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## Fluid Spatial Imaginaries: evolving estuarial city-regional spaces

### Introduction

From the 1960s through to the present a succession of government and more recently private sector-led initiatives have been under-taken to try to create more coherent identities, governmental structures and governance bodies for Britain's main estuary areas. The desire to create greater governance coherence was largely driven by the rationale of helping stimulate industrial and metropolitan development in estuarial regions perceived to have the capacity to host further employment and population growth (Frey, 1971). In the 1960s and 1970s in particular the underlying feeling was that growth was inhibited by the lack of an elected local or sub-regional government body with an estuary-level remit

In this paper we focus empirically on successive waves of identity making around three of England's major estuarine city-regional port complexes, involving some of the country's largest metropolitan areas: the Thames Gateway, the Mersey Belt, and the Hull-Humber city-region. This empirical focus is helpful in exploring conceptually the variety of ways in which new planning and regeneration spaces have emerged in a succession of different guises, the fluid spatial imaginaries of the title of this article. The concept of an imaginary, according to Jessop (2012a, p.17) "denotes a simplified, necessarily selective 'mental map' of a supercomplex reality". These imaginaries are never a simple representation of reality since they help construct the very reality they seek to represent. In this article we examine the role of successive waves of creating and remaking spatial imaginaries in the process of region-building in the case of estuary regions. Following Metzger's (2013) recent injunction in this journal to avoid writing Whiggish histories of regionalisation processes as producing somehow natural coherences around particular regional formations, we seek to provide a longitudinal and comparative approach to understand the processes of creating, stabilising, deconstructing and remaking regional identities, accepting that successful examples of stabilisation into recognised regions is more the exception than the norm. In particular we draw on recent work on region-making, spatial imaginaries and relational space to demonstrate the practices, the reversals and re-imaginings involved in trying to imagine new estuary regions over a fifty year period.

We develop an argument that over the course of fifty years it is possible to see a transition from policies that were largely framed territorially to a period which combines relational and territorial thinking about space. More than this, the comparative perspective reveals how new generations of region building may reflect common challenges and intellectual understandings, but generate different approaches to creating new spatio-temporal and geo-institutional fixes.

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3 Larger estuaries pose particular issues in terms of attempts to develop a shared  
4 cultural identity that matches proposals to create a new estuary-focused geo-  
5 institutional fix. One of the challenges is cultural, where distinctive and separate local  
6 identities and cultures may exist up-stream and downstream or on the two sides of the  
7 estuary. The Humber is a classic example of this, where the south Humber historically  
8 lies in the county of Lincolnshire, whilst the north bank is in the county of Yorkshire.  
9 Neither the creation of Humberside County Council in 1974 nor the opening of the  
10 Humber Bridge in 1981 proved sufficiently compelling symbols of unification to  
11 overcome the entrenched opposition by some on both banks of the estuary towards the  
12 notion of a Humberside region.  
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16 Another challenge concerns dealing with existing governmental arrangements,  
17 particularly where cities are involved as in our case studies, since new estuarial  
18 identities must necessarily deal with the tensions that arise from superimposing new  
19 'estuary region' identities that provide a sometimes poor fit with cities and city regions.  
20 For instance, the Mersey Basin covers two large separate city-regions, Liverpool and  
21 Manchester each with distinctive identities and a history of adversarial relationships  
22 between them, making it difficult for this policy imaginary to gain much political  
23 traction. By contrast the smaller estuary space known as Merseyside framed a more  
24 culturally cohesive set of places and as such faced fewer objections when it came to  
25 creating a Merseyside county council in 1974, albeit that frictions between some of the  
26 constituent local authorities continue to hamper attempts to create a coherent regional  
27 identity through to the present (see below).  
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### 34 **The spaces and territories of planning and regeneration**

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37 Most studies looking at the emergence of new governance spaces have tended to focus  
38 on specific initiatives and contemporary rationales (though see Allmendinger and  
39 Haughton, 2013). By contrast taking a fifty year time horizon and a comparative  
40 approach to explore the succession of attempts to create new regional spatial  
41 imaginaries is helpful in better understanding the emergence of a series of rationales,  
42 objectives and practices for regeneration and planning. The task of comparing three  
43 regions over this time horizon means that necessarily we focus on key moments,  
44 sacrificing some of the detail of policy evolution in order to get the benefits of this  
45 broader focus on how region-making rationales are presented, contested and re-worked  
46 over time.  
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50 In broad terms there are two drivers of regional spatial imaginaries over this  
51 period. The first concerns how centralised, statist and welfarist forms of government  
52 have given way to devolved, entrepreneurial, market supportive forms of partnership-  
53 based governance under the influence of global competition and emergent neoliberal  
54 ideologies. In effect we can see the changes from late stage Keynesian welfare state  
55 approaches to a more 'competition state' or neoliberal approach, through early reforms  
56 aimed at rolling-back of the state in the 1980s, to the rolling-out of more market-  
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3 supportive state sector reforms under New Labour (1997–2010) (Jessop, 2000; Peck  
4 and Tickell, 2002). Much discussed in the literature on the changing nature of  
5 governance is the shift in emphasis from *government* to *governance* forms over this  
6 period, and the continuous rescaling of the state at sub-national level, as new spatial  
7 fixes are sought and new geo-institutional architectures created that seek to take  
8 forward the competitive state agenda (Jessop, 2000, 2001; Jones, 2001). Alongside the  
9 much remarked upon ‘hollowing out’ of the nation state, has been a wave of initiatives  
10 that ‘fill-in’ the spaces left by the reworking of governmental powers and resources to  
11 new sub-national and local bodies, particularly in the area of regeneration (Goodwin *et al.*,  
12 2005, 2006; Jones *et al.*, 2005).

16 The second main driver has been the series of experiments across Europe  
17 attempting to create new regional identities that transcend existing regional and  
18 national boundaries, for instance the recently initiated Baltic Sea, Danube, Alpine, North  
19 Sea and Mediterranean regions (Metzger 2013, Stead, 2011). Other European inspired  
20 and endorsed spatial imaginaries concern environmental-functional spaces such as the  
21 Rhein, or sectoral imaginaries around, for example, transport. More explicitly,  
22 dissatisfaction with the variable nature of environmental protection throughout the EU  
23 in the 1980s resulted in the Habitats Directive which eventually led to the emergence of  
24 new, bio-geographic regions and imaginaries that promoted some national and regional  
25 spaces while suppressing though not eliminating others (Chilla, 2005). The resultant  
26 spatial imaginaries, backed up by funding and policy initiatives, have helped unsettle  
27 existing thinking and understandings with continental notions such as ‘spatial planning’  
28 providing justification and new narratives with which to pursue region-building.

33 Both drivers of change and the resultant waves of region-building and rethinking  
34 have necessarily involved attempts to generate new spatial imaginaries (Brenner 2004,  
35 Jessop, 2012a, 2012b), involving a rich and variable repertoire of discursive tactics and  
36 material practices, including the creation of symbolic markers in the case of new  
37 regional imaginaries (Dembski and Salet 2012, Dembski 2013). For instance, the  
38 building of the Humber Bridge in the 1970s and 1980s helped provide a material  
39 example of the potential for estuary-spanning activity in the emergent political unit of  
40 Humberside (North *et al.* 1987). In the case of creating new regional imaginaries,  
41 multiple imaginaries can exist at any one moment in time and at a variety of scales, each  
42 competing to present itself as a ‘natural’ and meaningful scale around which policy  
43 actors can cohere to undertake strategic work supported by an appropriate institutional  
44 governance infrastructure. Each spatial imaginary involves a performative function  
45 with a series of selectivities that identify, privilege and seek to stabilise particular  
46 understandings over others, drawing on a range of discursive tactics (logos, brands,  
47 rhetorical claims on behalf of the new imaginaries and dismissal of alternative  
48 imaginaries) and material practices (such as maps, strategies, plans, workshops,  
49 conferences, and institutions) appealing to stakeholders and different audiences.  
50 Economic imaginaries for instance identify, privilege and seek to stabilize certain  
51 economic activities rather than others, for instance industrial districts or competitive  
52 city-regions (Jessop 2012a), providing powerful new imaginaries that challenge existing  
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3 ones. Crucially, regions can be (re-) imagined in different and overlapping ways - as  
4 scalar or territorial constructs, as place making exercises, or as nodal points in a global  
5 economy of flows (Jessop 2012b).  
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7 These processes are helpful in trying to make sense of the recent explosion of  
8 experimentation with preferred governance scales and institutional forms for pursuing  
9 state growth strategies (Brenner 2004, Lovering 2007). It is important not to see these  
10 processes as part of a hollowing out and filling in of the state, involving the 'demise' of  
11 certain territorial government forms in favour of new governance forms, since in reality  
12 these always co-exist as complex, contingent hybrids, where new initiatives are layered  
13 on top of previous ones and frequently contain traces of them, not least in terms of  
14 personnel. This usefully links to one of our core concerns here, about the relationship  
15 between new, 'soft' spatial imaginaries and existing 'hard' territorial spaces, drawing in  
16 part on recent work on the emergence of soft spaces of governance (Haughton *et al.*,  
17 2010, Metzger and Schmitt, 2012). Whatever the origin or objective new spatial  
18 imaginaries are always layered on to the contingent histories of each area, each with its  
19 own accumulation of cultural, political and institutional rivalries and cooperation which  
20 need to be addressed if a new spatial imaginary is to succeed in creating a stable if only  
21 temporary coherence around agreed strategies.  
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26 In the UK a succession of central government-led sub-regional strategies and local  
27 government reforms in the 1960s and 1970s tended to reflect efforts to re-think the  
28 appropriate scales and functions for elected local government, notably including the  
29 creation in 1974 of new metropolitan counties such as Merseyside and Tyne and Wear,  
30 and estuary-centred county units such as Teesside and Humberside. These early  
31 attempts to imagine new official *governmental* spaces contrast with later experiments to  
32 create new *governance* spaces, in which typically new territorial understandings are put  
33 forward for debate, often introducing new names and identities for spatial units that are  
34 deliberately framed without reference to the formal boundaries of existing territorial  
35 political government units. Sometimes these newly imagined regions even come with  
36 fuzzy boundaries, in an attempt to emphasise the disassociation from existing territorial  
37 government boundaries (Haughton *et al.*, 2010; Heley, 2013). The new governance  
38 spaces and institutions are also generally accompanied by networks and alliances of  
39 public sector, private sector and civil society actors, lauded by those who set them up as  
40 opening up opportunities for fresh thinking and helping create more integrated  
41 approaches across multiple policy sectors and territories (Allmendinger and Haughton  
42 2009).  
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49 Such material and discursive practices have been the subject of recent debates  
50 on territories, scale, networks and place (e.g. Brenner, 2004; Jessop *et al.*, 2008) that  
51 seek to move away from thinking of the absolute, fixity of space in favour of an  
52 understanding based upon the fluidity of space: relational perspectives envisage space  
53 as forever in a state of becoming, existing as nodal moments, temporary permanences  
54 or temporary constellations within ever-changing often far-reaching flows and  
55 networks (Harvey, 1973, 2004; Massey, 2005; Agnew, 2005). Whilst such  
56 understandings capture the realities of global connectivities the day-to-day practices of  
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3 regeneration and planning on the other hand require engaging with and working  
4 through absolute or territorial space. This has led to an uneasy relationship between  
5 relational and territorial understandings of space within the regional development  
6 literature (Morgan, 2007). The early bifurcation in debates around territorial and  
7 relational space has more recently begun to be bridged in productive ways (see Jessop  
8 *et al.*, 2008; Massey, 2011; Cochrane, 2012; Jones 2009; Painter 2008). In particular  
9 recent empirical studies have begun to recognise the continued significance of territory  
10 and emphasise how spatial governance and regional politics have a strong territorial fix,  
11 but can also deploy a range of strategies, including relationally based forms of  
12 governance, to complement and help facilitate territorial politics (Morgan, 2007; Allen  
13 and Cochrane, 2010; Cochrane, 2012). Such a view sees territorial politics as bounded  
14 and porous, territorial *and* relational.

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16 Within the field of planning these issues have been explored empirically both at a  
17 UK (e.g. Haughton *et al.*, 2010; Heley, 2013; Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009, 2010)  
18 and mainland European level (e.g., Stead, 2011; Oleson, 2011; Metzger and Schmitt,  
19 2012; Faludi, 2010). The broad thrust of such studies has been to highlight how  
20 planning has changed from a largely territorial, hierarchical, nested structure and  
21 activity towards being a truly multi-scaled, networked assemblage of practices. In this  
22 view a variety of policy scales coexist, and the shifting of powers, responsibilities and  
23 expectations between formal and informal scales is a constant process. More than this,  
24 planners and regeneration professionals must now be embedded within, and achieve  
25 their policy goals through, a variety of networks consisting of diverse stakeholders. Yet  
26 this new form of planning remains territorially anchored as the reworking of scale and  
27 scope in planning and regeneration represents part of a continuous search by the state  
28 for a new territorial management fix, always bound up in socio-political struggles over  
29 establishing strategic directions and priorities (Jessop, 2000, 2001; Brenner, 2004,  
30 Allmendinger and Haughton, 2007).

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32 The emergence of new planning and regeneration spaces needs to be viewed  
33 against this backdrop as they can be accompanied by the dismantling of earlier units of  
34 government or governance, and by a growing complexity of institutions and sectors.  
35 Territorial spaces, unlike relational spaces, are relatively enduring entities and remain,  
36 in fields such as foreign policy, security and planning, the basis of shared understanding  
37 and action (Paasi, 2013). Territorial spaces are also, we might add, important spaces for  
38 contestation. Those charged with taking forward development in both new and existing  
39 governance spaces are necessarily always engaged in balancing pressures to look  
40 inwards and lock-in behaviours of stakeholders who sign up to a strategy, and  
41 pressures to look outward and open up to fresh ideas and ways of acting.

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43 It will be clear from this analysis that new planning and regeneration spaces exhibit  
44 a range of features and characteristics: they can be territorial or relational, relatively  
45 enduring or ephemeral, formal or informal, centrally sanctioned or locally driven. Such  
46 features are mediated and leavened by a range of unique circumstances and with a  
47 variety of unique configurations. We would argue that in contrast to earlier attempts to  
48 remake governmental scales which were largely exercises in territorial thinking, for  
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3 instance English local government boundary reforms of the 1970s (Redcliffe-Maud and  
4 Wood 1973, Pugalis and Townsend 2013), reforms to contemporary planning and  
5 regeneration practice tend to emphasise both territorial *and* relational ways of working.  
6 This dual function is hard-wired into the nature of planning in particular, as planners  
7 seek to 'open up' and think strategically in ways that acknowledge that social, economic  
8 and environmental activities are not bounded by particular jurisdictional boundaries,  
9 and then 'close down' such relational thinking into a territorially sanctioned and  
10 focused 'product', for example through a strategy or plan. New regeneration spaces  
11 likewise may reflect aspects of relational thinking by creating new geo-institutional  
12 governance fixes with boundaries that often eschew those of existing units of territorial  
13 government, but ultimately few of the new regeneration initiatives can succeed without  
14 some link back to the democratic sanction that comes from acting with and through  
15 those operating within territorial forms of government. In particular the development  
16 aspects of regeneration require cooperation with those creating and implementing the  
17 strategies contained in legally enforceable statutory land use plans.  
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### 24 **Creating sub-regional economic planning and regeneration spaces in England.**

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26 Whilst it is certainly noteworthy that we have seen a rapid expansion in the number of  
27 sub-national governance bodies in recent years (Lovering, 2007), it is also worth  
28 emphasising at this point that there is nothing original about attempting to create new  
29 imaginaries that look beyond the existing territorial units of local government (Keating,  
30 1997; Jones, 2001; Painter 2008, Paasi, 2003, 2010, 2013). For instance, in England  
31 during the 1960s and 1970s a range of government sponsored 'regional' and 'sub-  
32 regional' studies were undertaken under the auspices of central government including  
33 strategies for the estuary spaces of Teesside, South Hampshire  
34 (Portsmouth/Southampton), the Humber, Severn and Tay, in an attempt to examine the  
35 opportunities that these represented for attracting port-based industries and improved  
36 internal and international logistics (Frey 1971; Glasson, 1974; Glasson and Marshall,  
37 2007). Despite the contemporary denials of politicians about them influencing local  
38 government reforms, seen in retrospect it seems clear that the commissioned sub-  
39 regional studies did become exercises in territory making, with local government  
40 reform in 1974 resulting in some of the study areas, including Humberside, being given  
41 county council status. Some of the new estuary spaces very quickly evolved then from  
42 being innovative new spatial imaginaries, to formalised units of government. Whilst it  
43 might be possible to see this in Metzger and Schmitt's terms (2012) as a 'hardening' of  
44 soft spaces, this was in many ways more about the search of government itself for a new  
45 territorial scalar fix, rather than a transition from a relational governance space to a  
46 territorial form of government.  
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54 A key factor in the translation from free-standing, free thinking work on new sub-  
55 regional strategies to creating new territorial forms of local government was the  
56 parallel work of the Redcliffe-Maud Commission, which had been given the task of  
57 examining the boundaries of local government (Redcliffe-Maud- and Wood, 1973,  
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3 Pugalis and Townsend 2013). The Commission put considerable work into developing  
4 the idea of city-regions as coherent local government units, influencing the decision to  
5 create six new metropolitan county councils for existing built up metropolitan areas in  
6 1974, of which Merseyside County Council was one.  
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8 What these early initiatives reveal is the way in which new geographical  
9 imaginaries could be created primarily through the apparatus of government, starting  
10 with informal studies, often carried out within government or by directly commissioned  
11 consultancies working to central government. Where the political will dictated that  
12 these might be usefully carried on to become more formal parts of the governmental  
13 apparatus they were quickly turned into territorial government units (Glasson and  
14 Marshall 2007). The new counties were created with a clear remit within the hierarchy  
15 of sub-national government, providing a strategic and coordinating role for planning  
16 and regeneration policies for instance.  
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20 None of the new estuarial or metropolitan city-regional arrangements mentioned  
21 earlier were to survive in their original form as formal county councils, yet despite this  
22 some if not all of them have remained strangely enduring and difficult to eradicate from  
23 the official lexicon. Both regions and metropolitan county councils fell foul of the  
24 enthusiastic neoliberal roll-back of the state championed by successive Conservative  
25 governments from 1979–1997. The metropolitan county councils lasted through to  
26 1986 when the Thatcher government abolished them, frustrated by the opposition of  
27 some of the county leaders to national government policies (Haughton and Counsell  
28 2004). Local governments in all the former metropolitan county councils were given  
29 unitary status in 1986, which included strategic planning powers, although they  
30 continued to cooperate on strategic planning matters in the aftermath of abolition,  
31 producing official strategic planning guidance documents (Roberts *et al.*, 1999).  
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36 With local government bureaucrats seen as being as much of a problem as national  
37 civil servants, successive governments have been reluctant to channel additional  
38 resources and funding directly to local government, helping to fuel a constant process of  
39 creating new edge-of-state alternative governance bodies to help regenerate areas in  
40 need or to provide the strategies for growth in areas perceived to be experiencing  
41 blockages. Urban Development Corporations, Training and Enterprise Councils, the  
42 Thames Gateway, and many other new governance bodies based on public-private  
43 partnerships emerged, often working to new geographies that operated within or  
44 across existing territorial jurisdictions, so that they were not 'captured' by local  
45 government politicians and bureaucrats, or to put it another way, not directly subject to  
46 local democratic accountability (Shaw, 1990; Haughton *et al.*, 2000). Also important in  
47 this era was the work of the European Commission in insisting that independent  
48 regional and sub-regional strategies were prepared by local actors for areas that were  
49 eligible for regional funding, rather than rely solely on central government determining  
50 their needs and spending priorities, in this case indicative of a distrust of national  
51 government departments (Boland, 1999; Haughton *et al.*, 1999).  
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56 If the Thatcher years were quintessential examples of roll-back neoliberalism, the  
57 Conservative administrations of John Major (1992–7) and the subsequent New Labour  
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3 governments (1997–2010) might be said to have been engaged in a set of neoliberal  
4 roll-out state reforms, aimed at casting the state in a more market-supportive role  
5 focused on re-regulation rather than crude de-regulation (Allmendinger 2011,  
6 Allmendinger and Haughton 2013). For all the rhetorical commitment to social and  
7 environmental goals, economic growth remained the dominant driver of national and  
8 sub-national governmental reforms (Raco, 2005a). Particularly notable for the purposes  
9 of this article are Labour’s devolution agenda from 1997, which led to the growth in a  
10 regional governance apparatus, and the growth strategy from 2002 onwards, which saw  
11 the designation of a substantial array of new growth areas and local regeneration  
12 bodies (Raco, 2005a, 2005b; Haughton *et al.*, 2010; Allmendinger, 2011).

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16 Since 2010 the complex landscape of governance spaces that evolved under New  
17 Labour has been quickly dismantled, replaced under the Coalition Government’s  
18 austerity driven, deregulatory reforms, reverting to a crude neoliberal agenda of state  
19 roll-back, with major cuts to public sector budgets and institutions. As part of this the  
20 previous regional governance infrastructure has been dismantled along with many local  
21 and sub-regional regeneration initiatives, replaced by a poorly funded network of  
22 private sector-led, sub-regionally based Local Economic Partnerships (LEPs) as the new  
23 government’s favoured scale of regeneration activity (Deas, 2013; Pugalis and  
24 Townsend, 2013).

### 25 26 27 28 29 **Estuarial spaces for growth and regeneration**

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32 The above discussion helps frame the changing nature of planning and regeneration  
33 spaces and attempts at creating new spatial imaginaries. In this section we examine  
34 successive attempts to create new sub-regional identities and entities around three  
35 major estuarial spaces with substantial urban centres within them: the Thames  
36 Gateway, the Atlantic Gateway and the Humber. This section draws upon our  
37 experiences of research and writing on these are for over thirty years, starting with  
38 working on strategies for the Humberside (Graham Moss Associates 1984) and the the  
39 Upper Reaches of the Manchester Ship Canal in the 1980s (Haughton 1987), work on  
40 the Thames Gateway since the mid-1990s (Haughton *et al.* 1997, Allmendinger and  
41 Haughton 2009), and on-going work on the Atlantic Gateway (Deas *et al.* forthcoming).

#### 42 43 44 45 *Mersey Belt and Atlantic Gateway*

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47 The Atlantic Gateway is the latest in a long line of non-statutory spatial imaginaries for  
48 an area that broadly speaking covers the Manchester and Liverpool city regions and the  
49 spaces in between them (Figure 1).

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Figure 1. Atlantic Gateway

The recent governance history of this estuarial space can be usefully charted back to the preparatory studies for the 1974 Strategic Plan for the North West, in which the concept of the Mersey Belt first appeared as a sub-regional area linking the cities of

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3 Manchester and Liverpool, with Warrington the most notable settlement between the  
4 two (Deas, 1997; Williams and Baker, 2007; Dembski, 2012). In its early manifestation  
5 the precise outline of the Mersey Belt was not really all that clear, but broadly speaking  
6 it covered the pre-1974 local authority district boundaries around Manchester and  
7 Liverpool and the area between.  
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10 When regional planning returned to government favour in the early 1990s after a  
11 period in the political wilderness, attention returned to the Mersey Belt concept, which  
12 after much debate at public examination was included in a fairly weak form in regional  
13 planning guidance for the North West in the early 2000s (Haughton and Counsell 2004).  
14 In both periods, despite much talk the Mersey Belt failed to generate a strong support  
15 base or a separate institutional identity, not least because this would have required  
16 commitment of resources and personnel from the relevant local authorities, and still  
17 more problematic, a willingness to work towards shared agendas in a context when any  
18 concessions from one part of the sub-region to another might have created adverse  
19 media coverage and political fall-out (Deas *et al.*, forthcoming).  
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22 The creation of Merseyside County Council by national government in 1974,  
23 provided a statutory scale for strategic planning, backed up by an economic  
24 development remit, through to abolition in 1986 (Batey 1999). In the early 1980s  
25 various new central government-inspired initiatives began to rework the internal  
26 institutional landscape, notably with the introduction of the Merseyside Development  
27 Corporation, a private sector-led partnership which operated on both banks of the  
28 Mersey (Meegan 1990, Sykes *et al.* 2013). At one level, with a shared sense of cultural  
29 identity already in existence public acceptance of strategic planning and identity  
30 creation at the Merseyside scale has proven relatively uncontroversial with the public,  
31 helped by strong physical links across the estuary, the two Mersey Tunnels and a ferry,  
32 which acted also as powerful physical and cultural symbolic markers for the area,  
33 especially since the 1960s pop song 'Ferry Cross the Mersey'. After abolition of the  
34 Merseyside County Council joint strategic planning work continued, leading to the  
35 production of Strategic Planning Guidance for Merseyside in 1988, but at a mere six  
36 pages it was skimpy on detail, most notable for its turning the focus to economic growth  
37 based on private sector rather than public investment (Batey, 1999).  
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40 The Merseyside name did not disappear following abolition of the county council,  
41 and it continued to be used frequently in a variety of governmental initiatives around  
42 regeneration. In part this reflected that whilst it generated little in way of popular  
43 support and identification, 'Merseyside' as a label did not encounter the popular public  
44 resistance found in Humberside for instance. But it also reflected a fairly pragmatic  
45 political acceptance that the former county boundaries were used to define it as a  
46 NUTS2 region in terms of the European Commission. The importance of this is that from  
47 the early 2000s this sub-region was designated as an Objective 1 region and as such  
48 attracted high levels of European regional development funding to assist regeneration  
49 in the area (Batey, 1999; Boland, 1999; Haughton *et al.*, 1999). Nonetheless, tensions  
50 between the constituent local authorities have remained, particularly in relation to  
51 recent attempts to promote the use of Liverpool more prominently in city-regional  
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3 affairs (Heseltine and Leahy 2011, Sykes *et al.* 2013). The Atlantic Gateway concept  
4 emerged in 2008, known in its early incarnation as Ocean Gateway, the brain child of  
5 Peel Holdings, a private company which owns considerable development land along the  
6 Manchester Ship Canal and Bridgewater Canal. From the mid-2000s the company began  
7 to develop and promote the Atlantic Gateway concept as part of its development  
8 strategy for its land holdings (Harrison 2014, Deas *et al.* forthcoming). In effect the  
9 'Mersey Belt' with its public sector origins and emphasis on the river has been usurped  
10 by a new space that covers roughly the same area, though boundaries are never made  
11 clear, and in which the Manchester Ship Canal rather than the Mersey is presented as  
12 the main focus. The use of 'Gateway' in the title appears to be in part a genuflection to  
13 the Thames Gateway, but it also reflects that the term Gateway often appears in port  
14 and maritime city publicity materials around the world. The Gateway has a planned life  
15 of 50 years and seeks £50bn of investment. It has an independent corporate identity to  
16 that of Peel Holdings, with a management board consisting of the great and good from  
17 industry, government and civic society in the area.

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23 There were two key moments in the transition of the Atlantic Gateway from being a  
24 'pretender' to being a 'contender' in sub-regional governance. The first came with its  
25 acceptance and incorporation into North West Regional Development Agency's (NWDA)  
26 work in preparing a new integrated economic development and planning strategy for  
27 the North West. This work was published as a last hurrah, after the abolition of the  
28 NWDA had been announced (NWDA, 2010). The document contains no mention of the  
29 Mersey Belt; instead, there is a commitment to "Develop the international potential of  
30 the Liverpool-Manchester corridor, through the Atlantic Gateway concept" (NWDA,  
31 2010: 42). As Harrison (2014) notes in his detailed account of this process, this was a  
32 pivotal moment in the political acceptance of the concept.

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The second key moment in the official sanctioning of the Atlantic Gateway concept  
came with the call from national government in 2010 for bids from interested local  
actors to create Local Economic Partnerships (LEPs) that would operate at a level below  
the regional and above that of individual local governments. Successful LEP bids were  
expected to be led by the private sector, with bidders encouraged by the government to  
choose their own geographies and to not worry too much about overlapping  
boundaries. Whilst most bids took engagement with local government as axiomatic,  
there was one exception, when a private sector proposal came forward for an Atlantic  
Gateway LEP. Though the formal proposal was quickly withdrawn before it could be  
rejected, it achieved some of its purpose at least in drawing attention to this new private  
sector imagining and gaining acknowledgement from local governments that they  
would need to work with the Atlantic Gateway. Three LEPs were created for Liverpool,  
Greater Manchester and Cheshire and Warrington which, like the local authorities of the  
area, now find they must learn to live and work alongside the Atlantic Gateway.

In the context of public sector funding cut backs and limited funding for the LEPs,  
this leaves the Atlantic Gateway with Peel Holdings as its backer as a potentially  
significant future investor. Thinking of this as a 3-D governance model, we have the  
three LEPs working above the various local authority units, which provide a rather

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3 tenuous form of democratic anchorage for the LEPs. Above the LEPs, free-floating like a  
4 balloon or cloud, is the Atlantic Gateway, tethered back to ground through the various  
5 large investment sites that anchor much of the Gateway's proposed future investment  
6 activities. These it should be emphasised link more to the banks of the Manchester Ship  
7 Canal and Bridgewater Canal, and to Peel's port-related land holdings along the estuary.  
8 The Mersey label then has only limited value as a symbolic marker for the Atlantic  
9 Gateway, valued mainly for its cultural significance.  
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12 Though the Atlantic Gateway is perhaps best known as an economic development  
13 initiative, it is important to emphasise that the stated vision is more holistic than this,  
14 with considerable emphasis placed on improving communications infrastructure,  
15 supporting transition to a low carbon economy, and green infrastructure. This provides  
16 a link to our final Mersey imaginary. The Mersey Basin campaign to clean up the Mersey  
17 was an explicitly environmental organisation, enjoying considerable support for its  
18 activities from the European Commission and the UK government, support which was  
19 often conditional on having wider impacts than simply environmental clean-up  
20 (Williams *et al.* 1999). This organisation was established in 1985 with a 25 year time-  
21 horizon, closing down in 2010. The Campaign was set up at the behest of national  
22 government, but comprised a wide-ranging network of governmental and non-  
23 governmental actors. Key to its mission was recognition of the importance of the link  
24 between economic regeneration and environmental improvement, which meant that  
25 the work programme went beyond simple environmental remediation to promoting  
26 economic regeneration. Its boundaries were essentially based around environmental  
27 notions of a river catchment, but pragmatically these were treated as flexible and fuzzy  
28 when it came to deciding where projects might be supported.  
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31 What we see in the case of the Mersey Belt, Merseyside, Atlantic Gateway and the  
32 Mersey Basin is in many ways extraordinary: public sector imaginaries allied to the  
33 planning system, an environmental imaginary that also had regeneration goals, and now  
34 the Atlantic Gateway as a private sector led imaginary. All tapped into aspects of the  
35 zeitgeist and each was rooted in attempts to create not simply new strategic visions and  
36 related 'brands', but each also seeking to build alliances between actors in different  
37 sectors and to meld work that involved both economic and environmental rationales.  
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#### 46 *Thames Gateway*

47 In contrast to the Atlantic Gateway the motivation behind the creation of the Thames  
48 Gateway as a new spatial imaginary emerged from the public sector. The history of  
49 strategy making for the Gateway area goes back to the mid-1980s, when SERPLAN the  
50 regional planning body for the South East worked up the concept. It was launched in  
51 1991 by the then Secretary of State Michael Heseltine as the East Thames Corridor  
52 (Haughton *et al.*, 1997) though later re-branded as the Thames Gateway and given a  
53 unique status in the UK planning hierarchy through the publication of sub-regional  
54 planning guidance (Department of Environment, 1995). The initial rationale of the  
55 Thames Gateway was that London's growth was being held back by congestion and  
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3 overheating to the west of the capital, whilst to the east de-industrialisation had left a  
4 legacy of substantial derelict land and areas of high unemployment (Figure 2). Previous  
5 initiatives had been undertaken in the area, but not at this scale or indeed on this scale.  
6 Most notable was the London Docklands Development Corporation, set up at the same  
7 time as the Merseyside Development Corporation in the early 1980s, with a similar  
8 property-led, private sector-led ethos, and with planning powers controversially taken  
9 from the local authorities as part of the process. A strategic vacuum opened up at the  
10 Greater London level with the abolition of the Greater London Council in 1986, which  
11 both created the need and the opportunity for a large scale strategic regeneration  
12 project such as the Thames Gateway.  
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16 Despite its rapid insertion into the hierarchy of statutory plans, initial progress was  
17 slow, in part because no specific funds were allocated for the initiative, and only a small  
18 coordination unit existed which operated from within the central government planning  
19 ministry (Allmendinger and Haughton 2009). In short, there was an institutional  
20 absence and a lack of strong leadership. This led to various critical reports in the early-  
21 mid-2000s. A re-launch took place in 2003 when Thames Gateway was declared one of  
22 four national growth areas in the government's Sustainable Communities programme.  
23 At this stage a whole series of new internal governance vehicles were created to help  
24 carry forward delivery, creating a complex amalgam of governmental and governance  
25 bodies: by the mid-2000s the Thames Gateway area covered parts of three different  
26 standard regions, and included three sub-regional partnerships, a range of local delivery  
27 partners, two Urban Development Corporations, the Olympics Delivery Agency, and all  
28 or parts of sixteen local authorities (Raco, 2005b; Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009;  
29 Brownill and Carpenter, 2009). Subsequently, amidst continuing concerns over lack of  
30 leadership for the initiative as a whole, a Thames Gateway Chief Executive 'Czar' was  
31 appointed to provide leadership of these disparate spaces and institutions though with  
32 no formal authority.  
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41 **Figure 2.** The Thames Gateway. Source: Allmendinger, 2011  
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43 With this re-booting of the Thames Gateway came a succession of strategies and  
44 frameworks for the area as a whole and for its numerous sub-components, in effect  
45 trying to bridge the gap between the relational thinking implicit in the creation of the  
46 Gateway concept and the more territorial needs of public and private actors to better  
47 understand the implications and consequences of this strategy. Whilst the sub-regional  
48 planning strategy was still in force, this was evidently not enough to resolve the tension  
49 between the relational imaginary of Thames Gateway as a whole and the need for this  
50 territorial specificity and grounded delivery plans (Haughton *et al.*, 2010). As for  
51 physical 'symbolic markers', the Olympics site is perhaps the most high profile, but it  
52 was never coupled with the Thames Gateway in the popular imagination. In effect  
53 Thames Gateway captured the imagination of policy-makers, but there is little evidence  
54 that it won either support or concern from those living in the area. The Thames  
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3 Gateway remained an externally imposed imaginary, with considerable work on  
4 presenting individual initiatives within it, but only limited work on building public  
5 support for it as an over-arching concept.  
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7 The election of the Coalition in 2010 radically altered the fortunes of the Thames  
8 Gateway and dirigiste forms of planning and regeneration generally. Though ministers  
9 claim in public to be fully supportive, in practice funds have been substantially  
10 withdrawn and the institutional infrastructure has been steadily dismantled, a process  
11 that was begun at the end of New Labour's period of office, when plans were announced  
12 to wind down the two development corporations (Barclay, 2011). The result is that the  
13 Thames Gateway initiative no longer exists as a coherent single entity, instead a  
14 patchwork of residual initiatives remain, with the Thames Gateway seemingly reduced  
15 to a branding role in some but not all subsequent attempts at planning. The Government  
16 naturally presents this as a coherent part of its localisation strategy, giving power to  
17 local authorities (Barclay, 2011). In the process it announced government plans to close  
18 both the London and the Thurrock Thames Gateway Development Corporations, with  
19 any residual responsibilities and assets handed over to local authorities. The result is a  
20 hard to trace set of vestigial elements to what was once branded the largest  
21 regeneration site in Europe, lacking strategic coherence, bespoke funding, a meaningful  
22 institutional presence, or a governance framework.  
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25 It may be that in some respects the Thames estuary and its catchment areas are  
26 simply too big to provide a coherent economic governance space in the English context,  
27 where large large-scale regeneration projects of this nature are rare. By contrast we  
28 may be seeing the creation of more enduring multi-stakeholder initiatives around  
29 environmental issues, for instance Thames 21, a charitable trust, and Thames Estuary  
30 Partnership (Morris 2008). Initiatives on flood risk management and environmental  
31 protection continue to make sense on an estuary basis, whilst economic initiatives seem  
32 to be very much subject to the whim of whichever central government is in power, with  
33 little sign of local actors voluntarily coming together at that scale without a strong  
34 government steer.  
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#### 42 *Humberside, Hull and Humber City Region and the Energy Estuary.*

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45 As with the Atlantic and Thames Gateways there is a long history of attempts to create  
46 new planning and regeneration spaces for the Humber, going back to one of the sub-  
47 regional studies published in 1969 (Central Unit for Environmental Planning, 1969), the  
48 year that the Hunt Committee on Intermediate Areas also declared Humberside one of  
49 the best sites in the country for future maritime industrial development (North *et al.*,  
50 1987; Spooner, 1991). This early work helped inform local government reorganisation  
51 in the area leading to the creation of Humberside County Council in 1974, a new tier of  
52 local government that united the north and south banks of the river until its abolition in  
53 1996 (Figure 3). Despite the high hopes that the new county council and the opening of  
54 the Humber Bridge in 1981 might help to unite the two sides of the estuary into a  
55 unified entity, in practice the new sub-region never managed to overcome the  
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3 entrenched opposition of those on either bank who felt it diluted their historic  
4 Lincolnshire (south bank) and Yorkshire (north bank) identities (Spooner 1991).

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6 Despite these well-known antagonisms, the idea of a Humber region based on the  
7 boundaries of the former county has continued to be attractive to those seeking to  
8 promote economic development in the area. In one form or another, the Humber  
9 identity has remained a powerful force in shaping the work of sub-regional actors  
10 through to the present: Humberside Training and Enterprise Council, Humber Forum,  
11 Humber Economic Partnership, the Hull and Humber City Region, all focused on the  
12 Humber. Partly this was pragmatic, as the Humber was a NUTS2 level region eligible for  
13 European regional development funding, and the European Commission insisted on  
14 coherent regional strategies and partnerships as a condition of granting money. Indeed  
15 Gibbs *et al.* (2001) posed the question of whether the Humber might have too many  
16 strategies and too few partners. It is worth noting that whilst regeneration actors  
17 continued to act on a Humber basis, there has been little or no planning work at this  
18 scale since the abolition of Humberside County Council.

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22 The Hull and Humber City Region concept emerged in the mid-2000s when it was  
23 proposed as one of the eight city-regions that would be the focus of the work of the  
24 Northern Way (Northern Way Steering Group, 2004). Subsequently, as we noted earlier,  
25 the LEP initiative in 2010 invited bids from local actors who were allowed to choose  
26 their own geographies, suited to local needs. In the case of the Humber this led to rival  
27 camps setting out their ideas (Bentley *et al.* 2010, Pugalis and Bentley 2013), one for a  
28 Humber LEP maintaining the boundaries of the former Humberside County Council,  
29 whilst a competing North Bank focused bid stretched the area of influence northwards  
30 to embrace the area around Scarborough, whilst leaving out the areas south of the  
31 Humber. After the first round of bids, ministers refused to accept any bid for the sub-  
32 region, concerned about the evident local hostilities. In the second round agreement  
33 was obtained around a Humber LEP embracing both banks, yet with the odd  
34 institutional feature that the North Bank had its own sub-board created, but not the  
35 south bank.

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41 Such minor controversies apart, the value of thinking strategically around the  
42 estuary clearly endures – indeed the current branding exercise from the Humber LEP is  
43 that of the ‘Energy Estuary’, as the LEP seeks to promote development based around off-  
44 shore wind power and other renewable energy sources, including tidal and biomass. It  
45 is interesting too to note the concern about the Humber brand, and the importance to it  
46 of the estuary, in the LEP’s strategic plan: “The Humber has in the past failed to  
47 collectively market the area, its capabilities and its opportunities.” (Humber LEP, 2012:  
48 12). The value of the Humber in this latest interpretation then is not in forging a widely  
49 shared sense of regional identity for those living and working there, rather it is a brand,  
50 something to convey a message to the outside world about the region being ‘open for  
51 business’. As with the other two estuary regions, a number of environmental initiatives  
52 have been undertaken at estuary level, which have sometimes been contentious, as with  
53 estuary management plans (Morris 2008), mainly reflecting conflicts around economic  
54 and environmental priorities.

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3 There are intriguing issues around territorial and relational conceptions of space in  
4 so far as they relate to this region. The concerted campaign for the abolition of  
5 Humberside was based upon the arguments that it was an 'artificial' creation and that it  
6 smothered historic associations and labels such as Yorkshire or Lincolnshire (Spooner  
7 1991). Yet it is precisely as a functional economic space around the Humber estuary  
8 that the Humber identity has endured. Although it may pain some to accept it, the  
9 Humber has continued as a functional regeneration space following the abolition of the  
10 County Council. In effect the balance has shifted towards becoming a more relational  
11 space, emerging out of a short-lived experiment in trying to construct the area as a  
12 territorial space. Or to reverse the terminology of Metzger and Schmitt (2011) there has  
13 been a softening of a hard space.  
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18 Figure 3. Humberside  
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## 20 21 **Conclusions** 22

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24 This paper has provided a broad-brush historical account of how new spatial  
25 imaginaries have been minted for three of England's major estuary areas, all of which  
26 experienced a febrile search for strategic thinking and regional identity making as  
27 territorial and institutional structures have changed. The importance of these major  
28 urban-estuary regions for the English economy is undeniable, yet as this paper  
29 demonstrates, despite successive attempts there has been a failure to achieve a durable,  
30 workable governance framework for any of them.  
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33 The territories, scales, networks and places framework (Jessop *et al.*, 2008)  
34 provides a useful context for summarising our main findings. The case studies, we  
35 would argue, highlight the value of thinking both relationally and territorially when it  
36 comes to understanding attempts at making and re-making regional identities and their  
37 related geo-institutional support infrastructures. We can see for instance the  
38 importance of a succession of attempts and making, unmaking and then remaking new  
39 *territorial* forms. The example of the Humber is particularly stark – an informal study of  
40 the economic potential of the Humber estuary, rapidly followed by the creation of a  
41 Humberside County Council, the abolition of that body in 1996, and subsequent  
42 attempts by private and public sector actors on a Humber-wide basis still using the  
43 boundaries of the former county council, but without publicly using the 'Humberside'  
44 moniker. In part the issue here and in the Thames Gateway concerns *scale* and the  
45 continuous rescaling of the state that we have witnessed in England over recent years,  
46 with the sub-regional or city-regional scale resonating better with the political mood in  
47 some periods than others. The 1960s and 1970s marked one high point in the search for  
48 sub-regional solutions whilst the mid-2000s providing the next, when support for city-  
49 regional scale actions gathered momentum as New Labour's regional experiment  
50 faltered (Harrison, 2012).  
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56 But these similarities in enthusiasm for sub-regional scales should not mask the  
57 differences in the two time periods, with governmental territorial formations clearly in  
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3 the ascendancy in the earlier period, whilst *relational, networked* approaches are more  
4 dominant in the more recent period. The Atlantic Gateway concept for instance has an  
5 unclear geography, with boundaries not shown on maps to ensure there is no sense of  
6 containment of the idea, creating an ambiguous hinterland area in which other projects  
7 might be supported, for instance green infrastructure. The board of the Atlantic  
8 Gateway contains a mix of private, public and civil society actors, in effect building up a  
9 relational, networked space that pays limited attention to existing territorial boundaries  
10 by creating its own space, yet at the same time seeking legitimacy through its  
11 engagement with the representatives of the main sub-regional territorial spaces which  
12 it overlays. The Thames Gateway embodies a mixture of both relational, networked  
13 understandings of space and more territorial understandings, where the whole largely  
14 made sense through its reliance on creating an internal network of delivery involving  
15 both governance and governmental bodies.

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20 Attempting to settle on a meaningful sense of *place* is important in grounding these  
21 various initiatives, which because of their large size proved problematic, as they  
22 covered areas with diverse existing senses of place within them – creating a new  
23 identity was always going to be seen by some as usurping older ones. Indeed one of the  
24 interesting features of all three case studies is the extent to which actors have  
25 increasingly tended to deal with the issues of brand identity as much as area identity.  
26 Arguably this shift towards brand consciousness reflects that as governance actors no  
27 longer feel the need to address the general public of the region, as they are outside the  
28 democratic system of government. In this context what matters is whether the estuary  
29 or use of a specific city in the title of an initiative helps in improving visibility and  
30 credibility with other, more diverse stakeholders, not least businesses. In effect,  
31 developing a 'brand' that is outside existing political, territorial imaginaries is  
32 simultaneously a political decision that is depoliticising, in the sense that it allows  
33 consensus-building and debate around particular strategies to remain at a distance  
34 from the ballot box. It is this process of democratic distancing which in different ways  
35 has undermined attempts to build enduring strategies for all three estuary regions, as  
36 actors have sought to find effective ways of thinking and acting both relationally and  
37 territorially.

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43 To summarise, these case studies reveal the complex relationships that are made  
44 and re-made over time between relational and territorial forms of thinking and policy,  
45 and the ways that these are used to construct alternative spatial imaginaries with  
46 differential power to move hearts and minds. Or to put it more prosaically, it helps us  
47 understand how some imaginaries seemed to work better than others, by beginning to  
48 unpick the variety of discursive and material practices involved in trying to translate  
49 them into strategies, institutions and policies. The long-term and comparative analytical  
50 framework developed here allows us to move towards a more nuanced reading of the  
51 creation of new governance spaces, which may well present 'shop-fronts' that focus on  
52 their capacity to generate new spatial imaginaries and strategic ideas, even as they  
53 simultaneously rely heavily on the powers, legitimacy and cooperation of existing  
54 territorial structures and spaces.

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


Figure 2: Thames Gateway  
232x131mm (72 x 72 DPI)

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Figure 1: Atlantic Gateway  
124x77mm (150 x 150 DPI)



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Figure 3: Humber region  
120x118mm (150 x 150 DPI)