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Cities: The cultural dimension

Future of cities: working paper

Foresight, Government Office for Science

Cities: The cultural dimension

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August 2014

This review has been commissioned as part of the UK Government's Foresight Future of Cities Project. The views expressed do not represent policy of any government or organisation.

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Foreword

The Future of Cities project is informed by working papers which are commissioned by the [Lead Expert Group](#) and written by authors from academia and industry.

These papers highlight the key challenges and opportunities facing cities in the UK out to 2065. The Expert Group will draw upon this evidence base to develop project outputs which will be published in 2014 and 2015.

These outputs will aim to inform near-term policy making in both local and central government, which achieves desirable long-term outcomes for UK cities.

Professor Sir Alan Wilson

Introduction

In the last 50 years culture has undergone a dramatic shift in meaning and practice. In the post-War period a narrow social elite set dominant cultural values. The notion became limited to heritage, its material forms, and its conservation; the cultural realm was separate from the economic. Today culture is all of this and more: it is about new ideas, social groups and products, as well as the transformation of existing ones; it is at once economic and social, as well as cultural. Cultural values generally reflect a more diverse and democratic social composition (Marwick 1991). In this period the key term – culture – has undergone repeated interrogation: what is culture, what is its value, and to whom? Moreover, the nature and degree of these terms, and their relationships to the city, have changed.

Culture is both embodied in social groups, and in places and spaces. Woven into this cultural transformation cities have also undergone an unprecedented phase of redevelopment and change the world over; arguably, the last 50 years being their most tumultuous, particularly with regards to culture (Hall 1998). The built form of the city is the stage and actor in cultural change, the ‘City Beautiful’ movement of the early twentieth century being a notable example (Olsen 1986). Critically, the provision (and denial) of public spaces has been an important site of social and cultural demonstration that has challenged the regulated and enclosed prestige of buildings (Amin 2008). Such change does not only concern material infrastructure, but also its governance, and relationships with other cities and regions, nationally and internationally.

The aim of this paper - to sketch out the possible future cultural dimension of cities - is a challenging task; one where culture in both its old and new forms will have a greater impact than has been previously evident. We preface the review of the past 50 years, which is sub-divided into three temporal sections, with some definitional issues regarding culture, the creative industries in the UK; these two parts constitute the first half of the paper. In broad terms, four iterations of city-culture modalities can be identified: heritage, cultural and creative industries, regeneration, and the experience economy. In the second half of the paper, arising from the review of the past, we identify five drivers of change likely to influence the future (education and income, migration, technology, governance and deindustrialisation); these constitute the platform for developing six scenarios of the future city and its cultural dimensions.

Part I

The cultural field

The traditional concern of cultural policy has been with the fine arts and the conservation of physical artefacts of heritage. The urban fabric is, and has been since the start of the 20th century, marked by institutions charged with this task and the imposing landmark status of the buildings containing them. In practice this has represented the mainly public patronage of the arts: music and theatre, commissioning fine art work, and preserving, archiving and displaying artefacts.

Outside of these spaces, often the prime urban civic space, there lay a commercially orientated cultural presence, dominated by retail provision, but with a more commercial cultural presence: cinemas, restaurants, cafes, night clubs and bars; and beyond this sporting facilities are also a key aspect of urban culture; in traditional formulations this realm is not cultural, but commercial. Caught in between are two realms: one is public space, often the site of new emergent cultural expressions (Amin 2008); and the other is that of informal and 'everyday' leisure activities many of which have a strong cultural form. The last 50 years has been characterised by the dynamism and growth of production and consumption of commercial culture, and the creative industries have expanded through the means of music, television, and digital platforms. What marks out these forms is less their mark on the urban landscape, and more in the transformation of cultural practices in it. Creative industries now account for a significant component of economic output and employment in many cities, more than is generally appreciated, or accommodated in, urban plans. In London the creative industries represent the third largest sector of the workforce (Freeman 2010). Moreover, a significant indirect impact is also experienced by cities through the tourism and hospitality industries. Finally, the 'cultural offer' of cities is increasingly utilised as a tool of city branding, to attract not only tourists but also foreign direct investment (El Beyrouty and Tessler 2013). Thus culture has been repositioned. It now plays strategic and instrumental roles, in addition to its traditional ones; moreover it is not 'one', but many, cultures and sub-cultures which are increasingly markers of identity.

The cultural and creative industries

The cultural field extends considerably beyond the concern of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)¹, or the Local Authority Department of Leisure Services. Not only do cultural practices stretch across the formal and informal spheres, but also across the commercial and the non-commercial/public boundaries. Moreover, they are not exclusively rooted in singular places, or institutions, which government agencies regard as 'cultural or creative'. Culture is also embedded in ways of life, as well as in the economy and the state (Williams 1989). It could be argued that this 'messiness' is as much about the rate of change in the cultural field, as the inadequacies of the analytical lens through which we view it (state or commercial; formal or informal; economic or cultural).

¹ The Department of National Heritage (subsequently DCMS) was created in 1992. Its functions were previously carried out by a variety of Departments.

It was in 1997 that the term 'Creative Industries' was coined, with the establishment of the eponymous Task Force; the product of which was a definition, and a statistical audit: The Creative Industries Mapping Document (DCMS 1998)². Prior to this the term Cultural Industries had been current, usage was popularised by UNESCO (Girard 1982), and it was deployed as a key idea in the strategies of the Metropolitan County Councils (MCC), notably that of the Greater London Council (GLC) Industrial Strategy (Greater London Council 1985). Although the usages and concepts were different, in practice the terminology merged and developed³. It was notable that it took until the second mapping document before any regional dimensions of the creative industries were registered; even then the role of cities was not differentiated (DCMS 2001)⁴.

The dynamism of culture is disclosed through the repeated trope of the 'culture wars' as a representation of a crisis of cultural values. Across the timespan under question, one can identify at least six dualisms that represent such a rupture (see Box A). The original usage of the term culture wars dates back to the early 1960s and the two cultures debate; a discussion about the tensions between science and the humanities as ways of seeing, and of governing, the world (Snow 1964). Although it took longer to mature and be articulated, the debate about high and low culture found plenty of challenges in the 1960s. Of course this was also the ground upon which the discipline of cultural studies was founded, directing its concerns at ordinary culture and sub-cultures (Hebdige 1979, Williams 1989). If the high-low culture divide had been initially one of class, cultural studies opened up a dialogue relating to the post-colonial movement and migration: namely the debate about an emerging multi-cultural society (Gilroy 1987, Parekh 2002).

Box A: 50 years of tension between culture and value

high -low aesthetic
analogue - digital
art - science
mono- multi-cultural
cultural - economic value
elite - mass culture
classical – modern

In the last 50 years the dominant cultural norm of society has shifted from the values on the left to the right of the dyadic pairs.

Culture in the early 1960s was identified with: the classical tradition in arts and music, opera, literature and theatre. Popular culture, let alone 'pop' or modern traditions were less likely to appear in the cultural cannon.

² The definition of the Creative Industries can be seen in Box D below.

³ The current dominant interpretation is that adopted by UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2009). Framework for Cultural Statistics. Paris, UNESCO. This formulation used internationally (eg UNESCO (2013). Creative economy report 2013 special edition: widening local development pathways. Paris, UNESCO/UNDP.) extends the definition beyond consumption, and commercial culture to include the production system of cultural goods (tangible and intangible), as well as education, training, preservation and archiving.

⁴ But see Pratt 1997, which showed that most creative industry jobs were urban, and within that, dominated by London.

More recently the reverberations of digitisation are expressive of a further divide with the analogue. To be sure, this is not a repeat of the same distinction; each iteration creates a new group of winners and losers. However, the on-going debate points to the dynamic and poly-inflected object that culture is: one that initially has been seen as one of idealism and consumption; and has expended to include materialism and cultural production. This is not simply an academic debate about terminology and interpretation. The ever-changing means of cultural production and consumption, enabled through both social and technological means, represents the power of culture to enable people not only to be resilient, but also to grow and transform. The pace of change and the embedding of culture at the heart of day-to-day national government have occurred quite recently. Culture has moved from an 'arm's length' funding body and sponsored agencies, its position until 1992, when the Department of National Heritage was created as a Ministry, and in 1997 when the Minister (now named DCMS) gained a place at Cabinet.

Cities 1964-2014

Cities have continued to follow a dynamic path of growth and change: suburbanisation, dispersal and new towns, and inner city industrial decline and regeneration. The urban population of the UK continues to grow. The urban system has become decidedly more focused on London since the 1980s. In parallel, the pattern of governance has been interwoven notably with the 're-discovery' of the inner cities, a response to both economic decline and social unrest with a significant racial dimension: the inner-city riots of 1981, 1985, 2001, and 2011 are examples; each giving rise to considerable debate about culture and representation (Benyon and Solomos 1987, Solomos 2011). Overlain on this were the tensions between the governance powers and aspirations of the MCC⁵, their demise, and eventual re-articulation to Regional Development Agencies (RDA), and their eventual demise⁶. There are three moments when the culture and creative industries joined with cities to have significant impacts, all from the 1990s onwards: in the strategies of the MCCs, each had a cultural industries strategy; in the Regional Economic Strategies of the RDAs, each devoted a chapter to the creative industries; the City of Culture competition, elevated the cultural as a key part of urban strategies⁷, albeit with no extra resources⁸.

Box B offers a conceptual map of the emergent modalities of culture, creativity and the city: the competing interpretations of a. the field of governance of cultural value, b. the city of culture, and c. the creative city. In this section we examine the historical record in order to review the shifting relationship of culture and the city in the last half-century (played out in the field represented by Box B) in order to understand its drivers. As will be noted, it is not simply the volume and breadth of culture that has changed in relation to cities, but also the location, balance of material and non-material practices, production and consumption, and the mix of commercial and non-commercial activities. For clarity of discussion, the timespan can be divided threefold: inheritance, de-industrialisation, and the creative industries.


⁵ 1972 Local Government Act: Metropolitan County Councils: 1972-1986

⁶ 1998- 2012: Regional Development Agencies Act

⁷ Established in 2009, first awarded in 2013, awarded every 4 years.

⁸ Local government funding shortfalls led one local authority, Newcastle, to cut its culture budget to zero in 2013. see www.theguardian.com/culture/2013/jan/29/culture-cut-arts-funding-newcastle

Box B: Mapping the cultural dimensions of the city: City of Culture, the Creative City and the field of Culture Values



a. The governance field of cultural value

b. City of Culture

1. Tourism and Experience
2. Heritage and preservation
3. The arts
4. City beautiful, the designed and planned city of culture
5. The intercultural city, city of multiple cultural communities

c. Creative City

1. Creative decision making and governance
2. Mobilisation of youth, cultural politics
3. Place marketing, attracting investment
4. Industrial strategy
 - a. cultural quarters
 - b. cultural industry policy

Inheritance (1960s-1970s)

Culture and the city in the early 1960s was to a large extent the legacy of Victorian philanthropists and early 20th Century municipal endeavours (Briggs 1971). In both cases major cultural buildings were raised to celebrate and advertise culture as an integral part of the city above and beyond a mercantile or functional civic base. The municipal buildings of the Town Hall would usually be joined in close proximity by a museum, an art gallery, library, theatre and concert hall. Thus the principal markers of culture, occupied pride of place in the civic, predominantly non-commercial, heart of the city. This was a defining characteristic of many cities and their urban cultures; cultural values appeared to be settled.

The buildings of the civic precinct contained cultural institutions, which performed the role of educating and informing citizens of what was, for most, an uncontested and shared cultural heritage that was founded on high culture. The exception to this norm was the presence of a significant number of cinemas located in the core retail area, as well as outer urban, and suburban centres. Beyond this lay a significant field of the 'ordinary' cultural activities carried out in self-organised groups in the community⁹.

Urban growth and redevelopment was initially concentrated in the continued post-war suburbanisation and second wave New Town developments. The traditional townscape began to change further as a result of the changing organisation of retailing exemplified by the supermarket¹⁰ and the chain store. Due to floor space requirements new building was required and with it a novel urban form emerged: the shopping centre and arcade¹¹. A further iteration responded to increasing car ownership: namely the emergence of the out of town shopping centre, initially for DIY stores, and then later for weekly food shopping. The car and the out of town shopping centre impacted significantly on the traditional city core in terms of decreased footfall, and increased vacancy rates; the net result was a sharp decline of the high street and traditional shops; critically, the cultural life of the city was eroded. Mindful of this threat, there was much opposition in the form of planning regulations: in the end, to little effect.

There was concern that the domination of chain store retailers, and a small number of mall developers, was leading to a dramatic fall in diversity of retail offer even in new shopping centres, and of the urban experience¹². Culturally, there was also concern with the changing character of the high street; an aspect of urban cultural conviviality and pride was lost from many city centres. As city centres suffered decline, public cultural facilities were, in effect, in the wrong location and in older and less suitable buildings that made it more difficult to adapt to patterns of visitor demand (a shopping demand which was becoming participatory and interactive, compared to the previous norm of passive and receptive customers): the result of an economic reconfiguration, but one with profound cultural impacts.

Culture in the early 1960s, as noted above, was generally characterised as a consensual focus on high culture; however, new and emergent forms increasingly challenged this, not just cinema, which was by then an accepted new form, but especially by popular music venues. Local and regional popular music cultures arose, notably in the larger cities, starting with Liverpool¹³. It was not just live music, but also dance too; Northern Soul, again rooted in the North West conurbation, being a particular case in point. With the emergence of popular television much entertainment became home-centred; this had a significant knock-on effect in the urban realm: cinema audiences collapsed (UK Film Council 2002), cinemas closed, and the number of urban pubs steadily declined¹⁴. Commentators pointed to the emergence of a more individualised and isolated cultural lifestyle where informal, community and voluntary aspects were undermined¹⁵.

⁹ This cultural inheritance is captured in texts such as Hoggart (1957) and Williams, R. (1989).

¹⁰ The first Supermarket in the UK opened in 1951; but significant growth occurred from 1960s onward.

¹¹ Birmingham Bull Ring Shopping centre was the first indoor shopping centre in the UK, 1964

¹² <http://oxford-institute.sbsblogs.co.uk/2013/07/19/diversity-and-the-uks-high-streets/>

¹³ In the 1970s and 1980s the music epicentre shifted to the West Midlands, for Heavy Metal, and subsequently Ska; returning to Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool in the 1990s. Throughout this time London remained the focus of recording, marketing and management, as well as the biggest audiences.

¹⁴ The number of pubs declined by 28% between 1982-2012 www.beerandpub.com/statistics

¹⁵ A classic statement – written about the US – that sparked debate in the UK was Putnam, R. D. (2000). "Bowling alone : the collapse and revival of American community." 541 p.

UK cities were on a downward trajectory with respect to their traditional cultural offering; where (novel) cultural activity was growing, it was in re-purposed commercial cultural urban environments, such as pubs and nightclubs. The period of the 1970s saw the continuation of the post-war decline of cinema audiences; and another stalwart of the city centre, the cinema, moved to decay and decline. Smaller cinemas closed, or were converted into bingo halls; larger ones were closed or sub-divided into multiscreen cinemas in order to compete with the edge-of-town cinemas (UK Film Council 2002). Migration to cities resulted in the emergence of ethnic restaurants in many of them¹⁶. The popularity of these signalled a change in (what had until then) been a very conservative national food culture, as well as a greater propensity to 'eat out' (or at least not to prepare food at home)¹⁷; a trend that has gathered pace ever since.

A sign of the times was that in the late 1960s the National Trust board was challenged for its exclusive focus on the preservation of grand houses and stately homes. Likewise, the Arts Council of Great Britain was under pressure to respond to a changing society and polity¹⁸. For example, the 1965 'Policy for the arts' signalled both a tentative recognition of popular culture, and a decentralisation of its provision (Hewison 1995).

It is notable that the conception of protected and preserved buildings and sites also changed, admitting modern and industrial architecture. So much so, that by the early 1980's commentators noted a strand of national, or policy, obsession with a (romanticised) old country (Hewison 1987). The event of the 1970s and 1980s - the deindustrialisation of the Northern cities - provided one possible reason for people to take comfort in (an idealised) past, as had also happen at the dawn of the 20th century (Weiner 2004).

De-industrialisation (mid 1970s-late 1990s)

The period from the mid-1970s and late-1980s was one of national economic decline, experienced particularly in the Northern regions, an exposure to internationalisation and competition for inward investment as manufacturing industry declined or was relocated abroad. This had a massive impact in terms of a transformation of the industrial base of most cities outside of London and the South East, whose employment had until then relied on manufacturing. That manufacturing which remained was transformed, a condition of that transformation was invariably production reorganisation, that meant that the demand on industrial premises, which had been a main stay of the industrial heartland of cities, was quickly vacated leaving behind physical and social dereliction.

Governments began to realise that there was an 'inner city problem' which would not simply go away without direct action. London was rather an exception, it suffered massive manufacturing loss, but in gross terms these jobs were replaced with the surge of growth in financial services (Pratt 1994). Whilst overall jobs were stable in London, unemployment still grew as those migrating from the regions, or outer London, added to the labour supply.

The cities of the North and their regions took longer to recover, and this had a significant impact and legacy on their urban landscapes (many dominated by manufacturing and

¹⁶ As an example the number of 'Indian' restaurants in 1960 was 500; by 2011 9400

www.fedrest.com/marketresearch.htm

¹⁷ Average spend per person per week on eating out, out of total food spend, was 26% in 2005 compared to less than 10% in 1955. see www.defra.gov.uk/statistics/files/defra-stats-food-family-annual-2009/pdf

¹⁸ Driven by international in-migration, increased access to higher education, and higher standards of living (see below).

warehousing buildings now unused). For most cities the economic decline of the 1970s and 1980s compounded an already declining city centre, and one for which the cultural offering was either out of date, or not frequented by the population. Significant attempts were made to draw consumers back to the centre, with large-scale urban retail remodelling, for example the Arndale Shopping centre in Manchester¹⁹. The scale of such developments both reconfigured public and private space, and was one representation of cultural values in the city, just as the town halls and galleries of the previous century had been.

Many cities initiated physical regeneration schemes of once industrial land supported by European Regional Development Funds, which were available for many depressed regions at the time. A popular theme was to have waterfront development schemes for offices and residential uses, but driven by a cultural theme (Loftman and Nevin 1995). This drew on an emergent Northern European experience of culture-led urban regeneration at the time (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993).

Public cultural institutions were often limited in their capacity to change, in one part by falling tax income and limited autonomy from the nation state, and in the other part by the burden of the upkeep of buildings unsuitable for the changes that were overtaking cultural institutions such as museums and galleries: an active engagement with audiences, and an attempt to reach out from the gallery space, and to connect with community interests (Vergo 1989). One resolution of this tension was resolved by the rising popularity of industrial archaeology and museums. These provided a counterbalance to the socially and physically remote stately home model that had previously dominated physical heritage sites.

Alongside this, cultural industries strategies were developed by the MCCs (until their abolition in 1986). The pioneer was Sheffield, rooting its cultural industries regeneration in a solution to youth unemployment and local economic development²⁰. Thus, the foundations were set for policies focused on the cultural industries, alongside the arts and heritage. These programmes were operated under planning and local economic development budgets, in contrast to those of the arts and leisure which catered for heritage, libraries and museums.


The transformation of culture begun in the 1960s developed further with an upsurge in community arts practice and a growing recognition of the importance, and relative neglect of, culture for marginalised groups (representing 'new' migrants, and the poor). Central government attention shifted to the cities seeking to link culture and economic revitalisation. 'Garden Festivals' were a pioneering example of urban regeneration supported by central government, beginning with the Liverpool Garden Festival in 1984²¹. In 1988 the Arts Council produced its 'Action for Cities', which was indicative of a shift occurring toward instrumentalism: henceforth arts and culture would lead regeneration.

¹⁹ When it was built in the 1970s it was the largest of its kind in Europe.

²⁰ A definitive statement of such policies was Greater London Council. (1985).

²¹ Others were held in Stoke, Glasgow, Gateshead, and Ebbw Vale

Box C: Funding balance of projects of Heritage Lottery Fund 1994-2012



Source: Heritage Lottery Fund Strategic Framework 2013-18

In the same year Tate Liverpool opened, an example of the decentralisation of national cultural institutions, as part of a plan to regenerate the Liverpool dock area; a further satellite of the Tate opened in St Ives in 1993. This signalled a trend of provincial resurgence in gallery and museum building²², reaching its apogee after the millennium, and significantly aided by the 1993 National Lottery Act²³; an indicative balance of funding on projects is shown in Box C. In this period there has been a significant investment in flagship developments of new cultural infrastructure, in the case of major libraries and concert halls funded by local authorities (see Box E below)²⁴.

The notion of the temporary festival, such as the Garden Festival, also can be seen in the European City of Culture (ECOC) idea, which in its pioneering 1990 Glasgow incarnation became a significant vehicle for civic pride, marketing and industrial transformation. There have been many interpretations of the significance of this new approach to the ECOC scheme (Palmer-Rae Associates 2004) in places not previously noted as a high cultural destination. Whilst there is disagreement about the success for Glasgow, and whether the impact was solely due to ECOC, most agree that it opened the door to a new strategy of mixing of culture and regeneration (Booth and Boyle 1993).

As noted above, a significant shift in the physical form and changing function of the city centre has been the growth of the out-of-town shopping centre, and the inner city enclosed mall. These developments have invariably removed a large proportion of retail

²² Bradford's National Film and Television museum (1983), and the Royal Armouries Leeds (1996) were early examples.

²³ It would be instructive to see the proportional balance of cultural funding in the UK over time. However, the fragmented nature of these funding streams, their shifting targets and sponsors makes such a task formidable. See Casey, B., et al (1996)., Selwood, S. and G. Brown (2001).

²⁴ Notably Birmingham used its orchestra to project the city to the world.

activity from the city centre²⁵. Moreover, in-city malls have often effectively privatised what were once public streets; effectively extracting significant parts of the city from the common circulation space thereby changing the cultural experience. In part the 'new enclosures' were a response to a town centre management concern, to make the city centre safe and attractive. The almost universal presence of closed circuit television cameras has been one way to address the law and order issue²⁶, however, it also raises issues of civil liberties. Another idea was what became in many cases an aggressive drinking culture of the city centre, could be diffused by a more relaxed 'open all hours' city centre (Bianchini 1995, Heath 1997). City centres have become a mecca for the larger pub, the coffee shop, and fast food outlet. Drinking and eating has become the object of a city visit in itself rather than shopping. Such changes represent a profound contrast with the heavily regulated retail and entertainment culture up until 1994, where rigid closing times, and Sunday trading restrictions were maintained.

A trend throughout the last half-century has been the increase of tourism, both inward and outward²⁷. The latter has an impact on the expectations of the host-population to try a wider range of cultural experiences (adding to that already prompted by in-migration). The former is a significant market opportunity. London is always going to benefit the most as its national institutions attract the best audiences; however, it also puts a significant cost on the necessary regular upgrading to facilities. Perhaps the best example of a new trend has been Tate Modern: this captured a significant change in trend that was forward, and not backward, looking by showcasing modern art, in a consciously cosmopolitan and multicultural outlook, in an old industrial building (Leonard 1997).

The international pressure to maintain competitive advantage leads to a shorter turnover time between refurbishment, and this becomes an added challenge that opens up a gap between second and third tier cities. The 1990s marked a significant change in the post-war architecture profession. The reputation and visibility of architecture, and British architects, became very successful globally in this period, key developments such as major new offices, high-rise buildings, and airports, galleries and concert halls provided the canvas upon which to advertise a new architectural confidence. However, it was only in the 2000s that these architects got to build their structures in the UK.

The Creative Industries and the Heritage Lottery Fund (late 1990s onward)

Following on from the emerging trends from the early 1990s central government turned to focus on the economic impact of the arts, and alternate funding sources (and less money from the state). The headline change was the focus on the Creative Industries, a new concept (see Box D) that had its focus on the exploitation of intellectual rights and economic earnings. Although they were only available at the national scale, the accompanying 'Mapping Document' provided economic data that the creative industries could contribute directly to economic growth and jobs. Whilst it generated much publicity, little substantive policy flowed from it. It took until the second mapping document in 2001 to include an appendix on regional creative industries, but still nothing on the urban. Subsequent analyses have shown that 40% of all employment in the creative industries

²⁵ See British Council of Shopping Centres (2006). In the early 1960s there were no 'out of town' developments, now 60% of floor space is located out of town. It will require a massive regulatory change to slow, let alone turn around, this trend.

²⁶ The first town, Kings Lynn adopted the technology in 1987. There was a huge growth in the application of CCTV to town centres in the 1990s. By 1995 200 town centres had them fitted. See Graham, S., J. Brooks and D. Heery (1995), Visit Britain (2014).

²⁷ National statistics (1999). Visit_Britain (2014).

is in the major conurbations, and 24% of UK employment in the creative industries in London alone (Pratt 1997).

Box D: The Creative Industries

The DCMS introduced the notion of the creative industries in 1998 defined as

"Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property"

The industries were identified as:

1. Advertising
2. Architecture
3. Arts and antique markets
4. Crafts
5. Design
6. Designer fashion
7. Film, video
8. Interactive leisure software
9. Music
10. Performing arts
11. Publishing
12. Television
13. Radio

The establishment of the RDAs (1998-2012), and in particular the preparation of Regional Economic Strategies, required the audit and measurement of the creative industries, as well as investment in them. Hence, the cultural industries strategies of the MCC were revisited as the RDAs looked for industrial strategy ideas. This led to action on the ground in all the larger cities. Venture capital funds, and creative clusters were initiated by local public agencies in many urban locations; the latter much influenced by the Industrial Clusters report that stressed the future possibilities of new media in particular as a source of regional growth (DTI 2001). Plans were also made for training and education in relationship to the creative industries. As long ago as 1994 Sheffield had begun a strategy of developing 'Cultural Industry Quarters': dedicated provision of business advice and incubator space to co-locate new cultural and creative businesses. Cultural Industry Quarters, or Clusters as they subsequently were known, which were developed by most MCC, received validation in the DTI report noted above. The other new administrative component of the policy framework were the Regional Cultural Consortia, which were meant to link with the arts and cultural community, but had significantly less resource, and less impact.

Box E: A selection of New Galleries and Museums

Tate Liverpool, 1988

Tate St Ives 1993

Royal Armouries Leeds ,1996

The Lowry, Manchester 1999

Walsall Art Gallery, 2000

Tate Modern, London 2000

Imperial War Museum North, Manchester 2002

The Baltic, Gateshead 2002

The Sage, Gateshead 2004

The Public, West Bromwich 2010

Turner, Margate 2011

Hepworth Gallery, Wakefield 2011

A more visible appearance of (traditional) culture in the city emerged as a result of the availability of funds from the Lottery, the time-lag of investment planning and building, and the approaching millennium delivered many new galleries and museums (Box E); predominately outside London. The 2001 free admission policies and the new building programme boosted the popularity of museums, and crucially their visitor numbers. Tate Modern was perhaps the jewel in the crown given its success with visitors and cultural statement of a modern and cosmopolitan nation. The record of these new galleries and museums has been mostly good, and some excellent, but there have been some notable failures²⁸. However, despite the increasingly 'crowded market' of new museums, visitor numbers have continued to rise²⁹.

Thus, the huge boost in the creative industries (in profile, but also in terms of economic output), as well as the new cultural infrastructure boosted by the Lottery funds, marked a significant renaissance that has had an impact on cities in the form of new buildings, a renewed cultural confidence, and recognition of the part that culture and creativity may play in it. Connecting the existing infrastructure and melding it with these new circumstances has been a challenge. The first steps were laid out by the Urban Task Force (1999) which strengthened an existing trend of brown-field development, and critically, mixed use development. The latter was viewed as the key to resolving social, economic and environmental tension by reducing the travel to work distances. It also help to promote the re-population of cities based on the idea of the attraction of cultural activities and 'live-work' paces. This, it hoped, would create the conditions for a renaissance of urban living, especially for a younger population³⁰ that was both culturally vibrant and environmentally sustainable.

²⁸ Several galleries have struggled, but the most high profile failure has been The Public in West Bromwich (2010-2013)

²⁹ Between 2000-2010 visitor numbers increased by 51%. National Museum Directors Council (2011). www.nationalmuseums.org.uk/what-we-do/encouraging_investment/free-admission/

³⁰ Indicative are the projects of developers such as Urban Splash that have focused on this type of project (eg New Islington, Manchester).

This concept was given a major boost by the writings of Richard Florida (2002) who argued that cities that invested in both a high quality environment and contemporary cultural facilities that appealed to the 'creative class' would attract this group of workers to them. The critical fact that Florida revealed was that the 'creative class' was in demand by high growth/high technology industry, and thus such a strategy would attract these industries and jobs to their cities (hence reversing the trend of workers following jobs), as well as investing in culture and the environment. Not surprisingly, the idea was very popular.

Florida's ideas were taken up in the UK as well, but they underwent a transformation as they confronted the home-grown cultural industries model, and both rubbed up against a more traditional cultural heritage approach (Pratt 2010). The result was a rather confusing mix of approaches and rationales, but the overriding point was that cities - aside from London - generally lacked the strategic capabilities or resources from the mid-2000's onwards to offer a strong creative/cultural strategy.

Another challenge to the creative class thesis was the real contradiction between an idea of tolerance and diversity and the real life experience. The inner city riots of 2001 and 2011 gave pause to the notion that all groups were benefitting from the brave new world of the creative city. In parallel, those from the traditional arts and cultural establishment objected to the commercial nature of the culture provided in this new model of the city. From both, albeit different, perspectives there was a persistent question of just how inclusive the creative city vision was (Pratt 2011).

The investment in major cultural events such as the 2012 Olympics and the 2000 Millennium Dome give a distinctly urban focus. However, these were characterised by their temporary nature, as well as their 'legacy' regeneration function (similar to the Garden Festivals). The ECOC award to Liverpool was another example of a temporary festival. Following in Glasgow's footsteps, Liverpool gained the title of the UK's latest ECOC in 2008³¹. The lesson learned this time was that the competitor cities (within the UK) were judged to have gained significantly from the bidding process, notably Newcastle³². The celebration of identity and the local negotiation of a shared local cultural heritage was perceived to be a significant (unintended) outcome. In part this was the stimulus for the UK to set up its own National City of Culture competition on a four-year cycle, the first was awarded to Derry/Londonderry (2013), and will be hosted by Hull in 2017.

The revolution of retailing associated with the growth of online shopping had dealt another blow to the traditional city core. It was clear that retailing alone would not retain customers; thus the emergence of two related themes. The first sought to capitalise on the 'experience' of the city (Pine II and Gilmore 1999, that is what face-to-face contact in the city offered as a premium beyond online shopping. Thus trends in urban animation, buskers and street theatre, are employed by town centre managers to attract people back to the centre, and to compete with other centres and out of town centres³³. There

³¹ The ECOC has been subjected to extensive monitoring and evaluation; although conclusions are difficult to draw as the aims and objectives are different each time. In this sense Liverpool was significant in that it sought (for the first time) to create a pre- and post- event evaluation. See Garcia, B., R. Melville and T. Cox (2010).

³² We can add to this the bidding process for sports events; Manchester's bid for the 2000 Olympic games for example; the successful bid, but less successful outcome, of the Sheffield Student Games (1991), but the success of the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games (1986), and the Glasgow Commonwealth Games (2014)

³³ Pioneered in Brent Cross in London 1976, the out of tradition city centre retail mall continued to grow, notable developments (above 140,000ft2) being London's Bluewater and Lakeside, Sheffield's, Meddowhall and Manchester's, Trafford, and Merry Hill, Dudley. See www.retail-week.com/property/top-100-shopping-centres/

has also been recognition of the importance of public spaces, often graced with a major piece of specially commissioned public art.

City centres have struggled against on one hand the bland repetition of the same chain stores, and on the other hand, the infill of charity shops and banks. One growth area has been a general increase in restaurants and eating establishments in cities. Food culture, especially a diverse range of ethnically themed restaurants, in addition street food and farmers' markets has been a major transformation of city life. Additionally the growth of specialist cultural quarters: these are physical clusters of boutique craft and specialist retail activities, with some small-scale cultural production on site located in 'heritage' areas of inner cities³⁴. It is important to distinguish these from 'creative clusters' or cultural production quarters (see above). These are usually focused on the provision of incubator units for creative micro-enterprises³⁵. A variant are the artist studio complexes that have emerged in London managed by Space, and in many cities elsewhere in England and Scotland operated by agencies such as Acme. The resurgence of artists' studios and workplaces has become a significant entrant into many inner cities, their presence is often picked up as the first signs of gentrification and turnaround a process which invariably leads to the expulsion of the artists due to rising rents (Pratt 2009).

Another effect of the transformation of the Creative Industries has been that associated with broadcasting, especially the BBC. Digitisation has given rise to re-organisation of broadcasting around functions (news, sport, drama) rather than technologies (radio, TV). The BBC has relocated a substantial part of its organisation in Salford, and Bristol, as well as other national hubs such as Glasgow and Cardiff. The whole nature of broadcasting has changed; commissioning is now the main function, not broadcasting, today much programme making is competitively outsourced. Not surprisingly, independent production companies still cluster close to the commissioning hubs.

Film has also undergone a significant change, whilst public support continues it has been the commercial aspects that have been drivers. London has developed as a world leader in film special effects; as film is mainly 'enhanced' today, this is big business. A micro-cluster, but of international significance exists in Soho. An important 'offshoot' is Bristol, home of an animation cluster linked to Aardman Animation, and the BBC Natural History Unit. A new industry, computer games, has also developed clusters; but for organisational reasons peculiar to games production these clusters are predominately non-inner city³⁶.

Other creative industries, such as music and publishing, have retreated to London, Manchester and Glasgow-Edinburgh. The newspaper industry has also suffered decline, its traditional location in London is now as much dictated by cheap office space, as they are no longer linked to printing presses which are now dispersed closer to customers. Theatre and opera, perhaps, because they offer a live experience, have survived. However, regional theatre struggles and undoubtedly will continue to do so. Experiments such as NT live have demonstrated that digital representation is viable. However, whilst it provides access to audiences, the challenge of reversing decline in audiences (and particularly their narrow, aging, demographic) remains (Bakhshi, et al. 2010).

³⁴ Nottingham's Lace Market; Manchester's Northern Quarter, Brighton's Lanes.

³⁵ Examples, amongst many are: the Chocolate Factory, Wood Green; The Custard Factory, Birmingham; The media centre, Huddersfield; the Lighthouse, Brighton (and Wolverhampton), the Watershed, Bristol.

³⁶ Leamington Spa, Dundee, Warrington, Derby Guildford, and Teeside are examples.

The most significant marker of urban culture in recent years has been the austerity measures that have led to much reduced public funding, notably at the local scale (associated with libraries, and local museums)(Pratt and Hutton 2013). The smallest museums, which were mainly sustained through volunteering, have been able to survive; the largest museums and galleries have been in part protected, but are also in a good position to attract sponsorship. The middle-size museums and galleries, particularly those in the major cities outside London suffered most in this period. Volunteering cannot fill the gap; and sponsorship is much harder to attract.

Although it is not strictly urban in form, a notable growth of the cultural phenomenon of festivals has been significant in the last 20 years³⁷. The festivals are part of the urban system, they comprise urban residents and resources; they are in effect 'pop up' cities: music festivals such as Glastonbury now attract 135,000 visitors. The occurrence is not confined to popular music, there has also been a significant growth in festivals for literature, performance and science: the most successful in recent years³⁸ being Hay-on-Wye, Edinburgh and Cheltenham , which all now attract considerable corporate and media sponsorship³⁹.

³⁷ For example, in the summer of 2013, there were over 160 popular music festivals in the UK see Leyshon, A. (2014).

³⁸ All of these festivals have run for a long time, the oldest being Edinburgh, starting in 1947.

³⁹ Sponsorship has become an increasingly significant source of cultural funding in recent years see Arts and Business (2009).

Part 2

Drivers of change

Reflecting upon the last 50 years we can identify five drivers of change in the cultural field, (see figure 1). They all interact with wider economic change and urban development not covered here. These drivers are mobilised by changing inputs: demographic changes, technological, and internationalisation; as well as the politics and governance of the cultural sector. The results of these drivers are a range of cultural forms and experiences.

Figure 1: the five drivers of cultural change





Figure 2: the three stressors of cultural change



These can be described in three dimensions (see figure 2). First, the breadth of culture extending beyond classical culture and heritage to the creative industries, tourism and

consumption, an experience increasingly delivered at least in part via a digital platform. Some commentators see a shift towards an 'omnivore' cultural consumption where the range of cultural participation expands, effacing the old divisions. Second, the abiding concern of cultural agencies is with conservation and preservation; however, two new aspects of culture have emerged as critical: cultural participation and access, and cultural production. Finally, contemporary culture is globalised in the sense of the mixing of many new cultural forms, but also the UK has gained a significant reputation for pioneering cultural innovation (Landry 2000, Landry 2006, Wood and Landry 2007). We now review the five major drivers of change that we expect to play a significant role in the next half century.

Education and income

A key component of cultural change is education. Obviously, knowledge of culture gained in education is important and extends the depth and breadth of cultural appreciation. Education is also significant because extended participation (as a result of the rising school leaving age which occurred in 1972 (14-16 years) and 2013 (16-18 years), as well as the increasing participation in higher education, from the 1960s, but especially in the 2000s) delays family formation and an extension of leisure time and the relative freedom to engage in cultural activities. Moreover, growth of the birth rate in the post war-period created a powerful force in the economy.

In the 1960s, this process was further boosted by rising wealth and disposable income for younger persons. These two trends created the foundation for a rise in consumption associated with teenage fashion, mainly mobilised around music and clothing; this trend has continued, despite intervening recessions⁴⁰. The particularly short trend cycle of music and clothing feeds even more consumption (as the 'turnover rate' increases). This is one of the motors of the economic expansion of the creative industries. This process has been driven onward by the extension of cultural consumption by the 'baby boomers' beyond teenager-hood, into middle and increasingly older age (Young 2002).

A consequence is that the 'popular culture' consumption demographic is increasingly encompassing all age groups. Furthermore, the impact of higher educational achievement, associated with increasingly discerning cultural consumption, will also work its way through the population. Participation in higher education was around 5% in the early 1960s, it is closer to 45% today⁴¹. Female participation in the labour market has now exceeded that of men, as has higher education participation. It is clear that the white male norms of the cultural field will be challenged in terms of gender, class and ethnicity, and that this trend will intensify rather than wane.

However, the inheritance of the expansion of higher education (or rather the mode of financing it) will result in the current cohort, and those that follow, carrying considerably more debt from that education, and the ever-increasing costs of housing, through to middle and older age. Inevitably, this will set limits on consumption. Furthermore, working ages are increasing and pension values declining. In the median term cultural

⁴⁰ Spending on leisure goods and services now accounts for 18% of all household expenditure, up by 7% compared to household leisure spending in 1953. In the early-1950s, broadcasting was confined to three BBC radio stations and just one monochrome BBC television channel. Cinema attendance was 10 times higher in the early 1950s than it is today, although recently attendance levels have begun to improve. Young, R. (2002).

⁴¹ The number of students proceeding on to higher education has risen ten-fold over the last half century. In 2001, there were 2 million students in full- or part-time higher education, compared with just 220,000 in the mid-1950s. The UK had around 20 universities in 1950, compared with over 90 in 2002. Ibid.

consumption will continue to rise; and as a consequence in 25 years or so it will be expected to plateau.

Migration

A second aspect of demographic change that began in the 1950s is immigration. The first post-war migration groups were encouraged to fill labour market gaps: they hailed primarily from the Caribbean. Political refugees drove subsequent migration from East Africa and the Indian sub-continent. Later movements especially in the 2000s have been motivated by economic (push) factors; notably eastern European migrants. To this can be added a global flow of in-migrants attracted to the UK, many of them highly skilled, and in highly paid professions. Settlement of immigrants has been dominantly urban in character.

Immigration in the pre-millennium period was particularly significant in that it involved large numbers of families arriving in a relatively short period and settling permanently. Moreover, settlement was highly concentrated in a small number of cities; there has been a politically negative response by some portions of the population. Immigration has challenged the dominant mono-culturalist and assimilationist modes of the past. After considerable social struggle, a period of multiculturalism was ushered in and cultural institutions were transformed to support cultural diversity. Those cities with significant immigrant populations, especially as they became second generation, native born, commonly questioned the failure to see their cultural traditions and histories reflected in public and municipal culture. The local public celebrations of various ethnic groups are a representation of this change (for example: Chinese New Year, Diwali and Eid). The subsequent transformation has added a further nuance to the balance between heritage and change in the field of culture, as well as for whom, and how, it represents that culture. It is this process that will continue to shape what we mean by culture and heritage in the future.

Although the political debate focuses on arrivals, and net migration, the overlooked fact is that there is a large through flow of population bringing knowledge and expertise, and culture to the UK, and vice versa, higher education can be particularly highlighted here as a gateway to cities outside the capital; although London remains most popular. It seems unlikely that this pattern will change, and even if new settlement were prohibited as more extreme political actors threaten, the current mix of population would remain with us. It is a demographic fact that Britain is, and will stay, multicultural. The next 50 years will see the consequences as they work themselves through culture, economy and society will only get more profound as time goes on. The notion of 'plural cities' where no one group has majority describes a handful of cities today; it will be most cities by the mid twenty-first century⁴².

Even the temporary mobility of people, for instance as tourists, has important cultural implications. The rise in foreign travel has changed the taste and cultural tolerance of the UK population (as evidenced by the acceptance of multi-culturalism, and the embrace of diverse media, fashions and cuisines)⁴³. This will undoubtedly continue as travel costs

⁴² Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2013): The Dynamics of Diversity: evidence from the 2011 Census: Does Britain have plural cities? www.ethnicity.ac.uk/research/outputs/briefings/dynamics-of-diversity/

⁴³ The average British household in the 1950s could afford, at most, only one family holiday per year, and the vast majority tended to be spent in the UK at holiday camps, hotels and small guesthouses. In 2000, UK residents made 37 million holiday trips to European or inter-continental destinations, spending over £15 billion. Office for National Statistics *International Passenger Survey* (2000); *Travel Trends* (2001)

continue to fall, in spite of concerns about the environmental costs. In parallel, we see a rise in cultural tensions in cities expressed as racism, but also through a resistance to difference. A programme of engagement with such cultural differences underpins one strand of emergent cultural policy, seeking to achieve mutual understanding (Wood and Landry 2007). It has been argued that in so doing cultural diversity, rather than being a state of stress, can be transformed into an asset.

Incoming tourists are increasingly significant, not only adding to diversity, but economic growth. The spend-per-visit has increased dramatically in recent years, especially from Chinese visitors⁴⁴. Much of the tourism is urban based, and often around shopping, as well as counter balanced by a continuing concern with heritage.

Technology

The most obvious changes, especially in the cultural industries, seem to have been wrought by technology: mass reproduction and digitisation to give two obvious examples. However, we need to be very cautious about 'reading off' cultural change from technologies: technologies enable, societies transform cultures. Organisational and regulatory forces can shape, or sidestep, the potential impact of technologies.

The transformation of technology has had relatively little direct impact on the heritage sector, but a massive transformative effect for the creative industries. The fundamental transformation of music from live to recorded music and its popular consumption had manifest impacts. The business model of music, like that of any publishing, is based upon the ability to secure a growing rent from a single product, a record; the returns to scale are enormous. Furthermore, popular music forms that were international enabled even great profits to be made extending markets outside of the UK. In the 2000s the transformation of digitisation destabilised this particular model of distribution and business form in the creative industries. However, although the transformation was difficult for some, and led to a restructuring of the industries, overall creative industries consumption has continued to grow, indeed, it has proliferated, converged and hybridised into many new forms. The changes afforded by new technologies have affected the way we spend our leisure time. Mass TV arrived in the living room in the 1960s; TV has consistently taken on average 3 hours of our time each day; since the 1960s film attendance has collapsed. The rise of mobile computing and social media now exceeds even the time investment of TV, although both activities are increasingly carried out at once. Moreover, newspaper reading has declined in the last 30 years, from 72% to 45%⁴⁵. Clearly, with only 24 hours in a day, the impact of other leisure and cultural activities will become apparent.

The issues that are emergent with current technological-regulatory changes that will have lasting significance concerns the mass customisation of services based upon personal data characteristics. On one hand this is opening new markets, on the other hand it is causing considerable social and political concerns about privacy and surveillance. This applies to the tracking of individuals and their information shadow online and offline (with forms of electronic surveillance in the city). Clearly, there are massive challenges in negotiating security and freedom, which are likely to play out in terms of access to the public sphere of cities, and to cultural expression.

⁴⁴ Visit Britain (2014): china market and trade profile, January; National Statistics (1999) Travel Trends, a report on the 1999 National Passenger survey; Visit Britain (2014) inbound tourism Trends Quarterly, 9.

⁴⁵ Social Trends 40 (2014); The General Household Survey (2002) shows that just 12% of the population took part in arts activities in the last month.

A second theme that has been enabled by pervasive communications technologies has been coordination 'on the go' not linked to a building. The possibilities of temporary types of social gathering - the 'festivalisation' of temporary cultural events (from pop-up events to festivals) - is one example, another is the way that cities are becoming 'stages' for informal cultural activities that are 'harvested' by 'trend spotters' on city streets and fed back into the innovation process. Finally, the desire for experience, the qualities that the frequently atomised online life cannot provide, is likely to become an organising modality of cities as they respond to the online transformation.

Governance

There has been a significant shift in cultural values over the last half-century, represented by a turn away from the automatic acceptance of cultural values handed down by experts or those in authority. At the same time the breadth of what counts as culture has also widened; moreover, there has been a greater acceptance of what had been previously characterised as non-British and non-traditional cultural values and forms. Finally, the role of commercial culture has become far more pronounced; at the same time the implicit assumption that commercial culture will be inferior has diminished. These shifts in the cultural landscape present problems for policy makers as the object of policy making, and their audiences have changed. The rise of commercial cultural forms is in principle outside the purview of cultural policy. Thus, cultural policy has played 'catch up'.

As we have noted one of the biggest shifts in the balance has been to direct policy concern to commercial culture (usually in terms of the creative industries), and away from more traditional cultural forms. A second shift has been to change the accountability of cultural funding, increasingly it is an investment that has to yield social and economic benefits as well as cultural; urban regeneration being a case in point. In the process the 'arm's length principle', a buffer between political control of culture and its support, has become much weakened. Austerity has simply advanced these trends (Pratt and Hutton 2013).

In terms of the future, a key theme of cultural governance is instrumentalism, and 'value for money'. It seems unlikely that 'art for art's sake' will make a serious return in terms of state funding. A second theme is 'who pays for culture?'; the advance of the 'small state' has not led to the disappearance of culture but to culture funded by a number of sources: corporate sponsorship, the state, individuals and volunteers⁴⁶.

A third theme is the spatial basis of cultural policies. A complex pincer movement has led to a reduction of central state funding for culture. However this funding tended to benefit national treasures, more than often located in London. The lottery has leveraged capital funding for many new regional museums; future sources of sustainable revenue funding will be the challenge. Cities and regions at present are receiving less money and are disinclined to invest in culture. One possibility is that regional fragmentation advances and cities receive tax-raising powers, or much increased autonomy. Tax raising powers could increase the cultural budget; they could also draw upon culture to establish identity in an environment of stronger place-based competition.

One area that policy makers have begun to explore is the relationship of the cultural and creative economy to the rest of the economy, and to innovation. On one hand, this could

⁴⁶ Despite the concerns of Putnam (2000) people in the UK are continuing to participate in community activities and to volunteer. Despite recession and government initiatives such as the 'Big Society', levels of volunteering have remained more or less stable over the last decade. Cabinet Office (2014).

be manifested as another form of instrumentalism; on the other hand it might lead to the exploration of different value systems that culture may offer, and thus be deemed worth of investment in its own right.

De-industrialisation and the growth of London

The final driver of change is that which relates to the UK urban system, this has a particular part to play in the understanding of the position of culture and cities. The de-industrialisation that impacted UK cities in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in localised unemployment, and related social problems, as well as devastation of the urban fabric in inner urban locations.

New employment growth eventually came from drawing in more women, and more part-time workers into the workforce. The new jobs were not traditional manufacturing jobs, but retail and office jobs. London went through this cycle first, and emerged from the other side with net job growth but a transformed sectoral composition: manufacturing being replaced by financial services. Moreover, previous restrictions on office growth in London were relaxed and a disproportionate growth was concentrated in London. In the regions physical decay, and attendant social problems of unemployment, especially amongst the youth, gave rise to a particular instrumental inflection of policy for the creative industries where the balance of concern was in favour of the social impacts rather than the cultural or economic ones. Despite significant investment and job growth in regional cities, London, and the decline of mining and manufacturing shape the UK space economy.

For the future even if new developments were evenly spread (per capita), the South East would enjoy significant advantages. The greater efficiencies due to past investment will continue this cumulative progress. In the cultural sector, which is structurally dominated by London, the process will be even more pronounced. This is going to be a profound challenge for cities outside London.

The prospect of high-speed rail links such as HS2 could re-integrate the non-London conurbations, bringing them closer. However, the cultural system is structured, and not simply changed by proximity. As a result there is a danger that faster links will reinforce the centrality of London. In order to avoid this trend radical governance changes would be required that actively spatially redistribute and restructure the economic, cultural and governance system.

In the absence of structural changes, cities have reverted to exogenous growth models for revival, using culture in place marketing to attract investment to cities. Increasingly, culture and identity have been used to differentiate cities for investors; this has been enabled by large-scale physical regeneration with flagship cultural investment. Given the other trends, it would be safe to assume that such a pattern will intensify rather than diminish.

The next 50 years: six scenarios

In this section we will take the inheritance of the last 50 years, the emergent drivers of change and what we will identify as the themes of urbanisation that we are likely to experience. We present this as a range of scenarios based upon six ideal-type cities. We do not expect any one of these cities to be the model for the future, but rather that this range will point to the potential parameters for the role of culture in cities. The objective here is not to second-guess policy but rather to lay out potential consequences of longer term drivers and established trends that will result in a number of stylised challenges to direct future policy making.

The underpinning factors are long-term, or slowly changing processes. For example, those of demography; here we know that the population will be increasingly aging, better educated, and multi-cultural. Leading on from this there will clearly continue to be an interest in culture, in fact all trends indicate that this will be more profound, and have a broader range. The precise manifestation of this demand will be contested.

On one hand we can see a continuation, or even a revival, of a monoculture restricted to place based politics (city, region or nation); on the other hand, there is the rise of a cosmopolitan culturally omnivorous perspective comprising a politics of identity (culture as a resource to assert political abstractions⁴⁷), and a politics of allocation. A half-century long transition away from a large state toward a small state can be identified in which cultural funding (public or private) has been deeply impacted. Culture increasingly has to be justified by reasons other than cultural value per se: instrumentalism, sponsorship, or the market.

Accompanying a proliferation of cultural values and identities, there is the spectre of social and economic polarisation, and urban polarisation. This is manifest as the structural division of life changes, and the securitisation of a cultural commons and a collective city space is a marked trend. On the horizon there are other markers of division; the one likely to have most impact on the cultural field is that of the shifting balance of control over digital and intellectual property rights. In this sense, the options are between the city as an innovative, and diverse cultural commons, or, the city a cultural fortress protecting its unique assets from the sight of others under (digital) lock and key.

The scenarios that follow have been generated from 2 x 5 matrix: the five themes already discussed, lying on a dualistic continuum. This is represented in Box F. Clearly there are many permutations possible; we have chosen six to highlight some potential challenging outcomes. The intention here is not to 'predict' a precise outcome(s), but to provide a range of possibilities and non-normative challenges which are, for presentational simplicity, presented as vectors of the future cultural dimensions of the city as a heuristic for policy making.

⁴⁷ The classic statement on the construction of cultural traditions and claims to political nationalisms is Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger, Eds. (1992). *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Box F: The matrix of future cities and culture: topics and range

- a. Education/Training
Cultural spending, increasing debt
- b. Migration/Movement
Restrict immigration, selection by wealth, open immigration
- c. Technology
Dominance by technologies, mediation, cultural shaping of technologies
- d. Governance
Centralised planned, market demand, democratic culture, control of movement by technologies
- e. Space
Hierarchical urban system, fragmentation by city type, polarisation within cities

Tourist-experience city

The experience city will be organised for, and tailored to, an augmented reality of the city⁴⁸. We can already see this in the practices of contemporary museum curation; if extended to a larger scale we might consider the city providing an immersive experience, tailored to the visitor, complete with sensual feedback. It will not simply be a computer game, or a theme park, but a blending of the two with film special effects, and rooted in the unique physical environment and history of the city (Ashworth and Tunbridge 2000). It will blend the physical presence and virtual worlds: the physical setting will merge the streets, museums and galleries; as well as the sensual ambience. This option is only likely to be available to a small number of cities due to the resource intensive nature of the project.

The 'back story' is that such data rich environments will enable the more efficient management of people and experiences. These characteristics provide a limit for current 'tourist-historic' and 'cultural touristic' cities (Russo 2002, Russo and van der Borg 2002, Richards 2007). Thus the bottom line is to earn as much money through the total management envelope of the customer. By extending and merging retail trends, and experience, that is for the most invisible and willingly entered into by the user (by collecting uploading participants' personal data). Cities will compete to provide a unique digital enhanced experience⁴⁹. In this way cities may be able to square the circle of offering something unique and place specific, even when everything is reproducible, and reality is rendered banal.

Appropriate experiences will be selected, programmed and tailored to individual needs; and associated with previous visits to this, and to other similarly 'enhanced' cities⁵⁰. The data rich environment will enable not simply personal itineraries to be arranged, but will

⁴⁸ Pine II, J. P. and J. H. Gilmore (1999). *The Experience Economy: Work Is Theatre & Every Business a Stage*. Harvard, Harvard Business School, work, and the writings of William Gibson and Neal Stephenson, as well as the environment of role playing computer games such as Assassin's Creed.

⁴⁹ A digital extension of the notion of 'creative tourism' Richards, G. and L. Marques "Exploring Creative Tourism: Editors Introduction." *Journal of Tourism Consumption and Practice* 4(2): 1-11.

⁵⁰ This is an extension of challenge that historic, heritage and tourist cities seek to achieve supply management: managing access to particular facilities and directing users to others where there could be overcrowding. Here this can be done in real time, and interpolated with demand management as well.

be shaped to most efficiently manage resources. In so doing, queuing and congestion will be minimised, and 'wear and tear' can be balanced and resources will be used to maximum capacity. This will allow previously unachievable people management; real time rescheduling can also take place. The visitor experience will be further enhanced by tailored hotel, catering and transit arrangements - allowing the visiting of the maximum number of visit sites in any allocated period. The interactive personal profiling will enable the city to minimise any adverse 'shocks', and maximise the positive ones. Thus, the cultural offer will be moulded precisely to consumer demand.

It could be argued that this model is resilient and sustainable too; the common challenge with 'entertainment environments' is that visitors quickly tire of particular novelties, and demand more; hence they have to be constantly rebuilt. In the tourist-experience city, the software and hardware experiences always can be upgraded and thereby seamlessly re-purpose the interface, the infrastructure, and the experience.

A potential consequence is that access to the city will be controlled on the basis of ability to pay, and the willingness to forfeit their (meta-) data rights which will themselves be traded (Andrejevic 2013). The 'site' will need to be secured, and made exclusive to paying visitors. These city 'total environments' will require a significant number of people (who are cheaper than avatars) to 'service' them. These 'characters' who will bring life to the city and interpret it through interactions will be enabled by 'just in time' information and identifiers for tourists (this will minimise training of 'guides'), maximise appropriate engagement, and provide simple disciplinary metrics to be applied to the guides. The workers, that is the guides, managers, cleaners and ancillaries, will be domiciled in their own areas (Edge Cities) so as not to disrupt the visitor experience.

Homeland city

The 'homeland city' will offer the security and containment of the past, and be occupied by mainly those over 50 (of which there will be considerable demand due to demographic shifts). They are inspired by trends in New Urbanism especially in the US⁵¹ (Bray 1993, Beauregard 2002, White and Ellis 2007), as well as UK social and political shifts. A key management theme of these cities will be the preservation of 'traditional' values, they will be the (pre-) retirement oases for those that do not seek, and wish to be protected from, anything that challenges their value system. In terms of location they will be the likely future of the larger market towns, and in particular the seaside resorts of the UK.

Access to these cities will be limited to those that can invest their pensions and savings with the management company who will also provide comprehensive medical and nursing care as the need arises. Those under 50 will be restricted from visiting except at weekends and public holidays, however if they sign up to abide by the rules they may be allowed temporary residence permits. Planning and building controls will be strictly enforced, as well as aesthetic controls on gardens; community councils will implement this. Of course, workers will be required in this city; most will come from the community itself, as retirement ages continue to rise. More youthful employees will, when not on duty, be required to live outside the town, and observe the curfew. Some towns will have a nationality test, restricting access for all immigrants.

The range of cultural offerings in these cities will be particularly strong; the collective investment will favour an active cultural programme based upon musicals and light

⁵¹ As well as films such as the Truman Show, and to a lesser extent Sim City (although we anticipate a new version: 'the older years').

music, and history; the focus will be culturally conservative and the middlebrow. There will be ample provision of golf courses and bowling greens. Public transport⁵² provision will also be free and regular; private car ownership will be low and volunteer work high. The towns will be linked to substantial hospitals that will specialise in care services for the elderly; and most likely there will be a linked investment of the town management resources and the hospital. These towns will be disconnected from the mainstream, by choice.

Campus city

The notion of the campus city derives from that of science cities and technological hubs (Castells and Hall 1993) and smart cities (Great Britain. Office of and Technology 1999, Campbell 2012, Townsend 2013), as well as corporate technology environments such as those of Google and Apple⁵³, and the notion of the creative class (Florida 2002). Despite the name, universities will play a role instrumental to the corporate demands in this city.

In the campus city, culture and education is purely for instrumental purposes, supporting the city to the extent that scientific performance (likewise health, sport and recreation) is enhanced. Workers will be encouraged to 'live in'; but those that do not will have dedicated transit means to ferry them to work (see below). To counter the otherwise atomistic and utilitarian nature of life social relationships will be built into this model of urban life, they will be pro-social, and workers will be required to help others and support creative initiatives. These meetings will be totally open and data porous zones; seminars and meetings, and post-work socialisation will be continuous. Cultural resources will be needed to 'oil the wheels' of this community, but not to distract it. Entry to the city will be completely inclusive, as long as visitors achieve a particular IQ score.

The city will be based in a well-landscaped and secure 'campus' setting. Universities will be included as economic, scientific and cultural incubators; however, student numbers at these facilities will be regulated based on jobs available. The focus on research and development, as well as curricula scope, as well as the organisation of the city everyday life, will be planned to have the most impact as judged by a tie-up between hi-tech companies, universities and city authorities. This will be a 'total learning environment'. So much so that workers will be encouraged to be the Guinea pigs for their own experiments, and new forms of urban living, and cultural consumption, will develop from the interface of the instrumented city and the university.

Little traditional governance will take place, as provision of services will be governed by feedback from human-implanted apps, which will work in a two-way mode, offering feedback on service levels, as well as 'advice' about health and pro-social activities. This system will allow the abolition of money, as the implanted chip will monitor and coordinate spending and reward (based on a range of metrics). These will be the first cities and towns to only accept driverless cars, which will allow the cities to sprawl over increasingly larger areas, however time will be used productively whilst commuting. This transit will provide a useful way to bring in service workers from the Edge City, as they will not be permitted, or able to afford to be resident, in the campus city.

Funding of culture will be in terms of generous sponsorship from corporate and high-tech bodies. The priorities and instrumented capabilities will obviate state structures. As part

⁵² Although perhaps more likely 'subscription' would be a better term, as the urban provision is likely to be - in effect - uncoupled from state financing.

⁵³ See especially Eggers, D. (2013). *The Circle*. London, Hamish Hamilton.

of the contractual settlement of citizenship creators and authors, all those that cooperate with the campus city will be required to accept that all intellectual property rights are ceded to the corporations' "common wealth", in perpetuity.

Business Lounge City

The business lounge city is based upon ideas developed about the 'dual city' (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991)/ 'polarised city' (Sassen 2001), and the 'Transnational capitalist class' (Sklair 2001), and the growth of gated communities (Atkinson and Flint 2004); moreover, the emergence of 'linear environments' that exclusive groups can 'edit' their interactions with the world (the business lounge and the gated community being exemplars). This city form is one in which those rich enough, and with access rights, will be fully catered for and charged to the corporate bill. They will sustain high culture, with the best performances, in trophy concert halls sponsored by the same corporate donors; there will be access to elite sporting event as well on the same terms. Culture is as much about the display and environment as about practice and engagement.

These locations, and specifically the office space, will become the repositories of much of the world's art, as these institutions 'decorate' their facilities with high culture to maintain a symbolic representation of trust and solidity, as well as a way of spreading the risk in their portfolio of investments.

Such cities will have an exclusive eating and drinking quarter that will be tailored to the wishes of this elite group; they will provide discrete privacy and exclusive opportunities. Busy executives keen to maintain their own portfolio of education and knowledge will rely upon a peripatetic force of education professionals to update them on key topics, but also to deliver and arrange personal lectures on any subject; there will be a tie up between leading arts and humanities university faculties to provide this info-tainment.

Movement through the city will be via a number of special transit lanes, which will effectively join one part of the gated city to another, and bypass ordinary traffic; where this is not possible, roads will be reserved for this community. Safety and security, as well as protection from outsiders will be paramount. Whilst shopping for most will be an online experience, in the Business lounge city shopping will be re-invented as a personal shopping experience, with a personal shopper and shops opened specifically for this purpose, for those otherwise lacking the time or imagination. Likewise, unique cultural experiences will be created for the high-end traveller, and specific access rights, and a personal introduction and tour, of museums and their archives.

Infrastructure facilities will be provided and supported by the Business lounge cities, in the hope and expectation that they will retain corporate decision makers and the associated investment. Corporate donors will compete with one another to demonstrate their association with elite cultural values⁵⁴. As with the other ideal-type cities the elite will require a large number of workers to provide the personal services on a 24/7 basis; but these workers will not be able to live in the city due to costs and access, they will reside in the Edge City.

⁵⁴ In this case the particular cultural values are irrelevant, as long as they are symbolic of elite culture and aesthetics (and thus individual art works may not be conservative, but radical).

The Omnivore City

The Omnivore City will be the domicile of the upper-middle classes, the educated, but not corporate. It will position itself in contradistinction to the social and cultural polarisation and atomisation of knowledge, and the focus on consumption of other cities. It will stress democracy and involvement in decision making, using creative solutions to urban problems, and reaping the benefits from inter-culturalism (Landry 2000, Wood and Landry 2007).

These cities will be tailored to accommodate a fast changing cosmopolitan culture - world culture, based on the mobility of people and ideas. In many respects this will embody the 'open city' of 'open innovation' (Chesbrough 2003). However, in line with the ethos of this city it will not be aligned to the needs of corporate culture (Ferrary 2011). Rather than dictating cultural norms, the objective will be to encourage and celebrate the smorgasbord of ideas and practices. This agora of knowledge will be further promoted by a culture of interaction, in organisational and physical terms. The ideal citizen of this city is the 'cultural omnivore' (Peterson and Kern 1996).

By its nature this will be high-density, socially networked city⁵⁵, one that engineers meeting of people as both consumers and producers (all will be both) in numerous face-to-face networking arrangements. Co-working spaces, multiple-occupation buildings will be the norm. This will be high-touch, high-interaction city environment. However, it is unlikely that the omnivore city will be able to compete for land values⁵⁶ with corporate interests.

Even from this relatively privileged group, many will be unable to afford studio and living space in the old cities. For this reason, the omnivore cities will in effect grow up in the 'old suburbs', which will have been in disfavour from the new satellite, and new inner city on one hand, and the edge cities of the majority. Whilst inner-city meeting will be important, it will be increasingly difficult. This is why the characteristic form of the omnivore city will be studio networking in the suburbs, a form of lateral and multi-nodal networking of studio/homeworkers. The reason that the older suburbs will be important is that housing space standards provide are more appropriate. These spaces are likely to be on the inner edges of the conurbations, and satellite 'cultural hot spots'⁵⁷.

Edge City

Perhaps the most highly populated, but least 'cultured', urban form will be the Edge City; its workers will 'service' most of the other city forms; it will be ubiquitous 'back stage' presence in all cities. The notion of Edge City is one of not simply urban sprawl but a continuous poly-nucleated, and non-focal urbanism (Garreau 1991, Sudjic 1991). In cultural terms when compounded with economic and social polarisation, and small government, this will result in what is in many respects a cultural wasteland. Cities will be functional dormitories with transport links sponsored by corporate urban interests. Due to low pay, and the low tax base, few 'public services' will be provided. Moreover, such

⁵⁵ Globally *and* locally networked

⁵⁶ Not because the culture and knowledge is unimportant, rather the fact that it is not in private ownership, and its value is amortized in the future.

⁵⁷ For example Leamington Spa, Brighton and Dundee. See Pratt, A. C., R. C. Gill and V. Spelthann (2007). "Work and the city in the e-society: A critical investigation of the socio-spatially situated character of economic production in the digital content industries, UK." *Information, Communication & Society* 10(6): 921-941.

services would be more expensive to provide in such a dispersed form. Thus, it is also likely that there will be little support for additional taxation to sustain cultural facilities.

Shopping will have migrated online, obviating the need for shops. In these Edge Cities it will be far too expensive for companies to offer personal deliveries, they will retreat to 'drop offs'. However, these spaces will emerge as informal 'culture hubs'. They will be the places at which people will self-organise their own entertainment. Aside from the Omnivore City, this is likely to be the only place where cultural producers (formally or informally) will be able to remain in ownership (even if they choose not to exercise it) of producers. It is likely that a new culture of live and 'offline' activities will grow up that provide both a cultural space for artists and cultural workers, and provide a means by which that can make money from their art outside the corporate realm⁵⁸. This will have another manifestation in the nomadic cultural communities that will be an analogue of 'touring'; these cultural producers will establish temporary festivals/ cities and move from one edge zone to another seeking to maintain autonomy and creative freedom.

⁵⁸ If they produced work 'at work' they would have no rights over it.

Conclusions

The aim of this paper has been to offer insights into the future cultural dimension of cities in the UK in the period up to 2064. The review identified and tracked the key trends and processes over the period 1964 to the present; this revealed a paradigm shift had taken place in the conception and practice of culture, and the relationship of culture to cities. The objective is not to predict future trends, but rather to highlight potential trends and tendencies that will enable policy makers to understand that nature of changes respond appropriately.

In terms of an overview of the dimensions of change that have shaped the cultural dimension of cities we can highlight five points:

- a. The way that culture is financed: shifting from a state to a third sector and private role;
- b. The influence of culture on social life: shifting from a 'special' to 'ordinary', culture is more pervasive;
- c. The influence on economic life: a significant growth in the commercial aspects of cultural provision, and its influence on cultural values;
- d. The diversity of cultural expression: inclusion of a breath of cultural expressions from other parts of the world, from informal activities, what was previously regarded as low culture;
- e. The delivery of culture: increasingly via a succession of new technologies that allow choice of time and place, and choice of cultural participation.

These five shifts have been reflected in the struggle of the policy community and academics to fashion inclusive definitions and concepts that reflect practice. These changes have also provoked profound challenges as to how to regulate and govern the field of culture.

The changes in cultural practice have been woven with a significant change in the character of urbanisation and city life, marked by de-industrialisation, and the growth of the service economy. In turn there have been changes in the positioning of cities in their regions and the world; international flows of money and ideas, and people is increasingly the norm. However, these shifts have marked cities with new forms of social and economic, and cultural division that can be summarised in three points:

- a. The balance between elites and the rest, the access to the urban 'commons': cities have become more segmented and exclusive;
- b. The balance between public and private cultural values, notably the emphasis of commercial values and consumption: cities increasingly view culture in an instrumental light (attracting investment, tourism, and new experiences);
- c. The role of the economic: previously the economic dimensions of culture were considered minor, now they are taking a major role. In contrast to the instrumental role, this is a productive role characterised by a focus on the creative industries, and cultural quarters.

Clearly the future will be different from the past; it is not helpful to focus on a particular technology, or cultural practice in thinking about the future. We have identified the drivers and their likely dimensions, and as summarised above the vectors of change. This presents us with a unique perspective from which to view the character of governance challenges that will characterise the next fifty years of culture and cities. A strand that runs through all of these points concerns the balance between the public and the private realm: this debate reoccurs with respect to technology, economics, social and spatial fields, and is different for each cultural practice.

Cities are potentially cultural powerhouses, but such energy has to be managed, curated, and not dictated. This process must involve insight into the actions and the consequences of cultural practice. At present there is a weak academic, and policy, foundation, a lagging and insufficient empirical database. As with all fast changing and innovative fields, investment in research and understanding will pay dividends in future problem avoidance, and the fulfilment of potential.

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