result is surprising in view of the intense economic, political and military rivalry between India and Pakistan, let alone the role India played in breaking up Pakistan.

The journalists plump unequivocally for internal causes, and, in particular, economic inequality. 22 chose this (about half from each country), compared to 13 for political instability (again about half from each country). Seven journalists chose two or more causes. Thus, though political goals are ranked highly there is a strong awareness of the underlying importance of economic inequality.

I also asked a question concerning public ownership. In Pakistan 16 preferred public to private ownership of industry, 10 private ownership. (Two chose an intermediate position not allowed for, in fact not at all needed as I had structured the question round the words 'mostly private' and 'mostly public'). In Bangladesh 8 journalists preferred public, 15 private ownership. This indicates, perhaps, somewhat more socialist leanings amongst the Pakistani journalists. When certain data from all three of the above questions are tabulated together a somewhat clearer picture emerges, at least as regards comparisons between the two countries.

Table 10.6: Journalists' Overall Attitudes to National Priorities

	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Total
GOALS			
Political stability (1st)	7	12	19
Economic equality (1st)	6	3	9
CAUSES			
Political instability	6	7	13
Economic inequality	12	10	22
INDUSTRY			
Private ownership	10	15	25
Public ownership	16	8	24

Pakistan's journalists appear somewhat more radical than those in Bangladesh. The latter overwhelmingly support political stability rather than economic inequality as a prime national goal, while Pakistani journalists are equally divided on this. The difference between the two countries on causes of national problems are too slight to be of significance, but a far larger proportion of Pakistani than of Bangladeshi journalists would prefer public to private ownership. The difference there is quite distinct. One Pakistani journalist described private enterprise as "broad day-light robbery".

To sum up this section on political attitudes, the only conclusions I am prepared to reach are based on those aspects of the data which stand out clearly. The most important of these is the distinct lack of radicalism, especially in the case of Bangladesh.

The very strong support evinced by Bangladeshi journalists for political stability can hardly be construed as radical. Only one of those who put political stability first placed economic equality second. The support for political stability, rural development (however valid) and for private ownership of industry, suggests a somewhat conservative or at least cautious and practical approach to politics. Only one Bangladeshi journalist gave consistently radical responses, i.e. by putting down economic equality as an important goal (in the first two places), blaming economic inequality for the problems of the country, and opting for public ownership of industry.

The Pakistani journalists appear to be slightly more radical; many are infused with a mixture of liberal and socialist ideas, giving more support to the value of individual freedom and to public ownership of industry than Bangladeshi journalists. They seem slightly more concerned with economic equality and less concerned with rural development. The Bangladeshi concern for rural development is practical and realistic rather than ideological. The more urban and professional background of the Pakistani journalists is likely to make them less interested in rural matters. Finally, there is a noticeably larger number of consistently radical journalists in the Pakistani sample. As I have said, only one Bangladeshi journalist put economic equality as one of the top two goals, inequality as a cause of his country's problems, and preferred public to private industrial ownership. The figure for Pakistan was eight.

The editors were possibly more conservative than the rest of the journalists. Out of 21 editors (all those I interviewed) only one preferred public ownership of industry to private. 11 wanted private ownership, nine a mixed economy. But there was still a strong liberal streak. Out of 17 editors ten said they thought democracy was more important to their country than political stability. Only one or two editors were consistently radical, while the core of conservatism was quite pronounced. The majority of editors are a mixture of conservatism and liberalism, while the majority of other journalists combine more left-wing (but not often radical) tendencies with their liberalism.

10.1.5. The Journalists Speak for Themselves

I asked the journalists to comment on certain professional as well as political matters. They were very free with their comments and many wrote substantial replies. Their comments in general bear out the above discussion. There seemed to be no difference between the comments (nor indeed the answers to the questions that were not open-ended) of journalists on vernacular and English-language papers, or between journalists on partisan and non-partisan papers (though the number of the former was very small, there not being a large number of party paper journalists in either country).

The comments revealed a substantial amount of idealism, especially to the question 'Why did you become a journalist?' A small number lacked any idealistic motivation. One put the reason down to 'chance'. One took up journalism 'as a hobby', even though he believed it was a 'tedious, almost a killing job'. One said he joined because his father was a journalist. Only a few were entirely dismissive. One said 'I really don't know! The other two said there was no reasonable alternative: 'There was no worthwhile job to go for and I landed up in journalism by accident'. 'Journalism was the only field available'. The latter is interesting in view of what I have said about an expanding press opening up the number of middle-class jobs available to those who are unable to make it into the very restricted area of prestige middle-class jobs. Only one (in Pakistan) - a journalist on Jesaret, a Jamaat-E-Islami Islamic paper - mentioned a partisan cause.

"In my student life I came close to an ideological party... and being an ideological worker I thought that by this profession I can work for my cause in a better way."

The other comments varied in their degree of idealism. Most reflect powerful liberal ideals. The following are typical examples:

a) Pakistan

- i) "An urge to speak the truth."
- ii) "To guide nation towards peace, progress and prosperity,

and to try to establish a just society free from all sorts of exploitation."

iii) "To effectively participate in national development."

b) Bangladesh

i) "I have chosen this profession with a missionary zeal - a mission to serve the people. In an under-developed country like ours problems are huge, grievances are manifold and these are mostly left with no outlets. To project the grievances of the mute mass and problems of the nation I have chosen the profession, so that I can be of any help."

ii) "It is the realisation of school-days' dream of becoming either a teacher or a journalist. Later, as a Freedom Fighter, I thought that I shall continue to fight for the cause of the people through press."

iii) "To serve the society and the nation as well. I consider this profession as one of the noblest professions."

iv) "I was destined for it."

A chance to generalise their comments in the final question on the form, in which I asked the journalists to describe what they believed the press could realistically achieve in a developing country, accentuated the idealistic component.

a) Pakistan

i) "Press can educate the public. Press can guide the citizens of an underdeveloped country. Press can prepare the public minds for any emergency or bad days."

ii) "In it lies the panacea of all ills."

iii) "Transformation from pre-history to modern society. Rapid economic growth. Democratisation of society in the global context of imperialism and neo-colonialism."

iv) "The Press should strive to promote national solidarity and progress. It should project a progressive outlook while guiding the people to solve their social and economic problems. It should also do its best to remove economic disparity which tends to undermine national unity and cohesion."

b) Bangladesh

"It can play as an effective instrument to bridge the communication gap between the people and the government. Free flow of unbiased and impartial information will help the people to be aware about happenings in the country. This will in turn help them in formulating their own courses of action."

Much of the idealism in the above responses has, of course, slipped from answering what the press "could realistically" do to what the journalists would like the press to do. In reality the press has little power. Some, possibly more realistic journalists openly acknowledge the ambiguity.

a) Pakistan

- i) "The Press should reflect the thinking and the hopes and aspirations of the people. It should lie above all threats and must grow as a respectable institution which, unfortunately, it is not."
- ii) "I believe free Press can always safeguard the basic human rights. But unfortunately our colonial masters on their departure gave us a gift of a Bonapartist but well trained army. This institution has destroyed each and every institution in which a real democratic and free society is established... Now our Press has become subservient to the Armed Forces."

b) Bangladesh

"The press could act as a watch-dog. Pin-pointing government lapses and suggesting alternatives. Press can also mobilize public opinion against or for issues of national importance. But since the percentage of literacy is alarmingly poor in most of the developing countries the press is not as effective as it should be. Press in most of the developing countries enjoys no freedom, or restricted freedom, giving them little opportunity to play their assigned role."

It is only one step from saying what the press should do, if it were allowed and had the ability, to a position of open pessimism.

This bitterness is paralleled by a few strongly radical responses, more in the case of Pakistan than Bangladesh.

a) Pakistan

- i) "I don't think the press has any worthwhile role in a developing country. It always assumes the role of an instrument which helps perpetuate the people in power. The role of press as conceived in the West is perhaps alien to our conditions. The idea of an independent Press has been forlornly lost in Asiatic topography."
- ii) "Very little. Options lie in the field of political action. Besides, newspapers are owned by vested interests."
- iii) "Realistic is a relative term. In the first place the press has to be free in a developing country in order to give full expression to dissenting views. But, it is as important who the dissenters are. Depends on who is in power. If the country's development is not serving the interest of the vast majority (especially working class, peasants, intelligentsia) but leading to growing economic inequality, corruption and social degeneration (as in the case in most developing countries) then the Press should be free to convey the dissatisfaction and discontentment of the masses and actually act as a powerful pressure on the ruling classes."

b) Bangladesh

- i) "I believe that in the present context of reliance on super-powers and developed countries in the implementation of economic programmes there could be no genuine neutrality in the journalism of developing countries."
- ii) "To arouse public consciousness against economic inequality and external domination."
- iii) "To expose the character of governments - a shared sovereignty of bureaucrat-monopoly capital backed by imperialism and neo-colonialism."

- iv) "To motivate people to wage struggle for establishment of real people's power."

Nearly all of the above responses contain a strong element of liberalism. Though all the journalists deeply desire a free, purposeful press, some of them (but not many) demand that this be linked to socialist aims. Most journalists have a powerful belief in the potential of the press to take on the role of the 'Fourth Estate', and this belief is only to a limited extent coloured by particular political beliefs. The following, from a Bangladeshi journalist, is typical of this liberalism.

"Our people are ignorant. They are groping in the dark. Press may come forward with light and illuminate the whole thing."

But the following statement, from a Pakistani journalist, contains most of the elements discussed above: liberalism, idealism (disillusioned) and cynicism.

"After ten years in this profession, I repent having done so in the first place. I was overwhelmed with the notion that a press could make or disband a nation. But this is only possible when the press is free. The disintegration of a country takes place when the press is curbed and prevented from playing its correct role. Ours is a decaying society and I blame newspaper editors in this country for this unfortunate state of affairs. All that they are interested in is keeping their low-paid jobs intact. One can't expect a better performance from the editor's subordinates. Our papers could have educated and enlightened the people in this country on their rights. They failed in it, miserably. Through foolishness and prospects of personal gains very much in their mind, our editors have reduced their newspapers and magazines to the frightening status of sanitary towels. They have lost credibility. Our newspapers are read only for bullion rates, cinema ad's. and situation vacant columns. The only way we can salvage our newspapers and preserve fair and impartial journalism in this country

is to send all our editors on a compulsory apprenticeship with the Times of India. If TOI refuses to train our 'learned men', 'PLAYBOY' may be contacted. Compared to my newspaper that sexy magazine has far better editorial content."

10.2. A Westernised Profession

In its approach to political reporting and in its apparent belief in particular professional ethics the press in Pakistan and Bangladesh would seem to be heavily influenced by the West. This influence extends beyond political reporting, and it is this more general orientation to the West that I wish to examine in this section. As it is the elites of these countries that are most westernised, such an orientation is likely to be bound up with a certain elitism. First of all it is necessary to see how far these elements are reflected in the content of the newspapers.

10.2.1. Westernised Content

In the case of Dawn in 1951, if sensationalist news is considered Western in origin, then this paper was not westernised in that sense. Two of the main types of sensationalist news - crime and disasters - are quite minor in its reporting, together taking up only 2.2% of its non-advertising space. Moreover, its international coverage does not show an especial bias to the West. Coverage of Third World countries took up half of its international news. Less than 40% of the latter was on Western countries - not large, considering the dependence of Third World newspapers on Western news agencies for their foreign news. Western features (either about or from the West), too, are considerably less significant than non-Western features.

Some editors specifically stated that their papers were modelled on British papers - the Pakistan Times and the Moslem (even in lay-out) on the Guardian, the Morning News on the Telegraph. APP and PPI are closely modelled on Reuters. Though Dawn is clearly modelled on Western quality papers such as the Times, the context is less one of westernisation than of elitism. The rejection of sensationalism - and Dawn is very staid - reflects the rejection of the 'popular' in favour of the 'quality' model. The emphasis on international news which, if foreign relations are included, takes up 39% of all news space, indicates the sort of people who read the paper - a

highly educated elite. If all 'hard' news is split up between domestic, foreign, and those elements which concerned Pakistan's relations with the outside world (foreign relations, Kashmir, international trade and aid) the following result is obtained.

Domestic	21.0%
International/domestic	15.3%
International	25.5%

This absorption with international affairs bore little relevance to the social and development problems of Pakistan. Only 12.7% of news was on domestic social or economic affairs. This concern for international news bears a rather comic comparison with coverage of local affairs which were unable to get more than 3.4% of Dawn's news space. The paper gave negligible space to the expression of local problems, in a sense specifically 'denying' the local nature of the paper. On a necessarily rather crude analysis the reporting of national social and economic problems took up a daily average of somewhat less than 55 column inches of space in the sample, while local problems took up a mere 0.3 inches.

The connection with an elite readership is borne out by the large amount of advertising (aimed mainly at the well-off) the paper received. Advertisements took up 34.4% of total space. Much of it was paid for by Western firms, or subsidiaries or agents of these (between one-third and one-half). Considering the tiny readership of the paper this represents a substantial amount of advertising, which was clearly aimed at a westernised elite. Another aspect of the paper that directly reflected the westernisation element of elitism was the surprisingly small amount of space given to Islam. This is extraordinary in view of the immensely powerful role Islam plays in Pakistan. However, the newspaper's main readers, the professional middle class, are probably the most secularised segment in Pakistani society. The Muslim League itself had been far more concerned with the economic and political freedom of Moslems from the Hindus rather than in the Islamic faith 'per se'.

Dawn in 1951 was a very 'serious' paper of interest only to highly educated people, and it has not changed much since. Nor is it substantially different from the other major English-language dailies. I analysed three papers from the latter part of 1970: Dawn, the Pakistan Times and the Morning News. These were not typical samples because of the dreadful cyclone and tidal wave in the Bay of Bengal, already referred to, and the general election. The former had a drastic effect on the press. Newspapers were saturated with news of the calamity: huge photos (sometimes taking up several pages and appearing every day during the crisis) of the floods, of dead bodies bloated by the water, of mass burials; examination of the causes of the calamity and what went wrong with the early-warning system; accounts of previous natural disasters in Bengal; innumerable public appeals, and news of donations to help those left destitute in East Pakistan. The period of the sample did not coincide exactly with the period of the cyclone. In the period of my sample cyclone-coverage took up between 12% and 16% of space after subtraction of advertising, but otherwise it sometimes took up as much as between one-third and one-half of non-advertising space.

The staid quality of these papers can be gauged from the proportion of space taken up by what can be called 'hard' news' (politics, economics, international news, etc.). In Dawn this takes up 62% of non-advertising space. For the Times it is 60% and for the News 53%. This seriousness cannot be explained solely by the unusual events of the cyclone and the elections. News on the political parties took up an average of 11% of non-advertising space, the cyclone an average of 14%. In fact the rather low proportion of space taken up by politics of all sorts during the election campaign (an average of 17% of non-advertising space), indicates the sobriety of these Pakistani papers well enough, -especially when compared to the Nigerian papers.

The generally serious, rather aloof tone of the papers can be seen in other respects. As in Dawn of 1951, these papers pay very little attention to local news, which takes up three or four percent of non-advertising space. The vernaculars pay far more attention

to local news, which, in Nawa-I-Waqt for instance, takes up about 15% of space. Disasters and crime together absorb the same amount of space as local news in these three papers. However, in some respects the papers are different from the earlier Dawn sample. The coverage of religion (not all Islam) is greater, taking up between five and seven percent of space. International news (affected to some extent by the extra coverage required by the cyclone and the elections) is much lower, taking up 10.5% of non-advertising space in Dawn, 13.9% in the Times and 7.7% in the News. Within this itself the bias of the West is even less than it was before, Western countries receiving only about one quarter of all international coverage. These last facts possibly suggest that the English-language press was now taking a more realistic account of the real nature of Pakistani society. Dawn is now a somewhat more general paper, with broader coverage and slightly less elitist appeal than before. The other papers are similar to it. Coverage of the cyclone alone brought these papers closer to the people.

It is in overall style rather than particular coverage that these papers are heavily westernised; they are clearly based on the Western 'quality' newspaper. In one respect, though, the West does have a direct influence in content. This is in the area of features. Features take up a significant amount of space in the News. They take up less in the other two papers. However, in the case of Dawn nearly two-thirds of these are 'Western' (i.e. either originating from the West or about the West); for the Times it is somewhat over one-third. In the News the proportion of space taken up by Western features is very large indeed - three-fifths of all features are Western. In all over 10% of the News' total non-advertising space is taken up by Western features - more than international news receives and nearly as much as the political parties get. Most of these features were regular items, including such things as syndicated bridge columns, cross-words, and horoscopes. These articles continued despite the coverage given to the cyclone (and to politics). It was international news that was cut back, including news of the West, rather than light features from the West.

The extent of westernisation in features can sometimes reach silly proportions. For instance, a fashion article announcing a fur coat available in Selfridges for £60¹, or a clue in a cross-word asking for a 'former Prime Minister' (6 letters). The answer? Not Jinnah, but Attlee. Dawn carried a regular Osbert Lancaster cartoon. Two clerics appear in one, in which one of them says to the other "I say, Vicar, I've just thought of a wizard leg-pull - I'm going to write a MADLY left-wing letter to my M.P. and sign it Hewlett Johnson!"² I have no idea what Pakistanis made of that; probably no more than I can now. In another issue an article announced that "the Battle of the smog-masks gripped London last night as its famous fogs began to creep along the murky streets where Sherlock Holmes once tracked master criminals"³. This piece of 'news' naturally came via an American agency (UPA). The Pakistan Observer had regular Dr.Kildare and Rip Kirby cartoons. In one of the latter Rip Kirby is in a fantasy world with Aphrodite, Ares, etc. Kirby is dressed in Roman attire and glasses. Artemis, with huge breasts, blonde hair and a skirt of extreme shortness, fires an arrow at him (which just misses). Kirby remarks: "Great Scott! That was close!"⁴

There is no doubt that such material was considered to be popular, even if there were also economic reasons for its use. The following announcement in Dawn makes it fairly clear that editors and owners thought they were supplying a public want.

"It is announced for the information of readers that arrangements have been made with the New York Herald Tribune as a result of which the well-known columns and features which appear in the Herald Tribune will also appear in Dawn. These include regular columns by Walter Lipmann, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, David Lawrence, Art Buchwald, Roscoe Drummond, and others. Besides these, articles and features on Sports, Bridge, Fashions, Photography, Gardening, Cinema, Stamps, Art, Business, Aviation, Science, Theatre, etc. will appear in magazine and regular columns."⁵

- 1 Morning News (3.12.70)
- 2 Dawn (2.4.51)
- 3 Ibid (2.11.53)
- 4 Pakistan Observer (4.11.70)
- 5 Dawn (24.2.55)

There is a degree of elitism in this westernisation. Both were explicitly combined in many of the papers' advertisements. One, for instance, a Pan-Am advertisement, advertising its more expensive fares, described the advantages it offered in its flights to Europe as follows: a lounge, sleeperettes, cuisine by 'Maxims of Paris' and a bar service. The picture showed stewardesses serving drinks in the lounge where elegant Western women are to be seen. The advert invited the readers "after the pageantry of London to include Germany in your programme".¹ It also mentioned Germany's national wines. It was not put off from doing this, or advertising its bar service, by the fact that it was addressing mostly a Moslem readership.

10.2.2. The Editors' Comments on Westernised Content

Though the papers in 1970 gave significant coverage to international affairs (compared to many Third World papers), this coverage was not as great as in Dawn of 1951 (in proportional terms; in absolute terms it was considerably larger). However, if the effects of the cyclone were discounted the space taken up by international news would be somewhat greater - by between two and three percent of total news space. This means that the Morning News would have had 10% of space on international affairs, Dawn 13%, and the Pakistan Times 16%. In a non-electoral period the proportion would have been slightly higher again.

Below are given the proportions of non-advertising space taken up by international news over several years, using Amjad Ali's analysis² and my own. (Ali's analysis was of total space; I have recalculated it in terms of total space less advertising, in order to make it comparable to my own). The 1970 figures discount the effects of the cyclone.

Table 10.7: International News as a Proportion of Total News Space

1951					
<u>Dawn</u>					
25.5					
1963					
<u>Dawn</u>	<u>Pak.Times</u>	<u>Pak.Observer</u>	<u>Jang</u>	<u>Nawa-I-Waqt</u>	<u>Ittefaq</u>
17.1	16.2	20.2	7.6	6.6	11.9
1970					
<u>Dawn</u>	<u>Pak.Times</u>	<u>Morning News</u>			
13.0	16.0	10.0			

1 Ibid (18.1.53)

2 Ali, Amjad (1963), pp.12/13

Two things are of note here: i) the very big difference between the English-language papers and the vernaculars, ii) an apparent decline of international news in the former over time. Even with this decline the elitism of the English-language papers in comparison with the vernacular papers is quite clear.

All the editors of English-language papers that I spoke to, in both countries, believed that international news was an important selling-point for their newspapers. The editors of the more 'respectable' vernacular papers sided with the English-language editors in considering international news to be a significant element in demand for their papers. Other vernaculars did not rate international news highly, while the political papers did not consider such news to be of any importance to their readers at all. Of course, I am talking here of the editors' conceptions of public attitudes, and these could be misconceptions. I also asked editors why Western features were so prominent in their newspapers. With some of the English-language papers this prominence is quite deliberate, as they have a regular supply of features and news articles from various Western news organisations. For example, the Pakistan Times has the Observer service, the Moslem the Guardian service, and Dawn the New York Times service; Dawn has a regular Art Buchwald column.

Why is this so? I have considered two possibilities: i) popular demand by a westernised public; ii) the usefulness of such features as (relatively) cheap and easy space-fillers. (This is related to a general lack of resources within the press). The answers given by the editors indicate that both explanations are valid. The editor of the Morning News said 75% of his features material was foreign. It was of interest to readers but Pakistan lacked journalists experienced in writing that sort of material. The editor of Dawn thought traditional reliance on foreign ideas, and a related lack of creative journalism, were primary. Public demand and cheapness are secondary factors. The editor of the Pakistan Times in Lahore did not think there was a demand for foreign features. They are "space-fillers". Pakistani papers he said, are often short of local material and 'impose' foreign matter on their readers.

However, the editor of the Rawalpindi edition of the Pakistan Times believed there was a demand for Western features.

The editor of the Moslem said the dependence on Western media was necessary given the poor facilities of the media in the Third World. He claimed that foreign material was cheap. The Moslem then paid Rs.20,000 p.a. (about £1,000) for the Guardian service. This includes all sorts of material but it is largely a features/background service. The Rs.20,000 could not be considered expensive. A simple calculation can show this. Senior journalists such as leader writers and columnists got up to Rs.3,500 per month in the Moslem. As the paper used one or two Guardian articles per day it seems certain that it would take two journalists at least to replace the service, without regard to quality. Even if one journalist could do it (and he certainly could not compete with the range of Guardian material from which the Moslem would select its one or two daily articles), he would be receiving a salary of Rs.42,000 - double the cost of the features service. The editor also said that popular demand for such features is a very important part of the motivation for having them.

In sum, there seems to be no clear policy regarding the use of foreign feature material. It is the result of a long tradition of Western influence. That the tradition has remained is in part due to the economic advantage foreign media have and the related fact that Pakistani newspapers do not have sufficient journalists with the right sort of experience to replace foreign sources. Westernisation itself exists both in the public and in the newspapers themselves. They are, perhaps, mutually reinforcing.

10.2.3. Westernisation amongst the Journalists

There is little doubt that the journalists are, in a professional sense at least, strongly oriented to the West. However, this cannot be taken for granted. I tried to get an impression of the precise nature of this westernisation from the journalists themselves. The editors of the English-language papers had had considerable contact with the West. Two had worked in London for a period. Only one out of 19 editors in the two countries (a Pakistani) had never been to the West. Several had been over to the West many times - one over 18 times; another had been to the U.K. alone 25 times! Only

one, though, had had some education in the West. All the editors, of course, were familiar with the Western media directly through their work, but, in addition, one had worked in London for Reuters and several contributed articles to Western newspapers. Virtually all of the editors admitted that the papers and news agencies of their country were modelled on the Western press, but only two criticised the press of their country for being too westernised. Both of these were editors of vernacular papers.

The difference between the vernacular and the English-language papers seem also to apply to religion. Most vernacular editors considered coverage of Islam to be important to their readers (but not in Bangladesh). Only one English-language editor was of this view. This difference seems to apply to religious attitudes as well. Four out of nine Pakistani editors had performed Hajj (been to Mecca for the religious ceremonies as required by Islam). This does not necessarily indicate piety; prestige is equally important in motivating people to perform Hajj (while poverty is an obstruction). At least two of these editors regularly observe Ramazan (involving extensive fasting; this indicates a more certain sign of piety), as did one other who had not performed Hajj. This fairly high religious observance applies mostly to vernacular editors. My interview with the owner-editor of Jang, a wealthy man familiar with the West, was interrupted so that he could offer his prayers at the religiously required time. Only one English-language editor I spoke to was self-confessedly pious. Only one editor in Bangladesh showed any overt piety.

Not surprisingly, a smaller proportion of journalists than of editors had been to the West. Nevertheless exactly one-third of them had paid such a visit (either to Europe or the U.S.A.) - the same proportion for both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Three of these had also studied in the West. Nearly all the Pakistani journalists, and two-thirds of the Bangladeshi journalists, regularly read Western newspapers. Two-thirds of the journalists from both countries (34 out of 51) did not think the English-language papers of their country were too westernised. Another ten (five in each country) were ambivalent. Only six considered that the English-language papers

of their country were too westernised. This attitude contrasts strongly with their attitudes to the influence of the West on their societies. 46 out of the 51 considered their societies to be excessively westernised. Journalists in Pakistan and Bangladesh seem to wish to follow the style and ethics of Western journalism, while resenting the general influence of the West on their societies.

Only 15 out of the 51 journalists regularly observed Ramazan, while four had performed Hajj. These are not especially low figures—after all, a month-long fast during day-light hours is not an appealing prospect, and going to Mecca is expensive - but they certainly indicate a higher degree of secularisation than in society at large. In Pakistan it is not uncommon to see people praying in the street, and the mosques are well attended at the required times. The journalists' lack of enthusiasm for reading the regular religious articles in the press reinforces this implication of relative secularisation. Only three of the 51 journalists read such articles thoroughly. 25 hardly read them at all. When asked whether they would like religious articles to concentrate on traditional Islam or on interpreting it in accordance with modern needs, only five out of 51 chose the former.

Bangladeshi journalists were less interested in religious articles, especially those of a 'traditionally Islamic' nature. Several Bangladeshi journalists indicated to me personally, or on the questionnaires, their amazement that I should think of asking silly questions about religious beliefs - not seeing that a negative response is as academically significant as a positive response. Some Pakistani journalists showed equal antagonism to Islam. To the question, 'Have you ever performed Hajj?' one respondent replied 'Hell! No!' To the question, 'Do you regularly observe Ramazan?' he quipped 'We are already a starving people!' He was intensely liberal, believing very strongly in freedom of the individual and freedom of the press. He was also highly westernised, as this implies. In response to the question 'Do you think that certain sectors of your society are too much influenced by Western culture' he wrote 'I wish they were!' It is possible that secularisation

amongst the journalists is related to a significant degree of westernisation.

To conclude this section, the above data seems to indicate a set of journalists with considerable experience of the West, either directly or indirectly, who read Western newspapers and apparently hold these up as a model (as their comments, given below, will show even more). Editors were explicit about this modelling effect. These responses and the relative secularisation of the journalists indicate a considerable degree of westernisation, though this influence in their societies was not accepted without some resentment. Westernisation was most acute amongst the journalists on the English-language papers.

10.2.4. The Journalists' Opinions on the Western Press

So far I have not talked directly about the journalists' opinions on the Western press, though it is clear enough that they are familiar with it and also seem to accept it as a broad model. When I asked them to state what they considered to be the good and bad points in Western journalism, the journalists' replies were remarkably consistent. As far as the bad points are concerned nearly all journalists, with great justification, put narrow, biased, or excessively limited coverage of developing countries as the main criticism. As the following examples show, the responses were very similar.

a) Pakistan

- i) "Almost all Western newspapers display prejudice against under-developed countries and their inhabitants, particularly if they are Muslims."
- ii) "All the Western papers ignore the causes of poverty and injustice, and serving their own ends, doing nothing for humanity."
- iii) "It is racially biased, also politically, closing its eyes to the emerging forces that do not suit their traditional set-up."

b) Bangladesh

- i) "Inadequate coverage of Third World countries."
- ii) "Sensationalism in reporting events in developing countries. Lack of knowledge about real economic situation in developing countries."

- iii) "In matters of Asian coverage they are guided by their own interests and priorities."

I have quoted these criticisms at such length, before discussing the journalists' more general views on the good and bad points of the Western press, in order to counterbalance any impression that might have been gained so far that these journalists wholeheartedly admire the Western press. That is far from the case. They accept the broad principles of Western journalism as a basic model, but bitterly resent its ethnocentrism. All these journalists, indeed all journalists in this part of the world, believe that they get a raw deal in the Western press; and they do.

The journalists' views on the good points of the Western press were quite consistent. In the main they recommended its apparent objectivity, comprehensiveness, in-depth analysis. The following examples give some idea of this.

- i) "It is a free press."
- ii) "Outspokenness."
- iii) "Lots of original and analytical writing."
- iv) "Reportage is detailed and enlightened."
- v) "Boldness and direct style."

A number of these journalists also mentioned the technical or purely professional superiority of Western journalism.

- i) "Prompt and detailed coverage. Good news-worthy photographs."
- ii) "Impressive lay-out, good news-pictures, human-interest stories."
- iii) "Good presentation."

Admiration for the Western press in general reached an extreme in the case of three respondents who, when considering the bad points, said they could not think of any. One of these went as far as to say he believed the Western press played a role in educating the world's masses.

Despite the above points of praise, some journalists were not short on criticism either, apart from those made about coverage of developing countries. Some of them pointed a finger at scandal-mongering and sensationalism.

- i) "They highlight scandals. Crime reports are given preference over other reports."
- ii) "Too much emphasis on scandals."
- iii) "Blackmailing."

Some of the criticisms apparently reversed the general belief that the Western press is objective.

- i) "Not objective as posed."
- ii) "Slant and bias. Ill-informed views. Tilt in editorial comment."
- iii) "Slant. Preaching. Disproportionate exposure."

This apparent conflict of views on the Western press, I think, reflects a good deal of consistency. The above criticisms do not indicate rejection of the nature of Western journalism. This is clear enough from the fact that the three respondents just quoted all had favourable things to say under "good points". Furthermore, eight of the nine (from both countries) who criticised the Western press for lack of impartiality said that they believed the English-language papers in Pakistan were "not enough like Western newspapers". It would seem, then, that the journalists fully believe in Western journalistic values (whether these values really exist or not) and are, indeed, so imbued with these values that they use them to pin-point failures in the Western press itself. In other words, Western journalism does not live up to the high standards of Pakistani journalists, even though these are strongly influenced by the West. Pakistani journalists have a rigorous belief in total objectivity. These responses fit in well with the other results of the questionnaire, as well as with the content analysis, all of which showed a strong sense of 'professionalism' and attachment to rigid 'professional' norms of objectivity.

10.2.5. Television

Westernisation reaches its apogee in television. Television was introduced by Ayub, first in West Pakistan, then four years later in the Eastern wing. When, in 1968, it was established in Dacca, Ayub himself said on television:

"I was quite clear in my mind that television was not a luxury... We want to use this medium for the purpose of amusement to a certain extent but basically for making people aware of our problems and pointing out the solutions to them, and also for the purpose of spreading education as much as possible."¹

This did not prevent the Nippon Electric Co.Ltd., who were doing the work, from stating in a Morning News advertisement:

"On completion the new Dacca T.V. station will have a 450 foot high antenna and tower - one of the highest in Asia, and the most sophisticated equipment to bring the best in T.V. entertainment to millions of Pakistanis."²

Television in Pakistan, of course, has not been used for educational purposes. As one executive in Pakistan Television (PTV) told me, there is a "limited demand for educational programmes." The following table shows the breakdown of T.V. programmes for 1980/81.

Table 10.8: Break-down of Television Programming 1980/1 (%)

Foreign films and serials	22.7
News and current affairs	17.8
Pakistani films and plays	11.6
Music and shows	9.6
Religious programmes	8.8
'General' programmes (e.g. festivals)	3.9
Sport	3.7
Childrens' programmes	3.5
Regional language programmes	4.7
Educational Television Division	0.8
Miscellaneous	6.1
Commercials	6.7
Total	100.0

The largest category is clearly foreign films and serials. Though this comes to about 23% of all programming, I was told that about 30% of total programming is imported.³ News and current affairs rank quite highly but specifically educational programmes,

1 Morning News (26.9.68)

2 Ibid (25.9.68)

3 Government of Pakistan; Pakistan: An Official Handbook, 1978/81.

put out by the Educational Television Division (ETD) take up only 0.8% of broadcasting time. The ETD was set up in 1973 to broadcast literacy programmes, etc. It can also be seen that the regional languages, of which there are quite a number, hardly get a look in. (Colour was introduced in 1976 in Pakistan, in 1981 in Bangladesh). About 40% of programming in Bangladesh is in English.

Television in Bangladesh is heavily government financed. Pakistan Television (PTV) is primarily a commercial system, though it is government-owned. In 1979/80 28% of revenue came from advertising, 37% from licences, and 25% from government subsidy, (the rest from other sources¹). PTV has been quite successful in getting advertising revenue, which has climbed rapidly.

Table 10.9: PTV's Percentage Increase in Advertising Revenue
(over previous years)²

1975/6	43.8
1976/7	6.8
1977/8	22.1

It has been claimed that broadcasting now gets 60% of all advertising revenue (including radio which has 10%). Whether the figures is that large or not it is firmly believed by journalists that the broadcasting media have harmed the financial position of the press.

In Bangladesh there is only one production station (in Dacca). In 1982 there were an estimated 150,000 television sets. There are five broadcasting centres in Pakistan, but most T.V. sets are in the Karachi and Lahore areas. The estimated number of sets in these two areas (licensed sets plus 25%) in 1978 was about 560,000. They now have over two-thirds of Pakistan's estimated 750,000 sets. By comparison, Baluchistan had only 5,000 sets (all in Quetta). Only about 10% of households have a T.V. set. T.V. is still largely a luxury of the elite in Pakistan. Perhaps the popularity of the medium with advertisers follows from this. There is, as I have said, considerable westernisation apparent in the programming; it is of note that most of the main advertisers are Western companies, or their subsidiaries, agents, or licensees. Below are given, in descending order, the top 12 advertisers on PTV.³

1 PTV Facts and Figures 1981

2 PTV Facts for Advertisers, 1979

3 Ibid.

Table 10.10: The Main Advertisers on PTV, 1979

National Bank of Pakistan (nationalised)		
Glaxo Laboratories Pakistan Ltd.		
Lever Brothers	"	"
Brooke Bond	"	"
Kohinoor Soap and Detergents Ltd.		
Reckitt and Colman Pakistan Ltd.		
English Biscuits Manufacturers Ltd.		
Ceylon Tea Bureau		
Phillips Electrical Company of Pakistan Ltd.		
Burque Corporation		
Beecham Pakistan Ltd.		
Lipton	"	"

Western programming is important to PTV for two reasons:

i) it is cheap, ii) it is popular. While it costs PTV Rs.25,000 to make an hour of programming (scripting, acting, transport, sets, make-up), excluding technical costs (which might double programming costs), PTV pays only Rs.5,000 or so (\$500) for an hour of foreign programming ¹ (usually American). Given this fact, the role of imported material is hardly likely to diminish.

I saw a considerable amount of television while I was in Pakistan in 1979 (also in 1973). Some of the imported material was abysmal, some very good, e.g. Washington Behind Closed Doors. Apart from the latter (and the earlier series of The Ascent of Man) most imported material is popular entertainment stuff like Bionic Woman. However worthwhile Washington Behind Closed Doors might have been, it could clearly only appeal to a highly westernised elite. But even some well-educated English-speaking Pakistanis I spoke to could only understand parts of the programme. Some imported material was, in a different sense, beyond understanding - e.g. American boxing matches from the 1950s - filler material at its worst.

Most of the prestige indigenous programmes are highly westernised. Indeed, they have so little to do with the reality of Pakistan that they might as well be imported at a fraction of the cost. The most prestigious of these are T.V. films, which are professionally

1 Interview with PTV executives.

produced, and very expensive. They are nearly always about rich people, and always concern a love affair. In one I saw, the love affair concerned a divorced couple (divorce is rare in Pakistan). The ex-wife has just returned to Pakistan from London. Her son whines that he wants to go back to London (Pakistan was 'too hot'). London is often mentioned, almost as if it is a second home. In Pakistan they stay at an expensive hotel (acknowledged at the end as the Holiday Inn in Rawalpindi). The shots go from the airport to the hotel to an expensive restaurant (where the boy eats fish and chips) to a pleasant, solitary countryside scene, back to the hotel, etc. - carefully cutting out even the tiniest glimpse of the poverty to be seen everywhere in real life. The man wore a suit and the woman was extremely fair (most women in such programmes seem to be made up to look very fair; the 'hero's' second wife was a blonde). The protagonists often speak in English, especially, it seems, at climaxes: "time will heal it, time may also finish it". "I couldn't ask anything more from God." The divorcees fall in love again, but it is too late. Interestingly, PTV people I spoke to (including an actor who had appeared in such a T.V. film) spoke of these programmes with pride. One or two journalists I discussed such productions with spoke of them with contempt.

This particular T.V. film was sponsored by Vespa scooters. In the advertisements inserted into the programme a group of clearly well-off youths, all dressed in Western clothes, are seen zooming round on scooters. The ad. was almost undoubtedly filmed abroad - possibly in Italy. A number of advertisements (e.g. Coke) were imported - these stand out, being overtly Western and much more expensive and professional. But even some of the Pakistani ad's. are westernised. In a Lux advertisement the Western girl shown on the packet becomes, in front of your eyes, a Pakistani girl, and speaks in Urdu. A dishwashing liquid is advertised, in English, not to scratch the designs "on your more expensive china" (a problem that could only be of concern to the elite). A number of ad's., in fact, are in English. In a Macleans advertisement the speaker, despite his Pakistani accent, describes 'Macleans teeth' as "hwite" rather than "white".

10.2.6. Concluding Comments: Professionalism and Westernisation

I have shown that journalists in Pakistan and Bangladesh hold strong beliefs on the nature of their profession and that these appear to influence them in their day-to-day work. These 'professional' norms also seem to derive in part from conceptions journalists hold on the nature of the press in the West. Their model is western journalism. Westernisation, however, goes wider than that. The most westernised (and the most elitist) medium is television. Despite receiving very large government subsidies, television is still mainly a luxury of the elite in both countries, and has so far not been applied to educational uses to any significant degree. Television might epitomise these themes, but they apply to the media in general. The English-language press in particular is a continuing testament to the strength of professional norms, of westernisation, of elitism, and of the connection between these things.

10.3. The Organisation of the Journalists: Politics or Professionalism?

I have spent considerable time in discussing the professional ethics of journalists in Pakistan and how these affect the newspapers' approach to politics. The relationship between professionalism and politics is a subtle one, and one that varies throughout the press. I have shown the political differences between different types of paper, but I have hardly touched upon differences between different functional segments of the press, i.e. between editors, owners, other journalists, etc. The relationship between professionalism and politics is brought out more acutely when the organisation of the press is considered. There is more to the journalists' sense of professionalism than its dependence on westernisation. It is related also to their conceptions of their own status and of the role of journalism in society.

All those involved in journalism in Pakistan are involved in occupational or professional organisations relevant to their work and positions. The working journalists are organised in the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ). This looks after the journalists' interests but also acts as a spokesman for them in making known their views on the role of the press in Pakistan,

i.e. it has a political role too. Journalists become members of the PFUJ through membership of their own newspaper unions rather than as individuals; it is a federation of other unions. Editors can be admitted, but only if they lack the power to "hire and fire". The occupational significance of this qualification is clear enough. The editors are themselves organised in the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE). Very few are members of the PFUJ. The CPNE is concerned with journalistic (editorial) rather than occupational interests, unlike the PFUJ which concerns itself with both. The owners are represented by the All Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS). This is more like the PFUJ than the CPNE. It deals with material matters and acts as a pressure-group, e.g. vis-à-vis the government. (However, as the government also owns newspapers it has membership in the APNS too). Some editor-owners are represented in both the CPNE and the APNS.

In addition to the above groups there are all the individual newspaper unions (or unions representing groups of newspapers), which form the membership of the PFUJ, and the unions of non-journalist newspaper workers such as calligraphers and printers. Finally, embracing all workers in the press, is APNEC. This is a relatively new organisation designed to unite journalist and non-journalist employees in a single front; it is concerned only with the routine negotiation of wages and conditions of work. In Bangladesh there are the Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists the Editors' Council of Bangladesh, and the Newspaper Owners' Association.

In the various conflicts in which the press has been concerned, involving government, proprietors, editors, journalists and their unions, political and economic factors are intermixed in a complicated way. All governments in the Third World tend to authoritarianism. They do not want to be troubled by opposition from the press; government therefore finds itself opposed to a number of proprietors and editors. Equally, though, it does not want trouble from the unions, whether in journalism or industry. Even a left-wing government that supports industrial unions (as

did Bhutto's government to a limited extent) wants an obedient press, and is therefore unlikely to support unionised journalism. Like the journalists themselves, the proprietors want press freedom; but they want it for themselves, not for their journalists. As proprietors they are ideologically opposed to their workers as well as having an economic interest in attempting to restrain their union power. Thus, even those proprietors who feel opposed to the government either politically or over the question of press freedom, tend to side with it in opposition to the journalists' unions. The editors' position is even more ambiguous. Some work for the government, some own newspapers, but most are fully professional journalists who, though they tend to have a higher socio-economic background than the bulk of journalists, have most in common with them.

The journalists themselves feel opposed to all the above groups as they all, including the editors, represent authority. The unions which represent the journalists have two fundamental concerns: the professional interests of the journalists and their material interests. They are, in fact, connected, as a restricted press means less newspapers, less jobs, less opportunities to fight for improved pay and conditions, as well as less professional freedom. In this respect the journalists have some links with the editors, as all are working journalists seeking professional freedom and better working conditions. The journalists feel most opposed to the government and to the proprietors. The latter represent economic oppression, the government political oppression. The journalists face both but recognise that the two are inter-connected. Though the two types of oppression need not go together, and there is often political opposition between the government and the proprietors, they often reach a 'modus vivendi'. The government wants peace. The proprietors want to stay in business. The journalists themselves seem to recognise that this is less a matter of conspiracy than of convenience.

"The proprietors who started publishing newspapers in Pakistan after independence had no concept of the role of press and government - press relationship in a free

country. For them publishing a newspaper was an industry. And to make this enterprise profitable they needed government help and patronage. The government was too happy to treat newspaper publishing as an industry. In return for this help and patronage the proprietors surrendered the freedom of the press."¹

Even this is a simplification, because the relationship between the government and the proprietors is at best an uneasy one. Sometimes it is a matter of ideology, but more often of convenience.

10.3.1. The Journalists in Action

In the 1950s it was the editors who had been the most important, or active element in the struggle for press freedom. They had more influence then; since the 1950s both the proprietors and the government have reduced their effect. Moreover, the influence the editors had was wielded mostly through cooperation rather than antagonism. Indeed, there was an element of conservatism in the nature of this cooperation. In part this was because it was defined by the elite background of both editors and government ministers. The cooperation was a formal affair. Through what was called a "Gentleman's agreement" with the government, press advisory committees were set up to advise the government on possible offences. The committees themselves were to be set up with the consultation of what was then called the Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference. (PNEC).

The "Gentleman's agreement" and the advisory committees were a failure. They were a liberal pipe-dream. Some editors objected strongly to government cynicism in this regard. Altaf Husain, Dawn's editor, was strong-minded. When the Sind government did not form the Sind Advisory Committee in consultation with the PNEC he issued a statement saying that the PNEC "cannot possibly recognise (the advisory committee) as a properly constituted body."² Clearly the advisory committees had little real influence.

The editors are now in a different position. Some have strong political commitments, some are themselves proprietors, some work for independent papers, some for government papers. They can never act strongly as a united entity. The editors are also very divided

1 25 Years of Karachi Union of Journalists, p.22.

2 Dawn (26.1.51)

as to their attitudes to the PFUJ. On the one hand, for instance, there is Ahmed Ali Khan, editor of Dawn, one of Pakistan's most respected editors and an ex-official of the PFUJ. He recognises the weakness of his organisation, the CPNE, but believes the PFUJ does itself harm in not seeking the support of the independent editors. By contrast, Anwer Khalil, editor of Dawn's sister-paper, Hurriyet, is right-wing, highly anti-PFUJ, and believes the editors still have more influence (by being a part of the elite) than the PFUJ.

The editors are not a unity, and for this reason whatever influence they might once have held as a body has declined. The journalists' union, the PFUJ, has probably overtaken the CPNE in influence. It has certainly been more active. It is not usual for the press of any country to be as well unionised as it is in Pakistan. The press would not necessarily be very different without it, but it does represent the ideas and attitudes of a very significant number of journalists who are unable to see their ideas reflected in the press itself. It has also been strongly involved in matters of a political nature. It is not only a politicised body, but articulate and well organised. Founded in 1950 the PFUJ has been involved in a number of important disputes; even if these have been concerned on the surface with wages and conditions of work, many of these, because of the role of government in the press, have been essentially political disputes.

The PFUJ, apart from representing the journalists' material interests, has taken upon itself the cause of the freedom of the press. In fact, as APNEC is responsible for routine negotiations, the PFUJ has become more concerned with such matters. This brings it in opposition to the newspaper proprietors, but also to government. However, this opposition is based largely on the PFUJ's concern for the profession. It does not get involved in politics per se. It does not support a political party (whatever the tendencies of most of its members) or comment on government policies which do not affect the press. Furthermore, all governments - the pre-coup regimes, the military governments, the Bhutto regime - have in some measure suppressed the freedom of the press. The

PFUJ's opposition to government has, thus, been constant. This commitment was largely fostered during the more repressive regime of Ayub Khan, but did not at that time evolve into anything very concrete. When Ayub brought in his repressive newspaper laws there was a general reaction in the press, and elsewhere, which persuaded the government to mitigate the measures to a limited extent; the journalists as an organised body were not a central part of the reaction, as they themselves admit.

"But their campaigns against measures of far-reaching significance like take-over of PPL newspapers by the military regime in 1958, establishment of National Press Trust to expand official control on press, closure of radical journals, etc., have been of no consequence in respect of stopping the deadly process of muzzling the press."¹

At that time elite influence was of more significance than union power.

The PFUJ began to come into its own during Yahya's period of rule. But the first major action of the PFUJ was not over a political question; it was over money. The wages of journalists were determined by government through a very infrequently convened Wage Board. The first thing the PFUJ did when the new government took over was to persuade it to appoint a new Wage Board (the second) to revise the old rates of pay and fringe benefits set by the first Board. The second Board recommended new rates and an interim award. The government sanctioned this interim award but the proprietors, speaking through the APNS, decided not to pay it. The PFUJ then decided to call a strike, a demand which received support from 97% of the PFUJ's journalists when put to the vote. The PFUJ also demanded that the relief be awarded to the industry's non-journalist employees - a demand which the union called "historic", because it shifted the emphasis from middle-class professional demands to more worker-oriented concerns.

The APNS, in a difficult position because of the legal requirement upon them to pay the award, sought to get a stay of implementation

1 25 Years of Karachi Union of Journalists, pp.28

of the award through the courts. The petition was rejected. Despite a subsequent postponement of the strike by the PFUJ, the APNS refused to negotiate, arguing that it was wrong for such negotiations to take place between these two organisations. It wanted separate negotiations for each newspaper. The PFUJ saw this as an attempt to break its united stand and rejected the proposal. The strike went ahead. Only two papers, Mashriq and Nawa-I-Waqt, managed to continue during this period, but the agencies, through use of blackleg labour and hired hands, also continued to operate. Within ten days most of the newspapers had accepted the demands of the PFUJ.

Though the press was freer in this period than at any time in the previous decade, the government, largely because of the recent trouble, decided to purge a large number of left-wing journalists, in both public and private papers. It seems that the initial pressure for this came from certain right-wing political groups associated with the government. The campaign of victimisation against the journalists brought a reaction from the PFUJ inevitably political in nature. The union claims that the purge was planned before the strike, though the latter could have been the deciding factor. The purge took a toll of 150 workers, not all journalists. A rival union to the PFUJ was set up, the National Union of Journalists (NUJ), to which the more right-wing journalists began to move. The PFUJ found that its statements received no coverage in the press and PFUJ members were harrassed by the proprietors. The PFUJ reacted with a publicity campaign based on pamphlets, posters, and a 'Protest Day' of demonstrations (6 June, 1970). Six months later some members of the PPL Workers Union (from the Pakistan Times and Imroze) went on hunger strike. Despite police harrassment of the hunger-strikers 21 employeers who had been sacked from PPL newspapers were re-instated. The conflict dissipated with the general election of December 1970 and the subsequent break up of Pakistan.

With the change-over to a democratically elected government (Bhutto's) - one that most journalists were probably sympathetic to - there was a hope within the press of a vastly different relationship between the government and the press.

"The Peoples' Party before coming to power swore by the aspirations of the masses and their fundamental interests and underlined the need for promoting democratic conditions including the need for a free and democratic press."¹

It was not to be, however. Government attitudes to the press in developing countries are not affected by political beliefs, or its left or right-leaning policies; they are governed by the need to stay in power. The press becomes government-oriented in most developing countries, however radical the government's policies, and the PPP did not turn out to be especially radical.

Things started well, with the government ensuring the re-instatement of nearly all the journalists and other newspaper employees who had previously been purged. But, contrary to the journalists' hopes, the government did not go on to repeal Ayub's Press and Publications Ordinance. Nor did it abolish the National Press Trust. Instead, it strengthened the NPT by making its chairman a government appointee. It also banned three minor newspapers and a more important one (the Karachi Sun), as well as taking lesser action against larger papers such as Nawa-I-Waqt. It even acted against its own party paper, Musawaat, as I have already briefly mentioned. This dispute, however, was essentially professional rather than political in nature. I spoke to two senior journalists who were fired in this period (one later re-instated), to the editor who fired them (himself later removed), as well as to union leaders involved in the movement. According to the editor of the time the problem started when he transferred three reporters to the news (sub-editing) section. The cause of the move was, he said, "political"; reporters had not accepted the authority of the Chief Reporter. When they refused to move they were fired. Thirteen others went on strike and they were fired too. The PFUJ then started a protest movement in Lahore, during which well over 100 journalists were arrested (many only very briefly). Eventually some of the journalists were re-instated.

According to the Musawaat journalists the underlying problem was the use of the paper as a source of patronage. A new management

1 PFUJ Biennial Delegates Meeting, pamphlet, 1973.

had been installed by the PPP government; funds were misappropriated and incompetent people put into key positions. This is almost undoubtedly why some journalists objected to the chief reporter. In addition, the facilities were very poor, and journalists had expected better from the PPP. "The offices of Daily Musawaat were housed in the ground floor of a small residential building... There was only one lavatory...for all workers."¹ It was little different when I visited the building in 1979. Fundamentally, then, the cause of the journalists' reaction was professional and material at heart. They objected to poor facilities, the use of their paper for patronage, and unprofessional supervision. On the other hand, some journalists claim that those purged were mainly left-wing, and the editor of the time admitted to me that he supported right-wing journalists.

There is little doubt that most journalists support the PPP and did support it in its rise to power, but this did not stop the PFUJ from condemning the PPP for its lack of liberalism when it came to power.

"One promise after another has been thrown to the winds. The National Press Trust has not been disbanded. On the contrary, the government control on the Trust papers has been made more direct. The 'black laws' continue to adorn the statute book and have been applied more frequently than ever before. Arbitrary closure of newspapers, cancellation of declarations, arrests and detention of journalists without trial, harrassment and intimidation are the order of the day."²

Thus, Bhutto eventually found himself opposed not only by the newspaper proprietors, but by the journalists too. To the journalists, and their union, freedom of the press is the primary ideological consideration. Indeed, when Bhutto banned public political meetings, the Press Club (the home of the Karachi Union of Journalists) allowed PNA leaders to speak there. The government even called the club 'PNA House'. Ministers were not allowed to use the club in this way. According to the Secretary of the Club, journalists are less radical than "anti-Establishment".

1 Punjab Punch (May 26 - June 2, 1974)

2 PFUJ Resolution (extract), Biennial Delegates Meeting, pamphlet, 1973.

It is difficult to detect in this constant opposition to government by the PFUJ the adoption of a particular political position. Also, it supported (if not equally) newspapers of different political colours and with different types of ownership, and it made few political statements on matters in which the press was not directly concerned. The union's real political commitment is reflected in its statements concerning freedom of the press. It has explicitly stated its views on this in a document called 'Freedom of the Press: PFUJ's Case', produced during Bhutto's period of rule. In this the liberal commitment of the union comes out most clearly.

"Curbs on the press flow from various sources. The biggest and the most oppressive of these is, of course, the Executive or the Establishment... The PFUJ has been opposing all such curbs consistently in a principled manner for over the last 25 years. It has done so irrespective of the consideration as to what persons or parties have been in power. The history of the PFUJ bears full testimony to this fact. Belonging to a noble profession which pertains to what has come to be known as the 'Fourth Estate', the working journalists are not fighting for an abstract cause. They are not crusading for a subjective notion. They are fighting for a cause vital to the survival of democracy. Failure to own it and practise it can prove disastrous to the well-being of a people and stability and solidarity of a country....And what the PFUJ stands for is not a matter of controversy or partisan politics."¹

The above discussion has given some idea of the political actions undertaken by the PFUJ, some of them extremely courageous. Yet they have been political to a large extent simply through chance. Given the role of the government in the organisation of the press, the union's struggle for freedom of the press, and even for improved conditions for journalists, inevitably becomes political in nature. Nevertheless, some journalists are extremely politically committed. The most important of these is Minhaj Birna, for long the leader

1 Freedom of the Press: PFUJ's case, p.2.

of the union movement and revered by the majority of Pakistan's journalists. He has also been in constant trouble with the authorities. He became a journalist in 1944 (in India), moved to Pakistan in 1949, and only five years later was arrested for the first time. In 1956 he joined Imroze, owned by the leftist Mian Iftikharuddin, in which paper Birna says he "felt at home". The paper was taken over by the government, Birna was labelled a communist and, six months after Ayub came to power, he was fired. Though he was then only head of a union chapel, fellow journalists created enough fuss about his removal for him to be re-instated.

In 1963 he moved to the Pakistan Times bureau in Karachi, became secretary of the Karachi Union of Journalist (KUJ) in that year, rising to become KUJ President in 1966. When he led a strike, in that year, in the Daily Anjam (though he did not work on this paper) in protest against the firing for apparently economic reasons of five journalists from the paper, he was sent to Dacca as the Pakistan Times correspondent in East Pakistan "as a punishment". There he became Secretary-General of the PFUJ. Back in Lahore in 1969, he organised the country-wide strike of the following year in support of the interim relief granted by the Wage Board, but which the proprietors had refused to pay. He was one of the many journalists fired in the subsequent purge. Re-instated by Bhutto in 1972, he was fired again five years later, this time for writing against the National Press Trust (the organisation which owned the Pakistan Times, for which he worked) in a non-NPT weekly. Again, a change of government led to his return to work. However, since Zia's arrival to power Birna has been in constant trouble - being either out of work or in jail.

Other union activists also find life harder than they would if they were not union activists. KUJ secretary Habib Khan Ghorri, who works for Hurriyet, under an editor strongly opposed to the PFUJ, finds his promotion prospects blocked, or that his salary might be stopped for a while. Some union activists have like Birna found themselves in trouble with the authorities. For instance, a Musawaat journalist, Hamraz Ahsan, who is now in exile in London, suffered considerable persecution before finally leaving Pakistan.

In Yahya's period of rule Ahsan was actively involved in protest journalism writing about student movements, and other subjects unwelcome to the government, in the weekly press - as well as participating himself in the organisation of student demonstrations. For this he was arrested and, according to him, maltreated in prison. Released in 1970 (under an amnesty) he shortly after had to go into hiding for writing against the military action in East Pakistan. He was one of the journalists sacked from Musawaat during Bhutto's period of rule. After one and a half years, and a short period of jail, he was given alternative employment in Imroze. By this time he was Vice-President of the Punjab Union of Journalists. In 1978 he was jailed again, but released shortly after - jobless again. He claims he was later tortured during another brief spell of imprisonment. He then started his own political weekly, which was banned by the government. He was soon after led to believe that the government was trying to implicate him in a fabricated bomb plot, and fled to London as a consequence.

10.3.2. Politics or Professionalism?

The commitment of the union is apparent from its activities, the particular careers of its leading members, and the imprisonments, sackings, and currently whippings, that journalists have suffered. But which is more important to the journalists: politics or their profession? There is no simple answer to this question, just as there is no simple answer to the question: what is the most important to the proprietors out of prestige, political influence and profits? All three play a role. Both politics and professionalism are of importance to the journalists. The point to note, though, is that they are inextricable. Journalists first and foremost see themselves as members of a profession, and view politics primarily through 'professional' eyes: that is, their belief in democracy and freedom of the press is paramount.

Though most journalists are 'liberal leftists' (a description supported by a number of journalists), they include adherents of all types of political belief; the right-wing/Islamic component is by no means inconsiderable. Until the government inspired the creation of a rival union to the PFUJ, which has drawn off a number of the more right-wing journalists, all journalists were united

within the PFUJ whatever their political beliefs. Even now the PFUJ, which is much bigger than its rival, includes journalists from all across the political spectrum. Moreover, only a small number of them work for political papers. Few want to, as life is more uncertain in such work, and the pay worse. Furthermore, political journalism tends not to be held in as high regard as journalism which lacks such overt bias. The questionnaire results give credence to this assessment which was, in fact, voiced individually by a number of journalists. Of more concrete significance is the fact that most journalists have worked on several papers, sometimes going from partisan to more market-oriented papers, occasionally in the reverse direction. Some even cross over political boundaries, in so doing going from right to left or left to right. When Nawa-I-Waqt started a new edition in Karachi (at about the time I was in Pakistan), it drew journalists from most of Karachi's newspapers, including both Musawaat and Jesaret. Furthermore, few of the journalists working for either Jesaret or Musawaat are members of the party these papers represent. Membership of the Jamaat-I-Islami is extremely difficult to obtain and, so I was told, Musawaat journalists are not allowed to be members of the PPP.

The complexities and contradictions so far described make an assessment purely in terms of class quite untenable. Certainly Birna and a number of other journalists are significantly to the left and the proprietors of the big newspapers are to the right. The union condemns this right-wing ownership of the press with considerable force. But this simple class antagonism is disturbed, indeed overwhelmed, by the existence of government. All components of the press, including the proprietors, fear the government; and, at times, all components have simultaneously opposed the government. This itself is not explicable in terms of class. Government might be right or left-wing; most proprietors are to the right but there are papers in both Pakistan and Bangladesh owned by leftists; and there are journalists from all parts of the political spectrum. The major conflict as regards the press is with the government. The struggle is waged against the holders of power, not against a

particular class. All the antagonisms mentioned so far are understandable in such terms. Indeed, much of the journalists' resentment against the proprietors (and the editors) stems not from the class background or leanings of the proprietors but the journalists' belief that the proprietors and the editors have betrayed the press by giving into government. And, of course, the government is the major proprietor.

The journalists' primary interests are in the nature of their profession, particularly in the struggle for freedom of the press, and their own material concerns. In fact, there is little doubt that the latter are dominant. Mr. Ghorl, General-Secretary of the KUJ, explicitly stated, if unwillingly, that the journalists' primary interest is in pay and conditions of work. Despite the movements launched by the PFUJ there is considerable apathy. Not only did Mr. Ghorl complain of this to me but he even chose the opportunity provided by a preface to the KUJ Silver Jubilee souvenir to give vent to his feelings. Apathy extended even as far as not wishing to contribute to this special publication.

"I had to literally beg for articles in order to complete this task for an important occasion like Silver Jubilee of the Union. I came across fellow journalists who spent a lot of time in criticising the functioning of the Union, and extended 'golden' advice to improve it, but flatly refused to extend any kind of cooperation. Then, there were others who rejected trade-unionism for it is mere waste of time to them, but they are usually the first ones to rush for benefits whenever the Union succeeds in achieving material gains for the members."¹

In all unions there are those who are fundamentally apathetic, who want the material benefits the unions earn, but do not want to do anything themselves to earn them. But, in this case, the apathy goes further; it is political apathy too. Many, probably most, journalists do not want the union to get involved in political matters, whatever their own political inclinations. In broad terms their interests seem to hold the following order of primacy: firstly, pay and conditions; secondly, freedom of the press; thirdly,

1 25 Years of Karchi Union of Journalists, p.13

democracy (and the various possible forms this might take, e.g. socialist democracy). This was explicitly stated by one of the more radical contributors to the KUJ pamphlet just mentioned.

"The idealism for truthful writings has found its replacement. It is the idealism for successful career in journalism."

Indeed, this writer catches the central contradiction inherent in attempts to radicalise the union.

"The free press movement has to be led by the PFUJ (because of collusion of proprietors with government and the weak position of the editors). But the PFUJ being a white-collared body and consisting of members belonging to the middle-class or petty bourgeois class, has its own limitations...."¹

Though some journalists, notably Minhaj Birna, had begun to strike up links between journalists and other, non-journalist, newspaper employees (for which APNEC had been created), and even wished to link the PFUJ firmly in the industrial union movement as a whole, there is little general support for such moves. Many journalists resent the APNEC connection. Even Mr. Ghorī, a leading unionist, was not enthusiastic about this, seeing the interests of the journalists as distinct from, and sometimes even opposed to, those of other newspaper employees such as calligraphers and printers who do not do "mental work". In other words, the PFUJ is as much a professional association as a trade union.

In Bangladesh the unions have been much less active, but they did create sufficient pressure to persuade the government to establish a Wage Board in 1976, which would probably not otherwise have been established. The Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists (BFUJ) has demonstrated against Bangladesh's own "black laws", if less vigorously than its counterpart in Pakistan. These laws, requiring government clearance for bringing out a newspaper, forcing journalists to disclose their sources of information if so needed, and allowing the government to close down papers, were introduced by Mujib. Though not used by Ziaur Rahman, they have not been repealed (except for a partial annulment of one of the Acts). Over half of Dacca's

1 Ibid, p.29

500 journalists joined in the demonstration. As in Pakistan the journalists have demanded that government papers be handed over to separate trusts to be controlled by journalists, other newspaper workers, and intellectuals. They want neither government ownership nor private ownership - under the latter the journalists' economic prospects are particularly low. A few journalists described the political demands as lip service; others were not so cynical. It seems, though, that material demands have a clear primacy.

According to Mr. Humayun, President of the BFUJ (in 1979), the union contains all shades of opinion - it is a "multi-party" union - though it has something of a leftist slant. Not many journalists are committed political workers; they are "fighting for bread and freedom". As in Pakistan attempts were made to split the union. This attempt was made by Mujib's Baksalites when many journalists lost their jobs and others were forced to join Baksal. Though there is a strong Baksalite contingent in the union, the BNP, Ziaur Rahman's party, also has many supporters. The union does not have good relations with other industrial unions, nor even with the non-journalist workers in the press. They are governed by different unions and there is considerable rivalry between them. The journalists want a separate Wage Board from non-journalists.

There are many good reasons for the journalist's emphasis on career and for his political apathy. One is fear. Another is a sense of futility (which comes to be self-justifying): the journalist is in a weak position. Editors, the proprietors, and the government (in that order) are much stronger. Yet the journalist is not badly off economically. He is provided with a reasonable salary (by the standards of most developing countries) and many fringe benefits such as travel allowances, free medical care, and pensions (at least in the bigger papers).

"Today, the journalists are as prosperous as any other professional group. The government has given them wage awards and laws to protect their jobs."¹

1 Ibid, p.24.

This exaggerates their position; journalists in terms of both status and rewards are, on average, rather low down the professional scale. But they are certainly well inside it. Many editors said jobs in their papers are highly sought after. There are big differences within the profession, but the group overall is in a protected position. This protection offers advantages, but limitations too because it stems from government. It makes the average journalist, like the editors and the proprietors, to some extent dependent on the government (because it is the government that sets up the Wage Boards; journalists in both countries tend in fact to favour the use of Wage Boards). 'Being good' guarantees

a reasonably secure job with a reasonable if not wonderful salary, significant fringe benefits, 'professional' status, and, for some, extra benefits arising out of the corrupt system in which they live.

In 1979 junior reporters in 'Class A' papers earned Rs.800 per month (about £40) plus Rs.300 'conveyance allowance', and medical allowances. Junior sub-editors got the same, without the conveyance allowance. Most 'Class A' papers paid broadly this, with some differences - e.g. Dawn might pay a little more to attract better quality journalists. That this was not a bad starting salary (though hardly good either) can be seen from the fact that a junior lecturer also gets Rs.800, but with fewer allowances. Though this starting salary seems small it does increase significantly up to Rs.2,000 (about £100) for a senior reporter and Rs.3,500 (about £175) for an assistant editor or leader writer (in the most prestigious papers). Dawn paid full medical cover and established pension and provident funds even before pensions were legally required. In Bangladesh journalists earned less.

Table 10.11: Journalists' Pay-Scales in Bangladesh, 1977¹ (taka)

Editor	2,200 - 3,000 taka
Assistant editor	1,500 - 2,100
Senior reporter and sub-editor	1,100 - 1,640
Junior reporter and sub-editor	750 - 1,270

(In 1979 there were 40 taka to one pound).

1 Bangladesh Gazette, Extra, Dacca (11.8.77)

Allowances, however, nearly doubled some of these rates. Again, there is a close parallel with the academic profession. At that time a professor earned 2,200 - 3,000 taka, with no allowances; a lecturer, grade one, earned 850 taka. For further comparison, an executive officer in the civil service earned 400-500 taka.

It can be seen from this discussion that journalists in this part of the world are well inside professional pay scales. The professional nature of journalism was deliberately fostered by the first Wage Board (1960) which stated that all journalists lacking at least five years experience in journalism must have degrees. Thus all new journalists have degrees. The new Departments of Journalism have furthered the process. In Bangladesh about one in six journalists has an M.A. in Journalism.¹ Recently a Press Institute was founded to give more practical training to journalists who had started their careers. In 1978 it had 178 trainees (from all newspapers).²

The above pay-scales say nothing about extra funds which might come from absorption into the widespread corruption common in developing countries. Not surprisingly it is difficult to say anything precise about it, but it is a state of affairs openly acknowledged. It is also specifically mentioned in the PFUJ's Code of Conduct: "Whether for publication or suppression the acceptance of a bribe by a journalist is one of the greatest professional offences."³ The PFUJ condemned the practice in strong terms in a resolution dated October 1972.

"This meeting of the FEC of the PFUJ expresses its grave concern at the recent disclosure in Sind Baluchistan High Court that several editors and senior journalists have been receiving money from the secret government fund administered by the Central Ministry of Information during the Ayub regime. The meeting believes that the practice of bribing newsmen and using them as informers and influencing their professional functions is contrary to journalistic ethics and democratic traditions. It is equally scandalous to know that there are among the journalist community elements who can sell their souls for petty benefits."⁴

1 Interview with Department of Journalism academic, Dacca University

2 Interview with Press Institute Teacher, Dacca

3 PFUJ Biennial Delegates Meeting, 1973 (pamphlet)

4 PFUJ Biennial Delegates Meeting, 1973 (pamphlet)

This bribery in both Pakistan and Bangladesh applies at all levels of authority, from ministers to local policemen, and it extends outside to relations with businessmen and virtually anyone seeking good publicity or to prevent bad publicity. One editor of a major paper believed that as many as half of Pakistan's journalists are corrupt. However exaggerated this assessment might be it accurately reflects the cynicism that exists. Many journalists said bribery was widespread, and even that journalism was an attractive occupation to some for the 'extra' opportunities it offered. Such corruption, even the cynicism it engenders, has not necessarily anything to do with a lack of morality. It is a way of life, part of a system. It is an undesirable but natural outcome of a situation where there is great poverty and little effective accountability. Resources are scarce and corruption is one way of finding access to them. Journalism, like many bureaucratic occupations, is a field where it is possible to tap the system, if from its fringes.

In view of the professional image the journalist has of himself, his qualifications (nearly all have degrees; 15-20% have M.As. in journalism), his reasonable pay, his legitimate extra benefits and, for some, illegitimate ones, plus the fact that journalists live in a system they cannot oppose without great danger to themselves, it is not surprising that their material position might be of considerably more interest to them than the union's political activities. That some, such as Minhaj Birna, Habib Khan Ghorri, and Hamraz Ahsan, open themselves up to constant trouble, is a sign that there is a core of deeply felt commitment. This, though, only engages a minority of journalists. To the journalists as a whole material benefits come first, the position of the profession (its freedom etc.) second, more general political opposition third.

10.4. Professionalism in the Press: Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that the journalists have a largely middle-class professional background, with editors in general coming from the upper reaches of this part of the social hierarchy. Most journalists are closely bound up with their profession. Most of them had started their careers as soon as they had finished their education,

and had always been involved in journalism or in a related field. This attachment to career is reflected in an equally strong attachment to a set of professional ethics which centre largely on a liberal belief in objectivity and a 'free' flow of information, a belief fundamentally influenced by Western traditions. Though it contains both radical and conservative elements, journalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh is essentially a liberal profession. The professional sense of liberalism underlies all other beliefs and is strong enough to counteract any inclinations towards partisanship which the political leanings of the journalists (whether radical or reactionary) might otherwise lead them to adopt.' The strength of the profession of journalism is not only a powerful indication of market-orientation, but also reflects the fact that this occupation belongs firmly to the 'professional middle class'.

It is the strength of the professional middle-class component within the press which, aided by the market, has helped the press move away from partisanship as well as helping it steer clear of greater government control. This sense of liberal professionalism showed itself first of all in the 1950s when the editors tried as a body to limit government actions against the press in a fairly 'polite' way. The editors' method of 'behind-the-scenes' influence has possibly been overtaken by more direct actions on the part of the journalists' union. But even this opposition by the journalists' union is informed above all by a profound belief in the journalists' role as one of the liberal professions.

Though the press contains enormous divisions - between different political groupings, different types of newspaper, between owners, government and journalists - this sense of professionalism affects all elements to some degree. Journalists, and even some editors, have switched between political, government and independent papers quite freely. The PFUJ has demonstrated in favour of journalists in right-wing and left-wing papers (including both Jesaret and Musawaat). The editors have often acted as a body to try and protect individual newspapers. The CPNE, for instance, once remonstrated with the government after it had closed Musawaat,

allowing a compromise to be reached whereby the paper could re-open. The representatives of the CPNE at that time were the ex-unionist editor of Dawn, the anti-unionist editor of Hurriyet and the editor-owner of Jang.

The above indicates that there is some community of interest uniting the disparate elements of the press in Pakistan and Bangladesh, though this is understandably fragile. There is undoubtedly considerable fragmentation: newspaper-owners oppose the union on commercial grounds but some oppose the government on political grounds; the unions sometimes support government but more often than not oppose it; editors are in an ambivalent position, caught between all three forces - the owners, the government and their professional colleagues, the working journalists. The result is an uneasy triangle made up of government control, commercialism and professional freedom. While it is clear enough that these three elements all clash, it is equally clear that, while government always has the greatest direct control over the press, none of these elements is overwhelmingly dominant.

Commercialism and professionalism are both part of market-orientation, yet commercial interests often side with government in order to stay in business. The professional element in the press, though it actually depends on the strength of the market for its existence as a liberal force, finds itself opposed to both the government and to the newspaper-owners. It is for this reason that the leadership of the PFUJ has begun to adopt an increasingly radical stance. The editors, by contrast, are happy enough working in commercial enterprise, but strongly oppose government interference. Though editors and other journalists all have a strong affinity through being professional colleagues this difference between them is not an insignificant one. The professional middle-class component in the press is therefore not only embattled, caught up against the power of government and the ambivalence of commercialism, but is also fragmented. It still exists nevertheless, and is a continuing and powerful influence.

PART FIVE : OVERVIEW

The indigenous press in the Indian sub-continent started off through partisanship. In Pakistan and Bangladesh it has gradually become less partisan and more government-oriented. At the same time, both as an occupation and as a business, it has been increasingly market-oriented. Leaving the partisan stage, it has fluctuated uncertainly between these two orientations, government and the market, but the market has not been able to make the press independent of government. This is clear enough from the single fact that the government is now the main advertiser. The other factor which has had some influence in protecting the press from total government control is the second side of market-orientation: the occupation of journalism. It is the journalists' very strong sense of the professional nature of their occupation that has prevented an outright government take-over of the press. It should be added that this also depends in part on the public, but not primarily as purchasers of newspapers (though this is important too, as a totally government-oriented press would lose public credibility). The journalists appeal to the educated, largely professional middle class, in particular the English-speaking elite, for support. Without a link with this influential group the journalists would feel far less secure against government intrusion.

So, in effect, we have a partially market-oriented press reliant not on a mass market, but on a westernised, urban elite, and on business. These prevent the press becoming excessively government-oriented. But the relationship is uneasy. Business, for instance, is by no means opposed to government. It is, in fact, highly dependent on it. Not even under Bhutto did Pakistani business fail to achieve some 'modus vivendi' with the government. On the other hand, a simple class analysis equating business with government, and viewing the press as controlled jointly by them, would be highly inaccurate. Businessmen who own newspapers oppose government interference in their papers but achieve some sort of compromise (which certainly results in a conservative stance however).

These proprietors, and government, are opposed by the bulk of journalists. But this does not in any way make the latter representatives of the working class. They represent, in fact, the professional liberal elements of the middle class. As I have shown before, the business element of the middle class (in this case the newspaper owners) is often happy with strong government thus leaving the professional element to fend for itself.

The prime conflict in the two countries is between those in power and those out of it. The prime stance of the bulk of the journalists, including editors, is not one of opposition to a particular class, but of opposition to government, more particularly, to rule (direct or indirect) by functionary groups. For them the conflict is not primarily one of class but of power. It is between democracy and rule by fiat. The journalists support democracy because of their liberal, middle-class background, because press freedom is dependent on democracy, and because politics brings life to journalism. The interest in politics is a professional one. It does not arise out of partisanship. The content analysis, the questionnaires, and the interviews all support the hypothesis that journalism in Pakistan is essentially (by no means solely) a professional, liberal, non-partisan affair. All elements of the press have striven for professional freedom. The PFUJ has been the most vociferous. Though sometimes political and somewhat to the left, it exemplifies above all the professional and career interests of the journalists.

The primary struggle, then, is against the functionary groups, or political parties that try to become like them. Though the military and the bureaucracy (i.e. in the upper ranks) are largely middle-class in origin (and the politicians increasingly so) their class background is less important than their existence as functionary groups. This is so because resources in Pakistan and Bangladesh, indeed in most developing countries, are structured through power. Access to this, either directly or indirectly, is the main avenue to individual economic well-being. These functionary groups are elites but they have, with most politicians, broadly the same class background. The professional middle class is also an elite, a

sub-class of the same class that the functionary groups come from. So the antagonism between government (military, bureaucratic, or political) and the press is essentially intra-class. It is between different sub-classes of the same class.

The professional middle class is the weakest element in this set-up. It does not have the economic advantages of the business class, or the access to power of the military and the bureaucracy. Journalists also come from lower down in the middle class. The bulk of those who work in the press, therefore, tend to resent the unequalness of society. Sometimes this extends to concern for the really poor, but the journalists primarily resent the lowly position that they, the educated middle class, are contained in, seeing other segments of the middle class acquire positions of power and wealth. The journalists know that this can only change when the elitist nature of their society changes. Only if the elitist hold on society can be broken can the middle class take its rightful place, but what they view as the middle class is, of course, only that component of it made up by professional people. This is not simply a matter of concern for their own interests. Most journalists have a strong ideological belief in liberalism and the role of the professional middle class in society.

PART SIX : CONCLUSION

CHAPTER ELEVEN: CLASS, COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT

11.1. Introduction

Development, by definition, is concerned with scarce resources. Awareness of the need to develop resources signifies a necessary awareness of the limited means of achieving wealth. The scarcer these resources the greater the competition to gain access to them. Development is, thus, inevitably associated with conflict. This occurs even in the nationalist period, which is concerned simultaneously with both the struggle for national independence and a struggle between various indigenous groups for power (and, thereby, access to resources) after independence. With limited resources the ability to control them through power offers the main avenue to individual economic well-being. There is rarely a substantial class basis for this struggle. In most underdeveloped societies, the industrial class structure is not well developed while the developed traditional class structure becomes less and less relevant to the new, independent society.

Far more important than either the incipient 'modern' classes or the remaining traditional classes is the factor of ethnicity. Indeed, communal differences of any nature are more powerful than class differences. Community offers a far deeper and stronger sense of identity. Ethnic (or other communal) groups, however deeply divided by class, usually unite better against other ethnic groups than do classes across ethnic barriers.

In developing countries nationalism applies as much to ethnic groups within a state as to the state itself - usually more so. The state, as established by the colonial rulers prior to independence, is often an artificial creation. Ethnic groups within it are undecided on the benefits to them of inclusion in the state. These ethnic groups are not themselves homogeneous. They contain, if not classes, then numerous "class fragments". These find themselves in competition for power and resources primarily with similar class fragments in other ethnic groups. In other words similar class groups compete against each other on the basis of different ethnic identities. Though such conflict is ethnic in nature it can also

be seen as "intra-class". It is possible that ethnic divisions will become secondary as the state becomes more solidary, in which case, as classes are still not well developed, conflict will be primarily intra-class in nature. As classes become more established, conflict approaches the "inter-class" variety predicted by Marx.

Communalism will always exist. If it takes its early form (in late colonial terms) as nationalism, it continues as sub-nationalism - the nationalism of various ethnic or linguistic communities within the new state. Nationalism is, thus, a continuous process. It is not a phase in a world-wide class struggle (against a world-dominant Western bourgeoisie) as some Marxists tend to claim. Class might be a related factor, but class and community are still clearly distinct affairs. Worsley and Kautsky argue that, in the nationalist process, various social groups unite against imperial domination. As the colonising countries are capitalist countries nationalism is, in effect, a revolt against foreign capitalist domination. In so arguing, these writers exaggerate the capitalist nature of colonialism. There has always been and always will be colonialism of some sort, whether it is by Britain over India or India over Bhutan. The capitalist nature of the colonising country is peripheral to this, and the reaction by the colonised is not surprisingly against foreign domination whatever its nature.

Worsley and Kautsky also exaggerate the unifying effect of nationalism. Ethnic (or other communal) differences seem to be just wished away. Moreover, in their attempt to see class conflict in world terms (i.e. to ensure that the Western bourgeoisie becomes the villain of the piece), both writers assume that class divisions within the colonised countries themselves become irrelevant. Both writers describe the reasons different classes might have for becoming nationalists, and then ignore these differences, as if unity need be nothing more than a matter of convenience. Thus, paradoxically, these writers turn class analysis on its head.

Smith and Kedourie avoid these pitfalls by stressing psychological, cultural and ideological factors. This makes nationalism a much more

general thing (not restricted to a particular association with capitalism). However, both writers place too little emphasis on socio-economic factors; moreover, they concentrate too much on nationalist leadership. The socio-economic forces inducing substantial numbers to enter into the nationalist fray are given little attention. Though Kedourie (with great justification) allows that nationalism, rather than a unifying force, can be extremely divisive and destructive, while Smith allows of certain ideological divisions within nationalist movements, neither sees the possibility that nationalism can be, or can at least additionally be, a struggle between rival groups for power and access to resources. None of the above four writers allow for this. Nor are they prepared to see nationalism as a continuing principle. I have argued that nationalism fundamentally concerns any movements towards autonomy or group coherence on the part of any cultural group with territorial pretensions. It thus concerns movement for freedom from colonial control as well as movements by cultural groups within the independent state for their own, individual autonomy. There is no essential difference between nationalism and "sub-nationalism". It is a continuous process.

Though nationalism depends on cultural differences, it is concerned with concrete economic and social conditions - usually resulting in competition for control over resources by particular groups (more especially, by their leaderships). But this struggle for access to scarce resources is political, as the state has strongest control over resources and their accumulation. This struggle for political power, for reasons already given, is likely to be communal in nature - based on ethnicity, language, religion, region, even locality. Much of what happens in the so-called "development phase" is affected by this continuing divisiveness. This does not have to end in secession attempts; it can take place, equally, through a struggle for central control by the groups out of power. In fact, centripetal and centrifugal forces often work together, resulting in apparent ambiguity. In reality, though, the reason for these contradictory tendencies is clear enough; rival groups often attempt to gain central control, only turning to secession when this seems a hopeless cause.

Development and conflict seem to go together. The process of development is as much a matter of struggle for control over these resources as of the development of them itself. Theories, such as functionalism, which do not take this into account are in effect non-starters. Insofar as functionalism has tried to take account of conflict it has only succeeded in stabbing itself in the back. Little of functionalism has remained after such maulings that can give the theory any real meaning. Its central tenet offers no realistic foundation for the study of development. It is essentially a socio-political theory. It describes development primarily in social and political terms (stability, representativeness, etc.). Economic factors are apparently secondary. Functionalists do not see that it is impossible to talk in terms of stability and representativeness without taking as primary the economic factors surrounding these. If genuine stability is to be achieved, then, somehow a balance of economic forces has to be reached. In a situation of scarce resources this is hardly likely. If a system is to be representative, how does it become so when one man's fish (power and access to resources) is another man's poison (exclusion from these)? Power for one is loss of economic advancement for another.

Functionalism ignores both socio-economic factors and the conflict associated with these. Huntington progresses far beyond functionalism by emphasising the frequency of political conflict. He describes the conditions that might allow a stable, representative political system to develop, but considers them to be very difficult to achieve. Though giving a realistic assessment of the nature of political conflict, Huntington, like the functionalists, ignores underlying economic factors.

The theorists who make much of the patron-client system in developing countries go some way to introducing economic factors directly into the polity. The political system is also, in fact, an economic system. It is at the same time a way of building political support and of dispensing economic rewards. These processes are different sides of the same coin. Because resources are scarce such systems tend to be fragile; conflict is, therefore,

a common factor. These theories are vague though. Patron-client systems can exist in all sorts of political and socio-economic structures. The theories look only at the channels through which resources flow; they describe the water-works of the building but not the building itself.

Marxism at least describes a structure, though it is a structure that is imposed on a multiplicity of different types of society. The Procrustean nature of the theory is one of its main faults. However, Marxists are increasingly acknowledging that the class structure in developing countries is fragmentary, that the nature of these societies is radically different from those of the West (even 19th century ones), and that traditional class analysis is inadequate for their study. Nevertheless, Marxists ignore the great power of ethnic and other communal divisions, which are without doubt generally of far greater power than class divisions; they are too much concerned with the international class structure, at the expense of realising that internal socio-economic differences will exist and be exploitative even without the international factor (though I do not wish to deny the importance of colonialism and neo-colonialism); finally, they underestimate the power of politics. Power is not a reflection of class; in fact, the reverse is the case. Wealth is achieved through power, not power through wealth. But Marxists do stress the one thing that is primary: conflict. Moreover, if they ignore the political nature of this, they are aware of the underlying socio-economic factors (of which, I believe, class is only one).

What I wish to argue is that power is central to the development process. It is not merely a part of the super-structure, dependent on underlying economic factors; it is an economic force itself. In a situation of scarce resources the state is the main means of capital accumulation. Control of economic resources becomes more important than their ownership. Thus, economic and political factors are inseparable. As communal divisions tend to be more powerful than class divisions, the struggle for political power is primarily between groups with different cultural (ethnic, linguistic, religious) or territorial identities. Such conflicts, as I have already

suggested, are really a form of nationalism. However, these ethnic groups are themselves divided. Different class fragments within them compete with equivalent class fragments in other cultural groups for power and access to resources. If one cultural group achieves independence (or overwhelming control of the state), or if cultural divisions recede in importance for other reasons, then the class fragments tend to come in competition with others regardless of cultural differences. Furthermore, as the class structure is undeveloped and the means of achieving significant rewards very limited, the conflict is between roughly equivalent class fragments, i.e. it is intra-class.

It is the 'bourgeoisie' which becomes central to this struggle over power and access to scarce resources. The working-class is usually very small, and also weak. The peasantry tends to be quiescent. Peasant protests tend to be sporadic and limited in range. The landed gentry tends to give way to the bourgeoisie with its near-monopoly of educational opportunities. Nevertheless, the bourgeoisie, or what I have often (for the sake of convenience) called the 'middle class', is in reality only an agglomeration of class fragments. There are not enough resources, in particular power resources, to satisfy them all. They therefore compete for control against each other. Intra-class conflict often centres on the 'middle class'.

The main middle-class groups are professional people, businessmen, and 'functionary groups', i.e. the bureaucracy and the military - those with the functional ability to control the state. The first of these middle-class groups includes lawyers, journalists, teachers, doctors, etc. Most students hope to join the professional class, and so this professional, liberal group has a natural reservoir of support in the student community (though there are certainly radical and reactionary students too). This group can only hope to secure power and influence through political process. An open, democratic system gives the intelligentsia the best chance of personal advancement. It has no control over economic sources as have businessmen, or of a power-base as have the functionary groups.

Businessmen, on the other hand, tend to prefer military and bureaucratic power (for stability, secure contracts, etc.), but they often have political links with other conservative groups. The functionary groups (i.e. their leaderships) themselves might be initially based mostly on the land, but they become increasingly middle-class, and therefore represent another aspect of intra-class conflict. In developing countries the functionary groups are likely to be dominant (the bureaucracy less overtly so, and more in terms of a constant presence in the power structure); they have, the military in particular, the strongest power-base.

There is thus a very broad divide between the professional middle class and the middle-class functionary groups. The former seek influence through politics, the latter through its suppression. The division between these class fragments is as great as the division between entire classes in the West. A different type of class analysis is therefore needed. All these class fragments, being small, seek alliances. The landed class might ally with the functionary groups; businessmen often do. The professional middle class might ally with the workers against these (or with a rival 'middle class' against the landlords), and then turn against them once in power. Of the two types of conflict, just discussed - communal and intra-class conflict - the former has been of most significance in Nigeria, the latter in Pakistan.

Though the different types of conflict described above do not together form a necessary sequence of stages in which each type excludes any other sort of conflict, the following scheme is probably broadly true. Most developing countries will have intense ethnic struggles; if these recede then intra-class struggle is likely to take over, and this might eventually develop into inter-class struggle. Nigeria has by-and-large been in the first stage but is beginning to reveal more and more intra-class conflict. The latter has predominated in Pakistan though there has been much ethnic conflict and signs of inter-class conflict.

- 1 Ethnic (with incipient intra-class conflict)
- 2 Intra-class (with elements of ethnic and inter-class conflict)
- 3 Inter-class (with vestiges of ethnic and intra-class conflict).

All the conflicts so far described tend to be mostly urban. It is in urban centres that different ethnic groups become mixed and that different class fragments find themselves in open competition. There is often, too, a reservoir of poor, unemployed people willing to show their resentment in any form. Although such conflict can be intense, it is unlikely to bring radical change. It might bring a new regime into power, but not a new economic or political structure.

11.2. Nigeria

Nigeria is a good example of a country in which sub-nationalism overtook conventionally defined nationalism (the quest for freedom from colonial rule) even before Independence. All the major parties, which were based on the support of the dominant ethnic groups, rejected the possibility of a unitary state, each afraid that this would endanger its own regional power-base. The parties had no ideological differences over the nature of the country's future economic development. Their concern was entirely concentrated on the regional power battle. Ethnicity was the source of power and power was the source of economic advancement. There was no economic sector that could offer any indigenous group an avenue to wealth. Industry and trade were dominated by foreigners (mostly British), while land was fairly evenly distributed, there being no feudal class (not even in Northern Nigeria); what agricultural surplus there was was siphoned off through the regionally controlled Marketing Boards. Thus, the main access to resources was through political control - in particular control over the Marketing Board surpluses (but also over other sources of patronage).

Nigerians generally only made their way in trade and industry in the small and medium-scale sectors, and the failure rate was high. Such activities seem to have been left to Nigerians of a somewhat lower socio-economic background than those who went into politics. Politics was big business. The socio-economic background of politicians was not high (they were members of the bourgeoisie, mostly lawyers, teachers, and Native Authority functionaries); but it was higher than that of most of Nigeria's businessmen, who had a background in farming, petty trade, or the crafts. Power

became the source of wealth for the politicians. A large number of them entered into business or expanded their business, through the positions of power or influence they had acquired. The importance of the rewards that can be channeled through politics (both legitimately and illegitimately) can be seen not only directly, but also, through the expression of certain interests in the Houses of Assembly, indirectly. Concern over the M.Ps.' own pay, fringe benefits, conditions of work, and in aspects of the patronage structure such as bureaucratic jobs and corruption (whatever the motivations for this interest) received significant expression in the Assemblies. The parties themselves received enormous funds through governmental control over banks and marketing boards. Even in general economic terms power was primary; government spending on emoluments was a strong growth sector in the Nigerian economy prior to the civil war, growing significantly faster than GDP.

The bourgeoisie itself was little more than an agglomeration of disparate class fragments. By Western standards these could, in general, only be called "lower middle-class". Businessmen, civil servants and politicians were all what might be called "small" men. The prospects of the latter two groups were dependent on their educational advance over the rest of society - hence the great interest shown by M.Ps. in education (especially higher education). The bourgeoisie was not an economically dominant class which represented itself through the state. It became economically dominant through the state. Before its acquisition of power it was no more than an agglomeration of class fragments each made up, economically speaking, of rather "small" men.

The political economy of Nigeria was not (and still is not) based on a class system. It was articulated not by class but by ethnic divisions. Poor and rich in the North, for instance, combined against the threat from the Ibo and Yoruba South (Hausa poor against Ibo and Yoruba poor, Hausa rich against Ibo and Yoruba rich). The struggle for power followed ethnic lines. The pinnacle of this ethnic competition was the struggle for power for, as I have said, power determined who would get what. There

were several layers of communal competition, and each became politically defined. First came purely local competition, then the much more intense struggle between ethnic minorities and the majority ethnic group of each region, and finally, between the major ethnic groups of the Federation. Each layer of competition has its own political representation. Small localities were represented by their M.Ps. who competed against each other in giving political support to the leadership and demanding local facilities in return.

Minorities were often represented by their own parties, but these could achieve little against the parties of the major ethnic groups.

The parties of the major ethnic groups became the governments of their respective regions. Each major ethnic group could then practise a "mini-imperialism" within its own region. It not only dominated the minority groups within its region, but could use this whole region, rather than simply its own territorial area, as a power base for its struggle against the other major ethnic groups; in a sense it "press-ganged" the minority groups in its region to support it. A single ethnic group could, by a logical extension of this process, dominate the Federation. Thus, the Hausa-Fulani, by dominating in total fashion the Northern Region, the largest by far of the three, could also dominate Nigeria as a whole. But this process occurred at all levels. The Tiv not only had to defend themselves as a minority against the Hausa but tried to dominate other small groups, such as the Birom, in the territory they shared. It can be seen that communal competition affected all levels of Nigerian society.

"Internal colonialism", or ethnic aggrandisement within the federation, reached its height with the indirect take-over of the Western Region by the other two regions. The chaos this engendered led to the first military coup and to subsequent attempts to dispel ethnic conflict - first through unification, then through fragmentation (the creation of more states). Both these moves towards the limitation of regional autonomy (or, more precisely, the power

of the major ethnic groups), were resisted by these groups. Unification led to massacres of Ibos in the North by Hausa people afraid the change would diminish their competitiveness (in terms of power and government jobs) against the Ibo. Further massacres, and the subsequent creation of more states, led to the Biafran secession attempt. This was ultimately as much an attempt to maintain Ibo domination over the minority ethnic groups in the Eastern Region as an attempt to avoid domination by the Hausa.

The nature of the Nigerian political-economy was not affected by the changes between civilian and military regimes. Many aspects remained broadly intact - the nature of ethnic conflict, the extent of patronage, the powerful influence of foreign commercial interests in the internal economy. All the changes brought were alterations in the balance of advantage and disadvantage between various class fragments. Such changes did, though, reflect a growth in intra-class conflict. Though ethnic conflict still exists, with the terrors of the civil war and the effects of the creation of more and more states, it has declined.

One class fragment that has gained above others is the leadership of the army. Its actions can be seen in terms of those to be expected from a functionary group. Initially the army was a crucial part in the escalation of ethnic conflict; it was itself divided severely by ethnic divisions. As ethnic conflict declined in intensity the army increasingly acted in its own interests. The size of the army, and its necessary reduction, have become a major political problem. The decline in the role of ethnicity and the increasing role of intra-class interests can also be seen in changes in the nature of the coups. The first two coups had clear ethnic associations; the second pair of coups were the result of resentment within certain sectors of the army over military competition or the unfair distribution of power and career possibilities within the army.

The history of Nigeria's political-economy indicates the enormous primacy of ethnic conflict. This, however, has begun to decline, and is being replaced by intra-class conflict. Inter-class

conflict is not yet a significant factor, though there have been sporadic signs of it - occasional industrial strikes, and the peasant rebellion in the Western State in 1968/9. However, these actions have been limited, instrumental, brief, and aimed at government as much as at commercial employers. Though conflict is now primarily intra-class, i.e. between the various elites, there is a huge gap between these elites and those below them, i.e. between the top civil servants and the lower orders, army officers and the ranks, the politicians, businessmen, etc. and the average urban population. As Nigeria develops it is likely that these gaps will cause increasing strain, that the elites will resemble less and less separate class fragments, and that they will unite as a class against the threat from lower down.

11.3. Pakistan

Pakistan's nationalist struggle, as did Nigeria's, reflected a struggle between different elites for power as much as a quest for freedom from colonial rule. Pakistan was itself the result of this struggle; its creation was the consequence of a 'sub-nationalist' movement, one that was more concerned with freedom from Hindu domination than with freedom from the British. The quest for power, therefore, started well before independence. Though the communal origins of this struggle are clear enough the class factor was, and is, much stronger than it has been in Nigeria. Pakistan had at Independence a more developed middle class (both its business and professional elements), and a powerful land-owning class. Though communalism was a powerful factor, this was represented less by tribal than by religious and linguistic divisions.

Because class is of some importance, power is not quite so desperately sought after as it is in Nigeria. Those who are in a comfortable class position, with considerable economic benefits, do not need power to become wealthy. They merely seek political alliances that will ensure the maintenance of their economic well-being. Thus, the landlords of Pakistan have not been too disturbed at seeing their early political dominance eroded by new classes (in particular the professional class) that do need power; equally, Pakistan's businessmen have not sought any significant amount of direct

involvement in politics, being content to rely on a variety of conservative political alliances. In fact, the most intense power struggle has not involved these two groups, but other class fragments whose only means of benefitting economically is through power, such as the professional class and the military and bureaucratic elites. It is commonly argued that Pakistan is dominated by the business and landed classes and that the struggle for power has centred on this domination. In fact, these two groups have played secondary roles in the power struggle - as allies rather than as prime movers.

Power is therefore important, but the fight for its acquisition has in the main been between class fragments which have no direct hold on the economy. While they do not own resources to any large extent, they can benefit greatly from their control. For this they need power. The primary antagonism has been between the professional class and the functionary groups. This explains why there has been a large measure of economic stability (as far as policy is concerned), despite drastic political upheavals. Ayub's economic policy, for instance, incorporated greatly increased efforts both in industry and agriculture, but no radically new means for this were adopted. As a result of his policies an industrial elite rose to great heights of wealth and influence. But even this socio-economic change was a reflection of the nature of power. The industrialists were positively "jacked" into their elite position by the powers-that-be. It was necessary to Pakistan and Pakistani land-owners that indigenous facilities should be developed to process the country's raw materials. They encouraged Pakistan's businessmen to take on this role. The land-owners sacrificed a good deal of political influence in the process, but their economic interest came first.

The first economic upheaval came with large-scale nationalisation (in both countries after the civil war). Even then power was more important than class. Once the businessmen had been dispossessed as they have been in large measure both in Pakistan and Bangladesh, they remained dispossessed. They might have given implicit support to the functionary groups, but the latter have been in no hurry to divest themselves of their control over a large part of their

country's assets. For both civilian and military regimes the nationalised industries have become a part of the patronage structure. Nationalisation has not been an aspect of class struggle but of the power struggle. Power, then, is not so important as it is in Nigeria, but it is still the primary factor. It offers control of resources to those groups who cannot benefit from any direct class advantage. To a certain extent the monopoly of power of these latter groups has been resisted, according to circumstances, by those with direct class advantage - the businessmen and land-owners; but the primary conflict has been between the groups contending for power of necessity. The greatest clash is between the professional class and the functionary groups.

Much of Pakistan's conflict has been intra-class in nature. But Pakistan also suffers from significant communal divisions, though they are based on language rather than tribe. The major linguistic division, that between the East and West Pakistan, was reinforced by the intervention of nearly a thousand miles of Indian territory. The relationship between the two wings became an exploitative one. This was the result neither of accident nor of conspiracy. It stemmed initially from the complementarity of two economies which were nevertheless unequal. Though East Pakistan had a valuable cash crop, its enormous density of population, climatic vulnerability, extremely poor infrastructure, and lack of indigenous (i.e. non-Hindu) businessmen and civil servants made it weaker economically than West Pakistan.

Economic policy was so structured that exporters of primary producers were squeezed in favour of industrialisation. East Pakistan was the main exporter of primary produce and, right from the start, because of its initial economic and entrepreneurial lead, West Pakistan was the fastest industrialiser of the two wings. It seems fairly clear that this exploitation of primary producers was aimed not at East Pakistan itself, but at the primary sector 'per se'. Primary producers in West Pakistan were also disadvantaged by these policies, while those in power in West Pakistan were prepared to share the fruits of this exploitation with the East

Pakistani elite; indeed, it encouraged the rise of East Pakistani businessmen - but with little success. However, because the Bengali elite - comprising mostly rather "small" men - was economically weak, it was really interested in power; being unable to compete directly and effectively in the economy, it realised that control of resources offered the best prospects of profits. It also had a big political advantage in having the support of the largest linguistic group in Pakistan - taking up over half of the total population of the country. The central government did much to reduce disparities in other sectors, such as the Administration, but the Bengali elite wanted more; it wanted to be able to control the distribution of elite jobs.

The conflict was, in sum, the result of a struggle for power between various middle-class groups which needed power in order to get on - the professional classes in both West and East Pakistan and the functionary groups of West Pakistan. The East Pakistani professional class had the distinct advantage of substantial communal support for their claim. The conflict, therefore, was the result of a confusion of class and community antagonism. It is a distinct example of intra-class conflict, with a strong ethnic element.

The reliance on the private sector in Pakistan's industrialisation was not a matter of class bias. It was initially the result of the very weak position of the Administration at Partition; it simply did not have the wherewithal to take on industrialisation itself. Moreover, it seems to be the case that industry was never taken seriously as a possible road to wealth by those in power; land and power itself were seen as the traditional avenues. Pakistan's businessmen were of a lower social standing than Pakistan's politicians and civil servants and had different regional origins from the former. It seems unlikely that the nature of Pakistan's industrialisation was a result of a "conspiracy". Rather as in the case of Nigeria, what was seen as being a rather "dirty" job was given to relatively lower-class businessmen as of necessity (so it seemed to the professional and landed classes). Only later was it realised that industry was a significant avenue to individual wealth. Pakistan

lacked the powerful foreign industrial competition which existed in Nigeria. Politicians, administrators and, later, military personnel, then started jumping on the band-wagon. The earlier rather minor links between the business and other classes (forged through the Muslim League prior to Partition) then developed into very substantial links.

Although the emphasis was on the private sector, it was not on 'laissez-faire'. The Government retained strong control over the country's industrialisation; businessmen were highly dependent on the government for favour. Though the government intervened directly in the economy in favour of private business (selling off state-owned assets once established, for instance), it took an increasingly direct hold on the economy. This culminated, of course, in widespread nationalisation both in Pakistan and Bangladesh, since when there has been no substantial denationalisation. It seems then that the moment of the businessmen, however sweet, was brief; and it was achieved through political alliances in which the businessmen always played a secondary part. Those in power, whether political, bureaucratic, or military, soon saw their mistake, and have been careful to keep the country's economic strings firmly in their own hands.

It seems that successive governments tried to limit the influence of the industrialists (even Ayub attempted this), and it was certainly the case that Ayub tried to limit their influence in East Pakistan - seeking Bengali businessmen to replace them and giving great support to the public sector in this wing. In fact, industry was never a very important part of the Pakistani economy, even that of West Pakistan. The disparities between the two wings were not due to the influence of West Pakistani businessmen but to West Pakistan's natural economic superiority and, crucially, its hold on power - (political, administrative and military). Power was the crucial element; industry was to a certain extent, a "red herring". It was power that the East Pakistani elite fought for, not ownership of industrial assets. These were nationalised after Liberation.

Pakistan's political and economic history cannot be seen in terms of class conflict. At best there were simply a number of

class fragments which competed against each other for power, or allied with those in power or contending for power. Those that could achieve communal backing for their claims sought this; such backing existed at the regional level only. As the East Pakistani elite was the only group to have substantial communal backing, the major fissure occurred between the two wings of Pakistan. However, this was only one representation of the intra-class conflict between the professional class and the functionary groups. It must be remembered that the civil war followed shortly after the anti-Ayub movement. This latter movement reflected intra-class conflict directly. The civil war reflected a later development of this - the use by the East Pakistani professional middle class of its communal support in pursuit of its own interests.

Conflict in Pakistan, then, has been fundamentally intra-class but with a strong communal element. Inter-class elements have played only a secondary role. Land-owners have always been powerful, but their influence has been declining, both economically (through land reforms) and politically (because of the rise of the middle class, in particular the functionary groups). In the 1970s the working classes were introduced into the political battle for the first time (by Bhutto) though their contribution so far has only been peripheral. The main conflict has been within the middle class: between the functionary groups, the businessmen and the professional class. The functionary groups are, in effect, elites or class fragments which lack any direct access to wealth; they can gain this by taking power and, with it, the right to control resources and dominate the patronage structure. In the struggle between the groups businessmen tend to ally with the functionary groups, the professional class with the politicians; but some of these are land-owners, some businessmen, some socialists. Political alliances against the functionary groups have therefore always been fragile affairs. The professional class might also seek the support of workers. Obviously these various alliances are likely to be highly unstable, and this is evinced well enough by Pakistan's political history.

The various forces together make up a very delicate political balance. This balance can be easily upset, and often is. The result is never revolution, merely a re-alignment of forces. This occurs through urban violence. Cities are melting-pots of a variety of different forces which participate in violence for a variety of different, even opposed, reasons: right and left-wing elements, religious forces, the 'lumpenproletariat', professional groups, politicians, and students. Particularly important is the middle-class "triumvirate" of students, lawyers and journalists, with the backing of politicians in whom the professional middle class places so much hope. This "triumvirate" played an important role in the Karachi disturbances of 1953 and the movement against Ayub. Right-wing and religious forces were predominant in the anti-Ahmediya riots (of 1953 and in Bhutto's time) and in the movement against Bhutto. Though these were the main actors in each case, these disturbances only became as powerful as they did because of the number of different forces that were involved in them. Though a highly repressive military regime is now in power, it would not have been able to achieve this without the disturbances against Bhutto in which a large number of social groups were involved.

All these urban disturbances (except the Karachi ones of 1953) in Pakistan, both before and since the civil war, resulted in changes of regime. They were, therefore, a part of intra-class conflict. The political changes that have occurred in Bangladesh have not been the result of urban violence, but of palace coups. The first, against Mujibur Rahman, was entirely out of disgust and of fear of growing chaos. The great nationalist leader had shown his true colours after Liberation, and brought the country new economic miseries as well as political repression. The subsequent conflicts have had little to do with class or community. (Bangladesh is relatively homogeneous in both respects). They have been the result of intra-class competition, between the politicians and the functionary groups, in particular the military, and between different sections of the military.

Whereas Marx argues that socio-economic change reflects changes in class structure, I believe that in developing countries at least

it reflects changes in the type of group involved, of which class is only one. In developing countries there are three main ways for groups lacking access to scarce resources to gain such access - through communal, intra-class, or inter-class conflict. Pakistan has seen a good deal of the first, more of the second, and also a little of the third.

11.4. Conclusion

In many respects Pakistan and Nigeria have had similar histories. Both have suffered major civil wars, considerable ethnic conflict, and alternation between civilian and military regimes. Yet the two countries have radically different socio-economic structures. Nigeria's is characterised largely by ethnic differences, Pakistan to some extent by these but also by greater class divisions. In terms of the above "schedule" of conflict outlined in the introduction to this chapter, Nigeria has for long been firmly entrenched in the first (ethnic) stage, but is now between this and the second (intra-class) stage. Pakistan is well established in the second stage but has begun to edge a little way towards inter-class conflict - the final stage. Nevertheless I should think true class conflict is still a very long way off.

I have argued, as many others have argued, that traditional class analysis is not especially relevant to developing countries. There are class fragments, and possibly class "agglomerations", but there is rarely an established class structure in the proper Marxist sense. The class structure that exists in most Third World countries is not comparable to that of Western countries now, nor even to those of the 19th century. Third World societies are still fundamentally peasant economies, with a very small industrial base (and little capitalist or collective farming). Expansion occurs less in industry than in the export of primary produce, whether agricultural or mineral. Nor is it possible to interpret what clashes between various socio-economic groups do occur as 'incipient' class conflict. The conflict is, in fact, between various class fragments. These are all equally isolated. The difference between urban professional people and urban businessmen might be as great as that between either of these groups and the landed gentry. The upper reaches of Third

World societies are made up of a number of class fragments all vying for power, prestige and profit. They are disparate groups that meet in unstable alliances and then divide; together they form, at best, loose class clusters.

I have described a schedule of development based on conflict, going from ethnic to intra-class, then on to inter-class conflict. At each stage the interests of the various forces - ethnic groups, class fragments, or entire classes - can be represented through political parties or functionary groups. Both functionary groups and political parties can be right or left-wing, or represent different ethnic interests. This, however, makes no essential difference. In societies where resources are very scarce, groups must be defined primarily in terms of power - or their position in the power structure. Central to this notion is the recognition that power is the supreme avenue to wealth. Various class fragments and ethnic groups (or their leaderships) seek power either through political representation or a functionary group.

It has to be said that there is no essential difference between a political party and a functionary group. Often they become virtually the same thing. A party in power attempts to assume totalitarian control. It forgets the groups it had to wheedle and beg to support it in its rise to power, because they limit this power once it is established. A functionary group, by contrast, in seeking legitimacy often establishes itself as a political party. When a party replaces a functionary group, or vice versa, nothing vital changes. The result is merely the replacement of one patronage structure by another. With this change certain class fragments and ethnic groups will gain; others will lose. Treating functionary groups in this way - merely as different routes to power - helps in understanding their apparently arbitrary role in the political-economies of Third World societies. Functionary groups offer a more efficient route to power than the bargaining processes open to political parties; the latter, on the other hand, have the advantage of at least initial support and legitimacy.

Ethnic conflict tends to be of most significance in the early stages of development, though it is always important. As societies develop, various class fragments, always present, become more conspicuous. However, the difference between these two "stages" is only one of degree. In a period of ethnic conflict all social groups clash: workers, businessmen, professional people (and so on) of one ethnic group against workers, businessmen, professional people (and so on) of another ethnic group. As societies develop various middle-class fragments come to prominence. Though there is no middle class as such, these fragments together form a pivotal group. However, resources are scarce and, as the various fragments within this class "agglomeration" begin to burgeon, they compete against each other for power, firstly on the basis of ethnicity (if ethnic differences exist), but increasingly on the basis of their class fragmentation alone. Landed interests and workers can be involved at either end of the scale, and be of considerable importance, but the dynamic, pivotal role is played by the various middle-class groups. They might ally with workers or land-owners, and they might compete through politics or through functionary groups, in their struggle against each other.

There is no essential difference between functionary groups and political parties when considered in terms of power; nor is there any essential class difference. They are not, in fact, different types of group, merely different class fragments; increasingly they are becoming different middle-class fragments. A class fragment is such by virtue of its function. Professional people have professional functions, businessmen industrial and commercial functions. In this respect they are similar to the functionary groups, which have bureaucratic and military functions. Increasingly all these groups become basically middle-class. They are all fragments of the same class. The conflict between these class fragments is, therefore, based on occupational differentiation within a single class. This idea extends the Marxist conception of the division of labour by looking at the conflicts based on a 'division of labour' within a single class.

The bourgeoisie is the pivotal class in developing countries; conflict within it is, therefore, of primary significance. This concept also improves the suggestive but vague idea of the "circulation of elites", by considering the class background of the various elites. Each is an occupationally differentiated fragment of a broad middle-class clusters.

The group that is in the weakest position is the professional class. Whereas businessmen have control over an industrial and commercial base, military leadership control over the forces, and top civil servants over the bureaucratic rank-and-file, the professional group has no power base. Their hopes lie in the political parties, but these are weak in comparison with the functionary groups and themselves fragmented between various interests (land-owners, businessmen, workers, etc.). They hope to make the masses their power-base but have little chance to do this when the military have totalitarian control. This means the professional middle class can only bring the masses into the power struggle through violence. As it has little rural influence (it might have some in rural towns, but no further), and as it is difficult anyway to activate the rural population as a whole, this violence tends to occur in the cities. There all sorts of disgruntled groups are drawn into the picture. The result is sometimes a change in regime, but never revolution.

CHAPTER TWELVE: CLASS, COMMUNITY AND COMMUNICATION

12.1. Introduction

I believe that analysis of the professional group within the middle class to be of great importance. This group is the pivotal class fragment within the middle class, without which both functionary groups and businessmen would have much easier and greater domination. It is for this reason that I have undertaken study of one major professional group (the word 'professional' being used very loosely) - that of the journalists. I consider two professional groups in particular - journalists and lawyers - to be of great significance. Not only are both intimately connected with politics, but they each play a major social role. The lawyers man the legal system which is indistinguishably bound up with social structure. As Marx asserted, class conflict inevitably incorporates the legal system within the struggle. However, in developing countries, as class conflict is primarily intra-class, this struggle is more complicated. The legal system is often manned by a different class fragment from that of the ruling elite. The two, therefore, often conflict. The same goes for the journalists. For Marx journalism is a reflection of class domination. But in developing countries journalists tend to oppose the ruling elite. Of course, both the press and the legal system are often controlled, directly or indirectly, by those in power, but there is often inherent conflict between those that hold power and the professional groups that man the legal system and the press. It is this inherent conflict that I have looked at in the case of journalism.

Though I think Marxism is right to assert that there must be some connection between social forces and media output, with the latter as the dependent variable, I do not think that the actual relationship is as supposed, certainly not in the case of developing countries, where power is of far greater significance than class. The press generally reflects the interest of government, whether there is a dominant economic class or not. The class structure is, anyway, far less developed than it is in the West. However, if the press does not reflect the interests of a dominant class

in any predictable way, nor does it reflect the interests of the 'whole of society', as functionalists seem to think. The media are not mass media but elite media, and the poor, illiterate, linguistically divided public they can appeal to generally has limited contact with the media. More important, if the media can carry messages having a uniting effect, they can also carry messages of a disuniting nature. In highly divided societies where intense conflict is very common - the case in most of the Third World - this is only too likely. The functionalist argument is nonsensical, while the psychological variables necessary for the (almost magical) distribution of 'modernism' through the media seem to be simply a part of American mythology (or, worse, propaganda). The media are in general a limited, elitist, and westernised affair, which become of wider social significance only in times of conflict.

The press in the Third World does not necessarily reflect either the interests of a dominant class or of 'society as a whole', (whatever that would mean). In fact, to a certain extent, the press determines its own nature, though even this must be seen in the context of Third World conditions. It is necessary to be aware of the nature of the press itself before considering it as a part of the wider society. The primary factor to take into account is the general poverty of these countries. This makes it difficult for the press to survive; this problem is compounded by illiteracy, linguistic barriers, etc. Indeed, in any country the press has problems. Information is not a readily marketable commodity like sugar or potatoes. This is less the case in times of conflict. Information is then sought for, and is equally readily purveyed by interested factions. In fact, in all societies whether in the West or the Third World, the press has developed through partisanship. As societies change conflict occurs, and in these circumstances the press thrives. Conflict provides both demand and subsidy; the need on the part of interested parties for a public mouthpiece ensures the rise of the press. However, when one party achieves power it tries, for its own security, to control the press, which then changes from partisanship to

government-orientation. Later, as conflict subsides and the economy develops sufficiently to support papers (through sales and advertising) itself, the press becomes, or tends to become, market-oriented. However, in developing countries few newspapers achieve this; when it leaves the partisan stage the press tends to fluctuate between orientation to the government and to the market.

Not only does the press depend on conflict for its development, but it might also contribute to its escalation. As I have often said, most violence in developing countries is in a few major urban centres, and it is in just these places, in fact only in these places, that the press is of any significance. Thus, while the press does not play a major role in society, either in terms of class conflict or of development and social integration, it does play a role in political instability, i.e. in the ethnic and intra-class conflicts described in detail above. In the case of ethnic conflict the relationship between a highly divided society and a partisan press is clear enough. In the case of intra-class conflict, the relationship is much more complicated, and involves the press as an institution - all aspects of it. The former case is represented by Nigeria, the latter by Pakistan.

12.2 Nigeria

The Nigerian press like that of most other countries developed through partisanship, but the power struggle this reflected was less between the nationalists and their colonial overlords than between various ethnic groups for control after independence. It was assumed that independence would eventually come. Indeed, the early indigenous press at times encouraged British expansion in Nigeria. The press did not become a major part of the nationalist movement which was, anyway, rather mild in nature. It became far more involved in the struggle for power between the major ethnic groups. It was a nationalist press in a different sense, representing ethnic rather than 'nation-state' nationalist causes.

Nearly all papers in Nigeria started in association with political parties. Even tiny political factions had their newspaper representation. Analysis of newspaper content shows that the press was strongly political and that political reporting was overwhelmingly

partisan. This became so to an extreme degree in times of political crisis such as elections. Individual papers swing from partisanship to government-orientation (and back) according to the level of political crisis. Because of the nature of the federation, parties which were in government at the regional level opposed each other at the national level. The papers associated with these parties were, therefore, government-oriented and partisan at the same time. Only one paper, the Daily Times, was totally market-oriented. But even this was not a mass paper. It skimmed off readers from the nooks and crannies of a politically fragmented market. This paper was economically successful solely because it had the backing of a major British paper, of which it was a subsidiary. Even this, though, could not survive the political conflict of the 1960s.

Nigeria is such a divided country that central power has always suffered from weakness; this has allowed the press to continue its partisanship.

The causes of partisanship are two-fold. Firstly there is the intensity of political conflict; secondly, the economic weakness of the press, which makes it dependent upon political support. In fact, there would not be so many papers were it not for the number of political interests seeking a public mouthpiece. Even with them the press was small. Most papers, especially the most partisan, were bound to their towns of publication, in particular Lagos. So great was this dependence on the commercial markets of the big towns that sometimes papers might be based in these, and have most of their sales there, even though their real "political constituencies" might be elsewhere. Lagos, in particular, by virtue of its population and commerce, ensured that a number of papers remained there even if their intended sphere of influence was in the regions. This split between the economic and political markets is a further indication of the weakness of the press. The economic weakness of the papers made them dependent on subsidy, but not even political parties could afford to keep substantial papers going indefinitely without access to government resources. In the two Southern regions especially, chains of papers associated with the

parties in government gained directly from funds coming from banks controlled by these governments. There were also strong personal links between government leaders and top personnel in the banks and the newspapers. In other words, these papers became part of the patronage structure.

The split between the political and economic markets became more pronounced as the intensity of regional conflict increased. Because of their economic weakness papers could not expand out of Lagos as readily as had the political system. Nevertheless, the press did become a largely regional one, and this was reflected in the content of the papers, which paid a great deal of attention to their own region and virtually ignored the other regions. More important than this was the fact that the increasing partisanship of the press was associated with an increase in the regionalism, or tribalism, of its content. This was the basis of the newspapers' partisanship, just as tribalism (using the term loosely) was the basis of the political conflict. That the basis of this communal conflict was economic can be seen from the constant references in the newspapers' tribalist content to the economic advantage or disadvantage of various tribes; the Ibo, for instance, (this being a crucial instance), were portrayed in the North and West as being out to grab all the top jobs and economic opportunities in these regions. However, neither the parties nor the papers were concerned with economics, or economic ideology, per se. The problem of economic distribution was seen entirely through communal eyes.

It is difficult to say with certainty if the partisanship and tribalism of the newspapers of the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the escalation of conflict during this period, but it is equally difficult to deny the probability that it did. This could have occurred in the case of certain crucial events in which the press can be seen to have played a part, but it is probably in the raising of the general level of tension that the press played the greatest role. Though the total circulation of the papers was small readership was much greater than the number of sales, and mostly confined to a few cities. It is probable that most urban literates were being reached by the press, and it was only in a few cities

that the worst ethnic violence occurred.

It was in times of crisis that the press became most important, i.e. when it was most likely that conflict would occur. Even papers which tried to avoid contributing to the conflict, such as the Times, probably could not avoid doing so. Merely by reporting what the parties said it incorporated violence and contradiction into its content; almost inevitably this contributed to the growing uncertainty and tension. It was for this reason that all the regions at one time or another banned the Times. But tribalism in newspaper content could only have had an effect if it had been founded on some real basis. The most rabidly tribalist paper, the Sketch, whose target was the Ibos, seems to have had little effect. The Yoruba who read the paper had little reason to fear economic competition from the Ibos. The slogan of "Ibo imperialism" had far more effect in the backward North where, for certain sectors of the population, the Ibos did represent an economic threat (or at least appeared to).

With the end of the civil war, and with the substantial boost given to the economy by oil exports, the nature of the press has changed. Now the press shows significant signs of market-orientation. This is represented by one or two indigenous papers that attempt to appeal to as wide a market as possible, i.e. wider than that provided by partisanship. It is also reflected in an increase in journalistic professionalism - an essential part of market-orientation. A big change in the professional status of Nigeria's journalists has occurred over this period. In the early days journalism was inseparable from politics. A number of journalists became leading politicians. Now, with the decline of partisanship, journalism is more of a profession per se. It is concerned with the market, and with career. Journalists now resent both excessive partisanship and excessive interference from government. They want to be left to get on with doing the job of 'professionals'. They see their positions as the first stage of a professional career, not even necessarily in journalism or broadcasting. This does not mean that partisanship is dead. The press is still largely partisan, at least in terms of numbers of papers, and even broadcasting is still somewhat affected by regional rivalry. However, professionalism

is of increasing importance.

Though journalists are now firmly a part of the professional middle class (and have a broadly middle-class family background) they are fairly low down in terms of overall professional status. A number of them have a farming background, few have degrees, and their salaries are poor relative to those obtainable in other professions. However, the top posts in journalism and broadcasting pay very well, and considerable status attaches to them. There are no longer only owner-editors, but two groups of journalists: on the one hand an elite editorial personnel, on the other a large number of rank-and-file journalists. The gap between them is large. As papers have grown in size and scope (i.e. begun to change from political outlets to fully market-oriented papers), journalists have been recruited to do the "donkey work", their jobs having a strong routine, almost clerical nature. The editors and their assistants, by contrast, have retained the elite status of the old editor-owners. The growth in professionalism, therefore, has been deeply affected by the elitism inherent in Nigerian society. Even in occupational terms the press is an elite medium.

This elitism applies even more, of course, to newspaper content. Newspapers rarely contain references to unemployment or poverty. Education might receive more coverage than agriculture and industry combined, but most of this tends to be coverage of higher education. The ethnic tensions the papers tried to provoke were based not on the needs of the masses but on the ethnic distribution of elite jobs. Elitism is also indicated by the limited role of the vernacular press. The dominance of the English-language press is, of course, an aspect of westernisation, and this is clearly connected with the elitism of the press. Westernisation is apparent most of all in the large amount of Western features and sports items in Nigerian newspapers, but much western imagery is also conveyed through pictorial advertising.

The combination of westernisation and elitism reaches its apogee in broadcasting. The Western Region of Nigeria had the first fully operational television service in Africa, even before it had a radio service. Most of the new states are seeking to have television services of their own, despite the fact that its

range is highly elitist, affecting only a very small percentage of the population. All the current T.V. services are very reliant on state subsidy, and absorb resources which could otherwise benefit radio, which has a much wider penetration. The poor economic basis for television in Nigeria means that it is heavily reliant on the West. Western companies have been, and are, heavily involved in the establishment of television in Nigeria, and the training of its personnel. Much of the programming also comes from the West, while few programmes are educational. The result is that the bulk of society is subsidising an expensive medium of entertainment for the elite.

The press in Nigeria has had a strong connection with conflict, in particular ethnic conflict. It has become fully involved in the power struggle between the various ethnic elites. It has not been able to form a part of class conflict because it is, indeed all the media are, largely confined to the elite and sub-elite. Papers can never be class weapons until mass circulations are achieved. In Nigeria it has been largely an ethnic weapon. However, the press in Nigeria has had two main functions: the first and major one is political. The second is to sell (mostly Western) goods. The former represents the partisan impulse, the latter market-orientation. The first of these has declined in favour of the second; the commercial function has to some extent replaced the political function. This commercialism is associated with a good deal of westernisation and elitism. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the elite welcomes Western influence. Thus, if the press is coming increasingly under the sway of market-orientation, it is of a very particular kind. The media market is largely an elite market, and the elite is highly westernised.

12.3 Pakistan

The press in Pakistan also has a small total circulation. It is economically weak, but its total circulation is greater than that of the Nigerian press and its advertising revenue is also greater. The reason for the greater circulation is the strength of the vernacular press, which can reach lower down the social scale than the English-language papers. However, the reason for the substantial

advertising revenue is the strength of the English-language press. Pakistan has a much richer middle class than has Nigeria; the English-language papers, because of their appeal to this broad elite, are able to command considerable advertising revenue. Elitism is still apparent, therefore.

The Pakistani press is by-and-large an economically weak affair. Like the Nigerian press it developed through partisanship and, again like the Nigerian press, it was from an early time closely associated with 'sub-nationalism'. Before Independence, Moslem papers (only a few of which were in what was to become Pakistan) demanded a homeland on the sub-continent for Moslems (which Hindu papers then opposed). Now there are a number of political papers in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but few are attached to parties, and their overall role is of secondary significance. Partisanship is no longer very strong in Pakistan, though there are a number of instances, especially in the early days of Pakistan, when the press possibly did play an important role in the escalation of conflict.

Partisan papers in Pakistan now are neither economically nor politically viable. No government allows a significant opposition press, while papers that are popular "in opposition" lose their popularity when "in power". The press has, therefore, changed over time. Until the army stepped in the press was fairly free to be partisan. With military rule it became strongly oriented to government. Now an orientation to the market is trying, despite government restrictiveness, to assert itself. The major owners are now government and businessmen. Though some of these businessmen are associated with politics, their papers are primarily business ventures - a fact apparent in their content and in their commercialism. In Pakistan even some of the government papers are strongly oriented to the market.

The press in Pakistan contains partisan and government and market-oriented elements. Partisanship is now rather a minor factor, while adaptation to the market has become highly prominent. This is seen in the content of the papers, the relatively large sales of the vernaculars, the dependence of the English-language papers on advertising, and in the attitudes of the journalists.

Partisan papers find it hard to survive, though some continue to do so. Government papers also find things difficult if they become excessively government-oriented; their readership then declines drastically. They have to compete with the independent, market-oriented papers. Some government papers are hardly distinguishable from these; this is especially so as all papers, government-owned or not, have to tailor their content to avoid both extreme government-orientation and extreme government displeasure.

Market-orientation, now a dominant factor, has always been present. Even when the press was forced to be strongly government-oriented, as under Ayub Khan, it consistently tried to report government in a neutral way. In election periods political reporting does not shoot up as it does in Nigeria. Moreover, there is very little political commentary, and political coverage is restricted entirely to news columns. This news is itself extremely balanced. In fact, there had been a trend towards balanced reporting right from the beginning. In the elections of 1970 this trend reached its culmination. The press was free to report as it wished. That it did so in a rigidly impartial way seems to indicate a strong sense of professional ethics within the press. Editors and other journalists felt they should not interfere with the political process. Their job was to enhance democratic processes by acting as a neutral vehicle for the flow of political information.

The press was essentially a liberal affair. It believed in freedom and democracy. It seemed to have little understanding of underlying economic factors. The English-language press, especially, believed that good, open leadership was all the country needed to solve its political and economic problems. Its strong belief in democracy was not coloured by any economic ideology. It was the natural spokesman for the professional middle class. It opposed authoritarian government, in particular the functionary groups. It, therefore, formed a part of an intra-class struggle - a struggle between various middle-class fragments. Several class fragments are involved in the control of the press in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Firstly, there is the strong overall control of the functionary groups, or of political government acting like functionary groups. (As far as the press is concerned there is often little difference between them). Then there is a substantial involvement of business interests. A number of papers are owned either by businessmen or journalists who become businessmen. The pervasiveness of advertising and the great dependence of the press on this, is another indication of powerful business connections in the press. Also a number of political parties, or more frequently political individuals, also own or have an influence over some newspapers. Finally, there are the journalists themselves, who broadly reflect the interests of the professional middle class.

The professional liberal nature of this class is apparent in newspaper content, over which the journalists themselves have the major determining influence. It is apparent also in the attitudes and practices of most journalists. The journalists of both Pakistan and Bangladesh strongly favour the balanced reporting of all parties, reporting facts exactly as they are and without comment. Furthermore, though a number of journalists, especially in Pakistan, have radical tendencies, only a small number seem to be consistently radical. Most journalists have a powerful belief in the ability of the press to play a role in development. Again, a certain radicalism is apparent in this, but this belief is essentially liberal in nature: the press can spread understanding and enlightenment, and speak for the "people" against arbitrary government. In general, thinking of the press in terms of left/right distinctions is only of limited use. The primary distinction is between support for and opposition to government, whatever the nature of this government.

From the above it is clear that the press in Pakistan is very different from that of Nigeria. It is a great deal more market-oriented. There are two aspects to this: a greater involvement of business interests in newspaper ownership and in the funding of the press (through advertising but also some subsidy), and a much stronger sense of professionalism amongst the journalists. The journalist in Pakistan and Bangladesh is very aware of his professional status, and the needs and ethnics of the profession. He seeks the rewards, prestige and freedom, that he believes his profession deserves.

He resents government interference, in general looks down upon papers controlled by parties, and is angered by collusion between the owners of newspapers and government, which occurs only at the expense of the freedom of the press. Most journalists are career journalists with good educational backgrounds; few have had previous jobs bearing no relation to the media. Their fathers have mostly had professional or administrative backgrounds. Even political editors are in general journalists of long standing, (somewhat less so in Bangladesh than Pakistan). In both countries journalists, editors, and owners each have their own professional associations, and in general these look after their own professional interests. The owners, for instance, use theirs primarily to negotiate advertising rates, etc.

In Pakistan, the journalists' association, the PFUJ (Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists), is more political. It has been involved in substantial demonstrations, resulting in imprisonment, harrassment at work, and, more recently, lashings. The union leaders, in particular, have suffered consistent persecution. It should be added, however, that this persecution has only rarely reached an extreme degree. The press, and the journalists as a professional body, are treated with some circumspection by government. They prefer to try to win over this important segment of the professional middle class than to coerce it. Indeed, some newspapers seem now to wield sufficient public influence to inhibit the government from closing them down. Nevertheless, government is clearly a powerful restriction on press freedom, and most of the PFUJ's "political" actions have been aimed at trying to remove this restrictiveness. Even then, such action has been secondary to action in support of the journalists' material interests (pay, security, etc.). Not a few journalists would even be willing to sacrifice their freedom for material benefits. The union, therefore, wages a constant struggle to prevent such "cooperation".

Despite such temptations, the bulk of journalists are very much concerned with freedom for their 'profession', and their attitudes are revealed regardless of the nature of government. Though the union and probably most journalists were broadly

pro-PPP when this party was seeking power, they turned against it on several occasions when Bhutto's attempt to gain totalitarian control began to affect the press. The union has, in fact, opposed all governments, though always in the name of press freedom. The PFUJ is fundamentally liberal rather than radical. While some of its leaders have tried to establish links with other workers in journalism and outside it, other members have opposed this, arguing that journalists have little in common with other workers and should, therefore, look after their own ('professional') interests.

Though newspaper-owners generally cooperate with government in order to stay in business, while editors do the same to keep their jobs - facts strongly resented by the union - there is a certain professional sense of community within the press as a whole. The union itself contains journalists from all newspapers, including opposed party organs, though the government-inspired rival union has drawn off some of the more right-wing journalists. A number of editors have old union links and retain union sympathies. There is considerable mobility between newspapers, so that many journalists and editors now working for different papers have worked together on other papers. Moreover, there have been a number of instances where each of the three professional bodies, or parts of them, have acted against their own immediate interests in favour of press freedom, and sometimes all have cooperated. Conservative owner-editors have negotiated for the re-opening of the PPP's paper Musawaat. The PFUJ has demonstrated to help conservative papers and editors. The editors, who continue to believe they have some elite influence with the government (which the union is skeptical of), have often tried to dissuade government from taking action against a newspaper, whatever the political colour of the paper. All journalists, editors, and owners strongly desire freedom of the press, whatever their political beliefs, and all acted together in 1963 to try to oppose the encroachment of government, in the person of Ayub Khan, on the press.

The picture one gets from the above is an uneasy triangle of interests - government, owners, and journalists (including those editors who do not own newspapers). The government and the owners in general find an understanding. Neither wants trouble. On the

other hand they are frequently politically opposed, and so even this axis is an uneasy one. Journalists are in a weak position. They oppose the owners because of their collusion with government and because of their immediate opposition over material interests. They also strongly oppose government because of its control over their profession. On the other hand the government offers the journalists some material protection against the owners, and sometimes journalists favour the particular party in power (e.g. the PPP in Pakistan, and the Awami League in Bangladesh), even if such favour does not last long. Despite the strong divisions within the press as an institution there is some community of interests, and this has helped prevent total government control. Very broadly, the press has acted as a spokesman for the professional middle class, and with some moderate success. The press will never be a radical instrument. Most of those involved in the press have strong liberal beliefs. The journalist in Pakistan and Bangladesh is relatively well paid; he has some professional status and a strong sense of professionalism. He is unlikely to be radical.

At the same time as acquiring some professional status and rewards, within the press the average journalist has been pushed into an increasingly minor position. As in Nigeria, but even more so, his occupation is rather clerical and routine. As market-orientation progresses, and papers become bigger and better, the press has been increasingly affected by a rigid division of labour. Partly for professional and partly for economic reasons newspapers become somewhat like notice-boards for powerful or prestigious interests. Most news consists of statements from parties, government, prestigious bodies, etc. Newspapers depend more on agencies than their own journalists, especially for national news. Reporters are left mainly with local and crime news. Moreover, newspapers have far more sub-editors than reporters, as most journalistic work consists of preparing (or translating) the incoming statements for publication. There are hardly any specialised reporters, most having several "beats". What specialist work is to be done is done by the editorial staff and outside contributors. As papers have become less political and more comprehensive, journalists have been pushed into the routine role of collecting prepared information. Elitism within the press

is even more pronounced than it is in Nigeria.

The press as a whole is to a certain extent an elitist institution. The existence of the English-language press is a reminder of that. The English-language/vernacular division is fairly similar to the quality/popular division in the U.K. This is not so much so in terms of content, which in all papers is generally sober, but it is certainly so in terms of economic funding, readership, and prestige. It is because of this difference in appeal that the vernaculars depend mostly on sales, the English-language papers on the high advertising rates they can charge. It is in fact the elitist nature of these papers that helps them survive. These papers will survive as long as the English-speaking elite.

As in Nigeria, this elitism is considerably bound up with westernisation. This, again, is obvious enough from the English-language papers. Apart from their use of English, these papers are very clearly modelled on Western (in fact, British) newspapers. The news agencies ultimately stem from, and are modelled on, Reuters. Reliance on Western content is much greater in the features department. As in Nigeria, this often reaches ludicrous proportions (e.g. telling readers where in Oxford Street they can buy fur coats). The reasons for this are partly cost, partly the westernisation of both the readers and the journalists. Many journalists, especially editors, had had strong contacts with the West, and wanted their papers to be like Western papers - in fact, more impartial and less sensationalist than Western papers - more like the Western press than the Western press itself. Television is the most elitist and westernised of all. It is not used for education. It is a highly commercial system used to entertain the elite. A large part of it is in English, and the main advertisers are Western firms or products. Many advertisements convey strongly elitist and westernised images. The most prestigious indigenous material is also highly westernised and elitist. It has little to do with reality in Pakistan.

It is possible to perceive three middle-class fragments involved in control of the press - the professional middle class, the business

middle class, and the functionary groups (or political elites acting like them). The press reflects the conflicts between these. The journalists reflect the professional element, owners and advertisers the business element; the third corner of the triangle is represented by government. In Nigeria conflict in the press was reflected by opposition between papers of different political allegiance. In Pakistan it is not between papers of different allegiance but between different types of newspaper-orientation. Partisanship has declined in the face of market and government orientation, while market-orientation is in a continuous battle with government control. These conflicts affect the entire press, as an institution. The press in Pakistan is a middle-class affair and the various middle-class fragments within it are involved in an intra-class conflict. The press incorporates businessmen, government and some left-wing elements, but, above all, it is a liberal, professional, middle-class affair. With the rise of the functionary groups the press is subject to strong government control, but this is countered by the professional middle class, who need the freedom of the market. The conflict between these different press orientations, therefore, represents a struggle between those in power and those out of it, not a conflict between different classes. Class interests certainly exist, and are of importance, but power is more important.

The press is essentially an elitist affair. It reveals little concern for the masses. Both in content and institutionally it reflects a struggle between different class fragments for power and access to resources. The professional middle class seeks to break the hold on power of a small elite. It therefore represents a liberal, progressive element, but not a radical one. In its view the middle class as a whole can gain through the institutionalisation of democracy; this would bring with it an expansion of political, social, and economic life. More specifically, the professional middle class, which lacks its own power-base, can only achieve control through democracy. It supports politics against control by functionary groups, but opposes parties in power which act like functionary groups and, by doing so, restrict professional middle-class opportunities. The business part of the middle class, by contrast,

gains directly from the economy and benefits by cooperating with the government and its patronage structure. Thus, the business element of the papers in general supports government, hence the antagonism towards it of the journalists. But the business class can turn against the government when the power of the latter becomes something to fear. Furthermore, the government's concern for the business class is secondary to its own concern for power and the access over resources this gives it. All these class fragments have opposed interests, at least at times, but convergence between them is possible in the long term should inter-class conflict come to be of greater significance. At the moment, however, the press in Pakistan has little to do with the masses, and little to fear from them.

12.4. Conclusion: Class, Community, Conflict & Communication

I have tried to show in this thesis that development is fundamentally a matter of struggle over access to scarce resources. This affects the whole of society and follows the lines of social division which are most pronounced. These are usually communal, and, more specifically, often ethnic. Conflict over access to resources therefore erupts along ethnic lines and engulfs the whole of society. This culminates at the top of the social hierarchy in the struggle for power. In a situation of scarce resources the main economic resource is power. Various elites therefore struggle for power, but not on the basis of class, as the class structure is ill-defined. They are at best class fragments of an amorphous "class agglomeration". The result is what I have called "intra-class" conflict, and I have laid great stress on this throughout this thesis. Even if ethnic conflict subsides this struggle at the head of the social hierarchy continues, and thus ethnic conflict gives place to intra-class conflict.

In discussing intra-class conflict I have also laid great stress on the role in this of the bourgeoisie, or "middle class". This is broken up into a number of fragments whose mutual rivalry is based on occupational differentiation. The groups involved are the professional element of the middle class, the business element of the middle class, and the military and bureaucracy (the leaderships of which are also largely middle-class). The working class and

the land-owners which stand outside each end of this broad middle-class agglomeration, might both be drawn into the struggle, but intra-class conflict is primarily between the four middle-class groups just mentioned.

Of these four middle-class fragments I have laid the greatest stress on the professional component. It is in fact the weakest but it is for this reason that it is so important. It lacks the economic base of the business class and the power base of the functionary groups. It therefore seeks power through democracy, through an expansion of politics. This struggle is reflected directly in the occupational structures of the professional middle class. I have given journalism as an example. During a period of ethnic conflict the press is likely to be straightforwardly partisan, but during intra-class conflict the press is likely to be involved in a much more complex way. All the middle-class fragments described above compete to turn the press in the direction they require. Central to this struggle is the professional middle class which provides the journalists who man the workings of the press. I have described in detail this group's struggle to make the press the instrument not of government, not simply of vested business interests, nor in any significant way of the masses, but of the professional middle class.

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APPENDIX ONE: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE PRESS (METHODS)

All samples were of 15 issues, selected at regular intervals from periods of either a year, 6 months, or, in particular cases, the climax of an election campaign. Measurements were of the length of individual items (in inches) multiplied by their width. Except in a few minor instances the width of news columns was standard throughout each newspaper; where columns were wider or narrower than this estimates of total area were made in terms of the standard width. In all cases where the results were given as percentages these were percentages of total editorial space, i.e. total space after the subtraction of advertisements.

The categories themselves are fairly straight-forward (e.g. politics, economics, crime, etc.), but not always mutually exclusive. Where there was some overlap I categorised the item according to what appeared to be its primary significance. Thus political crime (e.g. violence in election campaigns) was catalogued under politics. In one case there was deliberate overlap, that of government coverage. Clearly, including government as one category amongst others would not make much sense, as government is involved in all spheres. Thus, all material classified under various headings, such as economics, foreign affairs, etc., which was related to government, were also catalogued separately under 'government', figures for this being given separately.

Classification according to underlying themes is a more difficult operation than the initial break-down into standard categories. It must be stressed that such classifications inevitably suffer from a certain amount of vagueness and arbitrary judgement. "Few researchers in the content analysis tradition now argue that quantification procedures 'guarantee' objectivity."¹ I like the rigour and discipline supplied by quantification but in the use of this and in the selection of categories I have aimed at insight rather than objectivity per se. The largest problems occur in those categories which seem to demand some subjective judgement. The major examples of this were the classification to do with nationalism and sub-nationalism (material ranging from tribalism to calls for unity), and the division of material according to

1 Curran (1976), p.5

whether it is favourable, neutral or unfavourable to the subjects or sources of the material. In the former case I to some extent mitigated the problem by accepting the ambivalence of such material into the classification. Thus, the intermediate category 'unity-regionalism' implicitly included the possibility that some material apparently calling for unity might at the same time add to the ethnic tension. The classification of material at either side of this pivotal category was much more straightforward. I further tried to get over the problem of vagueness of categorisation through flexibility. In all, I used five categories to cover the nationalism/sub-nationalism area. Below are given some examples of classification under these categories, all from Nigeria.

Tribalism

"Immediately the unsuspecting Yorubas gave them the support, the Ibos would come out in their true wolf's clothing devouring the Yorubas and getting every good thing for themselves".

(Report of political speech in Daily Sketch, 2.12.64)

Discussion of Regions

"All the Eastern Minister of Information and Welfare has done is to reveal the foolhardiness and planlessness of the NCNC Government of the East".

(Article praising the Action Group government of the Western Region after this region became the first to acquire television, Daily Service, 9.11.59)

Unity-Regionalism

"Once more, we deprecate the attempt of any political party to seek the annihilation of any tribe in the Republic".

(Editorial, Nigerian Outlook, 27.11.64)

Unity

"Your article about the Ibo occupants of our region is almost unbelievable. I do not agree with all the views you expressed therein. Temperamental traits of a few individuals should not be extended to all....Moreover, this is a time when even the empty wind can stir up feelings".

(Letter in Nigerian Citizen, 2.12.64)

Independence

"A wicked plan aimed at the destruction of the native controlled newspapers throughout British West Africa by economic competition on the one hand, and the dissemination of British imperialist propaganda in the interests of foreign big business on the other hand...".

(Article written when the U.K.'s Daily Mirror was beginning to establish papers in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, West African Pilot, 21.9.50)

Decisions as to what constitutes favourable, neutral or unfavourable coverage are yet more difficult. Such distinctions were applied mostly to the analysis of political parties and of government. I tried to get round the difficulties by using definitions of favourability which required as little subjective judgement as possible. I defined 'favourable' coverage of parties as that which they would be bound to want published - e.g. any statement of their views - and unfavourable coverage as anything critical of the party. The remaining material - purely routine announcements etc. - was labelled neutral. Favourable coverage of government was defined differently. While a party cannot necessarily expect its statements to receive press coverage, a government in general can. Its statements etc. can be seen as routine affairs. Only when coverage of government contained overt praise did I label it as favourable. Examples of government and party coverage are given below, all from Pakistani papers. (Neutral party coverage is excluded as this was not of great significance).

a) Parties

Favourable

"Emphasising his 'people's' conviction to save the people of Bangladesh from ravages of nature as of their fellow men we must attain full regional autonomy on the basis of 6-point and 11-point formulas', Shaikh Mujib said".

(Report on a statement by the Awami League Leader in 1970 election campaign, Dawn 25.11.70)

Unfavourable

"The statement that the Awami League boss made at his Press Conference in Dacca the other day showed no knowledge, let alone

appreciation, of the fact that in Lahore alone well over 100 relief centres were in operation".

(Political comment, Pakistan Times, 30.11.70)

b) Government

Favourable

"The popularity of television is yet another proof of the far-sightedness of President Ayub, who is anxious that Pakistan should achieve in as short a time as possible what it has taken advanced Western countries centuries to achieve".

(Article in Morning News, 26.9.68)

Neutral

"President Mohammed Ayub Khan yesterday said that awakening of the masses in a developing country like ours was possible if all the media of information were put to maximum use.... He said television was a necessity for awakening the people, making them aware of their problems and pointing to their solution".

(Article in same issue of Morning News)

Unfavourable

"A wave of indignation and resentment at the Central Government's unwarranted action against Dawn and Evening Star swept all over the country as the news reached the farthest corners of the two wings of Pakistan".

(Article in Dawn, 18.11.53)

APPENDIX TWO: FIELD RESEARCH IN PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH

My field research in Pakistan and Bangladesh was undertaken in the last quarter of 1979. I submitted a questionnaire (given in this appendix) to a sample of journalists in both countries (taken from the major papers of Karachi, Lahore and Dacca, and from the news agencies), interviewed the editors of a large number of papers and other people involved in the media. I did not undertake equivalent research in Nigeria for several reasons: i) the content of the Nigerian newspapers was straightforward; being so patently partisan it needed little explaining. The Pakistani press, by contrast, is a complicated mixture of partisanship, and government and market-orientation; ii) Pakistan has a professional body of journalists with long traditions - a journalistic background that the Nigerian press lacks; iii) much more has been written on journalism in Nigeria than in Pakistan; iv) journalism changed far more in Nigeria after the civil war than did journalism in Pakistan after the civil war; the press in Pakistan and Bangladesh was not substantially affected. Interviewing journalists in Nigeria would have thrown much less light on the pre-civil war press, which was the main subject of my analysis in both countries.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. When did you join your newspaper? _____
What position did you hold on joining? _____
What position do you hold now? _____
2. What other newspapers have you worked on? Please list, giving rough dates. _____
3. What other full-time jobs besides journalism have you had? Please list, giving rough dates. _____
4. In what year were you born? _____
Where were you born? _____
a) Town or Village _____
b) Province _____
5. At what institution did you finish your full-time education?
a) Name _____
b) Place _____
6. What is your father's occupation (or last occupation if retired)? _____
7. Why did you become a journalist? Please discuss in a few words.

8. Have you ever been to Europe or the U.S.A.?
a) Yes _____ (please tick)
b) No _____
If yes, how many times? _____
Have you studied in Europe or the U.S.A.?
a) Yes _____ (please tick)
b) No _____
9. If you were born (or lived) outside Pakistan/ Bangladesh, when did you come to Pakistan/Bangladesh?

10. Please name any foreign newspapers you read fairly regularly.

11. If you read any Western newspaper, please state what you think are the good points and the bad points in Western journalism.

<u>Good Points</u>	<u>Bad Points</u>
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12. Do you think the English-language papers of your country are
a) too Westernised _____
b) not enough like Western newspapers _____

13. Please estimate the percentage of your working hours you spend reporting on (% working hours)
- a) Local affairs (of any town or areas) _____
 - b) National affairs _____
14. Which towns (or areas) do you in general report most on? Please list in order of time spent.
- _____
15. What percentage of the time which you spend on local affairs (again, of any towns or areas) do you spend reporting on the area in which you live?
- If a number of your close relatives live in a different town or area from you, please state the percentage of the time which you spend on local affairs that you spend reporting on the area in which they live
- _____
16. What do you think a journalist should try to do in his reporting? (please tick one)
- a) Report the facts exactly as they are? _____
 - OR b) Discuss the facts? _____
17. In some countries the major political parties are associated with newspapers in which they can express their views. In some other countries the newspapers tend to report the parties equally. It can be argued that both systems enable the public to read a variety of political views. Which system do you prefer? (please tick one)
- a) Each paper expressing a different party view _____
 - OR b) Each paper expressing several party views. _____
18. Which of the following do you think are the most influential papers in your country? (please tick one)
- a) the Pakistani-language/Bengali papers _____
 - OR b) the English-language papers _____
- Please state in a few words the reasons for your choice.
- _____
19. How much editorial alteration (for reasons of space, style or suitability) are your reports in general subject to?
- a) a great deal _____ (please tick one)
 - b) quite a lot _____
 - c) not very much _____
 - d) none at all _____
20. Where do you prefer to read criticism of national policies (please tick one)
- a) in the actual text of a newspaper report on the policy? _____
 - b) in the newspaper's editorial column? _____

21. The following is a possible list of 6 goals often mentioned in relation to new countries. Please number these goals in order of the importance you think they should have, writing 1 by the most important down to 6 by the least important.
- Political stability
 - Rapid industrialisation
 - Rural development
 - Freedom of the individual
 - Greater economic equality
 - Democratic political participation.
22. Do you think that certain sectors of Pakistani/Bangladeshi society are too much influenced by Western culture? (please tick)
- a) Yes _____
 - b) No _____
23. Have you ever performed Hajj? (please tick)
- a) Yes. _____
 - b) No _____
- Do you regularly observe Ramazan?
- a) Yes _____
 - b) No _____
24. How much do you read the Friday newspaper articles on religion? (please tick one)
- a) Hardly at all _____
 - b) To a moderate extent _____
 - c) Thoroughly _____
25. Do you think that newspapers, when discussing Islam, should concentrate more on (please tick one)
- a) the traditions and past glory of Islam? _____
 - b) the interpretation of Islam in the light of social change? _____
26. Which do you think has in the past been most responsible for the problems of your country? (please tick one)
- a) Political instability in Pakistan/Bangladesh _____
 - b) Western interference _____
 - c) Non-Western interference _____
 - d) Economic inequality in Pakistan/Bangladesh _____
27. How well do you think the political parties of Pakistan/Bangladesh reflect the full range of public attitudes in Pakistan/Bangladesh? (please tick one)
- a) Very well _____
 - b) Moderately well _____
 - c) Not well _____
28. Do you think industry in Pakistan/Bangladesh should be (please tick)
- a) Mostly under public ownership? _____
 - OR b) Mostly under private ownership? _____

29. Finally, would you please describe below in as many words as you wish, what you believe the press could realistically help to achieve in a developing country.