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The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention. EDITED BY DON E. SCHEID. (Cambridge: CUP, 2014. Pp. xii + 282. Price £19.99 (ISBN 9781107610675)/£60.00 (ISBN 9781107036369))

This recent collection brings together a number of papers that, with one exception, presume the general acceptability of armed humanitarian intervention (AHI), and are engaged in either refining its parameters or re-describing its theoretical foundations. The collection covers a number of issues of interest to those working in the area, including the problem of abuse, the limits of duty (to intervene, to accept costs, to rebuild), and the foundations of sovereignty. Furthermore, the papers offer a broad engagement rather than narrow, technical discussions, reflect concern with AHI in practice and in theory, and represent useful contributions to current debates on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). In this review, I summarize the key contributions of each chapter, going into greater detail on those I found particularly interesting.

Following Sheid's helpful introduction to the predominant issues in AHI debates, Lucas insightfully critiques RtoP via an historical analysis of the modern development of AHI. This analysis spans three waves of thought, with the contemporary RtoP framework marking the start of the third. Dominated by a 'narrative of guilt' (39), this wave attempts to clarify the responsibilities (and restrictions) of AHI in order to avoid repeating the failures of the past (e.g. in Rwanda, Kosovo, and Somalia). Unfortunately, Lucas argues, this law-like, legislative focus ignores the insights of the second: the imperatives behind AHI track an *imperfect* duty, which inherently resists legislation. Obligations tied to imperfect duties are general and unassigned, enabling the confused and conflicting international responses that produced the heartbreaking failures of the second wave. The solution, says Lucas, lies not in further legislation; rather, AHIs should be likened to domestic violence (within a family). Importantly, such cases are complex, grounded in larger structural problems, and require long-term involvement from a range of parties whose duties cannot be precisely demarcated. Privileging this metaphorical framework better captures the nature of the problem and the difficulties practitioners face, which, argues Lucas, should be our focus if we don't want to repeat our mistakes.

Welsh is similarly critical of the legal turn embodied in RtoP's most recent formulation, arguing that its adoption of the 'language of crimes' (217), while aiding its approval, will hamper efforts to prevent atrocities. First, while appearing to improve clarity, the restriction of RtoP to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes has failed to eliminate interpretation and contestation. Further, its legal framework obscures the political and moral nature of the decision to intervene, which often must be made without the results of lengthy investigations. Second, the 'crime-lens' of RtoP entails choosing sides, displacing (the diplomatically useful) impartiality. Welsh attributes two further negative implications to this shift: First, it suggests a strict distinction between victims and perpetrators that oversimplifies the situation, and leaves little room for a negotiated resolution. Second, by assuming a criminal justice framework that does not exist internationally, it gives a 'false promise of deterrence' (220). Notably, Welsh's essay follows Doyle's, which is more optimistic about the increasingly

legal nature of RtoP. For Doyle, AHI represents an evolving, even progressing, negotiation between Liberal values of non-intervention and human rights, and its modern form as RtoP represents a good balance between 'license and leash' (206).

Shifting to a more theoretical analysis, Frowe's essay advances a justification-based account of permissibility, which she defends primarily via objections to Bellamy's intention-based account. Frowe highlights several problems with identifying intentions and distinguishing them from motives, but, crucially, argues that intentions are relevant only for evaluating character, not the permissibility of AHI. Rather, permissibility should be grounded in objective facts – whether justification can be given – as well as whether the actions of the interveners are expected to aid. This focus, Frowe suggests, better prioritises those in need of help. In the course of her discussion, Frowe also argues against the view that soldiers are required to accept greater risk in the protection of non-combatants; thus she rejects Walzer's principle of double intent. *Contra* Frowe, in his essay, Pattison argues that soldiers *are* required to accept greater costs in the protection of non-combatants, a position he labels the Restrictive view. In its defense, he rejects the Bystander and the Rescuer's theses, arguing they fail to identify morally relevant differences between beneficiaries, bystanders, and rescuers, and therefore fail to justify the alternative Permissive view. This, coupled with his arguments for role-based duties and duties to command, entails the asymmetrical distribution of risk.

Essays by Rodin and Tesón aim to shift dominant perspectives on AHI by reinventing and renewing two familiar concepts: sovereignty and proportionality. Both argue that state sovereignty is essentially derivative, grounded in individuals' rights to non-interference/self-determination, and therefore should not be thought in tension with AHI's goal of protecting (individual) human rights. Tesón uses this to motivate the claim that the only relevant condition when determining the justifiability of intervention is proportionality. Importantly, via a modification of the Doctrine of Double Effect, he expands this notion to include *moral* proportionality.

Rodin, conversely, remains focused on the nature of sovereignty, proposing a shift from the problematic framework of conditional sovereignty to a 'richer notion' of *human* sovereignty (246). This alternative paradigm privileges individuals' rights to political self-determination, free from violent or coercive interference (foreign or domestic), which, when embodied in just (i.e. non-violent) political relations, ground state sovereignty. Rodin argues this approach better *explains* the conditional nature of state sovereignty and better justifies the requirement that interveners remain impartial. After contrasting his with similar views held by Mill and Walzer, Rodin ends with some secondary arguments for the practical primacy of aiding security over economic needs, which he claims, entails a greater duty to aid in cases of atrocity than other instances of suffering (e.g. poverty).

This point marks the subject of Dobos and Coady's essay, which argues that mass atrocities do *not* transform the imperfect duty of beneficence to a perfect duty to aid (and therefore, intervention is only *permissible* rather than obligatory or prohibited). They note however, that the conditions that currently render intervention merely permissible (the imperfect

nature of the duty and the high-cost associated with intervention) are contingent, and could, with the appropriate international institutions, be such that interventions become obligatory.

The remaining essays deal with two issues: the problem of abuse and concerns regarding post-intervention. As to the first, Glanville offers a qualified defense of AHI against worries that it permits/promotes illegitimate interventions, arguing that abuse of an idea in practice is insufficient grounds to reject the idea. Relatedly, Bellamy ends his essay by listing five checks intended to minimise such abuse; this is particularly important given his primary argument that regime change is sometimes necessary to protect populations, and should not be prohibited by RtoP. As to the second issue of post-intervention, Orend argues that the Rehabilitation model of *jus post bellum* is preferable to the alternative, Retribution model, leading him to offer twelve principles for guiding post intervention justice based off the model. Meanwhile, Blake considers the (legal) nature of post-intervention liability, examined via an exploration of the *Pottery Barn Rule*: 'you break it, you own it' (133). He considers, and rejects, the Fault-based conception of liability, settling instead on the Strict Liability conception, which allows one to ascribe liability even in the absence of fault, and has the added benefit, in Blake's view, of discouraging interventions.

The one exception to this generally approving crowd is the essay by Todorov (translated by Johnson). Todorov is resoundingly critical of AHI, considering it a façade for imperialist motives. Via a discussion of recent events in Libya, he claims the contemporary formulation of AHI as RtoP not only fails to improve the doctrine, but in fact increases the risk for small nations (given the weakened status of sovereignty), marking a return to 'might makes right' (50) politics. But while Todorov voices a welcome critical perspective, his bold claims lack the requisite support. Thus the collection suffers somewhat overall, lacking a strong piece critical of AHI more broadly. In sum, however, this is a useful collection of insightful perspectives and important contributions to AHI debates.

AMANDA CAWSTON