

THE ROLE OF CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;  
THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON FOREIGN POLICY WITH  
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

(1949-1986)

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## CHAPTER 15

### RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND AFRICA: THE FOURTH PHASE

#### (OF BROADER UNITED FRONT) (1969-76)

An important trend has emerged in the international situation in the '70's. An increasing number of medium-sized and small countries are uniting in various ways into a broad united front to oppose hegemonism and power politics by the two super powers, to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and to fight for equality in international relations. This is an outstanding feature of the excellent situation in which "revolution is the main trend in the world."

China's relations with Africa during the period following the most dynamic phase of <sup>ENR</sup>NGPCR (1969 onwards) was marked by the emphasis given by policy makers to the first of the 'four major contradictions' of the world as characterised by Lin Biao (April 1969), i.e., 'the contradiction between oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other'.<sup>2</sup>

This is the period during which people-to-people relations or 'united front from below' - China's major ideological asset of the '50's and '60's - was undermined by the Sino-Soviet dispute on the one hand, and on the other, by China's active preoccupation with the influence exerted by the Soviet Union in people's organisations and national liberation movements in different parts of the world.

AAPSO, once a vehicle of, and a major factor in, Sino-African interaction, ceased to exert any impact on

China's policy towards Africa during the period under consideration.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time, China's relations with national liberation movements in Africa also, became more and more guided by their friendly relations with the Soviet Union or otherwise,<sup>4</sup> rather than by their own merits as weapons against colonialism and imperialism. By the same token, China's relations with African states increasingly came to be predicated on how ready they were to join forces with China in pursuing the broad aim of a broad united front simultaneously against Soviet 'social imperialism' and American imperialism.<sup>5</sup>

By the mid '70's, China was no longer particularly concerned whether a particular African state manifested a 'progressive' or 'non-progressive' character. With the end of wars of national liberation in Indo-China, China's decision makers had come to attach much greater weight to the question of whether a particular African state would be willing to stand publicly against the 'hegemonic' rule of the United States and the Soviet Union, the two super-powers.

China based its strategy of forging a 'broader united front' of states throughout the world on the view that a number of Third World countries - including many that were pro-Western in character - were prepared to assert their political and economic independence of the hegemonic super-powers.

For China, this was an opportunity to be exploited and widened in line with its well-established strategy of

'unite the many to defeat the few'.<sup>6</sup> Only, from the 1970's onwards, the Soviet Union would be included amongst 'the few'; and a number of *régimes* (e.g. Iran under the Shah, Chile under Pinochet, and Zaire under Mobutu) that had been regarded until a few years before as imperialist agents, would be included amongst 'the many'.

However, China's relations with 'progressive' states in Africa continued to be warm and co-operative in character, though an increasing number of them gradually became disenchanted with China and critical of its obsession with the role played by the Soviet Union in Africa.

15.1. State-to-State Relations, or 'United Front from Above'.


15.1.1. China's Relations with 'Progressive' States.

15.1.1.1. Algeria

The following summary of a conversation (November 1983) between the author and Selimane Houfmane, President of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of Algeria's FLN Party, may be regarded as an authoritative interpretation of Algeria's understanding of China's 'broader united front' strategy extended to include the Soviet Union among its targets. Houfmane argued as follows:

We were puzzled by the inclusion of the Soviet Union as a main target of their strategy of united front by the Chinese - even in relation to national liberation movements, whose target certainly was not the Soviet Union. We always told the Chinese of our dis-

AFRICA UNDER COLONIALISM (AS AT 1975)



Source: Peking Review 18 (29 August 1975): 35, p. 5.

-approval of their obsession with the Soviet Union, but we never adopted it as a policy. In order to avoid giving any opportunity to the imperialists to exploit disputes among forces opposing them, Algeria never publicly criticised the policies pursued, and actions undertaken, by socialist countries (including the Soviet Union and China.) We never publicly criticised China's behaviour, including its role in the Angolan crisis, but we told them that their policy in Angola was both non-revolutionary in character and opposed to a socialist movement (the MPLA) that represented the majority of the Angolan people.

Similarly, although we told the Soviet Union that its presence in Afghanistan was illegal, we never voted against the Soviet Union in the UN over this issue.<sup>7</sup>

Algeria, like most 'progressive' African states, never approved of China's new policy of linking opposition to colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism with Soviet 'hegemonism'..:

Whoever stands on the opposite side to the imperialist powers is our ally, the Soviet Union is certainly one of them. Our immediate target is to eradicate the direct oppressors of liberation movements and the direct exploiters of the developing countries.<sup>8</sup>

Algeria's disapproval of China's obsession with the Soviet Union is not only based on the Soviet Union's stand 'on the opposite side to the imperialist powers', but also on the fact that the Soviet Union, for Algeria, has been an important source of aid and economic co-operation, and the major one in the military sphere.<sup>9</sup>

In their attempt to project a broad united front against the international role played by the Soviet Union

TABLE 15.1

AFRICAN VOTES FOR ADMISSION OF PRC INTO UN  
AGAINST TAIWAN \*

Year **	For PRC	Against PRC	Abstentions	Total
1950	0	3	1	4
1952	0	4	0	4
1954	0	3	1	4
1955	0	3	1	4
1956	2	4	2	8
1957	4	3	2	9
1958	4	3	2	9
1959	5	2	3	10
1960	9	2	14	25
1961	9	9	11	29
1962	14	17	2	33
1963	12	17	4	33
1965	18	10	9	37
1966	17	17	5	39
1967	16	19	4	39
1968	15	20	6	41
1969	18	21	2	41
1970	19	17	5	41
1971	26	15	0	41

\* Compiled from Wei, Liang-Tsai, Peking versus Taiping in Africa 1960-1978 (Taipei: The Asian and World Institute, 1982), p. 388 (Table 4 2).

\*\* There was no vote in 1964 and no roll-call vote in 1951 or 1953.



and the United States simultaneously, China's policy makers had failed to take into consideration (especially before 1976 <sup>10</sup>) the strong influence exerted by the Soviet Union on progressive countries in the Third World.

During this period, Algeria's disapproval of China's preoccupation with the Soviet Union leading to a stance against MPLA (which Algeria unequivocally supported) during the Angolan crisis, <sup>11</sup> did not undermine the warmth of the relations developed during the '50's and the '60's, between the two countries.

China's strong support for Algeria's policy of non alignment, <sup>12</sup> its active campaign for a New International Economic Order, <sup>13</sup> and its strong commitment to socialism in the country (including the nationalisation of Algerian raw materials and oil resources) <sup>14</sup> contributed to the continuance of warm and militant relations between China and Algeria.

Contacts between the two countries at State-to-State and Party-to-Party levels which had suffered a decline <sup>15</sup> during the dynamic period of the GPCR, subsequently returned to normal. In November 1969, a Chinese military delegation led by Chen Chih-Chu, Commander of the Engineering Corps of PLA, paid a visit to Algeria. The delegation was warmly received by Haouari Boumedienne, President and Chairman of the National Council of The Revolution of Algeria. <sup>16</sup>

In September 1970, in a period of less than two years, (November 1968-September 1970) Chinese technical personnel had completed the construction of an Exhibition

and Fair building near Algiers (Sunawbar-al-Bahri Palace).<sup>17</sup>

In December 1970, a contract was signed under the terms of which Algeria agreed to export 40,000 tonnes of cast iron. This was followed by a second contract in March 1971 for an additional export of 18,000 tonnes of cast iron. This made China the main purchaser of cast iron in Algeria.<sup>18</sup>

A 35-member Chinese medical group arrived in Algeria (March 1971) to work in different parts of the country.<sup>19</sup>

In July 1971, Abdul Aziz, Bu Tafliga Member of the Council of the Revolution and Minister for Foreign Affairs, paid a 10-day visit to China, during which the two governments made a joint affirmation of their support to the forces of national liberation in Indo-China struggling against US imperialism, and popular forces in Arab countries struggling against Zionism. They reiterated their support for all national liberation forces in the world.

China gave strong support<sup>20</sup> to Algeria's opposition to the presence of foreign fleets in the Mediterranean sea.<sup>21</sup> At the end of Bouteflika's visit, an economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed which included provision for an interest-free loan of \$40 million.<sup>22</sup>

In October 1971, Pai Hsiang-kuo, Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade, paid a visit to Algeria.<sup>23</sup> This was the first visit by a high-powered Chinese official since November 1965 when China's efforts to convene a second Bandung-type Afro-Asian summit conference came to naught.

This visit coincided with the completion of a China-aided ceramics factory capable of producing 3,000 items of pottery for daily use. When the project was under way, 26 Algerians were sent (February 1969) to China to be trained in the Chinese ceramics industry.<sup>24</sup>

During the debate on the 'China question' at the UN General Assembly (25 October 1971), Algeria, along with Albania, took the lead in pressing for the adoption of the draft resolution on the restoration of China's seat in, and the expulsion of Taiwan from, UN.<sup>25</sup> In welcoming the first Chinese delegation to UN, ~~Algeria's~~ Rahal, Algeria's representative in UN, spoke as follows:

At this particularly important moment in the history of the United Nations our gesture is such as to exceed both in its significance and scope the normal framework of the usual congratulations and expressions of sympathy, because it is a reflection of the deep feelings of friendship towards and sincere admiration of the Algerian people for the people of China.<sup>26</sup>

In November 1972, an Algerian Government Delegation, led by Layachi Yaker, Minister for Commerce, visited China. The delegation signed a protocol for undertaking agricultural and industrial projects under the provisions of the Sino-Algerian agreement on technical and economic co-operation signed between the two countries during the previous year.<sup>27</sup>

In May 1973, another Algerian delegation, led by Mohammed Ben Ahmed, Member of the Algerian Revolutionary Council, visited China. During this visit China praised

Algeria for seeking a peaceful Mediterranean.<sup>28</sup> Algeria had been actively campaigning against the use of the Mediterranean Sea for military exercises and manoeuvres by big powers.<sup>29</sup>

Sino-Algerian relations developed further when Haouari Boumedienne, the Algerian President, paid a five-day visit to China (February 1974). This was the first visit to China by an Algerian head of state since Algeria's independence. The delegation was warmly welcomed in China and personally received by Mao Zedong.<sup>30</sup> *People's Daily* (25 February 1974) published a long article on the history of the close ties binding the two countries together since independence, tracing it back to the Algerian struggles for liberation.<sup>31</sup> The article strongly praised the dynamic and active role played by Algeria in campaigning for the restoration of China's seat in the UN.<sup>32</sup>

Boumedienne told (26 February 1974) his hosts that Algerian friendship

...is not the result of a feeling of subjectivism. It is forged in the common struggle all along...the deep understanding of trials that each has had to undergo at different stages of its struggle, in the infallible and unqualified solidarity when it had to count on its friends.<sup>33</sup>

In his talks with Boumedienne, unlike leaders of other 'moderate' African countries,<sup>34</sup> Zhou Enlai had no reservations about expressing China's revolutionary assessment of the world situation during the '70's.

Developments have shown more and more clearly that revolution is the main trend in the world today. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution-this is the irresistible trend of history.<sup>35</sup>

At the same time, Zhou Enlai assured Boumedienne that China would strongly support Algeria's proposal to convene a 'Special Session' of the UN General Assembly for undertaking a 'study of the problems of raw materials and development'.<sup>36</sup> At this Special Session of the UN General Assembly (April 1974) Deng Xiaoping, the head of the Chinese delegation, reaffirmed China's position in the following terms

The Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the problems of raw materials and development is successfully convened at the proposal of President [Algeria] Houari Boumedienne...This is the first time in the 29 years since the founding of the United Nations that a session has been held especially to discuss the important question of imperialist exploitation and plunder and effecting a change in international economic relations...The Chinese Government extends its warm congratulations on the convocation of this Session, and hopes it will make a positive contribution to strengthening the unity of the developing countries, safeguarding their national economic rights and interest, and promoting the struggles of all peoples against imperialism<sup>37</sup>...

Boumedienne's visit to China came at a time when Algeria was searching for correct methods and practical means of implementing its socialist policies and plans.<sup>38</sup> With more than 90 per cent of its population being rural,

Boumedienne could not have chosen a more appropriate occasion for re-iterating his pledges<sup>39</sup> and promises to the Algerian peasantry and promising to emulate the example of China in this respect.

We have followed with interest the impressive progress that you have made in building a genuinely socialist society under the illustrious guidance of a leader so exceptional that history already records him as one of the greatest figures of all times - Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. This progress constitutes a step forwards for the whole of mankind towards a better life and an outstanding enrichment of world civilisation.

...It is incontrovertible that the advent of the People's Republic of China was a principle event in the evolution of international relations following World War Two. Her appearance in the relation of forces was an element of decisive importance in the process of the liberation of the peoples of the Third World. That is to say, the triumph of China's socialist revolution, its recognition by all those who for long denied the evidence of the invincible momentum of revolutionary movements, asserts itself as a contribution of weight in favour of all forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America who fight for their complete and final emancipation.<sup>40</sup>

In the international field, both China and Algeria affirmed their agreement on major international issues, except on the question of the Soviet Union, because, as Boumedienne told the Chinese:

In our epoch, the fundamental contradiction is that between the aggressive forces of imperialism and the unshakeable forces of imperialism and the unshakeable will of the Third World countries for liberation.<sup>41</sup> [Emphasis added]

#### 15.1.1.2. Mali

As has already been pointed out,<sup>42</sup> whereas in Ghana<sup>43</sup> the overthrow of Nkrumah was followed by an end to Sino-Ghanaian diplomatic relations. In Mali the overthrow of President Keita (November 1968), a long-standing friend of China, did not interrupt the friendly relations between the two countries. The continuation of Mali's anti-imperialist policy,<sup>44</sup> under the leadership of Moussa Troare, the new President, on the one hand, and on the other, the abatement of the original vigour and rigorousness of GPCR at the time of the *coup* (November 1968),<sup>45</sup> must have contributed to ensuring that cordial relations between China and Mali would continue.

The construction of projects promised by China during Keita's rule continued.<sup>46</sup> In September 1970, Chinese personnel completed two aid projects in Bamako.<sup>47</sup>

In December 1970, a Malian delegation led by Charles Samba Sissoko, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, visited China,<sup>48</sup> and signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation between the two countries by which China granted Mali an interest-free loan of \$20 million.<sup>49</sup>

In November 1971, Kissima Doukara, Minister of Defence, led a military delegation to China,<sup>50</sup> presumably to request military aid (because military personnel do not usually travel for merely reciprocal reasons).

When China entered UN, Mamadu Boubacar Kante, Vice-Chairman of the Malian delegation, not only strongly criticised its persistent refusal to recognise PRC as the

sole representative of the Chinese people, but also went so far as to stress that China's admission to UN was a part of the successful Chinese revolution in the economic and technological fields, which was achieved during and by GPCR. Kante argued that

...[t]he Cultural Revolution that crowned the heroic struggle of the Chinese was due to their own power, their own ability. This Revolution has still not ended. Yet the world stands amazed. But detractors have not seen that in fact China is strong and that in has emerged from the battle ready to meet history with a culture and moral heritage that has been reassessed, the atom tamed, techniques perfected and in all fields enjoying a sophisticated economy.<sup>51</sup>

In August 1972, a Malian government delegation visited China with the aim of enhancing the friendship between the two countries and facilitating the process of economic and technical aid given to Mali by China.<sup>52</sup>

In April 1973, a team of 45 medical personnel arrived in Bamako to serve in Mali.<sup>53</sup> In June 1973, President Moussa Traore paid a visit to China. During this visit, which lasted a week, Traore praised China for its technological success and for the sincerity of its aid. China's success constituted

[a] source of encouragement, assurance and hope for the peoples of the Third World.<sup>54</sup>

China's easy terms of economic aid and co-operation, including interest-free loans, drew Traore's praise.<sup>55</sup> At the same time, Traore told his hosts that



[o]n the international plane, the views of our two countries coincide on most of major international problems.

Indeed, our two countries have always stood side by side in the anti-imperialist camp on the side of the oppressed peoples, whether on the problem of de-colonialisation, the struggle against apartheid, the situation in the Middle East, the support of the peoples of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos or international economic relations.

In this regard, Mali considers the restoration to the People's Republic of China of her rights as a founding member of the United Nations as a victory for the forces of peace and justice.

I am convinced that because of the identity of our objectives on the national and international planes, my visit will contribute to further strengthening the ties of friendship, solidarity and co-operation between our two peoples and our two governments. This is our most ardent wish.<sup>56</sup>  
[Emphasis added]

LR

The restoration of China's seat in UN followed by its resumption of permanent status in the Security Council were viewed by Traore as major factors 'strengthening the capacity' of UN in

maintaining peace and international security [and] at the same time it [may] constitute a guarantee for the small countries which are often victims of direct imperialism.<sup>57</sup>

During this visit, Traore signed another agreement on Sino-Malian economic and technical co-operation,<sup>58</sup> under which China granted Mali an interest-free loan of \$10 million.<sup>59</sup>

In August 1973, Chinese personnel completed a tea plantation and a processing factory in Mali.<sup>60</sup> In the

meantime, work on other projects was nearing completion - including an agricultural machinery repair shop, a rice mill, and a sugar refinery.<sup>61</sup>

#### 15.1.1.3. Guinea

The 'progressive' character of Sekou Toure's leadership ensured China's continuing good relations with Guinea, even when GPCR was at its most intensive.<sup>62</sup>

Guinea's consistent policy of active anti-imperialism and the unequivocal support which it continued to give to PAIGC contributed to good relations between the two countries during this period<sup>63</sup> (1969-76).

In February 1969, a Guinean government delegation led by N. Keita, Minister of Commerce, Transport and Communications, visited China. A trade protocol and an agreement for a Chinese loan in the form of commodities to Guinea were signed.<sup>64</sup> N. Keita praised China for the assistance that it was extending to anti-imperialist countries.<sup>65</sup> In June 1969, Guinea was one of the first three African countries (the others being Tanzania and Zambia) to receive an ambassador<sup>66</sup> after China decided to resume normal diplomatic relations with the outside world following the hiatus caused by GPCR.

In September 1969, another Guinean government delegation paid a visit to China to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of China's National Day (1 October), at the end of which another economic, and technical co-operation agreement was signed. Under this agreement, China pledged to repair the Conakry-Kankan

railway, to help Guinea in its agricultural programme, and to construct a cement factory;<sup>67</sup> 16,000 uniforms were to be given to the Guinean Militia, and 30 Landrovers to PDG (*Parti Democratique de Guinée*).<sup>68</sup>

In October 1969 too, Chinese workers began the construction of a sugar refinery in Guinea; in November the construction of another<sup>69</sup> hydro-electric station was begun.<sup>70</sup> By the end of 1969, Chinese workers had completed the construction of a bamboo processing centre.<sup>71</sup>

In May 1970, Chinese experts completed an oil processing plant, the first of its kind to be built in Guinea.<sup>72</sup> At the same time, a Chinese-built high tension transmission and distribution project capable of supplying power to 5 cities was put into operation.<sup>73</sup> In October 1970 an economic delegation of the Guinean government headed by Tibou Toumkara, Secretary of State for Rural Economy and Handicrafts, paid a visit to China. A protocol of Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation was signed.<sup>74</sup>

During the period 1969-72, Guinea signed 10 protocols and agreements with China - more than any other country in Africa.<sup>75</sup>

Sino-Guinean relations were brought closer when China strongly condemned the Portuguese invasion of Guinea (22 November 1970), and gave unequivocal support to Guinean resistance to it.<sup>76</sup> The Chinese government issued a full statement in support of Guinea's resistance of Portuguese

aggression and African<sup>77</sup> condemnation of such an action.

The statement pointed out that the invasion was

...a new monstrous crime committed by US imperialism and the Portuguese colonialists against the Guinean people and other African people. The Chinese government and people express their boundless indignation and the strongest condemnation against this marked act of aggression.<sup>78</sup>

China sent Guinea a sum of \$10 million.<sup>79</sup> Chinese doctors arrived in Conakry to treat Guinean soldiers wounded in their resistance against Portuguese and NATO mercenaries.<sup>80</sup> In the following year further financial aid involving \$9.8 million was sent by China to Guinea to help the country to offset the budget difficulty in the coming year (1971).<sup>81</sup>

China's support for Guinea gained it the following tribute (November 1970) by President Sekou Toure

I have the honour to extend to you my sincere, militant gratitude for your courageous taking of an unequivocal stand showing solidarity and support to Guinean people in their fierce war of resistance against the Portuguese fascist bandits. I assure you of the consciousness of total preparedness of the people of Guinea, who are fully mobilised with a view to carrying on the struggle against the international imperialist hydra until its last strongholds are battered down...As concrete proof of your sincerity and solidarity I am convinced that our peoples will emerge from their severe trials with their relations of mutual understanding, mutual respect and true militant co-operation even more consolidated.<sup>82</sup>

Guinea played a leading role in and outside the United Nations in campaigning for Chinese representation in the organisation. When China was seated in the UN the Vice Chairman of the Guinean delegation viewed the event as a lesson to the Western powers to correct their other mistakes, including their support of, and recognition for, Rhodesian and South African white minority *régimes*.<sup>83</sup>

#### 15.1.1.4. The Sudan

The Sudan was the first clear instance of an African state<sup>84</sup> towards which China's attitude was governed by its obsession with the Soviet Union's influence in the region. This was when China decided to establish friendly relations with the *régime* of Jaāfar Al Numeiri against the *coup d' état* (July 1971) led by communist-inclined forces with the support of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which was then the largest communist party in the Arab world and the second largest communist party in Africa after the SACP.<sup>85</sup>

Before discussing the political aspect of China's policy towards the Sudan, it is necessary to consider briefly the events which led to the abortive *coup* of July 1971 and the general political and ideological orientation of the Numeiri *régime*

In May 1969, General Numeiri and other radical officers—in the army brought to power a 'progressive government' in the Sudan. SCP was initially opposed to those in the army who advocated a *coup* in order to steer the Sudan in a right-wing and pro-Western direction.

SCP justified its stand on the ground that conditions were not yet ripe and social mobilisation was still at a low level. The *coup*, SCP argued, would only open even greater opportunities for power for the Sudanese bourgeoisie.<sup>86</sup>

When the *coup* took place (May 1969), SCP supported it on the ground that it was led by radical elements within the army. *Withholding* support from them would serve the interest of the right wing which had already excluded the communists from the government of 1965-69.<sup>87</sup>

The new government, under Numeir's leadership of the Revolutionary Council, adopted progressive domestic and external policies.

Banks and foreign-owned companies were nationalised and a five year plan for economic development (non-capitalist in character)<sup>88</sup> was sought to be introduced.

In the international sphere, the new government adopted a friendly approach towards socialist countries. For the first time, Sudan seemed to be moving out of the Western orbit. The appointment of four communist Ministers<sup>89</sup> gave the Sudan a radical image.<sup>90</sup>

Within the 'Progressive' atmosphere that was thus developing in the Sudan, relations with China became more and more positive in character and in keeping with the Sudan's anti-imperialist orientation.

In June 1970, China and the Sudan signed their first economic aid agreement during a visit to China by a Sudanese government delegation led by Mansour Mahgoub.<sup>91</sup>

The agreement included a Chinese loan to Sudan estimated at \$42 million, repayable within 16 years.

Two months later (August 1970), President Numeiri paid a visit to China during which China,<sup>92</sup> for the first time, found a Sudanese leader positively anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist and ready to support liberation movements in Africa, Indo-China and other parts of the world.<sup>93</sup> From China, Numeiri went to North Korea,<sup>94</sup> where he was offered more aid, and the host government promised to construct a china-ware factory in the Sudan, and send equipment for producing cement.<sup>95</sup>

In December 1970, the two countries signed a protocol on medical aid under which China agreed to send doctors, medicines and medical equipment to the Sudan.<sup>96</sup> A Chinese survey team also arrived in Khartoum to help with road construction.<sup>97</sup>

At the same time, relations between the Soviet Union and the Sudan continued on an even keel after the *coup*. Before the *coup* the Soviet Union had given the Sudan aid worth \$64 million.<sup>98</sup> Although no more financial aid was given to the new government of Numeiri, it was reported in April 1971 that the number of Soviet advisors had risen to 2,000.<sup>99</sup>

During the period May 1969-May 1971, Numeiri found himself in the middle of a conflict between the extreme left and the extreme right in both the government and the Parliament. He was seen as a not 'progressive' enough leader by the communists. In addition, SCP, like its

Egyptian counterpart during the late '50s, was opposed<sup>100</sup> to Numeiri's moves to join the Tripoli Alliance between Libya, Egypt and the Sudan (April 1971). Both Qaddafi and Sadat were anti-communist and opposed to any revolutionary change communist in character. Moreover, they were friendly to one another at the time. Unity with these countries would certainly have weakened SCP and reduced its influence to the level of that of the Egyptian communist party.

The communists also opposed Numeiri's policy of nationalisation in a precipitate manner. They favoured gradual economic reform eventually leading to 'successful nationalisation'.<sup>101</sup>

Numeiri, however, needed the support of the communists. Opposition to his government was strong not only from politically conservative elements which had controlled the government before the 1969 coup, but from extreme religious (i.e. the Ansar, Khatimya and Khadya) groups with which he had clashed.

Numeiri's balancing act between the Scylla of communism and the Charybdis of conservative and fundamentalist opposition consisted of leaning on SCP and other progressive groups which he defended on the ground that his régime was progressive enough as it was and deserved the support of SCP and other forward-looking forces.

However, in actual fact, Numeiri's policy was aimed at wiping out communist influence and activity in the country, thus removing a major obstacle to the government.



At the same time, he hoped to gain the support of religious groups and right-wing elements at the expense of the communists.<sup>102</sup>

Numeiri had to pay a heavy price for his policy. In July 1971, progressive forces in the Sudan including the communists in the army, reached the conclusion that Nemeiry must be overthrown.

A *coup* (19 July 1971) led by Hashim Al Ata, a communist <sup>inclined</sup> leader and Vice President of the communist dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), failed within three days.

Its failure was partly related to the direct support given by Arab countries, especially Egypt and Libya, to Numeiri. Sadat placed his forces in the south at the disposal of the Sudanese Defence Minister, who was on a visit to Egypt at the time of the *coup* which was supported by the Sudanese Air Force. For its part, Libya forced the aircraft carrying two progressive leaders (Bakar Anwar Nūr and Farūq Abdu Allah) from London to land in Tripoli. They had been invited by Hashim Al Ata to form the new government.

Another reason for the failure of the *coup* lay in the fact that in the absence of mass mobilisation it lacked popular support. However, the *coup* was certainly led by forces which were communist <sup>inclined and</sup> enjoyed communist support. It was aimed at eradicating the rapidly growing influence of bourgeois elements in Nemeiry's government.

A few days after the failure of the *coup*, (28 July 1971), Abdul Al Khalīq Mahgoub, General Secretary of SCP

and Shafai Ahmed Al Sheikh, Minister for Southern Affairs, along with other leading communist activists, were executed.

In contrast to the Soviet Union and its European allies, which strongly criticised Numeiri's conduct<sup>103</sup> and the 'barbarity and savagery' of the execution of the communist leaders,<sup>104</sup> China sent a letter of congratulation and encouragement to Numeiri on his success in crushing the *coup*.<sup>105</sup>

Ogunsanwo gave an interesting but far from convincing explanation of China's behaviour on ideological grounds. He argued that the

Chinese action can be said to have helped the general cause of Communism. If China had not come to Numeiri's support, then it is possible that anti-communist feeling in the Sudan following the *coup* would have been absolute, and that country would have gone over to imperialism.<sup>106</sup>

Ogunsanwo seemed to discount the fact that as second largest communist party in Africa, <sup>the</sup> ASP did enjoy a degree of popular support. He rested his argument that China's stance against the *coup* could be justified on the ideological ground of saving the country from falling within the imperialist orbit on the supposition that communists in the Sudan were generally opposed to the *coup*.

However, it did not appear to have mattered to China whether Nasser would or would not go over to imperialism, when it condemned his oppression of the Egyptian communists during the late '50s. In the event, Nasser,

for reasons already discussed,<sup>107</sup> did not become pro-imperialist despite China's condemnations of his régime. Paradoxically, China's failure to criticise Numeiri did not 'save' the latter from assuming an actively pro-Western stance. For, it was only after the *coup* that the Sudan improved its relations with Britain, the United States and other Western powers.<sup>108</sup>

At the same time, Nemeiry began to reverse the socialistically orientated domestic policies that had been adopted before the abortive *coup*.

The progressive character of Numeiri's government prior to the abortive *coup* seemed to have been dictated by the radical forces in his government. After their elimination or execution Numeiri started to reveal his true political character. He became openly pro-Western and pro-imperialist in his general political orientation. By 1975 Numeiri had suspended a number of nationalised projects, and a law was passed offering guarantees to foreign capital.<sup>109</sup>

Ogunsanwo would in all probability have refrained from making such judgements and predictions had he written his book two or three years later, after the abortive *coup*.<sup>110</sup>

China's refusal to support the attempted *coup* in the Sudan was, however, dictated by SCP's close relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>111</sup> The Sudan seemed to be the best place offering a ready-made opportunity to China to demonstrate to 'non-progressive' governments allergic to communism the validity

of its strategy of 'broader united front' including opposition to the Soviet Union or any pro-Soviet force.

Concern on China's part with State-to-State relations was especially important at the time of the *coup* (July 1971), when it was actively campaigning to win support for its admission to UN. Support for the *coup* would in all probability have undermined China's campaign for international support among conservative and moderate governments. Furthermore, China's policy towards the Sudan bore a similiarity to its policy in respect of the revolutionary uprising (JVP) in Sri Lanka in April 1971.<sup>112</sup>

After the abortive *coup*, relations between China and the Sudan were consolidated further, whilst relations between the Sudan and the Soviet Union deteriorated.<sup>113</sup> Less than a month (9 August) after the *coup* (22 July 1971), a Sudanese government delegation, led by Khalid Hassan Abbas, Vice-President and Defence Minister, paid a visit to China. Economic and technical co-operation agreements were signed between China and the Sudan.<sup>114</sup> Following this visit, China (24 August) gave the Sudan another interest-free loan of \$40 million for constructing bridges, roads, a textile factory and an international conference hall.<sup>115</sup>

During the first three years after the *coup*, however, Numeiri continued to advocate a policy which sounded anti-imperialist. Thus, when China entered UN, Fakhreddine Mohammed, Vice-Chairman of the Sudanese delegation expressed the view that China's formal entry into the

organisation represented a victory for anti-colonialist forces struggling against imperialist domination both within and outside UN because

[w]e have now among us the representatives of a government dedicated to the unrelenting fight against colonialism and alien domination, and committed to the support of the sovereign equality of all states, great or small, as it is indeed committed to the support of the right and dignity of the peoples to independence and self administration.''<sup>16</sup>

Khalid Hassān Abbas paid a second visit to China in December 1971, '<sup>17</sup> during which he was received rather coolly, presumably for the reason that it proved embarrassing for the Chinese leaders to express solidarity with representatives of a *régime* which had just executed its prominent local communists, and continued to hunt the others. However, Abbas exuded enthusiasm for China and praised its policies of 'firmly standing' behind his government.

Our people and our revolution once suffered from a perfidious conspiracy which was carried out by certain elements under 'leftist' slogans, in close collusion with certain people in countries in the socialist camp who claimed to be friendly with us...Our people and our revolutionary leaders will forever be proud of the brave stance taken by their militant leader, Mao Tse-tung and their great party in firmly standing by our people when the traitors' conspiracy took place and in the ensuing days.''<sup>18</sup>

Abbas's visit was followed by a military agreement (April 1972) between Sudan and China under the provisions of which the latter agreed to train the Sudanese armed forces.<sup>119</sup> At the same time, Chinese experts continued to construct aid projects and fulfil China's commitments to the Sudan.<sup>120</sup>

In October 1973, a Sudanese delegation led by Mansour Khalid, Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited China in order to promote even further friendly relations between the two countries.<sup>121</sup>

#### 15.1.1.5. Benin

The *coup d' état* (October 1972) in Benin (Dahomey, prior to 1975) resulted in the overthrow of the pro-Western government. The new *régime*, under the leadership of Mathieu Kerkou, gave Benin a radical image of opposition to colonialism, imperialism and racism.

The new government introduced state control by nationalisation of key sectors of the economy.<sup>122</sup>

In 1973, a National Revolutionary Council (CNR) was established as the supreme governing body. The government subsequently (13 November 1974) proclaimed socialism based on Marxist-Leninist orientation as its new political and economic ideology.<sup>123</sup> Attempts made by French, Gabonese and Moroccan mercenaries (May 1976) to overthrow<sup>124</sup> the revolutionary government failed. -

Immediately after the *coup* (October 1972), China recognised the new government and welcomed its national policy of opposition to foreign domination.<sup>125</sup> Two months

later (29 December) diplomatic relations between Benin and China were resumed.<sup>126</sup> China signed with Benin an economic and technical co-operation agreement (29 December 1972) including provision for an interest-free loan of \$46 million.<sup>127</sup>

#### 15.1.1.6 The Congo(B)

The Republic of Congo(B) - renamed People's Republic in 1969<sup>128</sup> was among the countries which continued to have warm relationships with China during the 1966-69 period. The two countries drew even closer together during the '70s as the Congo(B) developed into a Marxist-Leninist state.<sup>129</sup> In September 1970, the Congo(B) began the process of socialisation of the national economy by nationalising the Jiacongo Sugar Company.

Following an abortive *coup* led by Kikanga (a most conservative ex-lieutenant who had the support of Zaire), the Ngouabi government became even more radical.<sup>130</sup>

In September 1969, Chinese experts completed the fabrication of the Kinsoundi Textile Combine, the first state textile combine in the Congo(B). At the ceremony marking the handing over of the textile combine, Eduard Madingo, Secretary for State for Economy and Finance, stressed that

...such generosity is remarkable, for the Chinese technical assistance experts displayed a spirit of sacrifice, hard work and devotedness in studying the project, in its execution and preparations for its operation. This has enlightened all those who worked with them, far and near, thus vividly illustrating the thoughts of

Chairman Mao Tse-tung. In line with this thought the Chinese assistance technicians, wherever they are sent, live under conditions which are similar to those of the people of the country, and set an example in the idea and consciousness of socialist and internationalist revolution.<sup>131</sup>

In October 1969, the Congo(B) and China signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation.<sup>132</sup> In 1970, a Chinese military delegation led by Su Yu, Vice Minister of National Defence, paid a visit to the Congo(B) with the aim of further increasing Sino-Congolese(B) co-operation in the military field which began during the '60s. In July 1970, Alfred Raoul, Vice Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of the Congo, visited China, where he expressed his country's appreciation of China's support for African revolutionary forces in Africa and for the fundamental issues of liberation and economic independence.<sup>134</sup> This was reaffirmed by Li Hsien-nien, Vice Premier of China

At present, the African people's struggle against US-led imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism is developing in depth, and the flames of armed struggle keep on spreading. From their practice in struggle, the broad masses of the African people have come ever more clearly to see through the US imperialist ambitious design of trying to replace old colonialism and realise that US imperialism is the most dangerous enemy of the African people. Dauntless in the face of US imperialism, the African people are liquidating its military bases and smashing its subversive activities winning a series of brilliant victories. We believe that African peoples, further strengthening their unity and persevering in frustrated struggle, will certainly drive US



imperialism and colonialism and neo-colonialism out of the African continent and the African peoples will surely win complete victory in national liberation.<sup>135</sup>

In October 1970, a delegation of the Congo(B), led by Major Joachim Yhombi-Opango, paid a visit to China.<sup>136</sup> Two military agreements between the Congo and China (September 1971 and February 1972) were signed, by which the latter agreed to train the Congolese army and provide heavy military equipment.<sup>137</sup>

When China had its seat in <sup>the</sup> UN restored (25 October 1971), the permanent representative of the Congo(B) viewed the event

as one of the most important days in the organisation.<sup>138</sup>

Co-operation in the economic field between China and the Congo increased. In January 1971, Chinese experts began the construction of a two hundred-bed hospital in the Congo.<sup>139</sup> This was followed by China's agreement to finance and construct a hydro-electric complex on the Bouenza River in the southern Congo(B) capable of producing 130 million kw per year.<sup>140</sup>

Within a period of 15 months (July 1970-March 1972) Chinese workers completed the construction of a Dockyard named Chacona.<sup>141</sup> At the same time, projects that had been promised by China during the '60s, including cotton plantations, paddy fields, a tea plantation, a water supply project, a saw mill, and a technical school, were also completed.<sup>142</sup>

In January 1973, China gave the Congo(B) an interest-free loan of \$30 million.<sup>143</sup> President Ngouabi visited China (July 1973)<sup>144</sup> where he praised China for its genuine co-operation in support of economic emancipation of the developing world and for its support to the oppressed peoples.<sup>145</sup> The easy terms of China's loan and aid were much appreciated by Henri Lopes, the Prime Minister of the Congo(B) when he visited Beijing in February 1975.<sup>146</sup>

#### 15.1.1.7. Somalia

In October 1969, Somalia showed, for the first time after independence (June 1960), evidence of its 'progressive' policy by choosing a non-capitalist path of development<sup>147</sup> and opposing imperialist countries. When General Mohammed Siad Barre<sup>148</sup> seized power (21 October), in the name of a Supreme Revolutionary Council, his anti-imperialism was intensified by the military support which Western countries continued to extend to Somalia's antagonists, Ethiopia and Kenya.

At such a juncture, it would be natural to expect China to hasten to the task of forging close links with Somalia. However, this was not initially the case. Siad Barre's progressive policy was naturally liked, but his close relations with the Soviet Union were not to China's liking. Full satisfaction with Siad Barre's 'progressive' move inevitably depended upon his inclusion of the Soviet Union among the targets of the 'broader united front'. It is worth repeating that such a suggestion, was rejected

not only by Siad Barre but also by many other anti-imperialist forces in Africa.

Despite Somalia's close association with the Soviet Union during this period, (1969-76), culminating in the conclusion of a Twenty-Year Friendship Treaty (1974)<sup>149</sup> between the two countries, China did nothing to undermine its normal relations with Somalia as they had developed during the '60s.

China had few options open to show its disapproval of Somalia's close ties with the Soviet Union. It could not draw closer to Ethiopia, Somalia's antagonistic neighbour without endangering China's ideological credibility in Africa. The fact that Ethiopia and the Soviet Union were at loggerheads because of the latter's close relations with Somalia was not enough to justify China's support for Haile Selassie's imperial-feudal régime against President Siad Barre's radical government.

China's huge economic aid to Ethiopia and the welcome given to Haile Selassie in Beijing (October 1971) were puzzling enough, but to have sided with Ethiopia against Somalia in intra-African disputes would be going too far. China had already compromised its position as a revolutionary power in the eyes of many 'progressive' forces in and outside Africa by supporting Nemeiri against pro-communist elements in the Sudan during and after the abortive *coup* of July 1971. Thus, despite the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the military and economic sphere<sup>150</sup> in the Horn of Africa, China's policy towards

the Somali anti-imperialist government seemed to be level-headed.

Until 1976, Somalia continued to receive aid from both the Soviet Union and China on a large scale. Chinese experts sank wells in Heresia.<sup>151</sup> Chinese experts also completed the construction of a rice and tobacco experimental station in Johar which they formally handed over to the Somali government in April 1970.<sup>152</sup> In 1970, China also promised to help Somalia construct two research institutions.<sup>153</sup>

During his visit to China (June 1970), Ainarshe Guled expressed his country's appreciation of China's generous aid, and the hard work and sense of commitment of the Chinese experts.

We are grateful to the People's Republic of China for the assistance and aid which it so generously extended to our people. Spectacular results have already been achieved through this aid. Experiments carried out through Chinese aid and by Chinese experts have already proved that both rice and tobacco can be successfully cultivated in Somalia.<sup>154</sup>

At the same time, Ainashe reaffirmed Somalia's determination to work

...tirelessly...for the restoration of the legitimate right of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and the expulsion of the illegal Chian Kai-Shek régime, when this objective was realised the progressive forces in that world body would have gained a weighty ally and friend.<sup>155</sup>

The Chinese leaders found their Somali guest to share China's international attitudes and policies except towards the Soviet Union.<sup>156</sup> At a banquet given in his honour by Tung Pi-Wu, Vice-Chairman, Ainashe stated his country's internal and international position in the following terms:

After the defeat of imperialism and colonialism in many parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, ... colonialism took to subtle means of penetrating these areas again. In many parts power was passed to reactionary régimes that were distinguished from their former colonial rulers only by the colour of their skin. Neo-colonialism therefore flourished and its objectives and purposes were easily fulfilled. Progressive régimes were undermined and removed through systematic coups.<sup>157</sup>

During his visit, Ainashe indicated that the Somali government would appreciate China's support on the Ogaden question. The Chinese leaders played this aspect of his visit down by not referring to it in their statements and comments.<sup>158</sup> At the end of Ainashe's visit, an economic and technical protocol was signed between China and Somalia in which the former promised to expand the experimental rice and tobacco farms, and to build cigarette and match factories as part of its aid.<sup>159</sup>

China also agreed to construct a meat processing factory (December 1970).<sup>160</sup>

When Somalia was badly hit by drought in 1970-71, the Chinese Red Cross Society donated (January 1971) medical aid and food supplies to the victims estimated at a value of 1 million Yuan, (3 million Somali shillings).<sup>161</sup>

Sino-Somali relations developed further when China granted (July 1971) Somalia an interest-free loan of \$110 million<sup>162</sup> in aid of the country's new three-year development plan. This financial offer resulted from visits to China by two Somali delegations in quick succession (May-July 1971).<sup>163</sup> The most spectacular project covered by this loan was the 600 mile north-south road linking Beledwin and Hangeisa, second only in size and scope to the TanZam railway.<sup>164</sup>

In May 1972, President Siad Barre paid a state visit to China where he joined his hosts in condemning Western imperialism (but not 'social imperialism'), in reaffirming their unequivocal support for liberation movements in Africa as well as in other parts of the world.<sup>165</sup>

This visit contributed further to friendly relations between China and Somalia and enhanced economic co-operation between the two countries. Chinese workers completed the construction of a water conservancy project (February 1973-March 1974).<sup>166</sup> In February 1974, an irrigation project near Hargeisa built with Chinese help was also completed.<sup>167</sup> China gave Somalia an interest-free loan (1974) of \$1 million. By 1974, Somalia became the third largest recipient of Chinese aid (\$134 million)<sup>168</sup> in Africa (after Tanzania and Zambia).

In February 1975, a shipload of 4,038 tons of sorghum and seven tons of medicine were donated by the Chinese Red Cross to relieve hardship caused by drought in Somalia. This was followed (March 1975) by 25 crates of Chinese

medicine as a donation<sup>169</sup> to the drought-stricken areas in the country.

#### 15.1.1.8. Tanzania and Zambia

China's relations with Tanzania and Zambia during this period (1969-76) were dominated by the construction of the TanZam Railway. For this reason, it would be appropriate to consider China's relations with the two countries together in a single section.

##### 15.1.1.8.1. Tanzania

Tanzania was the fifth country in the world (after Albania, France, Rumania and Pakistan) and the first in Africa to receive a Chinese Ambassador (12 June 1969),<sup>170</sup> after China decided to re-enter the diplomatic arena after the most intensive phase of GPCR.


It is appropriate to recall that China's relations with Tanzania during the period of GPCR, for reasons already explained,<sup>171</sup> were not affected by the adverse effect which GPCR had on China's relations with most other countries.

During this period (1969-76) Sino-Tanzanian relations became even closer than in any previous period in the political, economic and military spheres. Some observers even went to the extent of characterising the relationship between China and Tanzania as an 'alliance'.<sup>172</sup>

The positive and actively progressive character of the Tanzanian government under Nyerere's leadership - especially in relation to national liberation movements in

MAP 15.2

THE TANZANIAN-ZAMBIAN (TANZAM) RAILWAY



Source: R. Hall and H. Peyman, The Great Uhuru Railway (London: Victor Gollancz, 1976) [as reproduced in A. Gavshon, Crisis in Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 131]



southern Africa which successfully intensified their struggle during this period (1969-76) - played an important part in bringing the two countries closer together during the '70s.

During the period under consideration, (1969-76), projects promised by China during the '60s were completed or nearing completion. At the same time, aid was also given to Tanzania. In December 1969, new military barracks, built with China's aid in Machingwea, were handed over to the Tanzanian authorities. In January 1970, Chinese military experts took over the training of the Tanzanian armed forces after Tanzania's decision not to renew an earlier agreement on the subject with Canada.

In January 1970, Chinese workers completed the construction of a national stadium in Zanzibar.<sup>173</sup> An agricultural tools factory was also completed soon after (March 1970).<sup>174</sup> A hospital, financed by the Chinese government and built by Chinese experts at Nkoani Pemba (Zanzibar's small island) was opened in July 1970. A plant for the manufacture of vaccines against smallpox and tuberculosis at Mabibo, near Dar es Salaam, was also completed in the same year (1970).<sup>175</sup> 46 Chinese doctors arrived in Dar es Salaam in September 1970 to serve in 14 medical stations in the country.<sup>176</sup>

In November 1970, a Tanzanian military delegation led by Colonel Alf Mahfudh, Chief of Operations and Training of the Tanzanian Defence Forces, paid a visit to China,<sup>177</sup> presumably for negotiations on the equipment of a naval base that was being built under Chinese aid which was

nearing completion. The naval base was handed over to the Tanzanian government in the following month.<sup>179</sup> In June 1972, a Tanzanian government delegation visited China<sup>179</sup> to facilitate economic co-operation between the two countries. This represented a watershed in the relations between the two countries, because the construction of the major project of the TanZam railway had just begun.

In December 1973, 18 Chinese medical experts arrived in Zanzibar to work for two years. A new sugar factory, built and financed under Chinese aid was handed over to the Tanzanian government in January 1974.<sup>180</sup>

President Nyerere paid his third visit to China in March 1974. At a banquet given by China's Prime Minister in his honour, Nyerere expressed his gratitude to and admiration for the hard work of Chinese personnel and for China's commitment to carry out projects and offers of aid given to Tanzania. Referring to the TanZam Railway, Nyerere explained that the project showed

...the world what friendship and revolutionary solidarity mean.<sup>181</sup>

China took the opportunity to announce a new interest-free loan to Tanzania estimated at \$75 million.<sup>182</sup>

China's support for Tanzania's policy of self-reliance extended to the political and military spheres as well. In September 1976, China completed the construction of a military and political academy. Tanzania thus hoped to train its officers and party cadres inside the country instead of sending them abroad.<sup>183</sup>

#### 15.1.1.8.2. Zambia

President Kaunda's political 'moderation' was no obstacle to Zambia being placed by Chinese leaders in the category of 'progressive' African countries during this period.

Zambia was favoured with greater aid than even countries which adopted clear-cut and firm policies against Western powers (with special reference to the latter's collaboration with Portuguese colonialism the racist *régime* of South Africa and the illegal racist *régime* of Southern Rhodesia). Two factors would appear to have contributed to China's characterisation of Zambia as a 'progressive' country on balance.

- i. During the period under discussion (1969-76), Zambia became, mainly for strategic reasons, the most active base for guerrilla operations and training. China was already involved in training guerrilla forces from Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia [South West Africa] and South Africa [Azania] in Zambia. In late 1968, with China's aid, over seven bases for training liberation fighters were opened in Zambia. By 1973, there were nearly 80 bases at which more than 5,000 liberation fighters in the region were being trained.<sup>184</sup>
- ii. Zambia, during this period, became the most outspoken country against the role of the Soviet Union in Africa as well as in the world as a whole. When the Soviet Union intervened in Czechoslovakia (August 1968), President Kaunda expressed the hope that

God will help the Czechoslovakian people to fight against Russian imperialism. '65

In July 1970, Chinese workers began the construction of a road, 380 km long, linking Lusaka and Mankoya. China gave Zambia 3 powerful radio transmitters<sup>'66</sup> to help jam South African and Rhodesian broadcasts and propaganda against the liberation forces in the region (November 1970).

In September 1972, M.M. Chona, Vice-President of Zambia, led a goodwill mission to China. Referring to the TanZam railway which was then already nearing completion, Chona paid the following tribute to China:

China, being herself a developing country, must be making great sacrifices to spare whatever aid she gives to the Third World. The construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway line will greatly strengthen us both politically and economically. Not only will the railway line serve Tanzanians and Zambians, but it will stand for [contributing] to the development of inter-regional communications in Africa. It will have contributed significantly to the strengthening of Africa. '67

When Rhodesia closed its borders (May 1973) with Zambia in retaliation against operations launched from Zambian bases, China extended a grant to the sum of \$10 million to Zambia. '68

In February 1974 President Kaunda paid another visit to China, '69 where he once again expressed great appreciation of China's aid and support to Zambia. Zambia

was granted an interest-free loan of \$33 million in order to enable it to improve the Serenje-Samfya road and undertake other technical and agricultural projects.<sup>190</sup>

In March 1975, the Zambian Foreign Minister visited China.<sup>191</sup> Another Chinese interest-free loan of \$21.5 million was given (July 1975) to finance the road between Kaoma and Lusaka<sup>192</sup> which was being built with China's help.<sup>193</sup>

#### 15.1.1.8.3 TanZam Railway

The political motivations underlying the TanZam Railway project and the economic objectives of the countries concerned have already been discussed.<sup>194</sup> In this section we shall refer only to the construction process and the completion of this project which greatly enhanced relations between China on the one hand and Tanzania and Zambia on the other.

The greater part of China's aid to, and relations with, Tanzania and Zambia during this period (1969-76) was devoted to the construction of the TanZam Railway (26 October 1970-23 October 1975).<sup>195</sup>

The first stage in the launching of the construction of the project took place when representatives of the three countries - China, Tanzania and Zambia - signed (12 July 1970) three protocols and minutes in Beijing.<sup>196</sup> Under these agreements, China agreed to grant Tanzania and Zambia an interest-free loan of \$405 million (\$135 million to Zambia, and \$270 million to Tanzania)<sup>197</sup> repayable over a period of thirty years starting in 1983.<sup>198</sup>

At the ceremony marking the beginning of construction of the project [a total distance of 1,860 km, (i.e. 1,115 miles) of which 976 km were in Tanzania, and 884 km in Zambia], President Kaunda expressed the following view on such a major commitment on China's part:

Geography...may not allow us to choose our neighbours, but we can at least choose our friends and our enemies. The Chinese people are our friends and they will remain so, so long as it is to the benefit of our respective peoples.<sup>199</sup>

The project marked the largest single commitment abroad<sup>200</sup> by China - financially and technologically.

Within a period of less than five years (October 1970-September 1975), Chinese workers and experts completed the project, including 147 stations and 300 bridges. The total cost of the project was estimated at \$500 million.<sup>201</sup> The technical needs of the project were met by human resources consisting of 30,000 Chinese and 36,000 African workers who were involved in the construction of the project.<sup>202</sup>

The completion of the project caught Western observers by surprise, as they had doubted China's ability to complete such an enormous project, considering its financial and technical limitations. TanZam railway emerged as a symbol and concrete expression of China's support - for liberation forces in the region. China's international status<sup>203</sup> was enhanced, as indeed was its popularity all over Africa.

#### 15.1.1.9. Madagascar

For twelve years after its independence (1960-1972) Madagascar (Malagasy before 1975), which had the largest<sup>204</sup> Chinese community in Africa, remained loyal to France,<sup>205</sup> the former colonial and metropolitan power. As such it was one of the most hostile states in Africa towards communism as a whole, and to China in particular. President Philibert Tsiranana feared that the overseas Chinese living in Madagascar would serve as a base for China's subversive communist activities. For Tsiranana and his Western allies, Taiwan was preferable to PRC for diplomatic relations in order that Madagascar's strategic importance as an island in the Indian Ocean off the continental coast of Africa and as a bastion of anti-communism might be safeguarded.

This situation continued until 1972 when Tsiranana was forced to resign following a week-long protest by students, workers, intellectuals and progressive soldiers against his oppressive and pro-French *régime*.<sup>206</sup>

The new government, under the leadership of Gabriel Ramamansa, initiated radical domestic policies and changes inspired by socialist tendencies, including restriction on land ownership both by Malagasy nationals and by foreigners, and the transformation of much of the cultivable land into agricultural co-operatives.

Internationally, the new government broke off diplomatic relations with South Africa and Israel. At the same time, Madagascar loosened its ties with Western

countries by normalising relations with socialist countries.<sup>207</sup>

China strongly supported the new radical image of Madagascar and its opposition to the forces of colonialism and imperialism as well as their racist and Zionist allies.<sup>208</sup> China was the second (after the Soviet Union: October 1972)<sup>209</sup> socialist country to establish diplomatic relations with Madagascar (November 1972).<sup>210</sup> Formal procedures for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Madagascar were effected during a visit to China by a delegation from Madagascar under the leadership of Didier Ratsiraka.<sup>211</sup>

China's aid to Madagascar was begun within a month of the overthrow of the Tsiranana régime. Following Madagascar's decision to sever diplomatic relations with South Africa, China promised to help the former to build a hotel and to provide aid.<sup>212</sup> In February 1973, China granted Madagascar an interest-free loan of \$12 million.<sup>213</sup>

In January 1974, Didier Ratsiraka, Madagascar's Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid another visit to China. He expressed his deep appreciation of China's support for African liberation and its continuous condemnation of imperialism and its allies.<sup>214</sup> Ratsiraka also signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation between China and Madagascar.<sup>215</sup>

In August 1975, China welcomed a visiting economic delegation from the Madagascar government. Another agreement on economic and technical co-operation was



signed between the two countries.<sup>216</sup> Included in this agreement was an interest-free loan of \$60 million from China, repayable from 1990 onwards. This aid was to be used for building a sugar factory, improve a national match factory, establish an experimental station for growing rice and vegetables, as well as other projects.<sup>217</sup>

#### 15.1.2. China's Relations with 'Non-Progressive' States

##### 15.1.2.1. Egypt

Following the death of Nasser (28 September 1970) Egypt, under the leadership of the moderate and pro-Western Mohammed Anwar Sadat, gradually lost its progressive image and active anti-imperialist character. The Soviet Union's hesitation and reluctance to provide Egypt with modern arms and military equipment opened the way for Western powers to gradually win Sadat over to their orbit.

In July 1972, prompted by his pro-Western character and anti-communist tendencies, Sadat ended Egypt's impatience with the Soviet Union's impractical promises of military aid, by ordering the withdrawal of <sup>over</sup> 20,000 Soviet experts and military advisers from the country,<sup>218</sup> thus bringing to an end the Soviet Union's influence and long-standing relations with the strategically highly important Egypt.

Egypt's politically moderate character did not seem to matter so much to China at this juncture. What mattered more to it was the fact that the Soviet Union was on the brink of a major set-back in a Third World country

after almost 2 decades (1955-72) of close friendship which was highly important for its strategic interests in the Middle East as well as in Africa as a whole. Sadat's decision to expel Soviet experts came as a golden opportunity to China in its Third World-wide campaign to include the Soviet Union as a target of the 'broader united front'. In fact, China found 'moderate' Sadat more acceptable than 'progressive' Nasser, because Nasser would not have turned against the Soviet Union - despite the latter's failure to fulfil its promises of military aid and delivery of modern weapons to Egypt after the 1967 war.

Unlike the Chinese leaders, but like most progressive leaders in Africa, Nasser always regarded the Soviet Union as an important anti-imperialist force. It was perhaps because China was well aware<sup>219</sup> of this fact, that in his message of support (2 February 1970) to Nasser, following Israel's intrusion in the Shadwan Island (January 1970), Zhou Enlai avoided using such words as 'hegemonism'. China was anxious not to offend Egypt by clubbing together U.S. imperialism and Israel with the Soviet Union.

the Chinese people are greatly concerned for the struggle of the people of the UAR, Palestine and other Arab countries, and are indignant at the US and Israeli clamours for aggression and their provocations. The struggle you are now waging is important for the struggle of the people of the whole world against imperialism and for national liberation... Although this struggle is very arduous...through armed struggle the Arab people will certainly overcome all kinds of difficulties, defeat US

and Israeli aggressors and win  
victory.<sup>220</sup> [emphasis added]

During the first two years of Sadat's rule (1970-72) and until the Soviet experts were expelled, China avoided any direct reference to the Soviet Union in its joint statements with, and messages to Egyptian leaders. When (January 1971) Mohammed Labib Shukeir, Speaker of the National Assembly paid a visit to China, he joined the Chinese leaders in expressing strong condemnation of American aggression against liberation forces in the Middle East.<sup>221</sup> Shukeir voiced Egypt's support for struggles against imperialism, but refrained from mentioning the Soviet Union in his speech .

We fully stand with you and fully support your right to liberate your own territory and your right of representing the entire great Chinese people as a member of the United Nations, until the rectification of the aggression perpetrated by US imperialism ever since your great revolution up to this time.<sup>222</sup>

In August 1971 another Egyptian delegation, led by the Minister for Economy and Foreign Trade, expressed similar views in China.<sup>223</sup>

In March 1972, an Egyptian government delegation led by Mohammed Riad, Counsellor for Foreign Affairs to the President, visited China. China praised Egypt's role in supporting liberation forces in Africa and in the Middle East, and condemned Israel.<sup>224</sup>

Sino-Egyptian relations assumed a more co-operative character in the political and economic fields after

Egypt's expulsion (July 1972) of Soviet advisers.<sup>225</sup> China granted Egypt an interest-free loan of \$80.5 million in September 1972, for the duration of 20 years to be used for the construction of 15 plants.<sup>226</sup>

In March 1973, Mohammed Hassan El-Zayyat, Egyptian Foreign Minister, paid a visit to China.<sup>227</sup> China and Egypt signed a protocol under which China agreed to build a second brick factory in Egypt.<sup>228</sup> During his visit to China in September 1973, Egypt's Vice-President condemned Big Power hegemonism and praised China for its support for, and solidarity with, the African and Arab peoples against imperialism and hegemonism.<sup>229</sup>

From 1972 onwards, China's interest in finding a solution in the Middle East had as its focus not only anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism but also accused the Soviet Union of causing provocations in the region rather than encouraging a settlement of the Middle East conflict.

The crucial reason why this question [the Middle East question] remained unsolved over a long period lies in the frenzied connection between the two super powers in this region.<sup>230</sup>

#### 15.1.2.2. Tunisia

Our relations with China were suspended only because of the latter's provocations and threats to Africa. Once it had frozen its earlier revolutionary hardline policy, we were more than willing to resume our relations with it. China's active move for *rapprochement* with the United States, its enemy number one for more than two decades, eased the fear of non-communist infiltration in their countries.<sup>231</sup>

China responded to this willingness on the part of al Mistiri, Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, by its decision<sup>232</sup> to resume the normal work of the Chinese Embassy and to despatch a diplomatic representation to Tunisia (8 October 1971)<sup>233</sup> not long before the decisive debate on the 'China question' was due to take place in the UN General Assembly (25 October). It must have been in the minds of Chinese policy-makers that normalisation of relations between China and Tunisia which was led by a well-respected figure among 'moderate' African leaders who had previously been hostile to its role in Africa<sup>234</sup> could only help China at this critical moment.

Within this context, while the leading campaigners for the restoration of China's seat in UN were mostly 'progressive' (e.g., Algeria) or communist in character (e.g., Albania), it was the positive response of 'moderate' countries which, quantitatively, played the decisive role in the final decision to expel Taiwan, and admit China to the organisation against the wishes of the United States and other leading anti-China campaigners such as Saudi Arabia. Rashid Driss, Permanent Representative of Tunisia to UN, gave a warm welcome to the Chinese representative to the organisation. Driss expressed the view that China's presence, inspired by Mao's thought, in UN would be a major factor in reinforcing the latter's vital aim of maintaining peace and ensuring justice.<sup>235</sup>

In May 1972, a Tunisian commercial delegation visited China where a Sino-Tunisian trade protocol was signed (19 May).<sup>236</sup> In August another Tunisian delegation, led by Mohammed Masmoudi, visited China.<sup>237</sup> Masmoudi criticised both super powers for

using the Mediterranean as an area for their rivalry.<sup>238</sup>

Tunisia and China signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation, under which an interest-free loan of \$40 million, repayable over 35 years, was given to the former, to cover 55 per cent of the cost of construction of the 120 km long canal of Medjerdah. This project was to irrigate 5,000 hectares and distribute 42 million cubic metres of drinking water for the people living in the Cap-Bon zone.<sup>239</sup>

In June 1973, a Sino-Tunisian medical protocol was signed, according to which, China agreed to send medical equipment and doctors to Tunisia.<sup>240</sup> In June 1973 China sent sports equipment and instructors to Tunisia.<sup>241</sup> In June 1974, Tunisia received 71 cases of pharmaceutical products and medical equipment and instruments.<sup>242</sup>

El Habib El Chatti, Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was warmly welcomed to China in July 1974.<sup>243</sup> He made it clear to China<sup>244</sup> that Tunisia's criticism of the super powers hegemonic role in the world was really aimed at the Soviet Union and not at the United States which after all was Bourguiba's model of 'democracy'.<sup>245</sup>

Throughout 1975 China co-operated actively with 'moderate' countries whilst becoming engaged in serious differences of world outlook with such 'progressive' African movements and governments as MPLA and independent Angola. When El Hedi Nour, the Prime Minister of Tunisia, visited China (April 1975), he repeated the stance that the hegemonic role in Africa was exercised not by China<sup>246</sup> but by the Soviet Union. At the same time, he openly supported the FLNA-UNITA alliance against MPLA.<sup>247</sup> Nour's visit to China was marked by an acknowledgement on both sides of the growing ties between them. China formally agreed to construct the Medjerda Canal. It also sent more medical equipment and 40 doctors to Tunisia.<sup>248</sup>

#### 15.1.2.3. Chad

Throughout the '60s, Chad remained a bastion of anti-communism in Africa. In particular, China was viewed with great hostility. China's support for the revolutionary Sawaba<sup>249</sup> against the established government of Niger, Chad's neighbour and friend, was at the root of the latter's fear. Reports<sup>250</sup> of China's links with the Chad national Union (CNU) must also have been behind President Tombalbaye's suspicion of China.

Though independent since 1960, under the leadership of Tombalbaye, Chad remained economically and militarily almost exclusively tied to France, the former colonial power. Not until 1972 did Chad begin to enter into diplomatic relations with 'progressive' countries in Africa (such as Libya under the leadership of Qaddafi) to

which it had been hostile before. At the same time, some French troops were ordered to leave the country. In October 1973, Chad broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.<sup>251</sup> This shift towards a 'moderate' stance in foreign relations was however, by no means a radical gesture. It was dictated by the aim of reconciliation with countries supporting the National Liberation Front (FROLINAT), the opposition party in Chad.

The flexibility of the government of Chad coincided with China's flexible approach towards 'moderate' governments based on the ideological strategy of a 'broad united front' during this period (i.e., from 1969 onwards). President Tombalbaye decided to establish diplomatic relations with China, because he

could not ignore a country (sic) with more than 800 million inhabitants.<sup>252</sup>

China's donation (June 1971) of 200,000 doses of vaccine perhaps contributed to a softening of Tombalbaye's anti-China policy. His talks with Yu Pi-wen, China's ambassador to Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: June 1971)<sup>253</sup> must also have mollified Chad's attitude towards China. Tombalbaye also wished to discourage China from becoming friendly towards FROLINAT.<sup>254</sup> Even so, Chad continued to vote against PRC's admission to UN.<sup>255</sup>

In September 1973, a delegation from Chad under the leadership of Abdoulaye Djonouma, Minister of Territorial Development and Housing, paid a visit to China, during which a trade, economic and technical agreement was



concluded between the two countries. China agreed to give an interest-free loan of \$50 million for developing rural areas in Chad.<sup>256</sup> In July 1974, the Chinese Red Cross donated pharmaceutical supplies to Chad, including a further supply of 200,000 doses of anti-cholera vaccine.<sup>257</sup>

#### 15.1.2.4. Niger

China's support<sup>258</sup> for the revolutionary Sawaba party during the '60s stood as a barrier to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the conservative and strongly pro-Western government of Niger until the overthrow of Hammani Diori (April 1974).

General Seyni Kountche, the new leader, set political prisoners free and allowed exiles including members of the Sawaba party to return to Niger. At the same time, he adopted measures calculated to lessen France's economic and political grip on Niger.

Internationally, Kountche's policy became more non-aligned in character. Relations with anti-imperialist countries (Mali, Algeria and Libya) improved, especially following a meeting with Algerian and Malian leaders along with a representative from the Libyan government (Niemei 1974).<sup>259</sup>

A delegation led by Major Sani Sound Sido, Vice-President of the Supreme Military Council, visited China in July 1974, thus marking the beginning of a new era of friendly relations between China and Niger.<sup>260</sup> An economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed

with China, including an interest-free loan of \$52.6 million for financing a cement factory, a sugar agro-industrial complex, a fruit plant and a farm implement factory.<sup>261</sup> In September 1975, China agreed to send a military team to work in Niger.<sup>262</sup>

#### 15.1.2.5. Mauritania

Mauritania was the only 'non-progressive' country in Africa which developed good relations with China during GPCR's most intensive phase.<sup>263</sup> Thus, it was not surprising that this relationship improved during the period under discussion (1969-76) for the reason that China was now eager to cultivate African countries with 'moderate' governments.

In April 1969, Mauritania received from China a gift of more than 3,000 tons of cereals.<sup>264</sup> In February 1970, a modern hospital built, financed and equipped by China, was completed;<sup>265</sup> in November 1970, the total strength of the Chinese medical, agricultural and cultural staff in Mauritania reached the figure of 200.<sup>266</sup> At the same time, Chinese workers were also engaged in digging 50 wells in the country.<sup>267</sup>

Hamdi Ould Moukness, the Mauritanian Foreign Minister, visited China in March 1971. He assured his hosts that Mauritania shared China's general approach to international questions.

Our foreign policy...is based on non-alignment, opposition to colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. In Africa all our actions are aimed at two essential objectives: the unity and

liberation of Africa, our search for unity is inseparable from our struggle for the liberation of our continent. In Indo-China we give our complete support to the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos who are setting an example of unparalleled courage to peoples fighting against imperialism.<sup>268</sup>

Moukness also reiterated his strong support for China's admission to UN because, he argued,

Taiwan is an unalienable province of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China.<sup>269</sup>

China and Mauritania signed an economic and technical agreement which included an interest-free loan to the latter of \$20 million<sup>270</sup> for financing and building a harbour for ocean-going ships in Mauritania.<sup>271</sup>

In May 1972, a Mauritanian trade delegation visited China with the aim of developing further economic and commercial co-operation between the two countries.<sup>272</sup> This was followed in November 1972 by the arrival in Nouakchott of a Chinese medical team consisting of 26 doctors. In 1973, Mauritania was given another interest-free loan of \$2 million by China.<sup>273</sup>

In September 1974, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah visited China, where he expressed his country's

deep satisfaction with the continuous development of economic and commercial exchange between the two countries.<sup>274</sup>

At the same time, Ould Daddah paid a warm tribute to China's

... essential and very decisive ... contribution to the struggle ... being waged by so many peoples of the Third World to liberate themselves from the colonial and racial yoke and break chains of neo-colonialism and imperialism.<sup>275</sup>

China granted Mauritania an interest-free loan of \$37 million to be used, among other purposes, for the construction of a deep water harbour in Nouakchott, and several agricultural projects.<sup>276</sup>

#### 15.1.2.6. Senegal

Senegal's close association - under Sedor Senghor's leadership - with the West as a whole, and France in particular, was the major reason underlying the break-up of the Mali Federation within two months of its declaration (June-August 1960).<sup>277</sup> It was not surprising that Senegal was opposed to China right from independence (1960). Its hostile position in relation to China was reinforced by the fear that China and Mali would cooperate with each other. During the '60s, Mali and China supported Sawaba against the Nigerean government, which Senegal regarded as a friendly country.

Despite his strong anti-communist orientation, Sedor Senghor thought that it was unrealistic to vote against the admission of China into UN. Accordingly, Senegal suspended relations with Taiwan in 1964; until 1968, Senegal voted for the admission of PRC into UN. Ironically, Senegal voted for China's admission to UN

during the most revolutionary period (1964-68) in PRC's history.

But once the hectic days of GPCR came to an end, Senegal resumed diplomatic relations with Taiwan (July 1969).<sup>278</sup> Senegal's sudden *volte face* in UN towards PRC was, in all probability, the result of widespread unrest and protest among the people, led by students and trade unions (1968),<sup>279</sup> demanding the removal of the government and its replacement by another more sensitive to the needs of the mass of the population. These events coincided with the events of a similar kind (albeit on a much larger scale) in France. GPCR was blamed for the mild insurrectionary fervour which students and workers in France<sup>280</sup> displayed in May 1968.

A month after China's admission to UN (October 1971), Senegal established diplomatic relations with it. Relations between the two countries, however, remained stagnant until 1973.

A visit by a Chinese agricultural mission to Senegal,<sup>281</sup> followed by a reciprocal visit to China (November 1973) by a Senegal government delegation led by Ousmane Seck, Minister for Co-operation and Planning, set the scene for an improvement in the relations between the two countries. An economic and trade agreement was signed between the two countries, under which Senegal was given an interest-free loan estimated at \$50 million.<sup>282</sup> This loan was intended to finance irrigation and agricultural development projects against the background of the work of a Chinese agro-technical group.<sup>283</sup>

In May 1974, President Sedor Senghor paid a visit to China,<sup>284</sup> where he expressed polite admiration for the revolution and the possible applicability of the host country's experience to Senegal's conditions. Sedor Senghor pleaded that diplomatic relations between China and Senegal were not established before 1971 due to his lack of experience in the field of foreign policy and international relations!

Shortly after independence in 1960...we recognised the People's Republic of China...unfortunately, owing to a misunderstanding resulting from our inexperience in foreign policy, we failed to initiate our co-operation more concretely until 1971.<sup>285</sup>

#### 15.1.2.7. Sierra Leone

The contradiction between the revolutionary ideology of China, and the pro-Western and conservative orientation of Sierra Leone stood in the way of friendly contacts between the two countries during the '60s.<sup>286</sup>

It is interesting to note that, despite its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, C. B. Rogers-Wright, Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister, told the UN General Assembly (December 1964) that his country 'would strongly support' seating PRC in UN.<sup>287</sup> More interestingly even, Sierra Leone voted in 1965 for the admission of PRC into UN.

Sierra Leone appeared to follow the majority of African countries (18 out of a total of 28 voted for, the remainder against) which voted for PRC's being seated in

UN.<sup>288</sup> At the same time, Sierra Leonian leaders clearly recognised the absurdity of keeping PRC out of UN.

However, although independent since April 1961, Sierra Leone did not establish diplomatic relations<sup>289</sup> with China until July 1971, when the latter began to pursue a more flexible approach towards 'non-progressive' countries. At the same time, Sierra Leone (under the leadership of Siaka Stevens<sup>290</sup>) had proclaimed itself a republic (April 1971), thus bringing to an end its overt political dependence on Britain.<sup>291</sup> Sierra Leone adopted more nationalistic economic policies (e.g., the take-over by the government of 51 per cent interest in the extraction of diamonds which is one of the country's major export items, the establishment of national companies for trade, insurance and navigation, and the establishment of a national commercial bank).<sup>292</sup> This relatively 'radical' outlook<sup>293</sup> of the republic's government must have been an important factor in the development of closer relations between the two countries

Arrangements for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries took place when C.A. Kamaara-Taylor, Sierra Leone's Finance Minister, visited China (29 July 1971). China and Sierra Leone signed agreements covering economic and technical co-operation, as well as trade and payment agreements.<sup>294</sup>

Under the provisions of these agreements, China granted (December 1971) Sierra Leone an interest-free loan of \$30 million.<sup>295</sup> This was followed (February 1972) by the arrival of 12 Chinese agricultural experts<sup>296</sup> in

Sierra Leone. According to the World Bank, agriculture represented 40 per cent of the country's economy.<sup>297</sup> The Chinese experts were involved in the sphere of rice cultivation including the establishment of a rice experimental plot and a sugar cane experimental station. China donated to Sierra Leone (1972) two patrol boats and trained 50 Sierra Leoneans in China to operate them.<sup>298</sup> In April 1973, a 12-member Chinese medical team arrived in Sierra Leone.<sup>299</sup>

China's fulfilment of its economic pledges and continuous economic aid to the country was probably a factor in Sierra Leone's growing distance from the United States and Britain. Thus, for example, Sierra Leone accused the United States and Britain (May 1972) of attempting to overthrow President Stevens' government for ideological reasons.<sup>300</sup>

In November 1973, President Stevens paid a week-long visit to China, during which he paid special tribute to China for

...the great assistance we have received and are receiving from the government and people of this great republic. We also want to thank you for the invaluable help you have been giving to our brothers and sisters in other parts of the continent of Africa, such as the TanZam Railway.<sup>301</sup>

#### 15.1.2.8. Gambia

In 1965, Gambia became the last British colony in West Africa to become independent. China recognised the country's independence forthwith and hoped that this



...would lead to further developments of relations between the two countries, China and Gambia.<sup>302</sup>

Gambia, however, remained anti-China<sup>303</sup> until 1974, when it followed the overwhelming majority of OAU members by establishing diplomatic relations with China. In June 1975, Dawda Kairaba Jawara, the Gambian President, visited China where he was offered medical assistance and a donation of 500 tons of rice for the country's disaster relief.<sup>304</sup>

#### 15.1.2.9. Burkinā Faso

From the time of its independence (December 1960) to September 1973 - when it eventually established diplomatic relations with China - Burkinā Faso (Upper Volta, before 1984) had been one of the most anti-communist in Africa. China was political anathema to Burkinā Faso because it posed an ideological threat.

In September 1965, Leo Yameogo, President of Burkino Faso, made his anti-China stance a major factor in his election campaign.

If you vote for me I will ensure that communism will never penetrate our country...I refer principally to the PRC...If we allow communist Chinese people to enter our country, Upper Volta will no longer be Upper Volta but an extension of Peking and its régime and we would disappear within a few days.<sup>305</sup>

In October 1971, Burkina Faso not only voted against China's admission to UN,<sup>306</sup> but also protested against the expulsion of Taiwan from the organisation.<sup>307</sup>

Burkina Faso began to soften its anti-China position only after China showed itself ready to adopt a friendly approach even to African governments (e.g., Cameroon and Zaire) which had once been targets of China's political attacks.<sup>308</sup> No longer had Burkina Faso any reason to fear China's revolutionary hard line, as the central theme of its policy was had shifted towards a greater emphasis being placed on State-to-State relations irrespective of the political colouring of the governments concerned.

It would appear that China took the diplomatic initiative by sending 300,000 doses of vaccine and \$50,000 worth of anti-biotics to Burkina Faso.<sup>309</sup> A goodwill mission from Burkina Faso visited China where the two countries formally established diplomatic relations with each other (15 September 1973).<sup>310</sup>

China granted Burkina Faso an interest-free loan of \$50 million repayable over 20 years,<sup>311</sup> to be invested in financing rural development, irrigation and the construction of the Tambao Railway.<sup>312</sup> It formed part of an economic agreement signed between the two countries (December 1973).<sup>313</sup>

#### 15.1.2.10. Togo

Togo was alarmed by China's revolutionary actions in, and predictions for, Africa during the '60's. It was ruled by a conservative government which was dependent on

the Western powers (especially France) and feared national liberation movements.<sup>314</sup> Although independent since April 1961, Togo refused to establish diplomatic relations with China until September 1972, a year after PRC's admission to UN.

Togo, like other West African countries once hostile to China, seemed to have waited until the latter demonstrated its eagerness to enter into friendly relations with them as part of a 'broad united front' strategy of small and medium sized states against the Big Powers, and especially the two super powers.

Unlike Burkina Faso, Togo submitted to the influence of the majority of OAU members, voting<sup>315</sup> (25 October 1971) in favour of PRC's admission to UN. This eased the process of establishing official contacts between the two countries. At UN, the delegate of Togo expressed the view that China's presence was a return of justice and an important contribution to solving world problems of colonialism, racism and disarmament.<sup>316</sup>

In September 1972, Joachin Hunlede, Togo's Foreign Minister, led a goodwill mission to China, where the two countries (19 September) established diplomatic relations.<sup>317</sup> China and Togo also signed an economic and technical co-operation agreement under which an interest-free loan of \$45.6 million<sup>318</sup> was given to Togo to be used for rural development.

In September 1974, Gnassingbe Eyadema, the President of Togo, visited China. Eyadema praised China for its policy of economic co-operation without strings and for

its support for a New International Economic Order. China was also praised for the support it gave non-alignment and its opposition to Big Power hegemonism.<sup>319</sup>

The Togolese government had already nationalised the entire phosphate production, (the principal source of foreign exchange for the country) and was preparing to adopt a radical national policy, more African than pro-Western in character (February 1974). Education was made practically free and compulsory for all Togolese children between the ages of 2 and 15 (1976).<sup>320</sup> In support of Togo's independent economic and political tendencies, China pledged, during President Eyadema's visit, to build a sugar refinery and to send 30 Chinese doctors with drugs and medical equipment to Togo.<sup>321</sup> In April 1976, China gave Togo agricultural equipment to the value of \$259,449.26 (110 million CFA).<sup>322</sup>

#### 15.1.2.11. Ghana

After the overthrow of Nkrumah, (1966) the new government of Ghana embarked on a propaganda campaign against China, condemning the latter's role in Africa and publishing documents and confidential papers which purported to reveal agreements between Nkrumah and the Chinese government relating to revolutionary activities and plans on the African continent.<sup>323</sup> Ghana's discrimination against China was brought to an end by a group of officers, who, under the leadership of Ignatius Acheampong seized power (January 1972), promising 'a partial rehabilitation of Nkrumahism'.<sup>324</sup> The new

government decided to resume diplomatic relations with China soon thereafter (29 February 1972).<sup>325</sup>

Ghana's view that the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia (August 1968) constituted 'unjustifiable aggression',<sup>326</sup> and its<sup>327</sup> vote in favour of China's admission to UN throughout the '60s, were in all probability an important factor underlying the diminishing of relations between the two countries, even despite the growth of economic co-operation between Ghana and Taiwan during the latter half of the '60s.<sup>328</sup>

Economic relations between China and Ghana developed only after a visit to China by a Ghanaian government delegation (September 1972),<sup>329</sup> following which China decided to renew two aid projects (a pencil factory and a tannery) which had been cancelled following the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries (November 1966).<sup>330</sup> China also renewed (March 1973) an interest-free loan given to Ghana during Nkrumah's *régime* for the construction of irrigation facilities, chemical complexes, a cotton complex and a textile factory.<sup>331</sup> At the same time, China also helped Ghana to construct a cement factory. In 1974, China donated agricultural machines and sports equipment to Ghana.<sup>332</sup>

However, China's aid to Ghana during this period was only marginal and did not betoken active economic co-operation between the two countries. In this respect, the relations between China and Ghana had been much warmer during the 1960-66 period. Most of China's aid given to Ghana during the first half of the '70s was not new but

rather in fulfilment of promises that had been made during Nkrumah's era.<sup>333</sup>

China seemed to be more interested in promoting good diplomatic and political relations with Ghana without committing itself economically to an undue degree. Thus, for example, China sought to exploit the arrest of a Soviet diplomat in Ghana, accused of using his diplomatic status for non-diplomatic activities, to step up its campaign against the Soviet Union and to condemn the latter's role in Africa.<sup>334</sup>

#### 15.1.2.12. Nigeria

China's belated support (confined to words) for Biafra during the late '60s<sup>335</sup> did not seem to have broken the continuity in Nigeria's recognition of <sup>the</sup> PRC (from October 1961).

The only path open to Nigeria is thus to recognise the government of China, exchange ambassadors with that state and fight relentlessly for the admission of Peking to the United Nations and the automatic expulsion of the Chiang Kai-Shek [clique] from the Security Council. Only [through] such a policy can Nigeria help to maintain justice and show that international peace must override the selfish interests of the United States and the time to effect the policy is now.<sup>326</sup>

However, Nigeria's fear of China's revolutionary policies during the '60s, its relative affluence which had the effect of downplaying China's role as an aid donor, its chronic political instability (as signified by two *coups d'état*<sup>337</sup> and a civil war during the '60s),<sup>338</sup> and

China's support for Biafra were the main factors inhibiting diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria. The two countries did not establish diplomatic relations until eight months before China was admitted to UN (October 1971).<sup>339</sup> People's Daily (14 February 1971, commenting on this development, quoted Mao as follows:

We must endeavor to establish normal diplomatic relations, on the basis of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and of equality, and mutual benefit, with all countries willing to live together with us in peace.<sup>340</sup>

There were two main factors underlying this new turn in Sino-Nigerian relations.

- i. By 1971, Nigeria had become the second largest market for China's exports, after Tanzania. Nigeria's imports from China were estimated at \$25.6 million.<sup>341</sup> It was logical that relations between the two countries should be established at the ambassadorial level, if only to sustain a rapidly increasing volume of trade between the two countries.
- ii. Nigeria's anti-communist suspicions underwent a shift. All Western powers (including Britain) which the Federal Government of Nigeria considered to be its close friends disappointed it during the civil war (1967-70). They failed to respond to Nigeria's appeal for military aid. In fact, Nigeria had reason to believe that the leading Western powers (France, the United States and Britain) directly or indirectly supported<sup>342</sup> Biafra in

order to safeguard their economic interests in the eastern region of the country.

During the civil war, active support for the Federal Government came from the socialist countries (especially the Soviet Union)<sup>343</sup> as well as from radical African countries.<sup>344</sup>

It was therefore natural for Nigeria to move away from heavy dependence on the West, pursuing a policy of actively opposing imperialist powers (including Britain) and identifying itself as an enemy of Rhodesia's and South Africa's racism.<sup>345</sup>

Thus, as Nigeria became less and less dependent on the West, it became more and more interested in establishing good relations with communist countries. China was included in this new approach, despite the fact that it had supported Biafra in the Nigerian civil war.

The main point to remember is that China's stand on Biafra never extended to offering the secessionist state material or military assistance. At the same time, Nigeria also knew that China's moral support for Biafra did not derive from active opposition on its part to Gowon's Government, but rather from its opposition to the Soviet Union whose influence on the federal government reached considerable proportions. It was well known too, that China's policy was particularly influenced by its friendly relations with Tanzania and Zambia.

All the four African countries - Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon - which had supported Biafra, sought reconciliation with the Federal Government of Nigeria after the civil war ended.<sup>346</sup>



For Nigeria, normalisation of relations with China would represent a major setback to any Biafran separatists that might still remain, because a China friendly to the Nigerian government would not support Biafra, especially when the latter had no ideological motivations that were comparable with China's own.<sup>347</sup>

Furthermore, Nigeria had been a consistent supporter of China's admission to <sup>the</sup> UN. If China had continued to support Biafra, Nigeria would almost certainly have obstructed the campaign in 1970-71 for winning recognition of PRC. China could not afford to lose the support of an independent member of <sup>the</sup> OAU and a powerful African state.

During China's diplomatic campaign for admission to <sup>the</sup> UN, Nigeria vehemently supported <sup>the</sup> PRC's claim to be represented in the organisation. Five days before (20 October 1971) <sup>the</sup> PRC's admission to UN (25 October), Dr. Okoi Arikeo, the Nigerian Commissioner of External Affairs, denounced the 'two China's' approach in a speech delivered before the UN General Assembly.

Nigeria could not see any justification for accepting credentials presented by two rival delegations, each claiming to represent China...it will be wrong for the United Nations to prevent a government from representing its country because some people do not like the complexion of that government.<sup>348</sup>

Welcoming the decision to restore PRC's seat in <sup>the</sup> UN, the Nigerian Observer (26 ? October 1971), the most popular and widely circulated newspaper in the country, wrote that

the UN by voting to replace the Nationalist China with the People's Republic of China has recovered from its time-worn illusion...Peking's landslide victory is a clear dramatisation of the fact that the world body is fed up with the bankrupt policy which the United States had long pursued against Red China.<sup>349</sup>  
[Emphasis added]

As one of Africa's richest countries, (mainly on account of its huge oil resources), Nigeria did not need China's financial aid. But it did need its goods, because of their low cost and their appeal to Nigeria's immediate needs. Moreover, Chinese experts were welcome because of their hard work, simple needs and commitment. In 1976, Nigeria became the largest market for China's exports to Africa, at an estimated \$128 million.<sup>350</sup>

In August 1972, a five-member Nigerian trade delegation under the leadership of Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, the Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, visited China.<sup>351</sup> A similar delegation from China, led by Fang I, (Chairman of the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries), paid a reciprocal visit to Nigeria (November 1972), during which China and Nigeria signed a five year economic and technical agreement. A trade agreement was also signed between the two countries.<sup>352</sup> Included in the economic agreement was a small Chinese loan to Nigeria estimated at \$3 million.<sup>353</sup>

Under the provisions of this agreement, the first agricultural study team, consisting of 12 experts, arrived in Lagos (February 1973) to conduct a survey of possible

sites for the large-scale cultivation of rice, wheat and cotton.<sup>354</sup> In May 1973, the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs led a delegation to China with a view to forging closer ties of economic development and co-operation between the two countries.<sup>355</sup>

In October 1975, a Chinese group comprising experts in metal work, woodwork, leather goods and automobile engineering arrived in Nigeria in order to help the country develop small scale industries.<sup>356</sup>

In the political field, relations between China and Nigeria were strengthened when Sani Souna Sido, Vice-President of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, led a government delegation to China (July 1974) where he told his hosts that

[l]ike the People's Republic of China, Nigeria is preoccupied with the international situation characterised by the struggle of the big powers for hegemony at the expense of the Third World.<sup>357</sup> [Emphasis added]

Gowon, President of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, paid a visit to China in September 1974, during which both countries agreed to improve their economic co-operation with each other. At the same time, both countries reaffirmed their unqualified support for national liberation movements throughout Africa.<sup>358</sup> The Chinese leaders took the opportunity to explain to Gowon China's assessment of the super powers and the crises facing them. It was a part of China's campaign to encourage smaller nations to join in its strategy of 'a

broad united front' vis à vis the United States and the Soviet Union. In a speech made at a banquet to welcome President Gowon, Li Hsien-nien, Vice-Premier, made the following statement

the Super Power known as 'the dollar empire' is now facing a profound crisis of acute inflation coupled with the decline in production. The other Super Power that flaunts the banner of socialism has wild ambitions but it lacks the strength, is hard up and goes begging everywhere.<sup>359</sup>

#### 15.1.2.13. Cameroon

With the removal of Dr. Ronald-Felix Moumie, who was poisoned in 1960, the leadership of <sup>the</sup> UPC became internally divided among itself. Within a period of three years, it almost entirely lost its earlier organisational character.<sup>360</sup> The growing friction among <sup>the</sup> UPC leaders enabled the government of Cameroon to suppress revolutionary activities within the country whilst oppressing UPC's supporters and leading activists, (including Ernest Ouamb, who visited China several times).<sup>361</sup>

It was not surprising that President Ahmed Ahidjo declared that Cameroon would recognise China only if the latter could prove that it would not help the guerrilla forces of UPC.<sup>362</sup> By 1971, <sup>the</sup> UPC was no longer an active and revolutionary movement that would prove an embarrassment to China which desired to promote State-to-State relations with Ahidjo's government.

Ahidjo's execution of the UPC leaders (1971) came at a time when China's major concern was to win more votes for the admission of PRC to UN. China's foreign policy-makers reckoned that it would be impolitic for the *régime* to antagonise Cameroon at such a crucial juncture. China's 'Anti-State Policy' had almost come to an end during this period, i.e. from 1969 onwards.

In March 1971, Cameroon established diplomatic relations with China.<sup>363</sup> With the exception of Cameroon's support for China's admission to UN<sup>364</sup> (October 1971), relations between the two countries did not improve until August 1972 when they concluded an economic and technical agreement, during a visit to China (August 1972) by a Cameroonian government delegation under the leadership of Efon, Foreign Minister of Cameroon.<sup>365</sup> Under the provisions of this agreement, China gave Cameroon an interest-free loan of \$20 million.<sup>366</sup>

In March 1973, President Ahidjo paid a week-long visit to China. In their joint *communiqué*, China and Cameroon expressed their

resolute support to the just struggle of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.<sup>367</sup>

During this visit China granted Cameroon another interest-free loan of \$55 million<sup>368</sup> repayable over 25 years, (beginning from 1983), in order to construct a hydro-electric dam at Lodgo and a Palace of Congress in the capital (Yaounde). This represented a great contribution

to Cameroon's attempts to escape from being heavily dependent on France.

At the Cameroonian National Assembly (June 1973), Ahidjo paid a warm tribute to China's aid.

We appreciate this gesture of the Chinese people not only because of the conditions in which it was made, but also and particularly because it was made by a people who are themselves engaged in a gigantic development effort.<sup>369</sup>

#### 15.1.2.14. Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea had been a Spanish colony and is one of the smallest countries in Africa (with less than 400,000 inhabitants). It consisted of the two parts of Rio Muni and Fernando Poo, and obtained its independence<sup>370</sup> (October 1968) at a time when China was far from interested in promoting State-to-State relations with countries with no positive commitment to oppose policies against colonialism and imperialism. Between 1968 and 1979, Equatorial Guinea was ruled by Macias Mguema, who exercised absolute power in every aspect of the political economic and military spheres in the country. Among Macias' measures were the appointment of himself as President for life, renaming the former Fernando Poo after himself, and the vesting in himself of executive and judicial powers.<sup>371</sup>

China's interest in Equatorial Guinea was centered in the small-scale armed resistance launched by the People's Idea of Equatorial Guinea (IPGE), under the leadership of

Jesus Mba Ovona, against the Spanish colonial power in 1966.<sup>372</sup> When the country became independent, IGPE joined the coalition government along with the other two parties led by Monaige and Munge.<sup>373</sup>

Despite its anti-communism, Macias' government was the first African country to recognise and establish (15 October 1970)<sup>374</sup> diplomatic relations with China during this period (1969-76). The close relationship between the Congo(B) and China, and China's reputation for easy economic conditions and its seriousness in fulfilling its promises of aid must have influenced Equatorial Guinea's decision to establish diplomatic relations with it. After diplomatic relations were established between the two countries, a Chinese envoy from the Congo(B)<sup>375</sup> paid a visit to Equatorial Guinea. China's flexibility towards 'non-progressive' governments during this period was another factor which contributed to diplomatic contact being begun between the two countries. Equatorial Guinea, which had no relations with Spain, strongly supported liberation movements in Portuguese colonies. At the country's independence ceremony (October 1968), President Macias affirmed that

Equatorial Guinea would consider itself completely independent only when the independence of countries such as Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea [is realised].<sup>376</sup>

China's positive attitude to Equatorial Guinea was based on the latter's non-alignment, support for liberation movements in and outside Africa, and its strong

opposition to colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. These were the words used by Jesus Alfonso Oyono Alogo, Minister of Public Works, Housing and Transport, of Equatorial Guinea, to Li Hsien-nien, the Chinese Vice-Premier, during his visit to China (January 1971)<sup>377</sup> which provided the occasion for the signing of an economic, trade and technical agreement between the two parties.<sup>378</sup> An interest-free loan estimated at \$10 million<sup>379</sup> was given to Equatorial Guinea by China.

In November, Primo Guse Esono Mica, Permanent Representative of Equatorial Guinea at <sup>the</sup> UN, attacked the United States for keeping China out of the organisation for 20 years. Referring to comments and reactions against China's admission to UN, Mica pointed out that Equatorial Guinea was

...not impressed by, or worried about, the publicity of the Yankee newspaper men. Let them write in their newspapers and periodicals what they wish. We have not come here to serve as students of the policy of the American government on this or any other matter.<sup>380</sup> [Emphasis added]

In 1972 Chinese experts in Equatorial Guinea began the construction of a road from Mongomo to Neue on the mainland (Rio Mumi).<sup>381</sup>

In August 1974, President Miguel Eygue Ntutuma led a government delegation to China. He paid tribute to his hosts for their genuine economic co-operation and identification with the smaller and poor countries of the world.<sup>382</sup>



#### 15.1.2.15. Gabon

Following its admission to UN, China was no longer interested in maintaining, at the same high tempo as before (1969-71), its campaign in favour of entering into diplomatic relations with each and every country in the world. Thus, for example, China was in no hurry to enter into diplomatic relations with such countries as Gabon, which were among the most ardent supporters of France in Africa. During the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, Gabon had continued to trade with Rhodesia, openly flouting the embargo imposed by UN.<sup>393</sup> Throughout the '60s (Gabon became independent in August 1960) and early '70s, Gabon, under the leadership of Albert Bernar, had been among the African countries antagonistic towards China. Gabon voted against PRC in the crucial vote on China.<sup>394</sup>

It was left to Gabon to take the initiative to offer a sort of political 'apology' for its hostile attitude towards China in the past. In April 1974, Gabon decided to establish diplomatic relations with China.<sup>395</sup>

China perhaps hoped that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Gabon would help bring to an end the latter's strong ties with the West and to start giving some support to national liberation movements in Africa. Gabon had previously been campaigning for a direct dialogue with South Africa and Rhodesia,<sup>396</sup> a policy which entirely rejected all the progressive and even a number of conservative régimes in the continent.

In July 1974, a government delegation from Gabon visited China, when the fundamental political differences between China and Gabon were eased and the ground was prepared for a useful political understanding between the two countries. In October 1974, President El Hadj Omar Bango paid a visit to China where he expressed views opposing colonialism and racism, and praised China for its unequivocal support for the African cause.<sup>387</sup> China granted Gabon an interest-free loan of \$25.7 million<sup>388</sup> for rural development and the construction of a textile factory.

Having tasted the easy terms of aid from a non-Western and communist nation, President Bango, less than a year later, returned to China (July 1975)<sup>389</sup> to seek further economic co-operation between the two countries.

#### 15.1.2.16. Zaire

It must have been a statement like

Moscovite communism has once again degraded itself in the eyes of the world.<sup>390</sup>

from Radio Kinshasa (on behalf of the Zairean government) that signalled a change in Sino-Zairean relations after <sup>more than</sup> 10 years of hostility between the two countries. This is all the more interesting in view of the fact that Zaire had proved to be the most outstanding instance of China's active anti-State policy in Africa during the '60s.<sup>391</sup>

Like Ahidjo of Cameroon, Mobutu was able to put an end to any effective revolutionary activities in the

country by the end of the '60s. Mobutu thought that China's recognition of his *régime* would enable him to intensify, with impunity, his campaign of oppression against the guerrilla forces which he equated with 'terrorists' and 'enemies of the people'.

The absence of guerrilla activity against the Mobutu *régime*, coupled with the importance attached by China to State-to-State relations (from 1969 onwards) led the latter to ignore the anti-Mobutu forces which it had supported not long before.

It is arguable whether China would have drawn closer to Mobutu's *régime* had guerrilla forces reached an advanced stage in Zaire in their struggle against the government. Reconciliation with Mobutu's government, under such circumstances at the expense of the revolutionary forces in the country would have undermined China's ideological credibility.

Relations between China and Zaire were not normalised until it became clear (24 November 1972) that the revolutionary forces in Zaire had disbanded. Mao whose attitude towards Mobutu was by no means positive, told him at a meeting in Beijing (January 1973) that China

had lost a lot of money and arms trying to overthrow the Zairean government. 392

As soon as it became clear that China's moral and material support had failed to meet its ideological objective, ideological tolerance of the Zairean *régime* took precedence over continuing to wait for the revolution

which would supplant it. Motivated by its global aim of organising a 'broader united front' of states against the super powers, China was now prepared to tolerate the oppressive and reactionary government of Zaire even though Mobutu had been directly involved in the murder of Lumumba (1961) and in the execution of Mulele (1969), and had been condemned by the Chinese media as a 'running dog of the imperialists'.<sup>393</sup>

During the first half (1969-72) of the period under consideration (1969-76), China's relations with Zaire continued to remain hostile in character. Zaire's repression of local revolutionary forces, as well as its subordination to US imperialism and support for Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola and opposition to FRELIMO and the Angolan national liberation movements, were strongly condemned by China.<sup>394</sup>

For its part, Zaire was among the 15 African countries which voted against China's admission to UN.<sup>395</sup> In February 1972, Mobutu expressed his hostility towards China in the following words:

The Zairean people can not easily forget the flagrant interference by People's China in their internal affairs during the dark and tragic period of rebellion in the country. As long as the Chinese authorities fail to give any proof of a radical and absolute change in their attitude towards us, there will never be any question of recognising the People's Republic of China.<sup>396</sup>

Relations between the two countries became normal only after a meeting in Paris (November 1972) between

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, and Inonga Lokingol'Ome, the Zairean Deputy Commissioner of State for Foreign Affairs, at which both countries agreed to

...realise the normalisation of relations between the two countries as of November 24th 1972, and to exchange diplomatic representatives at the ambassadorial level.<sup>397</sup>

Mobutu's nationalistic move of Africanising the names of Zaireans and adopting measures to promote African culture whilst keeping Western cultural influence in check, on the one hand, and on the other his publicly expressed opposition to the Soviet Union's role in Africa, seemed<sup>398</sup> to be politically sound enough for China to become reconciled with the Zairean government. This found clear expression in Zhou Enlai's speech during Mobutu's visit to China (January 1973). Zhou Enlai argued

The government of Zaire stands for African solidarity and unity, and an Africa belonging to Africans, which represent the contemporary trend in Africa. The Chinese government supports this just stand.<sup>399</sup>  
[Emphasis added]

During Mobutu's 10-day visit to China<sup>400</sup> (10-20 January 1973) a Sino-Zairean economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed.<sup>401</sup> Included in this agreement was an interest-free loan of \$145 million.<sup>402</sup> This was the largest loan given by China to any African country during the period 1970-73<sup>403</sup> and was the first economic aid ever

granted to Zaire by a communist country in the form of a loan.<sup>404</sup>

Zaire's agreement with China that it would

work together with other countries of the Third World in combating power politics and hegemonism of big powers<sup>405</sup>

must have influenced China's economic support. This would hardly have been possible even a few years earlier.

Mobutu's opposition (1973 onwards) to both US intervention in Indo-China and the diplomatic break between Israel and Zaire may have contributed to China's 'friendly approach' to Zaire.

Following Mobutu's visit to China, 19 Chinese experts in agriculture, horticulture and agricultural mechanisation were sent to Zaire (April 1973) to establish experimental stations.<sup>406</sup> By August 1973, the number of Chinese agricultural experts working in Zaire exceeded one hundred. In November 1973, ten Chinese doctors were sent to Zaire,<sup>407</sup> following a visit to China (October 1973) by a Zairean government delegation, during which both China and Zaire stressed that

[It is abnormal that people condemn the United States for its military intervention in Indo-China, but keep silent about the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the USSR...why don't we condemn the USSR in the same way?<sup>408</sup>  
[Emphasis added]

As a consequence of a visit to China by a Zairean government delegation (November 1973), political and

economic co-operation between the two countries developed.<sup>409</sup>

In April 1974, more agreements on co-operation between the two countries in agriculture, maritime navigation and medicine, among others, were signed. In May 1976, the two countries signed an air transport agreement; and a second Chinese medical team consisting of 13 doctors arrived in Zaire.<sup>410</sup> China also agreed (November 1976) to build the biggest stadium in the country, with a capacity of over 80,000 people.<sup>411</sup>

Following Mobutu's second visit to China (September 1974), an agreement was signed by which the latter promised more aid for building a machine tool factory and a sugar refinery, and for the construction of a 'People's Palace' in Kinshasa.<sup>412</sup> During his visit to Beijing, Mobutu praised China for its contribution to African liberation.

If one witnesses such brilliant victories of African fighting against the white colonialists, it is in large measure thanks to the efficacious aid of certain progressive countries in the world. The contribution of the People's Republic of China to the crushing of colonialists in Africa has not only been important, but decisive.<sup>413</sup>

When a *coup* to overthrow Mobutu (July 1975) was attempted, the Chinese media attributed the attempt to an imperialist plot.<sup>414</sup>

### 15.1.2.17. Rwanda

Rwanda was one of the 'moderate' African countries which saw clearly which way the 'China wind' was blowing in UN in 1971 when it voted, for the first time, in favour of PRC's admission into the organisation.<sup>415</sup> Underlying its recognition of China, might well have been an expectation that the latter would desist from giving support to the Tutsi people living in northern Burundi. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Belgium, the former colonial power (25 October 1971)<sup>416</sup> might also have influenced Rwanda's vote in UN. Rwanda and China established diplomatic relations on 12 November 1971.<sup>417</sup>

In March 1972, a Rwanda government delegation led by Pierre Mkezabra, paid a visit to China, during which a warm tribute was paid to China's unequivocal and continuous support for the liberation of African countries from colonialism and imperialism.<sup>418</sup> The two countries subsequently (13 May 1972) signed an agreement at Kigali (Rwanda's capital) on economic and technical co-operation which included an interest-free loan of about \$20 million to Rwanda.<sup>419</sup> China also promised to build a road linking Rwanda and Tanzania as well as to construct cement factories.<sup>420</sup> A trade agreement was signed following a visit to China by a Rwandan government delegation led by Augustino Munyaneza, Minister of International Co-operation.<sup>421</sup>

The relations between China and Rwanda were developed further following a *coup d'état* (6 July 1973) in the



latter which ended a twelve-year rule by Gregoire Kayibanda. The new government, under the leadership of Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, founded the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) as the only authorised political party, its purpose being to press for the economic development of five of the poorest countries of the world.<sup>422</sup> Internationally, the new government adopted a policy of positive and dynamic non-alignment; relations with Tanzania and Burundi were normalised.<sup>423</sup>

In August 1974, Nsekaliye Aloys, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation paid a visit to China<sup>424</sup> seeking further economic co-operation between the two countries. In the following year (September 1975) Aloys paid another visit to China where he praised its aid commitments and sincere co-operation with Rwanda.<sup>425</sup>

#### 15.1.2.18. Burundi

Burundi resumed diplomatic relations with China in October 1971 after a long interval during which they had remained suspended due to the former's disapproval of the latter's revolutionary policy. China's flexible approach towards pro-Western governments in order to win their support against 'Big Power hegemonism', and the overthrow (November 1966) of the monarchy in Burundi which was replaced by a republican system of government,<sup>426</sup> contributed to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries (13 October 1971), only a fortnight before the vote on the China question (25 October 1971)<sup>427</sup> was taken in UN.

It is worth noting that, despite the absence of diplomatic relations between China and Burundi during the 1966-71 period, the latter continued to vote for PRC's admission to UN. In fact, even during the phase (1966-69) immediately prior to the one under discussion, Burundi, under the leadership of Micombero, had attempted to resume diplomatic relations with China. As has already been noted,<sup>428</sup> events in China related to GPCR rendered a return to normal relations between China and Burundi difficult.

In January 1972, Artemon Simbananiye, Burundi's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Co-operation and Planning, led a government delegation to China. He praised China for its continuous and active support for African struggles for liberation and independence.<sup>429</sup> An economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed between Burundi and China which included an interest-free loan of \$20 million<sup>430</sup> repayable over a period of ten years (from 1981)<sup>431</sup> with a moratorium extending to another period of ten years. It was the first loan by a communist country to Burundi.<sup>432</sup> China also undertook to construct a military base, and to send military advisers to Burundi<sup>433</sup>

The radical policies pursued by Burundi after it restored diplomatic relations with China, its support for front line states, and its termination of diplomatic relations with Israel<sup>434</sup> (October 1973), contributed to the two countries becoming more friendly to each other during this period.

### 15.1.2.19. Uganda

China's relations with Uganda during the period under consideration (1969-76) passed through two stages. During the first stage which ended in January 1971, following the overthrow of Obote, China and Uganda continued their friendly relationship which had developed during the second (1959-66) phase of our periodisation of Sino-African relations.<sup>435</sup>

By the time he was overthrown, President Obote was well on the way to pushing forward some of the progressive policies and objectives which had been opposed by the more conservative elements in the country. As a result of a series of reforms (1969-70), Obote's government had brought under its control 60 per cent of the large scale business establishments, banking and plantations.<sup>436</sup> The 'Common Man's Charter' (late 1969), based on socialist tendencies,<sup>437</sup> became Obote's policy.

In the international field, Obote went even further by suggesting that Uganda should leave the Commonwealth. He attached great importance to Pan-African nationalism; at the same time, he found Britain's support for the racist *régimes* of South Africa and Rhodisia objectionable.<sup>438</sup>

At the UPC Delegates' Conference (18 December 1970), Obote expressed himself in extremely favourable terms towards China.

To some European powers, Africa is a preserve and playing field...the argument appears to be that an African is so dumb in the head that he knows only one answer to every proposal

coming from the Chinese namely 'yes Sir, yes Sir, yes Sir'. This reminds me of a song I was taught at school, many years back. 'Baa baa black sheep...down the lane'. I do not believe that there is an African government which is a black sheep and which will give the Chinese one-third of the wealth of the country; one-third to the Chinese puppets one-third to the maid - and one-third to the little boy crying down the lane in hunger and in cold - namely the people.<sup>439</sup>

Obote's anti-imperialist policy almost cost him his life in an abortive *coup* in December 1969 which was condemned by Zhou Enlai in a special message (January 1970). Zhou viewed this as an imperialist attempt to end Obote's progressive government.<sup>440</sup>

The second stage of China's relations with Uganda began with the overthrow of Obote by Idi Amin (January 1971). During Amin's rule (January 1971-April 1979), the private sector was viewed as vital for the development of Uganda's economy. In effect, the new policy was aimed at protecting Amin and his army colleagues who had the initial backing of the *petite bourgeoisie* who had been opposed to Obote's policies for fear that they 'would exclude them from access to power, wealth and status'.<sup>441</sup>

Internationally, Amin advocated policies which were, on the whole, opposed to those of Obote. In relation to South Africa, Amin advocated debate (January-May 1971) instead of confrontation, a position which was welcomed by Britain which had to face Obote's wrath at the Singapore Commonwealth Heads of State Conference before he was overthrown.<sup>442</sup>

Amin, however, appeared to give Uganda a relatively radical image when he broke off diplomatic relations (1972) with Israel.<sup>443</sup> This was not related to anti-imperialism or anti-Zionism, but rather to Amin's desire to promote good relations with oil-producing Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, where he sought political refuge when he fled from Uganda in 1979. Amin's faith in Islam was an important factor in promoting good relations with Arab countries.

In the same manner, the deterioration of the relationship between Uganda and Britain, after the initial honeymoon, was not motivated by anti-imperialism but was rather occasioned by his precipitate decision to expel Asians from Uganda and forcibly repatriate them to Britain.<sup>444</sup>

During the Angolan crisis (1975-76), Amin did not<sup>445</sup> support the position of the Soviet Union, Uganda's chief arms supplier.<sup>446</sup> This stance against the Soviet Union worsened until diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken (December 1975).<sup>447</sup> The hostile relations (following the overthrow of Obote) between Uganda and Tanzania, and the latter's support for <sup>the</sup> MPLA, would appear to have been a major factor in Amin's anti-Soviet policy towards Angola.

For Tanzania, however, Amin's decision to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was welcome because it had been concerned about Soviet military supplies to Uganda.

China's relations with Uganda during Amin's rule (1971-79), were influenced by the latter's fluctuating and contradictory policies, especially towards the Soviet Union. When China was admitted to <sup>the</sup> UN (25 October 1971) the Ugandan representative viewed the event as

a new birth of a new order in the United Nations.<sup>448</sup>

When supporters of Obote launched an attack on Amin's *régime* (August-September 1971), crossing the Uganda-Tanzania border, China was accused of being involved in the 'invasion'.<sup>449</sup> However, a few months later, Amin invited<sup>450</sup> Mao to attend the first anniversary of his military *coup* (January 1972) in order to enhance his international respectability. Mao, however, did not respond to Amin's invitation.

China welcomed Amin's anti-Soviet policy during the Angolan crisis. Amin's policy against the Soviet presence in Angola, however, was not based so much on his anti-hegemonic stance as China would have liked, but rather on his attempts, at least temporarily, to escape from repaying his debts to the Soviet Union.<sup>451</sup>

In the economic field, China continued to fulfil its projects which were financed by the \$15 million granted to Uganda in 1965.<sup>452</sup> The construction of a rice scheme, a dam, a spillway and a brick factory, which China undertook under its system of aid were completed in 1973.<sup>453</sup> No further financial aid was given to Uganda during this period (1969-76).<sup>454</sup>

#### 15.1.2.20. Ethiopia

When China and Ethiopia established diplomatic relations (24 November 1970),<sup>455</sup> the editor of People's Daily (30 December 1970), had very little to say about the common features of the internal and international policies of the two countries during the '50s and '60s. He had to go back to the late '30s and early '40s to remind the Emperor of the common struggle waged by China and Ethiopia against Japanese imperialism and Italian facism.<sup>456</sup>

Otherwise, the Chinese volunteers and Ethiopian troops had fought under the UN banner on opposing sides during the Korean war (1951-53); whilst, ten years later, during the Congo crisis (1960-63), Ethiopia provided more than 3,000<sup>457</sup> troops with half an air squadron to support the UN operation, which China strongly condemned.

China, for its part, supported the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),<sup>458</sup> throughout the '60s in opposition to Haile Selassie, repeatedly attacking him for subjecting Ethiopia to US imperialism.

As in 1964, when Zhou Enlai (during his Ethiopian visit) and Haile Selassie found very little in common except their views on the desirability of convening a Bandung-type Afro-Asian conference, so too during his Chinese visit (5-11 October 1971) seven years later, the Ethiopian Emperor found it difficult to respond to the statements made by his hosts exalting revolution and condemning reaction. He looked alternately worried or bored by Chinese statements directly or indirectly aimed at the destruction of régimes such as his own. However,

he managed to say things far from relevant to what the Chinese leaders were talking about. Most of Haile Selassie's statements were of a general nature and full of admiration for the old Chinese civilisation, the physical beauty of China, the Great Wall and how impressed he had been with Chinese sports. But he took care not to mention, among aspects of China that he admired, their revolutionary achievements.<sup>459</sup>

The Emperor, however, extracted a promise from China to desist from aiding the Eritreans (the ELF).<sup>460</sup> In Haile Selassie's judgement, the recognition of PRC as the sole representative of China would be enough to extract such a promise.

It should be noted that, during the '60s, Ethiopia had always voted for China's admission to <sup>the</sup> UN (with the exception of 1963, when it abstained).<sup>461</sup> This was motivated by Haile Selassie's conviction that a nation of 750 million people must be represented in a world organisation. In addition, the Emperor perhaps hoped that, China would, at some stage, as indeed it did, withdraw its support for <sup>the</sup> ELF.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia (the headquarters of OAU) and China, must have contributed to the support which was given for China's admission to <sup>the</sup> UN by conservative and anti-communist African governments. Chinese representatives at <sup>the</sup> UN were warmly welcomed by Yahannes Tseghe, Chairman of the Ethiopian delegation.<sup>462</sup>



Ethiopia and China also shared, though for different reasons, the view that the Soviet Union was playing a 'hegemonic' role in Africa. The Emperor feared the Soviet Union's growing association with Somalia, Ethiopia's antagonist, following the seizure of power by Siad Barre. China hoped that friendly relations with Ethiopia might reduce the fervour of the Ethiopian-American relationship, especially during a period when the United States along with Portugal (its NATO ally) was strongly believed to be considering the use of its bases in Ethiopia for training and other military facilities against the liberation forces in Mozambique and Angola.<sup>463</sup>

China's offer of an interest-free loan of \$84 million<sup>464</sup> could perhaps be interpreted in this general context. A comprehensive trade, economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed between the two countries when Haile Selassie visited China (9 October 1971).

In May 1972, a Chinese road survey team arrived in Addis Abbaba. In the following three months, a Chinese team of hydro-geological investigators (June), a study team for the electrification of provincial towns, and a technical investigation team (August), arrived in Ethiopia.<sup>465</sup>

Unlike Ghana, where China stopped aid and construction projects when Nkrumah was overthrown, when the Emperor was overthrown in September 1974, in a revolution which brought an archaic and repressive régime to an end,<sup>466</sup> China continued to honour its aid and

project commitments to Ethiopia which came under the militant and socialistically orientated régime of the Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC).

During the two years of its rule (1974-76), <sup>EM</sup>PMAC had no decisive policy towards the two Super Powers. Ethiopian relations with the United States continued along their normal course, although in a lower key. During the initial years, the PMAC leaders did not show any open hostility towards the United States, nor did they express a clear cut or formal commitment to socialism in a Marxist-Leninist mould as they subsequently claimed.<sup>467</sup>

At the same time, during the 1974-76 period, relations between the Soviet Union and the Ethiopian revolutionary government were at a testing stage and were not yet sufficient to undermine Sino-Ethiopian relations. Neither China nor the Soviet Union (or any other power) had had a direct hand in the Ethiopian revolution. When it succeeded, both the Soviet Union and China expressed their sympathy towards the revolution, though they were cautious<sup>468</sup> in their praise because of the unclear political character of <sup>EM</sup>PMAC at the time. Friendly links existed between both the socialist powers and Somalia (which had been Ethiopia's hostile neighbour).<sup>469</sup>

#### 15.1.2.21. Botswana

Botswana did not establish diplomatic relations with China until March 1974, though it became independent in September 1966.

Until the early '70s, Botswana's exclusive dependence on South Africa and Rhodesia in the economic and trade spheres and the 'moderate' political character of Seretse Khama,<sup>469</sup> its leader, resulted in a policy which was not nearly critical enough of the racist régime in Southern Africa.

Zambia's warm friendship with both China and Botswana on the one hand, and on the other, China's willingness to accommodate the 'moderate' international approval of several African governments during this period (from 1969 onwards) made it easy for Botswana to make friendly overtures to it. OAU's impact on Botswana, which led to its joining the front line states and adopting a stronger anti-apartheid line, gave its government under the leadership of Seretse Khama a somewhat radical image among the liberation forces of the region during the '70s.

Botswana's newly developing positive approach of publicly opposing the South African white minority régime was encouraged by an economic factor, viz the construction of the Zambia-Botswana highway built with Chinese help. Botswana's exclusive dependence on South African economic and trade links was thus reduced to a certain degree.

In October 1971, Botswana voted for China's admission to UN, though it recognised PRC as the only 'legitimate government of China'<sup>470</sup> only in March 1974 when Taiwan's representative was asked to leave the country. In January 1975, the two countries established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.<sup>471</sup>

15.1.2.22. Mauritius

China's contacts with Mauritius took place as early as 1959.<sup>472</sup> In March 1968, the country became independent following a series of upheavals and national resistance to the British colonial power.

Although Mauritius recognised China in 1969, diplomatic relations between the two countries were established only in April 1972.<sup>473</sup> During the UN vote on China's admission, Mauritius abstained.<sup>474</sup>

Mauritius' decision to abstain from the vote on the 'China question' was, in all probability, influenced by the Muslim members<sup>475</sup> of the cabinet headed by Sir Seewoosagar Ramgoolam (of the Independent Party), who was a follower of Saudi Arabia which was a leading campaigner against China's admission to UN.

When Saudi Arabia and its allies were no longer able to stop the growth of the majority in favour of PRC's admission to UN, Mauritius felt freer to establish diplomatic relations with China. Within five months after the UN vote, Mauritius established diplomatic relations with China (April 1972). Relations between the two countries ran a smooth course afterwards. It is reasonable to suppose that the conservative government leaders in Mauritius believed that the establishment of diplomatic relations with China would appease the workers whose demands for higher wages, and better conditions, supported by the left opposition elements, were becoming more and more clamorous.<sup>476</sup> Sir Seewoosagar Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of Mauritius, paid a three-day visit to

China in April 1972. The status of Mauritius as a Third World country, and its opposition to Big Power hegemonism were stressed by Ramgoolam and his hosts during this visit.<sup>477</sup> China granted Mauritius an interest-free loan estimated at \$32 million in August 1972.<sup>478</sup> In March 1973, Charles Getan Duval, Mauritius' Minister of External Affairs, paid a visit to China<sup>479</sup> in order to establish closer economic and trade co-operation between the two countries.<sup>480</sup>

15.2. People-to-People Relations or 'United Front From Below'

15.2.1. China and National Liberation Movements

15.2.1.1. Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde

Portuguese aggression<sup>481</sup> against Guinea (November 1970), with the objective of overthrowing Sekou Toure's government and destroying the headquarters of the General Secretariat of PAIGC had the effect of provoking a reactive thrust on the latter's part in order to continue their successful guerrilla operations and to gain greater international support and publicity.

In August 1971, PAIGC's successful armed struggle enabled it to claim the independence of Guinea-Bissau. In November 1972, the UN General Assembly recognised PAIGC as the sole representative of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.<sup>482</sup> Portugal attempted to disrupt the unity and continuing success of PAIGC by masterminding the assassination of Amilcar Cabral.<sup>483</sup> In turn, Cabral's assassination was followed by an intensification of armed

struggle and guerrilla operations in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

Following the overthrow of the Caetano dictatorship in April 1974, the new Portuguese régime was compelled to accept PAIGC's legitimacy (Algiers: August 1974) and conclude agreements with it<sup>484</sup> on the transfer of power to both Guinea-Bissau, and later (July 1975) Cape Verde.<sup>485</sup>

Attempts to unite Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde under a single government under PAIGC's leadership were virtually given up when the leadership of Guinea-Bissau (November 1980) was taken over by Joal Bernardo who replaced President Luiz Cabral. The long distance (almost 900 km between the two territories), and disputes between the leaders of both territories over the terms of unity seem to have been the two major practical factors which prevented the unification of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. In 1981, Cape Verde dropped the letter 'G' from PAIGC which became thenceforth *Partido Africano da Independencia do Cabo Verde* (PAICV).<sup>486</sup>

As has already been argued,<sup>487</sup> a major ideological reason which contributed to close relations between China and Guinea was the latter's support for PAIGC. Through Guinea PAIGC was able to gain China's financial and military support. China's condemnation of the Portuguese invasion of Guinea and PAIGC headquarters (1970) has already been discussed.<sup>488</sup>

When PAIGC proclaimed its independence (August 1971), China immediately recognized it. In July 1972, seven months before his assassination (20 January 1973), Amilcar

Cabral paid a visit to China, where he was given a warm welcome. Cabral and his delegation were among the honoured guests at the National Defence Reception.<sup>489</sup>

Renmin Ribao's editorial following Cabral's assassination, referred to his

outstanding contribution to Africa's national liberation struggle. This referred to PAIGC's determination to revenge the ignoble crime by exterminating the colonialists and their captured agents on its sacred soil.<sup>490</sup>

The statement added that

the nature of imperialism and Portuguese colonialism heightened their vigilance to go into battle more resolutely and carry the national liberation struggles through to the end.<sup>491</sup>

Formal diplomatic relations between China and Guinea-Bissau were established in March 1974, six months before the proclamation of its formal independence.<sup>492</sup> In March 1975, a Chinese rice plantation group arrived in Guinea-Bissau to help the country with its economy, 90 per cent of which was dependent on agriculture, producing rice.<sup>493</sup> A Guinea-Bissau delegation led by Victor Saude Marie, Commissioner of State for Foreign Affairs, visited China in July 1975, and an economic and technical co-operation agreement between the two countries was signed.<sup>494</sup>

The hard work of the Chinese workers in the agricultural field evoked the following tribute from a Guinea-Bissauian technician

The Chinese experts are modest and prudent, they work hard and maintain a plain living. They have set a good example for us.<sup>495</sup>

In April 1976, China and Cape Verde established diplomatic relations. Ta Kung Pao (29 April 1976) praised the Cape Verdian people for resisting 'imperialism and colonialism' and waging a 'protracted and arduous struggle to overthrow the Portuguese colonialists'.<sup>496</sup>

#### 15.2.1.2. Angola

UNITA's use of the appropriate methods of guerrilla warfare during the latter half of the '60s was the major factor in concentrating China's attention on it. <sup>the</sup> MPLA, for its part, extended (like FRELIMO)<sup>497</sup> its struggle to the social and political fields on the basis of a 'Marxist' analysis.<sup>498</sup>

In the military field, despite frictions within the MPLA leadership, <sup>the</sup> <sup>499</sup> MPLA was in control of 12 out of the 16 Angolan districts by September 1974.<sup>500</sup> From the beginning of the '70s onwards, <sup>the</sup> MPLA was regarded by the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces, outside Africa and within, as unquestionably the leading liberation movement in Angola. In Africa MPLA received military and financial support mainly from Algeria, Guinea, Tanzania and the Congo(B).<sup>501</sup>

Meanwhile, <sup>the</sup> UNITA and <sup>the</sup> FLNA concentrated their attention on out-manceuvring <sup>the</sup> MPLA rather than on intensifying the struggle against the Portuguese colonial power.<sup>502</sup> In fact, by the late '60s, <sup>the</sup> UNITA had become



much more an organisation of Angolan refugees in Zambia than an active liberation movement.<sup>503</sup> Worst of all, according to documents made public in Portugal after the 1974 coup, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of <sup>the</sup>UNITA had been, during the early '70s, secretly collaborating with the Portuguese military authorities in their actions against MPLA.<sup>504</sup> It was also reported that <sup>the</sup>UNITA was receiving arms from South Africa.<sup>505</sup>

Likewise, Holden Roberto had been devoting his energies, since the early '60s, to destroying <sup>the</sup>MPLA rather than to promoting guerrilla action against the Portuguese colonial authorities.<sup>506</sup>

The escalation of the struggles in Mozambique, Guinea(B) and Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Angola - in which (by 1974) 12,000 Portuguese soldiers died, 40,000 were injured, and countless liberation fighters were killed - played a major part in the ousting of Portugal's Prime Minister Marcelo (25 April 1974) by the Armed Forces Movement.<sup>507</sup>

In January 1975, the three rival liberation movements of Angola met in Mombasa (Kenya) and reached two important agreements. Under the first, they agreed to negotiate jointly with the Lisbon government. They also agreed on a common political platform, on administrative arrangements for a transitional government in which all of them would be given equal weight, and the merger of their troops into a common Angolan army.<sup>508</sup>

A few days later (10 January 1975) <sup>the</sup>UNITA, <sup>the</sup>FNLA and <sup>the</sup>MPLA jointly signed with Portugal the Alvor Agreements,

which established the prerequisites for the formation of the transitional government. 11 November 1975 was set as the date for the proclamation of independence.

However, if this marked an end to a long war against Portuguese colonialism, it also heralded the beginning of direct armed conflict between the three rival forces - <sup>the</sup> MPLA, <sup>the</sup> FNLA and UNITA - in a struggle to gain control of state power in Angola.

<sup>the</sup> UNITA and <sup>the</sup> FNLA were aware that circumstances during the transitional period would favour <sup>the</sup> MPLA, as the latter was in control of major strategic areas, including Luanda, the capital. In addition, <sup>the</sup> MPLA was recognised by a number of African countries as the major liberation movement, and as such the leading force in Angola's struggle for independence.

In order to destroy <sup>the</sup> MPLA's advantage, the Western imperialist powers and South Africa, (in collaboration with their African allies, and especially Zaire), gave moral and material support to <sup>the</sup> FNLA and <sup>the</sup> UNITA which enabled them to launch a full scale war against the MPLA forces and their supporters. In March 1975, within two months of the Alvor Accord, <sup>the</sup> FNLA, reinforced by Zairean troops, attacked the town of Caxito, massacring 60 <sup>the</sup> MPLA supporters. 509

By July 1974, the civil war intensified after <sup>the</sup> MPLA's reactive attacks against <sup>the</sup> FNLA and <sup>the</sup> UNITA<sup>510</sup> and their forces outside Luanda. The possibility of a coalition was thus ruled out opportunities for imperialist powers and

South Africa to exercise influence on the future of independent Angola.

The main aim of these powers was to ensure that <sup>the</sup> MPLA, which enjoyed the support of anti-imperialist forces within Africa and outside, was defeated. <sup>The</sup> MPLA had always been their main target from the early '60s onwards. They feared that an Angolan government, under its leadership, would seriously undermine their long established economic interests in the region. For South Africa, an attack against <sup>the</sup> MPLA from the south provided an opportunity to attack the SWAPO freedom fighters in collaboration with the UNITA-FNLA alliance, and <sup>the</sup> UNITA in particular. Zaire believed that an <sup>the</sup> MPLA-controlled Angola could pose an economic threat to it. Zaire would have preferred to entrust the export of its copper (representing 90 per cent of its foreign earnings) from Dilolo in Shaba (Zaire) along the Benguela Railway (Angola) to a government led by <sup>the</sup> FNLA which had always enjoyed its support.

The United States saw its vital economic interests in Angola as having been established by its collective security arrangement and the NATO policies which it shared with Portugal, its ally. Its economic interests were represented by the activities of Gulf Oil, the fourth largest American company, which had exclusive rights in Cabinda over oil.<sup>511</sup> Until 1975, the United States was the principal importer of goods from Angola, and the third largest exporter to Angola.<sup>512</sup>

The United States became directly involved in the Angolan crisis in July 1975 by providing <sup>the</sup> UNITA and <sup>the</sup> FNLA

with supplies worth over \$31 million in their joint war against <sup>the</sup> MPLA. <sup>513</sup> Holden Roberto had already been receiving \$10,000 <sup>514</sup> annually from CIA; and, in January 1975, <sup>the</sup> FNLA had received from \$300,000 <sup>515</sup> from CIA for its joint action with <sup>the</sup> UNITA. In August 1975, the United States gave more financial aid to <sup>the</sup> FNLA and <sup>the</sup> UNITA, estimated at \$10 million, <sup>516</sup> whilst arms continued to be given to <sup>the</sup> FNLA. <sup>517</sup>

At the same time, material aid was already being flown to the FNLA arsenal from its base near Kinshasa, and from France, South Africa, Israel and West Germany. <sup>518</sup>

During the summer of 1975, <sup>the</sup> MPLA was caught in a difficult and most decisive moment, facing war on two <sup>the</sup> fronts, in the north from <sup>the</sup> FNLA and in the south from <sup>the</sup> UNITA. In September 1975 a successful <sup>519</sup> though short-lived counter attack was launched on <sup>the</sup> MPLA in the centre of Angola and some parts of nearby Luanda. <sup>the</sup> MPLA now needed more than military aid and instructors. The 100 Cubans who, since the '60's, <sup>520</sup> had been training <sup>the</sup> MPLA liberation fighters, were no match for the mercenaries and the army which the imperialist powers provided to their allies (UNITA and FNLA).

As far as the progressive African countries, Cuba, and the Soviet Union were concerned, the situation had developed into a revolutionary war involving imperialist and non-imperialist forces.

What one must understand, what the whole of Africa must realise, is that the outcome of the revolution in Africa is being determined right now in Angola... In Angola two forces are

fighting each other; on the one hand, imperialism and its allies and its puppets; and on the other, the progressive popular forces which support the MPLA.<sup>521</sup>

Aid to <sup>the</sup>MPLA was not enough to win the war. <sup>the</sup>MPLA itself sought direct military aid and personnel from without. As the war escalated from July 1975 onwards,<sup>522</sup> more Soviet arms and military equipment<sup>523</sup> (including AK-47 rifles, machine guns, bazookas and rockets) were sent to MPLA, while Cuba (at <sup>the</sup>MPLA's request) sent over 700 soldiers and military experts.<sup>524</sup> Soviet aid to <sup>the</sup>MPLA during 1975 was estimated at a total of \$300 million.<sup>525</sup>

At the same time, the United States increased its financial and material aid to <sup>the</sup>FNLA and <sup>the</sup>UNITA through Zaire and South Africa. In the autumn of 1975, <sup>the</sup>UNITA and <sup>the</sup>FNLA received \$80 million.<sup>526</sup> In 1975, the United States shipped a 1,000-man 'arms package' to support a <sup>the</sup>FNLA-Zairean mercenary attack on the Cabinda oil enclave, long coveted by Mobutu.<sup>527</sup> It failed miserably.

Reinforced by the arrival of 1,000 Cubans, <sup>the</sup>MPLA was able to establish a popular state (11 November 1975) and crush <sup>the</sup>UNITA and <sup>the</sup>FNLA forces in central Angola (January 1976). By November 1976, <sup>the</sup>MPLA was firmly in control of a large part of Angola. At the same time, at the international level it received wider support than before, a support reinforced by the intervention in the crisis of South Africa and the United States .

<sup>The</sup>MPLA's victory represented a threat not only to Zaire's outlet to the sea, (the Zairean River and Benguela

Railway), but also to the interests of Zambia. <sup>The</sup> MPLA knew well that the moderate Zambia had given indirect support to the anti-Soviet and pro-Western <sup>the</sup> UNITA. Following <sup>the</sup> MPLA's victory, Zambia ceased its support for UNITA. Continuing support to <sup>the</sup> UNITA would be a great embarrassment as it became clear that, by late 1975, the latter had become a close ally of South Africa. Zambia's role in the Angolan crisis had already been questioned even by its closest friends - Tanzania, Mozambique, Algeria, Congo(B), Vietnam and North Korea - all of which fully recognised and supported <sup>the</sup> MPLA and its new government. <sup>528</sup> The recognition of and support for <sup>the</sup> MPLA by those two countries was based on the fact that it was

...the only genuine liberation movement in Angola. It alone had fought a prolonged struggle and had begun to mobilise peasants and workers in a way which would pre-empt the formation of a new colonialist state. The MPLA's success now presents prospects of a quite different form of independence and these crucial differences from UNITA and FNLA offer no basis for an imperialist front and a coalition government. <sup>529</sup>

At least until 1974, China's main concern was to see the three national liberation movements of Angola united against the common enemy of Portuguese colonialism. <sup>530</sup>

Even so, China seemed to be more friendly to <sup>the</sup> UNITA. <sup>531</sup> China's position was motivated not so much by <sup>the</sup> UNITA's guerrilla operations, (which by the late '60s had lost their original momentum) as by its selective approach (from 1969 onwards) towards the relations between the

different liberation movements and the Soviet Union. In an article on Angola which appeared in the Peking Review (13 February 1970), the editor made no reference to <sup>the</sup> MPLA and <sup>the</sup> FNLA.<sup>532</sup> According to a correspondent of the Hsinhua News Agency in Cairo (in the same article), <sup>the</sup> UNITA adopted the correct methods for a liberation war guided by

Chairman Mao's teachings on people's war and self-reliance ...especially [his] teachings on people's war and self-reliance...[and with] the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention...formulated for the Chinese Red Army by ... Mao Tse-Tung.<sup>533</sup>

<sup>The</sup> UNITA and its military organisation of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (AFLA), were praised by China for their ability to train more than 3,000 disciplined guerrilla fighters, to forge 'close ties with the people,' and to lead the people 'in production and in fighting'.<sup>534</sup>

This, however, did not mean that China ceased to support <sup>the</sup> MPLA.<sup>535</sup> In fact, the greater part of China's material aid did go to <sup>the</sup> MPLA. In the early '70s MPLA received equipment from China, whilst Chinese instructors were giving training to <sup>the</sup> MPLA forces.<sup>536</sup> In July 1971, Agostinho Neto, the MPLA leader, was warmly received in China. During this visit, Neto told his hosts that Chinese methods of liberation and Mao's teachings on people's war inspired Angolan liberation fighters. At a banquet given in his honour by the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association, Neto pointed out that

...the Angolan guerilla fighters and their leadership in their fight drew

inspiration from the voice of Chairman Mao, the great leader of the Chinese people, to which they always listened attentively. 537

Following the April 1974 *coup* in Portugal, when it seemed certain that the régime in Lisbon was prepared to transfer power to the liberation forces in Portuguese colonies, China felt that its policy of giving continued support to <sup>the</sup> MPLA should be reviewed in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union was exercising greater influence on <sup>the</sup> MPLA. Under the circumstances, one of the options open to China was to introduce a shift in its Angola policy by backing <sup>the</sup> UNITA or <sup>the</sup> FNLA or both. Even as early as May 1974, China had sent a 112-strong team of military instructors led by a General to train <sup>the</sup> FNLA forces at their base in Kinshasa. 538

As it became clear that the United States and South Africa were becoming directly involved in the Angolan crisis in alignment with the UNITA-FNLA alliance, China showed an inclination to withdraw from the crisis (July 1975). 539 China now found itself in a most confusing and controversial situation involving, on the one hand, a conflict of interest between the super powers as well as intervention by other foreign powers in the internal affairs of a state yet to become independent, and on the other, China's identification with <sup>the</sup> UNITA-FNLA alliance which had the support of US imperialism and South-African racism.



China found itself in an embarrassing situation in relation to its ideological friends - Tanzania, Congo(B), Mozambique, Algeria and other anti-imperialist forces - all of which supported MPLA. Continued support for the FNLA-UNITA alliance would have seriously undermined its relations with anti-imperialist forces throughout Africa.

Although China's involvement in the Angolan crisis was short-lived, its ideological impact on China was prolonged and of a serious nature. China's blind obsession with the Soviet Union's influence on MPLA drove it into a friendly embrace with Mobutu's régime, which was condemned as an imperialist agent and the worst oppressor of liberation forces in Zaire.

China's Angolan policy which was no longer seen as hostile to American and Western European interests received wide and favourable coverage in the Western media.<sup>540</sup>

China's strategy of a 'broad united front' of states capable of exploiting the political contradictions between the Big Powers was carried to the extreme of undermining and seriously threatening the anti-imperialist front, especially in Angola. It must have been clear even to China that MPLA forces, with Soviet military aid and reinforced by Cuban personnel, were fighting a war against imperialism and the racist régime of South Africa. For this reason alone, it would be reasonable to expect China, once an unquestionably uncompromising anti-imperialist power, not to give support to elements opposed to MPLA.

By the same token, any 'hegemonic' or 'imperialist' objectives that might have entered into the Soviet Union's

policy towards Angola<sup>541</sup> could be reasonably expected to be given a secondary place by China to the main task of enabling the liberation forces opposed to imperialism establishing their control over the independent state of Angola. The Soviet Union's aid to <sup>the</sup> MPLA did, without doubt, play an important part in consolidating the alignment between <sup>the</sup> MPLA and Cuba against the imperialist powers and the South African offensive.

Even 'moderate' African countries such as Nigeria, realised that <sup>the</sup> MPLA must, under any circumstances, be supported as it stood against the alliance of interests represented by the United States and South Africa. Nigeria's aid to <sup>the</sup> MPLA was estimated at £20 million.<sup>542</sup>

At the same time, OAU, at its summit meeting (10-12 January 1976), recognised <sup>the</sup> MPLA as the genuine liberation movement in Angola against imperialism and<sup>543</sup> racism by a 22:22 vote.

### 15.2.1.3. Mozambique

The ideology was socialist, the strategy was a people's war, the aid was from whoever offered it, the foreign policy was non-aligned.<sup>544</sup>

A similar statement was made 20 years earlier (1970) by Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, the founder President of FRELIMO. Frustrated by the Western powers' criticism, Mondlane sought support for FRELIMO from communist countries.

...what are we supposed to do, if, apart from Africans only the communists will train and arm us? It was apparently alright for the West to ally

itself with the communists against the facists, but when we are denied Western aid we are apparantly expected to do without communist aid as well...As for the suggestion that we are teleguided by Moscow and Peking because we accept their aid, the answer is that those who know FRELIMO know that this is simply not true. Let the West offer to help us, and then they can test whether or not we are truly non-aligned. 545

FRELIMO was the only national liberation movement in Southern Africa that proved itself capable of establishing good relations with both the Soviet Union and China.

The following factors played the major part in such a position.

- i. The popularity, leadership, and good organisation of FRELIMO made it difficult for any effective rival liberation movement to develop. Both the Soviet Union and China were as in the case of Indo-China, compelled to adopt a common policy towards the national liberation struggle in Mozambique.
- ii. FRELIMO adopted a strategy in the political, military and ideological fields, familiar to China and advocated by it to other liberation movements. China could not have attempted to interfere in FRELIMO's friendly relations with the Soviet Union in that country without courting unpopularity.
- iii. FRELIMO's friendly relations with the Soviet Union were welcomed by Tanzania, with which the former had always enjoyed very good relations. The decisive development of FRELIMO's struggles (1970-74) took place at a

time when China and Tanzania were very friendly with each other.<sup>546</sup>

Until Mozambique became independent (June 1975), China had excellent relations with FRELIMO.

China's decision to support (from July 1975 onwards) the UNITA-FLNA alliance and oppose MPLA did, however, give rise to friction between it and Mozambique.

- iv. Samora Machel,<sup>547</sup> (following Mondlane's assassination in February 1969) as President of FRELIMO, developed closer relations with China. This put an end to any chance of China giving support to COREMO, FRELIMO's weak and enfeebled rival.

Samora Machel led a FRELIMO delegation to China (August 1971) where he was warmly received as a revolutionary hero, and unequivocal support was promised to the struggles of the people of Mozambique.<sup>548</sup>

From 1969 onwards the Chinese media always referred to FRELIMO (in contrast to <sup>the</sup> MPLA)<sup>549</sup> as the effective liberation movement in Mozambique.<sup>550</sup> It was reported that, by September 1972, 90 per cent of foreign military aid to FRELIMO originated in China.<sup>551</sup>

When Portugal (7 September 1974) recognised the independence of Mozambique, FRELIMO was paid the following tribute by Zhou Enlai

Under the leadership of FRELIMO the heroic Mozambique people, by persevering in a protracted armed struggle, have at last compelled the Portuguese government to recognise the right of Mozambique people to national independence.<sup>552</sup>

Four months before the formal proclamation of independence, Samora Machel paid a third visit to China (February 1975), where he stressed that

[e]ver since the beginning of our struggle, the People's Republic of China has stood in the vanguard of the magnificent movement supporting us...

We can say, and it is justifiable to say, that together we have fought and together we have won victory.<sup>553</sup>

At the same time, Samora Machel told his hosts he was in China to learn from its experience of building a country out of a protracted liberation war.

We have come here to study and learn from your revolutionary experience of building the people's power and reconstructing a country ruined by pillage and the wars of aggression launched by the reactionaries and imperialist.<sup>554</sup>

In June 1975, China sent 30,000<sup>555</sup> tons of wheat to the people of Mozambique. This was followed by an interest-free loan of \$56 million,<sup>556</sup> repayable only after 1990. China also sent a medical team to review the health service of Mozambique, (September 1975). In November 1975 30 Chinese doctors arrived in Mozambique.<sup>557</sup>

#### 15.2.1.4. Zimbabwe

Inspired by the successful intensification of armed struggles in the Portuguese colonies, liberation fighters in Zimbabwe, under the leadership of ZANU, actively

increased their guerrilla operations during the period under discussion (1969-76).

ZAPU, with the Soviet Union's support, was in favour of a peaceful solution and a compromise settlement with the illegal régime led by Ian Smith.<sup>558</sup> Nkomo and his supporters believed that exclusive reliance on armed struggle would only enhance the position of ZANU which happened to be the militant and progressive liberation movement in the country, with strong ties with China.

China was opposed to negotiation; it condemned Britain for attempting to reach a settlement that would, in effect, serve the interests of Ian Smith's illegal régime.<sup>559</sup> China took the view that if Britain was seriously interested in finding a solution to the problem, it should put

...an end to the colonialist rule by the Rhodesian white racist régime<sup>560</sup>

which came into being, in the first place, as a result of colonial policies.

The Rhodesian white racist régime is a direct outcome of the British colonialist policy.<sup>561</sup>

At the same time, China appealed to ZAPU to form a national united front with ZANU in the battlefield.<sup>562</sup> During this period, OAU's attempts to bring the two parties together ended in failure, largely because of ZANU's resistance to ZAPU's policy of appeasement.

ZANU was continuously encouraged and supported by China in its struggle and its leaders were praised<sup>563</sup> for resolutely opposing any settlement short of the national liberation of Zimbabwe. Commenting on the occasion of the 9th anniversary of Zimbabwean 'National Liberation Day', Renmin Ribao, People's Daily (28 April 1975) wrote as follows:

All the evil-doing by the Vorster and Smith racists serves in a negative way to teach the people that the nature of reactionaries will never change and the enemy will not quit the stage of history of its own accord. If you don't hit it, it won't fall. The practice of struggle has proved time and again that armed struggle is the basic way for the oppressed nations and peoples to win independence, liberation, and the victory of revolution.<sup>564</sup>

#### 15.2.1.5. Azania

If fears of China's revolutionary hard line of the '60s towards 'moderate' governments had gradually begun to evaporate, the fear among the colonial and racist forces in southern Africa (which were the direct target of liberation forces) were intensified by China's commitment to construct the TanZam Railway as well as its close co-operation with Tanzania and Zambia which were the major bases for national liberation movements in the region

the greatest single threat to Africa is that communist China has established a bridgehead in Tanzania.<sup>565</sup>

Similarly, P.W. Botha, South Africa's Defence Minister, charged (27 November 1971) that

communist forces, mainly communist China are building their 'terrorist' activities on the northern borders of South Africa. <sup>566</sup>

China strongly condemned the decision of Edward Heath's Conservative<sup>567</sup> government to supply arms to the white racist régime in South Africa (July 1970).<sup>568</sup> Britain's attitude towards South Africa was viewed by China as constituting a major contribution to the reinforcement and consolidation of the apartheid régime in line with its own interests as a member of the imperialist camp.

The Chinese government holds that racial discrimination and apartheid which exist in Southern Africa and other areas, are the products of the policy of colonialism and imperialism. <sup>569</sup>

During the '60s, China identified rather closely with PAC because of the latter's policy of armed struggle; but in the '70s, China's main interest lay in undermining the Soviet Union's influence in the liberation struggle in Azania (South Africa). PAC, which might have served such a purpose did not have much of an impact on the liberation struggle during this period. During the '70s, ANC became, unquestionably, the leading movement in the national liberation struggles of Azania.

China was thus compelled to develop good relations with ANC, even though there was no prospect whatever of a change in the latter's policy of close co-operation with the Soviet Union.<sup>570</sup> In fact the ANC leaders regarded the



Soviet Union and Cuba, especially following the Angolan crisis, as the more reliable ally for their struggle.<sup>571</sup>

#### 15.2.1.6. Namibia

During the '70s, SWAPO emerged as the only effective and organised national liberation movement in Namibia which was recognised by both UN and OAU. SWAPO, however, was gradually losing its momentum in the battlefield.<sup>572</sup>

Like most national liberation movements in southern Africa, SWAPO has always tried to steer clear of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Its aim has been to try to obtain assurance from both powers. This, however, has not been an easy task. According to SWAPO's representative in Algiers:

We used all possible tactics and skills to extract Chinese aid or support for us without obsession with the Soviet Union. But whenever you meet the Chinese the Soviet factor is always in your mind and the Chinese always refer to it. We do not want to get involved in a dispute that will do no good for our struggle.<sup>573</sup>

SWAPO however, continued to gain material support from both China and the Soviet Union despite its pressure on Sam Njoma to scale down the aid given by China.<sup>574</sup>

#### 15.2.2. China and <sup>EN</sup>AAPSO

The Sino-Soviet dispute, which had penetrated <sup>EN</sup>AAPSO during the previous phase (1966-69), deepened further during this period. China's obsession with the Soviet

Union during the '70s led to its boycotting AAPSO conferences and meetings.

Its revolutionary character, at least in relation to support for armed struggle in Indo-China and southern Africa, was no longer sufficient for China to identify itself with <sup>LR</sup>AAPSO. China wanted <sup>LR</sup>AAPSO to become anti-Soviet in its international orientation. It would not be sufficient for <sup>LR</sup>AAPSO to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute in order to win China's friendship and support. <sup>LR</sup>575

China's admission to <sup>LR</sup>UN was viewed by <sup>LR</sup>AAPSO as a victory for the anti-imperialist forces and a defeat of the United States and its allies. Following the restoration of China's seat in <sup>LR</sup>UN (October 1971), the Permanent Secretariat for <sup>LR</sup>AAPSO in Cairo expressed the view (January 1972) that

the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations is a victory of the Afro-Asian peoples [and that]...

By adopting with a clear and wide majority the resolution on the restoration of the lawful right of representation of the People's Republic of China at the UN and its various organs and at the same time expelling the Chiang Kai-Shek clique from the organisation, the UN General Assembly has cleared a grossly anomalous situation and undone the injustice done to the country of over 750 million people.

The Permanent Secretariat is confident that the restoration of China's rightful place in the UN, will enhance the struggle of all anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces and will consolidate further the Afro-Asian peoples struggle for freedom, national independence and for peace and progress. <sup>LR</sup>575

The main resolutions adopted by both the 5th and 6th Congresses of AAPSO (Cairo: January 1972, and Algiers: May 1984)<sup>577</sup> hardly differed from those which strongly linked China with the organisation during the early '60s. At both conferences, armed struggle by liberation movements was hailed and people's wars were urged. The role of the United States in South East Asia, Latin America and Africa, was strongly condemned.<sup>578</sup>

As far as China was concerned, these resolutions were not enough to restore its relations with <sup>the</sup> AAPSO. China would be satisfied only if these resolutions were followed by resolutions condemning the Soviet Union's role in Afghanistan, Indo-China and on its northern borders. Such resistance on China's part

was not necessary in the face of imperialists' manoeuvres. This could only be done through direct talks with the Soviet Union and not public criticism or condemnation of it. This would only serve the interests of anti-socialist forces.<sup>579</sup>

Most, if not all African anti-imperialist forces, agree with the viewpoint cited above. Although many seemed to accept that the Soviet Union was playing a 'hegemonic' role in Afghanistan, Indo-China and other regions, they were inclined to overlook it and concentrate on imperialism which they continued to regard as the main enemy of the forces of national liberation in Africa. China's obsession with the Soviet Union, apart from being exaggerated, was viewed as a distraction from the main

TABLE 15.2

EXCHANGE OF VISITING DELEGATIONS BETWEEN  
AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND CHINA (1970-1975)

Year	From Africa to PRC	From PRC to Africa
1970	15	33
1971	15	9
1972	51	14
1973	65	25
1974	15	9
1975	19	8
Total	180	98

Source: Wei Liang-Tsai, Peking versus Taiping in Africa 1960-1978 (Taipei: The Asian and World Institute, 1982), p. 66 (Table 13).

task. In the final analysis, the pro-China character of AAPSO during the '60s was lost during the '70s.

The revolutionary line underlying China's foreign policy towards Africa during the '50s and '60s was gradually modified during the '70s (and especially from the mid-'70s onwards). Thenceforwards, China's strategy of 'broad united front' embraced governmental and non-governmental political forces, some of which were even pro-Western and anti-communist in character, and was driven by a blind obsession with the Soviet Union's growing influence in the continent. China's original goal of African revolution received severe setbacks and its ideological credibility among a number of African national liberation and revolutionary movements was brought into question. At the same time, a very uneasy atmosphere could be detected in China's relations with 'progressive' states. The development of China's strategy towards Africa during the following decade is the subject of the next chapter.

## NOTES

1. Peking Review 15 (28 January 1972): 4, p. 14.
2. See Chapter 9.1 of this work.  
See also the report of a speech by Chiao Kwan-hua Chairman of the Chinese Delegation, at the Plenary Meeting of the 28th UN General Assembly (2 October 1973) in Peking Review 16 (5 October 1973): 40, pp. 10-11.
3. See Chapter 15.2.2 of this work.
4. See Chapter 15.2.1 of this work.
5. It will become apparent in the following section that China's new emphasis in its overall strategy won the support of 'non-progressive' (e.g. Zaire) and 'moderate' (e.g. Tunisia) states. For a similar view see, for example. T. Deitch, 'Peking et l'Afrique', Asie et Afrique 6 (March-April 1982): 3, passim.
6. The factors underlying, and the motivations behind this development in China's world view have already been discussed in Chapter 8 of this work.
7. Algeria's long-standing relationship with China both on the people-to-people and on the diplomatic levels gives added importance to this version of Algeria's official position. See Table 16.6.
8. Author's interview with Selimane Houfmane (Algiers: November 1983).
9. During the period 1962 (the year of Algeria's independence) - 1976 (the end of the 4th stage of Sino-African relations), Soviet economic aid to Algeria reached a total of \$715 million. In the military sphere, Soviet aid to Algeria during the 1962-1974 period reached a total of \$350 million. This amount made Algeria the second largest recipient of Soviet aid in Africa (after Egypt) and the eighth in the world (after Egypt, India, Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Indonesia and Turkey). See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 14 (Table 1).
10. During the '80s, China seems to have been playing down its earlier blind obsession with the Soviet Union in deciding how it should approach the question of its relations with individual African states or liberation movements. See Chapter 16 of this work.
11. See Chapter 15.2.1.2 of this work.
12. In September 1973 (The Fourth Non-Aligned Summit: Algiers), Algeria played a major part in the discussions preceding agreement requiring positive steps to be taken for bringing a New International Economic Order (NIEO) into existence. At the Summit,

Houari Boumedienne urged that any solution short of active opposition to the present world order would be 'a deception of our own people and a 'subjection to imperialism and neo-colonialism'. [Author's translation from Khuta Al-Ra'is Houari Boumedienne, Bimunasabat Al-Muakatamar Al Rabi' Li-Ldowal Al Ghal Munhaz (President Boumedienne's speech of the 4th Summit of Non-Aligned Countries), El Jezair (Algiers): September 1973), Metabaat Elriyat (Algiers: Publisher of the Presidency, 1973)], p. 130.

13. This is documented in the following pages where Boumedienne's visit to China in 1974 is described.
14. See, for example, J. R. Nellis, 'Algerian socialism and its critics', Canadian Journal 13 (September 1980), p. 485; The Middle East and North Africa 1979-1980 (a year book by Europa) (London: Europa Publications, 1979), p. 226; and Peking Review 15 (11 August 1972: 32, p. 18.
15. See Tables 14.1 and 14.2 of this work.
16. New China News Agency no. 110806 (9 November 1969), p. 10.
17. The construction of this project began on 19 November 1968. See W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 86.
18. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 247.
19. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 86.
20. Peking Review 14 (6 August 1971): 32, pp. 24-25.
21. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 170.
22. See Table 12.4.  
See also A. McDermott, 'Algeria Seeks Closer Ties with China', The Guardian (23 October 1971).
23. A. McDermott, op.cit.
24. Construction of the project began in 1968. See W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 86.
25. Peking Review 14 (29 October 1971): 44, p. 6. See also Table 15.2.
26. cited in Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, pp. 28-29.
27. Peking Review 15 (11 November 1972): 46, p. 17.
28. Peking Review 16 (18 May 1973): 20, p. 3.
29. Algeria's position on this question stems from a long history of resistance to the use of Mediterranean Sea

for military purposes. This was reinforced by NATO's direct support to France during the Algerian War of National Liberation.

30. Al Mujahid Al Usbu no. 709 (17 March 1974).
31. Algerians repeatedly stress that China's major contribution to the Algerian war constitutes the backbone of Sino-Algerian relations.
32. As stated in Al Mujāhid Al Usbu no. 709 (17 March 1974) (author's translation).
33. Houari Boumedienne, in a speech at a banquet given to the Algerian delegation by Zhou En-lai, reported in Hsinhua News Agency no. 022628 (27 February 1974), p. 2.
34. See Chapter 15.1.2 of this work.
35. Premier Chou En-lai, 'speech welcoming President Boumedienne', reported in Peking Review 17 (8 March 1974): 10, p. 6.
36. Ibidem.
37. Speech by Teng Hsiao-ping, Chairman of Delegation of PRC at the 6th Special Session of UN (10 April 1977), reported in Peking Review 17 (12 April 1974): 15, p. 1.
38. Algeria does not seem to have adapted or borrowed a model from any particular socialist country. Rather, it tended to adapt various socialist experiments in the agricultural as well as in the industrial fields to Algerian conditions.
39. In an interview with Majallat Al Duskūr (Lebanon: 7 October 1971), Boumedienne explained these pledges as follows

Most of our population are peasants (more than 90 per cent) who fought and led the war of liberation against foreign colonialists. If the revolution neglects the countryside and concentrates on towns, the day will come when it [the revolution] will be strangled. [author's translation]

from Khutab Al Ra'is Boumedienne 2 July 1970-1 May 1972 [Algeria: Wizarat Al 'Ilam wal Thaqafa (Ministry for Information and Culture) 1972], p. 319.



40. Boumedienne's speech at a banquet given by Chou En-lai to the Algerian Delegation, reported in Peking Review 17 (8 March 1974): 8, p. 7.
41. Ibid., p. 8.
42. See Chapter 14.2.1.3 of this work.
43. See Chapter 14.2.1.5 of this work.
44. Peking Review 16 (January 1973): 3, p. 23.
45. The Red Guards were urged to join the party formally. Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia was perhaps an important factor in the toning down of the dynamism and intensity of GPCR. Chinese leaders were alarmed by the Soviet Union's armed intervention in Czechoslovakia followed by the promulgation of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' which in their view posed a threat to China's own security and integrity. China was anxious to abandon its isolationism of the mid-'60s in favour of a policy of some kind of relationship with the outside world, despite its imperfections.
46. W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 130-131. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 245; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 125.
47. viz., an entirely Chinese-equipped tannery unit, and a new transmitting station with four 50 Kw short wave transmitters. Peking Review pp. 130-131.
48. Peking Review 13 (25 December 1970): 52, p. 4. See also Chinese 'Press Release' (London: 29 December 1970).
49. See Table 12.4 of this work.
50. Peking Review 14 (5 November 1971): 45, p. 5.
51. cited in Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, p. 32.
52. Peking Review 15 (4 August 1972): 31, pp. 5 and 21.
53. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 125.
54. cited in Peking Review 16 (29 June 1973): 26, p. 8.
55. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
56. cited in ibid., p. 9.
57. cited in J. Bermingham et al., op.cit., p. 31.
58. Peking Review 16 (29 June 1973): 26, p. 8.

59. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 129.
60. For details, see ibid., p. 132.
61. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 126.
62. See Chapter 14.2.1.4 of this work.
63. See Chapter 14.1.1.1 of this work.
64. See A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 144; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 115.
65. Peking Review 12 (28 February 1969): 9, p. 20.
66. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 164; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 115.
67. See W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 116-120; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 248; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 115-116 (note 27).
68. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 248.
69. See Chapter 14.2.1.4 of this work.
70. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 118.
71. Ibidem.
72. Ibidem.
73. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 248.
74. Peking Review 13 (20 November 1970): 47, p. 21.
75. See Hungdah Chu (Ed.), Agreements of the People's Republic of China: A Calendar of Events 1966-1980 (London: Praeger, 1981), passim; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 115.
76. 'Statement of the government of the PRC' in Peking Review 13 (27 November 1970): 48, p. 6. See also Peking Review 13 (4 November 1970): 49, pp. 10-11; and Peking Review 13 (11 December 1970): 50, p. 8.
77. Following Portuguese aggression against Guinea, the OAU held an Emergency Ministerial Council Meeting (Lagos: 9-12 December 1970) at which Portugal and its NATO allies were roundly condemned. See Peking Review 13 (25 December 1970): 52, p. 28.
78. cited in Peking Review 13 (27 November 1970): 48, p. 3.
79. See Table 12.4. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 248; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 116.

80. Peking Review 13 (11 December 1970): 50, p. 22.
81. This figure was converted to US \$ according to the rates of that year (1971). The original figure was given UK £3.5 million in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 248.
82. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 249.
83. For text of his speech see Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, p. 34.
84. At people-to-people level China's policy in the Angolan crisis was an obvious case. See Chapter 15.2.1.2 of this work.
85. Abd Al-Khaleq Mahgoub, as the General Secretary of the SCP, played a greater part in the strength of the communist movement in the Sudan during the '60s.
86. Author's interview (August 1983) with a Sudanese communist activist who later joined the Department of Politics, University of Algiers as a lecturer.
87. Mohammed al-Said El Karar, 'El Hizb Elshoyoi Wenkileb 25 Mayo (1971)' (The Communist Party of the Sudan and the 25 May Coup), El Meidan (the official organ of the SCP) (Khartoum: 7 October 1985), series 9, p. 6.
88. Abd Al-Khaleq Mahgoub, 'For a New Democracy', in Anouar Abdel-Malek (Ed.), Contemporary Arab Political Thought (London: Zed Books, 1980), p. 193.
89. Ibid., p. 192.
90. Communist ministers were, however, chosen by Nemeiri, not by the SCP. [Author's interview with Mounif at University of Leeds (1985)]
91. Peking Review 13 (3 July 1970): 27, p. 67.
92. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 193.
93. Nemeiri's speech in Beijing, cited in Peking Review 13 (14 August 1970): 33, pp. 6-7.
94. Peking Review 13 (21 August 1970): 34, p. 31.
95. The Scotsman (25 August 1970).
96. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 65 and 172.
97. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 246.
98. T. N. Kanza, 'Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa', in W. Weinstein, op.cit., pp. 242-243 (Table 1).
99. The Guardian (7 April 1971).

100. C. Legum, 'Sudan's Three Day Revolution', Africa Report 16 (October 1971): 7, p. 12.
101. See Muhammed al-Said, op.cit., p. 6.
102. Author's interview with Sudanese and Algerian academics (Algiers: University of Algiers, June 1985).
103. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 241.
104. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 246.
105. Ibid., p. 247. See also A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 17.
106. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 247.
107. See Chapters 12.2.1.1.5 and 13.3.1.1 of this work.
108. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 655.
109. Ibidem.
110. A. Ogunsanwo's book was published in 1974 and covered only the period 1958-71.
111. L. Evans, China after Mao (New York: Monad Press, 1978), p. 101.
112. See Chapter 8 of this work.
113. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, Peking Review p. 241; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 241; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 171; and C. Legum, 'Sudan's Three Day Revolution', op.cit., p. 12.
114. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 194.
115. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 172; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 194.
116. cited in Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, p. 31.
117. Peking Review 14 (24 December 1971): 52, p. 4.
118. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., pp. 171-172.
119. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 194-195.
120. See W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 173-175.
121. Peking Review 16 (2 November 1973): 44, p. 3.
122. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 78; and R. Synge 'Benin', in Africa South of the Sahara 1984-86

- (annual publication) (London: Europa Publications, 1984), p. 219.
123. Dahomey's name was changed to Benin on 30 November 1975. On the same day, the People's Revolutionary Party was founded. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 78; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 132.
  124. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 78-79; and R. Synge, op.cit., p. 219.
  125. Peking Review 15 (15 December 1972): 50, p. 20
  126. For the text of the Joint Communique of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Benin and China, see Peking Review 16 (5 January 1973): 1, p. 8.
  127. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 44. Wei Liang-Tsai's figure, op.cit., p. 132, is \$2 million less (\$44 million).
  128. See Chapter 14.2.1.6 of this work.
  129. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 129.
  130. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 150; and The Guardian (26 June 1970).
  131. cited in Peking Review 12 (26 September 1969): 39, p. 33.
  132. cited in Peking Review 12 (17 October 1969): 42, p. 17.
  133. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 130.
  134. Peking Review 13 (24 June 1970): 30, p. 9.
  135. Li Hsien-nien, Vice-Premier, at a banquet given to a Congo (B) delegation, cited in Peking Review 13 (24 July 1970): 30, p. 6.
  136. Peking Review 13 (20 November 1970): 47, p. 20.
  137. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 130.
  138. cited in Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, p. 36.
  139. See W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 108; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 130.
  140. Ibidem.
  141. Peking Review 15 (7 April 1972): 14, p. 21.
  142. Peking Review 12 (26 September 1969): 39, p. 33. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 108.

143. See Table 12.4. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 130.
144. This visit followed another by Charles David, the Foreign Minister of the Congo (B) (June 1973). Peking Review 16 (22 June 1973): 25, p. 3.
145. For the text of the speech see Peking Review 16 (3 August 1973): 31, p. 7.
146. See Peking Review 18 (7 March 1975): 10, p. 12.
147. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 241.
148. Siad Barre took power after political turmoil in the country which resulted in the assassination (15 October 1969) of Shermake, the Acting President.
149. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 241.
150. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 241.
151. China promised to sink wells in Beletwem, Bandaba and Galkaayu also. W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 164-165.
152. Ibid., p. 163. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 245.
153. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 165. This source does not mention the fields in which these research institutions were meant to specialise.
154. cited in Peking Review 13 (26 June 1970): 28, p. 9.
155. Ibid., p. 8.
156. This was in sharp contrast to Emperor Haile Selassie's views and general orientation with which the Chinese leaders had the opportunity to become directly acquainted when he visited that country. See Chapter 15.1, 2.20 of this work.
157. cited in Peking Review 13 (26 June 1970): 26, p. 9.
158. See, for example, ibid., pp. 8-9.
159. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 200.
160. See W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 165; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 245.
161. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 200.
162. Ibid. See also Table 12.4 of this work.
163. See Peking Review 14 (4 June 1971): 23, p. 3; and Peking Review 14 (7 August 1971): 34, p. 3.

164. See F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 258; A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 102 (note 10). Construction of this project began in 1975. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 200; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 102 (note 10).
165. Peking Review 15 (19 May 1972): 20, pp. 4-5.
166. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 165.
167. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 201.
168. See Table 12.1. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 201.
169. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 201.
170. Later in the same month Chinese Ambassadors to Guinea, Zambia and the Congo (B), also resumed their work in these countries. Not long after, normal relations were re-established with Algeria and Mauritania. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 164; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 213.
171. See Chapter 14.2.1.7 of this work.
172. See, for example, G. T. Yu, China's African Policy. A Study of Tanzania, op.cit.
173. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 213.
174. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 180.
175. See Ibid., pp. 179-180; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 213.
176. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 214.
177. Peking Review 13 (6 November 1970): 45, p. 29.
178. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 214.
179. Peking Review 15 (22 June 1972): 22, p. 3.
180. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 214.
181. cited in ibid., p. 215.
182. Ibidem.; see also Table 12.4 of this work.
183. Ibidem.
184. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 243; and Yeh Po-t'ang, op.cit., p. 7.
185. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 163.

186. See W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 200-201; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 243.
187. cited in Peking Review 15 (22 September 1972): 38, p. 8.
188. See Table 12.4 of this work, see also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 18.
189. Peking Review 17 (1 March 1974): 9, pp. 10-11.
190. See Table 12.4. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 200; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 214.
191. Peking Review 18 (21 March 1975): 12, p. 5.  
This was followed (September 1975) by another visit to China by Alexander Grey Zulu, General Secretary of UNIPF, presumably with the aim of promoting further economic and political cooperation between the two countries. See Peking Review 18 (19 September 1975): 38, p. 4.
192. See Table 12.4 of this work. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 244.
193. Peking Review 15 (10 March 1972): 10, p. 19.
194. See Chapter 14.2.1.7 of this work.
195. On 23 October 1975, the first passenger train arrived in Kapiri Moposhi from Dar es Salaam. The cost of a ticket for the entire distance (1,162 miles) in 1976 was equivalent to £5.50. See N. Ashford, 'The Chinese built TanZam Railway runs on time', The Times (26 July 1976).
196. Peking Review 13 (17 July 1970): 29, p. 3.
197. See Table 12.4 of this work.
198. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 248.
199. cited in Peking Review 13 (6 November 1970): 45, p. 17.
200. For a detailed account of the TanZam Railway, see, for example, G. T. Yu, China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania, op.cit.; see also Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (London: Heinemann Press, 1974, pp. 125-126; W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 184-186; and M. Baily, op.cit.
201. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 250.
202. P. Sircar, 'The Great Uhuru Railway', China Report (India) 14 (1978): 2, p. 18.



203. G. T. Yu, China's Foreign Policy: A Study of Tanzania, op.cit., p. 143.
204. The 1961 (the year of the independence of Madagascar) figures estimated that 41,665 overseas Chinese were living in the whole of Africa, of whom 10,000 were in Madagascar. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 250-251 and note 34.
205. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 437.
206. Ibid., p. 438.
207. Ibidem.
208. See Peking Review 15 (27 October 1972): 43; and Peking Review 15 (10 November 1972): 45, p. 22.
209. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 438.
210. See Table 12.1 of this work.
211. For the text of the Joint Communiqué on the occasion of this visit, see Peking Review 13 (10 November 1972): 45, p. 4.
212. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 128.
213. Ibidem.
214. Peking Review 17 (1 February 1974): 5, p. 5.
215. Ibidem.
216. Peking Review 18 (1 August 1975): 31, p. 31.
217. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 254.
218. Two-thirds of these belonged to Soviet units independently manning sites, naval and air bases, and Soviet aircraft. The rest were advisers and instructors. With the exception of Soviet naval facilities in Alexandria, Marsa, Matruh, Sollum and Port Said, all other bases were put under Egyptian control. See A. McDermott, 'Sadat and the Soviet Union', The World Today 28 (September 1972): 9, pp. 405-410. McDermott reported only 1,600, instead of 2,000 as it was revealed later.
219. Peking Review 13 (9 October 1970): 41, p. 29.
220. cited in Peking Review 13 (6 February 1970): 4, p. 6. Nasser responded to this message as follows:
- We pay close attention to the achievements of the Chinese great people and admire their struggle. We have complete faith in China's

constant support for the struggle of the Arab nation and for the struggles of all countries for political and social freedom.

cited in Peking Review 13 (20 February 1970): 8, p. 20.

On 17 February 1970, Chou En-lai received Salah El Abd, Ambassador of Egypt to China. See ibid., p. 21.

221. Peking Review 14 (5 February 1971): 6, p. 3.
222. Ibid., p. 4.
223. Peking Review 14 (13 August 1971): 3, p. 4.
224. Peking Review 15 (31 March 1972): 13, pp. 3 and 20.
225. See, for example, Peking Review 15 (30 July 1972): 30, pp. 14-16; Peking Review 15 (4 August 1972): 31, p. 20; and Peking Review 15 (25 August 1972): 34, p. 19.
226. See W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 42; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 172.
227. Peking Review 16 (23 March 1973): 12, p. 3.
228. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 42.
229. Peking Review 16 (16 September 1973): 39, pp. 3-4.
230. Huang Hua's speech at the UN General Assembly, Session on the Palestine question, cited in Peking Review 18 (21 November 1975): 47, p. 12.
231. Author's interview with Mahmoud al Mistiri, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Tunis: 1 November 1983).
232. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports Tunis-Chinois: 1956-84, op.cit., p. 7. See also Table 12.1 of this work; Peking Review 14 (15 October 1971): 42, p. 19.
233. China sent (8 October 1971) Chin Minh Sheng as Chargé d'Affaires. On 11 February 1972, de Hov Yen-Feng, Chinese Ambassador, arrived in Tunis. See Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports Tunis-Chinois: 1956-84, op.cit., p. 8.
234. See Chapter 13.3.2.2 of this work.
235. See his speech in Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, pp. 46-47.
236. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports Tunis-Chinois: 1956-84, op.cit., p. 8.

237. Ibidem.
238. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 171.
239. Canal Medjerday Cap-Bon (a publication by Tunisian Ministry for Equipment) (Tunis: Ministère de l'Équipement, 1983); and Tunisie-Chine: Perspectives de Coopération (a publication by Secrétariat d'État à l'Information) [Tunis: Imprimerie Tunis-Carthage (S.T.E.A.G.), 1974], p. 13; and Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports Tunis-Chinois: 1956-84, op.cit., p. 8. For English sources on the size of financial aid, see W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 192. See also Table 12.2 of this work.
240. Tunisie-Chine: Perspectives de Coopération, op.cit., pp. 13-14.
241. Ibid., p. 14.
242. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports Tunis-Chinois: 1956-84, op.cit., p. 10.
243. Al Sada (Tunisian daily newspaper) (31 March 1975).
244. See his speech at a state banquet given to the Tunisian Delegation by Chi Peng-Fei, China's Foreign Minister in Peking Review 17 (19 July 1974): 29, p. 5.
245. See Chapter 13.3.2.2 of this work.
246. cf. Tunisia's view of China during the '60s as a 'colonial' power. vide Chapter 13.3.2.2 of this work.
247. Accounts of Nourira's talks with the Chinese leaders were shown in the original to this author by an official in the Tunisian Ministry for Foreign Affairs whose name cannot be revealed for obvious reasons.  
For Tunisian comments on Nourira's visit, see Al Sada (7 April 1975).  
For comments by Chinese sources on this visit, see Peking Review 18 (4 April 1975): 14, p. 3; and Peking Review 18 (11 April 1975): 15, p. 12.
248. Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports Tunis-Chinois: 1956-84, op.cit., p. 10.
249. See Chapter 13.2.3.3 of this work.
250. Chad's National Union espoused a revolutionary anti-imperialist political programme. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 184.
251. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 135; and Peking Review 15 (15 December 1972): 50, p. 20.

252. cited in Peking Review 15 (8 December 1972): 49, p. 3.
253. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 184; and Peking Review 14 (25 June 1971): 26, p. 4.
254. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 232.
255. See Table 8.1 of this work.
256. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 185. See also Table 12.2.
257. Ibidem.
258. See Chapter 13.2.3.3 of this work.
259. The aim of this meeting was to agree a common strategy to counter the intrusion of imperialist power in the Sahel area. See R. Synge, 'Niger', in Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85 (a publication by Europa) (London: Europa Publications, 1984), p. 644; and Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 530-531.
260. Peking Review 17 (26 July 1974): 3, pp. 3-4. Niger voted against China's admission to UN in October 1971. See Table 8.1. In May 1961, despite the fact that there were no diplomatic relations between the countries, a delegation of the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association included Niger in its African itinerary [Peking Review 4 (19 May 1961): 20, p. 23]. Niger was also one of the Moslim countries which Chinese Moslims visited after their pilgrimage to Mecca (see A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 33).
261. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 188.
262. Ibidem.
263. See Chapter 14.2.2.1 of this work. Somalia and Zambia, other non-progressive countries, had, too, good relations with China during the GPCR, but they established diplomatic relations with China well before the GPCR. See Table 12.1; and Chapters 13.3.2.7. and 13.3.2.10.
264. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 247.
265. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 135; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 248.
266. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 134.
267. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 136.
268. cited in Peking Review 14 (9 April 1971): 15, pp. 3 and 22.

269. Ibid., p. 3.
270. See H. Pick, 'Peking Shows the Way in Black Africa', The Guardian (9 February 1972); A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 248; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 134. See also Table 12.4.
271. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 137.
272. Peking Review 15 (26 May 1972): 21, p. 20.
273. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 134.
274. cited in Peking Review 17 (20 September 1974): 38, p. 9.
275. cited in ibid., p. 7.
276. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 134.
277. See Chapter 13.3.1.4 of this work.
278. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 144.
279. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 612.
280. See Chapter 7 of this work.
281. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 144.  
The text of the Joint Communique on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Senegal is contained in Peking Review 14 (17 December 1971): 51, p. 4.
282. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 144. See also Table 12.4.
283. See ibid., p. 145; and W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 161.
284. On this occasion, he also visited North Korea, India and Bangladesh. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 145.
285. Sedar Senghor's speech, at a banquet given to the Senegalese delegation, reported in Peking Review 17 (10 May 1974): 19, p. 16. For the text of the Joint Communique, see Peking Review 17 (24 May 1974): 21, p. 8.
286. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 627.
287. quoted in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 143.
288. There was a small but vocal left wing in Sierra Leone of which the government had to take note. See ibidem. See also Table 12.1 of this work.

289. For the text of the Joint Communique, see Peking Review 14 (6 August 1971): 32, p. 22.
290. For a short period during 1967, Sierra Leone appeared to be moving away from the West when Siaka Stevens, leader of the opposition party - All People's Congress Party (APC) - was elected as Prime Minister. However, the newly elected government was soon overthrown by Brigadier-General David Lansana, a close friend of the United States. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 627.
291. Ibid., p. 628.
292. Ibidem.
293. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 242.
294. Peking Review 14 (6 August 1971): 32, p. 22.
295. See Table 12.4 of this work.
296. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 145; and W. Bartke, op.cit., pp. 60 and 162.
297. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 629.
298. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 143.
299. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 162.
300. Peking Review 15 (5 May 1972): 18, pp. 20-21.
301. cited in Peking Review 16 (16 November 1973): 46, p. 9.
302. See ibidem.
303. Gambia voted against China's admission to UN.
304. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 150.
305. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 147.
306. See Table 15.1.
307. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit.,
308. See Chapters 13.2.3.1, 13.2.3.2, 15.1.2.12 and 15.1.2.15 of this work.
309. See Peking Review 16 (20 April 1973): 16, p. 5. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 148.
310. See Table 12.4 of this work.  
For the text of the Joint Communique between China and Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), see Peking Review 16 (21 September 1973), p. 3.

311. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 148.
312. Ibidem.
313. Ibidem.
314. Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 694-695.
315. See Table 13.1 of this work.
316. Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, p. 45.
317. For the text of the Joint Communique, see Peking Review 15 (29 September 1972): 39, p. 4.
318. See Table 12.4 of this work. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 191; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 145.
319. For the text of his speech, see Peking Review 17 (6 September 1974): 36, p. 6.
320. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 695.
321. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 146.
322. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 146.
323. See Chapter 14.2.1.5 of this work. See also Ministry of Information, Republic of Ghana, Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1966).
324. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 325.
325. See Peking Review 15 (3 March 1972): 9, p. 3. See also Table 12.1.
326. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 163.
327. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 387
328. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., pp. 121-122.
329. Peking Review 15 (15 September 1972): 37, p. 18.
330. See Table 12.1 of this work.
331. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 121.
332. Ibidem.
333. No further financial aid given to Ghana until 1985. See Table 12.4 of this work.
334. Peking Review 17 (1 February 1974): 5, p. 20.
335. See Chapter 14.1.3.1 of this work.

336. Radio Lagos (27 July 1964), quoted in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 137.
337. Both the coups d'état which Nigeria experienced in 1966 had no impact on the 'non-progressive' character of the Nigerian regime and its hostility toward communism.
338. See Chapter 14.1.3.1 of this work.
339. For the text of the Joint Communiqué, see Peking Review 14 (19 February 1971): 8, p. 5.
340. cited in Peking Review 14 (19 February 1971): 8, p. 5.
341. See Table 12.4 of this work.
342. See Chapter 14.1.3.1 of this work.
343. China was the only socialist country which refused to support the Federal Government.
344. Tanzania and Zambia supported Biafra.
345. See S. S. Ahmed 'Nigeria-China Relations: An approach to positive neutrality', Pakistan Horizon 26 (1973): 1, pp. 48-54; and O. Aluko, 'Nigerian Foreign Policy', in O. Aluko (Ed.), The Foreign Policies of African States, op.cit., pp. 174-175.
346. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 243.
347. See Chapter 14.1.3.1 of this work.
348. cited in S. S. Ahmed, op.cit., p. 51.
349. cited in Ibid. p. 52.  
For an account of the speech by the Nigerian delegate welcoming the Chinese representatives at the UN, see Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 47, p. 47.
350. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3.
351. Peking Review 15 (25 August 1972), p. 16.
352. See W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 56; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 138.
353. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 56.
354. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 139.
355. Peking Review 16 (4 May 1973): 18, p. 7.
356. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 139.
357. cited in Peking Review 17 (26 July 1974): 30, p. 4.



358. Peking Review 17 (13 September 1974): 37, pp. 9-10.
359. cited in Africa Confidential 15 (8 November 1974): 22, p. 3.
360. See Chapter 13.2.3.1 of this work.
361. All the leading activists, including Ouamb, were executed. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 143; and A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 244.
362. See Chapter 13.2.3.1 of this work.
363. For the text of the Joint Communique issued on this occasion, see Peking Review 14 (9 April 1971): 15, p. 9.
364. For the text of the speech by Cameroonian permanent representative at UN, see Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): p. 39.
365. Peking Review 15 (25 August 1972): 34, p. 4.
366. See Table 12.4 of this work; and W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 37.
367. cited in Peking Review 16 (6 April 1973): 14, p. 7. For more comments and statements by Ahidjo, during his visit to China, see Peking Review 16 (30 March 1973): 13, pp. 6-7.
368. See Table 12.4 of this work. This figure is compiled from the following sources: Jos-Blaise, 'Ahidjo in China', Africa no. 22 (June 1973) p. 12; Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 142; and W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 37.
369. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 142.
370. Three political parties led the national independence movement, viz., (1) the Falangist Munge (the National Union of Equatorial Guinea; (2) the nationalist movement Monalige (the National Union Movement of Equatorial Guinea); and (3) the Popular Independence for Equatorial Guinea party (IPGE). See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 219.
371. These measures were taken following an attempted coup (March 1969), led by Atansio Ndungo, Foreign Minister, aimed at overthrowing Macias. See Ibidem.
272. Peking Review 9 (25 February 1966): 9, pp. 28-30.
373. News in Brief, Africa Report 14 (January 1969): 1, pp. 22-23.
374. See Table 12.1 of this work. See Peking Review 13 (23 October 1970): 43, p. 10.

375. A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 241.
376. cited in News in Brief, Africa Report 14 (January 1969): 1, p. 23.
377. Peking Review 14 (29 January 1971): 5, pp. 3-4.
378. See ibid., p. 5. See also A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., pp. 241-242; W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 111; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 135.
379. See Table 12.2 of this work. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 111.
380. cited in Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, p. 30.
381. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 111; and Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 135.
382. Peking Review 17 (16 August 1974): 33, p. 3.
383. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 239.
384. See Table 8.1.  
President Albert Barner re-Christened himself Omar Bango in order to attract money from rich feudal Islamic regimes such as Saudi Arabia.
385. See Table 12.4 of this work. See also Peking Review 17 (3 May 1974): 18, pp. 7 and 13.
386. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 238.
387. Peking Review 17 (11 October 1974): 41, p. 7; and Peking Review 17 (18 October 1974): 43, p. 17.
388. See Table 12.4 of this work. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 150.
389. Peking Review 18 (4 July 1975): 27, pp. 4-5.
390. Radio Kinshasa (following the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia), cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 163.
391. See Chapters 13.2.3.2 and 14.1.3.1 of this work.
392. As quoted in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 166; see also A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 173 (note 6); and The Times (29 January 1973).
393. quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 166. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 165.
394. See, for example, Peking Review 14 (15 November 1971): 46, p. 19.

395. See Table 15.1 of this work. See also The Times (15 January 1971).
396. Kinshasa Home Service (23 February 1972), quoted in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 166.
397. cited in Peking Review 15 (1 December 1972): 48, p. 4.
398. Zaire's expulsion of South Korean Ambassador [see Peking Review 15 (15 December 1972): 50, p. 20] may also have contributed to Sino-Zairean rapprochement.
399. cited in Peking Review 16 (19 January 1973): 3, p. 4.
400. For Chinese comments and press communique, etc., see Peking Review 16 (19 January 1973): 3, pp. 3-4; and Peking Review 16 (26 January 1973): 4, pp. 3 and 6-8.
401. The Times (15 January 1973).
402. Ibidem; and The Daily Telegraph, 29 September 1973. See also Table 12.4.
403. See Table 12.4 of this work. Tanzania and Zambia received a larger amount of aid, but agreement on such aid had already been concluded before 1970. See Chapter 14.2.1.7.
404. See Foreign Policy Documents no. 108, Soviet, East European and Western Development Aid 1976-83 (London: Crown Copyright, 1984). Table 2. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union or any other socialist country has offered Zaire a large amount of aid since the above cited source was published (1984). Zaire's relations with the Soviet Union, and other possible communist sources of aid have been tense, especially since the Shaba Crisis (1978).
405. cited in A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 170. A similar statement can be found in Peking Review 16 (12 October 1973): 41, pp. 21 and 23.
406. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 167.
407. Ibidem.
408. Peking Review 16 (16 October 1973): 41, pp. 21-23.
409. Peking Review 16 (16 November 1973): 48, p. 3.
410. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 167.
411. Ibid., p. 168.
412. Ibidem.

413. Mobutu's speech at a state banquet given to his delegation, cited in Peking Review 17 (20 September 1974): 51, p. 9.
414. Peking Review 18 (27 June 1975): 26, p. 19.
415. See Table 9.1 of this work. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p.
416. See Table 4.1 of this work.
417. For the text of the Joint Communiqué issued on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Rwanda, see Peking Review 14 (19 November 1971): 47, p. 4.
418. Peking Review 15 (7 April 1972): 14, p. 5.
419. See Table 12.4 of this work.
420. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 160.
421. Peking Review 15 (26 June 1972): 26, p. 3. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 179.
422. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 582.
423. Ibidem.
424. Peking Review 17 (30 August 1974): 35, p. 5.
425. Peking Review 18 (19 September 1975): 38, p. 6.
426. See Chapter 13.3.2.5 of this work. See also Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 109.
427. For the text of Joint Communiqué between China and Burundi signed in Dar es Salaam, see Peking Review 14 (22 October 1971): 43, p. 4. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 177.
428. See Chapter 13.3.2.5 of this work.
429. Peking Review 15 (14 January 1972): 2, p. 21.
430. See Table 12.4 of this work. See also W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 94.
431. W. Weinstein, 'Chinese Policy in Central Africa: 1960-73', in W. Weinstein (Ed.), Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa, op.cit., p. 70.
432. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 94.
433. For further details, see, for example, W. Weinstein, 'Chinese Policy in Africa: 1960-73', op.cit., p. 70.
434. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 110.

435. See Chapter 13.3. / 7 of this work.
436. See J. Lonsdale, 'Uganda: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85 (London: Europa Publications, 1984), p. 899; and Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 712.
437. J. Lonsdale, op.cit., p. 899. See also A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 274.
438. For a detailed account of his foreign policy, see T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1985 (Vol. II), op.cit., pp. 535-558.
439. cited in ibid., p. 551.
440. Peking Review 13 (9 January 1970): 2, p. 31.
441. quoted from T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Developments of Uganda: 1900-1985 (Vol. II), op.cit., p. 613.
442. See ibid., pp. 553 and 605 (note 238).
443. See ibid., p. 628.
444. Ibid., pp. 628-629.
445. Ibid., pp. 31-33.
446. See Africa Report, ('African Updates') 20 (November-December 1975): 6, p. 25.
447. Africa Report ('African Updates') 20 (November-December 1975): 6, p. 25.
448. cited in Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, p. 33.
449. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 218; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 274.
450. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 218.
451. This was brought to my attention by M. Mamdani, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda, op.cit., pp. 68-77.
452. See Chapter 13.3.1.7 of this work.
453. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 193.
454. See Table 12.4 of this work.
455. See Table 12.1 of this work.  
For the text of the Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two

- countries, see Peking Review 13 (11 December 1970): 50, p. 7.
456. The People's Daily (3 December 1970) reproduced in Peking Review 19 (11 December 1970): 50, p. 7.
457. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, op.cit., p. 216.
458. See, for example, C. Clapham, Haile Selassie's Government (London: Longman Group, 1969), p. 80; N. Ayele, 'The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia', in O. Aluko (Ed.), op.cit., pp. 61-62; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 242; and A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 166.
459. See Peking Review 14 (15 October 1971): 42, pp. 5-7.
460. This he did by skilful exploitation of the new coolness in China's policy in the sphere of people-to-people relations. See F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, op.cit., p. 258.
461. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 387.
462. Peking Review 14 (3 December 1971): 49, p. 39.
463. See N. Ayele, op.cit., pp. 60 and 67-68.
464. See Table 12.4 of this work. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 235; and F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, op.cit., p. 258.
465. W. Bartke, op.cit., p. 113.
466. Haile Selassie was the longest ruling feudal ruler in modern African history. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, op.cit., p. 97.
467. See Chapter 16.1.1.1 of this work.
468. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, op.cit., pp. 242 and 258.
469. See Chapters 15.1.1.7 and 16.1.1.1 of this work.
470. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 282.
471. For the text of the Joint Communique on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Botswana, see Peking Review 18 (10 January 1975): 2, p. 4.
472. A Mauritian delegation visited China during that year. See Table 12.3 of this work.
473. See The Scotsman (15 April 1972); The Times (15 April 1972); and The Daily Telegraph (15 April 1972). See also Table 12.2 of this work.

474. See Table 8.1 of this work.
475. At independence, Mauritius came under the rule of a coalition between the Independence Party, the Labour Party, the Moslem Action Committee and the Independence Vanguard Bloc. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 479.
476. See ibid. p. 480.
477. For the text of the Joint Communique issued by the representatives of the two countries, see Peking Review 15 (21 April 1972): 16, p. 9.
478. See Table 12.4 of this work. See also W. Bartke, op.cit.; and The Daily Telegraph (10 August 1972).
479. Peking Review 16 (1 June 1973): 22, p. 3.
480. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
481. See Chapter 15.1.1.3 of this work.
482. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 274.
483. Cabral, PAIGC's leader, was assassinated by Portuguese secret agents in Conakry (20 January 1972). See B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 137.
484. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 275.
485. Ibid., p. 121.
486. T. Young, 'Cape Verde: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85 (London: Europa Publications, 1984), p. 279.
487. See Chapters 13.3.1.3, 14.2.1.4 and 15.1.1.3 of this work.
488. See Chapter 15.1.1.3 of this work.
489. Peking Review 15 (4 August 1972): 31, p. 7.
490. Reproduced in Peking Review 16 (2 February 1973): 5, pp. 18-20.
491. Ibid., p. 19.
492. See Table 12.1 of this work.
493. Hsinhua News Agency (Bissau: 29 August 1975).
494. Peking Review 18 (11 July 1975): 28, p. 6. See also Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 149.

495. cited in Hsinhua News Agency (Bissau: 29 August 1975).
496. Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong: 29 April 1976).
497. See Chapters 14.1.1.3 and 15.2.1.3 of this work.
498. See the editorial, Review of African Political Economy no. 5 (January-April 1976), pp. 5-6; and The Guardian, 'Angola: Support the MPLA' (USA: 26 November 1976).
499. The dispute within the leadership led Daniel Shipenda, prominent MPLA leader, to form his own organization known as the 'Eastern Revolt' faction. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 241.
500. B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., pp. 12 and 132.
501. P. Vanneman, 'The Soviet Intervention in Angola', Strategic Review 4 (1976): 3, pp. 92-103.
502. B. Davidson, People's Cause, op.cit., p. 132.
503. B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 557.
504. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 239. and A. Callinicos, South Africa: the road to the revolution (London: The Socialist Workers Party, September 1985), p. 17.
505. 'The Struggle for the State in Southern Africa' (editorial), Review of African Political Economy no. 5 (January 1976), p. 6; and The Financial Times (11 November 1975).
506. See Chapters 13.2.1.2.1 and 14.1.1.2 of this work.
507. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 233.
508. China's World View, op.cit., p. 66.
509. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 229; and J. A. Marcum, 'Lessons from Angola', Foreign Affairs 54 (April 1976): 3, p. 412.
510. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 229; and J. A. Marcum, 'Lessons from Angola', op.cit., p. 416.
511. K. L. Adelman, 'Report from Angola', Foreign Affairs 53 (April 1975): 3, p. 568.
512. Ibidem.
513. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 229; and J. A. Marcum, 'Lessons from Angola', op.cit., p. 416.
514. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 236.



515. Ibid., p. 228. See also Jonathan Steele, 'American Split on Angola', The Guardian (25 December 1975), p. 2; and E. T. Glaude, China's Perception of Global Politics (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 89.
516. E. T. Glaude, op.cit., p. 89.
517. GPD, 'The Lesson of Angola', Economic and Political Weekly 10 (6 December 1975): 49, p. 1860.
518. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 242.
519. CIA and South Africa collaborated with UNITA and FNLA. Ibid., p. 230.
520. Ibid., p. 229.
521. Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, cited in 'The Struggle in Angola' Review of African Political Economy no. 5 (Editorial briefings) (January-April 1976), p. 80.
522. For a short period (January-August 1974), the Soviet Union had discontinued its aid to MPLA because of the split within the organization. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 234; J. Marcum, 'Lessons from Angola', op.cit., p. 569; and C. Legum, 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa', Foreign Affairs 54 (July 1976): 4, p. 749.
523. See J. Marcum, op.cit., p. 415; Peking Review 18 (5 September 1975): 36, p. 20; and The Times (London: 5 December 1979).
524. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 249; and E. T. Glaude, op.cit., p. 89.
525. J. Marcum, 'Lessons from Angola', op.cit., p. 417.
526. E. T. Glaude, op.cit., p. 89.
527. A. Gavshon, op.cit., pp. 231-233.
528. The Guardian (USA: 26 November 1975).
529. The Struggle for the State in Southern Africa, op.cit., p. 5.
530. Jonas Savimbi, the INITA leader, Holden Robert, the FNLA Chairman, and Agosthino Neto, MPLA's President, visited China in 1968, 1971 and 1973 respectively. See K. L. Adelman, op.cit., p. 568.
531. See Chapter 14.1.1.2 of this work.
532. Peking Review 13 (13 February 1970): 7, pp. 21-22.

533. cited in ibidem.
534. Ibid., p. 22.
535. See Peking Review 14 (12 February 1971): 7, p. 22 and 16 (20 April 1973): 16, p. 23.
536. Author's interview with the people concerned who were subsequently working in Angola Information (London: the National News Agency of Angola, July 1985).
537. cited in R. Gibson, op.cit., p. 224.
538. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 242; C. Legum, 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa', op.cit., p. 750; Yeh Pa t'ang, op.cit., p. 8; D. Tatiana, 'Peking et l'Afrique', Asie et Afrique (Mars-Avril 1982); Africa Confidential 15 (8 November 1974): 22, p. 5.  
In the same year (1975), it was reported that Rumanians also were involved in training FLNA along with the Chinese. It was reported too that Rumania (August 1975) delivered to FLNA a large quantity of equipment. See A. Gavshon, op.cit., pp. 228-229 and 242.
539. See C. Legum, 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa', op.cit., p. 751; J. Marcum, 'Lessons from Angola', op.cit., p. 420; A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 222; The Financial Times (27 November 1975); and The Daily Telegraph (28 November 1975). Chiao Kua-hua, China's representative at the UN, denied that his country was involved in the Angolan Crisis when he said that we gave military aid to all three Angolan liberation organisations to help fight Portuguese colonisation. Being aware of their differences, we have all along urged them to unite against the enemy. After the agreement on independence was reached, we stopped giving new military aid to the three Angolan organizations (cited in GPD, 'The Lesson of Angola', op.cit., p. 1860).
540. See, for example, The Daily Telegraph (29 November 1979); The Times (5 November 1975) and The Financial Times (11 November 1975).
541. China's obsession with the Soviet Union's role in the crisis and its anti-Soviet comments as well as other official statements can be found in Peking Review 18 (5 September, 1975): 36, pp. 19-22; 18 (1 August 1975): 31, pp. 8-10; Hsinhua News Agency (London: 31 August 1975), p. 4; Hsinhua News Agency (Peking: 7 December 1975); Hsinhua News Agency no. 120730 (8 December 1975); and Press Release no. 15 (London: Chinese Embassy, 1975).
542. J. Marcum, 'Lessons from Angola', op.cit., p. 419.

543. Ibidem.
544. Author's interview (3 June 1985) with Allen Brooks, Representative of Mozambique Information Office in London.
545. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 229.
546. See Chapter 15.1.1.8, 1 of this work.
547. There was a struggle for power within the FRELIMO leadership after Mondlane was assassinated, but internal differences were soon overcome. See B. Davidson, 'The Seed of Midwinter', op.cit., p. 557; and his People's Cause, op.cit., p. 135. See also J. Marcum, 'A Martyr from Mozambique', Africa Report 14 (March-April 1969): 3 and 4, pp. 6-9.
548. Peking Review 14 (17 September 1971): 38, p. 22.
549. See Chapter 15.2.1.2 of this work.
550. See Peking Review 14 (8 October 1971): 41, pp. 16-17; 14 (1 December 1972): 48, p. 72; and 17 (16 August 1974): 33, p. 20.
551. L. Bruce, 'Frelimo', The Daily Telegraph (25 September 1972).
552. cited in Peking Review 17 (20 September 1974): 38, p. 5.
553. cited in Peking Review 18 (28 February 1975): 9, p. 14. For the text of the Joint Press Communique by the Chinese government and the Mozambique government, see Peking Review 18 (7 March 1975): 10, pp. 13-14. Samora Machel had visited China on two occasions before Mozambique became independent.
554. cited in Peking Review 18 (28 February 1975): 9, p. 14.
555. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 267.
556. See Ibid., p. 268. See also Table 12.4 of this work.
557. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 268.
558. B. R. Richard, 'Zimbabwe: Recent History', in Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85 op.cit., p. 989.
559. See Peking Review 14 (10 December 1971): 50, p. 20; and 15 (28 January 1972): 4, pp. 19-20.
560. Peking Review 16 (16 March 1973): 11, p. 11.

561. Chin Peng-fei, Chinese Foreign Minister at the UN Security Council, reported in Peking Review 15 (4 February 1972): 5, p. 14.
562. A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 240.
563. Peking Review 17 (11 October 1974): 41, p. 30.
564. cited in Peking Review 18 (2 May 1975): 18, p. 27.
565. Johannesburg Star (15 May 1970) as quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 228.
566. Johannesburg Radio (27 November 1971), quoted in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 276.
567. For a valuable analysis of British policy towards South Africa before 1970, see H. M. Grayson, The British Labour Party and South Africa 1945-1970 (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis) (York: University of York, Dept. of Politics, 1981).
568. Renmin Ribao (24 July 1970) in Peking Review 13 (31 July 1970): 31, p. 27.
569. Chin Peng-fei, Chinese Foreign Minister, in a letter to UN Secretary-General, published in Peking Review 15 (4 February 1972): 5, p. 14.
570. Author's interview (July 1985) with the Editor of Sechaba (the official organ of ANC). Regrettably, the author failed to ascertain the name of this interviewee.
571. Ibidem.
572. C. Legum, 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa', op.cit., passim
573. Author's interview (October 1984) with SWAPO representative in Algiers.
574. C. Legum, 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa', op.cit., p. 758.
575. Author's interview (Algiers: 24 July 1985) with Belgacem Kaddour, General Secretary of the Council of Solidarity with the Peoples of FLN of Algeria and Deputy President of AAPSO (1984).
576. The editorial, 'On the Admission of China to the UN', Monthly Review of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 14 (Cairo: January 1972): 1, p. 35.
577. The 6th Conference of AAPSO was held in Algiers (27-30 May 1984). The conference was attended by 100 delegations consisting of a total of 400

representatives. See El Moujehid El Osboi (weekly) no. 1243 (1 June 1984), pp. 8-11.

578. For the text of the Resolutions of the AAPSO Conference held in Algiers, see El Moatamar El Cedis Limonadamat El Shouúb El ifriqia El Asyeouia (The Sixth Conference of the Organization of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity) [Cairo: El Secretariat El Deima Limonadamat El Shoûb El ifriqia El Asyeouia (The Permanent Secretariat of the AAPSO), 1984]
579. Author's interview with Belgacem Kaddour, op.cit.

## CHAPTER 16

### SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS: STABILITY AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION DURING THE CURRENT PHASE: 1976-1986

Unlike the previous phases in our periodisation of Sino-African relations, each of which was underlined by new emerging developments and events, it would be difficult to pin-point reasons why the decade following the death of Zhou En-lai and Mao Zedong should be treated as an entirely new phase. This is particularly true when we consider China's policy and actions in Africa during the latter half of the '70s from a practical viewpoint. China's non-revolutionary stance in the cases of the Sudan (1971) and Angola (1975-76) when Mao Zedong was still alive and the Gang of Four was active was hardly different from its policy towards the Shaba crisis (1977-78).<sup>1</sup> Similarly, in the domestic sphere, China initiated the modernisation and 'open door' policy well before the death of Zhou En-lai and Mao Zedong.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the difficulties involved in justifying the decade just ended as constituting a separate phase, it must be recognized that the ambitious 'Four Modernisations Programme' formally introduced in 1978,<sup>3</sup> was predicated on a stable policy of economic co-operation with the outside world. The general line of China's policy towards Africa as well as other parts of the world during the last decade stems from this cardinal requirement.

The new Chinese leaders have been busy reassuring leaders and political forces throughout the world which

were once alarmed by the revolutionary line adopted by Mao Zedong, Zhou En-lai, Lin Biao and 'the Gang of Four', that there was no longer any need for them to fear China's communism and revolution. The new leadership had set itself the task of modernising socialist China into a stable and powerful country.

China's concern with stability rather than conflicts has also been emphasised in the thaw in its relations with the Soviet Union and its East European allies<sup>4</sup> during the last three years. Both Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping seem to have at least one thing in common. Both favour stability and both wish to avoid confrontation, their common aim being to further their respective countries' aim of economic modernisation.

China's blind obsession with the Soviet Union's influence in the world, which caused it revolutionary setbacks in the '70s in a number of cases, seems to be on the decline. If this trend were to continue, friendlier relations between China and progressive countries and liberation forces in Africa might materialise in the future.

During his recent tour of 11 African countries<sup>5</sup> (December 1982-January 1983), Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang told his hosts that China's policy was to concentrate on developing economic relations, South-South co-operation, and economic development, and to support negotiations for the settlement of issues. These aims, he said, were integral to China's new strategy for a united front and its relations with Africa.

At the same time, Zhao reaffirmed China's support for national liberation struggles in southern Africa and for African attempts to isolate the apartheid minority régime of South Africa.

At the end of his tour, Zhao Ziyang summarised Sino-African interaction in the following terms:

We all oppose imperialism, colonialism and racism; we all oppose big powers' domination over small countries and their power politics; we all stand for the preservation of world peace; we all stand for strengthening unity among Third World countries; we all deem it necessary to reform the unjust unreasonable old international economic order; we all agree to take concrete measures to establish a new international economic order and develop South-South co-operation; and we all wish to develop our inter-relations.<sup>6</sup>

16.1. State-to-State Relations or 'United Front from Above'

16.1.1. China's Relations with 'Progressive' States

16.1.1.1. Algeria

Despite domestic social and economic reforms and adjustments in its internal policy viewed by some<sup>7</sup> as 'moderate' in character, Algeria's foreign policy continues to be progressive. Whether under the leadership of Ben Bella (July 1962-June 1965), Boumedienne (June 1965-November 1978), or Ben Djedid (since February 1979), Algeria has always sought to uphold Amilcar Cabral's characterisation of it as the 'Mecca' of the revolutionaries<sup>8</sup> by continuing to remain anti-imperialist in its foreign policy stance.<sup>9</sup> US and British aggression



against Libya<sup>10</sup> (1986) was strongly condemned by Algeria which declared its policy as one of giving active support to Libya, despite the strained relations between the two countries. Algeria continues to be one of the few major contributors to African liberation struggles. It does not, however, publicise its activities in this sphere. According to Sulaymān Hofmān, President of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of FLN Party (November 1983)

Algeria considers its international and African duty to support liberation struggles in Africa not only for the sake of liberation but also to push the movement concerned to adopt a progressive political system that would provide a major thrust in favour of a positive and active policy of self-reliance, a new international economic order, economic co-operation and, above all, reinforce collective work for a successful African socialism based on African conditions.<sup>11</sup>

Algeria, as a leading campaigner for a new international order, views economic and trade co-operation among African countries as a vitally important prerequisite to changes in the contemporary international economic order dominated by "colonial and neo-colonialist interests".<sup>12</sup>

Keeping such a general orientation in mind, President Chadli Ben Djedid travelled (April 1981) to 12 African countries including Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania. During this tour, Algeria announced an increase in its military aid<sup>13</sup> to ANC and SWAPO.

During the current phase, and especially since 1980, Algeria has successfully handled its relations with both the Soviet Union and China. This is in line with China's diminishing interest in linking progressive anti-imperialist forces with the 'broad united front' opposed to Soviet 'hegemonism'.

Like most 'progressive' African countries, Algeria does not discriminate (at least publicly) between the Soviet Union and China. According to Soukhal, Vice Secretary-General of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the FLN Party,

When we see the Chinese or the Soviets we always think of having 80 per cent of our foreign policy in common. They all stand on the opposite side to Western imperialism and support African liberation from colonialism and racism. They all support our demand for a new international economic order to that imposed by the imperialist powers and they all recognise our socialism.'<sup>14</sup>

Recent discussions between Chinese and Algerian leaders have tended to focus on the means of eradicating colonialism, imperialism and racism, and of promoting economic relations and South-South co-operation, rather than on opposing Soviet Union's 'hegemonism',<sup>15</sup> a theme which dominated Chinese thinking during the '70s.

In a long 3-part article (March 1976) appearing in Al Mujahid Al usbu'i, the FLN's weekly magazine, China's campaign against the 'Gang of Four' and its drive to modernise its economy was viewed as a 'third revolution' in China and as an ideological cleansing operation aimed

at eradicating 'bourgeois tendencies' in both the Party and the State. These developments were viewed by Al Mujahid as constituting behaviour consistent with CCP's history.<sup>16</sup>

Algeria, in common with most developing countries, seems to favour China's modernisation programme on the grounds that it would strengthen mutual economic co-operation between the two countries. For African countries advocating 'socialism', by its successful modernisation China would become an alternative model of socialism, given the fact that their own attempts to establish it have failed, among other reasons, for the reason that capitalist and imperialist forces have dominated the international market.

During the latter half of the '70s, Sino-Algerian contacts suffered because the two countries pursued dramatically opposed policies towards the crises in Angola (1976 ff.) and Shaba (1977-78),<sup>17</sup> the Camp David Accord (1978), and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea.<sup>18</sup>

However, in recent years ('80s), Sino-Algerian relations have once again improved mainly for economic reasons.

Algeria desires much further economic co-operation with China because of the seriousness of its experts, unlike those of other countries of the world, and its most generous terms for trade and economic co-operation. We only wish China had the economic capacity to enable us to be independent of Western capitalism. This view is certainly shared by most of those who have experienced economic relations with China and dealt with Chinese experts.<sup>19</sup>

In April 1980, Lakhdar Brahimi, a member of the Central Committee of the FLN Party, led an Algerian delegation to China which was received by Deng Xiaoping, who re-affirmed China's determination to continue to give unequivocal support to Arab struggles against Zionism. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping reiterated that as the relationship between China and Algeria grew during the latter's armed struggle for liberation, their solidarity was bound to continue.<sup>20</sup> Algeria was the first country visited by Chen Mu-hua, Vice Premier, during her tour of 5 African countries (April-May 1980). She stressed China's desire to strengthen 'friendly co-operation' with Algeria in 'all fields'.<sup>21</sup> Later during the year (September 1980) Ali Abudaoui, Algeria's ambassador to China, and Huang Zhen, China's Minister for Culture, signed a Sino-Algerian cultural agreement.<sup>22</sup>

During the period 1979-80, Algeria was one of the African countries receiving Chinese medical aid and the assistance of Chinese medical personnel.<sup>23</sup> In July 1980 alone, 202 Chinese doctors arrived in Algeria.<sup>24</sup> In December 1981, an Algerian delegation led by Mohammed Hadj Yaâla (Member, Politbureau of FLN and Minister for Finance) visited China where an important agreement was reached between the two countries (1 January 1982) concerning the establishment of a Mixed Joint Committee for economic and trade co-operation between China and Algeria.<sup>25</sup> Under this agreement China promised to help Algeria construct a glass complex and match factories,

survey and build railway lines linking various parts of the desert with cities in the north, and many other light industrial projects.<sup>26</sup>

Especially during the last 6 years (following the death of President Houari Boumedienne in 1979), Algeria seems to have been engaged in the task of prising itself loose even from ~~the~~ Soviet Union . Algerian leaders seem to have felt that more than 100 projects built or being built in Algeria with Soviet aid,<sup>27</sup> in addition to Algeria's continuous dependence on Soviet military aid, prevented it from pursuing a truly independent foreign policy.

In April 1982, Chadli Ben Djedid, President of Algeria and Secretary-General of <sup>the</sup> FLN Party, visited China where he stated that

developing countries have the ability to develop themselves and will not let the Superpowers dominate the world.<sup>28</sup>

Within this context, President Ben Djedid sought greater co-operation between Algeria and China in agriculture, water conservancy, housing projects and railway building.<sup>29</sup>

In the political field, President Ben Djedid was by no means fully satisfied with his visit. As far as Algeria was concerned China's support for the struggles of the peoples of Palestine and southern Africa against Zionism and racism respectively could not possibly be separated from a policy of giving support to the people of Western Sahara.<sup>30</sup>

In 1982, a Chinese parliamentary delegation led by <sup>Ren</sup> Zheng, a Member of the Politbureau and President of the National Assembly, paid a visit to Algeria.<sup>21</sup> In May, a Chinese Red Cross delegation led by Yong Chu, Vice Minister for Health, also visited Algeria.<sup>22</sup> Both visits were aimed at developing further Sino-Algerian relations. These delegations had been preceded by another Chinese delegation under the leadership of Li Qi, Senior Representative of the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Trade, which visited Algeria with a view to studying the potential fields which had already been identified in which economic co-operation between China and Algeria could be founded. During this visit, Mohammed Salah Dembry, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, based in a Sino-Algerian Mixed Joint Committee, stressed that

our co-operation with China which covers various fields is part of South-South co-operation and could be an example for all people who seek socialist development.<sup>23</sup>

In June 1982, El Hadj Yaâla, member of the Politbureau of the FLN Party and Minister for Finance, led an Algerian delegation to China where he officially signed the agreement of the Mixed Joint Committee for Economic co-operation between Algeria and China in railway projects, building construction and small and medium industrial projects.<sup>24</sup>

In 1982, intensive contacts were made between China and Algeria at various levels and on different subjects

especially in the economic sphere. Following the establishment of the Mixed Joint Committee between China and Algeria, economic relations between the two countries have been markedly strengthened. Chinese experts have been involved in the construction of many projects in Algeria in the agricultural as well as in the industrial field.<sup>35</sup> In December (1982) Mohammed El Hadj Yaala again led an Algerian delegation to China in order to finalize and expand the terms and arrangements of mutual co-operation between Algeria and China on the basis of the recommendation of the Mixed Joint Committee for developing further economic and commercial relations between the two countries.<sup>36</sup> For the same purpose, Qiao Shi, Member of the Central Committee and President of the Department of International Relations of CCP led a delegation to Algeria (5-13 December 1982). During this visit, Chi reaffirmed China's common stance with Algeria in opposition to imperialism and Zionism and in support of African and Palestinian liberation struggles.<sup>37</sup>

Algeria was the second country (after Egypt) to which Premier Zhao Ziyang paid a visit (24-27 December 1982) during his tour of 11 African countries (20 December 1982-7 January 1983). He found a strong desire for further co-operation between China and Algeria. The Algerian press and broadcasting media urged that relations with China, as a potentially prosperous power in the Third World, must be established on a strong basis because it is vital for any practical challenge to the industrial capitalist world.

At the same time, China was praised for its intensive modernisation drive and gave its support for self-reliance and economic independence in the Third World.<sup>38</sup> During Zhao Ziyang's visit, China and Algeria signed an agreement by which the former pledged to help the latter construct new towns. It was also agreed that Algeria would increase its import of industrial equipment and consumer goods (including housing, instruments and clothes) from China. At the same time, Algeria agreed to export oil products, phosphate, leather and paper to China.<sup>39</sup>

In April 1983, Zhao Mozhi, Chinese Minister for Culture, paid a visit to Algeria with a view to strengthening Sino-Algerian cultural contacts on the basis of the cultural agreement between the two countries (September 1982).<sup>40</sup>

Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon and (with the support of the United States), aggression against Syria and PLO (December 1983), the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement strongly condemning such an act.<sup>41</sup> It is interesting to note that such a condemnation took place at a time when Zhao Ziyang was about to visit the United States, thus projecting China as an actively independent power in the sphere of foreign policy. China's stance was, no doubt, a contributory factor of Algeria's strict policy towards Israel's Zionist state and its strong opposition to the American role in the alliance with Israel in the Middle East.



In June 1985, Mohammed Sherif Mesaâdia, Member of the Politbureau and President of the Permanent Secretariat of FLN Party, led an Algerian delegation to China, where he urged more co-operation between Algeria and China in the economic and technological fields. He predicted stronger Sino-Algerian economic co-operation in the wake of the modernisation and Open Door policy pursued in China since Mao's death.<sup>43</sup> Mesaâdia returned to Algeria full of praise for China's ability to maintain the national unity of its far-flung population (extending to over 1 billion people) unimpaired. Mesaâdia urged all societies and countries to follow China's example in order to strengthen their national cohesion.<sup>44</sup> In October 1985, Tian Jiyun, Vice Premier, led a delegation to Algeria. In the course of his visit, contact between the two countries was further intensified.<sup>45</sup>

#### 16.1.1.2. Libya

On the 1 September 1969 the pro-Western feudal monarchical *régime* in Libya was overthrown by a group of young officers inspired by the style<sup>46</sup> and context of the Egyptian Revolution. They called themselves Free Unionist Officers. An Arab Republic of Libya and a new government were founded under the leadership of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) with Muammar al-Qaddafi as its Chairman.

Right from the beginning, with socialism and freedom as its ideological orientation and political priorities, SRC sought Arab unity. British and American troops based

in the country were ordered to leave and severe restrictions were placed on foreign concessions. At the same time SRC nationalised not only the key petroleum companies, but also uncultivated land owned by foreigners or by the Sanussi monarchical family. Land, thus nationalised, was distributed to poor peasantry. Arabic was made the official language and education compulsory. A free medical service was also introduced.

The foreign policy of the newly established Arabic Republic of Libya (renamed in March 1977 as the Popular Socialist Libyan Arab Jemahiriya), has been directed towards the goal of Arab unity.<sup>47</sup> Qaddafi believed that imperialism and Zionism on the one hand, and communism on the other, stood in the way of Arab countries reaching such an objective. Communism in theory and practice, despite its valid social and economic values, was - because of its atheism and internationalism - in conflict with Qaddafi's religion, Third World nationalism and his nationalistic vision of one Arab nation. Qaddafi was aware that the communist powers were opposed to the abortive union between Egypt and Syria (UAR: 1958-61).

For Qaddafi, however, it has been the imperialists and the Zionist state of Israel created by them that has been at the root of the persistence of Arab disunity. Hence imperialism and Zionism must be defeated in order that Arab prosperity and unity might be achieved. Within this context, Qaddafi's approach to communism has been influenced by two main considerations: the need<sup>48</sup> for military aid; and the need to unite with the communist

countries against the main enemies, viz., imperialism and Zionism. Another important factor influencing Libya's approach to international communism lay in its choice of 'positive non-alignment', as its foreign policy orientation. The global aims of colonialism and imperialism and the Western world as a whole comes into conflict with non-alignment which, on balance, favours the struggle of liberation forces against colonial and imperialist domination. The Palestinian question, in particular, has reinforced Qaddafi's active and firm stance against the imperialist powers.

with regard to foreign policy we will follow a policy of neutrality without partiality towards East or West. We are on the side of neither the Americans nor the Russians. Both are strangers to us and threaten the independence of the states situated on the shores of the Mediterranean. He who supports the Palestinian cause is a friend to the Arabs and he who supports Israel is an enemy to them...The Arabs who are sincere in working for Palestine must build their relations with other states on the basis of their position on this very cause.<sup>49</sup>

Included in Qaddafi's early anti-communist policy was his stance against the Soviet Union during the communist led *coup d'état* in the Sudan (1971);<sup>50</sup> his support for Egypt's decision to expel Soviet experts (1972); and, his opposition to the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty (1972). For its part, the Soviet Union accused Qaddafi of 'adventurism' and 'extremism'.<sup>51</sup>

Libya had already established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 15 years (1955)<sup>52</sup> before the anti-

monarchical 'revolution'. Since the revolution, Libya has steadily improved its relations with the Soviet Union. The following factors have contributed to the development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Libya':

- i. The failure of Qaddafi's early efforts to bring about a union between Egypt and Libya as a concrete step towards Arab unity. Egypt, under Sadat (from 1970 onwards), was becoming increasingly pro-Western and anti-Soviet. This meant that Libya shared the Soviet Union's objective of preventing Egypt becoming far too closely aligned with the West.
- ii. Libya was impressed by the Soviet Union's 'positive' response (after receiving a blank cheque from Houari Boumedienne, the Algerian President<sup>53</sup>) to Arab appeals for arms and weapons, in the wake of the 1973 October War.
- iii. Sadat's invitation to Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, to mediate between Egypt and Israel, in the aftermath of the October War, culminating in his trip to Israel (November 1977) and in the conclusion of the Camp David Accord (September 1978), impelled Libya to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union. Libya - along with Algeria, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and PLO - was strongly opposed to Sadat's negotiations with Israel. They joined together to form the 'Steadfastness Front' (Tripoli: December 1977).

If Qaddafi's approach to the Soviet Union was motivated by the latter's capability of providing Libya

with arms and weapons, China had neither the capacity nor the desire to follow in the Soviet Union's footsteps. Libya's offer, after the revolution, to buy a nuclear bomb, was flatly rejected by China.<sup>54</sup> China's refusal to sell a nuclear bomb, the non-communist<sup>55</sup> character of the Libyan revolution, and the development of close ties between Libya and the Soviet Union were factors underlying the delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Libya and PRC (August 1978)<sup>56</sup> and Libya's recognition of PRC (June 1971).<sup>57</sup> Had his appeal for an atomic bomb been met by China, Qaddafi would perhaps not have said that

China was stranger and her influence would never be allowed to spread.<sup>58</sup>

Libya's recognition of China was dictated by the latter's support for the Arab cause against Zionism and Qaddafi's strong anti-imperialist character.

we do not believe in communism but we believe that communist China is a fact. And it has continuously supported the Arab cause and stubbornly withheld recognition from Israel.<sup>59</sup>

Following Libya's recovery of the US Wheelus military base (June 1970), Zhou En-lai sent a message to Qaddafi stating that

since the revolution of September 1 1969...you have waged valiant struggles to oppose imperialism and safeguard national independence and won continuous victories. Furthermore, you have now resolutely liquidated the last imperialist military base in your

territory. This is another important victory won by the Libyan people.<sup>60</sup>

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the revolution of the Republic of Libya, Zhou En-lai sent a message to Qaddafi expressing the view that

the victory of the September 1 revolution in Libya was a powerful blow at imperialism.<sup>61</sup>

The editor of the Peking Review (now Beijing Review) praised Libya's decision to raise the price of its oil (April 1971) as representing

another major development in Libya in its struggle against Western oil companies.<sup>62</sup>

In June 1971, Libya recognised PRC as the sole representative of the Chinese people.

At a rally celebrating the first anniversary of Libyan recovery of the US military base (11 June 1971), Qaddafi strongly condemned the United States for using

...its influence to block China's aid mission to the United Nations and to scare other nations off from the People's Republic of China which represents one quarter of the world's inhabitants.<sup>63</sup>

When Israel shot down a Libyan Airlines passenger plane (April 1973), China strongly condemned the action and reiterated its continuous and unequivocal support for Arab struggles against the Zionist state of Israel.<sup>64</sup>

Despite China's strong support for the Arab cause against the US-Israeli alliance, however, China and Libya did not establish diplomatic relations until August 1978, when Abdjl Salam Jalloud, a Member of the General Secretariat of the General People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Qaddafi's 'right arm') led a delegation to China.<sup>65</sup> During this visit, agreements were signed between Libya and China on mutual co-operation in the economic and trade fields.<sup>66</sup>

Relations between Libya and China, however, developed during the '80s. The Sino-Soviet dispute and Libya's close relationship with <sup>the Soviet Union</sup> / \ on the one hand, and the close relationship between China and Egypt on the other (the latter being Libya's antagonist) exercised a strong impact on the course of Sino-Libyan relations.

In August 1982, Jaballah Azouz Altalhi, Secretary of the General People's Committee of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, paid a visit to China, where he was reassured of China's unequivocal support for Arab struggles against Zionism and Israeli aggression.<sup>67</sup> During this visit, Altalhi signed a medical agreement under which China agreed to send equipment and doctors to Libya.<sup>68</sup>

Relations between Libya and China improved further when Muammar al-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, visited China (25-29 October 1982). Zhao Ziyang praised Libya for its firm stance against colonialism and imperialism and for its determination to protect its sovereignty and independence. Zhao Ziyang avoided mention of the use of

hegemonism by the two superpowers, out of a sense of tact and respect for Libya's close relations with the Soviet Union. Qaddafi concluded his visit to China by signing an agreement on the establishment of a Sino-Libyan Joint Committee and a co-operation programme.

In May 1984, Li Peng, China's Vice-Premier, paid a visit to Libya, during which he sought to further economic co-operation between China and Libya (as well as Tunisia, the Sudan, Mauritania and Senegal).<sup>69</sup> In November 1985, Tian Jiyun, a Deputy Premier of China, led a delegation to Libya. China and Libya agreed to expand their economic ties with one another.<sup>70</sup>

Recent US aggression against Libya (April 1986) was repeatedly and strongly condemned by China.<sup>71</sup>

The Chinese government expresses its deep concern and anxiety and condemns such an act of attacking the territory of another state and encroaching upon its sovereignty in violation of the norms governing international relations.<sup>72</sup>

In May 1986, Zhao Ziyang received a special Libyan envoy through whom China once again reaffirmed its support for Libya's independence and sovereignty.<sup>73</sup>

#### 16.1.1.3. Mali

Although, since its independence (1960), Mali has consistently followed an anti-imperialist stance of 'positive non-alignment', thus enabling the establishment and maintenance of close diplomatic links with China throughout the '60s and '70s, in more recent years there



has been a cooling off of China's interest in it. In 1964, Prime Minister Zhou En-lai was keen to visit Mali because of its ideological alignment with China.<sup>74</sup> But in 1983, Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang did not include Mali among the African countries that he visited. China was now much more concerned with promoting stable relations with African countries rather than advancing the cause of revolution in Africa.

Throughout the decade following Mao's death China did, however, continue to provide aid to Mali albeit on a limited scale. In July 1978, Alioune Blondin Beye, Mali's Minister of Foreign Affairs, led a government delegation to China with the aim of promoting further economic and trade relations between the two countries.<sup>75</sup> China's military aid to Mali must also have been on the agenda of the Mali delegation. During the period 1974-1979, arms transfer from China to Mali was estimated to be at a figure of \$5 million.<sup>76</sup> In 1978, 100 Chinese military technicians were in Mali.<sup>77</sup>

In October 1978, Geng Biao, China's Vice Premier, paid a visit to Mali with the aim of forging closer economic links between the two countries.<sup>78</sup> China's economic aid to Mali during the 1978-79 period included a radio transmitter.<sup>79</sup> China also undertook to construct 3 dams in Mali, one of which was in fact completed in 1980.<sup>80</sup>

In August 1981, Moussa Traoré, President of Mali, paid a visit to China where he reiterated his country's praise for China's continued and unequivocal support for

African struggles for liberation, economic independence and self-reliance.<sup>e1</sup>

In November 1984, China granted Mali an interest-free loan estimated at \$1.1798 million (5 million CFA), to be used as working capital for the construction of two sugar plants.<sup>e2</sup> In May 1985, China and Mali signed 9 agreements by which the former promised to help the latter construct various projects in the spheres of agro-industry, health and radio transmission. Also included in these agreements was a Chinese grant estimated at \$6.816 million (2.89 million CFA).<sup>e3</sup>

In October 1985, China gave Mali another grant valued at \$6.368 million to finance its second sugar refinery based in Segou.<sup>e4</sup> A group of 30 Chinese doctors arrived in Mali in October 1985.<sup>e5</sup> In February 1986, another interest-free loan of \$0.660 million was given to Mali for the renovation of two industrial units - the Seribala Sugar Factory and the Sikasso tea processing factory.<sup>e6</sup>

#### 16.1.1.4. Guinea

Despite friction between the two countries arising out of China's decision to support the FNLA-UNITA alliance against MPLA<sup>e7</sup> (1975-76), cordial relations between them were restored in 1977. Sekou Touré's refusal to allow the Soviet Union landing rights in Conakry for aircraft carrying Cuban troops to Ethiopia in 1977 was a factor in the normalisation of the relations between Guinea and China. Sekou Touré's decision on landing rights for Soviet military aircraft was in all probability dictated

by his friendly relations with Somalia and the latter's close friendship with 'moderate' Arab countries, with whom Sekou Touré also had good relations, mainly for financial reasons.

In 1978, China introduced the modernisation programme and the 'open door policy' on a wider<sup>88</sup> scale than before; in the same year,<sup>89</sup> Guinea embarked on an 'open door policy' towards the West. In November 1978, Sekou Touré declared that Guinea now desired

broad co-operation with capitalist as well as socialist states [in order] to consolidate the freedom of our people and raise the level of their prosperity.<sup>90</sup>

During 1978, 30 Chinese military advisers and technicians were involved in training the Guinean army,<sup>91</sup> in addition to economic experts, who were already engaged in fulfilling economic and other projects which China had promised to establish during the '70s.<sup>92</sup> In October 1978, Geng Biao, Chinese Vice Premier, visited Guinea, seeking further economic co-operation between the two countries.<sup>93</sup> In 1981, Chinese personnel were nearing completion of an agricultural technique popularization centre at Yadiya, near Faranah.<sup>94</sup> At the same time, they were also helping Guinea develop its rice growing over an area of 250 hectares. In April 1983, the project was handed over to the Guinean government.<sup>95</sup>

In July 1982 Abdoulaye Toure, Guinean Foreign Minister, led a delegation to China seeking greater economic co-operation between the two countries.

Abdoulaye Toure took the occasion to reaffirm Guinea's alignment with China for active and continuous struggles against imperialism and racism in Africa.<sup>96</sup>

At the end of the year (30-31 December 1983), Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visited Guinea as a part of his tour of 11 African countries. During these travels, Zhao Ziyang used almost identical language in monarchical Morocco as he did in 'progressive' Guinea. He emphasised the importance of stability (rather than revolutionary changes) in the continent and urged further economic co-operation between China and Guinea.<sup>97</sup>

The *coup d'état* staged during the week 3 April 1984 following the death of Sekou Touré (26 March), bringing to power a Western-inclined and capitalistically<sup>98</sup> orientated government under the leadership of Colonel Diarra Traoré, did not undermine the warmth of Sino-Guinean relations. Had such a radical change of orientation occurred 15 or 20 years earlier,<sup>99</sup> Guinea's relations with China would almost certainly have received a set back; but not so at this time, when China's main concern was political stability in Africa and stable relationship with stable African government, of whatever political ilk. In March 1985, China donated 700 tons of maize to Guinea.<sup>100</sup> A month later, Guinea received 3,000 tons of rice seed from China.<sup>101</sup> In June 1985, China donated ancillary equipment to enable Guinea to make use of biogas.<sup>102</sup>

#### 16.1.1.5. Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde

During their national liberation struggles, both Guinea (B) and Cape Verde fought a united national liberation war under the leadership of PAIGC. Both countries promoted a militant relationship with China which gave them moral and material support.

The two territories, Guinea (B) and Cape Verde, eventually split off from one another into two separate states.<sup>103</sup>

Both countries held China in high regard for its support for their national liberation struggles. On this basis alone, their relations with China continued to be friendly after independence. In April 1977, Carmen Pereira,<sup>104</sup> Vice-President of the National People's Assembly of Guinea (B), paid a visit to China with the aim of developing co-operation between the two countries in the economic and trade spheres.<sup>105</sup> In the military field, China's aid included the despatch (1978) of 15 military experts to train Guinea (B)'s army.<sup>106</sup>

On the occasion (17-24 April 1982) of a visit to China by Joao Bernardo Vieira, Head of State and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Guinea (B), both countries advocated economic co-operation and trade relations as a fundamental basis for South-South co-operation as well as for the economic independence and self-reliance of poor countries.<sup>107</sup> A cultural agreement was signed between the two countries.<sup>108</sup>

On a similar basis, relations between China and Cape Verde continued to be friendly following the establishment

of formal diplomatic relations (25 April 1976)<sup>109</sup> between the two countries. China continued its aid (though limited) to Cape Verde. Despite the distance between the two countries, Chinese experts have helped the country to construct various government projects and buildings.<sup>110</sup>

When (May 1982) Aristides Maria Pereira, General Secretary of the African Party for Independence and President of Cape Verde, visited China, both countries urged economic and political co-operation among Third World countries. China and Cape Verde signed (15 May) an agricultural agreement.<sup>111</sup>

#### 16.1.1.6. Benin

The improved relations (i.e., from 1983 onwards) between Benin and the West and especially France following the visit of François Mitterand to Benin in January 1983), have not prevented the former from continuing to pursue its active anti-imperialist policy which began with the 1972 *coup*.<sup>112</sup> Under the leadership of Mathieu Kérékou, Benin continues to be a strong supporter of armed struggles as the ultimate means of national liberation of Azania and Namibia.

Relations between China and Benin during the current phase (since 1976) began with President Kérékou's 6-day visit to China (July 1976). A protocol for economic and technical co-operation between China and Benin was signed on this occasion, and Kérékou praised China for its

...good example...[for] the liberation fight against the dark forces, such as

imperialism, colonialism, racism and apartheid.<sup>113</sup>

France, in collaboration with its local African allies, Morocco and Gabon,<sup>114</sup> attempted (16 January 1977) to overthrow Kérékou's government. Lai Ya-li, China's representative in the UN Security Council, condemned the action, arguing that it constituted

...an encroachment by imperialism on the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Benin. The Chinese government and people extend their congratulations to the government and people of Benin who victoriously repudiated the invasion and defended their national independence.<sup>115</sup>

In the economic field,<sup>116</sup> relations between the two countries developed during the last decade. China continued to fulfil the aid commitments that it had made to Benin during the previous phase<sup>117</sup> (i.e., before 1976).

In January 1980, it was reported that China was the only communist country to offer aid to Benin.<sup>118</sup> 250 Chinese experts helped the country develop various agricultural projects and build sports complexes.<sup>119</sup> In November 1980, the Chinese personnel completed a paddy rice project in the country.<sup>120</sup> This was the largest of the eight paddy rice areas built with Chinese aid covering fields of a total area of 516 hectares.<sup>121</sup>

#### 16.1.1.7. Sao Tome and Principe

An organised independence movement in the islands of Sao Tome and Principe began only in September 1960 with

the establishment of the Committee for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (CLSTP) in Conakry. The islands of Sao Tome and Principe, unlike other Portuguese colonies, were not suitable for guerrilla struggles against the colonial power. During the intensive period (early '70s) of national liberation struggles in Portuguese colonies, these islands were well guarded by Portuguese soldiers as they were used as a vast concentration camp for political prisoners from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (B) and Cape Verde.

In late 1972, inspired by the successful national liberation struggles in other Portuguese colonies in Africa, CLSTP adopted the name of the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP). In the same year, OAU's Liberation Committee recognised MLSTP.

Unlike other national liberation movements, MLSTP was in no position to undertake armed struggle in the islands of Sao Tome and Principe.

Following the overthrow of the fascist *régime* in Portugal (April 1974), MLSTP led the independence movement of Sao Tome and Principe. Since the declaration of the independence of the country, MLSTP has adopted socialistically orientated economic and agrarian reforms. In external relations, Sao Tome and Principe has been an active supporter of national liberation struggles and strongly opposed to hegemonism and military exercises by Big Powers in its air and sea space.<sup>122</sup>

China's relations with MLSTP were originally begun under AAPSO's auspices and also under the aegis of OAU's



Liberation Committee. On the very day of its Independence (12 July 1975), Sao Tome and Principe established diplomatic relations with China.<sup>123</sup> In December 1975, President Manuel Pinto da Costa paid a visit to China.<sup>124</sup> In May 1976, a Chinese agro-technical team arrived in Sao Tome and Principe to experiment with rice-growing in Diog Nune state farm, near Sao Tome.<sup>125</sup> In April 1985, China gave Sao Tome and Principe an interest-free loan of \$12 million for financing a People's Palace.<sup>126</sup>

#### 16.1.1.8. The Congo (B)

The Congo (B) remains, to this day, a strongly anti-imperialist African country and a leading campaigner for African unity and independence.

During the decade of the '70s, China's relations with the government of the Congo (B) were strongly influenced by the former's obsession with the Soviet Union. But, during the '80s, China has ceased to insist dogmatically that the Soviet Union (i.e., Soviet hegemonism) should be included in the wider context of a united front against Western imperialism. Leaders of progressive governments seem to find a more relaxed atmosphere in China which permits them to express their anti-imperialist stance publicly without China feeling the need to condemn the Soviet Union at the same time for being a hegemonist or social imperialist power.

...in today's world where injustice is still the rule and imperialism dominates people and entire continents, the unity of the people of China and the Congo constitutes an important guarantee for

the peace and independence of the people.<sup>127</sup>

During the last decade, the relations between China and the Congo (B) have continued to remain cordial despite the latter's close friendship with the Soviet Union. In June 1977 a military delegation of the Congo (B) under the leadership of François Xavier Katali, Member of the Military Committee and Minister of the Interior, paid a visit to China. It sought further military aid for the Congo (B).<sup>128</sup> During the 1974-79 period, the total arms transfer from China to the Congo (B) was estimated at \$10 million.<sup>129</sup>

In the economic field, China continued to fulfil its aid commitments and promises to the country. In October 1978, *Geng Biao* the Chinese Vice Premier, paid a visit to the Congo (B) (as a part of his trip to 7 African countries).<sup>130</sup> At the time, Chinese experts were already in the process of completing the construction of a hydropower station and transmission lines in the Congo (B). The projects were fully completed in August 1979. In 1979, too, China sent the Congo (B) a naval guard as well as more technicians and experts.<sup>131</sup>

Relations between the two countries were further consolidated following Zhao *Ziyang's* visit to the Congo (B) (January 1983). He sought further economic co-operation and expressed China's strong support for settling African differences through 'patient consultations'.<sup>132</sup> In April 1983, China and the Congo (B) signed an agricultural contract under the promise of which

Chinese experts would train Congolese farmers to improve agricultural production.<sup>133</sup>

#### 16.1.1.9. Burundi

The political changes in Rwanda<sup>134</sup> (in 1973) seemed to have influenced the neighbouring country of Burundi. In November 1976, President Michel Micombero was overthrown. A Supreme Revolutionary Council was formed under the leadership of Baptiste Bagaza. The new government pursued a vigorous policy of liquidating 'feudal practices', including the abolition of the land-tenant relationship and the introduction of property rights for those actively tilling the soil. At the same time, a five-year development plan (for the 1978-82 period) was launched in Burundi. In the domestic social situation, the government sought national unity and an end to all regional or 'tribal conflicts'. All 'ethnic' or regional groups were represented in the new government.<sup>135</sup>

The new government sought good relations with neighbouring countries, affirmed its active support for the liberation movements in southern Africa, and promoted close relations with 'progressive' and socialist countries.

The 'progressive' character of Burundi during the decade of the '70s has helped to promote a good relationship with China. In January 1978, Albert Muganga, Burundi's Minister for Foreign Affairs, led a delegation to China, where he emphasised Burundi's common ground with China in support of liberation struggles in Zimbabwe,

Namibia and South Africa. At the same time, China and Burundi urged that

the question of Western Sahara should find an equitable solution in the interests of the Saharan people.<sup>136</sup>

China promised to help Burundi in its efforts to introduce agrarian reform (including the construction of dams).<sup>137</sup> In March 1979, President Jean Bagaza paid a four-day visit to China<sup>138</sup> where an agreement on economic and technical co-operation was signed, under the provisions of which an interest-free loan of \$40 million<sup>139</sup> was to be given to Burundi to develop its national economy, on the basis of a policy of independence and self-reliance. In May 1980, as a part of this loan, Chinese experts began the construction of a Textile complex.<sup>140</sup>

In August 1982, following a visit to China by Kandake Euphrasie, Member of the Political Bureau of the Party of Unity and National Progress and Secretary General of the Women's Union of Burundi, Chinese experts took part in the construction of a highway.<sup>141</sup> In August (4-9) 1983, Laurent Nzeyimana, Burundi's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, paid a five-day visit to China.<sup>142</sup>

#### 16.1.1.10. Rwanda

From July 1973, when it was founded, the *Mouvemente Révolutionnaire Nationale pour la Développement* (MRND), under the leadership of Juwendal Habyario Mana, has given Rwanda a 'progressive' orientation both in the domestic

and in the international spheres. Internally, it sought national unity and an end to social and regional differences. In the economic field, MRND adopted an active policy of developing its very poor (one of the poorest countries in the world) and backward economy.

In international relations, Rwanda improved its ties with 'progressive' and socialist countries both within and outside Africa. Its foreign policy was directed against the imperialist powers and their collaborators with the racist régime in South Africa.

Under the leadership of MRND, Rwanda's relations with China in the last decade have improved. In June 1978, President Juvenal Habyarimana visited China where he condemned, jointly with his hosts, colonialism, imperialism and racism. At the same time, the two countries expressed their strong support for the national liberation forces then active on the continent. At the end of his visit, President Habyarimana signed an economic and technical agreement between Rwanda and China.<sup>143</sup> In October 1978, Rwanda was visited by Geng Biao, China's Vice Premier. Economic co-operation between China and Rwanda was furthered as a result of the visit.<sup>144</sup>

In March 1980, François Ngaru Kiyintwali, Rwanda's Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid a visit to China where he was told by Hua Guo feng that

we have many good friends in Africa, and Rwanda is one of them... Relations between our two countries are based on mutual respect, help and support. Our friendship enjoys a very sound foundation and our relations have been developing quite well.<sup>145</sup>

In May 1981, another delegation from Rwanda under the leadership of Habimana Bonaventure, General Secretary of MRND, paid a visit to China. In his speech receiving the delegation, Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of CCP, praised Rwanda for its

foreign policy of maintaining its independence, good neighbourly relations and peace and neutrality.<sup>146</sup>

For his part, Bonaventure expressed Rwanda's deep appreciation of

China's support and aid to the struggles of oppressed peoples, especially the African people.<sup>147</sup>

China's aid to Rwanda in the development of its national economy since 1976 has been impressive. It includes a rice-growing project,<sup>148</sup> a cement works factory, a hospital, a sports stadium, a flour mill and the construction of reservoirs and rice mills.<sup>149</sup>

#### 16.1.1.11. Horn of Africa

The strategically important zone of the Horn of Africa, geographically placed astride the lower part of the Red Sea, not far from the Indian Ocean and in a well established position for access to, and communications with, the Middle East,<sup>150</sup> has been a major strategic area of great political sensitivity in the world, where Big Powers contend for influence to such an acute extent as even to endanger the *Détente* between East and West.<sup>151</sup>

The situation has been rendered serious from time to time as a result of internal conflicts within the region.

Territorial conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia over Ogaden, culminating in a war between two countries both of which lay claim to a 'common ideology of socialism', gave rise to tensions of a regional nature and to a shift in the policies of the Big Powers towards the countries of the protagonists.

Before discussing China's relations with Somalia and Ethiopia, it would be useful to consider in brief the development of the political situation involving the latter countries on the one hand, and the role of Superpowers on the other. Such an analysis would throw light on China's evaluation of the situation and its relations with Somalia and Ethiopia. For a brief period (1974-78) China attempted to maintain friendly relations with both the two 'progressive' states of the region locked together in mutual conflict.

During the first half of the decade of the '70s, Somalia's radical *régime*, under Siad Barre's leadership, was becoming more and more left-orientated and hostile to the imperialist powers. The 'progressive' position adopted by Barre's government culminated in the abolition of the Supreme Revolutionary Council and the formation of the Revolutionary Socialist Party of Somalia (1976). This development was viewed by the Soviet Union

...as a new important step in the development of the Somali revolution and evidence of the resolve of Somalia's working people, under the leadership of their militant vanguard,

to struggle for national independence, freedom and the building of a socialist society.<sup>152</sup>

At the same time, Soviet-Somali relations became very close, being reinforced by the 20-year Friendship Treaty of 1974, as a consequence of which 3,000 Soviet military advisers were to be sent to Somalia. 100 technicians and 700 Somalis were to be trained by Soviet technicians in Somalia and the Soviet Union. Military aid to the tune of nearly \$250 million was given to Somalia by the Soviet Union.<sup>153</sup> This alarmed the "Cold War warriors of the West",<sup>154</sup> especially the United States, who were already losing influence in the area which had been traditionally under their dominant influence, at least until the assumption of the progressive government in Somalia in 1969 and during the '70s until the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.

Whilst the Soviet Union's aim was to develop its strategic interest by forging friendly relations with Siad Barre's anti-imperialist government, Somalia's main aim was to create a strong and powerful army capable of asserting its territorial claims over Djibouti, Kenya, and Ogaden, in particular, in line with Siad Barre's aim of establishing a 'Greater Somalia'. In pursuit of such an orientation, Somalia sent its regular troops (May 1977) across Ethiopian border into Ogaden at a time when the Soviet Union was engaged in the task of consolidating its relations with Ethiopia's Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) immediately after the



appointment of Mengistu Haile-Mariam (February 1977) , who was believed to represent the most progressive strand in PMAC as its President. It is worth pointing out that, during the 1974-76 period, PMAC's revolutionary line was undermined by advocates of a more moderate line. PMAC had no clear<sup>155</sup> and active anti-imperialist policy, especially in relation to the United States.

For its part, the United States (during the period 1974-76, prior to Carter taking over as President), was not disposed to adopt a hostile stance towards PMAC. US arms sales and military aid to Ethiopia continued until early 1977,<sup>156</sup> following the assumption of power by Mengistu. It must be noted that the United States' policy of selling arms to Ethiopia was not dictated by its strategic importance. For, by the time Haile Selassie was overthrown, the United States had already begun to lose interest in Ethiopia for the following reasons:

- i. In line with an overwhelming majority of OAU members and under persistent pressures from Arab governments,<sup>157</sup> Haile Selassie had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel in the wake of the October 1973 War. This meant that as a practical strategic base for US-Israeli alliance in the Middle East, Ethiopia could no longer be of significance.
- ii. From 1970 onwards, the Kaynew Base at Asmara became strategically less and less important because of the increasing strategic use to which satellites were being put. The decision of the United States government to construct a major new base on the Indian Ocean

island of Diego Garcia (1,000 miles to the west of India) lessened even further Ethiopia's strategic significance.<sup>158</sup>

iii. In the wake of the famine which decimated Ethiopia's rural population (1972-74), and caused the death of at least 200,000 people,<sup>159</sup> political unrest deepened<sup>160</sup> and the country was ready for a major civil upheaval.<sup>161</sup> The United States adopted a policy of waiting for events to run their course.<sup>162</sup> Unlike, for example, the case of Iran-United States relations prior to 1979, the Ethiopia-United States relations were asymmetrical in character. The United States was far more important to Ethiopia (economically and militarily) than Ethiopia was to the United States.<sup>163</sup> American investment in Ethiopia ran to a total of no more than 10 per cent of the overall figure for foreign investment in the country.<sup>164</sup>

The decision of the United States to continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Ethiopia on an even keel after the revolution resulted from discussions among American decision-makers on Ethiopia's significance in the region as a countervailing force against the Soviet Union's penetration which had already reached Somalia, Southern Africa and Angola.<sup>165</sup>

The Eritrean factor also influenced the decision of the United States not to antagonise PMAC. As far as the United States and Israel were concerned,<sup>166</sup> opposition to Ethiopia would be tantamount to giving political support to Eritrean separatists, which in turn would enable Arabs

to extend their influence into an independent Eritrea, controlling the shore of Bab al-Mandeb, through which Israeli-bound tankers and other shipping passed.<sup>167</sup>

The Carter administration ended the various options and policies outlined above which its predecessor had kept in mind when it decided to maintain 'normal' relations with PMAC. In April 1977, the United States decided to suspend<sup>168</sup> arms supplies to Ethiopia, including those already paid for (according to the Derg, to the value of \$100 million.<sup>169</sup>) and made it clear that it was prepared to back Ethiopian rivals of Sudan and Saudi Arabia.

This change of course in the Ethiopian policy of the United States coincided with the intensification of the revolutionary character of PMAC's leadership with the emergence of Mengistu (February 1977) as its undisputed leader. Carter was well aware that the United States would be faced with a tougher task with the revolutionary government of Ethiopia than had been anticipated. This conviction was reinforced by the views of close Arab friends, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Sudan, which were strongly opposed to the United States policy of continuing to maintain friendly relations with and selling arms to the revolutionary régime in Ethiopia.

The Somali 'connection' played an important part in the decision of the United States to turn against the PMAC government. By the time the United States decided to suspend arms sales to Ethiopia, a set back had already occurred in Somalia's relations with the Soviet Union and

Cuba over the former's refusal to accept a peaceful settlement of the Ogaden issue.

The failure of Castro and Andropov to find a satisfactory basis for a settlement of the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, left the Soviet Union with no option but to take sides. The Soviet Union accordingly preferred to remain in the good books of 'progressive' Ethiopia rather than in the good books of 'progressive' Somalia. The main factors impinging on such a choice were

- i. Siad Barre's friendly overtures to pro-American and anti-Soviet Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia;
- ii. the increasingly anti-Western orientation of the Ethiopian government under the leadership of Mengistu; and
- iii. the strategic advantages of Ethiopia providing access to the Mediterranean.<sup>170</sup>

However, it must be remembered that, during the first half of 1977, the Soviet Union did have relatively good relations with Somalia, even while moving closer to Ethiopia. Before the summer of 1977, Ethiopia received arms from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet ally. It had been reported that, even as early as December 1976, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia had signed a secret arms agreement.<sup>171</sup>

During the latter half of 1977, following the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, the Soviet Union moved closer and closer to Ethiopia. Soviet arms and military supplies

were sent to Ethiopia in large quantities, whilst Soviet and Cuban experts arrived in Ethiopia in sizeable numbers.

Somalia reacted to such a direct shift towards Ethiopia on the Soviet Union's part by ordering (13 November 1977) Soviet and Cuban advisers to leave the country.

With the support of a large number of Cuban troops and Soviet advisers, Ethiopia was able to force Somali troops out of Ogaden in March 1978.<sup>172</sup> When the Ogaden War ended Soviet military aid to Ethiopia had reached a level estimated at \$1.5 billion.<sup>173</sup> An economic agreement between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia was signed in September 1978. In November 1978, the two countries signed a 20-year Friendship Treaty.

China's policy towards Somalia and Ethiopia has been guided by its general orientation (of total obsession during the '70s and of diminished obsession during the '80s) towards the Soviet Union. The escalation of the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia and the fluctuating relations of each of the protagonists with the Soviet Union took place at a time when China was engrossed in its anti-Soviet obsession. As far as China was concerned, the "Horn of Africa" was yet another example (after Egypt and the Sudan)<sup>174</sup> of the Soviet Union's behaviour as a hegemonic power in Africa. China blamed both the Soviet Union and Cuba for the escalation of the conflict.

In the initial stages of the present phase, China wished to remain friendly towards both countries. China believed that a peaceful solution to the conflict could be

sought, free from superpower rivalries and interference in the affairs of the region.

Within such a context, China's relations with Ethiopia and Somalia during the first two years (1976-77) of the current phase continued to be normal, albeit somewhat cooler than during the preceding phase (before 1976).<sup>175</sup> In April 1977, an Ethiopian government delegation led by Jamrat Ferede, a Member of PMAC, paid a week long visit to China seeking military aid.<sup>176</sup> During the 1974-78 period, Ethiopia received arms worth \$5 million from China.<sup>177</sup>

In the economic sphere, Chinese experts were in the process of finishing the construction (February 1978) of a gymnasium with a capacity of 7,000.<sup>178</sup> In August 1978 Chinese personnel completed a power station which was handed over to the Ethiopian government.<sup>179</sup>

However, as Ethiopia became more and more pro-Soviet and Somalia became more and more hostile to the Soviet Union, China found it more and more difficult to maintain friendly relations with both countries. Provoked by the Soviet Union's increasingly dominant position in Ethiopia, China renewed its support for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). China's motivation in adopting such a stance was predicated upon the failure of the Soviet Union and Cuba to bring pressure to bear upon the Ethiopian government to seek a peaceful settlement with ELF.<sup>180</sup> No wonder that Mengistu felt provoked to characterise China as

one of the 13 reactionary countries that [have] launched a concentrated assault against us.<sup>181</sup>

In March 1979, 2 NCNA correspondents were accused of spreading anti-revolutionary propaganda and ordered to leave Ethiopia.<sup>182</sup>

At the same time, Sino-Somali relations developed along friendly lines. The Somali decision to expel Soviet experts and reduce the number of Soviet diplomats in the country was described by China as an

...action of great significance in combating hegemonism...[it] once again proves that Soviet social imperialism is a paper tiger fierce of visage but faint hearted. So long as they dare to struggle, the small and weak countries certainly can defeat Soviet aggression, interference, control and bullying, with extensive sympathy and support from the people at home and abroad, and make positive contributions to the united struggle of the world's people against hegemonism...Justice is on the side of Somalia..<sup>183</sup>

In April 1978, President Siad Barre paid a visit to China where he was assured of unequivocal support for Somalia's struggles against imperialism and hegemonism.

...we appreciate the policy followed by the Somali people under President Siad Barre's leadership, upholding national unity and safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty internally and combating big-power hegemonism and imperialism externally.<sup>184</sup>

Somalia was the first<sup>185</sup> country visited (July 1978) by Chen Mu-hua, Vice Premier, as a reciprocal visit to the

## Vice-President

one made by Ismail Ali in the previous year (June 1977).<sup>186</sup> In her talks with Somali leaders Chen Mu-hua reaffirmed her country's stance

...on the side of their joint struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty.<sup>187</sup>

During her visit Chen Mu-hua attended a ceremony marking the completion of the 970 kilometre long Beletweyne-Burao Highway built by Chinese personnel.<sup>188</sup> This project was particularly important for Somalia for shipping its agricultural products from the south to the pastoral areas of the north.<sup>189</sup> The project was initially offered to the Western countries, but they turned it down on the grounds that the cost of transporting water to construction sites was too high. The Chinese solved the problem by digging wells, water storage areas and canals. All these were given to Somalia for its use to meet agricultural needs.<sup>190</sup>

In November 1978 Somalia was the first country<sup>191</sup> visited by Keng Piao, China's Vice-Premier, who was on a tour of African countries where Chinese experts were nearing completion of aid projects - mostly agricultural, including many which had been started but not completed by the Soviet Union.<sup>192</sup> In 1980 China gave Somalia 300,000 tons of rice and other food granted to help meet the immediate needs of refugees.<sup>193</sup>

In the military sphere Chinese arms and weapons to Somalia, sent during the 1974-79 period, were estimated at



a value of \$5 million.<sup>194</sup> In 1981, it was reported that China promised to deliver 20 MIG-19s to Somalia.<sup>195</sup>

In July 1981, a delegation of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party led by Ahmed Suleiman Abdulala, a Member of the Party's Political Bureau and Security Adviser to the President, paid a visit to China. In a joint statement marking that occasion, Li Xiannian, China's Vice-Chairman, and Abdulala noted that

...the strategic objective of the Soviet Union is global supremacy and the turbulent situation in the Horn of Africa is the result of Soviet aggression and interference.<sup>196</sup>

In 1981, experts from China in Somalia completed construction of the Balewen rice farm near Jowhar.<sup>197</sup> In March 1982, within four years of commencing it, Chinese experts finished the construction of the Fanol dam blocking the Juba river. This was capable of generating hydro electricity and irrigating 7,500 hectares of farmland. This was the first major water project to be constructed in Somalia.<sup>198</sup> In May 1982 Chinese experts completed a Plant Export Corporation and won a drilling contract in north western Somalia.<sup>199</sup>

Following a visit<sup>200</sup> to China (18-23 April 1972) by Hussan Kutmie Afrah, Second Vice-President of Somalia, China gave (May 1982) Somalia 3,000 cotton blankets and 10,000 cans of beef and mutton for relief aid for refugees<sup>201</sup> in the country.

In March 1986, Li Xiannian, President of China, paid a visit to Somalia where an agreement on Sino-Somali economic and technical co-operation was signed.<sup>202</sup>

The completion (October 1985) of the major project of 295 km of road in Ethiopia (begun in 1978)<sup>203</sup> by Chinese experts and the digging of wells and construction of other agricultural projects appear to have helped in easing the otherwise deteriorating relations between China and Ethiopia. The recent thaw <sup>204</sup> in Sino-Soviet relations and the diminishing obsession on China's part with the Soviet Union could well lead to a rapid improvement of Sino-Ethiopian relations, and lead to a restoration of China's earlier stance of maintaining friendly relations with both Somalia and Ethiopia. Recent (May 1986) moves towards reconciliation between the two countries (Somalia and Ethiopia) is also likely to contribute to friendly relations. China, for its part, has praised both countries<sup>205</sup> for their efforts in this direction.

#### 16.1.1.12. Angola

Throughout the latter half of the '70s China's obsession with the presence of the Soviet Union and Cuba continued to dictate its policy towards Angola, even though it no longer gave direct support to <sup>ENR</sup>UNITA and <sup>ENR</sup>FNLA. Both the Soviet Union and Cuba were blamed for instability in the country and for South Africa's aggression against Angola.<sup>206</sup> Within such a context, China continued to urge resistance and to praise guerrilla

forces, mainly of <sup>the</sup> UNITA, against Soviet and Cuban presence in the country.<sup>207.</sup>

China did not participate<sup>208</sup> in the debate on the resolution before <sup>the</sup> UN Security Council (March 1976) condemning South African aggression against Angola

...principally because the resolution remained silent about Soviet and Cuban intervention, and this omission was completely unacceptable to the Chinese people.<sup>209</sup>

China's controversial policy towards the Angolan crisis made Africans, progressive and non-progressive alike, wonder whether China's place and main concern was in the Third World or whether it stemmed from the belief that it was growing to be a Big Power like the United States and the Soviet Union. If so

times have changed, and all non-African countries including China must realise this fact. The mid-1970s are not the 1960s. American and Soviet men were naive in their dealings with tropical African states, and have thus been more cautious than both the Americans and the Soviets, and may have taken a more pragmatic approach towards African states. But they too must learn by their own experiences, and the major lesson to be learned by this experience [Angola] is that Africans will play China off against the USSR, or the West, if it is to their advantage.<sup>210</sup>

Even China's close friends were opposed to China's policy in Africa towards Angola. Salim A. Salim, Tanzania's Ambassador to UN, <sup>the</sup> expressed his criticism of Chinese statements on Angola in <sup>the</sup> UN Security Council thus:

we do not accept and we shall never accept the thesis that South African aggression in Angola was caused by Soviet support for the liberation movement in Africa.<sup>211</sup>

In November 1976, China refrained from taking part in the debate on the resolution recommending the admission of Angola to <sup>the</sup> UN which was passed by a majority of 13 to 0 (with United States abstaining), on the grounds that it would provide

social-imperialism with a pretext for prolonging its acts of aggression and interference in Angola.<sup>212</sup>

Jose Eduardo do Santos, now President of Angola, naturally took the view that China was in 'unnatural alliance' with the forces of imperialism and South Africa, and charged that Angolans were being killed by weapons 'made by the Chinese proletariat.'<sup>213</sup>

Having failed to convince African and international opinion that there was a line between the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union and Cuba on Angola on the one hand, and on the other South Africa's aggression against it, China embarked on a policy of moderating its active opposition to <sup>the</sup> MPLA. China must have realised that despite any interest of their own which might have motivated the Soviet Union and Cuba to enter into the Angolan scene, their opposition to Western imperialism was always popular among the progressive forces throughout Africa. Within this context, China seemed to admit that its policy towards the Angolan crisis (1975-76) had not been properly handled.

...we made a mistake in Angola, perhaps because we simplified the issue, reacted blindly, without proper analysis, to the position taken by the Russians. As the Angolan civil war went on, the affair became for us more and more of a fiasco, when we recognised this we tried more than once to normalize relations with the Luanda government but our approaches were premature.<sup>214</sup>

China was thus faced with the task of improving its relations with Angola in order to restore its revolutionary credibility among anti-imperialist forces in Africa. At the same time, China might have hoped<sup>215</sup> that it could influence Angola to loosen its ties with the Soviet Union. *Rapprochement* between the two countries began with the arrival (1980) of Chinese experts in various economic fields, (and especially in medicine and agriculture).<sup>216</sup>

Eventually, Angola and China recognised each other and began talks on normalising diplomatic relations (Paris: September 1982).<sup>217</sup> During the Sino-Angolan negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations (October 1982), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China issued a statement emphatically refuting the allegation that China was supporting <sup>the</sup> UNITA.

The Chinese side wishes to point out that some people have spread the allegation that China is giving aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Such an allegation is entirely groundless. In the period when the Angolan people were fighting against colonial rule, China gave assistance to the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, and also the Angolan National Liberation Front.

Since Angola won independence, China has ceased its aid to all the three organisations.<sup>218</sup>  
(emphasis added)

In January 1983, China and Angola established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.<sup>219</sup> In the Sino-Angolan *Joint Communiqué* on the establishment of diplomatic relations, China affirmed its support for Angola's

...just struggle to safeguard its national independence, state sovereignty and to develop the national economy, and condemns the systematic aggression of the South African racist troops against Angola, and demands the withdrawal of South African troops from the territory of Angola.<sup>220</sup>

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Angola and China, an Angolan commercial delegation went (22 February 1982) to China in order to

...look at the Chinese market and study the possibilities for further co-operation in areas of mutual interest.<sup>221</sup>

In May 1983, China reciprocated the Angolan delegation's visit with a visit to Angola by a Chinese delegation led by Gong Dafei, China's Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.<sup>222</sup>

Relations between the two countries have developed favourably since. South African aggression against Angola (December 1983) was strongly condemned by China

The Chinese Government strongly condemns the South African authorities for their crime and resolutely demands that they

put an end to their aggression and withdraw their forces from Angola.<sup>223</sup>

At the same time, China opposed the stand adopted by South Africa and United States that Cuban and Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Angola before a settlement in Namibia could be effected.<sup>224</sup>

In June 1984, Ismael Gaspar Martins, Angola's Minister of Foreign Trade, led a delegation to China to promote economic and trade relations between the two countries.<sup>225</sup> China and Angola signed their first trade agreement during this visit. On the same occasion, China undertook to send Angola 1,000 tonnes of wheat in aid, to alleviate drought.<sup>226</sup>

#### 16.1.1.13. Tanzania

China's commitment to giving aid to Tanzania has been intensive. China has also steadily taken part in various projects in Tanzania over a long period. Other African countries have viewed Tanzania's successful relationship with China as an example to follow. For its part, China takes the view that its aid to African countries should constitute a model for South-South co-operation, economic independence and self-reliance, and contribute to the realization of New International Economic Order (NIEO). The TanZam Railway, in particular, has influenced many<sup>227</sup> African countries to turn to China for help in their

efforts to construct similar projects that are needed for economic development.

Meanwhile, Tanzania has consistently attached a high value to its relations with China and to Chinese aid. In 1977, a rice farm (yield: 7.5 tons per acre) built with Chinese aid was inaugurated. In 1980, the rice harvest reached 17,000 tons, representing approximately 20 per cent of Tanzania's market demands.<sup>228</sup>

In September 1978, Edward Sokoine, the Prime Minister of Tanzania, paid a short visit to China, where a protocol on the further development of bilateral economic and technical co-operation between Tanzania and China was signed.<sup>229</sup> Included in China's aid to Tanzania during the year 1978 was an undertaking to the former to help the latter develop its coal mining industry, and to send medical aid and personnel.<sup>230</sup> In January 1979, Chinese experts found a coal deposit estimated at 50 million tons.<sup>231</sup>

In March 1980, Chinese personnel began the construction of a big Party building. They also completed a farm implements factory with a capacity of 3,700 tons.<sup>232</sup> China also gave Tanzania a loan of \$0.90 million.<sup>233</sup> In the military field, aid from China during the 1974-79 period reached a total value of approximately \$30 million.<sup>234</sup>

In March 1981, President Nyerere paid his fourth visit to China where he expressed the view that

when Tanzania most needed psychological and economic support, China proved



itself to be the friend of Tanzania and the African liberation movement.<sup>235</sup>

It was in Tanzania (11-13 January 1983) that Zhao Ziyang agreed with Nyerere that trade among Third World countries should be encouraged on the basis of barter.<sup>236</sup>

In developing countries South-South co-operation, all kinds of channels and forms may be taken; in a word the co-operation should be diversified in form.<sup>237</sup>

In May 1984, a shortwave transmitter, financed and built by the Chinese, was completed in Tanzania.<sup>238</sup> At the same time, China sent Tanzania 50,000 bicycles.<sup>239</sup> Salim A. Salim, Prime Minister of Tanzania led a delegation to China (17-24 September 1984), where an agreement was signed on a commodity loan extended by China to Tanzania estimated at \$852.272 for financing the import of spare parts for Chinese-built tractors.<sup>240</sup> During the same visit, Salim expressed deep satisfaction with China's support for Tanzania's 'efforts to develop' its 'economy'.<sup>241</sup> During the fiscal year 1983-84, the TanZam Railway made a profit of over \$6 million.<sup>242</sup> In December 1984, Tanzania received a large amount of medical aid and equipment from China.<sup>243</sup>

#### 16.1.1.14. Mozambique

Mozambique's insistence that

In Angola, two forces are confronting each other; on the one hand, imperialism with its allies and puppets; on the other, the progressive popular forces

which support MPLA. There is nothing else.<sup>244</sup>

had no adverse effect on its relations with China. China was aware that any friction in its relations with Mozambique would not only open the opportunity for Soviet penetration, but also put at risk its relations with national liberation movements in other parts of southern Africa for which Mozambique would serve as a natural base of major importance. Chinese leaders realised, too, that political differences must not be allowed to undermine the relationship between China's bilateral relations with Mozambique which, under Samora Machel's leadership, was 'distinctly Maoist in orientation' not only for liberation struggles but also for 'development techniques from rural to urban construction'.<sup>245</sup>

FRELIMO's longstanding friendly relations with China and its ideological identification with the Chinese model of 'people's war' of national liberation have contributed to a cementing of Sino-Mozambican relations.

[FRELIMO] learned the art of guerrilla warfare [in China] and it was with Chinese weapons that the people of Mozambique freed themselves from Portuguese colonialists.<sup>246</sup>

When southern Mozambique was hit by a flood (March 1977), the Chinese Red Cross sent 5,000 tonnes of food grains and 5 tonnes of medicine.<sup>247</sup> In September 1977, a Mozambican delegation, led by Marcelino Dos Santos, Minister for Development and Economic Planning, paid a visit to China with the aim of promoting economic co-

operation between the two countries.<sup>248</sup> This visit was followed by an interest-free loan of \$59 million<sup>249</sup> from China to Mozambique. In the same year, a Chinese agricultural team arrived to help Mozambique develop rice cultivation.<sup>250</sup>

In the military sphere, China's aid to Mozambique was estimated at \$5 million during the 1974-79 period.<sup>251</sup> In 1978, there were 345 Chinese military experts training the Mozambican army.<sup>252</sup>

Relations between China and Mozambique were further strengthened when (May 1978) President Samora Machel paid a state visit to China, during which a protocol of economic and technical co-operation between the two countries was signed.<sup>253</sup> In January 1979, Li Xiannian, Chinese Vice-Premier, reciprocated Machel's visit to China by paying a visit to Mozambique.<sup>254</sup>

The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning South Africa's bombardment of Matola a suburb of Maputo, the capital (23 May 1983).

This is a deliberate encroachment on the sovereignty and territory of an independent state, and a grave crime committed by the South African authorities against African people. The Chinese Government and people strongly condemn the South African authorities for their crime of barbarous aggression against Mozambique and firmly support the just stand of the Mozambique Government and the Organisation of African Unity.<sup>255</sup>

During President Machel's fifteen day visit to China (July 1984) Mozambique was given an interest-free loan of

\$13 million, (repayable over 10 years), in addition to a donation of consumer goods worth \$2 million.<sup>256</sup> This was followed by a shipment of 5,000 tonnes of maize.<sup>257</sup>

#### 16.1.1.15. Seychelles

Seychelles, strategically well placed in the Indian Ocean and in relation to the Middle East, effectively remained under the ideological and political control of Britain and its allies even after its formal independence (June 1976). Britain did not grant independence to Seychelles until it had made sure of the new government's loyalty to the West. Under the leadership of James Mancham, Seychelles pursued a policy of close relations with the minority and racist *régime* of South Africa, promoted closer relations with pro-Western governments in the wider region (especially Saudi Arabia), and offered its country to NATO as a military base for exercises.<sup>258</sup>

Mancham's government, which failed to maintain the country's political independence and tackle the economic crisis, was overthrown in less than a year. The new government led by Albert René, leader of the People's United Party (PUP),<sup>259</sup> imposed controls on foreign capital in the country and pursued a policy of positive non-alignment, including active support for national liberation forces in southern Africa. The United States, France, and Britain were strongly condemned for their attempts to turn the Indian Ocean into an imperialist arsenal.<sup>260</sup>

Soon after independence (28 June 1976), Seychelles established diplomatic relations with China (30 June 1976).<sup>261</sup> Close relations between the two countries did not develop until President Albert René visited China (May 1978), where he aligned himself with China's opposition to Big Power rivalry in strategic zones and the resulting 'threats' to smaller nations.

The Indian Ocean has in recent years seen a growing building up of the military capabilities of the super powers. This, in itself, is a threat to our sovereignty and our development. We sit like innocent onlookers on an active volcano which, in the event of a conflict, could erupt and blow us out of existence.<sup>262</sup>

China gave the Seychelles an interest-free loan of \$3 million for building secondary schools in the country.<sup>263</sup>

Since 1976, relations between the two countries in the sphere of economic co-operation and trade have steadily improved.<sup>264</sup>

President Albert René's more recent visit to China (27-30 May 1983) contributed to friendlier relations being forged between the two countries. Premier Zhao Ziyang praised the Seychelles for its active opposition to the expansion and hegemonism of Big Powers in the Indian Ocean region and for its

...non-aligned policy and its policy against imperialism, colonialism and racism.<sup>265</sup>

16.1.1.16. Madagascar

The 'progressive' character of Madagascar in the sphere of international relations stems from its adoption of active and positive foreign policies against imperialist powers and in support of national liberation forces both within and outside Africa. Madagascar demonstrated its 'progressive' tendencies by adopting socialism in its Charter of October 1976 which stated that

Socialist revolution is the only possible choice for us to achieve rapid economic, social, cultural, autonomous, humane and harmonious development.<sup>266</sup>

Relations between China and Madagascar during the current phase (1976 onwards) began with a visit to China by President Didier Ratsiraka (May 1976), following which a survey team was sent to Madagascar to study a road project 150 km long linking the capital, Antananarivo, with Tamatava, a port on the east coast.<sup>267</sup> Meanwhile, Chinese personnel were already in the process of completing projects included in the economic and technical agreements between the two countries. In October 1976, China sent a team of craftsmen to help Madagascar train more than 20 people in bamboo-weaving.<sup>268</sup>

In December 1978, China promised to build a 223 km road project from Moramanga to Andranompano.<sup>269</sup> In June 1979, Madagascar received an interest-free loan of \$10 million from China.<sup>270</sup> Much of the loan was to be invested in construction of sugar and match factories<sup>271</sup>

TABLE 16.1

## CHANGES IN NOMENCLATURE OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Present	Past
Benin (1975)	Dahomey
Botswana	Bechuanaland
Burundi <sup>1</sup>	Ruanda-Urundi
Cameroon	{ French Cameroons <sup>2</sup>
	{ British Southern Cameroons
Cape Verde	Cape Verde Islands
Central African Republic	Oubangui Chari
Congo	French Congo <sup>3</sup>
Djibouti	French Territory of the Afars and Issas <sup>4</sup>
Equatorial Guinea	Spanish Guinea
Gambia/Senegambia <sup>5</sup>	Gambia
Ghana	Gold Coast and British Togoland
Guinea-Bissau	Portuguese Guinea
Lesotho	Basutoland
Malagasy Rep/Madagascar	Madagascar
Malawi	Nyasaland
Mali <sup>6</sup>	French Soudan
Namibi <sup>7</sup> a	South West Africa
Rwanda <sup>1</sup>	Ruanda-Urundi
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic <sup>8</sup>	Spanish Sahara/Western Sahara
Senegal/Senegambia <sup>9</sup>	Senegal
Somalia/Somali Democratic Republic	{ British Somaliland
	{ Italian Somaliland
Tanzania <sup>9</sup>	{ Tanganyika
	{ Zanzibar
Togo	French Togoland
Zaire (1971)	Belgian Congo <sup>10</sup>
Zambia	Northern Rhodesia
Zimbabwe	Southern Rhodesia/Rhodesia
Burkina Faso (1984)	Upper Volta

1. Ruanda-Urundi was a Belgian-administered trust territory which became independent in 1960 as two separate states.
2. The Southern Cameroons, a British-administered UN trust territory, joined the Republic of Cameroon following a plebiscite in 1961.

1. Ruanda-Urandi was a Belgian-administered trust territory which became independent in 1960 as two separate states.
2. The Southern Cameroons, a British-administered UN trust territory, joined the Republic of Cameroon following a plebiscite in 1961: the people of the Northern Cameroons opted for integration with Nigeria.
3. Often referred to as Congo-Brazzaville.
4. Often referred to as French Somaliland.
5. The names 'Gambia' and 'Senegal' are retained, but in 1981 the two states formed the confederation of Senegambia.
6. The Mali Federation was formed by Senegal and Soudan in 1959, but survived for less than three months after being granted political independence by France in June 1960. France then recognised the separate independence of Senegal and Soudan, and the Union Soudanaise changed the name of Soudan to the Republic of Mali.
7. Not yet independent.
8. Also known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Its international status is in dispute.
9. The United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar came into being on 26 April 1964, as a consequence of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar; the name 'United Republic of Tanzania' was officially adopted a year later.
10. Often referred to as Congo-Léopoldville and subsequently (from 1 July 1966) as Congo-Kinshasa.

Source: W. Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984), p. 16.



by Chinese experts. In July 1979, China agreed to build a hydro-electric station in Madagascar.<sup>272</sup>

In 1980, China gave Madagascar an interest-free loan of \$60 million<sup>273</sup> to help rice cultivation and the construction of bridges and highways. Another major interest-free loan estimated at \$50 million<sup>274</sup> was given by China to Madagascar during President Didier Ratsiraka's visit to China (October 1985).<sup>275</sup> When Li Xiannian, President of China, paid a visit to Madagascar (March 1986) the two countries signed 3 documents which included an offer of Chinese aid of 2,000 tons of cement.<sup>276</sup>

#### 16.1.2. China's Relations with 'Non-Progressive' States

##### 16.1.2.1. Egypt

When Nasser died (29 September 1970), Prime Minister Zhou En-lai drew attention to Nasser's firm stand<sup>277</sup> against American imperialism, but refrained from making any references to Soviet 'hegemonism'. But when Sadat was assassinated (6 October 1981) Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang felt free to bracket the two superpowers together in his condolence message.

In his lifetime.. [A]-sadat worked steadfastly to safeguard state sovereignty, develop the national economy and oppose big-power hegemonism. His passing is a tremendous loss to the Egyptian peoples.<sup>278</sup>

Sino-Egyptian relations during the last decade have been underlined both by their 'open door' policy toward

the West and by their characterisation of the Soviet Union as a 'hegemonic' power.<sup>279</sup>

In April 1976, following Egypt's decision to <sup>officially</sup> abrogate its 15 year Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, a Sino-Egyptian military protocol was signed. Under it, MIG-17 and MIG-21 fighters were to be supplied by China to Egypt.<sup>280</sup> China's military aid commitment to Egypt during last decade includes 120 jet fighter aircraft and submarines built in Cairo with Chinese assistance.<sup>281</sup>

China's support for negotiations between Egypt and Israel (from 1977 onwards) was motivated by the belief that Third World countries should be encouraged to pursue their external relations independently of the Big Powers. When Hassen el-Tohamy (February 1978), Sadat's presidential envoy visited China, Hua Guo feng told him -

We appreciate the heroic struggle waged by the Egyptian Government and people under the leadership of President Sadat to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence and dignity and oppose big-power hegemonism.<sup>282</sup>

The same position was reaffirmed by Egyptian leaders to Ulan Fu, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress during his visit to Cairo (November 1978).<sup>283</sup>

In January 1980, Hosni Mubarak, Vice-President of Egypt, led an Egyptian delegation to China, where he identified Egypt with China's stand on the major issues of international relations.<sup>284</sup> China viewed Israel's handing back of the Egyptian territory of Sinai (22 April 1982) as

TABLE 16.2

ARMS TRANSFER FROM CHINA TO AFRICA (1975-79)

(in millions US \$)

---

Cameroon	10
Congo	10
Egypt	60
Ethiopia	5
Gabon	10
Gambia	5
Mali	5
Mozambique	5
Somalia	5
Sudan	5
Tanzania	30
Tunisia	10
Zaire	30
Zambia	30

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Source: J.L. Schere, China: Facts and Figures, Vol. 6  
 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press,  
 1983), p. 262.

TABLE 15.3

## MILITARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1959-79)

(in million US \$)

	Total Agreements Concluded	Deliveries	USSR Agreements Concluded	Deliveries	Eastern Europe Agreements Concluded	Deliveries	China Agreements Concluded	Deliveries
Total	52,770	39,670	47,340	35,340	4,285	3,405	1,145	920
1955-68	6,600	5,560	5,505	4,610	810	755	270	180
1969-79	48,170	34,105	41,835	30,730	3,475	2,650	875	740
1969	485	555	360	450	125	80	Neg1	25
1970	1,265	1,095	1,150	995	50	75	65	30
1971	1,790	1,050	1,590	865	120	125	80	60
1972	1,925	1,365	1,690	1,215	155	75	80	80
1973	3,045	3,340	2,890	3,135	130	130	25	80
1974	6,460	2,460	5,735	2,225	635	210	90	25
1975	4,000	2,425	3,325	2,040	635	285	40	100
1976	6,035	3,520	5,550	3,095	345	330	145	100
1977	9,260	5,125	8,715	4,705	475	345	75	75
1978	3,155	5,965	2,465	5,400	555	470	135	95
1979	8,750	7,205	8,365	6,615	250	525	140	70

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TABLE 16.4

COMPARISON BETWEEN SEVEN MAJOR RECIPIENTS OF ARMS  
FROM CHINA (1975-79)

(in million US \$)

Pakistan	240
North Korea	170
Egypt	60
Kampuchea	60
Zambia	30
Zaire	30
Tanzania	30
Total	620
Chinese World Total	725

Source: J.L. Scherer, China: Facts and Figures, Vol. 6  
(Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press,  
1983), p. 262.

...an important result of the persistent struggle of the Egyptian people.<sup>205</sup>

China believed that

Egypt's recovery of the Sinai Peninsula [was] a major achievement scored by the Egyptian people through protracted struggle.<sup>206</sup>

Unlike China, the Soviet Union (and the Arab Steadfastness Confrontation Front) was opposed to the *rapprochement* between Egypt and Israel.

For Israel does not simply return to Egypt the Sinai captured from it in an aggressive war. Its return has been paid for by the price of Sadat's betrayal of the common Arab interests, including and above all, of the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of their own states.

Moreover, together with the Sinai, Egypt has received US troops from the gendarme rapid development force. And this means...that Israeli occupation of the Sinai is replaced by American occupation.<sup>207</sup>

Egypt was the first country to be visited by Premier Zhao Ziyang during his African Tour (20-24 December 1982). In his talks with Zhao Ziyang, President Mubarak praised China for its stand opposing the Soviet Union's presence in Afghanistan and influence in Kampuchea. For his part, Zhao Ziyang urged Egypt to work positively towards Arab unity and sought further economic co-operation between Egypt and China.<sup>208</sup>

In April 1983, President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak paid a visit to China. In their joint *communiqué*, the Chinese

and Egyptian leaders reaffirmed their condemnation of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. At the same time, China urged Egypt to seek unity with Arab countries independently of the Big Powers. That would be the only practical solution to the Palestinian problem. An agreement on scientific and technical co-operation and a protocol of trade between the two countries was signed. It was also agreed that Egypt would establish a consulate-general's office in Shanghai.<sup>289</sup> As part of the economic agreement signed between the two countries China gave Egypt an interest-free loan of \$50 million (April 1984).<sup>290</sup> The warmth of the relations between the two countries and their shared desire for further economic co-operation was reaffirmed during a visit to Egypt by Li Xiannian, China's President (March 1986).<sup>291</sup>

#### 16.1.2.2. Tunisia

The Chinese now talk business not politics.<sup>292</sup>

In sharp contrast to its position towards China during the '60s,<sup>293</sup> Tunisia now claims that it has identical views with China on the major international issues such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Big Power hegemonism. In the case of Tunisia, 'Big Power' chauvinism means the Soviet Union rather than that of the United States, its close friend. The only difference between China and Tunisia, according to Mahmoud Al Mistiri (November 1983), Tunisia's Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, is over Chinese support for, and Tunisian 'opposition' to, the Camp David Accord.<sup>294</sup> Here it should be pointed out that Tunisia's opposition to the Camp David Accord was not motivated by any radical position in alignment with the actively anti-imperialist and Zionist forces in the Arab world, but rather from the fact that it would be against the grain for an Arab country to do otherwise. Moreover, Tunis is the headquarters of their League. Otherwise, Bourguiba, the Tunisian President, was the first Arab leader to seek a compromise with Israel during the '60s.

The political character of the Tunisian government under Bourguiba's leadership, has always been directed towards stability, 'peaceful' coexistence and economic co-operation. Tunisia has consistently favoured negotiations with, rather than active resistance to the forces of colonialism, imperialism and racism. During the last decade, Tunisia found China prepared to accept the approach advocated by most 'moderate' governments, largely for the sake of promoting better economic relations with them.

Contacts between, and reciprocal visits by, Chinese and Tunisian officials during the last two decades helped the two countries to improve their relations, especially in the economic, trade and military fields. During the 1976-85 period, more than 10 government and party delegations of different kinds paid reciprocal visits.<sup>295</sup> Among important visits between the two countries was the one by a Chinese military delegation to Tunisia<sup>296</sup> (October 1977). During the period 1974-79 China's



military aid to Tunisia reached the value of \$10 million.<sup>297</sup>

In December 1983, Ben Caid Essebesi, the Foreign Minister of Tunisia, led a delegation to China. In his talks with Essebesi, Premier Zhao Ziyang praised Tunisia for its support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of PLO, and for its 'constructive' efforts towards Arab unity. This policy was viewed by Zhao Ziyang as of fundamental importance for the Palestinian issue. He affirmed that

China is willing to continue to work together with Tunisia...to promote the unity of Palestine through the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the unity between the PLO and Arab countries as well as the unity between the Arab world and Africa.<sup>298</sup>

Sino-Tunisian co-operation in the economic field has been undoubtedly influenced by China's commitment to construct the Canal of Medjradah, a major project,<sup>299</sup> and the first in North Africa for which was prepared to provide aid. The project was completed in May 1984. Li Peng, Chinese Vice-Premier, attended its inauguration<sup>300</sup> (June 1984). The project is designed to divert water from the west to the east of Tunisia.

Mohammed Mzali, Prime Minister of Tunisia, visited China in 1984. An agreement on economic and technical co-operation between the two countries was signed. Both countries urged constructive efforts for South-South co-operation.<sup>301</sup> Recently (August 1986), Premier Zhao Ziyang paid a reciprocal visit to Tunisia. The visit was part of

his tour of Mediterranean and Balkan countries - Yugoslavia, Greece, Spain and Turkey. In Tunisia, Zhao Ziyang met Yasser Arafat, PLO leader, to whom he reaffirmed China's unequivocal support for Palestinian liberation struggles. Zhao found that Tunisia was strongly in favour of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan<sup>302</sup> and Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

#### 16.1.2.3. Morocco

We have already noted that, during the '50s and early '60s, Morocco's strategic importance for the Algerian FLN played an important role in promoting friendly relations between Morocco and China. Since 1976, Morocco itself has been in occupation of the Western Sahara, denying self-determination to the mass of the people of the Western Sahara who have been struggling for independence under the leadership of a national liberation movement (Polisario). It is appropriate to recall, too, that whilst during the '60s China supported the forces of national liberation in the Cameroon and the Congo(L), during the mid-'70s it was reluctant to offer similar support to the Polisario Front in its struggle against the oppression of the feudal monarchical régime of Morocco.

China has repeatedly argued that the quest for national liberation cannot be resolved on the battlefield alone.<sup>303</sup> China would like the conflict to be somehow ended; for, a continuation of the struggle would open up opportunities for the superpowers to push their way into the conflict for their own strategic ends. China would

ideally like to maintain friendly relations with both the conflicting sides.

Since the mid-'70s, relations between China and Morocco, for different reasons, (Morocco because it is virulently anti-communist and slavishly pro-Western in its political orientation) have been guided by the opposition of both to the Soviet Union's growing influence in the continent.<sup>304</sup> During the Shaba crisis<sup>305</sup> (March 1977), Morocco, like China, gave unequivocal support to the Mobutu régime of Zaire.<sup>306</sup>

When a Moroccan Parliamentary delegation visited China (May 1981), its hosts expressed their

...high appreciation of Morocco's persistent support for the just cause of the Arab, Palestinian and African peoples and their sympathy and support for the Afghan and Democratic Kampuchean peoples who are suffering from the external aggression.<sup>307</sup>

Similarly, when (February 1982) Maâti Bouâbid, Prime Minister of Morocco, paid a visit to China. Zhao Ziyang, China's Prime Minister, told him that both countries shared identical views.<sup>308</sup>

China seems to find support for its stance on sensitive foreign policy issues mostly from moderate and monarchical régimes and not from countries such as Algeria.<sup>309</sup> In Morocco, Zhao Ziyang found the political atmosphere conducive to the understanding that

China and Morocco share identical or similar views on many international issues, including the Middle East, Afghanistan and Kampuchean questions.<sup>310</sup>

As a leading and consistent trade partner of China,<sup>311</sup> Morocco has been able to draw closer and closer to China. Following the visit to China (February 1982) by Maâti Bouâbid, economic relations between the two countries have recently been expanded in order to enable China's participation in the construction of various projects and sports complexes in Morocco.<sup>312</sup>

#### 16.1.2.4. Chad

The situation in Chad during the last decade has been characterised by serious internal conflicts and civil wars involving, in particular, Moslems in the north and Christians in the south, and provoked by individual political leaders vying for power and leadership in the country. This situation is exacerbated by the readiness of regional (e.g. Libya) and Western powers (e.g. France) to interfere in the internal affairs of Chad. As a result, the independence and sovereignty of Chad has been severely undermined.

Neither Francis Tombalbaye, a long-serving President, nor his successors - Felix Malloun (April 1975-March 1979), Lol Mohammed Chawara (March-August 1979), Goukouni Oueddei (August 1979-June 1982), Hussein Hebre (June 1982) - succeeded in bringing internal conflicts and foreign intervention in the country to an end. In fact, it has been these leaders themselves who have failed to reconcile their differences, and widened the conflict. As a result, one side has invited France to intervene in the conflict

with the support of the Sudan and Egypt, and the other has relied on Libya and the Soviet Union for support. Both sides have been vying with each other for influence in the Chad, with its rich raw materials - especially uranium.

China has consistently supported OAU's efforts for a settlement of the Chad issue. It has urged the two sides to reconcile their differences for the sake of the unity of the country and to safeguard against foreign intervention and superpower competition. This was what Chinese leaders told President Felix Malloum, when he visited China (September 1978). An agreement was signed on economic and technical co-operation between the two countries.<sup>312</sup> China sent a large quantity of medicine to Chad in addition to medical technicians and personnel.<sup>313</sup>

In July 1983, Idris Miskire, Chad's Foreign Minister, was coldly received when he paid a visit to China. Chinese leaders told him that a peaceful settlement within the framework of OAU<sup>314</sup> represented the only practical means of bringing the civil political conflict in Chad to an end. He was, however, able to raise an interest-free loan of \$28.4 million<sup>315</sup> to ease Chad's serious economic difficulties.

At the 38th session of the UN General Assembly (October 1983), Wu Xueqian, Chinese Foreign Minister, put forward China's position towards the conflict in Chad in the following terms;

The conflict in Chad is becoming more and more complicated owing to the meddling of external forces...we are of the opinion that independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of

Chad be settled by the Chadian people themselves, and all foreign intervention must cease.<sup>316</sup>

#### 14.1.2.5. Niger

In countries where there is no serious internal conflict, China is in the habit of advocating the preservation of the *status quo* and urging governments to find an immediate solution to any potential internal conflict in which they might become involved. China's main hope for African countries lies in their freedom from the influence of Big Powers so that they can pursue an independent foreign policy. Therefore China is wont to regard any disruption or internal conflict in an African country as undermining China's strategy for it would automatically encourage Super Power intervention and threaten South-South co-operation, Third World unity and independent national economic policies.

Niger, under the leadership of Seyni Kountche, established formal relations with China only in April 1974, after a long period of hostility between the two countries caused by China's support for the revolutionary Sawaba during the '60s<sup>317</sup> against Diori Hammani's government. During the last decade, the two countries, having developed friendly relations with one another when negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries were in progress, China informed Niger that its main concern was not to provoke internal opposition in African countries, but rather to give its

support to stable governments and encourage independent economic tendencies, and self-reliance in them.<sup>316</sup>

During his visit to China in September 1977, President Kountche paid a warm tribute to the latter's support for national liberation movements in southern Africa and for its economic aid. He viewed China as

...an example and a source of inspiration for many countries, for third world countries in particular.<sup>318</sup>

China's aid to Niger has increased markedly since this visit. China's experts in Niger have been actively involved in helping the country develop its rural areas, especially in rice cultivation and digging wells. Also, China's aid in the country's construction of bridges and roads has been impressive.<sup>320</sup>

In May 1984, President Kountche paid a second visit to China, during which an agreement on economic co-operation was signed between China and Niger. It included an interest-free loan of \$4.717 million.<sup>321</sup> In 1985, Niger received a major interest-free loan of \$35.397 million.<sup>322</sup>

#### 16.1.2.6. Mauritania

The joint occupation of the Western Sahara by Mauritania and Morocco (1976) in collaboration with Spanish colonialism, and their oppression of the revolutionary movement of the Polisario did not greatly concern China. China was interested that Mauritania, like Morocco, should be helped to resist the Soviet influence in the continent. The Shaba crisis (March 1977) provided

the main basis for this assessment. Mauritania, like China, strongly supported Mobutu's *régime* against the guerrilla forces in Shaba<sup>323</sup> which were supported by the Soviet Union.

In all probability Mauritania could not find a better source of aid and economic co-operation than China to enable it to overcome its worst economic problems and to encourage it to pursue a self-reliant national economic policy. According to a report by CIA's National Foreign Assistance Centre in Mauritania (1979), China was the most popular aid donor in the country.<sup>324</sup> In a reception given to a group of Chinese doctors, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah expressed the view that

we Mauritians take the Chinese doctors working in Mauritania as our beloved brothers.<sup>325</sup>

In April 1977, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah visited China where he praised his hosts for their genuine friendship and exceptionally favourable aid terms.<sup>326</sup>

The succession of changes in the leadership in Mauritania that followed the overthrow of President Mokhtar Ould Daddah (10 July 1978), did not undermine Sino-Mauritanian relations. In fact, the overthrow of Ould Daddah could not have been more timely because of the embarrassment caused by the antagonistic stand taken by his oppressive *régime* against the national liberation movement in Western Sahara. Within a year after the *coup* (10 July 1978), the new government signed (5 August 1979) a peace treaty with the Polisario Front. Subsequently (4



January 1980) good relations between Algeria and Mauritania were restored. The new government took the view that an independent state of Western Sahara would serve as a buffer zone and a barrier against Moroccan expansionism. After all, Mauritania had once been claimed by Morocco as a part of its 'Great Kingdom'.<sup>327</sup>

Relations between China and Mauritania continued to remain warm. In April 1980, a delegation under the leadership of Chen Muhua, China's Vice-Premier, paid a visit to Mauritania, where it urged constructive and greater economic co-operation between the two countries.<sup>328</sup>

On the completion of a Chinese-aided water supply project in Nouakchott, capital of Mauritania, Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidallah, its Chairman, paid a special tribute to the aid donors.

People in the West often say we are water-poor here, but you Chinese friends have helped us find the water which has made Nouakchott what it is today.<sup>329</sup>

China's aid to Mauritania, during the last decade, has been highly significant given the latter's economic backwardness. It included the construction of a clothing plant,<sup>330</sup> a donation of \$60,000,500 in the form of agricultural machines (including 12 tractors and 4 harvesters), and the construction of a hydro-electric plant. A stadium with a capacity for 10,000 people and a port at Nouakchott were also built. In addition, Mauritania has frequently been in receipt of Chinese medical aid and personnel.<sup>331</sup> During the visit to China

(February 1986) of Colonel Maouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, the Mauritanian leader, Mauritania was given an interest-free loan of \$3,250 million.<sup>332</sup>

#### 16.1.2.7. Senegal

During the '60s there were no Sino-Senegalese diplomatic relations, because Senegal distrusted and feared China's revolutionary political influence in Africa. During the '70s and '80s, however, Senegal took advantage of China's new flexibility towards 'non-progressive' governments to forge good bilateral relations between the two countries. China chose to ignore even Senegal's offer of its territory as a base for French military operations in collaboration with Morocco against the liberation forces in Western Sahara. China attached some importance to Senegal's anti-Soviet stand on the Kampuchea and Afghanistan issues. President Abdou Diouf told his hosts in China that Senegal

...demands the retreat of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Cambodia the Senegalese government will continue to oppose hegemony of any kind. Any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of a country should not be tolerated.<sup>333</sup>

It is worth pointing out that, following the resignation of President Senghor (1981) and the coming to power of President Abdou Diouf, Senegal exerted some degree of independence in its domestic policies. At the same time, Senegal improved its once hostile relations

with Algeria which had been consistently friendly to the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara.

In May 1980, Chen Mu-hua, China's Vice-Premier, paid a visit to Senegal, the first by a high ranking Chinese official since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1971. During the visit China and Senegal expressed their desire for further economic co-operation and trade relations.<sup>334</sup> China's aid to Senegal has markedly increased. It has included 1,000 tons of powdered milk to help drought victims (1978); the sinking of wells in rural areas,<sup>335</sup> and the construction of dams.<sup>336</sup> Following the visit to China by President Abdou Diouf (July 1984), and the visit to Senegal by Li Peng, China's Vice-Premier (June 1984), China granted Senegal an interest-free loan of \$60 million.<sup>336</sup>

#### 16.1.2.8. The Gambia

The Gambia's foreign policy during the last decade has been influenced by the politics underlying the formation of the Sengambian confederation. The Gambia's relations with China have been guided by its agreement with Senegal over a bi-partisan foreign policy embracing both countries.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (14 December 1974), the Gambia has become a major recipient of Chinese military aid estimated at \$5 million.<sup>337</sup> Aid in other fields has included Chinese medical equipment and doctors as well as

the construction of health centres and sports complexes.<sup>338</sup>

#### 16.1.2.9. Sierra Leone

Sino-Sierra Leonean relations during the last decade constitute evidence in favour of the view that China's main concern has been with the stability of African régimes and the preservation of the *status quo* even at the expense of the oppressed peoples. Sierra Leone's endemic economic crisis and the well entrenched corruption in its government, which led to many serious strikes<sup>339</sup> (especially by students, teachers and workers) made no impact on China's ardour to maintain good state-to-state relations between the two countries.

In order to help it maintain stability by escaping from its serious economic difficulties, China has provided impressive amounts of aid to Sierra Leone. In addition to China's continuous medical aid to Sierra Leone,<sup>340</sup> a sugar factory built and financed by the Chinese and capable of employing 2,000 people, was completed (July 1978).<sup>341</sup> In May 1979, Chinese experts completed the construction of a pumping station.<sup>342</sup> In April 1979, a stadium financed by China and built by Chinese experts was completed.<sup>343</sup>

In 1980, China helped Sierra Leone build a sugar mill capable of processing 4,000 tons of cane daily. Chinese personnel also completed (1980) the construction of various sports complexes in the country.<sup>344</sup>

In March 1985, following a visit to China by President Siaka Stevens, an agreement on economic and

technical co-operation was signed between the two countries, under which both undertook to develop bilateral economic and technical co-operation in the form of contractual projects and joint ventures.<sup>345</sup> China also agreed to provide Sierra Leone with an interest-free loan of \$11 million.<sup>346</sup> China's support warranted a special tribute and deep appreciation by President Siaka Stevens in the course of his talks with Chinese leaders.<sup>347</sup> In September 1985, China promised to send 2 shipments of maize to Sierra Leone (during the period 1986-87).<sup>348</sup>

#### 16.1.2.10. Liberia

Liberia, though nominally independent since 1847,<sup>349</sup> has never been independent of American domination. It did not establish diplomatic relations with China until February 1977.<sup>350</sup> Despite its attempts during the '70s to reduce its dependence on the West (especially the United States) by adopting economic reforms and pursuing an 'open door' policy towards socialist countries, Liberia has continued to remain under the economic influence of Western capital and investment.

This situation did not change after the overthrow (April 1980) of President William Richard Tolbert by a group of soldiers under the leadership of Sergeant-Major Samuel Doe. The new government, of the Council of People's Redemption (CPR), continued the pro-Western (and in particular pro-United States) policy of its predecessor. The new government ordered the closure of the Libyan Embassy (April 1983), normalised diplomatic

relations with Israel (August 1983), and cut Soviet personnel in the country from 15 to 6 (November 1983). In July 1985, Liberia broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, accusing the latter of 'gross interference' in the former's internal affairs.<sup>351</sup>

The pro-Western orientation of the new government of Liberia did not affect China's attitude. China was gratified that Liberia was ready to condemn the "aggression" against its "sister, the Republic of Zaire",<sup>352</sup> during the Shaba crisis (March 1977).

In January 1977, a Liberian Goodwill Delegation visited China, where Liberia was praised for the support it was supposed to have given

African national liberation movements [and its opposition] to white racism, thus having made contributions to Africa's cause of unity against imperialism and colonialism.<sup>353</sup>

China agreed to assist in the cultivation of rice and vegetables and also to help construct a sugar factory in Liberia.<sup>354</sup>

In June 1978 President W.R. Tolbert paid a visit to China. At the state banquet given in his honour, he expressed the view that

With insistence we urge that Africa be left to Africans. We are opposed to all forms of domination however disguised.

Big Power interference in the internal affairs of Africa is detrimental to Africa and the African people.<sup>355</sup>

China's aid to Liberia during the latter half of the '70s included 20 military jeeps, 4 buses, 2 Red Flag limousines and the construction of a Barrek sugar refinery as well as sports complexes.<sup>356</sup>

In May 1982 President Samuel Doe paid a visit to China. A cultural agreement was signed between China and Liberia. At the same time, the two countries agreed to further their economic co-operation.<sup>357</sup> In April 1983, Chinese workers began the construction of a 311 mile Ganta-Harper highway financed by an interest-free loan of \$56 million.<sup>358</sup> In June 1985, China granted Liberia another interest-free loan of \$15 million for building construction and rice cultivation.<sup>359</sup>

#### 16.1.2.11. Ivory Coast

Since its independence in 1960, the intensely pro-Western and anti-communist Ivory Coast was among the African countries most hostile to China. In fact, President Felix Houphet-Boigny declared in 1965 that Ivory Coast 'will be the last to recognise China'.<sup>360</sup> Ivory Coast in fact was the last African country but one to recognise China (April 1983), the very last being Lesotho.<sup>361</sup>

Ivory Coast's recognition of China followed a meeting between President Houphet-Boigny and the Chinese Ambassador to Togo (February 1983). When Simeon Ake, Ivory Coast's Foreign Minister, subsequently visited China (March 1983), both countries established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level,<sup>362</sup> and agreed to

develop economic and trade relations.<sup>363</sup> During the last three years, Ivory Coast has become a major African trade partner of China's.<sup>364</sup>

#### 16.1.2.12. Burkina Faso

During the last ten years, the political character of Burkina Faso (Upper Volta before 1984) has remained Western-orientated. Of the changes of political leaders in Burkina Faso through *coups d'état* or through elections, only the military *coup* of August 1983 led by the *Conseil Nationale de la Révolution* (CNR) has given the country, for the first time, a 'progressive' and nationalistic orientation, decreasing for the first time the emphasis on a pro-French and pro-Western alignment.

Among Sankara's radical policies was the renaming of Upper Volta to Burkina Faso (August 1984), the adoption of 'socialism' as the basis for its economic policy and its political integration with the 'progressive' Ghana. At the same time, Burkina Faso sought solidarity with 'progressive' forces in and outside Africa.<sup>365</sup>

During the last decade, the normal practice of the Chinese media has been to report *coups d'état* rather than praise it if it was progressive or condemn it if it was Western-orientated. This is in direct contrast to the earlier practice of reporting a *coup* with Chinese evaluation of what the change of government represented. In its relations with Burkina Faso, China did not take any steps to forge links of economic co-operation with the successive governments of Upper Volta/Burkina Faso since



1973 when diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. China's main concern has been not with the political characteristics of the government, but with its stability.

In January 1978, Chinese workers completed the construction of a reclamation area for rice growing.<sup>366</sup>

Burkina Faso also received help in the construction of a number of small projects, especially in the field of sports.<sup>367</sup>

In March 1983 Felix Tiemtaraboum, Burkina Faso's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, paid a visit to China.

Our countries have won success in all fields since the establishment of diplomatic relations and we are satisfied with the good relations between the two countries.<sup>368</sup>

The two countries signed their first trade agreement, according to which they

will accord each other most-favoured-nation treatment in the spirit of co-operation and mutual benefit.<sup>369</sup>

In 1984, with the help of Chinese agro-technicians, Burkina Faso planted 1,600 hectares of paddy-rice capable of yielding 7,000 tons of rice.<sup>370</sup> In August 1984, in Ougadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, M. Dondasse, Minister for Planning and Co-operation and Feng Zhishan, Chinese Ambassador to the country, signed an agreement under which China undertook to make available a sum of

\$79,000 (150 million CFA) for a feasibility study for the construction of a hospital in Koudougou.<sup>371</sup>

#### 16.1.2.13. Ghana

Whilst, during the '60s, China's relations with an African country were guided by its orientation towards the Western powers, and by whether or not it supported national liberation struggles in the continent, during the '70s China's sole concern seemed to centre on its orientation towards the Soviet Union. Ghana's anti-Soviet stance<sup>372</sup> during the Shaba crisis (March 1977), was enough to drive China closer to it.

In November 1978, Pao Keng, China's Vice-Premier, paid a visit to Ghana (his tour included visits to the Congo(B), Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda and Somalia) in order to promote economic co-operation between the two countries.<sup>373</sup> Chinese experts were at that time in the process of completing a spinning mill while others were helping the country develop its rural areas and especially its rice fields.<sup>374</sup>

In June 1979, the pro-Nkrumah government, which had failed to bring about an early election or to resolve the country's economic problems, was overthrown by a *coup d'état* led by Jerry Rawlings. In the same month, elections were held and won by the People's National Party (PNP) under the leadership of Hilla Limann. Limann's government, too, failed to put down corruption and to stem the deterioration of the economy. Rawlings led another *coup* and formed the Provisional National Defence Council

(PNDC). The PNDC introduced a self-sufficiency programme called the 'Green Revolution' in which emphasis was placed on the reduction of costly food imports and fiscal reform.

PNDC favoured a confederation with 'progressive' Burkina Faso. At the same time, it urged active support for liberation struggles in southern Africa. In January 1984, Ghana was elected to the Chairmanship of <sup>EW</sup> OAU's Liberation Committee. Relations between Ghana and 'progressive' socialist countries including the Soviet Union, Cuba and Libya became friendly and co-operative in character.<sup>375</sup>

Recent changes in Ghana, which have imparted a 'progressive' image to it, would seem to have exerted a favourable influence on Sino-Ghanaian relations, especially at a time when China seems no longer to worry whether any particular African country had or had not close ties with the Soviet Union and its socialist allies.

China's aid to Ghana's new government has been impressive. It includes the construction of 5 irrigation projects, a 1,596 metre dam, 43 irrigation canals and ditches capable of irrigating 808 hectares of paddy fields.<sup>376</sup> Following the recent visit to China (September 1985) by President Jerry Rawlings, Ghana was given an interest-free loan of \$15 million.<sup>377</sup> Coming in the wake of China's need for foreign currency for its own 'four modernisation' programme, such a gesture should be viewed as an important contribution to an African country seriously interested in putting even vaguely socialist economic policies into effect.

#### 16.1.2.14. Togo

Togo's attempts, since the mid-'70s<sup>378</sup> to pursue economic policies independently of France and other Western countries, have been feeble than those of Benin, Burkina Faso and Ghana, its neighbours. Accordingly, China's aid to the latter countries has been more impressive<sup>379</sup> than that to Togo.

China's aid to Togo has been motivated by a desire to encourage it to maximise its economic independence and self-reliance.<sup>380</sup> Aid has flowed especially in the agricultural field, including rice growing stations.<sup>381</sup> Trade between the two countries has also been significant.<sup>382</sup>

#### 16.1.2.15. Nigeria

Nigeria's attempts at economic independence from the West led it to move closer to China which was prepared to give help in the sphere of agriculture. China attached importance to Nigeria as a power which could help intensify the campaign in favour of South-South co-operation and of developing countries being of mutual help.

A visit to Nigeria by Keng Piao, the Chinese Vice-Premier (October 1978), was the prelude to the deepening of co-operation between the two countries.<sup>383</sup>

In June 1980, China signed a protocol with Nigeria by which well drilling projects would be constructed in the latter.<sup>384</sup> In April 1981, China agreed to help Nigeria plan, design and construct bore holes for drinking water

in the upper Benue River Basin in the Bauchi state.<sup>386</sup> In March 1982, Chinese workers handed over to Nigeria the Itoikin agricultural complex and also began the construction of a railroad between Outrkpo and Ayangba.<sup>386</sup> At the same time, Chinese experts were engaged in the construction of approximately 20 other development projects.<sup>387</sup>

In the political field, China's appreciation of Nigeria's foreign policy can be found in Zhao Ziyang's words during the visit to China by Alex I. Ekueme, the Vice-President of Nigeria (March 1983).

The non-alignment movement has become a political force exercising important influence in the international arena. The Chinese Government and people deeply appreciate and firmly support the independent, sovereign and non-bloc principles followed by this movement.<sup>388</sup>

#### 16.1.2.16. The Cameroon

During the '60s China's gave military and financial aid<sup>389</sup> to UPC against the government of Ahmed Ahidjo. Since the early '70s, however, the Cameroon<sup>390</sup> has become a major recipient of both China's military aid (estimated at \$10 million) as well as financial aid (estimated at a total of \$175 million).<sup>391</sup>

In October 1977, President Ahmed Ahidjo visited China, where he expressed his agreement with China on the major issues of international relations, including support for African national liberation movements, economic co-

operation among developing countries and opposition to Big Power hegemonism.<sup>392</sup>

In June 1978, Chen Mu-hua, China's Vice-Premier, led a delegation to the Cameroon. On this occasion, President Ahidjo praised China for its genuine efforts in the sphere of economic co-operation and trade relations.<sup>393</sup> China's aid commitments and projects to the Cameroon include the construction of a bridge over the Chari River between Cameroon and Chad,<sup>394</sup> a State-owned palace,<sup>395</sup> and a cultural building.<sup>396</sup>

#### 16.1.2.17. Equatorial Guinea

Whether under the rule of President Macias Nguema, or his nephew, Teodoro Nguema, Equatorial Guinea has continued to be subjected to an oppressive régime.<sup>397</sup> In the international sphere, it became an area in the Atlantic Ocean of competition between Spain and France, with \$100 million<sup>398</sup> in debt to them.

China's interest-free loan of \$12.4 million<sup>399</sup> to Equatorial Guinea (1976) should be explained within the context of easing its heavy dependence on the West, based on a strategy of independence and South-South co-operation. Thus President Teodoro Nguema was told by his hosts in China (13 August 1984) that

strengthening unity and co-operation with African and other Third World countries is a fundamental point of China's foreign policy.<sup>400</sup>

Chinese workers continued<sup>401</sup> during this period to help with the construction of roads in Equatorial Guinea. Other aid commitments have included a hydro-electric station and telecommunication projects.<sup>402</sup> In the military sphere, it was reported in 1978 that China had 400 military experts and technicians training the local army.<sup>403</sup>

#### 16.1.2.18. Gabon

Since independence (1960), Gabon, under the leadership of President Omar Bongo (President since 1967), has remained heavily dependent on France. In collaboration with France, Gabon has been one of the most anti-'progressive' African countries. According to an international committee (1977), Gabon had been implicated in an abortive *coup* in Benin (January 1971) directed against <sup>the</sup> 'progressive' government.<sup>404</sup> During the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Gabon imported Rhodesian goods ignoring OAU's appeal for a boycott against UDI. In 1983, French military bases and facilities in Gabon were used by France to stage military operations in Chad.<sup>405</sup>

Having failed to mobilise 'progressive' African countries to join its anti-Soviet campaign, China turned to 'moderate' countries for support. However, 'moderate' Gabon under Omar Bongo, a pragmatic politician, would not commit itself to an unequivocally clear anti-Soviet line. When President Bongo visited China (May 1977), he was treated to an uninhibited denunciation of the Soviet Union

by his hosts who would not openly criticise it to visiting delegations from 'progressive' African countries.<sup>406</sup> During her visit to Gabon (June 1978), Chen Mu-hua, China's Vice-Premier, received high praise from her hosts for China's efforts in the sphere of economic aid and co-operation. Jean-Stanislas Migolet, Deputy Prime Minister of Gabon, stated that Sino-Gabonese relations were

...based on the sole criterion of real friendship and joint economic interests without any attempt to interfere in our respective internal affairs.<sup>407</sup>

In December 1978, President Bongo paid his fourth visit to China, during which he expressed the view that Sino-Gabonese relations were most fruitful in the economic, scientific, political and diplomatic fields. A similar characterisation was made by Leon Mbiame, Prime Minister, during Zhao Ziyang's visit to Gabon (January 1983).<sup>408</sup> In October 1983, President Bongo paid yet another visit to China, where he affirmed that

...the friendship between Gabon and China is based on respect for each other's characteristics and that the two countries hold identical views on many international political issues.<sup>409</sup>

China's aid to Gabon has been limited,<sup>410</sup> but trade between the two countries has been relatively important.<sup>411</sup> Political relations between the two countries seem, however, to have been even more important than economic co-operation.



16.1.2.19. The Central African Republic (CAR)

China's obsession with the Soviet Union undermined its relations with 'progressive' countries in Africa, especially during the mid-'70s when Angola became independent and the Shaba crisis (1976-77) erupted. Ironically, this erosion of past intimacy with important African powers was matched by a growing intimacy between China and such notoriously corrupt and inhumane régimes as CAR led by Jean Bokassa, who is currently being tried for the excesses that he had committed when he was in power.

During the '60s and early '70s, Bokassa had pursued an extremely hostile policy towards China, including opposition to its admission into <sup>the</sup> UN;<sup>412</sup> but, by the mid-'70s, he, like Mobutu of Zaire, had come to view China not as a revolutionary country to be afraid of, but as a power which was looking for support for its international campaign aimed at stemming the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the world in general and Africa in particular. Acting in accordance with his anti-communist proclivities, Bokassa was more than prepared to adopt a tougher policy against the Soviet Union.

In August 1976, <sup>the</sup> CAR and China resumed diplomatic relations after a suspension which had lasted 10 years (since January 1966). In November 1976, Bokassa's visit to China<sup>413</sup> was marked by China's grant of an interest-free loan of \$10 million to <sup>the</sup> CAR.<sup>414</sup>

In September 1979, Bokassa, by then self-declared Emperor of CAR (the 'little Napoleon' of Africa), was overthrown. Among the immediate reasons for the *coup* was

the murder of 500 people (including the massacre of 100 children)<sup>415</sup> by the police in response to protests and unrest against Bokassa's unbearably oppressive rule.

However, neither the government of David Dack, Bokassa's successor, nor that led by André Kolingba (who seized power in September 1981) have been able to put into effect their democratic promises pledges or resolve the country's economic problems. <sup>The</sup> CAR's economy has continued to be heavily dependent on France.<sup>416</sup>

China's main concern with <sup>the</sup> CAR, however, has been its internal stability and not with social and political changes. In the sphere of foreign relations, China would ideally like CAR to be anti-Soviet but is in fact quite satisfied that it is following a policy of rhetorical non-alignment. When General André Kolingba, President of the Military Committee for national Redressment of Central Africa and Head of State visited China (July 1983), Li Xiannian, China's President, praised <sup>the</sup> CAR for its

...efforts for national unity, social stability and a prosperous economy...peaceful, neutral and non-aligned policy...and its stand on maintaining African unity.<sup>417</sup>

<sup>The</sup> CAR and China signed (6 July 1973) an agreement on economic and technical co-operation,<sup>418</sup> and the Red Cross society of China donated a sum of \$50,000 to CAR.<sup>419</sup> Other aid commitments included 2 sets of 50 Kilowatt transmitters and antennas for the Bimbo broadcasting station.<sup>420</sup>

16.1.2.20. Zaire

The two sides recognised notably that they had the same common task: to know how to oppose the threat from the outside caused by Soviet imperialism<sup>421</sup>  
[emphasis added]

If relations with 'progressive' and 'radical' countries such as Guinea, the Congo(B), and Algeria constituted the central theme of China's political interest in Africa during the '60s,<sup>422</sup> during the '70s, 'moderate' Zaire, under Mobutu's rule, assumed disproportionate importance in China's African policy, not as an anti-imperialist power but as a potential partner in an Africa-wide anti-Soviet front.

The Sino-Zairean interaction manifested - in collaboration with Western powers - in support for the FLNA-UNITA alliance against <sup>the</sup> MPLA, was enhanced even further during the Shaba crisis (1977-78). When guerrilla forces of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FNLC), operating in the province of Shaba twice (March 1977 and May 1978) attempted to overthrow the Mobutu régime, China rallied to the support of the Mobutu régime.<sup>423</sup>

However, with the military and financial support of France, Belgium, the United States and West Germany, and the collaboration of African allies (mainly Morocco and Egypt), <sup>the</sup> FNLC forces were dispersed and defeated. China joined Mobutu and his Western allies in accusing the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany and Angola of collusion

TABLE 16.5

MILITARY TRAINEES FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN CHINA  
(WITH A COMPARISON WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND  
EASTERN EUROPE) (1955-1978)

From	To China	To USSR	To Eastern Europe
Algeria	25	2,200	200
Camercon	125	0	0
Congo	425	350	75
Guinea	350	850	50
Mali	50	350	10
Sierra Leone	150	0	0
Somalia	25	2,400	150
Sudan	200	325	25
Tanzania	1,025	1,975	10
Togo	50	0	0
Zaire	75	0	0
Zambia	50	200	0

Source: Compiled from J.L. Scherer, China: Facts and Figures, Vol. 3 (1980) (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press), p. 176, and Vol. 4 (1981), p. 269.

in the guerrilla offensive. People's Daily (19 March 1977) wrote as follows

We firmly support the just struggle of the Zairean armed forces and people in resisting foreign aggression and safeguarding state security and territorial integrity.<sup>424</sup>

China expressed strong support for the meeting between France, Britain, West Germany and the United States (Paris: 5 June 1978) to discuss strategies aimed at limiting the spread of the Soviet Union's influence in Southern Africa. According to the editor of the Peking Review, such a meeting would show that Western countries were beginning to realise the danger that would be posed to their vital interests if Africa were to be occupied by the Soviet Union.<sup>425</sup>

Huang Hua, China's Foreign Minister, paid a three day visit to Zaire (3 June 1978), during which he affirmed China's unequivocal support to Zaire for its resistance to 'Soviet expansionist designs in the heart of Africa'.<sup>426</sup> At a Press Conference (Kinshasa), Huang Hua expressed the view that

[als Zaire occupies an important position in the heart of Africa, Soviet social-imperialism and its agents always want to gain control over Zaire. This is part of the Soviet global strategy for world hegemony. It is by no means accidental that Shaba province was twice invaded by the mercenaries.<sup>427</sup>

In the wake of the Sino-Vietnamese border clash and the conflict over Kampuchea (from 1979 onwards), Zaire

repeatedly expressed strong support for China and condemned Vietnam and the Soviet Union.<sup>428</sup> Zaire has also been keen to express its opposition to Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.<sup>429</sup>

Since the crises in Angola (1975-76) and Shaba, Zaire has received large quantities of Chinese arms and weapons, (estimated at \$30 million),<sup>430</sup> thus leaping to a front ranking position (one of the first five) among African countries so favoured by China. In the economic field China's aid to Zaire during the latter half of the '70s included the construction of a people's palace, and help in the establishment of agricultural state farms covering a total area of 25,000 hectares.<sup>431</sup>

In March 1980, President Mobutu Sese Seko paid a visit (his third) to China (14-31 March), during which he praised China for its

...respect for Zaire's ideas [which constituted] a sure guarantee for sincere, lasting co-operation between two equal partners.<sup>432</sup>

During the reciprocal visits exchanged between Sese Keke Mobutu (June 1982) and Zhao Ziyang to Zaire (January 1983),<sup>433</sup> both countries affirmed their common stance in international relations.<sup>434</sup> China promised Zaire more aid and sought further co-operation between the two countries.<sup>435</sup>

#### 16.1.2.21. The Sudan

During the immediate aftermath of the abortive *coup* (led by communists) in the Sudan (1971), Sudan's relations with the Soviet Union reached a very low ebb. This was paralleled by China and the Sudan coming closer together. Relations between the Sudan and China became particularly close during the period under consideration (1976 onwards) especially following the decision of the Sudan government to expel Soviet experts (May 1977).<sup>436</sup>

The Sudan's tilt towards the West and revision of its early socialist plans did not seem to matter to China, so long as it could be counted as an anti-Soviet political force in Africa. Less than a month after Sudan terminated its contracts with Soviet military experts and closed their office (12 May 1977), President Nemeiri paid a visit to China (7 June 1977). Having expelled the Soviet experts, Nemeiri no longer hesitated to express himself openly against the 'hegemonic' role played by the Soviet Union and the Sudan's determination to join the campaign to fight against it.<sup>437</sup>

As the Sudan's relations with the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated (1974 onwards), China's military and economic aid to Sudan registered a marked increase. In the military sphere, China's arms transfer to the Sudan was estimated at \$5 million<sup>438</sup> during the period 1974-79, in addition to 6 MIG-19s.<sup>439</sup> Following a visit to China by a Sudanese military delegation (led by Abdel Magid Hamid Khalil, Commander in Chief of the People's Forces<sup>440</sup>) and a reciprocal one by a Chinese delegation,

TABLE 16.6

AFRICAN VOTES ON THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE:

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION (14 JANUARY 1980)

CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN

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Voting No	Abstaining	Non Participating
Angola	Algeria	Cape Verde
Ethiopia	Benin	Central African Rep.
Mozambique	Burundi	Chad
	Congo	Comoros
	Equatorial Guinea	Libya
	Guinea	Seychelles
	Guinea-Bissau	South Africa
	Madagascar	Sudan
	Mali	
	Sao Tome and Principe	
	Uganda	
	Zambia	

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Source: B.D. Larkin, China in Africa: Modernization and African Stability, African Contemporary Record (Annual Survey and Documents 1979-1980), p. A118 (Table 1).

Note This the only place in this work where the above source is cited.



China and the Sudan signed an agreement on military co-operation (January 1982) and a cultural agreement.<sup>441</sup>

In the economic sphere, China's aid to the Sudan during the period under consideration (1976 onwards) included the completion (March 1973-April 1977) of the major project of the 227 Km-long Wad Medani-Gadref Road, across the eastern plain of the country.<sup>442</sup>

In March 1983, a high level delegation of CCP visiting the Sudan, signed a protocol of friendship and co-operation aimed at enhancing good relations between the two countries even further.<sup>443</sup> The campaign against the Soviet Union, especially following the Sudan's expulsion of Soviet experts, has been a main subject of Sino-Sudanese reciprocal visits and contacts<sup>444</sup> as during the 10-day visit to China in October 1984 by Izzedin El Sayed, Speaker of the Sudanese National People's Assembly. The Sudan was praised for its policy of consultations with all Red Sea nations aimed at

...eliminating international conflicts and making the sea a neutral and peaceful region for vessels of all countries.<sup>445</sup>

Strong opposition to the hegemonic role exerted by the two Superpowers was among the main subjects discussed between President Numeiri and his hosts in China (10-15 December 1984)<sup>446</sup>

The overthrow of Numeiri (6 April 1985) was not to China's liking.<sup>447</sup> This must have been due to the indications given by the new government that it would like

to normalise relations between the Sudan and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet factor is not likely to undermine Sino-Sudanese friendship as China itself seems to be moving towards a *modus vivendi* in its own relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>448</sup> Recent attempts, made by the Transitional Military Council (under the leadership of Abdel Rahman Mohammed Hassan) and the current elected (April 1986) government (under Prime Minister, Sadiq Al Mahdi) to promote political stability and undertake economic reforms, have been welcomed by China.<sup>449</sup>

#### 16.1.2.22. Djibouti

Alarmed<sup>450</sup> by the political developments leading to the Ethiopian Revolution (1974), France yielded to the demand for independence both by Djibouti's independence movement and by OAU. Djibouti received its independence from colonial rule in June 1977. However, under the dominant and conservative rule of Hassen Gouled, leader of the Somali *Ligue Populaire Africaine pour l'Indépendance* (LPAI),<sup>451</sup> Djibouti continued to remain dependent on France in the military and economic spheres. The conservative character of Djibouti was reinforced by Saudi Arabia's 'financial power'.<sup>452</sup>

Right from 1977, China showed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Djibouti. Djibouti's independence came at a time when the relations between China and Ethiopia had sunk to a low ebb, as the relations between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia were in the ascendant. China believed that by establishing

diplomatic relations with Djibouti, it could establish a diplomatic countervailing influence in the region against Soviet influence in Ethiopia. But there were three major impediments in the way of such a move. First, Djibouti was heavily dependent on Saudi Arabia, which had not yet established diplomatic relations with China. Second, as a newly established government with a pronounced bent towards conservatism, Djibouti was slow to accept China's new credentials in international relations as a force in favour of stability and opposed to revolution. Third, Djibouti's own sovereignty was under threat in view of Somalia's territorial claim over it, which was exacerbated by the circumstances arising in the Horn in the wake of the Ogaden War of 1977.

It was only in January 1979 that Djibouti established diplomatic relations with China. Commenting on the occasion, People's Daily (9 January 1979) expressed China's strong support for Djibouti's opposition to the hegemonic rule of the Soviet Union in Africa.

President Hassen Gouled visited China (9-15 December 1979), where he, jointed his hosts in expressing strong opposition to hegemonism and to the contention between the two Superpowers in the Red Sea region. China and Djibouti agreed to strengthen their economic and trade relations.<sup>453</sup> China's aid to Djibouti has been limited,<sup>454</sup> but trade between the two countries has been relatively significant.<sup>455</sup>

### 16.1.2.23. Uganda

During the initial stage of Amin's rule,<sup>456</sup> Amin had accused China of complicity in Obote's attempts to overthrow his government. By November 1975, Soviet-Ugandan relations had reached their *nadir* when Uganda broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>457</sup> During both the Angolan<sup>458</sup> (1975-76) and Shaba (1977-78) crises, China and Uganda adopted an identical position *vis à vis* the Soviet Union.<sup>459</sup> Relations between China and Uganda improved during the phase (from 1976 onwards) under discussion.

China's aid to Uganda, during the last 3 years of Amin's rule (1976-1979), included the construction of the Kibimba rice farm in the Igango district. This was the largest mechanised rice farm, with 1,400 acres under cultivation<sup>460</sup> and capable of producing 4,000 tons annually. Also a rice plant,<sup>461</sup> built and financed by Chinese personnel, was completed. Trade between the two countries continued to expand.<sup>462</sup>

However, China's close friendship with Tanzania and the latter's identification with Obote placed limits on the extreme to which Sino-Ugandan relations could be furthered during Amin's rule. When Amin was overthrown by the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) with the help of Tanzania, (13 April 1979), after a decade of

...military despotism under which the mass of the people had to bear the brunt of fascist oppression and continued imperialist penetration,<sup>463</sup>

China described him as a man who

...has ruled as an autocrat and by a reign of terror<sup>464</sup>

However, neither the new government under the successive leaderships of Yusufu Lule, Godfrey Binamba, and the Military Council (April 1979-December 1980), nor the Obote (Mark II) government (December 1980-July 1985), were able to solve Uganda's continuous social unrest, regional conflicts and serious economic problems. Obote returned to power not as the 'apostle of socialism', but as the apostle of 'foreign capital' and the 'forces of international capital'<sup>465</sup> already well entrenched under Amin's régime. Upon returning to power, Obote favoured a policy of accommodation with Western powers and tolerance of their investment in Uganda as a practical guarantee for the continuatiuon of his government in power. Accordingly, in international relations the anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and Pan-African emphasis of the Obote (Mark I) administration<sup>466</sup> had completely lost their momentum in the Obote (Mark II) government.<sup>467</sup>

China's interest in Uganda was somewhat circumscribed by its endemic instability throughout the period 1978-86. The visit to China by Paulo Muwanga, Vice President, <sup>468</sup> (August 1984) did not lead to any further development in Sino-Ugandan relations.

The relative stability of Uganda under the National Resistance Council government, has been welcomed by China. Uganda, under the leadership of Yoweri Musaveñi, for the first time in two decades seems to be seriously interested in involving different political forces and sections of

society in the shaping of its long-term future. If this situation continues, Sino-Ugandan relations can be expected to become stronger and develop in a friendly atmosphere. China's interest in Yoweri Musaveni's government is geared to its evaluation of Uganda's political stability in the future and of the seriousness with which it is looking to remain non-aligned in international relations. China seems to be particularly in favour of the Musaveni government's economic policy of creating a mixed economy consisting of state-run as well as privately owned enterprises.<sup>469</sup>

#### 16.1.2.24. Kenya

The student revolt in Kenya (March 1971) against Kenyatta's dynastic government<sup>470</sup> made him even more rabidly anti-communist than before. The possibility of Kenya restoring normal diplomatic relations with China, despite the latter's flexible foreign policy towards 'moderate' and pro-Western governments, was placed in cold storage for the time being. For Kenyatta, both the Soviet Union and China were equally communist 'omens'; friendly relations with either would be far from desirable. The Soviet Union's military intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968) was viewed by Kenyatta's government as

...a naked and brutal manifestation of the worst form of imperialism<sup>471</sup>

When explosions took place (11 February 1970) in the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi, China accused Kenya of

indifference and demanded that the host government should assume responsibility for them.<sup>472</sup>

Sino-Kenyan relations were resumed on a normal basis only after Kenyatta's death (22 August 1978) and the assumption of power by Daniel Arap Moi. Among Moi's early measures was the normalisation (December 1978) of Kenya's relations with Tanzania, China's close friend, and the appointment of Oginga Odinga (the pro-Chinese<sup>473</sup> and discredited former Vice-President of Kenya) as Chairman of the Cotton Board.<sup>474</sup>

This should, by no means, be seen as a radical shift in Kenya's 'moderate' character and pro-Western inclinations. In fact, it was under Moi's government that the United States won Kenya's agreement to use the latter's port and air base facilities in the event that American forces should need to move in the Gulf area.<sup>475</sup> China did not object to Kenya's willingness to extend facilities of such a strategically sensitive nature to the United States. As far as China was concerned, Soviet hegemonism in the region was a greater evil than American hegemonism.<sup>476</sup>

Geng Biao China's Vice-Premier, visited Kenya (November 1979) during his African tour.<sup>477</sup> In August 1980, another Chinese delegation led by Ji Dengfei, China's Vice-Premier,<sup>478</sup> also visited Kenya. The political atmosphere created by these two visits enabled President Moi to pay a visit to China (14 September 1980), during which the two countries signed an economic and technical agreement as well as an agreement on

cultural co-operation.<sup>479</sup> Under the economic agreement, an interest-free loan of \$50 million was given to Kenya.<sup>480</sup> Projects to be built and financed by China in Kenya under its provisions included a rice mill and sports complexes.<sup>481</sup>

Zhao Ziyang, China's Prime Minister, visited Kenya at the conclusion of his African tour (December 1982-January 1983). President Moi took the occasion to praise China for its efforts to encourage African solidarity and unity as well as for its aid to Kenya, which would have the effect of increasing its economic independence.<sup>482</sup> Following Zhao Ziyang's visit, China granted Kenya an interest-free loan of \$36 million<sup>483</sup> (March 1983).

#### 16.1.2.25. Zambia

Kaunda's 'political moderation' has never stood in the way of China's policy of seeking good relations with Zambia, even during the '60s when the former was more revolutionary in its approach to African political development and the latter was strongly anti-communist in its political orientation.<sup>484</sup> Zambia's role as a base for national liberation movements in the region, its antagonism towards the Soviet Union and its appreciation of the China's contribution to the TanZam Railway project are factors which have contributed to a close understanding between the two countries.<sup>485</sup>

The only major difference in foreign policy between China and Zambia, emerging especially during the period under consideration (1976 onwards), was in relation to the



liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. While China gave active support to ZANU, Zambia continued to identify itself with the 'moderate' ZAPU. However, this does not seem to have undermined the Sino-Zambian friendship. Frictions between ZANU and Zambia seemed to disappear after Kaunda's visit to Zimbabwe in July 1981.

Hua Guofeng, Prime Minister of the State Council of China, in a message to President Kaunda, unequivocally condemned the armed incursions that were launched by the Rhodesian government into Zambia (October-November 1979) with the aim of destroying Zimbabwean guerrilla bases.

These unrestrained acts of armed aggression against Zambia by Rhodesian authorities were obviously aimed at compelling Zambia and other front line states to desist from supporting the Zimbabwean people's struggle for national independence. They are, however, futile. Their barbarous provocations will only arouse the people of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole to greater indignation and resolute struggle.<sup>486</sup>

During the 1974-79 period, the Zambian economy faced the most serious crisis since independence, largely caused by the blockade mounted by the Rhodesian and Portuguese authorities with the aim of forcing Zambia to expel Zimbabwean and Angolan liberation forces using its territory for guerrilla operations. China's aid to Zambia during these years was truly impressive. It included a textile mill (financed and built by China and the construction of roads and bridges (including a 330 km Sevenje-Mansa highway linking Lusaka with the northern

province of Luapulo).<sup>487</sup> In the military sphere, China's aid was estimated at \$30 million (1974-79). Zambia became the largest recipient in Africa of military aid from China.<sup>488</sup> More recently (December 1985), China gave Zambia a 30-ton ferry to operate on Lake Bangweulu.<sup>489</sup>

In April 1980, President Kaunda paid his third visit to China, during which a protocol on economic and technical co-operation and a cultural agreement between the two countries was signed.<sup>490</sup> Kaunda praised China for supporting African struggles and for its valuable contribution to the victory of African national liberation movements.

China is one of the leading supporters of the patriotic forces fighting colonialism, fascism and racism in Southern Africa...The front line countries provided the strategic bases and aid of logistics for the patriotic forces, and China's valuable support to them is also an indispensable and decisive factor in helping the oppressed people to win their historical victory.<sup>491</sup>

Mainza Chona, Secretary General of UNIP echoed similar sentiments when he led a delegation to China (October 1980).<sup>492</sup>

Zambia (5-8 January 1983) was among the 11 African countries visited by Zhao Ziyang, China's Prime Minister. On this occasion both countries affirmed their opposition to the linking of the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military personnel from Angola. At the same time, they agreed to extend their

economic co-operation further. China promised to help Zambia improve its railway system.<sup>493</sup>

#### 16.1.2.26. Botswana

The intensification of the war of national liberation in Zimbabwe, especially after the failure of the Geneva Conference (December 1976), made Botswana (like Zambia) extremely vulnerable to military attacks by Rhodesia against Zimbabwean guerrilla bases throughout the region. Zimbabwe's independence (17 April 1980) came as a relief to the 'moderate' government of Seretse Khama, not only because it no longer needed to fear Rhodesian raids but also because the departure of the guerrillas from Botswana would lessen its economic burdens. At the same time, the independence of Zimbabwe meant that Botswana had a friend along its borders and would not need to be totally dependent on South Africa for trade. Botswana could export its raw materials and import manufactured goods through Zimbabwe via Beira in Mozambique.

The decision to establish the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) taken by the five front line states when they met in Botswana (1979) reinforced their awareness of the need to take advantage of such an economic opportunity. Botswana's readiness to co-operate with other front line states in opposing South Africa's apartheid régime was given a boost with the accession to power of Quett Masire, who was described as 'less conservative'<sup>494</sup> than Seretse Khama, who died in July 1980. Interestingly, despite its conservative

domestic political orientation , Botswana was described by a South African newspaper (*Bleed*) as 'our own Cuba'<sup>495</sup> when it refused to sign a 'non-aggression' pact with South Africa and decided to accept Soviet arms (1981).

The moderation of the conservative character of Botswana contributed to its relations (which began only in January 1975) with China during the last decade. China repeatedly condemned Rhodesian attacks on the bases of Zimbabwean liberation forces in Botswana in violation of its sovereignty.<sup>496</sup> Botswana's co-operation (from 1975 onwards) with the other front line states has brought it closer to China during the current phase of China's foreign policy. In 1978, China offered Botswana an interest-free loan of \$16.6 million,<sup>497</sup> repayable over a 20-year period. China's aid to Botswana included a 120 km railway between Gaborone and the southern border.<sup>498</sup> In September 1984, China gave Botswana another loan of \$6.15 million to help the finance of the project.<sup>499</sup>

In November 1983, President Quett Masire paid a visit to China, where he praised Chinese support for the South African peoples and for their firm stand against the policy of co-operation with the South African racist régime pursued by the United States. Like China, Botswana expressed strong opposition to the linking of the withdrawal of the South African régime from Namibia with the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military experts from Angola. At the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union were strongly criticized for their hegemonic rivalries in southern Africa and the Middle East.<sup>500</sup>

16.1.2.27. Lesotho

With the establishment of diplomatic relations with Lesotho (April 1983), China now has diplomatic relations with all but 2 independent African countries (viz., Malawi and Swaziland). The kingdom of Lesotho (under the rule of the conservative Chief Lebua Jonathan, the Prime Minister), totally dependent on South Africa for its trade and economic relations with the outside world, had been, until 1983, hostile to China and a close ally of Taiwan.<sup>501</sup>

In 1975, Chief Lebua Jonathan protested for the first time against South Africa's occupation of the Orange Free State (OFS) which he claimed to be part of Lesotho. Popular protests in Lesotho against South Africa's racist régime and OAU's condemnation of *apartheid*,<sup>502</sup> were echoed in Chief Jonathan's statements criticising Lesotho's powerful neighbour. Lesotho made a conscious effort to strengthen its ties with OAU during the period under discussion.<sup>503</sup> In compliance with the UN decision and actions, Lesotho announced an embargo on all trade with Rhodesia.<sup>504</sup>

Such was the political atmosphere in Lesotho when J.R.L. Kotsokoame, the Foreign Minister, paid a visit to China (and four other Far Eastern and East European countries), where he confirmed that in his government's view, PRC was the 'sole legal inalienable part of PRC'.<sup>505</sup> Diplomatic relations with Taiwan were thus brought to an end. In a *joint communiqué*, China and Lesotho stressed that

the two governments have agreed to develop friendly relations and co-operation between the two countries on the basis of the principles of national respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.<sup>506</sup>

China affirmed its support for

...the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho in its efforts to safeguard national independence and sovereignty and to develop the national economy.<sup>507</sup>

China and Lesotho jointly condemned South Africa's racist policy and its occupation of Namibia.<sup>508</sup> Lesotho wished to establish diplomatic relations with China on the grounds that

...with that more than three-fourths of the international community recognising the Beijing Government, it was odd for Lesotho to try and snub one billion people whose Government was recognised by most countries of the world. It was further deemed too much for Lesotho to expect support from mainland China when in fact Lesotho was especially hostile to it....the fact of Lesotho's diplomatic life necessitated the establishment of relations with Beijing in the best interests of Lesotho.<sup>509</sup>

China and Lesotho signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation (16 May 1983), under the provisions of which the latter was given an interest-free loan of \$3.54 million<sup>510</sup> (12 million yuan).

In August 1984, King Moshoeshoe (the ceremonial Head of State of Lesotho) paid a visit to China.<sup>511</sup> In June 1985, a Chinese ministerial delegation led by Li Dongxi,

Minister of Metallurgical Industry, paid a reciprocal visit to Lesotho.<sup>512</sup>

The political shift in Lesotho towards greater co-operation with OAU - especially on the South African question (and the concomitant matters pertaining to the presence of Azanian refugees in its territory and support of ANC and PAC) - and towards developing friendly relations with socialist countries (Maseru had ambassadors from China and the Soviet Union), gave rise to serious conflict between the conservatives and pro-South African elements within the army on the one hand, and the government led by Chief Lebua Jonathan on the other.

In January 1986, Chief Lebua Jonathan was removed from power by General Justin Lekhanya with the help of the South African régime which had imposed a three-week long economic blockade on Lesotho prior to the *coup*. The government announced the expulsion of militant supporters of ANC in Lesotho to neighbouring Botswana and Zimbabwe.<sup>513</sup> At the same time, it agreed to establish a joint security committee with South Africa.<sup>514</sup> Under its new political orientation, the relations between Lesotho and China are unlikely to develop further.

#### 16.1.2.28. Comoros

The strategically well-placed islands of Comoros in the Indian Ocean became formally independent in July 1975. Its government under the leadership of Ahmed Abdallah, who unilaterally proclaimed Comoros' independence, lasted only for a month (6 July-3 August 1975) when Ali Soileh,

dissatisfied with Comoros' continuous dependence on France, led a *coup d'état* which led to the formation of a new government. France imposed an economic blockade on the islands. This, however, did not stop Soileh from pursuing radical reforms against feudal practices, and developing close relations with Third World and socialist countries. Comoros became an active member of OAU.

In November 1975, Comoros established diplomatic relations with China.<sup>515</sup> Contacts between China and Comoros, however, have been limited, especially following the overthrow of the Soileh government (May 1978) by French mercenaries who re-established Ahmed Abdallah as Prime Minister. China's aid to Comoros included the construction of 18 reservoirs and a 60 km long canal under an agreement signed between the two countries in 1977,<sup>516</sup> when Soileh's government was in power.

#### 16.1.2.29. Mauritius

Despite its 'moderate' character and its economic links with South Africa,<sup>517</sup> China has developed close and friendly relations with Mauritius during the current phase (1976 onwards). The strategic position of Mauritius in the middle of the Indian Ocean, and China's policy of provoking opposition to Big Power competition for spheres of influence must have influenced China's policy of extending substantial aid to Mauritius. A meeting between Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius (January 1983) ended in an agreement on the terms of a Constitution of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Among its major



aims was to make the Indian Ocean a peace zone free from military use by Big Powers.<sup>519</sup> This was entirely in line with China's aim in that part of the world.

In 1979, China agreed to help Mauritius build an airport;<sup>519</sup> China also made a token contribution (\$9,385) to flood victims in the country (1979).<sup>520</sup>

In May 1983, Anerood Jangauth, Prime Minister of Mauritius, paid a visit to China, where he expressed the view that his support of

...the African National Congress and the South West African People's Organisation is unflinching and total.<sup>521</sup>

China granted Mauritius an interest-free loan of \$17.1 million<sup>522</sup> (28 September 1984), followed (September 1985) by another interest-free loan of \$14.2 million (September 1985).<sup>523</sup>

16.2.1. People to People Relations or  
'United Front from Below'

16.2.1.1. Western Sahara

During the '60s, China encouraged national liberation movements to adopt methods involving armed struggle, people's war and guerrilla operations as practical means of obtaining final victory over their local oppressors. During the '80s, China's stance was the exact reverse of its general stand twenty years before. Preservation of the *status quo*, stability, and avoidance of conflicts that would only increase the opportunities for contention

between the super powers have been the main preoccupations underlying China's advice to the anti-oppressive régimes<sup>524</sup> that peaceful coexistence and negotiation are the practical means for achieving their aims.

This was clearly expressed in China's attitude towards the liberation forces of Western Sahara [in contrast to, for example, China's attitude during the '60s to the Cameroon and the Congo (L)] led by the *Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Seguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro* (the Polisario Front) engaged in armed resistance since 1975 against the monarchical and oppressive régime of Morocco backed by imperialist powers (and especially the United States and France) and their allies<sup>525</sup> (South Africa and Israel).

The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was founded in February 1976. It has been recognised over the years by 63 countries including non-aligned states outside Africa such as Yugoslavia and India and has enjoyed the strong support of the 'progressive' governments of Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique and Vietnam.<sup>526</sup> It is a full member of <sup>OK</sup> OAU. Its leaders are actively revolutionary and anti-imperialist, and inspired by the work of Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara. In an interview with this author (Algiers: November 1983) Mohammed Ould Salek, now Secretary-General at the SADR, did not mention China as a supporter of the struggle of the people of Western Sahara for independence and political autonomy. For China

the Western Sahara issue can not be resolved on the battlefield. It should be solved through peaceful consultations, and the sooner the better. A peaceful settlement will be conducive to peace and stability throughout the Maghrib region. It will also facilitate the region's economic development, raise the people's living standard and enhance African unity against hegemonism. <sup>527</sup>

Although formed only in 1973, the original foundations of the Polisario Front date back at least to 1968 when a Saharan group, led by Mohammed Sid Brahim Bashir, founded the Sahara Liberation Movement (MLS) with the aim of setting Western Sahara free from Spanish colonialism. On 17 June 1970, <sup>ER</sup> MLS led a direct confrontation with Spanish colonialists in El Ayoun. In the incident, at least 60 people were killed and hundreds injured by the colonialists.

Initially, (before 1975) when Western Sahara was under Spanish colonialism, China expressed its strong support for the national liberation forces in the colony. Chiao Kuan-hua, the representative of China at the 28th UN General Assembly (October 1973) expressed the view that

the Chinese people stand firmly by the African people. We resolutely support the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Azania, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Spanish Sahara and other regions in their just struggle for national liberation. <sup>528</sup>

However, as State-to-State relations on the one hand—  
and obsession with the influence of the Soviet Union on  
the other became strong elements influencing the decisions

of its policy makers, China [following the conclusion (14 November 1975) of the tripartite agreement between Morocco, Mauritania and Spain which allowed Morocco and Mauritania to occupy Western Sahara<sup>529</sup>] urged a peaceful solution to the new situation in preference to a continuation of armed resistance by the colony's guerrilla forces.<sup>530</sup>

Since the West Saharan war broke out in 1976, the region has been turbulent and [the war] has provided opportunities for the United States and the Soviet Union to interfere in the region's affairs.<sup>531</sup>

Ironically, when (May 1981) a Parliamentary Delegation from Morocco under the leadership of Maelainine Mohammed Ta Quioul Lah, Third Vice-President of the Chamber of Representatives, visited China at a time when Western Saharan liberation forces were involved in a war against Moroccan reactionary forces, they were told by their hosts that

...the Chinese expressed high appreciation of Morocco's persistent support of African peoples.<sup>532</sup>

In a meeting with S.E. Ahmed Osman, a former Prime Minister, and Special envoy of King Hassan II (25 May 1981), Zhao Ziyang remarked that

Our consistent policy on the 'Spanish' Saharan problem is that we hope the countries concerned will get rid of the outside interference, guard against the Soviet Union's meddling and through consultations among the parties concerned, solve the problem in a peaceful way.<sup>533</sup>



Source: "All Africa is Standing Up", Peking Review  
 (29 August 1975): 35, p. 5.

\* Angola and Zimbabwe are not shaded in the original they were still under colonial rule when it published.

#### 16.2.1.2. Zimbabwe

During the last decade, the Zimbabwean national liberation struggle in Africa was the only one which China unequivocally supported without becoming preoccupied with the disposition of the Soviet Union. This was possible because of China's close association with the popular and progressive ZANU.

The final stage (1976-80) of national liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, which witnessed the spread of guerrilla fighting in all parts of the country, was characterized by the following three major developments.

- i The victory of the national liberation struggles in Portuguese colonies in Africa, and, in particular the independence of Mozambique not only inspired the Patriotic Front to higher levels of struggle, but also provided a greater strategic access for and training of the ZANU guerilla forces.
- ii The formation (October 1976) of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe (PFZ) headed by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, leaders of ZANU and ZAPU respectively, was strongly supported by China.<sup>534</sup>
- iii The emergence (1975) of the front line states (Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana) with the major aim of conducting a common policy of hostility against the white minority régimes of Rhodesia (before 1980) and South Africa enabled PFZ to consolidate its position.

Alarmed by such developments, Ian Smith sought the co-operation of certain black leaders [e.g., Abel

Muzorewa, Ndabaminge Sithole, the leader of the United African National Council (UANC), and Chief Joseph Chimpeni which constituted the backbone of an 'internal settlement' and a 'multi racial government'. This move was aimed at defeating the national liberation forces. Abel Muzorewa became the 'Prime Minister' (June 1979).

Faced with continuing and intensive armed resistance, and having failed to obtain international recognition,<sup>222</sup> the so-called multi-racial government of Smith and Muzorewa collapsed within a period of three months (June-September 1979). The British government eventually (London: September 1979) came to an agreement with the front line states by which a conference of all parties concerned was convened. With the successful conclusion of the Lancaster House conference, the stage was set for a general election (February 1980) in which ZANU won 57 of the 80 African seats (with ZAPU winning 20 seats) in the Parliament.

Throughout the final stage of Zimbabwe's national liberation struggle, China continued to identify itself strongly with ZANU. Most weapons and arms used by the ZANU guerrilla forces had originated in China.<sup>223</sup>

When Robert Mugabe, ZANU's General Secretary and Joint Leader of PFZ, visited China (June 1977), he expressed great admiration for the latter's 'active support' and 'genuine aid' for the Zimbabwean nationalists. Contrasting China's attitude with that of the Soviet Union, Mugabe was reported to have said that the latter

renders aid only to grab spheres of influence, contend for hegemony and foster puppets.<sup>537</sup>

On the same occasion, Mugabe congratulated his hosts on their victory over the 'Gang of Four' and on having upheld the correct line.<sup>538</sup> For his part, Chairman Hua Guo ~~...~~ told his guest that

...the struggle of the Zimbabwean people is just and has won support from the people all over the world. We regard the victories of the Zimbabwean people's struggle as our own and as a support to us.<sup>539</sup>

At the same time, Hua Guo ~~feng~~ emphasised that only through armed struggle could the people of Zimbabwe ensure their liberation

...so long as they persevere in armed struggle and develop the people's forces the Zimbabwean people will surely overthrow the Smith racist régime and win their national independence and liberation.<sup>540</sup>

Following Mugabe's visit, China sent (30 September 1977) through OAU and Mozambique, (ZANU's headquarters and major military base), 547 crates of rifles, six crates of instruments and 6,901 crates of ammunition to ZANU.<sup>541</sup>

ZANU's pro-China character found expression, for example, in an interview given to Sara Rodriguez, correspondent of The Guardian (US), (Luanda: October 1978), in which Mugabe argued that

We regard China as one of our supporters. We have maintained very good relations with it and the understanding between us is that the



aid given us is without any strings whatsoever - and China has repeated this again and again. China has also recognised there are some areas where there could be differences between us. But these differences should speak more for our independence in taking certain different lines rather than as making contradictions of a severe nature between us.<sup>542</sup>

During the initial period of the transfer of power to the black majority (December<sup>1979</sup> February 1980), China warned PFZ that the peace agreement signed at the end of 1979 with Britain and Rhodesian authorities was

merely something on paper. Acute and complex struggles have yet to be waged in order to transform what is on paper into reality.<sup>543</sup>

In the wake of the landslide victory of ZANU (PF), Xinhua (4 March 1980) paid the following tribute to the Zimbabwean struggle:

This great victory marks the end of prolonged colonial rule and the white minority domination of the country and reflects the common aspirations of seven million Zimbabwean people. It also shows that the trend of struggle of the people in Southern Africa for independence is irresistible... Without this armed struggle, the Zimbabwean Africans would not have won their right to vote, nor could they have won the general election today.<sup>544</sup>

At the same time, commentators in China paid a special tribute to ZANU's leadership for their role in the victory of Zimbabwean national liberation forces.

This is a major victory of historic significance for protracted struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe

carried on by the Zimbabwean African National Union together with other patriotic forces.<sup>545</sup>

Simon V. Muzenda, Deputy Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, visited China (5-7 June 1980), where he was promised assistance to build the newly born Zimbabwe.<sup>546</sup> China granted Zimbabwe (September 1980) an interest-free loan of \$26.7 million.<sup>547</sup>

In May 1981, Prime Minister Mugabe paid his first state visit to China. During this visit, Mugabe told his hosts that

the Zimbabwean people, in their just struggle for freedom, had derived inspiration from the Chinese revolution ideologically and militarily.<sup>548</sup>

In May 1984, as part of an agreement on economic and technical co-operation between the two countries [signed during Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit<sup>549</sup> to Zimbabwe (January 1983)], China promised another interest-free loan of \$40 million.<sup>550</sup> As a part of the establishment of a joint<sup>551</sup> commission for economic, technical and trade co-operation (signed between the countries during Mugabe's visit to China), Zimbabwe was granted an interest-free loan of \$25 million in August 1985.<sup>552</sup> This loan was intended to help Zimbabwe finance its projects as part of the five-year development programme to be launched in 1986.<sup>553</sup>

#### 16.2.1.3. Azania

China's anti-MPLA stance during the Angolan civil war (1975-76), its identification with Western powers during

TABLE 16.7

ZHAO ZIYANG'S AFRICAN TOUR (DECEMBER 1982 - JANUARY 1983)

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Country Visited	Date
Egypt	20-24 December 1982
Algeria	24-27 December 1982
Morocco	27-29 December 1982
Guinea	30-31 December 1982
Gabon	1-2 January 1983
Zaire	3-4 January 1983
Congo (B)	4-5 January 1983
Zambia	5-7 January 1983
Zimbabwe	7-10 January 1983
Tanzania	11-14 January 1983
Kenya	14-17 January 1983

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the Shaba crisis (1977-78), and its attempts to link support for <sup>the</sup>ANC with its preoccupation with the influence extended by the Soviet Union (as manifested, for example, in the expectation that <sup>the</sup>ANC should adopt an anti-Soviet policy in southern Africa or in other parts of the world), <sup>the</sup>SSA seemed to have cast a shadow on <sup>the</sup>ANC's already unsatisfactory relations with China which was closer to <sup>the</sup>PAC, ANC's rival.

However, as China has tended in recent years not to be unduly dominated by the Soviet Union, it has shown a greater interest than during the previous phase in restoring good relations with <sup>the</sup>ANC. China now appears to be closer to <sup>the</sup>ANC than PAC on balance. Such a situation represents a reversal of the situation as it obtained during the '60s.

When Zhao Ziyang visited Zimbabwe (5-7 January 1983), during an African tour, he met (6 January) Oliver Tambo, Chairman of <sup>the</sup>ANC. More arms and weapons were promised on this occasion by China to <sup>the</sup>ANC. <sup>the</sup>SSS

China's attempts to promote closer relations with <sup>the</sup>ANC did not prevent Zhao Ziyang's from meeting John Myati Pekela, <sup>the</sup>PAC's Chairman (Dar es Salaam: 13 January 1983). Chinese policy makers want to keep their ties with PAC intact as a bargaining point, despite the fact that it maintains strong links with Western agents. However, at a press conference in Dar es Salaam, Zhao Ziyang justified China's position on the grounds that it supported any active force which stood against the racist régime of

South Africa. As far as he was concerned, PAC certainly qualified for China's friendship.

In Lusaka I have met with leaders of the African National Congress and the South West African People's Organisation. Today I have met with the leaders of the Pan-African Congress of Azania. China treats alike all the various national liberation organisations in southern Africa in their just struggles against racial discrimination and apartheid and gives them its firm support. Such is the stand that China takes, it does not favour one group and discriminate against another. <sup>556</sup>

Relations between China and <sup>ANC</sup> ANC developed further when Oliver Tambo, The Chairman of <sup>ANC</sup> ANC, visited China (3 June 1983, four months after meeting Zhao Ziyang in Lusaka on 4 January 1983). <sup>557</sup> Although the author, in an interview (London: July 1985) with the editor of *Sechaba*, was unable to find out the aim and the result of this visit, it would appear that <sup>ANC</sup> ANC was given arms and weapons. Leaders of national liberation movements do not usually travel merely for reasons of political and diplomatic solidarity. However, <sup>ANC</sup> ANC members take pains to stress that their relations with China have been much more friendly and warm since 1983 than they ever had been before.

Sino-ANC relations have been especially friendly since Oliver Tambo's visit to China (June 1983). China has, during the last four years, expressed its support for the South African peoples' struggles through <sup>ANC</sup> ANC as the leading political instrument of national liberation.

In the wake of the massacre of <sup>the</sup> ANC freedom fighters by the South African government (9 June 1983) the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued (10 June 1983) a statement condemning the *apartheid régime* and supporting the rights of

...the South African people to wage struggle in various forms to achieve basic human rights and racial equality. <sup>558</sup>

When the South African authorities massacred 28 ANC marchers who were commemorating the 1960 Sharpeville massacre (21 March 1985), Ren Tan, a commentator wrote in Beijing Review as follows:

The Chinese government and people as always, firmly support the struggle of the South African people. China is convinced that with the support of the world's just-minded people, the South African people can win their struggle. <sup>559</sup>

In April 1986, Alfred Nzo, the Secretary General of ANC, led a delegation to China, where he was warmly received. A special rally in support of the 'South African people's struggle' was held (3 April 1986) in Beijing, organised by the Chinese Association for International Understanding, the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. The delegation was met by Hu Yaobang, the leader of CCP, who assured it that

China will fight alongside the international community striving to end the racist rule in South Africa.<sup>560</sup>

The recent Emergency Law (12 June 1986) imposed by the South African government was strongly condemned by China. At the same time, <sup>the</sup>ANC and <sup>the</sup>PAC were praised for their pledge

...to continue their struggle against South Africa's racist régime until it is completely dismantled.<sup>561</sup>

#### 16.2.1.4. Namibia

SWAPO must have been more than satisfied with China's policy of being no longer unduly concerned with the Soviet factor affecting the promotion of friendly<sup>562</sup> relations between national liberation movements and socialist countries. During the '70s China had viewed the Soviet Union's presence in southern Africa as the main underlying fact in the escalation of the conflicts of the region. During the '80s, China has repeatedly condemned American and South African insistence on the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban personnel from Namibia as a precondition for settling the issue.<sup>563</sup>

China firmly supports the Namibian people's struggle for national independence and resolutely opposes the obstruction of the relevant UN resolution and of Namibia's independence by South African authorities with the backing of a super power. China is opposed to making the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola a *sine qua non* for the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the independence of Namibia.<sup>564</sup>

It must be stressed that China's early obsession with the Soviet -Union's influence in SWAPO did not have the effect of undermining its relations with the latter. SWAPO being the most popular national liberation movement, both within and outside Namibia, won China's respect and support. China repeatedly praised it for its strong opposition to the so-called 'constitutional conference' called by the South African government. <sup>565</sup>

Sino-SWAPO relations have been enhanced following the visit to China by Sam Njoma (January 1983). Njoma returned with a promise from China to provide SWAPO's freedom fighters with arms, ammunition, military equipment and humanitarian aid. <sup>566</sup>

During the '70s China was engaged in the task of forging a 'broad united front' of political forces - 'progressive' and 'non-progressive' alike - with the aim of keeping at bay both American imperialism and Soviet 'social imperialism'. Of the two major political forces, China had, by mid-'70s, come to regard the latter as even more dangerous than the former.

The changes leading to the 'Four Modernizations' policy coincided with the development of a new consciousness among African countries that a New International Economic Order was predicated upon their capacity to expand the scope and deepen the bonds of international economic relations among themselves by forging links of south-south co-operation. This new development was a happy augury for a new turn in Sino-



African relations in which economic ground underlining the general political aims of the two sides appeared to be more congruent than during the '60s. In other words, China's new strategy had the hallmark of an 'international economic united front'.

China's new emphasis on mutual economic and technological co-operation and on containing its antagonism towards the Soviet Union from spilling over into its relations with Third World countries has, of late, been on the whole well received in 'progressive' African capitals and national liberation movements.

At the same time, China's relations with 'non-progressive' African countries continued to develop along healthy lines for the simple reason that a large number identified themselves with its opposition to the Soviet Union's international role.

During the latter part of the phase with which this chapter is concerned, China's interpretations of the Sino-American views in international relations underwent a shift that must have puzzled American policy-makers. Consider, for example, the following two statements of China's role in international relations, representing a period of six years:

- i. There is much in common between us on matters of global strategy... [and that]...the anti-hegemonic principle is our greatest common point politically.<sup>567</sup> (5 January 1979)
- ii. We determine our position on international issues, each according to its own merit...China is critical of some US policies toward Third World countries.

This being the case, it is not possible to establish a strategic partnership between China and the United States.<sup>560</sup> [emphasis added]  
[11 January 1984]

The shift in China's position from regarding the military presence of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola as the major factor underlying the conflict in the area to opposing the demand made by the United States and its allies (including South Africa) that Soviet and Cuban military personnel must withdraw from Angola as a precondition for settling the Namibian issue, is clearly reflected in the two statements cited above.

## NOTES

1. See Chapter 16.1.2.20 of this work.
2. See Chapters 8 and 9 of this work.
3. See Chapter 9 of this work.
4. See J. Gittings, 'China set to renew ties with Eastern Europe', The Guardian (25 August 1986), p. 5.
5. The first such visit since Chou En-lai's 1964 visit. The 11 countries visited by Prime Minister Chou En-lai were Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Gabon, Zaire, Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Kenya.
6. quoted in Beijing Review 26 (23 January 1983): 5, p. 14.
7. See, for example, Hugh Roberts, 'Thirty Years after the Revolution', Africa Review 29 (December 1984): 6, p. 6.
8. R. A. Mortimer, 'Global Economy and African Foreign Policy: the Algerian Model', Africa Studies Review 27 (March 1984): 1, p. 9.
9. President Chadli Ben Djedid's visit to various Western countries (1983) did not affect Algeria's anti-imperialist line by any perceptible measure. See El Jeish no. 1215 (18 November 1983), passim.
10. See, for example, Al Shaâb (11 January 1986), (15 January 1986) and (20 April 1986).
11. Author's interview with S. Houfmane, op.cit.
12. quoted from R. A. Mortimer, op.cit., p. 11.
13. Ibidem.
14. Author's interview with Soukhal (November 1983).
15. Ibidem.
16. Saâd Zahran, 'Mādha yadūru Fi-AL Sīn?' (What is it going on in China?) (Al Mujāhid AL Usbū'i no. 812 (7 March 1976); pp. 24-25; and no. 819 (25 April 1976), pp. 16-17.
17. See Chapters 15.2.1.2 and 16.1.2.20 of this work.
18. Algerian support for Vietnam was signified by the visit (December 1980) to Algeria by General Nguab Griab, member of the Polit Bureau of the communist party of Vietnam and Vice-Premier, during which he expressed Vietnam's unequivocal support for

- Polisario. See Al Shaab (22 December 1980), pp. 1 and 3.
19. Author's interview with Mourad Leamoudi, Director of the Third World Department of the FLN Party of Algeria (November 1983).
  20. Beijing Review 23 (5 May 1980): 18, p. 5.
  21. Ibidem.  
Mu-hua also visited Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal and Mauritania (April-May 1980). See ibidem.
  22. Al Shaab (19 September 1980).
  23. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80 (series no. 5) (Maryland: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1981), p. 25.
  24. Ibid., p. 53 (Table 20).
  25. Beijing Review 25 (11 January 1982): 2, p. 8.
  26. Al Mujāhid Al Usbū'i (30 April 1982), p. 15, and Al Shaab (26 June 1982).
  27. Anba<sup>o</sup> in Moscow (Moscow News) no. 9 (1 March 1981).
  28. cited in Beijing Review 25 (10 May 1982): 19, p. 6.
  29. Ibidem.
  30. See Chapter 16.2.1 of this work.
  31. Al Shaab (13 April 1982).
  32. Al Mujāhid (5 May 1982).
  33. Al Shaab (24 June 1982).
  34. Al Shaab (26 June 1982).
  35. Al Mujāhid Al Usbū'i no. 1299 (28 June 1985).
  36. Al Shaab (4 January 1982).
  37. Al Shaab (16 December 1982).
  38. See Algerian News Agency (AFP: 26 December 1982); Al Mujāhid (28 December 1982); Al Shaab (26 and 28 December 1982); and Al Jeish no. 229 (January 1983).
  39. Al Shaab (25 December 1982).
  40. Al Shaab (25 April 1983).
  41. Beijing Review 26 (12 December 1983): 50, p. 16.

42. Author's interview with Belgacem Kaddour.
43. Al Mujāhid Al Usbūʿi no. 1300 (5 July 1985), pp. 18-19. See also Al Shaab (6 June 1985).
44. Messaádia, at a meeting for students studying abroad (Algiers: 26 June 1986).
45. Beijing Review 28 (25 November 1985): 47, p. 10.
46. Among the similarities of style between the Egyptian and Libyan revolutions was Nasser's and Qaddafi's initial nomination of older leaders of Nejjib Abdel Rahmane and Saád Eddine Boushweireb respectively as the head of their governments in order to avoid possible resentment against younger leaders taking over power in an overt manner.
47. The failure of the union, for example, between Libya, Egypt and the Sudan during the '70s, or between Libya, Syria and Morocco during the '80s should be mostly related to the absence of a positive commitment to Arab union on the part of the leaders of those countries, rather than be blamed on the supposed inconsistencies of Qaddafi's policy.
48. By 1984, Libya bought \$20 million worth of Soviet arms. See L. Anderson, 'Qadhdhafi and the Kremlin', Problems of Communism 36 (September-October 1985), p. 29.
49. cited in ibid., p. 32.
50. See Chapter 15.1.1.4 of this work.
51. See L. Anderson, op.cit., p. 33.
52. Libya's establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union came after the latter's support for its aid mission to UN. See, for example, J. Wright, op.cit., p. 116 (note 17).
53. Initially, Brezhnev hesitated to provide Egypt with arms because of Sadat's anti-Soviet and pro-Western line. President Boumedienne, however, told Brezhnev that he had come to buy arms with cash and it was no time for political bargaining.
54. J. Wright, op.cit., p. 204.
55. Qaddafi's refusal to establish diplomatic relations must also have been dictated by Libya's growing friendship with the Soviet Union, especially at the time (during '70s) when Sino-Soviet relations had reached a point of no return.
56. See Table 12.1 of this work.

57. See A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 101; A. Ogunsanwo, op.cit., p. 244; The Scotsman (12 June 1971); and The Observer (13 June 1971).
58. cited in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 101 (note 1).
59. Qaddafi, 'Speech Marking the First Anniversary of US Evacuation of the Wheel US Air Base (11 June 1971)', reported in The Scotsman (12 June 1971).
60. cited in Peking Review 13 (3 July 1970): 27, p. 73.
61. cited in Peking Review 13 (4 September 1970): 36, p. 31.
62. Peking Review 14 (16 April 1971): 16, p. 22.
63. cited in Peking Review 14 (18 June 1971): 25, p. 22.
64. Peking Review 16 (2 March 1973): 9, p. 13.
65. For the text of the Joint Communique see Beijing Review 21 (18 August 1978): 33, p. 3.  
For Western comments on such a visit see, for example, The Financial Times (10 August 1978); The Scotsman (10 August 1978); and The Daily Telegraph (5 August 1978).
66. Ibidem. See also Beijing Review 21 (18 August 1978): 33, p. 3.
67. Beijing Review 25 (30 August 1982): 35, p. 8.
68. J. L. Scherer, China Facts and Figures Vol. 6. (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1983), p. 260.
69. For comments in Chinese sources on Qaddafi's visit to China and Chinese delegations' visits to Libya, see Beijing Review 25 (8 November 1982): 45, p. 9; and 28 (9 July 1984): 28, p. 16.
70. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 32 (February 1986), p. 3401A. See also Beijing Review 28 (25 November 1985): 47, p. 10.
71. See Beijing Review 29 (7 and 21 April 1986): 14 and 16.
72. Beijing Review 29 (21 April 1986): 16, p. 7.
73. Beijing Review 29 (26 May 1986): 21, p. 8.
74. See Chapters 13.3.1.4 and 14.2.1.3 of this work.
75. Ta Kung Pao (10 August 1978).
76. See Table 16.2 of this work.

77. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. C.133.
78. Beijing Review 21 (17 November 1978): 46, p. 5.  
See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1979, p. 29392.
79. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46.
80. Ibidem.
81. Beijing Review 24 (31 August 1981): 35, p. 8.
82. Africa Research Bulletin (15 October-14 November 1984), p. 7508A.
83. Africa Research Bulletin (31 May 1985), p. 7743A.
84. See Table 12.4 of this work.
85. Africa Research Bulletin 22 (31 October 1985): 9, p. 7942C.
86. Africa Research Bulletin (31 March 1986), p. 8139C.
87. During the Angola Crisis (1975-76), Guinea provided the Soviet Union with a staging facility for aircraft transporting Cuban troops to Angola. See Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 489.
88. See Chapter 9 of this work.
89. Progressive governments which initially advocated strong anti-Western line, but have recently turned to the West can find consolation and justification for their shift of orientation in China's open door policy.
90. quoted in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 489.
91. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80. p. C.133.
92. Author's conversation with Abdol Aba and Abou Bakar Cham, two Guinean students (York: August 1985).
93. Beijing Review 21 (17 November 1978): 46, p. 5.
94. J. L. Scherer, Chinese Facts and Figures vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 198.
95. Ibid., vol. 7 (1984), p. 161.
96. Beijing Review 25 (19 June 1982): 29, p. 8.
97. Beijing Review 26 (17 January 1983): 3, p. 5.

98. State control of the economy and commerce have been steadily reduced by the new government in Guinea, private enterprises have been encouraged.
99. It is more than likely that Chinese commentators during the '60s would view such a coup in Guinea as imperialist inspired and its leaders as stooges of imperialism.
100. Africa Research Bulletin (31 March 1985), p. 7660B.
101. Africa Research Bulletin (30 April 1985), p. 7701A.
102. Africa Research Bulletin (3 June 1985), p. 7783A.
103. See Chapter 15.2.1.1 of this work.
104. Peking Review 20 (6 May 1977): 19, p. 12.
105. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
106. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. C.133.
107. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
108. Beijing Review 25 (3 May 1983): 18, p. 6-7.
109. See Table 12.1 of this work.
110. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46 (Table 15).
111. Beijing Review 25 (24 May 1982): 21, p. 7.
112. R. Synge, 'Benin: recent history', in Africa South of the Sahara, op.cit., pp. 219-220.
113. cited in Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 132.
114. R. Synge, op.cit., p. 219.
115. Peking Review 20 (25 February 1977): 9, p. 29.
116. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
117. See Chapter 15.1.1.5 of this work.
118. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. B.478.
119. See ibidem. See also J. F. Cooper, 'Chinese Foreign Aid 1979-80', op.cit., p. 48 (Table 16).
120. Ibid, p. 51 (Table 18).
121. J. L. Scherer, China: Facts and Figures, vol. 4 (1981), op.cit., p. 265.



122. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 593-594; and T. Young, 'Sao Tome and Principe', in Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85, op.cit., p. 712.
123. For the Joint Communique of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, see Peking Review 18 (12 July 1975): 30, p. 3.
124. Peking Review 19 (2 January 1976): 1.
125. Peking Review 20 (16 December 1977): 51, p. 27.
126. Africa Research Bulletin 22 (30 April 1985): 3, p. 7701B.
127. Beijing Review 23 (21 July 1980): 29, p. 7.
128. Peking Review 20 (10 June 1977): 24, p. 8.
129. See Table 16.2 of this work.
130. The other countries were Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda and Somalia. See Beijing Review 21 (17 November 1978): 46, p. 5.
131. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46 (Table 15).
132. Beijing Review 26 (17 January 1983): 3, pp. 6-7.
133. J. L. Scherer, China: Facts and Figures vol. 7 (1984), op.cit., p. 161.
134. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 110; and R. Lemarchand, 'Burundi', in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 290.
- 135 <sup>idem</sup>
136. Beijing Review 21 (3 February 1978): 5, p. 4.
137. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978 no. 8, op.cit., p. 33.
138. Beijing Review 22 (30 March 1979): 13, pp. 7-8.
139. J. L. Scherer, China: Facts and Figures vol. 4 (1981), op.cit., p. 265.
140. Africa Contemporary Record 1980-81, p. B.138.
141. <sup>see</sup> Beijing Review 25 (31 May 1982): 22, p. 8. and
142. J. F. Cooper, 'China's Foreign Aid 1979-80', op.cit., p. 48 (Table 16).
142. Beijing Review 26 (15 August 1983): 33, p. 9.
143. Peking Review 20 (16 June 1977): 24, p. 4.

144. Beijing Review 21 (17 November 1978): 46, p. 5.
145. Beijing Review 23 (31 March 1980): 13, p. 7.
146. Beijing Review 24 (1 June 1981): 22, p. 8.
147. Ibid., p. 9.
148. See J. F. Cooper, 'China's Foreign Aid 1978', op.cit., p. 35; J. L. Scherer, vol. 4 (1981), op.cit., pp. 261 and 265; and Africa Contemporary Record 1980-81, p. B.286.
149. J. F. Cooper, China's Aid to Africa 1979, op.cit., p. 33.
150. See F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 212; and R. Lyons, op.cit., passim.
151. See F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 211; and R. Lyons, op.cit., p. 10.
152. quoted in F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 241.
153. R. Lyons, op.cit., p. 10.
154. Ibidem.
155. F. Halliday, 'US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Intervention?', Review of African Political Economy no. 10 (September-December 1977), p. 8.
156. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., pp. 220-221.
157. Ibid., p. 219.
158. Ibidem. See also F. Halliday, 'US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Intervention?', op.cit., p. 13.
159. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 275.
160. As a result, the Emperor forced Aklilu Habte-Wold, Prime Minister, to resign and nominated Endalachew Makannen in his place.
161. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 219.
162. Ibidem.
163. Ibid., p. 220.
164. Ibidem.
165. Ibid., pp. 220-221.

On the policy of the United States towards Ethiopia prior to 1977 see, for example, F. Halliday, 'US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Intervention?', op.cit.

166. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 220.
167. Ibidem.
168. Ibid., p. 223.
169. R. Lyons, op.cit., p. 10.
170. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., pp. 223-224.
171. R. Lyons, op.cit., p. 11.
172. R. Lyons, op.cit., p. 12.
173. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 247.
174. See Chapters 15.1.1.4 and 15.1.2.1 of this work.
175. See Chapters 15.1.1.7 and 15.1.2.20 of this work.
176. Peking Review 20 (15 April 1977): 16, p. 7.
177. See Table 16.2 of this work.
178. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 34.
179. Ibid., p. 35. See also NCNA (20 September 1978).
180. See Beijing Review 21 (15 December 1978): 50, p. 29; and Beijing Review (14 September 1979): 37, pp. 22-23.
181. cited in Africa Contemporary Record 1979-1980, p. B.214.
182. Ibidem.
183. Beijing Review 20 (18 November 1977): 47, pp. 19-20. See also Peking Review 20 (11 November 1977): 46, p. 30 and Peking Review 20 (25 November 1977): 48, pp. 22-23.
184. Hua Guo Feng in Beijing Review 21 (1 April 1978): 16, p. 3.
185. Peking Review 20 (24 June 1977): 26, p. 5.
186. Beijing Review 21 (25 August 1978): 34, p. 4.
187. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (July 1979), p. 29706.

188. Beijing Review 21 (25 August 1978): 34, p. 4.
189. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978 op.cit., p. 31.
190. cited in Keesing's Contemporary Archives (January 1979), p. 29392.
191. Ibidem.
192. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 31.
193. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 41.
194. See Table 16.2 of this work.
195. J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 200.
196. cited in Beijing Review 24 (10 August 1981): 32, p. 9.
197. J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 199.
198. Ibid., vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 261.
199. Ibid., pp. 259-261.
200. Beijing Review 26 (3 May 1982): 18, p. 7.
201. J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., pp. 259 and 261.
202. Beijing Review 29 (7 April 1986): 14, p. 10.
203. For details of this project see, for example, Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 21 (14 February 1984): 1, p. 7171B.
204. See Beijing Review 27 (22 October 1984): 43, pp. 14-15.
205. Ibid., 29 (26 May 1986): 20, p. 11.
206. See Hsinhua News Agency no. 32726 (28 March 1976), pp. 5-6; and Peking Review 19 (2 April 1976): 14, pp. 13-15.
207. See Hsinhua News Agency no. 32726 (28 March 1976), p. 5; Hsinhua News Agency no. 081916 (20 August 1977); Peking Review 20 (25 November 1977): 48, pp. 25-26; and Peking Review 19 (9 January 1976): 2, pp. 19-20.
208. E. T. Glaude Jr., China's Perception of Global Politics (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 93.

209. A replay on the question of China's non-participation in the resolution by a representative of the Chinese government, cited in ibidem.
210. A Nigerian delegate at UN Security Council, cited in ibid., p. 98.
211. Ibid., p. 97.
212. Lai Yaff ., Chinese representative at UN Security Council, quoted in Hsinhua News Agency no. 112316 (24 November 1976).
213. S. S. Kim, 'China and the Third World', in S. S. Kim (Ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post Mao Era (London: Westview Press, 1984), p. 188.
214. A Chinese Diplomat in Africa Told, A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 139.
215. Beijing Review 21 (29 December 1978): 51, p. 29.
216. Africa Research Bulletin 1980-81, p. 442.
217. See Beijing Review 25 (4 October 1982): 40; and Hsinhua News Agency no. 092722 (27 September 1982).
218. Beijing Review 25 (1 November 1982): 44, p. 10. See also Angolan Press Agency (ANGOP) (Luanda: 7 December 1982).
219. See Beijing Review 27 (24 January 1984): 4, p. 9.
220. quoted in Angolan Press Agency (ANGOP) (Luanda: 12 January 1983).
221. Ibidem.
222. Angolan Press Agency (ANGOP) (Luanda: 14 May 1983).
223. Angolan Press Agency (ANGOP) (Luanda: 22 December 1983).
224. Beijing Review 26 (13 June 1983): 24, p. 10.
225. Angolan Press Agency (ANGOP) (Luanda: 6 June 1984).
226. Angolan Press Agency (ANGOP) (Luanda: 12 June 1984).
227. See Chapter 15.1.1.1 of this work.
228. Beijing Review 26 (5 September 1983): 36, p. 15.
229. Beijing Review 21 (22 September 1978): 38, p. 4.
230. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 29.

231. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46 (Table 15).
232. Ibid., p. 49 (Table 16).
233. Africa Contemporary Record 1980-81, p. 349B.
234. See Table 16.2 of this work.
235. Beijing Review 24 (30 March 1981): 13, p. 5.
236. Zhao Ziyong at a press conference (Dar es Salaam: 13 January 1983), pp. 20-21.
237. Ibid., p. 21.
238. The cost of the project was estimated at Shs.20.8 million, see Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 21 (15 March 1984): 2, p. 7205A.
239. Ibid., p. 7212A.
240. Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 September-14 October 1984): 9, p. 7462.
241. Beijing Review 27 (1 October 1984): 40, p. 7.
242. Beijing Review 27 (10 October 1984): 40, p. 7.
243. Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 December 1984-14 January 1985).
244. Samora Machel, President of Mozambique (December 1975), in China's Alliance with US Imperialism, op.cit., p. 31.
245. A. Gavshon, op.cit., p. 138.
246. Samora Machel, during his visit to China (18 July 1984), in Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 August 1984): 7, p. 7322B.
247. Peking Review 20 (18 March 1977): 12, p. 4.
248. Peking Review 20 (23 September 1977): 39, p. 5.
249. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 33.
250. Ibid., p. 34.
251. See Table 16.2 of this work.
252. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. C.133.
253. Beijing Review 21 (22 June 1978): 22, p. 4.

254. This was the first time a high Chinese official visited Mozambique. See Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. A.116.
255. Beijing Review 26 (30 May 1983): 22, p. 9.
256. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 30 (November 1984), p. 33196.
257. Africa Research Bulletin 22 (31 May 1985): 4, p. 7743B.
258. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 620.
259. In June 1978, PUP was renamed the Progressive Front of Seychelles People (PFSP).
260. See Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 620; and Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85, op.cit., p. 736.
261. See Table 12.1 of this work.
262. Beijing Review 21 (12 May 1978): 19, p. 4.
263. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 33.
264. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
265. Beijing Review 26 (9 May 1983): 19, p. 8.
266. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (6 February 1976), p. 27558.
267. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 254.  
In April 1986, Beijing Review [29 (7 April 1986): 29, p. 11] reported 6,000 Chinese residents living in Madagascar.
268. Beijing Review 21 (13 October 1978): 41, p. 26.
269. See J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 33; and J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 260.
270. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. 257.
271. Ibidem.
272. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46 (Table 15).
273. Africa Contemporary Record 1980-81, p. B.256.
274. Africa Research Bulletin 22 (30 November 1985): 10, p. 7982B.
275. Beijing Review 28 (7 October 1985): 40, p. 9.

276. Beijing Review 29 (7 April 1986): 14, p. 10.
277. Peking Review 13 (9 October 1970): 41, p. 29.
278. Beijing Review 24 (12 October 1981): 24, p. 6.
279. For an interesting comparison between Egyptian and Chinese modernization and their common stance against the Soviet Union, see R. I., 'Sadat's Egypt and Teng's China: Revolution versus Modernization', Political Science Quarterly 95 (Fall 1980): 3, pp. 361-371.
280. King-yi Hsu, 'Communist China's Diplomacy in the Middle East', Issues and Studies 16 (March 1980): 3, p. 78.
281. See J. L. Scherer, op.cit., vol. 6, p. 262; The Financial Times (6 June 1979); and Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, pp. B.37 and B.46.
282. Chairman Hua Guofeng, in his meeting with Hassan el-Tohamy, in Beijing Review 21 10 February 1978): 6, p. 3.
283. Beijing Review 21 (8 December 1978): 49, p. 4.
284. Beijing Review 23 (21 January 1980): 3, p. 7.
285. People's Daily (25 April 1982) in Africa Research Bulletin 19 (15 May 1982): 4, p. 6436B.
286. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman in an interview with Xinhua News Agency, quoted in Beijing Review 25 (3 May 1982): 18, p. 8.
287. Tass (26 April 1982) in Africa Research Bulletin 19 (15 May 1982): 4, pp. 6435C-6436A.
288. Beijing Review 26 (3 January 1983): 1, passim.
289. Beijing Review 26 (11 April 1983): 15, p. 8.
290. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
291. Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 21 (15 April-14 May 1984): 4, p. 7279C.
292. Author's conversation with Belgasim Munsif, responsible for Research Department of Al Amal (October 1983).
293. See Chapter 13.3.2.2 of this work.
294. Author's interview with Mahmoud Al Mistiri, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Tunisian government (1 November 1983).



295. See Aperçu Chronologique des Rapports Tunisie-Chinois: 1956-84, op.cit.
296. Al Sabah (29 October 1977).
297. See Table 16.2 of this work.
298. cited in Beijing Review 26 (12 December 1983): 50, p. 9.
299. See Chapter 15.1.2.2 of this work.
300. Beijing Review 27 (9 July 1984): 28, pp. 16-17.
301. Beijing Review 27 (29 October 1984): 44, p. 10.
302. Beijing Review 29 (4 August 1986): 31, pp. 4-7.
303. See Chapter 16.2.1 of this work.
304. See Peking Review 15 (8 April 1972): 15, pp. 15-16.
305. See Chapter 16.1.2.20 of this work.
306. Peking Review 20 (1 April 1977): 14, p. 29.
307. Beijing Review 24 (18 May 1981): 20, p. 9.
308. Beijing Review 25 (8 March 1982): 10, p. 8.
309. See Chapter 16.1.1.1 of this work.
310. Beijing Review 26 (10 January 1983): 2, p. 8.
311. See J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 199; and vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 261; see also Tables 12.2 and 12.3 in this work.
312. Beijing Review 21 (29 September 1978): 39, p. 4.
313. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., pp. 33-34.
314. Africa Research Bulletin 20 (14 August 1983): 7, p. 6907A.
315. See Table 12.4 in this work.
316. quoted in Beijing Review 26 (10 October 1983): 41, p. 13.
317. See Chapter 13.2.33 of this work.
318. See Beijing Review 26 (27 June 1983): 26, pp. 15-16; and Beijing Review 26 (13 June 1983): 24, p. 15.
319. cited in Peking Review 20 (23 September 1977): 39, p. 20.

320. See Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. B.556; J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., pp. 46-51; and J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1981), op.cit., p. 199.
321. See Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 May-14 June 1984): 5, p. 7294PC; Keesing's Contemporary Archives no. 4 (April 1985), p. 33513; Africa Research Bulletin 22 (30 September 1985): 8, p. 7902C.
322. See Table 12.4 in this work.
323. Peking Review 20 (1 April 1977): 14, p. 28.
324. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. B.556.
325. cited in Ta Kung Pao (14 April 1977).
326. Peking Review 20 (15 April 1977): 16, p. 14.
327. Morocco recognized Mauritania as a sovereign state only in 1969.
328. Beijing Review 23 (5 May 1980): 18, p. 5.
329. cited in Beijing Review 26 (5 September 1983): 36, p. 15.
330. Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 135.
331. See Africa Research Bulletin (February 1986), p. 8100A; J. S. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 199 and vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 260; and J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 44 (Table 16).
332. Africa Research Bulletin (31 March 1986), p. 8139C.
333. cited in Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 August 1984): 7, p. 7326C.
334. Beijing Review 23 (5 May 1980): 18, p. 5.
335. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 33.
336. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (January 1985), p. 33320.
337. See Table 16.2 of this work.
338. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 33; and J. L. Scherer, vol. 7 (1984), op.cit., p. 161.
339. See Africa South of the Sahara 1986 op.cit., p. 822; and Africa Report 30 (July-August 1985): 4, p. 42.

340. Peking Review 20 (5 August 1977): 32, p. 28.
341. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 33.
342. Ibid. p. 50; see also his China's Foreign Aid 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46.
343. Ibidem.
344. J. L. Scherer, vol. 4 (1981), op.cit., p. 265.
345. Beijing Review 28 (8 April 1985): 14, p. 10.
346. Africa Research Bulletin 22 (30 April 1985): 3, p. 7701B.
347. Beijing Review 28 (8 April 1985): 4, p. 10.
348. Africa Research Bulletin 22 (30 September 1985): 8, p. 7903A.
349. See Chapter 10.1 of this work.
350. See Table 12.1 in this work. See also Peking Review 20 (25 February 1977): 9, p. 4.
351. See Africa Research Bulletin 22 (15 August 1985): 7, p. 7726B; and Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 572.
352. William Tolbert (President of Liberia), quoted in Peking Review 20 (1 April 1977): 14, p. 29.
353. Huang Hua, Foreign Minister of China, in Peking Review 20 (1 January 1977): 1, p. 5.
354. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 33.
355. cited in Beijing Review 21 (30 June 1978): 26, p. 3.
356. J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., pp. 260 and 262.
357. Beijing Review 25 (17 May 1982): 20, p. 8.
358. J. L. Scherer, vol. 7 (1984), op.cit., p. 161; and Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 December-14 January 1984): 12, p. 7584B.
359. Beijing Review 22 (30 June 1985): 5, p. 7783B.
360. quoted by Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 152.
361. See Table 12.1 in this work.

362. See Beijing Review 26 (14 March 1983): 11, p. 12; and Africa Research Bulletin 20 (15 April 1983): 3, p. 6787A.
363. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work .
364. Beijing Review 26 (14 March 1983): 11, p. 12.
365. See The Guardian (26 August 1986), p. 7; and Africa Report 30 (July-August 1985): 4, p. 40.
366. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 35.
367. J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 261. See also J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46 (Table 15).
368. Felix Tiemtaraboum, Burkina Faso's Foreign Minister, cited in Beijing Review 25 (22 March 1982): 12, p. 8.
369. cited in ibidem.
370. Beijing Review 26 (5 September 1983): 36, p. 15.
371. Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 July-14 August 1984): 7, p. 7394C.
372. Peking Review 20 (1 April 1977): 14, p. 29.
373. Beijing Review 21 (17 November 1978): 46, p. 5.
374. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 51 (Table 18). See also his China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 35.
375. Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 467.
376. J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 260.
377. African Economic Digest 6 (28 September 1985): 38, p. 9.
378. See Chapter 15.1.2.10 of this work.
379. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
380. See Zhang Zhuji, 'Togo's Search for Economic Independence', Beijing Review 25 (18 October 1982): 42, p. 11.
381. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., pp. 33-35.
382. See Chapter 15.1.2.10 of this work.
383. Beijing Review 21 (17 November 1978): 46, p. 5.

384. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 48 (Table 16).
385. J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 199.
386. Ibid., vol. 6 (1983), p. 267.
387. Beijing Review 26 (21 March 1983): 12, p. 18.
388. cited in Beijing Review 26 (21 March 1983): 12, p. 8.
389. See Chapter 13.2.3.1 of this work.
390. In November 1982, Ahidjo resigned. He was replaced by Paul Biya.
391. See Table 12.4 in this work. See also Africa Contemporary Record 1980, p. B.395.
392. See Peking Review 20 (14 October 1977): 42, pp. 15-16.
393. Beijing Review 21 (25 August 1978): 34, pp. 4-5.
394. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 32.
395. Ibid., p. 34.
396. Ibid., pp. 33-34, and his China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46. See also The Guardian (25 February 1979), p. 12; and J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 198.
397. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (19 October 1979), p. 29885.
398. R. Pelissier, op.cit., p. 351.
399. See Table 12.4 of this work.
400. Li Xiannian, President of China, in Beijing Review 27 (27 August 1984): 35, p. 6.
401. See Chapter 15.1.2.14 of this work.
402. See J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 34; and his China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 48. See also J. L. Scherer, vol. 7 (1984), op.cit., p. 161.
403. Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. C.133.
404. R. Cornevin, 'Gabon', Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 430.

405. Ibidem. See also Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 238-240.
406. Peking Review 20 (13 May 1977): 20, p. 5.
407. Beijing Review 21 (25 August 1978): 34, p. 4.
408. See Beijing Review 21 (15 December 1978): 50, p. 3; and Beijing Review 26 (17 January 1983): 3, p. 6.
409. cited in Beijing Review 26 (17 October 1983): 42, p. 7.
410. Among China's aid commitments to Gabon during the last decade was the construction of a medical centre capable of serving 30 outpatients daily. See J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 260.
411. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work. See also Chapter 15.1.2.15 .
412. See Chapter 13.3.2.4 of this work; see also Table § .1.
413. Peking Review 19 (19 November 1976): 47, p. 3.
414. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 127.
415. Ibid., p. 128.
416. R. Mulvey, 'Central African Republic', in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 329.
417. quoted in Beijing Review 26 (18 July 1983): 29, p. 8.
418. Ibidem.
419. Ibidem.
420. J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 260.
421. Huang Hua, Foreign Minister of China, during his visit to Zaire (June 1978), quoted by D. Bonavia in 'China Fears Soviet and Cuban Aims in Africa', The Times (7 June 1978).
422. See Chapters 13 and 14 of this work.
423. Peking Review 20 (25 March 1977): 13, p. 16.
424. quoted in Peking Review 20 (25 March 1977): 13, p. 16.
425. Beijing Review 21 (16 June 1978): 24, p. 29.
426. Beijing Review 21 (9 June 1978): 23, p. 20.

427. cited in ibidem.
428. R. Breeze, 'China Loses Momentum', Far Eastern Economic Review, 105 (28 September 1979): 39, p. 35.
429. China Report no. 45 (8 April 1980), pp. 16-17.
430. See Table 16.2 of this work.
431. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 47 (Table 15), and p. 51 (Table 18).
432. Beijing Review 23 (7 April 1980): 14, p. 7.
433. Less than a month before Mobutu's visit, Zaire re-established diplomatic relations with Israel (May 1982). Such a decision was viewed by Qaddafi as
- ... a cheap service to our racist enemies in occupied Palestine and South Africa.
- quoted in Africa Research Bulletin 19 (15 June 1982): 5, p. 6444B.
434. Beijing Review 25 (21 June 1982): 25, p. 5.
435. Beijing Review 26 (17 January 1983): 3, p. 7.
436. Beijing Review 20 (18 November 1977): 47, p. 19.
437. See Peking Review 20 (10 June 1977): 24, pp. 11-13.
438. See Table 16.2 of this work.
439. Yeh Pao t'ang, op.cit., p. 7.
440. Beijing Review 23 (21 December 1981): 51, p. 5.
441. Africa Research Bulletin 19 (February 1982): 1, p. 6329.
442. Peking Review 20 (5 August 1977): 32, p. 30.
443. Beijing Review 26 (14 March 1983): 11, p. 12.
444. See, for example, Beijing Review 21 (21 December 1981): 51, p. 5; and Beijing Review 21 (8 November 1978): 49, loc.cit.
445. Beijing Review 27 (1 October 1984): 49, p. 7.
446. Beijing Review 27 (24 October 1984): 32, pp. 8-9.
447. Zhao Zhuxio, 'Sudan Forges New Ties', in Beijing Review 28 (24 June 1985): 25, pp. 13-14.
448. See J. Becker, 'Gorbachev concession brings diplomatic thaw', in The Guardian (26 September 1986), p. 8.

449. Beijing Review 28 (22 April 1985): 16; and Beijing Review 29 (9 June 1986): 31.
450. I. A. Nessro el Din, 'Moshkilat el Atraf El Arabia Fi El Karn El Ifriki' (Arab Problems in the Horn of Africa) [El Mostaqbal El Arabi (The Arab Future) no. 74 (April 1985)], p. 58.
451. In March 1979, LPAI was replaced by a new party named the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP).
452. F. Halliday and M. Molyneux, op.cit., p. 234.
453. Beijing Review 22 (19 January 1979): 3, p. 5; and Beijing Review 20 (21 December 1979): 51, p. 4.
454. J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., pp. 198-199.
455. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
456. See Chapter 15.1.2.19 of this work.
457. Ibidem.
458. Ibidem.
459. Peking Review 20 (1 April 1977): 14, pp. 28-29.
460. J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 199; vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 261.
461. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 34.
462. See Tables 12.2 and 12.3 of this work.
463. quoted from T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1985, vol. II, op.cit., p. 670.
464. Beijing Review 22 (20 April 1979): 16, p. 30.
465. quoted from T. V. Sathyamurthy, The political Development of Uganda: 1900-1985, vol. II, op.cit., p. 670.
466. See Chapter 13.3.1.7 of this work.
467. T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1985, vol. II, op.cit., p. 671.
468. Beijing Review 27 (27 August 1984): 35, p. 7.
469. See, for example, Beijing Review 29 (10 February 1986): 6 and 7, p. 12.
470. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 375.



471. quoted in A. Hutchison, op.cit., p. 163.
472. Peking Review 13 (27 February 1970): 26, p. 26.
473. See Chapter 13.3.1.7 of this work.
474. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 376.
475. Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 532.
476. Beijing Review 23 (29 September 1980): 39, p. 3.
477. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 25 (January 1979), p. 29392.
478. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 21.
479. Beijing Review 23 (29 September 1980): 39, p. 3.
480. See Africa Report 25 (November-December 1980): 6, p. 31; and J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 31.
481. J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 199. See also J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1978, op.cit., p. 33.
482. Beijing Review 26 (24 January 1983): 4, pp. 9-10.
483. J. L. Scherer, vol. 7 (1984), op.cit., p. 161.
484. See Chapter 14.2.1.7 of this work.
485. SWB no. FE/6395/AF11, (15 April 1980).
486. cited in Beijing Review 19 (7 December 1979): p. 49.
487. J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 261.
488. See Table 16.2 of this work.
489. Beijing Review 22 (31 December 1985): 11, p. 8020C.
490. Beijing Review 23 (21 April 1980): 16, p. 3.
491. quoted in ibidem.
492. Beijing Review 23 (20 October 1980): 42, p. 7.
493. Beijing Review 26 (24 January 1983): 3, p. 7.
494. J. Halpern, 'Botswana', in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 235.
495. Ibidem.

496. See, for example, Beijing Review 19 (20 April 1979): 16, p. 30.
497. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 32.
498. See ibidem. See also J. L. Scherer, vol. 6 (1983), op.cit., p. 260.
499. Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 September-14 October 1984): 9, p. 7464B.
500. Beijing Review 26 (28 November 1983): 48, p. 8.
501. See Wei Liang-Tsai, op.cit., p. 369.
502. At the OAU Summit Meeting (1970), Lesotho and Malawi were the only 2 African countries to abstain from a resolution calling on Western powers to cease supplying arms to South Africa. See Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 557.
503. See ibidem. See also Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 419-420.
504. Prensa Latina, op.cit., p. 421.
505. Africa Research Bulletin 20 (15 July 1983): 6, p. 6851A.
506. Ibidem.
507. Ibidem.
508. Beijing Review 26 (23 May 1983): 21, pp. 6-7.
509. Peete M Peete, Lesotho's acting Prime Minister, cited in Africa Research Bulletin 20 (15 July 1983): 6, p. 6851C.
510. Ibidem.
511. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 31 (December 1985), p. 34031.
512. Ibidem.
513. The Times 127 (3 February 1986): 5, p. 16.
514. Beijing Review 29 (10 February 1986): 17, p. 11.
515. See Table 12.1 in this work.
516. J. L. Scherer, vol. 5 (1982), op.cit., p. 198.
517. Prensa Latina, op.cit., pp. 480-481.

518. A. Simmonds, 'Mauritius', in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, op.cit., p. 657.
519. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 46 (Table 15).
520. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
521. Beijing Review 26 (30 May 1983): 22, p. 9.
522. Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 September-14 October 1984): 9, p. 7464A.
523. Africa Research Bulletin 22 (30 September 1989): 8, p. 7902C.
524. See Beijing Review 26 (15 August 1983): 15, pp. 12-113.
525. V. Brittain, 'Polisario's Battle for the Wall', The Guardian (21 February 1986), pp. 10 and 21-26.
526. See ibid., p. 10. See also El Shaab no. 7001 (20 April 1986).
527. Beijing Review 25 (15 March 1982): 11, p. 4.
528. Peking Review 16 (5 October 1973), p. 15.
529. Spain's decision to hand over the Western Sahara to Morocco was based not only on a fear of the revolutionary character of Polisario, but also and more importantly, on the belief that opposition to Morocco's claims on the territory would only provoke demands for the independence of the northern Moroccan cities of Ceuta and Melilla which were still and still are under Spanish colonialism.
530. Beijing Review 22 (30 November 1979): 48, pp. 16 and 30.
531. Beijing Review 25 (15 January 1982): 2, p. 3.
532. Beijing Review 24 (18 May 1981): 20, p. 9.
533. quoted in Beijing Review 24 (18 May 1981): 20, p. 9.
534. See Peking Review 20 (18 February 1977): 8, p. 30; Beijing Review 21 (2 June 1978): 22, p. 31; Beijing Review 21 (20 January 1978): 3, p. 29; and Beijing Review 22 (2 March 1979): 9, p. 27.
535. See Beijing Review 21 (7 April 1978): 14, passim; and Beijing Review 20 (4 May 1979): 18, p. 29.
536. See The Sunday Times (21 January 1979); J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979, op.cit., p. 27; Beijing

- Review 21 (24 November 1978): 4, p. 26; and Beijing Review 22 (12 January 1979): 2, p. 37.
537. N. Wade, 'Mugabe Praises China Aid', The Daily Telegraph (29 July 1971).
538. See Peking Review 20 (1 July 1977): 27, p. 5.
539. cited in Peking Review 20 (8 July 1977): 28, p. 3.
540. Ibidem.
541. The Daily Telegraph (11 February 1978).
542. Mugabe in an interview with Sara Rodrigues, The Guardian (US) (8 November 1978).
543. See Beijing Review 23 (7 January 1980): 1, p. 12.
544. Xinhua News Agency (5 March 1980).
545. Beijing Review 23 (17 March 1980): 11, p. 3.
546. Beijing Review 24 (16 June 1980): 24, p. 9.
547. J. F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, op.cit., p. 22.
548. cited in Beijing Review 24 (25 May 1981): 21, p. 9.
549. Beijing Review 26 (24 January 1983): 4, p. 8.
550. Africa Research Bulletin 21 (15 March-14 April 1984): 3, p. 7248C.
551. Beijing Review 28 (9 September 1985), p. 7.
552. See Chapter 12.4.
553. Africa Research Bulletin 22 (30 September 1985): 8, p. 7903C.
554. Author's interview with the editor of Sechaba, op.cit.
555. See Beijing Review 26 (24 January 1983): 4, pp. 8-9. Chinese arms to ANC promised by Zhao Zyang were confirmed to the author in an interview with Alan Brooks, op.cit.
556. cited in China and the World (4), op.cit., p. 20.
557. Beijing Review 26 (13 June 1983): 24, p. 10.
558. cited in Beijing Review 26 (20 June 1983): 25, p. 9.
559. Beijing Review 28 (8 April 1985): 14, p. 8.

560. cited in Beijing Review 29 (21 April 1986): 16, p. 6.
561. Beijing Review 29 (30 June 1986): 26, p. 11.
562. See Chapter 15.2.1.6 of this work.
563. See Africa Research Bulletin 20 (February 1983): 1, p. 6717A. See also Beijing Review 26 (12 September 1983): 37, pp. 11-12.
564. Zhao Z<sup>h</sup>yang at a press conference in Dar es Salaam (13 January 1983), quoted in China and the World (4), op.cit., p. 19.
565. See, for example, Peking Review 18 (10 October 1975): 41, p. 29.
566. Africa Research Bulletin 20 (February 1983): 1, p. 6716A.
567. Deng X<sup>h</sup>iao Ping in a message to a television audience in the United States, cited in Beijing Review 22 (12 January 1979): 2, pp. 17-18.
568. Zhao Z<sup>h</sup>yang in a televised conference in the United States cited in Beijing Review 27 (23 January 1984): 4, p. 20.

## CONCLUSION

Mao Zedong thought remains the guide to our action. China undergoes reforms precisely for the purpose of restoring Mao Zedong thought to what it is. Some people refer to these reforms as "de-Maoification". They have put things this way because either they know too little about China, or they are deliberately making distortion.'

This study makes no claim to resolve the ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding the question of the extent to which ideological or revolutionary considerations (e.g., the extent to which the Sino-Soviet dispute is a dispute over questions relating to the continuation of the class struggle or 'socialist construction'; or, whether PRC has pursued a socialist foreign policy in a traditional or abstractly Marxist sense during certain periods) have influenced China's role in international relations and the foreign policy in Africa as well as in other parts of the world. However, we believe that it will be a useful addition to the literature on the subject. The discussion of the relations between China and the African continent (the major studies on the subject do not go beyond early '70s) has been brought up to date in this study. Particular importance has been given to analysing the impact of ideological considerations (as defined in the early part<sup>2</sup> of this work) on the role of China in international relations as a whole, and in Africa in particular, through different stages and changing situations.<sup>3</sup>

Not only revolutionary China's experience of consolidating its revolution by extending its sovereignty to 'lost' territories safeguarding national security, ensuring domestic political cohesion and promoting socialist construction, but also China's historical experience of semi-colonialism and CCP's successful strategy of 'united front' prior to China's liberation was predicated on PRC's capacity to mobilise all forces - communist and non-communist alike - subjected or opposed to colonialism, imperialism (China being a main target of the imperialist policy of containment of communism) and oppression in general.

At least until the early '70s, non-communist political forces were opposed by China because

they were critical of the anti-imperialist united front (i.e., the anti-imperialist revolution) based on a strategy of giving ideological priority to the principal contradiction 'which plays the leading role'.<sup>4</sup>

This work, initially conceived as an analysis of China's role in international relations with special reference to the African continent, developed a structural logic of its own, necessitating a much wider framework of discussion. In order to appreciate the true complexity of China's international role, its relations with the United States on the one hand and with the Soviet Union on the other, had to be given a great deal of consideration, not only for the reason that China has its own interests in various regions of the world, but also because China has always placed great importance on the contradictions

between the superpowers on the one hand, and the other powers (and especially 'poor' countries) on the other. At the same time, China's position as an arm of the triangle of world power constituted by the overlapping, intersecting and mutually contradictory interests of the three great powers of the world active in Africa - viz., the United States as the leading hegemonic power of imperialism, the Soviet Union as the leading socialist power, and China as the leading Third World power committed to socialist construction through revolution - had to be considered in some detail, with reference to its possible impact on Africa.

During the first phase (1949-54), the policy of 'leaning to the side' of the socialist world under the leadership of the Soviet Union (with the ideological objective of containing the imperialist camp, and more immediate benefits in the economic and military spheres which China hoped would accrue), did not inhibit China's policy makers seeking an independent foreign policy from the Soviet Union, based on peaceful co-existence with non-communist but anti-imperialist forces provided that the latter were genuinely opposed to colonialism and imperialism.

When (i.e., from 1954 onwards) oppressed forces (e.g. the national liberation forces which started their struggle in Algeria in 1954) under colonial and imperial rule as well as régimes led by parties of the national bourgeoisie (e.g. India, Indonesia and Egypt) became more and more openly hostile to colonialism (as evidenced, for



example, at the Bandung conference in 1955), China welcomed the new development and joined forces with them (beginning with the *Pancha Shila* Agreement with India in 1954).

China's support for, and recognition of the anti-colonialist character of non-communist forces, had begun at least two years before on the announcement by the Soviet Union of its new policy of 'peaceful co-existence' and competition with imperialism. However, China's timing of its policy of co-existence with non-communist anti-imperialist forces manifested in the *Pancha Shila* Agreement (1954) and Bandung conference (1955), was a factor which enabled it to mount a credible attack against Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinisation. This speech reinforced China's drive for co-existence with anti-colonialist forces in the intermediate zone of Asia, Africa and Latin America. China believed that these three continents constituted the major potential alternative zone capable of repudiating the Soviet Union's new found desire to appease imperialism and waging struggles of liberation against it.

Serious international developments - such as the escalation of armed struggle for national liberation in Algeria (from the mid-'50s onwards); the continued aggression of British, French and Israeli forces against anti-imperialist Egypt (Suez crisis, 1956); the offensive move by the United States to assume the leading role in the imperialist camp, especially as signified by the initiatives in Indo-China; the collective and intensive

oppression unleashed by NATO allies against rising militant nationalist forces seeking a complete end to colonialism and imperialism in their countries; and the successful establishment by imperialist powers of military alliances and bases in countries ruled by loyal governments with a view to suppressing national liberation forces and reinforcing the policy of containment of communism - surrounding Khrushchev's thinking on *Détente* did not deflect the Soviet Union from embarking on a policy based on co-existence between socialist and imperialist countries.

As far as China was concerned, the lack of hesitation on the part of the Soviet Union, as the most powerful and leading anti-imperialist force, in its approach to a policy of *Détente* with the imperialist camp constituted a serious set back to the communist world as a whole, and to national liberation movements in particular. China was aware that its unequivocal opposition to the Soviet Union's international line would in all probability lead to a split between the two powers, and to a withdrawal of Soviet aid from China.

The CCP had the option of reinforcing its domestic policy line on self-reliance in order to improve China's economic and military position and eventually to its being taken seriously by its enemies (especially the United States). Internationally, China came to the view that the intermediate zone (especially Indo-China<sup>peo</sup> and Africa, where 'revolutionary prospects' were 'excellent') was the area exemplifying the principal contradiction between the

imperialist and colonialist powers on the one hand, and socialist, national liberation and anti-imperialist forces as a whole, on the other. Solidarity with this zone became the major concern in China's foreign policy from 1959 onwards (following Khrushchev's visit to the United States). China attacked national bourgeois régimes which pursued oppressive policies [as was the case in Egypt and Iraq (1959)] against local communist parties (the international communist front had not yet begun to be effectively undermined by the Sino-Soviet dispute), thus satisfying the imperialists's wishes.

While continuing the debate with <sup>the</sup> CPSU in order to persuade the latter to reverse its policy of *Détente* and to refrain from signing <sup>the</sup> NTBT, China pursued a strategy of mobilising communist and non-communist forces alike to resist the idea of peaceful co-existence with imperialist powers at the ideological level.

In Africa, where China's assessment of and support for revolution was predicated on the successful war of national liberation in Algeria (1962); the revolutionary struggles against the pro-Western governments of Cameroon and Congo(L) (China's anti-state policy); the Zanzibar revolution; and, China's policy of supporting national independence movements which opted for armed struggle and people's wars as practical means for securing unconditional independence, <sup>the</sup> AAPSO served as a major vehicle for China's solidarity with non-governmental anti-imperialist, 'progressive' and communist forces, all of which showed a pro-China character during the most

intensive period (1959-66) of Sino-African relations. This period also represented an irreversible turning point in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

At the same time, the establishment of diplomatic relations with 'progressive' as well as 'non-progressive' states served as a major factor in the containment of the West (later joined by the Soviet Union); by winning the recognition of a large number of governments, including some avowedly pro-Western governments, China laid the foundations for the anti-imperialist united front.

Most of China's contacts, aid (based on favourable and flexible terms and on suitability for African needs) and political activities in Africa were with 'progressive' states.<sup>5</sup> Like China, these states urged resistance to colonialism and gave moral and material support to the national liberation struggles that were being waged on the continent.

China also hoped that by promoting friendly diplomatic relations with 'non-progressive' states, the latter's anti-China suspicions would be softened, and that they could be persuaded to join the campaign for Afro-Asian solidarity. China also used its relations with these states as a basis for consolidating and extending its relations with national liberation movements, especially in those countries which were strategically highly important for access to guerrilla fighters - for example, for the FLN liberation forces, Morocco, for the Congo(L) revolutionary forces based in Stanleyville,

Burundi, and for liberation movements in southern Africa, Zambia.

China's diplomatic challenge to the outside world by recalling its ambassadors, and the revolutionary wave of GPRC alarmed Western and pro-Western governments but inspired a large number of non-governmental forces throughout the world, and national liberation and revolutionary forces in many areas of the world. In Africa, the hostility of a number of anti-communist governments did not seem to be of great concern to China. China viewed their behaviour as evidence of their fear of local revolutionary threats to their oppressive and pro-imperialist governments. Friendly relations, aid and economic co-operation were mostly confined to those 'progressive' states which actively supported, or those 'non-progressive' states which served as strategic bases for national liberation movements.

By placing the Soviet Union on a par with the United States as equally dangerous hegemonic imperialist forces in world politics, systematised by the development of the 'Three Worlds' theory and the 'broad united front' based largely on state-to-state relations during the '70s, China failed to maintain the revolutionary credibility of its foreign policy. In contrast to the '50s and '60s, during the '70s China failed to win the support of most of the 'progressive' forces - governmental and non-governmental alike - against the influence of the Soviet Union in the world. Its obsession with the Soviet Union to the extent of co-operating with 'non-progressive' forces and acting

against 'progressive' forces, brought into question the very basis of its ideological credibility. China's anti-Soviet campaign appealed only to those 'non-progressive' states which were strongly anti-communist and closely pro-Western in character. Thus, its opposition to <sup>the</sup> MPLA during the Angolan crisis was clearly aimed at undermining Angolan national liberation because it enjoyed Soviet and Cuban support.

It would be useful here to compare China's support for the 'non-progressive' Biafra (albeit belated and verbal only) during the Nigerian civil war [during the final year (1968) of the last phase (1966-69) of our periodisation] on the one hand and, on the other, for the pro-Western South African FNLA-UNITA alliance in Angola in 1975 (during the last year of the 1969-76 period). In both cases the critical juncture coincided with China's own internal tensions in the CCP leadership coming to the boil, as manifested, for example, by the rise and fall of Lin Biao (1968-72) at the end of the dynamic years of GPRC, and by sharpening of the 'two-line' struggle within CCP as evidenced by the struggle between the 'Gang of Four' and advocates of a wider 'open door' policy and expansion of modernisation [as well as the illness and subsequent deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, the two leading figures of the Chinese revolution] all of which took place during the period 1975-76.

China's policy towards Shaba crisis (1977), taking place during the last phase of our periodisation of Sino-African relations, though similar to its Angola policy,

was pursued at the expense of forces representing the masses which were opposed to the oppressive and pro-Western government of Mobutu; it did not reflect or coincide with, nor did it bear the mark of any serious tensions within CCP's leadership during the 1975-76 period. Post-Mao policy makers could be questioned more on ideological grounds than their predecessors.

The recent thaw in the Sino-Soviet relations, coupled with China's emphasis on the economic factor in the wider context including support for south-south co-operation, self-reliance and demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) underlining its foreign policy towards African countries, have led to the restoration of much friendlier and warmer relations between China and 'progressive' states including Algeria, despite the latter's failure to win the former's support for armed struggle for national liberation in Western Sahara; instead, China sought a peaceful settlement. China has argued that an escalation of the war would open up more opportunities for 'Big Power' intervention in a problematic issue involving neighbouring states along the southern zone of the Mediterranean sea, lead to more frictions within OAU, and create an uneasy atmosphere in China's relations with the countries concerned in the issue.

Neither China's move towards *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union nor the current campaign in China (January 1987 onwards) against bourgeois liberalism has been welcomed by 'non-progressive' states. But 'progressive'

states and national liberation movements - all of which experienced an uneasy atmosphere in their relations with China during the '70s because of its obsession with the Soviet Union - are pleased with both developments, and especially the former.

At the same time, recent developments in China have puzzled Western powers. For acceptance of China's 'open door' policy and modernisation programme for the construction of a powerful socialist China reflects a reluctant acceptance on their part of a lesser evil (especially in view of the market and investment possibilities opened up by China) than the one of having to co-exist with a powerful friendship between the two big communist powers of the world.



## NOTES

1. Zhao Ziyang at a Press Conference in Dar es Salaam (13 January 1983), cited in China and the World (4) (Beijing: Beijing Foreign Languages Press, 1983), p. 22.
2. That is, the Introduction and Part I.
3. Vide Parts II and III.
4. This ('unite the many to defeat the few'; or 'unite the weaker to defeat the stronger') was originally formulated in the Chinese context by Mao Zedong and carried out in practice by CCP in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. for the full text, see the Introduction of this work.
5. See Tables 12.1, 12.4, 12.7, 12.8, 13.3, 13.4 and 13.5.
6. See a recent article by J. Gittings, 'China's breath of intellectual courage expires', The Guardian (5 February 1987), p. 10.
7. See, for example, the Editorial entitled 'If they have a fling: Western fear of China driving closer to the Soviet Union', The Economist 300 (16-22 August 1986): 7459, pp. 7-8 and 28.

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The material on Africa and Sino-African relations from public libraries in Algiers and Tunis has been particularly useful. Various reports and pamphlets also relating to a number of national liberation movements in Africa were obtained from the following organizations, among others: ANC; SWAPO; Angola Information Bureau; and Mozambique Information Office (successor of MAGIC). The library of the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU) in London was useful particularly for press cuttings on Sino-African relations. The Cultural Department of the Chinese Embassy in London furnished me with Chinese journals, documents and pamphlets in the field of China's foreign relations

The list produced below contains only a selected sample of books, articles and documents representing only a fraction of the literature that was consulted in the course of this research.

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