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FACING MONSTROSITY IN GOYA'S LOS CAPRICHOS (1799)

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Facing Monstrosity in Goya's Los Caprichos (1799)

Summary

The aim of this thesis is to offer a re-evaluation of our cultural assumptions concerning the monstrous in the work of Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes (1746-1828), specifically his collection of etchings *Los Caprichos* (1799). In my study there are three closely related areas of investigation: the image of the monstrous body in Goya's work; the cultural aspects of monsters and monstrous forms in Western discourses and in the Spanish Enlightenment; and the theoretical encounter between the history of the sciences and deconstructive criticism. The interaction between these three areas provides a background against which to understand the Goyaesque body within the context of Spanish cultural practices.

Through an examination of eighteenth-century Spanish reformist absolutism, this thesis explores the contradictions, limits, or insufficiencies of the Spanish *Ilustración* in order to establish the ideological, cultural and artistic context out of which *Los Caprichos* emerged. One of the central issues that runs through my study is to establish how far, and in what ways, *Los Caprichos* can be seen as an Enlightenment work.

Traditional readings of *Los Caprichos* have paid very little critical attention to the monstrous human bodies depicted in the collection in the context of eighteenth-century discourses on monstrosity and corporeality. *Los Caprichos* invite a more complex, multifaceted consideration both of the body and the monster, of corporeality and monstrosity. By focusing on the Goyaesque body, the aim of this thesis is to open up a series of questions on the ways in which the monstrous body can be thought of in the critique of culture.

This study therefore seeks to provide a cultural history of the monstrous body in the art of Goya, showing how his pictorial representations in the collection of etchings *Los Caprichos* offer a critique of reason and problematize the perception and treatment of (European and Spanish) Enlightenment configurations of the body. It is my contention that *Los Caprichos* can be read in Enlightenment ways yet there are elements of an ideological, cultural and artistic nature that problematize such credentials, pointing to the limits and contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment itself.

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Introduction

The cultural industry that has grown up around the sign 'Goya' and around '*Los Caprichos*' is not the exclusive property of art historians and literary critics, cultural historians and philosophers; it is also an invaluable commodity in national and international art markets, producing an important part of institutionalized culture at national (Spain), regional (Aragón) and local (Zaragoza and Fuendetodos) levels. 'Goya' produces numerous exhibitions across the globe; 'Goya' is the precursor of Romanticism, Realism, or Surrealism, to name but a few –isms,[1] and, lately, of contemporary artists such as the Chapman Brothers; in the future, who knows? A brief overview of recent exhibitions of the graphic work of Francisco de Goya y Lucientes (1746-1828) and the collection of prints *Los Caprichos* (1799) in particular show how the artist's work still speaks to us. From opera to contemporary dance to traditional exhibitions, the end of the millennium offered numerous examples of the ways in which Goya's imagery is a source of inspiration or a pretext; since the beginning of my research, Goya has figured in the work of the Japanese 'butoh' dancer Min Tanaka[2] as well as in the British composer Michael Nyman's latest opera.[3] More traditional appropriations are those by museums and galleries: 'Goya's Drawings' (Hayward Gallery, London, 2001), 'Goya. Personajes y rostros' (Fundació Caixa Catalunya, Barcelona, 2000), 'Carnivalesque' (Brighton Museum and Art Gallery, 2000), 'Estampas de la Biblioteca Nacional de la época de Goya' (Sala Ignacio Zuloaga, Fuendetodos (Zaragoza), 2000), 'Monstruos y seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca Nacional' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, 2000), '*Los Caprichos*: Mirar y leer' (Palacio de Sástago, Zaragoza, 1999 - 2000), 'Rembrandt en la memoria de Goya y de Picasso' (Fundación Carlos de Amberes, Madrid, 1999-2000), 'Del Sueño al Capricho' (Museo del Prado, Madrid, 1999) 'Ydioma Universal: Goya en la Biblioteca Nacional' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, 1996), or 'Goya y el espíritu de la ilustración' (Museo del Prado, Madrid, 1988). Almost all of these exhibitions focused on *Los Caprichos* in one way or another: generically ('Estampas de la Biblioteca Nacional de la época de Goya', 'Del Sueño al Capricho'), thematically ('Goya. Personajes y rostros', 'Carnivalesque') or in a more pedagogical spirit ('*Los Caprichos*: Mirar y leer'). Indeed, two of these exhibitions, 'Goya y el espíritu de la ilustración' (1988) and 'Monstruos y seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca Nacional' (2000), have been crucial for the formulations of this thesis. 'Goya y el espíritu de la ilustración' presented and regarded Goya as an Enlightened artist. The aim of the curators, Eleanor Sayre and Alfonso Pérez Sánchez, was to ground Goya's art firmly in the programme of the *ilustrados* (progressive statesmen and leading intellectuals of the Spanish Enlightenment); the exhibition, supported by the Spanish Ministry of Culture and other official institutions, commemorated the death of Carlos III and needs to be considered within the wider context of the cultural and political rehabilitation of a specific period of Spanish history carried out by the Socialist government of Felipe González. 'Monstruos y seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca Nacional', devoted to teratological material produced in early modern Europe, welcomes the visitor with Goya's most emblematic etching, *Capricho 43* 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' (fig. 1), the viewer's first vision of monsters and monstrous forms. The visitor then encounters monsters of the physical body, monsters of the political body, monsters of the supernatural body, monsters of the female body and monsters of the imaginary body. For the curators of this exhibition, Antonio Lafuente and Javier Moscoso, 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' seemed to visually emblematize the significance of monsters to modern society and to the modern imagination.

This thesis takes issue with the 1988 exhibition's unproblematical location of Goya and *Los Caprichos* as an Enlightenment artist and an Enlightenment work, and the following question: 'to what extent can we actually consider *Los Caprichos* as an Enlightenment work?' is one of the central issues that runs through my study. The 2000 exhibition begs, at first sight, a simpler question: why has his collection of etchings, and *Capricho 43* in particular, come to epitomize monstrosity, a notion which is constantly invoked in discussions of Goya's etchings but which has not been sufficiently theorized. According to Tomlinson, *Capricho 43* 'has become the touchstone for a reductive narrative of an enlightened Goya' (1992: 6-7); it has also become an emblem of visual representations of the monstrous. My thesis will be exploring the relation of *Los Caprichos* with the Enlightenment and with monstrosity, two issues that need to be addressed and qualified rather than treated as received ideas and taken for granted.

Aims and objectives

My study departs from these cultural interpretations and, to a certain extent, re-appropriations, of the Aragonese artist: Goya the producer of monsters and Goya the Enlightened artist. The aim of this thesis is to offer a re-evaluation of our cultural assumptions concerning the monstrous body in the work of Goya, specifically his collection of etchings *Los Caprichos*. In my study there are three closely related areas of investigation: the image of the monstrous body in Goya's work; the cultural aspects of monsters and monstrous forms in Western discourses and in the Spanish Enlightenment; and the theoretical encounter between the history of the sciences and deconstructive criticism. The interaction between these three areas provides a background against which to understand the Goyaesque body within the context of Spanish cultural practices. My aim therefore is to provide a cultural history of the monstrous body in the art of Goya, showing how his pictorial representations in *Los Caprichos* offer a critique of reason and problematize the perception and treatment of (European and Spanish) Enlightenment configurations of the body. To this end, I pay particular attention to the ideological, cultural and artistic context out of which *Los Caprichos* emerge in order to examine how far the collection was responding to the ideas, cultural policies and artistic tastes of Spanish Enlightened reformers. Thus my study is grounded in the following premise: that the collection of prints *Los Caprichos* can be read in Enlightenment ways yet there are elements of an ideological, cultural and artistic nature that problematize such credentials, pointing to the limits and contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment itself.

Methodology

But, perhaps, the first question I should address is: why *Los Caprichos*? Described as a landmark in the world of art both in Goya's use of technique –a breakthrough in the art of printmaking, the first major graphic work– and in its meaning –'a symbolic watershed' (Wilson-Bureau, 1981: 15) separating the eighteenth century from the nineteenth century, a 'crucial point in the history of image-making' (Licht, 1973: 15)–, *Los Caprichos* are central to our understanding of Goya. In a review of Juliet Wilson-Bureau's *Goya: La década de Los Caprichos* (1992) published in *Print Quarterly*, Janis Tomlinson introduces the (un)certainties surrounding the series: 'despite the seeming familiarity of *Los Caprichos*, our knowledge about the series is very limited. I would question Wilson-Bureau's opening statement (p. xxi) that "the circumstances that induced Goya to decide to publish these etchings" are well-known: we in fact know very little about the artist's motives or intended audience' (1993: 188). How does one, then, start to frame a discussion where the question of knowing has created such disparate critical opinions? Furthermore, since any attempt to explain the inception and the later reception of the series is inextricably linked to the historical constructions of Goya as well as to the critical readings of *Los Caprichos* over the last two hundred years, how does one position oneself in relation to studies around the signs 'Goya' and '*Los Caprichos*'? My own position will offer a theoretical and interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of Goya's collection of prints, while, at the same time, I will be reviewing and engaging with the main critical writings that have constructed Goya as an Enlightenment artist close to the circle of the *ilustrados*.

My point of departure is the year 1793, generally regarded as a turning point in the work of Goya. Following his near-fatal illness the previous year, Goya's art assumed significant technical and thematic shifts as he embarked on what Paul Ilie describes in *The Age of Minerva: Counter-Rational Reason in the Eighteenth Century* as 'an increasingly less rational and more demonically imaginative course of paintings and engravings' (1995: I, 122). In *Los Caprichos*, hybrid creatures and monstrous figures take the form of the unacceptable, of the incomprehensible. Goya worked on the prints throughout the second half of the 1790s until they were published on 6 February 1799; these dates situate us at the end of a century and the beginning of another, a period of transition and change. The decade in which Goya worked and published *Los Caprichos*, as we shall see, was in many ways a microcosm of the tensions and conflicts shaping the Spanish eighteenth century. Produced on the cusp between the old and the new, *Los Caprichos* led me to explore the artist's work by paying particular attention to epistemological shifts and to the notion of transition from a poststructuralist perspective and by thinking about the monstrous bodies populating the series in terms of disruption, deviation and displacement.

The question posed by this study is the following: how can monstrosity and corporeality be thought together in the analysis of these etchings? The need for such a question arises from the surprisingly limited range of theoretical analyses of this work. Studies of Goya have been dominated by art historical approaches (iconographic, technical) and historical approaches (for instance, the conception of Goya as an unproblematically Enlightened artist). A general overview of the critical and historical writing that the collection of prints has generated shows that it ranges from an examination of contemporary literary influences (Edith Helman (1963), René Andioc (1984), Roberto Alcalá Flecha (1988), Eleanor Sayre and Alfonso Pérez Sánchez (1989)) to an analysis of the art-historical and iconographic traditions available to Goya (Enrique Lafuente-Ferrari (1947), George Levitine (1955, 1959), Folke Nordström (1962), Valeriano Bozal (1983, 1994)) and to works focusing on the technical process used by the artist (Harris (1964), Enrico Crispolti (1963), Eleanor Sayre (1974), Garrido Sánchez (1988), Tomlinson (1989)).[4] More recently, our vision of Goya has benefited from interdisciplinary approaches, taking the study of the artist in general and *Los Caprichos* in particular beyond the traditional agendas of connoisseurship and opening up new perspectives. My study is closer to recent studies which foreground the insights of cultural history and late twentieth-century critical theories (Janis Tomlinson (1992, 1994), Paul Ilie (1995), Victor I. Stoichita and Anna-María Coderch (1999)).

As for studies that have focused specifically on monsters and *Los Caprichos*, I shall be referring to them throughout my chapters. Whether in the context of my historical narrative charting attitudes towards the monster throughout the centuries, or in Chapters 4 and 5 where I analyze specific *Caprichos*, I shall be engaging with other critics who have dealt with the monsters depicted by Goya in the series. For introductory purposes, the equivocal significance of these monsters can be summarized thus: 'the monsters could be Spanish Inquisitors, French Revolutionaries, corrupt public officials, or [...] perpetrators of evil in diverse forms' (Ilie, 1995: I, 9); the latter meaning would interpret monsters as abstract embodiments of malice, prejudice, folly, superstition and so on. The monstrous character of the series – supernatural monsters, human monsters, grotesque figures– stands out. Moreover, its monstrous character can also be considered in terms of its generic unclassifiability, the visual refashioning undertaken by the Aragonese artist or the anti-classicism of the figures populating the prints, aspects which still invite the contemporary viewer to interpret and re-interpret these images. The monstrous bodies of *Los Caprichos*, therefore, can be read symbolically, allegorically, abstractly or generically, but it is my contention throughout this study that it is necessary to return to the issue of corporeality; that is to say, these monsters are also bodies, bodiliness is part of their existence (impulses and forces, needs of the human body, man's animal nature). Critical attention to corporeality and monstrosity will provide entry into the larger physical and institutional universe of late eighteenth-century Spain.

The figurative element of the compositions is unavoidably visible for the human body commands the page; one cannot fail to notice the multiplicity of physical types or the dramatic physicality of the figures, in other words, the centrality given to the body. But, we may ask ourselves, how could a painter fail to put the body, and its materiality, on the canvas or, in Goya's case, on the plates? Moreover, wouldn't it be the case that pictorial bodies are generically predisposed to appear as material ('really' there on the canvas or the plate), especially whenever the dominant aesthetics is representational? A discussion of the body is inseparable from the art form or medium being treated in this thesis. As I have already indicated, these monstrous figures are normally read as embodiments of irrationality and superstition, as 'personajes y rostros' representing the vices of eighteenth-century Spanish society. They are readily associable with an all too general notion of monstrosity which links physical and moral traits. However, traditional readings of Goya have paid very little critical attention to the monstrous human bodies depicted in the series in the context of eighteenth-century discourses on monstrosity and corporeality. During the eighteenth century the body was a contentious site whose boundaries were being investigated by many different disciplines; thinking of and representing bodies served eighteenth-century artists, reformers and writers not only to designate Enlightenment, but also to define and question cultural norms. *Los Caprichos*, I shall be arguing, invite a more complex, multifaceted consideration both of the body and the monster, of corporeality and monstrosity. By focusing on the Goyaesque body, my aim is to open up a series of questions on the ways in which the monstrous body can be thought of in the critique of culture. Dealing differently with the monstrous bodies of *Los Caprichos* will challenge traditional readings of the etchings. In this respect, my proposed theoretical framework and interdisciplinary approach will offer a re-thinking of reading protocols on the series.

Procedure and Structure

An etymological note on the word "monster" will enable me to situate the double focus of my research into the work of Goya. A reading of the etymology of the word "monster" immediately poses the question of the visual; the Latin *monstrare* – to show, to make known – as well as *monere* –to warn–, reminds us that monstrosity exists only to be read. That is, what constitutes the monstrous is ever subject and subjected to the gaze, to an ideologically positioned and / or positioning viewer. As I shall be arguing, Goya's etchings can be seen consistently to complicate the viewing position. This relation of the visual to the ideological determines the *modus legendi* of my reading of Goya's artistic production at the turn of the nineteenth century. The *modus legendi* of this thesis involves, firstly, 'a method of reading cultures from the monsters they engender' (Cohen, 1996: 3), and, secondly, an interrogation of social constructions of knowledge and practices of seeing.

The first two chapters of this thesis engage with the notion of monstrosity in two different, yet complementary, ways. Chapter 1 looks at the historical dimension of monstrosity in order to identify the historical context out of which a particular naming of the monstrous emerges, while Chapter 2 explores the theoretical dimension of monsters and the monstrous, since the contemplation of *Los Caprichos* raises issues of theory and ideology as my etymological note has indicated. Chapter 1 frames the textual generation of the monstrous as a movement from a narrative of the marvellous to a narrative of the deviant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such movement does not imply a progressive narrative whereby the monstrous is subsumed under modern, rational scientific discourse but rather points to 'the polyvalent attitude of the Enlightenment towards monstrosity' (Stafford, 1997: 270). This chapter traces the manifestations of the monstrous in different discourses, ranging from theological interpretations to considerations of monstrosity as moral aberration to superstition-infused representations of monstrosity and to medical attitudes towards the monster. Manifestations of monstrosity vary from culture to culture and between different historical moments, thus this chapter pays particular attention to the movement of culture, that is, the transformation of the nature of the social and cultural experience of the monstrous.

Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework and methodological approach for the analysis of *Los Caprichos* in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 2 examines constructions of monsters and the monstrous through the theoretical encounter between the history of the sciences (Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault) and deconstructive criticism (Jacques Derrida). The work of Canguilhem, Foucault and Derrida offers me a theoretical paradigm from which to tackle my analysis of Goya's art. Their work displays strategies with which to understand constructions of normality and monstrosity; their reading strategies are concerned with the critique of reason and the actual historicity of human knowledge; and their methods provide a mode of analysis from which to interrogate practices of seeing and reading protocols. As our analyses will show, monstrosity cannot be reduced solely to its 'visible' manifestations. Like the collection *Los Caprichos*, the texts of these French thinkers must be considered as 'new creations, which conform to no pre-existing genre, which observe few cultural or linguistic conventions, and which transform what they repeat' (Bannet, 1989: 1-2).[5]

The opening chapters provide the reader, therefore, with the historical (and changing) attitudes towards the monstrous available to Goya and his contemporaries, as well as with my theoretical position vis-à-vis monstrosity. Once the function and the aims of the first two chapters have been established, the title of this thesis, *Facing Monstrosity in Goya's Los Caprichos*, and my approach to *Los Caprichos* themselves can be accounted for. A first possible explanation of my title is a meta-commentary on the purpose of this study: I as a critic facing the monsters created by Goya and engaging with previous critical encounters with the series as a fundamental part of the process of reading the images. 'Facing monstrosity' offers another meaning, since it may be interpreted as the action of giving monstrosity a face (and a body), of making the monster visible and eventually naming it. 'Facing' a monster, we, as viewers, become aware of normativity, a gauge whereby normalcy comes into focus. In both cases, the notion of 'facing' brings into play the binary monstrous / normal. There is, however, a further meaning which will be fundamental to my reading of Goya's monstrous bodies, and which emerges from my theoretical chapter: faced with the structural scandal of monstrosity, aware of its normalizing and arbitrary function, Goya's etchings propose a questioning of monstrosity and normality. This study, therefore, engages critically with monstrous bodies and shows how crucial they are to our conceptions of ideology and aesthetics and to constructions of monstrosity and normality.

The historical location of *Los Caprichos*, a work rooted in a very particular Spanish time and place, is the aim of Chapter 3. The crucial question that structures this chapter, to what extent can we consider *Los Caprichos* as an Enlightenment work, has already been posed. The chapter focuses on three interrelated areas of the Spanish Enlightenment: ideology, culture and education, and the visual arts. The first part on ideology examines the politics of the Bourbon régime and describes the conflict between two different sociopolitical models and two different conceptions of culture (that of the Enlightened reformers and that of the traditionalists). The second section, culture and education, looks at the institutional practices of the Bourbon régime, above all in relation to education; this section is particularly interested in religious discourses and reformist discourses, and, by extension, received forms of cultural representation and new cultural forms, which will be fundamental for the analyses of the etchings in Chapter 4 and 5. The chapter closes with a discussion of the visual arts in the Spanish Enlightenment which considers the artistic traditions within and against which Goya was working.

As stated in my methodological remarks, central to Chapters 4 and 5 is Goya's depiction of monstrous bodies. The monstrous body is the site through which Goya explores the individual's relation to the political, religious and cultural contradictions and controversies of the Spanish Enlightenment. Individual, collective, institutional bodies, as well as bodies of knowledge, are inextricably linked in my discussion of *Los Caprichos*. In the final two chapters of the thesis, I explore *Los Caprichos* through two main strands of analysis: unruly bodies in Chapter 4 and institutional bodies in Chapter 5. The establishment of the Enlightened credentials of *Los Caprichos* in Chapter 3 lays the groundwork for the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 of the 'limits' at which the series is more than or even stops being an Enlightened work. It is the aim of these chapters, therefore, to challenge received ideas about Goya and *Los Caprichos*. Traditionally considered as the visual reflections of the political ideology of the reformers, *Los Caprichos* do not fit squarely within an Enlightened didactic tradition. *Los Caprichos* are traditionally tied to a discourse of reform which supports Enlightenment constructions of a reasoned or reasonable subject. However, my contention is that *Los Caprichos* destabilize Enlightenment conceptions of reason and Enlightened configurations of the corporeal, as I argue in the final two chapters of the thesis. It is my contention that a more complex and polyvalent Goya shows the shortcomings of certain reformist institutional practices and ideals, and produces a radical critique of institutions during the Spanish Enlightenment.

Chapter 4 argues how bodiliness, irrationalism, excess, hybridity, the fallibility of the senses and popular beliefs irrupt in Goya's images in order to call attention to the corporeal reality of the figures populating the series. I argue that Goya dissects the

Enlightenment way of looking at and explaining the body. In order to do so, the first half of the chapter examines Goya's reconfiguration of the classical body, as well as his depiction of hybrid bodies, as challenges to the Enlightened body-image of the singular, virtuous individual subject. The second half of the chapter looks at Goya's engagement with the classical physiognomical traditions that informed the promotion of Enlightened reforms. While physiognomical modes of reasoning anchor or stabilize a concept of normativity, my analysis of Goya's etchings reads monstrosity as, rather, a disruptive and displacing force which subverts Enlightened epistemic constructions of the body and questions received forms of cultural representation.

The final chapter, 'Institutional Bodies', explores the representation of the socio-political body: the clerical body, the nobility and the populace. The chapter examines the ways in which the Goyaesque body bears the marks of its cultural and institutional location. Thus the relation between individuals, institutions and discourse, and the construction of knowledge and practices of seeing, are central to my argument on institutional bodies. The chapter aims to show how the body is used to substantiate institutions and ideologies, and how social systems, systems of thought and institutional practices can be described as monstrous. In this sense, the Chapter will discuss whether Goya should be considered as an artist closer to the radical Enlightenment rather than the project of the moderate Enlightened reformers.

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[1] See Glendinning in *Goya and His Critics*: 'a model Romantic for the Romantics; an Impressionist for the Impressionists, Goya later became an Expressionist for the Expressionists and a forerunner of Surrealism for the Surrealists' (1977: 21). In his study, Glendinning masterly examines how different artistic movements have produced their own image of Goya, seeing him as a kindred spirit, and maps out 'the major patterns in Goya criticism, chronologically and conceptually' (1977: 1).

[2] 'Pilgrimage with Goya', August 2000.

[3] 'Facing Goya', August 2000.

[4] See 'The scientific and political reception of Goya since the 1930s' (Jutta Held, 1994: 249-253) for a review of key works in the interpretation of Goya's art.

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[5] In *Structuralism and the Logic of Dissent* (1989), Eve Tavor Bannet uses these words to describe the work of French post-structuralists Barthes, Derrida, Foucault and Lacan (1989: 1-11).

Chapter 1

Historical Dimension of Monstrosity: The Textual Generation of the Monstrous

Introduction

This chapter traces the various historical manifestations of the monstrous across different discourses. Physical, religious, moral, political, medical monsters will parade throughout the following pages. My aim is to look at discourses on monstrosity in order to identify the historical context out of which a particular meaning of the monstrous emerges. The historical dimension of this chapter ranges from medieval considerations of the monster in bestiaries and theological works to eighteenth-century medical treatises on monstrous births and monstrous malformations. 'Monsters', writes Margrit Shildrick, 'show themselves in many different and culturally specific ways, but what is monstrous about them is most often the form of their embodiment' (2001: 9). The historical survey proposed in this chapter therefore shall be paying particular attention to monstrosity and corporeality; in other words, to how the wide and complex range of discourses of monstrosity relate to the body. Monsters, of course, are also an important part of our imaginary. Whether physical or metaphorical, the monster 'came into focus against various orthodoxies at specific points in time and for specific reasons' (Curran, 2004: 245). My approach to monsters and monstrosity will therefore be sensitive to the movement of culture, that is, the transformation of the nature of social and cultural experience. The production of monsters interweaves a whole range of relations (social, material, cultural, textual). It is reconfigured in terms of its shifting relationship with the historically and culturally conditioned fears, anxieties and desires of the moment as well as of previous moments. Always alive and returning to haunt us, 'its contour could never be fully present except as the shadow of a "certain" monstrosity' (Derrida, 1995: 386).

Questions that will concern me in the following pages are: how does our culture visualize the monstrous? How is it represented? Why do some images or objects act as representations of the monstrous, or why are some images, and not others, invested with monstrous qualities? Could images that in their extreme form warrant the label monstrous serve as an interpretative model for an understanding of how our culture is constructed? These general questions will enable me to engage in a more specific way with the historical period in which Goya produced *Los Caprichos* (Chapter 3) and with our cultural assumptions concerning the monstrous in this collection of etchings. My analyses of *Los Caprichos* in Chapters 4 and 5 will draw upon the different discourses on monsters and monstrosity examined in this first chapter.

Monsters tend to appear at times of crisis and uncertainty. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's *Monster Theory* (1996) reflects on this particular feature: 'because of its ontological liminality, the monster appears at times of crisis as a kind of third term that problematizes the clash of extremes' (1996: 6). More recent studies on the subject of monstrosity emphasize this aspect: for instance, in *Embodying the Monster. Encounters with the Vulnerable Self* (2001), Margrit Shildrick observes that 'a preoccupation with the monstrous seems to be a regular feature of periods of social and political uncertainty' (2001: 20); Laura Lunger Knoppers and Joan B. Landes in their edited collection *Monstrous Bodies / Political Monstrosities in Early Modern Europe* (2004), which charts the relationship between monsters, religious strife and political instability, note that monsters 'reflect the felt upheaval and disorder of political revolution' (2004: 13). As I shall be arguing in subsequent chapters, the year in which *Los Caprichos* were published, 1799, came at the end of a decade of political and social unrest. The French Revolution and its aftermath had immediate political and religious consequences in Spain, contributing to the polarization of contesting ideologies. The long eighteenth-century is also witness to a shift between paradigms of knowledge concerning science, religion, political ideology, and social organization.

The chapter is organized as follows: it opens with an etymological note that establishes the semantic possibilities offered by the term that concerns us. Then I shall frame the textual generation of the monstrous as a movement from a narrative of the marvelous to a narrative of the deviant.

Monstrare and *monere*

Etymologically, the word monster is traditionally linked with two semantic fields: to show and to warn. In both cases, it discloses a pre-inscribed meaning. The Latin *monstrare* (to show, to display, to make known) sets before the beholder's eyes a being or thing to be seen - a prodigy, a marvel, a deformation, a hybrid, a monstrous example. The latter inform and instruct about nature's disorders: abnormal births, abnormal formations or unnatural conceptions relate with the idea of norm as departures from it. Its other meaning derives from the Latin verb *monere* (to warn, to admonish). The monster is a divine sign prophesying disasters. Endowed with religious connotations, it reveals the will of God. The monster as omen, divine portent or sign of God's displeasure will be used and reused in times of religious and political crisis across the centuries, as we shall see. An earthquake that shook the Iberian peninsula in 1755 provides us with an example in which the 'monster' retains this religious meaning. On 1st November 1755 an earthquake destroyed the Portuguese city of Lisbon, affecting also some regions of the South of the Iberian Peninsula, in particular Seville. On such a commemorative Christian date, All Saints' Day, the local religious authorities interpreted the earthquake as God's punishment and soon organized processions to ask for His forgiveness. For the canon Francisco José Olazábal y Olaysola it was a 'signo de la ira de Dios' (Sánchez-Blanco, 1999: 248) unleashed by the 'inmoralidad de los hombres' (1999: 246). In eighteenth-century Catholic Spain such supernatural explanations were hardly contested, only a few voices attempted to explain the disaster in terms of natural causes. Medical and literary academies, as well as contemporary journals, accounted for the earthquake within a secular, rather than theological, framework (see 'El terremoto de 1755', Sánchez-Blanco (1999: 241-269)). The survival of early meanings attributed to the figure of the monster and of supernatural interpretations will be crucial for my discussion of the monstrous in *Los Caprichos.*

The first attitudes towards monsters in the works of classical authorities - Aristotle, Cicero, Pliny, Augustine, Herodotus, Isidore of Seville, Solinus - are referred to in any popular or learned text that took monstrous births, prodigious events or related natural phenomena into consideration throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period. The writings of Aristotle on generation as a whole and on the physiology of monsters in particular represent a first strain. Religious, philosophical and medical treatises relied on Aristotle's *auctoritas* and, as will be argued later in this chapter, the implications of his body of scientific writing were still being accepted by eighteenth-and nineteenth-century medicine. Cicero, Augustine and Isidore considered monsters as portents and divine signs intended for man's good. In *De Divinatione* Cicero establishes 'monstra', 'ostenta', 'portenta' and 'prodigia' as synonyms; what Cicero 'firmly marks out', however, is 'the tragedy of the monstrous as a supranatural signifier of coming social and political calamities, or as a commentary on contemporary mores' (Shildrich, 2001: 12). The earthquake of 1755, to which I referred above, can be understood within this tradition. In Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies* (Book

XI), nature is controlled by the divine will and the whole of creation is a source of wonderment, a manifestation of the variety of creation: 'portents are those things that are seen to be born against nature. But they are not against nature, because they are made by divine will, since the will of the Creator is the nature of everything made. [...] But portents, wonders (ostenta), monsters (monstra), and prodigies are named such because they are seen to portend, display (ostendere), show (monstrare), and predict (praedicare) some future things' (cited in Wigginton and Stephen, 1989: 75). According to Isidore of Seville, monsters are designed and produced by God to show the future. Isidore's remarks on the word *monstrum* bring in the third traditional interpretation of monsters in the ancient, medieval and early modern period. The monster as an inhabitant of exotic places in African and Indian lands (Gigantes, Sciopods, Amazons, Cyclopes, or Blemmyae amongst others) is reported in the cosmographical and anthropological works of Pliny, Herodotus and Solinus and, later on, in the narrations of the discoveries in the New World by Western European travelers. In other words, alien races as the 'monstrous other' (fig. 2).[1] The tradition of bestiaries also captured the Medieval popular imagination. These texts displayed monstrous races, hybrid creatures and, above all, animals, and invested them with allegorical meaning in order to instruct the Medieval man. Goya's bestiary, as we shall see in Chapter 4, engages with the didactic role of such catalogues of monsters by, on the one hand, drawing on popular representations of monsters, and, on the other, drawing attention to the epistemological and metaphysical questions posed by this monstrous imagery. These traditions provided both the stock of teratological iconography and the teratological and etiological interpretative stances that will appear and reappear in the centuries to come.

From classical antiquity to what Foucault has defined as the (French) Classical Age,[2] the monstrous has been considered as a departure from the norm, a deviation from the normal type.

Siding with abnormality, dissimilarity, it calls for an understanding of what is normal. 'Like produces like' is Aristotle's claim in *Generation of Animals*: a variation or a deficiency (excess or defect) was traditionally taken as an example of instructive hybridization or as an example of misleading likeness 'by presenting similarities to categories of beings to which they are not related' (Huet, 1993: 5). As Shildrick has observed, 'the traditional characterization of monstrosity in terms of excess, duplicity or displacement suggests not only bodily imperfection, but an improper being' (2001: 12). This crossing over from the physical to the moral will retain its classical significance well into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as I shall argue in Chapter 4 in relation to the science of physiognomics. Monsters blur the differences between genres, defying any classification and disrupting the strict order of Nature. The hybrid is the result of the intermixture of dissimilar beings, its unclassifiability unsettles any established taxonomy and has further implications for the structuration of identities and for the regulation of (symbolic) order. In this way, the monstrous confounds any definitive etymology; the monster becomes a sign of a will to pervert the divine order of things, to depart from divine precepts. Within classical and Medieval thought, a consideration of the etymologies of names was the key to their nature: 'Etymology [...] could reveal hidden meanings that might elude someone who merely looked at the object named' (Friedman, 1981: 110).

A false likeness, according to Marie Hélène Huet, demonstrates a relationship among the monstrous, resemblance and imagination. This 'false resemblance' shows a monstrous progeny that results from disorder of the maternal imagination, a line of thought present within debates on imaginationism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment.[3] Such debates need to be seen within a wider discussion on monstrous births centering around theories of preformationism and epigenesis, which took place in the French Académie Royale des Sciences during the first half of the eighteenth century. Preformationists like Malebranche, Senebier, Spallanzani, Haller and Bonnet believed that living beings were created at the beginning of time by God, whereas defenders of epigenesis, like Fontana, Buffon, and Maupertuis, argued that living beings developed from an undifferentiated mass of matter into organs, and eventually, into a structure. Debates on monstrosity were considered within a theological frame since the main question was to explain monstrous births and malformations within a God-given universe. But let us briefly return to imaginationism. Imaginationists argued that, if the pregnant woman was affected or in some way "impressed" by an image or an object, imagination had the power to give shape to the foetus and even to imprint images on it. Considered among the causes of monstrosity, the power of imagination in pregnant women could provoke a deformity and play a role in the formation of monstrosities. The monstrous is identified with women or their sexuality (inner monstrosity, female organs) - the monstrous-feminine. In other words, the female regarded as another departure from the norm, as Aristotle wrote in *Generation of Animals*. In the passage on resemblance to parents and forebears, Aristotle writes: 'anyone who does not take after the parents is really in a way a monstrosity, since in these cases Nature has in a way strayed from the generic type. The first beginning of this deviation is when a female is formed instead of a male [...]' (1984: 401).

The movement from monsters as prodigies to monsters as instances of medical pathology is Katharine Park's and Lorraine J. Daston's object of analysis in their now classical 'Unnatural Conceptions: the Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France and England' (1981). Park and Daston argue that there is a long written tradition on the subject of monsters present in classical treatises, Medieval bestiaries and cosmographies, Renaissance wonder books and medical dissertations, until gradually the monster becomes an example of medical pathology. Park and Daston consider these works on monstrous births as a case-study to describe some of the social and cultural changes in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe, especially 'the "withdrawal" of high from popular culture', the gap opening between literate culture and traditional culture. It is their contention that the sharpening of social boundaries between city dwellers and peasants, between the illiterate and the learned, and the change in interpretation with regard to monstrous manifestations - 'the emphasis shifted from final causes (divine will) to proximate ones (physical explanations and the natural order)' (1981: 35) - gave rise to a new, civil ideal of culture detached from the ignorance and superstition of the folk. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, monsters present in prodigy books, wonder books and popular forms of literature were associated with religion and pleasurable reading. They were part of a shared culture of common concerns and assumptions. But, by the end of the seventeenth century, the urban literate laymen included the social and sociable use of monsters as part of their education. Monsters became progressively one of the subjects of discussion of scientific societies[4] and, eventually, the monstrous was approached in a medical light. Nonetheless, during this period the word 'monster' retained the proto-scientific Aristotelian views on terata, the Augustinian tradition of the prodigy and its religious connotations continued, and the Plinian myths of the monstrous races 'provided a familiar way of looking at the native people of the New World' (Friedman, 1981: 207). Indeed, during the early modern period the myths of the monstrous races 'were too vital to be discarded' (1981: 207) because of their religious, moral, and political implications. The various attitudes toward monsters and interpretations of the monstrous intertwined, forming much more of a continuum, and prompting mixed responses at the same time: both repugnance and fascination, pleasure and horror, desire and repulsion. That was, is, and will be the lore of monsters. It could be said that awe, curiosity, entertainment, knowledge responded to a similar attitude of mind.

Park's and Daston's thesis has been criticized subsequently on the grounds that their progressive rationalization and naturalization of monstrosity offered a 'secularizing teleology': 'the progressive narrative, in which the monstrous moves from portent to science, undervalues the political, polemical, and juridical uses of monstrous imagery through the early modern period' (Knoppers and Landes, 2004: 8).[5] A second criticism leveled against Park's and Daston's study of monstrosity is that 'they make only passing reference to its manifestation in popular culture' (Semonin, 1996: 71). The display of monsters in the marketplace was for religious purposes, but also as commercial display to curiosity seekers: 'within the popular mind [...] monsters were actors in a drama, rather than merely symbols of God's wrath or specimens of scientific interest' (Semonin, 1996: 71). I shall be returning to the popular lore of monsters in my analysis of Goya's prints. In '"No Monsters at the Resurrection": Inside Some Conjoined Twins' (1996), Stephen Pender criticizes Park and Daston along the same lines since they 'fail to take account of the complex, conflictual status of the monstrous in the early modern period [...] There appears to be a more fluid interchange between the portentous and the anomalous' (1996:145). By the end of the eighteenth century, it can be argued that the monstrous figures populating *Los Caprichos* 'served for the judgment of cultivated and uncultivated alike, of the micromegalic abnormalities of gigantic excess and dwarfish deficiency rampant in Spanish society' (Stafford, 1997: 73).

The writings on the monstrous and the reception of the monstrous, from Ambroise Paré's *Des Monstres et Prodiges* (1573) to the marketplace, from its recording in encyclopedias to its display in cabinets of curiosities or wunderkammern are witness to the impossibility of containing it in any conceptual system. The works of the surgeons Ambroise Paré and Fortunius Liceti (*De Monstrorum*

Caussis, Natura et Differentiis (1616)), could hardly be distinguished from the prodigy books of Pierre Boaistuau (*Histoires Prodigieuses* (1560) or Konrad Lycosthenes (Prodigiorum Liber (1557)), the historical account of Ulisse Aldrivandi (*The History of* Monsters (1642)),[6] or from books on natural wonders like that of Lemnis, *De miraculis occultis naturae* (1559). Although these monster books positioned 'monstrosity within a familiar network of epistemic associations –mythological, classical, biblical, medical and symbolic' (Shildrick, 2001: 13), they also posed interesting questions regarding classical considerations of monstrosity, since, as Cohen has pointed out, '"wonder books" radically undermine the Aristotelian taxonomic system, for by refusing an easy compartmentalization of their monstrous contents, they demand a radical rethinking of boundary and normality' (1996: 6).

Paré's *Des Monstres et Prodiges* serves here as an example. The French surgeon enumerates the causes of monstrous births; among the thirteen he lists are the traditional explanation of God's will and man's sins to demonstrate the anger and glory of God, a reference to the doctrine of the disorder of the maternal imagination, and more physiological explanations such as too great or too small a quantity of semen or hereditary diseases; he also posits, following Aristotle, three major categories of monstrosities: anomalies of excess, of default, and duplicity. According to Jean Céard (1971), Paré's is the most sustained attempt to "naturalize" monsters during the sixteenth century. However, in the words of Thompson, the treatise 'straddles the seam between wonder and error, between marvelous and medicalized narratives of the anomalous body' (1996: 3). Medicine, albeit in its primitive forms, had already approached the monstrous.[7] Traces of the development of the naturalization of the monster are to be seen in the inclusion of clinical descriptions of monstrous births, though these coexist with natural wonders and supernatural cases. The natural, the supernatural, and the medical partake of the same cultural milieu. The early seventeenth century sees the English natural historian Francis Bacon willing to distinguish between marvels of natural and supernatural origin within a naturalist framework. By rejecting supernatural explanations and questioning popular superstitions, the Baconian scientific programme affirms that all phenomena, including monsters, were natural. They belonged to one of Nature's states, the preternatural.[8] Monsters entered into the tripartite Baconian division of natural history as part of the history of nature erring. In the context of the Spanish Enlightenment, the Benedictine monk Benito Jerónimo Feijoo was the major introducer of the Baconian method in Spain; as he writes in 'Scepticismo filosófico' (1769): 'I do not know, nor can anyone know without revelation, the precise limitation of human understanding with regard to natural things [...] What I believe is that if such things can be known, it is most likely that this knowledge may be gained through use of Bacon's method and system' (cited in Haidt, 1998: 44).

The meaning of monsters was, as Pender evinces, 'subject to a dialectical understanding: the dynamic attempt to naturalize the monster through the discourses of science ran parallel to, and in some instances ratified, the continued proliferation of accounts of terata as miraculous, strange, and portentous' (1996: 146). Investigation and exhibition, dissection and display went hand in hand; monstrous births and human deformity were driven by the same force, common to the medical community and among people: (sanctioned) curiosity. Part of a similar attitude of mind, 'the marvelous and the scientific coexisted in the reception and study of monsters and continued to do so long after the monster's absorption by "legitimate" scientific discourses in the eighteenth century' (1996: 150). Like the monster books of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries, the collection of etchings *Los Caprichos* defies easy categorization and demands that we pay attention to a whole range of epistemic associations related to the figure of the monster.

The teratological tradition in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spain is represented by José de Rivilla Bonet y Pueyo's *Desvíos de la Naturaleza o Tratado del origen de los monstruos* (1695), Pedro Cachapero de Arévalo, whose *El maestro Pedro Cachapero de Arévalo [...] a los muy insignes y sapientísimos doctores médicos, y a los ejercitantísimos médicos vulnerianos, y curiosos cirujanos* (1610) contains examples of monstrous pathologies, and the volume *Colección de láminas que representan los animales y monstruos del Real Gabinete de Historia Natural, con una descripción individual de cada una* (1784-86) by Juan de Bru de Ramón y Parra (1740-1799), with which eighteenth-century Spanish engravers would have been familiar. In spite of the scarcity of prints representing monsters in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spain, accounts of human monsters demonstrate a comparable attitude to that of other European countries: 'aunque a veces se estudiaban bajo supuestos científicos, también se presentaban al público como curiosidades' (Carrete Parrondo, 1996: 65).[9] According to Henry Ettinghausen, Spanish seventeenth- and eighteenth-century relations on monsters could be roughly grouped into three main types: human monsters (monstrous births, congenital malformations), fabulous creatures (hybrid creatures or bizarre human physical deformations), and allegorical monsters ('composite figures endowed with a moral or a political meaning' (1996: 127)). Such prints were still popular during the eighteenth-century, as we shall see in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 where my analysis of some *caprichos* shows how Goya re-appropriated this tradition. The print revolution facilitated 'the dissemination of the monstrous – not merely as text but as printed image' (Knoppers and Landes, 2004: 9). Let us consider two relations which circulated in Spain during the early modern period,[10] *Relación verdadera de un parto monstruoso en la Ciudad de Tortosa* (1634) (fig. 3) and *Niño monstruoso, que nació en la Ciudad de Cádiz, el día 25 de Noviembre de 1767* (fig. 4).[11] The former, a relation on Siamese twins written by a Miguel Sorolla, includes a detailed anatomical description of the bodies (external,'descripción de la parte de delante,' 'descripción de la parte de las espaldas;' and internal, 'descripción interior') as well as factual information concerning the parents, their place of origin and a record of the actual circumstances sorrounding the birth: 'aviendo cofessado y comulgado, le tomaron dolores de parto entre las diez y las once del día, y a los tres quartos para las doze parió la criatura' (1993: 131-32). In the words of Miguel Sorolla, the anatomical examination was undertaken two days later under the supervision of two doctors, a surgeon, and a notary who were all witnesses to 'este prodigio de naturaleza'. And he ends with a note accounting for the popularity of the monster: 'Fue tan grande el concurso de la gente que'acudio à verle, que son pocos los de esta Ciudad que no le ayan visto' (1993: 131-32). More than a century later, on 25 November 1767, a monstrous birth is reported in Cádiz. The relation contains a thorough description of all the external parts of the deformed body; the text that accompanies the illustration relies on common objects and plain, vivid language to convey the physical organization of this anomalous body: 'En el ojo derecho se le apercibe una Eminencia, de la que sale una cuerda à manera de latigo'; 'En el sitio del Brazo Derecho, tiene una Eminencia, como dos dedos de ancho, y quatro de largo, la qual està unida à el ojo del mismo lado; de la parte media de esta Eminencia le sale otra parecida al huevo de una paloma'. The monstrous child was baptised, as were the twins, before dying seven hours later. The body, we are told, was kept in the hospital of Cádiz (1993: 131-32).

Naturalization of the monster

Georges Canguilhem ('La monstruosité et le monstrueux', 1962) and Marie Hélène Huet (*Monstrous Imagination*, 1995) trace the naturalization of the monster to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries within the framework of modern science and rational thought. The 'monstrous' had to be brought into relation with a type of discourse which was already, in some sense, natural and legible. For Jonathan Culler, '"naturalization" emphasizes the fact that the strange or deviant is brought within a discursive order and thus made to seem natural' (1989: 137).[12] The 'monstrous' is given a place within modern science, within the scientist's laboratory. By being recognized and named, the monster is included in a system. Park and Daston refer to the naturalization of the monster in these terms: '[drawing] upon an established medical tradition of compiling anomalies as the basis for comparative investigations, they [the scientists] approached monsters as special cases in the established fields of comparative anatomy and embryology rather than as items in a heterogeneous category composed solely of anomalies' (1981: 52). In this way, the irregular submits to the rule, it submits to Reason. This intention to organize the monstrous and to integrate it into the medical disciplines and the programmes of academies, regarding it as an object of classification subject to the 'familiar' order of things, is what I mean by naturalization. First biology and comparative analysis, and later on teratogeny - the systematic production of monsters in the laboratory-, and teratology - an attempt to classify all monstrosities - gave birth to a science of monsters.[13] Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772-1844), his son Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1805-1861) and Camille Dareste (1822-1899) made of the monster their object of enquiry and their scientific instrument. The Saint-Hilaires were searching for evidence of ideal patterns imposed on nature by some superior creative force, they were looking for 'the essence of things' that would reveal the system, the constant and general order of phenomena in nature, in their belief that mankind will eventually know and understand everything. Monsters were anomalies used for comparative purposes, and were considered counter-examples to normal embryological development.[14] Their observation would shed light on normal anatomy and physiology, helping to classify constant relationships methodologically and to discern the orderly interplay of familiar norms. The taxonomical delimitation and determination of anomalous structures pointed towards the establishment of a scientific pathology, whereby hybridity is transformed into anomaly, the monster being an instance, a specimen that falls within the authoritative logic of medical discourse on the normal and the pathological. In our historical survey of monsters, the work of Canguilhem alerts us that the eighteenth-century established a new relation between monstrosity and normalcy:

> By identifying normalcy and normalization as the polemical or ideological byproducts of monstrosity, Canguilhem prompted scholars working in intellectual history and the history of science to complicate the narrative charting the supposedly neutral or positive movement of monstrosity's rationalization henceforth this story would have to include the possibility that monstrosity functioned didactically, teaching us who we should be. (Curran, 2004: 234).

As Canguilhem points out, the same historical period, which, according to Foucault, naturalized madness, set itself to naturalizing monsters. "A foil for the norm" was Georges Canguilhem's definition of the monster in reference to the embryologist's jar in 'Monstrosity and the Monstrous' (1962). In the same way that in the nineteenth century the madman was kept in the asylum as a foil for reason and observation, the monster was kept in the embryologist's jar ready to be dissected in order to shed light on more regular structures. And it is Foucault who, in *Histoire de la folie*, writes: 'until the beginning of the nineteenth century, (...) madmen remained monsters - that is, etymologically, beings or things to be shown' (1965: 70). Two institutions, the hospital and the pedagogical institution, expressed a demand for rationalization and normativization. Both naturalized the term 'normal' and opposed it to 'unreason', be it in the form of the insane or the deviant. The Enlightenment's rationalist philosophy and physiology naturalized and normativized the monster in an effort to make transparent this anomalous creation of nature as a variation of nature's recognizable laws. Thus naturalization is related to modes of discourse already available within culture whereas the concept of normativization refers to the prototypes (the scholastic prototype and the state of organic health) established by these same institutions. I shall be returning to Foucault's work in Chapter 2. For the time being, his work enables me here, firstly, to address a shift regarding the concept of monstrosity, and, secondly, to start seeing how monstrosity and corporeality can be thought together. In a series of lectures entitled 'Les anormaux' (Cours au Collège de France, 1974-75), Foucault mapped the notion of monstrosity and argued that throughout history there have been changes in the locus of monstrosity: for the medieval mind the monster was the madman, while, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, conjoined twins came to occupy this locus, which was to be occupied by the hermaphrodite in the Age of Enlightenment. Foucault's work on 'Les anormaux' provides therefore another dimension to my narrative on monsters and monstrosity – monsters and monstrosity as a conceptual locus. As for the relationship between monstrosity and corporeality, I shall be arguing that 'in line with Foucault's concept of an emergent norm for the human body itself, monstrous difference became more regularly defined as deviant – abnormal– rather than as wholly distinctive' (Shildrick, 2001: 20). The theoretical implications of Foucault's study will be fully examined in the following chapter. Through his work, as well as that of Canguilhem and Derrida, we shall learn how knowledge of monsters is constructed through a double bind: contained within reason, the monster is indivisibly bound to the object of enquiry; yet the monster, the unclassifiable 'other,' is set up to be excluded.

... produce monstruos

'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' is invoked by the historian of science Georges Canguilhem in his article 'La monstruosité et le monstrueux':

> One repeats with Goya: "The sleep of reason gives birth to monsters," without asking sufficiently, precisely on consideration of Goya's work, whether by giving birth he meant engendering monsters or bearing them - put differently, whether the sleep of reason might not be the liberator rather than the generator of monsters. (1962: 34)

The invocation of Goya in this article is part of the historian of science's tracing of the relationship between monstrosity and the monstrous from Classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages through the first works on teratology to contemporary science. A summary of his article will help us to recap the different discourses on monstrosity identified in the previous pages. According to Canguilhem, 'monster' is a term reserved for organic beings; as a living being, a monster was the effect of the infraction of specific sexual segregation as well as a sign of the will to pervert the tableau of living creatures. Purity and perversion were part of the Medieval bond between teratology and demonology, 'the consequence of the persistent dualism of Christian theology' (1962: 31). During the classical and Medieval periods, monstrosity is the effect of the monstrous, and 'both concepts are at the service of two normative judgments, the medical and the legal' (1962: 30). Then the monstrous came progressively to be considered as a category of the imagination, more specifically, of the maternal imagination capable of rendering monstrous beings. In addition to the transformation of women into monsters according to Aristotelian principles, the Renaissance also blamed women for the production of monsters through their passions and desires. The first treatises on teratology juxtaposed monstrosity and the monstrous; it is the century of positivism that brings with it the scientific explanation of monstrosity and the reduction of the monstrous. The monstrous 'points out the weakness or failure of reason' (1962: 35); whether reason produces monsters when asleep or when dreaming, as the etching's caption ambivalently suggests, Canguilhem's invocation of Goya arguably refers to the nature of reason.

One repeats with Goya: 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' (The Sleep/Dream of Reason Produces Monsters). *Capricho 43* (fig.1) is open to a myriad of interpretations that will be taken into consideration at different stages of my study. Let us make a first interpretative move by focusing on the etching on a textual level, in particular the words 'produce monstruos'. In the pre-scientific age, as I argued in the opening pages of this chapter, the appearance of monsters was an act of God; God was posited as the centre and cause of all things. The pre-modern mindset understood monsters as phenomena to be considered and, ultimately, interpreted as the will of God. This interpretation of monsters was in accordance with the early Christian and Medieval sense of establishing knowledge, namely to establish knowledge was to reveal the divine to humans as pertaining to their existence and the world. Thus monsters, by nature revelatory, an act of God, were created to illustrate by contradistinction the very perfection of the norm. Not only monsters, but also marvels and prodigies revealed the omnipotence of God whether they demonstrated His benevolence or His wrath. Either way they were signs read as divine communication. Monsters, marvels and prodigies acted therefore as signs of God's affiliation with the created world.

The age of the sign, essentially theological, persists under the guise of scientific discourse. This dualistic system based on the supposed primeval conflict between light and darkness, good and evil, reappears in the form of rationalism and irrationalism in the age of the Enlightenment. In the modern age, the age of mechanical reproduction to use Walter Benjamin's expression in 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' (1936), monsters are produced. From the eighteenth century onwards, human thought becomes the centre and cause of all things. The term 'production' understood as a productive, practical activity expresses man's essence; human production holds the centre of human life and social reality. Human thought (rationality), the modern, rational mind, produces knowledge and, by extension, bodies of knowledge, as I shall be arguing in Chapter 2. In the scientific age, monsters are stripped of any religious connotation and become a medical concept. The science of teratogeny is a prime example of the rational mind at work: the production of monsters in laboratories created a body of knowledge that allowed modern science to observe and shed light on normal anatomy, embryology and physiology. The techniques and practices through which the monstrous was known and treated helped in an understanding of the normal terrain of social and medical life. The following words by Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire illustrate the scientific re-appropiation of monstrosity: 'monsters have their usefulness: they are means of study for our intellects' (cited in Huet, 1995: 126). Monsters are instruments for analyzing ideas and theories such as the eighteenth-century ideology of hereditary transmission, and are useful in order to conceive of the continuity of the universe. Nature ordains a place for monsters in her all-embracing scheme. Hence they are part of the greater scheme of things, of the Great Chain of Being. As the creation of an all-knowing maternal nature, the Chain of Being not only allowed for unexplainable differences but also required them to be accepted as part of nature's immutable plan. This underlying belief implied that the infinitesimal differences amongst beings would not allow for a clear definition of what could be labeled monstrous, that would contest the possibility of defining a being as monstrous. The idea of the Great Chain of Being withdrew from man the notion that monsters existed in contradistinction to him as his binary opposite. If man differed from the nearest so-called non-human species, his position as the 'middle-link' in the chain - the point of transition from merely sentient beings to intellectual forms of being - had an effect upon man's conception of himself. The belief that all creatures existed solely for man's sake was no longer valid within the philosophy of the Chain of Being; the relativeness of man's place and purpose within the Chain as well as the precept of the immutable Chain of Being, where every individual's place within it is fixed forever, was at odds with man's freedom and his desire to identify, name and rationalize things. If the place occupied by a being within the Chain has been allocated in accordance with some greater, perfect scheme, only excess(ive pride) would lead to any attempt at transcending such an order. A logical and tragic paradox repeated time and again in the history of Western reason. As the 'middle-link', man is 'in a sense in which no other chain in the link is, a strange hybrid monster' (Lovejoy, 1985: 199), for the universal scheme of things places him as a member of two orders of being at once, and he is not quite at home in either.

Monsters, then, bear human knowledge. The monstrous is brought under the control of reason, reason colonizes the monstrous. Once the monstrous is domesticated by science, it becomes fully visible and, as presence, its meaning becomes wholly present. Empirical definitions relied mostly on visual observation, hence the preeminence of the etymology *monstrare* (to show) during the Enlightenment. Scientific observation and interpretation as well as general visual definitions reduce monsters to indexes of the order of things. This vision produced by science led to the construction and maintenance of boundaries for what may count as normal and deviant, and solidified cultural definitions of normalcy and superiority. Projecting ourselves to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the impossible paradigm of normalcy still persists, arguably, in the science of genetics, in particular in the Human Genome Project. As Leslie A. Fiedler observes in his article 'The Tyranny of the Normal', 'the whole therapeutic activity is haunted by the ghosts of those two-headed, three-legged, one-eyed chicks that the first scientific teratologists of the eighteenth-century created and destroyed in their laboratories' (1985: 157). In 1844 the French illustrator Jean-Ignace Grandville, after visiting the comparative anatomy displays available to the public at the Jardin des Plantes in Paris, playfully depicted impossible hybrid creatures from the animal kingdom in 'The pursuit' (fig. 5), an engraving inspired by the teratologists' experimentations. Grandville's print was engaging, at the same time, with representations of hybrid creatures in bestiaries, wonder books and, no doubt, with the monstrous creatures etched by Goya in *Los Caprichos*.

'El sueño de la razón produce monstrous': Engendering? Bearing? Producing. What type of monsters? Physical monsters? Mental monsters? Social, political, moral monsters when reason is asleep? Monsters generated by the artist's imagination? No longer is monstrosity read as a divine sign, literally or allegorically, nor as a figure symbolizing the Manichaean understanding of the world, nor solely as the literal fact waiting to be dissected by the medical gaze. The fascination and the obsession with literal, physical and allegorical monstrosity gave way to a more complex conception of monstrosity. All the above traditions bear upon each other to produce or image forth those disturbingly ambiguous figures that populate Goya's teratology. Producing his work in the second half of the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century, Goya engaged with a whole panoply of monsters. For, as Curran and Graille have noted on eighteenth-century discourses and imagery on the monster: the monster is 'a fluctuating beast, a hybrid occupying an ambiguous position in Enlightenment thought somewhere between the limits of empirical knowledge and the territory of fantasy' (1997: 4).

Conclusion

My aim in this chapter has been to frame the textual generation of the monster as a 'movement from a narrative of the marvelous to a narrative of the deviant',[15] from the classical explanations of Aristotle, Pliny and Augustine for the different origins of monsters to the scientific treatment of monsters in the eighteenth century. Within the discursive practices of academic disciplines and modern science 'wonder becomes error' (Thomson, 1996: 3). However, as I argued, early considerations of monsters and beliefs on the monstrous run parallel to this 'secularizing teleology'. The monster appears in a myriad of contexts: moral discourses, religious polemic, superstitious beliefs. Indeed, 'what seems to be a simple narrative of progressively more rational approaches to the issue of monstrous forms obscures a far more complex process of contestation in which a whole range of modernist parameters of knowledge – truth and fiction, self and other, inner and outer, normal and abnormal are at stake' (Shildrick, 2001: 27).

Avoiding a historicization of the concepts of the normal and the monstrous that would derive from the present moment of historical enunciation and would bear the indelible trace of present value judgments, my study will concentrate on the historical context out of which a particular naming of the monstrous emerges. The period of concern is eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Spain, particularly the years spanning the production and publication of Goya's *Los Caprichos*. Goya's semantics of the body in the hybrid creatures and distorted figures of *Los Caprichos* is inscribed with political, religious, moral and cultural meanings, displaying 'the whole gamut of monsters available to the Enlightenment' (Stafford, 1997: 272). The comprehensive picture posited by the Enlightenment seems to me to be contested through the Goyesque vision; a vision that might provide an understanding of Spanish Enlightenment, and of the way in which body-images can be studied as a vehicle for the transmission of ideas. Goya's work will be read against contemporary discourses in order to understand the monster 'as an embodiment of a certain cultural moment' (Cohen, 1996: 4).

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[1] For a study of the tradition of monstrous races in the Medieval world and the way in which Western Christian thinkers came to terms with the questions beings posed about the nature of monstrosity, see John Friedman's seminal work *The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought* (1981).

[2] In temporal terms, the 'Classical Age' could be said to refer to the seventeenth century and part of the eighteenth century.

[3] See Huet's *Monstrous Imagination* (1993: 39-45) and Stafford's *Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and Medicine* (1991: 211-279) for a discussion of epigenesis and preformationism.

[4] The French Bureau d'Adresse, the English Royal Society, the Athenian Society and, in a more professionalized and institutionalized manner, the Parisian Académie des Sciences.

[5] In their 1998 *Wonders and the Order of Nature (1150-1750)* Park and Daston revisit their thesis by positing 'three separate complexes –horror, pleasure, and repugnance– and attempt to address the ways in which cognitive and emotional response to anomalous births overlapped and coexisted within the early modern period' (Knoppers and Landes, 2004: 10). However, their story continues to be 'tied to a progressive epistemological shift insofar as the supernatural is supplanted by the natural, and magical explanations give way to rational accounts' (2004: 11).

[6] Compiled and published posthumously in 1642 by Bartholomaeus Ambrosinus.

[7] See 'Monstrous Medicine' (Huet, 2004).

[8] The other two in the natural history of Bacon were the natural (species of things) and the artificial. For a further discussion of Bacon and the Baconian methodology, see Lorraine Daston (1991), Daston and Park (1981), and Pender (1996).

[9] In *El Grabado. La estampa como medio de comunicación en la sociedad española* (Madrid, 1984) and, more specifically, in 'Estampas fantásticas. Imágenes y descripciones de monstruos,' Juan Carrete Parrondo (1993: 55-68) compiles a number of relations that circulated in Spain around this subject.

[10] 'Las relaciones de sucesos son documentos que narran un acontecimiento ocurrido o, en algunas ocasiones inventado (pero verosímil), con el fin de informar, entretener y conmover al público –bien sea lector u oyente. Tratan de muy diversos temas: acontecimientos histórico-políticos (guerras, autos de fe ...), sucesos monárquicos, fiestas religiosas o cortesanas, viajes, sucesos extraordinarios como catastrofes naturales, milagros, desgracias personales ...' (see http://rosalia.dc.fi.udc.es/BORESU/Introduccion.html, accessed on 9/03/1999).

[11] These two relations are included within the category of human monsters in Henry Ettinghausen's article 'The Illustrated Spanish News. Text and Image in the Seventeenth-Century Press' (1993).

[12] In *Structuralist Poetics* (1977), Culler defines the term naturalization in the context of structuralist writing and in particular in relation to a theory of genre. Recuperation, naturalization, motivation, *vraisemblablisation* enable the reader to interpret something by bringing it 'within the modes of order which culture makes available, and this is usually done by talking about it in a mode of discourse which a culture takes as natural' (1977: 137).

[13] In 'La logique du déviant (Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire et la classification des monstres)', Patrick Tort traces the

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birth and evolution of scientific teratology during the eighteenth century: 'La tératologie d'Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire se trouve en effet à la convergence de nombreux discourses pratiques d'*ordination* et de *réordination* des connaissances positives et de l'investigation dans les sciences de la nature' (1980: 12).

[14] See Javier Moscoso, 'Monsters as Evidence: The Uses of the Abnormal Body During the Early Eighteenth-Century' (1998: 355-382).

[15] In reference to what she defines as freak discourse, Thomson characterizes the freak discourse's genealogy in these terms in the introduction to *Freakery. Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body* (1996: 3).

Chapter 2

Theoretical Dimension of Monstrosity: The Normal and the Monstrous

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the concept of monstrosity in its theoretical and visual manifestations, a preliminary move towards an exploration of the monstrous body in the *Los Caprichos* in Chapters 4 and 5. In order to establish the context of my own methodological approach in examining the concepts of monstrosity and the monstrous, I shall establish a dialogue between Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, philosophers who, through the interrogation of the binary normal / monstrous, put rational thought into question and challenge the Western metaphysical idea of pure vision. The intellectual exchange proposed here will be framed neither in terms of praise nor in terms of rivalry, but rather by establishing points of correspondence between their discourses. It is common knowledge that Canguilhem was Foucault's teacher as well as the official supervisor of *Histoire de la folie* for Foucault's *doctorat d'état*, and that Derrida studied under Foucault, but my interest does not lie in drawing presumed influences. Georges Canguilhem's own criticism of precursors, the 'virus of the precursor', in the history of sciences can be used here:

> A precursor, we are told, is a thinker or researcher who proceeded some distance along a path later explored all the way to its end by someone else. To look for, find and celebrate precursors is a sign of complacency and an unmistakable symptom of incompetence for epistemological criticism. Two itineraries cannot be compared unless the paths followed are truly the same. (1994:49)

This chapter will operate as a play of mirrors: the deflections, inflections and reflections of the three philosophers' trajectories in play; it will explore the way in which theoretical encounters have reconfigured their respective enquiries into the normal and the pathological, the normal and the deviant, the normal and the monstrous. In the intersections created by these French philosophers, two different conceptions of monstrosity will be at stake. I will be forging a link between what I will refer to as the medicalization of the monster within the framework of modern science and rational thought as presented in the works of Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, and a more abstract conception of monstrosity in the thought of Jacques Derrida. The former regard the monster through the reading grid of scientific disciplines such as biology and particular social practices like medicine; the latter's conceptual examination defines the monster as 'that which appears for the first time and, consequently, is not yet recognized' (1995: 386). Dictionary definitions of the normal - 'something that corresponds to what one has seen before' - obviously dwell on the idea of familiarity and recognition (normal is what is 'usual, regular, common, typical').

This is what is reexamined in Derrida's thought: the familiar, the habitual, the usual; in other words, those received ideas that shape our vision and understanding of the world. Derrida's reexamination of familiar habits of thought, of 'normal' habits of mind, within the Western metaphysical tradition draws attention to the procedures that legitimate a *certain* view of the world, of language, and of human communication. Derrida's project places in question a whole metaphysics which relies on conceptions of being as presence, and assimilates truth and reason to it; what Derrida calls a 'metaphysics of presence' pervades Western philosophical discourse from Plato to Husserl. In what follows I shall be outlining some of Derrida's moves, since attempting a definition of deconstruction is not only beyond the scope of this chapter but would also be a delimiting, reductive gesture contrary to the Derridean enterprise. I will be drawing upon different deconstructive strategies without ignoring their specific context of argument in order to map out ways in which Derridean thinking might contribute to an examination of certain crucial questions in the domain of the Spanish Enlightenment and, more specifically, through the incisive work of Goya, to further interrogate the tradition in which his artistic production was rooted. Without entirely breaking with the past, Goya forged a way forward to the new by transcending the aesthetic ideas of the age in which he lived. His art, whether as a designer of tapestries depicting Spanish national pastimes, as a portraitist of the court and its entourage, or as a cabinet painter, responded to the demands of his patrons while also exploring new forms of representation. Goya's extraordinary achievement lies not in the fact that he engraved and published *Los Caprichos* prints, which were the fruit of new ideas and a new aesthetic, but in that he imposed a boldly anti-academic, modern art upon the institutional conventions of his time.

Displacing monstrosity

The privilege of the voice over writing upon which traditional metaphysics founds itself reveals, for Derrida, a structure of opposition which is characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition. The relation between speech and writing as explored by Derrida in *Of Grammatology* (1967) prepares the ground for the deconstruction of other oppositions on which Western philosophy is constructed. In this tradition, the spoken sound has been identified with meaning and thought while the written sign, writing, has been considered useless and dangerous since it is just a mediating system that stands in for speech. The link between ideas and truth is ideally transparent in this model: the meaning of an utterance is self-present, simultaneous to the consciousness of the speaker. In the translator's preface, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak describes how Derrida relates phonocentrism to logocentrism, 'the belief that the first and last things are the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the infinite understanding of God, an infinite creative subjectivity, and, closer to our time, the self-presence or full self-consciousness', and the acceptance that 'the evidence for this originary and teleologic presence has customarily been found in the voice, the *phonè*' (1976: lxviii).[1] Speech is originary, self-present, authentic, full, natural; writing is secondary, supplementary, insincere, derivative, artificial. The value of self-presence as the paradigm of truth conceptually privileges the first term of the distinction between speech and writing, a conceptual privilege that can only be sustained by way of a violent exclusion of the second term. Such an exclusionary yet familiar founding gesture, Derrida writes, 'naturally' structures all our thinking. The value and authority of metaphysical principles whereby a system of thought depends upon a primary principle is a product of a particular system of meaning and truth: meaning is only meaning through that which it displaces and excludes.

Hierarchical dichotomies that establish the supremacy of one of the paired terms over the other - the high over the low, the inside over the outside, the visible over the invisible, reason over madness, the normal over the monstrous, the mind over the body - consistently devolve upon a logic of exclusion. In opposition to the ontological depth of the observer, the surveyed other is relegated to the status of the abject, simultaneously branded and rendered invisible. What Jacques Derrida has called a logic of the 'beyond' informs all Western relational metaphors. The topological bias of Western consciousness must recognize the monstrous 'other' as congenital, as a deferred version of itself. The monstrous is constitutive of it at the level of its structuration, and thus cannot be reduced to any particular apparatus or institution:

> the logic of the beyond, or rather of the *not beyond* (the *step beyond*, *Du pas au delà*) would

> take the place of the logic of positing. But without opposing it: entering instead into another relation with what it sets free or transgressively frees itself from. (1978:78)

The logic of the beyond is the logic of positing. As I will be arguing throughout this chapter, the concept of the normal implies the logic of positing. An unquestioned observer, the sovereign subject, takes up his position denying or repressing the surveyed other. Yet this oppositional logic is informed by the paradox of the *not beyond*: the observer can only take up a position by assuming himself free from the object of study - denying or repressing other possibilities - but this freedom itself is dependent upon what is denied or repressed. A logic of dissent is built into the oppositional *modus operandi* of Western metaphysical thought so that any claim to be beyond what are mutually constitutive terms, any attempts to transcend these terms through recourse to some mythical time and space outside of language, is violently, impossibly, exclusive. My intention in what follows is to articulate the irreducibly double and supplemental character of the referent, the fallacy, that is, of any absolute differentiation; to draw attention to the inseparability of discourse and violence.

But, first, we must attempt an explanation of the phrase 'the irreducibly double and supplemental character of the referent' by turning to Derrida's operational use of the notions 'double' and 'supplement' in *Of Grammatology*, a critique of the works of Rousseau, Saussure, and Lévi-Strauss.[2] These notions will lead us, firstly, to Derrida's reconsideration and radicalization of Saussure's theory of the sign in his essay 'Linguistics and Grammatology';[3] and, secondly, to what he calls 'the logic of supplementarity'. As representatives of the logocentric tradition that accords privilege to the spoken word and rejects writing - 'the exclusion by which [logocentrism] has constituted and recognized itself, from the *Phaedrus* to the *Course in General Linguistics*' (1976: 103) -, Derrida's enterprise is to point to the concealment of the metaphysical presuppositions within their texts. Moreover, Derrida interrogates through the work of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss the methods and assumptions of structuralism: as a dominant discourse in Western and notably French thought during the 1960s, structuralism 'remains caught, by an entire layer, sometimes the most fecund, of its stratification, within the metaphysics - logocentrism - which at the same time claims rather precipitately to have "gone beyond"' (1976: 99). A model for the study of other cultural systems, Saussurian linguistics provided the methods for investigating cultural codes in different disciplines across the human sciences, and offered an attractive model of total coherence and analytical power. Derrida shows how Saussure's notion of the sign is metaphysical and exposes how its application to other disciplines such as anthropology or the social sciences is underwritten by an affirmation of phonocentric and logocentric notions about writing.

The fundamental insight of Saussurian linguistics is that any sign is intelligible not by virtue of a self-conscious intender, of a self-evident meaning, but through its differential relations with other signs in the linguistic system. Saussurian linguistics' all too familiar precept that 'there are only differences *without positive terms*' explicitly points to the diacritical nature of meaning - a sign is not complete in and of itself. Signs consist of a signifier (phonic or graphic) and a signified (the mental concept), and the relation between them is, according to Saussure, arbitrary and conventional. The identification of the spoken sound with meaning (thought) in Saussure's methodology re-enacts the relation between the spoken and the written as well as the conventional relation of language and thought that belongs, as Derrida says, to this epoch, to the history of Western metaphysics:

> This logocentrism, this *epoch* of the full speech, has always placed in parenthesis, *suspended*, and suppressed for essential reasons, all free reflection on the origin and status of writing. (1976: 43)

While writing represents a danger to the purity of the system of speech, Derrida searches for those blindspots in Saussure's text that will subvert this very assumption. Writing acquires a problematic status within the text itself:

> If "writing" signifies inscription and specially the durable institution of a sign (and that is the only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), writing in general covers the entire field of linguistic signs. (1976: 44)

Writing *(écriture)* is not just a graphic or phonetic system, a sign of a sign, it is any system of signs always inscribed in a network of differential meaning:

> We say "[w]riting" for all that gives rise to an *inscription* in general, whether it is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of the voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also *pictorial*, musical, sculptural writing". (1976: 9; my italics)

And here I would like to comment briefly on the technique(s) used by Goya in *Los Caprichos*. Etching is a form of inscription, to etch is to mark. The etcher's burin engraves metal, grave, stone by coating it with a protective layer, drawing on it with a needle, and then covering it with acid to attack the parts the needle has exposed, especially to produce prints from it. Difference or 'writing' is at the origin of language, hence even speech is a form of writing: every concept has its opposite inscribed within it. Derrida fastens on Saussure's theory of the diacritical nature of meaning - there is no natural meaning inherent in the sign for language is dependent on a structural economy of differences - and drives the Saussurian project, in Christopher Norris' words, 'to its ultimate conclusions' (1982: 23). Difference, then, constitutes all language, and language, if we follow the Saussurian model, is institution and convention. As Robert Young puts it, 'representation never re-presents, but always defers the presence of the signified. The sign, therefore, always defers and differs, a curious double movement that Derrida calls "différance"' (1981: 15).

The 'logic of supplement' is another name for 'différance'. With these terms, Derrida not only overturns accustomed hierarchies but also displaces habitual modes of thought. This time it is Rousseau's work which Derrida uses in order to expose the counter-logic at work in his *Essay on the Origin of Languages*: the logic goes that speech is at the origin of language, the counter-logic is marked by Rousseau's confirmation of the priority of writing by treating it as the 'supplement' of spoken language. The meaning of the double-edged word 'supplement' - a supplement is something that may or may not be added as required but it is also that which completes or enhances something else when added to it -, serves Derrida to open Rousseau's essay up to its own deconstruction. Rousseau's conception of writing is undone and displaced, Derrida situates it differently for 'writing is the example *par excellence* of a supplement which enters into the heart of all intelligible discourse and comes to define its very nature and condition' (Norris, 1982: 33). According to Derrida, the structure of supplementarity is always already presupposed: writing is the structural property of the discourse itself.

Whether one calls deconstruction's intervention 'différance' or 'supplement' or 'writing', and, as Derrida's strategic operations constantly remind us, these terms remain distinct in a chain with many others – 'they form a chain where each other may be substituted for the other, but not exactly (of course, even two uses of the same word would not be exactly the same): "no concept overlaps with any other"' (1976: lxx) -, the operation seeks to shake and displace those institutional structures governing our practices. One of the main operations of deconstructive criticism is to focus on hierarchical oppositions in order to show their inconsistencies and contradictions. A certain kind of structurally and axiologically determined conceptual binary (speech / writing) exceeds its division, pointing therefore to the impossibility of closing off the deferring and the deferral of meaning in language. The critical operation of deconstruction *shows* how hierarchies can be not only reversed at any given moment, but also transformed. As D.C. Wood describes it, the reversal is just a first move in the game, thus in order to prevent the old opposition from reconstituting itself, a second move is needed, 'a reorganization of the conceptual field brought about by the introduction of a new term' (1979: 24). My argument in this chapter is that the monstrous occupies a position structurally analogous to other derogated terms in the speech / writing dualisms that shape Western thought; therefore the normal / monstrous will serve here to open up a critique or deconstruction of binary thinking in general. This is to anticipate my reading of those eighteenth-century Spanish institutional practices and forces that institute the normal by marking and excluding the monstrous. In 'Monster Culture (Seven Theses)', Jeffrey Jerome Cohen has drawn attention to the monster in these terms: 'the monster's destructiveness is rather a deconstructiveness: it threatens to reveal that difference originates in process' (1996: 14). The monster introduces a disruption, a crisis that undermines the stability of a given opposition - normal / monstrous - and thus also of a given structure that operates through differentiation, displacement, and exclusion. The monster resists any classification built on a hierarchy or a merely binary opposition; it throws into question a hierarchy of meanings, a fixed principle, a centre.

Binary oppositions represent a way of seeing, a sight that draws rigid boundaries. The position of the slash fixes both the place and the value of the terms on either side, separating orthodoxy from heterodoxy, normality from monstrosity. The emergence of an undecidable concept, the 'supplement', escapes any appropriation into binary conceptualizations yet the 'supplement' is always already structurally inscribed. The monster 'is a rebuke to boundary and enclosure, it is the living embodiment of the phenomenon Derrida has labeled the "supplement": it breaks apart bifurcating "either/or" syllogistic logic with a kind of reasoning closer to "and/or"' (1996: 7). The

Derridean project questions logocentric models of reasoning in Western discourse by reconsidering the familiar place and function allocated to concepts on either side of the slash. By altering the terrain, Derrida produces a reading which leads to unfamiliar conclusions. As Norris has pointed out, the clear-cut boundaries that define modern academic discourse are challenged by Derridean thinking, 'the texts of Derrida defy classification' (1982: 18). Because they resist orthodoxy, they establish a new relation to language and traditional modes of seeing; one that unavoidably revolves around the operations of that institution and the possibilities of subverting it.

Vincent B. Leitch describes the Derridean enterprise in the following terms: 'deconstruction is production' (1983: 178), more specifically, the production of undecidables: 'the purpose of deconstruction is to produce such *undecidables* and to track their insistent operations throughout the text' (1983: 180). Production is not to be understood as revelatory, as the revelation of the true meaning of a stable text. Derrida does not reveal, rather his texts rehearse the kind of foundational instability of any sign system. The production of meaning originates in process, in the movement of 'différance'; the contours of deconstruction are always changing. My reading of Goya's 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' (fig. 1) will suggest a moment of undecidability: 'sueño' can mean either 'sleep' or 'dream', it can mean 'sleep' and 'dream'. The undecidability of signification in terms, and also in visual terms as I will be arguing, will lead to a consideration of reason during the Spanish Enlightenment.

My method will be a *modus legendi*: a method of reading cultures from the monsters they engender. The culture to be read is Spanish culture during the life of Francisco de Goya. My analysis will deal with the work of Goya, and more specifically his constructions and representations of the monstrous body in his work after 1793, in particular in *Los Caprichos*. Regarded as a turning point in the work of the Spanish painter, his art after that date assumed significant technical and thematic shifts as he embarked on a less rational and more demonically imaginative course of paintings and engravings. Goya's hybrid creatures and grotesque figures, which took the form of the unacceptable, of the incomprehensible, will help to question notions of corporeality and monstrosity as they might relate to Spanish culture at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century: a period of crisis and extreme contradictions under the reigns of Carlos III, Carlos IV and Fernando VII. Through an analysis of Goya's monstrous representations from a post-structuralist perspective, I shall be examining the institutional practices of the monstrous in Spanish Enlightened culture.

The point of departure for my itinerary will be the work of the historian of science Georges Canguilhem on the normal and the pathological. His discussion of this binary opposition focuses on the failure of modern medicine to understand that 'normal' and 'abnormal' are evaluative or normative terms, not descriptive ones; and modern medicine's central assumption that pathological phenomena differ only quantitatively from normal ones. Canguilhem's work is both historical and philosophical for it is concerned with the actual practice of scientists, the production of scientific knowledge, and the nature of reason.[4] For Canguilhem, the concepts of the normal and the pathological are constitutive of and necessary for the activity and thought of the biological and medical sciences; however, his approach to the history of science poses philosophical questions as to the production of these sciences in particular contexts and practices. The second phase of the argument entails focusing on Michel Foucault's *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1961) in order to put into operation my methodological procedure when examining Goya's corpus. The discussion of Foucault's history of madness is twofold: first, it will enable us to formulate a series of problems that will be fundamental for my examination of Goya's monstrous bodies: the division between reason and unreason, the economy of exclusion and opposition, the figure of the other, and the power of normalization. Secondly, the critical exchange between Foucault and Derrida on the subject of the former's interpretation of Descartes' *First Meditations* in *Histoire de la Folie* will allow us to reflect on the methodological difficulties that one may encounter when writing against the categorical oppositions that inform Western metaphysics. According to Derrida, '*certain* philosophical and methodological presuppositions of this history of madness' (1977: 33) could be questioned. Derrida's critique could be summarized thus: Foucault's argument that a whole history of reason - classical reason - began in the seventeenth century is contested by Derrida: there is only one form of reason (and this will be fundamental for our understanding of Goya's *El sueño de la razón produce monstruos* (fig. 1) and the analysis of Goya's corpus). Derrida's second objection focuses on Foucault's reading of Descartes whereby madness is excluded from thought. Derrida's strategies will be examined in due course. By bringing together different lines of argument, the theoretical encounter between the history of the sciences and deconstruction will offer a base from which to explore the historical nature of reason, the historicity of writing, and to reevaluate our cultural assumptions concerning the 'monstrous'.

history of the sciences

Why bring together such disparate names, Goya and Canguilhem? Why invoke Georges Canguilhem, a historian of science, in my analysis of the monstrous body in Goya? Canguilhem's approach to the history of the sciences seems to me to offer a critique of reason that echoes that of the Spanish painter. Both question how the rationalism of the Enlightenment mind betrays its own necessarily monstrous positioning. The painter problematizes the Enlightenment's assumptions of representation and delves into the problems of human perception and knowledge; the historian of science seeks to unmask the philosophical assumptions underlying the life sciences, tracing the irrationalities and excesses practiced in the name of reason. The ruse of reason.

In the introduction to Canguilhem's *The Normal and the Pathological* (1978),[5] Michel Foucault reminds us of the importance of the work of Canguilhem, placing him at the very centre of French intellectual life. To name but a few theorists who have been influenced by Canguilhem's work: Althusser and the Althusserian circle of French Marxism, the sociological work of Bourdieu, the work of psychoanalysts close to Lacan, and Foucault himself. Why, then, can such a specialized work be of any relevance for our argument? It is my contention that Canguilhem's critique of modern rationality proves to be methodologically relevant to an analysis of modern culture.

The history of science as practiced in France by Alexander Koyré, Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem sets in play, according to Michel Foucault, 'the philosophical question of the Enlightenment' (1989: 10). This philosophical question is articulated in the French history of science from the early nineteenth century onwards:

> The history of science avails itself of one of the themes which was introduced almost surreptitiously into late eighteenth-century philosophy: for the first time rational thought was put into question not only as to its nature, its foundations, its power and its rights, but also as to its history and its geography; as to its immediate past and its present reality; as to its time and place. (1989: 9)

Among the themes which Michel Foucault and others like Dominique Lecourt see reflected in the works of Koyré, Bachelard and Canguilhem are the essentialist and idealist claims of reason, the rationalist optimism of the age, the rationalist desire for empirical discourse, the authority of positivist models of knowledge, and the political and cultural forces at play in the production of knowledge. Their genealogical approach is a critique of modern rationality and of the cultural practices it has sanctioned.

The ruse of reason in the actual practice of the history of science covers up the real position and the material interests inscribed within the techniques and theoretical knowledges themselves. Canguilhem's project teases out the contradictions inherent in the positivism of the biological sciences and exposes how modern, rational science is caught in the contradictions of its own conceptual logic. Canguilhem interrogates the philosophy of science and its normativizing moves, and through this interrogation his work traces the historical implications of modern structures of knowledge. His interest in the specificity of the life sciences' object of study is deeply imbricated with the production of knowledge. As Dominique Lecourt has observed: 'Georges Canguilhem's history of the sciences is epistemological [...] his history of the sciences is only epistemological because his epistemology is itself historical' (1975: 166). In other words, knowledge is historically produced. Hence the historico-epistemological perspective of his 'projet de savoir' - a philosophy of knowledge, of reason and of concept. Lecourt establishes in his work *Marxism and Epistemology* 'a certain form of writing (*écriture*),' a line of descent, what he calls a certain epistemological tradition, between Bachelard and Canguilhem. Bachelard's proposition that 'every particular science produces at each moment of its history its own norms of truth' (1975: 164) permeates the work of Canguilhem; in Canguilhem's search for the norm process within the life sciences one sees the underlying Bachelardian stratum. Bachelard's proposition can be expressed in these terms: the production of a certain knowledge determines the production of a certain normality. Scientific knowledges and their conceptual systems are formed around and determined by the connection between norms and the normal. For Bachelard, the actual historicity of knowledge is understood in terms of epistemological obstacles and epistemological breaks. The former are those beliefs, preconveived ideas and prejudices that people accept as commonsensical but which represent a limit for the investigation of things; the latter define the way in which scientific knowledge splits off from and contradicts commonsense experience and beliefs. The Bachelardian and, later on, the Canguilhemian method examines the way in which the production of a certain knowledge is established through processes of rupture and reorganization, contrary to the traditional philosophical belief whereby scientific knowledge is accumulative and progressive, and scientific truths are canonized as necessary truths devoid of contingent factors. Expressing his views on the notion of epistemological breaks in an interview with Julia Kristeva in 1972, Derrida is close to Canguilhem's thought:

> I do not believe in decisive ruptures, in an unequivocal "epistemological break", as it is called today. Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old cloth that must continually, interminably be undone. This interminability is not an accident or contingency; it is essentially systematic, and theoretical. And this in no way minimizes the necessity and relative importance of certain breaks, of the appearance and definition of new studies. (1987: 29)[6]

The relationship between the thinking of Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault was always marked by mutual influence and admiration. In 1960 Canguilhem, in his report on Foucault's *doctorat d'ètat*, already suggests that *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* will be an event in the understanding of the history of psychiatry.[7] In a short essay published after Foucault's death, he admits as much; its title is: 'On *Histoire de la folie* as an Event' (1986):[8] 'Reading Foucault fascinated me while revealing to me my limits' (1995: 284). By acknowledging his limits, Canguilhem learned 'another figure of the abnormal than organic pathology' and recognized 'the historical existence of a medical power that was equivocal'.[9] Canguilhem redefined and pushed back the limits of the concepts of abnormality and pathology within his theory on the normal and the pathological, as his 'New Reflections on the Normal and the Pathological' (1963-1966) attests. And it is within a Canguilhemian frame that Foucault charts the relationship between archaeology and discourse, examines the foundations of a historical order perceived in terms of continuity and accumulative progression within the human sciences, and reinterprets the history of scientific thought. In his archaeological project, Foucault extends, adapts and transforms the conceptual moves made by Canguilhem. But, what are these conceptual moves?

Canguilhem's method and approach focuses on the actual historicity of knowledge; to be more precise, on the actual historicity of human knowledge but never leaving aside the realm of concrete existence - how living organisms, and man is included here, relate to their natural and social environment. His interest in the life sciences - those disciplines where living beings are the objects of knowledge and man himself is an object of knowledge - brought about a shift in the history of science. Foucault describes it as a move from

> the heights (mathematics, astronomy, Galilean mechanics, Newtonian physics, relativity theory) toward the middle regions where knowledge is much more deductive, much more dependent on external processes (economic stimulations or institutional supports) and where it has remained tied much longer to the marvels of the imagination. (1989: 13)

Canguilhem's methodological position is also, as has been argued, a philosophical position for it carries with it an understanding of concrete human problems. Contrary to the idealistic philosophies of knowledge, of which positivism is symptomatic, and grounded upon the unity of method in the theory of knowledge and in the sciences, the continuous progress of the human mind and the logic of true and false, Canguilhem emphasizes the discontinuities of epistemic and scientific development.

Following on from Gaston Bachelard, Canguilhem rectifies the former's concept of discontinuity as applied to science.

In *The Normal and the Pathological*, Canguilhem's object of problematization is the assumed continuity in biology and physiology between health and disease. Within the life sciences such apparently oppositional structures - the normal and the pathological - can be reduced ultimately to a simple continuity and quantitative variation, to a statistical mean. This biological model of the norm delimits objectively the recognizable boundaries of the normal, and offers the category of abnormality as a reality to knowledge. As Canguilhem argues, the contrast between the normal and the abnormal has been 'actually grounded in the structure of living things themselves' (1994: 214). Through such considerations Canguilhem examines the pathologizing of otherness within the life sciences and the legitimatization of conceptions of abnormality, monstrosity, pathology, and so on through the practices of techniques of normalization. The structural oppositions are set up through a pathologizing of otherness, an operation which simultaneously conceals and makes visible the 'other.' What the biological sciences could not deny is that 'it proved impossible to make up a science of the living being without having taken into account, as essential to its object, the possibility of disease, death, monstrosity, anomaly, error [...]' (Foucault, 1989: 17).

In his 'Essay on Some Problems Concerning the Normal and the Pathological' (1943) and 'New Reflections on the Normal and the Pathological' (1963-1966),[10] Canguilhem explores the concepts of health and disease in the disciplines of physiology and pathology, and addresses the general problem of the normal and the pathological. In the same way that the monster was considered with regard to its excesses or its lacks, its measure within the "too much" or the "not enough", nineteenth-century medicine spoke of these excesses or lacks in relation to a norm - the pathological departing from the normal. Hence 'the pathological phenomena found in living organisms are nothing more than quantitative variations, greater or lesser according to corresponding physiological phenomena' (1989: 42). Following Broussais's principle, whose thesis was later appropiated by Auguste Comte and Claude Bernard, Canguilhem devotes part of his work to showing how during the nineteenth century pathogeny is reduced to a phenomenon of increase and excess. For instance, Claude Bernard postulates that an illness like diabetes consists in the disorder of a normal function (an excessive amount of glucose within the body): 'every disease has a corresponding normal function of which it is only the disturbed, exaggerated, diminished, or obliterated expression' (1989: 68). This claim and its corollary diagnosis are challenged by Canguilhem who argues that many diseases, understood in their full complexity, are not produced by an excess or defect of some constituent of a healthy body but by something else entirely. In the case of diabetes, 'it is the disease of an organism all of whose functions are changed' (1989: 88), not just a kidney disease or a pancreatic disease, but a diseased organism exposed to endless infections and dysfunctions. Therefore, it 'is completely illegitimate to maintain that the pathological state is really and simply a greater or lesser variation of the physiological state' (1989: 110).

If the healthy and the pathological states are susceptible to gradual explanation, nineteenth-century physiology is not far away from Aristotelian ideas of gradation and of hierarchy, and, by implication, of the superiority of normality, nor from the metaphysical assumptions underlying the Great Chain of Being. As argued in Chapter 1, the conceptions of plenitude, continuity and gradation as part of the belief in the general scheme of things 'continued to constitute essential presuppositions in the framing of scientific hypotheses' in eighteenth-century biology:

> Every discovery was a step towards the completion of a systematic structure of which the

> general plan was known in advance, an additional bit of empirical evidence of the truth of the generally accepted scheme of things. (Lovejoy, 1960: 232)

The persistent influence of Platonism is clear in that for every piece of empirical evidence there must be an ultimate reason, self-explanatory and sufficient, and in that there are no sudden "leaps" in nature. The principles of plenitude and continuity presupposed that the universe is a rational order and that man could understand things in full confidence. Lovejoy sees in empirical science the logically inevitable outcome of these beliefs,

> since it was acquainted in advance with the fundamental principles with which the facts must, in the end, accord, and was provided with a sort of diagram of the general pattern of the universe, could know in outline what to expect, and even anticipate particular disclosures of actual observation. (1960: 328)

Canguilhem sees these principles of the realist philosophical tradition imbricated in nineteenth-century physiology. Auguste Comte's and Claude Bernard's texts bear along with them a whole network of articulated themes and assumptions whose meaning links up with previous philosophical texts. This effect is what Derrida calls the 'disseminating' force always at work within language:

> [A]s every generality is the sign of an essence, and every perception the realization of the essence, a generality observable in fact takes the value of realized perfection, and a common characteristic, the value of an ideal type. (Canguilhem, 1989: 125)

As Canguilhem argues in the case of health and disease, however, the premise upon which physiology grounds its ideas is flawed since health and disease do not exist as a continuum.

It is in his problematization of the qualitative distinction between the normal and the pathological that Canguilhem outlines his views on norms and the normal. Always bearing in mind his reference to norms and normativity in the context of biology, these two states of the organism are to be considered as qualitatively different. Norms are the activity of the organism itself, and life is a normative activity, that is to say, it is institutive of norms and capable of changing the norms that it has instituted. Medical judgement does not establish what is normal or pathological - the normal cannot in reality be objectively measured and the pathological must be understood as one type of the normal[11] - this is established by the very nature of the organism. For the scientist explains both states by reducing them to a common measure:

> it is obvious that if one asserts the real homogeneity and continuity of the normal and the pathological it is in order to establish a physiological science that would govern therapeutic activity. (1989: 105)

Therefore physiology's object of study becomes stable by positing that physiology and pathology exist as a continuum. The former, defined as the science of the laws or constants of normal life, determines its object, a stable idea of the normal.

On the contrary, Canguilhem stresses that the normal is a dynamic and polemical concept. The term *norma,* associated with the actions of squaring and straightening, meaning to square, anxiously and negatively qualifies what it cannot contain - what offers resistance to the imposition of its normalising rule. 'The normal is the effect obtained by the execution of the normative project' to contain indeterminate phenomena in a - defensively - oppositional structure. This oppositional structure - the normal and the deviant - is set up through a relationship of exclusion:

> That which diverges from the preferable in a given area of evaluation is not the indifferent but the repulsive or more exactly, the repulsed, the detestable. (1989: 240)

The concept of an immutable locus or plenitude is bogus because the notion of normalcy is itself an unstable point of reference. What passes for normal is historically mutable:

> It is not by depending on a "normal science" in T. S. Kuhn's sense that one can return to the past and validly trace its history: it is in rediscovering the "norm" process, the actual knowledge of which is only one moment of it, without one being able, save from prophesying, to predict the future (1989: 16).[12]

Abnormality is existentially prior to the imposition of any normalising rule for a rule or a norm can only be established by setting it in opposition to some concept of abnormality, deviancy, monstrosity. From Nietzsche, through Bachelard and Canguilhem, this way of thinking is present in Michel Foucault's works *Folie et déraison: histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1961), *Naissance de la clinique: une archéologie du regard medical* (1963), and *Surveiller et punir* (1975), which analyze the "dividing practices" existent within the domains of psychiatry, psychology, medicine and criminology at the turn of nineteenth-century France. The asylum, the clinic and the prison housed those individuals who had strayed away from the norms of reason, health or lawful conduct, dividing individuals into the mad - sane, the sick - healthy, and the criminal - law-abiding. Foucault's thesis is summarised in Mark Cousins' and Athar Hussain's book on the French thinker: 'starting from the 19th century, discursive reflections on normal - adult - humans grew out of reflections on their converse - the "abnormals" and children' (1984: 101). Thus the abnormals bear human knowledge; an integral part of Foucault's methodology is that man becomes both the subject and the object of knowledge. The observer - and his cognitive and ideological apparatus - frames and determines the very object he purports to be seeking to know. The Foucaldian exploration of the conditions under which present-day judgement of normality and abnormality was constructed is a reflection of the fundamental duality of Western consciousness, Good and Evil. His method operates and stands at the dividing line between the normal and abnormal in rational, scientific societies in order to show how these dividing practices work and how they change; it proposes a change in the perspective from which things are seen and known, which carries with it a change of what is seen and known. The shift in changing the perspective of traditional assumptions, in doubting accepted modes of historical analysis and the methodological approach brought about by Foucault with respect to epistemology seeks to excavate the underlying epistemic conditions (*savoir*) that, in any given period, make various domains of scientific disciplines (*connaissance*) possible. The Foucaldian methodology in the above-mentioned works operates by inverting, reversing and overturning (*renversement*) accepted values, modes of analysis and historical continuities that alter the imbalance of the dualities under scrutiny. (This *renversement* would prove problematical as we will argue in the second half of this chapter when focusing on Derrida's critique of *Histoire de la folie*.)

If norms conform to habits, to rational principles, and to history or tradition, hence acting on the formation of habits, rationalizing principles, and historical legitimisations, respectively, Foucault denounces this given situation. However, in Foucault's work, the production of a certain normality in its relationship to its objects and subjects within domains of knowledge can be understood in two ways according to whether the priority is given to the juridical or the biological model of the norm. In the former case, norms are produced by acts of exclusion. The norm refers to a boundary, 'a line of division, traversing and controlling, in the form of a domination, an area of spontaneous events the starting point of which are considered to pre-exist this intervention (which, after the event, orders them, by containing them, in the way that a form contains a content)' (Macherey, 1992: 263).[13] In

Histoire de la folie, *Naissance de la clinique*, and *Surveiller et punir*, Foucault demonstrates the principles of exclusionary practice at work in nineteenth-century French institutions - the asylum, the clinic, and the prison. Arguably, and for the purposes of this chapter, *Histoire de la folie* is the classic example in which Foucault, through the narration of the history of the negativity of insanity, the subordination of madness to the notion of reason, through a model of juridical disqualification and exclusion, puts into practice a reading of the past that accounts for the present configuration of forces in modern structures of knowledge. The accepted view of asylums as benevolent, curative places is overturned by Foucault's analysis for they were juridical institutions that segregated individuals and marked off spaces of exclusion. The biological model of the norm refers to a limit. In this case, the norm acts 'positively and expansively, like an extensive movement, which progressively withdrawing the limits of its domain of action, itself effectively constitutes a field of existence in which norms find their application' (Macherey, 1992: 264). The work of Canguilhem in the biological sciences bears witness to the way the productive character of the norm acts as an inclusive and regulatory limit.

The positivist physiological principle whereby the normal is a statistical mean subject to measurement and deterministic explanations *naturalizes* social stratification as a hierarchical relation, thus concealing the way in which the 'essence', the 'common characteristic', the 'ideal type' have been politically constructed. The scientific logic resting upon the *norma* came to understand itself as eternal, having been true for all time, and as natural or 'god-given', not contingent upon human input. Driven by a desire to control nature and to correct its "mistakes", the normalising gaze of science and its narrative of the deviant designated that which did not conform to the norms and ordained its correction, operating through the normal-deviant model, the 'objective' visual method of classification, and the 'degrees of deviance' from the norm. The taxonomic impulse of empirical discourse literalized and obscured the intangibles of human variation, it contained physical differences within the diagnostic categories of empiricism.

Canguilhem's views on the normal and the pathological can be summarized thus: knowledge of the normal is triggered by disease. Only the pathological attracts our attention and through disease we appreciate the normal: 'it is the priority of the abnormal that attracts the attention of the normative, that calls forth a normative decision and provides an opportunity to establish normality through the application of a norm' (1994: 383). A practical operation whereby the abnormal, which comes first in functional terms, becomes logically posterior to the normal.

Canguilhem examines the normal and the pathological as an instance of what Derrida's deconstructive reading/practice would later have to say on Western philosophy. The history of Western thought is constructed around hierarchical oppositional structures in which one term is promoted at the expense of the other. Despite being prior to normality, the pathological is defined as a deviation from the normal. The abnormal is dominated logically by the normal: anything deviating from the normal type by excess, defect or configuration is abnormal. Canguilhem's problematization of the normal and the pathological recognizes the flawed configuration of this opposition, thereby destabilizing the structure on which normalization is built. According to Canguilhem, 'a norm is not a fixed rule but a transitive capacity' (1989: 212), by which he means that a living being in a pathological state is capable of instituting its own norms since a 'pathological state is never a state without norms.' Moreover, 'the normal should not be opposed to the pathological, because under certain conditions and in its own way, the pathological is normal' (1989: 354). The contrast between health and disease, in Canguilhem's words, is necessary. To recognize that this necessary contrast, or if one prefers construct, is flawed is to affirm the provisional nature of all meaning. In Derridian terms, to put the elements into 'play.' Thus one can hear Derrida in Canguilhem's texts.

Monstrosity and normality are constructed in relationship, they necessarily participate in each other:

> The history of monstrosity makes us aware of the history of normality: faced with a monster, one may become aware of what the norm is and when this norm has a history - which is the case with discursive norms, philosophical norms, socio-cultural norms - any appearance of monstrosity in this domain allows us an analysis of the history of normality. (Derrida, 1995: 386)[14]

The monstrosity represented in Goya's work will allow an examination of the norm ruling/prevailing during that particular period in Spanish history. The very perfection of the norm, represented by the classical body, is challenged by the physical human monstrosity explored in the painter's work. Through an examination of his pictorial bodies I will attempt to find out in what way and to what extent it would be possible to think differently about Goya's work. His monstrous figures will be a corpus from which to reread the dominant paradigms of his time, that is, the discursive norms, philosophical norms, socio-cultural norms of late eighteenth-century Spain.

Histoire de la folie criticizes the normative boundaries drawn by reason in its attempt to identify, disqualify, and exclude everything that posed a threat to its sense of order. For Foucault, the movement of reason is clear: the progressive domination of madness so that it can be integrated into reason. If Foucault's work on madness is 'an allegory of reason at the moment of establishing its will-to-power over truth' (Derrida, 1987: 215), his work allows a criticism of the very notion of rationality. His position in his analysis of rationality will be one of Derrida's targets in 'Cogito et histoire de la folie'. Derrida's words on the history of normality and the history of monstrosity will advance some of the issues at stake in the second half of the chapter, and take a different inflection with Derrida's closing words on *Histoire de la folie* in 'Cogito et histoire de la folie'. In that work, Foucault teaches us to think 'that there are crises of reason in strange complicity with what the world calls crises of madness' (1987: 63). We will think with Foucault and rethink with Derrida this 'strange complicity' through the exchange between the two thinkers.

The event

'In the age of fables, monstrosity denounced the monstrous power of the imagination. In the age of experiment, the monster is considered a symbol of puerility or mental sickness' (Canguilhem, 1962: 35). The monster is identified with intellectual primitivism and puerility, and becomes part of a discourse not just on physical pathology, but also on mental pathology. The madman in the classical age is perceived and constituted as a form of infirmity. There is no physical monstrosity in them, they are 'normal' people. Nevertheless, the madman is the deviant or morally other. The constitution of madness during the classical age is part of a much wider and more complex conception of monstrosity (in the form of human beings, social systems, systems of thought, superstitions). Let us focus on what Foucault has to say about the history of madness.[15]

Histoire de la folie shook the (epistemological) foundations of bodies of knowledge like psychology, psychiatry and the judiciary whose powers rested upon techniques of normalization, and exposed how these disciplines created their own norms of validity and objectivity without questioning the very possibility of such norms. An heir to the Bachelardian and Canguilheian work on the norm, Foucault becomes 'a denouncer of the normalcy of anonymous norms.'[16]

Two dates mark what Foucault refers to as an institutional creation peculiar to the seventeenth century in France. The decree that founded the Hôpital Général in 1656 was followed a year later by the creation of the Hôpital Général and the 'The Great Confinement' of the poor, the vagabond, the unemployed, the madmen - the outcasts from social order. This act of repression that spread throughout Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries established the concept of madness as we know it today. It objectified madness and introduced social exclusion as the sole recognition of man's relationship to the irrational, hence creating an abstract counterpoint to established rationality and subjugating madness to Reason. The Great Confinement was not just an act of internment, but rather an amalgam of heterogeneous elements and police practices, and it is this amalgam or stratification that Foucault is concerned with in *Histoire de la folie*, where he describes the hidden cultural formations that seem to have produced this particular phenomenon which operationally constituted the insane as an object of knowledge. A study that, in the words of Canguilhem, 'endeavors to show that madness is an object of perception in a "social space" structured in diverse ways throughout the course of history, an object of perception created by social practices rather than grasped by a collective sensibility, rather, above all, than broken down analytically by speculative understanding' (p. 278).[17] What were these social practices? Exclusion, internment, and discipline. This "social space," juridical and medical, constructs the madman through administrative and police practices as well as a new social ethic of labour.

'The delimitation of the "normal" is in fact only the discursive consecration of practices for establishing the juridical incapacity of the individual' (Canguilhem, 1995: 283). At the end of the seventeenth-century, the decision for internment lay in the hands of the judiciary. It was the judicial apparatus that enforced the confinement imposed upon the madman, moving away from solely medical criteria. In so far as he is alienated from his senses, the madman comes under a juridical theory of madness that considers him a subject of law; incapable in the eyes of the law of managing his own affairs on account of unsoundness of mind, he is exempted from his responsibilities. Concurrent with the juridical interdiction, the social practices of internment posit the madman as a social being whose exclusion, internment and relegation are socially and morally justifiable. His moral behaviour renders him *asocial* and implicates him in a field of culpability. Foucault suggests that these two aspects will lead to the emergence of two forms of medicine: on the one hand, a psychology that analyzes the mental faculties of the individual from the viewpoint of the capacities of the subject of law; on the other, a dualist pathology that observes the behaviour of social man and intervenes in order to divide individuals in terms of sane-mad, normal-abnormal. It is Foucault's contention that the

> alienación del sujeto de derecho puede y debe coincidir con la locura del hombre social, en la unidad de una realidad patológica que es a la vez analizable en términos de derecho y perceptible en las formas más inmediatas de la sensibilidad social. (1997: 205)

The strategies of different powers - juridical, medical, and social - create a single unity - *homo natura* - in which a social, normative experience of madness and a juridical, qualitative experience of madness collude. The synthesis produces the essential basis for nineteenth-century psychopathology.

The economic significance of confinement is fundamental in order to understand the social treatment of the mad, not just an enforcement of social order but also a display of a new 'ethical consciousness' with regard to the moral world of labour. Labour and poverty, work and idleness become polar opposites and another partition of Good and Evil in terms of Reason and Unreason. Those who were not productive were confined in periods of economic crisis due to their potential as social destabilizers, whereas in more buoyant times they were used as cheap workforce. Confinement had a double role: on the one hand, to reabsorb unemployment in an attempt to make invisible its most visible social effects; on the other, to control prices when there was a risk of inflation. Thus political, economic, and national considerations underpin the new attitude towards 'the idle and the unproductive' and, above all, the madman. It was this gesture of segregation which defined what was asocial and inhuman in the classical period, and by banishing what was defined as asocial or inhuman, segregation created the 'other' to characterize it as the 'alienated'. According to Foucault, then, the classical category of confinement is linked to the power being organized in France during the period, absolutist and increasingly bourgeois.

For Foucault, confinement hid away 'unreason, and betrayed the shame it aroused; but it explicitly drew attention to madness, pointed to it' (1967: 70). This is a major shift in the consideration of madness within Western society. Up until the classical period, madness was an undifferentiated experience; the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 'had freely allowed the forms of unreason to come out into the light of the day' (1967: 66). The madman was an eschatological figure, bearer of the secrets of the world or of the Devil. Foucault looks for the act of scission - constitutive and originative - whereby Unreason is categorically divided from a properly human Reason. These are his claims in the preface to *Histoire de la folie*: 'we must try to return, in history, to that zero point in the course of madness at which madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of division itself' (1967: xi). Claims that will change in the 1972 edition after Derrida's critique of Foucault's project on the 'archaeology of silence'.

The dialogue between Derrida and Foucault

This section, in which I discuss at length the critical exchange between Foucault and Derrida, will act as a methodological as well as a theoretical frame from which to view Goya's representations of the monstrous body in the social, institutional and political dynamic of its specific time and place. The extensive use I make of the Foucault-Derrida debate seeks to consider: firstly, the dangers and difficulties of working with any critical method that does not interrogate its own philosophical and political presuppositions, that is to say, the methodological and thematic consequences that govern the reading of a text; and, secondly, the teasing out of the inevitable double binds of logocentrism. In Derrida's words, methodology is never totally free from the marks of philosophical language. For Derrida, Foucault's reading of Descartes in *Histoire de la folie* provides a prime example of a discursive exercise that is inconsistent with the philosophical position it claims. Derrida's metaphysically symptomatic reading of the moments of aporia that overtake Foucault's discourse on madness and reason will render explicit and thematic the philosophical subtext of Foucault's exposition, and will open up an effective critique of those institutions within and against which Goya's work is set.

Jacques Derrida opens his 'Cogito et histoire de la folie' (1963),[18] a critique of Foucault's *Histoire de la folie*, by describing his consciousness - the disciple's consciousness - as an unhappy consciousness.[19] As somebody who studied under Foucault, Derrida dwells upon the dialogic relationship between master and disciple, and 'the danger of this dialogue being taken - incorrectly - as a challenge' (1997: 31). But engaging or reengaging in 'the interminable and silent dialogue which made him into a disciple' (*ibid*), the disciple 'must break the glass, or better the mirror, the reflection, his infinite speculation on the master. And start to speak' (1997: 32).

Derrida examines Foucault's enterprise in order to question the methodological operation adopted in the preface to the first edition of *Histoire de la folie*.[20] Is it feasible, Derrida asks, 'to write a history of madness *itself*?' Is it possible to write about a system without using the terms of that system; in other words, is it possible to talk about madness without using the language of reason? Doesn't the project of an 'archaeology of silence' already intimate its own impossibility? For 'is not an archaeology, even of silence, that is, an organized language, a project, an order, a sentence, a syntax, a work?' (1997: 35). Derrida's logic is clear: to expose the internal stability and cogency of the Foucaldian project which rests on Foucault's reading of a passage from Descartes's first *Méditations*. Foucault opens the chapter on 'The Great Confinement' by referring to the Cartesian exclusion of madness from the realm of philosophical thought and its resulting reduction to silence from the seventeenth century onwards. 'Dans le cheminement de doute, Descartes encontre la folie à côté du rêve et de toutes les formes d'erreur.' Foucault sees in this passage the philosophical equivalent to the social practice of confinement, and its concomitant implication that madness is excluded from the paradigm of truth and doubt, that is, from the Cartesian philosophical project. Philosophical judgment and social practices are closely related as part of the same structure of exclusion that marginalizes the madman; the Cartesian act of force is a sign of this structure of exclusion, the theoretical reflection of a social practice. What Derrida questions is whether the dismissal, exclusion and ostracism of madness from the realm of the Cogito, that Foucault locates in the passage of Descartes and that inaugurates the division between reason and madness (unreason), has 'the historical meaning assigned to it' (1997: 33).

In the economy of doubt, madness is excluded from the realm of the Cogito. According to Foucault, this exclusion is a founding move in the Cogito and represents an epistemological break that inaugurates the division between reason and unreason. The classical division, therefore, becomes the original moment, the event, the historical structure that disrupts the free circulation and exchange of reason and madness. The division refers to a point of presence, a fixed origin which, according to Derrida, is unavailable to us. The history of The Decision as established by Foucault via Descartes is challenged by Derrida:

> The attempt to write the history of the decision, division, difference runs the risk of construing that division as an event or a structure subsequent to the unity of an original presence, thereby confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation. (1997: 40)

The event or structure which inaugurates this epistemological break privileges the Cartesian Cogito and places the 'classical' exclusion of madness as originary. By referring to an original moment in which the dyadic relationship did not exist, in which madness existed before being caught by knowledge, Foucault is reaffirming a source of historicity, of meaning and of language for his own argument. It is in this operation, that of reaching a point of origin, where Derrida discerns a *different* project in Foucault's book - 'the project of convoking the first dissension of logos against itself is quite another project than the archaeology of silence' (59) - an attempt to account for a 'total historical structure,' that is, to account for the totality of a phenomenon by its reduction to a formula that governs the totality. Thus, Derrida says, Foucault conceives of the event as an instance/sample of the structure, the appearance of which precisely allows the structure to be grasped.

Foucault's claims for origins contain metaphysical contradictions that are not only troublesome for Derrida but also unnecessary. Foucault's aim to situate this silence of madness outside or beyond reason repeats the very same process of exclusion that he condemns, and takes the form of a valorization of the concept of 'madness' or 'unreason' in its attempt to write a history of madness *itself.* This privileging of and identification with the subjugated term – 'madness-as-negativity' – offers a simple reversal of the value-laden hierarchy and reduplicates the same structure being questioned: a violent, structurally totalitarian project. Is it necessary for Foucault to look for this point of origin? What Derrida reminds us at this juncture is that there is only one form of reason, that there is no going outside or beyond reason: the dividing line between reason and unreason did not emerge with classical reason since all thought is premised on a less comforting dissension within reason. As Derrida argues, 'the praise [*éloge*] of silence always takes place within *logos*, the language of objectification' (1997: 37). The exclusion of madness can only be seen as an operation within reason: reason, logic (*logos*, as language, thought) against itself. Therefore Foucault's project of transcending this division in order to recover the idea of the possibility of an original experience of madness is not only impossible but is imbued with unreflected historicism.

It is a problematic of 'Reason-in-general,' and Reason-in-general, Derrida remarks, cannot be exceeded:

> The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason, that which makes it just another actual order or structure (a determined historical structure, one possible structure among other possible ones), is that one cannot speak against it except by being for it, that one can only protest from within it; and within its domain, Reason leaves us only the recourse to strategies and stratagems. (1997: 36)

Foucault is overlooking the specificities of this particular structure of exclusion to which he attaches structural totality. For, as Derrida has shown elsewhere, structures are historical, temporary, contingent, operating through differentiation and displacement. In the opening paragraphs of 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' (1966), Derrida returns to the concepts of structure and event in order to problematize the structuralist project:[21]

> the movement of any archaeology, like that of any eschatology, is an accomplice of this reduction of the structurality of structure and always attempts to conceive of structure on the basis of a full presence which is beyond play. (1978: 279)

And to make a structure present is to immobilize it, to fix it, to stop the play of signifiers - a revelatory moment. Derrida re-thinks the notion of 'structure', 'no longer seeking to limit the play of its differential elements by always referring them back, in the last instance, to some organizing "center" or thematic point of origin' (Norris, 1983: 139); the structuralist project is at the heart of the tradition that makes the concept of 'structure' dependent upon the concept of 'centre'. Centres or governing principles such as essence, subject, transcendentality, constitute the very thing within a structure which, while governing the structure, escapes structurality, that is to say, they are not themselves subject to a structural analysis. As an operative concept the centre does not belong to the totality, and yet it is within it. This is what Derrida refers to as the 'structurality of the structure': the centre is paradoxically unique. A fixed centre aspires to a fundamental immobility, it expresses the desire for a fundamental certitude, hence freezing out the possibility of play, the possibility of thinking about history, change, the individual agent, time.

> This attempt is also a first passion. It keeps within itself the trace of a violence. It is more written than said, it is *economized.* The economy of this writing is a regulated relationship between that which exceeds and the exceeded totality: the *differance* of the absolute excess. (Derrida, 1997: 62)

No longer a fixed centre that limits and arrests the play of a system of differences, the centre comes to be thought of as a 'function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came to be thought' (Derrida, 1978: 280).

Derrida observes that Foucault's book presents itself precisely as a structuralist study in that it uncovers the preconditions of meaning, it finds in the Cartesian Cogito the division between madness and reason as the precondition for the possibility of meaning and therefore historicity. Every event is itself already inscribed in the structure of language. The dissension within the logos is the very origin of history, of historicity itself. And '*nothing* within this language, and *no one* among those who speak it, can escape the historical guilt' (p. 35). Derrida's critique of Western reason acknowledges the impossibility of abolishing this thinking *tout court*:

> We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of what it seeks to contest. (1978: 280)

Now we turn to Derrida's second objection, which concerns the detailed reading of Descartes's *Méditations* to which I alluded earlier. Foucault observes an imbalance between the treatment of doubt that derives both from the senses and from imagination and dreams, and the one that originates from madness. While the former, signs of reflection and thought in the conceptual economy of doubt, always contain a bedrock of truth that cannot be doubted, the latter leaves no residue of truth for 'I who think cannot be mad.' But I am pre-empting the dispute over Descartes's passage for, at this juncture, it is necessary to summon up the Cartesian methodical doubt in order to understand Derrida's criticisms of Foucault's reading of the Cartesian Cogito as well as Derrida's rereading of the passage in question. I will follow Descartes' method so as to locate those aspects in which Derrida's detailed reading of Descartes' passage and Foucault's interpretation of Descartes differ.

Descartes' systematic doubt seeks to find those fundamental truths from which it is possible to deduce the whole edifice of our understanding. To this end, the point of departure must be an absolute certitude about which no doubt at all would be possible. The Cartesian method seeks to eradicate all that can be doubted. Systematic doubt starts with one's sense perceptions: the senses can make one fall into error sometimes, but, Descartes asks, can they always make one err? Most men would consider it highly improbable that sense perceptions could always lead us into error, however, improbability does not mean certitude. Therefore the possibility of doubting one's sense perceptions cannot be totally eradicated. Descartes poses the following question: if the senses sometimes deceive us with respect to objects which are very small or very far away, there could *perhaps* be other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible even though they are derived from the senses. For instance, the certainty of the materiality and fleshiness of the body - 'I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing' -, however, this could be denied, Descartes proceeds to explain, perhaps if I were to liken myself to madmen - who imagine that they have a head made of earthenware or a body made of glass. 'But they are mad, *sed amentes sunt isti*, and I should be any the less insane (*demens*) were I to follow examples so extravagant' (1997: 46). Here lies the dispute over the (apparent) dismissal of the madman in Foucault's and Derrida's respective expositions. For Foucault, Descartes banishes madness from thought, establishing thereby a complicity with the medical and judicial structures of the time, whereas Derrida's analysis of Descartes' philosophical discourse does not see madness submitted to any particular exclusion. Moreover, Derrida's reading of Descartes proposes that the opening of the paragraph with a *perhaps* brings the figure of an imaginary non-philosopher to the method of doubt, a rhetorical and pedagogical movement which allows Descartes to introduce a more natural, common, and universal experience, that of sleep and dream. According to Derrida, the example of the madman is not total enough for it pertains to knowledge of a sensory origin.

The second step for Descartes is even more radical: the generalization by hyperbole of the hypothesis of sleep and dream - 'Now let us assume that we are asleep' - implies a radical break with all the senses. In this way, the absolute totality of ideas of sensory origin becomes suspect. How can one distinguish the state of sleep from that of being awake? How can one be certain that the world one perceives is real? Which are the certainties and truths that escape perception? Questions posited by Descartes at this stage which he seeks to answer in this manner. Let us take the following example: the impossibility which allows doubt about the existence of things and of the world does not affect some truths, like, for instance, the truths of mathematics - whether one is asleep or awake, the three angles of a triangle total 180° in Euclidean geometry. This is a simple and intelligible thing. The hypothesis of sleep and dream indicates a radical departure from all the senses and a move towards another, higher order of reasoning, the intelligible. In Derrida's account, it is at this moment in the Cartesian method that '*all* significations or "ideas" of sensory origin are *excluded* from the realm of truth, *for the same reason* as madness is excluded from it' (1997: 50). What concerns Descartes, Derrida argues, is those questions regarding only the *truth* of ideas. And Foucault would reply to this in 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire'[22] by pointing to Derrida's discursive inattentiveness. The passage from Descartes we have just discussed does not refer to the 'truth of ideas,' but rather, in Foucault's words, to the subject who thinks. Firstly, Foucault comments on the status of Descartes' *Méditations* as both an argument of logic and a demonstration orientated towards the modification and constitution of the thinking subject while doubting and meditating. Secondly, he reminds Derrida of some lexical and textual differences in Descartes' passage concerning the terms *insani*, *amentes*, and *demens*. While the first term alludes to the illusions of the madman within medicine, the second and third point to the juridical incapacity of the individual. Both terms, *amentes* and *demens*, designated those individuals incapable of religious, judicial, or social duties and responsibilities. Alienated from their senses, disqualified as subjects, they could not act as reasoning subjects (I who think cannot be mad). Foucault's position takes us again to Derrida's objection regarding Foucault's theoretical reflection of Descartes' text in the actual historical (juridical, political, and economic) sets of concerns. The exclusion to which Foucault assigns a historical or extra-philosophical origin is an exclusion, as Derrida remarks, that is 'at the very nature of discourse and language' (54), an exclusion which is always already achieved. It is the logic of exclusion.

Discourse and philosophical communication (and language itself, that which from meaning emerges) carry normality within themselves. And Derrida insists that 'in its most impoverished syntax logos is reason, and, indeed, a historical reason' (1997: 54). In its actual process, language is institution and convention: it is the logos man has inherited from the Greeks. It is a case of always already, of always being recognizable, of language as conventionality and normality.

In the third step of the route to a secure foundation for knowledge, Descartes suggests the hypothesis of the evil genius (*malin génie*) who distorts and deforms not only our sense perceptions but intelligible truth itself, an evil genius who deceives us in all things. It is equivalent to saying that perhaps our understanding is of such a nature that it necessarily errs whenever it tries to grasp the truth: 'I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things.' The artificial and metaphysical assault of the evil genius will, in Derrida's words, conjure up the possibility of total madness, 'a total derangement over which I could have no control since it is inflicted upon me - hypothetically - and I am no longer responsible for it' (1997: 52).[23] A madness from which ideas of either a sensory or intellectual origin cannot be sheltered.

Wherein lies fundamental certitude for Descartes? In the existence of the subject that thinks and doubts. If I think that the world exists, I might be wrong as to the existence of the world, but there is no error in that I am thinking. In the same way, I can doubt everything except that I doubt. My existence as a thinking subject (that doubts, that errs) is exempted from all possible error and all possible doubt. I think, therefore I am. The rational subject is the wellspring of truth - *res cogitans*. My existence as a thinking subject is not only the fundamental truth and certitude but also the prototype of all truth and certitude, since I perceive it with absolute clarity and distinction. This impenetrable point of certainty, clear and distinct, attained in the act of the Cogito and in the certainty of his own existence, enables Descartes to say, according to Derrida, 'whether or not I am mad, *Cogito sum*.' It is the point 'in which the possibility of *all* the determined forms of the exchange between reason and madness are embedded' (1997: 56). Even if I am mad, I still formulate the project of thinking this totality, of grasping this totality: thinking escapes the alternative of a determined madness or a determined reason. Thinking as excess, as the hyperbolical project, overflows the totality. To cite Derrida: 'any effort to reduce this totality, to enclose it within a determined historical structure, however comprehensive,' as Foucault attempts in his project, 'risks missing the essential, risks dulling the *point* itself' (1997: 57). Furthermore, 'it cannot be recounted, cannot be objectified as an event in a determined history' (1998: 58).

When Descartes reaches this extremity, he needs to guarantee the Cogito in God. Once the certainty of his own existence is achieved, Descartes needs to demonstrate the existence of a reality external to thought. All our knowledge, Descartes says, springs from the 'I think', thus all of my ideas must arise in myself. The only idea that could not have arisen from myself is the idea of God. The idea of an infinite and perfect being, whose content so far exceeds my capacity that I could not have constructed it from my own resources. The more I consider this infinite, omnipotent, omniscient being, the less convinced I am that such an idea could arise in me. Hence, one must conclude necessarily that God exists.[24] It follows that the infinite being, God, really exists, and has placed the idea of Himself within me. The idea of God, as infinite being, is innate. God, who exists as supreme power and perfection, made me the kind of creature that I am and created all that exists.[25] Once the deity's existence is established, Descartes can proceed to reinstate his belief in the world around him.

When Descartes pronounces the words 'I think, therefore I am,' in that instant of intuition, that instant in which the self is immediately present to itself, Derrida notes, the Cogito is temporalized. 'The Cogito must reflect and proffer itself in an organized philosophical discourse' (1997: 58). God becomes the sole guarantor of my representations and my cognitive determinations, and the supreme protective barrier against madness. Descartes uses the deity to set up a reliable method for the pursuit of truth, the guarantee that reason can be trusted; the existence of God henceforth plays a major role in the validation of reason. According to Derrida, this is the moment when internment takes place in Descartes's text. 'The identification of the Cogito with reasonable – normal – reason need not even await – in fact, if not in principle – the proofs of the existence of a veracious God as the supreme or protective barrier against madness' (1997: 59) because Descartes appeals to the principles of logic and causality in his conception of the existence and truthfulness of God and pulls himself out of madness.[26] The reliable 'clear and distinct' perceptions of the pure intellect as well as the consideration of such intellectual knowledge as a kind of illumination derived from a higher source than man's own mind ("natural light" or "light of reason").[27]

Foucault, Derrida says, has performed a "Cartesian gesture for the twentieth century", one that, according to Norris, is 'more deceptive for flatly denying (unlike Descartes) the fact of its investment in the discourse of reason' (Norris, 1987: 216). In his attempt to capture the plenitude of lost speech, Foucault reinstates the old onto-theological idea of an absolute origin or essence of truth, the transcendental event, and accepts into his discourse the premises of the tradition of metaphysics at the very moment he denounces it. By attempting to define the meaning of the Cartesian *Cogito* in terms of a determinate historical structure, Foucault fails to grasp that the *Cogito* has a transcendental status. In Norris' words, the '"critical" moments of Cartesian doubt when the security of every last rational belief was genuinely called into question' (Norris, 1987: 217) are ignored in Foucault's discourse. Derrida's intervention displays the latent metaphysical structure of the text, it shows the contradictions that shadow the text's coherence and express the form of a desire. As Derrida remarks, the logos casts a long shadow.

Conclusion

What I have attempted in this chapter is to incorporate into my argument three modes of analysis whose focus on the normal versus monstrous opposition - a paradigm for the oppositions of logocentrism in general- has incited a metaphysically symptomatic reading. Along the route of inquiry, my methodological trajectory has incorporated Canguilhem, Foucault and Derrida. Departing from a Canguilhemian framework, the Foucaldian and Derridian modes of analysis have enabled a consideration of the risks of falling back into logocentric procedures, and opened up the possibilities of moving around our own logical concepts. Derrida's critique of the logic at work in *Histoire de la folie* has provided some fundamental insights to understand the metaphysical traditions present not only in certain forms of historicism and structuralism but also in positivist philosophical traditions (as Canguilhem was well aware): the search for a transcendental fact or event, the search for a 'true reading'. Each mode of analysis in its own way displays strategies with which to challenge notions such as the Platonic ideal form or the *Cogito* of Descartes, creates new spaces from which to problematize the institutions that determine and re-enact such conceptual paradigms, and offers crucial insights into the fundamental philosophical issues of language and interpretation. Their works represent significant interventions in the way the monstrous has been determined, controlled and framed; moreover, their reading practices, concerned as they are with the imposition of institutional forms, de-limit institutional boundaries:

> Texts and discourses that provoke at the outset reactions of rejection, that are denounced precisely as anomalies or monstrosities are often texts that, before being in turn appropriated, assimilated, acculturated, transform the nature of the field of reception, transform the nature of social and cultural experience, historical experience. (Derrida, 1995: 386)

Not conforming to pre-existing academic practice, contesting traditional ways of organizing knowledge, contaminating cultural and linguistic convention, deconstruction has transformed familiar habits of thought. Nonetheless, the discursive monster, like all monsters, always runs the risk of being assimilated, legitimated and normalized. It is in that space where the monster appears, where it shows itself, as if invoking from the outset the metaphysics of presence, where deconstruction operates in order to become aware of the history of normality.

The possibilities figured forth in this chapter aim to establish a different frame(work) through which to look at Goya's work as well as of the social, institutional and political dynamics of his time. The bringing of Canguilhem's, Foucault's and Derrida's work to bear on Goya opens up a strategic reading of his corpus that will consider the Spanish painter's work within a tradition and how it works within and against it, thereby giving a new movement to previous interpretations and conventional critical approaches. In his work, rupture (discontinuity) and repetition or tradition (continuity) work contradictorily together from 1793 onwards:

> What gives these later paintings [post-1793 production] such force and such potency, and what makes them so inimitable, is the fact that they did indeed spring from disillusionment and were created out of the wreckage and death of an older kind of culture and another kind of painting. They draw their strength and tension from the painter's own sense of their newness and dissidence and from the knowledge that his way of seeing is not the old way of seeing.[28]

To think Goya differently will entail a change of perspective, a re-vision of Goya's monstrous configurations, which emerge at a given moment without tradition or normative precedent, while working through tradition. Working within a tradition, the tradition of Reason, will leave us recourse only to stratagems and strategies.

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[1] *Of Grammatology*, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). Hereafter citations will be from this edition.

[2] The critique of Lévi-Strauss is a continuation of a 1966 Lecture given at the John Hopkins University, 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences'. This critique of structuralism and its logocentric limitations will reappear in a more explicit form in the section on the Foucault and Derrida debate.

[3] *Of Grammatology*, pp. 27-73.

[4] Canguilhem turned to medicine to sharpen his philosophical understanding of concrete human problems: 'what I expected from medicine was nothing other than an introduction to concrete human problems. Medicine seemed to me then, and still seems to me now, a technique or an art at the crossroads of several sciences more than a science in the strict sense of the word' (1988: vii). These words are taken from the Introduction to his 1943 thesis, *The Normal and the Pathological* as quoted in the translator's preface to *Ideology and rationality in the history of the life sciences* (Massachussetts: Massachussetts Institute of Technology, 1988).

[5] *Le normal et le pathologique* was originally published in 1966. Foucault's introduction was added to the English language edition in 1978 and appears in the 1989 edition, *The Normal and the Pathological*, translation by Carolyn Fawcett in collaboration with Robert S. Cohen (Zone Books: New York, 1991). Foucault's original appeared as 'La vie et la science'in *Revue de Metàphysique et de Morale*, 1986 (special issue devoted to Georges Canguilhem, no: 1 pp. 3-14).

[6] Interview with Julia Kristeva, 'Semiology and Grammatology' in *Positions* (London : The Athlone Press, 1987) , translated and annotated by Alan Bass. The interview was published originally in France in 1972 as *Positions* by Les Editions de Minuit.

[7] "Report from Mr. Canguilhem on the Manuscript Filed by Mr. Michel Foucault, Director of the Institut Français of Hamburg, in Order to Obtain Permission to Print His Principal Thesis for the Doctor of Letters." Reproduced in *Critical Inquiry* 21 (Winter 1995) pp. 277-281.

[8] "On *Histoire de la folie* as an Event" in *Critical Inquiry* 21 (Winter 1995) pp. 282-286. First published in *Le debat*, 1986 (special issue after Foucault's death, n 41 Sept – Nov. 1986).

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[9] "Introduction to *Penser la folie: Essais sur Michel Foucault*" in *Critical Inquiry* 21 (Winter 1995) pp. 287-289.

[10] Citations will be from the 1989 edition, translation by Carolyn R. Fawcett in collaboration with Robert S. Cohen.

[11] '(...) The abnormal is not what is normal, but what constitutes another normal' (1989: 203).

[12] As Foucault says in the introduction to *The Normal and the Pathological* in reference to the "norm" process.

[13] Paul Macherey in 'Towards a natural history of norms', in *Foucault Philosopher.*

[14] In 'Passages – from Traumatism to Promise' (1995: 373-395).

[15] First published in 1961 as *Folie et deraison* and known later as *Histoire de la folie.* Since *Histoire de la folie* has never been fully translated into English, I will be referring, where necessary, to the French original and to the Spanish translation, *Historia de la locura y de la civilización.* The abridged version was published in English by Richard Howard under the title *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason.*

[16] In 'On *Histoire de la folie* as an Event', Canguilhem argues that this defines and describes Foucault's so-called genealogical works (1995: 282-286).

[17] "Report from Mr Canguilhem ..." (1995: 277-281).

[18] First delivered as a lecture (1966) and later appearing in *Writing and Differance.*

[19] There is a Hegelian undertone in Derrida's words. Against the individuality of the impulse, the universality of reason enters into play; in other words, one needs to 'reflect' in order to overcome the immediate proximity with the master. The dialogue expresses, on the one hand, the contradictions inherent in Foucault's work, and, on the other, the need to surpass its limits. The dialogic relationship between master and disciple manifests this insurmountable contradiction.

[20] The critical exchange between Foucault and Derrida has generated much debate and its relevance has reached literature, history, and philosophy. For further reading see the following: Geoff Bennington (1979) offers a very help summary of the main issues at stake in the exchange; Roy Boyne (1990) gives a sensible appraisal of the convergence of their thought around the themes of power and ethics; Robert D'Amico (1984) touches upon the positions that the Foucaldian and Derridian modes of analysis raise as to the relationship between the text and the world; and, Adam Sharman (1995) considers the critical exchange within Foucault's theory of discourse as act or event.

[21] In a provocative lecture delivered 21 October 1966 at the International Colloquium on Critical Languages and the Sciences of Man, Derrida criticized Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology and, by extension, structuralism. It was Derrida's contention that the metaphysical presuppositions about truth and meaning that structuralism sought to contest were already implied in the structuralist discourse since every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of metaphysics.

[22] 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire' ('Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu') appears as an appendix to the second edition of *Folie et déraison: histoire de la folie à là âge classique.* It contains another appendix, 'Madness, the absence of work' ('La folie, l'absence d'ouvre'). This second edition, 1972, was entitled *Histoire de la folie à là âge classique* and eliminates the original preface to which Derrida's criticisms are directed.

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[23] Here I follow Adam Sharman's (1995) corrected translation of Alan Bass (1978).

[24] A further proof of God's existence is that existence is contained within the very definition or essence of a perfect being.

[25] Having established the existence of God, the meditator is able to reconstruct solid foundations for knowledge, based on the mind's clear and distinct ideas whose reliability is guaranteed in God. Descartes' proof of the existence of God, as well as that of other rational philosophers such a Spinoza and Leibniz, derives from Saint Amselm's formulation of the ontological argument. It is an attempt to prove rationally that God exists, without appeal to revelation through Scripture or otherwise. Saint Anselm formulated the proof of the existence of God from a consideration of the concept of God which clearly and distinctly includes the existence of the external world which is guaranteed for us by the truthfulness of God who cannot allow that our natural desire to affirm the existence of the material world is a mere description.

[26] The material principle of causality: the objective reality of ideas requires a cause that has such reality in itself, the idea as an objective reality requires a proportional real cause; therefore the idea of an infinite being requires an infinite cause, it has been caused in me by an infinite being. The second principle appeals to morality: God is a being with every positive perfection, that is, God lacks nothing; a perfect God could not be a deceiver.

[27] It is not my aim to address either the structural flaws in Descartes' procedure or the controversial proofs of God's existence, namely what has come to be known as the 'Cartesian circle': if the reliability of the clear and distinct perceptions of the intellect depends on our knowledge of God, the question is how can that knowledge be established in the first place?

[28] Andrew Graham-Dixon in 'Seeing, but not believing.,' an article published in *The Independent* (22 March 1994) on the occasion of the exhibition 'Truth and Fantasy. Goya. The Small Paintings' held in the Royal Academy of Arts, 17 March - 12 June 1994.

Chapter 3

Locating *Los Caprichos* historically

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to locate Francisco de Goya's collection of etchings *Los Caprichos* (1799) in the historical and cultural context in which it was produced. I will be focusing on three interrelated areas of the Spanish Enlightenment – ideology, culture and the visual arts – in order to understand the political, philosophical, cultural and artistic currents with which *Los Caprichos* engage. Although the actual production of the eighty prints took place in the last decade of the eighteenth century, a period that stretched from 1794 to 1799, it is necessary to consider the dominant paradigms of the time, that is, the sociocultural, discursive and institutional dynamics of the Spanish eighteenth-century. My goal, then, is not to re-rehearse what historians and philosophers have written elsewhere about the period and the intellectual movement. Rather I wish to identify and explore those debates and ideas which are pertinent to the study of *Los Caprichos*.[1] The account of the historical and political events offered in the following pages will go hand in hand with a cultural analysis of the period under consideration, thereby, on the one hand, acknowledging the key historical moments that shaped the Spanish eighteenth century, while, on the other, always giving preeminence to a critical understanding of a variety of contemporary cultural and ideological formations.

According to Dorinda Outram, the Enlightenment 'necessarily took different shapes and forms in particular national and cultural contexts' (1995: 3), thus the specificities of the Spanish Enlightenment (*ilustración*) need to be addressed in the present discussion of *Los Caprichos*. The epistemological shift that took place across

Europe during the eighteenth century assumed a local form in Spain; concrete forces such as the Catholic Church and the Inquisition and their influence on the population, an immovable social hierarchy ('sociedad estamental'), an almost absent mercantile middle class, as well as the timid political reforms of progressive statesmen and leading intellectuals (*ilustrados*), the lack of a radical critique of beliefs, the repercussions of the French Revolution, all these factors helped to shape the ways in which the enlightened project developed in eighteenth-century Spain. This period of Spanish history is one of political and cultural conflict between two monarchical conceptions of political organization – 'a modern, centralist, bureaucratic state open to change' and a restrictive 'conciliar, aristocratic, and regionalist model' (Lynch, 1989: 295) -, and between two different cultures, that of the enlightened reformers and that of the traditionalists.

The first two sections of this chapter focus on the nature of the reforming movement. I will outline the policies of reformist absolutism and their influence on the body politic of Spain. As has been pointed out, the sections will establish, firstly, the conflictive ideological positions between the reformist minority and those sectors of society resistant to change, and, secondly, the existence of two camps within the reformist movement – one moderate (and more influential) and another more radical – in order to highlight that reformist absolutism was concerned more with immediate needs and social order rather than with a radical, programmatic and rigorous critique of eighteenth-century society. Through an examination of the reformist ideas of the Bourbon monarchy and the enlightened minority, I will be exploring the contradictions, limits, or insufficiencies of the Spanish *ilustración* in order to establish the ideological, cultural and artistic context out of which *Los Caprichos* emerged. The main question being posed in the following three sections – ideology, culture, and the visual arts - is to establish how far, and in what ways, *Los Caprichos* can be seen as an Enlightenment work. That is to say, I will be establishing the enlightened credentials of (Goya and) the series so as to identify in Chapters 4 and 5 the 'limits' at which *Los Caprichos* is more than or even stops being an enlightened work. In the words of Janis Tomlinson, 'the artist's relation to the Enlightenment is an issue to be addressed rather than an assumption that dictates our conclusions' (1992: 6). Addressing such a question will necessarily entail, as the chapter progresses, a general review of the critical and historical writing – reading protocols - that the etchings have generated since their publication on 6 February 1799, with the aim of showing the ways in which critics have constructed the vision of *Los Caprichos* as an Enlightenment work. Goya's relation to the Enlightenment has been mainly read through his graphic production of the late 1790s, and literature on *Los Caprichos* has, more often than not, located the artist among the *ilustrados*, considering the collection as a typical text of the Enlightenment.

As an introductory and paradigmatic example of this position, and a first approach to the society of the period, let us dwell briefly on the collection of etchings through a consideration of a recent exhibition of Goya's graphic work (*Los Caprichos*, *Desastres de la guerra*, *Tauromaquia* and *Disparates*). 'Goya. Personajes y Rostros', an exhibition held in Barcelona between 20 June and 17 September 2000 in the Centre Cultural Caixa Catalunya, presented to the modern viewer figures from all walks of late eighteenth-century Spanish life, in particular those etchings belonging to the series *Los Caprichos* that are a window onto the political and social structures of Spanish society: the exercise of power, the privileged estates (nobility and clergy) and the popular classes (women, peasants, the dispossessed). Taking a lead from the Announcement, the organizers claimed that the aim of *Los Caprichos* was to satirize the evil and follies of contemporary Spanish society; specific etchings illustrate the targets of the artist: the abuses of the privileged estates (*Capricho 42* 'Tú que no puedes' (fig. 6), *Capricho 23* 'Aquellos polbos' (fig. 7)), the ignorance and idleness of the nobility (*Capricho 4* 'El de la rollona' (fig. 8), *Capricho 39* 'Asta su abuelo' (fig.9), *Capricho 50* 'Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10)), the unproductive and corrupt clergy (*Capricho 13* 'Están calientes' (fig. 11), *Capricho 79* 'Nadie nos ha visto' (fig. 12)), and the vices of the populace (*Capricho 11* 'Muchachos al avío' (fig. 13), *Capricho 18* 'Y se le quema la casa' (fig. 14)). Seen in this light, *Los Caprichos* is an unmistakeably Enlightenment work: such a view of the series, seen as social critique and satire of Spanish eighteenth-century society, provides an immediate identification with the political, social and moral aspirations of the Spanish reformers. The introduction to the exhibition catalogue establishes such a link quite explicitly:

> Durante la década de 1790, Goya entabló relaciones con los miembros más progresistas de la aristocracia madrileña y un selecto grupo de políticos y escritores adscritos ideológicamente a la Ilustración, partidarios de la reforma social, como Jovellanos, Moratín, Iriarte, Meléndez Valdés o Ceán Bermúdez. En este contexto histórico y personal fueron concebidos *Los Caprichos*, que dan testimonio de una sociedad en proceso de cambio, en el momento crítico entre el fin del Antiguo Régimen y el nacimiento del pensamiento liberal burgués.[2]

Many a contemporary exhibition sets Goya up as an Enlightenment artist and presents the series as an Enlightened work. The aspirations and policies of the Spanish *ilustrados* are the focus of the following sections; attention to the contradictory ideologies, political and cultural policies, and artistic tastes of the Bourbon régime will enable me to relate Goya's work to its political and cultural milieu.

Ideology

It has only been over the last three decades that scholars of the Spanish eighteenth century have come to agree that conflict and contradiction configured the Spanish Enlightenment (Maravall (1967, 1968), Elorza (1970), Subirats (1981), Sánchez-Blanco Parody (1991)); long gone are the monolithic views of Menéndez Pelayo in *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles* (1880-1882), which defined the period as 'extranjerizante' (that is, dominated by imported ideas alien to the Spanish tradition), or the homogenizing visions of Sarrailh (1954) and Herr (1958), for whom the Spanish Enlightenment was the collective project of an enlightened minority and a phenomenon that was merely derivative of the French *philosophes*. Such views, according to Elorza (1970: 13), have meant that the ideological tensions pervading the period and the contradictions existing within different enlightened groups have been overlooked. Thus if Goya has been located among the progressive statesmen and intellectuals of the time – the 'minoría selecta' (Sarrailh, 1974: 122) - and has come to be seen unproblematically as an Enlightenment artist, these very same tensions and contradictions that define the late Spanish eighteenth century have been overlooked in readings of *Los Caprichos*. It is necessary then to qualify the artist's relation with the *ilustración* and the *ilustrados*.

Goya's lifetime (1746-1828) was marked by political change and revolution, 'exposing him firstly to the pleasures and aspirations of an enlightened Spain under Carlos III, then to the corruption of the reign of Carlos IV, which led to the martyrdom of his country under the Napoleonic occupation; and finally to the chaotic years of the confrontation between liberalism and the tyranny of Ferdinand VII, which forced him to live his life in exile' (Gassier and Wilson, 1971: 16). The Spanish eighteenth century is marked by the end of the Habsburg dynasty and the arrival on the throne of the Bourbons. Successive Bourbon monarchs (Felipe V (1700-1746), Fernando VI (1746-1759), Carlos III (1759-1789), Carlos IV (1789-1808)), following the French model, established the basis for an authoritarian and centralized government whose main priorities were the defence of Spanish interests and the reform of antiquated political, social and economic structures. The former entailed a more realistic foreign policy that sought (an almost impossible) neutrality in the European context as well as a reconsideration of the economic control of its colonies, while the structural reforms sought to 'activate the state and to make it an effective instrument of change' (Lynch, 1989: 163) in the modernization and regeneration of Spain. Faced with the legacy of the Habsburgs,[3] the political, economic, social and cultural programmes of the new dynasty were directed towards the reform of institutional practices, mainly the modification of old hierarchical religious and state institutions: 'the principal flaws in royal government', writes Lynch, 'were not the monarch nor the bureaucrats but the institutions' (1989: 2), namely regional autonomy and the privileges of the aristocracy and the Church. To this end, the first half of the century witnessed the strengthening of a central authority through the 'Decretos de Nueva Planta', whereby many of the 'fueros' or regional juridical and administrative privileges were eliminated (firstly in Valencia in 1707 and later on, in 1716, in Aragón, Cataluña and Mallorca) and regalist policies were implemented to control the power of the Church, policies that would characterize relations between the State and the Church throughout the century. Economical reforms were made necessary by an increase in population[4] and the steady development of the economy, leading to the first attempts to modify property and tax policies. And, in the cultural field, new philosophical and scientific ideas were introduced particularly through the 'novatores', who in private gatherings and away from universities and ecclesiastical institutions discussed the works of Bacon or Bayle or the publications of European academies and journals.[5] The main figures of the first half of the Spanish eighteenth century were Gregorio Mayans y Siscar (1699-1781),[6] a continuer of the Humanist tradition of Vives, Valdés and El Brocense, and Benito Jerónimo Feijoo (1676-1764).

According to Nigel Glendinning (1972), at the beginning of the eighteenth century Voltaire and other writers described Spain as 'a skeleton of its former self' (1972: 1), whilst the Spanish writer Cadalso (1741-1782) referred to the nation with a similar image in his *Cartas Marruecas* (begun in 1768 and written over a period of six years)[7]: 'en la muerte de Carlos III no era España sino el esqueleto de un gigante' (1999: 50). Military defeats, economic crises and inadequate political leadership made Spain a shadow of its former self. Both the absolutist monarchy and the enlightened reformers sought to restore the health of an ailing nation, the concept of reform being germane to Bourbon politics. The Spanish economy needed to recover if the country wanted to compete both in Europe and in the New World with the other powers, particularly France and Great Britain. The reformist movement, Palacio Atard observes, focused mainly on the economy: 'un formidable empeño de regeneración económica, al cual se subordina – como instrumento – la reforma del orden cultural y también la práctica político-administrativa' (1964: 34). Changes in the economic sphere would permeate all aspects of society and would contribute, according to the reformers, to the progress of the nation and the happiness of its citizens, and ultimately bring changes in the cultural sphere. The cultural politics of the Bourbon monarchies will be the focus of the next section so let us turn now to what the historian Jean Sarrailh defines as the 'cruzada de índole económica' (Sarrailh, 1974: 573) of the reformers and the main economic resolutions through which they sought to regenerate Spain. The following pages therefore place particular emphasis on the primacy of the economic factor since the rationalisation of the economic infrastructure and the changes in the mode of production affected all other spheres of eighteenth-century Spanish society.

The promotion of economic reforms was ultimately directed at rationalizing the modes of production of Spanish society. The reform programme of the governments of Carlos III and Carlos IV 'responded to needs rather than ideas' (Lynch, 1989: 254), their policies containing little ideology and, as I shall examine later, 'no overt attack on religion' (1989: 254). The 'economic crusade' failed to change not only historical privileges but also, it could be argued, the cultural norms legitimizing them, a world dominated by tradition, authority and mythology. Most enlightened reformers worked in conjunction with the Bourbon absolutist monarchy, which was considered to be 'el nervio de la reforma' (Palacio Atard, 1964: 34). Policies were designed and implemented respecting the *status quo*, since the main aim was to 'racionalizar el modo de producción, sin introducir cambios cualitativos en el mismo ni alterar las relaciones de producción, de acuerdo con los intereses primeros de los estamentos privilegiados' (Elorza, 1970: 27). Such rationalization was nonetheless favourable to the traditionally privileged classes (clergy and nobility) as well as to a nascent, mostly peripheral, mercantile class, creating, as Elorza argues in *La ideología del despotismo ilustrado*, a non-conflictive relationship between the reforming movement and traditionalist positions. Only a nascent liberal ideology, according to Elorza, offered a source of potential conflict:

> las relaciones entre las clases privilegiadas (i. e., la estructura del Antiguo Régimen) y la naciente burguesía tenían un carácter no antagónico; el estilo de pensamiento del despotismo ilustrado – incorporado por funcionarios y magistrados como Roma y Rosell, Campomanes, Pérez y López, nobles como Peñaflorida y un largo etcétera – constituyó la expresión ideológica de esta situación. (1970: 16)

To a reforming movement working within the *status quo*, Elorza opposes a different conception of politics and society embodied in the figure of a few radical reformers:

> A esta ideología, con su defensa coherente de la monarquía absoluta y el predominio de clero y nobleza, sobre la base de la producción agraria y una forma de explotación artesanal y manufacturera pre-capitalista se superpone la

> naciente ideología liberal, con su incitación, más o menos radical, a romper las relaciones sociales características de la sociedad estamental en favor de nuevas relaciones sociales y políticas típicamente burguesas. (1970: 16)

Whilst there were radical reformers seeking to transform society and culture, the vast majority of reformers designed their policies to modernize the state in order to create 'una sociedad estamental racionalizada y progresiva' (1970: 37), rather than to dismantle traditional social and cultural relations. However, radical voices, like those of Vicente Alcalá Galiano, León de Arroyal, Luis García Cañuelo, Francisco Cabarrús,[8] Valentín de Foronda,[9] José Agustín Ibáñez de la Rentería, José Marchena[10] or Manuel Rubín de Celis,[11] break any monolithic consideration of the reformist movement as being exclusively moderate.[12] Elorza traces these moderate and radical voices of the 1770s and the 1780s in his study, where he claims that the works of these radical reformers represent the origins of a liberal ideology in the Peninsula during the final decades of the eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth century. Their writings represent the first attempts at dismantling the power structures of the absolutist régime,[13] a political change that did not finally take place until 1812, in the wake of the crisis of 1808, when the Cortes of Cádiz approved the Constitution.[14]

Moderate and radical reformers shared certain concerns in economic matters. There was a shared interest in the modernization of the State through economic reform and the secularization of the country (that is, the restriction of ecclesiastical power to the religious sphere), as well as in a critique of the privileged groups. The transformation of society, however, signified a marked ideological contrast between *status quo* and radical positions. While the liberal (and revolutionary) notions - social contract, equality and constitution – and European (mainly the English) political models invoked in the works of Arroyal (*Cartas económico-políticas al Conde de*

Lerena (1787-1790) and the satire *Pan y Toros*) or Cañuelo (*El censor* (between 1781-1787)) advocated change in the political structures of Spain,[15] moderate reformers such as Jovellanos and Meléndez Valdés, both of whom held ministerial posts in the final decade of the eighteenth century, resisted any reformist policies that could undermine the hierarchies of the absolutist régime. The cautious policies of reformist absolutism, together with the course of events in Europe towards the end of the century (namely the French Revolution of 1789), which brought financial and social crisis to the country, and the indifference of the populace meant that no radical reform of the sociopolitical body was carried out.

As part of the reform of the economy, 'ilustración' in the Spanish Enlightenment came to be equated with practical knowledge ('saberes útiles') and the technical formation of the populace ('enseñanza técnica de oficios'). The educational aspects of the term – 'ilustración' as 'tarea pedagógica-moral' (Elorza, 1970: 30) – partook also of the economic ideology since the role of education was fundamental in the regeneration of the country – 'la educación como base imprescindible para el progreso social y económico del país' (Aguilar Piñal, 1991: 74). Historians and cultural analysts like Elorza and Eduardo Subirats have emphasised the instrumental use of reason during the Spanish Enlightenment. For example, in *La ilustración insuficiente* (1981), Eduardo Subirats argues that the term 'ilustración' is mainly understood as the divulging of knowledge, privileging the didactic, the pedagogic and the technical. I shall return to Subirats' essay in more detail in Chapter 5 in the context of my analysis of institutional bodies.

The reformers' legislation (economic, fiscal, commercial) held production to be the fundamental instrument of change: 'producir y dar más salida a los productos son dos objetivos siempre presentes en nuestros ilustrados, que repican una y otra vez en las páginas de Campomanes, Floridablanca, Ward, Gándara, Arriquíbar' (Elorza, 1970: 29). Productivity, the development of productive forces whether in agriculture, industry or commerce, was at the centre of a reformist programme that aimed to put an end to the non-productivity not only of undercultivated land but also of a large sector of the population – nobility, clergymen, useless bureaucrats, beggars, women. 'Ociosidad' is a recurrent theme in reformist discourses: 'Que nadie esté ocioso' (cited in Sarrailh, 1974: 530) is Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes' motto in *Discurso sobre la educación popular de los artesanos y su fomento* (1774), in which the magistrate resorts to an exclusionary rhetoric, 'el verdadero extranjero en su patria es el ocioso' (1978: 60) – we might recall here Foucault's ideas on the age of confinement as discussed in Chapter 2. Such exclusion is to be enforced by the State: 'todo hombre ocioso debe ser objeto de Inquisición del Gobierno' (Nicolás de Arriquíbar in *Recreación política* (1770, published in 1779) cited in Elorza, 1970: 54). The critique of idle, non-productive bodies seemed to be the solution to this socioeconomic problem, these words being echoed throughout the second half of the century, for instance, in the texts of Arroyal (*Cartas*) and Cadalso (*Cartas Marruecas*). The two main non-productive groups yet at the same time the wealthiest landowners were the higher nobility and the higher clergy who monopolized the land and in whose hands the economic infrastructure of the country rested. The transformation of these privileged estates and their age-old institutional practices was the main aim of the enlightened reformers moderate and radical alike. They needed to confront the traditional society of estates on the one hand and, on the other, the mentality of a population steeped in 'un sentido aristocrático de la vida' (Palacio Atard, 1964: 26) and in the excesses of popular religion. Insofar as the Enlightenment in general is recognized as a reformist movement of a secular nature, the Spanish enlightened reformers aimed through reports, economic societies and public initiatives approved by the Bourbon kings to secularize the economy and increase the productivity of the country.[16]

The Spain of the eighteenth century was a rural society whose economy was of an agricultural nature; any agrarian crisis, whether harvest losses, droughts or floods, had devastating effects on the economy of the country, plunging the nation into disaster. The privileged estates, higher nobility and clergy, owned the land and lived off rents; fiscal, legal and customary privileges were deeply rooted in institutions such as the noble entails ('mayorazgos'), which perpetuated the hereditary transmission of property, and the clerical mortmains ('señoríos').[17] Both institutions underscored the relations of agrarian production. Among the attempts at agrarian reform were Campomanes' *Tratado de la regalía de amortización* (1765), which primarily defended state intervention and denounced the privileges of the *Mesta* and the clerical mortmain, Gerónimo de Uztáriz's *Informe al Consejo sobre la ley agraria* (1768), and Jovellanos' *Informe sobre la ley agraria* (1795),[18] commissioned by the Real Sociedad Económica Matritense, openly hostile to the Church's accumulation of property and advocating the distribution of land to peasants, as well as the work of the Economic Societies - Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País - which followed the example of the Basque Seminario de Vergara (Guipúzcoa) established in 1765. These new institutions, considered as instruments of change in the service of the State, played an important role in the dissemination of new techniques and useful sciences and contributed significantly to the enlightened programme of repopulating and colonizing undercultivated and underdeveloped areas.

With the increase in urban population and a general economic growth, reformers also directed their efforts towards the protection of industry and trade in urban areas; among the measures taken by the government were the development of crafts, the disappearance of internal custom barriers, and the creation of factories such as the Fábrica de Tapices de Santa Bárbara (Madrid), founded in 1720 and supported by the State. The artisan sector would be the object of analysis of Campomanes' *Discurso sobre la educación popular* (1775), where the minister focuses on the professional dignification and technical improvement of the artisans, both considerations at the service of productivity and utility, the fundamental criteria for the advancement of society in the writings of Campomanes. Such are the economic and legislative reasons behind the magistrate's discourse; I will return to Campomanes' text in the next section in order to dwell upon its educational aspects, a paradigmatic example of the links between economic reform and culture. As for the disappearance of internal customs barriers, legislation aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the existence of a unified national market and, eventually, a 'homogenización del espacio económico español' (Elorza, 1970: 33). But, as Lynch argues, 'the failure of agrarian reforms denied the economy the pre-conditions of industrialization' (1989: 233). Only cities on the periphery, such as Barcelona, Bilbao and Cádiz, became important commercial centres, giving rise to a new relationship between the centre and the periphery. Their ports made them into places open to external influence where contact with the international community - the exchange of commercial goods and the encounter with other peoples and ideas – was an everyday occurrence. Trade with the colonies was mainly conducted from Cádiz, although this monopoly would end in 1778 with the introduction of free trade with America, whereas Barcelona added to its commercial port a textile industry developed in and around the city, allowing for the emergence of a wealthy bourgeoisie. It is commonly believed that Goya would have seen English (as well as French) satirical prints in the house of the businessman and art collector Sebastián Martínez during his convalescence in Cádiz.

Together with reformist laws on agriculture, the other main objective of the Bourbon monarchs, riddled with significant social and political implications, was the reform of the tax system.[19] From Ensenada's never-implemented policies on a single income tax in 1749 to Godoy's legislation on clerical tithes and non-discriminatory taxes for commoners and nobles in the last decades of the century, the fiscal privileges of the nobility and the Church were placed under scrutiny. However, such modifications of the tax system were met with resistance by the privileged estates, and more often than not were doing no more than seeking practical answers to specific crises. In the words of Lynch, 'rather than reorganize the tax structure and challenge fiscal privilege, the government preferred to borrow its way out of trouble by successive issues of state bonds, the infamous *vales reales*, and so unleashed a monster it could not control' (1989: 414). *Los Caprichos* might be said to engage politically in the debate on tax that threatened a long-established social hierarchy; as Tomlinson argues, 'they serve in fact as political cartoons that reinforce the attitudes underlying royal policy' (1992: 21). As examples of this, Tomlinson cites *Capricho 29* 'Esto sí que es leer' (fig. 15), which comments on the nobility's dependence upon servants, a luxury to be taxed, and *Capricho 42* 'Tú que no puedes' (fig. 6) and *Capricho 10* 'Unos a otros' (fig. 16), both of which represent the privileged church and the aristocracy as social burdens.

Both the agrarian and the tax reform were symptomatic of a politics of caution that was devoid of radical political content and did not attempt to subvert traditional social structures. The reformist policies emanating from within the framework of absolutism were directed towards a modernization of the State rather than of society;

if anything, the nobility kept its place in the social hierarchy. It was not only the traditionalists who defended the status of the nobility, but so also did thinkers like Feijoo in the first half of the century and moderate reformers such as Duque de Almodóvar and Sempere y Guarinos in the closing decades (see Elorza, 1970: 61-2). The attitudes towards the nobility coming from radical quarters were very different. Figures like Arroyal, Cañuelo, and Cabarrús criticised the nobility, as Maravall aptly puts it; by 'negándole todo fundamento objetivo y funcional, acusándola de atraso intelectual y aun biológico y haciéndola responsable del estancamiento económico y científico del país' (1967: 61). As I shall be arguing in the next section, monarchy and moderate reformers promoted the education of an existing nobility whose ultimate duty was to serve the State. Furthermore, as a ruling class, it was to be exemplary, virtuous and productive. It was believed that new criteria – service to the common good, virtue and merit – would transform the aristocratic élite into an economic, political and moral force. Only wealth and a politics of ennoblement during the reigns of Carlos III and Carlos IV allowed entrance into an estate traditionally bearing the marks of lineage. The promotion of members of the lower nobility such as Campomanes and Floridablanca to central positions in power was based on merit, thereby challenging the traditional holding of administrative and ministerial posts based solely on hereditary rights and collegiate education. The *pueblo llano* or *tercer estado* comprised the rural classes, the artisans and an emerging middle class of bureaucrats, merchants and urban artisans, who loosened 'the structure of traditional society, without however undermining its foundations' (Lynch, 1989: 235). Hierarchies and privileges remained as unshakeable institutional practices. In the words of Elorza, 'conservando los principios básicos de estratificación social y las relaciones de producción anteriores, se intentará conseguir la homogeneidad legal, económica y cultural, a fin de que el poder absoluto pueda actuar con plena eficacia' (1970: 38).

What about that fundamental social and religious institution in the history of Spain, the Church? And, more particularly, what was the relationship between the Bourbon monarchy and the Catholic Church? A powerful landowner hindering agricultural development, the Church was everpresent in society, monopolizing education and acting as supreme moral censor. In the same way that the Bourbon régime sought to renovate the social and moral functions of the ruling classes, its reformist policies were aimed at transforming the Church as part of the modernizing process: 'the clergy were seen as agents of the State promoting economic development, improving education, building public works, and, in general, advancing the utilitarian policies formulated in Madrid' (Callahan, 1984: 5). Religious measures were undertaken for a variety of reasons: economic, educational, legal and social. King and Government sought to become independent from the ecclesiastical authority – the power of Rome and its representatives in the Spanish Church - not just in economic matters but also in historical and ideological matters. In sum, the State sought to limit the power of the Church within the body politic. Regalism, namely the defence of the privileges of the Spanish Crown against the Holy See, was at the forefront of the Bourbon policy, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth century, its most active promoters being Aranda and Campomanes during the reign of Carlos III and Cabarrús and Urquijo under the government of Carlos IV. The main aim behind regalist ideas was to establish a government as economically and ideologically independent from the authority of the Church as possible and to minimize the power of the Papacy in Spain. The latter, the reduction of papal authority over the Spanish Church, was an interest shared by royal bureaucrats and reformist ecclesiastical figures.

In the economic sphere, the State needed a more rational, utilitarian administration of an excessive and unproductive ecclesiastical body, more specifically the regular clergy; ideologically, reformers directed their efforts towards a redefinition of the role of the Church in the education and moral guidance of Spanish society. Thus institutional and pastoral aspects of the Church were to be addressed by the Bourbons with a view to a rational organization of the Church as well as a change of attitudes as far as pastoral responsibilities were concerned (Callahan, 1984: 81). The Church had its own reformers; according to Callahan, 'between 1750 and 1780 the reforming movement, with its primarily pastoral and educational emphasis, received broad support from the élite of the Caroline Church' (1984: 70), represented in the figures of Felipe Bertrán, Bishop of Salamanca, Clement, Bishop of Barcelona, Francisco Fabián, Archbishop of Valencia, and Francisco Lorenzana, Cardinal of Toledo. They would be followed by other reforming figures in the 1780s such as Archdeacon Palafox of Cuenca, Antonio Tavira, and Juan Antonio Llorente. The reforms coming from within the institution itself can be traced back to the Humanist tradition of the Spanish sixteenth century,[20] which had already criticized the excesses of popular religion, so germane to Counter-Reformation culture and society, and had argued in favour of a simpler and more personalised devotional practice. What were the reformers within the Church after, then? First and foremost, 'the emphasis was not doctrinal but practical and pastoral' (Callahan, 1984: 69), hence their stress on the need to re-educate their parish clergy and to eradicate superstition and a vast array of popular religious beliefs and practices. 'The ideal of the reforming movement', writes Callahan, 'was an intellectual religion in which the faithful understood the truths of the faith, practiced the liturgy with simplicity and advanced on the road of personal spiritual perfection' (1984: 70). In the same way that certain enlightened reformers were close to the Bourbons' reforming policies, reformers within the Church might be described as being part of the *status quo*. Likewise, they belonged to a privileged enlightened minority, whose ideas were poles apart from those of the traditionalists, the regular priests and the general populace.

However, the traditionalist sectors of the Church were not prepared to lose their privileges and rejected the secular and utilitarian role assigned to them by the reforming élite (Callahan, 1984: 7, 65). Resistance to reform came from the conservative bulk of the Church (the majority of the hierarchy, the religious orders, the parish clergy and the missionaries) and a populace whose beliefs were deeply entrenched in traditional forms of religious expression. The ideological and moral orthodoxy imposed by the Catholic Church over the centuries was enforced by the Inquisition – founded by Fernando and Isabel, the Catholic monarchs, in 1478 - whose pervasive institutional presence still held sway during the eighteenth century. As the case of the Peruvian lawyer Pablo de Olavide, accused of heresy and imprisoned in 1778 after three years of trials (see Roth, 1996: 254-57), and the reaction to the French Revolution, which brought State and Church closer, attested, the Holy Office could set its repressive mechanisms in motion at any time.[21] Nevertheless, Carlos III managed to control and moderate Inquisitorial power through the appointment of reform-minded prelates like Felipe Bertrán to the position of Inquisitor General (Callahan, 1984: 33). Other factors, such as the lack of religious dissent, the complex economic and jurisdictional privileges of the clergy, and the illiteracy of wide sectors of the population made the changes promoted by the reformist minority difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Thus during the Spanish

Enlightenment 'the chasm between the reforming ideal and the social reality of the Church was never bridged' (Callahan, 1984: 72). The limitations in State policy as well as the resistance to reform within the Church meant that the long eighteenth-century saw no radical transformation of the Spanish Church.

Feijoo never questioned Catholic dogma; other enlightened reformers later in the century, whose main attempts stopped at limiting the power of the Catholic Church and regenerating the moral and pedagogical role of the clergy, did not question Catholic dogma either. Only the expulsion in 1767 both from Spain and the colonies of the Jesuits,[22] an order which for centuries had dominated Spanish education and imposed scholasticism, was a significant intervention of the State in religious affairs, though the Church hierarchy and the other religious orders in fact supported Carlos III's decision. The consequences of the expulsion of the Jesuit order for the educational system will be addressed in the next section. The equilibrium achieved during the reign of Carlos III between government officials and episcopal reformers, particularly in regalist matters and religious practices, was upset in the 1790s both by the effects of the French Revolution, the wars with France and England and the ensuing crises, and the alternate use of enlightened reformers and conservative figures in government under Carlos IV, which polarised even more the different political conceptions of kingship and Church. Traditionalists made use of this unstable state of affairs by launching attacks on 'the "execrable philosophy" of the eighteenth century' and on 'the secularism and "libertinism" propagated by the French Revolution' (Callahan, 1984: 81), resorting to an even more ultramontane and incendiary rhetoric and causing further divisions within the Church. Challenged by the new, secular doctrines, traditionalist groups argued that 'the survival of a Catholic society depended on the maintenance of the institutions and privileges of the Church before the threat of internal and external enemies' (1984: 82).

The presence of the Church pervades the social fabric of eighteenth-century Spain. 'The real strength of the Church', notes Callahan, 'lay in its spiritual hold over the population, from aristocrat to peasant' (1984: 52). Paul Ilie, meanwhile, refers in these terms to Spanish cultural life: it 'was steeped in Counter-Reformational traditions' (1984: 11) which made the Catholic religion 'the most powerful norm of Spanish civilization' (1984: 13). For Jiménez Lozano, eighteenth-century Spanish society is essentially

> una sociedad culturalmente católica; lo que quiere decir que es una cultura eidética tanto o más que una cultura auditiva: el catolicismo medieval en todas partes es una religión de la imagen [...] Es pues con una cultura campesina, católica y medieval, con una viva, fuerte y complaciente conciencia de ella, y con sus imágenes idealizadas y absolutizadas y su modo de percepción, con lo que la Ilustración va a chocar. Y lo va a hacer, naturalmente, en el plano de la vivencia y la cotidianeidad, mucho antes, mucho más y mucho más profundamente que en el de las ideas. (1989: 142-143)

Thus the Catholic religion shaped the beliefs and the customs of the Spanish population, their minds as well as their bodies. And nowhere is the power of traditional forms of religion and their impact on the populace more clear than in external expressions of piety (processions, official rituals, devotional associations, popular missions, mass evangelizations), religious prints, folk belief (local traditions) and the activities of the Inquisition. Most of these practices were the signs of Counter-Reformation devotions, which relied on public visual display and the superstition of the population; for instance, *Capricho 24* 'No hubo remedio' (fig. 17), which shows an image of an inquisitorial process, and *Capricho 52* '¡Lo que puede un sastre!' (fig. 18) capture the visible (and invisible) looming presence of the Holy Office and the clergy. Likewise, *Capricho 53* '¡Que pico de oro!'(fig. 19) might be read as a satirical reference to the popular missions of missionary preachers such as Padre Pedro de Calatayud and Fray Diego de Cádiz.

Although the power of the Holy Office was restrained by the Bourbon régime, Floridablanca, Carlos IV's Secretary of State, turned to the Inquisition in the aftermath of the French Revolution in order to protect Spain from revolutionary contagion. State and Church, at specific historical junctures, still protected each other's corporate interests. The 1790s were generally a period of political and social unrest. Continuous changes in government characterize the decade, enlightened reformers of different hues such as Campomanes, Cabarrús, and Jovellanos were dismissed in 1792, the last two only to be recalled into government during the liberal interlude of 1797-98 and ousted again a few months later.[23] The political relationship with France marks the decade, affecting both Spain's foreign affairs and her domestic policies. The events of 1789, as already noted, set in motion governmental and inquisitorial action against revolutionary ideas,[24] provoked war against France between 1793 and 1795, alliances with the neighbouring country with the arrival of Godoy, the new Secretary of State (and favourite) of Carlos IV, which consequently brought uninterrupted military conflict with Great Britain between 1796 and 1802. The emblematic date of 1789 also coincides with the coronation of Carlos IV; the events happening in France brought the fear of revolution and social upheaval into the Peninsula and served to polarize contrasting ideologies even further. The minister Floridablanca established a cordon sanitaire to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas, restoring a rigid censorship with the help of the Inquisition and repressing intellectual freedom (Herr, 1958: 239-68). What followed was a period of social and political unrest, despite the fact that there were brief interludes of liberal tendencies in the mid-1790s, after Godoy signed the Peace of Basle in July 1795. It was agreed that French troops would be withdrawn from Spain (and in return Spain would cede to France the colony of Santo Domingo). Two years later Godoy was forced to step down from power due to the economic collapse of the country. Leading *ilustrados* such as Jovellanos, after a period of exile from the court of the Spanish Bourbons, and Saavedra returned to power (as Minister of Justice and Minister of Finance, respectively) between November 1797 and August 1798. Meanwhile, shifts in the Church hierarchy responded to the shifts in the balance of power between traditionalists and reformists in ministerial positions during the decade: 'the balances of power shifted constantly, to the reformers between 1790 to 1792, to the traditionalists between 1793 and 1795, to reform again during the progressive ministry of 1797-1800' (Callahan, 1984: 83).

It could be argued that the decade in which Goya worked on and published *Los Caprichos* was in many ways a microcosm of the tensions and conflicts that had been shaping the evolution of the Spanish nation over the course of the century. In this context the Announcement that accompanied the publication of *Los Caprichos* is for many critics inextricably linked with the political events that shook the decade. Not surprisingly, with the political situation becoming more volatile, the Announcement carries with it a cautionary note. The characters populating the collection bear, we are told, no relation to any particular living person: 'en ninguna de las composiciones que forman esta coleccion se ha propuesto el autor, para ridiculizar los defectos particulares à uno ù otro individuo'. Claims to universality and disclaimers did not stop Goya's contemporaries from identifying some of the characters with public figures, a process encouraged by Valentín Carderera during the first half of the century and continued after 1860 by Charles Yriarte (1867), Paul Lefort (1877) and Conde de la Viñaza, pseudonym of Cipriano Muñoz y Manzano

(1887). In this vein *Capricho 55* 'Hasta la muerte' (fig. 20) has been considered a caricature of the Queen, María Luisa. This identificatory process will be a prominent feature of nineteenth-century French criticism's construction of Goya as a social satirist. As Tomlinson (1989/1994) has convincingly argued, these identifications respond to a very specific historical moment, the years that followed the publication of *Los Caprichos*, when revolutionary connotations and direct political references were grafted onto some of the etchings. Such political readings have accompanied the prints from the beginning of the eighteenth century to our days and have contributed to the view that they are an Enlightenment work. The author's concern might have arisen therefore from his own social and historical context: moving away from direct references to particular individuals, the author exonerated himself from any inquisitorial process coming from the State or the Church. Censorship was a major ideological limit on the dissemination of certain reformist ideas and, during specific periods, government and religious censorship worked together; such cooperation was particularly activated by the French Revolution. In addition to the censorious apparatuses of State and Church, self-imposed censorship also acted against the spreading of reformist programmes in general and radical ideas in particular (see Glendinning (1972: 6-7), Aguilar Piñal (1991: 118-124)). Thus critics and historians read in these lines a disclaimer on the part of Goya with the aim of avoiding prosecution by a still powerful Holy Office; their interpretation is justified by some facts: firstly, the dropping of subscription in the sales process in 1799 ratifies those precautionary words since, as Wilson-Bureau notes, it 'could have compromised those whose names would appear on the list' (1981: 36); and, secondly, Goya's action in 1803, when he decided to take the collection off the market and to donate the original copperplates, together with 240 unsold copies, to Carlos IV in exchange for a pension of 12,000 reales in favour of his son Javier.[25] Notwithstanding the importance of such facts, the universality of the compositions hinted at in the Announcement corresponds to a general belief arising from enlightened discourse, namely that the transformation and reform of social life was thought to begin with education.

Culture and education

The Spanish Enlightenment has been mainly described as a period of cultural renovation; tied to the decisions and actions of the absolutist monarchy and the reformist minority, its institutional practices were characterized by a certain pedadogic ideal: 'la misión de ilustrar en España', writes Álvarez de Miranda, 'es esencialmente una tarea educativa; se considera a la educación como uno de los cauces de la felicidad pública' (1995: 423). Driven by the idea that culture was a 'fuente de felicidad, puesto que crea y desarrolla la felicidad del pueblo' (Sarrailh, 1974: 167), reformers such as Jovellanos directed their programmes and writings towards the common good and public utility. Spanish enlightened reformers' 'faith in culture'[26] and in the role of education[27] is comparable with that of their European counterparts, with whom they shared the desire to overcome fear, mythology and superstition, and to transform a series of institutional practices based on privileges, uses and customs. Education for the enlightened reformers was, as Sarrailh defines it, 'fuente y principio de la dicha de la nación, como de la de cada individuo', and was primarily concerned with the necessity 'de reducir la miseria y de fomentar los recursos y, por consiguiente, las técnicas' (1974: 173). And Sarrailh concludes, with reference to education:

> Para que su eficacia sea inmediata, como lo desean apasionadamente los pensadores españoles, se propondrá tareas modestas y prácticas: será utilitaria en primerísimo lugar. Finalmente, para no engañarse en cuanto a sus fines,

> deberá ser dirigida por el poder central, que precisará su orientación y su desarrollo con vistas a la felicidad pública. (1974: 189)

The Spanish Enlightenment's 'cultural dirigisme', to borrow Sarrailh's phrase, refers to certain cultural policies: educational reforms and cultural actions emanated from the monarch, with the support of the *status quo* reformers, who directed and regulated cultural production. Reason and science would make people increasingly happy, the critical use of reason could prove emancipatory and could help to change habits of thinking and modes of conduct. In his *Cartas a Jovellanos* (1792), the radical Cabarrús writes that education is the 'condición básica de un progreso social en el futuro, con ciudadanos capaces de desenvolver una conducta racional, frente a los atrasos de la tradición' (cited in Elorza, 1970: 152). Reason, as opposed to Tradition and Revelation, would permeate all levels of society and challenge those established educational practices linked to specific groups: the instruction of the populace in order to improve agriculture and industry, the education of the dominant classes in order to reorganize a pedagogical model monopolized by ecclesiastical institutions and to transform the nobility into a productive, exemplary ruling class, and the reform of an obsolete higher education system, declared enemy of the new and anchored in scholasticism. The education of the nobility, the clergy and the third estate would benefit the country economically – the progress of the nation – and socially – happiness for all subjects. However, in the same way that economic measures were not aimed at subverting the established social and political order, cultural decisions did little to shake the foundations of an educational model still dependent on estatist hierarchies. Campomanes' and Jovellanos' cultural policies are to be seen in this light.

In his *Discurso sobre la educación popular*, Campomanes laid out the reformation of manners – the 'civilising process' of the Enlightenment project as Norbert Elias (1939) put it – of the artisan sector. In his introductory remarks to Campomanes' treatise, Elorza writes that

> la clase laboral con que sueña Campomanes debería distinguirse por su obediencia y resignación cristianas, por su amor al trabajo, por su aseo personal ("la poca limpieza de los artesanos los confunde con los mendigos y disminuye el aprecio del rico"), por sus sanas costumbres (les prohibe las tabernas, los toros, el teatro, el juego de apuestas), por su correcta forma de vestir (destierro de la capa larga y la redecilla de los majos). (1978: 23)

Jovellanos intervened in the policing of public spectacles in *La memoria para el arreglo de la policía de los espectáculos y de las diversiones públicas* (1796), making of the theatre a site of indoctrination and an ideal instrument for social and moral reform, as Stéphanie Sieburth observes:

> In the eighteenth century, Jovellanos and other men of the Enlightenment sought to hierarchize cultural production, to define audiences by socio-economic rank, and tried to use the theatre as a means of social control by educating the audience into certain kinds of behaviour and values. This attempted control of the populace's leisure time extended even to regulating the kinds of seating available in the theatre. (1999: 16)

The 'cultural dirigisme' of the government was enforced on public spectacles and popular festivals: 'sobre cada una de las fiestas y diversiones cayó la losa del silencio: edictos y prohibiciones legislan contra las expresiones carnavalescas por motivos de utilidad, moral y progreso' (Zavala, 1984: 6-7). Such policies were enforced in order to create orderly individuals and were directed at securing social order, responding ultimately to Enlightenment constructions of a reasoned or reasonable subject, as I shall be arguing in Chapter 4. The influential theories of Foucault on bodies disciplined by normative culture into performing appropriate roles – as discussed in previous chapters - come to mind as a way of accounting theoretically for the regulatory and interventionist policies of Campomanes and Jovellanos on the social body.

In 'The Idea and Function of Education in Enlightenment Thought' (1987), José Antonio Maravall opens his discussion by reflecting on epistemic shifts. The transformation of a mentality of an epoch necessarily brings with it

> a transformation of the modes of behaviour among individuals, and, moreover, changes in the appraisal of different social roles. This presupposes changes in the structure of society that lead to establishing for reasons of maximum efficiency, the reform of the human being as the basis for general reform. (1987: 39)

Reform entailed not only the transformation of mentalities and social mores – but also the transformation of bodily behaviours. Whether it was the reformation of habits, deportment or manners, Enlightenment projects promoted 'normal' bodily behaviours and marked others as 'deviant', as 'un-disciplined'. Thus the body became central in the construction and regulation of knowledge, identities and social order. New forms of knowledge, new forms of perception and changing attitudes meant the establishment of new cultural norms. The culture of the Enlightenment led to cultural re-orientations and decreed new ways of seeing. But traditional beliefs and traditional cultural forms – those belonging to the nobility or those of the populace – were also part of the cultural landscape of the second half of the eighteenth century. Broadly speaking, epistemic shifts changed the understanding of the natural world and the social world of eighteenth-century society. And the violent conflict between the new ideas and the old traditions led to cultural change:

> Major social changes in the later eighteenth century led throughout Europe to cultural reorientations that in different ways affected all classes. You could describe this conflict-ridden historical process as the clash of two cultures, a traditional one marked by feudalism, defended tenaciously not least by the lower orders, and another that struggled against its dominance, allied to the implementation of new economic modes of production and aimed at rationalisation and demythologisation of daily life and the personal relations characteristic of feudalism. (Held, 1987: 39)[28]

The eighteenth century and the Enlightenment - in its different conceptions (Lumières, Aufklärung, Enlightenment, Prosvechtence, Illuminismo, Ilustración) - brought with it new categories of thought and perception, as well as new cultural values, which in turn were shaped by concrete forces and local cultural practices. In the case of Spain, reformers and traditionalists struggled over cultural transformations, from governmental policies to everyday life. Thus, according to the reformers, economic (and scientific) knowledge would bring progress and happiness to the subjects; the instruction and betterment of the nation was justified socially in terms of productivity, rationalisation and profit for industry, commerce and, above all, the State. '[A]s soon as the enlightened thinkers consider that the concept of education / instruction includes a link to the duties and rights with respect to the State', Maravall notes, 'the subject of education falls under the responsibility of the political government' (1992: 79). The diffusion of culture was therefore considered to be the key to the transformation – and modernisation – of society. But, as has been argued, enlightened reformers in government focused mainly on the reform of the State and lacked the effective power to change the old social structures. In the Spanish Enlightenment the cultural and educational practices encouraged by the State were bound up with economic and ideological rules, meaning that traditional ways of life and traditional cultural forms resisted against the new cultural norms.

The works of the Benedictine scholar Feijóo, *Teatro Crítico Universal* (1726-1740) and *Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas* (1742-1760), represent a cultural revolution in eighteenth-century Spain. In his role as 'desengañador de errores comunes', the Benedictine intended to eradicate popular and 'learned' superstition by questioning traditional beliefs and authorities. The maxims 'desengañador de errores comunes' and 'impugnar errores comunes' pervade the publications of enlightened reformers who declared their didactic and moral intentions in critical, as well as satirical, works throughout the second half of the century, and, significantly, the critical tone of the Announcement advertising the sale of *Los Caprichos*, with its reference to the need to eradicate evil through education, beckons the reader to the discourses of Feijóo. The work of Feijóo parallels the new values of enlightened thinkers across Europe: to teach reason and eradicate superstition so as to question previous conceptions of religion and science, society and the individual. His faith in experimentation and observation, as well as his encyclopaedic work, did much to bring Spain up to date with European thought, but both *Teatro* and *Cartas* were more a repository of technical information, ideas and beliefs than a radical, programmatic and rigorous critique of his society. Like the 'novatores', Feijóo, a follower of Bacon, questioned the scholastic method: 'ni esclavo de Aristóteles ni aliado de sus enemigos, escucharé siempre, con preferencia a toda autoridad privada, lo que me dictaran la Experiencia y la Razón' ('Lo que sobra y falta en la física').[29] His critique was levelled at religious practices (popular superstitious beliefs in goblins and ghosts, astrology and almanac predictions, and witchcraft), false miracles and self-serving mythologies, and the economic abuse and vested interests of ecclesiastical institutions. The 'vulgo' – 'los que aceptan sin crítica cuanto se les dice y cuanto leen, sin pararse a discernir si se trata de tópicos inaceptables, de mentiras o de disparates' (cited in Caso González, 1983: 70) – was the explicit target of Feijóo. His teachings loom large in the lexicon of the Announcement when we recall them here: 'al público se le enseña: al vulgo no queda más remedio que desengañarle'.[30] Feijóo takes on the role of *desengañador de errores comunes*, employing the word *desengaño*, that is, the negation of errors, the destruction of errors, in its most literal sense. Whilst the writings of the Benedictine might be said to imply a reform of the whole of society, his discourses did not change the very fabric of Spanish society. I will be returning to Feijóo's work in Chapter 5 in order to compare his project with that of Goya's *Los Caprichos* in the context of the Spanish eighteenth century.

Education lay in the hands of the clergy. The Catholic Church controlled all spheres of education from schools to colleges and universities; the Society of Jesus in particular, with its network of seminaries and schools, occupied a privileged position within the educational system. It was in charge of the formation of the aristocracy as well as the spiritual guidance of the populace. The Church legitimated its authority through the transmission of eternal truths and received ideas - trust in ecclesiastical *auctoritas*, which had replaced the idea of knowledge through direct perception characteristic of the Middle Ages. The Church imposed its presence through the Holy Office. Revelation, Tradition and Authority were the immovable principles that shaped the mentality of eighteenth-century Spanish society. Thus in a country where faith and education were the domain of the Catholic Church, the new philosophical categories (reason, progress, nature, science) and sets of socio-cultural values (secularism, rationalism, utility, observation and experimentation) that the century brought with it found the unabated opposition of the traditionalist social bodies. Callahan's words might be recalled here: the Church held sway over the whole population, 'from aristocrat to peasant' (1984: 52). On one side of the social spectrum, the aristocratic élite received a traditional education in ecclesiastical institutions and obsolete universities; on the other side, the mass of ordinary believers was steeped in an oral tradition of folk memory, superstition and blind faith. Of course, one of the crucial questions one needs to ask when considering not only Feijóo but also the writings of the minority of enlightened reformers is: how did their political and educational views fit with their Catholic beliefs? Palacio Atard's description of these men might be said to encapsulate the, at first sight, irreconcilable conflict between reformist ideology and Catholic mentality: 'los españoles de la ilustración eran [...] hombres contradictorios [...] que han sido conformados intelectualmente por fuerzas morales y culturales diversas, divergentes y hasta radicalmente irreconciliables' (1964: 30). To the previous question, one might add: how could enlightened reformers counteract the Church since eighteenth-century Spain was an 'universo totalmente teologizado, sin una sola parcela de laicidad' (Jiménez Lozano, 1989: 144), a view of the world deeply ingrained in the imaginary of the Spanish people from Medieval and Counter-Reformational times? And a final and related question, already addressed in these pages, relates to the limits imposed by the Inquisition on their readings and writings. Thus the major obstacles that the enlightened reformers needed to confront were the mentality of the population and the formative power of the Catholic Church across all sectors of the population, in particular scholastic dogma and blind faith.

Children, women, artisans, the ignorant and unimproved populace would become the subject of the pedagogical writings (as well as the socio-economic literature) of European and Spanish reformers throughout the century. In his work on the British Enlightenment, *Enlightenment. Britain and the Creation of the Modern World* (2001), Roy Porter has pointed out that 'the attitudes of enlightened élites towards the populace at large were, nevertheless, profoundly ambiguous' (2001: 364); to draw a comparison with Spanish enlightened élites' attitudes towards the Spanish populace would not be that far-fetched.[31] These 'people' were addressed in the writings of Campomanes and Jovellanos, albeit in the reformers' own terms, that is, as part of governmental action. Thus Campomanes would defend adamantly the use of female labour in industry: 'defensor del trabajo femenino – no, por supuesto, de su liberación – como medio de redimir a la mujer de la ociosidad y convertirla en agente productor de la prosperidad económica' (Elorza, 1978: 32). Feijóo is the first enlightened thinker to address the condition of women and the education of women in 'Defensa de las mujeres', while Leandro Fernández de Moratín would make of women a fundamental aspect of his theatre in the last third of the century.[32] Josefa de Amar y Borbón would be one of the first women to express in her *Discurso sobre la educación física y moral de la mujer* (1785) what education signified to eighteenth-century women as subjects of education.[33] However, for the enlightened reformers, the economic and moral regeneration of the nation was still dependent upon the dominant classes.

Indeed, the notion of education, Álvarez de Miranda (1995: 424) reminds us, was restricted until the eighteenth century to the social élite, princes and nobles, and was generally associated with the concept of 'crianza' as presented in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century treatises like *Libro de la Buena Educación y enseñanza de los nobles* (Pedro López de Montoya, 1595) and books of emblems such as *Idea de un Príncipe Político Christiano* (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, 1659). The principal objective amongst eighteenth-century Spanish reformers 'was to educate the broad dominant group, the nobility and those related to it, but education in the disciplines of politics and morality predominated' (Maravall, 1987: 41). Thus the education of the élites was a priority, not all segments of the population were as important. Therefore the institutional reforms undertaken in the second half of the eighteenth century, in particular during the reign of Carlos III, sought to change certain traditional habits of thought, 'normal' habits of mind, that legitimated the political privileges and the moral authority of the nobility. Among the institutional reforms specifically directed to this social group were the decrees of 1771 and 1783: the former was an attempt to dismantle and reorganize an educational system controlled by the 'colegios mayores', an institution which was originally conceived to support students coming from the lower ranks of the nobility but which with the passing of time had been monopolized by the Jesuits (until their expulsion in 1767) and contributed to the perpetuation of the high nobility in the nation's government;[34] the latter established that nobility and work were compatible, attacking mainly the 'hidalgo' mentality, and making their dominance economically and socially justifiable (that is, making them profitable for industry, commerce and State).

The education of the higher social echelons was the concern of the reformers, and satire seemed to be the preferred medium to convey their criticisms. Different literary forms took issue with such concerns: the 'prensa filosófica y de costumbres' of reformist leanings such as *El Censor* or *El Apologista Universal*; the official press (*La Gazeta de Madrid, Diario Noticioso Universal* (known from 1788 onwards as *Diario de Madrid*)) used the nobility as a major target from the 1760s to the 1790s;[35] plays like Trigueros' *Los menestrales* (1784), writes Glendinning, took 'the common view of the period that true nobility lies in usefulness to society rather than in title' (1972: 119); the same theme is recurrent in Cadalso's *Cartas Marruecas* (for instance, letters VII, XII and XIII) and in Jovellanos's satirical poem 'On The Poor Education of the Nobility';[36] associated with the Sociedades Económicas del País, Iriarte, Ibáñez de la Rentería and Samaniego would express similar critical positions in their fables. Goya also participates in this institutional preoccupation of his time since the theme of the asinine in *Los Caprichos*, directed to exposing and condemning the Spanish nobility at the end of the century, lends itself most obviously to a social and moral reading. Education and ignorance, social abuse and oppression, or the genealogical obsessions of a sector of the population are among Goya's ostensible targets in the prints devoted to the asinine subject (*Capricho 39* 'Hasta su abuelo' (fig. 9) being a case in point).

Spanish reformist literature of the eighteenth century is a literature of ideas that sought to modify the social, political and cultural contexts; in other words, literature was used as a tool for change. The artist should subordinate art to politics, namely to the common good. Essays, reports and treatises, letters and memoirs, fables and plays, the press were all instruments used by the reformers.[37] Such literary forms would shape the modern literary genres of Spanish literature, as well as modern Spanish prose.[38] In the socio-political context of the period ('crítica de costumbres') Goya is necessarily read as a cultural critic, a reformer, since he is expressing in pictorial form the political and social concerns of literary friends and contributing visually to subjects (and forms) typical of the satire of the period. Another common literary reference accepted by critics when considering Goya's first conception of *Los Caprichos* is the literary *sueños* of the seventeenth century, in particular Quevedo's *Los sueños* (1627); other critics such as Bozal (1987, 1994) or Stochita and Coderch (1999) relate them to G. M. Mitelli's *Alfabeto in sogno* (1683), too. In the general context of Spanish eighteenth-century literature, Glendinning observes that the fictional dream or *sueño* as a vehicle of social satire became, together with the essay and the letter, 'a staple of periodicals in Spain in the late eighteenth-century and the early nineteenth century' (1977: 19). Following the frontispiece to Quevedo's work, Goya's first conception of *Los Caprichos*, known as the *Sueños*, features as the first *Sueño* a figure dreaming, the inscription being 'Ydioma Universal. Dibujado y Grabado por Francisco de Goya. 1797' (fig. 21).

The general views on education outlined up to this point enable us to consider the educational function ascribed to *Los Caprichos* (as seen mainly in the

Announcement). *Los Caprichos* have been regarded as an educational tool sharing the concerns of eighteenth-century reformist discourses. It is to these discourses that I now turn. Taking the Announcement as a point of departure to read the collection of etchings, and unproblematically assuming Goya to be its author, Maravall aligns Goya's etchings with the educational goals of the enlightened reformers in his (poorly translated) 1987 article:

> Goya said that he engraved and published his prints to combat the evils that human beings fall prey to because of "authority, ignorance, and self-interest" [...]. Goya noted that there was another way to arrive at and influence the sensibility and even thinking, that is, through the visual lesson of images; that was also education. And thus the painter reveals the educational path that the *Caprichos* follow, making them into a "censure of human errors and vices"; the painter represents "the multitude of extravagant acts and blunders that are common in civil society," "vulgar deceptions that generate ignorance." It is simply a matter of confronting one with the "forms and attitudes that have existed until now in the human mind, darkened or confused by the lack of enlightenment or encouraged by the unleashing of the passions." They are not figurations invented by the author. His fantasy allowed him to grasp the *ideal objects* that exist in the mind of a society submerged in vice and ignorance. (1987: 72-3)

Maravall's consideration is our point of entry for a more detailed discussion of culture and education during the Spanish Enlightenment. His reference to *Los Caprichos* serves two purposes here: firstly, it allows me to frame my present discussion on the cultural politics of the enlightened reformers and to anticipate specific debates and issues, and, secondly, it situates the collection of etchings squarely as an Enlightenment work. Maravall's words pose some immediate general questions about education during the Spanish Enlightenment, as well as some specific questions about Goya's prints. What were the major obstacles - 'evils' - which enlightened reformers had to confront? Who, or what institutions, defended and perpetuated 'authority, ignorance, and self-interest'? What is the meaning of enlightenment (or 'lack of enlightenment')? How does the collection of etchings relate to contemporary reformist discourses in other cultural fields? How does it relate to other 'visual lessons'? What does the Announcement tell us about the series? And, was Goya the author of the Announcement that appeared in *Diario de Madrid*?

For a start, the Announcement itself, as I will be arguing, is already framed in ambiguity, thus undoing any categorical thinking about or transparent meaning in *Los Caprichos*. By its very nature, many readers and critics are predictably wrapped up in the literariness of the Announcement. Critics such as Sánchez Cantón (1949), Gassier and Wilson (1971), Pérez Sánchez (1979), and Wilson-Bureau (1981) have no doubt that the text was composed, entirely or almost entirely, by the writer Leandro Fernández de Moratín or the art historian Ceán Bermúdez – both of whom were close friends of Goya -, while others allow some possibility for Goya's authorship (López Rey, 1953 (1970)) or, at least, for his formulation of the text (Helman (1963), Sayre (1989), Tomlinson (1994)). Those who believe that Goya was the author read in the Advertisement a continuation of what the artist had expressed on the title page of his *Sueños*, Goya's first conception of *Los Caprichos*, in 1797: 'Ydioma Universal. Dibujado y Grabado por Francisco de Goya año 1797. El autor soñando. Su yntento solo es desterrar bulgaridades perjudiciales, y perpetuar con esta obra de caprichos el testimonio solido de la verdad'.[39] The literary flavor of the Announcement, together with its sociopolitical dimension, connects Goya with the ideas and values of a moderate and reformist enlightened circle as represented by Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Leandro Fernández de Moratín, Juan Antonio Meléndez Valdés, Juan Antonio Ceán Bermúdez and others.

Los Caprichos certainly engaged with the topics and the pedagogic purpose expressed in the Announcement: to banish 'extravagancias y desaciertos' and 'embustes vulgares' sanctioned by custom, ignorance or vested interest. It is in the drawings that Goya begins to make his observations on the world that surrounds him, looking into the social structures, groups and values that were the targets of the enlightened reformers whose main aim was to criticize Spanish society and reform its institutions and its customs. Such was the agenda of the radical reformers behind the already mentioned *El Censor* during the 1780s: 'someter a examen el funcionamiento de la sociedad española' and 'los fundamentos mismos de la estructura social del despotismo ilustrado' (Enciso Recio, 1988: 86).

The work of Helman was one of the first consistently to read *Los Caprichos* in the context of the contemporary literature of ideas.[40] In *Trasmundo de Goya* (1963), she considers the literary as forming the backdrop to the collection in the widest sense. Goya's images of asses, for instance, might have found their point of departure in Gabriel Álvarez de Toledo's *La Burromaquia* (date unknown), Juan Pablo Forner's *Asno Erudito* (1782), and Doctor de Ballesteros' *Memorias de la Insigne Academia Asnal* (1792). Helman's investigations are extended to other themes: for those etchings on prostitution, Nicolás Fernández de Moratín's *Arte de las putas* (circulating in manuscript form and not published until 1898), whereas for those portraying the vices of the religious orders, Padre Isla's *Historia del famoso predicador Fray Gerundio de Campazas, Alias Zotes* (Part I, 1758; Part II, 1770). Helman suggested what other critics like Bozal (1994: 99-153) have expressed in a more cautious way, that is, that the etchings participate in the cultural milieu in which they were created but they are not mere descriptions or illustrations of literary sources. Traditionally, therefore, *Los Caprichos* have been interpreted within the larger movement of the Enlightenment and Neoclassical criticism related to rational didacticism; and the collection is seen as an educational tool for attaining enlightenment, a social critique and satire of Spanish eighteenth-century society. Familiar and recognizable readings that shape our vision and understanding of the series are those pioneered by Lafuente Ferrari (1947, 1977), Sánchez Cantón (1949) and López Rey (1947, 1953), who take the neoclassical aesthetics of the Announcement as a point of departure: 'se cree que este anuncio fue redactado por Leandro Fernández de Moratín' as a 'manifestación del espíritu neoclásico' (Bozal, 1987: 715). Their works stake out a territory which has contextualized Goya's life and work within (moderate, I would argue) enlightened circles; a critical tradition explored further by Helman, and extended, more recently, in Alcalá Flecha's *Literatura e ideología en el arte de Goya* (1988) and Pérez Sánchez and Sayre's *Goya and the Spirit of the Enlightenment* (1989). *Literatura e ideología en el arte de Goya* traces the literature and the cultural ideas of Goya's contemporary milieu in order to interpret the series; *Goya and the Spirit of the Enlightenment*, the result of an exhibition and catalogue that investigates the relationship between Goya and the Enlightenment, locates the artist among the progressive statesmen and intellectuals.[41] Such readings of *Los Caprichos* in the light of literary traditions set Goya up as a man of the Enlightenment, a 'painter philosopher' in the words of Helman (1993: 199). Helman is invoking a concept which is contemporary to Goya; a painter philosopher, Ceán Bermúdez writes in *Diccionario de los más ilustres Profesores de las Bellas Artes en España* (1800), is 'a painter who spent time in careful preparation and study before embarking on a work of art, employing his head as well as hand' (cited in Glendinning, 1997: 67). While art historians might insert Goya into this established artistic notion, literary critics, by associating the artist with the philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment, would give his work a rather different inflection.[42]

The involvement of the State in cultural guidance and regulation meant that the Spanish eighteenth century was witness to the creation of cultural institutions that parallel those of the rest Europe. Academies and the already mentioned Economic

Societies were created and sanctioned with the approval of the Bourbon monarchy from 1740 onwards (Glendinning, 1972: 6; Aguilar Piñal, 1991: 94-98), not to forget the creation of other cultural spaces typical of the century like the 'tertulia' (Palacio Atard, 1964: 232; Aguilar Piñal, 1991: 94). Although most of the Academies such as the Real Gabinete de Historia Natural (1771) and the Observatorio Astronómico (1790) were located in Madrid, responding to the centralizing politics of the Bourbon kings, other institutions were founded outside the capital, for instance the Colegio de Cirugía in Cádiz (1748) and in Barcelona (1760). But of particular interest for us in the present discussion of *Los Caprichos* are the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando inaugurated by Fernando VI on 12 April 1752 and the Calcografía Real set up in 1789 under the auspices of Carlos III.[43] The former would become an institution for the teaching of arts as well as the observance of aesthetic norms and the arbiter of taste;[44] the latter would play an important role in the diffusion of scientific knowledge and artistic heritage. In the final section of this chapter, I will be turning my attention to the visual culture of the period in order to place Goya's graphic production within an institutional and artistic context. Such a move will enable me to examine the broader operations of the Spanish Enlightenment visual culture through Goya's images in the next two chapters.

The visual arts

Whilst *Los Caprichos* have been largely considered through the lens of the literature and the philosophy of the period, the visual image as a direct and potent medium of communication cannot be relegated to a subordinate position and, by extension, given less intellectual ground. So, for instance, in their exhibition catalogue 'Mirar y leer. *Los Caprichos* de Goya', Carrete Parrondo's and Centellas

Salamero's position is symptomatic of a critical tradition which assumes that the textual 'reveals' the fullest meaning of the images and, ultimately, ensures that seeing is not reading – that is, not a proper reading: 'a pesar del carácter visual de las imágenes, su estructura y articulación son literarias' (1999: 13). Notwithstanding the importance of bookish literacy in reading protocols of *Los Caprichos*, in particular the close attention to the 'text' (whether the captions, the commentaries, or the illustrations as discourse), some critics have tended to overlook a larger picture: a model of education through vision. Such a model, explicitly mentioned in Maravall's comments on the series, is not, or is only marginally, explored in studies on *Los Caprichos*, and is usually subordinated, as in the case of Maravall, to a wider discussion of philosophical, political and socioeconomic literature. As a result of this disregard, criticism on the etchings presents a series of shortcomings: firstly, reformist literature, in particular satirical writings, seems to account for an explanation of the images (indeed, what shaped most contemporary and future readings of *Los Caprichos* as a whole is the familiar vernacular of satire);[45] secondly, by favouring the 'textual', critics ascribe specific, limited political intentions to visual images, which means, it could be argued, that an emphasis on the literary/verbal has reinforced Enlightenment readings of the series; and, thirdly, an investment in the primacy of 'high culture' – bookish literacy – delegitimizes inquiry into popular culture. Goya's collection has been isolated from other artistic traditions that preceded him and that relied on visualization for didactic purposes. As part of Goya's 'highly self-conscious rethinking and response to multiple traditions of representation' (Tomlinson, 1992: 8), an engagement with these images necessarily demands an analysis of a local visual tradition whose Medieval, Counter-Reformational and Baroque imagery was still so pervasive among great sectors of the population. Despite the changes throughout the eighteenth-century in cultural and social relations across Europe and in Spain, Spain still remained a culturally Catholic society. As argued in the previous section, Christian traditions and imagery, a long-standing tradition of instruction (religious didacticism, religious doctrine), and the art of Catholic persuasion are strong reminders that Spanish culture still remained steeped in what Stafford has described as 'a "papist" oral visual culture' (1994: 129). Goya seemed to be aware, unlike other Spanish enlightened reformers, that visual education in a predominantly 'cultura eidética' such as the Spanish one might still be valid and closer to the unenlightened masses. For instance, the Society of Jesus, so influential in the intellectual and cultural life of the seventeenth and the first two thirds of the eighteenth century till their expulsion, might arguably enable us to recognize a much richer perspective inscribed in *Los Caprichos.*

In the same way that Medieval and Counter-Reformational traditions can be seen at work in a broader consideration of the collection, the presence of Baroque elements in the series sets in motion the possibility of looking at (and reading) the images in different ways. The apparent significance of the Announcement demarcates a text which is neoclassical in its statement of aims, satirical in its intention, and contemporary in its use of a familiar vernacular. Yet to consider only the literal sense of the text is to lose sight of what might be said to be deliberately ambigous textual signs, which elicit from the reader a different set of interpretative questions. In (2000: 176), Stoichita and Coderch have emphasized the presence of Baroque elements in the Announcement, revealing the indebtedness of the text to a 'conceptista' tradition rooted in Baroque culture. Stoichita and Coderch's nuanced reading casts new light on the intention behind the lines of the text, particularly with regard to the addressee. Drawing upon Baltasar Gracián's notion of the 'buen entendedor', the addressee of the Announcement would be that viewer and reader capable of deciphering the nuances of expression, a competent decoder of signs – 'los inteligentes'. Despite the unknown authorship of the Announcement, the text seems to imply different kinds of readers (and viewers); the implications of having different audiences mean that, when one analyzes the etchings, different patterns of reading and looking at them emerge. Meaning rather different things to each audience, interpreted differently, the etchings, for instance, veer between the literary and the popular. To accept the literariness of the series as well as the allusive readability of the collection as a whole is not to overlook the use of imagery deriving from traditions of popular culture. The combination of the erudite and the popular, the high and the low, lends *Los Caprichos* different readings whether the viewer is a reformer, a connoisseur, or the 'public': 'el ciclo sugiere y soporta múltiples lecturas cuyos niveles dependen de las aptitudes e instrumentos interpretativos del espectador' (Stoichita and Coderch, 2000: 219). As Glendinning has observed, 'when Goya refers to his art as "idioma universal" (a universal language) in the preliminary drawing for No. 43, 'The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters', he is presumably implying, as Palomino had done before him, that 'art could speak to the illiterate majority as well as to the literate minority, and to people in many countries' (1973: 526). I shall be discussing these points in the final two chapters.

My turn to the visual in the remainder of the chapter is informed by the works of critics such as Licht and Tomlinson. Licht has observed that the originality of *Los Caprichos* lies in perception: 'a new logic of seeing [...] a radically new concept of composition, of seeing, and of transmitting perceptions' (1973: 93); in other words, in the visual. I shall return to this point time and again in Chapters 4 and 5 – 'exponer à los ojos', demonstrating to the eyes, *monstrare* – in order to examine, on the one hand, the apparent contradictions between the visible enlightened ideals of the themes and the deliberate ambiguity of the etchings; and, on the other, the critical function of Goya's art. By focusing on vernacular visuality in the following pages, I wish to consider: firstly, the visual arts in the Spanish Enlightenment; secondly, the institutional practices and artistic traditions within and against which Goya was working during the production of *Los Caprichos*, in particular as they relate to the art of engraving; and, finally, the creative process that led to the publication of the series in 1799.

Little is known about the role and the meaning of the visual arts for Spanish enlightened reformers. Tomlinson observes that

> there is little evidence that reformers in Spain were at all concerned with the contribution that could be made by the visual arts, and it is not methodologically sound to bridge the gap between aesthetic and intellectual movements by supposing that the artist was, like Jovellanos or Moratín, an avid reader of the progressive publications. (1992: 5)

Nonetheless, during the Spanish eighteenth-century the importance of visual representations – public ceremonies, engravings, prints, theatre performance – helped in the transmission of ideas and attitudes to wider audiences beyond the social élite, as religious images had done for centuries too. Society demanded new forms of representation. 'The Bourbon House', writes Tomlinson, 'seemed determined to create a new public image and to establish a comfortable lyfestyle by building new palaces' (1997: 14), and this new image was to stand in 'diametric opposition to that of the preceding dynasty' (1997: 15). There was a need to find new aesthetic formulas that would reflect the ideas of the new monarchy. The creation of the Academies, for instance, 'helped to establish a standardized taste in Spain on a national rather than a regional basis' (Glendinning, 1973: 522). Moreover, French and Italian artists working for the Bourbon régime established the artistic trends of the day, mainly in architecture. Carlos III brought the Venetian Giovanni Battista Tiepolo (1696-1770) and the Bohemian Anton Raphael Mengs (1728-1779) to work in the royal palaces and churches; both of these artists had already worked in the court of Naples where Carlos (as Carlos VIII, King of the Two Sicilies) had been a monarch between 1734 and 1759. As the theoretician of neo-classicism, Mengs looked back to Greek and Roman classical art as ideal models after being inspired by the discovery of the archaelogical sites of Pompeii and Herculaneum. For Mengs, naturalness, order, simplicity, legibility and beauty were the norms that should dictate any work of art. The aesthetic and ideological affinities between Mengs and the directors of the Academy (Floridablanca, Marqués de la Florida, Antonio Ponz) were expressed by Jovellanos in 'Elogio de la Bellas Artes' (14 July 1781):

> Cuando recomendamos tan encarecidamente a nuestros jóvenes artistas la imitación de la bella Naturaleza, no se crea que pretendemos retraerlos de trabajar sobre lo antiguo: antes por el contrario quisiéramos que observándole y estudiándole a todas horas aprendiesen a buscar en la Naturaleza misma aquéllas sublimes perfecciones que tan bien imitaron en ella los griegos. (cited in Bédat, 1989: 230-31).

During his period in Spain, Mengs, advocate of academicism, reformed the Academy of Arts, became director of the Real Fábrica de Tapices de Santa Bárbara and established the tastes of the Bourbon monarchy:

> El academicismo optó por el clasicismo como el estilo más acorde con la época de la Ilustración, imponiendo las nuevas formas a partir de los palacios reales, los establecimientos de artes aplicadas, la pintura de cámara y las instituciones industriales, docentes o militares promovidas por la Corona. (Martínez Shaw, 1996: 81)

By 1799, the year in which *Los Caprichos* were published, royal commissions, portraits and commissions for the aristocracy, paintings of religious subjects, and tapestry designs for the Real Fábrica de Tapices had earned Goya a reputation in the court entourage. In October 1799 his achievements as a Court painter since April 1789 were acknowledged when he was named First Court Painter. By then Goya was established also in academic circles; he was appointed Director of Painting at the Real Academia de San Fernando in 1795 after the death of Francisco Bayeu (1734-1795), a post he would resign from two years later for reasons of health. During these years Goya also produced portraits of enlightened reformers holding ministerial posts (Meléndez Valdés (1797) and Jovellanos (1798)), as well as of aristocratic figures close to enlightened ideals (the Duke and the Duchess of Alba (1795) and the Marquesa de Solana (1795)). Thus knowledge of both his commissioned and uncommissioned work placed Goya in a position whereby 'people who were interested could have known about his *Caprichos* and *Tauromaquia* as soon as they appeared (1799 and 1816, respectively), as well as his earlier prints after Velázquez (1788) since they were all advertised in Madrid newspapers' (Glendinning, 1977: 10). Goya, however, distanced himself from the prevalent stylistic trends. The recognition of the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando and the Calcografía Real as legitimate academic institutions by the Bourbon monarchy did not stop Goya from developing new approaches to painting and to etching at the turn of the eighteenth century. Parallel to the experimental innovations carried out by Goya in his graphic work is the flouting of conventions in religious paintings (for instance, the commissioned decoration of San Antonio de la Florida in 1798) as well as his personal response to more conventional genres such as portraits. During the time of the conception of *Los Caprichos*, Goya worked simultaneously in different media and for a variety of employers. Nonetheless, as Tomlinson reminds us, 'Goya began to experiment with commissioned projects only when his position within the court hierarchy and system of patronage was secure' (1997: 24).

During Goya's lifetime greater importance came to be attached to the personal vision of the artist. In his report to the Royal Academy on the teaching of art on 14

October 1792, Goya establishes his own aesthetic position and expresses his general concern with the liberty of the individual artist: 'I know of no better ways to advance the arts than by allowing students of art to develop their own abilities in their own way, without forcing them to go in one particular direction, and without making them adopt a particular style of painting if it is against their inclination' (Goya in Glendinning, 1977: 46). The Aragonese artist did much to encourage the movement away from Neo-classical principles in art - harmony, beauty, decorum and restraint - that gave priority to the idealization of subjects and the representation of heroic pasts and mythological narratives that equated virtue with beauty and truth in true pedagogical fashion. Bédat refers to Goya's radical aesthetic position against Mengs in these terms: his report 'revela cómo reaccionaba violentamente contra las ideas neoclásicas de Mengs, sublevándose también contra los que – sin ser profesores – querían aleccionar a los artistas por las ideas de Mengs' (1989: 222). However, while the aesthetic assumptions underlying the Announcement place Goya in opposition to institutionalised academic principles, the author inserts his project into age-old artistic traditions in the history of engraving, as I shall go on to discuss. Without entirely breaking with the past, 'Goya forged a way forward to the new' by transcending 'the aesthetic ideas of the age in which he lived' (Mena, 1989: 20). Scholarly work over the last two centuries has shown that *Los Caprichos* are informed by diverse, indeed divergent, cultural practices. The series therefore can be seen as a challenging palimpsest of traditions. Experimenting with new forms, drawing on artistic conventions while simultaneously challenging them, appropriating imaginatively a variety of idioms, Goya reverses generic expectations (always alive as he was to the possibilities within image reversal). The various aesthetic possibilities, which will be examined in more depth in the analysis of the etchings in the following chapters, conjured up by the visual images are already suggested in the Announcement. In 'Capriccio: Goya and a Graphic Tradition', David Rosand (1989: 8) argues that the project responds to 'the aesthetic of fantasy inherent to the genre' of 'capricho', and belongs to an artistic tradition which goes back to the first printmakers of the Renaissance, who saw the new art of engraving not only as a means of testing and exploring novel ideas, but also as a way of asserting their inventive powers and demonstrating their technique. Therefore any attempt to harness the images to explicit historical and literary events goes against the genre's defining features – invention and imagination. To seek a direct relation between etching and actual event tends 'to isolate from the series those etchings for which historical and literary parallels can be found, thus limiting interpretation and reducing *Los Caprichos* to illustrations of a text to be pieced together by scholars' (1989a: 15), and to fix the meaning of a collection in which the dialectical relation between image and word is of some importance.

Goya was the first Spanish artist to undertake a graphic work of the scope of *Los Caprichos*. Such an ambitious work placed him with the great masters of engraving, Dürer (1471-1528) and Rembrandt (1606-1669). During the Renaissance, Dürer raised woodcutting and copper engraving techniques to the status of art, while Rembrandt's use of etching to produce chiaroscuro would be fully exploited in Goya's further experimentation with other techniques. Etching and aquatint were techniques generally underestimated by Spanish artists, who favoured burin engraving: 'in the 1790s', as Wilson-Bureau notes, 'printmakers were still using the aquatint technique in a rather limited way for decorative, historical and topographical subjects' (1981: 32). Considered in its purely pictorial and reproductive sense, the art of engraving could be said to have been mainly practical or 'useful', as Sayre (1974:

3) has put it, or, in Carrete Parrondo's words, 'el utilísimo arte del grabado' (1996: 19). Thus the production of prints was related mainly to technical improvements and cartographical information, rather than more artistically oriented production. Aesthetically, such production across Europe was associated with low art since engravings were considered 'lowly graphic carriers, or mere illustrations, of scientific and technical information' (Stafford, 1993: 56).

Since the fifteenth century engraving had been considered to be the best way of disseminating and popularizing graphic work in mass production. A more popular art form than painting or sculpture, it fulfilled educational, religious and propagandistic functions. Eighteenth-century Spanish monarchs, in particular Carlos III and his ministers, were very aware of the possibilities of the medium, namely the propagandistic value of images. Apart from official portraits and allegories of the kings that consolidated and propagated royal authority, the monarchy was interested in the diffusion of science and the circulation of the latest infrastructural improvements (such as the construction of roads and canals), on the one hand, and, on the other, in making the national artistic heritage known to a wider public.[46] Whilst still considered a primarily utilitarian medium, Carlos III's establishment of a project concerned with the diffusion of art led to the reproduction of the masterpieces of Spanish painting.[47] Throughout the eighteenth century, successive Spanish monarchs, as well as other institutions such as the Real Academia de San Fernando and the Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País, supported the utilitarian development of engraving by providing scholarships for Spanish artists to go to France as 'pensionados' so that they would learn their trade under the supervision of the *Encyclopédie* master engravers.[48] Fernando VI inaugurated the Real Academia de San Fernando on 12 April 1752, and, as Sayre reminds us, 'printmaking was taught from the beginning' (1974: 1), Juan Bernabé Palomino (1692-1777) being the first academic to teach it.[49] (An important fact, bearing in mind that painting, sculpture and architecture were considered the only 'noble arts'). Institutional support continued during the reign of Carlos III under whose auspices the Real Calcografía was set up in 1789. Engraving therefore was recognized in Spain as an academic discipline from the second half of the eighteenth century. The institutionalization of engraving via the Real Academia de San Fernando and the Real Calcografía conferred status and legitimacy on a discipline which, like any other institution, established norms and aesthetic standards, and, in the words of Carrete Parrondo, 'impuso el llamado buen gusto' (1990: 8).

Although Goya's graphic output after *Los Caprichos* is prolific (*Desastres de la Guerra* (c.1810-1815, published 1863), *Tauromaquia* (1816) and *Los Disparates* (c.1815-1820, published in 1894 as *Los proverbios*), his production until the mid-1790s was limited to a small number of works. It amounts to some copies of Velázquez's paintings (c. 1778),[50] a print entitled *El agarrotado* (c.1778-80), and a few religious engravings (*La huida de Egipto*, *San Francisco de Paula*, and *San Isidro*). Do Goya's first prints conform to or stray from aesthetic standards? Whilst the series of etchings after Velázquez's works responded to the need for reproductions of the masterpieces of Spanish art and belonged to the wider Enlightenment project supported by Carlos III whereby engravings had a role to play in the instruction and diffusion of knowledge as well as in the recuperation of a 'Spanish' artistic tradition, the religious etchings might be said to belong to a larger tradition of popular engraving which represented biblical or genre scenes, or commemorated historical events. For the set of prints after Velázquez, Goya followed the academic fashion not only in terms of publication but also in the reproductive nature of this work, whose main purpose was to disseminate the images of the seventeenth-century painter: Goya 'trató de comportarse como un grabador tradicional en la manera de presentar su obra: buscó el reconocimiento de la Academia y lo obtuvo, puso a la venta las estampas en una librería bien conocida, bien por cuadernos, bien por estampas sueltas y las anunció en la *Gazeta de Madrid*' (Vega, 1992: 113).[51] More than twenty years later, the circumstances surrounding the publication of *Los Caprichos*, as has already been argued, were very different. The prospective buyer of the collection would have had to go to a shop selling perfume and spirits, an unusual trip since prints were normally sold in bookshops or acquired by subscription. The religious etchings that Goya produced bear witness to the interests of the society of the time, and their demand and commercial viability was met by the production of Spanish engravers. More than half of the prints produced in the second half of the eighteenth century were religious, that is, devotional images, 'most of the rest could be classified as useful: portraits of sovereigns, and occasional, general maps, and technical innovations, with a slight leavening of regional custom, exotic animals, and monstrous humans' (Sayre, 1974: 3).[52] As one can see from this list of topics, the main function of engraving, mainly burin engraving, was of a reproductive nature. Whether it was royal or religious patronage or private enterprise, prints responded to institutional and popular demands. The influence of these trends as a direct source of inspiration for Goya is a matter of constant debate and scholarship. They nevertheless formed part of the cultural milieu in which Goya was working.

The traditional process of engraving entailed a draughtsman copying the object to be reproduced, then an engraver transferring it to the plate. Goya breaks away from the accepted code of procedure since the innovation and experimentation present in *Los Caprichos* was not only at the level of technique, theme and composition but also in his original and inventive approach to the medium. The artist moved away from a reproductive craft to an original and creative art, from the more academic burin engraving to the newly discovered technique of aquatint. In this process, the Aragonese artist used the technique of etching as a laboratory of ideas, as a way of representing the rapidly changing world around him, and as an important instrument in the transmission of ideas and the communication of complex thoughts. *Los Caprichos* were based on experimentation, observation, and questioning. According to Stafford, the eighteenth century saw an increasing distinction between these two approaches to the medium - mere reproduction and original invention: 'there was a public medium, devoted to unimaginative copying and transmitting of secondary imagery for an educational or "reference" purpose. And then there was a seemingly "irresponsible" private medium, free to register the capricious notions of an individual artist's fantasia' (1993: 56). It is in this wider context that one needs to consider Goya's first approaches to the graphic world.

Throughout his life, Goya experimented with different techniques and rigorously investigated their aesthetic possibilities.[53] *Los Caprichos*, created over a period of three years, form part of the artist's continuous engagement with the language of engraving. A description of the engraving techniques employed by Goya features in almost any exhibition brochure or catalogue on *Los Caprichos*. Unlike burin or drypoint, techniques which require the use of a needle for engraving, both etching and aquatint are 'biting' processes. In the etching process,

> the artist covers a metal plate (traditionally of copper; more recently, zinc plates are also used) with an acid-resistant etching ground. Using an etching needle, the artist draws the image on the prepared plate, and in so doing removes the ground to expose the metal. The plate is then covered with acid which "bites" the exposed surface, corroding the metal to create crevices or indentations which hold ink. The etching ground is then removed, and the plate is inked; the excess is wiped off (although some may be left on at the discretion of the artist or printer), and the plate is covered with moistened

> paper. When plate and paper are put through a press, the paper absorbs the ink held by the plate. Thus the etching is produced: its embossed margin reflects the pressure of the metal plate. (Tomlinson, 1989: 16)

Aquatint, on the other hand, a type of etching, is 'a method for biting tones instead of lines' (Lumsden, 1962: 118):

> The aquatint method is a means of etching a continuous tone. A porous ground of powdered resin is dusted onto the copper plate and fused to it by heat. The metal that remains exposed around these droplets of acid-resistant resin is bitten, creating a reticulated pattern of crevices. These crevices hold the ink and print as a tone. The variety of aquatint tones that can be achieved depends upon the type of resin, the size of the grains (from fine to coarse), their density, the duration of biting time, and the amount of stopping-out that is employed. (Sayre, 1974: 176)

In broad terms, the technical differences between the techniques - burin engraving, etching and aquatint - reside in their use. Reproductive engravers resorted to burin engraving for the mere duplication of images, though it required severe discipline from the engraver in order to produce a faithful copy. Etching, by contrast, although a technique of line alone, allowed a greater sense of ease in the delineation of figures and objects. With no line-work at all, aquatint provided the etcher with the possibility of attaining subtle gradations of tone; aesthetically, it gives the print an effect similar to wash drawing, establishing a playful relationship between light and shade. Taking into account Goya's combination of these techniques, the tonal and textural effects of aquatint are exploited by Goya to their full advantage. (As we shall see, for *Los Caprichos* Goya would use a combination of etching and aquatint for most of the plates.) His prints – 'inventadas y grabadas al aguafuerte' - nevertheless relied on the creative effects of this newly developed technique. When using aquatint, once the plate is in the acid bath the artist cannot anticipate with exactitude the outcome of the final image. Significantly, the in-built uncertainty of the technical process is transferred onto the final print and, ultimately, onto the interpretive process. More recently, Stochita and Coderch (2000: 178-181) have dwelled on the 'iconología del aguafuerte' by reading the biting process metaphorically - the 'ácidos' and 'vinagres' mentioned in contemporary manuals such as *Instrucción para gravar en cobre* (1761) written by Manuel Rueda. The language of engraving was resolutely manual in its 'reliance on gouging burins and scrapers, puncturing needles and corrosive acids, burnished surfaces and varnished depth' (Stafford, 1993: 54); in the hands of Goya, 'printmaking techniques embodied the surgical, indeed the instrumental capacities of the visual arts to exhibit and display mercilessly' (1993: 54). In other words, the expressive possibilities of the medium to offer incisive images of the cultural context in which they were produced. Not just as works of art, but rather as cultural products.

Across Europe and in Spain the print media opened up the target audience for politicians and social reformers, as well as artists, who saw the chance of expanding income, sales, and markets. The value of printmaking as a medium for the transmission of ideas grew not only from the eighteenth century's belief in education and cultural diffusion but also from the changing conditions in the production process over the century. In the same way that the written word was being spread in the form of books, journals, newspapers and pamphlets, visual images could be disseminated to wider audiences through reproductive work – prints. Mechanical reproduction and the opening of markets meant that both printed words and printed images – cultural, but nevertheless consumer goods – reached more possible consumers. A developing commercial market in portable cultural products was the target of entrepreneurial publishers, as well as artists, across Europe.

Perhaps one could argue that Goya reclaims for the visual arts their moral force in the enlightened age of reform, a move that would certainly align the artist with enlightened reformers: the reform of style follows the reform of morality. However, the critical function of Goya's art cannot be explained only in terms of the 'textual', that is, by invoking literary analogues. The link established by the author of the Announcement between poetry and painting locates the collection also within the tradition of the *ut pictora poesis* established by Horace in his *Ars Poetica*, taking us to a consideration of the function of pictorial art. The Horatian parallel confers on painting, and by extension on the visual arts, the moral value granted to poetry. Thus the author of the Announcement (not necessarily Goya as explained earlier) acknowledges the significance of pictorial representation in the reform of morality and the contribution that could be made by the visual arts in the contemporary social and political context, thereby moving away from the more commemorative and decorative artwork commissioned by kings, nobles and religious orders. Another Horatian doctrine underlying the text is that of 'teaching and delighting'. Of profound relevance in classical and Spanish neo-classical theory, the 'aprovechar deleitando', as expressed by Luzán (1702-1754) in his *Poética* (1737), is linked to the explicit aesthetic of the author of the Announcement. Horace, a notable satirist and literary critic, serves as a model to those eighteenth-century writers and artists who applied themselves to social satire, in the same way that he had done for fifteenth-, and sixteenth-century authors, such as Cervantes.

Let us go back to that vital 'turning point' in Goya's life in order to situate the genesis of the collection. Described as 'la grave enfermedad de Goya del bienio 1792-93' or, more poetically, 'la misteriosa enfermedad de Goya' (Alonso-Fernández, 1999: 69) by biographers and critics alike, it has acted as a dividing line between the work leading to *Los Caprichos* and his previous work, as a helpful way of separating the public from the private Goya, or, regarding his post-1793 work, as a total break with tradition. The correlation between life, illness and art is undeniable; however, it has to be seen in the light of a larger context. Critics as disparate as Alonso-

Fernández and Tomlinson have convincingly argued for a continuum in Goya's life and art, respectively. The former, a psychiatrist, offers a fascinating psychological diagnosis of the personality of the artist in order to understand the changes and ruptures in his artistic creation;[54] the latter, an art critic and art historian, sees Goya's artistic production as having a continuity from the early 1790s to the publication of *Los Caprichos*.[55]

According to Janis Tomlinson, the 1790s are 'a period of withdrawal and resignation' (1994: 9) in the life of the painter. After his report to the Academy, his links to this institution steadily weakened for obvious health reasons, namely his deafness; as to commissioned works, there are no documented works for his patrons between 1792 and 1798;[56] and, since his personal correspondence provides us with few facts, very little is known about his private life. What we are left with is some information about his illness and subsequent convalescence at the house of Sebastián Martínez, his correspondence with Martín Zapater, two letters addressed to Bernardo de Iriarte, Vice-Protector of the Royal Academy of San Fernando, the first on 4 January 1794, informing him about some new cabinet paintings, the second one on 7 January describing a final painting to be added to the other eleven,[57] and, above all, notebooks of drawings sketched both on his return to Madrid and during his stay in the estate house of the Duchess of Alba at Sanlúcar de Barrameda in 1796 (referred to as the *Álbum de Madrid* or *Álbum B* (1794-96) and the *Álbum de Sanlúcar* or *Álbum A* (1796-97), respectively). Together with preparatory drawings, and printing proofs, it is possible to create a picture of the work in progress that led to *Los Caprichos* as we know them.

What Goya sketches in these notebooks differs from his commissioned works up to 1792 but shares aesthetic intentions and investigative purposes with the series of cabinet paintings he sent to Bernardo de Iriarte early in 1794.[58] The letter to Iriarte is as much an aesthetic statement as the ideas expressed in his report to the Academy two years before and in the Announcement that accompanied the sale of *Los Caprichos*:

> para ocupar la imaginación mortificada en la consideración de mis males, y para resarcir en parte los grandes dispendios que me an ocasionado, me dedique a pintar un juego de quadros de gabinete, en que he logrado hacer observaciones a que regularmente no dan lugar las obras encargadas, y en que el capricho y la invención no tienen ensanches.[59]

Albeit an altogether different medium and technique,[60] these 'quadros de gabinete' anticipate some of the artistic innovations more commonly seen in *Los Caprichos*: their resistance to traditional categorization, their questioning of convention and subject matter, and, in the words of Tomlinson, their 'search for an anti-ideal' (1994: 98)[61] – aspects that will become clearer as the analysis of the series in Chapters 4 and 5 progresses. At this juncture, it is only necessary to pinpoint the (at the time) 'monstrous' character of the collection in terms of its generic unclassifiability, the visual refashioning undertaken by the Aragonese artist or the anti-classicism of his figures. The notions 'capricho' and 'invención' are of crucial importance since Goya inserts his work in a tradition that asserts 'artistic imagination and the demonstration of inventive skill' (David Rosand, 1994: 8). As I have already pointed out, the word 'capricho' was already used in the 1797 *Sueños* – 'esta obra de caprichos' – and reappears in the payment order for the Osunas – 'quatro livros de caprichos'. In the art world of the eighteenth century, 'capricho' is associated with originality, 'no sólo en los asuntos, sino en el medio de concebirlos y ejecutarlos' (Helman, 1993: 163). Moreover, in the words of Blas, 'el artista toma conciencia de que el arte no debe ser imitativo sino fruto de su capricho' (1999: 28). According to the *Diccionario* of the Real Academia Española, 'capricho' is that 'obra de arte en que el ingenio o la fantasía rompen la observancia de las reglas' - a definition that suffices for the purposes of this section.[62] In the 1799 Announcement the words 'asuntos caprichosos' articulate the author's aesthetic positioning; the aesthetic idiom of the text is established by references to the author's aesthetic imagination and creativity ('fantasía del artífice'), to his inventive skills ('inventadas', 'ni ha seguido los exemplos de otro, ni ha podido copiar tampoco de la naturaleza') and to the creative role of his own genius ('el título de inventor y no de copiante servil'). These are words that echo both in Goya's letter to Iriarte in 1794, in which he refers to the series of cabinet paintings in terms of 'capricho' and 'invención', and in his report to the Academy.

Gassier and Wilson (1971), Sayre (1974), Tomlinson (1989a) and Wilson-Bureau (1992), among other critics, have traced Goya's creative process by examining the albums and the twenty-seven drawings carrying the inscription *sueño* in order to understand the first conceptions behind the 1799 prints. Sayre (1989), for instance, has described Goya's drawings as visual equivalents to literary journals. In an earlier work, *The Changing Image*, Sayre traces 'the development of an idea from drawing to print' (1974: vii), providing us with preparatory drawings, working proofs, successive changes and modifications of the plates; Tomlinson's *Graphic Evolutions* is an attempt to approach the 'series' internal chronology, which in turn should illuminate Goya's changing technique and intent' (1989a: 15).[63] Some of the characters populating *Los Caprichos* are traceable to the album sketchbooks, and some titles used by Goya in the final prints appear in the first drawings, although 'the more explanatory captions of the early *sueño* drawings are finally abandoned in favour of pithier, evocative captions that often stand in dialectical relation to the image, rather than fix the meaning' (Tomlinson, 1989b: 448). The scenes captured by Goya in the

Álbum de Sanlúcar are of young women engaged in their everyday activities; their movements (lifting of their skirts, pulling up of the stockings, tearing of the hair, or bathing) and postures (sitting or standing in the 'paseo', lying naked on bed or having a siesta) will reappear in those prints depicting relationships between men and women. Those portrayed in *Álbum B* (page 3 'Couple making love in the dark', page 22 'Maja and an officer', page 24 'Young man beating an officer', page 37 'Couple with a parasol in the paseo') parallel those represented in *Los Caprichos* (*Capricho 5* 'Tal para cual', *Capricho 7* 'Ni así la distingue', or *Capricho 27* 'Quién más rendido'); the looming presence of 'celestinas' in the drawings (page 4 'Maja and celestina waiting under an arch', page 38 'Two majas parading in the paseo') resurfaces in the etchings (*Capricho 15* 'Bellos consejos', *Capricho 17* 'Bien tirada está'). The masquerading asses of the sketchbook (page 72 'Mascaras de B. También ay mascaras de borricos', page 93 'Conócelos el aceitero') anticipate the ass sequences of the 1799 collection (*Caprichos 37* to *42*); witches and goblins (*Álbum B* page 56 and 57) haunt the viewer at several points of *Los Caprichos* (*Capricho 44* to *48*, *Capricho 51*, and *Caprichos 59* to *71*). Of all the drawings known, 'once [...] están en el origen de algunos *caprichos* y, en general, el ambiente de los grabados se vislumbra ya en el álbum'(Bozal, 1994:118). Closer analysis of the changes underlying specific images are present in almost every discussion of the collection, *Capricho 43* 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' (fig. 1) and its preparatory drawings being the object of individual inquiry (Dowling (1985), Soufas (1986), Sayre (1989), Ilie (1985 / 1995, I)). Sayre (1989) has traced the development of two *caprichos*: 'San Fernando ¡cómo hilan!'(fig. 49) from drawing (*Álbum B*, page 84, 1796-97) to etching (*Capricho 44* 'Hilan delgado'), and *Capricho 70* 'Devota Profesión' (fig. 51), from *Álbum B* (page 56 'Brujas à bolar' (fig. 52)) to the first drawings for *Sueños* ('Sueño. De brujas', 1797-98), and finally to the copper plate; Bozal (1987) looks at *Capricho 5* 'Tal para cual'; Tomlinson (1994) examines the changes to *Capricho 13* 'Están calientes' (fig. 11), originally entitled 'Caricatura alegre' in *Álbum B* and then 'Sueño / De unos hombres que nos comían' in the *Sueño* drawings; and Stoichita and Coderch (2000) describe the origins of *Capricho 57* 'La filiación', whose antecedent in the albums is 'La apunta por ermafrodita' (1796-97) and later on known as *Sueño 11* 'Mascara de caricaturas que apuntan por su significado' (1797-98). The series, therefore, was 'the result of a process of creativity and experiment that probably began as early as 1796, and was not concluded until the publication in 1799' (Tomlinson, 1994: 125).

Goya was interested in the commercial viability of his work, and *Los Caprichos* were intended as a profitable venture; in fact, the edition was conceived and marketed as a portable cultural product, a book: a paperbound album bound in leather, bearing the title 'Caprichos de Goya' on the spine. The artist himself figures in a self-portrait in the first of the eighty prints, his name and occupation engraved in the lower margin; this first image is preceded by neither a title page nor a printed explanation. What the public would have made of such a product is not known since the illiterate lower social classes were accustomed 'to buying prints of religious images, portraits and recent events' in the street or on the steps of churches (Tomlinson, 1989: 143), whereas the more privileged social groups would have purchased prints representing traditional customs and diversions in bookshops. Furthermore, 'the public', Tomlinson observes, 'could hardly have comprehended the weird cast of evil and debauched characters' (1989: 143) populating the series. On the other hand, the critic suggests that Goya's circle of friends would have understood the intentions and references, which takes us back once again to the Enlightened circle. Preparatory drawings, proofs, and finalized etchings might have been seen and commented on privately among the circle of Enlightened friends, which included leading Spanish intellectuals as well as critical representatives of the aristocracy, such as the Altamiras and the Osunas (a payment order dated on 17 January 1799 and signed by the Duke of Osuna for 'quatro livros de caprichos y grabados a la aqua fuerte' attests to this).

To conclude this final section, I would like to refer to two contemporary reactions to Goya's series. Pedro González de Sepúlveda, Professor of Engraving at the Real Academia de San Fernando and court engraver, wrote the following, almost immediately after the publication of *Los Caprichos*: 'I have seen the book of witches and satires by Goya, I didn't like it, it is very licentious' (cited in Wilson-Bureau, 1981: 36). On 27 March 1811 the first known review of the series is published in Cádiz in the *Semanario Patriótico*;[64] the author, Gregorio González Azaola, describes *Los Caprichos* as: 'esta colección compuesta de 80 estampas con más de 400 figuras de toda especie, no es otra cosa que un libro instructivo de 80 poesías morales gravadas, ó un tratado satírico de 80 vicios y preocupaciones de las que más afligen a la sociedad' (cited in Harris, 1964: 42).[65] Of these contemporary reactions, two aspects seem to be especially significant: firstly, both emphasize the generic quality of Goya's work – 'satires' and 'tratado satírico'; secondly, both agree on the nature of *Los Caprichos* as a book – 'book of witches and satires' in the disapproving comments of González de Sepúlveda and 'libro instructivo de 80 poesías morales gravadas' in the more perceptive words of González Azaola. For these contemporary commentators, the series belongs to already established traditions, that of the satiric print and that of the emblem book. Aesthetic and political issues are also raised by González de Sepúlveda's and González Azaola's remarks. Whilst the former points explicitly to the deviant aesthetics of the prints, expressing academic tastes and passing judgement, the latter adopts a reformist stance which recognizes the educational character of the series as well as its moral value. Other discerning insights by González Azaola prepare the ground for future writing on *Los Caprichos*; for instance, their 'enigmatic meaning' and, most interestingly, their value for different types of viewers (and the possibility of accounting for different readers): he is aware of the potential didacticism inscribed in the eighty prints – 'if I am not mistaken it is the most suitable work to sharpen the minds of the young, and an appropriate touchstone by which to judge the percipience and intellectual agility of all kinds of people' -, of its importance as a source of material for fellow artists – 'painters and engravers will find it a veritable text-book of their professions, given its infinite variety of heads, unusual situations, well-drawn dress, original faces and anatomical knowledge' -, and of the literary possibilities for poets and men of letters, for they 'will find in each satire a rich mine of ideas to stimulate their minds and spark off an infinite number of moral reflections' (cited in Glendinning, 1977: 60-1). Besides the image and the textual elements that accompany the series from its inception to its final publication and, later, the manuscripts, critical and historical writing produced over the last two centuries has exploited this mine. But, if the dependence of text upon image is inadequate, as critics such as Tomlinson have vehemently claimed – 'Goya clearly subordinated the written language to the pictorial, and in approaching these etchings we must be careful to guard that relationship' (1989a: 13) - then it seems to me that focusing on the visual construction of the image and interrogating what practice of seeing is at work in the series could help us to look at the familiar in new ways and could prove instrumental in the understanding of Goya's work.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a consideration of the period in which Goya was producing *Los Caprichos*. One of the main issues raised in these pages has been how far the collection was responding to the ideas, cultural policies and artistic tastes of the reforming movement. A further objective has been to offer a general overview of the main critical writings that have aligned the series to the *ilustrados*. There is no doubt that the collection can be read in Enlightenment ways yet there are elements of an ideological, cultural and artistic nature that problematize these readings, pointing beyond the limits and contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment. Thus *Los Caprichos* highlight the paradoxical aspirations and reflections of the Spanish Enlightenment. Goya reasoned new answers to new questions and a consideration of his relation to the central Enlightenment concept of reason needs to bear this in mind.

The next chapter opens with a reference to *Capricho 43* 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' (fig. 1) as a way of setting up many of the premises on which my readings of the prints depend. If, as I have been arguing in this chapter, *Los Caprichos* are traditionally tied to a discourse of reform which supports Enlightenment constructions of a reasoned or reasonable subject, it is my contention in the remainder of this thesis that Goya's collection destabilises enlightened conceptions of reason and enlightened configurations of the corporeal. The last two chapters will focus on the series through two main strands of analysis: unruly bodies and institutional bodies.

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[1] For reading on the Enlightenment, see the classical studies of Cassirer (1932 (trans. 1951)), Gay (1967), and Hampson (1968), or the more recent work of Dorinda Outram (1995) and Roy Porter (2001). As for the Spanish eighteenth-century, see the studies of Sarrailh (1954), Herr (1958), Palacio Atard (1964), Mestre (1976), Lynch (1989), Sánchez Blanco-Parody (1991), and Martínez Shaw (1996).

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[2] http://cec.caixacatalunya.es/fundacio/exposiciones/goya/html/presenta-p-e.html, accessed 31/07/2000.

[3] See Lynch (1989: 1-21).

[4] See Domínguez Ortiz (1976)

[5] See 'Los novatores' in Sánchez-Blanco Parody (1991: 28-42).

[6] See Mestre (1968).

[7] Published posthumously in 1789.

[8] Cabarrús was the driving force behind the creation of the Banco de San Carlos, a project explained in *Memoria para la fundación de un Banco Nacional* (1781). Among his other writings are *Elogio de Carlos III* (1789), *Cartas a Jovellanos* (1792), and *Cartas sobre los obstáculos que la naturaleza, la opinión y las leyes oponen a la felicidad pública* (1795, published in 1808). For more on Cabarrús, see Maravall (1968) and Elorza (1970: 139-163).

[9] Foronda collaborated with *El Espíritu de los mejores diarios*, where he published a series of 'Cartas' and 'Disertación sobre la libertad de escribir' (1789).

[10] Marchena expressed his critique of contemporary Spanish society through the pages of *El observador* in 1787-1788.

[11] Rubín de Celis expressed his reformist ideas in *El Corresponsal del Censor*, a publication closed by the authorities on 16 June 1788.

[12] The work of Pierre Villar, as Elorza observes, shed new light on the differences within the enlightened reformist movement: 'no cabe hablar de una realidad unitaria para los procesos ilustrados dentro del conjunto español' (Villar cited in Elorza, 1970: 68).

[13] In 'Las tendencias de reforma política en el siglo XVIII español' (1967), Maravall focuses on pre-1789 writings (in particular, those of Ibáñez de la Rentería, Arroyal, and Foronda) containing direct attacks on principles that supported the absolutist monarchy.

[14] Within the reformist ideological spectrum, a radical change rather than a progressive process of reform was articulated in the more seditious positions of Arroyal and Cañuelo, placing them closer to the prerevolutionary attitudes of Pedro Mariano Ruiz, Manuel María de Aguirre, who published his works in the Correo de los Ciegos and Correo de Madrid under the pseudonym of 'El Militar Ingenue', or Santiago Felipe Puglia, who firmly advocated the replacement of the absolutist regime with a liberal State in *Conversaciones de Perico y Marica* (1788), *Cartas* (1787-88), and *El desengaño del hombre* (1794, published in Philadelphia), respectively.

[15] Elorza describes Cabarrús' radical beliefs in the following way: 'sólo un cambio profundo en la estructura política española puede traer consecuencias positivas; es inútil toda reforma parcial basada en nuevos reglamentos' (1970: 146).

[16] According to Zavala in 'Dream of Reality: Enlightened Hopes for an Unattainable Spain', contemporary economic reformers looked back to the sixteenth-century: 'economic literature had flourished since the sixteenth century [...] lengthy *memoriales* or *discursos* were sent to the king or to his counsellors. Topics would vary from agrarian to industrial problems, but the best were minute analyses of specific social and economic conditions' (1977: 460).

[17] See Herr (1958: 88-98) for a historical analysis of such legal privileges.

[18] For a general discussion of the agrarian reform, see Guillermo Carnero's introduction to Jovellanos's *Espectáculos y diversiones públicas / Informe sobre la ley agraria* (1997: 70-83).

[19] As Elorza notes, 'apenas sin excepción de relieve, todos los economistas y políticos del siglo XVIII, desde Uztáraz, Ulloa o Campillo, expresan la urgencia de racionalizar el sistema fiscal' (1970: 35).

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[20] See Sarrailh (1974: 612-660) and Callahan (1984: 68-69).

[21] See Cecil Roth's work on the Spanish Inquisition, in particular his chapter 'Decline and Fall' (1996: 245-67).

[22] The order had been expelled from Portugal in 1759 and France in 1764.

[23] Floridablanca was dismissed on 28 February 1792, his replacement Aranda was also dismissed on 15 November of the same year. Godoy became Secretary of State in 1793 and surrounded himself with enlightened ministers in 1797 (Cabarrús, ambassador to France; Jovellanos, Secretary of Grace and Justice; Francisco de Saavedra, Secretary of Finance; and Mariano Luis de Urquijo, minister of Foreign Affairs). This progressive government collapsed in 1798.

[24] 'Si hasta 1789 la Inquisición española mantuvo su campo de actuación entre los límites de la herejía doctrinal y la preservación moral, en el índice de 1790, en estrecha relación con el gobierno, declara que su cometido será en adelante "defender el orden político y social establecido," frente al contagio de la propaganda revolucionaria' (Aguilar Piñal, 1991: 124).

[25] In a letter addressed to Cayetano Soler dated 7 July 1803, Goya writes: 'The work of my caprichos consists of eighty plates engraved in etching by my hand. They were offered for sale to the public on two days at one ounce of gold per book; twenty-seven books were sold. Five or six thousand books could be printed from the plates. Foreigners are those who most desire them and for fear that they should fall into their hands after my death, I wish to give them to my Lord the King for his calcography' (Goya, cited in Harris, 1974: 10). What this decision proves nonetheless is the commercial failure of his project, a failure supported by the following facts: the collection was advertised in Cádiz during the War of Independence (1808-1814) against the Napoleonic troops, then again by the Real Calcografía in 1816, but it was not until 1850 that the first public edition was published.

[26] See the section in Sarrailh's study *La España ilustrada de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII* (1954) devoted to culture, 'Fe en la cultura' (1974: 155-173).

[27] See Álvarez de Miranda's 'El papel de la educación' (1992: 423-434) in *Palabras e ideas: el léxico de la Ilustración temprana en España (1680-1760)* (1992), where he traces the meanings and nuances of the notion of education back to the Humanist tradition and as it was used by contemporary authors in the literature of the period.

[28] In 'Between Bourgeois Enlightenment and Popular Culture: Goya's Festivals, Old Women, Monsters and Blind Men', Jutta Held locates Goya's post-1790s production in the context of these epistemic shifts. For Held, 'Goya's visual language presents a dialectical process of conflict and interaction between these two cultures' (1987: 40). I will return to her argument in Chapters 4 and 5.

[29] See http://www.filosofia.org/bjf, accessed on 03/08/00.

[30] In 'Aproximaciones al vocabulario ideológico de Feijóo', Álvarez de Miranda notes that the 'public' is the 'destinatario de las medidas del gobierno tal como las entiende el ilustrado' (1979: 380).

[31] Porter's argument is that in the eighteenth century the very fabric of British society changed. Enlightened figures worked with the *status quo* in order to create a truly enlightened society.

[32] See 'La educación de la mujer en Moratín' in Palacio Atard 1964: 243-67.

[33] See López-Cordón Cortezo's 'La situación de la mujer a finales del Antiguo Régimen (1760-1860)' (1986: 47-107) for an interdisciplinary approach to the place of women during the period. Interestingly, the cover of the volume, *Mujer y sociedad en España (1700-1975)*, features one of Goya's *caprichos*, 'No te escaparás'. See also Kitts (1995) and Bolufer (1998).

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[34] Campomanes and Floridablanca were 'manteístas', that is, students who belonged to the lower nobility. The 'colegiales' were 'second sons of wealthy landholding families, who had usurped the funds intended for the maintenance of indigent scholars [...] After graduating they formed an aristocracy in the clergy and royal administration' (Herr, 1958: 25). See Herr (1958: 24-26) for the difference between 'manteístas' and 'colegiales'.

[35] Among the other targets of the *Diario de Madrid* were 'la corrupción de costumbres, la sátira de los "cortejos", "majos" y "petimetres", de las modas, las invectivas contra el ocio o la ignorancia, las reflexiones sobra la educación de la mujer' (Enciso Recio, 1988: 78).

[36] According to Caso González, 'los tiros de Jovellanos en la sátira van en dos direcciones: la del noble aplebeyado y la del noble afrancesado y degenerado' (1983: 388).

[37] The traditionalists also had their own institutional spaces (universities, churches, the Inquisition), instruments ('apologías' in the press, 'cartas pastorales', sermons, satire) and rhetorics ('misoneísmo', 'xenofobia' and 'ortodoxia') to convey their positions. See Egido in 'Los anti-ilustrados españoles' (1989: 95-119).

[38] It is in the eighteenth century when the Real Academia Española is founded by Juan Manuel Fernández Pacheco in 1713. The institution produced the *Diccionario de Autoridades* (1726-1739), the *Ortografía* (1742) and the *Gramática* (1771).

[39] It is believed that in 1797 there was a brochure advertising a set of seventy-two etchings to be sold at 288 reales. The frontispiece for the 'original' *Caprichos* would become *Capricho 43* in the 1799 collection.

[40] Sánchez Cantón (1949) found a parallel between Goya's images of flirtation and a satirical treatise on fashionable courtship known as Óptica del cortejo (Manuel Antonio Ramírez de Góngora, 1774); López Rey (1953) discussed the themes in connection with contemporary interests in theories of physiognomy put forward by Lavater.

[41] For Tomlinson, 'the assumption that Goya was intimately involved with this small circle of intellectuals has become a staple of subsequent scholarship, even though Goya's correspondence to his friend Martín Zapater, dating principally from the 1770s and 1780s and published in 1982, offers no corroboration' (1992: 4).

[42] Indeed the notion 'philosophe' has Enlightenment overtones since it describes the 'philosophes' as 'critics of contemporary social, political, and specially religious institutions and practices' (Herr, 1958: 73).

[43] During the reign of Felipe V the Real Academia de San Fernando was created. Other places like Valencia, Zaragoza and Sevilla had their own academies of art approved in the second half of the century.

[44] For a detailed study of this institution, see Claude Bédat's *La Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando (1744-1808). Contribución al estudio de las influencias artísticas y de la mentalidad artística en la España del siglo XVIII* (1989).

[45] Constructions of Goya as a satirist and enlightened thinker (Klingender (1948), Helman (1963)) take their cue from the artist's use of the genre.

[46] *Curso completo o diccionario universal de agricultura teórica y práctica, económica y de medicina rural y veterinaria* (Madrid, 1797-1803) by Abate Rozier, and *Prontuario teórico práctico del cuerpo humano* (Madrid, 1790) by Ignacio Lacaba and Isidoro Isaura were produced in the Real Imprenta. See Carrete Parrondo (1996: 17).

[47] A private enterprise set up in 1789 paralleled this interest in art. Under the protection of the Prince of Asturias and the direction of eight shareholders, the 'Compañía para el grabado de los cuadros de los

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Reales Palacios' project was to engrave a hundred paintings from the Royal Collection although by 1800 only half were done and the project failed (Carrete Parrondo, 1996: 11).

[48] The following 'pensionados' were sent to Paris in 1752: 'Manuel Salvador Carmona para el "grabado de retratos e historia", Juan Carlos de la Cruz y Tomás López para "el de arquitectura, cartas geográficas y adornos" y Alfonso Cruzado para el de "sellos de piedras finas"' (Carrete Parrondo, 1996: 8). Another decision taken by the government of Carlos III was the centralization of all the ministerial graphic production through the Real Imprenta in *Plan de grabadores del Rey* (Manuel Monfort, 1788).

[49] See Carrete Parrondo, Checa Cremades and Bozal (1987) for further reading on printing in Spain during the eighteenth century. See also Carrete Parrondo (1996) for further reading on the Real Academia de San Fernando and engraving between 1752 and 1844.

[50] According to Glendinning, 'a total of seventeen etchings are known, and there are four additional drawings unrelated to existing prints (1977: 24). For the etchings after Velázquez, see Vega (1995).

[51] The set of prints was advertised on Tuesday 28 July 1778 and on Tuesday 22 December of the same year.

[52] Some titles are *Colección de trajes de España* (1777-78) by Juan de la Cruz, *Colección de las principales suertes de una corrida de toros* (c. 1795) by Luis Fernández Noseret, and *Carta de las Costas de California* (1771) by Tomás López.

[53] The work marking a watershed in the study of Goya's graphic *oeuvre* is Tomás Harris' *Catalogue raisonné, Goya: Engraving and Lithographs* (1964, 2 vols). Experimentation with aquatint is already present, Harris argues, in some of the prints after Velázquez, such as 'Infante Don Fernando' and 'Ochoa' (1964: 85), since the prints of religious subjects were engraved in 'pure etching' (1964: 82). On Goya's working methods, see also Sayre (1974).

[54] See *El enigma Goya. La personalidad de Goya y su pintura tenebrosa* (1999).

[55] See *Goya in the Twilight of the Enlightenment* (1992) and *Francisco Goya y Lucientes* (1994).

[56] Tomlinson (1994: 9) cites an equestrian portrait of Manuel Godoy as the only record. After 1790 Goya received no royal commissions until 1799; instead he painted his last tapestry cartoons, assisted in the inventory of paintings in the royal collection, and decorated the church of San Antonio de la Florida (1798). Note that I am referring here to commissioned works.

[57] '... it represents a yard with lunatics and two of them fighting completely naked while their warder beats them, and others in sacks: it is a scene which I saw at Zaragoza.' Goya refers in these terms to the twelfth picture, 'A Yard with Lunatics' (1793-94).

[58] The eleven cabinet pictures were shown to the Academy on 5 January 1794. Six of them are devoted to subjects of national diversions – 'Las mulillas' (1793), 'Banderillas en el campo' (1793), 'Despeje de la capa' (1793), 'Cogida del Picador' (1793), 'Suerte de capa' (1793), and 'Suerte de matar' (1793) -, whereas the other six represent more personalized visions of the world – 'Yncendios, un fuego de noche' (1793-4), 'Asalto de ladrones' (1793-4), 'Interior of a Prison' (1793-4), 'El naufragio' (1793-4), 'Strolling Players' (1793-4), and the already mentioned 'Corral de locos'.

[59] In Gassier and Wilson (1971: 382).

[60] 'Thin metal sheets plated with almost pure tin, scissor-cut and slightly uneven, but measuring about 43 x 32 cm and covered with a thickly brushed, beige-pink preparation over a thin red ground' (Juliet Wilson-Bareau, 1994: 201).

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[61] Tomlinson is referring here to the anti-idealism represented in the figures of thieves, of commoners and of madmen in *Assault on a Coach* (1793-4), *Strolling Players* (1793-4), and *Yard with Lunatics* (1793-94).

[62] For the meanings of the term *capricho* in eighteenth-century Spain, see Ilie's '*Capricho / Caprichoso*: A Glossary of Eighteenth-Century Usages' (1976) and Dowling's 'Capricho as Style in Life, Literature and Art from Zamora to Goya' (1977).

[63] Tomlinson's acknowledged point of departure is the work of Enrico Crispolti (1963).

[64] Glendinning has explained that the review 'in part acted as an advertisement for copies of the work which were then on sale in the city' (1977: 59). It is worth noting that the year 1811 falls within the period of the Cortes of Cádiz during the Peninsular War.

[65] The review was first published in the *Burlington Magazine* by Enriqueta Harris. See Glendinning (1977: 60-1) for a translated version.

Chapter 4

Los Caprichos: Unruly Bodies

Introduction

These last two chapters retake the question posed in my introduction: how can monstrosity and corporeality be thought together in the analysis of these etchings? In an attempt to undo the critical habits surrounding *Los Caprichos*, it is necessary to return to the issue of corporeality, of the bodily, which may provide entry into a larger physical and institutional – and not only moral – universe, the 'faces' or 'masks' of Reason 'defined partly as the neglected underside of Reason' (Ilie, 1995, I: 1). The individual body will be explored in the present chapter while the institutional body will be the focus of Chapter 5. In the words of Nicholas Mirzoeff, 'at all times of social uncertainty in the West, the representation of the body has been a key concern' (1995: 1). The late eighteenth-century in Spain was, as I argued in Chapter 3, a time of extreme controversies and uncertainties. Changes and reforms affected not only the collective body but also the individual body. Yet change is always met by resistance since the (individual or institutional) body affected by change is at the same time a point of resistance. In the case of Spain, the importance of traditional cultural forms and the dominant presence of Catholic religious beliefs characterised resistance to change. What I propose in the remaining chapters of this thesis is therefore to examine the ways in which the Goyaesque body bears the mark of its historical and cultural location. Questions that will concern us are: to what extent and in what ways do these monstrous bodies respond to the larger cultural, religious, political - necessarily ideological- contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment? How are these monstrous bodies representative of wider cultural anxieties and fears about social change and moral reform? My aim is to re-evaluate our cultural assumptions concerning monstrosity and the monstrous body in *Los Caprichos*. As we shall see, the (monstrous) body is the vexed site through which Goya explores the individual's relation to a contradictory period. By focusing on individual and institutional bodies, Goya is very much highlighting material aspects of 'concrete human problems', to use Canguilhem's phrase.

Los Caprichos, I argued in Chapter 3, are traditionally tied to a discourse of reform which supports Enlightenment constructions of a reasoned or reasonable subject. Like the writings of moralists and satirists contemporary to him, Goya gives pictorial form to the errors, vices and irrational conducts of specific sectors of Spanish society. By offering images of unruly bodies and disorderly behaviours, the viewer recognizes objectionable beliefs and comportments and draws a lesson. Through the grid of a physiognomics of difference, the bodies depicted are marked as a monstrous site, a strategic visibility serving to distance and differentiate the enlightened from the unenlightened. Such reasoning places the collection of prints squarely within the reformist project of the *ilustrados*. But while Goya participates in figurative traditions which fix the body as the site of exploration of a cultural problematic, traditions which necessarily stabilize reading positions, representations of corporeality and monstrosity in *Los Caprichos* can arguably be read as destabilizing Enlightenment conceptions of reason and Enlightened configurations of the corporeal.

The monstrous bodies in *Los Caprichos* respond also to changes in representation at the end of the eighteenth century. Representational issues are not generally 'on view' within the context of the enlightened subordination of the body. The first section of this chapter will focus on Ilie's analysis of *Capricho 43* 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' and his concept of counter-rational Reason, which he defines as the opposite of a uniform centre of rationality in representative thought. Thus I will be considering throughout the chapter Goya's problematization of representation. If for eighteenth-century aesthetics 'the body is both the site of ideal beauty and the limit of what can and may be represented' (Kelly and Mücke, 1994: 11), then Goya's panoply of monsters provides a way of understanding other modes of reason(ing), other ways of representing the body and its function(s) within culture. My argument in what follows is that Goya dissects the Enlightenment way of looking at and explaining the body. In *Los Caprichos* there is a recuperation of those elements that seem to lie outside the ken of the Enlightenment project: irrationality, physicality, animality, hybridity, the grotesque, the popular; a recognition of the animal nature of the body and of the products of bodily impulses and forces. In short, Goya calls attention to the bodiliness and the corporeal reality of the human figures populating the series. Goya depicts these human figures engaging in irrationally motivated activities, displaying the effects of excess and passion, and lurking in a dark universe; he shows man's animal nature, the embarrassing needs of the human body, and the fallibility of the senses; and he acknowledges the presence of popular beliefs and cultural forms, alternative traditions that evolve side by side with enlightened reforms. This chapter will show how these elements irrupt in Goya's images and how they force a disruption of a perceived normativizing function. The title of this chapter points to those disorderly and unruly bodies and behaviours which are not amenable to discipline and control. In fact, Goya's work after 1793 engages more with 'unruly, contradictory and asocial forms, which he looks at from everchanging points of view' (Held, 1987: 44) than with 'normal' representations of the human body. Human actions spring not only from beliefs but also from desires, as Goya's etchings attest. These complex monstrous bodies can be read symbolically, allegorically and abstractly, of course. But they are *also* bodies, bodiliness is part of their existence; their physical nature is heavily inscribed in the etchings. As Schulz has noted, physicality pervades the actions of these bodies: 'swallowing, blowing, vomiting, sucking, yawning, shouting, snoring, and, most commonly, eating and drinking' (2000: 167). Irredeemably physical, they signify in their own right as if asserting their materiality.

Goya's monstrous bodies will be read against classical ideals of the body as well as against enlightened epistemic constructions of the body examined in the social constructionist theories of Foucault and Elias, which see the body as both a biological and a political-historical construct. The first part of the chapter looks at the ways in which Goya reconfigures the (neo)classical body by focusing, firstly, on contemporary aesthetic standards of ideal beauty, and, secondly, on civilized standards of an ideal bodily comportment and behaviour in the context of the reformation of manners during the Spanish Enlightenment. Such considerations provide the frame for the second part of the chapter in which I examine the collection in relation to physiognomical traditions and physiognomical modes of reasoning in order to show how the promotion of reforms and the reformation of manners in the Spanish Enlightenment were informed by classical epistemologies. As a traditional way of organizing knowledge, physiognomical body criticism claimed authority in reading the normal and the monstrous body. It is my contention that, by not conforming to pre-existing academic practice and by contesting traditional ways of seeing, Goya teases out the metaphysical presuppositions of such artistic traditions and foregrounds the shortcomings of certain reformist educational practices and pedagogical ideals.

In the following chapters the 'physical' and the 'institutional' should not be considered as discrete aspects of my concerns with issues on the body; rather they are inextricably bound. I would like to recall here Maravall's words: it is necessary to understand 'the reform of the human being as the basis for general reform' (1987: 39). Individuals cannot be divorced from the larger institutions in which they live their lives. The changes in and reformation of bodily behaviours are linked to economic and cultural reforms as well as to the ideological underpinnings of institutional power. The writings of Spanish enlightened reformers such as Campomanes and Jovellanos, alluded to in Chapter 3, sought to improve the use of a person's natural reason and participation in the reform of institutions and practices while at the same time attempting to regulate and control the body of the populace in various social contexts. The ensuing analyses attempt to bring the Goyaesque body back into enlightened debates about reform. In the process I shall be returning to the theoretical issues exposed in Chapter 2, namely Goya's critique of reason and the problem of human perception and knowledge. My first point of entry is Goya's most emblematic etching, 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos'.

'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos'

Reason, knowledge and monstrosity are part of the modern experience. For Paul Ilie, Goya's *Capricho 43* (fig. 1) is a 'paradigmatic statement in the perception of reality' (1995: I, 17). The eighteenth-century's grand metaphor of continuity took Reason as its guarantor; the belief in a continuous universe and the belief in cognitive continuity underlay the spirit of the age. The eighteenth century retained a paradoxical approach to monsters: used as transitional forms in the theory of a continuous Chain of Being, 'their existence made it easier for the mind to conceive of continuity'

(Canguilhem, 1962: 35). Modern, rational science shared this belief and concealed the structural discontinuity of the universe. Whether the Great Chain of Being, the clock, or the tree of knowledge, universal, empirical, or cognitive metaphors tended to obscure the structural discontinuity of the universe and to represent the 'unbroken intelligibility of a universe composed of perfectly fitting parts' (1995: II, 14). Ilie's argument in *The Age of Minerva. Counter-Rational Reason in the Eighteenth Century* (1995) and *The Age of Minerva. Cognitive Discontinuities in Eighteenth-Century Thought* (1995), is that 'eighteenth-century Reason displayed an alter ego capable of protean powers' (1995: II, 18), that is, that a counter-rational discourse pervaded the century. The mythic figure of Minerva, Goddess of Wisdom, a complex, multivalent symbol unobtrusive and all-pervasive in the visual arts in France and Spain, yet hardly alluded to in current eighteenth-century studies, is, for Ilie, symptomatic of the century's failure 'to reach its ideal of continuity' (1995: I, 4). In ancient mythology Minerva wove a tapestry; regarded as the supreme weaver of knowledge, keeper of secrets, only Minerva knew how to unite contradictions into a harmonious whole. The spinster Arachne, after a failed attempt to steal the secret of Minerva's weaving science and dethrone the Goddess, was turned into a spider. Minerva as the perfect weaver of tapestries was an excellent emblem of the century's pursuit of a Universal Language, 'the uninterrupted thread of wisdom' (1995: I, 6) uniting artists, philosophers, and scientists. But Minerva, iconographically ambiguous in Ilie's analysis of Spanish culture, also figures as the simultaneous, subtextual disruption of the Enlightenment project. Taking his cue from poststructuralist inquiry, in particular the works of Foucault and Derrida, what interests Ilie is both the disruption of the traditional methods of organizing knowledge and human perception and the supplementarity of alternative traditions that evolved side by side with Minervan reason; in particular, the symbolic and social implications of the absence or 'vanishing' of Minerva in Goya's 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos'. The pertinence of Ilie's reading for my own argument lies precisely in his concern with the displacement of Minervan reason, or its re-configuration in Goya's etching, to which we have already referred as 'a paradigmatic statement in the perception of reality'.

Let us turn now to Ilie's comparative analysis of *Capricho 43* and Goya's earlier (1798) portrait of the Spanish ilustrado Jovellanos (fig. 22). Whereas in the 'Portrait of Jovellanos' Minerva's political and civic attributes act as an icon for the politician and philosopher's Enlightenment ideals, the displacement of the goddess in the *capricho* is represented iconographically by the owl. The idealized form of Minerva is not only reconfigured, that is, substituted by that other figure or conventional emblem of rationality / wisdom, the owl, but disfigured in the owl's monstrous reproduction –the quartet of owls– and by the taxonomical monstrosity of the bats that defy rational understanding. The bat, neither bird nor mammal, 'upsets the paradigm of continuity and its taxonomical groundwork' (Ilie 1995: II, 61).[1] The appearance of three additional owls behind the human figure evokes conventional Minervan attributes –practical Reason, sage guardian of kingdoms, shield against the irrational.[2] At the same time, it evokes Ancient philosophy and hermetic and hierophantic cults. The detailed analysis of the partitioned shield of the goddess in the 'Portrait of Jovellanos' –Ilie reminds us of its indecipherability for art historians– indicates too Minerva's bipartite character: half of it depicts a warrior, the other half an indecipherable oval of darkness with arcane resonance. Whether her dualism and ambiguous symbolism signifies 'a perversion of rational wisdom or a knowledge that is more occult and perhaps more sinister than that the awakened mind knows by daylight' (Ilie, 1995: I, 40), we cannot say; only Minerva could bring together Reason and Unreason, order and chaos.

Reason, as the central and illuminating faculty of eighteenth-century, philosophy permeated all forms of knowledge; its figurative method was violently anatomical, dissecting appearance, enunciating depth, and uncovering the duplicity of the world. What the truth-claims of modern rational science concealed was the exorbitance of its own rhetoric: the fact that the monsters of the mind are a product of reason itself, a result of its own dreams, of its own excess. What *Capricho 43* sets up in the ambiguity of its title, of the human figure, and of the morphologically unclassifiable bats circling the dreamer slumped at his desk, is the paradox of knowledge itself. Deliberately uncertain, the etching's ambiguity suspends the principle of difference and identity that marks rational discourse. It reveals the discontinuities and ambiguities in both the natural world and in the perceptual process. When Reason sleeps, monsters appear (social, political, moral), but, inversely, the rationalism of the Enlightenment mind betrays its own necessarily monstrous positioning. Knowledge is contaminated by an irreducible irrational component at its core: Reason has infinite faces, already imbued and pre-figured by Unreason. Given Ilie's parallel between the mortal Arachne and the Enlightenment's equally flawed aspiration to absolute knowledge, I shall argue that it is the body that Reason traps in its tenuous and arbitrary web.

The classical body reconfigured

Capricho 65 '¿Donde vá mama?' (fig. 23) and *Capricho 52* '¡Lo que puede un sastre!' (fig. 18) serve here as a point of entry for an examination of Goya's reconfiguration of the classical body. But before I commence my analysis it is necessary to establish a definition of the classical body, however unattainable this ideal form might be. Perhaps Leonardo da Vinci's *The Vitruvian Man* (1490), which embodied 'the thesis of the perfectly expressive human form' and became 'the expression of a belief in the perfect form of the human body' (Mirzoeff, 1995: 19) contained in the symmetry of the circle and the elegant lines of the square, or the neoclassical aesthetic treatises of eighteenth-century scholars Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768) *–On the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks* (1755)- and his disciple Anton Raphael Mengs (1728-1779) *–Reflections on Beauty and Taste in Painting* (1762)–, which established Greek classical sculpture as representative of ideal beauty and perfection, are valid points of departure. According to neoclassical aesthetics, the ideal body stands upright and centred, is proportioned and symmetrical, shows restraint, conveys intellect and virtue, and is male: for the Enlightenment the perfect embodiment of the self-determined individual. 'The body *in art* [Greek statuary] becomes the body by which to measure the body in flesh' (Leppert, 1996: 207), the very perfection of the norm. In his writings Mengs 'cautioned against the imitation in painting of violent passions that "wound" the sensibility through their rupturing and ugly lines. It was only a healthy reasoning -a Neoclassical decorum- that could rightly gauge bodily beauty' (Stafford, 1991: 162). Mengs' distinction between the ugly and the beautiful, the normal and the monstrous, established a normative aesthetics that attached value to the imitation of decorous human behaviour.

As an art apprentice Goya would have had access to the prints of his teacher José Luzán y Martínez (1710-1785), which reproduced the paintings of the masters, and to pedagogical manuals[3] or loose engravings which presented studies of the human form; as a court painter and as academician, the Royal collection and the Royal Academy of San Fernando became part of his visual formation (Fig. 1).[4]

(Needless to say, Goya was also aware of the fantastic imagery of Hyeronimus Bosch and Domenico Tiepolo.) Matías de Irala's 'Modelos del cuerpo humano' (*Método sucinto y compendioso*, Madrid, 1730) provides prints with back, side and frontal views of the human body, as well as individual body parts (fig. 24). Various bodies, adult and child, male and female, are contained in individual grids, in which clear geometrical shapes delimit the proper measures of the human body and clear outlines sharply delineate the contour of the body. Proportioned, symmetrical and in classical poses, these human figures provided artists with naked diagrams of abstract bodies. 'Dictionaries, technical tracts, model books, penmanship and drawing manuals promoted', as Stafford has observed, 'a logic, or universal characteristic, of essential, teachable elements' (1997: 131). Goya, then, was familiar with works of classical sculpture through both engraved reproductions and casts after classical sculptures. His trip to Italy in the early 1770s provides art historians with another source: his drawings of sculptures of antiquity, namely the 'Farnese Hercules' (fig. 25) and the 'Belvedere Torso', recorded in the *Cuaderno italiano* (ca. 1770-71).[5] These drawings show 'how conscious he was, even in his early career, of the new style dominating artistic circles in Madrid' (Symmons, 1998: 28), while, at the same time, they also already reflect the development of an artistic idiom closer to *Los Caprichos*, 'scenes of violence and despair, grotesque masks and close-ups of sculpture reliefs of a particularly emotional or tormented nature' (1998: 33). His journey through and against artistic traditions began to take shape in his Italian sketchbook. As Stoichita and Coderch have pointed out, Goya returned to the material of the *Cuaderno*, in particular 'copies and versions in the style of the Ancients, and [...] copies in the style of Renaissance and Baroque religious art (1999: 86). I shall be exploring the latter in my analysis of *Capricho 52* and *Capricho 65*, arguing that these prints engage in a dialogue with Counter-reformation art. The notion of the ideal also needs to be seen in the light of the Announcement, discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 3, where Goya's reference to the ideal, 'formed by a selection and combination of parts that prove the artist's capacity for invention [...], carried a certain irony, since in *Los Caprichos* the combination of parts contributes, more often than not, to the formation of an anti-ideal' (Tomlinson, 1994: 142). Goya's main point of departure from contemporary aesthetic standard is his challenge to common rules, in particular to the classical body.

If we compare the anatomical illustrations of the encyclopaedia or the classical figures from model books (it is worth reminding ourselves here of the academic formation of Spanish artists in France under the supervision of the Encyclopédie master engravers, as well as the mainly utilitarian understanding of engraving in academic circles), both visual paradigms of the rational shape, to many of the bodies populating *Los Caprichos*, we find ourselves confronted with alternative accounts of the body. Unlike the classical body -clearly legible in its pure and seamless contour- or the anatomical illustrations –accurate representation for the representation of the knowable body-, we cannot attach totalizing meanings to Goya's images as the analyses of the following plates will show. Amalgamations of contorted and grotesque bodies (*Capricho 65* '¿Dónde vá mamá?'), hybrid bodies (*Capricho 63* 'Miren que graves' (fig. 26) and *Capricho 51* 'Se repulen' (fig. 27)), or entangled bodies (*Capricho 62* '¡Quién lo creyera!' (fig. 28), *Capricho 75* '¿No hay quién nos desate?'(fig. 29)) defy notions of correct anatomical representation and, by extension, the ideal serenity, composure and stasis of the classical body. Other caricaturesque figures emphasise individual, exaggerated deviations from standard bodies (*Capricho 52* 'Duendecitos' (fig. 30), *Capricho 54* 'El vergonzoso' (fig. 31)). Among the eighty etchings, there are also those which portray the human figure in more naturalistic terms, such as those in which young women are the central protagonists of the plate (*Capricho 16* 'Dios la perdone: y era su madre', *Capricho 17* 'Bien tirada está', *Capricho 32* 'Por que fue sensible') or part of a couple (*Capricho 5* 'Tal para qual', *Capricho 7* 'Ni así la distingue') or a group (*Capricho 2* 'El sí pronuncian y la mano alargan al primero que llega', *Capricho 14* 'Qué sacrificio', *Capricho 72* 'No te escaparás', *Capricho 73* 'Mejor es holgar') . But the figurative element of the compositions is unavoidably visible for the human body commands the page; one cannot fail to notice the multiplicity of physical types or the dramatic physicality of the figures, in other words, the centrality given to the body.

Although *Capricho 65* '¿Dónde va mamá?' (fig. 23) is traditionally considered a witchcraft scene, as its preliminary conception in Album B indicates,[6] my purpose here is to focus on the misshapen human figures delineated by Goya. *Capricho 65* represents an intricate amalgamation of bodies in which four naked figures rest on one another in acrobatic, impossible postures against a diffuse rural landscape. The central position of the etching is occupied by a rotundly baroque female figure, almost Rubensesque, whose mound of fat flesh is effortlessly sustained by her acolytes who carry her as if she is seated in a sedan chair, or a throne. A plausible image is rendered fantastical by Goya, who places an ordinary object, a parasol, in the hands of a cat, the fourth servant; the parasol might be interpreted as a displaced crown for this queen of witches. This voluptuous female body is sprawled and leaning against other bodies, unable to carry herself and lacking composure. Acting like the pedestal for a statue, the figure at the bottom of the plate, upper body hunched and head bent forward, resembles a monstrous inhabitant, face in his torso, of exotic lands as portrayed by the classical and the Medieval mind and later on in early sixteenth-century prints of the

New World. All the other bodies rest on him. His spread legs connote a primitive bodily posture that is replicated in the other two figures on either side of the womanly figure and given an animal replica in the feline creature at the top corner of the etching. Bodies viewed as 'primitive' traditionally suggest otherness, as printed images of native cultures have done through the centuries, shaping the European understanding of other peoples but also representing the concerns and anxieties of the European civilized viewers. Such images were fundamentally constitutive of the categorical sets through which viewers made sense of the world, and necessary to the discursive order upon which a culture is founded. Images of the 'other' and the 'self' are mutually constructed and (de)formed in a dialectical signifying process. The flawed configuration of the classical body in *Capricho 65* is supported by a human pedestal – primitive other – on which the other bodies are mounted.

The mixture of animalistic and primitivist elements also foregrounds the carnality inscribed in this etching. The iconographic codes of decorum, in particular feminine decorum, are not being observed by Goya. The gender of the figures in direct physical contact with 'mamá' is uncertain, and their sexuality is enigmatic since there is no direct view of their genitals, or in the case of the figure at the bottom, it is not specified since an owl is in their place. The motherly figure alluded to in the title is certainly not a source of nurture and support, but rather a bloated and flaccid mass. What I propose here is a comparison to a more sacred, mother figure, that of the Madonna enthroned, the visual prototype for idealized virtuous women, since the composition of the print might be said to model itself on religious imagery, so pervasive in Spanish culture during the baroque period. The demonic acolytes have replaced the formal perfection of angels, too. In representations of the Immaculate Conception and female saints, the female figures are generally depicted 'as standing figures, elevated on platforms above their kneeling adherents, and trampling a monster' (Cohen, 2004: 44). Mary is traditionally transported in a supreme throne, located in mid-air, moving up to heaven, flanked by angels; her body, 'being *assumed* into heaven' (Katz, 2001: 99), represented purity: 'Mary's assumption and immaculate conception, like her freedom from sin, sex, and bodily decay, further distanced her from human experience and, in some minds, from all humanity' (Katz, 2001: 99). Visual representations of the mystery of the Immaculate Conception were a common staple of Spanish religious art from the fifteenth-century onwards. After the Council of Trent, they became a classic of Counter-Reformation imagery, and, as an exemplary subject, their presence was still pervasive in eighteenth-century religious art. During the reign of Carlos III, the Virgin of the Immaculate Conception was proclaimed 'the monarchy's sole and special patroness' (Martínez Cuesta, 1997: 203), as announced in the opening session of the Cortes on 17 July 1760 and decreed on 16 January 1761. In order to commemorate the proclamation, the monarchy commissioned a painting on the subject from Mariano Salvador Maella (*The Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary*). Maella followed the iconography already fixed by baroque painters such as Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640), Jusepe de Ribera (1591-1652), Bartolomé Esteban Murillo (1617-1682). A brief glance at examples from these painters confirms the pictorial conventions mentioned above: Rubens' *Immaculate Conception* (1628) (fig. 32), Ribera's *Virgin of the Immaculate Conception* (1635) (fig. 33), Murillo's *Immaculate Conception* (ca. 1665-1670) (fig. 34) conform to classical depictions of this devotional image: a gracious Mary, crowned with an aura of stars, stands on a crescent moon surrounded by putti in her majestic assumption; her physical beauty expresses her purity and humility. The beholder of this image would have been delighted, instructed and moved. As part of its *propaganda fide*, the Counter-Reformation encouraged a return to more traditional forms of art. The Council of Trent restored the fundamental function of sacred imagery in the instruction of the Catholic faith and its role in animating devotion, and, in its propagandistic and didactic function, devotional imagery had to present 'clarity in subject matter, logic and order in narrative exposition, a classical sense of decorum, and dramatic effects encouraging the viewer's empathy and participation' (Moffit, 1999: 119).

A look at Goya's *Capricho 65* shows how the artist worked within and against artistic traditions. This print contrasts with the conventions of religious painting in a manner which departs drastically from the norms of idealized beauty and absolute purity and sets up an ironic visual parallel. The depiction of this mother or queen of witches goes beyond conventional witchcraft imagery and acquires a more subversive tone once Goya inscribes religious iconography into the composition of the print. Goya replays in this print both representations of baroque religiosity and Rubenesque female forms while at the same time offering a deformed and debased version of these visual traditions, tipping them over into the monstrous. Unlike the Virgins, Goya's figure does not seem to get off the ground; as such, the image is more rooted in earthiness, physicality and bodiliness. In *Capricho 65* the corporeal perfection of the radiant prototype has been replaced by a grotesque amalgamation of bodies.

Culturally endorsed imagery and culturally ingrained attitudes of the Counter-Reformation are also important in my analysis of *Capricho 52* '¡Lo que puede un sastre!' (fig. 18). Catholicism had been shaping the bodies and minds of the Spanish population since Medieval times; from the sixteenth-century onwards the Counter-Reformation provided more orthodox (and militant) religious attitudes. As I argued in Chapter 3, Catholicism was the dominant and normative ideology in eighteenth-century Spain, shaping the everyday life of aristocracy and populace alike. The reforms of the *ilustrados* came up against 'una sociedad culturalmente católica [...] y medieval' (Jiménez Lozano, 1989: 142). Minds and bodies were inextricably bound in responses to sacred images, as well as folk belief, or, to put it differently, human flesh was closely engaged with religious imagery and superstition. In *Re-forming the Body. Religion, Community and Modernity* (1997), Philip A. Mellor and Chris Shilling trace three major reformations of the body – 'the medieval body', the 'Protestant modern body' and 'the baroque modern body' – across particular eras and cultures. Taking their cue from Elias' work on the civilizing process (1939), Mellor and Shilling describe the Medieval body as volatile: 'medieval persons possessed instinctual and emotional responses to experiences and events which tended to be more impulsive, volatile and unpredictable than those of their modern counterparts' (1989: 36). A comparison can be drawn between this description and the Spanish society of the eighteenth century in order to understand not only the attempts of the Spanish *ilustrados* to reform modes of behaviour but also the individual and collective engagement of the populace with religious experiences. *Capricho 52* '¡Lo que puede un sastre!' is the print I shall be analyzing in this context.

Generically, *Capricho 52* can be interpreted as a devotional print of sorts, a meta-commentary on the part of Goya on contemporary religious prints so popular among different sectors of the population. This religious scene portrays a pious young woman kneeling in front of a gigantic figure, looking at it with ecstatic devotion. Other believers show the same religious fervour for the priest-like figure; their facial expressions convey their devoutness, their bodies their submissiveness and humility. This crowd of worshippers arguably represents a communal experience of the sacred. But the object of their faith, though, is not a 'real' priest. Concealed behind the habit, there is a tree, trunk and branches giving human form to the pious fraud. The branches of this tree stand for the risen arms of a priest in preaching mode. The uneducated masses, the image seems to tell us, are seduced by deceptive visual appearances which perpetuate the (in)visibility of tradition.[7] The monstrous flying creatures flanking the 'priest' convey an eerie, supernatural air to the scene.[8] Admittedly, Goya is criticizing the priesthood's exploitation of popular faith. The cloaked tree, as the title indicates, is a human fabrication, '¡Lo que puede un sastre!'; in other words, this fraudulent 'body' is a discursive construction of Catholicism. The scene is reminiscent of baroque paintings of apparitions: 'the formula adopted by Goya is similar to those found in Counter-Reformation paintings that portray apparitions, except that the theophany is shown to be an illusion' (Stoichita and Coderch, 1999: 88). External appearances and excessive, superstitious forms of religious fervour are therefore the targets of Goya's attack according to the manuscript commentaries: 'en el mundo se adora un leño vestido por un sastre, porque sólo nos contentamos con la exterioridad' (Calcografía Nacional in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np); 'la superstición hace adorar un tronco vestido al público ignorante' (López de Ayala in Sayre, 1974: 108). The Biblioteca Nacional calls attention to the idolatrous attitudes not only of worshippers but also of producers of religious imagery: 'la superstición general hace que todo un pueblo se prosterne y adore con temor a un tronco cualquiera vestido de tronco'.[9] Idolatry, superstition and witchcraft are conflated in Goya's etching. But I would like to redirect our attention to the group of worshippers being portrayed in this image since Goya provides an affective and empirical moment in the real lives of the populace, reminding us of the somatic experience of the sacred, of the emotional engagement of the populace with sacred imagery. The volatile bodies of Medieval Europe, immersed 'in the natural and supernatural world of demons, spirits and angels' (Mellor and Shilling, 1997: 8), are not that far away from the mindset and corporeal experiences of the volatile bodies of eighteenth-century Spain. It seems to me that overlooking and disavowing the role of these bodies in the production of knowledge is to deny other ways of behaving and gaining knowledge. Their desire to believe is what forms their rationale. Goya borrows the affective moments inscribed in devotional art as if to 'awaken strong emotions and make the beholder understand, believe, desire' (Knudsen, 2000: 15).

One can intuit another disquieting image in which the roots of the tree are firmly embedded in the ground: the 'arbre encyclopédique'. As we shall see later on in this chapter, modern, rational science also depends on a fictitious structure, the tree of knowledge, which can only manifest itself under the guise of abstract and ideal representations. As I discussed in reference to model books and anatomical plates at the beginning of this section, the body was ideated in the abstract. The insurmountable tension between the abstract concept of the Enlightenment (as well as of religion) and the concrete body is being addressed by Goya in this etching. In its privileging of mind over flesh, of disembodied reason over 'troublesome emotions, feelings and intuitions which race around the body' (Mellor and Shilling, 1997: 46), the Enlightened reformers did not engage other bodies: the illiterate, the superstitious and the impoverished. I shall return to this point in Chapter 5 in the context of Goya's engagement with the notions of 'engaño' (deception) and the enlightened project of 'desengaño' (discovery of deception)

Hybridization

The hybrid is perhaps the most familiar type of imaginary monster as it is represented in different religious, mythological and artistic traditions. In these discourses hybrid creatures and physical deformities are to be interpreted as a sign of moral corruption and come to concretise moral abstractions or allegories; however, the hybrid in its intermixture of different categories introduces ontological uncertainty and the questioning of boundaries (human / animal, ideal / monstrous). My theoretical engagement with Canguilhem, Foucault and Derrida in Chapter 2 comes into play here. Monsters always defy categories, norms, rules, systems of thought; the images analysed in this section represent 'disturbing hybrids whose externally incoherent bodies resist attempts to include them in the classificatory order of things' (Cohen, 1996: 6). To be faced with the monstrous hybrids of *Los Caprichos* is to enter a ceaseless questioning, to establish provisional responses and conclusions, and hence to affirm provisional meanings.

In the same way that for the Medieval viewer the hybrid might have looked ridiculous and provoked laughter, as well as incarnating sinfulness and moral impurity, the Enlightened viewer might also have had a mixed response to hybrid creatures: on the one hand, they might have regarded them with derision and disbelief as reminders of superstitious and popular beliefs, while, on the other, their rationalist desire for established taxonomies and regulated order would have been unsettled. Notwithstanding their spiritual, moral, or comical effect on the viewer, 'crude hybrids, and their monstrous behaviour, belong to the world of the body and its basest functions' (Bovey, 2002: 44-5), to the bestial nature within humans. The conflictual status of the hybrid calls attention to the desires of the body. In a reference to the Great Chain of Being in Chapter 2, I argued that man in a sense is a strange hybrid monster for he is placed as a member of two orders of being at the same time, human and animal, and he is not at home in either order(see Lovejoy, 1985: 199). *Los Caprichos* abound in hybrid creatures that disrupt the integrity of the human form and draw attention to this anxiety. Hybridisation is manifested in manifold ways in the collection; however, for the purposes of my discussion and for clarity, I shall refer to two different types of representations of the hybrid: hybrid creatures, which are composites of different animals, and intertwined bodies, in which two human bodies come together. In the first group, human and bestial features are blended together in *Capricho 63* 'Miren que graves' (fig. 26), humans are transmogrified into terrifying otherworldly creatures in *Capricho 48* 'Soplones' (fig. 35), *Capricho 51* 'Se repulen' (fig. 27) and *Capricho 64* 'Buen viaje (fig. 36)', or disfigured human figures cross over into the monstrous in *Capricho 67* 'Aguarda que te unten' (fig. 37). Others, like *Capricho 19* 'Todos caerán' (fig. 38), *20* 'Ya van desplumados' (fig. 39) and *21* 'Cuál la descañonan' (fig. 40), portray bird-men and bird-women as protagonists of scenes of prostitution and sexual guile in which women prey on men and men prey on women. Let us focus first on 'Miren que graves'.

In 'Miren que graves' (fig. 26), the mixture of species is taken to extremes: two beasts, with the bodies of bears and the heads of mules, carry their burdens, one a human body with the head and talons of an eagle, the other a human body with the head of a donkey. They are placed in an indeterminate space –an arena? a fair?- in which a blurred crowd is witness to their bestial display. The deformation of human form in *Capricho 63* epitomizes the violation of categorical norms; in their corporeal monstrosity, the hybrid creatures depicted here are an anathema to enlightened reason, as I shall shortly argue. But first we should briefly consider traditional readings of this print in order to understand some of the meanings it articulates. *Capricho 63* can be placed in relation to learned and popular images and sayings criticizing social abuse[10] and representing the theme of the world turned upside down.[11] The artist proposes a similar visual take in another print, *Capricho 42* 'Tú que no puedes' (fig. 6), where two peasants are carrying two donkeys, albeit this image is conveyed in more familiar terms than 'Miren que graves'. Allegorical readings of the etchings are unquestionable, for Goya offers visions of an unnatural social order and vicious deformations of human failings such as idleness[12] and ignorance. What have critics said about the crowd in the distant background? Very little, in fact, they either seem to be acclaiming the bestial creatures, and, by extension, participating in their errors, or crying out against them ('¿Es cierto que les aclaman? ¿No es posible que clamen contra ellos?' (Helman, 1993: 109)). They might be, on the other hand, mere spectators in an arena or a market square – indeed, popular lore for monsters in fairs and shows is well documented. Or, in a more politically inflected reading, it could be said that the populace is voicing their protest against power. Thus the print is at the confluence of several discourses, among them, reformist critiques of relations of power and dominance, symbolic associations with morality, and popular taste for monsters. However, conceptually, the monstrous is operating as a deeply disruptive force which displaces and troubles familiar readings. The hybrid creatures in *Capricho 63* epistemologically undermine the separation of the human and the animal, of the normal and the monstrous. In their display of human aspects, they are all too human. The ontological and epistemological uncertainty introduced by these hybrid monsters, therefore, unsettles any fixed binarism, questioning static categories of knowledge and systematic structurations.

In order to complete my discussion on hybrid creatures, I now turn to *Capricho 51* 'Se repulen' (fig. 27), where the corporeal monstrosity depicted by Goya is again all too human. On a first view, the image calls into question the boundary between human and other animals. Two human-like figures are sprucing themselves up, while a hybrid creature, half-eagle, half-human, oversees the pedicure (or is just waiting its turn) or screens their unsightly activities. Critics rightly interpret these figures as representations of goblins, spirits, or witches, thereby inserting the print within the theme of witchcraft[13] or anticlerical criticism.[14] The ghoulish figures of *Capricho 51* also stand, according to the manuscripts, for specific social types, which are the target of Goya's satire. Two examples should suffice to illustrate such identifications: 'Los empleados que roban al estado, se ayudan unos a otros. El jefe de ellos levanta erguido su cuello, y les hace sombra con sus alas monstruosas' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo, 1993: np); 'Los ladrones y pícaros, se tapan y disculpan unos a otros' (Calcografía Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np).[15] As we can see from these interpretations, the ghoulish figures of *Capricho 51* become discursively mobile, refusing to stay in place. I would like to shift our attention to issues of corporeality and monstrosity inscribed in the image, and a first step is to consider the hybrid creatures depicted by Goya as instances of vice. Tomlison follows this line of argument in her reading of *Capricho 51* for she sees the etching as a grotesque portrayal of sensual 'delight and vanity' (1994: 140) in which Goya is arguably providing the viewer with a moral lesson by pointing out that vanity is 'a trait observed in others, but one that we rarely notice in ourselves' (1994: 140).[16] These goblins, as Tomlinson defines the figures, become embodiments of vice.

But let us attempt a different reading of the etching. In *The Civilizing Process* (1939), Elias taught us that the paring of one's fingernails, like the performance and the speaking about other bodily functions, were part of 'historical transformations in behavioural codes and forms of affect control' (Shilling, 2003: 151) in which bodily parts and functions, as well as impulses and emotions, are progressively hidden from public view. Purging the body of its corporeality and regulating passions and emotions has been a fundamental aspect of the restructuring of manners and the creation of civilized bodies throughout the centuries.[17] And the Spanish eighteenth century is no exception to this process.[18] (Note I say 'process', for the civilized, as Elias observes, 'has grown out of that which we call uncivilized' (Elias, 1978: 59)). In 'Se repulen', the figure on the left makes a very 'civilized' use of the instrument in his hand, a pair of scissors, while he is carefully and deftly paring the toenails of his 'uncivilized' companion. The process of sprucing themselves up is conveyed in the feet of the figures, one neat and tidy at the bottom right hand corner of the image, the other in the process of becoming a clean and proper body. I shall return to this notion of the clean and proper body in my discussion of *Capricho 59* 'Y aun no se van' fig. 41) in the context of Julia Kristeva's notion of abjection; for the time being suffice to say that nail clippings are among those bodily excretions that are produced within the body to be expelled from it: as Grosz says, '"proper" sociality and subjectivity are based on the expulsion of the improper, the unclean, and the disorderly elements of its corporeal existence' (Grosz, 1990: 86). The learning and performing of socially appropriate skills which delineate civilized conduct is inextricably linked to the unclean and the corrupt.

As abstract embodiments of vice, if one follows Tomlinson's interpretation, the figures of 'Se repulen' are to be interpreted as monstrously different: their bodily actions embody absolute otherness. But absolute otherness would reinstate a binary opposition for the civilized body can only take up a position by assuming himself free from the uncivilized, monstrous other, denying or repressing other possibilities. But this claim itself is dependent upon what is denied or repressed. As Shildrick notes,

> So long as the monstrous remains the absolute other in its corporeal difference it poses few problems; in other words it is so distanced in its difference that it can be clearly put into an oppositional category of not me. Once, however, it begins to resemble those of us who lay claim to the primary term of the identity, or to reflect back aspects of ourselves that are repressed, then its indeterminate status – neither wholly self nor wholly other – becomes deeply disturbing. (Shildrick, 2002: 2-3)

The hybrid creatures, unnatural couplings and conjoined twins captured in Medieval bestiaries, wonder books, medical treatises and popular prints are reconfigured and reappropriated in *Los Caprichos*. While they retain early religious connotations, Goya inscribes them in the sociopolitical context of late eighteenth-century Spain. *Capricho 2* 'El sí pronuncian y la mano alargan al primero que llega' (fig. 42) and *Capricho 14* 'Qué sacrificio' (fig. 43) arguably represent unnatural couplings, albeit of a social type. Among the second group of hybrid bodies, that is, intertwined bodies, *Capricho 62* '¡Quién lo creyera!' (fig. 28) and *Capricho 75* '¿No hay quién nos desate?' (fig. 29) present entangled couples, whose union is presided by monstrous creatures, unidentifiable feline animals in the case of the former, a gigantic owl in the latter. Whereas *Capricho 75* clearly depicts a man and a woman tied to each other at the waist, *Capricho 62*, like *Capricho 65*, poses a similar enigma as to the gender of the entwined figures.[19] Whether fighting or copulating, these two figures clutch each other's bodies violently unaware (or fully aware) of the monsters about to prey on them; perhaps the abominable creatures can be said to give concrete form to the predatory aspects of their passion and, by extension, their moral depravity. Some critics (Helman, 1993: 126-127; Wilson-Bureau, 1992: 282) have suggested a visual representation of a literary source, the Spanish translations of Milton's *Paradise Lost* by Cadalso, Jovellanos and Meléndez Valdés: the moment in which the fallen angels are cast out from Heaven and on their way to Hell. There is no heroic fight nor a balanced, orchestrated movement in the characters depicted here, just the sheer physicality of the body and its bestiality. '¿No hay quién nos desate?' portrays the union of man and woman in an unusual manner tied to a trunk. This is the excruciating image of two tied-up bodies. Compositionally, the male and the female body are represented as two intersecting lines that form a cross, a shape prolonged by the extended wings of the owl. Are they a husband and a wife pulling in different directions? Is this the representation of an unwanted union?[20] If so, Goya does not tie them to the convention of contemporary satirical imagery of marriages of convenience (which are arguably parodied in the aforementioned *Capricho 2* and *Capricho 14*).[21] Or, is this a scene of rape as the rope tied around the woman's ankles and the despairing expression in her face seems to suggest? The male figure, in fact, seems to be carrying her off by force. If hybridization is traditionally understood as signifying abnormal or sinful behaviours, Goya makes visible and denounces the deformities and vices of unenlightened eighteenth-century Spain. But these bodies are 'fused' together, they are locked in a mutually constitutive relationship. Like the conjoined twins represented in prodigy books and broadsheets or displayed in the marketplace, their inseparability poses a challenge as to the body-image of the singular individual subject.

In the age of encyclopedism, the (uniform) human body represented 'the organic paradigm of all complex unions' (Stafford, 1991: 12). As a privileged model or model object, the body, more specifically the classical body, acquired the status of keeper of meaning and essential secrets. Analytic dissection and synthetic reconstruction became an objective standard against which the body, affective and mutable, was judged. Yet the paradigmatic anatomical method of the Enlightenment, a violent, adversarial 'opening up' of the subject, not only created truths but also administered the powers of exclusion and control, as our discussion of Foucault's work demonstrated. Through the work of Foucault on the asylum, the clinic and the prison, I traced how the classical age saw the development of disciplinary techniques of power to establish social control of the body. Modern, rational discourses established dividing practices (mad/sane, sick/healthy, criminal/law-abiding) which framed and determined which bodies were normal and which were abnormal. Normal bodies therefore became the (normative) standard against which other bodies – abnormal, deviant- were defined. The body is a victim of the Enlightenment project in that it is already secondary to the mind.

Natural science and the language of empiricism was the epistemic ideal of the eighteenth century. This resulted in a drive towards biological epitomization, a reductive and essentialist representation of the body shed of its materiality. It is precisely the Reasoned corrective of an immutable bodily form that Goya questions. Stafford's argument that the anatomical figure is 'turned into a lithic, even mineralogical specimen' is particularly pertinent for the analysis of Goya's *Capricho 59* 'Y aún no se van' (fig. 41), which sets up an antagonism between the Enlightenment's ideal and its fleshy approximation. In the print, a ghoulish assembly of figures is depicted pushing against a huge tombstone which seems about to crush them. In Spanish the word 'losa' also means 'burden', which brings into the etching another meaning: the crushing burden of human mortality.

The dramatic contrast between the huddled, bent figures and the sheer diagonal 'spine' of the stone, suggests the artist's dispute with the textual / representational ideals of the time. Science as a displaced theology, as the Reader of the Book of Nature, might be seen as denying or building over the inchoate mass of human fallibility. The tombstone might be seen as pronouncing death upon the superstitious and irrational beliefs of the populace. Open to metaphorical readings, the figures become embodiments of abstract notions such as death, superstition, or the supernatural. But these bodies are irremediably physical: Goya recuperates their bodiliness. My analysis of *Capricho 59* derives from Julia Kristeva's concept of abjection in *Powers of Horror* (1982). The bodily excess of the unsightly human mass portrayed in this *capricho* provokes horror and disgust. This reaction 'is symptomatic of our cultural inability to accept the body's materiality, its limits, its "natural" cycles and its mortality' (Grosz, 1990: 91). The tombstone acts as a border for those monstrous figures that threaten to cross it, possibly a moral limit if we are to accept one of the texts accompanying the etching, which reads 'La muerte va dejando caer sobre nosotros la losa del sepulcro, y con todo, no nos enmendamos'.[22] The contorted shape of the figure leaning against the stone struggles against its weight: feet, hands, and chest exert all their fragile force. An old woman cowers in fear; amidst gaping eyes and mouths, a convulsing body lies on the ground – a corpse?[23] It is as if the bodies had crawled out from under this rock; yet it is unclear whether the stone is being raised -along with the resurrected figures- or dropped. There is no epitaph written on this stone, no engravings on its surface, but there is a caption: 'Y aún no se van' (And Still They Don't Go). Roberto Alcalá Flecha's 'Vampirism in the work of Goya' (1993: 258-267) is an example of a reading of *Capricho 59* as a satirical commentary on contemporary beliefs in vampires – hence a reading which takes for granted the 'resurrection' of the figures. He situates and reads the etching within the period's intellectual and popular consideration of the vampire in Europe and its reception in Spain in the works of Feijoo, Cadalso, and Fernández de Moratín. According to Alcalá Flecha, the ambiguity of the title might be clarified by the titles of preparatory drafts, 'La Trampa' ('The trap') and 'Salga lo que saliere' ('Whatever May Emerge'), which draw attention to the huge slab. This would be a reference to the belief of cultivated minds in the impossibility of a dead body rising from the grave and then coming back to it without removing the gravestone. Alcalá Flecha admits that, although Goya's ultimate intention is out of our reach, the artist's point of departure is the visualization of a graphic joke (1993: 263). Goya's etching, then, would be an illustration of this absurd belief. Alcalá Flecha traces the literature and the cultural ideas of Goya's contemporary milieu in order to find a rational and cohesive explanation for the vampiric figures: the origin, the point of departure, for *Capricho 59* would respond to a graphically literal and metaphorical use of the word 'vampire' in reference to political and religious classes. To follow this line of argument would be to miss the *capricho*'s interrogation of representation itself. Alcalá Flecha's concern with the genealogy of the work fixes its scope and its boundaries. How are we to view the deliberate ambiguity of the Goyaesque vampire as well as the caption? The discontinuity between picture and text is arguably an instance of Reason and its alter-ego Unreason.

The Spine of the Book -Symbolic order, religious discourse, discursive rectitude, the scientific lexicon- would bind the body, delimiting its boundaries. Abjection is a relationship to a *bound*ary and represents what has been jettisoned out of that boundary, its other side. In Kristeva's words, abjection is:

> [a] weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and which crushes me. On the edge of nonexistence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me. There, abject and abjection are my safeguards. The primers of my culture. (1982: 2)

What threatens the 'clean and proper' -the paradigm of the 'clean and proper body'- must be cast out, excluded. For Kristeva, the symbolic order, and the acquisition of a sexual and psychical identity within it, can only exist by delimiting the body. The activity of exclusion is necessary to guarantee that the subject takes up his or her proper place in relation to the symbolic. The impossibility of purity is the paradox of the abject: what you seek to exclude is constitutive of you. In Grosz's words, 'abjection is a reaction to the recognition of the impossible but necessary transcendence of the subject's corporeality, and the impure, defiling elements of its uncontrollable materiality' (1990: 108). The body is a neglected entity in that its nature is cleared of the dung of life, and 'it is divorced from any sense of the fleshed "natural" body' (1990: 108). Kristeva's notion of the abject straddles themes and methods established in Chapter 2, namely acts of structuration and exclusionary practices that mark and exclude the monstrous body. As the unacknowledged condition of the dominant term, reason, the excluded term body returns 'as material and theoretical protagonist in [...] resistance to an authority already in place' (Smith, 1992: 2). Goya reminds us in 'Y aún no se van' that, despite the privileging of an abstract consideration of a uniform human body over the unruly body, corporeality and the materiality of the flesh do not go away. Bodies as bodies still do not go away.

As the analysis of these plates has shown, the ideal form of neo-classicism was haunted by uncontrollable somatic desires, the suffering fact of the human condition, in other words, the possibility of disease, death, anomaly, monstrosity. Once again critics invoke *Capricho 43* 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' (fig. 1) not only to highlight Goya's reconfiguration of, or challenge to, the classical body but also to refer to his work as paradigmatic of the fault lines inherent in neo-classical representations of the body:

> The Neo-Classical drawing of the body was fraught with danger, sexuality and potential failure, expressed in Goya's famous print *The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters*. If Reason were to slip for a moment and the dangerous excesses of the imagination allowed free rein, then the cautious construction of a perfect body by the elimination of imperfect detail could break down, releasing the monsters of Unreason. (Mirzoeff, 1995: 192)

Enlightenment thought aimed, in Stafford's words, 'to even out the odd' (1997: 466). That was its moral task whether in art or medicine. Setting its ideal according to the model and pattern of the contemporary natural sciences, the physiology of man –our physical organization– embodied the ideal of morphological perfection, representing Enlightenment's belief in the invisible, innate property shared by all individuals belonging to the same category. Thus biological anomalies, monstrous organizations destabilised the mimetic maxim of 'like produces like'. Attempts to construct a perfect body, to know the truth about the body could be achieved through the imitation of decorous human behaviour or alternatively informing the beholder about appropriate bodily behaviours and the proper management of appetites. The ancient and classical language of physiognomy provided ruling elites with a way of learning about, as well as seeing, unruly and disorderly behaviours. It is to this interpretative science that I now turn in the context of the Spanish Enlightenment.

Physiognomical modes of reasoning / Body criticism

The previous pages have considered Goya's reconfigurations of the classical body as well as notions of an ideal bodily comportment and behaviour so that in the remainder of the chapter I can locate the collection in relation to physiognomical traditions and physiognomical modes of reasoning. Physiognomy as body criticism was a 'rational' method of constructing knowledge. But in the pursuit of essences, its abstract, anatomical method offered a reductive image of the body. And a sinister one too, 'since its adherents claimed privileged powers of detection' (Stafford, 1997: 84). Goya was fully aware of the thematic and methodological consequences governing such body criticism.

The somatic has provided a point of entry into a larger physical and moral universe since the beginnings of Western civilization. Writers and painters have linked bodily qualities, the physical, to certain behaviours, the moral. There is a long tradition – and certainly a human impulse – in linking beauty with virtue and ugliness with vice: from Aristotle to the Medieval world right to the Enlightenment, the ancient Greco-Roman tradition relating the outer appearance of man to signs of his character resurfaces in *Essays on Physiognomy* (1781), a ten-volume study on physiognomy by the Swiss Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801). Here I understand physiognomy as an 'indication of character through the facial features and forms of the head and body' (Cowling, 1989: 9). Within physiognomical modes of reasoning, vice resembled such formless, ill-defined multiplicity, and was deemed both evil and ugly. During the Enlightenment, Stafford notes, 'the body was intimately tied to the establishment and upholding of ethical norms for ugliness and beauty' (1991: 16). It also served opposing political and cultural projects in their communication of moral messages since the belief in a relationship between physical and moral traits was shared alike by conservative and revolutionary forces.

In the case of Spain, the Enlightened reformers saw the traditionalists as an obstacle to the reformation of the individual and social body, while the traditionalists, in turn, perceived the reformers as a threat to their beliefs and values. The cultural, political and ideological differences between reformists and traditionalists have already been addressed in Chapter 3. In their constructions of normal and deviant bodies, the body became a key site for the communication of meaning and for the legitimation of us / them constructions. Representations of the 'other' (whether reformers or traditionalists) reflected the fears and anxieties of specific social groups and mobilized different cultural modes of seeing, which encouraged viewers to see and think in terms of binary distinctions. I shall be focusing on the reformists' discursive production of monsters through the grid of phsyiognomics. But before I turn to Goya's engagement with physiognomical modes of reasoning, it is important to bear in mind how traditionalists perceived the Enlightened reformer so that *Los Caprichos* can be seen in relation to this conflicting contextual frame. My analysis of *Capricho 39* 'Hasta su abuelo' (fig. 9) and *Capricho* 37 'Si sabrá más el discípulo' (fig. 44) will show how Goya inscribes reformist and traditionalist ways of seeing within the same etching since the image depicted represents both the nobility's perception of themselves and the reformers' perception of the aristocracy.

In the words of Jiménez Lozano, a whole way of life, Spanish Catholicism - 'la españolidad-catolicidad' – was under threat for the 'cristiano viejo', the 'hidalgo', the regular clergy and the populace:

> esa identidad absoluta entre la catolicidad y españolidad se había originado a finales del siglo XV y, luego, se había consolidado inmediatamente hasta un punto en que los *signa fidei* eran los mismos signos de la pertenencia a la españolidad: señales biológicas y antropológicas, castizas. (1989: 145)

Facing the 'enlightened other', the traditionalists would look for those external signs – 'palabras, gestos, vestidos, olores, y peinados negadores de su propia manera de ser, su identidad, su antropología' (1989: 146), as well as those cultural artefacts – 'pinturas, láminas, estampas, y objetos varios en los que hay una figuración erótica, política o anticlerical' (1989: 148) – that threatened their ways of life and cultural forms. A body signalling difference was to be regarded as a threat to the putative (traditionalist or reformist) norm. Such body criticism also played a prominent role in the reformist project.

The promotion of reforms in education and the reformation of manners during the Spanish Enlightenment was informed, as Rebecca Haidt claims in *Embodying Enlightenment* (1998), by classical epistemologies, which conditioned

> both the kinds of questions asked about bodies by authors whose productions aimed at the reform of institutions (such as those implicated in the training of doctors) and practices (such as comportment), and the ways in which bodily experiences might be represented in both authoritative and popular texts generated towards these ends. (1998: 2)

Haidt focuses solely on representations of the male body and constructions of masculinity in the works of Enlightened reformers in order to show how Enlightenment is inscribed in and designated, that is, embodied, by the virtuous or aberrant male body. One example of the use of physiognomics as body criticism in the Spanish Enlightenment is the 'literatura de petimetres', which counter-posed, Haidt argues, the 'hombre de bien' (the gentleman, marked by an ideal of bodily comportment) to the 'petimetre' (the fop, transgressively feminine, animal, or foreign) in order to construct the 'ideal' subject, the 'hombre de bien', who conformed to dominant modes of 'proper' behaviour.[24] Physiognomical approaches to the depiction, and knowledge, of man could be seen as a way of bringing bodies – and minds – into alignment, thus legitimising various us-them constructions. The cultural problematic explored through such an instance of embodiment might be said to exemplify the Enlightenment project: brought face-to-face with the figures, a contemporary reader would draw salutary lessons from the described disorderly bodies: reasoned forms facing unreasoned desires, reasoned forms versus unruly pleasures. 'Those who are irrational, who are not controlled by logos', writes Haidt, 'fall outside that system of mutual recognizance sustaining virtue and the development of "good men"' (1998: 173). In this respect, the rhetorical politics of physiognomy functioned to recognize and categorize the monstrous other by establishing the civilized gentleman in opposition to an uncivilized 'other' by making that other monstrous and thereby fixed and characterizable. This line of argument sees monstrous bodies as pedagogical tools that help ensure that viewers will not be like them, otherwise punishment awaits. But, as we have argued, the difference between civilized and uncivilized originates in process.

As Leppert has observed, the science of physiognomy 'was not only widely practiced as a social science, it was as well *an art project about bodies*' (1996: 206, my italics). Visual aesthetics, therefore, also participated in a public and moralistic agenda in its effort to define a normative human nature by producing representations that would serve as (utilitarian) instruments for the dissemination of enlightened ideals, as I argued in Chapter 3, and for the ideological and moral regeneration of individuals (and by extension the nation), as Haidt claims. Although mainly concerned with literature, *Embodying Enlightenment* touches upon the visual arts too in the context of philosophical ideas concerning the role of the senses in the acquisition of knowledge and refers explicitly to Goya's paintings the 'Maja desnuda' (1798-1800) and the 'Maja vestida' (1798-1805), though no reference is made to *Los Caprichos*. According to Haidt, these two paintings participated in 'the private production and consumption' (1998: 64) of erotic tales, erotic poetry, and erotic images among the *ilustrados*. Samaniego's *Jardín de Venus*, Nicolás Fernández de Moratín's *Arte de las putas*, or Meléndez Valdés's *Los besos de amor* are amongst the texts written (and read) as 'a means of production of enlightened knowledge about the sensing body's truth' (1998: 64). Haidt's concerns with the body, however, may arguably offer a different shading to Goya's engagement with the body criticism attached to physiognomy in general.

By looking at physiognomical traditions I will be treading familiar territory since the physiognomical grid has been applied to readings of *Los Caprichos* by critics and art historians throughout the decades.[25] In his 1953 seminal study *Goya's Caprichos: Beauty, Reason, and Caricature*, José López Rey authoritatively asserted that the series, as well as others of Goya's contemporaneous works such as 'The Magic Mirror' drawings (1797-9), 'must be linked with the contemporary interest in the physiognomical characterization of human passions' (1973: 115). In Goya's use of physiognomical traditions, López Rey saw an unproblematic 'rationalist attitude' (1973: 128), for the artist -and here the critic reads the series through the Announcement- 'expressed his conviction that human failings were the result of lack of enlightenment and the prevalence of reason over passion' (1973: 134). Held, on her part, links Goya's use of physiognomics to pre-literate and folkloric forms of knowledge ('belief in animistic ties with nature' (1987: 53)). More recently, Stoichita and Coderch have considered Goya's interest in the physiognomic analogy between man and animals in their analysis of 'The Magic Mirror' series (1999: 59-73), highlighting Goya's innovative interpretation of Lavaterian physiognomical methods through the collapsing of a classical method of representation, since Goya suppresses in his specular metaphors the 'step by step, face by face' gradual transformation from animal to human, thus 'revealing the gap between "illusion" and "truth"' (1999: 68). Through an analysis of two etchings of the asinine series, *Capricho 39* 'Hasta su abuelo' and *Capricho 37* 'Si sabrá más el discípulo',[26] I would like to take Stoichita's and Coderch's views further by taking issue with 17th-century and early to mid-18th-century concepts of representation (Foucault's 'classical' episteme), as well as with certain epistemological assumptions underlying the science of physiognomy.

A few physiognomical or 'type' representations which read for identification will be the focus of our analysis. The theme of the asinine in *Los Caprichos*, directed to exposing and condemning the Spanish nobility at the end of the century, lends itself most obviously to a social and moral reading.[27] Education and ignorance, social abuse and oppression, or the genealogical obsessions of a sector of the population are among Goya's ostensible targets in the plates devoted to the asinine subject. Even the moral responsibility of the artist is at stake in *Capricho 39* for some critics: 'the maintenance of such an aristocratic system is also the responsibility of artists whose transformations of its ugliness into more pleasing images also acquiesces in its irrationality' (Soufas, 1986: 322). As a metaphorical representation of popular sayings, 'No seas burro' (Don't be an ass) and 'el muy burro' (the great oaf), the etchings can be understood within a tradition that partakes, in Teresa Lorenzo's words, of the 'symbols and peculiar logic of Carnival language' (1989: xciii).[28] These etchings belong, of course, to a long tradition of poking fun at man's foibles and pretensions. On the other hand, it depicts in a metaphorical and satirical way how people understand reality in accordance with their own assumptions. Let us focus on *Capricho 39* 'Hasta su abuelo', resisting however the invitation to take the literal meanings offered by the manuscript captions and explanations: 'A este pobre animal le han vuelto loco los genealogistas y reyes de armas. No es él solo' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np) and 'Los preciados de nobles, suelen ser todos burros hasta el quinto abuelo' (Calcografía Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np).

Such scriptorial pointers do not contain or exhaust the scope of Goya's dispute with the institutional preoccupations of his time. In particular, I wish to argue that the 17th-century and early to mid-18th-century concept of representation is being potentially challenged. The drawings, preparatory drafts, and final etching of *Capricho 39*, which details a mule in human attire uncomfortably seated in his study, 'reading' a book, might be linked back to conventional portraits of contemplative figures in conventional settings for meditation and reflection. The final version of the etching, as in several of the early drafts, depicts the mule looking out towards the viewer. The continuity between the donkey's eye and the page, between vision and text, is broken by the momentary pose of the model. The only exception to this pose is the preparatory drawing of 1797-98, in which the anthropomorphic figure, hooves on text as if reading braille, is shown in profile. This scene of self-absorption, with its hint at the blindness of the reader (the pages of the pictured text are blank), is in keeping with the theme of ignorant self-assurance running through the compositions. In the final version of the etching, the book held open to view displays a pictorial taxonomy of asinine figures. The mimetic relationship established between the pictured reader and the 'words' in the text corresponds to eighteenth-century assumptions on the nature of the sign and signification. It does not only correspond, then, to 'genealogy' in its obsessive courtly guise of pure lineages and noble roots (the heraldic emblem figured on the study desk suggests as much), but also to a discursive organization symptomatic of the logocentric drive towards uncontaminated, unproblematized categories. Like the bats' morphological ambiguity in *Capricho 43*, the hybrid creature disrupts the continuity of identifiable categories. Identifying itself in the book, performing the cognitive operation of reading for identification, the anthropomorphic figure seems assured of the semiotic transparency of language. The figure of *Capricho 39* is looking for sameness and difference, which suggests Foucault's thesis concerning the altered representation of reality in the eighteenth century and the shift from a discourse of resemblance to a discourse of identity and difference. The humanized donkey, a manifest contradiction, destabilizes the rational representation of reality; a legible methodology whose organization and homogeneity portrayed in the monochromatic uniformity and linear disposition of the asinine figures on the page is coextensive with representation itself. Goya's altered representations of the body fracture the classical body and parallel in the same way 'the cognitive fault-lines detected by Foucault in both Classical and Enlightenment mentalities' (Ilie, I, 1995: 194). Such contradictions and fault-lines open up the possibility of reconfiguring received meanings of the monstrous in *Los Caprichos.*

The genealogical theme of 'Hasta su abuelo' relates, as I have been arguing, among other issues, to inherited conceptual systems. The print represents the idealized and absolutized self-willed perception of a specific sector of the population, the noble, the 'hidalgo' or, more generally, the 'castizo', as Jiménez Lozano puts it: 'la imagen de la propia identidad individual y colectiva absolutamente idealizada y a la que se presta una adhesion vital' (1989: 140). The same operation of reading for identification is at work in *Capricho 37* 'Si sabrá más el discípulo' (fig. 44). *Capricho 37*, however, offers a different version of genealogical forms of identity within the context of a more general view on education, namely, the relationship between master and disciples.[29] The print depicts a visual lesson in which an ass-donkey is teaching a class of young ass-pupils. There is an air of gravity about this teacher: he looks self-assured and lofty, his elegance is sartorial, his manners are solemn, and the cane in his left hoof is a sign of authority. This is the first lesson as the multiple imprint of the letter 'A' in the open book indicates, as well as an early impression of *auctoritas* on the younger generation. One can assume that the textual authority of classical authors, the pedagogical method here depicted, will inform the conduct and habits of these ass-pupils, as well as legitimate a certain way of understanding and perceiving the world. Authority and Tradition, the image seems to suggest, will be firmly imprinted in the bodies and minds of these pupils. The repeated bray of the 'A' grounds their knowledge and perception; conduct arises by habit, Goya tells us. The notion of 'habitus', as developed by Elias (1939) (and later on by Pierre Bourdieu (1984)), is central for the understanding of the body – a reminder that the reform of the human being is the basis for social reform. 'Habitus', write Mellor and Shilling, are 'those pre-cognitive, embodied dispositions which promote particular forms of human orientation to the world, organize each generations' senses and sensualities into particular hierarchies, and predispose people into particular ways of knowing and acting' (1997: 19-20). Admittedly, a certain pedagogical idea is at stake in this *capricho*. Both contemporary interpreters and recent critics have rightly identified the explicit critique of education. It is addressed in the manuscripts: 'un maestro burro, sólo puede sacar burriquitos' (Calcografía Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np); 'un maestro burro no puede enseñar más que a rebuznar' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Carrete Parrondo, 1994: np); and accounted for in recent criticism: the print represents 'the limitations of the teaching process, and foregrounds the role of teaching in the [...] passing down of behaviours, practices and traditions' (Wolf, 2000: 81-82). *Capricho 37* points out those concepts and constructs of language, culture and the mind that govern traditional modes of seeing and proposes through the figure of the "monster" the collapsing of these very same concepts and constructs. As I argued in Chapter 2, Derrida's critique of Western metaphysics challenges the grounding principle on which it is founded, namely, the logic of non-contradiction, the idea that something cannot simultaneously be 'A' and 'not-A'. In the same way that the deconstructive project of Derrida seeks to displace habitual modes of thought, Goya works within and against familiar conventions and representations in order to dismantle and expose the ideological and cultural forces at play in the production of knowledge and in the construction of identities during the Spanish eighteenth century.

The letter 'A' has brought into play various meanings, as well as different lines of argument, thus multiplying its representational possibilities. It can signify 'Animal', 'Asno', 'Autoridad', 'Aristocracia', 'Aplicado', as my analysis has been suggesting. Let us pursue other meanings, 'A' for 'Arte', for 'Academia' and for 'Abstracción', and their relation to issues of artistic representation. In his problematization of the practices and institutions that determine and re-enact the conceptual paradigms aforementioned, I am already anticipating Goya's engagement with institutional bodies, the focus of my final chapter. At this point, it is not my purpose to discuss the artist's participation in the debates on the pedagogical reform of the Royal Academy of San Fernando, 'a truly anti-academic manifesto' (Stoichita and Coderch, 1999: 85), since this has been done elsewhere (Tomlinson reads Goya's report of October 1792 against the institutionalisation of artistic training and the uniformity of style (1992: 38-47)). Rather I would like to return to the academic and classical representation of bodies examined in the first half of this chapter. Linear grids and geometrical dissection contained the bodies depicted in pedagogical manuals and anatomical plates. The preliminary drawing for *Capricho 37* features a pair of compasses and a ruler, fundamental instruments – *techne* - for conveying abstract perfection and geometrical proportion. The drawing of straight lines and circles gave shape, as I argued, to the body classical. Technical instruments played a crucial role in the construction of ideal, virtuous bodies, establishing a fundamental link between geometry and pedagogy. On the other hand, 'those that were not susceptible to geometrical analysis, and excessive, or conventionally "disorderly" features were deemed sure signs not only of aesthetic deformity but of inner irrationality and ethical monstrosity' (Stafford, La Puma and Schiedermayer, 1989: 216). The rational imposition of an abstract method on the human frame was not surprising in an era that witnessed social upheaval and social incertitude. Thus the taxonomical impulse of physiognomic discourse literalised and obscured the intangibles of human variation, it contained physical difference within the diagnostic categories of empiricism and participated in the social construction of difference. By contesting traditional ways of representing the body and contaminating cultural conventions, *Los Caprichos* do not conform to pre-existing academic practice. What is undeniable is that the somatic of the monstrous in Goya challenges and transgresses the compensatory illusions of beauty, integrity, purity and reason so central to the Enlightenment. Goya's representations of monstrous bodies recuperate the other side of experience, the expressive possibilities of the human body, and the lived materiality of the flesh.

Conclusion

The construction of the ideal body - the classical 'norm' - depends for its existence on the categorization of other - deviant - bodies. Such a model of binarized oppositions understands the body as ahistorical and non-cultural, through the repression and disavowal of its role in the production of knowledge. Though intractable, bodies have suffered both conceptual and actual dismemberments that have placed them at the service of totalising visual rhetorics. While Goya partakes of figural traditions such as physiognomics and satire, where embodiment serves the physiognomic values of the public realm, monstrosity in *Los Caprichos* suggests that knowledge is contaminated by an irreducibly irrational component at its core: Reason has infinite faces, all of them already imbued and pre-figured by the body. Against the ideal or classical form, Goya invokes dreams, superstitions, fanaticism, and occultism: the elusive and monstrous subject of irrationality. In this chapter I have argued that Goya's portrayal of the body in its grotesque and monstrous materiality, though generally read as a satire on the vices of Spanish society, may also be considered as an antidote to Enlightened configurations and aspirations. By countering Reason and its modes of representation, the Goyaesque body upsets the frameworks by which binary thinking conventionally represented the corporeal. Goya's depiction of bodies as bodies urges us to read the body differently. This rethinking would also involve an investigation of the body in relation to its institutions, a matter to which I now turn in Chapter 5.

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[1] Ilie devotes Chapter 2 ('Metamorphosis of the Bat') of his second volume to the myths, emblems, icons, literary tradition, and scientific data surrounding bats (1995: I, 57-77).

[2] As part of her multiple roles, Ilie surveys the different representations of Minerva within Spain: defender of the Spanish Church, synonym for spiritual and imperial hegemony, protector of enlightened despots (1995: I, 41). See also Ilie (1991).

[3] Here I am thinking of studies such as *Principios para estudiar el nobilísimo y real arte de la pintura, con todo y partes del cuerpo humano, siguiendo la mejor escuela y simetría, con demostraciones matemáticas que ajustan y enseñan la proporción y perfección del rostro y de ciertos perfiles del hombre, mujer y niño* (José García Hidalgo, Madrid, 1693) and *Método sucinto y compendioso en cinco simetrías apropiadas a los cinco órdenes de arquitectura, adornada con otras reglas útiles* (Matías de Irala, Madrid, 1730), in particular 'Modelos del cuerpo humano'.

[4] Among the publications of the Royal Academy, we find drawing manuals such as *Colección de vaciados de estatuas antiguas que posee la Real Academia de las Tres Nobles Artes de Madrid* (José López Enguídanos, Madrid, 1794); the Real Imprenta published works such as *Modelos del cuerpo humano. Leonardo da Vinci, el tratado de la pintura* (Juan Barcelón, Madrid, 1784) and *Cartilla de principios de dibujo* (José López Enguídanos, Madrid, 1797) (see Carrete Parrondo, 1987: 628).

[5] See Wilson-Bureau (2000) for an analysis of the *Cuaderno italiano*: 'it shows the young artist grappling with representations of the real and the supernatural worlds, with flesh and blood figures and the concrete examples of art, as well as with figures and compositions of his own invention' (2000: 53).

[6] 'Bruja poderosa que por ydropica ...' (Mighty witch who because of her dropsy is taken for an outing by the best flyers ...' is the title given by Goya to this preliminary drawing (1797-98), which was part of the *sueños* and related to the '6 quadros de composición de asuntos de brujas' for the Duke and the Duchess of Osuna (Wilson-Bureau, 1992: 50)).

[7] Schulz has read the image as the depiction of a 'metaphorical type of blindness' (2000: 163). Although the female figure enjoys normal sight, her devoutness 'indicates an inability to see beneath the clothing of the true, arboreal identity of the object of reverence' (2000: 163).

[8] As Sayre has observed in *The Changing Image*, Goya 'added in chalk a topknot to the monk's hood and lightly sketched in witches hovering in the sky' (1974: 108). These elements 'permit interpretation of the print as a scene of witchcraft' (1974: 108).

[9] See http://goya.unizar.es/InfoGoya/Obra/Catalogo /Grabado /C52p.html (accessed 3/08/04).

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[10] See Helman (1993 106-109) and Wilson-Bureau (1996), for whom *Capricho 42* might be expressing visually a contemporary 'desilusión en la reforma agraria' (1996: 198).

[11] As the visual representation of the popular saying 'Tú que no puedes, llévame a cuestas', Bozal observes that the etching is an example of the world turned upside down where 'asnos y hombres intercambian sus papeles, sobre los hombres, humildes, caen todas las cargas y los palos que venían cayendo sobre los asnos' (Bozal, 1994: 131). On this point, see Tomlinson (1994: 125).

[12] Helman (1993: 107) refers to the title of the preparatory drawing, 'Zánganos de las brujas', to interpret the image as a critique of the unproductive sectors of society.

[13] 'El tema de la brujería es propio de un compacto grupo de estampas a partir del *Capricho 43*, 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos'. Aparece de forma clara en 19 estampas (números 44-48, 51, 59-71)' (Bozal, 1994: 123). Various manuscripts, among them the Museo de Pontevedra and the Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, confirm the witchcraft theme: 'Esto de tener las uñas largas, es tan perjudicial, que aun en la brujería está prohibido' (Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np).

[14] For Wilson-Bureau, Goya must have gone through a process of self-censorship since the original idea 'debía haber sido una feroz sátira contra las impías practicas de la Iglesia, y un irónico comentario sobre las ventajas que sacan de su astuta apariencia. El significado se ha reducido a su contenido secundario como una sátira sobre la importancia de tener el aspecto adecuado' (1992: 271).

[15] Sayre brings our attention to the visual and verbal puns implicit in the image: 'the eighteenth-century expression "ser capa de maldades de ladrones, pícaros, etc." meant literally "to act as a cape for the evil deeds of thieves, knaves, etc. [...]", "meter la uña" (to apply the claw) meant to take advantage of, to defraud' (1974: np).

[16] Similar explorations of this theme are *Capricho 29* 'Esto sí que es leer' and *Capricho 55* 'Hasta la muerte', where the two old people portrayed, man and woman respectively, might be said to represent the excessive attention to external appearance and dress, as well as a reminder to the beholder of the inevitability of aging and death.

[17] Elias describes socialization, rationalization and individuation as the three main characteristics of the civilizing process (see Shilling (2003: 131-151) for a summary of Elias' theory of the civilizing process).

[18] Campomanes and Jovellanos devoted an important part of their treatises to the public regulation of the body. The former instilled in artisans the importance of proper hygienic habits and respectable conduct. In a section entitled "De los conocimientos cristianos, morales, y útiles, en que conviene instruir la juventud, dedicada a los oficios, y a las artes", Campomanes wrote: 'El aseo y decencia en su porte de vestir, se halla muy descuidada por lo común entre estas gentes [...] saliendo a la calle desgreñados, sin peinarse, ni lavarse las manos ni la cara [...] descuidando de todo punto su aseo; rasgando ellos sus vestidos con las luchas, y otros juegos violentos en que se entretienen, y son poco convenientes a los racionales' (http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/53696172095714777490046/index.htm)). The latter attempted to regulate unruly passions and emotions in spectators: 'El gobierno no debe considerar el teatro solamente como una diversion pública, sino como un espectáculo capaz de instruir o extraviar el espíritu, y de perfeccionar y corromper el corazón de los ciudadanos. Se deduce también que un teatro que aleje los ánimos del conocimiento fomentando doctrinas y preocupaciones erróneas, o que desvíe los corazones de la práctica de la virtud excitando pasiones y sentimientos viciosos, lejos de merecer la protección pública merecerá el odio y la censura de la pública autoridad' (Jovellanos, 1997: 198).

[19] Interestingly, the riddle of their gender is further complicated by the commentaries in the different manuscripts. According to the commentaries in the Museo de Pontevedra and the Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, these are two witches ('Ve aquí una pelotera cruel sobre cuál es más bruja de las dos. ¿Quién diría que la Pitañosa y la Crespa se repelaran así? La amistad es hija de la virtud: los

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malvados pueden ser cómplices, pero amigos no', whereas the Calcografía Nacional reads: 'Dos viejos lascivos, son despedazados por dos monstruos abominables'.

[20] For Wilson-Bureau, *Capricho 75* represents the 'tema del matrimonio desgraciado' (1992: 40). For other critics such as Soufas (1986: 325) and Alcalá Flecha (1989: 300-304), the image is a criticism of divorce laws in Spain.

[21] Identified respectively with satirical texts of Jovellanos, *A Arnesto*, and the comedies of Leandro Fernández de Moratín by Helman (1993: 119-124).

[22] This is the commentary in the manuscript of the Calcografía Nacional; the other two, Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza and Museo de Pontevedra, say: 'El que no reflexiona sobre la inestabilidad de la fortuna duerme tranquilo rodeado de peligros: ni sabe evitar el daño que le amenaza, ni hay desgracia que no le sorprenda'.

[23] Théophile Gautier's Romantic appreciation of this *capricho* in 1842 focuses on the human tragedy embodied in these figures: 'there is something profoundly tragic about the expression of despair in all these cadaverous faces, in the empty sockets of all their eyes, as they realize that they have striven in vain. It is the most painful symbol of impotent effort, the most sombre piece of poetry and bitter derision ever produced on the subject of the dead' (cited in Glendinning, 1977: 79-80).

[24] As a deviation from the ideal masculine character, 'the *petimetre* is the figuring of an eighteenth-century anxiety about the disciplining of gendered subjects' (Haidt, 1998: 110).

[25] See for instance Folke Nordström (1962) for a study of the correspondences between human beings and animals in Goya's art and Alcalá Flecha (1996) for an examination of the tradition of physiognomy and body language in Goya's work.

[26] The other etchings completing this series are *Capricho38* 'Bravísimo', *40* '¿De qué mal morirá?' and *41* 'Ni más ni menos'.

[27] In her tracing of literary sources for the asinine theme, Helman (1963) observes that Goya might have been aware of a satirical treatise entitled *Memorias de la Insigne Academia Asnal* (Bayona, 1792), which was illustrated with a series of prints portraying asses performing different professional and artistic activities such as medicine, music, or astrology (1993: 69). Helman also cites Padre Isla's *Fray Gerundio de Campazas* as a possible literary source, in particular the episode in which the 'maestro enseñaba a sus alumnos entre otras novedades, que no se debía emplear en la conversación palabras que empiezan con "arre", como arrepentirse, arremangarse, arreglarse, porque esto sería dar a seres humanos el trato que se daba a los burros' (1993: 76). See also Sayre (1992) for an examination of the ass sequence in the light of contemporary satirical literature; Nilson (1977) places the sequence in the popular iconographic tradition of the World Upside-Down.

[28] 'The language of folly, buffoonery, and Carnival remained in the 18th-century the only possible voice to express a moral judgment freely and without concessions' (Lorenzo, 1989: xciii). The translation of proverbs or colloquial expressions into visual forms, then, will have a moral and satirical value.

[29] Wolf (2000) and Schulz (2000) have focused on the relationship between teacher and pupils. Both identify those images depicting scenes of witchcraft and those portraying prostitutes and 'celestinas' as examples of this relationship.

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Chapter 5

Los Caprichos: Institutional Bodies

Introduction

Corporeality and monstrosity were central to my analysis of unruly bodies in the previous chapter and will remain a major preoccupation in the following pages. A wider and more complex conception of monstrosity comes to the foreground in this chapter: monstrosity applied not just to human beings but also to social systems, systems of thought and institutional practices.

The theoretical encounter between the history of sciences and deconstructive criticism in Chapter 2 established a dialogue between the works of Canguilhem, Foucault and Derrida. Their respective projects present critical reading practices which are concerned, I argued, with the workings of institutions and the imposition of institutional norms. Through the critical methods of Canguilhem and Foucault I showed how the normalizing gaze of enlightened rational thought and modern science designated that which did not conform to the norm –the abnormal, the deviant, the monstrous– and ordained its correction. Within the context of the philosophy of science and the life sciences, Canguilhem's critique of modern rationality sought to unmask the essentialist and idealist claims of reason, as well as the political and cultural forces at work in the production of scientific knowledge; in other words, the unmasking of the historical nature (and ruse) of reason. Foucault was also interested in unmasking the rules and practices governing social constructions of knowledge. His work, as I explained, builds on the Canguilhemian project since the Foucaldian critique of the human sciences and the history of scientific thought examined the underlying epistemic conditions that made various domains of scientific disciplines possible. Foucault's study of specific institutions such as the asylum, the clinic and the prison focused on the way these institutions, in conjunction with economic, judicial and political practices, defined what was to be normal and what was to be classified as abnormal or deviant. The knowledge produced by these institutions shaped, according to Foucault, not only specific understandings of normality and abnormality but also claims to absolute truth. These discursive practices, to use Foucault's term, were located in powerful social, political and cultural institutions that assigned fixed meanings to individual and collective experiences, and disciplined subjects into certain ways of thinking and acting. *Capricho 52* '¡Lo que puede un sastre!'(fig. 18), among other possible readings, offers an image which criticizes discursive constructions of Catholicism.

Foucault's reading practice can be translated to the realm of the visual since the institutions aforementioned depended on various forms of surveillance: 'modern forms of knowledge depend on a scopic regime that equates seeing with knowledge' (Rose, 2001: 7). Thus social constructions of knowledge and practices of seeing, discursivity and visibility, go hand in hand. These become embodied in 'institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission and diffusion and in pedagogical forms which impose and maintain them' (Foucault, 1977: 200). It might be argued that *Capricho 37* 'Si sabrá más el discípulo' (fig. 44), analysed in Chapter 4, responds to a specific knowledge shaping the minds of certain individuals and collectives of eighteenth-century Spanish society. The image displays strategies with which to challenge notions such as 'authority' and 'academic practice' and allows Goya to criticize the habits and irrational principles that determine and re-enact the conceptual paradigms on which they depend. In this chapter I shall look at the tradition of the emblem and the devotional print as a pedagogical form at the service of Church and State. With Derrida we learnt how deconstructive practice seeks to shake and displace those conceptual paradigms which govern our practices, claiming absolute knowledge and absolute visibility. In other words, deconstruction is concerned with 'the conditions and assumptions of discourse, with frameworks of enquiry', and engages 'the institutional structures governing our practices, competences, performances' (Culler, 1983: 56).

At this juncture, it is necessary to remind ourselves that this study has already considered *Los Caprichos* in relation to institutions and institutional practices. Chapter 2 touched upon institutions and institutional bodies from a theoretical perspective, through the critical approaches of Canguilhem, Foucault and Derrida. Chapter 3 involved a historical and cultural consideration of the institutional, as well as the social and political, dynamics in which *Los Caprichos* were produced. Goya's prints, traditionally associated with the reformist project of the *ilustrados*, were considered in the context of a moderate Enlightened movement which in its attempt at reforming institutional practices failed to change the historical privileges of nobility and clergy, as well as the cultural norms legitimising them. *Los Caprichos* were also seen in the light of institutionalised academic practice within eighteenth-century Spanish art, in particular engraving; recognized as a legitimate academic discipline by the Bourbon monarchy, its institutional status did not stop Goya from developing new approaches to etching at the turn of the eighteenth century. As the analyses of several *caprichos* in Chapter 4 showed, the artist engaged with multiple traditions of representation. Finally, my consideration of unruly bodies in the previous chapter necessarily addressed institutional issues for, as I noted, the 'physical' and the 'institutional' are inextricably bound. By prescribing how the body is to act and also prescribing how the body is perceived, institutions link the individual body to the body politic.

Chapter 4 analysed the representation of monstrous bodies in *Los Caprichos* in order to show how the monster operates as a disruptive force both subverting enlightened epistemic constructions of the body and questioning received forms of cultural representation. Thus a consideration of physiognomy enabled me to examine one of the ways in which Goya teased out the contradictions of a scientific body criticism whose modes of reasoning attempted to construct social difference through a taxonomical model which characterised normal and monstrous bodies and characters through facial features and forms of the body. Physiognomics was at the heart of the cultural and moral agenda of the reformist project: a morality of principles that established normative views on the civilized and uncivilized, self and other, normal and monstrous. The production of monstrous / uncivilized bodies created a body of knowledge that allowed enlightened reformers to observe and shed light on normal / civilized bodily behaviours. Goya's visual critique of physiognomical discourse was directed, I argued, at showing this science's construction of claims to absolute truth. The monstrous bodies populating *Los Caprichos* certainly signal eighteenth-century Spanish society's moral downfall, but facing these monstrous bodies also reminds us that Goya was pointing to the concealment of metaphysical presuppositions and epistemological constructions underpinning Enlighetened institutional power.

Goya's alternative accounts of the body provided also a productive way of engaging with issues of representation. His rethinking of different artistic traditions such as religious imagery, satirical prints, or popular prints, drew on both high and popular culture. Goya's reconfiguration of the classical body challenge aesthetic and moral restrictions since his style was not subjected either to religious tyranny or to neoclassical precepts. For example, *Capricho 65* '¿Dónde va mamá?' (fig. 23) might be interpreted as a deconstruction of a classical image of the Counter-Reformation, the representation of the Immaculate Conception. By inscribing subtle and subversive displacements within these traditions, Goya imposed an anti-academic, critical art upon the institutional conventions of his time. This chapter will continue to examine the artist's engagement with other traditions, as my analysis of *Capricho 50* 'Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) and *Capricho 11* 'Muchachos al avío' (fig. 13) will show. The former will be discussed in relation to the emblem tradition; the latter will be considered as a revisiting on Goya's part of the Bourbons' visual propaganda, as conceived in the tapestry designs of the Royal Tapestry Factory of Santa Bárbara.

The chapter opens with an analysis of *Capricho 53* '¡Qué pico de oro!' (fig. 19) as a way of establishing the paradoxical nature and limitations of Reason in the context of the Spanish Enlightenment. The reading of *Capricho 53* (fig. 19) enables me to introduce a discussion of the insufficiencies of the Spanish Enlightenment through the notion of *desengaño* following Eduardo Subirats' work *La ilustración insuficiente* (1981). There are two main aims that structure this discussion: firstly, Subirat's critique of Feijóo's reasoned representations in his study points to the compromise between (scientific) reason and institutional élites during the Spanish Enlightenment; and, secondly, this discussion also establishes a momentary comparison between Feijoo's project and Goya's *Los Caprichos* through the notion of 'desengaño' in order to show that Goya's critical art was closer in fact to radical, rather than moderate, reformism. My analysis will pay particular attention to those etchings, *Capricho 23* 'Aquellos polvos' (fig. 7) and *Capricho 24* 'No hubo remedio' (fig. 17), explicitly linked with the Inquisition, an institution which not only repressed individuals but also played an important role in the historical articulations of what individuals are or should be. Then I shall extend my discussion to representations of the socio-political body –the nobility, the clerical body and the populace. The representation of the populace will be addressed through reformist policies on productivity and social reform. For moderate enlightened reformers the instruction and improvement of the nation, as discussed in Chapter 3, was to be carried out without altering the *status quo* and was justified in terms of productivity and rationalization. Political and institutional reforms, therefore, were clothed in an ambiguous attitude towards the populace. Goya's etchings reflect this ambiguity as the section on unproductive bodies will show. The chapter closes with an examination of the nobility and clergy through the lens of the emblem and the devotional print, respectively. I shall be arguing that the education of the dominant classes was still dependent on estatist and static pedagogical models.

It is my contention that, as a modern cultural critic during the period with which we are concerned in this study, Goya embarks on a visual critique closer to the project of radical reformers who sought to dismantle traditional power structures and traditional social and cultural relations. While his work embodies the contradictions and paradoxes faced by Spanish reformers at the turn of the nineteenth century, namely the resistance of certain institutional bodies, his radical imagery also highlights the insufficiencies of the Spanish Enlightenment. In his exposing of the discursive formations –ways of seeing, institutionalised social gaze– that stabilised certain privileges, uses and customs, Goya's *Los Caprichos* provide an effective critique of those institutions within and against which his work is set.

'Desengaño'

Capricho 53 '¡Qué pico de oro!' (fig. 19), which follows '¡Lo que puede un sastre!' (fig. 18) in the series, proposes a similar scenario of interpretation since the etching can be read as a visible critique of modes of behaviour typical of eighteenth-century Spain. In the religious scenario first proposed here, the preacher, a parrot, sermonizes an attentive congregation from the pulpit. The opened mouths of the parishioners suggest awe and gullibility, their closed eyes point to a lack of perception and discernment; Schulz, for instance, has argued that the print 'satirizes blind reverence to authority' (2000: 166). The sermon, on the other hand, might be too long and tedious to catch their attention so the opened mouths and closed eyes might respond to the action of yawning, boredom might have struck the congregation. Critics, then, situate the image squarely as part of the critique of the regular clergy, in particular a visual representation of those sermonizers described in reformist works such as *Fray Gerundio de Campazas*, which was published in 1758 (Helman, 1993: 85; Alcalá Flecha, 1988: 66-68). A second interpretation secularises the image, as suggested in the manuscript commentaries: 'Esto tiene trazas de una junta académica. ¿Quién sabe si el papagayo estará hablando de medicina? Pero no hay que creerle sobre su palabra. Médico hay que cuando habla, es un pico de oro, y cuando receta es un Herodes: discurre perfectamente de las dolencias, y no las cura: emboba a los enfermos, y atesta los cementerios de calaveras' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1990: np). This critique of the medical body, like that of the clerical body, points to the mechanical repetition of knowledge derived from authority and tradition. As part of the asinine series, *Capricho 40* '¿De qué mal morirá?' (fig. 45) explicitly portrays the result of this type of learning: an ass-doctor (mis)treats a patient lying on his deathbed.[1] The lack of knowledge and ignorance of the patient's body is expressed in the resigned look of the ass. Should we interpret the animal in *Capricho 53* (fig. 19) as a parrot-doctor teaching his pupils the art of medicine, we might ask ourselves where the object of their study, a human corpse, is. (Perhaps, as the commentary intimates, the 'enfermos' are at death's door). The answer lies in the fact that 'the anatomical discoveries of the European Renaissance had not taken institutional root in Spain', since doctors, who trained through the scholastic method, as Haidt has explained in *Embodying Enlightenment*, had a 'general lack of acquaintance with tangible physical gore' (1998: 24).[2] Moreover, 'the word, not the burin or the scalpel, was the medium through which accurate knowledge of the body would have been transmitted to most' (1998: 17). Moving from the non-existent anatomical theatre to the more identifiable space of the orator's stage, a third interpretation of this image is plausible and relates to my discussion on physiognomics in Chapter 4: the loquacious bird might be said to portray a pedant of reformist ilk. The body posture and the gesture of the parrot bear resemblance to the erect, proud body of the orator whose beguiling rhetoric effectively persuades audiences. This audience might be already persuaded, though, and the parrot merely repeats what he has already learnt. In *La derrota de los pedantes*, Leandro Fernández de Moratín, argues Ilie, attacks those reformers and ignorant critics who merely divulge knowledge mechanically in parrot-fashion: 'an exaggerated Spanish devotion to the "methodical *Encyclopédie*" spawns pedantic epics, superficial compendia, and "Gallic" translations' (1995: I, 80). By claiming that an exaggerated devotion to the 'methodical *Encyclopédie*' produced its own monsters, Leandro Fernández de Moratín is satirizing certain dispensers of public enlightenment who 'make knowledge available in a way that "anybody curious might learn it like a parrot"' (Ilie, 1995: I, 83). These are diverging interpretations (and not, I would like to point out, diametrically opposed readings) of the way in which the parrot functions in *Capricho 53* (fig. 19), for the animal comes to embody a priest, a doctor or a pedantic reformer. But what they all have in common is their parrot-like repetition of received ideas, perceived truths, their belonging to elitist groups, and their use of a public space, religious or secular, which institutionalises authority, tradition and myth. By using a parrot, therefore, Goya points out that the qualities of this creature can be seen in traditionalist and reformist positions alike. A troubling familiarity, Goya seems to be telling us, is discernible in the rhetorical effects and the practices governing certain bodies of reformist knowledge during the Spanish Enlightenment.

According to Vibeke Vibolt Knudsen, rhetoric should have an effect on the receiver by teaching, delighting and moving (2000: 34). 'Knowledge and action', Knudsen writes, 'cannot be divided according to rhetoric' (2000: 34). Knudsen discusses the use of rhetoric in art in the context of her article on Goya, 'Goya's Realism', where she argues that Goya's imagery 'imparts knowledge [...] which challenges the beholder to take action' (2000: 34). The purpose of rhetoric is 'never just to inform; rather it seeks to alter as well' (2000: 34), therefore 'it must employ formal devices which imitate emotional conditions, awake recognition and play on experience, thus involving the receiver emotionally in the cognitive process' (2000: 34). This imitation of emotional conditions and recognition relies mainly on the 'expression and movement of the body' so that 'it speaks by expressing feelings' (2000: 35). If we translate these ideas to our reading of *Capricho 53* (fig. 19), we could argue that Goya is drawing attention to a situation in which the knowledge being imparted by the parrot is of little substance and the involvement of the congregation / pupils / audience is passive. Already persuaded or dead bored, these figures are mere passive recipients of Tradition and Authority, or mere slaves to the dictates of Reason. The suppression of emotions and feelings at the expense of reason characterizes the Spanish Enlightenment, as I shall go on to argue now in my discussion of the notion of 'desengaño'. As we shall see, the use and misuse of rhetoric by specific institutional bodies as depicted by Goya in '¡Qué pico de oro!' (fig. 19) finds a parallel in the insufficient use of 'desengaño' during the Spanish Enlightenment.

A series of preliminary connections between *Los Caprichos* and the term 'desengaño' serves here as a first point of entry for my discussion of Goya's radical critique of the Spanish Enlightenment. Firstly, an apparently marginal detail: the collection was sold on 6 February 1799 in the Calle del Desengaño, a toponymic with a high cultural and symbolic value, as critics such as Stoichita and Coderch have observed (1999: 184). Secondly, Goya opens his series with a self-portrait that might be said to be the visual equivalent of the figure of the *desengañado / desengañador*, 'the one who can see, and who reveals that the world is representation, spectacle, appearance and deception' (1999: 185), thus placing himself in relation to the moral project of reform. Goya inscribes himself simultaneously as a '*desengañado* (a disappointed, disenchanted person)' and a '*desengañador* (he who disenchants, who discovers a deception)' (1999: 185). His self-portrait (fig. 46) shows him in profile, a way of representing himself 'in the form of the third person' which, according to Stoichita and Coderch, establishes the artist as both observed and observer, object and subject of the representation (1999: 176-78).[3] An etymological note on the term 'desengaño', which will be further qualified through Subirats' study *La ilustración insuficiente*, is the last point of entry for my discussion:

> It is the opposite of the word *engaño* (error, illusion, charm, deception, hoax, trickery, pretence) and covers a vast territory that ranges from 'discovery' (as in 'discover a deception'), 'disillusion' or 'disenchantment' to nuances such as 'disappointment' and 'sadness'. (Stoichita and Coderch, 1999: 189)

I shall be returning both to the figure of the *desengañado* / *desengañador* and to the plurality of meanings of this notion in my comparison of Feijoo's and Goya's enlightened projects.

As I argued in Chapter 3, the Benedictine Feijoo shared Goya's concern for the eradication of popular and 'learned' superstition.[4] In the interest of regenerating religious experience, as well as the clerical body, Feijoo takes on the role of 'desengañador de errores communes', employing the word 'desengaño', that is, the negation of errors, in its most literal sense. Such is his aim in the letter 'El caso de las florecillas milagrosas de San Luis', the focus of Subirats' critique, where Feijoo seeks to expose the irrational underpinnings of a miracle said to occur every 19th August in a pilgrim village in Asturias. According to tradition, yellow flowers would inexplicably appear inside the local church, an event attracting huge crowds convinced of their supernatural and curative nature - a marvellous and extraordinary event. Feijoo decides to intervene and sets in motion an examination of Baconian proportions; a thorough investigation of records and testimonials, an examination of the hermitage and the observation of surrounding flora, reaches its climax one 19th August when the miracle is refuted. Rooting out appearance, the seeds of irrational belief, Feijoo stages and exhibits to public contemplation the non-appearance of the flowers – a metaphorical as well as literal cleansing of the church. Both the authorities (representatives of the Church, University, Bureaucracy and the Army) and the congregation attend this triumph of Reason. The intervention of Feijoo becomes a public representation sanctioned and supported by institutional hierarchies; his refutation of this false miracle is cloaked in authority and invested with truth. In 'El caso de las florecillas milagrosas de San Luis', Feijoo therefore stages and constructs a modern, rational form of knowledge, in which superstition is supplanted by reason and supernatural explanation gives way to a visual display of power and knowledge. The way in which this representation is constructed is as important as what is seen, or not seen in this case, that is, the non-appearance of the flowers. Feijoo's attack on irrationalism, superstition and ignorance is legitimised and institutionalised by those very same age-old hierarchies which had been consecrating and perpetuating Tradition, Authority and Revelation. Subirats' critique of Feijoo's reasoned representation teases out the underlying epistemological, social and cultural assumptions that structure his 'disposición o exposición pública y escénica' (1981: 87).

In his critique Subirats regards this episode as symptomatic of the compromise between scientific reason and institutional hierarchies which characterized the Spanish Enlightenment. In 'El caso de las florecillas milagrosas de San Luis', scientific revelation replaces religious revelation, displacing magical and sacred ways of looking at and understanding the world. The parishioners do not acquire any individual knowledge after attending this representation. Moreover, Feijoo's representation 'suprime profilácticamente todos los conceptos empíricos y emocionales que lo pudieran convertir en una figura de la protesta individual y colectiva contra abusos o coacciones sociales' (1981; 94). Wherein lies, then, the insufficiency of the Spanish Enlightenment for Subirats? (One might well ask whether any Enlightenment project can be sufficient). As I discussed in Chapter 3, the term 'ilustración' is mainly understood as divulgation of knowledge, privileging the didactic and the pedagogic; Subirats, for his part, adds that 'por ilustrar nadie entiende la acción de desvelar, mostrar, impugnar o denunciar' (1981: 13). The notion of 'desengaño' is also understood along the same lines, as Jesús Magallón observes: 'desengaño' is mainly linked to 'las *noticias* y *luces públicas*, es decir a la difusión de la ciencia' (Magallón, 2002: 24). 'A la palabra ilustración', Subirats writes, 'se le oculta [...] lo que ella fue como figura de pensamiento' (1981: 14). Its mitigated character does not make it equivalent to critique. And Subirats adds: 'la represión de la figura histórica de la Ilustración es uno de los requisitos del ocultamiento de los elementos constitutivos de la modernidad' (1981: 27).[5] Feijoo's use of the notion 'desengaño' in *Teatro Crítico Universal* and *Cartas eruditas y curiosas* stops at the level of representation: used in the service of visibility, it reinstates a 'pedagogía de la presencia' (pedagogy of presence), devoid of epistemological or metaphysical critique. Other meanings of 'desengaño' are effaced from Feijoo's project: 'desilusión', 'amargura', 'desconsuelo', 'desesperanza', 'desesperación' (1981: 44) – that is, its affective and empirical moments. My discussion of *Capricho 52* '¡Lo que puede un sastre!' (fig. 18) and *Capricho 59* 'Y aun no se van' (fig. 41) addressed such moments and drew attention to the erasure of the emotional from enlightened reason in the context of my analysis of unruly bodies in Chapter 4. In *Capricho 53* '¡Qué pico de oro!' (fig. 19), as I have been arguing, Goya not only parodied the priest and his congregation as representatives of a Church in which religion is taught and learned by rote but also questions that Enlightenment "preaching" which persisted in old habits and dogmatic practices. By the time at which *Los Caprichos* were published, as Ilie writes in the context of his analysis of *Capricho 43* (fig. 1) in *The Age of Minerva. Counter-Rational Reason in the Eighteenth Century*, Reason had

> become an urban, institutional resource, specifically in Spain, but also in Europe. The instrument [of Reason] that the laity and the clergy valued equally undergoes deterioration. Goya parodies Reason's "progress" by means of its soaring, monstrous replication. (1995: I, 57)

The monstrous replication in *Capricho 43* 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' (fig. 1) takes the form, as we argued in our previous chapter, of the quartet of owls and the taxonomical monstrosity of the bat. Likewise, *Capricho 53* (fig. 19) depicts such monstrous replication in secular and religious circles, this time embodied in the figure of the parrot. His congregation or audience, whether we interpret the animal as a religious preacher or a secular orator, remains unenlightened, 'desengañada' in Feijoo's use of the term.

The following section expands on these ideas, that is, the re-inscription of old institutional power and knowledge, by establishing a comparison between the reformist projects of Goya and Feijoo. The Aragonese artist, in the words of Cascardi, criticizes

> the persistence of archaism within the enlightened world in the *Caprichos* not as a revelation from an implicit stance on the failure of the (modern) enlightenment freely to penetrate archaic Spain, but rather as an indication of the Enlightenment's failure to subsume completely the authority of sacred institutions. (1991: 196)

One of these sacred institutions was the Inquisition, whose ideological system and social function was still pervasive at the end of the eighteenth century.

Representing institutions: the Inquisition

In a tantalizingly brief section entitled 'Goya y la ilustración' (1981: 123-24), Subirats compares Feijoo's project with Goya's *Los Caprichos*, arguing, however, for a much richer critical perspective inscribed in Goya's collection of etchings:

> [L]a sátira de Goya no conoce la escisión entre el conocimiento y la realidad entera del individuo que es su portador. No hay en sus grabados un principio de abstracción, de sublimación o purificación de la experiencia de la realidad. Y es que Goya no intenta legitimar nada, ni poner en escena algún principio nuevo, ni disponer una representación, ni invocar un orden universal. (1981: 124)

Feijoo's unreflective use of reason reinstates under a different guise the social and political power exerted by old hierarchies. 'La crítica feijoniana', writes Subirats, 'persigue un objetivo normativo' (1981: 49). By showing indifference to the world of the populace ('al vulgo no se le queda más remedio que desengañarle'(Álvarez de

Miranda, 1979: 370)), his disenchantment of monstrous mythology and superstition does not amount to the reform of the socio-political body but to a mere re-inscription of old institutional power. As Ilie observes, Feijoo's writings 'address educated and lay and clerical readers who held opinion-forming social positions' (Ilie, 1995: I, 332). It might be necessary to recall here Derrida's thoughts on deconstructive practice: 'breaks are always, and fatally, re-inscribed in old cloth that must continually, interminably be undone' (Derrida, 1987: 29). A close look at the public exhibition of the powers of reason brings to mind the activities of that other Tribunal, whose presence was still firmly ingrained in eighteenth-century Spanish life. Indeed, as Subirats came to realize in a later meditation on his 1981 essay, 'el vistoso proceso de Cangas [that is, Feijoo's "experiment" in San Luis, Asturias] recuerda en alguna incierta medida, en cuanto a su estructura escénica, a los viejos procesos inquisitoriales y las grandes escenificaciones teatrales que la Iglesia organizaba' (1993: 77).[6] Religion as spectacle - 'idiotic public processions, incantatory spectacles, tableaux vivants, and mesmerizing floats' (Stafford, 1994: 10), to use Stafford's description of some Catholic public representations, was central to the visual communication of Catholic faith and the display of religious authority. I am not proposing here that Feijoo's public intervention is comparable to the proceedings of the Inquisition, for Feijoo himself advocated the reform of this and other religious institutional bodies ('denunció los abusos de las instituciones eclesiásticas en aspectos económicos, atacó las desviaciones de una religiosidad superficial, llena de supersticiones y milagrerías' (Fernández González, 1989: 29-30)), but I am rather pointing to the ideological operations underscoring both forms of representation.

The institutionalised representations of the ecclesiastical tribunal of the Inquisition would be a constant concern in the art of Goya, especially the disruptive and corrosive effect of religious power on individual and collective bodies. Goya's critique will come to the fore with the changing political circumstances that shook Spain during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, a period which falls outside the scope of this study.[7] Goya returns to the Inquisition theme time and again, in particular during the restoration period in his painting 'Inquisition Scene' (ca. 1816), as well as in his drawings in Album C (1810-14), also known as the *Inquisition Album*, with works such as 'Por mover la lengua de otro modo', 'Por haber nacido en otra parte' or 'Por linaje de hebreos'. In the context of our present discussion of *Los Caprichos*, two etchings will be the focus of my analysis, *Capricho 23* 'Aquellos polvos' (fig. 7) and *Capricho 24* (fig. 17) 'No hubo remedio'.

Some manuscript commentaries refer to *Capricho 23* (fig. 7) as depicting an 'auto de fe',[8] others to the term 'autillo'[9] (an alternative to the 'auto de fe' which was 'held either in the church and attended by the general public or in the *sala de la audiencia* of the Inquisition, attended only by the prisoners, their families, and officials' (Tomlinson, 1992: 167)). Although 'the public auto de fe [...] had been done away with by the mid-eighteenth century' (Wolf, 2000: 80),[10] Goya's interest lies in showing the evidence of the disintegrative effects of institutional power upon real bodies. Unlike the documentary-like pictorial representations of 'autos de fe' of the Golden Age period, such as Francisco Rizi's 'Auto de Fe in the Plaza Mayor of Madrid' (1683), the artist draws our attention to the condemned body, to the imagery of punishment and sin. Both prints are devoid of the theatrical elements and the representational effects deployed by Feijoo in 'El caso de las florecillas milagrosas de San Luis'.

The caption in *Capricho 23* (fig. 7) responds to the popular saying 'Aquellos polvos, traerán estos lodos' (From that dust comes this mud), whose possible meanings have been analysed by Helman (1993: 117) and Sayre (1974: 58-9). For both critics, the caption may be referring to an immediate cause (the accused committed a crime) and effect (he or she should be punished) or may be making a more veiled reference to the effects of inquisitorial power on the populace ('ignorancia y superstición populares serían, pues, "los lodos" y "los polvos" en cuestión, el poder y efecto lamentables del Santo Oficio que perduraban aún en pleno siglo de las luces' (Helman, 1993: 117)). Thus the print can be explained in terms of an explicit cause and effect. According to the manuscripts, the punished body is that of a woman, and once again the etching elicits different interpretations: '¡A esta santa señora la persiguen de muerte! Después de escribirla la vida, la sacan en triunfo. Todo se lo merece. Y si lo hacen para afrentarla e tiempo perdido. Nadie puede afrentar a quien no tiene vergüenza' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np) or the more caustic 'Una mujer salió encorbata: era pobre y no hubo remedio' (Calcografía Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np).

Capricho 23 (fig. 7) and *Capricho 24* (fig. 17) can be read in conjunction since two different stages of the inquisitorial procedure are being depicted here by Goya: 'Aquellos polvos' (fig. 7) portrays the moment in which the authorities read out the sentence while the condemned is exposed to public view on a scaffold, whereas 'No hubo remedio' (fig. 17) represents the public humiliation of the condemned, who, mounted on a donkey, is brought to everybody's attention.[11] The inclusion of the crowd watching the proceedings in the case of the former and participating in the public humiliation in the case of the latter suggests that these ceremonies of ritual punishment are inseparable from forms of public entertainment. A volatile crowd, one might argue, recalling Shilling's and Mellor's description of the Catholic medieval body as volatile, would have been drawn to the spectacle and followed it through the streets: witnessing the humiliation, insulting the victim, praying piously, shouting at or cheering the authorities. The 'spectacle of the scaffold',[12] to use Foucault's phrase in *Surveiller et punir* (1975), is one of Goya's targets.

Compositionally and technically the bodies of the condemned occupy the centre of the prints; the light falls on the central figures, who stand out in stark contrast to the figures of secular (*Capricho 24*) (fig. 17) and clerical (*Capricho 23*) (fig. 7) authority represented in the background and the surrounding crowd. As Alcalá Flecha aptly puts it, by bringing the condemned figures closer to the viewer, Goya 'reduce el drama, con emblemático esquematismo, a sus personajes principales, el reo y el secretario, que, situados frente a frente, emergen como islotes en medio del mar de la muchedumbre' (1988: 265). In *Capricho 23* (fig. 7), the submissive body awaits seated, head slightly tilted forward, the reading of the accusation. In the eyes of the Spanish Inquisition this body is marked and deployed as monstrous: tied hands, body trapped in a sackcloth and a 'sambenito' (vest), and the conical cap ('coroza') on which the crimes are most probably written. The condemnation and public display of these figures inscribe all too real signs of difference in their bodies. The framing of the monstrous body carries out an ideological function: the institutionalisation of power relations. This living 'sambenito' has been branded heretic, morally deviant, in other words, a monstrous aberration within the political, religious and cultural reality of Catholic Spain. As embodiments of religious transgression, these bodies are the victims of the normative values of Catholicism. Goya highlights the monstrosity engendered by ideological normativity. Although torture and cruelty as inquisitorial methods of punishment had been in decline throughout the eighteenth century, the stigma attached to the condemned bodies represented in *Caprichos 23* and *24* is in itself a form of punishment. In the culturally specific context of Catholic Spain, the social stigmatisation created by the Inquisition is rooted in fear, a fear of difference which affects the viewers of the public spectacle. The fear of themselves becoming stigmatised might be conveyed by the facelessness of the crowd. Goya is representing the way the institution functioned culturally on a social and individual level. The collusion of religious and political ideologies, the hybrid of Church and State, central to the building of the Spanish nation for centuries, has generated this type of monstrosity.

Reforming the unproductive body?: the populace

Within the political, social and economic projects of moderate reformers, notions such as productivity and public utility guided the rational organization of the social body. From noble to clergyman to peasant, the Bourbon reformers sought to transform the attitudes of the Spanish population. Reforms, however, were met by the resistance of the privileged classes, the conservative bulk of the Church and the populace. As I explained in my historical contextualization of the Spanish Enlightenment in Chapter 3, the *ilustrados* considered production as a fundamental instrument of change and idleness ('ociosidad') as a burden to the State; we can recall here the words of reformers such as Campomanes ('el verdadero extranjero en su patria es el ocioso') or Arriquíbar ('todo hombre ocioso debe ser objeto de Inquisición del Gobierno'). This exclusionary rhetoric carries with it a series of identifications whereby unproductivity and idleness become deviations from the norm: productivity and labour. Such oppositions were also invested with moral (good and evil) and philosophical values (reason and unreason). *Los Caprichos* are populated with those unproductive bodies (nobles, monks, prostitutes, criminals) targeted by enlightened reformist policies. We might ask ourselves whether Goya made them visible as counterexamples of civilized, orderly bodies; or whether 'el sueño de la razón' (re)produced specific social groups as monsters. In other words, to what extent are they the products of the reformists' own civilizing discursive practice?

The representation of the socially unproductive will be the focus in this section; in particular, I shall be referring to the unproductive (as well as illicit) activities of the populace through *Capricho 11* 'Muchachos al avío' (fig. 13) and *Capricho 73* 'Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47). My reading could extend to *caprichos* depicting the excessive and parasitic body of the clergy (*Capricho 79* 'Nadie nos ha visto') (fig. 12) or the unproductivity of the nobility (*Capricho 50* 'Los chinchillas') (fig. 10), but I intend to engage with the nobility and clergy in the final section of this chapter, 'Reinterpreting Emblems and Devotional Prints: Nobility and Clergy'. However, one could argue the nobles depicted by Goya in 'Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) emblematise stasis, physical and mental inactivity. Camilo José Cela's fictionalised account of the family history of Los Chinchillas emphasizes this aspect: 'En la familia de los Chinchillas trabajar, lo que se dice trabajar, nadie trabaja; lo bueno que tienen es que ni se quejan ni les remuerde la conciencia' (1989: 112). Thus the print could also be read in the light of the reformist critique of those idle, non-productive bodies of different sectors of the Spanish population (nobility, regular clergy, women, beggars, criminals). As for *Capricho 79* 'Nadie nos ha visto' (fig. 12), idleness and sloth are among the transparent censures of Goya, drawing as the *capricho* does on body criticism of the time. In line with satirical and moral discourses on the rationalization of the State, the clerical body can be seen as parasitic upon a swollen body politic needing to rid itself of unproductive bodies. Indeed, as Teófano Egido has noted, 'la desamortización que obsesiona a los ilustrados es la de las personas, la del excesivo número de clérigos (regulares, se sobreentiende), improductivos e inútiles' (1989: 97). The etching brings to light literally 'what no-one usually sees, that is to say the hidden vices' (Stoichita and Coderch, 1999: 198) of the religious orders. Let us focus now on the representation of the populace.

In the context of eighteenth-century Spain, the scenes of *Capricho 11* 'Muchachos al avío' (fig. 13) and *Capricho 73* 'Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47) can be regarded as representations of criminal activities: the former portrays a group of outlaws, the latter a prostitute and her procuresses. In their depiction of social outcasts, both images are inextricably linked with political and economic policies and the enforcement of social order, as we shall see. The ironic captions of *Capricho 11* 'Muchachos al avío' (fig. 13) and *Capricho 73* 'Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47) place us squarely in the world of idleness: the former translates as 'Lads Getting Ready', the latter as 'Better To Be Idle'. The expression 'al avío' conveys a readiness that is not matched by the inaction being portrayed: four male figures sitting around, two of them smoking, another sharpening a knife, muskets lying around. The manuscript commentators have readily associated their idleness with a crime waiting to happen, an illegal activity ('Los contrabandistas en acecho de cuantos pasan, cerca de un camino, poco se diferencian de los ladrones' (Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, Madrid, in Helman, 1993: 215)); in fact, their external appearance betrays them as social types ('Las caras y el traje están diciendo lo que ellos son' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np)), and even betrays their geographical origin ('Los contrabandistas andaluces, cerca de un camino, pasan pronto a ser bandidos' (López de Ayala, in Helman, 1993: 215)). Read as smugglers, bandits or rogues, these lads are outside the law.[13] Outlaws, in particular bandits, are the subject of several of Goya's contemporary paintings in the years around 1798-1800: 'Bandits Shooting Male Prisoners' (The Bandits' Attack I), 'Bandits Stripping and Raping Two Women' (The Bandits' Attack II), 'Bandit Attacking a Woman' (The Bandits' Attack III). The scene and the social types depicted by Goya in *Capricho 11* (fig. 13) are also reminiscent of one of the numerous cartoons, 'El resguardo del tabaco' (1780) (fig. 48), that the artist designed for the Royal Tapestry Factory of Santa Bárbara. As I shall be arguing shortly when comparing the two images, Goya revisits one of his earlier works, albeit this time removed from the institutionalised visual art project of the Bourbon monarchy, which 'functioned to give the country's Absolutist rulers a clear overview of the different groups of people under its rule' (Held, 1987: 41).

During the second half of the eighteenth century, in particular during the reign of Carlos III, there was an interest in 'documenting the customs, occupations and characteristics of the country inhabitants' (Held, 1987: 41), which provided the ruling classes with scenes of everyday life and social types. The visual representation of popular festivals and pastimes in tapestry designs, for instance, performed a symbolic role, since it provided 'an ideal image of the Madrid reform politicians' plan to inculcate civilized standards of behaviour through education' (Held, 1987: 43). A more popular print idiom provided imagery of local, regional and social archetypes, portraying different costumes and deportments.[14] Goya's commissioned cartoon participates of both traditions.

'El resguardo del tabaco' (fig. 48) is a genre scene which shows five guards having a break in the line of duty. As Goya himself described the scene, the guards are 'sentados descansando y uno en pie dándoles conversación, a más distancia reconociendo el terreno se ven a la orilla de un río dos de ellos con todas las armas que regularmente llevaban' (cited in Helman, 1993: 98). According to Helman, the representation of this subject aligns Goya with the reformist project of the *ilustrados*, more specifically with Jovellanos' concerns with the economic and legal consequences of smuggling, as well as the social reformer's views on the negative effect of real or semi-legendary outlaws in popular folklore for, as she argues, the image evokes contemporary romances and 'tonadillas', which sang the praises of uncivilized and disorderly bodies.[15]

By establishing a dialogue between the tapestry design and the print, we find that they share compositional qualities: a group of young men, portrayed in a similar countryside setting, gather around a tree, their expressions and poses suggesting a break in their activity. The arrangement of the figures is similar for the bodies in both scenes form a circle in which one of them stands above the rest. As I have indicated previously, the men depicted in both images respond to stereotypes (guards in the case of the cartoon, smugglers in the etching). But while the image of the cartoon offers a panoramic view of the guards against a picturesque landscape, in 'Muchachos al avío' (fig. 13) Goya has zoomed in onto the human bodies depicted; only the tree cutting diagonally across the scene reminds us of the presence of nature – a bleak, gloomy landscape, though. More interestingly, the bodies of *Capricho 11* (fig. 13) seem to have lost the original documentary function and the 'costumbrismo' of their counterparts in 'El resguardo del tabaco' (fig. 48). Goya, therefore, re-works a well-established pictorial genre at the service of enlightened reformist aims and portrays a group of idle men who come to represent a specific set of contemporary anxieties concerning unproductivity and crime. The 'idealized' image of the 1780s in which the guards are enforcing the government's policies has given way to a darker side of Spanish culture in the late 1790s. The title of the preliminary drawing for *Capricho 11* (fig. 13) hinted at the idea of morality, 'Buena gente somos los moralistas'. But who are the 'moralistas' here? : The gathering being depicted? A group of moral reformers passing judgement on the group depicted? Is Goya asking the viewer to take up the position of moralist? These are questions and shifting perspectives which do not offer a stable viewpoint from which to interpret the image.

Capricho 73 (fig. 47) depicts another clandestine meeting but of a different kind, as we shall see. The title of the print, 'Mejor es holgar', has a popular ring to it, as some of the manuscript commentaries attest: 'Si el que más trabaja es el que menos goza, tiene razón. Mejor es holgar' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np).[16] What interests me is to focus on a series of inscriptions in the etching that will enable us to relate the print to contemporary discourses on prostitution and their relationship with social reform, the application of the law, and productivity. Prostitution is one of the main themes cutting across *Los Caprichos*;[17] indeed, not unlike William Hogarth's 'A Harlot's Progress' (1732), one could spin out a narrative of the life and fate of prostitutes, stage by stage, in Goya's collection. Tomlinson summarizes it thus: 'the recurrent figure of the prostitute –chatting with a potential customer, adjusting her stocking, taken into custody' (2002: 57)– can be seen in different contexts and situations.[18] But my purpose in the context of this present section on unproductive bodies, is rather to point out the connection between the prostitute and reforming institutions and productivity. In order to do this, I shall pick up two on moments in the life of the young female depicted in *Capricho 73* (fig. 47): the first, the print that occupies us; the second, a 1796-97 drawing entitled 'San Fernando. ¡Cómo hilan!' (fig. 49), which appeared in *Album B*. Visually, the three figures represented in *Capricho 73* (fig. 47) are linked by a skein of wool: a man holds the loose wool, which a young woman is winding into a ball, which, in turn, is being wound around the spindle held by an old woman in the background. The skein of wool, therefore, places the characters in an unspoken dialogue with one another. The pose of the young woman is that of the sexually available female, as her spread legs and the ball of wool in front of her pudendum suggest (is she a virgin we might ask ourselves? Or is her lost virginity being 'restored'?); the old woman is most certainly the 'celestina' plotting the activities of the prostitute, whereas the huddled male figure on the left-hand side of the print could well be the procurer. As Wilson-Bureau observes, 'todos los gestos y objetos representan un juego con los símbolos de la sexualidad' (1992: 259). For Wilson-Bureau, the young female is about to enter the world of prostitution since the implied meaning of 'Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47) is that 'si un trabajo útil y productivo es cansado, entonces "lo mejor es holgar" – con la implicación de que la muchacha puede pasar su vida de una manera menos honesta, y está siendo animada a ella por los dos viejos' (1992: 259). Not earning her living through honest work means not abiding by the law and, in the context of the second half of the eighteenth-century, facing confinement. In the same way that the symbolism of the skein of wool conveys a sexual activity of an illegal nature, a contemporary viewer would have inferred the link between spinning and confinement, thus anticipating the fate of this prostitute ('hilar' means 'to spin' but it also means 'prostitution' in colloquial language).[19] 'San Fernando. ¡Cómo hilan!' (fig. 49) is an explicit reference to the hospice of San Fernando, an institution created in 1766 to house Madrid's beggars, vagabonds and prostitutes. The confinement of these unproductive bodies had a social and moral reformist dimension, although its economic significance cannot be underestimated. The main purpose of confinement was eventually to integrate them 'into society as economically productive members' (Tomlinson, 1992: 100). Knudsen sees this drawing as an example of Goya's scepticism towards 'some of the institutional changes of the time' and 'the population's resistance to change' (2000: 20), for what the image posits in the dialogue established between the older woman on the left hand side and the two younger internees is the passing down of behaviours and practices even within the confines of a reforming institution. The women, Knudsen concludes, 'are and will remain prostitutes' (2000: 22).

Reinterpreting Emblems and Devotional Prints: Nobility and Clergy

The next section of this chapter will be devoted to the emblem and the devotional print as cultural forms and modes of expression with which Goya takes issue in *Los Caprichos*. Traditionally, the use of these two cultural forms, the emblem and the devotional print, was at the service of two institutions, the Church and the Monarchy, and, by extension, the aristocracy. I shall be considering how Goya engages with both artistic traditions: firstly, through his parodic portrayal of the nobility as living emblems in *Capricho 50* 'Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10), and, secondly, through his visual critique of the clergy in *Capricho 70* 'Devota profesión' (fig. 51), an etching modelled on traditional devotional prints.

It is common knowledge that throughout the history of Western art, art has 'conventionally functioned to extend and perpetuate institutional and personal power' (Leppert, 1996: 114), specifically the power of State and Church. Emblems were frequently adopted for aristocratic models of behaviour, serving simultaneously as instruments perpetuating economic and cultural difference and as educational tools. In Chapter 3, I discussed how in Spain education was controlled by the Catholic Church and how the Jesuits, in particular, occupied a privileged position within the educational system, forming the aristocratic élite and reaching the populace. The Jesuit order shaped patterns of thought and taste until 1767, the year of their expulsion. Whether in academic environments and cultured settings –schools, colleges and universities–, where the decoding of emblems was a regular activity in the teaching of rhetoric as part of the *Ratio Studiorum*, or in more popular environments –street processions, public ceremonies and dramas–, in which the emblem was a foil to propagate religious and didactic-pedagogic messages in order to catch man's affections and ravish his understanding, imagistic epistemology occupied a privileged position in the Jesuitical method of education. The Society of Jesus redefined and reinterpreted mainstream sixteenth- and seventeenth-century emblem books, adapting them for their own purposes. In the visual pastoral programme of the Jesuits, emblems and devotional prints need to be seen as the books of the illiterate populace: 'they aid the memory; they move the emotions; they have a ceremonial function in the practice of worship; they enhance the pedagogical process by making it more agreeable; they improve concentration; and they form part of the practice of meditation' (Porterman, 2000: 190). It was believed that they were more direct and easily comprehensible than words, and that they communicated truths to the mind intuitively, instructing through generating a powerful and vivid visual impression. Medieval folklore and popular culture not only infused emblems and devotional prints with images, motifs, symbols -that is, signs-, but also informed the rhetorical operations of such cultural forms.

Despite the general 'eighteenth-century critique of a "papist" oral visual culture' (Stafford, 1994: 129), Spain still remained an oral and a fundamentally visual culture firmly rooted in medieval and Counter-Reformation attitudes. Christian traditions and imagery, a long-standing tradition of instruction (religious doctrine, religious didacticism), and the art of Catholic persuasion remind us that Spanish culture was mainly 'eidética' (Jiménez Lozano, 1989: 141). The Counter-

Reformation movement emphasised the use of images in devotional and evangelical activities; adapted to the moral, religious and political thinking of orthodox Catholicism, 'spiritual pictures', sacred images and moral emblems moulded Spanish culture for centuries. One might argue that emblems, as well as devotional prints, produced what Foucault refers to as a regime of truth. According to Foucault, 'the most powerful discourses, in terms of the productiveness of their social effects, depend on assumptions and claims that their knowledge is true' (Rose, 2001: 138). As regimes of truth, the use of these cultural forms by the Spanish Catholic Church and State worked toward similar ends. It is within this context that devotional prints and emblems need to be considered.

Arguably, *Los Caprichos* not only address reformers and literate sectors of the population but they also address the illiterate, the unenlightened through imagery. According to Stafford, the etchings 'formed the secular antithesis to religious contemplation' (1994: 14), which was generally promoted by Catholic books of emblems and by religious imagery in general. Goya's generic otherness, as my analysis of *Capricho 50* 'Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) and *Capricho 70* 'Devota profesión' (fig. 51) will show, opens wider aesthetic and epistemological questions: what if Goya was retrieving a didactic function lost to 'idiotic public processions, incantatory spectacles, tableaux vivants, and mesmerizing floats' (Stafford, 1994: 10), to use Stafford's description of some Catholic public representations? Goya's artistic tour de force retrieves the visual as a model of education; the creation of vivid and concrete imagery produced a kind of immediate cognitive experience: look and extract a lesson. This return to the popular, or recourse to the visual as a popular medium, does not necessarily define Goya as a 'man of the people' as opposed to an 'enlightened artist' (for such labels do not help in understanding artistic choices), but rather shows him to be an artist who takes issue with representation and visuality. In *Los Caprichos*, Goya questions the revelatory mode behind the mechanism of perception and contemplation, the regime of truth that informs both political and religious discourses, which in the case of Spain had been historically associated. *Los Caprichos* admit a double-edged reading: on the one hand, Goya re-appropriates and reinterprets artistic forms whose religious function exerted an 'ideological spell' on the populace, while, on the other, Goya seems to be aware, unlike other Spanish reformers, that visual education in a culture that is predominantly 'eidética' such as that of eighteenth-century Spain, might still be valid and more able to reach the unenlightened masses.

The conjunction of monsters and emblematic imagery in Goya's *Capricho 50* 'Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) arouses the viewer's curiosity and demands that we pay close attention to it. The figures depicted in *Capricho 50* (fig. 10) are living emblems. The familial coats of arms act as straitjackets which restrain their bodily movements; their heads are immobilized by a lock, which only allows them to open their mouths in a mechanical manner. The locked heads convey that these are, or are in the process of becoming, men of *idées fixes*. Indeed, they are living exemplars of family fixation. One of them is lying down on the ground; the other, leaning against a wall, is waiting to be fed by a figure in the background which could be described as a humanized donkey. This background figure is, according to Schulz, 'borrowed directly from the emblematic traditions, where its attributes are associated with error and ignorance' (2000: 155). Ignorance is thus directly linked to their monstrosity. But other attributes and appendages catch our attention, in particular the rosary in the right hand of the lying figure and the sword on the one standing,[20] as well as the protuberance in their crotches. Their bodies are restricted and trapped, then, by the corset of the norm;

the dominant signs of Catholicism and nobility assign meaning by social hierarchy and religious practice. As members of the Spanish nobility, the bodies of Los Chinchillas have been constructed through (and here literally constrained by) discourse.[21] These are people of flesh and blood who are motionless representatives of traditionalist authority. Their world is shaped and perceived through heraldry. But Los Chinchillas are not depicted in a correct heraldic manner since the figures do not display their noble bearings; nor are they a moral or virtuous example for aristocratic models of behaviour. Goya has conspicuously emblazoned on them ignorance, gluttony and perversity. The artist sets before the beholder a monstrous representation of an exemplary model, thus parodying and subverting the culturally acceptable form of the traditional emblem. Los Chinchillas have become, therefore, antithetical embodiments of aristocratic models of behaviour. Like many of the etchings analysed in Chapter 4 (*Capricho 37* 'Si sabrá más el discípulo') (fig. 44) and in the present chapter (*Capricho 53* '¡Qué pico de oro!) (fig. 19), the transmission of knowledge and education are among the main concerns of the artist in this etching. Indeed, the explicit spoon-feeding[22] depicted in the image 'suggests the passive acceptance of received ideas based on tradition and social position' (Schulz, 2000: 159), the inherited mental and corporal habits of the nobility.

The representation of Los Chinchillas also evokes imagery related to insanity. Their unrestrained passions and perverse feelings might have landed them in the cell of an institution, most probably an asylum. They are reduced to mere physicality: eating and sexual arousal. Their desires, social and bodily, shape their identity:

> un tema recurrente en *Los Caprichos* es la atención producida en el concepto de verdad por el deseo, en donde el "deseo" debe ser entendido como la fuente de una serie de ilusiones de naturaleza social o sexual. Lo que estas imágenes sugieren es que los deseos, tanto sociales como sexuales, motivan una serie de distorsiones que obstruyen la clarividencia racional. El deseo frustra los

> intentos de la mente por coincidir con su objeto o por llegar a un adecuado conocimiento de sí misma (Cascardi, 1996: 64)

Whatever is being fed to them goes straight to their body without going through the faculty of reason. Are these cases of dementia? Of idiocy? Of feeble-mindedness? Open mouths and closed eyes suggest as much. As we have seen, Los Chinchillas might be read as monsters of ignorance and other vices but could we see them as madmen? Goya's art showed an interest in the figure of the lunatic and in representations of insanity, namely in 'Yard with Lunatics' (1793-4), 'Madhouse' (ca. 1816) and a series of drawings in Album G (1824-8).[23] Goya first envisaged the image of what would be *Capricho 50* (fig. 10) as an explicit reference to Reason: 'La enfermedad de la razón'[24] (fig. 50) was the title of the preparatory drawing (a more pathological metaphor than 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos'). Some of the figures have disappeared and some of the motifs have been displaced in the movement from drawing to print. Under a clearly delineated architectural backdrop, which for Tomlinson 'often signifies institutions of confinement in Goya's work' (1992: 100), the two central male figures are being nursed by three female figures, who will disappear in the final print; another male figure, looking to one side and oblivious to the scene, will be metamorphosed into the emblematic creature feeding Los Chinchillas. The preparatory drawing clearly elicits a reading in which Los Chinchillas are the passive members of an aristocracy constrained by their coats of arms. In the final print, however, the coats of arms have been replaced by a garment which iconographically resembles the straitjackets typical of representations of the insane. Why has Goya rubbed out the heraldic symbols? The erasure poses a series of questions as to the meaning of madness: Could the straitjacket be interpreted as a conceptual locus of insanity / monstrosity, in which case the madmen of the day are nobles? Is the folly represented a comment on the human condition in general? Is it referring to the body politic of Spain? We can attempt to answer some of these questions by referring firstly to the particular historical context of the Spanish Enlightenment described in Chapter 3, and, secondly, by recalling briefly some of the theoretical paradigms established in Chapter 2.

In a discussion of Cadalso's *Cartas Marruecas*, Ilie (1995, I) examines the writer's use of the figure of Spain as an insane asylum as part of a wider analysis which looks at the epistemology of madness in late eighteenth-century Spanish literary and philosophical texts. In the words of Ilie, 'the very word infirmity appears often and in diverse contexts of national and moral decay. Even more this *enfermedad* accompanies the notion of disorder. If the mind is weak', Ilie argues, 'so is the body's "machine", a convenient image for emphasizing physical and mental unreliability' (1995, I: 100). In the context of eighteenth-century Spain, the diagnosis would be the following: 'the disease is national backwardness, the *atraso* caused by retrospective fixation' (1995, I: 101). Los Chinchillas are representatives of a diseased body politic fixated with and fixed in their privileges, lineages and histories. And, as indicated in Chapter 3, ideas on intellectual (as well as biological) backwardness appear and reappear in the texts of radical *ilustrados* such as Arroyal, Cañuelo and Cabarrús. The pretensions of 'normal' society, that is, the privileged classes, and the delusions of the insane asylum, which Spain has come to be, are not too distant from each other.

It was during the age of Enlightenment when, according to Foucault, the madman (the monster) came to be considered as mentally sick (see my discussion of Foucault's *Histoire de la folie* in Chapter 2). Madness, as well as crime, sexuality or illness, were fundamental experiences that needed to be analysed in relation to discursive practices and technologies of power. Classified medically and visually, the madman was discredited; such classification dehumanised him and portrayed him as a being who could not be reasoned with. Read against the backdrop of emerging theories of insanity, Los Chinchillas are depicted as human beings who are alienated from their senses and unable to manage their own bodies. They cannot be reasoned with until they have received physical (and mental) treatment. Their confinement hides away their unreason, mechanical restraining subjugates their bodies to reason: 'recourse to opiates, solitary confinement in darkened rooms, cold baths, a "lowering" diet, blood letting, purgatives and so on [...] would pacify the body, so as to render the mind more receptive to reason' (Porter, 2003: 314). The portrayal of Los Chinchillas as emblems of madness at the turn of the nineteenth century 'points out the weakness or failure of reason', the madman becomes useful 'as a foil for reason' (Canguilhem, 1962: 35). If, as we indicated in Chapter 2, the reflection on normal / adult humans grew out of reflections on their converse, then the viewer when confronted with Los Chinchillas in *Capricho 50* (fig. 10) may interpret these madmen as a foil for reason. But what Reason? For, as Porter perceptively observes, 'there was always, waiting in the wings, the negation of that ideal [*homo rationalis*]: irrational man, the madman or lunatic, the dread warning of what was in store were man to divest himself of the use of his noblest gift – or, in the hands of satirists and print-makers, the mortifying critique of the abuse actually wrought by *soi-disant* rational man himself' (2003: 305).

The most popular and disseminated form of engraving throughout the Renaissance, the Baroque and the Enlightenment, was the devotional print. It taught people the life of Christ and the sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church, promoted the veneration of saints and the devotion of particular cults such as the Immaculate Conception, and acted as graphic sermons for worshippers. Devotional prints were also sold as indulgences for sinners; their acquisition not only granted remission of the temporal punishment in purgatory but also offered believers (divine) protection against natural disasters, epidemics, famine, and disease – signs of the wrath of God. The superstitious beliefs arising from indulgences and false miracles were, as Carrete Parrondo ('Censura y prohibiciones', 1987: 423-438) observes, persecuted and censored by ecclesiastical authorities throughout the centuries. In the eighteenth century, the reformist elite of the Spanish Church censored those prints which were 'llenas de fanatismo, superstición y mentiras perniciosas para engaños de simples ancianos y de beatas fanáticas, que incluían falsas concesiones de indulgencias o que servían para precaverse de la peste, incendios o muerte repentinas' (1987: 424). Rooting out the superstitious beliefs and uses associated with this mode of cultural expression, the main function of the devotional print was to 'impulsar las emociones piadosas de las gentes sencillas, en quienes inspiraban el mismo respeto y piedad que los retablos y pinturas de los templos' (Carrete Parrondo, 1987: 233).

Capricho 70 'Devota profesión' (fig. 51) has been consistently read as part of Goya's depiction of witchery in *Los Caprichos*, alongside other works produced during the same decade, such as drawings in Album B and the collection *Sueños* or six paintings of scenes of witches (1798) commissioned by the Duques de Osuna.[25] Critics have also pointed how the scene enacts the subversion of Christian rituals. I shall be looking at these practices by considering the ways in which the image can be related both to religious and pagan practices. But, as I shall be arguing, the artist engagement with devotional prints as a genre has been overlooked. This solemn ceremony represents the act of ordination: a novice, who stands on the shoulders of a monstrous creature, a satyr, is taking an oath of allegiance to two members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and, by extension, to the Divinity. The masters of ceremonies hold the book from which the novice is reading the solemn oath. Their holding of the sacred text attracts our attention immediately for they are not grasping it with their hands or arms but rather with a pair of pliers, an instrument to which I shall return. Present at the ceremony are also two silent witnesses, whose bodies are buried in the ground. A consideration of the graphic evolution of *Capricho 70* (fig. 51) and its imagery shows that the ritual being depicted is a monstrous hybrid of Christian and satanic rituals. The graphic evolution of this print can be traced to *Album B* ('Brujas a volar') (fig. 52) and to the *Sueños* series ('Sueño 3. Bruja principiante') (fig. 53) where the titles clearly indicate that Goya had a witchcraft scene in mind. In 'Brujas a volar' (fig. 52) the masters of ceremonies are seating on an altar, a pagan altar, in which deformed, grimacing faces are engraved; the macabre scene is completed with a skull, the only witness to this pagan ritual, which is lying on the ground. Skulls have multiplied in 'Sueño 3. Bruja principiante' (fig. 53), the altar has been eliminated and replaced by a monstrous bird (a falcon, perhaps, suggesting not only the flying power of witches but also their predatory nature), and the technical image reversal common to the working process (drawing to print) has taken place; otherwise, the main elements of the composition remain the same. Although the caption of the final print does not make an explicit reference to witches or witchcraft, their practices are addressed in the manuscript commentaries. Among these, we find an ingenious reproduction of the words recited by the masters of ceremonies and the novice during this solemn ceremony: '¿Juras obedecer a tus maestros y superiores? Barrer desvanes, hilar estopa, tocar sonajas, aullar, chillar, volar, guisar, untar, chupar, ciocer, soplar, freir, y cada, y cuando se te mande. Juro. Pues hija ya eres bruja. Sea enhorabuena' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Carrete Parrondo y Centellas Salamero, 1999: np). Other commentators point out in a more general way the vices being passed from master to disciple –'la ignorancia y la lascivia se hacen una profesión solemne' (Calcografía Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np)– and some extend these vices to the Spanish nation as a whole, for the etching 'shows a personification of Spain standing on the shoulders of Ignorance, and humbly dedicating itself to the worship of Fanaticism and Superstition' (anonymous French-man cited in Glendinning, 1977: 64).

Symbols of Christian, witchcraft and satanic rituals inscribed in the image tell the viewer that the novice could be a future priest or could join the forces of evil, that either psalms are being recited or spells are being chanted. It is as if the borrowing of symbols from one sphere might be used to explicate another. However, explanations are not that clear since the monstrous creatures and the monstrous ceremony represented in *Capricho 70* (fig. 51) blur the boundaries between religion and witchcraft. The ritualistic practices of witchcraft and priestcraft are closer than we think. And it is to the religious imagery that I now turn. The *mise-en-scène* –altar, garments, props and body language– suggests a religious space. The masters of ceremonies' garments might be said to identify them with ecclesiastical figures; the episcopal capes and the mitres, in particular, are symbols of office and hierarchy. Other objects suggest that these two figures are inquisitors: the conical hats resemble the punishing hats worn by inquisitorial victims, while the presence of the pliers, instruments of torture, and the book (could this be the *Maleus Maleficarum*[26] which described 'sinful acts and procedural details useful to fellow Inquisitors and to judges' (Sayre, 1994: 70) in their condemnation of witches?) contribute to this interpretation. The body language unmistakably communicates the ritualized conventions of recitation and reply: open mouths reciting formulaic words, closed eyes conveying concentration and solemnity. The contact between masters and novices is achieved through recitation and repetition. Once again, as in the case of *Capricho 37* 'Si sabrá más el discípulo' (fig. 44) and *Capricho 53* '¡Qué pico de oro!' (fig. 19), Goya is criticizing models of learning. From his ordination, this novice is learning religion by rote. Thus far my analysis of *Capricho 70* (fig. 51) has built upon, and expanded, those readings that regard the etching as a mockery of pagan and Christian rituals. Admittedly, it is religion and religious practices that are being challenged by Goya. What I would like to argue now in the final part of my analysis is that Goya is also challenging the cultural form which conveyed visually such religious beliefs and practices, the devotional print. The caption, 'Devota profesión', transports us to the world of religious worship or observance. A novice is devoting himself to the institution of the Church, affirming his allegiance to Catholic beliefs, and committing himself to rightful actions and behaviour; this future priest will be bringing the word of God to other devotees and acting as a mediator between divine grace and the believers through the action of administering the sacraments. As I indicated in the introduction to this section, specific devotions and sacraments were among the main subjects of devotional prints. The sacrament, a religious ceremony which is regarded as an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace, is a solemn oath - etymologically, *sacramentum* means solemn oath. *Capricho 70* (fig. 51), as my preliminary description of the print argued, represents the act of ordination, one of the seven rites religious of the Catholic Church (the other six are: baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, anointing of the sick, and matrimony). We can revisit the scene now that we have established that this is not just a mere ceremony. It is, in fact, a sacrament: two senior members of the clergy are conferring the holy orders on a novice taking the vows; the open book is the ordinary which lays down the order of divine service. What Goya represents is the monstrous sacrilege of a sacred moment.

In *1789: Les Emblèmes de la Raison* (1973), Jean Starobinski devotes a chapter (1988: 99-124) to the emblematic value of the oath in eighteenth-century art, focusing in particular on the French revolutionary art of Jacques-Louis David (1748-1825). Starobinski argues that the political (and civil) oaths which took place in the year 1789 (1988: 102)[27] were reflected in Jacques-Louis David's 'Oath of the Horatii' (1784-85) and 'The Tennis Court Oath' (1791).[28] The revolutionary oaths portrayed by David symbolized the new times; in contrast to the 'traditional ceremony of the *sacre*, or anointing of the Kings of France', which 'invested the monarch with the supernatural insignia of his power' (Starobinski, 1988: 102) received directly from Heaven, 'the revolutionary oath created sovereignty' whereby 'the separate will of each individual became generalized as all pronounced the words of the oath' (1988: 102). Goya's print, produced in the turbulent context of the aftermath of the French Revolution, proposes a very different oath. The sacrilegious act depicted by the Spanish artist deviates aesthetically and thematically from the solemnity and truthfulness embodied in David's 'Oath of the Horatii'. In *Capricho 70* 'Devota profesiôn' (fig. 51) Goya creates, I suggest, an emblem of unreason, which symbolizes the presence of archaic (and aberrant) beliefs and institutional practices firmly and obstinately entrenched in late eighteenth-century Spain.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen how Goya's prints exposed the discursive formations that sustained privileges, uses and customs, and unmasked the rules and practices governing social constructions of knowledge. Goya's imagery takes issue with the culturally constructed forms of knowledge mobilized from specific institutional locations. For the Bourbon régime the role of the visual arts was primarily utilitarian and propagandistic; for the Church visual imagery had primarily a religious and propagandistic function, too. The reasoned representation staged by Feijoo in 'El caso de las florecillas milagrosas de San Luis' or the official propaganda programme emanating from the Bourbon court have been contrasted with Goya's own reasoned representations of the victims of the inquisitorial process (*Capricho 23* 'Aquello polvos' (fig. 7) and *Capricho 24* 'No hubo remedio' (fig. 17)) or the populace (*Capricho 11* 'Muchachos al avío' (fig. 13) and *Capricho 73* 'Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47)). Ultimately all bodies, not just those of the Enlightened minority and the privileged classes (mostly men) compose the body politic.

Through the analysis of *Capricho 50* 'Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) as emblem, and *Capricho 70* 'Devota profesión' (fig. 51) as a devotional print, I have examined how Goya explored the way in which these cultural forms relate to institutional power. He is attacking and subverting those very same cultural forms that help produce and reproduce power relations and specific views of the social world. His images show the influence and perversions of symbolic and emblematic traditions of representation; question the educational, moral and institutional values embedded in emblems and devotional prints; and deconstruct the ideological operations at work in these images. By borrowing and adopting both secular and religious imagery, the artist figures forth significations which point to the mechanisms underlying institutional power. Goya's epistemological critique of institutions (that is, social constructions of knowledge and the conceptual paradigms that sustain them) shows (*monstrare*) not only the workings of traditional institutions but also the insufficiencies of reformist institutions in eighteenth-century Spain, which failed to subsume the authority of sacred institutions. This 'desvelar', 'mostrar', 'denunciar', if we recall the meanings of the notion of *desengaño*, is what makes his work radical. His work parodies the conventional and institutional forms of transmitting and diffusing knowledge, as well as their passive understanding, as my readings of Capricho 53 '¡Qué pico de oro!' (fig. 19) and Capricho 70 'Devota profesión' (fig. 51) illustrate.

Goya's interest in unruly bodies and institutional bodies would go beyond the publication of *Los Caprichos* and can be found in later works, as I have indicated throughout this chapter. It was in *Los Caprichos* where he laid the groundwork for his radical critique of Spanish institutions at the turn of the eighteenth century.

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[1] Critics have, of course, related this print to Goya's illness of 1792-93 which resulted in his deafness. *Capricho 40* would represent the artist's indictment of the medical profession. Soufas reads it as a self-reference on the part of Goya 'invoking not only illness in general but also "el mal francés", syphilis, of which Goya is alleged by many to have been a victim and which left him deaf' (1986: 322).

[2] Compared to the advances of modern medicine in other countries, Haidt argues that in eighteenth-century Spain 'the clinical *Gaze* was not even conceivable' (1998: 24). Haidt follows here Foucault's notion of the medical gaze, as developed in *La naissance de la clinique* (1983).

[3] For a detailed analysis of *Capricho 1* 'Francisco Goya y Lucientes, Pintor', the frontispiece to the collection, see Stoichita and Coderch (1999: 165-83).

[4] See 'Goya and Benito Feijoo: the artist's liberation through the new sensibility' (Livermore, 1988: 106-132) for an analysis of the affinities between Goya and Feijoo: 'there is scarcely one of Feijoo's essays which does not offer a similarity at some point or other with one of Goya's sketches, drawings or paintings and the likeness includes aesthetic, historical, scientific, social, superstitious, religious and emotional topics' (1988: 106). Livermore's essay aligns itself with the projects of critics such as Helman (1963), Sayre and Pérez Sánchez (1988) and Alcalá Flecha (1988), who consider Goya's imagery as visual translations of contemporary literary texts.

[5] Subirats' exploration of Spain's problematic relationship with modernity is informed by Adorno's and Horkheimer's critique of the Enlightenment project in *Dialektic der Aufklärung* (1947), namely their discussion of the term disenchantment: 'The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy' (1997: 3).

[6] See 'Un interludio autobiográfico: la Ilustración insuficiente' (1993: 69-80).

[7] See Tomlinson (1992: 160-187) for an examination of Goya's painting in the context of the Restoration period and Wolf (2000: 77-81) for a discussion of Goya's representations of various types of Inquisitorial punishment.

[8] 'Auto de fe. Un vulgo de curas y frailes necios hacen su comidilla de semejantes funciones. Perico el cojo que daba polvos a los enamorados' (Ayala, Madrid, cited in Helman, 1993: 116).

[9] 'Los autillos, suelen ser el agostillo y diversión de cierta clase de gentes' (Calcografía Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np).

[10] Helman gives an account of an 'auto de fe' which was described in the *Memorial Literario*, held in the Iglesia de Santo Domingo el Real in Madrid in 1784. She also traces a possible historical reference for *Capricho 24*, in this case Jovellanos' vain efforts as Minister of Grace and Justice to reform the Inquisition (1993: 118-19).

[11] Alcalá Flecha argues that, according to contemporary texts, the punishment that would be inflicted on the condemned would be flagellation: 'los penitentes sentenciados a este castigo eran montados a horcajadas sobre un asno, desnudos hasta la cintura, con un dogal al cuello y una capucha en la cabeza en la que se inscribía la indicación de su delito' (1988: 268).

[12] This phrase is taken from Foucault's words 'in punishment-as-spectacle a confused horror spread from the scaffold' (1991: 9).

[13] See 'Real Life "Caprichos" c. 1798-1808' (Wilson-Bureau and Mena Marqués, 1994: 271-299).

[14] See 'La estampa popular en el siglo XVIII' (Carrete Parrondo, 1987: 645-711) for an overview of this type of popular imagery.

[15] Helman cites the figure of the outlaw Francisco Esteban, alias 'El Guapo' (1993: 98-102).

[16] Other commentaries relate the print to the relationships between men and women ('Más agradable y fácil es echarse una mujer a la briba, que desenredar madejas y trabajar en su casa' (Calcografía

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Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np)) or family relationships ('Una familia viciosa difícilmente se sujeta a las ocupaciones honestas caseras. El bestia del marido se pone a tener la madeja, se enreda; la suegra la desenmaraña y la mujer se cansa y manifiesta en sus ademanes que la tiene más cuenta echarse a la brivía' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, in Helman, 1993: 227)).

[17] See Alcalá Flecha (1988: 365-407) for an overview of this subject in the light of the literary figure of the 'celestina' and contemporary texts by Nicolás Fernández de Moratín and Cabarrús.

[18] Tomlinson's general comments do not refer to any specific etchings, though *Capricho 7* 'Ni así la distingue', *Capricho 17* 'Bien tirada está' and *Capricho* 22 '¡Pobrecitas! might illustrate her point.

[19] The mythical resonance of the spinning motif would have also brought into the image a more universal connotation: the Fates and the threading of human destiny.

[20] 'Uno está echado en tierra y lleva un rosario en la mano derecha; el otro está en pie y trae ceñido un sable o espada; y éste, debajo de una especie de tabardo, lleva algo que pende hasta rozar el suelo, un pliego grande de pergamino, tal vez, que sería su ejecutoria' (Helman 1993: 190). See also Harris (1977: 205).

[21] Helman (1963) traces a literary connection to the comedy *El dómine Lucas* (José de Cañizares) in which Chinchilla, one of the main characters, is obsessed by lineage.

[22] Klingender relates spoon-feeding to the image of the funnel which harks back to popular medieval imagery: 'in Bosch's days the funnel was widely used in popular satire as a symbol for the lifeless, purely mechanical learning of the scholastics' (Klingender, 1948: 169).

[23] See Klein's 'Insanity and the Sublime: Aesthetics and Theories of Mental Illness in Goya's *Yard With Lunatics* and Related Works' (1998).

[24] This title was written over another original caption which read 'Pesadilla ... soñando que no me podia desenredar ... de nobleza en donde ...'.

[25] See Helman ('Algunos sueños y brujas de Goya' (1987)) and Sayre ('Goya's *Caprichos*: A Sampling of Witches' (1994)) for a general overview of witchcraft imagery in Goya's work during the 1790s.

[26] The *Maleus Maleficarum* was published in 1487 by two Dominican Inquisitors, Heinrich Institoris and Jakob Springer. See Sayre (1994).

[27] 'George Washington's oath of the allegiance to the American Constitution on April 30; the Tennis Court Oath on June 20 [...]; and the oaths of the National Guards [...] In the following year the civil constitution of the clergy required priests to swear loyalty to the Nation. After Mass had been celebrated by Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, the Feast of the Federation on July, 14, 1790, became one immense taking of the oath. Marriages were often celebrated before the altar to the *Patrie*, thus combining the loyalties of the spouse and the citizen. And every flag, with its legend, "Liberty or Death", was a reminder of an oath' (Starobinski, 1988: 102).

[28] Starobinski adds to David's representations that of J. H. Fuseli (1745-1825), 'The Oath of the Three Swiss Guards' (1779-81).

Conclusion

Let us return in the opening paragraphs of this Conclusion to the two exhibitions with which I opened this thesis, 'Goya y el espíritu de la ilustración' and 'Monstruos y seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca Nacional', in order to revisit the issues raised in the Introduction: the extent to which we can consider *Los Caprichos* as an Enlightenment work, and the relationship of Goya's inscription of monstrosity and monstrous bodies in *Los Caprichos* with the (Spanish and European) Enlightenment. Our historical location of Goya's collection of etchings in the political, cultural and ideological context of the Spanish Enlightenment demonstrated that not only the conflictive ideological positions between the reformers and the traditionalists but also those between moderate and radical reformers demanded a re-assessment of the artist's relation with the *Ilustración* and the *ilustrados*. As new work on the Spanish Enlightenment emerges (Ilie (1995), Haidt (1998)), our conceptions of Goya change and, by extension, so do our readings of *Los Caprichos*. The received and unquestioned identification of the prints with the political, social and cultural aspirations of the (moderate) Enlightened reformers, I argued, must be disturbed. My analyses of the etchings in Chapters 4 and 5 showed the apparent contradictions between the visible Enlightened ideals of the themes depicted in Goya's visual representations and the deliberate ambiguity inscribed in the series.

My first approach to the analysis of monstrosity in *Los Caprichos* was through *Capricho 43* 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' (fig. 1) in Chapter 4. Its title, inscribed in the image, was interpreted as a statement of modern experience since in this emblematic etching Goya reveals how the rationalism of the Enlightenment mind betrays its own monstrous positioning. An analysis of both the inscription and the iconographic elements of *Capricho 43* (fig. 1) (namely, the figure of Minerva, the quartet of owls and the taxonomical monstrosity of the bats) established how Goya disrupted Enlightenment parameters of human perception and knowledge (ideals of continuity and claims to absolute knowledge and visibility). Within the specific context of the Spanish Enlightenment, *Capricho 43* (fig. 1) was interpreted as a parodic and critically incisive representation of the use of Reason by reformers and traditionalist alike. The critique of Reason inscribed in *Capricho 43* (fig. 1) was paradigmatic for our analysis of physical and institutional bodies in Chapters 4 and 5. Firstly, the plurality of meanings set in motion by the undecidable word 'sueño' defies any attempt at fixing the image and points to the foundational instability of any sign system; as we have seen in our analyses of the prints, the visual undecidability and the conflicting readings embedded within the images challenge the Western metaphysical idea of pure vision. Secondly, and like the visitors to the exhibition 'Monstruos y seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca Nacional', 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos' invited us to examine Goya's complex conception of monstrosity and complex production of monstrous bodies (physical, institutional, metaphysical).

In our journey through the physical and institutional world of *Los Caprichos* we encountered not only the monsters haunting the Spanish eighteenth-century but also the monsters haunting modern society the modern imagination. Facing hybrids and grotesque bodies, supernatural and superstition-infused monsters, and monsters of the political body, we became aware of the dominant socio-cultural, discursive, philosophical and institutional norms shaping the bodies and minds of the people of eighteenth-century Spain. The hierarchies and privileges governing institutional practices, the discursive constructions of Catholicism, the archaic mentality of the population and the privileged classes alike, as well as the non-conflictive relationship between the reforming movement and the *status quo* produced all kinds of monsters. The limitations and contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment led us to consider Goya's position vis-à-vis the reformist project of the Bourbon régime and his critique of concrete forces such as the Catholic Church and the Inquisition, social hierarchies (the privileges of nobility and clergy, the unenlightened populace), and the instrumental use of Reason. The Spanish Enlightenment, I have argued, was primarily technical and indoctrinating in its outlook and practices; the moderate reformers' policies were ultimately at the service of the State and did very little to shake the traditional power structures and social relations. My discussion of the notion of 'desengaño' via the work of Subirats' *La ilustración insuficiente* highlighted the paradoxical nature and limitations of Reason in the context of the Spanish Enlightenment and enabled me to establish Goya's radical critique of Spanish eighteenth-century society. Always aware of the metaphysical assumptions and epistemological implications underscoring traditionalist models of knowledge, and the reproduction of these very same institutional practices in certain reformist pedagogical models, Goya exposed and deconstructed those cultural forms that sustained the transmission and diffusion of Tradition and Authority (whether of a conservative or a reformist sign). His radical critique of institutions and traditional cultural forms at the service of Church and State also moved beyond the cultural and moral agenda of the moderate reformist project, since his use of radical imagery sought to dismantle traditional power structures and traditional social and cultural relations, while pointing to the insufficiencies of the Spanish Enlightenment.

Central to my study have been Goya's views on the reform of the individual and society. The clash of traditionalist and reformist ideologies affected the individual and the collective body. As argued in Chapter 4, the body became central in the construction and regulation of knowledge, identity and social order. There we discussed how historical transformations in behavioural codes and forms of affect control not only had an effect on the individual body but were also met with resistance by certain sectors of the population. I considered the reformist treatises of Campomanes and Jovellanos in the context of theories of the civilized body. Further engagement with Norbert Elias' work on the civilizing process might prove productive in readings of eighteenth-century manuals of deportment produced in Spain and their relationship to print culture. Indeed, Elias' ideas on volatile medieval bodies (1939), as developed by Mellor and Shilling (1997), enabled me to explore specific aspects of eighteenth-century Spanish culture, namely the formative power of the Catholic Church and the mentality of a population steeped in Medieval, Counter-Reformational and Baroque beliefs and practices. The volatile bodies of eighteenth-century Spain were physically engaged with religious imagery and superstition, and Goya poignantly inscribes these affective and empirical aspects in his images. Unlike the writings of the aforementioned Enlightened reformers Campomanes and Jovellanos in the second half of the eighteenth century or the monumental work of the Benedictine Feijoo, 'the 'desengañador de errores comunes', in the first half of the century, Goya's representations took into account the bodiliness of bodies (with their desires, anxieties, fears and uncertainties). In *Los Caprichos*, Goya not only exposed the vices and errors of Spanish society but also involved and implicated the beholder in that exposure / critique. The chasm between the reforming ideal and the social reality of Spanish eighteenth-century culture becomes manifest in the monstrous bodies populating *Los Caprichos*. Our rethinking of the monstrous body in *Los Caprichos* has involved a reconnection of the separated body and mind, and an investigation into the relationship of the body with its culture. The problem, as we showed in Chapters 4 and 5, is that of (re)integrating reason not only with truth but also with the body.

I have argued throughout this study that Goya's alternative accounts of the body in *Los Caprichos* are also a site of debate with issues of representation. His images engage with different artistic traditions and cultural forms such as pedagogical manuals, model books and anatomical plates, emblem books and devotional prints, tapestry designs and satirical prints. Likewise, his images draw on both high and popular culture, as well as on a local visual tradition rooted in Medieval, Counter-Reformational and Baroque imagery. The multiple traditions of representation at work in the series, the artist's constant experimentation with image-making (and monster-making), as well as the ambiguity inscribed in the series respond to the cultural transformations and epistemological shifts in perception affecting the eighteenth-century world. Such transformations and shifts required a radical way of representing the world, a new logic of seeing. Goya's deconstruction of classical and religious imagery teased out the political and cultural forces at play in the production of knowledge. However, an examination of the diverse, and divergent, artistic practices used by Goya has made us aware of the different patterns of reading and looking that the prints elicit. His working within and against artistic traditions engaged with the possibilities of institutions and the possibilities of subverting them.

The relation of the visual to the ideological, crucial to our analyses of *Los Caprichos*, could be extended to other graphic works by Goya. As Nigel Glendinning pointed out some time ago, Goya's 'most critical work is inevitably to be found' in etchings and drawings (1973: 526). The possibility of rapidly producing representations of everyday scenes and situations, the innovative and experimental possibilities of the language of engraving, and the qualities of the medium (a popular art form, easily reproducible, with a rich educational, religious or propagandistic function) allowed Goya to display mercilessly and comment incisively on the changing world around him. My examination of the monstrous bodies populating *Los Caprichos* lays the groundwork for future explorations of the Goyaesque body. Further inquiry into the artist's representations of the body awaits, since his depiction of the body is always strikingly modern, as the mutilated bodies of *The Disasters of War* or the 'freaks' and marginal characters appearing in his late drawings attest.

By way of conclusion, let us look at a drawing from Goya's *Album G* (Bordeaux, ca. 1825-1828), 'Mirar lo que no ven' (fig. 54). A certain irony can be detected in this apparently harmless genre scene, a depiction of a peep-show where Goya puts seeing and knowing in the context of popular culture. Still steeped in the old folk mentality of the fair, the title suggests that the viewers crowded around the apparatus see nothing, or at least nothing beyond the scope of amusement, a thwarted view-point implicitly shared by us as readers of the scene. Boxed, framed, the body is marked as a monstrous site, a strategic visibility serving to distance and differentiate it. Since the body is hidden from (our) view, however, what constitutes a freakish or monstrous body remains a moot point, ever subject(ed) to the gaze: the monster exists only to be read - as the Latin *monstrare*, to show, to make known, as well as *monere*, to warn, reminds us. What this image foregrounds is the arbitrary operation of the exceptional, of the monstrous. As Roland Barthes succinctly put it, 'the monstrous is never based on more than a shift in perception' (1964: 15). It is as if Goya were saying that (the perception of) monstrosity ultimately lies in the beholder. Produced twenty-five years after *Los Caprichos* and during his exile in Bordeaux, 'Mirar lo que no ven' illustrates Goya's recurrent preoccupation with representation, visuality, bodies, figurality, and representation, issues which have concerned us throughout this study.



Fig. 1 *Capricho 43* 'El sueño de la razón produce monstruos'



¶ Juan de Mandauila.

¶ El que quisiere muchas cosas del mundo saber.

Compre este libro y sabra cosas que se espantara.

Libro d las marauil-
llas del mūdo y d'l vi-
aje dela tierra san
y ciudades delas
ay por el mūdo.

z las ꝓuincias
mōſtruos q̄
'es coſas.

135 Seres fantásticos. Juan de Mandeville, *Libro de las maravillas del mundo y de la tierra Santa*, Valencia, Jorge Costilla, 1521

Fig. 2 Juan de Mandeville, 'Seres fantásticos', Libro de las maravillas del mundo y de la Tierra Santa (Jorge Costillo, Valencia, 1521)



RELACION VERDADERA DE VN PARTO MONSTRVOSO, NACIDO EN LA CIVDAD DE Tortoſa, de vna pobre muger, conforme ſe vee en las dos figuras de arriba, y en la deſcripcion ſiguiente.

LVNES a los ſeis dias del mes de Março del año 1634. Iuan Xinto, y Maria Ortego, marido y muger, llegarõ al Hoſpital de Sãta Cruz de la Ciudad de Tortoſa, y preguntados, de donde eran, dixerõ, de la Almunia, lugar de Aragon, ella eſtaua preñada de ocho meſes, y por eſtar enferma, la puſieron en vna cama: y el ſiguiente dia, fieſta del Angelico Doctor ſanto Tomas de Aquino, auiendo cõfeſſado y comulgado, le tomaron dolores de parto entre las diez y las onze del dia, y a los tres quartos para las doze parió la criatura, cuya figura ſe vee pintada: y aqui abaxo ſe deſcriuirá, aduirtiendo, que aunque ſon dos pintadas, no es mas de vna, ſino que la del numero primero es mirada por las eſpaldas, y la del numero ſegundo por delante.

Deſcripcion de la parte de delante.

PRimò, dos cabeças tan bien pobladas de cabellos de color caſtaño, como la que mas, con dos roſtros muy hermoſos, con tanta perfeccion que parecia que naturaleza auia pueſto en ellos lo q̃ faltó en lo demas: eſtas dos cabeças tenian ſus dos cuellos, los quales aſſentauan ſobre vn pecho ancho y eſpacioſo, con dos teteçuelas en el: debaxo del pecho tenia la barriga conforme qualquier cuerpo humano, y en el ſu ombligo, y en el ſuelo del viẽtre, y en ſu lugar tenia el ſeñal, por el qual moſtraua ſer hembra, aunque no con la proporcion deuida, porque parecia ſer de perra buelta al reues. Mas abaxo tenia vn ſieſſo, o agujero, por el qual el cuerpo expele los excrementos naturalmente: del viẽtre abaxo tenia dos piernas con ſus rodillas, eſpinillas, y pies, cõforme tiene vn cuerpo humano, los pies cõ cinco dedos cada vno, y para la proporcion [illegible] delgados, y [illegible] bien compueſtos, q̃ caſi era la mitad de lo q̃ auian de ſer, de manera q̃ por eſta parte delãtera, eſtaua formado razonablemẽte, cõforme ſe vè en la figura por delãte: boluiẽdo arriba a los braços, le ſalian el braço izquierdo y derecho de ſus lugares naturales, como los demas cõ las manos, y en cada vno dellos cinco dedos, por eſta parte ſolo moſtraua ſer monſtruoſidad en tener dos cabeças.

Deſcripcion por la parte de las eſpaldas.

BVelto por las eſpaldas hazia la figura primera, q̃ ſe vè arriba pintada, y aqui haremos ſu deſcripciõ: primeramẽte moſtraua eſtar dos cuerpos jũtos por los lados, el vno el lado drecho juntaua cõ el izquierdo del otro, y moſtraua tener dos eſpinazos, en cada vno aſſentaua ſu cabeça, y baxãdo por abaxo ſe yuan juntãdo los dos eſpinazos, y veniã a hazer como dos canales, y al cabo del vno auia vna colilla, o rabillo como vn grano de almendra no muy grãde, y debaxo de eſte rabillo tenia demas del ſieſſo q̃ dixe en la figura por delãte, otro ſieſſo, y por eſte expelia los excremẽtos: boluiẽdo arriba ſe via q̃ tenia quatro eſpaldas; empero la eſpalda drecha, y izquierda, por la parte q̃ venia a vnirſe al cabo de las dos hazia como vna nuez, y de alli ſalia vn braço harto biẽ formado, y al cabo del como dos manos plegadas, y jũtas cõ ocho dedos cõfuſamente hechos, de vn color caſi tenado, diferẽte del demas del cuerpo, q̃ era muy blanco, y encarnado: al juntarſe de las piernas venia a ſobrepujar vna pierna encima de la vna de las dos q̃ arriba auemos dicho, y eſta venia a ſer tercera pierna, la qual era mal formada, y en ella tenia vn pie cõ ocho dedos caſi en la miſma proporcion de la mano arriba dicha, y de color, eſta es la figura q̃ moſtraua por las eſpaldas conforme arriba en la ſegunda ſe vè pintada. Eſta criatura viuio mas de media hora, fue bautizada por el Prior del Hoſpital, y la puſo nombre Maria Iuana.

Deſcripcion interior.

A Ocho dias de Março ſe juntaron para hazer anotomia deſte cuerpo, el Doctor Lorenço Romeu, y el Doctor Frãciſco Reuull, Doctores en Medicina de dicho Hoſpital, y Moſ. Iayme Miro tãbien cirujano de dicho Hoſpital, y delãte de algunos ciudadanos deſta ciudad le abrieron, y hallaron q̃ el ombligo acudia al higado, el qual higado era muy grande para lo q̃ era el cuerpo, y hallaron vn coraçon grãde atraueſſado en el pecho, y que de cada cabeça baxaua vna traquiarteria, y venia a parar a cada lado del coraçon: abrieron el coraçon, y hallarõ ſer dos voidos, y que los dos ſe comunicauã. Vieronſe eſtos prodigios de naturaleza, y para que fueſſe notorio à todo el mundo, lo quiſe dar à la eſtãpa, y el que mejor lo quiſiere ver, podrá en vn auto que Moſſ. Matheu Caſals, Notario publico deſta Ciudad, recibio por orden del Syndico del ſobredicho Hoſpital, con calificados teſtigos, que a ver eſte prodigio de naturaleza ſe hallaron. Fue tan grande el concurſo de la gente que acudio à verle, que pienſo ſon pocos los deſta Ciudad q̃ no le ayan viſto.

FIN.

CON LICENCIA.
En Valencia, Por Miguel Sorolla,
Año de 1634.

Fig. 3 *Relación verdadera de un parto monstruoso* (Valencia, 1634)



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COPIA DE UN MONSTRUOSO NIÑO, QUE NACIÓ EN LA CIUDAD DE CADIZ,
EL dia 25. de Noviembre de 1767. Lo que se observa tener de particular es lo siguiente. La Ca
beza monstruosa, y en el sitio de la Bregma, ò Mollera tiene una tumorosidad, que se di
curre ser una Esnia. En el Ojo derecho se le apercibe una Eminencia, de la que sale una Cuerda à
manera de Latigo: El Ojo Izquierdo es un Agujero: La Oreja derecha parecida à la de un Cerdo:
La Oreja Izquierda es regular, y tiene tres Berrugas: En el lugar de las Narizes se le observan do
agujeros sin hueso, ni division: La Voca imperfecta; Los Carrillos los tiene con algun bello: y e
el derecho tiene quatro Agujeros, que representan otras tantas vocas: La Cabeza cubierta de Pel
de una pulgada de largo, negro, y aspero como el de los Cerdos: El Cuello no se le distingue po
ser summamente corto, y del mismo ancho que todo el Cuerpo: En el sitio del Brazo derecho, tie
ne una Eminencia, como dos dedos de ancho, y quatro de largo, la qual està unida à el Ojo de
mismo lado; de la Parte media de esta Eminencia le sale otra parecida al huevo de una Paloma: E
Brazo Izquierdo es mas largo de lo regular, y en la Mano tiene ocho Eminencias, ò Berrugas, qu
representan otros tantos Dedos; todo el largo de la Espalda està cubierto de bello: En la parte in
ferior de los Lomos tiene como quatro dedos de largo sin hueso, que parece cabo: En la Pierna de
recha, parece tener hecha la Amputacion en la parte superior, con su Muñon criado: La Pierna I
quierda por la parte media, y superior està fracturada, y buelta para arriba; y en el sitio del P
solamente tiene un Dedo bien grueso, el qual desde su mitad està buelto para à baxo, y remata e
una pequeña Uña. Vivio siete horas, recibio el Agua del Baptismo; y se conserva su Cadaver e
el Colegio del Real Hospital de dicha Ciudad.

Fig. 4 Monstruoso niño que nació en la ciudad de Cádiz en 1767 (anonymous C18th)


LA POURSUITE

160. Grandville. ***The Pursuit*****, from** ***Un***

Fig. 5 Grandville, *The Pursuit*, 1844


Tu que no puedes.

Fig. 6 *Capricho* 42 ‘Tú que no puedes’


23.
Aquellos polbos.

Fig. 7 *Capricho 23* ‘Aquellos polvos’


P. 4
El de la rollona).

Fig. 8 *Capricho 4* ‘El de la Rollona’


39
Asta su Abuelo.

Fig. 9 *Capricho 39* ‘Hasta su abuelo’


50.
Los Chinchillas.

Fig. 10 *Capricho 50* 'Los Chinchillas'


13.
Estan calientes.

Fig. 11 *Capricho 13* 'Están calientes'


79.
Nadie nos ha visto.

Fig. 12 *Capricho 79* ‘Nadie nos ha visto’


11.
Muchachos al avío.

Fig. 13 *Capricho 11* 'Muchachos al avío'


18.
Ysele quema la Casa.

Fig. 14 *Capricho 18* ‘Y se le quema la casa’


29.
Esto si que es leer

Fig. 15 *Capricho* 29 'Esto sí que es leer'


77
Vnos á otros.

Fig. 16 *Capricho* 77 ‘Unos a otros’


24
No hubo remedio.

Fig. 17 *Capricho 24* 'No hubo remedio'


52
Lo que puede un Sastre!

Fig. 18 *Capricho* 52 'Lo que puede un sastre'


53.
Que pico de Oro!

Fig. 19 *Capricho 53* '¡Qué pico de oro!'


55.
Hasta la muerte.

Fig. 20 *Capricho* 55 'Hasta la muerte'


Idioma universal

Fig. 21 *Sepia Two*, 'Idioma Universal'



Fig. 22 *Portrait of Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos*, 1798


65.
Donde vá mamá?
Goya

Fig. 23 *Capricho 65* '¿Dónde va mamá?'



Fig. 24 Matías de Irala, *Modelos del cuerpo humano*, 1730



Fig. 25 'Farnese Hercules', ca. 1770-1785


63
Miren que grabes!

Fig. 26 *Capricho 63* 'Miren que graves'


51.
Se repulen.

Fig. 27 *Capricho 51* ‘Se repulen’


62.
Quien lo creyera!

Fig. 28 *Capricho 62* '¡Quién lo creyera!'


75.
¿No hay quien nos desate?

Fig. 29 *Capricho 75* 'No hay quien nos desate'


49.
Duendecitos.

Fig. 30 *Capricho 49* 'Duendecitos'


54
El Vergonzoso.

Fig. 31 *Capricho 54* 'El vergonzoso'



Fig. 32 Rubens, *Immaculate Conception*, 1628



Fig. 33 Ribera, *Virgin of the Immaculate Conception*, 1635



Fig. 34 Murillo, *Immaculate Conception*, ca. 1665-1670


48.
Soplones.

Fig. 35 *Capricho 48* 'Soplones'


64.
Buen Viage.

Fig. 36 *Capricho 64* 'Buen viaje'


67.
Aguarda que te unten.

Fig. 37 *Capricho 67* ‘Aguarda que te unten’


19.
Todos Caerán.

Fig. 38 *Capricho 19* ‘Todos caerán’


20.
Ya van desplumados.

Fig. 39 *Capricho 20* ‘Ya van desplumados’


21.
¡Qual la descañonan!

Fig. 40 *Capricho 21* 'Cual la descañonan'


59.
Y aun no se van!

Fig. 41 *Capricho 59* ‘Y aún no se van’


P. 2
El si pronuncian y la mano alargan
Al primero que llega.

Fig. 42 *Capricho* 2 'El sí pronuncian y la mano alargan al primero que llega'


Que sacrificio!

Fig. 43. *Capricho 14* '¡Qué sacrificio!'


37
¿Si sabrá mas el discipulo?

Fig. 44 *Capricho 37* 'Si sabrá más el discípulo'


40.
De que mal morira?

Fig. 45 *Capricho 40* '¿De qué mal morirá?'


P. 1
Fran.co Goya y Lucientes,
Pintor

Fig. 46 *Capricho 1* ‘Francisco Goya y Lucientes. Pintor’


73.
Mejor es holgar.

Fig. 47 *Capricho 73* ‘Mejor es holgar’



Fig. 48 'El resguardo del tabaco', ca. 1775-1780


82
16.
S.n Fernando ¡como hilan!
E.C

Fig. 49 'San Fernando, ¡cómo hilan!', *Madrid Album*



Fig. 50 'La enfermedad de la razón'


70.
Goya
Devota profesion.

Fig. 51 *Capricho 70* 'Devota profesión'


56
9.
Brujas à bolar

Fig. 52 'Brujas a volar', *Madrid Album*



Fig. 53 ‘Bruja principiante’, *Sueños*, 1797

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