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**Slobodan Milošević;
A Case-Study of the Criminal Leader**

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for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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Abstract

This thesis is a case-study of Slobodan Milošević as a prototype of the “criminal” leader. Challenging the existing consensus among Western liberals, for whom Milošević is unquestionably criminal, it asks whether and to what extent Milošević is a criminal leader. It approaches this by first dissecting the Western construction of Milošević as a criminal leader into its key components – his actions and intentions, his motivations, his personality and psychology, and his comparison with other “criminal” leaders. This normative-driven construction is then empirically tested, using two main sources. The speeches of Milošević, fundamentally misrepresented by many Western commentators, are analyzed. The second primary source used is semi-structured interviews (supported by public opinion poll data). Strongly influenced by bottom-up studies of the Hitler and Stalin regimes, two leaders that can be seen as crucial cases of the criminal leader, this research is particularly concerned with exploring how ordinary people in Serbia - heavily neglected in the existing Western literature - view Milošević. This allows us to ascertain whether and to what extent the Western, liberal construction of Milošević as a criminal leader has domestic/field validity. What the interview data reveals is a sharp discrepancy between the external (Western) and domestic (Serbian) viewpoints. The Serbian interviewees overwhelmingly view Milošević not as a criminal leader, but as a “bad” (unsuccessful) leader and/or as a victim. This discrepancy is translated into, and used to develop, a general concept of the criminal leader. This conceptualization emphasizes both the externally constructed nature of the criminal leader (policy dimension) and the importance of studying the criminal leader from below (domestic dimension).

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Map of Serbia

(<http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/europe/lcolor/yucolor.htm>)

List of Abbreviations

DS – Democratic Party

DSS – Democratic Party of Serbia

FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

GS – Civic Alliance Party

HLC – Humanitarian Law Centre

ICC – International Criminal Court

ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

IDP – Internally displaced person

JUL – Yugoslav United Left

KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army

NDI – National Democratic Institute

RTS – Radio Television Serbia

SANU – Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SMMRI – Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute

SPO – Serbian Renewal Movement

SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia

SRS – Serbian Radical Party

Introduction

“A black cloud has lifted from the Balkans”, remarked Bill Clinton (Berić, 2002, p.271). This “black cloud” was Slobodan Milošević, spectacularly overthrown in a popular uprising on 5 October 2000. After his decade in power, Milošević was to begin a new life, in a prison cell. An indicted war criminal standing trial in The Hague, Milošević faces charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. His legal criminalization, however, is only one part of the story and one that is not central to this thesis. This research is primarily concerned with the normative dimension of Milošević’s criminalization.

The image of Milošević as normatively criminal is the dominant image that one finds of him in Western literature on the former Yugoslavia. This research aims to discover, through analysis of Milošević’s speeches and qualitative interview data, whether and to what extent this image of Milošević exists outside of Western literature. The key question that drives this research, therefore, is whether, on the basis of the primary sources analyzed, Milošević is a criminal leader.

A second question that drives the thesis, and is closely connected to the first, is the question of how one should study a criminal leader. Related, subsidiary questions that the thesis seeks to answer are what is a criminal leader? How is a criminal leader constructed? Who determines which leaders are deemed criminal, and is the concept of the criminal leader universal?

The consensus that Milošević is a criminal leader is overwhelming, and exists independently of developments in The Hague Tribunal. To question and challenge this consensus is not to imply that Milošević has no political responsibility, or that he is entirely innocent. Whether he is guilty of the crimes for which he stands accused in law is a matter for the Tribunal to decide, on the basis of the evidence presented to it. By asking whether and to what extent Milošević is a criminal leader, the aim of this thesis is to stimulate fresh debate, to highlight the value of heavily neglected primary sources, and to draw attention to alternative images of Milošević.

Overview of Approach

Susan Woodward, a leading authority on the former Yugoslavia, has highlighted a general pattern in the post-Cold War period of US officials identifying “rogue” or “renegade” states, “headed by ‘new Hitlers’, such as Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević, who defied all forms of civilized behaviour and had to be punished to protect those norms and to protect innocent people” (Woodward, 1995, p.7). Such leaders, as Woodward makes clear, are criminalized on normative grounds. They are deemed to pose a fundamental threat to quintessential liberal values. The origin of these leaders’ criminalization, moreover, is external. Like the related concepts of “rogue” or “renegade” states, the concept of the criminal leader is externally constructed.

One of the key objectives of this thesis is to explore how the external construction of Milošević as a criminal leader fits with domestic conceptions. In other words, do ordinary people in Serbia themselves view Milošević as a

criminal leader? Clearly, this is a question that has important implications for the legal proceedings currently being brought against Milošević in The Hague, as we shall see.

A normative response to this question might be that the Serbian people, by supporting Milošević, are complicit in his crimes and, therefore, highly unlikely to regard him as a criminal leader. This, however, is a weak argument. Milošević did enjoy considerable support during his early years in power, yet we cannot condemn the Serbian people before understanding why they supported him and what they were actually giving their support to.

Unfortunately, the interviews conducted as part of the present research do not allow us to directly answer this question, since so few of the interviewees admitted to being supporters of Milošević – either today or in the past. While clearly this is an area for future research, analysis of Milošević's speeches suggests that his attractive, if often unrealistic economic pledges were a significant reason for his popularity. Thus, it might be argued that Milošević's popular appeal was strongly practical.

Normativists might also argue that the Serbs are in denial about events in the former Yugoslavia, making it very improbable that they will be able to see their former leader as criminal until they themselves have been re-educated. Such an argument, however, is also problematic. Firstly, it is true that only a tiny minority of the Serbian interviewees mention the wars, but many also express a desire to forget the past and move on with their lives. This urge to

forget should not necessarily be equated with denial. It can also be seen as a coping strategy. In view of Serbia's difficult economic situation, moreover, confronting the past is arguably not a priority for many people. Their concerns are more immediate and practical, namely trying to make ends meet.

Secondly, although the majority of the Serbian interviewees regard themselves as Milošević's biggest victims, this is not unsurprising. As we would expect, they judge Milošević on account of what he did to them personally. Their frame of reference, therefore, is fundamentally different from that used by Western authors, who focus on Milošević's crimes in a regional context.

Thirdly, given that the Western media heavily vilified the Serbs during the nineties¹, it was perhaps to be expected that the interviewees would want to emphasize to a Western researcher how they themselves suffered under Milošević.

Finally, some might argue that the Serbs do not share the moral standards of the West, making it almost certain that they would reject the dominant Western view of Milošević as a criminal leader. Such an argument, however, is flawed. The fact that the Serbian interviewees, overall, do not regard Milošević as a criminal leader does not mean that their morality is inferior to our own. Rather, the discrepancy between their view of Milošević as a bad leader and/or victim and the Western, liberal view of Milošević as a criminal leader can be

¹ In his discussion of the war in Bosnia, for example, the former *BBC* war correspondent Martin Bell asks, "...when had we ever shown a civilian victim of sniper fire on the Serb side of the lines? When had we reported from their hospitals?" (Bell, 1996, p.114).

seen as illustrating E.H Carr's argument that "the current canons of international virtue" have mainly been created by "the English-speaking peoples" (Carr, 1939, p.102). In other words, it is Western morality that prevails in international politics. This, in turn, can help to explain the lack of attention that has been given in Western literature to the domestic viewpoint – the view of ordinary people in Serbia.

This thesis, rather than dismissing the domestic viewpoint as inherently flawed and problematic, argues that it is essential. Leadership is a relationship, an "interaction between leaders and followers" (Kellerman, 1986, p.xiii). To help us answer the question of whether Milošević is a criminal leader, therefore, it is unsatisfactory to focus only on one half of the leadership relationship. The view from below must also be considered. In short, the criminal leader must be studied both from the top down and from the bottom up.

Overall, the existing Western literature is typically top-down in its approach. Its explanations of Yugoslavia's demise and descent into war focus on the actions and decisions of political leaders and elites; little attention is given to what was happening at the grassroots level. Similarly, the Milošević regime is nearly always studied from the top down. Milošević, his wife, the *Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* (SANU), the *Socialist Party of Serbia* (SPS), the Army – these are usually viewed as the key actors. When the Serbian people are mentioned, it is often in only a very abstract way, as highlighted by the various essentialist references to "the Serbian national psyche" (Clark, 2000, p.70) and "the Serb mind" (Cohen, 1998, p.222).

Journalistic accounts are likewise prone to take a very top-down perspective that “focuses mainly on institutions and political leaders and their duties and decisions, while leaving the common folk to exemplify trends, to serve as types: a fallen soldier, a screaming mother, a dead baby...” (Sudetic, 1998, p.xxxii).

In this thesis, however, “ordinary” people - defined as persons who, as individuals, exercise little direct influence on national affairs and policy-making – play a key role. The research uses qualitative interviews to gain insight into ordinary peoples’ opinions of Milošević, in order to find out whether and to what extent the dominant Western view of Milošević as a criminal leader exists within Serbia itself. By providing the reader with alternative, domestic images of Milošević, the thesis both makes an important contribution to existing Western scholarship, and provides valuable new insight into Milošević’s leadership and regime.

In its commitment to a more “bottom-up” approach, the research thus departs from the existing Western literature on the Milošević regime. Instead, it is strongly influenced by the work of certain academics, variously known as “Revisionists”, social historians, and “historians of everyday life”, such as Stephen Kotkin, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ian Kershaw, Detlev Peukert and Alf Lüdtke. These scholars, dissatisfied with traditional, top-down historiography of the Stalin and Hitler regimes, have concentrated on studying these regimes from below, by seeking to reconstruct the everyday lives of ordinary people.

To study such regimes from below has proven extremely controversial, particularly on moral grounds. Critics, such as Peter Kenez and Alfred Meyer, contend that focusing on the “trivial” elements of everyday life detracts attention away from the atrocities committed, thereby sanitizing the regimes. Despite such objections, bottom-up approaches have generated both important debate and new insight into the regimes.

In particular, they have exposed as problematic the assumption that ordinary people are simply victims of such regimes, but without going to the other extreme of arguing that ordinary people, to use Goldhagen’s description of the German people, are “willing executioners” (Goldhagen, 1997). What these scholars have argued, and shown, is that the relationship between these regimes and mass society was not one-way; each exerted a level of influence, albeit unequal, upon the other.

The existing Western literature on the Milošević regime, however, by virtue of its heavy top-down bias, largely fails to acknowledge this. It is content to represent the Serbian people – either as a pathological nation or, more typically, as victims.

In adopting a strongly bottom-up approach, this thesis is not seeking to highlight the culpability of the Serbian people. Rather, it is concerned with how the interviewees assess Milošević’s culpability. Equally, the research – in contrast to some existing, largely anthropological bottom-up research on the

former Yugoslavia² – does not endeavour to portray ordinary people simply as victims, a “typically liberal wrong premise” (Žižek, 1999, p.80). Instead, it seeks to give ordinary people in Serbia a voice, to generate some insight into their everyday lives during the nineties, and to explore the degree to which domestic and external views of Milošević either coincide or conflict.

The thesis explores not only the experiences and opinions of ordinary Serbian people, but also of national minorities in Serbia. The latter have received little attention in Western literature, and their inclusion in the interview sample not only gives it added richness and depth, but also strengthens the interview data by showing that the researcher has made an clear attempt to deal with so-called “contrary cases”.

The research is problem-driven, rather than methods-driven, and is primarily area-studies-based. The very detailed picture that the area specialist seeks to paint is such that he uses a variety of materials to achieve the desired richness and texture. His approach is often eclectic, relying upon various disciplines, such as history, sociology, anthropology and cultural studies. Similarly, this thesis adopts a self-consciously eclectic approach that draws upon both social history and IR. In this way, it contributes not only to area studies, through its detailed empirical research. It makes an important contribution to broader debates in international history regarding the merits and disadvantages of using a bottom-up approach.

² Examples will be given in chapter 3.

The thesis also contributes to wider debates in IR and international politics about the “criminal” leader, an ill-defined concept that it seeks to develop. This conceptualization of the criminal leader provides an important framework or backdrop for the entire research, and broadens the implications of the thesis and its findings. The initial concept of the criminal leader that the thesis develops, comprising four key dimensions, is modified to include an additional, fifth dimension – a domestic dimension. The theoretical importance of this domestic dimension both justifies the thesis’ strongly bottom-up approach and, in turn, is empirically confirmed by the interview data and the discrepancy it reveals between external and domestic views of Milošević.

The thesis’ eclecticism not only generates valuable new insight into Milošević’s leadership and regime. By expanding the scope of the research question beyond area studies, it both facilitates “greater communication and experimentation across a wider range of research communities across the social sciences” (Sil, 2004, p.322), and demonstrates that the problems and issues that area specialists address have much broader relevance and significance. Unless this is recognized, it seems likely that area studies will unfortunately remain on the margins of Politics departments in the UK, sidelined by its stronger competitors such as IR, comparative politics, and political theory.

Overview of Methods

In keeping with its overall approach, the thesis is eclectic in terms of its methods. It uses both qualitative and quantitative sources, and combines

textual analysis of Milošević's speeches with analysis of interview data and public opinion polls.³

The thesis seeks to fill an important gap in the existing Western literature by exploring the view from below. Before we find out what ordinary people in Serbia have to say about Milošević, however, it is important to first find out what Milošević was saying to them when he was in power. Milošević's speeches are a key primary source, and yet one that the existing Western literature, despite being strongly top-down, has surprisingly overlooked. Western authors typically refer to, and misrepresent, only three particular speeches - Milošević's Kosovo Polje speech (April 1987), his Gazimestan speech (June 1989), and his address to Serbia's municipal leaders (March 1991).

This research examines Milošević's main speeches and addresses between 1987 and 2000. The fact that Milošević rarely appeared in public and gave very few interviews makes systematic analysis of his speeches especially worthwhile. These speeches provide valuable insight into certain aspects of Milošević's leadership, such as his relationship with the Serbian people and how he sought to win popular support. They are also important in terms of allowing us to look at how Milošević portrayed himself as a leader. Did he, for example, present himself as a criminal leader intent on causing war and mayhem? The conclusion reached is that Milošević's speeches challenge,

³ According to Gerring, "...method-eclecticism, rather than fixed rules of procedure, is likely to remain – and should remain – the dominant mode of inquiry in the social sciences" (Gerring, 2001, p.242). In his view, "...social science is often led astray by a too rigid adherence to method. Most research designs cannot be reduced to a single method" (Gerring, 2001, p.240).

rather than confirm, the image of him as a criminal leader. In particular, they do not support the literature's claims, central to his construction as a criminal leader, that he planned the wars in the former Yugoslavia and incited ethnic hatred.

Although the thesis is not methods-driven, its main contributions to the existing Western literature on the Milošević regime derive primarily from its bottom-up method and rich interview data. Ninety people in Serbia and Kosovo were interviewed between May and September 2004, using qualitative, semi-structured interviews. Of these ninety interviewees, sixty-seven can be described as ordinary people. Forty-nine are Serbs, and eighteen are national minorities (Albanians, ethnic Hungarians, Muslims, Roma, and one Slovak).

The remaining twenty-three interviewees are elites, purposively selected because of their particular knowledge of the Milošević regime and/or personal relationship with Milošević. Ten of the elite interviewees knew him, and seven of these ten used to work closely with him. They include the current vice-president of Milošević's SPS, two former Foreign Ministers of Serbia, and one of the authors of the famous 1986 SANU Memorandum.

Interviews can be either quantitative (structured) or qualitative (semi-structured, unstructured). In this case, qualitative interviews were chosen for three main reasons. First, the main purpose of the interviews was to explore in detail the opinions that ordinary people in Serbia have of Milošević, and thereby ascertain whether and to what extent they themselves view him as a

criminal leader. Qualitative interviews were seen as most appropriate for this purpose. Unlike structured interviews, they would allow the interviewer flexibility, the chance to probe in depth, and the opportunity to follow up key points that the interviewees might raise.

Secondly, it was believed that qualitative interviews would give the best insight into ordinary peoples' everyday life experiences during the Milošević period, an area that the existing Western literature heavily neglects. As Bouma and Atkinson argue, "Qualitative research may be appropriate where the investigator is attempting to understand the nature of a person's experiences" (Bouma and Atkinson, 1995, p.208).⁴ Insight into these experiences, in turn, would give us the context in which to evaluate and assess interviewees' opinions about Milošević. Other scholars interested in exploring the realm of everyday life, such as Kotkin and Lüdtke, have similarly used qualitative, rather than quantitative research methods.

Thirdly, the present research is a response to existing Western literature about Milošević and his regime. Since this literature is qualitative, rather than quantitative, it made most sense to use qualitative sources to explore the degree to which the image of Milošević as a criminal leader exists outside of Western literature. It was also felt that by using qualitative interviews, the thesis could make an important contribution to the existing Western literature. Few authors have conducted interviews as part of their research, and those who have used

⁴ For their part, Marshall and Rossman argue that qualitative research has unique strengths for research "that is exploratory or descriptive, that assumes the value of context and setting, and that searches for a deeper understanding of the participants' lived experiences of the phenomenon" (Marshall and Rossman, 1999, p.60).

interviews have most frequently interviewed elites. Bennett, for example, interviewed “as many key figures as possible throughout the former Yugoslavia” (Bennett, 1995, p.x); and LeBor’s interviewees included Mira Marković (Milošević’s wife), Borislav Milošević (Milošević’s brother), and Dušan Mitević (the former head of *Radio Television Serbia*) (LeBor, 2002).

Finally, semi-structured interviews were chosen over unstructured interviews. Semi-structured interviews have some structure, in the form of an interview guide, but this is not rigidly adhered to. They strike a balance between the rigidity of structured interviews and the extreme looseness of unstructured interviews. In an unstructured interview, the interviewer will have decided only in general terms about the themes and topic areas to be explored. The decision to use semi-structured, rather than unstructured interviews was based mainly on practical grounds. As Arksey and Knight argue,

Unstructured interviews produce a wealth of qualitative data; the findings can generate deep insights into peoples’ understandings of their social world. However, at the analysis stage of the research, the time needed to do justice to all the data that have been collected is considerable. This is an important consideration to bear in mind, and generally this type of interview is not suitable for projects that have to be completed when time is in short supply (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p.7).

Since time in the field was limited, unstructured interviews would not have been appropriate. Furthermore, given that quite specific information was being sought from interviewees, it would have made little sense to use unstructured interviews.

Structured interviews, most commonly used in survey research, were also rejected, for the following reasons. Firstly, structured interviews are not

appropriate for exploring peoples' experiences and opinions in depth. Quantitative research is positivist and embodies a view of social reality as an external, objective reality. Uniformity in interview procedure is therefore essential, in order to be able to isolate, measure, and understand this reality. This means that the interview schedule must be rigidly followed. It also means that,

...the interviewer is expected to perform like a 'robot', acting in a neutral voice, offering the same impression to the respondents, using the same style, appearance, prompts, probes, etc., and showing no initiative, spontaneity or personal interest in the research topic. The purpose of this is to reduce interviewer bias to a minimum and achieve the highest degree of uniformity in procedure (Sarantakos, 1998, p.247).

This very strict interview procedure, combined with the use of closed questions (the questions must be direct and easily quantified), means that "...in a structured interview format there is little freedom for respondents to talk about what is important to them, or to raise their particular concerns" (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p.90).

Secondly, it was considered essential to gain the interviewees' trust. Not only were they to be asked questions about a difficult period that many now want simply to forget. They were to be asked these questions by an interviewer whose country bombed Serbia and Kosovo just six years ago. In quantitative research, however, the interviewer is required to be detached and aloof. This would have preserved a problematic distance between interviewer and interviewees, thus making it very difficult to establish any degree of real trust. It would also have made the interviews very formal, which might have

discouraged interviewees from speaking openly.⁵ The requirement of strictly following the interview schedule, moreover, would have limited how the interviewer was able to deal with the situation when interviewees became upset.

Thirdly, because it seeks to make generalizations and predictions, the structured interview privileges breadth over depth. Consequently, the sample is typically large and, most importantly, representative, so that very broad conclusions can be drawn. The present research, however, privileges depth over breadth, and it has consciously strived to avoid making the sort of sweeping claims and generalizations that one finds in so much of the existing Western literature on the Milošević regime. It is not seeking to find out how many people in Serbia regard Milošević as a criminal leader, but rather to explore in detail how ordinary Serbs and national minorities view Milošević today. Thus, while every effort was made to introduce diversity into the interview sample, the overall objective was to achieve a rich sample that would generate important bottom-up insight.

According to Sarantakos, “A structured interview is in reality a questionnaire read by the interviewer as prescribed by the researcher” (Sarantakos, 1998, p.247). There are, of course, other ways of conducting a questionnaire. For example, one can survey people on the street, send them a questionnaire, or interview them via telephone. For the purposes of the present research,

⁵ Once in the field, it quickly became apparent that interviewees, with the exception of the elite interviewees, were more relaxed and more forthcoming when the interviews were kept very informal.

however, it was felt that any kind of survey would not be suitable, primarily for practical reasons.

In the UK, market researchers often approach shoppers and ask them to complete a survey. In Serbia, however, it would be very unwise to do this. Some Serbs are very wary and suspicious of people from the West⁶, and therefore unlikely to respond well to being stopped on the street.

The major problem with the mail or self-completion questionnaire is the problem of non-response. As May argues,

...unless people have an incentive, either through an interest in the subject which the survey is covering or some other basis, then response rates are likely to be low and the figure of 40 per cent, or four out of every ten people sent a questionnaire, is not uncommon (May, 2001, p.97).

Had self-completion questionnaires been used in the present instance, it is probable that the response rate would have been even lower. It is likely that if questionnaires were randomly sent out to Serbian people by a Western researcher, many of them would have been suspicious and, therefore, not have responded.

Another problem with this type of survey is that it is very impersonal. In the words of Aldridge and Levine, "The language of survey research betrays its lack of concern with the individual: respondents, samples, cases" (Aldridge and Levine, 2001, p.13). In contrast, the present research does not treat the individual simply as a respondent or case, and this is reflected in the research

⁶ The girlfriend of one interviewee, for example, suspected the interviewer of being a spy.

method chosen. Unlike the survey, the semi-structured interview can be viewed as a conversation or dialogue between two individuals, interviewer and interviewee. This made it possible to tailor the questions according to who was being interviewed. Had a survey been used, it would have been necessary to devise three separate surveys – one for the (ordinary) Serbian interviewees, one for the Serbian elite interviewees, and one for the national minority interviewees.

Finally, surveys by telephone would not have been practical. If the respondents were randomly selected, it is likely that many of them would not have spoken English, and it would have been extremely difficult for the interviewer to interview people in Serbian by telephone. Furthermore, some people would almost certainly have put the telephone straight down upon hearing a foreign accent.

Notwithstanding the decision to use semi-structured interviews, rather than surveys, public opinion poll data nevertheless plays an important role in this thesis and nicely complements the interview data. The opinion polls that are incorporated into the thesis were conducted between September 1990 and June 2005 by five polling institutes in Belgrade – the *Agency for Applied Sociological and Political Research* (“Argument”), *Marten Board International*, the *National Democratic Institute* (NDI), the *Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute* (SMMRI), and *TNS Medium Gallup*.⁷

⁷ Unfortunately, it was not possible to find any public opinion polls of national minorities.

It is also important to emphasize that the findings of this thesis could be used as a basis for future survey research. To cite Gaskell, "...insights gained from qualitative interviewing may improve the quality of survey design and interpretation" (Gaskell, 2000, p.39). Surveys, in turn, would help us to ascertain whether and to what extent the opinions expressed by the interviewees are generalizable to the Serbian population as a whole.

Outline of Chapters

The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I is literature-based and comprises three chapters. Together, these three chapters lay the foundations for Part II. They explore how Milošević has been constructed as a criminal leader and how his criminalization can be linked to broader developments in the field of IR. They also seek to develop the concept of the criminal leader, and to answer the question of how one studies a criminal leader. Part II is empirical, and consists of five chapters. These chapters analyze Milošević's speeches and qualitative interview data (and some public opinion poll data), to find out whether and to what extent these sources support the image of Milošević as a criminal leader and whether, therefore, on the basis of these sources, we can say that Milošević is a criminal leader.

Chapter 1 is an overview of Western (essentially Anglo-American) literature on Milošević and the former Yugoslavia. The authors whose work forms the focus of this first chapter are academics, journalists, and *dramatis personae*. The aim of this chapter is to deconstruct, and to thereby identify the key elements in, Milošević's construction as a criminal leader. It argues that the

most important element in this construction is Milošević's actions and intentions. The three remaining elements are his motivations, his personality and psychological profile, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders, past and present. The chapter further argues that Liberalism underpins this construction - Milošević was seen as posing a fundamental threat to liberal peace and values. Since not all Western authors subscribe to the view of Milošević as a criminal leader, this chapter also looks at some alternative viewpoints in the literature.

Chapter 2 argues that Milošević's construction as a criminal leader can be linked to, and understood in the context of, broader developments in the field of International Relations. It focuses on four particular developments - the growing prominence of the Liberal paradigm, the normative turn within the discipline, changing attitudes towards war - in particular the criminalization of war - and, finally, the erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity. It is within the context of these developments, moreover, that other leaders besides Milošević - such as Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor - have been criminalized. The final part of this chapter, therefore, seeks to develop a general concept of the criminal leader. Using the criminalization of Milošević as a starting point, it argues that there are four key dimensions of a criminal leader - a behavioural dimension, a character dimension, an institutional dimension, and a policy dimension. Emphasizing that the concept of the criminal leader is externally constructed, it maintains that the policy dimension is the most important.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the question of how one should study a “criminal” leader. It focuses on the work of scholars who have studied the regimes of Hitler and Stalin from below. According to the concept of a criminal leader developed in chapter 2, both Hitler and Stalin can be considered as archetypal criminal leaders. Bottom-up research of their regimes is, therefore, used to support the thesis’ contention that the criminal leader must be studied not only “from above”, but also “from below”. The concept of the criminal leader developed in chapter 2 is consequently modified, through the addition of a fundamental fifth dimension – a domestic dimension.

Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter. It focuses on Milošević’s speeches, which are analyzed both thematically and chronologically. It argues that the existing Western literature fundamentally misrepresents these speeches, through highly selective quoting. Milošević’s reference at Gazimestan, on 28 June 1989, to the possibility of “armed battles” in the future, is a classic example. It further argues that the speeches can only be seen as providing evidence of Milošević’s “criminal” leadership and “criminal” intent if they are thus misrepresented. On the basis of the speeches that Milošević gave during his final two years in power, the image of him that emerges, it is contended, is not as a criminal leader, but rather as a desperate leader. He was clinging like a limpet to power, but the rock to which he was clinging was progressively crumbling.

Chapters 5 to 8 analyze the interview data gathered. A short introductory section precedes these chapters. It provides the reader with key information

about the interviewees, the interviews, and the sampling strategies used. It also discusses some anticipated criticisms of the interview data, for example certain biases and imbalances in the interview sample.

In order to find out how domestic views of Milošević fit with the dominant Western view, chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on the key element in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader – his actions and intentions. These chapters explore the degree to which there is support among the Serbian interviewees and the non-Serbian interviewees for the five key claims that Western literature makes with respect to Milošević's actions and intentions.

Chapter 5 deals with four of these five claims – (i) that Milošević is the person most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia; (ii) that he planned these wars in advance, with the purpose of creating a “Greater Serbia”; (iii) that Serbian crimes committed during these wars were planned and premeditated; and (iv) that Milošević used violence to achieve his aims. The chapter concludes that, overall, the national minority interviewees do support these claims, while the Serbian interviewees do not.

Chapter 6 concentrates on the fifth key claim that Western literature makes vis-à-vis Milošević's actions and intentions - the claim that he incited ethnic hatred. The experiences and opinions of the interviewees from national minority groups in Serbia play a particularly important role in this chapter. On the basis of the interview data, the chapter argues that the main form of discrimination that Serbia's national minorities suffered, with the exception of

the Kosovar Albanians, was social discrimination, rather than State or institutional discrimination. It further argues that the particular circumstances of the nineties were the primary cause of this social discrimination. The final part of this chapter addresses the remaining elements in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader - his motivations, his personality and psychology, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders. The chapter concludes that, overall, the national minority interviewees support Milošević's construction as a criminal leader, although not as a racist, whereas the Serbian interviewees do not. The Serbian interviewees, it is argued, regard Milošević above all as a "bad" leader.

Chapter 7 explores this image of Milošević as a "bad" leader. It argues that, according to the Serbian interviewees, Milošević was a bad leader in four particular senses. Firstly, he cared only about himself and his power, and not about the Serbian people. Secondly, he was an incompetent leader who lacked ability. Thirdly, he surrounded himself with "bad" people. Finally, the consequences of his rule – both for the Serbian people and for the country – were very bad. This chapter also examines a second image of Milošević that emerges from the Serbian interview data – as a victim. It argues that Milošević is viewed as a victim of the people around him, in particular his wife Mira; as a victim of himself and his own weaknesses; and finally as a victim of Western powers. Given that Milošević is currently standing trial in The Hague, the fact that the Serbian interviewees do not regard him as a criminal leader is very significant. In particular, it has important implications for the Tribunal's stated goals of achieving peace and "justice".

Chapter 8, the final chapter in the thesis, explores the attitudes of both the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees towards The Hague Tribunal. It argues that the national minority interviewees support both Milošević's normative and legal criminalization, whereas the Serbian interviewees generally support neither. In order to help explain the differences in opinion between the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees, it is suggested that the two groups of interviewees are working with fundamentally dissimilar frames of reference. The Serbian interviewees judge Milošević primarily in a domestic context, in which war plays only a marginal role. In contrast, the national minority interviewees judge Milošević in a much broader, regional context, in which war is central.

The conclusion to the thesis summarizes the main findings of the research, and explains how the different parts of the thesis fit together. It discusses the contributions that the thesis makes, whilst also acknowledging its limitations. It emphasizes how the thesis contributes to existing Western literature on the Milošević regime, in three particular ways. Firstly, through its rich interview data, the research makes a valuable empirical contribution to a literature that is, overall, empirically weak. It makes a second important empirical contribution to the existing literature through its analysis of Milošević's speeches. Thirdly, through its emphasis and exploration of the view from below, it makes a worthy methodological contribution to a literature that is heavily top-down in its approach.

It is also underscored, however, that the importance of the research and its implications extend beyond area studies. Firstly, by virtue of its eclecticism, particularly the attempts to bring together area studies and social history, the thesis contributes to methodological debates in international history about history “from below” and the value of bottom-up approaches. Secondly, through its efforts to contextualize and to develop the concept of the criminal leader, the thesis contributes to a broader discussion in international politics and IR about who is a criminal leader, what defines a criminal leader, who determines when a leader should be deemed criminal, and whether and when a criminal leader should be put on trial.

The second half of the conclusion addresses some broader issues. It discusses some possible implications of criminalizing leaders. It also considers how the concept of the criminal leader might evolve in the future, and how the current “War on Terror” might affect it. It asks if the criminal leader is becoming less significant in a world where certain “rogue” states and terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaida, are seen as posing the biggest threat.

Finally, some suggestions as to future research will be made. These suggestions, based on the thesis and its findings, will be mainly qualitative but also quantitative and comparative, in order to underscore that the thesis lends itself to different types of research.

Part I

The Criminal Leader; Deconstructing, Defining and Developing the Concept

Chapter 1

The Criminalization of Slobodan Milošević; An Overview of Western Literature

Introduction

Slobodan Milošević was born in the town of Požarevac, on 20 August 1941. His parents, who both committed suicide, were from Montenegro. Milošević studied Law at the University of Belgrade, receiving his degree in 1964. He began his career at *Technogas*, a major gas company, and rose to become its general director. From 1978 until 1983, he held the post of president of *Beogradska banka*, one of the largest banks in Yugoslavia.

Milošević then embarked upon a political career. In 1984, he became Chairman of the City Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade, and two years later he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. On 8 May 1989, he was elected President of the Presidency of Serbia, and he was elected President of Serbia in December 1990. After serving two terms as President of Serbia, he was elected President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 15 July 1997. He stepped down from this position on 6 October 2000, after being defeated by Vojislav Koštunica in the September 2000 FRY Presidential elections. Since July 1990, he has been the President of the SPS.

Today, Milošević is standing trial in The Hague, facing charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. He is the first former head of state to be

indicted by an international tribunal for alleged crimes committed while in office.¹ Although the trial is still in progress, it is clear that for Milošević's many critics, his guilt is already established. In their view, Milošević is unquestionably a criminal leader. The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to explore how the image of Milošević as a criminal leader has been constructed in the West.

Rather than focusing on one particular type of scholarship, this chapter will examine the views of a diverse range of Western authors – academics (such as Gow, Gallagher and Ramet), journalists (for example, Bass, Glenny, Silber and Little, and LeBor) and *dramatis personae* (including Sell and Zimmermann). The purpose of this is to illustrate how widespread the view of Milošević as a criminal leader actually is – it should not be associated with only one specific type of scholarship. With the notable exception of Florence Hartman, who is French, all of the authors associated in this chapter with the construction of Milošević as a criminal leader are British and American. As a suggestion for future research, it would be interesting to look at whether other Western authors – for example, French and German writers - share the view of Milošević as a criminal leader.²

¹ The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created on 25 May 1993 (UN Security Council Resolution 827). Milošević was indicted by the Tribunal on 27 May 1999, and extradited to The Hague on 28 June 2001.

² Serbia and France have traditionally been allies. However, in January and February 1993, *Médecins du Monde* put up thousands of posters in major cities in France, showing Milošević and Hitler side by side, with the caption, "Speeches about ethnic cleansing – does that remind you of anything?" (Johnstone, 2002, p.74). Germany, on the other hand, has been the traditional ally of Croatia. It has a large Croatian émigré community, and vigorously championed Croatia's right to secede from Yugoslavia. The strong anti-Serb tone taken by some German newspapers, therefore, was perhaps unsurprising. For example, Reismüller, the editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, justified Slovenia and Croatia's declarations of independence by describing the "Yugo-Serbs" as essentially Oriental, "militarist Bolsheviks" who have "no place in the European community" (cited in Johnstone, 1999). According to Johnstone, "...what occurred in Germany was a strange sort of mass transfer of Nazi identity, and guilt, to the Serbs" (Johnstone, 1999).

Notwithstanding the broad consensus that Milošević is a criminal leader, the literature does not in fact define the term. One reason for this is that the criminalization of leaderships is a relatively new phenomenon. What is clear, however, is that the concept of the criminal leader is essentially a normative construct, informed by liberal principles. That is to say that while many of the writers considered in this chapter support the legal prosecution of Milošević, they also see him as criminal on moral grounds. Thus, the term “criminal leader” is not used in this chapter, or in the thesis as a whole, in a strict legal sense. It should, however, be emphasized that it is precisely normative judgements of Milošević’s actions and intentions that have been used to justify the legal proceedings against him in The Hague Tribunal.³

The chapter comprises three main sections. Section 1 looks at how Milošević has been constructed in the West as a criminal leader. Milošević’s actions and intentions, his motivations, and his personality and psychological profile constitute three of the four main elements in his construction as a criminal leader. Linked to each of these elements is a particular sub-image of Milošević - as a dangerous warmonger, as a ruthless power-seeker, and as a flawed and psychologically impaired individual. The fourth element is a comparative element; Milošević has been frequently compared to other “criminal” leaders.

³ The Hague Tribunal, and in particular interviewees’ attitudes towards it, will be discussed in chapter 8.

Section 2 explores the theory that underlies the construction of Milošević as a criminal leader. It argues that the portrayal of Milošević as a criminal leader has been heavily influenced by liberal principles and the idea that Milošević posed a threat to liberal peace. Throughout this chapter, it is also argued that Milošević's construction as a criminal leader can be linked to Western, Orientalist stereotypes about the Balkans.⁴

While this chapter aims to give expression to the “dominant voice” in Western literature – the view that Milošević is a criminal leader – section 3 looks at some important alternative viewpoints in the literature. It first looks at two alternative portraits of Milošević - as an improviser, and as an obstacle to the West. It then looks at some alternative explanations of the wars in the former Yugoslavia that concentrate far less on the role of actors than on the role of circumstances, both internal and external.

Section 1 – The Construction of Milošević as a Criminal Leader

Milošević's construction as a criminal leader comprises four main elements, each of which can now be examined in detail.

⁴ According to Edward Said, Orientalism is “the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that particular entity ‘the Orient’ is in question” (Said, 1991, p.3). Moreover, “The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be ‘Oriental’ in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it *could* be – that is, submitted to being – *made* Oriental” (Said, 1991, p.5).

(i) Milošević's Actions and Intentions

Milošević's alleged actions and intentions constitute the key element in his construction as a criminal leader. Just as the commission of a crime requires both an action (*actus reas*) and a state of mind (*mens rea*), so those who criminalize Milošević focus on his actions and intentions, as they see them.

(a) Actions

Concerning Milošević's actions, Western literature levels three particular charges at him. The first of these is that he was most responsible for the break-up of Yugoslavia and for the bloody wars that ensued. The second charge is that he used violence to achieve his ends. The third charge is that he incited ethnic hatred. We can now look at each of these charges more closely.

The causes of Yugoslavia's collapse and descent into war were both multiple and complex. Nevertheless, conventional wisdom has it that Milošević was most to blame. In the words of Hayden, "orthodox" accounts "presume and then focus on the guilt of 'the Serbs' and especially of Slobodan Milošević" (Hayden, 2000, p.19). Zimmermann, for example, contends that, "The prime agent of Yugoslavia's destruction was Slobodan Milošević, president of Serbia" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.viii); and Sell maintains that, "Yugoslavia did not die a natural death; it was murdered, and Milošević, more than any other single leader, is responsible" (Sell, 2002, p.4).

Echoing such views, Silber and Little describe Milošević as “The instigator of Yugoslavia’s bloody disintegration and the guiding hand behind the wars...” (Silber and Little, 1996, p.385); Bass refers to Milošević as “the prime mover in the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration” (Bass, 2003, p.85); and Sudetic describes him as “the prime mover in Yugoslavia’s slide into nationalist turmoil...” (Sudetic, 1998, p.77). Gow identifies Milošević as “The man who had led Serbia into a decade of fruitless war and the Yugoslav lands into an abyss of mass murder and human misery...” (Gow, 2003, p.1); and Glenny contends that, “There can be no doubt that from an early stage, Milošević was well-prepared to accept war as a solution to the Yugoslav problem” (Glenny, 1993, p.38).

Reinforcing associations of Milošević with death and destruction, Hartman refers to him as “l’incendiaire des Balkans...” (“the arsonist of the Balkans”) (Hartman, 1999, p.356); Hazan describes Milošević as “the Balkan pyromaniac” (Hazan, 2004, p.69); and Doder and Branson emphasize Milošević’s “remarkable legacy of deliberate malevolence and destruction” (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.237).

Clearly, there is a broad consensus in the literature that Milošević was most responsible for the death of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed. The question that remains unanswered, however, is why he was most responsible. Let us turn once again to Hayden. He argues that, according to “orthodox” accounts, “...Milošević roused Serb nationalism to threaten the other peoples in Yugoslavia, thus forcing other republics to secede. Then Milošević activated a plan for a Greater Serbia, invading Croatia, then Bosnia...” (Hayden, 2000, p.19). Thus, it

seems that nationalism is the key to explaining why Milošević is deemed the person most to blame for what happened in ex-Yugoslavia. Spencer, for example, maintains that, “It was in Kosovo that Slobodan Milošević launched the nationalistic chauvinism that led to secession and wars throughout Yugoslavia...” (Spencer, 2000, p.31); and Zimmermann claims that, “Nationalism was the arrow that killed Yugoslavia. Milošević was the principal bowman” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.212).⁵

More particularly, it is the widespread belief that Milošević was seeking to create a “Greater Serbia” that accounts for the literature’s emphasis on his personal responsibility for the wars. Gow, for example, argues that, “The Serbian new state project⁶ meant war” (Gow, 2003, p. 118); and Magaš maintains that Yugoslavia “was destroyed for the cause of a Greater Serbia” (Magaš, 1993, p.xiv). Various referred to in the literature as a “dream” (Boatswain, 1995, p.3); a “well-defined political objective” (Cigar, 1995, p.4); a “programme” (Gallagher, 2001, p.236); a “project” (Gow, 2003, p.2; Hasani, 2000, p.5); a “plan” (LeBor, 2002, p.136); and a “vision” (Sell, 2002, p.151), “Greater Serbia” is a somewhat opaque term that is rarely defined, as if its meaning were self-evident. Nevertheless, it is a term that is widely used, both in Western literature and in the media.

⁵ It is widely believed, however, that Milošević was never a genuine nationalist. Bennett, for example, argues that, “Though he [Milošević] has played the Serb national card, he is not, and never has been, a Serb nationalist” (Bennett, 1995, p.247). Cohen, for his part, maintains that, “In practice, Serbian nationalism per se meant very little to Milošević” (Cohen, 2001, p.151).

⁶ This was a project to “establish new state borders from which unwanted communities would be removed – ethnically cleansed” (Gow, 2003, p.4).

Given this emphasis on a “Greater Serbia”, the wars in former Yugoslavia are frequently portrayed as predatory, expansionist wars. Magaš, for example, claims that, “It is now clear beyond any doubt that the war taking place in Yugoslavia is not an ethnic war but a war of territorial expansion” (Magaš, 1993, p.324); and Cohen argues that,

As the imminent dissolution of the Yugoslav socialist federation came more clearly into view during 1990 and 1991, Milošević turned his attention to efforts aimed at ensuring as much territory as possible for any new Serbian state (Cohen, 2001, p. 142).

Realists would argue that the pursuit of territory is not necessarily driven by aggressive and revanchist designs. According to Snyder and Jervis, for example, “It is important to keep the concepts of the security dilemma and predation separate, and to understand that elements of each are present in almost every specific situation, albeit in different ways and proportions” (Snyder and Jervis, 1999, p.19). They continue,

No individual case is ever entirely of one type or the other. Actors often feel they need to expand in order to be secure. Sometimes such beliefs are rationalizations for more purely predatory drives; at other times they are not, and it is extremely difficult for later analysts, let alone contemporary observers, to tell which is which (Snyder and Jervis, 1999, p.20).

This view, however, is not widely shared in the literature, where the dominant thinking is that the pursuit of territory was fuelled by aggressive designs and necessarily involved the commission of terrible crimes. Cigar, for example, argues that the policy of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina was “implemented in a systematic manner as part of a broader strategy intended to achieve a well-defined, concrete political objective, namely, the creation of an expanded, ethnically pure Greater Serbia” (Cigar, 1995, p.4). In a similar vein, Gow contends that the

commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes was “integral to the Serbian new state project” (Gow, 2003, p.7); and Williams and Scharf refer to Milošević’s “reliance on ethno-nationalism and ethnic cleansing as tools for accumulating and retaining political power in order to pursue his dream of a greater Serbia” (Williams and Scharf, 2002, p.xvii).

This leads us to the second charge made against Milošević – that he used violence to achieve his aims. According to Cohen, for example, “Violence was always part of Milošević’s equation” (Cohen, 1998, p.188); Cox describes Milošević as “...unleashing great violence in his pursuit of a greater Serbia...” (Cox, 2002, p.205); and Bass describes the Milošević regime as “one of the most murderous regimes on the planet...” (Bass, 2003, p.86). For their part, Doder and Branson claim that when Milošević delivered his famous speech in Gazimestan, on 28 June 1989, he “invoked the spirit of violence” (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.4).⁷ Moreover, that was not the only occasion on which he did so. Armacost, for example, maintains that,

In March 1998, violence again erupted in the Balkans, this time in Kosovo – an ethnic cauldron in the heart of the former Yugoslavia. For the third time in a decade, the violence was caused by the nationalist politics of Serbia’s long-standing dictator, Slobodan Milošević (Armacost, 2000, p.vii).

Armacost’s description of Kosovo as “an ethnic cauldron” has strong Orientalist overtones. That is to say that it is in keeping with common stereotypes about the Balkans as a highly explosive and dangerous region. These stereotypes are firmly entrenched. Back in 1904, for example, Edith Durham referred to “the bubbling

⁷ This speech will be examined in chapter 4 and, it is argued, does not support Doder and Branson’s claim.

edge of the ever-simmering Eastern Question” (Durham, 1904, p.1); and William Sloane, in 1914, wrote of the “seething, boiling mass of Balkan politics” (Sloane, 1914, p.229). More recently, Colonel Bob Stewart claimed that, “After the war [World War Two] ended, Tito managed to keep the country united until his death some ten years ago. Since then, the powder keg has been waiting to explode again” (Stewart, 1994, p.6).

It is suggested that portrayals of Milošević as a violent and brutal leader are linked to such stereotypes about the violent and dangerous nature of the Balkans. As will be seen in section 2, US policymakers often relied upon such stereotypes during the early nineties, in order to justify America’s non-intervention in the former Yugoslavia. During the NATO bombing, however, Milošević, not the region, was portrayed as violent. Speaking on 15 April 1999, for example, President Clinton referred to “...the Milošević vision – rooted as it is in hatred and violence...” (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.855).

We can now look at the third and final charge made in the literature against Milošević - that he incited ethnic hatred. This marks a significant shift in emphasis away from the idea of “ancient Balkan hatreds”⁸ to the idea that inter-ethnic hatred was deliberately fostered and encouraged. Gompert, for example, argues that, “Milošević injected into the Serbs the venom of ethnic hatred that had

⁸ The idea that hatred is endemic to the Balkans is another Orientalist stereotype. In recent times, it is perhaps most associated with Robert Kaplan, according to whom, “Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. Here politics have been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from time to time in history has flowed up the Danube into Central Europe. Nazism, for instance, can claim Balkan origins” (Kaplan, 1994, p.xxiii).

been absent in modern Yugoslavia” (Gompert, 1996, p.143); and Ramet contends that, “Milošević built his power on a foundation of hatred and xenophobia...”(Ramet, 2002, p.308). She further claims that, of all the ex-Yugoslav republics, “only Milošević’s regime relied on the inculcation and nurturing of hatred in the first place to develop support” (Ramet, 2002, p.351). For his part, Zimmermann refers to “the ethnic hatred sown by Milošević and his ilk...” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.41); while Duncan and Holman compare Milošević to Russia’s Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, claiming that the latter’s “blatant appeals to racism bear a striking resemblance to those of Milošević’s Serbia” (Duncan and Holman, 1994, p.208).

It is striking that the racism of the late president of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, is rarely remarked upon.⁹ According to Hammond,

While the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević was routinely condemned as an ultra-nationalist, comparatively little attention was given to the political doctrines of Croatian president Franjo Tuđman and Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegović, both of whom had espoused an exclusivist nationalism prior to the conflict (Hammond, 2002, p.183).

Zimmermann emphasizes Tuđman’s nationalism, arguing that, “Unlike Milošević, who was driven by power, Tuđman betrayed an obsession with Croatian nationalism” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.75). He also describes Tuđman’s regime as “a narrow-minded, crypto-racist regime hostile to Serbia and to the Yugoslavia that it erroneously believed Serbia controlled” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.246). For Zimmermann, however, “Tuđman’s saving feature, which distinguished him from

⁹ On 17 March 1990, for example, Tuđman declared, “Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb” (cited in Gallagher, 2001, p.266); and Holbrooke has spoken of Tuđman’s “deep hatred of the Muslims...” (Holbrooke, 1999, p.162).

Milošević, was that he really wanted to be seen as a Western statesman. He listened to Western expressions of concern and...often did something about them..." (Zimmermann, 1996, p.77). Commenting on this statement, Hudson remarks, "In some senses, Zimmermann has hit upon the core of the issue. Tudjman could be backed because he was essentially pro-Western, whereas Milošević had to be broken, because he was not" (Hudson, 2003, p.70).

(b) Intentions

We have seen that Western literature heavily blames Milošević for the wars in the former Yugoslavia. However, he is accused not only of being most responsible for those wars, but also of actively planning them, and thus intending for them to happen. Gow, for example, argues that although war was "highly likely and in the circumstances even inevitable, it was Milošević's Belgrade that saw in Yugoslavia's disarray a perfect opportunity to redraw the map; that planned and instigated war..." (Gow, 2003, p.9). LeBor asserts that, "War was a deliberate choice for the Milošević regime..." (LeBor, 2002, p.328). He also argues that, "It was in Croatia and Bosnia that Milošević and his allies were planning the 'armed battles' of which he had spoken at Kosovo in 1989" (LeBor, 2002, p.139).¹⁰

Zimmermann accuses Milošević of "devising and pursuing a strategy that led directly to the breakup of the country and to the deaths of over 100,000 of its citizens" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.212); and Hartman claims that intercepted

¹⁰ On 28 June 1989, Milošević delivered a speech in Kosovo, in which he referred to possible armed battles in the future. It will be argued in chapter 4, however, that undue significance has been attached to these words, in order to reinforce the image of Milošević as a warmonger.

telephone conversations between Milošević and the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, “révèlaient l’existence d’un plan précis¹¹ visant a créer par la violence une Grande Serbie” (“revealed the existence of a precise plan which envisaged the creation, by violent means, of a Greater Serbia”) (Hartman, 1999, p.152).

Milošević is accused not only of planning the wars, but also of planning the crimes committed therein. These crimes were not simply a by-product of the wars. They were carefully planned in advance; they were premeditated. Cigar and Williams, for example, argue that, “The atrocities committed by Serbian forces were part of a planned, systematic and organized campaign to secure territory for an ethnically ‘pure’ Serb state by clearing it of all non-Serb populations” (Cigar and Williams, 2002, p.21); and Malcolm maintains that ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was

a central part of the entire political project which the war was intended to achieve, namely the creation of homogeneous Serb areas which could eventually be joined to other Serb areas, including Serbia itself, to create a greater Serbian state (Malcolm, 2002, p.246).

Spencer, referring to the NATO bombing in 1999, claims that, “Milošević may actually have wanted the bombing because it gave a cover for the ethnic cleansing that he had planned in advance” (Spencer, 2000, p.36); and Williams and Scharf contend that Serbian crimes committed in Kosovo were “premeditated atrocities designed to terrorize the civilian population” (Williams and Scharf, 2002, p.174).

¹¹ Hartman is referring here to the so-called “RAM” plan. In his testimony to The Hague Tribunal, on 23 October 2003, Ante Marković, the former Federal Prime Minister, referred to the existence of “a RAM programme”, but admitted that, “I don’t know what it was” (Marković, 2003).

Such views, however, are not confined to Western literature. President Clinton, for example, speaking on 15 April 1999, expressed the view that, “The tragedy in Kosovo is the result of a meticulously planned and long-premeditated attack on an entire people simply on the basis of their ethnicity and religion” (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.850). For its part, the *International Crisis Group* (ICG), in its report of 11 May 1999, referred to Milošević’s “grotesque campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo...” (ICG, 1999, p.i).

In Milošević’s trial in The Hague, the Prosecution has similarly stressed that Serbian crimes committed during the wars in former Yugoslavia were planned and premeditated. In her opening statement on 12 February 2002, for example, the chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, argued that, “Some of the incidents reveal an almost medieval savagery and the calculated cruelty that went far beyond the bounds of legitimate warfare” (Del Ponte, 2002). Fellow prosecutor Geoffrey Nice referred to “Milošević’s criminal plans” (Nice, 2002).

Milošević’s intentions are fundamental to the charge of genocide. Article II of the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide* (1948) defines genocide as,

Many of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] (e)

Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, p.4).¹²

Thus, if Milošević is to be found guilty of genocide, the Prosecution must show that he had genocidal intent – the specific intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims as a people. However,

Since the prosecution has not been able to present unequivocal evidence of genocidal intent – a military order calling for the liquidation of all of the Bosnian Muslims, for example – the experts say that based on earlier rulings, they have serious doubts that the judges will issue a guilty verdict (Sullivan, 2004).

It is interesting to note, for example, that Milošević’s initial indictment for genocide, issued on 22 November 2001, was watered down in a later, amended indictment released on 22 November 2002. For example, the original indictment claimed that Milošević, acting alone or as part of a joint criminal enterprise¹³,

planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation, and execution of the destruction, in whole or in part, of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, in territories within Bosnia and Hercegovina...(The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milošević, 2001).

It specifically mentioned eighteen such territories. In contrast, the amended indictment makes no mention of the Bosnian Croats, and instead refers only to “the Bosnian Muslim national, ethnical, racial or religious groups”. It also names only eight, rather than eighteen, specific territories (The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milošević, 2002).

¹² In a landmark decision in April 2004, The Hague Tribunal found the Bosnian Serb general, Radislav Krstić, guilty of aiding and abetting the crime of genocide in Srebrenica, the scene of the worst massacre in Europe since World War Two. It was the first time since the Nuremberg trials that an international court had established a case of genocide on European soil.

¹³ More about this concept will be said in chapter 2.

Notwithstanding that Milošević's trial is still in progress, various commentators freely use the word "genocide". Back in 1996, Cohen, for example, referred to "the leadership responsible for directing Serbia's calculated program of genocide" (Cohen, 1996, p.135). Even some Western politicians have had no qualms about using the term "genocide". Speaking in March 1999, for example, the British Defence Secretary, George Robertson, stressed that it was imperative to intervene in Kosovo, in order to stop "a regime which is bent on genocide"; while President Clinton referred to "deliberate, systematic efforts at...genocide" in Kosovo (cited in Edwards, 2004). Lady Margaret Thatcher, moreover, also speaking during the NATO bombing campaign, declared,

We are not dealing with some minor thug whose local brutalities may offend our sensibilities from time to time. Milošević's regime and the genocidal ideology that sustains it represent something altogether different – a truly monstrous evil... (cited in Williams and Scharf, 2002, p.205).¹⁴

Use of the word "genocide" has also frequently appeared in Western media. According to Edwards, "A Nexis database search showed that in the two years 1998-1999, the *Los Angeles Times*, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Newsweek* and *Time* used the term 'genocide' 220 times to describe the actions of Serbia in Kosovo" (Edwards, 2004).

In Anglo-Saxon legal systems, one is innocent proven until guilty. In the case of Milošević, however, the opposite is apparently true – he is guilty until proven innocent.

¹⁴ According to Hume, "During the Kosovo conflict, the Nato governments and their allies in the media tended to use the rhetoric of genocide to substitute for the lack of much hard evidence to support stories of Serb atrocities against ethnic Albanians" (Hume, 2000, p.73).

(ii) Milošević's Motivations

In law, a person's motivations are irrelevant to establishing whether he is guilty or innocent. However, when we look at how Milošević has been constructed as a criminal leader, we see that his motivations are treated as relevant. Western literature portrays Milošević as a man motivated by power, to the point of being obsessed with it. Hockenos, for example, describes Milošević as "A tyrant who appeared addicted to power..." (Hockenos, 2003, p.154); Di Giovanni refers to Milošević's "insatiable appetite for power" (Di Giovanni, 2004, p.73); Judah describes Milošević as "an opportunistic and a cynical leader who was only interested in power" (Judah, 2000a, p.xii); and Cohen argues that Milošević's "most compelling interest" was "the retention of power at any cost" (Cohen, 2001, p.xiv). What is interesting is that this pursuit of power is not seen as rational, but as criminal.

What made Milošević's pursuit of power "criminal" was the fact that it was so ruthless and cold-blooded. Silber and Little, for example, argue that on 9 March 1991,¹⁵ "it became clear that Milošević would not hesitate to use force against his own people in order to preserve power" (Silber and Little, 1996, p.119); and Hartman describes Milošević as "un tyran sanguinaire prêt a sacrifier des centaines de milliers de vies sur l'autel de ses ambitions" ("a bloody tyrant prepared to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives on the altar of his ambitions") (Hartman, 1999, p.14). Even more scathing in their attack, Doder and Branson contend that,

¹⁵ This was the start of demonstrations against the regime, organized by Vuk Drašković, the leader of the *Serbian Renewal Movement* (SPO).

“Slobodan Milošević is the Saddam Hussein of Europe, doomed to wreak havoc and go to war – as he has done repeatedly already – in order to preserve his own power and distract his people’s attention from repression and poverty” (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.10).

In his trial in The Hague, Milošević has similarly been portrayed as power-hungry. In her opening statement on 12 February 2002, for example, Carla Del Ponte told the Tribunal that, “...the search for power is what motivated Slobodan Milošević” and that,

...Milošević did nothing but pursue his ambition at the price of unspeakable suffering inflicted on those who opposed him or represented a threat for his personal strategy of power. Everything, Your Honours, everything with the accused Milošević was an instrument in the service of his quest for power (Del Ponte, 2002).

(iii) Milošević’s Personality and Psychological Profile

Few of the Western authors who have written about Milošević have actually met him. Claims about his personality and psychology are, therefore, highly speculative. Nevertheless, his alleged character and psychological traits form part of his criminalization. In the words of Glenny, “The drive towards war in Yugoslavia could not have been as dynamic as it was had it not been for the extraordinary personality of Slobodan Milošević, the most paradoxical of dictators” (Glenny, 1993, p.31).

Milošević is portrayed in the literature as having various negative character traits, such as mendacity. Doder and Branson, for example, refer to Milošević’s

“consummate capacity for lying, intrigue and secrecy” (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.6); and Sell maintains that, “One of the few constants in Milošević’s personality is mendacity” (Sell, 2002, p.173). In a similar vein, Zimmermann refers to Milošević’s “habitual mendacity” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.24), and describes Milošević as “one of the most duplicitous politicians the Balkans has ever produced...” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.249).

Narcissism is another negative character trait often attributed to Milošević.¹⁶ According to Doder and Branson, for example, “The psychologists surmise that he lives in a narcissistic, self-centred place where he is the sun and everything revolves around him” (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.10); and Sell claims that,

US psychologists who have studied Slobodan Milošević closely describe him as having a malignant narcissistic personality. They see him as strongly self-centred, vain, and full of self-love. He is also completely indifferent to almost anyone or anything else around him (Sell, 2002, p.173).

Much is also made of the fact that Milošević was, apparently, rather reclusive. Volkan, for example, argues that, “Most of the time Milošević keeps to himself and has perhaps suffered episodic depression” (Volkan, 1997, p.240); and Scharf and Schabas inform us that, “Slobodan is said to have been a solitary child. Patterns of abandonment surrounded the young Milošević and could be seen as

¹⁶ According to Cashman, “Narcissism is a highly complex personality construct made up of several factors, including a disposition to exploit and manipulate others, a reveling in leadership and authority roles, attitudes of self-importance, superiority and grandiosity, egotism, a lack of empathy for others, physical vanity, and a hypersensitivity to the evaluation of others” (Cashman, 1993, p.41).

factors in the formation of a hardened, isolated individual” (Scharf and Schabas, 2002, p.5).¹⁷

It is suggested that Milošević’s reclusive nature is emphasized as a way of showing him to be somehow “abnormal”. This image of him is strong in the literature. Doder and Branson, for example, describe Milošević as “one warped and malevolent man” (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.284). Ramet claims that, “...the Serbian leader is suffering from an acute personality disorder” and “displays symptoms characteristic of paranoid schizophrenia and psychopathic hostility” (Ramet, 2002, p.310). She also refers to his “arguably paranoid-psychopathic personality traits” (Ramet, 2002, p.351).

Even Milošević’s relationship with his wife, Mira Marković, is portrayed as being somewhat peculiar and out of the ordinary. Di Giovanni, for example, maintains that, Milošević and Mira had “an unnaturally close relationship” (Di Giovanni, 2004, p.153).

What is interesting is that whereas badness and madness are usually treated as two very separate things, Milošević is associated with both. Hartman, for example, describes him as “un dictateur fou” (“a mad dictator”) (Hartman, 1999, p.402). Similarly, President Clinton, speaking on 2 June 1999, claimed that, “Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was not a response to bombing. It was the ten-year method of

¹⁷ In criminal law cases, facts about a defendant’s childhood and upbringing are sometimes introduced as mitigating circumstances. In contrast, information about Milošević’s childhood has been used to reinforce very negative images of him.

Mr Milošević's madness" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.1074).¹⁸ In addition, Milošević is often associated with irrationality. Cohen, for example, argues that, "...Milošević had cemented his power precisely by unleashing the irrational" (Cohen, 1998, p.190). Such claims can be related to Orientalist stereotypes about the Balkans itself. In the words of Burgess, "The Balkans epitomises the supposed unpredictability, indeed, positive irrationality of the region. There, human behaviour apparently follows little recognisable pattern" (Burgess, 1997, p.40).

(iv) Criminalization through Comparison

The final element in Milošević's criminalization is a comparative one. He is often compared to other "criminal" leaders, past and present. Doder and Branson, for example, describe him as the "Saddam Hussein of Europe" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.10). Tony Blair has also compared Milošević to Saddam Hussein.¹⁹ In his speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, on 22 April 1999, for example, Blair told his audience that,

Many of our problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men – Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević. Both have been prepared to wage vicious campaigns against sections of their own community. As a result of these policies, both have brought calamity on their own peoples (Blair, 1999).

¹⁸ According to Füredi, "When colonial nationalists were not depicted as self-serving scoundrels, they were dismissed as mentally unstable" (Füredi, 1994, p.117). The same argument can be made in relation to "criminal leaders".

¹⁹ James Bissett, the Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1992, however, disagrees with such comparisons. In his words, "Few would argue that Slobodan Milošević was a benign and lovable leader, but compared to Saddam Hussein he was a pussycat" (Bissett, 2001b).

For his part, Richard Holbrooke has compared Milošević and the former warlord and president of Liberia, Charles Taylor. According to Holbrooke, “Taylor is Milošević in Africa with diamonds” (cited in Beigbeder, 2002, p.207).

Milošević is most frequently compared, implicitly or explicitly, to Hitler and Stalin. Speaking in June 1999, for example, the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, argued that, “the appalling mass deportations we saw from Priština, particularly the use of railways, is evocative of what happened under Hitler and again under Stalin” (cited in Dunne and Krosiak, 2001, p.36).²⁰ Hartman describes Milošević as “le maître du regime le plus meurtrier d’Europe depuis Hitler” (“the master of the deadliest regime in Europe since Hitler”) (Hartman, 1999, p.14); and Magaš argues that,

Milošević has justified the annexation and wholesale incorporation of other republics and provinces by his concern for the fate of Serb minorities. This is how Hitler once justified the annexation of Austria, the partition and occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the attack on Poland (Magaš, 1993, p.321).

Similarly, Ramet claims that, “Milošević’s biography shares some points in common with the biographies of other dictators and extreme nationalists” (Ramet, 2002, p.309); Bennett contends that, “comparisons with both Hitler and Stalin are not far-fetched” (Bennett, 1995, p.247); and Zimmermann argues that Milošević’s tactic of using mass rallies to dispose of anti-Milošević governments in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro “was right out of Hitler’s and Mussolini’s play books” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.52).

²⁰ Booth describes such comparisons as “mindless” (Booth, 2001, p.316); and Hume argues that, “Whatever crimes Milošević is guilty of, his regime bears no sensible comparison with the Third Reich” (Hume, 2000, p.77).

We have now seen how the image of Milošević as a criminal leader has been constructed. To end this section, it is necessary to say something about the Serbian people. Have they too been criminalized? Most frequently, the Serbs have been portrayed as victims of Milošević.²¹ Benson, for example, argues that, “The Serbs made up the peasant element in the social structure of Bosnia...Like their kin in Kosovo, the Serbs were backwoodsmen, easy meat for nationalist demagogues like Radovan Karadžić and Milošević ...” (Benson, 2001, p.144). Hartman also views the Serbian people as victims, arguing that they were brainwashed like members of a cult (Hartman, 1999, p.181); and Judah maintains that, “Whole communities became pawns to be pushed across the board like so many chess pieces, but the kings grew rich in the process” (Judah, 2000a, p.xii).

However, not everyone regards the Serbs as innocent. Gutman, for example, refers to “the Serb conquest of Bosnia” and describes this as “a well-executed blitzkrieg” (Gutman, 1994, p.ix); and Hockenos claims that, “The inaction of the West in the face of Serbian aggression has set a worrisome precedent” (Hockenos, 1994, p.314). By using the adjectives “Serb” and “Serbian”, these authors thereby imply that the entire Serbian nation was implicated in these crimes. Indeed, as will be seen in the data chapters, there is a widespread feeling among the Serbian interviewees that the Serbian nation is on trial in The Hague, notwithstanding the

²¹ As will be seen in the data chapters, this is how many of the Serbian interviewees view themselves.

Prosecution's repeated insistence that it is concerned solely with individual responsibility, and not with collective responsibility.²²

Others are more explicit in their condemnation of the Serbs. Cohen, for example, maintains that, "As a people, the Serbs cannot escape responsibility: they massively backed Milošević's nationalist upheaval and they voted him into office in the first 'free' elections of December 1990" (Cohen, 1998, p.194). For his part, Gallagher argues that,

Milošević would not have found it so easy to promote Serbian hegemony if this concept had not been particularly appealing to many in Serbia proper, as well as the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and the republic of Montenegro... (Gallagher, 2001, p.236).

The demonization and criminalization of the Serbs, however, was most pronounced in Western media. For example, in April 1999, *Newsweek* published an article by Rod Nordland, entitled "Vengeance of a Victim Race", in which the author claimed that, "The Serbs are Europe's outsiders, seasoned haters raised on self-pity" (cited in Johnstone, 2000). For his part, Thomas Friedman, a columnist for the *New York Times*, wrote on 23 April 1999 that,

Like it or not, we are at war with the Serbian nation (the Serbs certainly think so), and the stakes have to be very clear: Every week you ravage Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulverizing you. You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389 too (cited in Edwards, 2004).

²² Speaking on 12 February 2002, for example, Carla Del Ponte emphasized that, "The accused in this case, as in all cases before the Tribunal, is charged as an individual. He is prosecuted on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility. No state or organization is on trial here today. The indictments do not accuse an entire people of being collectively guilty of the crimes, even the crime of genocide...Collective guilt forms no part of the Prosecution case" (Del Ponte, 2002).

Other authors argue that just as the Serbs were not innocent victims, neither were publics throughout the former Yugoslavia. Fromkin, for example, argues that,

Ethnic hatred may have been aroused or inflamed within the past few years by government-controlled television, but the gunpowder had to have been already there: lighting a match, as the politicians did, would not have ignited an explosion all by itself (Fromkin, 1999, p.161).

In a similar vein, Hammel argues that, “While politicians have manipulated, their publics have not been blameless. Many, but not all, members of those publics share the blame, for without them the politicians have no discontents to exploit” (Hammel, 2000, p.29).

Section 2 – Liberalism and the Criminalization of Milošević

Füredi describes how the British Empire criminalized its anti-imperialist opponents for reasons of self-interest. In short, “By criminalizing and discrediting its opponents, London could justify the use of emergencies and special measures to deal with them” (Füredi, 1994, p.109). Today, it is Liberalism that underlies the criminalization of leaders. It is argued that Milošević has been criminalized because everything that he appeared to represent was seen as antithetical and hostile to liberal values and ideals.

We particularly see this when we look at the rhetoric of British and US policymakers, a rhetoric that portrayed Milošević and his regime as a threat to such fundamentals as freedom, democracy, and liberal peace. Speaking on 2 June 1999, for example, President Clinton declared that, “The killing Mr Milošević unleashed in the former Yugoslavia a decade ago is now the last major barrier to a

Europe whole, free and at peace...It threatens all the progress made in Europe since the end of the Cold War” (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.1075).

Liberal values were invoked most explicitly as a way to justify foreign intervention in the former Yugoslavia. For example, at the start of the war in Kosovo, in March 1999, President Clinton informed the nation that by bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, “we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace” (cited in Chomsky, 1999, p.3). At the end of the war, moreover, he triumphantly proclaimed that, “I can report to the American people that we have achieved a victory for a safer world, for our democratic values, and for a stronger America” (Clinton, 1999). In his speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, on 22 April 1999, Tony Blair also underscored the importance of upholding liberal values, declaring, “This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values” (Blair, 1999).

Portrayals of Milošević and his policies as evil further emphasized the threat that he and his regime posed to liberal peace and values. For example, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, speaking on 1 February 1999 about the situation in Kosovo, declared, “that this kind of thing cannot stand, that you cannot in 1999 have this kind of barbaric ethnic cleansing. It is ultimately better that democracies stand up against this kind of evil” (cited in Chomsky, 1999, p.3). Similarly, in his speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, on 22 April 1999, Tony Blair vowed that, “If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later” (Blair, 1999).

To conclude this section, it is argued that Liberalism heavily underlies the construction of Milošević as a criminal leader. Liberalism strongly influenced British and US policy towards the former Yugoslavia, particularly the decision to intervene in Kosovo in 1999. It is interesting to note, however, that during the early nineties, when the dominant mood among policymakers was against intervention, it was not so much Milošević who was regarded as the problem, but the region itself. As Mazower argues, “Those who opposed Western intervention in the Balkans tended to blame Milošević less than long-run cultural determinants of behaviour in the region” (Mazower, 2000, p.128).

Cautioning against foreign involvement in the former Yugoslavia, for example, the former U.S Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger argued that,

If people are intent on killing each other under conditions in which it is almost impossible for the outside world to do anything without losing itself many lives, then my answer is: ‘I’m sorry, but they are going to have to kill each other until they wear themselves out and have enough sense to stop (cited in Fleming, 2000, p.1219).

Speaking on 28 March 1993, the U.S Secretary of State Warren Christopher expressed similar views. He said,

Let me put that situation in Bosnia in just a little broader framework. It’s really a tragic problem. The hatred between all three groups – the Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croats – is almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying and it’s centuries old. That really is a problem from hell (cited in Cohen, 1998, p.243).

As Bert argues, “Where one stood on intervention, therefore, tended to determine how one defined the nature of the war” (Bert, 1997, p.97).

Section 3 – Some Alternative Views in the Western Literature

Notwithstanding the broad consensus in Western literature that Milošević is a criminal leader, of course not everybody subscribes to this view. This final section, therefore, will consider some alternative viewpoints. It will begin by outlining two alternative portraits of Milošević in Western literature - as an improviser, and as an obstacle to the West. It will then look at some alternative explanations of the wars in the former Yugoslavia that emphasize the causal role of circumstances, both internal and external.

(i) Two Alternative Portraits of Milošević

(a) Milošević as an Improviser

Some authors maintain that Milošević was above all an improviser, rather than a warmonger. According to Johnstone, for example, “Despite a confident façade, Milošević was improvising, while Tudjman knew exactly what he wanted” (Johnstone, 2002, p.27). Similarly, Crnobrnja maintains that, “It can be argued convincingly that Serbia had no clear strategy as events unravelled” (Crnobrnja, 1996, p.227); and Marshall argues that, “Most people believe that Milošević’s idea of strategy was to stumble from one crisis to the next, trying to buy himself time with short-term solutions to long-term problems” (Marshall, 2002, p.107).²³

War was not, therefore, something that Milošević planned. Rather, it was something that became necessary or advantageous as events progressed. Gordy,

²³ As will be seen in the interview data chapters (in particular, chapters 5 and 7), many of the Serbian interviewees hold similar views.

for instance, argues that once the army discredited itself by using force against anti-regime demonstrators in March 1991, war became necessary as “the only means of preserving a power that had been openly challenged and exposed” (Gordy, 1999, p.37). For her part, Di Giovanni highlights the usefulness of war to the regime. She argues that, in many ways, Milošević “was addicted to war. Shortly after the Slovenian conflict began, a precedent was set: every time Milošević’s popularity plummeted, he launched a new war to temporarily revive it” (Di Giovanni, 2004, p.157).

Just as Milošević did not plan the wars, neither did he have real control over them. Hammel, for example, argues that, “An outstanding feature of the catastrophe was the speed with which criminal elements came to play a role, running guns, looting (often with the assistance of the army), feathering their nests with blackmarket profits” (Hammel, 2000, p.34). That so many of those engaged in fighting and perpetrating heinous deeds were motivated by the prospect of looting and plundering is significant. In particular, it undermines the argument, made by people such as Gow and Cigar, that the commission of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity was an integral part of the Serbian state project to create a “Greater Serbia”.

The fact, moreover, that war served the interests of particular groups meant that it was difficult to stop. The longer it continued, the more it took on a momentum of its own, independent of the decisions and actions of political leaders. In the words of Woodward, “Even if political leaders wish to reverse course and sign cease-fire

agreements in good faith, and citizens desperately want an end to the fighting. the momentum of such wars [nationalist wars] becomes increasingly difficult to stop” (Woodward, 1995, p.245).

(b) Milošević as an Obstacle

According to Gowan, the West’s role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia “has largely been overlooked in Western literature” (Gowan, 1999, p.p.18). A very welcome contribution to the existing Western literature, therefore, has been made by various authors, mainly although by no means exclusively on the political Left, whose work emphasizes the West’s involvement in the break-up of Yugoslavia. Brown, for example, maintains that, “What destroyed Yugoslavia and divided the several peoples against each other was...as so often before in their history, the intervention of powerful outside forces with their own interests”. He adds that, “Milošević was more the victim than the victor in that tragic process” (Brown, 2005, p.176).

For these authors, Milošević was seen in the West as a problem not because he was a criminal leader, but because he was an independent leader who refused to obediently follow the West – more particularly, the United States - and comply with all its demands. Milošević was therefore viewed, especially in Washington, as a serious obstacle, and consequently made to pay the price.

Hudson is one academic that adopts this line of argument. She points out that, in 1984, the Reagan Administration introduced a National Security Division

Directive on United States Policy towards Yugoslavia, “the objectives of which included expanded efforts to promote a ‘quiet revolution’ to overthrow Communist governments and parties, while re-integrating the countries of eastern Europe into the orbit of the World market” (Hudson, 2003, p.57).²⁴ Milošević, however, stood in the way of such re-integration, by “resisting full freemarket reform and integration into western institutions” (Hudson, 2003, p.2). As a consequence,

The demonization of Milošević was eventually to know no bounds, far outstripping the attacks and criticisms of leaders that could be considered responsible for, or to have condoned, similar terrible and tragic events, such as Tudjman or Izetbegović (Hudson, 2003, p.69).

Hudson further maintains that the United States and the European Union used the Yugoslav presidential elections, in September 2000, “finally to achieve what they had been trying to do for over a decade, and had failed to do through bombing – to satisfy their own economic and strategic goals in the post-Soviet period”. These included “the removal of a government in Belgrade which had not only a socialist economic orientation but also a strategic orientation away from NATO and towards Russia” (Hudson, 2003, p.138).

Parenti similarly holds that Milošević frustrated the US in the realization of its objectives, and consequently became a target. He argues that,

In my opinion, Milošević’s real sin was that he resisted the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and opposed a U.S imposed hegemony. He also attempted to spare Yugoslavia the worst of the merciless privatisations and rollbacks that have afflicted other former communist countries (Parenti, 2003).

²⁴ It was similarly during the 1980s that “enmity towards Tito, and even towards Yugoslavia, was taken up by an element of the British Right. These were the journalists and academics who backed the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in opposition to Communism in eastern Europe... They denounced Yugoslavia both as a Communist state and as an example of an unworkable, artificial federation, a microcosm of the proposed European Community” (West, 1996, p.335).

Emphasizing how the West's view of Milošević changed over time, Parenti maintains that,

At first, the West viewed the ex-banker as a Serbian nationalist who might be useful to them. As late as 1995, the Clinton administration accepted Milošević as a negotiating partner and guarantor of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, even praising him for the many concessions he made. Only later, when they saw him as an obstacle rather than a tool, did US policy makers begin to depict him as having been all along the demon who 'started all four wars' (Parenti, 2000, p.177).

Chomsky likewise takes the view that Milošević presented an obstacle to American foreign policy objectives. He claims that, "Serbia was an annoyance, an unwelcome impediment to Washington's efforts to complete its substantial takeover of Europe" (Chomsky, 1999, p.137). He continues, "As long as Serbia is not incorporated within US-dominated domains, it makes sense to punish it for its failure to conform – very visibly, in a way that will serve as a warning to others that might be similarly inclined" (Chomsky, 1999, p.137).

(ii) Alternative Explanations of the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia

We saw in section 1 that central to the construction of Milošević as a criminal leader is the claim that he bears greatest responsibility for the wars in the former Yugoslavia. In Western literature, however, there are some alternative explanations of the wars that focus less on individuals and more on circumstances.

Some of these explanations primarily emphasize internal, domestic circumstances, and we can distinguish between, on the one hand, Orientalist explanations that stress the violent nature of Balkan history and the existence of ancient hatreds and, on the other hand, Realist explanations that concentrate on the disintegration of the

Yugoslav State and its consequences. Other explanations, which can be described as structuralist, mainly underscore external, international circumstances. The two sets of circumstances are not mutually exclusive, however, and some authors, such as Woodward, emphasize both.

(a) Internal, Local Circumstances

Historically, accounts of events in the Balkans have been heavily Orientalist, emphasizing the inherently problematic and conflict-ridden nature of the region as a whole. For example, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in his book *Through Savage Europe*, Harry De Windt argued that the term “savage” “accurately describes the wild and lawless countries between the Adriatic and Black Seas” (De Windt, 1907, p.16). Later, in 1940, John Gunther described the Balkan Peninsula as “an unstable pyramid of nationalist hatreds and of minority hatreds within nations” (Gunther, 1940, p.438).

For some, ancient hatreds and the Balkan’s violent history lay at the heart of the recent wars in the former Yugoslavia. Describing the war in Bosnia, for example, Winchester claims that, “This was selective, spiteful fighting, in which soldiers and civilians with pure hatred in their hearts set about the destruction of personal enemies, the settling of old scores” (Winchester, 1999, p.87). Hupchick describes the war between Serbia and Croatia as pitting “the highly Westernized Catholic Croats against the still somewhat Byzantine and Turkified Orthodox Serbs in a struggle having cultural roots traceable through a millennium” (Hupchick, 1994,

p.17); and Owen argues that, “History points to a tradition in the Balkans of a readiness to solve disputes by the taking up of arms and acceptance of the forceful or even negotiated movement of people as the result of war. It points to a culture of violence...” (Owen, 1996, p.3).²⁵

Whereas Orientalist explanations of the wars see hatred as endemic to the Balkans, Realist explanations link that hatred to a security dilemma created by the collapse of the Yugoslav State. Ignatieff, for example, argues that, “There is one type of fear more devastating in its impact than any other: the systematic fear which arises when a state begins to collapse. Ethnic hatred is the result of terror which arises when legitimate authority disintegrates” (Ignatieff, 1993, p.16).

For Woodward too, the break-up of the Yugoslav State is the starting point for any analysis of the wars in former Yugoslavia. She argues that,

While the collapse of Yugoslavia was an extremely complex process, its *dynamic*, and thus an analysis of its causes, can actually be captured usefully by the concept of a security dilemma. Although the Yugoslav federal government continued to function up to the second half of 1991, its authority and especially its enforcement power had declined so much during the 1980s...that the context of its dissolution could be said to resemble the conditions of anarchy in which a security dilemma in international relations is said to occur (Woodward, 1999, p.80).²⁶

²⁵ According to Neier, “The idea that historical developments are impervious to external efforts to mitigate their brutality powerfully influenced key figures at various times during the Balkan wars” (Neier, 1998, p.147).

²⁶ Walter also views the wars in ex-Yugoslavia through the prism of a security dilemma. She argues that while the fighting between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in the early 1990s can, in part, be explained by their desire to secure greater control of territory, “it can also be explained by the fear and vulnerability they felt as the Yugoslav federation began to disintegrate” (Walter, 1999, p.2).

(b) External, International Circumstances

Some authors focus on external circumstances and their impact on Yugoslavia. Woodward, for example, argues that had internal events within Yugoslavia not been accompanied by the collapse of the Cold War international order, the outcome of these internal events might have been other than war (Woodward, 1995, p.16). Thus, for Woodward, “change from the outside, in the foreign economic and strategic environment on which the country’s stability had come to depend” was critical to Yugoslavia’s breakdown (Woodward, 1995, p.22).

Liotta also emphasizes international circumstances. She argues that, “...what happened in Yugoslavia was inseparable from international change and interdependence”, and that “contrary to much current belief, the process of Yugoslav disintegration was not confined to the Balkans but was itself a reflection of wider political disintegration at the end of the twentieth century” (Liotta, 2001, p.82).

She adds that, “The break-up of Yugoslavia by political disintegration was inseparable from the processes of larger European fragmentation in the wake of the Cold War” (Liotta, 2001, p.265).

Explanations of the wars in former Yugoslavia that focus on circumstances have two particular merits. Firstly, they provide us with the broader context within which Yugoslavia unraveled, even if they are prone to over-simplify history.

Secondly, they are less likely than actor-based approaches to demonize one particular side in a conflict.

However, such explanations are not unproblematic. For example, those that attribute the wars to the existence of ancient ethnic hatreds feed Orientalist stereotypes about the Balkans as a region dominated by violence and turmoil. They also suggest that because of historical and cultural factors, Yugoslavia's demise and the subsequent wars were to a certain extent inevitable. This is oversimplistic and unhelpful. As Cox argues, "History does not automatically generate conflicts; human beings do" (Cox, 2002, p.136). It also discourages in-depth analysis of what happened in the former Yugoslavia, because if events were inevitable, it is unnecessary to spend time analyzing them.²⁷

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to show how and why Milošević has been constructed as a criminal leader. However, this construction, it is argued, is problematic for five main reasons. Firstly, because it requires us to see Milošević as the person most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it encourages reductionist, oversimplistic accounts of these wars.²⁸ Not only do these accounts fail to do justice to the complexity of factors involved. They also demonize Milošević to the extent

²⁷ For Byman and Pollack, "Recognizing the importance of individuals is necessary to explode one of the most pernicious and dangerous myths in the study of International Relations: the cult of inevitability" (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p.145).

²⁸ According to Post, Walker and Winter, the fact that we often view a nation's foreign policy in terms of the personalities of its leaders perhaps "reflects our human tendency to reduce complexity to simplicity, attributing the causes of other people's behavior to their internal dispositions rather than to their situations" (Post, Walker and Winter, 2003, p.1).

that fundamental aspects of his leadership – such as his popularity and degree of control over the situation – are heavily neglected. As Woodward points out, the argument that Milošević was exclusively to blame for everything “ignores the conditions that make such leaders possible and popular...” (Woodward, 1995, p.15).

There can be no denying that Milošević bears some of the responsibility for the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars that ensued. However, Milošević-centric explanations that place exclusive blame on him should be rejected. To cite Byman and Pollack,

Within the discipline of International Relations, the study of individuals can be only one part of a larger whole. Ignoring their role is foolish, but so too is ignoring the influence of other forces such as systematic factors, domestic politics and bureaucratic pressures (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p.146).

Secondly, the portrayal of Milošević as a criminal leader can be objected to on practical grounds. The aforementioned Milošević-centrism that it both entails and encourages “led people to ascribe so much power to the man that foreign governments came to rely on him to end the wars and therefore could not risk his fall from power, even while they accused him of crimes against humanity” (Woodward, 1995, p.15). This resulted in the irony that Milošević was seen in the West as both a warmonger and a peacemaker.

At the same time, Milošević’s construction as a criminal leader encouraged the simplistic and naïve belief that Serbia could only move forward once he was no longer in power. Yet, as Hawthorne argues, “We need to disabuse ourselves of the

illusion that if we simply sweep away a problem, its replacement will necessarily constitute a sea change” (cited in Satloff, 2002, p.90).

Thirdly, the portrayal of Milošević as a criminal leader relies upon extremely speculative claims about his intentions. As we saw in section 1 of this chapter, two particular claims regarding Milošević’s intentions are central to his construction as a criminal leader. The first is that he planned the wars in former Yugoslavia, and thus intended for them to happen. The second claim is that crimes committed by the Serbs during the wars were planned and premeditated. However, since Milošević “did not sign anything, did not note anything, and did not write any reports” (Stevanović, 2004, p.177), it is extremely difficult to say anything concrete about his intentions. In the words of Stevanović, “Researching him is like chasing an illegal activist who has destroyed all incriminating evidence” (Stevanović, 2004, p.2). Furthermore, claims made about Milošević’s intentions rest upon “the dubious assumption that historical development can be explained by recourse to intuitive understanding of the motives and intentions of leading actors in the drama” (Kershaw, 1993, p.67).²⁹

The fourth reason why the image of Milošević as a criminal leader is problematic is that just as many of the claims made about his intentions are merely conjectural, so many of the general claims made about him are unsubstantiated. For example,

²⁹ In his work on the Hitler regime, Kershaw stresses that we cannot rely solely on a person’s intentions to explain complex events. He maintains that, “Hitler’s ‘intentions’ are indispensable to explaining the course of development in the Third Reich. But they are not an adequate explanation in themselves. The conditions in which Hitler’s ‘will’ could be implemented as government policy were only in small measure fashioned by Hitler himself, and moreover, made the ultimate failure of his aims and the destruction of the Third Reich almost inevitable” (Kershaw, 1993, p.79).

in his book *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries; A Strategy of War Crimes*, Gow consistently refers to a “Serbian project to establish new state borders from which unwanted communities would be removed – ethnically cleansed” (Gow, 2003, p.4). Yet, he provides no hard evidence for the existence of such a project.

Numerous other authors similarly fail to support their claims with evidence. LeBor, for example, refers to “...Milošević’s plan for a Greater Serbia” (LeBor, 2002, p.136), but provides no evidence that such a plan existed. He does mention the so-called “RAM” plan, but even then is forced to concede that, “...no copy of the RAM plan has yet been produced as evidence” (LeBor, 2002, p.351). For his part, Doubt contends that, “It is widely known that Milošević is the person most responsible for the war for a Greater Serbia and its brutalities throughout former Yugoslavia, starting perhaps with the attack on Vukovar in 1991” (Doubt, 2000, p.10). By beginning with the words “It is widely known that...” Doubt thus absolves himself of the need to provide evidence for his claim. It is as if what he is saying is an indisputable truth that requires no elaboration.

Unfortunately, this is a common trend in the literature, where many authors tell the same story about Milošević. If these authors feel that they are reiterating known facts, this perhaps explains why they often fail to support these “facts” with hard evidence. Milošević’s speeches, for example, are a heavily neglected, yet extremely important primary source. We shall find out in chapter 4 whether and to what extent they support the image of Milošević as a criminal leader.

Finally, the construction of Milošević as a criminal leader can be objected to on the grounds that it fundamentally neglects the experiences and opinions of ordinary people who experienced Milošević's "criminal" leadership at first hand. Arguing that the "criminal" leader must be studied both from the top down and from the bottom up, this thesis seeks to demonstrate the value of exploring how ordinary people in Serbia perceive Milošević. In so doing, it provides the reader with important alternative images of Milošević. In short, an exploration of the view from below can provide us with, to borrow a term from Scott, the "hidden transcripts" that we are so rarely given access to (Scott, 1990).

Now that we have looked at how Western literature has constructed Milošević as a criminal leader, it is useful to look at the wider picture. Chapter 2, therefore, is concerned with exploring particular developments in the field of International Relations that together both provide us with the broader context within which to situate the criminalization of Milošević, and help us to formulate a general concept of the criminal leader.

Chapter 2

The Criminal Leader and IR

Introduction

This chapter is not specifically concerned with Milošević. Instead, it has two very particular objectives. The first is to explore how the idea of the “criminal leader” can be linked with certain developments in the field of International Relations. The second objective is to develop a general concept of the criminal leader which is based around the construction of Milošević as a criminal leader, but which can also be applied outside the particular case of Milošević.

The chapter comprises five main sections. Sections 1-4, which are devoted to the first of the two aforementioned objectives, discuss four important and inter-related developments in IR. Section 1 explores how Realism has been challenged in the post-Cold War world. It argues that Liberalism has become increasingly influential in IR, with the result that explanations of war now focus less on structural factors than on “rogue states” and “criminal leaders”.

Section 2 looks at a second important, yet related development in IR. This is the distinctive normative turn within the discipline, manifested by an emphasis on ethics and human rights.

Section 3 explores how attitudes towards war have changed. There has been a gradual shift away from the view that war is normal, necessary and rational towards the perception that war is abnormal, unnecessary and irrational. At the same time, there is now a widespread belief that today’s wars are more violent

and brutal than previous wars. In light of these changing perceptions of war, it is not surprising that war leaders are now more likely to be seen, particularly in the West, as criminals rather than as heroes.

Section 4 looks at how the sovereign immunity of state leaders, a well-established principle in international law, is gradually being eroded as a result of all the above developments. This has meant that leaders can be criminalized not only in theory but also in practice, as the trial of Milošević demonstrates.

Finally, section 5 is devoted to the second key objective that guides this chapter – namely, to develop a general concept of the criminal leader, using the two literatures discussed in the present chapter and in the previous chapter. It emphasizes that the concept of the criminal leader is both externally constructed and essentially contested.

Section 1 – Changing Explanations of War; From Structure to Agency

Milošević-centric explanations of the wars in the former Yugoslavia can be seen as part of a broader trend in IR. That is to say that following the end of the Cold War, agency-based explanations of war have become increasingly important.

During the Cold War, the Realist paradigm dominated IR. With its emphasis on structure, Realism constituted a powerful explanation in a world defined by key realist concepts, such as the balance of power and security dilemmas, and shaped by two superpowers. With the end of the Cold War, however, it can be

argued that Realist and Neorealist explanations of war have become less powerful. To cite Chandler, "...since the end of the Cold War, structural explanations for conflict have again gone into decline and war is much less likely to be understood within an international framework of power politics" (Chandler, 2002a, p.168). On the one hand, Realism and Neorealism's ability to explain war has weakened as the nature of war has changed. On the other hand, the growing influence of the Liberal paradigm has challenged Realism's pre-eminence within the discipline.

(i) From Inter-State to Intra-State War

For realists, states constitute the main actors in IR. Thus, Realism is concerned with explaining war between states. However, "Nearly all scholars of armed conflict recognize that since 1945 intrastate violence has been a much more prevalent phenomenon than interstate war" (Ayres, 2000, p.109). Research by Wallensteen and Sollenberg, for example, shows that between 1989 and 2000, there were one-hundred-and-eleven armed conflicts in the world. Of these conflicts, ninety-five were intra-state and just seven were inter-state conflicts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001, p.632).

Furthermore, wars today increasingly occur inside failed states.¹ In the words of Kaldor, "The most important difference between the new wars and earlier wars is that new wars do not presuppose the existence of states" (Kaldor, 1997,

¹ According to Snow, "The failed states are those in which governance has broken down and virtual anarchy (often taking the form of extremely brutal rule by elements utterly lacking legitimacy) has persisted across time... The prototypical failed state... is Somalia" (Snow, 1996, p.100).

p.9). It can be argued, therefore, that Realism has less explanatory power today than it did during the Cold War. To cite Holsti,

Key analytical concepts such as balances of power, hegemony, alliances, deterrence, power projection and a whole range of geopolitical ideas... derive from the European and Cold War experiences. Their relevance to post-1945 wars is highly problematic (Holsti, 1996, p.14).

One particular key Realist concept, however, has been invoked to help explain today's conflicts. This is the concept of the security dilemma. According to realists, the security dilemma confronts all states in the absence of a world government. In short, because the international system is anarchical, states cannot trust each other. As a consequence, in the words of John Herz "A vicious circle will arise – of suspicion and countersuspicion, competition for power, armament races, ultimately war" (cited in Doyle, 1997, p.27).

Barry Posen was the first to utilize the security dilemma as an explanation for ethnic conflict. He applies the concept to "the special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security" (Posen, 1993, p.27). This occurs when central authority collapses, as in failed states, resulting in a self-help situation much like that in the anarchical international system. In this self-help situation, various groups within the state are forced to provide for their own security.

Posen heavily downplays the role that political elites play in generating conflict. For him, "...very little nationalist rabble-rousing or nationalistic combativeness is required to generate very dangerous situations" (Posen, 1993, p.29). Rather, in his view,

the security dilemma and realist international relations theory more generally have considerable ability to explain and predict the probability and intensity of military conflict among groups emerging from the wreckage of empires (Posen, 1993, p.43).

Thus, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, according to Posen, can be viewed through the lens of a security dilemma.

Other authors have similarly used the security dilemma to explain ethnic conflict, by emphasizing the role that fear - created by the security dilemma - plays in generating such conflict. According to Simons, for example,

Fear, not hatred, is the prime motivator in ethnic conflicts...Whenever citizens feel threatened by too much insecurity, they seek protection from the state. Should the state fail them, because officials are either inept or corrupt, individuals take matters into their own hands (Simons and Mueller, 2001, p.188).

In a similar vein, Lake and Rothchild maintain that intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future that “arise when states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups”. Under this condition, they argue, “physical security becomes of paramount concern” (Lake and Rothchild, 1996, p.43).

For some, however, it is problematic to see fear as the primary cause of ethnic conflict. Toft, for example, argues that,

Although the security-dilemma explanation is logically quite powerful, we can find many cases in which fear was not the motivating factor for ethnic violence...It does not address other motivations, such as greed or aggressiveness (Toft, 2003, p.8).

According to Angstrom and Duyvesteyn, who apply the concept of the security dilemma to the conflict in Liberia between 1989 and 1992, “The security dilemma fails to explain the outbreak of violence in both phases of the Liberian

conflict. It fails primarily because the violence was motivated by revisionist goals rather than security fears” (Angstrom and Duyvesteyn, 2001, p.207). They conclude that, “the explanatory power of realism in internal conflicts is limited to explaining the escalation and continuation of violence rather than its outbreak” (Angstrom and Duyvesteyn, 2001, p.218).

For his part, Gagnon argues that, “The dominant realist approach in international relations tells us little about violent conflict along ethnic lines, and cannot explain the Yugoslav case” (Gagnon, 1994/5, p.132).

(ii) The Rise of the Liberal Paradigm

Realism has been challenged from below by the nature of today’s wars. However, it has also been challenged from above by the Liberal paradigm and its increasing influence in the post-Cold War world.² Indeed for some, the end of the Cold War marked the victory of liberal democracy. Thus, in his 1989 article, “The End of History?” Francis Fukuyama argues that,

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history³ as such: that is, the endpoint of man’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama, 1989, p.4).

In his book, “The End of History and the Last Man”, Fukuyama further develops this thesis, claiming that,

² According to Legro and Moravcsik, some so-called “realists” are in fact liberals in sheep’s clothing. In the authors’ view, Realism “is in trouble” because “so-called defensive and classical realists...seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent, and less distinctive to realism” (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999, p.6).

³ That is to say, “history understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times” (Fukuyama, 1992, p.xii).

the only form of government that has survived intact to the end of the twentieth century has been liberal democracy. What is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal practice as the liberal idea.⁴ That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy... (Fukuyama, 1992, p.45).

While we may not have reached the “end of history”, Liberalism has become increasingly important. Indeed, it might be argued that within British IR – if not in US IR – there has been a paradigm shift in favour of Liberalism. For example, according to one of America’s most influential realists, John Mearsheimer, “Today, almost every British international relations theorist is an idealist.⁵ I cannot identify a single realist theorist in Albion” (Mearsheimer, 2004). He adds,

I believe it is a thoroughly admirable irony that E.H Carr, a realist, was hired to fill a chair named after Woodrow Wilson, a liberal whose ideas Carr deeply disliked, and that Ken Booth⁶, a dedicated idealist, was hired to fill a chair named after Carr (Mearsheimer, 2004).

The growing influence of the Liberal paradigm, not only in British IR but also in the United States, is very important for how we explain war. Realism, for example, is not concerned with the internal organization of states. According to the prominent neorealist Kenneth Waltz,

It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside states. If the aims, policies and actions of states become matters of exclusive attention or even of central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions, no valid generalizations can logically be drawn (Waltz, 1979, p.65).

⁴ According to Fukuyama, “...the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world” (Fukuyama, 1989, p.4).

⁵ Following E.H Carr, Mearsheimer uses the term “idealist”, rather than “liberal”.

⁶ Professor Ken Booth is E.H Carr Professor and head of the International Politics department at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth.

In a similar vein, Mearsheimer maintains that, "...the keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.10).

In contrast, Liberalism focuses on the unit level, rather than on the systemic level. Thus, for liberals the internal organization of states is extremely important. In short, "Liberalism gives rise to an ideology that distinguishes states primarily according to regime type: in assessing a state, liberalism first asks whether it is a liberal democracy or not" (Owen, 2001, p.145). This is a key question because liberal democracies, according to Liberalism, do not go to war with each other.⁷ Fukuyama, for example, argues that,

...there is substantial empirical evidence from the last couple of hundred years that liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically toward one another, even if they are perfectly capable of going to war with states that are not democracies and do not share their fundamental values (Fukuyama, 1992, p.xx).⁸

States that are not liberal democracies, therefore, pose a threat to liberal peace.

Accordingly, as the Liberal paradigm has become increasingly influential in IR, explanations of war have shifted away from an emphasis on the anarchic structure of the international system towards an emphasis on illiberal states.

To cite Litwak,

Since the end of the Cold War, one of the main objectives of American foreign policy has been the containment of 'rogue' or 'outlaw' states. Senior U.S policy-makers have asserted that these countries – North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya – constitute a distinct category of states (Litwak, 2000, p.xiii).

⁷ This notion can be traced to Immanuel Kant's work "Perpetual Peace" (1795), in which he argued that perpetual peace could be established through the creation of a "pacific federation" of liberal republics, "an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war" (cited in Doyle, 1997, p.257).

⁸ Mansfield and Snyder, however, emphasize that, "...countries do not become mature democracies overnight. More typically, they go through a rocky transitional period...In this transitional phase of democratisation, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states" (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, p.5).

A more recent development in IR is the idea that individual leaders cause war. Brown, for example, contends that, “Most major internal conflicts are triggered by internal, elite-level actors – to put it bluntly, bad leaders...Bad leaders are usually the catalysts that turn potentially volatile situations into open warfare” (Brown, 1996, p.571). We saw in the previous chapter that Milošević is widely deemed to bear greatest responsibility for the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. In a similar vein, it has been argued that, “The conventional Western response to the human crisis in Iraq is that it is solely the fault of their once convenient and former ally of the Iran-Iraq war era, President Saddam Hussein” (Halliday, 2004, p.268).⁹ Thus, Saddam, like Milošević, has been vilified and criminalized.

With regards to the Gulf War, for example, Keeble argues that,

Central to the manufacture of the war was the propaganda focus on the demonised personality of Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq. He was personally represented as a global threat, a monster, an evil madman daring to challenge the New World Order, the new Hitler (Keeble, 2000, p.65).

The cases of Milošević and Saddam are not unique, however. As Duffield argues,

The condemnation of all violent conflict by liberal peace means that the leaders of violent conflicts are automatically problematised. By their own actions, they risk placing themselves beyond the limits of cooperation and partnership. This is regardless of whether they are guilty of war crimes, as many are, or defending themselves from dispossession or exploitation, which some may be (Duffield, 2001, p.129).

The fact that war leaders are increasingly deemed as outlaws and criminals can be linked to another important development, namely the normative turn that has accompanied the growing influence of Liberalism in contemporary IR.

⁹ According to Halliday, “This is simplistic, dishonest, and irresponsible” (Halliday, 2004, p.268).

Section 2 – The Normative Turn in IR

Throughout the Cold War era, moral questions were heavily marginalized. As Chandler argues, “During the Cold War and most of the history of international relations, the research agenda was dominated by rationalist approaches which subordinated morality to the interests of power” (Chandler, 2005, p.149).¹⁰ In a similar vein, Smith and Light argue that, in the past,

Policy-makers, steeped in realism, tended to scoff at normative theory...and at those who suggested that it should inform government policy. National interests, they insisted, should be the basis of foreign policy; discussing ethics was inappropriate (Smith and Light, 2001, p.2).

When the Cold War ended, however, “the research focus shifted away from fixed identities and narrow material interests to one which emphasised the power of norms and ideas” (Chandler, 2005, p.152).

Normative issues now play an increasingly prominent role in IR. In the words of Gelb and Rosenthal, “Values now count in virtually every foreign policy discussion...The cases where ethics must be factored in these days are startling in number and complexity” (Gelb and Rosenthal, 2003, p.3). In their view, humanitarian intervention, as in Kosovo in 1999, “is perhaps the most dramatic example of the new power of morality in international affairs” (Gelb and Rosenthal, 2003, p.3). Thus, “For the government, as Blair made clear from the start, the war over Kosovo was a moral crusade” (Hume, 2000, p.70).

¹⁰ The Realists’ subordination of morality to power is exemplified by Machiavelli’s work “The Prince”, in which he argues that, “A prince should care nothing for the accusation of cruelty so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal; by making a very few examples he can be more truly merciful than those who through too much tender-heartedness allow disorders to arise whence come killings and rapine” (Machiavelli, 1993, p.92). It should be noted that not all Realists share such views. E.H Carr, for example, maintains that, “any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality” (Carr, 1939, p.118). In his view, however, “The fatal dualism of politics will always keep considerations of morality entangled with considerations of power” (Carr, 1939, p.302).

Many of the NGOs involved in humanitarian work, such as *Oxfam* and *Médecins sans Frontières*, have themselves embraced this normative trend. To cite Chandler, “The desire to politicise involvement in aid provision without sacrificing their neutral and ‘non-political’ status led NGOs to seek to justify their strategic choices through the language of morals and ethics rather than politics” (Chandler, 2002a, p.28).

Another example of the normative turn in IR is the notion of an “ethical foreign policy”. This idea is often linked to a speech delivered on 17 July 1997 by the late Robin Cook, in which he declared that, “Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. We will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy” (cited in Brown, 2001, p.16). Thus, according to Hammond, today Western governments, having lost the stable framework of the Cold War, “couch their foreign policy in the language of human rights and morality” (Hammond, 2002, p.191).

The normative turn in IR has also had an important impact in the media world, giving rise to what has been termed “journalism of attachment”. Hammond, for example, who particularly associates this “journalism of attachment” with the former *BBC* war correspondent Martin Bell and *CNN*'s Christiane Amanpour, argues that,

A striking feature of media coverage of post-Cold War conflicts has been the emergence of a ‘journalism of attachment’ or ‘advocacy journalism’, which explicitly rejects neutral and dispassionate reporting in favour of moral engagement and seeks to influence Western public opinion and policy (Hammond, 2002, p.176).

Not only does this “journalism of attachment” lack impartiality. It also tends to over-simplify today’s wars, by means of its strong moral reductionism. Thus, according to Hume, “In Bosnia, a generation of crusading journalists set the pattern for seeing the complex conflicts in the Balkans as a simple morality play, to be understood and reported in terms of God against Evil” (Hume, 2000, p.76). Similarly, “Like Bosnia, Rwanda became a morality play, presented in simple, black-and-white terms” (Hammond, 2002, p.186).

The rise of this “journalism of attachment” can help to explain why Western media vilified the Serbs during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. To cite O’Ballance, the Serbs were “demonised and drenched in odium” by the end of 1991 (O’Ballance, 1995, viii). More importantly, it helps to explain why the blame for the wars was overwhelmingly placed squarely on the shoulders of Slobodan Milošević. In the words of Little, “Suddenly it was OK to describe Mr Milošević as the driving force of the war. Suddenly it did not sound ‘unbalanced’ or ‘partisan’ to lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of one regime” (cited in Hammond, 2002, p.182).

If there has been a shift towards a more normative agenda in IR, there has also been a shift in attitudes towards war. Today, war is increasingly viewed as illegitimate, irrational, and even criminal.

Section 3 – Changing Attitudes Towards War

Historically, war has been seen as something normal. As Howard argues, “War has been throughout history a normal way of conducting disputes

between political groups” (Howard, 1983, p.7). This is no longer the case, however. In the words of Mueller, “Over the last century or two, war in the developed world has come widely to be regarded as repulsive, immoral, and uncivilized” (Mueller, 1990, p.9).

Attitudes towards war have changed in a second important respect. The traditional Clausewitzian view of war as a rational instrument of national policy has become far less acceptable. Instead, war today is widely viewed as something irrational. Finally, there exists a widespread belief that today’s conflicts are far more violent and brutal than previous conflicts.

(i) War is Illegitimate

As Gelb and Rosenthal argue, “From the dawn of human history, there have been laws about the initiation and conduct of war” (Gelb and Rosenthal, 2003, p.2). For example, in 1863, the US War Department promulgated the *Lieber Code*, to govern the conduct of the United States Army during the Civil War. The following year, in Geneva, twelve European governments signed the first international agreement on war, the *Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field*. In 1928, the *Kellog-Briand Pact* codified the principle that unilateral aggression is illegitimate, and renounced war as an instrument of policy except in self-defence; and four Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949, explicitly designating certain acts as war crimes.

Just as we have witnessed the increased regulation of warfare, we have also seen attitudes towards war change, particularly as a result of the two World Wars. According to Mueller, for example,

The experience of the First World War clearly changed attitudes war in the developed world. In an area where war had been accepted as a fixture for thousands of years, the idea now gained currency that war was no longer an inevitable fact of life and that major efforts should be made to abandon it (Mueller, 1991, p.1).

Furthermore, “World War Two substantially destroyed the notion that war was admirable and desirable, and eventually war romanticism died out in the developed world” (Mueller, 1990, p.220). Indeed, at the end of the Second World War, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg explicitly criminalized war. It declared that,

War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole (cited in Green, 2000, p.11).

Changing attitudes towards war can be linked to several factors. One factor is developments in warfare and technology, which have increased the lethality and sheer destructiveness of war. Even in 1925, Winston Churchill observed that war was now “the potential destroyer of the human race...Mankind has never been in this position before” (cited in Mueller, 1991, p.17). Developments in warfare have undermined the notion that war is something normal. In the words of Von Strandmann,

Over the last 140 years, major wars have changed so much in character that the notion of normality for all types of conflict seems inadequate...The tremendous development in destructive power and the increasing awareness of it has rendered the term ‘normal’ meaningless for potentially major conflicts after 1945 (von Strandmann, 1991, p.47).

Another factor is Liberalism and its growing influence in the post-Cold War world. For realists, war is a rational response by states to the security dilemma that the anarchical international system creates. In contrast “Liberalism was and is, in large part, an expression of revulsion against illegitimate violence: that of tyrants at home and of aggressors abroad” (Hoffman, 1995, p.160). Consequently, “...liberalism has made an important contribution to challenging the position of war as a standard feature of international political life” (MacMillan, 1998, p.281). This is because,

Part of liberalism, at least, has become internalised: war is increasingly perceived to be a human choice, a cultural practice that has social and political roots rather than being an integral part of political life, a factor of racial identity, or an immutable feature of an anarchic international system. There is, then, preliminary evidence that societal consciousness regarding the legitimacy of the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*¹¹ has evolved as liberal principles have become more firmly established (MacMillan, 1998, p.89).

(ii) War is Irrational

Traditionally, war has been viewed as a rational instrument of national policy, as a contest for power between states. In his famous treatise *On War* (1832), for example, Clausewitz argued that, “...War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means” (Clausewitz, 1982, p.119). Today, in contrast, wars are often portrayed as irrational. In the words of Collins, “Analysts of these ‘New Wars’ stress the irrational and uncontrollable nature of modern conflicts, alleged to be driven by a dangerous internal dynamic” (Collins, 2002, p.158).

¹¹ The initiation of war and conduct in warfare, respectively.

According to Keane, for example, “Some of today’s conflicts appear to lack any logic or structure except that of murder on an unlimited scale” (Keane, 1996, p.137). For his part, Snow argues that today’s internal wars

are somehow different from the wars we have traditionally thought of as civil conflicts. They seem, for instance, less principled in political terms, less focused on the attainment of some political ideal. They seem more vicious and uncontrolled in their conduct...these wars often appear to be little more than rampages by groups within states against one another with little or no apparent ennobling purpose or outcome; they are, indeed, uncivil wars (Snow, 1996, p.1).

It is suggested, however, that the labelling of these conflicts as irrational has less to do with their actual nature than with our own limited understanding of them. As Brown argues, “Unfortunately, the causes and consequences of internal conflict are not well understood” (Brown, 1996, p.ix). One reason for this is that the context within which these conflicts occur is unfamiliar and uncertain – the post-Cold War world. This world does not have the clear structure that characterized the Cold War world, and thus arguably appears more confused and complex. To cite Litwak, “It is a telling sign of our collective confusion about the ‘post-Cold War era’ that we are able to characterize the current period of international relations only in terms of what preceded it” (Litwak, 2000, p.19).

A second reason is that wars today occur mainly within states, rather than between states, which arguably makes them more difficult for outsiders to understand. Consequently, there is a tendency to dismiss these wars, and those who take part in them, as irrational. This is a fundamental distortion and oversimplification, as certain authors are keen to emphasize. In his discussion of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, for example, Gagnon asks, “Why is there

the focus on irrationality and emotion, rather than on the clearly strategic rationales behind the wars themselves?” (Gagnon, 2004, p.7).¹² In his view, there was nothing irrational about these wars. Rather,

The evidence shows quite clearly that the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s were the result of certain parts of the elite creating wars for their own purposes...the violence was planned and carried out in very strategic ways by conservative elites in Belgrade and Zagreb, working closely with allies in the war zones (Gagnon, 2004, p.179).

For her part, Seaton argues that,

a discussion of the instrumental rationality of some groups who further and prosper from the savage civil conflicts is so at odds with how the wars have been described that it has frequently been ignored. Consequently the conflicts appear all the more strange and irrational – in other words, ethnic (Seaton, 1999, p.57).

The leaders of these conflicts are similarly portrayed as irrational. We saw in the previous chapter that Milošević has been described as “mad” and “irrational”. Saddam Hussein has been depicted in a similar way. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, for example,

...the Bush administration deems Saddam Hussein reckless, ruthless, and not fully rational. Such a man, when mixed with nuclear weapons, is too unpredictable to be prevented from threatening the United States, the hawks say (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003, p.1).

The authors, however, reject such portrayals of Saddam. They maintain that, “...a careful look at Saddam’s two wars shows his behavior was far from reckless. Both times, he attacked because Iraq was vulnerable and because he believed his targets were weak and isolated” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003, p.2).

¹² In 1992, for example, the US Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, described the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the following terms – “This war is not rational. There is no rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It is gut, it is hatred; it’s not for any set of values or purposes; it just goes on. And that kind of warfare is most difficult to bring to a halt” (cited in Valentino, 2004, p.238).

Post similarly highlights how “Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, has been characterized as ‘the madman of the Middle East’”. Like Mearsheimer and Walt, Post sees this characterization of Saddam as highly problematic. In his view,

This pejorative diagnosis is not only inaccurate but also dangerous. Consigning Saddam to the realm of madness can mislead decision-makers into believing he is unpredictable when in fact he is not. An examination of the record of Saddam Hussein’s leadership of Iraq for the past 34 years reveals a judicious political calculator who is by no means irrational but is dangerous to the extreme (Post, 2003, p.335).

What is interesting is that although the “criminal” leader often acts rationally, his rationality is usually denied. On the one hand, he is portrayed as irrational. On the other hand, actions that are in fact rational are presented as evidence of the criminal leader’s badness. David, for example, argues that,

In one sense, the Miloševićs of the world are ‘bad’ in that they exacerbate hatreds to further their own ends. But can we really expect leaders to act in ways that would undermine their tenure in office?...The bad leaders model simply begs the question of when you get bad leaders and what does ‘bad’ really mean when it may just indicate leaders who are rational and self-interested (David, 1997, p.566).

(iii) War is More Violent Than in the Past

The belief that today’s wars are more violent and brutal than previous wars can help to explain why these wars are widely seen as illegitimate and irrational. Some authors attach the prefix “new” to today’s wars, in order to emphasize that they are qualitatively different from earlier wars. To cite Henderson and Singer,

In the past decade...there has been a growing tendency to suggest ‘new types’ of wars and to urge that these ‘new’ wars are quite unlike and appreciably different from all wars we have known and studied, and thus must be examined and described as a separate genus (Henderson and Singer, 2002, p.165).

Keane, for example, argues that, "...at least some of today's battles are best described as a new type of uncivil war..." (Keane, 1996, p.137); and Kaldor uses the term "New Wars". According to her, "The new wars can be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of their goals, the methods of warfare, and how they are financed" (Kaldor, 1999, p.6).¹³ For his part, Kaplan refers to "the transformation of war" (Kaplan, 1994). In his view,

The plethora of short-lived ceasefires in the Balkans and the Caucasus constitute proof that we are no longer in a world where the old rules of state warfare apply. More evidence is provided by the destruction of medieval monuments in the Croatian port of Dubrovnik: when cultures, rather than states, fight, then cultural and religious monuments are weapons of war, making them fair game (Kaplan, 1994).

Not only are cultural and religious monuments "fair game", however. Today's wars are seen as being particularly brutal on the grounds that they specifically target civilians. Snow, for example, argues that many of these wars "are hardly wars at all, because the 'combat' consists primarily of one or more sides terrorizing and savaging innocent civilians rather than engaging each other militarily" (Snow, 1996, p.155).¹⁴ Similarly, the *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* maintains that,

These internal conflicts commonly are fought with conventional weapons and rely on strategies of ethnic expulsion and annihilation. More civilians are killed than soldiers (by one estimate at the rate of about nine to one), and belligerents use strategies and tactics that deliberately target women, children, the poor, and the weak (The Carnegie Commission, 1997, p.xvii).

The fact that today's wars challenge classical Realist notions about war can perhaps help to explain why it is that they are widely seen as more violent and

¹³ These "new" wars are also of longer duration than previous wars. According to Collier, "The expected duration of a civil war is currently about eight years – double what it was before the 1980s. Wars therefore do more damage now and thus more powerfully provoke further conflict" (Collier, 2003, p.42).

¹⁴ Daalder argues that the wars in Croatia and Bosnia "exacted a high civilian toll because the Serb tactic of choice was to exploit their advantage in heavy weapons by shelling urban areas relentlessly" (Daalder, 1996, p.54).

brutal than previous conflicts.¹⁵ Not only do wars today occur mainly within states rather than between states. They also frequently occur in situations where the state in question no longer has the monopoly of organized violence. As Kaldor argues, “The new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases the disintegration of the state” (Kaldor, 1999, p.4).

An important consequence of this is that, “In the 1990s, most of the fighting is done by irregulars – the casualties of collapsing societies – or by paramilitary gangs that combine banditry with soldiery” (Ignatieff, 1999, p.128). This, in turn, is significant because, “As war passes out of the hands of the state into those of warlords, the rituals of restraint associated with the profession of arms also disintegrate” (Ignatieff, 1999, p.128). Thus, according to Ignatieff, the “codes of a warrior’s honor” have now broken down. Without these codes, “war is not war – it is no more than slaughter” (Ignatieff, 1999, p.117).

If true, this would help to explain why the violence that occurs in today’s wars is often seen as uncontrolled and unstructured. Keane, for example, claims that in at least some of today’s “uncivil” wars, the basic ground-rules are swept aside. Thus, “...on the ground and in the air the law of battle is straightforward: kill, rape, pillage, burn, destroy everything that moves, breathes or twitches” (Keane, 1996, p.139). For his part, Shawcross argues that, “...at the end of the eighties, Liberia exploded in an orgy of uncontrolled

¹⁵ Stedman, however, maintains that, “Civil wars today are no more bloody than those past. The U.S civil war cost upwards of 600,000 lives: the Spanish civil war of the 1930s and the Nigerian civil war of the late 1960s killed on similar scales” (Stedman, 1993, p.4).

and undirected factional violence where drugged young men in carnival masks killed each other” (Shawcross, 2000, p.195).

The erosion of the State’s monopoly of organized violence has had another important consequence - the lines between war and crime have become increasingly blurred. To cite Van Creveld, “Once the legal monopoly of force, once claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will break down...” (cited in Kaplan, 1994). This has given rise to the notion of “criminal” wars. To cite Kalyvas, “Most versions of the distinction between old and new civil wars stress or imply that new civil wars are characteristically criminal, depoliticised, private and predatory...” (Kalyvas, 2001).

Thus, Snow describes the war in Sierra Leone as a “criminal insurgency” (Snow, 1996, p.78); and Shawcross contends that by 1998, “Almost a third of sub-Saharan Africa’s countries were consumed by wars – civil, international, guerrilla or merely nihilistically criminal” (Shawcross, 2000, p.322).

If war is seen as abhorrent, repulsive and irrational, it is logical that leaders who are deemed to be the cause of war will be looked upon in the same way. Furthermore, if today’s wars are regarded as criminal, it follows that their leaders will be similarly viewed. In the words of Duffield, “Following the experience of Bosnia and Rwanda, a new trend has emerged involving a recognition that leadership may not be as anarchic as often depicted: instead, it is theorized as criminal” (Duffield, 2001, p.130).

The gradual erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity, however, means that the criminalization of leaders need not be confined to the realm of theory. It can now also occur in practice, in the form of prosecution in a court of law.

Section 4 - The Erosion of the Principle of Sovereign Immunity

The Treaty of Versailles (1919) contained a provision requiring that Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany be prosecuted. This, however, did not happen because “Most European governments were not willing to have a precedent established that their heads of states, especially monarchs, would be held criminally accountable” (Bassiouni, 2004, p.ix). As Lord Slynn of Hadley pointed out in the Pinochet case, the notion of State or Head of State immunity is “a well established principle of international law” (Lord Slynn, 1998).

This concept of sovereign immunity, however, is slowly being eroded.¹⁶ According to Jones and Powles, for example, it was at the end of the 1990s that, “...impunity was first seriously called into question – by the Pinochet case, the Rome Treaty for the ICC¹⁷, the Lockerbie proceedings, and the use of force to stop atrocities in Kosovo and East Timor” (Jones and Powles, 2003, p.xx). For his part, Shawcross argues that, “Impunity is still the cloak of warlords and killers everywhere...But that is beginning to change. Tentatively, a new global legal architecture is being created” (Shawcross, 2000, p.212).

¹⁶ Some argue, however, that what we are witnessing is less an erosion of sovereign immunity than an erosion of sovereign equality. According to Chandler, for example, “...it may be that we are seeing a redistribution of sovereign power; or rather, the acceptance of sovereign inequality” (Chandler, 2002a, p.121). More about this will be said in chapter 8.

¹⁷ The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by treaty on 17 July 1998, and the Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002.

The doctrine of individual criminal responsibility was incorporated into Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter and Article 6 of the Tokyo Tribunal Charter. In the Nuremberg judgement, it was said that those who commit acts which are condemned as criminal by international law

cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings...the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the State is authorizing action moves outside its competence under international law (Jones and Powles, 2003, p.423).

In recent years, the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility has been reaffirmed. Thus, for example, Article 7(2) of the Charter of the ICTY and Article 6(2) of the Charter of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) provide that, "The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment" (Jones and Powles, 2003, p.422). According to Lord Slynn of Hadley, therefore,

There is thus no doubt that States have been moving towards the recognition of some crimes as those which should not be covered by claims of State or Head of State or other official or diplomatic immunity when charges are brought before international tribunals (Lord Slynn, 1998).

The notion of sovereign immunity is being eroded not only in theory, but also in practice. In September 1998, for example, the ICTR sentenced Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister of Rwanda, to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity. In March 1999, the House of Lords, overruling the High Court's decision that Augusto Pinochet was protected from prosecution by traditional sovereign immunity, ruled that Pinochet had no sovereign immunity and could, therefore, face prosecution.

Giving his decision in the case, Lord Millett stated that,

In future, those who commit atrocities against civilian populations must expect to be called to account if fundamental human rights are to be properly protected. In this context, the exalted rank of the accused can afford no defence (Lord Millett, 1999).

According to Economides, “This was a significant shift in the direction of endorsing the concept of holding individuals of all rank and status responsible for their criminal actions and violations of agreed conventions and treaties in international law” (Economides, 2001, p.116). Two years later, on 28 June 2001, Slobodan Milošević was extradited to the ICTY. In short, the normative construct of the “criminal leader” is now assuming a more legalistic aspect.

It must be emphasized, however, that just as “‘leadership’ is an essentially contested concept” (Elgie, 1995, p.2), so too is the concept of the criminal leader. While there is a strong consensus that Milošević is a criminal leader, there is far less consensus about what makes a criminal leader in general terms. It is, therefore, important to try and develop the concept, using Milošević’s construction as a criminal leader as a starting point. To cite Gerring, “...the more contexts in which a given concept makes sense, the better that concept will be (*ceteris paribus*)” (Gerring, 2001, p.54).

Section 5 – Developing the Concept of the Criminal Leader

It is argued that the four particular developments in IR that this chapter has explored provide us with the two key dimensions of a criminal leader. In section 1, it was claimed that there has been a shift in IR towards agency-based explanations of war. We saw in chapter 1, for example, that Western literature holds Milošević most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Thus,

we can conclude that a defining element of the criminal leader is his behaviour: the criminal leader causes war. This behavioural dimension, comprising actions and intentions, is crucial.

Sections 2 and 3 addressed two further developments in IR – the normative turn within the discipline, and changing attitudes towards war. These developments are important in terms of the standards we use to judge leaders and their conduct. In chapter 1, for example, it was argued that Milošević's construction as a criminal leader is heavily influenced by liberal norms and values. The conclusion we can draw is that the criminal leader is an externally constructed concept, driven by Western liberal norms. This policy dimension of the criminal leader concept is so important that it can be seen as its constitutive element.

Finally, section 4 looked at how the principle of sovereign immunity is being slowly eroded. This important development further demonstrates that the criminal leader is an externally constructed concept, not just in normative terms but also in legal terms. It is primarily Western powers that decide whether and when a criminal leader should be put on trial, how he should be tried, and what crimes he should be tried for.¹⁸

¹⁸ In 1991, for example, the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, submitted to the twelve EC states the idea of an international court to judge Saddam Hussein. "But very quickly the political will of Europe and the United States to move forward slackened...The West abandoned the idea, granting de facto immunity to a man responsible for war crimes and genocide" (Hazan, 2004, p.10).

We have thus identified the two key dimensions of a criminal leader - a behavioural dimension and a policy dimension. There are, however, two other important dimensions to discuss – a character dimension and an institutional dimension.

Dimensions of a criminal leader	
(i) Behavioural dimension	This refers to actions and intentions
(ii) Character dimension	This refers to motivations, and to personality and psychology
(iii) Institutional dimension	This is about regime type
(iv) Policy dimension	This is about who decides whether and when a leader is “criminal”

Milošević’s actions and intentions play a crucial role in his construction as a criminal leader. His motivations, personality and psychology are also important elements in his criminalization. For the purpose of developing a general concept of the criminal leader, these different elements can be subsumed under the headings of behaviour and character.

Chapter 1 did not specifically refer to the institutional and policy dimensions. However, it identified both a comparative element in Milošević’s construction as a criminal leader (his comparison with other “criminal” leaders) and a theoretical element (the construction’s Liberal underpinnings). Both of these elements can be incorporated within the broader institutional and policy dimensions of the criminal leader concept.

We can now explore each of the four dimensions in turn. Throughout, reference will be made to certain leaders who, according to the concept we are developing, can be considered as criminal leaders, most notably Saddam Hussein. It is important to emphasize that the concept of the criminal leader has not been defined elsewhere. The concept of the criminal leader developed below, therefore, is necessarily an ideal type. It constitutes, however, an important basis for further research.

(i) The Behavioural Dimension – Actions and Intentions

The behavioural dimension is crucial – actions and intentions define a criminal leader. First and foremost, the criminal leader causes war. Moreover, the wars that he initiates are illegitimate. They are wars of aggression and territorial expansion that threaten regional stability. Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein can thus be considered as archetypal criminal leaders. In a speech to the United Nations, on 12 September 2002, for example, President Bush emphasized that,

Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world (Bush, 2002c).

Similarly, in a speech delivered on 26 February 2003, Bush claimed the Iraqi people were living under “a dictator who has brought them nothing but war, and misery, and torture” (Bush, 2003a). These words recall a speech given by Bill Clinton in March 1999, at the start of the Kosovo war, when he described Milošević as “...a dictator who has done nothing since the Cold War ended but

start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious division” (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.730).

Linked to the criminal leader’s responsibility for war, he is also responsible for war crimes – that is, crimes that are intimately attached to a state of armed conflict - and other human rights violations. Examples include Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, and the leaders of Rwanda during the genocide of 1994-95. A leader who violates human rights is not necessarily a criminal leader. Various African leaders, past and present - such as Uganda’s former president Idi Amin (1971-1979), Haiti’s former president Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier (1971-1986), and Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe - are commonly regarded more as corrupt dictators than as criminal leaders. In the case of Mugabe, however, it can be argued that this is beginning to change and that he is being increasingly criminalized.¹⁹

A leader who violates human rights is more likely to be deemed criminal when these violations constitute war crimes – in other words, when they occur in the context of a war that the criminal leader has provoked. In some cases, however, the scale and gravity of human rights abuses for which a leader may be deemed responsible are such that his criminalization does not depend on these abuses occurring in a war situation. The example of Saddam Hussein illustrates this point. In a speech delivered in Sedgefield, on 5 March 2004, for

¹⁹ Some would argue, however, that Mugabe’s construction as a criminal leader is based less on his human rights violations than on his refusal to co-operate with the West. Elich, for example, claims that, “The process of land reform is at root a struggle for justice and a challenge to the Western neoliberal model. The refusal to serve Western interests is what motivates U.S and British hostility” (Elich, 2005). This underscores the policy dimension of the criminal leader.

example, Prime Minister Blair referred to Saddam's "appalling brutalisation of the Iraqi people..." (Blair, 2004).

The case of Augusto Pinochet further demonstrates that a nexus between human rights violations and war is not essential to establishing a criminal leader. Giving his judgement in the Pinochet case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson emphasized that,

There is no real dispute that during the period of the Senator Pinochet regime appalling acts of barbarism were committed in Chile and elsewhere in the world: torture, murder, and the unexplained disappearance of individuals, all on a large scale. Although it is not alleged that Senator Pinochet himself committed any of those acts, it is alleged that they were done in pursuance of a conspiracy to which he was a party, at his instigation and with his knowledge (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 1999).

It should be emphasized, however, that Western powers are – and have always been - likely to turn a blind eye to a leader's human rights violations if policy considerations require this. Herman, for example, remarks that,

Pol Pot was a Communist enemy...Indonesia under Suharto and since his ouster has been a US client state and Western ally. It is a notable fact that both the media and human rights groups have found the Indonesian abuses in East Timor less noteworthy, less deserving of indignation and less the basis of urgent calls for humanitarian intervention than the abuses of Pol Pot (Herman, 2002, p.xii).

In chapter 1, we saw that the literature accuses Milošević of inciting ethnic hatred. Although this does not directly define a criminal leader in the way that causing war and committing/supporting war crimes do, it is indirectly important. This is because the incitement of hatred will often facilitate and accelerate both the descent into war and the commission of war crimes therein. Hitler's fostering of anti-Semitism is one obvious example. Another is the

hatred that Rwanda's Hutu leaders stimulated vis-à-vis the country's Tutsi minority.

In some instances, the criminal leader's personal, visceral hatred of other groups lies behind his efforts to cultivate and promote ethnic animosity, as in the case of Hitler's profound loathing of Jews.²⁰ In other instances, however, the criminal leader incites hatred to serve his personal ends. Thus, hatred serves an instrumental purpose. For example, in Rwanda, "the leaders who engineered the slaughter had shaky claims to power, which they attempted to bolster by fomenting conflict between groups" (Kressel, 1996, p.118).

Let us now turn to the intentions that underlie and fuel the actions of a criminal leader. Whilst it is often difficult to decipher a person's precise intentions - in most cases, we can only speculate - intentions are nevertheless a key element in defining what constitutes a criminal leader. Firstly, the actions of a criminal leader are not simply unintended consequences of his policies. Rather, they flow from his malignant intentions.

Secondly, deliberate defiance of the international community helps to define the criminal leader. Saddam Hussein exemplifies this. In a speech delivered on 5 March 2004, for example, Prime Minister Blair referred to "Saddam's programme to develop long-range strategic missiles in breach of UN rules" (Blair, 2004). For his part, in a speech to the United Nations, on 12 September 2002, President Bush emphasized that, "Iraq has answered a decade of UN

²⁰ Carr, for example, refers to Hitler's "paranoid hatred of Jewry" (Carr, 1987, p.69); and Kershaw writes of Hitler's "anti-Jewish paranoia" (Kershaw, 1987, p.230).

demands with defiance” (Bush, 2002c). Later, in a press conference about Iraq, held on 6 March 2003, Bush declared, “These are not the actions of a regime that is disarming. These are the actions of a regime engaged in a wilful charade. These are the actions of a regime that systematically and deliberately is defying the world” (Bush, 2003b).

In short, a leader who co-operates with the West is highly unlikely to be deemed criminal.²¹ Thus, his determination to portray himself as a Western statesman helps to explain why the former president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, was not branded a criminal leader, at least not while he was alive. However, it can be argued that Tudjman, who died from cancer in December 1999, has been posthumously criminalized, in particular for his involvement in Operation “Storm” (“Oluja”).²²

For example, on 19 February 2004, The Hague Tribunal amended its original indictment against Ante Gotovina, the overall operational commander of the Croatian forces deployed as part of Operation “Storm”.²³ According to the amended indictment, “During and after Operation Storm, at all times relevant to this Amended Indictment, Ante Gotovina, with others including...President

²¹ Not only political co-operation, but also economic co-operation is important. To cite Duffield, “a state’s willingness to adopt neo-liberal economic policy and co-operate with lender demands” provides “a fresh, if superficial, way of distinguishing the good from the bad...” (Duffield, 1998, p.88).

²² Croatian forces launched Operation “Storm” on 4 August 1995, with the aim of re-taking the Krajina region in Croatia. Three days later, the Croatian government announced that the Operation had been successfully completed. Some 200,000 Krajina Serbs had been forced to flee their homes in what amounted to the largest single act of ethnic cleansing in the wars in former Yugoslavia.

²³ After four years on the run, Gotovina was arrested in a restaurant in Tenerife’s Playa de Las Americas resort, on 8 December 2005. Gotovina had been number three on the Hague Tribunal’s most wanted list, after Mladić and Karadžić. His arrest thus marks a significant breakthrough for the Tribunal.

Franjo Tudjman, participated in a joint criminal enterprise...” (The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Ante Gotovina, 2004). This revised indictment thus explicitly criminalizes Tudjman as a participant in such an enterprise.²⁴ In contrast, the original indictment makes no mention at all of any joint criminal enterprise.

This poses a key question: at what point does a leader become criminal? In 1995, for example, when Milošević helped to negotiate the Dayton Accords that brought an end to the three-year war in Bosnia, he was not seen as a criminal leader. Rather, he was hailed as a “man of peace”. Thus, the Hague Tribunal’s initial indictment against Milošević was confined to allegations about crimes in Kosovo; it made no mention of crimes committed in Bosnia.

To cite Bissett,

It would not do to have the man Madeleine Albright hailed as ‘a man of peace’ at the time of the Dayton Accords indicted for crimes in Bosnia after he had played such a pivotal role in bringing about an end to the bloodshed there (Bissett, 2001a).

Subsequently, however, Milošević was criminalized and indicted, inter alia, for crimes allegedly committed in Bosnia, notwithstanding that these crimes had already occurred at the time of the Dayton peace negotiations. What is important to emphasize, therefore, is that the concept of the criminal leader is externally constructed, a point to which we shall return.

²⁴ In the trial judgement of Prosecutor versus Krnojelac, on 15 March 2002, a joint criminal enterprise was described as “an understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement between two or more persons that will commit a crime” (Mettraux, 2005, p.287).

(ii) The Character Dimension – Motivations and Psychology

It will be recalled from the previous chapter that according to the literature, what primarily motivated Milošević was a lust for power. Similarly, we can argue that one of the features of a criminal leader is an extreme hunger for power that knows no bounds. Prepared to go to any lengths to win and maintain power, a criminal leader is often cruel and ruthless. He puts his own interests first, whatever the cost for his own people. For example, in a speech delivered in Texas, on 8 April 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that,

The regime of Saddam is detestable. Brutal, repressive, political opponents routinely tortured and executed: it is a regime without a qualm in sacrificing the lives of its citizens to preserve itself, or starting wars with neighbouring states, and it has used chemical weapons against its own people (Blair, 2002a).

As a consequence of his insatiable appetite for power and the extremes to which it propels him, a criminal leader appears as a hardened individual with little or no feeling for others. In short, he displays a total lack of humanity. Speaking to the House of Commons on 24 September 2002, for example, Tony Blair described Saddam Hussein as “a cruel and sadistic dictator” (Blair, 2002b). For his part, David Crane, a prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and a former Pentagon lawyer, described Charles Taylor, the indicted war criminal and former president of Liberia, as “a regional monster” (cited in Bravin and Block, 2003, p.A15).

In addition to the motivations and personality of a criminal leader, the third element relating to character is his psychology. His mental state is somewhat ambiguous, and while this does not define him as criminal, it sets him apart as somehow abnormal. His abhorrent and ruthless behaviour so offends our own

sensibilities that we do not want to try and rationalize it. Instead, we prefer to see the behaviour as irrational. What is interesting, however, is that a criminal leader's impaired mental state does not in any way excuse his criminal behaviour. In short, madness does not mitigate badness; rather, it simply reinforces it. The example of Hitler particularly illustrates this. To cite Kressel, "Most psychologists and psychiatrists agree that, in some sense, Hitler was nuts" (Kressel, 1996, p.132).

(iii) The Institutional Dimension – Regime Type

In developing the concept of the criminal leader, we have thus far focused on the leader himself – on his behaviour and his character. A third important dimension, however, is an institutional dimension, focused on regime type. The fundamental point here is that the regime of a criminal leader is non-democratic, and for liberals non-democratic regimes pose a major threat to international peace and security.²⁵ In short, "The liberal view is that not democracies but authoritarian states launch mass killing" (Mann, 2001, p.70).

Speaking on 26 February 2003, for example, President Bush declared that, "The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life" (Bush, 2003a). Hence, by definition, non-democratic regimes and, by extension, their leaders represent a potential threat to liberal peace, and may thus be deemed criminal.

²⁵ Speaking on 8 April 2002, for example, Tony Blair argued that in the absence of democracy, "...regimes act unchecked by popular accountability and pose a threat; and the threat spreads" (Blair, 2002a).

It should be noted that the concept of “criminal regimes” is more developed than the concept of criminal leaders. The former are characterized by their links with terrorist organizations. Rotfeld, for example, argues that,

...the main threat to international security today are dictatorial and criminal regimes (mainly outside the OSCE area) that support, finance and shelter international terrorist networks on a global as well as regional and local scale (Rotfeld, 2003).

Although not in all cases, the regime of a criminal leader may be deemed “criminal” in this particular sense. For example, both President Bush and Tony Blair have consistently emphasized Saddam Hussein’s links with terrorist groups.²⁶

What is interesting is that following the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, there have been calls for Bush (as well as his predecessor, Clinton) and Blair to be put on trial for war crimes. Velko Valkanov, for example, the founder and chairman of the *International Committee to Defend Slobodan Milošević* (ICDSM), maintains that, “If any people should be tried for crimes against peace and humanity, these are first and foremost the leaders of the United States and other NATO member states” (Valkanov, 2005). This, therefore, raises a fundamental question: can the leader of a democratic regime be criminal?

Whilst this is possible in theory, it is argued that the realities of international politics make this unlikely. That is to say that because liberal democracies generally stick together – according to the democratic peace thesis, they do not go to war against each other – it is very improbable that they would construct

²⁶ In a press conference on 6 March 2003, for example, President Bush argued that, “Iraq is a country that has got terrorist ties. It’s a country with wealth. It’s a country that trains terrorists, a country that could arm terrorists” (Bush, 2003b).

one of their own as criminal. This brings us to the key dimension of the criminal leader concept – the policy dimension.

(iv) The Policy Dimension – The Concept is Externally Constructed

It is argued that the criminal leader is an externally constructed concept. Ultimately, therefore, there are no hard and fast rules as to what constitutes a criminal leader. In view of this, perhaps the crucial question that we need to ask ourselves is not what makes a criminal leader, but rather who decides when a leader is criminal.

Let us take the example of Charles Taylor who, in 2003, was indicted on seventeen counts of crimes against humanity. On the basis of the three dimensions of a criminal leader explored in this section – namely, behaviour, character and regime-type – Taylor can be considered as a criminal leader. However, it can be argued that he has not been criminalized in the way that Milošević and Saddam Hussein have been, for example, and although he is an indicted war criminal, the United States has appeared in no hurry to put him on trial. According to a columnist for the *Washington Post*,

Taylor poses a clear and present danger to West Africa and U.S interests. Yet the State Department continues to respond to congressional inquiries with bland assurances that everything is fine and Taylor is no longer a problem. It's not true (Farah, 2005).

The journalist emphasizes that Taylor has not only escaped answering for his crimes so far, but “may be given an opportunity to repeat them if the United States does not act” (Farah, 2005).

The case of Saddam Hussein is also very useful for highlighting that the criminal leader is externally constructed. What is interesting about Saddam is that while he is widely considered a criminal leader, he has been criminalized for his actions during the nineties, but not for his behaviour during the eighties. For example, during the Iran-Iraq war, “Washington, fully aware that Saddam was using mustard and nerve gas against Iranian civilians, calculated that it was better to keep backing him as the lesser of two evils”(Prison Planet, 2004).

What this shows is that the criminalization of leaderships is closely linked to policy considerations. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam was useful to the United States and thus was not deemed criminal, despite committing heinous crimes. During the nineties, however, Iraq had become a “rogue state” and Saddam had become a major threat to the American people, to the “civilized” world, and to freedom itself – in short, a criminal leader. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, for example, Margaret Thatcher and President George Bush

publicly evoked the necessity of trying Saddam Hussein. This public effort was an attempt, among other things, to criminalize the master of Baghdad and thereby legitimize in the name of universal morality...the validity of the Gulf War campaign against this tyrant (Hazan, 2004, p.9).

In the case of Saddam Hussein, there is an overlap between the concept of a criminal leader and the concept, also externally constructed, of a “rogue state”.

According to President Bush, rogue states

- (i) brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- (ii) display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- (iii) are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- (iv) sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
- (v) reject basic human

values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands (Bush, 2002b).

However, as with the concept of the criminal leader, what ultimately counts is the policy dimension. Thus, a state that meets the above criteria is not a rogue state until it is constructed as such. In other words, the criteria are not rigid. For example, “a country such as Syria that generally met them was nevertheless not described as a ‘rogue state’ because of its strategic importance” (Chancellor, 2002b).

Just as certain states are grouped together as “rogue states” or, more recently, as constituting an “axis of evil”²⁷, so too certain leaders are grouped together as criminal, through the use of comparison.²⁸ We saw in chapter 1 that comparison is an important element in Milošević’s criminalization. However, for the purposes of developing a more general concept of the criminal leader, what is important to note is that the origin of such comparisons is external, rather than internal.²⁹ This comparative element can, therefore, be considered as part of the policy dimension of the criminal leader.

To conclude, it is argued that policy considerations are inextricably bound up with the criminalization of leaders, that it is powerful Western states that decide whether and when a leader is to be deemed criminal and that, as a result,

²⁷ In his State of the Union Address, delivered on 29 January 2002, President Bush argued that states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea “constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002a).

²⁸ On 8 April 2000, for example, the headline of *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto) read, “Zimbabwe’s Hitler Wages War of Land” (Gowans, 2002).

²⁹ As we shall see in the data chapters, the interviewees overall do not support the use of such comparisons.

the concept of the criminal leader is not of universal application. Instead, it only applies in certain cases.

Conclusion

The concept of the criminal leader developed in this chapter is only an ideal type. It is based upon a particular case-study – the criminalization of Slobodan Milošević – but this case-study cannot tell us everything. Future case studies of other “criminal” leaders, such as Saddam Hussein would, therefore, be extremely valuable and would help us to develop the concept further. Given that the criminal leader is externally constructed, however, perhaps the key point to be made here is that it is likely to remain an essentially contested and rather slippery concept without clear parameters.

If defining the criminal leader is problematic, so too is the question of how one studies a criminal leader. We saw in chapter 1 that Western literature takes a very top-down, leader-centric approach in its construction of Milošević as a criminal leader. Other leaders who fit the concept of the criminal leader developed in this chapter, such as Hitler and Stalin, have also traditionally been studied in a similar way. As we shall now see, however, this is beginning to change as importance is increasingly being given to the view from below. In keeping with this, the main argument that chapter 3 seeks to make is that the criminal leader should be studied both from the top down and from the bottom up.

Chapter 3

Studying Criminal Leaders; The Case for a Bottom-Up Approach

Introduction

A key aim of this thesis is to explore whether and to what extent ordinary people in Serbia support the dominant Western image of Milošević as a criminal leader. This particular chapter seeks to demonstrate the importance, in both theory and practice, of examining the view from below, through posing and answering the question of how one should study a criminal leader.

The present chapter focuses on two particular leaders who, according to the dimensions of a criminal leader outlined in chapter 2, can be considered as archetypal criminal leaders – Hitler and Stalin. Traditionally, studies of the Hitler and Stalin regimes have concentrated on the two leaders themselves¹, while devoting little attention to the ordinary people who lived under these regimes.² However, this has begun to change as a new wave of scholars, including Stephen Kotkin, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Detlev Peukert, and Ian Kershaw, have sought to challenge orthodox historiography. Rejecting narrow, leader-centric approaches as inadequate, these scholars emphasize the importance of exploring the view from below.

Influenced by the work of these individuals, this chapter argues that a comprehensive study of the criminal leader requires us to focus not only on the

¹ There are a vast number of studies focusing on the leadership and personalities of Hitler and Stalin, including William Carr's *Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics* (1978), and Alan Bullock's *Personality and Power: The Strange Case of Hitler and Stalin* (1995).

² According to Peterson, "The natural tendency of historians has been to shine their flashlights of knowledge at the figure of the 'leader', perforce ignoring the vast gray world of the 'followers'" (Peterson, 1969, p.3).

leader himself, but also on the ordinary people who directly experienced his “criminal” leadership. Their voices should also be heard. As Shkilnyk maintains, “There is no evidence more powerful than that drawn directly from what people say in their own words about their life experiences” (cited in Magid, 1991, p.64). Thus, four chapters of the thesis are devoted to exploring the opinions that ordinary people in Serbia have of Milošević.³ Few Western authors have sought to interview ordinary people. Those who have conducted interviews as part of their research have typically interviewed elites.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will begin by explaining why the view from below is important for studying criminal leaders. It will then demonstrate this, using examples of bottom-up research vis-à-vis the Hitler and Stalin regimes. Section 2 will examine some of the main criticisms of this type of research. Finally, in order to highlight the value of a bottom-up perspective more generally, section 3 will provide some examples of such research vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia.

Section 1 – Hitler, Stalin, and the View From Below

It is argued that we cannot study a criminal leader simply by focusing on the leader himself. Rather, we must also consider the view from below. There are four main reasons for this. The first reason relates to the nature of leadership itself. In short, leadership is a relationship. To cite Mazlish,

³ The thesis’ concern to give a voice to those - both Serbs and national minorities in Serbia - whom we seldom hear is shared by scholars from the *Subaltern Studies Group*. Objecting to the fact that hitherto Indian history has been written from a colonialist and elitist point of view, these scholars - such as Ranajit Guha and Partha Chatterjee - seek to rewrite the history of colonial India from the distinct point of view of the masses.

...the leader does not exist, fully formed, before the encounter with the group he is to lead. He discovers himself, forms and takes on his identity as a particular kind of leader in the course of interacting with his chosen group. He also finds a public style, which may be quite separate from his private style. It is a creative encounter (Mazlish, 1986, p.276).

Thus, we cannot adequately study a criminal leader if we ignore one half of the leadership relationship – ordinary people. This can give us only a very narrow and incomplete picture. The thesis, therefore, favours an interactionist approach to leadership.⁴ In the words of Elgie,

For interactionists, the extent to which leaders are able to influence the decision-making process is considered to be contingent upon the interaction between the leader and the leadership environment in which the leader operates (Elgie, 1995, p.7).

The ordinary people who either support or challenge the leader are clearly a fundamental part of this leadership environment that cannot be ignored.

The second reason for looking at the view from below relates directly to the concept of the criminal leader. Chapter 2 emphasized that this is an externally constructed concept. It is, therefore, important to examine whether and to what extent external views of the leader are congruent with domestic views. What the interview data reveals is an important discrepancy between external (Western) and domestic (Serbian) views of Milošević. As we shall in chapter 7, the Serbian interviewees in the sample view Milošević above all a “bad” leader⁵, not as a criminal leader.

⁴ According to Tucker, there are two ways of approaching leadership. The first is to approach it as “an interactional process, a relation between leaders and followers”. The second way is to approach leadership as “a kind of activity that leaders seek to perform in their capacity as leaders” (Tucker, 1981, p.24).

⁵ Central to this concept is the idea that Milošević cared only about himself and his power, and not about the Serbian people he ruled.

A third important reason for exploring the view from below is that, in order to make an informed assessment of a particular regime, it is not sufficient to concentrate solely on leadership. This is to address only one dimension of regime type and to ignore the three additional dimensions of regime type highlighted by Linz and Stepan – pluralism, ideology and mobilization (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p.41). The Western literature reviewed in chapter 1 essentially focuses only on the leadership dimension. By examining the view from below, the present research, in contrast, also addresses a second dimension of regime type - pluralism. The term “pluralism”, as used in this context, should not be understood in its strict sense. The thesis is not looking at civil society in Serbia, but it is concerned with ordinary people and their opinions of Milošević.

The final reason for examining the view from below is that just as good research requires us to use more than one source, so it requires us to consider more than one perspective. Confining ourselves to a narrow top-down perspective is inadequate. The view from below is a particularly valuable perspective to explore, because it can provide important and fresh insight, thereby adding complexity and richness to conventional top-down approaches. In his work on Rwanda, for example, Pottier argues that bringing ordinary people back into the frame allows us “a new way of viewing the situation” (Pottier, 2002, p.3). For him, the complex voices of those with nuanced stories to tell, such as refugees and survivors of genocide, constitute “an antidote to the easy readings that obliterate context and detail...” (Pottier, 2002, p.202). The fact that the Western literature examined in chapter 1

heavily neglects the view from below makes the “insider” view of ordinary people in Serbia even more important to explore.

These four reasons explain why, in theory, the view from below is important for studying criminal leaders. In order to demonstrate the value of the view from below in practice, the remainder of this section will explore the bottom-up turn in studies of two particular leaders – Hitler and Stalin – who can be seen as “crucial cases” in the study of criminal leaders.⁶

The concern of the scholars whose research forms the focus of this section is to produce a more bottom-up account of the Hitler and Stalin regimes. Their argument is that we cannot study these regimes without considering the micro level of everyday life. Their work, therefore, explores and seeks to reconstruct the everyday life experiences of ordinary people who lived under these regimes, using a variety of sources. These include interviews and oral history, archives, diaries and letters, photographs and newspapers.

It should be emphasized at the outset that the argument these scholars make is not about criminal leaders and how we should study them. However, since both Hitler and Stalin can be regarded as criminal leaders – according to the dimensions of a criminal leader set out in the previous chapter – bottom-up research vis-à-vis their regimes can be used for the purpose of illustrating and supporting the argument that we cannot study the criminal leader by focusing

⁶ According to Gerring, “A basic version of a crucial case is that the case is chosen because it has come to define, or at least to exemplify, a concept or theoretical outcome”. For example, “France is a crucial case in the study of revolution” (Gerring, 2001, p.219).

only on the person of the leader himself. The research discussed in this section supports each of the four above-made arguments in favour of examining the view from below.

In Germany, the birth of the *Alltagsgeschichte*⁷ movement, in the mid-1970s, had a significant impact on traditional historiography of the Hitler regime. Intent on developing a more qualitative understanding of ordinary people's circumstances and everyday lives, *Alltag* historians, such as Alf Lüdtke, focus not on structures, class antagonisms or economic fluctuations, but rather on values, beliefs, mentalities and lifestyles. The French *Annales* School, which developed in the 1920s, offered an important model. In a similar vein, the so-called "Revisionists", such as Sheila Fitzpatrick and Ronald Grigor Suny, have re-examined and challenged traditional historiography on the Stalin regime, by shifting the focus away from the State and the person of Stalin to the sphere of everyday life.

At the beginning of this section, it was argued that one of the reasons why studies of the criminal leader should include the view from below is that we should not restrict ourselves to one particular perspective – a top-down perspective. The above-mentioned "historians of everyday life", "social historians" and "Revisionists" similarly emphasize the importance of exploring different perspectives. For example, they regard a narrow focus on the State as inadequate. As Andrle argues vis-à-vis the Stalin regime,

...once it is accepted that the state was not monolithic in its practices of policy implementation, that it struggled to control the population with

⁷ "The history of everyday life".

only a mixed success, and that its policies were replete with unintended effects, then the history of the Stalin era is no longer adequately represented by the study of political dictatorship, its ideology and its power apparatus alone (Andrle, 1994, p.198).

What is important is not the State per se, but rather the interconnections between the practices of the State and everyday life, between the macro and micro levels. Kotkin, for example, describes his work on the USSR as “an inquiry into the minutiae of urban life and how certain ways of thinking and accompanying social practices fit into the grand strategies of Soviet state building during the formative period of the 1930s” (Kotkin, 1995, p.23).

It was also argued at the beginning of this section that since leadership is a relationship, the study of criminal leaders requires that we explore both halves of that relationship – the leader and his followers. Similarly, the new wave of scholarship on the Hitler and Stalin regimes emphasizes that we should not only focus on the person of the leader. To cite Bessel,

No longer is it possible to regard the horrific history of Nazi Germany as the product of a few demonic politicians (or even more pointedly, ‘the will of a single madman’) who entranced millions of Germans and sent them down a path towards war and mass murder (Bessel, 1987, p.xiv).

Similarly, Peterson contends that Hitler “did not operate in a vacuum; there were millions of others involved. One reality cannot be understood without the other” (Peterson, 1969, p.430). For his part, Voegelin maintains that,

Therefore one cannot in any way isolate Hitler and analyze him as a single personality. Instead, one can see the phenomenon of his rise to power only in connection with a disposition of the German people, which brought Hitler into power (Voegelin, 1999, p.59).⁸

⁸ Meier makes a similar argument vis-à-vis Milošević and the Serbian people. He contends that, “There had to be a predisposition in the political thinking of a large part of the Serbian people to ‘solutions’ along the lines of what he represented. This in turn leads one to the conclusion that the problem is not Milošević at all, but rather the political dispositions among people in Serbia itself” (Meier, 1999, p.44).

What all of this means in practice, according to Peukert, is that a study of everyday life in the Third Reich includes the interaction between the Nazi system and the people - interaction rather than domination of “top” over “bottom”. Thus, we must look not only at “the shaping of life-styles by the demands of the system”, but also – in the other direction – at “the impact that was made on the Nazi movement by prevailing attitudes, expectations, and forms of behaviour” (Peukert, 1987, p.25).⁹

What is clear, therefore, is that those who adopt a more bottom-up approach to the Hitler and Stalin regimes do not confine themselves to exploring only one of the dimensions of regime type identified by Linz and Stepan – leadership. For example, various scholars look at a second dimension – mobilization. They examine how the regimes of Hitler and Stalin mobilized the masses. According to Andrle, for example, “The activities of Stalin’s state were largely defined by mobilizing people...”. Thus, the Stalinist regime can be described as “a mobilization regime” (Andrle, 1994, p.198). For his part, Schoenbaum refers to the Hitler regime’s “mobilization of disaffection” (Schoenbaum, 1966, p.15).

Finally, it was argued that exploring the view from below is important in terms of allowing us to ascertain the degree to which external and domestic views of the externally constructed criminal leader coincide. At the same time, the new insight that we gain from examining the view from below can make us

⁹ Similarly, Kershaw maintains that, “...it is reasonable to ask to what extent popular opinion and ‘popular opposition’ influenced Nazi policy, whether in fact it had any impact at all on the Nazi leadership, or whether the regime could ignore it altogether” (Kershaw, 1983, p.378).

question and re-evaluate our opinions. A parallel can be drawn here with bottom-up research on the Hitler and Stalin regimes.

Such research particularly questions and problematizes the idea that ordinary people were merely the victims of these regimes. In other words, it seeks to demonstrate that this concept of victimized masses is flawed and of limited validity. Instead, it assumes, and endeavours to show that the relationship between State and society was far more complex than a simple oppressor/victim relationship. According to Fitzpatrick, for example,

no political regime, including Stalin's, functions in a social vacuum. There were social pressures and constituencies influencing Stalinist policy formation...More importantly, there were social constraints, social responses and informal processes of negotiation between the regime and social groups that had a very significant impact on policy implementation – that is, on Stalin's 'revolution from above' in practice (Fitzpatrick, 1986, p.372).¹⁰

For his part, Peukert argues that,

Active consent – popular approval of Nazi policies – was conditional upon the regime's ability, by invoking a constant supply of genuine or ostensible achievements, to meet peoples' basic everyday needs for security, progress, and a sense of meaning and purpose in life (Peukert, 1987, p.76).

By emphasizing the reciprocal nature of regime/society relations, these scholars thus portray ordinary people as actors in their own right, rather than simply as passive victims.¹¹ Indeed, for the Revisionists and *Alltag* historians, we do a great injustice to ordinary people if we portray them merely as victims.

¹⁰ Toft makes a similar argument in more general terms. She emphasizes that, "...leaders maneuver within boundaries whose areas are determined by forces beyond their control. This is a crucial point because it counters the tendency to see leaders as always forming public opinion *ex nihilo*, rather than representing a preexisting public opinion" (Toft, 2003, p.84). Western literature on the Milošević regime, with its emphasis on elite manipulation, exemplifies such a tendency.

¹¹ Goldhagen, however, takes the argument one stage further. According to his controversial thesis, ordinary German people were "Hitler's willing executioners" (Goldhagen, 1997, p.454).

To cite Lüdtke, “It is obvious that the historical actors were (and are) more than mere blind puppets or helpless victims” (Lüdtke, 1995, p.5).¹²

These scholars are, therefore, interested in understanding active passive resistance to, or support for, these regimes. According to Peukert, rather than explain popular support for a system of ideology in terms of elite manipulation, we must instead “explain what were the fundamental needs and activities in which the population’s active consent, or passive participation, took root” (Peukert, 1987, p.68). In other words, rather than starting at the top and working down, we should instead begin at the bottom and work up.

Although the present research has been influenced by the work of Revisionist and *Alltag* scholars, it cannot claim to be social history. For example, it does not seek to reconstruct the everyday lives of ordinary people who lived through the Milošević years; and while it aims to provide the reader with some insight into what everyday life was like during this period, in particular economically, it is more concerned with exploring the views and opinions that ordinary people in Serbia have of Milošević, in order to find out whether they themselves see him as criminal.

However, the thesis shares the concern of social historians to do justice to the view from below. As Kotkin argues, “there is no substitute for letting people speak in their own words as much as possible” (Kotkin, 1995, p.21). In this

¹² Western literature tends to portray the Serbian people as victims of Milošević and his propaganda. Cohen, for example, describes the Serbs as being “delirious” and “brainwashed” (Cohen, 1998, p.194); and Melchoir contends that the Serbian nation was “majoritairement

way, it seeks to redress an important top-down imbalance in the existing Western literature. While Suny rightly claims that, “For too long Russian history has been written not only from the top down, but with the bottom left out completely” (Suny, 1987, p.3), we could easily replace the words “Russian history” with “Western accounts of the Milošević regime”. In attempting to redress this imbalance, the thesis makes a significant contribution to the existing Western literature by providing important insight into domestic views of Milošević.

This section has argued the case for using a bottom-up approach. It has also sought to demonstrate the value of such an approach, using examples of bottom-up research vis-à-vis two particular leaders, Hitler and Stalin, who can be seen as paradigm cases of the criminal leader. While such research constitutes a welcome addition to a traditionally, leader-centred historiography, it has also been heavily criticized.

Section 2 – Some Criticisms of “Everyday Life” Approaches

Contemporary studies of everyday life during the Hitler and Stalin regimes have proven very controversial. The main criticisms fall into four groups.

(i) Moral Criticisms

Moral criticisms are perhaps the most numerous and the most significant. The critics’ basic contention is that the emphasis on “ordinariness” and “ordinary, everyday life” detracts from the more brutal and violent aspects of the regime.

aveuglée par l’orientation destructrice du leader serbe” (“overwhelmingly blinded by the destructive tendencies of the Serb leader”) (Melchoir, 1993, p.47).

According to advocates of the “totalitarian” version of the Stalin era¹³, revisionist arguments “sanitize” the Stalinist regime by highlighting the “trivial” elements of everyday life and government social policy, at the expense of the dreadful atrocities perpetrated by the regime.

Kenez, for example, claims that consciously or unconsciously, revisionists “de-demonize Stalin and his Politburo, so much so that Stalinism disappears as a phenomenon. In their presentation, the politics of the 1930s was humdrum politics” (Kenez, 1986, p.396). Meyer similarly claims that by questioning the degree of control that Stalin actually possessed, the revisionists are to some extent absolving the dictator from blame (Meyer, 1986, p.404).

It is, however, over-simplistic to argue that by focusing on the sphere of everyday life, we thereby “sanitize” the regimes of Hitler and Stalin. In the words of Norbert Elias, “an attempt to explain is not necessarily an attempt to excuse” (cited in Ayçoberry, 1999, p.7). In the case of Milošević, for example, we do not gloss over his crimes by exploring the everyday life experiences of ordinary people. On the contrary, we thereby gain fresh insight into his crimes.

The interview data, analyzed in chapters 5-8, tells us about Milošević’s crimes against his own people and about what the interviewees consider to be his biggest crimes. Not only is this information important in helping us to make

¹³ In the aftermath of World War Two, studies of the Stalin era developed around the totalitarian model. Exemplified by Merle Fainsod’s case study of Smolensk province, in 1958, this approach focused on the issue of state control and its extension over more and more areas of thought and action. Thus, for Fainsod, “...Stalinism spelled the development of a full-blown totalitarian regime in which all the lines of control ultimately converged in the hands of the supreme dictator” (Fainsod, 1959, p.12).

sense of the interviewees' opinions of Milošević. It is also important because the existing Western literature typically focuses on Milošević's crimes against Bosnian Muslims, Kosovar Albanians and other non-Serbs, telling us little about what the Serbian people themselves suffered.

(ii) Methodological Criticisms

Approaches that focus on everyday life are also flawed, according to the critics, on the grounds that their methodology is too vague. Decisions about what should be included in the analysis are highly subjective, with the risk that only a very impressionistic and selective picture of a situation can be given.¹⁴ Kenez, for example, heavily criticizes Fitzpatrick's decision to avoid looking at the terror perpetrated by the Stalinist regime. Fitzpatrick justifies this on the grounds that it would be moralistic to look at the terror. Kenez, however, rejects this argument, maintaining that if the emphasis on terror betrays a certain moral dimension, so too does the denial of its significance (Kenez, 1986, p.399).

Others criticize everyday life approaches as lacking scientific rigour. Wehler, for example, criticizes *Alltagsgeschichte* as a kind of "bland, conventional oatmeal" dished up as historical science (cited in Lüdtkke, 1995, p.10), and Kocka argues that *Alltagsgeschichte* is "fundamentally unscientific". In his eyes, history as a science is based on the conception of what is basically a

¹⁴ Even those who practice an everyday life approach concede that there are problems regarding the quality of the data. For example, in her study of popular opinion in Stalinist Russia, Davies admits that much of the data can only yield a rather "impressionistic" picture (Davies, 1997, p.16).

unified history. The mass of myriad individual (hi)stories is far less significant (cited in Lüdtkke, 1995, p.9).

Yet, judgements about whether or not something is scientific are themselves highly subjective, and closely related to one's theoretical position. For example, some quantitative researchers dismiss qualitative research as "soft" and unscientific.¹⁵ Douglas, however, maintains that, "The only valid and reliable (or hard scientific) evidence concerning socially meaningful phenomena we can possibly have is that based ultimately on systematic observations and analyses of everyday life" (Douglas, 1971, p.12). This is because social actions "must be studied and explained in terms of their meanings to the actors themselves" (Douglas, 1971, p.4).

(iii) Conceptual Criticisms

Some criticize everyday life approaches on the grounds of the particular terminology used. The very term "everyday life" is somewhat vague and ill-defined. What exactly should it include? As one might expect, scholars' views on this are extremely diverse. For example, Fitzpatrick understands "everyday" to mean primarily the sphere of family life. Others, however, look primarily at work-life and at the behaviours and attitudes generated at the workplace¹⁶, while scholars of everyday life under totalitarian regimes often

¹⁵ There is an overlap between some of the criticisms made of everyday life approaches and criticisms of qualitative research in general. For example, the criticism that "...one weakness of 'everyday history' is its preoccupation with the minutiae of narrative, which has prevented historians of plebian concerns from ascertaining the representativeness of their data and from determining the context of their findings" (Jackson, 1990, p.244) is a criticism that is frequently made about qualitative research.

¹⁶ For example, Steve A. Smith (1987).

concentrate on active and passive resistance to those regimes¹⁷. As to the term “ordinary, everyday people”, Lüdtke himself acknowledges that this is “as suggestive as it is imprecise” (Lüdtke, 1995, p.3).

Problems of terminology clearly exist, but these can be minimized if authors clearly define what they mean by terms such as “everyday life”. It should also be pointed out that problems of terminology are not specific to everyday life approaches. For example, it is striking how many Western authors use terms such as “Serbian nationalism” and “Greater Serbia” without ever actually defining them.

(iv) Practical Problems

Finally, in addition to the above criticisms, there are potential practical problems involved in doing bottom-up, everyday life research, thus giving further ammunition to the critics. For example, practitioners of “everyday history” typically use a rich variety of sources, including oral history, memoirs, letters, diaries, old photographs, archives, newspapers, pamphlets and statistical compilations. However, as Andrieu argues, “The canvas is broader, the dangers of over-generalization greater, and the material more fragmented” (Andrieu, 1994, p.x).

As well as being fragmented, the material can also be unavailable, inaccessible, or very limited. In his study of everyday life in Magnitogorsk, for example, Kotkin admits that “the greatest deficiency of the source base of the present

¹⁷ For example, Sarah Davies (1997).

monograph is...the failure to uncover any diaries or personal letters, and thus to reach people's intimate thoughts" (Kotkin, 1995, p.373)¹⁸. Similarly, Lüdtke points out that "It is rare to find letters or documents written by the individuals themselves (or consciously passed on, handed down to others)" (Lüdtke, 1995, p.13); and Kershaw explains that,

One of the greatest general difficulties in trying to establish patterns of development in political attitudes during the Third Reich is that direct, authentic expressions of opinion in their original form are few and far between (Kershaw, 1983, p.6).

In their concern to give a voice to the masses, scholars from the *Subaltern Studies Group* have also encountered difficulties in finding adequate sources. Guha, for example, suggests that one way of combating elitist bias in the literature "could perhaps be to summon folklore, oral as well as written, to the historian's aid". He goes on to point out that,

Unfortunately, however, there is not enough to serve for this purpose either in quantity or quality...For one thing, the actual volume of evidence yielded by songs, rhymes, ballads, anecdotes, etc, is indeed very meagre, to the point of being insignificant, compared to the size of documentation available from elitist sources in almost any agrarian movement of our period (Guha, 1997, p.14).

Micro-level research is also very labour-intensive and time-consuming. Good contacts are essential, and the researcher must be very flexible, patient and resourceful. He/she must also be prepared for many disappointments along the way. Nevertheless, it is argued that the practical difficulties are outweighed by the satisfaction and rewards that one can get from doing this type of research. These rewards can be both academic – for example, making an important and original contribution to an existing literature – and personal, such as learning new skills and making new friendships.

¹⁸ In the present research, attempts to gain access to diaries were similarly unsuccessful.

Thus far, this chapter has argued, and sought to show, that the view from below is both an important and necessary perspective to explore in the study of criminal leaders. However, the value and usefulness of a bottom-up approach is not confined to the specific case of the criminal leader. The final section of the chapter, therefore, will look at some more general examples of bottom-up research, relating to the former Yugoslavia. This thesis both situates itself within this particular body of research, and makes a worthy contribution to it.

Section 3 – Examples of Bottom-Up Research vis-à-vis the Former Yugoslavia

In view of the emphasis that this thesis places on the view from below, it is extremely encouraging that other researchers working on the former Yugoslavia have similarly acknowledged the importance of this particular level of analysis and have sought to make a more bottom-up contribution to the existing literature. This section will survey some of the research that has been undertaken so far, before making some suggestions as to future micro-level research.

Those who have adopted a more bottom-up approach tend to come from the disciplines of sociology and social anthropology. An early example of micro-level research in the field is Joel Halpern and Barbara Kerensky Halpern's ethnographical study of a Serbian village, Orašac, during the 1970s. Underscoring the importance of the view from below, the authors argue that, "With urban life in Serbia having grown in significant measure out of village traditions, by looking at the village here we are looking in a very specific way

at the genesis of the modern Serbian nation” (Halpern and Kerensky Halpern, 1972, p.45).

More recently, Tone Bringa followed a Muslim community in Bosnia over a period of six years. Sharing the concern of the *Subaltern Studies Group* and social historians to give a voice to those who are seldom given the opportunity to speak, Bringa explains,

This book is concerned with the voices behind the headlines, the lived lives behind the images of endless rows of refugees and war victims deprived of past and future, defined by others solely in terms of what they have lost – as refugees (Bringa, 1995, p.5).

Bringa clearly sees the villagers in her study as victims. For her, these people bear no responsibility for the war. As she argues,

Neither my material nor this book can or intends to explain the war for the simple reason that the war was not created by those villagers who are the focus of this account. The war has been orchestrated from places where the people I lived and worked among were not represented, and where their voices were not heard (Bringa, 1995, p.5).¹⁹

For his part, Mart Bax has spent more than a decade conducting research in Medjugorje, a peasant village in the southwest of Hercegovina. For him, moreover, there is a clear need for further research focusing on the view from below. In his words,

The conclusion seems obvious that for a better comprehension of the present-day problems in Bosnia Hercegovina, attention should be more intensely and systematically devoted to processes and developments on the lower levels of social integration (Bax, 1995, p.xix).

Ger Duijzings similarly adopts a bottom-up approach, declaring that,

¹⁹ This thesis seeks to portray the Serbian people neither as victims nor as perpetrators. Rather, it aims to demonstrate that by examining the views and opinions that ordinary people have of Milošević, and by exploring their everyday life experiences during his years in power, we can thus gain a richer, more textured understanding of Milošević's leadership and regime.

The anthropological approach adopted in this study is identifiable in the perspective 'from below', looking at wider developments from the viewpoint of small communities which have been affected by events and decisions that are far beyond their control (Duijzings, 2000, p.209).

Highlighting the importance of exploring the view "from below". Duijzings points out that the concerns and objectives of the masses are not necessarily the same as the concerns and objectives of the elite. He maintains that,

While all Serb politicians share the idea that Serbian rule over the province [Kosovo] is an almost inalienable and sacrosanct right...it is my own experience that many ordinary Serbs appear to be less adamant and more pragmatic. They are indifferent to the teachings of the Kosovo myth, they are too much occupied with their daily struggle to survive....(Duijzings, 2000, p.205).

What this suggests is that elite theories that portray the masses as being like sponges, soaking up the ideas that filter down to them from the top echelons of society, are over-simplistic and reductionist.

One such idea is Serbian nationalism. Western literature tends to focus on the nationalism of elites, such as Dobrica Ćosić and Vojislav Šešelj, and various elitist institutions, such as SANU and the Serbian Orthodox Church. What it fails to do, however, is to look at what nationalism means to ordinary Serbian people. Research conducted by Alvin Magid, between 1983 and 1984, thus constitutes a rare exception. Magid's interviews with ordinary Serbs challenge the assumption, often made in Western literature, that if a person is a Serb nationalist, he/she therefore supports the creation of a "Greater Serbia". For example, one interviewee, an artist, told Magid, "I am not a fierce Serbian nationalist with a delusive urge to construct a latter-day 'Great Serbia'...I am a Serbian cultural nationalist, not an advocate of Serbian political nationalism" (Magid, 1991, p.296).

Another interviewee, a low-level factory supervisor, expressed a similar view –

I know it is neither possible nor desirable for any part of Yugoslavia to control all the other parts. We have some Serbian nationalists who wish it could be otherwise; they dream the madman's dream of a 'Great Serbia' at the center of Socialist Yugoslavia, as its political head and brain. I myself am a proud Serb but I do not have that mad dream (Magid, 1991, p.391).

What we might draw from this is that, if we are to gain a deeper understanding of Serbian nationalism - which the literature rarely defines - it is necessary to look at how nationalism is understood by ordinary Serbian people and at how nationalism manifests itself at the level of both elites and masses. It is also necessary to discard, or at least to rigorously re-examine, the simplistic idea that all Serbian nationalists seek a "Greater Serbia".

Aleksander Pavković focuses on the national ideologies involved in the creation and fragmentation of Yugoslavia. He himself does not adopt a bottom-up approach, explaining, "I do not explore, in any systematic way, the extent to which these ideologies were accepted – and how they were interpreted – by their rank-and-file supporters" (Pavković, 2000, p.x). Acknowledging the importance of the view from below, however, he adds, "This question, I think, warrants a separate comparative study of this crucial period in the spread of national ideologies" (Pavković, 2000, p.x). At the same time, Pavković dedicates his book to "the victims of the wars in Yugoslavia whose voices and suffering it fails to record" (Pavković, 2000, p.xi). Thus, we see that, like Bringa, Pavković views ordinary people primarily as victims, rather than as actors.

Continuing with the theme of nationalism, Ana Dević suggests that studies of nationalism should incorporate the sphere of everyday life (Dević, 2002). Dević is concerned with the everyday grievances of ordinary Serbs, in particular with their increasing sense of powerlessness²⁰, and it is within this context that she situates the mobilization of ethnicity. For the author, what is important is not elite manipulation per se, but rather the context – “the grievances that the ordinary inhabitants of Yugoslavia had experienced in their everyday lives” – within which this manipulation occurred (Dević, 2002).

For his part, Eric Gordy underscores the importance of everyday life in helping to explain how the Milošević regime remained in power. In Gordy’s view,

the regime’s strategies of self-preservation can be found in everyday life – in the destruction of alternatives. Specifically, the regime maintains itself not by mobilizing opinion or feeling in its favor, but by making alternatives to its rule unavailable (Gordy, 1999, p.2).

He discusses the regime’s destruction of political alternatives, information alternatives, musical alternatives, and its destruction of sociability, and thus conceptualizes the domain of everyday life as a contested space. As he argues,

The destruction of alternatives is a struggle of the state against the society, in which the state seeks to assure that alternatives to its rule remain unavailable, while social actors try to keep channels of information, expression and everyday activity open (Gordy, 1999, p.206).

Thus, ordinary people are participants in, rather than simply victims of, this struggle, which “cannot be ‘won’ by either side” (Gordy, 1999, p.206).

²⁰ Through this emphasis on the “powerlessness” of ordinary Serbs, they are once again presented to us as victims, rather than actors. In contrast, as we have seen, bottom-up research on the Hitler and Stalin regimes is far less likely to portray ordinary people merely as victims. Peukert, for example, argues that while it would be unjust to condemn a whole generation of Germans, “this generation was undoubtedly implicated in guilt, either through participation or, at least, through failure to offer resistance” (Peukert, 1987, p.22).

In recent years, some prominent academics in Belgrade have conducted important bottom-up research in Serbia. In late 2001 and early 2002, a team led by Zagorka Golubović, Ivana Spasić and Đorđe Pavićević conducted 303 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in nineteen Serbian cities and towns, as part of a project entitled *Politika i svakodnevni život; Srbija, 1999-2002* (“Politics and Everyday Life; Serbia, 1999-2002”). The authors conclude that,

This study has provided us with elements to build a more realistic picture of the citizens of Serbia – how they experience their everyday in the context of contemporary political events, how they perceive the recent past and the present, how they see themselves within these frameworks, and what attitudes they assume towards the future (Golubović, Spasić, Pavićević, 2003, p.306).

These three academics are highly respected, and their book has generated considerable interest among other scholars in Belgrade. It is, therefore, to be hoped that there will be further research, concentrating on the lives and experiences of ordinary people, in the very near future, like the research undertaken by staff at the *War Documentation Centre* in Belgrade. They have produced two books, *Ratovanja* (“Warfare”) (2003) and *Sudbine Civila* (“The Fate of Civilians”) (2004), which contain a series of interviews with ordinary people about the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

A further example to note of recent research that addresses the view from below is the work of two respected Belgrade journalists, Dragan Bujošević and Ivan Radovanović. Their book, *The Fall of Milošević; The October 5th Revolution* (2003), is “the outcome of conversations with 60 people – politicians, police, soldiers, and members of the public - who were in Belgrade that day” (Bujošević and Radovanović, 2003, p.v).

The present thesis makes a further important bottom-up contribution to the literature. Limited time, limited resources and difficulties in finding appropriate sources meant that it was not possible to perform the very detailed, micro-level research undertaken by scholars such as Kotkin and Peukert. The thesis does not reconstruct everyday life during the Milošević years, as social historians would do. However, it does attempt, through the use of rich, qualitative interview data, to give the reader some sense of what life was like during the Milošević years, thus gesturing towards an everyday life approach. By exploring the views and opinions that ordinary people in Serbia have of Milošević, the thesis also provides an original and valuable bottom-up view of Milošević's leadership.

It is argued that further research focused on the view from below would prove extremely fruitful. Such research vis-à-vis the Milošević regime, for example, could help us to gain a better understanding of why people in Serbia either supported or opposed the regime. It could also enrich our knowledge about certain groups in Serbia, such as ethnic minorities, who have received little attention in Western literature. We know very little, for example, about what life was like for minorities living under the Milošević regime. Knowing more about this could give us new insight into the character of the regime, which has been variously described in the literature as "nationalist-authoritarian" (Gordy, 1999, p.8; LeBor, 2002, p.159); as an "unusual dictatorship" (Cox, 2002, p.163); a "television dictatorship" (Doder & Branson, 1999, p.68); and as a "soft" dictatorship (Cohen, 2001, p.xiv) that developed into a "desperate hard-boiled dictatorship" (Cohen, 2001, p.345).

Another group that Western authors have tended to overlook is the Kosovo Serbs.²¹ This is, therefore, an area where micro-level, bottom-up research could be very valuable. For example, the suffering of the Kosovar Albanians has been extensively chronicled. In contrast, we know very little about what everyday life was like for the Kosovo Serbs, either before or during the Milošević era.²²

We also know very little about what everyday life is like today for those Serbs who have remained in Kosovo.²³ It would be extremely interesting to explore the effects of war and population displacement on Serbian areas in Kosovo, such as Kosovska Mitrovica and Gračanica. The population of both areas has swollen, due to an influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing from other parts of Kosovo. The Serbian village of Gračanica, for example, used to have a population of 4,000 people. Today, however, it has a population of 10,000. This has created problems such as over-crowding and increased traffic.

It would also be useful to look at how well the new arrivals have been integrated into these Serbian areas. In Kosovska Mitrovica, for example, one female interviewee said that there is some level of distrust between the town's

²¹ Some academics in Serbia, however, have conducted research on this topic. For example, *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the survey conducted in 1985-1986*, written by Ruža Petrović and Marina Blagojević, was published in Belgrade in 1992. Later, in 2003, a book written by Mario Brudar was published, with the title *Nada, Obmana, Slom; Politički život Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji (1987-1999)* ("Hope, Delusion, Ruin: The Political Life of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija").

²² For example, "...television in 1998-9 mostly showed Kosova as an exclusively Albanian society, with the Serbs more or less exclusively seen as part of an repressive foreign military apparatus" (Pettifer, 2005, p.156).

²³ Today, only 100,000 Serbs remain in Kosovo. The Kosovar Albanians constitute 90% of the population of Kosovo.

original inhabitants and those who moved there from other parts of Kosovo. More generally, to what extent have refugees been integrated into Serbian society as a whole? This is another topic that should be researched.

Finally, it is suggested that we could gain a deeper understanding of Serbian nationalism – which the literature does not adequately define - by using a more bottom-up approach. To cite Jonathan Glover,

...once we go beyond economic interests or the interests of colonizers²⁴, we can see the psychological needs that are met by the sense of nationhood and by the nation-state. A deeper explanation of nationalism requires exploration of other needs (Glover, 1997, p.13).

A particularly interesting area of inquiry would be to look at the relationship between social exclusion and Serbian nationalism. Are those who are socially excluded more likely to embrace extreme forms of nationalism? A study of grassroots supporters of the *Serbian Radical Party* (SRS) could help us to answer this.

Conclusion

This chapter began by focusing on some of the academics that have studied the Hitler and Stalin regimes from the bottom up, rather than from the top down. Whilst acknowledging that this type of research has proven controversial and has been heavily criticized, as we saw in section 2, it was argued that the view from below is extremely important for studying criminal leaders; in particular, it gives us an “insider” perspective on the particular “criminal” leader in question. This, in turn, has important implications for the concept of the

²⁴ We can replace the word “colonizers” with the word “elites”.

criminal leader developed in the previous chapter. This concept, it is argued, should now be modified to include an additional, fifth dimension – a domestic dimension – the importance of which the interview data chapters will seek to demonstrate.

A clear case has been made for studying criminal leaders “from below”. However, it is necessary to emphasize that like any approach, a bottom-up approach has certain limitations; these will be discussed in the introduction to the data chapters. As the present chapter has, therefore, made clear, exploring the view from below does not mean that we should ignore or neglect the view from above. The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they complement each other. Thus, as argued at the end of chapter 2, the criminal leader must be studied both from below and from above.

The thesis gives particular weight to the view from below, not least because Western literature dealing with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia has tended to heavily neglect this valuable perspective. However, in constructing Milošević as a criminal leader, Western literature has also neglected a particular top-down perspective. That is to say that while speculating about Milošević’s intentions, it has in fact paid little attention to what he himself actually said. Chapter 4, therefore, will analyze Milošević’s main speeches, with the aim of finding out whether his words and the way in which he presented himself as a leader are consistent with the dominant Western image of him as a criminal leader.

Part II

Is Milošević a Criminal Leader? Analysis of Milošević's Speeches and Qualitative Interview Data

Chapter 4

Milošević in His Own Words; An Analysis of His Main Speeches

Introduction

Western literature focuses heavily on the person of Milošević, yet it pays little attention to his speeches, which have not been systematically analyzed.¹ When his speeches are referred to, they are fundamentally misrepresented through highly selective quoting. Particular sentences or paragraphs from two or three speeches are typically cited, totally out of context, and given an interpretation that becomes problematic when the speeches are taken as a whole.

Milošević's speeches constitute an important primary source and should, therefore, be examined in detail. For the purposes of the present research, the value of these speeches is three-fold. Firstly, they allow us to assess whether there is any evidence in what Milošević actually said to support two specific claims that Western literature makes - that he incited ethnic hatred and planned the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. In particular, studying his speeches enables us to ascertain whether Milošević possessed "criminal" intent.

Secondly, analysis of Milošević's speeches provides us with insight into a neglected aspect of his leadership – how he saw and presented himself.

¹ One possible explanation is that the speeches are not readily accessible. Milošević's main speeches are contained in two particular books. The first of these books, *Les Années Décisives* ("Decisive Years"), published in 1990, covers the speeches that Milošević made between 1984 and 1990. It is also available in Serbian, under the title *Godine Raspleta* (1989). The second book, *Od Gazimestana do Ševeningena* ("From Gazimestan to Scheveningen"), is a collection of Milošević's main speeches from 1989 to 2000. It was published in Belgrade in 2001. Some of Milošević's speeches are available in English, however. The book *The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History through Documents* (2000), edited by Auerswald and Auerswald, and the website www.slobodan-milosevic.org are two examples. These were the four principal sources used for this chapter.

Chapter 1 looked at how Western liberals see Milošević. Chapters 5 to 8 examine how the Serbian and national minority interviewees view him. In addition to these external and domestic perspectives, however, it is also important to explore how Milošević portrayed himself and how he appealed to the masses. How he presented himself as a leader is especially significant, given the strong tendency of Serbian citizens to

define, favour or reject a certain political option on the basis of a prominent individual. At that, an equally strong impression may be gathered on the basis of one statement only, of public appearance, manner of presentation, perceived temperament, even physical appearance (NDI, 2003, p.17).

Thirdly, there are various precedents in other literatures for examining the speeches of particular individuals, including César Chávez, Che Guevara, the Sandinista leaders, Eisenhower, Tony Blair, and members of the Ba`th party in Iraq. A frequently invoked reason for doing so is that these individuals are thereby allowed to “speak for themselves”.² Given that Milošević gave few interviews and rarely appeared in public, allowing him to speak for himself is very important.

The speeches will be examined thematically, but also chronologically, in order to show how Milošević’s rhetoric changed over time. Narrow, Milošević-centric approaches that focus on Milošević’s actions and intentions are problematic because their heavy emphasis on agency means that insufficient attention is given to the role of circumstances. Just as it is inadequate to examine Milošević’s leadership solely from the top down, so it is unsatisfactory to neglect the context within which he exercised his leadership.

² In his book about the speeches of Che Guevara, for example, Deutschmann says, “This book...has a simple purpose: to let Che’s ideas speak for themselves” (Deutschmann, 1987, p.7).

Milošević's actions and intentions were influenced and affected by circumstances, and we can clearly see this by analyzing his speeches chronologically.

The chapter comprises three main sections. The first section will focus on the two speeches that have received the most attention in Western literature, namely Milošević's Kosovo Polje speech, in April 1987, and his Gazimestan speech, in June 1989. Section 2 will concentrate on the speeches that Milošević made between 1990 and 1998. It will explore both the major themes that emerge, and the type of language used. Finally, section 3 will analyze the speeches that Milošević made in 1999 and 2000. It will argue that these are fundamentally different, thematically and stylistically, from his earlier speeches. Throughout the chapter, there will also be a small number of references to some of the speeches that Milošević made during the eighties, in order to illustrate or accentuate certain points.

Before we proceed to an analysis of Milošević's speeches, it should be noted that, according to some commentators, what Milošević said and what he actually did in practice were not necessarily the same things. Sell, for example, claims that, "While he claimed to want to preserve Yugoslavia, he was in fact pumping arms into the hands of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia..." (Sell, 2002, p.7); and Doder and Branson maintain that, "...while preparing for war, he [Milošević] talked of peace" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.75). Does this mean that Milošević's speeches are unreliable?

While it is tempting, especially for Milošević's many detractors, to claim that he was a liar, this is over-simplistic, for three main reasons. Firstly, if one carefully reads Milošević's speeches, one gets the clear impression that he was someone who liked to keep his options open as much as possible. If, therefore, he was declaring his support for Yugoslavia while at the same time supplying arms to Serbs outside Serbia, this could simply mean that he wanted to be prepared for all eventualities.

Secondly, events may intervene to produce a mismatch between what a person says and what he/she actually does. To assume that any mismatch was deliberate on Milošević's part attaches too much weight to his intentions and too little weight to circumstances. In short, "...an 'intention' is not an autonomous force, but is affected in its implementation by circumstances which it may itself have been instrumental in creating" (Kershaw, 2000, p.90).

Thirdly, true/false dichotomies are not necessarily appropriate for analyzing political discourse, because, "The discourse of politicians is a story they are telling about themselves and about how they would like to be perceived by the relevant audiences" (Gagnon, 2004, p.xx). So, for example, "When Milošević claimed to be a peacemaker, he was not establishing a truth but rather was telling a story, creating an image that was meant to influence the behavior of various domestic audiences" (Gagnon, 2004, p.xx). Thus, his speeches can provide useful insight into his calculations about how to win popular support, and into his understanding of the values, thinking and hopes of the Serbian people.

Section 1 – Milošević’s Kosovo Polje and Gazimestan Speeches

Two particular speeches have received considerable attention – Milošević’s Kosovo Polje speech and his Gazimestan speech. For many, these speeches, particularly the latter, reinforce the image of Milošević as a criminal leader who deliberately destroyed Yugoslavia and plunged the country into war.

(i) Milošević’s Speech at Kosovo Polje, 25 April 1987

In April 1987, Ivan Stambolić, the Serbian President, sent Milošević, his protégé, to Kosovo Polje, in order to try and defuse the growing tensions in the province between Serbs and Albanians. Upon his arrival, Milošević witnessed the spectacle of angry and aggrieved Serbs. They were demonstrating not only against the Albanians, but also against the Communist State, which they believed had failed to protect them. They demanded protection, and Milošević responded. To cite LeBor, “Fearful of the crowd, but aware he should try and take command of the situation, he declared, ‘No one should dare to beat you again!’” (LeBor, 2002, p.82).

This famous sentence is widely seen as extremely significant. For some, it symbolized Milošević’s transition from Communist apparatchik to nationalist demagogue. Sell, for example, claims that after that night in Kosovo, Milošević “reinvented himself as a charismatic nationalist” (Sell, 2002, p.4). Similarly, Maas contends that, “Milošević’s transition from socialist to nationalist, from apparatchik to dictator, happened at a precise moment, on 24 April 1987, in an epiphany of mythical proportions” (Maas, 1996, p.208).

Despite such claims, the speech that Milošević gave the next day, to a delegation of Serbs, condemned rather than condoned nationalism. He argued, for example, that,

Nationalism always means isolation from others, a withdrawal within one's own limits. This also means lagging in development, for without cooperation and links in the Yugoslav area and beyond, there is no progress. Every nation and nationality that closes and isolates itself behaves irresponsibly toward its own development (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.13).

Nationalists, he maintained, "must be opposed by every honest man", because nationalists were a threat to brotherhood and unity, and "we must preserve brotherhood and unity as the apple of our eye" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.11). He further contended that if Yugoslavia was to become richer and happier, "...the forces of socialism, brotherhood and unity, and progress must be separated from the forces of separatism, nationalism, and conservatism" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.15).

He expressed concern about the economic situation in Kosovo, on the grounds that, "Kosovo continues to be underdeveloped, unemployment is high, foreign loans are high, exports are unsatisfactory, and the number of incomplete projects is large" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.12). He also outlined the measures that had been taken to improve the situation, such as sustained investment in the material development of Kosovo.

What is striking is that only one small section of this particular speech is ever cited in Western literature. This is the part where Milošević told his audience,

...comrades...you should stay here. This is your country. Your homes, your fields, your gardens, your memories are here. Surely you will not leave your land because it is difficult to live there and you are oppressed

by injustice and humiliation. It has never been in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples to give up before obstacles, to demobilize when they should fight, to become demoralized - to become demoralized when the going is difficult. You also should stay here because of your ancestors and because of your descendants. Otherwise, you would disgrace your ancestors and disappoint your descendants.

I do not propose, comrades, that in staying you should suffer, carry on, and tolerate a situation with which you are not satisfied. On the contrary, you should change it, together with all the progressive peoples here, in Serbia, and in Yugoslavia (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, pp.13-14).

These two paragraphs are habitually cited totally out of context, without any reference to the rest of the speech. What is more, the short, but significant paragraph that precedes them is typically omitted. In this neglected paragraph, Milošević declared, "Our aim, however, is to get away from hatred. Our goal is that all the people in Kosovo should live well. The first thing that I want to tell you in connection with this goal, comrades, is that you should stay here" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.13). He then continued as above.

It is argued here that when this overlooked preceding paragraph is included in the citation, this necessarily gives a different interpretation to the next two paragraphs. What Milošević said suddenly looks more like an attempt to defuse, rather than to incite, ethnic tension and hatred.

Regarding the two paragraphs of the speech that are always quoted, many different versions exist. For example, in Cohen's version, Milošević said, "I do not propose, comrades, that in staying you should suffer and tolerate a situation in which you are not satisfied. On the contrary, you should change it" (Cohen, 2001, p.63). This gives the impression that Milošević was telling the Serbs and Montenegrins to take matters into their own hands, and to change the situation

themselves, independent of others. Yet, in the version cited above (and in Milošević's book *Les Années Décisives*), what he actually said was, "You should change it, *together with all the progressive peoples here, in Serbia, and in Yugoslavia*". In other words, he regarded the process of change as a combined effort, rather than as a uniquely Serbian effort.

To summarize, it is argued that this speech has been fundamentally misrepresented through selective quoting, in order to reinforce the image of Milošević as a criminal leader who bears greatest responsibility for Yugoslavia's demise and descent into bloody war. It is only possible to claim that Milošević's message "was one steeped in ethnic nationalism" (Scharf and Schabas, 2002, p.10) if we rely on just two paragraphs of the speech, omit the crucial preceding paragraph, and totally neglect the rest of the speech. Milošević's words at Gazimestan have been similarly distorted and misrepresented.

(ii) Milošević's Speech at Gazimestan, 28 June 1989

On the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (1389), Milošević addressed a crowd of approximately one million Serbs and Montenegrins in Gazimestan. Enormous significance has been attached to this particular speech, and it plays an important part in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader. For many, the speech is evidence of the fact that Milošević not only bears greatest responsibility for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, but also that he planned those wars. According to Zimmermann, for example, it was a speech laced with "veiled warnings and threats against those who would block Serbia's

national aspirations” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.20); and Naimark describes the speech as “a warning of war and sacrifice” (Naimark, 2002, p.152). Moreover, extracts of the speech have been used by the prosecution in Milošević’s trial in The Hague, with the aim of showing that he had been planning war as early as the summer of 1989 (LeBor, 2002, p.122).

Like Milošević’s Kosovo Polje speech, however, his speech at Gazimestan is always cited in a very selective manner. Only one or two paragraphs of the speech tend to receive any attention. Furthermore, these paragraphs are given an interpretation that simply does not stand up to scrutiny once the rest of the speech is also taken into account.

At Gazimestan, as in many of his other speeches, Milošević placed strong emphasis on the need for unity. The urgency of achieving unity was underscored through a parallel emphasis on the dangers of disunity. He maintained, for example, that it was “the tragic disunity in the leadership of the Serbian state” that had significantly contributed to the Serbian defeat in the 1389 Battle of Kosovo (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.31). Therefore, it was “the obligation of the people to remove disunity, so that they may protect themselves from defeats, failures, and stagnation in the future” (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.33). He further claimed that the attainment of unity in Serbia “will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its citizens, irrespective of his national or religious affiliation” (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.31).

Milošević's insistence on the imperative of unity need not be interpreted as meaning that all Serbs should be together in an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia". He remarked, for example, that,

Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.32).

He emphasized socialism, rather than nationalism, and completely downplayed national differences. According to him,

The only differences one can and should allow in socialism are between hard working people and idlers and between honest people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and other nations, are in their own republic (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.32).

If national differences were unimportant in Serbia, this was also the case in Yugoslavia as a whole. Underscoring equality among the different nations in Yugoslavia, Milošević maintained that,

Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.32).

This emphasis on national equality was linked to a concern Milošević expressed that Yugoslavia should not be less progressive than developed countries. He argued that,

...Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the contemporary, particularly the developed, world. This world is more and more marked by national tolerance, national cooperation, and even national equality (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.32).

He continued,

The modern economic and technological, as well as political and cultural development, has guided various peoples toward each other, has made them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal as well...Equal and united people can above all become a part of the civilization toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the head of the column leading to such a civilization, there is certainly no need for us to be at its tail (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, pp.32-33).

As to the Serbs themselves, Milošević portrayed them as both victims and heroes. For example, he highlighted the “tragic disunity” in the Serbian leadership at the time of the Battle of Kosovo, and contended that,

The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and this betrayal led Serbia and the Serbian people into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.31).

Counter-balanced against this image of Serbs as victims was a parallel image of Serbs as brave heroes. For example, Milošević claimed that the national and historical being of the Serbs had always been liberational, and that they liberated not only themselves but others too, when they could. He further declared that,

The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for six centuries, and has been feeding our pride, and does not allow us to forget that at one time we were an army great, brave and proud, one of the few that remained undefeated when losing (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.33).

According to Cohen,

In these words, two years before Yugoslavia was engulfed in fighting, the fate of the South Slav state was foretold. Milošević’s message was clear enough: the Serbs – an army that in defeat remained undefeated, a people that in suicide found redemption – were ready to bury themselves in the rubble of Yugoslavia in order to liberate themselves from the yoke, real or imaginary it hardly mattered (Cohen, 1998, p.432).

This quote from Cohen is paradigmatic of a strong tendency in the literature to misrepresent Milošević's Gazimestan speech.³ Such misrepresentation is particularly blatant vis-à-vis that part of the speech in which Milošević alluded to the possibility of future armed battles.⁴ Significantly, this is very often the only part of the speech that receives any attention. What Milošević said was,

Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without resolve, bravery and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here in the Field of Kosovo in the days past (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, pp.33-34).

Various authors see this reference to possible armed battles as evidence that Milošević was planning war in Yugoslavia. Zimmermann, for example, argues that, "For the first time he raised the specter of war..." (Zimmermann, 1996, p.20). Like many authors, however, Zimmermann cites only two sentences from the speech – "Six centuries later we are in battles and quarrels. They are not yet armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.20).

For their part, Doder and Branson maintain that at Gazimestan, Milošević "rattled his saber...as he identified himself with a holy cause and invoked the spirit of violence. Only when the cause was won could the saber be sheathed"

³ This speech has not only been misrepresented, however. Ramet, for example, claims that Milošević vowed at Gazimestan that, "We shall win despite the fact that Serbia's enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with those in the country" (Ramet, 2002, p.310). However, these words did not even appear in Milošević's Gazimestan speech. Milošević actually made this statement in his "Brotherhood and Unity" speech, delivered in Belgrade, in November 1988.

⁴ Milošević himself has complained that this part of the speech has been taken completely out of context. For example, in his Introductory Statement to The Hague Tribunal, on 13 February 2002, he said, "You quoted a fragment of a sentence in which I say that we have many battles ahead of us, not armed battles, though we must not exclude those either. This is a very general sentence, commonly used by people today. Peace is not a secure and stable category in the world today. Why do states have armies otherwise? But you calculatingly leave out *everything* else" (Milošević, 2002, p.146).

(Doder and Branson, 1999, p.4). They proceed to quote the two sentences of Milošević's speech which, taken by themselves, appear to support their argument – “‘After six centuries, we are again waging struggle and confronting battles’, Milošević said unflinchingly, staring straight ahead as if reviewing the troops. ‘These are not armed battles, though that cannot yet be excluded’” (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.4).

Johnstone, however, adopts a very different view of these two oft-cited sentences. According to her, “To interpret this patriotic rhetoric, typical of any head of state celebrating a historic battle, as a threat or declaration of genocidal war is either maliciously dishonest or paranoid” (Johnstone, 2002, p.272).

For his part, Gil-White maintains that, “It is really necessary to omit reference to any other part of the speech, and to ignore the facts of Yugoslavia at the time, for the quote – completely out of context – to appear as a threat” (Gil-White, 2002). The point is, however, that many authors who cite these particular sentences fail to refer to the rest of the speech. For example, they ignore what Milošević went on to say next, namely,

Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the twenty-first century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course, of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000. p.34).

Thus, we can see that the chief battle with which Milošević was concerned was not an armed battle. Rather, it was a battle to realize Serbia's prosperity.

It is important to look at Milošević's reference to "armed battles" in the context of the speech as a whole. However, it is also necessary to consider it in the context of his other speeches. What these speeches suggest is that Milošević appeared to regard many things in life as a struggle and a battle. In February 1986, for example, at the 28th session of the Municipal Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade, he talked about "...cette bataille pour une nouvelle approche de l'économie..." ("...this battle for a new approach to the economy...") (Milošević, 1990, p.73).

In July 1988, at Drmno, Milošević maintained that Serbs must mobilize for progress. He added, "S'il faut aujourd'hui déclarer et mener une guerre, alors que ce soit une guerre contre l'inertie, l'indifférence et la discorde" ("If today we must declare and carry out war, then it will be a war against inertia, indifference, and disunity" (Milošević, 1990, p.202). In November of the same year, in his "Brotherhood and Unity" speech, Milošević argued that Yugoslavia "est le fruit d'un grand combat, nous la défendrons dans un grand combat" ("is the fruit of a great struggle, we will defend her in a great struggle") (Milošević, 1990, p.233).

Much later, at the Fourth SPS Congress, in February 2000, he claimed that the country was "fighting a battle for freedom and independence" (Milošević, 2000a). The key point is that when Milošević used words such as "fight", "battle", and "struggle", he was not always using them in a literal sense. For him, "battles" did not necessarily mean military battles. In his mind, battles

were also associated with positive achievements, such as the realization of economic and social prosperity.

Given that references to “battles” and “war” were not uncommon in Milošević’s speeches, it is argued that undue significance has been attached to his Gazimestan speech. The speech, taken in its entirety, does not provide evidence of Milošević’s “criminal” intent. It does not support the claim that he was planning war in the former Yugoslavia unless one focuses narrowly and exclusively on his reference to “armed battles”. However, it has proven convenient for Milošević’s detractors to do precisely that, in order to reinforce the liberal construction of him as a warmonger and criminal leader.

Commenting on the Gazimestan speech, for example, Sell remarks, “Sadly, I saw the consequences of the wars that Milošević first threatened in that speech” (Sell, 2002, p. xvi). In a similar vein, the *International Crisis Group* contends, “That speech contained the first open threat of violent conflict by a Socialist Yugoslav leader...” (cited in Gil-White, 2002).

Now that we have looked at the two speeches that have received the most attention in Western literature, we can turn to some of Milošević’s speeches that have been largely ignored.

Section 2 – Milošević’s Speeches, 1990-1998

The Yugoslav crisis and inter-ethnic relations constitute a major theme in the speeches that Milošević made during the nineties. A second major theme, and

one that was also very prominent in the speeches he gave during the eighties. is the economy and economic development.

(i) Yugoslavia and Inter-Ethnic Relations

Central to Milošević's construction as a criminal leader is the charge that he bears greatest responsibility for the wars in former Yugoslavia. Consequently, his declarations of support for Yugoslavia are often dismissed in the literature as mere charades. Zimmermann, for example, argues that, "Milošević poses as the protector and savior of Yugoslavia. It's all bunk... Milošević is not a Yugoslav; he is a Serbian imperialist" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.249). Zimmermann further contends that, "He would support unity as long as it served his purposes; when it didn't, he was quite prepared to try to tear the country apart" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.103).

Equally scathing of Milosevic's expressions of commitment to Yugoslavia, Sell argues that, "While he claimed to want to preserve Yugoslavia, Milošević was in fact pumping arms into the hands of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, preparing an uprising that he knew would destroy Yugoslavia" (Sell, 2002, p.7).

Some authors, however, believe that Milošević initially did want to preserve Yugoslavia, but switched to a Greater Serbia policy once he realized that Yugoslavia was finished. Doder and Branson, for example, contend that, following the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, on 22

January 1990⁵, Milošević “knew that his hope to replace Tito as the undisputed master of Yugoslavia was a mirage. And so he began to think in terms of a Greater Serbia...” (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.74). Thomas, for his part, regards 1991 as the crucial turning point. He argues that,

Through 1987-1990, Milošević’s strategy had been formulated within the framework of a federal Yugoslavia, in which Serbia under his control would play the leading role. From March 1991, however, Milošević became the enthusiastic advocate and executor of ‘Great Serb’ ideas (Thomas, 1999, p.86).

Milošević’s speeches, however, do not support such arguments and make no reference to a “Greater Serbia”, despite claims that he “chose to base his own power on the appeal of ‘Greater Serbia’” (Glover, 1997, p.21). Nevertheless, by selectively quoting from Milošević’s speeches, particularly the speech that he made to Serbia’s municipal leaders on 16 March 1991, his critics can continue to argue that he was not genuinely committed to preserving Yugoslavia, and was instead planning war.

Speaking in Bor, in eastern Serbia, on 1 November 1990, Milošević described Yugoslavia as a “zajednička domovina svih jugoslovenskih naroda” (“a communal home of all Yugoslav peoples”). He underscored Serbia’s support for Yugoslavia and stressed that “Srpski narod je kroz svoju istoriju mnogo uložio u formiranje Jugoslavije” (“The Serbian nation has, throughout its history, invested a great deal in the making of Yugoslavia”) (Milošević, 2001, p.37).

⁵ At this Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Slovene delegation walked out, which resulted in the Congress being adjourned indefinitely. It was never to resume.

In an earlier speech to the Serbian Parliament, on 25 June 1990, he stressed the sacrifices Serbia had made for the sake of Yugoslavia. He also claimed, however, that these sacrifices were never recognized or rewarded. Instead, “...cette nation s’est vu sans cesse, depuis 1918 jusqu’à nos jours, attribuer l’image d’un peuple oppresseur” (“...this nation has continually, from 1918 until today, had attributed to it the image of an oppressor nation”) (Milošević, 1990, p.319). Clearly bitter about Serbia’s treatment in Yugoslavia, Milošević further claimed that the provisions of the 1974 Constitution (and of its predecessor, the Constitution of 1971) were evidence of a “politique antiserbe” (“an anti-Serb policy”) (Milošević, 1990, p.318).

Reform of this Constitution had, therefore, been a priority for Milošević upon coming to power.⁶ He always stressed that he simply wanted Serbia to have the same rights as the other republics, and in his speeches he consistently underscored his commitment to the principle of equality. In his speech to the Serbian Assembly, on 25 June 1990, for example, he said that the Yugoslav Federation was only workable if the equality of all its constituent republics was fully respected (Milošević, 1990, p.316). Similarly, in Bor, on 1 November 1990, he declared his commitment to Yugoslavia as “Država u kojoj su narodi i ljudi ravnopravi” (“A State in which all nations and people are equal”). Not only would nations and peoples in Yugoslavia be equal – they would also live in peace and harmony (Milošević, 2001, p.37).

⁶ More about this will be said in chapter 5.

Milošević's speech in Bor, however, is never cited. Instead, great attention is often given to a speech that he delivered on 16 March 1991. Only a tiny part of this speech, however, is ever quoted.

Tim Judah first mentions this speech on page five of his book. He writes, "Later, he [Milošević] was to roar, 'If we don't know how to work well...at least we know how to fight well'" (Judah, 2000a, p.5). Judah gives no further details of the speech, and indeed does not refer to it again until page 172 of his book. Even then, he quotes from it very selectively. In short, Judah cites only those parts of the speech that, taken in isolation, can be used to support the argument that Milošević wanted war. Similarly Thomas, who describes the speech as "aggressive", only cites this one particular sentence (Thomas, 1999, p.86).

To put this sentence into context, the day after the resignation of Borisav Jović, the Serbian President of the Federal Presidency, Milošević called a private meeting of Serbia's municipal leaders. In response to a question by the municipal leader of Svetozarevo about Serbia's strategy in the event of Yugoslavia's break-up, Milošević replied,

Da li ćemo mi da saopštimo preko radija šta ćemo da radimo? Ja mislim da to ne možemo da učinimo. A ako treba da se tučemo, bogami ćemo da se tučemo. A nadam se da neće biti toliko ljudi da se sa nama tuku. Jer ako ne umemo dobro da radimo i privređujemo, bar ćemo znati dobro da se tučemo (Will we announce on the radio what we will do? I do not think that we can do that. And if we need to fight, by God we will fight. And I hope that they will not be so crazy as to fight us. Because if we don't know how to work well and to do business, at least we know how to fight well) (Milošević, 1991, p.41).

Despite the significance that has been attached to these sentences, it is argued that they do not allow us to say anything concrete about Milošević's intentions. He was not firmly committing himself to war. What he was basically saying was that if x happens, then y will happen, and this was in keeping with his overall style of leadership. He often kept his options open. To cite the Belgrade intellectual Aleksa Djilas, "Milošević always kept himself in the centre, and this gave him room to manoeuvre".⁷ The fact, moreover, that Milošević was apparently making preparations for war does not necessarily mean that he wanted war or that he was planning war, notwithstanding claims to the contrary.⁸ Similarly, the fact that he spoke at Gazimestan, in June 1989, about the possibility of armed battles in the future does not necessarily mean that he was actually planning these battles.⁹

It is necessary to reiterate that context is extremely important when looking at Milošević's speeches. Individual sentences must not be extracted and looked at in isolation – they must be analyzed and interpreted within the context of the particular speech as a whole. We must also pay attention to comparative context. When looking at a particular speech, we should situate it within the context of other speeches that Milošević made.

For example, while enormous attention has been given to Milošević's claim that, "And if we need to fight, by God we will fight", he did in fact made

⁷ Interview, Belgrade, 20 May 2004

⁸ Zimmermann, for example, describes Milošević as "devising and pursuing a strategy that led directly to the breakup of the country and to the deaths of over 100,000 of its citizens" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.212); and Sell refers to "Milošević's drive to destroy Yugoslavia" (Sell, 2002, p.127).

⁹ LeBor claims that "It was in Croatia and Bosnia that Milošević and his allies were planning the 'armed battles' of which he had spoken at Kosovo in 1989" (LeBor, 2002, p.139).

similar sorts of comments elsewhere. In his speech in Bor. on 1 November 1990, Milošević stressed that Serbia would not tolerate violence against Serbs living outside Serbia, and warned that there would be “consequences” for the perpetrators of such violence (Milošević, 2001, p.37). Later, in his speech at the Sava Centre, on 20 October 1994, Milošević said that Serbia “...bi se borila, kao što bi se branila i svaka država na svetu, ako bi bila napadnuta” (“...would fight, just as any State in the world would defend itself, if she was attacked”) (Milošević 2001, p.85).

These examples suggest that for Milošević, any military action that Serbia took would be purely defensive. Serbia would not be the initiator of such action, but would be merely responding to the actions of others.¹⁰ This perhaps helps to shed new light on the speech he gave to Serbia’s municipal leaders on 16 March 1991. Was he being aggressive, or was simply saying that Serbia would do what was necessary in the circumstances?

Let us now turn to the theme of inter-ethnic relations. We saw in chapter 1 that various authors have accused Milošević of inciting and encouraging ethnic hatred. It is argued, however, that Milošević’s speeches neither expressed nor fomented hatred of other Yugoslav nations. Speaking in Pirot, for example, on 7 September 1990, Milošević pointed out that Slovenes and Croats could not be held responsible for Serbia’s economic difficulties (Milošević, 2001, p.33).

This is significant because if he had wanted to incite Serbian hatred of

¹⁰ Milošević repeatedly argued that the Yugoslav wars were purely defensive wars for Serbia. He also frequently claimed that Serbs had only ever fought defensive wars. In his speech at the Sava Centre, for example, on 20 October 1994, he declared that, “Kroz čitavu svoju istoriju, Srbija je vodila isključivo oslobodilačke ratove” (“Throughout her entire history, Serbia has led exclusively liberating wars”) (Milošević, 2001, p.85).

Slovenes and Croats, he could have done so by blaming these two nations for Serbia's economic problems. What Milošević's speeches actually emphasized was peace and equality between Yugoslav nations.

Just as Milošević underscored equality between the different nations in Yugoslavia, he also stressed the importance of equality within Serbia itself. Thus, for example, in a speech in Kosovo, in December 1992, he declared, "Residents of Kosovo Polje! I wish to tell you that we adhere to the policy of ethnic equality throughout Serbia" (Milošević, 1992b). In keeping with this promise, he called upon Serbs in Kosovo to develop "unity, understanding, and love with all those who live in Kosovo". He did not indiscriminately attack all Kosovar Albanians. Instead, he reserved his wrath for the Kosovar Albanian leaders and their supporters. He argued that,

We know that there are many Albanians in Kosovo who do not support the separatist policy of their nationalist leaders. They are under pressure, intimidated, and blackmailed, but we shall not respond with the like. We must respond by offering our hand, living with them in equality, and not permitting that a single Albanian child, woman or man be discriminated against in Kosovo in any way (Milošević, 1992b).

He continued, "We must, for the sake of all Serbian citizens, insist on the policy of brotherhood, unity, and ethnic equality in Kosovo" (Milošević, 1992b).

Although Milošević repeatedly emphasized the value of equality between nations, he did, on occasion, declare - or imply - that Serbia was, in fact, superior. For example, in the speech that he gave in Belgrade, on 24 December 1996, he argued that despite all the pressures and misfortunes to which Serbia had been subjected, and which would have destabilized any other country, she

had not been destabilized (Milošević, 2001, p.91). He was thus hinting that Serbia was special. Yet, context is very important here. Serbia had, as Milošević pointed out in this speech, been through an extremely difficult period, leaving many people feeling disillusioned and hopeless. Thus, it could reasonably be argued that what Milošević was trying to do in this speech was to restore a sense of pride and dignity in his people.

Even if one does not accept that Milošević was genuine in his declared commitment to national equality, the fact is that when he spoke about inter-ethnic relations, he underscored equality and peace, not hatred and violence.

To conclude this section, it is simply impossible to know what Milošević really wanted and what he genuinely believed. Yet, on the basis of the speeches he made in the period 1990-1998, three important observations can be made. First, there is nothing in his speeches to support the claim that his objectives radically changed in 1990/91, from wanting to preserve Yugoslavia to wanting a Greater Serbia. Secondly, there is no evidence in his speeches that Milošević was planning war. Thirdly, his speeches do not support the claim that he incited and promoted ethnic hatred.

While some commentators maintain that there is a lacuna between what Milošević said and what he actually did, it can be argued that there is a gap between what these commentators themselves say and do. They are happy to comment on Milošević's character and intentions, yet few of them have taken the time to explore his speeches in detail.

(ii) The Economy

That the economy constitutes such an important theme in Milošević's speeches is very significant. Firstly, contrary to the image of Milošević as a warmonger, it shows that Milošević's priorities were primarily economic development and progress, rather than territorial expansion and the creation of a Greater Serbia.¹¹ Secondly, Milošević's emphasis on economic issues challenges claims that he appealed to, and relied upon, ethnic hatred and chauvinism. Instead, it suggests that his appeal was more practical than ideological, and that what he instilled in people was not ethnic intolerance but the hope of a better life.

In the period 1990-1998, Milošević's speeches focused heavily on the economy and the need for economic development. In his speech in Pančevo, for example, on 10 May 1990, he said that Serbia was resolved upon a programme of economic and social reforms (Milošević, 2001, p.22); and in his speech at the Sava Centre in Belgrade, on 20 October 1994, he said that Serbia must draw upon all her resources to bring about economic stabilization and development, and to raise both community and individual standards (Milošević, 2001, p.84).

Milošević was very good at setting targets (the creation of an efficient market economy, social and economic prosperity, modernization, advances in technology, economic integration with the rest of the world), but he generally

¹¹ The only type of expansion that Milošević talked about was economic expansion, not territorial expansion. In Drmno, for example, in July 1988, he maintained that Serbia "doit mobiliser pour son expansion économique..." ("must mobilize for her economic expansion") (Milošević, 1990, p.201).

said very little about how he planned to achieve those targets. For example, in the speech he gave on 24 December 1996, in Belgrade, he said that Serbia wanted to create numerous rights, including the right of workers to return to their jobs, the right of workers to live and to be paid well, the right of peasants to be paid on time for their produce, et cetera (Milošević, 2001, p.91). Yet, he did not explain how such rights would be realized. He simply said, "Sve te pravde mi treba da ostvarimo" ("We need to create all of these rights") (Milošević, 2001, p.92).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Milošević did not fulfill his grand economic promises. However, he himself accepted no responsibility for this failure. Instead, he blamed the international community and sanctions. In his Closing Statement to the Second SPS Congress, in October 1992, for example, he said,

Although the crisis we are facing is not only the result of developments in Serbia, but largely the consequence of international interests and the policy pursued in keeping with those interests, we here in Serbia are obliged to do our best in order to weather the crisis as soon as possible. I here have first of all in mind the sanctions...(Milošević, 1992a).

He also repeatedly claimed that there were various forces, internal and external, seeking to harm Serbia. In Pirot, for example, on 7 September 1990, he referred to the existence in Serbia of "konzervativnih, primitivnih i rušilačkih snaga..." ("conservative, primitive and destructive forces...") (Milošević, 2001, p.33). In a similar vein, speaking in Belgrade, on 24 December 1996, he claimed that a strong Serbia was not in the interests of many powers outside Serbia, and that these powers were working with a "fifth column"¹² inside Serbia to destabilize the country (Milošević, 2001, p.91).

¹² He was referring here to the Serbian Opposition, namely, the *Zajedno* ("Together") coalition.

It proved extremely useful for Milošević to emphasize the existence of these enemies and ill-wishers, not least because it provided a way to unite the nation behind him. In his speech in Belgrade, on 24 December 1996, for example, he declared that despite efforts to weaken and destabilize Serbia, “Izaći ćemo ne slabiji nego jači, jer se Srbija pod pretnjama i pritiscima uvek ujedini čvršće i snažnije” (“We will emerge not weaker but stronger, because when threatened and pressured Serbia unites more firmly and strongly”) (Milošević, 2001, p.92).

While portraying Serbia as a victim of both internal and external forces, Milošević also promoted the image of brave and courageous Serbia, remaining strong in the face of outside pressures. This further served to detract attention from his own responsibility for Serbia’s economic crisis. For example, in his speech at the Third SPS Congress, on 2 March 1996, he said that Serbia “is quite understandably very exhausted economically, but even in the course of these several difficult years it kept going as best as such grave circumstances permitted”. He then added, optimistically, “It is quite understandable to expect Serbia’s economy to recover rapidly” (Milošević, 1996).

In view of his many promises regarding the economy, Milošević could not speak only about Serbia’s economic difficulties.¹³ Thus, the opening of a new factory, railway, or motorway was heralded as a great event and a sure sign of

¹³ As will be seen in the data chapters, many of those interviewed as part of this research argue that Milošević did not paint a true picture of the economic situation in his speeches. Rather than addressing the economic crisis, he glossed over it.

Serbia's economic recovery.¹⁴ On these occasions, Milošević once again promoted the idea of brave and resilient Serbia who, against the odds, had made great progress. Thus, for example, on 7 July 1995, he declared that Serbia had succeeded in creating “najmoderniju i najlepšu podzemnu železničku stanicu u Evropi” (“the most modern and most beautiful underground railway station in Europe”), despite having been under a total international blockade and subjected to unprecedented and continuing pressure (Milošević, 2001, p.85).

Similarly, in his Inaugural Speech as Yugoslav President, on 23 July 1997, Milošević said that Serbia had suffered numerous “blows” in the preceding six years, and that “These blows were brought about by the historical whirlpool that engulfed this part of the world” (Milošević, 1997). He continued, “We could not fully protect ourselves from it, but we managed to resist its blows more than many other countries in a similar or even more favourable position than we were in” (Milošević, 1997). As we shall see in the next section, the idea that Serbia had succeeded where others would have failed and simply conceded defeat became an increasingly prominent theme in Milošević's speeches.

Throughout the nineties, Serbia was in the grip of an economic crisis, which created widespread poverty, fear, and feelings of insecurity and helplessness. Given these circumstances, Milošević's pronouncements on the economy

¹⁴ On 7 July 1996, for example, Milošević opened a satellite station near the village of Ivanica. He told the gathering that the satellite signified Serbia's “continuing rapid development and movement forward in terms of our connections with the surrounding countries and the outside world” (cited in Thomas, 1999, p.225).

would have sounded extremely appealing. Indeed, it is suggested here that Milošević's economic promises were a significant reason for his widespread popularity, particularly during the first half of the nineties. This is borne out by the fact that his greatest supporters came from low-income social groups, such as pensioners, peasants, and housewives.

Yet, the economy proved to be a double-edged sword for Milošević. It helped to strengthen his grip on power, but also to weaken it, and ultimately it helped to bring down his regime. Milošević's failure to fulfill his economic promises was a major reason why so many Serbs turned against him.¹⁵ For example, the results of 840 interviews conducted in Serbia by the NDI¹⁶, in the last week of September 1999, showed that 64% of interviewees blamed the Serbian government and Milošević for Serbia's poor economic situation. By contrast, only 3% blamed sanctions, and just 2% blamed the NATO bombing (NDI, 1999).¹⁷

The part that the economy played in Milošević's fall from power is further evidenced by the results of public opinion polls conducted by *TSN Medium Gallup*, in April, June and August 2000. These polls, which used national representative samples, showed that for the majority of respondents, economic issues were the most urgent. In April 2000, out of a total of 1088 respondents, 32.4% selected economic issues as the most pressing. In June 2000, the figure

¹⁵ According to Professor Vojin Dimitrijević, from the *Belgrade Centre for Human Rights*, "Milošević was immensely popular, until somewhere in 1998. He discovered in the demonstrations of 1996-1997 that, after a long period of peace, the citizens of Serbia now realized that the standard of living was lower and lower, that inflation was high, that there was general impoverishment" (Interview, Belgrade, 26 May 2004).

¹⁶ This is an American-based political institute that has an office in Belgrade.

¹⁷ Similarly, the Serbian interviewees, as will be seen in chapter 7, overwhelmingly blame Milošević for Serbia's economic crisis.

was 28.9% (out of a total of 1095 respondents); and in August 2000, 45% of the 1096 respondents selected economic issues as being the most important (TNS Medium Gallup, 2000).

These poll results show that by the late nineties, popular dissatisfaction with, and opposition to, the regime were growing. In the final two years of its life, the Milošević regime became more and more desperate. It was increasingly running out of options, and thus had to employ new tactics.

Section 3 – Milošević's Speeches, 1999-2000

The speeches that Milošević made in 1999 and 2000 were quite different, both thematically and stylistically, from his earlier speeches. Two particular themes dominated Milošević's speeches in these final two years – the NATO bombing and the role of the Serbian Opposition. Although these were new themes, they were not unrelated to some of the themes in his earlier speeches. For example, we have seen that he blamed the international community for many of Serbia's problems. In 1999 and 2000, his attacks simply became more specific – NATO was now the target. Furthermore, while his earlier speeches had consistently identified the existence of ill-defined "forces" seeking to harm Serbia and her interests, they now identified a far more concrete threat – the Serbian Opposition.

These two new themes effected a change in the style and tone of Milošević's speeches. The most noticeable change was in the type of language he used. In

contrast to his earlier speeches, Milošević's speeches in 1999 and 2000 were characterized by strong colonial-type language.

The tone of his speeches also became more dramatic, and more complex. Some speeches had a triumphant tone, created by Milošević's repeated claims that "small Serbia" had defeated the mighty NATO. Other speeches had an aggressive and confrontational tone, produced by Milošević's increasingly bitter attacks on the Serbian Opposition. Finally, in the speeches that Milošević made shortly before the fall of his regime, on 5 October 2000, the tone was increasingly desperate.

(i) The NATO Bombing

In many of the speeches he made in 1999 and 2000, Milošević bitterly condemned the NATO alliance and its "aggression" against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In Leskovac, on 11 October 1999, for example, Milošević accused NATO of committing genocide against Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo, with the help of Albanian criminals, terrorists, and drug-dealers (Milošević, 2001, p.131). He also described NATO as an armada of the most heavily armed murderers in the world, "koje ne znaju ni koga ni zašto ubijaju..." ("who do not know either who or why they are they killing") (Milošević, 2001, p.130).

Later, at the Fourth SPS Congress, on 17 February 2000, he referred to the NATO war as a "disgraceful and cruel war" (Milošević, 2000a), and claimed

that, “In 1999, new Fascism focused on little Serbia, with a tendency of singling out several streets with maternity hospitals” (Milošević, 2000a).

Milošević’s speeches also emphasized how Serbs had bravely defended the country against the NATO “aggressor”. In his New Year message in January 2000, for example, he declared that Serbs had heroically defended the fatherland in front of the whole world (Milošević, 2001, p.134).¹⁸ The irony is that while Milošević consistently stressed the courage with which Serbs had defended their country, the reality is that few Serbs had been willing to fight, or to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Kosovo. For example, a poll taken by the independent newspaper *Nedeljeni Telegraf*, on 11 March 1998, showed that more than 70% of those asked were against sending a close relative to fight in Kosovo (Liotta, 1999, p.32).

According to Milošević, Serbs had been forced to defend not only their country, but also their freedom. During a visit to the *Zastava* factory in Kragujevac, for example, on 15 September 2000, he declared that the NATO alliance “ima za cilj kolonizaciju naše zemlje, Balkana i celog sveta, verovatno” (“has as its objective the colonization of our country, of the Balkans, and probably of the entire world”) (Milošević, 2001, p.152). Later, in his Address to the Nation, on 2 October 2000, he claimed that, “These imperial powers do not want peace or prosperity in the Balkans. They want this to be a zone of permanent conflicts and wars which would provide them with an alibi

¹⁸ According to a female interviewee in Belgrade, “Milošević assured us every night that we had won the war and that we had won against NATO [laughs]. Well, what can you say? The country was destroyed completely, but we won [laughs]. What was worse than the bombing was the propaganda that came after” (G).

for maintaining a lasting presence” (Milošević, 2000b). The following month, at the Fifth SPS Congress, on 25 November 2000, he described NATO’s presence in Kosovo as a new and contemporary form of colonization (Milošević, 2000c).

Such language constituted an important stylistic change in Milošević speeches. The tone of Milošević’s speeches also changed, becoming increasingly triumphant, even nationalistic. For example, in his Closing Statement to the Fourth SPS Congress, he proclaimed, “The entire world is aware that in this war we have offered resistance in all ways – by arms, media and morally. And that in all of the three ways we were superior” (Milošević, 2000a). Similarly, in a speech in Negotin, on 12 September 2000, Milošević claimed that Serbs had demonstrated to the world their superiority as a civilization (Milošević, 2001, p.150).

At the same time, however, Milošević also portrayed the Serbs and Serbia as victims. In Leskovac, for example, on 11 October 1999, he declared that during the past ten years, Yugoslavia, and especially Serbia, had suffered every possible social and natural misfortune, including “i ratovi i izbeglice i sankcije i zemljotresi i poplave i neprekidni politički i medijski pritisci” (“wars and refugees and sanctions and earthquakes and floods and constant political and media pressure”)(Milošević, 2001, p.132). Later, in his Closing Statement to the Fourth SPS Congress, he referred to the “tyrants” tormenting Serbia (Milošević, 2000a).

In his trial in The Hague, Milošević has continued to promote the image of Serbia as a victim, indeed an eternal victim. In his Introductory Statement on 13 February 2002, for example, he argued that,

What you are trying to prove here is that there is great suffering in war, that people die, that people suffer, that victims suffer greatly. Well everyone knows that, especially us, since we were the victims of most wars in Europe (Milošević, 2002, p.212).

(ii) The Serbian Opposition

Sell writes that,

Toward the end, Milošević thought he was much more secure than he actually was, according to insiders, and this sense of complacency may have contributed to the relative ease with which Milošević fell under pressure of street demonstrations in October 2000 (Sell, 2002, p.181).

Others share this view. Professor Svetozar Stojanović, from the University of Belgrade, for example, argues that when Milošević called early elections¹⁹, this was “a crucial mistake” and “another of his self-delusions”. According to Stojanović, “Milošević somehow persuaded himself, and was persuaded by his wife, that his standing among the Serbs was so high that he would defeat everybody in the elections, although he did not have to call those elections”.²⁰

In a similar vein, Milorad Vucelić, the current vice-president of the SPS and the former director of *Radio Television Serbia* (RTS), argues that,

In the end, Milošević lost touch with reality. He called elections a year early because he believed he had never been stronger. This is what the people around him were telling him. He also believed that the Opposition would not be able to unite against him.²¹

¹⁹ Milošević's mandate did not expire until July 2001, but he called elections for 24 September 2000.

²⁰ Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004

²¹ Interview, Belgrade, 5 June 2004

Notwithstanding these arguments, the fact that Milošević's speeches increasingly attacked the Serbian Opposition, and sounded more and more desperate, suggests that he may have been aware of his own vulnerability. It is also significant that whereas Milošević had always made very few public appearances and rarely gave interviews²², in the second half of 1999 he suddenly began to appear in public far more frequently. For example, three days before the election he had scheduled for 24 September 2000, he made two campaign appearances in one day, for the first time since coming to power in 1989. This again may suggest that he knew he needed to try and regain his former popularity.

In his earlier speeches, Milošević had avoided making direct attacks on his political opponents. As Thomas argues, "Milošević rarely insulted opposition leaders, preferring to regard them as politically irrelevant" (Thomas, 1999, p.75). When Milošević did refer to the Opposition, he generally did so in a non-hostile way. For example, in 1992, in his Closing Statement to the Second SPS Congress, he simply commented that while the Party "has no reason to avoid or shirk from such criticism" by the Opposition, at the same time "it is not the task of the ruling party to make unprincipled concessions to opposition parties, nor to determine its programme, organisation and personnel policy according to the criteria set by its political adversaries" (Milošević, 1992a).

²² Borisav Jović, a close Milošević associate, recalls how Milošević never wanted to walk through the streets of Belgrade and always asked, "Zašto nam to treba?" ("Why do we need to do that?") (Jović, 2001, p.15).

However, as Milošević's regime became less secure²³, it increasingly targeted the Opposition. This is particularly well illustrated by Milošević's Closing Statement to the Fourth SPS Congress. In that speech, he declared that Serbia did not have an opposition. She simply had "a group of bribed weaklings and blackmailed profiteers and thieves" who were exploiting the situation and manipulating the Serbian people (Milošević, 2000a). Later, on 21 September 2000, in rallies in Belgrade and Montenegro, "he delivered slashing attacks on the Opposition, calling them 'rabbits, rats, and even hyenas' who wanted to turn Serbia into a 'permed poodle' and had 'the loyalty of dogs' to the NATO masters 'who bribe and pay them'" (Sell, 2002, p.337).

Milošević attacked the Opposition in two main ways. Firstly, he portrayed it as totally incompetent. For example, at the Fourth SPS Congress, he argued that in those towns where local governments had been set up "as branch offices of some Western governments", there was no longer any public transport (and if there was, it was too expensive for people), the streets were not cleaned, corruption was rampant, et cetera. He further claimed that these local authorities had committed evil against the Serbian people, "because they became the present-day janissaries" (Milošević, 2000a).²⁴

Secondly, Milošević accused the Opposition of serving the interests of foreign powers. For example, in his Address to the Serbian Nation, on 2 October 2000, he claimed that, "For a long time there has been a grouping among us which,

²³ By mid-2000, according to Cohen, the Milošević regime was "debilitated and angst-ridden" (Cohen, 2001, p.xv).

²⁴ The brutal behaviour of the janissaries in the Pashalik of Belgrade, during the Ottoman occupation, was a major catalyst for the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813), led by Karadjordje.

under the guise of being pro-democratic, have in fact represented the interests of the governments attacking Yugoslavia, especially Serbia” (Milošević, 2000b). He further argued that the real leader of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) was not Vojislav Koštunica, but rather Zoran Đinđić, who “collaborated with the military alliance that attacked our country” (Milošević, 2000b).

This speech, Milošević’s first televised address to the Serbian people since the end of the Kosovo war, was made on the day of the run-off election with Koštunica.²⁵ The very fact that Milošević spent the entire speech attacking the Opposition shows just how vulnerable he was feeling (and with good reason, given that just three days later his regime was spectacularly toppled). In short, the speech was “a desperate address by a desperate man”, trying desperately to cling on to power (Cohen, 2001, p.422).

In this 2 October 2000 speech, Milošević said nothing at all about his own policies, other than “It is precisely our politics which guarantees peace and theirs [the politics of the Opposition] which guarantees lasting conflict and violence...” (Milošević, 2000b). Instead, Milošević spent the entire speech describing what life would be like in Serbia if the opposition were to come to power. The irony is that while he stressed all the dreadful and unpleasant things that would happen, many of these things had already happened – under his rule.

²⁵ Koštunica and other opposition leaders refused to participate in run-off elections, and instead called for a series of protest meetings throughout Serbia.

For example, he warned that,

All countries finding themselves with limited sovereignty and with governments controlled by foreign powers speedily become impoverished in a way that destroys all hope for more just and humane social relations (Milošević, 2000b).

Yet, the majority of people in Serbia were already very poor.²⁶ He also claimed that if the Opposition came to power, there would be a large socio-economic divide between a poor majority and a rich minority. Again, however, such a divide already existed. For example, in 1993, according to one survey, the richest 10% in Serbia had at their disposal 37% of national income, while the poorest 10% had only 1.6% of it (Nikolić, 2002, p.88).

Having painted a picture of what life would be like if the Opposition were in power, and having spoken about invasions and colonization, at the end of his speech Milošević said, “Citizens, you must make up your own minds whether to believe me or not” (Milošević, 2000b). It was almost as if he anticipated that many people would not believe what he was telling them. As if to prove his trustworthiness and credibility, he continued,

My motive in expressing my opinion in this way is not personal; not at all. I was twice elected president of Serbia and once president of Yugoslavia. It should be clear to all, after the past ten years, that NATO isn't attacking Serbia because of Milošević; it is attacking Milošević because of Serbia (Milošević, 2000b).

This final claim was a last-ditch attempt by Milošević to convince the Serbian people that he himself was not the problem.

It has emerged from this analysis that there was a clear relationship between how secure Milošević felt and how he treated the Opposition. When his

²⁶ As will be seen in chapters 5 and 7, many of the Serbian interviewees emphasize how poor they were during the Milošević years.

position was very secure, he rarely mentioned the Opposition, and certainly did not attack it. Yet, as his position became more and more untenable, the increasingly united Opposition became a major target for him. Milošević tried desperately to discredit the Opposition in every way he could, in particular by claiming that it was serving the interests of foreign powers.

The problem for Milošević, however, was that his growing sense of insecurity and desperation was reflected in his speeches, and in this way he perhaps contributed to a growing disillusionment with his regime. When he came to power, Milošević appeared strong and confident, and this was arguably another reason why he had such strong popular appeal. It is normal for people, and not just Serbs, to want a strong and capable leader. If a leader appears weak and vulnerable, people are less likely to support him.

By the end of the nineties, after everything the country had been through, the Serbs needed a leader who could take the country forward, a leader with fresh ideas and vision. Yet, Milošević did not offer this – he could only attack the Opposition. His objective was to discredit the Opposition yet, paradoxically, he may have done the very opposite. The extent to which, in his Address to the Serbian Nation on 2 October 2000, he concentrated on the Opposition, was very revealing. He evidently regarded the Opposition as a formidable threat, and if it was a threat, then it was not simply a group of “bribed weaklings, blackmailed profiteers and thieves”, as Milošević had claimed at the Fourth SPS Congress.

Conclusion

This chapter began by looking at the two Milošević speeches that have received the most attention in Western literature – his 1987 Kosovo Polje speech and his 1989 Gazimestan speech. It argued that through selective quoting and neglect of context, both speeches have been strongly misrepresented, to create and reinforce the image of Milošević as a criminal leader and warmonger.

Section 2 looked at some of the speeches that Milošević gave between 1990 and 1998, focusing on two recurrent themes – Yugoslavia and inter-ethnic relations, and the economy. It was argued that these speeches do not support claims that Milošević wanted to create a “Greater Serbia”, just as they do not substantiate claims that his regime fostered intolerance and ethnic hatred. It was also contended that excessive focus on, and misrepresentation of, one particular speech – the speech that Milošević gave on 16 March 1991 – has served to reinforce the view of him as a criminal leader who planned the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Regarding the economy, it was argued that Milošević’s attractive economic promises help to explain both his initial popularity and growing unpopularity, and that he appealed to citizens on the basis of economic issues, rather than on the basis of nationalism and ethnic hatred.

Finally, section 3 concentrated on the speeches that Milošević gave during his last two years in power. It argued, and demonstrated, that these speeches were thematically and stylistically different from Milošević’s earlier speeches, and

suggested that these changes can be attributed to the regime's growing desperation and sense of vulnerability. Milošević's increasing attacks on the Serbian Opposition, which he had previously tended to ignore, show that he had come to view it as a fundamental threat to his position.²⁷ It was also during his final two years in power that Milošević's speeches became more overtly nationalistic, in particular by emphasizing Serbia's superiority vis-à-vis the West. To say that there were elements of nationalism in Milošević's speeches should not, however, be taken to mean that they encouraged war and hatred; they did not.

In the introduction to this chapter, it was argued that an important reason for analyzing Milošević's speeches is that they enable us to see how Milošević portrayed himself as a leader, a dimension of his leadership that has received little attention in Western literature, and how he sought to win popular support. Now that we have examined his speeches, the following points can be made.

The first and most important is that Milošević did not in any sense portray himself as a war leader. Apart from the war in Kosovo in 1999, Milošević never mentioned the wars in his speeches, except indirectly when he referred to Serbian refugees.²⁸ Just as he never referred to the wars directly, so he never actually declared Serbia's war aims. To cite Tanner, "Time and time again the

²⁷ This is particularly significant given that, "In the history of Serbia the Opposition only ever won one election, that of 1888" (Stevanović, 2004, p.57).

²⁸ For example, in his Closing Statements to the Second SPS Congress and to the Fourth SPS Congress, Milošević talked about the assistance that Serbia had given to Serbian refugees.

complaint was raised that Serbia's goal in the war had never been stated. No one knew what frontier the Serbs were fighting" (Tanner, 2001, p.270).²⁹

Secondly, Milošević portrayed himself as a strong, competent leader who would modernize Serbia and bring prosperity to its citizens. His speeches were not fluffy and ruminative. They typically called for action of some sort. To cite Judah, "What Mr Milošević really likes to do is to make speeches about building high-speed railway lines. He likes to talk about being 'constructive' and 'resolute'" (Judah, 2000b, p.33). Thus,

In the early stages of his rise, Milošević successfully developed the image of a young, decisive and modern leader who would lead Serbia away from the shibboleths and stagnation of self-management socialism into a more dynamic and prosperous future (Sell, 2002, p.51).

Thirdly, we have learnt that Milošević did not start to make direct attacks on the Serbian Opposition until 1999, when he felt increasingly vulnerable. By avoiding such attacks until this time, Milošević portrayed himself as being somehow above politics. He presented himself as a statesman, rather than as a politician, and this perhaps helps to explain why he continued to inspire trust. For example, survey research conducted in 2000, by the Office of Research of the US Department of State, showed that even as late as the period March 1998 to June 2000, Milošević remained the most trusted leader in Serbia (Cohen, 2001, p.361).

Fourthly, particularly in his later speeches, Milošević portrayed the Serbs, and by extension himself as a victim of Western, imperial powers. In his trial in

²⁹ At the same time, Milošević did not conduct himself as a war leader. For example, he never visited Serb soldiers at the front or wounded soldiers in hospital, and during the war in Kosovo, in 1999, "He did not even think of visiting the Kosovo he had so courageously defended or of taking a walk in the Belgrade that loved him so" (Stevanović, 2004, p.157).

The Hague, he has continued to present himself as a victim. For example, in his Introductory Statement, on 13 February 2002, he spoke of “my crucifixion here...” (Milošević, 2002). As we shall see in chapter 7, a significant number of the Serbian interviewees also regard Milošević as a victim who was sacrificed on the altar of Western interests.

Finally, as we have seen, the economy constituted a major theme of Milošević’s speeches. It can, therefore, be argued that what Milošević primarily appealed to in his speeches was not nationalism or chauvinism, a critical point in view of the literature’s claim that he incited ethnic hatred. Rather, what he mainly appealed to was peoples’ hopes for a better and more prosperous life.³⁰ In other words, his appeal was more practical than ideological.

At the same time, by portraying himself as a strong and able leader who would take Serbia’s economy in hand, he was also thus appealing to Serbian political culture, in particular authoritarianism³¹, a “fatalistic attitude” towards change (Mihailović, 1997, p.26), “the century-old propensity of the Serb people to follow authoritarian leaders” (Pribićević, 1997, p.114), and the notion that

³⁰ The fact that Milošević failed to fulfill his economic pledges, in the eyes of the Serbian interviewees, helps to explain why so many of them emphasize his poor mismanagement of the economy and economic crimes, as will be seen in chapter 7. According to the interviewees, rather than giving them a better life, Milošević actually made them extremely poor.

³¹ The Serbian psychologist Bora Kuzmanović understands authoritarianism primarily as “an uncritical attitude towards authority and the principle of hierarchy in social relations – i.e. as authoritarian submissiveness and, at the same time, authoritarian dominance and aggressiveness towards those who violate conventional norms” (Kuzmanović, 1995, p.174). Vujović similarly defines authoritarianism as “the uncritical bestowal of trust in and submission to a supreme leader” (Vujović, 2000, p.124).

Serbs are eternal victims.³² That Milošević appealed to peoples' wants, needs and values helps to explain why he initially enjoyed strong popular support.

In the introduction to this chapter, a second important reason was given for analyzing Milošević's speeches. It was argued that this analysis would allow us to find out whether there is anything in what Milošević actually said that supports two of the particular claims, central to his construction as a criminal leader that Western literature makes about him. The first of these claims is that he incited ethnic hatred and intolerance; the second is that he planned the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Having examined the speeches, it is argued that they do not support either of these claims. Only if we deal with the speeches in a highly selective, partial and context-oblivious manner is it possible to argue that certain speeches – or rather particular sentences - substantiate these claims.

However, when the speeches are systematically analyzed, and when certain, oft-cited sentences are looked at in both the context of the particular speech as a whole, and in the context of other speeches more generally, they do not in any way lend weight to Milošević's construction as a criminal leader. More specifically, they do not provide any evidence of his "criminal" intent. Thus, on the basis of analysis of Milošević's speeches, the question of whether he is a criminal leader can be answered in the negative.

³² Ramet refers to the Serbs' "victim complex" (Ramet, 1995, p.119). The Serbian Orthodox Church has played an important role in nourishing this idea of Serbs as victims. Father Nikolaj Velimirović, for example, one of the most influential Serbian Orthodox theologians of the twentieth-century, claimed that, "Since the ancient people of Israel, I see no other people in the world's history with a more tragical fate than that of the Serbian people" (Velimirović, 1916, p.75).

Milošević's speeches clearly constitute a valuable primary source that provides fresh insight into his leadership. Speeches, however, are intended for an audience, in this case Serbian citizens. Thus, now that we have explored the speeches themselves, we can turn our attention to the recipients of these speeches – ordinary people in Serbia.

Leadership is a relationship that should be studied both from the top down and from the bottom up. This bottom-up perspective is especially valuable for studying a criminal leader. As emphasized in the preceding chapters, this is an externally constructed concept. It is important, therefore, to look at how Milošević is seen by ordinary people - both Serbs and national minorities - in Serbia. Do they themselves see him as a criminal leader? This is a question that the interview data chapters will now seek to answer.

An Introduction to the Interview Data Chapters

The following four chapters are based on the results of eighty-seven qualitative, semi-structured interviews. These interviews took place between May and September 2004 in four main areas of Serbia – Belgrade, Vojvodina (Novi Sad, Subotica, Kikinda), Central Serbia (Čačak, Kragujevac), and South Serbia (Niš, Novi Pazar). Two interviews were carried out in Milošević's hometown of Požarevac, in eastern Serbia. In addition, some interviews were conducted in Kosovo, in both Serbian areas (Kosovska Mitrovica, Gračanica) and Albanian areas (Priština, Vučitrn/Vushtri).

This short introductory section to the data chapters will begin by giving the reader essential information about the interviewees. It will then discuss sampling strategies and how the interviews were conducted. Finally, it will address some anticipated criticisms of the interviews.

The Interviewees

In total, there are ninety interviewees¹ in the sample, of which sixty-three men and twenty-seven women. The interviewees fall into three main groups. Since the thesis aims to generate a more bottom-up account of Milošević's leadership and regime, the vast majority of the interviewees are not elites, but "ordinary" people, defined as persons who, as individuals, have little direct influence on national affairs and policy-making. The non-elite interviewees can, in turn, be divided into two main groups – Serbs and national minorities.

¹ Two of the interviews were group interviews. There were three interviewees in one group, and two interviewees in the other group.

The Serbian group comprises forty-nine interviewees, of which thirty men and nineteen women. Of these interviewees, twenty-five are under the age of 35 (sixteen men and nine women). Fourteen interviewees are between the ages of 35 and 50 (eight men and six women). Ten interviewees are over 50 (six men and four women).

Seventeen of these forty-nine interviewees are from Belgrade (ten men and seven women), seven interviewees are from Vojvodina (five men and two women), seven interviewees are from Central Serbia (six men and one woman), three interviewees are from Southern Serbia (two men and one woman), two interviewees are from the town of Požarevac (one male and one female), and eight interviewees are from Kosovo (four men and four women).² Finally, two interviewees are refugees from Croatia (one male and one female), and three interviewees are refugees from Bosnia (one male and two females).

Of these forty-nine interviewees, thirty have been to university/are studying at university, and nineteen have not been to university. Of the thirty interviewees who have been to university/are at university, twenty-four speak English. Of the nineteen interviewees who have not been to university, only six speak English. In total, thirty interviewees speak English and nineteen do not.

In the second, national minority group, there are eighteen interviewees – fourteen men and four women. Ten interviewees are under the age of 35; six interviewees are between the ages of 35 and 50; and two interviewees are over

² Two of these interviewees are now living as IDPs in Belgrade.

the age of 50. Within this sample group, there are five Albanians - four men and one woman. Four of the interviewees are Kosovar Albanians. The fifth interviewee is an ethnic Albanian living in Belgrade.

There are five ethnic Hungarian interviewees, four men and one woman. Three of the interviewees have two Hungarian parents. The fourth interviewee has a Hungarian father and a Serbian mother. The fifth interviewee has a Hungarian father and a Croatian mother. These last two interviewees will be classed as ethnic Hungarians because in the former Yugoslavia, a person's nationality is determined by the nationality of his/her father.

There are three Muslim interviewees, two men and one woman. The male interviewees are from the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, and the female interviewee is a Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo.

In the sample, there are also four Roma interviewees, three men and one woman, and one male Slovak interviewee.

Of these eighteen national minority interviewees, eleven have been to university and seven have not. All of them speak English, except three of the four Roma interviewees.

Since all of the non-elite interviewees were promised anonymity, only their initials will be used in the following chapters.

The third and final group of interviewees are “elites”, defined as individuals who occupy posts of political command, as well as individuals who can directly influence policy-makers. The decision to include some elites in the interview sample, notwithstanding the thesis’ emphasis on the view from below, was based on two particular considerations. Firstly, since it was anticipated that there would be gaps in the knowledge of the non-elite interviewees, it was felt that interviewing some elites would be important for giving us a more detailed picture of Milošević and his leadership. Secondly, given that it was not possible to interview Milošević himself, it was judged that the next best option would be to interview some elites who personally knew and/or worked with him.

In this elite group, there are a total of twenty-three interviewees, of which nineteen men and four women. Six of the interviewees are former ministers or colleagues of Milošević. Vladislav Jovanović became the Foreign Minister of Serbia in August 1991. In April 1992, he took up the post of Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a position he occupied until August 1995. Živadin Jovanović served as the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs between January 1998 and November 2000. He became a member of the main board of the SPS in 1996, and became one of the four vice-chairmen of the Party.

Dr Oskar Kovač was a member of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia from 1986-1989, and a member of the commission for economic reform that Milošević set up at the beginning of the 1990s. Kovač was also deputy Prime

Minister in Milan Panić's government, in 1992. Today, he works at the Economics Faculty in Belgrade. Professor Kosta Mihailović was also a member of the above-mentioned commission for economic reform, and one of the authors of the 1986 Memorandum of the *Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* (SANU).

Professor Mihailo Marković served on the committee for political reform that Milošević created in 1989. Marković was also the vice-president of the SPS from 1990 until 1992. Milorad Vučelić is the current vice-president of the SPS, and the former director of *Radio Television Serbia* (RTS).

Six of the elite interviewees work in the media. Saša Mirković is the general manager of *B-92*, an independent radio and television station in Belgrade. Janko Baljak is a documentary producer at *B-92*. Aleksander Nenadović is the former editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper *Politika*. Vladimir Milić is a journalist at *TV Mreza*, a production company in Belgrade. Ljiljana Smailović is a journalist for the weekly newsmagazine *NIN* in Belgrade. She has spent a considerable amount of time covering Milošević's trial in The Hague. Zoran Milešević is the owner and director of *VK TV* in Kikinda.

Six interviewees are academics. Aleksa Djilas is a Belgrade intellectual and the son of the famous dissident Milovan Djilas. Vojin Dimitrijević is a Professor of International Law and the director of the *Belgrade Centre for Human Rights*. Mihailo Pantić is a Professor of Literature at the Philological Faculty in Belgrade. Dr Branka Prpa is a historian and the current director of

the Historical Archives in Belgrade. Professor Svetozar Stojanović works at the *Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory* in Belgrade. He was a special advisor to President Ćosić and Prime Minister Panić from 15 June 1992 to the end of May 1993. Professor Ljubinka Trgovčević was a member of the Serbian Parliament from 1984 until 1986, and a member of the Serbian Presidency when Ivan Stambolić, Milošević's former mentor, was President of Serbia. Today, she is Vice-Dean of the Political Science Faculty in Belgrade.

Three interviewees are politicians. Goran Svilanović, Serbia's Foreign Minister from November 2000 until April 2004, is the current president of the *Civic Alliance Party* (GS). Nikola Lazić is the International Secretary of the *Democratic Party of Serbia* (DSS). Branislav Kovačević is a member of the *League for Šumadija* party, and a candidate for the post of mayor of Kragujevac.

The final two elite interviewees are experts on national minorities. Vladimir Djurić is a Legal Advisor at the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights. Marija Vujnović is Project Manager at the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights.

All of the elite interviewees, with the exception of one, are Serbian.³ Eighteen speak English and five do not.

³ Dr Kovač is an ethnic Hungarian. However, since he was selected for interviewing on the basis of his economic knowledge and expertise, rather than because he is an ethnic Hungarian, he will be treated for these purposes as an elite interviewee.

Since there are no major differences between the elite interviewees and the non-elite Serbian interviewees in terms of how they perceive Milošević, the two groups of interviewees are not treated separately in the following data chapters. However, as we might expect, the opinions of the Serbian interviewees (elite and non-elite) fundamentally differ from those of the national minority interviewees. Consequently, the interview data chapters deal with them separately.

Sampling Strategies

How were these three groups of interviewees selected? The main sampling strategy used to find ordinary Serbian people to interview was snowball sampling. This type of sampling is very practical, and it is particularly useful when one first enters the field and faces the daunting task of having to locate people to interview. In snowball sampling, the researcher asks the interviewee if he or she knows anybody who might agree to be interviewed. If the interviewee gives the names of three people, the researcher will contact each of them and, hopefully, arrange to interview them. These three interviewees will then be asked to suggest the names of other possible interviewees. The process continues until the requisite number of interviewees is found. In just one month, snowball sampling produced the initial target number of twenty-five interviewees. However, this type of sampling also has important limitations, as will be discussed.

A second type of sampling used was purposive sampling. In purposive sampling, what is important is the relevance of the sample. The researcher

seeks to select information-rich cases that will answer the research questions posed. In this case, purposive sampling was mainly used to find elite interviewees, in particular interviewees who personally knew Milošević, and it proved very effective. Ten of the twenty-three elite interviewees in the sample knew Milošević, and seven of these ten interviewees used to work closely with him.⁴

Purposive sampling was also used to find national minority interviewees. For example, contact was sought, and later established, with an NGO in Belgrade that works with Roma. Thanks to this NGO, *Roma Heart*, it was possible to visit two Roma settlements in Belgrade and to speak to some Roma people. In order to establish contact with other national minority groups, it proved necessary to travel out of Belgrade, to Vojvodina, to the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, and to Kosovo.

The third and final sampling strategy used was opportunistic sampling. That is to say that any new opportunities that arose were always taken advantage of. For example, the invitation by one of the directors of *Sloboda*⁵ to attend a meeting of *Sloboda* activists was viewed as a good opportunity to establish contact with some Milošević supporters who, up until that point, had been notably absent in the sample. A group interview with three Milošević supporters followed from this meeting. The news that *Sloboda* would be

⁴ For anyone undertaking this type of research, it is essential to have good contacts. Being fortunate enough to have these contacts, as a result of previous trips to Serbia, meant that gaining access to important public figures, such as politicians and former foreign ministers, was very easy. Trying to arrange interviews with public figures in the UK would undoubtedly be far more difficult.

⁵ "Sloboda" ("The Freedom Association") is an NGO in Belgrade. It is helping Milošević with his defence in The Hague.

holding a Vidovdan⁶ rally in the centre of Belgrade, on 28 June 2004, was seen as another valuable opportunity to meet some Milošević supporters. As a result of attending this rally, two more Milošević supporters were found and subsequently interviewed.

The Interview Process

An interview guide was drawn up prior to entering the field. When it was piloted, with the aid of six acquaintances in Belgrade, some small modifications were made. In particular, questions relating to very specific past events, such as the mass rallies of the late eighties, were taken out. The piloting showed that these events happened too long ago for people to be able to say very much about them.

The final interview guide that was used for the interviews comprised twenty-seven questions, grouped into eight main topics – (i) everyday life during the Milošević years, (ii) Milošević's leadership, (iii) Milošević's speeches, (iv) the wars in the former Yugoslavia, (v) regime/society relations, (vi) the Media, (vii) the Hague Tribunal, and (viii) the present and the future. No interviewee was ever asked all twenty-seven questions, however. It was considered more important to allow interviewees to freely express their opinions and to discuss what mattered most to them.

The interviews were kept as informal as possible, in order to put the interviewees at ease and encourage them to speak openly. Some of the most

⁶ Vidovdan commemorates the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. This battle, which was a defeat for Serbia, is one of the most important events in Serbian history.

successful and useful interviews were conducted in very social and informal settings, for example in coffee shops and on café terraces. The interviews with elites were generally more formal, and most frequently took place in interviewees' offices.

Most of the interviews lasted approximately one hour, but some were closer to two hours. The elite interviews tended to be slightly longer than the non-elite interviews. Two interviews were group interviews, with two and three people respectively. The rest of the interviews were conducted with just one person at a time. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded, although this was not always possible or appropriate, particularly in cases where interviewees were clearly very nervous.

Some Anticipated Criticisms of the Interview Data

Overall, the interviews were very successful, generating rich empirical data and thereby making an important contribution to the existing Western literature on the Milošević regime. However, certain criticisms can be anticipated. Some of these will be standard criticisms of qualitative research in general, such as issues of validity and representativeness. We shall address these standard criticisms first, before considering some more specific anticipated criticisms.

According to Silverman, “‘Validity’ is another word for truth. Sometimes one doubts the validity of an explanation because the researcher has clearly made no attempt to deal with contrary cases” (Silverman. 2000, p.175). Some critics

also question the validity of qualitative research by claiming that its findings are anecdotal. In the words of Bryman,

There is a tendency towards an anecdotal approach to the use of data in relation to conclusions or explanations in qualitative research. Brief conversations, snippets from unstructured interviews...are used to provide evidence of a particular contention. There are grounds for disquiet in that the representativeness or generality of these fragments is rarely addressed (cited in Silverman, 2000, p.177).

Regarding the issue of validity, it is important to highlight that the researcher in the present case did make efforts to deal with contrary cases, namely by including some national minorities in the interview sample. As to the charge of anecdotalism, it should be emphasized that the interview data has been treated in a comprehensive and holistic manner. The following four chapters incorporate all eighty-seven interviews into the analysis, and aim to display the full richness and complexity of the data by presenting the variety of viewpoints expressed on any one particular issue. As will be seen, moreover, the findings of the research are supported by various Serbian public opinion surveys.

Thirdly, it is important to point out that some of the existing Western literature itself suffers from anecdotalism. This is particularly true of journalistic writings, which are very common. Prominent examples of anecdotalism are the various unsubstantiated claims made about Milošević, such as “War was a deliberate choice for the Milošević regime...” (LeBor, 2002, p.328), and “There is no doubt that the paramilitaries functioned as one piece of Milošević’s carefully planned strategy to create a Greater Serbia” (Sell, 2002, p.325).

Let us now turn to the more problematic issue of representativeness. According to Silverman, “the problem of ‘representativeness’ is a perennial worry of many qualitative or case study researchers” (Silverman, 2001, p.249). First of all, it is extremely difficult for qualitative researchers to generate a representative sample, since the number of interviewees is typically quite small (ninety interviewees is a relatively large number for a qualitative study). More importantly, however, most qualitative researchers are not seeking to achieve a strictly representative sample.⁷ Rather, the aim is to produce a sample that will enrich and deepen our understanding of a particular phenomenon or problem, and/or to generate new insight by offering a fresh perspective. To cite Gaskell, “The real purpose of qualitative research is not counting opinions or people but rather exploring the range of opinions, the different representations of the issue” (Gaskell, 2000, p.41).

It is, however, recognized that in the present case, there are important issues relating to the interview sample. One anticipated criticism is that there is not enough diversity in the total sample. Certainly, one of the trade-offs of using a snowball sampling strategy is that certain groups are likely to be over-represented in the sample while others are under-represented. For example, there are sixty-three male interviewees and twenty-seven female interviewees in the total interview sample. In other words, the number of male interviewees is more than twice the number of female interviewees.

⁷ To cite Jennifer Mason, “The key issue for qualitative sampling is therefore how to focus, strategically and meaningfully, rather than how to represent” (Mason, 2002, p.136).

Some might argue that this over-representation of male interviewees weakens the interview sample and the overall research findings. What is important to note, however, is that there are no significant differences between the attitudes of the male and female interviewees towards Milošević.

We can group these attitudes into four main categories – very critical, critical, mildly critical, and supportive. Interviewees who are very critical of Milošević hold him directly responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Those who are critical of Milošević accuse him of caring only about himself and his power, and not about the Serbian people. Interviewees who are mildly critical of Milošević emphasize his weaknesses and mistakes, for example his stubbornness, his failure to make long-term plans, and his neglect of PR work. Finally, there is a small, fourth group of interviewees who express support for Milošević.⁸ Among the non-elite Serbian interviewees, 23.3% of men and 15.8% of women are very critical of Milošević; 43.3% of men and 47.3% of women are critical of him; 20% of men and 26.3% of women are mildly critical of Milošević; and 13.3% of men and 10.5% of women express support for him.

Just as there is a gender bias in the total interview sample, there is also an age bias. The under-35 age-group is over-represented, and the over-50 age-group is under-represented. For example, of the forty-nine non-elite Serbian interviewees, only ten are over 50. One practical reason for this is that the

⁸ It is important to point out, however, that these categories – particularly the very critical and critical categories – are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

older generation in Serbia typically do not speak English.⁹ What the interview data shows, however, is that interviewees over the age of fifty are the least critical of Milošević. Of those interviewees who are very critical of Milošević, 28% are under the age of thirty-five; 14.3% are between the ages of thirty-five and fifty; and only 10% are over fifty. In contrast, of those interviewees that express support for Milošević, 8% are under the age of thirty-five; 7.1% are between the ages of thirty-five and fifty; and 30% are over fifty. The fact that pensioners were among Milošević's strongest supporters¹⁰ is thus reflected in the interview data, despite the under-representation of those over the age of 50.

Although the total interview sample may not be evenly balanced, its strength is that it includes two particular groups of people who have received little attention in Western literature – ordinary Serbs and national minorities. The inclusion of these two groups makes the sample far more representative and more diverse than a sample that includes only elites, the social group that Western literature typically focuses most heavily upon. Ideally, there would have been more national minority interviewees in the sample. That there are only eighteen reflects the fact that it proved far more difficult to find non-Serb interviewees. However, what we learn from these eighteen interviewees about their experiences of life during the Milošević years, a very under-researched area, is extremely valuable.

A final anticipated criticism of the interviews relates to the fact that there is a preponderance of English-speaking interviewees in the sample. Of the

⁹ Today, many Serbian children learn English in school. Older generations, however, were more likely to learn Russian.

¹⁰ This point will be discussed more in chapter 7.

ninety interviewees in the total sample, sixty-three speak English and twenty-seven do not. This, it might be argued, constitutes a significant bias, since the opinions of these English-speaking interviewees are unlikely to reflect popular opinion as a whole. Certainly, it does appear that there are attitudinal differences between English-speaking interviewees and non-English speaking interviewees. In particular, interviewees who do not speak English are less critical of Milošević than interviewees that do speak English. For example, of the forty-nine non-elite Serbian interviewees in the sample, seven are mildly critical of Milošević. Of these seven interviewees, five do not speak English and two do. Of the same forty-nine interviewees, six express support for Milošević. Of these six, only two speak English; and of the four interviewees who admit that they used to support Milošević, only one speaks English.

However, in response to those who might argue that far more non-English speaking interviewees should have been included in the sample, the following points should be made. Firstly, forty-five of the total eighty-seven interviews took place in Belgrade, chosen as a main base for practical reasons, and many people in Belgrade do speak English, particularly young people.

Secondly, the use of a snowball-sampling strategy tended to produce interviewees that spoke English. If the first interviewee had some knowledge of English, it was quite likely that he or she would know other people who spoke English.

Thirdly, employing a professional interpreter is very expensive, even in Serbia. Since resources were limited, therefore, this was simply not a realistic option. In those cases where the interviewees did not speak English, friends or colleagues translated. Four of the interviewees were conducted in Serbian without any assistance.

Finally, it should be emphasized that gaining the trust and confidence of interviewees was always a key priority, since it was felt that this would encourage people to speak openly. In those cases where interviewees spoke English, this desired trust was usually established. However, in those cases where it was necessary to rely upon a third person to translate, the possibility of developing any kind of rapport between interviewer and interviewee was significantly lessened. In such cases, the primary interaction was between interviewee and translator, while the interviewer was an outsider. In short, where the interviewer and interviewee were able to directly communicate, without the aid of a third party, this created more suitable interview conditions than was the case when a translator was involved. The use of a translator lent an air of formality to the interview, and preserved a certain distance between interviewer and interviewee.

Let us now turn to some more specific anticipated criticisms of the interview data. Firstly, some might argue that the interviews are of limited value because they are retrospective. Milošević came to power in 1989 and fell from power in 2000. The interviews were conducted in 2004. This raises an obvious question: how reliable are peoples' memories? Of course, it is inevitable that

interviewees will not be able to remember everything. As Weiss argues, “The vagaries of respondent memory make for reports in which some observations are crystal clear while others are obscured or distorted or blocked” (Weiss, 1994, p.149).

What is striking, however, is the vividness of recall when interviewees talk about their everyday life experiences during the Milošević years. Asked the question, “Could you tell me something about what everyday life was like for you during the nineties?” many of the interviewees give highly detailed descriptions of both their lives and, in some cases, of their feelings at the time. The fact that the interviewees’ recollections and descriptions are very similar is an important indication of their reliability.

Furthermore, the thesis seeks to deal with this issue of the interviews being retrospective through triangulation. It uses public opinion poll data and other sources, such as the website of the *Institute for War and Peace Reporting* (IWPR) and the website *Free Serbia*, in order to contextualize and add weight to the interview data.

It is also important to stress that while interviewees may not remember everything, gaps in memory can themselves be highly significant. In particular, they can be seen as coping mechanisms. Jansen’s study of five post-war Croatian villages, for example, shows how

largely homogeneous narratives of past and present relied on strategies of vagueness and selective amnesia. In a context of danger and poverty, such ways of coping allowed people not to be implicated in potentially threatening debates (Jansen, 2002, p.88).

A second possible criticism of the interviews is that because they are retrospective, they can only tell us how the interviewees feel about Milošević today, not how they felt about him during the 1990s. This raises the important question of whether the opinions that the interviewees hold today are likely to resemble those they held when Milošević was in power. It is significant, for example, that only six of the forty-nine non-elite Serbian interviewees actually express support for Milošević today (and four interviewees admit that they used to support him).

Since it is likely, given Milošević's initial levels of popularity, that more of the interviewees would have actually supported Milošević in the past, it may be inferred that their opinions of him have fundamentally changed. However, because the data does not tell us what the interviewees thought about Milošević during the 1990s, we have nothing against which to compare their current opinions and thereby ascertain in detail precisely how their opinions of him have changed. Certainly, this is an important limitation of the data.

On the other hand, it should be emphasized that no Western academic undertook this type of bottom-up research when Milošević was in power. The present research makes an important contribution to the existing Western literature, but it cannot compensate for research that, regrettably, was not done a decade ago.

It should also be underlined that the image of Milošević as a criminal leader is relatively recent – in 1995 for example, the international community saw Milošević as a peacemaker. Thus, in order to explore whether and to what extent ordinary people in Serbia support this image of Milošević as a criminal leader, it makes most sense to examine how they view him today. The interviews themselves could be made the basis for future quantitative research,

for example surveys. Such research would allow us to find out how representative the opinions of the interviewees actually are.

Thirdly, the interview data raises the important issue of whether the interviewees are always telling the truth. For example, it is quite likely that more interviewees in the sample used to support Milošević than are willing to admit. To conclude from this, however, that many of the interviewees are simply lying is over-simplistic. As Dean and Whyte argue,

...the interviewer is not looking for *the true attitude or sentiment*. He should recognize that informants can and do hold conflicting sentiments at one time and they hold varying sentiments according to the situations in which they find themselves (Dean and Whyte, 2003, p.258).

The very fact that many of the Serbian interviewees view Milošević both as a “bad” leader and as a victim highlights this.

It is also important to emphasize that, “Respondents tend to give socially approved answers to our questions, to over-report their virtuous actions and under-report their vices...” (Aldridge and Levine, 2001, p.103). In the present case, the fact that the interviewer is a female from the UK might, according to some, increase the likelihood of interviewees giving what they consider to be socially desirable answers. For example, is it likely that many interviewees would want to admit to an interviewer whose country bombed Serbia and Kosovo just six years ago - precisely because of Milošević - that they support or used to support Milošević?

It is impossible to know whether and to what extent the interviewer’s nationality has affected the answers that the interviewees give. It would be

interesting to find out if a researcher from, for example Hungary or Bulgaria, would receive similar answers. What can be said, however, is that every effort was made to gain the trust of the interviewees. For example, as previously noted, the interviews were deliberately kept as informal as possible. The use of a snowball sampling strategy, moreover, meant that the interviewees knew something about the interviewer in advance, from those who had already been interviewed. It is true that on a couple of occasions, the interviewer was accused (although not by any of the interviewees) of bombing the Serbs. The majority of Serbs, however, are able to differentiate between the British government and an individual British researcher.

In some respects, moreover, the nationality of the researcher (and perhaps also her gender) was arguably an advantage. Given that the Serbs were so heavily demonized in the West during the nineties, many of the interviewees seemed only too happy to have the opportunity to speak, and to give their side of the story, to a Western researcher.

Finally, some might argue that there is little value in interviewing ordinary people, on the grounds that ordinary people have only limited knowledge and opinions that simply reflect those of the elite. Some of the interviewees themselves admit this. To quote a female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, "Ordinary people don't know anything except what is written in the papers" (MV). For his part, a male interviewee in Novi Sad explains, "It is very difficult to make sense of the Milošević years, because everything was happening behind closed doors" (DK); and a male ethnic Albanian interviewee

in Belgrade concedes, “I don’t know much about Milošević’s politics...I feel that I can only talk about my own experiences” (IG).

At the same time, there is a tendency for interviewees to try and appear more knowledgeable than they may actually be. They do this by making unsubstantiated claims, often based upon rumour and hearsay.¹¹ One male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, claims that the American Administration was planning war in the former Yugoslavia. He also maintains that Tudjman paid the Clinton Administration to give military help to Croatia in 1995 (SZ). A female interviewee in Čačak, moreover, claims her son-in-law told her that Vuk Drašković, the leader of the opposition SPO, helped Tudjman to win the elections in Croatia (VS). How would ordinary people know about such things?

Certainly, there are gaps in the knowledge that ordinary people have, and they do sometimes make factual errors. For example, several interviewees confuse Milošević’s 1987 Kosovo Polje speech with his 1989 Gazimestan speech. However, this does not mean that there is no value in interviewing ordinary people. Firstly, any research that gives a voice to ordinary people is to be welcomed, given the existing Western literature’s heavy neglect of the view from below.

Secondly, while ordinary people will not necessarily have detailed factual knowledge, they can give us some important insight into what everyday life

¹¹ According to the sociology of rumour, rumour becomes more important in insecure times when people feel that events are beyond their control. Rumour thus becomes indicative of social crisis.

was like during the Milošević years, thus filling a significant lacuna in the existing Western literature.

Thirdly, while ordinary people do not always perceive and understand things correctly, the errors they make are themselves important. For example, they are very relevant in helping to explain inter-ethnic tensions, which are often fuelled by misunderstanding and the fear that this induces.

Finally, any gaps in the knowledge of ordinary people can be easily filled if we also include some elites in the interview sample. The knowledge and expertise of elites will complement and add texture to the picture painted by ordinary people.

Now that the reader has important information about the interviewees and the interviews, let us now turn to the interview data itself, which is analyzed in chapters 5 to 8.

Chapter 5

Domestic Views on an External Construction; Part I – The Wars in the Former Yugoslavia

Introduction

The objective of this chapter, and of the chapters that follow, is to explore the images that ordinary people in Serbia, both Serbs and national minorities, have of Milošević, and to find out whether and to what extent they themselves see him as a criminal leader.

We saw in chapter 1 that the most important element in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader is his actions and intentions. Using the data from eighty-seven semi-structured interviews, the present chapter and the chapter that follows will look at whether and to what degree the interviewees agree with the five key claims that Western literature makes with respect to Milošević's actions and intentions.

This chapter will concentrate on four of these claims, namely the claims that Milošević (i) was most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, (ii) planned the wars, (iii) planned and premeditated the crimes committed by Serbian forces during these wars, and (iv) used violence to achieve his aims. Chapter 6 will deal with the fifth key claim made in the literature – that Milošević incited ethnic hatred. It will also address the three remaining elements in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader - his motivations, his personality and psychological profile, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders.

In this chapter, as in the following three chapters, the interview data will be complemented by public opinion poll data. These public opinion polls were conducted between 1990 and 2005 by five polling agencies in Belgrade – the *Agency for Applied Sociological and Political Research* (“Argument”), *Marten Board International*, the *National Democratic Institute* (NDI), the *Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute* (SMMRI), and *TNS Medium Gallup*. The interview data will be also be supplemented with factual information from the *Institute for War and Peace Reporting* (IWPR), *Radio Free Europe*, *Free Serbia*, and other similar sources.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 provides some factual information about Milošević’s policies that serves as an important backdrop against which to view the interview data. This section focuses on two particular policy issues that concerned Milošević – the status of Serbia and its two autonomous provinces under the provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, and the position of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and their right to self-determination. It argues that while Milošević’s concerns were legitimate, they have been misconstrued as evidence of his determination to build a “Greater Serbia”. More broadly, it maintains that in constructing Milošević as a criminal leader, Western authors have fundamentally misrepresented his actions and intentions.

Each of the remaining four sections addresses one of the particular claims made in the literature regarding Milošević’s actions and intentions. Section 2 explores whether the interviewees agree with the claim that it is Milošević who

was most responsible for the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. Section 3 focuses on the claim that Milošević planned the wars. Section 4 is concerned with the claim that the crimes Serbian forces committed during the wars were planned and premeditated, a claim that raises important questions both about the character of the wars, and about Milošević's level of control over the paramilitaries who committed the worst crimes. Finally, section 5 deals with the claim that Milošević used violence to achieve his aims, by exploring interviewees' opinions about what constituted Milošević's biggest crimes.

As we shall see, there is a clear divide with respect to each of the above claims between the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees.

Section 1 – Milošević's Policy Concerns

We saw in chapter 1 that central to the construction of Milošević as a criminal leader is the notion that he bears greatest responsibility for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and that he planned these wars in pursuit of a "Greater Serbia". Before we examine how the interviewees themselves assess Milošević's responsibility for the wars and the extent to which his policies contributed to the wars, it is important to first provide the reader with some key information about Milošević's policies.

This section, therefore, will focus on two particular issues that concerned Milošević – (i) the position of Serbia and its autonomous provinces under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, and (ii) the position of Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is argued here that while Milošević's concerns regarding these issues were both legitimate and justified, his many detractors in

the West have chosen to overlook this. Thus, Milošević's acts of curtailing the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and of arming the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, are widely viewed as aggressive acts. In this way, the image of Milošević as a criminal leader is reinforced.

(i) Serbia and the position of its Autonomous Provinces

A new Yugoslav Constitution was promulgated on 21 February 1974. Under this Constitution, "If all the republics were sovereign states, representing their complete territory, it was clear that Serbia did not possess that attribute" (Pešić, 2000, p.31). This is because Serbia alone had autonomous provinces – Kosovo and Vojvodina - within her borders. These autonomous provinces, moreover, were equal to the republics in everything but name. What this meant was that,

...Serbia, according to the provisions of the 1974 Constitution, had within her political borders two political entities that, for all practical purposes, had political equality and full representation in the federal bodies. This considerably weakened the position of Serbia both within its own boundaries and in negotiations at the federal level (Crnobrnja, 1996, p.94).

For example, laws approved in Serbia had to be confirmed in the provincial parliaments, but legislation passed in the latter did not go to the Serbian parliament for approval.¹ In the judicial system, the court of appeal beyond the Supreme Court of Kosovo (or Vojvodina) was not the Supreme Court of Serbia, but that of the Yugoslav Federation. Thus, the provinces could block Serbia's passage of laws for the entire territory, yet Serbia could not block the laws of its own autonomous provinces, even though they were nominally part

¹ A parallel can be drawn here with the so-called "West Lothian Question". This refers to a question posed by Tam Dalyell, MP for the Scottish constituency of West Lothian, during the debate over Scottish devolution in the 1970s. If power over Scottish affairs was devolved to a Scottish Parliament, how could it be right, Dalyell asked, that Scottish MPs at Westminster could vote on issues affecting England, while English MPs could not vote on Scottish issues.

of the Serbian republic. As Spencer notes, "...there are few other countries in the world in which the third tier of government is so powerful" (Spencer, 2000, p.13).

In short, Serbia's position under the 1974 Constitution meant that "40 per cent of the population who were of non-Serbian nationality made decisions about 'narrower Serbia'" (that is to say, Serbia without the autonomous provinces) (Pešić, 2000, p.31).

This was clearly a very unsatisfactory situation, and one that Milošević – upon coming to power – sought to rectify, by amending Serbia's own Constitution. According to the new Serbian Constitution, "The territory of the Republic of Serbia is a single whole, no part of which may be alienated" (Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 1990). Under this Constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina were still autonomous, but they were strictly units of territorial autonomy, without state functions (Article 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 1990).

From the perspective of Milošević, and indeed of many Serbs, it was necessary to reduce the autonomy of the two provinces, in order for Serbia to attain a position analogous to that of the other republics in the Yugoslav Federation. Milošević's many critics, however, have chosen to see something far more ominous in these constitutional changes, namely an aggressive assertion of Serbia's authority that heralded the start of Milošević's drive for a "Greater Serbia".

It is interesting to note that while much is made in Western literature of the fact that Milošević curtailed the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, far less attention is paid to the actions of his counterpart in Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, vis-à-vis the Serbian population in Croatia. To cite Hayden, "...rather than reassure the Serbs of Croatia, the HDZ government [of Franjo Tudjman] embarked on courses on action that could not have been more alienating to the Serbs of Croatia had they been intended as such" (Hayden, 2000, p.69).

For example, Croatia's new Constitution, promulgated on 22 December 1990, relegated the Serbs to the status of a minority. According to this Constitution,

The Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others (Radan, 2002, p.175).

Furthermore, under Tudjman, an official document called a *Domovina* (a form providing proof of Croatian origin) was introduced, and this became an instrument of differentiation between Croats and non-Croats when it came to jobs and privileges. Such details, however, are scarcely mentioned in much of the Western literature on the former Yugoslavia.

(ii) The Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Right to Self-Determination

According to the 1981 census, 1,958,000 Serbs (or 24% of all Serbs) lived outside the territory of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (Cohen, 1998, p.139).

In Croatia, Serbs accounted for 12.2% of the population, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs made up 31.4% of the population. When Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia, by invoking their right to self-

determination, this raised the fundamental question of whether the Serbs in these two former Yugoslav republics also had a right to self-determination.

According to Hannum,

Perhaps no contemporary norm of international law has been so vigorously promoted or widely accepted as the right of all peoples to self-determination. Yet the meaning and content of that right remain as vague and imprecise as when they were enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson and others at Versailles (Hannum, 1996, p.27).

As Radan points out, “The critical question for self-determination relates to the meaning of ‘peoples’” (Radan, 2002, p.4). In the case of the break-up of Yugoslavia, however, the meaning of “people” was heavily contested. While the seceding republics claimed that “people” was to be understood in a territorial sense, the Serbs “maintained that the right to self-determination belonged to ethnic nations, encompassing, in particular, Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina” (Dimitrijević, 1995, p.59).

Unhelpfully, the 1974 Constitution was very vague on the question of self-determination. It essentially fudged the issue, instead of clarifying it. To cite Dimitrijević, “...it remained unclear whether the subjects of this right were ethnic nations, as opposed to peoples in the sense of inhabitants of a state or territory...” (Dimitrijević, 1995, p.58).

Article 5 of the Constitution stated that, “The frontiers of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may not be altered without the consent of all the Republics and Autonomous Provinces” (Constitution of the SFRY, 1974). However, Article 3 of the Constitution vested sovereignty not in the republics, but in the people - “The Socialist Republics are states based on the sovereignty

of the people...” (Constitution of the SFRY, 1974). Furthermore, in its preamble, the Constitution referred to “...the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession...” (Constitution of the SFRY, 1974). Thus, it can be argued that the preamble to the 1974 Constitution “recognized a right of secession not to the Federate Republics, but to the constituent peoples, without in any case regulating it” (Bernardini, 2005).

According to the traditional rules of legal interpretation, however, “...the provisions of preambles are not binding but rather are to be used as aids in interpretation, while those of the operative articles are legally binding” (Hayden, 2000, p.71). This distinction was important with respect to the issue of whether the republics of Yugoslavia possessed a right under the Federal Constitution to secede.

While the constitutional position was far from clear, the seceding republics justified their secession from Yugoslavia on the basis of the right to self-determination.² On 20 February 1991, for example the Slovenian Assembly passed a resolution by which Slovenia disassociated itself from Yugoslavia. This disassociation, as opposed to secession, was justified “on the basis of the permanent and inalienable rights of self-determination of the Slovene nation, which is one of the basic principles of international law” (Radan, 2002, p.172).

² Hudson emphasizes that the Croatian and Slovene declarations of independence, in 1991, were illegal under international law, because the international frontiers of Yugoslavia were recognized under the Final Act at Helsinki, in 1975. This stated that changes to Yugoslavia’s frontiers could not be made without “the consent of the governments and peoples concerned” (Hudson, 2003, p.86).

On 11 January 1992, in its Opinion 2, the Badinter Commission³ gave its answer to the key question of whether the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina themselves had a right to self-determination.⁴ Opinion 2 dealt with the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina as a minority and, as such, held that they did not have a right to self-determination. Yet, as Radan argues,

The Serbs had the same constitutional status under the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY as did the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, namely that of constituent nations...It follows that as Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Serbs were constituent nations within the SFRY, one could not discriminate between their rights to self-determination. If the Croats and Bosnian Muslims of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, had the right to their own states at the expense of the borders of the SFRY, then logically the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, had the same right at the expense of the borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Radan, 2002, p.219).

Furthermore, if the Serbs did not have a right to self-determination because they were a minority, “How could the borders of the SFRY have been changed by the exercise of the right to self-determination by groups forming sections of the SFRY’s population?” After all, “These groups were minorities in the context of the SFRY in that none of them was the largest national group within that state, just as the Serbs were not the largest group in either Croatia or Bosnia-Hercegovina” (Radan, 2002, p.217).

³ The Badinter Commission was set up by the European Community in 1991. Composed of the presidents of the constitutional courts of five EC countries, the Commission’s role was to consider legal questions arising from the break-up of Yugoslavia, including the issue of recognition.

⁴ On 21 December 1990, Serbs in the Knin region of Croatia proclaimed the formation of a Serb Autonomous District of Krajina (SAD Krajina). Two further autonomous districts – of Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem, and of Western Slavonija – were formed soon after. On 28 February 1991, SAD Krajina passed a resolution on the disassociation of SAD Krajina from Croatia, justified on the basis of “the internationally recognised right of people to self-determination”. Similarly, in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the *Republika Srpska* proclaimed its own Constitution on 28 February 1992, the preamble of which stated that the Serb Republic was based upon “the inalienable and unassignable natural right of the Serbian people to self-determination” (Radan, 2002, p.189).

Just as Milošević had sought to make Serbia constitutionally equal to the other Yugoslav republics, by limiting the autonomy of the two autonomous provinces, so he and the SPS maintained that the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had the same right to self-determination as the Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, and Macedonians. To cite Obradović,

With the collapse of the SFRY, the SPS emphasized that the same right of a people to self-determination according to which the Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians had decided to break away from Yugoslavia, allowed the Serbian people, on the territory where they constituted a majority, to decide to remain within the common Yugoslav state (Obradović, 2000, p.434).

The fact that Milošević was simply insisting on equal rights for the Serbs outside Serbia was frequently overlooked. Instead, after Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia, Milošević's "subsequent insistence, after the secession occurred, on the right to self-determination for Serbs in their ethnic territory, was wrongly interpreted as a bid to create a Greater Serbia" (Mihailović and Krestić, 1995, p.81). That so many Western authors, as we saw in chapter 1, maintain that Milošević was seeking to create a "Greater Serbia", supports this.

To conclude this section, it is argued here that the construction of Milošević as a criminal leader misrepresents his actions and intentions. The following four sections will examine how the interviewees assess Milošević's actions and intentions, and whether and to what extent they support the main claims that Western literature makes with respect to Milošević's actions and intentions, as set out in chapter 1.

Section 2 – Milošević Was Most Responsible for the Wars

At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the question all interviewees were asked was, “Who do you consider was most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia?” They were not asked who was most responsible for specific wars.⁵ In giving their answers, the interviewees similarly did not distinguish between different wars.

(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees

The Western, liberal view that Milošević was most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia is one that few of the Serbian interviewees share. Some of them argue that while Milošević was responsible for the wars, he was no more responsible than any of the other leaders in Yugoslavia. According to one female refugee from Croatia, for example,

...I think that you cannot divide Milošević's responsibility from that of the other presidents. If you talked only about his responsibility for the wars on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia, and only about him, you would have only one side of the story. That is the problem. And if you are talking about the responsibility of all of them, then it enables you to have a whole picture (S).

The majority, however, do not regard Milošević as being most responsible for the wars. Instead, they identify two particular culprits – political elites in the former Yugoslavia and/or the international community. Since the opinions of the national minority interviewees are very different, they will be treated separately at the end of this section.

⁵ Slovenia was the first former Yugoslav republic to descend into war. The war started on 27 June 1991, two days after Slovenia had declared her independence, and lasted just ten days. Next it was the turn of Croatia, whose bloody war ended in early 1992, following an agreement between Serbs and Croats negotiated by Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State. On 6 April 1993, war began in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was brought to an end with the signing of the Dayton Accords, on 21 November 1995. The final war took place in Kosovo. NATO's seventy-eight day bombing campaign, referred to by many Serbs as “the NATO aggression”, started on 24 March 1999.

(a) The Responsibility of Politicians in All Former Yugoslav Republics

There is a widespread belief among the Serbian interviewees that political elites throughout the former Yugoslavia bear the greatest responsibility for the country's demise and descent into bloody war. According to one female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gračanica, for example, "Yugoslavia could have been more like Czechoslovakia, but the politicians in the various republics decided to have a war. It was 'funny' to see them shaking hands while people were killing each other in the streets" (ALD).

These politicians are seen as caring only about their own power. A male interviewee from Čačak, for example, argues that, "The reason for the break-up of Yugoslavia was the ambition of politicians in every Yugoslav republic. They all tried to gain as much power as possible" (L). For her part, a female refugee from Croatia maintains that, "The aim of all politicians was the same – to divide people. When you divide the people, then of course you can rule over them until the end – for as long as you like" (S).

Such views are in keeping with the results of research by *Argument*, conducted between 12 and 19 February 2001, on a representative sample of 910 adult citizens of Serbia. As in the present research, the respondents were asked who was most responsible for *the* wars in the former Yugoslavia, and 75% of them answered political leaders. The international community was identified as the second main culprit (Gredelj, 2001, p.248).

This emphasis on the responsibility of politicians and political leaders is in keeping with the top-down, elite-centred approaches that characterize so much of Western literature on the break-up of Yugoslavia. Such approaches are problematic. They focus on a very small group of actors and can thus become over-simplistic and reductionist. Stone, for example, argues that, "Close study of the political manoeuvrings of the elite may conceal rather than illuminate the profounder workings of the social process" (Stone, 1971, p.62). This narrow focus, moreover, means that the view from below is often neglected. The masses are portrayed as naïve and gullible. To cite Ivanović, "Some consider the public to be like empty land – an uncultivated field where just about anything can be sown" (Ivanović, 1999, p.92).

It is, therefore, somewhat paradoxical that so many interviewees implicitly support this heavy focus on elites. This may attest to feelings of powerlessness and insignificance, to be discussed more in chapter 7. However, it may also be a convenient way for them to avoid the painful task of self-scrutiny and self-reflection.

(b) The Responsibility of the International Community

A prevalent belief among the Serbian interviewees is that the West was involved in, and indeed wanted, the break-up of Yugoslavia. According to one male interviewee in Belgrade,

If you analyze the standpoints of European countries, you can see that the breakdown of Yugoslavia was wanted. They didn't want such a big country... It's much easier to control smaller countries than bigger countries. Imagine having to control Yugoslavia as a whole, rather than having to control Slovenia and Croatia separately (SC).

Another male interviewee in Belgrade, and a Milošević supporter, adopts a similar line of argument. He maintains that, “Yugoslavia was a very developed country, but some political circles in Europe wanted to break the links between Yugoslav people”. Intelligence services, he claims, had an interest in making Yugoslavia a smaller country (DB).

For one female interviewee in Belgrade, the problem was less Yugoslavia’s size than her socialist orientation. The interviewee argues that, “Yugoslavia belonged to the bloc of Socialist countries. All socialist countries had to be knocked down. And it was the turn of Yugoslavia” (MM).

If the international community is widely seen as being most to blame for the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, one particular country is consistently deemed to be especially responsible – Germany.⁶ According to a male interviewee in Čačak, for example, “Foreign countries – above all Germany, but also Great Britain and France – helped to bring about war in former Yugoslavia” (V). A male interviewee, and Milošević supporter, in Belgrade similarly highlights Germany’s role, arguing that, “...the so-called international community – in the first place Germany, Austria and the Vatican – is mainly guilty for war starting” (DB).⁷

⁶ Germany, an ally of Croatia during WWII, strongly pushed for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, who had declared their independence on 25 June 1991 and 26 June 1991 respectively. For example, on 24 August 1991, the German Ministry issued a statement saying that if the bloodshed continued unabated, Bonn would “seriously re-examine” the question of extending recognition to Slovenia and Croatia within their existing frontiers” (Tanner, 2001, p.254). On 15 January 1992, the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states.

⁷ Various Western commentators similarly emphasize the responsibility of Western powers. Thomas, for example, argues that, “The dissolution of Yugoslavia had much to do with the political intrusions of the Western powers, especially Germany and the United States, in support of their favoured ethnic groups and to advance their own policy agendas” (Thomas, 2003, p.4).

Such views are echoed by some of the elite interviewees. Dr Oskar Kovač, for example, from the Economics Faculty of the University of Belgrade, maintains that, even after the war in Slovenia, the descent into further wars could have been stopped, “But at that point, the Germans twisted the hands of the French and the British, and then the European Union decided that they wanted to disintegrate Yugoslavia once and for all”.⁸

For his part, Vladislav Jovanović, a former Foreign Minister of Serbia and later of the FRY, refers to Germany, together with Austria and the Vatican, as “revanchist forces” with a policy of animosity towards Yugoslavia as a common state;⁹ and Professor Mihailo Marković¹⁰, a former vice-president of the SPS, claims that,

Germany desired to correct the history of the First and Second World Wars. That’s why Genscher, the foreign minister, so strongly supported Croatia and Slovenia – Germany’s natural allies. And Genscher went out of his way to ensure that Croatian and Slovenian sovereignty would be accepted by the European Community, against the recommendations of the Badinter Commission.¹¹

(c) The Responsibility of Milošević

In response to the question of who was most responsible for the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, only a small minority of the Serbian interviewees answer Milošević. Opinion poll research by SMMRI on perceptions of truth in Serbia, in the second half of April 2001, supports this finding. While 64.6% of the 2171 respondents agreed (only 8.2% disagreed) with the statement “There

⁸ Interview, Belgrade, 7 May 2004.

⁹ Interview, Belgrade, 24 May 2004.

¹⁰ Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004.

¹¹ On 11 January 1992, the Commission ruled that Croatia did not fulfil the necessary criteria for recognition, including human rights guarantees for the Serbs living in Croatia (Serbs made up 12% of Croatia’s population). By this time, however, Germany had already recognized Croatia’s independence, choosing not to wait for a decision from the Commission.

would have been no wars if we had had wiser politicians in Serbia at the beginning of the nineties” (SMMRI, 2001, p.17), they did not hold Milošević most responsible for the wars. Rather, asked to evaluate which factors contributed most to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of war, 77.8% answered Croatian nationalism, 73.5% said the United States, and 72.3% answered NATO interests (SMMRI, 2001, p.15).

Those interviewees that do hold Milošević most responsible for the wars nevertheless qualify this in various ways. A male interviewee in Čačak, for example, argues that Milošević was most responsible for the wars, but adds that, “...someone made a profit from that war. Maybe Milošević, Tudjman, maybe other foreign forces – I don’t know” (IB).

A male interviewee and former Milošević supporter in Požarevac also considers Milošević to be most to blame for the wars. In this interviewee’s opinion, “Milošević should just have let the other republics leave the Federation, without starting a war. He should not have used force to make people stay where they did not want to be, or to go where they did not want to go”. However, he further contends that, “Milošević, Tudjman, and Izetbegović were as one personality. If none of them had been on the political scene at the time, war would have been avoided” (BM).

This view is echoed by a male interviewee from Novi Sad, who maintains that, “Milošević was most responsible for the wars in former Yugoslavia, but all the leaders of the former Yugoslav republics were also responsible. All of them

wanted war. War was their instrument for staying in power" (VC). In a similar vein, a male refugee from Sarajevo, now living in Novi Sad, claims that, "They all wanted war. Milošević, Tudjman, Izetbegović – they all wanted war. They all knew that war would make it easier for them to get what they wanted. In a normal situation, they couldn't get it all, but in war they got it all" (GM).

The argument most frequently made by the Serbian interviewees is that Milošević's own responsibility for the wars was no greater than that of any other leader, either in the former Yugoslavia¹² or in the West. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, claims that, "He's guilty like everybody involved in the war" (LC). A male interviewee in Čačak similarly contends that, "Milošević is guilty like Tudjman, Izetbegović, Chirac, Clinton, Major, Kohl, Yeltsin, Boutros-Ghali, et cetera" (V).

The belief that Milošević was no more responsible for the wars than was anyone else is one that some of the elite interviewees share. Nikola Lazić, for instance, the international secretary of the DSS, argues that, "Milošević was personally responsible, but so were the others. The thing is that a number of the leaders in the region used national feelings to create conflict".¹³ For his part, Živadin Jovanović, a diplomat and former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, maintains that historical distance is necessary to pass judgement, both on Milošević and on everybody else. He further argues that,

¹² According to Gordy, on the question of who caused the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. "a very strong current of public opinion in Serbia regards the political leaders of other Yugoslav states as at least equally responsible" (Gordy, 2003, p.57).

¹³ Interview, Belgrade, 28 May 2004.

I must dismiss the whole accusation against Milošević as the man most responsible for the Yugoslav crisis and its development, including the terrible wars. He bears some of the responsibility, but his responsibility is not greater than that of others, both inside and outside Yugoslavia. Any policy that tries to isolate the responsibility of one party is not a good policy.¹⁴

(ii) The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees

In contrast to the Serbian interviewees, the majority of the national minority interviewees underscore the culpability of Milošević and his regime. According to one male Kovovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, “Milošević’s regime and Mira Marković¹⁵ as a backstage player were the most responsible for the wars in former Yugoslavia” (LF). A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica similarly regards Milošević as primarily responsible, on the grounds that “he had the most power” (MB).

One male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar holds Milošević and the Serbian authorities in Belgrade most to blame, on account of their failure to negotiate with Croatia and Slovenia. The interviewee argues that Milošević was less interested in negotiating than he was in controlling Yugoslavia (NV). A female Bosnian Muslim interviewee in Priština similarly claims that Milošević was the most responsible because he was not willing to negotiate (I).¹⁶

¹⁴ Interview, Belgrade, 17 May 2004.

¹⁵ Mira Marković is the wife of Milošević. The couple were high-school sweethearts and remained inseparable. Mira, a devout Marxist, taught Philosophy at Belgrade University and led the *Yugoslav United Left* (JUL). As will be seen in chapter 7, many of the interviewees emphasize Mira’s very negative influence on her husband.

¹⁶ It is often claimed that Milošević negotiated in bad faith. Speaking on 8 October 1998, for example, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued that, “Time and time again, Milošević has promised us to do things that he has no intention of doing” (cited in Judah, 2000b, p.184). According to some, however, it was Alija Izetbegović, the Bosnian president, who was particularly unreliable in negotiations. Burg and Shoup, for example, claim that, “He was notoriously indecisive and prone to change his mind when dealing with international negotiators” (Burg and Shoup, 2000, p.67); and the journalist Martin Bell claims that the Bosnian government “had a habit of backing away from concessions already made” (Bell, 1996, p.284).

Some of the national minority interviewees, however, make the same point that various Serbian interviewees make. They argue that while Milošević was most responsible for the wars, other politicians were not blameless. One male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver, for example, maintains that, “Milošević was fifty percent responsible, but he needed Tudjman and Izetbegović. He could not do everything by himself” (SS). A male Slovak interviewee in Novi Sad similarly argues that, “Politicians from Croatia, Bosnia, and from Serbia were all responsible, not just Milošević” (JG).

Rather than blaming other politicians in the former Yugoslavia, some of the national minorities hold the Serbian people themselves responsible for the wars. One male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar argues that, “Responsibility lies not only with Milošević. It lies with the people, above all with the Serbs, because they were blind” (AD). For his part, a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Novi Sad claims that,

There is something in the Serbs’ tradition, some kind of militarism that is closer to the East, the Arabic East, than to Europe. There is something militant, and the kind of passion that Serbian people had during the nineties was very strong, very strong (AN).

Not surprisingly, it seems that few Serbs would agree with such views. In a survey conducted in February 2001 by *Argument*, for example, 910 adult citizens of Serbia were asked who was least to blame for the wars in former Yugoslavia. The most popular response given was ordinary citizens (79%) (Gredelj, 2001, p.248).

Section 3 –Milošević Planned the Wars

Central to Milošević's construction as a criminal leader is the claim that he planned the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, with the purpose of creating a "Greater Serbia". As will be seen, the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees have very different opinions with regard to these two interwoven claims.

(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees

Among the Serbian interviewees, there is little support for the claim that Milošević planned the wars. Indeed, only two interviewees – a male from Kikinda (RP) and a male from Novi Sad (VC) – explicitly argue that Milošević planned the wars. A third interviewee, also a male from Novi Sad, explains, "I don't know if Milošević planned the wars. But he was so stupid that he provoked them in many ways" (DK).

The majority opinion is that Milošević did not plan the wars. Various interviewees emphasize that Milošević did not have any long-term plans. A male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, contends that, "Milošević had a very short-term view. He didn't think about the long-term" (SZ). Similarly, Professor Ljubinka Trgovčević, the Vice-Dean of the Political Science Faculty in Belgrade, argues that, "Milošević knew only what he had to do tomorrow, not after tomorrow. He only thought several hours and one day ahead, but not more".¹⁷

¹⁷ Interview, Belgrade, 19 July 2004.

To some degree, such views can also be found in Western literature, in particular among those authors, like Crnobrnja (1996) and Marshall (2002) who, as will be recalled from chapter 1, regard Milošević primarily as an improviser. According to the “Milošević as improviser” view, while Milošević did not actually plan the wars, they nevertheless proved very useful to him. Echoing this, a male interviewee in Belgrade argues that,

Milošević hid a lot of things - he hid how bad the economy was at that time. He was trying to turn peoples' attention from daily life to war. You always heard news from the war, from the war areas, and you cannot ask ‘Where is my payment? Where is my salary?’ if you know that somebody is dying on the front line. He was turning the attention of people to something else (SZ).¹⁸

Another male interviewee in Belgrade similarly claims that,

Milošević divided society, and he put society in a permanent war situation. And in that permanent war situation, you always have enemies. And in those circumstances, he described himself as a protector, a leader, as a fighter. He was always fighting. He was always creating the situation in which our society, our country was in jeopardy. It's quite a common pattern in history. When you are a dictator, the easiest way to stay in power is by creating enemies (RJ).

Just as there is little support among the Serbian interviewees for the claim that Milošević planned the wars, so too the claim that he was seeking to create a Greater Serbia receives little endorsement. A male interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, argues that, “Greater Serbia was just a story for people, for the world” (A); and a male interviewee in Čačak contends that, “Milošević was not trying to create a Greater Serbia. No, that was a mask for people... Milošević only wanted to rule – nothing else” (IB). According to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica, moreover, “If Milošević had wanted to

¹⁸ More about the economic situation will be said in section 4 and in chapter 7.

create a Greater Serbia, then he would have had an army of professionals, like Legija's¹⁹ army, rather than an army of young and inexperienced men" (SK).

Milorad Vučelić, the current vice-president of the SPS, claims that, "Milošević never believed in a Greater Serbia. He was a Leftist. He was not a chauvinist".²⁰ Vučelić further maintains that, "There was never any plan to create a Greater Serbia. This idea was created by the secret services of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1908".²¹ In his introductory statement to The Hague Tribunal, on 13 February 2002, Milošević similarly argued that, "... 'Greater Serbia' is not a Serbian project at all, but a product of Austro-Hungarian policy of Balkan conquest and the propaganda serving that goal, which the Serbs were in the way of" (Milošević, 2002, p.214).

(ii) The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees

In contrast to the Serbian interviewees, the widespread opinion among the national minority interviewees is that Milošević did plan the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. This view is particularly prevalent among the Kosovar Albanian interviewees. According to a male interviewee in Vučitrn, for example,

At Gazimestan, in 1989, Milošević was trying to mobilize the Serbs for war and to impose his ideas on the whole of Yugoslavia. After Gazimestan, the Kosovar Albanians knew that there would be war, but they expected it to start in Kosovo, not in Slovenia (AR).

¹⁹ Legija, whose real name is Milorad Luković, was the head of the "Red Berets", a special operations unit in Serbia formed in the mid-1990s. He is accused of having masterminded the assassination of Serbia's former Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjić, who was murdered on 12 March 2003. After Djindjić's assassination, Legija went on the run, until finally giving himself up to the police on 2 May 2004.

²⁰ Interview, Belgrade, 5 June 2004.

²¹ Interview, Belgrade, 5 June 2004.

The interviewee adds that, “Milošević planned all the wars in former Yugoslavia and he intentionally allowed ordinary criminals to be involved in these wars. These criminals got their share” (AR).²²

Another male Kosovar Albanian interviewee, also in Vučitrn, argues, “It is my opinion that the politics Milošević led was all set up in advance. He could not have done everything in two or three years without preparation” (IL); and a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica contends, “I think that Milošević was planning something – I don’t know what. But I don’t think he planned everything that happened...” (RK).

A male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade, however, believes that the wars in ex-Yugoslavia were inevitable. He argues that,

There had to be some sort of breakdown, something had to go wrong. Communism was falling apart and there had to be some sort of a consequence. In a more civilized country, with not so many bad memories of World War Two, things might have happened differently, like in Czechoslovakia. They didn’t have a war there. They just decided not to live together anymore, and all at once you had two countries instead of one. But in Yugoslavia, people are different. People are not very well educated about things. People are very, very easily manipulated by the media - often they do not acknowledge the existence of other sources.²³ I think that’s the reason why it happened this way. Something had to happen, and war came because of the people, because it was a very easy thing to do (IG).

²² According to LeBor, “Milošević knew where to look for recruits to carry out the dirty work of the Bosnian and Croatian wars: among ultra-nationalist criminals and football fans. These were the core of the paramilitary groups who carried out many atrocities” (LeBor, 2002, p.186). Similarly highlighting the important role that football hooligans played in the wars, Čolović maintains that, “these wars can be described as the vandalistic, destructive campaigns of hooligan-fans, taken over by the state for the aims of its war policy...” (Čolović, 2002, p.283).

²³ In research by SMMRI on perceptions of truth, in April 2001, the 2171 Serbian respondents were asked if they had ever been in a position where a newly-discovered fact, from any source of information, about any event related to the wars in Croatia, Bosnia or Kosovo had caused them to change their opinion about the responsibility of the warring sides. 85.5% of respondents answered no, and only 14.5% answered yes (SMMRI, 2001, p.58).

The interviewee adds,

Of course, someone gained something out of it, and I guess that Milošević was the one who started it all. I can imagine Tudjman and Milošević sitting together in a games room, having a beer and having some great fun together (IG).

While there is a strong belief among the national minority interviewees that Milošević planned the wars in the former Yugoslavia, there is also virtually unanimous support for the literature's claim that Milošević was trying to create a Greater Serbia. A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, maintains that, "Milošević wanted a Great Serbia, taking in Bosnia-Hercegovina and also part of Croatia. This led to wars in former Yugoslavia". The interviewee adds, "Milošević started the wars to make a Great Serbia"(IL). In a similar vein, a female Muslim interviewee in Priština contends that, "Milošević wanted a big Serbia. It's very simple – a big Serbia"(I).

A male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar also believes that Milošević was seeking a Greater Serbia. He argues,

I think that of course Milošević wanted to create a kind of Great Serbia or something like that, a very similar idea to the idea that Šešelj²⁴ had. But it was a kind of smoother way... Milošević was more subtle than Šešelj. He was clever, you know. He did it in a silent way (AD).

Section 4 – Serbian Crimes Committed During the Wars were Planned

We saw in chapter 1 that one of the reasons why, according to Western literature, Milošević is a criminal leader is that he planned Serbian crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. However, one feature of these wars is that it was paramilitary groups who committed many of the worst

²⁴ Vojislav Šešelj, currently awaiting trial in The Hague, is the leader of the far-right SRS.

atrocities.²⁵ A fundamental question, therefore, is whether and to what extent Milošević controlled these paramilitaries. Once again, the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees have very different opinions on this.

(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees

According to one male interviewee in Belgrade, “It’s just not possible” that the paramilitaries were acting independently. The interviewee maintains that, “The paramilitaries were together with the Army. It’s not possible that some very high centre of power wasn’t even informed about what was happening” (IZ).

Some of the interviewees, however, emphasize that Milošević did not, and could not control the paramilitaries. A male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, explains,

I don’t think he had any control, because when you give authorization to the warlords – there were thousands of them - there is absolutely no control...And those warlords were not under any control. They just did what they did (NS).²⁶

A male Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica similarly argues that, “During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Milošević was not controlling the paramilitaries. He can only be tried for the acts of the regular police and the regular army” (ZT).

²⁵ The UN Commission of Experts identified 83 paramilitary groups on the territory of the former Yugoslavia – some 56 were Serbian, 13 were Croatian, and 14 were Bosnian. The estimated size of these forces was 20,000-40,000, 12,000-20,000 and 4,000-6,000 respectively (Kaldor and Bojičić, 1997, p.160). Two of the most notorious Serbian paramilitary groups were Arkan’s “Tigers” and Šešelj’s “Četniks”.

²⁶ Echoing this, Sikavica argues that, “Paramilitary leaders asked nobody’s permission before going into action...” (Sikavica, 2000, p.143).

Milošević himself has always denied having any influence over Arkan, the most notorious of the paramilitary leaders. According to Richard Holbrooke, the former US Special Envoy to the Balkans, “Milošević dismissed Arkan as a ‘peanut issue’ and claimed he had no influence over him” (Holbrooke, 1999, p.190).

Others interviewees argue that the nature of the wars was such that it was simply impossible to have real control. A male interviewee in Kikinda, for example, maintains that,

You can't have control in a war like that. It's not World War Two. You had all those paramilitary groups and everything, and the folks defending themselves in mixed ethnic villages. I am certain that Milošević knew what was happening. He probably couldn't control even 50% of that, but he had information about everything...He must have known what was happening. But I don't think he could control, for example in *Republika Srpska*²⁷ or wherever, those paramilitaries. You can't control them (RP).

Another male interviewee, a refugee from Croatia, argues, “I don't think that anyone could control the war. You know, it was something that was happening by itself”. He adds, “Never was anything planned on the Serbian side. Serbs are chaotic, you know” (DNO).

The nature of the wars in the former Yugoslavia is important for a second reason. The literature's claim that Serbian crimes were planned and premeditated implies that the wars were fuelled by Serbian aggression. Indeed, various authors explicitly argue this. Williams and Scharf, for example, refer to “Serbia's aggression against neighboring states” (Williams and Scharf, 2002, p.34). They also refer to “the new campaign of Serbian ethnic

²⁷ Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb leader, proclaimed the existence of an independent *Republika Srpska* (Bosnian Serb republic) on 7 April 1992.

aggression” in Kosovo, in 1998 (Williams and Scharf, 2002, p.57). However, several of the Serbian interviewees stress that the wars were civil wars. According to Professor Stojanović,

I don't understand people who say they were not civil wars. Simply by definition, they were civil wars, simply because what are civil wars? Civil wars are wars among citizens of one country. So when the wars broke out, they didn't break out between existing independent states, but between different parts and citizens of one country. When the West recognized the independence of the republics, this did change the character of the wars, but only on paper. It is really cynical to say that since you recognize someone, this changes the character of the war. I mean, simply by proclaiming that something is a reality doesn't mean that there is a new reality.²⁸

Not only were the wars civil wars. They were also wars in which Serbs were defending themselves. A male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, argues that, “We were just defending, all the time. We were just defending. The others attacked us” (SZ). Another male interviewee, also in Belgrade, maintains that in Croatia and in Bosnia,

The Serbs were basically fighting for their right to live. And Serbia was helping that fighting, but we had no other options. A Serbian poet, Matija Bećković, called those Serbs who lived in Croatia and Bosnia ‘the remnants of a slaughtered people’. And that is really true (RJ).

Vis-à-vis the war in Kosovo, a male interviewee in Čačak maintains that, “It was legal Serbian police who were in Kosovo, and they did not liquidate anybody. They were defending their territory, and that is normal. It is normal to defend your country” (V). A male Kosovo Serb interviewee, in Kosovska Mitrovica, contends that Kosovo was a battle against terrorism.²⁹ He argues,

²⁸ Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

²⁹ The first armed attack on Serbian policemen in Kosovo occurred in May 1993. The first organized attack took place in August 1995, when a bomb was thrown into a police station in Dečani and the police were assaulted with automatic weapons. In the winter of 1997-98, the *Kosovo Liberation Army* (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves), led by Hashim Thaçi, announced the start of the battle for Kosovo's unification with Albania, and stepped up its attacks on both police and civilians. From 1997, the Drenica region of Kosovo (Srbina, Klina and Glogovac) was controlled by the KLA, not by the Serbian state.

“There was some use of extra force and illegal force, but Milošević had to fight against terrorism in that way. The problem is that the West does not want to admit that terrorism exists in Kosovo and that the victims are Serbs” (ZT).

On this latter point, it is important to note that Washington initially regarded the *Kosovo Liberation Army* as a terrorist organization. For example, at press briefings in both Priština and Belgrade, on 23 February 1998, the special U.S representative for former Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, declared that the KLA was “a terrorist group beyond any doubt” (cited in Johnstone, 2002, p.236). The turning point in the international community’s attitude towards the KLA came in January 1999.

On the morning of 15 January 1999, Serbian police encircled the village of Račak, in pursuit of KLA fighters who had recently killed five policemen and two Albanian civilians (the KLA attacked not only Serbs, but also Albanian “collaborators” – those who chose Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia). That evening, the Serbian Interior Ministry announced that the operation had been a success and that several dozen terrorists had been killed. The next day, William Walker, chief of the OSCE Observer Mission, went to the scene, and promptly declared that, “Yugoslav security forces are directly responsible for the massacre of 45 civilians” (cited in Udovički, 2000, p.332).

Doubts about Walker’s version surfaced almost immediately, and a Finnish forensics team subsequently concluded that there was no execution at close range at Račak; that the tooth marks on the corpses were caused by animals

that had access to the bodies overnight, probably stray dogs; and that it was misleading to speak, as Clinton had done, of “innocent men, women and children”, since there was just one woman and one adolescent boy among the dead - all the others were men (Johnstone, 2002, p.243). Significantly, by the time that the Finnish conclusions were actually published, NATO had already bombed Serbia.

To conclude, whereas the literature emphasizes both the criminal nature of the wars and of the crimes committed therein, the interviewees, in contrast, underscore the defensive nature of the wars. If the wars were thus fought for a legitimate purpose, it follows that the crimes committed during the conflict were themselves legitimate, at least to some degree.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the key Serbian figures in these wars are seen less as criminals than as heroes. In the second half of April 2001, for example, 2171 Serbian respondents polled by SMMRI were asked to evaluate the behaviour of the Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić and his army. 46.3% of respondents said that this behaviour was excellent, while only 28.5% said that it was bad (SMMRI, 2001, p.20).

As part of the same research, the respondents were asked to identify the greatest defenders of the Serbian nation during the wars of the nineties. The four most popular answers were Mladić (41.80%), the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić (28.50%), the assassinated paramilitary leader Arkan (23.70%), and Milošević (17.10%) (SMMRI, 2001, p.29).

In a separate survey carried out by the newspaper *Vesti*, on 22 October 2003, 75% of the 300 Serbs polled (in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia) said that they would not alert police if they met Mladić on the street. Indeed, half of the respondents said that they would actively help him to avoid arrest. Moreover, more than half of those polled said that Mladić, indicted by the Hague Tribunal for genocide in Bosnia, was “the biggest Serbian hero” of modern times.³⁰ Only 14.5% of respondents said that they would denounce Mladić to the police or support his extradition to The Hague; and half of these said that they would be motivated by material award, not by any desire to see justice done (Tribunal Watch, 2003).

(ii) The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees

In contrast to the Serbian interviewees, there is a general belief among the national minority interviewees that Milošević did control the paramilitary groups responsible for some of the worst crimes. A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, argues that, “Milošević personally did not commit crimes, but he was in charge, both of the regular army and of the paramilitaries” (LZ). Another Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn also believes that Milošević controlled the paramilitaries, adding, “After a while, you could see how it was planned. It was all planned in advance how the Albanians would be removed from Kosovo” (IL).

³⁰ In a recent address at *Goldman Sachs* in London, on 6 October 2005, Carla Del Ponte, the chief prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal, noted that, “Ratko Mladić...is still seen as a hero by many Serbs, both in the Serb part of Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro”. What is interesting is that whereas Del Ponte implied that it was wrong for the Serbs to see Mladić as a hero, she pointedly commented that Operation “Storm” against the Serbian Krajina, in 1995, was a “success”, and that the indicted Croatian war criminal, Ante Gotovina, “was one of the commanders and, quite naturally, he is revered as a hero” (Del Ponte, 2005). As previously noted, Gotovina was finally arrested in Spain on 8 December 2005.

According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, however, Milošević did not have control of the paramilitaries during the Bosnian war. The interviewee argues,

I was involved in the war in Bosnia, and nobody was in control – there was no kind of strategy, no kind of anything. That was a stupid war. There were many different armies fighting in Bosnia. Milošević used the paramilitaries, but he did not control them (RK).

Also in contrast to the Serbian interviewees, the national minority interviewees essentially view the wars as wars of Serbian aggression. According to one female Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Priština, for example, “Milošević led his people into war. He was trying to annihilate everything” (TG). Another interviewee, a Muslim in Novi Pazar, describes how, during the wars, the Serbian army had its guns pointed towards Novi Pazar, with the purpose of frightening the town’s Muslims.³¹ He recalls, “Wherever you looked, you only saw all the guns. They were pointing at you all the time” (AD). In the view of one male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, the only time during the nineties that Serbia was actually defending herself was in 1999, when NATO was bombing her (MB).

Section 5 – Milošević Used Violence to Achieve His Ends

The literature’s claim that Milošević used violence to achieve his objectives encourages us to focus on violent crimes, such as ethnic cleansing, and on the context within which such crimes were committed – war. Indeed, as was argued in chapter 2, one action that defines a criminal leader is his commission of war crimes. However, this means that other types of crimes, such as economic crimes, tend to receive far less attention. The concern of this section,

³¹ Muslims make up 80% of the population of Novi Pazar. Serbs constitute the remainder of the population.

therefore, is to focus on the domestic context and to find out what the interviewees consider to be Milošević's biggest crimes. It is interesting to note that Saddam Hussein, another "criminal" leader with whom Milošević is sometimes compared, has been criminalized largely on the basis of what he did to his own people. Those who criminalize Milošević, in contrast, focus on his crimes against other nationalities, rather than on his crimes against the Serbian nation.

(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees

According to the Serbian interviewees, Milošević is guilty of four main crimes. Firstly, he badly treated the Serbian people. Secondly, he cared only about himself. Thirdly, he was incompetent; and fourthly, he destroyed the country. Thus, for the overwhelming majority of the Serbian interviewees, Milošević's biggest crimes were against Serbs and against Serbia. Such a belief has had a significant impact on Serbian interviewees' attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal, as will be seen in chapter 8.

A frequently expressed opinion among the Serbian interviewees is that Milošević's biggest crime was making the Serbian people poor. While he and the people around him lived like kings, ordinary Serbs lived like paupers.³² According to a male interviewee in Kragujevac, for example, one of Milošević's greatest crimes was the fact that in 1993, the interviewee and his wife, a lawyer, could only buy apples and toilet paper with their two salaries

³² According to Vujović, "...1993 was a year of major impoverishment..." (Vujović, 1995a, p.86). For example, "...in the course of 1993, and especially in the second half of the year, large numbers of people were partially or completely unable to fulfil many of their hitherto normal requirements" (Vujović, 1995a, p.108).

(MA).³³ Another male interviewee, in Čačak, maintains that, “Milošević is guilty for what he did to the Serbian people – for robbing and humiliating them. That is what Milošević should be blamed for, not for war” (V).³⁴

Many interviewees stress that Milošević did not simply rob them of their money and dignity. He also robbed them of a part of their lives. In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade, “Milošević’s greatest crime was wasting ten years of our lives...” (MV). This is a widely-held belief among the Serbian interviewees, and one that helps to explain why so many of them now want just to forget Milošević. In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade,

I’m not interested. I’m not at all interested in him any longer. When I see his face on television, I just switch the channel. It’s too much, you know, for us. I stopped being interested in anything about Milošević on the day that he was driven to The Hague. That’s the end of the story for us (G).

This strong desire among interviewees to forget Milošević accounts for the complete indifference that some of them express towards his trial. One female refugee from Croatia considers that she lost the best years of her life, as did her friends who had to join the army, and because of this she refuses to watch Milošević’s trial. She explains, “I just don’t want to let him take this part of my life. If I were now to take a look at the trial everyday, I would somehow feel that he is taking away this year of my life, and I don’t want that” (S).

³³ Serbia’s fourth largest city, Kragujevac, known as “the valley of the starving”, was one of the areas worst affected by the economic crisis. In the period from March 1994 to March 1998, for example, 1350 inhabitants of the city only survived thanks to the soup kitchens provided by the Red Cross (Milićević, 1998).

³⁴ More about Milošević’s economic “crimes” will be said in chapter 7.

A female interviewee in Belgrade similarly feels that it would be counter-productive for her to watch the trial. She argues,

I think that people like me, of my age, lost enough. We lost ten years. We lost the normal lives that our parents had, and that generations before us had. I think that we should move on and do something with our lives if we can, if we have the opportunity. So I don't want to go back and think about what he's doing now or how he's performing (LC).

Another group of interviewees maintain that Milošević's greatest crime was betraying his own people. A male interviewee in Kikinda highlights Milošević's treachery towards the Serbs in Croatia, arguing that, "He promised help, and he didn't help" (RP).³⁵ This sense of betrayal was no doubt compounded by the fact that, as we saw in section 1, Milošević had initially championed the rights of the Serbs in Croatia.

There is no doubt that Milošević could have done more to help the Krajina Serbs. The most likely explanation for his failure to do more is that, by 1995, the cost to Serbia – and to Milošević's regime - of continued support for the Krajina Serbs had become too great. For example,

If Serbia defended the Krajina Serbs, it would be declaring war on an internationally recognised sovereign state. An all-out-war with Croatia would certainly have triggered a furious diplomatic backlash. Milošević wanted sanctions lifted, not tightened (LeBor, 2002, p.230).

If Milošević betrayed the Krajina, however, it can be argued that his Croatian counterpart, Franjo Tuđman, callously betrayed Vukovar, a town in eastern Slavonia that was under siege from the Yugoslav Army for three months in

³⁵ On 4 August 1995, Croatian forces launched Operation "Storm" in order to recover the Krajina, forcing some 200,000 Serbs to flee their ancestral homes. For his part, Milošević did nothing to help the Krajina Serbs, and there was no media campaign in Belgrade demanding the defence of the Krajina. Indeed, on 5 August 1995, the day that the Krajina fell, "Belgrade Television showed a circus festival in Monte Carlo" (LeBor, 2002, p.230). Thus, according to MacDonald, "One of the most tragic aspects of the war in Croatia was Milošević's cynical handling of the Croatian Serbs after they were no longer useful to him" (MacDonald, 2002, p.204).

1991. According to Gow, “Vukovar could probably have held out indefinitely, had there been a commitment to its defence, but the political will was absent” (Gow, 2003, p.240).

The reason why this political will was absent, in Gow’s view, is that if Zagreb had sent military support to Vukovar, this would have gone against the grain of Croatia’s “victim strategy”. The key to this strategy was to force international recognition of Croatia’s independence, and “the more Croatian towns were attacked, the more likely it became that international support for Croatia would grow” (Gow, 2003, p.239).³⁶ Interestingly, Tudjman’s betrayal of Vukovar receives little attention in Western literature. Croatian television, however, recently showed a documentary entitled “Vukovar Izdan” (Vukovar Betrayed).³⁷

A male Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica underscores Milošević’s betrayal of the Kosovo Serbs.³⁸ For this particular interviewee, Milošević’s greatest crime was the fact that today, there are very few Serbs

³⁶ If Tudjman did nothing to defend Vukovar, so the Izetbegović government did nothing to defend Srebrenica, which “has aroused the strong suspicion of a calculated sacrifice” (Johnstone, 2002, p.112).

³⁷ The documentary, by the Croatian journalist Denis Latin, was shown on 21 November 2005. Based on analysis of recorded conversations between Tudjman and the Croatian commander Mile Dedaković, it claims that Tudjman refused to send troops to Vukovar, in order to preserve Croatia’s international image as a victim. For the same reason, it argues, Tudjman refused to allow Vukovar to be evacuated. Children that had been evacuated were returned to Vukovar two days before the start of fighting. This is contrary to the *Fourth Geneva Convention* (1949), Article 17 of which stipulates, “The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases...” (www.icrc.org).

³⁸ According to some commentators, Milošević simply used the Kosovo Serbs for his own purposes. Glenny, for example, maintains that, “Milošević’s sudden conversion to the plight of the Serbian and Montenegrin minority in Kosovo in 1987 was cynical” (Glenny, 2000, p.627). Djilas, however, maintains that, “Milošević’s sympathy for the plight of the Serbs in Kosovo was genuine. He was not simply a monster only interested in power, as many of his opponents characterize him” (Djilas, 1993, p.94).

living in Kosovo (ZT).³⁹ Another male Kosovo Serb interviewee, also in Kosovska Mitrovica, similarly condemns Milošević for his treatment of the Kosovo Serbs. The interviewee maintains that Milošević committed his greatest crime when he signed the Kumanovo Agreement, in 1999⁴⁰, because “When Milošević decided to sign the Kumanovo Agreement, he gave the green light to ethnic cleansing by Albanians and NATO. It was a joint operation” (RN).

Closely linked to the charge that Milošević’s greatest crimes were bringing suffering and misery to the Serbian people, and betraying them, is the claim that his biggest crime was caring only about himself. In the words of one female Serbian interviewee in Novi Pazar, “I don’t feel that Milošević respected people. He respected only himself and his own family” (SM). A similar opinion is expressed by a female interviewee in Belgrade, according to whom Milošević’s biggest crime was that, “He was thinking of himself. His power led him. And I think that everything he did was for his family and not for the people in the country” (LC). A female refugee from Bosnia concurs, arguing that Milošević’s greatest crime was his ego (NM).⁴¹

Many of the interviewees, however, regard Milošević not simply as an egoistic and power-hungry leader, but also as an incompetent leader, as will be seen in chapter 7. For some interviewees, it was this incompetence that constituted Milošević’s greatest crime. Thus, for one male Kosovo Serb interviewee, now

³⁹ Kosovo has a population of 2 million, of which only 100,000 are Serbs. The Kosovar Albanians are now the majority in Kosovo.

⁴⁰ Under this agreement, the Serbian police and army left Kosovo and *KFOR* took over.

⁴¹ This notion that Milošević cared only about power will be discussed more in chapter 7.

living as an IDP in Belgrade, Milošević's biggest crime was that "He did not have any knowledge about politics" (SP). For one male refugee from Croatia, Milošević's most important crime was that, "He had no plan, and that was a disaster" (DNO).

Finally, there are a group of interviewees who maintain that Milošević's greatest crime was committed against Serbia herself, and particularly against the country's economy.⁴² For example, one male interviewee in Novi Sad maintains that,

Apart from war, Milošević's biggest crime was his destruction of Serbia's economy. Because of Milošević, Serbia will not achieve anything in the next twenty to thirty years, and the next generation will also suffer. When babies are born in Serbia, they already owe two thousand Euros (AS).⁴³

Other interviewees argue that thanks to Milošević, Serbia went backwards rather than forwards. Thus, for one male interviewee in Čačak, "Milošević's biggest crime is that by the time Serbia is ready to enter the EU, the EU will no longer exist. He took Serbia backwards" (L). A male interviewee in Belgrade similarly indicts Milošević and maintains that, "Two hundred years of effort was put back in ten years. He destroyed everything that we did in two hundred years" (NS).

It is quite striking that only three of the Serbian interviewees identify war as Milošević's greatest crime (VC, AS and DK). Interestingly, all three are young males from Novi Sad. Another male interviewee, in Belgrade, argues that

⁴² An overview of Milošević's economic policies will be given in chapter 7.

⁴³ Echoing this, Markovich maintains that, "...the scope of economic destruction during the rule of Slobodan Milošević is of such magnitude that, under present economic trends, two decades will be needed to recover from it" (Markovich, 2004, p.124).

Milošević's politics was his biggest crime, since it comprised wars and victims (ZG). Furthermore, only one interviewee, a young male in Belgrade, considers that Milošević's biggest crimes were committed *outside* of Serbia (IZ).

According to a female interviewee in Belgrade, people in Serbia simply do not want to focus on Milošević's crimes outside of Serbia. She argues, "It's a part of him that most people ignored –the wars with Croatia, the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the constant harassment in Kosovo by the police and the Army. That's something people don't want to see..." (MJ).

The results of research by *Argument* support this. In February 2001, 910 adult citizens of Serbia were asked the question, "What is Milošević guilty of and what should he be tried for"? The respondents focused overwhelmingly on Milošević's crimes in Serbia and against Serbs. The four most popular answers given were stealing the votes in the 2000 election (59%), abuse of office and power for personal and family benefit (56%), using unfair and unjust electoral rules and procedures (47%), and causing an increase in crime, corruption and bribery in Serbia (46%). Only 40% answered war crimes in Kosovo, and only 37% answered war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Gredelj, 2001, p.253).

It is also significant that more than half (52.50%) of the 2171 adult citizens of Serbia surveyed by SMMRI, in April 2001, were not able to state a single crime committed by Serbs. In contrast, 82.5% of the respondents were able to name one or more crimes committed against Serbs (SMMRI, 2001, p.25).

Moreover, according to research by SMMRI in August 2004, 71% of the 1245 respondents said that the Serbs had carried out fewer crimes than the Croats, Albanians and Muslims during the wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-95). Of this percentage, 25% also said that the Serbs had committed fewer crimes than the Slovenes (SMMRI, 2005, p.15). In similar research in April 2005, 74% of the 1205 respondents said that the Serbs had committed fewer crimes than the Croats, Albanians and Muslims during the wars, of which 24% also thought that Serbs had carried out fewer crimes than the Slovenes (SMMRI, 2005, p.15).

To cite Nikolić, “It has to be emphasized that the majority of the Serbian people is not ready to meet face-to-face with the crimes committed by Serbian military and paramilitary units in Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Kosovo” (Nikolić, 2002, p.138).

At the end of World War Two, Yugoslav peoples did not have the opportunity to talk about, and to try and come to terms with, all of the terrible atrocities that had occurred during the war.⁴⁴ Afraid that discussion of these crimes might destabilize the new Yugoslavia, Tito ensured that they were simply swept under the carpet. According to one female interviewee in Belgrade, this was a huge mistake. She explains,

I personally think that it was a big, big mistake that we never had something like a truth and reconciliation committee after the Second World War. Not now, but after the Second World War. Even fifty years

⁴⁴ The Serbs suffered greatly in World War Two. For example, research conducted independently by a Serb historian, Bogoljub Kocović, and a Croat, Vladimir Šerajavić, indicates that during the war between 295,000 and 334,000 Serbs died on the territory of the *Independent State of Croatia* (NDH), an Axis puppet state ruled by the fascist Ustaše leader, Ante Pavelić (Cohen, 1998, p.37).

ago, that war was not over, because nobody ever put a full stop on it. And it was just like it was somewhere under the carpet, and then it exploded (G).

In the same way, if Serbs are unable to face up to what happened during the nineties and to acknowledge that there was great suffering on all sides, and if other nations in the former Yugoslavia are similarly fixated on their own suffering, it might be argued that this does not bode well for the future stability of the region. In the words of Stambolović, “The point is that there can be no thinking of the future without considering responsibility for the past” (Stambolović, 2002, p.69).

On the other hand, it might be argued that endless discussion of the past, and of the crimes committed, can in fact impede, rather than facilitate, progress. With reference to Bosnia, for example, Chandler contends that, “The international focus on war crimes has created a deeply divisive atmosphere, which is hostile to local attempts at reconciliation” (Chandler, 2005).

(ii) The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees

In contrast to the Serbian interviewees, the national minority interviewees overwhelmingly see war and its terrible consequences as Milošević’s biggest crimes. One male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, argues that, “Milošević’s biggest crime was refuelling nationalism and starting the wars in former Yugoslavia. After that, a sequence of happenings occurred. Milošević personally did not commit crimes, but he was in charge” (LF). Similarly focusing on Milošević’s direct role in the wars, a male Muslim

interviewee in Novi Pazar maintains that, “His greatest crime was leading, controlling and financing war” (NV).

For one male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, Milošević’s biggest crime was not starting the wars, but rather failing to stop them. He argues,

Milošević allowed so many tragic things to happen while he was in power. Nobody can say that he exactly made this war, but I think he certainly could have stopped it. This was his major crime. If he were a positive person, he would have stopped the war (MB).

Other interviewees consider that it was the consequences of the wars that constitute Milošević’s biggest crime. One female Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Priština, for example, maintains that, “His greatest crime of all was a crime against humanity – the fact that he killed human beings” (TG). Similarly, a male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn contends that, “Milošević’s biggest crime was the deaths of so many people in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo” (IL). For a female Bosnian Muslim interviewee in Priština, one crime stands out above all others – Srebrenica (I).⁴⁵

Another interviewee, an ethnic Albanian living in Belgrade, similarly considers Milošević’s greatest crime to be the destruction of lives, but this interviewee uses the term “destruction” in a far broader sense than the other interviewees. He argues,

Milošević was in a position to do something for his people and everybody else. He was an intelligent person, and there must have been a moment when he realized that what he was doing was bad for his people and that he was destroying thousands of lives. He had an opportunity to step down – he had a choice. But he made one wrong choice after another (IG).

⁴⁵ In July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces, led by the indicted war criminal General Ratko Mladić, massacred some 7,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica.

Some of the interviewees feel unable to identify one specific crime that Milošević committed. A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver, for example, maintains that, “Everything that Milošević did, right from the very beginning, was wrong” (SS). Similarly, a female ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica argues that, “He did everything – everything was his crime” (AK).

Like the Serbian interviewees, some of the national minorities underscore their own particular suffering. Thus, one male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar maintains that, “Milošević’s biggest victims were the Muslims, of course, above all the Bosnian Muslims” (AD). Another male interviewee, an ethnic Hungarian in Novi Sad, argues that, thanks to Milošević, “I lost my freedom and legal place in Europe. I am the same as Pakistanis and Albanians when I go to Europe now” (AN).

Some of the national minority interviewees, however, perhaps most surprisingly the Kosovar Albanian interviewees, are ready to acknowledge that Serbs also suffered terribly because of Milošević. One male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, argues that, “Milošević was never thinking about the interests of the Serbian people. They were his biggest victims” (AR). Another male Kosovar Albanian interviewee similarly emphasizes that, “Serbs were also victims of Milošević and nobody can blame all Serbs for what happened” (IL).

A female Bosnian Muslim interviewee in Priština, moreover, maintains that the suffering of the Serbs continues today. She argues that, “Thanks to Milošević,

Serbs are unhappy in the Balkans because they are animals for all nationalities”

(I). Thus, it can be argued that there is a greater willingness on the side of the national minority interviewees than there is on the side of the Serbian interviewees to acknowledge the suffering of others.

Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, we have seen that the opinions of the Serbian interviewees and of the national minority interviewees fundamentally differ in relation to each of the four claims discussed in sections 2 to 5. What is interesting, however, is that despite their very different viewpoints, there is a broad consensus among both the Serbian and the national minority interviewees that it was unfair for the West to focus solely on, and to demonize only Milošević.

According to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gračanica, Croatia’s President Franjo Tudjman was a strong nationalist dedicated to an ethnically pure Croatia, and thus, “I really wonder why the West didn’t do something against Tudjman and his politics. All leaders should have been portrayed in the same way that Milošević was” (ALD).⁴⁶ The interviewee highlights the West’s failure to condemn Tudjman when his forces expelled some 200,000 Serbs from Krajina in August 1995 (ALD).⁴⁷

⁴⁶ As argued in chapter 1, Tudjman’s actions are often only mildly rebuked. Bennett, for example, argues that, “...Tudjman’s hold on power in the summer of 1990 was tenuous and insecurity accounted for much of the insensitivity of his actions” (Bennett, 1995, p.141).

⁴⁷ Some Western commentators make the same point. Parenti, for example, argues that, “The massive ethnic cleansing of Krajina Serbs by Croat forces earned hardly a cluck of disapproval from Western leaders” (Parenti, 2000, p.78).

The Belgrade journalist Vladimir Milić holds a similar view. According to him,

Milošević was fairly portrayed in the West. The problem is that Tudjman, Izetbegović and the others were not fairly portrayed. In war, as in love, you need two sides... Milošević was a 'Butcher of the Balkans', but so too were Tudjman, Izetbegović and the Kosovar Albanian leaders. Yet in the eyes of the West, it was only Milošević who was the 'Butcher of the Balkans'.⁴⁸

That the national minority interviewees themselves hold similar views is particularly interesting, given that they appear to share the dominant Western image of Milošević as a criminal leader. There is a broad consensus among the national minority interviewees that when we are considering the causes of Yugoslavia's demise and descent into war, the net of blame must be cast much wider than Milošević. In the words of one male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, "Nothing is black and white, and I don't believe that Chirac, or Blair, or any of them, are more innocent than Milošević was" (AN).

Another male Hungarian interviewee, in Subotica, contends that, "Western portrayals of Milošević were not fair, because Milošević alone could not do everything. He needed Tudjman and Izetbegović.⁴⁹ Everybody was involved" (SS). A male Slovak interviewee in Novi Sad similarly considers it unfair that so much of the media focus was on Milošević, given that he could not have made the wars in former Yugoslavia by himself. In the interviewee's words, "For a fight, you need more than one man. You need two or three people" (JG).

⁴⁸ Interview, Belgrade, 23 May 2004.

⁴⁹ Izetbegović receives little attention in Western literature and is most frequently portrayed as a victim. Some, however, are more critical. Holbrooke, for example, argues that, "though he paid lip service to the principles of a multiethnic state, he was not the democrat that some supporters in the West saw" (Holbrooke, 1999, p.97). Holbrooke also claims that Izetbegović exploited the suffering of his people (Holbrooke, 1999, p.155).

We have looked at the extent to which the interviewees agree with four of the key claims that Western literature makes regarding Milošević's actions and intentions. Chapter 6 will now examine to what extent the interviewees agree with the fifth claim – that Milošević incited ethnic hatred. This chapter will concentrate particularly on the opinions and experiences of the eighteen national minority interviewees

Chapter 6

Domestic Views on an External Construction; Part II – The Incitement of Ethnic Hatred

Introduction

In April 1994, the Croatian government of Franjo Tudjman demanded that all “non white” UN troops be removed from Croatia, claiming that only “first-world troops” were sufficiently sensitized to Croatia’s problems (Parenti, 2000, p.45). Yet, it is Milošević, not Tudjman, who is often portrayed in the West as a racist. Speaking on national television in February 2000, for example, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described Milošević as a man “who decides that if you are not of his ethnic group, you don’t have a right to exist” (cited in Parenti, 2000, p.187). Linked to this image of Milošević as a racist is the literature’s claim, explored in chapter 1, that he incited ethnic hatred. It is the primary concern of this chapter to find out whether the interviewees, in particular the national minority interviewees, agree with this claim.

National minorities¹ did suffer discrimination in Milošević’s Serbia. However, it is argued that much of this was social discrimination that needs to be understood in the context of the specific circumstances of the nineties. In a

¹ It is important to note that in Yugoslavia, national minorities were known as “nationalities”, or “narodnosti”. The term “nationalities” designated “a group which resided mainly in a neighbouring nation or some other country, for example Albanian” (Pupavac, 2000, p.3). The term “nations”, or “narodi”, in contrast, “designated a national grouping, resident wholly, or mainly, in Yugoslavia” (Pupavac, 2000, p.3). Article 245 of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution stated that, “The nations and nationalities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall have equal rights” (Constitution of the SFRY, 1974). The 1990 Serbian Constitution, introduced under Milošević, similarly emphasized equal rights. Article 13 declared that, “Citizens are equal in their rights and duties and have equal protection before the State and other authorities, irrespective of their race, sex, birth, language, nationality, religion, political or other beliefs, level of education, social origin, property status, or any other personal attribute” (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 1990).

climate dominated by war, economic crises, high unemployment, and general uncertainty, national minorities became an easy and convenient scapegoat. It is also argued that while it is convenient to portray Milošević as a racist, reinforcing his comparison with other “criminal” leaders such as Hitler, the interview data reveals a far more complex and nuanced picture.

The present chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 1 explores the opinions of the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees regarding Milošević’s speeches. Section 2 examines the views of the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees on the Serbian media, which Milošević heavily controlled. Section 3 deals with Milošević’s treatment of national minorities, from the viewpoint of the Serbian interviewees. Section 4 focuses on the opinions and experiences of the national minority interviewees. Finally, section 5 addresses the three remaining elements in the Western, liberal construction of Milošević as a criminal leader – his motivations, his character and psychology, and his comparison with other “criminal” leaders.

Section 1 – Milošević’s Speeches

(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees

Among the Serbian interviewees, only a tiny minority regard Milošević’s speeches as aggressive. A male interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, claims that,

Milošević talked about the same things that Hitler did. The tone of Milošević’s speeches was aggressive. He used to say that Serbs were being subordinated by other nations in the region, that members of the

Opposition were traitors, agents of the CIA, et cetera. His rhetoric was the same as Hitler's rhetoric (DK).

A female interviewee in Kikinda recalls watching Milošević deliver his famous Gazimestan speech, on 28 June 1989 – "I remember saying to my husband, 'Look at that lunatic! He will do us harm'" (SU). Another female interviewee, in Belgrade, explains that she did not like to listen to Milošević's speeches. "He made me nervous whenever I listened to him, because I knew that after that, something bad would happen" (DN).

The majority, however, emphasize that Milošević's speeches were fanciful, rather than aggressive. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, recalls, "I had no nerves for listening to Milošević, because his speeches were always the same. Everything was milk and honey. Everything was fine. But it was always emptiness inside, emptiness between the lines" (LC). A male interviewee in Belgrade similarly argues that, "The things Milošević told people in his speeches were nonsense. People were dying from hunger, but he was telling us that everything was fine and rosy" (SZ). Emphasizing that Milošević's appearances in public and on television were very rare, the interviewee adds,

When he did appear, he told people stories, like Hans Christian Andersen. The only people who believed these stories were pensioners² who didn't leave the house. If you never left your house and only listened to what Milošević was telling you, then you would think that everything was fine, as if you were living in Switzerland (SZ).

² Pensioners consistently voted in high numbers for the SPS - 68% in November 1990; 49% in November 1991; 50% in November 1992; and 52% in November 1993 (Branković, 1995, p.88). One explanation is that the older generation is most afraid of change. To cite Lazić, "Conservative Serbia fears changes and finds an inferior present more desirable than an uncertain future" (Lazić, 1999, p.17). More on this point will be said in chapter 7.

For her part, a female interviewee in Požarevac maintains that, “Milošević had a nice story and he could seduce people – he really succeeded in that. He knew what moved the Serbian people, and he knew what he needed to do to make people adore him” (J).

Other interviewees regard Milošević’s speeches as protective. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, discusses Milošević’s Kosovo Polje speech, on 24 April 1987. According to her, “It was a very inspiring speech. Milošević said ‘Nobody will touch you any more’. It was like a father protecting his sons, you know, and it was not in any way aggressive” (MV). A male interviewee in Čačak similarly argues that, “Milošević’s speeches were more defensive than aggressive. He promised people that he would look after them. He promised all good things. He was good at lying [laughs] – he was good” (IB).

To summarize, if, as Western literature claims, Milošević did incite ethnic hatred, it was not, according to the majority of the Serbian interviewees, through his speeches.

(ii) The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees³

Among the national minority interviewees, there is a more widespread belief than there is among the Serbian interviewees that Milošević’s speeches were aggressive. According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica.

³ According to the 1991 census, national minority communities account for 29.38% of the population of Serbia. The three most numerous communities are the Albanians, the Hungarians, and the Bosniaks Muslims (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.6).

Milošević always gave the same speech, but just in a different form. His speeches were aggressive, but not openly. Milošević was smart – he knew that the international community could listen to, and record, every one of his speeches. So he never said anything for which he could later be accused. However, between the lines, his speeches were aggressive. For example, he always said things like, ‘we appreciate the rights of other ethnic groups, but...’. He was very skilful (MB).

A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn explicitly associates Milošević’s speeches with the incitement of ethnic hatred. He argues, “Milošević consumed nationalism and created hatred, until he really spoilt the Serbian spirit and soul. Now Serbs have serious problems getting rid of this hatred” (AR).

Other interviewees describe feeling vulnerable and nervous when they heard Milošević speak. A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, claims that Kosovar Albanians felt very afraid when Milošević delivered his speech at Gazimestan, on 28 June 1989 - “They were caught off guard and wondered what was going to happen to them” (LF). The interviewee was just fifteen years old at the time, but remembers masses of people streaming to Gazimestan, shouting and yelling. He recalls, “It was quite a traumatic experience, not just for me but for everybody, especially for older people. My grandfather was very afraid, and he kept saying that something bad was going to happen” (LF).

According to another male Kosovar Albanian interviewee, “At Gazimestan, a kind of hysteria was generated”. He adds, “It is not easy when you hear Serbs saying nasty things about Albanians and threatening them. You have to start to be more cautious” (IL). A male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar similarly

describes feeling anxious when he heard Milošević speak. He explains, “It’s enough to say, ‘You, Serbs! You should fight for your own rights!’ It’s frightening, you know. What should we expect from Serbs when they were getting messages like that?” (AD).

Other interviewees, like many of the Serbian interviewees, argue that Milošević’s speeches were full of half-truths and lies. For example, according to a male Slovak interviewee in Novi Sad, “Milošević painted a pretty picture in his speeches. ‘Everything is beautiful here – just grass, butterflies and flowers. And we’ll be millionaires next year, same time!’” (JG). A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver claims that, “Milošević’s speeches were primitive, manipulative. He talked about Serbia, about Serbs, about how everything would be great, about Serbia’s achievements, et cetera. The usual Communist shit!” (SS). As an example of Milošević’s manipulation of the truth, the interviewee describes how,

During the NATO bombing, Yugoslav forces hit a bridge in Beška⁴ because they didn’t want NATO to bomb it. Yugoslav forces made a small hole in the bridge, but its structure wasn’t damaged. When the bridge was repaired and re-opened, we were given the impression that a totally new bridge had been built (SS).

For his part, a male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar argues that,

Milošević never said anything against others. His speeches were perhaps even polite. But when he spoke, there was no link with reality. It was always like that. He used to say that Serbia was a country where people lived well. People were starving and waiting to buy bread, but Milošević talked about progress in Serbia (NV).

This again creates an impression of Milošević as a rather weak leader who was forced to resort to half-truths and lies, in order to stay in power. To cite a male

⁴ Near Novi Sad.

ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver, “What could he offer to people who had been used to living quite well?” (SS).

Milošević was nevertheless a skilful orator, according to some of the interviewees. A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, for instance, argues that, “Milošević had great charisma and he knew what to say. He did not give long speeches, like Fidel Castro. His speeches were short and targeted. He always knew what to say and what people felt, until 1996” (RK).⁵ Similarly, a male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn argues that, “Milošević’s speeches were very energetic and convincing. You could see and feel his passion” (LF).

Section 2 - The Serbian Media

(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees

There is a strong emphasis in Western literature on the media’s spreading of ethnic hatred. Thompson, for example, argues that, “RTS is a lying machine designed to inspire, provoke and underwrite nationalist fears and hatreds” (Thompson, 1994, p.viii); and Bennett maintains that, “The media, more specifically the Serbian media and Serbian journalists, bear huge responsibility for the resurgence of nationalist hatred in Yugoslavia in the 1980s...”(Bennett, 1995, p.95).

Some of the Serbian interviewees support such claims. A male interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, argues that,

⁵ In 1996, huge demonstrations took place all over Serbia, in protest at Milošević’s failure to recognize the opposition *Zajedno* (“Together”) coalition’s victory in the local elections.

RTS and *Politika*⁶ played a big role in the Yugoslav crisis – they pushed people into war. *TV Novi Sad* was particularly guilty for this.⁷ Everyday on television, there were reports about the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, but none of these reports were objective. They were full of lies. It was really disgusting (DK).⁸

Another interviewee, a male in Kragujevac, describes how

RTS told the Serbian people that they were threatened, that it was necessary for them to defend their Serbian brothers in Croatia and Bosnia. It broadcast terrible pictures of dead and wounded people. These pictures made people go and fight for their country. The war started from nowhere (MA).

A female interviewee in Belgrade adds,

It was funny, because you never expected that kind of propaganda could ever exist. But it existed, and it had a lot of influence among the less educated people⁹ and among people who do not live in big cities. It was the kind of propaganda that just brainwashed you.¹⁰ We were told that ‘All the world is against great Serbs’ and that ‘great Serbs are fighting against the entire world and the New World Order’ (G).

As with Milošević’s speeches, however, the majority of the Serbian interviewees associate the State-controlled media more with the propagation of fairytales than with the propagation of ethnic hatred. For example, according to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gračanica,

RTS showed only the bright side of the world. It talked about Milošević and his dedication to the people, about the places he had visited, about the things he had done. It claimed that the Serbian economy was blooming. It was a fairytale (ALD).

⁶ *Politika* is the oldest and most influential State newspaper in Serbia.

⁷ In 1993, for example, Marko Keković, the main editor of the *TV Novi Sad* news programme, said, “I, as a journalist, am not ashamed to lie in the interests of the Serbs” (cited in Ivanović, 1999, p.31).

⁸ According to Ivanović, for example, “RTS covered up the siege and bombing of Sarajevo for almost two months” (Ivanović, 1999, p.34).

⁹ Research has shown that voters with low levels of education were far more likely to vote for the SPS than voters with high levels of education. In 1991, for example, 52.3% of voters with low education named the SPS as their preferred party. In contrast, only 21.4% of voters with high levels of education chose the SPS (Gordy, 1999, p.56).

¹⁰ Many of the Serbian interviewees share this view, though few of them accept that they themselves were brainwashed.

In a similar vein, a male interviewee in Novi Sad argues that, "According to the RTS news, everything in Serbia was good, great things were happening, and Serbia was a friend of the world. It was all just fairytales" (AS).¹¹

This perhaps helps to explain why, according to research by SMMRI, in April 2001, 42.5% of the 2171 respondents said that they did not trust RTS and other state media. Only 23.2% of the respondents said that they did trust them, even though 80.40% said that RTS and other state media were their main sources of information during the wars in ex-Yugoslavia (SMMRI, 2001, pp.54-55).

To sum up, while there is some support among the Serbian interviewees for the claim that hatred was disseminated through the media, a more prevalent view is that media propaganda was more ridiculous than it was jingoistic.

(ii) The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees

A significant number of the national minority interviewees accuse the Serbian media of spreading hatred and malicious lies. According to a male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, "RTS was full of hatred and nationalism" (AR). A second male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn describes how he had Serb friends in Belgrade and Niš who were too frightened to visit him in Kosovo. He explains, "I asked them to come to Kosovo, but they were too scared. They were afraid of being raped or killed,

¹¹ The journalist Vlado Mares echoes such views. According to him, "Two worlds co-exist in Serbia. First, the Serbia of state-run RTS TV, where all is well with the country and the people eat and live well under the regime of Slobodan Milošević. Then there is the real world, where a Belgrade textile worker earned just 1.4 dinars a day in July – at the official rate, barely 12 US cents - less than half the cost of a single loaf of state subsidised bread (Mares, 1999).

because of the things that RTS was saying about Kosovo and the Albanians” (LF).

A female Muslim interviewee in Priština similarly argues that the Serbian people were not given the truth about the situation in Kosovo. According to her, “RTS did all the things that Milošević wanted. If a Serb killed an Albanian, RTS told people that another Albanian had killed the victim, because of tradition” (I). A male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar adds, “A lot of hatred was created as a result of RTS. It talked about things that never happened. For example, it talked about problems in Novi Pazar that did not really exist. It was horrible to watch. It was just war propaganda”. The interviewee emphasizes that, “Milošević himself never spoke against minorities, but others did it for him, like RTS” (NV).

According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, “The media was a great tool to manipulate uneducated people with. People were brainwashed” (RK). For his part, a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade contends that Serbian media during the Milošević period was “the most brutal brainwashing machine that was ever invented”. He adds,

What I remember most is some television shows with singers and actors and TV hosts and magicians, and funny people jumping around the screen and trying to amuse people. And they were all laughing, and they looked like they were having the best time of their lives. And the reason that I am now frustrated is that, from one point of view, I see those people as war criminals, because they took an active part in closing the nation’s eyes. You know, like ‘Bread and Games’ – the things that the Romans did to amuse their people. Well, they didn’t give us any bread, but they gave us lots of games. And I can’t believe that anybody actually watched these shows and enjoyed them, because they were so absurd. While people were dying 300 kilometres from Belgrade, people in Belgrade were having fun (IG).

Such entertainment was the specialty of *Pink TV*.¹² Interestingly, Western literature has tended to neglect *Pink TV* and to focus instead almost exclusively on RTS. According to a male Serbian interviewee in Belgrade, however, “*Pink TV* was more influential than RTS. The aim of *Pink TV* was just to entertain, and so it was more interesting to people than RTS, which was mainly about politics” (ZG). Unlike RTS, however, not everybody in Serbia had access to *Pink TV*.

Section 3 - Milošević’s Treatment of National Minorities in Serbia

This section focuses on the opinions of the Serbian interviewees, while the next section will concentrate on the opinions and experiences of the national minority interviewees.

The majority opinion among the Serbian interviewees is that the Milošević regime did not mistreat Serbia’s national minorities. According to a female interviewee in Belgrade, for example,

Claims that Milošević mistreated minorities are laughable. The Albanians in Kosovo had their own schools, their own university, and they had their own medical centres. They could use our schools, but they refused that¹³, so Milošević let them make their own. They refused to use our medical centres, so Milošević gave them their own. And I think that was a big mistake (MM).

A male interviewee in Belgrade claims that,

Milošević treated ethnic minorities very well. He was not a fascist. Even today, Belgrade has one of the largest Croat communities in the Balkans.

¹² The owner of *Pink TV*, Željko Mitrović, was on the main board of JUL, the political party of Milošević’s wife.

¹³ Echoing this, Johnstone argues that, “The whole world, all the human rights champions are saying that the Albanians have been banned from the schools. That is a pure lie! They are the ones who refuse to attend the schools governed by the program of the Serbian state, which nevertheless guarantees them courses in Albanian history and culture and the use of their language” (Johnstone, 1999, p.20).

Belgrade has a population of two million people, and there are 100,000 Croats living in the city. Belgrade also has one of the largest Islamic communities in the Balkans (NS).¹⁴

A second male interviewee in Belgrade similarly argues that Milošević treated minorities well. According to this interviewee, “Milošević was trying to maintain a picture of Serbia as a multicultural society, and he cared about that because he was, in his core, a cosmopolitan, a communist” (RJ). For her part, a female interviewee in Kikinda argues that, “Milošević discriminated against his own nation most of all. His discrimination against minorities was no greater than his discrimination against his own people” (SU).

Several interviewees make the point that a person’s nationality was not important to Milošević. According to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gračanica, for example, “Milošević thought that anyone who did not support him was his enemy. He destroyed anyone who opposed him. He did not hate Albanians” (ALD). A male interviewee in Belgrade likewise argues that, “It wasn’t important for Milošević which nation you belonged to. It was only important whether or not you supported him. If you didn’t support him, he didn’t want to see you. Nothing else” (SZ).

Dr Branka Prpa, the director of the Historical Archives in Belgrade, agrees. In her opinion,

Milošević was not a nationalist. He was completely indifferent towards national belonging. He simply had a very strong will for power. So, if he thought that nationalistic ideology was needed for his purposes, he

¹⁴ According to D’Aymery, in the Balkans today “There are practically no more multi-ethnic countries with the exception, ironically, of Serbia...” (D’Aymery, 2001, p.7). In contrast, following Operation “Storm”, in August 1995, Croatia became “the most ‘ethnically pure’ state in the whole of the former Yugoslavia” (Cedric Thornberry, cited in Thomas, 2003, p.13).

would embrace it. In that sense, he is a very interesting person. He was not a fanatic. He just wanted to rule.¹⁵

A tiny minority, however, claim that Milošević did persecute minorities. According to a male interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, “Milošević mistreated minorities, but he never said anything bad about them in his speeches. What Milošević was thinking, Šešelj¹⁶ was saying and doing. They were a team” (DK). A second male interviewee in Novi Sad similarly argues that, “It was not the official policy of the regime to discriminate against minorities, but some of the people who were close to Milošević –like Šešelj – organized such discrimination” (VC). The interviewee claims, for example, that after Operation “Storm” in 1995, Šešelj and others helped the Krajina Serbs to get their revenge, adding that, “It was Šešelj who organized all of this, and Milošević fully supported him, although never officially (VC).

Echoing such views, Professor Vojin Dimitrijević, from the *Belgrade Centre for Human Rights*, argues that,

All the incidents against the Croat minority here were mostly carried out by the Radicals, by Šešelj and so on, but they were tolerated by the Milošević police. There was no reaction. But somehow Milošević did not allow this to become a system.¹⁷

These interviewees are clearly of the opinion that it was a deliberate strategy on the part of Milošević to use Šešelj and the Radicals to do his dirty work. In the words of one male interviewee in Kragujevac, “The people who worked for Milošević did all of the dirty jobs, while he was always the ‘good’ guy” (MA).

¹⁵ Interview, New Belgrade, 28 July 2004.

¹⁶ Šešelj was the leader of the “White Eagles”, a paramilitary group comprised of “tatty, gap-toothed folk, mainly working-class city-dwellers for whom Šešelj’s doctrine of Serb racial superiority was a compensation for all life’s petty setbacks” (Tanner, 2001, p.245). Šešelj was transferred to The Hague Tribunal on 24 February 2003.

¹⁷ Interview, Belgrade, 26 May 2004

Various Western authors also maintain that Milošević instrumentalized the Radicals to serve his own ends. Woodward, for example, argues that,

Both Serbian president Milošević and Croatian president Tudjman encouraged the presence of right-wing radicals, both within their parties and further right, so that they would appear the more moderate and stabilizing factor to the international community and to undercut other nationalist parties in their opposition (Woodward, 1999, p.355).¹⁸

It might, however, be argued that Milošević's reliance on Šešelj and the Radicals was necessary rather than deliberate, dictated more by circumstances than by policy; in short, a sign of weakness. Let us take the issue of mobilization. A strong leader should be able to mobilize his people for war, stirring in them intense patriotic feelings. Churchill and Thatcher are obvious examples. In the case of Milošević, however, "The very fact that the vastly stronger and better armed Yugoslav Army could not defeat poorly armed Croatian troops demonstrated Milošević's failure to inspire the Serbs to a national crusade" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.97). In essence, "...Milošević lacked the political vision and resolution to be a stirring wartime leader" (Sell, 2002, p.151).

For example, "Conscription of reservists in Serbia in the summer of 1991 turned out to be excessively difficult. Hundreds of young men went into hiding or fled the country to avoid having to put on a uniform" (Milan Milošević, 2000a, p.110).¹⁹ In the words of Gagnon, "the result of this call-up was what may be one of the most massive campaigns of draft resistance in modern history" (Gagnon, 2004, p.2). He argues that,

¹⁸ See also Hartman, 1999, p.219.

¹⁹ Gagnon argues that, "between 50 and 85 percent of Serb men called up to fight in Croatia either went into hiding or left the country (200,000 men reportedly went abroad to avoid the draft) rather than fight" (Gagnon, 2004, p.109). According to Posa, moreover, "...85% of army reservists in Belgrade refused their call-ups to be sent to Slovenia" (Posa, 1998, p.75).

At a time when the Serbian media was filled with images of genocidal Ustaše massacring innocent women and children, the attempts to mobilize young men and reserve forces in Serbia to fight in Croatia were stunningly unsuccessful (Gagnon, 2004, p.108).

What this meant, in practice, is that Milošević was increasingly forced to rely upon extremist and criminal elements over which he had little or no control.

To cite Woodward,

The declining number of regular troops and difficulty finding conscripts willing to fight led to supplementation with militant extremist volunteers and criminals released from jails who were more often motivated by the invitation to loot and plunder than nationalist fervour. The worst excesses of reported massacres, rape, and mutilations emerged because of such conditions (Woodward, 1999, p.265).

Thus, it might be argued that Milošević's reliance on the Radicals is symptomatic less of his criminal leadership than of his weak leadership.

To conclude this section, it is argued that there is little support among the Serbian interviewees for the claim that Milošević incited ethnic hatred. Regarding Milošević's speeches, the majority view is that they were more farcical than fanatical. They were speeches that fed people with dreams rather than with hatred. Similarly, the majority of interviewees emphasize more the media's propagation of ludicrous stories than the spreading of chauvinism and intolerance. Finally, we saw that while there are a small minority of interviewees who believe that Milošević mistreated national minorities in Serbia, the more widespread view is that they were in fact treated well.

Section 4 - The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees

Surprisingly little has been written in Western literature about Milošević's treatment of national minorities in Serbia. Yet, in view of the literature's claim

that Milošević incited ethnic hatred, it is important to look at what national minorities in Serbia actually experienced during the Milošević years. Do they feel that they were mistreated by the Milošević regime? Do they believe that the regime had a specific and concrete policy against national minorities?

Some might argue that a detailed analysis of the laws on national minority rights could tell us more than the data from eighteen semi-structured interviews can tell us. It can be counter-argued, however, that to rely solely on these laws is problematic. In short, the fact that national minorities had extensive rights on paper²⁰ does not automatically mean that they exercised all of these rights in practice. For example, according to the Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities,

The conditions for receiving schooling in minority languages are much more favourable in the communities where a minority population is concentrated. They are less favourable in the communities where a lower number of members of the minorities live. As a result, the number of pupils/students attending classes in their mother tongue is much lower than the number of pupils/students receiving schooling in the Serbian language (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.29).

Moreover, as Marija Vujnović, from the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, argues, "...at the implementation level, sometimes it didn't all go quite as well as it looked in law".²¹ We cannot, therefore, gain an entirely reliable picture of the situation by confining our analysis to the legal level. Instead, we

²⁰ According to Serbia's *Law on Elementary Schools*, for example, in areas where at least fifteen pupils belonging to a national minority have enrolled in the first grade, classes will be held in the national minority language. Alternatively, bilingual instruction will be given. Even if the envisaged threshold of fifteen pupils is not reached, classes may still be held in the national minority language, subject to the approval of the Minister of Education (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.26).

²¹ Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004.

must speak to the people directly concerned – the national minorities themselves.

According to Vladimir Djurić, a legal advisor at the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, “There were different approaches regarding different national minorities”.²² This section, therefore, will look at different national minorities separately.

(i) The Albanians

According to the 1981 census, the last census that the Albanians participated in, there were 1,674,353 Albanians living in Serbia, accounting for 17.12% of the population (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.6). There are four Kosovar Albanian interviewees in the sample, three men and one woman, and one male ethnic Albanian interviewee.

Cox contends that, “...minority groups under Milošević faced severe discrimination” (Cox, 2002, p.3). Vujnović, however, maintains that it is necessary to distinguish between different levels of discrimination against minorities, namely State discrimination, social discrimination, and institutional discrimination. Regarding State discrimination, an example of which might be apartheid in South Africa, Vujnović contends that, “Serbia did not practice this type of discrimination. Some laws weren’t very, let’s say, beneficial to the minorities, but most of the laws didn’t make any huge problems and in no way discriminated against minorities”.²³

²² Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004.

²³ Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004.

In contrast, social discrimination, she argues, was widespread. Such discrimination was closely linked to the unstable and tense climate that the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars created.

Vujnović considers that institutional discrimination was perhaps most important with regards to Kosovo, because “when you look at the Milošević period, it was very difficult to find an Albanian who was in a very important position”.²⁴ Corroborating this, the Albanian interviewees themselves underscore the Milošević regime’s strong institutional discrimination against them. One example that the interviewees give is the expulsion of Albanian professors from the university in Priština, and the forced dismissal of many Albanians from their jobs.

A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee, for instance, describes how he was expelled from *Trepča*²⁵ in October 1991, without being given any reason. He recalls, “A Serbian man came to *Trepča* and started to apologise for having to sack the Albanians. At that time, Albanian employees at *Trepča* had not received their salaries for three or four months” (IL).

This institutional discrimination against the Kosovar Albanians gave rise to the existence of so-called “parallel institutions”. A male interviewee, for example, describes how, after Albanian students were expelled from university buildings in 1991, they started having their lectures in private houses (LF). Another

²⁴ Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004.

²⁵ *Trepča* is the main company in Kosovo. It has mines and factories all over Kosovo.

male interviewee explains, “My new university building was a private house in a suburb of Priština” (AR).

As well as institutional discrimination, the interviewees clearly feel that there was also State discrimination against them, one example being the 1990 Serbian Constitution. According to one male interviewee,

Under that Constitution, the Kosovo Assembly lost the power to decide about crucial things. Kosovar Albanians lost school and university buildings, they lost their jobs, and they lost the opportunity to travel abroad and to be issued with regular documents (AR).²⁶

On this latter point, the interviewee emphasizes that, “I didn’t have a passport for eight years, and I was unable to travel from 1992 until 1998. This is because I didn’t want to serve in the Yugoslav Army” (AR).

Not everyone agrees, however, that the Serbian Constitution of 1990 deprived the Kosovar Albanians of their rights. Vladimir Djurić, for example, maintains that,

Albanians in Kosovo, after the 1990 Constitution, had national minority rights and they could enjoy national minority rights like every national minority in Serbia – to have their own schools, primary and secondary schools, perhaps a higher education, to have their language in official use. But they boycotted that. And after the boycott, the Milošević regime started to pressure the minority, with armed forces. But in the context of minority rights, there was no change. If you accept that territorial autonomy is a part of minority rights, this would lead to the conclusion that the 1990 Constitution derogated minority rights, et cetera, et cetera. But according to our legal conception, that was not the case.²⁷

²⁶ As explained in the previous chapter, this Constitution derogated the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, which had given Kosovo and Vojvodina the status of autonomous provinces within Serbia. Since none of the other Yugoslav republics had autonomous provinces within their territories, many Serbs saw the 1974 Constitution as a measure designed to keep Serbia, as the largest Yugoslav republic, in check.

²⁷ Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004.

According to a female Bosnian Muslim interviewee, married to a Kosovar Albanian man in Priština,

Officially, the 1990 Constitution did not deprive Albanians of their rights. But on the street, it was a different situation. Officially, you had a right to work like Serbian people, but it was very difficult to find a job if you were Albanian (I).

The third form of discrimination that the interviewees experienced was social discrimination. One male interviewee describes feeling like a second-class citizen and being constantly intimidated. He claims that, "When you went out, you felt threatened by Serbian security formations" (AR). Another male interviewee explains that,

During the early nineties, I experienced segregation for the first time. Suddenly everything changed – overnight. Serbs no longer wanted to go to school with Albanians. Albanians could not go freely to bars, discos, et cetera, and the police could stop and search you without justification (LF).

Of all the national minorities in Serbia, the Albanians arguably suffered the greatest discrimination under Milošević. According to some commentators, Milošević had a deep personal hatred of Albanians. Zimmermann, for example, contends that, "Kosovo was Milošević's hottest button. He was unyielding, emotional, pugnacious and full of invective for its Albanian inhabitants" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.57). What is interesting is that all except one of the Albanian interviewees believe that Milošević did not harbour a specific hatred of Albanians.²⁸ According to one male Kosovar Albanian interviewee, "Milošević hated anybody who stood in the way of his plans, and he eliminated anybody who stood in the way of his vision, including Serbs" (LF).

²⁸ A notable exception to this is the female Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Priština, who maintains that, "Milošević wanted to destroy everything that was Albanian. He wanted to destroy the lives of Kosovar Albanians" (TG).

For his part, the male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade maintains that, “The way that minorities were treated under Milošević was not very different to the way they were treated before Milošević or after Milošević”. He explains,

I have heard many stories of Albanians being oppressed by the Serbian government, not only in the time of Milošević, but many years before, and many years before World War Two as well. It was just something that had been happening there almost forever. My grandfather was ejected from high school because he said that he was an Albanian, and that happened in 1936. So things like that were happening all the time. The difference might be that under Milošević, Albanians actually organized themselves and decided to fight (IG).

While the Albanians undoubtedly did suffer discrimination during the Milošević regime, it would be over-simplistic to argue that such discrimination was the consequence of Milošević’s personal antipathy towards Albanians. Firstly, it is necessary to emphasize that Kosovo was not simply a problem of minorities. It was also a major constitutional problem, as emphasized in the previous chapter. According to Professor Ljubinka Trgovcević, a member of the Serbian Parliament from 1984 until 1986, “Milošević opened the Serbian problem and Serbia had a problem. The problem was that Serbia was in three parts and had little influence over the provinces. She was like a kid with two parents”.²⁹ Trgovcević explains that,

Delegates from Kosovo and Vojvodina, in the State Presidency and in the Serbian Parliament, had the possibility to stop everything that happened in Serbia, to stop laws, to discuss them, to vote, to do all things. That was a great problem for Serbia, because the autonomous provinces were states within a State. They were completely separate states.³⁰

The second point to make is that the discrimination the Albanians suffered, in particular the social discrimination, should not be looked at in isolation from

²⁹ Interview, Belgrade, 19 July 2004.

³⁰ Interview, Belgrade, 19 July 2004.

the broader context. According to the *Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia*, for example, Serbian culture

tends to find hidden separatist motives and aspirations in claims of national minorities. Serbian culture tends to view 'minorities' as 'a foreign, guest-like element', which is duty-bound to respect house order, to respect 'hospitality' and to stop irritating the 'host' with its demands (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001, p.167).

Moreover, in a climate of heightened nationalism, insecurity and wars – such as existed in Serbia during nineties - ethnic distance necessarily increases. To cite Cohen, "...Serbian intolerance and prejudice was a long-standing feature of ethnic relations in the region and had been growing during the 1990s" (Cohen, 2001, p.224).

In addition, it should be noted that ethnic distance in Serbia has always been greatest vis-à-vis Albanians. According to the Belgrade sociologist Ognjen Pribičević, "the Serbs do not treat the Albanians as equal, they treat them as uncivilized, very primitive, dirty...as humans of a lower profile" (cited in Cohen, 2001, p.224).³¹ For example, the results of a survey conducted by *Argument*, on a representative sample of 1322 adult citizens, in September 1990, showed that 38% of respondents said that they would never marry an Albanian. In contrast, 23% said that they would not marry a Muslim, 15% said that they would never marry a Slovene, and 13% said that they would never marry a Croat (Argument, 1990).

Research on threat perception, conducted in December 2000 by SMMRI, also showed that Serbs perceive the Albanians as the most threatening nation.

³¹ Three of the Serbian interviewees themselves expressed prejudice towards Albanians.

Asked which of their neighbouring nations they viewed as highly threatening to Serbia, 78.60% of the 1133 respondents answered Albanians. The percentages given for the other nations were dramatically lower - 41.20% of respondents identified the Croats as highly threatening, and 35.10% of respondents identified the Bosniaks (SMMRI, 2000, p.13).

(ii) The Muslims

According to the 1991 census, there were 237,785 Bosniaks/Muslims living in Serbia, making up 2.5% of the population (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.55). There are three Muslim interviewees in the sample, two men and one woman.

On the basis of the interview data, it is argued that with the exception of the Albanians, who suffered strong institutional discrimination, the main form of discrimination that all other national minorities in Serbia suffered during the Milošević period was social discrimination. It is further argued that this discrimination was, in large part, attributable to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. These wars helped to create a climate of fear and uncertainty in which national minorities became an easy and convenient target. One male interviewee, for example, describes how relations between Serbs and Muslims in Novi Pazar began to change as a result of the wars. He explains,

The Muslims here felt pretty unsafe when the Serbs came back from the wars, because they always carried a gun. It was very frightening. If you had a good friend, you never knew what you should expect from him. Everything changed. Everything in the Serbs' consciousness changed. The whole system was changed after that and, as I said, you never knew what to expect from the neighbours who were Serbs (AD).

The interviewee also claims that Serbs in Novi Pazar started to treat the Muslims as second-class citizens. Consequently, the interviewee felt uncomfortable telling people his real name. He explains. "It's a very unpleasant feeling when you are not free to say your name. Several times when I was in Belgrade, I couldn't say my name because I was worried" (AD).

Having a Muslim name also caused problems for the female Bosnian Muslim interviewee in the sample. She used to be head of finance at the electro-technical faculty in Priština, a position that entitled her to an apartment. Yet, she was refused this privilege, because of her nationality. In her words, "It was very open. They said, 'you are Muslim. You don't have a right to get a flat'" (I).

The third Muslim interviewee, a male from Novi Pazar, maintains that there was always some prejudice against minorities during the Milošević years. He recalls, for example, that whenever he travelled by train to Budapest, it would always be his documents that were checked. He argues that, "As a minority, you always had to prove that you were not against the Serbian State. People were always suspicious of you because you were not a Serb" (NV).

Whilst all three interviewees experienced discrimination during the Milošević years, they have very different opinions about Milošević's personal attitude towards minorities. One interviewee, for example, maintains that,

Milošević didn't hate minorities. He didn't even like the Serbs. What he loved was power, and he stayed in power. Everything he did was against 'the citizens'. After that, we can say that everything he did was against the minorities and against the Serbs. He wasn't a 'great Serb' (NV).

The problem, however, according to this interviewee, is that while Milošević did not hate minorities, he made them feel vulnerable and apprehensive. The interviewee explains,

Milošević said that Yugoslavia was the prison of Serbs. He said he would free them and give them back their dignity. It was a story that had nothing to do with Muslims, Hungarians or other minorities. He wasn't against other minorities, except Albanians. But if you always speak only about the Serb nation, what can the minorities do? What can they expect? (NV).

The female interviewee shares the view that Milošević was against Albanians and argues, "Milošević was a big nationalist and he hated Albanians" (I). For the third interviewee, however, it was not only Albanians that Milošević hated. According to this interviewee, although there was nothing that people could recognize as a campaign to persecute minorities, "Milošević taught the Serbs to hate anyone who was not a Serb. This created great uncertainty among Muslims. He hated all minorities" (AD).

(iii) The Hungarians

According to the 1991 census, Hungarians comprise 3.52% of the population of Serbia. Hungarians are mainly concentrated in Vojvodina, where they make up 16.86% of the province's population (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.6). There are five Hungarians in the sample, four men and one woman.

When asked about their personal experiences during the Milošević years, the ethnic Hungarian interviewees spoke mainly about the social discrimination they faced. In the words of one male interviewee in Novi Sad, "As a national minority here in Serbia, the nineties were the start of some kind of very

unpleasant social atmosphere” (AN). As one example, he says that his mother, an invalid, was thrown out of a bomb shelter during the NATO bombing in 1999. Since NATO planes were taking off from Hungary, the presence of a Hungarian woman in the shelter angered some Serbs.

The interviewee feels that he himself experienced some discrimination, although it was not explicit. Rather, it occurred at the level of “those little things that you cannot see in everyday life. For example, when I wrote a screenplay and I gave it to the Ministry of Arts, I felt some kind of discrimination to get the money to make a movie”. The interviewee also points out that nobody ever knew how to pronounce his name correctly. However, he does not feel that these were real problems.

As far as he is concerned, “The problems – and this is important – for national minorities came mostly from the refugees who did not understand the historical background of this part of the country” (AN). The fact that there is strong support among Serbian refugees for the far-right SRS reinforces this.³²

It is significant that the interviewee identifies a specific group of people, refugees, as causing the greatest difficulties for national minorities. This further supports the argument that social discrimination, rather than direct discrimination by the Milošević regime, was the primary form of

³² According to the March 2002 census in Serbia, the population of Vojvodina has substantially grown thanks to an influx of refugees (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2002, p.259). It is no coincidence, therefore, that in the general election held in Serbia on 28 December 2003, the SRS achieved its greatest success in Vojvodina. Winning thirty-five of the forty-five municipalities, the Radicals only lost in eight mainly Hungarian municipalities in the north, and in two municipalities dominated by Slovaks (Briza, 2004).

discrimination against minorities in Serbia during the nineties. An interviewee from the village of Csantaver, for example, recalls one occasion when he was speaking in Hungarian with a friend on the street in Subotica. “A Serbian man came up to us and said, ‘That’s the last time I’ll hear you speak in Hungarian!’” (SS)

For some interviewees, however, the discrimination was official as well as social. For example, a female interviewee in Subotica claims that, under Milošević, Hungarians had to write their names in Serbian, not in Hungarian.³³ All official documents, such as birth certificates, also had to be written in Serbian. Marija Vujnović, however, maintains that it was not State policy that Hungarians could not write their names in Hungarian. According to her,

This is where it is very important to make a distinction between what the State is doing and what happens at the social level. When I say the ‘social level’, I also mean the person that is working behind the counter in the administrative office of a particular municipality. If that person, for instance, discriminates against someone, for whatever reason...that is social discrimination, not State discrimination. According to the rules, the person is supposed to act in a certain manner, but maybe he can sometimes be more helpful or less helpful. And this is where we did have problems.³⁴

Another interviewee in Subotica also maintains that there was some official discrimination against minorities. He argues, for example, that,

The Hungarian minority in Serbia was not mistreated like the Albanians were, but Hungarians did not have the same rights as Serbs. In Yugoslavia, all minorities had rights above European standards, and they were officially called ‘nationalities’. Under Tito, everything was written in six languages. Under Milošević, everything was written in Cyrillic (MB).

³³ For example, the Hungarian surname “Koszo” is written as “Koso” in Serbian.

³⁴ Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004.

Nevertheless, the interviewee goes on to make the point that in Subotica, Hungarians are the majority, followed by the Croats. The Serbs are the third largest group. He explains, “This is important, because if there had been any serious mistreatment of minorities during the Milošević period, the Hungarians and Croats would have left Subotica and Serbia” (MB).

Among the ethnic Hungarian interviewees, opinions differ regarding Milošević’s personal feelings towards national minorities. The female interviewee claims that, “Milošević hated Hungarian people, but I don’t know why” (AK); and a male interviewee maintains that it was Milošević’s intention to cleanse Vojvodina of ethnic minorities (AN). One interviewee, however, stresses that everybody was a victim of Milošević and his policies, and that it was not only national minorities who suffered (MB). Another male interviewee maintains that Milošević was not a racist, and emphasizes that, “I never suffered under the Milošević regime because of my nationality. I only suffered because, like everybody else, I had no job and no money” (RK).

(iv) Other National Minorities

This section will deal with the remaining five interviewees – one male Slovak interviewee³⁵ in Novi Sad, and four Roma interviewees³⁶ in Belgrade, of whom three men and one woman.

³⁵ According to the 1991 census, Slovaks comprise less than 1% of Serbia’s population. They make up 3.2% of the total population of Vojvodina (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.6).

³⁶ According to the 1991 census, Roma constitute 1.43% of the population of Serbia (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.6). It should be noted that in Yugoslavia, the Roma were classed as an “ethnic group”. To cite Pupavac, “The term ‘ethnic groups’, which included Romanies and Vlachs, referred to a people with primarily an oral tradition or in the process of codifying its written language” (Pupavac, 2000, p.3).

According to the Slovak interviewee, “Milošević had a policy against some minorities, in particular the Albanians, but not against every minority”. The interviewee feels that Milošević maybe discriminated against Albanians, Croats, and Muslims, but not specifically against Slovaks.³⁷ Nevertheless, he says that he did feel threatened when Milošević was in power since “many people, when the war started, became ‘big Serbians’, big nationalists. And they were like sheep” (JG).

For the interviewee, however, it was not all Serbs who posed a problem. Rather, he distinguishes between two particular groups of Serbs. On the one hand are those Serbs who came to Vojvodina after World War One and World War Two, together with those who came as refugees from Croatia and Bosnia during the nineties. On the other hand are those Serbs, old Vojvodinians, who have lived in Vojvodina for more than eighty years.

The interviewee explains that he never had any difficulties with the old Vojvodinians. Instead, “When we speak, we are the same. They don’t treat me as a Slovak or Hungarian or Gypsy. It doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter to them who I am, what nationality I am”. In contrast, “Those people who came here after the First or Second World Wars, and who were infected with Milošević’s nationality virus – they look at me as somebody who is here and doesn’t belong here” (JG).

³⁷ It might be argued that those national minorities whose countries were involved in the wars in the former Yugoslavia suffered more than those national minorities whose countries were not involved.

Although the interviewee felt physically threatened during the Milošević period, he considers that his actual rights as a minority themselves were not endangered. He argues, “Milošević was a nationalist, but some of the things that national minorities had from earlier he didn’t touch – schools, language. He didn’t touch Slovak culture”. Language is obviously an important aspect of any culture and according to the interviewee,

My language rights were the same. You know, I hate Milošević, but in that way he was fair. We had primary schools in the Slovak language. We had high schools in the Slovak language. If I wanted to, I could study the Slovak language at university.

Nevertheless, for the interviewee, “Milošević is guilty because many Serbs became nationalists, and he is guilty because many people from national minorities were frightened” (JG).

All of the four Roma interviewees in the sample assess the Milošević period from a very particular perspective - an economic perspective. Moreover, they consider that life under Milošević was better than it is today, mainly because of the thriving black market that existed during the nineties. In the words of one female interviewee, “Under Milošević, Roma could work on the black market and earn some sort of living, but today they can’t do that (SL). A male interviewee similarly maintains that, “During the Milošević years, there were more opportunities for Roma to make money” (SE).

As to whether Milošević persecuted Roma, the female interviewee claims that Milošević did not mistreat Roma. Rather, “He just let them do their own thing” (SL). A male interviewee, for his part, stresses that no Roma were forced to leave Milošević’s Serbia. He argues that, “Although many went to

Germany, they went of their own will, because of the wars and because of the economic situation. There is more discrimination against Roma today than there was under Milošević (BR).

A second male interviewee, who himself left Serbia and went to Germany as an economic migrant, claims that discrimination against Roma did exist. He argues, for example, that Roma people could not find jobs and that Roma children were put into special schools. He adds, however, that, “Discrimination against Roma still exists today – maybe it is even worse than it was under Milošević” (Z). The third male interviewee maintains that Milošević mistreated both Roma and Serbian people alike (SE).

The Roma have always been the victims of social discrimination and prejudice, and not just in Serbia. If Roma in Serbia did suffer more during the Milošević period than they had done previously, it might be argued that this was more because of the particular circumstances of the time than because of any deliberate policy by the Milošević regime against Roma. Professor Vojin Dimitrijević, for example, underscores the link between discrimination against Roma and circumstances. He argues that,

...Roma were victims of increased violent behaviour that was caused by the wars. Troubled Serbia is now reaping the harvest of all the wars – the decline of morality, values and so on. So of course, again, the attitude towards the Roma is racist. You have the skinheads and so on – all these losers among the Serbs who vent their ire against the Roma and those who are powerless.³⁸

In criminalizing Milošević, Western literature often portrays him as a racist who specifically discriminated against other nationalities. Naimark, for

³⁸ Interview, Belgrade, 26 May 2004.

example, contends that, "...every nationality of former Yugoslavia – Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians – stood in the way of Milošević's ambitions" (Naimark, 2002, p.155). This, however, is oversimplistic.

Firstly, it is important to note that some national minorities themselves supported Milošević, even if it was primarily for economic reasons. According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, "Minorities supported Milošević because of the money and privileges they received. There was a part of society that got richer and richer in that period" (AN).³⁹ A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn similarly points out that,

There were always some Albanians who were loyal to Milošević. He paid them well and they enjoyed many privileges and opportunities...Milošević was very interested in loyal Albanians, in order to give the impression that his politics was inclusive of all nationalities (AR).

Secondly, it should be emphasized that while national minorities did clearly suffer under Milošević, so too did many Serbs, particularly refugees and IDPs. For example, according to a 1999 report by the *Humanitarian Law Centre* (HLC) in Belgrade,

Several persons displaced from Kosovo told HLC researchers that the Serbian government had issued oral orders banning their employment in Serbia. The HLC also registered instances of displaced persons being denied proper medical care (HLC, 1999, p.11).

Moreover,

Contrary to the requirement that the authorities must ensure that displaced schoolchildren receive an education, the Serbian Education Ministry orally recommended non-enrolment of students from Kosovo in the 1999-2000 school year (HLC, 1999, p.121).

³⁹ According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver, the Hungarian landlord of the local pub joined the SPS so that he would not have to pay taxes on his business (SS).

Thus, according to Marija Vujnović, “When you look at human rights or individual rights, maybe that’s where the Milošević regime can really be attacked”. She argues that various individual rights, such as civil, political, and especially economic and cultural rights, were denied to the entire population and that,

When you look at it that way, then you get a different picture. A lot of things seem to be a denial of minority rights when you just look at that specific group, but when you also look at the Serbian population, you can see that maybe everybody suffered from things like that. I think that maybe discrimination was strongest against those who actually opposed the regime and had democratic views.⁴⁰

It will be recalled that this latter point is one that some of the national minority interviewees themselves make. In the words of a male Kosovar Albanian interviewee, for example, “Milošević hated anybody who stood in the way of his plans, and he eliminated anybody who stood in the way of his vision, including Serbs” (LF).

Thirdly, some prominent Western figures themselves do not believe that Milošević was a racist. In his testimony to The Hague Tribunal on 3 November 2003, for example, Lord Owen⁴¹ declared,

It is my view that President Milošević – no doubt Mr Milošević you see now is not fundamentally racist. I think he is a nationalist, but even that he wears lightly. I think he’s a pragmatist. And it is a fact that Muslims have lived --live in Serbia.⁴² There are areas of Serbia where there are substantial Muslim groups (Owen, 2003).

For his part, Warren Zimmermann, the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 until 1992, argues, “I don’t see Milošević as the kind of ethnic exclusivist

⁴⁰ Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004.

⁴¹ David Owen was the European Union envoy to the former Yugoslavia.

⁴² Professor Mihailo Marković, a former vice-president of Milošević’s SPS, describes an incident where Milošević angrily scolded Milorad Vučelić, then the director RTS, for having allowed the broadcast of a song that had the words, “Alija, I hate you because you are a balija”, a pejorative term for Turks and Muslims (Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004).

as Croatia's President, Franjo Tudjman⁴³ who dislikes Serbs, or Bosnian Serb politician Radovan Karadžić, who hates everybody who isn't a Serb" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.25).

Thus far, we have addressed the five key claims that Western literature makes with respect to Milošević's actions and intentions, and we have seen that there is far greater support for each of these claims among the national minority interviewees than there is among the Serbian interviewees. We can now examine to what extent the interviewees agree with the literature's claims vis-à-vis the three remaining elements in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader - his motivations, his personality and psychological profile, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders.

Section 5 – Concluding the Analysis

This section is divided into three sub-sections and, once again, the opinions of the Serbian interviewees and the opinions of the national minority interviewees will be treated separately.

(i) Milošević's Motivations

According to Western literature, Milošević was primarily driven by, even obsessed with power. This "insatiable appetite for power" (Di Giovanni, 2004, p.73) resulted in cold, calculating and ruthless behaviour. The overwhelming opinion among the Serbian interviewees themselves is that power is essentially what drove Milošević. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example,

⁴³ According to Ivan Zvonimir Čičak, president of the *Croatian Helsinki Committee*, Tudjman frequently referred to the Muslims as "dirty, stinking Asians" (Udovički and Šitković, 2000, p.212, n59).

contends that, “Milošević had too much power. It closed his eyes to real life, to the real world...And his power was never enough for him. He always wanted more and more. It was like an empire – the Milošević Empire” (LC). According to Aleksander Nenadović, the former editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Politika*, “Milošević was a power-hungry man who enjoyed power as much as he enjoyed whiskey. He did not have faith in anything serious. He was obsessed with power”.⁴⁴

There is also a widespread belief among the Serbian interviewees that Milošević’s lust for power caused him to behave in a selfish and ruthless manner. A female refugee from Croatia, for example, argues that, “You must be made of a special material if you do whatever it takes to have power” (S); while a male IDP from Kosovo maintains that, “Milošević didn’t defend the people in Kosovo. He defended himself and his power in Belgrade” (SP). For his part, Janko Baljak, a documentary producer at *B-92*, claims that,

The Serbian people were in the hands of a lunatic gambler. Milošević was just gambling with them and with the image of the Serbs. And he was not even a good gambler. He was a bad gambler. He always lost – wars, territory, people, buildings, image, everything.⁴⁵

The literature’s claim that Milošević was motivated by power is one that also finds support among the national minority interviewees. According to a male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar, for example, “When you speak about Milošević, it’s all about power” (NV). In a similar vein, a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee from Subotica maintains that, “Milošević was obsessed with power, and he did what he did to stay in power” (SS).

⁴⁴ Interview, Belgrade, 21 May 2004.

⁴⁵ Interview, Belgrade, 30 June 2004.

We have seen in this chapter that there is support among the national minority interviewees for the literature's claim that Milošević incited ethnic hatred. The fact, therefore, that many of them believe he was driven mainly by power, rather than by a visceral hatred of non-Serbs, is significant; it further suggests that Western portrayals of Milošević as a racist are flawed.

(ii) Milošević's Personality and Psychology

We saw in chapter 1 that Western literature focuses heavily on Milošević's negative personality traits, namely mendacity and narcissism, and portrays him as somehow abnormal, for example by emphasizing his reclusive nature. The Serbian interviewees similarly highlight a number of Milošević's unpalatable characteristics.

Several interviewees stress that he was extremely stubborn. A male interviewee in Niš, for example, argues that, "Milošević had a stubborn politics. He did not compromise. He believed that only he was right and nobody else" (SC). Similarly, a female interviewee in Čačak claims that, "When Milošević spoke to Western politicians, he was rude, inflexible and arrogant. He was rigid in his speeches and manners, and this was good neither for him nor for the Serbian people" (VS).

Some of the Serbian interviewees also remark upon Milošević's lack of warmth and humanity. For example, according to the Belgrade intellectual Aleksa Djilas⁴⁶, "There is an exceptionally cold side to Milošević that is very

⁴⁶ Interview, Belgrade, 20 May 2004.

worrying”.⁴⁷ In a similar vein, Professor Ljubinka Trgovčević argues that, “Milošević was so autistic – he hadn’t any, any emotions for others. And that’s the problem. He just wanted to know what was good for him, not what was good for others”.⁴⁸

Describing Milošević’s performances in the courtroom, the Belgrade journalist Ljiljana Smailović also highlights his lack of feeling for others. She claims that,

Milošević likes to extinguish his cigarette butt on the witnesses. He likes to kick them when they are down...He is hard on people, and he likes to dominate. He displays a total lack of humanity. Because he feels so superior in the courtroom, he throws his weight around, and is not always aware of his own inhumanity and lack of human warmth and respect for others.⁴⁹

Linked to these claims about Milošević’s extreme coldness is the belief many of the Serbian interviewees hold that he did not care about his own people.⁵⁰ In the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, “I don’t think that Milošević really cared about the Serbian people. If he had cared, he would have done something proper for us. At least he would have prevented the NATO bombing in 1999” (NS). A female interviewee in Kikinda, moreover, contends that, “The only ideology that Milošević believed in was his own self” (SU).

⁴⁷ Certain Western commentators who have met Milošević similarly refer to his exceptional coldness. Zimmermann, for instance, argues that, “Despite his undeniable charm, I found him a man of extraordinary coldness...I never saw him moved by an individual case of human suffering. Nor did I ever hear him say a charitable or generous word about an individual human being, not even a Serb” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.24). For his part, the journalist Misha Glenny, who interviewed Milošević in the summer of 1991, recalls, “The most abiding feature...was the complete absence of anything resembling feeling or humanity in his attitude” (Glenny, 1993, p.126).

⁴⁸ Interview, Belgrade, 19 July 2004.

⁴⁹ Interview, Belgrade, 12 June 2004.

⁵⁰ This is an important point that will be discussed more in chapter 7.

Some of the interviewees also portray Milošević as being psychologically impaired. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, argues, “First of all, I think he was mad” (G). For her part, a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica claims that, “Milošević was a crazy guy – a lunatic” (SK); and a male interviewee in Niš describes Milošević as a “bolestan čovek” (“a sick man”) (SC).

Dr Branka Prpa develops this portrayal of Milošević. According to her,

I see Milošević as a psychiatric case, because the intellectuals - myself included - who fought against him could never predict his next moves. His next step was always so crazy that it simply could not have been predicted. It was unthinkable. As rational people, we always tried to think about the rational moves that Milošević would make next, but he always did the opposite to what we had expected. For the same reasons, the international community had real problems with Milošević. He was unpredictable and the international community could not understand him.⁵¹

Some of the national minority interviewees similarly describe Milošević as psychologically challenged. A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, for example, argues, “I think Milošević is a sick man and he believed in all the stupid things he said, and that is his problem. I really think he is abnormal, but he is very clever and very intelligent” (RK); and according to a female Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Priština, “Milošević is a psychopath. He is a clever man, but he has devastated many lives. He is a psychopath. He is nothing for me” (TG). Unable to decide whether Milošević was bad or mad, a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade asks, “Was Milošević a crook or a lunatic, or both at the same time?” (IG).

⁵¹ Interview, New Belgrade, 28 July 2004.

(iii) Milošević's Comparison with Other "Criminal" Leaders

Regarding Milošević's comparison with other leaders, such as Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler, there is a prevalent belief among the Serbian interviewees that such comparisons are exaggerated and over-simplistic. According to Janko Baljak, for example, "Victims are victims, but Hitler was Hitler and Milošević is Milošević. For us, Milošević is Hitler, but in the European context and the world context, the comparison is too strong".⁵² A male interviewee in Belgrade also rejects such comparisons, although on different grounds. In his words,

In the West, Milošević became a Balkan Butcher, a war criminal who was worse than Hitler. It's not a realistic picture. He is not a war criminal and he is not Hitler. If you look at the facts, all the big war criminals, the great war criminals - like the Nazis in World War Two, or Pinochet, or Noriega, or Stalin – they were all extraordinary men. And Milošević was just an ordinary man who was an excellent actor. Nothing else. My point is that he was not capable of anything great. So he was not, therefore, capable of great crimes (RJ).

Although some interviewees do compare Milošević with other "criminal" leaders, it is important to emphasize that they are not comparing Milošević's crimes with the crimes of men such as Hitler and Stalin. Rather, the interviewees compare Milošević with other "criminal" leaders on the basis of his style of speaking and mannerisms. A male interviewee in Kragujevac, for example, argues that, "Milošević was a good speaker – like Hitler" (MA); and according to a male interviewee in Niš, "Milošević was like Mussolini in terms of his mannerisms - the way that he stared straight ahead of him, with his head held high" (SC). Similarly, a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica claims that, "Milošević was very charismatic, but so too were Hitler and Ceausescu" (SK).

⁵² Interview, Belgrade, 30 June 2004.

Dr Branka Prpa also makes use of comparison. She explains,

It has always been a wonder to me how such a banal and trivial person as Adolf Hitler came to be the leader of the German people. I often wonder the same thing about Milošević, who was also a very trivial person. Everything he said was stupid demagoguery.⁵³

It can be argued that all of these comparisons are more illustrative than serious, helping us to build up a clearer picture of Milošević. In short, they bring him to life, rather than support his construction as a criminal leader.

Among the national minority interviewees, while there is considerable support for Milošević's construction as a criminal leader, few of them support his comparison with other "criminal" leaders. A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, for example, considers that it is more appropriate to compare Ratko Mladić with leaders such as Hitler and Stalin. He argues,

For the first few years, Milošević was portrayed as someone who was even worse than Ratko Mladić, but Mladić is a pure war criminal – like the Nazis in World War Two. He directly ordered the massacre in Srebrenica. That was a pure war crime. Milošević just had a hunger for power (MB).

For his part, a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade argues that,

If Milošević had been the new Hitler, you wouldn't have had any Croats or Muslims or Albanians living in Belgrade. And here is the living proof of an Albanian... You would expect me to have been dead for ten years now if Milošević had been the new Hitler (IG).

Conclusion

Now that we have addressed all four elements in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader – his actions and intentions, his motivations, his personality and psychological profile, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders - some final conclusions can be drawn. Beginning with the national minority

⁵³ Interview, New Belgrade, 28 July 2004.

interviewees, the only element in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader that does not find much support among them is his comparison with other "criminal" leaders. On the basis of the interview data from the eighteen national minority interviewees, therefore, the question "is Milošević a criminal leader?" can be answered in the affirmative.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize that while this image of Milošević finds strong support among the national minority interviewees, it is not unqualified support. For example, although we saw in chapter 5 that the majority hold Milošević most responsible for the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, we also saw how some interviewees stress that Milošević alone was not responsible and not solely to blame. It should also be underscored that support for Milošević's construction as a criminal leader is substantial, but not overwhelming. As we have seen, the national minority interviewees always express more than one viewpoint.

One of the most interesting findings to emerge from the data relates to the literature's claim that Milošević incited ethnic hatred. While the national minority interviewees broadly agree with this claim, they do not, overall, believe that Milošević was driven by ethnic hatred. Thus, it can be argued that for the national minority interviewees, it is primarily Milošević's actions and intentions, rather than his motivations that render him a criminal leader.

Turning now to the Serbian interviewees, it is important to emphasize that their whole perspective on Milošević is very different from that of the national

minority interviewees, for two main reasons. Firstly, while it proved very difficult to find interviewees willing to admit to having supported Milošević, the fact is that he did enjoy considerable support. In the presidential elections held on 11 November 1989, for example, Milošević won 80.36% of the votes (67.13% of the whole electorate) and lost only in Kosovo (Antonić, 2002, p.411). In the presidential elections of 9 December 1990, he won 63% of the votes cast, obtaining 3,258,779 votes against Vuk Drašković's 821,674 votes (Djukić, 2001, p.36).

Milošević's party, the SPS, also won the largest number of votes, although not an absolute majority (46.1%) in the 1990 elections (Gordy, 1999, p.35), as well as in subsequent elections. In the 1992 republican elections, the SPS won 28.8% of the votes; in the 1993 elections, it won 36.7% of the votes; and in 1997 the SPS, in coalition with the SRS and JUL, won 34.2% of the votes. According to Goati, "Although one may assume that the SPS obtained part of the votes thanks to electoral manipulation, there can be no doubt that in that period, the SPS enjoyed powerful support amongst the Serbian electorate" (Goati, 2001, p.47).

It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that at least some of the Serbian interviewees would have supported Milošević, and this will have almost certainly influenced how they view him today. Although some national minorities did support Milošević, their support was more self-interested than genuine.

Secondly, as we saw in chapter 5, the overwhelming majority of the Serbian interviewees believe that they were Milošević's biggest victims. This is significant because the major claims that Western literature makes with respect to Milošević's actions and intentions, the key element in his construction as a criminal leader, are centred on the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and on the crimes that took place during those wars. However, since Serbia was not directly affected by war until 1999, when NATO began its bombing campaign against the FRY, the interviewees tend to focus more on immediate events that directly impacted on their everyday lives, such as the economic crisis. Thus, because the Serbian interviewees are more concerned with what Milošević did to the Serbian people, to their country, and to their reputation in the world, their frame of reference for judging Milošević is very specific.

Western literature and the national minority interviewees, in contrast, use a different, broader frame of reference that looks at Milošević's crimes more within a regional context. Thus, it is not surprising that the overall conclusions to be drawn from the Serbian interview data and from the national minority interview data are different.

As regards the Serbian interviewees, the question "is Milošević a criminal leader?" can be answered in the negative. We have learnt that there is little support among them for any of the five key claims that Western literature makes with respect to Milošević's actions and intentions. This is mainly because, as explained above, the wars do not form the crucial element in the

Serbian interviewees' assessments of Milošević. Rather, they judge him primarily on the basis of what he did to them.

We have seen that there is, however, broad support among the Serbian interviewees for the literature's claim that Milošević was primarily motivated by power. We have also learnt that the Serbian interviewees attribute to Milošević various negative personality traits, such as stubbornness and coldness, just as Western literature does. Given that the interviewees do not support the literature's claims about Milošević's actions and intentions, and thus do not support his construction as a criminal leader, their arguments with respect to Milošević's motivations and personality are crucial. What these arguments reveal to us is that according to the Serbian interviewees, Milošević was above all a "bad" leader, an image that chapter 7 will now explore.

Chapter 7

Milošević as seen by the Serbian Interviewees; “Bad” but not Criminal

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the dominant image that the Serbian interviewees have of Milošević – as a “bad” leader. There is a fundamental discrepancy between this image of Milošević and the dominant image of him that we find in Western literature, as a criminal leader. The existence of this discrepancy supports the thesis’ contention that it is important to explore how the externally constructed criminal leader is seen by his own people. To reiterate the argument made in chapter 3, the criminal leader should be studied both from the top down and from the bottom up.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 1 explores three of the four particular senses in which, according to the Serbian interviewees, Milošević was a “bad” leader. Section 2 concentrates on the fourth and most important reason why Milošević is considered as a bad leader – the economic consequences of his time in power. The section will begin by giving an overview of Milošević’s economic policies, before looking in detail at the particular charges the interviewees make against him. Finally, Section 3 looks at a second image that some of the Serbian interviewees have of Milošević – as a victim. They see him as a victim of himself, as a victim of the people around him, in particular his wife Mira, and as a victim of the West.

Section 1 – Milošević as a “Bad” Leader

What emerges from the interview data is that according to the Serbian interviewees, Milošević was a “bad” leader in four particular ways. Firstly, he cared only about himself and his power, and not about the Serbian people. Secondly, he was incompetent and lacked ability. Thirdly, he surrounded himself with bad people. Finally, the consequences of his rule – both for the Serbian people and for the country – were very bad. We can now examine each of these elements in turn.

(i) Milošević Cared Only About Himself and His Power

The widespread belief among the Serbian interviewees that Milošević cared only about power is very common in Western literature, as we saw in chapter 1. It is, moreover, a view that various Serbian authors also hold. The sociologist Pribićević, for example, maintains that Milošević “does not follow any particular ideology, but only and exclusively his interests in preserving his own power” (Pribićević, 1997, p.115); Stevanović claims that Milošević “had no specific programme, either economic or political, other than to preserve power for himself” (Stevanović, 2004, p.34); and the journalist Djukić contends that, “...Milošević simply lusted for power” (Djukić, 2001, p.79).

In response to the above arguments, it should first of all be emphasized that Milošević was not unique in his desire to remain in power. All politicians want to stay in power. Secondly, it is important to note that while Milošević undoubtedly enjoyed power, it is greatly over-simplistic to see his leadership as nothing but a naked lust for power. He did have specific goals. For example,

he initially wanted to preserve Yugoslavia, but once this was no longer possible, his objective was to create a unified Serbia in which all Serbs would live together in one state, as they had done in Yugoslavia. He wanted to defend Serbia's national interests; he wanted to institute economic reforms; he wanted Serbia to retain her independence vis-à-vis the West and be able to remain strong in the face of external pressures.

Yet, Milošević was not operating in a vacuum, and as the environment in which he was functioning changed, so too he had to modify his objectives and re-evaluate his position.¹ This does not mean that he was inconsistent in his political line. Rather, he was very pragmatic and, in the words of Pribićević, “demonstrated an enviable skill to adjust to new situations and the popular mood” (Pribićević, 1997, p.115). Furthermore, Milošević was very consistent in his pragmatism. Nevertheless, it is perhaps easy to understand why various interviewees and commentators alike might see in Milošević's pragmatism and ability to manoeuvre a lack of any clear strategy or agenda, other than the raw pursuit of power.

According to some authors, part of Milošević's success lay in the fact that his appeal was not one-dimensional. Pavlowitch, for example, argues that, Milošević

had something to offer most people – a re-vitalization of the party which would also be read as a step towards the advent of democracy, a defense of Serbia which could be used in the defense of Yugoslavia, a chance of

¹ For example, the impact on Serbia of sanctions, first introduced in May 1992, forced Milošević to reconsider his position vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs. Anxious to get sanctions lifted, Milošević's patience was severely tested when, in July 1994, the Bosnian Serb assembly rejected the Contact Group peace plan. Milošević responded, on 4 August 1994, by imposing his own sanctions on *Republika Srpska*.

promotion for younger politicians, and an alternative to open anti-Communist nationalism, namely a reformed unified socialist market (Pavlowitch, 2002, p.194).

In a similar vein, Vujačić maintains that,

...analyses of the ‘Milošević phenomenon’ which insist on only one dimension of his appeal (typically nationalism) are bound to miss the point. On the contrary, it was precisely the combination of simultaneous appeals to different constituencies which helps to explain Milošević’s success (Vujačić, 1995, p.6).

For her part, Johnstone claims that,

The ability to be ‘all things to all men’ is often the key to political success. What was *really* wrong with Milošević was what was also his greatest political asset: his ambiguity. He appeared...to be able to square all the circles (Johnstone, 2000).

If Milošević could be “all things to all men”, this further helps to explain why it can be difficult to identify precisely what he stood for and why, therefore, so many interviewees and commentators believe that he cared only about himself and about power.

(ii) Milošević was an Incompetent Leader with Limited Abilities

In contrast to the Balkan strongman image of Milošević that one finds in so much of the Western literature, the interview data yields a very different image of him as a rather weak and incompetent leader. In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade, “Milošević was a very middle class politician in historically the most important moment in our history. That was his misery, and it was ours too” (MM). Professor Svetozar Stojanović adds that, “Milošević was simply a small, local, provincial post-Communist politician. And that was his real capacity”.²

² Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

According to the interview data, Milošević demonstrated his incompetence and mediocrity in four particular ways. Firstly, he did not make any long-term plans. In the words of one male interviewee in Kragujevac,

Milošević's politics was catastrophic. He was not born for politics. For a man to be a successful politician, he must have vision and the ability to think ten years ahead. Milošević had neither. He had no plans at all – it was real chaos (MA).

A male interviewee in Novi Sad similarly argues that, "Milošević was not able to see far ahead. The decisions he took were made on the basis of short-term, not long-term, calculations. They were made on a day-to-day basis" (VC).³

In contrast, those Western authors that regard Milošević as a criminal leader emphasize that he did make plans. In particular, as we saw in chapter 1, it is claimed that Milošević planned the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the crimes that Serbs committed during those wars, in order to create a "Greater Serbia".

Various authors argue that the 1986 SANU Memorandum provided the foundations for Milošević's programme. Ramet, for example, contends that almost exactly one year after it was published, "Milošević would step forward to carry out the program spelled out in the Memorandum" (Ramet, 2002, p.20): and Rusinow describes the infamous Memorandum as Milošević's "scripture" (Rusinow, 1995, p.20). According to Professor Kosta Mihailović, however, a member of SANU and one of the authors of the Memorandum, this document did not constitute a programme. Rather, "It was a reaction to the deep

³ It would, it is suggested, be more accurate to say that Milošević constantly had to revise and reconsider his plans as circumstances changed. Had he had no plans at all, it is very unlikely that he could have stayed in power for as long as he did.

economic and social crisis in Yugoslavia, and it was addressed to the Serbian Parliament. There was no intention for it to be a public document”.⁴

Secondly, according to the interviewees, Milošević failed to acknowledge his own limited abilities, always thinking that he was stronger and more powerful than he actually was. A male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, maintains that,

Sometimes Milošević presented himself as bigger than he really was. It's quite incredible. He was a very good actor – a very good actor. He presented himself as if he was a big man, a big leader. He was so full of himself. It was like he was above, so much above, everybody else. Even when he spoke with some Western leaders, he was so pompous (RJ).⁵

In chapter 1, a distinction was made between approaches in Western literature that emphasize the role of circumstances, and approaches that stress the role of actors. In the case of Milošević, it could be argued that his rise and success had more to do with circumstances than with his skills as a leader. In the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, “Milošević was the wrong man in the right place at the right time” (RJ). A male interviewee in Novi Sad expresses a similar view, arguing that, “At the right time and in the right place, one man came along and said the right words. A few right words. And that was it” (A).

The problem, however, is that Milošević himself was not able to appreciate the fundamental role that circumstances played in his rise to power and political career. In the words of Professor Stojanović.

⁴ Interview, Belgrade, 15 July 2004.

⁵ In the literature, the adjective “pompous” is often reserved for the late Croatian President, Franjo Tuđman. Zimmermann, for example, argues that, “His passion for display caused him to write his own pompous speeches and to concoct ceremonial events at which, resplendent in military uniform, he would be the central figure” (Zimmermann, 1996, p.76).

Milošević has never been able to distinguish between his abilities and capabilities, and just what you would call circumstances or historical luck/misfortune. In the initial phases of his power, historical circumstances assigned him a much greater role than his real capacities as a personality and as a ruler, but he never understood that hiatus.⁶

Unable to recognize his own limitations, Milošević behaved arrogantly and with a sense of superiority that antagonized those whom he should have sought as allies.⁷ As he created more and more enemies, both the country and the Serbian people increasingly suffered. After all, in the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, “You cannot be a good leader if you have war, you have sanctions and you argue with half of the world” (SZ). For her part, a Bosnian Serb refugee in Kosovska Mitrovica maintains that, “Milošević should have been smart and had the United States as his friend, not as his enemy. Instead, he acted with *inat*⁸ towards the United States and towards the whole world” (NM).

Thirdly, according to the interview data, Milošević was out of touch with reality. In the words of Professor Mihailo Pantić, from the Philological Faculty in Belgrade, “Milošević was a post-Communist Emperor who was out of his time and living in his own reality”.⁹ Milošević’s view of the international political situation highlighted this. To cite Professor Stojanović, “Milošević thought he understood the world very well and didn’t need any advisors. In

⁶ Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

⁷ According to Sell, Milošević “seemed confident and even cocky in his dealings with international negotiators...” (Sell, 2002, p.225).

⁸ This is a specific Serbian term that has no direct English equivalent. It means something like “spite”.

⁹ Interview, Belgrade, 22 June 2004.

other words, he was a lonely figure...And he simply didn't understand that there was no possibility to continue being non-aligned".¹⁰

Milošević regarded himself as a key figure on the international stage, yet failed to realize that several important scene changes had taken place - notably the end of Communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall - and fundamentally altered the nature of that stage. For example, he persisted in the erroneous belief that Russia would come to Serbia's assistance.¹¹ According to Goran Svilanović, the president of the GS, "Milošević was waiting for something big to happen in Russia. He never came to terms with the fact that Communism was dead and that the world had changed".¹² The Belgrade journalist Vladimir Milić similarly argues that,

Milošević acted under the false belief that the Communists would return to power in Russia, and that Russia would help Serbia. He simply did not understand that the world had changed and that Communism was dead. By the time he realized this it was too late.¹³

If Milošević had such a tenuous grasp of the new international order and such limited abilities as a leader, the image that we get of him is above all an image of incompetence, rather than belligerence. In the words of Professor Stojanović, "Surely, in terms of Serbian national interests, he was a sheer catastrophe".¹⁴

¹⁰ Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

¹¹ Beset with difficulties following the end of communism and the break-up of the USSR, Russia did not make any serious effort to come to Serbia's assistance until 1999, during the NATO bombing of the FRY.

¹² Interview, Belgrade, 3 June 2004.

¹³ Interview, Belgrade, 23 May 2004.

¹⁴ Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

Intercepted telephone conversations between Milošević and the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, between 1991 and 1992, appear to reinforce this image of incompetence. They show that Milošević seemed to have far less knowledge and information about events on the ground than we might expect a leader to have. During a conversation that took place on 10 September 1991, for example, Karadžić asked Milošević if Koštajnica had been taken. Milošević replied, “Well, I don’t have precise information” (www.domovina.net). Later, on 19 September 1991, Karadžić remarked, “...we have confidential information that the situation with the army in Slavonia is catastrophic”, to which Milošević responded, “Really! I also heard that there are great difficulties, but I don’t have correct information” (www.domoviva.net).

That Milošević appeared to be so poorly informed about events on the ground is significant given that, in his trial in The Hague, the Prosecution is seeking to prove Milošević’s “command responsibility”, a concept that will be discussed more in chapter 8

The fourth and final way in which Milošević showed his lack of competence was by neglecting vital PR work.¹⁵ According to one male Milošević supporter in Belgrade, for example, “Milošević didn’t know how to use marketing and

¹⁵ Tim Marshall argues that in contrast to the Croatian Government, which spent millions on hiring American and Canadian PR firms, “Belgrade, governed by a bunch of stolid, Communist, nationalist, out-of-touch, criminal, conspiracy theorists, told the outside world to mind its own business, and prodded visiting journalists in the chest. They lost the public relations war along with all the other wars, for two reasons. Firstly, their side committed the majority of the crimes; secondly, they were stupid and didn’t even bother with PR” (Marshall, 2002, p.59).

public relations. He didn't want to spend money on that, but he is now paying a much higher price" (AB). Echoing this, Vladislav Jovanović, a former Foreign Minister of Serbia and later of the FRY, argues that, "Milošević neglected PR work. He believed too much in the truth of Serbia's arguments. This was political naiveté on his part, for which he has been criticized".¹⁶

Aleksa Djilas adds that,

Milošević completely lacked imagination. He had lived in the West and he spoke good English. He should, therefore, have understood the power of the media and the influence that it has on politicians. Yet, it took him a long time to realize this. Consequently, he did little to try and change the West's image of the Serbs, unlike Tudjman and Izetbegović who hired PR firms to garner international sympathy.¹⁷

(iii) Milošević Surrounded Himself With "Bad" People

For some interviewees, the problem was not so much Milošević himself as the people he had around him, above all his wife, Mira Marković.¹⁸ The influence that Mira had on her husband is widely regarded as something very negative and harmful.¹⁹ A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, maintains that Milošević committed a "big political mistake" by marrying Mira, whom the interviewee describes as "a woman who wanted to run politics" and "a complicated and powerful woman" (MM). For Aleksander Nenadović, the former editor-in-chief of *Politika*,

Mira's influence is a dark part of the Milošević story. She inspired him, and he may have accepted her as being more intelligent, more knowledgeable, and more capable than he was. He talked to her before

¹⁶ Interview, Belgrade, 24 May 2004.

¹⁷ Interview, Belgrade, 20 May 2004.

¹⁸ More about Mira and her political party, the *Yugoslav United Left* (JUL), will be said in section 3.

¹⁹ Zimmermann notes that, "She was thought to have the influence of a Lady Macbeth on her husband..." (Zimmermann, 1996, p.21).

he made any important decisions, and he tried to find out what she really thought - whether or not she approved.²⁰

Nenadović adds, “There was something irrational about their relationship. After all, Mira was not particularly attractive. She got fat!”

According to Professor Svetozar Stojanović, moreover, “I think that Milošević cannot be understood without his wife, and vice versa.²¹ And French psychiatrists have a good term for that – ‘une folie à deux’”. Highlighting Mira’s influence on her husband, Stojanović recalls,

I was a witness on several occasions when, in the evening, he would agree with more rational people, and he would promise to do this and not to do that. And then, next morning, he would change his mind, so something had happened during those twelve hours. Well, he went home!²²

It is noteworthy that those interviewees, and they are very small in number, who still support Milošević significantly downplay the influence that Mira had on her husband. According to one female Milošević supporter in Belgrade, for example,

The idea that Mira had a strong influence over Milošević is a figment of the West’s imagination. Serbia is a conservative and patriarchal society, and by creating stories about the enormous influence that Mira had over her husband, the West was trying to deprive Milošević of his manhood (RB).

A male Milošević supporter, also in Belgrade, claims that, “Mira could not influence her husband because he was simply not the type of person that you

²⁰ Interview, Belgrade, 21 May 2004.

²¹ Scharf and Schabas similarly argue that, “One cannot decipher Milošević without also focusing on his lifetime partner, Mira Marković” (Scharf and Schabas, 2002, p.6); and Cohen notes that, “The extremely close bond between Mira and Slobodan suggests that her role must be carefully considered when assessing the strengths and deficiencies of Milošević’s political behavior” (Cohen, 2001, p.112).

²² Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

could influence. She had similar views to her husband, but they argued about many things. She was not as influential as people think” (PK).

Some of the interviewees also maintain that Milošević made the mistake of surrounding himself with incompetent people. In the words of one male Milošević supporter in Belgrade, “Milošević is a person who trusted the people around him, and he made many wrong decisions because of that. In that respect, he was not a good leader, because many of those people were bad people” (AB).

Milorad Vučelić, the current vice-president of the SPS, claims that, “Milošević’s greatest weakness was choosing the wrong type of people to have around him, starting with me! [laughs]. He chose the wrong people and gave them positions for which they were not equipped”.²³ In a similar vein, Živadin Jovanović, the former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, argues that one of Milošević’s weaknesses was that,

He surrounded himself with rather incompetent people, but people who would please him and his family... Many people around him did not fulfil the criteria of competency but the criteria of formal loyalty. So I think it was a great weakness – the absence of clear-cut criteria so that people would be selected to fit functions and not vice-versa.²⁴

Interestingly, some of the national minority interviewees express similar opinions. According to one male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, “In the case of many dictators, the people around the dictator are worse than the dictator himself is. Maybe this was the case with Milošević too” (LF). A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica likewise argues

²³ Interview, Belgrade, 5 June 2004.

²⁴ Interview, Belgrade, 17 May 2004.

that, “The people around Milošević were very bad people – war criminals. His wife was even worse” (RK).

Section 2 – Milošević’s Economic “Crimes”

The final and most important reason why Milošević was a “bad” leader, according to the Serbian interviewees, is that his economic policies had very bad consequences, both for the country and for the people. Before dealing with the interview data itself, this section will begin by providing a brief overview of Milošević’s economic policies, of which there has been very little analysis in Western literature. This overview will help to put the interviewees’ comments into context.

(i) The Economic Policies of Milošević and the SPS – An Overview

Before embarking upon a career in politics, Milošević had been president of the *Udružena beogradska banka*. While working at the bank, he made several visits to the United States, met David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and attended the 1979 annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank, held in Belgrade.

During this time, Milošević was widely seen in the West as an economic liberal. The former US Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, for example, who had known Milošević during the late 1970s, told Zimmermann, “I thought he [Milošević] was a liberal; he talked so convincingly about westernising Yugoslavia’s economy”. He then added, “I just must have been wrong” (cited in Zimmermann, 1996, p.59).

It is not the case that Milošević was adverse to economic reforms. As we saw in chapter 4, the economy was a prominent theme in many of his speeches. The problem, from a Western point of view, was that Milošević's economic reforms reflected the belief of him and his Party that, "the chief fundamental form of property under socialism remains social property" (cited in Thomas, 1999, p.48).²⁵ In 1990, for example, the SPS placed key sections of the economy and social services under state control. In addition, Milošević slowed down the process of privatisation and annulled all the privatisation that had been carried out under the federal law of 1990, by passing a new law in 1994.

This is not to say that Milošević and the SPS were wholly opposed to a market economy.²⁶ Article 56 of the 1990 Serbian Constitution, for example, declares that, "Social, state, private and cooperative property and other forms of ownership shall be guaranteed", and that "All forms of ownership shall enjoy equal protection of the law" (The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 1990); and the 2000 Report of the SPS refers to "an integral programme of

²⁵ This commitment to social property put Milošević and his party at odds with other political parties in Serbia, such as the *Democratic Party* (DS). In its 1990 *Letter of Intent*, for example, the DS declared that social property is "contrary to every rational law of economics", and that "...only a market economy and free enterprise can provide for a prosperous society..." (Branković, 1995a, p.64). Unsurprisingly, therefore, according to a survey of 900 adults in November 1990, 51% of private owners supported one of the opposition parties (20% the SPO, 11% the DS, and 20% others), while only 16% of private owners supported the SPS (Branković, 1995a, p.65).

²⁶ According to Mihailo Marković, a former Vice-President of the SPS (1990-1992). "Milošević offered a socialist idea in a very much revised and improved version – as a third way. This 'revised socialism' was the idea that the State takes care and feels responsible for the social security of people; that education – as much as possible – should be free, including university; that the health service should also be free; and that the State should greatly support culture. The second idea was that there should be a pluralist economy with all three kinds of property - private property, co-operative property (where people join resources to create a business), and State property. The third idea was that one should avoid the pitfalls of two extremes – one was State control and State planning, like in Russia. The other was economic anarchy, a *laissez-faire* economy. Between these two, a middle way was to have a market economy where some necessary elements of regulation were in the hands of the representatives of the people, of the State" (Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004).

reconstruction and development of the economy and country”. and in particular “the programme designed to create realistic economic prerequisites for economic growth, economic and social security, and continuation of market reforms” (Report on the Socialist Party of Serbia’s Work Between the Third and Fourth Congress, 2000, p.13).

These reforms, however, would occur at a pace set by Milošević and his Party, not by Western institutions, in order not to alienate core SPS voters.

The SPS was created in July 1990, by a merger of the *League of Communists of Serbia* and the *Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia*. Claiming to be a party maintaining continuity with the *League of Communists of Yugoslavia*, the SPS presents itself as a modern leftist party, committed to achieving “freedom, peace, social justice, equality, solidarity and creativity” (Report of the Socialist Party of Serbia’s Work Between the Third and Fourth Congress, 2000, p.3).

During the nineties, the Party’s leftist orientation was particularly reflected in its economic policies. To cite Obradović, the SPS

endeavoured to present itself as a ‘peoples party’ that represented the interests of the Serbian people and Serbia, but also as the ‘protector of the interests of potential “social losers” in the process of economic transition’ (Obradović, 2000, p.432).

Thus, it adopted various measures specifically aimed at helping particular social groups, most notably farmers, workers, pensioners, and peasants. During its 1990 election campaign, for example, the Party’s main slogans were

“land for the farmers”, “pay for workers” and “pensions for pensioners” (Slavujević, 1995, p.176).

According to the *Basic Tenets of the Platforms and Statutes of the Socialist Party of Serbia*, adopted at the Party’s founding congress in 1990, the SPS is “against the widespread dismissal of workers and against policies that produce social insecurity” (Obradović, 2000, p.445). Job security became particularly precarious following the introduction of UN sanctions, in May 1992. Before the 1992 and 1993 elections, however, the SPS promised voters that they would not lose their jobs as a result of decreases in production; and this was not to remain an empty promise. In June 1993, on the initiative of the SPS, the Serbian Parliament adopted a *Law on the Special Conditions for Hiring and Dismissing Employees During the UN Security Council Sanctions*. Under this law, it was impossible to fire an employee while the sanctions were in effect (Obradović, 2000, p.448).

Following the introduction of sanctions, the regime also “...limited wage differences and paid out guaranteed wages, rationed supplies of staple foods and set low prices for them, and exempted the poorest sections of the population from communal charges” (Slavujević, 1995, p.176).

Appealing to the needs of its rural constituency, in 1990 the SPS effected the restitution of land confiscated from the peasantry by the authorities in 1946 and 1955. Further highlighting its commitment to its rural constituency, the Party, in its 2000 Report, maintains that it has upheld, inter alia, “financial

consolidation and stable financing of agriculture”, “protection of domestic production”, and “renewal of agricultural machinery” (Report on the Socialist Party of Serbia’s Work Between the Third and Fourth Congress, 2000, p.18).

The Report also claims that,

On the SPS initiative, the government bodies provided substantial financial resources for the development of agriculture and rural regions...In the course of the last three years over Din. 10 million was invested for these purposes (Report on the Socialist Party of Serbia’s Work Between the Third and Fourth Congress, 2000, p.19).

Given that the economic policies of the SPS primarily targeted dependent social groups, it is not surprising that these same social groups constituted the Party’s main support base. That is to say that, “A number of polls show that the most important SPS strongholds need to be looked for among manual workers, pensioners and the elderly population in general, farmers, the less educated, civil servants, and the military” (Pribićević, 1997, p.111).

For example, according to a poll of 900 Serbian citizens, in November 1990, 40% of manual workers supported the SPS (in contrast, only 13% supported the SPO and only 4% supported the DS); 42% of non-manual workers supported the SPS (only 10% supported the SPO and only 7% supported the DS); 50% of farmers supported the SPS (13% supported the SPO and 2% supported the DS); 68% of pensioners supported the SPS (only 2.5% supported both the SPO and the DS); and 48% of housewives supported the SPS (11% and 4% supported the SPO and the DS respectively) (Branković, 1995b, pp.85-88). The same poll revealed that 43% of low-income groups supported the

SPS, 16% supported the SPO, and 2% supported the DS (Branković, 1995b, p.90).

According to a later poll, conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, on the eve of the 1993 republican elections, the SPS was supported by 41% of interviewed workers, 30% of pensioners, 28% of farmers, 26% of housewives, and 15% of clerks (Pribićević, 1997, p.111).

The above-mentioned social groups are those most afraid of fundamental change. For example, a large part of the working class feared political change (a change in the ruling party) for at least two reasons –

1. many work in the ‘socially-owned’ commercial sector. The general move towards privatisation announced by political opponents of the socialist government threatened jobs while heralding the introduction of more stringent standards of expertise, quality and discipline; 2. the changes indicated also threatened elements of the welfare state workers were used to (social security, health insurance, guaranteed minimal wage, a high level of job security, etc) (Branković, 1995a, p.61).

As to pensioners, “Their productive years are over and any change which could threaten the position they have earned by their work would directly endanger their survival” (Branković, 1995a, p.62). The fact that the SPS positioned itself as a party of moderate change - in 1990, its election slogan was “With us there is no uncertainty” – further helps to explain its appeal among these social groups.²⁷

²⁷ Some interviewees claim that the SPS also offered the promise of a good career and professional success as a means of attracting support. According to a female interviewee in Novi Pazar, for example, “If you wanted to get a job, you had to be one of Milošević’s pawns” (SM). The interviewee recalls how her sister, an English teacher in a high-school in Novi Pazar, was promised the job of school principal if she joined the SPS.

In view of Milošević and his Party's declared commitment to social security, social justice and social welfare, it is significant that so many of the Serbian interviewees focus on Milošević's economic crimes, accusing him of making them poor. The first point to make is that at the height of the economic crisis, many people did not actually blame Milošević for their plight, even if they do so today. According to Thomas, by the winter of 1993/1994,

the relationship between the town and countryside had broken down... On both sides of this rural/urban divide there were many who did not blame the government or the President for this crisis. In the towns food shortages were blamed by some on the laziness or vindictiveness of the peasantry. In the rural areas blame for the lack of basic materials such as petrol and fertiliser was often aimed at a general class of urban bureaucrats, who were held responsible for exploiting the peasantry, rather than specifically at the government (Thomas, 1999, p.166).

The second point that should be made is that had the interview sample included more dependent social groups - for example, some peasants, or more pensioners - it is very likely that there would not have been the same emphasis on Milošević's economic crimes. Unsurprisingly, of all the interviewees in the actual interview sample, it is the pensioners who speak most positively about Milošević's economic and social policies.

According to a female pensioner and Milošević supporter in Belgrade, for example, "Under Milošević's regime, I had job security – I knew that nobody was going to take my job away from me. Today, I have no job and no opportunity of finding one" (RB). A male pensioner, also in Belgrade, maintains that, "Milošević had good social policies, much better than in many countries. There was good job security, and companies had to provide payments – regular monthly payments – to people who were on what we called 'forced leave'" (PK).

Finally, it is important to underscore that although the majority of the Serbian interviewees in the sample heavily blame Milošević for Serbia's economic crisis, he was by no means solely responsible for it. Rather, various external factors significantly contributed to this crisis, in particular IMF macro-economic stabilization policies, UN sanctions, and the NATO bombing.

(ii) External Factors that Contributed to Serbia's Economic Crisis

During the 1970s, the Yugoslav government had fuelled growth with foreign loans. However, the result of a Western recession that started in 1975, developing into a worldwide economic depression during the 1980s, was that these foreign loans suddenly began to dry up. After 1978, for example, commercial banks virtually stopped lending money to Eastern European states. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia still needed to repay its huge foreign debt.²⁸ Thus, in 1982, the government obtained a so-called "three-year standby loan" from the IMF and, as Woodward explains,

The IMF conditions were that the government introduce domestic economic reforms to make the country better able to service its debt. It proposed, in effect, an anti-inflationary macroeconomic stabilization policy of radical austerity, trade and price liberalization, and institutional reforms to impose on firms and governments monetary discipline and real price incentives (Woodward, 1999, p.49).

All of this came at a price for ordinary people. Food subsidies were abandoned in 1982, and prices for petrol, heating fuel, food and transportation rose by one-third in 1983. Firms showing losses were obliged to lay off workers, and there was high inflation. Aggregate inflation for the period 1979-1985, for example, exceeded 1,000%, compared to a European average of less than 50% (Lampe.

²⁸ In 1971, Yugoslavia owed US \$4 billion; in 1975, she owed US \$6.6 billion; in 1978, the figure owed was around US \$11 billion; and by 1983 the figure had reached US \$20.5 billion and was still rising (Benson, 2001, p.133).

1996, p.293). Inflation, in turn, created poverty. For example, “By the end of 1984, the average income was approximately seventy percent of the official minimum for a family of four, and the population living below the poverty line increased from 17 to 25 percent” (Woodward, 1995, p.52).

Various authors maintain that the problems caused by these IMF austerity policies in Yugoslavia were a fundamental factor in the country’s disintegration. Hudson, for example, argues that, “...it was primarily the disastrous economic problems caused by the IMF economic policies imposed on Yugoslavia in the 1980s which provoked the crisis that eventually resulted in the break-up of the federal republic” (Hudson, 2003, p.2). In a similar vein, Chussudovsky contends that, “Macro-economic restructuring applied in Yugoslavia under the neoliberal policy agenda has unequivocally contributed to the destruction of an entire country” (Chussudovsky, 1996, p.29).

What is striking, however, is the number of interviewees who appear to have no recollection of how IMF policies impacted on their daily lives. Instead, many of them simply remember the Tito years as a golden era. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, recalls that, “During the time of Tito. we got credits and we had a lot of money, people were working, they had their salaries, they had their education, they had everything”. She adds, “We are nostalgic for that period” (DN). A male interviewee in Niš also says that he feels nostalgic for Yugoslavia, because it was a “divna zemlja” (“beautiful country”) (VU). Such rose-tinted memories of the past can help to explain why the interviewees are so critical of Milošević – he is seen as having robbed them of the good life they once enjoyed.

If there were already economic problems when Milošević came to power in 1989, these problems only deepened as a result of UN sanctions and the NATO bombing. Sanctions, first imposed on 30 May 1992, had extremely detrimental effects on Serbia's economy. For example, sanctions had a huge impact on prices. Thus,

After one year of sanctions (mid-1992 to mid-1993), the loss of revenue in the new Yugoslavia is estimated to be some \$25 billion, and the per capita national income has dropped by an order of ten, from around \$3,000 to \$300. In that one year, the price of bread has increased 800 times, while the price of milk has increased over 1,000 times.²⁹ GNP dropped by \$12 billion in that year, the value of foreign trade fell by \$9 billion, industrial output fell by forty percent in the first five months of 1993 over the same period in 1992, and one half of the labour-force is unemployed (Bookman, 1994, p.114).

Serbia's economy also suffered enormous damage as a result of the NATO bombing, in 1999. According to analysis by the economic group *G17*, direct damage suffered by Serbia – excluding Kosovo – amounted to approximately \$US 3.8 billion, and indirect damage amounted to \$US 30 billion. The average salary in Serbia before the war had been about 150 German Marks, whereas after the war, it was just 80 German Marks. Furthermore, several thousand people were left without a job because their factories had been destroyed (Antonić, 2002, p.282).

As we shall now see, however, it is Milošević whom the overwhelming majority of interviewees hold most responsible for Serbia's economic crisis. Moreover, what the interviewees remember most about Milošević's time in power is economic hardship and extreme poverty.

²⁹ "At the onset of sanctions, 5,000 dinars had a value of \$550, while three weeks after sanctions were imposed, their value dropped to \$2.70. In the course of three weeks in August 1992, the value of the dinar had dropped from 9 million per deutsche mark to 35 million" (Bookman, 1994, p.117).

(iii) Everyday Life in Milošević's Serbia

In the words of one male interviewee in Kragujevac, "In the history of the Serbs, starting from the seventh century, there never was a man who caused more suffering and more deaths among the Serbian people than Milošević" (MA). Echoing this, Slobodan Antonić, one of Belgrade's leading experts on the Milošević regime, argues that Milošević "can definitely be counted among the worse rulers in Serbian history. In the thirteen years of his rule, Serbia was struck by the most diverse evils" (Antonić, 2001, p.39).

As previously noted, Western literature has tended to neglect the domestic consequences of Milošević's leadership and to focus more on the regional consequences. Thus, while we know that Serbian people suffered as a result of hyperinflation and sanctions, we know very little about their daily lives and about how they were feeling during the Milošević years. This is one area in which the interview data makes an important contribution to the existing Western literature.

G, a middle-aged woman with two children in Belgrade, recalls how she struggled when her second daughter was born, in 1992.

I always needed milk powder for my baby, but the stores were empty. I remember sitting next to the telephone with a phone directory and ringing around all the pharmacies, to see if any of them had some milk powder. One pharmacy in Belgrade would have one tin, a pharmacy in Pančevo would have one or two tins, et cetera.

Owing to the food shortages, G suddenly had to learn how to make bread and other essentials. "My mother used to buy enormous bags of flour and she was always making bread. It was her way of dealing with the situation".

MA, a middle-aged man from Kragujevac, chose to temporarily leave Serbia and his family and find work abroad. In 1993, he travelled to Crete and worked for three months picking olives. “I worked hard to be able to buy four pairs of *Nike* trainers for my family. Even then, we were still very image-conscious” [laughs]. He also sold his car to get extra money. MA’s mother lived in the countryside. She had a pig and grew vegetables, and used to send her son and his family food. During the nineties, many Serbs who lived in cities and towns were heavily dependent on food parcels sent to them by friends and relatives living in the villages.

It was not only food that was in short supply. RJ, a twenty-five year old male in Belgrade, broke his ankle in 1994, while staying with relatives in Ljubovija, in western Serbia. The nearest hospital had no film to X-ray his ankle. His uncle therefore drove him, in the middle of war, across the river Drina to the nearby town of Bratunac, in *Republika Srpska*.

Interestingly, when asked about everyday life during the Milošević years, very few of the interviewees mentioned war. Instead, the overwhelming majority focused on the economic situation, associating the Milošević period with economic misery. In the words of Professor Mihailo Pantić, “Under Milošević, people lived for ten years on the existential margins. Average life was awful and disgusting. There was great instability, and people just lived from day to day”.³⁰

³⁰ Interview, Belgrade, 22 June 2004.

According to a male interviewee in Kikinda, “Most of us, when you mention the Milošević period or era, remember the hyperinflation in 1993.³¹ That was probably the worst thing that happened to us” (RP). This hyperinflation reached a peak in January 1994, when the monthly rate of inflation in Serbia averaged 313,563,558.0%. This meant that the daily rate of inflation averaged 62.02% for that month (Gordy, 1999, p.170). Thus, a kilogram of potatoes that had cost 4,000 dinars on 10 November 1993 cost 8,000,000,000,000,000 dinars on 17 January 1994 (Gordy, 1999, p.71).

The spiralling inflation created a surreal situation. According to one female interviewee in Belgrade, “...it was complete madness, like in a twilight zone. For example, you had to write nine cheques, to the maximum value, to buy one chocolate” (G). Another interviewee, a male in Čačak, recalls, “I remember my mother writing ten cheques for ten eggs” (IB). At the same time, money was constantly losing its value. As one female interviewee in Belgrade describes,

The worst year was 1993 – that was the nightmare. My salary, as an interpreter in a foreign trade company, was around two German Marks per week. And we were paid on Friday, each Friday, and it made a difference whether you received your salary before noon or after noon, because if you received your salary before noon, you could buy about five German Marks for it, maybe even seven if you were lucky. If you received it after noon, you could not buy anything, but you had to spend that money because the next morning, it was worth nothing (G).

Inflation also created widespread poverty in Serbia. For example, in March 1996, “According to some indicators, at this moment almost 70 per cent of the population of Serbia is on the verge of poverty...” (Kaljević, 1996); and the sociologist Ljiljana Mijanović maintains that in the first half of 1997, just 35%

³¹ At the end of November 1993, inflation was running at 18.7% a day; 21.190% a month; and 286 billion percent a year (Thomas, 1999, p.165).

of the Serbian population had an income sufficient to provide the bare necessities (cited in Milan Milošević, 2000b, p.54). Thus, most interviewees remember struggling to buy even basic essentials. One male interviewee in Čačak, for example, recalls that during the hyperinflation, he and four of his colleagues had to pool their wages in order to buy two hundred grams of coffee (V). To cite Stevanović, “Until Milošević came to power, modern Serbia had never experienced real hunger” (Stevanović, 2004, p.156).

Poverty, in turn, bred crime. Between 1990 and 1993, for example, the number of reported crimes in FRY rose from 120,442 to 173,642. As might be expected, the largest increase was in the number of economic and property crimes (Nikolić-Ristanović, 1996, p.613). According to Nikolić-Ristanović, “Although it was not reported officially, it is well known that during the war, almost every citizen of the FRY was involved in some illegal activity” (Nikolić-Ristanović, 1996, p.616).

Who was to blame for Serbia’s economic crisis? According to Dr Oskar Kovać, from the Economics Faculty in Belgrade, it is “rubbish” to blame Milošević. Kovać maintains that hyperinflation was the result of sanctions³², not of Milošević’s bad economic policies. He admits that, between 1992 and 1994, Serbia’s GDP dropped by almost 60%, but adds that,

...from 1994 until 1998, Serbia had rates of growth of GNP between five and six percent, which nobody had in the whole of Europe, at least not in Eastern Europe, in the so-called transition countries, because they had the so-called transitional recession. So they certainly were not bad economic

³² Sanctions were first imposed on 30 May 1992. On 16 November 1992, the United Nations imposed a naval blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, in order to enforce fuel sanctions. On 26 April 1993, sanctions were further extended, in order to freeze Yugoslav assets abroad and to prevent the transshipment of goods through the FRY.

policies if they could stop a hyper-inflation and produce for four or five years average rates of growth of five or six percent.³³

The eminent Belgrade economist Professor Kosta Mihailović similarly maintains that Milošević was not responsible for Serbia's economic troubles. He argues that,

The core of Milošević's economic policy was very practical – how to survive and to get out of that economic crisis. The conditions didn't allow for the creation of a good, consistent policy of economic development. All external conditions directed the behaviour of Serbia and the Serbian economy, so that Slobodan Milošević was not in the position to influence seriously – in either a positive or a negative sense – that policy.³⁴

Most of the interviewees, however, directly blame Milošević for the economic crisis. Some also claim that the Milošević regime benefited from the fact that people were so poor. In the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, “Milošević made the people poor and when he made them poor, he killed in them any critical opinion” (RJ). A female interviewee in Belgrade, and one of the founding members of *Otpor*³⁵, further highlights the impact that poverty had on people. She explains,

I think it's important, when I look back, that for all of the people who formed *Otpor*, our economic situation was not that bad. And I think it gave us the freedom to focus on something else. And, of course, on the other side, if you are very involved with helping your family or working everyday for some small salary, you don't have the same inspiration or ignition to do something. And I think that's something very important – that we more or less had the freedom to focus on *Otpor* (MJ).³⁶

³³ Interview, Belgrade, 7 May 2004.

³⁴ Interview, Belgrade, 15 July 2004.

³⁵ *Otpor* (“The Peoples' Movement of Resistance”) was created by students from the Philosophy Faculty in Belgrade, in late October 1998. It had some 70,000 members, and about 80 offices throughout Serbia. With its very simple and direct message, “Gotov je!” (“He's finished!”), *Otpor* played a key role in bringing about the downfall of the Milošević regime. It was an NGO until December 2003, when it became a political party.

³⁶ Such arguments can also be found in the existing Western literature. Gordy, for example, contends that, “As long as individuals were severely hindered in their private lives, the regime maintained its ability to act unobstructed in the public sphere” (Gordy, 1999, p.176). In a similar vein, Sell maintains that, “forced to expend more and more physical and mental energy for their day to day survival, people simply did not have the time or the strength left over to oppose the regime” (Sell, 2002, p.194). Such arguments do not, however, explain why people actively supported the regime.

What is very clear is that many interviewees experienced feelings of powerlessness during the Milošević years, and poverty most certainly contributed to such feelings. However, these feelings were more complex than simply economic powerlessness. People felt powerless against a regime that exerted strong control over their lives. In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade, “The worst thing about living under Milošević was the feeling that you were not in control of your own life. You felt that someone else was controlling it” (G).

Research by *TNS Medium Gallup*, in April 2000, suggests that such feelings were widespread. The 1088 respondents were asked the question, “Do you believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the decisions made by the national government?” Only 1.8% answered “Almost always”, and 65.0% answered “Almost never” (TNS Medium Gallup, 2000).

Some interviewees dealt with the situation through escapism. According to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee, “Drugs and alcohol were very cheap during that period. It was a bad way to try and escape reality”(SK). For his part, a male interviewee in Belgrade recalls, “My favourite place in Belgrade was the National Library. It was my place of refuge” (ZG).

Some interviewees also describe feeling powerless to change the West’s very negative opinion of the Serbs.³⁷ A male interviewee in Čačak, for example,

³⁷ Hockenos claims that, “Most of the world’s diplomatic players came to judge Serbia, embodied in Milošević, as the principal antagonist, even if no one side deserved exclusive blame” (Hockenos, 1993, p.108).

explains, "I felt very sad and angry about how the West was portraying the Serbs, and I didn't know what we could do to correct the West's opinion of us" (IB). According to a female interviewee in Belgrade, this sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the West came to a head during the NATO bombing.³⁸ She argues, "We all felt completely helpless in regard to NATO and in regard to Slobodan Milošević, because it seemed like we were between the hammer and the nail. It was two big forces that just kind of turned your life around" (MJ).

A male interviewee from Belgrade, moreover, claims that these feelings of powerlessness still exist today. He explains,

What I personally lost with Milošević's regime is that when you go to any foreign country and say that you are from Serbia, people look at you differently. They look at you as if you were some barbarian [laughs], or as if you come from some country that has nothing, knows nothing...and I don't think that the new government – any new government in the near future – will have the power or the strength to change that. It's going to stay for a long time (SC).

In addition, some interviewees felt powerless in the context of their family lives. For example, a male Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica, made a refugee in 1999, describes feeling helpless at not being able to do anything for his mother and brother who were living in a collective centre in Vranje (RN). Younger generations sometimes felt powerless to express different beliefs and opinions to their parents. As one male interviewee, a Kosovo Serb now living as an IDP in Belgrade explains, "In 1996, the younger generation started to think in another way, but we didn't have enough power because our parents were for Slobodan Milošević" (SP). Another interviewee, a

³⁸ Writing during the NATO bombing, John Simpson noted, "The majority of people in this country feel like prisoners at present, hideously vulnerable to an outside force which can strike them at any time it chooses, according to a logic they cannot understand" (Simpson, 1999).

female living in Novi Pazar, describes how she voted for Milošević simply in order to fit in with her family (SM).

Closely linked to their feelings of powerlessness, many interviewees also describe feelings of humiliation. In part, poverty was the cause of this humiliation. One female interviewee in Kikinda, for example, recalls that,

In 1993, I couldn't afford even a potato. I used to wake up in the morning without any dinars even for bread. I felt so humiliated, and I had doubts about myself as a parent, because I couldn't provide basic food for my family. I felt that I was not clever enough, not smart enough (SU).

A second reason for peoples' sense of humiliation was that they could no longer travel freely. Milošević's Serbia became an international pariah and suddenly Serbs could no longer travel without visas.³⁹ For many, this was extremely humiliating. In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade, "I remember when I used to travel to England without visas, and I also know very well what it's like now when you want to travel anywhere, and the feeling that we are in some kind of cage and under some kind of punishment. Still!" (G).

Some of the interviewees emphasize that it was very different when Tito was President. At that time, according to one female interviewee in Belgrade, "Everybody loved us and it was a great feeling. You could go everywhere and everybody was polite to you. And you really had the feeling that you could be proud of coming from Yugoslavia at that time" (LC). A male interviewee in Čačak similarly argues that, "Before Milošević. Yugoslavia was a military

³⁹ Even today, Serbs still need visas to visit most countries.

force in the world, and with the red Yugoslav passport you could go anywhere” (IB).

A third major feeling that some interviewees describe is fear – fear of having to fight in war.⁴⁰ A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, recalls,

It was in 1992, the first time, when maybe five or six of my male friends escaped because they didn’t want to go to the Army. There were wars and there was an extreme fear of what could happen to you. And it was always safer to go out of the country than to even risk being sent to the Army (MJ).

For his part, Janko Baljak, a documentary producer for *B-92*⁴¹, describes how he managed to avoid being mobilized, by sleeping in a different place every night. “Every day, the police would come to my mother’s house, and she would tell them that I was away from Belgrade, shooting a documentary somewhere”.⁴²

For some, however, the idea of fighting a war was very attractive. In the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade,

War gave people – particularly unemployed people - a sense of pride and purpose. When they joined the army, they were given nice uniforms, they got a good salary, and they felt important. It’s very easy to make a war where there are a lot of people without jobs (SZ).⁴³

⁴⁰ Some of the national minority interviewees also experienced this fear. A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, recalls how, “Many of us - many of us young people - went to psychologists, and in that way we avoided serving in Milošević’s army. They liked to recruit ethnic minorities to fight in those wars” (AN). A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee, moreover, claims that when he was in his fourth year of secondary school, there were only three males left in his class. The other ten had left for Germany, Switzerland, and other countries, due to fear of having to serve in the army (LF).

⁴¹ *B-92* was created in 1989. It was closed down on 9 March 1991 (during the large street demonstrations led by Vuk Drašković), and was also closed down for two days at the beginning of December 1996 (again, during the big street demonstrations provoked by the local election results). It was then closed down the night before the NATO bombing started, and was taken over during the bombing. Today, however, it has resumed broadcasting and is now a television network.

⁴² Interview, Belgrade, 30 June 2004.

⁴³ Woodward similarly argues that, “In the early stages of the conflict, the unemployed provided ready fighters because they were promised wages and benefits” (Woodward, 1999,

Now that we have a clearer image of what ordinary Serbian people experienced and felt during the Milošević years, it is perhaps easier for us to understand why, as we saw in chapter 5, so many of the Serbian interviewees consider that Milošević's greatest crimes were committed against Serbia and against Serbs. In turn, once we understand this, we thus have an important context, or frame of reference, within which to assess the interviewees' opinions of Milošević.

What is clear is that in contrast to the existing Western literature, which primarily judges Milošević from a normative perspective, the Serbian interviewees largely judge him from a socio-economic perspective. They do not regard him as a "bad" leader for having lost four wars (in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo). Instead, as we have seen, they particularly blame him for making them poor and for creating an economic crisis.

We have seen why, according to the Serbian interviewees, Milošević was a "bad" leader. We can now examine a second image of Milošević that emerges from the interview data – as a victim.

Section 3 – Milošević as a Victim

Although it proved extremely difficult to find interviewees willing to admit that they had supported Milošević⁴⁴, it is clear that there is, nevertheless, considerable sympathy for him among Serbs. This sympathy manifests itself not only in interviewees' attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal, to be

p.364). In 1993, for example, there were 450,000 unemployed people in Serbia (Kaljević, 1996).

⁴⁴ Of the forty-nine ordinary Serbian interviewees, only six said that they still support Milošević today, and only four admitted that they had supported Milošević in the past.

examined in chapter 8. It is also reflected in the perception that some interviewees have of Milošević as a victim.

Firstly, Milošević is seen as a victim of those around him. According to Aleksander Nenadović, for example, the former editor-in-chief of *Politika* and a fierce Milošević critic, “Milošević was pushed by those who had more knowledge and more experience than he did”, for example the intelligentsia. These “empty heads”, as Nenadović describes them,

were eager to help Milošević and to convince him that if he wanted to be successful, then he should listen to them - they would provide him with arguments. Milošević loved the love that was offered to him by these people.⁴⁵

Professor Mihailo Marković, moreover, claims that the people around Milošević simply used him. According to Marković, sanctions enabled a small number of private individuals to become extremely rich, and

Milošević believed that these rich businessmen would be his natural opponents, because they would naturally be against any kind of socialist idea...But he wrongly believed that he could make them his allies. He would organize them into a Party, which was JUL, and his own wife would lead that Party. So these ‘nouveau riche’, as the French say, would become his friends, his allies, but that was a devastating idea and an idea with very big consequences, because there was a terrible contradiction here. We have rich people in a very poor country, and these rich people get all kinds of privileges because they are in one of the ruling organizations. And that was their motive, in fact, for being interested in this alliance with Milošević, because they would get privileges. They would be protected and their money and their riches would be protected. And they would be able to promote their business using those privileges.⁴⁶

If Milošević was a victim of those around him, he is seen above all as a victim of his wife, Mira. According to a male interviewee in Belgrade, for example,

⁴⁵ Interview, Belgrade, 21 May 2004.

⁴⁶ Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004.

I think that a big, big factor in his decision-making was his wife. Mira, who influenced him so much.⁴⁷ And I think that he just lost touch with reality by listening to her, her decisions, her opinions, and also to some of the people who just wanted to stay in power. That's why they kept him misinformed (SC).

A male interviewee in Kragujevac expresses a similar opinion. He argues that,

In the beginning, Milošević was a good leader for Serbia. He started off very well. His mistake was that he listened to his wife. Some of the things he did he did only because of Mira, and the nation suffered as a result. She was a megalomaniac for power, control and money. She wanted more and more, and she is guilty for everything (DZ).

Concurring with such views, Saša Mirković, the director of *B-92*, claims that, "Milošević had this crazy wife who was manipulating and who, in the end, was probably the most responsible for the Milošević catastrophe".⁴⁸

Mira's influence on Serbian political life was particularly evident after 1994, following the creation of JUL, a pro-Yugoslav and Marxist party, which quickly became very powerful.⁴⁹ Indeed, according to Djukić,

...the Socialist Party was shaken from its roots by YUL, which quickly established itself as the most influential Serbian party. Suddenly, 'the regime' no longer referred to the Socialists but to YUL, even though it was in fact a minority party (Djukić, 2001, p.84).

There were important similarities between the SPS and JUL. For example, both parties presented themselves as parties of the left, and both parties claimed to promote the welfare of disadvantaged citizens.⁵⁰ The close

⁴⁷ According to Cohen, "Mirjana's influence grew considerably during the 1990s as Milošević's position was becoming increasingly more precarious, and as his inner circle of friends and loyal advisors gradually shrank" (Cohen, 2001, p.113).

⁴⁸ Interview, New Belgrade, 14 June 2004.

⁴⁹ For example, although JUL failed to win a single seat in the Serbian legislature in 1993, two cabinet ministers came from JUL. Furthermore, according to research by the Institute for Social Sciences in Belgrade, the SPS was 13.3 times more powerful than JUL, and yet in 1997, the SPS acquired only 4.3 times more seats in the legislature than JUL (Milan Milošević, 2000b, p.97).

⁵⁰ In contrast to the SPS, however, whose main support, as we have seen, came from the poorest sections of society, such as peasants and pensioners, such people were not among JUL's membership. According to Djukić, "Marković's Serbia was a place where the rich got

relationship that developed between the SPS and JUL culminated in the November 1996 federal elections, when the two parties entered into a coalition (together with the *New Democracy* party), and in March 1998, when the SPS formed a coalition government with JUL (and the SRS).

Some commentators, however, maintain that the close relationship between the two parties was based purely on strategic calculations. According to Thomas, for example,

It was reasoned that if support for the SPS waned amongst Serbs then minority groups, for whom the SPS was irrevocably tainted with nationalism, might be persuaded to cast their votes for an apparently 'non-nationalist' party of the left (Thomas, 1999, p.229).

For his part, Pribičević claims that JUL was founded "to support Milošević as well as satisfying Mirjana Marković's ambition to take an active part in politics" (cited in Milan Milošević, 2000b, p.99).

The relationship between the SPS and JUL, moreover, created deep divisions within the ranks of the SPS. Mihailo Marković, for example, the Vice-President of the SPS from 1990 until 1992, strongly disapproved of his Party's dependence on JUL and Mira Marković. In his view, "JUL did not represent a real Left.⁵¹ Its members were just thieves and profiteers, so they could not be in an alliance with the SPS".⁵²

richer and the poor could only hope for better times. Virtually none of her followers was poor, and most belonged to the nation's political and financial elite" (Djukić, 2001, p.167).

⁵¹ When Professor Marković suggested that JUL was not a credible party, Mira replied that he was a "decrepit academician and infantile Socialist" (cited in Djukić, 2001, p.84).

⁵² Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004.

On 28 November 1995, Mihailo Marković, Borisav Jović and Milorad Vučelić – the main critics of Mira and JUL⁵³ - were dismissed from the SPS executive committee and replaced with people of whom Mira approved. Emphasizing Mira's influence on her husband, Mihailo Marković maintains that she was behind these dismissals. He claims that, "While Milošević had been in Dayton, Mira informed him that some people in the SPS were preparing a conspiracy against him. She named Jović, Vučelić and myself".⁵⁴

The second sense in which the Serbian interviewees see Milošević as a victim is as a victim of himself and his own weaknesses. According to a female Bosnian Serb refugee in Kosovska Mitrovica, Milošević had good intentions but was not wise enough to help the Serbs in Kosovo. She argues that, "He did not have enough political wisdom to do the things he wanted to do" (NM). A male Kosovo Serb interviewee, also in Kosovoska Mitrovica, likewise claims that, "Milošević did not have good politics, but he did have good intentions" (ZT).

A female interviewee in Čačak, moreover, maintains that although Milošević made many mistakes, above all his failure to pay attention to the wishes of Europe and the United States, nevertheless "Everything that Milošević did he did because he was trying to protect Serbian citizens" (VS). These claims that Milošević had good intentions are especially interesting because, as we have seen, those Western authors that regard Milošević as a criminal leader emphasize the criminal nature of his intentions.

⁵³ According to Vučelić, "Milošević's biggest mistake was creating JUL" (Interview, Belgrade, 5 June 2004).

⁵⁴ Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004.

For others interviewees, Milošević was a victim of his own misguided beliefs. According to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gračanica, for example, “Milošević is convinced that he was right and that he was doing the right thing for the people” (ALD).⁵⁵ Professor Stojanović similarly feels that Milošević saw himself as a sincere supporter of the Serbian cause. He argues,

It’s simply not true...that somehow Milošević, from the very beginning, was deep inside himself manipulating the Serbian national interests and Serbian emotions and Serbian patriotism. He simply believed that he was, actually, ready to do everything possible in order to defend Serbian national interests when it became quite obvious that Yugoslavia would fall apart.⁵⁶

These claims that Milošević had good intentions and a deep-felt, if misplaced, conviction that he was acting in the best interests of Serbia and of the Serbian people, make him appear more tragic than criminal. In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade,

Everything that Milošević was fighting for and dreamed of is in mud now. He had the role of a superhero who would save his own people, and now he is in the role of a super butcher who destroyed his own people. He was loved, and he so believed in his role as a saviour – as someone who would give his people a better life. He fought for the freedom of his country. Now, he is a prisoner and his country is a prisoner too. He is a prisoner of those who made war here, and his nation is a prisoner of money. That is the reason why he is a tragic person. He fought for freedom, and what happened? (MM).

Thirdly, Milošević is seen as a victim of Western powers. According to this view, Milošević stood in the way of Western, in particular American interests.⁵⁷ Thus, he was an obstacle that needed to be removed. A male

⁵⁵ A male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade shares this view. He argues, “I think that Milošević really thought that he was doing what was best for Serbia. He wasn’t just a bad guy who decided to become rich and powerful. It’s just, he saw himself as a sort of national messiah or something. And people believed him” (IG).

⁵⁶ Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

⁵⁷ Professor Mihailo Marković argues that, “The Balkans became an area of which the United States and its allies needed to have control, because of long-term projects in the Middle East and Central Asia, connected with oil” (Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004).

interviewee from Čačak, for example, claims that, “Saddam stood in the way of America’s interests, just as Milošević did” (L).

This is not to say that the West was always against Milošević. Indeed, several interviewees claim that, in the beginning, Milošević was the West’s man. A male Kovovo Serb interviewee, for example, argues that, “It is not possible to stay in power for ten years without support from the West” (ZT). Expressing a similar view, a male interviewee in Belgrade claims that,

Milošević appeared in Serbia out of nowhere, so to speak, and he had a very fast rise in the political life of Serbia. That’s really strange, you know. He had to have had some backing from the West, from the United States itself, and in the beginning I think he was their man (SC).

However, there is a widespread belief among interviewees that once Milošević had served his purposes, the West saw him as a nuisance and thus turned against him. In the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, “Maybe they wanted him in power for all those years, and when he was no longer of any use, they just decided to throw him away” (SC). A second male interviewee in Belgrade claims that Milošević and Serbia had become a liability. In his view,

at some point, when the West saw that any form of cooperation was too expensive for them, they just decided that it was easier for them to fight and to overthrow Milošević. I think that they used a cost effective scheme. They simply calculated that it wasn’t paying - it wasn’t worthwhile to negotiate with him. Generally the Serbs, Serbia, were an example of a rogue state – a state that obeys no orders. And the West estimated that such an example of a state could not be tolerated (RJ).

According to a third male interviewee in Belgrade, and a Milošević supporter, it is because Milošević refused to be the West’s “yes man” that he is now sitting in a courtroom in The Hague. In the interviewee’s words,

Milošević is on trial only because he resisted against very unjust demands from abroad. That is his only guilt. If he had listened to the West’s demands and conditions, he would not have been transferred to

The Hague Tribunal. That is sure. It's quite sure that he could have been the greatest killer, but if he had followed the West's wishes and tastes, he wouldn't have been punished (DB).

In a similar vein, Aleksa Djilas maintains that, "If Milošević had signed the Rambouillet accords, he would have been treated for hyper-tension in Walter Reed hospital" (a top hospital in Washington that treats foreign dignitaries and politicians).⁵⁸

The representation of Milošević as a victim is interesting for three particular reasons. Firstly, it is fundamentally at odds with the Western construction of Milošević as a criminal leader. Secondly, it illustrates that interviewees' feelings towards Milošević are highly complex, and sometimes ambiguous.⁵⁹ They see him not in very black and white terms, as either a villain or a hero, but rather in terms of grey. Finally, the view of Milošević as a victim is important because it gives us some insight into interviewees' attitudes towards the West. In particular, it is a view that attests to the sense of general powerlessness that many interviewees appear to feel vis-à-vis the West.⁶⁰

Exemplifying this sense of powerless, a male interviewee in Belgrade argues,

I think that the destiny of Slobodan Milošević, Yugoslavia, and all the people of the Balkans was designed somewhere else, many years before the conflict actually broke out. Western powers were just using our

⁵⁸ Interview, Belgrade, 20 May 2004.

⁵⁹ Other researchers have highlighted the ambivalence of public opinion. Jovan Teokarević, for example, a researcher at the *Institute for European Studies* in Belgrade, argues that, "The basic characteristic of public opinion in FRY during 1995 was instability, confusion and inconsistency in the dominant values" (cited in Nikolić, 2002, p.74).

⁶⁰ It is not surprising, therefore, that according to the results of research on threat perception by SMMRI, in December 2000, Serbs regard the West as a significant threat to Serbia. For example, when asked about threats coming from Western nations, 70% of the 1133 respondents said they regarded Americans as highly threatening to Serbia, 57% identified Germans, and 55% said they saw the British as highly threatening (SMMRI, 2000, p.17). These results are interesting because they show that Western nations are seen as posing a greater threat to Serbia than other nations in the region.

history. Knowing the history of this peninsula or region, they knew just where and how to spark the conflict. And it just unfolded spontaneously afterwards (SC).

In a similar vein, a female refugee from Bosnia claims that,

Yugoslavia was just an open laboratory for somebody to perform experiments on and to see how the people in Yugoslavia would react. The people were like mice. Maybe it was a step towards achieving some particular goal – for example, the relocation of NATO bases from Germany to the Balkans, or to Russian territory. The aim was not to conquer the Balkans territorially. The aim was to make the Balkans into a unique market, and thus make a profit (B).

Some Western commentators will no doubt dismiss such arguments as pure conspiracy theories. However, the fact that many of the interviewees justifiably feel that the West contributed to the destruction of Yugoslavia cannot be simply dismissed as some sort of conspiracy theory. It should also be noted that where conspiracy theories do exist, they themselves reflect feelings of powerlessness. To cite Ashraf, “Conspiracy theories often serve an important social function, helping to assuage certain kinds of anxiety among group members...” (Ashraf, 1997).⁶¹

If ordinary Serbian people continue to feel powerless, this further underscores the importance of further bottom-up research that gives these people a voice.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the two dominant images that the Serbian interviewees have of Milošević. According to the interviewees, he was a “bad”

⁶¹ Knight sees a connection between conspiracy theories and globalization. In his view, “In many ways conspiracy thinking has become not so much the sign of a crackpot delusion as part of an everyday struggle to make sense of a rapidly changing world. Given that the forces and institutions of globalization are affecting countless people across the planet, it is no surprise that a conspiratorial sense of being the victim of invisible and indefatigable forces is an everyday attitude in many countries” (Knight, 2002, p.7).

leader because he cared only about himself and not about the Serbian people; because he was incompetent; because he surrounded himself with bad people; and because the consequences of his rule were very bad. Some of the interviewees, however, also/alternatively view Milošević as a victim. They see him as a victim of the people around him (especially his wife), of himself, and/or of the West.

The fact that the Serbian interviewees do not regard Milošević as a criminal leader does not necessarily mean that the dominant Western view of Milošević is wrong. In other words, the external image of Milošević as a criminal leader is not “invalid” because it finds little support among the Serbian interviewees. It is, however, an image that is problematic from a domestic perspective. In short, the interview data can be read as a rejection both of Western conceptions of the criminal leader, and of the particular normative standards that inform these conceptions.

The implications of this are clearly very significant. Milošević has not merely been externally constructed as criminal, but has also been put on trial in The Hague for war crimes. The very existence, however, of alternative domestic images of Milošević poses a problem for these legal proceedings against him in The Hague. That is to say that if the Serbian interviewees and, by extension, the Serbs as a nation, do not see Milošević as a criminal leader, and if they do not buy into the normative standards that have so strongly influenced the creators of the Tribunal as well as the Prosecution in Milošević’s trial, this raises questions about whether and to what extent the Tribunal can actually

succeed in achieving its declared goals – peace and justice. It also raises questions about the very meaning of “justice” – “justice” according to whom? The final chapter in this thesis will now explore the attitudes of both the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees towards The Hague Tribunal. Since the Serbian interviewees overwhelmingly do not see Milošević as a criminal leader, we should expect them to be far more antagonistic towards the Hague Tribunal and far more opposed to Milošević’s trial than the national minority interviewees who, as we have seen, largely support the image of Milošević as a criminal leader.

Chapter 8

Interviewees' Attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal

Introduction

The *International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991* (ICTY) was created by the UN Security Council, on 25 May 1993 (Security Council Resolution 827).¹ It is empowered to try cases involving (i) grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, regarding the treatment of soldiers and civilians in wartime (ii) violations of the laws and customs of war, (iii) crimes against humanity, and (iv) genocide. In contrast to the existing Western literature, the Tribunal is concerned not with Milošević's moral culpability, but with his legal culpability. Within the courtroom, it is facts that matter, not values.

The Prosecution's case against Milošević rests on demonstrating his participation in a "joint criminal enterprise", a concept discussed in chapter 2. It also rests on establishing Milošević's "command responsibility" – it must prove that he personally ordered killings to be committed, or that he knew about atrocities being committed and chose not to stop them.² In other words, command responsibility is responsibility for both acts and omissions. This is

¹ It is important to note that the UN Security Council, in fact, has no actual authority to create courts, a point to which we shall return in section 1.

² The trial of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, before the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, established the principle that high political officials and military commanders have a positive responsibility to ensure they know about acts being committed under their command, as well as to prevent and punish violations of international humanitarian law, even in cases where conditions were such as to prevent them from actually knowing about these violations. Yamashita was sentenced to death for atrocities that troops under his command had committed in the Philippines in 1944.

significant because, as we have seen, the normative construction of Milošević as a criminal leader emphasizes his actions, not omissions.

The existing Western literature criminalizes Milošević for having caused the wars in the former Yugoslavia. What matters to The Hague Tribunal, however, is not who is responsible for having started the wars³, but rather who is responsible for the terrible crimes committed during those wars. Thus, Milošević has not been indicted for starting the wars, although according to Gordy, "...many Serbs believe that Milošević is being tried for having started the wars or for bringing about the destruction of Yugoslavia" (Gordy, 2003, p.57).⁴ Rather, Milošević has been indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, relating to the wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

In his famous typology of different types of guilt, Karl Jaspers distinguishes between criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical guilt (Jaspers, 2000, p.34). In practice, however, the distinctions are often less clear-cut. In the particular case of Milošević, it can be argued that there has been an equation of moral and political culpability with legal culpability. While on the one hand this raises questions about whether Milošević can receive a fair trial, what his trial has

³ In contrast to the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo, the Hague Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with the so-called "crime against peace", defined as the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for any of the foregoing" [Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal] (Woetzek, 1962, 122).

⁴ Ivanisević similarly argues that, "Most persons in Serbia believe that the tribunal is trying Slobodan Milošević for having started the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in pursuit of creating a 'Greater Serbia'" (Ivanisević, 2003).

itself highlighted is the difficulties of establishing legal culpability in practice.

To cite Ivanisević,

Many Western observers expected the tribunal to rapidly confirm the accepted wisdom that Milošević was responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Yet they failed to appreciate the important difference between determining political responsibility in the realm of public opinion and establishing criminal responsibility in a court of law (Ivanisević, 2004).

The very fact that the trial is taking so long highlights this.⁵ The Nuremberg trials, in contrast, were concluded in ten months.

If moral/political culpability and legal culpability have been equated, so too have individual and collective guilt, according to many of the Serbian interviewees. There is a widespread feeling among them that the Tribunal wants to establish not just Milošević's culpability, but also the collective guilt of the Serbian people. This is despite repeated insistence by the Tribunal that it wholly rejects the concept of collective guilt. Speaking on 22 May 2001, for example, the newly appointed Registrar of the Tribunal, Hans Holthius, stated that,

By focusing on individual responsibility, the founders of the Tribunal wished to prevent the stigmatisation of a whole national, ethnic or religious group and to neutralize those persons who sustain the climate of hatred and nationalism which caused the terrible chaos (cited in Beigbeder, 2002, p.94).⁶

We have so far learnt that there is considerable support among the national minority interviewees, although not among the Serbian interviewees, for

⁵ Milošević's ill health has contributed to delays in the trial process.

⁶ Jaspers himself dismisses the notion of collective guilt. In his view, "It is nonsensical...to charge a whole people with a crime. The criminal is always an individual. It is nonsensical, too, to lay moral guilt to a people as a whole...Morally one can judge the individual only, never a group" (Jaspers, 2000, p.36). He adds that, "To pronounce a group criminally, morally or metaphysically guilty is an error akin to the laziness and arrogance of average, uncritical thinking" (Jaspers, 2000, p.36).

Milošević's normative criminalization. By examining the attitudes of both the Serbian interviewees (section 1) and the national minority interviewees (section 2) towards The Hague Tribunal, the aim of this final chapter is to discover whether and to what extent there is support among the interviewees for Milošević's legal criminalization.

Section 1 – The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees

Among the Serbian interviewees, attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal are surprisingly diverse. We can identify three main viewpoints. The first viewpoint is that Milošević should have been tried in Serbia, not in The Hague. According to the second viewpoint, it is right that Milošević is in The Hague. The third viewpoint, which is held by only a small minority, is that Milošević should not be on trial at all. We can now explore in more detail each of these three positions.

(i) Milošević Should Have Been Tried in Serbia, Not in The Hague

According to Gordy, "Surveys indicate that a broad majority of the Serbian people would like to see Milošević prosecuted, albeit for violations of Serbian – not international – law" (Gordy, 2003, p.59). Supporting this, the prominent feeling among the Serbian interviewees is that Milošević's trial should have been held in Serbia.⁷ The reason that interviewees most frequently give is that it was Serbs who were Milošević's biggest victims.⁸ According to a male

⁷ More generally, according to research by SMMRI, in August 2004. 71% of the 1245 respondents (adult citizens of Serbia) said that war crimes trials should take place in Serbia, rather than in The Hague. Trials held in domestic courts, according to 66% of respondents, would be fairer and more impartial than trials held in The Hague (SMMRI, 2004, pp.11-12).

⁸ It will be recalled from chapter 5 that the majority of the Serbian interviewees believe that Milošević's biggest crimes were committed against Serbia and against the Serbian people.

Kosovo Serb interviewee in Belgrade, for example, “I think that Serbian people should have tried Slobodan Milošević, because he did more to us than to anybody else” (SP).

A female refugee from Bosnia similarly maintains that, “If there is something to judge Milošević for, it is the Serbian people who should judge him, because he brought the country into war, he created an economic disaster and he made Serbian people poor” (B). Nikola Lazić, the international secretary of the DSS agrees. He argues, “I think that it was necessary for Milošević to be tried in Serbia, in order to show here the real light, the full truth about his regime”.⁹

It is important to note that the charges brought against Milošević by the Serbian authorities, following his arrest in April 2001, themselves reflect such views. These charges, namely financial violations related to embezzlement and abuse of office, referred only to Milošević’s alleged misdeeds in Serbia.

The second reason that Milošević should have been tried in Serbia, according to the Serbian interviewees, is that he will not get a fair trial in The Hague.¹⁰

In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade, “Western propaganda

⁹ Interview, Belgrade, 28 May 2004.

¹⁰ Certainly, it can be argued that the Tribunal’s rules and procedures heavily favour the prosecution. To cite Chandler, “...because, like Nuremberg, the Tribunal was established on an ad hoc basis to try certain crimes with a preconceived aim, there was little pretence that defendants’ rights would be safeguarded” (Chandler, 2002a, p.141). Chandler emphasizes that, “There has been little pretence of judicial impartiality. The first president of the Tribunal publicly declared that the Bosnian Serb leaders, Karadžić and Mladić, were ‘war criminals’, a presumption of guilt which would have disqualified him in domestic legal systems” (Chandler, 2002a, p.142). Furthermore, the defence may be barred from access to documents or information that may be “contrary to public interest or affect the security interests of any state”, and “...Tribunal rules allow a judge or trial chamber to take measures to prevent disclosure of the identity or whereabouts of a victim or witness, on the pretext that they must be protected from reprisals” (Johnstone, 2002, p.103).

wants to make one person guilty for everything and to finish the job that Western governments started ten years ago. Milošević is a tragic person, and finally he's a tragic victim of what's happening" (MM).

One reason that Milošević will not get a fair trial, according to some interviewees, is that the Tribunal lacks independence.¹¹ For these interviewees, it is a political court dominated by American interests. A male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, claims that, "The Hague Tribunal is an American instrument for removing political opponents" (SZ).

In a similar vein, Vladislav Jovanović describes the Tribunal as "A terrible political instrument to fulfil the policy of the United States".¹² In October 2000, Vojislav Koštunica, Milošević's successor and a strong opponent of the Tribunal, also claimed that, "The Hague court is not an international court, it is an American court and it is absolutely controlled by the American government" (cited in Bass, 2003, p.93).¹³

A second reason why Milošević's trial is seen as unfair is that the institution conducting the trial is itself unfair, by failing to treat all sides equally. The Belgrade journalist Vladimir Milić, for example, argues that, "Tudjman and Izetbegović were never accused of war crimes. The Hague Tribunal waited for

¹¹ Echoing this view, Chandler maintains that, "the Tribunal lacks any independence from the major world powers, particularly the United States" (Chandler, 2002a, p.143). The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg suffered similar criticisms. As Woetzel notes, "...the fact that the Allies conducted the trial and that Allied judges served on the tribunal, has led to the political criticism that it was a trial of the vanquished by the victors, and, therefore, an act of political policy rather than a judicial proceeding" (Woetzel, 1962, p.xi).

¹² Interview, Belgrade, 24 May 2004.

¹³ Johnstone emphasizes that, "...the Tribunal has been heavily dependent on the government of the United States, which sponsored its creation and provided it with personnel, resources, and information needed to formulate indictments" (Johnstone, 2002, p.94).

them to die, and then said that it had been planning to indict them both".¹⁴ He further claims that, "This has contributed to anti-Western and pro-Milošević feelings in Serbia. People see it as a question of justice – if Milošević is the only leader that the Court sees as guilty, then the Serbs will get behind him".¹⁵

The Belgrade intellectual Aleksa Djilas makes a similar argument. In his view,

It is unjust that Tudjman died peacefully in his bed, in December 1999, and was never indicted by the Tribunal, despite all the terrible things he did. There would have been greater support for the Tribunal in Serbia if Tudjman had also been put on trial, instead of just Milošević.¹⁶

There is, moreover, a feeling among interviewees that others besides Tudjman and Izetbegović should have been put on trial for their actions. According to a female interviewee in Čačak, for instance, "Those outside of Yugoslavia should also be tried for the damage that they did, like the NATO generals. They should be prosecuted for so-called 'collateral damage'" (VS). In a similar vein, a female Kosovo Serb interviewee, now living as an IDP in Belgrade, argues that, "The Tribunal does not deal with every war crime. If it did, then Clinton and Blair would also have been put on trial for their war crimes against civilians in FRY" (SNP).

Some Western commentators themselves hold similar views. Chomsky, for example, claims that, "The Tribunal instantly discredited itself in the Balkan case by excluding crimes committed by NATO" (cited in Hamilton, 2001); and Laughland argues that by refusing to prosecute NATO for war crimes, the Tribunal has given "tacit legal approval" to the organization's attempts to turn

¹⁴ According to LeBor, "Officials at the ICTY confirm that had Tudjman lived, he would have been indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity" (LeBor, 2002, p.254).

¹⁵ Interview, Belgrade, 23 May 2004.

¹⁶ Interview, Belgrade, 20 May 2004.

itself into “a worldwide police force with an effectively unlimited mandate” (Laughland, 2002). For his part, Chandler contends that, “The only reason for the lack of investigation into NATO actions would appear to be the close links between the two institutions” (Chandler, 2002a, p.145). In his view, moreover, “The creation of the ICTY provides a striking case study of the current institutionalisation of legal and political inequality in the international sphere” (Chandler, 2002a, p.141).

The Serbian interviewees see the Tribunal as having a particular bias against Serbs.¹⁷ Notwithstanding the repeated insistence by Tribunal spokespeople that it is individuals, not nations, who are on trial, there is a widespread belief among the interviewees that the entire Serbian people are being judged.¹⁸

According to a male interviewee in Belgrade, for example,

I think that the Court’s only purpose is to sentence Milošević, and to close the story about ‘the Great Butcher from the Balkans’, to close the story about Serbian aggression towards Bosnia and Croatia, to make the Serbs bear guilt – the kind of guilt that even the Germans at the end of World War Two were not made to carry (RJ).

Expressing a similar view, a male interviewee in Čačak contends that, “The Hague is an ad hoc tribunal, created only for judging the nations of the former Yugoslavia, and above all the Serbs. Somebody must be blamed for everything, and the Serbs are guilty because they lost the wars” (V).

¹⁷ It is not, therefore, surprising that according to research on threat perception by SMMRI, in December 2000, 58.0% of the 1133 respondents polled viewed The Hague Tribunal as highly threatening to Serbia (SMMRI, 2000, p.21).

¹⁸ Milošević himself has encouraged this belief. For example, in his Introductory Statement to the Hague Tribunal, on 13 February 2002, he argued that, “Over the past two days all the prosecutors that we have heard have uttered one particular sentence – that they were just trying an individual...But in all the indictments they accuse the whole nation, beginning with the Serbian intelligentsia and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences” (Milošević, 2002, p.136).

According to former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Živadin Jovanović, moreover, such views are widespread.¹⁹ He claims that, “Most of the Serbian people see the Tribunal as a continuation of the one-sided policy of the West – that Serbs must be condemned for all consequences of the wars in the former Yugoslavia”.²⁰ The Bosnian Serb writer, Gojko Berić, however, is far more cynical. In his opinion, the theory of collective guilt “has been of the greatest importance to the Serbs, since it did away with any individual responsibility. If an entire people is guilty, it goes without saying that no one is individually to blame” (Berić, 2002, p.281).

What is clear from public opinion research is that the Tribunal is generally very unpopular in Serbia. Gredelj, for example, summarizes the findings of a survey in mid-February 2001 by *Argument*, on a representative sample of 910 adult citizens of Serbia. He argues that the respondents

manifest a high level of (reactive, situational) agreement with some of the most widespread negative stereotypes about this institution which are increasingly placed in public, despite their dubious nature: ‘The Hague Tribunal is an instrument of NATO policy’ (72% of respondents agree); ‘The Hague Tribunal is a political tribunal and serves as a means of political pressure on Serbia’ (67% agree); ‘As concerning Croats and Muslims, only the “small time offenders” are called before The Hague Tribunal’ (68% agree); ‘Secret indictments are contrary to law’ (63% agree); ‘The Hague Tribunal declares all the accused guilty in advance’ (55% agree) (Gredelj, 2001, p.255).

In a survey by the weekly Serbian newsmagazine *NIN*, in July 2001, 72% of Serbs said that the Tribunal is “illegitimate”, even though 57% said that Milošević is responsible for war crimes (Bloche, 2001). At this point, it should

¹⁹ Some Western commentators hold similar views. Johnstone, for example, contends that, “...the planned conviction of Milošević by the ICTY was designed not only to justify the NATO bombing, but also to establish Serbia’s guilt for all the wars of Yugoslav disintegration” (Johnstone, 2002, p.120).

²⁰ Interview, Belgrade, 17 May 2004.

be emphasized that Western critics of the Tribunal similarly argue that it is illegitimate, on the grounds that it was created by an institution – the UN Security Council – that has no authority to set up courts.²¹ In the words of Johnstone, the creation of the ICTY was thus “an ingenious usurpation of judicial authority, which clearly overstepped the Security Council’s mandate as envisaged by the authors of the Charter” (Johnstone, 2002, p.93). The fact, therefore, that the Tribunal was flawed from its very inception can help us to understand the interviewees’ criticisms of, and lack of trust in the ICTY.

According to the *South East Europe Public Agenda Survey* in 2002²², trust ratings for The Hague Tribunal were lowest in Serbia (8%) and in *Republika Srpska* (4%) (International Institute for Electoral Assistance, 2002). Supporting this finding, research by SMMRI, in 2003, 2004, and 2005, also shows that there is little trust in the Tribunal among Serbs. In each year, 69% of respondents said that they had no trust in the ability of the Tribunal to judge indicted Serb nationals impartially, on the basis of established facts. Similarly, in each year, only 10% of respondents said that they did trust the Tribunal to judge Serbian nationals fairly (SMMRI, 2005, p.20).

In research by SMMRI in August 2004, the 1245 respondents were asked what they considered to be the primary purpose of holding war crimes trials in The Hague. Of these, 74% saw in the Tribunal some sort of conspiracy theory.

²¹ On 27 May 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 827, in which it determined that the situation in the former Yugoslavia – particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina – amounted to a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

²² The survey involved a total of 10,000 face-to-face interviews conducted during January and February 2002 in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

According to 12% of respondents, the primary purpose was to establish a new world order, headed by the United States; 30% said the main purpose was to judge Serbia and the Serbs, and thereby justify the NATO "aggression" of 1999; and 32% maintained that the principal purpose of the trials was to make Serbs guilty for all the suffering that occurred during the wars, in order to place Serbia in a position of dependency on the international community (SMMRI, 2004, p.29).

According to the same research, 70% of respondents (compared to 85% in 2003) said that it was necessary to co-operate with The Hague Tribunal. However, of this 70%, only 15% of respondents said that such co-operation was necessary to bring about justice. For 33% of respondents, co-operation with the Tribunal was essential to avoid new sanctions being imposed on Serbia; and 22% were in favour of co-operation on the grounds that this was a prerequisite for Serbia's re-integration into the international community (SMMRI, 2004, p.28).

Similar research in April 2005, involving 1205 respondents, shows that 76% now favour co-operation with the Tribunal. However, only 17% regard co-operation as a means to achieve justice. The majority support co-operation with the Tribunal simply on the basis that this will benefit Serbia. For 32% of respondents, co-operation is necessary to avoid sanctions, and 27% consider such co-operation to be a necessary precondition for Serbia's re-integration into the world community (SMMRI, 2005, p.17).

Between 20 and 27 April 2005, *TNS Medium Gallup* also surveyed Serbs about their attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal. Of the 1494 respondents, 611 (40.9%) expressed extremely negative attitudes towards the Tribunal, and 321 (21.5%) expressed somewhat negative attitudes. Only 118 respondents (7.9%) displayed somewhat positive attitudes, and only 32 (2.1%) were very positive about the Tribunal (TNS Medium Gallup, 2005).

Most recently, between 6 June and 12 June 2005, *Marten Board International* asked 1234 respondents if they supported the delivery of Serbian citizens to the Hague Tribunal. Of these respondents, 17.5% answered “absolutely”, and 20.1% said “mainly yes”. It is noteworthy that the percentages of those who answered “mainly no” and “absolutely not” were slightly lower - 15.5% and 18.8% respectively (Marten Board International, 2005). It is significant that this research was conducted shortly after The Hague Tribunal released footage of members of a Serb paramilitary group, the *Scorpions*, killing Muslim men on Mount Treskavica, south-west of Srebrenica, in 1995. Several Serbian television stations broadcast the video on 2 June 2005.

While there is a growing acknowledgement on the part of many Serbs that co-operation with The Hague Tribunal is necessary, there is no doubt that it remains highly unpopular. According to Dimitrijević, the Prosecution is heavily to blame for this. In his view,

...the Prosecution played into Milošević’s hands. Instead of addressing the massive number of Serb TV viewers, poisoned by nine years of anti-Tribunal propaganda, and telling them that the trial was about *ius in bello*, about violations of humanitarian law irrespective of the origin of the conflict and the rightness and wrongness of the aims of the parties in

conflict, the prosecutors started with a recital of Serbian history and of the plans for Greater Serbia (Dimitrijević, 2002, p.2).

Echoing this, Gordy argues that, “the tribunal has not really invested enough energy to explain its goals and procedures, and establish its legitimacy, to the people in the countries where it has oversight” (Gordy, 2003, p.61). Recent public opinion research by SMMRI supports this argument. According to the research, conducted in April 2005, of the total 1205 respondents only 6% said that they were very informed about the organization and workings of the ICTY. In contrast, 72% said that they were not well informed (29% said they knew little about the Tribunal, and 43% said they knew very little) (SMMRI, 2005, p.6).

Gordy also claims that, “The prosecution, through its choice of witnesses, sometimes plays right into his [Milošević’s] hands” (Gordy, 2003, p.61). For his part, Nikolić blames the Serbian government. He argues that,

Milošević is in The Hague, but Serbia does not know why. The government and the media under its influence do not explain to the population the reasons for it, nor do they document the crimes of which he has been accused (Nikolić, 2002).

In addition to these criticisms, there is a more fundamental issue to consider: are the Tribunal’s twin objectives of achieving peace and justice²³ actually compatible? According to a male interviewee in Belgrade, “If Milošević is found guilty, and if Serbia and Montenegro are sentenced to pay war damages

²³ At the start of Milošević’s trial, on 12 February 2002, the chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte declared that, “This Tribunal is one of the measures taken by the Security Council acting for all Member States of the United Nations to restore and maintain international peace and security. That is our purpose, and our unique contribution is to bring to justice the persons responsible for the worst crimes known to mankind” (Del Ponte, 2002). Beloff, however, emphasizes that in the years between Nuremberg and the creation of the ICTY, there had been some thirty-four civil wars, many of them causing far more deaths than the wars in the former Yugoslavia. “Yet Washington has never felt it necessary to show why ‘justice’ was required only in the case of Yugoslavia” (Beloff, 1997, p.91).

to the other republics, there will never be peace in the Balkans...So this is really the true danger that lies in his trial..." (RJ).

This suggests that the establishment of a true and lasting peace requires that not only is justice done, but is also seen to be done – by all sides.²⁴ If not, the danger is that some will seek their own forms of justice, thus bringing further instability and bloodshed to the region. To cite Kent, "If, somewhere along the way, the parties involved do not come to feel that legal justice has actually been done, the cycle of reprisals cannot be broken for good" (Kent, 1995).

The difficulty, however, is that justice has no uniform or universal meaning. Like the concept of the criminal leader itself, justice is a contested concept, at both an inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic level. Personal experiences and interests shape conceptions of justice. Thus, as Johnstone argues, the Tribunal's slogan "no peace without justice" "may well be a formula for eternal war when justice on one side of the mountains is injustice on the other" (Johnstone, 2002, p.96).

If, therefore, the notion of justice is essentially contested, is not the Tribunal's pursuit of this elusive ideal likely to obstruct, rather than to facilitate, the process of peace and reconciliation?²⁵ Chandler, for example, maintains that, "The international attempt to judge selective acts of the Bosnian war as war

²⁴ According to a recent study, based on interviews conducted between March 2000 and July 2002 with survivors (in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Rijeka and Banja Luka) of the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, 79% of survivors believe that justice has not been served. Only 6% of survivors interviewed for the study said they were satisfied that those who had committed crimes were being investigated, prosecuted and punished (Kole, 2005).

²⁵ In a recent address at *Goldman Sachs* in London, on 6 October 2005, Carla Del Ponte declared that, "Our primary objective is to bring justice, thereby contributing to the process of reconciliation between peoples who have been torn apart by the wars of the nineties" (Del Ponte, 2005).

crimes has meant that ten years after the war ended there has been little chance for reconciliation” (Chandler, 2005).

It might be argued, however, that the “justice” administered by The Hague Tribunal is to a large extent symbolic. It is about conveying the message that the international community will not and does not tolerate human rights abuses and war crimes. Substantive justice, in contrast, has a more tangible, grassroots impact. It directly affects peoples’ lives and, therefore, more directly affects the process of peace and reconciliation. To cite Chandler, “Postwar reconciliation has little to do with legal judgements and much more to do with the practice of getting on with life and developing shared interests in the present” (Chandler, 2005). From this point of view, the fact that so many of the Serbian interviewees express a wish to forget the past can be regarded as something positive – as a desire to move forwards.

The third reason why, according to some of the Serbian interviewees, Milošević should have been tried in Serbia is that he would have had a much tougher time in a Serbian prison than in The Hague. In the words of one male interviewee in Čačak,

Milošević should be in our prison, not having a nice life there. He should be with prisoners who are in prison because of him. I think that he wouldn’t survive a night in our prison...He has to thank those people who sent him to The Hague (IB).

Another male interviewee in Čačak similarly feels that The Hague is too good for Milošević. He argues that, “Milošević should be put in the stocks and people should throw things at him. He should not be sitting in an air-conditioned court wearing a suit” (V). Such arguments support Gordy’s claim

that, “There is no reason to believe that people who object to the ICTY believe that Milošević is innocent. Most Serbs feel that he is guilty of something” (Gordy, 2003, p.59).

(ii) It is Right That Milošević is in The Hague

A second group of interviewees consider it right that Milošević is standing trial in The Hague. Although they give a number of different reasons, the most common reason proffered is that Milošević could not have been properly tried in Serbia. According to one male interviewee in Kragujevac, for example.

If Serbia had a proper legal system, judges, et cetera, Milošević should have been tried in Serbia, rather than in The Hague, because his biggest crime was against the Serb people. But given the weaknesses of the judicial system in Serbia, it is better that Milošević is now in The Hague (MA).²⁶

Other interviewees feel that the possible consequences of Milošević being tried in Serbia are sufficiently serious to warrant his trial being held in The Hague.

One female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, argues that, “If he were here, maybe there would be some demonstrations or some kind of fights. And it’s much better for peace inside the country that Milošević is not in Serbia” (DN).

Another female interviewee in Belgrade considers that if Milošević were tried in Serbia, “he would manage to make himself into some kind of hero” (G).

It should, however, be pointed out that those interviewees who approve of Milošević being in The Hague do not necessarily support the ICTY as an

²⁶ Bass similarly argues that, “In a perfect world, it would have been better to put Milošević on trial in a Serbian court in Belgrade, just as it would have been better to put the top Nazis on trial before a German court in Berlin...But a Belgrade trial would have helped matters only if it were a real war crimes trial – one that produced the kinds of revelations about Bosnia and the self-styled Krajina Serb republic that are emerging now in The Hague” (Bass, 2003, p.86).

institution.²⁷ One male interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, explains that while deficiencies in the Serbian judicial system make it necessary for the trial to be in The Hague, he himself does not support the Tribunal, on the grounds that it is a political court (DK).²⁸ Echoing this, a male Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica claims that, “The Hague Tribunal is a place where international law is broken. It is a political court” (ZT). For her part, Professor Ljubinka Trgovčević, the Vice-Dean of the Political Science Faculty in Belgrade, explains, “I was asked to testify for the Prosecution, but I said no because I see the trial as political”.²⁹

Finally, some interviewees feel that while Milošević should be tried in The Hague, he should also be tried in Serbia. To cite Branka Prpa, “...Serbia’s victims have the same rights as other victims to satisfaction in the form of justice”.³⁰ A female interviewee in Kikinda, for example, believes that, “Milošević should be tried in Serbia as well as in The Hague, because of the people here – the people who suffered while he was leader. He has to pay for what he did” (D). In a like manner, a female interviewee in Novi Pazar maintains that, “It is right that Milošević was sent to The Hague, but he should also have been tried in Serbia, in order to give Serbs the opportunity to say how they felt when he was in power” (SM).

²⁷ According to Gordy, “All institutions, past or present, domestic or international, consistently register low confidence levels in public opinion surveys. Repeatedly, institutions are regarded as relatively closed, corrupt, and working against the interests of ordinary people” (Gordy, 2003, p.59).

²⁸ Kerr maintains that, “In the international arena, law and politics are inextricably intertwined. This was reflected in the establishment of the Tribunal and in its operation” (Kerr, 2004, p.208). She further argues, however, that, “The Tribunal was established as a tool of politics, but it was a judicial not a political tool” (Kerr, 2004, p.210).

²⁹ Interview, Belgrade, 19 July 2004.

³⁰ Interview, New Belgrade, 28 July 2004.

(iii) Milošević Should Not Be On Trial At All

A small minority of Serbian interviewees take the view that Milošević should not be on trial at all, either in The Hague or in Serbia. For the tiny number of Milošević supporters in the sample, Milošević should not be standing trial because he is an innocent man. A male Milošević supporter in Belgrade, for example, explains, “When I see him in The Hague, I can compare him with Jesus. Why? Because Milošević is innocent and is in court, and that court will find him guilty. He’s not guilty” (AB). Another male Milošević supporter, also in Belgrade, contends that if Milošević were to be tried in Serbia, this would only be the lesser of two evils. Yet, “It would be evil too, because Milošević really doesn’t deserve to be put on trial for any, any reason in this world. It’s a kind of foolishness, because it’s something like Kafka’s trial” (DB).

There are also a very small minority of interviewees, not Milošević supporters, who maintain that Milošević cannot be held accountable for his actions and, therefore, should not be standing trial. According to a male refugee from Croatia, for example, “Milošević shouldn’t be tried. He was the president” (DNO). This interviewee considers that if Milošević did something wrong, it was up to the Serbian people to vote against him. Another male interviewee, in Čačak, contends that, “Milošević cannot be held accountable for the actions of individuals. Kennedy was not guilty for what American soldiers did in Vietnam, and Milošević is not guilty for what Serbian soldiers did” (L).³¹

³¹ As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, however, according to the principle of command responsibility, a high political official or military commander can be held responsible for the crimes of his subordinates if he knew about crimes being committed and did nothing to stop them.

Section 2 – The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees

As we have just seen, there is strong opposition to The Hague Tribunal among the Serbian interviewees, the majority of who consider that Milošević should have been put on trial in Serbia. In contrast, all except one of the national minority interviewees approve of Milošević being in The Hague.³² According to a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade, for example, “I was very happy to see Milošević leaving for The Hague, like most of the people around”. He adds, “I see the Tribunal as a very good institution, and I’m very glad that it exists” (IG).

For some of the national minority interviewees, Milošević could simply not have been properly tried in Serbia. A female Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Priština, for example, argues that, “It is better that Milošević is tried in The Hague, rather than in Serbia. If he were tried in Serbia, he would not be punished for the deeds that he did” (TG). According to a male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar, “You know, it’s very hard for the Serbs to see what Milošević has done. He ruined them. He ruined them” (AD). A second male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar, moreover, believes that the Serbs are simply not ready, or not willing, to deal with the past. He argues,

It is better than Milošević is being tried in The Hague rather than in Serbia. Serbs avoid talking about what happened during the nineties, and if they are against Milošević today it is because he lost the wars, not because he started them (NV).³³

³² The three Roma interviewees in the sample were not asked about The Hague Tribunal, mainly because the interviews were of very short duration. The Roma interviewees were asked mainly about the economic situation in Serbia both today and when Milošević was in power.

³³ The interview data itself does not support this latter point. As we have seen, the Serbian interviewees regard Milošević as a “bad” leader primarily on the grounds that he made them poor and destroyed the Serbian economy, not because he lost the wars.

However, according to one male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, it would have been very beneficial to the Serbs if Milošević had been tried in Serbia. In the interviewee's view,

For the Serbian people, it would have been better if Milošević had been tried in Belgrade. Serbs are not fully aware of the atrocities committed on Milošević's orders since he was very smart to conceal them. If Milošević had been tried in Serbia, the Serbs would have had the opportunity to learn the full extent of atrocities ordered by him. However, it is good for the region that Milošević is being tried in The Hague (AR).

While there is an almost total consensus among the national minority interviewees that Milošević should be in The Hague, not all interviewees agree on the main purpose of the trial. For most of the interviewees, the priority is that Milošević be punished for his actions. In the words of one male Slovak interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, "Milošević has to explain why he did what he did and he has to be punished for that. Many people died. Many people still have many problems – financial, psychological, and health problems" (JG).

A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, moreover, emphasizes that Milošević's crimes against Serbs should not go unpunished. He argues, "Milošević is a war criminal, but the problem is that he is on trial for his crimes in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia, and not for his crimes in Serbia, for example the murder of people like Stambolić³⁴ and Čuruvija³⁵" (RK). However,

³⁴ Ivan Stambolić, Milošević's erstwhile mentor and the former president of Serbia, was mysteriously kidnapped while out jogging, on 25 August 2000. His body was later discovered in 2003. Milošević and his wife are believed to have been involved in Stambolić's murder.

³⁵ Slavko Čuruvija was a journalist who became openly critical of the Milošević regime. He was made to pay the price and was gunned down on his doorstep, on 12 April 1999. His partner, Branka Prpa, was interviewed as part of the present research.

according to a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade, Milošević has been made a scapegoat. The interviewee maintains that,

Some people in Serbia took Milošević and they put all their internal guilt into his personality. People that were voting for him, and who should feel at least a little share of guilt, were happy to see him in The Hague because they were purified by him leaving. Do you understand what I'm trying to say? It was much easier to blame one person – and I'm talking about Serbs now – than to blame oneself (IG).³⁶

For his part, a male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn emphasizes that justice is not simply about just deserts. He argues, "It is right that Milošević is in The Hague, and he should be given a fair trial there. Truth is relative – it has two sides. It is not absolute. Milošević's version of the truth should be heard also" (LF).

A small minority have very negative views about the trial process and its purpose. One male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vučitrn, for example, asks, "What good can come of Milošević's trial? No one can compensate for all those losses" (IL). A male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar is equally pessimistic. In his view, "I think that Milošević will never pay for what he has done" (AD).

A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Novi Sad expresses mainly indifference towards the Tribunal. In his words, "It's a real comedy in The Hague. How is Milošević in the Court without a lawyer? I don't want to hear

³⁶ A female Serbian interviewee in Belgrade expresses a similar view. According to her, "...it is very ugly of people in Serbia to now say, 'Let's judge him', because those were the people who voted for Milošević. It's very ugly, you know - it's a shame. I'm ashamed that I live in a country where people talk and behave like that. It's a national shame – really a national shame. And no one will respect such a nation, you know" (MM).

about him. Just send him to a village, give him a big house and let's forget about him" (AN).

A second male ethnic Hungarian interviewee, in Subotica, however, is strongly opposed to the Tribunal. For him, "The crimes for which Milošević has been accused in The Hague are crimes for which many others – including Tony Blair – could also be accused". He adds, "I don't think that the Tribunal will prove Milošević's responsibility in the right way. They don't have the right proof or the right motives. They have mainly political motives (MB). Interestingly, it will be recalled that both of these arguments made by interviewee MB are also voiced by some of the Serbian interviewees.

What we have seen is that there is far greater support among the national minority interviewees than among the Serbian interviewees for the ICTY. The attitudes of the Serbian interviewees vis-à-vis the Tribunal are consistent with the two main images of Milošević that emerge from the Serbian interview data. Milošević's image as a "bad" leader is reinforced by the widespread belief among interviewees that he should have been tried in Serbia, on the grounds that his biggest crimes were against Serbia and the Serbian people.

Similarly, the image of Milošević as a victim is buttressed by claims that he is being tried by an unfair, politically motivated tribunal that lacks independence and has a strong bias against Serbs. The claim made by Milošević's supporters that he is an innocent man who should not be standing trial at all further reinforces this image of him as a victim.

The attitudes of the national minority interviewees towards the Tribunal, in contrast, are consistent with their support for Milošević's construction as a criminal leader. Seeing Milošević as a criminal leader, these interviewees consider it only right that he is standing trial for his crimes in an international court of law. Their support for the ICTY thus shows that they approve of Milošević's criminalization in both a normative and legal sense.

Milošević's trial is likely to end in the summer of 2007. If, as seems most likely, he is found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity³⁷, it would be very interesting to know what impact such a verdict would have both on interviewees' attitudes towards the Tribunal and towards Milošević himself. Would a guilty verdict, for example, mean that the Serbian interviewees start to see Milošević more as a criminal leader, at least in legal terms, than as a "bad" leader? Conversely, what effect would a not-guilty verdict have on the opinions of the national minority interviewees? Clearly, further bottom-up research of this kind would be extremely useful and valuable once the trial is over. If the Tribunal does deliver a guilty verdict, we could then re-formulate our research question: is Milošević the convicted war criminal a criminal leader?

Conclusion – Some Final Reflections

The hostility and opposition that so many of the Serbian interviewees express towards the Hague Tribunal reflect their belief that Milošević is not a criminal leader, but rather a "bad" leader and/or a victim. The existence of these alternative images of Milošević, in turn, raises important questions about the

³⁷ He is far less likely to be found guilty of genocide, owing to the difficulty of establishing the requisite *mens rea* –intention to commit genocide. He is more likely to be found guilty of the lesser charge of conspiracy to commit genocide.

Hague Tribunal, not least the question of whether the Tribunal can achieve “justice” and what exactly “justice” means in this context.

Whilst the significance of the interview data and its main findings has been clearly demonstrated, it is anticipated that some Western commentators will nevertheless challenge this on normative grounds. That is to say they will argue that a normative reading of the interview data leads to the conclusion that the Serbs are in denial, and therefore unable to give an objective assessment of Milošević’s leadership. In other words, it was inevitable that the Serbian interviewees would not see Milošević as a criminal leader. This type of argument, however, is over-simplistic.

Firstly, it is wrong to automatically assume that just because the Serbian interviewees overwhelmingly view themselves as Milošević’s biggest victims and emphasize his crimes against Serbs, this necessarily means that they are in denial. Serbia’s economic situation is such that people perhaps feel that their major priority today is not confronting the past, but rather dealing with the present and finding a way to make ends meet. It should be noted, for example, that, “an estimated 800,000 people – 10 per cent of the population – live on an income of less than 2.40 Euros per day” (European Agency for Reconstruction in Serbia, 2004).

Many people in Serbia today are particularly concerned about living standards. For example, according to recent research by *Marten Board International*, in June 2005, of the 1234 respondents, only 10.7% said that their current living

standards were good. In contrast, 38.0% said that their living standards were average, 29.8% said that they were bad, and 16.3% said that they were very bad (Marten Board International, 2005).

Furthermore, only 17.3% of respondents said that they expected their living standards to improve within the next six months. Attesting to the Serbs' general lack of optimism about the future, 41.1% of respondents said that they expected their living standards to remain the same, and 26.7% said that they expected them to worsen (Marten Board International, 2005). In this context, the desire that many of the interviewees express to simply forget the Milošević period can be seen as a form of coping mechanism, rather than deliberate denial of past events.

Secondly, the Serbs were widely demonized during the nineties, with the result that their own suffering received little international attention or sympathy.³⁸ During the NATO bombing in 1999, for example, John Simpson, the *BBC*'s World Affairs Editor, was in Belgrade, reporting on the war. As a result of this, he received "large amounts of hate mail from people who didn't want to be told what it was like to be on the receiving end of NATO's bombing" (Simpson, 2001, p.286). Not surprised by this, he explains, "...I always knew I would get a lot of grief for sleeping with the enemy; or at any rate living, working and to some extent suffering with them" (Simpson, 2001, p.286). The world, in short, was not interested in hearing about the Serbs' pain and misery.

³⁸ To cite Handke, "so many international magazines, from 'Time' to the 'Nouvel Observateur', in order to bring the war to their customers, set up 'the Serbs', far and near, large and small, as the evildoers and 'the Muslims' in general as the good ones" (Handke, 1997, p.76).

In view of this, it is perhaps not surprising that the interviewees want to emphasize what they themselves endured during the nineties.

Thirdly, although this research focuses primarily on the Serbs, it is very possible that had the interviewees been mainly Croats or Muslims, they too would have focused on their own sufferings during the nineties. For example, referring to the establishment by the international community of a war crimes tribunal in Bosnia, Srdjan Dizdarević, president of the *Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia*, argues that, “The court will face strong pressure from nationalists from all three [ethnic groups] who insist that they were the victims; that they fought to protect their [people] and that in a defensive war there are no war crimes” (cited in Freebairn, 2004).

In a similar vein, Amor Masović, a member of the Bosnian Muslim *Party of Democratic Action (SDA)* is of the opinion that, “A considerable part of the Bosnian public is not ready to face the truth and admit that crimes were committed” (cited in Freebairn, 2004). For his part, the British journalist Jonathan Steele claims that, “...Serbia is largely still in a state of denial about the crimes committed in its name – and the same applies to Croatia” (Steele, 2005).

Fourthly, the Serbian interviewees work with a particular frame of reference. In contrast to the existing Western literature and the national minority interviewees, the Serbian interviewees primarily judge Milošević within a domestic context, rather than within a regional context. Moreover, as their

view of Milošević as a bad leader highlights, they judge him mainly from a socio-economic perspective, rather than from a normative perspective. This, in turn, gives some clues as to why people may have supported Milošević. If, as the analysis of Milošević's speeches suggests, his economic pledges significantly contributed to his popularity, any moral condemnation of the Serbs for lending their support to Milošević becomes problematic.

Finally, and most importantly, the discrepancy that this research has revealed between the dominant Western image of Milošević as a criminal leader, and the domestic images of him as a "bad" leader and/or victim, should not be interpreted as evidence that Serbian morality is flawed. Instead, it should be seen as evidence that, to cite E.H Carr, "Theories of international morality are...the product of dominant nations or groups of nations" (Carr, 1939, p.101).³⁹ In other words, it is the morality of the most powerful that prevails. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the image of Milošević that has prevailed in international politics is as a criminal leader.

If morality is a reflection of power, the implications of this extend to the legal sphere. In theory, the gradual erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity means that any leader can be put on trial. The realities of international politics, however, make it unlikely that powerful Western leaders will ever stand trial, even when they unleash illegitimate wars.⁴⁰ In his capacity as British foreign

³⁹ More recently, Chandler has argued that, "The strength of the West in relation to Eastern Europe ensures that Western claims to exert moral authority over the region remain uncontested" (Chandler, 2000, p.32).

⁴⁰ Johnstone notes that, "Of course, the very idea of indicting the president of the world's greatest military power seems utterly preposterous. It is indeed preposterous because of the relationship of forces" (Johnstone, 2002, p.122).

secretary, for example, the late Robin Cook once remarked of the Hague Tribunal that, “this is not a court set up to bring to book the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom or Presidents of the United States” (cited in Chandler, 2002a, p.145). In other words, just as the criminal leader is not a universal concept, neither, it would seem, is the administration of justice.

Various commentators argue that what we are in fact witnessing is the erosion of sovereign equality. Franceschet, for example, contends that, “Particularly in recent years, unequal sovereign equality has been a more salient feature of the application of international law, thus making for non-universal legal and political relationships among states and societies” (Franceschet, 2005). For his part, Chandler refers to “a new epoch of unequal sovereignty” (Chandler, 2001). In conclusion, therefore, rather than distinguishing between criminal and non-criminal leaders, perhaps the key distinction is between indicted criminal leaders and un-indicted criminal leaders.

Conclusion

This final part of the thesis will begin by summarizing the chapters and their main findings. It will proceed to a discussion of both the limitations of the research and its contributions to the existing Western literature on Milošević, as well as to international history and IR. It will then open out the thesis to explore some broader issues. Firstly, it will examine some of the possible consequences of criminalizing leaders. Secondly, it will consider how the current “War on Terror” has affected the notion of criminal leaders. Thirdly, it will reflect upon some of the wider implications of the research. Finally, it will make some suggestions for future research that build upon this thesis and its findings.

Thesis Summary

The thesis was divided into two parts, built around the two main research questions – is Milošević a criminal leader, and how should we study a criminal leader? Part I of the thesis was literature-based and laid down the fundamental foundations upon which the empirical part of the thesis - Part II - was built.

Chapter 1 provided the reader with an overview of existing Western literature on Milošević, focusing on the dominant image of him as a criminal leader. It explored how Milošević has been constructed as a criminal leader, breaking this construction down into its component elements. It identified four key elements. The first of these elements, and the most significant, was Milošević’s actions and intentions. According to the literature, Milošević was the person most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, he planned

these wars in advance, he planned and premeditated Serbian crimes committed during the wars, he used violence to achieve his aims, and he incited ethnic hatred.

The second key element was Milošević's motivations – the literature portrays him as a leader motivated by power and prepared to ruthlessly pursue power whatever the human cost. Milošević's personality and psychology constituted the third element in his construction as a criminal leader. The literature depicts him as a reclusive and warped individual with various negative personality traits, such as mendacity and narcissism. The fourth and final element was a comparative element, whereby Milošević is compared to other "criminal" leaders, past and present.

The chapter argued that Liberalism constitutes the theoretical underpinnings of Milošević's criminalization. It sought to show that he was perceived in Britain and in the United States as a threat to liberal peace and values, and to thereby highlight the extent to which policy considerations played a part in Milošević's construction as a criminal leader.

The final part of the chapter examined some alternative viewpoints in the literature. It first examined two alternative images of Milošević – as an improviser and as an obstacle to the West. It then examined some alternative explanations of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. These alternative explanations, rather than seeing Milošević as the main cause of the wars, instead emphasize the role of circumstances, both internal and international.

Chapters 2 and 3 moved the discussion away from the particular case of Milošević, but like chapter 1 they formed an indispensable part of the thesis. To answer the question of whether Milošević is a criminal leader, it was important to consider the notion of the criminal leader in more general terms. Chapter 2 sought to explore how this notion actually arose, by linking it to certain developments in IR, such as the erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity and the normative turn within the discipline.

The second part of the chapter attempted to develop the concept of the criminal leader. Drawing upon both the literature on Milošević and the broader IR literature, it identified four key dimensions of a criminal leader – namely a behavioural dimension, a character dimension, an institutional dimension, and a policy dimension. It argued that the policy dimension is the most significant, underscoring the fact that the criminal leader is an externally constructed – and thereby an essentially contested – concept.

If the criminal leader is externally constructed, this raises the important question of whether the leader is seen by his own people as criminal. The key argument made in chapter 3, therefore, was that the criminal leader must be studied not only from above, but also from below. The chapter first sought to explain why, in theory, the criminal leader should be studied from below. Four main reasons were given. In particular, it was argued that since leadership is a relationship, it is not possible to adequately study the criminal leader by focusing only on one half of that leadership relationship – the leader himself. Instead, we must also examine the second half of that relationship – ordinary

people. By exploring how ordinary people see their leader, we can thus ascertain whether and to what extent their views are congruent with external views.

The chapter then sought to demonstrate why the criminal leader should be studied from below, using examples of bottom-up research on the Hitler and Stalin regimes. The insight into these regimes that such research has generated not only highlights the value of bottom-up research. Since both Hitler and Stalin can be regarded as paradigm cases of the criminal leader, it also supports the argument that we can gain crucial insight into the criminal leader by exploring his leadership from the bottom up. The concept of the criminal leader, developed in chapter 2, was accordingly modified to include a fundamental domestic dimension, the importance of which the data chapters would confirm.

Part I of the thesis, therefore, answered the question of how one studies a criminal leader. The objective of Part II was to find out whether the image of Milošević as a criminal leader finds support outside of Western literature, by analyzing two important primary sources – Milošević's speeches and qualitative interview data. This, in turn, would allow us to answer the question of whether and to what extent Milošević is a criminal leader, according to these sources.

Chapter 4 analyzed Milošević's main speeches between 1987 and 2000. To find out whether these speeches support the image of Milošević as a criminal

leader, the chapter focused on two particular claims that Western literature makes about him – the claims that he planned the wars in the former Yugoslavia and incited ethnic hatred. It argued that Milošević’s speeches do not support either of these claims and provide no evidence of his imputed “criminal” intent. It further argued that Milošević’s speeches, particularly his 1989 Gazimestan speech, have been heavily misrepresented through highly selective quoting; and that only when certain sentences or paragraphs of individual speeches are taken totally out of context and looked at in isolation can they be seen as lending any support to the literature’s claims.

Moving from the top down to the bottom up, chapters 5 to 8 sought to explore whether and to what extent ordinary people in Serbia support the image of Milošević as a criminal leader, using qualitative interview data. While some elites were included in the interview sample, the overwhelming majority of the interviewees were “ordinary” people, both Serbs and national minorities.

Chapters 5 and 6 were structured around the four key elements of Milošević’s construction as a criminal leader, as set out in chapter 1. The aim was to find out whether and to what extent the Serbian and national minority interviewees support the various claims that Western literature makes with respect to each of these four elements. It was argued that, overall, the national minority interviewees support Milošević’s construction as a criminal leader, although not as a racist. In contrast the Serbian interviewees, it was argued, do not see Milošević as a criminal leader. Rather, they view him above all as a “bad” leader.

Chapter 7 explored this image of Milošević as a “bad” leader. It began by identifying the four senses in which, according to the Serbian interviewees, Milošević was a bad leader – namely, he cared only about himself and about power; he lacked competence and ability; he surrounded himself with bad people; and the consequences of his rule were very bad for the Serbian people and for the country. The chapter then examined a second image of Milošević that emerged from the Serbian interview data - as a victim. We saw that Milošević is considered a victim of those around him, in particular his wife; a victim of himself; and/or a victim of Western powers, above all the United States. It was argued that these alternative images of Milošević are very significant, in particular because their existence poses a problem for the legal proceedings against Milošević in The Hague and for the Tribunal’s professed aim of achieving “justice”.

Chapter 8 built on this argument by examining the attitudes of both the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees towards The Hague Tribunal. It argued that, as might be expected, the national minority interviewees overwhelmingly approve of Milošević being in The Hague, and thereby support both his normative and legal criminalization. In contrast, it showed that the Serbian interviewees are overwhelmingly opposed to Milošević’s trial in The Hague and to the ICTY itself. The majority opinion among them is that Milošević was a bad leader whose biggest crimes were against his own people. According to the interviewees, therefore, the Serbs themselves should have put Milošević on trial.

It was recognized that some might claim, based on a normative reading of the interview data, that the Serbs are a nation in denial and, therefore, unable to see Milošević as criminal. However, it was counter-argued that rather than reading the interview data as evidence of a flawed Serbian morality, the data should instead be interpreted in accordance with E.H Carr's observation that it is the morality of the most powerful that prevails. This reality, it was claimed, helps to explain the discrepancy this thesis has exposed between the Serbian interviewees' view of Milošević and the dominant Western view of him as a criminal leader.

Limitations of the Research and its Contributions to the Existing Western Literature

Like any piece of research, the present research has certain limitations. Three in particular can be highlighted. Since these have already been discussed elsewhere, a summary will suffice here. Firstly, because the interviews are retrospective, the research can only tell us what the interviewees think about Milošević today. It cannot tell us what they thought about him during the nineties. Nor can it tell us anything about how, or why, interviewees' opinions of Milošević changed over time. In short, the research is limited to the extent that it only tell us whether and to what extent the interviewees today support the image of Milošević as a criminal leader.

A second limitation of the research is that it cannot tell us whether and to what extent the opinions and attitudes expressed by the interviewees are representative of public opinion as a whole. The use of public opinion polls to complement the interview data indicates that some of the opinions expressed

by the Serbian interviewees do reflect Serbian public opinion more broadly. However, neither the interview data nor the public opinion poll data can tell us, for example, whether and to what degree the perception of Milošević as a “bad” leader and/or a victim is widespread among Serbs.

A third limitation of the research, and one that is unconnected to the interview data, is that, for practical reasons of time, it does not examine certain sources, most notably Serbian newspapers. Although Serbian language training was successfully undertaken, it would simply have been too time-consuming to undertake a systematic survey of Serbian newspapers, given that time in the field was limited. The thesis does, however, refer to certain authors whose work focuses on the Serbian media, such as Thompson (1994) and Bennett (1995). Moreover, as will be recalled, some of the elites interviewed as part of this research work in the media, most notably Aleksander Nenadović, the former editor-in-chief of *Politika*.

It is, however, important to underscore that, “There are no perfect research designs. There are always trade-offs” (Patton, cited in Marshall and Rossman, 1999, p.42). Virtually all research has certain flaws and weaknesses. It should also be emphasized that despite the thesis’ particular limitations, its achievements are considerable. It makes three very significant contributions to the existing Western literature on Milošević.

Firstly, through its strong interview data, the thesis makes an important empirical contribution to the literature. The fact that the existing literature is,

overall, surprisingly weak in this area makes the interview data particularly valuable. Above all, this data broadens and enriches our understanding of the Milošević regime, by providing us with a more detailed and nuanced picture.

Through its analysis of Milošević's speeches, which as previously emphasized have been heavily neglected, the thesis makes a second important empirical contribution to the existing literature. This analysis not only draws attention to crucial speeches that are never cited. It also demonstrates the extent to which certain speeches have been strongly misrepresented.

Thirdly, through its emphasis and exploration of the view from below, the thesis makes a worthy bottom-up contribution to a literature that is heavily top-down in its approach. In this way, the thesis provides critical insight into the opinions and experiences of two particular groups of people that the existing literature neglects – ordinary Serbian people and national minorities in Serbia.

This research, however, contributes not only to area studies. The bottom-up work of scholars such as Peukert (1987) and Kotkin (1995) has stimulated an important debate in international history about how one should study regimes like those of Hitler and Stalin. Through its use of a bottom-up approach, the thesis contributes to this debate in a positive way, by demonstrating through its rich interview data the insight to be gained from studying a constructed “criminal” leader from below.

Just as the thesis seeks to combine area studies with social history, it also endeavours to bring together area studies and IR. It uses the case-study of Milošević to develop the concept of the criminal leader and, in this way, contributes to important debates in IR and international politics about what makes a criminal leader, at what point a leader becomes criminal, and whether a criminal leader should be put on trial. At the same time, it draws upon IR both in order to contextualize the concept of the criminal leader and, more broadly, to help us evaluate the normative approach which the concept reflects.

In short, while area studies has long been considered to be the poor relation of IR, this thesis demonstrates, through its eclectic approach, how area studies, IR and social history can be fruitfully combined in an original and creative way to generate new insight and debate.

Some Possible Consequences of Criminalizing Leaders

As previously emphasized, this research is concerned with Milošević's normative criminalization and construction as a moral criminal. It is not directly concerned with his trial and legal culpability. Nevertheless, it might be argued that the process of normative criminalization has potential legal repercussions. This thesis has suggested that Milošević's normative and legal culpability have, to a certain extent, been equated. As a result, he is widely assumed guilty until proven innocent. A key question, therefore, is whether a leader's normative criminalization might prevent him from receiving a fair trial.

The very fact that The Hague Tribunal, like the Tribunals in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, is an ad hoc tribunal, created for the specific purpose of prosecuting, arguably put Milošević at a strong disadvantage from the outset. To cite Chandler, “The emphasis is on prosecution rather than fact-finding” (Chandler, 2002a, p.142). It is significant, for example, that according to the opening sentence of its statute, the Tribunal’s aim is the “Prosecution of Persons *Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law*”. The statute does not refer to persons “accused of” serious violations of humanitarian law.

For Chandler, this is evidence of the Tribunal’s “implicit rejection of ‘innocence until proven guilty’...” (Chandler, 2002a, p.142).¹ Echoing this, Black argues that the trials that take place within these ad hoc tribunals are “inquisitorial proceedings in which there is only one objective, and that is to put the accused in prison and use them as examples to their home peoples” (Black, 2005).

We saw in chapter 8 that many of the Serbian interviewees consider that Milošević is not receiving a fair trial. They are not alone in this belief. The book *Pisma za Slobu* (2002) contains letters of support for Milošević from mainly ordinary people, in Europe and beyond, who are extremely critical of the trial process. Prominent Western figures, such as the former U.S Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and the playwright Harold Pinter, have also voiced

¹ Kerr notes that, “The accused were more often than not referred to as war criminals, even before the trial had commenced” (Kerr, 2004, p.99); and Johnstone contends that Tribunal indictments are “the equivalent of conviction in the court of public opinion, with guilt taken for granted...” (Johnstone, 2002, p.97).

concern about the fairness of Milošević's trial.² Both men are members of the ICDSM.

Similar concerns have been raised in relation to the trial of Saddam Hussein.

To cite Berman,

Everyone agrees that Saddam Hussein and his henchmen, if tried properly, should be found guilty of crimes against humanity. But a long list of human rights groups and international law experts doubt if the tyrant and his deputies will receive the due process and fair trials promised by U.S and Iraqi authorities (Berman, 2005).

According to *Human Rights Watch*, for example, "The Iraqi Special Tribunal lacks significant fair-trial protections, including...a requirement that guilt be proven beyond reasonable doubt" (Human Rights Watch, 2005); and Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice Programme of *Human Rights Watch*, maintains that the Tribunal has "serious human rights shortcomings" (cited in Collier, 2004).

It is also noteworthy that according to a recent report by the *BBC*, Saddam's lawyers "say they have none of the estimated eight million documents relating to the case, and have not been formally told of the charges" (BBC News, 2005).³ In short, the question is whether Saddam can receive a fair trial in a court of law, notwithstanding that he "has already been tried and found guilty of atrocities in the international court of public opinion" (Scharf, 2004).

² In an interview with Ramona Koval, in 2002, Pinter said, "My position is that I think Milošević should be given a fair trial. If he's to be tried, then it should be an impartial, objective trial. And clearly it cannot be the case here, because he's being tried essentially and effectively by NATO. NATO is paying for the court. Therefore it's a NATO court. It is, if you like, a victor's court and it cannot possibly be impartial" (Pinter, 2000).

³ The first of a series of charges against Saddam Hussein were announced on 17 July 2005. Since his capture by US forces in December 2003, he had been held in solitary confinement without charge (Howard, 2005).

Secondly, the thesis has argued that leaders seen as posing a threat to liberal peace are consequently criminalized. Ironically, however, it might be argued that the criminalization of leadership itself poses an indirect threat to peace, more specifically to regional peace. If leaders who are constructed as criminal thereby fail to receive a fair trial and, more importantly, are seen by their own people as receiving an unfair trial, regional peace and stability might consequently be put in jeopardy. As previously argued, if Milošević is found guilty by a Tribunal that many regard as illegitimate and biased against the Serbs, this could have long-term negative consequences for the region. If Serbs feel that the Tribunal has not brought them justice, there is the danger that some will seek their own forms of justice.

Similarly, the trial of Saddam Hussein, which began on 19 October 2005, might inflame the existing situation in Iraq, further dividing its already dangerously fragmented society and intensifying anti-American feeling. For example,

Some analysts say many Iraqis could be enraged if Hussein receives a flawed trial and is then executed. That could reinforce the growing public suspicion that the U.S. occupation has continued Iraq's long tradition of politicised justice and arbitrary killings (Collier, 2004, p.2).

A third implication of constructing a leader as criminal is that all evils are automatically attributed to him. As a result, his removal from power seems the most obvious solution to resolving a complex set of problems. For example, a poll commissioned by *CNN International*, in April 1999, found strong support in five NATO countries for Milošević's removal from power.⁴ Asked the

⁴ The *Angus Reid Group* questioned by telephone 300 people in France, 476 people in Germany, 300 people in Italy, 300 people in the United Kingdom, and 300 people in the United States.

question, “Must any peace settlement include the removal of Milošević?” 77% of respondents in France answered yes; in Germany 85% said yes; 79% in Italy said yes; in the United Kingdom 83% answered in the affirmative; and in the United States 82% answered yes (Free Serbia, 1999). For his part, Prime Minister Blair told reporters, on 6 June 1999, that, “There isn’t a future for Serbia with Milošević” (Radio Free Europe, 1999).

However, like a cancerous tumour, it is often insufficient simply to remove the criminal leader. The entire system must also be destroyed. Yet, according to various interviewees, the system that Milošević helped to create remains intact.

According to one male interviewee in Belgrade, for example,

As the years have passed since 5 October 2000, I have realized that only Milošević was taken out, and that the whole system has stayed the same. The political system is still functioning by the same laws it did in Milošević’s time. The system is the same...And it’s as if the system is now producing a new Milošević, a new leader, a new father of the nation, because nothing else has changed. Nothing else has changed. And as time passes, we will certainly have a new Milošević if we don’t change the system (RJ).

A second male interviewee in Belgrade similarly maintains that,

The roots of the Milošević regime have not been removed – they are still in place. This is the reason that Zoran Djindjić was killed. Money and power in Serbia are still in the hands of the people who worked with Milošević, such as the Army and the secret police (ZG).

Thus, in contrast to 5 October 2000, when there was much optimism in Serbia, today there is great disappointment, political apathy and deep concern about the economic situation, manifested in growing support for the SRS. For example, according to a recent survey by *Marten Board International*, between 6 June and 12 June 2005, 30.2% of the 1234 Serbian respondents said that they would vote for the SRS if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow (Marten

Board International, 2005). In the words of a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade, “People are very frightened, and again they are looking for a ‘good prince’ who will make fast changes” (IG).⁵ None of this bodes well for the future.

It is not, of course, argued that the West’s criminalization of Milošević caused these problems. What is argued, however, is that Milošević’s construction as a criminal leader influenced Western policy vis-à-vis Serbia, in particular by encouraging a somewhat blinkered approach, and thereby indirectly contributed to the current situation in the country.

International Politics and the Criminal Leader

Chapter 2 of the thesis sought to explore the criminalization of leaderships in a broader context, by linking it to certain developments in IR. From this, it became clear that the criminalization of leaders is very much a post-Cold War phenomenon.⁶ Yet, the post-Cold War world was fundamentally shaken – and in many ways changed – by the events of September 11 2001. It might be argued that the nineties constituted a normative interregnum. The current “War on Terror”, however, could be seen as marking a return to Realist politics. It is important, therefore, to consider how the normative concept of the criminal leader fits into this post-9/11 world. Has the criminal leader become less significant?

⁵ Many interviewees saw the late Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjić, as a “good prince” who would make their lives better. Consequently, his assassination, on 12 March 2003, is widely seen as a great tragedy for Serbia.

⁶ This is not to say, however, that the phenomenon did not exist during the Cold War. To cite Füredi, “At a stroke anti-colonial activists could be transformed into criminals or terrorists” (Füredi, 1994, p.1).

We have seen that central to Milošević's construction as a criminal leader are the Yugoslav wars and the atrocities therein committed. Yet, as Joseph points out,

The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war against terrorism have long since overshadowed the graphic atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Throughout the U.S presidential campaign – a contest dominated by foreign policy – the Balkans remained invisible (Joseph, 2005, p.111).

Thus, it might be argued that the magnitude of 9/11 and its global implications have, to some degree, eclipsed the criminal leader's crimes.

Certainly, from a Realist perspective, it is not the criminal leader that poses the greatest threat, but rather certain states, such as North Korea and Iran. However, if we approach the concept of threat from a Liberal, rather than a Realist perspective, it is not only security but also values that are important. Thus, the criminal leader, by virtue of the threat he poses to liberal peace and values, is still an important actor in IR.

Moreover, the establishment of various war crimes tribunals, for example in The Hague, in Rwanda, in Sierra Leone, and most recently in Iraq, as well as the ICC, shows that the crimes of criminal leaders and their accomplices have not, and will not, be forgotten. The trial of Milošević and the future trial of Saddam Hussein are likely to strengthen the concept of the criminal leader.

Thus, it can be argued that the war on terror has not diminished the significance of the criminal leader. What it has done, however, is to render the concept of the criminal leader far more problematic, both in normative and

legal terms. As part of its war on terror, the US has committed extremely grave human rights violations. To cite *Amnesty International*, “In the ‘war on terror’, the [US] administration has jettisoned fundamental human rights principles, while continuing to proclaim the USA to be the bastion of human rights” (Amnesty International, 2005b).

Both Abu Ghraib, described by *Human Rights Watch* as one of the most flagrant examples of human rights violations in 2004 (Channel News Asia, 2005), and Guantánamo Bay exemplify this discarding of fundamental human rights. For example, at Guantánamo Bay, in Cuba, detainees are held incommunicado in tiny cells, denied access to lawyers, and subjected to interrogation techniques including sleep deprivation, isolation, and hooding.⁷ They have the status of “enemy combatants”, not prisoners of war, and are thus denied the protection of the Geneva Conventions. The so-called “enemy combatant” is another example of an externally constructed concept.⁸

Not only is the US guilty of human rights violations. It is also guilty of blatant double standards. For example, “The human rights violations which the US has been so reluctant to call torture when committed by its own agents are annually described as such by the State Department when they occur in other countries” (Amnesty International, 2004). *Amnesty International* also claims that, “...Guantánamo has become a symbol of a government’s attempt to put

⁷ The first detainees were transferred from Afghanistan to the US naval base in Guantánamo Bay in January 2002.

⁸ The US has defined an “enemy combatant” as “Any person that US or allied forces could properly detain under the laws and customs of war. For purposes of the war on terror an enemy combatant includes, but is not necessarily limited to, a member or agent of Al Qaeda, Taliban, or another international terrorist organization against which the United States is engaged in an armed conflict” (Amnesty International, 2005a).

itself above the law. The example it sets is of a world where basic human rights are negotiable rather than universal” (Amnesty International, 2005a).

The net result of these human rights abuses and double standards is that the US has lost credibility and moral authority. To cite Kenneth Roth, the director of *Human Rights Watch*, “Governments facing human rights pressure from the United States now find it easy to turn the tables” (Channel News Asia, 2005).

On the one hand, therefore, the US, and the West more generally, have lost the moral authority they need to construct certain leaders as “criminal”. On the other hand, some Western leaders, such as Blair and Bush, have lost their own credibility and moral authority as a result of the war in Iraq. It was argued in chapter 2 that the criminalization of leaders is linked to the criminalization of war in IR. Given that many regard the war in Iraq as an illegal, and thus a criminal war⁹, it is not surprising that there have been calls for those who launched this war to be put on trial for war crimes.

On 28 March 2003, for example, in a letter printed in *The Guardian*, the Labour MP Tam Dalyell argued that, “...since Blair is going ahead with his support for a US attack without unambiguous UN authorization, he should be branded as a war criminal and sent to The Hague” (Dalyell, 2003). For his part, Teague maintains that, “The invasion of Iraq was illegal. Its authors are criminals and should be tried as such” (Teague, 2004).

⁹ Fisk describes the Iraq war as an “illegal, immoral, meretricious war” (Fisk, 2004).

It is thus clear that the concept of the criminal leader has become more problematic as a result of the war on terror. As previously emphasized, the criminal leader is externally constructed. If, however, those who construct criminal leaders – namely Western powers, above all the United States – themselves violate human rights, disregard international law, and launch illegal wars, this means that according to the behavioural dimension of the criminal leader (actions and intentions), there is little to distinguish the criminal leader from his creators.

What is more, if the criminal leader is deemed to pose a fundamental threat to liberal peace and values, the irony is that the US and its allies are themselves now threatening these same liberal principles, through their war on terror. In the words of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, speaking on 10 December 2004,

The sinister shadow of terrorism is generating a confused response, unanchored in the principles that have guided us in the search for a proper balance between our desire for collective security and our need for liberty and individual freedom (cited in Amnesty International, 2005a).

Just as the war on terror has rendered the concept of the criminal leader normatively problematic, it has also problematized the concept in legal terms. As we have seen in the cases of Milošević and Saddam Hussein, the rhetoric of criminalizing leaders increasingly requires that concrete measures be taken, in the form of putting these leaders on trial. Notwithstanding various calls for Bush and Blair to stand trial for war crimes, it is unlikely that this will ever happen. In June 2003, for example, Belgium indicted Bush, Blair, and others for war crimes during the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan. However, when Donald Rumsfeld threatened to move NATO out of Brussels, Belgium

capitulated and its Court of Cassation asked for the indictments to be dismissed (Cohn, 2003).

If the principle of sovereign immunity is being eroded, it is clear that this process is very uneven. To cite Chandler, “while, for some states, sovereignty is being limited, for others, it is increasingly free from traditional international constraints” (Chandler, 2002a, p.121). What is more, while Milošević is not only on trial, but also on trial for the acts of his subordinates (the principle of “command responsibility”), Bush will not find himself on trial for the acts of US soldiers in Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. This is because in 2001, the US passed the *American Service Members Protection Act*, to shield its servicemen from the reach of the ICC.

The key point to be emphasized, therefore, is that the criminal leader is not a concept that can be universalized. It is an externally constructed concept and, as such, the United States and its allies will decide who is a criminal leader. They will also decide when a leader’s “criminal” behaviour can be excused, mainly on the grounds that he is a useful ally, as in the case of Pakistan’s General Pervez Musharraf. He is “considered by the Bush Administration to be an indispensable and loyal ally in the war against terrorism – someone who is willing to take on the mullahs” (Hersh, 2004, p.287).

These Western powers will also do everything to ensure that calls for their own leaders to be put on trial are obstructed and never realized. What this

highlights is that the policy dimension of the criminal leader is the most important. Western policy constructs certain leaders as criminal.

Wider Implications of the Research

While the thesis has concentrated on the particular case of Milošević, its implications are more far-reaching. Firstly, it has implications for how we study other criminal leaders. The thesis has emphasized, and demonstrated, the importance of exploring Milošević's "criminal" leadership from below. More broadly, however, it has also argued that every criminal leader must be studied both from the top down and from the bottom up. Using examples of bottom-up research on the Hitler and Stalin regimes, it has sought to demonstrate that studying a criminal leader from below can bring new and valuable insight into his leadership and regime, insight that we would not gain by confining ourselves to a purely top-down approach.

At an academic level, therefore, the implications of the present research are that other scholars studying criminal leaders, such as Saddam Hussein, should not neglect the view from below. That is to say that in analyzing Saddam's leadership and regime, they should explore both the opinions that ordinary people in Iraq have of their former leader, and peoples' everyday life experiences while Saddam was in power.

Secondly, the thesis has implications at a policy level, in terms of how one should deal with a criminal leader. As we have seen, the interview data reveals that the Serbian interviewees, as a whole, do not support the Western, liberal

construction of Milošević as a criminal leader. The fact that there is a fundamental discrepancy between international (Western) and domestic opinion underscores that in dealing with the criminal leader, Western policy-makers cannot afford to ignore domestic public opinion. If they act against the criminal leader without taking any account of public feeling, they risk inflaming, rather than calming the situation, as the case of Iraq highlights. To cite Beloff, with reference to the former Yugoslavia, "Too much damage has been done by ignorant and arrogant outsiders who pay no attention to the feelings and fears of the local peoples" (Beloff, 1997, p.134).

Thirdly, the policy implications of the research extend to The Hague Tribunal. While the Tribunal's objectives may be laudable, the fact is that, "If the ICTY is to contribute to peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia, its decisions will have to be perceived as just and fair" (Meernik, 2003, p.159). In Serbia, it can be argued that the Tribunal's decisions are not perceived in this way. That the Court is not very popular among the Serbs is well known. If real progress is to be made, however, it is also important to know the reasons why. If the Tribunal is to try and improve its image in Serbia, and it unquestionably needs to, its representatives must first understand why public opinion is hostile to the Tribunal in the first place. This means exploring in depth popular attitudes towards it.

The present research, by examining the opinions of ordinary Serbs vis-à-vis the ICTY, has generated important insight that could, if taken seriously, help the Tribunal to improve its image. Of course, the Tribunal cannot do this without

the co-operation of the Serbian government, but equally it cannot seek to appeal to Serbian public opinion unless it has some understanding of the beliefs, misconceptions and grievances that shape that opinion.

Fourthly, the research has implications for our understanding of Serbian nationalism. We have learnt that the Serbian interviewees judge Milošević from a heavily socio-economic perspective, and analysis of his speeches suggested that Milošević's economic promises were an important reason for his popular appeal. Similarly, it can be argued that the current popularity of the SRS is more economic-based than ideological. During the December 2003 elections, for example, Nikolić¹⁰ "concentrated on joblessness and the high price of basic foods in his campaign, promising in the November [2003] election to peg the price of a loaf of bread at three dinars" (Sudar, 2004). Thus, "...the SRS's populist policies have found an audience in those citizens who have suffered the most during the transition process – pensioners, farmers, the unemployed, and those who once worked for state-owned corporations" (Cvijanović, 2003). This suggests that Serbian nationalism is not primordial, but instrumental - a response to circumstances. As Kupchan argues, "...underlying social and economic conditions affect the course of nationalism within a given polity" (Kupchan, 1995, p.3).

Finally, the research contributes to discussions in IR about the causes of war. The thesis argues that one of the defining features of the criminal leader is that he causes war. It also argues, however, that the concept of the criminal leader

¹⁰ Tomislav Nikolić is the deputy leader of the SRS.

is externally constructed, and therefore not a concept that can be universalized. Consequently, its implications for IR are that the criminal leader's relevance as a cause of war depends on the circumstances. That is to say that it is only in wars, such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia, where a particular leader is constructed as criminal that the concept of the criminal leader provides an explanation for war.

The research also suggests that the line separating war from peace has become increasingly fluid. The criminalization of war, as discussed in chapter 2, means that higher moral principles, such as humanitarianism, are needed to justify it. Thus, Realist concerns, at least officially, play a far less significant role in today's wars. Instead, they are "liberal" wars, fought for the cause of democracy and liberal peace. The implications of this are that the criminal leader is not only a cause of war. He is also, and perhaps more importantly, a justification for external powers to make war in the name of liberal peace.

Suggestions for Future Research

By way of concluding this thesis, some ideas for future research will be outlined. The bottom-up, everyday life approach adopted in this thesis suggests two possible areas for future research (various suggestions were also made in chapter 3). Firstly, there is a need for further research on national minorities in Serbia. As previously argued, although Western literature portrays Milošević as a leader (in some cases, as a racist leader) who incited ethnic hatred, it does in fact devote little attention to the objects of this hatred – Serbia's national minorities. No comprehensive assessment of Milošević's

leadership and regime can be made without some understanding of what national minorities actually experienced.

This thesis contends that national minorities suffered primarily social discrimination, rather than State or institutional discrimination, a hypothesis that further research could test. It would be especially interesting to explore the relationship between national minorities and Serbian refugees, both today and during the nineties, since several of the national minority interviewees claimed that it was refugees who created the most problems for them.

The second suggestion is for further research on Serbian refugees and IDPs, another group that Western literature has heavily neglected. In the present research, five refugees and three IDPs were included in the total interview sample. Interestingly, these interviewees did not, overall, blame Milošević for what had happened to them. It would be very useful, however, to explore whether other refugees and IDPs feel the same way. We have seen that the majority of the Serbian interviewees blame Milošević primarily for what he did to Serbs and to Serbia. If those Serbs who arguably suffered the most – those who had to leave their homes and who lost everything – do not overall hold Milošević responsible for what happened to them, this would open up many new research questions, particularly concerning the relationship between refugees/IDPs and Milošević.

Further research, however, need not only be qualitative. The thesis also lends itself to future quantitative research. Such research could be used to test some

of the thesis' main arguments. The argument, for example, that the Serbian interviewees, as a whole, view Milošević above all not as a criminal leader but as a "bad" leader, could be made the basis of a public opinion survey. This would give us some indication of how widespread this particular perception of Milošević actually is in Serbia.

Similarly, the idea that Milošević was a victim could be further explored through quantitative research. Once Milošević's trial has concluded and The Hague Tribunal has delivered its verdict, it would be particularly interesting to examine, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, whether and to what extent this has affected popular attitudes towards Milošević and towards the ICTY itself.

Quantitative research, particularly in the form of public opinion polls, would be especially useful vis-à-vis national minorities in Serbia. All of the public opinion polls referred to in this thesis are polls of Serbian public opinion. National minorities have been far less involved in this type of research. Some of the national minority interviewees made very important and interesting arguments that could form the basis of future survey research. These include the argument that Milošević was not a racist and hated anybody who stood in his way, irrespective of nationality and ethnicity, and the argument that Serbs were Milošević's biggest victims.

Finally, some suggestions for future comparative research will be made. Firstly, the thesis has concentrated on Western literature written about

Milošević. It would be very fruitful, however, to compare Western literature with Serbian and regional literature. How do scholars in Serbia and in the former Yugoslavia portray Milošević? If, as argued, the criminal leader is an externally constructed concept, to what extent is it used by scholars from the region? Do these scholars, like the Serbian interviewees, regard Milošević above all as a “bad” leader? Given the absence of any systematic studies of the media, a survey of Serbian newspapers could also be usefully undertaken.¹¹

Secondly, since Milošević is sometimes compared to Saddam Hussein, it would be useful to explore how Western literature and Western policy-makers have constructed Saddam as a criminal leader. To what extent do the elements in this construction differ or resemble the elements in Milošević’s construction as a criminal leader? Given the current situation in Iraq, it would be too dangerous to undertake fieldwork in the country. However, perhaps at some point in the future, it would be very interesting to interview ordinary Iraqis about their everyday life experiences under Saddam’s regime and their opinions of him, and to thereby empirically test his construction as a criminal leader.

Thirdly, it would be very worthwhile to analyze and compare the speeches of several different “criminal” leaders. With the notable exception of Adolf Hitler, the criminal leader’s speeches have typically received little attention. In short, the criminal leader is rarely permitted to speak for himself. Research

¹¹ A bottom-up survey of Serbian newspapers might focus more on regional newspapers, particularly on the “letters to the editor” columns. Such a survey would help us to find out whether and to what extent the opinions expressed by the Serbian interviewees differ from the opinions that ordinary people held during the nineties.

that examines and compares the speeches of various “criminal” leaders would highlight what these leaders have in common, as well as what distinguishes one criminal leader from another. This information, in turn, could help us to further develop the concept of the criminal leader.

The thesis lends itself, therefore, to future qualitative, quantitative and comparative research, and it is hoped that other researchers will follow up some of the above-made suggestions. Certainly, one particular suggestion will be taken forward. As part of a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, further bottom-up research on national minorities will be undertaken next year.

Appendix

Interviews with Serbs

Interview with SZ. Belgrade, 3 May 2004.

Interview with LC. Belgrade, 9 May 2004.

Interview with SM, RB and PK. Belgrade, 10 May 2004.

Interview with NS. New Belgrade, 12 May 2004.

Interview with RJ. Belgrade, 13 May 2004.

Interview with MV. Belgrade, 16 May 2004.

Interview with S. Belgrade, 17 May 2004.

Interview with B. Belgrade, 18 May 2004.

Interview with SNP. Belgrade, 26 May 2004.

Interview with SP. Belgrade, 28 May 2004.

Interview with MM. New Belgrade, 9 June 2004.

Interview with BM. Požarevac, 15 June 2004.

Interview with J. Požarevac, 15 June 2004.

Interview with IZ. Belgrade, 21 June 2004.

Interview with ZG. Belgrade, 21 June 2004.

Interview with MJ. Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

Interview with DN. Belgrade, 1 July 2004.

Interview with A. Novi Sad, 3 July 2004.

Interview with AS. Novi Sad, 3 July 2003.

Interview with VC. Novi Sad, 3 July 2003.

Interview with DK. Novi Sad, 3 July 2003.

Interview with DB. Belgrade, 6 July 2004.

Interview with IB. Čačak, 8 July 2004.

Interview with V. Čačak, 8 July 2004.

Interview with VS. Čačak, 9 July 2004.

Interview with L. Čačak, 9 July 2004.

Interview with SC. Belgrade, 16 July 2004.

Interview with G. Belgrade, 19 July 2004.

Interview with D. Kikinda, 21 July 2004.

Interview with SU. Kikinda, 22 July 2004.

Interview with RP. Kikinda, 22 July 2004.

Interview with DNO. Belgrade, 6 August 2004.

Interview with ZM. Kragujevac, 10 August 2004.

Interview with DZ. Kragujevac, 10 August 2004.

Interview with MA. Kragujevac, 10 August 2004.

Interview with AB. Belgrade, 12 August 2004.

Interview with IDP. Kosovska Mitrovica, 19 August 2004.

Interview with MV. Kosovska Mitrovica, 19 August 2004.

Interview with SK. Kosovska Mitrovica, 19 August 2004.

Interview with ZT. Kosovska Mitrovica, 20 August 2004.

Interview with NM. Kosovska Mitrovica, 20 August 2004.

Interview with RN. Kosovska Mitrovica, 20 August 2004.

Interview with ALD. Gračanica, 22 August 2004.

Interview with SM. Novi Pazar, 25 August 2004.

Interview with GM. Novi Sad, 7 September 2004.

Interview with SC. Niš, 14 September 2004.

Interview with VU. Niš, 14 September 2004.

Interviews with National Minorities

Interview with IG. Belgrade, 25 May 2004.

Interview with MB. Subotica, 31 May 2004.

Interview with SS. Csantaver, 31 May 2004.

Interview with RK. Subotica, 1 June 2004.

Interview with AK. Subotica, 1 June 2004.

Interview with BR. Belgrade (Borča), 8 June 2004.

Interview with Z. Belgrade (Borča), 8 June 2004.

Interview with SL. Belgrade (Borča), 8 June 2004.

Interview with SE. Belgrade (Borča), 8 June 2004.

Interview with I. Priština, 23 August 2004.

Interview with TG. Priština, 23 August 2004.

Interview with IL. Vučitrn, 24 August 2004.

Interview with LF. Vučitrn, 24 August 2004.

Interview with AR. Vučitrn, 24 August 2004.

Interview with AD. Novi Pazar, 25 August 2004.

Interview with NV. Novi Pazar, 25 August 2004.

Interview with JG. Novi Sad, 7 September 2004.

Interview with AN. Novi Sad, 7 September 2004.

Interview with Elites

Interview with Dr Oskar Kovać. Belgrade, 7 May 2004.

Interview with Živadin Jovanović. Belgrade, 17 May 2004.

Interview with Aleksa Djilas. Belgrade, 20 May 2004.

Interview with Saša Nenadović. Belgrade, 21 May 2004.

Interview with Vlada Milić. Belgrade, 23 May 2004.

Interview with Vladislav Jovanović. Belgrade, 24 May 2004.

Interview with Professor Vojin Dimitrijević. Belgrade, 26 May 2004.

Interview with Nikola Lazić. Belgrade, 28 May 2004.

Interview with Goran Svilanović. Belgrade, 3 June 2004.

Interview with Milorad Vučelić. Belgrade, 5 June 2004.

Interview with Ljiljana Smailović. Belgrade, 10 June 2004.

Interview with Professor Mihailo Marković. Belgrade, 11 June 2004.

Interview with Saša Mirković. New Belgrade, 14 June 2004.

Interview with Professor Mihailo Pantić. Belgrade, 22 June 2004.

Interview with Professor Svetozar Stojanović. Belgrade, 29 June 2004.

Interview with Janko Baljak. Belgrade, 30 June 2004.

Interview with Professor Kosta Mihailović. Belgrade, 15 July 2004.

Interview with Professor Ljubinka Trgovčević. Belgrade, 19 July 2004.

Interview with Zoran Milešević. Kikinda, 23 July 2004.

Interview with Dr Branka Prpa. New Belgrade, 28 July 2004.

Interview with Branislav Kovačević. Kragujevac, 10 August 2004.

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