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**Methods of Repression in Bahrain during the 20th and
21st Century: From the Civil List to Social Media**

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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs

Durham University

(November 2015)

Methods of Repression in Bahrain During the 20th and 21st Century: From the Civil List to Social Media

Despite being afflicted by cyclical bouts of unrest over the past century, repression in Bahrain as a concept has not been the focus of considerable academic attention. This is the first interpretive historical and contemporary study of repression in Bahrain. It addresses the limitations of regime-type analysis and quantitative studies of repression, which tend to focus on the co-variation between repression and demobilization. Using a template analysis, a virtual ethnography and framing theory, this thesis offers a new conceptualisation of repression. Several episodes of contention in Bahrain are analysed, including; tribal resistance to the British reforms of the 1920s, the rise of the Higher Executive Committee in the 1950s, the leftist agitation of the 1970s, the 1990s Intifada, and the 2001 Uprising. Using evidence from multiple sources, including recently released Foreign and Commonwealth Office files, social media, and historical records, this thesis argues that Bahrain's protecting powers have had a marked impact on the severity, nature and type of repression in Bahrain, as well as the structure of the repressive apparatus. While the British mitigated the excesses of Al Khalifa's treatment of political opposition, their declining influence following Independence saw the rise of a Saudi-Al Khalifa dual authority structure that created a new approach to repressive choices. Crucially, Bahrain's protecting powers influenced the nature and type of repression that was applied to political opposition. Yet despite this meta-narrative of outside influence, this research complicates generalisable theories of repression, showing that repressive choices are often contingent on a complex mix of the availability of resources, elite attitudes, strategic objectives of power holders, and the nature of threat. For this reason, the research sheds light on repression in Bahrain, but also highlights the value of conducting case studies and long term studies that allow researchers to compare and contrast the reasons motivating repressive choices. The new conceptualisation also emphasises the rising importance of social media and rhizomatic actors as tools of repression.

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Notes on Transliteration

The IJMES transliteration has been utilised here with a few exceptions. In the case of direct quotations, the original spellings have been preserved. In cases where existing Arabic scholars or commentators have adopted a certain spelling of their name that does not conform to the IJMES system, their preferred choice has been used. This is based on the respect for their personal preference of their own name. Generally speaking, Arabic transliteration has been used sparingly to appeal to both specialist and non-specialist readers.

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Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
BCHR	Bahrain Center for Human Rights
BDF	Bahrain Defence Force
BICI	Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
BNA	Bahrain News Agency
BNC	Bahrain National Congress
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CNU	Committee of National Union
GCCPS	Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield
HEC	Higher Executive Committee
IAA	Information Affairs Authority
IFLB	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
HRW	Human Rights Watch
NLF	National Liberation Front
SIS	Security and Intelligence Services
SIU	Special Investigation Unit
MOI	Ministry of the Interior
NSA	National Security Agency
PSF	Public Security Forces

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Statement of Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.”

Dedicated to my Mum and Dad

Introduction

Repression in Bahrain in the 20th and 21st Century

Repression in Bahrain

When it comes to repression, counter-revolution and how social movements or dissidents are ended/inhibited, we have only just begun to 'scratch the surface of the topic'.¹ Even the definition of political repression itself is the subject of much debate. However, given its contemporary and historical importance in Bahrain, and especially in light of the Arab Uprisings, repression is perhaps one of the most 'compelling conceptual lenses through which to mediate between meaningful happenings in the past and the concerns of present day audiences'.² It is also self-evident, from an ethical standpoint, that studying repression is important simply by virtue that many often suffer as a result of it.³ Repression, like collective action, is often treated as a 'subsidiary form of political, social or economic history', and it is something that also requires a history 'in its own terms'.⁴ Yet repression has only received incidental references in historical accounts of Bahrain. Key texts on Bahrain have retold its history using different lenses. Khuri's seminal *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, for example, approaches the development of the state from the perspective of 'political authority' and the impact of colonial and tribal rule on political structures in Bahrain. Fred Lawson's history opts for a lens of modernization theory, tracking the development of Bahrain. Abdulhadi Khalaf explores control strategies in his analysis of contentious politics on Bahrain, examining the manner in which tribal rule exerts a system of patronage related to Rentierism. As Jones and Shehabi note, 'repression and dissent in Bahrain have generally remained outside of research focus and dominant approaches

1 C. Davenport, *How Social Movements Die: Repression and Demobilization of the Republic of New Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 21 of 346. [Kindle Edition]

2 T. Skocpol, 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology', in T. Skocpol (ed), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 362.

3 C. Davenport, 'Repression and Mobilization: Insights from Political Science and Sociology', in C. Davenport, H. Johnston, and C. Mueller (eds), *Repression and Mobilization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, p. xii.

4 C. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, University of Michigan, 1977, ch. 8, p. 14.

adopted by NGOs, think-tanks, and international relations experts have tended to focus through paradigms of sectarianism, modernisation, rentierism, or even democratisation, where 'reform' and 'dialogue' have become tired idioms'.⁵ Stacy Strobl, for example, examines the importance of sectarianism in defining policing outcomes and attitudes towards the police in Bahrain, while Toby Matthiesen emphasises the importance of sectarianism as a regime survival strategy. Justin Gengler, in his recent PhD, focuses on ethnic mobilization in Bahrain and its relation to the Rentier State.

By using Bahrain as a case study, this seeks to add to the literature on repression, expanding on the need to understand how autocratic states repress in different ways, while also addressing the issue of the lack of conceptual clarity among the many manifested forms of repression.⁶ In particular, it addresses the deficiency on literature outlying the 'specific contours' of the repressive methods and choices made in Bahrain over the past 100 years, and fulfils the need that has arisen since the Arab Uprisings to understand Arab countries independently, especially Bahrain, which Swedler argues is an 'outlier' in a number of respects in the studies of the region.⁷ Indeed, scholars such as Justin Gengler argue that Bahrain has always challenged the 'prevailing interpretation of politics in the Arab Gulf – the so-called rentier state paradigm – which holds that regimes can buy the political acquiescence of the citizenry through judicious distribution of oil revenues'.⁸ Those, such as Abdulhadi Khalaf, argue rentierism only partly explains a regime's resilience, and that the movement of 2011 marked the end of rentierism politics in Bahrain.⁹ Bellin herself frequently refers to Bahrain as an exception to her more generalisable explanations of Arab State authoritarianism, and thus it becomes clear that a more in-depth investigation will reveal more idiosyncrasies about repression in the small Gulf Kingdom.

5 A. Shehabi & M.O. Jones, 'Bahrain's Uprising: The Struggle for Democracy in the Gulf', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 33.

6 M. Khawaja, 'Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank', *Sociological Forum*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1993, p. 50.

7 J. Schwedler, 'What should political scientists be doing?', in *Arab Uprisings: New Opportunities for Political Science*, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS Briefings). p. 57.

8 J. Gengler, 'Bahrain's Sunni Awakening', *Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)*, 17 January 2012, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011712>, (Accessed 8 August 2015).

9 A. Khalaf, 'Foreword', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015.

Bahrain, a small archipelago in the Persian Gulf, presents an interesting case in itself with regards to studying repression for a number of reasons. It has been afflicted by internal political instability and conflict throughout its modern history. What began as the feudal oppression of the native *baḥārna* by the conquering Al Khalifa tribe and their allies has evolved into the general repression by the Al Khalifa-dominated regime of a number of uprisings spearheaded by different movements. These uprisings have had several different characteristics, from the nationalist movements of the 1950s and 60s and the labour and leftist movements of the 70s, to the increasingly Islamic movements of the 80s and 90s. The most recent of these uprisings began in 2011, when Bahrainis, galvanized by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010, took to the streets on 14 February 2011 to demand greater political rights. However, in all cases, despite political reforms, or reformulations, the ruling Al Khalifa family have succeeded in preserving their monopoly on the country's material, political and military resources, highlighting what Eva Bellin describes as authoritarian 'robustness'.¹⁰ All movements, whether organized political societies, or indigenous groups who are subordinate to the superordinate Al Khalifa, have faced serious and repeated political repression, a fact that has not been tempered by limited democratic reform.

Yet while authoritarian resistance has been examined by numerous scholars, most notable among them Bellin, who focuses on the extensive will and capacity of the coercive apparatus in Arab states as making them exceptional, new approaches are necessary.¹¹ Repression, this research argues, is a useful lens. In particular, there is little done on how long term changes of repression occur in countries that have experienced a shift in protectors. For a country like Bahrain, that suffers from a position of sovereign insecurity, it is important in understanding how foreign factors influence internal repression. Thus Repression and Bahrain are both relatively undernourished in the literature, and thus form a marriage of relative convenience in terms of academic study.

In addition to an intellectual justification, let us consider too the moral aspect, most notably the historical continuity of social injustice. In 1829, British naval officer

10 E. Bellin, 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 127 – 49.

11 M. M. Howard and M. R. Walters, 'Response to Eva Bellin, Ellen Lust, and March Lynch', *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 12, no. 2, June 2014, pp. 417 – 419.

Major Wilson noted that 'the enormities practised by the Uttoobees¹² towards the original inhabitants of Bahrain far exceed what I have ever heard of tyranny in any part of the world'.¹³ The British Captain Taylor also said of the *bahārna* under the Al Khalifa that, 'The aboriginal inhabitants of Bahrein, now subjected to a foreign power, suffer from the tyranny of their masters more keenly than language can express'.¹⁴ In 1878, Captain Edward Law Duran described a group of Shi'ā *bahārna* from the village of A'Ali as a 'broken-spirited helpless lot', and noted that one of the most salient aspects of his survey of Bahrain was the 'innumerable complaints of the tyranny of the Sheikhs and their tribe'.¹⁵ In 1921, Major Daly submitted a scathing condemnation of the Al Khalifa, and in particular 'Abd Allah bin 'Isa Al Khalifa's¹⁶ treatment of the *bahārna* community; 'Instances of this oppression are far too numerous to quote, but details are on record of a large number of cases of recent date, which include illegal seizure of property, wrongful imprisonment with cruelty, and political murders, for which no one has been brought to trial, and no effort made to enforce justice'.¹⁷ He added that 'oppression in the past two years has amounted to terrorism'.¹⁸ Political murders were becoming common, as were 'outrages against respectable women'.¹⁹ Things reached such a pitch that there was 'no security for persons or property'.²⁰ Over the course of the century, little has changed, and modern accounts refer to similar oppression of, not the *bahārna* per se, but the Shi'ā, losing

12 The Uttoobees, is the British pluralisation for the Arabic *al-'Utubī* (plural = *'utūb*). *'utūb* are the name for the federation of Arab clans believed to originate in Najd.

13 Major Wilson, 'Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government' [107] (149/733), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/732, in *Qatar Digital Library* <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100022870191.0x000096> (accessed 28 July 2015).

14 Anon, 'Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government' [23] (60/733), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/732, in *Qatar Digital Library* <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100022870191.0x00003d> [accessed 27 July 2015]

15 E.L. Durand, 'Notes on the islands of Bahrain and antiquities, by Captain E. L. Durand, 1st Assistant Resident, Persian Gulf, 1878 – 1879, in P. Tuson and E. Quick (eds), *Records of Bahrain 1820-1960*, Slough, Archive Editions, vol. 2, 1993, p. 545.

16 'Abd Allah was the son of the then ruler, 'Isa Al Khalifa. His brother Hamad was heir apparent at the time and the eldest son of 'Isa. 'Isa, who was elderly and senile, was frequently referred to by the British as being dominated and under the influence of his wife. See 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [119v] (243/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library* <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00002c> [accessed 4 November 2015]

17 C.K. Daly, November 21, in P. Tuson and E. Quick (eds), *Records of Bahrain 1820-1960*, Slough, Archive Editions, vol. 3, 1993, p. 668.

18 Ibid.

19 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [84v] (173/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library* <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385510.0x0000ae> [accessed 4 November 2015]

20 Ibid.

the ethnic identifier. Especially after the 1980s onwards, we see Amnesty International stating that the 'majority of protesters, Shi'a Muslims, have complained of being politically marginalized by the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family, which dominates all aspects of political and economic life in Bahrain'.²¹ This historic continuity highlights how the need for social justice requires an understanding of the methods used in maintaining political domination. Repression is an apt conceptual lens, and a relevant means of exploring Bahrain's unequal political contract. It may also help explain why authoritarianism in Bahrain may well be, as Steven Heydemann notes, 'stronger, more flexible, and more resilient than ever'.²² Specifically, this research attempts to answer the following question; how have the dominant political and social order in Bahrain prevented, controlled, or constrained potential radical change to their authority since the end of the First World War?

This thesis contributes to knowledge by being the first study of political repression in Bahrain, a state with significant (it is argued) foreign intervention in internal matters. By adopting a fine-grained approach to repression, this study addresses a number of deficiencies in the study of repression, which often focus on creating general causal models based on narrow definitions of repression. By broadening yet conceptually refining different types of repression, and examining strategic-decision making processes, this research shows how repressive choices and methods are often dependent on specific contextual and temporal factors, while highlighting long-term trends in the repressive structure of Bahrain's political system. The nature of repression and control shifted according not only to the threat to the ruling Al Khalifa regime, but also a number of other factors, such as those tools available to the government, and the personality of those responsible for control policy, and the nature of institutions themselves. Contextual factors, attitudes of elites, levels of accountability are all important in determining repressive choices. In addition to these micro-level transactions that influence repressive choices, this research also reveals how the shift from British colonial protection, to Saudi overrule following 1971, marked a key shift in general trends of repression. Increasing Al

21 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Reform Shelved, Repression Unleashed*, London, 2012, p. 3.

22 S. Heydemann, 'Upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world', Analysis Paper 13, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, October 2007, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2007/10/arabworld/10arabworld.pdf>, (Accessed 20 November 2015).

Khalifa and Saudi autonomy following independence in 1971 led to a reassertion of what sociologist Abdulhadi Khalaf calls the Al Khalifa's 'legacy of conquest',²³ and a de-incentivisation to resort to the public delegation of issues of collective importance. While the British protected the Al Khalifa, institutionalising their rule, and abetting their tribal authoritarianism, they also tempered facets of their repressive nature, whereas increasing Saudi influence perhaps enabled it. In others words, repression got notably more severe in many regards following independence when British influence diminished, especially for the country's Shi'a population. Furthermore, many of these reforms, including the relatively recent democratisation, have lacked 'binding consultation between the agents of the government and the people, inhibiting a crucial aspect of democracy: the protection of citizens from an arbitrary state'.²⁴ Like much social history on collective action, or any history for that matter, this thesis is corrective.

In addition, as repression is, like social movements, a phenomena that is not concerned about disciplinary boundaries, the nature of the research expands into fields of legal research, politics, and communications. Through addressing the history of informational control, this thesis also problematises the liberating potential of technology, and critically examines how social media in the recent uprising was used as a tool of social control, propaganda and surveillance. The increased role of online vigilantism also highlights the need to examine further the role of non-state actors as agents of repression.

Defining Repression: Breadth or Depth?

First though, we must define repression, which itself is subject to much debate. This definition is rooted in conflict theory. All states repress. As Max Weber states, 'conflict cannot be excluded from social life... "Peace" is nothing more than a change in the form of the conflict or in the antagonists or in the objects of the conflict, or finally in the chances of selection'.²⁵ In order to gain and maintain access to material resources,

23 A. Khalaf (2008), 'The Outcome of a Ten-Year Process of Political Reform in Bahrain', Arab Reform Initiative, http://www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/ARB.23_Abdulhadi_Khalaf_ENG.pdf, (accessed 30 December 2013) .

24 L. Kalmanowiecki, 'Origins and Applications of Political Policing in Argentina' , *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 27, no. 2, Violence, Coercion and Rights in the Americas, 2000, p. 37.

25 M. Weber 1949, p. 27. Cited A Turk, *Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defence of Authority*, Beverley Hills, Sage Publication, 1982, p. 11.

both the state and private actors frequently use repression and control to prevent potential challenges to their position of privilege, frequently resulting in conflict. Such forms of control may be broad, as in the Durkheimian preservation of cultural, social or ethnic stratification, or much narrower, such as the use of torture to deter political dissents or opponents of the regime. Whereas the former phenomenon may be more broadly termed a form of a social control, the latter might more readily be considered a form of repression. Yet drawing a distinction between broader forms of control and repression is not straightforward. Scholars of repression often disagree about what constitutes political repression. Robert Justin Goldstein provides a useful starting point, and argues that repression 'consists of government action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key government policies, because of their perceived political beliefs'.²⁶ More recently, and despite other definitions of repression, Goldstein has reiterated his commitment to his original definition, noting that it can 'defy even the most expert lexicographer'.²⁷ Scholars such as Christian Davenport have embellished on Goldstein's work²⁸, defining repression as:

the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions²⁹

Such measures may include 'harassment, surveillance/spying, bans, arrests, torture, and mass killing by government agents and/or affiliates within their territorial jurisdiction'.³⁰ Brett Stockdill provides a similar definition, and classifies repression as 'any actions taken by [government] authorities to impede mobilization, harass, and

26 R.J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976*. 1st Illinois Ed edition. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978, p. XVI,

27 R.J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, Oxford, Routledge, 2010 (first published 1983). p. xiii.

28 Ibid.

29 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2007, p. 2.

30 Ibid., p.1

intimidate activists, divide organizations, and physically assault, arrest, imprison and/or kill movement participants'.³¹

Although these definitions of repression have been widely used by social movement scholars, Jennifer Earl notes that they place too much emphasis on the role of the state. For this reason, Earl defines repression as any 'state or private action meant to prevent, control, or constrain non institutional, collective action (e.g., protest), including its initiation'.³² Similarly, Charles Tilly defines repression as 'any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action'.³³ Jules Boykoff's study on repression emphasises that non-state actors such as the media play an integral role in vilifying and turning public opinion against social movements. As a result, Boykoff argues that the role of non-state actors necessitates a broadening of the concept of repression.³⁴ As Davenport argues, there is a need to include 'alternative mechanisms' of control when analysing repression, including those that might be included under normative or material power.³⁵ Luis Fernandez also agrees with the need to broaden out definitions of repression, arguing that it 'opens up the theoretical possibilities for broader studies of protest control'.³⁶ For example, private security firms, software firms, the arms trade, and vigilantes may also play an important role in repression. As Earl notes, there is 'very little' study of non-state actors and private repression.³⁷

Hendrix too argues that a state's administrative, bureaucratic capacity may be more important in determining a state's repressive capacity than the ability to put boots on the ground.³⁸ While the line between state and private actors is not always clear, studies of repression tend to be state-centric. The role of private actors tends to focus on national institutions such as the media. However, this study stresses the importance of extra-state, international actors, in determining repression.

31 B.C. Stockdill, *Multiple Oppressions and Their Influence on Collective Action: The Case of the AIDS Movement*. PhD Dissertation, 1996, Evanston, Northwestern University, p. 146.

32 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control', *The Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 37, 2011, pp. 261 – 84, p. 263

33 C. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, p. 100.

34 J. Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States*, Edinburgh, AK Press, 2007.

35 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', p. 19

36 L. A. Fernandez, *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti Globalization Movement*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2008, p. 9.

37 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...', p. 265.

38 C.S. Hendrix, 'Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 273-285.

So on the one hand, over-broad definitions of repression run the risk of making it a 'theoretical umbrella' as opposed to a useful analytical tool.³⁹ On the other hand, focusing on one aspect of repression such as the policing of protest runs the risk of ignoring other aspects of repression that are important in understanding the broader web of control, and in the case of Bahrain, the reason for the regime's resilience.

As well as noting that repression is a contested concept, there is also the problem of the general limitations on academic studies of repression, as social movement scholars have tended to focus more on the study of the 'emergence, growth and effectiveness of social movements' as opposed to the role the state or private actors play in preventing or repressing their activity.⁴⁰ Furthermore, as states move towards more democratic forms of representation, then more attention must be spent on those institutions that do not necessarily form part of the traditional coercive apparatus. As Davenport notes, alternative mechanisms of control, separate from coercion, 'have not been examined extensively'.⁴¹ Furthermore, 'The failure to incorporate coercive behaviour with other forms of state influence has hindered not only the study of repression but also the study of the alternatives'.⁴² On a similar note, Goldstein notes that repression may be legal and peaceful, or illegal and violent.⁴³ Despite the debate, defining repression is important for conceptual clarity. For the purpose of this study, the definition of repression leans towards to a more inclusive, open-ended definition, defined as *the process by which the dominant hegemonic order attempt to maintain power by destroying, rendering harmless or appeasing those organizations, people, groups, or ideologies that potentially threaten their position of power or privilege*. The dominant hegemonic power is the Al Khalifa regime, a regime which Abdulhadi Al Khalaf describes as a 'despotic form of rule that has gradually evolved in the British-designed political and economic reforms of in the first decades' of the 21st century.⁴⁴

39 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...', p. 272.

40 J. Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States*, Edinburgh, AK Press, 2007, p. 14.

41 C. Davenport, *State Repression and Political Order*, p. 9.

42 C. Davenport, *State Repression and Political Order*, p. 19.

43 R.J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, p. xiii.

44 A. Khalaf, Contentious politics in Bahrain: From ethnic to national and vice versa, The fourth Nordic conference on Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle East in globalizing world, Oslo, 13-16 August 1998 . <http://www.smi.uib.no/pao/khalaf.html>, (accessed 7 February 2014).

Chapter Outlines

Chapter One: The justifications, concepts and theories for the study are laid out. There are four key issues. Firstly, regime type analysis of repression yields unsatisfying results. Secondly, Bahrain exhibits a number of characteristics that make it an interesting case study, such as the Al Khalifa regime and their reliance on foreign powers. Thirdly, studies of repression are often quantitative, and attempts to build generalisable causal models have reached often divergent conclusions, emphasising the need for fine grained approaches such as historic ones. Fourth, there are a lack of nuanced conceptualisations of repression, and this thesis proposes a new one, ideally positioned to create a rich net for studying repression.

Chapter Two: In addition to discussing sources, this chapter outlines the tenets of the transformative paradigm, the nature of a template analysis, and the use of interpretive historical narrative. In order to buttress this historical work, a virtual ethnography and framing has been conducted to examine further the role of social media and the media in the recent uprising. Drawing on elements of interpretive and comparative historical sociology, this chapter puts forward the assertion that historical studies of repression offer the depth required to give the more nuanced analysis needed in the field. It also makes a case for the need to integrate disciplines to form methodological approaches that are novel and unconventional.

Chapter Three: In this chapter, political tactics of repression are detailed and examined. In particular, the chapter notes a number of interesting trends. Firstly, the British desire to sail a Middle Course in Bahrain led to reforms designed to ameliorate dissent through indirect and pacific means, yet it also ultimately led to the crystallisation of the Al Khalifa regime. It also notes that in the 1950s, growing Arab nationalism and a desire to sail this middle course of non-interference meant Britain pursued other means in order to repress the Higher Executive Committee. Post-independence diminishing British influence and increasing Saudi ascendancy meant that tactics like democracy were eschewed in favour of methods centred around patronage. This Saudi largesse had the simultaneous effect of binding Bahrain closer to Saudi, resulting in long-term de-democratization and rentierism. Diminishing

British influence upon Independence also seemed to cause a manifestation of both Saudi and Al Khalifa animosity towards political opposition and the Shi'a. In particular, this chapter contributes to knowledge by offering new facts on Bahrain's transition to Independence, as very little primary document research has been done on this period.

Chapter Four. First, this chapter details the repressive capacity of Bahrain's security services, in particular the police, for which most historical and current data is available. This chapter looks at how personal integrity violations in Bahrain are intrinsically tied up with the institutional and political structures in Bahrain, and how Al Khalifa conservatism underlined by Saudi fear of Iranian expansionism has informed a militant and coercive policy of repression. In particular, the chapter notes that while the British established and played an important role in the police, Britain's desire to keep Bahrain at arms length resulted in the ascendancy of the Al Khalifa , who favoured a more security-orientated approach. Following Independence, increasing Al Khalifa and Saudi control, coupled with diminishing British influence led to a more repressive coercive apparatus, one in which the British were less able to influence policy in the favour of less violent and broad-brush means. As well as detailing the emergence of the police force, this chapter argues how tactics such as mass arrests and torture have emerged, not simply because of the criminalization of the Shi'a threat, but due to the embedded discrimination and sectarianism that pervades the security forces and the ruling regime.

Chapter Five: By examining laws, legislation, and legal processes, this chapter argues that the legal system in Bahrain is becoming an increasingly comprehensive and important tool of repression. Despite increasing standardisation of law, the arbitrary nature of its execution during political unrest highlights the continuity of particularistic features of tribal law embedded within a standardized system. In addition, legal repression is facilitated by legal structures and processes. Laws are generally enacted as reactionary measures to control dissent. The extent of impunity for state officials is also investigated and highlighted. In particular, a re-examination of historical sources sheds new light on the trial of the al-Madani killers in 1977, and

the trial of the Khawalid⁴⁵ in the 1920s.

Chapter Six: The control of information has become increasingly important, and despite British involvement in the censorship of anti-regime material, their general encouragement to liberalise the media was met again with Al Khalifa hostility to this. Post Independence this continued, yet despite recent liberalisation, the process of Al Khalifa control has persevered. By undertaking a framing analysis and virtual ethnography, this chapter argues that protesters and opposition are framed as violent, Iran-sponsored agents working to install a theocracy. It also problematises the liberating potential of social media by arguing how it has been used as a tool of surveillance and control in the recent uprising.

45 Khawalid is a pluralisation of Khalids (the Khalids). The term is used to refer to a branch of the Al Khalifa family descended from Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa (1853 – 1925). Khalid bin Ali was the half-brother of Isa bin Ali Al Khalifa, who ruled Bahrain between 1869 and 1923.

Chapter One

Bahrain: A Special Case? Shifting Hegemony, Bahrain's Sovereign Ambiguity, and a Template for Studying Repression

Repression, Regime Type & Repressive Capacity

Bahrain's cycles of instability over the course of the past century have rendered it an interesting political case study. Despite the growth of political democracy, and the ratification of a number of international treaties such as the International Code of Civil and Political Rights, the recent crackdown by the government has been more brutal than any other in history. Vincent Boudreau states that one 'way of thinking about state reactions to social challenges is to argue that different kinds of regimes have different repressive potentials...'⁴⁶ or repressive capacity. Davenport argues in his uses of Giddes' typology of different types of regimes that 'autocratic governments repress in different ways',⁴⁷ and that a concerted effort must be made to understand the nature of this repression and reasons for its occurrence; 'for research, the implications are clear: in the future, there must be an effort extended to disaggregate regime type so that we can understand the circumstances under which civil liberties are restricted and human rights are violated'.⁴⁸ It is therefore incorrect to treat all autocratic governments in the same manner.⁴⁹ As such 'we would not expect repression to be comparably applied across all types of autocracy'.⁵⁰ The logical implications of Davenport's statement are clear, and suggest that the most comprehensive understanding of repression on a state level is naturally an examination on a case-by-case basis.

46 V. Boudrea, 'Precarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive Policy', in C. Davenport, H. Johnston, and C. Mueller (eds), *Repression and Mobilization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, p. 36.

47 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 44, no. 4, 2007, p. 486.

48 Ibid., p. 486.

49 Ibid., p. 500.

50 Ibid., p. 489.

Most recently, Ala'a Shehabi and Marc Owen Jones argue that what has emerged in Bahrain is essentially a kleptocratic ethnocracy, where one ethnic group, the Sunni Al Khalifa⁵¹, has captured the instruments of state in order to protect their position of material and political privilege.⁵² At the heart of this regime is a 'ruling core' of mostly Al Khalifa family members, who have a great degree of personalist influence in internal policy. As a result of this, a system of domination has been created, and is reproduced through social, political, coercive, and legal institutions that reflect the 'norms, values and interests of the dominant ethnic group'.⁵³ This has led to a tribal state structure that is institutionally repressive, as the disparities in life chances which it generates fuel social conflict. These are further exacerbated as the regime attempt to continually consolidate and protect their position.

The despotic rule that has emerged has, in part, been shaped by the 'settler-ruler' mentality of the Al Khalifa. Unlike in the neighbouring shaykhdoms such as Qatar and Kuwait, where the ruling families assimilated into the local population, forming a more cohesive political entity, the Al Khalifa continue to 'jealously guard their identity/image as 'settler-rulers''. Khuri expands on this, and notes the 'exclusiveness and non-assimilative character'⁵⁴ of the Al Khalifa, whose legitimacy was based on historically claimed rights of conquest devoid of any substantial public delegation.⁵⁵ This settler ruler mentality is embedded within the Al Khalifa 'legacy of conquest', which relates to how, even to this day, 'the ruling family in Bahrain...refer to their conquest as the basis for establishing legitimacy of their dynastic rule'.⁵⁶ In short, Bahrain, its wealth, and its people, are seen as possessions or subjects of the conquering Al Khalifa. With this in mind, and even within the assumed homogeneity of the Gulf monarchies, and their autocratic nature, Khalaf makes a convincing case for regime nuances.

51 The Al Khalifa, originally from Kuwait, migrated to Qatar. From here they invaded the island of Bahrain in 1781/2, ejecting the Persians who had previously ruled.

52 A. Shehabi & M.O. Jones, 'Bahrain's Uprising: The Struggle for Democracy in the Gulf'.

53 T. Sellin, *Culture conflict and crime*, New Jersey, Social Science Research Council, 1938.

54 F. Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transition of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981. p. 236

55 Ibid.

56 A. Khalaf, 'Opening remarks, Bahrain: 30 years of unconstitutional rule', Parliamentary Human Rights Group, House of Lords, 25 August 2005, <http://jaddwilliam2.blogspot.co.uk/2005/08/royal-dream.html>, (accessed 22 November 2015).

Regime Distinctiveness: Between the Sovereign and Suzerain, the Emergence of a Dual Authority Structure

While this tribal kleptocratic ethnocracy led by the Al Khalifa tribe might be a suitable shorthand for Bahrain, it is imperative with Bahrain to acknowledge too one of its most notable features - the role of external actors. Toby Craig Jones argues that the Al Khalifa have only managed to perpetrate such continued repression against the indigenous people due to the protection afforded to them by outside powers⁵⁷. On the recent uprisings, Curtis Ryan notes that 'the outcome of almost every case within the Arab uprisings has turned at least in part on the action and decisions of external powers'.⁵⁸ Originally, this was Britain, who in order to secure their domination of trade routes to India, conducted a series of treaties with tribal leaders along the Persian Coast in the 1800s. The first of these agreements was the General Maritime Treaty of 1820, which recognised the Al Khalifa as the legitimate rulers of Bahrain. A subsequent agreement in 1861 turned Bahrain into an informal protectorate of Britain, and the Al Khalifa, and Britain were now bound to provide 'security' of his 'possessions against similar aggressions directed against them by the Chiefs and tribes of this Gulf'.⁵⁹ In 1880, the British completed an agreement with the Chief of Bahrain in which they forbade the Al Khalifa from engaging in negotiations or treaties without the consent of the British.⁶⁰ This was updated again in 1892.⁶¹ However, in exchange for control over Bahrain's foreign policy, Britain were now bound to protect the Bahraini government from external aggression.

Since the 1800s, "special relations" with Britain provided the regime with a important source of legitimacy. Britain, as an external source of power 'warded off external threats and helped the regime suppress its internal opposition. For more than

57 T.C. Jones, 'Time to disband the Bahrain-based U.S. Fifth Fleet', *The Atlantic*, 10 June 2011, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/time-to-disband-the-bahrain-based-us-fifth-fleet/240243/, (accessed 20 November 2015).

58 C. Ryan, 'New Opportunities for Political Science: IR Theory', in *Arab Uprisings: New Opportunities for Political Science*, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS Briefings), 2012, p. 56.

59 1861 Agreement between Shaykh Mohamed bin Khalifa, independent ruler of Bahrain, on the part of himself and successors, and captain Felix Jones, Her Majesty's Indian Navy, political resident of her Britannic majesty in the Gulf of Persia, on the part of the British Government, 1861, in P. Tuson and E. Quick (eds), *Records of Bahrain 1820-1960*, Slough, Archive Editions, vol. 1, 1993, p. 725.

60 Translation of agreement signed by the Chief of Bahrain, dated 22 December 1880, *Records of Bahrain*, vol. 2, p. 409.

61 Exclusive Agreement of the Shaykh of Bahrain with the British Government, dated 13 March 1892. *Records of Bahrain*, vol. 2, p. 456.

a century, but especially since the discovery of oil, British might, including military force, was ready at hand to rescue the Al Khalifa from attacks on its opponents whether these were tribal, confessional, or nationalists'.⁶² Tellingly, King Hamad highlighted Al Khalifa reliance on the British, noting his father's sadness at their departure, stating 'Why, no one asked you to go?'"⁶³

Khalaf argues that Britain's motives of what seemed to be 'wholehearted support' of the Al Khalifa was due to her 'apprehension of the geopolitical consequences of Saudi ambitions, Iranian claims, and, later, as part of its region-wide actions to restrain the growth of the Arab national liberation movement'.⁶⁴ As Khuri notes, Al Khalifa 'rulership did not depend on the support, material, political or otherwise, of their subjects'.⁶⁵ He adds, 'alliances with outsiders were meant to strengthen the family's grip over internal affairs while retaining its local exclusiveness'.⁶⁶ Yet this externally bolstered strength, and the exclusivism it has facilitated, has meant that the Al Khalifa suffered from limited legitimacy among ethnic groups that were excluded from political power. Indeed, as Nakhleh states, places like Bahrain 'cannot be an independent actor in the international arena. Whether Bahrain wills it or not, by its very location it will be caught in the squeeze of international politics'.⁶⁷ Crises in Bahrain have impinged upon the interests of outside powers, and thus invited significant external involvement in repression. So just as shifts in 'international political re-alignments'⁶⁸ impact upon the political status quo and opportunities available to social movements, they too impact upon repression, the repressive capacity and repressive choices. After all, Bahrain's crisis of sovereignty implies an inability by the regime to have full autonomy over state actions, thus regime type is perhaps a disingenuous category, as it applies responsibility to an entity that is very much contingent for its definition on the actions of other regime types (i.e. Britain and Saudi). A writer in the Economist eloquently summed up this interference.

62 A. Khalaf, 1998.

63 Bahrain News Agency, 'HM King Hosts Reception Ceremony in London', 12 May 2013, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/560364>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

64 A. Khalaf, 1998.

65 F. Khuri, p. 238

66 F. Khuri, p. 238

67 E. Nakhleh, *Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society*, New York, Lexington Books, 2011, p. 111.

68 D. McAdam, 'Political Process and The Development of Black Insurgency 1930 – 1970', in V. Ruggiero and N. Montagna (eds), *Social Movement: A Reader*, London and New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 179.

For a tiny country, without even much oil to recommend it, Bahrain has an unusual number of big friends ready to rally enthusiastically to the ruling family's sides as it cracks down, yet again, on dissent. Several have their own reasons for doing so: dislike of the democracy (Saudi Arabia); eagerness to ingratiate itself with the Gulf states (Jordan); the desire to protect a useful military base (America and Britain). And most are happy to form a phalanx against Iranian meddling – if that is, indeed, what is happening.⁶⁹

Yet the question of how Britain and Saudi Arabia have demonstrated extensive interference in quashing political opposition designed to challenge the Al Khalifa regime remains understudied. Inevitably, the international realignments that followed independence are important to Bahrain, whose ruling regime has sought to placate and be amenable to international players with varying ideologies and foreign policies, at least to give the illusion of sovereignty. As King Hamad noted recently, 'the blessed and appreciated efforts and initiatives of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin 'Abd al-Aziz Al Saud have had a profound impact on sparing the region a lot of risks'.⁷⁰ Yet a regime that has summarily relied on outside forces to maintain its power does not necessarily fall neatly into any pre-defined category, and will never be a leading player, or ultimately determiner of its own destiny. While it is a truism now that international linkages have been important in bolstering the resilience of Arab states⁷¹, the existence of the literature on how repression changes temporally in countries like Bahrain is virtually non-existent. Yet, if such changes do exist, they may be more discernible in a country like Bahrain, that has been subject to two, arguably contrasting spheres of influence; British colonialism and Al Khalifa/Saudi Arabian authoritarianism, itself coinciding with a rise of US influence in the region. Indeed, the argument is that repressive action is defined in part by the differing dual authority structures that have emerged in Bahrain, from an Al Khalifa Britain coalition, to a Saudi Al Khalifa coalition.

69 The Economist, 'Spot the villain', 3 February 1996, issue, 7951, p. 44.

70 *Gulf Daily News*, 'Saudi Role Vital', 17 April 2015, <http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=400151>, (Accessed 12 November 2015).

71 See, for example, Bellin and Heydemann

The Case for Historical, Fine-Grained Studies of Repression

With a definition of repression outlined, and Bahrain outlined as an interesting unit of analysis, it is important to address *how* one can approach studying repression when simple measures of regime type may be determined too encompassing, as repressive capacities are dependent on a myriad of interacting factors. While there may be similarities in how different states control dissent, it is useful to examine them on a case by case basis to best understand how regime response to control are dependent on specific temporal, geographical and political factors. Aurel Braun acknowledges this, stating; 'it is vital not to divorce intellectual history from its national, historical, and social bases' when examining dissent and repression.⁷² Indeed, the systemic features of political organization and the historical context are necessary in having sociologically informed understanding of repression.⁷³ Furthermore, as repression changes according to time, space and context,⁷⁴ focusing on one country will allow a more 'fine-grained' approach in which similarities and differences can be identified as to why the state or other actors chose specific courses of repressive action at specific times. As Charles Tilly argues, 'the repressiveness of a government is never a simple matter of more or less. It is always selective, and always consists of some combination of repression, tolerance and facilitation'.⁷⁵ This focus on nuance will address shortcomings that arise from creating generalisable explanations about, for example, the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East, and be more akin to historical studies of repression undertaken by the likes of Goldstein and Boykoff, who examine multiple incidents of contention across national or regional histories.⁷⁶

The need for a historical understanding of repression also stems from the divergent findings and limitations of those studies that attempt to create overly broad explanatory models or grand causal theories. Indeed, quantitative studies of repression or studies that focus on covariance between repression and other variables tend to produce very different results. For example, Douglas Hibbs argues that repression increases dissent, whereas scholars such as Mark Lichbach and Ted Gurr believe

72 A. Braun, 'Dissent and the State in Eastern Europe', in C.E.S. Franks (ed.) *Dissent and the State*, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1989, p. 113.

73 A Turk, *Political Criminality*, p 202.

74 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order'.

75 C. Tilly, 1977, ch. 4, p. 14

76 See Boykoff, 2007; Goldstein, 1978.

repression decreases dissent.⁷⁷ Although there tends to be general consensus on the idea that liberal political democracy decreases state repression, there is also the argument that 'mixed and transitional regimes, which combine elements of autocracy and democracy are the most coercive'.⁷⁸ Also, Daniel Hill finds that the link between 'democracy and torture to be quite tenuous', particularly during periods of violent dissent'.⁷⁹ In fact, one of the few relationships to have stood the test of time is the fact that states are more likely to resort to repression when faced with a domestic threat.⁸⁰ Other quantitative measures like the Political Terror Scale,⁸¹ seem to have misleading results on Bahrain. Similarly, Lawson's⁸² quantitative work on the contentious politics in the 1990s Bahrain *Intifada*,⁸³ is ambiguous in its attitudes to the motivations for state repression.

The limitations of quantitative studies are also apparent in their failure to offer an explanation of *why* repression and control might occur. For example, do elite attitudes impact upon type/frequency/consistency of repression?⁸⁴ - an interesting assertion if we argue, as Davenport does, that 'ideas/beliefs also play a role' in determining response to threats. Recent political scholarship on Bahrain, for example, has argued that power in the palace in Bahrain shifted to the hardliners during 2011, and it was this that led to a far more violent and coercive crackdown by the authorities. Frederic Wehrey, for example, states that 'Conservative figures within the Bahraini royal family are redoubling their efforts to subdue the opposition. This is plainly visible in new arrests, media censorship, warnings to Shi'a clerics, and more aggressive counter-demonstration tactics'.⁸⁵ Jane Kinninmont, too notes that the

77 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', p. 8

78 Ibid., p. 11.

79 D. W. Hill, *The Concept of Personal Integrity Rights in Empirical Research*, PhD Thesis, University of Georgia, 2013, from http://myweb.fsu.edu/dwh06c/pages/documents/pi_concept13Aug13.pdf, (accessed 2 November 2015).

80 C. Davenport, *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics*, New York, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, p. 1.

81 The Political Terror Scale, Retrieved from <http://www.politicalterrorsscale.org/countries.php?region=Eurasia&country=Syria&year=2010>, (Accessed 20 November 2015).

82 F. H. Lawson, 'Repertoires of Contention in Contemporary Bahrain', in Q. Wiktorowicz (ed) *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 89 – 111.

83 Intafada [Arabic]; uprising [English].

84 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...' p. 263.

85 F. Wehrey, 'The March of Bahrain's Hardliners', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 May 2012, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/march-of-bahrain-s-hardliners>. (accessed 10 October 2015).

unrest shifted the country 'towards a more hardline, security-oriented',⁸⁶ form of governance. But does this hold up? How are decisions to use certain types of repression limited by available resources? Are authorities, like Gamson argues, opportunists who repress groups when they are weak or do they only repress when they perceive themselves to be more threatened?⁸⁷ Is it correct to make this generalisation? Tilly, for example, argues that states will not repress groups if they fall below a certain threshold of weakness,⁸⁸ and that the power of challengers and the size of demonstrations will influence the use of repression.⁸⁹ In Tilly's analysis, strong threats will more likely be co-opted. Conversely, Paul Gregory and Phillip Shroder argue that Stalin exacted more repression when enemies were perceived to increase above a threshold where they represented a challenge.⁹⁰ While this does not contradict Tilly, it also implies an upper threshold above which coercion becomes facilitation. As Pion-Berlin notes, 'it may be more important to study government perceptions about oppositional violence than to study the opposition itself'.⁹¹ Yet how objective is a perceived threat, and to what extent does that perception rest on the attitudes of those in power? Will regimes repress even when not threatened with an existential threat? Similarly, can these personal attitudes of those in power impact on the nature of repression? Can internal political battles impact upon the nature of repression? Can international actors play a role in influencing repression?

These questions can be rarely addressed by quantitative studies or facile causal models. Even Charles Tilly notes that scholars of social movements and sociologists should focus on 'sources rather than theories in their effort to overcome their 'unawareness of the historical limits to their observations'.⁹² Indeed, 'because *history* is not often readily available for quantitative comparative analyses, cross-country

86 J. Kinninmont, *Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse*, Chatham House, London, 2012, p. 1, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle%20East/pr0612kinninmont.pdf>, (accessed 6 October 2015)

87 W.A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Homewood, IL, Dorsey, 1968.

88 C. Tilly, 1977, ch. 4, p. 22.

89 Ibid.

90 P.R. Gregory, P. J.H. Shroder and K. Sonin, 'Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An "Eliminations Model" of Stalin's Terror', Working Paper No. 91, CEFIR/NES Working Paper Series, 2006.

91 D. Pion Berlin, 'Theories of Political Repression in Latin America: Conventional Wisdom and an Alternative', *American Political Society Association*, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter, 1986), p. 51.

92 Cited in B. Dill and R. Aminzade, 'Historians and the study of protest', in B. Klandermans and C. Roggeband (eds), *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*, New York, Springer, 2007, p. 305.

analyses that treat countries as “like units,” conditional on a few contemporary observables such as per capita income, are likely to suffer from bias due to the omission of historical factors'.⁹³ Therefore in order to better understand the control of dissent in Bahrain, it is important to study the country's historical experience of social conflict and hegemonic responses to it, even if these insights may only be fleeting, temporally limited, and confined to very specific situations. Yet they are insights nonetheless. As Skocpol notes, 'the whole story can never be told in any work of history or historical sociology. But interpretive works can convey the impression of fullness much more readily than works of historical sociology that aim to apply models or establish causal connections of relevance to more than one case'.⁹⁴

What the literature highlights though, as Davenport notes, is that 'amid varying contexts, methodological approaches, and model specifications, different findings abound'.⁹⁵ For this reason, hypothesis testing is eschewed in favour of more interpretive approaches. To simply focus on whether states are democratic or not, for example, is to miss the nuances that may define why or how repression occurs. As Turk argues, 'the perception of threat and the specifics of the control response will be determined by the knowledge and instruments available to them'.⁹⁶ Thus in addressing questions like this, one must be prepared to qualitatively address historical studies of repression in order to see what repression existed, how it has changed, and why it might have changed? Indeed, 'if neither the systemic features of political organization nor the historical context'⁹⁷ of repression is specified, 'inquiry is very likely to flounder'.⁹⁸ Ultimately, one 'cannot assume but must establish the applicability to particular cases of any general conclusions about trends and prospects in political policing'.⁹⁹

The temporal range of this study then is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, to track change, and examine how and why repression has shifted, it is necessary to consider a time period spanning a significant number of years. A

93 J.G. Hariri, 'A Contribution to the Understanding of Middle Eastern and Muslim Exceptionalism', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 77, no. 2, 2015, p. 489.

94 Skocpol, p. 371.

95 C. Davenport, *How Social Movements Die...*, 2015, p. of 346.

96 A Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 117.

97 *Ibid.*, p. 202.

98 *Ibid.*

99 *Ibid.*

temporally large study can help 'prize' open the authoritarian play book. Secondly, it is acknowledged that repression in an autocracy does not necessarily remain stable over time. While it has been argued that the demise of the Soviet Union made autocracies less repressive, due to their desire to appease the democracy espousing principles of the singular global hegemon (USA), it is equally reasonable to assume that regimes had to repress more after the Cold War in order to stymie greater demands for liberty and democratisation.¹⁰⁰ A temporally large study will offer a more likely chance of finding these occasional sparks of insight into processes that are generally secretive and opaque. The aim, similar to works of interpretive historical sociology, is to present an account that is 'vivid and full, like a good Flaubert novel'.¹⁰¹ As an interpretive work, the aforementioned questions can be subsumed into the following:

- 1) What methods have been utilised in order to resist these changes, and how have these methods evolved over time?
- 2) When possible to identify, why did the authorities choose specific methods of repression in certain contexts, and what influenced those choices?
- 3) To what extent have Bahrain's protecting powers had an impact on the nature, and type of repression, repressive choices and repressive capacity made?

A Template for Understanding and Categorising Methods of Repression

How do we determine what constitutes a method of repression? After all, as Turk states, 'how political resistance is neutralized is as important to authorities as neutralizing it'.¹⁰² Many studies of what could be deemed repression focus on limited facets such as protest policing, and fail to consider 'the variety of subtler ways the state attempts to exert social control'.¹⁰³ Similarly, Marwan Khawaja notes that few studies of repression 'provide clear criteria for conceptually distinguishing among the many manifested forms of repression'.¹⁰⁴ More recently, Earl notes that there are a lack

100C. Davenport, 'State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace', 2007, p. 500.

101T. Skocpol, 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology', in T. Skocpol (ed), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 371.

102A Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 137.

103J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent: The Mechanisms of State Repression in the USA', *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2007, p. 284.

104Cited in J. Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets*, p. 15.

of 'refined and powerful conceptualization[s] of repression'.¹⁰⁵ The first was Gary Marx¹⁰⁶ in 1979, yet others have followed, such as Jennifer Earl and Jules Boykoff who have enumerated different methods for studying repression. Jennifer Earl's 2011 work on political repression sets out a typology based on the following core distinctions: '(a) whether the repressive actor is a state, private or hybrid actor; (b) whether the repressive action is coercive or uses more carrot-based "channelling" (McCarthy et al. 1991, Oberschall, 1973); and (c) whether the repressive action is observable/overt or unobserved/covert'.¹⁰⁷ Boykoff outlines ten action modes, each of which refers a specific method of repression.

However, even a cursory glance at such typologies highlights that they are not pertinent to Bahrain. Preliminary inductive research on Bahrain has highlighted methods of repression that were missing from these typologies, such as exile, the removal of citizenship, or demographic engineering to create a cordon sanitaire around the regime. With regards to Bahrain, Omar Shehabi outlines an incidental summary of state responses to dissent, noting the rulers dealt with existential threats by sowing divisions, stalling, co-opting, and then using force.¹⁰⁸ Abdulhadi Khalaf too in the foreword of Bahrain's Uprising outlines three key elements of repression, '1) the security services' use of brutal force to disperse protesters, followed by sweeping police raids to arrest known activists and leaders of protest; 2) use of the media and traditional notables to discredit protest leaders and their lack of "patriotism"; 3) dispensing promises of political reforms in combination with offering lavish *makramat* to protest leaders perceived as "moderate".¹⁰⁹ When taken together these complement one another to form a richer net for conceptualising repression. Yet this

105J. Earl, 'Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Towards a Theory of Movement Repression', *Sociological Theory*, vol. 21, no. 1, 2003, p. 44.

106Marx highlights the main purpose of repression as to; 'inhibit capacity for corporate action, direct energies of movement of defensive maintenance needs and away from pursuit of broader social goals, create unfavorable public image and counter-ideology, gather information on movement, inhibit supply of money and facilities, inhibit freedom of movement, expression, and action; create myth and fact of surveillance and repression; apply legal sanctions, damage morale, derecruitment'; in G. Marx, 'External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes, and Complications' In M. Zald and J. McCarthy (eds.), *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, Cambridge, MA, Winthrop Publishers, 1979, pp. 94 – 125.
<http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/movement.html>, (accessed 4 February 2014).

107 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...', p. 264.

108O. Shehabi, 'Divide and Rule in Bahrain and the Elusive Pursuit for a United Front: The Experience of the Constitutive Committee and the 1972 Uprising', *Historical Materialism*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 94-127

109A. Khalaf, 'Foreword', Bahrain's Uprising, 2015 p. xv.

net can be improved further. Repression, whether by that name or something else, (e.g. political policing, control), has been addressed by scholars from different disciplines, from criminology to history and political science. As Davenport notes:

At present, an unwritten division of labor appears to exist: Scholars concerned with civil liberties, protest policing, human rights violations, and genocide/politicide focus on repression, while scholars interested in rhetoric, communication, and propaganda focus on persuasion, and scholars concerned with selective incentives, wages, bribes, oil profits, and welfare systems focus on material benefits. Clearly, however, there is some overlap.¹¹⁰

It would therefore be useful to aggregate theories and concepts, and in particular typological approaches to repression to create a more thorough and richer template for analysing repression. In addition to this, studies of repression that focus on just one aspect of repression, such as protest policing, risk sacrificing 'breadth on the altar of depth'.¹¹¹ As this historical work seeks to 'use concepts and theories to develop a meaningful historical interpretation',¹¹² this section, in line with many interpretive works, presents the 'relevant concepts and theories at various levels of abstraction...from various fields'¹¹³ to create the basis of the lens through which to interpret Bahrain's history. We have defined repression generally, but by parsing different concepts of repression across disciplines, the nature of their change across different categories can better be assessed, as can the evolution of the repressive capacity. Davenport highlights the utility of delineating categories of repression, and states that 'disaggregation is specifically useful if we expect governments to respond to different challenges with distinct repressive strategies'.¹¹⁴ There is the temptation in such a review of methods of repression to review every facet on literature on any subcategory of control. Yet while these have been looked at where possible in order to add more insight into particular aspects of repression, scholars who have approached

110C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', p. 9.

111J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...', p. 284.

112T. Tsou, *The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. xxi.

113Ibid.

114C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', p. 18.

categorisations of repressive methods have been focused on in order to create a clearer focus.¹¹⁵

As this is a political historical study mediated by the concept of repression, the most useful approach in studying repression is to acknowledge its complexity, but discern categories of repression that combine methods of repression with their aims and intended outcomes. With this in mind, it is important to review theories of repression, and in particular typologies, with a view to creating a comprehensive template that can then be used to select empirical data. It is important to note that in this thesis, the term 'template' is preferable now to typology or taxonomy. This is because taxonomies rely on empirical observation while typologies are ideal-typical. Given this rather rigid a posteriori and a priori binary, a template analysis, which combines elements of both empirical and theoretical influence for its definitions, bridges both.¹¹⁶ In light of this overlap, this study codes different theories of repression to identify common aspects of repression in order to create a template for which to select data that can be deemed to be repressive.¹¹⁷ As well as approaching repression through 'multiple lenses',¹¹⁸ the purpose of what could be considered disciplinary triangulation is to create a clearer, more complete lens with which to view Bahrain's history through.¹¹⁹ While some may level accusations of 'theoretical "eclecticism"',¹²⁰ this, as Tang Tsou argues, is 'a matter of necessity in an endeavour

115For this reason, useful reading, such as the literature on the National Security State, has been important rather than integral to the construction of the template. Indeed, the useful outline provided by Jack-Nelsen Pallmeyer in his 1992 book *A Brave New World Order*, provides characteristics of the National Security State, which describe the nature of a specific state, as opposed to focusing on methods of repression. While these seven characteristics do include the ways such states behave, and include methods, they focus more on regime-type rather than regime methods. Pallmeyer's description of the state emphasises the role of the church in mobilising ideology, making it an unusual point of reference for the Persian Gulf. In addition, such literature can be too state centric, focusing on the role of the state and not necessarily the bottom-up notions of control increasingly recognised by scholars of repression. Furthermore, other important texts, such as Michael Hogan's work on the National Security State, is very much specific to the political development of America vis a vis its constitutional demands, and not necessarily any more pertinent to Bahrain than literature on the authoritarian states.

116J. McGarry and B. O'Leary (eds.), 'Introduction: the macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict', in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, Oxford, Routledge. 1993.

117 (It also, inductively, harvests categories from empirical observations but this will be discussed later).

118Z. Hoque, M. A. Covaleski, T. N. Gooneratne, (2013) 'Theoretical triangulation and pluralism in research methods in organizational and accounting research', *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1170 - 1198


119To further the analogy, the process of this theoretical triangulation resembles white light going into a prism; the object is to disperse it into its myriad colours, each of which represents a facet of repression.

120T. Tsou, 1986, p. xxi.

to achieve an informed understanding¹²¹ of repression in Bahrain. Studies of repression that focus, or at least are clear on delineating methods have been the focus of the literature review as these provide a richer and more comprehensive means of parsing repression. However, many studies of repression, political policing, or political power, have been referred to when they offer useful definitions or insights

By conducting a template analysis of theories of repression, four broader categories of repression and control have been identified. These are *political statecraft*, *personal integrity violations*, *legal repression*, and *information control*. The diagram below highlights how these categories are a useful heuristic, but acknowledges that there are overlaps in categories. For example, creating visa restrictions to prevent political dissidents entering or leaving a country may be considered an aspect of statecraft, yet if it were legislated it would fall into legal repression too.

Fig 1. *This heuristic illustrates the interconnected nature of different types of repression (and the overlapping of some codes). A similar model was used by Luis Fernandez in his work on policing protests in Seattle, though his were generated using grounded theory and participant observation as opposed to being derived from the aforementioned methods.*¹²²



Political Statecraft

Criminologists such as Austin Turk use the term statecraft to describe the broader way in which political policing occurs. Statecraft is defined as the art and science of social control as developed and used in the political organization of social life¹²³. Building

121Ibid.

122L. A. Fernandez, 2008, p. 32

123 A. Turk, *Political Criminality*, 1982.

on sociologist William Gamson's 1968 work, Turk summarises three of the four major strategic operations of statecraft as insulation, sanctioning, co-optation and persuasion (see section on Information Control). Insulation is essentially the blocking of access to those perceived as a threat to positions or authorities that control those resources 'that can be brought to bear on authorities'.¹²⁴ Methods include restricting visas, modifying immigration policies, exile, deportation, screening employees from potentially sensitive positions, gerrymandering, or restricting the movements of dangerous groups.¹²⁵ In this sense, dangerous groups may include political dissidents, or groups perceived in many spheres to be subordinate, such as women. In the former USSR, Robert Sharlet calls a similar process 'bureaucratic deprivation', which ranges from 'petty harassment, such as the suspension of telephone service, to more consequential deprivations such as job dismissal, eviction, and preventing a dissident's child from entering the university'.¹²⁶ Sanctioning is the general system of punishment or rewards. For the deserving, rewards may include job offers, promotions and increased salaries. For the troublesome, this may involve the loss of jobs, or the withdrawing of status (perhaps even nationality).¹²⁷ As McCarthy and Zald note, 'the more than subsistence income, fringe resources, leisure, and flexibility offered by many jobs can indirectly be important in facilitating social movement participation. Conversely the denial of such employment to activists can be a means of indirectly damaging a movement'.¹²⁸ Gary Marx adds that the removal of employment of jobs 'can damage morale, shrink resources, and make sustained actions difficult or impossible. For some activists, the cost of continued participation may become too great, and they may quit. But more direct efforts toward this end may also be undertaken in the form of explicit de recruitment activities'.¹²⁹ Co-optation, perhaps potentially the most dangerous, involves including former dissidents or trouble makers in the internal apparatus so that they have a say and responsibility in decision making. This can diminish social movement strength by removing structural support from former followers. Alternatively, newly co-opted agents can influence former

124 W.A. Gamson, 1968, p. 117.

125 A. Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 160.

126 R. Sharlet, 'Party and Public Ideals in Conflict: Constitutionalism and Civil Rights in the USSR', *Cornell International Law Journal*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1990, p. 345

127 A. Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 161.

128 G. Marx, 1979.

129 G. Marx, 1979.

followers into supporting the status quo.¹³⁰

Political scientists too have examined strategies of repression and control in authoritarian states. Aurel Braun's work on the control of dissent in Eastern Europe offers a framework for studying how the dominant social order respond to dissent, and overlaps with the work of Gamson and Turk. Braun includes the concepts of co-optation, containment, coexistence in his outline of political control.¹³¹ Lustick too, in the area of political science, offers shorter hand for talking about Israel's control strategies of the Arab minority, describing the 'three components of Israel's control system as segmentation, dependence and co-optation. Segmentation refers to the isolation of the Arabs from the Jewish population and to the internal fragmentation of the Arab community; dependence means the forced reliance of the Arab population upon the Jewish sector for economic and political resources; and co-optation refers to material, social and political enticements to elites to elicit their cooperation'.¹³² Co-optation is similar to Gamson's co-optation, whereby elites or the state attempt to pacify dissenters by offering them positions in the public administration or government (similar to co-optation). Similarly, inclusion and co-optation contain considerable overlap with Tilly's concept of 'facilitation', which is the process of legitimatising a group, by giving it publicity, paying it off, or doing anything to lower the group's cost of collective action.¹³³ These strategies of co-optation ultimately aim to achieve pacification through partial inclusion¹³⁴ and form part of a general political strategy pursued by Middle Eastern states in which they appropriate and contain civil society, managing political contestation¹³⁵ by limiting its ability to flourish independently. As Wiktorowicz notes in his work on Jordan, the Middle Eastern 'state attempts to limit the possibility of collective action in the niches of society by requiring that all group work is performed in the open through civic society organizations and are within the reach of administrative practises'.¹³⁶

130 A. Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 162.

131 A. Braun, 'Dissent and the State in Eastern Europe'.

132 J. Reudy, Review of 'Arabs in the Jewish state: Israel's Control of a National Minority', Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 6, 1982, p. 7, <http://www.wrmea.org/1982-september-6/book-review-arabs-in-the-jewish-state-israel-s-control-of-a-national-minority.html>, (Accessed 10 November 2015).

133C. Tilly, ch. 4, p. 3.

134J. I. Ross *The Dynamics of Political Crime*, London, Sage, 2003 p. 159.

135S. Heydemann, 2007.

136Q. Wiktorowicz, 'Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2012, p. 49.

Although labelled types of 'power', Dallin and Breslauer's concepts of normative and material power outline similar strategies used by authoritarian governments in repressing dissent: 'Normative power (also referred to as positive or symbolic power), commonly called persuasion and including socialization, education, and the offer of prestige, recognition, or love; 'material power' (also referred to as technical or utilitarian power), commonly called incentives and including such forms as wages, rewards, bonuses, bribes, and promotions;¹³⁷ Sociologist Abdulhadi Khalaf, whose research has explored the repression of labour movements¹³⁸ and contentious politics¹³⁹ in Bahrain, draws on the work of Mann to examine various political strategies adopted by the 'Al-Khalifa regime' to contain challenges to its authority. Khalaf's work focuses more on statecraft, or what Mann calls 'infrastructural power', that is to say, the 'capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm'.¹⁴⁰ There is less focus on the state's coercive apparatus, or 'despotic power'.

This study adds to Khalaf's work by giving a more theoretically broad emphasis on repression, while also using updated data. Khalaf argues that the Al Khalifa regime is a 'ruling-core' who use a system of patronage and *makramāt* (gifts or rewards or sanctioning) to both give and remove privileges from different social groups, taking advantage of Bahrain's oil revenues which facilitate this process. This system of granting and withdrawing privilege is supported by the Al Khalifa's monopoly ownership of the country's resources, both materially and militarily. Khalaf also notes the importance of inclusion strategies in Bahrain, which include the giving of 'gratuities and favours in form of employment, cash, and plots of land' via regime-sponsored patrons¹⁴¹. Yet by providing incentives or rewards to some members of the group but not others, these methods may foster schism and disunity, leading to the fragmentation and weakening of certain groups, and the general stratification of society where the have and have not divide falls along religious, gender ethnic, or identity-based cleavages.

137A. Dallin and G. W. Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, p. 2.

138A. Khalaf, 'Labor Movements in Bahrain', *Middle East Research and Information Projects Report*, no. 132, 1985, pp. 24-9.

139A. Khalaf, 1998.

140Mann, Cited in Khalaf, 1998.

141 Ibid.

Statecraft in particular contributes to repression by 'Problem depletion', which works by 'removing (1) the perceived need for the movement and/or (2) the perceived relevance of claims-making effort within the relevant population'.¹⁴²The government may, for example, create 'front SMOs; that 'actually represent the status quo's interest but that maintain the veneer of a challenger'¹⁴³ in order to compete with the threatening organization, and convince others the issue is being dealt with on official terms. Similarly, the creation of committees, investigatory panels on terms defined by the regime may undermine the perceived need of joining other political forces. Demonstrable commitment to issues addressing key grievances such as corruption, land reform, injustice (as examples), is argued to be the most effective way of splitting support away from insurgent groups in particular. In this sense, reform can be considered repression. Limited democratisation, for example, falls into repression according to the definition, as it serves to diffuse general discontent by providing a forum for grievances, but not to the extent it significantly alters the status quo. While such an assertion that democratisation can be seen as a form of repression may seem counter-intuitive to some, democratisation is a continuum. At one end of this continuum, where one can consider a certain level of political democracy to have been achieved, scholars such as Davenport and Armstrong¹⁴⁴ argue that there is often a decrease in violent repression. However, this is based on the normative assumption that repression is necessarily an act of physical violence, a definition that this thesis rejects. Furthermore, given the importance of repression as a tool of hegemonic power maintenance, acts of 'democratic' reform that can be shown to be a deliberate tool designed to weaken social movements or opposition while disproportionately preserving the status quo can be considered repression. Until the level of democracy is achieved where the people are theoretically, and in practise, the source of power, such as in what Gerardo Munck calls high-quality democracies,¹⁴⁵ then one must always be

142 C. Davenport, *How Social Movements Die...*, 2015, p. 23.

143 Ibid., p. 27.

144 Davenport C, Armstrong DA II. 2004. Democracy and the violation of human rights: a statistical analysis from 1976–1996. *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* 48(3):538–54

145 Gerardo Munck (2014) calls the 'quality' of democracy. Munck argues that 'democracy is diminished by counter majoritarian institutions, such as (i) presidents with strong legislative powers, (ii) upper chambers with strong powers, (iii) rigid constitutions, and (iv) courts with the power of judicial review regarding matters of normal politics'. See G.L., Munck, 'What is democracy? A reconceptualization of the quality of democracy. *Democratization*, vol. 23, no. 1, p. 13, 2014 doi: 10.1080/13510347.2014.918104

critical of whether those institutions are tools of power maintenance or otherwise. Indeed, just as there is a difference 'between violence practised by the oppressed and by the oppressors',¹⁴⁶ there is a difference between democracy from and for the people, and democracy from and for the continued maintenance of dominant hegemonic order.

Fig 2. Summary of Methods of Statecraft

Statecraft	Insulation	Exile, restricting immigration policies, screening employees from sensitive jobs, removal of citizenship, stratification
	Deprivation and sanctions	Cutting off access to essential resources, mass layoffs, removing scholarships,
	Rewards & makramāt	Jobs, increased salaries, promotions, co-optation
	Selective Reform	Grievance removal, reform stalling/temporary tolerance, superficial reform that fails to threaten distribution of resources, limited democratisation

Personal Integrity Violations

Pamela Oliver defines two of the three main goals of repression as deterrence and incapacitation.¹⁴⁷ Perhaps most obviously, such measures can be understood as torture, police violence, or incarceration. Dallin and Breslauer call this 'coercive power' or 'physical power', noting that it 'includes such forms as fines, penalties, terror, and regulatory and police power'.¹⁴⁸ The literature on Latin America too notes the importances of disappearances,¹⁴⁹ while more extreme examples might include mass executions or assassinations.¹⁵⁰ Austin Turk notes the importance of violence in

146H. Marcuse, 'Repressive Tolerance', in R. P. Wolff, B. Moore, jr., and H. Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1965, pp. 95-137.

147 P. Oliver, 'Repression and crime control: why social movement scholars should be more attention to mass incarceration as a form of repression', *Mobilization*, vol. 13, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1- 24

148Dallin and Breslauer, p. 2.

149 J. Nieto, 'U.S. Security Policy and United States-Colombia Relations', *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 112 – 119.

150 G. A. Lopez & M. Stohl, 'State Terrorism: From the Reign of Terror to Ninety-Eighty Four Terrorism', *Chitty's Law Journal*, 32-35, 1984-1987, pp. 14 – 33.

political policing, arguing that 'neutralization of resistance by violence and or other means, and intimidation tactics aimed at general deterrence' are the ultimate goals of political policing.¹⁵¹ Personal Integrity Violations generally include repressive acts such as 'acts of harassment, intimidation, physical assault, arrests'.¹⁵² Among these varied definitions of police power, or coercive power, lie numerous similarities. Daniel Hill summarises them succinctly in his definition of personal integrity violations as; '1) state-imposed deprivations of life, 2) physical harm at the hands of state agents, and 3) state-imposed detention'.¹⁵³ In addition to these three concepts, there are the more nebulous aspects of personal integrity violations that may not constitute obvious harm, but may include harassment or intimidation designed to deter activists from engaging in group action. These are not deprivations of liberty per se, but might include curfews, or other restrictions on movement that serve to physically contain the opposition in meatspace.

While governments may be seen to enforce certain forms of personal integrity violations in situations that may be seen as legitimate, this is based on laws and criminal codes as defined by a particular government. Hill notes, 'The fact that there are many instances of government violence that conform to domestic legal procedure has led some (e.g., Stohl et al., 1986) to suggest that "illegal" (i.e., not conforming to domestic legal code) is a useless category for the purpose of identifying and measuring violations of personal integrity'.¹⁵⁴ Thus personal integrity violations here refer to those actions, legal or illegal, that fall into the definition used by Hill, and that are deployed by the Bahrain government or its supporters to deal with political dissent.

Arrests too are a crucial method for decreasing the efficacy of social movements, as they reduce the number of opposition bodies in meatspace and disrupt the organizational capacity of political movements. Arrests 'divert activists from their social-change goals, undermine morale of social-movement participants, and discourage support from potential recruits or bystander publics'.¹⁵⁵ The targeting of leaders can be particularly significant; 'Because social movement leaders are

151 A.T. Turk, . Social Control and Social Conflict in J.P. Gibbs (ed) *Social Control: Views from the Social Sciences*, London, Sage, 1982, p. 253.

152 Fernandez, p. 8.

153 D.W. Hill, p. 16.

154 Ibid., p. 16.

155 J. Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets*, p. 140.

symbolically and instrumentally important, movement-damaging activities often focus on weakening them as the most visible and presumed central part of a movement'.¹⁵⁶

Furthermore, arrests also exacerbate paranoia among activists, while tying them up in lengthy and costly legal proceedings that drain valuable resources.¹⁵⁷ These form part of what Isaac Balbus calls 'legal repression', which is a means of repressing dissent by the 'formal rationality' of legal methods that 'depoliticize the consciousness of the participants, deligitimate their claims and grievances, and militate against alliances between participants and other non-elites or elite moderates'.¹⁵⁸ Earl notes such arrests can be challenging and painful experiences that increase costs by entangling the victim within the criminal justice system, thereby raising the costs of dissent.¹⁵⁹ Thus, in order to avoid such actions like violence, activists, citizens, or protesters will withdraw from organizations, institutions, or actions deemed to be dissident (e.g. Olson, 1965, Davenport, 2015). Personal integrity violations are important in the role of deterrence; 'general deterrence is the ultimate goal of political policing; it is the anticipated product of intimidation'.¹⁶⁰

While some personal integrity violations, such as arrests, may more easily be the domain of state institutions such as the police, violence and intimidation can be undertaken by multiple agencies, whether official, quasi-official, or unofficial. Indeed, vigilantism can emerge in an environment where the state refuse to, or is unable to, deploy means of coercion to prevent it. In this regard, the state may deliberately facilitate or turn a blind eye to vigilantism if it serves useful social control purposes. As Lopez and Stohl argue, the government may participate in repression through the '(covert) employment of the security forces and the condoning of unofficial vigilante groups or death squads against groups or individuals for the purposes of intimidation and compliance with state or majority interests'.¹⁶¹

156G. Marx, 1979.

157 Churchill and Vander Wall, in Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets*, p. 140

158 I. Balbus, in J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent', p. 291.

159 J. Earl, 'You can beat the rap, but you can't beat the ride: bringing arrests back into research on repression', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change*, vol 26, 2005, pp. 101–139 in Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent', p. 291.

160A Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 150.

161 G. A. Lopez & M. Stohl, 'State Terrorism: From the Reign of Terror to Ninety-Eighty Four Terrorism', *Chitty's Law Journal*, 32-35, 1984-1987, p. 21.

Fig 3. Summary of Methods Personal Integrity Violations

Personal Integrity Violations	Containment	Targeted or mass arrest of leaders, organisers, or activists, road blocks, curfews, kettling, kidnap.
	Physical Harm	Mass arrests, torture, disappearances, use of mass harm weapons, e.g. tear gas, collective punishment, extra judicial killings, police violence, genocide
	Threats	threats of violence, other threats, general intimidation.

Legal Repression

The law can also be used as an instrument to extend control over society, subjecting all persons to rules laid down through certain institutions. In particular, repressive laws and legal systems can be characterised when 'law is subordinated to power politics'.¹⁶² As Tilly notes, legislation and law can be a good index of a state's repressiveness. Indeed, 'legality matters because laws state the costs and benefits which governments are prepared (or at least empowered) to apply to one form of action or another'.¹⁶³ In this context, law is an increasingly important category in repressing dissent. Laws are complemented by administrative actions and breaches of due process¹⁶⁴ that also should be considered repression. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri state that emergency laws in particular allow the state to define the demands of interventions, as well as the 'capacity to set in motion the forces and instruments that in various ways can be applied to the diversity and the plurality of the arrangements in crisis'.¹⁶⁵ Given that Bahrain has been subject to the emergency laws for about half a decade, it can be argued that political activity in Bahrain has been subject to what Giorgio Agamben describes as a 'state of exception that has now become the rule'.¹⁶⁶ In other words, political activity has been criminalised, or at least has the potential to be easily criminalised so that 'increasingly numerous sections of

162 P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, *Law and Society in Transition: Towards Responsive Law*, 2009, Ebook. p. 18.

163C. Tilly, ch. 4, p. 6.

164 R.J. Goldstein, 1978.

165M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 16 – 17. (Cited in J. Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets*, p. 157.

166G. Agamben, *Means Without End: Notes on Politics*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 138.

residents [are] deprived of political rights'.¹⁶⁷ As James L. Gibson argues, such laws can reflect a 'repressive public policy', which is defined as 'statutory restrictions on political activities through which citizens, individually or in groups, compete for political power'.¹⁶⁸

Non-emergency laws are important too. Dictating when people can and cannot meet, who they can meet, and for what purpose is critical in controlling the outcomes of those meetings. Although such laws may seek to mitigate the use of coercive force by creating a more palatable framework for organising dissent, the replacement of force by law simply serves to make repression less visible. By defining when, where and what is discussed, the state are better able to control and repress potential challenges to its authority. Drawing on Foucault, Quentin Wiktorowicz states that 'discipline orders individuals in spatial settings to maximize the ability of the state or those in power to maintain constant observation. By dictating when and where individuals are present and even their relations with one another, the state enhances its social control'.¹⁶⁹

The removal of legal outlets for opposition movements was common in Latin America, with Patricia Weiss Fagen noting how the Brazilian government, for example, 'enacted a series of Institutional Acts and decrees that banished individuals from political participation; curtailed political activities; outlawed political parties, student organizations, and trade unions; ended direct elections; and reduced Congressional powers'.¹⁷⁰ Many of these laws, or forms of 'channelling', as described by Jennifer Earl, have been used in Bahrain in an attempt to limit, control or constrain the activities of social movements or political activists. The absence of coercive force also, as a corollary, imbues those whom the law benefits with the credibility that results from their resort to repression without the stain of violence. Although their focus is on states of exception, George Lopez and Michael Stohl also note in their typology of state terror the importance of legal methods of repression, including 'the use of legislative and extra-constitutional or extra-systematic acts and policies; the adoption of martial law; a state of siege; a state of emergency, or other decrees which

167G. Agamben, *Means Without End*, p. 133.

168J.L. Gibson, 'The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression During the Vietnam War Era', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 51, no. 1, 1989, p. 15.

169 Q. Wiktorowicz, 2000, p. 48.

170 Fagen, P.W., 'Repression and State Security', in J.E. Corradi, P.W. Fagen (eds) *State Terror and Resistance in Latin America*, University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 47.

provide for a suspension of the normal protection of constitutional rule'.¹⁷¹

Legal processes are also important. Otto Kercheimer, for example, argued that the objective of the classical political trial is to 'incriminate its foe's public behaviour with a view to evicting him from the political scene'.¹⁷² He adds that in the derivative political trial perjury, defamation and contempt are 'manipulated in an effort to bring disrepute upon a political foe'.¹⁷³ Ultimately, the objective of political trial is not the execution of impartial justice, but rather a means of undermining or destroying power relations, and may be a means by which to discredit political leaders or social movements. In this sense, truth, evidence or standards of due process are subverted in favour of achieving political goals. These goals may be to assert the supremacy of the dominant order by giving them the authority to punish or sanction, or to simply remove potential threats to their authority. Indeed, the process represents 'differentiated political justice',¹⁷⁴ in which justice is meted out according to the nature of the threat, its intent, and the government's objectives.

In describing his modes of repression, Jules Boykoff includes legal processes; 'public prosecutions and hearings', and 'extraordinary rules and laws'.¹⁷⁵ Boykoff notes that such trials, in addition to being part of a legal process that embroils activists in legal labyrinths, is primarily a form of dissuasion, in which negative associations are 'attached to the character, nature, or reputation of an individual or group based on perceptions of that individual or group'.¹⁷⁶ Although many will not be deterred, or aware of government attempts to stigmatize or demonise activists, people may be discouraged from engaging in dissent if the consequences are publicized. Furthermore, while those who are further radicalised by such action may play into the government's strategy by endorsing a more brutal government response, this high profile stigmatization allows international actors or government supporters to potentially rationalize and justify their support. The establishment of certain laws and the use of legal repression in authoritarian regimes can result in 'rule by law' instead of 'rule of law'. In 'rule by law', or repressive law, 'there is little or no separation

171 G. A. Lopez & M. Stohl, 'State Terrorism: From the Reign of Terror to Ninety-Eighty Four Terrorism', *Chitty's Law Journal*, 32-35, 1984-1987, pp. 14 – 33.

172 O. Kirchheimer, 1961, p. 46.

173 *Ibid.* p. 46.

174 R. Sharlet. 1990.

175 J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent', p. 288.

176 *Ibid.* 296.

between law and politics, and the dictates and policies of the rulers trump laws'.¹⁷⁷ Nonet and Selznick conceptualize repressive law as those laws and systems in which law is designed to uphold the social order. It is often ad hoc, designed to punish disobedience, and demands conformity.¹⁷⁸

Facilitating this repression is the impunity of state officials guilty of egregious or illegal acts. As Turk states, 'Court and administrative decisions exonerating legal control agents are to be expected in any polity. For official repression even to be subjected to legal review is an accomplishment; and for a regime to punish its own agents for using harsh tactics against its political enemies is unthinkable in most countries'.¹⁷⁹ Impunity can be intimidating, for it demonstrates that the state can repress in an egregious fashion without fear of consequence. Impunity is also a fundamental function in the persistence of repression, for in the 'absence of, meaningful oversight, crimes of power are likely to persist'.¹⁸⁰ It also immunizes state actors while obstructs victims from seeking justice and/or compensation.¹⁸¹

Given the social context, an argument could be made about how the role of Sharia law and Islamic jurisprudence play out in the use of legal repression. Unfortunately, the nature of Islamic jurisprudence and the extent of the research required to delve adequately into this sphere is beyond the scope of this thesis. Having said that, Bahrain's Sharia courts mostly have jurisdiction over matters of personal status relating to Muslims of all nationality. Furthermore, while Bahrain's legal system is influenced to a large extent by British common law, the predominant influence is Islamic law. Thus analysis of legal repression inevitably takes into account aspects of Islamic legal rulings.¹⁸²

177R. Peerenboom, *China's Long March to Rule of Law*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 64.

178P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, p. 18.

179A Turk, *Political Criminality*, p 147.

180M. Welch, *Crimes of Power and States of Impunity: The U.S. Response to Terror*, New Brunswick, Rutgers university Press, p. 160

181Ibid., p. 161.

182 While there is much to be explored in terms of, for example, enforcing patriarchal structures that impact upon existing social and cultural structures, this is not the prime focus of this research.

Fig 4. Summary of Methods of Legal repression

Legal Repression	Specific Laws	Laws that render collective action difficult, e.g. public gathering laws, laws that give security apparatus broad powers of arrest and incarceration such as emergency laws, laws that criminalize freedom of expression and civil liberties, suspension of constitutional protection,
	Legal processes	Summary trials, leniency for state control agents, show trials, unaccountability for elite officials, secret trials, refusal of access to lawyers, failure to adhere to standard of due process, police witnesses. Limited inquiries or inquiries launched after control objective released

Informational Control

Turk emphasises the importance of information control techniques in repressing dissent, highlighting the role of 'intelligence gathering, information control (censorship propaganda)', in responding to dissent. Turk states; 'Information control is indoctrination. Free thinking and criticism are to be suppressed; celebrations and apologies are to be broadcast. From the perspective of authorities, the ideal is for educational, research, religious and media institutions to accomplish such social control without police assistance'.¹⁸³ Gamson notes that such strategies, if they achieve their utmost efficiency, aim to 'control the desire and not the ability'¹⁸⁴ to challenge authority. Gary Marx also emphasises the importance of informational strategies to repress dissent, and stresses how key methods are the creation of an 'unfavourable public image' of the perceived dissidents.¹⁸⁵ He also noted that it was important to mobilise a strong 'counter-ideology', to 'gather information on movements' and to 'inhibit freedom of movement, expression, and action', Marx suggests a similar process, and argues that authorities may attempt to create an 'unfavourable public image' of social movements deemed threatening.¹⁸⁶

Jules Boykoff emphasis the role of informational control strategies in suppressing dissent, arguing that surveillance, infiltration, the use of agent provocateurs, black propaganda, mass media manipulation and mass media

183 A Turk, *Political Criminality*, p.129.

184 W.A. Gamson, p. 125.

185 G. Marx, 1979.

186 Ibid.

deprecation work to compliment each other to crush movements. Ruud Koopmans stresses that in modern democracies in particular, the interaction between violent agencies and protesters is less important than the act of repression as a for of 'strategic communication in the public sphere'.¹⁸⁷ Cottle too notes the changing imperatives of protest in the public sphere; 'Unlike in earlier times, the co-present public at demonstrations no longer count the most (Tilly, 2005); rather, it is the mass audience watching and reading the media coverage at home, and some-times elites and authorities watching and coordinating responses, from afar (Koopmans, 2004: 368)'. Here, it is 'public discourse and the mass media [that] play a crucial role', and that it is futile to consider the impact of repression without examining the media and its relationship to the public sphere.¹⁸⁸ The media in particular plays a role in 'Problem depletion' which works by 'removing (1) the perceived need for the movement and/or (2) the perceived relevance of claims-making effort within the relevant population'.¹⁸⁹ There are numerous paths to this. States may use propaganda or ideological methods to convince people there are no problems. Boykoff argues that such tactics contribute to 'stigmatization', a 'relational mechanism whereby discrediting attributes are attached to the character, nature, or reputation of an individual or group based on perceptions of that individual or group'¹⁹⁰. The 'use of certain phrases and specific imagery tends to strip dissidents of credibility and make them appear irresponsible, fringe-like, and sometimes even violent'.¹⁹¹ He adds that stigmatization creates a bifurcated world-view amongst publics that seeks to establish groups of both insiders and outsiders, separating deviant actors from conformists. By doing they may prevent those movements from gaining additional followers, adherents or supporters.¹⁹² Similarly, as Pallmeyer notes that this stigmatization reflects an obsession with enemies that is a defining characteristi of the National Security State.¹⁹³

The mass media, for example, play a role in stigmatizing movements, and

187 R. Koopmans, 'Repression and the Public Sphere: Discursive Opportunities for Repression against the Extreme Right in Germany in te 1990s', in C. Davenport et al (eds), *Repression and Mobilization.*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2005, p. 239.

188Ibid., p. 161.

189 C. Davenport, *How Social Movements Die*, 2015, p. 23.

190 J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...', p. 296.

191J. Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets*, p. 32.

192 Ibid., p. 296.

193J.N. Pallmeyer, *Brave New World Order*, Orbis Books, 1992

http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/National_Security_State/Seven_Characteristics_NSS.html

Gamson argues the rise of mass media contributed to the single most largest shift in the nature of repression in the USA. This persuasion is an aspect of information control, in that it attempts to induce a state of compliance or indifference via all available ideological resources, whether educational, religious, or mediated. It is an imperative aspect of control as perceived by Middle Eastern governments, where traditional values of respect and deference are encouraged. As Steve Heydemann notes, controlling new communications technologies, is one of the key factors that allows authoritarian regimes to keep power.¹⁹⁴

Boykoff also argues that information control strategies, such as encouraging the emergence of suspicion and discord through the use of infiltrators or saboteurs, can divide, split and weaken movements. Such division may be intra or inter group, and can break up individual movements or prevent co-operation and solidarity between movements. However, while Davenport suggests that such issues are internally related to social movements, internal schism is often intricately connected to the outside. Thus surveillance, for example, which seeks to not only provide authorities with information conducive to undermining social movements, is also meant to modify the behaviour of those being monitored. Setting the foundations for modern surveillance studies, Michel Foucault used the notion of Bentham's Panopticon to explain the mechanism of surveillance, arguing that '[the] major effect of the Panopticon is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power'.¹⁹⁵ In this regard, surveillance should be 'permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action'.¹⁹⁶ Thus 'it is not just being watched that is enough to induce obedience to authority, but rather the possibility of being watched'.¹⁹⁷ Ben and Marthalee Barton stress the importance of surveillance as a form of repression, arguing that the 'asymmetry of seeing-without-being seen is, in fact, the very essence of power', and the 'power to dominate rests on the differential possession of knowledge'.¹⁹⁸

194S. Heydemann, 2007.

195M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Sheridan A. New York: Pantheon, 1997, p. 201.

196 Ibid.

197 M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance, and social control in the Bahrain Uprising', *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings, Past and Present*, vol 9, no. 2, April 2013, p. 75.

198B.F. Barton and M. Barton, 'Modes of power in technical and professional visuals', *Journal of Business and Technical Communication*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 138–162, 1993.

Even where surveillance does not occur, Marx notes that it is important to 'create myth and fact of surveillance and repression',¹⁹⁹ which can be done by publicising incidences of surveillance or egregious acts of repression. Pamela Oliver describes one of the three main goals of repression as surveillance.²⁰⁰ Surveillance, as with other methods, can contribute to burnout, where those engaged in struggle are worn down physically, emotionally, and psychologically from their struggle.²⁰¹ Earl too notes the importance of surveillance, and argues that 'with more and more protest-related activity happening online, it will be increasingly important for scholars to consider how repression may work online'.²⁰² Mann et al too note that 'surveillance techniques have increasingly become embedded in technology'.²⁰³ With this in mind, social media as a tool of repression is a particular focus in chapter six, as it represents the zeitgeist of the Arab Uprisings.

Fig 5. Summary of Methods of Information Control

Informational Control	Media Control	Censorship, stigmatization of movements or leaders, selective release of information, selective release of state secrets
	Intelligence Gathering	Surveillance, agent provocateurs, infiltration of political/activist groups,
	Ideological	Indoctrination, education, general mobilisation of ideological resources through media, religion, culture etc.

Stylized Relations between Repressive Methods and their Effects

Although it is important to delineate the types of repression, it is also important to theorise how these elements might impact upon dissent. After all, repression can, according its definition, only be considered repression if it foreseeably plays a role in allowing the dominant hegemonic order to fend off challengers. Although some of

199 G. Marx, 'External Efforts...'

200P. Oliver, 2008.

201 J Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...'

202 Earl, J., 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...'. p. 278.

203 S. Mann, J. Nolan and B. Wellman, 'Sousveillance: inventing and using wearable computing devices for data collection in surveillance environments', *Surveillance & Society*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 331–355, 2003.

these aspects have been referred to above, a further discussion will enrich our concept of repression, and also provide more insight into those methods of repression suitable to insert into the template. Many processes inherent within statecraft, personal integrity violations, legal repression are designed to be repressive, and contribute to resource deprivation,²⁰⁴ that is, the 'hindering of SMO efforts to generate the human and financial resources necessary to continue engaging in channelling behaviour'.²⁰⁵ This may be through deportation or exile, arrest, murder, depriving members of their livelihood, preventing them from accessing institutions that could give them political leverage to impact change. It may also involve cutting funding to movements, limiting personal advancement by preventing access to employment, scholarships, positions of office etc. Such acts may eventually demoralise or weaken movements, leaving them unable to function efficiently or effectively. Indeed, without resources, movements cannot 'pay rent; travel; offer decent salaries; training, seminars, and workshops; obtain equipment, food, and medicine; and engage in a wide range of dissident activities, such as strikes, demonstrations, petitions, sit-ins, teach-outs, terrorism, guerilla warfare, and insurgency'.²⁰⁶

While methods describe what the state do, scholars like Boykoff have argued that so-called mechanisms of repression theorise *how and why* these state actions have their effect.²⁰⁷ There is much appealing in Boykoff's description of mechanisms. Social mechanisms are explanatory accounts of a series of events that bring about a change between two variables. As Hedstrom and Swedberg state: 'Assume that we have observed a systematic relation between two entities, say I and O. In order to explain the relationship between them we must search for a mechanism, M, which is such that occurrence of the case or input, I, it generates the effect or outcome, O. In the case of this study, I is repression, and O is demobilization. Accordingly, focusing on mechanisms allows one to 'move beyond covariation' (i.e. the positive or negative relationship between two variables)²⁰⁸ and identify the 'cogs and wheels'²⁰⁹ that explain why cause and effect relationships come about between variables. The study of mechanisms moves away from the study of grand theory, and towards a more

204C. Davenport, *How Social Movements Die...*, 2015.

205Ibid. p. 23.

206 C. Davenport, *How Social Movements Die*, p. 24.

207J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...' p. 288.

208J Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...'

209J Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989, p. 3.

middle level approach that seeks to identify similar processes that can occur within different historical and political contexts. For this reason, social mechanisms 'inhabit the intermediate space between laws and descriptions, between grand theory and historiography'.²¹⁰ Given that the explanatory power of social mechanisms lies in the fact they ought to achieve a certain level of generality, they serve as an important underlying theoretical assumption of how the state repressed dissent. Furthermore,

when working with mechanisms, one is not necessarily in search of a one-to-one, mechanism-to-outcome causal relationship (Bhaskar, 1978). Mechanisms are dependently connected: they intersect with, play off of, and in some cases amplify each other in interlocking configurations, or 'concatenations of mechanisms' (Gambetta, 1998). Such concatenations constitute the 'workhorses of explanation' that McAdam et al. (2001, p. 30)²¹¹

Yet, mechanisms are inherently problematic because, by their very nature, they invite one to criticise them on the account that there may be sub-mechanisms that operate within the mechanisms. This could lead to a zero-sum game in which the search for mechanisms is subordinated by a never-ending quest to expose the 'nuts and bolts'. As Lichbach states, it is difficult to identify in any one situation what mechanisms are fundamentally at play.²¹² As such it is important to add the caveat that while mechanisms may offer some explanatory power, it is perhaps better, albeit more modest, to adopt stylized explanations of causal relations. In this sense, we can *theorise* the way in which methods of repression contribute to a number of outcomes, for example, short and long-term demobilisation, nascent mobilisation, escalation and radicalisation.

Not all methods lead to the single outcome of demobilization. Some, for example, may lead to short or long term escalation. Violent or not, repression can simply breathe life into social movements or causes by imbuing in people a sense of

210J Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...', p. 286.

211Ibid.

212 M. Lichbach, 'How to Organize your Mechanisms: Research Programs, Stylized Facts, and Historical Narratives', in C. Davenport et al (eds), *Repression and Mobilization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

anger or indignation. The benefit of talking about how these methods lead to repression is simply to offer a more thorough justification for the selection of these repressive methods. The term mechanisms might be better described by the term stylized categories of repression, in other words, simplified notions of processes that *theorise* how repression works to squash protest movements. Like mechanisms, stylized categories are perhaps more modest, providing 'a how-possible explanation; [they tell] us how the effect could in principle be produced'.²¹³The reasons for preferring stylized mechanisms is that they acknowledge their lack of generality, and by doing so, do not run the risk of creating an 'endless...inventory of mechanisms'.²¹⁴Stylized categories then show how the methods within the categories of Statecraft, Personal Integrity Violations, Legal Statecraft and Informational Control may do a number of the following. The below table represents a table of 'stylized categories', which are essentially regularities distilled from a range of theoretical explanations of how repression impacts upon dissent. They illustrate how repressive processes may impact psychologically or physically on group or individual processes.

213P. Hedstrom & P. Ylikoski, 'Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences', *The Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 36, 2010, p. 52.

214M. Lichbach, 'How to Organize your Mechanisms', p. 233.


Fig 6.²¹⁵ Summary of stylized categories of repression

<i>Intimidation</i>	Frightens people into stopping
<i>Incapacitation and Containment</i>	Physically restrains or prohibits people from protesting, physically removes people from space, including arrests of leaders, roadblocks etc, killing.
<i>Embroidment & Regulation</i>	Puts people into complex processes or situations that prevent or hinder them from protesting. Can drain resources, reduce morale, divert time away from activism, can create negotiation with state that tempers impact of activism.
<i>Co-optation and Placation</i>	Make those more amenable to certain course of action through incentivising actions and disincentive others.
<i>Persuasion/Dissuasion</i>	Dissuades people from getting involved in such activity, whether educationally or ideologically, through demoralisation. or through surveillance
<i>Fragmentation</i>	Reduces cohesive solidarity of movement as a whole, and even whole social groups, facilitating control through disunity
<i>Strengthening</i>	Augment forces designed to protect status quo.
<i>Escalation</i>	Creates resentment, anger, and fuels protest

²¹⁵It is important to note the distinction between categories. Not all methods will intimidate people into stopping, nor may those who are intimidated actually want to stop, for example. In these cases, incapacitation, embroilment, co-optation or persuasion may provide alternative strategies. Fragmentation may occur when groups are targeted through legal procedures, or if a number of its members are incapacitated or intimidated into withdrawing their support. The potential interactions or concatenations are large, but it is important to note them. In other instances we may have an overlap of nomenclature. For example, should co-optation be a method of repression, or does it explain why repression works?

Fig 7: Summary of types of repressive action and how they impact upon dissent

Repression in Bahrain: Methods and Stylized Mechanisms



Chapter Two

Methodology: Template Analysis, Social Justice, and Interpretive History

In order to explore both modern and historical incidents of repression, this research adopts a methodological framework that is inherently interdisciplinary. The research paradigm is transformative; highlighting the relevance of social justice to this study. The methodological considerations of the transformative paradigm encourage mixed methods, as long as qualitative research forms an important part. The methods chosen for this study draw mostly from interpretive historical sociology, yet data is organised and coded using a template analysis, while the more contemporary events have been embellished using a framing analysis, and a virtual ethnography. However, the objectives and presentation are akin to those deployed by interpretive historical sociologists. While they all may be associated with different disciplines, I believe they are conducive to 'integrated disciplinarity',²¹⁶ that is to say, integrating approaches in innovative ways in a manner that best suits the object under research.²¹⁷ As historical sociologist Theda Skocpol argues, sociologically informed studies of history are not 'hermetically sealed' from one another.²¹⁸ While the overarching method will be template analysis, a discourse analysis and virtual ethnography have been undertaken to produce data that can then be fit within the study itself. The data is used to flesh out the narrative of historical events, and development of repression.

Transformative Paradigm and Evidence-Based Activist Research

Integral to the transformative paradigm is its axiology. That is to say, it is a paradigm shaped as much by ethical concerns as it is anything else, and its intellectual justification is itself the need to focus on social justice. It is this axiology which forms an important part of defining other considerations of ontology, epistemology and

216R. Wodak, 'What is Critical Discourse Analysis? Interview with Gavin Kendall', *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, vol. 8, no. 2, art. 29, 2007 <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/255/561> (Accessed 03/02/2014)

217 Wodak, 2007.

218T. Skocpol, 1985, p. 362.

methodology. Axiological considerations include respecting cultural norms of interaction, while beneficence is 'defined in terms of the promotion of human rights and increase in social justice'.²¹⁹ Axiomatic within this is the tenets of the transformative ontology, which rejects 'cultural relativism and recognises influence of privilege' in shaping what is real.²²⁰ Furthermore, 'multiple realities are shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, gender, disability and other values'.²²¹ Additionally, there is no one method associated with the transformative paradigm, meaning the salience of axiology is paramount, and does not limit the scope of research inquiry.²²² Like much activist research, I hope that shedding more light on the extent of government repression will empower the powerless, expose the inequities of the status-quo, and promote social changes that help 'equalize the distribution of resources'.²²³ The transformative paradigm can be applied to a study in any discipline so long as it is related to important social issues of the day, such as empowerment, injustice, inequality, oppression, domination, and alienation are important objects of study, whether framed historically or in a contemporary context²²⁴.

Arguably, such an approach is especially important with relation to history, as more traditional historical enquiries have 'silenced members of oppressed and marginalized groups'.²²⁵ Indeed, a vital part of the transformative paradigm's methodological stance is to acknowledge 'contextual and historic' factors, 'especially as they relate to discrimination and oppression'.²²⁶ This study therefore seeks to revise current historical work on Bahrain, placing state repression and control as the focal point. By doing so, it hopes to raise awareness of methods of control that Bahrainis have been, and still are, subjected to. It is emancipatory in the sense that it contributes towards narratives of resistance, further positioning current claims of oppression within an expansive historical account of subordination and domination. Lastly, and

219D. M. Mertens 'Philosophy in mixed methods teaching: The transformative paradigm as illustration', *International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches*, vol. 4, 2010, p. 11.

220 Ibid.

221 Ibid.

222 Ibid., p. 14.

223 F. M. Cancian 'Conflicts Between Activist Research and Academic Success: Participatory Research and Alternative Strategies', *The American Sociologist*, vol. 24, no. 1, 1993, p. 92.

224 J. W. Creswell, (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, London, Sage.

225 Ibid.

226 D. M. Mertens, 'Philosophy in mixed methods teaching...', p. 11.

perhaps it is this researcher's own naivety or waning optimism, that revealing the structures of control may force some to question and revise certain assumptions that cause them to resist change and support oppression.²²⁷

It should be evident then that the nature of this research is not devoid of the researcher's own ideological and political inclinations, and this thesis is based on ideological opposition to structures of power that lead to exploitation or promote inequality. As Sara Roy says, 'any claim to neutrality, or, for that matter, objectivity, is in my experience nothing more than calculated indifference'.²²⁸ Given that repression often prevents marginalised groups from better positioning themselves in society, understanding how it operates is a fundamental issue within the 'transformative' paradigm, which aims to enhance social justice and human rights whilst respecting cultural norms.²²⁹ So unlike Howard Brown's²³⁰ history of repression in France, for example, which claims to be 'neutral' on issues of violence, this work acknowledges that violence should not be condoned when used to uphold exploitative and unequal political and social relationships.

Template Analysis and Interpretive Historical Sociology

History and Current Events through the Conceptual Lens of Repression

As with interpretive historical sociology defined by Theda Skocpol, a concept is used as a heuristic device to 'facilitate the selection, organization, and interpretation of

²²⁷It is important to note that in the context of this study, repression is predominantly the result of dominant groups attempting to maintain their monopoly of power, wealth and resources. Studying repression does not necessarily imply support for any of the individuals, social movements or groups attempting to create political change. Indeed, in some instances the wishes expressed by some social movements may not be conducive to the betterment of certain marginalised or oppressed groups. However, when social movements are fighting a system that deprives them of rights enjoyed by others, there is an immediate issue of social justice that must be addressed. It is unreasonable to refrain from such critique on the basis of fears that a new social order may be more repressive than the preceding one. To adopt such a mentality would negate any form of change, as people would accept inequality and marginalisation on the premise that no one can anticipate future outcomes. Furthermore, in many cases, extreme manifestations of certain groups may derive themselves from government policy, thus the creation of radical groups can be contingent on acts of state and non-state repression – so one must oppose repression on principle, for it is often state repression that creates groups whose end goals may seem counter-productive to the promotion of social justice.

²²⁸S. Roy, 'Humanism, Scholarship, and Politics: Writing on the Palestinian Israeli Conflict', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 36, no. 2, 2007, pp. 54-65

²²⁹D.M. Mertens, 'Transformative Mixed Methods Enquiry', *Qualitative Inquiry*, vol. 16, no. 6, 2010, p. 470.

²³⁰H. Brown, 'Domestic State Violence: From the Croquants to the Commune', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 42, no. 3, 1999, pp. 597-622

empirical material'.²³¹ In this case, the relevant concept is 'repression'. This is because repression continues to negatively impact the lives of thousands of Bahrainis – many of whom have suffered and still suffer from the excesses of state and non-state repression. In line with the emphasis on social justice, interpretive historical sociology attempts to be meaningful in the sense that it is significant to the present and relevant to audiences beyond academia, tying it to the notion of impact. With regards to Bahrain, the study of control and repression is highly relevant and meaningful.

Following the outline of the theoretical framework in the introduction, the 'common-sense device of narrative storytelling' is frequently employed, accounting for the impetus for those repressive choices. As for the use of narrative, Lichbach notes that 'there are many ways in which a narrative “seeks to use history to construct the theory and to flesh out its implications” (Rosenthal 1998, 2)'.²³² Out of the narrative stream of happenings, that begin in the 1920s, Bahrain's cycles of unrest represent a 'set of chronologically linked strategic situations'.²³³ From this historical trajectory, we can 'derive many observable implications about the recurring pattern of politics (i.e., strategising) manifested in the case's particular events, individuals, issues, groups, conflicts, regions or time periods'.²³⁴ This 'overall thesis, or meta-narrative, illuminates the general pattern or overall stylized facts of the case'.²³⁵ The instances of contestation selected across the 20th and 21st century represent the 'short-run equilibria' that 'compound to produce a long-run equilibrium as the series of within-case studies compounds to produce the overall case study'.²³⁶

The episodes under scrutiny are *baḥārna* resistance to tribal repression in the 1920s, the Higher Education Committee movement of the 1950s, the leftist movements of the 1960s and 70s,²³⁷ the religious unrest of the 1980s, the 1990s Intifada, and the Uprising of 2011. By focusing on these particular episodes of unrest, it is possible to offer more analytical focus to the study rather than examining every

231 V.E. Bonnell, 'The Uses of Theory, Concepts and Comparison, in Historical Sociology', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1980, p. 166.

232 M. Lichbach, 2005, p. 241.

233 M. Lichbach, 2005, p. 241 – 242.

234 Ibid.

235 Ibid., p. 240.

236 Ibid.

237 These include the National Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf and various trade union movements.

conceivable aspect of social control. As these episodes of unrest have acted as an opportunity for the regime to repress dissent, they are a logical unit of analysis for studying repression, and represent what Mark Lichbach calls 'episodic crises, recurring problems, periodic challenges, or key turning points in the case's history'²³⁸ which form 'linked strategic situations'.²³⁹ Although these situations remain separate, the recurring patterns of politics, highlight both nuance for each occurrence, but also a more generalisable trend. These, combined with other contextual factors, elite attitudes, resource availability, institutional capabilities, organizational structure, have had a large implication for strategic choices and the repression of dissent. Fundamentally, this approach seeks to address the deficiency in historical work on contentious politics, which tends to be very restrictive in focusing on temporally limited events, such as a singular strike or episode of contention.²⁴⁰

An Emergent Academic Tradition?

Similar to Goldstein's work on America, this is a 'history and analysis of political repression, so naturally it stresses events relevant to this subject'.²⁴¹ Emphasis is also placed on the shift to Independence in 1971, as it is at this time regional hegemony transfers from British hands to Saudi and American influence. While there has never been a historical study on repression in Bahrain, other qualitative studies on the topic are worthy of note. Jules Boykoff pulls data from a number of sources across a 50 year history in order to create his taxonomy of repression in the USA. Boykoff categorises different types of repression, 'systematizing an array of cases ranging from the early twentieth to the early twenty-first century'.²⁴² Austin Turk's research on political policing pulls data from a wide range of sources (including Amnesty International reports for example) in order to create a taxonomy of different methods. Turk, however, does not simply focus on the USA, and his taxonomy of methods of repression is more frugal than Boykoff's.²⁴³ Robert Goldstein's history of repression in America between 1870 and the (then) present (1978) covers a similar broad expanse of time, yet it is organized accordingly, as does his 1983 study on Political Repression

238 Ibid., p. 239.

239 Ibid.

240 B. Dill and R. Aminzade, 2007, p. 269.

241 R.J. Goldstein, 1978, p. xxii.

242 Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets*, p. 9.

243 A. Turk, *Political Criminality*.

in 19th Century Europe.²⁴⁴ Gary Marx too does the same, though his time frame is admittedly shorter.²⁴⁵ So while there is an emerging academic tradition of doing long-term studies of repression, their approaches differ somewhat. While Goldstein's work was organized according to movement, this work, for example, is organized according to repressive categories, to see how they evolved in all spheres.

Template Analysis: Codes of Repression

Firstly, the primary method resembles thematic analysis, although strictly speaking, it is template analysis. Template analysis is a 'varied but related group of techniques for thematically organizing and analysing textual data'.²⁴⁶ It involves the combination of deductive and inductive approaches, whereby a 'template' is produced that contains codes determined both before and during the interpretation of data. Usually, the template of codes is either formed from the researcher's own ideas, or from ones that emerge from theoretical reading and/or preliminary research. Simply put, 'a code is a label attached to a section of text to index it as relating to a theme or issue in the data which the researcher has identified as important to his or her interpretation'.²⁴⁷ Codes may be simple or complicated, and may overlap with each other. There also tends to be a hierarchy to the codes, with groups of similar codes 'clustered together to produce more general higher-order codes'.²⁴⁸ In this research, the codes have been generated from aggregation of theories on repression and social control, mixed with codes that have emerged from the data. Combining empirical evidence and theory avoids overcoming the 'facile distinctions' between inductive and deductive methods, a problem that often characterises the somewhat artificial gap between sociological versus historical enquiry.²⁴⁹ Unlike Boykoff's action-modes, these codes, while non-hierarchical, are more cogently organized.

Among the benefits of template analysis is that it is not tied to any particular epistemological outlook, making it an appropriate method that fits into different

244 See Goldstein, R.J., *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1978; R.J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, Oxford, Routledge, 2010 (first published 1983).

245 G. Marx, 1978.

246 N. King, 'Using templates in the thematic analysis of text' in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), *Essential Guide to Qualitative Research in Organizational Research*, London, Sage, 2004, p. 256.

247 Ibid., p. 257.

248 Ibid. p. 258.

249 V.E. Bonnell, 1980, p. 158.

disciplines. Although similar to content analysis, template analysis is more flexible as the salience of themes need not define their importance, nor do they have to be defined beforehand for example. There may also be as many themes as one finds useful, as opposed to some thematic approaches which are more proscriptive in the number of levels they determine.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, unlike approaches like grounded theory, template analysis allows a more dynamic relationship between data and theory, and affords the researcher the freedom to go between the two to modify, add and/or delete codes or themes. It also allows a more rigorous way of constructing the conceptual outline important to interpretive historical sociologists. While not traditionally a means to analyse and organise data gathered from historical textual sources, the use of such a method highlights the inherent interdisciplinary nature of this study. Nigel King too notes that template analysis is a flexible approach, and can be used in a number of disciplines. While there is little evidence of template analysis being used specifically to organize historical data, history has often been criticised for a lack of methodological reflection.²⁵¹ Given the interdisciplinary nature of this research, the transformative paradigm and its absence of a proscribed method gives considerable scope for methodological experimentation. While some of the codes may seem descriptive, there is arguably no such thing as mere description or even narrative.²⁵² According to King, description and narrative are inherently interpretive acts, as descriptive codes stem from an interpretation based on theoretical and conceptual considerations that have been defined by a specific research question.²⁵³

The template detailed in the previous chapter also has the benefit of functioning as a heuristic guide to facilitate the collection of empirical data, and serves to roughly guide the structure of the PhD. Through each chapter, the narrative moves between the type of repression and the motivation for its action. Embedded within the narrative are assumptions that those methods of repression do adhere to the

250N. King, 'Constructing the Template', [online video], 2008,
http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/_REQUALLO/FR/Template_Analysis/The_Template.php (Accessed 17/12/2013)

251M. Rowlinson, 'Historical Analysis of Company Documents' in Catherine Cassell and Gillin Symon (eds.), *Essential Guide to Qualitative Research in Organizational Research*, London, Sage, 2004, p. 302.

252N. King, 'Descriptive and Interpretive Coding', [online video], 2008,
http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/_REQUALLO/FR/Template_Analysis/Analytic+Descript_coding.php (Accessed 09/01/2014)

253 Ibid.

theoretical assumptions of how repression impacts upon dissent. As Skocpol states,

interpretive historical sociologists can almost always be faulted for their insouciance about establishing valid explanatory-arguments. Both the concepts deployed by interpretive historical sociologists and the descriptive narratives on which they rely so heavily assert or imply all sorts of causal connections. Yet these historical sociologists are not concerned to establish explanations that hold good across more than single cases.²⁵⁴

Gathering Data

From Historical Documents, to Statutes, Ordinances, Tweets and NGO Reports

As noted, this research has explored a number of studies of repression to create a template with hierarchies that serve as a means by which to organise the empirical data. In addition to secondary sources on Bahrain much of the research here relies on primary documents: For the section of this study dated between 1918 and 1947, primary documents from the India Office in the British Library in London are the main sources of empirical data. Chief among these is the correspondence between the British Political Agent in Bahrain, the Political Resident in the Gulf, and the Government of India. India Office records also include newspaper clippings from the periods in question, petitions by members of the Bahrain public, statements from the Higher Executive Committee/Committee of National Union (HEC and CNU), the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), and letters from members of the ruling family to British officials. Such documents are a useful supplement to the correspondence between British Officials. Other important sources for this period are the personal diary and papers of Charles Belgrave, financial adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain between 1926 and 1957. These papers have been underutilised in most accounts of Bahrain's history, with the exception of Nelida Fuccaro, who uses the Belgrave papers. Most of the India Office Records are housed in the British Library in London, while Durham has bound collections of these related to Bahrain. For the periods between 1947 and 1982, correspondence from the Foreign Office and later the

254 T. Skocpol, 1985, p. 371.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has been used. This mainly includes dossiers from the Political Agency in Bahrain and later the British Embassy after Bahrain independence in 1971.

To complement the British records before 1956, accounts given by Belgrave in his memoirs were a useful means of comparing with the documents written by the British administration. However, data from so long ago can only be cross-verified to a limited extent. It would be, difficult for example, to interview or conduct focus groups with members of the Bahraini Government given the sensitivity of the topic. Following the seventies, reports by Amnesty International on human rights concerns on Bahrain could be usefully cross-checked with British documents at the time. Generally they matched up, though in cases where there seemed to be discrepancies, the greater access afforded to the British meant that their reports were deemed more reliable. From the 1970s – 1980s, many of the primary documents from the British Embassy in Bahrain can be read alongside reports by Human Rights organizations. Wikileaks cables from the 1990s and 1970s detailing conversations between US government officials and high level Bahraini officials are also a useful source of data to gain insights into strategic decision making.

Much of the empirical data for the 1990s Intifada and 2011 Pearl Uprising comes from documents produced by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. These have been supplemented with newspaper articles, documentaries and news broadcasts where available. In addition to this, much of the evidence of repression and deviance comes from the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry Report, a document written by international legal scholars about the events of 2011. As Turk states, such documents are 'the most defensible sources of empirically usable criteria for defining illegalities are the published findings of official legislative committees and judicial commissions'.²⁵⁵ Second only to this, are the reports of 'fact-finding organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists'.²⁵⁶ David Pion-Berlin concurs, arguing that in a discipline where empirical data is hard to come by, organisations such as Amnesty provide 'valuable documentation of human rights

255A. Turk, 'Organizational Deviance and Political Policing', *Criminology*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1981, pp. 235 - 236

256 Ibid., p. 236.

abuses'.²⁵⁷ As has been mentioned, the data for this work relies heavily on these.

It should be noted that British records are useful for studying repression, not least because Britain was the protecting power of Bahrain and had a great deal of influence in the administration of affairs. Documents from this period also contain a number of ordinances, laws, and statutes. These were complemented by finding a comprehensive list of laws from the Bahrain government through www.legalaffairs.bh, both in English and Arabic. Scholars from James Gibson, to Luis Fernandez have examined legislation as a means of gauging repressiveness. British primary documents have all been used to get an insight into the political decisions and the strategic decision making of the both the British and Al Khalifa government. Given the nature of the study, which may be considered by some to be subversive, access to official government statistics or personnel would not be deemed a way of gaining valid data – especially given that part of this research is to deconstruct government propaganda and myths. Furthermore, the events that may play 'a key role in strategic decision-making or framing processes may become available only long after the demise of the movement or its protagonists, as memoirs, letters, and other documents that record divisions and conflicts among those struggling for change become available for scholarly analysis'.²⁵⁸ Given that the FCO usually keep documents for thirty years, they are not available between 1982-3 and 2015.

In addition to reports by NGOs, more empirical data was pulled through the process of conducting the online ethnography. This includes tweets, videos from YouTube (especially ones documenting examples of security service repression), news articles, and conversations with those people on Twitter and other social media. State sources of information, especially with regards to propaganda and censorship have been utilised. Indeed, the advances of technology mean that many of these forms of repression or human rights abuses are captured on camera. These include: press releases from the Ministry of the Interior, articles from local newspapers in both English and Arabic. Such papers include the *Gulf Daily News*, *the Daily Tribune*, *Al Wasat (the Centre)*, *Al Ayam (the Days)*, *Akhbar Al Khaleej (Gulf News)*, and *Al Watan (The Nation)*. International news sources and documentaries have also been used to pool data and obtain useful information and insights from Bahrainis involved

257 D. Pion, Berlin, 1986, p. 49.

258B. Dill and R. Aminzade, 2007, p. 269.

in the uprising. Using a plurality of sources for a data corpus is entirely legitimate within thematic or template analysis.²⁵⁹

However, the main emphasis of this multi method project, is to form a historical and contemporary account of repression in Bahrain organized according to a template derived from the coding of different approaches to studying methods of repression. While some of the data can be cross-checked, allowing us, to an extent, to validate 'the consistency of specific and factual items from various sources', much of it exists only in primary sources. However, despite all this talk of triangulation, we are not subscribing to a naïve realism whereby we are assuming there is a 'single definitive account of the social world'.²⁶⁰ Instead, as per the transformative paradigm and its constructionist epistemology, triangulation, where possible, is used to add a 'sense of richness and complexity to an enquiry'.²⁶¹ Figure 8 shows the relative availability of the different sources across the decades under study.

Fig 8: General Availability of Sources for the Study

	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s	80s	90s	00s	2010
British and Government of India diplomatic Correspondence	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Red	Red	Red
Charles Belgrave Diaries	Green	Green	Green	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Newspaper Clippings(Bahraini)	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Green	Green
Wikileaks Cables (US Embassy)	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Wikileaks Cables (Saudi)	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green
NGO Reports (e.g. Amnesty International), reports by independent commissions	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Red	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Laws, legal notices, ordinances	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Video evidence (YouTube etc)	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green
Tweets, blogs,	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green
Foreign news reports on Bahrain	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Green

Key

Red; Unavailable

Yellow: Some availability

Green; Available

259 V. Braun, and V. Clarke. 'Using thematic analysis in psychology', *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2006.

260 A. Bryman, 'Triangulation', *Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods*, London, Sage, 2003, http://studysites.sagepub.com/chambliss4e/study/chapter/encyc_pdfs/4.2_Triangulation.pdf (Accessed 7 August 2015).

261 Ibid.

*Virtual Ethnography*²⁶²

In addition to gathering data from historical sources, primary documents and human rights reports, other data was derived through immersing myself, both online and offline, in the Bahrain activist community. This combination of activities could be described as a mixture of both traditional and virtual ethnographies. For the most part, the community was not the focus of the study, but merely the impetus for action and a repository for knowledge on Bahrain. Much like a traditional ethnography, a virtual ethnography involves the 'ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, listening to what is said, asking questions – in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research'.²⁶³ Unlike a traditional ethnography, however, a virtual ethnography takes places online. The social networking site Twitter was crucial to the carrying out of the research. Instead of using it to just gather useful commentary from key players, or useful links to relevant articles, videos and information, this ethnography was a natural part of life, participating in the Bahrain online community irrespective of research being undertaken. It bridged the gap between academia, activism and investigative work. Twitter allowed me to become part of a transnational activist community, one that included both Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis alike. Like most research within the transformative paradigm, or most activist-based research, the inclusion of marginalised or oppressed groups from the community being researched (in this case Bahrainis) is an integral part of the research approach.²⁶⁴ Indeed, the transformative epistemological approach requires an interactive link between research/co-researchers and/or participants where possible (we are part of knowledge).²⁶⁵ Becoming more involved in the activism was an important step of deepening my relationship with other activists. Indeed, the very act of engaging in activism and making it a part of the research is an important part of the transformative

262 This virtual ethnography was the methodology of a paper I published; M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance, and social control in the Bahrain Uprising', *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings, Past and Present*, vol 9, no. 2, April 2013.

263 M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson, *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 1.

264 D.M. Mertens, 'Philosophy in mixed methods teaching...', p. 15.

265 *Ibid.* p. 11.

paradigm, as it highlights not only the relevance of research to the process of activism, but also that research is itself activism. In essence, it is not so much a research method, but a way of life. Such an approach cannot be rushed. The issue of establishing trust, particularly in an online environment where people became increasingly suspicious about government surveillance, was of particular importance.

The importance of building trust within what can only loosely be termed a Twitter 'community' cannot be overstated, for it formed the basis of establishing relationships that led to interviews, discussions and chats. It was also these relationships that developed through the virtual ethnography that formed the basis of investigative collaborations that were important in identifying potential surveillance tactics used by hegemonic forces.²⁶⁶

The virtual ethnography was especially useful in fulfilling evidential requirements of this study, understanding the role new technologies such as social media play in surveillance and political repression. This growing awareness of surveillance via social media, coupled with the video of evidence of more coercive state repression that was increasingly common on YouTube, promoted an interest in repression as a concept and thus helped flesh out a preliminary template of state repression.

As part of my ongoing activism and research that began online, I was also invited to join Bahrain Watch, a cloud-based NGO run by activist volunteers advocating transparent governance in Bahrain. Many of my own research projects fused with the goals of Bahrain Watch, and some of the some subsequent reports published as collaborations are important, yet separate, source material for this research. All information produced by Bahrain Watch is referenced as normal. However, one must acknowledge that research on the recent uprisings is thanks to the collaborative efforts and interactions afforded by the increased connectivity allowed by sites like Twitter and Facebook. Even much of the historic work has been augmented by establishing relationships with scholars on Bahrain who used Twitter, and who engage in online public discussion and debate on certain topics. Such

²⁶⁶ M.O. Jones, 'Social Media, Surveillance and Social Control in the Bahrain Uprising', *Westminster Papers of Communication and Culture*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2013, p. 76.

interactions have led to the discovery of certain documents, the correction of small errors, and the fine-tuning of some arguments.

Crucially, the virtual ethnography allowed me to experience first hand the impact of surveillance on my own behaviour, and this formed the foundation for me discussing it with other. For this reason, the virtual and traditional ethnography was very much the corner stone of this study, prompting rigorous discussion and creative research with activists from Bahrain's marginalised community. I do feel indebted to all those activists and academics who have helped, and it feels as much of a collaborative project as anything. Perhaps interesting about the initial virtual ethnography is that it was the stepping stone into a Bahraini activist community. This group, with often slightly differing political agendas, were bound by the common theme of desire for political reform. Indeed, this community of activists, marginalized and repressed in Bahrain, became the basis of what might be called a collaborative, critical ethnography. As per the transformative paradigm, 'a critical ethnographer will study issues of power, empowerment, inequality inequity, dominance, repression, hegemony and victimization'.²⁶⁷ This informal networks of dissidents, activists, and academics flitted from being objects of research in themselves, interviewees and informants, to inspiration and instigators of ideas, threads, and experience. So while this is a PhD authored by myself, it is vital to 'acknowledge the collaborative context in which [it was] produced',²⁶⁸ especially in terms of support and guidance offered by members of the community. This is not to downplay my own role, but merely to express my own discomfort with not acknowledging the inspiring people I was lucky enough to encounter.

However, researching the surveillance aspect of social media, and the process of doing an ethnography itself raised an important number of ethical considerations. For example, how much does conducting research on social media sites constitute a type of surveillance itself. In many ways, monitoring and observing social spaces is itself a kind of surveillance. Furthermore, engaging with people who were themselves the targets of state repression may expose them to more attention than is desirable. For this reason, those activists who are quoted are named only with their explicit

267J.W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. London: Sage, 2013, p. 94.

268J. Rappaport, 'Beyond Participant Observation: Collaborative Ethnography as Theoretical Innovation', *Collaborative Anthropologies*, 1, 2008, p. 2.

permission. Efforts to protect data have also been made, including encrypted email and the use of secure browsing through Tor. Where desired, interviews or exchanges with activists or opposition have occurred across encrypted emails or locations deemed suitable by them. In terms of obtaining what might be considered valid data, the narrative of activists, journalists and evidence depicted in videos or tweets was often cross-checked so as to ensure the veracity. While this 'cross-verification' may constitute some form of between method methodological triangulation, it is by no means fool proof. For example, and for reasons that become clear in the chapter on surveillance, I would never take an account of an event from an unknown source at face value. Certain activists' accounts became notable as reliable spokespersons of movements – though one must always be wary.

Framing

For the section on information control, in addition to historical sources, a number of social movement scholars have looked at how the media have played a role in assisting the repression of dissent. Boykoff enumerates the different methods of repression that the media use.²⁶⁹ Cottle too maintains that the way in which information is portrayed by the media is important. Indeed, 'how demonstrations are variously selected, sourced, narrativized, visualized, discussed, contested and elaborated in the news media remains worth struggling for'.²⁷⁰ In an era where social media have challenged the state monopoly on media in authoritarian regimes, this is particularly worth exploring. Yet crucially, it is interesting to see in terms of how movements are stigmatized by the regime. To what extent are they framed in order to draw popular support away from them? The mass media in particular shape public perceptions of threats, or social movements through framing. A 'frame', according to Goffman (1974), is a means of organizing, classifying and interpreting our life experiences.²⁷¹ The frame, or 'schemata of interpretation', enable individuals to label and perceive certain events, protagonists, or information, and make sense of them. Gamson notes that a frame is a 'central organizing idea or story line that provides

269 J. Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets*.

270 S. Cottle, 'Reporting Demonstrations: The changing media politics of dissent', *Media, Culture and Society*, vol. 30, no. 6, 2008, p. 856.

271 Z. Pan, & G.M. Kosicki, 'Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse', *Political Communication*, vol. 10, no. 1, 1993, p. 56.

meaning'. 'There are five such devices that signify the uses of frames: metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).²⁷² A frame is an 'interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's past or present environment'.²⁷³ Crucially framing is about salience, and 'involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described'.²⁷⁴ Halloran et al for example argued how the media coverage of anti-Vietnam War protests served to 'concentrate attention on the forms of actions to the neglect of underlying causes' and portray it as violent. Similarly, Gitlin's study argues how media framing 'trivialized, polarized, marginalized, and disparaged'²⁷⁵ the Students for a Democratic Society in the US. An assessment of how protesters and dissent has been framed is useful in order to process the nature of stigmatization. In his work on repression in the UA, Jules Boykoff conducts a frame analysis and notes that protesters are often framed as violent, freakish, disruptive, ignorant, and amalgamating their grievances.²⁷⁶

In countries like Bahrain, a remotely critical media is a recent phenomenon. The centralisation of state power often means that there is much homogeneity in state discourse, rhetoric, and media. Yet by identifying these discourses, whether in visual images or text, we can see how social movements are 'framed' by the Bahraini regime and, in some cases, the international media, and to what extent the government attempts to frame them. Like Critical Discourse Analysis, this Frame Analysis is designed the 'unpack the ideological underpinnings of discourse that have become so naturalized over time that we begin to treat them as common, acceptable and natural features of discourse'.²⁷⁷ A 'critical' approach often involves addressing data in

272 Ibid., p. 56.

273 D.A. Snow, and Ro. D. Benford, 'Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices, and the Life of the Social Movement', in A.D. Morris and C. McClurg (eds) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992, p. 137.

274 R.M. Entman, 'Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm', *Journal of Communications*, vol. 43, no. 4, 1993, p. 52.

275 S. Cottle, p. 856.

276 Boykoff, *Beyond Bullets*, p. 31.

277 P. Teo, 'Racism in the News: A Critical Discourse Analysis of News Reporting in Two Australian

newspaper articles, or political texts, or any form of communication that involve 'manipulative strategies' that seek to reinforce the dominant ideological norm.²⁷⁸ As Fairclough and Wodak²⁷⁹ (1997: 258) argue, 'discursive practises may have major ideological effects and help produce and reproduce unequal power relationships between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people'.²⁸⁰ Indeed, a critical discourse can reveal the structures of inequality, and with regards to repression, see how the state and private actors 'pathologize those who hold views different from their own'.²⁸¹

For the 2011 Uprising, a frame analysis of over 3000 MoI Tweets, BNA statements, newspaper articles and video statements relating to protests was conducted between 2011 and 2014. Coverage of political issues related to dissent in articles of both Arab and English dailies were assessed; these included *Al-Wasat*, *Al-Watan* and the *Gulf Daily News*. Videos and statements served by non-official but pro-government sources were also looked at. The manner of sampling really stems from the ethnographic research, which involved the daily readings of newspapers, viewing of videos on Twitter, and scouring of YouTube for videos published related to Bahrain.

Where data is available, news articles contained within Foreign Office documents offer useful additions to the sample. During times of political upheaval, there are a significant number of press clippings contained within the archives that are useful. Generally speaking though, the frame analysis relies on information harvested during recent uprisings that began in 2011. Although this may be problematic in terms of trying to identify historical trends in media repression, newspapers are only a relatively recent phenomenon, and have historically been heavily censored, which suggests that official publications would of course have been ideologically predisposed to supporting the state. The proliferation of new media forms and the relative liberalisation of 2001 makes issues of discourse more relevant, and seeing how state media reports on violence will highlight the extent to which media

Newspapers', *Discourse & Society*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2000, p. 12.

278 Ibid.

279N. Fairclough and R. Wodak, 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in T.A. Van Dijk (ed), *Discourse as a Social Interaction*, London, Sage, p. 258.

280 Ibid.

281R. Blaug, 'New theories of Discursive Democracy: A User's Guide', *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1996, p. 63.

liberalisation has impacted upon the deprecation of political dissidents in the press. On the other hand, the advantages of sampling articles and sources from over a broad time frame will allow the possible identification of meta-themes of repression. That is to say, forms of possible ideological bias in the official rhetoric that has existed through decades.

Such methodological experimentation is common in the field of historical work on social movements studies. Sociologically informed studies of long periods of contentious politics have often been innovative. Tilly for example, used administrative reports, newspaper clippings, and secondary sources to analyse large-scale social change. In *The Contentious French*, for example, Tilly covers the evolution of dissent over a 400 year period.²⁸² Unlike Tilly though, whose work on contentious politics in France adopted a more quantitative approach, this research uses qualitative data taken from primary and secondary textual sources. Tilly too focused on the nature of changes in contentious activity, and focused less on repression. The discourse analysis and the virtual ethnography are particularly relevant to chapter six on information control. This extra weighting to the chapter six was, in many ways, a pragmatic assumption. The research started with a focus on social media, yet in terms of interdisciplinary methods, the field of social media and internet was identified as an area requiring further academic exploration. From deductive methods we create our net, which we use to drag through the myriad of data collected from virtual ethnography and archival research. However, the net has some holes in it, and new evidence emerging from the data allows us to refine the net. So while the overarching method and data organisation of this research relies on template analysis, a virtual ethnography and discourse analysis have been used for the purpose of producing extra data that can then be fit within the template. In this sense, the template analysis forms an important tool in the actual structuring and presentation of the data in the research. While template analysis is a method in itself, it is complemented by the virtual ethnography and discourse analysis in that they provide extra insights, which can be evidenced by supporting categories of repression delineated in the template.

Inevitably, a large historical time-scale will limit the depth to which research can reveal. Quoting E. J. Hobsbawn, Goldstein notes that 'it is frequently necessary to

282 C. Tilly, *The Contentious French*, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1989.

reduce...extremely important information “to a paragraph or two, a line, a passing mention or a mere nuance of treatment”²⁸³

283R.J. Goldstein, 1983, p. xi.

Chapter Three

Political Statecraft: Between Democratisation, Discord and Division

Unfortunately some members of the ruling family still think in the old way – that Bahrain is the spoils of war 'gained by the sword', where the land, wealth and positions of authority are to be distributed amongst the sons of the victorious tribe and its supporters.²⁸⁴ - *Ibrahim Sharif*

The process of politics, including the allocation of resources, the management of communal issues, and the calculations of institutional figures all form a part of explaining why certain repressive choices have been made. Repressive choices in Bahrain are often contingent on specific contextual factors, such as the inclination of hawkish groups, or certain individuals, regional politics, the availability of resources, and crucially, the political objectives of Bahrain's protectors. Indeed, the change in suzerain from the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia in 1971 resulted in changes to strategic decision-making within the Al Khalifa regime, prompting changes in the nature, intensity and type of repression. This shift, compounded by resource availability and ideological inclination, has resulted most notably in political strategies designed to exclude Bahrain's Shi'a from political life.

Feudal Entitlement, Internal Factionalism, Co-optation and the Civil List

In 1898, the British, Bahrain's protectors, had already acknowledged that they would recognize a system of primogeniture, and Hamad bin 'Isa Al Khalifa, Shaykh 'Isa's eldest son, would become successor. When the Ruler, Shaykh 'Isa, proved unable to control belligerent elements of his family, the British deposed him putting his son

²⁸⁴ E. Sharif, 'A Trial of Thoughts and Ideas', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 55.

Shaykh Hamad in his place in 1923. This, they argued, would 'bring the affairs of Bahrain more under our [British] control and aid towards securing the inhabitants against a despotic rule'.²⁸⁵ Despite this strong move, the British had long stressed, particularly in the early half of the 20th century, that their influence in Bahrain should be brought about by 'indirect and pacific means, and through the increase of influence with the Shaykh by gaining his confidence and trust'.²⁸⁶ This reflected a desire to sail a middle course between protection and colonial control, in which Britain would only interfere in a limited capacity.

The British desire to bring stability to Bahrain required a strong response to belligerent members of the Al Khalifa family, the control of whom was necessary in preserving Pax Britannica in the Gulf. Britain's invidious position was highlighted by the fact that they were treaty-bound to protect the Al Khalifa from external aggression, but it was members of the Al Khalifa family, mainly led by the Ruler's son, 'Abd Allah bin 'Isa Al Khalifa, that were the prime fomenters of intrigues and resistance to British reforms. Together with their tribal allies the Dawasir, this Al Khalifa faction was engaged in the oppression of the indigenous *bahārna* population.

However, because Britain acted as a deterrent against resisting feudal rule, they were very aware that it was only British protection of the ruling family that made the *bahārna* fearful of resisting the Al Khalifa. As Clive Daly noted in 1921, 'Bahrain subjects are afraid to take the law into their own hands as the Sheikh is under our protection, and they urge, with some reason, that we ought in consequence to take steps to prevent the Sheikh from abusing his authority'.²⁸⁷ Daly even went as far as to say that the pitch of misrule was Britain's failure as a protecting power.²⁸⁸ Despite sympathy from the likes of Daly and other British Political Agents, the *bahārna* pleas for extensive reform were generally rebuffed by the Government of India, who, unlike agents on the ground in Bahrain, believed that they should continue to sail a 'middle course' between treating Bahrain as a full 'British protectorate' and 'an independent

285 J.C. Gaskin, *A reply to First Assistant Resident's request conveyed in his memorandum of the 1st April 1898*, 30 April 1898, *Records of Bahrain*, Vol. 3, p. 25.

286 C.K. Daly Note on the Political Situation in Bahrain, November 1924, *Records of Bahrain*, vol. 3, p. 669.

287 C.K. Daly, Tyranny of the Sheikh of Bahrain and his family over Bahrain Subjects, 30 December 1921, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 663.

288 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [158r] (320/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library*
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x000079> [accessed 4 November 2015]

principality'.²⁸⁹

Yet Britain's position was ambiguous on what exactly this was. What was clear was that agents in Bahrain were advised to avoid interfering reforms and focus on Customs reform and currying influence with the Shaykh, reflecting the trade-orientated nature of the British colonial project. However, despite egregious acts undertaken by members of the Ruling Family, British policy towards repressing dissenting members of the Al Khalifa was primarily co-optation and monetary incentivisation, as the Government of India still wished to pursue direct and indirect means of pacification. Following repeated pressure by Major Daly for the Government of India to do something about the ruling family tyranny, it was generally agreed that only in 'glaring cases of oppression' could the political agent intervene, yet this brought with it a great deal of subjectivity in what was termed oppression.²⁹⁰

The root of the Al Khalifa's terrorisation of the *bahārna* lay in their extortive practises. Members of the family who found themselves hard up for cash, would either draw money from the customs revenue, or make demands of the *bahārna*. As the Al Khalifa had, prior to the reforms, drawn money without check from customs revenues²⁹¹, customs reforms were seen by the British as imperative, as they would limit the shaykhs' unfettered borrowing, and thus help to prevent them arbitrarily extorting *bahārna* in order to pay back ever-increasing debts. Various changes were made. The Director of Muharraq Customs, Jasim al-Shirawi, a good friend of 'Abd Allah bin 'Isa and pecuniary beneficiary of the status quo, was illegally deported by Major Daly for an 'alleged conspiracy against the Bahrain Order in Council'.²⁹² Now, on the orders of the British, money earned through customs would be distributed solely through the Privy Purse of the British-appointed Hamad. Members of the Ruling Family who did not step in line would receive no income, a repressive policy that reflected both a desire to secure control indirectly and pacifically, yet tailored to undermine the exploitative aspects of Al Khalifa feudalism.

289 Draft Letter (Unapproved) from The Secretary to the Government of India to Major P. Z. Cox, 1905-1906, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 281.

290A. P. Trevor, Tyranny of the Sheikh of Bahrain and his family over Bahrain Subjects, 6 January 1922, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 677.

291 Their ability to do this was facilitated by the fact Customs were farmed out to a Hindu firm and not approved the the Government of India. The Hindu firm even kept their accounts in Sindhi so as to make auditing and accountability more difficult.

292M. G. Rumihi, *Bahrain: Social and Political Change Since the First World War*, London and New York, Bowker, 1976, p. 173.

In his speech to a Majlis convened to announce Shaikh Hamad's accession as the Ruler of Bahrain, Political Resident S.G. Knox warned that those [Khalifas] who did not work in supporting Hamad would live on a 'bare pittance for subsistence', and those those who committed mischief would be 'cut off absolutely and punished accordingly'.²⁹³ This had notable impacts in the future. In 1929, for example, the Amir did not want to reduce Shaykh 'Abd Allah's payment from the civil list for fear he would cause trouble.²⁹⁴ The effectiveness of the Civil List in co-opting the Al Khalifa was evidenced in 1959, when, in a private meeting with British official H.C.G. Lian, Khalifa bin Muhammad said that none of the Al Khalifa dared put a foot wrong because the Ruler 'held the purse strings and could cut off an allowance when he pleased'.²⁹⁵

By introducing the Civil List, and by deposing 'Isa and instating Hamad as Amir, the British mitigated the Al Khalifa's ability to extract wealth arbitrarily and violently as they had done in the past. Yet ultimately the Civil List was a form of socialism for the rich and corrupt, for it sought to repress the elite classes by giving them access to funds on the explicit condition that they; a) ceased to oppose the British reforms b) fall in line with Hamad's rule and stop oppressing the *bahārna*. The Civil List was also a form of material repression, the purpose of which was to ameliorate dissent by giving the tribal shaykhs other sources of income beyond extortion and customary privileges, and by limiting the improvidence of Al Khalifa shaykhs by defining a fixed income.

While the British believed ensuring the unity of the Ruling Family was imperative in creating a functioning government, and ending anti British agitation and the oppressive practises of the tribal shaykhs, it also created a vested interest group with access to massive power and wealth. In the future, revenues accruing to the ruling family, and their protectiveness of this now British-created right, would be a key grievance among Bahrain's increasingly politically aware population, itself highlighting the short-sightedness of British policy in Bahrain. In fact, the Civil List and payment to the Privy Purse accounted for about 25% of mean annual state revenue between 1922 and 1971.²⁹⁶

293Col. S.G. Knox, Speech to Majlis in Bahrain, 26 May 1923, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 11.

294C. Belgrave, Letter to Prior, 12 July 1929, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 488.

295H.C.G. Lian, Secret letter from British Residency in Bahrain, 23 July 1959, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 375.

296This figure was derived from analysing the annual reports between the specified dates. They are

Legacy of the Civil List and other Forms of Restraining the Al Khalifa

The payments to the Ruler and the Ruling Family were certainly a source of contention, especially in the 1950s, when the Ruler asked that his personal income be removed from annual financial reports to avoid embarrassment.²⁹⁷ Even in 1942, the Privy Purse was explicitly mentioned as a source of tension. Indeed, social problems as a result of economic stagnation were particularly outrageous given the ruling family's share of the state's revenues. As a form of repression, the cost of this particular method was exorbitant. While some British agents believed in limiting the Civil List, it was generally believed that tolerating the costs associated with it were better than generating dissent within the ruling family. Indeed, it was acknowledged at the time that the main source of trouble in the Gulf at the time came from within ruling families themselves, and that overall political stability often came from securing the unity of the ruling elite. For the British, preserving the material power of the Ruling Family facilitated a social structure in Bahrain conducive to British needs. Although this enforced fiscal responsibility came at a great cost to Bahrainis, Charles Belgrave felt that aggressive attempts to limit the Civil List would risk ceding his influence over Hamad. Certainly, for a social group who had sought power and extracted wealth through means of piracy and feudalism, fiscal forms of repression were an effective means of ensuring the unity of the Al Khalifa family and ensuring continued British influence until Independence.

In addition to the Civil List, the British took other measures to force an end to Al Khalifa agitation. The Al Khalifas were banned by the British in the 1930s from selling their land to anyone else but other Al Khalifas.²⁹⁸ This was done to stop Al Khalifa shaykhs selling off their ancestral land at low prices, an issue which led to them becoming destitute and either pestering Shaykh Hamad for more money from the Civil List or extorting members of the public. Gifts of land given by the ruler to his relatives were also an issue, as they included large villages and districts, and the same plots were often re-gifted, leading to confusion as to who actually owned what.

summarised here. M.O. Jones, 'How the Al Khalifas Took a Quarter of Bahrain's Wealth', *Your Middle East*, 29 April 2013, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/marc-owen-jones-how-the-al-khalifas-took-a-quarter-of-bahrain's-wealth_11643 (accessed 20 May 2013)

297E. P. Wiltshire, Annual Review of Bahrain Affairs for 1960, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 387.

298C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1351 (1932-33), in *Bahrain Government Annual Reports 1924 - 1970*, Gerrards Cross, Archive Editions, vol. 1, 1986, p. 284.

This reform would, the British believed, 'do more than anything else to stop oppression of Shiah's', owing to the fact their land would not be constantly usurped and regifted to the Al Khalifa's tribal allies.²⁹⁹

It was eventually decided that gift holders could only keep the property in their lifetime, and that after death the property should revert to the ruler. This Belgrave noted, would help Hamad 'establish his authority over his family', and strengthen his ability to continually reaffirm his patronage networks.³⁰⁰ However, this issue would sew the seeds for a future of contention, for it was Al Khalifa land ownership and expropriation that formed the basis of modern day accusations of corruption and greed. The Civil List and the Privy Purse represents the vestiges of political control rooted in Britain's ambiguous position towards Bahrain. They were a product and repressive choice born from the 'middle course' between stronger intervention and allowing the Al Khalifa to run rampant. Yet while originally designed to 'remove the worst features of Arab misrule',³⁰¹ the reform 'overran its original limited objective'.³⁰²

The British lack of desire to take an even firmer stand has prompted a legacy of problem. In the case of land, the Agency accepted that all they could do was mitigate future damage, rather than rectify old wrongs; 'Nearly all the property of the Shaikss [sic] has been looted from Bahrainis in the lifetime of Shaikh Easa. It would be impossible and undesirable to try to right these old cases now but sufficient we could put a stop to further exploitation of the shaih [sic] subjects'.³⁰³ Indeed, Daly noted that most gardens confiscated from the 'original owners' [*bahārna*] occurred under 'Isa's rule, and that they new now owned about two thirds of the gardens, very few of which had been obtained legally.³⁰⁴ The land policies designed to benefit the *bahārna* and police the Al Khalifa have now resulted in an Al Khalifa monopoly of land ownership that reflects their initial conquest.

299 The Agency Bahrain, 11 February 1923, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 743.

300C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1352 (1933 – 1934), in *BGAR*, vol. 1, p. 371.

301J.G. Acheson, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, 'British administration in the Bahrain State', 28 May 1929, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 540.

302Ibid.

303 The Agency Bahrain, 11 February 1923, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 743.

304'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [158r] (320/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library*

<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x000079> [accessed 4 November 2015]

Rewards, Makramāt and Sanctions

Rentierism and Patronage

Despite the curtailing of the Civil List in 1971, the Al Khalifa family has grown, a problem once foreseen by British official C.G. Prior, who noted they were 'breeding like rabbits'.³⁰⁵ Thus maintaining the unity of this power elite has necessitated the bestowing of privilege to other family members, this time via institutions of state, whether in the forms of ministerial roles, land, or other favours. The need to ensure the unity of a power elite with ever dwindling resources has led to a form of Al Khalifa cronyism that is itself a source of tension with the public, but also a means of ensuring their continued position of power. Interestingly, this form of repression has resulted in an underlying structure of kleptocratic ethnocracy. That is to say, the ruling family continue to maintain unity through the disbursement of privilege to mostly Sunni allies, and by doing so antagonise large swathes of the population who are not beneficiaries of what they feel entitled to. Whereas personal financial difficulties impacted upon the baharna, there is evidence to suggest that post-independence, the Saudis bore the brunt of this cost, thus helping continue the consolidation of the unity of the ruling family. As Francis Trew noted in 1985, 'Apart from the official economic support, the Saudis helped the Amir and other members of his family out of some of their personal financial difficulties'.³⁰⁶

Upon the consolidation of the Al Khalifa regime under the British, the process of state building necessitated the creation of social services, specialised offices, and institutions. Inherent within this process is inevitably the provision of opportunities, jobs, and life chances to members of the public. While the provision of such 'rewards' to ward off discontent can be framed within broader aspects of problem depletion, the Bahrain example often highlights how such benefits are a common form of repression designed to divide or maintain loyalties, fragment opposition, or remove the brunt of popular discontent. The ruling core has an unrestricted discretion that can enhance or weaken the influence enjoyed by intermediary patrons. This has been enabled by the regime's monopoly on positions of power and government, which have allowed them to be the ultimate arbiters in this system of selective patronage. As Khalaf writes, 'Loyalty to the regime of divergent, and among themselves conflicting, forces have

305C.G. Prior to the Political Resident, '28 July 1929, RoB, vol. 4, p. 483.

306 F.S.E. Trew, Bahrain:Annual Review 1985, 23 January 1986, FOIA Request from FCO

been maintained through an elaborate segmented system of intermediary patrons. On the top of the segmented pyramid of patrons stands the Amir himself, as a supreme patron'.³⁰⁷

The acquisition of oil was particularly significant, as it allowed the government to ward off discontent by investing in social welfare programs that attempt to positively 'privilege' citizens, assuming their loyalty did not waver. Oil also made it possible for the Al Khalifa to allocate a monthly stipend to the '2500-3000 members of the ruling family according to an elaborate classification'.³⁰⁸ In addition, these resources allowed the ruling family to disburse rewards in the 'form of employment, cash, and plots of land'.³⁰⁹ This administrative reform was constantly pushed forward under British protection, who were particularly mindful that the benefits accruing to the Ruling Family could not continue without some semblance of wealth sharing. It follows then that the British would occasionally warn the Al Khalifa that they were not obligated to help them should they face internal dissent.³¹⁰

Declining British Influence

The build-up to Bahrain's Independence in 1971, and the resultant withdrawal of British military forces prompted much concern about Bahrain's security, especially given that British protection had hitherto restrained the Al Khalifa, and deterred or contained oppositional movements. While the Al Khalifa's used Independence to promote the idea that, now unfettered from the strictures of British colonialism, they were better able to meet the needs of their people through the announcement of a constitution, the use of *makramāt* to placate potentially restive citizens was not abandoned. Indeed, it was still encouraged by the British. Andrew Sterling, the British Ambassador to Bahrain in 1970, noted; 'Bahrain's attainment of full independence, a 12.5 per cent pay rise of Government employees, the redemption of the Amir's debts and the waiving of instalments due on the purchase of Government houses took the edge off discontent'.³¹¹ Britain felt that these moves to stave off revolution had to be pushed 'hard...if anything is actually to be done'.³¹² Andrew

307Ibid.

308 Khalaf, 1998.

309Ibid.

310 C.K. Daly, 11 April 1922, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 771.

311A.J.D. Sterling, 'Bahrain: Annual Review for 1971', FCO 8/1823, TNA.

312A.J.D. Sterling, 'Bahrain: Annual Review, for 1970', FCO8/1638, TNA.

Sterling also noted that, 'these domestic reforms cannot be a sure guard against revolution but they can make the revolutionaries' task longer and harder'.³¹³

These comments came at a time where Britain acknowledged that its already limited internal influence was further giving way in light of Bahrain's sovereignty. Instead, British attempts at retaining stability in Bahrain, and dousing revolutionary urges centred around the encouragement of certain factors. They argued that economic conditions needed to remain good and that the Government needed to identify itself more closely with the people. They also hoped for no hostile propaganda campaigns from Egypt. If these conditions could be maintained, 'the present regime's chances of survival appreciably beyond are none too bad'.³¹⁴ The lack of a military deterrent meant that British influence was best achieved through diplomacy. Sterling stated that although these 'non-military means of influence were disrespectfully christened Operation Figleaf....a fig leaf is not to be despised when it covers the awkward evidence of castration'.³¹⁵ Despite this fig leaf, the British stressed the importance of British personnel in the police, noting that if Colonel Ian Henderson were to leave, then subversion would be 'more difficult to contain'.³¹⁶

Growing Saudi Influence

Methods of repression through patronage were assisted by the sky-rocketing of oil prices after the oil crisis of 1973. The subsequent revenue accruing to oil producing states, like Bahrain, allowed the Al Khalifa regime, now increasingly under the patronage of Saudi, to fall back on policies of rentierism and patronage. With this Saudi patronage, came Saudi influence. As was noted in 1974, 'Bahrain is economically, and therefore politically, very dependent on Saudi Arabia'.³¹⁷ This method was described as 'Ian's recipe'. As Tesh Notes; 'Ian's recipe, incidentally, is a Saudi – Bahrain Treaty of Friendship specifying the right of each to help other maintain law and order, followed by a big programme of social welfare spending'.³¹⁸

Broadly speaking, in 1974, the British noted that the 'increase in revenue has enabled the Government to embark on a whole range of additional social and

313A.J.D. Sterling, Annual Review for 1970

314 Ibid.

315 Ibid.

316 Ibid.

317 R.M. Tesh, Form at a Glance (FAAG), 24 June 1974, FCO8/2180, TNA.

318 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Elections, 11 December 1973, FCO8/1975, TNA.

infrastructure projects as well as schemes for development aimed at the “formation of a modern industrial state”.³¹⁹ National minimum wage was increased, food subsidies increased, and the cost of living controlled.³²⁰ While the Bahraini government's policy was still to 'deal firmly with the political labour agitators', until further modernization had taken place,³²¹ agitators engaged in some short stoppages were not treated simply with force. Tesh notes that in 1974, 26 of the 27 labour disputes ' had been settled, or were in the process of being settled, by the processes of mediation, statutory conciliation, and statutory arbitration provided by the Labour Ordinance of 1957'.³²² In 1975, the salaries of Civil Servants and parastatal employees (ALBA ,BAPCO, Aviation) were increased by 15% to defuse 'the main source of labour discontent'.³²³ The increase in oil revenues also allowed electricity bills to be halved, and it was hoped that such measures would 'convince the Bahraini man in the street that he is better off with this regime than with any conceivable alternative'.³²⁴

Where ideological confrontations were necessary, Shi'a Islamists were often appeased with token gestures that were 'patently paternalistic and designed to secure their quiescence',³²⁵ such as the tightening of alcohol provision during Ramadan.³²⁶ Likewise, the government allowed them to 'blow off steam' through protests even if they had no intention of meeting demands.³²⁷ However, this superficial reform marked a reassertion of Saudi-facilitated tribal *makramāt*, as opposed to continued commitment to democratic reform and a closer identification with its people through democracy, which had been encouraged strongly by the British since at least 1963. In 1976 the British noted that with the 'sycophantic attitude of the local press towards the country [Saudi]',³²⁸ and the 'stream of official visits',³²⁹ and the 'proliferation of projects built with Saudi aid' that Bahrain was 'rapidly becoming a Saudi pensioner'.³³⁰

319 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain National Assembly, 12 November 1974, FCO 8/2180.

320 R. M. Tesh, Bahrain: Internal, 9 April 1974, FCO 8/2180, TNA.

321 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain's First Parliament, 8 July 1974, FCO 8/2180, TNA.

322 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Internal, 23 June 1974, FCO 8/2180, TNA.

323 R. M. Tesh, Letter to Ivor Lucas, 6 May 1975, FCO 8/2415, TNA.

324 R Kinchen, Dissolution of the Bahrain National Assembly, 29 August 1975, FCO 8/2415, TNA.

325 P.F.M. Wogan, Iran and the Gulf, 23 April 1982, FCO8/4332, TNA.

326 US Embassy Manama, 'Bahraini Political Developments: Foreign Minister's Comments', 11 September 1975, Wikileaks, <https://file.wikileaks.org/oc/2476/163374.pdf>, (accessed 26 October 2015).

327 H.B. Walker, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1979, FCO 8/3490. TNA.

328 E.F. Given, Bahrain 1976, 15 March 1977, FCO8/2873, TNA.

329 Ibid.

330 Ibid.

For oil-poor Bahrain, moving closer into Saudi's orbit meant the resurgence of Rentier politics. Without Saudi largesse, and the money from the economically shared, but Saudi-controlled oilfield Abu Safah, it would have been difficult to implement these costly policies, which have deferred or depleted some demands for further political pluralisation. Yet, as Given notes, 'Circuses to supplement bread are a very old-fashioned remedy for discontent, but notoriously ineffective in the long run'.³³¹ It is difficult to determine how effective these *makramāt* were, but they at least reflect perhaps the intentions of the regime. After all, it was 'Saudi displeasure at Bahrain's parliamentary experiment',³³² that preceded Saudi agreement 'to help finance certain economic reforms and development schemes',³³³ indicating that such goals were pursued in order to mitigate demands for democracy.

The oil boon also allowed Saudi Arabia, described by 'GoB leaders' as 'the "backbone" to stability on the Arab side of the Gulf',³³⁴ to finance or underwrite arms sales for Bahrain, including the procurement of rockets, or the retransfer of military equipment. Yet while the procurement of arms for military purposes may be seen as a means of buttressing newfound sovereignty without British protection, the Saudis made it clear that they wished to buy the arms themselves, as they could then gain political leverage by being the parties to give over the weapons to Bahrain. In a discussion on Bahrain's desire to purchase 2.75 inch rockets, one US cable reported in 1978, 'Mansouri [Foreign Ministry Undersecretary] said SAG [Saudi Arabian Government] would prefer to purchase the rockets themselves since SAG is footing the bill. This was so SAG could have the benefit of some political leverage over GOB'.³³⁵ Indeed, even Bahrain's defence purchases were kept on a tight Saudi leash. As Roger Tomkys noted about the BDF's decision to buy British-made Hawks; 'The contracts may still come as the Amir wishes but Saudi Arabia holds the purse strings tight and will continue to have the real say'.³³⁶ In the end, the Saudis handed down

331 Ibid.

332 US Embassy Manama, 'Bahraini Political Developments: Foreign Minister's Comments', 11 September 1975, Wikileaks, <https://file.wikileaks.org/oc/2476/163374.pdf>, (accessed 26 October 2015).

333 Ibid.

334 US Embassy Manama, 'Bahrain's Foreign Policy', 9 February 1975, Wikileaks, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975MANAMA00163_b.html

335 US Embassy Riyadh, 'Bahrain's Arms Requests', 1 March 1978, Wikileaks, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978JIDDA01545_d.html

336 W.R. Tomkys, Farewell to Bahrain, 1984, FOIA Request from FCO.

their 'superseded F5s', implying that they did not want the Bahrainis to have superior equipment. Unsurprisingly, this lack of independence, the inevitable consequences of which were a lack of a strategic depth, meant that Bahrain 'looked to Saudi Arabia, and particularly the Saudi Air Force, to protect it against any overspill from the [Iran/Iraq]'.³³⁷

For their part, the British certainly believed post-Independence that positive economic performance led for less agitation. While this largesse cannot be ignored in terms of its effect on placating the population, the main issue is that the distribution of these resources was uneven, discriminatory, and plagued by corruption. In many cases, it simply increased the Al Khalifa monopolization of land and commerce, a problem that was growing more acute through the 1970s and 1980s³³⁸. As a result, underlying grievances such as discrimination were not addressed, and the oil price dip in the 1990s exposed this, forcing spending cuts and reducing the government's ability to fight contentious activity with a carrot-only policy.³³⁹ The failure to secure funding for modernization projects in sectors such as Bahrain's heavy industry also shrank opportunities for employment, generating protest.³⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the Shi'a continued to face alienation. As one merchant told the Washington Post, 'We are totally kept out of all the major ministries. . . . If you switch on the TV, there is not a single program that refers to us, our history, our folklore, our geography. We are nothing'.³⁴¹

The growth of the GCC and the combined fears of traditional monarchies of Bahrain's unrest, has resulted in Gulf regimes attempting to salvage the policy of *makramāt* and blatant paternalism in order to abrogate any true form of inclusive politics. As a reaction to the beginning of unrest in the 1990s, Saudi Arabia raised Bahrain's allotment from Abu Safah from 70,000 barrels a day, to 100,000. An increase in intensity of unrest simply resulted in Saudi giving Bahrain the full allocation of 140,000.³⁴² In addition to this, 'Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates reportedly resumed annual subsidies of \$50 million each to Bahrain's

337 F.S.E. Trew, Bahrain: Annual Review 1984, FOIA Request from FCO.

338 E. F. Given, Prospects for Bahrain, 29 October 1976, FCO8/2643, TNA.

339 The Economist, 'Morning, and questioning, in Bahrain', 13 March 1999, issue 8110, pg. 86.

340 F. H. Lawson, 'Repertoires of Contention in Contemporary Bahrain', in ed. Q. Wiktorowicz (ed.) *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 92.

341 Ibid, p. 91.

342 Human Rights Watch, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial, Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain*, 1997.

rulers³⁴³ following the onset of the political unrest at the end of 1994'.³⁴⁴ In addition, the recommendation of a consultative council was put forward, an idea believed to have been '95 percent made in Saudi Arabia', according to one businessman interviewed by Human Rights Watch.³⁴⁵ The proposal reflected Saudi's own attitude to domestic trouble, as they were, according to Pascal Menoret, rejecting any political *infitah* (opening) at the time.³⁴⁶

This policy of 'ignoring the protests while trying to improve standards of living'³⁴⁷ has had a questionable impact upon unrest, yet reflects the Gulf monarchies' fear of democratic empowerment. Following the outbreak of the unrest in 2011, the ruling family offered 1,000 dinars to every family in March 2011, shortly after the outbreak of protests.³⁴⁸ Concerned Bahrain's instability may be a bellwether for their own autocratic regimes, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) offered a \$21 billion aid package ("Marshall Plan") to Bahrain.³⁴⁹ Given the salience of housing grievances, \$5.56 billion of this was earmarked for the building of 47,000 – 57,000 houses.³⁵⁰

Although this general policy of patronage has continued to the present day, it has clearly not been enough, especially when the ideological inclinations of protesters have constantly moved beyond simple demands for improved living standards. Indeed, as al-Naqeeb noted, 'the effective monopoly of the sources of power and wealth which the ruling elites practise, creates "mobility closures" in society which will lead, with the passage of time, to increasing friction between social classes and ranks'.³⁵¹ Yet despite these internal interventions promoting this form of repressive rentierism, it is questionable how sustainable it is. Not only does the reliance of the

343It is interesting that unrest in Bahrain often results in the GCC pouring money into Bahrain, via the rulers. It would be interesting, yet difficult given the ruling family's secretive accounts, to see how such money was distributed, or found its way into the pockets of elites. Rampant corruption could make unrest in Bahrain a lucrative business.

344 Cited in Human Rights Watch, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

345 Ibid.

346 P. Menoret, *The Saudi Enigma*, London, Zed Books Ltd, p. 125.

347The Economist, 'Mourning, and questioning, in Bahrain', 1999.

348T. Fuller, 'Bahrain's Promised Spending Fails to Quell Dissident', *New York Times*, 6 March 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/world/middleeast/07bahrain.html?_r=0 (accessed 2 October 2015).

349U. Laessing, 'Gulf states launch \$20 billion fund for Oman and Bahrain', Reuters, 10 March 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/10/us-gulf-fund-idUSTRE7294B120110310>, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

350 Trade Arabia, 'Bahrain to build \$5.59bn housing units', 19 September 2012,

http://www.tradearabia.com/news/CONS_222196.html, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

351K.H. Al Naqeeb, *Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula*, London, Routledge, 1990, p. 125.

Al Khalifa on traditional *makramāt* and patronage highlight the deficit of democracy in Bahrain, but also the unwillingness to rectify it.

Sanctioning and the Withdrawing of 'Privilege'

'My third piece of advice is in regards to rewards and punishments, the two principal functions of a ruler'³⁵²

Just as state benefits have been framed as a benevolent form of gratuity in exchange for loyalty, the imbibing of a reward and punish culture among Bahrain's Al Khalifa dominated institutions have meant that a failure to be loyal has prompted a withdrawal of these 'privileges'. The importance of loyalty as a particularistic form of repression is evident in the statements of the government, and in particular the Al Khalifa, who constantly emphasise the importance of 'loyal citizens'.³⁵³ During the 2011 Uprising, the Sayeghra family set up a campaign and encouraged people to come and pledge their loyalty to the King by signing an allegiance oath. Bahrainis were invited to the National Stadium to sign the pledge, with many fearing that if they did not, there would be recriminations. These fears were underlined by the fact many of the signatures would be engraved on a 'sword of allegiance', which would then be presented to the King.³⁵⁴

Such tactics existed as early as the 1920s, when Manama residents were 'coerced' into signing a pledge showing their approval of Shaykh 'Isa Al Khalifa to the British.³⁵⁵ Similarly, in the 1920s, co-opted *bahārna* tried to force disgruntled Bahrainis to sign these documents, at least to give the impression that they were content.³⁵⁶ While such petitions were discouraged under the British, their re-emergence in the 1990s has highlighted a reassertion of tribal politics. In one instance, Rashid bin 'Isa Al Khalifa, the head of the General Organization for Youth and Sports,

352 Col. S.G. Knox, Appendix IV to Report on Bahrain Reforms, 26 May 1923, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 791.

353J. Gengler, 'Bahrain's Sunni Awakening', 2012.

354 Bahrain News Agency, 'Shaikh Nasser to launch the Youth Sword and Patronise the Allegiance Pledge Signing', 12 April 2011, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/452594?date=2011-04-15>, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

355 A.P. Trevor, Letter to Mr. Denys de S. Bray, 'Tyranny of Shaikh of Bahrein and his family over Bahrein subjects', 13 January 1922, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 685.

356 Col. S.G. Knox, 'Report on Bahrain Reforms', 1923, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 779.

forced Shi'a clubs based in Sanabis and Diraz to sign loyalty pledges to the Amir, in a move designed to humiliate them.³⁵⁷ Reflecting an animalistic, dehumanising discourse, itself indicative of the Al Khalifa's perception of the Shi'a underclass, Shaykh Rashid bin 'Isa Al Khalifa was reported to have said about the eventual acquiescence to the petitions, 'You see, they came like dogs'.³⁵⁸

This punishment highlights the continued existence of a sense of feudal entitlement within the ruling elite. Often, this withdrawal of privilege as formed the basis of collective punishment, a fact spurred on by the rise of a number of factors, mostly notably an increase in sectarianism following Saudi's growing influence, the reassertion of Al Khalifa dominance without British control, and an increasingly belligerent stance that resulted from post revolutionary Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War. Yet, discrimination against the Shi'a and *baḥārna* predated this, and collective punishment is perhaps more a reversion to the pre-British age of Al Khalifa tyranny, rather than something new.

Privilege Deprivation

Over the years, and due to the changing nature of the modern state, withdrawal of privilege has taken the form of employment deprivation and other means of lowering life chances of oppositional elements. During the 1990s, when the Islamist nature of Bahrain's largely Shi'a opposition was more prevalent, collective punishment in the form of withdrawing state utilities was a form of repression enabled by Bahrain's inherently sectarian topography. This topography was the result of Sunni urban centres such as Manama and Muharraḡ being prioritised in development over the more historically rural *baḥārna*. Villages like Jidd Hafṡ and Bilad al-Qadim became suburbs of Manama that lacked both modern housing and adequate public services. Indeed, this urban manipulation decreased the chance of the Shi'a underclass integrating into the socio-economic fabric of modern Bahrain, which in turn has led to a culture of marginality, underdevelopment and political/religious militancy whose capacity for mobilisation draws on the historical memory of old rural and agricultural

357 Human Rights Watch, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial, Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain, 1997.

358 Human Rights Watch, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial, Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain, 1997.

communities.³⁵⁹ Unsurprisingly, this culture of marginality has resulted in the ghettoisation of some Shi'a villages, a feature which facilitated certain forms of communal/collective punishment. For example;

By the fall of 1997, the security services started punishing communities that provided material and moral support to the protesters. Supplies of electricity and water were periodically shut off to predominantly Shi'i residential districts. Mysterious fires destroyed the homes and businesses of suspected dissidents. The military commander in charge of the National University abruptly cancelled mid-year examinations, disrupting students' progress to- ward their degrees.³⁶⁰

Employment and Educational

As Bahrain moved towards industrialisation, those who had formerly been involved in more subsistence forms of income generation such as farming or fishing, became reliant on salaried labour. These big changes, as Tilly argued, affect 'the interests and the organization of various contenders for power, and thereby affected their mobilization and collective action'.³⁶¹ In this instance, these changes created greater dependency of the new industrial classes on the benevolence of the tribal overlords, who maintained extensive influence on the offices and industries of state. As a result, employment deprivation has become a more noticeable tactic, especially when non-existent or weak unions were unable to resist state-sanctioned actions, and especially when certain professions are dominated by Shi'a employees.

In 1956, the government threatened to cut the salaries of employees who did not go to work during strikes by the HEC.³⁶² In June 1974, 113 employees of ALBA were dismissed after the Ministry of the Interior declared the strikes illegal.³⁶³ As well as being prevalent in the public sector, which is perhaps less surprising, it is also true of the private sector. There have also been examples of high level Al Khalifa complicity in enabling foreign companies to rid themselves on unruly labour. In one

359N. Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama since 1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 224.

360F. H. Lawson, 'Repertoires of Contention...', 2004, p. 104.

361C. Tilly, ch. 8, p. 11.

362 Office Notice, 29 October 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

363 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain's First Parliament, 8 July 1974.

instance, an American construction firm, Brown and Root, and its 'local civilian labour contractor...were allowed to by-pass the Labour Ministry, involve the Prime Minister, and lay off, with doubtful legality a number of labourers'.³⁶⁴In this case we see corruption and cronyism influencing repressive choices, especially at a time when the ruling family, through their business practises, were acquiring more of a stake in aspects of Bahrain's commerce, industry, and trade. As Franklin notes, 'As the oil industry developed, the ruling family acquired a source of revenue sufficient to make it the wealthiest segment of society. In recent years this gap between the rulers and the people has greatly widened. The ruling family and its allies are now well integrated into the administrative machinery, and are in a particularly good position to exploit the growth of the real estate market'.³⁶⁵ As a consequence, this personal stake in Bahrain's commercial success resulted in perhaps a more conservative attitude to dissent, especially when that dissent impacted on an increasingly wider net of vested interests.

The tactic of removing people from their jobs became more acute in the 1990s, when people were dismissed from their jobs simply for making political demands, highlighting this reassertion of a *makramāt* for loyalty mentality in the provision of jobs and services. In 1995, a number of the sponsors of a popular petition demanding the reinstating of the 1973 National Assembly were arrested, including, Shaykh 'Abd al-Amir al-Jamri and 'Abd al-Wahab Husayn 'Ali. Others faced non-custodial punishments. For example, Sa'id 'Abd Allah 'Asbul, was dismissed from his job at the Ministry of Works and Electricity after resisting pressure by the authorities to take his name off the petition.³⁶⁶ At the end of March 1995, a petition sponsored by 20 professional women and signed by 200 others was handed to the Amir. Although its requests were reasonable, calling for the Amir to initiate a national dialogue, and 'to restore democratic rights and to ensure that the rights of those held in custody are respected....a number of them were threatened with dismissal from their jobs if they failed to withdraw their names from the petition and to "apologise" for their action'.³⁶⁷

364 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Internal, 23 June 1974.

365 R. Franklin, 'Migrant Labour and the Politics of Development in Bahrain', MER 132, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer132/migrant-labor-politics-development-bahrain?ip_login_no_cache=a7ae599f50b951b5145fca37baa546b4#_12_, (Accessed 10 October 2015).

366 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, 1 September 1995, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9984.html>, (accessed 2 October 2015).

367 Ibid.

At least two of them, 'Aziza al-Bassam and Hasa al-Khumayri, were dismissed³⁶⁸ On April 1995 seven teachers³⁶⁹ and several of their pupils were arrested at Madinat 'Isa Secondary School for Girls, and then dismissed from their jobs, reportedly when the authorities discovered that a demonstration was to be held at school.³⁷⁰ Others, such as Sa'id al-Asbul, were dismissed from their work for being involved in the petition campaign, and also blacklisted from obtaining other work following government intervention.³⁷¹

As a matter of policy, the unrest in the 1990s prompted measures to securitise the Shi'a problem, enforcing discrimination through institutional changes. Most notably, the reformist technocrat 'Ali Fakhro was replaced as Minister of Education by General 'Abd al-Aziz al-Fadhil, who had been previously in charge of training in the BDF. Soon, al-Fadhil, along with another former BDF Officer, Colonel Muhammad Jasim al-Ghattam, replaced Dr. Ibrahim al-Hashmi as president of Bahrain University. After this change, increased discrimination of Shi'a applications, as well as the purging of Shi'a from senior positions was evident.³⁷² Unconfined to the educational sector, Human Rights Watch noted numerous unconfirmed reports of new hiring and firing policies designed to reduce the number of Shi'a in ministries and state companies formerly considered to be Shi'a employment redoubts, such as the Ministry of Electricity and Public Works and BATELCO, the state telecommunications company'.³⁷³

While documentation and the circulation of information has improved since the 1990s, the Uprising in 2011 saw on an unprecedented scale the use of mass lay-offs to punish those who had engaged in strikes that were actually 'within the permissible bounds of the law'.³⁷⁴ The BICI report notes that 'during the events of February/March 2011, 2,075 public sector employees and 2,464 private sector employees were dismissed'.³⁷⁵ According to the ITUC, many of those dismissed were

368 Ibid.

369 Fatima 'Abd Allah Abu Idris, Khatun Ahmad Khalaf, Samira 'Abd 'Ali Saif, Sawsan Ahmad Mansur al-Halwachi, Fathiyya al-Saffar, Wadad Shubbar and Muna Hussain.

370 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 15

371 Ibid., p. 10.

372 Human Rights Watch, *Routine Abuse: Routine Denial*.

373 Ibid.

374 *BICI Report*, 2011, p. 353.

375 M.C. Bassiouni, N. Rodley, B. Al-Awadhi, P. Kirsch, and M.H. Arsanjani, *Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry [BICI Report]*, 23 November 2011, BICI, Manama, p. 420, www.bici.org.bh/BICIREportEN.pdf

prominent trade union leaders, further diminishing the organizational capacity of the movement.³⁷⁶ While the government now claim to have reinstated the majority of those who have lost jobs, in 2013, two years after the firings, the GFBTU claimed that 657 workers still had not been reinstated.³⁷⁷ There is little doubt that the purpose of the lay-offs was to intimidate those engaging in strikes, and to reassert the premise that the life chances and livelihoods of civilians are dependent on loyalty to the Al Khalifa-dominated government.

In addition to firing, and requiring private companies to fire those accused of 'absenteeism', students, an integral part of the protest movement, were targeted. As early as 1956, the Bahrain government were reported to have removed the tuition fees of a critical Bahraini student studying law in London.³⁷⁸ In the 1960s and 1970s, the Prime Minister's conservative streak was riled by Kuwait's leniency with subversive elements generating unrest in Bahrain and disappointed at Kuwait's 'softness' to its own radicals, the majority of whom were Bahraini nationals studying at Kuwait University.³⁷⁹ As a result, in 1974, the Bahraini government pressured Kuwait to expel a Bahraini leftist from University in Kuwait.

2011 marked a deepening of this targeting of students, who formed the mainstay of the opposition, and to whom the government always seemed to have had an antipathy. In order to intimidate and raise the costs for students taking part or planning to take part in the protests, the government ordered the expulsion of hundreds of students from university, taking the repression of students to an unprecedented level in Bahrain's history. Between March and June of 2011, 427 students were expelled from the University of Bahrain, while another 54 had been expelled from Bahrain Polytechnic.³⁸⁰ Many of those expelled found it hard to obtain work or study in universities in the region due to the fact they had been expelled. In line with the idea of loyalty in exchange for *makramāt*, UoB later required that all students sign a loyalty pledge to the King and the Kingdom of Bahrain. The terms of the recent pledge stated that those 'who do not sign give up their right to university

376 International Trade Union Confederation [ITUC], *Countries at Risk: Violations of Trade Union Rights*, 2013, p. 35.

377 ITUC, *Countries at Risk*, 2013, p. 35

378 Higher Executive Committee, 29 March 1955, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 150.

379 R.A. Stein, Security on Gulf and Bahrain, US Embassy Manama, 30 April 1973,

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973MANAMA00248_b.html, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

380 *BICI Report*, p. 356.

study, and those who break the pledge can be expelled'.³⁸¹ While many were reinstated, those facing criminal charges were not. The BICI report found too that most students had been expelled as a result of investigations that relied on 'hearsay and circumstantial evidence'.³⁸² In many cases, the only evidence were photographs of the students attending peaceful demonstrations.³⁸³ In addition, many students had their scholarships withdrawn as a sanction for engaging in pro-democracy protests. By 31 March 2011, 97 students had had their scholarships revoked.³⁸⁴ Although these were reinstated with retroactive pay, the message was clear – continue to engage in protest and face consequences. With many of those students studying abroad, the move also highlighted the reach of the Al Khalifa-dominated Bahrain government, who could also exert pressure on students and their families irrespective of their location. While Mike Diboll attributes this policy to the side lining of a reformist cadre under the Crown Prince and the rising influence of a cabal of hardliners, including the PM, and the Khawalid,³⁸⁵ this is debatable. During times of political dissent the ascendancy of hardliners in Bahrainis should be assumed, as matters of security, especially since Independence, always seem to be in the hands of the Prime Minister or the anti-reform cadre that includes the Khawalid.

The politics of loyalty in exchange for privilege as a method to punish or retaliate against those perceived as attempting to tarnish Bahrain's reputation was evident in recent democratic elections. Unconfirmed governmental sources announced that only those who could prove that they had voted would be entitled to certain provisions and jobs.³⁸⁶ As a result, some people felt intimidated into voting,³⁸⁷ an act which, at the time, was considered one of support for the government, who were attempting to affirm their democratic legitimacy to the outside world by flaunting

381 Ibid.

382 *BICI Report*, p. 364.

383 Ibid.

384 *BICI Report*, 2011, p. 406.

385 M. Diboll, 'Written Evidence from Dr. Mike Diboll', Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on the UK's Relationship with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, 12 November 2012, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaaff/88/88vw25.htm>, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

386 E. Dickinson, 'Bahrain's Elections and the Opposition', Middle East Institute, 23 December 2014, <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/bahrains-elections-and-opposition>, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

387 The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 'Bahrain's October 24 and 31, 2002 Legislative Elections', 2002, https://www.ndi.org/files/2392_bh_electionsreport_engpdf_09252008.pdf, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

high turnout numbers. Indeed, the scale of the tactic in the recent uprising marks a new era of state reach into both public and private affairs, highlighting the further ability of the government to withdraw what are perceived as citizen 'privileges' (e.g. jobs), as opposed to rights. The fact that democratic engagement directly relates to one's life chances certainly reflects a punitive nature to the reform process in Bahrain, one that punishes even the choice of participation.

Insulation

Exile

While encouraging inclusion in democratic institutions on the basis that they cannot generate substantive change marks a development in repressive techniques, exclusion has also been a common method in Bahrain's history. In the early part of the 20th century, the British favoured exile as a form of repressive action. At a time of relatively poor communication and slow travel, it was seen as an effective way of preventing troublemakers from spreading their influence. A main target of these in the early days of British reforms were fledgling nationalists and members of the Al Khalifa family not amenable to British influence. Saudi attempts at influence were also targeted. Following the Najdi-Persian riots in 1923, in which Knox stated 'it is unthinkable that Persians are the aggressors'³⁸⁸ the alleged agent of Ibn Saud, Qusaybi, was arrested and kicked out of Bahrain.

Bahrain's nascent nationalism movement was also a target. While scholars such as Rumaihi believed that representatives of the Bahrain National Congress were moderates, and tried to reach out to the Shi'i 'Abd 'Ali bin Mansur Rajab, Al-Tajjir argues that not so much meeting took place.³⁸⁹ Fuccaro argues that the Bahrain National Congress (BNC) were inspired by the ideas of governance championed by the Khilafaat Movement and the Indian National Congress,³⁹⁰ yet the fact that all of their representatives were Sunni and most of their demands regarded the protection of traditional mercantile privileges suggests that they were simply adopting a new language to resist the British reforms at the expense of the indigenous *bahārna*. The fact that they supported 'Isa is perhaps the most compelling evidence suggesting their

388 Col. S.G. Knox, 11 May 1923, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 757.

389 M.A. Al-Tajir, *Bahrain 1920 – 1945, Britain, the Shaikh and the Administration*, London, Croom Helm, 1987 p. 62.

390N. Fuccaro, p. 158.

desire to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. As a result, the British saw the Bahrain National Congress as a radical challenge to their reforms, and subsequently deported its two ringleaders Ahmad bin Lahij and ‘Abd al-Wahab Zayani to Bombay on 7 November 1923. Similarly, when ‘Abd Allah Al Khalifa was working to undermine his brother Shaykh Hamad, Daly exiled two of his advisers, Jasim al-Shirawi and Hafiz Wahba.³⁹¹ This process of exile or incarceration of political figures continued throughout the twenties, and while it highlighted growing British involvement in Bahrain's internal affairs, it also strengthened their influence vis a vis the position of Hamad.

In the early days of British reform, and despite their protection of the Al Khalifa ruler, other members of the ruling family were not spared this treatment, although stringency on part of the British oscillated wildly depending on what was seen as politically expedient at the time. Anti-British efforts were particularly targeted. In 1929, a man was deported for anti-British propaganda,³⁹² while two men accused of trying to kill Shaykh Hamad were deported to the Andaman Islands.³⁹³ However, British attempts to punish the ruling family were always met with resistance, and some of those expelled by the British returned, such as ‘Ali bin Khaled and his brother Ibrahim.³⁹⁴ Despite British anger, there was little consequence, highlighting the limitations of British influence.

One of the most notable examples of British influence in wholesale exile was their mass expulsion of the *Dawasir*, a tribe loyal to the Al Khalifa. They were given an ultimatum by the British; fall in line with Hamad's rule or leave Bahrain. The tribe, who would assist the Al Khalifa in overawing the Shi‘a *baḥārna*, did not accept the legitimacy of Hamad's succession. Indeed, they were implicated in a number of gross acts of terror, including an attack on the village of ‘Ali on 19 June 1923³⁹⁵ that killed three, and seriously injured four. They also took 5000 rupees loot (Ibid). Their attacks were reportedly encouraged by ‘Nejd’³⁹⁶, where the *Ikhwan* were also repressing Shi‘a.

The final straw came after some Shi‘a notables who gave evidence in the case

391 M. G. Rumaihi, 1976, p. 173.

392 C. Belgrave, 5 January 1929, *Papers of Charles Dalrymple-Belgrave: Transcripts of Diaries, 1926–1957*, Library of the University of Exeter.

393 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, *BGAR*, vol. 5, p. 47.

394 C. Belgrave, Papers, 11 Feb 1927.

395 Col. S.G. Knox, Attack on ‘Ali by Dawasir Tribesmen, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 118.

396 C. K. Daly, ‘Relations of Shias and Sunnis in Bahrain’, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 126.

against the Dawasir were murdered, most likely in revenge. Although some Dawasir chose to stay in Bahrain and fall in line with Hamad's rule, many left to the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia. The decision to exile the Dawasir was based on the premise that they were not falling in line with the British-backed Hamad's rule, and thus their removal could be justified in accordance with the British treaty with the rulers of Bahrain. Resources and the limits of intervention also meant that the British could not afford to keep deploying gunboats as a deterrent. The exile of the Dawasir was key, as they had been the backbone of resistance to Hamad's rule, and 'their departure from Bahrain has assisted Hamad to assert his authority more than would ever been possible had they remained'.³⁹⁷

While the expulsion of unreformed Dawasir elements stymied Al Khalifa factionalism by reducing the ruling tribe's military and extractive capabilities over the *bahārna*, the emergence of political opposition with reformist and nationalistic agendas posed a new challenge for the emerging regime. In particular, the Al Khalifa's gravy train prompted much discontent and, eager to preserve this position of privilege, the Al Khalifa were soon keen to take advantage of the British in dealing with opposition. Ahmed Shirawi, for example, was exiled after riots in 1935.³⁹⁸ In 1938, nationalist forces with loosely democratic ideals were in evidence. The ringleader, 'Ali bin Khalifa al-Fadil, was exiled for two and a half years, a comparatively light sentence for a movement that was considered 'directly against the Government'³⁹⁹. It is also interesting to note that while some suggested the formation of a council of five Arabs (Sunnis) and five *bahārna*, their decisions were to be approved by a committee headed by Shaykh 'Abd Allah bin 'Isa, indicating perhaps another attempt to secure control over Bahrain's Internal Affairs through the language of reform.⁴⁰⁰ Hamud bin Sabah Al Khalifa was also alleged to be mixed up in the agitation, and he had issue with the British government since his conviction of attacks on *bahārna* villages.⁴⁰¹ In the 1950s, and with the rise of the HEC and its general anti-colonial sentiment in the

397'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [159r] (322/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library*
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00007b> [accessed 4 November 2015]

398Staff at UK Embassy Bahrain, Biography of Yusuf bin Ahmad al Shirawi, Leading Personalities, 1976, FCO8/2643, TNA.

399 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for Year 1357 (1938-39), *BGAR*, vol. 2, p. 29.

400 H. Weightman, Report, 27 October 1938, *RoB*, vol. 5, p. 174.

401 H. Weightman to Fowle, 27 October 1938, *RoB*, vol. 5, p. 185.

region, the British sought to stay with the known quantity of the Al Khalifa who, in exchange for protection, gave the British an important geostrategic foothold in the region.

Less concerned with the political fallout of an exile decision, the Al Khalifas were keen to pressure the British to have the leaders of the HEC deported as soon as possible.⁴⁰² However, the British were aware decisions seen as heavy handed would reflect badly on them, especially during rising Arab nationalism in the region. The British were also worried that keeping such popular leaders in Bahrain would be problematic, as the poor prison facilities and lack of security meant messages could pass on easily from the accused to others.⁴⁰³ They also worried their continued presence would be a 'constant irritant and keep local agitation alive',⁴⁰⁴ and sought to get rid of him by other means. As a half measure, they paid Abd al-Rahman al-Bakir, the leader of the HEC, 5000 rupees to leave on one occasion, which the British, and presumably al-Bakir, attempted to keep secret.⁴⁰⁵

For lack of a solution, the British resorted to more creative means. When al-Bakir was out of the country, the British instructed their consulates not to renew his passport without a reference from Bernard Burrows, the Political Resident.⁴⁰⁶ This did not succeed, and the British realised that that deportation of the HEC leaders to Beirut, Syria or Cairo would result in agitation or the setting up of a 'Free Bahrain Government'.⁴⁰⁷ The British also considered sending two to England, and two to Beirut on just a one way ticket, or even the Seychelles. In the end, the three prisoners were exiled to the island of St. Helena, a move which E.P. Wiltshire of the Political Agency Bahrain concluded had 'resulted in a peaceful four years'.⁴⁰⁸ He added, 'out of sight and so almost "out of mind"'.⁴⁰⁹ In the months following the deportation of the St. Helena three, others deemed to be threats to security were deported, such as schoolteacher Hassan Geshi, and Bedreech Khalfan, a 'young woman' who had become a 'political leader'.⁴¹⁰ Despite Belgrave discouraging the deportation of Geshi,

402 Foreign Office, Communique to Bahrain, Intel 223, 24 December 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 287.

403 B. Burrows, 15 November 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

404 Ibid.

405C. Belgrave, Papers, 17 December 1956.

406 B. Burrows, 22 September 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

407 Foreign Office, Communique to Bahrain, 14 November, 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA

408 E.P. Wiltshire, 30 December 1960, FO1016/691, TNA.

409 Ibid.

410 C. Belgrave, Papers, 6 January 1957.

who had worked in Bahrain for twenty years, members of the Al Khalifa deported him without legal justification.⁴¹¹ This authoritarian learning was bolstered by an impression that such a process of 'banishment is a traditional method in the Gulf States',⁴¹² and the general belief in the Gulf was that deportation was 'beneficial to security'.⁴¹³

Despite the British administration's strategising, the political scandal created by the St. Helena affair made the British more sensitive in their dealing with Bahraini internal political affairs. The breakup of the British empire and Bahrain's Independence also meant that political prisoners could not be whisked away to remote places where they would be less likely to cause trouble. Yet even as it fell out of favour with the British, the ruling family still advocated this method. As J.P. Tripp notes, the 'ruling family' preferred the 'clandestine deportation of known troublemakers',⁴¹⁴ such as 'Abd Allah Rashid, who was deported in 1960 simply for distributing leaflets and writing slogans on walls'.⁴¹⁵ So while this tradition was often adopted by the British, it was becoming clearer that such security decisions were increasingly being made by the Al Khalifa.

Consequently, post-Independence there was a marked resurgence of exile as repression, sometimes en-masse, by the Al Khalifa regime. This course of action was prompted by the desires of the ruling core itself, and went against strong British suggestions to the contrary. On one occasion in 1982, Ian Henderson complained that he was 'very concerned over the increasing number of deportations being carried out by the Bahraini authorities acting for Shaikh Hamad or the Prime Minister'.⁴¹⁶ Henderson added that the deportations had 'no legal basis', and by the beginning of 1982, about '300 people had by now been deported, many of them Bahraini passport holders'.⁴¹⁷ It seemed there was also no political threat posed by these Shi'as, and they were just rounded up and put on board 'willy nilly'.⁴¹⁸ While Ian Henderson maintained some degree of influence in Bahrain, he was clearly opposed to what he

411 C. Belgrave, Papers, 8 January 1957.

412B. Burrows, 12 November 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

413B. Burrows, 15 November 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

414J.P. Tripp, *The Internal Situation in Bahrain*, 1 June 1963, FO 371/168670, TNA.

415 HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*, 1997.

416W.R. Tomkys, *Internal Political Situation Bahrain 1982*, 10 April 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

417 Ibid.

418 Ibid.

saw as a unilateral move on the part of the new ruling core to collectively punish the Shi'a in general. It also highlighted a worrying aspect of what Tomkys described as a 'multiplicity of pseudo security organisation',⁴¹⁹ operating on behalf of members of the Al Khalifa family. In July 1982 Tomkys noted that:

the total number of Bahrainis deported in recent years to Iran is put at 182. In some cases whole families have been deported at short notice on the basis of a single unsubstantiated allegation against one of their members. The legality of their deportation, particularly for those who are arguably Bahraini rather than Iranian by nationality is doubtful semi colon nor is there much political wisdom in the practice which is bitterly resented in the Shi'a community here which may simply serve to provide recruits for subversive training schools in Iran'.⁴²⁰

This tactic of exile reflects a resurgence of Al Khalifa hegemony, as articulated in Henderson's complaint. However, this shift to Al Khalifa control of the various security organs, coupled with the Islamic revolution and increasing Saudi influence, prompted a vindictive policy of collective punishment against the country's Shi'a. While this could suggest individual Al Khalifa prejudice may have manifested itself in state repression, it also illustrates how regional tension between Saudi and Iran played out in Bahrain. As the two main players in what Gregory Gause calls the New Middle East Cold War,⁴²¹ government action against the Shi'a opposition reflects its ideological commitment of a Sunni pole represented in Saudi Arabia.

However, given that Henderson strongly argued that the policy would probably have a negative effect in terms of security, the decision does not necessarily follow the rational implication that it was done for security reasons. The increasing criminalisation of the Shi'a meant that these deportations reached hundreds. Following the Gulf War, Amnesty International noted that hundreds of political dissidents had been exiled. Amnesty also note that 'hundreds of Bahraini nationals that had been expelled from the country... attempted to return to the country, including

419 Ibid.

420 W.R. Tomkys, Return of Bahraini Deportees from Iran, 5 July 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

421 F.G Gause, *Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War*, Foreign Policy at Brookings.

No 11, 2014.

whole families'.⁴²² They added that 'scores of people were permitted to return although usually after more than one unsuccessful attempt. Many others, however, were denied entry'.⁴²³ The same trend of exile and deportation occurred in the 1990s, when Shi'a religious political figures were targeted. In January 1995, the Bahrain authorities exiled at least eleven Bahrainis upon their return to the country.⁴²⁴ In 1995, the arrest of 'Ali Salman, a prominent Shi'a religious figure and critic of the government, prompted a chain of events that resulted in the forcible exile of Ali Salman and two other religious scholars, Hamza al-Dayri, and Sayyid Haydar al-Sitri.⁴²⁵ Salman was seen as the driver of a signature petition for reform, and was probably targeted because of this.⁴²⁶ Human Rights Watch noted that this tendency to forcibly exile people stood Bahrain apart not just in the Middle East, but in the world, stating that roughly 500, mostly Shi'a, Bahrainis had perhaps been exiled by 1995, with 128 being deported in 1993 alone.⁴²⁷

However, while this form of exile is against International Law, it seems to have abated in the recent uprising. Having said that, the intimidation of political dissidents has prompted many to flee Bahrain, resulting in an involuntary exile. For Bahrain in the 21st century, it is harder to send people abroad, legally, and it is now assumed ideologues, activists, or dissidents can foment unrest from distant lands. Indeed, while exile may have seemed like a solution sixty years ago, we see now Bahrain putting pressure on Britain to hand over convicts sentenced in absentia living in Britain. With an empire, Britain had some latitude with where they could deport convicts. However, even this was not effective, and frequently exiled convicts would stir up trouble abroad or return to Bahrain and stir up trouble.

In the recent Uprising, a number of US officials have been asked to leave by the Bahrain government for their perceived support of the opposition. Thomas Malinowski, US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, was expelled from Bahrain after he met with representatives of Al Wefaq.⁴²⁸

422 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 42.

423 Ibid.

424 Ibid., p. 44.

425 Ibid.

426 L. Bahry, 'The Opposition in Bahrain: A Bellwether for the Gulf', *Middle East Policy*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1997.

427 HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Exile*.

428 BBC News, 'US Diplomat Tom Malinowski Expelled from Bahrain',

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-28204511>, (Accessed 5 November 2015).

Ludo Hood, an American diplomat, was withdrawn after the US government feared for his life, following a loyalist backlash at footage of him giving Krispy Kreme doughnuts to protesters. Like Hood, US envoy Thomas Krajeski was the subject of a petition endorsed by nine Sunni Islamist societies, who claimed he was 'interfering in political matters' and giving support to the opposition.⁴²⁹ The focus of attacks on US diplomats reflects the US's less sycophantic position to Bahrain (as opposed to the UK's more obsequious foreign policy), and also highlights how international lobbying by opposition groups has been a notable feature of the recent uprising. Indeed, this deterritorialization of protest and advocacy has warranted the need for adaptive responses by the Al Khalifa regime.

Shaping Civil Society

Removal of Citizenship and Naturalisation

Through a process of 'manipulating entry or exit in reference to polity or sub polity boundaries',⁴³⁰ the Al Khalifa regime have attempted to reduce the likelihood of persons with ideologically opposing views from infiltrating Bahrain, whether the country itself, or its institutions. With this in mind, popular sanctions common in Bahrain's history include the removal of citizenship of the regime's political enemies. In 1956, the Bahrain government removed the citizenship of Abu al-Rahman Bakir, who was also the editor of a newspaper critical of the Bahraini government. In addition to this, notable Shi'i figure 'Abd al-Hadi Al -Mudarrasi was stripped of citizenship and deported in 1981.⁴³¹ Between 2011 and 2015, the Bahraini government removed the citizenship of at least 72 citizens, a move which actually contravened Bahrain's nationality law.⁴³² Unfortunately, this disregard of law, both international and local, typifies a shift to this state of exception, where the resurgence of tribal politics is evident, as it highlights how even citizenship is a gift bestowed by the ruler, as opposed to an an inalienable right enjoyed by Bahrainis.⁴³³ 'Ali Shucair notes that

429 *Gulf Daily News*, 'Societies Seek to Expel Envoy', 12 June 2013, <http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=355162>, (Accessed 12 May 2015).

430A. Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 160.

431 *BICI Report*, p. 29.

432 Al Jazeera, 'Bahrain Strips 72 of Citizenship for "Harming" Kingdom', 31 January 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/bahrain-strips-72-citizenship-harming-kingdom-150131140438495.html>, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

433 *Ibid.*

stripping citizenship represents a shift from merely punitive, to tyrannical, ' since the Bahraini judiciary is not only issuing prison sentences against opposition members for 5 to 15 years, but also depriving them of their citizenship'.⁴³⁴ Abdulhadi Khalaf argues that in 'Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, threatening to revoke — or not renew — one's citizenship has become one of the tools used by security forces to control citizens, as well as a form of punishment for those whom the authorities wish to deny their generosity'.⁴³⁵ In addition to this, distrust of the country's Shi'a population has prompted mass deportations of workers. In 2011, Bahrain announced that they were deporting 16 Lebanese nationals they claimed had links to Hezbollah.⁴³⁶ Although the decision was reneged on, other countries in the region such as the UAE went ahead with the expulsion of hundreds of Shi'a, pointing to a region wide surge in sectarian-fuelled securitization.⁴³⁷

The government has also sought to strengthen its position and weaken opposition by boosting its own popularity vis a vis the issuing of citizenship to foreign, Sunni nationals, reflecting a growing sectarian issue in the region exacerbated undoubtedly by Saudi influence and the fear of Shi'a expansionism. The government has reportedly naturalised thousands of foreign citizens, in a 'decade-long program of naturalizing foreign Sunnis in return for police and military service'.⁴³⁸ One financial times journalist described the Ruling Family attempting to build a 'cordon sanitaire' around it, naturalising between 8000 and 10000 Sunnis from Pakistan, Jordan, Syria and Yemen during the perceived Shi'a uprising in 1998.⁴³⁹ This naturalisation and use of migrant labour ensures that oppositional movements will always have to contend with either docile labour or a cadre of naturalized government loyalists, reducing the likelihood of broad-based popular resistance to the regime. Because citizenship is contingent on continued loyalty, potential dissidents among these ranks may, in

434A. Shucair, 'Bahrain begins to revoke dissidents' citizenship', *Al Monitor*, 4 September 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/09/bahrain-citizens-deprived-revolution-arab-spring.html>, (Accessed 2 October 2015).

435A. Khalaf, 'GCC Rulers and the Politics of Citizenship'.

436 Now Lebanon 'Mikati thanks Bahrain for halting deportation of Lebanese nationals', 19 April 2011, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/archive/mikati_thanks_bahrain_for_halting_deportation_of_lebanese_nationals, (accessed 2 October 2015).

437The New Arab, 'Lebanese families given 48 hours to leave the UAE', 18 March 2015, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/3/18/lebanese-families-given-48-hours-to-leave-the-uae>

438J. Gengler, 'Bahrain's Sunni Awakening'.

439 Cited in J. Gengler, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arabian Gulf*, PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 2011.

theory, be easily disposed of through de-naturalization and deportation. Through the removal of citizenship from dissidents, and the naturalization of those seen as likely to be pro-government, the government have undertaken social engineering designed to make citizens more amenable to the ideological inclinations of the ruling elite.

The policy also seems to demonstrate a direct renege on the British policies of the first half of the 20th century. For example, the descendants of the aforementioned Sunni Dawasir tribe have also been largely repatriated by the Bahraini government, with up to 20,000 reported to be holding dual Bahrain-Saudi citizenship permitted under a Decree Law of 2002. A video by the Bahrain Center for Human Rights documented that the Dawasir living in Damman (Saudi Arabia) were voting in the Bahrain elections on the Bahrain-Saudi causeway while also obtaining housing and state benefits from the government.⁴⁴⁰ When asked who they voted for in the elections, a number of them mentioned that the Chief of the Dosari (Dawasir) tribe, 'Ali bin 'Isa, told them who to vote for.⁴⁴¹ Through 'Ali bin 'Isa, the regime ensured that the Dawasir voted for a pro-government candidate. The film caused a stir in Bahrain, prompting a parliamentary enquiry, yet this was deliberately scuppered by the government's insistence that naturalisation cases prior to a Decree of 2002, or those 'special cases' determined by the 1963 Naturalization Law, be exempted. Given that virtually all cases fell under one of these laws, the investigation yielded little fruit.⁴⁴²

In 2006, the problem of naturalization and anti-Shia discrimination became more acute again after perceived Shi'a empowerment under Maliki's government in Iraq. Salah al-Bandar, an adviser to the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, was deported after he blew the whistle on the actions of a cabal closely linked to the Al Khalifa family, who he alleged were engaged in 'conspiracy to rig the elections, manipulate the country's sectarian balance and ensure Sunni domination over the country's majority Shiites'.⁴⁴³ The report singled out Ahmed Attiyatallah Al Khalifa, the then head of the Central Informatics Organization, the body responsible for organization the elections.

440 Political Naturalisation in Bahrain II, [online video], 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBzFRVY79jA>, (accessed 2 October 2015).

441 Ibid.

442 J. Gengler, 'Bahrain's Sunni Awakening'.

443 H. M. Fattah, 'Report Cites Bid by Sunnis in Bahrain to Rig Elections', *New York Times*, 2 October 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/02/world/middleeast/02bahrain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, (accessed 2 October 2015).

In 2006, Al-Wasat published an investigation documenting that 17,000 names on the voter roll that could not be accounted for after reports suggested that 5,000 South Asians had been naturalized prior to the elections.⁴⁴⁴

The nefarious strategy was reportedly part of a five-year plan to 'put political control of the country firmly into the hands of militantly anti-Shiite Sunnis'.⁴⁴⁵ The network arose in response to a report written by an Iraqi academic in 2005, titled 'A proposal to promote the general situation of the Sunni sect in Bahrain'.⁴⁴⁶ The paper was itself a bi-product of the fall of Saddam's regime and the perceived empowerment of Shi'a in both Iraq and Iran. Prior to the release of the Al Bandar report, the Americans had noted how regional developments, and the emboldening of Shi'a in Iraq had prompted a response in Bahrain that sought to focus on containing Shi'a influence. This, according to the US Embassy, had been let by the two Al Khalifa brothers Shaykh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah and Muhammad bin Attiyatallah.⁴⁴⁷ Monroe notes the importance of regional politics in developing these tactics of political repression.

there can be no doubt that regional developments - Shia empowerment in Iraq, belligerent rhetoric and actions out of Iran, unhappy election experiences in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, concerns about Shia advancements enunciated publicly or privately by key allies like Jordan and Saudi Arabia - have frightened or emboldened those in Bahrain who want to protect traditional Sunni power and privileges⁴⁴⁸

Despite al-Bandar blowing the whistle, the scandal shows the ability of high-level Sunnis to mobilise identity politics in order to counter the Shi'a threat. This was evident in the recent uprising, where Sunni groups, backed by societies like Manbar al-Islamic, and other tribal Sunni and Salafist groups, staged a popular counter-

444 W.T. Monroe, 'Elections Highlights No. 1: Dates Announced, E-Voting Out', US Embassy Manama, 8 October 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06MANAMA1756_a.html, (accessed 2 October 2015).

445 H. M. Fattah, 2006.

446 Cited in J. Gengler, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization*.

447 W.T. Monroe, 'Bahraini Political Scene Part II: Royal Family Conservatives Tighten Reins on Politics', US Embassy Manama, 24 May 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06MANAMA907_a.html, (accessed 2 October 2015).

448 Ibid.

revolution⁴⁴⁹ that helped quell the anti-government uprising in March 2011.⁴⁵⁰

Thus the government's manipulation of identity politics, whether through the withdrawal or issuing of citizenship, drives mobilisation among the country's Shi'a, promotes grievances along ethnic lines, and ensures a cadre of supporters for the regime. Coupled with recent complaints that other distributive awards are being given to Sunnis, we can see how the selective distribution of wealth undermines the broad brush, economic deterministic approach about rentier politics, criticised by scholars such as Okruhlik.⁴⁵¹

Selective Recruitment

Another part of defining who maintains labour power and thus political and economic strength is employment policy. Given Bahrain's increasing industrialisation, the pace of which outstripped the ability of the country to provide appropriate indigenous labour, migrant workers from abroad have been in demand since the 1960s. However, the political inclination of certain 'states' precluded their citizens from employment opportunities in Bahrain. As Robert Tesh writes in 1972, 'Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians and Egyptians have not been politically welcome'.⁴⁵² In the 1960s, one British official explained the reasons for this; 'It is not surprising at a time when the Gulf states are increasingly feeling the draught of Arab nationalism that Bahrain should be turning to Saudi Arabia in whose friendship she has, in any case, such a stake'.⁴⁵³ Indeed, Arab Nationalism, and its perceived reach in the revolutionary Arab states turned Bahrain, a traditional monarchy, closer to Saudi Arabia. Teachers in particular, tasked with moulding the minds of impressionable children, were subject to scrutiny. Yet the Iranian Revolution, and the Iran-Iraq war, which sharpened sectarian tensions in the wake of declining Arab nationalism meant employment policy in the security forces

449 Interestingly, this supposed hardline cabal led by the Khawalid, descend from the same family exiled by the British in the 1920s for orchestrating attacks on *bahārna* villagers.

450 J. Gengler, 'Bahrain Drain; Why the King's Sunni Supporters are Moving Abroad', *Foreign Affairs*, 5 September 2014, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-09-05/bahrain-drain>, (accessed 2 October 2015).

451 G. Okruhlik, 'Re-thinking the Politics of Distribution: Lessons from the Arab Uprisings and the Lack Thereof', in *Arab Uprisings: New Opportunities for Political Science*, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS Briefings), pp. 42 – 43, http://www.ssrc.org/publications/docs/POMEPS_Conf12_Book_Web.pdf, (accessed 5 November 2015).

452 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1972, FCO8/1974, TNA.

453 M. Joyce, 'Ruling Shaikhs and Her Majesty's Government 1960 – 1969', London and Portland OR: Frank Crass, 2003, p. 63.

focused more on perceived loyalty of sect and tribe, as opposed to Arab nationalist allegiance. The recruitment of Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis, into the security services, has increased since the Iranian revolution.

Due to the general shortfalls of local skilled labour, the employment of 'docile labour' from abroad, and particular South Asia has been encouraged. In 1974, it was estimated that the labour force would have to be increased by 50% with workers from 'India, Pakistan and elsewhere'⁴⁵⁴, amounting to around 30,000 people.⁴⁵⁵ The process of altering the make up of the foreign labour force has also been a strategy in attempting to ensure labour docility, and the government has sought to fragment the 'working class along ethnic, lingual and religious divides',⁴⁵⁶ weakening their collective bargaining power. Yet ultimately, despite very visible attempts to Bahrainiise the work force, the use of foreign, 'docile labour' continues to increase in many sectors. In 2001, the number of non-Bahrainis in the work force was 181,220,⁴⁵⁷ while in 2015 the figure is 551,859.⁴⁵⁸ Yet as Franklin notes, 'the development policies of the last decade have served the interests of the ruling elite'.⁴⁵⁹ However, 'at the same time, this sort of dependent development has substantially added to the list of problems the society must deal with'.⁴⁶⁰ The calculated assumption is that the generation of unrest through unpopular hiring policies is preferable to further hindering the use of foreign labour in Bahrain, which both strengthens and furthers the political and material interests of the regime.

Towards Shi'a containment

The leftist threat in the form of the National Liberation Front was also closely monitored, and Bahrainis returning from Soviet or Communist countries were watched closely, as the government worried they were 'establishing positions of influence in the government'.⁴⁶¹ Yet without the impetus of any immediate threat,

454R.M. Tesh, Annual Review for the Year 1974, FCO8/2414, TNA.

455R.M. Tesh, Internal Political 1974, 17 December 1974, FCO8/2180, TNA.

456'A. Khalaf, Labor Movements in Bahrain, 1985.

457 Bahrain Central Informatics Organization, Labour Force by Nationality and Sex in Census Years – (1959, 1965, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001)
http://www.cio.gov.bh/cio_ara/English/Publications/Statistical%20Abstract/ABS2009/CH11/1.pdf

458 Bahrain Labour Market Indicators, Labour Market Regulatory Authority, Q2, 2015,

http://blmi.lmra.bh/2015/06/mi_dashboard.xml, (accessed 20 November 2015).

459 R. Franklin, 'Migrant Labour and the Politics...'

460Ibid.

461 E. F. Given, Prospects for Bahrain, 29 October 1976, FCO8/2643, TNA.

Special Branch were content to rely on surveillance through penetration rather than incarceration. The refocusing of the threat on the country's Shi'a has resulted in priority being placed on an employee's sect. In 1997, Bahry noted that although some ministries contained up to 80% Shi'a labours, these were all areas deemed 'non-sensitive', and certainly did not include the military.⁴⁶² Now, the ITUC have documented that Bahraini Shi'a face further discrimination in the work place, a problem compounded following the 2011 uprising.

With growing regularity, jobs are now being denied to Shias. Some companies, such as Gulf Air, have actually fired Bahraini workers, targeting Shias specifically, under the pretext of restructuring. This was done unilaterally and without prior consultation with the GFBTU. At the same time, the companies are hiring non-Bahrainis and Sunnis with lesser qualifications and announcing new job vacancies. Furthermore, the Government has allegedly pressured many contractors to fire qualified Shia workers by denying them tenders. These violations are continuous and recurrent, and the labour legislation fails to protect workers⁴⁶³

Again, the criminalisation of the country's Shi'a, and the fact the country's Shi'a form most of Bahrain's disgruntled opposition, has led to a form of policy that works to undermine the ability of workers to 'withhold their labor power through strikes and work stoppages',⁴⁶⁴ often a key component in exercising their collective power. While hiring policy has reflected the perceived nature of the threat to the Al Khalifa regime, the government's exclusion and suspicion of Shi'a has led to a process by which policy motivates discontent, and simultaneously seeks to disarm it.

Political Amnesties, Taming Revolutionaries, and Benevolent Change

While tactics such as exile and the removal of privileges such as citizenship or jobs highlight the power of the ruling regime, the ability to restore them to underlies the

462 L. Bahry, p. 51.

463 ITUC, 2013, p. 36.

464A. Austin Holmes, 'Working on the Revolution in Bahrain: From the Mass Strike to Everyday Forms of Medical Provision', *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest*, 2015, 10.1080/14742837.2015.1037265

regime's perception of themselves as the ultimate authority – both vindictive and merciful. Often this restoration of privileges is a form of conciliation that seeks to reduce animosity, and thus potential subversion among political dissidents. Such Amiri gratuities and prerogatives also include the return of exiles or the 'symbolic release of political detainees'.⁴⁶⁵ As early as 1956, such tactics were suggested by Belgrave, yet the Al Khalifa always had the final say. As Belgrave notes; 'Went out to see HH, Sh Abdulla was there, took a list of 10 of the prisoners recommending their release, but he crossed out 2, however its a good political gesture'.⁴⁶⁶ 'Abd al-Rahman Bakir was even invited to be on an administrative committee, a form of co-optation that would have weakened the demands of the HEC'.⁴⁶⁷

The St. Helena three were invited back to Bahrain, some of them taking part in institutions such as the National Assembly. Often this was on the advice of the British, and not necessarily the will of the Bahrainis. Robert Tesh noted in 1973, 'I pointed out that the political prisoners of today could easily become the chosen leaders of tomorrow'.⁴⁶⁸ Indeed, an example of this is Hassan al-Jishi, who was exiled from Bahraini for his *Ba'athi* agitation in 1957, and who returned in 1971, only to be elected President of the National Assembly in 1973.⁴⁶⁹ Similarly, the 'tamed exile Abdul Aziz Shamlan' was the Amir's candidate for Speaker of the Assembly in 1973.⁴⁷⁰ Khuri notes that this policy of co-optation was 'led by the Prime Minister', who 'perhaps deliberately employed many of the “freedom fighters” of the past, which weakened the opposition ideologically and organizationally'.⁴⁷¹

However the tactic did not always have the desired effect. The government blamed the outbreak of labour unrest in 1974 on the release of 'two dozen or so political detainees'.⁴⁷² Similarly, in 2007, the King sought to diffuse tension by ordering the public prosecution to drop its legal case against Hassan Mushayma', Abdulhadi Al Khawaja, and Shaker 'Abd al-Husayn, who had been charged, among other things, with promoting change to the political system using illegitimate means.

465A. Khalaf, 1998.

466 C. Belgrave, Papers, 24 December 1956.

467 FO 371/120548, TNA.

468 Anon, 18 July 1960, FO1016/684, TNA.

469 R.M. Tesh, From Bahrain Embassy, 18 December 1973, FCO8/1975, TNA.

470 Ibid.

471F. Khuri, p. 224.

472R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1974, 2 January 1975, FCO 8/2414. TNA.

Despite this, clashes broke out between security forces and civilians in areas where these figures were popular.⁴⁷³

As well as releasing prisoners, the government has issued amnesties formally or informally in order to ameliorate dissent by forging the illusion of a new beginning. Sometimes the Amir has personally intervened, undermining the police in the process, highlighting the extent of his ultimate power. In 1965, the ruler Shaykh 'Isa upset Shaykh Mohammed by ordering the release of prisoners, and Mohammed was allegedly disheartened that the ruler had not allowed him to exercise 'arbitrary and independent control over arrests'.⁴⁷⁴ Indeed, 'Isa's reputation for softness meant he was often easily pressured by influential families to release their relatives. In 1977, following a time of stability, the government 'were able to release a number of political detainees for National Day'.⁴⁷⁵ Occasions such as National Day have often been used to release political prisoners, affirming the benevolence of the regime while imprinting the ultimate authority of the elite under the banner of nationalism.

However, the fear of a negative Saudi reaction has previously discouraged the government from releasing prisoners,⁴⁷⁶ again highlighting the rise of Saudi influence in Bahrain's internal repression. Thus amnesties, as a tool to dampen desire of social movements, are only effective during periods of relative calm. However, in recent years, it appears that the such amnesties are less concerned with the appearance of benevolence or goodwill, but more so that political societies can police their own constituency. During the outbreak of contentious activity in the 1990s, the release of political prisoners was often on the condition that those released would calm down their followers.⁴⁷⁷⁴⁷⁸ The Bahraini government's concern for agitation even meant the release was contingent on them calming down agitators living abroad, a bizarre turn of events considering state policy had created this exiled opposition abroad. In one instance, Shaykh Khalil and Hasan Mushayma' were released on the understanding that they would travel to Damascus and London to persuade exiled regime opponents

473 W.T. Monroe, 'Court Case Against Activists Dropped, But Clashes Flare Up Anyway', US Embassy Manama, 24 May 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07MANAMA476_a.html, (accessed 3 October 2015).

474 J.P. Tripp, 14 Feb 1965, FO 371/179790, TNA.

475 E.F. Given, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1977, FCO8/3091, TNA.

476 R.M. Tesh, 'Bahrain Elections', 11 December 1973, FCO8/1975, TNA.

477 The Economist, 'Spot the villain', p. 44.

478 L. Bahry, p. 49

to end their activities'.⁴⁷⁹

Yet conciliatory gestures aimed at forging new beginnings were most controversial following 'Isa's death in 1999. While Hamad had been 'weaving the story of his drive for political reform into a tapestry',⁴⁸⁰ earning 'international praise'⁴⁸¹ in the process, his accession was also a fig leaf for the continuation of business as usual. Hamad engaged in a number of steps that Fred Lawson argues served as the backdrop to the diffusal of social tensions. In May 1999, 'Hamad ordered large quantities of lamb and rice to be distributed at government expense to matams throughout the country for use in the up-coming 'Ashurah ceremonies, and in early June he ordered the release of 360 leading detainees'.⁴⁸² In addition to this, 'The ruler pardoned Shaykh 'Abd al-Amir al-Jamri on July 8, after al-Jamri submitted a written statement expressing his regret over the events that had taken place during the course of the uprising'.⁴⁸³ Political societies such as *Wa'ad* formed, their membership consisting of returned exiles.⁴⁸⁴ This included Rahman Al Nuaimi, a Sunni liberal who was exiled in 1970'.⁴⁸⁵

Religious figures, who were exiled in the 1990s, included Shaykh Ali Salman Shaikh Hamza al-Dayri and Sayyid Haydar al-Sitri, were invited to return. While some continued in their political activity, a smaller number were integrated into the institutions of state, such as Murtadha Badr, a former IFLB activist who was elected head of the Manama Municipal Council.⁴⁸⁶ Thus the significance of what happened in 2001, and Hamad's moderate credentials, should be seen more critically as a means of assuaging popular discontent without being hamstrung by a democratic body. Fundamentally, the traditional process of *makramāt* were still in place, and the new reforms were acts of Hamad's personal benevolence, as opposed to deep-rooted constitutional change. This personal benevolence is evidenced in the testimony of one

479 HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

480 G.P. Parolin, 'Reweaving the Myth of Bahrain's Parliamentary Experience', in M.A. Tetreault, G.O. Okruhlik, and A. Kapiszewski (eds), *Political Change in the Arab Gulf States; Stuck in Transition*, London, Lynne Rienner, 2011, p. 21.

481 Ibid.

482 F. H. Lawson, p. 105.

483 Ibid.

484 A. Ereli, 'A Field Guide to Bahraini Political Parties', US Embassy Manama, 4 September 2008, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MANAMA592_a.html, (accessed 3 October 2015).

485 Ibid.

486 C. Beaugrand, 'The Return of the Bahraini Exiles', Mapping Middle Eastern and North African Diasporas, BRISMES Annual Conference, July 2008, Leeds, United Kingdom, <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00511588/document>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

member Al Wefaq, who said, 'Then the king sat with the opposition and opened a dialogue, a new page. He took steps we highly appreciated: he released all political prisoners, allowed exiles to return, cancelled the emergency law and staged a referendum on the National Charter'.⁴⁸⁷

GONGOisation , Upgrading and Co-optation

The government have also served to limit the flourishing of critical opposition and meaningful change by placing stringent controls on civil society organizations and institutions, a key driver for political change. As Heydemann notes, 'the hallmark of authoritarian upgrading is the ability of Arab regimes to exploit rather than resist broad social, political, and economic trends both to blunt the challenges they might contain and to generate political resources that bolster regimes' hold on power'.⁴⁸⁸

In particular, the government have attempted to limit the effectiveness of NGOs and civil society organizations which, if left unfettered, could provide extra momentum to social movements, institutions, or individuals desiring change. Human Rights Watch note that in Bahrain, 'the Ministry of Social Development has far exceeded international standards in its restrictive scope' and has 'routinely exploited its oversight role to stymie the activities of NGOs and other civil society organizations'.⁴⁸⁹ They have done this in a number of ways, from the process of 'arbitrary rejection of registration applications and intrusive governmental supervision of NGOs',⁴⁹⁰ to the 'takeover and in some cases dissolution of organizations whose leaders have criticized government officials or their policies'.⁴⁹¹ They have also put considerable limits on the ability of groups to raise local or foreign funding.⁴⁹² One Bahraini activist noted that the object was "to interfere, restrict, and attempt to control the activities of civic organizations".⁴⁹³ Crucial to this strategy is the use of co-opted

487 International Crisis Group, *Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform*, MENA Report, No. 111, 28 July 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Bahrain/111-%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20VII%20-%20%20Bahraains%20Rocky%20Road%20to%20Reform.pdf>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

488S. Heydemann, 2007.

489 HRW, *Interfere, Restrict and Control*, p. 1.

490 Ibid.

491 Ibid.

492 Ibid., p. 2.

493 Ibid., p. 1.

agents or loyal opposition figures, who, to varying extents, consent to the limitations imposed by the government on civil society activity. While this tactic has become more salient in the recent uprising, it can, according to Shaykh ‘Abd al-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, be attributed also to anti-opposition and anti-Shi‘a hardliners in the ruling family, especially the Khawalid, who, through their personal relationships with the King and their official positions have been working since at least 2006 to ‘throttle’ civil society’ by advocating for the clamping down of such groups.⁴⁹⁴

The shift to the manipulation of civil society is a key development in the arsenal of repression, as the government are countering new modes of mobilisation by appropriating and utilising them. As protesters in Bahrain adopt a modern human rights agenda and discourse, the ‘framing of demands on a popular level according to international legal conventions illustrates a new articulation and platform for legitimacy’.⁴⁹⁵ Within this shift, human rights activists have emerged as leaders of the movement, and the role of NGOs in lobbying international and regional bodies for change increases. The government now have to fight an uphill battle against the discourse of human rights, the appeal of which lies in ‘its capacity to imagine and assert universal rights possessed by every human rather than the specific political rights of citizens or members of a particular political community’.⁴⁹⁶ Yet the regime, for their part, reacting to this oppositional tactic, have appropriated the discourse themselves. Responding to the fact human rights have provided Bahrain’s opposition with moral resources and agency, ‘authoritarianism has been upgraded and the ruling family has learnt to play the “human rights game”, engaging with the UNHRC and celebrating its “track record” on human rights’.⁴⁹⁷ By doing so, it has given itself a liberal fig leaf for what is a fundamentally illiberal regime and thus enabling it to reinforce its position in the international community, whilst highlighting the hypocrisy of the latter.⁴⁹⁸

The government themselves have appropriated a rhetoric of human rights, and

494 W.T. Monroe, ‘Bahraini Political Scene Part II: Royal Family Conservatives Tighten Reins on Politics’.

495 L. Bhatia, and A. Shehabi, ‘Shifting contours of activism and policies for justice in Bahrain’, in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), *Bahrain’s Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 95.

496 Ibid.

497 Ibid., p. 130.

498 Ibid.

have been especially keen to emphasise how the protests have impact on the rights of the 'silent majority' for a peaceful, undisrupted existence, stressing the neo-liberal sensibilities of being able to, for example, drive to work without disruption of civil disobedience. Indeed, the process of stigmatization of Bahrain's opposition has relied heavily on the government trying to wrestle the human rights mantle back from the activists and protesters.

The process of adopting a position of human rights defenders was embodied most strongly by the commissioning of the BICI report, a step which was heralded by Bahrain's transatlantic allies. The government have used the BICI Report as a platform to launch a cadre of Human Rights Organizations that they claim are independent, but in actual fact receive funding directly or indirectly from the Bahraini Government.⁴⁹⁹ In addition to setting up a Ministry of Human Rights and a National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR), the government have legalised a number of Human Rights organizations, including the Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society, Bahraini Monitor, the Manama Centre for Human Rights, and others. Recently one of these three GONGOS⁵⁰⁰ contributed to a witch hunt by publishing the photos of well-known and internationally respected human rights activists, saying they were responsible for terrorism. King Hamad also wants Bahrain to become home of the Arab Court for Human Rights, which Cherif Bassiouni dismissed as a 'Potemkin tribunal' – an empty vessel giving a facade of justice.⁵⁰¹ Thus, prompted by pressure for reform, the government have dealt with demands for pluralisation by creating a heavily regulated civil society that simply extends the means the regime has to control the population.

Fragment, Polarise, Stratify and Conquer

As Charles Wright Mills one argued that the unity of a power elite, when combined with a fragmented polity, facilitates control.⁵⁰² While various British policies had sought to facilitate the unity of the Al Khalifa regime under Hamad, this has been

499Ibid. p. 126.

500Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society, Karama Human Rights Society, and Gulf European Center for Human Rights.

501 R. Lowe, 'Bassiouni: new Arab court for human rights is fake "Potemkin tribunal"', International Bar Association, 1 October 2014, www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=c64f9646-15a5-4624-8c07-bae9d9ac42df, (accessed 3 October 2015).

502 C.W. Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1967.

complemented by the tactic of dividing potential opposition to the government. It was noted as early as 1923 that the ruling family had been attempting to weaken opposition to their rule by encouraging enmity between Sunni and Shi'a. In the 1920s, the state of Al Khalifa inspired communal strife was noted by the British administration; 'Owing to the extremely bitter relations in Bahrain between Sunnis and Shaihs [sic], which attitude has, for their own ends, been deliberately encouraged by the rulers for years'.⁵⁰³ This tactic has not abated significantly, and even the British, despite their seeming indignant attitude, used such tactics when it suited them. In the 1930s/40s, 'Arabs', a term often used by the British to refer to Sunnis in Bahrain, attempted to get the *baḥārna* to join strikes. Belgrave, however, reminded them that the British had always looked after their interests and thus sought to compound *baḥārna* reluctance to get involved.⁵⁰⁴ The Persian merchants, who also opposed the goals of the HEC, were also granted permission to set up a group that directly opposed the actions of the HEC, a calculated strategy designed to create some opposition to the HEC. The HEC argued that 'the policy of the Persian Committee will be to oppose the Committee of National Union – the people's committee'.⁵⁰⁵

While these fissures were often encouraged, sometimes they were driven by a lack of material resources or other political imperatives. Burrows, for example, in 1956, in his reluctance to see British Intervention, eschewed using British troops in favour of other methods. Yet at the time it is important to bear in mind that the sectarian unity touted in the HEC was perhaps not as significant as it has been made out to be.⁵⁰⁶ Even in 1953, many Shi'a went to the Agency for protection following the outbreak of sectarian skirmishes in Muharrag,⁵⁰⁷ highlighting a lack of depth to the cross-sect unity espoused by the HEC. The British tended to admit that the HEC was not particularly anti British, and the even Nasser and the Syrians had told the the HEC to co-operate with the Bahraini government.⁵⁰⁸ Yet when Britain decided to support the Al Khalifa and tackle the HEC, Burrows thought it might be best to resort to

503 The Agency Bahrain, 11 February 1923, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 739.

504 Sir T. Fowle, Agitation in Bahrain, 12 November 1938, *RoB*, vol. 5. p. 132.

505 'Al Nida Al Arabi', Issue 1, September 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

506O. Shehabi, 'Political Movements in Bahrain, Past, Present, and Future', *Jadaliyya*, 14 February 2012, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4363/political-movements-in-bahrain_past-present-and-fu, (accessed 3 November 2015).

507 C.Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953.

508 Minutes from Meeting, 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

political techniques. It was believed interceding at the moment of the movement's highest popularity might be dangerous. They did not, for example, wish to move too quickly against al-Bakir in order to avoid making a martyr of him.⁵⁰⁹ Musing on the demise of the HEC, Burrows stated by persuading the Ruler to 'make reasonable reforms and to give time for the more extreme demands of the Committee to disgust moderate opinion', they had 'ensured that there was in fact a very wide measure of support in November for the action eventually taken by the ruler against the CNU'.⁵¹⁰

Yet there is also evidence to suggest that the National Front at the time, led by 'prominent younger embers of the Ruling Family', provoked unrest at a HEC Rally in March 1956 in order to prove that the HEC were 'entirely unreliable' and that it was necessary for 'foreign police force to maintain order'.⁵¹¹ Indeed, until this point, the HEC had 'remained almost entirely within the bounds of the law'.⁵¹² The British did not confirm whether this happened, but noted that it 'fits admirably with his [the Ruler's] for our support in his conversation with Secretary of State'.⁵¹³ It may be true then that the National Front acted as provocateurs in order to put pressure on the British to intervene.

Even during Bahrain's brief democratic experiment in 1973 – 75, divide and rule was used to try and split the National Assembly. As Tesh noted, the 'rulers are deliberately encouraging the Right (particularly the Religious group) to react against the Left'.⁵¹⁴ One Minister insisted that the Left were being successfully smeared as communists and were becoming generally unpopular. However, as Tesh noted, a "divide and rule" policy does however have its dangers and creates the possibility of violence'.⁵¹⁵ This apparently prophetic comment was realised in 1976, when leftist PFLOAG activists were accused of killing a religious scholar, and the government were worried about violence breaking out between leftists and the villagers.⁵¹⁶ The consequences of this policy were manifest in growing fringe religious radicalism in Bahrain, which was compounded by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. However, despite

509 B.A.B. Burrows, 1 October 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

510 D.M.H. Riches, 11 April 1957, *RoB*, vol. 7, 345.

511 B.A.B. Burrows, 4 March 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, pp. 209 – 2.12.

512 B.A.B. Burrows, 4 March 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 211.

513 *Ibid.*, pp. 209 – 210.

514 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 6 May 1974, FCO8/2180, TNA.

515 *Ibid.*

516 A.J.D. Sterling, 1971.

the work of more extreme groups like the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Shi'a in Bahrain remained relatively quiet following the Revolution. As Harold Walker stated in 1980, 'Since the Iran/Iraq conflict began there have, as you know, been virtually no visible signs of support among the Bahraini Shi'a for the Imam Khomeini'.⁵¹⁷

Yet growing divisions between the leftists and Shi'a, especially after the murder of 'Abd Allah al-Madani, the notable Shi'i editor of al-Mawaqif, meant that a united leftist Shi'a front was an impossibility at the time of the Iranian Revolution. As such, it was not an appropriate opportunity for pressing for regime change. Yet following the Iranian Revolution, the government eschewed their 'low key' approach to the Shi'a problem, and instead drove 'young Shia into the extremist camp'.⁵¹⁸

This abandonment of this low key approach to Shi'a unrest was manifest in the 1990s, when Shi'a marginalization combined with economic woes created an acute political crisis. As expected, the government curtailed political cooperation between moderate Sunnis and Shi'as to divide the movement, driving the Shi'a movement further underground, making them both more radical and religious.⁵¹⁹ In 1991, Amnesty noted the government's move against the Shi'a was a 'deliberate policy' designed to target and "harass and intimidate entire communities – particularly Shia communities" living in villages near the capital city.⁵²⁰ With the rise of a large Shi'a bloc following the reforms of 2001, the government feared an overwhelmingly strong Shi'a mobilisation. Yet when Al-Wefaq split over a decision to participate in 2006 elections, Najati speculated that the government's arrest of Hassan Mushayma', 'Ali Salman's rival, was designed to make him a hero among the Shi'a community, driving a wedge between Al-Wefaq and Haq in order to divide the Shi'a street.⁵²¹

Attitudes to the Shi'a post-2011

In the build-up to the uprising of 2011, government repressive policy can be seen as a

517 H.B. Walker, The Shia in Bahrain, 26 October 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.

518 P.F.M. Wogan, 23 April 1982, FCO8/4332, TNA.

519 L. Bahry.

520 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, May 1991, pp. 5-6.

521 W.T. Monroe, 'Prominent Shias Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia Outlook in Bahrain', US Embassy Manama, 9 April 2007, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:eZh_8zJoqAoJ:https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07MANAMA328_a.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk, (accessed 3 October 2015).

product of hawkish ascendancy. As Monroe states;

'The royal family is, in fact, divided on how to deal with the Shia....royal family hard-liners, exemplified by the Prime Minister, are wary of reform for many reasons: the demographic threat posed by the majority Shia, whose loyalty to Bahrain (i.e., connections with Iran) has long been questioned; concern that democracy, and by extension noisy street demonstrations, will scare investors away; and -- most importantly -- the potential threat to the Al-Khalifa regime that reform may ultimately pose. Although one of the key hard-liners is Royal Court Minister and close King confidant Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed, the views of the King are less clear. It was the King, after all, who launched the reform movement, talks of a day when the King will serve as a constitutional monarch paternalistically protecting the interests of all Bahrainis, and infuriates hard-liners by regularly ordering the release or pardon of Shia extremists and demonstrators. And yet, he does little to reign in Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed and his hard-line allies.⁵²²

Yet the alleged split in the ruling family, and Hamad's reform-orientated mentality, has long been subservient to the interests of hardliners. The limited nature of the reforms of 2001 already ensured the containment of the Shi'i street, implying that it was always the investment-orientated hardliners who dictated policies that have facilitated anti-Shia discrimination. Given this high-level distrust of the Shi'a, it is unsurprising that the government instrumentalised sectarianism in order to divide the movement.

This instrumentalisation was most notable in the recent uprising when the government enflamed religious tensions by deliberately destroying Shi'a religious structures, which Amnesty International considered to be 'collective punishment'.⁵²³ They also targeted Sunni members of the opposition. Ibrahim Sharif, the General Secretary of Wa'ad, was arrested, as was Muhammad al-Buflasa, a former member of

522 W.T. Monroe, 'Future of Bahrain: Ambassador's Parting Thoughts', US Embassy Manama, 19 July 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07MANAMA669_a.html, (accessed 3 October 2015).

523 Amnesty International, 'Human rights in Bahrain – Media Briefing', 31 April 2012, <http://www.amnesty.ca/news/news-item/amnesty-international-human-rights-briefing-on-bahrain>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

the Bahrain military. Justin Gengler once posited that Ibrahim Sharif and al-Buflasa were the most dangerous men in Bahrain, not because they were violent, but because both Sharif and al-Buflasa's stances placed them 'against the royal family and government', which, 'as Khuri observed three decades ago, is especially intolerant of social and political groupings that cut across Sunni-Shi'i lines'⁵²⁴. Yet it was not just these high profile figures that were the 'most dangerous'. Manaf al-Muhandis, for example, was arrested for starting a successful online campaign called #UniteBH (Unite Bahrain). The purpose was to unite Bahrainis, irrespective of sect, through Twitter.⁵²⁵ Others espousing unity were ridiculed. For example, guards at a checkpoint ridiculed a driver for wearing a t-shirt saying 'No Sunni, No Shi'a, Just Bahraini'.⁵²⁶

Indeed, by playing up the sectarian threat, Bahrain's Sunnis 'disproportionately loyal' to the Royal Family have been mobilised to 'defend Bahrain against Shi'i and Iranian designs'.⁵²⁷ However, as Justin Gengler notes, the problem with this balancing act is that the 'more the state succeeds in convincing "loyal citizens" of the need to defend Bahrain against Shi'i and Iranian designs, the more it opens itself to the charge of not acting firmly enough'.⁵²⁸ This has led to a state of affairs where loyalist-dominated democratic institutions support draconian and repressive legislation in the name of national security, giving a veneer of popular legitimacy to discriminatory practises. This has been compounded by King Hamad's empowerment of Sunni Islamists. Regional issues such as the Iran-Iraq war have also sharpened sectarian tensions to a point that, according to 'Ali Salman, has been unprecedented in Bahrain history.⁵²⁹

While much of this divide and conquer has taken the form of driving a wedge between different sects to prevent the rise of large-scale formal political organizations, the [Bahraini] government has opposed the foundation of political parties, societies,

524 J. Gengler, 'The Most Dangerous Men in Bahrain', Religion and Politics in Bahrain, [web blog], 5 June 2011, <http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/most-dangerous-men-in-bahrain.html> , (accessed 5 October 2015).

525 @Redbelt, 'Today is the anniversary of my detainment. Just because someone posted my picture on Facebook. Also because I started #UniteBH', [Tweet by @Redbelt], 29 March 2012, <https://twitter.com/Redbelt/status/185324439934738432>. (accessed 11 January 2015).

526M. Yusif, 'Just Bahrain' not welcome at checkpoints', *Mahmood's Den*, [web blog], <http://mahmood.tv/2011/03/19/just-bahraini-not-welcome-at-checkpoints/>, (accessed March 5, 2015).

527J. Gengler, 'Bahrain's Sunni Awakening'.

528 Ibid.

529 W.T. Monroe, 'Future of Bahrain: Ambassador's Parting Thoughts'.

labour unions, or clubs that cut across regional, ethnic, or religious groupings. It has been particularly acute in the labour sphere. Trade unions or worker activity has been highly fragmented by the regime, especially after the 1965 Uprising, which was prompted by action taken by the state-controlled oil company BAPCO to lay off expatriate workers. Committees at BAPCO were subsequently created to be a 'safety valve should any disturbances take place in the future'⁵³⁰, yet organized in a way that would obviate getting social and political items on the agenda⁵³¹. The resultant committees could only bargain on mundane⁵³² issues, and the ballot-system was arranged so that a company-wide system was avoided and that no 'Bahraini personalities could emerge as the few representatives of a mass of workers'⁵³³.

In 1973, the British note how the 'government and management contrived to drive a wedge between the striking employees of two BAPCO contractors and their ringleaders, making some concessions to the former and dispersing the latter'.⁵³⁴ Eschewing labour legislation, the government sought to engage in industrial arbitration that would prevent the emergence of a strong labour power base.⁵³⁵ In 1980 the Bahrain government were firmly committed to keeping labour groups 'small, not centralised'.⁵³⁶ Although they were distrusted by the majority of underground worker movements, the introduction of government sponsored 'Workers' Committees⁵³⁷ in 1981 contributed, albeit marginally, to the process of labor pacification'.⁵³⁸

However, like the reforms of 1965, the activities of these groups were deliberately and heavily curtailed. The promulgation of the 1981 Labour Law paved the way for the introduction of an 11-member elected General Committee. These eleven were elected from the 48 elected worker representatives, who formed, along with an equal number of management-appointed members, the Joint Committees (JC). The JCs had their roots in the nominated Joint Consultative Committees created in

530 Anon, 1965, in A. Burdett (ed) Records of Bahrain, Cambridge Archive Editions, 1961-1965, 1997, vol. 5, p. 422

531 Ibid., p. 423.

532 Ibid., p. 412.

533 Ibid., p. 422.

534 R.M. Tesh, 23 July 1973, FCO8/1975, TNA.

535 G Foggon, 28 October 1974, FCO 8/2180, TNA.

536 H.B.Walker, Bahrain Internal, 18 May 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.

537 This was via the 'joint commission of workers and employers to attend to matters related to industrial relations'. Order 9, Khalaf.

538 'A. Khalaf,' Labor Movements in Bahrain'.

1971. Interestingly, the companies that were permitted to have JCCs were mostly one in which the management were Western. This was done primarily due to the experience held by such staff in dealing with labour issues. The focus on having an appointed body to balance the will of elected members reflected the government's fear of providing political space to those deemed subversive. Even those who ran for the elected positions were vetted by the SIS.⁵³⁹ In addition to this, the Prime Minister was reported to have personally intervened to prevent certain candidates being elected; 'The Prime Minister has involved himself closely in the process and allegedly turned down several quite presentable candidates on his own account'.⁵⁴⁰ In addition, while the Joint Committees and the General Committee could write their own constitutions in accordance with the Labour Law, the latter's had to be ratified by the Ministry of Labour. Reflecting the relative improvement of the labour situation, but one that nonetheless guaranteed government control over labour matters both at the international and national level, Simon Collis wrote, 'Meanwhile, the General Committee will present Bahrain with a rather more decent figleaf to sport in international labour circles'.⁵⁴¹

Yet while the emergence of King Hamad's reforms saw the emergence of the umbrella union, the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions, (GFBTU) the 2011 Uprising and the strikes organized by the GFBTU prompted the government to dismantle them. The government issued new legislation that paved the way for the creation of a new umbrella trade union that Cathy Feingold⁵⁴² described as an 'absolutely blatant attempt to split the union movement'.⁵⁴³ Unusually, the acronym of the new union spelled BLUFF, and critics such as Khalil Boazza, a Bahraini labour activist, believed that the new movement would weaken Bahrain's previously 'opposition-dominated' unions.⁵⁴⁴ Some union activists even argued that unions representing workers at some major corporations went over to BLUFF without the

539 S.P. Collis, Bahrain Labour, 12 March 1983, FCO 8/4920, TNA

540Ibid.

541 S.P. Collis, Bahrain Labour, 12 March 1983, FCO 8/4920, TNA

542Cathy Feingold is the director of the international dept. of the international department for the AFL-CIO, the American Trade Union federation

543 B. Law, 'New Bahrain trade federation splits union movement', BBC News, 17 November 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20324436> (Accessed 10/01/2014)

544H. T. al-Hasan, 'Bahrain's new labour scheme: one step forward, two steps back?', *Open Democracy*, 5 August 2012, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/hasan-tariq-al-hasan/bahrain%E2%80%99s-new-labour-scheme-one-stepam-forward-two-steps-back> (Accessed 22/11/2013)

consent of their members.⁵⁴⁵ Overall, the new trade unions amendments and the creation of BLUFF highlighted the government's attempts to limit effective collective action, contributing to the process by which the 'state erodes the capacity of social movements, thereby diminishing the ability to engage in contentious politics'.⁵⁴⁶ By dividing and disempowering the GFBTU, the government reduced the union's ability to call effective strikes, and lobby on behalf of Bahraini workers both nationally and internationally.⁵⁴⁷

Thus the nature of political repression is not just preventing people from engaging in collective action, but shaping the nature of that collective action in order that it can be best controlled. Fragmentation and reshaping is a dynamic process in which the government attempt to assess potential oppositional coalition, and divide them accordingly. Whether through trade unions, or through religion, the government have maintained a degree of organizational fragmentation.

Reform as Repression: Grievance Removal, Administrative Reform, Democratisation

Bahrain is rapidly industrialising in a period of rampant inflation; in which there is great maldistribution of wealth together with universal education; in which semi-feudalism has already largely given way to broad-based cabinet government; in which the mushrooming towns contrast with the neglected villages and the Islam traditionalists with the modernists: such a country needs a representative organ to balance and adjust the strains'.⁵⁴⁸

Demands for democracy, or at least democratic ideals, have been a key driver of reform since the early 1900s. The notion of them was not unfamiliar in Bahrain, a perceived Gulf backwater at the time, and the British realised as early as 1922 that the spread of 'democratic ideas'⁵⁴⁹ had made the Al Khalifa's tyrannical rule difficult. Generally, attempts at political liberalisation in Bahrain have been done as a form of

545B. Law, 'New Bahrain Trade Federation'.

546 J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...', p. 294.

547 A. Austin Holmes, 'Working on the Revolution in Bahrain...', 2015.

548 R.M. Tesh, 'Bahrain's First Parliament'.

549 C.K. Daly, Communique from the Agency in Bahrain, 11 April 1922, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 711.

top-down, state sponsored control, the purpose of which has been to provide a 'safety-valve' for popular politics, thus mitigating the chances of direct violent action. These institutions have taken a number of forms. For example, the Manama Municipality established in 1919, was tasked with 'forcing a new political and sanitary regime in the town as the antidote to Bahrain's social and political malaise'.⁵⁵⁰ The municipal councils established in urban areas across Bahrain were efforts to extend the influence of the Government of India and allay social turmoil through a functional administrative apparatus.

However, the limitations of the councils were made apparent when increasingly discontented elements pushed to have more democratic institutions established. Until the 1940s, both the Al Khalifa and the British have been reluctant to institute such reforms. However, in 1935, TC Fowle sought to impress upon the ruler that 'times have now changed and governments must now depend, to a large extent, on the public opinion of the majority of their subjects'.⁵⁵¹ Despite this, demands for a democratic council, mostly by the Persian Holis, and not the *baḥārna* or Arabs, in the 1930s were rebuffed by the Al Khalifa, who thought that they would be the 'swan song of the Al Khalifah as Rulers of Bahrain';⁵⁵² Yet the British noted that if the agitation spread beyond the Holis, it would be foolish to not implement at least an advisory body for the Shaykh.

While the British, and specifically the Government of India, had put the breaks on suggesting democratic institutions, they had pressed for reforms both after and during the agitation of the Manama *baḥārna* in 1934/1935, yet this mostly related to more representation on the commercial council and the municipalities, as well as improvement to education and the creation of a criminal code.⁵⁵³ Increasingly, the British were pushing for administrative reform, and not democracy, to curb dissent. As Burrows noted in 1954, 'the removal of some justifiable grievances will leave the subversive virus with less to feed on'.⁵⁵⁴ Generally speaking, the British believed that a solid legal system would actually increase the power of the administration and, as a consequence, bolster Al Khalifa power; 'It is the object of the reforms which the

550 N. Fuccaro, p. 118.

551 T.C. Fowle, Communique to Government of India, RoB, vol. 5, p. 109.

552 Political Agent, Express Letter, RoB, vol. 5, p. 200 - 204

553 G. Loch, Communique to the Political Resident, 18 February 1935, RoB, vol. 5, p. 94.

554 B.A.B. Burrows, 20 July 1954, RoB, vol. 7, p. 59.

Bahrain Government have announced on our advice to increase both the impartiality and the power of the administration'.⁵⁵⁵ If these reforms failed to ameliorate dissent, the British knew that it would at least allow time to strengthen the coercive apparatus. Burrows noted that the government 'should prosecute the essential reforms which have been long under discussion in the hope that this would give a breathing space in which they might strengthen the Public Security Department, and at the same time satisfy the more intelligent section of the people now discontented'.⁵⁵⁶ Yet the Ruler was reluctant to pursue administrative reforms that could empower the Shi'a. It was only after 'strenuous efforts on the part of Mr. Wall and Sir Charles Belgrave, that the situation was retrieved',⁵⁵⁷ and the government published an ordinance that 'reforms would be announced if the strikers returned to work'.⁵⁵⁸

In the 1970s, the British still emphasised the need for reform as a form of counter-revolutionary insurance, and urged for popular representation.⁵⁵⁹ Sterling noted that the British were to 'urge the government to effect its promised constitutional reforms' and 'improve the system of administration' in order to help 'guard against revolution'.⁵⁶⁰ Sterling noted in the 1971, this constitutional advance was the 'best defence against subversion'.⁵⁶¹ Indeed, in order to smooth over the transition and build confidence, Shaykh 'Isa announced that a constitution would be introduced in 1971.⁵⁶² Tesh believed in 1973 that even the steps towards democratisation had defused labour unrest, 'Judging by the absence of violence and the paucity of strikes since the outbreak of March 1972, the steps taken towards popular representation are having the desired effect'.⁵⁶³

However upon Independence, the British had already reported that the hawkish Prime Minister had halted moves towards popular representation', demonstrating the 'native talent for procrastination'.⁵⁶⁴ Democracy was also opposed by Bahrain's neighbours, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and even Kuwait.⁵⁶⁵

555 Ibid., p. 57.

556 B.A.B. Burrows, 20 July 1954, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 54.

557 Ibid.

558 Ibid.

559 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Internal, 17 December 1973, FCO8/1975, TNA.

560 A.J.D. Sterling, Annual Review 1970.

561 A.J.D. Sterling, Annual Review 1970

562 Ibid.

563 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Constitutional Development, 12 June 1973, FCO8/1975, TNA.

564 A.J.D. Stirling, Annual Review 1970.

565 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain's Elections, 11 December 1973, FCO 8/1975, TNA.

Tesh wrote in 1972, that 'there is some irritation that Saudi Arabian conservatism puts the breaks on popular representation in Bahrain'.⁵⁶⁶ When the reforms did materialise, the parliament was only 'representative enough to be credible'.⁵⁶⁷ The fact the 'Shi'a villages' were 'underepresented'⁵⁶⁸ perhaps reflects Saudi-Al Khalifa animosity towards the Shi'a. The veneer of credibility was evident in the amended constitution, which 'appeared to curtail the Amir's powers but in fact was calculated to give the government and the Prime Minister an assured position for the first four-year parliament at least – after which they would take their chance'.⁵⁶⁹ In effect, the National Assembly would still guarantee continued Al Khalifa rule. As Tesh noted, 'The aim of the Al-Khalifah inner circle was to delegate sufficient power to the People to satisfy them that its intentions were genuine, but not to concede so much that the administration would be hamstrung, or rash measures forced on it, or powerful neighbours antagonised, or the position of the Al Khalifa irredeemably undermined'.⁵⁷⁰

In addition to this distribution of power that favoured the Al Khalifa regime and its allies, the government also engaged in tactics designed to limit the power of elected members. For example, during the short-lived National Assembly, the government angered elected members of the NA by 'insisting on priority for its own bills' and using 'parliamentary devices – closed sessions, the committee system, the rules of reply, etc – to curb the elected members' powers'.⁵⁷¹ They also chose to pass controversial legislation, like the security decree, in the summer recess by Amiri decree as they knew parliament would not accept it.⁵⁷² The decree, which had been opposed by the assembly, was legal until the assembly declared it null.⁵⁷³ When the Assembly did not ratify the bill, it was dissolved in order to 'contain the growing influence of opposition and alter the power balance to the advantage of the ruling family'.⁵⁷⁴ Even the timing of the dissolution was calculated, and done in the summer where it was assumed that the heat would 'provoke the least reaction'.⁵⁷⁵

566 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1972, 31 December 1972, FCO 8/1974, TNA.

567 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1973, FCO8/2181, TNA.

568 Ibid.

569 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual review for 1973.

570 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Constitutional Development.

571 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Internal, 4 March 1975, FCO8/2415, TNA.

572 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1974.

573 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 1 March 1975, FCO8/2415, TNA.

574 F. Khuri, p. 234.

575 H.B. Walker, Bahrain Internal, 28 June 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.

The tactics of democratisation and constitutional reform as a means of guarding against revolution had been profoundly influenced by Saudi encroachment. The British noted that 'Saudi Arabia, though an immensely powerful friend, is too rich, too Islamic, and too close for comfort',⁵⁷⁶ and that 'the government became less inclined towards political change, no doubt under Saudi influence'.⁵⁷⁷ Like the British had done in the 1920s, the Saudis used their own *makramāt* to secure influence among the ruling family. As Ivor Lucas noted, 'all the traditional regimes in the Gulf are becoming increasingly dependent on Saudi support and that they must to a greater or lesser extent accept what goes with it'.⁵⁷⁸ Saudi's keenness to secure favour was evident in its provision of 'grotesquely expensive sports facilities to please some of the younger shaykhs', gifts that were most likely 'conditional on the abandonment of [democratic] experiments which might prove dangerous to the Al Sa'ud as well as to the Al Khalifa'.⁵⁷⁹ Saudi influence undoubtedly buttressed the anti-reform nature of hardliners such as the Prime Minister, who began to move away from reinstating democracy. As E.F. Given noted in 1979, 'this may be due to the influence of the Saudis, who I believe greatly disapproved of the Bahrain experiment in democracy'.⁵⁸⁰

While successive British political agents had initially rejected, but eventually encouraged the idea of democracy, it was now chiefly Saudi conservatism, and fear of Shi'a subversion that prompted the question of democracy to be firmly snubbed in 1980, when the Bahraini leadership insisted there would be no return to parliamentary life.⁵⁸¹ Yet Al Khalifa prejudice seemed to have crept in too, with Tesh noting that 'The Amir 'growled about "All these Shia"' in the Assembly's early days. ⁵⁸² The Prime Minister too was insistent that democracy in Bahrain would mean a parliament populated by men in Turbans who take their orders from Khomeini.⁵⁸³ The feeling that the government gave too much in the way of representation in 1970 may explain the renege on promises made by the King in 2001. Yet without British pressure for

576 R. Tomkys, *First Impressions*, 4 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

577 E.F. Given, *Bahrain: Annual Report for 1976*, 5 January 1977, FCO 8/2873, TNA.

578 I.T.M. Lucas, *Bahrain 1977*, 9 February 1978, FCO 8/3091, TNA.

579 E.F. Given, *Prospects for Bahrain*, 5 July 1976, FCO8/2643, TNA.

580 *Ibid.*

581 H.B. Walker, 26 October 1980, FCO8/3489.

582 R.M. Tesh, 'Bahrain: Constitutional Development'.

583 H.B. Walker, *Bahrain Internal - Representative Assembly*, 19 February 1981, FCO 8/3893

reform, which had been particularly acute in 1963, the Al Khalifa could indulge their habitual disdain for democratic institution by 'clinging' not to Britain, but to Saudi Arabia, with whom they were more ideologically aligned.

Thus democratisation as a means of grievance removal and a safety valve to mitigate potential unrest was a temporary tactic, not deep rooted enough to affect Al Khalifa hegemony. Attempts to resurrect the democracy were prevented by Bahrain's new patron, Saudi Arabia. The Al Khalifa Ruling Family Council too were disillusioned with democracy, and blamed the Amir for ever having agreed to it.⁵⁸⁴ The Prime Minister, who was firmly 'in the saddle' by the late 1970s, was, according to the British, 'reluctant to defy King Faisal'.⁵⁸⁵ Thus the reassertion of Al Khalifa authoritarianism and Saudi pressure can offer more insight into the repressive measures taken by the Al Khalifa regime. However, as Franklin notes, 'The dissolution of Parliament in 1975 abruptly terminated this political development without ending the sentiments in favour of reform, creating and reinforcing a profound sense of deprivation and frustration'.⁵⁸⁶

Saudi influence was also touted as being important in stymying any democratic advance in the 1990s. In a time-honoured tradition, the 1990s Intifada resulted in the construction of an appointed council to form as a safety valve for the popular temper. In 1993 a thirty member council with fifteen Sunni and fifteen Shi'a was appointed by the Amir, but they had no legislative function. As one Bahraini argued, this 'Shura proposal was 95 percent made-in-Saudi Arabia',⁵⁸⁷ pointing again to the idea that the extent of repressive reform was dictated by Saudi interests. Given the context of the times, it is hardly surprising. In 1997, the Saudi Interior Prince Nayif had 'ugred his Yemeni counterpart to cancel the parliamentary elections' on the basis that they were a 'threat to stability in the region'.⁵⁸⁸

While the Shura council was criticised as pointless, a number of Bahrainis, including a former Cabinet minister, alluded to how policy was increasingly the role of a small cabal headed by the conservative, Saudi-influenced Prime Minister; 'even the cabinet itself was no longer the site of useful policy discussion, and in recent years

584 R.M. Tesh, 10 June 1974, FCO8/2180, TNA.

585 A.J.D. Stirling, 'Bahrain: Annual Review for 1971'.

586 R. Franklin, 'Migrant Labour and the Politics...'

587 Cited in HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

588 Washington Post, 26 April 1997, HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

assembled only to rubber-stamp the decisions of Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the brother of the Amir, and to hear from a small number of other influential officials, most notably Minister of Interior Muhammad bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, a first cousin of the Amir'.⁵⁸⁹ Unsurprisingly, the regime's attempt at diffusing tension through a facade of popular representation was a failure, and unrest continued through the 1990s. While the council was updated in 1996 to forty members,⁵⁹⁰ it was dissolved in 2002 upon the creation of the country's bicameral parliament.

Towards Facade Democracy: A Faulty Safety Valve

When viewed under a critical lens, the reforms of 2001, which were meant to usher in a new era of progress, can best be described as a constitutional coup. Ostensibly a response to American foreign policy promotion goals of democratisation, the actual reforms were clearly tempered by a fear of giving the Shi'a too much power. As Al Aali notes, "The Saudi leadership opposes open elections in Bahrain for fear that the Shi'a would gain too much power".⁵⁹¹ In particular, Bahrain's close alliance with Saudi has facilitated the execution of Saudi foreign policy objectives, which revolve around countering internal democratic development in Bahrain. This, they see, as a form of Iranian expansionism in the region⁵⁹². As they did in the early 1970s, the government sought to restrict the threats posed by social movements and opposition by diffusing tension through democratic reforms, while also ensuring mechanisms for their continued political dominance. However, the structures of democracy chosen 'virtually guaranteed that ultimate decision-making power remained in the palace'.⁵⁹³ This supported the British assertions of 1982, in which they noted that the 'Al Khalifa intend to continue to control Bahrain themselves'.⁵⁹⁴ In particular, 'the way in which

589 Cited in HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

590 T. Lansford, 'Bahrain', *Political Handbook of the World 2014*, London, Sage, p. 109.

591 W.T. Monroe, 'Bahraini Political Scene Part II: Royal Family Conservatives Tighten Reins on Politics'.

592 O. Hassan, 'Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia's counteracting democracy strategy', *Democratization*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 479-495, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2014.981161

593 International Crisis Group, 'Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt', MENA Report No. 105, 6 April 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Bahrain/105-%20Popular%20Protests%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20-III-The%20Bahrain%20Revolt.pdf>, (accessed 2 November 2015).

594 W.R. Tomkys, 8 May 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

the Amir and his family spend their funds will certainly be off limits'.⁵⁹⁵ To this end, constitutional amendments required a two-thirds majority of both elected and appointed chambers houses, rendering change highly improbable. Furthermore, the reforms meant that 'while power to pass laws rests with both chambers, the cabinet alone has the right to initiate and draft them, and the appointed Shura chamber has in effect veto power over initiatives and decisions by the elected chamber'.⁵⁹⁶

Perhaps most importantly, the newly declared King retains the 'power to rule by decree (*marsūm bi-qanūn*), provided such decrees do not violate the constitution'.⁵⁹⁷ Yet as we will see in the chapter on legal control, the constitution's national safety caveat essentially suspends constitutionality guaranteed protections of civil liberties or rights. In addition to this, a few political slights of hands were issued during the reforms. A number of statutory decrees were issued before the creation of a new parliament, ones that were not able to be challenged by the new elected body. These included the draconian press law, which although suspended after protests, was enforced at the government's discretion.⁵⁹⁸ As with any statutory decrees issued prior to the first meeting of Bahrain's 'democratic' National Assembly, none could be amended unless both houses voted to rescind them.⁵⁹⁹ The reality of this meant that it is virtually impossible to rescind any laws decreed before the creation of the National Assembly in 2002, no matter how draconian.

Electorally, the regime were careful to disempower the country's Shi'a. Prior to 2014, Bahrain's electoral boundaries were drawn in such a way to minimise the impact of the Shi'a vote. Sunni constituencies numbering only a few hundred were often given the same voting power as a Shi'a-dominated block consisting of thousands of citizens. In some cases, one Sunni vote equalled 21 Shi'a votes.⁶⁰⁰ Influential in this strategy were hardline members of the ruling family, 'two well-

595Ibid.

596 International Crisis Group, 'Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt'.

597 International Crisis Group, 'Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt'.

598 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 'Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms – Bahrain', 2008.

599International Crisis Group (2011) Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt, Available http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/AdvancedSearchDetails.aspx?id=5654#.Us_xS_RdWws (Accessed 10/01/2014)

600F. Desmukh, 'Gerrymandering in Bahrain. Twenty-one persons, one vote', 2013, Bahrain Watch, <https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2013/02/11/gerrymandering-in-bahrain-twenty-one-persons-one-vote/>, (accessed 2 October 2015).

placed Al Khalifa brothers - Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah and President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah - have been leading the effort to contain the electoral process'.⁶⁰¹ In 2014, the government eventually redrew electoral districts to tackle issues of blatant gerrymandering that weakened the 'Shi'a vote', but the now established Shi'a Islamist Al Wafaq opposition complained that it was done so in a way to disempower both them and Islamists in general.

The facade democratisation prompted by the King had, prior to the 2014 elections, given more clout to Sunni Islamists to balance the increasingly empowered Shi'a bloc in parliament, a move which the American Ambassador noted made Bahrain more conservative. King Hamad's empowerment of the Sunnis reflected a conflict in his 'desire to be a regional leader on reform' and the desire of 'neighbours -- especially Saudi Arabia -- who worry about the influence his reforms might have elsewhere in the region'.⁶⁰² Yet although the King 'counsels patience and understanding with the Shi'a', he still 'permits hard-line royal family members to crack down hard against Shi'a interests'.⁶⁰³ The influence of these hardliners was noted by Al-Wasat editor (and former Shi'a exile) Mansur al-Jamri, who said that Minister of the Royal Court Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed is now the de facto Prime Minister, and that Shaykh Khalifa is currently more focused on protecting his business interests and his family's future.⁶⁰⁴

Whether or not this faction exerts more power than the Prime Minister is debatable, and perhaps irrelevant, as their interests seem generally aligned on matters of internal security. The limited nature of democratisation as a repressive safety valve, evident in the constitutional coup, reflects again a middle course between appeasing US and European Interests, while also bending to the Saudi and Al Khalifa desire to not empower the Shi'a too much. So long as transatlantic democracy promotion is itself muted by a strategic 'interest in containing Iran',⁶⁰⁵ significant democratic reform that would put the Shi'a on an equal footing with other Bahrainis is unlikely. This is especially true given that Bahrain's transatlantic allies will 'prioritize immediate

601 W.T. Monroe, 'Bahraini Political Scene Part II: Royal Family Conservatives Tighten Reins on Politics'.

602 W.T. Monroe, 'Future of Bahrain: Ambassador's Parting Thoughts'.

603 Ibid

604 Ibid.

605 O. Hassan, 'Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda?...', p. 480.

security interests over promoting democracy'.⁶⁰⁶ As for democratisation in its current guise, the limits, as defined by Saudi and the Al Khalifa, have already been reached.

Conclusion

By parsing the different methods of political statecraft, this chapter highlights a number of important considerations with regards to the development of repressive statecraft in Bahrain. Firstly, the deployment of a number of tactics have been contingent on particular foreign policy objects of Bahrain's suzerains. In particular, British intervention in the 1920s and the 1950s was tempered by a desire to not be seen to be too involved in Bahrain's internal affairs. Nonetheless, the prospect of instability in Bahrain always prompted intervention by Bahrain's protecting powers. Secondly, the reasons for using certain tactics in certain instances are difficult to generalise. For example; rewards and rentierism, which were enabled by Saudi largesse, were often an excuse for the cutting short of democratic experimentation or administrative reforms in favour of more blatantly paternalistic and patrimonial distribution of makramāt. This itself stemmed from the Saudi fear of emboldening Bahrain's Shi'a, and subsequently the Shi'a in Saudi's Eastern province. Yet the impact of such tactics has always been somewhat limited, a fact that has been thrown into sharp relief in the recent Uprising, which Khalaf calls the mark of the death of rentier economics.⁶⁰⁷

Repression now is mainly focused on the Shi'a community, and methods disproportionately effect them, whether through gerrymandering, or denationalization. This has been notable in particular in the two major episodes of dissent; the 1990s Intifada and the 2011 Uprising. While the Iran-Iraq war and the Iranian Revolution was a catalyst for further repression of the Shi'a, the tendency towards a more draconian policy was set in place following Independence in 1971, itself due to Saudi ascendancy and the reassertion of the Al Khalifa's legacy of conquest. As Jones notes, 'without Saudi support, the Al Khalifa may be forced to negotiate a social contract that provides more concessions and power to the ruled, yet this seems far off'.⁶⁰⁸

606 Ibid.

607 Khalaf, 'Foreword', 2015.

608 M. Jones, 'Saudi Intervention, Sectarianism, and De-democratization in Bahrain's Uprising', in Davies, T., Ryan, H. and Pena, A., (Eds), *Protest, Social Movements, and Global Democracy Since 2011 (Special Issue)*, *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, Vol. 39, 2016, pp. 251 – 279.

Chapter Four

Policing, Security, and Personal Integrity Violations

The officers responsible for interrogation are Arabs and the more brutal among them, according to Ian Henderson, are invariably Bahraini. The encouragement they get from some members of the AL Khalifa is to be more rather than less tough in their methods⁶⁰⁹

Violations of personal integrity have been a crucial method of containing dissent in Bahrain over the past 100 years. As the key actors responsible for the processes of *intimidation*, *incapacitation* and *containment*, this chapter documents how the repressive potential of Bahrain's security services has developed over the past 100 years, highlighting a number of factors that have come together to create the historical persistence of security service militancy, from ideological reasons and poor training, to social conditions leading to high levels of antagonism against the government itself. However, in addition to the foreign and sectarian make-up of the police, it was independence that prompted a decline in British control over police and a subsequent reassertion of AL Khalifa and Saudi influence in matters of internal security. While this coincided with the rise of the Shi'a theocratic Iranian state, it is important to note that changes in repressive policy were set in motion before this, and that growing repression seems to be more a reassertion of brutal policy prior to the reforms of the 1920s. Furthermore, a culture of permissibility has arisen in Bahrain's security services, in which extreme forms of coercion seem to be perceived as valid means of social control, a phenomenon buttressed by the increasing use of sectarianism to legitimise oppression and the Al Khalifa's legacy of conquest. The inability of the government to secure legitimacy has necessitated the need for a 'strong arm' of government to deal with frequent political agitation. Indeed, personal integrity violations have been used frequently to repress dissent, and despite the creation of a constitution and parliament, they appear to have become worse over the last 100

609W.R. Tomkys, 16 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

years.

Policing: The Struggle Between Force and Consent

A Brief History

Before discussing personal integrity violations, and how and why they have changed, it is useful to look at the political milieu that has shaped Bahrain's security apparatus in order to explore why they have emerged as the force that they have. The term security apparatus is preferable to police since the CID, police, NSA, military, Bedouin, auxiliaries, and Levy Corps have all been used to repress dissent. This is particularly true during times of political crisis, where the differing roles between such agencies or groups becomes increasingly nebulous, and cooperation between them expands to include internal policing duties.⁶¹⁰

As the main institutions responsible for violating personal integrity, the security apparatus has historically been a contentious force in Bahrain, suffering from both a legitimacy deficit and an authoritarian disposition. While the security apparatus has modernized and professionalized over the past 100 years, it evolved as did many colonial forces in the region, as a 'complex mixture of paramilitary, civil and tribal organizations; of civil and tribal courts administering different law'.⁶¹¹ However, the term modernization belies the fact that many of these characteristics have simply been imbibed to create a larger apparatus with more sophisticated tools of coercion at its disposal. Indeed, while the apparatus of control has been modernized, there has been little consent to this change, resulting in a force with a disputed mandate. The inability of the police to maintain public approval and respect, and thus minimise the need for repressive force, stems from the fact that their primary function in Bahrain has been to defend British, foreign and Ruling Family interests while insulating the elites from anti-constitutional agitation. While Bahrain was a British protectorate, tactics of policing, especially since Independence, resembled that of other colonies, having 'little to do with serving the community and everything to do with upholding the authority of the colonial', and in Bahrain's case, the recolonised state.⁶¹² Indeed, the

610 A. Turk, *Organizational Deviance*, p. 248.

611 D. H. Johnson, 'From military to tribal police: policing the Upper Nile province of the Sudan', in D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 151.

612 D. Killingray, 'Guarding the extending frontier: policing the Gold Coast, 1865–1913', in D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940*,

security services were, and continue to be, little more than the 'agents of arbitrary "traditional" rule', and in this case, Al Khalifa domination.⁶¹³

This proximity was symbolised by the British official Charles Belgrave, who was both financial advisor to the Ruler, as well as Commandant of the Police.⁶¹⁴ This joint responsibility as an officer of public service and as an employee protecting the wealth of the ruling family inevitably led to some role confusion. This blurring of roles continued well into the 1960s, when Benn, the British superintendent of the police, was being given a supplementary financial emolument 'paid for privily'⁶¹⁵ out of the personal pocket of the Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa. This fact, 'had become "embarrassingly widely known"⁶¹⁶, and no doubt contributed to the 'perception that the British were mercenary enforcers of Al Khalifa hegemony'.⁶¹⁷ As a result, it is unsurprising that the security apparatus has reflected the political intentions and prejudices of the dominant power.

Yet initially the police and security apparatus was created to bolster Hamad's, and therefore Britain's position. Prior to the police, the ruler and other members of the ruling family had relied on 'wild Bedouin' as a source of strength.⁶¹⁸ The repressive actions of the *al-fidawiyya*⁶¹⁹ (warriors), most of whom were acting on the orders of their respective tribal chiefs, needed to be addressed as they were a continued source of annoyance for the British authorities. Persian disquiet over the treatment of their fellow co-religionists was also a major issue, as the British were keen to diffuse tensions with Persia, who were threatening to go to the League of Nations to hold Britain to account for the misrule of Bahrain's Shi'a subjects. Although the British were concerned too that reforms that challenged Sunni hegemony would anger Ibn Saud, they thought that appeasing Persia would force the Al Khalifas and (Ibn Saud) to put their house in order, frightening them with the

Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 123.

613 D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), 'An orderly retreat? Policing the end of empire', in *Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism, and the Police, 1917–65*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, p. 4.

614 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, *BGAR*, vol. 5, p. 47.

615 J.P. Tripp, Communique to A.D. Parsons, 14 February 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.

616 A.D. Parsons, Communique to T.F. Brenchley, 18 December 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.

617 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards: Police Deviance, Brutality, and Unaccountability in Bahrain', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 212.

618 F.B. Prideaux, Communique from the Agency in Bahrain, 24 June 1904, *RoB*, vol. 3, p. 274.

619 The *al-fidawiyya* were the armed retainers of the feudal shaykhs who were responsible for coercion and enforcement.

bogeyman of Persian intent.⁶²⁰ Despite this self interest, Britain's Viceroy also suggested humanitarian reasons as motivations for the decision to reform, stating: 'All we want is to put ourselves right with the world and the Bahreinis by the introduction of some measure of justice and equitable taxation'.⁶²¹ The creation of the Manama Municipality was significant in this, for it prompted the creation of a embryonic police force (collection of *Naturs*), designed to prevent 'rowdyism' and protect trade in the capital.

Poor Quality of Recruits: Mercenaries, Baltajiyya, and Foreigners

In addition to the Municipality, Hamad was given a personal body of Levy Corps, not to protect him, 'but to remove the excuse that he had no force to maintain order and could not restrain his relatives, fidawis and other Sunnis from armed attacks on his Shia subjects'.⁶²² This establishment of the Muskati Baluchi Levies followed the second Sitra Outrage, which Hamad insisted he could not control,⁶²³ and paved the way for British-backed militaristic intervention on the mainland. The set up of the Levies also accompanied the creation of a small police force totalling 89 people. Yet it was decided that there was no need for separate police and Levy force in 1926.⁶²⁴ Indeed, the Levies were short lived following an incident in which one of them shot and killed their commanding officer, wounding Major Daly, the Political Agent, in the process. Their sudden disbanding required the prompt arrival of an Indian regiment and Indian Police.⁶²⁵ However, Indians did not speak much Arabic, which meant that they were replaced by a force of local men, a move which was completed in 1932.

Aside from teething trouble, the police force was popular, especially among the oppressed *bahārna* and residents of Manama who, on one occasion, lent their weapons and support to the police following an attack on a police outpost. Generally, the Shi'a at this time supported Hamad (according to Belgrave).⁶²⁶ The establishment

620 Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State for India, 14 May 1923, RoB, vol 3, p. 761.

621 Ibid.

622 Horner, Express Message, 1923 – 1932, RoB. Vol. 4. p. 222.

623 C.G. Prior, Communique from Political Agency Bahrain, RoB, vol. 4, p. 550.

624 'Notes on formation of New Police Force', RoB. vol. 4, p. 223.

625 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, BGAR, vol. 5, p. 48.

626 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, p. 47.

of a standing force of armed enforcers of Hamad's authority did not come without resistance. Unsurprisingly, the faction of the Al Khalifa who opposed the British-led reforms directed attacks against the police in the early days, as they saw it as an extension of British colonial control and an encroachment on their tribal privilege. Indeed, contrary to many colonies, where the police were a source of popular hostility,⁶²⁷ the police force in Bahrain was popular with an indigenous population attempting to protect themselves from oppression – in the beginning at least.

Despite the initial popularity with the country's Shi'a population, the early security apparatus in Bahrain was the result of a balancing act, an attempt to control the Al Khalifa while also not overly antagonising them, Ibn Saud, or the Persians. To ameliorate this, a number of Al Khalifa were co-opted into joining the police, yet having recalcitrant members of the ruling family who were 'uneducated, vain, lazy, and inclined to oppress'⁶²⁸ in the police meant that the security apparatus, even in its nascent form, was populated by characters seen as villainous, cruel and unpopular. In addition to this, 'many of the recruits were also drawn from the country's *al-fidawiyya*, the notorious henchman and enforcers used by the Al Khalifa to extract tax, intimidate the populace, and uphold their feudal rule'.⁶²⁹ Unsurprisingly, they were disliked by many of the population. The fact that they were led by equally unpopular characters was also an issue in maintaining discipline, authority and control. In the 1920s, the Amir of Manama, whose role was 'Governor and Chief of Police combined',⁶³⁰ was described as 'one of the worst characters in Bahrain'.⁶³¹ However, he could be 'trusted by the Sheikhs to support them in every form of extortion', and 'had arbitrarily collected taxes, practically the whole of which were devoted to his personal expenditure'.⁶³² When he was removed by Hamad in 1923, the representatives of the Al Khalifa demanded the reinstatement of the Amir of Manama.⁶³³ The Amir of Muharraq, who used to be the Amir of Manama, was also

627 D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), 'An orderly retreat?' p. 9.

628 A.P. Trevor, 'Bahrain Reforms', RoB, vol. 4, p. 189.

629 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards: Police Deviance, Brutality, and Unaccountability in Bahrain'. p. 220.

630 C. Belgrave, 'The Bahrain Municipality', RoB, vol. 3, 1993, p. 651.

631 The Amir of Manama was later in charge of watchmen, (not police): C. Belgrave, Papers, 8 February 1927

632 C.K. Daly, Note on the political situation in Bahrain November 1921, 6 January 1922, RoB, vol. 3, 1993, p. 669.

633 C.K. Daly, 'Memorandum', 4 October 1923, RoB, vol. 4 p. 141.

described in 1929 by Charles Belgrave as a 'fat useless one eyed rascal who never [did] any work'.⁶³⁴ In 1930, the Amir of Manama, who was appointed in 1927 was described by Belgrave as a 'fat lazy scoundrel'⁶³⁵ who did nothing but 'strut(s) about with a belt full of pistols and daggers' had watchmen who were 'treating people very badly'.⁶³⁶

Yet by creating the police the British had usurped the Al Khalifa's monopoly on arbitrary violence and position of privilege, creating a system whereby the British were the main bulwark against Al Khalifa oppression of the *baḥārna*, a position that would eventually be eroded in the subsequent decades. This change set in place a dynamic that served to moderate, but not fundamentally alter, an antagonistic relationship between the Al Khalifa and the citizens of Bahrain. Despite modernization, subsequent members of the Al Khalifa family holding important positions have been criticised for either their hostility towards the Shi'a, or general incompetence or criminality. In 1956, Major William Oscar Little, a British officer in the Bahraini police described the Director of Police and Public Security, Shaykh Khalifa bin Muhammad, 'as a debauchee and a drunkard', and 'a leading crook, with a finger in every nefarious and profitable racket, from drug smuggling to the slave transit traffic and procurement of girls'.⁶³⁷ Shaykh Khalifa's replacement, Muhammad bin Salman Al Khalifa, also had a reputation for anti-*baḥārna* violence (see chapter on legal control).

Naturs, Bedouin and Vigilantes

As well as the questionable nature of recruits, the complex mix of paramilitary, tribal, and official security organizations also made issues of co-ordination, discipline, and role delineation complicated, inclining the Bahrain Security Services to deviance⁶³⁸.

634 C. Belgrave, Papers, 9 October 1929.

635 Ibid., 11 February 1928.

636 Ibid., 19 February 1930.

637 W.O. Little, 'Report by Major Little', in Pamphlet on Bahrain, Part IV, p. 4, 1957, FO 371/126918, TNA.

638 Police system complicated. Initially, suggested in 1924, paid for by municipalities. OC levies administrative charge of police, but not work, two superintendents (amirs). Police to be higher grade than Levies. Picked men from levies appointed as police. p. 237 Rob vol. 4

pg 8. vol 2. 1937. History of 1926. Baluchi levies brought in. Assas attempt. Levies sent away. Everyone afraid of Dawasir. Indian regiment brought in. Then Indian Levies under park brought in end of 1926. ...quote 'regarded by the people of Bahrain as expensive foreign mercenaries'...phased out 1932.

The Bahraini police grew out of force of Natures or 'watchmen'. These ill-trained, often illiterate guards, initially commanded by a minor Shaykh (Amir) and operating in the Manama Municipality, would eventually supplement the work of the police. As Belgrave noted, 'they [the Natures] were greatly feared especially by the Shia villagers'.⁶³⁹ Described in in 1929 as 'rather a wild body' but suitable to local requirements, they were the only force that Arabs would join as they could 'resign easily', go diving and were 'not obliged to wear uniforms'.⁶⁴⁰ Belgrave in 1927 described Natures as a 'sort of civil police',⁶⁴¹ and they were frequently called upon to help police unrest, even though their training and discipline was questionable. For example, in the pearl diver riots of 1932, many started firing guns 'wildly' in an effort to control the situation.⁶⁴² In 1965, five hundred *nawātir* helped quash the March uprising, helping the already stretched police.⁶⁴³

The evolution of various elements, including the *al-fidawiyya* into the Natures was also supplemented by the fact the shaykhs appeared to maintain a lot of their Bedouin retainers who would help enforce the law. Yet these Bedouin were notably violent in their approach. In 1938, the *Shabab al-Watani (The Youth of the Nation)*, a group of young, politically-minded Bahrainis, claimed that they were beaten by a 'number of bedouins' when they protested outside the British Agency.⁶⁴⁴ A picket of boys were also arrested by the Ruler's retainers in 1938.⁶⁴⁵ In 1954, when the Al Khalifa oppression of the 1920s was still well within living memory, the Shaykh's Bedouin were used at road blocks to intimidate people, who were described as 'very scared of them'.⁶⁴⁶

In 1954, during Sunni – Shi'a communal disturbances, the police and the 'Ruler's Bedouin'⁶⁴⁷ patrolled Bahrain, with Charles Belgrave arguing that such ancillaries were necessary, even though the Higher Executive Committee had protested against the 'provocative attitude of the Bedouin police auxiliaries'.⁶⁴⁸ The

639 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, *BGAR*, vol. 5, p. 47.

640 C.G. Prior, 29 June 1929, RoB, vol. 4, p. 556.

641 C. Belgrave, Papers, 8 April 1927.

642 C. Belgrave, Papers, 26 May 1932.

643 P.E. Turnbull, A review of the structure and organization of the Bahraini State Police Force, 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.

644 Al-Shabab al-Watani, 1938, RoB, vol. 5, p. 130.

645 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, *BGAR*, vol. 2, p. 29,

646 C. Belgrave, Papers, 4 December 1954.

647 J.W. Wall, Communique to FO, 4 December 1954, RoB, vol. 7, p. 86.

648 Ibid., p. 87.

problem was exacerbated by a ill-disciplined, and jumpy police force. As Belgrave noted in 1954; 'The Police refused to go out on duty without rifles, the fact is the Police, except for show, are utterly useless & the main fault is Khalifah who is lazy, cowardly & incompetent & always keeps himself well out of the way if there is any possibility of trouble'.⁶⁴⁹ On a number of occasions, the British had to intervene to prevent the young shaykhs leading attacks of hundreds of bedouin against the *baḥārna*. The Ruler even joined the Bedouin in war dances after they gathered in Rifa'a to show support and intimidate the *baḥārna*.⁶⁵⁰

Yet the presence of multiple agencies under Al Khalifa control became more acute after the diminution of British control of the police following Independence. The British Ambassador Roger Tomkys complained that a multiplicity of pseudo-security organs (see chapter on statecraft) were illegally deporting Shi'a. In the recent uprising, the role of such para-state security organizations has been heavily evident. Numerous reports, videos, and accounts have shown how thugs in civilian clothes have attacked activists or protesters. In 2012, Ahmad Ismail, a citizen journalist, was shot and killed by unknown assailants in an unmarked car as he filmed a protest. Dr. Mike Diboll, a teacher at Bahrain Polytechnic, described how "loyalist" vigilantes 'equipped with pickaxe handles, iron bars, swords, spears and machetes' and 'supported by Ministry of the Interior Police', came to campus to confront protesters.⁶⁵¹

Indeed, since 2011, numerous videos have emerged of vigilantes, or *baltajiyya*, attacking civilians. The term *baltajiyya* has become engrained in the Bahrain lexicon due to their prevalence. This vigilantism epitomises a Hobbesian lawlessness, as it can lead to pro-democracy activists silencing their calls for change in exchange for the security afforded by an authoritarian government. Indeed, the psychological implications of unfettered and unrestrained vigilantism can be telling, and their lateral nature symbolises a breakdown of traditional non-state mechanisms of protection, such as community and neighbourliness. In combination with state violence, vigilantism is therefore amongst the most insidious forms of political violence. The extent to which the authorities endorse this vigilantism is highlighted by their apathy

649 C. Belgrave, Papers, 6 September 1954.

650 C. Belgrave, Papers, 6 July 1954.

651 M. Diboll, 'Written evidence from Dr Mike Diboll'.

in tackling it, and their general fear of restraining Sunni loyalists.

Foreign Mercenaries

The Bahraini government's recruitment policy in the officially state-sanctioned security services has often motivated contentious politics, being both a source of discontent and a driver of repressive action. This is particularly true due to the number of foreign employees in the PSF and National Guard. As Ala'a Shehabi and Nazgol Kafai state, 'The running joke in Bahrain is that you can expect to be arrested by a Pakistani, interrogated by a Jordanian, tortured by a Yemeni, and judged by an Egyptian, but at least you can expect your fellow prisoners to be Bahraini'.⁶⁵² This historical recruitment of foreigners, termed pejoratively, but accurately, *al-murtazaqa* (mercenaries) has bred resentment, and resulted in a security apparatus that is 'for the most part alien and thus mercenary in nature'.⁶⁵³

In the first half of the 19th century, recruitment policy was shaped to a large extent by British foreign policy concerns, with the historic tensions between Persia and Saudi informing how candidates were selected. This was particularly true in the 1920s when Britain, having to appease both the Saudi, *baḥārna*, and the Al Khalifa, adopted an ambivalent strategy to recruitment. For example, during the early part of the 20th century, when the British were seeking to restrain Al Khalifa piracy and banditry, it was expedient, yet expensive, to have Punjabi Indian Muslims as policemen. Yet locals saw them as 'expensive foreign mercenaries',⁶⁵⁴ and they were phased out to be eventually replaced by a force described by Belgrave as consisting of 'Bahrain Arabs, Shia Baharna, manumitted slaves, local Persians', and a 'sprinkling of 'Kurds, Iraqis, Swahili and Sudanese'.⁶⁵⁵ However, discontent at the presence of Persian policemen excited further historical animosity between the Al Khalifa, Al Saud and Persia, culminating in the Najdi Persian riots in 1923, in which a number of

652 N. Kafai and A. Shehabi, 'The struggle for information: revelations on mercenaries, sectarian agitation, and demographic engineering in Bahrain', *Jadaliyya*, 29 May 2014, www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/17912/the-struggle-for-information_revelations-on-mercen, (accessed 3 November 2015).

653 D. Killingray, 'Guarding the extending frontier: policing the Gold Coast, 1865–1913', in D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 106.

654 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1937, *BGAR*, vol. 2, p. 10.

655 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1351 (1932 – 33), *BGAR*, vol. 1, p. 358.

Persians were killed. As most of the Natures at the time were Persians⁶⁵⁶, and Ibn Saud's anger more acute than Persia's, this prompted Knox to get rid of a couple of them to appease Ibn Saud.⁶⁵⁷

Further shifting geopolitical imperatives changed the nature of this recruiting policy, yet they always brought with them questions of police legitimacy. Following India's Independence, and the growth of Arab Nationalism and Communism in parts of the Arab World, the British had to look elsewhere for recruits. In the 1950s, soldiers from Iraq and tribal militias from *al-Hasa* were brought in to help keep order.⁶⁵⁸ These troops were acceptable to both the Al Khalifa and the British, but not the citizens, who protested over the presence of foreigners in the police. Despite this, the tradition of recruiting strangers to police 'strangers' continued into the 1960s when the British commandant of the police, Winder, went to Pakistan to recruit ex-servicemen'.⁶⁵⁹ In 1965, of the 921 strong police force in Bahrain, only 25% were Bahraini. In 1970, this had increased to 32%.⁶⁶⁰

Fig 9. Table showing percentage of foreigners in the Bahrain police

	1934 - 1935	1957	1960	1965	1970	2015
Percent Bahraini	6% ⁶⁶¹	24.00%	21.00%	25.00%	32.00%	50% ⁶⁶²

There were a number of reasons why local policemen were eschewed in favour of foreigners. For example, Winder, the police commandant in 1965, maintained that 'Bahrainis [did] not make good policeman being lazy and not amenable to discipline'.⁶⁶³ It was also a problem that very few applied. In 1961, of 360 recruits who applied, only four were Bahraini.⁶⁶⁴ Also, the lack of suitable local recruits

656 A.P. Trevor, From the British Residency – Bushire, 10 November 1923, vol. 4, p. 196.

657 Col. S.G. Knox, From Bushire to Secretary of State for Colonies, RoB, vol. 3, p. 757.

658 F. Khuri, p. 207.

659 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards', p. 212.

660 J.S. Bell, Annual Report for 1970, *BGAR*, vol. 8, p. 95

661 This number is derived from a total force of 172, and 10 Shi'a bahārna. No 'Bahrainios' were mentioned, just Arabs, Persians, Manumitted Slaves, Swahilis, Sudanese, Iraqis, Yemenis, Kurds, Malabaris, and Baluchis. p. 523. Annual Records/ Belgrave. Vol. 1..On p. 445 he mentions all enlisted locally-not all local.

662 S. E. Nepstad, *Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 140. (This figure includes all armed forces).

663 J.P. Tripp, 14 Feb 1965, FO 371/179790, TNA.

664 M. b. S. Al Khalifah, Annual Report for Year 1961, *BGAR*, vol. 6, p. 46.

prompted the employment of foreigners, especially after the troubles of 1965.⁶⁶⁵

Following the disturbances of 1965, Peter Edward Turnbull was commissioned to do a report on the Bahrain Police. He argued that more Bahraini policeman should be recruited, yet the trend of employing foreigners continued unabated post-Independence, and was adopted by the newly formed military. In 1974, three hundred 'kindred tribesmen' from Saudi Arabia were brought in to join the Bahrain Defence Force.⁶⁶⁶ The imperative of recruiting foreigners, specifically Sunnis, was especially apparent after the Iranian Revolution, and it is now believed that 50% of Bahrain's security apparatus are foreign Sunnis. This recruitment problem was compounded by the reluctance of young Bahrainis outside the Al Khalifa to join the security services.⁶⁶⁷

The use of foreign Sunnis in the security apparatus was evident in the 2011 Uprising. At least five hundred Emirate policemen entered Bahrain in 2011 to augment the Bahraini forces.⁶⁶⁸ These Emirate policemen remained in Bahrain until at least March 2014.⁶⁶⁹ In April 2014, the *Bahrain Mirror* published leaked documents revealing that there were at least 499 Jordanian citizens working in the Bahraini security sector.⁶⁷⁰ Furthermore, according to Pakistan's foreign minister Naila Chohan, 10,000 Pakistanis were serving in Bahrain's 'defence services' in 2014.⁶⁷¹ Many of Bahrain's PSF are still recruited from Yemen, Syria, Jordan and other countries in the Arab world, although the military tends to be predominantly Bahraini.

The use of these *al-murtazaqa* is provocative on a number of levels. Not only does it raise issues of employment by depriving Bahrainis of many state sector jobs, thus promoting antagonism along political and economic lines, but it also means that a non-native police force are tasked with policing a foreign citizenry – an issue that

665 K. Oldfield, 30 August 1965, FO 371/179790, TNA.

666 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1974, 2 January 1975, FCO 8/2414. The National Archives.

667 W. R. Tomkys, Tel 75: Internal Security, 27 April 1982, FCO 8/4332.

668J. Lessware, 'State of emergency declared in Bahrain', *The National*, 16 March 2011, www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/state-of-emergency-declared-in-bahrain, (accessed 3 October 2015).

669*The National*, 'Emirati officer dies in Bahrain bomb explosion', 3 March 2014, www.thenational.ae/world/emirati-officer-dies-in-bahrain-bomb-explosion, (accessed 3 October 2015).

670*Bahrain Mirror*, 'Bahrain Mirror publishes important document regarding Jordanian police: 499 policemen are costing Bahrain 1.8 million dollar per month', 3 April 2014, <http://bmirror14feb2011.no-ip.org/news/14724.html>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

671 P. Muhammad, 'Foreign relations: tit-for-tat proposed over visa rejections', *The Express Tribune*, 1 April 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/689833/foreign-relations-tit-for-tat-proposed-over-visa-rejections/>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

erodes the legitimacy of the police.⁶⁷² It has also prevented the emergence of what Douglas Johnson calls a positive 'link between government and the people'.⁶⁷³ Fuad Khuri concurs, arguing that the use of foreign police in Bahrain is said to 'harden their hearts',⁶⁷⁴ imbuing the police with less empathy to the local population and increasing the likelihood of more egregious violations. So while policing may be understood 'as a continuum of activities ranging from a pole of service, protection, and concern for individualizing justice to a pole of domination, exploitation, and concern for maintaining order',⁶⁷⁵ the security services in Bahrain have long inhabited the latter end of the continuum, an aspect facilitated by having a mercenary police force. Even the Bahraini Interior Minister recently acknowledged that using Bahrainis to police Bahrain problems would be problematic.⁶⁷⁶

672Insert Table on Recruitment

673D. H. Johnson, p. 153.

674F. Khuri, p. 123.

675Austin Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 116

676Lies of Samira bin Rajab, [online video], 14 March 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA4qMgNugys>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

Fig 10: Outline of the multiple modern security organs in Bahrain

	Bahrain defence Force (BDF)	National Guard	Public Security Forces (PSF)/Police	National Security Agency	Criminal Investigation Department (CID)
Established	1968	1997 ⁶⁷⁷	1920s	2002 ⁶⁷⁸	1966
Responsible to	The King, who is the Supreme Commander of the BDF	The King of Bahrain	Ministry of the Interior. Formerly the Bahrain Police Directorate, the Ministry of the Interior was created in 1971.	Separate entity reports through a director (who has the rank of Cabinet Minister) to the Prime Minister	Ministry of the Interior
Formerly known as	This was established ahead of Bahrain's independence from Britain.	Established in 1997 the National Guard was intended to add strategic depth to Bahrain's Army and Police.	The Police, established in the 1920s has evolved considerably over the past century. The PSF are the main law enforcement arm of the Police and are responsible for most riot control operations.	General Directorate of State Security (est. 1996), formerly known as the Security Intelligence Services (est. 1970s), formerly known as Special Branch (amended as special branch in Arabic meant penis)	Has always been known as the CID.

Anti-Shi'a Discrimination

The Shia would not rise against the Al Khalifa unless police oppression became much more brutal than hitherto. If they did they would expect, rightly, to be crushed eventually (and no doubt inefficiently) by Saudi forces⁶⁷⁹

In addition to the recruitment of aliens to police locals, there is deep-rooted discrimination of Shi'a in the security services, something that has led to a contentious disposition towards the police, and thus resulted in an increased

⁶⁷⁷The National Guard was established in 1997 pursuant to Emiri Order No. 1 of 1997 and is governed by Emiri Decree Law No. 20 of 2000. According to Emiri Decree Law No. 20, (BICI Report).

⁶⁷⁸Decree No. 14 of 2002 established the National Security Agency (NSA) to replace the General Directorate of State Security that was formerly under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.194 (BICI Report).

⁶⁷⁹ R. Tomkys, First Impressions.

occurrence of personal integrity violations. The trend, which appears to have continued today, was epitomised in 1953, when Charles Belgrave noted, 'one of the policemen referred to the Shias as "the enemy" & that is the way they regard it'.⁶⁸⁰ He also noted that all the police 'showed a strong anti-Shia basis' and that this 'feeling sticks to them all'.⁶⁸¹ Following communal disturbances in 1953, Belgrave revealed that the police obviously sided with the Sunnis after the fracas devolved into a sectarian affair.⁶⁸² He added that the 'police were obviously in sympathy with the Sunnis and the Muharraqis'⁶⁸³ and that 'the Shias propose to have a general strike tomorrow & I entirely sympathise with them'.⁶⁸⁴ J.W. Wall, a British official, also noted in 1953 that the police were mostly Sunnis, who 'naturally enough, felt the best way to restore order was to hit a Shiite [sic]'.⁶⁸⁵ The discrimination and subsequent repression against the recruitment of Shi'a was exacerbated after Independence, and by the Iranian Revolution, which created an increased wariness of the country's Shi'a population, effectively placing the majority of Bahrain's population under suspicion.

However, this explanation is not wholly sufficient, as the Shi'a had long been excluded from the police force in Bahrain before the Revolution. Charles Belgrave, for example, often rejected *bahārna* recruits as 'their physique and eyesight are not on the whole as good as that of the Arabs and men of African origin'.⁶⁸⁶ Belgrave also noted; 'in my opinion the best type of men are those of mixed Arab and African extraction, they have more intelligence than the pure African and are tougher than the local Arab or Bahrani'.⁶⁸⁷ While this suggests something of the 'significance of imperial prejudices about the attributes of different races and cultures'⁶⁸⁸ it also brings up issues of how such problems might be rooted in social, political and economic discrimination. Despite the health issues presented by the *bahārna*, given the purpose of the security forces at their inception, there were still religious and political considerations to bare in mind in order to implement control policies. For example, recruiting locally was problematic, as the likely candidates would be Najdis, 'over

680 C. Belgrave, Papers, 6 October, 1953.

681 C. Belgrave, Papers, 1 October 1953.

682 C. Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953.

683 C. Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953.

684 C. Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953.

685 J.W. Wall to B.A.B. Burrows, 5 October 1953, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 22.

686 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for Year 1357 (1938 – 1939), p. 14.

687 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1351 (1932 – 33), *BGAR*, p. 358.

688 D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), 'An orderly retreat?', p. 7.

whom there would be no control and all security would then cease in Bahrain'.⁶⁸⁹ To this effect, it was actually a Shi'a *bahārna* (Hajji Salman) who became the first Superintendent of Police. He worked in the Bahrain police from its inception in the Manama Municipality until his death in the summer of 1934/35.⁶⁹⁰ Hajji Salman also survived an assassination attempt in 1926,⁶⁹¹ which the British believed was a plot to wipe out the police, possibly by 'Abd Allah bin 'Isa Al Khalifa, who resented the usurpation of Al Khalifa privilege.

Hajji Salman's eventual death prompted members of the Manama Shi'a community to 'secure the appointment of Hajji Salman's son as Superintendent of Police'.⁶⁹² Although Belgrave refused on the grounds his son was not qualified, he also noted that such positions were often perceived by locals as hereditary, yet what the mobilisation of the Shi'a community highlights is the belief that a member of the *bahārna* community in the police would secure them against Al Khalifa oppression. The police, Prior noted in 1929, were part of the reason that the *bahārna* 'had security and justice for the first time for 150 years'.⁶⁹³

Yet ultimately, the British still supported the Al Khalifa as rulers, and the continued co-optation of members of the ruling class into positions of authority caused a further reassertion of Al Khalifa influence in recruitment matters. In 1939, shortly after Hajji Salman's death, Shaykh Khalifa bin Muhammad bin 'Isa Al Khalifa, was appointed Superintendent of Police.⁶⁹⁴ While even in 1929, the uniformed constables were 'mostly Persians',⁶⁹⁵ reassertions of Persian claims to Bahrain in 1948 provoked anti-Shi'a sentiment in the ruling family, which led to less Persians in the police⁶⁹⁶. This was at the time of an increase in sectarian strife, and the make-up of the police was argued to be a driver of coercive tactics. In 1955, as it became increasingly clear that the policing apparatus was key to control, more and more members of the Al Khalifa were recruited into officer positions.⁶⁹⁷ By 1965, the British argued that the police should no longer be controlled directly by the Ruling

689 Secretary, Communique to Resident, 12 August 1926, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 217

690 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1353 (1934 – 35), *BGAR*, vol. 1, p. 523.

691 C. Belgrave, Papers, 3 August 1926.

692 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1353 (1934 – 35), p. 523.

693 C.G. Prior, 29 June 1929, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 551.

694 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for Year 1358 (1939 – 1940), *BGAR*, vol. 2, p. 21.

695 C.G. Prior, 29 June 1929, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 551.

696 C. Belgrave, Papers, 29 May 1951.

697 C. Belgrave, Annual Reports for Year 1955, *BGAR*, vol. 5, p. 47.

Family, implying that the police force were subject to the control of a general Al Khalifa interest group.⁶⁹⁸ Yet the policy of Bahrainisation leading up to independence resulted in Al Khalifa taking more positions. For example in 1970, expatriates were replaced in police headquarters by Inspector Khalifa Muhammad Al Khalifa and Assistant Superintendent Ahmed Sultan Al Khalifa.⁶⁹⁹ Shaykh Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Khalifa was also promoted to Deputy commandant, under Commandant J.S. Bell,⁷⁰⁰ while Shaykh 'Isa bin 'Ali Al Khalifa was appointed Director of Immigration.⁷⁰¹

After Independence, and in particular after the Iranian Revolution, Bahrain's Shi'a population were excluded from the higher echelons of the security forces, requiring 'a certificate of good behaviour before getting a job'.⁷⁰² Even ten years after its creation, the British note that the BDF contained no Shi'a.⁷⁰³ (The same is true today, as noted by Ibrahim Sharif). It is unclear how much Saudi influence played in the recruitment policy. As, Francis Trew, the UK Ambassador to Bahrain in 1984, noted, 'Saudi Arabia is funding the development of the Bahrain Defence Force and calls the tune'.⁷⁰⁴ Post 1979, Ian Henderson showed some suspicion of the Shi'a policeman taking part in the 'Ashura processions, as it meant they could not be called upon when duty required.⁷⁰⁵ As with Charles Belgrave, the attitude and influence of influential individuals had a large influence on the nature of the police. For examples, Yemenis were seen as treacherous, and Najdis unreliable due to their allegiance to Al Saud. Just as Belgrave's impressions of race, ethnicity and perceived loyalty/independence defined recruitment policy, so too did the Al Khalifa distrust of the Shi'a. This distaste for the Shi'a and the increasingly anti-Shi'a sentiment in the upper echelons of the security services post-Independence was evident as recently in 2007, when the King's brother and head of Bahrain's National Guard, Shaykh Muhammad bin 'Isa Al Khalifa reportedly said to Shi'a notable Shaykh al-Najati that

698M.S. Weir, 7 October 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.

699 J.S. Bell, Annual Report for 1970, p. 89.

700 Ibid., p. 89.

701 Ibid., p. 91.

702S. Strobl, 'From colonial policing to community policing in Bahrain: the historical persistence of sectarianism', *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, vol. 35, no. 1, 2011, p. 30.

703H.D.A.C. Miers, Attempted Coup in Bahrain, 26 February 1982, FCO 8/4332.

704 F.S.E. Trew, Bahrain: Annual Review 1984, FOIA Request from the FCO.

705S.P. Collis, 'Bahrain Internal: Ashoora', 15 November 1981, FCO 8/3893, TNA.

the Shi'a 'should appreciate that he did not dismiss Sunnis married to Shia from the security services, even though it was in his power'.⁷⁰⁶ The implication of course, being, that there was considerable opinion against having Shi'a in the security services.

During 2011, after the so-called rise of hardliners, Khalid bin Ahmed, who was notoriously anti-Shi'a, stated that only the older members of the Al Khalifa family knew the mentality of these protesters and 'how to deal with them'.⁷⁰⁷ The continuance of a political structure dominated by one family also indicates that attitudes of social control methods have been preserved generationally. Saudi pressure to, and the Saudi regime's need to retain the support of the Wahabi 'Ulamā' by putting pressure on Bahrain to contain the 'ideological challenge posed by Iran'⁷⁰⁸ also inevitably underlines Bahrain's policy towards the Shi'a. This discriminatory recruitment policy challenges the assumption that the police are employed for the public good, and instead positions them as a private force protecting the interests of hegemonic elite, rather than the citizenry in its entirety, irrespective of sect or class.

Failure of Policing 'by Consent' and the Resurgence of Collective Punishment

The exclusion of the indigenous *baḥārna* Shi'a from the police has corroded the legitimacy of the institution and their ability to win public consent for policing tasks, setting up a contentious disposition to policing operations. As one British official said in 1982, 'So long as the Al Khalifa continue to discriminate against the Shi'a majority, there will be a supply of restless young men trying to subvert the Bahraini government'.⁷⁰⁹ The extent of police violence has led to some accusing the state of engaging in collective violence against civilians, particularly those living in Shi'a areas. In the 2011 Uprising, videos and reports have shown security forces indiscriminately firing tear gas into enclosed places and Shi'a neighbourhoods. During the 1990s Intifada, there were at least two reported deaths from tear gas, 60-

706W.T. Monroe, 'Prominent Shias Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia Outlook in Bahrain', Wikileaks 9 April 2007, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07MANAMA328_a.html, (accessed 3 October 2015).

707J. Gengler, 'The Khawalid, Al Khalifa Politics Lurch into the Open', 22 February 2013, Bahraini Politics, [web blog], <http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/the-khawalid-al-khalifa-politics-lurch.html>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

708S. Mabon, 'The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian – Saudi Rivalry', Middle East Policy Council, vol xix, no. 2, 2012.

709 HDAC Miers, 'Attempted Coup in Bahrain', 26 February 1982, FCO 8/4332.

year-old Sakina al-Ghanimi, and 18-month-old 'Aqil Salman 'Ali al-Saffar, who both died in 1995.⁷¹⁰ This figure jumped during the 2011 Uprising, and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) reported that up to 24 people had died from tear gas related injuries between February 2011 and March 2012.⁷¹¹ Many more deaths as a result of tear gas have been reported since then and PHR have argued that the Bahraini authorities were 'weaponizing toxic chemical agents', and using tear gas to intentionally impair people's health, and in particular those of the Shi'a sect.⁷¹² This level of intimidation has extended to the security forces preventing ambulances⁷¹³ reaching the wounded, the occurrence of which has been reported in both the 1990s Intifada⁷¹⁴ and the 2011 Pearl Uprising.⁷¹⁵

Tear Gas was first introduced into Bahrain in 1956 by the British, and its capacity as a less than lethal method has facilitated collective punishment, as it inhabits the nebulous area between deadly force and a 'humane' method of crowd control.⁷¹⁶ Initially introduced to disperse crowds with minimum casualties, it is now overused, partly due to the rituals of contestation that have emerged in Bahrain's Shi'a villages, but also because of the general tendency of Bahrain police to resort to methods early on in any confrontation. Yet this weaponisation of tear-gas is also symptomatic of a sectarian state policy. A state that pursues certain policies with regards to its police force will produce a coercive apparatus that has particularistic features. The 'collective punishment' is itself facilitated by Bahrain's sectarian topography, and the emergence of Shi'a ghettos created by continued government discrimination, such as the banning of sales of land to Shi'a in 2007 in the Sunni dominated governate of Muharraq.⁷¹⁷ Other social engineering projects as revealed in Al Bandar report also highlight this policy. Such ghettoisation and marginalisation of

⁷¹⁰Amnesty International, *A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 40.

⁷¹¹Physicians for Human Rights, 'Weaponizing tear gas: Bahrain's unprecedented use of toxic chemical agents against civilians', August 2012, https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Bahrain-TearGas-Aug2012-small.pdf, (accessed 3 October 2015).

⁷¹²Ibid.

⁷¹³It is interesting to note that Daly reports how after an attack on the Shi'a village of A'ali in 1923, Khan Sahib Yusuf Kanoo was told not to rent cars to Shi'a trying to take their wounded women and others to hospital. 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [159r] (322/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library* <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00007b> [accessed 4 November 2015]

⁷¹⁴Amnesty International, *A Human Rights Crisis*.

⁷¹⁵See, for example, the *BICI Report*.

⁷¹⁶B.A.B. Burrows, Letter from Bahrain to Foreign Office, 12 March 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 227.

⁷¹⁷W.T. Monroe, 'Prominent Shias Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia Outlook in Bahrain'.

the Shi'a explains how riot police can launch dozens of tear gas canisters into whole villages without generally having to be concerned about angering non-Shi'a, Sunni, or expatriate residents.

Violent Coercion, Para military Policing & the Authoritarian Reflex

From Britain's gunboat diplomacy, to the arrival of over two thousand GCC troops, the policing of Bahrain's internal affairs has always blurred the lines between military intervention and regular policing, inhabiting the cusp between consensual policing and a reliance on violent coercion. Yet while gunboat diplomacy existed at a time when, 'British prestige rested on fear and not on respect', the decision to achieve change by more pacific means meant more interference in internal institutions.⁷¹⁸ Yet, as with other British colonies, the 'continuity of personnel between the army and the police, the military style of police training and organization, meant that the police presence...retained something of the aura of an army of occupation'.⁷¹⁹ As a result 'popular hostility to the police and political realities dictated that policing remained predominantly a paramilitary activity' throughout both the British Administration and after Independence.⁷²⁰

In the latter half of the 20th century, policing protest has frequently included 'military style deployment of large police and army formations, numerous detentions and arrests as well as use of water cannons, mounted police and dogs, tear gas, and rubber bullets'.⁷²¹ This style of policing protest highlights an 'authoritarian reflex', that is to say, the tendency of states with authoritarian histories to revert back to draconian techniques when changing political opportunity structures threaten the status quo.⁷²² However, because Bahrain's fragile position has prompted a near permanent sense of anxiety and perceived threat, the authoritarian reflex has been engaged frequently, especially with ideological threat of Shi'a expansionism. This reflex has been aggravated by a lack of any real accountability or procedural oversight, resulting in frequent accusations that the police fail to adhere to standards of due process, such as issuing warrants for searches and arrests.

718F. Khuri, p. 88.

719 D. H. Johnson, p. 151.

720D. Killingray, p. 106.

721A. Juska and C. Woolfson, 'Policing political protest in Lithuania', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol. 57, no. 4, 2012, p. 405.

722Ibid.

This bifurcation in the rule of law seriously threatens the legitimacy of the police and legal system. A group of Bahrainis complained about this problem as early as the 1940s, stating that while Bahraini houses could be raided without warrants, police required a warrant from the Political Agent to raid the house of a foreigner. This bifurcation was also evident with regards to elite crime. In 1954, after the Ruler's son, Muhammad bin Salman Al Khalifa, and a group of Bedouin, broke into the house of a *baḥārna* and beat up the resident, Charles Belgrave personally persuaded the victim not to make a complaint.⁷²³ In this instance, the Ruler had ordered his sons to attack the *baḥārna*, indicating further antipathy towards the indigenous community.⁷²⁴

As cooperation and compliance with the police is fundamentally structured by the legitimacy of the police,⁷²⁵ this lack of procedural justice aggravates police-society relations. While these tactics also erode the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of Bahrain's marginalised and dissident communities, the lack of legitimacy can also encourage a lack of compliance with the law, resulting in the creation of two groups with conflicting goals and an increased permissibility with personal integrity violations.⁷²⁶ This is in part attributable to the reactionary tactics used by the police, which have resulted in a large number of citizens being killed or wounded by the state security forces since the 1950s. In 1953, Belgrave noted there were 'police beating up people, sometimes indiscriminately⁷²⁷ during Muharram⁷²⁸ altercations. At the same time, the British were attempting to dissuade the ruler, unsuccessfully, from relying on more coercive methods. Belgrave noted in 1954 that the Ruler's 'idea is more Police & more force to enforce law & order & no sign of any concessions to public opinion'.⁷²⁹ The results of this armed, poorly trained and inexperienced police force, who were also inclined and encouraged towards coercion, became evident on 1 June 1954, when a group of Shi'a civilians, angry at the sentencing of a co-religionist who had been involved in an altercation in Sitra, gathered at the police force to

723C. Belgrave, Papers, 5 December 1954.

724Ibid.

725J. Sunshine and T. R. Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing', *Law and Society Review*, vol. 37, no. 3, 2003.

726Ibid.

727C. Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953

728 Muharram is a holy month celebrated by Muslims, and in particular, Shi'a.

729Ibid, 28 December 1954.

protest. The police opened fire and killed three of them.⁷³⁰ Two years later, in 1956, police opened fire in a market, killing five civilians and injuring seventeen. Even after the suggested expansion of the police before 1956, the Ruler, ignoring the advice of Charles Belgrave, increased spending on the police, even though this resulted in a large budget deficit.⁷³¹

Almost ten years later, in 1965, during unrest provoked by the state oil company's laying off of workers, between six and eight civilians were killed by police using Greener guns to break up strikes led by the National Liberation Front – a leftist group with Nasserist leanings and who were advocating more workers rights.⁷³² In 1965 the Political Resident was given standing authority to commit British troops if necessary, although this was considered undesirable. Yet the strike was largely a pretext for leftist agitation, and the police in Bahrain 'took on an increased security function in dealing with unrest and insurrection prompted by anti-colonial politics'.⁷³³ Although British troops were not committed, Royal Navy helicopters were used to drop tear gas on protesters. Despite this, the British were reluctant to commit their armed forces to defend Bahrain, which meant the police had to be increasingly capable of performing a duty that might be expected of a military during a period of martial law. Consequently, the British eventually attempted to address this militancy by commissioning a report by Peter Edward Turnbull. The report, which recommended significant police reform, including a severe reduction in numbers, but increase in pay and efficiency, was duly ignored by the Al Khalifa, who were sensitive on issues of security and chose instead to increase the size of the police instead.⁷³⁴⁷³⁵ As a result, the police force almost doubled between 1965 and 1970, increasing from 1012 personnel to 2012.⁷³⁶ The Ruler and Shaykh Mohammed personally bought new armoured vehicles for the police in 'recognition of their good work during the

730 Many of those present then ran to the Political Agency where they demanded the protection of British soldiers and the disarming of the Bahrain police. In a poignant moment, a member of the crowd grabbed a British flag and wrapped it around one of the deceased as a 'makeshift symbol of al-kafan', the white linen symbolising the ordeal of the family of Imam Hussein'.

731 Ibid., 19 January 1957.

732 J.P. Tripp, April 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.

733 D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), 'An orderly retreat?', p. 5.

734 J.P. Tripp to M.S. Weir, 5 April 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.

735 M.S. Weir, 7 October 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.

736 These figures are taken from the statistics provided in the annual reports of Bahrain between 1924 and 1970.

disturbances'.⁷³⁷

This constant expansionism correlated with the security-minded, fragile position of the Al Khalifa, whose fear of popular insurrection was validated by the British, who knew that during any armed uprising, the police would be quickly overcome. As J.P. Tripp noted 'the British commandant of police considers that an actively hostile crowd would very quickly get beyond the control of his police and believes that only the intervention of British troops could restore the situation'.⁷³⁸ This fear, and diminishing British influence leading up to and following independence, coupled with Saudi fear of Iranian expansionism, meant that ruling family tendencies towards securitisation measures could continue relatively unhampered.

Ruling Family Rivalries and Coercive Strengthening

The 1970s saw, according to one US official, a regional, 'Gulf Arms Race'.⁷³⁹ In Bahrain, this was compounded by post-Independence, intra-family rivalry and tensions between the then Crown Prince, Hamad Al Khalifa, and the Prime Minister, Shaykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who controlled the National Guard and the MOI respectively, resulted in the growth of a police force that would be better able to deal with any potential BDF insurrection or rebellion. This rivalry resulted in a security inflation, in which more and more resources were diverted to strengthening the police and providing to them equipment and training designed to contain a military threat. As Andrew Sterling notes,

The greatest danger is still the Bahrain Defence Force, against which the Special Branch efficiency offers almost the only protection. The Cabinet claim to recognise the danger and they have allowed no increase in the Defence Force while ensuring a considerable expansion of the police; but the menace remains⁷⁴⁰

The British Ambassador E.F. Given wrote that the police, 'ordered large quantities of

737M.S. Weir, 22 April 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.

738J.P. Tripp, The Internal Situation in Bahrain, 1 June 1963, FO 371/174521, TNA.

739 US Embassy, 18 July 1978, 'Bahrain's Financial Plight', Wikileaks,

https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976MANAMA00964_b.html

740A.J.D. Sterling, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1971.

anti-riot equipment, including some which would enable the police to take on the Defence Force'.⁷⁴¹ The presence of internal subversion in the form of PFLOAG also meant the Prime Minister boosted the strength of the police. Indeed, a 'by product of the "security situation"' was 'the increasing strength of the police'.⁷⁴² As a result, the budget was doubled again.⁷⁴³

With the rise of leftist challenges in the 1970s in the form of the National Liberation Front and other Trade Union Movements, there was a resurgence of political activity. This was abetted by a number of factors, including increased urbanization, rises in costs of living, changes in political opportunities, and further industrialization. However, despite the arms race between the BDF and the police, both came together to fight threats to the regime. Police, often using armoured cars and tear gas, dealt with protesters with little restraint. In many cases, they were backed up by the newly formed army, as if they were dealing with an an insurgency and not a protest. In the March uprising of 1972, labour activists took to the streets after negotiations with the government on labour unionisation broke down. Their 'major demands concerned improvement of labour laws, freedom of association (including the right to unionise) and the release of political prisoners and detainees'.⁷⁴⁴ Anti-riot squads combined with the Bahrain Defence Force to crush the demonstrations. Afterwards, 'most known leaders of the CCBWPU⁷⁴⁵ were detained for a year but never brought to trial'.⁷⁴⁶ At the time, units of the Saudi National Guard were also frequent visitors of Bahrain, including during the 1972 'uprising'.⁷⁴⁷

After the promulgation of the constitution in 1973, initial oppositional success in the newly formed parliament increased opposition morale and led to a spate of labour unrest.⁷⁴⁸ As a result, 'Thirty-six strikes took place during the first six months of 1974, affecting all major employers on the island'.⁷⁴⁹ However, the government's initial confusion emboldened the activists into thinking the government were weak.

741 E.F. Given, Bahrain: Annual Report for 1976.

742 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 8 October 1974, FCO8/2180, TNA.

743 Ibid.

744 A. Khalaf, 'Labor Movements in Bahrain'.

745 The Constitutive Committee CCBWPU, an alliance between the NLF, the Bahraini section of the PFLOAG, and independent opposition figures.

746 A. Khalaf, 'Labor Movements in Bahrain'.

747 Ibid.

748 Ibid.

749 Ibid.

Further strikes helped gain certain concession, include a raise in the minimum wage. However, the failure of further negotiations prompted the whole of the ALBA workforce to go on strike. This strike, which cost the government 20 million dinars, prompted the regime to respond with militaristic and non-militaristic means. As Khalaf notes, 'the security forces took charge. Anti-riot squads and units from the Bahraini Defence Force were sent in and around the smelter's area. Troops were also positioned at every "strategic point" in main towns and crossroads'.⁷⁵⁰

Although the BDF were seen as a potential threat, both they and the Police cooperated to vanquish labour unrest, which was harming Bahrain's economy. Yet the necessity of a Bahrain Army has always been challenged by its limited resources, and the intervention of British and Saudi troops has always been deemed essential in case of a serious insurrection. The BDF and the national guard were therefore more a deterrent against internal threat than an effective force to ward off outside challengers. Yet ultimately, the increase in size of the police simply reflected a quantity, not quality approach to security. Despite the increase in size of the coercive apparatus, Henderson lamented what he saw as a 'total failure' of 'the Al Khalifa to face up to the need to train their own officers to take over responsibility for the security services'.⁷⁵¹

This militancy, buttressed by the continued ascendancy of the Prime Minister and a general anti-Shi'a and *bahārna* ideological position, prompted severe repression in the 1990s Intifada. Indeed, policy in its entirety was not even a cabinet decision, but the work of a small cabal including the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior Muhammad bin Khalifa Al Khalifa.⁷⁵² The tradition of provoking the Shi'a manifested itself in 1994, when government forces, without provocation, fired multiple tear gas canisters into the open area outside a Shi'a mosque. They then arrested about two dozen people, and shut down the mosque.⁷⁵³ The lack of provocation seemed to reflect the government's willingness to manufacture a pretext on which to clamp down on growing unrest. In the following years, 'security forces and riot police were said to have routinely beaten unarmed civilians, including women and minors'.⁷⁵⁴ In 1995 the combination of a paramilitary force, galvanised by

750Ibid.

751 W. R. Tomkys, Tel 75: Internal Security, 27 April 1982, FCO 8/4332.

752 HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

753Ibid.

754Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 40.

hawkish influence, resulted in an atmosphere of permissive police violence. During the 1990s Intifada, extra judicial killing outside of prison was common, with most protesters being killed during altercations with the police. A number of these cases occurred during peaceful protests, and early on during the uprising, when protests had not had a chance to become violent, pointing to a policy of escalation by the police. Indeed Amnesty argues that of the ten initial deaths occurring between December 1994 and May 1995, most occurred during marches 'described as peaceful, with the participants calling on the government to restore democratic rights'.⁷⁵⁵

While a sectarian force under British stewardship had been inclined to oppress, after Independence the aggressive attitude to dissent, furnished by an institutional conservatism underscored by anti-Shi'a sentiment became notably more acute. As was noted by one observer, 'A defensive regime – the Al Khalifa family – which has an even more defensive Saudi Arabia breathing down its neck, responded aggressively, cracking down on all dissent'.⁷⁵⁶

The 2011 Uprising and Evidence of Police Rioting

Hope following the 2001 reforms, symbolised by the *bahārna* of Sitra carrying King Hamad in the air, was underscored by a decline in protest and thus police violence. However, the mass protests that erupted on 14 February 2011 prompted the Bahraini authorities to engage their authoritarian reflex, even though popular protests had remained largely peaceful. With the Saudi-backed Al Khalifa adopting more self reliance in matters of internal security, a tougher security policy emerged. Killings led to bigger protests, which resulted in further killings. As was noted in the BICI report, the 'forceful confrontation of demonstrators involving the use of lethal force and resort to a heavy deployment of Public Security Forces led to the death of civilians. This caused a marked increase in the number of persons participating in protests and led to a palpable escalation in their demands'.⁷⁵⁷ Thirteen civilian deaths were officially attributable to the security forces between 14 February and 15 April 2011⁷⁵⁸, 'while the death of eight civilians could not be attributed to a particular person

⁷⁵⁵Ibid., p. 34.

⁷⁵⁶The Economist, 'Gazing backward', 25 March 1995, issue 7907, p. 74.

⁷⁵⁷BICI Report, p. 416

⁷⁵⁸Ibid., p. 223.

or agency'.⁷⁵⁹

The rise of social media has led to an increase in documentation of police tactics that validate previous accusations of their heavy handedness. Videos depicting gross acts of police brutality have become common, with hours of footage showing policemen attacking subdued and unarmed civilians⁷⁶⁰, deliberately damaging property, and shooting at civilians. This was particularly prevalent during 2011, where multiple videos emerged of police smashing up cars parked near the Pearl Roundabout. Often police were filmed in large groups, throwing Molotov cocktails, stones, metal construction rebars and other non standard weapons.⁷⁶¹ The methodological nature and widespread nature of much of this deviance implies that it was either encouraged, tacitly accepted, or completely ignored. The repeated occurrence though suggested at least that the Ministry of the Interior did little in the way to discipline such policemen (see chapter five).

The evidence, coupled with the narrative in the BICI report and various NGOs highlights a culture of police rioting. The term, which was used in the Walker Report from 1968, is used to describe 'unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence' against protesters or property.⁷⁶² Accusations of this type of behaviour are frequently levelled at the Bahrain police. One witness described the clearing of the Pearl Roundabout that happened on 17 February 2011 as if the police were 'hell-bent' on trying to injure as many of the protesters as possible, even when they were fleeing.⁷⁶³

The frequently aggressive tactics used by the Bahrain police have not endeared them to dissidents. Reliance on military style methods have further delegitimized the police and reduced cooperation with the general public. Indeed, the Bahrain authorities frequently responded to demonstrations with 'violence and minimal

⁷⁵⁹Ibid., p. 226.

⁷⁶⁰As part of the online virtual ethnographic, I collated a database of videos I could find demonstrating police deviance. This list can be viewed here.
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/12489YCwvB-boyzQgYzPfu2q_nBJiS85WjTPEc7HGRuM/pub?output=html

⁷⁶¹M.O. Jones, 'For the record: police in Bahrain throw Molotov cocktails', *Marc Owen Jones* [blog], 18 March 2012, <http://marcowenjones.wordpress.com/2012/03/18/for-the-record-police-in-bahrain-throw-molotov-cocktails/>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

⁷⁶²Summary of report submitted by Daniel Walker, Director of the Chicago Study Team, to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, introduction by Max Frankel, E.P. Dutton, New York, 1968, www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/tu_chicago7_doc_13.html, (accessed 2 November 2015).

⁷⁶³T. Mitchell, 'Witness to an Uprising: What I Saw in Bahrain', *The Atlantic*, 14 December 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/witness-to-an-uprising-what-i-saw-in-bahrain/249977/>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

concessions',⁷⁶⁴ the hallmark of paramilitary policing. In the recent uprising, the BICI report noted that the weapons and the way they were used violated principles of 'necessity and proportionality'.⁷⁶⁵ Often, the police fired without due care as to whether the victim was injured or killed.⁷⁶⁶

Attempts to reform the police have generally been prompted by the Al Khalifa's desire to increase its co-ercive capacity, as opposed to creating political solutions to increase consent. Indeed, the attitude of the Al Khalifa towards policing highlighted by Belgrave in 1954 seems to have endured; 'more Police & more force to enforce law & order & no sign of any concessions to public opinion'.⁷⁶⁷ Indeed, the security apparatus in Bahrain has been more 'reactive than proactive'.⁷⁶⁸ These fears of militant policing have not been assuaged recently. Matthew Cassel⁷⁶⁹ argued in 2011 that the so-called 'Miami Model' of policing, was coming to Bahrain after the government invited former Miami police chief John Timoney to help reform the police.. Jeremy Scahill notes that the Miami model is more akin to 'paramilitary soldering'.⁷⁷⁰ The model is characterised by the deployment of military style armoured personnel carriers, and the use of helicopters, which makes many protests seem like war zones.

Despite these fears, the Manama model has long existed prior to the Miami model. Violence has long been, and continues to be, an important aspect of maintaining Al Khalifa hegemony. It has however, got quantitatively worse over the past century, and shows no sign of abating.

Use of Torture

Torture⁷⁷¹ is a form of personal integrity violation aimed at neutralizing political

764PHR, *Weaponizing Tear Gas*.

765BICI Report, p. 418

766Ibid.

767C. Belgrave, Papers, 28 December 1954.

768D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray, 'An orderly retreat?', p. 10.

769M. Cassel, 'Even Bahrain's use of "Miami model" policing will not stop the uprising', *The Guardian*, 3 December 2011, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/03/bahrain-miami-model-policing, (accessed 3 October 2015).

770J. Scahill, 'The Miami model', Democracy Now! on *Information Clearing House*, 24 November, www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5286.htm, (accessed 2 November 2015).

771Torture is defined by the United Nations as 'any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or

opposition, and has been used since at least the 1920s in Bahrain. Yet how torture is done is as important as the deterrence or acquiescence it seeks to achieve. Indeed, torture is vital in 'making the consequences of political resistance so gruesome that no one who has experienced it is psychologically and/or physically capable of further resistance – if he or she survives'.⁷⁷² Torture is also instrumental, and has been used in Bahrain for a number of reasons, including; exacting confessions, gathering information about political movements, forcing detainees to relinquish their political beliefs, forcing detainees to report on the activities of their friends, and forcing detainees to promise to cease engaging in political activity.⁷⁷³ In this respect, torture seeks to damage and debilitate social movements through intimidation, intelligence gathering, and persuasion. Although it has existed for a decades, its severity and occurrence appears to have increased markedly since Independence, and even more so since the 1990s Intifada.

Although Amnesty International reports document torture occurring as early as 1972,⁷⁷⁴ a more thorough consultation of British records shows that detainees were exposed to physical harm for the purposes of extracting information from as early as 1926. Indeed, British officials were directly involved in torturing political prisoners themselves, a fact that has not been addressed in the literature on Bahrain. This was particularly true during the 1920s, when the British administration was beset by numerous challenges to its authority, whether it was perceived Bolshevik agitation or the actions of groups working on behalf of a faction of the Ruling Family to undermine British authority. When the British set up a force of Levies to protect Hamad's authority, 'Abd Allah and 'Isa's wife sought to undermine these reforms.⁷⁷⁵ Dissent was sown in the ranks of the new armed forces, allegedly via a Persian Bolshevik Mullah, which culminated in a Baluchi Sepoy killing two other Levies. The attack also resulted in Major Daly, the British political agent at the time, being stabbed, shot and wounded. During the course of the investigation, Belgrave admits to using 'methods of a mild Spanish Inquisition' to get information from one of the

at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions'.- UN Convention Against Torture.

772A. Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 137.

773Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

774Amnesty International, *Annual Report 1972 – 1973*, p. 70.

775A paramilitary force of troops

conspirators.⁷⁷⁶

In a raid on the village of Sanābis, again thought to be orchestrated by the faction of the Al Khalifa trying to undermine British authority, the British Captain Parke used sleep deprivation methods to get suspects to talk.⁷⁷⁷ Belgrave noted; 'P's idea is to keep him from sleeping for a few nights and then he may talk, that is not exactly torture'.⁷⁷⁸ In another case, where a cabal apparently headed by Shaykh 'Abd Allah bin 'Isa Al Khalifa organised an assassination attempt on the Ruler, Captain Parke tortured suspects to get them to talk. Belgrave noted how the torture from his juniors occurred at their own volition, and although this angered Barrett, the Political Agent, no action was taken to discipline Parke.

The men admitted that it had been ordered by Shaikh Khalid a near relation of the Shaikhs. Barrett wrote officially to the Shaikh telling him of his various relations who were implicated in the murders but the Shaikh does not dare to do anything about them. It makes me really very angry. Barrett spoke about the business of the Police having used rather oriental methods with the prisoners to get them to give evidence. Parke ordered it and Barrett is very angry with him, one thing they did was to tie the men up and then put lighted papers between their toes. Of course it is a pity that it came out, but knowing the men and what they have done I don't feel much compunction for them. It is a pity that Parke took part in it himself.⁷⁷⁹

Furthermore, in 1932, following the outbreak of riots, Belgrave 'beat' a few detainees in order to get them to talk. He writes in his diary

I spent the whole morning till two o'clock interrogating the prisoners, at first they wouldn't speak but I beat a few of them till they did speak, it was all very barbarous and illegal but on some occasions one has to

776C. Belgrave, Papers, 15 August 1926. Interestingly, Belgrave expresses remorse for these deeds – saying that 'he felt sorry for the boy'.

777C. Belgrave, Papers, 12 November 1928

778Ibid., 12 November 1928

779Ibid., 16 April 1929

behave illegally. They gave me the information that I needed and on that I was able to make a list of the names of the men who were the ringleaders and who actually broke into the Police Office and took the man out.⁷⁸⁰

While some may protest that the 1920s were 'different times', and attitudes to violent methods of coercion were less pronounced there are a number of issues. Firstly, such methods were obviously perceived as an effective way of achieving certain objectives, whether information gathering or punishment. Secondly, Belgrave himself acknowledged the deplorable nature of his actions, and the Political Resident Barrett expressed his disapproval on finding out that another British officer had used 'oriental methods'. Belgrave even noted with remorse that he had acted 'illegally', although no penal code existed at the time. Clearly, the British police had a lot of autonomy from superiors in many ways, a fact arguably true of all the British agents in the region. Belgrave's own admittances tend to confound any illusions of a civilising British colonial presence. Yet despite its occurrence, torture prior to Bahrain's independence seems to be less systematic.

Evidence of torture in the forties, fifties and sixties is harder to come by, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's refusal to comply with freedom of information requests confounds further research into the issue. The increasing professionalization of the police in the 1960s and the shift to more intelligence led policing under Henderson did not initially prompt an increase in torture. Despite reports of police brutality in 1965, a surprise visit by the Red Cross revealed nothing of suspicion.⁷⁸¹ Under Henderson's methods (see chapter on Information Control) the police were forbidden from arresting suspected dissidents let alone torturing them, implying a general shift in policing behaviours. The British too, believed Henderson and Bell's methods were less draconian than their predecessors, and were initially 'regarded with favour' by Bahrainis.⁷⁸² Yet popular discontent, and the activities of bodies like Amnesty International, meant that the authorities were aware that such actions could not be done with total impunity.

⁷⁸⁰Ibid., 27 May 1932.

⁷⁸¹ Visit to Bahrain by International Red Cross Official, 1965, FO 371/179809.

⁷⁸² K. Oldfield, 15 August 1965, Amnesty International and Political Prisoners, FO 371/185355, TNA.

Torture post Independence

Reports of torture after Independence in 1971 became more common and consistent,⁷⁸³ and deaths as a result of torture increased, with both the British administration and NGOs documenting its occurrence. Even though the 1970s and 1980s saw a better documentation of torture by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the increase likely reflects a spike rather than simply better documentation. Amnesty International reported that six political detainees died in custody between 1980 – 86.⁷⁸⁴ After Independence, deaths by torture increased. Between 1976 and 1986, eight people died in police custody, and Amnesty International and the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group reported that at least six of those were believed to be as a result of torture.⁷⁸⁵ In 1981, 23-year-old Muhammad Hassan Madan was beaten to death by three policemen in Muharraq police station.⁷⁸⁶ The ensuing protests also resulted in the police running down six Shi'a and killing nine-year-old yr old 'Adel Hasan Khoki.⁷⁸⁷ It is said that their bodies were buried in secret graves⁷⁸⁸, the Khoki incident certainly was not reported.⁷⁸⁹ In most cases there was no investigation, internal or otherwise. In three of these cases between 1976 and 1986, investigations found that three of the deceased had died of suicide or medical illness.

Yet the first Shi'a martyr was considered to be Jamal 'Ali, who was killed in police custody. In a suspicious case of history repeating itself, the *Gulf Daily News* reported that Jamal 'Ali had died of kidney failure as a result of bad health.⁷⁹⁰ Similarly, in 2011, the Bahrain News Agency noted that Karim Fakhrawi, who was found to have been tortured, also died of kidney failure. The British acknowledged that as well as likely being an 'innocent party', 'Ali was 'electrocuted'⁷⁹¹ and 'beaten

783Amnesty International Annual Reports from 73 – 74, 77, 1980 and 1982, all report torture.

784Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 2.

785R. Wilkingson, 'Speak Together of Freedom. The Present Struggle for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain', *The Parliamentary Human Rights Group*, March 1996, http://bahrain.wikia.com/wiki/Speak_Together_of_Freedom:_The_Present_Struggle_for_Democracy_and_Human_Rights_in_Bahrain,_Robert_Wilkinson,_The_Parliamentary_Human_Rights_Group,_March_1996, (accessed 3 October 2015).

786Copson, Telegram No 165, 16 September, 1981, FCO8/3893, TNA.

787Ibid.

788Bahrain Martyrs, [Instagram Account], 16 February 2014, <https://instagram.com/p/ke8XaLxEt/>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

789 Copson, Telegram No 165, 16 September, 1981.

790*Gulf Daily News*, 'Ministry denies deaths rumours', April 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.

791K.J. Passmore, Letter from Roland Moyle, MP: Bahrain, 16 September 1981, FCO8/3893, TNA.

up in custody' where he 'died of his injuries'.⁷⁹²

In addition to an increased sense of vulnerability brought about by Bahrain's Independence in 1971, there was a notable shift in power at the Ministry of Interior that empowered hard-liners within the Ruling Family – in particular the Prime Minister and a merchant elite, who Harold Walker mentioned included the al-Muyyad and al-Zayani family. This relationship was highlighted in 1974, when 'the government and the merchant class thought it was time to take a firm hand'⁷⁹³ against any unrest. The Prime Minister himself exhibited antipathy towards the Shi'a that indicate how his personal influence was significant in increasing repression against the country's *bahārna* and Shi'a population. This shift in power to the Al Khalifa was accompanied by a corollary diminishing of British influence in the security apparatus. In 1973, it was reported that the Prime Minister had the last word on matters of internal security and basic foreign policy⁷⁹⁴ and kept police and special branch 'closely under his own control'.⁷⁹⁵

Despite diminishing influence, the British were still well-represented in the Bahraini police, yet this seemed to have little impact on moderating torture. Foreign Office correspondence, corroborated by US State Department cables both acknowledge the declining influence of the British head of police, Jim Bell, and the British head of special Branch, Ian Henderson, in the 1970s.⁷⁹⁶ The British embassy reported

Two years ago the Chief of the Police and the Head of the Special Branch, both British, came directly under the Prime Minister and were regularly and visibly in close and constant touch with him. Now they hardly ever see him, but work to a Bahraini Minister of the Interior who is fortunately conscientious and hard-working. The Chief of Police is now 'Director-General of Public Security', advising and administering from the background rather than exercising direct executive control. He has lost

792H.B. Walker, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1980, 10 February 1981, FCO8/3894, TNA.

793R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 1 July 1974, FCO8/2180.

794R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1973.

795R.M. Tesh, 17 December 1973.

796 'Advisory Roles of the UK and Certain Others Countries in the Persian Gulf States', US Embassy Manama, 20 February 1975, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975MANAMA00217_b.html, (accessed 5 October 2015).

much of his power, and rather sadly accepts this. The Head of Special Branch – which is now, at the top, wholly expatriate – is no longer allowed to detain or interrogate; his intelligence network must therefore function by other means, and the power of deterrence has dwindled.⁷⁹⁷

As a result, Henderson and Bell were 'excluded from various private lines of command influence'.⁷⁹⁸ However, they were still seen as an 'inestimable advantage in practical terms', as they offered some assurance about the maintenance of law and order in the wake of Al Khalifa conservatism.⁷⁹⁹ Ultimately though, the British were less involved in the policing of Bahrain politics, and their ability to ensure a more moderate attitude towards policing was reduced.

The murder of newspaper editor Shaykh 'Abd Allah al-Madani in 1976 signified the overturning of Henderson's influence, and his relatively restrained policy towards interrogation and torture. It was used by the Bahraini authorities to justify a crackdown on leftist political groups in Bahrain, and resulted in a policy that had previously prevented targets of subversion from being arrested, and therefore tortured. As Given noted, 'the murder removed the restriction on the interrogation of Popular Front suspects, and enabled the police to acquire a clearer picture than before of its ramifications and activities'.⁸⁰⁰ Prior to this, 'the absence of interrogation of suspects meant that the police received only the amount of intelligence which their sources in the NLF cared to give them'.⁸⁰¹ The impact seemed immediate, and two Bahrainis, Muhammad Ghulum Busheri and Sa'id al-'Uwaynati, were killed as a result of torture following the arrest. Although the trial was a farce, and the evidence shaky it was used as a pretext for clamping down on political opposition. This was at a time where the ruling family were 'closing ranks'⁸⁰² and concentrating in their hands both politically sensitive posts such as security as well as posts relating to social affairs.⁸⁰³ Again, this had gone in opposition the recommendations of the Turnbull report, which had

797 R.M. Tesh, 1 March 1975.

798 W.R. Tomkys, Bahrain Internal Security, 10 April 1982.

799 P.F.M. Wogan, Letter to W.R. Tomkys, 23 April 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

800 E.F. Given, Political Murder in Bahrain, 29 January 1977, FCO8/2874, TNA.

801 Ibid.

802 E.F. Given, 5 July 1976.

803 Ibid.

advocated 'removing direct control from members of the Ruling Family'.⁸⁰⁴

The legislative provisions of the State Security Decree also facilitated 'the torture of prisoners in Bahrain'.⁸⁰⁵ Detainees could be held incommunicado for months, or even years, isolated from the outside world, with no access to legal counsel until the time of their trial and infrequent visits from their family. Provisions governing trial before the Supreme Civil Court of Appeal also allowed the court to base its judgement solely on confessions given to the police, or even merely on police testimony that they recorded such confessions (even in the absence of witnesses). In the 1980s, confessions were allowed as the sole basis for a conviction, even if uncorroborated. In this regard, the incentive of using torture was increased for the police, and there were few safeguards ensuring that such evidence would be discarded in the courts.⁸⁰⁶ Combined with the new State Security Law, the al-Madani affair consolidated a shift from a more laissez faire approach to intelligence gathering to one that demanded the interrogation, and, as a consequence, torture, of suspects. Indeed, the tug of war between Henderson and the Al Khalifa appeared to be generally over, and this ended what seemed like a 'lack of a coherent policy on dealing with' political opposition, which had previously vacillated 'between inactivity and excessive zeal'.⁸⁰⁷

Following the increase in torture, the British wished to impress upon the Bahrainis such a method was not simply 'morally undesirable'⁸⁰⁸, but also self-defeating, using the example of SAVAK. However, they were also reluctant again to upset the Al Khalifa by doing so.⁸⁰⁹ This lack of influence strengthened the problem, and led to a division of labour between the British and Arab police. Roger Tomkys reported that the most brutal among the torturers were Bahrainis, and that the 'encouragement they get from some members of the Al Khalifas is to be more rather than less tough in their methods', indicating an increase in brutality with increasing Al Khalifa control.⁸¹⁰

Torture also became functional and important in creating intelligence networks. The increasing necessity of intelligence was met with a problem of how to

804 M.S. Weir, 7 October 1965.

805 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, p. 10.

806 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

807 E.F. Given, 5 July 1976.

808 'Bahraini Police Methods', FCO 8/4332, TNA.

809 Ibid.

810 W.R. Tomkys, 16 February 1982.

obtain it lawfully. In 1991, Amnesty International reported that, 'detainees are tortured and ill-treated to obtain information, or confessions which may then be used as a basis for their conviction and sentence... or threatened and warned against taking part in any form of political opposition activity in the future'.⁸¹¹ Amnesty International also reported that many prisoners were 'subjected to torture or threats in order to force them to cooperate with the authorities, reporting back on the activities and friends of particular individuals'.⁸¹² Between 1994 and 1998, Human Rights Watch received reports of at least 7 deaths in custody due to torture.⁸¹³ The need for information, and the continued relevance of confessions without sufficient safeguards to ensure confessions have not been coerced, have allowed the method of torture to flourish.

Modern methods of torture, patterns and explanations

With more accurate documentation comes more insight into those methods used. Torture in the eighties frequently involved 'beatings with lengths of hosepipe or electric cable, enforced standing upright for many hours or days, sleep deprivation, prevention from going to the toilet, extinguishing cigarettes on the body and suspension in contorted positions'.⁸¹⁴ In addition to this, Amnesty International received reports of 'prisoners being forced to eat faeces or a lizard, having their skin pierced by a drill and being threatened with sexual abuse or execution'.⁸¹⁵ The multitude of techniques highlight the importance of humiliation and the destruction of the victim's self-esteem. Psychological methods such as threats to the family of the detainee are used. It is also interesting to note the consistency of techniques over the decades.⁸¹⁶ Interestingly, other methods have been used that are particular to Bahrainis, and the Shi'a in general. For example, the endemic issue of sickle cell

811 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, pp. 8 – 9.

812 Ibid.

813 HRW, *Torture Redux: The Revival of Physical Coercion during Interrogations in Bahrain*, 2010, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bahrain0210webwcover_0.pdf, (accessed 5 October 2015).

814 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, pp. 8 – 9.

815 Ibid., p. 7.

816 severe and sustained beatings all over the body using hosepipes, electric cables and other implements; falaqa (beatings on the soles of the feet); forcing detainees to beat each other; suspension from the limbs in contorted positions, with blows administered to the body at the same time; enforced standing for several hours or days; sleep deprivation; preventing detainees from relieving themselves; immersion in water to the point of near drowning; burning the skin with cigarettes; and piercing of the skin with a drill. Reports of the sexual molestation of male detainees, particularly of youths, have also been received over the years. These include physical assault as well as other methods such as the insertion of objects into the penis or anus. - AI, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis, p. 29.

anaemia in Bahrain is exploited to facilitate torture, as is the derision of the Shi'a faith by officials. Sickle cell anaemia patients in the 1990s and the recent uprising have often been kept in 'air-conditioned rooms in winter for prolonged periods' exposing them to the risk of organ damage, especially kidney or eyes.⁸¹⁷ In addition, 'they also risk leg ulcers, gall stones and bacterial infection, and suffer generalised body pain'.⁸¹⁸ Shi'a detainees are also frequently prevented from 'saying their prayers or performing ablution' highlighting how the perceived type of threat influences methods.⁸¹⁹ Often when those with sickle cell anaemia die in custody, the authorities simply blame the disease by attributing it to kidney failure,⁸²⁰ reflecting a tendency to use cause of death without referring to the underlying cause of death. Such distinctions are important in determining why the person died. At least three deaths, two in custody, and one from tear gas, were blamed by the government on sickle cell anaemia. In the case of the custodial deaths of Hasan Jasim Muhammad Maki⁸²¹ and Zakariya Rashid Hasan al-Asheri⁸²², the BICI report found the deaths had been as a result of torture, and in the third, they noted that Sayid Jawad Ahmed Hashim Marhun did not even suffer from sickle cell anaemia.⁸²³ The BICI Report noted that the level of mistreatment was dependent on the 'categories of detainees', again, emphasising the relationship between threat and method of torture.⁸²⁴

The continuance of torture throughout the 1990s seemed to be indicative of a laissez faire attitude towards state violence. This was emphasised when Shaykh Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, a member of the ruling family and the then Foreign Minister, dismissed claims of torture and mistreatment by saying 'I think there is a lot of exaggeration, I am not say [sic] we are perfect, I am not saying that, I am not saying there aren't some mistakes'.⁸²⁵ In addition to this lack of accountability,

817 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 28.

818 Ibid.

819 Ibid.

820 *BICI Report*, p. 244.

821 Ibid., p. 242.

822 Ibid., p. 244.

823 Ibid., p. 254.

824 Ibid., p. 417

825 Associated Press Archives, 'Bahrain – Crises', 4 December 1996,

<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/Bahrain-Crises/12dd0996a99586175645c5ab8800cf71?query=bahrain¤t=30&orderBy=Relevance&hits=330&referrer=search&search=%2fsearch%2ffilter%3fquery%3dbahrain%26from%3d21%26orderBy%3dRelevance%26allFilters%3d1990%253ADecade%26ptype%3dIncludedProducts%26%3d1398682372621&allFilters=1990%3aDecade&productType=IncludedProducts&page=21&b=00cf71>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

there appears to be an attitude that those detained on suspicion of criminal activity are automatically guilty. As Human Rights Watch acknowledged, 'there is also a sense that anyone in custody for whatever reason must deserve punishment, which ordinary police and security officials feel entitled to administer.'⁸²⁶ This attitude appears to have been aggravated by the sectarian divide between perceived Shi'a dissidents and the Sunni police. In addition, the historic marginalisation and more recent criminalisation of the Shi'a at large may have a knock on effect. Their perception as an underclass, and lack of *wasta* (influence), perhaps making them more liable to mistreatment in custody.⁸²⁷

Although torture was said to have decreased following the advent of the National Charter in 2000, this changed in 2007, when there was a 'reversion to past practises'.⁸²⁸ Security officials 'utilized a specific repertoire of techniques' that mimicked exactly those from the 1990s.⁸²⁹ This resurgence also coincided with a regional fear of Shi'a empowerment. The King of Jordan, for example, noted that Shi'a victories in Iraq were leading to a rising Shi'a Crescent. Naturally, this engaged 'the Gulf-wide obsession with Iran's potential influence'.⁸³⁰ In addition, this coincided with the creation of an almost entirely Bahraini-run security services, a thing the British had anticipated with gloom in the 1980s, when they noted a Bahrain run Special Branch could lead to civil unrest.⁸³¹ In 2009, Shaykh Khalifa bin 'Abd Allah Al Khalifa was tasked by the King to Bahrainiise the BNSA in order to remove 'the last vestiges of British influence'.⁸³² This, coupled with a legislative amendment of 2008, gave the NSA powers of arrest and interrogation,⁸³³ and paved the way for the NSA violence of 2011.

In 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry documented that a

826 HRW, *Routine Abuse: Routine Denial*.

827 Ibid.

828 HRW, *Torture Redux*.

829 HRW, *Torture Redux*.

830 G. Abdo, 'The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a Sunni Divide', The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, Analysis Papers, no. 29, April 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2013/04/sunni%20shia%20abdo/sunni%20shia%20abdo>, (accessed 15 October 2015).

831 P.F.M. Wogan, *Iran and the Gulf*, 23 August 1982.

832 C. Henzel, 'Scenesetter for Manama Dialogue, December 11 -13', US Embassy Manama, 2 December 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAMA681_a.html, (accessed 5 October 2015).

833 *BICI report*, p. 45

'systematic practice of physical and psychological abuse' had taken place during 2011.⁸³⁴ As before, the forms of torture⁸³⁵ and abuse were similar.⁸³⁶ This historic similarity that was documented after independence points to an institutional memory of repression, where the transmission of memories, tactics, behaviours, occur between members of the ruling class, their associates, and the institutions they control. As the BICI report notes, 'the very fact that a systematic pattern of behaviour existed indicates that this is how these security forces were trained and how they were expected to act'.⁸³⁷ Yet while this brutality in the recent uprising has been attributed to a shift to hardliners, it has been prevalent since Independence and grown steadily more endemic since. This implies a number of more explanatory issues, such as the increasing involvement of Saudi in Bahrain's affairs, the criminalisation of Shi'a, the sectarian imbalance of the police, the Bahrainisation of the police, higher popular mobilisation, and the demise of sufficient moderating influences.

Impunity Legitimising Torture

Underpinning much of the persistence of torture is both a lack of accountability, coupled with a shift to policy makers and officials who perceive its value as a tool of social control. Although it is difficult to prove that torture is ordered by those in key political positions, their influence, or failure to influence, implies some level of complicity that points to a systemic issue of either negligence, wilful blindness or tacit approval. Amnesty International wrote in 1996, that 'the impunity with which such practices are carried out, and the absence of any official accountability, has resulted in torture being regarded as an apparently legitimate method of interrogation'.⁸³⁸ This lack of accountability has been an ongoing problem, yet its historical persistence can also be explained by a culture of impunity buttressed by reactionary attitudes to dissent. There was also little influence to temper such excesses.

In particular, the British embassy were fully aware of the goings on within

834 *BICI Report*, p. 298.

835 e.g. excessive handcuffing and blindfolding, forced standing, severe beatings, electric shocks, cigarette burns, beating the soles of feet (falaqa), sleep deprivation, threats of rape, sexual abuse, religious insults (usually anti-Shi'a), electric shocks, hanging or suspension, solitary confinement, expose to extreme temperatures, and other forms of humiliation

836 *Ibid.*, pp. 288 – 290.

837 *Ibid.*, p. 281

838 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

Bahrain's Ministry of the Interior, yet appeared to do little to stop it. As Tomkys noted in 1982, 'brutality is normal and expected'⁸³⁹ On other occasions, Britain actively misled the British public about torture in Bahrain. When army officer Sa' id al-'Uwaynati was tortured and murdered by the Bahrain Defence Force for his alleged role in the murder of the newspaper editor 'Abd Allah al-Madani in 1976, the British Embassy in Bahrain effectively denied the extent of their knowledge to Stan Newens, a British MP making enquiries about human rights abuses in Bahrain. They also misled Newens on the explanation of Ghulum's death. Other British officials justified it by saying that Bahrain was moderate compared to other regimes, repeatedly using euphemisms to trivialise what was a serious ethical issue.

In light of increased global competition for contracts in Bahrain, the British were sensitive about losing out on trade opportunities by upsetting the Al Khalifa. During the interrogation of those arrested for the coup attempt in 1982, Henderson reported that the security forces 'got the job done without without any of the prisoners being severely or lastingly' injured, a 'creditable achievement' in 'local terms'.⁸⁴⁰ However, J.C. Moberly was unwilling to press the Bahraini authorities on issues regarding torture, as it might prejudice their relationship with Bahrain.⁸⁴¹ British leverage and influence diminished as they sought now to curry favour with Bahrain in order to gain business contracts and investments that would benefit the United Kingdom. As Sterling noted;

Bahrain is one of our best Arab markets. So it is worth continuing to give the Bahrainis the things that they want from us: help for the police, who are the best guarantee of local stability; training for the Defence Force officers, both to keep them happy and to top them going to Iraq; favourable consideration for ECGD cover and, in particular, a continuingly effective technical assistance program. Our position here is strong. We can best maintain it by giving help and advice at least as readily in the future as hitherto, but always remembering that the

839 W.R. Tomkys, 16 February 1982.

840 W.R. Tomkys, 16 February 1982.

841 J.C. Moberly, Bahrain: Use of Torture by the Special Branch, 19 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

Bahrainis are now fully independent and expect to be treated accordingly.⁸⁴²

In reality, Britain benefited from a status quo that facilitated torture, and were assuaged by pragmatic goals from any compunction to act. Through a policy of beneficial and wilful negligence, demonstrative obfuscation, the British were complicit in a brutal policy, and perhaps eased their conscience through constant reiterations that Bahrain was independent and that such egregious behaviour was commonplace in the Middle East.

Yet while Ian Henderson was reportedly tried to temper the excesses of the Al Khalifa regime, frequently trying to dissuade the Prime Minister from taking more draconian forms of action, the British Embassy feigned ignorance, and there is little evidence that they sought to highlight these egregious acts. Emile Nakhleh suggested that it was tacitly accepted, and that a division of labour emerged, where Arabs did the torturing and the British concerned themselves with intelligence.⁸⁴³ Many Bahrainis maintain, however, allege that Colonel Ian Henderson engaged personally in torture, although his role is still not clear.⁸⁴⁴ While Henderson's influence in this regard is hard to determine, the British, disavowed from their obligation to rule with a moderating influence, ultimately gave tacit support to security measures that were coercive, yet had the appearance of being beyond their control. While knowledge of Henderson's role is still shrouded in mystery, he may have been, quite controversially, a man who tempered the excesses of hardliners in the government. After Independence, the British may have objected to these brutal methods, but they objected quietly.

The reforms of 2001, and the amnesty to anyone in the state security apparatus who may have committed crimes before 2001, emphasised that the new order was not committed to accountability. Indeed, until the publication of the BICI report, government officials often claimed that reports about ill-treatment were exaggerated in order to generate sympathy for the opposition. This happened in 1996, for example,

842A.J.D. Sterling, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1971.

843E. Nakhleh, 2013.

844R. Fisk, 'Britain at the Heart of Bahrain's Brutality Rule', *The Independent*, 18 February 1996, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/briton-at-the-heart-of-bahrains-brutality-rule-1319571.html> , (accessed 5 October 2015).

when the Foreign Minister gave an interview to AP news ⁸⁴⁵, and more recently in 2011, when officials claimed that doctors or protesters had inflicted wounds to generate international sympathy.⁸⁴⁶ While the government accepted, after reading the BICI report, that systematic torture had taken place in Bahrain during 2011, the promise of reforms designed to mitigate the occurrence of future torture have been executed in a manner designed to prevent actual accountability.⁸⁴⁷ Justice has not been forthcoming (See chapter on legal repression). The fact that torture follows similar patterns, and has been occurring throughout Bahrain's history with little to no accountability suggests that it moves beyond a systematic problem to a systemic one, in which torture is tacitly acknowledged as a legitimate method of coercion, as well as an important instrument of state control, surveillance, and deterrence. Indeed, the problem has deepened following Independence, and remains ongoing.

Cutting off the Head of the Snake: Arresting Leaders

The Bahraini authorities have engaged in the process of arresting intolerable political opposition since the inception of organised political opposition, although evidence suggests that while leaders were targeted in the first half of the 20th century, mass arrests have become increasingly important as a tool of repression. In late 1934, early 1935, when a group of Manama *bahārna* inspired by Gandhi's demonstrations against the British campaigned for more rights for labourers, the British threatened the eight ringleaders, saying they would be held responsible. However, the habit of targeting political leaders came into sharp relief in 1956, when the British realised that the popularity of the Higher Executive Committee⁸⁴⁸ meant that that unrest would break out if they arrested the leaders – especially as their methods had remained 'within the

845Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, 'Bahrain Crises', [video], AP Archives, <http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/Bahrain-Crises/12dd0996a99586175645c5ab8800cf71?query=bahrain¤t=30&orderBy=Relevance&hits=330&referrer=search&search=%2fsearch%2ffilter%3fquery%3dbahrain%26from%3d21%26orderBy%3dRelevance%26allFilters%3d1990%253ADecade%26ptype%3dIncludedProducts%26%3d1398696824995&allFilters=1990%3aDecade&productType=IncludedProducts&page=21&b=00cf71>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

846P. Cockburn, 'Bahrain regime jails doctors who dared to treat protesters', *The Independent*, 30 September 2011, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/bahrain-regime-jails-doctors-who-dared-to-treat-protesters-2363331.html>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

847 *BICI Report*, p. 298.

848This was the original name before they were forced to change the name to the Committee of National Union. The Amir reportedly did not like them 'higher', which implied they were above his rule.

bounds of the law'.⁸⁴⁹ Although members of the Ruling Family, further worried by the British talking to the HEC, were pressuring Belgrave to take 'immediate and drastic action' against the HEC by arresting the leaders, Belgrave thought such an action might not degrade the movement but lead to even more unrest.⁸⁵⁰ This relative 'weakness' as demonstrated by British caution was also evident in 1956, when the Shi'a leaders of the HEC were not arrested as the British thought them harmless and feared it would upset the villagers.⁸⁵¹ The Foreign Office, for their part, encouraged a policy of delaying arrests, stating that, 'I hope that you will be able to prevent him provoking a dangerous situation unnecessarily before his police are capable of dealing with'.⁸⁵²

Reluctance to undertake arrests prompted consideration of other methods. It was argued that the 'better elements' should be detached from the reformists only with timely action.⁸⁵³ However, the divisions and fragmenting of the movement, facilitated by government political manoeuvring, resulted in considerable moderate opinion turning against the leaders, itself a form of repression that was designed to soften public opposition to an eventual arrest. In addition to government manoeuvring, the growing split in the HEC was a result of the fact that they had to 'respond to the whims and moods of various incoherent factions within the broad spectrum of opposition' and 'indulge in riots, strikes, and demonstrations that it neither planned or wanted'.⁸⁵⁴ This growing fragmentation, itself a result of the combination of government policy and HEC tactics, paved the way for the arrest of the leaders. After the arrests, the HEC's supporters faded 'into thin air'.⁸⁵⁵

In 1965, students and strike leaders were arrested, with schools in particular being a source of contention for the Bahrain government. The British claimed that the settling of the strike and the 'arrest of the ringleaders' returned everything 'back to normal by mid April' of the same year.⁸⁵⁶ In 1973, the British documented that PFLOAG were broken after most of its leaders were arrested.⁸⁵⁷ Following an

849B.A.B. Burrows, 4 March 1956, p. 211

850Ibid. p. 210.

851B.A.B. Burrows, Bahrain Internal Situation, 6 November 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

852 Foreign Office, 'Foreign Office to Bahrain', 6 March 1956, RoB, p. 216.

853Ibid.

854F. Khuri, p. 207

855C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, p. 8.

856G.W.R. Smith, Annual Review for the year 1965, *BGAR*, vol. 7 p. 1.

857R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual review for 1973.

outbreak of strikes in the 1970s, trade unionist leaders were arrested. Between 'June 15 to 25, the SIS rounded up the leaders of the strike and a number of other labor activists and political figures'.⁸⁵⁸ The British noted that arresting the leaders 'was effective', and that it was likely that 'left-wing leaders themselves hastily restrained those workers outside ALBA who wanted to strike in sympathy'.⁸⁵⁹ The British also noted that such a move encouraged the leftists in the Assembly to step more in line with what the government wanted. Twenty-nine trade unionists were arrested in June 1974⁸⁶⁰, while more were arrested in 1975 prior to the dissolution of the National Assembly. In the latter instance, mass arrests were designed to destroy the leadership prior to an unpopular political decision. In 1981, after an alleged coup attempt by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Front, seventy-three people were given steep sentences (3 life imprisonment, 60 15 years, 12 juveniles 7 years).⁸⁶¹ Despite acknowledging that they did not present a serious threat, Shaykh Khalifa argued that a strong response was necessary to deter others, implying that regimes do not always repress strongly when they feel threatened; 'They didn't represent anything dangerous to us but we are not used to this sort of thing so we had to take strong action'.⁸⁶² Sometimes arrests were designed to reduce societal tension. Following the murder of 'Abd Allah al-Madani in 1976, the police were under pressure to make arrests lest the incident result in communal strife between religious folk and left wingers. After the arrest of three culprits, anger reportedly 'subsided'.⁸⁶³

In the 1990s Intifada, the targeting of political leaders continued. Other prominent religious leaders were accused of inciting hatred against the regime, and arrested by the authorities. These include Shaykh 'Abd al-Amir al-Jamri, 'Abd al-Wahab Hussain, Shaykh Khalil Sultan, Shaikh Hassan Sultan and Hassan Mushaima', who were all arrested.⁸⁶⁴ In the 2011 Uprising, twenty-one leaders were rounded up and put in prison.⁸⁶⁵ While some have been tried in absentia, the rest, who were

858A. Khalaf, 'Labor Movements in Bahrain'.

859R.M. Tesh, Bahrain's First Parliament, 8 July 1974.

860Amnesty International, Annual Report 1974/1975, London, p. 126.

861W.R. Tomkys, Trial of Detainees, 15 March 1982, 8/4332, TNA.

862*Gulf Daily News*, 'Interview with Shakykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa', 15 Saturday 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

863E.F. Given, Political Murder in Bahrain.

864 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

865Protest leaders currently in prison, Abd al-Hadi al-Khawaja (also a citizen of Denmark), Abd al-Wahab Hussein, Hassan 'Ali Mushaima, Muhammad al-Muqdad (also a citizen of Sweden), Abd al-Jalil al-Muqdad, Abduljalil al-Singace, Seed al-Nuri, Abd al-Hadi al-Mukhudar, Mirza al-Mahrus,

imprisoned, have become known as the Bahrain 13.⁸⁶⁶ Summary justice followed, and the fledgling protest movement suddenly lost a lot of its important figureheads. Religious figures and human rights activists were also arrested, including Nabeel Rajab, Sayyed Yousef, and Zainab al-Khawaja, thus reflecting the importance of Bahrain's advocacy revolution, and also the threat posed by the revolution to the regime. Although it is difficult to determine strategic decision making in modern times, the empowerment of the Shi'a in the region, the influence of Saudi, and the power of hawkish Al Khalifa, all point to the reason for a reactionary arrest policy.

The Shi'a Threat and the Rise of Mass Arrests

While leaders have been targeted consistently throughout history, the process of mass arrests has become more widespread over the past fifty years. Devolution and horizontal stratification of opposition movements has also made the arrest of leaders problematic, as has the potential problem of leaders abroad fomenting unrest. With hierarchical organizations and cell structures, which arose in Bahrain in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, broad-based arrests are necessitated due to structural changes resilient to leader removal. Improvements in communication and travel within the region have also meant that it is easier for those in exile to foment unrest in Bahrain. This was noted in 1965, when the British argued that exiled Bahrainis in Kuwait were sewing discord. Yet even with the growth in technology and travel, which allowed leaders to command unrest, rising levels of education and growing awareness of ruling family corruption resulted in greater popular discontent. The Turnbull report of 1965 noted the problem of education, and noted that relative spending on education compared to security had meant that the "insurance rate" for security had in five years fallen considerably below the increased risk which a liberal education policy is liable to create,... as the present emergency so poignantly illustrates'.⁸⁶⁷ Indeed, charismatic leaders were no longer as important in mobilising political unrest.

In the 1950s, the ideological sway of pan-Arabism was also important in

Muhammad 'Ali Rida Ismail, Muhammad Jawwad Muhammad, Ibrahim Sharif, Salah al-Khawaja, Nabeel Rajab, Zainab al-Khawaja (also a citizen of Denmark). See HRW, *Interfere, Restrict, Control*.

866S. Bery, 'Nabeel Rajab: Why Did the U.S. State Department Drag Its Feet?', *Amnesty International Blog*, 21 August 2012, <http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-east/nabeel-rajab-why-did-the-u-s-state-department-drag-its-feet/>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

867 P.E. Turnbull, 1965.

seeping into the population, and the Al Khalifa and the British were increasingly perceived as a colonialist anachronism and a remnant of Western imperialism. Larger scale arrests began in earnest in the 1950s, when arresting political leaders alone did not stave off agitation completely. After the British invasion of Suez in 1956, the authorities arrested tens of people, building a new camp in Rumaitha in order to hold them. In 1965, when workers mobilised to oppose BAPCO's plans at making redundancies, the arrest of leaders was buttressed by widespread arrests. In March 1972, police arrested over five hundred people after what Amnesty International described as a series of 'non-violent strikes and demonstrations' took place.⁸⁶⁸ The size of the initial arrest was clearly designed to have a salutary effect on demonstrators while also removing bodies from meatspace. This is highlighted by the fact that about four hundred were released shortly after they were detained.⁸⁶⁹ Sometimes agitators were targeted for no apparent reason other than intimidation. As Amnesty International noted in March 1978, '35 employees in the ship- building and aluminium smelting industries were arrested and imprisoned for several days, during which time they were beaten. These arrests do not seem to have been connected with any particular activities on the part of those detained'.⁸⁷⁰

The Bahrain authorities also frequently retain a reserve of political prisoners in order to maintain a level of deterrence. Amnesty International documented that 'the number of political prisoners held for more than short periods has remained constant at approximately 30, releases being matched roughly by new arrests'.⁸⁷¹ In 1978, Amnesty International reported that 'in many cases...the same people have been arrested, released and re-arrested several times over a period of years, without ever having been charged with an offence, and it appears to be the pattern that arrests are made from time to time simply in order to discourage dissent'.⁸⁷²

Although it is evidenced that the al-Madani murders may have encouraged this policy of salutary arrests, it simply seems to have been used as a pretext to justify a more draconian policy advocated by the Prime Minister, who 'would have his own way on security matters which were his sole responsibility'.⁸⁷³ Over all, Independence

⁸⁶⁸ Amnesty International, *Annual Report, 1971 – 1972*, London, p. 48.

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁰ Amnesty International, *Annual Report 1978*, London, p. 252.

⁸⁷¹ Ibid.

⁸⁷² Ibid.

⁸⁷³ R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 18 November 1973, FCO 8/1975.

seemed to prompt a more hawkish approach to arrests. For example, in 1973, a group of PFLOAG members, including two women, were arrested and put in a prison on the Bahrain Island of Um al-Hassan where the Prime Minister, 'determined to act firmly', said they would stay.⁸⁷⁴ In the same year, a PFLOAG member accused of storing weapons and explosives was also given a stiff sentence, reflecting the government's desire to deter other potential recruits.⁸⁷⁵ Accordingly, the British believed that PFLOAG's back was broken after the arrest of most of its important members, destroyed its existing structure.⁸⁷⁶ Clearly the political murder of Al-Madani provided a great opportunity to move against PFLOAG, and an even better opportunity to insure continued division between religious elements and leftists. The PFLOAG arrests in al-Madani case happened quickly⁸⁷⁷, and perhaps too quickly, in order to keep peace. This hawkish reaction by the government was only restrained by the fact they had run out of room in prison to put PFLOAG members.⁸⁷⁸ The Prime Minister's attitude to dissent reflected too growing autonomy and independence of Bahrain's Police. This was highlighted as early as 1974, when the British complained about being kept in the dark about early morning arrests of ALBA labour agitators. Quoting Shaykh Muhammad bin Mubarak, Robert Tesh states 'For once we have taken the initiative. What they did not tell me is that the police were going to pounce'.⁸⁷⁹ This action was said to be the result of firm action undertaken by the 'Government and the merchant class'.⁸⁸⁰

The Criminalisation of the Shi'a

The rise of the so-called 'Shi'a threat' and the subsequent criminalisation of the Shi'a has also impacted upon mass arrests. As Roger Tomkys noted in 1981, the 'increasing numbers of arrests of arrests among the Shi'a community in the last few days, not confined to young hotheads, may alienate them more widely'.⁸⁸¹ Towards the end of

874 US Embassy Manama, 'Security on Gulf and Bahrain', 30 April 1973,

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973MANAMA00248_b.html, (accessed 5 October 2015).

875 US Embassy Bahrain, 'Bahraini Subversive Given Stiff Sentence', 12 May 1973,

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973MANAMA00279_b.html, (accessed 5 October 2015).

876 R.M. Tesh, 'Form at a Glance (FAAG)', 24 June 1974.

877 E.F. Given, Bahrain: Annual Report for 1976.

878 Ibid.

879 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 1 July 1974.

880 Ibid.

881 W.R. Tomkys, Meeting Between Minister of State and Bahraini Prime Minister, 18 December 1981, FCO8/3893, TNA.

the 1970s, the Iran-Iraq war and growing Shi'a anger at the manner in which Saddam Hussein's regime was treating Iraq's Shi'a generated some discontent. However, contrary to narratives that posit that the Iranian revolution prompted Shi'a insurrection in Bahrain, the Shi'a were relatively quiet during the Iranian Revolution. The police even acknowledged this, and noted that since the Islamic Revolution, there had been 'virtually no visible signs of support among the Bahraini Shi'a for the Imam Khomeini'.⁸⁸² Yet the Prime Minister, ubiquitous in Bahrain's affairs, decided to move against the country's Shi'a population. In the early 1980s, 650 Shi'a were arrested, even though the Ashura holiday had passed peacefully, bringing the total to around 850.⁸⁸³ Interestingly, the fact Ashura had been peaceful encouraged the Prime Minister to make the mass arrests, suggesting how personal inclination influenced repressive policy and not the perceived threat.

In a conversation with Christopher Wilton, the British First Secretary in Bahrain, Ian Henderson had said that the Prime Minister's reason for moving against the Shi'a was reportedly to demonstrate to them that the 'Bahrain Government were true Arabs'.⁸⁸⁴ Even Ian Henderson, the so-called 'Butcher of Bahrain' disagreed with the decision to order this crackdown, as it would 'probably have the opposite effect from that desired'.⁸⁸⁵ The British Embassy reported that over one thousand Shi'a were arrested, although it is not clear for what reason, if any. Amnesty International corroborated these numbers.⁸⁸⁶ Indeed, Independence, the Iran Iraq War, the Iranian Revolution, the empowerment of the Al Khalifa, the growing influence and enabling factor of Saudi Arabia, and the diminishing of British Influence meant that the Bahraini Government 'abandoned their tolerant and low key approach to Shia unrest'.⁸⁸⁷ The sectarian dimension to this repression has continued. In 1991, Amnesty International argued that the government's move against the Shi'a was a 'deliberate policy' designed to target and 'harass and intimidate entire communities – particularly Shia communities' living in villages near the capital city.⁸⁸⁸ Amnesty International reported that as many as 4,000 people were arrested between December 1994 and

882H.B. Walker, *The Shia in Bahrain*, 26 October 1980.

883K.J. Passmore, *Bahrain Internal*, 3 December 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.

884 *Ibid.*

885 *Ibid.*

886Amnesty International, *Annual Report*, London, 1982.

887K.J. Passmore, 3 December 1980.

888Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, pp. 5 – 6.

September 1995, with many being held for months without charge or trial.⁸⁸⁹

The framework for these mass arrests was also facilitated by the State Security Law, which has given a legal pretext for the arrests of thousands of protesters since the 1970s.⁸⁹⁰ The law essentially allows for indefinite incommunicado detention. In the 1980s, detainees such as Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali al-'Ikri, 'Abd al-Karim Hassan al-'Aradi and 'Abd al-Nabi al-Khayami were held under the State Security Law's 'provisions, without charge or trial, for as long as three to seven years'.⁸⁹¹ Even after the abolition of the State Security Law, the advent of the Anti-Terrorism law gave the security services very broad powers of detention and arrest. Those suspected of engaging in a multitude of acts stipulated in the anti terror law can be detained for up to 60 days without being charged.⁸⁹² This can then be renewed by order from the High Court for a period of up to 6 months.⁸⁹³ These laws have subsequently allowed the authorities to incarcerate citizens on the barest suspicion of wrong doing. Indeed, the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights reported that 'in 2013 alone, there were 38 terrorism cases where 318 defendants including women and children were sentenced to prison, or are awaiting verdicts'.⁸⁹⁴ The shift from arresting political leaders to mass arrests has marked a corollary shift from 'cutting off the head' of the snake to attempting to destroy or incapacitate the body. The advent of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian revolution, as well as a reversal to more Saudi-backed Al Khalifa autonomy in matters of internal security has led both a more hawkish approach, but also a larger coercive apparatus, that was less fearful of a backlash if draconian measures were taken.

Conclusion

From the evidence, it is clear that the scale of personal integrity violations have gotten worse in a quantitative sense. Arrests have shifted from a leader-focused approach, to

889Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

890Ibid.

891Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, p. 4.

892Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 'The Terrorism Law in Bahrain: A Tool to Silence Dissidents', 13 March 2014, <http://www.bahrainrights.org/sites/default/files/Terrorism%20Laws%20in%20Bahrain%20-%20FINAL.pdf>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

893Article 29, Law no 58, Protecting Society from Terrorist Acts, July 2006, <http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/AdvancedSearchDetails.aspx?id=2125#.U49LEfldXD1>

Part about six months comes from Civil Procedures. Also reported in the <http://www.bahrainrights.org/sites/default/files/Terrorism%20Laws%20in%20Bahrain%20-%20FINAL.pdf>

894Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 'The Terrorism Law in Bahrain'

mass arrests, to the collective punishment, arrest and targeting of Bahrain's Shi'a population. Torture too has become more prevalent, consistent, and routinised since Bahrain's Independence, and superficial democratisation has, unsurprisingly, failed to temper its egregiousness. The para-militarisation of the police has continued unabated, and despite advances in training, the absence of consent means that policing will continue to involve military style soldiering. Facilitated by lack of accountability, poor regulatory bodies, lack of transparency, sectarian make-up of policing institutions, militant nature of police, the multiplicity of security forces, wilful blindness by authorities and Bahrain's allies, poor training, loyalist demands for protection violations of personal integrity have remained ingrained in Bahrain's policing. While many of these traits were a hangover from the Bahrain police under the British, the transfer of power after Independence resulted in a key change in personal integrity violations. After independence, police remained an alien body that served, and were responsive to, the narrow political interests of the colonial, and recolonised regime.

Like in many former colonies, the security services in Bahrain have long been an ambiguous amalgamation of mercenary bodies, quasi-military bodies and other 'informal structures of authority'.⁸⁹⁵ This habit of the police functioning like a 'military garrison'⁸⁹⁶ is not simply a legacy of Bahrain's colonial past, but also indicative of Bahrain's status as a frontier between two hegemon, a fulcrum between local politics and a barrier to perceived Shi'a expansionism. The police force, initially created to temper elements of the Al Khalifa family from undermining British-led reforms, has since struggled to remain free of political bias. This has been exacerbated by Bahrain falling under the Al Khalifa and Saudi yolk, which prompted an increased shift in the intensity of policing in addition to increased discrimination against the country's Shi'a.

895D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), 'Consent, coercion and colonial control: policing the empire 1830 – 1940', in D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 5.

896Ibid., p. 4.

Chapter Five

Legal Repression and the emergence of Repressive Law

'Even if the police stick to the book, Bahrain has a repressive enough legal system to squash most dissent'⁸⁹⁷

Laws, legal processes and the legal system have been a recurring aspect of repression in Bahrain, and have become an ever larger and more comprehensive part of the repressive capacity of the state. By examining legislation, legal structures, legal processes, and, where possible, the strategic decision making behind these, this chapter argues for the emergence of what Nonet and Selznick call 'repressive law' in Bahrain, through both statutory effects, but also political manoeuvring and outside interference. The establishment of certain laws and the use of legal repression has facilitated in particular the *embroilment, regulation, and persuasion* that have defined the scope of legal interference by the Al Khalifa regime throughout the 21st century, and initially stemmed from the British desire to retain order through indirect and pacific means. Systemic legal bias has also emerged in Bahrain, and the hegemonic order dominate the process of lawmaking and legal processes, resulting in 'rule by law' instead of the 'rule of law'. While one must acknowledge that any given legal order or legal institution is likely to have a mixed character, Nonet and Selznick's argue that within their typology of law, responsive, autonomous, and repressive, elements of one category tend to be more salient in certain states⁸⁹⁸. This chapter argues, that Bahrain most closely approximates the repressive law model.

A Repressive Legal Structure

A Brief Outline of Systemic Legal Bias From Tribal to Colonial

The legal system in Bahrain has always been populated by members of the ruling family or those whose interests are aligned with the ruling elite. Historically, Al Khalifa feudal lords had considerable discretion when it came to dishing out justice in

⁸⁹⁷The Economist, 'Whitewash', 23 January 1999, issue, 8103, p. 60.

⁸⁹⁸P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, p. 18.

their individual 'fiefdoms', with law being at the discretion of local tribal shaykhs governing their individuals estates, yet the process of reforms underscored by legal changes centralized authority, but maintained much of the particularized tribal law that had defined the pre-reform period. While Khuri asserts that tribal societies like the Al Khalifa refute a standardized penal code, as it 'opposes the principles that bind a tribal group together – namely, exclusiveness based on kinship and the ability to “particularize” or make law without legislative bodies',⁸⁹⁹ a code has emerged that is subservient to the ruling elite's interests. This has stemmed from the Al Khalifa's reluctance to cede control over the legal system, which has been a persistent problem over the past century. Indeed, in the 1920s, Shaykh Hamad bin Isa continually lost any monopoly of powers of punishment that had been agreed on with the British, and members of the Al Khalifa family ruled over their 'individual spheres', conducting 'ruthless oppression'.⁹⁰⁰ In 1954, the Ruler Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa thought judicial reform would mean ceding his absolute authority over Bahrain.⁹⁰¹ The influence of the Al Khalifa in the judiciary persisted post Independence. In 1976, Salman's son, Shaykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa said he would put the judges on trial if they did not agree to his sentence.⁹⁰² In 2013, the Prime Minister was also filmed telling a man accused of torture that both he and the Al Khalifa were above the law.⁹⁰³

Certainly, the lack of political dynamism and the continuation of tribal rule has led to a form of 'sticky authoritarianism', where the influence of conservative members of the Al Khalifa judiciary have impacted upon the legal apparatus, whether in specific legal decisions, or processes of legislative development. However, while the British sought to reform the legal system in the 1920s in order to alleviate Persian disquiet over the oppression of *bahārna* subjects, it only ever became a hybrid entity, one that fused tribal and colonial interests at the expense of a more impartial judicial system. This combination of arbitrary rule and more standardized laws has resulted in

899F. Khuri, p. 216

900'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [158r] (320/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library*
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x000079> [accessed 4 November 2015]

901 J.W. Wall, 25 October 1954, RoB, vol. 7, p. 73.

902 British Embassy Bahrain, Letter to Rt Hon Anthony Crossland MP, 29 January 1977, TNA, FCO 8/2874, TNA.

903 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards', p. 228.

a system which is not only reflective of ruling class interests, but also a legal system that can be subverted more readily when ruling class interests are threatened. Certainly the tensions inherent in this dual authority system impacted upon the timely implementation and execution of laws and legal processes in the face of dissent.

While the British were less reactionary than the Al Khalifa, legal reforms were usually secondary to British commercial interests. They were also reactionary more than pre-emptive, and the impetus for their creation frequently derived from crisis instead of forward thinking policy, as it was crisis that prompted Britain to deviate from the Middle Course they were keen to steer. However, the increasing British reforms to the legal system initiated in 1919 by Major Dickson reflected the problems of this dual authority system, in which the tribal and colonial authority systems came into conflict.⁹⁰⁴ This conflict, and tension between the British and the Al Khalifa would often centre around the need to change both laws and the legal system. The British hoped that the the creation of a more solid legal system would help ameliorate dissent by providing people with appropriate channels from which to conduct agitation. As T.C. Fowle said in 1938, they have no 'no legal means of putting forward their grievances, whether real or imaginary, and are therefore reduced to illegal channels such as agitation'.⁹⁰⁵ In addition to this, the Sharia courts that had been used to adjudicate on civil and criminal matters were deemed unjust by the British, who were concerned in particular about cases of violence perpetrated by Sunnis against the Shi'a. The British administration noted that if such cases were referred to a Sunni *qadi* (judge) the perpetrator would escape 'scot free or with light punishment'.⁹⁰⁶

By arguing people have a 'legal' means of expressing themselves, the government were a in a stronger position to deal firmly with those who employed 'illegal' means. However, Fowle accused the Bahrain government in 1938 for being 'responsible for the agitation' due to being 'remiss about initiating reforms, e.g. the Bahrain Code'.⁹⁰⁷ This 'remiss' attitude dogged the implementation of a legal channel for dissent. In 1963, J.P Tripp noted the intractable problem of how the Al Khalifa saw justice as a shaykhly prerogative, where the 'idea of an independent judiciary is

904F. Khuri, p. 88.

905 T.C. Fowle, 17 November 1938, RoB, vol. 5, p. 139.

906'File 19/165 IV (C 57) Bahrain Reforms' [106r] (242/476), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/340, in Qatar Digital Library

<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023555763.0x00002b> [accessed 18 April 2016]

907Ibid.

abhorrent'.⁹⁰⁸ He added that he did not think the Ruler nor his family believed in a system of 'impartial justice', and that British attempts to help reform them had failed or were doomed to fail. Following Independence, the Al Khalifa and the merchant elites reasserted themselves, with Saudi gaining influence in Bahrain, especially through the Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa who was amenable to Saudi pressure⁹⁰⁹. With the absence of any democratic safety valve following the 1975 dissolution of parliament, and with Bahrain slowly becoming a Saudi pensioner',⁹¹⁰the legal framework reflected an increase in repressive law.

In the 21st century, much remains the same, despite the introduction of a constitution in 2002, which stipulates that that the judicial system should be independent and that judges should not be subject to any outside influence, the International Commission of Jurists argues that the 'the Bahraini judiciary has typically been subject to inappropriate government influence'.⁹¹¹In 2012, a decade after the reforms, many senior judges still belong to the ruling family, and the King appoints all judges.⁹¹² Furthermore, those members of the judiciary who are members of the ruling family may still issue verdicts that are aligned with the will of the ruling family. The International Commission of Jurists argue that many of the judges not affiliated with the ruling family are Egyptians on two year contracts, and that they may be unwilling to issue rulings unfavourable to the government for fear of not having their contracts renewed.⁹¹³ In times of social upheaval, this pressure is even more acute, and social movements may find themselves at the receiving end of decisions made by judges whose concern for their jobs transcends their desire to meet out impartial justice. In short, Bahrain's legal system is constructed in such a way as to reflect the will of the ruling elite in times of political agitation. Indeed, the odds are stacked against political dissidents. However, it is well structured to ensure that prime legislative capacity lies in the hands of the ruling core, and the King, who can rule by decree. Nonetheless, the advent of legal reforms led by the British symbolised a shift

908 J.P. Tripp, *The Internal Situation in Bahrain*, 1 June 1963, FO 371/174521, TNA.

909 *Leading Personality Reports 1977*, FCO 8/3090, TNA.

910 E.F. Given, 'Bahrain 1976', 15 March 1977, FCO 8 2783, TNA.

911 International Commission of Jurists, 'Bahrain – Attacks on Justice 2002', 26 August 2002, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/48a57efa0.html> (accessed 5 December 2014).

912 Freedom House, *Bahrain 2012*, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/bahrain-0>, (accessed 10 November 2015).

913 *Ibid.*

from a place in which sheer coercive power and tribal justice as repression was replaced by channelling in the form of an entire 'body of laws, announcements, decisions, or decrees made and enacted by government'.⁹¹⁴

Laws

Emergency Laws: Legal Form for Cracking Down on Dissent

Being remiss about implementing reforms, and particularly establishing a legal framework, has necessitated the use of emergency laws as band aids to combat unrest, itself not unusual in an embattled nascent state with little to draw on but arbitrary tribal practises. Yet as this section highlights, Bahrain has been subject to emergency law for the majority of the past fifty years, and, as with repressive legal systems, a 'spirit of martial law prevails'.⁹¹⁵ These include the Emergency Law of 1956, the Public Security Law of 1965, the State Security Decree of 1974, and the State of National Safety in 2011. In this manner, emergency laws have expanded the definitions of dissent and have facilitated the process of the incarceration, trial and incapacitation of political 'criminals'. The British, who had embarked on a process of influence designed to be spread by 'indirect and pacific' means, had been encouraging legal reform, yet they blamed the Al Khalifa for its slow implementation. However, the vagueness of the terms of Britain's suzerainty over Bahrain has made the implementation of law haphazard and unclear, and while Britain preferred non-interference, laws were often introduced brashly as reactionary measures to what the British perceived as, initially, Al Khalifa misrule, and later threats to the Al Khalifa. Because Britain were often forced to take the reigns when emergencies necessitated it, the laws were often harsh and draconian .

A delayed penal code meant that legal framework had not failed to set the terms for legitimate dissent, and the first formalised emergency 'notice' came in 1956, as a reactionary measure that gave the authorities significant powers to deal with the Committee of National Union, a populist nationalist movement that potentially threatened British hegemony in Bahrain as well as the ruling Al Khalifa regime. Crucially, the uprising of 1956 drew government attention to its weaknesses and lack

914 Khuri, p. 216.

915 P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, pp. 34-35.

of security laws.⁹¹⁶ Yet the issuing of the notice was not without equivocation, and the indecision of the British to pressure the Ruler into accepting rested on two considerations. Firstly, they thought it would 'make clear to the reformists that the Bahrain Government is determined to preserve order and that political activity must be kept within proper constitutional bounds'.⁹¹⁷ It would also 'enable the Ruler to act in proper legal form against the reformist leaders if their conduct merited it'. Without legal resources, must use non-legal power to deal with any problems of social interaction.⁹¹⁸ However, the British knew the HEC would see the move as 'provocative',⁹¹⁹ and it might prompt disorder that would necessitate the intervention of British troops. The British also considered the advantages of the Ruler being able to use his more discretionary tribal laws.⁹²⁰ Yet, crucially the Emergency notice of 1956, gave the authorities 'legal form' to crack down on absolutely any dissent, the HEC or otherwise. Specifically, it gave magistrates, including state officers, the authority to ask people to disperse on pain of death.

The 1956 emergency law was superseded by the equally broad Bahrain Public Security Law of 1965, which was also brought in hastily following strikes at Bahrain national oil company (BAPCO) due to an absence of a proper legal framework for managing dissent. JP Tripp of the British Political Agency stated that the laws, 'although repugnant to normal British notions of justice, are regrettably necessary in Bahrain.'⁹²¹ Despite this apparent repugnance, the British persuaded the Ruler of Bahrain to issue the Public Security Ordinance,⁹²² saying that the recent disorder was an 'ideal peg with which to hang the enactment of a Public Order decree' on.⁹²³ Article 3 (1) of the Public Security Law of 1965 gave the Ruler of Bahrain ultimate power to 'lay down any regulations which he considers necessary or suitable in the interests of public security or for the preservation of public order or the safety of the country'. Furthermore, any regulation invoked by the Ruler under the Public Security Law

916F. Khuri, p. 216.

917D.M.H. Riches, 10 April 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 239

918 A. Turk, *Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict*, *Social Problems*, vol. 23, no. 3 (Feb. 1976), pp. 276-291 p. 284.

919D.M.H. Riches, 10 April 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 239

920Ibid.

921J.P. Tripp, *Communique to M. S. Weir*, 26 April 1965, *RoB*, vol. 5, p. 389.

922 Ibid.

923R.F. Brenchley, *Communique to JP Tripp*, 26 March 1965, *RoB*, vol. 5, p. 385.

voided any other laws that may run contrary to it.⁹²⁴ On 22 April 1965, and in accordance with Article 3 of the Public Security Law, the Ruler issued Public Security Regulation No. 1. This gave the Ruler the power to lawfully detain anyone deemed to be a 'danger to public security or the safety of the country'.⁹²⁵ These broad laws, which deepened the government's ability to legally repress anyone deemed a threat to the state (itself a broad and nebulous concept), reflected both the British fear of nationalistic forces and the Al Khalifa's fragile position. Indeed, while the British had to persuade the Al Khalifa to issue the Public Safety Law, the Ruler's reluctance may have stemmed from no real respect for justice, but more that Sheikh 'Isa objected to having to legally justify his actions when it came to dealing with anyone wishing to 'harm Bahrain'.⁹²⁶

Through these emergency laws, the government's ability to justify containment and involve protesters in embroilment and regulation increased, yet reflected again British overreach into a situation that had stemmed from administrative apathy and a failure to implement proper reforms since 1956. The reactionary measure again highlights the British going beyond their middle course and encouraging the ruling regime to take drastic measures in order to initiate proper 'legal form'. The British were also under pressure to protect British subjects, and over zealous in their application of laws that would have been unthinkable at home, but seemingly fine on the periphery of an embattled empire in retreat. In addition to the creation of this vague law, the police were obstructing the Code of Criminal Procedure as it would involve them having to disclose 'evidence in open court the evidence and sources on which their cases against subversives might rest'.⁹²⁷ This, coupled with the Public Security Law, marked the growing asymmetry between the rights of the police and the public, fuelling a disparity that facilitated the incarceration of perceived agitators with no external oversight.

After Independence in 1971, at a time of increasing Saudi hegemony, the 1965 laws were replaced by the State Security Decree of 1974, another draconian piece of legislation that sought to manage the inherent risk of a new legal system and Bahrain's

924Public Security Law, *RoB*, vol. 5, p. 385.

925Ibid.

926J.P. Tripp, Letter to J.A. Shellgrove, *RoB*, vol. 5, p. 383.

927Ibid.

venturing into Independence. The new law, encouraged by Ian Henderson⁹²⁸, was an attempt by the government to maintain their ability to adopt a monopoly on emergent legal resources, which was itself challenged by the new parliament. Indeed, the new parliament established in 1973 had exposed the government to the risk of legitimate dissent, and the unprecedented need to devolve issues of national security to an elected body, was anathema to the tribal politics of the Al Khalifa regime. Yet because the parliament failed to vote in accordance with how the government had expected due to a surprise coalition between leftists and the religious group, the Prime Minister, according to British documents, led the decision to dissolve the parliament with the State Security Decree remained.⁹²⁹ In order to legitimise the dissolution, the Bahraini government fabricated a coup as a pretext. The Americans noted that the coup was indeed a pretext; 'GOB seized on ineffectual intent of certain radical elements as a justification for taking, on "security grounds", moves it felt otherwise necessary'.⁹³⁰ Indeed, there was 'no clear security threat to regime', highlighting that even threat perception is not necessary in implementing repressive laws.⁹³¹

Although the British had encouraged the law, the foreign Minister of Bahrain told the US Embassy in 1975 that the decision to implement the law had 'come from the Prime Minister who, over the summer in consultation with the Amir, Foreign Minister and Interior minister, had come to the conclusion continuation of national assembly as it had been constituted and operated for last two years was harmful to Bahrain's national interest'.⁹³² Yet while Bahrain's diversification strategies, and British concerns, reflect a neo-liberal quest for security and predictability, the new law marked the triumph of security, and the growing assertiveness of a ruling core worried by the results of Bahrain's brief democratic liberalisation. The State Security Decree Safety Law lasted over thirty years, and was instrumental in repressing dissent in the 1980s and the 1990s. It allowed the state to detain without trial for up to three years anyone convicted of a range of ambiguous activities, from spreading 'atheistic

928 Author Unknown, Letter to ITM Lucas, 22 June 1975, FCO8/2415, TNA.

929 Leading Personality Reports 1977, FCO 8/3090, TNA.

930 US Embassy Manama, 'Bahraini Political Developments: Foreign Minister's Comments', 11 September 1975, Wikileaks, Link hard to find?

https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975MANAMA01057_b.html

931 Ibid.

932 Ibid.

principles' to the spreading of 'subversive propaganda'.⁹³³

The broad nature of the law⁹³⁴, and its lack of clear definition of the acts it sought to criminalise led to it being used to target the long-term detention of political criminals for the non-violent expression of their opinions.⁹³⁵ In addition to offering a broad description of what might constitute a crime under the State Security Law, the scope for lodging an appeal was limited. Detainees could submit a complaint regarding their arrest, but only after spending three months in detention.⁹³⁶ This initial period of three months detention not only deprived the defendant of the right to be brought promptly before a judge, but it also allowed the authorities to sweep potential dissidents off the street without fear of bureaucratic slowdown. It also meant that Special Branch no longer had to persuade a judge every six days to keep those charged of sedition detained. If a complaint did go to the Supreme Court of Appeal, hearing would be held 'in camera' and only attended by members of the 'prosecution, the complainant and his representative'.⁹³⁷ Furthermore, as stipulated by Article 3 of the State Security Law, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not have to adhere to the Code of Criminal Procedure.⁹³⁸ So while successful appeal would still necessitate at least an obligatory three month period of detention, the odds of securing an appeal are heavily weighted in favour of the state. Thus the decree facilitated the state's legal repression by loosely determining what activities constituted as subversive, and laid a framework for criminalising behaviour that could be defined at the whim of the state. In short, Independence, saw the deepening and further codification of a legal apparatus that sought to legitimise the processes of containment, embroilment, and incapacitation, while giving the intelligence apparatus greater scope for increasing knowledge in Bahrain's affairs.

The challenge posed by the 1990s Intifada posed such a threat that the security

933Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

934For example. Article One permits administrative detention for the following:; if there is serious evidence that a person has made statements, committed acts, undertaken activities or made contacts which are damaging to the internal or external security of the country, or to the country's religious or national interests, or to its fundamental structure, or social or economic systems, or amount to discord, which affects, or could affect, relations between the people and the government, or between the various institutions of the state, between sectors of the people, those working in establishments and companies, or which aim to assist in the commission of acts of sabotage or harmful propaganda, or the dissemination of heretical principles

935Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, p. 4.

936Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

937Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

938Ibid.

law had to be augmented. Despite the broad nature of the State Security Law, the Amir issued a decree in March 1994 whereby suspected cases involving arson or violence were handed to the State Security Court.⁹³⁹ This was after 'Isa Qambar, a 29-year old Bahraini accused of killing a policeman, had his case shifted to the criminal court after his lawyers successfully argued his case was not in the jurisdiction of the State Security Court. The government, concerned it would have 'to prosecute other destruction of property and bodily harm cases in the criminal court, with its higher standards of evidence and more substantial adversarial procedure... transferred jurisdiction over some fourteen additional articles of the penal code from the criminal courts to the State Security Court'.⁹⁴⁰ Ten months after these changes, the State security courts tried 130 more people than they had done the previous year, pointing to an increase in the efficacy of this repressive law.⁹⁴² This legal slight of hand sought to not only criminalize sedition, but to broaden the definitions of sedition so that more and more crimes could be dealt with in a manner that allowed the state to do cope more punitively with dissident tactics. After the changes, Notwithstanding this modification, the State Security Decree was, in principle and practise, barely less draconian than the 1965 law. It simply amounted to an equally draconian, yet more verbose and sophisticated legal ambiguity, augmented by the ability of the executive to modify it when political expediency necessitated.

While 2001 saw the demise of the State Security Law, existing legal strictures still ensured the continuation of repressive law. For one, the 1976 penal code was criticised for voiding civil liberties enshrined in the 1973 constitution.⁹⁴³ Likewise,

939Amnesty International, *Report: Bahrain, 1 January 1997*, <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=publisher&docid=3ae6a9fe0&skip=0&publisher=AMNESTY&coi=BHR&searchin=title&sort=date>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

940'The additional offenses that can now be prosecuted in the security court include arson and use of fires or explosives (Articles 277 -281), and assaults or threats 'against a civil servant or officer entrusted with a public service' (Article 220), or 'against another in any manner, even though without having the intent of killing the victim, if the assault leads to death of the victim' (Article 336). Also in early 1996 the government quietly expanded the security court from one chamber to three chambers in order to cope with the increased number of arrests (see below). Over the following ten months, more than 180 persons were convicted under the state security process, compared with one estimate of fewer than fifty in 1995. This period also saw increased detention of women and children'. - Human Rights Watch, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain*, 1997.

941HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

942Ibid.

943Bahrain's 1973 constitution guarantees freedom of speech (Article 23), the press (Article 24), communication (Article 26), association, including the right to form trade unions on a national basis

provisions of the 1976 penal code still void articles of the new constitution, and has been 'heavily criticised for giving the government the right to suspend key human rights or encroach on them for “national security” reasons'.⁹⁴⁴ In 2006, and in light of the emboldening of the Shi'a in Iraq, Bahrain passed a law on counter-terrorism that threatened to undermine the constitution and reform moves initiated in 2001. By defining terrorist acts so broadly, the law has allowed the 'criminalization of rights that are internationally recognized such as freedom of assembly, freedom of expression or the right to strike'.⁹⁴⁵ The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights described the law a 'tool to silence dissidents',⁹⁴⁶ and despite Bahrain being a State Party to ICCPR, the law allowed for 'ill-treatment, disappearances, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances'.⁹⁴⁷ The International Commission for Jurists also argued that

(Article 27), and assembly (Article 28). In many cases, however, the 1976 Penal Code effectively nullifies those rights, particularly in the following articles; Article 134A calls for imprisonment and a fine for 'any citizen who has attended abroad in whatever capacity and without authorization from the Government, any conference, public meeting or seminar, or has participated in any manner whatsoever in the deliberations thereof with the intent of discussing political, social or economic conditions in the State of Bahrain or in any other state so as to weaken financial confidence in the State of Bahrain or undermine its prestige or standing or to worsen political relations between Bahrain and these countries.'; Article 163 more broadly penalizes 'any person who establishes, sets up, organizes or runs in the State of Bahrain without a license issued by the Government, international societies, organizations or institutions of any kind whatsoever or branches thereof,' or 'any person who joins the aforesaid societies, organizations and institutions', including any citizen who 'join[s] or participate[s] in any manner without a Government license in any of the aforesaid organizations which are based outside the country.'; Article 164 authorizes the closure and dissolution of 'aforesaid societies, organizations and institutions.'; Article 165 authorizes an unspecified prison sentence for 'any person who expressly incites others to develop hatred or hostility toward the system of government.'; Article 168 penalizes 'any person who deliberately disseminates false reports, statements or malicious rumors, or produces any publicity seeking to damage public security, terrorize the population or cause damage to the public interest', and penalizes possession of 'any publication or leaflet' containing such material or possession of any device intended for the reproduction or dissemination of such material.; Article 169 penalizes publication of 'untrue reports' that 'undermine the public peace or cause damage to the country's supreme interest or to the State's creditworthiness.'; Article 178 proscribes any assembly of five or more persons 'aimed at undermining public security, even though for the realization of a legitimate objective.'; Article 222 penalizes 'any person who offends with the use of signs, saying, writing or by any other method a civil servant or officer entrusted with a public service.'

944 Interview with Bahraini Lawyer, 20 November 2013.

945 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 34th Session of the UN Committee Against Torture, 10 May 2005: Submission by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) on the impact of the draft law on counter-terrorism of the Kingdom of Bahrain on its obligations under the United Nations Convention against torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), 10 May 2005, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/48a57eff2.html> [accessed 9 December 2013]

946 Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 'The Terrorism Law in Bahrain: A Tool to Silence Dissidents'.

947 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 34th Session of the UN Committee Against Torture, 10 May 2005.

the terms in the law were too nebulous and unclear, and ran contrary to the cornerstone of criminal law *nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege*⁹⁴⁸ (no crime without law⁹⁴⁹). According to the legislation, a demonstration that led to clashes with the police could result in the protesters being branded terrorists and detained for 90 days upon the basis of secret and undisclosed evidence. Such a law does not simply criminalize civil disobedience, a key method used by social movements, but also renders it a terrorist act, further empowering the state in its legal ability to prevent legitimate freedom of expression and expanding the number of the citizenry who may be deprived of rights. The law also limited the discretionary powers of judges, further empowering the state in regards to sentencing outcomes.⁹⁵⁰ The law came among the US war on terror, and there was considerable US pressure on countries in the Gulf to clamp down on terrorism.⁹⁵¹ Other terror attacks in Saudi, Kuwait, and Oman also prompted support among a number of influential Bahrainis for a crackdown.⁹⁵² The parliament, with its limited powers, could do little to challenge the law, and it carried many of the hallmarks of its State Security predecessor.

From a State of State Security to a State of National Safety

Although the State Security Law lasted until the advent of the National Charter in 2001, the creation of a constitution and a bicameral parliament under the then Amir Hamad was no more than a gilded cage. Hamad has sought to build his legacy on a platform of democratisation and the abandonment of the legal structures that had been the source of much repression and discontent. Yet Hamad's 'constitutional coup'⁹⁵³ shattered illusion of an authentic reform process, and illustrated the continuation of new forms of control, ones that reflected both a Saudi and Al Khalifa fear of emboldening the Shi'a or giving them more power, especially the power to make

948Essentially means a law has to exist prohibiting an action before it can be deemed as criminal

949This principle is founded on the idea that no one can be tried for a crime that is not stipulated in law, nor its punishments defined. The ambiguity of the laws in Bahrain are such that the government have almost unlimited discretion in determining what is considered a crime under the law.

950Law Number 58 for the year 2006, Law for the protection of society from terrorist acts'.

<http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K5806.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2015).

951 W.R. Tomkys, Mahdi Tadjir, 16 May 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA., TNA.

952W.T. Monroe, Bahrainis Publicly Acknowledge Regional Terrorist Threat, US Embassy Manama,16 February 2005, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05MANAMA224_a.html, (accessed 2 October 2015).

953A. Gresh, 'Bahrain: divide, repress and rule', April 2011, <http://mondediplo.com/blogs/bahrain-divide-repress-and-rule>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

laws. This was evident following the outbreak of protests in 2011, where the government introduced the Orwellian named 'State of National Safety'. This law, which was passed by decree and not subject to ratification by parliament, allowed the authorities broader scope in dealing with dissent without democratic scrutiny. The law was approved by the Prime Minister and the Supreme Defence Council, a body created to monitor matters of national security which is made up exclusively of members of the Ruling Family and not accountable to the legislature⁹⁵⁴. In other words, the decision bypassed even the weak parliament, demonstrating how the legal repression endorsed by the constitution lacked any binding consultation between not just the state and society, but the Ruling Family and society. Unsurprisingly, the law was passed the day after 2,000 Saudi soldiers from the Peninsula Shield entered Bahrain to “defend Bahrain as a bulwark against perceived Iranian expansionism”.⁹⁵⁵ However despite this draconian measure reflecting a large degree of fear from both the Al Khalifa and the Saudis, it cannot simply be said to be the work of hard-liners such as the Khawalid or the PM, as it was voted on by the Supreme Defence Council. The extent of ruling family autonomy in this is challenged by the 'Saudi invasion', and the fact that protests had reached such a pitch that Saudi saw the Bahraini red line as having been crossed.

The State of National Safety removed the restraining barrier of role delineation, and gave legal pretext for multiple enforcement agencies to work together to impose curfews, search citizens, censor or confiscate publications, regulate or ban public gatherings.⁹⁵⁶ This lack of 'separating functions' is a move that Austin Turk associated with increased deviance and coercion.⁹⁵⁷ The absence of statute 'identifying the exact powers to be exercised by the Government during a State of National Safety',⁹⁵⁸ compounded the issue. This outcome was not undesirable for the regime, as the Bahrain government also induced a temporary state of lawlessness to create a wide sense of disorder to create panic and a desire for 'law and order'. During March 2011, the government's government's withdrawal of the police from the streets created an

954A. Shehabi. 'Bahrain's Sovereign Hypocrisy', The Middle East Channel, *Foreign Policy*, 14 August 2013, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/14/bahrains_sovereign_hypocrisy?wp_login_redirect=0 (Accessed 6 October 2015).

955J. Kinninmont, *Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse*, p. 20.

956 BICI Report.

957 A. Turk, 'Organizational deviance and political policing', *Criminology*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1981, p. 248.

958BICI Report, p. 418

atmosphere of lawlessness that was later used to justify a heavy-handed deployment of security forces'.⁹⁵⁹ Federico Ferrara describes this deliberate creation of social disorder as a form of repression. Bahraini citizens were placed in a 20th-century version of Hobbesian dilemma, where 'anarchy was pervasive',⁹⁶⁰ and where 'violence and the indiscriminate pillage were not only tolerated but promoted by the armed forces'.⁹⁶¹ Indeed, such a dilemma created a corollary demand for intervention by the armed forces, the only one's capable of reasserting order.

The decree also created a two-tiered quasi military court system, and all those arrested under the National Safety law's broad mandate would be tried in a court in which one of the three judges was a member of the military, a Sunni-dominated body whose experience lay with military and not civil justice. Human Rights Watch described the courts as 'as a vehicle to convict defendants of alleged crimes stemming from the exercise of fundamental rights of freedom of expression, association, and assembly, in violation of international and Bahraini law'.⁹⁶² No matter how nefarious, the State of National Safety was crucial in giving the authorities the correct, yet highly repressive, 'legal form' to arrest and put on trial important leaders of the political opposition. Twenty-one opposition activists were tried and given harsh sentences (ranging from 5 – 25 years), even though much of their testimony had been extracted under torture and that most of the evidence related 'almost entirely to peaceful political activities and raised serious due process issues as well'.⁹⁶³ However, the judges argued that the provisions of the decree took precedent over those in the Bahrain constitution that protect a citizens right to free speech and association.⁹⁶⁴ In addition, statutes were interpreted by the Military Attorney General in a way 'least favourable to the arrested persons and to the defendants appearing before the National Safety Courts'.⁹⁶⁵

Despite the name of the decree, the State of National Safety was simply a way

959 J. Kinninmont, *Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse*, 012, p. 20.

960 F. Ferrara, 'Why Regimes Create Disorder: Hobbes' Dilemma During a Rangoon Summer', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 47, no. 3, 2003, p. 310.

961 Ibid.

962 Human Rights Watch, *No Justice in Bahrain: Unfair Trials in Civilian and Military Court*, 2012, p. 3. <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bahrain0212webwcover.pdf> (Accessed 6 October 2015).

963 Ibid., p. 4

964 Ibid.

965 *BICI Report*, p. 418

of increasing the efficiency with which the Bahrain government could justify the detention and arrest of a large number of people. Indeed, over 3,000 people were arrested following the declaration of a State of National Safety,⁹⁶⁶ reducing the efficiency of the opposition movement in that they actually reduce the number of activists at large. In particular, the incarceration of political leaders reduced the organizational capacity of the opposition in Bahrain. Describing something as law sets out the terms for those activists, simply adding a veneer of legal form to a process that would otherwise be seen as an entirely arbitrary means of repressing social movement activism. Given that the Prime Minister has stated a number of times that all citizens are 'equal before the law',⁹⁶⁷ the process also allows the government to argue that procedures are done in 'accordance with the law'. Perhaps most crucially, the protection afforded by the constitution is entirely subservient to the security of the Al Khalifa regime. Rather than preventing repressive law, the constitution enshrines it by having a caveat that allows for a state of national safety. Most tellingly, while the memorandum attached to the constitution states that measures undertaken in a State of National Safety are meant to be less restrictive than Martial Law Decree of 1981, they were interpreted in a manner that 'exceeded those stipulated in Amiri Decree No. 27 of 1981'⁹⁶⁸ (Martial Law).

While Bahrain's precarious position has always made it vulnerable to increased uncertainty, prompting the almost constant existence of a state of emergency, one in which the regime have justified the 'suspension of normal legal principles and procedures'⁹⁶⁹ the state of National Safety simply reflects the legal redundancies put in place to deal with popular unrest. The fact such emergency laws have always been accompanied by foreign intervention simply add legal support to the strengthening of the coercive apparatus. While some, such as Hamilton may argue that a constitutional endorsement of a state exception is a 'pragmatic recognition of limited constitutional dominion',⁹⁷⁰ the decision to institute National Safety in Bahrain is solely by decree,

966 *BICI Report*.

967 *Gulf Daily News*, 'No Place for Anarchy', 13 March 2013, <http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=349200>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

968 *BICI Report*, p. 57.

969 Welch, p. 18.

970 S. Humphreys, 'Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception', *The European Journal of International Law*, vol. 17, no. 3, 2006, p. 678.

with no binding consultation between state and the King, demonstrating that legalising lawlessness in the form of an emergency law is a discretionary right initiated by the King in the defence of private interests. The fact that Bahrain is a 'red-line' by Riyadh, and that the arrival of Saudi troops was swiftly followed by the laws,⁹⁷¹ indicate that the decision of the National Safety Law was not solely a Bahraini one. Emergency laws highlight foremost the 'close integration of law and politics',⁹⁷² especially when enacted as a response to widespread popular discontent (with the exception of 1965 in Bahrain). In such cases, the 'direct subordination of legal institutions'⁹⁷³ is a means of preserving local minority elite interests in the face of populist demands. While in Latin America, the constitution was 'rendered inoperative by continuing states of emergency',⁹⁷⁴ in Bahrain the constitution is de-legitimised by the very caveats that allow a state of national emergency.

Ordinary law, Ordinances and Regulations: The Expansion of Repressive Law

While emergency laws are a band aid, designed to cope with agitation in a context where administrative and non-coercive control are not sufficient to give the authority vague enough parameters to deal with dissent, non-emergency laws or ordinances are also an important tool of repression. Many of these laws concern the regulation of public meetings, labour organizations, regulation of the press, and the association of people in clubs and societies. The British attempts to clamp down on Al Khalifa 'rowdyism', resulted in the creation of the Manama Municipality, which offered one of the first legal frameworks in Bahrain for regulating public space. A curfew was introduced, and systems of taxation and discipline were regulated and formalised, already setting a precedent that urban centres would be subject to the law before the rural 'hinterland'. The Al Khalifa, for their part, sort to strangle the legal reforms from within, resisting British encroachment on what they saw as tribal law, that's particularism had gave a legal particularism to their oppression of the *baḥārna*. Popular demands for reform highlighted the widespread desire to end arbitrary tribal rule, and petitions for a penal code in 1935 and 1938⁹⁷⁵ fell on deaf ears, despite

971 S. Mabon, 'The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian – Saudi Rivalry', *Middle East Policy Council*, vol xix, no. 2, 2012.

972 P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, pp. 50-52.

973 Ibid.

974 Fagen, P.W., 'Repression and State Security', p. 48.

975 T.C. Fowle, 12 November 1938, p. 132.

British encouragement.⁹⁷⁶ (It is telling that during the 1990s Intifada, and despite numerous 'legal reforms', protesters took to the streets and got petitions due to no legal means of expressing their discontent.⁹⁷⁷ Petitioning the government marked a resurgence of the tactics used by the *baḥārna* in the 1990s).

It was only in 1954 that the British finally got around to drafting one, again, highlighting how the lack of timely reforms impacted upon dissent and subsequent repressive choices. They also brought in a labour code in 1955. While the attempted standardization of law originally stemmed from the British Administration's idea that the ruler had 'proper legal form' ⁹⁷⁸ to repress dissent, the British were initially worried that laws at the time would antagonize the HEC. Yet tackling the HEC via administrative and legal measures was in the face of Al Khalifa backsliding were preferable to British boots on the ground. As a result, Britain's 'middle-course' was once again abandoned; 'We shall be involved in a greater degree of direct participation in the administration, through the Judicial Adviser and the British police officers, than would otherwise be necessary or perhaps desirable'.⁹⁷⁹ This was not Kuwait, Burrows argued, where British influence was more involved in the administration. In Bahrain, given the recent memories of Al Khalifa oppression, British influence was seen as necessary as there was 'no alternative method of reassuring the people of Bahrain that impartial justice will in future be done and that police will be in a better position to maintain order without the unwarranted use of firearms'.⁹⁸⁰

As predicted, the introduction of a penal code was opposed by the HEC on 'the grounds that it incriminated whoever took part in sedition or civil disturbances'.⁹⁸¹ The HEC had already been worn down by a number of unilateral government notices. The final straw came when government claimed that a march planned by the HEC had deviated from its route, and, as such, the HEC had failed to control people and was thus responsible for these 'grave disorders'.⁹⁸² So while the desire for a penal code ultimately drove forward the standardization of law in resistance to tribal particularized law, the penal code and emergency law were designed to facilitate

976 T.C. Fowle, Communique to the Foreign Secretary, *RoB*, vol. 5, p. 4.

977 The Economist, 'Bahrain's Spreading Flames', 19 July 1997, Issue 8026, p. 56.

978 D.M.H. Riches, 10 April 1956, p. 238

979 B.A.B. Burrows, 20 July 1954, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 58.

980 Ibid

981 F. Khuri, p. 206.

982 Bahrain State Radio Transcript, 6 & 7 November 1956, Bahrain Internal Political, 1956, TNA.

repression and Al Khalifa domination. In this respect, the rise of the HEC marked the widespread beginning of the conflict between 'de facto rights' 'from below', and 'de jure' rights 'from above'.

Limiting Organization, Maintaining Fragmentation

With the HEC out of the picture, the Bahrain government felt less need to hurry reform. The Labour Ordinance considered in the late 60s and encouraged by the British provided for registered union organization, was scuppered by Al Khalifa and merchant class interests, on the basis the law would 'conflict with those vested interests among the members of the Ruling Family and the more influential merchants which are still effective obstacles in the way of progress'.⁹⁸³ Indeed, the British dropped pressure to introduce such a law as they feared that introducing such measures might be seen as subversion.⁹⁸⁴ The undermining of the Labour Law highlighted the Al Khalifas fear of legal changes giving groups power to collectively organise, whether in unions, or in public spaces. Thus the ability to formulate the law, and the nature of the laws themselves, was something that remained the prerogative of the Ruling Elites.

The first law concerning the regulation of public meetings was the Amiri Decree Law No. 18 of 1973 on the Organisation of Public Meetings, Rallies and Assemblies. The law was passed hastily in September 1973, two months prior to the establishment of parliament in order that it not be subject to public debate. As such, it gave legal form to the containment of public order before the public could question it. The law, which was subsequently amended in 2006 and 2011, stipulates, amongst other things, that the head of public security be informed of the time, place, and subject matter of all public meetings and demonstrations. Law No. 32 of 2006 stipulates that organisers are also responsible for 'forbidding any speech or discussion infringing on public order or morals', although it does not define 'public order or morals'.⁹⁸⁵ It also permits the authorities to deem whether a police presence should be necessary, thus giving the authorities the legal scope to best position legal control agents to pre-empt any serious attempts at dissent. Human Rights Watch have argued

983 G. Middleton from the British Residency, 18 July 1960, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 820.

984 *Ibid*.

985 *BICI Report*, p. 209.

that the Bahrain government have used the law to prosecute both organizers and participants in gatherings arbitrarily deemed as “illegal”.⁹⁸⁶ Combined with stiff sentences, charges of illegal gatherings have been a means for the authorities to scoop up activists expressing publicly their right to free expression. In one high profile case in 2012, prominent human rights activist Nabeel Rajab was given a three year sentence for charges related to illegal gathering.⁹⁸⁷ The extent to which such charges of illegal gathering have been used to clamp down on perceived trouble makers is evident in the fact that the authorities have 'arrested hundreds of mostly young men and imprisoned them on charges of “illegal gathering”, “rioting” or “arson” after trials that failed to comply with international fair trial standards'.⁹⁸⁸ The Law on Public Gatherings, and its subsequent amendments (discussed later) came into place ahead of the National Assembly to manage the risks posed to the regime by the democratic body, yet treated the right to peaceful assembly 'as if it were a mere privilege, imposing arbitrary obstacles in the way of those who wish freely to exercise this right, including to demonstrate against the government'. Two constitutions later, both of which enshrine freedom of expression, its draconian tenets are still being utilised to give legal form to preventing freedom of expression.

Legal channels to constrain dissent have also been useful in defining the nature and size of opposition. Since the rise of Arab Nationalism, and the proliferation of para-political institutions such as the ‘Uruba club were, laws of association have been important in attempting to create 'organizational fragmentation' that seeks to weaken potential challengers. In 1959, the government issued an ordinance that regulated the foundation and operation of clubs and societies in Bahrain, ensuring that they were 'ethnically divided between Shi‘a and Sunni, Arab and Persian, Indian and Pakistani'.⁹⁸⁹ The principal of fragmentation extended to both foreign labour and expatriates. While the introduction of such a law sanctioned the creation of such clubs, it also regulated them in an attempt to minimise their potential to act as

986 Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch UPR Submission on Bahrain*, 21 November 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/21/human-rights-watch-upr-submission-bahrain> (Accessed 6 October 2015).

987 Index on Censorship, Bahrain Activist Nabeel Rajab Sentenced to Three Years in Prison, August 2012, <http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2012/08/bahrain-activist-nabeel-rajab-sentenced-to-three-years-in-prison/> (Accessed 6 October 2015).

988 Amnesty International, *Behind the Rhetoric: Human Rights Abuses Continue in Bahrain Unabated*, April 2015, p. 11.

989 F Khuri, p. 185.

institutions that encouraged widespread political mobilisation. Indeed, clubs were forbidden to extend membership beyond a particularly geographic location, especially if eligibility for joining was broad⁹⁹⁰ As Fuad Khuri notes; 'The proliferation and fragmentation of club organization has not been haphazard; it is an expression of government policy and the factional divisions of communities and ethnic groups'.⁹⁹¹ Therefore while the authorities used the law to permit the establishment of clubs and societies, the law also helped ensure that the membership of those clubs was constrained and limited so as to maintain some degree of disorganization and disunity, further weakening potential opposition. Clubs believed to foster dissidence in any way were targeted. Following the killing of 'Abd Allah al-Madani, for example, clubs in al-Dayh and Abu Sayba' were shut down. In the 1990s Intifada, clubs had to seek permission from the authorities to hold public meetings. When the 'Uruba Club asked to have an event on the theme of 'freedom of the press and condemning violence',⁹⁹² they had to submit all the names of invitees to the Ministry of the Interior, who subsequently denied permission to hold the event.

Although such legislation has served to stymie political organization or shape it in such a way that political debate is skewed in a manner that benefits the government (e.g. promoting affiliation according to religious sect for example), it has never been a panacea, and has required upgrading. For this reason, the Law of Associations, amended in 2002, was written to further constrain the operation of civil society organizations and NGOs so important in shaping Bahrain's political debate.⁹⁹³ As Human Rights Watch argue, the Law of Associations has been used to

to suppress civil society and restrict freedom of association in three main ways: by arbitrarily rejecting registration applications and intrusively supervising NGOs; taking over and dissolving—more or less at will—organizations whose leaders have criticized government officials or their policies; and severely limiting the ability of groups to fundraise and receive foreign funding.⁹⁹⁴

990 Ibid., p. 185.

991 Ibid.

992 HRW, *Routine Abuse: Routine Denial*.

993 HRW, *Interfere, Restrict and Control*, p. 2.

994 Ibid.

With the advent of the Law No. 26 of 2005 with respect to Political Societies, passed by a Sunni Islamist dominated parliament, the government also sought to draw a legal distinction between legitimate political societies and illegitimate political societies. As the law required all groups to register with the Ministry of Justice, those who did not could be construed as rejecting the legitimacy of the constitution promulgated in 2002. The state's purpose here was clear, to deligitimise and criminalise those groups who did not, through their willingness to succumb to the state's legal-bureaucratic apparatus, register with the Ministry of Justice.⁹⁹⁵ Furthermore the law empowers a judge to seek a court order to shut the political society down for up to three months if they violate either the constitution or the law. Although the court must reach a decision within thirty days, the political society is suspended during this time, giving the government the ability to disrupt the activities of such groups even before any wrongdoing has been ruled by the courts.⁹⁹⁶ The law also prevents Bahrain's restive teenagers from forming legal political allegiance, with the minimum joining age set at 21. Cross-group co-operation is also discouraged, with it being illegal to be a member of more than one society.

In June 2012, Law No. 26 was invoked to dissolve the Islamic Action Society (Amal). The government accused them of failing to submit their annual reports, failure to convene a general conference for more than four years, and taking decisions from a religious authority that openly advocates and incites hatred.⁹⁹⁷ Despite the official reasons, Amal had been a thorn in the regime's side for some time, and their dissolution was the culmination of the government's antipathy towards Amal as opposed to their failure to adhere strict to laws and regulations. Amal's failure to comply with specific laws thus enabled the government to prevent them engaging in legally sanctioned protest, even though their failure was on account of the fact most of its board members and over 200 active members were arrested in 2011.⁹⁹⁸

995 J. Gengler, 'Bahrain's Legal "War on Terror"', Religion and Politics in Bahrain, 17 September 2013, <http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/bahrains-legal-war-on-terror.html> (Accessed 6 October 2015).

996HRW, *Interfere, Restrict and Control*. p. 52,

997Ibid. p. 63,

998 Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 'Bahrain: Right to Association under Attack as Ministry of Justice Moves to Dissolve Islamic Action Society "Amal"', 20 June 2012, <http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/5326>, (Accessed 3 November 2015).

Indeed, despite the King's political openings of 2001, the legal slights of hand constrained most of the advantages bestowed upon society with repressive and constrictive law. Law of Associations (no. 21/1989) gives the government significant powers to interfere in the work of NGOs, such as the ability to replace board members and forbidding the NGO from engaging in political activities.⁹⁹⁹ The law has been used, as a weapon, by the regime in dealing with dissent. In 2011, the Ministry of Social Development used the Law of Associations to dissolve the Bahrain Teachers Society and 'replace the board of the Bahrain Medical Society' after they had supported protesters demand for more political rights.¹⁰⁰⁰ The Law of Associations also curtails sources of funding for NGOs, and those groups who refuse to accept government funds (for fear of appearing to be co-opted and complicit in the government strategy) have severe restrictions on how they raise money. As Gary Marx states, 'Social movement organizations need money', and 'government actions may be taken to deny or restrict a movement's to' resources such as money.¹⁰⁰¹

Further attempts to deepen government control over civil society continued throughout 2013. In September 2013, Ministerial Order No. 31 of 2013 stated that political societies must liaise with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) prior to meeting with members of foreign parties or political societies.¹⁰⁰² The MoFA may also send a representative to the meetings.¹⁰⁰³ Such a move represents the increase of state surveillance over the activities of political groups, and makes it more difficult for rights groups to alert foreign governments and audiences in their struggle for advocacy. This in turn, creates further obstacles for social movements trying to draw attention to their cause. This does not simply reflect government fears of, for example, groups like Al Wefaq meeting with Shi'a figures in other countries, but also the tenants of Bahrain's advocacy revolution, which has seen a burgeoning number of groups seeking assistance from international organizations. Al-Wefaq, operating within the system, also feel the pressure to make sure their political activity is within

999 *Human Rights Watch*, Human Rights Watch UPR Submission on Bahrain, 21 November 2011.

1000 HRW, *Interfere, Restrict and Control*. p. 12,

1001 G. Marx.

1002 Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, *Report: The Recommendations of the Bahraini National Assembly Restrain Human Rights*, 8 September 2013, <http://byshr.org/wp-content/en-reco.pdf> (Accessed 6 October 2015)

1003 Gulf News, 'New Rule for Bahrain Societies over Contacts', 4 September 2013, <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/new-rule-for-bahrain-societies-over-contacts-1.1227200> (Accessed 6 October 2015).

the confines of acceptable means. This was the case at least until recently, and Al-Wefaq would try to 'mollify Shi'a demands and passions while demonstrating to the government its mass support'.¹⁰⁰⁴ Yet, as Nonet and Selznick argue, 'some forms of consent are distorted by desperation, for example, when weakness and disorganization induce oppressed to adopt the goals and perspectives of their oppressors'.¹⁰⁰⁵

In additions to curtailing the work of NGOs that may hold the governments to account, the Bahraini authorities have sought to weaken and control another common institution for political mobilisation – the trade union. This has been especially necessary following industrialisation, which has changed the social base of power and created a shift towards 'issue-orientated' politics which transcended traditional and more predictable (for the tribal Al Khalifa) forms of organizations such as sect. While trade unions were illegal throughout much of Bahrain's history, there have been calls for workers rights from as early as the 1930s. When trade unions were actually permitted to form, strict laws were implemented, and breaking these laws resulted in severe penalties. What is more, even abiding by those laws and exercising the right to strike within legal parameters has resulted in state repression. The Labour Law of 1981 even allowed the Secret Service to vet candidates running for positions on a company's elected Joint Committee.¹⁰⁰⁶

In 2011 when the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU) organized a legal action, thousands of workers went on strike. The government responded with a series of witch hunts that resulted in the sacking of thousands of workers. In addition to this, amendments to the trade union law were made that sought to divide, fragment and ultimately weaken the GFBTU. Amendments included only allowing unions chosen by the Ministry of Labour to represent Bahraini workers in national and international bargaining, a change that the International Trade Union Confederation argued would prevent the GFBTU from voicing its concern that the new amendments were designed to prevent the GFBTU from further denouncing government violations.¹⁰⁰⁷ The amendment also included a clause that the ITUC

1004 A. Ereli, 'Bahrain's Shi'a Opposition: Managing Sectarian Pressures and Focusing on 2010 Parliamentary Elections', US Embassy Manama, 22 July 2009, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAMA438_a.html

1005P. Nonet and P. Selznick, pp. 31 – 32.

1006 S.P. Collis, Bahrain Labour, 12 March 1983, FCO 8/4920, TNA

1007ITUC, 'ITUC Statement on Recent Attacks on Rights of Bahraini Trade Unionists', 11 October 2011, http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ITUC_Bahrain_Statement_Final_3_.pdf (accessed 6

argued would prevent trade union leaders convicted of actions leading to the dissolution of a trade union (e.g. leading strikes in 2011) from being elected for five years following the date of his conviction.¹⁰⁰⁸ In other words, trade union leaders who organized the legal strike in 2011 (by the BICI) would be targeted by the new law. These measures, Amy Austin Holmes argues, have severely curtailed the ability of the opposition to lead effective protests.

In line with how challenges to authority have honed the Bahrain's government's use of repressive law, the Ministry of the Interior claimed that it was considering studying sites that would be specifically for protests and demonstrations.¹⁰⁰⁹ Although the outcome of the study was unclear, the government banned all protests between 30 October 2012 and 13 December 2012 citing 'repeated abuse' of the right to protest.¹⁰¹⁰ In August 2013, a ban on protests in Manama was then formalised into law via an amendment to Article 11 of the Public Gatherings Law¹⁰¹¹, highlighting how the government were not satisfied with the existing laws' effect on the behaviour of protesters. The new amendment banned public meetings, marches gatherings and demonstrations in the capital, 'excluding sit-ins outside international organisations', which can be held with the written authorization of the Public Security Chief.¹⁰¹² However, in addition to this condition, the Public Security Chief may also define the time, place, and number of people participating in any demonstration. The exclusion of protests from the country's capital represents an attempt to limit the visibility and occurrence of protest as well as mitigate the effects of civil disobedience. Since part of the purpose of a protest is to garner public and media attention, relegating them to discreet locations, far from the eyes of the media or other citizens, is a way of reducing their effectiveness as a means of expressing discontent or gaining public support.¹⁰¹³ Indeed, it functions as a form of censorship

October 2015).

1008Ibid.

1009Kingdom of Bahrain Ministry of Interior, Study to Identify Sites for Approved Rallies, 12 July 2012, http://www.policemc.gov.bh/en/news_details.aspx?type=1&articleId=13799 (Accessed 6 October 2015).

1010Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor, US Department of State, Bahrain 2012 Human Rights Report, April 2013 <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/nea/204355.htm> (Accessed 6 October 2015).

1011 Amnesty International, *Behind the Rhetoric*.

1012Trade Arabia, 'Bahrain bans public meetings in Manama', 7 August 2013, <http://www.tradearabia.com/touch/article/LAW/240713> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1013In a more humorous example of this idea, someone wrote into the *Gulf Daily News* to suggest that protesters should be confined to small islands or zones.

and containment, attempting to persuade people, via omission, that Bahrain is a place in which protest and discontent are not a serious problem.

The protests in 2011 have also prompted a swathe of legislation designed to extend state repression further into the private sphere. This was facilitated by the tactics of Al Wefaq. In a move of political principle, the almost exclusively Shi'i al-Wifaq withdrew from parliament, vacating 18 out of 40 seats, prompting bi-elections that resulted in the election of a largely pro-government coalition who ratified, among other things, laws that gave the state even deeper powers to deal with dissent.¹⁰¹⁴ Yet Al Wefaq's point of principle, an attempt to win supporters among those factions more tempted by the confrontational politics of the illegal opposition such as al-Wafa', Haq, and Bahrain Freedom Movement backfired. The government capitalised on this, pushing draconian legislation through the lower house in order to give some semblance of popular legitimacy to measures that sought to legally enshrine the continued stifling of civil society. While Bahrain's parliament was already structurally biased in favour of the regime, the withdrawal of al-Wifaq simply encouraged a repressive public policy.¹⁰¹⁵

The 1976 juvenile law was amended so that the parents of anyone under 16 who took part in a public gathering would be warned on the first offence, and imprisoned or fined on the second.¹⁰¹⁶ Again, this attempt to raise the costs of protest through legislation that informally makes parents part of the policing apparatus is designed to weaken opposition through a process of intimidation. Using families to police their offspring, the state's role in the private sphere has become increasingly pervasive as legal controls seek to replace extralegal or more violent means of controlling dissent.¹⁰¹⁷ This also marks a further shift to collective responsibility and

1014 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2015, 2015*, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/bahrain#.VWius8_BzGc, (accessed 5 October 2015).

1015 Existing laws already regulate people's right to freedom of association, expression, and peaceful assembly. For example, the 'Public Gathering Law of 1973 and the Press Law of 2002, also unduly restrict the activities of political societies as they relate to freedom of assembly and expression'. See Human Rights Watch, 2013. While existing legislation is restrictive enough, the new moves saw an entrenchment of authoritarianism, and the emergence of even more repressive public policy.

1016 Amnesty International, 'Bahrain: New Decrees Ban Dissent as Further Protests Organized', 7 August 2013 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/08/bahrain-new-decrees-ban-dissent-further-protests-organized/>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

1017 M. Al A'Ali, 'Rioters' parents may face jail', *Gulf Daily News*, 4 December 2013, <http://www.gulf->

punishment. That is to say, those other than the people carrying out criminal activity are being held accountable for crimes. This asymmetry is matched by a similar, yet opposite degree of state unaccountability. Essentially, families are explicitly expected to police what the state has failed to, and the burden of accountability has extended further from the state to the citizens. Thus the political rights of parents or guardians now become contingent on the behaviour of those under their care, representing the deepening of repression. For those abetting protesters by providing medical treatment, the government announced that they will be held 'legally responsible' for the victim's 'health and well being', forcing protesters to either suffer or turn themselves in to a hospital, and by extension, the police.¹⁰¹⁸

Freedom of expression has also been constricted in the legislation of censorship. Bahrain's formalised publication law came into effect in 1965.¹⁰¹⁹ The law offered formal legal control that limited who could publish and what they could publish. Among its stipulations was that no one could insult any ruling figure or anyone in the ruling family except without their permission. The law was also thorough and far-reaching, and 'newspaper' was deemed to be any magazine, paper, newsletter or circular issued in Bahrain. Indeed it was so broad that any conceivable medium was subject to these draconian laws. Also, to instigate regime change whether through advocating violence or other means became illegal, further limiting the opportunities for expressing discontent at the government and thus solidifying its power. Furthermore, the law stipulates that those who wish to own a newspaper or become its editor must have a 'good reputation'. Such subjective prerequisites naturally preclude those who may be seen as a threat to the existing regime. Thus the legal system in Bahrain has explicitly been designed to restrain organizations, activities, and discourse that may be harmful to a ruling core. While such laws offer 'handy tools for imposing order', they are 'far less competent at securing stability founded in consent'.¹⁰²⁰ The government even penalised the seemingly trivial, and made the importation of V for Vendetta masks illegal.¹⁰²¹ So although Bahrain's

daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=366155 , (accessed 6 October 2015).

1018BNA, 'Northern Police Directorate/ Statement', 24 February 2013,

<http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/548078>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1019Publication Law of 1965, http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/AdvancedSearchDetails.aspx?id=2184#Us_OsvRdWwt , (accessed 6 October 2015).

1020 P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, p. 52-53.

1021 S. Mustin, 'Anti-protest: Bahrain Bans Import of Plastic Guy Fawkes Masks', 25 February 2013,

nebulous emergency laws were guilty of no crime without law, but that development has resulted in a legal system often so specific that it seeks to delineate and criminalise all facets of collective action, whether in theory, or in practise.

Legal Processes

The Political Trial and Political Justice

While laws may seek to give the government a legal means of pursuing dissent, the use of legal processes and the courts to repress dissent is also important. A political trial is one such method, and is designed to 'incriminate its [the state's] foe's public behaviour with a view to evicting him from the political scene'.¹⁰²² The political trial has been used throughout Bahrain's many episodes of contentious activity. In the 1920s, when the British were attempting to end ruling family persecution of the indigenous *bahārna* community, a problem that was effecting Britain's relationship with Persia, a few members of the Ruling Family were put on trial for various crimes. Yet even at what was arguably the peak of British influence, justice was 'meted out differentially based not just on the 'offender, the intent, and the offense', but the goals of the regime too.¹⁰²³ To put an end to arbitrary trials, the British further consolidated Shaykh Hamad bin Isa's rule by giving him exclusive power among the Al Khalifa to try certain cases or inflict punishment.¹⁰²⁴ However, while members of the Ruling Family were put on trial, their sentences were barely enforced.

For example, on 18 September 1923, a group of *al-fidawiyya* killed a *bahrāni*¹⁰²⁵ villager after a camel belonging to Shaykh Khalid Al Khalifa was found wounded near the village of Sitra. Shaykh Khalid was found guilty of having 'encouraged and approved of the attack',¹⁰²⁶ and was made to forfeit his property in the town of Sitra and pay blood money of two thousand rupees¹⁰²⁷. His son 'Ali bin

The Independent. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/anti-protest-bahrain-bans-import-of-plastic-guy-fawkes-masks-8510615.html>, (accessed 2 November 2015).

1022 O. Kirchheimer, *Political Justice*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 46.

1023 R. Sharlet, 'Party and Public Ideals in Conflict: Constitutionalism and Civil Rights in the USSR', *Cornell International Law Journal*, vol. 23, no. 2,

1024 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [119r] (242/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library*

<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00002b> [accessed 27 October 2015]

1025 *Bahrāni* is the adjective of *bahārna*.

1026 C.K. Daly, 25 September 1923, No. 123-C, *RoB*, Vol. 4, p. 130.

1027 *Ibid*.

Khalid, who was found guilty of 'organising and accompanying the attack' was banished to India¹⁰²⁸. Salman Al Khalifa, another son of Khalid Al Khalifa was banished from Bahrain for a year. According to Charles Belgrave, the punishment so 'annoyed' the Khalid shaykhs that they briefly returned to Sitra and shot nine people¹⁰²⁹ in what became known as the second Sitra outrage.¹⁰³⁰ Following this, Shaykh Khalid's sons were sentenced to death, a move that was intended to establish the new regime under Hamad.¹⁰³¹ Although 'Ali bin Khalid was banished to India, he returned to Bahrain about six months later without British permission¹⁰³². Much to Belgrave's chagrin, the political resident Barrett also allowed Shaykh Hamad to issue a retrial of the two Khalids involved in the Sitra outrage. Shaykh Hamad then proceeded to 'square' the thirty-four witnesses who had seen the Khalids shoot nine villagers.¹⁰³³ Belgrave wrote a letter to Barret complaining about his decision to let the Khalids return, and also complained to the Shaykh about the 'persuasion' that the *baḥārna* witnesses in the Sitra case were being subjected to.¹⁰³⁴ In February 1928, the Shi'a *Qādi* Sayyid 'Adnan wrote a letter to Hamad saying he had managed to 'square' the witnesses in the case.¹⁰³⁵

While the Khalids were not imprisoned, the illusion that justice had been done was seen by the British as an important step in securing the authority of the courts and the legal system. Whether or not many perceived this as the case is, of course, difficult to determine. Nonetheless, the return of the Khalids highlighted the limits of Britain's ability to press for high-level accountability. Instead they had to concede that mitigating conflict within the Ruling Family was more of a priority than the execution of substantial justice. The façade of justice that hides elite impunity has been an enduring aspect of Bahrain's history, and this case has never been accurately documented.¹⁰³⁶

1028Ibid.

1029 C. Belgrave, Papers, 30 January 1928.

1030'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [159r] (322/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library*
 <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00007b> (accessed 4 November 2015)

1031'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [195r] (394/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library*
 <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x0000c3> (accessed 5 November 2015)

1032C. Belgrave, Papers, 11 Feb 1927.

1033Ibid. 30 January 1928.

1034Ibid., 22 February 1928.

1035Ibid. 25 February 1928.

1036Khuri ends the discussion of the case by noting that the Khawalids were given the death sentence

In addition to the retrials of 1929, Ibrahim bin Khalid bin 'Ali Al Khalifa was convicted for instigating an assassination attempt on Shaykh Hamad in 1926. He had allegedly co-ordinated this from exile on the mainland after his involvement in the Sitra Outrages. In the end, the men who carried out the attack were given varying prison sentences, while Ibrahim was exonerated by Shaykh Hamad on the grounds that because the attack had been against him, he had the power to forgive.¹⁰³⁷ (Ibrahim eventually worked in Hamad's house). Other Al Khalifas and shaykhs were also convicted for crimes including rape and murder; including Shaykh Hamad bin Sabah and Shaykh Hamad bin 'Abd Allah al-Ghattam.¹⁰³⁸ Yet fines were only imposed, even though the relatives of the victims demanded the death penalty.¹⁰³⁹ Hamad's lenient sentences stemmed from both his weakness and desire to maintain family unity, itself an important factor in preventing further challenge to his rule.

It is also interesting to note that initial investigations suggested that it was the Ruler's brother Shaykh 'Abd Allah who had been behind the assassination attempt. Interestingly though, 'Abd Allah was brought in to augment the judges on the Bahrain Court that convicted Ibrahim. When it was suggested that 'Abd Allah be put on the court, Belgrave wrote in his diary; 'As 'Abd Allah is one of the people implicated he would be certain to condemn the men to shield himself, and if they accused him in Court he is quite clever enough to suppress any such idea. I think it would be a good idea to put him on the Court'.¹⁰⁴⁰ Unless Belgrave had made a grammatical error, he appeared to be supporting 'Abd Allah's position as a judge in order to protect himself from accusations against his involvement in the assassination attempt on his brother.

Given 'Abd Allah's previous attempts to undermine Hamad's rule, his involvement would not be unlikely. Such evidence, in addition to 'Abd Allah's continued attempts to work against Hamad, contradict Khuri's assertion that 'Abd Allah committed himself to maintaining unity within the ruling family following the

but then fled. Al-Tajir mentions a fine and prison sentences/
1037 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1348 (1929-30), *BGAR*, vol. 1, p. 153.

1038 Shaykh Hamad bin Sabah was found guilty of instigating an attack on the house of one of his tenants in the village of Tubli in around 1981. The house owner was killed. Shaykh Hamad bin Abdulla Al Ghattam had been previously tried by Shaykh Hamad for instigating murder and rape in a tenants house in Farsia. After being retried he was found guilty and a payment of blood money was ordered.

1039 Ibid.

1040 C. Belgrave, Papers, 4 February 1929.

abdication of Shaikh 'Isa in 1923.¹⁰⁴¹ Indeed, Khuri's idea that 'Abd Allah became a conciliator as opposed to a party to conflict seems too simplistic, and it was perhaps the fear of losing a generous stipend from the state that induced 'Abd Allah to limit his intrigues against Hamad. Furthermore, despite 'Abd Allah's attempts to work against Hamad, he was perceived by the British as the most competent Al Khalifa, and one who was important in securing Shaykh 'Isa's supporters to cooperate more fully with the British reforms. While these attempts to repress dissident members of the Al Khalifa resulted in reprisals or amnesties, they highlight the limits of British control over Al Khalifa agitation. Indeed, the British may have tempered their excesses, but they were never in full control, and justice was subsumed to strategies designed to control Al Khalifa agitation.

Institutionalising the Political Trial

Both the British and the relatively unified Al Khalifa clients came together in opposition to the agitation of the 1950s. The political trial once again became a means of attacking the legitimacy of dissenters while consolidating the position of the Al Khalifa. In 1956, after Bahrain had been subject to two years of political agitation by the Higher Executive Committee, the government decided to move against the leaders of the HEC. Following a highly political summary trial, in which the British CID officer Benn acted as government prosecutor, three leaders of the HEC were illegally deported to the British island of St. Helena.¹⁰⁴² In addition to questionable evidence, those accused refused to defend themselves on the basis that the trial was held in secret, although the British argued that they shifted the location of the trial to avoid creating a public security issue.

Major William Little, a former member of the Bahraini police turned whistleblower submitted a report to British parliament criticising the nature of the trial, arguing that it was simply a means of publicly discrediting the movement.¹⁰⁴³ Belgrave, who disliked Little, and had at one point called him 'absolutely useless' and a 'mischief maker',¹⁰⁴⁴ also added that much of the evidence would be 'inadmissible' in

1041 F. Khuri, p. 98.

1042 C. Belgrave, Papers, 22 December 1956

1043 The report was kept secret for about 50 years, highlighting the British authorities desire not to generate criticism of their policy abroad

1044 C. Belgrave, Paper, 14 February 1957,

a 'strict court of law'.¹⁰⁴⁵ It should also be noted that the notorious 'Abd Allah Al Khalifa acted as a judge on the trial, thus making those responsible for giving justice against political agitators the same parties interested in maintaining Al Khalifa hegemony. Unlike earlier trials, where Al Khalifa legitimacy was threatened due to them being in the docks, the new arrangement consolidated their power and legitimacy by allowing them to arbitrate on matters of sedition and treason. British complicity in this political trial was highlighted by the collusion of local officials in shipping the detainees off to the island of St. Helena. Although the defendants applied for a successful habeas corpus action to the 'Supreme Court of St. Helena and to the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council'¹⁰⁴⁶ and were released, the legal deviance necessary to dull the movement's momentum had achieved its objectives.

Although the British played a crucial role in logistically and politically supporting the demise of the HEC, post-Independence Bahrain has seen a certain routinisation of the political trial, and it has become a feature of Bahrain's contentious episodes. In 1976, five alleged members of PFLOAG were put on trial for the murder of 'Abd Allah al-Madani, editor of the weekly paper *al-Mawaqif*. Despite a lack of evidence, which was mostly based on confessions allegedly extracted under torture, three of the five were given the death penalty.¹⁰⁴⁷ The questionable nature of the evidence and the provisions of the State Security Decree meant the men had little chance of defending themselves properly. Their fate was also sealed by the pressure of hardliners in the Bahraini and Saudi government demanding death sentences.¹⁰⁴⁸ According to the British Ambassador, the Prime Minister of Bahrain threatened to put the judges on trial if they did not secure death sentences.

Eventually, 'after a long delay, reflecting dissension within the Ruling Family to the degree of severity to be shown, two were sentenced to death and one to life imprisonment, while the instigators were acquitted'.¹⁰⁴⁹ The decision was then reversed, and the person sentenced to life imprisonment was also executed. A number of those who were acquitted languished in jail for eight years, simply to prevent them

1045Ibid., 23 December 1956.

1046M. Joyce, 'The Bahraini Three on St. Helena, 1956 – 1961', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 4, 2000, p. 618.

1047E.F.Given, *Political Murder in Bahrain*.

1048Ibid.

1049Ibid.

becoming opposition heroes.¹⁰⁵⁰ Such summary justice was done in order to avoid international pressure for a reprieve.¹⁰⁵¹ The Al-Madani trial is significant as it represents the first clear examples (at least in the British archives) of Saudi influence in the repressive choices of Bahrain's government.

Following the successful repression of the leftist threat and their subsequent demise in the 1970s, the oppositional vacuum was filled by the Islamist threat, which gained ground following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Two years later in 1981, the government arrested seventy-three people from the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB). Again, the trial was held *in camera*, while the defendants' lawyers were never given sufficient access to their clients. There had been a virtual media 'blackout' of the trial which was closed to international observers and the press. The verdicts were subsequently harsh, with sixty of those accused given sentences of fifteen years, three to life imprisonment, and ten to seven years. The harsh sentencing was no doubt designed to have a salutary effect on other potential dissidents, though the lack of death sentences was adequate to not generate too much international pressure for a reprieve.

In the trial of the IFLB members, the British had attempted to dissuade the Al Khalifa from giving death sentences for fear of further isolating the Shi'a community.¹⁰⁵² Ian Henderson advocated passing death sentences but not carrying them out, as he believed carrying them out would be disastrous for stability.¹⁰⁵³ Indeed, there seemed to be an overnight decision to change death sentences to imprisonment, perhaps highlighting that the Amir did not want to push the Shi'a too far. The decision was such that even the Minister of the Interior considered resigning, and those close to PM seemed surprised by the sentences. Henderson was said to be relieved at the outcome of the trial.¹⁰⁵⁴

Again, the Al Khalifa were caught between Saudi Arabia advocating for harsh punishments and the British advocating a slightly less stringent approach. Saudi believed if dissent 'were not stamped on hard, Bahrain would bear the responsibility

1050 صحيفة الوطن.. الفرعة عندما لا تجد من يردعها 1050 WAAD, National Democratic Action Society, [website], 22 October 2010, <http://www.aldemokrati.org/details.php?artid=6765> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1051 E.F. Given, 'Political Murder in Bahrain'.

1052 P.F.M. Wogan, 23 April 1982.

1053 W.R. Tomkys, The December Coup, 21 March 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

1054 W.R. Tomkys, 23 May 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

for subsequent similar attempts (coups) in the region'.¹⁰⁵⁵ Ultimately, the decision lay with the Al Khalifa, who it was reported, 'may not have decided what penalties would be appropriate', and thought it advantageous to take a 'slow course'.¹⁰⁵⁶ However, the trial highlighted the extent of Saudi influence in Bahrain's repressive choices. As one British Diplomat foresaw, 'the danger is that Bahrain will snuggle so closely under Saud Arabia's protection that it will eventually lose its independence and liberal traditions'.¹⁰⁵⁷ Consequently, the laws were broadened substantially in order that anyone implicated in the plot could stand trial 'without obliging the authorities to demonstrate that they were full parties to the conspiracy'.¹⁰⁵⁸

Saudi fear of Iranian expansionism undoubtedly played a role in the political pressure. As Mabon argues, 'the strategic importance of the Al Khalifa for Saudi Arabia, coupled with a history of Iranian action in Bahrain, clerical ties and Iranian rhetoric, means that Riyadh has to act under the assumption' that any prospect of Iranian interference is a valid threat.¹⁰⁵⁹ Perhaps most interestingly though, is that the current King of Bahrain, considered a reformist by many, was believed by the influential Shi'a Mahdi Tajir to have been pressing for a 'root branch extirpation of the Shi'a opposition following the alleged coup'.¹⁰⁶⁰ This does cast some light on his reformist credentials.¹⁰⁶¹ Certainly the presence of the IFLB reflected how the revolution in Iran had emboldened certain groups and refocused Saudi and Bahrain security attention onto Iran. However, the attitude of hardliners, and the fact that Shaykh Khalifa noted that the coup attempt 'didn't represent anything very dangerous to us' suggests that it may have been a pretext to clamp down on the Shi'a.¹⁰⁶²

The next major political trial in Bahrain occurred in 1996, when 'Isa Qambar was convicted of taking part in the killing of a policeman during the Bahrain Intifada. At the time, the Prime Minister was said to be responsible for this draconian judicial policy'¹⁰⁶³ Qambar's prosecution contained all the tenets of a political trial. For

1055S.M.J. Lamport, Bahrain Security, 8 March 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

1056W.R. Tomkys, Internal Political Situation Bahrain 1982, 10 April 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

1057Ibid.

1058S.P. Collis, Bahrain Internal, 20 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

1059 S. Mabon, 'The Battle for Bahrain'.

1060W.R. Tomkys, 16 May 1982.

1061 The British document in which this is mentioned is redacted immediately after the quote about extirpation.

1062 *Gulf Daily News*, 'Interview with Shakykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa', 15 Saturday 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

1063The Economist, 'Sheikhly fall-out', 6 december 19987, Issue 8046, p. 82.

example, ‘Isa Qambar and his co-defendants were arrested without judicial warrants and denied access to their family and legal counsel until the day of their trial.¹⁰⁶⁴ In addition to this, the evidence relied on confessions extracted in pre-trial detention, allegedly under torture.¹⁰⁶⁵ Defendants also argued that there was no forensic evidence linking them to the murder weapon. Furthermore, defendants in a separate case gave evidence against ‘Isa Qambar and his associates, even though this violated Article 137 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.¹⁰⁶⁶ The defendant who gave evidence allegedly did so in exchange for his release.¹⁰⁶⁷

Like the al-Madani case, there was also pressure to reach a verdict before the judicial recess on 15 July.¹⁰⁶⁸ The state media also widely publicised the trial of those accused of killing the policemen, yet the government remained silent on the issue of civilians being killed by police.¹⁰⁶⁹ This smear game, assisted by a convoluted program of legal embroilment and legal deviance, threw Qambar and oppositional legal help into a lengthy process of deliberation and distraction. Amnesty International said that the trial 'ignored internationally accepted human rights standards', the authorities in Bahrain obviously were seeking to raise the costs for those planning on engaging in dissent.¹⁰⁷⁰ Although the case was eventually tried by the High Court (and not the State Security Court) because the defendants' lawyer successfully argued that the case was a murder, the accused were denied fundamental rights in pre-trial detention.¹⁰⁷¹ Following the trial of Qambar, eight leading Shi‘a Muslim activists were also put on trial, a move that reportedly was done by the Prime Minister to undermine the comparatively conciliatory approach of the then Crown Prince Shaykh Hamad.¹⁰⁷²

In 2011, thirteen opposition activists and political leaders were arrested between 17 March and 19 April. The number of those put on trial was actually twenty-one, although seven were tried in absentia – all by the National Safety Courts.

1064Ibid

1065Ibid., p. 26.

1066Ibid.

1067Ibid.

1068Ibid.

1069Ibid., p. 34.

1070Associated Press, 'Execution Stirs Protests In Bahrain', 27 March 1996,

<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/27/world/execution-stirs-protests-in-bahrain.html> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1071 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 25.

1072 The Economist, 'Sheikhly fall-out'.

According to Human Rights Watch, many of the charges related to 'the exercise of freedom of expression, assembly and association'.¹⁰⁷³ The sentences given were harsh, and ranged from between twenty-five and two years in prison.¹⁰⁷⁴ Despite a retrial under a civilian court as demanded by the recommendations of the BICI report, the original rulings were upheld, and confessions extracted under torture were still deemed admissible. Cherif Bassiouni, the head of the BICI team, expressed his outrage at this decisions, declaring; ' I cannot think of a more egregious and specious legal decision'.¹⁰⁷⁵ Like many other political trials, press access was limited. The defendants eventually refused to show up to the hearings complaining that many of the hearings were held in 'secret' and thus not subject to the scrutiny of either the public or the local and international media.

Similar trials of other reputable figures was undertaken in the recent uprising, frequently on the basis of questionable evidence. On 29 September 2011, the Lower National Safety Court convicted twenty medics of a number of offences, including 'instigating hatred against the ruling system', 'spreading false news' and 'incitement to overthrow the regime'.¹⁰⁷⁶ The medics claimed that they were tortured, and Human Rights Watch stated that procedural flaws meant that the trials violated both international human rights law and Bahrain law.¹⁰⁷⁷ Although most of the medics had their conviction quashed in March 2013, the interim period saw a process of vilification by the state media. The medics were smeared in the press by sensationalist stories, one of which claimed that Kalashnikov rifles were found in the hospital in which the medics worked.¹⁰⁷⁸ Given the medics' role as front-line witnesses to atrocities carried out by the authorities, and the inherent respect associated with the medical profession, it was likely that any testimony given by the medics would be viewed favourably by international NGOs and news organizations. Thus, they

1073HRW, 'Bahrain: Vital Reform Commitments Unmet', 28 March 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/28/bahrain-vital-reform-commitments-unmet> (accessed 5 October 2015).

1074HRW, 'Bahrain: Promises Unkept, Rights Still Violated', 22 November 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/22/bahrain-promises-unkept-rights-still-violated> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1075B. Law, 'Bahrain reconciliation distant among slow pace of reform', *BBC News*, 23 November 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20449587> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1076HRW, 'Bahrain: Medics Describe Torture in Detention', 22 October 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/21/bahrain-medics-describe-torture-detention> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1077Ibid.

1078N. Zahra, 'Kalashnikovs drama in medics' trial...', *Gulf Daily News*, 29 November 2011.

represented a threat to the regime. In their attempts to make trials look fair, authorities have also been accused by Amnesty International of trying, en masse, those convicted of crimes, and then releasing a few in order to make the trial seem fair.¹⁰⁷⁹ By the time retrials had come around, the social control objectives had been completed, and whenever the regime face a serious challenge, the general processes of procedural unfairness and 'rampant official discretion'¹⁰⁸⁰ illustrate a proximity of law and politics that point to the existence of repressive law.

Selective Accountability and Asymmetric Justice

In addition to the use of legal processes that contribute to repressive law, Bahrain's legal control agents such as the police and employees of the intelligence services have been given broader scope to carry out their duties with minimal disruption. Accountability of legal control agents accused of committing crimes or violations is one such disruption, and reduces the ability of the authorities to quash dissent, as well as damaging the legitimacy of the state. Having legal controls agents tried for crimes erodes the authority of the state and is often avoided – especially in times where the regime faces an existential threat. This impunity has been reoccurring aspect of repression in Bahrain's history.

Between 1953 and 1956 the nature of the coercive apparatuses' impunity was very much determined by the unwillingness of Britain to draw itself into Bahraini politics, while at the same time maintaining order until the Bahrain authorities were capable of dealing with dissent themselves. After three people were shot and killed by the police in 1954, people demanded that the police responsible for the shooting be held accountable. The authorities, fearing an increasingly tense situation, sought to diffuse matters by forming a Commission of Inquiry headed by a British judge named Haines, as the judiciary were described 'as inept and discredited members of the Ruling Family'.¹⁰⁸¹ Indeed, the decision to involve Haines was done due to the fact that the inquiry would hold no weight without the appointment of a British judge.¹⁰⁸² Shi'a leaders also requested that the British police the town, highlighting the pitch of sectarian tension between the police and the Shi'a. The tensions between the public

1079 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 25.

1080 P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, pp. 50-52.

1081 J.W. Wall, 25 October 1954, RoB, vol. 7 p. 71.

1082 B.A.B. Burrows, 1 July 1954, RoB, vol. 7, p. 40.

and the police were further noted by the British Commandant Colonel Hammersley¹⁰⁸³, who stated that there had not been 'good feeling' between the police and the public for a long time.¹⁰⁸⁴ As a consequence of this, the Political Agent also advised the inclusion of a prominent Shi'a to sit on the board with Haines.¹⁰⁸⁵

The Commission of Inquiry found that while two officers had acted commendably, 'severe disciplinary action' needed to be taken against those police who had fired without orders.¹⁰⁸⁶ Despite this, the Ruler later pardoned those policeman responsible, a decision that angered the British administration, not least because the Bahraini government were still showing reluctance in reforming the courts. The Commission of Inquiry appointed to investigate the events of 1 July 1954 was the first documented investigation into civil unrest and the role of the police, yet the poor implementation of disciplinary measures against state officials reflects both weakness in the Ruling Family and the limits of British influence. The decision of the Ruler not to prosecute any of the policeman found responsible illustrates what might be termed the beginning of a culture of impunity with the Bahrain police. Indeed, the lack of accountability would suggest that the police, at this time, were given more autonomy to commit deviant acts.

On 11 March 1956 an altercation between a number of vegetable sellers and the Market Inspector led to a serious incident that culminated in police firing on a crowd of civilians. The shooting killed five civilians and injured seventeen, six of them seriously.¹⁰⁸⁷ In anticipation of a circular from the HEC that would be critical of the police, the Political Resident Burrows said explicitly that statements from the British 'should not (repeat not) criticise police'.¹⁰⁸⁸ However, another inquiry was launched into the incident. It was to be headed up by G.L. Peace, the Judicial Adviser, and W.P.R. Mawdsley, the Assistant Judge for H.M.'s Court for Bahrain. Judge Haines, who had led the previous inquiry into the 1954 police shootings, was asked to advise what action ought to be taken on the Board's findings.¹⁰⁸⁹ Haines

1083 Colonel Hammersley was third in command of the Bahrain police at the time. Above him was Director of Police Shaykh Khalifa, and Commandant Charles Belgrave.

1084 G.L. Peace, W.P.R. Mawdsley, 31 May 1956, *Report into March Disturbances, 1956, RoB*, vol. 7, p. 266.

1085 B.A.B. Burrows, 1 July 1954, p. 39.

1086 *Report into July Disturbances, 1954*, p. 63.

1087 B.A.B. Burrows, 12 March 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 218.

1088 *Ibid.*

1089 Judge Haines, Comments on Disturbances, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 269.

argued that the police fire was 'grossly excessive' and unjustified. Despite this, he concluded that the culpability¹⁰⁹⁰ of the police could not be sufficiently proven, and therefore no criminal procedures ought to be taken against the police, calling instead for departmental disciplinary action.¹⁰⁹¹ Despite this, further investigations were not recommended. Bernard Burrows¹⁰⁹² and whistleblower Major W.O. Little argued that it was Colonel Hammersley and not Charles Belgrave¹⁰⁹³ who was probably guilty of negligence. Nonetheless, the government responded to the inquiry by saying that the public were 'mainly to blame for these disturbances', and stated that training of the the police will focus on 'modern methods of crowd dispersal'.¹⁰⁹⁴ No mention was made of the fact the during the inquiry into the shootings of 1954, Haines recommended that something much 'less lethal than rifles' be used for 'mob dispersal'.¹⁰⁹⁵

An explanation for the unsatisfactory and dismissive nature of Haines's recommendations can be understood in the context of Britain's political considerations at the time. Indeed, the Foreign office had pledged to support the Bahraini government with British troops if order was to break down,¹⁰⁹⁶ yet this was seen as a last resort, as the British believed direct involvement would invite harsh criticism of British 'colonial' interference at a time of rising anti-colonialism and Arab Nationalism. For this reason, the British were keen for the Bahrain police force to be capable of acting autonomously and without British assistance. In order for this to happen it was imperative that morale amongst the police remained high. Bernard Burrows argued that the criticism of the police in the 1954 inquiry resulted in a severe lowering of their morale over a long period, and that the 'diminution of it [police morale] would bring the nearer the possibility of intervention by British forces'.¹⁰⁹⁷ In this respect, there were compelling political pressures that meant that the outcome of

1090 (1) the policemen fired their rifles without orders with intent to do grievous bodily harm or to kill and that the death or wounding of any particular individual resulted from this action, or:

(2) that they attempted to commit such an act.

1091 Oddly enough, Haines's concludes that despite all the deaths and injuries the police had fired from the hip and into the air. Haines also argued that because one man had been shot by someone other than the police, it had to be proven that all injuries and deaths were not caused by persons other than the police.

1092 D.M.H. Riches, Minutes, 26 June 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 267.

1093 It is often argued Belgrave is responsible for much of what went on in Bahrain – perhaps unfairly.

1094 Government Comments on March Disturbances 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 273.

1095 *Report into July Disturbances*, 1954, p. 63.

1096 Foreign Office, Communique to Agency Bahrain, No. 202, 6 March 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 63.

1097 B.A.B. Burrows to Foreign Office 12 March 1956, p. 226.

the inquiry should not be too critical of the police. Indeed, it was police weakness that prompted reforms and further foreign interference while the apparatus was strengthened. The second enquiry, with its foregone conclusion, was simply a means of embarking upon conciliatory measures in order to provide a 'breathing space in which they might strengthen the Public Security Department'.¹⁰⁹⁸

Legalising Impunity

Indeed, the events of 1956 highlighted how maintaining the morale of the police was perceived as important for the government. In 1965, not one mention was made of investigations into the police's killing of eight protesters in the March Uprising. The same was true following government repression in the 1990s, and no officials were held accountable. On the contrary, upon becoming King in 2001, Hamad Al Khalifa, sought to exonerate those employees of the state who were guilty of committing crimes during the unrest, and issued Decree Law No. 10 of 2001 and Decree Law No. 56 of 2002. While the former allowed political prisoners accused of state security crimes to go free, the latter allowed those who had potentially engaged in torture or extra judicial killing to go free. In other words, Decree 56 conferred impunity from prosecution and investigation upon security officials accused of human rights abuses before 2002.¹⁰⁹⁹ As Khalaf notes, 'Decree 56 saved many senior al-Khalifas and SIS officers'¹¹⁰⁰ and was an important pre-condition in securing Ruling Family consent to any reforms. Unsurprisingly, any suggestion to the contrary was quashed. When 'Abd al-Aziz Al Khalifa suggested to the media that some form of transitional justice was necessary, he incurred so much of their 'wrath' that he offered to resign.¹¹⁰¹

Impunity has been routinised in Bahrain's history, indicating the subservience of legal processes to power politics. While granting impunity may exacerbate conflict by promoting anger, it is secondary to ensuring that the morale and integrity of the security forces is maintained. In addition to the lack of accountability, those accused of political crimes have never properly acknowledged to have been innocent, meaning that the state maintains some degree of moral high ground by avoiding positioning

1098 B.A.B. Burrows, 20 July 1954, p. 54.

1099 HRW, *Torture Redux*.

1100 M.O.Jones, 'Bahrain's history of political injustice', Your Middle East, 29 April 2013, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/marc-owen-jones-bahrains-history-of-political-injustice_14064, (accessed 5 October 2015).

1101 W.T. Monroe, 'Bahraini Political Scene Part II'.

itself as the guilty party in its conflict with society.

*The Era of Reform: Factors Encouraging Impunity*¹¹⁰²

While Amnesty International believe that not one no member of the SIS or CID have been brought to justice by engaging in acts of torture prior to 1995¹¹⁰³, the same seems to be largely true after the period of reform that began following King Hamad's accession to the throne.

In 2011, following the outbreak of unrest, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry Report revealed that dozens of people had been tortured, tens killed, and thousands imprisoned by the State Security Forces.¹¹⁰⁴ Following recommendations by the BICI report to create a mechanism to hold both junior and senior officials accountable, the government attempted to demonstrate its commitment to reform by prosecuting a number of low level officials. However, as of November 2012, the highest ranking official charged with 'abuse' was a Lieutenant Colonel.¹¹⁰⁵ The tactic of selectively holding only low-level security officers accountable represents an attempt to paint police deviance as the work of a couple of 'rotten apples', that is, 'rogue officers operating with individualistic motives but whose actions are not reflective of the police institution as a whole'.¹¹⁰⁶ A less critical analysis

would suggest that police deviance in Bahrain was the result of what O'Connor describes as 'rotten barrels', namely, groups of police acting together but whose misconduct is also not representative of the police institution in general. However, given the habitual nature of police deviance in Bahrain, the concept of a 'rotten orchard' seems more appropriate.¹¹⁰⁷

Considering the nature of the abuses carried out by the police in Bahrain, both

1102 Much of the data gathered concerning the impunity of state officials was gathered from tracking local news reports, NGO sources, and State Department reports.

1103 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*, p. 9.

1104 *BICI Report*.

1105 BICI Follow Up Team, *BICI Follow-Up Report*, November 2012, p. 10, http://iaa.bh/downloads/bici_nov2012_en.pdf (accessed 6 October 2015).

1106 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards', p. 210.

1107 *Ibid*.

historically and more recently, the concept of a 'rotten orchard' seems more appropriate. This metaphor, originally put forward by Maurice Punch in 2003, outlines how 'deviance is not merely the fault of individuals or groups, but the result of systemic problems that either encourage, reward or necessitate police deviance'.¹¹⁰⁸ In this definition, the systemic issue refers to the formal structures such as 'the police organization, the criminal justice system, and the broader socio-political context'.¹¹⁰⁹ Indeed, as Turk notes, 'legal deviance is much more likely to be attributed to individuals than organizations. Indeed, it is easier to punish individuals, and scapegoating will as far as possible be used to block the imputation of legal deviance to the organization'.¹¹¹⁰ Deviance and impunity become more necessary the more widespread the abuses, and the more those organizations are intertwined with the regime.

Despite the findings of the BICI report, which documented systematic torture, the authorities were reluctant to charge any of the officers with torture. When prosecutions did occur, the sentences were extremely lenient, reflecting a desire to appease international actors or local opposition. Indeed, a 'distinct pattern of legal wrangling' emerged, one that involved the use of a series of legal procedures that initially incriminated, but ultimately repealed or commuted the sentences of security officials.¹¹¹¹ The examples of such trials are extensive; Originally sentenced to ten years in prison, the two policeman who tortured and killed 'Ali Saqr in custody had their sentence reduced to two years. The policemen who tortured and killed civilian and journalist Karim Fakhrawi were 'sentenced to seven years for manslaughter, but had their sentences reduced to three after appeal'.¹¹¹² Similarly, 'the police officer accused of killing and shooting civilian 'Ali 'Abd al-Hadi Mushayma' was first sentenced to seven years for manslaughter, but this was reduced to three following an appeal'.¹¹¹³ In another controversial case, 'the police officer who shot Hani 'Abd al-'Aziz Jum'a was also sentenced to seven years for manslaughter, reduced to six

1108 Ibid.

1109 M. Punch, 'Rotten orchards: "pestilence", police misconduct and system failure', *Policing and Society*, vol. 13, no. 2, 2003, p. 172.

1110 A. Turk, *Organizational Deviance*, p. 240.

1111 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards...' p. 229.

1112 Ibid. p. 230.

1113 Ibid. p. 230.

months on appeal'.¹¹¹⁴ In addition to this, 'Ali al-Shayba, an officer accused of permanently disabling a man by shooting him in the leg, first had his five year sentence reduced to three, and then six months on account of his ill health'.¹¹¹⁵

Others have simply been acquitted, such as the two officers accused of shooting Fadhil al-Matruq on February 2011 and the five policemen accused of beating blogger Zakariyya al-'Ashiri to death in custody.¹¹¹⁶ Amnesty International reported that in at least one case where an officer was sentenced to seven years for abuses committed in 2011, he was 'free pending the outcome of his appeal'.¹¹¹⁷ In other cases, policemen being prosecuted for abuses have been accused of remaining on duty through the trial,¹¹¹⁸ although the government say they remain on administrative duty.¹¹¹⁹ These prosecutions also reflect a minimal commitment to investigating the deaths of those killed by the security forces in 2011. Forty-five cases of death believed to have been caused by the security apparatus were thrown out by the government, although no case of violence against police officers has ever been left unpunished.¹¹²⁰

Those members of the security forces charged are often accused of manslaughter and not murder, which holds a maximum sentence of only seven years.¹¹²¹ Manslaughter also implies a lack of menace, and thus has the effect of rendering the state unintentionally violent. Ultimately though, even this wrangling does not obscure the fact that the state is using such cases to project a veneer of accountability. Little is likely to change. The BICI recommendations to improve redress for victims of state violence have been implemented to preserve government control. For example, five of the eight on newly created Special Investigations Unit , tasked with investigating torture, are former MOI prosecutors.¹¹²²

1114 Ibid. p. 230.

1115 Ibid. p. 230.

1116 Ibid. p. 229.

1117 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Reform Shelved*, p. 9.

1118 N. Zahra, 'Officer Jailed in Shooting Case', *Gulf Daily News*, 26 June 2012, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Officer+jailed+in+shooting+case.-a0294433698>


1119 Ministry of the Interior Media Center, 'MOI Response to US State Department's 2013 Country Report on Human Rights', 8 May 2014, <http://www.policemc.gov.bh/en/print.aspx?articleId=22819&mode=print>, (accessed 2 November 2015).

1120 BICI Follow Up Team, *BICI Follow-Up Report*, November 2012, p. 10, http://iaa.bh/downloads/bici_nov2012_en.pdf (accessed 6 October 2015).

1121 N. Zahra, 'Sentences slashed for officers', *Gulf Daily News*, 28 October 2013, <http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=363780> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1122 Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor, US Department of State, Bahrain 2013 Human Rights Report, 27 February 2013, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/nea/220348.htm>

Fig. 11: Heuristic Illustrating Structure of Accountability for Police



Government and Al Khalifa Influence in Shielding Loyalists

It is interesting to note that the Prime Minister still plays a role in this lack of accountability. Reflecting his commitment to a loyal constituency, 'the PM, it is said, is determined to demonstrate that the Al Khalifa remain loyal to those who faithfully serve the Al-Khalifas'.¹¹²³ Although these words by former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain W.T. Monroe were uttered in 2007, a leaked video emerged in 2013 of the Bahraini Prime Minister meeting with an exonerated security agent accused of torture. In it, the Prime Minister says,

I am here to thank you, Mubarak, for your patience and good work. A

(Accessed 6 October 2015).
1123 W.T. Monroe, 'Future of Bahrain'.

human as they say is judged by his work, and your work as a family is the reason for your reputation which is exemplary. A human is left with nothing but his reputation in life and death, and yours is a great one as a family. We are one family.¹¹²⁴

The Prime Minister also mentioned to the gathered loyalists that they were above the law, saying 'These laws cannot be applied to you. No one can touch this bond. Whoever applies these laws against you is applying them against us. We are one body'.¹¹²⁵ Indeed, this highlights a total absence of reformist influence in the legal apparatus, and also reflects the confidence of hawks in ensuring continued unaccountability.¹¹²⁶

In addition to lenience for legal control agents, the government also sought to repress dissent and strengthen their own position by raising the costs for those engaging in attacks on the state's legal control agents. In 2012, amendment 221 of law no. 33 imposed stringent sentences on those who attacked or injured members of the security forces, even if it was done unintentionally.¹¹²⁷ Similarly, while law 52 of 2012 also appears to criminalise official use of violence such as torture, it excludes from accountability those who cause injury in the name of legal punishments or 'procedures'. This law could potentially be a get out clause for those legal control agents accused of excessive force in the protect of the state.¹¹²⁸ As such, it gives the regime a stronger remit to engage in repression, for it does not clearly curtail the use of harsher methods of suppression, disincentivising restraint by precluding legal control agents from sufficient accountability.

In addition to raising the penalties for those who attack the security services,

1124Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, 'Prime Minister's Speech to Mubarak bin Huwayl', [online video], 7 July 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=GB&client=mv-google&hl=en&feature=plcp&v=YVundvyyNS8&nomobile=1>, (accessed 1 October 2014) – translated by the author.

1125Ibid.

1126 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards: Police Deviance, Brutality, and Unaccountability in Bahrain', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds.), *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 229.

1127Law Number 33 for the year 2012, Amendment to number 221 for the penal code decreed by the law 15 for the year 1976, <http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K3312.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1128Law Number 52 of the year 2012, ammendment to some of the penal code stipulated by decree 15 from the year 1976. <http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K5212.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2015).

laws have been introduced that criminalise those who incite hatred against the security forces, including the NSA, the police, the National Guard, and the Bahrain Defence Force.¹¹²⁹ The government also increased the penalties for insulting the King, the country, the flag of Bahrain, and the 'regime'.¹¹³⁰ By 2013, six people had been jailed for up to a year for allegedly insulting the King on the social-networking website Twitter.¹¹³¹ In a worrying, yet unsurprising event that highlighted Saudi's influence in Bahrain, the authorities arrested nine people on 23 January 2015 for making statements on social media that were deemed defamatory to the late King 'Abd Allah of Saudi Arabia.¹¹³²

Societal Pressure

Yet repressive choices such as impunity are also necessary due to societal pressure, itself manufactured from the government's invocation of an exogenous threat. A number of pro-government rallies held in support of the security forces were held between 2011 and 2013. In addition to this, groups have been established to pressure the government into protecting those policemen accused of abuses.¹¹³³ Following the outbreak of protests in 2011, groups from the mostly loyalist villages of al-Hidd and Busaiteen erected billboards around Bahrain depicting a noose with the slogan; 'We Demand from the Government the Maximum Punishment [No Pardon] for the heads of Fitna and the Misguided Elements'.¹¹³⁴ Such campaigns were validated by state media, who published sycophantic speeches by the likes of Dr. 'Abd al-Latif al-Mahmud, the head of the Gathering of National Unity, who demanded that those who carry out crimes against the state not be given amnesty.¹¹³⁵

Thus coercive violence by the state is endorsed by many who support the

1129M. Al A'Ali, '20 years jailed backed for inciting hatred', *Gulf Daily News*, 30 April 2013, <http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=352350> (Accessed 6 October 2015).

1130Amnesty International, *2014 – 15 Report Bahrain*, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/bahrain/report-bahrain/>, (accessed 3 October 2015).

1131S. Yasin, 'The cost of Tweeting in Bahrain', *Index on Censorship*, July 2013, <http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/07/the-cost-of-tweeting-in-bahrain/> (Accessed 6 October 2015).

1132 Amnesty International, *Behind the Rhetoric*, 2015.

1133M. Al A'Ali, 'Group formed to help Policemen', *Gulf Daily News*, 1 January 2012, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Group+formed+to+help+policemen.-a027611748>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

1134J. Gengler, 'Guilty by Billboard', *Bahrain Politics Blogspot*, [web blog], 10 May 2011,

1135Bahrain News Agency, 'جلالة الملك يزور مجلسي ال محمود والمسلم بالحد ويحث على تعزيز اللحمة الوطنية التي تجمعنا كأسرة واحده متكاتفه ومترابطة 21 June, 2011, <http://bna.bh/portal/mobile/news/461875>

regime, or internal state 'legitimaters'¹¹³⁶. Indeed, it is not uncommon 'for residents in places with endemic crime problems to adopt a “tough on crime” mentality. In such environments, there is more tolerance for what might ordinarily be termed police deviance'.¹¹³⁷ For this reason, 'police abuse does not stem simply from police authority alone, but also from a larger belief system shared by citizens in which brutality is acceptable as long as it is directed against “bad people.”'¹¹³⁸ The problem with this argument is that it attempts to confer legitimacy on deviant policing by invoking an element of consent. In actual fact, the fear that allows people to exercise greater tolerance towards police deviance is an artificial construct, born out of the regime's ability to exaggerate the sectarian threat'.¹¹³⁹ In Bahrain, tolerance of state violence has become increasingly high among loyalist elements in society.

These demands for security by loyalists have an impact on police accountability, as holding accountable legal control agents runs the risk of angering those constituents on whom the regime rely on for support. This is emphasised by the fact many of the local security forces are drawn from the country's Sunni communities, whose support for the ruling regime is often contingent on jobs provided in *al-Amin (the security forces)*. Indeed, there are already 'hardline Sunni groups angry about even the government's limited steps to put the BICI report's suggestions into practice'.¹¹⁴⁰ The decision by the Court of Cassation to overturn the death sentences against two opposition activists who had been convicted by a military tribunal of killing two policemen sparked a furious protest, prompting demonstrators to hang photographs of the spared men from a mock gallows.¹¹⁴¹

Yet limited prosecutions against Sunnis are are a 'reminder of the difficulty of actually prosecuting Sunni extremists in Bahrain'.¹¹⁴² The rise of Iran and ISIS, and the sharpening of the Middle East Cold War has highlighted the long standing 'Bahraini reluctance to move against or alienate the Sunni Islamist community at a time of

1136 G. A. Lopez & M. Stohl, 'State Terrorism: From the Reign of Terror to Ninety-Eighty Four Terrorism', p. 25.

1137 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples', p. 233.

1138 N.W. Pino and L.M. Johnson, 'Police deviance and community relations in Trinidad and Tobago', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, vol. 34, no. 3, 2011, p. 459.

1139 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples'.

1140G. Carlstrom, 'In the Kingdom of Tear Gas', *MERIP Online*, 13 April 2012,

[http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041312?](http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041312?ip_login_no_cache=a560e0ddfd87c30e7b1e14c337e587ee)

[ip_login_no_cache=a560e0ddfd87c30e7b1e14c337e587ee](http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041312?ip_login_no_cache=a560e0ddfd87c30e7b1e14c337e587ee) , (accessed 3 October 2014)

1141Ibid.

1142 W.T. Monroe, 'Future of Bahrain'.

heightened concern about Iran and rising Shia influence in the region¹¹⁴³ It is worrying then that a policy of exacerbating ethnic tension and fragmenting opposition along sectarian and political lines has given the ruling regime more legitimacy in exercising a policy of impunity and violent repression.

Conclusion

With significant interference from Britain and Saudi Arabia, the Bahraini government has frequently used laws, legal processes and legal deviance to repress dissent, a fact which is facilitated by a repressive legal structure that represents primarily the interests of the Al Khalifa ruling core. Through a combination of emergency laws, political trials, regular laws, non-accountability and systemic legal bias, the Al Khalifa regime have sought to ameliorate dissent, both before and after its inception. Yet while scholars on Latin America noted military dictators suspended 'judicial protection, due process and executive accountability'¹¹⁴⁴ during their period of rule, Bahrain has more or less existed in such a state for much of the 20th and 21st century., Theoretically speaking, this work rejects the moral functionalist idea that law is simply a means of resolving problems, and adopts a critical perspective that emphasises how law reflects the norms, values and interests of a ruling elite.¹¹⁴⁵ Far from being a neutral apparatus, the law in Bahrain is a means of reinforcing the power and control of the dominant Al Khalifa regime.¹¹⁴⁶ At times where the Al Khalifa regime has been threatened in Bahrain, 'the mandate to prevent radical changes in the distribution of power and privilege is incompatible with the idea of a legally or ethically limited effort to do so'.¹¹⁴⁷

Interestingly, while Khuri argues that the British introduction of uniform laws curtailed the particularity of tribal law, particularism has re-emerged through the structures of state and is evidenced in the state's ability to produce laws that protect the interests of the ruling elite, whether through decree, or through the ossification of punitive laws enacted through parliament. Khuri too is perhaps too optimistic when he asserts how the trial of the Khalids represented the establishment of public over

1143Ibid.

1144 Fagen, P.W., 'Repression and State Security', p. 48.

1145 T. Sellin, *Culture conflict and crime*, New Jersey: Social Science Research Council, 1938.

1146W. Chambliss & R. Seidman, *Law, Order, and Power*; 1971.

1147A. Turk, 'Organizational Deviance and Political Policing', p. 241.

private law.¹¹⁴⁸ The authorities have subverted law in the interests of protecting their position of power.

In its most modern guise, the Al Khalifa government and a loyalist parliament demonstrate the permeation of tribal structures through democratic institutions. The inability of opposition movements to formulate legislation mean that the legal framework offers citizens, and particular Shi'a, no safeguard from an 'arbitrary state'.¹¹⁴⁹ Where legal controls fail to contain or constraint social movement activity before its inception, the system in Bahrain is manipulated in order that social control objectives take precedent. Indeed, the legal order is broken to save the social order.¹¹⁵⁰ The recent uprising in particular has highlighted how law is also a 'form of power' that can be used as a 'weapon in social conflict', generating and exacerbating 'conflicts rather than resolving or softening them'.¹¹⁵¹

1148The myth that the Khalids (or Khawalid) were deported has been propagated as recently as 2013.

For example Charles Levinson of the Wall Street Journal wrote an article stating that the deportation of the Khawalid in 1923 had left a wound that festered for decades.

1149L. Kalmanowiecki, p. 37.

1150G. Agamben, *State of Exception*, Translated by Kevin Attell, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 26.

1151A. Turk, 'Law as a Weapon' p. 276.

Chapter Six

Information Control

*'All expressions of political thought are regarded as subversive'*¹¹⁵²

The control and regulation of information have formed an integral part of repression in Bahrain over the past 100 years, although modernization has necessitated ever more extensive measures of allowing the state to interfere in the informational sphere. This primarily takes the form of censorship, propaganda, and surveillance. The extent of censorship, surveillance, and propaganda has expanded, and the media has been a key instrument of repression, particularly since the 1950s. While globalisation and even increasing liberalisation of the press have resulted in difficulties in controlling the flow of information, elite strategies to throttle the press or shape the message have also bolstered narratives designed to stigmatize and demonise resistance. With the rise of Saudi 'bolstering tyranny'¹¹⁵³ in the region, coupled with their fear of Iranian expansionism, there has been a growing demonization and stigmatization of Bahrain's Shi'a, and the media's growing efforts to frame protesters as violent, Shi'a religious zealots, demonstrates the increasing prevalence of Sunni tribal sectarianism as an informational strategy. While social media poses new challenges for authoritarian regimes, these challenges have been met with repressive solutions that problematise the democratising and liberalising potential of technology. The ruling core, and the constituency on which they depend for some legitimacy, have used new technologies to extend the state's surveillance and informational control abilities, making the process of repression more rhizomatic¹¹⁵⁴ in the information realm. The ability of both the regime and its supporters to engage in unfettered media and online vigilantism certainly answers the question posed by Marc Lynch, 'Are some groups differentially

1152J.P. Tripp, 16 April 1963, FO 1016/684, TNA.

1153G. Greenwald, 'The US – alongside Saudi Arabia – fights for freedom and democracy in the Middle East', *The Guardian*, 12 January 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/12/us-saudi-arabia-libya-freedom>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

1154 Rhizomatic here is in the Deleuzian sense, and refers to increasingly horizontal, bottom-up forms of control in which citizens begin to take charge of surveillance.

empowered by the new media'.¹¹⁵⁵ The chapter too notes the importance of foreign actors in determining developments of informational control strategies, and reflects the increasing outsourcing of propaganda and surveillance strategies.

Censorship and Insulation

Insulation

Editors or publications thought to be critical of Bahrain's protecting powers Britain, Saudi, or the Al Khalifa have often been censored, highlighting the importance of British and Saudi sensitivity in Bahrain's repressive apparatus. The British, ever sensitive of their responsibility to protect Bahrain, were cautious about external ideas or criticism provoking disturbances in Bahrain. As a result, censorship was used from early on in the reforms of the 1920s to stymie the flow of ideas and information to those groups that may have exerted pressure or provided support to potential agitators in Bahrain. This was particularly true of the press and media. As early as 1922, 'Abd Allah bin 'Isa was paying the Persian and Arab Press huge sums of money for anti-British propaganda.¹¹⁵⁶¹¹⁵⁷

In 1933, Charles Belgrave was concerned about any propaganda criticising the British in Bahrain in Arab and Iranian newspapers. In order to counter it journalists were required to obtain visas¹¹⁵⁸ before entering Bahrain, an act that Belgrave claimed to help decrease propaganda in Bahrain.¹¹⁵⁹ Those who violated this diktat would often be punished. For example, in the 1920s, Belgrave deported Ahmed bin Faraj for writing violently anti-British opeds in Cairo Papers. The Shaykh however, sent him a letter saying that he could return, much to Belgrave's chagrin. The Political Agent Barrett caved, and Belgrave stated that he [Barrett] was as weak as the Shaykh.¹¹⁶⁰ According to Major Little, there had been a complete ban on the British Press entering Bahrain prior to the 1956 riots, and Charles Belgrave (the Ruler's advisor) had been

1155M. Lynch, "New Arab Media Research Opportunities and Agendas" In *Arab Uprisings: New Opportunities for Political Science*, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS Briefings): 57–58.

1156'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [119r] (242/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library*
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00002b> [accessed 27 October 2015]

1157'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [159r] (322/412),

1158C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1352 (1933 – 1934), p. 393.

1159Ibid., p. 489.

1160C. Belgrave, Papers, 4 January 1929.

the local correspondent for *The Times*. This embedding of Charles Belgrave as the soul voice of progress in Bahrain undoubtedly shaped the world's perception of Bahrain. For example, Burrows was keen that any publicity of the trial of the St. Helena three in 'the *Times* and the Associated Press should focus on the convictions, and that their removal from here and detention in a British possession should obtain as little publicity as possible'.¹¹⁶¹

The lack of criticism of British Policy in international media outlets can largely be explained by this ban, although even the British administration in London were quick to intervene in criticism of Bahrain. In 1957 Major W.O. Little, a former employee of the Bahrain state Police, circulated a pamphlet among British Members of Parliament entitled 'Memorandum on Bahrain and Related Problems'.¹¹⁶² The document offered a highly critical assessment of how the British and Bahrain authorities handled the 1954-1956 crisis, and included scathing accounts of British officers in the Bahrain Police. The Foreign Office described the pamphlet as 'scurrilous and tendentious',¹¹⁶³ and debated how to prevent the further circulation of the pamphlet. They considered getting those mentioned in the pamphlet to issue a writ for libel in the hope that it would discourage Little from further propagation. At the same time however, the Foreign office worried that if a libel case were pursued, it might give rise to 'undesirable publicity and might well encourage a further spate of Parliamentary Questions'.¹¹⁶⁴ In the end, Little was 'exposed' and dismissed from the J.I.B. after him and another former employee of the Bahrain state Police Captain Hills were caught taking and copying documents about Oman from the Joint Intelligence Bureau. Despite Bahrain only being a British protectorate, the British were keen to mitigate any criticism of the government or the Ruling Family, and the police, especially soon after the unwelcome intervention by British forces in 1956.

In 1955, in order to further the government's monopoly on distributing information, the two local newspapers *Sawt al-Bahrain* (Voice of Bahrain) and *Al-Qafilah* (The Caravan) were suspended because they made 'offensive remarks about neighbouring friendly states'.¹¹⁶⁵ Indeed, the editor of the former was 'Abd al-Rahman

1161 B.A.B. Burrows, Secret to Foreign Office, 15 December 1956, *RoB*, vol. 7, p. 303.

1162 W.O. Little, 'Report by Major Little', in Pamphlet on Bahrain, 1957, FO 371/126918, TNA.

1163 Foreign Office, 1957, FO 371/126918, TNA.

1164 Ibid.

1165 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1955, in *BGAR*, vol. 5, p. 3.

al-Bakir, one of the eight leaders of the HEC and later the CNU. In addition to this, al-Bakir had his nationality temporarily revoked by the Ruler in 1954.¹¹⁶⁶ This punishment, incidentally, gave many Sunni an 'immediate and personal grievance comparable to those enjoyed by the Shi'a, having a mobilising effect, prompting more Sunnis to be involved in HEC meetings.¹¹⁶⁷ Indeed, punishing a high profile and politically active Sunni simply had the effect of generating further mobilisation. In 1956, the Bahrain government cancelled the nationalistic newspaper *Al-Watan* (The Nation) for its anti-Saudi and anti-British editorial stance. *Al-Shu'lah* (The Flame), a re-branded version of *Al-Watan*,¹¹⁶⁸ was also banned a month later for its criticism of Iraq and the Information Section of the British administration (and the British in general).¹¹⁶⁹ The news editor of the Bahrain wireless news bulletins was also removed because his views tended to 'present the Egyptian view to the exclusion of others'.¹¹⁷⁰ Because the papers commanded a wide readership, and advocated governmental reform, unionisation, and improvement of living and labour conditions, they were seen as inherently subversive. In 1960, the British, more fearful of communism than Arab Nationalism at this point, wanted to ban the Indian newspaper *the Blitz*, which one official saw being read by a Bahraini, again indicating the influence of the fears of Bahrain's protecting powers in shaping the information availability in Bahrain.¹¹⁷¹

Britain Press for Media Relaxation

The fifties were instrumental in the development of information control strategies in Bahrain, as the rise of mass media and wireless technologies posed new problems for the British, whose presence in the Middle East provoked the ire of anti-colonial Arab Nationalist. However, the strength of the HEC highlighted the limited efficacy of simply trying to repress newspapers. So while the British had long resisted a press, during the 1950s the British began to see its value, at least for the purposes of spreading pro-government propaganda to counter the adept strategies of Arab

1166J.W. Wall to Political Resident in Gulf, 25 October 1954, RoB, vol. 7, p. 71.

1167Ibid.

1168Anon, 6 September 1956, FO 371/120548, TNA.

1169For a complete history of Bahrain's Print and Broadcast Media, see Rumaihi 'The Development of Mass Media in the Kingdom of Bahrain', PhD Thesis, University Exeter, 2002

1170Ibid.

1171Confidential, 11 July 1960, FO 1016/684, TNA.

nationalists in Egypt and Kuwait who were using wireless technologies to foment unrest. Bernard Burrows suggested that an independent newspaper be set up, arguing that this would be complemented by an information office and the Bahrain Government Public Relations Office. Combined, these would make it easier to 'guide' without resorting 'to censorship and suppression'.¹¹⁷² This attitude reflected a growing realisation that if information could not be stopped, it should at least be controlled. However, Major Little claimed that the repression of the local media prevented the 'emergence of moderate opinion' and that the Bahrain radio station was ineffective against Egyptian propaganda. In 1956, The new criminal code also contained an article designed to tackle the publication of inflammatory pamphlets and circulars that were issued by the groups of the HEC. These lack of avenues to foster moderate opinion may have contributed to the rise of fringe groups and violence in 1956.

Yet despite a relative relaxing of British attitudes in the 1960s, the personal attitudes of subsequent members of the Al Khalifa family proved hostile to a greater press presence, reflecting to the British influence, and their ability to secure pacification through indirect and pacific means. In 1960, the British noted how the ruler 'obstinately refuses to allow the broadcast of any subject of a controversial nature',¹¹⁷³ and in 1963, the British Political Agent noted that Ruling Family's attitude was entirely security-orientated, and for this reason allowed no newspapers.¹¹⁷⁴ Indeed, J.P. Tripp stated in 1963 that all 'expressions of political thought were regarded as subversive'¹¹⁷⁵ by the Ruler.

Return to Hard-Line Influence on Censorship

Post Independence, Bahrain's brief democratic experiment allowed more latitude for free speech, and livened up the press somewhat. Robert Tesh noted that 'criticism of the government in a reasonably polite way was pretty free'.¹¹⁷⁶ Ultimately though, it was still a 'puppet press'¹¹⁷⁷ and opposition groups like the Marxists, who were democratically represented in parliament, were denied permission to open a

1172 B.A.B. Burrows, 5 March 1955, RoB, vol. 7, p. 129

1173 Wm C. Lyall, 22 October 1960, FO 1016/684, TNA.

1174 J.P. Tripp, 18 April 1963, FO 1016/684, TNA.

1175 J.P. Tripp, 16 April 1963, FO 1016/684, TNA.

1176R M Tesh, 'Bahrain Internal', 1 March 1975, FCO 8/2415, TNA.

1177Ibid.

newspaper.¹¹⁷⁸ Post independence, as Bahrain lilted further into its neighbours orbit, criticism of Saudi Arabia, or indeed, other friendly nations in the Gulf, was penalised heavily. For example, on 1975, a local paper was suspended for a month after it published comments critical of Saudi Arabia made by a visiting official from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.¹¹⁷⁹

The stringent censorship resumed after the demise of parliament. Ibrahim Muhammad Bashmi, was imprisoned by the regime in 1975 for being the editor of a paper that published an article that contravened the 1955 Penal Code and the 1965 Press Ordinance.¹¹⁸⁰ In 1982, the *Guardian* journalist David Hirst was prevented from entering Bahrain to cover the trial of those accused of plotting a coup, as he had not given advanced notice. Similarly, Amnesty International observers were allowed in but they were not allowed to enter the courtroom.¹¹⁸¹ The British, who were now firmly of the opinion that the Al Khalifa's attitude to censorship was 'shortsighted',¹¹⁸² said that the Bahraini authorities should be actually encouraging the press and Amnesty to cover it¹¹⁸³ in order to remove plausible suspicion that the trial was a kangaroo court. This, the British thought, would prevent Shi'a from using their 'predilection for martyrdom' to 'weave an effective political and religious mythology' out of any mishandling.¹¹⁸⁴ Indeed, the coverage of the trial was minimal, and David Hirst noted that the local newspapers were 'as insubstantial as their headlines are bold',¹¹⁸⁵ and that not even the head of Bahrain's state television could get access. Indeed, Roger Tomkys noted that all the press got their information from a 'Ministry of Information handout'.¹¹⁸⁶ The British explained the reasons for this stringent policy as coming directly from the Prime Minister; 'all concerned thought the Prime Minister was responsible for this policy',¹¹⁸⁷ - reflecting growing influence in multiple spheres of Bahrain's government. Such minimal coverage was usual on issues related to political mobilisation. Even the coverage of the elections for the Joint Committees

1178Ibid.

1179R M Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 4 March 1975.

1180Amnesty Report in, FCO8/3893, TNA.

1181P.F.M. Wogan, Bahrain Coup: Trial of Detainees, 16 March 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

1182W.R. Tomkys, The December Coup.

1183P.F.M. Wogan, Bahrain Coup.

1184Ibid.

1185D. Hirst, 'Putting the Gulf's Resistance on Trial', *The Guardian*, 15 March 1982.

1186W.R. Tomkys, Trial of Detainees.

1187W.R. Tomkys, The December Coup.

was arranged to be as 'low-key' as possible.¹¹⁸⁸

This short-sighted attempt at insulation continued into the 1990s. Amnesty complained during the 1990s Intifada that the government resorted to a number of tactics to prevent information¹¹⁸⁹ being released that could aid social movements in their attempts to lobby local and international actors to pressure the government. The rise of more newsworthy and egregious incidents also meant more stringent control of information. On 4 April 1995, one of the Bahrain government's controlled daily newspapers, *al-Ayam*, published a statement issued by the then Minister of Information, Tareq al-Mu'ayyed, highlighting the government's fear of negative press going outside Bahrain. The statement said 'The ministry wishes to draw attention to the fact that no citizen is permitted to transmit news abroad without obtaining authorization from the ministry...', and that those who do so may be liable to legal action'.¹¹⁹⁰ Although the threat of legal action had, according to Amnesty International, no basis in law since no decree had been issued, 'a number of people were summoned by government officials and reportedly told to refrain from giving interviews to the media and transmitting information abroad on the situation in Bahrain,¹¹⁹¹ a Saudi hand in determining press policy was evident when both the 'editor of the newspaper and the minister of information separately warned' a Bahraini journalist 'that Saudi officials had complained about the reporter's articles'.¹¹⁹²

Even after the reforms of 2001, six of Bahrain's seven daily newspapers in Bahrain are 'either pro-government or owned by figures affiliated with the royal family'.¹¹⁹³ Attempts by oppositional forces to provide balance, apart from through non-official means, such as social media, are stymied by the government's refusal to

1188 S.P. Collis, Bahrain Labour, 12 March 1983, FCO 8/4920, TNA

1189 Article 5(4) of Amiri Decree No. 7 of 1976 stipulates that sessions of the State Security Court shall be public unless it is deemed necessary to hold them *in camera* 'out of consideration for public order, public security or the higher interests of the state ...'. The same article stipulates that sentencing shall be pronounced in public session. In practice, sessions are always held *in camera*, attended only by members of the courts' bench, the defendants, defence lawyers and representatives of the Public Prosecution. Relatives of the defendants as well as independent observers and the media are barred from attendance. Sentencing also takes place in closed session. Such *in camera* proceedings are inconsistent with the right to a public trial guaranteed by Article 10 of the UDHR and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. - AI, 'Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis'.

1190 HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

1191 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

1192 HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

1193 POMED, 'One Year Later: Assessing Bahrain's Implementations of the BICI Report', November 2012, <http://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/One-Year-Later-Assessing-Bahrain's-Implementation-of-the-BICI-Report.pdf> (accessed 13 October 2015).

issue newspaper and television licenses to opposition groups like Al Wefaq.¹¹⁹⁴ Bahrain pulled the plug on Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal -al Saud's television channel *Alarab* within 24 hours of its first broadcast an interview with a senior member of Al Wefaq.¹¹⁹⁵ Recently, media and informational strategies have come further under the control of hawkish members of the ruling family, many with allegedly anti-Shi'a tendencies, such as the Khawalid. As former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain noted, 'Sources also indicate that royal court elements have had a direct hand in a scathing press campaign launched by Arabic daily *Al Watan* against NDI, other NGOs, and even the U.S. Embassy'.¹¹⁹⁶ *Al Watan*, in particular, was noted for its close ties to the royal court.¹¹⁹⁷ Paradoxically, it was the reforms of 2001 and Hamad's rise to power that empowered Anti-Shi'a hardliners such as the Khawalid, who have continued to maintain a tight grip on informational control strategies. Yet a relative rapprochement has now, especially since 2011, seen a reassertion of pervasive censorship. A leaked cable from the then Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud indicated that the 2011 unrest prompted Saudi to ask Bahrain for a co-operation between its media agencies to adopt strategies to counter what it say as efforts by foreign agencies to attack the reputation of Bahrain and Saudi.¹¹⁹⁸

Shi'a and baḥārna Exclusion

Books or publication that are critical of, or embarrassing about, the Al Khalifa are banned, although this includes most histories, including Khuri's *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, and the papers of Charles Belgrave.¹¹⁹⁹ Much of these highlight the Al Khalifa oppression of the indigenous population. Yet the marginalisation of particular Shi'a or baḥārna voices from Bahrain's media and cultural fabric has perhaps simply strengthened this native identity.¹²⁰⁰ In addition to this censorship, baḥārna and Shi'a culture is marginalized in Bahrain's historical and cultural output. TV shows produced

1194Ibid.

1195 S. Kerr, 'Bahrain pulls plug on Saudi media tycoon's TV Station', *Financial Times*, 20 February 2015, (accessed 20 October 2015).

1196W.T. Monroe, 'Bahraini Political Scene Part II'.

1197W.T. Monroe, 'Government Committees Warn Newspapers about Anti Regime Coverage, 21 June 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06MANAMA1116_a.html (accessed 6 October 2015).

1198 F. Al Saud, 'Secret and Urgent', Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 – 2012 (1433 Hijra), Wikileaks, <https://wikileaks.org/saudi-cables/doc46685.html>

1199 Cited in J. Gengler, *Ethnic Conflict* p. 56.

1200 Ibid. p. 56.

by Bahrain's national television are mainly done in Sunni dialect, marginalizing the baḥārna dialect almost completely.¹²⁰¹ The National Museum tends to promote the history of Bahrain's Sunni dominated pearl industry and pre-Islamic civilization of the Dilmun, to the almost complete exclusion of the 'Ajam and the *baḥārna*, the latter of whom mostly formed a settled agricultural class. As Amal Khalaf notes, the state-controlled image economy emphasises the ruling family, and therefore privileges Sunni Muslims.¹²⁰²

Yet Bahrain's heavily managed image economy aims to portray it as a neo-liberal haven, increasingly important following Bahrain's attempt to diversify away from oil into sectors such as finance. In order to not disrupt the image of Bahrain as a peaceful oasis, safe for investment, casualties or victims of police brutality in the 1990s were frequently sequestered away in order that the visibility of their injuries or testimony remained hidden. Often they are secretly transferred to Bahrain's Military Hospital, where the identity is better assured/hidden as Bahrain's Military lies closely under regime control. This combined with the sequestering of victims, allows the government to claim that people are 'fabricating' evidence or injuries, adding to the stigmatization of social movements. Yet widespread abuses in the recent uprising, coupled with social media, has increased the government's fear of this information getting out. Medics have been targeted in particular due to their proximity to the results of state violence. Dr. 'Ali al-Akri, one of many medics to be arrested, tortured and prosecuted by the government, claimed they did it because the medics were witnesses to the atrocities.¹²⁰³ The reaction of the government to those attempting to assist journalists also marked a new height for retribution; at least three residents of Bahrain, two of whom were Bahraini (one was Omani), were arrested and interrogated for acting as a fixer for BBC Middle East correspondent Martin Ingram and BBC Television Reporter Sue Lloyd Roberts.¹²⁰⁴

1201C. Holes, 'Dialect and National Identity: The Cultural Politics of Self-Representation in Bahrain Musalsalat', in P. Dresch and J. Piscatori (eds), *Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2005.

1202A. Khalaf, 'The Many Afterlives of Lulue', Ibraaz, 28 February 2013, <http://www.ibraaz.org/essays/56>

1203M. Chulov, 'Bahrain doctors await the call that will send them to prison', *The Guardian*, 30 September 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/30/bahrain-doctors-prison-uprising> (accessed 28 October 2015).

1204 Human Rights Watch, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial, Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain*, 1997

Between 14 February 2011 and the end of November, there were at least 221 instances 'where a foreign journalist, NGO member, politician, trade unionist, aid worker, or activist was denied access to Bahrain, alone or as part of a group. This total includes representatives from at least 17 NGOs and 22 media organizations. Some individuals have been denied access in multiple instances. Access denials to Bahrain increased from 2011 to 2012: of the 221 cases of access denial, 74 were in 2011, and 147 were in 2012'.¹²⁰⁵ In 2013, three journalists from the British broadcaster Channel 4 were deported after attempting to film protests while in Bahrain on an Formula One visa.¹²⁰⁶ Bahrain Watch add that 'Methods of access denial include: denial of visa, refusal at a port of entry, changing regulations to prohibit planned visits, deportation, and blacklists'.¹²⁰⁷ The denial of an organization whose access could facilitate and support the work of opposition social movements severely represses the abilities of those organizations to garner regional and international support. The larger the scale of abuses, the more profound the censorship.

Increasing the Reach: Censoring Abroad

While Bahrain's protecting powers have always been sensitive of criticism of the Bahrain regime, British companies continue to work directly to prevent negative coverage of Bahrain. Western PR companies, particular in London and Washington, have played a big role in pressuring international organizations to remove material from newspapers that could be seen critical of the regime in Bahrain. Bahrain threatened to sue the *Independent* for defaming it. Dragon Associates, a London-based company, forced the *Guardian* to take down an article written by Nabeel Rajab and John Lubbock that described how torture had occurred at Bahrain's F1 track.¹²⁰⁸ This was strategically timed ahead of the Bahrain F1, and although the *Guardian* put it up again (albeit with a superfluous addendum), they did so after tickets for the F1 had already started selling.¹²⁰⁹ Similarly, CNN decided not to repeat a shocking

1205 Bahrain Watch, *Access Denied*, 2012, <https://bahrainwatch.org/access/viewreport.php#findings> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1206 J. Halliday, 'Channel 4 journalists arrested and deported from Bahrain', *The Guardian*, 23 April 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/apr/23/channel-4-journalists-arrested-bahrain> (accessed 5 October 2015).

1207 Bahrain Watch, *Access Denied*, 2012, <https://bahrainwatch.org/access/viewreport.php#findings> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1208 Interview with Brian Whitaker, February 2012.

1209 Bahrain Watch, *PR Watch: Dragon Association*, 2012, <https://bahrainwatch.org/pr/dragon->

documentary presented by Amber Lyon on Bahrain after its first airing caused 'blowback' from the Bahraini government.¹²¹⁰ The Bahraini government also hired British law firm Carter-Ruck to attack the *Independent* for their negative coverage on Bahrain.¹²¹¹ Wikipedia also suspended accounts after I discovered that changes to entries about John Timoney and John Yates had been made immediately before it was announced that they were coming to Bahrain. Information that was negative was removed so that it looked like Bahrain was recruiting two unblemished candidates to reform the police. Recurring tropes exist in government framing of protests. By attempting to reduce negative press of Bahrain, these companies are conforming to the government's desired narrative that Bahrain is safe space, ripe for investment and the global flow of capital. Yet interestingly, the reach of this repression highlights the importance of the growing web of non-state actors invested in laundering the reputations of authoritarian regimes.

Intimidation: Targeting Liberal Media Outlets and Journalists

While the proliferation of media technology and newspapers has enabled more information to get out, the government's authoritarian reflex has meant that tactics apart from insulation are necessitated. The recent uprising in Bahrain has seen the most egregious targeting of journalists, not simply because there have been more journalists, citizens and otherwise, covering the protests, but also due to the increased influence of security minded, anti-reform, Sunni hard-liners. As Wehrey notes, 'the hardline faction, which controls the security forces as well as the instruments of censorship, is now very open about its intention to silence the opposition'.¹²¹² Yet the nature of this intimidation started long before the uprising of 2011. Shaykh Ahmed Attiyatallah Al Khalifa reportedly established two media watch committees under the auspices of his office to, at least, intimidate journalists and editors into not writing articles that were deemed anti-regime. While such directives could only, in theory, come from the IAA, Shaykh Atayitallah's interference signified the influence of

associates.php (accessed 6 October 2015).

1210 J. Horne, 'Tn Tn Tn and torture in Bahrain: Puncturing the spectacle of the "Arab Spring"', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones (eds), *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 163.

1211 Ibid.

1212 F. Wehrey, 'The March of Bahrain's Hardliners'.

elements of the ruling core in dictating press freedom.¹²¹³

In 2011, early on in the Uprising Bahrain's only opposition newspaper, *Al-Wasat*, was targeted by pro-government thugs, who attacked the company's printing press.¹²¹⁴ *Al-Wasat* was suspended on 2 April 2011 after the government used a raft of legal arguments to quash it, accusing them of 'publishing fabricated news,' 'harming public safety', and 'damaging national interests'. Mansur al-Jamri, the paper's award-winning editor, admitted to publishing six incorrect articles, but also claimed he was the victim of a deliberate campaign to plant disinformation that had been sent from accounts with IP addresses in Saudi. The editorial staff were replaced by government-appointed personnel, and the newspaper's stance became less critical overnight.¹²¹⁵ Saudi too intervened in what they see as pro-Shi'a or Iranian propaganda, and the King has intervened by decree to take the Iranian satellite channel off the air whenever it reports on Bahrain.¹²¹⁶

In addition to the intimidation, and subsequent censorship of *Al-Wasat*, attacks and extra judicial killings on other journalists also increased. Reporters Sans Frontier (RSF) noted that citizen-journalist Ahmed Ismail Hussain was 'killed while covering a peaceful demonstration in Salmabad on 31 March 2012'.¹²¹⁷ Although it is not known who killed him, RSF state the authorities were clearly to blame for the torture and 'deaths of Karim Fakhrawi, a co-founder of the newspaper *Al-Wasat* and member of its board, and Zakariya Rashid Hassan'.¹²¹⁸ The authorities have also harassed, tortured, arrested, and tried journalists in an attempt to prevent them evoking support for Bahrain's opposition by publishing potentially damning news stories. Photographers wearing clearly marked vests, such as Hamad Muhammad and Amer Muhammad, have been targeted by direct shots with tear gas canisters, and no one has been held accountable. Others have been arrested or convicted on spurious charges,

1213W.T. Monroe, 'Government Committees Warn Newspapers'.

1214M . Tran, 'Bahrain accuses human rights leader of faking pictures of beating', *The Guardian*, 11 April 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/bahrain-human-rights-activist-accused> , (accessed 6 October 2015).

1215Freedom House, *Freedom on the Net 2012: Bahrain*, 2012, www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Bahrain%202012_0.pdf

1216B. Hubbard and M. ElSheikh, 'Wikileaks shows a Saudi obsession with Iran'. 16 July 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/world/middleeast/wikileaks-saudi-arabia-iran.html>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

1217 Reporters Without Borders, 'Bahrain', <http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/bahrain/>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

1218 Ibid.

including Mustafa Rabea, Ammar 'Abd al-Rasul, Ahmed al-Musawi, Sayid Baqir al-Kamal, Qassim Zayn al-Din, Ahmad Zayn al-Din, Ahmad al-Fardan, and Hussam Surur. Again, spurious legal charges have been used to set in motion the processes of legal embroilment. The alleged crimes range from 'participating in an illegal gathering', to 'attacking policemen'.¹²¹⁹ Between 2011 and 2012, sixty-eight journalists were charged with treason or 'publishing news that defamed the image of Bahrain abroad'.¹²²⁰ Some, such as Naziha Sa'id and Mohammed al Oraibia, have accused the police of torturing them. Those like Mohammed Al Najer, complained to have been arrested and beaten by police while covering protests.¹²²¹

Foreign news agencies have also found themselves in trouble after obtaining access. Bahrain Watch has noted that 'Some individuals who gain access to Bahrain are harassed by security forces, have their movements restricted, or are only granted access to attend Government events'. Bahrain Watch note that this 'policy of restricting access to foreign observers puts a greater burden on local organizations that are already stretched thin by Government harassment, and reduces impartial coverage of the situation in Bahrain'.¹²²² This 'lack of impartial coverage may cause policy-makers to consult biased or outdated information about Bahrain, leading them to suboptimal policy decisions'.¹²²³ Most foreign journalists are just deported, and torture is reserved for nationals over whom the government believe they have more impunity to exact grisly punishments. While the intimidation of journalists has occurred before, the proliferation of media outlets, citizen journalists, and social networks, has created an information deluge that has prompted the government to react more violently. Yet the hard-line influence, and loyalist ownership of mass media, has facilitated an aggressive policy towards censorship, itself enabled by hard-line control of security institutions.

Social Media and Trolling

The Bahrain authorities have always been suspicious of new technologies. In the

1219 Reporters Without Borders, 'Media Freedom Still Under Attack in Bahrain', 11 March 2015, <http://en.rsf.org/bahrain-media-freedom-still-under-attack-11-03-2015,47675.html> (accessed 6 October 2015).

1220 POMED, 'One Year Later'.

1221 Reporters Without Borders, 'Media Freedom Still Under Attack in Bahrain'.

1222 Bahrain Watch, *Access Denied*.

1223 *ibid*.

1990s, government offices issued strict control of photocopier and fax machines, while in 1996, international calls from public phones were banned as they could not be traced, and the government suspected citizens may attempt to contact subversive elements abroad or journalists/members of NGOs.¹²²⁴ What set the 2011 uprising apart from previous contentious episodes was the use of social media. In addition to the targeting of official journalists and agencies, unaffiliated activists and netizens have been intimidated and 'trolled' into silence. Trolling can be defined as 'a form of aggressive internet communication where people using anonymous or non anonymous accounts to engage in abusive behaviour towards others'¹²²⁵ and varies in severity, from provocative comments, to death threats, to outright bullying.¹²²⁶ This intimidation was prolific on social media, especially in 2011, where people often felt intimidated into not criticising the government due to the prevalence of online harassment, mostly from Twitter trolls, or 'e-thugs' (reflecting the commonly used Arabic term at the time, that translates as thug) Although some were indifferent, other users admitted that it has stopped them tweeting or writing anything critical of the regime.¹²²⁷ One informant noted that trolling stopped him tweeting; 'Don't know how long Marc, my heart is heavy. Even my moderate views get attacked by trolls'¹²²⁸ Others have 'protected' their Twitter accounts, meaning that what they write can only be read by those followers permitted by the author, contributing to the censorship and silencing of oppositional voices on Twitter. This tactic was especially effective in the midst of the political upheaval in 2011, when there was the very real possibility of arrest and torture. The prevalence of Bahrain's Twitter trolls has prompted a number of international journalists or activists to write about them.¹²²⁹ For example, Al-Jazeera reporter Gregg Carlstrom tweeted in November 2011: 'Bahrain has by far the hardest-working Twitter trolls of any country I've reported on'.¹²³⁰ Global Voices'

1224HRW *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

1225 M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance, and social control in the Bahrain Uprising', *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings, Past and Present*, vol 9, no. 2, April 2013, p.

1226Ibid., p. 77.

1227(the phrase self-censorship is problematic, as it implies that there is no stimulus that causes the censorship, shifting the responsibility from the hegemonic order, to the individual).

1228Conversation with victim of trolling, 2011.

1229 including Jillian York, (2011) David Goodman (2011) and Brian Dooley (2011). Following the release of the BICI report on 23 November 2011. See M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance...'

1230 M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance...'

MENA editor Amira Al Hussaini “cyberbullying = censorship! Welcome to the new era of freedom in #Bahrain”. Trolling in Bahrain reached such a pitch that it was addressed in a report commissioned to investigate human rights abuses during the uprising of 2011. The report singled out the actions of @7areghum, a Twitter account that 'openly harassed, threatened and defamed certain individuals, and in some cases placed them in immediate danger'.¹²³¹ Although the authors of the report noted that @7areghum had broken Bahraini law and international law, there is no evidence that Bahrain government have asked the US government to subpoena Twitter to release information about the account.¹²³² In addition to forcing people into censorship, these trolls are an important source of disinformation. They frequently disseminate information that is controversial, defamatory, sectarian, or wrong'.¹²³³ In times of conflict, such disinformation is harmful, 'for it is also a time when people are feeling vulnerable, defensive and afraid'.¹²³⁴ Trolls exploit people's desire for information, which increase during a time of crisis. However, the lack of credible official information on issues and the government's deliberate obfuscation makes the scramble for answers both desperate and blind.¹²³⁵ It is not clear in all cases who run the accounts, yet thousands of sock puppet accounts appeared at key moments at 2011, spreading government propaganda, or intimidating opposition figures online.¹²³⁶

In some cases, people reported that the circulation of government atrocities made them more afraid of engaging in dissent. While accounts such as @7areghum were never identified, the similar @mnarfezhom account was identified to be Salman Al Khalifa, a member of the ruling family.¹²³⁷ Although his anti-Shi'a discourse, and critique of the protest movement was not considered problematic by the government, he was questioned by authorities after he slandered influential and Sunni notables.¹²³⁸

1231 *BICI Report*, p. 401.

1232 M.O. Jones, 'Bahrain activists' trouble with trolls', *Index on Censorship Uncut*, 15 May 2012, <http://uncut.indexoncensorship.org/2012/05/bahrain-marc-owen-jones-twitter-trolls/>, (accessed 4 October 2015).

1233 M.O. Jones in J.D. Goodman, "'Twitter Trolls' haunt discussions of Bahrain online', *The Lede* [*New York Times* blog], 11 October 2011, <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/twitter-trolls-haunt-discussions-of-bahrain-online/>

1234 *Ibid.*

1235 *Ibid.*

1236 M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance...'

1237 Bahrain Watch, *The IP spy files: How Bahrain's government silences anonymous online dissent*, August 2013, <https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/ip-spy-files.pdf>. (accessed 30 December 2014).

1238 S. S. Grewal, 'Probe into slander on Twitter', *Gulf Daily News*, 7 January 2013, <http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=345115> (accessed 20 October 2015).

Again, this asymmetry in the application of rule and law reflects a tacit approval by the regime of harassment strategies designed to intimidate opposition members. What is clear though, is that such tactics, whether undertaken directly by the government, or facilitated by their wilful blindness, contributed to censorship by invoking a climate of fear. This was underscored by reminders by the head of Public Security that circulating videos of the security forces engaged in egregious acts would be considered an act against the nation.¹²³⁹ Despite this warning, social media has actually facilitated the process of 'making the consequences of resistance so gruesome that no one who has experienced them is psychologically and/or physically capable of further resistance'.¹²⁴⁰

Between Propaganda and PR

The Increasing Need for Propaganda

Shaping the perceptions of citizens about the nature of reality is an important aspect of repression, as it can deter people from supporting social movements via stigmatization. The most salient strategy of the Bahrain government has been to portray opposition as being externally supported fifth columns operating in Bahrain. Before independence, inside agitation was often attributed to nationalist or leftist movements, while after Independence, Iran has often been used as the external 'bogeyman' with a hand in dissent in Bahrain. As early as the 1920s, the British would frighten the Shaykh with 'bogeyman of Persian pretensions to get his own house in order'.¹²⁴¹ Yet the media scene in Bahrain has hardly ever been vibrant, and it is only really in the last fifteen years that the proliferation of media outlets and the internet has seen a burgeoning of state and non-state discourse that attempts to shape public perceptions of opposition movements. Thus stigmatization and demonization and intimidation by way of new media technologies is an increasingly more prevalent tool in the government's repertoire of repression.

1239 @YusurAlBahrani, 'Chief of Public Security in #Bahrain @Tal Hassan, claims that who publicize video of @moi_bahrain violations is traitor', 25 December 2012, <https://twitter.com/YusurAlBahrani/status/283442087192588288>, (accessed 10 October 2015).
@Tal Hassan, 'يقوم الدجالون والعملاء ببيت تلك اللقطات ويبالغون فيها وحسبما يردهم من تعليمات وبما يحقق لهم ولمن -', <https://twitter.com/tal Hassan/status/283339899518730241>, 24 December 2012, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1240 A Turk, *Political Criminality*, p. 134.

1241 Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State for India, 14 May 1923, *RoB*, vol 3, p. 761.

Propaganda has always reflected the type of threat, and the perceptions authorities have of that threat. Rising nationalism, for example, made Britain and the Al Khalifa regime particular paranoid about the dissemination of Arab Nationalist propaganda. On 1 February 1955, the government of Bahrain opened the Public Relations Department. This was done primarily to explain the governments policies and achievements, and to combat the 'continual incitement against established authority being poured out by the Cairo and Damascus wireless'¹²⁴² stations. The newspaper *Al Khalij* (The Gulf) edited by the British Colonel Anderson was set up to spread pro-government propaganda, marking the beginning of the trend of British Officers or former British Officer doing propaganda on behalf of the Bahrain Government.¹²⁴³ They even co-opted 'Ali Sayyar, the former editor of *Al Watan*, and once described by the HEC as the 'greatest torch of freedom in Bahrain;' He later resigned due to accusations of collusion with the British.¹²⁴⁴

The same problems arose during the worker and student strikes of 1965, where slack reform meant it was still deemed necessary to create a 'lively and strong' broadcasting station 'capable of answering the groundless allegations poured out by Kuwait and other hostile Middle East broadcasting stations'.¹²⁴⁵ Despite the recalcitrance of the Ruler and the Al Khalifa, the British encouraged them to allow an independent newspaper, 'Al-ADwa' something which he had long been against.¹²⁴⁶ The first issue was published on 9 September 1965, and described by J.W.D. Gray as lacking 'spice' on account of the draconian Press Law issued in August 1965.¹²⁴⁷ Indeed, such was the government's paranoia about propaganda, that the Press Law was both comprehensive and stifling. Amongst the requirements was that the editor and owner had to be over 25, and that the papers were not allowed to criticise the Ruler or his family, or publish news that may damage the economy or harm relations with 'friendly nations'¹²⁴⁸ All publications brought into the country could be appropriated by the authorities if they contravened any of the articles laid out in the

1242C. A. Gault, 27 January 1957, RoB, vol. 7, p. 335.

1243B.A.B. Burrows, Summary of news, 24 August 1956,

1244Note in Margin on, 'Daily in Bahrain by 'Ali Sayyar', 1956,

1245W. Luce, Dispatch No. 305, 26 April, 1965 telegram to foreign office, RoB, vol. 5 p. 292.

1246Arabian Department, 'Minister of State's Visit to the Persian Gulf', 9 – 16 May 1965, RoB, vol. 5, p. 297.

1247J.W.D. Gray, Letter to S.J. Nuttall, 14 September 1965, RoB, vol. 5, p. 49.

1248<http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K0765.pdf>

Press Law, and anything that encouraged people to embrace communism was also banned. The press in Bahrain was never intended to be a 'fourth estate', one designed to speak truth to power, but rather a way in which the government could celebrate its own achievements, deploy propaganda, and counter news issued by foreign actors. Even in 1974, during Bahrain's brief democratic experiment, the British noted that the government was 'infiltrating the press' and controlled both state radio and state TV.¹²⁴⁹

In addition to celebrating government achievements, propaganda has been used as a tool of intimidation. In 1979, for example, 'the expressions of support the authorities received from other Arab Governments probably convinced the dissidents that they were not up against the Bahrain Government alone'.¹²⁵⁰ Similarly, in 1980 it was thought that a rumour that Saudi troops were in Bahrain was spread to intimidate any *baḥārna* from protesting.¹²⁵¹ In 1982, the British mentioned that there was a 'well advertised campaign to underline the fact that Bahrain enjoys the support of its Arab neighbours'.¹²⁵² Indeed, this strategically placed information has also been deployed in order to have a salutary effect. In 1979, for example, 'the expressions of support the authorities received from other Arab Governments probably convinced the dissidents that they were not up against the Bahrain Government alone'.¹²⁵³ During the 1990s Intifada, the Saudis were more demonstrable in their shows of support, staging military exercises around invading a Bahrain overtaken by fundamentalists, and the Defense Minister Prince Sultan stating to the BBC: 'We are prepared to stand forcefully by Bahrain if the need arises'.¹²⁵⁴ When the GCCPS came over the bridge in 2011, it was widely broadcast on state media, with soldiers displaying the V for victory sign, potentially evoking the 'visceral fear' that many *baḥārna* reportedly have of Saudis.

Stigmatization and False Balance

Another important way that the opposition movement has been framed has been the government's creation of a good versus evil binary, in which the government present themselves as a bulwark against violent extremism. The state media, loyalists, and PR

1249 R. M. Tesh, 9 April 1974.

1250 H.B. Walker, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1979.

1251 K.J. Passmore, Bahrain Internal: Ashura, 1 December 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.

1252 W.R. Tomkys, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1981, 13 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.

1253 H.B. Walker, 'Bahrain: Annual Review for 1979', 8 January 1980, FCO8/3490.

1254 Cited in HRW, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*.

firms working for the Bahraini government have employed a number of rhetorical devices and narratives that contribute to framing the opposition in a negative light. In this, acts of violence against the state are exaggerated or focused on, while egregious acts perpetrated against citizens are dumbed down. Even in its infancy, this was noted of the Bahrain press. For example, in order to justify its decision to dissolve the National Assembly in 1975 for reasons of national security, the government widely publicised acts of violence perpetrated by those with leftist political associations. One man, 'Abd al-Rahman Ahmad 'Uthman, a member of the PFLO who allegedly confessed to throwing a bomb into a police station, had a trial widely published in the now defunct 'Gulf Weekly Mirror'. The British even noted that this was 'no doubt to lend support to the government's line that national security was under threat'.¹²⁵⁵ This pattern continued unabated into the 1990s. For example, Amnesty International noted that official investigations into the killing of 3 policemen received widespread publicity, while the 'government remained silent on the killing of civilians'.¹²⁵⁶ As John Pilger notes, omission can be the most virulent form of censorship, as it can present a simplistic narrative in which the villains and the heroes can be controlled by the state. Unsurprisingly the government have always been keen not to draw any attention to torture or wrong-doing. Even the British noted, that after the death of Jamal 'Ali, the papers carried a disingenuous statement about his death, attributing it to kidney failure.¹²⁵⁷ Thirty years on, the government blamed kidney failure on the death of someone who the BICI noted died of torture.¹²⁵⁸

The rise of media outlets, both national and regional, has prompted a need for tactics that aim to utilise media to the regime's advantage. In the 1990s, state newspapers frequently published images of suspects along with accounts to them having confessed. *Al-Ayam* was singled out on a number of occasions by Amnesty International for publishing the names and personal details of those accused in various cases. Amnesty note that 'articles along similar lines were published regularly in Bahrain's newspapers for several months'.¹²⁵⁹ AI added that such statements 'undermined the defendants' right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty before a

1255E.H. Noble, Bahrain Internal, 26 August 1975, FCO 8/2415, TNA.

1256 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

1257C.E.J. Wilton, Bahrain Internal, 14 May 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.

1258 *Gulf Daily News*, 'Ministry denies death rumours', FCO8/3489, TNA.

1259 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

court of law, guaranteed by Article 20(c) of Bahrain's Constitution and Article 14(2) of the ICCPR, thereby prejudicing any chance they may have had of receiving a fair trial.¹²⁶⁰ In 1996, Kathy Evans of the *Guardian* reported how the state 'paraded' a 'string of bearded young men with dead staring eyes' on television, all of them confessing to their role in an alleged Iranian-backed plot to overthrow the government. This trial by media occurred again in 2008¹²⁶¹ and 2010, and the BCHR and the FIDH accused the state-controlled media of publishing images of those connected to a terror threat, including lawyers defending the suspects.¹²⁶²¹²⁶³ Indeed 6 out of the 7 daily newspapers published the images, highlighting the lack of editorial diversity.¹²⁶⁴ Amnesty International described the decision as, 'nothing less than a form of trial by media in which the accused themselves had no means by which to defend themselves or their reputations'.¹²⁶⁵ In one particular egregious example, Bahrain State Television aired the confession of 'Ali Ibrahim Saqer on 28 April 2011, who was accused of killing two policemen. However, he had already been killed in custody on 9 April 2011 as a result of torture.¹²⁶⁶ Despite so-called media reforms, state media still pursued this form of trial by media, and in 2012¹²⁶⁷ and 2013, *Al Watan* published the names and photos of terror suspects – a move that is usually illegal under Bahraini law.¹²⁶⁸

Despite many opposition members branding certain stories as 'fabrications', or *mufabrat*, instances of alleged protester violence have been highly publicised,

1260Ibid.

1261R. Khalifa, '(AP) – Bahrain TV airs terror plot confessions', BCHR, 29 December 2008, <http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/2625>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

1262BCHR, 'ANHRI: Bahrain: Court holds mass hearing for human rights activist', 29 October 2010, <http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node?page=155&nomobile=true>, (accessed 7 October 2015).

1263Human Rights Defenders, 'Violent crackdown continues to target human rights defenders', Press Release, 8 September 2010, <https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-africa-middle-east/bahrain/Violent-crackdown-continues-to>, (accessed 6 October 2015).

1264H. Toumi, 'Bahrain's prosecution defends decision to publish suspects' names and pictures', Habib Toumi, [web blog], 2 September 2010, <http://www.habibtoumi.com/2010/09/02/bahrain-prosecution-defends-decision-to-publish-suspects-names-and-pictures/>, (accessed 8 October 2015).

1265Amnesty International, *Crackdown in Bahrain: Human Rights at the Crossroads*, London, p. 16, http://www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/bahrain_ai_2011_hr_crossroads.pdf, (accessed 2 October 2014).

1266Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, 'A man died in custody confession on television that he had killed two policemen', 28 April 2011, <http://www.byshr.org/?p=396>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1267 POMED, 'One Year Later'.

1268@F-albinali, '@marcowenjones @lawyereemkhalaf its a concern, NHRI raised it as well. My view is that that's it's a grey area. Something for the defense', 21 February 2013, https://twitter.com/f_albinali/status/304556075405955072, (accessed 10 October 2015).

leading to the emergence of a violence frame. An attack on a Pakistani muezzin by a group of protesters was highly publicised by the state media who claimed that his tongue had been cut off. Doubts about the story were strengthened by the BICI report, which claimed his tongue was lacerated, and that those found guilty of the attack were tortured into confessing. Pro government newspapers *Gulf Daily News*¹²⁶⁹ and *Al-Ayam* reported a taxi-driver had been killed by 'terrorists',¹²⁷⁰ while the moderate *Al-Wasat*¹²⁷¹ claimed it was a traffic accident. In other instances, social media commentators, endorsed by the state in the form of recognizing them through the issuing of social media awards, perpetuated news designed to defame notable activists. Lex Birch, who was awarded most 'outstanding resident' by the Information Affairs Authority, claimed that Nabeel Rajab, had ordered people to cut off the fingers of British expatriate Peter Morrissey..¹²⁷² The veracity of government claims has been questioned, not least due to the fact they have been exposed on a number of times with questionable stories. For example, in the 1990s, the government claimed parents beat the corpses of their children to make it look like they had been tortured.¹²⁷³ In 2011, people were accused of making their wounds worse in order to elicit media sympathy. One video was circulated that showed children being made up to look injured, with pro-government supporters claiming it was opposition fabricating wounds. It was discovered that the video was from a Palestinian school putting on a nativity play. At least here, social media provided means by which to highlight the government's fabrications.

In addition to these more overt strategies attempting to associate violence with the opposition, the government have resorted to more subtle rhetorical devices. Chief among these are constant referencing to them not as protesters or activists, but as 'vandals', 'terrorists' and 'hooligans' beholden to outside powers. Although there are groups in the February 14th Movement to have used violence, the initial protests in

1269 S.S. Grewal, 'Track down my father's killers', *Gulf Daily News*, 15 June 2011,

<http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=307919>

1270 *Al Ayam*, 'Terrorists brutally and mercilessly stabbed his body with their knives', 29 March 2011,

<http://goo.gl/qmhTWC>

1271 *Al Wasat*, 'Funeral of Rashid Mamri in Riffa Cemetery', 23 March 2011,

<http://www.alwasatnews.com/3120/news/read/533682/1.html>

1272 @LexBirch, '@NABEELRAJAB well you are, and you proved it by sending out your thugs to amputate #UK citizens fingers #Bahrain. We all know the truth now', 10 February 2012, <https://twitter.com/LexBirch/status/167887885960347648>

1273 *The Economist*, 'Whitewash', p. 60.

2011 started as peaceful. Yet, state media, in both English and Arabic, have used a narrative that is designed to conflate fringe violence with the tactics of the entire opposition. This excerpt from a weekly security report by the Ministry of the Interior highlights this rhetorical slight of hand; 'The security report brings you a summary of what happened during the week from rioting, vandalism and law-breaking which SOME [original emphasis] still call it a peaceful protest. And through this week's report once again we will show you by footage what has been labelled as peaceful as an act of terrorism'.¹²⁷⁴ This rhetoric is regurgitated in the state media or by the work of loyalist interest groups writing op-eds, such as 'Citizen for Bahrain'. In an op-ed for the GDN, Citizens of Bahrain stated the following; 'The opposition claims that its methods are peaceful, but its actions say otherwise. When opposition militants, trained and armed by Iran, are going to such efforts to bring armed conflict to Bahrain's shores'...¹²⁷⁵

Generally speaking, there is a homogeneity to hegemonic state and non-state discourses that attempt to skew the narrative around criminality linked with Bahrain's Uprising. These techniques can be summed up in four ways. The rhetoric attempts to;

- 1) Vilify the victims or the people the victim was associated with. I.e. Say they were engaged in nefarious activities or doing something illegal/using weapons.
- 2) Denounce any responsibility by indicating that the police acted in self defence.
- 3) Use phrases that imply lack of agency when it comes to killing. I.e. instead of saying the victim was killed, say he died. Similarly, suggest disconnect between incident and death of victim.
- 4) Legitimize police response by mentioning how they adhered to protocol or were doing their duty.

The following excerpt from a MOI statement concerns the death of Husayn al-Jaziri. The numbers used above to mark the rhetorical devices used by the MOI in their attempts to abrogate their responsibility and deligitimise opposition claims of police oppression or malpractice.

*The **most violent (1)** group amassed at around 8am in the village of Daih where 300 rioters assembled to **attack police (1)** deployed in the area, **with rocks, steel rods and Molotov cocktails (1)**. **Warning shots (4)** were*

1274 Bahrain News Agency, 'Bahrain Weekly Security Report 12/07/2012', 12 July 2012, http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/516756#.T_8KWEjw0Z0.twitter, (accessed 2 November 2015).

1275 Citizens for Bahrain, 'Weapons cache proves motives not peaceful', in *Gulf Daily News*, 5 January 2014, <http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=368096>

*fired but failed to disperse the advancing crowd which **continued their attack (1)**. Officers discharged birdshot to **defend themselves (2)** and at least one **rioter was injured (3)** in the process. **A short time later, a young man was pronounced dead at (3) Salmaniya Medical Complex.***

In a similar incident in October 2012, when the police shot and killed 16-year-old Hussam al-Haddad, the MOI issued the following statement.

*The director general of the Muharraq Police dept said that a police patrol was carrying out its duty securing (4) a crowded Al Khalifa Avenue in the middle of Muharraq, when it was subjected to a **terrorist attack (1)** carried out by a large number of **fire bombs (molotovs) (1)**. This was at 9.30 pm yesterday. The **attack endangered the lives of the patrol, civilians, residents and those present, which led to the injury of the patrol, fear among citizens/residents, panic, and damage to public and private property (2)**. The police dealt with matters in accordance with established **legal procedures (4)** appropriate to such cases and **defended both themselves and citizens (2 and 4)**. This resulted in the **injury (3)** of one of the persons taking part in this **terrorist activity (1)**, who was immediately taken to hospital where he died. To confirm, this was **both a terrorist act and attempted murder (1 and 2)**, intended to take the lives of those policemen on patrol whilst also subjecting citizens and residents to danger. Director general says he had informed the public prosecution of the incident.*

The MOI also choose to frame the deaths of policemen, or what it calls ‘duty martyrs’. The headline about the death of policeman Muhammad Asif reads as follows, ‘*Police Officer Dies In Unprovoked Attack*’. Contrary to the report about the death of Hussain Al Jaziri, which implied his guilt , and stated that he was participating in the day’s most violent protest (the fact the protest was termed ‘the most’ violent also indicates that the police were under the most duress at this time-further legitimizing their harsh response), the report about Muhammad Asif claims that the attack was unprovoked. So whereas protesters killed by the police are

inevitably done in the name of 'self-defence', police killed at the hands of protesters are done so without provocation. It also states that an investigation was launched to find those who were 'responsible'. When protesters die at the hands of the police an investigation is sometimes launched, though it rarely mentions that the purpose is to find out who is 'responsible'. In the BICI follow-up report, 18 instances of police violence are framed as responses to dealing with a 'riot'.¹²⁷⁶ The term riot obviously implies an orderless, dangerous situation, as opposed to peaceful political expression.

While it is unsurprising that the MOI use these rhetorical devices to demonise protesters and absolve themselves of responsibility, such statements are often the basis of the police's defence argument should they actually end up in court. This is especially disturbing when the media are prevented from bearing witness to such incidents. Indeed, journalist Mazen Mahdi and a number of other reporters were arrested and detained for covering protests (though they weren't given an actual reason for their arrest). By removing witnesses from the scenes of such incidents the MOI are able to exploit an information vacuum, one in which their testimony will lack credible contradiction. This is especially true in a court run by a non independent judiciary dominated by members of the Ruling Family, who also run the Ministry of the Interior. In addition to using rhetoric that demonizes protesters, the MOI often use the term 'to become a martyr' when referring to police casualties. They do not do this with civilians, which suggests they are attempting to appropriate the category of 'legitimate victim', adding a sense of religious sanctity to the action of the security services. This rhetoric is also present in official documentation. In the November 2012 follow up to the BICI report, in which the government are meant to be demonstrating their implementation of the reforms, a detailed list of deaths of protesters during confrontations with the police is included.

The state media have also attempted to fabricate the idea that respectable International Organizations are of the opinion that the Bahrain government are countering a violent threat by putting falsified quotes or stories in national papers. For example, the Bahrain News Agency put out a news release claiming that Eileen Donahoe, the US ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council, had 'expressed her dismay at violent demonstrations and burning of tires' by Bahrain's opposition.¹²⁷⁷

¹²⁷⁶ BICI Follow-Up Report, November 2012

¹²⁷⁷ Bahrain Watch, 'UN Ambassador to UN Human Rights Council', September 2014,

When informed, Donahoe's office denied the story. In another example, the Bahrain News Agency claimed that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon had hailed Bahrain's efforts to 'preserve its security and stability hailing the reform process spearheaded by His Majesty King Hamad bin 'Isa Al Khalifa'.¹²⁷⁸ In actual fact, Ban Ki Moon voiced concern about state violence towards protesters. In another case, chairman of the BICI commission, Cherif Bassiouni, was forced to claim his opinions were deliberately represented by pro-government newspaper *Al-Ayam*.¹²⁷⁹ Amnesty International too had to issue a rejoinder after *Akhbar Al-Khaleej (The Gulf News)* claimed that they had issued a statement condemning opposition for using children as human shields at protests.¹²⁸⁰ Other people or international organizations to have been misrepresented or misquoted by Bahrain's government controlled media include; Member of European Parliament Marietje Schaake, Former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton, CNN, and International Federation for Human Rights President.¹²⁸¹¹²⁸²

The Iran Myth, Sectarianism, and Existential Threat Myth

The importance of creating or exaggerating an existential threat to provoke the real possibility of violence or death is the very essence of securitization. Securing and protecting citizens from a threat gives the state 'legitimacy to undertake extreme measures to protect itself and keep the larger citizenry secure'.¹²⁸³ The government, via the media, have long exaggerated links to outside groups in order to achieve this securitization, and frame dissent as the influence of ill-intentioned outsiders. Prior to the emergence of the IFLB, the link between Bahrain's leftist movement and external

¹²⁷⁸<https://bahrainwatch.org/media/#!donahoe>, (accessed 2 November 2015).
Bahrain Watch, 'Secretary General of the United Nations', *Fabrigate*, September 2014,
<https://bahrainwatch.org/media/#!bankimoon>
¹²⁷⁹*Fabrigate*, 'Chairman of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry', Bahrain Watch,
<https://bahrainwatch.org/media/#!cherif>
¹²⁸⁰*Fabrigate*, 'Amnesty International', <https://bahrainwatch.org/media/#!amnestyintl>
¹²⁸¹ *Fabrigate*, <https://bahrainwatch.org/media/>
¹²⁸²These are but a few, other known cases include; Souhayr Behlassen, Reuters News Agency, Author and Broadcaster Joseph Braude, Former UK Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt, British MP Conor Burns, Tunisian Minister of Culture Mehdi Mabrouk, Tunisia's Al Nahda Party, Former UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, International Federation of Journalists, and UK Under Secretary of State and Lords. See *Fabrigate*, Bahrain Watch, <https://bahrainwatch.org/media/>

¹²⁸³ L. A. Fernandez, p. 161.

sponsors was deliberately exaggerated by the Bahrain government. Even the British noted that 'the extent to which the People's Bloc and ULO were taking their orders from outside Bahrain has been deliberately exaggerated by the Government'.¹²⁸⁴ Yet since the Iran-Iraq war, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has been the bogeyman, and following the Prime Minister's crackdown on the Shi'a, the government, through the media have tried to paint the opposition as a fifth column, determined to impose a Shi'a theocratic state in Bahrain. The Bahraini regime has harshly suppressed Shi'a groups and played the sectarian card to portray the Shi'a as an Iranian 'fifth column', resulting in dividing Sunnis from Shi'a.¹²⁸⁵

This demonisation of the Shi'a was particularly acute after the alleged coup attempt of 1981, which was widely reported. Any attempt to besmirch Iran was taken. For example, reports on Iranian subversion in Yemen were given 'pride of place in the local press'.¹²⁸⁶ The Prime Minister reiterated his anti-Shi'a suspicions in 2012 in an interview with Der Spiegel, where he said, contrary to the BICI report which had found no Iranian involvement in Bahrain's unrest, that protesters wanted to turn Bahrain into a 'second Iran'.¹²⁸⁷ In the 1990s, 'statements were made on a number of other occasions by government officials, linking the mass protests and acts involving violence in Bahrain to the activities of an unauthorized organization supported by hostile foreign powers'.¹²⁸⁸ This was done deliberately to detract from the fact that the Intifada was 'neither exclusively Shia nor hardline Islamist'.¹²⁸⁹ Indeed, 'the committee that drafted the petition for democracy and basic rights includes Sunni religious leaders and a Sunni feminist professor'.¹²⁹⁰ In 1995, the Minister of the Interior stated that behind incidents of sectarian strife and sabotage, 'lies an extremist religious organization with illegitimate goals and aims linked with a political organization abroad and supported by a foreign country'.¹²⁹¹ (Foreign country here

1284 R.M.Tesh, Bahrain's First Parliament.

1285 M. Ma'oz, 'The "Shi'i Crescent": Myth and Reality', The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, no. 15, November 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2007/11/middle-east-maoz/11_middle_east_maoz.pdf, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1286 S. P. Collis, 16 January 1982, FCO 8/4332

1287 Spiegel Online, 'Interview with Bahrain's Prime Minister: The Opposition "are Terroziing the Rest of This Country"', 27 April 2012, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-bahraini-prime-minister-prince-khalifa-bin-salman-al-khalifa-a-830045.html>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1288 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

1289 The Economist, 'Gazing Backward'.

1290 Ibid.

1291 Amnesty International, *Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis*.

always means Iran).

In addition to Iran, this threat has been extended to other Shi'a organizations such as Hezbollah, for example, on '1 May 1995, the State Security Court sentenced Hussain 'Ali al-Tattan to 10 years' imprisonment, Salman 'Abd Allah al-Nashaba to five years' imprisonment, and eight other defendants to three years' imprisonment',¹²⁹² for being members of *Hezbollah* in Bahrain. Officials also publicised that Shaykh 'Isa Qassim, based in Qom in the 1990s, guided Hezbollah in Bahrain, and that the 250-strong network was only a small part of a labyrinthine network connected to Iran.¹²⁹³ Similarly, TV coverage was given to a group of Shi'a youth who said they were trained in Lebanon and called the Bahrain Hezbollah.¹²⁹⁴ In 2014, Bahrain's foreign minister Shaykh Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa said Hezbollah was behind an explosion that killed a Jordanian officer working in Bahrain,¹²⁹⁵ although given the government's attempts to forge an Iranian link, the veracity of these claims is disputed. In 2013, Erin Kilbride, an American teacher living in Bahrain, was deported for allegedly inciting hatred against the government and ruling family. The BNA published an image of her room, replete with a Hezbollah flag hanging on the wall.¹²⁹⁶ Two days after the second anniversary of the 14th February uprising, the Ministry of the Interior announced that they had arrested eight men who were part of a terror cell with links to Iran, Lebanon and Iraq.

During the uprising, there was a string of false stories claiming boats from Iran, heading to Bahrain, had been intercepted. A Kuwaiti news portal claimed Qatari authorities had intercepted an Iranian boat smuggling weapons to Bahrain.¹²⁹⁷ (Qatar later denied the story.)¹²⁹⁸ On 21 March 2011, soon after the Uprising began, King Hamad announced that a foreign plot had been foiled with the aid of Saudi troops. A week later a Kuwaiti news site said that Qatari authorities had intercepted two Iranian

1292Ibid.

1293K. Evans, 'Bahrain plot "is led from Qom"', *The Guardian*, 12 June 1996.

1294L. Bahry, May 1997.

1295 Reuters, 'Policeman killed in "terrorist" attack in Bahrain: interior ministry', 8 December 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/08/us-bahrain-security-policeman-idUSKBN0JM25320141208>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1296Bahrain News Agency, 'Teacher with Links to Extremists Deported for Social Media Activities and Violation of Labor Laws', 10 August 2013, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/574672>, (accessed 2 November 2015).

1297H. Toumi, 'Qatar denies seizing Iran boat loaded with weapons', *Gulf News*, 23 January 2013, <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-denies-seizing-iran-boat-loaded-with-weapons-1.1136351>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1298Ibid.

ships carrying weapons to Bahrain, a story that Qatar again denied.¹²⁹⁹ On 12 November 2011, a few weeks before the release of the BICI report, the government reported that they had discovered another terror cell with links to Iran.¹³⁰⁰ A similar report was released strategically the day before the National Assembly was dissolved in August 1975. About 30 people were arrested from the National Liberation Front and the People's Front. Soon after, the weekly paper *al-Mawaqif* (Points of View) published an article claiming that a ship loaded with arms was intercepted as it headed towards Bahrain. Many of those arrested also had 'pamphlets ready for distribution'. The only difference about today's 'plotters' is that they are Shi'a rather than left-wing.¹³⁰¹

As well as these suspicious news stories, officials such as Sameera Rajab, the Minister of State of Information, propagate bizarre myths, some of which beggar belief.¹³⁰² These include mentioning that there were tunnels¹³⁰³ to Iran dug under the Pearl Roundabout, or that an Iranian drone had been found off the coast of Bahrain.¹³⁰⁴ In another instance, Sameera Rajab claimed protesters were carrying Bahraini flags with twelve points, reflecting their commitment to twelver¹³⁰⁶ Shi'a Islam, the dominant strand in Iran. Sameera Rajab even went on Al Jazeera holding a photo of a flag as evidence, even though the flag in the photograph she was holding did not have twelve points. The conspiracy reached such a pitch that the Arabic translation of the BICI report contained mention of the 12-point-flag, implying high level and influential forces were inserting anti-Iranian propaganda in an official document, and

1299 J. Bladd, 'Qatar denies seizing Iran ships carrying weapons', *Arabian Business*, 28 March 2011, www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-denies-seizing-iran-ships-carrying-weapons-390435.html, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1300M. Singh, 'Terror Plot Foiled', *Gulf Daily News*, 13 November 2011, <http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=317594>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1301A. Khalaf, 'A ship loaded with arms and explosives', Al-Waqt, <http://bahrainonline.org/showthread.php?t=224765>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1302Lies of Samira bin Rajab, [online video],

1303@busalmani, 'نفق في الدوار يودي على ايران و نفق في عذاري يودي العكر حشى اللي عندكم ارانب مو بشر كله تحت', *Bahrain* 23 October 2012, <https://twitter.com/busalmani/status/260673433485062145> (accessed 10 October 2015).

1304Fajr al-Bahrain, 'competition...enter and put in your information', [web forum] <https://www.fajrbh.com/vb/threads/24682/>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1305Al Wasat, 'Iran deny sending unmanned aerial spy drone above Bahrain', 23 May 2013, <http://www.alwasatnews.com/3911/news/read/774772/1.html>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1306Twelver Shi'a Islam is the largest branch of Shi'a Islam. The name reflects that its adherents believe in twelve divinely ordained leaders, known as the Twelve Imams.

casting doubts about the integrity of the report.¹³⁰⁷ (Soon afterwards, the Arabic translation of the report was withdrawn). The government also announced in 2013 that the February 14th Youth Coalition were backed by Hadi Al Mudarrasi, an exiled Iraqi Cleric who had lived in Bahrain, and who was now living in Iran. Al Mudarrasi had been accused of attempting to stir up unrest in Bahrain during the 1980s.¹³⁰⁸ Other sensationalised reports include articles focusing on emotive topics like the role of women and children, claiming that they were being used as human shields in the villages. Faisal Fulad, of the Government run Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society stated to the press that 'Iran-backed extremists are using children as human shields'.¹³⁰⁹ In a video alleging to show a police raid on a Bahrain bomb-making lab, a one thousand Iran Toman note was placed strategically on the table.¹³¹⁰

1307N. Toorani, 'Arabic Report of BICI Withdrawn', *Gulf Daily News*, 30 November 2011, <http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=318698>, (accessed 2 November 2014).

1308 'Bahrain: Report on the carrying out of terrorism and the identity of the February 14 Movement', [online video], 12 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=D_WBKYBXIY0 (accessed 10 October 2015). Translated from Arabic by the author.

1309S.S. Grewal, 'Children used as "human shields"' *Gulf Daily News*, 7 June 2013, <http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=354827>

1310 'Bahrain Propaganda Machine is Turned up to Eleven', Marc Owen Jones, [web blog], 13 July 2012, <https://marcowenjones.wordpress.com/tag/timoney/>, (accessed 5 November 2015).



Illustration 1: The figure holding the snakes wears a t-shirt with 'Bahrain' written on it. The caption on the right says 'Conflict with the Persian snakes', from @AAK_News Instagram account, 6 November 2015,. https://www.instagram.com/p/9vSLy0JTzj/?taken-by=aak_news, (accessed 8 November 2015).

The fetishization of the Shi'a and Iranian threat, and the rise of sectarianism through media channels, argues Al Naqeeb, is a particular feature of tribal monarchies, that became more apparent both after the demise of Arab nationalism, to which they had all been hostile. Al Naqeeb adds that this 'tribal consciousness' is becoming more embedded, and facilitated with rise of new media outputs. Khuri concurs that the regime exploit the polarities inherent in political unions,¹³¹¹ and this is most easy along sectarian lines, which explains the emphasis on focusing efforts at stigmatization on the sectarian threat. Indeed, it is probably this trend, less so than the fact Bahrain's media recently appointed the Sameera Rajab as information minister, who has widely reported as being pro-Saddam Hussein – a figure widely disdained by many Shi'a everywhere.¹³¹² Her anti-Shi'a statements have previously caused much trouble. Yet

1311F. Khuri, p. 242.

1312 D. Murphy, 'After Formula One Scrutiny, Bahrain Hires a Fan of Saddam Hussein to Improve its Image', The Christian Science Monitor, 25 April 2012, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Backchannels/2012/0425/After-Formula-One-scrutiny-Bahrain-hires-a-fan-of-Saddam-Hussein-to-improve-its-image>, (accessed 5 November).

these 'pathological symptoms'¹³¹³ of mostly Sunni tribal exclusivity have long tentacles, and present a business opportunity. The buttressing of such existing sectarian sensibilities with negative media framing has contributed to Bahrain Sunnis adopting a government line in which they 'reject the position taken by Sunni liberals that democratization would integrate the Shi'ah'. Instead, conservative Sunnis are portraying 'democracy as a vehicle for the Shi'ah to seize power in Bahrain'.¹³¹⁴ As the regime rely more on a policy of divide and conquer, that creates a small but ideologically extreme core of support, inevitably repressive policy seeks to become more draconian. Strengthened by the support of these Sunni conservatives, 'the regime imposed considerable restrictions and harsh discrimination on Shi'i political representation, employment, education and, for the first time in Bahrain, Shi'i religious worship'.¹³¹⁵ To this end, state media frequently attempts to dehumanise the Shi'a by referring to them as subhuman, such as spiders or snakes.




Illustration 2: The caption reads 'A Persian Dream'. Artist: Muharraqi. Sourced from @AAK_News Instagram Account, 8 November 2015, <https://www.instagram.com/p/90OGq4JT2u/>, (accessed 8 November 2015).

1313 K.H. Al Naqeeb, p. 127.

1314M. Ma'oz, 2007.

1315M. Ma'oz, 2007.

Indeed, despite democratisation, state-controlled media is still an avenue for government repression. Reforms to the media post-2011 have done little to change this. The creation of the Higher Media Board (HMB) is nothing more than a reorganization of the censorship apparatus, with control of appointment in the hands of the Al Khalifa. It consists of seven members, 'four of whom will be directly appointed by the King, and one each appointed by the Prime Minister, President of the Shura Council, and the President of the Council of Minister'.¹³¹⁶ Thus, recommendations from the BICI to create a media body that promotes opposition representation and tempers incitement to violence or hatred through the media have not been implemented

Western PR Companies

To market the exogenous Iranian threat myth to the international community, Bahrain turned to the mostly Washington and London-based PR companies, marking a broadening of the repressive reach of the Bahrain government. The idea here was simple, legitimise the crackdown to the international community to diminish global support for Bahrain's opposition, or at least allow Bahrain's Western allies to justify any inactivity on their part. Former British military officials and diplomats wrote a number op-eds for various publications. Harold Walker, the British Ambassador to Bahrain between 1979 – 1981, stated in an op-ed for the Conservative Middle East Council¹³¹⁷, that 'the 1979 Islamic revolution' and the impact of Iran has been the single most important factor in fragmenting Bahraini society and injecting religion into opposition politics'.¹³¹⁸ However, in a diplomatic cable written in 1980, Harold Walker stated that, 'Since the Iran/Iraq conflict began, there have, as you know, been virtually no visible signs of support among the Bahraini Shia for the Imam Khomeini'.¹³¹⁹ In addition to Harold Walker suspiciously changing his tune, this PR offensive by PR groups defending the Bahrain government was widespread.

¹³¹⁶POMED, 'One Year Later'.

¹³¹⁷I was asked by the CMEC to write a piece on social media in Bahrain. My critical piece was rejected on the basis it did not fit with the Conservative support for the Bahrain Government

¹³¹⁸H.B. Walker, 'Bahrain after the BICI', *Conservative Middle East Council*, 6 December 2011, <http://cmec.org.uk/blog/bahrain-after-the-bici/>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

¹³¹⁹H.B. Walker, *The Shia in Bahrain*.

The reach of PR was also evident in the pages of the media. In a parliamentary report commissioned to evaluate the UK's relationship with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the Bahrain government's perspective on the events of 2011 were overrepresented. Of the 30 submissions dealing with Bahrain in Part One of the report, 22 were submitted by organizations or individuals either paid directly by the Bahrain government, suspected of doing PR for the government, or British officials deemed to hold establishment views on Britain's Foreign Affairs.¹³²⁰ At least five relatively glowing and separate testimonies were included from members of the Bahrain Society, an organization whose previous chairs include Harold Walker, and Michael Rice, a former PR expert whose company, the Michel Rice Group, was asked to cover the dissolution of Bahrain's parliament in 1975 so that the Bahrain Government could 'present their case abroad'.¹³²¹

The role of British elites in spreading this propaganda was drawn out by investigative work, including the monitoring of Bahrain's tendering contracts and the US Foreign Registration Act. Other British officials, like retired British army officer Graeme Lamb, whose company, G3, were contracted by the IAA in 2011 for £1.5 million, wrote at least 6 op-eds for newspapers, including the *Guardian* and the *Times* of London, all of which tried to put spin deflecting criticism from the Bahrain government.¹³²² The main argument in his article for the *Guardian* article was, 'Of course, Bahrain could and should do better. But Iran is a bigger, and a more immediate problem'.¹³²³ The emergence of these sectarian narratives addresses how 'different political interest groups attempt to control and respond to political dissidence within particular countries',¹³²⁴ and highlights 'how the salience of given narratives varies over time and place'.¹³²⁵ Other PR companies contracted by the Bahrain government created seemingly independent websites and social media

1320M. Jones and J. Horne, FAC Submission Breakdown, Internal Document at Bahrain Watch, 2012, <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1puCoqyyMvPeJy1fWmVuGqIVOOzGcLsLNuwo94ZFH0UM/edit?usp=sharing>

1321E.H. Noble, 26 August 1975.

1322Bahrain Watch, *PR Watch*, G3, <https://bahrainwatch.org/pr/g3.php>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1323G. Lamb, 'Why narrowly cast the push for democracy as the "Arab Spring"?', *The Guardian*, 22 February 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/feb/22/democracy-arab-spring>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1324M. M. Howard and M. R. Walters, 'Explaining the Unexpected: Political Science and the Surprises of 1989 and 2011', vol. 12, no. 2, June 2014, p. 401.

1325Ibid.

accounts to attempt to influence public opinion, by arranging meeting with influential Western government officials.¹³²⁶ In total, the Bahraini government spent about \$32 million between 2010 and 2012 on PR companies.

Fig 10: Summary of frames of how the opposition and government were constructed

Demonising Protesters	Exonerating the Government
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The opposition protesters are wolves in sheep’s clothing who may be calling for democracy, but are actually backed by Iran and want to impose a Shi’a theocracy; • The February 14th Youth Movement in particular are violent radicals • The opposition's values are backward and conservative, and they are sectarian 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Any violence carried out by security forces against protesters is always only in reaction to violence carried out by protesters, labelled as “terrorists” or “vandals“ • The country is not ruled by an autocrat, but by an enlightened monarchy shepherding its subjects towards democracy; • Torture and police abuse is not systematic, but is the result of just a few bad apples rather than the orders of any senior officials • The government has made amends for any mistakes it made last year.

Social Media

The rise of social media has increased the opportunities for the government and pro-government forces to attempt to stigmatize opposition or spread propaganda. This was particular commonly on articles published on online news sites that were critical of the regime; before long, tens of accounts would 'astroturf' the comments section, criticising the author or 'debunking' the criticism. In 2011, myself and another activist discovered that a PR company paid for by the Bahrain government had created a fake journalist persona called Liliane Khalil¹³²⁷¹³²⁸, who wrote an extensive op-ed published on the site of the author Reza Khalil, noting how human rights

¹³²⁶ Bahrain Watch, 'Bahrain Govt Hires 18 Western Companies to Improve Image after Unrest', 23 August 2013, (accessed 10 October 2015).

¹³²⁷This story was broadcast on Al Jazeera and France 24. See M.O. Jones, ‘The hunt for #LilianeKhalil’, Al Jazeera English, 4 August 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=TgCp15kVggl

¹³²⁸Despite her singular mention, the investigation into Liliane Khalil was extensive and painstaking. At the time, with the rise of issues like the 'Gay Girl of Damascus', the issue was very revelatory in determining the dangers of social media and what sources to rely on.

activist Abdulhadi Al Khawaja, and BCHR, were essentially an Iranian-linked clandestine operation. At the time, this was the first real insight into how PR companies were generating patently false stories that sought to emphasise the Iran angle. Authors working for the same outlets have also published pieces criticising vocal human rights activists in an attempt to stigmatise and discredit their views. One site ranked prominent activists and commentators on Bahrain according to their 'troll' level,¹³²⁹ suggesting that HR activists were somehow disingenuous, attention seeking, opportunistic, and fat.¹³³⁰ Erin Kilbride notes that loyalist accounts insult opposition figures by making references to their sexuality or promiscuity 'in order to place opposition leaders on the extreme fringes of Bahraini society and depict their work for civil rights as deviant and foreign to Bahrain'.¹³³¹¹³³²

Social media has also provided opportunities for an ostensibly bottom up form of repression, creating a fertile breeding ground for this alleged evidence of an Iranian-backed plot. Such grass roots conspiracies were appropriated by the government to fit their diplomatic strategy. This was most notably demonstrated by the aforementioned Twelve Point Flag Conspiracy propagated by Sameera Rajab. : The 12 point flag conspiracy started as a video, which was then circulated on YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and other messaging services. It quickly received 18,400 views, and was given an air of credibility when a number of online commentators, including one studying for a PhD in Law at Leeds University, confirmed without evidence that some loyalist students at the University of Bahrain were being bullied into taking down the official Bahraini flag and told to put one up with twelve

1329Bahrainwatch, 'Bahrain: Please don't feed these trolls', [web blog], June 2012, <https://bahrainwatch.wordpress.com/2012/06/08/bahrain-please-dont-feed-these-trolls/> , (accessed 10 October 2015).

1330<http://www.bahrainviews.com/?p=170> [taken down]

1331E. Kilbride, "'Too Gay to Represent Bahrain'": Homophobia and Nationalism in the Wake of a Revolution', *Muftah*, 15 December 2014, <http://muftah.org/homophobia-and-nationalism-in-bahrain/#.VjY7hCsl-ao>

1332Kilbride writes, 'Political opposition leaders have received the same sort of crude, homophobic, and even transphobic attacks. Photoshopped images feature Sheikh 'Ali Salman, leader of Bahrain's largest opposition party, al Wefaq, dressed in drag sporting a pink tutu and sash that reads "Ms. Iran." Others reckon that Salman's Twitter handle, @wefaqGS, stands for "Wefaq Gay Salman" rather than the actual name, "Wefaq General Secretary." The@WatchBahrain cartoon series, which levels vitriol against prominent Bahraini opposition and international rights activists, labels the group "Al Wefag. - E. Kilbride, "'Too Gay to Represent Bahrain'": Homophobia and Nationalism in the Wake of a Revolution', *Muftah*, 15 December 2014, <http://muftah.org/homophobia-and-nationalism-in-bahrain/#.VjY7hCsl-ao>

points.¹³³³ Another Bahraini, a member of the ruling family, and a former professor of international relations, stated on Twitter: 'Do you know what's the story behind the 12 edged flag? Well, all I can say is that majority of Shi'a in #Bahrain are Twelvism Shi'a. Research it'.¹³³⁴ Encouraged by a climate of uncertainty and fear, and legitimised by credible members of the online community and the government, the conspiracy's impact was surprising.

Naturally the 12 point flag controversy highlighted the increase of a sectarian discourse that has long been bubbling under the surface. The extent to which those propagating the discourse were government operated accounts or citizens within and without Bahrain cannot be determined, although an investigation by members of Bahrain Watch, including Bill Marczak, found evidence that suggested that the Bahraini government was operating social media accounts spouting extremist discourse. Bill Marczak notes, 'If the Government did indeed run these accounts, this would raise serious questions about to what extent the Government is inciting its supporters — and the opposition — to violence'.¹³³⁵ One of the most pernicious occurrences was the 7areghum Twitter account, which paved the way for the propagation of sectarian discourse. These tweets, and those from similar accounts, set the tone for the sectarian discourse, which had previously been generally present on YouTube videos of political violence in Bahrain. Derogatory terms like *Majūsi*, *Rawāfid*, *Şafawi*, and *Walad/abna' al-Mut'a*¹³³⁶. Importantly though, it shows how playing the sectarian card, whether the will of a small cabal, or a broader government strategy, creates the potential for violent escalation in pursuit of repressive goals. The opposition were also portrayed as utilising international linkages to undermine the regime. In one instance, a fake Wikileaks cable that appeared to originate on a loyalist

1333 @Kalfadhel, 'Many UOB students were bullied to take off the official Bahraini flag (with 5 points) and replace it with the', 12 March 2011, <https://twitter.com/KAlFadhel/status/46576218627248128>, (accessed 10 January 2015).

1334F. Desmukh, 'Myths and Lies in the Bahrain Infowars', [web blog], 11 April 2011, <http://revolutionbahrain2.blogspot.co.uk/2011/04/myths-and-lies-in-bahrain-infowars.html>,

1335B. Marczak, 'Is Bahrain's government running extremist accounts?', Bahrain Watch blog, 5 August 2013, <https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2013/08/05/is-bahrains-government-running-extremist-accounts/>

1336 *Majūsi*, meaning Zoroastrian, is a derogatory term often used by Sunnis to describe Shi'a.

Rawāfid, meaning rejecter, is often used by Sunnis to mean one who rejects the true Islamic authority and leadership. *şafawi* is another term derogatory term directed Shi'a – it comes from 'Safavid, the Iranian dynasty that made the state religion of Iran Shi'a Islam. *Walad/abna' al mut'a* literally means children of mut'a. *Muta'a* is a type of temporary marriage that some Muslims argue is immoral.

internet forum was used by two state newspapers as the basis of a story accusing the critical Sunni MP Osama Al-Tammimi of supplying the US Ambassador Thomas Krajeski with private parliamentary documents and asking for US citizenship.¹³³⁷



Illustration 3: Cartoon from a blogger and Tweep '@WatchBahrain' whose series of drawings tried to show that Human Rights activists were doing the Iran's bidding

Surveillance

The Growth and Increasing Importance of Surveillance

Khuri notes that the Al Khalifa could name every family in Bahrain, and their history. Yet the seventies represented a time when there was increasing distance between not just the Al Khalifa and the *bahārna*, but also the Al Khalifa and the traditional upper middle class merchants. The necessity of information in keeping the security forces informed of oppositional activities became more acute as opposition developed more sophisticated structures, and also as the process of modernization and reform eviscerated the Al Khalifa's traditional ability to maintain a knowledge of what was

1337 B. Marczak, 'The "Trivially Fake" Wikileaks Cable that fooled Bahrain's Press and Parliament', Bahrain Watch, [web blog], 12 September 2013, <https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2013/09/12/the-trivially-fake-wikileaks-cable-that-fooled-bahrain's-press-and-parliament/>, (accessed 5 October 2015).

going on in Bahrain. While British tactics of surveillance overseas were then brought to Bahrain by Henderson, highlighting how policing experience in the 'colonies' informed practise elsewhere, tactics of infiltration had been used by the ruler since as early as the 1920s. The ruler had 'secret agents'¹³³⁸ - in village communities since, the 1920s (most likely the ruler's 'special proteges among the Baharinah'¹³³⁹ - that S.G. Knox once called 'myrmidons'). In 1965, Bahrain recruited Colonel Henderson, who pioneered methods of infiltrating the Mau Mau during his tenure as head of security in Kenya. By capturing, co-opting, and turning members of opposition groups, Henderson formed 'pseudo-gangs' or 'counter-gangs' who would then infiltrate these networks, professionalising this structure of infiltration. Again, Britain's experience of control strategies garnered in other corners of the empire were brought to bear in Bahrain.

In 1980, Special Branch described how surveillance was foundational for controlling the National Liberation Front, a cell-structured, USSR influenced, Marxist political organization who had formed in 1955: 'in 1968, it was penetrated at all levels by the Bahrain Security Forces, and its organised structure was destroyed'.¹³⁴⁰ At the time, any former exiles or political dissidents were potential suspects, and closely monitored by the security forces following Henderson's appointment. Robert Tesh wrote in 1973 how those that drifted back from exile were 'closely watched and occasionally detained by the Security Forces'.¹³⁴¹ In the run up to the election for National Assembly, Special Branch were even 'keeping track' of the activities of 'would-be members',¹³⁴² highlighting the government's paranoia about the democratic turn. In 1975, the British noted that 'a million pounds is being allocated to setting up student officers in foreign universities presumably to try to control their political activities'.¹³⁴³

Even after the British began losing their influence in matters of security policy, the role of the British in maintaining the efficacy of the intelligence apparatus was frequently mentioned as a necessity in preserving stability in Bahrain. The 'efficient and loyal Special Branch are run by Britons, because no Bahraini could do it. These

1338C.K. Daly, 30 September 1923, *RoB*, vol. 4, p. 136.

1339S.G. Knox, 'Report on Bahrain Reforms', p. 779.

1340 Bahrain Special Branch, 'The Bahrain National Liberation Front (NLF)', FCO8/3489, TNA.

1341 R.M. Tesh, 'Bahrain: Annual review for 1973

1342RM Tesh, 'Bahrain Internal', 18 November 1973, FCO 8/1975, TNA.

1343RM Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 1 March 1975.

are now coming under attack (not, as yet, seriously) . They have at last been given the protection of Bahraini Minister of the Interior'..¹³⁴⁴Indeed, the British were very keen to maintain control of Special Branch, as they feared that 'Bahraini control of Special Branch could provoke civil unrest'.¹³⁴⁵The British, for their own part then, saw an efficient, British-run Special Branch as a bulwark between the local population and the ruling core. The absence of the British, they argued, would be disastrous for Bahrain. Yet while it is fashionable to criticise Henderson's role, and argue that he was foundational to security in Bahrain, the reality is that while important to Bahrain's security, his apparatus was subservient to the Al Khalifa core and his control over Special Branch was limited by external interference.

Surveillance policy changed following the assassination of Al-Madani in 1976, and leftists in particular,¹³⁴⁶ who had been closely observed without being interrogated, were now hauled in for often brutal interrogation. This was accompanied by a shift in political control of the security apparatus. With the side-lining of Henderson and Bell, and the ascendancy of the Prime Minister, the Shi'a were particular targets, especially in the early 80s; 'The security forces took some precautionary steps to emphasise their close surveillance of Shi'a meetings and these appear to have had the desired effect'.¹³⁴⁷ In addition to this, 'The Shi'a clergy were also closely monitored', by the security services,¹³⁴⁸ especially during Ashura. In addition to being closely monitored, muezzins were rewarded with a 50% pay rise as 'trouble blew itself out' in 1979¹³⁴⁹, the implication being that they were being rewarded for remaining politically on message. Although some attributed the efficiency of the surveillance apparatus to uncovering the coup in 1981, a British note scribbled on a document mentioned that Hamad had told the Jordanians that the coup had been discovered 'by chance', highlighting an element of confusion as to the true nature of what actually happened.¹³⁵⁰ Following the coup attempt, the efficiency of Bahrain's security forces was bolstered by Saudi and UAE money, extending

1344 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual review for 1973

1345 P.F.M. Wogan, Iran and the Gulf.

1346 E. F. Given, Prospects for Bahrain.

1347 R.M. Tomkys, Bahrain Internal, 30 October 1982, FCO 8/4332.

1348 S.M.J. Lamport, 'Bahrain Security, 8 March 1982.

1349 H.B. Walker, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1979

1350 H.D.A.C. Miers, Attempted coup in Bahrain.

Bahrain's capabilities beyond what would be expected for such a small state.¹³⁵¹

The regime's distrust of the Shi'a evolved into embedding even more repressive structures, and any sign of unrest prompted a deepening of the process of administrative surveillance. In 1996, in the midst of the unrest, the government divided the country into four *muhafidhahs* (provinces), each with a governor directly responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. Accordingly, one of the duties was to maintain public order and security, and each governor could appoint an unlimited number of *mukhtars* responsible to him. As Bahry notes, the 'multitude of local mukhtars gives the government intensified security control over villages as well as urban areas'.¹³⁵² On the defensive by the unrest, the government made administrative reforms that further increased their power over Shi'a religious elements. This mainly took the form of exercising further control over the Shi'a clerical establishment. While the ministry of justice already 'nominates the imams in the Sunni mosques, pays their salaries, and promotes or fires them',¹³⁵³ the Shi'a, on the other hand, had been outside the reach of the government, yet the new decree would mean that all clerical appointments would be overseen by the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs, who would screen Shi'a nominations for clerical positions, as well as deciding on expenditure for Shi'a mosques and matams.¹³⁵⁴ The decree also allowed the government to direct scholarships towards students, allowing them to control where they received their theology education, potentially steering them away from unfriendly countries like Iran. This continued the historical trend of masking regime strengthening as progressive reform.

Despite the political reforms of 2001, this surveillance network of informants has continued to the current day, yet it is the Shi'a villages that are still scrutinized. In a meeting with the former US Ambassador, 'Jawad scoffed at the government's distrust of Shi'a in the security forces, claiming that the police have hired numerous Shi'a to work undercover in the villages, and these Shi'a have always worked loyally for the government'.¹³⁵⁵¹³⁵⁶ In 2010, the BCHR told Human Rights Watch that there

1351 S. P. Collis, 16 January 1982.

1352L. Bahry, 1997.

1353Ibid.

1354Ibid.

1355W.T. Monroe, 'Prominent Shias Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia Outlook in Bahrain'.

1356It is worth noting that the Al Khalifa have long relied on co-opted *bahārna* to assist their domination. In 1923 Daly talks of how *bahārna* Waziers were appointed to sublet Al Khalifa plots

were 'no Bahraini Shi'a in the ranks of the Special Security Forces, and that the only Bahraini Shi'a working for the NSA are a small number of informants and persons holding low-level positions'.¹³⁵⁷ In 2012, Jane Kinninmont wrote that this apparatus is often coerced into place, and that Shi'a 'refusing to act as informants were beaten, slashed with box-cutters, burned with cigarette lighters, or threatened with sexual assault'.¹³⁵⁸ While this network of informants or 'pseudo-gangs' remains from Henderson's days, there is evidence to suggest that the initial idea that such groups would serve to mitigate against employing more coercive forms of repression, implying that the methods of coercing people into becoming informants have changed since pseudo-gangs were implemented. In 2011 foreign expertise was brought in to increase the effectiveness of surveillance, and CCTV cameras were installed around the country, but particularly outside Shi'a villages. This policy reflected the advisory influence of the British John Yates. For Yates, 'CCTV is everywhere [and is] utterly fantastic'.¹³⁵⁹ Police units dispatched to protests and other incidents often have a cameraman present recording protesters. As Horne notes, 'this is reminiscent of British Forward Intelligence Teams, used to help police identify and monitor protesters, whose details are then stored on a database'.¹³⁶⁰ So while intelligence does not seem to be replacing coercion, but merely augmenting it, the tactics have become more commonplace, highlighting a deepening of the surveillance apparatus through the creation of multiple levels of observation.

Bahrain's security forces have long used surveillance to monitor students studying abroad. In 1977, the British noted that 'students abroad continue to furnish a reservoir of dissidents', but they also mentioned that Bahrain's student organisations were "fairly well penetrated by the security forces".¹³⁶¹ This trend of targeting students continued in the 1990s: 'Bahraini students studying abroad, and relatives of political opposition activists or suspects are often subject to arrest and detention on their return

of land and to extort the *baḥārna* farmers. See 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [158r] (320/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in *Qatar Digital Library* <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x000079> [accessed 4 November 2015]

1357 Human Rights Watch, *Torture Redux*.

1358 J. Kinninmont, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse, p. 12.

1359 J. Horne, 'Policing Bahrain: the long arm of the British', *Open Democracy*, 8 August 2013, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/john-horne-john-lubbock/policing-bahrain-long-arm-of-british> (accessed 10 October 2015).

1360 *Ibid.*

1361 E.F. Given, Bahrain Round Up, 20 June 1977, FCO 8/2872, TNA.

to Bahrain'.¹³⁶² As Amnesty note, 'Many have been subjected to torture or threats in order to force them to cooperate with the authorities, reporting back on the activities and friends of particular individuals. Detainees are apparently left in no doubt that if they fail to comply, they may be held indefinitely'.¹³⁶³ In the 2011 uprising, Bahraini students studying in Britain complained of harassment by the Bahraini authorities. In 2011, at least nine students in Britain said that their £850 subsistent grants and tuition fees had been axed. One student noted how the Bahraini Ministry of Education informed his father that they had video footage of his son attending a rally in the UK. They asked the father to order the son home.¹³⁶⁴ The reach of this fear of surveillance is also compounded by Britain's historic support of the Al Khalifa regime. Jaafar Al Hasabi notes that the threat of surveillance was extended as far as London, after two activists were attacked on their way home.¹³⁶⁵ He noted that activists in London did not feel safe anymore, because of spying, and other means. He believed that Britain's relationship with Bahrain meant that anything said here could be relayed back to Bahrain, and that the behind the scenes relationship between Bahrain and Britain were such that activists felt threatened. He noted considerable behavioural changes, including how he would often be careful on the telephone, and only speak to people via face-to-face to interaction, undermining the democratic potential of technology. The combination of actual surveillance, the threat of surveillance as Marx notes, and the visible grisly consequences of engaging in dissent, all combined to create a climate of fear that lessened, for some people, their will to engage in contentious activity, whether in the UK or Bahrain.¹³⁶⁶

Government Spying

New technologies, while providing opportunities for resistance, have been targeted by the government in an attempt to undermine tactics of anonymity used by activists. Bahrain Watch revealed that at least eleven activists were put in jail in 2012-2013 for

1362Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, p. 6.

1363Amnesty International, *Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights*, p. 9.

1364R. Booth and J. Sheffer, 'Bahrain regime accused of harassing UK-based students', *The Guardian*, 15 April 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/15/bahrain-regime-uk-students>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

1365J. Al Hasabi, 'Privacy Extra: Jaafar Al Hasabi and Marc Owen Jones Discuss Bahrain and Surveillance', [online video], 19 Marc 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ViK48BX24U> (accessed 20 October 2015).

1366 Ibid.

referring to King Hamad as a 'dictator' (*tāghiyya*) or a 'fallen one' (*saqit*) in Arabic.¹³⁶⁷ Their details were obtained by using the internet, and it was often social media that was used as the medium of delivery. These attacks, most likely carried out by Minister of Interior's Cyber Crime Unit, were fairly crude, and sought to identify the poster's IP address, which are assigned every time they use the internet via a local provider (e.g. Batelec, Zain, Menatelecom). Because 'Bahraini law requires that every time an IP address is assigned, the internet service provider must record the name of the subscriber of the internet connection, as well as the date and time',¹³⁶⁸ IP addresses offer a wealth of information about the target. This information but be kept for at least one year, and the 'security forces must be able to directly access this information at any time'.¹³⁶⁹ As a result, targets would be compromised if they clicked on malicious links generated from freely available online services sent out by government operated Twitter and Facebook accounts. Malicious links were also sent out through 'e-mail, and likely via other services including YouTube, InstaMessage, and mobile messaging services including BlackBerry Messenger and WhatsApp'.¹³⁷⁰ Some activists were sent malicious links from opposition or activist accounts that appear to have been hacked by government agents.¹³⁷¹ The government used 'IP spying' on 'journalists, labour unions, human rights groups, activists, licensed opposition groups... whistleblowers, Sunni groups, vigilantes, and even residents opposed to the seizure of their homes to build a government housing project'.¹³⁷²

The growing relevance of European-made surveillance technology was highlighted when it was revealed that the Ministry of the Interior was using FinSpy, malware developed by UK-Based Gamma International, to spy on opposition members. Finspy can, without the user knowing 'take remote control of a computer, copy its files, activate the microphone, take screenshots, intercept Skype calls, and log every keystroke'.¹³⁷³ Other people perceived as political dissidents were infected

¹³⁶⁷Bahrain Watch, *The IP spy files: How Bahrain's government silences anonymous online dissent*, August 2013, <https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/ip-spy-files.pdf>. (accessed 30 December 2014).

¹³⁶⁸Ibid.

¹³⁶⁹Ibid.

¹³⁷⁰Ibid.

¹³⁷¹Ibid.

¹³⁷²Ibid.

¹³⁷³M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance and cyberpolitics in the Bahrain Uprising', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*, London, Zed

after opening malicious files disguised as banal email attachments, including Ibrahim Sharif, the Sunni head of the country's liberal Wa'ad party, Muhammad al-Tajir, a prominent human rights lawyer, Hadi al-Musawi, head of Al Wefaq's Human Rights Department, and Hasan Mushayma', an incarcerated opposition leader adopted by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience.¹³⁷⁴ A number of activists were targeted when FinSpy was attached to an email that appeared to come from Al Jazeera journalist Melissa Chan.¹³⁷⁵ Some of Bahrain's most prominent lawyers, activists, and politicians, were targeted by Finspy. Sai'd Shehabi 'as also among three Bahraini exiles granted asylum in the UK to have their computers targeted, illustrating how Bahrain's repressive reach extends well beyond its borders. Others residing in Belgium and Germany were also targeted.¹³⁷⁶ Vulnerabilities were also exploited in the social media app Zello, which allows people to use their phones like walkie talkies: Fifteen activists were arrested after being lured to a meeting arranged by the police who had posted the message through the account of a compromised member. The police then posted messages via the app saying that they would come and get the activists, 'one by one'.¹³⁷⁷ In an Q and A at a presentation on Bahrain at LSE in 2011, one Bahraini activist claimed that those who were arrested were asked for their Facebook or Twitter login details, and threatened when they did not comply. Indeed, while it is important to note the liberalising or democratising potential of new technologies, the Bahrain authorities have been successful in utilising it as a counter-revolutionary and repressive measure. Other British companies such as Olton, also contracted by the Bahraini Government, have advertised their products as being able to use social media to target ringleaders and thus stave off unrest.¹³⁷⁸ In an interview,

Books Ltd, 2015, p. 247.

1374F. Desmukh, 'Bahrain Government Hacked Lawyers and Activists with UK Spyware', *Bahrain Watch*, [web blog], 7 August 2014, <https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2014/08/07/uk-spyware-used-to-hack-bahrain-lawyers-activists/>, (accessed 31 Decembr 2014).

1375W. Marczak and M. Marquis-Boire, 'From Bahrain With Love: FinFisher's Spy Kit Exposed?', Citizenlab, 25 July 2012, <https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/from-bahrain-with-love-finfishers-spy-kit-exposed/>, (accessed 31 December 2014).

1376European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 'Gamma/FinFisher: No investigation into German-British software company', 12 December 2014, <http://www.ecchr.de/surveillance-technology/articles/human-rights-organisations-file-oecd-complaints-against-surveillance-firms-gamma-international-and-trovicor.html>, (accessed 31 December 2014).

1377W. Marczak, 'Bahrain Watch Issues Urgent Advice for Activists to Stop Using @Zello Due to Security Flaw', *Bahrain Watch*, [web blog], 7 September 2014, <https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2014/09/07/bahrain-watch-issues-urgent-advice-for-activists-to-stop-using-zello-due-to-security-flaw/>, (accessed 31 December 2014).

1378M.O. Jones, 'Social Media and Surveillance..'

an ex-employee mentioned that part of their mandate was to dig up publicly available information on oppositional elements as defined by their clients and use it to blackmail them.¹³⁷⁹

Social Media, Rhizomatic Control and Sousveillance

In an age where the relevance of controlling digital networks and information systems is becoming integral to state security, and surveillance more and more embedded into technologies, the Bahrain government and pro-government loyalists have sought to use the internet and technologies to extend their digital surveillance network and the Bahrain government were early adopters of Twitter accounts. Aware that social media poses a challenge to the regime's ability to control its image, the regime issued Social Media Awards in a grand ceremony.¹³⁸⁰ The move was an attempt to confer legitimacy and credibility on certain news sources on Twitter and Facebook, and was preceded by warnings to avoid spurious social media sources and only listen to official governments ones.

Unsurprisingly, one of the winners was the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). While the MOI's account tended to publish news without interacting with other people, this did not stop people from interacting with the MoI. In the first half of 2011 in particular, its pro-regime supporters would often use Twitter to inform the MoI of people, especially others Tweeps, whom they thought were opposition 'traitors'. This example, shows someone reporting the person with the Twitter handle @hussainm89; Dear @moi_bahrain can you please arrest this MOFO Hussain Mirza born 1989, he is a traitor'. In another example, a prominent Tweep at the time encouraged this type of behaviour; 'If u have any names or information about any traitor or terrorist, kindly send it to @moi_bahrain no need to expose his family & children'.¹³⁸¹ The effect this fear of surveillance had was made clear by several informants. One informant stated; 'Be careful Marc. Don't argue a lot. A lot of people from MoI on Twitter. And if you mention the king justice etc, you might be unable to enter the country. Just be careful

1379Interview with former employee, 2014.

1380Bahrain News Agency, 'Shaikh Fawaz Presents Social Media Awards', 8 February 2012, <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/493277>, (accessed 2 November 2015).

1381@adelmaymoon, 'If u have you any names or information about any traitor or terrorist, kindly send it to @moi_bahrain no need to expose his family & children', [Tweet by @adelmaymoon], 1 May 2011, <https://twitter.com/adelmaymoon/status/64784728217223168>, (accessed 10 October 2015).

plz'.¹³⁸² In many instances, especially in 2011 accounts like 7areghum would circulate images of protesters or activists, circle their heads, brand them traitors, and ask for personal information such as name, address, and telephone number. Such a tactic was effective in a small, island community like Bahrain, and soon people mentioned by 7araghum would go into hiding.

In March 2011, some prominent Tweeps were targeted in this way. A photo of 'web terrorists' was circulated on Twitter, it included Manaf al-Muhandis, Mahmud Yusif and Muhammad Masqati.¹³⁸³ After the circulation of the document, these bloggers were subsequently arrested. A year after his release, Manaf al-Muhandis Tweeted, "Today is the anniversary of my detainment. Just because someone posted my picture on Facebook".¹³⁸⁴ Following their release, none of them tweeted anything controversial or political for a considerable time. 'Ali 'Abd al-Imam, a prominent blogger, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for 'spreading false information and trying to subvert the regime'.¹³⁸⁵ However, he escaped the island in 2013 after finding a way to get from Bahrain to Britain. As their account were becoming trusted, the above arrests reduced the amount of credible online activism, prompting much fear among other online activists, who were far more reluctant to tweet anything critical of the regime – at least without using a pseudonym. Some informants stated that their family had pressured them not to use social media such as Twitter for fear of arrest. One informant stated: 'I used to Tweet but then when some of my friends got arrested my father sat me down and gave me a loong [sic] talk, guilting me into deleting all my tweets'. One informant reported that her father, a former influential banker, was messaged by a former colleague to ask if he could do as much as he could to get a traitor removed after he was mentioned by 7areghum.

Accounts like @7areghum demonstrate the potential pitfalls of what Mann calls 'personal sousveillance', that is, the use of technology such as social media to document one's own day-to-day experience. Bahraini activists, sharing their collective joy at reaching the Pearl Roundabout, took images of themselves celebrating. However, such seemingly banal yet defiant and political 'personal sousveillance' can

1382 Exchange with Twitter user during March 2011.

1383 M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance, and social control in the Bahrain Uprising'.

1384 @Redbelt, 'Today is the anniversary of my detainment'.

1385 Global Voices Advocacy, 'Remembering 'Ali Abdulemam', 7 November 2011,

<https://advox.globalvoices.org/2011/11/07/remembering-ali-abdulemam/>, (accessed 7 October 2015).

be re-appropriated by the regime and its supporters and used as part of its own surveillance apparatus.¹³⁸⁶ This is nowhere more evident than in Bahrain, where the increasing polarization of society has resulted in citizens using social media as a tool of peer-to-peer surveillance.

Conclusion

Informational control strategies have deepened intensely over the past fifty years, although the recent uprising has demonstrated that social media in particular can be appropriated by counter-revolutionary forces as a tool of repression, highlighting the importance of non-state actors in repression. Certainly, information control strategies shift according to changing international contexts. Bahrain's Independence, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Iranian Revolution created a situation in which the regime became increasingly suspicious of the country's Shi'a population. Undoubtedly, Bahrain's shift into the orbit of Saudi Arabia contributed to enabling this fear of the Shi'a as a threat. As such, surveillance strategies, propaganda campaigns, and media framing attempts, have led to an increase in anti-Iranian and anti-Shi'a rhetoric. It also seems clear that elite opinion makers are close to the media industry itself, and that the Al Khalifa ruling elite exercise an enormous amount of control over media output, whether through unofficial means such as the Khawalid, or through institutions such as the Supreme Media Council. This raises the alarming question of to what extent elite perceptions of the Shi'a as an underclass are now being indoctrinated into, and perpetuated by, future generations of Bahrainis? Importantly though, information control has increasingly become an operation in which multiple actors outside the state are involved, from cyber vigilantes, to international corporations that include Western PR companies or surveillance specialists. 'Crucial to all this will be the Government's will to insist on retaining the means of knowing what is going on, and controlling subversion – ie an effective security service with good morals'.¹³⁸⁷

1386 Ibid.

1387 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Internal, 18 December 1973.

Conclusion

'Revolution is unlikely to succeed as long as the Kingdom of Saudi remains intact'.¹³⁸⁸

This thesis has sought to explore Bahrain's modern history through the lens of repression in order to better understand 1) what constitutes repression 2) why certain methods are used, and 3) what role Bahrain's external actors have played in constructing the repressive apparatus and influencing methods of repression. Through answering the first part with an expansive definition of repression, organized according to the master categories of *statecraft, personal integrity violations, legal repression, and informational control*, we have been able to garner insights into particular aspects of repressiveness and the reasons for its use, from the growth of repressive law and the rhizomatic growth of social media surveillance, to political strategies designed to provide facade safety valves without power sharing. The thesis has also highlighted the deficiency of broad causal models, indicating that more academic attention needs to be dedicated to how repressiveness is deeply dependent on contextual, temporal, and other factors. These include; the attitude or ideology of elites, the weakness or strength of the coercive apparatus, the availability of resources (whether technical, monetary, or political will), the perception of threat, the nature of the threat, the technologies available and, crucially, the intentions of foreign actors.

Revisionism, historic injustice and repressive cycles

The application of the repression template to Bahrain's history has brought to the surface new facts about Bahrain's history. While these have been detailed throughout, there have been some notable historical trends. In particular, the examination of political trials suggests the regime has routinely imprisoned or executed political criminals with little due process or evidence. This is especially true with regards to those accused of killing al-Madani in 1976, the St. Helena three and the trial of those

¹³⁸⁸W.R. Tomkys, 4 February 1982.

accused of attempting to assassinate Shaykh Hamad in 1926.

This thesis has, in particular, revised historical accounts of the aforementioned assassination attempt of Shaykh Hamad. It seems that Charles Belgrave acted as a true eminence grise, throwing members of the Khawalid family under the bus in order to preserve the utility of 'Abd Allah Al Khalifa, who was actually the prime suspect in the case. To the best of my knowledge, this fact has never been revealed in the substantial scholarship on Bahrain during the first part of the 20th century. Even now, such facts remain remarkably pertinent, as they throw into sharp relief the current tendency to focus on the role of the Khawalid, whose recent rise to power has been described by journalist Charles Levinson as partly the result of wounds that 'festered'¹³⁸⁹ in the decades following the various trials of the 1920s. The close examination of these trials, whether it be that of 'Isa Qambar or those deported to St. Helena, reveal what appear to be systemic attempts to subvert justice undertaken in order to preserve the interests of the status quo. Such new insights provide interesting examples of those fleeting moments in which the motivations for particular repressive choices can be discerned. They also demonstrate the cyclical tendency of certain aspects of repression in Bahrain's modern history.

In many regards, such facts demand further investigation. Certainly for colonial historians, many questions have arisen about the extent of British 'complicity' in the pursuit of Al Khalifa regime maintenance. The idea that the British helped prop up the Al Khalifa regime cannot be in dispute. British officials and citizens were clearly engaged in practises that could have faced legal consequences if it were not for the fact that Bahrain's nominal independence construed upon them some autonomy from what could be generously regarded as the burden of imperial responsibility. Who used to be colonial officers became what were viewed as mercenaries, and the sovereign state system allowed an informal amnesty for those complicit in abuses in states where they were not actually citizens, but employees. Prior to Independence, Britain intervened militarily, politically and economically, straying from what they hoped would be a middle course of pacification and minimal interference. In particular, the British influence in the police has been revealed not simply as a force

1389C. Levinson, A Palace Rift in Persian Gulf Bedevils Key U.S. Navy Base, The Wall Street Journal, 22 February 2013, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324595704578239441790926074>

who tempered the excesses of a brutal local institution in a classic Orientalist exposition, but as one that fundamentally created and shaped an institution the legacy of which is still felt today.

Yet this is far from an anti-colonial polemic. Indeed, despite the crystallisation of Al Khalifa rule through British protection, this study has revealed that the British-led reforms did, for a number of decades, temper the brutal legacy of conquest of the Al Khalifa regime, who had hitherto tyrannised, oppressed, and extorted the indigenous *bahārna* population. Bahrain's independence, and the subsequent decline of British influence, prompted its recolonisation by Saudi Arabia which had an enabling effect on more coercive forms of repression. That, coupled with the Iran-Iraq war and the Iranian Revolution seemed to result in a culture of revenge, whereby the Al Khalifa regime, unrestrained and galvanised by Saudi conservatism, reasserted their previous tribal dominance over the Shi'a. With the Saudis now conducting the type of regional imperial intervention formerly reserved for the British, the latter have undertaken a more surreptitious, neo-colonial form of influence, executed through the sale of weapons, cover ups, political support, and the provision of security expertise.¹³⁹⁰

With regards to foreign actors, this thesis has highlighted how Bahrain's sovereign insecurity has had an impact on repression. Bahrain's relationship with its suzerains, in particular Britain and Saudi Arabia, has had a large impact upon determining the repressive methods and choices in Bahrain; from the micro level, such as Saudi pressuring Bahrain to execute prisoners, to Saudi making political gifts contingent on the abandonment of Bahrain's democracy. This is not to overstate the case of a singular variable, yet Saudi clearly has behaved as an *enabler* in forms of repression designed to be more paternal, violent, coercive, and draconian. On the other hand, the British generally favoured the more thrifty alternative of administrative and constitutional reforms towards the end of the 20th century. Nonetheless, it was British protection of the ruling family in Bahrain that ossified a tribal system that set the foundations for the nature of continued tribal exclusivity and societal discord in Bahrain. Indeed, the various strands, legacies, policies, and

1390 M.O. Jones, 'Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf', Open Democracy, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/marc-owen-jones/bahrain%E2%80%99s-uprising-resistance-and-repression-in-gulf>, (accessed 20 November 2015).

influences of different agencies make determining particular variables problematic, although there does seem to be some evidence of repressive cultures, i.e. certain methods that are resultant from a confluence of particular ideologies, instruments, experience, and attitudes. Despite the relative difficulty of finding comparable locations, comparative studies on places similar to Bahrain would be fruitful in seeing how the evolution of repression changed

It needs to be said that this thesis does not want to completely denounce Bahrain's sovereignty, or lack thereof. Indeed, Bahrain, despite its small size, has been able to play off regional tensions between Saudi and Iran for its own benefit, indicating substantial agency. For example, it signed an MoU with Iran for potential gas sails, mostly to prompt Saudi ire and get Qatar and Saudi Arabia to renege on a decision not to export gas to Bahrain.¹³⁹¹ However, its deference to Saudi has been hard to deny, whether in repression, or even trivial matters, and while the securitisation of the Shi'a threat may suggest that Saudi's influence in Bahrain is reserved predominantly on issues of GCC security, Bahrain's unwillingness to defy their neighbours is evident in the most banal of matters. For example, Bahrain refused to recognise Kosovo in 2009 until Saudi had done so. As U.S. Ambassador Henzel noted, 'Bahrain is unlikely to get out ahead of the Saudis on Kosovo'.¹³⁹² Nonetheless, the growth of a GCC alliance seems to reflect an increasing tribal, monarchical, and Sunni coalition whose interests transcend the demands of Bahrain's citizens wanting political change, and whose policies will continue to impact how Bahrain's represses internal dissent.

Theoretical implications: new insights and old generalisations

By examining long term trends in repression, this thesis highlights not only that authoritarian regimes repress differently, but that the same regime represses differently over time due to changing regional politics and internal dynamics. For example, deaths in custody only appear to have occurred after Independence in Bahrain. Beginning before the Iranian Revolution, such deaths imply a change in certain factors over those years that resulted in the emergence of such tactics. While

1391 US Embassy, 'Bahrain-Iran Gas Deal Still Far Off', 3 February 2009, Wikileaks, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAMA58_a.html, (accessed 20 November 2015).

1392 C. Henzel, 'Bahrain Will Follow Saudi's Lead on Kosovo', 19 February 2009, Wikileaks, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAMA97_a.html

the reasons for this have been hypothesised in the preceding chapters, it is only through an extensive historical analysis that we can ascertain the emergence of such a phenomenon. This is also particularly interesting as it is often the Iranian Revolution or the 1981 coup attempt that is argued to have been the key moment in shifting the regime's threat perception and subsequent increased coercion of the Shi'a population.¹³⁹³ However, as this research highlights, such assertions place an erroneous emphasis on the Iranian Revolution, rather than other variables, such as the impact of Independence, the increasing role of Saudi, or the reassertion of the Al Khalifa's legacy of conquest. Thus this interpretive work has undermined normative assumptions on Bahrain and the region, which tend to reflect transatlantic foreign policy objectives that portray Iran as the main agent in creating draconian policy shifts in the Arab Gulf States towards the Shi'a. In Bahrain's case, what is certainly evident is the extent to which Independence and Saudi ascendancy has resulted in deleterious consequences for the country's Shi'a community. Through the examination of repressive methods, this thesis has been able to highlight this. Indeed, the tendency to over-emphasise the role or the importance of the IFLB and the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain's history complement the government's attempts to paint the Shi'a opposition as a security threat, and enact processes, legislation, or actions that serve to disproportionately criminalise Shi'a members of society. Certainly, emphasising the impact of the Iranian Revolution on Bahrain's internal politics adds credibility and legitimacy to a discourse of national security, which runs the danger of positioning discrimination against Bahrain's Shi'a as being in the interest of maintaining Bahrain's sovereignty.

In addition to revising previous assumptions about events prior to the 1950s, this is one of the first, if not the first, study of Bahrain to focus on primary documentation of the immediate post-Independence period. The national archives, coupled with freedom of information requests, have shed interesting light onto a period of time that has proved to be remarkably insightful into the shifting nature of political decision making in Bahrain. The period also marked the rise of US hegemony, and the activities of leftist organizations such as PFLOAG. With these threats and changing dynamics, it was interesting, for example, to compare how the

1393 L. Louër, Sectarianism and Coup-Proofing Strategies in Bahrain, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 245-260, 2013.

regime treated leftist opposition versus Shi'a opposition. Yet the aforementioned reassertion of the Al Khalifa legacy of conquest is perhaps the most notable finding of this period. This thesis has also complicated generalisations regarding repression in the Cold War period, such as the argument that the demise of the Soviet Union made states less autocratic in order to appease the democracy-spreading agenda of the United States. While this may be true in some contexts, this research, like Christian Davenport's research on repression in authoritarian states, highlights that the death of the Soviet Union did not have a great effect on Bahrain. In actuality, Bahrain's continued geostrategic importance to the United States meant that its protection of the status quo continued unabated. Indeed, repression has gotten worse despite the end of the cold war.

The large temporal timespan combined with a broad conceptualisation of repression has also highlighted a number of other interesting trends, prizing open the authoritarian play book. The growth of legal forms of repression and information control are particularly notable. While it would be tempting to assert, as Foucault does in *Discipline and Punish*, that the growth of these invisible forms of control replace more coercive and disciplinary measures, it seems that in Bahrain they simply augment them. As we have seen, coercive methods have not abated but actually increased. Yet this is not to attach a particular value to certain types of repression. If anything, the study has exposed the problems of attempting to rank repression, or ascertain levels of severity among its manifested forms. The tendency in the field to focus perhaps on overt physical acts of harm as the more egregious acts of repression is problematic. Surveillance, for example, may not traditionally be seen as a violent form of coercion, yet when it instils anxiety or fear that modifies behaviour, making victims less likely to engage in challenges to the status-quo, it is fundamentally and physically altering their physiology. Thus how do we determine where coercion begins and ends?

Information control too is a growing tool, and one that has become fundamental to repression since the 1950s in Bahrain. It is also one of the clearer areas where we see innovation. From crude PR and propaganda to pseudo gangs and now social media, innovation in the field reflects the regime's ability to adapt to new technological challenges. Thus by expanding the framework for repression we are

inviting people to critically interrogate the very notion of repression and its visibility. Indeed, it is perhaps more insidious to dismiss certain institutions, regulations or actions as benign, than to explore the extent to which they regulate our behaviour in a way that deliberately advantages a specific 'elite'.

Perhaps one of the most unexpected, yet important contributions in this thesis, is its shedding light on how individual actors within a regime can influence repressive choices. As noted by Jennifer Earl, there is little done on how elite attitudes impact upon the type/frequency/consistency of repression?¹³⁹⁴ Yet this thesis has shown, for example, that under the British, Belgrave's influence was pervasive, as was the personal influence of various political agents. In recent times, this research has implicated the Prime Minister as a key driver of certain repressive strategies. This, in many regards, represents one of the most significant shifts in the past hundred years of repression in Bahrain. This ties in with Goldstein's argument that the single most important variable throughout history in determining repressive outcomes is the attitude of policy-making individuals towards dissidents.¹³⁹⁵ Certainly, as was noted earlier in this research, 'ideas/beliefs also play a role' in determining response to threats. Interestingly, these findings cast some doubt on recent scholarship that has emphasised how the violent repression of 2011 was the result of an 'anti-reform' faction led by the Khawalid and other hardliners.¹³⁹⁶ It would perhaps be more accurate to say that any large scale challenge in Bahrain will be met with violent repression, rather than it being simply the result of a swing to hardliners away from moderates. Furthermore, this hardline reaction has been evident since the 1970s. Thus, the importance of historical habit is important, as is the significance of ruling family coalitions in controlling dissent. Certainly the issue raises questions about the existence of path dependencies, institutional memory, or authoritarian learning. In Bahrain, there seems to be a notable cycle in responses to unrest, and an authoritarian

1394J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...' p. 263.

1395Goldstein, 1978, p. 558.

1396See for example J. Kinninmont, 2012, J. Kinninmont, *Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse*, Chatham House, London, 2012, p. 20.

<http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle>

[%20East/pr0612kinninmont.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle%20East/pr0612kinninmont.pdf) (accessed 6 October 2015). p. 1; F. Wehrey, 'The March of Bahrain's Hardliners', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 May 2012,

<http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/march-of-bahrain-s-hardliners> (accessed 10 October

2015); Gengler, J. (2014). Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securitization of 'the Shi'a Problem' in Bahrain, *Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea*, 3 (1), 53 – 79.

reflex facilitated by the fact that officials from the same family, and who discuss affairs on a family council, often hold positions for decades, rather than years. As Justin Gengler once noted, 'Khalid bin Ahmad replied that the crown prince would "bring God only knows what disaster upon the family," and that it is only the older members that "know these people" (i.e., the protesters) and how to deal with them'.¹³⁹⁷ In states like Bahrain, where the will of influential members is less tempered by institutional processes, the attitudes of elites will certainly impact upon repression. Yet crucially, the Prime Minister, rather than the Khawalid, long seems to have been driving against opposition movements.

Certainly the focus of this thesis has cast doubt on numerous generalisations made about the nature of regimes and why they use repression. Depending on how one wishes to quantify repression, this has demonstrated, for example, that political democracy does not necessarily mean a decrease in repression. Certainly personal integrity violations have become worse in Bahrain despite democratisation. Could it be, as has been argued, that transitional regimes are the most coercive? The combination of perceived increasing political opportunities but limited realities may create a dynamic that encourages collective action, yet maintains barriers. What was an opaque ceiling has become a glass one. Alternatively the influence of personalistic attitudes skew understanding of threat perception. We have seen, for example, that disagreements between Henderson and the Prime Minister reflect a disagreement over fear of consequences and fear of appearing weak. The Prime Minister did, for example, wish to increase repression against the Shi'a despite Henderson saying it would only make things worse. Rather than assuming, as a norm, that increased dissent is an undesirable outcome, it could be that it is an inevitable part of specific, divide and rule governing strategies. Notions of whether government's repress relevant to their own strength and weakness have also been challenged. It is perhaps better to examine to what extent regime strength or weakness influences those methods and strategies adopted. For example, the regime weakness in the 1920s (with threats of the withdrawal of British protection), prompted more conciliatory attitudes from the regime to the population at large. However, rather than extorting and enacting violence against the population, the regime took British advice and accepted

¹³⁹⁷J. Gengler, A Different Sort of Coup, 20 March 2011, <http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.de/2011/03/different-sort-of-coup.html>, (accessed 5 May 2016).

a stipend to maintain internal cohesion. Having said this, it is important to bear in mind that any criticism of generalizations in repression studies here are contingent on a definition that may not be applicable for those scholars valuing a more parsimonious conceptualisation.

Despite these findings, scholars of repression have long complained of the difficulty of obtaining clear data on how governments calculate the 'onset and escalation of repression'.¹³⁹⁸ Bahraini internal documents are not public, and with next to no mechanisms allowing transparency, there is little opportunity to gain a really deep insight into, for example, the workings of the Royal Court without whistleblowers coming forward. However, by utilising multiple sources, especially diaries, government correspondence, and high level insight, this thesis has obviated, to some extent, the usual hurdles. Indeed, there is much truth in Tilly's assertion of the utility of focusing on sources as opposed to theories in order to find historical limits to observations.¹³⁹⁹ It would, of course, have been invaluable to have access to Saudi documents detailing strategic decision making. To some extent this was possible; the recent Wikileaks cables of Saudi correspondence did, for example, confirm Saudi's obsession with Iran. However, this offered merely a glimpse into the Kingdom's notoriously secret political machinations. Future studies of repression will still be hampered by these problems, yet continued attention to historical sources, and leaked information such as that garnered through Wikileaks, will offer more insights into government strategising in repression. However, methodological innovation should be considered by those wishing to study repression in a more expansive way.

Moving away from the state

The approach of this thesis has shown that future studies of repression would benefit from being less state-centric. Indeed, 'while living in a world that stresses the interconnection and dissolution of older political units such as states, scholars, activists, politicians, and ordinary citizens interested in coercive government activity are consistently attempting to refocus attention back onto relevant actors'.¹⁴⁰⁰ In addition to the role of Britain and Saudi, repression in Bahrain is increasingly the

1398C. Davenport,

1399 Cited in B. Dill and R. Aminzade,

1400C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2007, p. 19.

result of a broad global network, whose stakeholders include international companies, foreign governments, and non-state actors. Just as advocacy groups have turned to the outside world to assist in their struggle, governments too seek assistance from the outside world to repress dissent. Donatella Della Porta once explored the policing of transnational protest, yet in Bahrain, we can clearly see the development of the transnational repression of local protest, and transnational protest over local repression.¹⁴⁰¹ It would be interesting to examine these repressive networks in the future, examining where their power nodes lie, and what forms they take. Certainly, focusing just on states is to miss flagrant examples of privateering or complicity in repressive methods.

This global repressive network too reflects the imperative of transnational corporations in attempting to generate profit from instability, and the increasing roles the government of Britain (as a relevant example) has in facilitating that process. From a social justice perspective, better regulation of the arms trade, and more robust treaties and enforcement are required to temper the desire to secure increasingly lucrative arms deals that provide government's such as that of Bahrain with increasing capacity to preserve their position of hegemony. Certainly in a transnational, globalised environment, focusing on state repression is not necessarily the most appropriate lens. Indeed, it could be argued that such an approach feeds the dominant paradigm about the value of sovereignty, which is used by states such as Bahrain to denounce foreign 'interference' that could actually assuage certain types of repression.

In this regard, authoritarianism as a concept is also problematic. While this work departs from covariate analysis, attempting to find the nuance within a state deemed authoritarian, the multiple agencies involved in executing repression has highlighted how the authoritarian framework perhaps focuses too much on the state. By examining methods broadly, we can examine those authoritarian structures, and those structures, as evidenced in Bahrain, stretch beyond the state. Perhaps scholars studying the regime-state nexus may find much of use here. Indeed, the term regime has been used throughout this work, and perhaps better reflects a confluence of actors acting together to attain certain power-maintenance objectives. However this can make the term, as an analytical unit, somewhat slippery, for as the case of Bahrain has

1401 D. Della Porta, A. Peterson, H. Reiter, and D. Nelken (eds), *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, Aldershot, Ashgate.

demonstrated, shifting international politics has significantly altered the nature and make-up of the regime. Furthermore, to place too much emphasis on authoritarian regimes is to shift responsibility of repression away from sovereign states. This is especially problematic when the states under scrutiny, such as Bahrain, benefit from relationships with states not considered authoritarian – such as Britain. If, as even Bellin argues, authoritarianism robustness is facilitated by foreign support of militaries, then to what extent is examining the subordinate state missing the core problems of authoritarian resilience? From the perspective of rectifying social justice, this needs to be addressed.

Ever-expanding webs of control

As well as the importance of non-state actors and international networks, rhizomatic forms of control, through online or offline vigilantism have demonstrated the power of society in repressing dissent, especially when mobilised along ideological grounds. This has been particularly evident in the analysis of social media use. As this research has shown, social media can extend the repressive apparatus to citizens, and through trolling, peer-to-peer surveillance, propaganda, and other means, those aligned with the hegemonic order can facilitate control strategies. Not only does this problematise the utopian potential of social media as a place of democratic emancipation, but it also highlights the mixed role of technological determinism and social constructivism in outlining how such technologies are used. This is not to deny the potential liberating aspects of technology, but rather it emphasises the importance of doing future, case by case research on the role of social media during unrest in specific countries. The role of specific technologies in repression will certainly be contingent on socio-cultural and political factors.

Indeed, the relative merits of parsing up repression is that it opens up the door to more interesting theoretical insights into the nature of repression. Rather than seeing repression as a monolithic concept, the proliferation of categories garnered from numerous studies of similar phenomenon, coupled with inductive research, has created a template that, while tailored to this study, may be useful for other scholars wishing to examine aspects of repression. By using levels of disaggregation, this thesis has demonstrated that the Bahrain regime has responded 'to different challenges

with distinct repressive strategies', thus addressing a question posed by Davenport.¹⁴⁰² However, the expansive definition of repression, while giving scope to examine multiple aspects of Bahrain's history has made it difficult to go into extreme depth on any one facet of repression. Although depth has been achieved by focusing on just Bahrain, a long temporal time span, coupled with a broad conceptualisation of repression, has made generalisations difficult. Yet as Skocpol argues, 'interpretive works can only be judged to be more or less successful at meeting the challenge they set for themselves: finding the most compelling conceptual lenses through which to mediate between meaningful happenings in the past and the concerns of present day audiences'.¹⁴⁰³ Repression is compelling, and highly relevant to Bahrainis and those interested in human rights. The benefits though, should not be undersold, and by uniting disciplines through the concept of repression, this study offers a new approach to the study of national histories.

Given the current regional climate, and the New Middle East Cold War between Riyadh and Tehran, the position of Bahrain's Shi'a will likely remain bad. Certainly Saudi's intervention against what it perceives as Iranian and Shi'a expansionism in Yemen has exacerbated regional tension, and the rise of ISIS is both a catalyst and a symptom of escalating regional tensions. This defensive stance is only likely to make Bahrain fall more under Saudi's control, and acts such as the provocative execution of Nimr Al Nimr suggest that Saudi are likely to adopt more violent methods of coercion in the near-term. The future for a more equitable sharing of power in Bahrain is bleak. Trapped between Saudi and Iran, and of geopolitical strategic importance for both the US and the UK, Bahrain's lack of independence has impacted significantly on repression. British and American military interests in the region equate to transatlantic support for the authoritarian status quo, while Saudi military intervention virtually guarantee that even armed insurrection would have little effect on regime change. Unless, as Christopher Davidson argues, Saudi Arabia collapses, Bahrain's constellation of external allies will help stave off unrest.¹⁴⁰⁴

1402C. Davenport, *State Repression and Political Order*, p. 18.

1403Skocpol, 19

1404C. Davidson, *After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies*, London, Hurst, 2012.

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