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
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From Babel to Brussels

European Integration and the Importance of
Transnational Linguistic Capital



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From Babel to Brussels. European Integration and the Importance of Transnational Linguistic Capital

Summary

Globalisation and the political process of European integration opened the European Union member states to one another. As different EU member states have different languages, participation in globalisation and the process of European integration is dependent on Europeans' ability to speak the languages of others. Those who speak multiple languages can more easily come into contact with citizens of other countries, conduct business and diplomacy, cooperate academically, organise protests across national boundaries, or enter into romantic relations with them. In short, they can socialise transnationally in a number of different dimensions. Those who only speak their native language are, in contrast, tied to their home country and can only take slight advantage of the perks of a united Europe and a globalised world. Possessing transnational linguistic capital is a deciding factor in whether or not someone can participate in an emerging European society; it becomes a new measure of social inequality, a resource that can either lead to societal inclusion or exclusion.

The question central to our study is to what degree citizens in the twenty-seven EU member states possess transnational linguistic capital and how to explain the differences in multilingualism both between and within the member states. We present a general explanatory model for foreign language proficiency, create hypotheses from this model and test them empirically. Drawing on a survey conducted in twenty-seven European countries it can be shown that the peoples' ability to speak different languages can be very well predicted with the help of the different explanatory factors. We find that country size, the prevalence of a respondent's native language, the linguistic difference between one's mother tongue and the foreign language, and age affect language acquisition negatively, whereas a country's level of education has a positive influence. Using Bourdieu's theory of social class, we show that besides other factors a respondent's social class position and the level of education are important micro-level factors that help to increase a person's transnational linguistic capital.

One must put these results in the context of the state of the art. The analysis of multilingualism is a major topic in linguistics, psychology, and education. The societal conditions in which language learners are embedded are hardly taken into account in these studies. This would not be worth discussing any further if sociology was not relevant to multilingualism; but the contrary seems to be true. Our analysis shows that the neglected societal conditions are actually of central importance in determining transnational linguistic capital.

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Foreword: Why this Book is Published in Open Access?

This book is an English translation of the German work “Mehrsprachigkeit im vereinten Europa. Transnationales sprachliches Kapital als Ressource in einer globalisierten Welt” (Multilingualism in Europe. Transnational linguistic capital as a resource in a globalised world), published in 2010 by the Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Literature that has appeared since 2010 has not been systematically considered for this translation. This omission includes the 2011 work by Philippe van Parijs, “Linguistic Justice for Europe and the World”.

The English version will not be published by a publishing house, but will instead be made available as an open access publication. It is the first of my books to be published this way. While the number of open access journals has grown significantly, the publication of open access books has not followed the same pattern. In this respect, the publication of “From Babel to Brussels” is an interesting personal experiment.

I have been motivated to pursue this mode of publication for the following reasons. Firstly, a book published by a social sciences publishing house will cost, in paperback, around € 25-30, while the open access version is available to readers for free. It is self-evident that readers would rather read a book for free than pay for it. The internet also makes it possible for anyone with a computer to access the book instantly, meaning not only that the book is available at no cost, but also that there is also no waiting period before a reader is able to read the text. Libraries generally only have one available copy of a given book. If this copy is loaned out, potential readers must wait until the book is returned. Open access availability means that many potential customers have access to the book simultaneously.

Secondly, most authors of scientific books do not earn any income from the publication of a book by a publishing house. This means that authors do not make any significant financial loss with the open access publication of their work. Financial incentives are, moreover, not the main reason why authors

from academia write scholarly books. They want their work to be read by others, and especially to influence their peers, an influence that is manifested in citations of the published work. Since the potential reach of open access books available on the internet is much greater than the reach of traditionally published books, authors have an interest in open access publication.

Thirdly, publishers are not only sellers who mediate between authors and potential readers, they also perform a checking and correcting function, selecting works from a list of submitted manuscripts, commenting on those manuscripts and making suggestions for improvement (allowing the author to revise and improve the text), typesetting the books and creating an attractive layout. It is my impression, however, that publishers are paying less and less attention to these tasks. Good editing of texts is largely absent, and authors are increasingly expected to edit their own book manuscripts so that publishers have very little work to do. This will make it increasingly less attractive for authors to publish their books through publishing houses.

The above arguments imply that open access publication is a win-win situation for both authors and readers. Notwithstanding, there are significant advantages in publishing books through a publishing house. In particular, the well-known English language scientific publishers have established strong reputations and have accrued a large amount of symbolic capital in the academic field, and this capital is transferred to the books and especially to the authors who publish with these publishers. Books which are published by renowned publishers are regarded as important and significant simply by virtue of the fact that they are published by these renowned publishers. For the potential reader, the publishers, in this way, provide guidance. They divide the list of published books into important and unimportant works, and play a role in structuring the scientific field hierarchically. This increases the likelihood that books which are deemed to be important will be read. While the rate of horizontal diffusion of open access books is certainly much larger than that of books which are distributed by publishers, very good publishers are more influential in the vertical and hierarchical structuring of scientific fields than the democratic market of open access publication. Whether

publishing via open access can offset the advantages of publishing houses is difficult to say. I am curious to find out whether I have made the right decision by publishing this book in open access.

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The research cluster “Languages of Emotion”, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation), granted me a sabbatical to undertake the work. An invitation to the “Center for European Studies” at Harvard University, which proved to be an excellent working environment, gave me the opportunity to bring these reflections to fruition on paper in a relatively short time. And an invitation to the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Social Science Research Center Berlin) gave me the opportunity to work on the English translation of the German manuscript.

Berlin, September 2012

1. SETTING THE STAGE

The world today is characterised by a multitude of different languages and is often depicted as a Babylonian confusion of tongues, because it prevents people from understanding those who speak a different language. This attribution connects today's multilingual world order back to the Tower of Babel, one of the oldest myths describing linguistic diversity. The most well-known version is found in an Old Testament passage in Genesis 11:1-9:

Now the whole world had one language and a common speech. As men moved eastward, they found a plain in Shinar and settled there. They said to each other, 'Come, let's make bricks and bake them thoroughly.' They used brick instead of stone, and tar for mortar. Then they said, 'Come, let us build ourselves a city, with a tower that reaches to the heavens, so that we may make a name for ourselves and not be scattered over the face of the whole earth.'

But the LORD came down to see the city and the tower that the men were building. The LORD said, 'If as one people speaking the same language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them. Come, let us go down and confuse their language so they will not understand each other.' So the LORD scattered them from there over all the earth, and they stopped building the city. That is why it was called Babel – because there the LORD confused the language of the whole world. From there the LORD scattered them over the face of the whole earth.

The Tower of Babel is but one of a number of tragic stories in the Old Testament, such as the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, fratricide, or the Great Flood; the cause of these tragedies, however man's striving for Godly power, is similar across all stories.

The Tower of Babel story contains several interesting sociological theorems applicable to today's linguistic constellation. People who settled in Babylon were a community, partially so because they spoke a common tongue. The importance of language in the process of identity formation is underlined by the consequences of God's punishment: After their dispersal, the settlers began to speak many languages; from one united people came many, and each spoke a different language. Whereas a common language unifies and strengthens communal identity, multiple languages divide and lead to a segmented structure of different communities.

In addition to language's identity and community building function, it also has a society building function. Building a city and a tower that reaches up into the heavens is only possible precisely because the people speak the same language. Their communal language allows them to coordinate their actions because they understand each other. Consequently, their plan for a large-scale societal project fails when God takes away their capability to coordinate their actions by taking away their means of communication. And indeed, one can hardly imagine how a large construction project, such as creating an entire society, could succeed if the people involved could not communicate with one another.

One of the themes in the Tower of Babel story is then about the sociology of language which reappears and is even further developed in the New Testament Pentecostal story. After the crucifixion of Jesus and fifty days after his resurrection at Easter, Jesus' followers are gathered in Jerusalem for the harvest festival of Shavuot when the Holy Ghost descends upon them, as is told:

When the day of Pentecost came, they were all together in one place. Suddenly a sound like the blowing of a violent wind came from heaven and filled the whole house where they were sitting. They saw what seemed to be tongues of fire that separated and came to rest on each of them. All of them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other tongues as the Spirit enabled them. (Acts 2:1-4)

The miracle of Pentecost does not undo the Babylonian confusion of tongues; people thus are still speaking different languages and are still split into different linguistic communities scattered across the Earth. Now it is the followers of Jesus who are multilingual and who possess what we will later call transnational linguistic capital, meaning the ability to communicate with other people in their specific native language. Because of this ability, Jesus' followers were able to spread the word of God to different communities around the world. Pentecost is therefore also rightly called the birthday of the Church as an organisation, one of the earliest globally acting 'companies'. The ability of the Lord's followers to speak foreign languages allowed them to create a globalised society and to counteract its previously fractured and scattered structure.

Even though the present is very far removed from biblical times, we find the same tension – the tension between the Old and the New Testaments stories, between a confusion of tongues and the opportunity to create a society that crosses linguistic borders – which forms the basis of our present study. Our analysis focuses on developmental processes that began in the second half of the twentieth century. Political scientists refer to our current world order as one of 'Westphalian sovereignty', dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which created nation states and established internal European borders. The modern Westphalian political order consists of multiple internally as well as externally sovereign states, "containers" that coexist next to one another (Taylor 1994; Beck 1997). The Westphalian order has also structured the institutionalised linguistic order insofar as most nation states have a different official language; as a rule national boundaries are at the

same time language boundaries. Linguistic heterogeneity within a specific country is rare whereas linguistic heterogeneity between nation states is high as different countries usually speak different languages. This constellation resembles the post-Babylonian world of people scattered across the Earth. Many people in this world cannot understand each other because they live in their national “container” and only speak the official language of their home country.

With the onset of globalisation the constellation began to change in a fundamental way at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. The extent, frequency, and speed of exchange between different nation states and different world regions have increased enormously over the last sixty years. Globalisation has profoundly changed societies, both softening international borders and creating more opportunities for economic, communicational, cultural, and political exchange. Europe witnessed fundamental changes and is therefore the focus of our study. The political process of European integration opened the twenty-seven European Union member states to one another through the creation of a single European market and through freedom of movement for goods, services, workers, and financial capital. The creation of a common market has advanced cross-boundary economic processes and promoted inter-European trade, value-added chains, and transnationalisation of financial capital.

Both globalisation and Europeanisation of formerly isolated nation state “containers” open new opportunities for the European people. Yet, because different EU member states have different languages, participation in globalisation and Europeanisation is dependent on Europeans’ ability to speak the languages of others. Possessing transnational linguistic capital is therefore a deciding factor in whether or not someone can participate in these transnational processes. Those who, like the followers of Jesus, speak multiple languages can more easily come into contact with citizens of other countries and also interact, convert, conduct business and diplomacy, cooperate academically, organise protests across national boundaries, or enter into romantic relations with them. In short, they can socialise

transnationally in a number of different dimensions. Those Europeans with transnational linguistic capital, meaning that they are multilingual, are therefore in the position to build transnational relationships and to take part in Europeanisation processes. Those who only speak their native tongue are, in contrast, tied to their home country and can only take slight advantage of the benefits of a united Europe and a globalised world. Transnational linguistic capital therefore becomes a new measure of social inequality in today's increasingly globalised and European society and is a resource that can either lead to societal inclusion or exclusion.

In addition to the consequences of mono- and multilingualism on the individual level, there are also collective consequences. Societies that share a common language usually have more vibrant trade with one another than do nation states that speak different languages, as the transaction costs are much higher in the latter case. Therefore, a multilingual European citizenry would certainly increase the overall economic growth in Europe. The allocation of resources within the European market would also improve markedly were its participants multilingual. Insufficient foreign language proficiency is one of the most important reasons for the rather low levels of geographic inter-EU mobility. An increase in such mobility, furthered by multilingualism, would lead to a better balance of supply and demand within the EU and would have a positive effect on economic growth both in countries with both labour shortage and surpluses. In addition, an increase of inter-EU mobility would lead to a better match between the skills of employees' and open job positions with particular qualifications offered by employers (see Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 2008).

The emergence of a European public sphere would also profit from a more multilingual citizenry (see Gerhards 1993, 2000). Political decisions are increasingly being made by EU institutions, rather than by national governments, but the media remain focused on the national level. The French people still inform themselves about happenings in France in the French language, the Germans read about what is going on in Berlin in German, etc. The consequence is that citizens are not well-informed about EU-level

decisions. One of the most important reasons for this lack of a European public sphere is due to the language constellation. Creating a European public sphere and getting citizens to participate in the project of European integration would be much easier if its people could understand one another.

Since multilingualism has both individual and collective benefits, we are curious to see the degree to which Europeans speak foreign languages and can thus reap these benefits. We do not assume that transnational linguistic capital is like the Holy Ghost visiting Jesus' followers on Pentecost; rather, we assume that multilingualism has societal causes. The question central to our study is to what degree citizens in the twenty-seven EU member states possess transnational linguistic capital and how to explain the differences in multilingualism both between and within the member states. In so doing, we differentiate between two types of transnational linguistic capital: the number of languages a person speaks, regardless of which languages those are, and also the ability to speak English which is the language with the highest communicative use in the EU. Before answering these questions, we must consider some conceptual aspects of the relationship between language and society; additionally, we will analyse the societal conditions at the macro-level that necessitate multilingualism. Finally, we will consider the normative question of what kind of EU language policy would be both sound and just.

Our argument follows as such: The second chapter develops a theoretical frame for the subsequent empirical analysis. In this chapter, we briefly describe how we understand language in general and by which characteristics different languages are defined. We then discuss the societal functions of language and differentiate between community building and society building functions: a common language not only enables more highly concentrated interactions, but can also serve to build community and collective identity. This dual function also applies to multilingualism. I will explain our understanding of transnational linguistic capital in more detail using Pierre Bourdieu's theory.

The third chapter is an analysis of the institutionalised language system in Europe. Describing basic societal conditions helps us to understand why transnational linguistic capital came to be such an important resource for participating in the process of European integration. Three factors are important here: (a) In contrast to the USA, there is no common language in the United States of Europe, but rather twenty-three different official languages. Linguistic heterogeneity within a particular country is very rare, because most member states only have one official language. In contrast, linguistic heterogeneity between states is very high, because there are twenty-three different languages among twenty-seven states. The third chapter contains a more detailed description and explanation of how this linguistic segmentation along national boundaries developed in the 19th and 20th centuries. The consequences of this historically established system are that multilingualism is a necessary precondition for every transnational and European activity, as the people in each European country speak a different language. (b) Multilingualism is not a meaningful resource in isolated societies with little contact to the outside world, because the skill can not be used very often. By increasing exchanges between different European countries, globalisation and Europeanisation have changed the importance of multilingualism radically. We differentiate several dimensions of Europeanisation and globalisation, using several data sources to describe their development. The findings show that European societies have not only become more strongly interlinked, but also the degree of worldwide interdependence has increased sharply due to globalisation. This interdependent world presents citizens with new demands, but also with new possibilities that they cannot take advantage of unless they learn foreign languages. (c) The creation of nation states shows us how formerly linguistic heterogeneous entities became homogenised through political processes. It is therefore important to take a closer look at the EU's language policy, which we do in the third section of this chapter. In contrast to nation states' policy, EU's language policy supports linguistic diversity of its members and supports as well as the existing minority languages. Hence, Europe's linguistic

heterogeneity will not change in the short-term due to the EU's language policy. This is another reason why multilingualism is a deciding factor for participation in Europeanisation.

The fourth chapter comprises the empirical core of this study: Using a survey conducted in the twenty-seven EU member states, we analyse the respondents' proficiencies in foreign languages. Until now, only Neil Fligstein (2008) in his pathbreaking study "Euroclash" has started to analyse foreign language proficiency of European citizens. We go beyond Fligstein's study insofar as (a) we present a more general explanatory model, which (b) in addition to individual characteristics also takes macro contexts into account and (c) extends the number of countries which are analysed. The empirical results of our analysis shows that multilingualism among EU citizens is not very far along: More than half of EU citizens do not speak a foreign language and their chances to participate in Europeanisation processes are therefore only limited. However, the results also show that foreign language proficiency varies dramatically both between and within countries: Whereas over ninety percent of people in the Netherlands speak a foreign language, only thirty percent of Hungarians do so.

Not every foreign language opens up the same number of communicational doors: The more people potential students of a language can reach by learning that language, the higher the returns on their linguistic capital. Therefore, knowledge of a prevalent and widely spoken foreign language is a more important resource than is knowledge of a language only spoken by a few. We therefore measured the number of respondents who are proficient in Europe's most-widely spoken language which is English: Almost half of the Europeans speak English, but there are also vastly different levels of English proficiency between and within countries. In Bulgaria, for instance, 84.6% of the population does not speak English; in the Netherlands, this number drops to only 12.4%.

The second part of chapter four looks into the question of why people in certain EU member states possess high levels of transnational linguistic

capital and are able to speak English and why this is not the case in other countries. We first present a general explanatory model for foreign language proficiency which goes beyond Fligstein's (2008) attempt to explain multilingualism: Opportunities for learning a foreign language, the costs associated with such learning, and the motivation to acquire a new language are the three central elements we use to explain foreign language learning. The societal conditions in which people are embedded affect these three dimensions and often determine who has access to acquire transnational linguistic capital and who does not. We derive hypotheses from this explanatory model and subsequently test them empirically. We find that the size of a country and the prevalence of a respondent's native language affect the motivation and the necessity of learning a foreign language negatively. A country's level of modernisation, especially its development of the educational system, has a positive influence on foreign language proficiency. Using Bourdieu's theory on social class, we also show that a respondent's socio-economic class position and the level of education are important micro-level factors that help to increase a person's transnational linguistic capital. We also look into the effect of the respondents' age, immigrant status, and possible emotional connection to their native language. Overall, the results show that many factors that influence social inequality between and within countries are the same factors that influence transnational linguistic capital. Only certain groups of citizens of the European member states, predominantly those who are already privileged through class, education or otherwise, will be able to profit from Europeanisation, as they have one of the central resources at their disposal: transnational linguistic capital. The European project is, in addition to all of its other goals, also a project about socio-economic class.

Our empirical results must also be interpreted within the context of other academic disciplines; language and multilingualism are major topics in linguistics, psychology, and education, and publications on bi- and multilingualism fill entire libraries (see for example overviews by Wei 2000; Bialystok 2001; Bhatia & Ritchie 2006; Auer & Wei 2007). These publications

are dominated, however, by ever-smaller questions about multilingualism and evermore elaborate methodology. For example, researchers can show which neurological processes accompany second language learning, which cognitive conditions must be in place before one can start to acquire multiple languages and can prove the influence of multilingualism on cognitive development. There are studies that attempt to decipher the age at which children can most quickly learn a second language, which language programs produce the best results, etc. The societal conditions in which these language learners are embedded are hardly taken into account at all. And sociologists have by and large withdrawn from researching language and analysing the conditions of multilingualism.

This would not be worth discussing any further if sociology was not relevant to language research and multilingualism; but the contrary is true. Our analysis shows that these neglected societal conditions are actually of central importance in determining multilingualism. Determining whether someone speaks English depends less on someone's cognitive abilities than it does on, for example, whether a person comes from an upper class family in a small, Western country or from a working class family in a former Soviet country. Such factors are the actual determinants of multilingualism but which have not been taken into account in previous analyses. Our study shows that research on bi- and multilingualism and on language in general, is in desperate need of expansion from a sociological perspective.

In the fifth and last chapter we discuss the normative question of whether the current EU policy of supporting twenty-three official languages and fostering minority languages is fair. We argue that the current language policy of the EU is acting to perpetuate inequalities in citizens' access to transnational linguistic capital, even if unintended. It would be preferable if the EU did not only recognise the dominance of the English language, but also supported English as the *lingua franca* of Europe, even at the likely expense of other national and minority languages. This suggestion not only contradicts the EU's language policy and ideology of "unity in diversity", but also contradicts the dominant paradigm among linguists and anthropologists who support

linguistic diversity. Hence, this chapter (and the Appendix) goes into a lengthier discussion of why a policy that fosters linguistic diversity is based on rather weak arguments.

Supporting English as a *lingua franca* would undoubtedly favour countries in which English is already the official language. To compensate for this asymmetry, we suggest that the twenty-seven member states fund the EU's new language policy at varying levels. Those language communities whose mother tongue is chosen as a *lingua franca* have to subsidise those language communities that have to study the *lingua franca*. Disproportionate financial support is also an underlying feature of EU regional policies and therefore fits into a preexisting policy model.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The primary purpose of the following discussion consists of the development of a conceptual framework which should serve as a guideline to the empirical study in the following chapters. Up until now sociology has paid little attention to the analysis of multilingualism. The major sociological theories do not offer much help when one is developing a theoretical framework for organising empirical research aimed at answering the questions formulated in the introduction. The researcher has to use his own lodestar. Assistance in developing a theoretical framework can be found for the most part in research on economic and social migration and integration which has analysed the way migrants learn a new language. Therefore, I will tie in with the state of art in this research field. I will start out by giving a definition of language and individual languages. In a second step I will discuss the central social functions a language fulfils, whilst differentiating between the influence of language on society building and on community building. If language is used for processes of society building, I will use the term *instrumental linguistic capital*; if language is used for community building processes, that is, the formation of a collective identity, I will use the term *symbolic linguistic capital*. In a third step, these concepts will be applied to the ability to speak several languages. Under certain societal conditions, which are dealt with in the literature under the heading of globalisation and Europeanisation, multilingualism becomes a central resource. Those who have acquired transnational linguistic capital, in other words are multilingual, are in a position to participate in transnational processes and

Europeanisation, while those who can only speak their native language are limited to their own country and can only benefit in a limited way from the advantages of a united Europe and a globalised world. To have transnational linguistic capital at one's disposal is thus a new source of social inequality within a developing European society.

2.1 What is Language?

Most definitions of language explain language as a system of signs, which serves to transfer information. Such a basic definition contains different crucial elements. The concept of transmission suggests that there is at least one speaker and one recipient and that there is an exchange taking place between them. Information is being exchanged. Information can be statements about the world or a state of mind and feelings, plans, intended purchases, declarations of love, political speeches, etc. This exchange of information is conveyed by signs. As Ferdinand de Saussure (1967) pointed out, signs consist of two components: the indicated and the indicator. The indicator has a material substratum, it consists of sounds/sound waves or letters/pictures. The sounds or letters and pictures signify that which is being indicated. It is, however, not identical with the indicated. René Magritte refers to precisely this difference in his most famous painting "La trahison des images". In this picture there is a pipe underneath which the words "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" ("This is not a pipe"), point out that the representation of an object is not identical with the original object itself. The allocation of particular sounds or signs to particular meanings is always arbitrary. There is no reason inherent to the indicated as to why the allocation is as it is; consequently the allocation varies from language to language. The arrangement of the letters T-i-s-c-h indicates an object in German, which usually stands on four legs and at which one can sit in order to eat or write. What we call "Tisch" in German is called "mesa" in Spanish, "table" in English and "stół" in Polish.

The meaningful sounds and signs are combined with one another in accordance with a system of rules, thus producing larger units, phrases and sentences.¹ These rules are laid down in the grammar of a language. Therefore, a language consists in essence of grammar and vocabulary. By speaking or writing sentences – created through words and grammar – people describe ‘things in the world’: They formulate declarations of love, express intentions to buy things or take other actions. Thus, every communication contains a triadic structure: Ego indicates to Alter something in the world with the help of sounds and signs.² Alter understands the meaning of the message and on this basis can make his own statements which in turn are understood by Ego. Based on this mutual exchange human beings are able to coordinate their actions and cooperate with one another.

The ability of human beings to speak is connected with one of a number of conditions which extend from the anatomical to preconditions in the brain (very clearly delineated in, for example, Friederici 2002; Fischer 2008a). The ability to produce differentiated sounds is dependent on a particular anatomy of the mouth and throat in which the position of the larynx plays an important role. In comparison to chimpanzees the larynx in human beings is positioned much lower, thereby producing a larger but at the same time more finely tuned vibrancy which enables the production of very different sounds, especially vowels. This is an anatomical foundation which apes, closely related to sapiens, do not possess. I will not further discuss the different pre-conditions which make human speech and, ultimately, writing possible. What the different preconditions enable, however, is that each human being – insofar as they are not disabled in any way – learns to speak

¹ I will not deal here with the division of linguistic units – phonem, morphem, word, phrase, sentence, text – and its respective the sub-disciplines (phonetics, morphology, etc.); the linguistic explanations will remain few and are kept to the necessary.

² Michael Tomasello (2008) concludes that the oral communication of human beings developed from gestures. Communication with gestures also demonstrates a triadic structure. Before they can speak, children use their forefinger in order to show someone with whom they are communicating something in the world. This gesture of showing indicates an object; the people involved immediately adopt the line of vision as well as the sight and intention of the other person, thus sharing with him a common meaning. Precisely this ability, according to Tomasello (2008: 331), is not possessed by chimpanzees.

and, indeed, almost automatically without having to be explicitly encouraged to do so. The ability to speak is inborn (cf. Pinker 1994 following on after the works of Noam Chomsky).

Even though the general disposition to learn every language is given to all humans alike, each human being learns only the language which is spoken in their surroundings (mother tongue). Consequently, the ability to be able to communicate with others depends on whether or not one speaks the same language as the person who is being spoken to. Speaking the same language means, according to our definition of language, that the speakers give the same significance to the sounds and sequence of sounds and the signs and sequence of signs as well as being in command of the same system of rules governing the combinations of words and sentences, that is, the same grammar. If this is the case, they can communicate with one another; if not, then direct communication is scarcely possible. This is a fairly simple definition of individual languages. All the different languages which exist differ from one another through different grammars, different vocabulary and, in part, through a different sign system. German, Swedish, Japanese, Russian etc. are individual languages.

The differences between the various languages with respect to grammar and semantics and, consequently, with respect to mutual understanding are relative. In order to describe the relationship of the various languages to one another and to analyse language change, comparative linguistics uses concepts from evolutionary biology (cf. Dixon 1997; Mufwene 2001). Several languages create a genetic unit if they derive from a common previous language, meaning that they can be traced back in the family tree of languages to a common node. A genetic unit does not have to consist of related languages, as it can also be one language if the language we are dealing with is an isolated one. Languages which have the same origins, that is, derive from a common original language, belong to the same family of languages (cf. Lewis 2009). German, English, French, Russian, Bulgarian and Latvian belong, in contrast to Arabian, Chinese, Turkish, Hungarian and Basque, to the same family of Indo-Germanic languages. As in real families,

within the same extended family different languages also possess different degrees of closeness in descent and common genes, that is to say different degrees of overlap in grammar and in lexis. The distance between different individual languages influences the effort that has to go into learning the other language. The smaller the distance between two individual languages, the easier it is to learn the other one. I will return to this point below when discussing the hypotheses regarding the learning of foreign languages.

We are concerned here how to define an individual language. The concept of individual languages becomes imprecise when the degree of overlapping between two languages is extensive, as it would be with two egg or even one egg twins. In these cases, from the linguistic point of view, it is usually a matter of largely artificial, mostly political decisions, as to whether one speaks of two individual languages or of two dialects of the same language. This is true of Norwegian and Swedish or Croatian and Serbian. Norwegians and Swedes on the one hand and Croatians and Serbs on the other can understand each other even though officially their languages are different. This is because social groups, such as ethnic ones or nations, frequently define themselves by means of a common language. The difference between two languages, which is, from a linguistic point of view marginal, is defined in such cases as substantive in order to be able to distinguish one nation or ethnic group from another nation. I will return to this symbolic function of language for the definition of communities in more detail.³ At this point, however, we can determine that individual languages are usually distinguished by different grammars and lexis. These differences manifest themselves pragmatically through the fact that two speakers who speak different languages, cannot, or only barely, understand each other.

The fact that actors do not possess a common language does not mean that they cannot interact with one another. However, the transaction costs of the interaction are extremely high compared to speaking the same language. A

³ In addition, the difference between Serbian and Croatian is emphasised through the use of another script – Latin and Cyrillic (cf. the comments in Nic Craith (2008: 25ff.) on the political construction of the difference between these two languages).

translator is needed who speaks both languages. The transaction costs consist firstly in having to pay for the translation, secondly in the time it takes for the translation, which slows down communication, and thirdly a translation is always imprecise which in itself makes things more difficult and detracts from communication.

An alternative to translation for the participants is to try to communicate directly and without the use of language. Everyone who has ever been in a country where he/she does not speak the language and has tried to find out the way to the train station, is aware of the high transaction costs involved. Even a relatively simple communication, like asking for directions, is practically impossible through mimicry and gestures, not only because the subtlety of mimicry and gestures is limited, but also because the grammatically controlled combinations of signs are very few. Peter A. Kraus (2004: 100) tells us of an occurrence in Belgium in 2001, in which a train crash could not be avoided, because each of the railway employees responsible for security spoke only either Flemish or French.

2.2 Language Proficiency as Human Capital

What is the significance of knowledge of one or several languages for a society? Language and language competence can be understood as a resource or as capital which can be used for the organisation of a society on the one hand, and for community building on the other. If language is used for processes of society building, I shall speak of instrumental linguistic capital, if language is used for community building processes, I shall speak of symbolic linguistic capital. If competence in several languages is being discussed, I shall refer to this as transnational linguistic capital and differentiate analogously between an instrumental and a symbolic function of transnational linguistic capital. These concepts are based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1992; summarised in Loos 2000), who understands

linguistic competence as capital and differentiates between the resource function on the one and the symbolic function on the other hand.⁴

However, neither Bourdieu nor other authors use the concept of transnational linguistic capital. Just as all of the works of Bourdieu adhere largely to methodological nationalism (Beck & Grande 2004) in that they analyse primarily the class structure of a society organised as a nation state, so his concept of linguistic capital also refers by and large to the nation state. Hence, Bourdieu's concept of linguistic capital refers to first and foremost to the elaborate knowledge of the high, official language of a country and the ability to speak this language, which is usually dependent upon class (Bourdieu 1992). However, under the condition of transnationalisation and Europeanisation, new skills become important in order to be able to act beyond the nation state "containers" (Taylor 1994; Beck 1997). Multilingualism is one of these.

2.2.1 Language as Instrumental Capital

As is well known, the basic concept of sociology is, according to Max Weber, the one called social action.⁵ A mutual reference of actors to each other is an interaction and leads to social relationships. Weber distinguishes between two forms of social relationships: 'Vergesellschaftung' (society building) and 'Vergemeinschaftung' (community building). Language fulfils a central function for the processes of society building as well as for community building. I am adopting the two concepts, society building and community building, from Weber, although he himself did not discuss the role of language in either of these processes.

⁴ In the literature similar concepts can be found to indicate the same meaning. Peter A. Kraus (2004) differentiates between an instrumental and an expressive function of language. Hartmut Esser (2006: 52) describes linguistic competence in part as a resource, by means of which other socially relevant resources can be obtained. In addition, he discusses the symbolic function of language. Language enables us to name things, to create stereotypes and to discriminate. Finally, Jochen Roose (2010: 126) discusses the practical and the symbolic meaning of language.

⁵ According to Weber "Action is 'social' insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (Weber 1985: 4).

Weber defines a social relationship as “‘associative’ (Vergesellschaftung) if and insofar as the orientation of social action within it rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of interests (...)” (Weber 1985: 40f.). With the definition “rationally motivated adjustment of interests” Weber is thinking primarily of interactions motivated by economic interests. The concept of society building is, however, to be much more broadly understood, as it includes all forms of exchange between people who are interacting with one another, among other things, the exchange of information, goods, shares, sexual “services” or scientific knowledge.

The fact that language makes interaction between people possible, without having very high transaction costs, ensures that it is more than likely that society building will take place among those who speak the same language rather than among those who speak different languages. Anyone who has been to international conferences or who has been in a multilingual situation knows this problem from firsthand experience. People who speak the same language tend to start talking to each other rather than to those who do not. Those who speak the same language sit down at the same table and converse. Other people, who are sitting at the same table and do not speak the same language as the rest, are more or less excluded. Frequently communication in the same language becomes more intense and forceful. The speakers discover a mutual interest in each other and those who speak the same language sit down together at the next meeting again. They meet more often and thus the interaction becomes increasingly intense between the communication partners, excluding those who speak another language. This is the first step in the direction of society building among those speaking the same language. On this basis and depending on interests, intellectual, amorous or business relationships occur. In this respect language can be regarded a means, a fund, which makes the establishment of a society possible. This does not mean that there are no societies which are not bilingual or trilingual. On the level of interactive systems (friendship, partnerships, marriage) as well as on the level of entire nation states (for instance, Switzerland, Canada, India, South Africa), we find societies organised by people who do not speak the same

language. However, their occurrence presupposes many more preconditions and is thus less likely.

How powerful the effect of language or rather different languages is, even if people live in a common nation state, is shown by the example of Switzerland. Switzerland has existed as a loose confederation since the 13th century. It was founded in the present form as a federal state in 1848. German, French, Italian and Rhaeto-Romance are its official languages. In spite of a long national unification the linguistic division of Switzerland still shapes the behaviour of its citizens. As an illustration, a good example is the way in which the Swiss use the media.⁶ The national television of Switzerland consists of two channels, each with two complete programmes for the three large language regions (SF 1 and SF 2 for German speaking Switzerland, TSR 1 and TSR 2 for French speaking Switzerland, and TSI 1 and TSI 2 for Italian speaking Switzerland). In addition, there are the broadcasts which can be received from abroad, primarily the television programmes from Germany, France and Italy. The foreign broadcasting stations have a very high share of the Swiss market. This lies at around sixty-five percent of the audience viewing time (cf. Hasebrink & Herzog 2009). The media behaviour of the Swiss absolutely complies with the linguistic division of Switzerland. The Swiss German watch the Swiss German programmes and the German programmes which come from abroad, the French speaking Swiss turn on the French, and the Swiss Italian the Italian programmes. Based on the Swiss television programmes alone, Daniel Beck and Bertil Schwotzer (2006: 26) come to the following conclusion: "The market share of SRG television programmes from other language regions is fairly low. In 2005 it was 0.7 percent in the German speaking part, in the French speaking part it was 1.8 percent and in Ticino 4.1 percent". The term "fairly low" seems to me to be a definite understatement. The fact is that Switzerland is divided into different

⁶ Unfortunately there is no other evidence available on the impact of the division of languages in Switzerland on the way its society is organised. It would be interesting to learn to what extent the language boundaries influence the economic boundaries, for example, how pronounced trade between the different language regions is. An interesting indicator would also be to know the number of marriages across the language boundaries in order to study the effect of the languages on the private sphere.

societies based on language. If we assume that the media have a considerable influence on the perception of the world which people have, then the Swiss live, in part at any rate, in different worlds.

The idea that a common language significantly influences the formation of a society is strikingly confirmed by findings from the macro-economy. In economics there has been a long drawn-out discussion on the influence which a common language has on trade between different countries. The conclusions of the empirical studies are unequivocal: Countries which speak the same language trade much more intensively with one another than countries who do not (summarised in Melitz 2008). This fact remains the same even when a number of other factors which influence trade between countries (for instance, the existence of a free trade area, common membership in a political union, a common currency, common history and culture, geographical distance, GNP, etc.) are examined. Economists see the reason for these findings in the much reduced transaction costs which sharing a common language involve. Obtaining information about a possible trading partner is much simpler and to carry out business is much easier.⁷

The correlation which has been described between language and the organisation of a society can also be described from the perspective of the individual. Knowledge of the language which is spoken in a group is, from the perspective of the individual, a central resource for participation in a society. Since most people live in the society in which they grew up and consequently speak the language of this society as their native language, the linguistic prerequisite for the formation of a society is a given. The importance of language for all forms of society building becomes clear, however, when this prerequisite is not met and when the participants have little linguistic capital. This is true, for example, for migrants, who by moving from one country to another often have to learn a new language. This means that the capital of their mother tongue is to all extents and purposes devalued at one blow,

⁷ This correlation has been further specified in research, in that on the one hand a differentiation is made between the different goods which are to be exchanged, while on the other hand different figurations of overlap between different languages are differentiated (cf. Melitz 2008; Felbermayr & Toubal 2010).

because they are unable to communicate in their native tongue.⁸ Research on integration has shown both theoretically and empirically what an enormous role language plays in the social integration of migrants.⁹ What are the central findings? Knowledge and the competent use of the language spoken in a society is a specific form of human capital.¹⁰ A good command of the language can be used in various spheres of society and can be the mean success for those who have this language at their disposal.¹¹

(a) Education and educational degrees: People's income and the recognition they enjoy from society are largely determined by their professional status. Achieving an attractive professional status largely depends on the educational degrees and qualifications. For instance, one can only become a university professor, a doctor or a lawyer if one has passed the respective university exams. A basic prerequisite for achieving educational degrees, and the attractive professional positions which they imply, is knowledge of the language spoken in a society. Insufficient or bad language competence leads to lack of success in school. This counts not only for the subjects in which language itself is examined, but for other subjects as well. Mathematics and physics are also taught in the native tongue of the respective country. Those who are not in command of the language, or only poorly, will consequently

⁸ This is valid only to a limited degree for those cases in which the host country has a large group of migrants who speak the same language.

⁹ Hartmut Esser (2006) has summarised the theoretical and empirical stand of the literature very well by integrating it into a general theory of the explanation of trade. Esser himself stands on the shoulders of elaborate research which I do not wish to retrace here, whose theoretical premises and empirical findings broadly agree (cf. many others, summarised Chiswick 2007).

¹⁰ Human capital means people's abilities, knowledge, experiences and motives which they use in order to earn money (Becker 1993).

¹¹ The use of linguistic capital depends on the structure of each individual society, in other words, the particular circumstances of a society. Hence, in a society of hunters and gatherers the ability to use bow and arrow well can be far more important and contribute more towards a better "income" and more respect from the other members of society than the ability to express oneself in elaborate language. In post-industrial societies the "bow and arrow skills" will not bring any special advantages. It is here that language ability that comes from the particular structure of this society is especially relevant. Esser (2006: 39ff.), in agreement with Siegwart Lindenberg (1989) and others, concludes that all human beings are concerned to maintain or improve their physical well-being and to receive recognition from other people. They can only achieve these universal goals when they achieve specific goals as defined by a specific society, which in turn lead to the universal goals. The specific goals, or intermediate goods, are different depending on the type of society.

learn less, will get worse results in exams as well as in class, lower marks on their report cards, and lower qualifications. As the quality of school leaving certificates influences the entrance to the labour market and to professions, poor language abilities reduce the chances of achieving an attractive professional position.

(b) Integration in the employment market and professional positions: Good knowledge of the language increases the possibility of attaining recognised school leaving certificates and the well-paid, prestigious professional positions which they lead to. In addition, the quality of knowledge of the language has a direct effect on the probability of obtaining attractive professional positions (cf. Esser 2006: 399ff.). The different professions differ in the degree to which knowledge of the language is necessary for carrying out said profession. With physical work, the need for language skills is considerably lower than with work in which communication is at its heart, for example, in the service and advisory sector. “The highest possible L1 competence,¹² whether in Finnish or in Italian, is of no use at a product advice and consultation in a bank in the Netherlands or France when the customers only understand the language of the receiving country” (Esser 2006: 402). This is still the case when the person has a high educational degree. There is also another factor which explains why weak competence in the language can lead to disadvantages on the employment market. Language competence is frequently interpreted by employers as an indirect indicator for other professionally required skills. On the basis of weak language competence, which is “ascertained” during each job interview en passant, as it were, without tests, it will be concluded that the applicant does not entirely possess other important qualifications either (cf. Esser 2006: 207).

(c) Integration and social capital: Those who do not speak the language of the country they are living in at all, or only badly, do not have much chance of getting to know people from this country. Contact, however, is a prerequisite for intense relationships, for friendship, love or marriage. Therefore, it is not surprising that those migrants who do not have a very extensive knowledge

¹² With L1 competence Esser means competence in the mother tongue.

of the language of the host country are also those who are not very well integrated. Social relationships often do not exist for their own sake. They are social capital, as they serve as the basis for obtaining useful information and to get support in emergency situations, thus in turn facilitating access to other societal spheres (employment market, schools, or doctors).

(d) Political participation: The societies which are at the centre of this study are all democracies. Democracy means that the making of collectively binding decisions is coupled with the interests and decision making processes of citizens. Such a link primarily results by means of elections. Citizens vote at periodic intervals for representatives who then assume the positions of power and are authorised to pass and enforce binding decisions for the citizens living in one territory. However, at the same time they can also be dismissed from their positions of power at the next election, if the citizens do not feel that they are being represented well enough. Apart from voting in elections citizens can attempt to influence political decisions or decision makers by actively working for political parties, interest groups or social movement organisations.

In almost all countries the franchise is coupled with citizenship and in several countries, for example, the USA, one can only become a citizen when one is able speak the language of the country. Therefore, in these countries the chance to participate in elections is coupled with language competence. Also in those countries where this is not the case imperfect language competence limits the chances for political participation. In order that citizens can decide who to vote for and change their minds at the next election or become involved in various interest groups, social movements and parties, they must be able to inform themselves about politics, the representatives and their competitors. The debates and the exchange of information in the political arena – in the mass media, party conferences and in the internet – are all conducted in the official language of each country. Participation in the political arena and thus in the democratic opinion building process definitely depends on the ability to be able to understand and speak the language in which the information is conveyed and in which the debates are conducted. If

this is not the case then one is more or less excluded from the democratic process. Thus, the knowledge of the language in the country of residence is a prerequisite for political participation.¹³

The previous discussion should have shown that the knowledge of the language which is spoken in a group is a very central resource for becoming part of a society. It alleviates access to other important resources considerably and thus the chance to improve one's income and achieve social recognition. I have discussed this interrelationship using the example of migrants, who have left their original language community and thus are confronted with surroundings in which another language is spoken, because it illustrates very well the connection between language and participation in a society. However, the connection between language competence and chances of participation is also valid for speakers in the same language community. They can be in command of their (mother) tongue to a greater or lesser degree. The better people can read and write the language codified as the official language, the more likely they are to achieve higher educational qualifications, to be more successfully placed in the employment hierarchy, to establish connections to higher classes, and to participate better in political processes (Bourdieu 1992; Bourdieu & Passeron 1977). The work of Basil Bernstein in the 1960s has already demonstrated that having the appropriate language competence is dependent upon social class. Bernstein (1960, 1973) has proved that there is class specific language development and use of language (restricted versus elaborate), which has a strong impact on success at school and consequently helps to reproduce the class structure of societies.¹⁴ Empirical research into education of recent years has consistently confirmed these findings.

¹³ The fact that the various factors mutually influence each other has not been discussed here. Hence for many professions becoming a citizen is a necessary prerequisite. When, however, citizenship is coupled with language competence, this has a direct and indirect influence on chances in the employment market. The same thing applies to social integration insofar as having a network also improves chances on the employment market.

¹⁴ Bernstein's ideas have been criticised by William Labov (1966). On the basis of his own research, above all on the language of Afro-American youths, Labov concludes that different class dialects with reference to the breadth and differentiation of their expression are functionally equivalent to Standard English. The language of the lower

Is the connection between language competence and the chances of participation in different fields of society also valid for learning a foreign language and possessing transnational linguistic capital? For migrants, who want to gain a foothold in a linguistic community, there is a great incentive to learn the new language. For people who live in a homogeneous linguistic community, separated from other speech communities, there is no utility – at least not in a sociological sense – in learning a foreign language. They cannot improve their chances of participation and getting access to relevant resources by learning a foreign language, since due to their isolated position they cannot establish any social relationships at all with foreign speakers. Under these conditions transnational speech capital is worthless.

Should, however, the circumstances of a society be different, should we be dealing with a globalised world with many-faceted exchange relationships between different countries speaking different languages, then foreign language skills become useful capital, because they can now be used for transnational interactions. It is precisely this situation which has come about since the middle of the last century, at the latest since the 1970s. The relevant transformation processes are treated in the literature under the headings of “globalisation, transnationalism and Europeanisation”. Before I discuss these altered circumstances and the significance of transnational linguistic capital in more detail, I would like to examine more closely the second function of language, namely its role in identity formation and community building.

Several examples illustrate that in spite of language’s extensive utility for getting access to relevant resources many people are not prepared to put their native language ‘on the back burner’, even though this would be very advantageous. Also the massive conflicts between different speech groups,

class is indeed different from Standard English, but it is not deficient (difference versus deficit hypothesis). Steven Pinker argues in a similar vein (1994: 28f.). However, from a sociological perspective it does not matter whether linguists like William Labov or cognitive psychologists like Steve Parker, following Chomsky, assume that different class dialects are of equal value, because they are only different superficial manifestations of an identical deep structure. When, in a society, different languages are evaluated differently and this evaluation leads to the fact that people are more successful in that society using a certain language – as a rule the standard language – than with another language, then this is a social fact.

arguing about the hegemony or autonomy of their languages, are hard to understand when the function of language is reduced to the instrumental dimension only (from the economic perspective cf. Grin 1994: 32). Language can become and very often becomes a group identity characteristic and obtains thereby an identity building function. If this is the case then giving up your own language and adapting to a new language can become a question of identity.

2.2.2 Language as Symbolic Capital

“A relationship will be called ‘communal’ (Vergemeinschaftung) if and so far as the orientation of social action – whether in the individual case, on the average, or in the pure type – is based on a subjective feeling of the parties, either affectional or traditional, that they belong together” (Weber 1985: 40). The feeling of belonging to a group, the identification with a group can be “produced” by various characteristics. Communities can constitute themselves on the basis of a common skin colour, similar descent, a similar lifestyle or on the basis of a common language. A common language is of special significance here (Liebersohn 1970: 5f.). First of all I will explain, with reference to the pertinent social psychological research, the systematic connection between language and community building and group identity. I will then illustrate by means of several examples, the role language plays for identification within different communities.¹⁵ Since the mechanism which makes language uniquely suited for the creation of a sense of identity is usually implied, but not made explicit in sociological and historical literature, it seems to me to be worthwhile devoting more attention to social psychological research.

¹⁵ The sociological interest in an analysis of the conditions for the genesis of community feelings follows from the premise that communities have consequences relevant to action. On the one hand a community supports the solidarity of the members of the group between each other in different acts of solidarity. On the other, communities are defined by borders to other groups; community building frequently goes hand in hand with defensive actions towards other groups, extending from prejudice to war.

2.2.2.1 Language and Community from the Perspective of Social-Psychology

(1) The socio-psychological discussion on the factors which lead to the creation of group identity is strongly influenced by the work of Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner and the concept of the “Minimal Group Theory” (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1986; Billig & Tajfel 1973). In the experiments of Tajfel et al. the probands were divided into two arbitrary groups, which were previously non-existent. The groups were named after painters, so that there was a Klee Group and a Kandinsky Group. Next, people in the groups were asked to give certain sums of money to two people. One of the two came from the Klee Group the other from the Kandinsky Group. The people themselves were not known to the other probands. They only knew that the person was either a member of the Klee or the Kandinsky Group. There had been no previous contact between the probands and the others who were to receive the money. The Klee and the Kandinsky Groups were, therefore, not real groups but existed as such only in the minds of the probands. The results of the experiments demonstrated that the probands gave those people higher sums of money that were members of their own group, and gave members of the strange group significantly less. From these findings the authors of the study concluded that any arrangement of people in groups, regardless of how artificial they are, leads to the fact that groups are constituted simply on the basis of the categorical allocation to a group only and that they favour the members of their own group as opposed to those of a strange group. If this circumstance is valid for all criteria of categorisation, then it is also valid for language (Giles & Johnson 1987). However, are there findings which go beyond this, which demonstrate that a common language contributes more than other criteria to group building?

(2) To answer this question the recent work of Katherine Kinzler et al. (Kinzler et al. 2007, 2009; cf. the reference to earlier works which is given there) is relevant. The group of authors around Kinzler carried out several experimental tests in which they attempted to demonstrate, whether and to what extent the native language is a criterion which defines group belonging and leads to the fact that people prefer those who speak their native tongue

as opposed to those who do not. The innovative aspect of Kinzler and co-author's studies is that they have proved the connection between language and group belonging, even for the new born. In addition, they were able to prove that language, in contrast to other criteria, has a very special importance for the definition of group belonging.

(a) Five to six month old babies watched a film in which an English speaking woman spoke to them. The test was organised in a way that in the first showing the film was played normally. In the second showing with a second woman the language was run backwards, creating an artificial language. Then both women were shown being silent. The length of time the children looked at the women was measured. The woman who spoke in their native tongue was looked at significantly more often and longer than the woman who spoke in the artificial language. The native language, therefore, has an influence on the degree of attention which someone receives.

The experiment was repeated by using English and French instead of the artificial language; English for babies whose native language was English and French for those whose native language was French. It was demonstrated that the babies clearly paid more attention to the person who spoke in their native language. In order to analyse the effect of the native language not only on attention, but also on behaviour, the following experiment was carried out. The babies – now ten months old – watched a film in which first a woman spoke to them in their native language, and then in another language. At the end of the film each woman held a small plush toy in their hands. Directly after the film these plush toys were standing on a table in front of the children. The children were able to take one of them. They took the plush toy which earlier had been held in the hands of the woman who had spoken their language significantly more often. These findings were confirmed in a further experiment. Some children at five years of age were shown photos of two unknown children, while at the same time hearing one child speaking in English, the other in French. Afterwards they were asked which of the two children shown in the photos they would rather have as a friend. The children chose significantly more often the child who had spoken in their

native tongue. The results show that language has a clear influence on the choice of other people, on the degree of attention which people enjoy, as well as on the preference for people who speak the same language.

(b) This, however, still has not answered the question as to what degree language has a special, in comparison to other factors perhaps even a stronger influence on the building of groups. Kinzler et al. (2009) have also put forward findings to answer this question. Five year old white children looked at pictures of other children. Half of the children in the photos were black, the others white. Afterwards the children were asked which of the children shown they would like to have as a friend. The majority of the children chose a white child significantly more often – that is, someone with the same skin colour as themselves. In the second experiment the children were shown the same photos, only this time the children in the photos spoke. The white children spoke French, the black children spoke English. The native language of the children, with whom the experiment was carried out, was English. Again the children were allowed to pick a friend. This time the black children were chosen much more frequently; those, therefore, who also spoke English, but had a different skin colour. The interesting thing about both experiments and their findings is that the different strengths of two different categories were tested simultaneously. Until that time, research had assumed that above all it was visual criteria which were used for the classification of “in-groups” and “out-groups”, such as, sex, race and age. The experiment, however, demonstrates that language is obviously more important than, in the American context, such an important criterion as skin colour.

(3) Why language plays a significant role in the establishment of group identity is not entered into by the authors of the experiments. The following hypothesis can help to give a causal reason for the correlative connection. The fact that language can be used so effectively for the creation of communities probably goes back to the fact that all experiences of socialisation which we make after birth occur through the medium of language. The first words a mother speaks, the attention which we receive in

our parental home, the entire process of cognitive and emotional socialisation occur in the medium of language. We begin to think and to communicate in our native language. Language becomes an immediate component of our personal history, thereby allowing us to obtain a relationship of the deepest intimacy with our own language, with its words and with its sounds.

It is exactly this fact which makes our native tongue especially suited for the processes of collective identity building. In contrast to other criteria used to create collective identities, our native language is interwoven to a great degree with personal experiences, with our own history and personal identity. It signals the belonging to the group, which is the primary group for every human being. Kinzler et al. (2009), with reference to the relevant literature, suggest that seen from an evolutionary point of view this can be combined with advantages. While the variance of physiognomy among different groups tends to be low, this is not the case for language and different accents by which one can recognise one's own group as opposed to groups of strangers. In addition to this, language in comparison to other identity criteria, like wearing certain clothes, body painting or cultural practices, cannot simply be changed and is a constant indicator of belonging to a group. Usually it is not possible to speak a new language without an accent, if one has not learnt it by the end of youth. The native language thus remains a relatively constant identity marker (Lieberson 1981).

(4) The findings discussed up to now from experimental social psychology have referred to the significance of language in the categorisation of people, without the people having further contact with one another on the basis of the classification made. When, however, a common language is a central criterion for group building, then as a rule consequences derive in day-to-day situations from this group building. Once chosen, the persons will interact with one another and they do this in one and the same language. The community building process based on a common language leads to a concentration of interactions between the members of the community and hence leads to a society building process: The children in the group who have

chosen their friends will play with them, plan to meet again, they play with each other again, etc. Since the choice of friends occurs on the basis of a common language, society building also takes place in a common language. The growing society building process strengthens in turn the community feeling of the group members. Language, therefore, in comparison to other criteria not only has a special meaning for bringing a group into existence, it forces the pace of the society building process of the group and impacts in turn on the community building of the group.

(5) Let us assume that for various reasons the group which has been formed decides to describe themselves as a group, that is, to name features which are typical of themselves. Hence a level of reflection and self-description can be added to the process of normal group interaction. The group knows that it is a group, that all members of the group speak the same language and that it is this which differentiates it from other groups. It is very probable that the members of the group, in order to describe their group identity, will have recourse to the common feature of a linguistic identity. In this way the community has constituted itself reflexively as a language community. It has become a group which gains its identity factually as well as reflexively from a common language. Political entrepreneurs can build on the possibility of making a group identity through self-description. History, particularly descriptions of the rise of nation states, has provided many examples of how nations as imagined communities are created by political elites on the basis of language. I will return to this at a later point when discussing the importance of language in the creation of nation states.

The arguments which up to now have been formulated with reference to socio-psychological literature have tried to make plausible why language, besides having a society building function, also has a community building function. This obviously does not mean that language is the only characteristic by which communities can be constituted. It also does not mean that linguistically heterogeneous groups cannot develop a group identity; the characteristics of identity building are just different in these cases. However, the explanations should have shown that a common

language is one among several characteristics that is suitable for (a) forming communities and that (b) language – for the abovementioned reasons – is especially well suited for facilitating the processes of community building.

One can also formulate the abovementioned connection between language and community building, similar to that between language and community building, from the perspective of the individual. Knowledge of the language which is spoken in a group and a good command of it, from the individual's point of view, is not only a resource, an instrumental capital, but can also be important for the identity building of a society.

We have not yet addressed the type of community language can be “used” for. History and the present show us that language can be used for defining the identity of nations, regions and classes. This can be illustrated by several examples.

2.2.2.2 Language and the Identification with various Communities

Nation and Language: The establishment of nation states is probably the most prominent example in history of the use of a common language as an identity marker for establishing a community. In almost all cases the establishment of a nation state goes hand in hand with a policy to homogenise a country linguistically and to establish one single language which then becomes the official language.¹⁶ The process of establishing one single official language is not only an instrument of nation state society building, but also a medium of community building. The single language becomes an official language, as well as a national language and, thus, the central feature of a nation's identity. Almost all nation states have developed institutions for the preservation and nurture of their language. They regulate the usage by the writing of dictionaries and through institutions whose job it is to maintain the language. They begin to canonise their national literature, preserve folk songs and folk culture and describe their identity by means of their national language. The reverse side of the process of linguistic

¹⁶ Some of the smaller states in Europe, for example, Belgium and Switzerland, are exceptions to this general rule; here the internal linguistic division became socially institutionalised.

homogeneity and the establishment of a common language as an identity marker of the nation is the exclusion and repression of minority languages (cf. Mann 2001). I will go into the connection of nation state building and linguistic homogeneity in more detail in chapter 3.

Region and Language: However, there are also many examples in history of the national language being rejected in order to express the identity of a sub-national unit. The division of Belgium in Walloon and Flemish parts is purely a linguistic division and has a long history. The supremacy of French speaking Wallonia, which had supported the foundation of a Belgian state in 1831, increasingly aroused the resistance of Flanders and the Flemish movement, which step by step won cultural and linguistic rights (cf. Kern 1997). The development which has taken place in several regions of Spain in the era after Franco, or the Baltic states after independence from the Soviet Union are further examples in the present day. The Basque region, Galicia and Catalonia rose up against the dominance of the Spanish central state after Franco's death and developed their own regional autonomy. This emancipation manifested itself in a number of different dimensions. In all three regions the language of each has become the central feature of regional identification. Castilian, as a *quid pro quo*, was regarded as the language of the central power, which had repressed regional autonomy for centuries and its symbolic capital was increasingly devalued. Catalonia has been particularly successful with its autonomy and language policies (cf. for the following Bernecker et al. 2007). During the Franco era the official use of the Catalan language was forbidden and instruction in schools took place only in Spanish. Today this has been radically changed. In parliament and in the civil service, Catalan is spoken and street signs are written in it. The most important means of transmission for passing on Catalan are the schools. A policy of "immersion" has been introduced in the primary schools, the aim of which is to teach Catalan as quickly as possible to those children who do not know the language. Today the universities are also being taught mainly in Catalan, while the media broadcast and print in it for the most part, too. Many jobs, especially in the civil service of the Catalan region, require that

the person who fills the position can also speak Catalanian. Having a good command of the Catalanian language, and especially being able to speak it instead of Castilian has become a central mark of Catalanian identity. For those who speak the language the competence itself ensures recognition from their linguistic community. Kathryn A. Woolard and Tae-Joong Gahng (1990) in their study on the status of Catalanian were able to prove this correlation.¹⁷

Similar developments can be demonstrated in the Baltic states after their independence from the Soviet Union. Take, for instance, Latvia. During the Second World War the country was occupied by Russia and integrated by force into Soviet Union. Between 1940 and 1990 the composition of the population changed through immigration and resettlement and the number of Russians increased exponentially. After the restoration of sovereignty in 1990 Latvian became the only official language. The new Latvian sovereignty and identity revealed itself in a corresponding linguistic policy which upgraded Latvian in all areas of society to the detriment of Russian (cf. Nic Craith 2008: 31ff.). Many people in Latvia who suffered under the rule of the Soviet Union were not much inclined to speak Russian, in spite of knowing the language, simply because it was the language of the oppressor.

Social Class and Language: For societies in which one language is spoken and everyone learns this language with their socialisation, it is nevertheless true that as a rule there are different dialects, class dialects and accents in these societies. Even though the dialects in regard to oral and written language skills and the chance to communicate are equal, this is frequently not the case with the symbolic recognition accorded to the dialects. Together with the process of linguistic homogeneity, many nation states developed a high level language which was canonised by linguists and other academics. Pierre

¹⁷ There are similar developments in Galicia, which, with its around 2.7 million inhabitants, is one of the poorest regions in Spain. In June 2007 the following resolutions were passed regarding the Galician language. (1) All communication with the civil service must be made in Galician. (2) Instruction in schools must be at least fifty percent in Galician. This applied to pre-school as well as for primary, secondary and adult education. All subjects were to be taught in Galician including Physics, Biology, etc. (3) The teachers had to provide proof of competence in Galician, which, of course, excluded many applicants from other parts of Spain.

Bourdieu (1992) has reconstructed this process for France and has shown how it was possible for the elites to establish a single language and to delegitimise other languages and dialects (Bourdieu 1992; cf. also Loos 2000; from the perspective of a historian cf. Weber 1976). Command of the high level language is paired with high social recognition. Those who know it, distance themselves from those who do not. They capitalise on their ability by using it as symbolic capital, gaining distinction by distancing themselves from the common language of the lower classes with all its “vulgarity” (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977: 119; cf. also Bourdieu 1992: 43-65). Above all the schools and institutes of learning classify those people being able to articulate well in the high level language with high social recognition.

The command of the high level language not only brings advantages in respect to qualifications, better chances on the employment market and a higher income (see the remarks on the society building function of language), but it also signalises membership in the upper classes and helps to create classes, that is, to transfer a class position into class consciousness and class identity (Bourdieu 1992: 62ff.).¹⁸ Research in the psychology of language has shown in many studies that high level language, which is usually spoken by the upper classes, is valued considerably more than class dialects (cf. the literature overview in Giles & Billings 2004). The different evaluations of language lead to consequences for its speakers. Landlords prefer speakers who speak the high level language; the same is true for teachers in evaluating children’s school work. For the same crimes judges give milder sentences to those who speak the high level language well than to those who do not. Finally, it has also been shown that employers, all other things being equal, are more inclined to hire people who speak the high level language than not.

The examples illustrate that language can be, and is used as a central factor in the making of various kinds of collective identities. Much historical research demonstrates how important and how relevant language can be for the

¹⁸ The situation is the same for migrants who change not only their country, but also the language community. The learning and the speaking of the language of the host country is not only combined with advantages in the society, which we have described above, but also with an increase in recognition and symbolic capital.

construction of “imagined communities”. Socio-psychological findings provide plausible reasons why language is especially suited to serve as a factor in the creation of communities. If people identify with a linguistic community they are often prepared to bear a high “price” for the defence or for the expansion of their linguistic community. For instance, migrants who have a high identification with their native tongue and regard it as one of the major factors of their original identity, and for this reason reject the language of their host country, will have to accept drawbacks in education, in integration in the employment market, in creating networks with the natives and in the extent of their political involvement. The people of Galicia, who possess a high identification with their region and therefore support the state education policy of instructing the children in Galician, will limit the chances of their children to have international communication and relationships to one region, because Galician is spoken by only a very few people.

These examples demonstrate that the society and community building functions of a language can contradict each other. If language is an important identity marker of a group then relinquishing their own language can mean the loss of their collective identity. Under these conditions instrumental advantages which might follow from adapting to a new language will be paid for by disadvantages in the symbolic dimension of identity formation.

This situation is also true for the acquisition of a foreign language. People can identify positively or negatively with a foreign language. The stronger a positive emotional identification with a language, the greater is the willingness to learn it and vice versa. The level of identification with a language is, in turn, primarily determined by the level of identification with the group who speaks this language.¹⁹ The level of intensity people identify with languages is consequently determined by the collective identities they feel connected to.

¹⁹ The rejection of English by a section of the population in Germany after the Second World War is explained by the rejection of the Americans and the British as victors and as occupiers; the rejection of Spanish in Catalonia is an expression of the rejection of the dominance of the Spanish central government.

2.3 Transnational Linguistic Capital and its Growing Importance

When people live in a society which is linguistically homogeneous and cut off from other societies which speak different languages, there is not much sense in learning a foreign language. They can improve neither their social nor their communal chances through learning another language. However, the more societies are interconnected with other societies, whose members speak a foreign language, the more valuable it becomes to be able to speak several languages. I will deal in more detail in chapter 3 with the changed circumstances which create the potential for the use of foreign language skills. At this point it will suffice to give a short sketch of the changed circumstances which support the argument that under globalisation and Europeanisation the possession of transnational linguistic capital has become particularly important. Nation state societies are described in the literature as “container societies” (Taylor 1994; Beck 1997). This means that the institutions of a society remain restricted to the territory of each nation state. Even the various forms of interaction (from the exchange of goods to marriage) dominantly take place within the nation state. Globalisation and transnationalisation have increasingly subjected the national states to change. This is true above all for the countries which are members of the European Union. The member states of the EU have been definitely made “porous” in the last forty years, insofar as they have transferred a part of their sovereignty to the institutions of the European Union, whereby the political areas for which the European Union and not the nation states are responsible have been expanded. This development, initiated by the EU member countries themselves, of shifting legislative powers has led to a Europeanisation of the societies of the member countries of the EU, as well as to an increase in exchange among them, thus contributing to a porosity of the nation state containers (cf. Münch 2001, 2008; Fligstein 2008; from the historical perspective cf. Kaelble 2005, 2007). Above all the creation of the European domestic market, as well as the freedom of movement of goods, capital, services and labour has encouraged trans-border economic development, the increase and the growth of inner European trade, the

growth of European value added chains and the transnationalisation of capital (cf. Ambrosius 1996; Hirst & Thompson 1998; Fligstein & Stone Sweet 2002; Fligstein & Merand 2002; Verwiebe 2004). However, European societies have been deeply altered not only by Europeanisation, but also by globalisation. Since the 1970s interregional economic, communication and political exchange has increased exponentially (see chapter 3.2).

These structural changes have different consequences for the different groups within a society. Many observers have pointed out that above all the upper class and especially high finance profit from globalisation and Europeanisation (Beck 1997; Zürn 1998; Altvater & Mahnkopf 1999; Hartmann 2007). Open borders enable businesses to win new markets and to relocate to countries in which wages and labour costs are considerably cheaper than in their own country. In comparison to business, the mobility of the workforce is much lower. People are strongly bound to their home, their family and their country. The differences in mobility lead to differences in opportunities and income. While capital itself profits from the changed order of things, people very often have to bear the brunt of the disadvantages, such as reduction or stagnation in pay, a drop in tax revenue for the state, or higher unemployment.

Nevertheless, all work is not the same, as people are equipped in different ways with human capital; it depends on adequate human capital whether the process of transnationalisation and Europeanisation is connected with advantages or disadvantages. Multilingualism assumes an added importance under the conditions of transnationalisation and Europeanisation. Since the nation states usually speak different languages, trans-border exchange is only made possible, or made considerably easier, when people have the necessary transnational language skills. Having this resource makes it very much easier to interact with people from other countries, to do business, to cooperate on scientific matters, to conduct political negotiations, to organise protests beyond national borders, to enter into relationships, etc., in short: to socialise transnationally in different dimensions. Being in possession of transnational language skills thus puts those who are multilingual in a position to play a

part in the process of transnationalisation and Europeanisation and to build up the required transnational relationships. Those who only speak their native language are confined to their own country and cannot make use of the advantages of a united Europe and a globalised world. Therefore, being in possession of transnational linguistic capital is a new source of social inequality in the context of a developing European society.

In the empirical analyses I will differentiate between two variations of transnational linguistic capital. People possess transnational linguistic capital when they speak various foreign languages regardless of which foreign languages these are – all languages will be treated equally here. However, the usefulness of a language varies with the amount of communication partners one can achieve through its knowledge. The number of potential communication partners is calculated in turn from the sum of people who speak this language as a mother tongue and those who speak it as a foreign language. Since this number of speakers is different depending on the language, the utility of different languages varies. The amount of people, for instance, who speak Latvian or Finnish as a native or foreign language is considerably lower than for those who speak English. English is the language within the EU, as we will see, which has the highest communicative value. People possess – and this is the second variant – transnational linguistic capital when they know the language with the highest linguistic utility (English).

Good linguistic competence can be, as we have seen above, useful for various social fields. This is also valid for possessing transnational linguistic capital under the circumstances already outlined.

(a) Multilingualism opens up, first of all, educational possibilities and provides the chance to acquire qualifications which will lead to better paid work. The more and the better one knows different languages, so all the better – *ceteris paribus* – the marks will be that one gets in school. In addition and above all, multilingualism enables entrance to institutions of learning in other countries, to pass exams there and to obtain qualifications, which,

when we think of American and British elite universities, have a better reputation.

(b) Multilingualism improves access to better professional positions; positions which are coupled with a high income and prestige. On the one hand access to the employment market is frequently connected with the acquisition of educational qualifications. If having transnational linguistic capital leads to higher and better qualifications, then it is indirectly connected to better access to better paid jobs. On the other hand multilingualism is directly connected to chances on the employment market. This is especially true in the European Union. The institutionalising of the rule on free movement has given all citizens of the Union the freedom to seek work, to settle or to provide services in every member state. The rule on freedom of movement is equally valid for the self-employed (the right of settlement). This legal expansion of job possibilities can in fact only benefit those who can speak several languages, because most foreign jobs require knowledge of the country of residence's language. Domestic firms have also internationalised their contacts, which has led to a change of the requirement profile for employees. International experience, intercultural competence and multilingualism have become central qualifications. The same is true for politics and the political bureaucracy. "Even bureaucracies, traditionally the stronghold of nation state self-isolation, are today incorporated in networks of communication and information. Many technical committees and administrations (...) have to consult with experts from other countries in order to be able to correctly assess legal affairs and issues resulting from this interweaving" (Mau 2009: 69). It cannot be denied that indeed their level of internationalisation has increased enormously (see chapter 3.1). All in all one can assume that people who have transnational competences in general and transnational linguistic capital in particular have better career possibilities.²⁰

²⁰ On the question as to what extent the elites in various countries are already Europeanised see Michael Hartmann (2007: 195-213, 2009).

(c) Thirdly, multilingualism improves the possibility of expanding one's own network and hence the chance to internationalise social relations. International networks are themselves in turn social capital, which can be used to expand business connections, political contacts and as an information stock exchange.

(d) Finally, having transnational linguistic capital improves the chances for political participation. Knowing foreign languages enables participation in the political life of another country; one can follow the reports in the media better and get involved by joining parties and civil organisations. The transnationalisation of political participation is especially relevant within the context of European integration. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the citizens of the EU possess, besides their own nationality, citizenship of the Union, and thereby obtain the right to vote in local elections in the European country where they are resident. However, they can only make use of this legal right when they understand the language of the country and can inform themselves about the political debate in the country concerned.

(e) Apart from the instrumental use, multilingualism has a symbolic use. As we have seen, the symbolic use of language refers to identification with a community, whereby the language can be used to construct various communities (nation, region, class, etc.). I suspect that having transnational linguistic capital can be used to create a new class consciousness. People who are multilingual and can therefore be active in different countries and in different languages are respected by their fellows for having this competence. In the same way as the cultural elite in the countries stage-manages their highly cultured way of life as an educated class through public appearance, distancing themselves from the middle classes, so the possession of transnational linguistic capital enables people to present themselves as a transnational class and to distance themselves not only from the middle and lower classes but also from the upper classes in their own countries, who have remained purely national. Thus one can capitalise on the ability to speak many languages by creating symbolic capital and by distancing oneself from

the “locals”.²¹ It is not difficult to imagine that the strategies to gaining distinction on the basis of foreign language skills are much the same as those which Pierre Bourdieu has described for the highly cultured life style. The fact, that foreign language competence is a result of a learning process is covered and multilingualism is presented as a supposedly natural skill. Those who do not speak any foreign language are regarded as being backward.

Besides having a new class consciousness the new multilingual elite might stand out as having an altered solidarity with the nation state. Adam Smith formulated a similar idea 150 years ago in his book ‘Wealth of Nations’: “The proprietor of land is necessarily a citizen of the particular country in which his estate lies (...). The proprietor of a stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country” (Smith 1864: 358). It is precisely those people who are operating transnationally, integrated in transnational networks, who dissolve their ties to the nation state.²² Steffen Mau, Jan Mewes and Ann Zimmermann (2008a/b) show, for example, that people who have many foreign connections, who are embedded in transnational networks, are more likely to be cosmopolitan in their attitudes and have positive attitudes towards foreigners (Mau et al. 2008a/b).²³ One can assume that a transnational position will also lead to a new tie to and identification with international organisations, such as the European Union. I will return to this subject in chapter 5 again with my own brief analysis.

²¹ Empirically we know very little about the newly developing transnational class, even if there are some popular scientific speculations on this subject.

²² Samuel P. Huntington (2004) describes in his book on the change in American identity the reduction in the ties of the international elite to the USA and sees in it a danger for the future of the USA.

²³ Being cosmopolitan is defined by the authors as follows: “Cosmopolitanism, in contrast, is conceived as a particular worldview characterised by the capacity to mediate between different cultures, the recognition of increasing interconnectedness of political communities and the approval of political responsibility at the supranational and global level” (Mau et al. 2008b: 2).

3. FROM NATION STATES TO A EUROPEAN SOCIETY

In the preceding chapter I have emphasised that it is only under certain contextual circumstances that foreign language proficiency becomes an important human resource. Three factors are significant here, which I will describe in more detail in this chapter. These factors are determined by the macro-structural background conditions which make transnational linguistic capital a relevant resource in the first place.

The necessity to speak various languages in order to interact within Europe is dependent upon the respective institutionalised language constellation. In the United States, for example, English is the official language in all the states. It is not necessary for the citizens of Maine and Idaho to speak a foreign language in order to be able to communicate with each other, aside from the possible difficulties in communicating with immigrants. In the United States of Europe, however, the situation is entirely different. The EU is a merger of twenty-seven sovereign states. As a rule there is only one official language in each nation. A linguistically segmented structure organised according to nation states is a constitutive characteristic of Europe's linguistic constellation. A description of the genesis of this basic constellation will be the topic of the first section.

As long as the majority of interaction and communication occurs within the borders of a particular nation there is no need to learn a foreign language. However, the more societies interact with others which speak different languages, the more valuable it becomes to speak a foreign language. In a

second step I will explain how the processes of Europeanisation and globalisation have weakened and internationalised the borders of the encapsulated societies of the EU – known as container societies – so that possessing transnational linguistic capital has become a relevant resource.

The emergence of nation states is a perfect example of how formerly linguistically heterogeneous structures became homogeneous due to political decisions. It is for this reason that it is important to analyse the language policies of the European Union more closely, which I will do in the third section. The language policies of the EU are characterised by two significant features: on the one hand the acceptance of the linguistic heterogeneity of the European Union and the rejection of a policy of linguistic homogenisation, and on the other considerable support for European citizens' multilingualism. In a third step I will analyse in more detail the political and ideological background of these policies.

There is a general argument which underlies this chapter: The linguistic order is a parasite on the social order; if the host (social structure of the world) changes, then the parasite (constellation of languages) changes. The social order is in turn an order which is structured hierarchically with a centre and a periphery; the strengths and weaknesses of individual languages reflect the hierarchically structure of the world order.

3.1 Nation Building, and Language Standardisation, World Society and the Rise of English as a Hegemonic *lingua franca*

The need for people to speak different languages so that they can interact with one another across Europe, and beyond, arises from the specific institutionalised language constellation. If all the European countries spoke the same language, then the problem of mutual understanding would not arise. This, however, is not the case, since the institutionalised order of languages, that is, the regime of languages in Europe, is organised according to nation states and is hence linguistically segmented. Within the individual nation states themselves, though, there is only very limited linguistic

heterogeneity, since most of the member states recognise only one language; inter-state heterogeneity, in contrast, is virtually one hundred percent, because the twenty-seven member countries have twenty-three official languages. In Section 3.1.2 I will explain precisely how this linguistic constellation in Europe came about as the nation states emerged.

Nation states themselves are embedded in an international order, in a world society which allots to the various nation states very different statuses. Inevitably, the varying levels of importance between the nation states go hand in hand with the varying importance of their languages. The factors which are responsible for the worldwide dominance of English will be discussed in a second step (chapter 3.1.3). The fact that English today is the language most widely disseminated is the reason why it is not only a good idea to learn foreign languages in general, but English in particular. The ideas concerning the relationship between the global society and the status of languages are based primarily on the work of Abram de Swaan (de Swaan 1993, 2001b).

3.1.1 General Mechanisms of Language Change

Recent comparative linguistics has employed concepts and theories from evolutionary biology (cf. Dixon 1997; Mufwene 2001) to analyse not only the relationship of different languages to one another but also their linguistic changes. In principal, three constellations can be distinguished regarding the development of the various languages in relation to one another.

(1) The jumping off point of the development of languages is a constellation in which there are several different language groups speaking different languages in one area, but which are not, or only to some extent, interconnected with one another. In this situation the language development of the individual languages is influenced primarily by endogenous factors. The evolution of language is based on the concrete spoken language and not on the abstract system of rules, which linguists suppose to be the common

elements of a language, or, in other words its deeper structure. Languages are not spoken in a uniform manner by their speakers; there are constant deviations from the standard language, because there are scarcely any speakers who speak a language perfectly. This mechanism of the “imperfect replication” of a language (Mufwene 2001: 193) leads to the constant production of linguistic deviations (pool of variations). These variations lead to the emergence of dialects and over several thousand years this leads to a change in the language, so much so that the ultimate change deviates to such an extent that the original language and its mutation have very little left in common.

(2) The development of languages is different when different groups of speakers of various languages are in contact with one another. Dixon (1997) distinguishes a special sub-case for this constellation. Within a particular territory there exist several language groups with a similar size. If these different groups are in contact with one another then changes in the languages can be put down to internal mutations on the one hand and mutual linguistic influences between the groups on the other; the changes are, however, of a moderate nature. If the constellation survives for a long time, for instance, over several thousand years, and if exchange between the (different) language groups continues, then this leads to a slow adaption of the languages to one another, so that they converge into a common prototype. Dixon (1997) has demonstrated that the development of languages in Australia up to its discovery and colonisation followed this model.

(3) The constellation between various languages changes dramatically, though, when a situation of punctuated equilibrium occurs. The concept of punctuated equilibriums is a theory published by the American palaeontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould in 1972, which states that biological development normally occurs slowly and through small variations in particular phases. Changes, on the other hand, occur in an explosive manner when the process is “punctuated” by exogenous events. Dixon applied this idea to the analysis of changes in languages. Events which

lead to a rapid change in the language constellation are generally speaking societal events, which alter the power and prestige between different language groups. Thus, natural catastrophes or epidemics can decimate the number of speakers of a particular language, causing the relative power of other language groups to increase, which then expand at the cost of the other languages. Therefore, the changes in the relative power of different groups of speakers are responsible for the fact that some languages gain while others lose significance. The languages themselves react to social changes like parasites to their hosts. With the expansion or disappearance of social groups (hosts), languages also expand or disappear (Mufwene 2001: 192ff.). There are many reasons for the power of a specific group, for example, military might, conquest and the suppression of formerly foreign territories, economic power through the expansion of trade, as well as religious or ideologically motivated expansion, constitute the major driving forces.

Linguistic research on the evolution of languages forms the foundation and point of departure for sociological analysis. The two following developments are particularly important for our research question. The rise of nation states in Europe and their worldwide expansion as a type and a model of how to organise a society can be understood as a punctuation, which has fundamentally altered the hierarchy of languages, so that on the one hand in almost all nation states a process of linguistic homogenisation was triggered, while on the other hand linguistic segmentation between the nation states was institutionalised insofar as different nation states speak different languages.

At the same time the nation states are embedded in a world society whose structure gives varying positions of power to the different nation states. Powerful nation states, or rather those which were influential in the past and have left traces of their power behind them, such as the colonial powers, determine the international hierarchy of languages because their position of world hegemony bestowed upon their individual languages a hegemonic position.

For both developments it is true to say that societal institutions precedes and determines the language constellation and the hierarchy among the languages. The number of individual languages which are spoken on this earth, the dominance of some languages and the insignificance of others is undoubtedly determined by the power structures and the social order of institutions, which determine the hierarchy of languages like a punctuation.

3.1.2 Nation State Building and Language Standardisation

When sociologists and, indeed, lay people talk about society they are usually thinking of societies as nation states, for example, the societies of the USA, Ghana, France or Peru. Even in cases where no nation state exists, the problem of the non-existence of a society is dealt with in terms of nation state categories. The most prominent example, which we hear about on the news almost daily, is that of the Palestinians, who are striving to achieve their own nation state. Even in areas of limited statehood, as in Afghanistan, the process of disintegration is discussed with reference to the nation state (cf. Risse & Lehmkuhl 2007). According to John W. Meyer, world society consists of the structural isomorphism of different nation states (Meyer et al. 1997). To understand societies as nation state societies is not an invention of sociologists blinded by constructivism, and therefore not the result of a methodological nationalism, but it has real substantive content. The world society is in reality divided into, among other things, nation states. At present there are 193 different nations states (as recognised by the United Nations) in the world.

Historical research on the emergence of nation states is so extensive that an overview is no longer possible. The following short summary cannot do justice to the amount of scholarly literature available, nor to the diversity of the different routes to nationhood. However, this is not our aim. From a sociological point of view our purpose here is to describe as an ideal type the general relationship between nation building and language constellation primarily with reference to the European nation states.

From an historical point of view organising societies as nation states is a relatively recent development. The process began in the 18th century and accelerated in the 19th and 20th centuries. What are the central characteristics of a nation state? According to the classical definition of the state by Georg Jellinek (“The Three Elements Theory” cf. Jellinek 1905; cf. Hobsbawm 1996: 516f.), a state requires political power on the basis of having the monopoly of physical power, as well as exercise of this power within the borders of a territory and over the citizens inhabiting that territory. According to Max Weber the state has “Anstaltscharakter” (institutional character) (Weber 1985: 516f.): Firstly, it secures and defines the borders with the help of the military and assumes control over all incoming and outgoing goods and people (with reference to the following see above all Rokkan 1999, 2000). Toll barriers, passport controls and customs embody state border policies. Secondly, the creation of a nation state is concurrent with the installation of a system of institutions confined only to that territory as well as the creation of a unified system of laws and regulations. This includes the creation of a nationwide administration, whose writ runs to the furthest corner of the nation, meaning the introduction of a unified system of registration (births, deaths, etc.), as well as a national currency and a national legal system, a national tax system, the creation and maintaining of a nationwide transport system (roads and rail), and a countrywide system of schools and universities. A national territory is pervaded and unified by these institutions, while local and regional peculiarities are usually smoothed out. At a later historical date, state rule reconnects to the will of the people it governs through the establishment of democratic forms of government within the national territory and the emergence of an interventionist state, which intervenes in the national society to establish favourable conditions for the market economy and to ensure social equality through a welfare state (cf. Leibfried & Zürn 2006).

The inclusion of the people who live within the territory of a state occurs parallel to the emergence of national institutions. The people become citizens of their state, they allow themselves to be registered, recorded and

administered as citizens of their country. They have to be educated (compulsory school attendance), are obliged to defend their country in time of war, must pay taxes and excise duties, in return for which they enjoy the protection of the state and freedom of movement within its borders. Above all, if it is a democratic state, they have the right to elect their government and can claim social welfare benefits from their (and only their) country.

The unique nature of a nation state consists in the fact that the different dimensions of the modern state overlap at the national level (Leibfried & Zürn 2007: 10). The congruence of territory, population and statehood in the abovementioned dimensions is, therefore, the constitutive characteristic of the creation of nation states (Held 1995; Zürn 1998). In this respect the description of nation states as container societies encompassing an increase in interaction is a correct one (Taylor 1994; Beck 1997).

However, nation states are not only characterised by specific institutional features, nation states are also characterised by a new type of sense of community, by a specific feeling or sense of belonging felt by its citizens. The nation becomes a dominant object of identification for its citizens and competes with alternative objects of identification, such as religion, region, ethnicity, or social class (Anderson 1991).

Historically and analytically two different combinations of state and nation can be distinguished. In the first case the process of building a state takes place initially and the nation comes later. Charles Tilly speaks in this event of “state led nationalism”. In the second case, a national social movement precedes the state building process. Tilly describes this process as a “state seeking” process. The emergence of a state can follow from the separation of a territory from a larger one or through the integration of several territories into a new nation state (cf. Tilly 1994: 133f.).

The importance of some features for the collective identity of a specific nation state and the status given to one feature in favour of another varies considerably among the nation states (Weber 1985: 242f., 528f.; Hobsbawm 1990). Many nation states put institutional characteristics at the heart of

their sense of identity. The rights won with citizenship, the values of the constitution, become the elements which are described as the special characteristics of the nation of which one is proud (state nation). As a rule we are dealing here with nation states in which the state and the apparatus of power have already been established before the process of nation building began (cf. here Hroch 2005). Typical representatives of the state nation are the USA and France at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. Other nation states emphasise a common descent, a common religion or common cultural values at the centre of their personal narratives (cultural nation). Very often these are nations which have not yet developed a state, and in which the process of creating a state followed the process of nation building.²⁴ Germany and Italy are frequently cited as the ideal types of a cultural nation. Nevertheless, it is equally true that the so-called state nations seek to establish a number of cultural elements in order to create their identity. The USA, for example, sees itself as a nation within the Protestant tradition; Americans celebrate their own history extensively as a symbol of national unity as well as referring to the English language as one of the central features of their identity (cf. for many others Huntington 2004).

Dramatic consequences for the linguistic order are bound up with the emergence and expansion of nation states as the dominant form of society and community. In practically all European nation states, but not only here, a linguistic homogeneity is established when one language is distinguished as the obligatory national and official language. Other languages, dialects or the languages of migrants which have existed up to then are marginalised and

²⁴ Historical research has shown that according to each nation state and historical constellation considerably different identity markers were used, so that possible generalisations have to be treated with caution (see Hobsbawm 1990 for the following). In many countries ethnicity plays an important role as an identity marker (China, Japan and Korea), in others very little. In Poland and Ireland the Catholic religion is an important criterion for national identity, not, however, in France. There are many countries which look to a long (partially invented) history as a criterion for their identity, while on the other there are just as many ethnic communities which have a long history, like the Mapuche and the Aymara Indians, that do not use it as a criterion for their identity construction. Finally, in many nation states a common language assumes the role of defining the nation, not, however, in Switzerland, Belgium or Canada.

often rigorously repressed (cf. the comprehensive study by Kamusella 2009 on the development of Central Europe).²⁵

Several of the smaller European states, for example Belgium and Switzerland, are exceptions to the general rule, since in these cases the internal linguistic cleavages were institutionalised, which has led to a federal system of institutions (Rokkan 1999; Rokkan & Urwin 1983). In spite of state unity the internal linguistic cleavages of both countries define to a great degree the behaviour of its citizens, as we have seen from the example of Switzerland in chapter 2. In this case within one and the same country the possibilities of mutual understanding are limited. For Belgium, which participated in the Eurobarometer survey upon which our empirical analysis in chapter 4 is based, the following distribution became evident. From those who speak Flemish as their mother tongue, 70% also speak French, although only 27% of Walloons speak Flemish (own calculations), which means that 73% of the Walloons cannot communicate with the Flemish in their native language.

In Switzerland where aside from Rhaeto-Romance, which is spoken by very few people, there are three more languages. Iwar Werlen (2008) reports the following distribution. From among those who speak German as their mother tongue, 71% speak French and 32% Italian. Of those who speak Italian as their native language, 74% speak French and 65% German. If the Swiss or Belgians want to communicate with each other they often have to resort to the language which the majority of them speak most frequently but which is not one of the national languages, namely English.²⁶

The reason why in most cases the process of nation state building went hand in hand with the process of establishing only one official language can be

²⁵ The term official language is here and in the following not to be understood as being defined explicitly in the constitution as the official language. This is neither true for the UK nor for the USA. It is only in the constitutions of some US federal states that English is expressly stated as the official language in the USA.

²⁶ For example, more Walloons speak English than Flemish. In the course of time the number of Walloons who speak Flemish has even declined, whereas the number of those who speak English has increased. Communication between Walloons and the Flemish by means of a third, foreign, language is becoming increasingly likely.

traced back to the two central functions of language: its society (a) and its community building function (b).

(a) The creation of a national system of institutions, the permeation of society with these institutions and the integration of citizens into this process are made much easier, if the people living in the territory speak the same language. The striving towards linguistic homogeneity had its origins in Absolutism (Hroch 2005: 62ff.), since bureaucracy, legislation, and all regulations can be very much more easily enforced when the people who are subject to them speak the same language. The process of linguistic homogeneity was continued with the emergence of nation states. A school and university system can be more easily founded when the language of instruction is the same. Transport systems can be better co-ordinated when the coordination can refer to a unified system of signs, and the integration of the citizens into the democratic process is more easily achieved with monolingualism. The enormous reduction of transaction costs which goes hand in hand with monolingualism is the most important reason why processes of nation state building almost always coincide with the attempt to determine, standardise and impose one language (Hobsbawm 1996: 88). Put another way, in those countries in which the emergence of a state and societal integration were very advanced, the pressure to achieve linguistic homogeneity was very great, whereas in those countries which were less socially integrated the level of linguistic segregation was higher. Miroslav Hroch (2005: 65ff.) has used this argument in an attempt to explain why Western societies were more highly linguistically homogenised than those of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(b) At the same time, and to a varying degree in the different nation states, the single language which had been declared the national language became a distinguishing marker of national identity. In chapter 2, I have already pointed out while referring to social-psychological literature that language is particularly suited for the development of a collective identity. In fact, many nation states define their identity, although not alone, through their national language. To this end, they generally create institutions which standardise

and guard linguistic usage by imposing obligatory dictionaries and grammar books. Myths about the origins of the language are “invented”, the history of the language is canonised and its special qualities are adjoined, furthermore a national literature written in that language is considered as something special. As historical research has demonstrated in detail, many of the processes in the various nation states of Europe have developed in this manner. The fusion of national identity is also expressed in the names of many nation states (England/English, German/Germany, French/France, and Spain/Spanish). In these cases the very nomenclature indicates the fact that language is a central distinguishing feature in the designation of national identity.

Europe is the continent in which the emergence of nation states not only started, but where it was also taken to the furthest degree. This is shown in the structure of the languages. Today Europe is the largest region in the world with the fewest number of regional languages (cf. the data in Haarmann 2006: 326ff.). The time span in which and the speed at which the process of homogeneity was accomplished varies considerably from country to country. Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to obtain concrete empirical information on the process of linguistic change.²⁷ I would, however, like to mention at least one example from the extensive literature, even if it's not possible to draw conclusions for other countries from the case described. Language change is relatively well researched in France.

The systematisation used by Dennis Ager (1996) to describe the rise of an official language, which he applied to the developments in France and England, is useful. Ager distinguishes four different phases, “Selection, Codification, Elaboration and Acceptance” (Ager 1996: 29-39, 1997).

²⁷ This has two reasons. Firstly, the sources for early periods are much worse than for the present; secondly, there are different definitions of what constitutes different languages. For instance, when various authors assert that in one country at a specific time only a percentage of the population spoke the language of the elite then it is frequently not clear whether the population spoke another language from the elite or just a dialect. If the latter was the case then communication between the elite and the populace would have been possible.

The first step is the choice of one language as a standard language from out of the number of spoken languages in one territory. In France it is the dialect of the Ile de France, Francien. The reasons for the rise of this and no other language are many, but they are all associated with factors of social power. Under the Capetians, Paris and the Ile de France gradually emerged as the political centre of France. It was heavily populated and wealthy, and in addition Paris was the cultural centre, with the royal court as a magnet for literary personalities and with the Sorbonne as a centre of learning. In rural areas of France the regional languages and dialects continued to be spoken. The regional elites, however, frequently assumed the prestigious dialect of the Ile de France and functioned as intermediaries. The second step in the establishment of a standard language consists in the codification of the chosen language. The codification of the French language is bound up with the foundation of the Academie Francaise in the year 1634. Its main function was the codification and the safeguarding of the French language by publishing dictionaries and grammar books. The third step in the establishment of an official language Ager calls "Elabouration". This means the adaptability of the language to new (technological) developments and the changes in dictionaries and grammar. Finally, the fourth step comprises the expansion and rise of the standard language at the cost of other spoken languages. The comprehensive rise of the standard language occurs in France in the period between the French Revolution and the beginning of the 20th century. Ager refers to various sources and concludes that the non-French speaking part of the population in France was forty-six percent in 1764, which decreases to twenty-five percent in 1863 and disappears almost entirely in the first third of the 20th century (Ager 1996: 37).²⁸

One of the main reasons why the rise of French was elevated to and carried out as a political programme in the French Revolution lies in the political

²⁸ The figures Ager presents deviate somewhat from the estimates of Eugen Weber. He surmises that at the beginning of the Third French Republic (1871) half of the French population did not speak French at all or, if so, to a limited degree (cf. Weber 1976: 70f.). In comparison to Italy that was still a high quota. Eric Hobsbawm (1996: 88) mentions that at the time of the unification of Italy in 1860 only around 2.5% of the Italians spoke Italian on a daily basis.

ideas of the French Revolution itself. Next to the intentional creation of a national consciousness, the idea took hold that political enlightenment and participation of the entire population was only possible when everyone spoke the same language. The implementation of the programme to educate the French citizens in a single language followed the establishment of a mandatory school system. While the school system under the Ancien Régime for the most part was in the hands of the church and was carried out in the regional languages, in the Republic it became a matter of state. French speaking teachers were sent into the provinces in order to teach the official language (Grillo 1989; cf. also Oakes 2001: 53-64).

The reverse side of the coin of nation state homogeneity is the marginalisation and repression of minority languages. They are banned to the private sphere of life; there is no institutionalisation through standardisation through dictionaries, safeguarding of the language, school instruction of the population in the minority languages, use as an official form of communication, etc. History is, in addition, rich in examples which demonstrate with what rigour and brutality minority languages were repressed in order to establish the concept of a single language. Due to the division of Poland at the end of the 18th century, for example, 1.5 million Poles were annexed to Prussia. At first Prussia tried to integrate them in a peaceful manner and gave them far reaching rights (bilingual decrees, Polish parity as an official and legal language, Polish schools). This policy was altered after the foundation of the German Reich in 1871 under Bismarck. Among the language policy measures, were the germanisation of Polish names, the transfer of Polish teachers, the prohibition of Polish as a school subject as well as Polish newspapers, and the final abolition of Polish as an official and legal language. Thus, language policy became “all the more repressive, the more evidently German nationalism grew” (Puschmann 1996: 20).

After 1922 the South Tyroleans in Italy were not treated much better under the rise to power of the Fascists. In South Tyrol Italian was introduced as the official language, German was forbidden as the language of instruction, place

names and sometimes family names were Italianated, resettlement of Italians was enforced (Puschmann 1996: 22).

On other continents many examples can also be found which demonstrate the connection between nation building and the oppression of minorities and their languages.²⁹ Taiwan, for example, which belonged to China, was seceded to Japan after the Chinese defeat in the Chinese-Japanese war. The Japanese government then introduced Japanese as the official language and severely suppressed Chinese. This policy was successful, for when Taiwan was returned to China in 1945 seventy-one percent of the population spoke Japanese. After 1945 Chinese was reintroduced as the official language and the pendulum swung in the other direction (cf. Chen 1999: 30ff.).

Examples of the oppression of linguistic minorities for the sake of the creation of a national identity extend into the present and affect Europe, as the conflict over the linguist rights of the Kurds in Turkey demonstrates. The emergence of Turkish nationalism with Kemalism formed the most important foundation for the new state founded in the 1920s. From the very beginning; a single Turkish language was the central element in the formation of an identity. The special nature of Turkish was legitimatised by the so-called sun linguistic theory. It was attempted to prove that Turkish was the original language from which all other languages sprung (cf. Laut 2000). This evidently absurd theory was taught at universities. The stylisation of Turkish into a national language meant conversely the delegitimising and repressing of the existing minority languages. The massive attempt of the Turkish state to integrate the Kurds into Turkish society went hand in hand with the suppression of the Kurdish language. The official use of the Kurdish language was forbidden for a long time and Turkish was the only language allowed. Kurdish surnames and place names were exchanged for Turkish names and place names. Resettlements involving the deportation of Kurds and the resettlement of Turks were intended to destroy the connection of language

²⁹ Cf., for example, the analysis of the connection between nation building and the linguistic homogenisation in the four Latin American countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay by Rainer Enrique Hamel (2003).

and territory. It is only recently and under pressure from the European Union within the negotiations for Turkish entrance to the EU that this has changed. The cultural freedoms of the Kurdish minority have been somewhat strengthened by allowing some use of the Kurdish language, Kurdish lessons in private schools and Kurdish radio and television channels, although the latter are very restricted and have only limited broadcasting time.

The institutionalised linguistic constellation existing in the member states of the European Union today is the result of this briefly outlined process of nation state organisation of society and identity building. The European Union is a merger of twenty-seven states which sooner or later have all gone through the process of building a nation state. The results are as follows:

- In eighteen out of twenty-seven EU countries there is only one official language.
- In a further six countries only one official language is permitted for the whole territory, in certain small regions, however, a second official language is allowed. These countries are: Austria, Spain, Italy, Finland, Slovakia, and the Netherlands.
- The third group is made up of the few countries which have all permitted the use of two or several official languages. Luxemburg, Belgium, and Malta are in this group.

Therefore the twenty-seven nation state containers of the EU which are each characterised by a specific institutional order have in most cases one single language. The borders of the nation state institutional order are usually identical with those of a discrete language, which, on the whole, gives the language order a very particular stability.

The nation state as the dominant form of societal organisation in the 19th and 20th centuries characterises generally speaking not only the rise of a single language to be spoken by all and the marginalisation and oppression of minority languages, but also the relationship towards the languages of migrants. While the national language and the minority languages form two sides of the same coin within a nation state, migrants and their languages do

not merit any attention at all within the horizon of this binary codification. There are, for instance, more Turkish speaking inhabitants in the countries of the EU than there are Luxemburgish, Maltese, Danish or Latvian speaking citizens (cf. Nic Craith 2008: 57f.), yet Turkish does not enjoy any official status, neither in the nation states nor on the European level.

3.1.3 World society and the Hegemony of English

Nation states have different levels of importance within the framework of the world society. Depending on size, military, economic and political power some occupy a hegemonic position, while others find themselves on the periphery. The position of power of the different nation states has a direct influence on the power position of their languages in the international order. Since the language constellation which has been institutionalised in a territory can only be replaced by another at the expense of enormous difficulties and transaction costs, it is not only the present distribution of power between nation states which is relevant, but also that of the past.

The shadow of history on the dominant relationships between languages is a particularly long one. Among other things this explains why the colonial period and the distribution of power between the countries during that time affects the order of languages today. In the broadest sense of the word the colonial period began with the conquest of Portugal and Spain, at that time known as Castile, at the beginning of the 15th century and ended at the close of the Second World War. The fact that Spanish³⁰ and Portuguese³¹ are still the official languages in many countries of the world originates in the early

³⁰ Aside from Spain itself, Spanish is the official language in the following countries: Central and South America: Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile; North America: the Federal State of New Mexico; the Caribbean: Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico; Africa: West Sahara (the official language together with Arabic) and Equatorial Guinea. Moreover, Spanish is spoken in Trinidad and Tobago as well as in Morocco.

³¹ Apart from its country of origin Portuguese is the official language in the following countries: South America: Brazil; Africa: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe; Asia: East Timor and Macau.

days of European conquest. France had to cede all their colonies in North America and India to Britain after their defeat in the Seven Years War (1763). Subsequently the colonial activities of France took place primarily in Africa and Asia. Many of France's former colonies have retained French as their official language even after independence.³²

The success of British colonial policy (for the following Crystal 2003) has been particularly influential on the present order of languages. The British Empire was created in a time span of over three hundred years. Expansionist phases of conquest alternated with peaceful periods in which trade and diplomacy predominated. The rise of the British Empire began with the settlement of the east coast of America in the early 17th century. The inhabitants of the thirteen colonies, who declared themselves independent in 1776, founded the USA and extended their territory at the cost of France, the Netherlands and Spain in the following century, were of British descent. They consequently kept English as their official language after independence from Great Britain. The fact that today Canada is predominantly English speaking can also be traced back to the power of the British Empire. After the defeat of France in the Seven Years War France had to cede its colonies in Eastern Canada to Great Britain.³³

In 1770 James Cook reached the east coast of Australia and claimed the country as a British colony, calling it "New South Wales". In the coming years the British continued to extend their area of influence and settled Australia for the most part with British convicts, who, naturally, spoke English. New Zealand, although independent at the beginning of the 19th century, became a

³² Aside from France, French is today the official language in the following countries: Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Ruanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Togo, Chad, and in the Central African Republic; Europe: Belgium, Luxemburg, Monaco, Switzerland; North America: Canada; Asia, Australia and Oceania: Comoros and Vanuatu. French is not the official language in all cases. In some countries French is common as the language of bureaucracy, above all in Africa: Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauretania, in Central America (Haiti) as well as in Asia in Laos and in Lebanon.

³³ England allowed the French Canadians in Quebec freedom of religion in order to ensure their neutrality in the conflict with the colonies in the future USA which was demanding independence. It is this decision which leads to the fact that today Canada is partially French speaking.

colony of the British Empire in 1840, mainly to forestall French expansion. This was followed by a large migration of Britons to New Zealand. Papua-New Guinea used to be called British-New Guinea and at the end of the 19th century was declared a British protectorate and then annexed. The small islands of Oceania suffered a similar fate.

British colonial influence also extended to Asia. The English had already established trading posts on the Indian sub-continent and in the 18th century the British East India Company became the dominant power. British India, which today constitutes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar), was the most important colony of all. The region was under direct British colonial rule from 1858 to 1947. Africa, which was largely unoccupied until around 1880, then became the main object of expansion for the European great powers. After losing the First World War, Germany lost its African colonies, so that together with France and Portugal Great Britain was the dominant African colonial power. Many of the African states have retained English as the official language, even after their independence following the Second World War.

In 1921, at the zenith of colonialism, the sovereign area of the United Kingdom was thirty-seven million square kilometres, roughly a quarter of the earth's surface. The total population was about 500 million, constituting around a quarter of the population alive at the time (Crystal 2003: 78). The hegemony of the United Kingdom led to the hegemony of its language. Added to this were the lost children of the British, the former colonies, who had already made themselves independent, like the USA and Canada, who continued to speak English. The consequences of the historical development for the hegemonic position of English are still with us today. In the following countries, English is still the official language or in some cases the official language together with others: Africa: Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Swaziland and the Seychelles; Asia: India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Singapore; Australia and Oceania: Australia, Papua-New Guinea, New Zealand together with the island of Fiji, the Solomon's, Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati, Micronesia, Tonga, Marshall Islands,

Palau, Nauru and Tuvalu; Europe: United Kingdom, Ireland and Malta; Central America: Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadine, Granada, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica as well as St. Kitts and Nevis; North America: the United States of America and Canada as well as Guyana in South America. Moreover, English together with other languages is the official language of various international institutions and organisations: the African Union (AU), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (USAN), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN).³⁴

The hegemony of English not only goes back to the colonial dominance of the United Kingdom, but also to the rise of the USA as a world power and the extension of its sphere of influence. The inevitable export of the English language in relation to this occurs not only in occasional cases through the military occupation of foreign areas and through force, but through mechanisms which can be categorised as “soft power” (Nye 2004). There are very many societal areas in which the USA plays a leading role and hence determines communication in these areas with its language (cf. Crystal 2003). The USA is the country on Earth which far and away imports the most goods, and it is one of the three countries with the highest volume of exports worldwide. Other, above all smaller countries, which want to do business with the USA, have an incentive to accommodate themselves to the USA’s dominance by doing business in English.

Furthermore, the fact that the USA is the leading scientific nation is indicated by the number of Nobel prizes which have been awarded to American scientists, especially in the period from 1945 to the present, or by the good rating of American universities in the worldwide rankings. This results in the fact that in many scientific areas the most important publications are in English. Scientists in other countries must, if they are to remain competitive,

³⁴ Further countries have another official language, although they use English as a means of communication: Somaliland in Africa, Malaysia, Israel and Hong Kong in Asia, Cyprus and Gibraltar in Europe as well as St. Martin in Central America.

adapt to the hegemony of the English language. The dominance of English can be substantiated with data from two fields of scientific research.


As table 3.1 illustrates the number of articles in chemistry published in English was already high at the end of the 1970s (62%); but the percentage of articles written in English still increased in the following years and sum up to 82.5% in 1998.

Table 3.1: Scientific articles in the field of chemistry in different languages (1978 to 1998, in %)

	1978	1982	1987	1992	1998
English	62.3	67.6	73.0	79.3	82.5
Russian	19.5	16.5	12.0	7.6	3.1
Japanese	4.7	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.5
German	5.0	3.8	2.9	2.3	1.6
Chinese	0.3	1.7	2.7	3.2	5.9
French	2.4	1.6	1.1	0.6	0.5
Polish	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3
Others	4.7	4.0	3.2	1.9	1.6
<i>N</i>	363.196	382.257	384.141	430.247	559.009

Source: Laponce (2003): Basis of analysis: "Chemical Abstracts"

Figure 3.1: Scientific articles in the field of sociology published in English (1960 to 2007, in %)



Source: Own survey and calculation. Basis: "Sociological Abstracts"; included are articles of „Peer Review Journals“ only.

The dominance of English is not only a characteristic feature of the sciences, but also of the social sciences and the humanities. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, the number of English written articles in sociology increased steadily over time.

The USA and the UK also the culture industry (books, periodicals, music, audio-visual media and art) dominates: in 2002 the greatest exporter was the UK with 8.5 billion dollars, followed by the USA with 7.6 billion. The largest importer in 2002 was the USA with 15.3 billion dollars, twice the second largest importer the UK (7.8 billion), followed by Germany in third place with 4.1 billion dollars (Unesco Institute for Statistics 2005). Added to this is the dominance of English in the “World Wide Web”; in order to be well informed it makes sense to understand English.

The dominance of English in many areas of society, of which I have given only a few examples, has no influence on the official languages chosen by the nation states, although it does have an influence on the choice of foreign languages which are learned by people in these countries, or rather, which are offered and taught by the institutes of learning. One of the last barriers against the “soft power” of Anglo-American power and its language was the Soviet Union. The member countries of the Soviet Union and the socialist states which were in its sphere of influence were subject to the hegemonic position of the Russian language. The citizens of the so-called Eastern Bloc generally learned Russian as their first foreign language, be it, because this was what the school curriculum offered, or be it, because they hoped to benefit from it. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its influence, the independence of the Central and East European countries and their increasing orientation towards Western Europe are reflected in a reorientation in their choice of foreign languages. The following table, which shows the percent of pupils in Hungary who learn various foreign languages, illustrates this dramatically. Within seven years starting from 1989 the number of pupils learning Russian had sunk from 81.3% to 3.7%.

Table 3.2: Number of students studying different foreign languages in Hungary (1989 to 1997, in %)

	89/90	90/91	91/92	92/93	93/94	94/95	95/96	96/97
ENG	34.2	41.2	47.4	53.0	56.3	58.1	60.2	61.8
GER	28.0	34.5	41.5	46.1	48.7	50.5	51.9	53.4
FRE	6.9	8.3	9.0	9.1	8.8	8.3	8.0	7.7
RUS	81.3	57.1	32.8	17.6	10.7	7.2	5.2	3.7
<i>N</i>	273.392	291.779	309.289	322.912	330.586	337.301	349.299	36.395

Source: Fodor & Peluau (2003: 85-98). The numbers apply to High Schools; the columns do not add up to 100% as the students can choose between several foreign languages.

The above effect is another striking example of the general argument which underlies this chapter, which is that the linguistic order – expressed in the terminology of evolutionary theory – is a parasite on the social order; if the host changes, then the parasite changes. The social order is in turn an order which is structured hierarchically with a centre and a periphery; the strengths and weaknesses of individual languages reflect the hierarchically structure of the world order.

The dominant position of English goes back to the dominant position of the British Empire, which has resulted in so many nation states using English as their official language and speaking English as their native tongue. Due to the very high transaction costs of a change once a language has been institutionalised, the former colonies have generally kept the language of their one time colonial rulers as their official language, even after their independence. In India, for example, in which both Hindi and English are officially designated in the constitution as the national official languages, the plan was that English should lose its equal status with Hindi after 1965. Primarily, the intended demotion of English had a symbolic function and was supposed to express the rejection of the old colonial order. Since it was clear, however, that giving up English would cost a very great deal, it was decided to refrain from carrying out the original plan.

Secondly, the hegemony of English is closely linked to the super power position of the USA since the Second World War and the power which it has

acquired in many other areas of society. The dominance of the USA has the effect of “soft power”, which makes it appropriate for many countries to have English as the first foreign language. If we look at the two trains of development together – nation state building and linguistic homogeneity on the one hand, the structure of the world society and the hegemony of English on the other, they suggest the picture of a “Global Language System” as outlined by Abram de Swaan (2001b). This has four levels:

(1) There are many languages in the *periphery* of the system usually spoken by a few people, and which are institutionalised to a limited degree. They are frequently not written languages, and are generally minority languages in nation states. The number of peripheral languages is very great, even though the number of speakers is fairly low (cf. the data in Crystal 2000: 15). As a rule communication between the different peripheral languages is not direct, but occurs via the relay station of the central or super-central languages.

(2) In the middle of the system, so to speak, are the official languages of the nation states, which de Swaan terms as *central languages*. These developed in the process of national state building, are institutionalised to a high degree, and insofar as they are written languages, are cultivated and supervised by the nation states and in which education and public communication (the media, literature) occur. Central languages are at the same and in most cases a central characteristic of a nation state’s identity. In most cases the establishment of the central languages has displaced the minority languages to the periphery. The number of central languages is put by de Swaan at around one hundred, hence in comparison to the peripheral languages very few; however, the number of speakers of these languages is at about ninety-five percent of the population (cf. Crystal 2000: 15).

(3) De Swann terms as *super central languages* the central languages which are the native languages in several nation states and are spoken in other countries by many citizens as foreign languages. The number of super central languages is very low (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Hindi,

Japanese, Malay, Portuguese, Spanish and Swahili), the number of speakers, however, very high.

(4) One language stands out from the group of super central languages even further and is termed by de Swaan as a *hyper-central language*. The language is English and this is based on the fact that not only so many people speak English as their first language, but there are also many who for the abovementioned reasons have learned English as their first second language. English is not the most widely spoken native language. It is Chinese, or rather Mandarin, with 1.2 billion speakers. If, however, one adds up all the people who either have English as their native tongue, or who are able to speak it as either a second language or a foreign language, then one arrives worldwide at an estimated figure of 1.5 billion English speaking people, that is, roughly one quarter of the world's population in 2000 (Crystal 2003: 6).

Let us sum up briefly the conclusions of this chapter. The institutionalised linguistic order in Europe consists of a structure divided into nation states which are linguistically segmented. The inner-nation state heterogeneity is very low, since most of the member states have permitted only one official language, whereas the inter-state heterogeneity is virtually at a maximum. This structure is the result of an historical process, which is closely linked to the emergence and stabilisation of the European nation states. Communication beyond the nation state containers is thus only possible when people speak a foreign language that is spoken in the other member countries.

At the same time we have seen that not every language is equally important. Powerful nation states, or those which in the past had great influence, determine the international linguistic order insofar as their world hegemonic position grants their languages a hegemonic position. The dominant position of the British Empire and that of the USA in the 20th century have led to the fact that a special predominance belongs to the English language. It is true that in Europe English is the official language in only the UK, Ireland and Malta; the worldwide prominence of English, however, makes it the language

whose utility as a means of communication is the highest (de Swaan 1993, 2001a/b). People who want to communicate with other people in other countries are well advised under these circumstances not only to increase their transnational linguistic capital in general, but above all to learn English. The thesis that the anticipated utility of communication of a foreign language influences the acquisition of a foreign language has been put forward by Abram de Swaan (1993, 2001/b). People learn the foreign language with which they can reach the greatest number of partners with whom they wish to communicate.

3.2 Europeanisation and Globalisation of Nation State Societies in Europe

As long as the nation states are so to speak self-sufficient containers, in which the greatest part of exchange is internal, there is little incentive to learn the languages of other countries. The more, however, societies are linked to other societies which speak other languages, the more worthwhile it becomes to speak several languages. In the following I will demonstrate how European unification has affected the degree of interconnectedness of European member states and how European societies have become transnational in the context of globalisation. In this account we refer to numerous empirical findings and surveys and concentrate on a systematisation of the findings (e.g. Fligstein 2008; Fligstein & Merand 2002; Fligstein & Stone Sweet 2002).

The process of the Europeanisation of nation state societies has taken place in four different dimensions which are interlinked with each other: the emergence of a European polity, territorial expansion of the EU, the emergence of a single European social space, and Europeanisation of the twenty-seven EU member societies. In all of the dimensions an increase in Europeanisation has taken place, even when this process has not been straightforward. Time and again there were discontinuities, delays and fallings off. The short-term fluctuations cannot disguise the fact that the long-

term development is in the direction of an increase in Europeanisation (from the historical perspective see Kaelble 2007).

3.2.1 The Emergence of a European Polity

European integration manifests itself first of all in the establishment and expansion of the different political institutions of the EU, which have been equipped with sovereign authority and have assumed part of the sovereign rights of the nation states. Europeanisation on this level means that the competences of the European institutions and their organisational power were extended over time at the cost of the parallel national institutions. This process can be seen in all the European institutions and has been extensively delineated in books on political science (for others Kohler-Koch et al. 2004; Wessels 2008; Börzel & Risse 2002). I would like to give a short summary of the findings for the most important institutions.

The European Council: The European Council is the committee of the EU heads of state and government. Up until 1969 the heads of state and government only met on ceremonial occasions. In 1969 at a summit meeting in Den Haag concrete topics were discussed for the first time. Since this meeting was a success, similar ones were arranged at irregular intervals in the subsequent years. In 1974 it was agreed that they would meet every four months. The European Council was first admitted as an institution of the EU in 1987 with the Single European Act. The central task of the European Council consists in the formulation of general political aims, initiatives for the further development of the EU, and in the solving of conflicts, which at the ministerial level, that is the Council of the European Union, cannot be solved. In actual fact, the European Council has become increasingly an initiator of impulses for the further development of the EU. In due course “the European Council developed from being a ‘Debating Club’ into an initiator of policy programmes with a lasting effect on the formation of several central policies of the EU” (Wessels 2008: 163). The Treaty of Lisbon rules that the European Council should now officially be an organ of the EU meeting four times a year.

Council of the European Union: The Council of the European Union (council of ministers) is the most important decision making organ in the European Union. It is composed of the representatives of each member state at the ministerial level. One of its central tasks is to pass (together with the Parliament) European legislation, to vote on the principles of economic policy in the member states, to pass international agreements with other states outside the EU and with international organisations, to approve the EU budget (together with the Parliament) and to cooperate in the development of common foreign and security policies.

If we look at the development of the council over the years then we see that the member states have continuously expanded the legally fixed rights and duties of the council and the policy fields for which it is responsible (Wessels 2008: 191). The increase in importance of the council basically took place in the period from the foundation of the EU until 1990 and is to be seen in a series of indicators: The number of the council formations has increased in the time mentioned and today there are nine different council formations.³⁵ The number of meetings per year and those of the various working groups has also increased. The number of policy areas in which individual members can be outvoted has also increased (cf. data in Wessels 2008: 199, 212).

The European Commission: The present European Commission goes back to the High Authority which was created within the framework of the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Its duty was to enforce the resolutions of the ECSC. The High Authority consisted of eight members who were appointed by the member countries and a ninth member which was elected by the Authority. With the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) and of EURATOM in 1958 two new commissions were established. In 1967 the High Authority of the ECSC and EURATOM were combined to form the European Commission within the

³⁵ In order to prevent the number from getting out of hand, the European Council of Seville in 2002 decided to restrict the number of council formations to nine. At the same time an internal differentiation of the councils took place. One council formation includes several departmental ministers who are responsible for different policy areas. Insofar the sheer number of council formations is still not a good indicator for the expansion of the areas of policy for which the council is responsible (cf. Wessels 2008: 199).

framework of the European Community treaty. The responsibilities of the Commission were enlarged in the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). It has the sole right to introduce new legislation; it is responsible for upholding the treaties, works on the implementation of the resolutions of the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament and represents the EU to the outside world. In addition, the Commission formulates in the so-called White and Green Books recommendations for actions to be taken by the Community in particular policy areas. The number of recommendations passed has risen considerably over the years (cf. the figures in Wessels 2008: 233). The responsibilities of the EU have also progressively increased over time, while the institution itself has grown together with the number of directors, commissioners and committees as well as the administrative personnel of the Commission as a whole.

The European Parliament: At the founding of the ECSC in 1952 a parliamentary assembly at European level also met, which consisted of representatives of the national parliaments, but which only had an advisory function. With the founding of the EEC and EURATOM the parliamentary assembly of the ECSC was responsible for all three communities and was enlarged to 142 members, although it was not given any new responsibilities. When the European Community received its own financial resources in 1971, the parliamentary assembly participated in the preparation and adoption of the budget, although not in the subsidies for agriculture. Since the end of the 1970s the European Parliament has become increasingly important. In 1979 the first direct European elections took place. In 1987 the Single European Act brought an important expansion of responsibilities for the Parliament. From then on it was involved in the general legislation and was able to make official amendments to bills, even when the final decision still lay with the European Council. This was changed, at least in some policy fields, with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Here the codecision procedure was introduced for some areas. Finally, through the Treaties of Amsterdam in 1997 and Nice in 2001 the codecision procedure was broadened, so that now it was applicable to a majority of policy areas within the European Union.


European Court of Justice: The European Court of Justice was founded in 1952 by the Treaty founding the ECSC. Initially, it was responsible for disputes within the ECSC's treaty. After the founding of the EEC and the EURATOM in 1957 the European Court of Justice was responsible for settling all disputes on the basis of the three treaties. The duties of the European Court of Justice have increased with each expansion of European law, since the unified interpretation of European law is the central task of the court. In addition, the organisation of the court has been enlarged. In 1989, the European Court of First Instance was established in order to ease the burden on the court. Furthermore, since 2005 there also exists the court for the public sector, which is responsible for disputes between the community and its officials and employees. The institution, as well as the amount of jurisdiction, has continually expanded from year to year.

Within the political sciences there are two different positions regarding the interpretation of EU institutions. Intergovernmentalists emphasise that the institutions of the EU are under the control of the governments of the nation states, hence that the nation states still have the last word in the core areas of politics (Moravcsik 1993). Supranationalists and Neofunctionalists have, on the other hand, attempted to show that the institutions of the EU have become independent powers, which have replaced the sovereignty of the nation states (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998). Looking at the development of the EU institutions over the years an Intergovernmentalist would certainly agree that the power of the European institutions has expanded exponentially. Even when some of the institutions, like the European Commission and the Council of Ministers have an intergovernmental structure, it is still true for these institutions that the number of decisions where individual countries could be outvoted has increased.

The following figure makes this clear. In the Council of Ministers, in itself the prototypical intergovernmental institution in the EU, there are different rules for voting. If one looks at the different voting rules over the years, one sees that the share of resolutions which had to be carried unanimously is on the

decrease. The veto power of the member countries is, therefore, increasingly being restricted in favour of majority decisions.

Figure 3.2: Development of the Decision Making Procedure in the Council of Ministers³⁶



Source: Wessels (2008: 195)

3.2.2 Territorial Expansion of the EU

Alongside the creation of supranational European institutions Europeanisation manifests itself in a step-by-step territorial expansion of the EU's sphere of control, by enlarging the number of member states. The countries of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands were, as is well known, the founding countries. In 1973 Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the community; Greece followed in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, in 1990 after the reunification of Germany

³⁶ European Community for Coal and Steel, EEC – European Economic Community, Single European Act, Treaty on the European Union, European Constitution. Every member state has a vote with the simple majority. According to the Single European Act a qualified majority is achieved with the majority of the members (14 member states) or 255 (74%) of the weighted votes (orientated according to the populations of the member states in question) and on request, if 62% of the population in the EU are represented. With the specially qualified majority decision several sets of rules are counted: qualified majority with 72% of the members and 65% of the population, if decisions are not made at the proposal of the Commission or the Foreign Minister (according to Art.I-25 Treaty on the European Union), qualified majority decisions, with the exception of the member state in question (Quorum -1), qualified majority decisions, in which only a group of certain states are involved, as, for example, the Euro Group.

the former GDR, finally, in 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland. At the collapse of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence the chance for the EU to expand into Eastern Europe arose. The EU has used this chance to expand its hegemony at the cost of Russia. 14 years later on May 1st, 2004, ten, mostly Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus). In 2007 Bulgaria and Rumania followed.

Therefore, since its foundation, the territory of the EU institutions has continually expanded. For all these countries it holds true that they are subject to the same laws and resolutions of the institutions of the EU. All EU legislation, which is binding for all member countries – *Acquis communautaire* –, must be accepted by all countries which want to become a member of the EU, meaning that the expansion of the EU represents not only a territorial expansion, but also an expansion of the power of the European institutions.

3.2.3 The Emergence of a Single European Social Space

The newly created European institutions are not just there for their own sakes. Their policies have an effect on the member states and over time on increasingly more member states. They have an impact on ever more policy fields with the aim of creating a common European social space, which is less and less limited by the nation states. The then EEC was founded by the Treaty of Rome with the purpose of creating a common European market. Moreover, the creation of a common market is still the central goal of the EU. In this respect most of the measures refer to the establishment of a common economy of “Europe”. It would go beyond the scope of this book to discuss this third area of Europeanisation adequately. The following legislation is of particular importance for the creation of a unified European social space, which then elevates the question of knowing a foreign language into a very important one.

Tariff reduction: The gradual reduction in tariffs begins within the EEC in 1959. The Customs Union came into power in 1968, thereby abolishing the customs in trading within in the EEC for good. A common customs tariff was established for trade with third countries. The abolition of tariffs reduced the transaction costs for trade within the EU, while at the same time making the cost of trade more readily calculable.

Single European Market: The abolition of tariffs leads to an improvement in the European exchange of goods, although numerous non-customs trade restrictions, such as the different production norms or approval procedures, restricted free trade. A Single European Market was implemented with the Single European Act in 1987. At the heart of the treaty are the so-called four freedoms: persons, goods, services and capital were to move as freely within the EU as had been the case up to then within the national economies.

The freedom of movement of persons is of particular interest for our research question. All citizens of the EU have the freedom to look for work in every member state, to work, to settle or to provide a service. This regulation includes, apart from the immigrant employee, marriage partners, children under the age of twenty-one as well as further relatives in the ascending or descending line, whom the employee is supporting. The freedom of movement rule is also valid for self-employed people (the right to establish a business). Within the context of creating a common market, freedom of movement was extended to those who were not gainfully employed, such as students and pensioners. In addition, the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and the transference of rights to social benefits earned in another country were agreed upon. All these measures have one aim, which is to make the nation state containers more permeable for the citizens and to Europeanise them.

Common currency: With the introduction of the European “currency snake” in 1972 currency exchange rates in the EU were restricted, which was a first step towards a common currency. In 1999 the Euro was introduced as the official currency for the non-cash payments on the stock exchange and in

2002 as hard cash in eleven EU states. Today the Euro is the official currency in seventeen EU countries. It is also true to say that the common currency makes economic transactions cheaper and more reliable, because they are no longer dependent on changes in the currency exchange rates and it thus facilitates European trade and mobility.

Removal of controls on the movement of people: In the so-called Schengen Agreement (1985) five European states decided to abolish controls on the movement of people at the common borders. In the meantime, twenty-eight countries have gradually joined this agreement. From among the EU countries only the United Kingdom and Ireland have not fully joined the Schengen Agreement. For Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus only certain regulations from the agreement are valid, but removal of the border controls for these three countries has been delayed to a later date. In addition, the agreement is valid for the non-EU states of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. While within the Schengen area security checks have ceased to exist, people at the borders of non-EU states are checked in the usual way.

Common citizenship: With the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 each citizen of a EU member country is at the same time a citizen of their country and the European Union. Apart from the right to freedom of movement in the entire area of the EU, already discussed above, citizens have the active and passive franchise in local and Europewide elections and the right to diplomatic and consular protection. These measures are also intended to improve mobility within Europe. Added to this is the symbolic significance which is associated with citizenship in the Union, in that the differences between the nation state citizenships are Europeanised.

If we look at the different legislations as a whole, we perceive that they are all pointing in one direction. They are aiming at the possibility of a European space of interaction and communication, which transcends and Europeanises the nation states. This does not mean that there are no more intra-European hindrances to Europeanisation. There are different taxation rates in the member states, different social standards and implementing provisions for

the large amount of legislations. Problems with the recognition of pension claims when moving from one EU country to another show, for example, that the nation state container is still very influential. It is only that over time it has become less important through the process of Europeanisation. The expansions of the treaties, legislations and policy areas have lead at the same time to a strengthening of the European institutions and their power.


3.2.4 Europeanisation of the twenty-seven EU Member Societies

The creation of a system of European institutions, the territorial expansion of the sphere of control and the increase in jurisdiction to create a European space of interaction and communication has had an impact on the societies, which is the fourth dimension of Europeanisation that we have distinguished here. Our knowledge about the level of Europeanisation in this dimension is considerably less. This has two reasons. First of all, we are not dealing here with the organisation of institutions and contractual resolutions, but with the effects of the institutions and resolutions on societies and these are very difficult to measure empirically. Secondly, the analysis of this dimension of Europeanisation is not something political scientists are concerned with but falls within the area of sociology. And sociology of European integration is in comparison to political science research on the same topic much less comprehensive. It has only recently taken off in the last few years and is increasingly putting the horizontal aspect of Europeanisation in the centre of the discussion (cf. Bach 2000, 2008; Bartolini 2005; Crouch 1999; Delhey 2005; Díez-Medrano 2003, 2008; Favell 2008; Fligstein 2008; Fligstein & Merand 2002; Gerhards 1993, 2007; Haller 2008; Heidenreich 2006; Hettlage & Müller 2006; Lepsius 1990, 1991; Mau 2010; Mau & Verwiebe 2010; Münch & Büttner 2006; Vobruba 2005, 2008).

I have tried to collect data to measure the Europeanisation process in several societal fields and have follow up other authors and studies (cf. Gerhards & Rössel 1999; Fligstein & Merand 2002; Fligstein & Stone Sweet 2002; Fligstein 2008).

Let us begin with the *area of law*. One indicator for measuring the increase in importance of European law, which is often referred to in the literature (Beckfield 2006), is the so-called preliminary ruling of the European Court. The European Court is, among other things, responsible for the interpretation of the EU treaties. If in one of the member countries an interpretation of EU law is required in a court case, then the national court can submit the decision to the European Court. The number of the preliminary rulings indicates indirectly the amount of EU rulings, for the more there are, all the more can they collide with the national law of the member countries.

Figure 3.3: Number of proceedings for a preliminary ruling of the European court of Justice over time (1961 to 2006)




Source: Own survey on the basis of the European Court of Justice (Europäischer Gerichtshof 2008).

The curve shows clearly that the number of preliminary rulings has increased over time and thus also the degree of juridical pervasion of EU member countries by European Law.

With the *shift of political decision making power* from the member countries to the institutions of the European Union the conditions for lobbying for interest groups and civil society activists have changed. If they want to put

forward their interests, they have to look to Brussels instead of their nation states. And, in fact, with the passing of time a Europeanisation of interest groups has taken place (Fligstein 2008: 173). Figure 3.4 shows the number of interest groups which are registered with the EU.

Figure 3.4: Number of special interest groups represented in Brussels (1990 to 2005)




Source: Wessels (2008: 281)

In the relatively short time span of fifteen years the number of interest groups rose from 1,954 to 2,843, an indication for the Europeanisation of the pre-political sphere.

As we have seen, one of the central goals of European politics is to create a *European economic space*. The success of this policy can be seen in a number of indicators (cf. above all Fligstein 2008: 62-88). A simple indicator for measuring the level of Europeanisation in the economies of the member countries is the share of the inter-EU exports from the total exports of the EU countries. The following figure 3.5 shows the development for the period from 1980 to 2006. In 1980 the share of inter-EU exports was already 56%; this increased up until 2006 again to nearly 69%. Almost 70% of the trade with foreign countries undertaken by the EU countries remained within the borders of the member countries of the EU.

Figure 3.5: Share of inter-EU exports in the total export of the EU Member States (1980 to 2006, in %)




Source: Own calculation on the basis of Eurostat (2002, 2006, 2009a).

Whether and to what extent the Europeanisation of the member countries of the EU has also added to the *intra-European mobility* of persons is difficult to establish empirically and for several reasons (cf. Verwiebe 2008).³⁷ We know, however, that the number of EU citizens who live in another EU country is quite low, amounting to about 1.5% for all European countries and varying between 0.5% in Portugal and Finland on the one hand, and 5% in Belgium and Cyprus on the other. In Germany 2.5% of the population are EU foreigners (Mau & Verwiebe 2010). Based on available data I have tried to measure the intra-European mobility for eight countries in the EU (Austria, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom) for the period of 1999 to 2006. The following figures are the result.

³⁷ For many EU countries there are no reliable figures on immigration or emigration. If data is available then very frequently it is not for a very long period of time, so that long term trends are difficult to determine. Additionally we are not interested in mobility as a whole, but rather in intra-European migration. This means that the country of origin of the immigrants has to be known in order to classify them as European migrants, but unfortunately the origins of the immigrants are frequently not given in the official statistics. In spite of these limitations the following findings can be entered into the balance.

Figure 3.6: Share of Non-EU Citizens Proportionally to the Total Population (1999 to 2006, in %)³⁸



Source: Own calculation on the basis of data from Eurostat (2009b) and OECD.Stat (2009).


The share of the EU foreigners in the chosen eight countries is on the whole very low. It evens out initially, only to rise again in 2004 to the prior, albeit very low, average. However, we also know that mobility in other countries in the EU is considerably higher than in the eight countries for which we have systematic data for a fairly long period of time. After the expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe there was a migration of workers above all from Poland and the Baltic states primarily to England, Ireland and Sweden, because these countries had stipulated a transitional period for the Freedom of Movement Act (cf. Mau & Verwiebe 2010: 287).³⁹

³⁸ Included is the share of immigrants from EU-15 in the total population of the target countries Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The data is limited to the chosen countries as the data for the other EU member states is incomplete or not available at all.

³⁹ Steffen Mau and Roland Verwiebe (2010) have, due to the poor data situation on the development of intra-European mobility, evaluated the mobility willingness of citizens on the basis of a Eurobarometer survey. In 2001/02 as well as in 2005 citizens were asked whether they intended to move to another European country in the next five years. The share of those questioned in EU-15 countries was 1.5% in 2001 and 2.7% in 2005, whereby people from the Baltic states, Poland, France, Ireland, Sweden and Finland expressed an over-average willingness to move. In all the countries (apart from Italy) the share of those who were more mobile rose within the four years which lay between dates of the surveys.

The result demonstrating very weak intra-European mobility is less valid for one part of the population, the students. However, even for this group it is not easy to obtain reliable data for the development of intra-European mobility. Many students go to another country with the Erasmus Programme.


Figure 3.7: Number of Erasmus students (1987/1988 to 2006/2007)



Source: Own calculation on the basis of data of the European Commission (2008).

As the above figure shows, the number of Erasmus students has risen in barely 20 years from around 3,000 to almost 150,000 students per year. However, the curve exaggerates the number of students in a foreign country, because the number of Erasmus students is not weighted by the number of all students. It is not easy to obtain reliable figures on the relation of the number of students abroad in Europe to the total number of students over a longer period of time and for several European countries. For three European countries – Denmark, Germany and Spain – I have determined the number of Erasmus students in relation to the total number of students from the period 1998 to 2007. The results are seen in Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8: Number of students in foreign countries of Europe (Erasmus) proportionally to the number of students for countries Denmark, Germany and Spain (1998 to 2007, in %).



Source: Own calculation on the basis of data of the European Commission (2009) and Eurostat (2009c).

The number of students who are not studying in their own country but in another European country with the help of the Erasmus programme is, all in all, very low. Nevertheless, it has risen within nine years by 20%, from 0.84% to 1.04%. Not taken into account here are students who have not gone to another European country with the Erasmus programme, as well as those who are abroad but not in a European country. The number of students abroad, regardless in which country or which programme has organised their stay, is higher than the figures shown in Figure 3.8. In 2005, 2.9% of German students studied abroad, in France it was 2.5% and in England 1.0% (cf. Isserstedt & Link 2008).

If we draw up a balance of all the empirical results then it appears that intra-European mobility is very low, and it appears not to have changed very much, except with students. Mobility in Europe is, therefore, much lower than, for instance, in the USA. One of the reasons for the low mobility within the EU is certainly the language differences between the countries. I will return to this subject later.

Before I sum up the results of our analysis of the process of Europeanisation, I would like to discuss briefly a second development, which has

fundamentally altered European societies and has promoted the necessity of learning foreign languages.

3.2.5 Globalisation of the Member States of the EU

European societies are not only much more strongly interconnected through the process of European unification, but also have been transnationalised beyond the borders of Europe by globalisation. Under globalisation we understand the process of the increasingly worldwide integration in different fields of society, for instance, the economy, communication, culture, politics, etc. (cf. Held et al. 1999). Europeanisation is a subsidiary of the process of globalisation, insofar as it concerns a transnationalisation process, which, however, stops at the borders of Europe, whereas the globalisation process comprises the increase of interconnection beyond Europe.

There are countless publications now available on globalisation, a process which began in the 70s of the last century. For the purposes of an empirical illustration of the change which has taken place, I will restrict myself here to the analysis of an index on the description of the processes of globalisation, which is frequently used in the literature, namely the KOF Index of Globalisation (cf. Dreher 2006). From 1970 to 2006, the working group at the ETH Zurich collected a considerable amount of empirical information from a number of countries measuring the opening or closing of the different countries in the world. The indicators are allocated to three sub-dimensions of globalisation:⁴⁰

Political globalisation: the number of embassies a country has, the number of memberships in international organisations, frequency of participation on UN missions, frequency of co-signing of international treaties

Social globalisation: number of foreign contacts (telephone, letters, tourism, foreigners in a country), level of international information (Internet users, TV


⁴⁰ Cf. <http://globalisation.kof.ethz.ch>

users, newspapers), cultural proximity (number of McDonalds, number of Ikeas, strength of the bookselling industry)

Economic globalisation: strength of economic exchange (exports, direct investments, etc.), restrictions on free trade (tax, hidden obstacles, restrictions for foreign capital)

The different indicators are entered into the calculations of each globalisation dimension with a different weighting (cf. Dreher 2006). In addition, on the basis of the three sub-dimensions the authors have constructed an aggregate index which amalgamates all three dimensions, thus attempting to show the globalisation processes in total. The three sub-dimensions are entered into the calculations of the aggregate index with a different weighting. On the basis of the data available online the process of globalisation was calculated for nine member states (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland) for the period from 1973 to 2006. We have restricted ourselves to nine member countries of the EU, because these have been members of the EU since the survey of the KOF Index, and thus we have a relatively long period of time at our disposal.

As the following figure shows in the period from 1973 to 2006 a dramatic globalisation process took place in all the nine member states. This is true above all for the areas of economical and social globalisation. The area of politics had already reached quite a high level at the time of the first survey, dips in the period from the middle of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s due to the termination of the bipolar constellation between the capitalist West and the socialist East, only to increase over the base level in the early years of the 1990s.

Figure 3.9: Globalization of nine EU Member States (1973 to 2006)

Source: Own calculation on the basis of KOF Index of Globalization (ETHZ 2009).

Let us summarise the conclusions of this chapter. As long as the national states of Europe with their segmented order of languages were closed units, there was little attraction to learn the languages of other countries. As I have shown in this chapter, these conditions have changed. First of all, I have attempted to demonstrate how the member states have Europeanised, thereby differentiating four different, although interconnected dimensions of Europeanisation, which are: the establishment of a European system of institutions, the territorial expansion of the sphere of influence and thereby the number of languages, the increase in legislation in order to establish a European space of communication and interaction, and the increase in the degree of interconnectedness of the European societies. We saw further that European societies became not only more closely linked through the European integration process, but that also the degree of worldwide interconnectedness in the areas of economy, politics, communication and culture has increased through globalisation.

These developments result in the fact that entirely new demands and opportunities are available to people, of which they make only very little use though. The mobility of the citizens of Europe is very low and considerably lower than, for example, that of the USA, and over the years it has not risen very much. This may have several reasons. First of all, in spite of a formal right to freedom of movement, mobility in Europe involves many disadvantages and costs, which do not exist in the USA. Among these costs is the fact that qualifications acquired in one country, which should be formally recognised in another, are, in actual fact, frequently treated as being inferior, which often leads to a reduction in income and a lower place in the labour market. Moreover, this situation also applies to pensions and social benefits, for, although this has been legally regulated, they can frequently only be transferred from one country to another with difficulties (cf. Mau & Verwiebe 2010). Finally, language skills are important. In order to work in another country, one generally has to speak the language of that country fluently. It is precisely this prerequisite which many people do not possess, as will be seen in the empirical analyses. Therefore, the chances which have resulted from the development of Europeanisation and globalisation can only be used to a limited degree.

3.3 European Union's Language Policy

As we have seen in chapter 1, in the creation of their nation states the member countries of the EU have gone through a process of linguistic homogenisation. The divided and segmented linguistic structure of Europe results from this historical, still institutionalised inheritance organised according to national states. At the same time the nation states of Europe have been opened up through the process of Europeanisation and globalisation. Participation of the people in the areas which have newly become transnational will be made easier, when they speak the languages which are spoken in other countries. The emergence of the nation states teaches us that politics has a decisive influence on the question of which

languages people learn and speak. Consequently I will analyse more closely the language policy of the European Union in the following.

The language policy of the European Union is characterised by three distinctive features (cf. Phillipson 2003: 105-138; Castiglione & Longman 2007). In contrast to the nation states the European Union does not pursue a policy of linguistic homogenisation by supporting a single *lingua franca*, which would be binding for the European Union. The EU accepts the official languages of its member countries as its own official languages. The multilingualism of the EU is thereby a constitutive feature of the European Union (1). The EU not only accepts the official languages of its member countries as its own languages, but it also protects and supports the minority languages spoken in the member countries, thereby supporting once more the linguistic heterogeneity of Europe (2). At the same time, the European Union supports the multilingualism of its citizens through a number of programmes (3). I will describe each of the three aspects of the EU language policy and try to retrace the reasons as to why the language policy has turned out the way it has.

3.3.1 The Legitimacy of twenty-three Official Languages

While the EU in many policy areas strives for a unity and convergence of the member states – a single market, a single currency, a single jurisprudence – this is not the case when it comes to language policy. The acceptance of multilingualism within the EU is indisputably contractually documented. This goes back on the one hand to the Treaty of Rome, and on the other to a Regulation from 1958 (cf. summarised by Truchot 2003; Kraus 2004: 134ff.; Ammon 2006). The procedure for deciding on the language question within the EU is stated in the Treaties of Rome. The Council of Europe decides on the languages unanimously. The question of regulating the languages, therefore, belongs to the areas which must be decided concurrently between all the governments. A change in the present regulations is practically impossible, because each of the twenty-seven member countries has the right of veto. In

addition, most of the member countries place great value on maintaining the multilingual constellation. Consequently it is unimaginable that any one of the member countries would voluntarily relinquish the right to have “its” language as an official language of the EU.

While the procedure for stipulating the official languages is codified in the Treaties of Rome, so far as regulations dealing with content are concerned, such as which languages are allowed in which contexts, these were decided in Regulation No. 1 for the Regulation of the Language Question for the European Economic Union by the Council in 1958. Originally only four official languages were mentioned in the regulation. However, with the expansion of the EU other official languages were included in the regulation. The regulation consists of eight articles (Council of the European Economic Community 2007).

Article 1 The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the Union shall be Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish.

Article 2 Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State sends to institutions of the Community may be drafted in any one of the official languages selected by the sender. The reply shall be drafted in the same language.

Article 3 Documents which an institution of the Community sends to a Member State or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State shall be drafted in the language of such State.

Article 4 Regulations and other documents of general application shall be drafted in the official languages.

Article 5 The Official Journal of the European Union shall be published in the official languages.

- Article 6 The institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases.
- Article 7 The languages to be used in the proceedings of the Court of Justice shall be laid down in its rules of procedure.
- Article 8 If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be used shall, at the request of such State, be governed by the general rules of its law. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

The language regulation of 1958 is still valid today. Therefore, the equal treatment of all European (official) languages is the first and central purpose of the EU language policy. All the national official languages of the member countries are simultaneously the official languages of the EU. One exception to this is Luxembourgish, the government of the country having relinquished its use as an official language of the EU. Told there are twenty-three official languages for the twenty-seven member countries: Bulgarian, Danish, German, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, Greek, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Swedish, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, Czech, and Hungarian. As I have already mentioned in the introduction, some languages are official languages in two countries at the same time (Flemish in the Netherlands and in Belgium, French in France and in Belgium, German in Austria and in Germany, Greek in Cyprus and in Greece); that is why the number of official languages (23) is not identical with that of the member countries (27). Hence, the EU remains with regard to its language configuration segmented to a high degree.

Peter A. Kraus (2004: 137) has pointed out that the EU policy of recognition of the official languages of its member countries differs from other international organisations. The ASEAN states use, for example, only English as their official language, NATO, English and French. Although the United Nations is a world organisation, meanwhile with 193 member countries, only

six languages are allowed as official languages. These are Arabian, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. This regulation was passed by the General Assembly in 1946. An official Language means that all documents (draft resolutions, minutes, reports) are written in the official languages and that all meetings must be translated from and into the official languages. Two of the six official languages – English and French – are permitted as working languages. This means that all internal organisational work must take place (in oral as well as in written form) in both of these languages.

The acceptance of the official languages of the member countries as official languages of the EU and the rejection of a policy promoting a *lingua franca* is connected with consequences for communication within EU institutions, as the regulation of 1958 stipulates that all laws, documents and regulations must be written in all the twenty-three official languages. Furthermore, citizens and the national states can all turn to the EU in their language and have the right to receive an answer in their own language. The information sheets of the EU are also written in all the official languages.

The rules of procedure decide the working language which the institutions use internally (Schumann-Hitzler & Ostarek 2005: 21). In the following I will briefly describe how the individual institutions deal with the multiplicity of languages. This gives us a good idea of the enormous transaction costs which are connected with the principle of multilingualism. The language services of the EU institutions cost the EU around 1.1 billion Euros per year (Website of the Translation Head Office 2007).

EU Commission: Since 2001 the Commission has used German, English and French as internal working languages (Peterson & Shackleton 2006: 61), whereby English and French are preferred (Ozvalda 2005: 66f.; Schumann-Hitzler & Ostarek 2005: 21). It is only after the decision making is completed that translation into the other official languages occurs. The Directorate-General for Translation is responsible for the Commission and the other organs of the EU, apart from the Parliament and the European Court (Mickel & Bergmann 2005: 33). The Directorate-General for Translation alone

employs 2,350 employees and has a yearly budget of around 280 million Euros (Soriano 2007). It is thus the largest translation service in the world. Round fifteen percent of all those working for the Commission are employed by the language services (Michel & Bergmann 2005: 33). In order to relieve the institutions' translation services, the translation Centre for the Organisations of the European Union (CdT) was established.

The European Council: Translations are made from and into all official languages at all meetings of the European Council. All documents are moreover presented to the Council in all official languages (Mickel & Bergmann 2005: 32).

The Council of the European Union: All documents about which the Council of the European Union consults are translated into the official languages of the EU. At the Council's meetings translations are made from and into all languages (cf. homepage of the Council of the European Union). However, at all informal meetings it appears that the "3+1 solution" (English, French, German and the language of the presidency of the council) has prevailed (Ozvalda 2005). In the Committee of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER) the three language regime is employed (English, French, German). In the Council's working groups translations in all official languages are made when a law is being prepared. In the majority of the groups translations are made in only five EU languages (English, French, German, Spanish and Italian). In forty-five groups nothing is translated and only English and/or French is spoken. In the Councils working groups a so-called "market model" is employed, which means that the member states in individual cases decide for or against their own translation, but share in the costs (Mickel & Bergmann 2005: 32). While the Council of the European Union can rely for translations on the Directorate-General for Translation, it also has at its disposal its own Language Services of the General Secretariat of the Council with more than 700 translators.

The European Court: In cases to the European Court the language of the complaint is the language of the lawsuit, if it's one of the EU official languages.

In cases dealing with preliminary rulings, the language of the national court invoked by the Court is the language of the lawsuit. In the sessions, the hearings, if required, are simultaneously translated into the different official languages of the European Union (Website of the European Court). The working language is only French (Weidenfeld 2006: 408). The European Court has an Interpretation Directorate at its disposal. At the beginning of 2006 the Court's Interpretation Directorate employed 796 people, who all spoke a minimum of three languages and were fully qualified lawyers. This constitutes roughly forty-five percent of the Court's personnel.

The European Parliament: The standing orders of the European Parliament stipulate that all parliamentary documents must be written in all of the official languages. Furthermore, all of the MEPs have the right to speak in their official language and to have all the other official languages simultaneously translated into this language. This is also the case for the official languages of all those present in committee and delegation sessions; this, however, can be bypassed in exceptional cases with the agreement of all those present (Art. 138 Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament). The European Parliament has a high commitment to being polyglot, for instance, a statement on the homepage explains that "As regards interpreting, the European Parliament differs from the other EU institutions in so far as the principle of 'controlled full multilingualism' is observed in its day-to-day work". In order to avoid bottlenecks in the translating, the European Parliament has introduced a system of "relay languages", which means „a text is first translated into one of the most widely used languages (English, French or German) and from there into the minor languages. Other major Community languages (Italian, Polish and Spanish) could also become relay languages in due course." The parliament employs its own translation service with about 700 translators.

The above short accounts should be enough to make clear that the principle of multilingualism comes at a high cost. Above all, these costs are financial, but they are also temporal, since every translation involves delays. Especially in the composing of drafts, which are supposed to be tabled in the parliament

by several MEPs, a translation is demonstrably too complicated and sluggish. The drafts are constantly changing and the result of a close interactive process (cf. Wright 2007: 161). The same is true for attempts to convince other members of a particular position prior to a debate. This requires a personal conversation which is obviously much easier if the same language is spoken. In addition to this, in parliamentary debates the liveliness of the immediate exchange of arguments suffers greatly from being translated. Finally, every translation carries the risk of mistakes being made. The mistakes which arise and which are often funny are then worth reporting in the newspapers. In an article in the German weekly DIE ZEIT of June 17th, 1999, the author Daniela Weingärtner reported the following examples: “The transports internationals routiers, abbreviated on the lorries to T.I.R. was translated by a German MEP as Tir Transport. In the cabins this became Tiertransport (animal transports or transports des animaux). A British MEP compared the tempo in a heated debate with rafting on wild rivers, shooting rapids. However, the German translator heard “rabbits”, at which a German MEP, to the confusion of the speaker, wished “Waidmannsheil!” (Hunters’ Greeting!). And when the parliament wanted to appoint “A Commission of Wisemen” (French: sages) in order to investigate abuses in the Commission, the “Drei Weisen” (“Three Wisemen” (trois sages) became the “Three Monkeys” (trois singes) (Weingärtner 1999).⁴¹

Excursus: Legal Regulations and Empirical Practice

(1) Even if de jure all the official languages of the member countries of the EU enjoy equal status and only three working languages are permitted, in the day-to-day practice of interaction within the institutions of the EU an

⁴¹ That the attempt to manage without translation and to communicate in English, even when English is not the speaker’s native language, also does not function without mishap and can lead to amusing misunderstandings is illustrated by the following example. A female, newly appointed Danish minister, who was participating in a Council meeting for the first time and had to take the Chair right away, opened the meeting in English with the remark that she was “not fully in command of things because she was just at the beginning of her period” (quote in Phillipson 2003: 140). “At the beginning of her period” means that she had just begun to menstruate.

asymmetry in the use of different languages has emerged. In the beginning phase of the EG communication principally was in French and that for the following reasons (cf. Truchot 2003): French was the language which was most spoken in the six founding countries and was the official language in three countries (France, Belgium and Luxembourg), and the most widely spoken foreign language in the other countries. The most important institutions in the EU were and are located in Brussels and Luxembourg; countries in which French is the official language. The United Kingdom was not yet a member of the EU, hence English was not an official language.

With the admission of new members English has increasingly become the dominant language (cf. Kraus 2004: 141ff.; Ammon 2006). In a survey carried out in 1990 among (high) officials and delegates of the European Community (EC), Michael Schloßmacher comes to the conclusion, that “The languages of the officials in the EC organs are in all functions English and French, all the others play only a marginal role” (Schloßmacher 1994: 112). On the basis of different available data Claude Truchot (2003: 104) has retraced the development of the languages in which the documents written by the Commission have been formulated. In the period from 1986 to 1999 a clear increase in the importance of the English language can be seen.

Table 3.3: Languages used in texts by the European Commission (in %)

Year	French	English	German	others
1986	58	26	11	5
1989	49	30	9	12
1991	48	35	6	11
1996	39	45	5	12
1997	40	45	5	12
1998	37	48	5	10
1999	35	52	5	8

Source: Truchot 2003

The dominance of English in internal communication will have increased enormously since the admission of twelve Central and Eastern European countries in the years from 2004 to 2007, whose languages became official languages. At least this can be concluded, if Abram de Swaan’s “Q-Value

Theory” is taken as a basis. With the membership of the new countries the number of those who speak English as their native tongue did not increase, but the number of those who speak English and no other foreign language increased exponentially. This leads to the simple conclusion that “The more languages, the more English” (de Swaan 2001b).

(2) The consequences which are linked to the dominance of certain languages within the institutions of the EU have not been well enough researched to date. However, we can assume the following outcomes.

(a) The dominance of certain languages disadvantages those persons and interest groups as regards determining the political agenda, who do not speak these languages well enough. In 1996 a study of the networks among the MEPs revealed that “relationships were dictated by language competence, that informal information flows were truncated by language barriers, and that negotiations in unofficial settings was constrained for MEPs with no or little knowledge of English or French” (Wright 2000; quoted from Wright 2007: 151). The translation of working papers into minor languages takes longer, comes later and thereby hinders preparation (Wright 2007: 157). In addition it hinders informal networking and thus influences the chance MEPs have to push their own interests through. This is true, for example, for the Italian MEPs. “The Italians punch below their weight” (Wright 2007: 160) because of their inability to speak foreign languages.

(b) The dominance of certain languages can have a selective influence on the recruitment of the MEPs. The fact that very good language skills increase the chances of achieving your aims leads to the fact that in anticipation of this fact MEPs, who have these skills, are nominated in the nation states. The consequence of this is that certain persons, for the most part those who are more educated, have a much better chance of becoming MEPs. This in turn strengthens the “bias” which already exists at the level of national parliaments so that the upper classes are clearly over-represented in the European Parliament. Seen from the democratic point of view, this is a problematical over-representation of certain classes in a society.

End of Excursus

The fact that the principle of the equality between official languages, or rather the three working languages, is being contravened on the quiet, has in the past led to frequent protests by the national governments. For many member countries of the EU, above all for the countries whose languages are relatively widely spoken (German, French, Italian and Spanish), examples can be found which show that the national governments insist that their language is not at a disadvantage (Ammon 2006). In 1999, the former Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, sparked off a massive conflict with the Finnish Council Presidency at the time, because the latter did not want to allow German as the working language at a meeting with the heads of government. Schröder had threatened to stay away (Forsberg 2000: 14).

In 1999 the former President of France, Jacques Chirac, left the room at a meeting of the heads of government of the EU in a fury, because a French corporate representative asked him a question in English and not in French. Chirac later explained that he had been deeply shocked that his compatriot had spoken to him in a foreign language (cf. BBC 2006). The corporate representative defended his choice of language with the fact that most of the people in the room spoke English and not French. One can assume that Chirac's reaction was based on his concern to assert the sovereignty of French and not because he personally did not understand English, since as a former student at Harvard University he must have been able to.

The German Bundesrat and Bundestag have repeatedly, and recently quite sharply, reminded the Commission that German is to be treated on parity with English and French. The last request by the Bundestag in 2008 regarding this matter was made by the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Liberals together, so all the parties are united on this point. On November 17th, 2008 a similar demand by the Bundestag addressed to the Commission was passed by all its members.

An impressive example of the symbolic significance of the language question in regard to national identity is that of the Irish. Although Ireland has been a

member of the EU since 1973, Irish (Gaelic) has been an official language of the EU only since 2007. The number of Irish who speak Gaelic in everyday life is low. The resuscitation of Gaelic as their own language can be regarded more as a project of the elite in an attempt to discover their own history, as distinct from that of Great Britain's. The "madness" which is connected with this might best be illustrated by the following. Of the thirteen Irish MEPs only four speak Irish at all, and they use their language in Parliament to symbolise their national uniqueness. The other Irish members have to learn their so-called mother tongue. The European Parliament offers special courses in this subject (cf. Borovsky & Hartig 2008).

These examples illustrate how important it is to the nation states that their official language is recognised as an official language of the EU. At this point the question arises as to how the adherence to the principle of multilingualism in the EU can be explained. The EU policy of treating all existing official languages of the member countries as equal official languages of the EU can be explained by the fact that the member states of the EU are not prepared to give up their linguistic sovereignty. Why they are not prepared to do so? Political Science differentiates between the so-called "high politics" and "low politics" (Hoffmann 1966). The areas which directly touch upon the heart of national sovereignty, for example, foreign and defence policy, count as "high politics". In these areas, it holds true that the nation states are not, or only to a small degree, prepared to delegate sovereign rights to supra-national institutions. If they do this regardless, then they usually retain the right of veto for themselves, so as not to be outvoted by other countries. The areas of "low politics" are those policy areas which do not belong to the core areas of nation state politics and where the nation states are more inclined to give up sovereign rights. The intergovernmental theory of European integration interprets the establishment of the EU by the distinction which I have outlined above as primarily a process of the integration of areas of "low politics" (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993, 1998).

The fact that any attempt to even perhaps reduce the official or working languages of the EU meets massive resistance from the nation states and that the nation states have kept for themselves the right to veto any attempt to change the language order, indicates that language politics is an area of “high politics”, or more precisely, an area of interpreted “high politics”. In the language question we are not dealing with a subject which intergovernmentalists think of when they discuss the core areas of the state. These areas are primarily the areas of policy concerned with security, interests, resources, power, etc., that is to say, “hard” interests. The language question is concerned, and here I refer back to the concepts explained in chapter 2, not with the building of society but with the identity building function of language, that is to say the symbolic dimension. The nation states interpret their own national language as a central feature of their identity and they attribute a very high significance to this interpretation, thereby elevating the subject of linguistic sovereignty to one of interpreted “high politics”. And the member countries are prepared to let this symbolism cost them something, as the enormously high transaction costs caused by multilingualism demonstrate.

3.3.2 Protection and Support of Minority Languages

Not only does the EU accept the official languages of the member countries as its own languages, but it also, even if only to a limited degree, fosters the minority languages which exist in its member countries, thus supporting the linguistic heterogeneity of Europe. The policy of protecting and supporting the minority languages has, however, markedly less legal importance than the policy of accepting the official languages, since minority languages are neither official nor working languages of the EU. The protection of the minority languages is, moreover, much more controversial. While the institutions of the EU and above all the European Parliament within the context of a worldwide debate on the protection of minorities try to support the rights of the minorities in the member countries, the member states,

especially those which have large linguistic minorities within their territorial boundaries, are much more low-key when it comes to fostering minority languages. They interpret support for the rights of minorities as an attempt to undermine the national linguistic identity. This conflict explains why the support for minority languages within the EU ends up being so ambivalent. However, if we look at the development over time, we see that there has been a definite increase in the significance of the protection of minority languages. The questions arise as to how the protection of minority languages is bound in law and by what means the minority languages are fostered by the EU (1) and how we can explain the increasing importance of support for the minority languages (2)?

(1) There are points in several treaties and laws, which can be interpreted as a summons to actively protect minority languages. One statutory basis upon which the policy of protecting minority languages rests is Article 151 of the Maastricht Treaty which makes the promotion of culture one of the tasks of the European Union (Vizi 2003: 53). It remains open, however, as to whether the minority languages fall under the heading of culture. The Charter of Human Rights of the EU in 2000 is somewhat more precise. In Article 22 it states, "The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity" (European Community 2000). Nevertheless, in the anti-discrimination regulations, languages as subjects of discrimination are not explicitly mentioned, but only religion, opinions, disability, age and sexual orientation. The legal lack of clarity opens up a leeway for interpretations which have been made different use of by the political players in the EU.

Due to the inclusion of Eastern Europe the protection of minorities and the minority language has gained increasingly in importance (Heidbreder 2004: 480). In this regard the EU has been accused of having a double standard, particularly because the European Charta for Regional and Minority Languages of the Council of Europe or the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities were not signed or ratified by several member states (Heidbreder 2004a; Vizi 2003: 50), while at the same time the

new member countries were being put under pressure to protect the minorities and their languages more energetically.

The “key player” (Shuibhne 2007: 129) in minority language politics is the European Parliament. In the 1980s the Parliament called upon the Commission in three resolutions (Arfe-Resolutions 1981 and 1983; Kuijpers-Resolution 1987) to protect minority languages (Shuibhne 2007: 129). Obviously such resolutions are not binding, but nevertheless the founding of the European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL) in 1981 (which however was closed down some years later) and the report on linguistic minorities by the Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana (1986) can be ascribed to these initiatives (Shuibhne 2007: 129). More importantly, though, as early as 1988 one million ECU for the promotion of minority languages were included in the budget by the Parliament (Vizi 2003: 56). However, the yearly budget of up to four million Euros was axed by the European Court in 2000 because of its unclear legal basis, although a lower sum under another budgetary item still stands the minority languages in good stead (Strubell 2007: 171). As a reaction to Maastricht and at the end of the European Year of Languages in 1994 and 2001 the Parliament repeated in further resolutions the call for more protection for the minority languages, and financial support as well as legislative initiatives in this matter (Shuibhne 2007: 130). The so-called Ebner Report in 2003, in which the Parliament called yet again for permanent financing and the inclusion of “regional and lesser-used languages in language education programmes” (Shuibhne 2008: 127) is one such initiative.

Primarily the Commission restricts itself to supporting projects and organisations for the protection of minority languages. EBLUL, support for minority languages during the European Year of Languages, support for the online news agency EuroLang, which specialises in minority languages, or the publication of various studies like EUROMOSAIC (1996) can be mentioned in this connection (Vize 2003; cf. Grin & Moring 2002; Nic Craith 2008). In the “Action Plan on Language Learning and Language Diversity” for 2004-2006 the Commission explicitly includes the minority languages for the first time

(Shuibhne 2008: 127). This is a very big step, because it means that the Commission is treating the official languages of the EU and the minority languages spoken within the EU on an equal basis in their support for the multilingualism of the citizens.

At the same time there are reservations from several member countries regarding a strengthening of the rights of the minority languages. This manifests itself in the refusal to support the legal document which lays down the most far-reaching protection of the minority languages, the “European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages” of the Council of Europe. Out of the twenty-seven members of the EU, which at the same time are members of the Council of Europe, eight (Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal) have not signed the charter, seven have signed the charter, but up to now have not ratified it (France, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic) and only twelve have signed and ratified it (Denmark, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Hungary, the United Kingdom and Cyprus). As we have seen in the last section, the nation states interpret their national language as a central feature of their identity, thus making the language question a sphere of “high politics”. This framework also influences the interpretation of the legitimacy of minority languages and becomes contentious for those countries which have large linguistic minorities within their territory. Countries which have not signed or ratified the charter are afraid that by recognising the minorities or minority languages in their territory they will endanger their national unity. These fears are certainly the most important reason why support for the minority languages in the EU is so moderate. However, if we regard the development in retrospect then the topic gains much more significance. How can we explain this development?

(2) The discovery of the topic of protection of minority languages is embedded in a worldwide change in the perception and interpretation of minorities and their languages. The changes are dealt with in academic literature and in politics under the heading of “multiculturalism”. Supporters

of a multicultural position depart from the idea that most societies consist of different cultures and that the different cultures should be regarded as equal by the politicians in charge, recognised and fostered, and that it is not legitimate to work towards a society in which the cultures are subsumed by a majority culture. Cultural difference is exemplified by skin colour, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual orientation but also language (cf. for many others Gutmann 2001 and the contributions in Joppke & Lukes 1999). How the change in the perception of minorities and minority languages has come about is difficult to explain. That it has happened though, cannot be disputed.

Will Kymlicka (2007) and Douglas A. Kibbee (2008) have delineated the development of law towards an increase in the protection of minorities. While earlier efforts to institutionalise universal rights worldwide are attempts to codify and enforce the rights of the individual, for instance, human rights, a change has occurred since the 80s of the last century. The definition of the rights of minorities as group rights is becoming increasingly important; moreover we are not just talking about the defence of minority languages (defensive rights), but about their support and promotion. In 1992 the UN passed the “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic Religious and Linguistic Minorities”, which supplementary to the Human Rights deals with the rights of minorities. The states declare that they will protect the existence and the national, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of the minorities in their territory. In 2001 UNESCO passed the “Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity”. This goes above and beyond the previous legislation insofar as the minority languages are not just conceded defensive rights, rights that is, which are supposed to protect the speakers of minority languages from oppression.

Both agreements aim to protect the existence of national minorities and their languages within the signatory states and to codify their equality. Minority languages are interpreted as a cultural asset whose use should be encouraged. For example, instruction from pre-school to university should be offered in the minority languages, justice and public administration should authorise them, and the media should give them adequate space.

In total it can be said that over time the protection of minority languages has been extended in many respects: (1) The subject has received considerably more legal and political attention, (2) the protection of minority languages has developed from an individual right to a collective one, (3) minority languages are not only protected, but they have also been actively encouraged. Minority rights have developed from purely defensive rights to entitlements.⁴²

The legislative developments, of which I have given only a brief description, are accompanied by a public debate in which reasons for the protection and nurture of minority languages are discussed. The spokesmen in the debate are politically liberal legal experts, sociologists, anthropologists and linguists (cf. Krauss 1992; Hale 1998; Skutnabb-Kanga & Phillipson 1995; Crystal 2000; Phillipson 2003; Kymlicka 2007; Nic Craith 2008). Those leading the discussion on minorities, can be interpreted in terms of John W. Meyer's neo-institutional theory as a "cultural otherhood", who see themselves to be 'disinterested' actors, stemming from civic society and science, who advise the active participants such as the UN, UNESCO and the EU. These "cultural others" are not themselves politically active, but act in an advisory capacity. "This is the posture of the disinterested consultant, more concerned with the truth than his own interests" (Meyer 2001: 234).⁴³

⁴² The dramatic increase in the importance of the protection of minorities and their encouragement is shown not only in the statutes quoted, but also in the organisation of a number of international institutions and foundations, who deal with minorities and their languages. Monitoring systems were developed, the endangered languages, which often have no written form, are listed according to linguistic criteria, statistics are collected on their dissemination and the number of their speakers, etc. (cf. Crystal 2000: 91ff.). The purpose of all this is to inform the public and politicians about the extent of the threat to minority languages and then move them to intervene.

⁴³ Most of the authors who have published on this subject are, however, themselves protagonists, who support the extension of the rights of minorities. The self understanding of these authors is that their articles are scientific and analytical in nature, whereas I would classify them as political and normative texts (cf. the critical commentary on the literature by Kibbee 2003 and de Swaan 2004). The academic background which the authors bring with them attracts a specific audience. Ironically, the authors argue for the preservation and cultivation of exotic languages whereas they themselves publish in the world hegemonial language of English in order to maximize the reception of their texts and hence their own reputation in the academic world (cf. the cynical remarks by de Swaan 2004 on this matter).

There are two central arguments put forward by the “the others” for the encouragement and nurture of minority languages. I will present the arguments while at the same time commenting on them critically.

Linguistic and biological diversity: The protection of diverse languages is equated to biological diversity. Article 1 of “The Declaration on Cultural Diversity” adopted by UNESCO states, for example, that, “[a]s a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognised and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations”. This fundamental idea, that diversity of languages is an asset to society and can have a positive effect on its productiveness is formulated in various different ways. Douglas Kibbee (2003) describes this position as the “green theory of ecological protection”. Those who support the demand for linguistic plurality think that the protection and support of minorities and minority languages is not only an ethical imperative but also an ecological one. The justification for this reasoning results from the assumption in evolutionary theory that there is an advantage to the diversity of species. This suggests that under altered environmental conditions (for example, a new disease) diversity ensures that although many organisms will die out, others will survive purely on the basis of a different genetic make-up. The genetic variation is, as it were, a safeguard against risk, which under altered environmental conditions can help to ensure survival.

Is this argument, however, also valid for languages? Only if it can be proven that the various cultures are based on different languages, so that a diversity of languages is hence causally connected to a diversity of cultures (which then provides a variation pool of different forms of society) does linguistic diversity constitute an advantage. However, if it is true that more or less the same things can be expressed by all languages, then there is no actual evolutionary advantage in having a diversity of languages. The loss of a particular language does not lead to the loss of cultural advantages. This brings us to the next point.

Linguistic diversity as cultural diversity: Language is interpreted as an expression of culture. Different languages lead to differences in cultural appropriation. Consequently the protection of minority languages is an imperative, if one wants to protect not only the languages but also the cultures which are created by the languages. The supporters of an expansion of the protection for minority languages conclude that the protection of minority languages is, therefore, an ethical imperative (cf. Arzoz 2008a).

However, literature from the field of cognitive psychology demonstrates that the influence of language on thought is very limited (for a more extensive discussion of this argument see appendix). Two conclusions result from this research: (a) Because thoughts take place in an inner language, the influence of natural speech on thought is low. (b) Everything which people express in a particular natural language can essentially be translated into another language (Hunt 2001: 8320). What follows from this research is that it is possible to retain one's own culture and way of life, while at the same time not speaking one's own language. Culture and language are substantially decoupled from one another. Hence, cultural diversity is possible without a corresponding linguistic diversity (cf. Ladefoged 1992).⁴⁴ I will discuss these arguments in more detail in the appendix.

We have seen that the European policy of encouraging minority languages is embedded not only in the changes in international jurisdiction, but also in the hegemonial discourse on minorities, which I have outlined briefly. These developments form, among other things, the essential legitimacy for the legal development within the EU, which I have described in my first point, and which explains why the protection of minority languages has become an increasingly important element in EU policy making. I have restricted myself primarily to presenting and interpreting EU policy. Whether or not such a policy makes any sense and which normative standards can be employed in

⁴⁴ There is a third argument that is important for the changed discussion on minorities which concentrates on the issue of who is responsible for the protection of minorities. The sovereign rights of the nation states are being increasingly questioned in this regard; a shift of responsibility to international organisations is occurring; international organisations are increasingly seen as being responsible to protect the rights of minorities, even against the interests of the nation states.

assessing language policies will be discussed in the final chapter in more detail. The few hints I have given should however have made clear that I'm not convinced that the EU is following the right language policy.

3.3.3 Support for Multilingualism

If the acceptance and support for multilingualism and the protection and nurturing of the minority languages are the first two primary goals of EU language policies, then the principle of encouraging the multilingualism of the people of Europe is the third central goal. According to this plan citizens should speak two of the languages spoken in the EU besides their native language whereby all the languages are treated equally. Which far reaching goals the EU is pursuing with its policy of encouraging the multilingualism (a) and what measures is it taking to realise them (b)?

(a) As in the encouragement of the minority languages, the encouragement of multilingualism has an ideological underpinning. The following quote from the former Commissioner for Multilingualism (this policy field has had its own commissariat since 2007, but the post has been abolished later) expresses very well the goals of the EU, which can also be found similarly formulated in many other EU legal documents: "The ability to communicate in several languages is a great benefit for individuals, organisations and companies alike. It enhances creativity, breaks cultural stereotypes, encourages thinking 'outside the box', and can help develop innovative products and services. These are all qualities and activities that have real economic value. Multilingualism also helps to make people more mobile to pursue learning opportunities or job vacancies abroad countries. It is beneficial for individuals, business and competitiveness. By extension, it is crucial for achieving the over-arching policy aim for the European Union: the Lisbon strategy to create more jobs and growth. (...) The Commission's multilingualism policy aims to draw these various strengths together. In particular, its objective is to encourage language learning and promoting

linguistic diversity in society, promote a healthy multilingual economy, and give citizens access to European Union legislation in their own languages” (Orban 2007).

The legitimacy of a policy which encourages multilingualism is fuelled, as the quotation shows, by two motives, a cultural and an economic one. Through the multilingualism of its people first of all the Union would like to contribute to an improvement in mutual understanding and to the reduction of prejudice. Secondly it understands multilingualism as an investment in the improvement of the human capital of its citizens, which will enable them to be mobile within the European market and to work outside of the nation states, thus contributing to the economic growth of Europe as a whole (cf. also Linsenmann 2006: 355; Mickel & Bergmann 2005: 100). Regarding multilingualism it behaves in the same manner as in many other policy fields: In the first instance the EU is an economic union, and obtaining legitimacy for non-economic policies is usually achieved by economic arguments (cf. for equality of the sexes and family policies Gerhards et al. 2009, for environmental policies Gerhards & Lengfeld 2008).

(b) The measures which the EU has taken to encourage the multilingualism of its citizens are various and usually embedded in the education policies of the EU as a whole. In this connection “Socrates” and “Leonardo da Vinci” were the most important programmes integrated into the “Life Long Learning Programme” in 2007. This is a proactive programme for encouraging transnational cooperation in the field of education. The EU has granted the programme from 2007 to 2013 around seven billion Euros. It integrates four different, individual programmes (cf. Directorate General for Education and Culture 2008).

COMENIUS is aimed at various pre-school institutions and schools up to the end of secondary school as well as at school administration, teacher training and in-service training. Comenius supports the mobility of school children, student teachers and teachers, thereby supporting the learning of modern foreign languages. School partnerships are supported and the mobility of

school children, assistant teacher situations for student teachers abroad as well as in-service training courses for teachers abroad.

ERASMUS is directed at universities and supports the mobility of students, lecturers and other teachers in higher education. University study abroad is supported, internships abroad, guest lecturers, the organisation of mobility, or intensive programmes and preparatory visits.

LEONARDO DA VINCI is the programme for cooperation in vocational education and training. Stays abroad in vocational education and training institutions are supported, projects for the transfer and for the development of innovations, partnerships, networks, preparatory visits and contact seminars. The target groups are vocational education institutions, such as vocational schools, external and industry-wide educational institutions, companies, management and labour and their organisations, professional associations and chambers of commerce.

GRUNDTVIG is the programme for general adult education. The programme is open to all institutions of adult education in the member states. This can be public institutions, such as authorities, administration and government offices or institutions under public or private sponsorship, like initiatives, clubs, further education colleges or non-governmental organisations. The mobility of those employed in adult education is supported in the form of individual further training, study partnerships for the cooperation of institutions from different partner states, projects for the development, testing and distribution of projects and networks for the further development of specific subjects and themes in adult education.

All these programmes not only deal with the acquisition of a foreign language, but nevertheless learning a foreign language is one of their central goals.⁴⁵ The concrete programmes are enlarged upon by other, more

⁴⁵ An evaluation of the programme “Lifelong Learning” established in 2007 with reference to the aimed for success is not available to date. However, there are several findings on the success of the pilot programmes integrated into the programme (cf. on this subject McCoshan et al. 2008).

symbolic initiatives for the encouragement of multilingualism. Hence, for example, 2001 was declared the year of languages; yearly the 26th September is celebrated as language day and the European Language Seal is given for innovative projects in connection with the learning of languages and their teaching (Lutjeharms 2007: 113).

In all of the efforts of the EU to improve foreign language competence, all member states languages are treated equally, including the minority languages. The EU does not support any policy for the support of a *lingua franca* in Europe, it has no preference for a particular foreign language. Learning one of the smaller languages is supported by the EU just as much as the learning of the more widely spread languages. Once again the question must be posed here, as to whether this is a meaningful policy. Abram de Swaan (2004) doubts this and in the last chapter of the present work, in which the normative question of an appropriate language policy is discussed, I will agree with his argument. De Swaan suggests that equal support for all languages has in the long-term precisely the reverse, non-intended effect of supporting one language, namely English. "The more languages the better remains the battle-cry. But this multiplicity of languages actually subverts diversity: the more languages that compete, the more English will take hold. In the general confusion of tongue, in which no indigenous language can predominate, English automatically imposes itself as the sold, obvious solution. That is what has happened in India and South Africa, in Nigeria, and in the European Union. The hegemony of English is being hastened and consolidated by the promotion of a multiplicity of languages – the by European Commission, for instance" (de Swaan 2004: 475).

4. EUROPEAN CITIZENS' TRANSNATIONAL LINGUISTIC CAPITAL

The processes of Europeanisation and globalisation taking place in the member countries of the European Union entail numerous opportunities as well as challenges for the people of Europe. In order to participate in the process of Europeanisation, to work in another member state, to study there, to spend holidays there, to establish new contacts and to become politically involved, they have to be proficient in the language of the country they live in. Transnational linguistic capital, as measured by the ability to speak foreign languages, is therefore a deciding factor in whether or not a person can participate in the process of Europeanisation. With this resource at one's command, new options become available; those speaking their native language only, are tied to their home country and cannot take advantage of a united Europe.

In the first subchapter I will address the issue of whether and to what degree the citizens in the twenty-seven EU countries have transnational linguistic capital available and to what degree they speak English, the most widely-spoken language in Europe with the highest level of communicative use. For this, I will analyse the 2005 Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 63.4). The results reveal wide-ranging differences in the extent people possess transnational linguistic capital not only among the twenty-seven countries but also within the countries as well. Therefore, in a second step I am going to tackle the question of how these differences can be explained. Thereto I enunciate a theoretical explanatory model and test it first with bivariate and

then with multivariate analysis'. Until now, only Neil Fligstein (2008) has analysed foreign language proficiency of European citizens. We will go beyond Fligstein's study insofar as we will present a more general explanatory model which takes micro as well as macro contexts into consideration.

4.1 Who Speaks How Many Languages?

The survey forming the basis of the following analyses was conducted in May and June 2005 by the Institute TNS Infratest on behalf of the European Commission. Included were people fifteen years and above who were surveyed in face-to-face interviews. The sample size amounts to about 500 persons in smaller (i.e. Malta, Luxembourg), and 1,000 persons in larger countries. A weighting of the data according to age, gender, region and size of the place of residence ensures the representativeness for a country's population. As the weighting also accounts for the population of the respective states, the Eurobarometer results are representative for all twenty-seven member states. Such a weighting has been used in all the following analyses.

Before turning towards the findings of the analysis, I intend to define the term of transnational linguistic capital and its operationalisation more precisely. Up to now I have referred to transnational linguistic capital in general. Multilingualism is manifest in four different abilities that are jointly connected: in understanding, speaking, reading and writing a language. Both of the passive abilities (understanding and reading) are easier to learn than the two active ones (speaking and writing); writing a foreign language is definitively the most difficult aspect of foreign language proficiency. The empirical analyses refer only to the speaking of a foreign language. Among other questions the interviewees were asked in the Eurobarometer survey, "Which languages do you speak well enough to have a conversation in?" The answers to this question constitute the central dependent variable of our study. Even though there is no empirical information available on the

abilities to understand, read and write, one can assume that those speaking a foreign language are also better able to understand, read and write the respective language than those for whom this does not apply.

As can be seen from the questionnaire of the Eurobarometer foreign language ability is not measured by a language test, but rather – as is the case for most large-scale surveys – by respondents' own subjective self-evaluation. The question then arises as to whether self-evaluation is an adequate tool to measure the respondents' "actual" linguistic capability or to what degree people wrongly estimate their abilities. Several studies indicate that self-evaluation is a good measure of language proficiency.

In his study on migrants' foreign language acquisition, Hartmut Esser (2006) has dedicated a whole subchapter to this methodological question (chapter 7.6) and evaluated all relevant references and data sources, so that I can rely on Esser's argumentation. All in all Esser arrives at the conclusion that the subjective self-evaluation of language competence can indeed be used as a replacement indicator for an objective measurement of competence.

There are several studies available in which both subjective self-evaluation and concrete language tests were conducted for measuring language proficiency. Although the correlation between the two measures deviates across different studies, the fact that the correlation lies between .58 and .46 (Esser 2006: 527f.) shows that there is a robust correlation between factual and perceived linguistic ability.⁴⁶

In his study Esser is interested in explaining migrants' foreign language competence. He developed a model to explain foreign language capability and applied it to both subjective self-evaluations of foreign language proficiency and the results of language tests. Both model calculations show exactly the same causal structure, even though the explained variance varies in both models. With regard to our question this finding means that the subjective

⁴⁶ Christian Dustmann and Arthur van Soest (2001) have shown that the subjective self-evaluation can entail systematical false estimations. Especially beginners often overestimate their factual abilities; over time the self-evaluation adapts to the objective competence. On this basis the authors tried to calculate a statistic correction that they used in the analysis.

evaluation of one's own foreign language competence can by all means be used as replacement measurement of the objective command of foreign languages. No mistake is being made in terms of the structure of the causal explanation when one uses self-evaluation of language proficiency to measure real language competence. Moreover, we assume that the self-evaluation measurement as it is used in our analysis will not lead to any bias in respect to differences between countries, since it is implausible that, for example Swedes overvalue their command of foreign languages, whereas Poles undervalue it.

Table 4.1 shows the number of foreign languages European citizens speak. In addition to the categories "none", "one", "two" and "three or more", we have calculated each country's mean and standard deviation (cf. for an analysis of the foreign language competence in fifteen EU countries in Fligstein 2008: 147ff.). The term foreign language proficiency used in the table and the following explanations requires some comments. Included are persons who have acquired further languages during their life, in addition to their native language and persons who have grown up with two or even more native languages, due to the fact that two or more languages were spoken in the family or the direct environment.

Table 4.1: Transnational linguistic capital in 27 countries of the European Union (in %)

	Foreign Languages				Mean	S
	none	one	two	three		
EU-27	51.3	27.1	15.1	6.6	0.77	0.93
Hungary	70.6	18.4	9.0	2.0	0.42	0.74
United Kingdom	70.0	20.4	7.5	2.1	0.42	0.72
Portugal	64.1	16.3	13.9	5.7	0.61	0.92
Spain	63.9	23.7	9.2	3.3	0.52	0.79
Italy	63.7	24.3	9.4	2.6	0.51	0.77
Romania	59.4	21.4	14.2	5.0	0.65	0.90
Ireland	59.2	24.9	12.9	3.0	0.59	0.82
France	55.5	27.8	12.8	3.9	0.65	0.85
Bulgaria	54.6	28.9	12.4	4.1	0.66	0.85
Poland	50.9	26.1	12.8	10.2	0.82	1.01
Greece	50.6	32.7	13.5	3.2	0.69	0.82
Austria	41.6	33.6	15.2	9.7	0.93	0.98
Germany	40.6	36.7	18.7	4.0	0.86	0.86
Czech Republic	40.0	32.3	19.2	8.6	0.97	0.97
Finland	33.7	24.4	22.6	19.4	1.28	1.13
Slovakia	31.1	26.8	22.9	19.3	1.31	1.11
Belgium	28.9	22.5	25.5	23.0	1.43	1.13
Cyprus	27.8	52.8	13.9	5.6	0.96	0.81
Estonia	13.8	37.9	31.0	17.2	1.54	0.94
Denmark	12.6	25.2	35.3	26.9	1.77	0.99
Sweden	12.3	40.7	28.1	18.9	1.54	0.94
Slovenia	11.1	27.8	33.3	27.8	1.77	0.98
Lithuania	9.8	43.5	32.6	14.1	1.51	0.85
Netherlands	8.6	22.5	43.5	25.5	1.86	0.90
Latvia	6.6	49.5	34.1	9.9	1.47	0.76
Malta	4.8	33.3	42.9	19.0	1.74	0.86
Luxembourg	0.0	4.3	26.1	69.6	2.61	0.64

N= 26,520

(1) One of the European Union's stated goals is that its citizens should speak two foreign languages or more; however, the EU is far from reaching this goal. Over half of EU citizens cannot speak any foreign language at all, about one-quarter speak at least one foreign language, and only fifteen percent speak two or more. For them the nation state is indeed a container, the leaving of which involves many difficulties in understanding.

(2) The results also show considerable differences between countries; whereas almost every citizen in Luxembourg and over ninety percent of citizens in Latvia, Malta, and the Netherlands speak a foreign language, this percentage shrinks to only one-third in countries like Hungary, Portugal, Great Britain, and Spain. Because a number of factors act simultaneously to reinforce or contradict one another, it is not easy to explain the ranking of the countries. People living in countries that use English as their native language (like Great Britain and Ireland) have very low levels of transnational linguistic capital, whereas citizens of very small countries (like Luxembourg and Malta) have especially high levels. Higher levels of modernisation also seem to promote fluency in multiple languages, which will be discussed later on in more detail.

(3) Finally, the results show high levels of variance within any given country. The average standard deviation is 0.93 on a 0-3 scale. This means that there are citizens with high levels of transnational linguistic capital as well as people without any in every given EU member state. The internal variance can be traced back to educational, class, and cohort differences, as we will discuss in the following sections.

If the ability to speak several languages is interpreted as a central resource allowing participation in processes of transnationalisation and Europeanisation, then the first empirical results show that this resource is distributed very unequally. As I have explained in chapter 2.1 multilingualism is connected with a multitude of advantages: It facilitates studying in different countries and improves educational options, it enhances the opportunities at the labour market and makes it easier for companies, or rather their members of staff to develop new markets. Scholars' possibilities to avail themselves of other researchers' findings and to make available their own in order to improve their reputation, is enhanced by having transnational linguistic capital. Furthermore, multilingualism increases the possibilities to mingle with potential acquaintances, friends and partners. Additionally it improves chances of political involvement in a world which is in the process of globalisation and Europeanisation. Finally, multilingualism

is connected with symbolic gratifications, since presenting oneself as a multilingual speaker in different settings can be interpreted as a strategy for defining a new, emerging transnational elite. Multilingualism is a capital able to increase one's income and at the same time a means of distinction from those who do not have the same resources.

Up to now we have understood transnational linguistic capital as referring to the number of foreign languages one speaks, fully independent of the question of which concrete foreign languages these are. If however, transnational linguistic capital is taken as a resource to communicate with other people, this resource's usability will be essentially dependent on the number of speakers who can be reached with that foreign language. The number of communication partners within reach is calculated from the sum of a language's native speakers and the number of persons speaking this language as a foreign language. Every language studied by a person as foreign language has a communicative value, a so-called Q-value (cf. de Swaan 2001a/b).

Luxembourgish, for example, is only spoken by about 300,000 native speakers and very few non-native speakers, as compared to German, which is spoken by over one hundred million Europeans. Learning Luxembourgish, therefore, has a much smaller effect on one's ability to communicate with other people than learning German would have. The following table shows the most-widely spoken languages in the EU.

Table 4.2: Most widely spoken languages in 27 countries of the European Union (in %)

	Foreign or native language	Only foreign language
English	45.9	33.8
German	28.7	1.4
French	22.4	10.8
Italian	14.9	2.4
Spanish	12.7	4.4
Russian	5.9	5.4
<i>N</i>	26,476	26,469

Even when the citizens' native and foreign language proficiency is distributed across many languages, there are only five languages, be it as a native or foreign language, spoken by over ten percent of EU citizens. These languages have the highest communicative value (Q-value), with English being the most widely-spoken in Europe, as is to be expected following the line of argument in the last chapter. After all, 43.1% of Europeans are able to communicate with one another in that language. Therefore, for EU citizens who begin learning a foreign language in order to communicate with as many other people as possible it makes sense to choose English first. This is especially true taking into consideration not only the European language constellation, but the number of people who speak English beyond Europe. As we have seen in chapter 3.1 English is the most widely spoken language in the world, either as native or foreign language. Compared to Chinese which is the language that has the most native speakers, English is more widely spread across different regions of the world. Moreover, it is easier for most of the speakers to study English rather than Chinese due to the fact that the linguistic distance between most languages and English is less than between these languages and Chinese.

If people or educational institutions in Europe decide to learn, teach or promote a foreign language and in doing so follow the principle of gaining the greatest possible benefit in the form of the reaching of as many speakers as possible, they will probably decide in favour of English because this is the predominant language in Europe. The degree to which the citizens of the twenty-seven EU member states speak Europe's dominant language can be seen in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: English proficiency in 27 countries of the European Union (in %)

	No English proficiency	English as foreign or native language	English as foreign language
<i>EU-27</i>	54.1	45.9	33.8
United Kingdom	0.5	99.5	7.4
Ireland	0.5	99.5	6.0
Malta	4.8	95.2	90.5
Netherlands	12.4	87.6	87.3
Sweden	15.0	85.0	85.0
Denmark	15.8	84.2	83.5
Cyprus	27.8	72.2	72.2
Luxembourg	33.3	66.7	66.7
Finland	39.6	60.4	59.9
Slovenia	44.0	56.0	55.6
Austria	45.1	54.9	53.3
Belgium	48.2	51.8	51.7
Germany	48.9	51.1	50.8
Greece	56.1	43.9	43.5
Estonia	58.6	41.4	41.4
France	65.7	34.3	33.8
Latvia	65.9	34.1	34.1
Italy	70.7	29.3	28.6
Portugal	72.8	27.2	26.4
Romania	73.4	26.6	26.5
Poland	74.1	25.9	25.4
Lithuania	74.3	25.7	25.7
Slovakia	75.8	24.2	24.2
Czech Republic	76.2	23.8	23.7
Spain	79.3	20.7	19.8
Hungary	83.8	16.2	15.9
Bulgaria	84.6	15.4	15.1

At first glance the table is not easy to interpret, because the countries which are similar in terms of their command of English do so for different reasons. Altogether, four groups emerge which differ in their level of English competence (reference point of the interpretation is the central column showing the percentage of persons who speak English either as native or as foreign language):

The *first group* consists of countries in which English is the official language or one of them. English language proficiency is almost one hundred percent in these countries (United Kingdom, Ireland, and Malta).

The *second group* is made up of small, highly modernised countries like Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Finland. Between 60 and 87% of people in these countries speaks English.

The *third group* contains countries in which 34 to 60% of the population speaks English. There are highly developed countries like Germany, Austria, and Belgium in this group, as well as smaller and less modernised countries like Greece, Estonia, and Slovenia.

The *fourth group*, for which English language proficiency lies between 15 and 35%, consists of Romanic countries (France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal) and many Eastern European countries (Latvia, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria).

Dividing the countries into these groups gives us several hints as to the causal factors that may have an influence on English language proficiency, like country size or level of modernisation, etc. Before turning towards this issue in the following chapter, I would like to analyse what people think about the relevance of foreign languages. The fact that about half of the citizens do not speak any foreign language might correspond to their own wishes. In the Eurobarometer survey people were asked how many languages one should be able to speak in the EU. Table 4.4 presents the percentage of interviewees saying that EU citizens should have at least one foreign language at their command.

As the results show there is a Europe-wide consensus that people should be proficient in at least one foreign language. All in all, ninety percent of the respondents agree to that idea; the variance between the countries is quite small. The fact that half of the citizens of Europe do not speak a single foreign language obviously derives only to a minor degree from their motivation and hence must have different causes.

Table 4.4: Number of foreign languages one should learn (in %)

	At least one foreign language	No foreign language	N
<i>EU-27</i>	89.6	10.4	25,357
Cyprus	97.2	2.8	496
Greece	97.1	2.9	996
Poland	95.7	4.3	981
Lithuania	95.5	4.5	982
Latvia	95.5	4.5	979
Estonia	94.7	5.3	984
Denmark	94.7	5.3	1,017
Belgium	92.8	7.2	997
Czech Republic	92.5	7.5	1,017
Sweden	92.3	7.7	1,038
Luxembourg	91.7	8.3	496
Netherlands	91.5	8.5	1,026
Spain	91.3	8.7	933
Hungary	90.5	9.5	980
Italy	90.3	9.7	971
Malta	90.0	10.0	478
Germany	89.4	10.6	1,522
Slovakia	88.6	11.4	1,015
Bulgaria	88.1	11.9	833
France	87.9	12.1	994
Slovenia	87.6	12.4	1,004
Portugal	86.6	13.4	919
Ireland	85.7	14.3	910
Romania	85.0	15.0	856
United Kingdom	84.5	15.5	984
Finland	84.1	15.9	1,011
Austria	82.7	17.3	938

In addition, citizens were asked which languages children should learn besides the own native language.

Table 4.5: Foreign languages children should learn

	Most often mentioned	Second most often mentioned	Third most often mentioned
<i>EU-27</i>	<i>English</i>	<i>French</i>	<i>German</i>
Belgium	English	French	Dutch
Bulgaria	English	German	Russian
Denmark	English	German	Spanish, French
Germany	English	French	Spanish
Estonia	English	Russian	German
Finland	English	Swedish	German
France	English	Spanish	German
Greece	English	German	French
United Kingdom	French	Spanish	German
Ireland	French	German	Spanish
Italy	English	French	Spanish, German
Latvia	English	Russian	German
Lithuania	English	Russian	German
Luxembourg	French	English	German
Malta	English	Italian	French
Netherlands	English	German	French
Austria	English	French	Italian
Poland	English	German	Russian
Portugal	English	French	German
Romania	English	French	German
Sweden	English	German	Spanish
Slovakia	English	German	French
Slovenia	English	German	Italian
Spain	English	French	German
Czech Republic	English	German	Russian, French
Hungary	English	German	French
Cyprus	English	French	German

As the results in table 4.5 show, in all countries in which English is not the native language, it is the language that is stated most often. Luxembourg is an exception. The reason for that might be that here the benefits from being proficient in French are indeed higher than being proficient in English, since a large part of the population speaks French and the command of French is especially useful taking into account the neighbourhood to, and the close relations with France. The distribution of languages being stated as second and third foreign languages complies with the expectations that derive from the theory of communicative value. On the one hand people prefer to learn

those languages that are widely spread across Europe and the world. On the other hand there are characteristics specific to countries affecting the foreign language's expected communication benefit. Thus, the large Swedish minority in Finland might be the cause of the fact that Finns name Swedish as the second most important language. Similar reasons might explain why people of the Baltic states give high priority to Russian.

4.2 Explaining Differences in Transnational Linguistic Capital

We have seen that multilingualism varies considerably between the countries as well as within the countries; the same applies to English as a foreign language. In the following I will firstly present a general explanatory model that can help us explain the differences in multilingualism (chapter 4.2.1). Second, we will formulate concrete hypotheses that stem from the explanatory model and test them with a bivariate analysis. The third step tests our hypotheses with a multivariate analysis. As I am interested in both the explanation of the level of transnational linguistic capital in general and the explanation of English language proficiency, this will be followed by two separate subchapters. Chapter 4.2.2 focuses on the explanation of the level of transnational linguistic capital and chapter 4.2.3 on the explanation of English.

4.2.1 A General Model to Explain Transnational Linguistic Capital

There are different theoretical approaches which have tried to explain language acquisition. Hartmut Esser (2006: 65-73) has recently presented and summarised different approaches from linguistics, economics, and sociology. He comes to the conclusion that most theories have a variety of commonalities among each other, both in terms of the stated factors which could explain foreign language proficiency as well as in terms of the

postulated causal mechanisms.⁴⁷ Esser himself synthesises the different theoretical approaches and links the explanation of foreign language acquisition with a general theory of social behaviour. Thereby he follows other scientists who have tried to explain language and foreign language acquisition and have proposed and tested similar explanatory models (e.g. Lieberson 1970, 1981; Selten & Pool 1991; Espenshade & Fu 1997; Chiswick & Miller 2001; van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005; Van Parijs 2004, 2011; Chiswick 2007; Braun 2010; Hans 2010). I will base my own explanation in the following on Esser's considerations. However, Esser is interested in explaining the conditions of acquiring a foreign language by migrants and not by natives. First of all I will explain Esser's general model and next discuss the special conditions of multilingualism of non-migrants.

Esser's explanatory model of foreign language acquisition by migrants consists first of all of an explanatory core modelling the decision to study a foreign language as an investment decision, secondly as the determination of those societal conditions which impact on the different dimensions of the core model thereby influencing the decision to acquire a foreign language.

(a) General explanatory model: foreign language acquisition as investment decision

(1) According to Esser, migrants who enter a new society basically have two options in terms of the acquisition of the language of the immigration country: They can either decide to study the new language or they can stick to their mother tongue and not try to acquire the foreign language. Both of the two alternatives form two poles of a scale; between the poles different degrees of investment in the foreign language acquisition can be located.

(2) If and to which degree actors invest in acquiring a foreign language depends on the question whether the outcome of the investment minus the costs arising is higher than the outcome occurring without investing in the

⁴⁷ While the economic theories explain exactly the mechanisms and partly model them mathematically, the other approaches remain to a greater extent implicitly formulated; however, Esser barely detects substantial differences.

acquisition of a foreign language. Being fluent in English might, for example help people to achieve better positions in the labour market than people who do not have this competence. Scholars writing in English and accordingly being able to publish in English journals achieve, for example, a broader readership; this can lead to a more frequent citation of their work and thus a higher reputation in the respective "scientific community". Moreover, this might bring with it better chances for more attractive job positions including a higher salary. An analogical situation applies, for instance, to the profession of secretaries. In the public sector in Germany secretaries speaking several languages are rated at a higher pay group than those not fulfilling this condition. At the same time there are costs, especially time costs connected to the acquisition of foreign languages. In order to being able to write without mistakes in a foreign language a long time must be spent on studying this language. It is hard to calculate how high these costs are exactly. Referring to the relevant literature Philippe Van Parijs (2004: 132), who has dealt extensively with the analysis of foreign languages, states the figure of 10,000 hours as being needed in order to learn a language (see also Grin 2004; van Parijs 2011). As speculative as such a number might be and as little accounts for individual differences in learning a foreign language, it expresses the fact that acquiring a foreign language is related to considerable costs. According to this assumption, investment in the acquisition of a foreign language takes place only if the outcome of the investment, minus the costs arising, pays off in comparison not doing so.

(3) Whether the investment in the acquisition of a foreign language is worth it, now depends on three general conditions: (a) on the opportunities, the access to facilities for learning a language, (b) on the motivation to make an investment in a foreign language and finally (c) on the costs themselves (Esser 2006: 41; Chiswick & Miller 2001; van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005; summarising Chiswick 2007; cf. also already Selten & Pool 1991).⁴⁸

⁴⁸ The three factors are rooted in other propositions of dimensioning. Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller (2001) and later Frank van Tubergen and Matthijs Kalmijn (2005) differentiate the following factors: „Exposure“, being identical to the term used here of opportunity, “efficiency” meaning costs, and „incentives” referring to the term used here

Access, or rather the *opportunity structure*, constitutes a central precondition of acquiring a foreign language. If, for example there exists compulsory schooling in a country and English as first foreign language is obligatory for all students, a more favourable opportunity structure for studying English is available than if there is no obligation to learn a foreign language or if Russian is the first compulsory foreign language.

Even if the opportunities to acquire a foreign language are favourable, the individual can still refuse to study a foreign language. *Motivation for learning a foreign language* is another factor that influences acquisition and can, in turn, be influenced by a number of other factors. Sociologists are not only interested in idiosyncratic, individual motives, but also in collective preferences. Some countries and languages are viewed as highly prestigious; some are not. Separatist Catalonians, for example, may be more motivated to improve their Catalan rather than their Castilian Spanish; similarly, Iraqis who view American troops as an occupying force may be averse to learning English, the language of their occupiers.

Lastly, the costs attached to learning a foreign language are important. The lower the *monetary and non-monetary costs of learning*, the more likely someone is to acquire a foreign language. For highly-educated people with previous learning experience, the cost required to learn a foreign language would be less than for people with little education and few study skills.⁴⁹ Moreover, the different foreign languages vary in terms of the effort needed to study them. If a Swede or a German wants to learn Chinese, he would have to learn a new system of characters, but not if he decides to learn Spanish. The costs of learning Spanish for a German or a Swede are therefore smaller than the costs of learning Chinese.

of motivation. Later on Esser (2006: 73ff.) differentiates four factors decisive for the acquisition of language: motivation, opportunity, costs and efficiency. Efficiency describes the pace of learning a language. To me this seems to be a subset of costs – the faster someone learns, the smaller are his time costs; accordingly, the factor is discounted here.

⁴⁹ Of course, the respondent's education does not only affect the costs of acquiring a foreign language, but is above all connected with the opportunity structure as the foreign language training is part of the academic curriculum. The more highly educated someone is, the more time he or she has spent in educational institutions, the longer he or she has been taught foreign languages.

(b) Societal conditions influencing foreign language acquisition

This explanatory model only describes the general dimensions and mechanisms of learning a foreign language. The opportunity structures, motivation, and costs of foreign language acquisition are, however, all factors which individuals only have limited influence over. Some people grow up in post-industrial societies that require students to learn two foreign languages; others from less modernised societies attend schools where foreign language education is still underdeveloped. Social class is also a factor that matters; upper class or upper middle class parents who value foreign languages impart this value to their children and can also back up their conviction with financial resources and by sending their children to an English language boarding school so that they can learn English properly. In contrast, working class families often do not value education and foreign language learning to the same extent as upper and middle class parents do; and may also not have the financial resources to facilitate such learning. These examples show that opportunities, motivation, and costs are highly influenced by societal conditions. However, these societal conditions which impact on foreign language acquisition play a different role for migrants than they do for non-migrants.

Migrants of the first generation usually study the language of the immigration country as adults and are able to spend more or less effort on learning this language. So far we are talking about peoples' decisions either to invest in the acquisition of a foreign language or not. The situation for non-migrants who learn a foreign language is usually different. They study foreign languages in the educational institutions of their countries. In some countries it is obligatory to start a foreign language in the first, third or fifth grade and two years later another one. Partly also the choice of a specific language is prescribed, in Germany, for example English. Of course, adults also still learn foreign languages by attending adult evening classes, language courses abroad or private language schools at home; the percentage of those who do so is small in comparison. Hence, for foreign language acquisition by non-

migrants the leeway for making individual decisions seems to be essentially smaller than for migrants learning a new language as adults. Hence, the assumption that language learning is an investment decision is not completely appropriate. To a great extent the decision of the individual is determined by structural factors. This, though, alters nothing about the fact that the opportunities, the costs and the motivations affect foreign language acquisition.

In the following I will attempt to explain the probable effects of societal conditions on the opportunities, motivation, and costs of learning a foreign language. The differences in transnational linguistic capital between EU member states shown in table 4.1, can be traced back to varying societal conditions in each country affecting opportunities, costs and/or motivations to study a foreign language. Therefore, member states stand as a placeholder for varying constellations of societal conditions that exist in certain societies and that influence foreign language proficiency.

By relating societal conditions to the theory's explanatory core, for instance to the costs, opportunities and the motivation, we follow the Hempel-Oppenheim model of explanation as the explanandum is deduced from more general hypotheses and antecedent conditions. Thus, the accusation of practicing sociology limited only to the formulation of ad-hoc hypotheses can be avoided. At the same time, linking societal conditions to a theoretical core makes a higher generalisation of the findings possible.

Before I deduce different hypotheses and then test them empirically, two preliminary remarks are needed.

(1) The empirical analyses are based on a secondary analysis of Eurobarometer data. This can lead to either a lack of appropriate indicators for testing one's own explanatory assumptions or the impossibility for precisely operationalising the respective theories, meaning that one and the same variable can be assigned to several theoretical constructs. These general limitations of secondary analyses also partially apply to our own analysis. Admittedly, most of the relevant variables are available in the data

set, though in some cases the variables cannot be assigned precisely to one of the three relevant factors of the general explanatory model only – opportunity, motivation, costs – but can affect several of these factors.

(2) There are two potential ways of presenting and testing the hypotheses. Usually, the presentation is structured according to the core model of the explanation by dealing with the three hypotheses one after the other and subsuming the respective societal conditions under these three dimensions; this is the theoretically “correct” approach since it complies to a greater extent with the logic of theoretical deduction. An alternative presentation deals with the societal conditions one after the other and explains to what extent which societal parameter condition affects which dimension of the explanatory model. As in this case we are analysing some of the conditions having an impact on different dimensions of the explanatory model at the same time, it seems to me, to be more reader friendly and clear to follow the second method.

4.2.2 Explaining Transnational Linguistic Capital

Every EU citizen is a member of a particular nation state with particular institutional structures, one or more official languages, a national media, and a certain population size. These macro-contexts which are quite similar for every citizen of an individual nation, but differ between nations, affect the chances of being multilingual. At the same time, citizens of any given country differ from one another in terms of their social class, their level of education, and their age. These “individual” characteristics in turn influence the probability of being multilingual. Accordingly, the societal conditions, which are able to explain the level of transnational linguistic capital, can be arranged in macro-level factors on the one hand and individual characteristics on the other hand. We will focus first on macro-level factors that affect transnational linguistic capital and then discuss individual-level factors. Table 4.6 gives an overview of the conditions and their effect on the three dimensions of our explanatory model. The table refers to a proposition

by Hartmut Esser (2006: 93f.), though, the content of the table is different. This is due to two reasons. First of all, Esser focuses on the explanation of the acquisition of a foreign language by migrants; different conditions apply in part than to the group of citizens studying a foreign language in their native country. Secondly, Esser's study is not internationally comparative. Correspondingly, disparities between different macro-contexts are irrelevant to him.⁵⁰

I will discuss and test the different hypotheses in order. So as to operationalise the explanatory factors, new variables were formed, partially relying on to other data sets. The precise description of the different variables is to be found in the appendix at the very end of this book.

Table 4.6: Theoretical model explaining transnational linguistic capital

	Opportunities	Costs	Motivation
<i>Macro-level factors</i>			
Multiple official languages	+		+
Prevalence of native language			-
Country size	-		-
Level of modernity and education	+	-	
<i>Individual-level factors</i>			
Respondent's age	-	+	-
Respondent's social class	+		+
Respondent's level of education (institutional cultural capital)	+	-	+
Foreign birth of the respondent and his/her parents	+		
Identification with native language			-

⁵⁰ Most studies which have analysed the language proficiency of migrants focus on one country and thus cannot analyse the effect of different macro-contexts. Exceptions are the survey by Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller (1995) and the very good analyses by Frank van Tubergen and Matthijs Kalmijn (2005).

(a) Institutionalised language constellation and number of official languages

As we had seen in the last chapter, most European countries became linguistically homogenised as a result of nation state building and designated one language as the official language; Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, and Ireland, however, have two official languages, and citizens of these countries are sometimes required to learn both national languages, either in school or in other environments. The opportunities for learning a foreign language are therefore much more pronounced in these countries than in countries with only one national language. Additionally, institutionally bilingual societies may have a positive effect on the motivation of citizens to learn the second language, because knowledge of both official languages would improve access to a broader labour market, and increase social and political networks, etc.⁵¹

Table 4.7: Number of official languages in a country and citizens' transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	One official language	Two or more official languages
No foreign language	51.8	25.1
One foreign language	27.2	22.8
Two foreign languages	14.8	22.8
Three foreign languages	6.1	19.3
<i>N</i>	<i>23,510</i>	<i>3,010</i>

$r = 0,10^{***}$; Spearman's $Rho = 0,08^{***}$; Tau-b = $0,08^{***}$

The results of table 4.7 confirm our hypothesis, that the percentage of people who speak multiple languages is higher in countries with institutionalised multilingualism than in countries with only one official language.

⁵¹ In Ireland bilingualism is indeed legally codified but is factually not practised by the population; only a small percentage of the Irish speaks Gaelic; if Ireland is classified as a monolingual country the statistic correlation becomes clearly stronger in the table.

(b) Prevalence of a native language and the communicative value of a foreign language

As I have shown in chapter 2.1, the primary function of language is to allow people to communicate with one another; speaking the same language increases the opportunities of cooperation and identification with other people. People who live in a society where a large number of people speak the same language have more opportunities to communicate than do people who live in societies where only a small number of people speak their language. This second group of people is therefore more likely to learn a foreign language in order to increase their ability to communicate with more people.⁵² In other words, the communicational value of a foreign language is lower for people who speak (either as a native or foreign language) a language spoken by many and is higher for people who do not. This is likely to have an effect on the motivation to learn a foreign language (cf. de Swaan 1993; 2001/b).⁵³

To test this hypothesis, the different countries were classified into two groups: countries whose language is spoken by either more than or fewer than ten percent of the EU population (as either a native or a foreign language). I then analysed whether both of the groups differ significantly due to their transnational linguistic capital. Secondly, I calculated the mean between the degree of prevalence of the respective language and the citizens' foreign language competence. The results of both of the calculations are summarised in the following table.

⁵² Jochen Roose (2010: 129f.) shows that in border regions more people are proficient in the language of the neighbouring country than in the rest of the country. He attributes this to the higher benefit that is connected to the command of the language of the neighbouring country.

⁵³ In doing so the so-called "Q value" of each language is calculated according to a certain formula: $Q_i S = p_i \cdot c_i = P_i / N_s \cdot C_i / M_s$. $Q_i S$: Communicational utility of the language i in the constellation S . p_i : Prevalence of i , for instance, the percentage of the speakers P of i of the total number of the speakers N in the constellation S . The prevalence informs about the number of speakers with whom a direct communication in the language i is possible. c_i : Centrality of i , i.e. the percentage of multilingual speakers C having i in their repertoire of languages in relation to all multilingual speakers in the constellation S . Centrality is a measure for the connection of I with other languages in the constellation S .

Table 4.8: Prevalence of a language and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Up to 10%	Over 10%	Mean prevalence
No foreign language	37.4	59.4	20.8
One foreign language	28.0	26.1	17.4
Two foreign languages	21.5	11.5	14.8
Three foreign languages	13.1	3.0	10.5
<i>N</i>	<i>17,346</i>	<i>7,798</i>	<i>25,144</i>

$r = -0,27^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $-0,25^{***}$; Tau-b = $-0,24^{***}$; Eta = $0,22^{***}$

The results confirm the hypothesis: People whose language is prevalent have much lower levels of transnational linguistic capital than do people whose language is spoken by fewer than ten percent of the European population. The mean values are to be interpreted as follows: The language of those speaking three foreign languages is on average spoken by 10.5% of the people in the EU (as foreign or native language). In contrast, the language of those speaking no foreign language is spoken by 20.8%. Eta coefficient refers to the association between the mean values and transnational linguistic capital, whereas the other measures of association refer to the relation between the grouping of the countries and multilingualism.

(c) Country size and foreign language competence

A language's degree of prevalence is often connected with the size of a country, insofar as the languages of smaller countries have a low and those of bigger countries a high degree of prevalence. But the size of a country can also affect the level of transnational linguistic capital in another way. The smaller a country is the broader is its international interconnectedness. This has an impact on the opportunity structure as well as on the motivation to acquire a foreign language. There are several arguments available in

literature which make this correlation plausible (cf. to the following particularly Geser 1992).

Geometrically speaking, the circumference of a surface increases more slowly than does its interior area. This means that a small country (with a small interior area) has a higher than average boundary length (circumference) with its neighbours. This fact alone already increases the probability of external contacts. As is usually the case in Europe, when a national border also marks a change in language, country size has a positive effect on foreign language acquisition. Thus the size of a country affects the opportunity structure of acquiring a foreign language. This is especially true for small, economically modern societies. The probability of finding trading and communication partners in one's own (linguistically homogeneous) society is much lower in small countries than it is in large countries. The small country size motivates internationalisation. That is why small countries' economies tend to be more internationally linked than larger countries (cf. Katzenstein 1985). In turn the exchange with other countries becomes easier when people speak the other country's language (cf. van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005: 1419).

There is another reason why the size of the country probably has an impact on the citizens' command of foreign languages. People do not only learn a foreign language at educational institutions and via the direct contact to people speaking that language. People also tend to learn languages through the media, and the translation and the dubbing of foreign media is only worth the expense if the audience is of a certain size. If the audience size is small, then foreign media tends to be left in its original language and is distributed with subtitles. The cost for the dubbing of movies is about eleven times higher than the cost of subtitling (Van Parijs 2004: 128, 2011). Accordingly, the share of media products distributed in the original language is considerably higher in small countries compared to that in big countries (Kilborn 1993; Hasebrink & Herzog 2009). People receiving foreign-language media products will thereby improve their foreign language proficiency (cf.

Mitterer & McQueen 2009). The size of the country therefore affects the opportunity structure for foreign language learning.

In order to test the hypothesis of the relation between the size of a country – operationalised by the number of inhabitants – and the level of transnational linguistic capital, I carried out two calculations. On the one hand the countries were classified into different groups according to their size and the percentaged relation with the foreign language competence was calculated. On the other hand the mean value of the population was related to the foreign language proficiency. The results of both of the calculations are summarised in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Country size and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Up to 5 Mio.	5 to 11 Mio.	11 to 35 Mio.	Over 35 Mio.	Mean population
No foreign language	26.5	41.2	39.5	56.5	47.4 Mio.
One foreign language	36.3	26.8	24.3	27.3	46.8 Mio.
Two foreign languages	25.2	19.4	24.2	12.2	40.7 Mio.
Three foreign languages	11.9	12.6	12.0	4.0	30.4 Mio.
<i>N</i>	<i>5,534</i>	<i>10,327</i>	<i>4,055</i>	<i>6,604</i>	<i>2,6520</i>

$r = -0,20^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $-0,20^{***}$; Tau-b = $-0,18^{***}$; Eta = $0,18^{***}$

Again the results confirm the hypothesis. The larger a country is the higher is the percentage of people who do not speak a foreign language. 56.5% of the citizens in countries with more than 35 million inhabitants do not speak a foreign language, whereas the percentage in countries of up to 5 million inhabitants is only 26.5%. The average population of a country of those speaking three languages amounts to 30.4 million inhabitants. In contrast, the size of the population in countries where no one is speaking a foreign language is 47.4 million.

(d) Modernity and transnational linguistic capital

The twenty-seven EU member states differ in their levels of modernity. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), a measure often used in literature for measuring a country's degree of modernity, Bulgaria and Romania are the least modernised EU societies, as compared to Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands which have the highest scores.⁵⁴ Up until the present day we do not know exactly which factors have advanced modernisation and how the causal relations between different factors are determined. The outcome of the process of modernisation is the development of a society that can be described by a set of characteristics, which together form a syndrome (cf. Norris 2002: 20ff.). Daniel Bell (1973) distinguishes two phases of the modernisation process. Modernisation in the sense of industrialisation implies that the industrial production of goods becomes the dominant field of production with factories and formal organisations becoming the dominant units of production. Goods and services are distributed via markets, the degree of the production's mechanisation is high, the level of education rises, as does urbanisation. Bell (1973) identifies the second phase of modernisation as post-industrialisation. Post-industrialisation is connected with an increasing importance of the service sector, which hence becomes the dominant field of production. Technology and scientific development increasingly gain relevance, a society's level of education rises significantly. Above all the increasing importance of education during the modernisation process represents an important factor for explaining the level of transnational linguistic capital. In the context of modernisation it becomes manifest in a variety of indicators:

First of all, the percentage of people included in the educational system increases while the illiteracy rate and the percentage of those not having attended school become marginal. Secondly, the length of training is gradually lengthened and thirdly – interrelated with that – the share of the population attending higher institutions of learning increases continuously.

⁵⁴ The HDI involves the real GNP per capita, the level of education and the average life expectancy.

Part of the improvement of education within the context of processes of modernisation is the improvement of foreign language proficiency. The more and the longer people remain in their countries' institutions of learning the better their education should be (*ceteris paribus*). Since foreign language learning is a part of institutionalised education in all EU countries, one can expect that a country's level of modernisation affects the foreign language proficiency of its citizens. The educational system therefore creates opportunities for foreign language acquisition: People living in a country with a highly developed educational system will have more and longer opportunities to acquire knowledge in foreign languages than people living in a country with a less developed educational system.⁵⁵

In addition, educational levels can impact the costs associated with learning a foreign language. As people become generally better educated, they are more inclined to learn a new subject area (such as a foreign language) and to do so more quickly. The duration and intensity of the education is closely related to a general improvement of study techniques which then reduce the time one has to spend on acquiring a new language.

In order to measure a country's modernity the HDI can be used. A more specific and therewith better operationalisation of the hypothesis is to directly measure the level of development of the different educational systems of the twenty-seven EU countries. For that purpose different measures can be used. We used the measure of "yearly expenditure on public and private institutions per full time pupil", as measured in Euros PPS (Purchasing Power Standard). This measure considers two reasonable assignments of absolute measures of educational expenditures: on the one hand the relation of expenditures to the number of trainees, on the other hand differences concerning the price level in the different countries by taking into consideration purchasing power parities. With the help of

⁵⁵ Frank van Tubergen and Matthijs Kalmijn (2005) as well as Harmut Esser (2006: 114) argue in a similar way in terms of the acquisition of the language of that country into which migrants have immigrated. People from countries of origin or regions with a high level of modernity have advantages in acquiring a new language compared to people from countries with a low level of modernity.

purchasing power parities the educational expenditures expressed in national currencies are converted into a common artificial currency, the so called PPS.

According to this calculation, Denmark and Austria spent over 8,000 Euros on education per pupil annually, and Great Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands invested over 7,000 Euros. These countries form the top of the list in the EU. Bulgaria and Romania, in comparison, invested less than 2,000 Euros per pupil and thus bring up the rear within the EU.

I have carried out two calculations in order to test the correlation between a country's level of modernity, respectively its investment in education and the level of transnational linguistic capital. On the one hand the countries were divided into three groups of modernity, with regard to educational expenditures. Then the percentage of people who speak none, one, two or three foreign languages was calculated. Secondly, the mean value between the degree of modernity or the educational expenditures and the foreign language competence was assessed.

Table 4.10: Level of modernization (HDI) and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Low	Middle	High	Mean HDI
No foreign language	51.6	48.7	53.0	0.918
One foreign language	25.6	31.1	24.9	0.919
Two foreign languages	14.6	15.7	14.8	0.919
Three foreign languages	8.2	4.5	7.3	0.917
<i>N</i>	<i>8,163</i>	<i>7,682</i>	<i>10,675</i>	<i>26,520</i>

$r = -0,01$; Spearman's Rho = $-0,02^*$; Tau-b = $-0,01^*$; Eta = $0,02$

Table 4.11: Expenditure on education and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Low	Middle	High	Mean Expendit. in Euro
No foreign language	49.1	58.7	43.9	5,554
One foreign language	26.5	25.3	29.4	5,660
Two foreign languages	15.4	11.8	18.6	5,721
Three foreign languages	9.0	4.2	8.0	5,632
<i>N</i>	<i>7,149</i>	<i>10,717</i>	<i>8,150</i>	<i>26,016</i>

$r = 0,06^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $0,08^{***}$; Tau-b = $0,07^{***}$; Eta = $0,04^{***}$

The results in both of the tables come to similar findings: There is no strong correlation between a country's degree of modernity with respect to the amount of educational expenditure on the one hand and its citizens' foreign language proficiency on the other hand. Although the association measures for the correlation of educational expenditures and transnational linguistic capital point into the right direction, thus supporting the hypothesis, the correlation is rather weak (even if it is significant based on the high number of cases).

What could be the reasons for the weak relationship between modernisation and educational expenditure on the one hand and transnational linguistic capital on the other? Modernisation levels and educational expenditures are probably counteracted by other factors that affect foreign language acquisition. For example, the United Kingdom is one of the top four countries in terms of educational expenditures, but English is also its official language (so the communicational value of a foreign language is comparatively low). The opposite is true in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic countries: these countries spend the least on education, but the languages spoken there are not particularly wide-spread (so the communicational value of a foreign language is especially high).

(e) Age and transnational linguistic capital

The member states of the EU have experienced a process of social change since its founding in the 1950s. Two aspects of social change are of great importance for multilingualism. On the one hand, tying in with what was discussed above, the level of modernity has risen in all societies, especially the population's level of education insofar as the duration of training was extended and the quota of persons with higher educational achievement has gradually increased. To give an example: The school system of the Federal Republic of Germany is structured in a tripartite way. All children enter in the same program, but at the age of ten, they go to one of three types of schools (secondary general school, intermediate school, grammar school). The track that they enter determines which type of school they can go next, and whether they will go to a university. The percentage of thirteen year old pupils attending the highest level (grammar school = Gymnasium) was twelve percent at the beginning of the 1950s, twenty percent at the beginning of the 1970s and thirty-three percent in 2004. The percentage of pupils attending the lowest level (secondary general school = Hauptschule) decreased rapidly from eighty percent at the beginning of the 1950s to a bit more than twenty percent in 2004 (Statistisches Bundesamt/Federal Statistic Office 2008).⁵⁶ The quota of first-year students (percentage of an age cohort beginning its studies at a university) has increased enormously during the same period. Similar developments can be observed in the other European countries.

Not only the duration of study and training has extended over time and the level of education has risen, European societies also have become more Europeanised and globalised as we have seen in chapter 3.2; the number of political, social, and economic ties to other societies has risen over time. Both changes of the macro-structural context should have an effect on the multilingualism of different age cohorts. On average, older generations have

⁵⁶ <http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/Querschnittsveroeffentlichungen/Datenreport/Downloads/Datenreport2008,property=file.pdf>

had lower levels of education, less transnational experience, and fewer opportunities to learn foreign languages than have younger cohorts. Moreover, the increasing processes of Europeanisation and globalisation might affect the motivation to acquire a foreign language. Younger generations, in contrast, see both the necessity of and the advantages which learning a foreign language brings with it.

In addition to this cohort effect, we also assume that there is a life-long effect on foreign language proficiency. Those who study a foreign language as a student may forget that language during their lifetime, especially if they have no opportunity to use it as they age. Additionally, the expenditure of time (cost) of learning a new language increases with age as the pace of learning, the ability to imitate and memory declines with age. For all these reasons we assume that younger people have a higher level of transnational linguistic capital than older people.

I have grouped respondents into six age groups and analysed whether the younger cohorts have a higher level of foreign language proficiency than the older generations. In addition a mean comparison test was conducted and the average age of those was analysed who have none, one, two or three foreign languages at their command. The findings reveal clearly: Younger generations have higher levels of transnational linguistic capital than have older generations. The percentage of those who speak at least one foreign language has more than doubled from 33.5% of those above 55 years old to 68.7% of the 15-24 years old.

Table 4.12: Age and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	15- 24	25- 34	35- 44	45- 54	55- 64	65+	Mean age
No foreign language	31.3	39.1	49.6	54.4	59.3	71.3	50,3
One foreign language	33.6	34.2	28.1	25.8	24.0	17.9	41,5
Two foreign languages	25.8	19.1	14.8	13.8	11.3	6.9	38,3
Three foreign languages	9.3	7.5	7.5	6.0	5.4	4.0	40,8
<i>N</i>	3,447	4,158	4,674	4,473	4,223	5,535	26,510

$r = -0,24^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $-0,26^{***}$; Tau-b = $-0,22^{***}$; Eta = $0,28^{***}$

(f) Social class, class fractions, occupations and multilingualism

The descriptive findings show that transnational linguistic capital levels differ not only between the twenty-seven countries, but also within individual countries. All EU societies are class societies, and we assume that the economic class of a person's parents and of the person him or herself influence that person's levels of transnational linguistic capital.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, the data set does not contain any information about the respondents' parents. Thus the possibilities to test the hypothesis which will be specified further on, are quiet limited. However, if one accepts the following assumption the impact of the parents' economic class position on the respondents' foreign language competence can be operationalised in a valid way at least rudimentarily. Sociological class analysis emanates from the assumption that the parents' class position greatly affects their children's chances in terms of education, the future income, the occupation and life style. Hence, a permanent reproduction of a society's class structure takes place mediated by the parental home. The strength of the reproduction of the classes varies between the different countries (cf. Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). If class positions are, however, at least partially passed on from one

⁵⁷ The influence of economic class can help explain not only differing levels of TLC within a particular country, but also between different countries. If the upper class in a society tends to speak more foreign languages than do lower classes, and if the upper class in Country A is larger than in Country B, then the number of multilingual people in Country A will be larger than in Country B.

generation to the next, then information concerning the respondents' class affiliation can be interpreted as an approximate measurement of the parents' class position.

Different typologies describing the class structure of a society are discussed in the literature. I will refer to Pierre Bourdieu's typology, as I have already defined the term transnational linguistic capital by referring to Bourdieu's work. A society's class structure results from the aggregation of capitals owned by persons and the assignment of persons with the same endowment of capital to the same class. As is well-known, Bourdieu distinguishes three classes that differ from each other due to the amount of capital (the upper class, the middle class and the lower class). Within these three classes class fractions are placed that are identified by different compositions of cultural and economic capital (Bourdieu 1984, 1983). Bourdieu not only names classes and class fractions in an abstract way, but describes them in detail indicating concrete occupations. This is important for our empirical analysis, as the data set contains the occupations of the respondents. The upper class divides into a class fraction with a lot of cultural capital and a group with little cultural capital. The property owning class composed of self-employed possesses high economic but a relatively low cultural capital. This contrasts to the educated class, where the cultural capital dominates the economic. According to Bourdieu, the educated class consists of professors and other academic occupations. The middle class or the *petite bourgeoisie* is composed of those in the middle occupational positions, primarily in middle management. The *petite bourgeoisie* is divided further into the declining *petite bourgeoisie* with little or shrinking economic and cultural capital, while a middle volume of both capital forms can be held by the executive *petite bourgeoisie*. The new *petite bourgeoisie* endowed with middle volumes of capital exists as a complementary class to the new bourgeoisie. The lower class is not further differentiated by Bourdieu but is composed of low skilled and manual workers.

The data set does not include information on income and property, so that the operationalisation of economic capital is not immediately possible. The

interviewees were asked for their occupation which was also used by Bourdieu in order to describe the classes and class fractions.⁵⁸ The following occupational groups were formed from the different categories:

- Professionals (either employed or self-employed) including doctors, architects, lawyers, etc.
- Higher and middle management including directors, managers, department chiefs, engineers, teachers, etc.
- Entrepreneurs, the self-employed including shop and business owners, self-employed craftsmen, etc.
- Skilled white collar and skilled workers
- Unskilled white collar and unskilled workers

I expect that all occupational groups have a higher level of linguistic capital than the reference group of unskilled white and blue collar workers. Secondly, I assume that the middle class of skilled white collar and skilled workers have a lower level of linguistic capital than the entrepreneurs, higher and middle management and the professionals. Finally, I act on the assumption that there is a difference between the professionals and the higher and middle managers on the one hand and the entrepreneurs on the other hand. All three groups belong to the upper class, but form two different fractions within this upper class. The entrepreneurs are those with a high level of economic but a relatively low level of cultural capital.⁵⁹ The reverse capital structure applies to the other two groups. Accordingly I assume that the entrepreneurs have a lower level of transnational linguistic capital compared to the professionals and managers.

⁵⁸ If interviewees were not employed at that time – because they kept house, were retired or unemployed – they were asked for their former occupation. In a first step the answers concerning the current and the former occupation were combined.

⁵⁹ Due to the fact that the category does not only include entrepreneurs but also “small” self-employed, people like craftsmen, who Bourdieu would assign to the *petite bourgeoisie*, the operationalisation is a bit diffuse.

I act on the assumption that the class position of the respondents' parents (1) as well as their own class position (2) impacts on the level of transnational linguistic capital.

(1) The higher the class of the respondent's parental home, the more the parents will have probably invested in the child's education. Educational investments include the creation of opportunities for education as well as the instilling of the belief that education is an important aim in life. Foreign languages are part of these educational investments. In this respect it can be assumed that the parents' class position affects the endowment of the children with transnational linguistic capital. Charlotte Büchner (2004) shows in her analysis of the Socio-Economic Panel data that students having attended school abroad or having studied there mainly come from parental homes of the upper class and upper middle class. Furthermore, the expected differences concerning the endowment with transnational linguistic capital between the class fractions of the upper class can be influenced by the parental home. While the self-employed tend to promote their children's practical, technical and scientific competences, the educated class tend to invest in a humanistic education including foreign languages. The symbolic use of transnational linguistic capital might play an additional role here (see thereto chapter 2.1). Multilingual people receive other peoples' respect due to this competence. Similar to the cultural elites in the countries who celebrate themselves by demonstrating their high cultural life styles in public settings, thus separating themselves from lower classes and the class fraction of those who have much economic but little cultural capital, a high level of transnational linguistic capital enables to present oneself as part of an emerging transnational class thus achieving a higher level of recognition and distinction.

Having different transnational linguistic capital due to the parental class affiliation affects in turn the chances to achieve a certain class position, as multilingualism increases the possibility of achieving better occupational positions in a higher class.

(2) The class position reached by the respondent opens up different opportunities of practising foreign language competence. If unskilled workers and white collar workers have learned foreign languages at all, the probability of them having the opportunity to use and practise these is much lower than that of executive managers and professionals. Moreover, we assume that the class fraction of the self-employed have fewer possibilities to use and improve an existing knowledge of foreign languages than educated classes.

The empirical results (Table 4.13) confirm our expectation that all professional groups in comparison to the reference group of unskilled white and blue collar workers have higher levels of transnational linguistic capital. Furthermore, the middle class is less multilingual than are all types of upper class respondents which also conforms to Bourdieu’s hypothesis. There is a clear difference between the professional and managerial class on the one hand and the self-employed on the other. This result supports Bourdieu’s notion that there are different class fractions in the upper class. Entrepreneurs and self-employed are a good example of the class with more economic capital but less cultural and linguistic capital.

Table 4.13: Social class and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Upper Class		Middle Class		Lower Class
	Professionals, Academics	Higher and middle management	Self-employed or entrepreneurs	Skilled blue and white collar workers	Unskilled blue and white collar workers
No foreign language	29.3	32.8	52.8	55.5	70.6
One foreign language	31.1	34.7	25.6	26.6	19.7
Two foreign languages	25.2	22.2	13.2	12.5	6.7
Three foreign languages	14.4	10.3	8.5	5.4	2.9
<i>N</i>	1,689	3,346	1,590	12,922	2,960

$r = -0,11^{***}$; Spearman’s Rho = $-0,14^{***}$; Tau-b = $-0,12^{***}$

(g) Institutionalised cultural capital (education) and multilingualism

According to Bourdieu a society's class structure results from the aggregation of capitals held by people. The economic and the cultural capital are the central resources for the formation of the class structure. Unfortunately we do not have any information on the peoples' income and property, but we do have some on their institutionalised cultural capital. This is composed of education or educational qualifications awarded to a person by a society's educational institutions. As foreign languages are usually imparted via educational institutions it can be assumed that the institutionalised cultural capital has a positive impact on one's level of transnational linguistic capital.⁶⁰ There are three arguments in favour of this assumption. Higher education means a longer period spent in educational institutions. As language teaching is part of school education, one can assume that the longer a respondent attends school, the more exposure she/he has to both a lengthy and demanding foreign language curriculum. Not only does education affect the opportunity structure for learning a foreign language, but also motivation to do so (Esser 2006: 110). Institutes of higher education in particular convey the message that learning a foreign language is culturally valuable in and of itself. Finally, education can also influence the cost of learning a foreign language, in that general study techniques improve with the length of a person's education; this is reducing the time investment necessary for learning a new language.

It is not easy to survey educational achievements in twenty-seven countries with different educational systems in a comparative way. However, the Eurobarometer contains a variable which makes a rough comparison of the educational achievements possible in spite of the different educational systems. The interviewees were asked for their age at the time they finished their education. The older a respondent was at the end of his education, the higher his educational achievement, the higher his institutionalised cultural capital and the better his transnational linguistic capital.

⁶⁰ The foreign language proficiency gained at the educational institutions can then again lead to the increase of institutionalised cultural capital in the form of educational qualifications.

At first the respondents were divided into three educational groups in order to analyse whether those with higher levels of education were more proficient in foreign languages than those with lower levels of education. Secondly, the average age at the end of the education of those who speak none, one, two or three foreign languages was calculated.

The hypothesis is confirmed by our analysis. Moreover, a comparison of the findings of the different bivariate analyses that have been carried out up to now shows that institutionalised cultural capital has the strongest effect of the variables so far on multilingualism.

Table 4.14: Institutionalized cultural capital (education) and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Low	Middle	High	Mean education in years
No foreign language	80.7	54.0	25.6	16.6
One foreign language	14.9	28.6	34.1	18.9
Two foreign languages	3.2	12.3	26.4	20.4
Three foreign languages	1.2	5.1	13.9	21.0
<i>N</i>	5,662	12,031	5,869	23,562

$r = 0,40^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $0,41^{***}$; Tau-b = $0,37^{***}$; Eta = $0,43^{***}$

(h) Respondents' or the respondents' parents' international heritage and transnational linguistic capital

Up to now, we have assumed that citizens of the EU member states were born and raised in the country where they currently live and that they learned the language of that country as their native language. Such an assumption ignores the fact that some citizens have transnational experience, such as being born in one country and later moving to another. Due to the segmented language structure, migration to another country usually means moving to another language, and people who move to a new country are often confronted with the necessity of learning a new language. One can therefore expect that people who have moved to another country speak more

languages than those who have not. The following table divides respondents into two groups: those who were born in the country they currently live in and those who were born in another country.

Table 4.15: Respondents' country of birth and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Born inland	Born abroad
No foreign language	53.1	19.5
One foreign language	26.1	44.2
Two foreign languages	14.6	23.3
Three foreign languages	6.2	13.0
<i>N</i>	<i>25,157</i>	<i>1,333</i>

$r = 0,14^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $0,15^{***}$; Tau-b = $0,14^{***}$

The results confirm the hypothesis that respondents who have moved from one country to another speak more foreign languages than do those who have not left their national container. This is true not only for the respondents themselves, but their parents' transnational experience probably also has a positive effect on speaking several languages. Parents who emigrated from another country usually speak their native language at home in the new country and also encourage their children to learn their native language as a link to their heritage.

Children whose parents have not migrated have to a lesser degree the opportunity to be brought up bilingually. This hypothesis is also confirmed by the data displayed in the following table. Persons having at least one parent who was born abroad speak significantly more often one or several foreign languages than persons whose parents are both natives.

Table 4.16: Parents' country of birth and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Both parents born inland	At least one parent born abroad
No foreign language	54.0	27.6
One foreign language	25.9	37.2
Two foreign languages	14.1	23.6
Three foreign languages	6.0	11.5
<i>N</i>	23,705	2,742

$r = 0,15^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $0,16^{***}$; Tau-b = $0,15^{***}$

(i) Identification with country of origin and transnational linguistic capital

As I have discussed in chapter 2.1, language not only impacts on society building processes but also on identity formation. Language is quite often a group's most important feature of identity. If the respective native language is a feature of identity of a group the influence and the studying of a foreign language may be interpreted as a detraction or even loss of their own collective identity. In this case the motivation to acquire a foreign language is low. The opposite may also be true; the stronger one's positive emotional identification with a foreign language, the higher that person's motivation to learn it and vice versa. The degree of identification with a language is again crucially determined by the extent of identification with the group speaking that language.

Due to the data available a test of the correlation between identification and multilingualism is possible only to a limited degree. In terms of the dependent variable we do not have any information on the degree of motivation for learning a foreign language. Though I assume that foreign language proficiency itself can partially be traced back to the motivation for acquiring the foreign language in the first place. Furthermore, we are lacking information on the identification with the different foreign languages. However, information on the identification with the native language is indirectly available. The interviewees were asked to what degree they identified with their home town, their region and their country. The response

options ranged from “very strong” and “fairly strong” to “not very strong” and “not strong”. The three different objects of identification form together a syndrome of attitudes. Those who felt strongly attached to their country also feel strongly attached to their home town and their region. Due to that, in a first step I have formed an additive scale out of the responses to the three questions (Crombachs alpha = .79). The new variable measures the degree of national and sub-national identification. Indeed therewith we have not operationalised the identification with a country’s language. As the language in question very often is a central feature of the region or the country, I assume that the identification with the country or a sub-national unit also measures identification with the language spoken there. Taking this bridging assumption as given, we can now test the expected correlation between the degree of national and sub-national identification and the citizens’ multilingualism. Table 4.17 shows the results in terms of the correlation between the degree of identification with the country and multilingualism⁶¹ on the one hand, and the differences between the mean values in the degree of identification with the country/the region/the home town between those people speaking none, one, two or three foreign languages on the other hand.

Table 4.17: Identification with country of origin and transnational linguistic capital (in %)

	Very strong	Fairly strong	Not very strong	Not strong	Mean
No foreign language	55.6	47.9	39.3	35.5	8.43
One foreign language	25.7	28.6	30.5	26.1	8.04
Two foreign languages	13.2	16.6	19.0	26.4	7.82
Three foreign languages	5.6	6.9	11.2	12.0	7.54
<i>N</i>	<i>15,813</i>	<i>8,678</i>	<i>1,659</i>	<i>264</i>	<i>26,273</i>

$r = 0,11^{***}$; Spearman’s Rho = $0,11^{***}$; Tau-b = $0,10^{***}$; Eta = $0,16^{***}$

⁶¹ The findings in terms of the correlation between the degree of identification with the place of residence, or the region and multilingualism look quiet similar.

Corresponding to our theoretical expectation it emerges that those respondents who identify strongly with their country of origin and the sub-national units of their country generally speak fewer languages than do those who have a weaker identification with their country of origin.

(j) Multivariate analysis

In the following I will test to which degree the bivariate results bear up under a multivariate testing. Multivariate analysis allows us to compare the differing strengths of individual factors that help explain transnational linguistic capital. In addition we can prove if certain independent variables affect others. Thus it can be assumed for example that a part of the effects stemming from the respondents' class position can be traced back to education as education affects class position. Table 4.18 shows the results from seven different linear regression models.

Additionally three more calculations were conducted for all models. (1) The dependent variable is strictly speaking not a metric, but an ordinal one. Correspondingly "ordered logit" regressions were calculated. (2) As the dependent variable is skewed to the right, we have conducted additional logistic regression analyses questioning whether someone speaks a foreign language at all or not as dichotomous dependent variable. The findings of both calculations are identical to those of the linear regression analyses. As the linear regression analyses are a bit easier to interpret I decided to present only those. (3) Furthermore, we have estimated multilevel models. Also here the results do not differ from the simple regression models. We therefore decided to represent only the results of the linear regression analysis, which are easier to understand.

I will discuss only whether and to what extent the different hypotheses are confirmed and will not repeat the explanation of the causal mechanism accounting for the correlation between independent and dependent variables, as this has already been covered within the discussion of the bivariate findings.

The first model (Table 4.18) takes several context variables into account that could explain the level of transnational linguistic capital: the size of the country, the degree of prevalence of the native language and the question whether there are several official languages in a country or not. As the beta-coefficients show, all theoretical expectations are confirmed. Respondents from smaller countries, countries with multiple official languages, and countries with non-prevalent languages speak more foreign languages than do respondents for whom these conditions do not apply.

Table 4.18: Explaining transnational linguistic capital (linear regressions)

	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6	Final Model
Multiple official languages	0.088** *						0.054** *
Country size	0.032** *						- 0.085** *
Prevalence of Language	0.220** *						- 0.275** *
Professionals, academics		0.242** *	0.234** *	0.078** *			0.108** *
Higher and middle management		0.294** *	0.294** *	0.105** *			0.143** *
Entrepreneurs, self-employed		0.122** *	0.120** *	0.050** *			0.048** *
Skilled workers		0.162** *	0.145** *	0.041** *			0.054** *
Age			0.166** *	0.066** *			- 0.059** *
Institutional cultural capital				0.359** *			0.301** *
Educational expenditures				0.039** *			0.204** *
Born abroad (respondent)					0.070** *		0.049** *
Born abroad (parents)					0.097** *		0.080** *
Identification with country of origin						-0.135	- 0.051** *
R ²	0.067	0.067	0.094	0.186	0.022	0.018	0.285
N	19,708	19,708	19,708	19,708	19,708	19,708	19,708

* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001, (a) Standardised regression coefficients, (b) Reference group: unskilled workers.

The second model looks at respondents' occupational position and as expected, all groups have higher levels of transnational linguistic capital than do unskilled workers. Also, people from the middle class are less likely to be multilingual compared to the two sections of the upper class. A comparison of the different class sections of the upper class reveals that professionals and management are more multilingual than the self-employed and middle management which conforms to Bourdieu's hypothesis. The self-employed are those with more economic but less cultural and transnational linguistic capital.

The third model includes age, and the fourth includes institutional cultural capital (education) and national educational expenditures.⁶² As signs of the coefficients indicate all hypotheses are confirmed: Countries with higher national educational expenditures tend to have respondents with higher levels of education and better foreign language proficiency. Younger respondents also have more transnational linguistic capital. A comparison between Models 3 and 4 shows that the age effect almost disappears when one takes education into account, because younger respondents tend to be better educated. Including education also reduces the explanatory strength of occupation on transnational linguistic capital (compare Models 2 and 4). This also conforms to Bourdieu's understanding of education as a determining factor in class position. Finally, education increases the overall explanatory power of the model from nine to eighteen percent and therefore has the strongest effect on multilingualism. All in all Bourdieu's assumptions are confirmed by the analyses very well. The level of linguistic capital is essentially determined by the respondents' class position and their endowment with capital.

Model 5 shows that respondents who or whose parents were born abroad have higher levels of transnational linguistic capital. The expected negative effect of identification with one's country of origin is also confirmed by the

⁶² In the bivariate analysis, we used two indicators for modernity: the Human Development Index and the national educational expenditures. Because these two indicators are highly correlated with one another, we limited our analysis here to national educational expenditures alone.

multivariate analysis in Model 6. Finally, the last model accounts for all theoretically based influencing factors. The R^2 value is 28.5%, which proves that these variables predict multilingualism very well. Moreover, Model 7 also shows that all of our theoretical assumptions were confirmed. Institutional cultural capital, national educational expenditure, and the prevalence of the country's official language have the strongest influence on transnational linguistic capital.⁶³

4.2.3 Explaining English Proficiency

In addition to being interested in transnational linguistic capital in general, we are also specifically interested in explaining the ascertained differences in citizens' English language proficiency, because English is the language most widely spoken among Europeans, be it as native or foreign language. Since the ability to speak a certain foreign language is a special case of foreign language proficiency in general, many of the aforementioned hypotheses can also be used to explain English language proficiency.⁶⁴ Hence, I am going to discuss only very briefly those hypotheses that can be transferred and to test them not in a bivariate but only in a multivariate analysis. I will pay more attention to the new hypotheses which refer to English in particular. Table 4.19 gives an overview of the different hypotheses for explaining English as a foreign language. The newly added hypotheses are highlighted.

⁶³ Comparing the results of Model 4 with those of the comprehensive model it becomes obvious that the impact of the educational expenditures becomes stronger in the comprehensive model. This is due to the fact that the national educational expenditures correlate positively with the country size and the prevalence of the language; thus the effect of the educational expenditures is underestimated in Model 4.

⁶⁴ Here we can abandon a testing of the correlation between the number of official languages and multilingualism. With regard to English this applies only to Malta. Malta used to be a British colony from 1800 to 1964; at Malta English is the second official language beside Maltese. Accordingly, almost all Maltese speak English, as is also shown in table 4.3.

Table 4.19: Theoretical model explaining English proficiency

	Opportunities	Costs	Motivation
<i>Macro-level factors</i>			
Prevalence of language			–
Country size	–		–
Level of modernization and education	+	–	
<i>Ex-socialist country</i>	–		–
<i>Linguistic distance between native language and English</i>		+	
<i>Self-perpetuating dynamic in the use of English</i>	+		+
<i>Individual-level factors</i>			
Respondent's age	–	+	–
Respondent's social class	+		+
Respondent's education (institutional cultural capital)	+	–	+
Foreign birth of the respondent and his/her parents	+		
Identification with originative language			–

I have assumed that the communicative value of a foreign language one wants to learn is lower for those whose mother tongue has a high degree of prevalence than for people whose language is only rarely spoken. This hypothesis should also apply to English as foreign language. Those whose language is spoken by many are less motivated to study English than speakers of small languages. A similar effect on English proficiency is likely to stem from a country's size. I have discussed several causal mechanisms which could make plausible why in smaller countries not only the opportunity structure but also the motivation to learn a foreign language are more favourable in smaller than in bigger countries. This correlation should also and above all apply to the learning of English when one considers that many movies are made in English and that in small countries these are often shown in the original version due to high dubbing costs. I have assumed that a country's degree of modernity and especially the development of its educational system affects its citizens' foreign language proficiency. The more modern and the broader and better developed the educational system,

the better is the education in foreign languages including English and the more citizens are able to speak English.

English proficiency is a specific transnational linguistic capital. Insofar as it can be assumed that the hypotheses I have deduced from Bourdieu's class theory also apply to the English proficiency we can say that people from the upper classes will more often be able to speak English than people from the lower classes and that within the upper class the class fraction of the educated class will more often be proficient in English than the self-employed. And also the institutionalised cultural capital should have a strong impact on the citizens' command of English, as those who have enjoyed a longer and better education are as a rule more likely to have studied English.

The probable influence of age on English proficiency can again be interpreted as a cohort effect. On the one hand the school leaving age has been raised and the level of education has been improved in the European countries over time; on the other hand the degree of international interconnectedness has clearly increased. For the different generations this means that they have experienced different levels of education and faced different international experiences and challenges. Accordingly, the older generations will have had fewer opportunities to study English compared to the younger cohorts.

Furthermore, it may be assumed that those who were born or whose parents were born in an English speaking country and today live in another country speak better English than those not sharing this immigrant background. As in the survey respondents were not asked in which specific foreign country they or one of their parents were born, the correlation cannot directly be tested. But as the group of persons born in an English speaking country is a subset of those born abroad all together (and that is what has been surveyed), the information as to whether the interviewee or one of his parents was born abroad can be used as an approximation measure of the theoretical construct. The correlation between the respondent's, or the respondent's parents' immigrant background and English proficiency should be weaker than the one between immigrant background and general multilingualism. And finally

I assume that the readiness to study English is rather held back than stimulated by a strong identification with national and local units and with the respective native language.

The multivariate analyses will allow us to test whether all these assumptions can be confirmed empirically. Beside these general hypotheses there are three additional theoretical expectations that are particularly relevant for explaining competence in the English language.

(a) Bipolar world order and English proficiency

We assume that a country's position during the world order of the Cold War (as either East or West) will influence the degree to which its citizens are proficient in English. Socialist Eastern and Central European member states were, until 1989, under the influence of the Soviet Union, where the Russian language held hegemonic power. Russian was often a mandatory foreign language (cf. the explanation in chapter 3.1). The Russian Empire was meant to protect people from the advance of English. Therefore, I assume that people living in a country which used to belong to the Soviet sphere of influence speak less English than people living in a country which used to belong to the Western sphere of influence. We do not think that this bipolar world order influenced transnational linguistic capital as such, but rather that it affected the choice of a particular foreign language. We therefore limit the following analysis to respondents who speak at least one foreign language.

Table 4.20: Ex-Socialist country und English proficiency (in %)

English proficiency	Non ex-socialist country	Ex-socialist country
No	17.8	46.7
Yes	82.2	53.3
<i>N</i>	8,665	6,749

$r = -0,30^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $-0,30^{***}$; Tau-b = $-0,30^{***}$. The analysis is limited to those who speak at least one foreign language.

The findings in the table confirm our theoretical expectation. English proficiency of those speaking at least one foreign language is almost thirty percent higher in the Western countries than in the socialist countries formerly in the Soviet sphere of influence. The correlation should not apply anymore or at least to a lesser degree after the collapse of the bipolar world order. Central and Eastern European countries quickly oriented and opened themselves westward after 1990 and many became full members of the EU in 2004 and 2007. This hypothesis can be tested by analysing the English proficiency of different age cohorts separately. We divide the respondents into two age cohorts: those who, in 2005, were under twenty-five years old and those twenty-five and over. Again I limit the analysis here to those speaking any foreign language.

Table 4.21: Ex-Socialist country and English proficiency for two age cohorts (in %)

Younger than 25 years		
English proficiency	Non ex-socialist country	Ex-socialist country
No	8.3	16.9
Yes	91.7	83.1
<i>N</i>	1,380	1,198

$r = -0,13^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $-0,13^{***}$; Tau-b = $-0,13^{***}$. The analysis is limited to those who speak at least one foreign language.

25 years or older		
English proficiency	Non ex-socialist country	Ex-socialist country
No	20.1	57.6
Yes	79.9	42.4
<i>N</i>	7,285	5,548

$r = -0,36$; Spearman's Rho = $-0,36$; Tau-b = $-0,36^{***}$. The analysis is limited to those who speak at least one foreign language.

The difference in English language proficiency between Western and former Soviet countries is notably smaller among respondents twenty-five and younger. This finding again confirms the thesis of the impact of the bipolar world order on the population's English proficiency. Whereas the difference between citizens from Eastern and Western societies is 37% for the older cohort, it is only 8.6% in the younger group.

(b) Linguistic distance and the respective cost of English language acquisition

As I have discussed in chapter 2.1, comparative linguistics divides individual languages into language families. Within and between language families there are different degrees of proximity measured by the overlap in lexicon, phonetics and grammar, etc. The distance between a native language that one already speaks and a new language one wants to learn affects the effort one has to put into studying the foreign language. The smaller the distance between two individual languages, the higher therefore the interference between the native language, or an already learned language, and a foreign language one intends to learn, the easier it is to study the new language. Linguistic distance therefore influences the costs involved in learning a foreign language. And the higher the costs of acquiring a language are, the smaller is the probability that foreign language acquisition will occur or be successful. This anticipated relationship between linguistic distance, the costs and the probability of language acquisition has been proven in several studies which have analysed migrants' language acquisition (cf. Carliner 2000; Chiswick & Miller 2001, 2004; van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005; concerning language acquisition in border areas of the EU cf. Roose 2010).

In a first step the distance between the different languages spoken by the EU citizens and English was determined using a classification that has also been used by other scholars (van Tubergen & Kalmijn 2005; Roose 2010). The respective language classifications have been published in book form, but are also available online (cf. Lewis 2009).⁶⁵ English is an Indo-European language and belongs to the group of the Germanic and the sub-group of the Western Germanic languages. All other languages than English have been divided into two groups, one group with a large and the other with a small distance to the English language.⁶⁶ The findings of the following table (the analysis is again

⁶⁵ <http://www.ethnologue.com>

⁶⁶ People speaking a native language that either does not belong to the main group of Indo-Germanic languages or that belongs to the main group of Indo-Germanic but not to the sub-group of Germanic languages were assigned the value "1". People speaking a native language that belongs to the group of Indo-Germanic languages and either to the group of Germanic languages or to the sub-group of Western Germanic languages have received

limited to those speaking at least one foreign language) confirm our hypothesis: People speaking a language as native language whose linguistic distance to English is smaller are significantly more often able to speak English than people speaking a native language whose distance to English is larger.

Table 4.22: Linguistic distance between native language and English and English proficiency (in %)

	Close	Far
No	8.1	36.2
Yes	91.9	63.8
<i>N</i>	4,972	10,253

$r = -0,31^{***}$; Spearman's Rho = $-0,31^{***}$; Tau-b = $-0,31^{***}$

(c) Inherent momentum in the rise of English

For everyone currently beginning to learn a foreign language, it is rational to choose English, because English, being the most widely-spoken language in Europe, has the highest communicative value. This decision to learn English leads to an increase in the number of English speakers. For those who decide to learn a foreign language in the future, it becomes even more sensible to choose English, because the number of English speakers will have grown even more. This process explains why small differences become larger over time. Similar phenomena are discussed in economics under the keyword "network externalities" (cf. Katz & Shapiro 1985). Computer users have to decide between the system software by Apple and the one by Microsoft. The decision once made increases or decreases the network of users of a specific system, thereby influencing the subsequent decisions of future users.

We can get an idea of the dynamic of the growth of English when we compare the different generations of our respondents. As we saw above, the number of citizens who speak a foreign language at all has increased with every generation, so this analysis only takes into account those respondents who

the value "0". For the first group the distance of their native language to English is bigger than for the second group and therefore also the effort for studying English.

speak at least one foreign language. That way, we can see how in time English has displaced other foreign languages.

Table 4.23: Age and English proficiency (%; only those who speak at least one foreign language are included)

	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
No	11.2	18.1	21.5	33.9	39.7	49.5
Yes	88.8	81.9	78.5	66.1	60.3	50.5
<i>N</i>	2,578	2,817	2,930	2,609	2,218	2,259

$r = -0,28$; Spearman's $Rho = -0,28^{***}$; Tau-b = $-0,25^{***}$; Eta = $0,31^{***}$

The changes between age groups are considerable: Within forty years, the percentage of English speakers (among those who speak any foreign languages) has risen by over twenty-eight percent.

(d) Multivariate Analysis

Similar to our explanation of transnational linguistic capital in general, we will now test if our hypotheses about English in particular withstand a multivariate analysis. I will limit the first analysis to those persons speaking at least one foreign language and analyse the impact of the three factors influencing peoples' English proficiency discussed above. Thus I will focus on the explanation why EU citizens speak English and no other foreign language.

Table 4.24: Explaining English proficiency (logistic regressions)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Total Model 5
Ex-Socialist country	0,245***	1,059			
Ex-Socialist country *		0,149***			0,264***
Age > 25					
Linguistic Distance			0,435***		0,414***
Age				0,962***	0,956***
Constant	4,663***	4,663***	10,651***	15,058***	111,153***
Nagelkerke R ²	0,117	0,169	0,137	0,114	0,338
<i>N</i>	15,222	15,222	15,222	15,222	15,222

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (a) Excluded are those who speak English as their mother tongue and those who do not speak a foreign language. (b) Depicted are unstandardised effect coefficients (odds ratios): >1: positive effect, <1: negative effect, =1: no effect.

In order to answer these questions five logistic regressions were calculated. In a first step I have considered whether a respondent comes from an ex-Socialist or Western country. Because this variable's effect is only valid for older generations, we did a second calculation with a dichotomous age variable (of whether the respondent was older or younger than twenty-five years). Comparing the results in Model 1 with those in Model 2 shows that the political system one used to belong to affects the probability of speaking English, but this correlation only applies to older generations. The third model analyses the impact of the linguistic difference between his/her country's native language and English and the probability that the interviewee speaks English. Those speaking a native language with a big distance to English have only forty-three percent times as great a chance of being proficient in English as those speaking a native language with a small distance to English. In the fourth model the respondent's age was taken into consideration. Each year a respondent ages decreases the chance of being able to speak English by the factor of 0.96. The last model includes all independent variables. The effect of the theoretically derived variables persists for all factors, an explained variance of almost thirty-four percent is

more than satisfying, and the three independent variables can easily explain the English proficiency of those interviewed.

English is one foreign language among others; accordingly, those factors which explain the level of transnational linguistic capital should also have an impact on the specific language of English. The following analyses include those factors able to explain general foreign language competence, as well as those able to explain the specific competence of speaking English. I limit the analyses to the calculation of three different models. In addition, we have estimated multilevel models. Also here the results do not differ from the simple logistic regression models. We therefore decided to represent only the results of the logisitic regression analysis, which are easier to understand.

Model 1 in Table 4.25 includes all variables from the regression analysis which were used to explain the general transnational linguistic capital (excluding the number of official languages). The results are very similar to those from table 4.18. All variables that influence levels of transnational linguistic capital are also helpful in explaining English language proficiency. The explanatory power of the different variables is also similar but with one exception. The respondent's foreign heritage has the opposite effect than expected. Those respondents who were born in a different country from the one they currently live in are less likely to speak English than are those who were born and still live in the same country. In another calculation (not shown here) we found that educational level neutralise the effect of foreign heritage. Respondents born abroad are generally from less-modernised countries with less-developed educational systems.

Table 4.25: Explaining English proficiency (logistic regressions)

	Model 1	Model 2	Total Model
Country size	0.994***		0.998
Prevalence of language	0.979***		0.938***
Professionals, academics	5.607***		5.478***
Higher and middle management	5.838***		5.943***
Entrepreneurs, self- employed	2.349***		2.695***
Skilled workers	2.275***		2.473***
Age	0.966***		0.961***
Institutionalised cultural capital (education)	1.233***		1.269***
National educational expenditures	1.791***		1.302***
Born abroad (respondent)	0.772*		0.777*
Born abroad (parents)	1.019		1.112
Identification with country of origin	0.959***		0.963***
Linguistic distance		0.581***	0.382***
Ex-socialist country		1.786***	
Ex-socialist country*Age > 25		0.240***	0.431***
Constant	0.002***	1.457***	0.058***
Nagelkerke R ²	0.401	0.124	0.462
<i>N</i>	18,083	18,083	18,083

* $p < 0,05$, ** $p < 0,01$, *** $p < 0,001$

(a) Excluded are those who speak English as mother tongue. (b) Depicted are unstandardised effect coefficients (odds ratios): >1: positive effect, <1: negative effect, =1: no effect c) Referential category for the professional groups is the group of unskilled workers.

Model 2 considers the variables referring only to the explanation of English. Persons whose native language has a higher linguistic distance to English, have a 0.38 times greater chance of speaking English than persons whose native language has a low distance to English. The same applies to older persons from the former socialist countries.

Finally, Model 3 includes all variables at the same time. The effects of the variables from Model 1 and 2 persist so that almost all of our hypotheses are confirmed. Looking at the context variables, we see that respondents are

more likely to speak English if they come from (a) smaller countries, (b) countries with a non-prevalent language, (c) countries that highly invest in education, (d) countries with an official language closely related to English, and (e) countries that were not part of the Soviet Union. However, the country size variable is not significant. Furthermore, respondents who have a weak identification with their home country are more likely to speak English than are those who are still strongly linked to their country of origin, and also, presumably, their native language.

Our expectation about social class and English is also confirmed, since in comparison to the reference group of unskilled blue collar and white collar worker, all other groups are significantly more likely to speak English. The difference between professionals and managers as compared to the self-employed shows the difference between two sub-groups of the upper class. Finally, our hypothesis that younger and more educated respondents would be more likely to speak English than the elderly and the less educated is also confirmed. The total model explains forty-six percent of the variance in English language proficiency and therefore has outstanding explanatory power.

4.3 Outlook on How the Citizens' Multilingualism will Develop

On the basis of a survey analysis in twenty-seven countries of the EU I have analysed the peoples' foreign language competence. The analysis shows that the citizens' foreign language proficiency is far from good. More than fifty percent of the citizens do not speak any foreign language at all; for this reason their chances of taking part in the process of Europeanisation are very limited. Moreover, the analyses reveal the competences of multilingualism vary significantly between and within the countries. In Hungary 70.5% of the population does not speak a single foreign language, in the Netherlands only 8.6% do not.

Not every language enables the same communicative chances. The more people can be reached with a foreign language, the higher is the rate of return

of the corresponding linguistic capital. That is why I have determined the number of speakers proficient in English throughout the twenty-seven EU countries, as English is the most frequently spoken language in Europe: Scarcely half of the EU citizens are able to communicate in English. Again, here huge differences arise within the countries and between the countries. In Bulgaria 84.6% of the population does not speak English, in the Netherlands there are only 12.4%.

Why do people in some countries of the EU have such a very good endowment of transnational linguistic capital and are able to communicate in English and why is that not the case in other countries? In order to respond to that question, I have first developed a general model to explain foreign language proficiency. The opportunities for acquiring a foreign language, the costs that are connected with studying a foreign language and the motivation to learn a foreign language are the three central elements of the core explanatory model. The societal conditions people are embedded in impact on these three dimensions and determine who has transnational linguistic capital, or who speaks English and who does not. The hypotheses deduced from the explanatory model have then been empirically tested. It appears that both the peoples' multilingualism and the ability to speak English can be very well predicted with the help of the different explanatory factors.

These findings have to be interpreted in the context of the general level of research. Analysing peoples' multilingualism is the domain of linguists, psychologists and educationalists (cf. the summarizing overview in Wei 2000; Bialystok 2001; Bhatia & Ritchie 2006; Auer & Wei 2007). In their analyses they focus above all on the cognitive, partially neuro-mental pre-conditions of multilingualism, on the analyses of the impact of multilingualism on the cognitive development and the analysis of the family and school conditions and consequences of multilingualism. Only the broader societal conditions people are embedded in are not considered in these analyses. In contrast, our findings show that it is exactly these neglected societal conditions which essentially affect multilingualism. It is therefore

urgent that research on bilingualism and multilingualism must be supplemented by a sociological perspective.

Every explanation always implies a prognosis. If the societal conditions change, this will have the anticipated effects on the independent variable, in this case transnational linguistic capital. In which directions will the societal conditions change and how will this impact on the level of transnational linguistic capital? A discussion of possible changes of the explanatory factors indirectly summarises again the most important findings of the causal analysis.


(a) If the use of a foreign language increases, so does the motivation to learn that language. Since the 1970s nation state societies have increasingly opened their borders due to the process of transnationalisation. We had also seen that the process of transnationalisation manifests itself above all as a process of increasing Europeanisation. The level of interconnectivity between the different member states of the EU has increased tremendously over time. The increasing interconnectedness of interactions becomes apparent in quiet different dimensions, ranging from the increase of the exchange of goods and services to collegiate exchange to the increase of political interdependence. As there are different languages spoken in the EU member states, participation in this process of transnationalisation and Europeanisation is only possible with the ability to speak other languages. As the process of transnationalisation progresses, transnational linguistic capital will become more important and also increases the motivation of EU citizens to learn foreign languages. All European countries will, metaphorically speaking, become smaller as they become more and more linked with other nations. This increases the pressure to acquire a foreign language proficiently. This process of integration throughout Europe and the world in many societal fields – economy, culture, communication, and politics – will continue in the future as the causes of this process remain powerful. Technological innovations having enormously facilitated worldwide communication and transport continue as do also the politics of trade

liberalisation and global trade. This will be accompanied by an increasing need of foreign language proficiency in general, and of English in particular.

(b) Globalisation and Europeanisation positively influence people's migration patterns. We assume that in the future intra-European migration and also immigration into Europe will increase rather than decrease. This means that children are more likely to grow up in families with parents who were born in another country. Our empirical analysis shows that this often leads to children growing up bilingually.

(c) The process of improving education in the EU is also far from over and has been at the forefront of the political agenda at both the country and EU level. Part of the measures in terms of education policy is the Lisbon Agenda of the European Union that was adopted at the special summit of the European Heads of State and of Government in the year 2000 in Lisbon. It was the declared aim of the different measures to make the EU the most competitive and most dynamic economic region in the world within ten years. The EU emphasised that knowledge and the innovations emanating from it are the EU's most important advantages in global competition. Accordingly, education policy as a means of the promotion of a knowledge-based society is given special relevance (Münch & Bernhard 2009). An increase in investment in education, the improvement and lengthening of mandatory schooling and an increase in the number of people obtaining a higher educational qualification are the EU's central educational goals. Because of this focus, there has been a noticeable change over the last several years in terms of educational levels, data is available for nine European countries (Denmark, Germany, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden) from 1995 to 2007 regarding the number of people, who, after finishing their secondary education, went on to begin a university degree.

Figure 4.1: Share of persons having started studying after school in nine EU countries (in %)



Source: OECD (2009)

The percentage of people in institutions of higher education rose from thirty-five to fifty-nine percent. Because education has a positive effect on foreign languages (and specifically English), we expect that levels of transnational linguistic capital and of English language proficiency have increased during the last few years and that they will continue to do so.

(d) The structure of the world society has – at least in Europe – changed so dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the integration of Eastern and Central European countries in the post-Cold War world order that there is hardly any foreseeable alternative to continuing market liberalisation and westernisation. A new bipolar world order – as in the times of the Cold War – is unlikely. A new cleavage structure might develop though, or has already developed, in rudimental forms between Western and Islamic countries, as well as between Western countries and China. However, it cannot be predicted that it will divide Europe. Insofar as we can see the demand for multilingualism will increase further and English will remain the unchallenged hegemonic language. The exponential growing increase in China's economic and political significance and the fact that Chinese is the native language with the highest prevalence will certainly increase the communicative value of Chinese for communication outside of Europe, but not for communication within Europe.

(e) In addition, there is the inherent momentum in the rise of a foreign language and above all the spread of English. The dominance of English has motivated many Europeans to learn English, the language with the highest communication value, thereby further raising both the number of English speakers and its communicative use. This process seems unlikely to stop in the near future.

(f) It is also unlikely that the current class structure in European societies will disappear. Thus, the inequalities in terms of the level of transnational linguistic capital within the societies will survive. This means that members of the upper classes will be more proficient in more foreign languages than will be those in the middle and lower classes, and within a particular class, those sub-groups with higher cultural capital will have especially high levels of transnational linguistic capital.

If these expectations prove to be correct, we can expect an “elevator effect” for transnational linguistic capital, whereby foreign language and English proficiency will improve across Europe, even though differences between classes, educational levels, age groups, country size, and linguistic prevalence will remain constant.

5. AN ARGUMENT FOR A NEW LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

As I have summarised the argument and the empirical findings in the introduction as well as at the end of each respective chapter, there is no need to draw another balance at the end of the book. Instead, in the concluding remarks I will focus on the political implications of our results by asking what a sound and at the same time just language policy for Europe can look like.

According to John Rawls' "A Theory of Justice" (1971), justice is the first virtue of social institutions. One of Rawls' essential theoretical assumptions is the maxim of equal opportunities: Everybody should have the same opportunities to achieve social status in a society. For this purpose, a society needs rules and regulations ensuring that people with the same abilities and talents can indeed achieve the same positions. Although Rawls has made this claim primarily to install justice within a nation state, one can also apply his arguments to Europe and the language policy of the European Union.

The process of European integration has opened up the member states of the EU to each other and sets the foundations for the emergence of a European society. Foreign language skills and especially English proficiency are central resources of the peoples' participation in a European society. Those speaking several languages can benefit from the European economic market; they can improve their job opportunities as well as their income; it is easier for them to get into contact with citizens of other countries, to cooperate economically or scientifically, to conduct political negotiations, to organise protest events or to enter romantic relationships beyond national borders, etc. Those only

speaking their mother tongue are confined to their countries, unable to take advantage of a united Europe and a globalised world. Possessing transnational linguistic capital is thus a source of social inequality in the context of a developing globalised and European society.

In turn, the ability to speak different languages largely depends on the social position a person has attained and is, as our empirical analysis has shown, rather unequally distributed. Particularly people from larger countries, from less developed societies and from the lower classes with little education are significantly less well-endowed with transnational linguistic capital. This contradicts the idea of equal opportunities for all European citizens. If it is not desirable that only the upper classes, the citizens from wealthy countries, and the big companies that can afford translators are able to participate in the process of Europeanisation, then the people from lower classes and persons from the less developed countries will have to be provided with adequate language proficiency, so that they have the same opportunities to participate in a Europeanised and globalised society.

This lack of fairness, due to different foreign language skills also applies to the different fields of science and scholarship. From my point of view, research in German humanities and social sciences are quite often qualitatively on the same level as American research in many respects. However, the fact that the findings are mostly published in German prevents them from being recognised throughout the world. The language differences manifest themselves in the extent of distribution of the research results, which then is reflected in the most frequently used performance and ranking indicators for research, the citation indices. The place of birth and hence a scientist's or scholar's mother tongue thus determine the evaluation of the quality of his or her research, although the language of publication reveals nothing about the quality of a historical study, a poetry analysis or a methodologically elaborated analysis of survey data. In order to make the same conditions of competition possible for all research and thereby achieve equal opportunities as a precondition for a just society itself, people must be enabled to communicate in one and the same language.

To achieve this aim there are two different options which one can choose from: the promotion of the citizens' multilingualism in general or the promotion of a *lingua franca* in Europe. As English is the language that is most distributed worldwide it is the only language under consideration. I will argue that it is reasonable not only to enforce the acceptance of the dominance of English as *lingua franca*, but also to actively promote it politically, even at the cost of other languages and of the minority languages spoken in Europe. In so doing I will partly leave the field of empirical analysis and move into the field of normative deliberation. Here empirical evidence is less important than good arguments that must be deduced and substantiated in a normatively plausible way.

(1) As became obvious in chapter 3.3, the European nation states, although to a different degree, pay keen attention to the maintenance of the status of their respective language as an official language inside the European Union. They are on guard against any disadvantage to their own language and even try to foster the growing influence of this language. The European Union accepts in its language policy twenty-three official languages and does not pursue a policy of linguistic homogenisation. On the contrary, besides the official languages it supports the minority languages in Europe. At the same time the EU is aware of the fact that a united Europe will only become a united Europe of all its citizens, if they are able to communicate across national borders. That is why it promotes the multilingualism of its citizens. It wants every citizen to be able to speak two foreign languages. Thereby all European languages are treated and supported equally. For the promotion of multilingualism, the EU has taken a variety of measures as we have seen above. Will this policy contribute to the improvement of communication throughout Europe, thereby increasing the citizens' opportunities for participating in *their* Europe?

Acting upon the language policy of the EU, people in the twenty-seven countries will study different foreign languages at one time, by means of which the bilateral communication opportunities should improve significantly. But a Europe without linguistic boundaries will not be

attainable in this way. A German studying Flemish, a French speaking Spanish and a Pole being able to speak Latvian have each increased their transnational linguistic capital, but that does not mean that they can communicate with each other. The more languages exist, the greater is the variety of possible language combinations people can choose from, and the smaller is the likelihood of two people who meet will have chosen the same foreign language. Philippe Van Parijs (2004: 122f.) has calculated possible combinations for different numbers of mother tongues and has shown that in a Europe of twenty-three official languages the free choice of two foreign languages cannot materially increase the probability that Europeans can communicate with each other. The variety of languages which are spoken in the European Parliament illustrates this constellation and the set of problems connected with it, as we have seen in chapter 3.3. Van Parijs (2004, 2011) concludes that politics should further enforce and foster the trend that has already been empirically determined anyway, namely that English has taken hold as *lingua franca*.⁶⁷

What are the advantages of a common foreign language in Europe and which counter arguments have to be considered? In order to find an answer to that question, we have taken arguments by Van Parijs (2011) and have added some further points.

(2) Since the so called freedom of movement rule has been in force the legal preconditions have been in place for all EU citizens to settle with their spouses and children in any member country and to work there. This option is rarely exercised. As we have seen in chapter 3.2, intra-European mobility is very low. One of the main reasons for this low mobility is insufficient foreign language skills. A good proficiency of the language spoken by most of the EU citizens is a precondition for being able to make use of the options of mobility in Europe and throughout the world. In chapter 2.1 we have discussed several advantages which are connected with the possession of transnational

⁶⁷ Van Parijs (2004, 2011) discusses two more alternatives to English as *lingua franca*: the introduction of Esperanto as a common language and the improvement of translations with the help of modern software development. He arrives at the convincing conclusion that none of them can be a practicable possibility.

capital in general and English proficiency in particular. Multilingualism, and especially the command of English, allows studying in other countries, the taking of exams there and the acquiring of respective certificates of education. Secondly, English proficiency improves the chances of getting a better job. The Europeanisation and globalisation of economy and politics have altered the profile of requirements for jobs. International experience and the command of English have become pivotal aspects in one's qualifications. Persons having this competence can benefit from the opportunities of an international labour market. Thirdly, English proficiency improves the extension of one's social network and international social capital. In turn, international social capital itself is a resource that, among other things, can be used for the extension of business connections and the exercise of political influence. Finally, good English proficiency also improves the chances for political participation, involvement in the political life in another country and in a transnational public. The transnationalisation of political participation is especially important in the context of the European integration. Since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 the citizens of the EU hold not only their national, but also EU citizenship. However, they can only utilise the associated legal possibilities, if they are able to communicate Europe-wide.

(3) An improvement of the citizens' command of English would not only entail advantages for individuals in the described dimensions, but would also have positive collective effects. Based on the possibility to communicate in one language and the thereby reduced transaction costs, the internal and external European trade would be considerably facilitated. This again would raise European economic growth significantly. Geographical mobility being facilitated by the proficiency of English would result in a better balance of labour supply and demand for labour within the EU and again would have a positive effect on economic growth (cf. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 2008).

Moreover, the emergence of a European public would profit tremendously by one foreign language being shared by all European citizens. As we have seen

in chapter 3.2, the political decision making processes have been constantly Europeanised; collectively binding decisions are being made more frequently by EU institutions instead of national governments and parliaments. The development of a European public is lagging behind this process, since the media coverage continues to be widely attached to the nation states. Thus, for example, the Poles inform themselves mostly in Polish about their country's politics, the French concentrate their attention on what is happening in their country using the French language. As a consequence, the citizens of Europe are not sufficiently informed about decisions made by the institutions of the EU, although they are directly subject to these decisions. One of the most important reasons for this deficit of a European public sphere is to be found in the language problem (Gerhards 1993; Kielmannsegg 1996: 55; Grimm 1994: 44; Scharpf 1999: 674; Pérez-Díaz 1998: 221; Schlesinger 1999). Consequently, the emergence of a European public sphere and the citizens' participation in the European integration process would become considerably easier, if the people of Europe could communicate with each other and if the news coverage as well as discussions about the European integration process could take place in a common language.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ The thesis that the existence of a European public sphere's deficit can in the first place be ascribed to the language problem has not remained unchallenged. Referring to Gadamer's hermeneutics Cathleen Kantner (2004) has tried to show in her analysis that communication is also possible between two people not speaking a common language. Nicole Doerr (2008, 2009) shows in her analyses of discussions of groups who prepared the European Social Forum and the World Social Forum, that despite multilingualism deliberative processes have been possible. Analysing the conditions of the emergence of a European public Thomas Risse (2010) references Cathleen Kantner's thesis and alike concludes that the diversity of languages does not hinder the emergence of a European public. However, the conclusions the authors have drawn underestimate the fundamental significance of a common language for every form of communication. Of course communication also works via gestures and facial expressions and certainly translators can be hired. Yet, taking into account the twenty-three languages of the EU, this turns out to be rather complicated. The transaction costs of communication that is not conducted in one language are tremendously high. Insofar we do not have to discuss whether a common language is an essential precondition for a European public sphere. But what in my opinion is undeniable is the fact that it would tremendously facilitate and accelerate the emergence of a European public sphere. And this precisely is the pivotal argument: Starting from the assumption derived from theories of democracy that an expansion of the European public sphere is desirable, this aim will be more easily achieved if Europe is linguistically united in a common foreign language. Every citizen studying a *different* foreign language will not dissolve the Babylonian confusion of languages in Europe. Thereby the *bilateral* communication will improve, but not the chance of a uniform communication inside the whole of Europe. This will only be possible, if everybody

There is one additional argument which brings the idea of a Europe being linguistically united through the English language even closer to the Habermasian idea of a European public sphere (Habermas 2004a/b). The unified language community of Europe has the chance to develop a “demos” without being an “ethnos” at the same time (Van Parijs 2004: 118). For most of the citizens of Europe, the English language is not a feature of a historically grown community with a clear territorial reference, but a medium of communication being widely exempt from historical ballast that is often connected with national languages. In addition to that, the implementation of English as a dominant foreign language that has occurred until today is, at least in Europe, not the result of an expansive language policy by the British or the Americans wanting to impose their mother tongue on other countries. It is the result of a “soft-power” constellation and many small decisions of individuals mutually enforcing each other. This allows for the assumption that there will be little resentment towards English as *lingua franca*, as the language itself is not associated with claims to the power of a country, thereby provoking fear of heteronomy. However, one can assume that the institutionalisation of English as *lingua franca* would symbolically enhance those who speak English as a mother tongue. The way in which this inequality regarding the reputation of languages can be compensated for, will be discussed below.

(4) As I have argued in chapter 1 and as we can learn from the process of nation building, a common language not only facilitates a structural integration of society, but also contributes to identity formation and identity building. This also applies for having different languages at one’s command. Proficiency in foreign languages enables people to make transnational experiences, to interact with people of different cultures and thus to get to know different ways of life and societies.⁶⁹ This leads to the cognitive

speaks the same foreign language; and this can under the given circumstances and the dynamic of the development only be the English language.

⁶⁹ The broadening of horizon by getting in touch with other cultures can also be influenced by media usage. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2009: 171ff.) found out, that people following the news show higher trust rates in people from other countries and other religions.

broadening of one's horizon. Thus, the peoples' bonds to their own national "container" and the sub-national units soften and openness for new bonds develops beyond the nation state.

Robert Putnam (2007) has shown in a deliberative and methodologically sound analysis, that there is a negative relationship between the level of ethnic heterogeneity of a society and the level of trust between the citizens. The correlation between the two factors is robust and statistically significant, even when one controls for many other factors which influence the level of trust (cf. also Newton & Delhey 2005). In contrast, people living in ethnic homogeneous societies are more trustful and more open minded. Trust is insofar important for the integration of a society as it is a precondition for the development of social capital, people's involvement in the civil society and the solidarity between the people (cf. also Van Parijs 2008: 29).⁷⁰

Quite often ethnic heterogeneity goes hand in hand with linguistic heterogeneity. Hence, one can conclude that the relationship between ethnicity and trust also holds true for the relationship between linguistic heterogeneity and trust. To be able to speak the languages of other people will increase the probability of the emergence of trust, solidarity between the people and the identification with one's society.

The supposed effect of foreign languages on the broadening of horizons and the development of trust and transnational identification is a relevant question, especially for the EU. Survey research has shown quite often, that European citizens identify themselves first and foremost with their nation state, their region and their town and that identification with Europe has not increased over time, although the European integration process has speeded up tremendously (cf. Noll & Scheuer 2006; Roose 2007).

⁷⁰ The results of Putnam's analysis are discussed controversially in the literature. More recently Will Kymlicka (2009) has summarised the debate and supplemented it with the results of his own research. The negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and trust is supported by other studies. However, there seems to be no statistically significant correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and the level of solidarity measured by the amount of social expenditure, whereas the growth of ethnic heterogeneity has a negative impact on social expenditure (cf. Kymlicka 2009).

Our data allows us to test at least rudimentarily whether having transnational linguistic capital has an impact on the citizens' identification with Europe and the support of the European unification process. In the survey analysed by us, the citizens in the twenty-seven EU countries were asked whether and to which degree they felt attached to Europe.

Table 5.1: Transnational linguistic capital and identification with Europe (in %)

Attachment to Europe	Proficiency in foreign languages			
	none	one	two	three
Not at all	9.3	6.3	4.9	3.1
Not that much	26.5	23.2	20.7	19.5
Fairly	42.0	46.5	47.3	48.1
Strongly	22.2	24.1	27.0	29.3
<i>N</i>	10,157	7,437	5,229	3,122

$r = 0.10^{***}$, $Rho = 0.10^{***}$, $Tau-b = 0.08^{***}$ ($p < 0.001$)

As displayed in table 5.1, those speaking several languages also feel attached to a higher degree to Europe. The same correlation applies to those speaking English. They also feel more strongly attached to Europe than those who do not speak English as a foreign language. These findings persist in a multivariate analysis as well. Besides the proficiency in foreign languages and in English we included a variety of other variables influencing the identification with Europe (cf. Fuchs et al. 2009).

In further analyses we considered the impact of foreign language proficiency, or rather English proficiency, on the support of the European unification process and on the fears of the loss of a national identity (tables are not presented here). The results show that those who are multilingual are in favour of the EU as an institution, and support a further deepening of the EU, and are at the same time culturally open-minded and show low tendencies to exclude foreigners. These results are confirmed in a multivariate analysis. In addition, these findings correspond to those of Steffen Mau, Jan Mewes and Ann Zimmermann (2008a/b) who could show that transnational experiences can foster cosmopolitan orientations. As a result, multilingualism and the

proficiency in English not only bring about advantages in integrating citizens structurally into an emerging European society, but also symbolically.

(5) The factual implementation of English as *lingua franca* and the plead to politically support this process also leads to inequalities between the different languages. Languages are, according to Abram de Swaan (2001b) public goods. And as in any public good, the question remains how to manage its production without having some participants paying all the costs for it, while others, even if unintentionally, profit from it as free riders without taking a share in the costs. In the case of the introduction of English as a *lingua franca* those speaking English as a mother tongue would be the free riders, as they do not have to study a new language themselves. Consequently, those having to study English as a foreign language would be those having to pay the costs to produce a common good.⁷¹

In addition, English native speakers would become privileged when English becomes the official *lingua franca* of the European Union. They will have advantages on the labour market, as they speak the *lingua franca* better than those who have studied it as a foreign language; they can better express their position in political and public debates and therefore become more influential; they will more easily build up international networks and will be able to transfer this social capital into other forms of capital, etc.⁷²

How can these anticipated inequalities be compensated for? Different solutions are discussed in the literature. Jonathan Pool (1991) came forward with the best known proposal that he modelled mathematically. The basic

⁷¹ On the other hand, investments in a new foreign language are also of advantage for those having made the investment, as they now have two languages at their command and can capitalise this bilingualism.

⁷² Van Parijs (2004) points out another inequality that would be connected with the preferential treatment of English (see also Grin 2004). The preferential treatment of a language does not only lead to better chances for the speakers of that language to transform their language proficiency into other capitals. It also allows for the enhancement of their symbolic capital, insofar their language's prestige obtains more acceptance. Van Parijs makes some suggestions how to reduce these expected effects: (a) "Demystification": It should be noted that English is nothing but the dialect of some Germanic barbarians having settled across the canal, so there is nothing special about the English language. (b) "Ritual affirmation": In the way the Pope issues the Easter blessing in all languages of the world, the European Union should take care that in all public rituals multilingualism is supported symbolically.

idea is that the introduction of a *lingua franca* is connected with costs and benefits which are dispersed to different degrees among the different language groups. In order to achieve an equitable solution those language communities whose mother tongue is chosen as a *lingua franca* should subsidise those language communities that have to study the *lingua franca*, up to the point at which costs and benefits of the foreign language acquisition even out (Van Parijs 2007: 74, 2011). The exact amount that would have to be paid as compensation payment is hard to define as for this purpose a multitude of parameters have to be included (more precisely Van Parijs 2007, 2011; Grin 2004: 199).

However, the fundamental idea is extremely appealing, as it presents a way to refute the argument that the introduction of a *lingua franca* will lead to an unequal and thus unjust burden for the different language communities. And it shows that an efficient and at the same time fair language policy in a multilingual union is in principal possible. The European Union as a political institution has the power and the possibilities for implementing such a policy. To a different degree the twenty-seven countries would have to take a share in financing this language policy of the EU and respectively the resources would have to be distributed disproportionately to the countries. Those countries in which English proficiency is the lowest would have to get the greatest support. This idea of a disproportional support is thereby absolutely compatible with the EU's fundamental philosophy of an integrated Europe and other political measurements.

Regional policy could act as an example for the language policy. With structural funds the EU aims at the adjustment of economically weaker regions in order to contribute to the convergence of regions and member countries. In the first instance, convergence means the support of growth and employment in regions and member states with the biggest backwardness. Growth and employment should be achieved by an improvement of human resources, innovation and the advancement of the knowledge based society. A European language policy could be legitimised based exactly on these goals. It is an investment in the human capital of precisely those citizens who

cannot adequately participate in the process of Europeanisation due to a lack of proficiency in English.

Van Parijs (2004: 129) further suggests a measurement that would probably enhance the command of English in the population without any input of resources. We have seen in the empirical analyses, that people in smaller countries speak better English than people in countries with a large population; this difference partially depends on the fact that in smaller countries many movies and TV programmes are shown in the original language which in many cases is English, whereas in larger countries nearly all of the films are dubbed. This is due to the fact that the costs for a translation would be too high considering the relatively small demand. The reception of movies in the original version supports the acquisition of the language in which the movie is shown. Since most of the movies are of Anglo-American origin, subtitling leads to the improvement of the English language proficiency. Though, Van Parijs' (2004) proposal to ban the translation of movies by law will neither be politically possible, nor is it legal, as such a direction would contradict the principles of a free market, which are extensively protected by the laws of the EU. However, almost all countries in the EU either have public or state-run broadcasting services. Hence, member states of the EU could mutually commit themselves to ensure, that their public broadcasting services show a part of their programmes and especially the youth programmes in the original versions and languages. That would be a measure in favour of the improvement of foreign language and English proficiency, as not only would it cost nothing, but even save the dubbing costs.

(6) The arguments given so far should have made clear that a common *lingua franca* would certainly accelerate the Europeanisation of the societies of Europe, positively influence the economic growth, abet the emergence of a European public sphere, improve the peoples' equal opportunities to participate in the process of Europeanisation and enhance the citizens' identification with the European project. At the same time policies can be

found in order to balance inequalities connected with the choice of a language as *lingua franca*, as the last paragraph has shown.

The weightiest argument against the support of English as *lingua franca* of a united Europe is raised by those who regard the dominance of one language not only as a danger to the other languages, but also to their cultures, as they think languages and cultures are strongly interwoven. Thus, critics of a dominance of English interpret a shift in the diversity of languages as a shift of dominance in the cultures. According to them the dominance of English would at the same time be connected with the dominance of Anglo-American world views and values, as languages impose limits on the ways in which speakers conceptualise the world. Every language leads to a unique interpretation and conceptualisation of the world; hence, different languages lead to different cultures (cf. for example Phillipson 2003). Richard Münch (2004) particularly regards the function-specific English spoken by a transnational elite like officials in industry, by bureaucrats and management consultants to be a threat. According to him this language conveys a specific ideology of Europe as a neo-liberal project.

This idea of the linguistic foundation of cultures represents the hegemonic view among linguists and anthropologists that many international organisations as well as the EU have adopted (cf. for example Crystal 2000; Phillipson 2003; Nic Craith 2008). That does not necessarily mean that the hypothesis is plausible.

Firstly, the promotion of English as a *lingua franca* for all Europeans would not mean that the linguistic sovereignty of the nation states inside the countries is being attacked. The countries' mother tongues will be preserved; they will only be complemented by an accelerated promotion of a foreign language.

Secondly, the current research hardly supports the thesis of language having an impact on thinking and the conceptualisation of the world. I will discuss the relationship between language and worldviews more extensively in the appendix (in addition see Gerhards 2011; Nunner-Winkler 2011). Modern

cognitive psychology (Fodor 1975; Pinker 1994) states that thinking takes place in a special mental language. Because of that, the impact of natural languages on thinking is low so that everything people express in a certain natural language can in principal be translated into another language. But if language and culture are not that intimately connected with each other as is often implied in the literature, this has consequences for eventual political conclusions. Thus, one key argument against a uniform foreign language in Europe is refuted, or at least reduced. Philippe Van Parijs briefly summarizss as follows: “There is nothing intrinsically ‘pro-capitalist’, or ‘anti-poor’, or ‘market-imperialist’ about the English language, just as it is not because Marx wrote in German that there is something intrinsically ‘anti-capitalist’ or ‘pro-proletarian’ or ‘state-fetishist’ about the German language. Like all other languages in the world, English and German have the means of expressing negation, so that whatever Marx wrote in German you can also deny in German and whatever Bush said in English you can also deny in English” (Van Parijs 2004: 138).

Almost all arguments we have discussed support the idea of not only enforcing acceptance of the dominance of English as *lingua franca* in Europe, but promoting it in a politically active way, even at the costs of the support of other languages. The story of the Tower of Babel from the Old Testament with which we started our study teaches us what great advantages a common language provides. The Europeans should not be afraid of the judgement from above when setting about the further development of the European project. A common foreign language would tremendously accelerate Europe’s development on different levels and would bring the people in Europe closer together.

Appendix A: The relationship between Language and Culture

In chapter 3.3 we have seen that the protection of languages has received considerably more legal and political attention in the last thirty years. And in the last chapter we have seen that there is a large group of scholars and politicians who criticise the dominance of English as a *lingua franca*. There is a central argument put forward for the encouragement and nurture of different languages and against the dominance of one language: The protection of diverse languages is equated to biological diversity. Different languages lead to differences in cultural appropriation. Consequently the protection of languages is an imperative if one wants to protect not only the languages but also the cultures which are created by the languages.

This idea is politically of great significance. Those authors who think that the culture of a society is mediated largely by language are also those who complain about the decline of individual languages, especially the smaller languages and oppose against the dominance of one hegemonic language. To them the loss of a language is also the loss of a culture and for this reason is interpreted as a very special sacrifice (see Crystal 2000; for a critical view de Swaan 2004). As we have seen in chapter 3.3 the European Union has made this position its own. It is, therefore, worthwhile dealing a little longer with the thesis that language shapes the construction of reality while considering at the same time the current research in this area. As a first step I will briefly discuss the central arguments and examples which speak for the thesis followed by the critical objections to it.

(1) In 1770, the influential writer and philosopher of Weimar Classicism, Johann Gottfried Herder, submitted a treatise “On the Origins of Human Speech” to the “Electoral Brandenburg Society of Sciences and Humanities” in reply to an invitation by the academy itself, by means of which an argument within the academy was supposed to be reconciled. The argument was about whether language was either of human or of godly origin. In the second part

of the treatise Herder deals with the question of the relationship between history, society and language. According to Herder a specific language leads to a specific world view. And because there are many languages in the world this has led to different cultures. "Each nation has its own store of such thoughts which have become signs, this is its national language: a store to which for centuries they have carried (...) the thoughts of an entire people" (Herder 1984: 76). Wilhelm von Humboldt followed Herder's idea: "Through the mutual dependence of thoughts and words on one another it becomes absolutely clear that languages are not actually a mean for showing the truth which has already been recognised, but far more, to discover that which has not yet been recognised. The difference is not one of sound and signs but of a diversity of world views" (Humboldt 1963: 262; see also Trabant 2007).⁷³

This idea of Herder and Humboldt is then later developed further by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf (cf. summarised Hunt & Agnoli 1991; Hunt

⁷³ The idea that language is crucial for the worldviews people hold seems also to be the basic assumption in sociological thinking. Alfred Schütz, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann have taken Humboldt's idea that human beings' perception of and adaption to the world is conveyed by language and have developed a theory of language-based construction of society. Everyone is born into a world which already exists. He/she learns in this community how to master a multitude of situations. Schütz calls this unquestioned knowledge as "recipe knowledge" (Schütz 1955/2003a: 122). At the same time each person is born into a specific language community. The existing language is not a neutral medium of communication. It structures the knowledge about society, thus affecting the construction of social reality. "The existent language is a system of existing experience schemas that derive from the idealisation and anonymisation of the immediate subjective experience. These typifications of experience which are removed from subjectivity are socially objective, whereby they become a societal given 'apriori'" (Schütz & Luckmann 2003: 318). These typifications of experience are largely mediated by language (Schütz 1972: 63f.). Thus, for example, the "Du" and the "Sie" in German mark the difference between the private and the public spheres. For example, the jargon of the individual sciences represents a linguistic objectivity which prescribes to the persons acting in the field how they should behave. Therefore, language has a power which endows knowledge and reality (Berger & Luckmann 1969/1987: 163). It is precisely this idea that knowledge about society is substantially knowledge which is mediated by language and that typifications are linguistic normalisations which the authors express repeatedly. Alfred Schütz has illustrated the great effectiveness of the typification of experience and its dependence on language for the purposes of coping with daily life with the example of strangers (Schütz 1972). For those people who have moved from one society to another, the typified experiences which they have already learned no longer count. They no longer have the knowledge which allow them to typify situations. They no longer know the horizon of meaning connected to certain words and sentences nor the connotations of words in which past experiences are stored (Schütz 1972: 64). Precisely this pervasion of language and worldly experience makes it so difficult for the strangers to get their bearings in the new society, simply because just learning the new words and syntax of a new language is never enough. To this day the theory of the linguistic construction of reality is the dominant idea in phenomenological sociology.

2001). The basic thesis states that the native language which we have learned by speaking determines our thought and the cognitive representation of the world. Accordingly, it is assumed that different languages lead to different views of the world. Edward Sapir (1921) departed from the thesis that the linguistic categories were a necessary prerequisite of the world view. Something that cannot be provided for by language cannot be perceived.

This radical view of the relationship of language and cognitive representation has been, according to Hunt (2001: 8320), falsified by psychological research, since there are more than enough examples which show that people even without the appropriate linguistic categories are able to categorise in a differentiated manner. A popular example in the research is the analysis of colour perception (cf. Berlin & Kay 1999). Hunt (2001) reports on a study which was carried out with an ethnic group in New Guinea, the Dani. The members of this group possess only two linguistic categories to describe colour, namely light and dark. Nevertheless, the people are able to discern a number of different colours.

In comparison to his teacher Sapir, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) developed a more moderate thesis on the relation between language and cognitive representation, inasmuch as he starts from the premise that language influences but not determines thought. His examples refer, among other things, to Franz Boas' example, which has been taken over and frequently quoted in the literature of the many words which the Eskimos use for snow and the analysis of the ideas of the Hopi Indians regarding space and time.⁷⁴ There is now much empirical evidence to support the correctness of this moderate thesis. Three examples should be mentioned very briefly (cf. the presentation in Hunt & Agnoli 1991; Hunt 2001; for further examples cf. Werlen 2002; Boroditsky 2003, 2011; Nunner-Winkler 2011; cf. also the contributions in Gumperz & Levinson 1996):

⁷⁴ Officially Eskimos have four words for snow: *aput* (snow on the ground), *qana* (falling snow), *piqsirpoq* (drifting snow) and *qimuqsuq* (snowdrift) (cf. Werlen 2002: 385).

(a) In Spanish there are two different versions of the verb “to be”. While the verb “ser” is used to describe things which one always has, the verb “estar” is used for those things which one has temporarily. One says, for example “Yo soy un hombre” (I am a man), but “Estoy en mi officinal” (I am in my office). This way of expressing differentiations linguistically, which exists neither in German nor in English, enables Spanish children to differentiate between the permanent and the temporary qualities of objects; an ability which children, in whose languages this way of differentiating linguistically does not exist, do not have to the same degree.

(b) There are languages in which the words for numbers are consecutively conjugated. This is not true for German and English, for instance. The numbers “eleven” and “twelve” have a special status inasmuch as they are not compound words of “ten” plus “one” or “ten” plus “two”. Only after the numbers thirteen and fourteen the names of numbers are compound words. Mandarin is different. Studies have shown that pupils in whose language the lay numbers do not follow in a consecutively logical linguistic manner have more problems in maths with the numerical order with the “non-logically derived” names of numbers than pupils in whose language the numerical sequence is completely logical. Hunt and Agnoli (1991) interpret these findings as an example of the fact that the linguistic categories of thought are here influencing the ones that are operating mathematically.

(c) In many languages there is a difference between state and nation. While the concept of the state denotes the political administration and the government of a country, the concept of nation refers to cultural unity of a society. In Chinese there is no linguistic difference between state and nation. This non-existent differentiation in the language has led to considerable misunderstandings between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China accepts the existence of two states and the fact that cooperation exists between the two states. China claims, however, that there is only one Chinese nation and that Taiwan is a part of that nation. The fact that in Chinese there is no way to distinguish linguistically between state and nation has led to conflicts between the two countries. Hence the

People's Republic reacted aggressively to Taiwan's request that there be a two state solution, thinking they were suggesting a two nation solution (Hunt 2001).

(2) Let us now look at the contra-arguments to the idea of the linguistic construction of reality. The Whorf hypothesis has been criticised by scholars from the field of cognitive psychology. Accepting Noam Chomsky's work, Jerry Fodor (1975), in his much quoted monograph, starts from the premise that thought takes place in a special mental language ("mentalese"). This mental language is a universal one, which all people possess. Every operation in this mental language can be translated into a natural language. A few years later Steven Pinker put forward arguments in a similar vein (1994) in his essay "The Language Instinct", which is based on a great deal of empirical research.⁷⁵ Two conclusions result from the basic assumptions: (a) Because thoughts take place in an inner language, the influence of natural speech on thought is low. (b) Everything which people express in a particular natural language can essentially be translated into another language. In this connection Hunt speaks of an "intertranslatability hypothesis" (Hunt 2001: 8320). This does not mean that translation is easy. Frequently, one language does not possess the word which another language gives to the same thought. At this point a great deal of effort goes into writing around the idea or describing it. The great effort which translating involves should not, however, disabuse us of the idea that translation is not in principle possible.

If we interpret the abovementioned three examples in the light of this assumption from cognitive psychology then one can assume that there is in fact a language influence on thought, however, this influence is limited. The difference between "ser" and "estar" in Spanish can be expressed by other languages, even if it is a bit more complicated and involves circumlocution. The linguistically illogical lay numbers in many languages may have a small impact on numeracy, this impact, however, will not be very great. The non-existence of the difference between state and nation in Mandarin may lead to

⁷⁵ Pinker (1994: 55-82) deals with Whorf's ideas at more length. In the light of more recent research he comes to the conclusion that Whorf's thesis can be regarded as false.

political irritations should the difference between the two concepts be important. However, once the linguistic source of the irritation has been realised the problem can easily be sorted out through circumlocution.

Even Hunt, who in actual fact is a supporter of Whorf's hypothesis, says at the end of his survey of the literature on the effect of language on perceptions of the world: "The effects are generally rather small, but they occur every day a speaker uses language. Whether or not language exerts an important control on thought depends upon how one defines 'important'" (Hunt 2001: 8324). If one tries to specify "important" more closely, one comes to the conclusion that the influence of language on the construction of reality is not very large.

(a) It may be right that in the different languages there are different terms which lead to differences in cognitive representation. One cannot, however, conclude from examples that world views are fundamentally different in different languages. The linguistic differences must be compared to the linguistic similarities. If one does this by using a dictionary one will see that there are words for most things in the world in the different languages, the overlap between language and the world in different languages is therefore relatively high.

(b) In those cases for which this is not true the same content can usually be described by circumlocution. If in one language there is no special word for the different types of snow, then one can describe the snow with other words ("dry", "wet", etc.). The differences in vocabulary only mean that in one language there are higher linguistic transactions costs – meaning that one has to use more circumlocutions – not, however, that it is totally impossible.

(c) The feasible differences between distinct languages depend on the family similarity of the languages. The more similar the languages are, the less likely it is that there will be differences in world views. Whorf himself has indicated that the "standard average European languages" have a more or less similar history and therefore will not be very much different from one another in their cognitive representation of the world (cf. in this context Werlen 2002: 384). This was one of the reasons why he chose languages which belonged to

an entirely different language family, for instance, the Hopi language, in order to support his thesis. The languages which are at the centre of our analysis all belong to the same language family. In a world in which we are increasingly interwoven with each other the experiences of human beings will become ever more similar and the differences between different language communities ever less.

(d) Finally, one can assume that the differences between various languages depend on the field which the languages are referring to. Mathematical derivatives can probably be translated into all the languages in the world, because the order of the symbols and the meaning associated with them are perfectly clear. In private life or in literature (in particular poetry), which do not allow a speaker to use long circumscriptions in order to express something for which there is no word in one of the languages, it might be more difficult. If there is no word for special facts and circumstances (like "Heimat" or "Weltschmerz" in German) then this cannot be said directly, maybe not even felt or thought.

All in all, these remarks were intended to show that the assumption that the construction of social reality is a linguistic one and also different according to each language is not sustainable. It may be the right way to describe the exception, but not the rule. This point is important when it comes to the normative question of what a good language policy should be like. One of the central arguments brought forward against the introduction of a central language or a *lingua franca*, emphasises the point that not only the other languages, but also the culture of the speakers of these languages, would be threatened. If, however, language and culture are not as closely bound to one another as the literature assumes, then this has consequences for the political conclusions in regard to language.

Appendix B: Description of Variables

Variable	Values	Description	Data source
Foreign language proficiency	0 = none 1 = one 2 = two 3 = three or more	number of foreign languages in which a person is able to have a conversation, due to self-assessment	EB 63.4
English proficiency	0 = no 1 = yes	ability to have a conversation in English – self-assessment	EB 63.4
Multilingual country	0 = no 1 = yes	country with more than one official language	
Prevalence of native language	0% to 100%	share of EU population speaking the language as foreign or as native language	EB 63.4
Linguistic distance	0 = very low 1 = low 2 = high 3 = very high	linguistic distance between native language and English according to the affiliation to the same family of languages	http://www.ethnologue.com
Country size	0,399 to 82,5	population in million	Eurostat
A country's level of modernization	0,805 to 0,956 < 0,87 = low 0,87-0,939 = middle ≥ 0,94 = high	Human Development Index 2004: gross domestic product, life expectancy, literacy rate, enrolment ratio; metrically and categorically used	http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics

National educational expenditure	1436 to 8093 < 3700 = low 3700-6299 = middle ≥ 6300 = high	educational expenditure per year and student in Euro PPS; metrically and categorically used; for multivariate analysis in 1000 Euro PPS	Eurostat
Ex-socialist country	0 = no 1 = yes	country classification according to the situation of 1989	
Age	15 to 97	age of the person in years	EB 63.4
Class fractions	in each case 0 = no 1 = yes	dummy variables for (a) professionals, (b) higher and middle management, (c) entrepreneurs, self-employed, (d) skilled workers, white collar (e) unskilled workers	EB 63.4
Institutionalized cultural capital	14-25 ≤ 15 = low 16-20 = middle ≥ 21 = high	age at the end of the education in years, max. 25 years; metrically and categorically used	EB 63.4
Identification with country	1 = very strong 2 = fairly strong 3 = not very strong 4 = not strong	a person's identification with the country of residence	EB 63.4
Identification with country, region and city	1 to 10 1 = not strong 10 = very strong	additive index – the person's identification with city, region and country of	EB 63.4

		residence; metrically and categorically used	
Country of birth	0 = in the country where respondent is now living 1 = different country	the persons' country of birth	EB 63.4
Parents' country of birth	0 = both in the country the respondent is now living 1 = at least one parent in another country	the parents' country of birth	EB 63.4

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