

European Union: identity, diversity and integration

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European Union

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CULTURAL IDENTITY, DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. INTRODUCTORY STUDY

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Abstract. *European cultural identity reflects both the image of homogeneity and that of cultural diversity. This double perspective gives the integration process a complex dimension which makes us take into consideration not only the European unitary ensemble but also the local, regional, or national structures. “Identity revenge”, “the feeling of return to historic, national and cultural identity” are terms that ask for redefining the national and European identity space that was forced to open to the new geo-political, historical and cultural configurations. Beyond any approach, the image of the European culture is provided by the association of the concepts people – culture – history – territory. They confer a certain local specificity due to their characteristics. From this point of view, we can identify besides a European culture, a cultural area of local, regional and national specifics. Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a culture of cultures, that is a cultural area with a strong identity on the particular, local, regional, or national levels, or a cultural archipelago, that is a joint yet disrupted cultural area. Irrespective of the perspective, we cannot deny the existence of a European cultural area, whether a diversity cultural area, or one of “disrupted continuity”. Cultural diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are elements specific to the European area. The European integration process is complex; it does not impose and is not conditioned by the idea of cultural unity, or the existence of a common culture including all Europeans. Specificity and diversity are precisely the means of intercultural dialogue between European peoples. Each European society has to find their own integrating solutions depending on traditions and institutions.*

Keywords: *identity, diversity, border, European Union, culture, pluralism*

Introduction

The trends expressed in the scientific environment of the European culture are either gathered around the concept of *cultural homogeneity*, a phenomenon in a strong

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causal connection with globalisation, or it designates an existing reality that cannot be denied or eliminated, that is *cultural diversity*. In the first case, we deal with universalization and uniformity of values, images and ideas broadcast by media or cultural industry. Within such construction, regional and national character suffers, as one may notice the insertion of a means of cultural “predominance” mainly issued by the United States of America, also known as “Americanisation” of world culture (La culture au cœur, 1998: 255-258). In the second case, cultural diversity involves plurality of ideas, images, values and expressions. They are all possible through a variety of expression and the presence of a great number of parallel local, regional, ethnic, national, etc. cultures. Moreover, given the context, certain authors speak of “identity revenge” and the “feeling of returning to historical, national and cultural identity”, particularly in an area such as Central and Eastern Europe and at a historical time when national features and identity are compelled to be redefined by being more open to the new geopolitical, historical, or cultural configurations (David and Florea, 2007: 645-646). Beyond the relative epistemological antagonism of the approach, our debate can have slight variations. The field of cultural cooperation tends to become “multipolar”, as the concept of “cultural networks” is introduced. These networks have begun to shatter old structures and support identity, communication, relationship and information (Pehn, 1999: 8). International stakeholders acquire an ever more important role; their projects, ideas, methods or structures, in other words their identity, are not only more visible (thus acquiring a multiplying effect on others); they are also more specific and particular in expression.

Is the European culture global or specific? Can we speak of cultural globalisation? Or, is the European culture going cosmopolite? Which is the place of the traditional, the ethnic, the national, the specific and the particular? The debate makes room to the equation global v local, general v particular. National and regional cultures do not disappear under the immediate acceleration of globalisation due to the increasing interest in local culture. Considered as a general process, globalisation is “characterised by multiplication, acceleration and strengthening of economic, political, social and cultural interaction between actors all over the world” (Tardif and Farchy, 2006: 107-108). If generalised, this cultural globalisation does not have the same influence throughout Europe.

In the French version of the report published in March 1998 on the issue, the *European Steering Committee on Culture and Development* of the Council of Europe starts with the question: “European culture: the corner shop, the independent trader, or the world supermarket?” The conclusions of the report are rather generalisations that can be classified as follows (La culture au cœur, 1998: 255-259): 1. There is a very strong requirement for accessible broadcast media products and other worldwide cultural services; at the same time, local cultural offer including local media arouses the interest for the particular, for ideas, images and values celebrating the community and local feelings due to interaction and local practices. Diversity is also preserved due to the support of nation-states. 2. Facing the strong trend for consolidation of “cultural continents” world (e.g. the European or the North-American one), there are autonomous “cultural islands” that are defined and preserved on local, regional and national levels by enforcing all expressions and cultural production to the local and traditional criteria of excellence/acceptance. These “cultural islands” turn into cultural museums closed against any external influence. 3. There is a strong “seduction of globalisation”. From this point of view, the European culture is an economic success as it is worldwide oriented from a commercial point of view. The economic “conquest” of world markets supports cultural “export”. In this equation, an important role is played by great companies in the field of

information and telecommunication, cultural production, entertainment and tourism. 4. The European area is a place for cultural mixture, for interculturality. This makes it possible that “hybrid cultures” may appear to assimilate ideas, images and values to their own cultural format. 5. If we accept the idea that all countries should act worldwide and that no culture can work in isolation, the policies adopted by governments should save local cultural production and diversity.

The European cultural perspective is also provided by the European Union’s policy. *“Is there a European cultural policy?”* This is the title of a conference held in Bucharest in January 2009 by Vincent Dubois, a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences in Strasbourg and a member of the Institut Universitaire de France. The question seems to be natural and legitimate from the point of view of identifying the specific culture in the European area. The discourse begins with an apocryphal quotation by Jean Monnet (he would have never uttered this phrase!): “If I were to redo something – certainly, the European construction – I would start with culture” (Dubois, 2009). The abovementioned message considers that what we call the “Jean Monnet method”, the project he built to sketch the European integration, has another direction: starting with the economic structure, there is a mechanism. Considering the production system, we grow to be interested in social issues. These interests entail Europe’s cultural integration. This project, this orientation of interests has definitely had influence on the manner of designing the process of cultural integration. What cultural actions initiated by the European Union lacks, either partly or totally, is the support and claim of a cultural policy through the involved political organisations. Nevertheless, there are three important objectives of the European cultural agenda: 1. promoting cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. Yet, as far as this objective is concerned, we deal with a broad meaning of culture overriding culture in a strict sense. It concerns interethnic exchanges beyond mere promotion of cultural products; 2. promoting cultures as creative accelerators. Terms such as “art” or “culture” are not used in the documents issued by the European Union. The term “culture” is used in the wider anthropological meaning. The term they prefer is “creativity”; it designates any activity defined through innovation; 3. promoting culture as an all-important element in the European Union’s external relations. We can see that the cultural objectives as such are subsumed to the ones concerning European integration in a broad sense (Dubois, 2009).

An important element is provided by the reference level: sub- or multinational, autochthonous or diasporas; last but not least, it is the European and international context (Bennett, 2001: 29-32).

Beyond any approach, the image of the European culture is provided by the association of the concepts people – culture – history – territory. They confer a certain local specificity due to their characteristics. From this point of view, we can identify besides a European culture, a cultural area of local, regional and national specifics. Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a culture of cultures, that is a cultural area with a strong identity on the particular, local, regional, or national levels, or a cultural archipelago, that is a joint yet disrupted cultural area. Irrespective of the perspective, we cannot deny the existence of a European cultural area, whether a diversity cultural area, or one of “disrupted continuity”.

1. European Identity and EU External Borders

Such a vision on the border has undoubtedly resulted from the need to characterise certain border typologies. Such a conceptual approach can be made when

attempting to characterise contemporary European space. The concept acquires new features precisely in such a community construction where regional or sectorial identities are still very powerful irrespective of their forms.

An interesting survey on the topic entitled *Border in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure* (Delanty, 2006: 46-58), was published by Gerard Delanty, professor of sociology at the University of Liverpool. The survey starts from the premise that societies are spatially organised through different “border” delimitations. From this perspective, each space may be characterised as open or close depending on the typology of the border delimiting it. Fabienne Maron speaks about “frontières barrières” (characterised by restrictions and visa) to design the opposite of “frontières ouvertes” whose crossing is authorised without restrictions (Maron, 2007: 115). However, in the context of the new geopolitical mutations in the European area, they all acquire a new significance under the pressure of changes generated by the process of European integration. The old borders fade away leaving room to new border structures resulting from new concepts and approaches on delimitations more or less spatial.

The debates on current European borders have often acquired the image of polemics on their place, role, shape, or consistency. Kalipso Nicolaides considers that *Eurolimes* is “un paradigme qui lie l'integration a l'interieur et a l'exterieur, les liens intercultureles, interethatiques et interclasses tisses au sein de l'Union d'aujourd'hui et les liens inter-Etats tisses avec ses nouveaux membres potentials” (Nicolaides, 2007: 287). Beyond the image of national states’ borders, the definition of this paradigm is carried out in the survey entitled *Why Eurolimes?* (Horga, 2006: 5-13). According to the same pattern, the *Eurolimes* paradigm designs, according to several researchers in the field, what we understand by “inclusive frontier” (Nicolaides, 2007: 275-290; Zielonka, 2002; Zielonka, 2006; Geremek and Picht, 2007), that is, the borders to which the European construction tends. The main idea of the integration process is not to settle barriers, but to attenuate them. From this perspective, internal borders become more and more *inclusive* and less visible. Security and border traffic control are transferred to external borders that become more and more *exclusive*, more restrictive if we respect the logic above. Such a theory is valid up to a point. Internal borders do not simply become more open, more *inclusive* (Delanty, 2006: 51); there is an integration process taking place in steps. On the other hand, we cannot consider as fully equal good and *inclusive/open*, or bad and *exclusive/close*. A simple example can confirm our hypothesis: in war areas, borders are relatively open to refugees (Delanty, 2006: 51). However, we cannot conclude that we have an *inclusive* border “open just for pleasure” like European borders to which community integration tends as a model.

As a methodological and conceptual approach from the perspective of the topic, surveys published in volume 4 of the *Eurolimes Journal*, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, are very interesting. The debate focuses on possible interpretations on typology, form and structure of the new borders in central and eastern European space after the accession of the first communist countries to the European Union in 2004. The new Europe is made up of eastern territories on the continent. The external border of the EU has been pushed to the east, to the traditional limits of Europe (Horga and Pantea, 2007: 7), which entitles us to wonder when and if this enlargement process should stop: before or after reaching these limits? European spaces and peoples might remain outside the more or less *inclusive* border. Then the European border cannot be only geographical with people living on both sides. Cultural distances between people can increase even within the community as the number of immigrants, refugees, and transnational

communities is constantly increasing (Nicolaidis, 2007: 287). Moreover, immigrants' integration is mainly crossing an *inclusive* community border (Quispel, 2007: 102-110).

Beyond cultural and political perspectives, the situation in the past years has shown a new type of *inclusive* border resulting from states' economic interests, either belonging to the community or not. Business development bringing benefits to both sides has been able to provide a more flexible trend to political norms and regulations (Kundera, 2007: 69-77).

All these and others can identify a process of community transformation developing with passing from *exclusive* to *inclusive* border.

Without greatly differing from others, such a conceptual approach suggests an image of the border from several points of view. The concepts of territory, border, or frontier are historically determined constructions to a great extent. This is how administrative, military, and cultural borders as well as the market focused in territory delimited by border constructions came into being (Maier, 2002: 17-37). Yet, in time, the concept of border has been diluting. This is also due to the process of European integration and construction. In certain cases, the physical border has even disappeared, while other "borders" that are no longer superposed over national states have appeared. The globalisation process has a considerable influence on the erosion of borders and barriers crossing the European continent (Neuwahl, 2005: 24). In the European Union, there are several governing systems, cultures and administrative borders. Many of them do not coincide with national borders. At the same time, the multinational and transnational character of some organisations funded by community programmes lead to integrating huge areas devoid of barriers against communication, cooperation, working together, cross-border circulation.

In general, the concept of border is associated with the *hard* physical border, a concept related to the barrier that can be crossed provided certain special conditions and requirements (visa to enter that country is the best example of a restrictive requirement in the case of *hard* border). On the other hand, a state can have *hard* borders with a neighbouring country, while having *soft*, open borders with another neighbouring country (Neuwahl, 2005: 24). A border can be both *hard* and *soft* at the same time. A state can eliminate visas for the citizens of a state while strengthening and reinforcing requirements in border control (Potemkina, 2005: 165-182). In the European Union, community institutions suggest that Member States should have *hard* external borders and *soft* internal borders. Visa, border police control on people and goods crossing the border are characteristic of *hard* border. Unlike this type of border, the *soft* border is characteristic of a more flexible transit system with no restrictions of circulation for goods and persons (DeBardeleben, 2005: 11). There are several steps to reach this type of border. They consist of the following: eliminating visa, reducing taxes for people and goods to zero, facilitating and strengthening human contacts on both sides of the border including cultural, educational, and training programmes, etc.

The enlargement of the European Union to the east, a process materialised by integrating several former communist countries, has led to changing the view on former community borders, to pushing the external frontiers to the border of these countries. The *hard* border that would provide protection to community citizens according to European institutions has thus become the concern of the newcomers. Nevertheless, within the community there are supporters of other European states: Poland constantly supports Ukraine, Romania supports the Republic of Moldova and Serbia, Hungary or Slovenia support Croatia and the examples can continue. Despite community restrictions, these states try to develop contacts and *soft* border constructions with their partners outside the

community. These states' European integration has led to a certain isolation of Russia (associated with a *hard* type reaction), which was disturbed by the enlargement of the EU at the same time with the enlargement of NATO. They are all part of a complex process generated by community mechanism, geopolitical realities and macroeconomic strategies. Thus, European enlargement determines the outline of new models of neighbourhood relations somehow different from the former relations between nation states.

Without getting into details, we wish to show some concepts leading to the same interpretations in general lines. Besides, several authors consider that *hard*, *exclusive*, *close*, *sharp-edges* or *barrier* are equal. They are all associated with restrictions and strict control being characterised by the numerous conditions imposed to those intending to cross them. On the other hand, *soft*, *open*, *inclusive*, *porous*, *communicative* or *bridge* type borders remove transit restrictions by rendering traffic more flexible (DeBardeleben, 2005: 11).

From another perspective, Charles Maier identifies three possible conceptual approaches of the border (Maier, 2002: 41-43): the first, "*positive and constructive*", considered as a border providing political order and good neighbouring relationships; the second, "*negative and revolutionary*", seen as an illogical obstacle against normality, peace and unity; and the third approach, "*dialectical and evolutionary*", characterised by the dissolution of a border and the inevitable settling of another, yet not necessarily at the same level of formality.

Another approach originates in the clear separation of people, institutions and organisations as compared to the European Union. The perspective is either internal, in which case the border does not constraint community expression, or external, in which case the border interferes as a barrier, as an obstacle against freedom of circulation. Thus, the European Union is the expression of a *fortress* protecting its citizens against external perils (immigrants, imports, insecurity, etc.) (Delanty, 2006: 52-53). Such a perspective released again and doubled by the trend for world anti-terrorist fight has more and more supporters amongst political leaders of the European Union Member States. Joint or not, the security policy has provided new coordinates and even European neighbourhood policy despite the fact that many countries neighbouring the EU are not insecurity "exporters". In this context, the issue of immigration turns more and more into a security issue (Matuszewicz, 2007: 103-117; Wackermann, 2003: 63-84) that has to be managed even through a reform of the border crossing system.

2. Europe – a cultural diversity space

The concept of border has long developed as an "intolerance axis" of nationalism and racism, of neighbours' rejection (Wackermann, 2003: 28). Besides the physical frontier, irrespective of the conceptual approach, we identify other types of "borders" whether within or at the border of the European Union. We consider these frontiers symbolic or ideological since more often than not they are not palpable. From Europeanism to nationalism, from ethno-religious to cultural identities and social gaps, the wide range of approaches of these frontiers may continue in the context of implementing efficient European neighbourhood policies. The physical border at the external boundary of the European Union may "open" in time. Yet other types of borders may appear between people and communities. For instance, immigrants live within the European Union preserving their own identity and thus creating a world that "refuses integration" due to the specifics this identity develops. We can see that there is a gap between this kind of communities and the majority that may become a symbolic cultural border and turn into "external" border.

In the current context of economic-financial crisis, many European societies develop a strong “self-protection” feeling not only of economic origin. There is also a kind of preservation of their own identity, including the cultural one. Crisis or exaltation moments can easily lead to nationalist feelings diluting the “Europeanist” perception of the border. This dilution occurs at the same time with strengthening identity-community and the feeling of ethno-cultural appurtenance to a nation. There is a time when many European peoples come to the foreground and “re-find their identity” by turning to the national trend despite the “unity” and solidarity stated by the Member States officials at European institutions.

National borders established at different times and in different historical and political contexts have contributed to national and cultural economic integration of peripheries. In the current context, the integration of Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union has brought about a reversed phenomenon: disintegration of national market and administrative decentralisation have led to influencing the integration of peripheries to national and cultural systems. Currently, there are strong trends to focus on cross-border cooperation, thus eroding the idea of compact and relatively isolated national group (Muller, Schultz, 2002: 205). From the cultural point of view, we can notice the flows of exchanges without a loss of local, regional, or national features. Cultural characteristics introduce the debate on cultural border. It divides cultural areas with their own identity, thus building what we call the European cultural area of cultures.

2.1. Europe: culture of cultures

The numerous political borders tend to have a decreasing importance in the European Union area to the point of fading away. In time, the former borders turn into mere “symbols of singularity and independence” (Banus, 2007: 139). At the same time, cultural borders acquire a new ever more visible role. It is not only an internal approach, when cultural “sub-elements” specific to the European area can be identified; it is also an approach characteristic of governance external to the European Union. This cultural border makes a clear-cut distinction between Europe and non-Europe. This perspective raising the issue of the unity of the European civilisation and providing the image of a European cultural set (divided into cultural “sub-elements”) is crushed by the supporters of national cultures of European peoples. The “culture of cultures” idea lays stress on cultures’ specifics, yet acknowledging its unity. Basically, cultural borders are contact areas providing communication and cooperation to avoid barriers between the European peoples or cultures.

Cultural diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are elements specific to the European area. The European integration process is complex; it does not impose and is not conditioned by the idea of cultural unity, or the existence of a common culture including all Europeans. Specificity and diversity are precisely the means of intercultural dialogue between European peoples. Each European society has to find their own integrating solutions depending on traditions and institutions. The integrating model used in Germany might not work in France. There are salient differences between the model of the French assimilation policy and the tolerance expressed in the United Kingdom. If we expand this approach to Central and Eastern European area, differences are even more striking.

European societies and cultures do not reject each other in the European construction equation. It is a time when each can learn from the experience and expertise of others. The ex-communist Eastern and Central European countries have undergone a process of transition to a democratic model after 1990. Yet, this democratic model

involves accepting diversity including the acknowledgement of national minorities' claims. In some situations, cultural expression and political responses to claims did not rise to the occasion. Unfortunately, the result was military solutions.

In Western Europe, minorities have gradually earned a long-term recognition of autonomy and equity in point of national resources (from this point of view, there are contrasts with the sudden changes in Central and Eastern Europe turning into intense manifestations due to minorities' claims and resistance of the majority). There is not the same situation in the rights of minorities originating from old European colonies. Upon their proposal, there is the issue of social status, financial means and relationship between European cultures and cultures in the regions of origin (La culture au cœur, 1998: 69).

Europeans' attitude concerning immigrants has not been steady throughout time. If in the 1970s the European countries favoured immigration and some of them, such as Federal Germany and Switzerland, even encouraged it for reasons of labour force, things have subsequently changed. At the end of the 1980s, due to the overwhelming number of immigrants and their "non-European" character, the old continent became less welcoming. However, Europe tried to favour a climate of openness and generosity. "It is fundamental to create a welcoming society and acknowledge the fact that immigration is a double meaning process supposing adaptation of both immigrants and the society assimilating them. By its nature, Europe is a pluralist society rich in social and cultural traditions that are to develop even more in the future" (Tandonnet, 2007: 50). Could this European optimism identified by Maxime Tandonnet be just a utopia? The presence of the Islam in Europe is a certitude, yet its Europeanization is still debatable. According to the French academician Gilles Kepel, "neither the bloodshed of Muslims in Northern Africa wearing French uniforms during the two world wars, nor the toil of immigrant workers living in terrible conditions and building France (and Europe) for next to nothing after 1945 did turn their children into... European citizens as such" (Leiken, 2005, 1). If Europeans can assimilate the Muslim immigrants or if there is to be a conflict of values is open to debate. Stanley Hoffman has noticed that Westerners are more and more scared that "they are invaded not by armed forces and tanks, but by immigrants speaking different languages, worshipping other Gods, belonging to other cultures and taking their jobs and lands, living far from the welfare system and menacing their lifestyle" (Stanley, 1991: 30; Huntington, 1998: 292).

Alternating negotiation and conflict, communication and doubt, Muslims build little by little an individual and collective identity "risking to be at the same time pure and hybrid, local as well as transnational" (Saint-Blancat, 2008: 42). The multiplying identity vectors contribute to the flow of symbolic borders and to individualising diasporas communities. There is a sort of gap around each Islamic community as compared to the rest of the community. This gap often turns into an internal and external border at the same time. This reality is stressed by the establishment of community models where identity features are transferred from the ethnic and national area (Turks, Magrebiens, Arabs) to the religious, Muslim, Islamic one (Saint-Blancat, 2008: 44). According to the behaviourist model, we can notice several behavioural reactions of Islamic communities building up a solidarity overcoming ethnic or national differences. This reality is also determined by the discriminating attitude of the majority. Several stereotypes lead not only to a patterned image, but also to a solidarity around the Islamic values even in the case of non-believers, maybe atheists. The phenomenon can be reversed: from Islamic solidarity, they may reach ethnic solidarity. It is the case of the Pakistani Islam communities in the United Kingdom (about 750,000 people) who have ethnically regrouped (individualised on an ethnic border) due to a religious support (Pędziwiatr, 2002: 159).

Ethno-cultural borders may overlap or not over state borders: we can identify symbolic “borders” in most European states separating more or less human communities on ethnic or cultural criteria.

EU policy has an impact on national minorities’ position in the Member States. One of the current objectives of the European Union is building a “neutral” area where different national cultures may find themselves and cooperate (La culture au cœur, 1998: 69). A key element of accession agreements for Central and Eastern European countries mentioned the treatment of national minorities including the management of the “border” between minorities and majorities. For example, in Estonia there was a programme funded by the state on the issue of the “Estonian society integration” (implemented in 2000-2007) together with programmes funded by the EU, UN and other Northern states whose aim was to promote interethnic dialogue and Estonian language learning by the Russian speakers (Thompson, 2001: 68). In Hungary, the government was concerned with improving the treatment of the Gypsies, which was required by the European Union during the pre-accession negotiations. The issue of the Gypsies is a general issue for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In their reports on the accession negotiations with the countries in the region, the European Commission showed their concern on the protection of national minorities’ rights. In the 1999 report on the progress of the candidate countries, the Commission stated that “the rooted prejudice in many candidate countries still results from discrimination against Gypsies in social and economic life” (Thompson, 2001: 69). There will still be difficulties despite the attempts of the European institutions to improve the situation. Some Central and Eastern European countries seek to redefine their national position after escaping the Soviet era. In such a context, national minorities have a hard time to identify with the national identity of the state. For example, according to Estonia’s response to the recommendations of the Commission on minorities’ protection, the Government speaks of “preserving the Estonian nation and culture” and the “development of the population loyal to the Estonian Republic” (Thompson, 2001: 69). The case of Ukraine (which is not a European Union Member State) is more eloquent due to the fact that it has a privileged relationship with the EU at its external border. Here, one can find what Samuel Huntington called the “erroneous civilisation line” – a delimitation dividing two cultures with different perceptions of the world (Thompson, 2001: 69).

Thus, the difficulties of integration are obvious. Amongst the groups of different ethnies or cultures, there are often communication barriers that often lead to gaps and entail discrimination reactions and conflict situations. On the other hand, these gaps are but expressions of elitist political trends that are difficult to seize in daily life. From this point of view, ethnic borders are spaces of mutual understanding and insertion and, from another point of view, they are spaces of divergence and exclusion (Tătar, 2003: 159).

2.2. Cultural Europe: between common values and interests

The classical criterion for cultural location connecting a cultural area to a people speaking the same language, having the same lifestyle and behaviour, etc., can be replaced by some criteria defining the common and organic cultural area of the Europeans.

We first refer to common cultural values due to which we can confirm today the existence of a cultural reality specific to the European area. In the survey entitled *The Cultural Frontiers of Europe: Our Common Values*, Rudolf Rezsöhazy develops the common values of the European cultural area on new elements conferring specificity and unity (Rezsöhazy, 2008): 1. The Greek-Roman civilisation as a basis to build the European culture and spirit; 2. The values of Christianity starting with basic notions, such

as the single and personal God, the concept of salvation and damnation of man, love, justice, solidarity and fraternity of man (all men are considered sons of the same Father); 3. Middle Ages and mediaeval civilisation; 4. Renaissance and Reform; 5. Enlightenment; 6. Political and industrial revolution; 7. Capitalism and socialism; 8. Development, progress and welfare of post-war history; 9. Family as core value of our society.

Another approach conferring unity to the European area refers to common interests of Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern and Western Europe have undergone a process of political, economic, military and environmental integration (Dubnička, 2007: 299). The fight against terrorism and the fear of military wars, the fear of increasing world population associated with poverty and migration to Western Europe raise the following dilemma: integration or national identity? Which is the role of the EU in this situation? The answers to these questions have to be sought in the following fields: culture, history, religion, economy and security (Dubnička, 2007: 299-309). Besides divergences separating the Europeans, the current context brings to the foreground the strong determinism recorded by the integrationist trend triggered by common interest.

An area with common values and interests is able to build and strengthen its common identity character. There is also the relation with the non-European area. From this point of view, the European cultural area takes a distinct form as compared to other cultural types and systems. Thus, there is a cultural border around cultural Europe. Such cultural border makes a clear distinction between Europe and non-Europe. Besides this theory laying stress on scepticism concerning certain projects for future enlargement of the European Union, we can notice the use of debating on the issue of the real borders of Europe, an issue approached by analysts for centuries.

Cultural perspective raises debates on the notion of the unity of the European civilisation as well as on the relation between geography and culture. Can Europe be separated from Asia on the cultural criterion of delimitation? Professor Delanty approaches the concept of Christian Europe and Europe as an heir of the Roman and Greek civilisation (Delanty, 2006: 46). Besides the line of geographical, tectonic separation of the two continents, is the European culture able to impose new borders? It is a question to which European analysts provide different answers. Visions are strongly influenced by the current geopolitical subjectivity. During Middle Ages, Europe was limited to the Catholic West clearly separated from the expanding Islamism. Through Peter the Great's endeavours, Russia was included in the European diplomatic system. Europe as a concept expanded. For the first time in 1716, in *Almanach royal* published in France, the figures of the Romanovs were amongst the European monarch families. This was mainly due to the fact that Russia joined the other powers in the European diplomatic system (Anderson, 1968: 156). Around 1715, the position of the Ottoman Empire resembled Russia from many points of view. It joined the European diplomatic arena at the end of the 15th century. The fact that the Turks joined the European relations system was mainly due to the rivalries between France and the Habsburgs (Anderson, 1968: 157). Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire did not express as a European state and did never belong to the European diplomatic system in the 18th century. To Napoleon, the European area meant the "French Europe" conceived as a space whose borders had to be settled according to the tensions against the Ottoman Empire (Delanty, 2006: 46). Further examples are available to these days. Yet, the hypothesis of cultural borders of the European area imposes certain delimitations that we often assume, whether we like it or not.

Our aim is not to trace such borders of the European area. However, we have to point out that our debate rather imposes a characterisation of the European identity as a

spatial notion that is protected like a fortress. Is Europe (we directly refer to the EU, which is more or less associated to the European area as a whole!) not only politically, but also culturally an area imposing external borders clearly determined from a territorial point of view? If we pursue the evolution of the process of European construction in time, we can conclude by answering the question with the simple fact that in the European Union external borders are more and more important (more closed!), while the internal borders are becoming formal (more open!). Thus, Europe seen as a “fortress” is more and more open, more “hospitable” from the point of view of its Member States, and more closed, more secure at the borders and less permissive from the point of view of the rest of the world. In this construction, we can identify more than the advantages of high degree of democracy and welfare that the Community citizens enjoy; there is also the exclusivity imposed to others by closing the fortress. When putting aside internal barriers, Europe (EU!) starts to become a super-state reinventing the “hard” border to protect states and politically associated people; it excludes those who have not been beneficiaries of such political decisions. Do external borders of the Community turn into expressions of the national state border in this context? There are several territories that are geographically “within” the Community, but do not belong to the European Union. The attempt to trace the Community border to (physically!) separate the “Europeans” and the “non-Europeans” is impossible from a cultural point of view. Even recent historical heritage after the Cold War imposes both borders and real barriers that cannot be surpassed from the point of view of political decisions. Borders are still closed irrespective of cultural heritage. On the other hand, the process of tracing external borders does not seem to have finished. Considering this remark, there are people and states that will belong to the “inside” in the future, although they are currently outside the borders. The hard border whose construction is more definite excludes both Europeans and non-Europeans. Consequently, the European border is either open or closed depending on the exclusivist interests and less on cultural grounds. Thus, politicians’ discourse using the European cultural heritage as a reason against the integration of countries such as Turkey is mere populist action. The decision is political and the club is exclusivist. “Europe is and should remain a *house with many rooms*, rather than a culturally and racially exclusive club” (Bideleux, 2006: 62). Thus, the European Community is a territory closed on both political and identity grounds.

Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a culture of cultures, that is, a cultural area with a strong identity on the particular, local, regional and national levels, or a cultural archipelago, that is, a joint cultural area with disruptions. No matter the perspective, the existence of a European cultural area is not denied, whether we speak of diversity or “disrupted continuity”. The European culture seen as a “house with many rooms” does not exclude the existence of the “house” or the “rooms”. The natural question arising from this perspective is as follows: are specific cultures completely integrated in the general European cultural area? The answer seems natural. Our European identity supposes a basic reality. Besides, the particularity of the European culture is provided by diversity and multiculturalism as means of expression on the local, regional or national levels. Consequently, the European cultural area is an area with strong identity both particularly and generally. The phrase “culture of cultures” is appropriate from this point of view. As to identifying cultural borders, we can notice the fact that cultural contact areas belong to at least two categories: internal areas between

local, regional or national elements; external areas that impose the delimitation around what European culture is. Both approaches used in this paper do not exclude each other despite the conceptual opposition. The existence of national cultural areas does not exclude the existence of a common European cultural area. In fact, it is precisely this reality that confers the European area a special cultural identity. Europe can be conceived as a cosmopolite space, a media-cultural space where cultural security can turn into an element of preservation of a European common identity, besides the approaches we have referred to. Facing economic pressure generated by the economic policies, today's Europe responds to the whole world as a powerful common cultural area through the EU. Do peoples' identities disappear in this equation? The debate has to comprise approaches starting from the definition of the place of the national in the context of the European construction process. Can the nationalism specific to the 19th and 20th centuries Europe be extrapolated to peoples in a different concept, that of Europeanism? Besides the slight variations of the approach, "nationalism" can be European. In this case, Europe as a whole is strengthened as a structure in construction including the cultural perspective.

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I. IDENTITY AND ELEMENTS OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE EUROPEAN SPACE

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INSIGHTS INTO THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

*Roxana Maria DASCĂLU**

Abstract. *This conceptual paper seeks to present the main theories of social identity and to explain the fundamental processes related to the concept of identity. Then, once the connection between identity and communication is highlighted, it looks into the concept of European identity. A European identity already exists, in spite of the fact that “country first, but Europe too” is the revealed result of the Eurobarometer surveys. A fresh perspective in the field considers the nature of the compatibility between the national and European identity (which do not exclude each other) to be the different approaches of identity emergence: while national identities are largely “cultural”, European identities are primarily “instrumental”. The paper argues that the instrumental European identity, as the identity based on self-interested calculation, is a reality. The European Union (EU) has been experimenting new ways to contribute to the emergence of a European identity, trying to promote to its citizens symbols as identity markers once used by nations with the same aim (such as a flag, an anthem, a currency). In the EU context, funding opportunities are also being used to foster European identity acquisition.*

Keywords: *identity, collective identity, EU funds, instrumental European identity*

1. The concept of “identity”

For the past two decades, the attention given to the concept of identity - both in the social sciences and in the world at large - has continued to rise (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott, 2006: 695). Processes of globalization and regionalization and the increasing influence of mass media and other communication have triggered numerous contacts of individuals around the world. These increased contacts have led to different approaches on how people construe their identity, in the process of defining and knowing themselves.

The literature reveals two perspectives that illustrate how individuals construe their identities: the individualist and the collectivist perspectives (Grant, 2010). The individualist view claims that “individuals think of themselves as independent of relationships”, as “they value autonomy and uniqueness and construe their sense of self separate from the others” (Grant, 2010), while others see themselves as part of different groups, they define themselves in terms of their relationships with others, by their roles in the groups and situations they face as members of the particular groups (Grant, 2010). This perspective understands identity as “the relational aspects that qualify subjects in terms of categories such as race, gender, class, nation, sexuality, work and occupation, and thus in terms of acknowledged social relations and affiliations to groups” (Venn in

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Hollway, 2010). Henri Tajfel claims that social identity involves “both knowing that one belongs to certain social groups and perceiving value and emotional connection related to that membership” (Gaines, 2010). Therefore, social identity involves both an awareness of membership to a specific group and an emotional attachment to that group.

Social identity theory, developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner, claims that “individuals strive to achieve or to maintain a positive social identity”, which is based on favorable comparisons between one’s own group (ingroup) and any relevant distinct group (outgroup) (Grant, 2010). A *social group* is “a set of individuals who...view themselves as members of the same social category” (Stets, Burke, 2000: 2). Once an individual strongly identifies with a group, s/he will make everything possible to ensure that the ingroup is better than the outgroup(s). As Stets and Burke (2000: 11) suggest, “in group-based identities, only the actor’s perceptions and actions are directly involved” and the first factors that matter in identifying with the group. However, if one’s social identity is unsatisfactory, “individuals may leave their group to join a more positively group, make their existing group more positively distinct or redefine ingroup characteristics as being positive” (Grant, 2010). The formation and deformation of one’s identity depends on the relations of the individual with others. If the individual is properly esteemed or recognized, his/her identity is assured. By contrast, if one “is forced to confront a reduced, demeaning, or contemptible image of himself, one can suffer real psychological damage” (Muldoon, 2010) and reveal negative attitudes towards the ingroup. Therefore, collective identity should not be taken for granted, as it might be a subject of change, process known in the literature as *identity change*: “One’s identity is the product of a continued negotiation among myriad factors, including one’s choices, social circumstances, historical background and political institutions” (Davidson, 2010). Individuals construe and become aware of their identity through *identification*, a process which links individuals (who) to social groups (what) (Risse, 2010b: 30). The author makes a relevant distinction between the subjects (who – elites, citizens, so on) and the objects of identification (what – gender, nation, Europe, so on). Relevant to mention is that each person, however, over the course of his or her life, is a member of a unique combination of social categories/groups; therefore “the set of social identities making up that person’s self-concept is unique” (Stets and Burke, 2000: 4). This also means that different persons may identify stronger with a given social group, less with another group, while not identify with other groups at all. Thus, every person has a different “constellation” of identities, which may intersect with others’ identities in some points – groups –, but there are not two persons holding the same “constellation” of identities.

The process of identification involves “an interaction, between how we identify ourselves and how others categorize us, between self-image and public image” (Jenkins, 2010). Or, the self is reflexive, “it can take itself as an object and can categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories or classifications” (Stets and Burke, 2000: 2). Identification basically is “a process of classification, drawing on criteria of similarity and difference” (Jenkins, 2010), between the characteristics of the ingroups and outgroups, known in the literature as the “I-Other dialectic”. Stuart Hall argues that entire communities construct their identities in relation to the Other (Balaji, 2010), even the European community, as this paper will show.

Identity theory understands identity as the manifestation of a specific set of roles in society. Thus, like social identity theory, identity theory deals principally with the components of a structured society. Persons acting in this social structure name one another and themselves by recognizing one another as occupants of positions (*roles*) (Stets

and Burke, 2000: 5). Basically, identities are internalized role expectations (Stryker and Burke). In identity theory, “the core of an identity is the categorization of the self as an occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and expectations associated with that role and its performance” (Burke and Tully, 1977; Thoits, 1986 in Stets and Burke, 2000: 5).

An important distinction between social identity theory and identity theory lies in the core element of the identification process. Having a particular *social identity* means being at one with a certain group, being like others in the group, and *seeing things from the group’s perspective* (Stets and Burke, 2000: 7; our highlighting). In contrast, having a particular *role identity* means *acting to fulfill the expectations of the role*, coordinating and negotiating interaction with role partners, and manipulating the environment to *control the resources for which the role has responsibility* (Stets and Burke, 2000: 7; our highlighting). We believe that in analyzing European identity both theories have a significant take, as it seems to promote both cultural and instrumental identities, as later defined in this paper. Moreover, as Stets and Burke (2000: 15) claim, one always and simultaneously occupies a role *and* belongs to a group, so that *role identities* and *social identities* are “always and simultaneously relevant to, and influential on, perceptions, affect, and behavior”. Another idea which endorses this fact is that “manipulating symbols and resources in order to obtain goals is importantly what identities do” (Freese, Burke in Stryker, Burke: 19). Thus, there are more aspects of identities than just symbols and values, identity are also instrumental, as this paper argues. Moreover, in doing this, identities create value, and thus they can both increase the level of commitment to groups that underlie the identities and increase their salience (Stryker and Burke: 19).

The communication theory of identity (CTI) highlights the explicitly acknowledged interdependency between communication and identity, as “identity is formed, maintained, and modified in a communicative process, and communication is a performance of identity” (Hecht and Hopfer, 2010). Communication is internalized as identity “when people place themselves in socially recognizable categories and thereby validate, through social interaction, whether these categories are relevant to them” (Hecht and Hopfer, 2010). Identity is manifested in social interaction through expectations and motivations, which influence the person’s communication. Thus, “identity is externalized to social interaction through expectations attached to identities” (Hecht and Hopfer, 2010).

The three theories of identity are relevant to this study, as European identity is a genuine collective identity which is intimately linked with concepts such as European public sphere. Communication, through the emergence of a communicative space for the citizens of the EU, is the essential condition for the emergence of a European identity and a European demos, a European polity.

2. European identity as the major card to play towards the political EU

The issue of a common identity that would bind together the citizens of the member states has been one of the major challenges of the EU. While at the EU institutional level there is a strong support for both deepening and enlargement, these processes are not as appreciated by its citizens (Inthorn, 2006: 71). Therefore, as many theoreticians endorse, one of the major issues when debating on the possible emergence of a European identity is the gap between the institutional EU and the feeling of belonging to the EU (Beciu, 2004: 287). Recognition of this problem is not new. Even the founders of the European Communities predicted that the citizens of EU member states would more and more identify with these institutions and they would become less identified with their

nations. - a change of attachment towards the new political power (Duchesne, Frogner, 2007: 2). EU officials started to look into the concept of a European identity starting with the 1970s (Străth in Schlesinger, Foret, 2007: 118). Until then, while a “European consciousness might sometimes have been evoked, identity as such was not a card to play” (Schlesinger and Foret, 2007: 127). The economic crisis of 1970s urged the member states to reinforce their global position by deepening the European construction, thus coming across the European identity issue, which became a permanent concern of the EU institutions. Therefore, in 1972 a “Declaration on a European Identity” defined European identity based on three pillars: (1) common heritage, interests and special obligations within the community; (2) the “dynamic nature” of European unification; and (3) the extent to which the nine member states are collaborating in relation to the rest of the world (Burgess, 2002: 479). This embryo of the concept of European identity is based on internal unity and heritage with regard to the rest of the world. Thus, it presupposes common features of the nine member states in relation to other international associations and states (Bârgăoanu, Negrea and Dascălu, 2010: 4).

Trenz (2005: 9) synthesizes the approaches in analyzing the formation of a European collective identity in two main categories: understanding European identity as the degree of support of European citizens towards the EU (by analyzing Eurobarometer surveys which since 1975 have included questions on the feeling of belonging of the Europeans) and by looking at a European collective identity “as a projection that is developed in public discourse”. In our opinion, these two approaches have to be integrated in order to determine empirical results in the direction of creating a European identity, and they must be strongly correlated to the public communication of the EU institutions and the feedback “EU citizens” offer.

As already announced, the literature reveals European identity as referring to the concept of collective identity. Moreover, it definitely is a *political identity*, which involves “the sense of belonging to politically relevant human groups and political structures” (Bruter, 2005: 1). The same author claims that the emergence of a corresponding political identity can be considered as “the primary source of legitimization of a political community” (2005: 1).

“Collective identities are social constructions which use psychological needs and motives to provide an answer to the questions “who do I belong to?” or “who do we belong to?” “ (Eder, 2009: 431). Answers to these questions always involve more than one group as the targets of belonging. Therefore, one person is able to have multiple identities, which do not exclude each other. Moreover, one should bear in mind that not all the multiple collective identities of a person are salient at the same time. Social identity theorists originally used the term *salience* to indicate the activation of an identity in a specific situation. A *salient social identity* was “one which is functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one’s membership in that group on perception and behavior” (Oakes in Stets, Burke, 2000: 19). In identity theory, salience has been understood as *the probability* that an identity will be activated in a situation (Stryker in Stets and Burke, 2000: 19; our highlighting). Salience is directly linked with commitment: the stronger the commitment, the greater the salience (Stets and Burke, 2000: 22). Commitment, on the other hand, involves two aspects: the number of persons to whom one is tied through an identity and the relative strength or depth of the ties to others (Stets and Burke, 2000: 22).

Both theories (identity theory and social identity theory) agree that an identity has no effect without activation. To examine the likelihood that an identity will be activated across many situations, researchers must consider factors such as the fit of the identity to

the situation (the stimuli present in the situation that fit the characteristics of the identity), which has been emphasized in social identity theory, as well as the individual's structural commitment, as promoted by identity theory (Stets and Burke, 2000: 26). Simply put, which collective identity becomes salient while others remain dormant depends on the specific situation the person faces (Simon and Klandermans, 2001: 321) and the strengths of its commitment to a specific group, of which identity is to be activated. This is an essential aspect, as when debating on the issue of European identity, it is often related to the national identity and presented in zero-sum terms: citizens of member states may feel either German, British, Greek etc or European (belonging to the European Union) and not as having complementary identities. This has been a contested assumption (Bruter, 2004; Risse, 2003; Burgess, 2002), as the Eurobarometer surveys show that "country first, but Europe, too" is the dominant outlook in most EU countries and people do not perceive this as contradictory (Risse, 2003: 8). Moreover, we support the idea that rather than a mere shift in identity from being German, Irish or Latvian to being European, a fundamental change in the underlying dynamics of identity formation is underway (Holmes, 2009). Most of the cases belong to the following scheme when referring to the collective identities related to territorial aspects: a person relates first to their community identity, then to their regional identity, their national identity, their European/ Asian (and so on) identity, all to be integrated in a global identity. Another way of conceptualizing the relationship between European and national identities is the "marble cake" model, which is not explicitly dealt with in the literature (Risse, 2004: 6). This model suggests that the various identities that an individual holds cannot be completely separated on different levels (Risse, 2004: 6), this classification might only be suitable for academic purposes. Risse (2004: 6) claims that "identity components influence each other, mesh and blend into each other", thus we cannot truly separate German or Dutch identity from European identity. Moreover, the author has an interesting position suggesting that "European identity might mean different things to different people" (Risse, 2004: 6).

We argue that, although the argument of multiple identities is valid, the preeminence of the national identity over the European identity of most of the people living across the EU is a serious matter when it comes to the EU democratic deficit, the lack of an EU demos and a European public sphere (Bărgăoanu, Negrea and Dascălu, 2010: 6). This is a relevant aspect when considering the fact that if the national identity was strong, one might see another European citizen, of another member state, as the "other" and, thus, impeding the identification with the EU to get stronger or even crystallize. These facts are clearly revealed as true in crises situations, when different groups, communities or nations, feel that their identity and interests are threatened by EU integration, as the Greek crisis in 2010 shows. Basically, the national identity is reinforced when any of its components is threatened or if some nations are thought to benefit more from the EU (more resources, for example) than others (Hix, 1998). This happens because people who highly identify with a group are "willing to work for the group and promote action when things get badly" (Scheepers et al, 2003: 569). Therefore, in times of crisis for the EU, European citizens promote action in favor of their countries and relate to their national identity, not their European one, even in cases when people hold a European identity as a secondary one. Creating a strong European identity is compulsory, as many scholars emphasize: "a collective identity above the level of primary groups and a collective we-feeling are needed in order for the EU citizens to acknowledge the sacrifices imposed in the name of the European collective goods" (Eriksen, 2007: 24). As Eriksen and Fossum (2004: 437) put it, "the success of the EU depends upon developing a shared

identity and a value basis for integrating different conceptions of the good life, and a diverse range of societal interests". Although "common norms and values are required to motivate collective action" (Eriksen and Fossum, 2004: 440), achieving one's goals and interests due to membership of a particular group (e.g. the EU) might be enough to determine the person (the European citizen) to promote action in favor of the group (European citizens). This could happen, if the EU made efforts to at least develop this instrumental sense of belonging to the EU.

Moreover, EU desperately needs a strong leadership that defines itself as European, for the European citizens. Jacques Delors, one of the most respected leaders of the European Community, clearly highlights this need the EU faces: "we don't just need firefighters; we need architects too. And there are no architects left – and no visionaries either."; "By "visionaries" I mean people who will evoke, stimulate or awaken in us that which is best in the human race." (Delors, 2011: 5). As Díez Medrano (2009: 93) highlights, "we take for granted that European leaders are driven by long-term political identity projects for Europe", as most public debate about the EU still concerns "mundane" policy-related issues and bargaining between states (Delors, 2009: 93) and not strategic long term objectives for the EU.

A successful leadership depends on building internalized commitment and strong identification with the goals and interests of the community (Gaines, 2010). This is achieved through communication. Once trust is strengthened, "leaders can help shift individual members to align more closely with collective identity" (Gaines, 2010). A strong leadership of the EU should be able to communicate to its citizens their common destiny and fate, because only with a proper communication of EU to the citizens "people are turned into compatriots who are willing to take on new collective action to provide for each other's well-being" (Eriksen and Fossum, 2004: 442). And this is what EU needs.

In our opinion, another additional solution for the emergence of a European identity could be the postponing of the enlargement process, because a well defined territory is an essential condition for the construction of a community, since the acknowledgement of the differences that separate "us" from the "others" is a core feature of any collective identity (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2000: 2). Moreover, there are scholars (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009: 3) who claim that with Europe once again united, after the enlargements in 2004 and 2007, "the store of collective memories has broadened enormously and this makes the emergence of a collective European identity even more problematic than it had been before enlargement". In what regards the cultural assets of a European identity, this might well be the case, as these enlargement waves have introduced in the EU very different self-understandings of Europe, of its history and of its mission.

EU's "others" are frequently constructed as territorially defined entities such as America, Russia, Asia and even Turkey (Risse et al, 1999: 155). Nowadays, Turkey is a candidate to the EU, fact that triggers confusion in identifying this specific EU's "other". This controversy would be solved once the decision on granting the membership or postponing the enlargement process was made. European leaders also have tried to present the continent's own past of wars and nationalist rivalries as the "other" to the public (Risse et al, 1999: 155), a relevant example being the Franco-German reconciliation and the strong relationship between the two once rival countries in the history of the EU starting with the founding treaties.

Although a truly consolidated European identity will not emerge just in a few decades, but in centuries (Lewis, 2008), if European leaders fail to support this process,

first for themselves, then for the European citizens, its future might be in danger (Bârgăoanu, Negrea and Dascălu, 2010: 6).

3. What about an instrumental european identity?

We consider one of the most relevant perspectives on European identity in the literature to be the theories of the emergence of a European identity (Ruiz Jimenez et al, 2004: 2):

- a. a “*cultural*” theory, which understands identities as being based on ethno-cultural factors generated through a long-term process;
- b. a “*civic*” theory, which understands identities as being based on agreement over rules for peaceful political co-existence;
- c. an “*instrumental*” theory, which conceives of identities as being based on self-interested calculation (whether economic or political).

In what concerns the “*cultural*” theory, scholars argue that if a European identity were to emerge, it would not, and should not, be based on the same identity markers that the nation state promotes, such as language, myths or a common cultural heritage (Ruiz Jimenez *et.al.*, 2004: 2). The authors claim that “while it may be possible for a cultural European identity to emerge, this would certainly take a long time and would ultimately lead to the substitution of national identities” (Ruiz Jimenez *et.al.*, 2004: 2).

From the “*civic*” perspective on European identity, “the substance of EU membership lies in a commitment to the shared values of the Union as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment to the duties and rights of a civic society covering specific areas of public life, a commitment to membership of a polity which promotes the direct opposite of classic ethno-nationalism” (Ruiz Jimenez *et.al.*, 2004: 4). This perspective connects European identity to concepts such as the Habermasian communicative rationality and the European public sphere, which are seen to be crucial for the emergence of a European identity, but mostly with his “*constitutional patriotism*” as the basis for political identity at a European level. This is a kind of patriotism which should be based on a “*civic*” (and cosmopolitan) understanding of the principles underlying the European polity (Castiglione, 2009: 39). This means a supranational patriotism open to the inclusion of the “*other*”, but which remains rooted in a self-understanding of the European perspective. As other Habermasian concepts, it is seen as an attractive, but normative perspective. A less normative approach may be that of Castiglione (2009), who sees the civic European culture as a growing perception of citizens’ that the EU contributes to a fundamental (though multilayered) institutional and legal order within which they can exercise their liberty. Therefore, the basic assets of a European civic culture should simply be the freedom of work, study and travel in any EU member state.

Other scholars argue that instrumental factors may play an important role in defining and strengthening individuals’ sense of identification with the UE. Some premises accepted in the literature are that: the perception of the potential gains or losses that might result from membership of the EU may influence peoples’ identification with it and “the better the citizen’s evaluation of the results of European policies (compared to the results of policies pursued by national government), the more likely s/he is to feel European” (Castiglione, 2009: 3). Schoen (2008: 5) claims that “drawing on Eurobarometer data, the analysis shows that instrumental self-interest and territorial identities contribute considerably to explaining support for common foreign affairs and defense policies”. Risse et. all. (1999: 157) believe that any type of collective identity has an instrumental component also: “Collective identities define and shape in the first place

how actors view their perceived instrumental and material interests and which preferences are regarded as legitimate and appropriate for enacting given identities. At the same time, a change in perceived material and instrumental interests might well lead over time to changes in collective identities". Once the European Community created the single market and then the unique market, some European citizens had major benefits. Thus, identity change in response to market developments reflects shifting economic self-interests (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009: 12), also. Fligstein (2009) conducted a research into finding out who the Europeans are, the people who positively identify with EU. His premise relies on this connection between the identification with the EU and the material benefits some Europeans have as a result of their country being member of the EU. He claims that those who have a sense of belonging to the EU "tend to be the most privileged strata of society: managers, professionals, white-collar workers, educated people, and young people" who "speak second languages, report having traveled to another member state in the past twelve months, and have joined European-wide organizations" (Fligstein, 2009: 134). Although his corpus and the results of his research cannot reach such a conclusion, he suggests that "interest and identity are wrapped up together" (Fligstein, 2009: 146). As Sanchez-Cuenca (2000: 168) more plastically suggests, "identities, so to speak, do not fall from heaven: they are a consequence of complex economic and political calculations".

Moreover, we find evidence in the literature for the existence of different types of European citizens, which correlates with the typology of the emergence of European identity. Relevant is the following classification of European citizens in terms of their support to European integration: positive Europeans, with Europhiles and instrumental Europeans and Euroskeptics (Haesly, 2001). Europhiles are those who "enthusiastically endorse all aspects of European integration", while instrumental Europeans "support only specific aspects of European integration, as they believe EU delivers important economic benefits to their communities and to their country" (Haesly, 2001: 82). The author's hypothesis, which is validated in the cited study, is that instrumental EU support consistently leads to lower levels of European pride than those of the Europhiles, but higher levels than those expressed by the Euroskeptics.

In this context, the authors (Ruiz Jimenez et.al, 2004: 18) promote an interesting perspective on the multiple identities theory, as they consider the nature of the compatibility between the national and European identity to be the different approaches of identity emergence: while national identities are largely "cultural", European identities are primarily "instrumental". We firmly support this theory and claim that the only theory of European identity which has empirical evidence is the instrumental one. People across the EU tend to identify with the supranational structure when they perceive the benefits that EU brings in their lives, when EU becomes real to them. The most relevant and perceivable instruments in developing such an identity across the EU are the financial opportunities that EU bring to its citizens (Sanchez Salgado, 2008: 15) through the funds it offers under the Regional and Cohesion Policy, the Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies and the thematic policies. This could be a valid solution for the consolidation of a European identity, which could be promoted by a strong leadership of the EU, along with well communicated vision and mission for the supranational structure.

In triggering and consolidating national identity, nation states make use of various symbols and instruments ("identity markers"), which have the purpose to remind citizens they belong to a national community. Such symbols and instruments are the flag, the anthem, the currency, passports and particular national holidays when relevant moments

in the nation's history are commemorated (Risse, 2010a). As (Kaelble, 2009: 206) tells us, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, when a strong European movement was active in the initial period of European integration, many European symbols were proposed: various designs of a European flag; postage stamps; historical places commemorating Europe, such as Strasbourg; human rights charters; historical figures such as Charlemagne, reinforced by the Charlemagne prize of Aix-la-Chapelle; institutions for advanced education - the College of Europe in Bruges; and rituals such as the lifting of border barriers by young Europeans or the signing of international treaties by elder statesmen. The EU has followed the national strategy in promoting its own identity markers, such as the EU's flag and anthem, the Euro, the EU's flag on European citizens' passports and even holidays, such as the 9th of May, when every European should celebrate the birth of the European Community. But only the European flag, the Erasmus program, and the EU currency (the Euro) have succeeded (Kaelble, 2009: 206), in a relative manner, while most other European symbols have remained weak or ambiguous: the European anthem and Europe Day remain largely unobserved and unknown and references to outstanding European historical figures are infrequent (Kaelble, 2009: 206).

As these identity markers don't have the same power as the national one, the EU has had to be innovative and use other strategies to enforce a sense of belonging to the EU. We believe that the most innovative strategy is the use of EU funds, so that EU citizens may relate directly to the EU, so that, in this way, it has direct effects on their day to day lives. Moreover, the mandatory rules regarding the visual identity of the EU that every institution which manages European funds and every beneficiary of these funds must respect and apply are a strong instrument for identity acquisition towards the EU. To this end, the EU gives great amounts of money for large communication campaigns, which use different media to reach the objective of informing both potential beneficiaries *and the large public* on the financial opportunities that EU offers its citizens to develop their business, the region's infrastructure, their organizations' human resources and so on. Therefore, every citizen of the member states has to know, even s/he is not directly involved, that the EU has a major contribution in making his/her life better. Taken into account that the message of the large communication campaigns and the purpose of the mandatory rules regarding the visual identity of the EU connect more with the instrumental component of one's collective identity than with the cultural or affective ones, we consider that both at the EU level (as in strategic objectives) and the empirical level, the consolidation of an instrumental European identity should be considered the main card to play in developing a sense of belonging to the EU of its citizens.

4. Conclusion

This conceptual paper has presented the main theories in social psychology which deal with the concept of identity, emphasizing the fundamental aspects of identification, salience, identity change as the processes intimately related with the concept. Moreover, it has been noted that the communication theory of identity (CTI) highlights the explicitly acknowledged interdependency between communication and identity, as identity is formed, maintained, and modified in a communicative process.

Regarding European identity, we have defined it as a collective political identity, formed mainly through the use of "I-Other" dialectic. We have presented the newest perspective in the literature on the emergence of a European identity and claim that the only theory of European identity which has empirical evidence is the instrumental one. People across the EU tend to identify with the supranational structure when they perceive

the benefits that EU brings in their lives, when EU becomes real to them. The most relevant and perceivable instruments in developing such an identity across the EU are the financial opportunities that EU bring to its citizens through the funds it offers under the Regional and Cohesion Policy, the Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies and the thematic policies. This could be a valid solution for the emergence of a European identity, which could be promoted by a strong leadership of the EU, along with well communicated vision and mission for the supranational structure.

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VOICE AND SILENCE IN RELATION TO IDENTITY

*Horia MOAȘA**

Abstract. *Voice and silence are strategic communicative resources that employees utilize in constructing their identities. People react positively to voice not because they expect specific gains, but because an opportunity for voice signifies valorization, membership and, most importantly, a chance for self-authorship. The challenge for the identity construction process is for people to maintain a sense of self-continuity and coherence (Whorthington, 1996: 13 and McAdams, 1996: 306, in Clarke et al., 2009: 326), while multiple and diverse moments and contexts offer the possibility to tell many different identity stories many of which are paradoxically contradictory and fundamentally unstable (Gergen, 1992, in Clarke et al., 2009: 326). This latter view leads to a more postmodern definition of identity that will be analyzed here in relation to voice and silence and illustrated by the case of a management consulting team in a Romanian company.*

Keywords: *voice, silence, identity, social constructivism, postmodernism, dramaturgy, self-narrative*

1. Introduction

Language and voice are very important in the formation of identity, but if that very language/voice is absent because of censorship, silencing or lack of voice, limited discursive or symbolic resources, how are individuals going to construct their identity?

Voice and silence are tightly connected to the identity formation process because they are strategic communicative resources that individuals use in order to construct a sense of self that will enable them to survive, get by and advance inside their organization.

This article strives to present not only the interplay between voice, silence and identity, but also multiple connected ways in which individuals construct their identities inside organizations.

Four main approaches will be discussed in relation to the identity formation process:

- Identity as self-narrative – how actors make sense of and project their self through self-narratives and how these could be stable and coherent or changeable and fractured.
- Identity between agency and structure – how actors are torn between accepting symbolic or discursive resources and creating new ones, adapting or changing existing ones.
- Identity as dramaturgical endeavor – “how the looking glass of other’s reactions” (Burke, 1991: 839, in Down & Reveley, 2009: 385) becomes not

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only a means to construct, anchor, verify and repair narrative identities, but also a source of anxiety and control

- Identity in context – how actors draw upon single or multiple contexts in order to construct their sense of self.

2. Voice and silence – short theoretical introduction

Voice and silence are interrelated and intertwined (Creed, 2003: 1528) strategic forms of communication (Scott, 1993: 4; Grice, 1989: 87) which denote expressing or revealing ideas, opinions and aspects of identity, respectively withholding or non-disclosing them (Van Dyne, Ang and Botero, 2003: 1361; Creed, 2003: 1504; Morrison and Milliken, 2000: 714). Characterized by being active, conscious, intentional and purposeful, voice and silence become critical components of social interaction (Van Dyne, Ang and Botero, 2003: 1365). Voice and silence presuppose each other and social actors have both voice and silence because they operate at multiple levels and deal with multiple issues at different moments in time.

Voice and silence are conceptual opposites only at a first sight, since one signifies expressing, while the other one withholding (Van Dyne, Ang and Botero, 2003: 1361). In fact, voice and silence presuppose each other. Voice cannot exist without silence and silence cannot exist without voice. One gives meaning and significance to the other in such a way that the absence of one would minimize completely the importance of the other one's presence.

This re-conceptualization brings several implications into the foreground, the most important of which is that voice and silence should be considered as social activities, rather than a state of being/state of affairs, since they are strategic and communicative forms of interaction. Social actors are not voice or silence. Social actors can have voice and silence; they can do both. This places more emphasis on agency, dynamicity, change and opens up the road to emancipation, while viewing them as a state of being/state of affairs removes their strategic nature and leads to a certain determinism which minimizes the possibility of change and transformation.

There are three main concepts that are tightly connected to voice and silence: power, discourse and identity. Of all three, the most important concept is **identity**, which “not only constitutes a way of seeing or classifying myself that distinguishes me from other people, but it also simultaneously allows me to see myself as similar to a class of individuals with whom I most closely associate myself or with whom I would like to be associated” (Erikson, 1964 in Whetten and Godfrey, 1998: 19).

3. The case

The case focuses on a management consulting team that was employed in a Fish Company to improve the daily activities and to yield more profit and a more positive image.

The Fish Company is a middle to large size enterprise in Romania, counting almost 250 employees. It is one of the oldest fish companies in Romania with a background in fishing of more than 30 years. During the last decade, the company tried to enlarge its operational basis by adding other divisions tightly connected to its core activity. Presently, the company has three operational divisions: the original fish division which encompasses 400 ha of water where fish are grown, one processing unit and seven directly owned fish stores; the tourism division which manages one restaurant and two motels with restaurants

as well as a natural reserve and many annual fish competitions; the construction division which sells different sorts of sand and gravel used in the construction industry.

My point of entry was determined by the company's decision to be publicly listed. The company is owned by one private majority shareholder and a state owned investment fund who decided in 2010 that it is time to publicly list the company. But in order to be listed, the company needed to "look good" in front of its future investors. Therefore, the owners decided to hire what will end up to be called "a team of mercenaries" who's solely goal was to improve the operations and image of the company.

Each "mercenary" has occupied a middle management position: cost control manager, fish division manager, production manager, marketing manager, commercial manager etc. They had a deadline of two years to complete the improvement of the company.

4. Methodology

The methods used for gathering data were participant observation during a period of 1.5 years and interviews taken with both "mercenaries" and members of the family, because this was a family based company. The interviews were taken both during my participant observation and after I have exited the company.

I have interviewed all the members of the consulting team and most members of the family, depending on their direct contact with and influence on the consulting team. This process resulted in 20 one-hour interviews.

The main focus was on the daily interactions between the consulting team and family members and how these interactions influence the attainment of organizational goals.

The following general research questions guided my efforts:

- How are goals going to be attained?
- Are goals unanimously accepted? Is there only one correct way to fulfill these objectives and everybody follows this way? Or are there many ways of fulfilling objectives and everybody has to make individual strategic decisions?
- What are the resources that actors mobilize in order to fulfill these objectives?
- What is the interactional dynamic between "mercenaries" and the rest of the organization?

What "mercenaries" soon discovered was that their work was twofold: on the one hand they had to deal with the company's daily operations and try to make them more efficient and profitable, and, on the other hand, they had to work with the owner's family, overcome their family business mentality and the daily interactional conflicts and tensions.

A superficial picture of the company can be portrayed by listing a few positions occupied by the owner's family members: the owner was the general manager of the company, his sister was the business development manager, his wife was the manager of one restaurant, his mother and brother-in-law were the managers of a motel, his god-daughter was the manager of the other motel and his cousin was the manager of the constructions division. And the list goes on.

One of the main aspects that came into the foreground when analyzing the interaction between "mercenaries" and the rest of the organization was the identity formation process. "Mercenaries" were specialists brought in to make the company more efficient and more profitable. Thus their work was more rational. On the contrary, the members of the family were more emotional and their emotions influenced their daily organizational activities.

The interactions between “mercenaries” and the rest of the organization were characterized by the tension between guarding their specialist identity on the one hand and thus opposing the current status quo and integrating in the company’s culture and thus negating their own reasoning, training and knowledge of how things should be done.

This tension brought into the foreground several aspects related to the identity formation process.

5. Identity as self-narrative

Identity and identification are tightly connected to voice and silence, since the presence or absence of language provides actors with the possibility to make sense of and project their self through self-narratives. Identity is subjectively and publicly available through self-narratives that actors construct inside themselves or in interactions with others (Clarke et al., 2009: 324).

Identity’s self-narratives could be stable, coherent and unified, or changeable, fractured and diverse. On the one hand, the challenge of identity is to incorporate multiple and diverse elements in order to build a sense of self-continuity and coherence (Whorthington, 1996: 13 and McAdams, 1996: 306, in Clarke et al., 2009: 326). On the other hand, multiple and diverse moments and contexts offer people the possibility to tell many different identity stories which can be contradictory, changing, disparate and fundamentally unstable (Gergen, 1992, in Clarke et al., 2009: 326). This latter view leads to a more postmodern definition of identity which goes hand in hand with voice and silence as interrelated and intertwined strategic forms of communication. Identity becomes a paradoxical collection of forms clustering in moments of time, similar to a garbage can full of meanings where streams of identity, which condense and vary in moments of time, are forming from fragments of meanings, statements, names etc., that are held together, at the same time (Hatch and Schultz, in Whetten and Godfrey, 1998: 36).

Social actors have fragmented, multiple identities where “who we are” is no longer “who we say we are”, but also those parts of the self that are silenced, or are not talked about, as is the case, for example, with the Canadian mistreated soldiers in Pinder and Harlos (2001: 332), the gay and lesbians in Ward and Winstanley (2003: 1257), or with the gay and lesbian Protestant ministers in Creed (2003: 1505).

Social actors are simultaneously part of different subcultures (due to department, gender, age, length of service etc.) and this offers them the possibility to present a different self-narrative according to the context or the moment in time.

“Being employed only since last year I guess I am part of the “mercenaries” group with which I am on the same wave-length and we try daily to change things around here. But I spend almost all my day with the accounting team and I feel I am closer to them than I am to the “mercenaries”. (FM – cost control)

The way actors manage these multiple and diverse identities depends on personal strategies, context or moment in time.

As a result we can no longer conceive of identity as that which is central, distinctive and enduring (Whetten and Godfrey, 1998: 75) about one individual, group or organization.

6. Identity between agency and structure

Although language and discourse are a primary medium of control and power (Fairclough, 1989: 3, in Clarke et al., 2009: 331), social actors can choose when, where and what to speak up. The complexity implied by identity is simplified and broken apart in

self-narratives voiced in interactions which take place in different moments and contexts. Choosing to speak up implies those parts of self that “not only depart from organizational expectations, but also have been historically marginalized” (Creed, 2003: 1504). There is a tension between claiming and preserving valued aspects of the self. Therefore silence and voice appear to be aspects of not only agency but also self-authorship.

Clarke et al. (2009: 341) support the argument of agency by positing that individuals are active in positioning themselves in the way they story their lives. Down and Reveley (2009: 382) sustain the same argument when they present employees as being far from passive in the face of discursive pressures and more agential, creative and generative. They can choose among or play with competing discourses (voice) and they can resist (silence) specific discursive regimes in creating a sense of self. As Ashcraft (2007: 15) contends, we are talking about intersectionality, which presupposes that different discourses are brought together to function as integral players in the organization of (occupational) identity.

However, Clarke et al. (2009: 224) limit their model to a single context (the organization as the site for realizing the project of the self) and a single set of available discourses (identities constituted within organizationally based discursive regimes).

In contrast, Down and Reveley (2009: 383) see identity work as reflective self-narration that draws not only on organizational, but also on socially supplied narratives and discourses, thus widening the array of discourses that come into play in the identity formation process. Ashcraft (2007: 28) argues that there are multiple discourses beyond organizational boundaries that still function to organize work and influence identity. Upholding the same argument, Kuhn (2006: 1340) posits that not only organizational, but also social discourses shape identity in the identity regulation process. Additionally, Kuhn (2006: 1339) emphasizes large scale social, economic and technological changes, which constitute the reflexive modernity, as the antecedents and determinants of personal identity. The twist is that discourses shaping identity construction vary with local cultures, as the surrounding field provides the cultural meaning system with which both individuals and organizations assert their legitimacy and construct their identities (Bourdieu, 1991, in Kuhn, 2006: 1355). Although reflexive modernization argues for generalizability of resources appropriate for identity construction (Kuhn, 2006: 1355), culturally varying visions of self, temper these claims allowing for local adaptation and variation.

“This is the difference between a village and a city (The Fish Company is located in a village 20 km away from one of Romania’s most developed cities n.a.). What can they do in [...] Village? Can they live only on the beet and potatoes they grow on the fields? No! And so they are happy to be hired at this company and they accept anything...We have other possibilities...I do not accept to be transformed into a slave and I try to impose myself anytime I get the chance. They either do as I know it should be done, or else...I think this is the reason why they do not love us that much!” (SF, commercial manager)

If individuals were to choose only from organizationally based discourses, and discursive practices contribute to the reproduction of existing social and power relations, thus exercising pervasive control over employees, then the agency would be reduced to a minimum. Employees can only choose the position they occupy on a certain continuum comprised of discourse based descriptors, or if they position themselves on that continuum at all.

Not even multiple discourses necessarily create a space of action that enables resistance to managerially defined selves through counter or dis-identification, or through self-consciously fake performances (Kuhn, 2006: 1354). The multitude of discourses

creates a vision of the organizational self that provides greater or fewer options for self-creation (Kuhn, 2006: 1354).

It follows that voice is just a surface act of speaking and being heard, because from a post-structuralist point of view, discursive practices eliminate certain issues from arenas of speech and sound (Simpson and Lewis, 2005: 1255). One example for this normative view on silence could be that by foregrounding issues such as productivity, efficiency and growth, the organization is conceived as primarily an arena for masculine endeavor, while issues of gender are silenced. Women, for example, may be encouraged to voice their differences, experiences and opinions, but they often encounter difficulties being heard. There are already established ways in which we must talk that constitute our experience of our reality and that influence our attempts to account for ourselves or for reality to others around us (Kuhn, 2006: 1341).

If discourse contains both voice and silence, if the dominant discourse can also contain oppositional discourses (Fairclough, 1989: 49), than actors still have a chance to become stronger and resist the hostile discourse. As long as hegemonic discourses contain references to minority discourses, the latter maintain their legitimacy and can strategically use it to increase their discursive domination and thus power.

A small sense of freedom against corporate seduction and identity prescriptions is achieved by contesting and ridiculing, as well as through humor, counter-narratives, cynicism and irony (Clarke et al., 2009: 345). For example, the mercenaries started to use nicknames when they talked about family members: *The Iron Lady* was the CFO who approved of any budgetary expense only after time consuming discussions and explanations between mercenaries and the general manager; the general manager was called *Big Fish*; the general manager's sister was called *Sandy Belle* (after the cartoon character's name n.a.) in order to describe that while she was good-looking, her competencies in managing her department were close to zero. Stories are also important mechanisms against corporate seduction. The story of the general manager's house is a widely used story among the old members of the organization. The general manager is always pressing employees not to make mistakes and considers that the main cause for these mistakes is the rush to do things quickly and not consulting with colleagues. The story comes to counteract the general manager's message by recounting the events that took place while his house was built. Because he did not listen to the workers and because he wanted things to be done faster than humanly possible, the general manager had to redo several components of the house twice.

Resistance and the use of reverse discourse can make minorities stronger and empowered, and thus enable them to work against hostile discourses (Ward and Winstanley, 2003: 1261).

In conclusion, identity as self-narrative becomes a game of continuing dialectic between agency and structure (Clarke et al., 2009: 347). Identities are constructed within discursive contexts (structure), but individuals are able to influence and shape these contexts (Jenkins, 1996, in Down & Reveley, 2009). Organizations and organizational prescriptions do not completely determine and explain identities, as the self is crafted through practice and is thus achieved. In interaction, actors can choose what to voice and what to silence, but these choices are frequently made from existing organizational discourse. The same agency-structure dialectic is also presented by Kuhn (2006: 1339), who affirms the distinction between individual efforts to portray a positive and distinctive identity (identity work) and the organizational and social discourses shaping those identities (identity regulation). From a constructionist point of view, identity signifies "the

conception of the self reflexively and discursively understood by the self” (Kuhn, 2006: 1340). Therefore, identity is shaped by local and distal discourses which provide scripts, roles, subject positions that tie actors to social structures and orient their feelings, thoughts and values in a particular direction. In response to these multiple and conflicting scripts, roles and positions encountered in daily organizational and non-organizational life, actors struggle to create a coherent sense of self, sometimes complying and sometimes resisting to organizational goals (Kuhn, 2006: 1341).

7. Identity as dramaturgical endeavor

When “who they are” is not fully answered through the organizational (Clarke et al., 2009: 245) or social (Down & Reveley, 2009: 383; Kuhn, 2006: 1341) supply of discursive resources, or when there is a lack of locally relevant symbolic resources, the identity formation process requires an additional element: encounters. In the dramaturgical-behavioral perspective promoted by Down and Reveley (2009: 384) identity formation consists of not only narration, but also dramaturgy. The two elements are used simultaneously in order to display and confirm/verify identity. In the identity formation process, voice and silence are strategically used as forms of communication not only to draw upon, select and play with discursive/symbolic resources, but also to adapt to face to face interactions, reactions and to mount credible dramaturgical performances.

Silence and voice as strategic communicative resources employed in the identity formation process can be viewed as rhetorical masks or as political strategies (Creed, 2003: 1507). This shifts the analysis from structure to agency: silence becomes an individual strategic choice.

In the identity formation process, as a rhetorical mask, silence signifies active accomplishment where employees hide more radical voice and action behind a veneer of passivity. As a political strategy, silence signifies complicity and cooptation. Voice may be “complicity when it appears in the form of lip service or instances of politically correct speech and hollow gestures where non-action speaks louder than words” (Creed, 2003: 1507).

Therefore, “the looking glass of others’ reactions” (Burke, 1991: 839, in Down & Reveley, 2009: 385) becomes not only a means to construct, anchor, verify and repair narrative identities, but also a source of anxiety and control. Actors voice only those discursive resources constrained by organization and locale that align not only with their own self narratives, but also with the expectations of relevant others in the workplace (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, in Kuhn, 2006: 1354). The power moves away from discourses towards the haunting and continuous confirmation or disapproval of surrounding others.

“There are good days and bad days...Sometimes I have to shut up and accept what I’m told, sometimes we get along great and they accept me the way I am. Yesterday for example I had to put up a great show only to make them understand that I no longer want to come to work on Saturdays. I’m not their slave. Maybe I want to relax during the weekend and not do any work at all...I’m surprised they have accepted. I’m on guard all the time to see what state they are in, how they woke up this morning so as to know how to behave and what to say” (AN, assistant marketing)

In this sense, Simpson and Lewis (2005: 1254) attack an important issue of identity: gender. Women may be encouraged to voice their differences, opinions and experiences, but they often encounter difficulties being heard: women who speak up in meetings but their ideas are ignored, only to find out that the same ideas get credit later on in the meeting, when voiced by male colleagues; or women who present solutions which

everybody agrees upon, but nobody enacts. Silence is a state of absence and neglect, while to speak up and stand out in the crowd (visibility) is to be seen as different and to be isolated and marginalized from the dominant group. The conclusion is that voice without listening and acting is in fact silence. Without the approval, confirmation and acceptance of the surrounding other, neither voice, nor identity have any value.

8. Identity in context

Identity accounts presuppose interaction. However, any interaction gains value when discussed in context. There is a variety of personal, social and organizational interests that generate a multiplicity of discursive resources available for identity work and regulation (Kuhn, 2006: 1342). These accounts present explanations for past and future activity that guide interactants' interpretations of experience while molding individual and collective action. Although individuals are subject to and progenitors of multiple discourses in social life, identity work should not be expected to reflect a single category of experience, rather, identity work should involve the construction of multiple selves (Gergen, 1991, in Kuhn, 2006: 1345).

There are two main contexts that bare importance to the discussion of identity in relation to voice and silence: the socio-historical context and the cultural context. First, by socio-historical context I understand Ashcraft's (2007: 9) contention that jobs have core features or essences, which span sites, levels and time and which lend themselves to certain fates and particular types of people (e.g. jobs possess features that are regarded as male or female). This essentialist ideology argues that the task content of an occupation is a determinant of their initial sex composition. Only social constructionism can counteract the essentialist ideology by changing discourse and communication from inertial elements, into generative forces (Ashcraft, 2007: 14). It follows that it is not task content, but discursive struggle over the meaning of jobs that is a principal determinant of their initial sex composition.

When people occupy a certain position, they do not automatically start wearing abstract occupational selves, or job identities, because they become involved in a constant negotiation process which brings us back to the agency-structure dialectic. Although actors are confronted with an occupational image, a public discourse of occupational identity manifest in conversational representations of the essence of a job and those who perform it, they must enact the job and make sense of the work they do through micro-practices (communication) thus building a coherent narrative regarding what counts as legitimate work, what tasks matter more and why and "who naturally belongs in particular jobs" (Ashcraft, 2007: 13). It follows that routine role communication suggests the practical limits, tensions, variability and negotiability of image discourse that tilts the balance more towards agency.

Even though identities have histories, and the historical origins of occupations are important, identities are eternally in process, constantly reproduced and altered in dynamic interaction, "an ongoing persuasive endeavor that traverses time and space, macro and micro messages, institutions and actors that manages the dialectic of lived pressures and material circumstances" (Ashcraft, 2007: 15).

The second context of importance to the discussion of identity is the cultural context. On the one hand, there is the view that nowadays discourses and symbolic resources are generalizable across cultures due to globalization, global markets and trade, and increased interaction and communication between cultures. It would imply that, regardless of culture or local surroundings, actors would benefit from the same

discourses and symbolic resources in their attempt to construct, negotiate and make sense of their identity. On the other hand, there is the view that discourses shaping identity construction vary with local cultures. Culturally varying visions of self, temper reflexive modernization's claims about plasticity and generalizability of resources one may appropriate for identity construction (Kuhn, 2006: 1355). Discursive resources are formed and constrained by the Discourses of the locale. The surrounding field provides the cultural meaning system within which both individuals and organizations assert their legitimacy and construct their identities (Kuhn, 2006: 1355).

9. Conclusion: silence, voice and the identity formation process in organizations

I have demonstrated in this article that a “both and” conceptualization of voice and silence, where multiple levels, moments in time and issues are taken into consideration, is much more suited not only for a more complete understanding of the concepts themselves, but also for gaining a deeper insight into other organizational dynamics, such as the identity formation process. Hence, social actors have fragmented, multiple identities where “who we are” is no longer “who we say we are”, but also those parts of the self that are silenced, or are not talked about.

Voice and silence are interrelated and intertwined strategic forms of communication that allow individuals to construct multiple identities depending on the context or moment in time, utilizing both local/organizational and distal/social and cultural discursive and symbolic resources. This opens up the road towards emancipation, while viewing them only in a functionalist paradigm where individuals have a coherent single identity formed only by local/organizational discursive and symbolic resources removes the strategic nature of the identity formation process and leads to a certain determinism which minimizes the possibility of change and transformation.

This is not to say that a functionalist paradigm is not suited to analyze the identity formation process. A functionalist paradigm can yield significant analysis results. However, by employing a multi-paradigmatic approach with social constructivism and postmodernism in the foreground, the analysis of the identity formation process can yield richer results. Thus, the individual is free to construct its single or multiple identity/identities in interaction, depending of the context and moment in time, depending on the reactions of relevant others and by embracing, introducing or changing discursive and symbolic resources from both the organization and the social and cultural surroundings.

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TO SEE THINGS IN ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: FEMINIST INFLUENCE IN EPISTEMOLOGY, A NEW WAY OF REGARDING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Abstract. *In this paper I take into consideration the need for feminist theory in epistemology. I place this article in the theoretical approaches used in Anglo-Saxon space that allows me to emphasize the context in which feminist epistemology appeared and the contributions it had made in this field. To highlight the new directions that feminism brought to epistemology and philosophy of science, I will bring into attention some discussions on androcentrism, epistemic objectivity and neutrality. Standpoint theories -mainly related to general discussion of the work of Sandra Harding and Nancy Hartsock- and the informations that they bring will be presented as an important part in the work, since they have had an impact on epistemology and generated most debates and reactions.*

Keywords: *feminist epistemology, knowledge, adrocentrism, empiricism, standpoint theory*

Background: why a feminist epistemology?

“Women”s chains have Been forged by men, not by anatomy.”
Estelle R. Ramey

In general, most of us are introduced to scientific knowledge through the school textbooks of classes. It is almost accepted as definition that evolution of knowledge depends on new scientific knowledge and that methods of science are the most rational tools that humanity can explore the world with and have a vision as objective about it. Teachers and researchers in science textbooks are the authority that confirms which fact drives knowledge and truth. This authority of scientists is not one that is imposed to others or influence directly the investments or public policies, but rather is a cognitive authority, certifying that the scientific work (seen as a product) is perceived as public knowledge, a way of understanding the world (Addelson Pyne, 2004). These are epistemic questions that can be raised about what knowledge, objectivity, neutrality means. An “epistemology” is a frame or theory that addresses the specificity of creation and generation of social world knowledge, preoccupied in understanding the nature of reality. It is based on three basic questions: “what is knowledge “, “how can we know” and “how can we be sure of what we know” (John Greco, 1999). Such epistemological framework specifies not only **what** you know and **how** you recognize knowledge, but provides

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information about **who** are the “connoisseurs” (knowers) and the means of being one of them, how can you compete on the ideas and knowledge “market”, which are rules that can make you to approve or reject an idea (Stanley Wise, 2002). It may raise -as Elizabeth Potter said in her *Feminist and Philosophy of Science. An Introduction* (2006)- serious questions about the way researchers choose the research questions, the hypotheses, the methods and even how they interpret the datas, if they are influenced by cultural assumptions of their time or if they are really objective, as it is assumed.

Feminist epistemology investigates, questions and brings insights to the way knowledge is produced and what it really means. Most of the time, feminist epistemology is seen as a paradoxal association of concepts (Code, 2000; Longino, 1999) due to the fact that epistemology -in general- tries to keep the knowledge production in a detached, impartial, objective state so that it can become more apolitical. Feminism, by contrast, is motivated by the political value of women’s oppression and tries to find arguments that are more subjective and personal. It is the only section of epistemology that addresses knowledge through gender subjectivism themes (Code, 2000). For feminist epistemology it is important to study the way norms and traditional practices of knowledge affects women’s lives and how it can contribute to the oppression.

Beginning with the 80s, feminist epistemology theories know a powerful ascension. More and more, due to serious debates raised by feminists, the questions involving objectivity and the relevance of traditional theoretical presupposition regarding knowledge and its production, wins multiple extensions on the matter. Till this period, the second wave feminists produced an impressive quantity of datas, facts, statistics about women and their lives, from a political, sociological, economical, historical and cultural point of view. Historically, epistemology is a recent interest on feminist agenda due to the fact that second wave feminists had the (universalistic) conviction that knowledge, by definition, transcends the material, cultural, historical and political specificities and does not take account on the experiential diversity. In addition, there was the risk that such an approach could continue the old stereotypes about women who are seen to be too emotional, too rooted in concrete and everyday life, so they are not able to have an objective or abstract reasoning. Even if “women's issues” came to be discussed (especially in moral philosophy and socio-political) through such alleged specific to women - such as reproduction, sexual harassment, discrimination in the labor market, etc. - epistemology seemed a safe area in which the given self-proclaimed neutrality could transcend the particular and to present things “as they are” and not subject to questioning of this perspective.

In this context, to build a feminist epistemology becomes in the 80s a topic impetuous requirement. It was necessary to allow feminism to be more than a series of theories that collects information that are filtered and understood through concepts, methods, practices that were established by the academic (scientific) male world. In any case, it is less controversial the idea that science is an area where men work and think.

We can not talk about an overview image of women and their lives only by adding new data to a body of knowledge that takes in consideration traditional men's lives and their beliefs (Harding, Hintikka, 2004). Twentieth-century philosophy of science had focused on the efforts to determine the necessity and the sufficient conditions of knowledge in general. This conditions establish a basis to gain an epistemic certainty, but feminists (with other postcolonial philosophers) have challenged the possibility of such gain. To the disapproval of those who consider knowledge as for all and anybody, a territory essentially neutral, feminists deconstruct the so-used “ universal we” and the neutrality on which all this philosophical tradition stood. So, they talk about

androcentrism, the knowledge specifically or typically generated by the interests and the life style of men, as part of the half truth that the science of knowing taught us. This knowledge may be presented in two ways: a) in the content of theories and research and b) in the interest of which are chosen certain words or certain issues (Anderson, 1995: 70). For example, images related to the immune system as a battlefield are such male reflections. Feminist epistemology is committed to expose the androcentrism, especially in social and biological theories. Thus, they call into question concepts of domination and subordination, marginalization and difference, which are uncertain related to epistemic authority, credibility and even trust. Furthermore, they expose the implausibility of "General knowledge" undermining the very ideas that seemed compelling as those of reason, objectivity, neutrality and impartiality (Code, 2007). They have shown that application of neutral theories of knowledge mask hegemonic power relations, privileges, questioning in this sense a history of exclusion and ignorance which made influential, white, christian, educated men, to be the main drivers of knowledge of reason. Therefore, they conclude that epistemology and normative rules generated did not provide an universal perspective, but rather favored experiences and beliefs of the others. These experiences and beliefs have penetrated all philosophies regardless of being epistemological, moral or metaphysical, belonging to a upper-class, educated, white male perspective.

As Elizabeth Anderson called, feminist epistemology is profoundly social (social epistemology) and investigates the influence of gender concepts, rules constructed in society and knowledge production based on interests and experiences of gender specific (Anderson, 1995: 54). This type of epistemology produces theoretical concepts to understand the social dimensions of knowledge and has a special interest in developing normative epistemological perspectives. This perspectives are needed, because on them depends the justificatory demands (normative) that political feminism makes in connection with eliminating oppression of women. It brings forward empirical questions such as those related to how the exclusion history of women in the field of theory has affected the direction and content of the research land (in anthropology, in philosophy, psychology), how the use of gender metaphors in biology has made some phenomena to be more "silent" than others (Potter, 2006), as history, economics or medicine would change if they had been seen in terms of women's lives instead of one only of men, as the feminist movement brought new data has changed the traditional and the differences between women and men.

These empirical approaches are particularly valuable to feminist theorists to make their arguments and examples undeniable by mainstream theorists. More, the empiricist type of arguments produces new information, that, in the process of self-criticism and self-evaluation, may have the ability to practice a reform related to feminist theory (Anderson, 1995).

Approaches in standpoint epistemology

In a simplistic manner, the concept of standpoint represents the idea that our perspective on something (take for example a painting) is influenced by the place where we stand in relation to that thing (for example if we are close to that painting or not). In other words, standpoint feminist theories suggest that understanding our world is strongly linked to where we are positioned as observers or researchers. This basic idea of the importance of social position or place (location) in our research was developed by theorists using arguments related to production, status and research purposes. Liked, this

arguments are in fact related to knowledge as it was known and represented one of the most powerful critique of traditional epistemology (theories knowledge).

In terms of standpoint theories, empiricist feminism -even the rigorous one- can (and does) not have enough capacity to provide radical analysis of the historical material circumstances that produce both subjectivities and knowledge while researching. Therefore, the feminist standpoint build on analyzing the epistemic position of women under patriarchy and economic domination. Just as capitalist ideology subordinate the working class, patriarchal ideology represents the source of subordination of women to men (presented as a natural fact), say the feminists. Therefore, like the historical and material analysis taken from Marxist, feminists analyze the historical and material circumstances of the lives of women. One thing to note is that standpoint feminism should not be confused with “women standpoint” because it is not a good that can “belong” to women only in the virtue of a simple biological fact, but that it is a socio-political knowledge product hired to expose the false assumptions that the patterns of dominance and subordination are constructed. Standpoint epistemological theories deconstruct the “natural” character of patriarchy. As Sandra Harding (1992) argued, standpoint feminist epistemology does not seek to talk about women in general, but to improve the science knowledge and bring contributions to feminist theories. It is what distinguished a woman theory from feminism. This difference minimizes the risk that these theories fall into the traps of relativism (as, for example, may risk the theories enounced by Hartsock). She also argues that objectivity in scientific research is a disappointment, even if the orthodox epistemology raises the value of objectivity, of political neutrality as maximizing points to acquire power over scientific knowledge and to predict phenomena.

“The problem with conventional concept of objectivity is that it's not too rigorous as mentioned, but that is not rigorous enough: too weak to even achieve the purposes for which it was created, without taking into account the difficult projects that feminisms and other new social movements brings them “(Harding, 1992: 438)

Indeed, Harding tries to alert us on what she calls “bad science “, but she lacks the capacity to give arguments and to call which are the safety nets that are able to prevent these theories when male practices and policies “pervert” scientific acuity.

In these standpoint theories, often cited as a key author is Nancy Hartsock who in 1983 published *The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism*. In her view, feminism has not given enough attention to the epistemological consequences that women lives are different in a structural way from those of men. In support of this ideas, she outlines the arguments of Marxist theories that understanding and knowledge are structured by the material dimensions (or economic) of life (she also often uses the so called “standpoint of the proletariat”). She identifies some key points through which standpoint theory states that:

- 1 A material dimension of life influences the knowledge and understanding of our world
- 2 Those groups of people occupying different positions in the materialistic structures will generate different worldviews
- 3 The power of dominant groups shows a hegemonic perspective on knowledge
- 4 All the above suggests that the vision of the oppressed must be brought to light.

As she argues, vital in this process of revealing the vision of world and knowledge of oppressed groups is the systematic analysis of this process. Only in this way it can result the social change and release (Hartsock, 1998: 107). Like Marx, she does not see the group as a given that affirms itself once with the natural birth (such as women), but that acquires its

characteristics and unity through education. In developing the theory, Hartsock focuses on gender division of labor as a basic type of feminist standpoint, arguing that the dual responsibility of women to (re)produce material products and human beings is a structural position that brings the potential to that they can understand “patriarchal institutions and ideologies based on social human relations” (Hartsock, 1998: 107). In simple words, from the position of oppressed groups, women can have the (potential) advantage of acquiring a more complex understanding of social relationships from the simple reason that they are motivated to understand the true nature of exploitation which are subject and to find solutions to stop it. This is a dual vision by which women as an oppressed group 1) are subject to the rules created by men and patriarchal system in power (social, economic, political) gaining in this case an understanding of how they see and judge the world, 2) are subject to understanding their experiences generated by their operating lives, bringing them an epistemic privilege. Therefore, Hartsock, addressing this feminist vision, identifies perspectives on the experiences of women as preferable basis for interpreting social life, whilst emphasizing the liberating potential and the nature of acquiring knowledge that may be winning this type of perspective. This approach, in Sandra Harding theories, is different because she speaks about a privileged feminist positions as oppressed group in the science, not women. But she does not develop the idea and she does not demonstrate that feminists could achieve a better, a more scientifically validated results than those of non-feminist theoreticians.

Standpoint epistemologies (where Nancy Hartsock is just one example), are critically important to the traditional scientific models of knowledge because they provide broad perspective on the social position of an individual. In other words, is a theory which has a deep political commitment to feminists and their common interest related to the lives of women. In terms of Sandra Harding, standpoint theory is a scientific success of knowledge that aims to rebuild the practice and purpose of this sciences. For example, stressing the idea of women as oppressed, standpoint feminist theories seeks to find, as I mentioned above, the androcentric characters of research and knowledge. They provoke such notions that dominated the epistemology like the truth and reality, objectivity, impartiality and values when it comes to knowledge production. They argue (contrary to any conventional scientific methodology) that the social identity of the researcher is important and it is focused on an increased awareness on power relations in the research process. They make a link between research and policies, being forms of research about women and their experiences generating knowledge as opposed to women's experiences built and defined by dominant patriarchal structures.

The approach of these theories expounded by Hartsock, start based on the assumption of universal experience of women's experiences and how they know, thus, creating a kind of homogeneity of these experiences that actually belong to white women, heterosexual, that are part of the middle class. Somehow, her approach abstracts femininity, and this represents a strong criticism, made by different groups of women who have pointed out that there should be more attention on how various oppression can be (race, ethnicity, sexuality, (dis) abilities). Therefore, feminist standpoint theories turned in their development the understanding of this concept as seeing it as a relational phenomenon. For example Ruddick (1989) defines the standpoint as “a vision world top side and dominant modes of thinking” (Ruddick, 1989: 129). She found that the roots of feminist standpoint is similar to how relates a mother with her own child and proposes the concept of “maternal thinking” as opposed to the “maternal instinct”. This type of “maternal thinking” is what builds a vision of the world based on love, caring and altruism (understood as taking care of others), applicable to both women and men. But, also as

Hartsock, Ruddick does not insist into taking into account the cultural aspects of human relations, presenting her central concept of “thinking mother “as a phenomenon that is uniform and ahistorical.

Another common criticism of the feminist epistemologies is that it fails taking into account phenomena such as “internalized oppression”, in which the perspective on knowledge of the groups that are oppressed is distorted by oppressing forces. For example, women who were victims of rape, it is problematic in seeing their experience as considered advantageous and profitable in epistemic terms. Donna Haraway (1988) mentions that standpoint theories in terms of looking at groups marginalized is not without problems. The concept that she highlights, the “situated knowledge” which is relational, rises questions regarding standpoint epistemology, and in the same time offers a way to conceptualize objective knowledge to feminist theories. Building on the work of Haraway, Sandra Harding (1993) tries to move away from the political identity and insists that “Those on the periphery of social activities can provide starting points for thinking, points the relationships between people and the natural world to become visible “(Harding, 1993: 54). She gives as example the case of Hegel who was not a slave or of Marx who was not a proletarian, but both of them were able to understand the complexities and realities of these groups. On the other hand, Spivak (1993) agrees with the idea that there are no settled or constant limits regarding standpoint approaches, but for the political good and political mobilization, is better to pretend (at least some of the theoreticians) that it exists and it is valid. The proposed solution she gives does not intend to move away from essentialist tendencies associated to the concept of standpoint as does Harding, but to accept them as a form of strategic essentialism.

A critical concern regards the valuation of standpoint theories as social achievements, without being providing concrete and explicit discussions about the process that should lead to such achievements (Hennesey, 1993; Welton, 1997). How Hundleby (1997) points out “gaining a point of view (m.n. standpoint) does not mean to find a correct, ideal perspective “(Hundleby, 1997: 37). At the same time, the experience of oppressed not necessarily mean that you have a guarantee of deeper knowledge. Experience it is not a type of knowledge without errors, but it can do to increase the consciousness of oppression, it can develop group consciousness which can then establish a starting point to develop a method of release (Harding, 1993; Hartsock, 1983). Meanwhile, the transition from empirical materiality from women's lives to the discursive materiality from feminism, is wide untheorized (Hennesey, 1993: 67).

A major problem that should give pause to future researcher in the field is resulted by Sandra Hardings concepts on feminist standpoint epistemology: if feminists are marginalized as she says and if she's right about that -that this status confers epistemic privilege- what happens if feminism will achieve goals? For the current situation of standpoint epistemology is justified by the argument that feminists, by virtue of being a political minority, need a special insight on human nature and its processes.

Conclusions

Feminist epistemology is atypical in this area of academic research and even paradoxical, as well as some theoreticians called it. It does not come with answers that have universalist values. From its point of view, the desire to achieve objectivity and neutrality in knowledge is childish. It does not come to talk about abstract concepts, but about reality that women live and perceive differently than men. In my view, I see that this field is still young and not well defined. Therefore it is a new field that develops and

enlightens new subjects continuously. Different forms of feminist epistemology (if they go on the sorting made by Harding: empiric category, standpoint and postmodern) are not complete and had received strong and valid criticism. But that does not mean that they, with their theoretical shortcomings, had not shaken theories of existing traditional epistemic as they were known. It questioned how they were designed, the individuals who were “recipients” of knowledge, the visions of how which tend toward objectivity. It may not have come up with satisfactory answers on this, but their criticism of objectivity, neutrality, the ontology of Cartesian type as we know, is valid.

We can not deny that these epistemologies that are occurring on the chain theories and release ideologies (feminism, environmentalism, animal rights, postcolonialism, etc) would not be credible or would not have a basis to argue the point. They speak of groups that are overlooked in history, politics, society, economy. Discussions on the standpoint theories reflect the particular concerns of gender studies, especially on how to bring to light the inequities and gender inequalities between women and men, yet searching for ways to support these differences and the differences between categories of women. It is clear from my point of view that, as Hartsock mentioned, such feminist standpoint epistemology ultimately produced fertile ground for feminist debates about power, politics and knowledge (Hartsock, 1998: 230).

There are many risks of these feminist epistemologies, including entering into abstract categories as those androcentric theories are. In the same time it is difficult to argue based only on the facts of experience without recognizing the subject or researcher position. Sandra Harding referred to these contradictions and unresolved problems from feminist epistemology as its main source of creativity and challenge, but a philosophy of social science incapable of saying much will not be for too long into attention. On the other hand, feminist epistemology examines the dominant paradigms of knowledge and practices of Western philosophy and science. It seeks to justify itself through a work that exposes, criticizes and corrects the forms of knowledge rooted in the expression of social dominance, rather than having a practical approach to reconciliation or blend of gender and traditional epistemology. This is of course another limit of these theories, but in my view, maybe feminist epistemologies did not gave the right answers, but they certainly had put the right questions.

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ANTHROPOLOGICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE FOREIGN RURAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL “LEADER” IN ROMANIA

*Ileana SĂDEAN**

Abstract. *Like an anthropologist I had the feeling that I was considered an obstacle, an enemy of the individuals who effectively aimed the change and “welfare” of the rural microregion. This article is designed to contribute to the legitimacy increase of the anthropologist involved in the rural development. It is very important to understand that the focus is not a critical spirit of the anthropologist, but a different vision on change and development following his different training in terms of the development. The active role of the anthropology is represented by these actual “criticisms”. In conclusion, the article demonstrates the necessity of an anthropological approach of the human being aspects of rural development too, the anthropologist can be able to facilitate “the translation” between community and development actors, the most frequently from the direction of the speech full of symbols of the identities to the “scientific” speech, often based on economic concepts, thus emphasizing the interdisciplinary character of the rural development process.*

Keywords: *anthropology, rural development, Leader program, popular culture*

In Romania, anthropology has a character of novelty, of something abstract, theoretical and is, in this case, outstripped by any expression or concept containing terms that suggest dynamism, such as: development agent, social entrepreneur, community facilitator, hereinafter referred to as “developers”.

Anthropology is a self-sufficient discipline; it cannot be dictated (solely) by the needs of the market. Through this kind of perspective one can fall into the trap of economic reductionism. As a self-sufficient discipline, it can afford itself to formulate certain criticism towards community development. This would be the actual “active” role of the anthropologist in the rural development. “The anthropologist’s risk through his involvement in the rural development is to become an outcast of this space. It is a risk which the anthropologist has to take if he wants to remain an anthropologist. Modernization, as any other ideology, has its “rebels”. Whoever shapes himself as an anthropologist will inevitably be aware of such risk.”¹

“In the situations where the development agent acts convinced of its good intentions and of the best ideological solution for the community welfare, the

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¹ <http://www.scribte.com/istorie/ANTROPOLOGUL-AGENT-DE-DEZVOLTA223710228.php> (accessed July 25, 2012)

anthropologist reveals another attitude towards the changes. His “susceptibility” towards the “utility” of the change, towards using the power in order to fulfill the change, towards “improvement” is well known.”² In the evolutionary anthropology there is Rommer’s law, which states that the biological organisms change and adapt themselves, not in order to benefit from new opportunities, but to preserve their life characteristics when faced with certain outer changes.

We intend to treat the Leader rural development model as a human reality in which the man is the heart of things. “A social reality cannot be truly studied if regarded only in its material data, beyond the man.” (Bernea, 1944: 14) Non-reimbursable financing nuances, more than the very philosophy of Leader with all its principles, the vision upon development and welfare. More than an economic mechanism, than a whole series of bureaucratic regulations and financial flows, it reveals ways of thought and action, as well as the most intimate identity traits of rural communities. The Leader model responds more to the “shape”, to those concrete, quantitative aspects, related to the delimitation of the territory, the number of inhabitants, the public-private structure.

It is applied to a small territory, assumingly homogenous, socially cohesive, often characterized by common traditions, local identity, sense of belonging etc. If these elements are obvious, quantifiable and respected as such, because they represent eligibility criteria, it is not specified the type of compatible organisational culture and the team capable of understanding and using in an unaltered manner the principles of the Leader model.

It does not refer, unlike other more traditional measures of rural policy at “what” to do, but shows “how” to proceed. “Seven key features summarise the Leader approach. They are described here separately, but it is important to consider them as a tool-kit. Each feature complements and interacts positively with the others throughout the whole implementation process, with lasting effects on the dynamics of rural areas and their capacity to solve their own problems.”³

We are asking ourselves further whether somehow the phenomenon of non-reimbursable funding is the one with a stronger impact on the dynamics of the identity of the rural areas, on the behaviors and attitudes toward solving problems, establishing real needs etc. Not the “philosophy” of the Leader model, which hides the traps of the development, comes to be interiorized by the rural communities, but the very way to “resolve their problems”, to improve their lives by getting “non-reimbursable” funding will succeed in changing their vision on development and overthrowing rural cultural values.

One of the traps of development is economic reductionism and neglect of its social impact. “Economic welfare is seen as a panacea, a universal remedy for all human and social evils, fact upon which not all development discourses agree.”⁴ When trying to satisfy their economic, social or cultural needs, the rural communities still depend upon a decision-making group holding resources. Hence, through rural animation, comprising the whole specter of strategies and mobilization methods of the human resources available at a community’s level, the animator should not just identify potential beneficiaries of funding that correspond to the quantitative criteria of the development plans (no. of projects, project categories etc.). This would mean that all efforts focus solely on meeting the indicators related to the absorption of the Leader funds and on the strict compliance

² Ibidem


³ http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/leaderplus/pdf/library/methodology/leader_approach_ro.pdf (accessed August 5, 2012)

⁴ <http://www.scribte.com/istorie/ANTROPOLOGUL-AGENT-DE-DEZVOLTA223710228.php> (accessed August 2, 2012)

with the development strategy. In this situation human being disappears from the whole scheme. Projects should not be done for the sake of attracting funds, but for meeting the real needs of the citizens of the micro region.

On the one hand, the analysis of implementation of the Leader rural development model shows us the LAG’s type of organisational culture and the connection between the vision of the LAG⁵’s manager and the vision on the concept of development; on the other hand, the analysis of the functioning of the phenomenon of non-reimbursable funding presents us the *man*, regardless of ethnicity.

Another trap in which the developers fall is *participation*, namely that the negative social impact of development might diminish through the “participation” of the community in programmes for development and change. In this case we have to consider that participation is based on homogenous communities, which contradicts the fact that people have different opinions, values and needs. “We can ask ourselves if increased participation in local planning will lead to consensus or to conflicts between those with different perceptions and interests, the diversity of opinions being recognized”⁶. From this perspective, it is not sure that increased participation or “collaborative planning” is likely to provide better policies or planning decisions.




⁵ Local Action Group – public-private partnership - which represents the second principle of the Leader model for rural development

⁶ <http://www.scribte.com/istorie/ANTROPOLOGUL-AGENT-DE-DEZVOLTA223710228.php> (accessed August 2, 2012)

The most relevant variable aspects that interact in the context of applying the Leader model (see diagram below) are the group's culture (LAG), the target communities and the identity culture. "Starting with the writings of the new-institutionalists, there are authors who stress the importance of cultural factors on economic performance. For instance, Fudulu (2007: 77) considers that the level of economic performance chosen by a community is signaled by the level of wealth chosen by that community's representative individual. Thus, a greater level of wealth is compatible with a more pronounced dynamics of the economic performance. But, since cultural preferences for wealth, respectively for power, differ from one society to another, we can conclude that not all collectivities are geared towards the accumulation of material wealth. Furthermore, changing the institutional arrangement in a society, it has to start before all, from predominant cultural preferences."⁷

Analysed separately, the (Leader) development model and the implementation (LAG, management through projects, grants), without the interaction with the management team of the LAG, with the community and its culture, remain some theoretical models which produce no effects and have a marginal utility for anthropology. "The question of whether human thought gets to objective truth is not a theoretical problem, but a practical one. In practice, man must prove the truth, that is the strength and real, untranscendent character of his thought. The controversy around the reality or non-reality of a thought that breaks itself from practice is a purely *scholastic* matter."⁸



Source: LEADER Magazin

⁷ <http://ecol.ro/carte/libertate-economica-si-proprietate-implicatii-privind-reforme-institutionale-din-romania-si-4> (accessed August 1, 2012)

⁸ http://www.marxists.org/romana/m-e/desc/Marx_Teze_despre_Feuerbach.doc (accessed July 25, 2012)

Leader is recognized as an innovative approach within the EU rural development policy and stands for “Links between actions of rural development”⁹

In the EU it was launched in 1991 as a rural development model and became meanwhile a funding axis. It has gone through a natural ageing process, having had three generations, as follows: Leader I (1991-1993), Leader II (1994-99) and Leader + (2000-2006). The Leader model has not targeted Romania in all of these three periods of experimentation, generalization and thoroughness, so as to take into account the particularities of the Romanian rural.

In Romania, the institutional construction of the Leader began only in 2006, and the functioning of the LAG, the implementation of the development strategies in 2012. The Leader model was adopted as an imposed requirement for Romania’s accession and alignment with the other Member States of the European Union, as regards rural development. Since 2007, the Leader is included in national and regional programmes for rural development (NPRD) supported by the EU, alongside other rural development axes.

In Romania, the National Programme for Rural Development - PNDR - is conceived on four axes, the Axis IV LEADER being a horizontal one, i.e. projects on Leader can access measures within all four axes.


The vision of the Leader model upon rural development is the improvement of the quality of rural life, based on a series of specialized concepts and principles of implementation, constituting itself in an archetypal model.

Leader supports the **improvement of the quality of rural life**, but it does not define in what the quality of life, its improvement and necessity consist of. It establishes however “how it should be done” through respecting the seven principles. In what consists the quality of life and “what” are the LAGs doing for its improvement? At a theoretical level, we find in the NRDP stated about the Leader programme that:

- “Through its specific actions will lead to the improvement of local governance and to the promotion of the endogenous potential of the territories.
- Through the consolidation of the territorial coherence and the implementation of integrated actions will lead to the diversification and development of the rural economy, for the benefit of the communities.
- Through the institutional construction, in view of developing and implementing integrated strategies, will give the rural actors, representatives of different fields of activity, the possibility to work together and interact for the benefit of the local communities. The strategies drafted and selected will be materialized into projects to be implemented in the LAG’s area of coverage, projects that will be financially supported by public funds to which is to be added private co-financing.
- Because of the horizontal character of the Leader 4 Axis, which assumes accessing more measures within the EFARD axes, the impact of the actions implemented through this approach is very high and it covers a wide range of actions and beneficiaries.
- It can play an important role in stimulating new and innovative approaches for the development of rural areas. Innovation will be encouraged through flexibility and freedom in decision making regarding the actions to be put into practice. Innovation in rural areas can imply the transfer and adaptation of the generated innovation elsewhere, the modernization of the traditional know-how forms or discovering new solutions to persistent rural problems that political instruments have not managed to solve in a durable and satisfying way. These can provide new answers to the problems of the rural areas.

⁹ Liaison entre actions de développement de l’économie rurale

• Through cooperation with other territories included in the rural development strategies will facilitate the transfer and adaptation of the innovations developed elsewhere.”¹⁰



Source: NPRD

Far from making alone the “rules of the game”, we need to give special attention to the LAG, because it is in the closest vicinity of the “man”, i.e. of the rural communities “subject to development”.

A whole series of administrative or development processes in the sphere of rural development are reglemented by laws, rules or procedures. There is a hierarchy of the formal norms, starting at european level, then national, regional, on one hand, but also rules and norms drawn up at local level, that of the LAGs.

Unlike all supra-structures involved in rural development, the LAGs has the highest power of modeling the concept of local development and can opt for organic development, starting from the very base of the problems, thus the “substance” being the one that determines the “form”.

The specific traits that differentiate it from the other institutions, in that which concerns the impact at community level, are described through the reality that:

¹⁰ http://leader-romania.ro/index.php?pag=leader_pndr (accessed July 28, 2012)

- It represents the only institution, seen as a rule of the game, that has the liberty to decide on the causal link between form and substance, between norms, actions, laws and the development needs of the rural community from the Leader territory which it manages.

- It is the one that, at the same time, makes a difference regarding the implementation of the Leader model, especially through the organisational culture and through the animation. The other institutions only intervene regarding the form, in the implementation stage.

The GAL, especially through rural animators, is present in the middle of the “Leader territory” and, in this case, has access to qualitative knowledge and can increase the “motivation for achievement” of the communities, and we can say it is equivalent to the “responsible group” seen by McClelland. “The axial idea of McClelland is that modernization and development become comprehensible through the agent capable of triggering and maintaining them. Which is the responsible group for economic upgrading? In McClelland’s view, it consists of local entrepreneurs, not of politicians or western counselors. Consequently, the political class has to invest in the human factor/being, not only in economic infrastructures. In a more general analysis framework he used, for projective testing, folk songs, humor books, poems, children’s stories, used in public manuals and encoded the degree of incidence of those elements through which the very “need for achievement” is expressed in the content of each of the narratives analyzed. The axial idea was that popular literature, popular stories “are reflections of a nation’s popular spirit”, otherwise they wouldn’t have become popular stories (reflections of the minds of the people forming a nation). After he collected information about the “achievement motivation”, McClelland raised the question: “to what extent does the achievement motivation correlates with economic development?” and he discovered a tight correlation in the comparative analysis on nations, identifying a systematic association between the achievement motivation curve and the development curve. (In the USA, in 1950, and in the USSR, in the same period, the score was about the same, with the difference that USA was declining and USSR was growing). The source of this motivation must be sought in the family, meaning in the parental socialization. This requires the parent to apply “high achievement standards for their children, expressible in expectations of excellence in their children’s education, in obtaining good professions and so on, to encourage children, show them affection and give them reward, not to be authoritarian, to let their children develop their own initiatives, not to do too much for them” (Bădescu, 2011: 14-15)

McClelland’s *Development Agents Theory* targets a natural causal link between form and substance. When you introduce foreign bodies, western institutions, incompatible with the understanding and the meaning of the indigenous culture, “instead of removing the negative effects of the old, it emphasizes them even more and, at the same time, give birth to new phenomena with disastrous consequences in the people’s life.”¹¹

Accepting that in the Western Europe states, where the Leader model was initiated and has been adjusted progressively for more than 20 years and has led to a western type of rural environment that Eastern Europe is continuously trying to emulate, Romanians are hoping that by applying the Leader formula a similar type of rural environment will result. “Facing modernization in Romania benefits from a historical experience of 250 years. The result of the experience of modernization (that has had intellectuals as promoters, some of which now provide faint critics) is nothing but the inoculation of a platonic mentality: the prototype, the truth lays elsewhere and has to be

¹¹ http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formele_f%C4%83r%C4%83_fond#cite_note-3 (accessed August 5, 2012)

mimicked. Or, another alternative, travelling towards the lair of truth. The hypothesis of “here and now”, that could be translated by “within us, through us and for us”, is excluded. Following such observations, anthropology must take into consideration attitudes that gain prevalence with such peoples: replacing ethnocentrism by its opposite. Not “us with our values”, but “them with their values”.¹²

“Forms without substance are the embodiment of both the inversed causal ratio and the lack of unity between superstructure and foundation.” (Schifirneț, 2007: 196)

By studying state policies that have targeted the Romanian rural life since the post-war years and up until now we can start comprehending the mark that the past has left upon the material inventory, the mindset and the collective behavior from nowadays rural environment. “By entering their mind, unimagined twaddle can be found. They do not realize at all that nothing belongs to them, that everything belongs to the historical formation that has given birth to them: the way they work, their clothes, their movement, the way they smile, their beliefs and thoughts. They are the embodied force of inertia especially because they live the illusion that they, themselves, there are nothing in themselves.” (Czeslaw, 2008: 30)

I have chosen the post-war period mainly because of its organic link with the present, because the effects of the decisions and changes that have taken place 60 years ago still persist today. Thus, we already have an outline for what “substance” means in implementing the Leader rural development program, which is the “form”. There are people who lived then and still live today, but transformed by these imposed measures. “Only by uprooting that which he has irreversibly covered will he become free.... deep inside him the old moral and ethical standards continue to exist and so, duplication is born. This schism is the cause of many difficulties in everyday life.” (Czeslaw, 2008: 38, 41) We have to understand “irrational inertia”, prejudice and their past in order to relinquish their duplication and to thoroughly respect “free consent” when we aim to improve the life of rural communities. “Usually, man is inclined to believe the order in which he lives to be *natural*” (Czeslaw, 2008: 45)

According to Ernest Bernea, the Romanian state has often been unable to respond to the needs of rural life; moreover, the judicial form of modern Romania has disregarded the village. The due point of view that would help us understand things properly is the one that would place us at the center of its world, underlying its values. Thus, we will notice that the Romanian rural civilization, contrary to what is postulated in a tabloid mass-media, is European, international really; an ancient civilization, original, born at the same time as the Romanian people and fully accomplished. In this regard, the Romanian peasant, according to Liviu Rebreanu, is our “ancestor, all of ours” and, if we would please, we would have a lot of extremely useful things to learn that would apply to our restless lives, too tense, hardly connected to the “timelessness of the village”, that our philosopher-poet Lucian Blaga reminds of.

The main mechanism for implementing Leader type development plans is the grant. The policies for providing the grant, the assigned amounts and the other regulations at European level, national concerning the flow and the route of the funds up to the LAGs, targets the superstructures and the institutions outside the micro regions, but the administration and the allocation of funds to the final beneficiaries belongs to the LAGs.

¹² <http://www.scritube.com/istorie/ANTROPOLOGUL-AGENT-DE-DEZVOLTA223710228.php> (accessed August 2, 2012)

The financing of the Leader axis will be made from the total amount granted to each EU member state, in accordance with the new European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (FEADR), in order to support rural development. “The actual financial resources are accompanied by a whole specific methodology that has to be followed in the process of grant funding and through which social philosophy elements wish to be implemented.”¹³ The manner in which the funds are managed in order to achieve the development strategy in each micro-region represents a variable and depends on the management and on the culture of the LAG. Together they generate an impact at community and cultural dynamics level and define, in a specific manner, rural development.

However, the relative non-reimbursable character has to be questioned. And we refer to European funds. Given that their degree of absorption in Romania does not exceed 15% of the approximately 20 billion Euro assigned from the EU budget for the 2007 – 2013 programmed period, and Romania’s contribution is of about 7 billion Euro, how non-refundable are these funds? These issues, though, do not represent the subject of the current paper. We shall stop upon the representation of the non-reimbursable financing in the Romanian culture and upon the socio-cultural impact over the rural community, which is rarely taken into consideration by the development actors.

The grant is a modern concept for the Romanian rural and is seen, basically, as proof of the solidarity between EU member states. “The alternative speeches on development are a field in which the anthropologist can feel at home. According to the interests of the parties at stake, alternative discourses appear, that are sometimes incompatible. The anthropologist may observe that their incompatibility results from different metaphors and understandings of development. The anthropologist’s task would be to facilitate the translation of one in the terms of the other (the direction of translation is usually from the “emotional” speech, containing identity symbols to the “scientific” discourse, often based on economic grounds).”¹⁴

The renowned sociologist, Henri H. Stahl, warns us about the damaging mimicry constantly practiced by Romanians: by continuously borrowing from others, we have produced “the overthrow of the old roles of our households. However, we have ourselves abandoned those roles, without noticing that, here as well, in our old traditions, were urges and good paths to follow”. Thus, in order to explain the mechanism through which non-reimbursable financing operates, we can call on more familiar concepts in the rural area, such as “gift” or “loan”. Their analysis from a cultural and religious point of view gives nuances to the understanding of what development through non-reimbursable financing projects means and of what “social philosophy” means.

To the question “Why certain institutions or NGOs award grants”, the answer from the guide that offers reference information in this domain is that today, “non-reimbursable funding is destined to support activities – important for certain segments of society or for the overall development of the economic and social organism – from domains for which, due to the short term situation, there are currently not enough accessible financial resources or from domains which traditionally need greater financial resources than available (for example, activities with social character). Most funds of this kind are granted to Romania by other states or international institutions.”

¹³ <http://www.finantare.ro/ghid-introductiv-finantari-nerambursabile#13> (accessed July 27, 2012)

¹⁴ <http://www.scribube.com/istorie/ANTROPOLOGUL-AGENT-DE-DEZVOLTA223710228.php> (accessed July 28, 2012)

Non-reimbursable financing calls for the same type of questions we have when talking about a loan, respectively: who provides, who requests, who it is provided to, does it answer to real needs?

“Apparently limiting, the religious perspective proves itself, in the end, as an unimpeded path of analysis and understanding of the popular culture phenomenon, both overall and in the details of its manifestation.”(Papadima, 2009: 6, 7) The Romanian archaic culture is the result of its structural synthesis with Christianity, especially with orthodoxy. In the Romanian folklore this fusion of the Christian view with the ethnos was very profound. For this reason we chose to report to the universal inheritance, where we find answers to the questions mentioned above, as well as authentic life models which can be updated in the present. The patristic writing if the saints provide us with many references to “giving”, “lending”, “helping”, “charity” and so on.

About the ones who lend, the ones who take and the ones to whom it is given:

Saint John Chrysostom underlined that “he who has money will never lend the poor without receiving reassurance that his money will be given back. Thus, he does not care about his fellow man, but is interested only in the gains. The poor can’t guarantee with land or anything else, because he has nothing; he cannot find anyone to guarantee for him because no one trusts him.”¹⁵

The LAGs are confronted with serious financial blockage caused by not receiving the advance in order to start functioning, this generation negative chain reactions.

“We will not be given money in advance, but we are being asked for guaranteed and papers of all sorts. They are monitoring or apportioning our money. The partners have expectations, but not contributions and even if they would exist, they would be unsatisfactory.”(LAG representative)

“But who takes a loan? He who needs it or he who wants to multiply his fortune? It would be natural that, he who has the necessary would not ask for a loan in order to live in luxury and that what is lent to the poor would not be expected back. It is hard to establish which are the real benefits of non-reimbursable financing for the community as a whole.

“In the conceptual arsenal of the western ideology on development is included the “marketing” of the community development. The “facilitator’s” role is to discover the problems and needs of the community and to mobilize the community for becoming aware of them (“awakening of consciences”) and solving them. The anthropologist may ask himself: are these needs and problems real or are they “brought” along with all the occidental imaginary? If they are “brought” it means that the needs of the community are simply instilled. The process is parallel to the advertising discourse which aims not at satisfying a need, but at instilling it. Once becoming aware of the problems and needs, any attitude of criticism regarding their fulfillment becomes an act of heresy. From that moment on, the community becomes “condemned to happiness”. The pro-development attitude is additionally supported by the orientation of the official policy, whose “strategic line” typically has precedence over local development solutions. It leaves almost no possibility for people to reject development altogether. 27. Development *per se* is always assumed, the community “condemned to development”.

Because this only covers part of the total budget of the project, the potential beneficiary has to financially support at least part of the project through his own contribution. Thus, it is obvious that he can’t be “the poor person” who is missing the

¹⁵ <http://www.ioanguradeaur.ro/736/milostenia/> (accessed August 7, 2012)

essentials, but someone who maybe wants to achieve a dream by leaping over some steps in his personal development. And then, who does development concern ?

Eminescu wrote: "Who imagines, being able to progress through leaps does nothing but go back", *Non datur saltus in natura*. The middle solution was considered as ideal: "The real progress cannot be achieved but through preserving on the one hand, adding on the other"; and the whole process had a global aspect of organic development, only in accordance with - what we would call today - "the logic of the living": "To artificially age a child, to seed plants with no roots in order to have a garden ready in two hours is not progress, but devastation".¹⁶ In that respect, from a religious perspective, we are prevented: Do not go to foreign doors! "The foreign fountain is indeed tight." It is better to ease your needs slowly, with thoughtful thoughts, than to get rid of them at once with foreign money and then lose all your wealth. If you have what to pay with, why don't you seek to get rid of the difficulties you have now with that money? And if you cannot pay, then you are only curing a bad with another bad.

Preoccupied by the relation between the individual and the community, Mauss brings into discussion the ratio between interest, "the individual search for the useful" and disinterest, between the utilitarian calculation of a *homo oeconomicus* and the *useless and irrational expense of the pure gift*.

The concepts used by him – freedom and obligation, waste, interest, utility -, best express Mauss' conception regarding morale and the economy of the "total social fact": the gift. His message is still current and refers to the existence of solidarity between people, which is based on the ethics of the exchange of gifts and which, in his opinion, constitutes "the oldest economical and juridical order we know".

In order to obtain financing, the LAGs have mentioned in the development strategies that they have financial supporting capacity (they have received points for ensuring this condition, "*The capacity to implement the strategy, in terms of financial resources*").

More than half a year after the contract through which they were engaged to implement the strategy was signed, the LAGs, not possessing sufficient domestic financial resources and because of not being provided the advance are making serious efforts in order to avoid the termination of the contract. This would mean that, the LAG team, in turn, will not get back what they have "lent". We reach the conclusion that "it is better to receive no education, than to receive a bad one." (Mairescu, 1978: 153) The LAGs answer the question "how" if we study the implementation module of the Leader model and the question "who" if we analyze the vision upon the local development strategy and the influence upon the community.

The consistent resources used in the preparation stage of the Leader program, along with developing community awareness about its necessity and benefits do not justify the blockage that arose at the beginning of the implementation.

Saint Basil the Great: About loans: "When the one borrowing takes the money, he is at first bright and cheerful; he is enjoying a foreign flower, wishes to show that his life has changed: rich table, luxurious clothes; the servants also have a different look, they are more cheerful; then come the flatterers, the guests, the countless parasites of the home. But as soon as money begins to run out and time, with its passing, adds interest, nights no longer bring him rest, his days are no longer cheerful, the sun does not enchant him anymore, but bitters his life. "Drink water from your own pots", says the Bible; ie: explore

¹⁶ <http://www.scribube.com/istorie/Utopia-lui-Eminescu16312101022.php> (accessed August 8, 2012)

your own powers, do not go to foreign springs, but gather from your orchards, the ones that shall make your life easier! Search to give everything, but freedom.”¹⁷

Conclusions

The Leader approach can be analysed both as “form” and as “substance”, but at different levels.

The Leader model responds to the “form” if we relate to the vision on development, which means the “substance”. It represents something finite, a set of concrete qualitative and quantitative aspects connected to innovation, networks and cooperation, multisectorial actions, territorial delimitation, number of inhabitants, public-private structure etc., compared to the infinitude of the development and to the evolution of the communities. On the other hand, the Leader model represents the “substance” if we relate to the LAG’s organisational culture.

These two questions are essential: “what” should be done and “how” should it be done? For answering the “how” question we have the Leader model as a response, but the way in which it is respected into practice by the LAGs remains to be seen. The three coordinates are interdependent: the strategy, the Leader model and the organisational culture; the first and the last are variables, and the Leader model is the constant.

A logical undertaking follows, namely to analyse with which type of organisational culture is the Leader model compatible, starting from its principles and from Hofstede’s approach criteria, and to observe which are the sources of resistance in the situations in which the Leader approach is not efficiently applied. We are trying to find the correspondence between the fundamental characteristics of the Leader method and those of the organizational culture. For the success of the implementation, it is necessary to translate in the plan of the Romanian national values and then in the plan of the organizational culture the seven key features, specifically:

1. Area-based local development strategies
2. Bottom-up elaboration and implementation of strategies
3. Public-private partnerships: local action groups (LAG)
4. Innovation facilitation
5. Integrated and multisectorial actions
6. Networking
7. Cooperation

Besides the anthropological research on the aspects of the development we will use the “Study on the Romanian values and behaviour from the perspective of cultural dimensions applying Geert Hofstede’s method”, carried out by Interact in partnership with Gallup Romania, published in 2005¹⁸, which proves that Romania has values such as: **“a high power distance, a high degree of collectivism, a feminine culture, with a high uncertainty avoidance and a short-term orientation”**¹⁹, which support neither one of the Leader principles considered separately, nor all of them considered as a whole.

“At national level, cultures differentiate themselves through values and less through practices. At organisational level, the cultural differences consist more of practices and less of values. It has also been observed a level of occupational culture

¹⁷ <http://www.strajerul.ro/ro/parintii-bisericii.html> (accessed August 10, 2012)

¹⁸ Interact newsletter, nr. 11/martie 2005

¹⁹ <http://www.training.ro/docs/studiu2.pdf> (accessed July 13, 2012)

somewhere at half the distance between nation and organisation."²⁰ At an individual level it is possible that the influence of the national, respectively the organisational culture are completely faint and there are no differences related to the individual's living place, rather everything is reduced at universally accepted human values and behaviours. What type of organisational culture should we build for the LAG?

A hypothesis emerged during the research, using the constructivist methodological paradigm is that the "correct" application of the Leader principles, using an integrative approach, renders a LAG with a compatible organisational culture capable of generating a multiplying effect on rural development without the need for additional financial resources.

In addition, regardless of the values of the national culture, the selection based on the competitiveness, lucidity and morality of the manager and of the animators involved in the implementation of the development strategy, using Leader method, are capable of eliminating the situation in which, as Eminescu stated, "not something essential, not the improvement of quality was the target of the Romanian civilization, but maintaining all of the old shortcomings, dressed in costly reforms and entirely in disproportion with the production power of the people and with its intellectual culture". (Eminescu, 1980-1989: 18).

The construction of the organisational culture model compatible with the Leader "philosophy" and then the finding of the sources of resistance to it represent the next important stages of the research.

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²⁰ <http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/StiinteCOM/planif/4.htm> (accessed August 3, 2012)

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II. EDUCATION AND COMMUNICATION

Ioana CIUCANU ⇔ *Making Diversity Work in European Higher Education the Interplay Between Performance and Diversification*

Mirela VLĂSCEANU ⇔ *Impact of Quality-Based Funding in Romanian Higher Education: 1999-2010*

Andra-Maria ROESCU ⇔ *Studying Causal Inference in Political Science. The Case of Experiments*

Paul Aparaschivei ⇔ *Political Communication in Romania from a New Perspective: the Online Voter*

Andreea Elena CÂRSTEA ⇔ *Mass Media and the Reconfiguration of the Public Sphere*

MAKING DIVERSITY WORK IN EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND DIVERSIFICATION

*Ioana CIUCANU**

Abstract. *The past few decades have been marked by consistent structural changes of modes of governance in the public sector including higher education. Causes for these shifts are multiple pertaining to specific processes like massification, the rise of the “Evaluative State” with quality and performance as core elements of public delivery, and the concept of knowledge society outlining both economic and social dimensions of education. Taking into account this whole new dynamic, the paper addresses the relationship between diversity and performance in higher education by analyzing the outcomes of their interplay in terms of funding policy strategies employed both at European and national level. Accordingly, I argue that financing policies may be seen as a tool for fostering diversification of higher education systems.*

Keywords: *governance, ranking, financing policy, Bologna Process, knowledge society, homogeneity*

Introduction

In the past two decades, diversity and performance have gained priority both in global and European context due to major changes taking place in the field of higher education, changes that shifted traditional roles and activities of universities from an elitist approach to public concerns for equal access and socio-economic responsiveness. The emergence of the knowledge society, demographic developments, economic growth and increased competitive pressures for globalization have stimulated an array of reforms to contemporary higher education systems which have resulted in a strong international science policy trend emphasizing the research performance of universities Dobbins (2011).

Moreover, the OECD publication of “Universities under Scrutiny” (1987) was among the first official points of view on the changing role of higher education and questioned “the very purposes and functions in post-industrialized societies”.

Regarding this global and regional dynamic, policy proposals sketched by the OECD referred to coupling university’s self-definition with external expectations by designing policies that would promote greater vocationalism and a sense of “appliedness” (Peters 2004), as well as a greater focus on efficiency, performance and accountability. Nevertheless, higher education, and more specifically research are seen as the major pillars upon which the future European knowledge society and economy is being built, their significant role being emphasized by the European Commission in the Lisbon strategy. In

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this light, diversity and performance have become core themes in both international and European debates concerning management and governance of higher education systems. First, issues of performance and performance assessment have been raised in the broader context of what Guy Neave (1998) described as the “Evaluative State”, collocation which refers to policies designed within the paradigm of public management aiming at quality evaluation of public activities, performance management strategies imposed on public organizations, and assessment tools for measuring outputs and outcomes.

For instance, New Public Management ideas, such as disaggregation, competition and incentive-driven policies (Dunleavy et al. 2005) have been implemented since 1980s on an international scale.

As such, the paper aims at analyzing the dynamics imposed by the interplay between diversity, and processes of diversification and/or homogenization, and performance both at European and national level. In developing the topic, I first outline the main changes occurred in the field of higher education regarding the roles of universities in the context of a knowledge society in the past five decades. Then, I focus on highlighting the reasons for bringing up diversity as a key issue on European and national agendas and relating it to performance-driven policies, as well as analyzing the ways in which they influence each other across European countries in general, and in Romania, in particular.

1. European higher education and the knowledge society

1.1. Between the Old and the New Paradigm

In his article on Karl Jaspers’ “Renewal of the University”,

Jürgen Habermas (1987) tackles the phenomenon of expansion that has evolved after World War II in higher education, which led Talcott Parsons to speak of an “educational revolution”, thus affecting and changing both nature and structure of higher education systems. Since then, there has been a growing demand to widen access to higher education, which was bound to change the elitist nature of universities (Rosenblit et al, 2007: 373).

The phenomenon of massification in education, in general, and in higher education, in particular, which began to take place after the 1950’s, called for a reanalysis and reassessment of the role of education in a post-industrial society. As thus, the OECD publication of “Universities under Scrutiny” (1987) was the first official point of view regarding the changing role of higher education and it came to question “universities’ purposes and functions in post-industrialized societies”. Policy proposals sketched by the OECD referred to coupling university’s self-definition with external expectations by designing policies that would promote greater “vocationalism” and a sense of “appliedness” (Peters, 2004: 68), as well as a greater focus on efficiency, productivity and accountability. However, the massification of higher education within OECD countries also involved rethinking new funding models apart from those delivered by the state. In this sense, funding becomes the new key variable in dealing with higher education policies. Starting with the 80’s, in higher education spectrum a change of paradigm in terms of what universities are supposed to be and to offer in the larger context of a knowledge-based society has been taking place. In this new context, universities are expected to adapt faster than before to maintain their leading role in contributing to societal progress (Rinne and Koivula, 2009: 186).

On the one hand, higher education is being considered to be socially valuable through matching its production of knowledge and innovation to the social and economic

needs given in a certain national, regional or international context. In this certain case, knowledge turns into a commodity and its transfer into the society the most important universities' feature, or as Peters stressed it (2004: 73), knowledge is now valued for its strict utility rather than as an end in itself or for its enlightenment effects. The notion of "problem solving research" (Gibbons et al., 1994) gives account of thinking of scientific research as a central element in the "new production of knowledge", as well as an account for the third mission attached to universities, apart from its classical features of teaching and learning, which is intimately connected to research activities and to its purposes (Laredo, 2007: 445).

Furthermore, Laredo contends that universities do not structure themselves along the three missions, but that they articulate them differently depending on the functions they fulfil; that is mass tertiary education with BA degree as a central feature, professional specialized higher education and research with MA as a feature and "problem solving research" as central activity, and academic training and research at doctoral level (2007: 452). Thus, this approach offers the lens through which to look at the ways universities articulate with their environments.

The roots of this approach are diverse and they relate to the broader process of R&D policies establishment after World War II. These types of policies entitled universities with the creation and distribution of new knowledge, that is innovation, but bearing in mind social and economic perspectives (2007).

1.2. Defining new roles within the knowledge society

As an intellectual device, the knowledge society aims to describe a new situation in which information and knowledge production are the defining features of relationships within and among societies, organisations, industrial production and human lives (Välilä, Hoffman, 2008: 269). Hereinafter, in the past thirty years, the concept of governance in the field of education, and mainly in higher education, has suffered structural changes with the redefinition of the roles of the state and universities in designing education policy strategies. Several researchers have been discussing even about a "hollowing out" of the nation state and the emergence of network governance mode of public management (Bleiklie and Kogan, 2007; Enders, 2004; Neave, 2000) with functions moving from the nation state upwards to European Union level (Ferlie et al., 2008).

In developing this topic, Guy Neave (2000: 25) argues that this change of paradigm which characterizes the field of higher education and which has been undergoing for the last decades has marked the transition from "comprehensive" to "specialized" university. That is, the vision of university having a full range of faculties has shifted to a narrower one which encourages institutions to get specialized, thus restricting the range of disciplines, research fields, and saleable services. There are several features that have been identified and which have influenced and reshaped the relation between state and universities in the last few decades. All these refer to the process of massification in higher education, but also to globalization and internationalization (Bleiklie and Kogan, 2007; Enders 2004; Neave, 2000; Rinne and Koivula, 2009).

As such, the concept of governance in higher education has gained new dimensions. As Meek (2000: 25) outlines, the relationship, over the last couple of decades, between universities and governments, nearly everywhere has been characterized by the dual process of financial stringency and increased emphasis on accountability and evaluation of performance. Bearing in mind these structural changes, both economic and social dimensions are embedded in the policy strategies stressed by the European Commission

relative to preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and by completing the internal market (Lisbon Agenda, 2000). Consequently, this new model emphasizes leadership, management and entrepreneurship more than individual academic freedom, internal democracy and the organizing role of academic disciplines (Olsen and Maassen, 2007: 7).

In this respect it can be noticed that a European “knowledge society project” (Matei, 2012) has emerged, thus being defined in the context of the Bologna Process through its founding document, the Bologna Declaration (1999). Moreover, this project was designed as to contribute to the creation of a European knowledge society as a means for advancing a specific political, economical and social agenda for the European continent: “a Europe of knowledge is now widely recognised as an irreplaceable factor for social and human growth and as an indispensable component to consolidate the European citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the necessary competencies to face the challenges of the new millennium, together with an awareness of shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural space” (The Bologna Declaration, 1999). Thence, European Commission outlines, promotes and sustains universities’ task to continuously adapt to changing needs and society demands, with research supporting knowledge society which depends for its growth on the production of new knowledge and its transmission through education and training (Weymans, 2010: 121).

1.3. Governing the European Higher Education landscape

In this context, the European Commission has put forward a clear vision for the governance of European higher education institutions, which primarily includes a diversification of funding resources, an intensification of ties between universities and industries and a closer match between the supply of qualifications and labour market demands (Dobbins et al. 2011: 666).

Hence, the classic model of public sector governance, in time, has been replaced by a new one which puts emphasis on managerialism, public accountability and quality in public service delivery. Furthermore, the growth of research interest in higher education is also partly a function of higher education’s enormous expansion in recent decades so that today its character and performance have large implications for all members of society, whether or not they engage directly with higher education (Brennan, Teichler, 2008).

In the context of European Union, the governance of higher education has been shaped through the initialization of what is known as the Bologna process, represented by a series of intergovernmental conferences of European education ministers at which programmatic declarations and communiqués were passed (Witte, 2006: 123). Altogether, the Bologna Declaration (1999) formulated a set of goals, among them the aim “to build European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010 which comprises a set of transnational activities, to promote citizen’s mobility and employability, to achieve greater compatibility and comparability between higher education systems and to increase their international competitiveness”.

Along with the Bologna Process, the EU Lisbon Council in 2000 has stressed the importance of education and training in forging economic competitiveness and development within European Union. In this respect, the Lisbon strategy could be considered an all-encompassing knowledge society project (Matei, 2012: 678).

Moreover, the Lisbon European Council laid the ground for applying the “open method of co-ordination” for the first time to the field of education, a method suited to build

up a high level of commitment (Witte, 2006). This created a Europe with three parallel paths towards a European higher education area: the intergovernmental Bologna Process focusing on system reforms, the European activities in Socrates II focusing on the traditional areas of exchange and networking, and the Lisbon Agenda, emphasizing higher education's capacity to contribute to innovation in the European knowledge economy (Beerens, 2008, p. 417). Nonetheless, Beerens outlines that the process of Europeanization can be seen as the emergence of a new layer of governance, a layer with a wide range of interactions, and that layer is the European Higher Education Area which is particularly designed to enhance the convergence between higher education systems in the different countries, the Bologna Process being the main vehicle to achieve this (Van der Wende 2008).

The achievements of the Bologna Process have been substantial and they related to the implementation of ECTS (European Credit Transfer System), changing the degree structures into a two-cycle system, along with the development of a European Qualification Framework¹, quality assurance and accreditation initiatives and work on the "third cycle", the reform of studies at doctoral level (2008, p. 50). In the EHEA, the qualification frameworks are found at two levels²: an "overarching framework" that sets the parameters within which countries of the EHEA can develop their national qualification frameworks, and the national qualifications frameworks that are compatible with the overarching framework. Nonetheless, Isopahkala-Bouret et al. (2011) argue that this framework attempts to be a holistic competence framework which is able to provide a comprehensive understanding of competent performance. The proposal for the EQF was launched by the European Commission in 2006 and formally established in 2008 and it designates standards to all levels of qualification. Regarding the establishment of a two-cycle system of degrees, this was set as a novel initiative for most European higher education systems, which have historically shown a wide variety of degree structures (Witte, 2006).

Subsequently, this move towards a harmonized academic degree structure meant transforming these diverse systems into Bachelor's and Master's degree, undergraduate and graduate studies, or a two-tier structure (2006: 512).

2. Diversity and diversification in higher education

2.1. The rationale behind diversity in higher education

Diversity, it is claimed, affects nearly every aspect of higher education: access and equity, teaching methods and student learning, research priorities, quality, management, social relevance, finance (Meek et al, 2000). In this respect, the debates around the theme of diversity and diversification in higher education are not of a recent date, but they started in the 70s and 80s as a response to concerns related to specific phenomena such as massification, public budget cuts and an increased interest in public accountability. In this respect, Meek et al. (1996: 9) argue that with the emergence of mass higher education, many national governments have identified a diverse higher education system as a policy imperative. Consequently, the concept of diversity is being perceived as an inherent good (Huisman et al. 2007), bearing strong normative assumptions on how the higher education realm has to be designed in order to best meet its *raison d'être*. Nonetheless, diversity and diversification carry with them the views on what ought to be the proper relationship between government, higher education and society, just as they also represent, on a

¹ http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/eqf_en.htm accessed on 19.06.2012

² <http://www.ehea.info/article-details.aspx?ArticleId=65> accessed on 19.06.2012

broader plane, a particular vision of the relationship between the local and the national communities (Neave, 2000: 19).

As Sybille Reichert points out in her study, the concept of institutional diversity is often treated as a normative value, one that should be espoused by higher education systems and individual institutions in their policies, funding and framework conditions (2009: 12). In this context, diversity is associated with adaptive behaviour towards environmental conditions, comparable to the dynamics of biological populations, which is often used as a basic analogy for the investigation of diversity in higher education. Nevertheless, the concept itself has to be defined and most of the academic literature that has been written so far has dealt with defining diversity.

One first attempt in this respect is the description Robert Birnbaum (1983) gives on institutional diversity as one of its major ideological pillars, thus having a strong ethical component. Moreover, it is often argued that a more diversified system enhances much better students' choices and, consequently, the levels of participation (Huisman et al., 2007: 563).

It also enables and protects specialization within the system and meets the demands of an increasingly complex social order (Birnbaum, 1983) and it is often associated with the positive performance of higher education systems (van Vught, 2009). Thus, diversity is desired for the fact that (1) it increases the range of choices available to learners, (2) makes higher education available to virtually everyone, (3) matches education to the needs, goals, learning styles, speed and ability of individual students, (4) allows institutions to select their own missions and confine their activities to those which are consistent with their location, resources, levels of instruction, (5) diversity is thought to become a precondition of universities and colleges freedom and autonomy because the greater the differences among institutions, the more difficult it is for a central authority to convert them into instruments of indoctrination rather than of education (2009: 1).

Birnbaum's classification of seven forms of diversity gained popularity among scholars in the field: (1) systemic diversity which refers to differences in institutional type, size and control; (2) structural diversity within the system refers to degrees of autonomy; (3) programmatic diversity relates to curricula, and level of degree; (4) procedural diversity – three types: delivery systems, student policies, and administrative processes; (5) reputation diversity which reveals factors like undergraduate selectivity, and the quality of programs as evaluated by peers, and (6) constituent diversity which relates to differences in backgrounds, abilities, preparation, values, and educational goals of students (1983: 37-56). As such, the concept of diversity may refer to many different aspects like staff and student composition, general variety in the institutional landscape, or variety with respect to research quality (Huisman, 2010: 247).

But the notion that universities should specialize and focus on what they are good at has a long history, particularly in the US, initially formulated to justify a plurality of religious environments to match respective practices of students and staff (King, 2004: 119).

One of the most extensive reviews of diversity concepts is delivered by Huisman who locates the concepts in the biological sciences where diversity is understood as a static process, merely a measurement of the characteristics of a community consisting of individuals of different species at a particular point in time (Meek et al., 1996: 4). In this respect, it can only express the variety; that is the number of species, or the relative proportion of their abundance. In terms of this typology of forms of diversity, the focus is on external diversity (a concept which refers to differences between higher education institutions), rather than on internal diversity (differences within higher education institutions) (van Vught, 2009). In recent

accounts of institutional patterns of the higher education system, Teichler (1998, 2008) argues that national higher education systems are described concretely in most cases according to: different types of HE institutions; different types of programs (academic versus professional); various levels of programs – sub-degree, bachelor, master and doctoral programs); variation in reputation and prestige within formally equal institutions and programs; different profiles of institutions and study programs.

Consequently, he focuses his line of argument on two different types of institutional diversity; that is on vertical diversity in terms of quality of teaching and research, selectivity at entry, professional success of graduates, reputation of researchers and horizontal diversity in terms of substantive profiles of research and curricula (Teichler 2005: 99). On the other hand, Huisman (2007: 566) analyzes higher education diversity relative to five dimensions: institutional size, form of institutional control, range of disciplines offered, degrees awarded, and modes of study. Most of these analyses emphasize the multidimensional aspect of the concept of diversity in higher education as well as the theoretical and empirical difficulties in offering a universal or unitary definition. As above-described, in dealing with the subject of diversity, scholars adopt one or more dimensions of what diversity reveals for their studies.

In a previous study (2000: 41-53), Huisman focuses on the operationalization and measurement of diversity of higher education institutions analyzing changes in the process of diversification in different HE systems such as the Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, Finland and UK. In this sense, he offers a model for analyzing the concept of diversity in HE and measuring on dimensions like size and programmes offered.

2.2. Diversity and diversities within higher education systems

As early mentioned, policy trends toward higher education diversification can be traced back in the 1960s when the structure of higher educational systems became a major issue in higher education policies. In this sense, the establishment of *polytechnics* in UK, the *Institutes Universitaires de Technologie* in France and the *Fachhochschulen* in Germany initially supported the view that most European countries placed prime emphasis on institutional diversity (Rosenblit, 2007, King, 2004), and that two-type or multi-type structures were likely to emerge in many countries. Starting with the 1980s, efforts have been made for grasping ideas on what diversity in higher education is intended to achieve, as well as on finding ways for fostering it.

Nevertheless, in the European context, the current studies in the field show that the debates and developments regarding institutional patterns of higher education underwent three stages (Teichler, 2008: 358): (1) from 1960s to late 1970s when problems of diversification according to sectors of the higher education system, notably types of HEIs and programs, were the key issue – the establishment of the Polytechnics in Britain, France and Germany are often referred to as the most visible reforms towards binary, two-type systems.

Moreover, integrated and comprehensive university concepts were applied in countries like Germany and Sweden, aiming at increasing the intra-institutional diversity, for example, to serve a broad range of students through a range of curricular philosophies; (2) from the mid 1970s to mid 1980s when more attention was paid to vertical differences between individual institutions through reputational hierarchies, mostly subdivided to disciplines. Thus, he contends that the decision of introducing the “Research Assessment Exercise” in UK, together with funding research according to their research performance are often viewed as the starting point of vertical differentiation processes; (3) since mid

1990s where institutional diversity is perceived as being embedded supra-nationally, globally and European.

Hence, three influential political approaches regarding the extent and the character of diversity can be detected in the European higher education landscape, and they relate to the Bologna process, rankings and managerial approach (Teichler 2012). First, within the Bologna approach some specific elements can be distinguished in terms of increasing similarity of the patterns of national HE systems and levels of study programs. All the more, this approach opposes any steep vertical and any extreme horizontal differentiation among HE systems (2012: 937). In this regard, it is argued that, from the very beginning, the Bologna process, through its core harmonisation objectives, has set a tension between the aim of convergence and the will to maintain the diversity of national HE systems in Europe (Witte, 2008). Nonetheless, while the tension between convergence and diversity is inherent in the Bologna process initial set-up, strong underlying forces can also be depicted pushing towards the diversification of European HE systems independently from Bologna, such as expanding student enrolment, increasing academic specialisation, growing needs for a knowledge society, intensifying globalisation in HE, and increasing competition between higher education institutions (2008: 83).

Furthermore, the ranking approach is viewed as concentrating fully on vertical diversity due to its emphasis on assessing research performance, thus scoring on the reputation scale becoming its cherished objective. In this sense, Marijk van der Wende (2008) outlines the reputational-driven global rankings by arguing that they have stimulated global competition for leading researchers and researches. Secondly, within national systems, the rankings have prompted desires for high ranking research universities both as a symbol of prestige and as an engine of economic growth (2008: 54). In analyzing US higher education, Eckel (2008: 176) addresses the tensions between two HE policy objectives, effectiveness and prestige. Therefore, it is contended that US colleges and universities are pursuing these two different sets of priorities, both being essential to their functioning, but in a disproportionate way, with prestige being primer focus. The third approach which may be named the managerial approach focuses entire attention on university management and its strategies for re-allocation of institution's vertical and horizontal positions on the map of the overall national higher education system (Teichler, 2012: 938).

2.3. Relating diversity and performance: the case of performance-based funding

Over the last three decades public pressure has forced governments in many western countries to look for ways to meet society's needs without spending too much taxpayer-generated money (Liefner, 2003: 470) and one way to respond to these new challenges was linking funding to performance. It is worth noting that governments have used funding schemes for higher education institutions to reach specific objectives, such as promoting equity, increasing autonomy and accountability, or increasing quality of education activities (Miroiu and Vlăsceanu, 2012). In this light, competitiveness, as a market instrument, became necessary for obtaining high levels of funding, and universities have to offer high-quality teaching and research and foster educational and organizational innovations (Liefner, 2003). As Serban (1998) points out, funding methods for public higher education serve different objectives and these have evolved through time from adequacy in the 1950's to distributive growth in the 1960's to redistributive equality in the 1970's to stability/quality in the 1980's to accountability/reform in the 1990's. Whereas the first wave of competitive funding was characterized by "single target, single

measure”, it is now a more sweeping change under way, with the entire higher education funding targeted for competition, sometimes related to competition in research performance (Sörlin, 2007: 421).

In his analysis on higher education funding systems across OECD countries, Jongbloed (2004) classifies funding mechanisms into four categories according to two criteria: centralised/decentralised mechanism and input/output orientation. As such, the switch from itemised to lump-sum or block grant budgets has been common place through OECD countries since the 1990’s (OECD, 2003). In this respect, the degree of input-output orientation should be identified as well as the degree to which demand and supply play a role in the funding mechanism (Bakker, 2007: 34).

On the other hand, the observed trend is that across OECD states, governments have split their support for teaching and research by providing block funding for each activity along with a move away from negotiated line item funding towards more transparent, rational, formula-based, mechanisms (Jongbloed and Vossensteyn, 2001, OECD, 2003). Moreover, an increase in public expenditure on tertiary education across EU member countries can be depicted in the last decade, with operational public grants still holding the largest shares on the overall.

Table 1: Total public expenditure on tertiary education as % of GDP, 2000-2007

EU 27	
2000	1.05
2007	1.12

Source: Eurostat

Table 2: Composition of revenues for public universities in 2008

Country	Share of operational public grant %	Share of tuition fee %	Share of third party funds %
Austria	78	6	16
Belgium	45	5	45
Bulgaria	55	20	25
Cyprus	80	15	5
Croatia	70	30	0
Czech Republic	75	5	20
Denmark	73	2	25
Estonia	48	13	39
Finland	65	0	35
France	87	5	8
Hungary	70	15	5
Ireland	40	35	25
Italy	65	12	23
Latvia	50	15	35
Lithuania	65	25	10
Luxembourg	92	2	6
Malta	95	3	2
Netherlands	66	6	28
Norway	75	0	25
Poland	71	22	7
Portugal	60	10	30
Romania	70	25	5

Country	Share of operational public grant %	Share of tuition fee %	Share of third party funds %
Slovakia	94	1	5
Slovenia	50	25	25
Spain	76	21	3
Sweden	88	0	12
U.K.	38	24	38

Source: European Commission Report: Funding Reform, 2008

Indeed, one of the most important features of any performance funding system is the set of indicators that are used to measure performance and may be related to input, process, output or outcome measure (Orosz, 2012). As such, inputs include the resources, human, financial and physical, that are used to support the educational, research and administrative activities of higher education institutions. Process measures provide information on how a certain activity is carried out. Output indicators provide information on the quantity of products that are the result of the institution's activity; in the case of higher education institutions, output indicators may include measures such as the number of credits earned, or the number of degrees awarded, whereas outcome indicators measure the impact of the institution's activity on its environment (2012). Consequently, the level of funding associated with performance becomes critical since the impact of financial incentives varies by the size of the reward. For example, Germany has begun implementing university reform according to the steering paradigm of competition for scarce public funding, and consequently, financial initiatives have been set out to encourage universities to improve their performance (Orr et al, 2007a: 5). Though performance funding mechanisms are largely in use across all German *Länder*, their budget relevance is still marginal and they differ from *Land to Land*, as indicated in the table below.

Table 3: Components of state subsidies to HEIs in Germany and their relative proportion 2005

German States	Indicator-based funding %	Project-based funding (earmarked grants)	Mission-based funding	Incremental funding %
Baden-Württemberg	20 (28 FH*)	No	No	80 (72 FH)
Bayern	2.4 (0.6 FH)	No	No	97.6 (99.4 FH)
Berlin	15	No	No	85
Brandenburg	95	No	Yes	5
Bremen	5	No	Yes	95
Hamburg	98	No	Yes	2
Hessen	95	No	Yes	5
Niedersachsen	30 (FH)	No	No	70 (FH)
Nordrhein-Westfalen	17	No	Yes	83
Rheinland-Pfalz	95	No	No	5
Thüringen	15	No	Yes	85

Source: Orr, 2007b, p. 165

*FH- Fachhochschulen (Universities of Applied Sciences)

Table 4: Origin of the funds and their distribution 2011

Federal Government	Million Euro	%
Institutional funding of the DFG*	1,188.4	49.1
Special allocation for earmarked projects	423.8	17.25
Sum	1,612.2	66.6

Source: DFG statistics, 2011³

*DFG- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation)

Moreover, according to some (Burke and Modarresi, 2000: 434), performance funding contains several major components such as external accountability, institutional improvement, increased state funding, improved public perception of higher education, and meeting state needs.

All the same, it is argued that performance-based funding is used to promote vertical differentiation and functional specialization between institutions while at the same time secure horizontal diversity and pluralism within the system (Sörlin, 2007: 413). Thus, in the past few decades, on European level as well as globally, the old trust-based regimes have been gradually replaced by performance-based regimes in which governments make active use of the funding instruments to pursue complex policies, such as enhancing and improving higher education performance (2007: 436). Consequently, in relating performance-based funding and diversity, it is argued that public funding allocated to research and development activities may constitute a useful tool in fostering diversity as long as it is provided within a competitive framework assigned to non standardized evaluation procedures (Horta et al, 2008). During the 1990's, countries such as the Netherlands, the U.K. and the Czech Republic have moved particularly towards earmarking of research funding through formulae based on specified performance criteria (OECD, 2003, European Commission Report, 2008). Hence, changes in funding structures and mechanisms can be noticed across European higher education systems, as shown in the following table.

Table 5: Number of European countries and the shares of their public research revenue components for the public university sector

Share of Operational research grant	0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%	N countries
2008	4	6	6	7	23
1995	5	3	3	9	20
Share of Competitive research grant	0-25%	26-50%	51-75%	76-100%	N countries
2008	8	6	5	4	23
1995	10	3	2	5	20

Source: European Commission Report on Funding Reform, 2008, p. 5

In other words, competitive funding schemes should be designed as to enable differentiation among institutions according to their resources and capabilities to develop research (2008: 146).

³http://www.dfg.de/en/dfg_profile/evaluation_statistics/statistics/financial_resources/index.jsp
accessed on 11.10.2012

3. Patterns of diversity and diversification in the european higher education

3.1. Diversity between standardization and market demands

A major theme in the study of diversity is the response of higher education institutions and systems to what has been termed as the new public sector policy environment of self-regulation and market competition (Meek, 2000). Built into the new policy context is the assumption that market forces are far better means for achieving functional differentiation of institutional types, programmes and activities than centralised government control and regulation (2000: 25). Preliminary research findings suggest that there are two crucial factors influencing the direction of higher education diversity: (1) the way in which governments structure the policy environment (Meek, 2000) and (2) the relative power of academic norms and values within HE institutions (van Vught, 1996). Contrary to views highlighting market benefits towards creating diversity within HE systems and institutions, there are several approaches which assume that market steering mechanisms introduced in the space of higher education policy and management may create an environment more homogeneous than state administration (Meek, 2000: 36).

Hereby and Van Vught (1996, 2009) departures from analyzing HE systems as open systems, a view which implies that its components are both able to receive inputs and to deliver outputs. Scholars agree that there are currently a multitude of forces which either increase or reduce the extent of diversity within national systems of higher education, sometimes favouring international convergence, at other times, promoting specific national options (Teichler 2012).

All the more, van Vught (2009: 11) maintains the level of influence of academic norms and values in a higher education organization is related to the level of diversity of the higher education system. Drawing on the notion of competition under conditions of scarce resources, it is argued that market competition between institutions in the same policy environment results in emulation and a convergence of academic norms and values (2000: 37).

Respectively, Meek et al. (1996) argue that explanatory concepts for the change of higher education systems can be classified into three perspectives, respectively internal, environmental, and systemic perspectives. The internal perspective addressed by Clark (1996) focuses on the base operating unit within higher education institutions, the academic discipline. According to this approach, dynamics within higher education play a major role, for example, the increase of student numbers or trends towards specialization disciplines (Teichler, 2012: 936). The next view is based on a systemic approach which stresses the idea that powerful actors try to shape these dynamics according to their views and values. Further developing this line of argument, Neave (1996: 27) turns the table so as to concentrate on the forces that work for and against homogenization and integration, presenting both concepts as ideal-types which are never reached entirely in real life, not are their opposites: differentiation and diversity. Furthermore, he points out that, in operational terms, the state control model is built around the principle of legal homogeneity that is, a given institutional type will be regulated by the same set of laws. The last perspective encompasses an environmental view according to which external social, political and economic forces affect the configuration of higher education (2012: 936).

3.2. Paths towards diversity and/or homogeneity

On the one hand, historical trends in diversity in European higher education show a development from a broad European system to a set of national systems and, on the other hand, a certain diversification in terms of institutional missions and profiles, i.e. a

process creating horizontal diversity (Huisman, van Vught, 2009). But such an institutional diversity is more often based on regulation than on the actual characteristics or performances of the institutions involved (2009: 19). The analysis undertaken by Huisman, Meek and Wood (2007) based on a cross-national and longitudinal approach of ten higher education systems show that system size (the number of HEIs in a particular country) does not imply a high level of diversity. Furthermore, there has been found that a possible explanation for the high level of diversity in binary systems could be that legally mandated boundaries are preserving diversity in the system (2007: 574). Put in other words, the given explanation holds that even if binary systems seem to maintain a certain level of policy-driven diversity, government-initiated merger operations bring about more homogeneity (Van Vught, 2009: 12). On the other hand, focusing on institutional diversity in European higher education, Sybille Reichert (2009) reveals that the diversity of institutional types or profiles seems to be valued positively only if it goes hand in hand with sufficient transparency as regards the definition of access criteria to different institutional types or profiles, as well as with flexibility and cooperation between institutions. Some of the findings confirm that the value of internationally visible research for the competitive profile of an institution has risen in the perception of policy makers and institutional leaders in all five countries covered in the study (Reichert, 2012: 119). For example, in England and Slovakia, research has become the key criterion for vertical differentiation among institutional types, formally through legislative definitions and accreditation criteria in Slovakia, and informally through the weight of the funding instruments in England.

Therefore, in all five countries observed (England, France, Norway, Slovakia, Switzerland), there can be noticed internationally oriented research exerting a homogenizing effect on institutional profiles. And the clearest case of vertical differentiation to be found in this study is to be the Slovak higher education system, where 20% of university budget is being based on research performance (2012: 88). Related to this, the 2005 and 2006 methodologies designed for ranking Slovak HEIs consist of a high proportion of research oriented criteria in assessing institutional performance and distribution of funding grants (Devinski, 2008).

All the same, in Switzerland and Norway, the effects of research oriented funding flows are weaker due to the existence of multiple types of research funding sources which sustain different orientations, from international and basic to regionally oriented and applied research (Reichert, 2012). Altogether, Reichert suggests that Switzerland could be seen as the most horizontally and least vertically differentiated system of the five in the way that the distinction between internationally oriented research and regionally responsive research and innovation is not associated with a strong difference of social status or public recognition.

Moreover, signs of convergence can be identified not only in the European realm, but also in other parts of the world, for example, in Australia where the college and university sectors began to converge in many of their characteristics from the 1990's. Some of the values and functions of one sector were adopted by the other, programmes, courses, services to students and outside groups, and consultancy, were highly valued in the non-university sector and became increasingly so by the universities themselves (Kogan, 1997: 59).

Although specialization through research was difficult to achieve in the college sector, many of their academic staff strove to become part of the international disciplinary community and to participate in the activities of their peers (Kogan 1997: 60).

Nevertheless, even if the U.S is often noted for its high level of mission differentiation, institutions with dissimilar missions and control can share many features (Eckel, 2008), e.g. at program level, different types of institutions often have similar academic structures (Departments of Chemistry, Colleges of Education) and they can offer similar fields of studies (Biology, Health, History, etc.). Institutions in different categories also have overlapping degree programs, particularly at the BA degree level, but also at the graduate level, for instance, a master's university and a research university can offer both an MBA as well as bachelor's degrees in foreign languages (Eckel, 2008: 177-178)

3.3. Desired diversity, maintained homogeneity in Romanian higher education landscape

Processes of homogenization can be traced in Romanian higher education context as well. In this light, it is argued that the development of Romanian higher education over the past 15 years has exhibited a strong tendency, affecting both public and private universities, towards institutional homogeneity (Miroiu and Andreescu, 2010: 89). Thus, the dominant characteristic of national higher education system is its homogeneity, or at least the existence of a powerful process of weakening the differences between old and new universities, between large and small, between comprehensive and highly specialized (2010).

This trend is revealed by institutional practices in terms of similarity between missions, as codified in the university Charters, organizational structures, types of study programmes and their organization, as well as content, procedures and practices related to teaching and research; internal regulations are all similar and at most incrementally different (Miroiu and Vlăsceanu, 2012: 802). The explanations set forth here suggest that institutional homogenization has been set in place as a response to the growing competitiveness of Romanian academic environment, but one that has not fostered performance as it was expected (Miroiu and Andreescu, 2010: 90).

Moreover, it is contended that the new elements of competition introduced through exposing the higher education system to the market environment have forced universities to adopt a variety of legitimization practices (2010: 90). These practices resided in complying with quality assessment and assurance, as well as institutional and programmatic accreditation procedures established on national level which have shaped a standardized external environment based on universal standards, criteria and scales. In terms of study programmes evaluation and accreditation practices, the resulting patterns of universities' behaviour rendered emergence of resembling programmes regardless of academic field and disciplines (2010: 92). It is noted that, for example, accreditation mechanisms forced all academic programmes to look like the established ones in older, highly-regarded universities (Andreescu et al, 2012: 866).

Following this line of argument, another homogenizing factor that may be identified relates to public resource allocations to state universities. In this sense, the introduction of competitive instruments for allocating financial resources to public universities has constrained and directed universities' behaviour towards similar strategies for reducing costs and increasing revenues, that is increasing tuition fees and student places as well as an enhancement of part-time and distance learning programmes. Furthermore, the design of performance criteria for financial allocation enhanced competition in scoring on research and management indicators.

In the first years after introducing quality funding criteria, quality indicators accounted for 10% of the core financing of public universities and progressively increasing to 30% in the past five years, as documented in table 6.

Table 6: Evolution of influence of quality indicators on the core funding of public universities expressed in thousand RON

Year	Allocations for core funding	% of total funding	Allocations based on quality indicators	% of total funding
2005	844,970,033	87.3	122,922,330	12.7
2006	927,238,248	80.0	231,809,562	20.0
2007	1,241,100,000	75.0	413,700,000	25.0
2008	1,342,663,350	70.0	575,427,150	30.0
2009	1,361,178,000	70.0	583,362,000	30.0
2010	1,332,459,379	70.0	571,054,019	30.0
2011	1,196,727,700	70.0	512,883,300	30.0

Source: CNFIS⁴

Therefore, one general conclusion drawn is that financial pressures for vertical differentiation have not been strong enough (Andreescu et al, 2012), fact rendered by the poor influence quality indicators had on the overall budget allocations.

Starting with 2012, a new funding methodology has been put in place which intends to create a stronger linkage between performance and financing of public universities. The current formula introduces excellence indexes which take into account the results of 2011 study programmes' hierarchization exercise by attaching different coefficients in calculating budget allocation per university.

Table 7: Value of excellence index according to study programmes' hierarchization and level of study

Level of study	Study programme hierarchy				
	A	B	C	D	E
Bachelor	3	2	1	0	0
Master	4	1	0	0	0
PhD	5	1	0	0	0

Source: CNFIS

Accordingly, the new formula is designed as to insure higher allocations for institutions that score higher on the performance dimension, hence enabling a more substantial vertical diversification of public universities. To what extent the new financing scheme will render the desired effects, rests to be advanced in further research enterprises.

4. Concluding remarks

The past few decades the field of higher education has been marked by multiple changes which resided in reshaping and redefining the roles of universities towards the state, and the society, in the first phase, as well as towards economy and different stakeholders, in the second stage. In the European context, these changes bear different causes, from the burst and evolution of massification processes across whole Europe, accountability and quality revolution across all public administrative activities, to the more recent debates on issues of performance and diversity of higher education systems and institutions. Building on this complex picture, the paper aimed at describing and questioning the dynamics in the interplay between performance and diversity with focus on processes and their outcomes. In this sense, the dynamics have been steered both externally, through different supranational

⁴ National Council for Higher Education Funding

strategies and policies, such as the Bologna process and Lisbon Agenda, and internally through national/local/federal standards related to quality and performance criteria and indicators in designing core higher education policies.

Thus, analyzing the dynamics within the European higher education systems, it is revealed that patterns of both diversification and homogenization can be found at system and institutional level as well, and that the causes behind it point out several directions, such as more fit for purpose regulations in public resource allocation and institutional autonomy, quality assurance standards and assessment criteria. Moreover, taking a closer look at the Romanian higher education landscape, the dominant and persistent process encountered refers to degrees of homogenization related to academic programmes and internal organization of core activities and tasks.

Nevertheless, the current debates on diversity and differentiation in higher education highlight the need for designing strategies aiming at enhancing greater diversity among systems and institutions, bearing in mind the multidimensional aspect of diversity. Consequently, performance assessment tools should be implemented as to focus on measuring different inputs and outputs regarding management, institutional capacity or local and regional development and innovation, apart from those related to research productivity. In this light, the European Commission's discourse in the field of higher education is shaping the emergence of new mechanisms of performance assessment driving at more diversification across European HE systems, such as launching projects like U-Map and U-Multirank. Apart from developing new performance assessment schemes sensitive to issues of systemic and institutional diversity, financing policies may be designed and used for advancing diversification as several examples from England, Slovakia and Romania reveal it.

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IMPACT OF QUALITY-BASED FUNDING IN ROMANIAN HIGHER EDUCATION: 1999-2010

*Mirela VLĂȘCEANU**

Abstract. *This paper analyzes some of the effects of funding policies in Romanian higher education from an institutionalist perspective. More precisely, the article focuses on the impact that the quality-based funding used until 2010 had on the performance of universities. The results of the analysis indicate that universities responded to the incentives created by the funding formula, but that its success in encouraging performance was limited.*

Keywords: *institutional change; quality indicators; formula funding; institutional incentives; performance*

1. Introduction

This paper deals with higher education financing from an institutionalist perspective, studying the funding mechanisms for higher education and the way they have evolved in the past twenty years in Romania. Its theoretical focus is on institutional change, studying changes in funding mechanisms. The assumption is that such modifications have changed the incentives of the agents involved and have reshaped the institutions in the higher education system.

In the first part I will give a brief overview of the theoretical framework employed, which is based on rational choice institutionalism and has as its particular focus the issue of institutional change. The second part of the paper consists of a description of financing and funding policies for higher education used in Romania between 1990 and 2012. This part includes both the presentation of the main reforms, but also various insights produced by prior research into the consequences and incentives created by each financing policy. Finally, I conclude with an empirical quantitative study on financing and performance which aims to highlight to some extent the way in which higher education institutions responded to a new institutional setting.

2. Theoretical Background

Institutional theory began by focusing on the origin and appearance of institutions. These were seen as stable equilibriums (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981: 514; Sugden, 1989), as norms or rules. In the first approach, lasting institutions were those that provided an equilibrium solution that none of the actors had incentives to change (Shepsle, 2001). In the latter two, they were based on actors' beliefs about what is proper and improper in a given situations (institutions as norms) or on a common understanding of prescribed, allowed and forbidden actions which was sanctioned by an authority, in the case of

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institutions as norms (Ostrom, 1995). Given these formulations of theory, institutional change was one of the main puzzles for institutionalist analyses (North, 1990, p. 6). While institutions appear in order to solve problems created by the interaction between actors, leading them to better outcomes than those which could be obtained if their action was unconstrained, or in order to solve collective action dilemmas, the manner in which existing institutions evolve and change is less well understood. What type of pressures may lead to institutional change and what are the conditions under which this occurs are some of the main questions directing current institutionalist research (Shepsle, 2001). Therefore, the study of institutional change may be considered a second generation research direction of the institutionalist approach and represents a current development in the field.

For the purposes of this research, the most relevant theories on institutional change are those proposed by Avner Greif (2004) and Elinor Ostrom (2007) due to their focus on endogenous institutional change. Greif's theory has as its starting point the institutions as equilibriums perspective and proposes an approach useful for studying the situations in which the new conditions created by an institution lead to changing the patterns of behaviour associated with that institution (Greif, 2004: 634). In his theory, the way towards understanding why institutions change is by understanding why institutions stabilize. Firstly, he seeks to establish the circumstances under which institutions remain stable and how they create lasting and self-enforcing arrangements. More precisely, Greif identifies as the causes of institutional change both changes in the circumstances in which institutions function and in the behaviours associated with existing institutions. In some cases, the maintenance of these behaviours and responses when underlying conditions change leads to maintenance of the equilibriums. Thus, existing institutions are strengthened through a demonstration that the behaviour associated with them provides adequate responses even in new circumstances. In other cases, maintaining the behaviour associated with an institution in a new setting has undesirable outcomes and the institution is self-defeating (Greif, 2004: 639). In both instances, the answer to the question of why institutions change is provided by the patterns associated with the existing institutional setting, thus residing in the characteristics of existing institutions.

Similarly, the institutional analysis and development framework proposed by Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom and Hess, 2007) provides an integrated perspective on institutions which also accounts for feedback mechanisms impacting the initial institutional setting. The model provides an instrument for studying variables related to the setting, to the agents and to the rules, namely the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, a tool capable of accommodating institutional change. The framework comprises three clusters of variables: *situational variables*, which include biophysical characteristics, attributes of the community and operational rules; *actional variables*, including information about actors and the array of permitted, forbidden and required actions, and, in the third cluster, the *patterns of interaction and the outcomes* (Ostrom and Hess, 2007, p. 44). The latter are subject to evaluation procedures, and the patterns of interaction arising from an institutional arrangement, along with their outcomes, lead to modifications of situational variables (ideas, rules, etc.) and to changes in the actional sphere, where other responses or strategies may be deemed more appropriate and employed in future interactions.

2. Institutional Change in the Romanian Higher Education System

The theoretical models presented in the previous section provide a very useful framework for assessing the reform of financing policies for higher education in Romania. Firstly, the funding and financing policies have suffered a series of modifications from 1990 until 2012, in various attempts to improve the system, either in terms of efficiency or

of performance. Secondly, compared to their intended purposes, these policy changes did not fulfill or, at the very least, did not fully live up to their promises. Consequently, it is worth investigating what the initial conditions were when the policy changed and to what extent these changes have led to the creation of new institutions. In order to examine this issue I will present in this section a brief overview of the financing policies, of the setting in which they were implemented, and on their outcomes. This will be organized in three sections, according to the funding and financing mechanisms in use in each period. The first concerns the nine years between 1990 and 1999 and deals with the early reforms, the first post-communist law on education and the implications of what has been termed “historical funding” (Miroiu and Dincă, 2000). The second part focuses on the period between 1999 and 2010, when a formula-funding mechanism was in place. Finally, I will give a brief description of the latest reform of higher education, which introduced a ranking component in the allocation of public funds for higher education.

2.1. The transition years and historical funding: 1990-1998

The first years after the fall of communism were characterized by a slow transition to the market economy and by efforts of reshaping the existing institutions and organizations so as to better respond to the new circumstances. Higher education financing was no exception in this respect. For the first three years, until 1993, education was still mainly regulated by the law passed in 1968, albeit a slightly modified and updated version of it. At the same time, new laws allowed private universities to appear, the principle of university autonomy was introduced and university colleges appeared as a short-time higher education programs (Bârzea and Fartușnic, 2003). The first important reforms in higher education began in 1993 with a new law concerning the authorization and accreditation of universities, both public and private. Two years later, a new law on education was adopted, with numerous provisions for higher education.

However, up until 1999, the system of financing higher education did not change dramatically compared to the previous regime. According to the 1995 law, education received 4% of the national GDP, and out of this about 0.5% went to higher education. Funding was given only to public institutions, through yearly allocations earmarked on budgetary chapters. The funding was based on input criteria, namely university size measured in terms of teaching and administrative personnel. Most of the funding corresponded to the salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff, which, by 1999, made up about 80% of the expenditure on public higher education (Miroiu, 1999, p. 141). In terms of amounts, however, public universities were under-funded throughout this period. The total expenditure for education was much below that of other European countries, as well as the cost per student (Miroiu and Dincă, 2000: 27).

Another important trait of the system for this period was the excess of regulation, which had a major impact on the consequences of rules concerning funding. The principle of university autonomy was not complemented by a decentralization of public higher education, the state retaining control, through the Ministry of Education, on most aspects of higher education. For example, the number of students a university could enroll was set by the Ministry for every cycle of higher education and for every study program. At the same time, the faculties and universities were required to submit to an evaluation in order to become authorized to function, but the same applied for new study programs as well. No new program could be established in an accredited higher education institution without its having to undergo the same rather lengthy procedure. To be more precise, new programs were initially evaluated and, if all was well, they received a provisional

authorization. This became an accreditation only after three generations of students graduated successfully, passing the national standards established for university graduation. As well as this, public universities could not enroll tuition paying students, and could not, thus, supplement the public funding they received. They did have the right to supplement state funding by accessing private sources, such as working with firms, or receiving donations and sponsorship. However, they were required to have approval of the Ministry for using funds acquired from private sources (Miroiu, 1998: 125).

One other major aspect which interacted heavily with the financing system was the strong welfare dimension of policies at that time. Public funding came with a strong focus on granting social benefits to both teachers and students. On the one hand, teaching positions were highly regulated, with laws establishing in detail what the workload and payment level should be for every position in the academic hierarchy. On the other hand, the policies were very concerned with improving access to higher education. Therefore, students themselves received a large number of social benefits – such as 50% discounts for public transportation, heavily subsidized housing, discounts for attending shows and exhibitions in public cultural institutions, etc. – in addition to tuition free higher education. While the social benefits of teachers affected the budget of universities directly, leading to expenditure on salaries being high, the social benefits for students affected mostly the budget for education, out of which a portion went to other ministries in order to cover the expenses of public services to students. In 1998, the funds subsidizing public transportation were almost 10 times higher than the state funds directed for academic research (Miroiu, 1998: 123).

The implications of these institutional arrangements were apparent before the reform of 1999. First among these was a heavy reliance of public universities on state funding. Throughout the 1990s, Romanian public universities had almost no other sources of income than the national budget. Although they were formally encouraged to collaborate with private enterprises, in practice there was little incentive for firms to invest in higher education programs and universities, especially since there was a surplus of workforce. Another implication is that the managerial component of university administration remained underdeveloped. In the circumstances described, universities had a very limited role in determining on what to spend and in allocating their budget. The autonomy in choosing the content of the curricula and the fields in which they offer education was decoupled from financial autonomy. Not least, universities had very little incentive to invest in research activities and in promoting performance in teaching and research, given that these activities had generally little to no impact on their funding and attractiveness to potential students.

2.2. Global funding and quality indicators: 1999-2010

The financing system introduced in 1999 aimed to represent a more transparent, flexible and conducive to performance mechanism of allocating funds. According to the new formula, universities received funding as a *lump-sum grant* whose size was correlated with the number of students, the field of study, the type of program, and with performance criteria, and as *complementary funding*, comprising the amounts earmarked for student assistance (scholarships, transport gratuities, financial aid for housing) and investment expenses (CNFIS, 2007: 2). However, most of the funds were allocated based on one input indicator, namely the number of equivalent students. This represented an average number of students enrolled, weighted by coefficients for the type of program and for the field.

Two aspects of this system deserve particular attention. Firstly, the amount granted based on performance and quality indicators was a percentage of the lump sum, but was computed separately from the number of students, using indicators of research and institutional capacity. The percentage of funding granted based on performance indicators grew between its introduction and 2011, and represented at most 30% of the base financing granted to universities (Miroiu and Vlăsceanu, 2012: 800).

The second particularly interesting aspect of this formula funding was that the main input indicator, the number of students, still did not depend entirely on the decision of the universities. The number of budget supported places for each cycle and study program and specialty was determined by the Education Ministry at the national level (although based on universities reported capacity and demand for places). In addition, for the first few years after the new funding formula was introduced, public universities still could not enrol tuition paying students, and therefore increases in funding could only be obtained by increasing the number of state funded places. Even after the possibility of enrolling paying students was created, taxes in most universities remained low and most of the funding of universities still came from the state budget (Miroiu, 2005; CADI).

Compared to the previous stage, the reform introduced in 1999 has significantly altered the conditions in which public universities acted. Firstly, since funding came as a lump-sum, universities were now able to make management decisions concerning personnel or investment policy. As well as this, universities gained more freedom in determining what type of activities or institutional development they wanted to invest in. Secondly, the change of the financing mechanism created the conditions necessary for a shift from teaching to more research-oriented activities and a first framework for assessing universities' performance. It was also the first to create some pressure on universities to adapt to these challenges and explicitly take into account the need for assessment and self-assessment of their activity.

In the ten years of their functioning, these provisions had two very important consequences. On the one side, universities actively tried to expand their student base, which in turn generated changes in the number and type of programs offered and in the criteria required for admission. As well as this, in some cases it led to decreases in quality, to the extent in which the need to cut costs manifested itself in less teaching positions and an increase of the student per teacher ratio. At the same time, the performance indicators used led to a high rate of conformity, all public universities managing to meet at least some of the quality standards and to access this source of funding. In practice, the use of this funding formula also meant that most of the public universities became very similar in terms of the programs offered, in respect to the balance between teaching and research and in terms of quality (Miroiu and Andreescu, 2010).

2.3. Global funding and ranking systems: 2011-2012

Especially due to the lack of diversity and in higher education institutions, a series of new reforms in higher education were implemented beginning with 2011. The major changes consist in a new classification of universities and in the replacement of quality indicators for funding with a ranking system.

First of all, the classification, as reiterated in the legislation, is not a ranking system. It is merely the categorization of universities into three groups: universities centred on research, universities focused on research and education and universities specializing in education. The division corresponds to the requirements introduced by the new law on education, Law 1/2011, and affects primarily the number of funded places

allocated to universities for different programs. More precisely, research universities will be given about 20% more places for their master and doctoral programs, research and education universities keep the same number of budgeted places in bachelor and masters programs, but receive less places for the doctoral students, while for universities focused on education the number of financed places for master and especially doctoral programs is much reduced. The classification is related to quality assessment evaluations and is designed as a means to increase diversity in the system. The rationale is to make it easier for universities to invest their resources more adequately in the type of programs they are best equipped to deal with.

The classification is supplemented by the “hierarchization” or ranking of study programs. Unlike the classification, it is primarily a ranking done not at university level, but within fields and subfields, across all universities offering them. In practice, it means that all programs are categorized into fields and subfields of study, and all programs in the same field are evaluated across universities. They are then placed in five categories, from A – best, to E – poor programs. The ranking is to be done every year and constitutes the basis on which funds are allocated, with high performance programs receiving significantly more of the performance- based funding than the poorly situated ones. The ranking is done taking into account four standards for performance, each comprising relevant criteria measured through a number of indicators in an annual assessment exercise. The four standards are: research, teaching and learning, relation to the outside environment, and institutional capacity.

Compared to the previous reforms, these recent changes are likely to produce large-scale effects in the system. Firstly, the classification is regarded by those involved and by the public as a ranking system, with research universities being the best and education universities the worst. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the reform will indeed encourage specialization of universities in either research or education, or if it will rather lead to all universities investing resources into becoming more research-oriented. Secondly, the ranking system for quality funding is a much more extensive assessment tool of university performance, and has the potential to yield more serious consequences for university financing than the previous formula. Therefore, it may have a larger impact on increasing quality in higher education.

3. An Empirical Case Study: Quality-Based Financing and Performance in Romanian Universities

The application proposed here seeks to determine if universities responded to the institutional changes described above and to test whether the patterns of behavior have changed following the major changes in legislation concerning funding. If this is the case, the implication would be that we are dealing with institutional change in the system of higher education, and, even more interestingly, that the actors involved are responsive to changes in their environment.

In order to analyse this matter I use an empirical model relating to the second policy presented, that of formula-based funding. This model tries to link university performance, as evaluated in 2011, with the quality-based financing received in the previous years. The hypothesis is that those higher education institutions that received the most funding on quality- based indicators (QI) are the same universities which have more high-ranking study programs. Differently put, I expect institutions that have responded better to the changes introduced in 1999 and that have best adapted to the new institutional setting to be the best performers ten years later.

In order to determine if this is the case I've created a model to verify if for the 49 public universities in Romania, the number of highest ranked study programs (the A level ones) is correlated with receiving a large proportion of financing on quality-based criteria in the previous years. In order to test this I use a multivariate regression model in which the number of A-level programs of each university, as established in 2011 following the ranking exercise, is the dependent variable. Independent variables include both controls and variables of interest. For controls I use the age of the university, the results of the quality evaluations conducted by the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, the total number of programs in each university, the number of (equivalent) students based on which formula-funding was granted and the variation in total public funding received by the universities. Independent variables of interest are the variation in amounts allocated on quality indicators as part of the yearly funding and the variation in the proportion of quality-based funds received by universities. The variation in funding, either total or quality-based, is computed as the difference in funding between 2010 and 2005, the latter being chosen as a baseline due to the fact that inflation was relatively stable during this five year span. The other independent variable used is also the difference between the per cent of funds received by universities in 2010 on quality indicators and the per cent of allocations of this type in 2005.

For testing the hypothesis of a correlation between funding and performance I have ran several regression models. The first two do not include the variables of interest, being meant as a baseline for the rest of the models. In the first model, the only variable directly connected to financing that was included is the variable measuring differences in the number of equivalent students, which is not significant. In the second model I've included a variable accounting for the variation in the total amount of funding received by universities, which has a significant positive impact on the number of highest ranked study programs of the universities.

Beginning with model 3 I have included in the analysis the variables of interest. In model 3 I've used the variable referring to the variation of funding received based on quality indicators, which is positively correlated with the dependent variable and significant. In model 4, I have used as predictor the variable referring to the percentage of funding received on quality indicators. This variable is not significant, but its effect on the dependent variable is extremely high - an increase in the percentage of QI funding accounts for thirteen more study programs with an A ranking.

In addition to these I have ran two more models, in which I used as control variable the variation in total public funding received between 2005 and 2010. As both the QI funding and the percentage of QI funding should be highly correlated with this variable, in these models I have also included interaction terms between the variables of interest and the control.

Table 1: Effect of funding based on quality indicators (QI funding) on A-level programs

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	-6.929**	-4.985*	-5.005*	-8.931
University age	0.045 *	1.441	0.015*	0.044*
Quality evaluation	4.138.	3.040.	3.259.	3.961.
Total number of fields	0.229***	1.471**	0.157***	0.233***
Variation in student numbers	0.0006		0.00021	0.0006
Variation in total funding		1,610***		
Variation in QI funding			0.00028***	
Variation in QI funding percentage				13.393

Given the small population of universities on which I have analysed the impact of the variables of interest, I have also ran simulations to estimate the marginal effects of the quality-based funding. Graphically, the results of models 3 and 4 are show that there is a positive correlation between quality based funding and the number of fields ranked A.

Figure 1: Effects of quality-based funding (in amounts) on the number of A-ranked programs.





Figure 2: Effects of quality-based funding (in percentage) on the number of A-ranked programs



4. Conclusion

The results of this empirical analysis indicate that there is a positive relation between funding received on quality criteria before 2010 by Romanian public universities and their performance in the 2011 evaluation. The implications of this finding are twofold. On the one hand, it indicates that quality-based funding did have a positive impact on higher education institutions and that it has encouraged them to improve their performance, or at least to conform more to demands concerning quality and performance. On the other hand, it may indicate that these organizations have successfully adapted to the policy setting of the 1999-2010 and have learned how to function in the new institutional environment. In any case, it offers some proof of responsiveness to an institutional change and that there is a feedback mechanism between institutions and those directly affected by them.

However, these are just a set of preliminary conclusions, useful in opening a further research agenda. In order to fully test the hypothesis of institutional changes leading to modifications of actors' behavior it would be interesting to see if there were such adaptive effects immediately after the new funding formula was introduced. Also, it would be interesting to study the consequences of the new ranking system of 2011 being established and producing effects in term of funding. Finally, the model should be improved by looking at the temporal evolution of these institutions, and by a more in-depth consideration of the effects of specific quality indicators.

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STUDYING CAUSAL INFERENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. THE CASE OF EXPERIMENTS

*Andra-Maria ROESCU**

Abstract. *This paper touches upon a long discussed issue in research methodology: the problems that arise when trying to make causal inference in observational studies. The starting point of the paper is the fundamental problem of causal inference, defined by Holland (1986) and the counter-factual framework. Given this framework, I analyze the experimental methodology as a possible solution to these problems. I provide a short definition and classification of experiments and discuss their feasibility and utility in measuring causal inference, using examples from the field of political science. I conclude that experiments can indeed surpass some of the most frequent problems with observational studies and that this type of methodology brings added value to scientific research by allowing the experimenter to have the control and variation that can seldom be found in real life situations.*

Keywords: *causal inference, counterfactual framework, experiments*

Trying to establish causal relations is the purpose of any scientific research endeavor. However in most observational studies problems arise due to the fact that most effects we observe have several causes and we end up not being able to distinguish between the separate effects that each has. In order to establish causal relations, we usually need to compare groups of individuals that are otherwise identical, except for the feature we are interested in. For example, if we want to establish the effect that education has on income, we should compare individuals that are the same age, the same gender, live in the same environment and so on. The comparison is valid if all these features are identical, so that we can actually attribute any change in income to the change in education. If the groups are not identical on some variable except education, we cannot distinguish the effect of education from the effect of this other different variable. However, in practice, not all causes that influence the effect, in this case income, are known or can be controlled. In other words, to be held constant. This incapacity to isolate the element that we are interested in from some other potential causes of some effect we are observing might lead to incorrect causal inference and predictions. One way to overcome this shortcoming of the observational studies is to turn to experiments, especially laboratory experiments, which allow the researcher full or at least greater control over all the causes that might generate an effect. In most cases, the experiment is a

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simplified model of the reality which we want to study produced in a controlled environment, which is usually the lab, where the experimenter can decide what to keep constant and what to vary. Thus, using experiments, the researcher can isolate the cause he or she is interested in and study the outcomes it produces, while holding all other causes constant. However, issues regarding the selection of the participants into the experimental and control group might still arise. Then, there are the issues regarding the internal and external validity of the experiment. The *internal validity* refers to how appropriate the experimental design is for measuring what we want to measure or in other words whether the experiment actually captures what it was intended to capture. The *external validity* refers to the degree of generalization of the results. Are the results applicable to other populations, other time periods or other locations? Finally, issues regarding the applicability of experimental results to real life situations might also arise. Can the experimenter, in a lab setting actually create the incentives that exist in real life?

Although experiments can also lead to problems, I argue that a good experimental design, driven by theory and repeated experimental sessions can lead to credible and valid results that can have a real contribution to scientific progress by helping improve old theories or help construct new ones that fit the empirical data better.

The article is structured as follows: the first section introduces the counter-factual framework with which most studies regarding causal inference operate and the problems caused by its assumptions. The second section defines and classifies experiments and discusses their utility in overcoming the problems mentioned in the first section. The third section discusses the issues that may also arise with experiments and offers some potential solutions and the fourth section concludes the paper.

1. The counter-factual framework and the fundamental problem of causal inference

We always use causal statements to try to explain the world around us, no matter whether to talk about everyday events or about scientific research. For example we might say that we have passed an exam because we studied hard or that children who have parents with a high level of education are more likely to have higher education levels themselves. However, unless we conduct scientific research, we rarely think about what these statements actually imply. That is, that in making these statements we are actually comparing two situations or states in which all other things being equal, the presence of that element which we have identified as the cause determines the effect which we observe. Using the same examples, in the first we are saying that if we could observe a state where we went and took the exam without studying, all other things being equal, we would not have passed. In other words we are comparing a world where we have studied for the exam and passed with a world which is exactly the same, except that we did not study for the exam and did not pass and conclude that we passed the exam because we studied for it, not because the teacher liked us, not because it was warm outside and not for any other reason. Thus, having studied for the exam is the actual cause of passing the exam. Moving to the second example, we are saying that if we could observe the same child with and without parents with higher education, or two children that are otherwise identical except that one comes from parents with higher education and the other one does not, the likelihood of having higher education is higher for the child with better educated parents. That is, out of two children who the same intelligence levels, have been exposed to the same experiences, have had the same education etc., the one with better educated parents will be better educated himself, in comparison with the other child.

However, even as scientists, we can seldom have access to data about people or situations that are identical in all other respects except the one we are interested in. Or, to frame it in an even more convincing manner, in most situations we can observe only the result of having taken a certain decision and not the result which a different decision might have led to. We can only observe the results of the exam after having studied for it, we cannot also observe the outcome of the situation where the same person would have shown up to take the exam without having studied. In other words, in most cases, a person or a situation can only be observed in one state or the other, but almost never in both. However, when making causal inference regarding the cause that led to a certain effect, we are always making comparisons regarding the two states. This is what Holland (1986) has defined as the fundamental problem of causal inference. And because of this problem, we are always in a counter-factual framework when trying to determine the cause that led to an effect.

The counter-factual framework can be best explained using the language and example of experiments in the medical field. Imagine two groups of patients who are identical in all or at least in most of the relevant respects: medical history, predisposition to diseases, age, gender, lifestyle etc. Now imagine that we want to test a new drug which would be the treatment and we only administer it to only one group and not the other. This would mean allowing for the second one to be the control, or simpler put, allowing us to observe what happens to the second group when they do not get the treatment in comparison to what happens to the first group when they do. In this setting we can only observe what happens to the first group after taking the medicine and to the second group after not taking the medicine, but we cannot observe what would happen to the first group if they had not taken the treatment or to the second group if they had. However, the goal is to say something regarding the effect of the medicine and we thus conclude that it can be measured by measuring the difference between the mean health state of the treated group and the mean health state of the untreated group, which would be, in technical terms, *the average treatment effect*. However, in doing so, we are implicitly assuming that the treated group would have behaved the same way as the untreated group, had they not been treated and the untreated group would have behaved (had the same reaction to the medicine) as the treated group, had they been treated (Morgen and Winship, 2007: 31-58). The same holds if we extend the model to more than two potential outcomes or groups and to other fields from social science. Returning to the example with the children of high and low educated parents, the same logic applies. Whether we are doing an experiment or just testing this hypothesis using observational data, we are making the same assumptions, that the groups we are comparing are similar in all other respects except the factor we are interested in and that each group would behave as the other if the first group would be in the same situation as the second and vice versa. For example, when running a simple regression on the results of a simple survey, we are comparing the two categories we have talked about earlier: the children with high educated parents, which would be the *treatment group, where the treatment is having parents with high education* and the children with low educated parents, which would be *the control*, as they don't get exposed to parents with a high level of education, which was the treatment. In this setting, holding everything else constant (like intelligence levels, place of residence etc.), the results of the regression tell us to what extent the education of the parents influence the education of the children and thus, to what extent we can use the parent's education level to predict the child's.

A serious problem arises from this logic, because we can only assume that the treated would behave as the untreated if not treated and vice-verse, if and only if the two groups are otherwise identical in all relevant respects, except for the fact that one group got the treatment and the other did not. However, we almost never operate with complete information about our data in observational studies, mostly because information is expensive and also because some factors that might influence the two groups might not be known or might be ignored by our theory. Therefore, the causal inference we make might be misleading or bias and might lead to incorrect predictions (Morton&Williams 2010, McDermott 2002, Morgen and Winship 2007)¹. In less technical terms, there might be some unobserved factor that might make the two groups different besides the level of education of their parents and that factor might also have an effect on the children's education level.

In experiments however, because we can control all or most of the relevant factors and only alter one, the one we are interested in, we can attribute any change in the effect to this alteration, with a high degree of certainty. Therefore, the rest of the article concentrates on experiments, because when experiments are feasible to conduct and if correctly conducted, they are the most efficient scientific method of research. However, this is not to say that experiments do not have limits, flaws or shortcomings.

II. Experiments: definition, types and features

In order to define and classify experiments, I first turn to experimental economics and use Vernon Smith's view on theory(1989, 1994) as a starting point to define and provide some general characteristics of experiments. Then, I move on to discuss particular characteristics of each type of experiments and some problems that might be associated with that particular type of experiments. There is a variety of experimental methods that are currently used in social sciences in general and in political science in particular. The most commonly encountered ones are laboratory, field an survey experiments. However there can also be computer simulations, natural experiments and thought experiments.

According to Vernon Smith(1989:152), a theory has three main components: *the environment* – which would comprise all the characteristics of the agents: utility,

¹ There are of course a series of techniques that can be employed to get more precise estimates for the causal effect. For example, the sample can be randomized to resemble the experimental setting. Randomization in very simple terms would mean splitting the sample into two groups by assigning individuals to one of the groups in a random manner. The expectation is that though randomization all unobserved elements that might have an effect are equally distributed between the two groups we are using to make causal inference and therefore the effects drop out when estimating the average treatment effect. We can also use instrumental variables that influence the cause but are in no way related to the effect except through the cause. We can also study the mechanism through which the cause influences the outcome. Or we can condition (control) for all variables that we believe might create an indirect link between the cause and the effect, by using for example a regression where all factors that might influence the effects are included as co-variates. Also we can do matching according to some propensity scores calculated on some relevant observed variables. The idea behind matching is that we can get a more accurate estimate of the causal effect if instead of comparing all the individuals in the sample we only compare those that are as similar as possible in all other regards (using some control variables like socio-demographic data and other variables that are believed to have an effect on the dependent variable) except the feature we are interested in. This way the comparison will become more credible, even though this means shrinking the sample. For a more detailed discussion on this issues see Morgen and Winship (2007)

preference functions, initial endowments, production or cost functions etc; *the institutions* – the set of rules that constrain the behavior of the actors and turn actions into outcomes and the *behavior of the actors* – the choices they make given their characteristics (the environment) and the rules (institutions) that link choice to the allocation of resources. Therefore, behavior is a function of the environment and the institutions under which the agents interact and most theories in social sciences try to explain and predict behavior in different environments or under different institutions. However, we cannot establish the cause of a behavior we observe if both the environment and the institution or institutions vary and this is the most frequent case in real life situations. For example, if we try to study the effect as particular electoral system has on the voters' behavior, we should compare at least two choice situations which are identical, except for the electoral system in place. But two elections usually bare differences on many level, in the stakes, the closeness of the race, the state of the economy, the period of time etc. With so much variation it is difficult to distinguish the effect of the system from all the rest of the factors. We can explain voting behavior by looking at the electoral system only when everything else is constant or we can explain behavior by looking at the some feature of the environment, for example stakes of the elections, only when all else, including the electoral system is constant.

Therefore, to put in more general terms, in order to test hypotheses regarding the agents' behavior we should either keep the institutions constant and vary the characteristics of the environment, thus assessing the effect that different initial endowments for example, have on behavior or we can vary the institutions while keeping the environment constant, thus assessing the impact of different institutions on behavior. Unfortunately, in real life, aside from the complexity of the situation and the entanglement of factors, except for natural experiments, we might also have a problem with the variation of key interest factors. Variation of these factors tends to be insufficient or occurs during long periods of time, which makes comparative analysis difficult. For example, we cannot assert the effect of the electoral system if we do not have elections held under different systems, because we know nothing about what happens when the system changes. Also, as already hinted by the above example, in most real life situations it is difficult to discriminate between the effects of institutions and the environment, especially since they act simultaneously. Moreover, both institutions and the environment have multiple components which interact and cannot be easily isolated for analytical purposes. It is for this reason that most analytical models use simplifying assumptions in explaining facts, by taking only some factors into account and considering the others to be constant, even if they are really not constant, which always brings noise to the results. Even so, sometimes these simplifications are not enough to allow for the separate analysis of the effects that each causal factor produces. Therefore, experimental settings are often advocated as a means to control for the noise introduced by external factors, or to generate new research data. The most widely used types of experiments are field and laboratory experiments. The wide use of lab experiments is due to the high degree of control that they allow researchers. They mimic the main causal factors included in the theory in a controlled environment in order to test their effects. In contrast to field research, laboratory experiments allow for the isolation of causal factors and for an analysis of their individual impact in a controlled and especially designed setting.

Thus, experiments can be defined as intervention into the data generating process by the experimenter (Morton and Williams 2010). Following McDermott (2002), we can also define experiments in the following way:

“[...] I take the term to refer primarily to laboratory studies in which investigators retain control over the recruitment, assignment to random conditions, treatment, and measurement of subjects.” (McDermott, 2002: 32)

Or, in Vernon Smith’s terms, experiments would be a controlled setting in which we can define the environment and the institutions under which agents interact and observe their behavior. Of course, in order to determine to what extent the effects we are observing are due to the cause we have identified, either a characteristic of the environment or an institution, we should always have at least two groups which should be otherwise identical except for the characteristic which we are interested in, just like in the examples above for observational studies. We can thus discriminate between the two groups by the presence or absence of this characteristic. The group that has the characteristic, for example the group interacts under a certain institution, is known as the *treatment group*, while the group that does not have that characteristic is known as the *control group*. If and only if these two groups are otherwise identical, i.e. have the same environment, the difference in behavior between the two groups can be attributed to the institution under study.

In order to ensure that the two groups are as similar as possible, we should always be careful to select the same type of people in both groups. However, even if we were to use all information we had about these individuals to divide them into two identical groups, there still might be some unobserved characteristic that might make them different. The solution in this case would be to use *random assignment* into the two groups, so as to ensure that whatever unobserved or unknown characteristic makes them different will be balanced among the two groups and thus the effect will cancel out when measuring the difference between the groups. For example we cannot say anything about the effect of education on income if we compare a group of only men to a group of only women. But if we randomly split in two the population of men and women, having both men and women in each group, we can safely say that whatever difference might be produced by gender differences is present in both groups and cancels out when studying the difference in income between the two groups.

Another important aspect of experiments that needs to be taken into account is whether we would like to have a *intra-subject* or a *between subject* design. The first one refers to the situation where we observe the same subject under both treatment and control. Although this is not always possible, it could be a solution to the fundamental problem of causal inference, because we are no longer assuming that the treatment would behave as the control if it were control and vice-versa because we actually know how the treatment acts when it becomes control and we can observe the same individual in both states: treatment and control. For example, if the same individual votes under different rules while holding everything else fixed, we can compare the participant’s choices under the various rules to identify the effect of the rule on vote choice. We know how the individual behaves under each rule, out of which one is control –the baseline and the rest are treatments. However, another issue arises with this type of design. That is, whether the order in which the subject is exposed to the rules, or treatments in general, also plays a role in the subject’s vote choice or behavior. We could imagine for example that the subject would want to be consistent and chose the same candidate to vote for no matter which rule is in place. For this reason, when using an intra-subject design we should always be careful to randomize the order in which subjects are exposed to different treatments so as to cancel out the effect that the ordering of the treatments might have on behavior.

The second type of design, the between subject design, is the one we have been talking about up until now. It is the situation where the two groups, treatment and control, are composed of different subjects. In this situation, our main concern becomes the validity of the comparison between the two groups, thus dealing with the issue of the fundamental problem of causal inference. In other words, we should remember that we are assuming that the treatment group would have behaved the same way as the control, had it not been exposed to the treatment and vice versa.

Now, let us turn to *laboratory experiments* and their particular characteristics. When running a laboratory experiment we usually take a student sample, create the environment and institutions and let them interact in this controlled environment to draw conclusions regarding their behavior. The net advantage of running laboratory experiments in comparison to other types of experiments is that the experimenter has full control over the environment. However, a number of issues are associated with this type of experiments.

First, if we are doing a laboratory experiment, we might be concerned about the extent to which we can actually assume that individuals inside the laboratory behave as they would should they find themselves in the same situation in real life. The solution found to this problem by economists was to use financial incentives to create the stakes for the decision making process (Smith 1994). There are two types of financial incentives. The first type is a show up fee, which is fixed and ensures that people will turn up to participate in the experiment. The second is variable and is dependent on the actions taken by the participants during the experiment. The second type of incentives can also be used to induce the preference structure necessary to test hypotheses drawn from a theory that requires participants to have a certain preference structure (Morton & Williams 2010).

A further complication with laboratory experiments regards the choice of subjects. The most common used type of subjects are students, first because the experimenter usually has easy access to them. Secondly because they are used to following instructions. However, one might wonder to what extent the student population resembles the rest of the population and whether it is justified to generalize conclusions drawn on student samples beyond students. We will come back to this issue later on, when we address the question of external validity in experiments.

Let us take another example from political science to clarify what we mean by treatment and control groups, random assignment and financial incentives. Say for example we would like to study the effect of voting rules on vote choice, using the spatial model developed by Anthony Downs in 1957. Downs (1957) idea was that there is a uni-dimensional ideological continuum where both voters and parties can place themselves. In this setting, the voter will vote for the party that has the closest position to her own. Using this setting, Van der Straaten et al (2010) have studied strategic and sincere vote under 4 rules. They have designed a 0 to 20 continuum on which they placed 5 parties. Then they randomly assigned a position to each participant and told them that they would win 20\$ minus the distance between them and the candidate that wins the elections. Participants were also informed of the positions of the rest of the players in the game and played 4 rounds for each of the rules under consideration. In this case, the plurality rule plays control for the other 3 which are treatments (2 round majority, approval and single transferable vote) and the incentives induce preference between the candidates, each voting preferring the candidate closest to her position. Thus, sincere voting can be determined if the voter chose the candidate closest to her and strategic if she chose a candidate that was further away if the closest candidate had no chance to win. By

comparing the amount of strategic vote carried out under each of the rules, we can determine which voting rule creates more incentives and opportunities to vote strategically (Van der Straaten et al 2010).

There are a number of advantages in doing laboratory experiments, some of which we have already mentioned. The experimenter has full control over the environment, institutions and interactions of the subjects. Secondly, because they are usually done with students, they are relatively accessible and cost effective. Thirdly, they are quite flexible, as a large number of repetitions can be done as a robustness check of the results and also a number of elements like characteristics of the environment or institutions can be varied, one at the time, to study the effect of the change on behavior and outcomes.

However, a series of objections regarding the use of such methods in economic and political research have been raised, especially concerning the external validity of the results obtained in the lab. In order to strengthen the experimental results obtained in the laboratory, most researchers undertaking laboratory experiments (e.g. Ostrom 2006) argue in favor of mixing research methods and in favor of several repetitions on different populations if possible. For example running a student experiment on other socio-demographic category.

Or, another way to test for the external validity of the lab results is to do *field experiments*, which are the second type of experiments discussed here. Field experiments use real life settings to study causal inference, still making use of random assignation between at least one control and one treatment group. Although the researcher's control over the variables under study is far less and the possibility to vary the environment or the institutions is quite small, it has been argued that field experiments do have some advantages over lab experiments (Carpenter et al. 2005). Student samples are replaced with ordinary people, thus obtaining a more representative population from a socio-demographic point of view. Furthermore, because field experiments are generally carried out in real life circumstances, when agents are confronted with real choices, they do not produce the artificial setting lab experiments are often accused of having. For example, field experiments studying voting rules are generally carried out during real life elections, where people are asked to rank the real candidates (or parties), according to different electoral rules (e.g. Laslier and Van den Straaten, 2008). Also, participants in field experiments are believed to be more experienced with the type of choice situations studied in the field than students in laboratory experiments. Thus, field experiments can prove to be a very useful research tool in electoral studies, especially when field research is completed with laboratory experiments where the researcher can better control and test causal inferences advocated by voting theories and confirmed in the field.

Because the experimenter has less control over the situation in the field, some specific problems can also arise with field experiments. For example, random assignation of subjects to particular groups might not be effective and the treatment might not reach the participants it has been intended for. In this case we are dealing only with the intention to treat and this might lead to sample selection bias (Morgen and Winship 2007). Let us take another example from the field of political science to explain. The study by Gerber et al. (2000) on the 1998 elections in New Haven, Connecticut, is very useful. The idea behind this field experiment was to study the effect that different campaigning methods had on voter turnout. Three main treatment conditions were used: receiving a letter reminding people that there would be elections and they could vote, receiving a phone call with the same message and finally receiving a visit from a candidate or a volunteer inviting people to vote. Of course there were also mixed treatment conditions used for

some groups. For the purpose of the experiment, the population of the city of New Haven was randomly split by area into several groups, each of which received one or more treatments and also leaving one group with no treatment. After the elections, turnout rates by area were measured and compared to see whether there was any difference between the treatment groups and the control.

Of course some of the letters did not reach their destination or were not read by the voters. Some voters did not answer their phone or door although several attempts have been made. Also, the experimenter had no control over communication and information spillover between groups. Thus, for some people there only existed the intention to treat, and not the actual exposure to treatment. However, the experiment does have the advantage that it targeted real voters and real elections with real candidates.

The third type of experiments that we are going to discuss here are survey experiments, usually done over the internet on large representative samples. The idea behind survey experiments is that of repeated measures. We first measure the variable of interest, for example attitudes towards immigrants. We then expose participants to a treatment, which is usually done through vignettes, which are hypothetical scenarios. Finally, we measure the variable of interest again after the exposure. For example, we would first ask how likely it is that a person would accept an immigrant for a neighbor. We then provide a vignette that give a face, a name, an occupation and some background information about a particular immigrant and ask again how likely it would be for the participant to accept that particular immigrant as a neighbor. Or, to take another example for electoral studies, we might be interested in how positive and negative information during the electoral campaign would impact vote choice. For this purpose we should first see how likely it is for the participant to vote for that particular candidate and how strongly she likes the candidate. We can also run a pre-experiment survey or use the first measurement in the survey to randomly assign participants to different vignettes. Then we could provide some vignette in the form of a newspaper article providing either positive or negative information and measure vote choice and attitudes towards the candidate again. However issues regarding sample selection might arise. For example, how representative is the sample that has access to internet in a country where internet is not so widely spread. Also, we have to be very careful regarding our choice of vignettes and test whether they are credible to the participant and actually impact in some way the participant. Finally, there is also the issue of whether the statement made about this hypothetical situation would actually be what that person would do should she ever be confronted with this choice in real life (Gaines&Kuklinski 2007).

The fourth type of experiment that we will consider is the natural experiment. Natural experiments refer to real life situations where someone other than the experimenter randomly assigned different conditions to different groups. Although the experimenter had nothing to do with the assignation process, she might still use the results to analyze the effect that the change has had on the outcomes (Morton&Williams 2010). To give an example, imagine a situation where the authorities of a country decide to use different electoral systems in different areas of the country for the same elections. This situation would be ideal to test the effects that varying the voting rules has on vote choice. We would however still have to consider the extent to which the resulting groups are similar enough to allow for comparison. Do the people in the two groups have the same levels or education, income, gender distribution etc.? Are the areas similar enough from a socioeconomic point of view? Are the same parties proposing candidates in all areas? These are questions we

should answer before running any analysis on the results. On the other hand we could of course always turn to matching, to only compare the most similar parts of the groups.

The next type of experiments we will consider have a long tradition in political science and are starting to become more and more widely spread as computer power increases. These are of course computer simulations. The difference between usual experiments and simulations is that in most simulations we already assume the data generating process and use it to generate the data and examine the effects that the process might have over time. Maybe the most famous example from political science are Axelrod's tournaments (1984) regarding the repeated prisoner's dilemma game². Axelrod used computer simulations to see what happens to a population of different strategies over time if they played prisoner's dilemma with each other over and over again. His aim was to see which strategies were evolutionary stable, that is, which strategies increase in number over time and become dominant and which disappear from the game.

Simulations can also be used to compare voting rules for example, and the outcomes they produce for different profile preferences of the voters or, to test different properties of voting rules (McCabe-Dansted&Slinko 2006). It is especially useful in cases where new rules are used and little is known about their effects.

Finally, the last type of experiment we will consider here is thought experiments. These experiments ask questions about what would happen if we changed a single element of the situation we are studying. This type of experiment is usually the product of counterfactual thinking. Morton&Williams (2010) offer historical examples of this: what would have happened if Great Britain had confronted Germany before the Second World War? Although these experiments are useful in thinking about our research questions, they are not actual experiments as defined at the beginning of this section. However, it is good practice to always start with a thought experiment when deriving testable hypotheses regarding our theory and use them as a starting point for designing adequate research methods.

III. When and why use experiments? Advantages and potential problems

As previously mentioned, it is good advice to always think about what would be the ideal experiment to study any research question we might have. However, it is not always possible due to human and material resource costs or ethical issues. To take an example, it would be useful perhaps to run an experiment in all areas of the country but this would involve extraordinary human and material costs.

Or take the famous example of Milgram's experiment (1974) on people's propensity to obey even when this means hurting other people. Milgram invited people to the laboratory and asked them to apply electric shocks to other people as an incentive to perform better in learning exercises. The participants were told that there is another person in the other room whose task was to learn words and then repeat them and that each time

² The prisoner's dilemma game is a classic in game theory. Its aim is to show how individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. Its starting point is a story of two prisoners captured by the police and questioned separately. Each prisoner is informed that if she confesses and turns on her partner she will walk free, while the other prisoner gets 10 years. If both confess they both get 5 years and if none of them confess then they get 2 years each. Each prisoner also knows that the other prisoner has received the same offer, so they both end up confessing and get 5 years each, to avoid the worst situation where the first doesn't confess but the other one does and the first one get 10 years. Although both would be better off not confessing, the individual rational response, because their outcome also depends on the other person's choice, they both choose to confess. (Miroiu 2007)

that person got a word wrong, the participants should apply an electric shock. The shocks should increase in intensity with each mistake. The results showed that the great majority of people applied the most intense stock they could even though that could have seriously harmed the other person, should they have been really tied to the stock machine, even when the other person complained, cried for help and asked the participant to stop applying shocks. Although participants were informed at the end of the experiment that the person in the other room was not actually tied to the machine and was not actually harmed, the experiment still raises ethical issues as the experiment might have caused psychological damage to the participants applying stocks.

The previous example provides a good opportunity to talk about deception and consent in experiments. It is the economists' position that we should never use deception in experiments. Participants should always have full information regarding the situation they are in, the choices they can make and the consequences of each choice. The main argument for this is that deception compromises the results of any future experiment in which a participant from a deception experiment might participate in (Morton&Williams 2010). This is because the participant might not believe the experimenter in the future or act as if deception would be involved thus biasing the results. Therefore, we should always find designs that do not involve deception. Should this not be possible and should deception be essential to our research question, we should always inform participants in the end that deception has been used. Even if deception was not used, it is always important to debrief participants at the end of the experiment.

The second issue concerning participants is having their consent for participating in the experiment and for using the results afterwards. This also relates to deception as, in order to obtain an informed consent, participants should have full information regarding the content of the experiment.

There are however plenty of situations where running an experiment is not too expensive and there are no ethical issues, or there is a way to deal with them. In this case, if we decide to run an experiment we should pay special attention to two issues in particular, which we have briefly touched upon at the beginning of the article.

The first one is internal validity. To what extent our experiment measures what we intended it to measure. In other words, did we correctly identify and isolate the causal chains? Is the simplified theoretical model we are reproducing in the experiment (especially when we are talking about lab experiments) still able to tell us something about the causal chain? In other words, does the experiment resemble real life enough to draw conclusions regarding causality? (Guala 2005). In order to achieve internal validity we should always rely on theory when choosing the experimental design to study our research question. We should also pretest all our instruments to make sure that they operate the way we intended them to and that participants understand their task and react to the incentives. If the design is too complex to follow or if the financial incentives are too small to motivate participants then we might not be able to create an appropriate design for our research question. We should also be careful about experimenter and experiment effects, as participants might behave differently because they are in an experiment or they might behave the way in which they think we expect them to behave (Morton&Williams 2010).

The second one, which is more difficult to achieve is external validity. To what extent can our experimental results be generalized to other populations, to the same population under different circumstances or to the same population under the same circumstances in different periods of time? (Guala 2005) In order to achieve external validity in experiments we should always do as many repetitions as possible on different

populations, in different circumstances and in different periods of time. This subject has also been touched upon for the specific case of type of experiments.

Talking about experiments in economics, Hoffman&Spitzer (1985) argue that we can only use our (lab) experimental results to explain real life situations and make predictions if and only if we are willing to assume the following: people prefer a larger gain to a smaller one; the same human behavior rules apply both in real life and in the lab; the main institutions that govern the real life situation have been included in the experiment.

Furthermore, there is always a trade-off between internal and external validity (Guala 2005) which can easily be explained by the fact that the more specific the experimental design is, the more difficult it is to generalize the results to other circumstances. The reverse is also true. The more generalizable the design is, the less internally valid it is, because it loses a lot of the specific characteristics when just restricting the design to those that are common to more than one situation. And, on top of that, there are still the issues with the fundamental problem of causal inference specific to any between subjects design. Therefore, designing an experiment that is both internal and external valid is no easy task. One additional solution, besides doing several repetitions and varying some of the characteristics for robustness checks, is to use mixed methods. We can either use several experimental methods, thus canceling out some of the specific problems with each, or we could use both experimental and non-experimental methods and compare the results (Ostrom, 2007).

Finally, after the experiment we should also do a post-experiment questionnaire to get some extra information regarding the participants (if we have not already done that using a pre-experiment questionnaire) and also check participants' understanding of the experiment. We can also use the questionnaire data to check how balanced our groups are on a series of observable variables after randomization or we could use them to build propensity scores and do matching on our sample for a cleaner estimation of the causal effect.

Leaving aside all the methodological issues that might arise when designing and conducting an experiment, let us now concentrate on the utility of experiments in social and/or political science. Vernon Smith (1994) identifies a variety of situations in which experiments prove to be quite useful:

- a) To test a theory. The experimental setting offers the cleanest test for theories. By recreating the main constraints on behavior advocated by the theory and blocking out all real life disturbance factors, the theory has optimal conditions to predict behavior. If the theory fails in these ideal conditions, then there is little chance of producing correct prediction in the real world;
- b) To explore the applicability field of a theory or in other words its prediction area. We can relax one assumption of the theory or modify one parameter to check whether the theory can still produce correct predictions in this situation;
- c) To discriminate between 2 competing theories. We can use experiments to produce enough variation so as to check which theory produces correct predictions more frequently, or which has the wider field of applicability;
- d) To identify the reason for which a theory fails in producing correct predictions. In the lab we can isolate and test each of the assumptions of a theory and identify the one that does not hold, thus contributing to the development of better theories;
- e) To identify empirical regularities that might lead to the formulation of a new theory. In a simplified setting, like the one in experiments, regularities can be

- more easily identified and thus can lead to the extension of old theories or the development of new ones;
- f) To compare different environments. We can compare behavior in different environments while holding the institutions constant and thus check how robust an institution is and also test its effects on behavior when the environment changes;
 - g) To compare institutions or to test out a new institution. The same idea as before applies, we can keep the environment constant and vary the institution;
 - h) To evaluate public policy proposals. We can run experiments to test the effects of a new public policy without having to undertake the social cost of a real life pilot and the data gathering process associated with it.

Therefore, experiments can also be used in theory building or altering, thus contributing to the progress of science. Experiments provide the theories with the cleanest test, in a controlled environment without all the noise present in real life situations. And should the theory not be able to pass this test, then it should definitely be revised and improved and experimental results are also the place to start. We can start re-questioning our core assumptions, even if they have all been assumed as true and check the limits of the theory and then move on to expand and alter. Thus, in this respect, by altering parameters, environments or institutions, experiments can also be used to check the falsifiability of a theory (Popper 1981, 2005), by finding situations where the theory doesn't apply, explain why and then make the necessary changes to widen the field of applicability of the theory.

Of course, depending on the purpose we have, one or more experimental methods might be useful. Also, depending on the situation, we might opt for an intra-subject (if possible) or a between subject design or test out both and check for differences. However there are two things to keep in mind when doing any experiment. Pre and post-experiment control is important. We should always use randomization methods to assign subjects to groups and we should always check to what extent our randomization has succeeded in providing balanced groups. Should there be any imbalance left, post-experiment methods of control like matching should be used.

IV. Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to discuss the fundamental problem of causal inference in most observation studies and different types of experiments as a solution around this problem. The net advantage of experiments is that they can be used to isolate the causal effect between the cause and the effect, because by directly manipulating the cause we eliminate all other elements that might have an effect on both the cause and effect, causing problems when trying to make causal inference. Also, experiments allow for variation of the cause that is rarely encountered in real life situations, especially in short periods of time. Finally, experiments usually allow replications for robustness checks. However, there are a series of problems associated with all types of experiments. Laboratory experiments might create an artificial environment which does not resemble real life situations and might not allow for generalization of the results due to the use of student samples. Field experiments lack the control which we find in the lab and might cause sample selection problems and spillover effects. Survey experiments might only reach a certain type of population and also people might not perceive or react to the vignettes the way they are supposed to. Also, there is believed to be a significant

difference between stating that you would do something in a given situation and actually doing it should you even find yourself in that situation.

However, with all their problems, well designed experiments might lead to better estimates of causal effects not only because of the high level of control and variation, but also because sometimes it is possible to have intra-subject designs. Having intra-subject designs allows us to avoid having to make the assumption that treatment and control groups would behave exactly as the other group if they had been assigned the opposite condition. In other words the treatment group would have behaved as the control had it been assigned control and control would have behaved as the treatment had it been assigned treatment.

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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN ROMANIA FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE: THE ONLINE VOTER

*Paul APARASCHIVEI**

Abstract. *The online political communication in Romania has developed in the recent years, along with the growing access to Internet of the Romanian citizens and with their more intense activity on the social networks. The present paper focuses on the Romanian voter with access to Internet, as target of the online communicational effort invested by the political parties. The study shows how many voters actually have access to Internet, which are their preferred platforms and, thus, creates a profile of the online behaviour and media consumption of the voters of the main political parties in Romania.*

Keywords: *internet, online profile, voters, social networking sites*

Introduction

At present, the political and electoral confrontation in Romania uses all communication channels. Along with the transformation of the national media landscape, including here the emergence and evolution of new media, the Romanian political communication sees itself in front of a new beginning. The reshaping of the media landscape (Dobrescu and Bârgăoanu, 2003: 83; Gurevitch, Coleman and Blumler, 2009) maintains some actors, such as the television, at the top of the voters' preferences, dethrones others, such as the written press and promotes in the public space new ones, which only now reveal their political and electoral potential. We are talking mainly about the online channels, which, in the context of the development of electronic communication networks in Romania, have begun to have a more and more important role in the communicational effort of the political parties and leaders (Guțu, 2007: 152; Sălcudeanu, Aparaschivei and Toader, 2009).

In this general context, the parties as well as the politicians can ask themselves where, in the midst of all this dynamics and transmutations are their voters? What effort must they invest and on which channels must they deliver their message, in order to reach a large share of their voters?

In recent years, the academic literature has presented several studies on the changing model of political communication, and on including new media in the strategy of the classic media (television, newspapers, radio) to remain connected to the new trends in online communication (Norris, 2001: 163). All these developments have resulted in a structural change in political marketing and, thus, the communication and presence of political actors in the public space has been adapted to come into compliance with current communication trends

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(Negrine, Lilleker, 2002). Specifically, changing media consumption behaviour has led to a change in style of political communication, namely to the adaptation of political actors to the new channels to which the average consumer turned (Römmele, 2003).

Regarding online political communication, Romanian literature offers a number of studies and analyses on various election campaigns that offered as many examples of using new media in political and electoral communication (Guțu, 2007: 152; Sălcudeanu, Aparaschivei and Toader, 2009; Dumitru, 2011, Alexandrescu-Fieraru, 2011; Barbovschi, 2008; Pătruț, 2011; Momoc, 2011). Most of these studies are concentrated, however, on the political actors and not on the electorate. Basically, we found out what were the key moments when the Romanian parties and politicians have chosen to communicate online, we examined the communication strategies they used on the Internet, but we know little about the online profile of political supporters. There are numerous analyses about how politicians have used blogs, websites or platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to communicate with voters in Romania. There are not, however, studies to consider whether the political communication and electoral communication conducted on certain online platforms is also effective. Basically, except internal studies, conducted by the staffs of the parties or politicians, there is still no academic work to examine to what extent the supporters of a particular party or politician are present and active on the platforms in question.

Whether it analyses in terms of quality the form in which the politicians have communicated online (Sălcudeanu, Aparaschivei and Toader, 2009: 114) or approaches the online communication networks built around politicians and the impact of a particular online platform, such as the blog (Dumitru, 2011: 183; Sălcudeanu, Aparaschivei, Toader, 2009: 51; Pătruț, 2011: 57), the existing literature in Romania does not offer a concrete portrait of the media preferences and media consumption behaviour of the users from the other side of the computer. Except for some information about socio-demographic characteristics of social democrats voters on the Internet (trafic.ro), there is not a clear and updated image of the online media consumption preferences held by the Romanian voters.

The present study provides an empirical investigation of consumer preferences of traditional and new media in Romania, as they were revealed by a sociological research, representative at national level. Since the electorate's media appetite for political subjects' increases during election campaigns, the survey was conducted in a non-election period, during March 2012, in order to capture the usual media consumption behaviour of the Romanians, correlated with their political preferences.

New media and political communication – the USA model

Internet and social media is a complex object of study, the main reason for this being represented by the very essence of these media, which is their speed of change and expansion. Therefore, a comprehensive definition and classification of social media are processed from year to year; currently, there is a variety of services and niche channels, plus always other and other innovations. In addition to forums and Wikipedia, blogging platforms, podcasts or sites with photo and video content, the recent years brought an extremely intensive development of micro-blogging platforms and social networks.

Internet adoption within the extended political communication mix has been achieved for the first time in the U.S. election campaign. Even since 1992, the staff of the Democratic candidate for presidential elections, Bill Clinton, posted on Internet information such as campaign speeches, programmatic and biographical documents about the candidate (Bimber and Davis, 2003: 21). The target audience of this this initiative was primarily a specialized audience: the journalists connected to the Internet, who also had limited access to the new

communication space. The original purpose of the online presence of the candidate was the swift transmission of information towards the traditional media (Bimber and Davis, 2003: 22).

The growing number of Internet users, but also the decline of print media are two processes whose development heavily impacted media consumption behaviour of U.S. voters (Latimer, 2009: 1023-1040). Coupled with the emergence of new online communication platforms, but also with the enhancement of the bidirectional nature of communication on the Internet, the role played by the online presence of the candidates has grown significantly, both in the public's and political actors' perception (Ryan, 2010: 164). The Internet began to be widely used by potential around the year 2000 and, therefore, the stake of online presence began to be considerable for the campaign staffs of the candidates (Farmer and Fender, 2005).

2004 is considered a turning point in reinventing the online electoral communication. At that time, the presidential campaign imposed on the U.S. landscape of electoral channel a new media which, in the coming years, would become one of the preferred technologies used for political communication: the blog (Lawson-Borders, Kirk, 2005). David D. Perlmutter (2008, p. 160) believes that we can start to talk about imposing the blog and other social media in political communication mechanism only since 2006. In the time span between the 2004 presidential elections and 2006, these new media have legitimized a lot, being adopted by a growing number of American politicians (Williams and Gulati, 2007). New media thus gained the attention of the press, the politicians and the voters so much, that in 2008 the essential question was not whether a team is expected or not to introduce new media in the electoral communication mix, but what was the most effective way these media should be used in order to create a single social network that would ensure political participation on the Internet, and consequently, in the offline dimension (Perlmutter, 2008: 160-161; Panagopoulos, 2011: 1-18; Druckman, Kifer and Parkin, 2011: 21-47).

The entire process, developed organically over 20 years, aims to transform the macro level of how to plan, develop and evaluate political campaigns, not only in the United States of America, but throughout the entire today's world. Through an unprecedented promotion and cross-border expansion, the online electoral communication today is not confined only to the transmission of information to a captive and passive audience. Along with the development of new communication platforms, different media consumer behaviours emerged, that have led to patterns of behaviour on the Internet, depending on the platforms of communication used. The same is true, as we shall see, with the Romanian voters, who are Internet users.

The Internet and new media in the political communication in Romania

Romania has made important steps in reducing the digital divide that has characterized the country in early 2000, when a computer or an Internet connection was available for only a limited part of the country's population (Georgiadis, 2004: 96). More specifically, in 2001, only 3.1% of the Romanians had Internet. Of these, the vast majority of connections were made up of dial-up subscriptions. In terms of Internet access, only 9% of Romanians ever used the Internet, 44% from public places, 31% from the office, 13% from the universities and 11% from home (Bjola, 2001). At a distance of 10 years, over 8.5 million Romanians, representing 39.2% of the total population had access to the Internet. Even if these figures show consistent improvement in the rate of Internet penetration in Romania, the country ranks last at the percentage of residents who use the Internet, according to the classification of the EU Member States (Internet World Stats, 2012). Although there is still a relatively small number of Romanians connected to the

Internet, the situation is somehow compensated in terms of the speed of the existing connections. In 2010, the Internet connection speed in Romania was the fastest in Europe and fourth, reported worldwide. In 2012, Romania ranked 13 worldwide and is ranked 10th in Europe, with an average speed of 6.6 Mbps connection (Akikai, 2012).

In terms of using new media, the latest statistics provided by Cristian Manafu show that the Romanian social media landscape is in a mature stage, given the statistics about the number of social media users in Romania. Thus, at the time of writing these paper (July 2012), there were 4.9 million Facebook users, 754,000 accounts on LinkedIn, 52,000 Twitter users and over 64,000 blogs (Manafu, July 2012).

An extensive sociological study of how the Internet is used in Romania and what is the Romanians' behaviour on the Internet was conducted in March 2011 by the Romanian Institute for Assessment and Strategy (IRES), at the command of the Romanian Association for Assessment and Strategy. From a sample of 1,146 individuals aged 15 and over, living in the urban area, it resulted a subsample of 731 respondents who were Internet users. The sociological research has succeeded in providing some important answers about online consumer behaviour of the urban Romanians voters. Reported to the subsample of respondents who said they use the Internet, some of the data results are important: 71.4% of Romanians use Internet daily; 97% of them have Internet access at home; the share of connections through phone or TV cable is equal, of 45%; 96% of Romanian Internet use in order to be informed.

The IRES research provides information about the behaviour of Internet users who want to inform themselves online. Thus, the news portals (34%) or newspaper sites (29%) are preferred by the Romanians who want to learn about daily events. Only 5% of Internet users said they use blogs as their main source of information. Among the topics most sought on the Internet, we find sports subjects (18%), politics (16%), entertainment and health (both 15%).

Out of the Internet users interested in politics, who seek information on the Internet, most of them are over 65 years (47%), followed by those aged 26-45 years (21%) and 46-65 (18%). Reported to the subsample, young people are less likely to seek political information online. In terms of education, Romanians with higher and secondary education are most interested in political issues on the Internet. If we look exclusively to the political information consumption on the Internet, it results a cognitive dissonance, given by the fact that older people are most likely to use new media for information on political events, while young people are less likely to do so.

An item worthy of attention, included in the research, is the extent to which Internet users in Romania follow or access the website of a political party in Romania. It appears that only 4% of those with Internet access have visited the website of a political party at least once. Out of these, according to an open question in the questionnaire, the Liberal Democratic Party website is the most visited (38%), followed by pages of the Social Democratic Party (19%) and the National Liberal Party (13%). This element can be an indicator of the political profile of Internet users, and will be further looked upon in this case study analysis.

Nonetheless, the IRES sociological research has some shortcomings that do not allow it to provide a clear picture of the online consuming behaviour of Romanians, linked to their political preferences. First, the sample in question is exclusively urban. It results that the data presented above is subject to significant corrections if we would added the population in the rural areas in Romania. The users share would decrease significantly and, most likely, the online behaviour patterns identified by the sociological research would suffer certain corrections. Therefore, a new sociological research is required, one to

follow closely the relationship between the political preferences of the Romanians and their online media consumption.

Political context

For a better understanding of the data provided by the sociological research, it's important to add context to the research data used, by briefly mentioning the social and political reality existing in March 2012, in Romania. The main governing party, PDL, had just come out of one of the most difficult socio-political periods of the last years, marked by public rallies in the Bucharest and other 60 cities (Realitatea.net, 2012). Romanians had went out into the streets in January and February, asking for the resignation of the Government, Prime Minister Emil Boc (president of PDL at that time) and President Traian Basescu (elected president in 2009, former President of PDL, perceived by the public opinion as politician close to his former party). The political and electoral erosion of the party had been a continuing process that had been lasting for three years, since it took over governing (Palada, 2012).

In order to manage the political situation, on February 6, Emil Boc submitted his resignation as a Prime Minister and President Traian Basescu proposed a replacement in the person of Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, who was also in charge of forming a new government (Mediafax, 2012). As of February 9, Romania had practically a new government, which was supported by the votes of the same parliamentary majority. The purpose of this new appointment for Prime Minister, besides the obvious social relief, was the revival of the ruling parties, synonymous with a restoration of the right in the perspective of the local and parliamentary elections that were to take place in Romania in just a few months.

On the other side, in the context of the general social discontent, the opposition grew in the voters' preferences, in two distinct directions. In the context of the austerity measures imposed by the Romanian government in the last three years, voters in Romania turned mainly to the Social Liberal Union (USL), the main parliamentary opponent force, consisting of three parties (Social Democratic Party, National Liberal Party and Conservative Party). Also, another part of the electorate turned to the People Party of Dan Diaconescu, who grew steadily by promoting an aggressive rhetoric against the entire political class in Romania and promoting itself as an alternative.

The research design

The raw data analysed in this study come from a survey conducted by the Sociological Research and Branding Company (CCSB), which have been made available to the author of this research, at his request. The sociological research was conducted in March 2012 and consisted in interviewing the adult, non-institutionalized population of Romania, using the CATI method (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing). The questions in the survey were related to notoriety of main political actors, the level of trust and intention to vote. The sample surveyed was a national one: 1,104 interviews were conducted, the sample being a multistage cluster with probabilistic selection of individuals. The sample was validated based on the INSSE 2009 data and on the 2002 population census. The tolerated research error is 3%, at a 95% probability level.

The variables initially included in the sociological research which will be analysed in this study are the voting intention for parties in the future parliamentary elections and the daily use of information sources (television, radio, newspapers and internet). In addition, the survey followed the time periods of use of the information sources and the fields of interest of the population surveyed. For reasons exclusively related to self-

imposed analytical limitations for this study, the further research will focus on the analysis of the media consumer behaviour, correlated with the intentions and political sympathies of the Romanian electorate.

The questions that this study aims to answer to are:

1. What is the most used source of information, correlated with the political preferences of Romanians? On what place is the Internet, in the top of the most used information sources in Romania?
2. How one characterizes the Internet usage behaviour of the Romanian political parties supporters?
3. Which is the political party most voted by the Internet users in Romania? Is there a political party that may be considered to be preferred by the Romanian electorate present on the Internet?

As shown by the research questions also, it must be emphasized even from this stage of the study that the present paper does not wish to outline the socio-demographic profile of Internet users based on their political preferences. What this paper aims is to subtract the general media consumption preferences of the Romanian citizens, considering first of all their political preferences. Thus, the purpose of this study is to identify the main online platforms used by the Romanians voters, in order to portrait the Romanian voter in terms of online media consumption.

The research results

According to the survey, the political situation in March 2012 complied with the electoral trend traced up to that time. Of all citizens eligible to vote, USL had a 27% voting intention, while PP-DD and PDL each had 8%. Other parties were favoured by a total of 7% of Romanians. Out of the Romanians decided to go to vote, USL benefited of a 54% voting intention and PDL would have been voted by a 16% share of the electorate, this placing it on an equal position with PP-DD, which also received 16% of the voting intention of voters. Another 14% of Romanians would have opted for other political parties.

In terms of media consumption (see Table. 1), the most used source of information is television, followed by radio, Internet and newspapers. Newspapers are read more often (27-30%) by USL (especially those who prefer PSD) and PDL voters, and less by PP-DD voters (17%). Radio is more listened by PSD voters and less by PNL or PP-DD voters, while the Internet is used more often by PDL and PNL voters and less by PSD and PP-DD supporters. The TV news is often followed by USL voters (especially those who prefer PSD).

Table. 1. The most used source of information, correlated with political preferences

	Newspapers	Radio	Internet	TV News
TOTAL	21%	48%	40%	82%
USL	27%	49%	36%	92%
PSD	30%	53%	33%	94%
PNL	24%	41%	40%	85%
PDL	27%	50%	55%	87%
PP	17%	35%	21%	85%
Undecided	16%	49%	42%	74%

At a first look, the electorate most likely to use the Internet for information is composed of traditional right-wing voters, whether we refer to PDL voters, or to PNL

voters. If we look at the USL social-liberal electorate, we notice that its voters have an overall below the average utilization of the Internet as an information source. This is explained by a lower share of Social Democrat voters who choose Internet as main information source (33%) compared to the liberals (40% - the national average). But what really attracts attention is the considerable above average share of Liberal Democrats present on the Internet (55%). Basically, they are 15% above the national average, making PDL the party with the most potential voters on Internet, both in terms of access and daily use of this channel.

Another important dimension to establish a profile of Internet users in Romania correlated to their political preferences relates to the purposes for which the Romanians use the Internet. Thus, online news and videos on YouTube is the most frequently accessed content by Romanians (about one third of the population and over half of those with Internet access). Blogs are accessed only by one of five Romanians with Internet access, similar to the Trilulilu site. Hi5 and Twitter are rarely accessed by Romanians.

What we see, compared to the sociological study of IMAS, is that a much higher share of Romanians began to access the blogs. Basically, almost 10% of the population access the blogs frequently, compared with only 5% a year ago, which practically means a doubling of the potential audience won by blogs between 2011 and 2012. A special role is played by Facebook, a social network accessed by 53% of Romanians with Internet access. Here too one can see a spectacular evolution, given that in 2011 around 40% of Internet users said they had an account on a social network, and in 2012 over 50% of Internet users say they have a Facebook account.

When these data are correlated to the political preferences of Romanians, it results an interesting situation: we can identify which are the new media preferred by voters of the major parties in Romania. According to Table. 2, online news platforms are more accessed by voters from PDL (45%), USL (32%) and less by PP-DD voters (11%) or undecided voters (24%).

Regarding social networks, these are especially sought by PDL, PSD and PP-DD voters with Internet access. USL voters (especially those of the liberals) or people who don't adhere to a clear ideology tend to be not so present on Facebook. In what concerns sites with video content (such as YouTube or Trilulilu), they are popular especially with PDL and PP-DD voters, rather than with USL voters.

As a preliminary conclusion, according to research data, USL have a consistent consumption of online news and content published on blogs, but are less present on social networks and on video sites. PSD voters comply with the USL electorate pattern, underlining however that social democrats are more present on Facebook and inform more from blogs. Liberal voters, on the other hand, are less likely to be present on Facebook and more likely to be present Hi5 and Trilulilu. In their case, we observe an average consumption of online news, behaviour which complies with the general line identified among the of USL voters.

The results concerning the PDL voters draw attention. This party has the voters who have the highest intake of Internet content in all fields and on all platforms. In their case, YouTube is on the first place and is followed by Facebook, online news, Trilulilu and blogs. Even on Twitter, a platform on which the presence of Romanian users is very low, the presence of the liberal democrat electorate (4%) is two times the national average (2%). Most clearly, the democrat liberal voters are the ones most present on all channels, placing themselves above the national average on all platforms analysed.

Regarding the PP-DD voters, the situation is characterized by a low level of Internet access. Out of those who, however, have Internet access, most prefer social

networks and sites with video content such as YouTube or Trilulilu. For the undecided voters, YouTube is the most accessed platform when browsing the Internet.


Table 2. Accessed sites, out of the total sample, according to voting intention

	News	Blogs	Facebook	YouTube	Trilulilu	Hi5	Twitter
USL	32%	10%	22%	26%	7%	4%	2%
PSD	29%	11%	25%	24%	6%	3%	3%
PNL	32%	6%	19%	33%	12%	6%	2%
PDL	45%	16%	46%	57%	24%	4%	4%
PP	11%	1%	19%	22%	12%	4%	0%
Undecided	24%	7%	27%	33%	10%	3%	2%
TOTAL	28%	9%	28%	33%	11%	4%	2%

We later calculated the electoral potential of political parties among those using / not using the Internet. The aim was to identify where are the latent voters of each party, which is to identify to what extent the Internet presence of a party may give it an electoral competitive advantage in the future. Out of Romanians who do not use the Internet, 29% would vote for USL, 4% for PDL, 12% for PP, 6% for another party, while 40% are undecided and 9% would not vote. Basically, USL has built a public speech that has the ability to attract most of the Romanians who do not use the Internet daily.

On the other hand, out of the Romanians who use the Internet daily, 25% would vote for USL, 12% for PDL, 4% for PP, 31% are undecided and 10% would not vote at all. Although the USL electoral potential is confirmed in this case too, attention is drawn by the online voters who prefer PDL three times more than Romanians who have never used the Internet. Basically, this indicator too confirms the potential offered by the online environment to the Democrat Liberal Party and the presence of a latent electorate on the Internet, willing to vote for them.

Fig. 1. Voting intention correlated with Internet usage



Having identified the presence of the Romanians on the Internet, their preferred platforms and to which extent the online presence or absence of the political parties in Romania can bring them votes, we will further consider an element, independent of all information presented above: the period of Internet use. The exact period in which voters of political parties use new media is extremely important for any practitioner who wants to maximize the effect of the political content posted online among the target audience, and for any researcher who aims to identify online behavioural elements of Romanian voters.

In terms of the period of Internet use, most of USL voters (57%) read news online during the day, either in the morning (33%) or in the afternoon (24%). 43% of USL voters with Internet access read news online, in the evening. Browsing the blogs, Facebook and YouTube is usually done by USL voters in the second part of the day, at night (50-70%) or in the afternoon (23-32%) and less frequently in the morning (10-12%). PSD voters do not differ to much from the liberal ones in terms of the period they access the Internet, with some emphasis that the latter use the Internet more frequently in the afternoon and in the evening. Most of PDL voters prefer to surf the web in the evening, whether we talk about news sites, YouTube or blogs. As a general conclusion, Romanian voters tend to inform themselves and browse the Internet especially in the evening or at night.

Research conclusions

The stratification of population based on access to Internet, online media usage and preferences of accessing the Internet is also reflected in the different behaviours of voters belonging to various parties. Most of liberal voters have Internet access (approx. 60%) and use it quite often, most of them for news and movies, while social networks are used less frequently. Among PSD voters internet access is lower (approx. 40%), as they are bigger consumers of traditional media (including radio) compared to liberal voters. Among those who use Internet, online news, social networks and blogs are accessed more frequently. The USL voters present a behaviour which unites the two sub-electorate groups, PSD and PNL, with an average level of Internet use and with an above the average consumption of newspapers and TV. The news is read especially at day, while evening is reserved for recreational activities.

PDL voters are the ones most drawn to new media and read newspapers more often. PDL voters enjoy the highest Internet access and they use it most often, both for information and to watch movies or listen to music and to cultivate contacts with friends on social networks. PP-DD voters consume to a lesser extent any media, except for TV. Internet access is relatively low (less than 30%) and when they spend time online, they prefer social networks such as Facebook or Hi5 and sites with video content, such as YouTube, Facebook or Trilulilu.

However, these data can only begin to draw the profile of the Romanian voter present online and must be regarded as a starting point for further and more in-depth research on the matter. Even so, the data gathered so far show that USL is well represented in households without Internet access or where Internet use is not a habit; on the other hand, PDL is better placed among Romanians with internet access. Nonetheless, the research also reveals that heavy online users are also those less likely to vote. Basically, this affects mainly PDL, a party in an identity and popularity crisis, which relies, as the study shows, on the support of most of the Romanians active online. They are, however, as mentioned, the same citizens who may not come to vote. This may produce a boomerang electoral effect for the Democrat Liberal Party, in the parliamentary elections to come.

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MASS MEDIA AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

*Andreea Elena CÂRSTEA**

Abstract. *It has been argued that the changes produced at the level of communication channels and means strongly influenced and constantly influence the configuration of the public space. Starting from Habermas' model of public sphere, I intend to find out how the reality of a more and more technologized society determines reconfigurations, redefinitions, diversifications and fragmentations of the public space. The role mass media plays in this equation is highly controversial and there are discussions underlining both positive and negative effects provoked by the mass communication means to debate and free exchange of opinions in the public space. On the one hand, it is obvious for everyone that mass media and new media contribute essentially to the exceeding of the territorial borders and to a more wide-ranging access to information and arenas of discussions and debates, but, on the other hand, the commodification and the commercialization introduced by mass media and the politics' intrusion in information diffusion tend to transform the real debate into a simulated debate. In this context, it has been reasoned that the only possibility to preserve a real debate and to favor equitable information is to maintain a free and open mass media able to ensure the diversity and pluralism of expressed opinions and points of view.*

Keywords: *media public space, television, debate, democracy*

1. What is public sphere?

The definition of the concept of public sphere knew more stages and the numerous studies regarding the diversification of communication means brought a large amount of new lights and shadows regarding the concept and its characteristics. Generally, the public sphere (or public space) is regarded today as any form of association in the name of dialogue and free debate. The public sphere is nor singular (as in a singular institution, group or category of institutions or groups), nor unitary. New researches and discussions emphasize the fragmentation of the public sphere produced as a result of the differentiations provoked by the spreading of mass media and new media, but they agree upon the fact that the main characteristics of all kinds of public spheres are interaction and the unrestricted exchange of opinions or points of view. In the vision of some authors, the public sphere includes all areas of public life – Internet forums, rubrics reserved to the free expression of public opinion in the newspapers, magazines or TV shows – where citizens can express freely, without censorship's menace, their opinions regarding the matters of the day. According to this approach, the public sphere can be defined as including “all physical or virtual locations where relevant ideas and feelings are freely expressed”

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(Bennet and Entman, 2001: 2-3) and as enclosing “the communicative institutions of a society, through which facts and opinions circulate and by means of which a common stock of knowledge is built up as the basis for collective political actions: in other words, the mass media, which since the eighteenth century have evolved into the main source and focus of a society’s shared experience” (McNair, 2003: 20-21). According to other theories, public space is a sort of “red wire” that determines and leads the communicational action, but also leads the becoming of the politics and the constitution of the social connection (Miege, 2002: 168).

The difficulties of the definition of the public space are thought to be related to the ambivalence of the notion. Referring to any frame of interaction and exchange of opinions, the concept “covers at the same moment one or more physical locations (agora, saloons and coffee houses, squares, Parliament etc.), but also the constitutive principle of a political action that takes place in one of those places, action that we define as democratic (the open debate as opposed to secret matters)” (Chambat, 2002: 69).

2. Public Sphere – the Initial Model

The founder model of the concept of public sphere was proposed and defined by Jürgen Habermas in his fundamental paper *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* and starts from the premise that the public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*)¹ presupposes the gathering of a number of people having equal rights with the explicit purpose of debating public matters. Consequently, “the subject of this publicity is the public (*das Publikum*) as a carrier of public opinion (*öffentliche Meinung*)” (Habermas, 1993: 2).

According to Habermas’ theory, the emergence of public sphere or public space can be placed in the 17th and 18th centuries, in the saloons from London, Paris and other European cities where people gathered to discuss matters of the moment. “The bourgeois public sphere can be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor” (Habermas, 1993: 27). So, in the initial model of public space the debate is characterized by direct interactions between individuals interested to discuss and to understand the public issues.

The emergence of mass culture and mass media changed the appearance of the debate by introducing different intermediates in the equation. And, by modifying the debate and the exchange of opinions and ideas, these transformations at the level of communication resources changed the character of the public sphere. Subsequently, it can be argued that, by the constant transformation in the rules of interaction and debate, the public space is permanently reconfiguring. The growth of mass media and especially of mass entertainment leads to the necessity of redefining public space accordingly with these new factors that determine a huge variation of the border between private and public.

Also, according to Habermas, the last transformations that took place in mass media and political communication provoke a sort of degradation of the public debate, the politics being rather settled in Parliaments and in mass media than through open exchange

¹ The origin of the term is to be found in the antique Greek culture and is related to the distinction between the polis sphere (called *koine*), which is accessible and common to all free citizens and the private sphere of every individual (called *oikos*, *idia*). The Greeks also used the term *bios politikos* when talking about the public life that developed in the *Agora*. In the Roman culture we find an equivalent in the construction *res publica* (Habermas, 1993:3; Marga, 1985: 80-81).

of ideas and points of view. He also affirmed that there is a huge risk to witness how commercial interests overcome public's interests. Hence, Habermas considers that the traditional public sphere stands under the danger of degradation because of the excessive commercialization of mass media and because of the political intrusion which tries to confiscate the debate and lead it into a desired direction, transforming it into a mere mockery of debate.

3. Mass-media and the redefinition of the public sphere

The studies post Habermas insist upon the fact that although the perils and threats identified by Habermas continue to exist, they are partially attenuated by the diversity of mass media sources and by the fact that the media channels are trying to become authentic public spaces. Subsequent studies about the role mass media plays in the reconfiguration of public sphere emphasized that the accent is moving upon the description of the new public sphere, a media public sphere, whose specificities relate to the diversification of the methods to transmit information and upon the role of intermediary that mass media and, more newly, new-media began to play. In this informational society the public sphere fulfills mostly the "function of a mediator" between different social groups, institutions and organizations, between diverse identities and affiliations (Beciu, 2009: 102). Having a larger area of information the individual tends to adapt and vary the character and the typology of public debate.

The communication and information channels and resources are essential in the configurations of the public sphere. It is only natural to argue that every new means of communication provoked some kind of rearrangements at the level of public sphere by establishing a number of diversifications and fragmentations provoked by the emergence of different groups of interaction.

The commencement and development of televisual communication is seen as the big revolution in the reconfiguration of the public sphere. Recent approaches consider that the mass-communication corresponds to a "technical and cultural revolution" (Lecomte, 2004: 8). They speak about the emergence of a so called "catholic agora" (Lecomte, 2004) as a space for debating ideas. In this context, through the realization of a "discursive configuration of opinion and willingness of a public formed by citizens", the public sphere becomes "the fundamental concept of a normative theory of democracy" (Habermas, 2005: 36). As a result, we can talk about a "deliberative democracy", model that "has its roots in the intuitive ideal of democratic associations, in which the justification of terms and of the association conditions comes from a public argumentation and judgment of equal citizens. In such an order the citizens share through a public reasoning a common engagement regarding collective problems and consider as legitimate the fundamental institutions if these ensure a favorable frame for a free public deliberation" (J. Cohen in Habermas, 2005: 36). According to this theory, essential for democracy is the guarantee of a debate frame that is equilibrate and unbiased and permits to different categories of people to freely express their opinions. The relation between democracy and mass media determined many evaluations and the conclusions of such evaluations lead to the idea that between democracy and mass media is a mutual relation, the good functioning of one determining the good functioning of the other. "The democratic procedures are endorsed by the public means of communication which, functioning as warning mechanisms, bring into requisition new and controversial opinions about the dangers that one way or another endanger different communities or the world" (Keane, 2000: 144-145).

In the preface he has done for his fundamental paper about public sphere after 30 years from its first edition, Habermas affirmed that the emergence of the informational society changes the frame of the problem and that the interactions that characterize the public sphere fold to the new realities. The annulation, the breakage of the borders can provoke feelings of uprooting and “a multiplication of roles” (Habermas, 2005: 45). Subsequently, the informational society produces some kind of isolation and alienation and also a profound modification at the level of interaction manners, but doesn't annul the interaction. The direct contact becomes more sporadic, the relation transform from physical into virtual ones, the people are more spectators than actors, but they are still part of a public sphere characterized by the debate upon the important matters of the moment. This process leads to the creation of more “plural and autonomous” public spaces (P. Chanial in Charaudeau and Ghiglione, 2005: 55). In this context, mass media's growing importance is the direct result of the necessity of a professional activity that will contribute to the “publicize of social practices and representations” (P. Chanial in Charaudeau and Ghiglione, 2005: 55). According to this approach, the media is the bearer of a double role, first the role of witnessing the things that can be seen or heard and second the role of a mediator preoccupied with its own publicizing. By proposing genres like televised debates, talk-shows, the televisual communication imposed a new formula of deliberation in the public sphere and produced the transformation of the citizen into a spectator (Charaudeau and Ghiglione, 2005: 55-56). Later, new media, Internet, through its ensemble of social network sites (like *Facebook*, *twitter*, *My Space*), blogs, video-sharing sites (*YouTube*, *Vimeo*) and discussion forums (of institutions or physical persons) contributed to the redefinition and enlargement of the public sphere, but also to its fragmentation. The transformations emerged along with this new mean of communication accentuate the tendency towards the overlap of the public and private spaces, as seen in the double meaning of this process. On one hand, we witness a development of individualization through the process of assuming control and, on the other hand, we notice the emergence of new opportunities for socialization. Subsequently, some scholars consider that the new technologies “participate to the redefinition of the frontier between public and private”, insisting upon four essential properties of the informational society: technicalization of relations, commercialization of communication, fragmentation of the publics and the globalization of informational fluxes (Chambat, 2005: 76).

The settling of new types of interactions, the change at the level of mediation from one frame to another, the role that the intermediate assumes, all lead to the emergence of the so called “partial public spaces”, which, at least apparently, “don't communicate with each other” (Miege, 2005: 178). Miège considers that the fragmentation of the public sphere is provoked by more causes. As a first cause he identifies the grown asymmetry created as a result of the fact that people more often interact with communicational devices that are administrated by social institutions which allow only “partial and predetermined interactions”. Second, he names the inequality of participation, referring to the fact that people have different degrees of access to information (some have access to secret information, while others know only what the newspapers or the TV show). Another cause, related to the previous one, is the huge inequality of access to modern means of communication and information. And the last cause of the fragmentation is the more complex administration of social and cultural consensus, which implies the fact that the dominant social classes usually have control over the means of communication (Miege, 2005: 178).

We notice that any definition of the public sphere should take into consideration the transformations produced by the emergence of the new communicational and informational techniques which twisted not only the debates rules, but also their development frame. The public that participates in the debates is obviously enlarged, but also divided by interests and access.

4. Television and the emergence of a new kind of visibility in the public sphere

Numerous discussions refer to the relation between mass media in general, and television in particular, and democracy. It has been argued that “historically, television was heralded as the ultimate instrument of democracy. It was, as no other medium, destined to unite us, educate us and, as a result, improve the actions and decisions of the polity” (Denton, 2000: 91). Following the same line of reasoning, “the notion of accountability is essential to the notion of democracy. Because citizens delegate authority to those who hold office, politicians are accountable to the public for all actions and deeds” (Denton, 2000: 92). Television, as any mass media channel, has an important role in informing the citizens about the actions of political actors. In any democracy the citizens delegate their powers to the politicians who must act in direct relations to the undertakings that brought them the trust of the citizens. In this equation mass media plays the role of the “watchdog” that observes and informs about the deeds of the political actors. Mass-media fulfills more functions, essential for the democratic process. They have to *inform* and *educate* the public, giving the right amount of information that permits to the public to see the entire picture. Other functions of mass media are to “provide a *platform* for public political discourse (...) give *publicity* to the governmental and political institutions and (...) to serve as a channel for the *advocacy* of political viewpoints” (McNair, 2003: 21-22). In order to ensure a complete and real picture about the political environment mass media has to present all versions of the fact, the diversity and the exchange of ideas being the core of democracy. “A free marketplace of ideas is vital for a thriving democracy. Diversity of thought and respect for dissent are hallmarks of the values of freedom and justice. When multiple viewpoints are heard and expressed, the «common good» prevails over the «private interest»“ (Denton, 2000: 93).

In order to be the “watchdog” of the democracy, mass media channels need to guarantee the free exchange of ideas and different viewpoints, according equal rights at expression to all actors involved in the political process. In this context it seems quite natural that the genres mostly used in the political journalism are debates, talk-shows and interviews (McNair, 2002; McNair, 2003; Charaudeau and Ghiglione, 2005), genres that permit both the free expression of ideas and the dialogue between participants, creating the frame for deliberative confrontation.

Television changed the character of political communication more than any other mass media channel. Through its combination of image and sound, through the combination of more images and more sounds in simultaneous presentation, television provoked an intensification of political communication and transformed it in something less controllable by the political actor. Permitting a huge visibility for the political actor, the television produced a need for an increasing professionalization of political communication. As a result of the changes there appeared a need for professionals of political communication, the so-called “spin-doctors”, with the direct mission to “sell” the politician, to make him appear in a positive light, to make his imperfections appear as simply human and unimportant mistakes and to amplify his quality and education. The politician is the subject of a new kind of visibility (Thompson, 1995; Thompson, 2005:

31-51)² provoked by the fact that the information environment became “more intensive, more extensive and less controllable than it was in the past” (Thompson, 2005: 48-49). As a result the political actor is more often the victim of different types of scandals (sexual scandals, financial scandals, what we could call “declaration scandals” or gaffes)³ and the role of the spin doctors is to prevent or solve this type of situations.

Consequently, political journalism changed in the past decades, mass media – especially television - using more and more narrations and interpretations while presenting and discussing politics. Brian McNair, among many other authors, noticed that “the media alter the message” and that political communication “is largely *mediated* communication, transmitted through the print and electronic media” (McNair, 2003: 29). Researchers identify a menace in this strong mediation because, by inducing phenomena like extreme commercialization through scandal and tabloid approaches to diverse subjects, mass media develop a so-called “spiral of cynicism” (Cappella, Jamieson, 1997), which could be characterized as the negative tackling of all situations both by the mass media and by the political actors. The political situations are more and more presented in the terms of conflict, and the political confrontations look more like small battles in a generalized war. This approach in political journalism “invites the attribution of cynical motives to political actors in campaigns and public policy debates, not because voters are distanced from the process but precisely because they are drawn into it and, through a rational analysis of the politicians whose motives they have come to know, reject the actors and ultimately the process” (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997: 37). The result is a weaknesses chain, in which “reporters and politicians justify their own cynical discourse by saying that it is required by the other. By producing the predicted discourse, each reinforces the assumption the other brought to the exchange” (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997: 237). Investigating this phenomenon, Michael Robinson developed the theory of “video-malaise” (Robinson, 1976: 409-432), term similar to that of the “spiral of cynicism”, that would designate the Americanization and commercialization of political journalism. According to the “video-malaise” model the tendency is that the television focuses on negative news and mediates excessively the back-stage games, which results in a negative perception of politics and political actors at the level of the public with consequences in political participation (namely absenteeism and stand-off of the citizens).

The discussion about this phenomenon is not unidirectional and there are voices that sustain that the commercialization and Americanization of political journalism is not necessarily a bad thing, more important being that the television shows attract spectators and develop a sort of civic competences among citizens, necessary conditions for increasing the

² Thomas Mathiesen proposes the term *synopticon* to describe the society we are living in (along with the term *panopticon* proposed by Michel Foucault). According to his theory we live in a “viewer society” in which everybody sees everybody (the many see the few, but the few also see the many) (Mathiesen, 1997: 215-234).

³ John B. Thompson considers that the rise of political scandals is provoked not by a decline in the moral standards of the politicians, but by three other factors. The first factor, in his opinion, is the technological developments that make it easier to record or photograph anyone and to disseminate the information. As the second factor he identifies the changes in the culture of journalism, the rise of the so-called muckraking and investigative journalism (especially after the celebrity conferred to Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward by the Watergate scandal). A third factor, as is pinpointed by Thompson, is the change in the political culture, namely “the gradual decline of class-based party politics” and the weakening of the “strong contrast between left and right” (Thompson, 2005: 43-47).

interest regarding public issues. Pippa Norris, a supporter of this point of view asserts that “the news media have become diversified over the years, in terms of channels, availability, levels, and even the definition of news. This means that today information about public affairs (broadly defined) is reaching audiences over a wider range of societal levels and with more disparate interests. (...) A citizenry that is better informed and more highly educated, with higher cognitive skills and more sources of information, may well become increasingly critical of governing institutions, with declining affective loyalties towards traditional representative bodies such as parties and parliaments. But increasing criticism from citizens does not necessarily reduce civic engagement; indeed, it can have the contrary effect” (Norris, 2003: 318-319). Put differently, no matter the approaches used in political journalism and mass media in general, the debate and the free exchange of different ideas and opinions in the public space are seen as fundamentals of democracy.

5. Conclusions

The development of mass culture and of the technologized society determined and determines constantly reconfigurations of the public space. Seen as an interaction and debate space, the contemporary public sphere is divided, transforming into a conglomerate of partial, virtual and physical public spaces.

An important aspect regarding the character of the current public sphere is related to the importance mediation induced by mass media plays inside the interactions between individuals. Therefore, in characterizing the new public space – a media public space – the accent is moved upon the specificity of every method of transmitting information and upon the analysis of the intermediary role that the diverse media have.

An evaluation of transformations and reconfigurations of the public sphere is not possible in negative or positive terms, but has to take into consideration the ensemble of the processes that led to this reality.

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III EUROPEAN UNION ZONE – THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

Bogdan BERCEANU ⇔ The Dimension of Emerging Institutions in
the European Union Member States

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THE DIMENSION OF EMERGING INSTITUTIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES

*Bogdan BERCEANU**

Abstract. *The aim of the paper is to present the dimension of emerging institutions understood as changes created in the Member States by the pressure of the European Union. We expect to find through this work the nature of the emergent change understood as institutional change in public administration system and if this change leads towards one common model and as result to the disappearance of preexisting differences among Member States. The paper will make use of documentary research of national and European literature and regulations.*

Keywords: *Europeanization, European integration, institutional change, emergence, convergence, transition*

1. Introductory Notes

European Union (EU) through its policies and legislation has a great impact on economic and social conditions in Member States and thus on their economic competitiveness. As national public administrations as well as the judiciary are the guarantors for its implementation, the interest of Member States in public governance of other member states has increased over time. This interest in the administrative capacity and the judiciary is even greater in the European Union as regards to future member countries.

Putting aside the pure intentional objectives of political and ideological nature, the European Union can be seen as the most visible international actor in the institutional Europe of today. Since January 2007, 27 Member States have agreed on participating and contributing to common regional, social, agricultural and monetary markets, creating in between a single European space of security and defense. Conceding an amount of their sovereignty to the European Union, Member States have also agreed on accepting the European acts as a special category of external demands to which answering is usually imperative and driven by common formulated models, standards or institutional arrangements. Possible packages of alternative solutions, the latter seem to replace the decrepit internal institutional arrangements, with minimum effort and political debate (Andersen, 2004, p. 21 in Matei, Matei and Iancu, 2010).

The dimensions of cooperation between the EU and Member States, the permanence of those involved in European policies and the need to act at two levels - domestic and European - impose significant requirements to the governments of Member States. These requirements relate to creating and maintaining a complex system of

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horizontal and vertical connections in each Member State. Governments must make decisions concerning the scope of coordination procedures and structures suitable for the delivery and allocation of responsibilities (Kassim et al., 2000: 771).

Formal structures generate credibility by sheer virtue of their existence. In the various economic literatures described above, including the bargaining power literature, researchers either take for granted “institutional” status or assume that it generates credibility, or they attribute credibility to the status quo bias that characterizes a formal legislative construction as a result of the political transaction costs of changing it that is, overturning it, altering it, or reinterpreting it.

In these coordinates, an analysis of institutional change concerns on the one hand, the influence of local institutional framework conditions imposed by the EU accession process and on the other hand, after the time of formal accession, the ability to formulate strategies relations with EU institutions, while preserving institutional autonomy.

We will refer at these kinds of institutional changes caused by the EU at the state level with the term “emerging”.

The term “emerging” will be used in the paper to refer to countries that have a high volatility and that are in transition. These countries have to face with political changes, economic changes, social changes and demographical changes. This term will be used to define the changes the institutions and the public administrations of the European countries suffer under the pressure made by the European Union. The term is often used regarding the changing of the organizations in the public sector or the institutions for the same sector.

The observation that we can make when looking in the national arena from the point of view of the member states is an increasingly interactive interaction between both national and European institutions.

The institutions at the national level such as the government, the ministerial bureaucracy, and the regions are part of the system of the national public administration and it is normally that the research made in the paper to be also focused on the presentation of these emerging structures. A broader definition of institutions, and in relation with the meaning used in the paper, includes organizational structures, cultural elements, normative and symbolic influence actors (see March and Olsen, 1984: 247).

1.1. Theoretical background

According to Henisz and Zelner (2005: 362), an emerging institution in one sector whose consequences, procedures, or structural type differs from those of institutions governing other sectors, or an emergent institution that is adopted in isolation rather than as part of a broader “package” of linked, consistent reforms, is more susceptible to change than is an emergent institution that resembles established institutions or is adopted as part of a broader package of reforms.

Most of the new EU member states have adopted in the pre-accession period, administration reform models from existing offerings in the other more developed European countries (Goetz, 2000: 742; Bouchaert and Pollitt, 2000: 43). Adoption of best practices was, especially for new members of the European Union, the main trend in the European administrative process of adaptation.

The development of this process, after formal accession document, leaves open the question of identifying premises for institutional change under the influence of European Union membership. To determine the nature of these assumptions regarding a model of

institutional change in public administration it is useful to identify the coordinates of this change, regarded as a transition from one set of rules of the game to another.

It will also be taken into consideration that the European Union has a long tradition as a rule exporter in the analyses made in the paper. The empirical studies on the process of rule export from the EU to nonmember states support this argument. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, 2005b), Vachudova (2005), Lavenex (2006, 2008), Hofer (2007, 2008) cited in Renner and Trauner (2009: 452) and others use a rational external incentive model. They argue that “governance by conditionality” occurs in a hierarchical setting based on the export of predetermined EU rules. In the recent rounds of enlargement, the process of exporting those rules to non-member states remained patchy or slow unless the EU offered a credible prospect of EU membership and a credible linkage of membership with rule adoption.

During its four waves of enlargement, the Union has expanded its regulatory framework into candidate countries and has undoubtedly contributed to the democratic consolidation of new member states (Pridham, 1991: 45). This pre-accession process itself constitutes a rigid form of external governance since it consists precisely of aligning the candidate countries with the EU *acquis* (Renner and Trauner, 2009: 451).

1.2. The research and objectives of the study

Starting from these premises and under these conditions our research will go on inside this paper trying to identify the way in which the institutions from EU states become emerging, what are the conditions and the instruments that lead to this situation and if there are models which can be followed to realise the model.

In this paper, we attempt to provide some answers to the following related questions, which consists the basis of our analyses. The first research question is addressing the process of accession and integration of the European Union and the way in which it affects through its policies and legislation the institutional framework of the national states. The second question of this research is that it exists a direct relation between the emerging institutions and the European Union in terms of undertaking similar innovations and adaptations which leads towards one common model and, as a result, to the disappearance of preexisting differences among member states, in other words if the premises of convergence exist. Another question that we are attempting to solve is related with the causes that generate the institutional changes and the consequences of such changes.

The research will be focused on analysing the way in which the emerging economies can lead to the emerging organizations, institutions and then to the emerging of the public administrations. There will be taken into account the common features of the European states, respectively the transition these states have as the result of changing both the political regimes and the process of integration in the European Union.

As research methods used in the paper, we can mention: the systemic analysis method, encyclopedic method and the historical method. In this work it will also be used the specialty literature and researches made on the European Union.

2. Brief account on emergence theory

According to J. Huxley (in Corning, 2002: 5) the emergency phenomenon in the natural world implies a multi-level system which interacts with the two parts –the inferior and the superior of the system and or with the exterior or interior medium. Moreover, these emergent present systems have in their turn an up and down influence – especially in an horizontal plan.

There are a few relevant examples: the scholar system, the ecosystem, the political systems, the local societies, the interacting systems inside small groups and so on. These can be explained as: “an ensemble of unimportant elements which exist in different states or conditions. If the changes of state are measurable we can consider these elements as variable and the state of the system at a given moment will be the values list of these elementary variables” (Lugan, 1993: 4). All these mustn't take us to the conclusion that it is about a strange thing connected to the physical systems, because the feature of emergence is not limited only to the biological and physical systems but this is also characteristic to other social, economic, political or administrative systems, too. Thus, the emergence system can be found in different places such as the traffic models, towns, government political systems or economy and market phenomena, organizational phenomena when simulating on computer. Every time there is a multitude of individuals who interact with each other, many times there is a moment when the disturbance simulates order and something new appears: a model, a decision, a structure, and even a direction change, etc.

A system is an ensemble of identifiable, interdependent elements, connected between them by relations, so that if one of them is modified the others are modified too, and, as a consequence, the whole ensemble of the system is modified, changed. If we consider the public administration from the systems theory perspective, we can state that this implies studying taking into account the position and the connections with the other subsystems, connections which influence its own configuration. In this way, the administrative system appears as a component part of a more general part of a social order, which acts upon it as a constraint (Matei, 2000: 23).

During the last decades the word “emergence” was associated and used especially with the economic systems concerning the emerging economies or markets.

The term of “emerging market”¹ was introduced by Antoine W. van Agtmael in 1981 during a conference which was taking place in Thailand. In that period Thailand was considered a third world country and this expression used to discourage investors. So, van Agtmael used the word “emerging” to eliminate the negative shade. Presently, the word “emerging” as Ashoka Mody was referring to countries with a high volatility and which are in transition, facing economic, political, social and demographic nature changes. These economies have a more alert growing rhythm in order to catch up with the developed countries, offering the possibility to those more prepared people to take extra chances to get higher profits/ results

As we stated in the beginning, the public administration cannot be conceived as an independent system but as an assembly of interdependent elements, connected between them by relations, so that if one of them is modified, the others are modified and, consequently, the whole ensemble of the system is modified, changed. This system is one organised under the conditions of the economic and political systems which influence in a completely particular way the institutions from the public sector. There is no activity field where we do not have specific organizing forms based on the centralized or decentralized economics system which influence their features.


The national activity is made up of production and consumption. The companies, including here the State with its institutions and companies which produce, in their turn, goods and services, which are there offered to be used and consumed by the population.

¹ In the beginning, the definition of emerging market used to refer to capital markets from countries whose indicator (income per inhabitant) didn't overcome 10,000 US dollars

The Government is responsible with the social institutions, with the elaborating and planning the public policies. The public administration, through its institutions, supports the governmental policies and then the Government runs the policy (Nauro, 2009: 575-576). This situation leads us to an interdependence relation between the economic and public administration systems², the changes of the first system having in its turn positive or negative consequences upon the second system. So, we can say that the emerging markets or economies in a country or in a certain geographic area (like Member States which are from Central and Eastern Europe) which presents certain particularities, can inevitably lead to an emergence of the institutions of these countries.

The *point B* of the figure shows the connection between the administration represented by the institution of the government, the activity at the national level and the social performance of the national economy. The government is responsible for the social institutions and policy planning. The social institution sustains the government policy and then government executes the policy. At *point A* we can notice a lack of experience of administration and national activities. It is necessary for the emergent countries which are in the transition of the modern capitalist economies, of the economy which consolidates this thing with the experience of other countries using the administrative cooperation.

Fig. 1. The analytical model of integration and the national economy



Source: Nauro (2009: 576)

In diagram B, we can discover the problem of the political influence in the countries in transition from the socialist to capitalist economy and from the centralized to decentralized administration, the political system might sometimes be an obstacle for the fastest realisation of this desideratum.


The particularity of the emerging economies in Central and Eastern European states (especially those from the ex-communist bloc) has a double aim: separating from the planned market economy models, of communist type and beginning some changing

² Talking about the connection between the economy and administration, this can be presented in figure 1, in which there is made an analysis of the social mechanism model that produces the transition from a socialist economy to a capitalist one and in the meantime from a centralised administration to a decentralised one.

processes towards the models of capitalist market economy, on the one hand, and implying in the European integration process, on the other hand. Both targets mean stages of the changing process not only under the impact of the strategic options for the different transition forms, but also on the time axis, establishing real emergence stages.

When we talk about public organisations we must consider that these don't represent isolated entities but they interact in different ways with the medium they are in and they accept the challenge. So, in an emerging economy, an economy in transition influences the organisation, too. The challenges of the public organisations are directly connected with their integration in an enlarged system, local, national or international. So, the medium of the organisations is more and more complex, changing and uncertain (Matei, 2006: 86). The analysis upon the emergent societies of the organisation is important from the point of view of the public services performances. The organisations which perform public services can be grouped in three categories (Alexandru and Matei, 2000: 26): "bodies of the public administration, public institutions, and autonomous bodies of public interest".

Fig. 2. The conceptual model of changes in emerging organizations



Source: Adaptation after Zhou, Tse, Li (2006: 249)

To better characterize the directions and the influences that the uncertain medium has upon the organizations, McKelevy (1980: 15) used to identify the organisation as being "a system of nearsighted activity, containing one or more subsystems that have inputs and outputs that help them face a medium that impose them different constraints and challenges".

The organisations become emerging due to the interaction of the agents (individuals, partners, groups, parent organizations, etc) and the medium. This special type of interaction is unusual, because this reflects a synergy of agent and the medium connections. The result of this synergy was named as emerging feature by Katz and Gartner (1988: 430).

These changes are intense in the emergent economies, which are going through a transition without precedent at the level of the *social, economic and judicial institutions*. Besides, they suggest more work in international contexts, signifying the necessity to study the organisational changes in emergent economies. Up to present the research was organised as a change in the emergent economies and focused mainly on the policies “at the state level, such as liberalization and privatization.” (Peng, 2003, to be seen, too, Denison, 2001 apud Zhou, Tse, Li, 2006: 243-249). As a result, some places once known most frequently as phrases like: the third/ underdeveloped/ returned/ the communist world have “progressed” to the position of “emergent markets”. This name coexists with the others, as the ones offered by the “Occident”, to the countries from the west, like “after-communism” or “economies in transition” (Sidway and Pryke, 2000: 83).

3. The perspective of emergence characteristics of European Union member states

After we have already spoken in the precedent paragraphs about the notions of emergence and its relation with the economy and with the public administration we will try to see how the institutional change is produced at the level of the EU member states, taking into consideration especially the states from Central and Eastern Europe, states which accessed the EU in 2004 and 2007.

As regards to the Central and Eastern European countries, this approach was carried out while the conditions of accession to the EU. These countries were in a position to respond to two challenges: on the one hand, democratization of public administration as a prerequisite for becoming a member of the European Union and, on the other hand, the increase of government management performance. Because of holding these processes, most often appropriate initiatives were considered identical, the reform of the administration associated with the preparation for EU accession.

This is even more explicit as a high effort to fulfill the accession criteria was done through the initiation of public policy formulation and implementation of which required passing through the local administration.

3.1. Emergence characteristics of EU member states

As a characteristic of the European countries we can consider the fact that the emergence follows “a line with two successive anchors: the first, which corresponds to the interior transition, of abstract nature, and the second, specific to the exterior transition, of contingent nature” (Dinu, 2007: 151-163).

Through the internal transition, a country chooses to enter in a built order on hierarchical dependences. It is the the globalization developed on the principle of the explanation unicity (Dinu, 2006: 21). The ordering principle this globalization develops is that of adversity, the only base of the hierarchical systems of the *top down* type.

The European integration, as a form of the external transition and part of the emerging countries from South-East Europe, illustrates the experience of the open systems of *bottom-up* type. The change as a learning process “as a principle of harmonious competition of cooperative nature, which opens the main way of globalisation, as a building paradigm of another idea of global order than a hierarchical one” (Dinu, 2007: 151-163).

Defining the word transition as a process of slow or sudden pass from one state or situation to another, this phenomenon is permanently in people's lives and activity, everywhere. This means that, both at the level of an individual and at the level of a social group or a collectivity, the transition appears every time the present conditions ask some changes, representing the normal evolution form, of adapting to all the changes appeared in the natural medium or in that created by man (Zittoun, 2008). Including almost all the life fields and man's activities, the transition trains both the economy and the culture, the science and the education, the politics and the freedom, the sphere of the relations between people, the traditions and the behaviour, the work conditions and the quality of life.

Most of these steps, especially in the post accession period as a process of European integration were considered part of a process of *modernization* (Rice, 1990: 116). Transformations occurring in most former communist countries have gained through the area modifications, the dimensions of institutional change. Political transition from controlled economy to a market one is placed in the context of political reforms. This transformation takes place by changing the rules of interaction between formal state structures and society. Resize formal framework decision is, under these conditions, the consequence of institutional changes whose premises are prior to any changes made at this level. These assumptions may be related to countries in Eastern and Central Europe with two sources of dissatisfaction (Rose, 1992: 371-392) the first is the unsatisfactory results obtained following the imposition of specific institutional arrangements of central planning economy, the lack of operating rules a market economy (nonmarket economy). The second source is the consequence of authoritarian communist regime in the distribution of resources made on political criteria.

The two sources of dissatisfaction cause a phenomenon of institutional change aimed at improving the results of appropriate institutional arrangements (Hesse, 1993: 219-275). Reasons for initiating a change process are determined by the failure of previous institutional arrangement to ensure the rules facilitate exchanges between individuals (excessive control of the state, limiting the various rights etc.). As a result institutional change is driven primarily by eliminating those drawbacks which led to the previous institutional arrangement failure.

This kind of transformation, whose coordinates were not analyzed in the last years both in terms of transition to market economy phenomenon but rather from the perspective of European integration process, corresponds to an analysis of the development under the former communist societies in a process of forced modernization.

3.2. The process of institutional change

Institutional change in the Central and Eastern European states corresponds to a step of amending the rules and framework inside which individuals made choices in these countries (see Agh, 1993: 231-252). In this sense, the option between institutional choices made in a process of change is caused by the type of institutional arrangement aimed at security features, or contextual details of decisions (Benoit and Schiemann, 2001: 153-182). Thus, while the dimensions of institutional change are determined by the extent of the implications of changes in rules of the game, considering the political contexts in which these choices are made affecting the best results following the adoption of appropriate institutional arrangements. The success of the operation depends on the consent of those to comply with the new institutional order.

Since the objective is to increase welfare change through market liberalization, the rules are modeled to reflect a conception of how markets are protected by discretionary

state interventionism. Interventionist nature of the state analysis is based on the role that it plays in society. How much, how and especially why the state should intervene in the market remains, in terms of transitions to a market economy, subject to interpretation, even in the context of institutional transformation process of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

According to the rules governing the *market institution*, individuals interact through economic exchanges. During these exchanges, the utility function of each of the actors is affected by the costs they must incur to get what they want. According to standard economic model, production costs affect the price of traded goods or services. Therefore, how organizations are composed depends on the institutions guidance of the choices we make in the various interactions we have with others. Thus, developing a way of organizing can be explained as a result of an effort to reduce transaction costs that would be too high if such institutions should be developed (Williamson, 2005).

From the perspective of *new institutional theory* the institutional change is interpreted as the change in the rules of the game in terms of how people interact in society (North, 2003: 355; Williamson, 2005: 595). Institutions are rules sanctioned by the members of a society by agreement, customary or required, on how to run the society relations (North, 2005: 276). A broader definition of institutions includes organizational structures, cultural elements, normative and symbolic influence actors (see March and Olsen, 1996: 247-264). At the society level, among these rules are other that are guiding the relations between government and economic agents (regulation), between politicians and bureaucrats (control), and between citizens and government (accountability) (Przeworski, 1998: 99). Institutional change leads to changes in the nature of these relationships and results from interactions between individuals.

Historical institutionalism analysis suggests an approach which aims at institutional change during the historic choice made by individuals. Economic history of this view is a source of examples of institutional configurations which change was determined by the context in which they occurred. Studying the historical evolution of institutions is therefore the key to understanding their change (North, 2003: 355).

Another key to understanding institutional change is offered by *sociological institutionalism*. It focuses on the set of customs, and practices that represent the cultural dimension of institutions. This affects the way in which institutions evolve. Originally it appeared as a subdomain of organizational theory, sociological neoinstitutionalism proposes an interpretation of the actions of individuals as determined by the codes of understanding, moral templates and symbols that make up this cultural dimension (Hal and Taylor, 1996: 936-975). Institutions influence individual behavior through this dimension.

Looking at the mentioned dimensions already explained, we can affirm that a process of institutional change corresponding to the transition to a market economy confused with the adoption of institutional arrangements in which democratic forms of control of the state replaced the institutional *status quo* characteristic of communist societies (joint ownership factors production, political control of administration, etc).

Transition process, which began with the fall of communism (if we refer exactly at the EU states from Central and Eastern Europe), was held in the form of major institutional changes, aimed at redefining the role of the state in the relation with citizens to resize public policies and appropriate context in which decisions are taken at administrative level (Przeworski, 1998: 102).

This process was assimilated to an institutional change process due to institutional rules and the implications that the government intervention have had on individuals. A

phenomenon of institutional change appears due to changes in the institutional contexts of the countries where this process takes place. These changes represented the face of the emergence process in the EU countries.

4. The dimension of institutional changes at the national level

The process of emerging institutions of the European Union member states cannot be conceived beyond the process of Europeanization and European Integration. This process is the one that generates the institutional transition and leads to creating different unavoidable and irreversible changes at the level of the states which would like to become members of the European construction.

Probably one of the most original metaphors of the social sciences, which can be used for the study of the European Union, is the *Heineken* metaphor. This was formulated for the first time by Hellen Wallace (2000: 381 in Iancu, 2010: 77) and according to this the European Union, thanks to its formulated policies gets to, as the Dutch company (due to the beer it produces), in any corner of the world, create different reactions according to the consumer. Translated and interpreted for the present work, the Heineken metaphor says the fact that the European Union through its demands generates different changes at either the level of the member states or at the candidates or possible candidate states.

We were stating in the anterior paragraphs the fact that the Central and Eastern Europe countries have some certain common features: they all have passed from totalitarian political systems to some democratic ones, they all have passed from a centralized economy to a market one and they all have the aspiration to become part of the European Union. These characteristics that generate the transition and characterize the states as being emergent do not exclude the institutions and the public administration.

In the support of the statements above, we can say that the European Union has formulated some clear criteria ever since 1993 that were about its relationship with the countries from the old communist system, criteria which are valid to a present expansion too. These criteria can be identified as factors that generate the emergence in the states that want to access the European Union:

- Permanent institutions which should guarantee the democracy, the rule of law, the human rights, the respect to minorities and their protection
- A functional market economy
- The ability to face the obligations that come from the quality of member in the European Union, as well as the joining of the Euro area.

To this it was added in 1995, through The White Carta concerning the preparation of the associated countries from the Central and Eastern Europe, the beaureaucratic criteria of the consolidated ability, that can be translated through a reformation of the national public administrations, meaning the “adapting of the administrative machinery and of the whole society to the necessary conditions for the implementing of a new legislation” (Iancu, 2010: 94). This is a complex process that presents the creation or the adaptation of the institutions and of the administrative and judicial structures.

4.1. Causes of emerging institutions in EU member states

As we stated, we understand by emerging institutions, the transition and the changes that happened at the institutional level and in the public administration. The institutional changing is determined by the resize of the instruments and the redistribution structures of the resources at society level (Börzel, 1999: 573-596). The changing of the administrative component of a process of institutional change at a real level can be considered, from this point of view, part of the European integration process (see Radaelli, 2000: 3).

Also, another cause is the type of national coordination of EU policies (Kassim et al., 2006: 131) and the character and the formation of the positions taken by Member States to the public policy agenda of the European Union. Given their scale and their implications in the Member States, the institutional system of training local public policy represented by formal rules and informal decision making structures and reforms initiated characteristics may be associated with representations of this type of reporting to EU institutions. The dimensions of cooperation between the EU and Member States, the permanence of those involved in European public policies and the need to drive at two levels - domestic and European - member governments impose significant. These requirements relate to creating and maintaining a complex system of horizontal and vertical connections in each Member State. Governments must make decisions concerning the scope of coordination procedures and structures suitable for the delivery and allocation of responsibilities (Kassim et al., 2006: 139).

The changes may be associated with a process of Europeanization of domestic institutional mechanisms (Goetz, 2001: 1031-1051; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 255-280). This process is ongoing and part of it took place in pre-accession period.

Regarding the relations between EU institutions and Member States, we can say that these institutions, adopted after the event membership is reflected not so much in character positions taken against a public policy agenda in Europe as domestic institutional model for managing these policies (Kassim et al., 2006: 143).

Appropriate questions of this type of problem concerns the local perspective of the process of institutional change which places the European integration process in a specific pre-existing institutional context. For Romania, for example, as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe undergoing the process of institutional adaptation, this outlook includes changes to domestic institutional variables whose details are subject to a constant process of transformation (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004: 619-639).

4.2. Consequences of emerging institutions in EU member states

Taking into consideration the causes in the framework of Europeanization phenomenon induced problems, institutional harmonization expressed by means of aggregation of public policy at local level, which is that the reference point position on the EU institutions - can be treated the same as theoretical. The range of significances of the Europeanization concept is impressive: from the *Europeanization as a transnational process* (the dissemination of “Western” norms, styles and conducts within Europe), through the *Europeanization as institutional adjustment to the E.U. requirements*.

Among these, the “*Europeanization – institutional adjustment*” approach, specific to the public administration in the first place, has generated the most diversified uses, as well as the most debated distinctions (Matei and Matei, 2008: 33-51). Europeanization is an independent variable with an impact upon the national processes, policies and institutions (Borzal, Risse, 2003 in Matei and Matei, 2008: 33-51).

One of the factors that may influence the trajectory of institutional change is reflected in the consequences of political commitments made during the transition to a market economy. These commitments, corresponding to the European integration process, reflect the choice of a political partnership which determines the conditions for conducting local level institutional changes. This process, considered a trend of institutional Europeanization induces a scaling pattern at the local distribution of resources (Börzel, 1999: 573-596).

A process of institutional change, combined with that of European integration in the candidate countries presents three factors (Grabbe, 2001: 1013-1031):

1. *Speed of adaptation.* Candidate countries have passed the pre-accession period through a process of change because the established deadlines for integration took place faster than the other states that have already become members of the Union.
2. Receptivity to EU policies. Unconditional acceptance under political pressure to formal integration in the European Union took place under lack of viable alternatives in terms of a transition process model.

2. *Fulfillment of conditionality.* Unlike the *acquis communautaire* which was non-negotiable, the adoption of practices or patterns of behavior similar to structures found in specific institutional policies meant to increase the administrative capacity of Member States in order to fulfill conditionalities related to responsiveness to political EU economic and social objectives.

So, we can affirm that the processes of European integration and of Europeanization represent the main causes which generate the institutional transition of institutions in the Member States and have had consequences on the implementation of common rules and strategies in order to fulfill the objectives imposed by the European Union.

4.3. Institutional convergence: part of the emerging institutions process

Another dimension of the process of emerging institutions in EU is the convergence facet. The member states of the European Union have to adjust their legislation, policies and public administration structures and procedures to comply with the requirements of EU law and to function more effectively within the EU framework. Compliance with EU law is a complex concept. It does not relate to only one stage, it is the outcome of a multi-phase process, including law-making at domestic level(s), which may involve adopting new rules or adapting existing ones; control of these laws with regard to their application in practice; and enforcement in cases where the laws are not followed (Faulkner, 2010). Distinctive national patterns of institutional adjustment “emerge as corresponding to a basic logic of differentiation indissociable from the integration process itself” (Harmsen 1999 in Faulkner, 2010).

One of the main questions in the literature is whether national policies and systems lead to convergence. Convergence is discussed in terms of match between EU level principles and rules and national institutions, in terms of game playing or competitive selection (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1998, Scharpf 1996 in Matei and Dogaru, 2010: 3-22), and it could be looked at from different points of view.

Administrative convergence is defined by the extent to which domestic administrative styles and structures “reveal similar characteristics because of the influence” of EU membership (Knill, 2001: 187-215). Driven by a consequentialist logic the anticipated result is administrative convergence of national practices around the most effective administrative solutions when transposing EU legislation. EU member states are expected to converge around a single coordination model through pressures deriving from

their membership. Administrative convergence can be understood in *institutional terms*. Among the most frequently discussed basic patterns of institutional change is the incremental - otherwise known as evolutionary - pattern. This entails continuous change in small, incremental steps along a single path in a certain direction (North, 1990 in Kaeding, 2007: 425-445). Scholars argue that institutional change occurs incrementally through “path-dependent mechanisms of feedback, increasing return, and choice within constraints” (Campbell 2004, in Kaeding, 2007: 428).

Working against the process of convergence is, however, the persistence of the traditional central institutions of the state and of the core functions of the central executive. The amount of change in the death and birth of governmental departments and in the transfer of activities between departments is a key research agenda, because despite attempts at fundamental reforms of the manner in which policy is formulated the end result may be a mere tinkering with the engine of government or other changes which do not constitute a radical overhaul. A substantial reason for a lack of major change is the presence of factors inhibiting change.

Richard Rose (1987, in Maor and Jones, 1999: 51) suggests there are four mutually reinforcing pressures impeding institutional change: 1. constitutional convention; 2. legal obligations; 3. administrative practice; and 4. political interests. He proposes that elections are the occasion for a change of governors not of government itself. Ministers are the carriers of policy and they prefer to spend their time steering rather than rebuilding the vehicles of government. Legal obligations also create institutional inertia. Primary legislation (such as Acts of Parliament) place massive obligations on each succeeding administration and while responsibilities may be transferred between departments the very nature of programmes previously legislated ensures such relocations produce few policy changes.

Finally, there is little desire for institutional change from established “insider” pressure groups (March and Rhodes, 1992 in Maor and Jones, 1999: 52). Once pressure groups become a part of a compact issue network or policy community they do not desire that network or community to be disrupted by institutional changes.

The presence of mechanisms specific to Europeanization of public administrations, such as administrative convergence and dynamics, as well as some standards deriving from the principles of the European Administrative Space (Matei and Matei, 2008: 33-35) make us to affirm that the European institutions can be seen as a system of new practices and rules, representation and resource structures, and they have effect on the institutions of the Member States, especially on the national public administrations.

5. Concluding remarks

We noticed that the system of public administration is inter-related with other systems which influence it. This is a sub-system of the global social system with strong political, social, economical, cultural determination, in a complex connection with its environment (Matei, 2009: 37). In this respect, we present some theoretical perspectives on institutional change and factors that can influence this process. We have shown that the process of accession to the European Union required the initiation of measures associated with the effort of compliance. Meeting these conditions aimed at among others, without being as inflexible as the process of adopting the *acquis communautaire*, the initiation of measures associated with a process of modernization.

The dimension of emerging institutions was regarded from the perspective of the transition and changes to which the countries are subject with a stress on the strategies of

reform in the public administration under the guidance of the European Union rules. We associated this process of emerging institutions from the Member States with the process of Europeanization and European integration. In this sense, the changes were associated with a process of Europeanization of domestic institutional mechanisms. This process is ongoing and part of it took place in pre-accession period and the second part after the accession process. The development of this process, after formal accession, leaves open the question of identifying premises for institutional change under the influence of European Union membership. To determine the nature of these assumptions regarding a change in the elections being held on the adoption of a model of institutional change in public administration it is useful to identify the coordinates of this change, regarded as a transition from one set of rules of the game to another.

The dimension of emerging institutions is represented by the changes and reforms that the institutions suffer from the state levels, understood as a process of transition, and also by the convergence facet understood as the gradual process of constitutional, institutional, procedural, organizational and behavioral innovations and adaptations to EU decision in the integration process. This provides a transfer mechanism both for national administrative best practice, thus influencing by Europeanization, the national administrative policies.

The European Union will continue through its instruments to affect the structures of the Member States and it will continue to determine between countries the process of emerging institutions like in the field of economy and markets. The end of this process is the convergence that may be expressed by the common characteristics of the administrative models.

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WHO ARE THE OLYMPIANS? A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF PEOPLE'S TRUST IN THE EU

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Abstract. *The study aims to test the concept of Olympianism in order to identify the extent to which it reflects a valid and generalizable attitude among Europeans. The research uses linear regression analysis and statistic correlations by means of which are identified the factors that influence citizens' confidence in the EU, as chosen indicator of Olympianism. The results of the regression are tested through the analysis of Eurobarometer data between 2006 and 2012. The operationalization of the concept is based on the theoretical background and groups the variables found in the literature according to three dimensions: political-institutional, moral-attitudinal and identitarian. The research results show that Olympianism is not an entirely valid concept for the European continent and therefore it needs reconceptualization. Further findings regard the identified divergent and convergent patterns that show different factors which influence people's support of the EU, in relation to their nationality. An essential finding that contradicts one of the main hypotheses in the literature regarding Olympianism is that it is opposed to national consciousness. The research draws on data from the latest European Values Study in 2008. Eight countries are analyzed in comparison to the general, European tendency: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, France, Belgium, Germany and Great Britain.*

Keywords: *Olympianism, EU trust, globalization, democratic deficit*

The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty has brought again to the fore the debate about the role and function of the national state in relation to the increasing tendency of transferring national power to the supra-national level. A number of scholars have long been proclaiming the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992) brought by the extinction of the Westphalian state (Ohmae, 1995), considered as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983), or at least its demystification through the construction of the European Community (Hobsbawm, 1992). As a response, others proclaim the resurrection of the nation state (Munck, 2007) and the failure of the European project (Dungaciuc, 2004) in terms of trust, legitimacy and identity. In support of this last view, the European Commission itself has acknowledged that it is confronted with a trust deficit, attributed to the “communication gap”, for which it tries to find solutions in the programming documents which aim at “bridging the gap” between Brussels and European citizens (*White Paper on a European Communication Policy*, 2006; *Communicating Europe in Partnership*, 2007).

In a global society where key roles are not always played by national states, but increasingly by international organizations and supranational institutions, the struggle for

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power is often carried at an inter-regional or inter-continental level (America – Europe – Asia), rather than intra-continental. Globalization has brought along power shifts, restructuring the power matrix. For Held (2006), globalization determined an extension of the political, economic and social activity to the global level, intensifying the interconnectedness between states and societies. This has led to the interpenetration of foreign and domestic policy and the growth of international political organizations aiming at managing the collective, transnational problems. Scholars (Dahl, 2002; Della Porta, 2005; Held, 1999, 2006) warn that the new, transnational setting in world politics brings challenges to democracy and are concerned with the democratic deficit and lack of accountability of the international organizations which play an increasing political role. However, there is a consensus that the nation-state framework can no longer be applied at the supranational level.

Taking this new context into consideration, the European Union is founded on geopolitical reasons and can be seen as a struggle for power on the global stage, an effort to counterbalance the emergence of BRICS and of the leading role of the United States. Davenport (2005) presents this strategy as part of a larger project of a “new diplomacy”, which “seeks to alter the world’s political power structure” and which has been facilitated by the end of the Cold War: “I have come to think of international diplomacy during and after the Cold War as two very different poker tables. At the Cold War table, in operation from 1945 to 1989, sat two high-stakes players: the United States and the Soviet Union [...] The post-Cold War table is quite different. With no nation capable of sitting across from the United States in a military and economic power contest, the nature of both the game itself and the kind and number of players began to change. For starters, many new players sought a seat at the table. Other nations wanted in the game, of course, but so did nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of many types. International organizations, including the United Nations and newer ones such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), took what they viewed as their rightful place at the table, as did new groupings of nations such as the European Union and the « like-minded states » [...] Short on military and economic capital, these new players have sought to change the table to a « soft power » game. Small- and medium-sized « like-minded states » and NGOs have combined to carry out a « new diplomacy », with notable victories in enacting international treaties” (Davenport, 2005: 113-115).

According to Davenport (2005: 124), this “new diplomacy” facilitates the access to power by pursuing a human rights agenda through the expansion of international law in three main areas: treaty-based law, universal jurisdiction, international organizations and global governance. The internationalization of law can affect state sovereignty by submitting a country’s decisions to the international fore. This new form of soft power, Davenport argues, is often manifested through a “mobilization of shame”, as in the case of the Kyoto Treaty. The UN Charter is also, according to the author, an important instrument for the new diplomacy advocates. In support to this view, Kenneth Minogue (2000: 147) considers that humanitarianism takes the form of internationalism, its aim being “to transcend sovereign national independence and replace it with rights enforced by a benign world authority”. As Davenport also remarks, contrary to state sovereignty, international law is essentially top-down in nature, coming not from the citizens but from “more remote, and less democratic, bureaucracies and elites” (2005: 131), such as the United Nations or the European Union. David Held (1999) also remarks that the human rights regime has produced a shift from sovereignty of national states to individual freedom, giving new rights to international organizations to question the authority of state

and hold it accountable. In other words, the internationalization of law has eroded state sovereignty in favour of state accountability, but in the same time has given international organizations more power on the global scale.

The humanitarian worldwide project, frequently associated with the self-imposed need for political correctness, tends to replace politics with moral judgements, shaping what Minogue calls “political moralism”, through which politics becomes “the authoritative allocation of values” (1995: 107) at a global level. This “benevolence” is associated with a redemption of the West in the face of its imperial history, similar to an Australian National Sorry Day at a global level. It would seem that Europe has acknowledged what Edgar Morin (2004) defined as “western arrogance” and is incorporating it into a new consciousness. As Kurth remarks, “with the 1960s [...] any conception of Western civilization came under sustained assault, and the Western traditions have been on the defensive ever since” (2003/2004: 8), rejecting its own traditions and values. Minogue explains that this self-contestation has led to an international adherence on moral, rather un-fundamented grounds, adherence which paved the way for the international “political moralism”: “After the death of communism, most contemporary forms of universalism have focused on a supposed moral superiority of international institutions over national sovereignty. In some contexts, people who believe in such ideas are called « cosmopolitan », a term that expresses a common feature of such international adherence, namely rejection of nostalgia and local solidarities. This rejection may in some cases reach a form of contempt of one’s own nation” (1993: 72).

This “revolution of feeling” as Minogue (2003) calls it, has its roots in the “culture war” of the ‘60s and results in the more recent political correctness. The new, universalist humanitarian project has been the vision brought by the League of Nations and the UN, a commitment for the betterment of humankind. Treaties guaranteeing rights become the new weapon of the “moral politics”. Minogue defines this new vision as “Legal Salvationism” – “the doctrine that bringing law to bear on every aspect of human life is the path to a better world” (2004: paragraph 23). Legal Salvationism is described as “a form of utopianism whose point is to bring the whole world into a single legal order” (*ibidem*, paragraph 26), by means of international law, applied by faceless supranational institutions such as the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice and other watchdogs of human rights.

However, Legal Salvationism has its roots in the Enlightenment, a profoundly Western tradition which “provided the ideas of liberal democracy, the free market, and the belief in reason and science as the privileged means for making sense of the world” (Kurth, 2003/2004: 6). The modern Enlightenment was reinforced by developments in technology and has led people to believe in the perfectibility of a global order through a global Legal Salvationism which promises a better world: “Today, the only Western tradition embraced by the political, intellectual, and economic elites of the West is that of the Enlightenment [...] with its emphasis on the liberty of individuals, institutionalized in liberal democracy and free markets [...] with its emphasis on the rationalism of elites, institutionalized in bureaucratic authority and the credentialed society. Together, these elites promote the contemporary version of the Enlightenment project. They are intent upon imposing it around the world” (Kurth, 2003/2004: 10).

Legal Salvationism mandates the experts to solve the problems of the humankind by treaties, rights, laws and regulations aimed at ensuring peace, equality, inclusion and welfare in a brave new world of universal, one-size-fits-all, values and norms. This “form of salvation is being advanced both by the entrenchment of political correctness in Western

law, and by the spread of human rights through accession to international treaty” (Minogue, 2000: 148). This salvation is brought by an “international managerial class” who leads this “campaign to legislate virtue” and is the guardian of human rights and social justice. And this view is, according to Minogue, grounded on the “internationalist illusion” that “international politicians and bureaucrats are wiser than those of (for example) European national states” (2008: 10). This international managerial class is called by Minogue “Olympians”, an “elite that believes that it enjoys superior enlightenment and that its business is to spread this benefit to those living on the lower slopes of human achievement” (2003: paragraph 24). They are called “Olympians” because they “look upon the rest of humanity rather as the divinities of Mount Olympus looked upon the all too human Greeks” (2000: 147). Through human rights and international law, institutionalized in international bureaucracies, the Olympians aim to advance a new form of world government – “Olympianism”. Minogue defines it as “a vision of human betterment to be achieved on a global scale by forging the peoples of the world into a single community based on the universal enjoyment of appropriate human rights” (2003: paragraph 25). Olympianism offers “moral answers to political questions” (Minogue, 2003), and believes that every problem must have a rational, achievable solution.

Minogue is concerned that this new elite not only threatens the sovereignty of the national state by handing the power to supranational institutions such as the EU or the UN, but also that they threaten freedom itself by over-regulating every aspect of life. This concern is shared by another Eurosceptic British scholar, William Mason (2008), who analyses the costs of EU overregulation for Great Britain. Thus, the Olympians are considered to remove the power from people, entangling them in a complex framework of rights, rules and regulations: “Olympian passion for signing up to treaties and handing power over to international bureaucrats who want to rule the world. Everything down to the details of family life and the modes of education are governed and guided so as to fit into the rising project of a world government. The independence of universities in choosing whom to admit, of firms choosing whom to employ, of citizens to say and think what they like has all been subject to regulation in the name of harmony between nations and peace between religions. The playfulness and creativity of Western societies is under threat. So too is their identity and freedom” (Minogue, 2003: paragraph 39).

Olympianism appears to be the desire or utopic project of a universal empire ruled by “moral politics”. It aims to replace government with an unaccountable, supranational governance. Having global aspirations, Olympianism considers nation states and nationalism a problem. As Dan Dungaciu observes (2004: 355-356), Olympianism is based on fundamental errors regarding the nation state: that nationalism is to blame for all the past conflicts and for the two world wars. Olympianism as “moral politics” resembles Habermas’ concept of cosmopolitan solidarity, fueled by “feelings of indignation over the violation of rights, i.e. over repression and injuries to human rights committed by states” (2001: 108). Seen from this perspective, the moral universalism of human rights can shift citizens’ loyalties from the nation-state to supranational institutions with a human rights agenda.

At the European level, Olympianism could be rooted in the classical pre-theories of EU integration. What these theories have in common is the aim to restore peace and avoid war. EU’s goal of establishing a Pax Europaea has been acknowledged in 2012 through the Nobel Peace Prize received by the EU for contributing for over six decades to the “advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (<http://www.nobelprize.org>).

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006b: 17-18) notices that the pre-theories of EU integration have three common features: first, they all start from the assertion that contemporary problems reach beyond the national level and, therefore, need international solutions; second, they share a faith in the ability of international institutions to suppress conflict; and third, they aspire for integration beyond Europe, the final goal being worldwide governance. If Olympianism is proven to be an empirically validated concept, these beliefs can be considered to have fueled it at the European level. Its roots may be traced back to functionalism. Functionalism believes that, in the transnational context, international organizations are better than nation states at providing solutions in economic and technical areas, and pleads for a shift, through international cooperation, to non-territorial, functional, technocratic agencies (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006b: 24). The premise of functionalism lies in delegating non-political tasks to experts and, therefore, avoiding politicization by focusing on problem-solving (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006b: 24). Functionalism aims towards the creation of an international community where authority is shared between different functional organizations and claims that welfare or common good can be reached through technocratic progress (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006a). Functionalism and, later on, neofunctionalism, can be regarded to as starting points for Olympian shifts of loyalties from the national to the supranational level.

Another characteristic of Olympianism, as Minogue (2003) points out, is "Christophobia", a "hostility to Christianity" which was brought about by Enlightenment, by the triumph of reason and of science. Along with Nietzsche's proclaimed "Gott ist tot", "Christophobia" has become, according to Minogue, the liberation from what the 20th century had become to look at as superstitions, "strange prejudices" and "divisive absurdities" of religion. In a modern world, demystified by science, by logical positivism and the new definitions for progress, Christianity did no longer provide a suitable *Weltanschauung*. "Christophobia" thus paved the way for a new, secular "religion", rooted in the modern age and in the rational belief in Legal Salvationism – Olympianism, as a global mission of salvation and civilization through the extension of Western prosperity, moral and human rights: "Olympianism, however, is in the interesting position of being a kind of religion which does not recognize itself as such, and indeed claims a cognitive superiority to religion in general. But there is a deeper reason why the spread of Olympianism may be measured by the degree of Christophobia. It is that Olympianism is an imperial project which can only be hindered by the association between Christianity and the West" (Minogue, 2003: paragraph 26).

Being itself a "religion", Olympianism opposes Christianity by trying to subvert it. Instead of God it proposes society and humankind, having as missionaries journalists and the media, universities (Minogue, 2003), as well as the Olympian, educated elite: academics, lawyers, teachers, clergymen, politicians and administrators, "crusaders of the pen rather than the sword" (Minogue, 2000: 147) and "moral enthusiasts" (Minogue, 2000: 150). American conservatives (Bork, 2004; Graglia, 2005; Davenport, 2005) are especially concerned about the spreading of Olympianism throughout the Supreme Court of the United States, judges being considered the most representative Olympians who spread moral relativism and "moral politics" against the Bill of Rights and the Constitution in pursuit of a "liberal agenda of political correctness" (Bork, 2005: xiii). Derbyshire (2004: paragraph 17) notes that "we Americans are heading into a « crisis of foundations » of our own right now. Our judicial elites, with politicians and pundits close behind, are already at work deconstructing our most fundamental institutions - marriage, the family, religion, equality under the law".

British conservatives (Strafford, 2009; Mason, 2008; Minogue, 2008) are also concerned with supranational Olympian institutions such as the European Court of Justice and the European Commission, which, as they signal, significantly threaten state sovereignty and impose a universal set of values and morally-packed decisions that are sometimes, according to these scholars, in contradiction with national interests or traditions. Robert Bork warns about the dangers of this power shift towards supranational and international institutions with moral grounds which can threaten freedom itself: “the proliferation of international tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights and - more recently, and more ominously - the International Criminal Court, which intends to judge the behavior of citizens of all nations, even those that have not ratified the treaty establishing the court [...] The result of these extreme forms of internationalism can only be a serious reduction of our sovereignty and our freedom” (2003: paragraph 16).

Olympian institutions suffer from an inner democratic deficit. In most cases, they are unelected, faceless and abstract institutions, with a low accountability for their decisions and actions. The European Union has often been accused of having a democratic deficit, or even of being anti-democratic (Strafford, 2009), as the only institution that is elected by citizens and thus accountable, the European Parliament, has a significantly diminished power in comparison to the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Stuart (2003: 53) considers that the fundamental question that lays the ground for democracy is the voter’s: “can I get rid of them if I don’t like what they are doing?”. A truly democratic EU should advance an answer. Minogue goes so far as to consider that The European Union is a “triumphant expression of the Olympian spirit in which power has moved from democratically elected states into the hands of a bureaucracy” (2004: paragraph 42).

Robert Dahl (2002) identifies three stages in the history of democracy: the shift from nondemocratic city-states to democratic ones, the nation-state and the current transnational system, which reduces the autonomy of states and increases their dependency to external actors. According to him, this current transformation implies that “citizens of a country cannot employ their national government, and much less their local governments, to exercise direct control over external actors whose decisions bear critically on their lives - for example, foreign investors who choose to invest their money elsewhere” (2002: 27). This leads to the need to delegate the decision-making power for transnational issues to a growing number of unelected, unaccountable supranational political institutions, such as the EU or the UN. According to Dahl, this increase in the political system produces a paradox: “while larger systems may be able to cope with problems that matter more to a citizen, the opportunities for the citizen to participate in and greatly influence decisions are vastly reduced” (2002: 28).

For this reason scholars (Strafford, 2009; Mason, 2008; Minogue, 2004) consider that supranational and international institutions represent a threat to democracy. However, almost paradoxically, this may be precisely the reason for people’s tendency to confide in them. As Robert Bork remarks, “Court is held in high esteem precisely because it is unelected, unrepresentative, and unaccountable - which is to say that the justices are not seen as politicians. To survive and to get anything done, politicians have to make expedient compromises. Judges, or so it is mistakenly believed, are not politicians but men and women of principle, untarnished by compromise” (2004: paragraph 58). This assumption might be extended to all the other abstract institutions like the EC, the UNO, the European Court of Justice etc., which sometimes seem to be invested by people with a superior virtue. This investment of trust is associated, according to Bork, with a “distrust of democracy”, and by Minogue (2004) with the public distrust in politicians.

The British conservative Kenneth Minogue considers that Olympianism “appeals to a self-consciously enlightened public opinion” (2000: 147). Olympians are not only the ruling elite, but also the intelligentsia, the Western middle class, “educated people who take a self-consciously god-like stance about the passions of the mass of mankind. They stand for universal rationality against such prejudices as racism, nationalism, sexism and other forms of particularist oppression” (2004: paragraph 26). They belong to the educated middle classes of liberal democracies with a “welfarist moral”, which Minogue calls “Olympian public opinion”: “Olympian opinion both in its populist and its elite forms judges international issues not with the multi-dimensionality of the concept of the national interest, but in the simplistic terms of individual morality, and indeed of a kind of morality - war bad, peace always good - that previously, if we may put the matter brutally - made the 1930s « a low, dishonest decade » [...] The national interest is thus under attack by moralism from below and internationalism from above, and both our identity and our security as a historic nation are under threat from both directions” (2004: paragraph 41).

Other scholars (Elliott and Atkinson, 2009) are more preoccupied with what they call the “New Olympianism”, which is focused on the financial and economic elites of the world, or more specifically the American and European ones. They see as key New Olympian organizations the independent central banks, international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, the EU, the World Trade Organization and the “Wall-Street gods”. Others (Munck, 2007) call them “liberal globalizers”, who preach an almost blind faith in the “magic of the market”, self-regulated by “an invisible hand” that “makes people richer”. According to these authors, the New Olympians repudiate economic barriers and state interventionism. Their supreme goal is the free global market as main principle of world governance. Not only does the economic globalization erode state boundaries, but, according to della Porta (2005), it also leads to a loss of legitimacy for the nation-states, as a consequence of the reduced state intervention in the liberalized market.

The pillars on which the New Olympian dream stands is the absolute free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. But this New Olympianism is not only economic, but, as Martin Wolf shows, it also has a moral agenda, making people “more concerned about environmental damage, pain and injustice” (Wolf, 2004: 57). It is a world-view that “goes beyond simple economics and offers an alternative to all collectivist or social views of the world. Corporations are seen as virtuous as well as dynamic agents of progressive change” (Munck, 2007: 2). Global corporations play a central role in the New Olympianism and in the process of shifting the power from government to governance. Not only do they enjoy “power beyond flag and country” (Madsen, 1981: 15) but in many cases their wealth is comparable or even higher than the wealth of an entire country. The richest ten corporations in the world (according to the Top Global 500 Companies, published by Fortune Magazine in 2011) have, altogether, revenues close to Germany's Gross Development Product (GDP at purchasing power parity) and only five times smaller than the European Union's total revenue, which is the highest in the CIA country ranking by GDPs - 14,820,000 millions \$ (CIA World Factbook, estimations for 2010). Another meaningful comparison is between Romania's GDP - 254,200 (millions \$), lower than the revenues of the fifth richest corporation, Sinopec Group - 273,422 (millions \$), China's largest oil producer and refiner.

Liberal globalizers (or “New Olympians”) thus advance a new, grand narrative aimed to fill the void left by the obsolescence of religion in our modern, secular world. Their view builds itself upon the same fundamentals as Olympianism, but puts instead of

society or humankind the global market. It is by excellence a teleological belief, though rather utopic. Its vehicle is globalization and its final destination is “the decline of inequality and poverty world-wide as the market works its magic” (Munck, 2007: 2). Though the initial, British concept of Olympianism has not stirred up too much debate neither in the academic area, nor in the field of public opinion, New Olympianism has been brought in the spotlight due to the present global crisis. Elliott and Atkinson (2009), not without solid arguments, point to these financial elite’s self-proclaimed supremacy and to their actions as being the roots of all evil. According to the two scholars, the history of the New Olympianism is traced back to the stock market bubble of the 1920s, the Wall Street Crash of the 1929 and the Great Depression that followed, then to the Dot-com bubble of the 1990s and culminating with the Global Recession started in 2007. An almost cyclical pattern generated by the New Olympians through their insistent prophecy of the “magic market”: “the New Olympian creed boiled down to one short paragraph. The « awesome array » of transactions in the financial markets creates stability, not instability. Bubbles happen, but only rarely, and when they do it is the invisible hand that sorts out the problem and not the willingness of policy-makers to use vast quantities of taxpayer money to save the gods and goddesses of Wall Street from the consequences of their own folly” (Elliott and Atkinson, 2009: 139).

Elliott and Atkinson seem to be asking: *does history not teach us anything?* Following Joseph Stiglitz’s older views about the different solutions countries have found for the past financial crisis, the two authors show how the New Olympians’ recipes have failed in the past and are bound to fail again, at the expense of the regular citizens. “Come the 1980s and 1990s, and the New Olympians had an answer to the problems of the developing world. Unsurprisingly, they were the same answers as those being promoted domestically. The Washington consensus - the mind-set of a coalition of the U.S. Treasury, Wall Street, the World Bank, and the IMF-insisted that the least-developed nations open up their markets to foreign imports, scrap capital controls, cut public spending, and keep a tight rein on welfare projects. Precisely the opposite policies, in other words, to those used by every country in history that has developed successfully, including Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan [...] But while many of those forced to swallow the New Olympian medicine in the 1980s and 1990s saw their economies go backward, those that ignored the Washington consensus, such as China and India, started to develop rapidly” (Elliott and Atkinson, 2009: 182).

In 2011, the New Olympians prescribe the same medicine that proved to have serious side effects to the countries that had tried it in the past. The new crisis has brought a large number of clients to the IMF: Romania, Greece, Hungary, Poland and many others. But the price for financial “salvation” is adopting the Olympian agenda. This, we might say, is the missionaryism of the New Olympianism. Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World Bank and Nobel Prize winner, seems to confirm this view: “in theory, the fund [IMF] supports democratic institutions in the nations it assists, in practice, it undermines the democratic process by imposing policies” (Stiglitz, 2000: 57).

However, New Olympianism has not remained without counteraction. Bursts of public opinion have held responsible corporations, financial elites and international institutions both for the economic crisis and for impoverishing the people. The UNDP Human Development Report for 2011 concludes that the “business-as-usual” of the world is “neither equitable nor sustainable”. Income inequality has deteriorated in most countries and regions and “the gap between the rich and the poor widened over the last two decades in more than three-quarters of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development countries and in many emerging market economies” (Human Development Report, 2011: 29). Average country-level income inequality increased over 1990–2005 around 20%, the worst deterioration being in Europe and Central Asia - more than 100% (Human Development Report, 2011: 30). The same conclusion is brought by a recent article in *The Guardian*, which signals the growing income inequality and fervently accuses the New Olympians (without specifically naming them as such) for this process: “What has happened over the past 30 years is the capture of the world’s common treasury by a handful of people, assisted by neoliberal policies which were first imposed on rich nations by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. I am now going to bombard you with figures. I’m sorry about that, but these numbers need to be tattooed on our minds. Between 1947 and 1979, productivity in the US rose by 119%, while the income of the bottom fifth of the population rose by 122%. But from 1979 to 2009, productivity rose by 80%, while the income of the bottom fifth fell by 4%. In roughly the same period, the income of the top 1% rose by 270%” (Monbiot, *The 1% are the very best destroyers of wealth the world has ever seen*, 7 November 2011).

Among the reactions or counter-movements against the New Olympians have been the protests of the 1990s and early 2000s, often labeled as anti-globalization movements, triggered by the OECD proposal to liberalize cross-border investment and trade restrictions. Most counter-movements of the 1990s had an anti-capitalist agenda and were targeted at international institutions – the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF – and even at corporations. Madrid 1994, the “Global Carnival against Capital” in 1999, Seattle 1999, Prague 2000 are only some examples; many of the protests were subscribed to the Peoples’ Global Action (PGA) social-movement. Another current reaction can be considered the “Occupy Wall Street” movement, which has spread global and claims for accountability of the financial elites that have wrecked the economy. What these movements have in common is people’s attempt to recover their voice in a supposedly bottom-up democratic world and to be considered as subjects, not simply objects of Olympians’ decisions. Both movements charge the Olympians for the growth of inequity, for lack of transparency and democratic deficit. In the same anti-Olympian direction, Elliott and Atkinson (2009) advance the proposals for reform: replacing New Olympianism with a New Populism. The key principles of New Populism are a) *the subordination of finance*, b) *personal and social security*, c) *accountability*, d) *undesirability of a semi-detached super-rich class*, e) *the protection and strengthening of an independent middle class*, f) *social stability and tranquility being considered more important than market efficiency or shareholder value* and g) *liberty of the person*. Their view is essentially conservative and centre-left, as they themselves acknowledge, and leans toward a revival of state interventionism in order to better control the New Olympians and to deregulate the market. A similar suggestion is advanced even by the UNDP (an Olympian that has decided to leave the sinking ship?) in its latest Human Development Report. It states that “one-size-fits-all thinking is rarely effective when formulating policy or implementing programmes” (2011: 83), due to which differences between countries should be taken into consideration (*ibidem*). In addition, the UNDP recognizes the failure of the global market agenda: “the 2008 global financial crisis and its aftermath reinforced the growing consensus that deregulation went too far and that the pendulum should swing back” (*ibidem*: 82).

1. Who are the olympians?

Applied to the case of Romania (and in extension to other former-communist, Eastern European countries), the concept of Olympianism, and especially the idea of an

Olympian public opinion, seem to be viable. The transition from communism to democracy is often considered a failure, discontent with the political class and, more broadly, with the standard of living, being in some cases transposed in citizens' tendency to reject their national identity. On the other hand, European integration has been seen, at least during 2007 and prior to integration, with enthusiasm (Preda, 2005), as an area of "high diplomacy" (Beciu, 2004; Beciu, 2007) and of expert governance. Amid chronic discontent with national government, the current economic crisis has deepened citizens' dissatisfaction with the political class, their hopes moving towards a saving, "messianic" Europe (Bârgăoanu, Dobrescu, Marincea, 2010). For Romanian citizens, EU becomes a genuine platform for Olympianism: "The end of the twentieth century gave Olympianism two platforms that can effectively launch it: the first is support for the United Nations [...] The second is support for the European Union, more frequented because of the immediate possibility to transcend national states, and as an effective transition to full internationalism" (Dungaciu, 2003: 8).

The empirical part of the paper will focus on testing the concept of Olympian public opinion at the level of the European citizens. It aims at identifying the Olympian profile and the differences between citizens in different European countries. In order to reach such conclusions, the concepts must be further operationalized with the help of the theoretical background already exposed. Drawing from the distinction made by Minogue (2004), the research focuses on the populist form of Olympianism, or the "Olympian public opinion", rather than on the Olympianism of the ruling class elite, though the two concepts are inherently bound.

According to scholars (Dungaciu, 2003: 7-10), Olympians are characterized by their adhesion to global projects and international commissions, their detachment from "national loyalties" as a manifestation of denationalization. They identify themselves as belonging to an international culture, they consider themselves citizens of the world, or European citizens, rather than Romanians, Germans or other nationality. Being often dissatisfied with national politicians (Bork, 2004; Minogue, 2004) and even distrusting democracy (Bork, 2004), populist Olympians shift their faith towards experts, technocrats, or the "managerial class" (Minogue, 2004, 2008) – that is, the Olympian ruling elite - believing in a better governance through the bureaucratization of administrative processes. In other words, Olympians have a high confidence in the European Union (among other supranational bodies), due to their lack of trust in their national governing institutions, and they trust civil servants, who represent the "managerial class" of a bureaucratized governance.

From a sociological perspective, Olympians belong to the "educated middle classes" (Minogue, 2004) of liberal democracies: lawyers, academics, teachers, bureaucrats, administrators, clergymen, journalists and scientists (Minogue, 2000) are among their preferred occupations. Being an "enlightened public opinion" (Minogue, 2000), Olympians value most the role of experts and of science (Dungaciu, 2004) as ultimate respondents to life's questions and providers of meaning. They are adepts of rational morality (Minogue, 2004) and, by excellence, humanitarians, guided by human rights and political correctness. Olympian public opinion is most likely to be in favour of gay rights, women's rights (Kimball, 2003), rights to abortion (Bork, 2004; Kurth, 2002) and to fervently condemn racism and xenophobia (Kimball, 2003). Olympians are "moral enthusiasts" who adhere to multiculturalism, environmentalism (Bork, 2004; Minogue, 2000), feminism (Bork, 2004) and other humanitarian "-isms". Bork (2004) sees these attitudes as a form of "hostility to traditional authorities" - such as marriage, family or the Church – and of "Balkanization of society and [...] weakening of social discipline based

upon a shared morality” (paragraph 51). According to him, the New Left movements from the ‘60s have led to moral relativism and to radical individual autonomy, “creating new and hitherto unsuspected constitutional rights: rights to abortion [...] freedom from religion in the public square, racial and sexual preferences” (Bork, 2004: paragraph 37). Being sons of the Enlightenment, they value technological progress and believe they have control over their lives and over nature. They have replaced God and religious “superstitions” with “humankind” and “progress”. Not only are they not religious, but they are also “Christophobic” (Minogue, 2003).

Minogue (2003) considered that “the grand Western project” of creating a universalist, secularist faith has had three versions: Progress, Communism - as the Marxism version of progress - and Olympianism. According to Minogue, Communism has set the stage for the rise of Olympianism. Bork (2004) points to a similar direction, stating that Olympianism is “what’s left of socialism”. Therefore we may place it on the left of the political spectrum. On the other hand, theorists of the New Olympianism see it more as right-wing politics, rooted in capitalism and focused on building a global free market.

2. Research methodology

The empirical work aims to identify whether there is an Olympian public opinion and its potential characteristics. Drawing from the theoretical background, I have narrowed down populist Olympianism to one of its fundamental traits – trust in supranational institutions, more specifically people’s trust in the European Union. Throughout the analysis, this has been considered the dependent variable. By building a regression model and identifying potential significant correlations, the research aims to explain confidence in EU through the lens of Olympianism and all its previously presented features.

The most suitable database from which to extract the necessary data has been considered to be the one resulted from the last wave of the European Values Study (EVS) - 2008. The database is available on the EVS website (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu). The extensive survey comprises 47 countries/regions, covering most countries on the European continent (both EU and non-EU members), but also four non-European countries, members of the European Council and considered potential EU candidates (Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). In order to facilitate comparisons, the regression model and the statistical correlations have been run both on the entire database and, individually, on a number of eight European countries. These are: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Romania and Spain. Several considerations justify the choice of these countries, the research interest being to identify potential convergent and divergent patterns of Olympianism. Romania and Bulgaria are the newest member states (since 2007), former communist countries and with a higher than average confidence in the EU. According to the 2011 Standard Eurobarometer 75 (2011: 44), Romania has the highest trust in the EU (62%), followed by Belgium (61%) and Bulgaria (60%) (the results are very similar to those of the EVS 2008: Integrated Dataset – see Table 1). While one can expect that Romania and Bulgaria’s high confidence is due to their recent membership, the availability of the Structural Funds and the internal, political problems, for Belgium the high trust may rather be motivated by its statute of EU founding member, a higher satisfaction with living standards and Brussels being considered the “Capital of Europe”, with the European Parliament, European Commission and other important EU institutions being located there. Therefore, it is expected that different patterns of Olympianism emerge between these countries.

The other two EU founders, France and Germany, are also considered relevant for comparison. France, similar to Spain, has a more moderate attitude towards EU in 2008, while in 2011 they have both joined the Euro-skeptic group (confidence in EU has fallen to 39%). Germany (considered by many the key EU actor) and Great Britain are two of the most Euro-skeptic countries, despite their long EU history. Finally, Albania is included in the analysis because it is not yet a Member State and because of its highest level of confidence in the EU (81% in 2008). It is expected that Albanians have a different profile from the other countries and that their primal motivation for EU adhesion is dissatisfaction with the national political context.

Table 1. EVS results: confidence in European Union

	AL	BE	BG	FR	DE	RO	ES	GB	Total
Do not trust EU	19%	39%	42%	48%	64%	39%	45%	76%	49%
Trust the EU	81%	61%	58%	52%	36%	61%	55%	24%	51%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source of data: EVS 2008 Integrated Dataset, available at: <http://zacat.gesis.org>

Because the theoretical background advances numerous, different characteristics of Olympianism, some without a direct connection with the others, I have operated a distinction between three dimensions: *political-institutional*, *identitarian* and *moral-attitudinal*. The regression model comprises the political-institutional dimension of Olympianism. By means of regression analysis, the research aims to explain confidence in EU - as indicator for Olympianism – in relation to citizens' distrust in national politics and institutions, their political views (right or left), their confidence in international ("Olympian") organizations such as the United Nations Organization, trust in experts and civil servants ("managerial class") and trust in corporations (premise of the "New Olympianism").

In order to test the prediction validity of the regression results, which were carried out on the EVS dataset from 2008, I have complemented it with an analysis of Eurobarometer data. The spring waves of the Eurobarometers for each year between 2006 and 2012 were chosen for this purpose. I collected the data regarding four of the variables: the dependent variable – citizens' trust in the EU and three independent variables which are essential for testing the hypothesis – citizens' trust in the UN, in national parliaments and national governments. The data for all the countries in the analysis (except for Albania, where data is not available because of its non-membership) has been used to test the validity of the regression predictions.

Regression analysis was not suitable to apply for the other two dimensions, because they comprise a series of variables that have no direct connection between themselves, they belong to different areas and hence did not form a valid model for regression. Therefore they have been tested through correlations, in order to study their potential influence on the main variable – trust in the EU. The identitarian dimension seeks to identify the relations between nationalism, national or European identity and people's confidence in the EU. In this dimension are also included the level of education and the religiousness of the European citizens. The moral-attitudinal dimension incorporates the characteristics of Olympianism identified by scholars as "humanitarianism", "environmentalism", focus on human rights (or what they call "radical individual autonomy"), anti-traditionalism. It is important to note that using the existing EVS database has limited the selection of variables to the ones existing in it.

The main research questions that guide the analysis are: to what extent can Olympianism be considered a potential characteristic of the European citizens? which are the factors that influence European citizens' trust in the European Union? Two main hypotheses are advanced:

1. People trust the European Union because they trust international institutions – the United Nations Organization (UNO)
2. People trust the European Union because they do not trust their national political institutions

3. Research findings

What determines citizens' trust in EU?

After running several regressions both on the entire database, comprising all the 47 countries, and, separately, on the other eight countries chosen for comparison, the regression model tested proved valid (sig = 0.000) for all the cases. The final regression model has been obtained after verifying important coefficients such as R Square, Durbin-Watson (>1.7 in all cases), Tolerance (>0.4), condition indexes (in order to avoid collinearity), and also after analyzing the resulting charts: the normal probability plot, the histogram and the partial regression plots and assuring they provide a normal distribution. The regression model comprises nine variables which can explain European citizens' trust in the European Union (the dependent variable). These factors are: confidence in national Parliament, confidence in national government, confidence in civil service, satisfaction with democracy, good/bad view of national government, political view (left/right), confidence in the United Nations Organization, belief that experts should make the political decisions and confidence in major companies. The regression model has a high prediction rate (44%) for European citizens' trust in the EU, which can be generalized for the entire EU population (R square = 0.445) – the 47 States comprised in the EVS 2008 research, which cover most of the countries in Europe. In addition, at the European level (the entire database) all nine factors in the regression have a significant influence on the dependent variable (sig <0.02).

As Table 2 shows, trust in the United Nations Organization (UNO) has, by far, the highest contribution in shaping European citizens' trust in the EU (beta = 0.526). At a political-institutional level, confidence in EU can be explained in relation to people's confidence in national government (beta = 0.079), people's confidence in major companies (beta = 0.078), people's confidence in their national Parliament (beta = 0.069), their confidence in civil service and the belief that experts should make the decisions. In other words, Europeans who trust their national political institutions (Parliament, Government), who trust civil servants and are satisfied with democracy tend to have a higher trust in the EU as well. Also, trust in the EU is influenced by people's trust in international organizations such as the United Nations Organization or their trust in corporations. People who consider technocrats most suited for government or prefer a political system where experts make the decisions are most probable to also trust the EU, considering European representatives experts in their fields.

Contrary to what theorists of "Olympianism" think, the results show that European citizens who have a positive perception about their government also trust the EU (and vice versa). Results also show that citizens with a right-winged political view are more inclined towards trust in the EU in comparison to left-winged ones (though the influence of the variable is not too strong). Along with the tendency to trust companies among those who trust the EU, this right-view suggests that the New Olympianism

concept (rather than the left-oriented Olympianism) might be closer to Europeans' public opinion.

Table 2. Coefficients of the regression model

		Coefficients ^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.245	.021		11.680	.000		
	how much confidence in: parliament (Q63G)	.070	.005	.069	13.572	.000	.470	2.127
	how much confidence in: civil service (Q63H)	.071	.005	.065	14.375	.000	.590	1.696
	how much confidence in: government (Q63R)	.079	.005	.079	16.237	.000	.512	1.954
	are you satisfied with democracy (Q64)	.027	.005	.025	5.846	.000	.668	1.497
	view government: very bad-very good (Q65)	.018	.007	.010	2.487	.013	.749	1.334
	political system: experts making decisions (Q66B)	.040	.003	.042	11.993	.000	.978	1.023
	political view : left-right (Q67)	-.003	.001	-.008	-2.382	.017	.973	1.028
	how much confidence in: United Nations Organisation (Q63L)	.521	.004	.526	135.229	.000	.792	1.263
	how much confidence in: major companies (Q63O)	.085	.004	.078	19.386	.000	.743	1.346


a. Dependent Variable: how much confidence in: European Union (Q63J)

When the regression was run on each of the nine countries analyzed, the results showed that trust in the UNO remains the most important predictor for citizens' confidence in the EU, in each of the nine countries. This seems to confirm scholars' views who often define "Olympianism" in terms of a high trust in international organizations and supranational institutions, some of the most frequently mentioned by them being the UNO, the World Trade Organization, the European Commission (and the EU, as a whole) etc.

The analysis shows that in most of the countries under study (except for Romania and Bulgaria, where $\text{sig} > 0.05$, and Albania, which has a reversed tendency) citizens who trust their national Government and Parliament also tend to trust the EU. However, there are some differences between the countries. For Albania, Belgium, France and Germany, trust in the Parliament is a more solid predictor of the attitude towards the EU than trust in government. On the other hand, in Spain and Great Britain, constitutional monarchies, trust in government has a bigger impact on trust in the EU. If trust in these two national institutions is, in most countries, positively correlated with peoples' confidence in the EU, in Albania this is only true for the Parliament, while in the case of the Albanian government the tendency is reversed, probably due to corruption problems. In other words, citizens who do not trust their government consider the EU trustworthy, or look up to it as a possible solution for national problems (while Albanians had in 2008 the highest confidence in the EU – 81%, though not yet a member, their satisfaction with democracy and trust in their national institutions was around 30%). This very high dissatisfaction with the Albanian government and with the democratic system is a strong predictor of EU confidence, the euro-enthusiasm of Albania being also potentially explained by the status of candidate member state. Similar with the Albanian case, Romanian's confidence is partly due to their negative attitude towards national government ($\text{sig} = 0.02$, $\text{beta} = -0.056$). Both states have serious corruption problems and are confronted with poverty and


growing inequality. However, the general tendency is that the confidence in national parliaments weighs heavier in the public opinion about EU than trust in national governments, probably because people may feel represented by them, and not as much by the government, who also is the first one to be blamed when things go bad, especially in a recession context.

Figure 1. Evolution of Belgian citizens' trust in different institutions



Sources of data: EB65, EB 67, EB69, EB71, EB73, EB75, EB77

Figure 2. Evolution of French citizens' trust in different institutions




Sources of data: EB65, EB 67, EB69, EB71, EB73, EB75, EB77

It is important to remind the reader that the analysis has been carried out on data from 2008 and it would be a fair assumption that the public opinion has suffered significant changes with the deepening of the European sovereign debt crisis. The data collected from each Spring Eurobarometer during 2006 – 2012 shows that, despite the different patterns in the evolution of public opinion in different countries, there are certain commonalities which seem to be in line with the results of the regression. In most of the


countries analyzed, the evolution of trust in national governments closely resembles the one of trust in national parliaments, during 2006 – 2012, but there are differences between countries. For Belgium, France and Germany, where the regression on 2008 data showed that trust in the Parliament is a more solid predictor of the attitude towards the EU than trust in government, the Eurobarometer data indicates that during the seven years citizens' trust in the national Parliament has exceeded their trust in their Governments. The tendencies are different for the other member states.

As predicted by the regression analysis, for the three founding members confidence during 2006 - 2012 in EU tends to increase or decrease along with trust in national Parliaments, according to the Eurobarometer data. However, the deepening of the crisis brings some changes in the predictions. In spring 2012, Belgian citizens' trust in EU becomes inversely proportional to trust in national institutions (Figure 1). In other words, people's trust in the government (44%) and parliament (46%) increases, while their trust in EU decreases (49%), becoming closer to the former. A similar, more pronounced trend of inversely proportional change is noticeable for France between 2010 and 2012. For French citizens, 2012 brings a unique turn of opinion for the whole interval analyzed (2006 – 2012): people start trusting more in their national institutions than in the EU (Figure 2). This might be a result of the presidential elections which took place in spring 2012 and brought François Hollande to power, replacing Nicolas Sarkozy. The same shift in public opinion happens in Germany starting with 2011 (Figure 3). These trends can also be explained in relation to the evolution of public opinion in EU regarding the actors who are more capable of taking effective actions against the crisis. According to EB 76 (Autumn 2011: 120) and EB 77 (Spring 2012: 20), starting with 2009, Europeans increasingly expect national authorities to find solutions for the crisis. Moreover, in 2012 these expectations reach the same level for national governments as for the EU. In other words, not only do people in countries like France and Germany start trusting their national institutions more than the EU, but they also have more demands from the former in comparison to earlier years.

Figure 3. Evolution of German citizens' trust in different institutions



Sources of data: EB65, EB 67, EB69, EB71, EB73, EB75, EB77


Figure 4. Evolution of English citizens' trust in different institutions

Sources of data: EB65, EB 67, EB69, EB71, EB73, EB75, EB77

Public opinion in the United Kingdom over the past seven years stands out for citizens' higher trust in the UN in comparison to all other institutions, who are highly criticized. The regression analysis on 2008 data showed that both trust in national government and in the parliament are predictors for confidence in EU, the former being stronger. The analysis of the Eurobarometer data partly confirms this prediction (Figure 4). The exception is the year 2010, when the relation between the dependent variable and the independent ones becomes inversely proportional. In other words, in 2010 EU trust decreases, while trust in government and parliament both increase. Furthermore, starting with 2010, people shift their loyalties from the EU level to the national one even in the case of government, which was distrusted more than the EU between 2006 and 2009. It is important to notice that 2009, the year when the UK has entered recession, represents a low peak for British citizens' confidence in national institutions and, to some extent, in the EU, triggering the public opinion shift starting with 2010.


The data revealed by the Eurobarometers regarding Spanish public opinion shows a significantly different pattern, but mostly confirms the results of the regression analysis for all the three predictors (Figure 5). Citizens' trust in UN follows almost the same path with their trust in EU over the years. People's trust in the government and the parliament are closely connected, almost overlapping. The two also seem to be a good predictor for trust in EU, being in a directly proportional relation with this variable. The only exception is the year 2011, when trust in national institutions slightly increases, while trust in EU keeps decreasing. This increase may have been caused by the low, but positive growth of Spanish GDP in 2011 (International Monetary Fund, 2012: 53), after the previous years of economic contraction.

A significant and progressive decrease of Spanish citizens' trust in national authorities and in the EU starts with 2009, the year when Spain officially enters recession. Even though confidence in the EU remains above trust in national institutions, all the indicators reach a low peak in 2012, when Spain re-enters recession with prospects for a bailout.


Figure 5. Evolution of Spanish citizens' trust in different institutions

Sources of data: EB65, EB 67, EB69, EB71, EB73, EB75, EB77

Bulgaria and Romania, the newest member states, display similar patterns of public opinion. Though the regression analysis showed that trust in national institutions in Bulgaria is not a significant predictor, in the case of Romania people's distrust in the government was proven to increase their confidence in the EU. The analysis of the Eurobarometers for Romania shows that, in the period analyzed, the result of the regression does not maintain its validity (Figure 7). Furthermore, similar to the previous countries analyzed, there seems to be a direct proportionality between Romanian citizens' trust in national institutions and their trust in the EU, the only exception being 2012, when the relation reverses (tendency which is common to Belgium, France and Germany as well). The sudden increase of Romanian's trust in the government may be a result of the changing of the former, democrat-liberal government, and the coming to power of the Social Liberal Union, in May 2012, when the fieldwork for the Eurobarometer was carried out. On the other hand, Bulgaria displays no clear relation between citizens' trust in national authorities and in the EU, confirming the results of the regression (Figure 6). However, for both countries trust in the UN was shown by the regression analysis to be a significant predictor, which is confirmed by the analysis of the Eurobarometers for 2006 – 2012 (Figure 6 and Figure 7).

Figure 6. Evolution of Bulgarian citizens' trust in different institutions

Sources of data: EB65, EB 67, EB69, EB71, EB73, EB75, EB77

Figure 7. Evolution of Romanian citizens' trust in different institutions

Sources of data: EB65, EB 67, EB69, EB71, EB73, EB75, EB77

The regression predictions regarding the relation between trust in UN and trust in EU do not hold for all countries during the entire interval analyzed. However, at an overall look at the graphics generated based on the Eurobarometer data, there seems to be a relation of direct proportionality between the two variables for most of the countries. This holds true for Romania and Spain quite accurately, for Bulgaria, with the exception of the year 2011, for France, with the exception of 2012, when all other indicators increase while EU trust decreases, and for Germany, with the exception of year 2007. Belgium and UK are different cases. In the former, citizens' trust in UN and EU has similar, rather high values, public opinion oscillating between the two. Before the crisis, Belgian citizens had more confidence in the EU than in the UN, but when the crisis reached Europe the relation between the two started to change. On the other hand, British citizens value the UN much more than the EU, their Euroscepticism and closer relation to the US being potential explanations. Overall, except for France, in all other member states analyzed there is a decreasing tendency for both people's confidence in the EU and in the UN between 2006 and 2012. It is not the purpose of this paper to explain in detail the yearly evolution of these indicators for each country, but rather to give a general image of the relation between these variables, in order to test the prediction capacity of the regression analysis.

The European Union, especially the European Commission, can be regarded to, at an administrative/institutional level, as a bureaucracy where experts in European affairs play a central role. For this reason people's trust in civil service, or the "managerial class", as scholars call them, and their potential belief that experts should be involved in political decision-making are two potential factors that can impact citizens' trust in the EU. The regression proved this to be true at the European level. For the eight countries analyzed, only in Romania confidence in experts making decisions impacts (positively) people's trust in the EU. On the other hand, trust in civil service is a more powerful predictor, being significant for Bulgaria, Germany, Albania and Great Britain.

While Albanians' trust in the EU can be explained by their dissatisfaction with democracy, or rather with the functioning of the democratic system in their country, in Belgium and France, two of the major actors in the European project, it is precisely opposite: their satisfaction with democracy is a vector of trust in EU. This may suggest that Olympianism as a result of denationalization or dissatisfaction happens only in countries with a low living standard and haunted by corruption, while wealthy, Western

states, where citizens are more satisfied with the national context, are “Olympian” more in the sense of “social justice” and equity. Another interesting predictor for the dependent variable measured is citizens’ political views. Noticeable differences appear between more developed countries which are older Member States and newer, less developed ones. Citizens of France, Germany and Great Britain who trust the EU have left-wing views, while Bulgarian citizens trust the EU due to their right-wing views. This might explain the way citizens in these countries perceive the EU and its role. Citizens of developed, prosperous states seem to see the EU as a vector for reaching convergence between European countries and assuring people’s welfare through redistributive social policies. These countries are also among the European countries (and at a global level, as well) which have had the highest public social expenditures between 1980 and 2007, with a constant increasing tendency (see Adema, Fron, Ladaïque, 2011). At the other pole is Bulgaria, ex-communist country, a member state of EU since 2007, classified by the World Bank among the upper-middle-income economies and with one of the lowest incomes per capita in the EU (see World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security, and Development, 2011). Bulgarian citizens, as the regression suggests, see the EU rather as an opportunity for progress, for economic growth through liberalization and access to the European free market. Their right views that determine trust in the EU might also be rooted in their recent history and might come as a reaction to the prior communist regimes. Other findings show that Bulgarians, Belgians, French citizens and Great Britain citizens who have confidence in major companies tend to trust the EU more than those who don’t.

From the above information certain profiles of citizens who trust in the EU can be drawn. Except for confidence in the UNO, which is the most important common characteristic, the following sentences can be made: Albanians who trust their Parliament and civil servants, but do not trust their government and are dissatisfied with national democracy, tend to see the EU as a trustworthy and desirable project. Romanians who consider that technocrats should be in charge are also confident in the EU. Bulgarians with right-wing political views, who trust civil servants and corporations also invest their trust in the EU. For Spanish people, trust in their government and parliament dictate the way they feel about the EU, while for Great Britain, along with these two factors, citizens who trust the EU (though rather scarce) are left-viewed, trust civil servants and big companies. The founders of the European construction have similar profiles. Belgians and French citizens trust the EU because they trust their national political institutions, because they trust companies and because they are satisfied with democracy. In addition, French who approve the EU are rather on the left side of the political spectrum, as well as Germans (for whom their trust in the Parliament and in civil servants can decide their support for the EU).

The regression models applied on each of the eight countries are partly confirmed by the Eurobarometer data and have a very high explanatory potential: Romania 60%, Bulgaria 51%, Albania 45%, Belgium 41%, Spain 40%, Germany 39%, Great Britain 37%, France 31%.

Attitudinal and identitarian dimensions of Olympianism

Apart from the regression model, the research aimed at testing the potential impact of other variables that can be found in the literature regarding the concept of Olympianism and which have been introduced in the theoretical part of the paper. I have grouped these factors under two dimensions: attitudinal and identitarian. Though other additional variables (such as, for example, support for/identification with feminist movements) could also be tested, using the existing EVS database has limited the selection variables to the ones existing in it (see Table 3).

Under the identitarian dimension I have grouped variables regarding European identity, national identity, importance of religion in one's life and educational level. European identity is reflected by citizens' answers regarding the geographic group they identify themselves with mostly (national, European or the world). National identity is given by citizens' pride of being of a certain nationality, but also by three variables that can be considered to fall under the category of *nationalism*: the importance they give to respecting national political institutions and laws, fear that the EU means economic loss for one's country, loss of power or loss of national identity/culture.

The attitudinal/moral dimension comprises different aspects. Control over one's life, the belief in man's superiority over nature ("humans were meant to rule over nature") can be considered as products of a rationalist, post-Enlightenment thinking. Confidence in environmental organizations is a factor that is often mentioned in relation to Olympianism. Concern with humankind can point to a feeling of belonging to a globalized world and can also show an interest towards human rights. Other variables that have to do with tolerance and human rights point to xenophobia (don't like as neighbours: immigrants) or racism (don't like as neighbours: people of different race), care for immigrants' life conditions. On the other hand, variables were tested that measure people's attitude towards sensible issues and which point to their values. These variables have also been found in the literature in connection with the concept of Olympianism. They are: attitude towards marriage (marriage is outdated; it is alright to live together without getting married), attitude towards homosexuals (homosexuality is justified; it is alright for homosexual couples to adopt children), attitude towards abortion (abortion is justified; abortion is alright if a couple doesn't want more children) and attitude towards death penalty (death penalty is justified). According to scholars, Olympians adopt attitudes opposing conservatory, religious ones. On the other hand, the American conservative Robert Bork (2003) associates European Olympian public opinion with the opposition towards death penalty.

In order to explore if there is a relation between these variables and citizens' trust in the EU, several Bivariate, Pearson Correlations have been run for the entire database and for each of the eight countries analyzed. All the 22 variables prove to have significant correlations with the confidence in EU. In the following pages these correlations will be described, at a general, European level and for the countries analyzed. Only significant correlations, either at a 0.01 level or at a 0.05 level have been taken into account.

As it would be expected, people who consider themselves in the first place European citizens, and not Romanian, French or German, are the ones more confident in the EU. However, among the countries analyzed, this tendency is significant only in the case of France, Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain, the most developed EU members. It also appears that a strong national identity, manifested through pride, is not necessarily contrary to people's adhesion to the EU, but rather consolidates it. This is valid for Bulgarians, Belgians, Germans and Spanish citizens and also tends to be general at the European level. National pride can thus facilitate the desirability of the EU by making an appeal to a common history and shared values.

On the other hand, fear that the EU brings disadvantages to the European countries is, as the results show, a significant cause for distrust. For all eight countries under study, the fear that the EU means that member states pay and may thus lose money without important gains directly affects people's confidence in the EU. The same negative correlation is valid for the countries analyzed (except for Spain) when people are asked about the potential effects of EU on national sovereignty. Results show that Europeans

who fear that EU causes a loss of national power tend to distrust it. Albanians and Spanish citizens do not consider loss of identity and culture among the most relevant arguments against the EU. On the other hand, in most of the European countries people who have this fear are more reticent towards the EU. This can also be considered a manifestation of nationalism. Another side of nationalism and of relation with national authority is shown by the respect citizens have or do not have for national institutions and law, which, in most cases, is extended to the supranational level, as the correlations show.

The Albanians who trust the EU are the only ones of the eight countries for whom religion is not important in their lives. This might be explained in relation to nationalism, as the analysis shows a strong correlation between the importance of religion and national pride. In other words, very religious Albanians are more nationalists. For the rest of the eight countries (except Bulgaria and France) and as a general European tendency, religion plays an important role in the lives of citizens who trust the EU, which comes in contradiction with scholars' views regarding Olympianism. In addition to religion's importance, people who trust the EU are also concerned for humankind in general, a characteristic found in the literature about Olympianism.

The education level of respondents also has a significant influence on their confidence in the EU in the case of the older Member States, while in Bulgaria, Romania and Albania there is no direct connection between the two. This might be due to a higher euro-enthusiasm caused by the recent accession, the positive media coverage, the large political adherence to the European project and also by the availability of the European funds for Romania and Bulgaria. Albania also had the highest trust in the EU in 2008 (80% - EVS), which is partly due to people's dissatisfaction with the national political system and the hope for a "Messianic Europe". These factors have made the EU a solution in the collective mind and have created a wider support among citizens. In Romania, for example, the debate about EU membership has rarely focused on potential negative implications, but rather "promoting" the positive aspects, which has led to a wider confidence in EU, even among people with lower levels of education.

However, at the European level it seems that people who are more educated are the ones inclined towards the EU, which is in line with scholars' views. This could be a result of a longer experience in the EU, a fracture between common people's initial expectations of direct benefits and actual ones, or the "communication and democratic deficits", which make the EU distant, bureaucratic, hard to follow and understand for the common, less knowledgeable citizen.

Trust in the EU is also characteristic for people who consider they have a strong control over their own lives and have a high perceived freedom of choice. A similar tendency at the European level (though, from the nine countries analyzed, significant only in France) is that people who trust the EU also have the view that humans were meant to rule over nature, which is rather a post-Enlightenment judgement.

On the other hand, trust in environmental organizations and corporations have a strong influence on confidence in the EU for most of the European countries. In regard to xenophobia and racism, the analysis shows that these are, in many cases, incompatible with EU adhesion, as Olympianism theory also suggests. Supporters of the EU are much more moderate people, tolerant to immigrants and even concerned with their well-being, tolerant with other races. Citizens who trust the EU put great value on human rights and disagree with death penalty (except for Albania). The importance of human rights for Europeans who confide in the EU can also explain why trust in UNO has been found a strong predictor for the dependent variable.

Table 3. Significant correlations by country between the variables analyzed and Trust in the EU

TRUST EU	Albania	Bulgaria	Romania	Spain	France	Belgium	Germany	Great Britain	All
Perceived identity	-	-	-	-	European	European	European*	European	European
National pride	-	Yes	-	Yes*	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes
EU fears: own country pays	No	No	No	No*	No	No	No	No	No
EU fears: loss of power	No*	No	No	-	No	No	No	No	No
EU fears: loss of identity	-	No	No	-	No	No	No	No	No
Respect national institutions and law	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	-	-	Yes
Religion is important	No*	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Concerned with humankind	-	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Educational level	-	-	-	High*	High	High	High	High	High
Control over one's life	-	Yes	Yes*	Yes*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes
Confidence in environmental organizations	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes
Confidence in big companies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes
Don't like as neighbours: immigrants	-	-	-	-	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree*	Disagree	Disagree
Don't like as neighbours: different race	Disagree	-	-	-	-	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree	-
Concerned with immigrants	No	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Humans were meant to rule over nature	-	-	-	-	Yes	-	-	-	Yes
Marriage is outdated	Disagree	Disagree	-	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree*	-	Disagree
Alright to live together without getting married	Disagree	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Disagree
Justify homosexuality	Disagree	Agree*	-	-	Agree	-	-	Agree	Disagree
Homosexual couples - adopt children	Disagree	-	-	-	Agree	-	-	Agree	Disagree
Justify abortion	Agree	-	-	-	Agree	-	-	Agree	Agree
Abortion if couple doesn't want more children	Agree	Disagree*	-	-	Agree*	-	Disagree	-	Disagree
Justify death penalty	Agree*	-	-	-	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree

* Weaker correlation (Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level).

When it comes to moral beliefs and values, Europeans who trust the EU are rather traditional and conservatory, following religious precepts. The correlations ran on the entire database show a general tendency of people who trust the EU to disagree with homosexuality, abortion, death penalty, and to still value marriage. However, between the nine countries analyzed there are some notable differences. Trust in the EU seems to be influenced by people's perceptions on these delicate issues. Confidence in the EU is characteristic, in France, Great Britain and Bulgaria, to some extent, to people who agree with homosexuality, while in Albania, a more conservatory country, it is characteristic to people who disagree with it. Albanians, Spanish and French citizens who agree with abortion tend to trust the EU, while for the Germans the opposite is valid.

Research Conclusions

The research shows that, at a European level, there is a common pattern that could explain why people trust the European Union. There is a series of inter-connected factors that can predict Europeans' attitude towards this subject. However, the results show that the concept of New Olympianism would seem more viable. Companies are widely trusted among those who confide in the EU, who are usually right-winged in political views. The research partly contradicts the theoretical assumptions that ground the Olympian thesis: that people trust the European Union because they have lost faith in their national political institutions and in democracy. This assumption has been validated only for the case of Albania and, to a lower extent, Romania. Due to the high levels of corruption and living standards which are lower than in other Members States, these countries tend to turn their hopes towards a "Messianic Europe". On the other hand, for the other states under analysis trust in EU is conditioned and nurtured by the way people perceive politicians nationally, in other words nations still dictate in the collective mind.

The analysis of Eurobarometer data for 2006 – 2012 shows a clear tendency of normalization, the levels of trust in national institutions becoming closer to trust in the EU towards 2012. In some cases (France, Germany and UK), this implies a resurrection of national confidence at the expense of EU trust. These tendencies seem to be associated with the deepening of the crisis, which produces significant shifts in public opinion. Not only is the second hypothesis proven wrong, but also the data shows a contrary tendency. In other words, EU trust depends, in most of the case, in people's confidence in national institutions. In this regard Olympianism is not a valid concept for the current state of affairs in the EU. Furthermore, in some cases the results indicate a resurrection of trust in national authorities. France and Spain, countries severely affected by the crisis, turn to national institutions and start losing faith in the EU.

There seems to be an overall direct proportionality between the independent variable and the dependent ones, as the regression also suggests. Most of the exceptions that question the regression prediction validity can be associated with important events in different countries, such as the entering in recession of UK and Spain, the French presidential elections, the changing of the Romanian government or, more generally, the deepening of the Euro crisis. Even though, except for France, Germany and UK, trust in EU remains higher than trust in national institutions, there are significant decreases in both, and the concept of Olympianism as denationalization does not seem to be validated on the longer term. However, the research partly confirms the hypothesis drawn from the theoretical background. The connection with the UN revealed by the regression holds true on the longer term with some notable exceptions. The results of the regression confirm that there is a preference towards the EU managerial class of experts and public servants,

which serves as reason for confidence. For Romanians and Albanians, there does seem to be a dichotomy: politicians – bad, technocrats – good.

The correlations confirm that nationalism is not necessarily opposed to trust in supranational institutions, or to Olympianism. National pride and respect for national authority consolidate confidence in the EU, even in countries like Romania and Bulgaria, who aren't very satisfied with their living standards and with the ruling class. Another finding that contradicts Olympianism regards religion. Religion does impact trust in EU, but it is rather the religious people who confide in the European project; the exception is Albania, where very religious persons are rather nationalists and distrustful of the EU.

The analysis shows that educated people are more prone to the EU, but mainly in the Western countries. Other Olympian characteristics which are mostly confirmed are tolerance (mainly in Western countries), environmentalism and concern for humankind. On the other hand, as opposed to scholars' assumptions, Europeans who trust the EU are rather traditional and conservatory when it comes to marriage, homosexual rights or abortion.

Overall, the analysis shows that Olympianism is not so much present in the European sphere, or at least not entirely as it is described. The European Olympian is rather closer to a New Olympianism, and could be described as educated, tolerant, concerned with environment and humankind, religious and conservative in moral regards. He/she has a pronounced feeling of European belonging, but has a strong national identity, nonetheless. The European Olympian has predominantly right-winged political views, trusts corporations, bureaucracies and international organizations. And most importantly, the European Olympian trusts national institutions and democracy, which are his/her milestones and which decide his attitude towards the European Union.

3. Conclusions

The developments of the twentieth century have brought substantial changes in the global power matrix. Globalization and internationalism have become the new grand narratives. The two world wars, the rise and fall of communism and the Cold War have made the Western civilization reflect upon itself. Modern Enlightenment is considered to have brought progress at the expense of religion, it has made men take control upon its destiny but also realize, as Paul Valery once said, that “nous autres peuples nous savons maintenant que nous somme mortels”. The paradigm shift imposes new answers to new problems and a new weltanschauung for people to make sense of a global world.

Scholars consider that Olympianism has been advanced by Western elites as the new, one-size-fits-all answer. Building on the demonization of the Westphalian states, Olympianism is essentially an internationalist project that aims to shift the power from government to governance. Abstract, faceless international institutions are invested with superior moral virtue and are given power to decide over the conduct of citizens and even countries. American and British conservatives claim that behind the “good intentions” of human rights and “Legal Salvationism” stands only the struggle for world power. They are concerned that this new diplomacy as a form of soft power threatens the sovereignty of states and freedom itself, by regulating every aspect of life.

The UN, the EU, the WTO, the International Court of Justice, banks and corporations are thought to be the key Olympians who, appealing to an “enlightened public opinion”, succeed in becoming the global powers of the XXI century. Their inherent democratic deficit and un-accountability is seen as the main threat to democracy. But the imposing of the Olympian agenda is not as easy as the conservative scholars would lead us to believe. It comes not without counteraction, both at the nation state level and at the

citizens'. Euro-skepticism is increasingly rising and the global recession raises serious questions about the deregulation of markets and about the legitimacy of supranational institutions. Similar to some globalizers' insistence on the imminent end of states, other scholars foresee the resurrection of nations. However, even if the Olympianism concept is not entirely feasible, it does raise pertinent questions that call for reflection.

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CASE-STUDY IN THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION: THE EU MEDIATION IN THE RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR OF AUGUST 2008

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Abstract. *This paper looks at the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 and argues that the case-study is highly relevant for the study of mediation in contemporary conflicts due to both its multi-layered character and variety of the actors involved, among which the European Union acted as mediator. While the EU may have been motivated by humanitarian, security and political concerns in ending the violence, its own relevancy and credibility as a foreign policy actor were being actually questioned. An assertive French President took the forefront as the leader of the only organization which could undertake crisis management in that very sensitive political context and this paper aims at assessing the results of his performance and the institutional lessons learned.*

Keywords: *European Union, cease-fire, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, French presidency, multi-layered conflict*

1. Introduction

There are many strands of research studying various elements of the process of mediation and the characteristics of its protagonists, of interest for both academics and practitioners. This paper focuses on a recent hotly debated conflict in which mediation was attempted: the Russia-Georgia War of August 2008. While the specific aim of the case-study is to provide an in-depth account of the mediation efforts by the European Union – represented by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy – in the war of 2008, its more general goal is that of identifying the challenges of mediating in multi-layered conflicts and assessing the possibility of successful outcomes.

The European Union's involvement in conflict management was not something new. The EU itself was designed as a project meant to consolidate peace and reconciliation between former enemies (France and Germany). The creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – despite all its flaws – enabled the EU to act more coherently on the international stage and undertake conflict management initiatives. Christopher Hill argued that as far as conflict resolution is concerned, the EU can act as both an actor organization and a framework organization (Hill, 2001: 325). In the first case the EU is a player in its own right and can act through mediation, political or military intervention whilst in the second one it provides the framework for third parties to peacefully solve their disputes, especially in the context of enlargement and pre-accession

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processes. The literature on EU and conflict resolution is very rich, approaching mainly the EU intervention in the conflicts in its neighbourhood which are generally of the *intra-state* type (ethno-political/secessionist ones) (Coppeters et al, 2004; Tocci, 2007; Popescu, 2010; Tocci, 2011, etc). The EU's experience with *inter-state* conflicts is limited, basically comprising the largely unsuccessful attempts of conflict management in former Yugoslavia, where the Bosnian wars in the '90s for example "were both civil wars within a disintegrating Yugoslavia and interstate wars between Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia" (Levy, 2007: 19).

When the Russia-Georgia War broke out in August 2008, no wars had taken place in Europe since 1995 and the EU had tried hard to maintain a stable and peaceful neighbourhood (towards South and East) through enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The failure to prevent armed conflict on European soil could have been interpreted as downgrading the EU's achievements and force of attraction as a political project meant to pacify the continent.

2. Mediation of international conflicts

According to the literature on conflict management, mediation can be defined as "a process of conflict management, related to, but distinct from, the parties' own efforts, whereby the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without resorting to physical force, or invoking the authority of the law" (Bercovitch, 1992: 8). In international relations, mediation is consecrated as a particular form of negotiation most useful in protracted conflicts, when the parties' efforts have reached a stalemate, but none of them is willing to pay the costs of a potential escalation, they are prepared not only to engage in direct or indirect dialogue but also to accept some kind of external help and to surrender some control over the process of conflict management (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 322).

The main components of a mediation process are: the actors (the parties to the conflict), their interactions, their expectations, their experience, resources and interests and the specific situation of conflict to be mediated. In addition to these, there is the mediator, as the main element that differentiates between negotiation and mediation. The mediator's role and behaviour are highly dependent on the circumstances in which mediation is performed, so that each initiative remains specific to a certain context. As specific as the behaviour and roles performed by the mediator may be, the goal is (almost) always the same: the settlement of the dispute.

The mediator's role is described in the literature "on a continuum of ascending levels of involvement as communication facilitators, conduits of information, translators of information, promoters of specific outcomes, direct agents of influence and supervisors or guarantors of an outcome" (Bercovitch, 1991: 4). To be effective, the role (and the associated strategies) must be congruent with the conflict giving rise to mediation, the actors involved and the nature of their relationship (Bercovitch, 1991: 4). Along with the strategies used by the mediator – which can be communication - facilitation, procedural or directive ones – there are other important characteristics pertaining to his identity, such as his /her rank, experience, status in international relations and his/her relationship with (one of) the parties (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000: 175-181). Of particular interest can be the type of power that legitimizes his or her intervention; according to USIP¹ scholars there

¹ United States Institute for Peace, Washington

isreward power (when the mediator has something to offer to the parties in exchange for changes in behaviour), **coercive power** (relies on threats and sanctions to carry them out with the intention of changing the behaviour of the parties), **expert power** (based on the mediator's greater knowledge and experience with certain issues), **legitimate power** (based on certain rights and legally sanctioned authority under international law), **referent power** (based on a desire of the parties to the conflict to maintain a valued relationship with the mediator) and **informational power** (that works on the content of the information conveyed as in the case of a go-between or message carrier) (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 1999: 29).

Although generally states are the main actors performing mediation, there are also numerous instances when organizations or even individuals have undertaken this responsibility. As far as international/regional organizations are concerned, research points to the fact that while their motives could be "somewhat more complex" than those of states (due to peacemaking often being their *raison d'être*), their mediation activities may still be affected to a certain extent by state (or self-) interests (Zartman, 2007: 441-442)

Last but not least, mediation is deemed as fully successful when it is given credit for making a great difference to or settling a dispute; it is partially successful when its efforts initiate negotiations and some dialogue between the parties; mediation success is limited when it achieves only a ceasefire or break in hostilities and it is deemed unsuccessful when it has no discernible impact on the dispute (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, 1991: 9-10).

But the quest for an early cease-fire may undermine reaching the "ripe moment"² when a conflict may actually be *solved* – and not only *managed* – thus triggering unintended consequences that might further complicate the already tense situation on the ground. Moreover, multi-layered conflicts could pose particular problems to mediation because of the complexity of relations between parties, their number and degree of involvement, together with the various issues at stake.

This paper looks at the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 and argues that the case-study is highly relevant for the study of mediation in contemporary conflicts due to both its multi-layered character and variety of the actors involved, among which the European Union acted as mediator. Moreover, the case-study is worth exploring because mediation was attempted before the Lisbon Treaty altered significantly the EU's external representation apparatus in 2009, thus transforming this initiative into one of the last major ones by the six-month presidency of the EU before it lost its institutional role in foreign policy.

3. Historical background of the conflict

Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union on April 9th 1991. The newly independent republic comprised three main territorial subdivisions: Georgia with the capital in Tbilisi, the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Autonomous Oblast (district) of South Ossetia. The international community recognized the new independent state within the borders of the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, but a series of nationalist measures taken by the transition regime of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia (imposing Georgian as the unique language throughout the country, restraining autonomy

² For a discussion about the notion of "ripeness" of conflict please see, among others, Greig, J. Michael, (2001), "Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals", in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45, no. 6, 691-718.

for the non-Georgian entities) together with regional nationalism alienated both South Ossetia and Abkhazia who fought secession wars with Georgia in the '90s (IIFMCG Report, I, 2009: 13). Two cease-fire agreements – the first signed in Sochi (1992) and the second one in Moscow (1994) – ended the wars with South Ossetia and Abkhazia respectively, in the aftermath of which Georgia lost control of large parts of both territories. Both agreements provided for the deployment of peacekeeping forces (mainly Russian) in the former war theatres and international missions (from the UN in Abkhazia and the CSCE/OSCE in South Ossetia) to facilitate the peace processes. With the election of Mikhail Saakashvili as President of Georgia in 2003, the country took a turn to the West, enjoying massive support from the EU (for reconstruction and rule of law) and even more from the US (including military advisers and armament deals). At the same time, the relation with Russia under President Vladimir Putin's rule worsened as Georgia joined forces with post-Orange revolution Ukraine and sought NATO membership. But in April 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest neither Georgia, nor Ukraine was granted the Membership Action Plan which would have signalled the countries' firm perspectives of joining the Alliance within a reasonable period of time. Instead, the NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration highlighted that "*NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries' applications for MAP*" (NATO Summit Declaration, 2008, par. 23). But that was enough to show Russia that the Euro-Atlantic perspectives of its neighbours were serious, even though progress towards reaching their target was slow.

In the mean time, another event had fuelled the political divisions in Europe: on February 17th 2008 the Assembly of Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the province. This triggered recognition from big powers such as the United States, Great Britain, Germany or France, while Russia reacted in anger and joined Serbia in a vocal opposition to the move, which it considered illegal³. The European Union was once again divided (not as radically as during the Iraq war though), with several member states refusing to recognize Kosovo's self-proclaimed independence because of their own minority issues. Although Kosovo's situation was a very particular one due to the conditions that had led to the war, NATO's intervention and the subsequent setting-up of a UN interim administration⁴, states which refused to recognize its independence argued that it disregarded Serbia's territorial integrity according to international law and hence it could set a precedent for violent secession of territories in Europe.

In this already tense climate in Eastern Europe, in the first half of 2008 there was also an increase in violent incidents both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite Tbilisi's negotiation efforts. By August 2008, the "frozen conflict" had reached boiling point once again.

4. Main parties to the conflict

The war started on the 7th of August 2008 at midnight when the Georgian artillery attacked the city of Tskhinvali and soon transformed into a combined inter-state and intra-

³ "Kosovo breakaway illegal, says Putin" online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/15/russia.kosovo>, accessed 11.10.2012

⁴ According to UNSC Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, online at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement>

state conflict, opposing Georgian and Russian forces at one level of confrontation as well as South Ossetians together with Abkhaz fighters and the Georgians at another one (IIFMCG Report, I, 2009: 10). The mediator's entering the stage only added to the complexity of cast and plot, but essentially the mediation initiative targeted the inter-state level of the conflict, as Sarkozy was trying to obtain a cease-fire signed by the two heads of state: the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev.

The Russia-Georgia War of 2008 had many protagonists, at least two layers of conflict and numerous contentious issues. Each of the parties followed its own motivations and was aiming at accomplishing precise objectives. In addition to the parties, the mediator had his own agenda - focused on ending the conflict - but also underpinned by internal motives that influenced the perception of the crisis and the approach to solving it.

As far as the parties' motivations and objectives are concerned, there is an official narrative used also for propagandistic reasons during the war and post-factum assessments by experts and academics which also touched upon the legality of the parties' actions (IIFMCG Report, 2009; Green and Waters, 2010). In a conflict in which each participant claimed it had acted in self-defence exploring the intricacies of their motives and objectives becomes fascinating.

The first account of the Georgian Government's motivation for attacking Tskhinvali with artillery fire in the night of August 7th was provided by Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili, Commander of the Georgian contingent to the Joint Peacekeeping Forces who candidly admitted that the action was aimed at "restoring the constitutional order in South Ossetia" (Report, I, 2009: 19). In fact, when re-elected in January 2008, President Saakashvili had promised the Georgians "a winning lottery ticket" in the South Ossetian and Abkhaz issues. As all negotiation attempts with Tskhinvali and Sukhumi failed during the first half of 2008, the continuation of politics by other means may have been considered an option. In other words, the Georgian President may have decided to impose Tbilisi rule by force. But Mamuka Kurashvili's declaration was soon disavowed and official rhetoric became that Georgia acted in self-defence: it had to respond to fire from Tskhinvali targeting the Georgian villages in South Ossetia and to counteract the Russian invasion through the Roki tunnel that same night.

Basically, the objectives of the Georgian military actions were the following: the protection of civilians in the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia; neutralisation of the firing positions from which fire against civilians, Georgian peacekeeping units and police originated; halting of the movement of regular units of the Russian Federation through the Roki tunnel inside the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia (IIFMCG Report, I, 2009: 19-20). This soon transformed into a race against the clock to save Tbilisi and the Saakashvili regime when Russian troops invaded the territory of Georgia proper. The former claim of self-defence became more verisimilar than ever.

On the other hand, Moscow justified its military intervention as self-defence as well, but in the broadest (and not unanimously accepted) sense of the term: the protection of Russian citizens residing in South Ossetia and the Russian contingent of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces deployed in South Ossetia in accordance with the Sochi Agreement of 1992 (IIFMCG Report, I, 2009: 21). In addition to this, it was seeking to stop the genocide allegedly perpetrated by Georgian forces in South Ossetia. As the genocide accusations soon proved unsubstantiated by evidence, Russia focused its official rhetoric on the issue of protecting its citizens in South Ossetia (to whom it had been granting Russian passports in the months before the war) from a ruthless Georgian attack.

Although discussing the issue of the “passportisation” policy used by Moscow few months before the war exceeds the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that it has been deemed illegal under international law by the Report of the EU-sponsored fact-finding mission headed by Swiss ambassador Heidi Tagliavini in 2008-2009 (IIFMCG Report, I, 2009: 18). Consequently, this justification used by Moscow was highly doubtful and it actually turned irrelevant when the Russian troops advanced on the territory of Georgia proper heading for the capital Tbilisi. It is then that it became clear for the future mediator and for the entire international community that the real objective of the military invasion was regime change in Georgia. In other words, the underlying motivations of the Russian military intervention were purely political: to “punish” a very vocal and bold Georgia who was hosting American military advisers, was playing the role of “beacon of liberty”⁵ in the South Caucasus and was pursuing NATO membership together with Ukraine. All these translated in Moscow as the encirclement of Russia by the West and a continuous remembrance of its humiliation back in the ‘90s, when it was downgraded from super-power status to that of the “sick man” of Europe (Friedman, 2008).

More concretely, the Russian objectives were to stop the advancement of NATO in its backyard (by accentuating the instability of the region and complicating the security environment there), to reaffirm its spheres of influence (according Cold War language promoted by highest rank officials such as Dmitri Medvedev in the aftermath of the war), to restore the credibility of the Russian army and to depose Saakashvili because of the personal antipathy prime-minister Vladimir Putin had for him. And, of course, to mark the forceful comeback of Russia as a regional power in Europe, committed to defending its proxies South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Russian tit for tat in the Kosovo issue.

South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia were the protagonists of the intra-state level of conflict; although the first two had been de facto self-governing entities since the wars in 1992/94, the international community never recognized their secession from Georgia, while Tbilisi developed parallel governing authorities in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi and sought to bring them back under its rule as it did with Adjara. The term “Georgia proper” was coined regarding the undisputed Georgian territory and the two were generally referred to as “separatist regions”.

The escalation of violence between South Ossetian militias and Georgian army in the few months prior to the August War was an immediate indicator of a warming-up of one of the “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasus. As far as Tskhinvali is concerned, the main motivation for engaging in the war was the perceiving of a window of opportunity to settle once and for all the issue of secession from Georgia; colluding with Moscow, South Ossetia sought to change the *status quo* by means of war, including ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages on its territory. Initially, the South Ossetian army reacted in self-defence to the Georgian attack on August 7th, but after that its military operations served for maintaining multiple fronts for the Georgian army while the Russian troops were heading towards Tbilisi.

Another front was opened in Abkhazia, where the Abkhaz “army” seized the moment and tried to get hold of the Kodori Valley – officially, to “liberate” it. This tiny piece of territory did not belong to the Abkhaz-controlled territory under the provisions of

⁵US President George W. Bush called Georgia “a beacon of liberty for this region and the world” in a speech held in Tbilisi, on May 10th 2005. See “Bush: Georgia «beacon of liberty»“ online at http://articles.cnn.com/2005-05-10/world/bush.tuesday_1_inspiring-democratic-reformers-georgian-people-abkhazia?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed 11.10.2012

the Moscow Agreement, but it did so during the era when Georgia was part of the Soviet Union. Although the Abkhaz authorities gave four different explanations for their opening of a second front against the Georgian army (IIFMCG Report, I, 2009: 25), none of them was legal under international law and their military actions amounted to aggression to which the Georgian army responded in self-defence. As in the case of South Ossetia, Abkhazia engaged in war with the objective of consecrating once again on the battlefield the reality of its *de facto* separation. Moreover, it sought territorial gains from a vulnerable Georgia with the ultimate goal of achieving its independence.

The five-day war represented a nightmare not only for the participants, but also for the European Union as a neighbour, a regional organization promoting peace and stability through prosperity and as a crisis manager. Fortunately, this was indeed “the hour of Europe”, although reminiscences from EU impotency during the wars in the Balkans were still lingering. The assessment of what happened in Georgia was not unanimous within the European Union, but the common objective was undisputable: to react decisively and put an end to the violence before Tbilisi fell to the Russian troops. It was French president Nicolas Sarkozy who, as President of the European Council took the lead and acted as mediator between Moscow and Tbilisi. What was at stake was peace in Europe, stability in the Eastern neighbourhood of the European Union and its credibility as an organization promoting a normative stance based on democracy, rule of law, human rights, etc. Both Russia and Georgia were the EU’s partners in various foreign policy and economic arrangements such as the Strategic Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy respectively.

While the EU may have been motivated by humanitarian, security and political concerns in ending the violence, its own relevancy and credibility as a foreign policy actor were actually questioned. Although it may be possible that Sarkozy hijacked a role that the Georgians wanted Washington to play, he managed to mediate with a degree of success which will be assessed in this paper. Sarkozy’s objectives were clear: to prevent a Georgian defeat and occupation (which would have triggered the end of the democratically elected Saakashvili regime), to avoid the plunging into war of Russia and the West and to bring the war to a quick end (Asmus, 2010: 193). In this, he enjoyed the total support of the EU member states, whilst the United States took the backseat. Last but not least, the EU also had objectives regarding its internal cohesion, member states perceiving this crisis as one in which they had to act together and avoid unilateral stances that could hurt a common position and the credibility of the EU’s mediation.

5. Results and unintended consequences

The conflict started on the night of 7 to 8th of August when Georgia launched an artillery attack on South Ossetia and 24 hours later the 54th Russian Army stationing in North Ossetia intervened in order to counteract the Georgian attack. After that, the Russian troops advanced on the Georgian territory, reached the outskirts of the capital Tbilisi and stopped the offensive only as a result of a cease-fire mediated by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy. As president of the European Council, he had gone to Moscow and Tbilisi in order to obtain a cease-fire consecrated by the acceptance of a six-point plan by both parties: 1) refrain from use of force; 2) a permanent cessation of hostilities; 3) free access for humanitarian aid and the permission for the return of refugees; 4) the withdrawal of the Georgian forces to their usual bases; 5) the withdrawal of the Russian forces to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities and, pending an international mechanism, they were to implement additional security measures; 6) opening of international talks on the

security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the basis of relevant UN and OSCE decisions (IIFMCG Report, II, 2009: 439).

The cease-fire was proclaimed during a press conference in Tbilisi on August 13th at the end of what Georgia labelled as Russian “aggression” and the Russian Federation called a “peace enforcement operation”, while the EU refrained from labelling the violent episode one way or the other, but insisted on a cease-fire from the very beginning (IIFMCG Report, II, 2009: 22).

But on August 26th Moscow recognized the independence of the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, triggering firm reactions from the European leaders and the convening of an extraordinary European Council on September 1st⁶. The European Council condemned Russia’s unilateral decision of recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which it deemed “unacceptable” and reminded that conflict resolution in Georgia had to be based on the respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as recognized by international law, on the Helsinki Final Act and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Moreover, it confirmed the EU’s determination to support the efforts on the ground in order to reach peaceful and durable conflict resolution, highlighting its significant personnel and financial contribution to the consolidation of the OSCE observer mission in South Ossetia and announcing its decision to send urgently a fact-finding mission so as to gain the necessary information and map out the ways in which the EU could engage troops on the ground under the ESDP; it decided also to name a Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia and the suspension of negotiations for a new Partnership Agreement with Russia until the latter withdrew its troops to the lines prior to August 7th (European Council, 2008).

As a result of the divergent interpretations regarding the *status quo ante bellum* it was decided that an agreement on the implementation of the August cease-fire should be signed, which had to establish the measures concerning the withdrawal of the armed forces and the international monitoring mechanisms. The Implementation Accord stated the continuation of the activity of international observers of UNOMIG and the OSCE mission, whilst the EU was to deploy 200 observers in the regions adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia thus becoming the guarantor of the principle of refrain from the use of force (IIFMCG Report, 2009, II, p.441). In addition to this, it was agreed that international talks regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia would start in Geneva on November 15th so as to implement the 6th point of the cease-fire plan.

The Russian troops withdrew from Poti and Senaki on September 13th and from the so-called buffer zones around Abkhazia and Ossetia until October 9th, according to the Implementation Agreement of the 6-point cease-fire plan; nevertheless, the Russian Defence Minister stated on September 13th that he would maintain a military presence in the two separatist republics, while Russian check-points remained in Ahalgori, in contradiction with the commitment of withdrawing all troops to the lines prior to August 7th (IIFMCG Report, II, 2009: 441).

⁶ Nicolas Sarkozy, Bernard Kouchner, Angela Merkel, David Miliband condemned Russia for the acquisition of territories by force and the modification of Georgia’s borders, claiming that this kind of actions were null and void and unacceptable for the EU (26-28 August), apud Vladimir Socor, “Summit tests EU’s capacity to oppose Russia’s reexpansion”, in *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 5, issue 165, 28 August 2008, online at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33907&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=166&no_cache=1, accessed 13.06.2012

The General Affairs and External Relations Council of September 15th reiterated the EU's resolve to play an important role in crisis management in the Russian-Georgian case, both through a presence on the ground and the preparing of, and participation in, the international talks for durable conflict resolution in Georgia. Pierre Morel was named EU Special Representative for the Crisis in Georgia and it was decided that an independent civilian mission under ESDP would be sent in the region before October 1st according to the Implementation Agreement of September 8th that would closely cooperate with the UN and OSCE missions on the ground. On October 1st 2008 the 200-strong European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM Georgia) was deployed in theatre, setting up its general headquarters in Tbilisi and four field offices in Tbilisi, Gori, Kashuri and Zugdidi. EUMM Georgia had to monitor for one year the *entire* territory of Georgia - including Abkhazia and South Ossetia – its mandate entailing stabilization, normalization, confidence-building and information tasks (EU Council Joint Action, 2008: 302)

Due to the EU's decisive intervention for mediating the conflict in the summer of 2008 by the French Presidency of the European Council and the signing of the Implementation Accord, the authorities in Tbilisi thought that the Europeans were determined to get involved more substantially in the region in order to counterbalance Russia's power politics (Moscow had deployed peacekeepers on the ground and held a veto over the continuation of the UN and OSCE missions in Georgia). Consequently, the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili hoped that the EU would send a **military** mission with a robust mandate and would help significantly with the resolution of the conflict as a result of the lobby performed by the member states with which Georgia enjoyed special relations (Romania, Poland, the Baltic states, etc) (Fischer, 2009: 387). But when the EU committed to sending a **civilian** mission, the Government of Tbilisi had to accept less than it had hoped for and, because of the perceived inefficiency of the other missions on the ground, it chose to cooperate closely with EUMM, thus creating the impression that the mission would be biased towards the Georgian side. This is an example of unintended consequences that only made more difficult the cooperation with the separatist authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as they perceived that EUMM favoured the Government in Tbilisi.

On the other hand, the lack of consensus on the long term within the EU regarding the relationship with Russia prevented the EU (as mediator) to respond adequately to developments such as the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the maintaining of Russian checkpoints on the territory of Georgia proper (in Ahalgori and Perevi) and of Russian troops in the two separatist republics; the unintended consequences of the gradual loss of political support for common action within the EU undermined the follow-up efforts and the leverage of the mediator when the provisions of the agreements were not respected.

6. Conclusions and lessons learned

Some authors pointed out to the fact that the cease-fire plan of August 12th mediated by President Sarkozy was flawed both in substance and process (Socor, 2008a), hastily designed by the French and signed by the Georgian side under tremendous pressure and even intimidation (Asmus, 2010: 202-207). The Report of the Fact-Finding Mission emphasized that its provisions were not fully applied by the Russian side until only a few days later, a situation that repeated itself with the Implementation Agreement signed in September. The withdrawal of the bulk of Russian troops from the territory of Georgia proper (narrowly) met the deadline of October 14th, but troops remained in the separatist provinces, whose independence Moscow recognized in the aftermath of the war. With such

accomplishments, the EU mediation efforts could be easily deemed as ineffective. Nevertheless, they were extremely valuable, at least because of the lessons learned.

The main lessons learned by the EU belong to two categories – lessons for the EU as a political organization and as an international mediator respectively. In the first category the lesson was that of internal cohesion – the EU member states acted together, rallied around the French Presidency in its mediation efforts and agreed unanimously on sending EUMM on the ground, which became the fastest deployed ESDP mission ever. In the second category the lessons highlighted the value of quick (re)action and personal relations among European leaders. An assertive French President took the forefront as the leader of the only organization which could undertake crisis management in that very sensitive (political) context: as Moscow held veto power at both the UN and OSCE (which it later used to oust their missions in Georgia and the separatist regions), NATO could not be involved and the US had to stay out of it (because of the lame-duck presidency already involved in two wars in the Middle East and the risk of returning to brinkmanship politics with Russia). Hence, an intervention by the European Union became the only option. It had the legitimacy, credentials, instruments and will to try settling the conflict: a political and economic partner of both state parties, the EU was uniquely qualified for mediation efforts. The extra advantage was the presence of Nicolas Sarkozy at its helm at that moment: beyond its personal qualities, the French President had mended the country's relations with the US and NATO (so he was a trustworthy mediator from Washington's point of view) and enjoyed good leverage in Moscow (although not as good as his Italian counterpart Silvio Berlusconi). On the other hand, he had a rather neutral stance regarding Georgia, but quickly understood how deep the Russian leadership's resentment towards the regime in Tbilisi was because of Putin's anger with Saakashvili and Georgia's courting of the West (Asmus, 2010: 199).

The theoretical assumptions in the introduction highlighted the main elements influencing the successful outcomes of mediation in international conflicts. Among them, the mediator's relations with the parties, his/her identity and personal features and the moment in which mediation is attempted seem the most important for this case-study. The basic objective of saving Tbilisi from falling to the Russian troops and preserving the Saakashvili regime was attained by the mediator when obtaining the cease-fire agreement. Everything else remains controversial and will be questioned in the last section of this paper.

The case-study undoubtedly provides food for thought. This paper aimed at presenting the facts of war and assessing the results of the mediation initiative. Some questions still remain, opening avenues for further research.

First of all, is obtaining a ceasefire between parties still a measure of success for third-party intervention in contemporary conflicts? According to the literature cited in the introduction, a cease-fire amounts to a limited success of the mediation and although any initiative aimed at preventing human suffering is useful, a hasty end of violence might undermine the future prospects of peace negotiations. The Sarkozy-Medvedev cease-fire plan was signed while the Russian troops were heading towards Tbilisi, so the Georgian President did not have much of a choice (or if he did, the alternative was basically inconceivable). Its ambiguous wording – although left room for manoeuvre for both sides – framed the setting of future conflict resolution initiatives.

While dictated by mainly humanitarian concerns, the signing of the cease-fire plan in those particular circumstances entailed strong political implications illustrated by the second question: what is worth sacrificing (or postponing) on the long term in order to obtain a ceasefire on the short term - principles like sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc?

The cease-fire plan did not include any reference to Georgia's territorial integrity because Sarkozy was convinced that the Russian side would not have signed it; from his point of view, it was essential to stop the violence and prevent the fall of Saakashvili's regime, whilst territorial matters could be discussed later. In other words, immediate stability on the ground was preferred to a principled discussion with implications on the long term. As the failure of the Middle East Peace Process teaches us, hiding extremely delicate issues under the carpet and promoting a gradual approach focused on short-term achievements can lead to the entrenching of the parties' positions thus making the resolution of the conflict almost impossible.

Thirdly, in complex cases of overlapping layers of intra-state and inter-state conflict, which are the main difficulties for the mediators: what actors to mediate between? what diplomacy track to employ? how to deal with internationally non-recognized separatist entities or various proxies of a big power? Fortunately, the French president did not have to go to Tskhinvali and Sukhumi to get the cease-fire plan signed since dealing with Moscow was enough to tame its proxies as well. Unfortunately, after having recognized their independence, Moscow tries to get the EU to do the same, especially through claims that Brussels has to ask permission from Tskhinvali and Sukhumi for the EUMM to patrol on their administrative borders within Georgia (and *de facto* secession borders). Although South Ossetian and Abkhaz representatives take part in the Geneva talks regarding their future status, neither the EU nor the international community has the intention of providing recognition of the separatist authorities. Nevertheless, some kind of engagement is necessary if progress is to be attained on the ground.

And last but not least, to what extent is the success or failure of a mediation effort determined by the mediator's status and personality? The literature shows that the latter's influence is quite significant. So, the question is: in President Sarkozy's case, what part played his institutional leverage as the representative of the EU and what part his personal skills did? If it had not been for Sarkozy's assertive style and status as French President, would the cease-fire have still been obtained? Here it becomes truly important what kind of influence the mediator can bring to the table – in Sarkozy's case it must have been mainly **referent power** (Crocker, Hampson, Aall, 1999: 29) based on the desire of the parties to the conflict to maintain a valued relation with the mediator, both as an individual and as representative of the EU, and to a lesser extent **reward/coercive power**.

All in all, the mediation attempt by the European Union in the Russia-Georgia War of August 2008 should be studied as a case in point for the EU's increasing leverage in international relations – at least in its neighbourhood – where the United States have given up the leadership role. In addition to this, since the EU is acclaimed as a *sui generis* organization, the innovative approaches and instruments it could bring to the negotiating table indicates its added value in this field. Finally, its participation in mediation attempts could shed new light on the institutional intricacies leading to consensus and the establishing of the mandate for mediating, thus also raising the question as to who may perform that task on behalf of the EU after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

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THE NEO-FINLANDIZATION – A THEORETICAL REVIEW

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Abstract. *With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Finland's new status on foreign policy arena, one can assume that the term 'Finlandization' should have disappeared from the diplomatic usage. However, the reality shows that it is still present in the terminology of international relations even though it tends to appear in a slightly different form from classical term: neo-Finlandization. The concept needs some clarification though. By using unstructured interviews, document analysis and press coverage, the present article systematizes and analyses the concept of neo-Finlandization in a manner that explains the logic of its use in contemporary international system.*

Keywords: *adaptive acquiescence, asymmetric relationship, Finland, Soviet Union.*

Introduction

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union it appeared that the concept of Finlandization, that characterized the Finnish-Soviet relations almost half of century, would be recorded in history books just as a peculiarity of the Cold War and nobody would need to use it anymore in the current international relations. However, after the August 2008 Georgian war, some scholars saw Finlandization coming back into actuality (e.g. Johnson 2008) as a policy that concealed Russia's attempts to restore its dominance over the former Soviet republics.

In 2009, the former EU ambassador to Russia, Michael Emerson, was asking in an article for the Centre for European Policy Studies if there could be identified any neo-Finlandization attempts in the Eastern neighbourhood and if Moscow sees the phenomenon unavoidable and useful. One year after, Vance Chang, Hans Mouritzen and Bruce Gilley engaged in a debate in the journal *Foreign Affairs* about whether Taiwan is sliding toward Finlandization in relation with China. These examples show that the concept of Finlandization becomes again present in foreign policy discussions still raising questions and dilemmas. In order to understand Finlandization and to be able to detect it, an exhaustive analysis is required.

1. Finlandization - A Brief History

At the end of the World War II, Finland was in a situation not at all advantageous. The small country was bordering the Soviet Union, and fought against USSR during the Winter War and Second World War. However, Finland did not become a "people's democracy", as many Soviet Union's neighbours did. At the same time, it could not

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participate fully in either Nordic collaboration or European integration. Instead, Finland became a special case that was difficult to categorize on the basis of a rigid distinction between East and West (Moisio, 2008: 82). It stood in a grey zone between the democratic West and Soviet East.

At the basis of Soviet-Finnish relations was the agreement signed in 1948, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The agreement included also military clauses, but in essence it was different from the treaties signed with the Warsaw Pact countries. It established a policy of neutrality that emphasized hospitality and close collaboration rather than hostility towards the old enemy (Moisio, 2008: 82). Initially, the treaty had to be in force for 10 years, but it was renewed until 1990.

In the preamble of this treaty it is recorded Finland's desire to "remain outside the conflicting interests of Great Powers". The treaty required that if Finland or the Soviet Union was attacked (through Finnish territory) by Germany or a German ally, Finland would fight to repel the attack; neither country would join an alliance directed against each other; they would not interfere in each others' internal affairs; they would respect each other's sovereignty; would work for the consolidation of economic and cultural relations between them; and would support the principles of the United Nations (Singleton, 1981: 280). In the framework of this agreement, while Finland was trying to promote relations with the Western Europe, good relations with the Soviet Union and the "politics of loyalty" remained at the core of its official foreign policy during the Cold War (Moisio, 2008: 82).

The relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union was not labeled anyhow at the beginning. It was only in the 1960s that the concept of "Finlandization" was established and started being used publicly. This happened within the context of worsening of the relations between the USSR and the West. The West German Professor Richard Löwenthal claimed that he had used the term of Finlandization for the first time in 1966 when the Bucharest Conference of the Warsaw Pact suggested the abolition of all military alliances in Europe. Within this context, Löwenthal argued that this situation would lead Western Europe into the same kind of condition as Finland vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (Berndtson, 1991: 22). The term was "adopted" then by Western European journalists, diplomats and politicians who were fearing that the Soviet Union was gradually occupying parts of Europe by both formally and informally means and its was also a manifestation of the fear that the United States might withdraw its troops from Europe and leave the space for a communist expansion (Moisio, 2008: 83). Within that context, one could hear even of "Finlandization of the spirit", defined as subjugation of the spirit to the Soviet will (Buckley Jr., 1977: 958).

Paradoxically, the first debates about "Finlandization" were not about Finland, but about German domestic politics. The concept was used as a criticism of Chancellor Willy Brandt's new Ostpolitik in Germany. Opponents of the new foreign policy orientation used the term to criticize the new course of action when the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was fresh in memory. At the beginning of 1970s, the concept of "Finlandization" started to be used also in the United States, where some members of Congress used it for drawing attention to the consequences of withdrawing American troops from Europe (Berndtson, 1991: 22).

The invention of term "Finlandization" was not perceived well by the Finns. They saw it as "an unfair concept, which gave a false description of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union" (Majander, 1999: 77). For Finnish president Kekkonen, the concept was a word that underrated and insulted his country and which gave a false image of Finland internationally (Sami, 2008: 83). The Finns felt that their country and its basic orientation

on foreign policy was made a pawn in the bigger game which was intended to serve other interests than those of Finland (Väyrynen, 1986: 13). Despite this criticism, however, “Finlandization” persisted and was adapted to scientific use in theories of international relations. It was used for describing “those states which had a formal independence but existed in barely disguised servitude to Moscow” (Johnson, 2008).

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was an attempt to establish the term post-Finlandization on the post-socialist or post-industrial models used in social sciences. Post-Finlandization should have denoted the current Finnish tendency, in which Russia and everything Russian is presented in a predominantly negative light, but the term remained quite confused (Majander, 1999: 82). Much more likely to impose is the term of neo-Finlandization.

However, one thing is certain, the concept of Finlandization did not dissolve along with the Cold War. With or without the prefix “neo-” it is used in the current international affairs discourse and even in Finland, the concept is very present in public debates and media as a negative attribute to someone’s policy, actions, statements, etc.

2. Defining Finlandization

Even the academic literature about Finlandization in foreign languages is not very broad, there are still several definitions of the concept. George Ginsburg and Alvin Z Rubinstein defined Finlandization as a concept focusing strictly on the relation of one country with the Soviet Union. They presented seven features of this concept: “(1) responsiveness in foreign policy to Soviet preferences; (2) avoidance of alliance with countries deemed by the Soviet Union to be competitors or rivals; (3) acceptance of neutrality in peace or war; (4) abstention from membership in regional and international groupings considered unfriendly by Moscow; (5) restraint over the media in one’s country to muffle or minimize criticism of the USSR, so as to avoid possible provocation; (6) compensatory gestures in commercial and cultural contacts with the USSR, extending to treaties and diplomatic consultations, to offset disparities in the relationship with the USSR, on the one hand, and West European countries, on the other; and (7) openness to penetration by Soviet ideas and media” (Majander, 2008: 78).

Moisio (2008: 84) divided the content of “Finlandization” into five main ideas: (1) although Finland fought against the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the country voluntarily changed its identity orientation during the Cold War. In other words, even though the Soviet Union did not militarily occupy Finland, Soviet influence was nevertheless extended by insidious control over Finnish domestic politics and, that at least in practice, the Finnish political leaders accepted this. (2) The concept gave an impression that Finland was no longer an independent state de facto, but was politically remote-controlled by the Soviet Union. (3) “Finlandization” meant that Finland no longer belonged to Western Europe, as the loyalty of the country’s leaders towards the East seemed to have becoming more and more explicit. (4) The passive attitude shown towards European integration by the Finnish government confirmed that Finland was in the Soviet sphere of influence. (5) The structure and content of Finnish foreign trade clearly demonstrated association with Europe’s socialist countries, even though the country was not a member of the Warsaw Pact.

These definitions prove that the attempts of Finnish president Kekkonen to transform the negative connotation of Finlandization into a positive praise, by presenting the concept as political reconciliation with the Soviet Union, a peaceful coexistence between nations with different social systems, was not very successful. Despite the fact that the Finns

were seeking a balance in their cultural and trade relations between East and West, the Finland accepting concessions towards the Soviet Union mainly in the foreign policy area (Helsinki did not oppose the Soviet foreign policy in the international arena, and Finland accepted in principle a commitment upon mutual consultation to side with the USSR in the hypothetical event of a European war) (Sariola, 1982: 20-21), some European media labeled Finland as Kekkosslovakia (after president Kekkonen), implying that its political culture was closer to that of Czechoslovakia than its Nordic neighbours (Moisio, 2008: 84).

With the new phase of the Cold War, in the late 1970s - 1980s, the Finlandization started to be viewed in a softer way. The concept began to be used with reference not to Finland and the Soviet Union in particular but to any small country neighbouring a Great Power. Thus, "Finlandization" was defined by Punasalo (1978: 1) as the situation when "a country undertakes to follow neutrality as a neighbour of a Great Power which represents a different social order and uses arrogant political methods. This means that the country's authority to decide its foreign policy is limited, but its internal authority is almost complete". The definition of Punasalo implies that the smaller country is in a situation of oppression from its bigger neighbour. However, as the history has showed, "Finlandization" was not a black and white situation. Thus, even Finland had to make foreign policy concessions; economically the country had only benefits from the "special relationship" with its bigger neighbour. The USSR was a stable supplier of raw materials, especially oil, and imported Finnish manufactured goods and even offered Finns large construction projects in the Soviet Union, which eased unemployment problems in Finland. In return, the USSR received western technology (Berndtson, 1991: 26). Between 1952-1990, trade with the USSR accounted for about 15 per cent of Finland's total exports, having a major beneficial impact on the Finnish economy in terms of profitability, diversification or stability (Sutela, 2005: 3). Furthermore, in terms of cultural life in Finland, the country was more "Americanized" than many countries in Western Europe. In many scientific fields and in mass entertainment, the country was Americanized faster than most of European nations. In fact, after the Second World War, in many cultural areas Finland consciously created close relations above all with the United States because they were seen as a counterforce to political relation with the Soviet Union (Berndtson, 1991: 27).

One of the most recent definition of the "Finlandization" belongs to Michael Emerson (2009) who describes the concept as the situation when "a small state [...] acquiesces in the hard security sphere of influence of an authoritarian and hegemonic neighbour, while belonging at the same time to the liberal democratic and economic regime of the West". At a glance, this definition implies that there is a division of regime power: the "hard" part is "ceded" to the great power, while the small state preserves the "soft power". In order to avoid ambiguity, a development of this definition is needed.

3. Finlandization as Adaptive Acquiescence

The most sophisticated study of Finlandization belongs to Hans Mouritzen (1988). Relying on several empirical studies (e.g. Danish and Swedish regimes during the World War II) he developed the concept in terms of adaptive acquiescence. The author offers several perceptions of adaptation: not as an activity, but as an underlying belief system (citing Rosenau (1981)), in other words the nation-state in question should orient itself towards its environment, the mode of adaptation being called a "self-environment orientation" that "precedes goals in the causal chain that leads to the behavioural of political organisms". Adaptation can also be seen as the outcome of an activity: whether

an activity or a belief system has turned out to be successful (“adaptive”) or unsuccessful (“maladaptive”) – whether it has been able to keep fluctuations in the essential structures within acceptable limits. Whether behaviour was adaptive can be seen from analysing its consequences. The Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Reading 1976) defines adaptation as “changing to fit changed conditions”, a “systemic change in response to change in environment of system”. Thus, the regime orientations, such as adaptive acquiescence, refer to patterns of behaviour, while the continuous accommodation of infringements on one’s values is a form of behaviour, a policy. (Mouritzen, 1988: 27).

As regard to acquiescence, the Oxford dictionary defines it as the action of “accepting something reluctantly but without protest”. In a case of neo-Finlandization, the passivity and obedience of the small actor are generated by an unfavorable situation due to pressure of a neighbouring great power. This means that the small country is not passive because it does not want to have any reaction but that this situation is accepted as a fact of life. Mouritzen (1988: 61) lists four conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to label the orientation of a regime to its environment as “adaptive acquiescence”: the regime has to be under a net pressure from its salient environment, a pressure that challenges its basic regime values; the regime has to be adapting to that pressure (adaptive acquiescence logically presupposes an actor with a certain minimum of autonomy); the regime’s means of adaptation to the pressure have to consist in continuously tolerating infringements on its declared regime values (offering concessions relative to these values); the infringements/concessions are tolerated in exchange for something, namely an increased probability of preserving at least the core of the regime values. Thus, adaptive acquiescence is not exerted with enthusiasm, but rather with a certain resignation.

The unfavourable pattern of dependence is accepted as a fact of life but in “exchange” for these acquiescence and concessions (infringements on the regime’s values), the regime expects to be able to defend and preserve at least the core of its values (for example its basic autonomy). In other words, the smaller country tries to make the best out of a difficult situation. The essence of adaptive acquiescence is that the regime is willing to live with an overall loss of values: in return for the infringements that it continuously tolerates, it receives the likely *preservation* of certain values; in other words, it maintains something it already possessed. (Mouritzen, 1988: 2).

The *main logic* of the strategy of concessions is that the values conceded to be seen as marginal in comparison with the values that the regime hopes to *preserve* in return for the concessions. If we take the example of the Soviet-Finnish relations, we can see that from the beginning there were infringements of regime values of territory, welfare (Finland had to refrain from Marshal aid) and identity (trials against the “war responsables”), in exchange for preservation of the sovereignty and democratic identity values. The later concessions, such as the infringements on the regime value of general autonomy (the Soviet veto power as regards the selection of candidates for President) were also allowed in order to preserve the “good relations” with the Soviet Union – that is, the status quo (Mouritzen, 1988: 367). There are also value infringements that can be observed on a more regular basis, such as the so-called “self-censorship” – by appealing for press restraint and asking the journalists to function as “co-diplomats” - infringement on the regime value of free speech and on Finnish identity values.

Thus, during adaptive acquiescence, the values typically conceded are total freedom of the press, political pluralism, a diffuse solidarity with other peoples under strain, while the regime strives to safeguard its own general autonomy; its identity; and its control over a certain territory, including its population and material assets. The value

infringements can be observed the best when crises situations occur. In these cases, the negative sanctions from the external actor are visible and the concessions of the weaker state are rather tangible. However, it does not mean that the basis type of adaptation is different when no crisis occurs. In fact it seems that both regimes representatives have the tendency to minimize, conceal or reinterpret adaptive acquiescence whenever possible.

Adaptive acquiescence is the only regime orientation that implies conscious, voluntary and continuous infringements on the regime's values. The phenomenon of neo-Finlandization is not very frequently encountered for understandable reason: it is a very difficult model of politics for the weak state. The acquiescent actor has to show a realist resignation, accepting that is "part of a great-power sphere of interest" and abstains from "borrowing military strength from any competing great power to revise this status quo". In exchange, the weak power expects to have its core values respected. On the other hand, the neo-Finlandization requires certain "restraint on the part of the Great Power, which must resist the temptation to simply impose its own puppet regime". Thus, within this logic, the concessions are mutually committing (Chang, Mouritzen and Gilley, 2010).

An armed intervention of the great power towards the weaker neighbour is a good indicator that the adaptive acquiescence does not occur. Intervention probably takes place because the bigger neighbour is dissatisfied with the weaker actor's behaviour, its obstinacy in offering concessions. After an intervention has taken place, we can notice either the imposition of a satellite regime in the weaker power, or, if the intervention was successfully resisted, the continuation of defiance on the part of the weaker regime (Mouritzen, 1988: 374).

The Finlandization does not imply that the weak actor enjoys any benefit from concessions or perceives them beneficial, but that it expects the concessions to be appreciated by the receiving actor. The infringements on the regime's values are intended to affect the Great power's behaviour by "friendly" means so that the probability of preserving the conceding regime's core values increases (Mouritzen, 1988: 71).

However, in the long run, the concessions can lead to more expectations from the great power, and the weak state can slide on a dangerous slope. Therefore, countermeasures should be used in order to recover from the downward slope of concessions. Maintaining an overarching commitment to the core values, giving credibility to this commitment, an elitist approach to foreign policy (only a small number of top politicians should be kept adequately informed and involved in major decisions), restricting free and democratic debates and convert the media in "co-diplomats" by endorsing government's policy line (Chang, Mouritzen and Gilley 2010) in order to avoid "upsetting" the bigger neighbour, are the "weapons" of the weaker actor in front of danger of slippery slope of concessions.

Mouritzen (1988: 77-79) identified five main strategies for safeguarding the regime values: *détente* and mediation, non-commitment, the strategy of concessions, the counterweight strategy and the strategy of bastions. The *strategy of détente and mediation*, for instance, aims to reduce tension between actors in the salient environment. The justification is typically a belief that armed conflict (or high tension) between the weaker actor and the great power constitutes a grave danger to the conceding regime itself. *Détente* is typically believed to favour the caretaking of the regime's own values. *The strategy of non-commitment* aims to avoid commitments and to safeguard the regime's own general autonomy. One typical justification for this strategy is a "wait and see" argument (in times of turbulence or insecurity, it is wiser to retain freedom of manoeuvre instead of staking resources on what may prove to be the "wrong horse"). Another

justification is that a non-committed course makes it possible to play off conflicting actors against each other. The possibility that resources may be offered to one of the conflicting actors will typically lead to a more accommodating attitude from the other actor. A justification for the strengthening of non-commitment concerns the risk of military pre-emption from strong actor, as a result of mistrust vis-à-vis the weaker actor. *The strategy of concessions* is based on the assumption that the concessions will affect the receiver's cost-benefit calculations in such a way that the status quo of the weaker actor is seen as preferable to its various unpleasant alternatives such as imposed domination. The concessions are seen as benefits that would sweeten the status quo to their receiver, securing a reasonable degree of goodwill of the great power, and thus contribute to the maintaining of the status quo of the smaller country. In order to win goodwill, the concessions should not be offered reluctantly. If they have to be given anyway, sooner or later, it is better to offer them at an early stage, before they have actually been requested. In this way, minor concessions in the short run may prevent major, drastic demands later.

As Mouritzen argues, *the counterweight strategy* can be subdivided into deterrence strategy, based primarily on military counterweight, and a strategy of "civil counterweight". The essence of the first subdivision is to communicate to relevant actors that a military attack will carry with it unacceptable consequences to its initiator, while the strategy of civil counterweight implies a reduction in the regime's sub-unit's autonomy. Some reductions are voluntary (as increased cohesion among regime-supporting parties) others are not (e.g., centralizing decision making). The reductions make it more difficult for external actors to play off various subunits against each other. Thus the regime's defensive power is strengthened and, hence, its ability to limit concessions.

In the case of *the bastion strategy*, concessions should not be given gradually, but have to be more or less mutually committing (they constitute "bastions"). The offering of concessions encourages the great power to new demands. It runs easier once the first difficult concessions have been handed over, either due to sheer bastion mechanics (increasing penetration) or to psychological reasons on the part of regime representatives. Therefore, as long as a small and seemingly harmless concession may draw with it more and more wide-ranging concessions, the strategy of the weaker state must be to avoid the first, seemingly harmless concession. The pressure from the great power should be formulated in terms of threats to the bastion at stake and as part of its defence, the bastion should stress in rhetoric and in talks with the great power. As a result of this strategy, the great power can be convinced that the weaker state is ready to defend the bastion with available means.

There are residual, dynamic factors like strategic and economic importance of the weaker actor's assets, side-benefits won by the acquiescent regime, the personal qualification of the leader of the great power, the pendulum effect, the expectation of gratitude, policy reorientation on behalf of the bigger neighbour etc., that are seen as responsible for change in regimes' value accounts. These factors can initiate both a climbing and a sliding process of a slope of concessions.

The returning factors: bastions, centralization and civil counterweight (for example, cohesion between regime-supporting political parties and national revival in the population) and filters between issue-areas and factors of inertia (factors that prevent, delay or reduce change in response to pressure for change) are able to reduce, delay or prevent climbing of the slope of concessions and they may also have long-term effects on future modes of adaptation, but they cannot initiate a process of change.

Adaptive acquiescence must be performed by an actor, but it is not necessarily performed only vis-à-vis an actor. Mouritzen distinguishes between two cases of Finlandization vis-à-vis an actor: when concessions are given directly to the entity from which the challenges are perceived, we are dealing with “direct adaptive acquiescence”; while when concessions are given to another actor, which is seen as an ally against the perceived threat or the unfavourable conditions in general, the situation is labelled as “indirect adaptive acquiescence”. During indirect adaptive acquiescence, the weaker state is simultaneously involved in two separate, but interconnected games: “the adversary game” vis-à-vis the perceived threat, and “the alliance game” vis-à-vis the perceived ally. The strategy of concessions is the core strategy of the alliance game, as the regime aims to sweeten the status quo for the ally, and, hence, secure continued protection; while the adversary game is dominated by the strategy of (military) counterweight, in order to deter the adversary.

The indirect adaptive acquiescence is likely to create more binding ties at all levels, than a direct adaptive acquiescence. The public of the weaker actor is probably less unenthusiastic about a protection arrangement than about the direct acquiescence. In case of indirect adaptive acquiescence, the inertia seems to be stronger than in direct version, the risk is that the weaker regime will not reduce, or abandon the concessions, when the dynamic conditions make this possible (Mouritzen, 1988: 389). An acquiescent regime cannot play two great powers against each other, because the weaker state has already committed itself, or recognised itself as dependent upon one of them. To try to switch dependencies would be far too dangerous (Mouritzen, 1988: 241). Similarly to this model, Mouritzen presents also direct and indirect adaptive acquiescence vis-à-vis a non-actor (for instance ‘foreign policy compliance’).

Under right circumstances, Finlandization can have some positive effects. In fact it promotes stable peace, which is preferable to escalating tensions and arms races. The weaker state sustains a peaceful relationship with the great power by making strategic concessions to it, while the neighbouring great power needs only vague threats rather than military coercion to influence weaker actor’s policies (Chang, Mouritzen and Gilley 2010).

Thus, compared with any other European neighbour of the USSR, Finland was a success story (Lukas, 1992). During the Cold War, citizens from European communist people’s democracies were willing to be Finlandized, in order to gain freedom from the Soviet Union (Majander, 1999: 81). In his book, *Finlandization: towards a general theory of adaptive politics*, written in a period of relaxation of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West, Hans Mouritzen foresaw the “Finlandization” (adaptive acquiescence) to be a more frequent future scenario in foreign policy debates and as a perspective for the Eastern European countries.

Adaptive acquiescence is, in fact, a “margin of safety” attitude. The concessions, or the infringements permitted on the regime values can be regarded precisely, as an “insurance fee”, paid in order to remove the perceived threat to more vital regime values. Thus, there are no risks taken as regards these core values (Mouritzen 1988: 321). This safety-first attitude can make the government circles hesitant or even reluctant to “escape” from adaptive acquiescence should dynamic forces open a door for this possibility. They would rather continue with minor concessions than run the short-term risks possibly implied by an escape attempt. In other words, government would be a source of inertia in such a situation.

A source of inertia can become also the educational system. If adaptive acquiescence brings with it the promotion of the language of the great power as the first

foreign language in school, the population's foreign sympathies can be affected by their abilities in foreign languages. Furthermore, private or semi-official institutions or research institutes may be created in order to support the broader "education" effort – notably through the dissemination of information and propaganda. As a result, there may be created cognitive effects and, thus, also, cognitive inertia (Mouritzen, 1988: 333).

There could also appear benefits from Finlandization, which would be difficult to predict at the beginning of the relationship though (for instance, the Finnish industrialist could not foresee, at the end of the WWII the advantages for Finnish capitalist industry that were gained from the cooperation with the Soviet Union). The benefits are usually discovered in the process of adjustment to a new mode of adaptation. Normally, the weak regime will make efforts to retain the benefits once discovered, but they will seldom be actively striven for in advance (Mouritzen, 1988: 345).

4. Finlandization or Neo-Finlandization?

The prefix *neo-* comes from the Greek word *neos*, that means young, fresh, new or recent. By using it to a noun or an adjective, *neo-* indicates a new or revived form of a process, phenomenon, concept, etc. Thus, neo-Finlandization could be understood as a new concept or a revival of the "old" concept of Finlandization. Giving the fact that Finlandization was initially established as a concept that described a phenomenon which took place during the Cold War, but whose core principles can be used for explaining current asymmetric relationships between a great power and a small state, which accepts strategic concessions to the bigger neighbour in order to preserve its core values, we consider that the neo-Finlandization should be understood as a revival or adaptation of the concept of Finlandization to the new international environment. However, since the concepts are the same, we suggest that in scholarly context the use of adaptive acquiescence for popular terms Finlandization and neo-Finlandization is more appropriate.

Conclusions

The phenomenon of neo-Finlandization is neither common nor easy to detect. The concept bears a negative mark and therefore, whenever it is possible, both the great power and the weaker neighbour prefer to minimize, conceal or reinterpret it. When searching for neo-Finlandization, it is generally a good idea to focus on relationships between powers with different regime identities that are asymmetrical in terms of powers, and where the weaker power is part of the stronger power's immediate sphere of interest. Because geographical proximity and the imbalance in terms of power make the stronger's negative sanctions more credible, and the first condition paves the way for some easily discernible identity concessions (Mouritzen, 1988: 374).

However, even that power asymmetry, geographical proximity, different regime identities and significant civil counterweight favour the appearance of neo-Finlandization, these factors are not definitive. Certain "lucky" circumstances are still needed for the occurrence of the phenomenon. If we take the case of Finland, for instance, the country kept its sovereignty despite the fact that fought against its great power neighbour during two wars not only because of regimes differences or civil pressure, but because the Soviet Union needed all its resources at the Central European front and it had more interests there comparing to its Nordic neighbour.

The neo-Finlandization is becoming nowadays more sophisticated and more difficult to detect. There is possible that in the future the phenomenon will get a neutral connotation or will be discreetly used by some states for reintegration of former

possessions not directly but by gaining strategic concessions from the weaker regimes. Therefore, the concept should not be ignored by international relations scholars or foreign policy actors.

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IV. EUROPEAN POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT MODELS

Vicenția Georgiana DUȚESCU ⇔ *Policy Cohesion of the European Union a Perspective on the Management Authority for the Sectoral Operational Programme on Transport 2007-2013*

Maria-Magdalena RICHEA ⇔ *Models of Human Resources Management in Nonprofit Sector Organizations*

Anca-Adriana CUCU ⇔ *Performance Management of Health Care System in Romania: Realities and Perspectives*

Cristinela-Ionela VELICU ⇔ *Cross-Border Mobility of Health Professionals: an Exploratory Study of Migration Flows and Retention Policies in the CEE Region*

POLICY COHESION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION A PERSPECTIVE ON THE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY FOR THE SECTORAL OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME ON TRANSPORT 2007 - 2013

*Vicenția Georgiana DUȚESCU**

Abstract. *The present paper sets itself to analyze the influence of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union after Romania's accession in 2007, as well as the rules for administering the structural funds established according to the Regulations of the European Commission in this respect. The main objective of the cohesion policy of the European Union is to promote socio-economic cohesion, reducing disparities between the member states and the regions. Having become a member of the European Union not until 2007, Romania has for the first time the opportunity to benefit from European funds within the cohesion policy. Given the economic crisis that affected Romania as well, today it is important to also speak about the attributions, responsibility and the degree of professionalism in administering structural funds.*

The present topic also proposes a realistic approach on the ability of the Management Authority designated by the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure to manage the Sectoral Operational Programme on Transport.

Keywords: *administering, Commission, funds, objectives, responsibility*

1. Introduction in public administration

The present paper aims to realise a comprehensive approach for public administration and policy cohesion concepts and also seeks the influence of policy cohesion in public administration development, in this case of the Management Authority for the Sectoral Operational Programme on Transport. The scientific approach of this paper rises from the following research topics:

- How the cohesion policy has influenced the organizational system in public administration with respect to the Ministry of Transport?
- How did the transport sector develop once the Cohesion Policy was implemented?
- What were the obstacles regarding the absorption process of European funds?
- Is the Cohesion Policy appropriate for public administration?

The administration occupies a variable space; dependant on the different types of social organizations and it has a history that is inextricably linked to that of the society it serves. The administration didn't exist throughout all time; it appeared seemingly

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simultaneous with the advent of social division and it was built progressively with the formation of the Modern State (Matei, 2006: 43).

In his book, "Public Administration" (Alexandru, 1999: 64), Alexander I. defined Administration as the "primary content of the work of the executive power of the State; the system of public authorities which perpetrate the executive power; the leadership of an economic agent or a socio-cultural institution; a compartment comprised of productive organizational entities, etc."

The public administration in Romania has evolved and transformed, as was natural to happen, and it became necessary to adjust on the fly to the new requirements of the EU.

It is often said that bureaucracy is incompatible with democratic government. This is completely false. Democracy implies the supremacy of the law. Otherwise, officers would act irresponsibly and arbitrarily. The two pillars of democratic government (Democratic government="a system of government under which those ruled are in a position to determine, directly by plebiscite or indirectly by election, the exercise of legislative and executive power and the selection of the supreme executives), according to Ludwig van Mises (b. September 1881, Lemberg, at that time Austria-Hungary, today Lviv in the current context Ukraine- d.10 October 1973, New York, U.S.A).

Economist and Austrian-American political philosopher, son of a Jewish family from Galicia (Ukraine), a prominent figure in the Austrian School of economic thought. In Mises papers, liberalism finds a foundation whose consistency and intellectual rigor are hard to match. For the Austrian philosopher, the order of private property is the concept that perfectly subsumes liberal political philosophy. In his opinion, all the other major theoretical achievements of liberalism - the plea for freedom, tolerance, peace - can be understood as the natural consequences of the right to private property.), are the priority of the law and budget, of finance.

The priority of the law is that no judge will impose a penalty if law does not stipulate this. The author brings to our attention the fact that it is an understatement to name government the authority in which the rules are left to free will and to compare it with the authority in the case of which law prevails and in which citizens are able to participate in achieving their rights as citizens. Even a totalitarian regime cannot function without bureaucratic rules and guidelines, otherwise chaos being created. The primary purpose of a constitutional state is the public good. The differences between the two systems also consist in the citizens' possibility, in the case of a democratic regime, to choose their own leaders by voting. This system stipulates that people have sovereignty, not only in the day of the elections, but also between election periods.

As I have stated above, a democratic system is not based only on law but also on a financial system. Democratic control is also budgetary control. The state budget will not be spent without prior approval, and the use of these funds for purposes other than those approved is forbidden.

The statement that bureaucratic management is an indispensable tool for a democratic government is a paradox. Many will object to this. People are accustomed to associate democratic governance as the best system of government, associating bureaucratic management with a harmful way to govern. The author highlights the following question: How can these two concepts be linked, connected? Therefore, Ludwig von Mises argues that bureaucracy is essentially neither good nor bad. It is just a method of management that can be applied in different spheres of activity. In the public system it is therefore imperative to have a bureaucratic system.

2. Policy cohesion. Structural funds

The European Union consists of 27 member states that form a community, but also a single market of millions of citizens. As it's probably normal, there are important socio-economic differences between these states and the regions that compose them. Seeking after an improvement of the competitive position as a whole, the European Union creates and develops a cohesion policy meant to reduce the economic and social disparities.

At present, the key points of the cohesion political reform are to fully centre resources in member states and the poorest regions, to include all regions in funding programmes, as well as to change the established priorities in order to stimulate economic growth, employment and innovation (Dan Drosu Şaguna, Raluca Găinuşă Nicolae, 2011: 12).

Through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) (ERDF and ESF are also called structural funds), and the Cohesion Fund (CF) the biggest source of financial support is created, with respect to investments in the field of economic growth and jobs at European level.

The use of Community funds has at least two major implications (Gabriela Drăgan: 3), tightly interconnected:

- on the one hand, it generates substantial economic growth ("growth boost"), by increasing the demand for certain goods and services relating to the sectors that benefit from investments and,
- on the other hand, it leads to the reduction of disparity (the catch-up process), attributed to the development of infrastructure and human resources.

Starting with the year 2007, the new regulations regarding structural funds (Regulation (EC) no. 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council on the ERDF, Regulation (EC) no. 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council on the ESF, Regulation (EC) no. 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council on the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), Regulation (EC) no. 1083/2006 regarding the general provisions of ERDF, ESF, CF, Regulation (EC) no. 1084/2006 regarding CF, Regulation (EC) no. 1085/2006 regarding the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance) have reorganized the cohesion policy into only three objectives:

1. convergence (by which the regions economically underdeveloped are supported - the convergence objective addresses to member states and less developed regions, which owned less than 75% of GDP from the mean value of the 27 member states, before adopting regulations regarding structural funds),

2. regional competitiveness and employment (by which the other regions are supported in order to accomplish the Lisbon objectives - this objective is meant to assist member states and regions not "covered" by the convergence objective in order to be able to deal with the economic and social changes and with globalisation challenges),

3. European territorial cooperation (by which a balanced development of the Community territory is sought after, the encouragement to cooperate and the exchange of good practices between EU regions - this objective sets itself to develop cross-border and cross-national cooperation, between regional levels in urban and rural areas, and to develop economic relations).

The objective of the European Regional Development Fund is to support the development of economic and social cohesion by reducing disparities between regions. This objective is for developing regions from an economic point of view, including the conversion of industrial regions on the decline. In financial terms, we might say that ERDF is by far the largest structural fund (Sven, 2010: 7).

The European Regional Development Fund finances activities within all cohesion policy objectives of the European Union, namely convergence, regional competitiveness and employment, as well as European territorial cooperation, providing financial assistance for:

- connected infrastructures, especially in research and innovation, telecommunication, environment, energy and transport,
- direct support for investments in enterprises for providing stable jobs,
- financial instruments destined to support regional and local development and to favour the cooperation between cities and regions,
- technical assistance measures.

With respect to the European territorial cooperation objective, within operational programmes, a series of special instructions are provided, given the participation of many states, and the provisions related the content of operational programmes, the eligibility of expenses, the administration and control systems, responsibilities that are specific to member states and the Commission. Member states that participate in an operational programme appoint a single management authority, a single certification authority and a single audit authority, the latter being in the member state of the management authority.

The European Social Fund (it sets itself to improve hiring opportunities on the internal labour market thus contributing to the development of life standards) is the most important financial instrument with respect to European employment and social policy. ESF contributes to integrating the unemployed and the disadvantaged segments by integrating in the labour market, at the same time supporting convergence and regional competitiveness.

Within the EU, the European Social Fund seeks after promoting facilities for employment and professional geographic mobility of workers, their adaptation to industrial changes, especially by training but also by professional reorientation.

The primary policies relating to the European Social Fund refer to:

- improving the access to a job for people looking for a job,
- adapting workers and enterprises through learning systems during the entire life,
- consolidating human capital by applying reforms in education,
- socially integrating disadvantaged persons and fighting against forms of discrimination on the labour market.

In this respect we can speak about the European Strategy for employment, a strategy that has been elaborated in order to encourage the exchange of information and the participation of all member states in identifying solutions and good practices for creating jobs in each member state. (see: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=ro>)

The member states whose gross domestic product per capita is less than 90% of the European mean value must benefit from the Cohesion Fund (at present, the following states are beneficiaries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia).

The Cohesion Fund supports activities within the convergence objective. We might say that the Cohesion Fund has in common with other funds rules of scheduling, managing and control, just as the structural funds.

The Cohesion Fund intervenes in the following domains:

- cross-European transport networks, especially primary projects of European interest defined by the European Union,

- environment; the fund can also intervene in projects in the field of energy or transport, if it's clearly advantageous to the environment: the development of railway transport, the use of renewable sources of energy, the consolidation of public transport, etc.

For the scheduled period between 2007 and 2013, the cohesion policy has the sum of 347.41 billion Euros, distributed in percentages, for the objectives, as follows:

- 81.54 % for the Convergence objective,
- 15.94 % for the objective of regional Competitiveness and employment,
- 2.52 % for the objective of European Territorial Cooperation (see: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/fonds/index_ro.htm).

The operational programmes that are the priorities of the respective member state and/or the regions benefit from funding out of one single fund. The European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund can each finance, complementarily, the activities relating to the range of intervention in the other fund, limited to 10% when necessary. As an exception to the rule, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund together intervene in the case of infrastructure and environment programmes.

In this context, it is important to mention the principles of intervention of structural and cohesion funds (Art. 9 -17/ Reg. EC no. 1083/2006):

- Complementarity: the assistance of funds is complementary to national activities,
- Coherence: European funds financing must comply with EU priorities,
- Coordination: EC and member states ensure coordination between the interventions from structural and cohesion funds,
- Conformity: with the provisions of the Treaty on the functioning of EU,
- Scheduling: identifying priorities, financing, the managing and control system,
- Partnership: EC and member states cooperation,
- Proportionality: the financial resources are proportional to the total amount of expenses afferent to an operational programme,
- Shared management: the principle of a good financial management or the use of public credits in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness,
- Additionality: the contribution of European funds is not replaced by public expenses of a member state,
- Equality between men and women and non-discrimination,
- Durable development: the objectives of the structural and cohesion funds shall be fulfilled taking into account the durable development and the objective of environment protection.

The real touchstone of the cohesion policy was the expansion of the EU towards the East (considering the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, it was specified that all acceding states had to be democratically stable, that law had to be abode within them, they must have the ability to adopt the Community Acquis, and to prove to have a functional market economy), actually emphasising the disparities within EU.

In order to be able to develop and support operational programmes financed through ERDF, ESF and CF, inside ministries the so-called management authorities (art. 11 from Decision no. 497 in 1 April 2004) were founded, or the public bodies that ensure the management of financial assistance from structural funds. The creation of these authorities within specialized central public authorities was necessary given the complexity, the degree of responsibility and the need to optimally coordinate these

programmes. Consequently, the involvement of state authorities in managing these programmes is undoubtedly necessary.

- In what way has the cohesion policy influenced the organizational system in public administration with respect to the Ministry of Transport?

The member state is obliged to appoint for each operational programme a management authority, a certification authority and an audit authority (according to Art. 58 from CE Regulation no. 1083/2006). The management authority is a public authority or a national, regional or local public or private body, appointed by the member state for managing the operational programme. The main attributions of the management authority are the following: (art. 60 from CE Regulation no. 1083/2006)

a. to make sure that the operations are selected for funding in accordance with criteria applicable to the operational programme and that they comply with the applicable Community and national standards throughout their entire execution;

b. to verify that the co-financed products and services are provided and to check whether all expenses stated by beneficiaries for the operations have actually been borne and that they are in accordance with Community and national standards; the check-ups on the spot regarding the operations can take place by survey, in accordance with the methods adopted by the Commission according to the procedure mentioned in Article 103, paragraph (3);

c. to make sure that there is an electronic registering and deposit system for accounting documents, for each operation within the operational programme and that there is a collection of data regarding application, necessary to financial management, monitoring, check-ups, audit and evaluation;

d. to make sure that beneficiaries and other bodies that participate in the operation execution either apply a separate accounting system, or an accounting codification suitable for all transactions regarding the operation, without breaking national accounting standards;

e. to make sure that the evaluations of the operational programmes mentioned in Article 48, paragraph (3) are made in accordance with Article 47;

f. to establish procedures for keeping all documents regarding expenses and audits necessary to guarantee a correct organization of the audit, in accordance with Article 90;

g. to make sure that the certification authority receives all the necessary information regarding the procedures and the check-ups made in comparison with the expenses with respect to certification;

h. to orientate the Monitoring Committee and to send it the documents allowing for qualitative monitoring of the application of the operational programme with respect to its specific objectives;

i. to lay down and, after the approval of the Monitoring Committee, to present the Commission the annual report and the final execution report;

j. to make sure of the compliance with obligations with respect to information and advertising, mentioned in Article 69;

k. to send the Commission the elements that allow for the evaluation of major projects.

Management authorities:

(see:http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/glossary/managing_authority_ro.htm)

- make sure that the activities selected for funding correspond to the criteria inscribed in the operational programme

- verify whether the co-financed products and services are provided efficiently, according to Community and national standards
- keep accounting evidence and make sure that there is a rigorous auditing track
- make sure of the efficiency that the operational programme is evaluated accordingly.

1. Management Authority of Sectoral Operational Programme Transport “SOP-T”

Procedures and implementation system

The Management Authority for SOP Transport is the public body that insures the administration of financial assistance from the structural instruments for primary transport investments. In accordance with the Government Decision no. 497/2004, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, by the General Directorate for Foreign Financial Affairs, has the role of Management Authority for SOP Transport (Framework Document for Implementing the Sectoral Operational Programme “Transport” 2007-2013, Version 3 January 2012).

The Sectoral Operational Programme “Transport” 2007-2013 is a strategic instrument elaborated upon the objectives of the National Strategic Reference Framework, establishing priorities, goals, and the allocation of funds for developing the transport sector in Romania with help from the Community, between 2007 and 2013.

-How did the transport sector develop once the Cohesion Policy was implemented?

If we want to talk about transport sector development we can specify the main objectives:

The objective of the Sectoral Operational Programme - Transport (SOP-T) is to promote in Romania a durable transport system, that allows fast, efficient and safe transportation of people and goods, with services of appropriate level that correspond to European standards, at national level, within Europe, between and throughout Romania’s regions.

- To modernize and develop the primary axes TEN-T (=Trans-European Transport Networks), with the implementation of necessary measures for the protection of the environment,

- To modernize and develop national transport networks, in accordance with the principles of durable development

- To promote railway, maritime, and intermodal transport

To support the development of durable transport, by minimizing transport side effects on the environment, and to improve the safety of traffic and health.

The following table presents a general list of the priority axes and the respective operations:

Table 1

Summary list of SOPT priority axes and key areas of intervention		
SOPT Priority axes	EU Fond	Key areas of intervention
Priority axis 1 Modernization and development of TEN-T priority axes aiming at sustainable transport system integrated with EU transport networks	CF	1.1 Modernization and development of road infrastructure along the TEN-T priority axis 7
		1.2: Modernization and development of railway infrastructure along the TEN-T priority axis 22
		1.3 Modernization and development of water transport infrastructure along the TEN-T priority axis 18 and the inland navigable canals
Priority axis 2 Modernization and development of the national transport infrastructure outside the TEN-T priority axes aiming at sustainable national transport system	ERDF	2.1 Modernization and development of national road infrastructure
		2.2 Modernization and development of national railway infrastructure and passenger service
		2.3 Modernization and development of river and maritime ports
		2.4 Modernization and development of air transport infrastructure
Priority axis 3 Modernization of transport sector aiming at higher degree of environmental protection, human health and passenger safety	ERDF	3.1 Promote inter-modal transport
		3.2 Improve traffic safety across all transport modes
		3.3 Minimize adverse effects of transport on the environment
Priority axis 4 Technical Assistance	FEDR	4.1 Support for effective SOPT management, implementation, monitoring, and control.
		4.2. Support for information and publicity regarding SOPT

Source: Sectoral Operational Programme Transport_2007–2013, http://www.ampost.ro/file/POS_Transport_final_RO_c.pdf

Coherence and compliance of SOPT with the national policies:


Table 2

National policies	National policy reflection in	
	SOPT priority axes	SOPT key areas of intervention
<p>Law nr. 203/2003 (republished) on developing and modernizing the transport network of national and European importance and Law 336/2006 for approval of the National Territorial Planning – Section I – Communication ways</p> <p>Romanian modal transport strategies approved by Law</p> <p>National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) and National Development Plan (NDP) 2007-2013</p> <p>Negotiation Chapter 9- Transport</p> <p>Governmental programme for the period 2004-2008</p> <p>Law 3/2001 for ratifying the Kyoto Agreement</p> <p>Government Decision 321/2005 for reassessment and management of the environmental noise</p>	<p>Modernization and development of TEN-T priority axes aiming at sustainable transport system integrated with EU transport networks</p> <p>Modernization and development of national transport infrastructure outside the TEN-T priority axes aiming at sustainable national transport system</p> <p>Modernization of transport sector aiming at higher degree of environmental protection, human health and passenger safety.</p>	<p>Modernization and development of road infrastructure along the TEN-T priority axis 7</p> <p>Modernization and development of railway infrastructure along the TENT priority axis 22</p> <p>Modernization and development of water transport infrastructure along the TEN-T priority axis 18</p> <p>Modernization and development of national road infrastructure</p> <p>Modernization and development of national railway infrastructure and passenger service</p> <p>Modernization and development of river and maritime ports</p> <p>Modernization and development of air transport infrastructure</p> <p>Promote inter-modal transport</p> <p>Improve traffic safety across all transport modes</p> <p>Minimize adverse effects of transport on the environment</p>

Source: Sectoral Operational Programme Transport 2007 – 2013, http://www.ampost.ro/file/POS_Transport_final_RO_c.pdf

The implementation system of the Sectoral Operational Programme Transport is shown in the diagram below:

Fig. 1 Organogram – version June 2012



As it is noticeable in the MA SOPT chart above, the compartments/offices are clearly separated, this favouring the entire activity of the management authority. Knowing precisely the attributions and the assignments, the MA SOPT employees are all aware of their duties, from both the job description and the perspective of working procedures.

To provide an example, and by limiting to the analysis of the project evaluation method, the main responsibilities of the Project Evaluation Office within the Programming Directorate are to evaluate, select, and contract the projects proposed for funding within SOP Transport. Office activities also comprise: SOP Transport eligible developing projects follow-up, monitoring and insuring JASPERS (Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions - assists the 12 Central and Eastern EU Member States and Croatia in the preparation of major projects to be submitted for grant financing under the Structural and Cohesion Funds) assistance secretarial office and issuing additional paper to the funding contract.

The process of selecting SOPT projects is one of the most important processes of implementing structural instruments through SOP Transport, due to the fact that it is the project by which SOPT strategic approach is transformed into concrete actions and interventions, which can lead to failure in accomplishing SOPT goals and targets, if chosen improperly.

With the purpose of a good governance, the administrative and eligibility conformity criteria shall be verified within the Programming Directorate, by project officers, and the evaluation criteria shall be analyzed and underlined by an Evaluation Committee in which only presidency (with no right to vote) and the secretarial office shall be insured by the Programming Directorate.

The stages of the evaluation process can be divided into:

- Verifying the administrative conformity,
- Evaluating eligibility,
- The technical-economic evaluation of the project.

The stage of evaluating the administrative conformity seeks after complying the form necessary to submit the funding request and it is done based on an evaluation chart with “Yes” or “No” answers. It is obvious that the funding requests that received a “Yes” to all the administrative conformity criteria can go to the next stage. It is similar in the case of eligibility evaluation, yet this time seeking after, for instance, the compliance of the funding request with the strategic requirements imposed by SOP T, and with the regulations specific to European funds, respectively, etc.

The funding requests that go over the first two stages of evaluation shall be subject to a technical-economic evaluation in which the relevance and the appropriateness shall be analyzed.

The SOPT projects Evaluation Committee shall consist of 4 members as a rough guide, structured as follows:

- 1 member from MA SOPT – Monitoring Directorate
- 1 member from MA SOPT – Financial Management Directorate,
- 1 member from the Directorate General for Infrastructure, Multimodal Transport and Private Sector or from the directorate General of Civil Aviation, according to the project – MTI,
- 1 member from the Directorate General for Public Sector Investments, Public Procurement and Privatization– MTI.

One must keep in mind that during the stages of administrative and eligibility evaluation, the Evaluation Committee does not take part, and it is built up only in the stage of technical-economic evaluation.

The presidency of the Evaluation Committee shall be ensured by the executive officer of the Programming Directorate or by the head of department, as well as by any project officer within PD, who was consequently commissioned by the President of the Evaluation Committee. The secretarial office of the Evaluation Committee is ensured by the SOPT project officer.

For this final stage an evaluation chart shall be used with a score ranging from 0 to 100 points, the funding requests with less than 45 points being declined.

The process of evaluating/selecting the funding requests lead by MASOPT shall not exceed a period of 45 working days from the date of submitting the funding request, unless it is necessary to break off the evaluation in order to obtain clarifying information from the Beneficiary. It must be mentioned that transport projects, especially those relating to infrastructure, have a longer preparation period and a complexity degree that is high both economically and technically.

The evaluation of the funding requests is made differently also according to the value of the projects:

a. In the case of projects amounting to less than 50.000.000 Euro, the approval is granted by SOP T Management Authority,

b. In the case of projects amounting to 50.000.000 Euro or more, or the so-called major projects, the funding requests approved by the management authority are submitted for the approval of the European Commission, along with all the necessary documents attached. After the issuance of the European Commission Decision, the SOP T Management Authority will be able to conclude a contract with the Beneficiary of the respective project.

In the case of projects generating income, according to the provisions of Art. 55 par. 1 of the General Regulations no. 1083/2006, establishing the general provisions regarding the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund, a project generating income is any operation that implies an investment in an infrastructure whose use is subject to royalties borne directly by users, or any operation that implies selling or renting land or estate, or any other paid service provision.

In the stage of evaluating projects, in the funding request, the applicants mention whether the project generates income or not. From the cost-benefit analysis, the net income generated by the project is established, and thus it is inferred from the cost of the investment, and then the eligible costs of the project proposed for funding from SOPT 2007-2013 are established. The Evaluation Committee verifies whether the eligible expenses of the projects generating income do not exceed the current value of the investment costs minus the current value of the net income from this investment during the project's life cycle for:

- investments in the infrastructure; or
- other projects in which the value of the income can be estimated in advance (source: procedure for Selecting Projects CODE: SOPT-MA-PD-PEO-1/ February 2012).

The Beneficiary can solicit MA SOPT to revoke the funding of a submitted funding request, throughout the period starting from the submittal and until signing the funding contract.

MA SOPT takes note of the applicant's request and sends him an address for confirming the funding revocation of the respective funding request.

The funding revocation of funding requests

The PD executive officer, commissioned by the head of the PEO, leaves the project officer the task to issue the address for confirming the funding revocation of the funding request.

The project officer issues the address within 3 days, the head of the PEO verifies it within one day, the PD executive officer approves of it within one day, and the general executive officer of MA SOPT signs it within one day.

If the request for funding revocation is submitted by the applicant in the period when the technical-economic evaluation takes place, within the Evaluation Committee, a meeting of the Evaluation Committee members is called out, in order to notify the evaluation members regarding the funding revocation of the funding request. The work of the Evaluation Committee is concluded without filling out the evaluation charts and the evaluation report. In the minutes for concluding the work of the Evaluation Committee it will be mentioned that the funding request has been revoked from funding and that the work of the Evaluation Committee ends without issuing the evaluation charts and the evaluation report.

According to the EC Regulation 1828/2006, the Management Authority shall inform the Beneficiaries of:

- The specific terms of the products or services that must be provided within the operation,
- The funding plan,
- The deadline for execution,
- The financial information or additional information that must be held and communicated.

The Management Authority shall establish whether the Beneficiary has the ability to fulfil these requirements before the approval decision is made.

The verifications that need to be carried out by the Managing Authority shall cover administrative, financial, technical and physical aspects of operations, as appropriate.

Verifications shall ensure that:

- a) statement of expenditure is in accordance with reality,
- b) products or services have been provided in accordance with the approval decision,
- c) the beneficiary's requests for reimbursement are correct
- d) operations and expenditures comply with the Community and national rules.

In any type of verification carried out by the Managing Authority, procedures that avoid double financing of expenditure through other Community or national schemes or with other programming periods shall be ensured.

Verifications must include the following procedures:

- (a) administrative verifications with respect to every request for reimbursement made by beneficiaries;
- (b) on the spot verifications of individual operations.

In case on the spot verifications of individual operations are conducted at random, the Managing authority will determine the sample size in order to obtain reasonable assurance of the legality and regularity of transactions, taking into account the risk identified by the Managing authority for the type of beneficiaries and operations in question.

The Member State or Managing Authority provides the European Commission with the following information on major projects (Article 40, EC Regulation 1083-2006):

- (a) information on the body responsible for implementation;
- (b) information on the nature of investments, their description, the financial volume and their location;
- (c) results of feasibility studies;
- (d) a timetable for implementing the project and, if the period for implementation of the operation should be bigger than the programming period, the phases for which a Community co-financing is required during 2007-2013;
- (e) a cost-benefit analysis containing an analysis of risks and foreseeable impact on the sector concerned and the socio-economic situation of the Member State and / or region and, if possible, where appropriate, other regions of the Community;
- (f) environmental impact analysis;
- (g) the justification for public contribution;
- (h) the financing plan showing the total amount of financial resources and the planned contribution for the Funds, EIB, EIF and all other sources of Community financing, including the indicative annual plan of the financial contribution from the ERDF or the Cohesion Fund for the respective project.

What were the obstacles regarding the absorption process of European funds?

A considerable level of work in preparing these infrastructure projects was represented by another obstacle in the entire process. Lack of well-trained specialists or the selection of specialists considering the lowest price, represented the cause of delay in the implementation of infrastructure projects with a minimum of 5 years. Given these aspects, major projects that entered the European Commission's analysis have hit a "wall", yet one flexible and open to cooperation. Infrastructure projects that had poorly prepared studies have delayed their effective implementation.

The Managing Authority as administrative apparatus was in a constant change that has generated both positive and negative aspects. Any organization is more competitive, as it is able to continuously develop on multiple plans and knowing the process of change to its effective management is one of the factors that can ensure the competitiveness of organizations.

Organizational change targets making essential changes of the organization as a whole, which opposes small changes that involve unessential changes in the organizational structure. Organizational change involves changing the mission and vision of an organization, introducing new technologies with new types of activities, introducing a system of evaluating performance, essential changes in the organizational structure. Organizational change corresponds to new guidelines on how the organization is to conduct its activity, having key implications on the behavior of all components of an organization.

Political analysts point to corruption, lack of staff motivation, lack of information, inadequate administrative capacity and major gaps in understanding the functioning of European Union institutions.

Coming back to the management system MA SOPT, I can tell that it represents that wheel of the system without which the entire process of absorption of structural funds would not be achieved. Currently recording the lowest rate of absorption of EU structural funds, the immediate conclusion would be that the entire administrative apparatus cannot handle such a process. It would be easy to say this, but such a conclusion would be too simplistic.

The above analysis only covers a small part of the whole process, a process which proves to be very slow. Legislation and European requirements were the first obstacles in the way to a successful absorption process and the pre-accession period regarding the alignment with European legislation proved to be too short for our country.

The above-mentioned information yet give me enough reasons to perform a SWOT analysis of the system, namely that of the Managing Authority as organizing form in a public system. So, I shall try to emphasize the strengths, the weaknesses, the opportunities and potential threats.

<p>STRENGTHS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -high-level of professionalism -clearly represented and defined guidelines/services -technological and information resources - portfolio of works performed -good relationship with EU institutions -well-defined procedures -limited number of beneficiaries -access to information -monitoring and evaluation system of Managing Authority 	<p>WEAKNESSES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -low-degree of funds absorption -insufficient workforce -poor remuneration of staff (Managing Authority with the lowest wage in Romania on a MA level) -insufficient staff training -decision-instability - poor communication between the directions of MA SOPT -inability to effectively mediate dialogue between the EC and beneficiaries
<p>OPPORTUNITIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -the existence of financial resources for strengthening administrative development -the possibility to exchange experience with other Managing Authorities in the European Union - efficient improvement and use of human capital -creating a good image by achieving results 	<p>THREATS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -staff-migration towards other authorities / institutions -long periods of stagnation regarding the development of the administrative capacity and the decline of the administrative apparatus -strengthening the position / image of MA SOPT as a public authority unable to manage the absorption of funds

Is the Cohesion Policy appropriate for public administration?

Significant advances were made in the organization, operation and management of structural funds by MA SOPT by providing a functional institutional building for networks of intermediary bodies and regional units whose responsibilities involve management of regional and local structural funds; developing the staff's ability to manage a project and the involvement of public authorities in developing the ability of potential project beneficiaries.

Through its cohesion policy, the European Commission wants as we have seen above, to transform and develop the European transport system. Each of its proposals will be preceded by a thorough impact assessment which will take account the added value at a EU level and the principle of subsidiarity. The Commission will ensure that its actions will lead to an increase in the competitiveness of transport, while contributing to the necessary reduction with at least 60% by 2050 of GHG emissions generated by transport.

Transport is fundamental to our economy and society. Mobility is vital to the internal market and quality of citizens' life, given that they enjoy the freedom to travel. In our country and not only here, transport allows economic growth and employment, their sustainability being necessary. Given the European Commission's vision both through the cohesion policy and other tools, what steps should our country take given the current situation?

If we talk about the administrative apparatus we must talk about an integrated approach to managing the elements that form the activity of project evaluation and monitoring. Division of labour and setting tasks for each civil servant contribute to their consistent and efficient achievement. At a management level, decisions must be consistent and stable, avoiding a temporary approach of the problem. A global and integrated approach of decisions unequivocally leads to effective decisions. Strengthening the connection between the SOPT Managing Authority and its beneficiary's results in facilitating the understanding of the absorption mechanism.

Conclusions

However, although it has been more than three years from the accession, Romania still faces a big challenge in absorbing EU structural funds. The absorption rate is still low, in relation to the allocated funds and the general national income, and, given the ongoing economic context and credits, national authorities have engaged in taking measures to increase absorption, taking into consideration a close involvement of commercial banks (according to *The Role of Commercial Banks in the Absorption of EU Funds*, Report by the Working Group approved by the EBCI Full Forum Meeting 16-17 March 2011, Brussels).

It is worth keeping in mind that during the implementation process of a project, absorption can be influenced by the vulnerabilities arising from Romania's macroeconomic framework both internal and external. Not attracting European funds can be detrimental in the recovery of development gaps and real convergence with EU countries. Vulnerability at the level of European fund management is recognized and becomes a real help in identifying problems in this respect. Hiring "artificial" staff can be a real impediment in developing an absorption capacity of management authorities, making more difficult the assessment, management and control process of these authorities.

A unified approach to wages or equal pay for equal work could encourage further involvement from the employee's part.

However, significant advances were made in the organization, operation and management of structural funds by MA SOPT by providing a functional institutional building for networks of intermediary bodies and regional units whose responsibilities involve management of regional and local structural funds; developing the staff's ability to manage a project and the involvement of public authorities in developing the ability of potential project beneficiaries.

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Legislation:

- Regulamentul Consiliului nr. 1083/2006 privind stabilirea cadrului general pentru Fondul european de dezvoltare regională, Fondul social european și Fondul de coeziune și abrogarea Regulamentului Consiliului nr. 1260/1999, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Regulamentul Comisiei nr. 1828/2006 privind stabilirea regulilor de implementare a Regulamentului Consiliului nr. 1083/2006 și pentru implementarea Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1080/2006 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;

- Regulamentul Comisiei (CE) nr. 1681/1994 privind neregulile și recuperarea sumelor plătite necuvenit în cadrul finanțării prin Fondul de Coeziune, precum și organizarea unui sistem de informare în acest domeniu, modificat și completat de Regulamentul Comisiei (CE) nr. 2035/2005, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Regulamentul Consiliului nr. 1605/2002 privind regulamentul financiar aplicabil bugetului Comunității Europene, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Legea nr. 500/2002 privind finanțele publice, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- HG nr. 457/2008 privind cadrul instituțional de coordonare și de gestionare a instrumentelor structurale, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- OUG nr. 64/2009 privind gestionarea financiară a instrumentelor structurale și utilizarea acestora pentru obiectivul convergentă, aprobată cu modificările prin Legea nr. 362/2009 cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- HG 218/2012 din 23/03/2012 de aplicare a prevederilor Ordonanței de urgență a Guvernului nr. 64/2009 privind gestionarea financiară a instrumentelor structurale și utilizarea acestora pentru obiectivul convergentă .
- HG nr. 759/2007 privind regulile de eligibilitate a cheltuielilor efectuate în cadrul operațiunilor finanțate prin programele operaționale, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- OUG nr. 66/2011 privind prevenirea, constatarea și sancționarea neregulilor apărute în obținerea și utilizarea fondurilor europene și/sau a fondurilor publice naționale aferente acestora, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Ordonanța de urgență nr. 34/2006 privind atribuirea contractelor de achiziție publică, a contractelor de concesiune de lucrări publice și a contractelor de concesiune de servicii cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 875/2011 pentru aprobarea Normelor metodologice de aplicare a prevederilor Ordonanței de urgență a Guvernului nr. 66/2011 privind prevenirea, constatarea și sancționarea neregulilor apărute în obținerea și utilizarea fondurilor europene și/sau a fondurilor publice naționale aferente acestora cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Decizia CE nr. 3469/2007 de adoptare a Programului Operațional Sectorial – Transport, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Ordinul comun MT - MEF nr. 92/274/2008 privind aprobarea Documentului Cadru de Implementare a Programului Operațional Sectorial “Transport”, 2007 – 2013, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Ordinul comun MT - MEF nr. 28/75/2008 privind aprobarea listelor de cheltuieli eligibile în cadrul operațiunilor finanțate prin Programul Operațional Sectorial “Transport”, 2007 – 2013, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Ordinul MT nr. 563/2007 pentru aprobarea Procedurii de organizare, desfășurare, evaluare, atribuire și monitorizare privind achizițiile publice de produse, servicii și lucrări în cadrul Ministerului Transporturilor și a unităților aflate în subordinea, sub autoritatea sau în coordonarea sa, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Hotărârea Guvernului nr.76/2009 privind organizarea și funcționarea Ministerului Transporturilor și Infrastructurii, modificată de Hotărârea Guvernului nr.104/2009 privind organizarea și funcționarea Ministerului Transporturilor și Infrastructurii, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;

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MODELS OF HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN NONPROFIT SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS

*Maria-Magdalena RICHEA**

Abstract. *In the context of globalization, the dynamic of working mechanisms is changing constantly, in order to meet the demands required by an international labour environment defined by a harsh competition for obtaining economic resources, in a world in which “global governance emphasizes the emergence of new forms of regulation, the apparition of many new protagonists in the world affairs: NGOs, experts, associations, local and regional networks, private corporations” (Maurel, 2011: 44).*

Considering the new trends in the international labour market, this paper aims to identify the characteristics of nonprofit management culture, due to the fact that the economic capital deficit turns the existence of nonprofit organizations into a real challenge nowadays.

In this respect, the main research objectives of this study are: (1) to identify and highlight models of human resources management adopted in nonprofit sector organizations and (2) to identify and highlight leadership models adopted in nonprofit sector organizations.

Keywords: *nonprofit management styles, nonprofit leadership styles, strategies of human resources management, international labour market.*

Introduction

Within the contemporary globalized society, the new forms of social organization of labour are the result of a harsh competition over resources, regarding both types of resources: human capital and economic capital.

Forms of global competition, in which organizations (public, private, nonprofit) are anchored, have determined the structure of new models of work activity in which human capital represents the key strategic resource.

Nowadays, the economic capital deficit turns the existence of nonprofit organizations into a real challenge, especially in terms of recruiting and selecting the best employees, in order to establish dynamic working mechanisms in a competitive working environment.

Taking into account the global social and economical realities that involves “the need to promote harmonization of economic policies to contribute to achieving economic cohesion on a regional level” (Brie, 2009: 82) and also on a global level, the main purpose of this paper is to identify the characteristics of nonprofit management culture, according to which the managers working in the nonprofit sector organizations must assume:

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- the role of an active participant in a new type of labour market game;
- the risks implied by the new rules of the labour market game.

In the following, I will present the most efficient *models of human resources management* shaped in the international framework of nonprofit sector organizations and I will also highlight the *leadership models* adopted in this niche of the international labour market.

A. Methodological Design of the Study

A.1. The research theme aims to identify the characteristics of nonprofit managerial culture adopted in the international framework of nonprofit sector organizations.

A.2. The research subject is to identify the main strategies of human resources management, that, throughout the years, proved their efficiency in the nonprofit sector organizations.

A. 3. Raised research questions:

- What are the characteristics of human resources management models adopted in the nonprofit sector organizations?
- In an age marked by the uncertainty of structuring the work activity on the international labor market, what are the leadership styles adopted in nonprofit sector organizations?

A. 4. Research objectives:

- 1) to identify and highlight models of *human resources management* adopted in nonprofit sector organizations;
- 2) to identify and highlight *leadership models* adopted in nonprofit sector organizations.

B. Theoretical Framework of the Study

B. I) Models of Human Resources Management in Nonprofit Organizations Sector

As I said in the introductory stage of this paper, nowadays, the economic capital deficit turns the existence of nonprofit organizations into a real challenge. Considering that, the nonprofit sector organizations are constituted at the crossing between the public and the private sectors. Therefore, in the following, I will present the distinctive characteristics of nonprofit organizations, in order to outline the way for identifying the specificity of the nonprofit managerial culture. Thus, nonprofit organizations are:

- “private from the property’s sight and profit production but public because of their finality, offering to consumers “collective goods” or products with public utility - health services, educational, cultural, etc.” (Vlăsceanu, 2010: 10);
- “independent of the trends found on the distribution market or revenues redistribution but they submit to the fundamental restriction of revenue nondistribution to those that control or manage them” (Vlăsceanu, 2010: 10);
- “independent of the governmental administration and institutions disposing of autonomous management mechanisms, similar to the organizations whose purpose is producing profit” (Vlăsceanu, 2010: 10);
- “imply the participation of employers or associates and volunteers in a variable proportion but either way, inevitable” (Vlăsceanu, 2010: 10).

According to Helmut Anheier, management represents “*the process of planning, organizing, directing, and controlling activities to accomplish the stated organizational objectives of organizations and their members...Management makes an organizational mission operational, and works toward achieving its objectives*” (Anheier, 2005: 244). Thus, in what concerns nonprofit management culture, throughout the years, in the nonprofit sector were used models of management both from the public sector and from the private sector. Although the nonprofit “*organizations are multitudes of different organizational components*” (Anheier, 2005: 244), in the following I will present the *models of Human Resources Management* that proved their efficiency in the nonprofit sector organizations and that also emphasizes a certain specificity of nonprofit managerial culture.

B. I) a. In this respect, there will be presented the following **key approaches**, in order to **highlight the development of Nonprofit Management Models**:

Exhibit 1: A HOLISTIC CONCEPTION of Nonprofit Field (Gomez and Zimmerman, 1993 *Apud* Anheier 2005: 245, 246). Conceptual design of the graph-the author:




Exhibit 2: A NORMATIVE DIMENSION OF MANAGEMENT in the Nonprofit Field (Herman and Renz, 1997 *Apud* Anheier 2005: 246). Conceptual design of the graph-the author:




Exhibit 3: A STRATEGIC-DEVELOPMENTAL DIMENSION in the Nonprofit Field (Gronbjerg 1993 *Apud* Anheier 2005: 246). Conceptual design of the graph-the author:






Exhibit 4: AN OPERATIVE DIMENSION in the Nonprofit Field (Herman 1994; Oster1995*Apud* Anheier: 246). Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



As we have seen above, in the key approaches that highlighted the development of nonprofit management models, “*organizations are seen as economic and political systems that have normative and strategic as well as operative dimensions*” (Anheier, 2005: 246). Therefore, according to the line of argumentation of Helmut Anheier (2005: 246, 247), a nonprofit organization can be shaped as follows:

Exhibit 5: THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS STRUCTURE (Anheier, 2005: 246). Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



B. I) b. Models of Human Resources Management in Nonprofit Sector Organizations

Considering the structure and the specificity of the nonprofit organizations and also the fact that “nonprofit organizations are multitudes of different organizational

components” (Anheier, 2005: 245), in this section will be presented management models that have emerged in these types of organizations and were constituted as sector specific management models. Moreover, these nonprofit management models “represents one possible analytical framework that can be used to understand the various dimensions, dilemmas, and structures involved in nonprofit management” (Anheier, 2005: 247).


The nonprofit management model outlined at the macro level was founded on the basis that it represents “conglomerates of multiple organizations or component parts” (Anheier, 2005: 247). In this respect, in the next section, will be presented the micro components of the nonprofit management models, developed on the following dimensions:

D1: Performance-time axes - an axes that generates a “critical first dimension between *tent* and *palace*” (Anheier, 2005: 247) and it refers to issues such as organizational permanence and organizational objectives. This nonprofit management model presents two types of organizations, making the analogy with the organization of a palace and the organization of a tent.

Thus, a *palace model of organization* “values predictability over improvisation, dwells on constraints rather than opportunities, borrows solutions rather than inventing them, defends past actions rather than devising new ones, favours accounting over goal flexibility, searches for final solutions rather, and discourages contradictions and experiments” (Hedberg et al. 1976; Weick, 1977 Apud Anheier, 2005: 247). As we have seen above, the palace model of organization represents a nonprofit management model quite similar with a taylorist model of organization.

On the other side, a *tent model of organization* “places emphasis on creativity, immediacy, and initiative, rather than authority, clarity and decisiveness” (Hedberg et al. 1976; Starbuck and Dutton 1973; Mintzberg, 1983 Apud Anheier, 2005: 247). The tent model of organization represents a nonprofit management model quite similar with an adhocratic managerial style. The image of this nonprofit management models is presented in the conceptual graph that can be seen below:

First model of nonprofit management: *Palace vs. Tent* (Source: Gommez and Zimmerman, 1993 Apud Anheier, 2005: 249). Adaptation of the model-the author:




D2: Task-formalization axes - an axes that has as main tasks the organizational environment and organizational culture. In the model of organization of a *technocratic*

culture, “some organization emphasize functional performance criteria, task achievement, and set procedures, and operate under the assumption that organizations are problem-solving machines” (Gomez and Zimmerman, 1993 *Apud* Anheier, 2005: 248). This is also a type a management model developed in accordance with Taylor’s scientific management.

The model of organization of a *social culture*, “are akin to families rather than machines... are close to the human relation approach in organizational theory, emphasizing the importance of informal relations and holistic concepts of employee motivation”(Gomez and Zimmerman, 1993 *Apud* Anheier, 2005: 248).This is a type a management model developed in accordance with the human relation approach theory, and it highlights the importance of human relation approach in the organizational theory.The image of this nonprofit management models is presented in the conceptual graph that can be seen below:


Second model of nonprofit management: *Technocratic culture vs. Social culture* (Source: Gommez and Zimmerman, 1993*Apud* Anheier, 2005: 249). Adaptation of the model- the author:



D3: Structure-hierachy axes - an axes that hasrefers to organizational structure and organizational design. In this respect, model of organization based on *organizations as hierarchies* “involves centralized decision-making, top-down approaches to management, a low span of control for middle management, and an emphasis on vertical relations among staff” (Gomez and Zimmerman, 1993 *Apud* Anheier, 2005: 248). This type of management model is a mixed one, developed in accordance with thelines of thought of: Weber’s concept bureaucracy, Fayol’s concept of public administration and Taylor’s scientific management.

The other model of organization, is based on *organizations as networks* and “emphasize decentralization and bottom-up approaches in decision-making, and encourage work groups as well as horizontal relations among staff and management”(Gomez and Zimmerman, 1993 *Apud* Anheier, 2005: 248, 251).As we observed above, this management model is similar with the management models that promotes workingteams in organizations and coalition-building.The image of this nonprofit management models is presented in the conceptual graph that can be seen below

Third model of nonprofit management: *Hierarchy vs. Network* (Source Gommez and Zimmerman, 1993 *Apud* Anheier 2005: 250). Adaptation of the model-the author:




D4: *Orientation-identity axes* - an axes that focuses on the relation between the organization and its environment. Thus, the model of organization of *outer-directed organizations* “look primarily at other organizations and its constituencies; they react to environmental stimuli and take their models and solutions from them” (Pugh et al.1968; Kieser and Kubicek, 1985 *Apud* Anheier, 2005: 251). As we observed in the authors line of thought, this model of organization are focused on the control on the influences of external environment on organizational internal direction.

The model of organization of *inner-directed organizations* “emphasize a more selective view of the environment and fous on their own objectives and the world-view” (Beer, 1984; Probst, 1987 *Apud* Anheier, 2005: 251). As we observed in the authors line of thought, in this model of organization, the internal organization represents the source for possible strategies. The image of this nonprofit management models is presented in the conceptual graph that can be seen below:

Fourth model of nonprofit management: *Outer-directedness vs. Inner-directedness* (Source Gommez and Zimmerman, 1993 *Apud* Anheier, 2005: 250).

Adaptation of the model- the author:



B. II) a. Classical Models of Leadership

Throughout the years, many forms of leadership have been shaped in the management culture. Therefore, the classification of leadership styles is made according to: the objectives and strategies of the organization; opportunities and development for the future planning, as well as according to ending of one's model of leadership.

Leaders and managers play very important roles in all types of organizations. Empirical observations showed that a frequently encountered situation is the one in which, the boundaries concerning the two types of roles are flexible, and leaders tasks and responsibilities are interconnected with managers tasks and responsibilities, even though *leaders* "form vision, inspire others to chase the vision, take risks, gather and use power, and seek opposing views" (Connors, 1997: 101) and *managers* "build the commitment to a set of goals, use their knowledge of human motivation to guide the behavior of others, solve problems, and pursue an orderly course of action" (Connors, 1997: 101). In this respect, further on, I will present the most debated leadership styles in the specialized literature concerning leadership, as follows:

Leadership of type A- "the control of employees is connected to the tasks narrowly defined; the workers develop highly specialized abilities; the interdependence of individuals is minimized; the focus is on the individual, not on the group; the high performance amplifies the possibility of promotions" (Huczynski, Buchanan, 1991; cited in Zlate, 2004: 185). Thus, this is a model of leadership that focus on individual that should develop specialized abilities, in order to obtain high performance at the workplace and the possibility of promotions.

Leadership of type J- "employment is done until retiring, and the control is made by socialization; the movements inside the organizations tend to happen in an horizontal manner; workers are not specialized, but possess universal working skills, motive for which they can be moved from one part of the organization to another; teamwork, collaboration are encouraged"(Huczynski, Buchanan, 1991; cited in Zlate, 2004: 185). Thus, employees have the opportunity to move from one part of the organization to another, since they possess universal working skills and the work activity isn't a specialized one and the employment is done until retiring. Within this model of leadership focus on teamwork and collaboration.

Leadership of type Z -"long-term employment, individual decisions; individual responsibility; frequent evaluations; rapid promotion; explicit and formal control, implied and informal control; moderate-specialized carrier; holistic goals"(Huczynski, Buchanan, 1991; cited in Zlate, 2004: 186). In this regard, this model of leadership represent a mixed model of leadership, that combines elements of type A of leadership and type J of leadership.

Transactional Leaders - "leaders who guide and motivate their followers in the direction of established goals by clarifying role and task requirements" (Robbins, 1996: 438). As we have seen, this model of leadership focuses on the role of guiding their followers, in order to meet the established goals and task requirements of the organization.

Autocratic Leadership- "this type of leader exercises almost absolute power and commands strict compliance and conformity. The autocratic leader generally has a well

defined and controlled disciplinary process with an emphasis on punishments for noncompliance. This leader determines prescribed policies, procedures, rules and goals” (Goethals et al., 2004: 821). Therefore, this model of leadership represents a coercitive model, that focuses on well defined policies, procedures and goals, in order to exercise absolute power for compliance and conformity and punishments for noncompliance.

Democratic Leadership- “is sometimes referred to as enlightened leadership. An individual manifesting this type of leadership recognizes each person’s self-worth and esteem. The leader’s actions are based upon trust, integrity, honesty, equality, openness and mutual respect. Democratic leaders show consideration and concern for others by empathetic listening and understanding. They foster open communication among all employees at all levels” (Goethals et al., 2004: 821). Within the model of democratic leadership, as we have seen above, leaders show consideration and concern, empathetic listening and understanding for organizational members, in order to recognize individual self-worth.

Laissez-Faire Leadership- “The laissez-faire leader is one who believes in freedom of choice for the employees, leaving them alone so they can do as they want. The basis for this style of leadership is twofold. First, there is a strong belief that the employees know their jobs best so leave them alone to do their jobs. Second, the leader may be in a political, election-based position and may not want to exert power and control for fear of not being reelected”(Goethals et al., 2004: 822). Thus, within the laissez-faire model of leadership, leaders give to their employees the freedom for choosing the best solutions to achieve their working tasks and responsibilities.

Forecasting Leadership- the main reason of this type of leadership is to “catch and anticipate future coordinates of the organization” (Zlate, 2004: 181).

Strategic Leadership- type of leadership oriented towards “establishing the strategy that has to be followed by the organization, in order to achieve its goals” (Zlate, 2004: 181).

Dynamic Leadership - concerns “the making and conducting the processes developed in time, the ones that assure the organizational failure or success” (Zlate, 2004: 181).

Leadership by Objectives- the main goal of this type of leadership is that of “coordinating the objectives of all organizational subsystems, in order to achieve the expected results” (Zlate, 2004: 181).

Leadership by exception- “it focuses on certain problems and periods that imply deviations from the general rule, thus exceptions, which have a maximal impact on the organizational existence and goals” (Zlate, 2004: 181).

Leadership by innovation- “centered on managing change, innovative transformations within the organization, that are meant to highlight the rhythm of development or attenuate a series of excesses that have an unfavorable impact on achieving the objectives” (Zlate, 2004: 181).

B. II) b. Models of Leadership in Nonprofit Sector Organizations


As I mentioned in the introductory stage of this section, any classification “of leadership styles is made according to: the objectives and strategies of the organization; opportunities and development for the future planning, as well as according to ending of one’s model of leadership.

Therefore, in what concerns the nature of leadership in nonprofit sector, leadership “*is a social influence process when a person in leadership role tries to affect the behavior of another party, a follower or potential follower*” (Connors, 1997: 101). In this regard, in the previous section I presented the classical models of leadership, in order to highlight the foundation of leadership activities and to make the transition to the leadership models that emerged in nonprofit sector organizations. Thus, in this section, I will present the leadership models specific to the nonprofit sector organizations, such as:

❖ First Category of Leadership Models: *THE FIVE PRACTICES OF LEADERSHIP*


1. Model the way-within this leadership model, the path to excellence in leadership activity “begins with something that grabs hold of you and will not let go” (Kouzes and Posner, 2007 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 297). Thus, excellent leaders “lead through their own words, lives, and actions...and find their voice by clarifying their personal values...and set the example by aligning their actions with the shared values of the organizational members” (Kouzes and Posner, 2007 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 297).

Therefore, in modeling process of their own leadership path, excellent leaders find their way to leadership activity, by clarifying their personal values. The next level in this modeling process of leadership is to build an organizational language of common shared values and then to transmit it to organizational members, through their own words, lives and actions, not by “someone else’s life or words” (Kouzes and Posner, 2007 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 297). The image of the model the way process of leadership can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:




2. Inspiring a shared vision-within this leadership model, the path to excellence in leadership activity begins by “envision the future by imagining exciting and ennobling possibilities. Then, they enlist others in a common vision by appealing to the shared aspirations of organizational members” (Kouzes and Posner, 2007 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 297).

As we observed above, in the process of inspiring a shared vision of the leadership activity, excellent leaders choose to envision a strategy with the future of organization. Then, the next step is to design the ennobling possibilities which attract organizational members and make them to adhere to a common vision of shared aspirations. The image of *inspiring a shared vision* process of leadership can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



3. Challenge the process -within this leadership model, the way to excellence in leadership activity places the leaders in “search for opportunities by seeking innovative ways to change, grow and improve. They are not afraid to experiment and take risks by constantly generating small wins and learning from their mistakes” (Kouzes and Posner, 2007 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 297).

In the construction of the leadership model based on challenging the leadership process, the excellent leader holds on the central role in a research process, in order to find innovative ways to change, grow, improve organizational performance at all organizational levels. The main feature of this seeking for innovation process is the willing to experiment and take risks, imagining as constant rewards for organizational members, small wins – with educational role. The image of *challenge the process* of leadership can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:




4. Enable others to act - within this leadership model, the path to excellence in leadership activity is to “foster collaboration by promoting cooperative goals and building trust. They are able to strengthen others by sharing power and discretion with them” (Kouzes and Posner, 2007 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 297, 298).

On the way to enable others to act, excellent leaders adopt as main strategy fostering collaboration at organizational level, by promoting cooperative goals and build trust within the organization. The anticipated result by fostering collaboration is to share power and discretion with organizational members and strength them. The image of *enable others to act* of leadership can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



5. Encourage the heart - within this leadership model, the way to excellence in leadership activity is to “recognize contributions by showing appreciation for individual excellence. They celebrate organizational values and victories by creating a spirit of community among organizational members”. (Kouzes and Posner, 2007 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 297).


The way to excellence in leadership, according to this leadership model has as starting point recognizing the individual contributions of organizational members and to show appreciation for individual excellence. These leaders creates a tradition for celebrating organizational values and victories, thus showing their appreciation and valuing for achieving organizational performance, in order to create a spirit of community and excellence for organizational members. The image of *encourage the heart* process of leadership can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



Resulted Implications for Leadership Challenges - after presenting the first category of leadership models and their constituent processes, there were identified some implications for leadership’s challenge and effectiveness. Therefore, Kouzes and Posner discovered that “people who use these behavior are seen as being: more effective in meeting job-related demnads; more successful in reresenting their units to upper management; creating higher performing teams; fostering loyalty and commitement; increase motivational levels and willingness to work hard; reducing absenteeism, turnover and drop-out rates; possesing high degrees of personal credibility” (Kouzes and Posner 2007 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 297, 298).

The leadership models presented in the previous section, have as main results the implication listed above for effectiveness and excellence in leadership activity. The image

of the resulted implications for leadership challenge on the way to excellence in leadership activity, can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



❖ Second Category of Leadership Models: *The Leader as Servant*

Within this leadership model, “the great leader is seen as servant first, and that simple fact is the key to greatness... leadership could be taken or given away, but service and the servant nature was the real person-not bestowed, not assumed” (Greenleaf 1977 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 298). The path to a great leader it may be found following a servant leadership approach, that represents “a mission of care and service of others... and it appeals to organizational members and volunteers in nonprofits... because it helps people develop their own personal spirituality and provides a framework for virtue”(Greenleaf 1977 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 298). In this respect, servant leadership represents the essential ingredient in the seeking process for individual greatness, and also a starting point for developing a framework for virtue, among volunteers and other organizational members, by offering them the opportunity for developing their own personal spirituality.

In Greenleaf’s theory, servant leadership begin with listening, because “only a true natural servant automatically responds to any problem by listening first...this helps others see the leader as servant first” (Greenleaf 1977 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 299).After developing the capacity of an active-listener in the relationship with organizational members, the next level is to invoke their intellectual abilities necessary for develop “a sense for unknowable and they need to forsee the unforeseeable” (Greenleaf 1977 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 300). By developing the sense for unknowable and for unforeseeable, servant leaders develop their ability for making organizational predictions, in terms of anticipating problems and finding their solutions before such situations really occur, in order to avoid unpredictable and risky situations for their own organizations.

A very important capacity that servant leaders must have “emphaty and an unqualified acceptance of their people... and acceptance of the person requires a tolerance for imperfection... the secret is in attracting a team of ordinary people to perform better than they would otherwise be able to do” (Greenleaf 1977 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 300). Attracting a team of ordinary people in a servant leader’s team, represents the distinctive characteristic of this leadership model, because by accepting and tolerating imperfection on a basic level, leaders develop a performant and productive teamwork, and also empower ordinary people to achieve difficult and challenging workingtasks.

In servant leadership’s theory, the concept of power is defined in term of “getting things done in organizations... leaders create power bu sharing it-not by hoarding it... and servant leaders share power by working in the serviceof others helping them to discover and build their own power together” (Greenleaf 1977 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 300). The concept of power, within this leadership model represents an ongoing process that makes


sense in the interaction between servant-leaders and organizational members, and the main implication is designing the organizational power, by sharing it among all organizational members. The image of *leader as servant* process of leadership can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



❖ Third category of leadership models: *The Web of Inclusion*

This leadership model is based on feminine principles in leadership activity, described by Sally Helgesen as “*a pattern*, a model for coherently ordering people and their tasks; and as *a process*, a way of thinking and acting, of behaving as solving problems as they arise” (Helgesen 1995 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 300). Therefore, the leadership model of the web of inclusion describes women leaders that “labored continually to bring everyone at every point closer to the center- to tighten ties, provide increased exposure and encourage greater participation” (Helgesen 1995 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 300). As we observed, the web of inclusion represents a leadership model specific to organizations lead by women and it promotes, both a pattern for coherence in ordering people and also a process of modelling ways of thinking, acting and solving problems.

In this regard, in the following will be presented the feminine principles adopted in the web of inclusion model of leadership, as they were described by Anita Roddick, the founder of Body Shop “principles of caring; making intuitive decisions; not getting hung up on hierarchy or all those dreadfully business school management ideas; having a sense of work as being part of our life, not separate from it; putting your labour where your love is; being responsible to the world in how you use your profits; recognizing the bottom line should stay at the bottom” (Helgesen 1995 *Apud* Agard, 2011: 301). Therefore, the web of inclusion leadership principles are subsumed to principles of care ethics. The image of *web of inclusion* process of leadership can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



C. Theoretical models developed from research inventory

As we have seen in the previous sections, the main guidelines of this study were represented by the research questions formulated in its early stage. Thus, the questions that guided my research approach were the following:


- What are the characteristics of human resources management models adopted in the nonprofit sector organizations?
- In an age marked by the uncertainty of structuring the work activity on the international labor market, what are the leadership styles adopted in nonprofit sector organizations?

After carrying out the research, were identified several possible answers to this research questions. Therefore, one possible answer is that there were identified four major management models specific to nonprofit sector organizations, actually nonprofit management models, that have distinctive features and that emphasize different strategies for managing a nonprofit organization.

In the introductory stage of the section “*Models of Human Resources Management in Nonprofit Sector Organizations*”, was highlighted the fact that nonprofit management models “represents one possible analytical framework that can be used to understand the various dimensions, dilemmas, and structures involved in nonprofit management” (Anheier, 2005: 247). In order to discover the possible analytical framework for nonprofit management, were presented the four major management models that have resulted from previous research programmes and proved to be, at least so far the most effective nonprofit management models. Therefore, considering that “the nonprofit organizations are multitudes of different organizational components” (Anheier, 2005: 245), the micro components of the nonprofit management models that resulted are the following: the first model of nonprofit management: *palace vs. tent* - developed in line with performance time - axes; the second model of nonprofit management: *technocratic culture vs. social culture*- developed in line with task-formalization axes; the third model of nonprofit management: *hierarchy vs. network*- developed in line with structure-hierarchy axes; the fourth model of nonprofit management: *outer-directedness vs. inner-directedness* - developed in line with orientation-identity axes.

We cannot develop a future theoretical framework for nonprofit management, without referring to the main feature of the nonprofit organizations that refers to his hybrid

and mixed particularity, that reflects that “nonprofit organizations are multitudes of different organizational components” (Anheier, 2005: 245). In this regard, the theoretical model developed from research inventory aims to develop the management models discovered in the previous research programmes, by presenting them in an integrated model, specific to nonprofit management, due to the fact that at the macro level nonprofit management represents “conglomerates of multiple organizations or component parts” (Anheier, 2005: 247). Therefore, based on the theoretical model proposed by Helmut Anheier (2005: 247-251), we propose the following integrated model for nonprofit management, by designing the image of *an integrated model of nonprofit management*, that can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph—the author:




Another possible answer to the research questions proposed in the early stage of this study, refers to the fact that, “although the concept of leadership and the concept of management are not synonymous, they are far from being incompatible... leadership is an essential ingredient for management’s activity, as management is the foundation and the major support for leadership’s activity” (Vlăsceanu, 2003: 290), and, therefore, we cannot present the management models that emerged in the nonprofit sector, in the absence of the leadership models that developed in the nonprofit sector.

Thus, in the previous stages of this study were presented nonprofit leadership models that developed within nonprofit sector organizations over the years. In what concerns the nature of leadership in nonprofit sector, leadership “*is a social influence process when a person in leadership role tries to affect the behavior of another party, a follower or potential follower*” (Connors, 1997: 101). In this respect, emerged different processes for the leadership activity in the nonprofit sector, that comprise and sustain different principles for modeling the leadership activity.

The essential ingredients for the leadership model in nonprofit sector were put into three categories of leadership models, as follows: the first category of leadership models - *model de way, inspiring a shared vision, challenge the process, enable others to act, encourage the heart*- in order to find the excellence in leadership activity; the second category of leadership models - *the leader as servant*, defined as a great leader; the third

category of leadership models - *web of inclusion*, that promotes a leadership practice according to feminine principles of leading.

In developing the theoretical framework for the leadership model in nonprofit sector, will be also assumed the fact that “nonprofit organizations are multitudes of different organizational components” (Anheier, 2005: 245) and actually two versions of the same story. In this regard, the theoretical model developed from research inventory aims to develop the leadership models discovered in the previous research programmes, by presenting them in a general model, specific to nonprofit leadership. Therefore, based on the theoretical model proposed by Kathryn Agard (2011: 297-301), we propose the following general model for nonprofit leadership, by designing the image of a *general model of nonprofit leadership*, that can be seen in the graph below. Conceptual design of the graph-the author:



D. Concluding remarks resulted from this stage of the study

1. Nonprofit management models shown in this paper, are those which have proved their effectiveness in international research programs, carried out so far.

2. In the nonprofit management culture, both management models and leadership models, are outlined in accordance with organizational features, such as: mission, strategy, task environment.

3. As we observed above, nonprofit organizations represent multitudes of different organizational components.

4. Nonprofit management culture is anchored both in the business world of the private sector and in management world of the public sector.

5. Taking into consideration the fact that nonprofit organizations are the image of different organizational components, and also the influences of the business world of the private sector and of the management world of the public sector have on these types of organizations, results the hybrid and mixed feature of these organizations.

6. After carrying out this study, were identified the micro components of the nonprofit management models as follows: the first model of nonprofit management: *palace vs. tent* - developed in line with performance time - axes; the second model of nonprofit management: *technocratic culture vs. social culture* - developed in line with task-formalization axes; the third model of nonprofit management: *hierarchy vs. network* - developed in line with structure-hierarchy axes; the fourth model of nonprofit

management: *outer-directedness* vs. *inner-directedness* - developed in line with orientation-identity axes.

7. There were also identified, the essential ingredients for the leadership model in nonprofit sector. These essential ingredients were put into three categories of leadership models, as follows: the first category of leadership models - *model de way, inspiring a shared vision, challenge the process, enable others to act, encourage the heart*-in order to find the excellence in leadership activity; the second category of leadership models - *the leader as servant*, defined as a great leader; the third category of leadership models - *web of inclusion*, that promotes a leadership practice according to feminine principles of leading.

8. It was highlighted the fact that nonprofit management models represent, in the previous research programmes, one possible analytical framework that can be used to understand the various dimensions, dilemmas, and structures involved in nonprofit management.

9. In this regard, was developed a theoretical model from the research inventory, on the following coordinates:

9.a) by developing the management models discovered in the previous research programmes, presenting and shaping them in the form an integrated model, specific to nonprofit management;

9.b) by developing the leadership models discovered in the previous research programmes, presenting and shaping them in the form of a general model, specific to nonprofit leadership.

10. Therefore, after carrying out this study, there were identified two new models specific to nonprofit managerial culture-*an integrated model of nonprofit management* and *a general model of nonprofit leadership*.

❖ Implications for Future Research:

➤ To achieve a qualitative study, in order to identify the specificities of nonprofit managerial styles in Romanian nonprofit sector organizations;

To expand the research over other countries, in order to realize a comparative study concerning nonprofit managerial culture.

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PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN ROMANIA: REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

*Anca-Adriana CUCU**

Abstract. *Nowadays, in the context of the economic and financial crisis, the public sector must tackle new challenges by changing its traditional “bureaucratic” behavior and designing new strategies and tools in order to accomplish its mission: delivering high quality public services while lowering the volume of public spending. Thus, the search for performance is high on the agenda of public authorities and the pace at which the context changes implies that performance, even when acquired, must be managed in order to preserve the results. As a consequence, the management of performance in the public sector is a stringent question for both scholars and practitioners – public managers. Our paper addresses the problem of the management of performance in the Romanian health system. We have chosen this particular sector as its reform was subject to conditionality from the part of several international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the European Commission) for approving the financial Agreements with the Romanian Government. The question addressed is whether there is an institutional and legal framework for managing performance in the Romanian health system or there are only ad-hoc measures adopted by the public central authorities to address the requirements of international institutions.*

Keywords: *efficiency; effectiveness; New Public Management; public reform*

1. Introduction

In the context of the economic and financial crisis, the public sector is currently facing new challenges that it must address by changing its traditional “bureaucratic” behavior and designing new strategies and tools in order to accomplish its public mission. The role of the state and thus, of the public sector, is becoming more and more important, as it is called to find solutions for an efficient spending of the public money in times of financial crises. In the same time, the search for efficiency must find its correspondent: public action must be characterized, more than the private one, by effectiveness. And users are waiting for a high quality public service delivery. In other words, we are talking about a public sector performance characterized by an efficient, effective and high quality public action. The research of performance is more complicated in contemporary times when everything is evolving and, thus, changing rapidly and that’s why the performance, even when acquired, must be managed in order to preserve the results obtained. As a

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consequence, the management of performance in the public sector is a stringent question for both scholars and practitioners – public managers.

In Romania, the transition period was characterized by profound changes in all the aspects of the political, economic, and social life. The public sector has also undergone fundamental changes, rather requested by international institutions in order to fulfill the conditions of a democratic state and an open market economy. The reforms are “complex, including changes as a result of pre-accession, accession process, Europeanization, and recently the effects of the world economic and financial crisis” (Matei and Matei, 2010: 6).

Our paper addresses the problem of the management of performance in the Romanian health system. We have chosen this particular sector as its reform was subject to conditionality imposed by international financial institutions in order to close the financial Agreements with the Romanian Government. On the other hand, the last European report on the healthcare system mentioned that Romania is the only European country reporting to the World Health Organization in which the share of public spending in the health care system comes entirely from public sources (Bjornberg, 2011: 66). The accession to the European Union has had a significant impact on the Romanian public sector, including the health domain: many public institutions have been created, the Romanian legislation has been changed in compliance with the EU “*acquis*” and all these measures had as a consequence a growth (in terms of expenditures and personnel) of the Romanian public sector. During the financial crisis, under the conditionality imposed by international financial institutions – International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) – the Romanian Government adopted measures to reduce public expenditure by decreasing the number of employees in the public sector and the level of salaries for all public employees.

With respect to the changes mentioned above and in the context of the economic and financial crisis that requires from the part of political leaders and public managers an efficient public spending and effectiveness of the measures adopted, the research question of our paper is: what performance management system could be implemented in the Romanian healthcare system in order to meet these new challenges? What decisions to be taken in order to maintain a high quality public service that fulfills the needs of the healthcare system beneficiaries? Which organizational changes should be implemented at a macro- and micro-level so as to manage a well-performing healthcare system? How to motivate people to continue working at high standards, as we are talking about measures that have touched people’s lives, with less money and increased quality of services delivered?

The research methods used in this paper are, firstly, a qualitative analysis of the literature in the field of public management of performance, and secondly, a qualitative analysis of the legal and institutional framework of the Romanian healthcare system, which aims at identifying the organizational changes that have been determined and their effects on the system’s performance.

2. The role of the new public management in public sector reform

In the last two decades, the changes both at state level and on the global scene have determined policy makers to initiate a series of major reforms in the public sector, searching for new models of public management different from the traditional model of public administration, which no longer met the increasing needs from the part of the citizens as clients, as well as the government itself. The development of a new public management in OECD countries firstly, and then worldwide, started since the 1980s. Many academic works demonstrate that the governments of various countries, regardless of their political orientation, left or right, have adopted ambitious policies of

“administrative reform” or “administrative modernization”. Reforms, to a variable extent, called New Public Management (NPM), aimed not only at reducing the costs of public services, but also at improving the quality of the services. NPM has been defined as a “general theory of governance, activities and methods for organizing public services, knowing the government’s objectives” (Matei, 2004: 133).

Table 1: Old and new style of process


Dimension	Old style/Traditional	New Style
Direction	Top down and bottom –up	Top-down
Mode	Consensual or consultative	Conflicting
Process	Compromise and bargaining	Directed
Character	Public process/Broadly based	Private process/Narrow elite
Key advisers	Incremental, sectorial and cautious	Comprehensive, faith in bold ideas
	Internal public service advisers	Private sector advisers
		Ministerial advisers
Implementation	Centralized (decentralized in Scandinavia)	Decentralized
Review mechanism/Reform initiatives	Commission of inquiry	Task force
Review of reform initiatives	Not applicable	Ministerial
		Quasi-independent review
		Parliamentary review
Stance	Reflective	Active/instrumental

Source: Halligan, 2001: 85

The New Public Management is characterized by different initiatives from state to state as, for example: the creation of state agencies, privatization, decentralization, creating public-private partnerships, use of indicators of performance, total quality management, as well as new ways of managing the career of civil servants, of inciting and motivating them. These methods have been promoted and taken from one country to another, depending on the specifics of the so called “best practices” through international forums, the various programs based on “good governance” administrative reforms proposed by international bodies such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and the European Union.

Burgess very well illustrated the goals of New Public Management as follows:

Figure 1: The goals of New Public Management



Source: Brunetto, Farr-Wharton: 39

3. The performance management movement

Nowadays, especially in times of economic and financial crisis, performance, under all its aspects, is high on the agenda giving “the impression of being obsessed with performance” in all “spectrum of society, from specific individuals through various organizations whether private, public, voluntary, for profit, governmental, national or international”(Watkins, 2006: 78). Despite this, performance is not a new concept; it was launched at the beginning of the last century, as highlighted by Bouckaert:

Table 2: Performance movements in the twentieth century

Performance movement	Timescale	Characterization
Social survey movement	1900s-1940s	Social reformers needed facts about social problems
Scientific management and the science of administration	1900s-1940s	Government needed a scientific approach as opposed to adhocery
Cost accounting	1900s-1940s	Large corporations and government needed insights in the cost of products and services for management and transparency
Bureaus of Municipal Research and its offspring		Synthesis in practice of the previous three movements
Performance budgeting	1950s-1970s	Shift attention in the budgetary process from inputs to outputs and objectives. Coincides often with an agenda of executive control
Social indicators	1960s-1970s	Social engineering of the welfare state
New Public Management (2 nd generation of performance budgeting)	1980s-2000s	Public sectors worldwide are under pressure and adopt performance strategies
Evidence-based policy	1990s-2000s	Research and indicators rather than ideology and opinion have to undergird policy. Fits into Third Way politics

Source: Van Dooren, Bouckaert, Halligan, 2010: 45

Performance management became more and more important as an “identifiable subject for academic study and research” in the mid 1990s (Thorpe and Beasley, 2004: 336).

Table 3: Comparison between traditional and contemporary Performance Management Systems

Items	Traditional financial based PMSs	Contemporary PMSs
Basis of systems	Accounting standard	Company strategy
Types of measures	Financial	Financial and non-financial
Focus of measures	Internal, historical	Internal and external, future oriented
Audience	Middle and top managers	All employees
Shop floor relevance	Ignored	Used
Frequency	Lagging (weekly or monthly)	Real-time (hourly or daily)
Maintenance	Expensive	Relevant and easy
Integration	Ignored	Integration exists
Linkage with reality	Indirect, misleading	Simple, direct, accurate
Local-global relevance	Static, non-varying	Dynamic, situation structure dependent
Stability	Static, non-changing	Dynamic, situation timing depending
Format	Fixed	Flexible/variable

Purpose	Monitoring	Improvement
Function	Allocate blame	Encourage creative and learning
Decision making	Structured	Unstructured
Effect on continuous improvement	Impedes	Supports/stimulates
Linked to strategy	No/less link with strategy	Derived from strategy

Source: Burgess, Ong, Shaw, 2007: 588-589

Not many cross-countries comparisons regarding performance management systems in the public sector have been implemented and some characteristics of different systems are identified as follows:

Table 4: Four ideal types of managing performance

	Performance administration	Managements of performances	Performance management	Performance governance
Measuring	Administrative data registration, objective, mostly input and process	Specialized performance measurement systems	Hierarchical performance measurement system	Consolidated performance measurement system
Incorporating	Some	Within different systems for specific management functions	Systemic internal integration	Systemic internal and external integration
Using	Limited: reporting, internal, single loop	Disconnected	Coherent, comprehensive, consistent	Societal use
Limitations	Ad hoc, selective, rule based	Incoherence	Complex, perhaps not sustainable as a stable system	How controllable and manageable?

Source: Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 73

4. The healthcare system in Romania: between tradition and modernization

The Romanian health system has the features of three models: the Semashko model (social security is provided by the state budget), the Beveridge model - which assumes the existence in the system of a “filter” (played by family doctors who are freely chosen by patients), and the Bismarck model (a compulsory health insurance based on income) (Matei & Savulescu, 2010, p 2).

The major institutional actors in the Romanian health sector are the Ministry of Health, whose main attribution is to develop policy in this field and the National House of Health Insurance (CNAS). The reform of the health sector was an ongoing priority after the fall of communism and the fundamental law in the field of health insurance was adopted in 1997¹. This law replaces the old system based on financing by taxation at the national level by another model characterized by individual taxation (a tax on wages) as a health insurance (CASS). An institutional feature of the system, considered a source of several functional difficulties, is the relationship between the Ministry of Health and the National House of Health Insurance (CNAS). This law doesn't stipulate any hierarchical relations or control

¹ Law No. 145 of 24 July 1997 on social insurance for health, published in the Official Gazette No. 178 of July 31, 1997

between the two institutions, and, consequently, the Ministry as both head of the reform and the body that monitors the implementation of its policies does not have any control power to evaluate how the health budget is spent by the CNAS. Following the difficulties of the development and implementation of the health budget, as from August 2011, the Romanian Government has decided to put the CNAS under the coordination of the Ministry of Health.

Despite the measures to reduce the public sector sphere by means of privatization or licensing public employees, taken by the Romanian Government, the number of employees in the health sector continued to increase.

Table 5: People employed in key sectors of economy (thousands)

Economy sector	2008	2009	2010
Total population employed	9369	9243	9240
Public administration, defense, social insurances of public sector	466	490	471
Education	399	386	385
Healthcare and social assistance system	381	395	403

Source: Statistical breviary of Romania, National Institute of Statistics, 2011, p. 18

Another problem that characterizes the health system in Romania is corruption. Corruption in the public sector in the states of Central Europe, due to changes caused by the fall of communist regimes, is one of the features frequently highlighted by the international institutions when evaluating these systems. There has been identified (Matei & Matei, 2006: 43) even a “market of corruption” characterized by some supporting principles such as: the existence of “demand and supply”, the implementation mechanisms that rule the market in the absence of control by the authorities, and of course, the price of corruption which is determined by socio-economic conditions. On the basis of specific indicators set by international organizations (the perception of corruption used by Transparency International, corruption control calculated by the World Bank and the Global Integrity Index), a “mutual determination between corruption, public integrity and performance of governance” was also established (Matei & Matei, 2009: 13).

Informal payment is characteristic for former communist countries of Central Europe and is considered a safeguard mechanism “for those who want to overcome the disadvantages of a health system underfunded” (Chereches & all, 2011: 8). Informal payment is mentioned in official documents such as, for example, the National Strategy for hospital rationalization recognizes that informal payment is part of the old culture (that of the communist period). Different official reports show that this type of payment is widespread in the health system. Thus, in a study on “Health System in Romania”, the Agency for Government Strategies stated that 8% of people said they were asked to give informal payments and 26.3% still felt a form of pressure to do so (ASG, 2008). Another study developed by the same institution, “Barometrul Politicilor Publice - Barometer of Public Policies”, shows that 40% have offered informal payments out of 68% people who used medical services.

5. Managing performance in the Romanian health care system: conditionality or necessity?

One of the most important aspects of performance management in the healthcare system is the right balance between the determinants of performance: efficiency, effectiveness and quality.

In the literature, “technical efficiency” in the health system “has been defined as “providing maximum health services out of available resources or minimizing the use of

available resources to produce a given level of health services” and “economic efficiency” as “a product of both technical/productive efficiency (producing healthcare without waste) with efficiency in resource allocation (allocating health resources to their most highly valued uses)” (Kirigia, 2007: 76).

In Romania, the reform of the health sector is one of the criteria for concluding Agreements between international financing institutions and the Romanian Government. In the letter addressed to the International Monetary Fund, dated on the 09th of September 2010, the Romanian Government took on several restrictions in this area such as: the obligation of hospital managers to respect the rule according to which expenses for personnel do not exceed 70% of the functioning costs of the health unit, decrease the number of hospital beds by 9200 units, the transfer of several hospitals to local authorities for which the last ones must provide funding from the local budget, the law concerning the system of co-payment of health services.

In order to implement these commitments, one year later, the Romanian Government adopted a National Strategy for hospitals’ rationalization² with the following objectives:

- Increase the efficiency of the delivery of health services by reducing costs
- Ensure the redistribution of resources to other sectors (primary health care, ambulatory care, care at home)
- Decentralization of decision empowering the local community to manage the health units at local or county level.

The role of the Ministry of Health will be especially at a strategic level i.e. the development of public policies in the field of health.

In the country report 11/80, dated from April 2011, the IMF stated that the accumulation of arrears due to the mismatch between the right to healthcare services and the available budget is considered the main cause for the difficult situation in which the Romanian healthcare system finds itself. In this sense, the IMF recommended the Romanian authorities to implement measures such as: another package of health services financed by public funds, excluding non-essential services; the introduction of the principle “money follows the patient”; the use of generic rather than brand name drugs when possible; reducing the number of beds in public hospitals and the introduction of ICT in the system (electronic prescriptions, national health cards, electronic records of patient). In the Letter of intent, included in the IMF country report no. 11/80, the Romanian Government commits to the continuation of the health reform through the adoption of measures such as: the establishment of a co – payment policy (patients must bear some costs of their treatment, apart from contributions that are deducted directly from wages as contributions for social insurance health - CASS), a 10 % decrease in the number of patients to be found in hospitals financed by public funds as compared to the 2010 levels, the reduction of the amount of reimbursement of doctors by 70% to 50%. Another action refers to the reduction of the price paid by the government for medicines, which affected both patients and producers of drugs which implies that physicians are forced to replace innovative drugs with generic, cheaper ones. Thus, the Ministry of Health will reimburse generics only mentioned in the approved list (List C³).

One may wonder then if the performance of public action is measured only by certain financial indicators. How many public managers should also consider the

² Government Decision no 303 from 23 of March 2011 published in Official Gazette no. 223 from 31 of March 2011

³ Health Ministry Order n° 1275 de 26 August 2011 published in Official Gazette n° 609 from 30 August 2011

effectiveness of public action in the healthcare system, where the users are human beings and the long term impact - in other words, the nation's general state of health - should be a priority for them? We cannot speak yet of performance management in Romania's healthcare system and the effects of these measures on the performance and quality of the medical services offered cannot be measured. Even before these measures were set in place, Romania had been counted among the last countries in European Union, according to EUROSTAT figures regarding the government funding of the health sector (Appendix 1).

6. The way forward for a performant healthcare system

In industrialized countries discussions about how to increase the performance of health systems were high on the agenda of the last 20 years. In order to harmonize and to share best practices from different countries, OECD was the international forum to discuss and find solutions to this problem. The need for a benchmarking system at an international level regarding the performance of health system from different countries conducted to the elaboration of a set of "performance indicators of the medical care system" as: "rates of avoidable mortality and morbidity; survival rates; rates of effective health care interventions which play an important role in health gain; rates of adverse events following treatment; rates of satisfaction with the healthcare system" (Jee&Or, 1999: 12)

Thus, specialists from OECD countries paid a special attention to the "coordination of care" defined as "policies that help create patient-centered care that is more coherent both within and across care settings and over time" which aims at "making health-care systems more attentive to the needs of individual patients and ensuring they get the appropriate care for acute episodes as well as care aimed at stabilizing their health over long periods in less costly environments" (Hofmarcher et al, 2007: 6).

One of the first health system reforms that set out to acquire efficiency and effectiveness was that of Great Britain's National Health System (NSH). In order to assess the performance of health organizations at a local level, a balance scorecard was introduced by the central hierarchy of NSH (Chang, 2007: 102). A specific feature of this performance management tool that was characterized by six dimensions ("health improvement; fair access; effective delivery of appropriate health care; efficiency; patient/attendant experience of NSH; health outcomes of NSH health care", Chang, 2007: 105-107) was the importance of outcomes in terms of improving the health conditions of citizens on the long term.


Switzerland is the OECD country with the highest share of GDP for health. In 2004, the TARMED system was introduced in order to obtain an efficient allocation of resources and the possibility of controlling health expenditure (OECD, 2006: 125).

7. Conclusion

Although some steps to reduce public spending by reducing the number of public employees or cutting budgetary revenues of different sectors were taken by several European governments, the problem that must be taken into account regarding the Romanian case is the criteria used in order to reduce public spending. Were the obligations that the Romanian Government has taken on when accepting the external conditionality based on a clear and judicious evaluation of the health system, including the long term impact of such actions and their irreversible consequences? We mentioned in the first part of our paper that public performance is defined not only by the efficiency, but also by the effectiveness of public action and the quality of public service delivery.

Several measures have been adopted in the Romanian healthcare system at the request of international financial institutions. The need for restructuring and reforming the

system after the communist regime appeared as a necessity. At the same time, such measures are not part of an integrated and coordinated approach for increasing performance and reducing public allocation for health system, but rather contextual measures adopted by each government in response to specific requirements.



Source: EUROSTAT, available at :

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/images/c/cd/Current_healthcare_expenditure%2C_2009_%281%29.png

In conclusion, we cannot yet speak about managing performance in the Romanian health system, as the results of this reform are mitigated. There is a need for a better coordination between different institutional actors of the system, between the central level, the Ministry and the CNAS, and the local authorities to whom there have been transferred important responsibilities in this field. Another important aspect is that the management of each hospital and the decision of having professional managers evaluated upon performance indicators could help in this process. But all these measures could have results on the long term and not from one year to another.

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CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF MIGRATION FLOWS AND RETENTION POLICIES IN THE CEE REGION

*Cristinela-Ionela VELICU**

Abstract. *This exploratory study aims to analyse the mobility patterns and the impacts of health professionals' migration on health systems and the effects of health professional mobility on the performance of health systems in the Central and Eastern European countries. The most interesting point of inquiry involves identifying the mechanism through which emigration actually affects health care systems and outcomes. The main research question is focused on studying the role of health professionals' migration on the country's stock of health professionals and to define an appraisal method to evaluate the impact on health systems of health workforce supply. The research assumption is that health personnel migration is not a random event it is determined by certain factors present in destination and source/origin countries. Therefore, the paper will be focused on comprehensive analysis of scale and characteristics of health professional mobility in the CEE countries (Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary), the positive or negative impacts on the performance of health systems result from mobility flows, the effects of EU enlargement on professional mobility, the options and regulatory inventions (recruitment policies, international frameworks, workforce planning and general workforce measures) implemented by governments in order to address health professional mobility issues and the main motivations of the mobile workforce.*

Keywords: *labour mobility, health systems, health workforce, retention policies, demand and supply health professionals.*

1. Introduction

Health care systems and services critically depend on the size, commitment and skills of the health workforce. Countries analysed in the present study have critical shortages and imbalances of health workers also often lack the technical capacity to identify and assess crucial policy issues related to the health workforce. Therefore, fundamental questions regarding the status of the workforce, the level of mobility of health “professionals and the problems health workers face remain largely unanswered in the current state of literature and policy analysis studies. The lack of comprehensive, health workforce mobility up-to-date data and the absence of commonly agreed definitions and analytical tools make the task of identifying potential causes and effects of health personnel migration a difficult one. Thus, the analysis of how health professional mobility impacts on health systems in the CEE region and the motivational factors that

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influence individual health professionals to migrate constitute an important ad-value for the health policy research field. Health professional exodus from resource CEE countries is driven by developed shortages in Western European Countries, the US or Canada. Fuelling their need is a growing aging population, the increasing burden of chronic diseases, and high-tech and expensive health care that requires highly-trained health professionals in developed countries. Health professionals' migration affects service provision, quality of care and the distribution of health workers across regions and countries. The recent expansion of the European Union (EU) has caused concern among authorities in recently integrated countries about the loss of professionals, although figures for previous expansions do not seem to support this concern (Holzmann et al., 2004).

2. Conceptual Background

Health professional mobility needs to be understood within the wider strategies addressing the general workforce issues with which it interacts (Dubois et al. 2006). Before analysing health professionals' mobility flows from CEE it is important to clarify the conceptual framework; Migration of professionals can be defined as the voluntary movement of workers from one employment station to another in search of different working arrangements (Martineau, Decker and Bundred, 2004). A common categorization of regular migration is associated with the anticipated duration of stay. ILO (2004: 9-10) distinguished three main types: (i) permanent migration; mainly for highly skilled migrants, family reunification and refugee settlement; (ii) temporary migration for employment, for migrants to take up all kinds of employment, to fill vacant posts, such as nursing positions or "guestworkers" and (iii) temporary migration for time-bound employment.

Migration of health professionals is often referred to as "brain drain" which can occur if emigration of tertiary educated persons for permanent or long-stays abroad reaches significant levels and is not offset by the feedback effect of remittances, technology transfer, investments or trade. Brain drain reduces economic growth through unrecompensed investments in education and depletion of source country's human capital assets (Lowell and Findlay, 2001: 6)

What makes health workers migrate? This question can be addressed using the set of literature on migration, and in particular in various theories or concepts of migration. Scholars tend to concede that economic considerations play a central role in the decision of an individual to migrate or stay. Therefore, this paper aims to identify and analyse potential migration push and pull factors. Economic theories understand migration as an investment in human capital; according to neoclassical micro theory, the potential migrant is a *homo oeconomicus* who makes an (economically) "rational choice" by carrying out a cost-benefit analysis in order to decide whether to migrate or stay in his residence country. The key element in calculating the economic advantage is the level of economic gain that the migrant can achieve. Thus, the neoclassical economic theory has been criticized of unrealistically reducing human beings to rational gain-maximising agents (Krieger et al., 2004: 79-93). There are a number of problems connected to the rational choice model. The first one is how exactly to calculate the net migration result? First this is difficult enough with the anticipated genuinely monetary costs, about which there may not be sufficient information available, and which anyway include a future-directed anticipation element which is based on expectations and extrapolations rather than safe knowledge (Kalo and Wächter 2004: 21) Second, how can non monetary incentives be quantified?

The potential benefits of studying human resource policies and practices from a comparative perspective have been recognized by both academics and practitioners (Clark et al. 2000). The international movement of health professionals is not a recent phenomenon: during the 1950s concerns were expressed about the so called “brain drain” of British medical graduates seeking employment in countries like the US, Canada or Australia. Migration tended either to be of graduate doctors from a developed country to another, or of physicians trained in developing countries and emigrating to practice in an advanced economy. The main assumption was that this phenomenon should be temporary; physicians were likely to return home following the acquisition of new skills in countries with better resourced health care systems. However, the pull factors of higher salaries, better working conditions, career prospects, as well as the setting down of the family roots (Hooper, 2008) determined health personnel to work abroad. Nevertheless, the push factors such as poor working facilities, low standards of living, the level of professional development, professional prestige or long term career opportunities. Witt (2009) argues that push factors are more significant in determining health professionals practice medicine abroad. The brain drain literature has debated whether it is attributable to the aggregation of many individual decisions to leave or, to wider structural forces (Gatrell, 2011: 170). There are two main questions which can be raised. On one hand, should national governments in the CEE region deny specialized citizens the right to seek advanced in resource rich countries? And, on the other side, why should tax-payers in poor countries help to train a doctor who then seeks employment abroad?

International migration is recognized as an important mechanism for globalization; between 1990 and 2005, the number of individuals living outside of their country of birth increased from 154 to 190 million, reaching a level equivalent to 3% of the world population (United Nations, 2005). In 1978, the World Health Organization (WHO) first published data on the global migration of health professionals. The migration patterns and the extent of migration of the health care professionals from the developing countries to the developed countries has been analysed by different scholars (Martineau, Decker, and Dundred 2002: 16, Buchan, Parkin, and Scholaski 2003). In the academic literature, there is ambivalence about migration, reflected in a dissensus on global migration policy. On one side, labour economists debate whether immigration benefits the receiving countries (Borjas, 1999; Card, 2005) while, on the other side, development economists disagree on whether emigration is good for sending countries (Bhagwati & Hamada, 1974; Stark & Wang, 2002). While there is an enormous literature on the consequences of immigration for receiving countries and for the United States, in particular, research on impacts on sending countries, as discussed in this paper is less developed; Health professionals’ migration changes a country’s supply of labour, skill mix, and exposure to the global economy. These effects may have important consequences for a sending country’s aggregate output, structure of wages and the health care systems’ sustainability.

3. Methodology

How to ensure the comparability of research results? Variations between Central and Eastern European countries (in institutional settings, types of health system and organizational peculiarities, for example) do not allow direct comparison? The exploratory study uses information about migration flows, international regulation and policies governing physician migration derived from two questionnaires elaborated by OECD and a secondary analysis of EUROSTAT Labour Force Surveys, as well as literature review and official policy documents of CEE countries. In order to analyse migration flows

effects on health systems performance I conducted a desk research of relevant literature. The review was not systematic, but it was designed to identify and learn from the experiences of CEE countries with respect to the impact, regulation and health policy implications of international migration of health professionals. The following electronic databases were searched: EMBASE, HealthSTAR, MEDLINE, Social Science Citation Index and Health Management Information Consortium. The study used as well data provided from European funded projects which analysed current trends of mobility of health professionals to, from and within the EU: Mobility of Health Professionals (MoHProf)¹ and HEALTH PROMeTHEUS 2009 - 2011². Second, this exploratory study defines health professionals as individuals who were born in a resource country, are citizens and undertook their basic medical training in the resource country.

Set of indicators:

- number of foreign doctors (in whole and by country of origin) and percentage over the total number of physicians in the destination MS where data were available;
- number of doctors registered abroad for each CEE country analysed in the exploratory study;
- *emigration factor* for each European country³

Understanding the phenomenon of migration of health professionals requires documenting migration flows in terms of:

- The numbers of migrants
- The direction of flows
- The characteristics of the migration (temporary or permanent)
- The socio-demographic characteristics of the migrants themselves (Dovlo and Martineau 2004).

3.1 Challenges in measuring health professionals' migration

Migration of health workers is an important part of a broader dynamic of change and mobility within the health care labour markets and it should not be addressed in isolation. Migration of health care professionals has been often treated from the perspective of a one-way linear brain drain without studying the main causes and the possible impact on health systems performance. However, the dynamics of international mobility, migration and recruitment are complex. It covers individuals' rights and choice, health workers' motives and attitudes, governments' different perspectives to managing, facilitating or limiting outflow or inflow of health workers, and recruitment agencies' role as intermediaries in the process (Buchan and Perfilieva, 2004). Four different studies published datasets of stocks of emigrated health workers from a number of countries (Hagopian et al. 2004; Mullan 2005; WHO 2006; Clemens and Pettersson 2008). Each used numbers of health personnel reported in recipient countries to estimate the magnitude of emigration from resource countries; the stock estimates differ substantially across datasets. These discrepancies are due to several factors: First of all, the four datasets used different sources of information on the numbers of foreign physicians in recipient countries, on one side WHO and OECD (OECD 2005, WHO) used national census data,

¹ The Mobility of Health Professionals (MoHProf) policy briefs are available online at: <http://www.mohprof.eu/LIVE/>

² HEALTH PROMeTHEUS 2009 – 2011 project details are available online at: <http://www.ehma.org/index.php?q=node/46>

³ Considered as the relation between doctors practising abroad and the total number of doctors related to that country –practising in it or abroad.

while Mullan (2005) and Hagopian et al. (2004) collected data from health workers' professional organizations. Census data allow comprehensive analyses on the stock of immigrants and their distribution across regions and states. Census data can provide as well detailed information on the migrant profile, such as demographics (age, sex, profession) and socioeconomic characteristics (education, income, sector of activity, etc.), but censuses are unlikely to provide information on migration flows. Secondly, researchers used different sets of recipient countries data. Third, the studies used different definitions of migrant health workers; a migrant worker is defined as a person who was trained in another country (WHO; Mullan; Hagopian), while for Clemens and Pettersson a migrant health professional is one born in another country. Last, datasets estimate stocks of emigrated health professionals for different years. However, these limitations explain why the literature on causes of health professionals' migration is largely descriptive and has no actual input in explaining migration impact on health systems performance.

3.2 Indicators and measurement strategies

Measuring and monitoring health professionals' mobility in the CEE region remains challenging for a number of reasons, including scarcity of the required data (almost no country has reliable data on international out-migration) underuse of available data; lack of disaggregation (information sources often combine transition and exit factors, limiting the ability to estimate separate indices for each indicator) and lack of standardization of measurement techniques. In order to analyse mobility profiles within the CEE region this study uses a set of indicators initially developed by the WHO. However, the evidence needed to monitor and evaluate the phenomenon remains weak; available studies are excessively reliant on: (i) census-based estimates of lifetime migration (by country of birth of individuals practising a health occupation in the destination country at the time of enumeration, regardless of place of education); (ii) registry-based estimates of foreign-trained workers obtaining professional licensure; and (iii) numbers of residency or work permits issued to foreigners according to the self-reported occupation held in their country of origin. Additionally, analysing health professionals' migration flows is made more difficult because of the lack of up-to-date, comparable data and information, for example on numbers of health workers, in training and employment, their specialisations, their geographical spread, age, gender and country of provenience. Therefore in order to make informed policy decisions there is a need to standardising health workforce indicators or setting up systems to monitor flows of health workers.

4. EU Regulations: Policy Framework for the Free Movement of Individuals

4.1. Regulatory framework for the free movement

The Treaty of Rome lays the foundations for the free movement of labour within the European Community.

In view of barriers related to the mobility of health professionals, the Council has issued various Directives regulating the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Free movement of workers is laid down in Article 39 EC and further developed in Regulation 1612/68⁴: it provides the right of EU citizens to work in another Member State as an employee or civil servant. The right of establishment is stated in Article 43 which

⁴ Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community.

provides for the right to work as a self-employed person in another Member State. Article 49 enshrines the right of free provision of services. Regulation 1408/71 and implementing Regulation 574/72⁵ coordinate the various social security schemes in order to facilitate this fundamental right of free movement. Secondly, European Directives (75: 362: EEC and 75: 363: EEC), passed in 1975, aimed to facilitate the entry of doctors into member states other than the ones in which they trained. The objective of the general system is to promote the free movement of persons within the EU by establishing procedures to ensure that individuals wishing to practice a profession in another EU Member State should not have to repeat their training. Host MS cannot refuse access to a regulated professional to a national who is fully qualified for his profession in his Member State. The automatic recognition throughout the Community on the basis of compliance with coordinated minimum training requirements set out in the so-called sectoral Directives⁶. For health and social care professionals whose training requirements are not coordinated, the general system of recognition applies.⁷ Approximation of EC legislation requires that acceding countries shall have to transpose mutual recognition of qualification in the health field, applying to doctors, pharmacists, nurses and midwives. Freedom of establishment⁸ applies when a professional enjoys the effective freedom to become established in another MS in order to conduct a professional activity there on a stable basis.

Key features of the Physicians Directive (93:16: EEC) can be summarized to describe the regulatory framework of physicians free movement in the EU:

- According with citizenship and completion of training, doctors are entitled to register in other MS;
- Member states must recognise as specialists, doctors who meet the above criteria;
- The training was done in one of the 52 specialties listed in the appendix of the directive both for the country of origin and the target country;
- The implementation of vocational training programmes lasting at least 2 years for general practice.
- The establishment of Competent Authorities to supervise training within that MS and to issue certificates to doctors who complete training satisfactorily; and secondly, to issue or verify certificates and diplomas under 93: 16: EEC for doctors entering the member state. Host states are required by the directive to recognise certificates and diplomas issued by other member states.

Europeanising the recognition of diplomas contributed to a certain convergence of certification in health care occupations and improvement in training. However, most

⁵ Council Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community; Council regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of 21 MARCH 1972 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons, to self-employed persons and to their families moving within the Community.

⁶ 477/452 & 453/EEC (OJ L176 of 15.7.77)(nurses); 78/686 & 687/EEC(OJ L233 of 24.8.78) (dentists); 80/154 & 155/EEC (OJ L33 of 11.2.80)(midwives); 85/432 & 433/EEC(OJ L253 of 24.9.85)(pharmacists); and 93/16/EEC(OJ L165 of 7.7.93)(doctors)

⁷ See Directives 89/48/EEC(OJ L189 of 24.1.89) and 92/51/EEC(OJ L209 of 24.7.92)

⁸ Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, available online at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2005L0036:20090427:EN:PDF>, accessed 28 May 2012.

Member States attempt to raise bureaucratic barriers to mobility⁹. This applies both to establishing a business and to providing services in another Member State; the European Commission released a Draft Services Directive against of this practices, which prohibits setting arbitrary requirements for establishing a business or delivering services in another MS. Thus, EU institutions need develop mechanisms and guidelines for supporting “circular migration” of health workers, facilitating health workers to return to support health sector development in their home country after periods of training and career development working in wealthier countries, as well as for constructively engaging health worker diaspora in country level action to overcome the shortage of health workers.¹⁰ The EU is developing common immigration policy which includes approaches to avoid undermining development prospects of third countries through, for example, exacerbating “brain drain”, by instead promoting circular migration. Additionally, the Commission produced a proposal for a Directive to facilitate the admission of highly-qualified migrants into the EU¹¹. Within the 2007 proposal, a clause is focused specifically requiring ethical recruitment in sectors, such as the health sector, experiencing a lack of human resources.

4.2 Role of EU Enlargement

The European Union (EU) enlargements in 2004 and 2007 introduced 100 million citizens from 12 new Member States (EU-12) and have caused substantial expansion of the pool of health professionals within the EU labour market. There is still no comprehensive analysis of mobility trends during the course of enlargement (OECD 2008, Wiskow 2006). Romanian case study was published before accession (Galan 2006). Other reports and case studies cover only the first 12 to 18 months of EU accession in Estonia (Buchan & Pefilieva 2006) and Lithuania (Buchan 2006b). Data and analysis published on Polish nurses include the first quarter of 2007 (Leśniowska 2007, 2008). Surveys to analyse the migration intentions of health care professionals after joining the EU were conducted in Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania (Borzeda *et al.* 2002, Gai auskiene *et al.* 2003). Case studies have been published on Member States that acceded to the EU before 2004, including France (Cash, Ulmann; 2008), Italy (Chaloff; 2008), Germany (Buchan; 2006b), Ireland (Humphries *et al.* 2008) and the United Kingdom (Buchan 2002, 2006a, Buchan & O’May 1999, Jinks *et al.* 2000). Concerning Central and Eastern Europe countries and the impact of EU accession researchers studied migration outflows in the Czech Republic (Angelovski *et al.* 2006), Poland (Leśniowska 2007), Estonia (Buchan & Pefilieva 2006), Lithuania (Buchan 2006b) and Romania (Galan 2006).

5. Workforce Supply: Impact on the Performance of Health Systems

The absence of a robust health workforce in the CEE region operating in stable delivery infrastructures undermines effective domestic health systems and European public health interventions. Most studies have found strong evidence indicative of major and enduring global shortages in nurses and doctors over the next decades (Bach, 2003;

⁹ See the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the state of the internal market for services, Brussels: European Commission; 2002.

¹⁰ Council conclusions on EU Strategy for Action on the Crisis in Human Resources for Health in Developing Countries (GENERAL AFFAIRS and EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting - Luxembourg, 10 April 2006.

¹¹ COM(2007) 637. At the same time, a proposal - COM(2007) 638 - for another directive on a single application procedure and common rights to all legally-resident third-country national workers was adopted.

Joint Learning Initiative, 2004; Liese, Dussault, 2004). The main purpose of the EU health workforce is to develop effective and efficient health systems, with the capacity to improve health and prevent disease due to the fact that health workers in the widest sense constitute 1: 10 of the EU workforce and approximately 70% of healthcare budgets are allocated to salaries and other employment-related charge. The world health report 2000, human resources for health were defined as the stock of all individuals engaged in promoting, protecting or improving the health of populations (Dal Poz et al, 2006).

The intensification of globalization, the health workforce is no longer constrained by domestic supply as a country may directly tap into international labour markets to augment shortages and correct imbalances. To tackle the health workforce crisis, there is a permanent need to increase training capacity, to improve retention and management of the health workforce, to address concerns related to international migration of health workers and better monitor these flows. The consequences for resource countries, including financial and human resource loss directly affect health systems and on long term providing essential public health intervention.

5.1 Health care labour market

Data on the overall size and density of the stock of health workers in different countries in the European Region reveal significant variations. WHO has recently estimated that there are 16.6 million health workers in the European Region, an average of 18.9 per 1000 population. This accounts for about 10% of the working population (nota nr. 26). WHO has also published more detailed estimates, using recent data showing marked variations in the number of health workers per 100 000 population. The density of health workers tends to be highest in EU countries. Therefore, countries with lower densities are the most likely to be exposed to any negative impact of out-migration. However, the magnitude of health workers' role is matched by their role on health spending. WHO estimates that across countries worldwide 50% of total public and private expenditure is spent on health professionals' wages, allowances and salaries (Hernandez et al. 2006). In 2000, health services employment was estimated to account for around 10 per cent of total employment in high-resourced economies and 6% in transition economies in the European region¹².

At the European level there is an intense discussion over developing a health workforce policy for the EU - 27 and policy tools to address a number of challenges facing health systems in Europe. Member States and health authorities have to face the challenge of adapting their healthcare systems to an ageing population. Between 2008 and 2060 the population of the EU-27 aged 65 and over is projected to increase by 66.9 million and the "very old" (80+) will be the fastest growing segment of the population¹³. European Commission's Green Paper on the European workforce for health followed by a consultation process in 2009 organized by the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers Affairs (DG SANCO). Explored three topics: (i) assessing future health workforce needs, (ii) adapting skills and redistribution of tasks, and (iii) creating a supportive working environment to attract motivated health professionals

Conditions under which the EU can respond to health professional mobility:

¹² ILO, 2002. *Statistics of employment in health services* by ILO refer to the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC, Ref. 3, 1990).

¹³ based national population projections, EUROPOP 2008 convergence scenario - European Commission's Green Paper on the European workforce for health.

- very limited potential for imposing such restrictions on EU citizens - free movement of workers is an economic imperative¹⁴
- Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications ensures a high portability of qualifications for medical doctors, nurses and dentists by facilitating an automatic procedure in which qualifications are checked by the conformity of their qualification levels and training periods rather than by individual assessment of the skills and competencies acquired (Peeters et al. 2010).
- EU has a large set of policy instruments (including regulations, directives and decisions) with which to respond to health professional mobility issues.

Table 1. Factors involved in producing migration outcomes in health labour market

	Demand	Domestic supply	Price	Migration
Policy instruments	Level of public expenditure on Health Regulation of content of insurance coverage	Subsidy levels in training (eg, publicly funded places) Quotas Entry requirement to professions	Regulation of prices, wages, and fee levels	Migration controls Entry requirements to professions
Market forces	Private expenditure on health and health insurance	Private investment in training Take-up of available subsidized training places	Price allowed to reflect market conditions	Supply response to vacancy rates, earning potential and effectiveness of migration controls of health workers outside the domestic market

Source: Pond, McPake, 2006: 1452

5.2 Framework for defining health workforce

The health workforce is defined to be all persons, skilled and unskilled, engaged in actions whose primary intent is to enhance the health status of the population. The health workforce includes persons who directly provide health care (prevention, curative and rehabilitative care, ancillary services, medical good provision and public health) as well as administration and support workers who – as a kind of invisible backbone – help the health system function. Both employed and self-employed health workers are included (Hernandez et al., 2006: 2)

Workforce planning is the continuous process of aligning the numbers, skills and competencies of health professionals with the aims, priorities, needs and demands of the health system (WHO, 2011: 57)

Human resources for health (HRH) have long been recognized as “the cornerstone of the [health] sector to produce, deliver, and manage services”. The size and distribution of the health professionals’ mobility is the result of the inflow into, outflow from and circulation of workers between different sectors (public or private), industries (health services or other), regions (rural or urban), countries or statuses (employed, unemployed or inactive) (Dal Poz, Gupta, et. al., 2004: 25). The major research focus on the health care workforce in the 1960s and 1970s was on models

¹⁴ This freedom of movement applies to the European Economic Area (EEA), which includes the EU-27 Member States and three European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Switzerland is a member of the EFTA but not of the EEA and has a separate bilateral agreement on mobility with the EU.

to predict future staffing needs, based on shortages of specific types of health workers in developed countries and by reports from socialist countries that health manpower planning could aid health policy strategies in order to ensure adequate supply of health workers.¹⁵ In the 90s, the research shifted to the study of health workers' effects on allocative and technical efficiency in health systems; recent studies are centred on analysing health professionals as a resource in addressing population health goals or explaining shortages in so-called medically underserved areas¹⁶ (Bloom, Bärnighausen, 2011: 503). In the past decade professionals' migration was a common topic of editorials, policy reports or academic publications.

Table 2. Health workforce framework

Individual's training, occupation & place of work	Working in the health industry	Working in a non-health industry or unemployed/inactive
Training in health and employed in a health occupation	For example, physicians, nurses, midwives working in health-care facilities	For example, nurses working for private companies, pharmacists working at retail outlets
Training in health but not employed in a health occupation	For example, medically trained managers of health-care facilities	For example, medically trained university lecturers, unemployed nurses
Training in a non-health field or no formal training	For example, economists, clerks, gardeners working in health-care facilities	For example, primary school teachers, garage mechanics, bank accountants

Source: Dal Poz, Gupta, et. al. 2009 : 14

6. Cross-Border Mobility of Health Professionals: Empirical Evidence

What are the scale and characteristics of health professional mobility in the Central and Eastern European countries? The net inflow of migrants to the EU in 2000 was 680 000 or 2.2 per 1000 population after the enlargement in 2004 and 2007. The income gap between acceding countries in Central and Eastern Europe and existing Member States was estimated at 60%, which was much higher than for the previous enlargement of the EU (Krieger, 2004). Why do some health professionals leave their country but others stay or return? The OECD (2008) has looked into these motivations and some studies focus on migrants from third countries (Nichols & Campbell 2010a, 2010b). The framework of the European NEXT-Study has included extensive research on intention to leave the profession and another study has explored young doctors' willingness to work in rural areas (Girasek et al. 2010)¹⁷. The basic methodology is the country case study because impacts, inflows, outflows and policy responses are hugely influenced by country context.

7.1 The factors influencing health workers migration decision: Flow analysis

What is the magnitude of actual flows from and to countries? Demographic pressure and demand for skilled professionals in advanced economies in the Western Europe are the primary drivers behind flows. This current situation exemplifies what King


¹⁵ This approaches are analysed in the 1978 WHO handbook of health manpower planning by Hall and Mejia (1978) and recent reviews used as well categorization of planning perspectives (Markham, Birch: 1997; Dreesch et al. 2005)

¹⁶ A medically underserved area can be defined as an region where the number of health workers falls below the target, such targets can be used on need, demand and supply criteria.

¹⁷ Nurses' Early Exit Study (<http://www.next.uni-wuppertal.de/EN/index.php?next-study>, accessed 13 May 2012).

(2002) has referred to as a “polarisation of migration flows” in Europe. Flow is defined as the actual number of health professionals entering or leaving a country in a given year. (WHO, 2011: 25). It can also be measured in percentages as the share of foreign health professionals newly entering the health system relative to all new entrants, providing an up-to-date estimation of yearly intakes to the system. Likewise, outflows can be calculated by total numbers or the numbers of health professionals leaving the country as a proportion of the total workforce. Thus, flow analysis captures the dynamic of health professional mobility, quantifying the phenomenon by counting the numbers of health professionals leaving and entering countries.

Figure 1: The stock flow model



Source: Buchan, Seccombe

7.2 Push and pull factors

Push factors relate to the country of origin and consist of adverse conditions (financial and other), which the individual is subject to. Pull factors relate to attractive conditions in the country of destination. Push factors come into play when the adverse conditions in the country of origin are greater than in the destination country.

Pull factors presuppose that the relationship in terms of positive and negative conditions between the country of origin and destination is the other way round.

Table 3: Main push and pull factors in the migration and international recruitment of health professionals

Push Factors	Pull factors
<i>Low pay (absolute and/or relative)</i>	Higher pay
<i>Economic instability</i>	
<i>Poor working conditions</i>	Better working conditions
<i>Lack of resources to work effectively</i>	
<i>Limited career opportunities</i>	Career opportunities
<i>Low level of professional development</i>	Professional development
<i>Low social recognition of the profession</i>	Respect and recognition of the profession
<i>Limited educational opportunities</i>	Provision of post-basic education
<i>Better quality of life abroad</i>	

Source: author’s adaptation

7. Mobility Profiles in Central and Eastern Europe

7.1. Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic there is scarce information, knowledge or evidence available on migration and mobility intentions of health professionals. The only source of information is the Czech Medical Chamber, which issues certificates of professional integrity for doctors for migration intentions. In 1999, there were 228,667 people working in health care, 55 % in state health establishments and 45 % in the non-state sector. There were 36,854 full-time physician contracts, of which 57 % worked in private health establishments. The health system employs

104,489 paramedics and of these 37 % worked in private health care and 7.4% in non-state establishments controlled by city or municipal authorities. There were 6,161 unskilled personnel (3.6 per cent of the workforce) and 15,401 auxiliary health personnel (8.9 % of the workforce). Nurses constituted 75% of the paramedical workforce. Of the total workforce, 49.2 % (112,412 employees) were employed in hospitals, including outpatient departments. Independent outpatient establishments employed 55,421 employees, 24.2 % of the total workforce. The main destinations for migration of Czech health professionals are Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. The push factors which facilitate migration of health workers are differences in salary of doctors and other professions, expectation of a better life or better working conditions. However, Czech entry into the European Union did not have a dramatic impact on migrating physicians or other health workers (Marečková, 2004).

7.2 Hungary

The data available on cross-border movements since May 2004 indicate that Hungary has become a source country, primarily for western EU Member States and then for non-European countries, mainly the US. Hungary lacks 2200 physicians, according to the figures from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (data from 2006), although the total number per population is not much below the EU average (280.63 and 315.22 per 100 000 inhabitants)¹⁸. 8% of the approximately 36,000 licensed doctors are from other countries, principally Hungarian-speaking minorities of Romania, Serbia and Ukraine. A significant number of Hungarian doctors are practising abroad, principally in the US, the UK, Germany, Austria or Italy. In the recent years, over a thousand doctors requested information about the documentation necessary to practise in other MS while there are an estimated 2,400 vacancies for doctors in the country (García-Pérez et al. 2007: 3). In some regions, geographical and professional, the shortage is so severe that the security and sustainability of medical services is threatened.

For instance, 162 (out of 6801) family practitioner posts in Hungary are unfilled, and in small villages these often become long-term vacancies.

Table 4: Health professionals resident in Hungary as proportions of all health professionals applying for certification – 2004- 2008

Year	Medical doctors resident in Hungary %	All medical doctors
2004 (May- Dec.)	504 (56%)	906
2005	604 (68%)	889
2006	520 (72%)	721
2007	590 (85%)	695
2008	730 (91%)	803

Source: HEALTH PROMeTHEUS, 2011: 370

Do to the lack of accurate data it is challenging to estimate the inflow dimension of health professionals' migration. Between 2004 and 2008, a total of 639 foreign medical doctors, 1585 foreign nurses and 82 foreign dentists registered to practise in Hungary (Wismar et al., 2011: 317). A particular detail should be emphasized, Hungarian minorities, mainly coming from Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine, have applied for different

¹⁸ The number of doctors that are lacking was calculated by the difference between the filled jobs and unfilled vacancies. According with data provided by Hungarian Central Statistical Office: *Yearbook of Health Statistics 2006*, Budapest: Hungarian Central Statistical Office; 2007.

health workers positions in order to practise in Hungary: 1297 medical doctors came from Romania (70% primary care, 54% specialist care) and Ukraine (16% primary care, 15% specialist care). Still, data show that Hungary is primarily a source country, rather than a destination country. For instance in 2008, the number of inflowing doctors (OHAAP¹⁹ recognized 64 foreign medical diplomas) was lower than the estimated outflow (730 Hungarian-resident medical doctors requested certificates) (Wismar et al., 2011: 376).

Hungarian government has not developed yet retention policies or strategies to attract foreign health professionals; in 2009 a new system of postgraduate medical training was introduced as a public policy response to migration of medical doctors. In combination with different factors, such as the aging of the health workforce the shortages of health professionals impact in different degrees according to the level of care or geographical distribution. Nevertheless, the health workforce has been affected by the ongoing transformations of the Hungarian health care system, for example, in 2007 the Ministry of Health decided to cut in the number of hospital beds (concerning about 10% of the hospital sector) over a period of a few months. This measure indicates that around 6000 people (1100 medical doctors and; 4500 allied health personnel, mainly nurses) lost their jobs (Wismar et al., 2011: 385). Previous studies on professional expectations show that the main motivations for health professionals' migration are low levels of salaries, the quality of life, the situation of the Hungarian health system and the working environment (Eke et al. 2006, 2008)

7.3. Poland

Regarding the supply of health professionals, in comparison to other EU countries, Poland has significantly lower indices of physicians and nurses per 100.000 population. According to WHO data, in 2006 there were 320.55 physicians per 100 000 inhabitants in all EU countries. In the same year this index in Poland accounted for 203.18 physicians. In EU-15 the respective index was even higher than in all EU countries and reached 337.82 physicians per 100 000 inhabitants. Data provided by the Polish Ministry of Health show that in the registers of licensed medical professionals of 2008 there were 131.4 thousand of physicians, 36.1 thousand of dentists and 275.1 thousand of nurses and 33.3 thousand of midwives. Out of these numbers 78 thousand of physicians (59%), 12.7 thousand of dentists (35%), 183 thousand of nurses (including university graduates; 67%) and 21.8 thousand of midwives (including university graduates; 65%) were working directly with patients in particular units of health care system (MoHprof -National profile of migration of health professionals - Poland).As determined by the preliminary outcomes of quantitative research conducted by the Centre of Migration Research,devoted to mobility of Polish health professionals, the main destination countries of Polish physicians wereGreat Britain (35% of total number of people who left Poland), Germany (14%), Spain (13%), Sweden (12%), Ireland, US and Norway. The UK seems to be attractive destination for doctors of all specialisations. Nearly one third of anaesthesiologists, who were registered in the study, immigrated to Spain. The Polish Ministry of Health, the authority responsible for issuing qualification confirmations for so called “regulated medical occupations” issued altogether 1535 confirmations, including 1093 for physiotherapists (MoHprof -National profile of migration of health professionals - Poland). Other regulated medical professions include: dentist assistants, laboratory diagnostics, dieticians, dentist sanitarians, school sanitarians, speech and language pathologists, massage specialists, children carers, optometrists, opticians, audiofonologists, medical rescuers, behavioural

¹⁹ Hungarian Office of Health Authorisation and Administrative Procedures

therapists, dentist technicians, ECG technicians, pharmacy technicians and orthopaedic technicians. Regarding the inflow of health professionals, the newest data on work permits issued for foreign medical workers in Poland, in 2010 there were 76 work permits issued for medical professionals, which includes work permits for 20 physicians and 2 nurses. The number of work permits decreased comparing to previous years: in 2009 its total number accounted for 177 and contained 72 work permits issued to physicians and 3 for nurses (MoHprof -National profile of migration of health professionals - Poland). According to the Polish Chamber of Physicians and Dentists, in March 2011, there were 291 doctors and dentists originating from EU countries working in Poland (111 dentists, 180 doctors). Most of them came from Germany (92), Latvia (44), Sweden (34) and Czech Republic (29). There were also 712 doctors and dentists originating from third countries. Health personnel came from Ukraine (323), Belarus (84), Russia (57), Syria (52) and Mongolia (35)

Table 5: Practising medical doctors and certifications of professional qualifications issued in Poland, 2005–2008

	2005	2006	2007	Dec. 2007	2008
Registered medical doctors	116 847	118 475	116 160	117 240	116 492
Certificates issued (cumulated)	3 579	5 114	6 237	6 724	7 138
Change on previous period (%)	-	(42.9)	(22.0)	(7.8)	(6.2)
Cumulated certificates as proportion of registered medical doctors (%)	(3.0)	(4.3)	(5.4)	(5.7)	(6.1)
Practising medical doctors in Poland (at 31 Dec.)	80 315	Na	Na	81 932	na

Source: HEALTH PROMeTHEUS, 2011: 423

Note: na - no data available

In Poland the health mobility phenomenon generally means emigration; data available show that most of health personnel emigrated to Germany, the UK and the Scandinavian countries. Nevertheless, the various mobility practices such as short-term work cycles, remigration or weekend work, make migration a mixed phenomenon. Poland accession into the EU has opened up a series of new opportunities for health professionals and it has had a great impact on the migration of Polish medical workers. Data show that 3% (3579) of Poland's 116 847 practising medical doctors collected the certifications required to seek jobs in other MS within the first year of EU accession. Moreover, the following years, the proportion of certifications issued to practicing medical doctors increased annually by an average of 1.2%. At the end of 2008, the proportion of total certifications issued reached 6.1%. All in all, it is difficult to make an appraisal of the exact impact of health personnel mobility on the Polish health system due to the lack of official reports. Clearly, emigration contributes to staffing shortages in small towns where country (*poviat*) hospitals experience problems in employing the appropriate number of doctors.

7.4. Slovakia

Analysing mobility trends in Slovakia is a difficult task, due to the fact that Slovak authorities do not have detailed information on, or comprehensive assessments of, the exact extent and structure of labour emigration flows nor of their impacts on the country's labour market. The dynamics of the enlargement put a lot of pressure on the labour market, between 2000 and 2006, the number of Slovak nationals working abroad increased from 49 300 to 168 800 (Divinský 2007). Medical professionals working in Slovakia in 2007 comprised 34 040 active nurses, 16 201 active medical doctors and 2697 active dental doctors (HEALTH PROMeTHEUS, 2011: 482). After May 2004 Slovak health professionals applied for the

equivalency of education confirmations required to perform a health profession in other EU Member States. Health workers were seeking positions in Austria, the Czech Republic, the U.K and Germany. According to a study focused on emigration motivations most nurses (40.9%; 728) declared an intention to migrate to Austria; most medical doctors chose Germany (21.8%; 300) or the United Kingdom (17.1%; 235) (Beňušová 2007). Slovak Health Ministry seems to underestimate the dimension and the magnitude of the outflows of health professionals' mobility, for instance, is likely than more than 3243 reported health professionals reported by the official statistics have left Slovakia between January 2005 and December 2006. This assumption is validated by the Slovak Health University how issued 311 equivalence confirmations of specialization for medical doctors. There are no data available on the current inflows and stocks of foreign health workers, but data from 2007 show that inflows were minimal: of the 125 foreign doctors 68 (54%) came from EU countries and 57(46%) came from third countries (HEALTH PROMeTHEUS, 2011: 485). Notwithstanding the limitation of existing statistics on health professionals' migration in Slovakia, I can argue that outflows are not balanced by inflows. a total of 3741 health professionals emigrated between 2004 - 2007, an annual average of 1247 (Beňušová 2007)²⁰; however, only 171 foreign health professionals were working in Slovakia in 2007. Over the last years Slovak Government has implemented different interventions to manage health professionals' migration.

The main retention policies were focused on the modernization of health-care facilities and increasing remuneration levels. Slovakia is as well the beneficiary of EU funded Programme - ERDF's Operational Programme Health - over € 250 million were invested in increasing technical capacity, creating new health care facilities, thus it is not possible to evaluate the its impact on the professional migration until the modernization process is complete. The programme aims as well to balance the regional differences in available health workforce capacities in Slovakia; training is provided on the condition that enrolled medical workers will stay and practice in the country at least one year after the graduation. Another important retention measure was to increase health professionals' salaries, these measures were taken after strikes among the health workforce. Therefore the wage of health professionals was increased by 181.6% of the average monthly salary in Slovakia in 2005 but had risen to 214.7% by 2009.

7.5. Slovenia

Slovenia is an interesting study case due to the fact that it has been a destination country for health professionals from the former Yugoslavia, almost 80% of the health professionals came resource countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia changed the dynamics of health workforce. According to Wismar et al (Wismar et. all, 2011: 511) three main factors allowed considerable inflows: a chronic shortage of health professionals, the numerous opportunities for medical and dental graduates that resulted from these shortages, and an expanding health-care sector at a time of significant limitations in several other countries of the former Yugoslavia.

Regarding outflows trends, there are not reliable data on the number of health professionals leaving Slovenia to practice abroad, the estimation can be made only by using proxy data. The largest outflows of health personnel happened in 2002 and 2005, around 1% of all medical doctors and dentists submitted requests for bona fide statements to the Slovene Ministry of Health in the period 1999–2007 (Wismar et al., 2011: 517). Data from the

²⁰ Beňušová K (2007). *Impact of EU directives on regulation of the nursing profession*. [Thesis]. Trnava University in Trnava, Faculty of Health and Social Work, Department of Nursing, Physiotherapy and Clinical Disciplines.

destination countries² show a general growth in the numbers of Slovene medical doctors emigrating to Austria (4 in 2003, 10 in 2007), Germany (11 in 2003, 28 in 2007), Italy (0 in 2003, 6 in 2007) and the United Kingdom (8 in 2003, 19 in 2007) (Wismar et al., 2011: 519). The main motivation for the foreign-trained health professionals seeking a job in Slovenia are the financial ones. A specialist's average monthly salary was €1200 in Croatia and reached €750 in the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in Slovenia specialist's net monthly salary is between €1600 and €3000 (Wismar et al., 2011: 528).

Table 6: Foreign-trained medical doctors in Slovenia

	1992	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Foreign-trained medical doctors	608	1225	1293	1335	1407	1450	1497
All active medical doctors	3486	6045	6240	6370	6525	6502	6642
Foreign-trained medical doctors in all active medical doctors (%)	17.4	20.3	20.7	21.0	21.6	22.3	22.5

Source: Wismar et al., 2011: 514

7.6 Romania

Romania can be described as a mainly as source country for health professionals with a poor planning and management of the health workforce. Romanian Ministry of Health and other institutional bodies do not provide accurate information about the magnitude of inflows and outflows of health professionals. Up to the date decision makers did not elaborate strategies and retention policies in order to prevent and control health workers mobility. Nevertheless, additional disincentives for health professionals were introduced in 2010, including a 25% salary decrease and reductions in staff and there is no monitoring system on health professional mobility. Since 2007, when Romania joined the EU, all medical doctors (including dentists), nurses and midwives applying to the Ministry of Health have been issued with certificates of diploma recognition based on a preliminary verification. Even if 1421 of the 4990 medical doctors who requested verification certificates in 2007 actually emigrated less than a third (28.4%) (Dragomiristeanu et al. 2008, Ministry of Health 2008).

Table 7: Practising medical doctors applying for diploma verification to work in EU Member States, 2007–2009

	Total	% of practising medical doctors
2007	4990	10.2
2008 and (Jan.–May) 2009	2683	

Source: Wismar et al., 2011: 452

About 3% (1421) of the total number of practising medical doctors left Romania in 2007 and more than 90% of these requested CGSs for EU Member States (Dragomiristeanu et al. 2008). France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom appear to be the favoured destination countries – a finding supported by the high numbers reported from these destination countries. National Centre for Organising and Ensuring the Health Information System (NCOEHIS) carried out another special study concerning the emigration of health professionals, data show that 360 Romanian medical doctors left the country in 2004 (Pertache & Ursuleanu 2006).

Table 8. Romanian regions and declared destination countries of medical doctors applying for CGSs, 2007

Region	Practising Medical doctors	CGS applicant medical doctors	Declared destination countries in order of popularity	
Total		%		
North-east	6 407	321	5.0	United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Australia, Israel, Sweden, Portugal, United States, Netherlands, Spain, Ireland
Iasi district	2 021	256	12.7	Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom, Australia, Israel, Italy, Sweden, Portugal, United States, Netherlands, Spain
South-east	4 414	65	1.5	France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada, Pakistan, Sweden, Belgium, Australia
South-Muntenia	5 112	45	0.9	France, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Belgium, Ireland
South-west Oltenia	4 402	48	1.1	France, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Canada, Sweden, Middle East
West	5 501	184	3.3	United Kingdom, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Canada, United States, Spain
North-west	6 413	170	2.7	France, United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Spain, Canada, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands
Centre	5 461	88		United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Ireland, United States, Belgium, Luxembourg
Bucharest-Ilfov	12 720	500	3.9	
Bucharest	12 481	494	3.9	South Africa, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Switzerland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Monaco, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, United States, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden
Total	50 430	1 421	2.8	

Source: Dragomiristeanu et al. 2008.

However in Romania, there is little evidence that health workforce mobility impacts on the functions of a health system set out in the World Health Report 2000 such as service delivery, resource generation or financing (WHO, 2000).

Table 9. Health professionals per 100 000 inhabitants, Romania and EU, 2000–2007

Year	Medical doctors		Family doctors	Dentists		Nurses	
	RO	EU	RO	RO	EU	RO	EU
2000	204	307	51	37	56	402	671
2002	210	316	52	41	57	418	699
2004	222	321	53	46	58	400	726
2006	217	321	54	49	60	397	746
2007	224	322	54	54	Na	Na	na

Sources: WHO 2009, a Ministry of Health 2008.

Notes: No comparable EU data for family doctors; na: No data available.

Most health professionals (especially medical doctors) are concentrated in the big university cities. The situation related to primary care professionals is also alarming. An NCOEHIS study (Pertache and Ursuleanu, 2006) shows a critical situation concerning the coverage of the rural population as well as large disparities between the administrative regions of Romania – 98 rural localities had no family doctor in 2005, while no urban locality experienced this problem.

Table 10. Coverage of medical doctors by development regions and residence in Romania, 2005

Region	Inhabitants per medical doctor			Medical doctors per 100 000 population		
	Urban	Rural		Region	Urban	Rural
National average	450	278	1768	222.2	358.3	56.6
North-east	564	286	2778	177.2	349.6	43.9
South-east	655	426	1982	152.6	234.5	50.5
South	773	430	1773	127.3	232.4	56.4
South-west	514	295	1536	194.6	339.2	65.1
West	367	260	1316	272.4	384.5	75.9
North-west	407	240	1770	245.9	415.5	56.5
Centre	465	313	1732	214.9	319.5	57.7
Bucharest-Ilfov	203	188	972	492.5	532.8	102.9

Source: Pertache, Ursuleanu 2006.

After Romania joined the EU in 2007, the Romania has become the most important source country for nurses in Italy with 8497 nurses, representing 25% of foreign registered nurses in Italy (Wismar et al., 2011: 459) Nevertheless, by 2008, Romanian doctors represented 40% of the foreign medical doctors registered with the French medical chamber. Thus, comparing the existing inflow data we can observe that in 2004, 260 doctors applied for the mutual recognition of diplomas, in 2007, 1421, and in 2008, 1252²¹. It can be argued that the EU accession endorsed health professionals' decision to practice abroad.

A survey done by the National College of Physicians²² in 2007 shows that: First, the main two reasons of dissatisfaction related to medical doctors' daily activity are: lack of resources (especially modern medical equipment) and limited career opportunities. Secondly, the reasons for preferring to work abroad were: the low level of wages in the Romanian health care system (55%) and poor working conditions (40%) Thirdly, physicians are also dissatisfied with the level of health system financing (48%) and health system

²¹ Figures from Dragomiristeanu et al. 2008, Pertache and Ursuleanu, 2006 studies.

²² Data available online at http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/hmr_expert_meeting_galan.pdf, accessed 12 June 2012.

organization (40%). Overall, high annual loss of health workforce is determined by unsatisfactory the low level of salaries, the lack of performance recognition, limited career opportunities and last but not least wide discrepancies between the levels of competence and working conditions

8. CONCLUSIONS

8.1. Effects of health professionals' migration

What are the (positive or negative) impacts on the performance of health systems that result from mobility flows? Cross-border migration of health professionals directly affects the health system, and in consequence also affects population health outcomes and health workers remaining in the resource countries. Mutizwa-Mangiza argues that those health workers who remain in public health systems are ill-motivated, experience workload, but also because they are poorly paid, poorly equipped, inadequately supervised and informed and have limited career opportunities. Moreover, migration threatens the functioning of the health system, mostly because health systems depend on a balanced mix of professional skills, appropriately deployed, for equitable coverage. Losing part of the professional mix in the health workforce may result in either an absence of some services or in professionals' having to adapt their roles to deliver services commonly outside their scope of practice (Stilwell et al., 2003: 5). The lack of data makes it difficult to empirically assess the impact of health professionals' migration on health systems. The impact of health professional mobility will be analysed in terms of the four functions in order to identify whether and at what level mobility has repercussions for health systems (WHO, 2011: 48).

Table 11: Emigration factor for the CEE countries

Country	Physicians in the country ²³	Physicians registered in other countries		
		Total	Only in other MS	Emigration factor
<i>Romania</i>	42,538	4,397	1,523	9.4%
<i>Hungary</i>	32,877	2,461	1,043	7.0%
<i>Czech Republic</i>	35,960	1,809	900	4.8%
<i>Poland</i>	95,272	6,568	3,130	6.4%
<i>Slovenia</i>	4,475	44	44	1.0%
<i>Slovakia</i>	17,172	888	888	4.9%

Source: WHO, 2006 ; García-Pérez et al. 2007, author adaptation

**Emigration factor the relation between national (national-trained) doctors practising abroad and the total number of doctors related to that country -practising in it or abroad (García-Pérez et al. 2007: 6)*

Buchan's (2008) categorization of cross- border instruments and tools for managing health professional mobility (Table 12) provides a very useful starting point for further retention policies and governmental interventions.

Table 12: Policy and regulatory interventions

<i>Cross-border instruments and tools for steering and managing health professional mobility</i>	
Instrument/tool	Description
Twinning	Links developed by health care organizations in source and destination countries based on staff exchanges, staff support and flow of resources to source country

²³ WHO estimation of number of physicians in the respective country.

Staff exchange	Structured temporary move of staff to another organization, based on career and personal development opportunities or organizational development
Educational support	Educators and/or educational resources and/or funding in temporary move from destination to source organization
Compensation	Destination country provides some type of compensation to source country in recompense for the impact of active recruitment (much discussed but little evidence in practice)
Training for international recruitment	Government or private sector makes explicit decision to develop a training infrastructure to train health professionals for employment in other countries in order to generate remittances or fees
International code	Code of ethics on international recruitment. The best known codes are those from the United Kingdom (introduced 2001) and the WHO Global Code (adopted 2010).

Source: Adapted from Buchan 2008, WHO, 2011

8.2 Good practices: Cross-border health workforce frameworks

Partnerships are essential in addressing health workforce challenges in the EU. A sustainable health workforce depends on the recruitment of young people into the health professions and on the retention of qualified experienced staff in a highly competitive global labour market. Countries can develop interventions to manage migration of health workers. First, one option is bilateral agreement between Member States and second, code of practices in the field of international recruiting of health professionals. Whatever the source of any framework or code, its effectiveness is based on the extent of its content, compliance and coverage. In order to be effective, a code should contain practical details to guide international recruitment, cover all relevant health professionals and countries and include cross-border monitoring mechanisms and possible penalties for non-compliance.

The United Kingdom reports the highest level of in-flow. A recent OECD report (Simoens & Hurst, 2006) noted that migrant doctors in the UK come from a broad range of countries, most notably India and Ireland, but also from a range of European countries such as Germany, Greece, Poland, Spain and Ukraine. About one in three physicians in the NHS is from another country. This is a result of an explicit policy of international recruitment, based on bilateral agreements (for example, an agreement with Spain on nurse recruitment). Another example is Germany where there is a rising trend of recruiting physicians from Poland, with which Germany shares a border and some indication of increased out-flow to the UK. The federal and devolved structure within Germany makes it difficult to generate an accurate national picture; data suggest that 6-7% of physicians are from other countries, and recruitment activity has been noted in eastern Germany. OECD notes that 27% of foreign doctors in Germany are from other EU countries, 37% are from other European countries, and 35.5% are from outside Europe (Simoens and Hurst, 2006).

In 2001, the United Kingdom introduced a code of conduct for international recruitment aiming to prevent recruitment from countries with workforce shortages. Bilateral agreements are the most commonly used cross-border framework. In 1990, a Belgian university signed an agreement allowing Romanian third- or fourth-year medical students at a Romanian university to spend one to three years of their specialization in one of its hospitals. By 2009, some 450 Romanian interns had taken part in the programme (WHO, 2011: 60). General workforce measures included in this study are those that facilitate retention and avoid attrition of health professionals and, to this end, aim to improve working conditions and the working environment. A large number of general workforce measures have been implemented. Salary increases for health professionals,

especially doctors, were reported in Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia and (locally) for Hungary. The memorandum on salary levels signed between the Lithuanian Ministry of Health and the medical associations in 2005 was a particularly important measure. Increasing salaries (20% annually for medical doctors and nurses during 2005–2008) is likely to have had positive effects on high dropout rates from medical studies, attrition to other better paid professions and on emigration rates.

In order to improve health workforce planning the European Commission (DG SANCO) put in place a joint action on health workforce planning²⁴. The general objective of the joint action is to put in practice a platform for collaboration of MSs in Europe to better prepare the future of the health workforce. This platform will support MSs and Europe to take effective and sustainable measures in view of the expected shortage of health workforce on European and national level. Such a platform will enable MSs to: develop and reinforce health workforce forecasting and planning capacity in MSs, share and benchmark practices, results, knowledge and expertise from MSs at an European level, support evidence based decision making in MSs and at an European level, meet current and future challenges in health care by taking into account demand and supply and aim at sustainability of health systems. The European Commission adopted a Communication “towards a job rich recovery” on 18 April 2012. This “employment package” responds to the political message from the 2012 Spring European Council for the EU to adopt a coherent and coordinated approach to meet the Europe 2020 targets for employment. The health care sector will remain a key driver for providing jobs in the years to come with an estimated 8 million job openings between 2010 - 2020.

The Commission has included an action plan for the EU health workforce as part of this “employment package” which will assist Member State to tackle the challenges facing the health workforce and to support job creation in the medium to long term. The action plan sets out a number of concrete initiatives to promote European cooperation in four core areas. First to improve workforce planning and forecasting; the Commission will launch the earlier mentioned joint action on workforce planning and forecasting which will create a European partnership with Member States and stakeholders to share good practice on planning and forecasting methodologies. Second: Anticipation of future skill needs. Continuous professional development (CPD) and lifelong learning programmes need to adjust to the new skill needs and provide the necessary training to equip healthcare workers with right skills throughout their career. Third: Share good practice to improve recruitment and retention rates of health professionals. The EU action plan highlights the agreements of the European Social Dialogue in the hospital and healthcare sector to improve recruitment and retention. Fourth: Addressing ethical recruitment of health professionals. DG SANCO plans as well to develop a common approach to the WHO code on the international recruitment of health personnel which will take into account the agreement of the social partners on the ethical cross-border recruitment and retention in the hospital sector.

Final remarks

This exploratory study outlined the key features of the health professionals’ mobility patterns in six Central and Eastern European countries; the magnitude of health professional mobility is an important phenomenon CEE region in terms of inflows and

²⁴The presentation of the Joint Action on health workforce planning is available online at:http://ec.europa.eu/eahc/documents/news/Workshop_on_JA_56_12_2011_Presentations/5_12_2011/JA_2012_SANCO/4_B_Lengyel_JA_workforce.pdf

migration effects on the performance of health care systems. The major limitation of the preset study is the limited number of time series data about health workers mobility across countries and within countries for different health professions. The EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 made the situation even more difficult: CEEC health workers joined the mobile health workforce. However, it is too soon to draw conclusions on the effects of EU enlargement on health mobility profiles and tendencies. Recently data from Estonia, Hungary and Romania point to a new surge in outflows, presumably related to the global economic downturn (Wismar et al., 2011: 74).

First, it is important to note that Central and Eastern European outflows started well before accession following the political transformations that took place in various parts of the region. Second, data on push and pull factors show that the main motivations for health professionals' migration are the financial ones, money is an important aspect but only one among many factors that determine job satisfaction and willingness to stay or seek for alternative options at home or abroad. In order to assess the health workers migration impact on the performance of health care systems further analysis is needed, which can include qualitative analysis based on expert interviews and cross-national comparisons. The research must include in-depth analysis of how mobility contributes to shortages concerning the size, skill-mix and geographical distribution of the health workforce, workforce and population ageing, attrition and/or underproduction of new health professionals in source and resource countries. Figures about certain types of mobility that may be on the rise in the EU such as short-term mobility, returning migrants, weekend work and dual practice, undocumented workers or commuting and training periods abroad are not available

The study shows as well that Central and Eastern European MS must improve workforce strategies and build on retention policies, raising the domestic supply of health workers and elaborate public policies in order to optimize health workers skills and their input within the health systems. In forecasting and planning a need based health workforce governments have to take into account different aspects such as recruiting, educating, distributing, retaining, motivating and managing the health workforce.

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V. EUROPEAN ZONE: SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE

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AS THE POPULATION CLOCK WINDS DOWN OR SPEEDS UP? DEMOGRAPHIC STORIES: APOCALYPTIC, OPPORTUNISTIC AND REALISTIC

*Dragos Lucian IVAN**

Abstract. *It is our purpose to offer an analysis of the theoretical models used to research demographic and population change. The purpose of our theoretical perspective is to justify the extensive use of qualitative research in demography. Over the course of time the variables that influenced demography have changed, reality captured in the theoretical models offered. Nowadays we notice the need not only of combining theoretical models with empirical research in demography, but also the need for complex research that offer both a quantitative approach and a qualitative understanding of this complex phenomenon. We are witnessing population change at a rapid pace.*

Keywords: *Generation, population, family, Europe*

We believe that Europe is changing. The moment we assert such a thing we expect the majority of people to start thinking of identity, culture, economy and politics. Naturally, we also intend to refer to those levels, but we believe that the change in the make-up and structure of the population influences at all levels the existence of the European community. We agree that diversity exists within the European community. Indeed, “the diversity of the socio-economic situations in the cross-border areas is an important phenomenon within the European Union, as physical and political geography, history, languages, cultures and traditions are integrating, or disintegrating, factors according to the complexity of the existing combinations”(Brie, 2006: 8). We do not wish to contest the diversity of the European community, we simply wish to underline the fact that through demographic change, the European community maintains its diversity, but gains a different diversity. Variables change, proportions and structures change. Over the course of history demography has played an important part in the evolution or devolution of human communities. Traditionally, the approach to population study has been a quantitative one, focused on fertility and mortality. Theoretical models worked and exploited these two variables in a quantitative manner. The complexity of the population change that we are witnessing in our contemporary times convinces us to analyze the theoretical models, as they appear and over the course of time. We are compelled to support the need for a mixed approach to population study between quantitative and qualitative research, because new variables have emerged.

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Methodological concerns

a) Research Questions

1. Research question: How do scientific theoretical elites perceived the overall significance of inter-generational relationships?
This question refers mainly to the theoretical analysis of this issue and its importance in the relation to the overall perception integration as an issue of demographic importance for the EU and Romania.
2. Research question: Do scientific theoretical elites see any link between the changes in society and the changes in the construction of inter-generational relationships?
3. Research question: How do scientific theoretical elites assess inter-generational relationships? Can we notice a change in their perspective and structure?

b) Assumptions

1. Hypothesis: Theoretical models can become sectors of positive influence between theory and practice, this in turn can expand into research methodologies that support the theoretical aspect and capture the reality as it was depicted in theories, managing to either support or attack the theoretical support.
2. Hypothesis: Theoretical observations show that inter-generational relations are not an isolated phenomena, but a changing one, directly linked with demographic change.
3. Hypothesis: The outside environment of social interaction is replicated in theoretical aspects, any change in time of the outside environment and of inter-generational relationships has to be felt also in theory.
4. The great theories of demography and inter-generational relationships are constructed by opinion leaders in both theory and practical research, who spread their experience outside of the theoretical ground.

During this theoretical research we have used content analysis. We have chosen this type of analysis so as to be able to test theoretical issues surrounding inter-generational relationships over the course of time, as they were theoretically perceived. We have analyzed documents, scientific journals and scientific books and we were able to make correct inferences that constructed a broad description of the inter-generational phenomenon. The purpose of our content analysis was to build a theoretical model describing the evolution of the inter-generational phenomenon.

Our approach was from the earlier models. This was the starting point and was deductive in nature. From there we have advanced from the general to the specific.

c) Limitations

As we have used this method we also took into consideration its limitations. The primary possibility of limitation for our study is the way in which the content has been analyzed. The content is made out of important and primary theories and their interpretation can be different. In order to prevent this we have analyzed a long bibliographical list on the topic of inter-generational relationships.

Our results could be misinterpreted. In order to protect our theoretical research from this threat we have tried to use neutral language and proper scientific language.

Sophisticated theoretical information is translated into graphic and comprehensible forms in our contemporary age when the overwhelming majority of population is used only to grasp the visual. Such has been the preoccupation with getting as much information as possible in a concise manner that surprisingly little attention has been given to past theoretical models used to understand demography and to perceive the dynamics of population. Shaping the outlook of population dynamics needs the mediating power of scientific literature that should underpin empirical evidence. In our opinion the theoretical models used over the course of time to explain population dynamics are a repository of scientific knowledge dispensed to the a-temporal researcher to help him cope with a wide range of contemporary and secular demographic changes. We avoid calling demographic change a problem, we merely intend on analyzing the situation as it is, not putting subjective labels on it. Combining theoretical models and empirical evidence we desire to symbolically affirm the indivisibility of theoretical and empirical research, while at the same time asserting the importance of constantly re-evaluating the potency of demographic dynamics over time. It comes as an obvious responsibility of the researcher to become the mediator between theoretical and empirical research.

We believe that the way in which the theoretical model evolved captured the reality of population and demography. In terms of research we have noticed that even recent research conducted in the field of demography and population studies has focused only on quantitative data that related mostly to fertility and mortality. We believe that the theoretical models have known a change in time, introducing new paradigms in the way in which population change should be researched. In time the importance of technology, environment and inter-generational relations have become evident. Due to this we wish to capture the need for qualitative studies in population and demographic research.

The controversies surrounding the proper research etiquette were the first notable occasions for scientific discussions. Through these discussions the central issues on the demographic research agenda were defined. In promoting this approach the necessary tools for social understanding were created.

Notenstein (1953:27) was among the first theoretician in demography and focused mainly upon the fertility decline experienced in western and industrialized countries. His theory concentrated on the size of the family and he directly linked the size of the family to the degree of industrialization. Urbanization and industrialization were thought to bring about demographic change due to the new value of children but also due to the technological advancements and improvements in life quality. Notenstein believed that with the decrease in mortality fertility decline is not far for the future of a country. The moment mortality decreases, the number of children that a family has increases. The survival rate allows the family to have more children, but in an urbanized and industrial society children are no longer producers but consumers. The economic value decreases, as the cost of raising a child increase exponentially. Parents are thus discouraged indirectly from having more children. The cost of having children is both in terms of money, but also in terms of time. Less time at work means more time at home with the children or the other way around.

Schultz (1973) and Becker (1960) belong to the neoclassical group of theoreticians in demography and offer an additional theory in understanding demographic evolution. They include in this the choice of the parents. It focuses on the choice of the parents that have to take into account their income, their openness towards giving up

material goods so as to have enough resources to raise children and the predicted costs of having children. As we notice the choice is exclusively based on economic options, other conditions such as social, institutional or political ones are excluded.

Earlier theories on demographic evolution stressed the importance of economy in influencing both mortality and fertility. It seemed as the most obvious route into this problem was the economic one that could present solution for this social determination. We believe that this argument is both economist and idealist. It is economist inasmuch as it views economic factors as the most important in determining mortality and fertility due to the value economic development places on the existence of population and on childbearing. The position is idealist in the respect that it seeks to explain that fertility decline is based on rational choices. Childbearing in an economically developed world is economically disadvantageous.

We are in front of two periods: pre-modern and modern theories. Fertility is presented as a rational behavior as long as it takes place in a pre-modern period. In order for an area to obtain economic development it needs population, thus high fertility. On the other hand modern rationality is based on the rationality of low fertility, having a baby becomes economically disadvantageous.

The presence of a developed economic system implies the presence of taxes, flexible prices and higher costs for education, security and stability. Gary Becker (2001) considers that through this economic reasons we can explain very easily the decline in fertility. In this sense, the economic sphere of representation within which the individual functions does not make a big difference between the costs that come with childbearing and the costs that come with the acquisition of a product that needs maintenance. An imaginary relationship is formed that end up construction the conditions of existence that include prices, income, taste, costs that apply for childbearing as well as any other activity. Although susceptible to a more extended presentation, T. W. Schultz also granted the concept of economy a privileged place in understanding demographic evolution.

Why westernization knows different levels in different countries?

It seems that the general tendency in understanding demography has moved gradually away from economic variables, towards socio-economic variables and even cultural ones. Lesthaeghe (1995: 27) tries to offers an answer for our previous question. Caldwell (2006) left us with one riddle, explicit in fact. He was also puzzled by the way in which social and economic factors interact with demographic evolution in a different way in different regions of the world or even different countries of the same region. Lesthaeghe (1995: 32) considers that this difference can only be explain culturally. Lesthaeghe (1995: 51) notices that fertility has changed over the course of time in the same place and that the same economic model applied in different regions is followed sometimes by different demographic results. The author considers that individualization, materialism and secularism play an important part in shaping the results obtained out of the encounter of population with socio-economic variables. Lesthaeghe's research, for example has highlighted the impact of secularism, materialism and individualism on the coverage of economic and social variables upon demography, as they compete to influence and form relationships. These relationships are mediated through cultural variables that determine longevity and intensity of social and economic factors upon demography. In classical demographic transition theory economic and social factors have been considered primary in defining demography. These are the structural elements with which we are used to working and hearing about in any demographic analysis. By way of example he cites cases from all over the world where population has known various

degrees of development, either towards expansion or towards shrinkage. The author cites different examples in support of his theory, proving that indeed there are differences in evolution, differences that can not be explain with only social and economic factors, arguing that the concentration of socio-economic variables are left without answer without the presence of cultural variables to influence towards the result. Dealing with only economic and social variables the researcher may unintentionally produce a misleading picture of the demographic transition. Lesthaeghe (1995: 53) considers that the effects of cultural variables are even more pervasive. Here, the accelerating of demographic change towards either over-population or under-population is explained through the presence of specific cultural variables. At the same time cultural variables impose also time constraints. This process of selecting the intensity and lasting effects of social and economic variables influencing demography, in the presence of cultural differences works unevenly, however. Lesthaeghe' studies have showed that differences in fertility levels and their speed of transition contain influences from religious beliefs and practices. Nevertheless, Lesthaeghe understood that demographic understanding does command large and differentiated knowledge from different scientific fields coupled with regularly conducted investigations. Once we have taken into consideration the presence of cultural elements, does this mean that this analysis is an accurate reflection of demographic transition? The answer is no, not entirely. These studies have demonstrated that demographic change is at the same time complex and sometimes contradictory. There is ample evidence that we are dealing with a lot of theoretical approaches that were saturated by the economic approach, but this has started to change. New directions are being investigated and new answers are being offered. As a result, we believe that critique should be part of any demographic investigation, critique that can be easily mobilized in the defense or attack of the status quo. We prefer to believe that demographic analysis is rather partial and incomplete rather than distorted.

Lesthaeghe (1995: 21) creates even a system of values. The author does not exclude at any time the presence of economic utility, previously used in theories. The author realizes that previous approaches based on cost-benefit perspective upon fertility and mortality are just incomplete, not wrong. The conclusion to which his research leads is that the individual has developed difference levels of needs, and the satisfaction of these needs start from a primal, basic level and grows into a large and branched out tree that engulfs luxury needs and non-material needs. He believes that cultural change manifested through the appearance of individualism in the nineteenth and twentieth century have influenced fertility and demographic evolution. The needs of the community, safeguarded by religion and secularism have been placed on a second place in comparison with individualism and self-fulfillment. In western Europe greater freedom of choice has also meant a cultural change that solidified a new reality that demanded a new demographic reality. Gradually religious beliefs started to be viewed as secondary while individual needs started to be manifested more strongly. This shift demanded also a change in demographic transition. Demographic transition and fertility decline came on the background of relaxation of barriers while focusing on higher individual needs. The shift was from what the community wants to what the individual wants and in the end the individual's self fulfillment came first. This cultural evolution corresponded with another demographic reality. We believe, as Lesthaeghe believes that a cultural model demands a specific demographic transition. The two are strongly linked and you can not have change within one without expecting change in the other. The change in cultural habits followed by change in demographic transition is testament to their link and the power that lies between

these entities. The very fact of demographic sensitivity to cultural change, to an external entity that is culture and the apparent mechanism that exists to deal with it, is also an acknowledgement of the importance of researching cultural models. The means and limits of this relationship must be negotiated. Study of these processes of negotiation with both internal and external variables to demography is essential in understanding the nature of demography and what controls it or what it controls. In other words, we meant through control something which is able to shape output. What is the interplay of factors that determine demography? Till now we have discover quite a few and new doors are being opened. What is for example the relative importance of cultural factors in shaping the context for a particular demographic transition? How and why, finally does demographic output come to be as it is? Till now we discover that research has covered only partial answers to these questions, but it is constantly expanding into other areas of expertise in search for answers.

It is easy to notice that Lesthaeghe's theory does find support in our contemporary society. For instance research has proven the existence of an increase number of divorces, coupled with an increase in pre-marital sex relationships and increase in the degree of cohabitation. All of these are changes at the cultural level that manifest themselves in our society through results upon fertility. Fertility continues to register a steep decline. Family structure and fertility decline has been a major concern for Lesthaeghe. Lesthaeghe (1995: 19) is a leading supporter for emphasis on cultural values when analysis demography. The author considers that the demographic problems are functional ones, even more, they are societal ones and need to be detailed through careful analysis. It is perhaps, sufficient to note that Lesthaeghe (1995: 47) considers the limited ability of material oriented theories to explain demographic transition. Economic perspectives are according to him limited in their power of accounting for demographic causes, change, the relationship between demography and social structures. The author considers that demographic analysis has been subjected to a very restricted conceptualization of the context in which it developed.

Another major expansion into demography is that of history. Charles Tilly (1981), a historian, starts by analysing demographical evolution through pointing out particular historical moments that demonstrate a change in human evolution. In a way Charles Tilly (1981) continues Malthus idéé of analyzing specific moments in time, but from a historical point of view. Historically speaking, Tilly notices two events that represented human societal evolution but with different demographic results. On one hand we have the transition from an agrarian society to an urban society that results in demographic explosion through high fertility rates and on the other hand we have the shift away from an industrial society towards a bourgeois system that in affect resulted in depopulation through declining fertility. Charles Tilly (2006) is concerned to obtain answers for questions such as how and why there is this different link between societal evolution and demographic evolution. From the perspective of historians the economic explanation that industrialization is followed by low fertility rates is not correct at all. Historians have captured specific moments in history that predict potential low fertility rates. The concentration of the state in fixing a minimum legal age at marriage has also arguably influenced not only public perception upon marriage at young ages but also public reaction and behavior. It tacitly started to define the individual's perception related to the children's role as economic contributors. The increasing cost of having children become evident with the imposition from the state of compulsory schooling. K. Seccombe (2011) understands that this was meant to help economic development, but in doing so it raised consistently the expenses a child represented, leading towards lower fertility rates. In the face of state

intervention the natural system of inter-generational relationships has naturally begun to collapse and it was steadily replaced with a redistributive system of justice. K. Seccombe (2011) is at pains in emphasizing that each measure meant to ensure financial stability and economic prosperity has had an impact upon demographic transition. Seccombe (2011) also quarrels with the measures taken for the labour market. By focusing on the economic benefits through longer hours, including women in their vast majority in almost mandatory jobs the delicate inter-generational and familial system started to miss some of its components. C. Saraceno (2010: 39) notes something very interesting, not captured by any other theoretician. Motherhood was redefined in human society. It shifted from childbearing to child rearing. We also notices that the flow of responsibility started to move away from the children and towards the parents. The flow of resources also started to shift from parents towards the children. Saraceno (2010: 42) started to discuss around the change in values at the level of perception. We are used for people to understand the value of children, but from a purely qualitative point of view, but in the past the situation was not like this at all. Quantity was important, because quantity meant economic prosperity and many children meant that you had the human resource needed to prosper.

Seccombe (2011) points out the way in which family attitude towards childbearing changed in the twentieth century. On one side women desired to shorten their childbearing period but were not in control of birth control methods and could not refuse, culturally speaking the invitation of their husbands. On the other hand, men possess the capacity, given to them culturally and institutionally to withhold from having more children, but were not consistently motivated in doing so. Seccombe (2011) believes that the two members of the nuclear family managed to find a similar interests due to the change in family economy. Both started to understand the new place of a child, apparently, in an economy.

J. M. Winter goes further and analyses other important historic events that presented the possibility for change in the demographic evolution. The World War was a subject not discussed in conventional demographic theory. The merit of J. M. Winter was that he understood the social and status changes brought about by the new context created by war. Men were drafted and shipped towards the battlefield and all of the sudden women were given new roles. The economy would not have survived otherwise, in the condition of men mobilization on the front. On one hand we have the pre-stages of the war that greatly influenced the role of the woman in society and allowed her equality towards jobs, status and prestige, and on the other hand we have post-war social and cultural change, with the de-mobilization of men and their return to family life. The first set the setting for a better status for women and more freedom of choice, impacting demographic evolution in the future, through their liberty to decide the number of children, the level of involvement in family life or the opportunity to focus more on a career, while the second change led to immediate demographic change through the appearance of the generation of baby-boomers. On the short run we notice the creation of increase fertility, but on the long run we notice the increase in fertility decline, as a whole, but also in comparison with the post-war stage.

The detachment of women from the cultural model under which they have lived till then had only a partially destabilizing role in the over-all fertility, being beneficial due to the increase freedom of choice they deserved and the status upgrade they should have got. Women continued to provide positive support to their families, they conferred legitimacy to the changes that took place at the societal level. In eroding extend family model the general attitude towards the importance and value of children played a vital role, but coupled with a change at the cultural level. The introduction of new perspectives, both cultural and economical tended to undermine the prestige and influence of extend

families. By providing new channels of interpretation for family life, by-passing traditional family values rotted in the mentality of the time, the new cultural and social model posed a serious challenge to the stable, hierarchical system known to that day. The assault of the cultural and social reform on the traditional way of living did not present a disruptive effect right away, on the contrary, initially we notice an increase in fertility, but on the long run presented consequences that surpassed the short term results. Viewed from a long-term perspective the rise of the new cultural model represented an integrative rather than dislocative influence upon the family, the only change was the number of children, that took effect upon demographic transition. Governments largely abandoned attempts to regulate these social changes. This was followed in the next years by severe social changes that manifested themselves also at the demographic level.

J. H. Lees notices the demographic transition he is among the first researchers to do this. The author captures another reality. At first the welfare state, specially created in the west to manage this social situation encourages low fertility, but as time progresses the attitude towards it changes, trying to increase the fertility rate.

The situation for Europe and for Romania is more delicate. On the one hand we notice the European continent started to present a fertility level well below the replenishment level. On the other hand, the apparent successful pursuit of technological and economic advancement is no longer able to offer protection against social changes that manifest themselves at the demographic level. Equally important is to understand that the demographic transition is going through a rapid development in countries that just adhere to the European Union. To understand the direction and significance of demographic evolution we need to look beyond the traditional variables that offered the answer and go into deeper structures, such as migration, inter-generational relationships and personal will. Because inter-generational relations are news in this case it does not mean that it was always news. But the operation of inter-generational relations value and the definition of it is extremely elusive. It is left to the researcher to go beyond the cliché of inter-generational relationships and discover the way it works nowadays.

Events are likely to appear as sudden and unexplained or as having only direct and immediate effects, but rarely the case is like this. Researching is not simply a matter of collecting data, whether about individuals or phenomena. Fact and data do not exist on their own but are located within a framework of wide-ranging social, economic, cultural and political assumptions. The way in which the researcher chooses which facts are relevant for his research depends on which sets of assumptions are held, as we saw previously in the theories exposed. Of course, we notice the existence of circumstances in which the author goes out of his way to highlight a special issue. In this case we have to take into consideration the possibility of distortion.

Recently there have been some initiatives in creating a theoretical model that can be applied to inter-generational relationships. Bengston (2002) created a theoretical model putting into comparison the relationships between parent and children. We have identified that the model uses six situations to describe the relationship between a child and a parent. The model is lacking other dimensions, because it focuses only on the relationship between parent and child, leaving outside other generations that may still interact with the family. We find this surprising especially for Bengston, a contemporary. During our times we notice that although fertility is low, the overall life expectancy has significantly risen, this creating a large chain between generations. It is not uncommon for children to have grand-grand parents and for grand-parents to have grand-grand children. Bengston (2002) idea of analysis intergenerational relationships has caused the appearance of other interpretations.

Bengston (2002) displayed another drawback in his theory. All the actions and exchanges that took place at the level of intergenerational relationships in Bengston theory (2002) were of a positive nature. No conflict was present and no possible negative effects were envisaged in his theory. Silverstein (2002: 6) started discussing about intergenerational relationships from the steam point of conflict. He pointed out to the existence of conflict between generations. The source of the conflict was most of the time attributed to economic reasons and the division of material resources between the members of a family. Parrott (1997) went a little bit further and completed the theoretical models brought about by Bengston and Silverstein (1994) with his construction of a dichotomy based on conflict and solidarity. He considered that at the base of intergenerational relationships lies this permanent exchange of either conflict or solidarity, the percent varying according to different circumstances. Parrott borrowed from Berngtson his model, in which he described the relationship between parent and child in six different dimensions, but added the possible negative relations between the two. His contribution was extremely valuable, not so much in innovating but by simply adding the second nature of any human type relationship, the conflict, the confrontation. Berngtson revised his theory in 2002 together with Parrott and including conflict in intergenerational exchanges.

Lowenstein (2006: 216) further advanced this research topic. The author understood and supported the existence of intergenerational relationships and also supported the existence of the pair of solidarity-conflict but found that these do not simply move from a maximum degree to yet another maximum degree. For example, in accordance with the dynamics of a family, inter-generational relationships do not know only low solidarity or low conflict, but this can vary. The two concept vary in intensity and in duration over the course of time. This made understanding the inter-generational relation in a family even more difficult, but closer to reality. Lowenstein found that both conflict and solidarity coexist in a family, at different levels. There are no situations in which solidarity or conflict disappears all together, but rather know variations in intensity and in manifestation.

So, according to these theoretical models we can admit that intergenerational relationships are characterized by a bi-dimension constructed by conflict and solidarity. For now intergenerational relationships have been limited as there were studied exclusively as being bi-polar, between the parent and the child, leaving outside the scientific curiosity the other members of the family. At the same time it was established that conflict and solidarity coexist in a permanent continuum, never shall we see a family without conflict or without solidarity.

The concept of inter-generational relationships has been further development in our contemporary times by Pillemer (1998). This author presented a theoretical perspective on intergenerational relationships that included also the concept of ambivalence. Pillemer states that within a family there are also permanent sources of conflict and of solidarity that can never be reconciled. His research supports the idea of ambiguity that permanently exists in intergenerational relationships and prohibits the overall and total understanding of this complex type of relation.

Intergenerational relations have known mainly sociological approaches. This is a plus because they were viewed as a constant process that existed as long as the human community existed. Gouldner (1960: 169) tried to define inter-generational relations with a careful look upon the normative principles that lie at the base of this relationship. He argued that in any successful inter-generational relation reciprocity is the key. In other words, most of the time the members of the family are conscious about the exchanges of material and immaterial possession between the members. The normative principle is

there to guide this permanent flow of material and immaterial possessions between different generations. At the base of relations within a family there is the concept of debt. Parents have the duty of taking care of the children and of their parents, the children once they are mature have the duty of repaying the debt toward their parents through health care and support in their old-age. The problems of functional and social intergenerational systems had to be detailed here by Gouldner. It is not sufficient to note down that the debt has to be repaid, but we have to conclude that repayment of this social debt is guided by normative principles that stand at the base of the family structure. Coleman (1988: 111) continued Gouldner's idea and brought into discussion the existence of social capital and expanded it outside the family. This further approach of social capital, in fact adopted by Coleman, derived from intergenerational relationships. The analysis conducted by Coleman upon this social action lead him to believe that social interaction is something more profound than the exchange of words, but also the exchange of trust and goodwill. We argue that these two theories, Gouldner and Coleman, help in preventing the obscuring the complexities of both the internal and external in relation to the family of social interactions. Social capital represents more than simply exchanging information, but it is a repository of social action and social solidarity that can be triggered in specific conditions and that has particular beneficiaries. It is not difficult to identify the obligation that lies between a child and a parent. In the first place, the social relation between the two is a durable one, as durable as the obligation is also the social service. This normative conduct rule is fundamental in establishing links at the level of the family or in any small group. Second, it can not be argued that social capital is a latent resource. Seen in this light we understand that social capital can be consumed when it is needed. For example, a child benefits from the help of his parents the moment he finds himself in a difficult situation. On the other side this type of social capital is activated also when the child notices the aged of his parent, that starts to need support. Intergenerational relations are triggered by specific events and family transitions.

Durkheim (2003) created a theory around solidarity, that also included intergenerational relationships. Durkheim's examination of solidarity and of the effects it created draws upon the existence of intergenerational relationships, but in a different research tradition. He challenges the limits of solidarity, as it was known to that period of time and captures two realities in which solidarity exists in its purest form. The development of society, he argues, has resulted in two types of solidarity: mechanical and organic. A general decline of the mechanical solidarity was the result of the industrial revolution. Mechanical solidarity has at the base of its existence normative aspects and customs that can be found in a traditional family. Intergenerational relationships existed due to a traditional internalization of customs that formed the normative mandatory part of a family structure. The members of a family agreed to endorse this type of relations because they were mutually beneficial. Organic solidarity, in Durkheim's vision replaced mechanical solidarity. These two types of solidarity belong to different historic periods and account for differences and changes at the level of the human society. Organic solidarity appeared in a time characterized by the existence of the division of labor. Under these conditions the individuals living in a society were dependant on each other at the work place. Naturally this dependence started to be manifested also at home, especially economically speaking. At first intergenerational relations were characterized and help in place by customs and tradition, but with the industrial revolution they were held in place by the sense of dependence. Parsons (1983) examination on how intergenerational relations handle societal change influenced him in illustrating them in a theory that stated

that different types of solidarity exist and manifest themselves simultaneously. At the base of the existence of solidarity we can find social interactions, only in their presence can solidarity manifest itself.

We identified three reasons that can hold intergenerational relations together. We agree with Durkheim's view that at first there was the normative type of solidarity, followed by the economic or dependency type of solidarity, but also adds a third type of solidarity, consensus solidarity. The consensus type of solidarity is constructed in the presence of social interaction, between individuals that construct conscious rules of exchange. We continue by arguing that these three types of solidarity do not adhere to limited periods of historical time, but rather are characteristic of any type of social interaction. We believe that a good example of inter-generational relations influencing the faith of a community is the case of "the young people who are either forced by local demographic realities to make marriages outside their own communities, or are determined to do these things by new social and professional realities that manifest themselves as strong determinism" (Brie, 2011: 103). The types of relationships that are encouraged will come to define the community and will determine change in social behavior and demographic structures.

We should include in this relationship the concept of power. Thus, according to this thesis while the one that possesses the resources gains in strength the other individual sits on a weakened position. Such a conceptualization reflects a shift from preoccupation with intergenerational relations dictated by customs and tradition and towards intergenerational relations dictated by economic and utility reasons. Furthermore, the individuals are seen performing either the role of the provider or that of the dependant by the manner in which they act in this relationship. To balance out this situation Parrott and Bengston consider that conflict will appear as the one offering the most help will feel injustice over longer periods of time, while the one receiving the support will want to offer other forms of help, such as emotional support or information, so as not to perceive the weakened position at which he stands. Hendricks considers that the status of those of a certain age will decrease in direct connection with the resources that they have to offer. This in turn could lead to a decrease in social interaction. This danger was perceived by us and we argue that social isolation can be explained in the case of those of a certain age through this final effort not to lose their status within the family. Thus, over time links are forged among family members, these links are gradually changed and the roles might shift from resource manager to dependant member of the family. This in turn leads sometimes to social isolation.

This "mainstream" approach to intergenerational relations was important in two senses. On one hand it offered the theoretical basis for research in this field, and on the other hand it offered the theoretical support to continue this research from a particular point onwards. To understand the nature of intergenerational relationships in the period of our contemporary times we also need to understand the theory of Inglehart (1971). For, behind Inglehart's concern with intergenerational research we find a definition for the variations of relations that are part of intergenerational exchanges. The exchanges that took place at the level of intergenerational relations were seen as social instruments in the evolution of society and family and as symptomatic of the most troubling tendencies at the level of the society. Although the effects of intergenerational relations were not fully captured in Inglehart's theory he did manage to capture two types of elementary exchanges at the level of the family. There are some intriguing elements here which are worth remarking. In lieu of a fuller account we mention that the author identified two types of exchanges and characterized them according to the direct or indirect way they

take place. Perhaps more important than the distinction between the two: restricted exchange and univocal reciprocity were the distinctions between the theoretical and methodological approaches proposed for investigating these types of exchanges within intergenerational relations. In the approach proposed by Inglehart in the case of the restricted exchange the main focus was on the existence of reciprocity between the two actors involved in the relation. This was in direct opposition with the univocal reciprocity, switches in choice, between people involved in an intergenerational relation. These switches of choice were viewed as a paradigm case in which it was difficult and not even a concern to measure influence and effect. We are talking about situations in which a man might receive the help of his neighbor to build a fence between the two. The neighbor helps maybe thinking that in the future they could build something else together. We should remember that in the case of restricted exchange we are dealing with a situation in which the giver receives something contingent with what he offered, while in the case of the univocal reciprocity the case is exactly the opposite.

There is a tendency to leave behind the exact resources that circulate between generations. We wish to complete the theoretical models presented above with that of Bourdieu (2005). Bourdieu (2005) goes past the existence of a social relation, which implies the creation and consumption upon request of social capital and adds another two elements. The power of intergenerational relations lies in what it transfers. In determining its power we have to understand that it transfers something more than social capital, but it is not sufficient to understand but to account for these transfers and understand their need in society. In terms of economic references, Bourdieu's notices that in intergenerational relationships there are transfers of an economic nature. The transfer of income is permanent. Those that are active work in order to obtain financial stability and provide for those that are neither at the working age or need financial sustainability. The concept of inheritance lies also in strong link with intergenerational exchange. In traditional families but also in modern ones there is the habit of transferring more or less with documents an inheritance. From the social perspective, there on one hand the accumulation of social capital within the family and knowledge coupled with the identity of the individual. The family creates a social system within itself offering and taking social support from its members. Outside the family, the relations with the family allows the individual to define himself and to use the knowledge gathered within the family. At the cultural level, intergenerational relationships allow for embodied cultural capital to be transferred between generations. Within the family the individual gains experience and knowledge. He can use this experience, gathered from past situations and events fostered by the family to have preferences and behaviors of use in society.

Intergenerational relations are very important. Biggs (2007) considers that the successful manifestation of intergenerational relations leads to the successful introduction of the individual in society. His economic, political and cultural future is determined by the type of intergenerational relations that existed in his family.

We rather prefer Burgess (1926) perspective upon the family, which is viewed as a unit, a structural unit that is made out of interacting individuals.

These theoretical realignments had marked important consequences upon our own conception of demographic research. For the way demography was viewed over the course of time had a powerful impact upon the way in which we wish to continue our research in this field.

There can be little doubt that fertility transition occurs in different institutional, social and cultural contexts. Environmental conditions are indeed very important and even

instrumental, but a researcher can not use a pattern of cultural, institutional and environmental conditions to decide whether or not his hypothesis is correct and to anticipate future demographic evolution. The system of concepts that we studied encouraged us to believe that demographic transition, demographic change occurs the moment in which a large segment of population decided to adopt measures to prevent birth or to improve other segments of their lives, outside the family. This in turn happened the moment in which a variety of conditions were met. We understand the importance of each individual change in the social, economic, political and cultural environment, but we deny the possibility for a demographic transition without the presence of a combination of conditions. Freedman (1997: 6) is one of the supporters of the idea that demographic change can not have only one cause. Setting up your research while concentrating on only one cause, sets up the theory and research for failure. We understand that it is difficult for a researcher to tackle all the reasons that are at the base of demographic change, but we need to stipulate the fact that other factors should be at least mentioned in passing, if not explained in detailed. The purpose of this short presentation for the major theories on demographic change serves exactly this purpose. We wish to understand and to transmit that the reasons that led to demographic change are numerous in number and complex in nature. Out of all of these reasons we chose to investigate one, focusing on the aspects that link him with the over all situation and with the aspects that form the environment. The goal is to understand the circumstance in which these changes take place. Once we understand that there can be no one cause for demographic change we are less likely to fall in the trap of seeing one change, one cause as paramount or sufficient for triggering demographic change.

More particular difficulties are posed the moment in which we take into consideration mortality. The structure of the population has been studied for a long time with the help of mortality indicators. Although we understand the need for this variable in the process of research we believe this condition is not sufficient for triggering fertility decline. To accept such scientific appearances at face value would be to ignore that the high concentrated density of theoretical material presented and the fact that empirical studies have demonstrated that declining mortality does not necessarily mean declining fertility. Thus, declining mortality is not a sufficient cause for declining fertility, but it is one of the necessary conditions for this to happen. To put the point crudely, fertility decline is secured by mortality decline.

When the number of children that a family can sustain, taking into consideration the costs involved in raising a child, surpasses the economic possibilities of that family, the members of the family will tend to use birth control.

The moment in which a country starts a process of demographic transition it is a sign that the country or region has a particular level of cultural, economic and institutional development. These social and institutional structures encourage the manifestation of a model including through family size and fertility limitation. Yet another interesting thing is that countries that are in the region but lack the level of development of the country caught in demographic transition may experience this process through influence or example.

We have also identified some major flaws in the theories so far. The contours of this argument were most formally stated from the start, but we believe it is necessary to underline a few things that we consider represent the drawback of the demographic theories so far. The contribution of these theories to demographic study is very important and they are supposed to help us furnish our research with ideas that need to be proven actual or not. If the processes they described still work, we are contented, but if not it means they need revisiting. The incorporation of only one or two problematic issues that are supposed to

triggered fertility decline and demographic transition is incorrect according to us. Most of the theories in demography take into account only broad and general variables, such as economy or institutions, or the involvement of policies in the family related decisions. Demographic change can be triggered by different elements at different moments in time. We have learnt that there is a great variety in both causes and influences.

As we advanced towards the present we notice that there is a cycle in using mortality decline as a prerequisite for fertility decline. Towards the start of demographic theoretical construction there was a constant preoccupation towards making mortality decline the main cause for fertility decline and demographic change. As time passed and researched in this field development we notice the tendency to gradually offer less attention to the mortality variable. In our present day, most of the demographic studies we encounter left mortality all together out of their sphere of interest. Without a mortality decline, fertility decline is highly unlikely.

On the other hand, the theoretical approaches that embrace cultural model as a defining one in fertility increase or decline have the drawback of seeing culture as rigid and inflexible. Culture is not of a normative nature and it not passed from one generation to another in its total form, but suffers modifications and changes. There is a tendency to overestimate the power of institutions to force through soft power an individual into having a certain behavior. Members of a society, individuals are known for their ability to resist outside forces if so they decide. We agree that there are social controls active within a human community. We also support the theory that individual rationality plays an important part in any decision making process. These two truths does not mean that individuals listen all together to the norms of society or that they use their rational thinking to plan and strategize about the number of family members they plan to have. Although we believe people plan the number of children, their view upon the total number is flexible and can change.

Another misleading factor of the theories is that most of them did not take into account the idle time in our society. Most of the theories tried to demonstrate a demographic change overlapping it with a historical reality from that time. Demography can be influenced by factors that are in a different historical time. We believe that historical actions and demographic change are not necessarily overlapping they can happen at different times and in different orders. The stress that be placed on restricted periods of time, limited by historical events, on the part played by an historic event or by a demographic change in shaping each other formed the formal conduit of most demographic theories. Through this way of thinking links of causality have been missed and information that would have been precious in understanding such complex processes has become misleading in its nature, although the initial purpose was backed by positive and fair intentions. A valid measure of these theories demonstrates that in their vast majority the author considers that economic, political, social and cultural variables have an immediate effect upon demography. On the contrary we expect that these changes would take effect in time, gradually installing themselves in the society and shaping demography over time. The effects which were presented in the theories were most of the speculative in nature, when trying to find a cause. We believe that it is better to work with a certain set of possible effects and be more cautious when constructing links between a demographic change and an historical event or situation. We believe that theories should be tested over a longer period of time. Although the nature of these demographic changes is ambiguous when confronted with quantitative types of study we wish to encourage these techniques but also coupled with qualitative research.

The presence of social and cultural influences in demographic change, as mentioned in the theories presented above encourages us to believe that more interest in qualitative studies should be placed when trying to understand the demographic shapes that are being created. This move from quantitative to quantitative and qualitative research is an absolutely critical choice in the new approach to demography. It entails a redefinition of what theories have postulated so far or at least a re-thinking on how demography works in relation with other variables. We argue that a purely quantitative approach forsakes the content of a particular message, that of the individual, for the sake of obtaining figures that seem to legitimize demography. It omits any consideration of how individuals themselves interpret their environment and the way in which they see themselves react to the changes that are taking place. Provided that qualitative study is not pushed so far as to exclude hard data and quantitative study, we strongly believe in this idea of combining qualitative and quantitative study in demographic research.

We believe we should be more concerned with the social contradictions which are articulated in our society and we agree with the author that “There are always potential dangers of disintegration threatening the community solidarity lines whether real or imagined by people belonging to a world “besieged” by several perils (Stefanescu, 2011: 15). Population change has proven in the past that can dramatically alter the faith of a community. Focusing only on quantitative study may leave aside a qualitative understanding without which the true meaning of population change can be left outside our grasp.

This research is partly the result of these criticisms wishing to add to the already rich knowledge in demographical studies with more recent developments. We wish to look beyond the limitations specified above and encourage others to do the same.

We believe we have a lot to learn from past and contemporary theories and we are limited only by our ability to understand these theories while avoiding being inhibited by them. We believe that it is necessary to work on “securing the identity matrix” (Ciocea, 2011: 36) at a cultural level but we should invest more in understanding the population matrix which is changing its structures and inner relations.

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THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MODEL

*Andra Maria POPA**

Abstract. *The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty marks an important step towards the constitutionalization of the European Economic and Social Model. Through granting a constitutional status to the values, principles and objectives of the EU, the Treaty shows EU's explicit choice for a society based on the particular combination of market, state and society (Bărbulescu et al., 2011: 33), namely the social market economy. This paper aims to explain how constitutionalization of this model occurred up to the Lisbon Treaty and what has facilitated this process. The author has chosen to fundament her argumentation on the theoretical approach advocated by Frank Schimmelfennig (2003): "strategic action in a community environment".*

Keywords: *constitutionalization, European Union, European Economic and Social Model, Lisbon Treaty, strategic action in a community environment*

The lack of an effective coordination of European economies and, therefore, the absence of a true economic union between the member states (MS), have made the European Union (EU), throughout the years, particularly vulnerable. At the end of the first decade and in the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, it has been profoundly hit by multiple economic and financial crises (most recently, by the sovereign debt crisis within the Eurozone), which questioned the very future of the Euro currency. In this context, while concentrating on short-term solutions to overcome the stringent problems of the Eurozone, special attention must be directed also towards implementing an EU-wide sustainable model of society, that is based on the economic and social coordination of all 27 (from July 2013, 28) EU MS and that would ensure the economic growth needed for the EU to become globally competitive.

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is a milestone in the development of the specific EU integration model because it marks an important step in the constitutionalization of the European Economic and Social Model (EESM). Through granting a constitutional status to the values, principles and objectives of the EU, the Treaty shows the EU's explicit choice for a society based on a particular combination of market, state and society (Bărbulescu et al., 2011: 33), namely the social market economy. This paper aims to explain how constitutionalization of this model occurred up to the Lisbon Treaty and what has facilitated this process. In doing so, the author has chosen to fundament her argumentation on the theoretical approach advocated by Frank Schimmelfennig in some of his works, namely on the perspective of "strategic action in a

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community environment” (Schimmelfennig, 2003; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2005; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006).

The first part of the article is dedicated to setting the theoretical framework. Thus, a conceptual clarification is made regarding the term “constitutionalization” and the main assumptions of the “strategic action in a community environment” approach are introduced. The second part includes the analysis of the constitutionalization process of the EESM. First, several understandings of the EESM from academic literature and EU documents are listed; then, the steps of the constitutionalizing are reviewed. The conclusions present an assessment of the constitutionalization process through the lens of the “strategic action in a community environment” approach.

1. Theoretical Framework

1.1. A Constitution for the EU vs. the Constitutionalization of the EU

The issue of the “constitutionalization” of the EU has, for some time, been in the spotlight of both academic community and public opinion. In the context of EU becoming more political, the debates have reached their climax along with the preparations for the Constitutional Treaty (i.e. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe). Nevertheless, the process of constitutionalization isn’t necessarily equivalent to the establishing of a constitution for the EU.

As Snyder notes, the concept of “constitution” has four possible meanings (Snyder, 2003: 6-7):

- 1) In empirical sense – the way in which the polity is organized in real life – the functioning of the EU institutional and decision-making system stands for such a constitution;
- 2) In material sense – all basic legal norms which form the legal order of the polity – EU Treaties define the legal order of the EU; the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can be included here as well;
- 3) In instrumental sense – the formal written document which gathers the main constitutional norms – since the Constitutional Treaty hasn’t been ratified, it is arguable whether the EU has a constitution in this sense; taking aside the fact that they aren’t shaped in a classic constitutional-like format, EU Treaties can be considered such constitutions;
- 4) In subjective sense – the formal written document, elaborated by citizens directly or through their representatives, which is perceived by them as their fundamental legal act – for now, the EU fails to deliver such a constitution.

A distinction has to be made between the process of constitutionalizing the EU and the process of developing and adopting a constitution for the EU in an instrumental sense – as for the case of establishing the Constitutional Treaty. This paper focuses on analyzing the first process which includes the latter. Although the period between the Nice Treaty¹ and the European Council meeting of June 2007² was the peak in the process of

¹ The Treaty was complemented by the Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe, adopted at the European Council meeting in Laeken (Belgium), in December 2001, which convened the European Convention with the main task of drafting the Constitutional Treaty.

² When it was decided to abandon the efforts to establish the Constitution for Europe and convene an Intergovernmental Conference to draw up and adopt a Reform Treaty, which would enhance “the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as well as the coherence of its external action” (ECoun, 2007: Annex I, art. 1).

formally constitutionalizing the EU, the constitutionalization of the EU has begun long before the European Convention and continued after the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty (Beach and Christiansen, 2007: 1164).

According to Snyder, the constitutionalization of the EU refers to “social processes which might tend to confer a constitutional status on the basic legal framework of the European Union” (Snyder, 2003: 12). Basically, constitutionalization represents the processes of European legal integration through which principles of liberal democracies, such as fundamental rights, separation of powers and representative democracy, are embedded in the EU legal order (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1149). Thus, in order to understand and predict these processes, it is worth analyzing the mechanisms that determine the institutionalization of democratic principles in EU’s basic legal framework.

Since neither the rational-choice institutionalist theoreticians, nor the constructivists are able to fully explain the process of constitutionalization, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig propose the alternative of analyzing the constitutionalization of the EU according to the “strategic action in a community environment” approach (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1150; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2005: 11). They argue that community actors use items, such as identity, values and norms, which compose the EU-ethos, in strategic purposes in order to put social and moral pressure on other actors that are reluctant to the constitutionalization of the EU (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1150). Their alternative theoretical explanation is meant to offer a better understanding of the constitutionalization processes that occur through the parliamentarization and institutionalization of human rights within the EU, despite strong divergences between MS’ opinions or poor learning and socializing effects (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1157).

Since the European Economic and Social Model (EESM) is composed of a set of core economic and social principles of the EU, that employ rights for all citizens of the MS, by institutionalizing these principles both in the articles of the Lisbon Treaty and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, it can be argued that the model has, in this way, been constitutionalized. Thus, it is relevant to analyze its constitutionalization through the “strategic action in a community environment” approach. The following subchapter describes the features of this theoretical approach.

1.2. Strategic action in a community environment

The strategic action in a community environment approach is developed by Schimmelfennig in his works, based on the contributions of Erving Goffman regarding the strategic power of social norms, but also following rationalist assumptions of fixed preferences and strategic action, and constructivist premises of the relevance of the cultural environment on actors’ actions (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 157).

Goffman argues that actors are more concerned with creating the general impression that they keep up with the predetermined standards, than they are with actually meeting those standards; when bargaining, these actors can come to a “veneer of consensus” by hiding their personal opinions behind statements that everyone feels obliged to support, at least declaratively (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 158, after Goffman, 1959: 251 and 9).

Synthesizing Goffman’s ideas, Schimmelfennig develops his new approach by combining premises of rational institutionalism with some coming from constructivism. Thus, following a rationalist perspective, Schimmelfennig assumes that actors involved in European integration have stable preferences, established based on their own personal interests, and they act strategically in order to maximize their gains through negotiation

outcomes (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 159). In their activity, actors aren't preoccupied with truth seeking; they are more interested in what the direct consequences of their actions are and how those consequences would affect them (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 159). Actors won't change their identity or internalize preferences which are generally perceived to be proper, as a result of their interaction with other actors (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 159). From a constructivist perspective, Schimmelfennig sees the EU as a community environment for its MS and believes in the importance of informal cultural values and norms in the negotiation between MS (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 159).

Together with Rittberger, Schimmelfennig defines three core features of an international community (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1158):

- 1) its ethos – the values and norms which define the community and differentiate it from other communities; when members fundament their positions on its provisions, it ensures more legitimacy to their actions;
- 2) its high interaction density - the frequent interactions that take place in many policy fields and at different political levels, which provide an informal environment for rule enforcing;
- 3) its decentralization - the absence of a unique, centralized rule-making and enforcement authority.

The authors (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1158-1159) argue that the EU fulfils these criteria and therefore actors within the EU are very likely to employ in strategic actions on European level. Thus, these actors are expected to engage in "rhetoric actions" by using EU-ethos based arguments to legitimize their proposals and strengthen their bargaining power and success in influencing policy outcomes; the ones caught using the ethos opportunistically, will be publicly exposed and, as a result, their future attempts to legitimize their positions through an EU-ethos based rhetoric will create suspicion (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1158-1159). The actors, whose actions and proposals aren't in line with the EU-ethos, can be shamed in public, and pressured to accept proposals which even contradict their own preferences (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1158-1159).

This theoretical approach can be applied to the constitutionalization of the EU, happening through parliamentarization and institutionalization of human rights, because advocates of these processes, when defending their interest in the EU constitutional negotiations, are able to apply to EU-ethos based arguments and, thus, exert social influence on other actors, persuading the reluctant ones to agree with them on constitutional matters (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1159). By consequence, the institutionalizing of the principles of the EESM - which is complementary to the institutionalizing of human rights within the EU - can also be analyzed through the strategic action approach.

It is believed that the strategic action of an actor within an international community is more effective if several environment conditions are fulfilled (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 1159-1160; Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006: 13-14; Schimmelfennig, 2003: 162):

- 1) Constitutive rules – if a policy issue involves fundamental questions of the community purpose, it is easier for actors to bring it on the agenda, by questioning its legitimacy or its connection with the community identity, and afterwards interpret it in line with the community ethos; thus, in the case of the EU, issues of EU constitutionalization (such as parliamentarization and institutionalization of human rights) or membership are more likely to be addressed than technical regulations;

- 2) Saliency – when a policy issue is perceived as affecting the national competences of the members, actors will put greater pressure on the community to solve the problem; in the case of the EU, when an integration step is believed to affect the competences of national parliaments or the provisions on human rights – thus, deepening the democratic deficit of the EU – MS are expected to exert pressure on EU institutions to fix the problem by increasing constitutional rights of the EU level;
- 3) Legitimacy – even among issues that are both constitutive and salient, the effects could vary according to the values and norms in question and their legitimacy; the authors focus on two aspects of legitimacy:
 - a. Internal coherence – refers to already existing internal norms and practices of the community; in the EU, the effects on the constitutionalization process will be stronger if the MS’ proposals are consistent with earlier treaty provisions, common member state declarations, or informal practices;
 - b. External coherence – refers to already existing international norms and practices of other international organizations to which the community belongs; in the case of institutionalizing the human rights in the EU, it is well known that the system of human rights protection has been institutionalized for some time in the Council of Europe;
- 4) Resonance – it is more likely for an issue to resonate stronger on the community level when it matches domestic values and norms; in the case of the EU, those constitutional demands, which resonate the most with national institutionalized norms, will create the strongest pressure to comply with EU rules, in the context of the shaming process;
- 5) Publicity – the shaming and reputation building processes are considered to work better in public, because then the actors would be forced to adopt a norm-conforming behaviour; in the EU, the EU-ethos is expected to have a greater impact on constitutional negotiations if they are conducted in public, rather than in Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC).

Based on the importance of these environmental conditions, the authors have formulated a “constitutionalization hypothesis” for the processes of parliamentarization and institutionalization of human rights within the EU (Rittberger, Schimmelfennig, 2005: 15). Since the constitutionalization of the EESM follows similar patterns with these processes, this hypothesis can easily be applied to the constitutionalizing of the EESM. Thus, the hypothesis, adapted to the case of the constitutionalization of the EESM, states that decisions to institutionalize the principles and values of the EESM are likely to occur (adapted from Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2005: 15):

- the more an issue is perceived to undermine the competences of the national welfare states, creating a “social deficit” and determining MS to push for an EU response through strengthening constitutional rights at the EU (saliency);
- the more legitimate a particular norm related to the institutionalization of the EESM’s principles is (internal and external coherence);
- the more strongly a proposal for constitutionalization resonates with similar domestically institutionalized norms regarding the fundamental principles and values of the EESM (resonance);

- the more public the negotiations within the process of the constitutionalization are (publicity).

2. Analysis

Before engaging in the analysis of the constitutionalization process of the EESM, some remarks need to be made regarding the several understandings of the EESM in both the academic literature and in official EU documents.

2.1. What is the European Economic and Social Model?

The concept “European Economic and Social Model” (EESM) refers to the specific EU model of society, based both on sustainable growth and social cohesion. One cannot speak of a universally accepted definition for this concept, as each of the actors, which are using it on a regular basis in their discourses (i.e. academics, researchers, politicians, journalists, etc.), refers to it in terms of its own field of interest.

Given the fact that, since the beginning of the European integration process in the 1950s, economic aspects have dominated the European political agenda, the social issues related to the European model have been neglected for a long time. As a result, academic publications, official documents and public speeches in the last two decades (more intensively since the 1990s) often use the term “European social model” when referring to the EESM. This discursive abundance, manifested in recent years’ literature and polity, comes as an attempt to compensate for the asymmetry created over time in the European integration process between policies promoting market efficiency and those promoting social protection and equality (Scharpf, 2002: 665), i.e. between the economic policies being increasingly Europeanized and the social policies that remained mostly up to the competence of national states.

Among the first to use the concept of “European social model” was Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, who, in the mid-1980s³, defined the European model as an alternative to the American version of pure-market capitalism (Jepsen and Pascual, 2005: 236). In his speech on “Social Europe”, Delors said that in addition to its goal of establishing a genuine and competitive single market, the EU is also interested in ensuring social cohesion within its member states.

Another important official mention of the term has been made in the White Paper on Social Policy, where the Commission defines the aim of the European social model: to provide citizens of Europe with “a unique blend of economic well-being, social cohesiveness and high overall quality of life” (CEC, 1994: 1). Also listed herein are the principles and values underlying this model, i.e. democracy and individual rights, collective bargaining rights, market economy, equality, social welfare and solidarity (CEC, 1994: 2). These principles, integrated also into the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers⁴, were chosen to emphasize the idea that economic success is achieved hand in hand with social progress (CEC, 1994: 2).

One of the best definitions for the model, given in a European official document, lies within the Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council in December 2000.

³ In particular, in his speech in the British Trade Union Congress, in 1988.

⁴ The Charter was signed in 1989, in Strasbourg, by 11 states (all the members of the European Community at that time, except the UK), establishing the general principles for the European Labour Law and contributing to the foundation of the European social model.

Coming immediately after the Lisbon European Council⁵, which endorsed the Lisbon Strategy and settled ways to modernize the European model, the Nice European Council completed the definition of the European social model by sketching its main features. Thus, the European model has four basic elements (ECoun, 2000b: Appendix 1, art. 11; Alber, 2006: 394):

- 1) Services of general interest which provide a high level of social protection;
- 2) The use of social dialogue within the process of public policy making;
- 3) Social cohesion delivered through services of general interest;
- 4) A set of common core values / principles, including pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality, a high level of employment, sustainable economic growth, increased competitiveness, higher quality of life and of the environment.

A very good description of the European social model is provided by the Barcelona European Council in March 2002. According to the Presidency Conclusions (ECoun, 2002: art. 22), the European social model is based on good economic performance, a high level of social protection, a high quality education system and the functioning of social dialogue. This definition is the first to include an explicit reference to the importance of education and training as essential components of the European model.

Jepsen, Pascual (2005) and Hay, Wincott, Watson (1999) have made an inventory of definitions regarding the concept of European social model, existing in the literature. Thus, they have identified four types of definitions through which the European social model is presented as:

- a) a model incorporating certain institutional features common to all MS of the EU, which allows for a distinctive regulatory and development framework for the competition within the EU;
- b) a model in which a variety of different national social models has been identified, the European model being regarded as an ideal model (in the Weberian sense);
- c) a transnational European model that transcends the similarities between national social models, the responsibility for social issues being gradually transferred to the supranational EU level;
- d) a set of cohesion instruments – particularly in relation to the EU enlargement process – which are able to create new hybrid social model.

Jepsen and Pascual (2005: 15) add a fifth type of definitions to the above mentioned four: the European social model is described as concept/policy through which “a common European solution may be provided to problems that are common to a varying degree”. In this context, rather than fulfilling its traditional role of correcting market-failures, social policy is designed as “instrument for optimising the adjustment of social protection systems to market forces” (Jepsen and Pascual, 2005: 15). This kind of definitions rest on the idea of developing a European political project aimed at building a European identity, not only

⁵ At the European Council in Lisbon, in March 2000, the EU has set its strategic goal for the next 10 years which is “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (ECoun, 2000a: art. 5). This objective indicates the direction in which the EU wanted to direct its economic and social model, in order to make the Union more competitive abroad, have a higher degree of employment, ensure the adequate social protection of its citizens and promote social inclusion.

through institutions and shared values, but through the very common social policy solutions it offers.

The most common way of defining the European social model remains the one referring to a set of economic and social characteristics, principles common to all MS. These definitions for the European social model tend to lead to a normative approach of the concept. Thus, the European model is seen as a set of common rules agreed at EU level, together with the practices designed to promote voluntary coordination of policies within the EU (Jepsen and Pascual, 2005: 8).

There are many authors who have doubts about the viability of the idea of a single European model, given that, in the EU are several different types of economic (sub)models (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes, 2001; Giddens, 2005). The most developed (sub-)models are:

- a) The continental or Rhenish model;
- b) The Nordic or Scandinavian model;
- c) The Anglo-Saxon or British model;
- d) The Mediterranean.

These four types of (sub-)models are more or less compatible with each other, which is why it is difficult for them to converge into a single European model. Zweynert (2007: 14) pleads for the creation of common rules for managing the competition and heterogeneity of national models, and believes that a single EESM might develop over time spontaneously, and not by imposing such a model EU-wide.

When discussing the EESM, many studies tend to associate the model with the process of globalization and list the major challenges facing the EESM. Thus, these challenges can be divided in three main categories (Alber, 2010: 14-19; Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes, 2001: 5-19; Hay, Watson and Wincott, 1999: 26-27; Sapir, 2006: 371-375):

- 1) External or international – challenges resulted from globalization:
 - a. Strong global trade competition – determined by continuous trade liberalization and the emergence of developing countries (i.e. the BRICS⁶) as leading world producers and suppliers;
 - b. Internationalisation of finance – which allows more capital mobility, thus creates relocation opportunities for companies, but also encourages speculative behaviour, which, due to greater financial interconnectivity, resulted in the global financial crisis in 2007-2008;
- 2) Internal or domestic – challenges coming from within the national welfare states:
 - a. Rapid technological change – which calls for investment in R&D and especially in ICT;
 - b. The gradual shift from a manufacturing economy to a service-based structure – increasing the need for high-skilled labour and life-long learning programmes;
 - c. Demographic change (aging population combined with shrinking fertility rates) – which is a tremendous threat to the sustainability of public pension schemes;
 - d. Changes in household and family patterns – greater female employment (especially in the service sector) and the transformation of housework in formal employment;

⁶ Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.

- e. The outdated national labour market and social policies – which haven't been fully reformed since the “Golden Age” of economic growth, between 1945 and the early-1970s, in order to adapt to 21st century's requirements;
- 3) Supranational or European – challenges arising from the EU decision-making framework:
- a. Great asymmetry between the ease of undertaking “negative integration”⁷ measures in the economic field and the complexity of developing “positive integration”⁸ initiatives in the social field;
 - b. The difficulty of coordinating MS' economic and social policies – depending on the policy field, the Council acts by unanimity, qualified or simple majority; thus, given the great diversity of national socio-economic specificities and interests, it is a great challenge to reach consensus regarding EESM issues;
 - c. Unreformed EU budget – there haven't been recent major changes in the allocation framework, thus the EU budget still allocates more resources to agriculture than it does to innovation and R&D activities; now, with the negotiating of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, the budget is expected to be reformed in order for the Europe 2020 Strategy goals to be delivered accordingly;
 - d. Heterogeneous economic and social models of the MS – as a result of the Eastern enlargement in 2004-2007 (and with the accession of Croatia in July 2013), the diversity of the economies and welfare states within the EU has increased and their convergence is quite modest;
 - e. Poor economic governance structures – prior to the global financial and economic crisis, the EU has had a quite unsuccessful framework for determining fiscal discipline and macro-economic stability (i.e. the Stability and Growth Pact hasn't worked effectively); along with introducing the European Semester, the “Six-pack” legislation, the Euro Plus Pact and, more recently, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, which is waiting to be ratified by the MS⁹, the EU makes efforts to strengthen its economic and fiscal governance.

Given the context of globalization, in which it is necessary to maintain both the economic and social diversity of the European society - as a core and distinctive principle of the EU - the concept EESM is complemented by a new approach for tackling EU

⁷ Negative integration (de-regulation) occurs prevalent in the economic field by removing barriers towards free movement of goods, services, people and capital, thus making efforts to complete the Single European Market. It finds its fundamentals in the primary law of the EU Treaties (see the provisions regarding the Internal Market and the free movement, starting with the Treaty of Rome in 1957); the main EU actors in charge for carrying it out are the European Commission and the ECJ, who are responsible for verifying the actions against infringements of Treaty obligations (Alber, 2010: 18).

⁸ Unlike negative integration, positive integration (re-regulation) implies harmonizing the social policies of the MS and depends on secondary EU law, agreed upon by national governments within the Council, or supplementary law, i.e. the case law of the ECJ. The main EU actors responsible for creating positive integration opportunities are the Council and the European Parliament (Alber, 2010: 18).

⁹ It has been signed by 25 MS, all except UK and the Czech Republic, and, in order to entry into force, it has to be ratified by at least 12 Eurozone MS.

competitiveness issues, namely the open method of coordination (OMC)¹⁰. This method was created to enhance the competitiveness of the EU, finding a balance between long-term economic performance, solidarity, welfare and the environment. Thus, by facilitating mutual learning between member states, the OMC manages to find a way to coordinate their actions in the economic and social fields, whilst at the same time, preserving and taking account of the national specificities of each society.

Another important line of approach for the EESM is that according to which the model represents more than just a way to achieve social policies; it refers to a model of organizing economic and social relations, which meets the special combination of economy, state and society, which is specific for Europe (Luzarraga and Llorente, 2011: 125; Alber, 2006: 394). Thus, in terms of economy, EESM aims to combine the dynamics of growth within a market economy with the dialogue involving social partners; regarding state, it should be noted that, besides the fact that they function as liberal democracies, EU MS are welfare states, which supplement market action through redistribution, in order to mitigate social inequalities; in relation to society, in addition to creating opportunities for individuals to pursue happiness, EESM promotes solidarity between individuals, thus strengthening social cohesion (Alber, 2006: 395).

2.2. The Constitutionalization process

Ever since the debates within the European Convention, which was called to draft the Constitutional Treaty, continuing with the text of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and culminating with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has manifested its clear option for a specific way of organizing the economic and social relations between its MS, namely, the social market economy. As previously mentioned in this paper, over time, there have been several attempts to define the EESM in official EU documents, but prior to the discussions that took place within the European Convention, there have been no explicit references in European primary law of the type of economic and social model the EU wants to develop. Before the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty, EU Treaties described only part of the features of the EESM, by setting them as objectives for the EU, but didn't indicate the set of principles and values, which fundaments the model. Therefore, the author believes that through introducing the provisions regarding the EESM in the Treaty of Lisbon, the model has finally been constitutionalized.

Since the Treaty of Lisbon is considered to be, in fact, the old Constitutional Treaty, but without its constitutional form (Bărbulescu et al., 2011: 25), one can say that the constitutionalization process of the EESM has started during the work of the European Convention, which drafted the Constitutional Treaty, and ended with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, the analysis within this paper concentrates on the time frame between

¹⁰ The OMC is perceived to be a new mode of governance within the EU, creating a middle path between the community and the inter-governmental method. It has been formally established in the Lisbon Spring European Council in 2000, in order to help the Lisbon Strategy in reaching its strategic goal. The main instruments of the OMC, as identified by Radaelli (2003:15), are:

- Guidelines;
- Benchmarking and sharing of best practices;
- Multi-lateral surveillance;
- Indicators;
- Iterative process;
- Implementation through domestic policy and legislation (this means that no EU legislation is needed).

28th February 2002 - the date of the inaugural meeting of the European Convention – and 1st December 2009 - the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

For a better understanding of the process, the analysis consists of a reconstruction of the constitutionalization process, which highlights the environmental conditions that have facilitated or, on the contrary, impeded the institutionalization of the EESM.

First, it is important to take note of the elements within the EU-ethos that describe the type of economic and social model the EU chose to develop. According to the theoretical perspective presented above, these items can help MS legitimize and support their positions in negotiations for the constitutionalization of the EESM, but they can also contribute to exposing the states whose proposals or actions aren't consistent with the EU-ethos, and afterwards convince them to accept an EU-ethos based compromise. The brief description of the EU-ethos regarding the EESM provides also a clear image of the *status quo* on the degree of constitutionalization of the EESM existing prior to the Lisbon Treaty.

Before starting the constitutionalization process in 2002, the institutionalized EU-ethos regarding the EESM was limited to a few phrases in the Common Provisions title of the Treaty on the European Union¹¹. These provisions were accompanied by the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU and the ECJ rulings related to the issue of the EESM. The Treaty has set as one of the objectives for the EU the promoting of an “economic and social progress and a high level of employment”, a “balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency” (EU, 2002: Title I, art. 2). This paragraph of the Treaty highlighted some of the specific features of the EESM, such as the fact that the EU seeks long-term economic growth, accompanied by high levels of employment and without neglecting the social impact of its economic development. With the liberalization of its economy (as a result of removing internal borders between MS), the EU shows that it doesn't follow a neoliberal model of pure market economy, but it is also concerned with correcting market failures through measures aimed at achieving economic and social cohesion and ensuring sustainable development. In order to have a good economic performance, while also providing social protection for its citizens, the EU seeks to consolidate its Economic and Monetary Union; in other words, the EU aims at coordinating and harmonizing the economic policies of its MS, as well as the unification of their monetary policies in order for them to adopt a single European currency.

Although, at that time – in 2002 – it wasn't legally binding¹², the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU included provisions regarding the principles that define the

¹¹ At that time, the EU was functioning according to the Amsterdam Treaty, adopted in 1997. Starting 1st February 2003, the EU moved under the provisions of the Nice Treaty, which had been signed in 2001. Since the Nice Treaty hasn't brought any amendments on the Common Provisions title within the Treaty on the EU, no differentiation between the two periods (before and after the entry into force of the Nice Treaty) needs to be done.

¹² The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU was developed during the Convention set up in 1999 by the Cologne European Council. The Convention, including representatives from each of the MS governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament and the European Commission, worked from December 1999 throughout October 2000 and drafted the Charter, which was signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in December 2000 at Nice. (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm accessed on 14.08.2012).

EESM¹³. It is true that, due to the fact that the Charter wasn't yet formally integrated in the EU legal order, it couldn't be used by the ECJ to fundament its judgements; nevertheless, it could offer a good preview on the rights that were to be constitutionalized in the upcoming years¹⁴. The ECJ has developed a substantial jurisprudence on issues related to the EESM, at first, just in the field of economic integration, but, as time passed, the ECJ's regulatory capacity extended to the field of European social order (see Micklitz 2009). Among the ECJ ruling cases connected to EESM issues, the *Cassis de Dijon*¹⁵ case remains the most famous, because it fundaments the mutual recognition principle¹⁶ and has the capacity to produce a spillover effect from the economic to the social field (Micklitz 2009).

Given the above mentioned status quo, in 2001, within the Laeken Declaration, the MS have decided to convoke a European Convention that would draft the Constitutional Treaty. In the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the EU, no special, structured demands for shaping the future of the EESM were made; the document states briefly some economic and social features of the model, i.e. solidarity, economic and social cohesion, sustainable development, employment, combating social exclusion, internal market, single currency, cultural and linguistic diversity (EU, 2001: 3). It calls for a coordination of economic, financial and fiscal policies, in order to make the internal market and the single currency fully operational, without jeopardizing the MS' competences in these fields; at the same time, it asks for common actions in order to provide for its citizens more jobs, an improved quality of life, less crime, decent education, better health care (EU, 2001: 3).

In the first plenary working-session of the Convention, in which the members were invited to express their expectations about the future of Europe, some pointed out the need to create a "credible and efficient economic and social nucleus and to step up coordination of fiscal and budgetary policies, especially between the twelve states sharing the same currency – the euro." (EConv, 2002c: 3). The discussion regarding the elements of the EESM continued in the second plenary session, which debated upon the missions and competences of the EU. Thus, although a large majority of the Convention members were advocates of an economic government for the Euro-zone, of the integration of the Fundamental Rights Charter (which creates support for the EESM's principles) in the new Treaty or of EU extending its action in area such as environment, research and innovation or food security, there were divergences of opinion on issues such as economic and social

¹³ The Charter includes provisions regarding rights that support the principles of the EESM, e.g. the right to property (EU, 2010, Charter: art. 17), the right of collective bargaining and action (EU, 2010, Charter: art. 28), social security and social assistance (EU, 2010, Charter: art. 34), etc.

¹⁴ An amended version of the Charter has been integrated in the Lisbon Treaty and therefore, as of December 2009, has become part of the EU legal order, along with the Treaties (EU, 2010, TEU: art. 6, line 1).

¹⁵ ECR 120/78, *Rewe v. Bundesmonopolzentralverwaltung*, 1979 ECR 649.

¹⁶ According to the Commission, the mutual recognition principle states that „goods which are lawfully produced in one member state cannot be banned from sale on the territory of another member state, even if they are produced to technical or quality specifications different from those applied to its own products. The only exception allowed - overriding general interest such as health, consumer or environment protection - is subject to strict conditions. The same principle applies to services.”

(http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/internal_market_general_framework/121001b_en.htm accessed on 14.08.2012).

cohesion, the development of a European social model which takes into account the differences between MS, combating social exclusion and unemployment, common tax arrangements or the implementation of a European education system (EConv, 2002d: 3-4). While talking about competence delimitation, in the third plenary session, Convention members referred also to the need for greater coordination of economic policies in the framework of the monetary union, associated with increased EU competences in social and employment policy (EConv, 2002e: 3). Most members agreed that EU's competences in the field of economic and social policies ought to be strengthened, and, at the same time, an efficient political monitoring system has to be implemented, for verifying how the distribution of competences between the EU and the MS is respected – through examining compliance with the principles of proportionality¹⁷ and subsidiarity¹⁸ (EConv, 2002e: 10).

In the meeting of 6-7 June 2002, six working groups were established and their mandates were set. Thus, a working group on Economic Governance was created which had the tasks of examining whether the introduction of the Euro determines a competence shift to the EU regarding economic policy, whether economic policy coordination should be prescriptive or based on open coordination and to what extent economic coordination should include social and employment policies (EConv, 2002g: 3).

During the plenary session open to public, on 24-25 June 2002, civil society representatives pointed out the need for: a balance between economic and social policy by extending EU objectives on social and employment issues; an increased social dialogue; the inclusion of the OMC in the Treaty; the recognition of services of general interest as being compatible with competition rules (EConv, 2002h: 2-4). In the 3-4 October 2002 plenary session, three Convention members put forward motions regarding the inclusion of issues on social Europe in the plenary agenda and the creation of a specialized working group on this subject (EConv, 2002i: 5); although this issue raised differences between members, the Praesidium agreed that the Treaty needs to set out objectives for the EU in the social area as well, and decided to extend the next meetings' discussions on the report of the Economic Governance working group to cover social issues and decide whether to form an extra working group on social aspects of EU integration.

The plenary meeting in 28-29 October 2002 presented a first draft of the Treaty. In art. 3 (EConv, 2002k: 8) the draft listed as objectives for the EU some of the EESM's key features: economic and social cohesion, internal market and economic and monetary union, high level of employment and a high degree of social protection, high level of environmental protection, technological and scientific progress; the draft also stated that these objectives ought to be pursued according to the competence distribution between MS and the EU. There were no specific comments on this part of the draft made by Convention members.

In their final report, presented in the plenary meeting of 7-8 October 2002, the members of the working group on "Economic Governance" recommended the inclusion of economic and social objectives of the EU in the Constitutional Treaty (EConv, 2002l: 2). Some of the working group members believed it is important to include references to

¹⁷ According to the proportionality principle, "the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties" (EU, 2010, TEU: art. 5, line 4).

¹⁸ The subsidiarity principle states that "in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level" (EU, 2010, TEU: art. 5, line 3).

sustainable growth and competitiveness, while others were of the opinion that it is necessary to highlight issues such as full employment of labour, social and territorial cohesion, social market economy, economic progress and creating a balance between market competition and providing public services (EConv, 2002l: 2). As a result, the Praesidium committed to finding the proper set of words to define EU's objectives so that they would cover both economic and social aspects (EConv, 2002m: 4). Regarding the debate on Social Europe, there have been several divergences on extending EU competences in the social field or introducing horizontal social clauses which affect other policy areas, a considerable support for formalising social dialogue and a strong call for introducing provisions about the creation of a European social market economy (EConv, 2002m: 6-7); the creation of the Social Europe working group was also decided and mandated to identify what social objectives should the Treaty define for the EU, whether EU competences in social matters should be modified, if there should be a relationship between economic policy coordination and social policy coordination, and what role should social partners play (EConv, 2002n: 2). In their final report presented in the 6-7 February 2003 plenary session, the Social Europe group stressed out that the Constitutional Treaty should contain a reference to the EESM in the part on EU objectives (EConv, 2003a: 10). Thus, it was necessary to provide a proper definition for this concept. As a starting definition for the EESM was indicated the one provided by the European Council in Barcelona in 2002; to this, references to EESM's distinctive principles and values have to be added, with special emphasis on the idea of keeping the diversity of approaches in tackling common European economic and social issues (EConv, 2003a: 10). On the subject of including social objectives in the Treaty, the group decided the text should include, among others, social justice, solidarity and equality (in particular equality between men and women), full employment, high level of social protection (EConv, 2003a: 8-12). Regarding the competences of the EU in the social field, the working-group concluded that the existing distribution was adequate (i.e. shared competence between the EU and the MS); however, more clarifications could be done in order for the EU to be responsible for issues related to the functioning of the Single Market and ensuring competition, and other matters with a cross-border impact (EConv, 2003a: 2), thus the main responsibility in the social area should remain within the MS¹⁹, in this way respecting the principle of subsidiarity. The group supported the inclusion of provisions defining the OMC and its procedure in the Treaty, as an instrument for achieving EU's objectives in areas where the EU doesn't have competences to legislate; it also suggested mentioning some examples of areas where the OMC can be applied (EConv, 2003a: 17-20).

The plenary decided to integrate the suggested principles of the EESM in art. 3 of the future Constitution (EConv, 2003b: 5). The best solution to materialize the recommendations of the working groups on Social Europe and Economic Governance for integrating the EESM's principles in the Treaty has proved to be the reference to a social market economy mode of organizing EU's economic and social relations. Although this proposal was regarded with suspicion by supporters of maintaining the reference on open market economy, this concept was the most suited to reflect the relationship between economic and social progress within the EU and its efforts to ensure greater coordination of economic and social policies (EConv, 2003a: 10). As a result of discussions in the working groups and the plenary sessions of the European Convention, in the

¹⁹ The group also recommended to enhance EU competences in the field of public health, by maintaining it as a shared competence (EConv, 2003a: 15), and to create the legal basis for adopting EU legislation on services of general interest (EConv, 2003a: 16).

Constitutional Treaty, among the Union's objectives, has been introduced a reference to the EESM, which is based on a highly competitive social market economy (EU, 2004: art. 3, line 3). EU competences in the social area remained shared competences²⁰ alongside with the ones regarding the Single Market and economic, social and territorial cohesion (EU, 2004: art. 13), while economic, employment and social policies of MS shall be coordinated by the EU through defining guidelines (EU, 2004: art. 14).

The draft of the Treaty was presented within the European Council of 19-20 June 2003 at Thessaloniki and an IGC has been called to agree on its final version. The IGC was convened on 4 October 2003 in Rome and conducted its negotiations under the Italian and Irish Presidencies until 18 June 2004, when an amended draft of the Treaty was agreed on by the 25 MS. During the IGC's meetings only minor changes have occurred to the Treaty's provisions on the EESM, i.e. on the proposal of the European Central Bank, price stability has been added to EU's list of objectives (ECB, 2003: art. 8). The Treaty was signed on 24 October 2004 in Rome and had to be ratified by all MS according to their constitutional rules.

The ratification process has been put on hold after the people of France and the Netherlands have rejected the text of the Constitution through the referendums held on 29 May, respectively 1 June 2005. One of the motives for the rejection in France is believed to be the French public's perception on the effectiveness of the EESM (Ivaldi, 2006: 59). On a background of poor domestic economic and social performance, the French voters were profoundly influenced in their decision by the debates within the referendum campaign, in which the "Yes" and "No" supporters have had a strong ideological fight over the neo-liberal character of the EU and the Treaty's ability to ensure social rights for EU citizens²¹. Quite a considerable amount of the French "No" voters (16%) rejected the Constitution because it entailed too little "social Europe" (EC, 2005a: 17), while 7% of the "Yes" voters motivated their choice by stating that the Constitution was a first step towards a more social Europe; thus it might be concluded that the French were supporters of a shift in competences from the national to EU level in the social area. By contrast, the Dutch "No" had little to do with the voters' concern of a too liberal development model for the EU²²; their main reasons for a negative answer were their poor information on the Treaty and their fear of sovereignty loss (32%, respectively 19% - EC, 2005b: 16). In this case, it might be argued that the Dutch weren't that keen on shifting competences (social or other) to the European level and weren't in favour of a political Europe, that also included a coordination of the MS' social models.

After a "period of reflection" (ECoun, 2005: 2), marked by national debates on the Constitution, the European Council of June 2006 agreed to make a report assessing the state of discussions in the MS, which would serve as basis for further decisions on how to

²⁰ Thus, the EU is entitled to act on social issues only if the MS's action – be it on national, regional or local level – isn't sufficient to achieve the proposed goal or when an EU level action is more efficient.

²¹ Post-referendum opinion polls revealed the salience of the 'too liberal' EESM: in the IPSOS poll, 40% of French voters motivated their negative vote on the Constitution being too economically liberal; in the SOFRES poll, 34% said the Treaty was too liberal; even the post-referendum Flash Eurobarometer in France has shown that top reasons for a 'No' were the belief in the Treaty's negative impact on the employment situation in France (loss of jobs, relocation of firms) - 31% - and the perception of the Constitution being too liberal – 19% (Ivaldi, 2006: 61; EC, 2005a: 17).

²² Only 5% of respondents of the post-referendum Flash Eurobarometer in the Netherlands answered that the Constitution was too liberal (EC, 2005b: 16).

continue the reform of the EU (ECoun, 2006: 16-17); it also called for the adoption of a political statement made by all EU leaders for setting EU's values and objectives and confirming their commitment to deliver them (ECoun, 2006: 17). At the same time, a group of European politicians²³ was mandated to come up with a solution for the constitutional impasse and formulate a new text for the Treaty. Following the commitments under the political Berlin Declaration²⁴ of March 2007, the group prepared for the European Council meeting in June 2007 a proposal for a compact Treaty, accompanied by two protocols – one on the Functioning of the EU institutional and legal system, and one on the Development of the Union's Policies in order to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century – and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Based on these assessments, the European Council of June 2007 decided to convene an IGC and mandated it to abandon the Constitution and draw up the Reform Treaty by amending the existing Treaties and introducing the innovations which resulted from the IGC in 2004 (ECoun, 2007: Annex I, art. 1). Thus, in December 2007 the Reform Treaty, which became known as the Lisbon Treaty, was signed. This Treaty included the provisions regarding the EESM as agreed upon in the Constitutional Treaty in 2004.

The ratification process was once again a milestone. Starting with the Irish referendum, which due to an initial "No" in June 2008²⁵, had to be resumed in October 2009, this time with a positive outcome, and continuing with the German Constitutional Court pending verdict on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty²⁶ and the Polish President's wavering²⁷, and culminating with the Czech refusal to ratify the Treaty unless an opt-out for the Charter of Fundamental Rights was ensured²⁸.

²³ The group was called Action Committee for European Democracy, also known as the Amato Group.

²⁴ By signing the Berlin Declaration (officially, the Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome), the Presidents of the three major EU political institutions have reiterated EU's commitment to develop its EESM, which combines economic success with social responsibility (EU, 2007: 1).

²⁵ Main reasons for a 'No' were the voters' poor information on the Treaty (22%) and their willingness to protect Irish identity (12%). Among the reasons for a 'Yes', 2% of voters stated the need to protect the European model of society (EC, 2008:19).

²⁶ Among others, the German Constitutional Court gave a verdict about the Treaty affecting member states' competences over social policy. It explained that it is inappropriate to believe that EU's economic policy is purely market-oriented, with no social orientation, and it affects MS' ability to tackle social issues, because the EU has competences in the social area and it has manifested interest in social problems over time, and the MS are entitled to decide on important social issues on their own (BVerfG, 2009: art. 393). The Court indicated that the Lisbon Treaty has been designed accordingly: it has provisions on the EESM in the objective section, it has social horizontal clauses and regulates the role of social partners (BVerfG, 2009: art. 396).

²⁷ The Polish President has delayed the ratification until the second Irish referendum came to a positive outcome and negotiated opt-outs of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (for Title IV of the Charter – EU, 2010: Protocol no. 30). (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/6290694/President-of-Poland-signs-Lisbon-Treaty.html> accessed on 14.08.2012)

²⁸ In order to finalize the ratification, the Czech President asked for and received an opt-out for the Czech Republic from the Charter that would ensure protection against property claims made by ethnic Germans expelled from the country after the Second World War (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/30/czech-republic-lisbon-treaty> accessed on 14.08.2012).

Finally, on 1st December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. By including provisions regarding the EESM in art. 3 of the Treaty on the European Union²⁹, the Lisbon Treaty now describes the coordinates of the EESM, based on the unique combination of market, state and society (Bărbulescu et al., 2011: 33; Luzarraga and Llorente, 2011: 125), namely the social market economy. The features of the EESM have become more visible by their explicit formulation in the EU objectives part and their supplement by the rights stipulated in the Charter. The Treaty also includes some instruments that would facilitate EESM's development: the horizontal clauses³⁰, the social dialogue³¹, and the reform of European economic and social policies (Bărbulescu et al., 2011: 33-34). Thus, some of the policies involved in the development of the EESM remain the exclusive competence of the EU (i.e. custom union, competition policy, common commercial policy, monetary policy for the MS of the Eurozone), others stay a shared competences between the EU and the MS³² (i.e. internal market, social policy, economic, social and territorial cohesion, environment, consumer protection, common safety concerns in public health matters, research, technological development and space) or are subject to a special type of coordination coming from the EU³³ (i.e. economic, employment and social policies), while in some fields the EU is entitled only to support, coordinate or supplement MS' actions (i.e. protection and improvement of human health, industry, education, vocational training, youth and sport).

²⁹ Art. 3 of the TEU notes: "The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.

It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.

It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.

It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced." (EU, 2010: TEU art.3, line 3).

³⁰ The Lisbon Treaty introduces a set of guidelines meant to direct the public policy actions (Luzarraga, Llorente, 2011: 129). They are listed in the first part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (EU, 2010: TFEU Title II) and are made compulsory for all MS and EU actors engaged in European and domestic policy making and delivering (Bărbulescu et al., 2011: 52). If they aren't taken account of, proceedings may be instituted before the ECJ.

³¹ Through art. 152 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the Union recognises the role of social partners and, by taking account of their national diversity and their autonomy, it supports them in engaging in social dialog, especially within the Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment (EU, 2010: TFEU art. 152).

³² These policy-areas fall under the principle of subsidiarity, thus the EU is allowed to act only when the European level is believed to be the most appropriate to achieve a certain proposed action in line with the Treaty's objectives. Starting with the Lisbon Treaty, in these policy fields, national parliaments are given the responsibility to monitor the compliance of EU legislative acts proposals with the subsidiarity principle, acting like "guardians of national competences" (Aldecoa Luzzaraga, Llorente, 2011: 117-121).

³³ The MS' actions in these fields are coordinated by the EU through the OMC by defining broad policy guidelines (EU, 2010: TFEU, art. 5).

Conclusion: Constitutionalizing the European Economic and Social Model – a strategic action in a community environment?!

As seen above, the constitutionalization of the EESM, as part of EU's reform process, followed closely the pathway of the constitutionalization of the EU through the Lisbon Treaty and was marked by several disputes, which have even put the ratification of the EU Treaty in danger³⁴. In negotiations, EU actors (MS or civil society representatives) were mainly driven by their own personal interest³⁵, but they also used an EU-ethos based rhetoric to back up their statements and actions³⁶.

Environment conditions were quite favourable for EU actors to engage in strategic actions for constitutionalizing the EESM. Thus, almost all the conditions indicated in Schimmelfennig's theoretical explanation were fulfilled and influenced the process positively.

The EESM is a *constitutive issue* of the EU because it reflects the way the economic and social relations are organized within the EU. By pointing out the key characteristics of the type of economy and society the EU wants to develop among its MS, the constitutionalization of the EESM carried out up to the Lisbon Treaty tackles one of the fundamental questions of the European community.

Salience was more prominent in the EESM constitutionalization process regarding social issues. The fear of extending EU competences in the social area has produced different reactions: while the French were complaining about not enough "Social Europe"³⁷, the German Constitutional Court stated the EU has considerable competences in the social area (BVerfG, 2009: art. 393).

The *external coherence* of the debates regarding the constitutionalization of the EESM was high because many times references have been made to international norms on social issues, i.e. the European Social Charter signed in 1961 at Turin. As a result, art. 151 of the TFEU on social policy offers the European Social Charter as example for the kind of fundamental social rights the EU and its MS have to ensure for their citizens (EU, 2010: TFEU art. 151). *Internal coherence* is also high; EU actors called upon EU existing norms or practices regarding EESM issues, which are now included in the Treaty. Thus, the definition given to the EESM by the Barcelona European Council in 2002 has been considered when formulating the Treaty's provisions (EConv, 2003a: 10) and the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, established in 1989 at Strasbourg, has been taken as example in setting out the fundamental social rights of EU citizens (EU, 2010: TFEU art. 151).

Resonance played an important role in the process because some MS invoked non-compliance with their domestic arrangements for certain provisions and succeeded in

³⁴ E.g. the French 'No' on the Constitutional Treaty and the ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty.

³⁵ Personal interest means the national preferences of the MS (i.e. 27% of the Irish people who voted 'Yes' for the referendum motivated their choice as being in the best interest of Ireland – EC, 2009: 9) or the ones of the civil society organizations (i.e. the civil society representatives in the publicly open plenary session of the European Convention advocated for the formalization of the social dialogue – EConv, 2002h: 3-4).

³⁶ A good example for this can be found in the explanation given by the German Constitutional Court on her ruling on social policy issues in the Lisbon Treaty (BVerfG, 2009: art. 392-400).

³⁷ 16% of the French 'No' voters in the 2005 referendum have argued the EU has not enough competences in the social field (EC, 2005a: 17).

changing them according to their preferences. This was the case of the Polish and British opt-outs³⁸ on the Charter.

The *publicity* for the constitutionalization process of the EESM was ensured especially through the European Convention, where the main decisions regarding the institutionalizing of the model were taken, which were, later on, integrated in the Lisbon Treaty through the IGC in 2007. As stated by Mr. Jean-Luc Dehaene in his speech in the inaugural meeting of the European Convention (EConv, 2002a: art. 5; EConv, 2002b: Annex II), the works of the Convention were made public via the Forum³⁹ and the dialog with the civil society was conducted on four levels:

- especially in written, on the internet, via the Convention and the Forum websites;
- in each national Forum, in the MS and candidate countries;
- with observers from the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the social partners and non-governmental organisations;
- at the level of the Convention itself, through public hearings focused on specific issues.

Many speakers in this inaugural meeting supported the idea of continuing the Forum debates during the Convention, both at EU and national level (EConv, 2002a: art. 5; EConv, 2002b: Annex II). The plenary session of 24-25 June 2002 was devoted mostly to civil society. For this meeting, eight contact groups chaired by Praesidium members were established, in order to facilitate the dialogue with and among the civil society; at the same time, reports on the progress made in the national consultations were discussed (EConv, 2002f: 1). After the two negative referendums on the Constitutional Treaty, the heads of state or government of the MS called for a “period of reflection” (ECoun, 2005: 2) in which a broad debate took place in every MS involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties; thus, the constitutionalization process had once again become public through the Plan D - Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, launched by the Commission in October 2005.

The process of constitutionalizing the EESM started with adding items regarding the organization of economic and social issues within the EU on the agenda of the European Convention and ended (for now) with including provisions about the EESM’s principles in the Treaty of Lisbon. In this process, actors have pursued their interests, but, in order to reach compromise in negotiations for the Treaty, they had to guide their actions by key elements of the EU-ethos, i.e. market economy, solidarity, social progress, sustainable development, diversity. Thus, it can be concluded that the constitutionalizing of the EESM was delivered by the strategic action of EU actors, which took place in the environment of the European Union.

Although many voices (some of them belonging to EU officials) say that, due to the global financial and economic crisis and the debt crisis within the Eurozone, the EESM has no future⁴⁰, the EU struggles to keep its particular development model. Since

³⁸ Through the Lisbon Treaty, both countries have clarified that the ECJ is able to rule their issues on fundamental rights to the extent that these rights are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or UK (EU, 2010: Protocol no. 30).

³⁹ The Laeken Declaration indicated the Forum as a means to integrate the citizens in the debates of the Convention, by keeping them constantly informed about the discussions within the Convention and using their contributions as input for the debates (EU, 2001: 7).

⁴⁰ In an interview for the Wall Street Journal in February 2012, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said “The European social model has already gone”, arguing that there will be “no escape”

one economy needs growth in order to be able to ensure social welfare to its citizens, the EU has to concentrate on making that growth possible. Therefore, in 2010, the Europe 2020 Strategy was launched, in order to provide smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (EC, 2010). This Strategy is meant to consolidate the EESM by implementing measures both in the economic and social field. Being aware of the interconnection between economic long-term prosperity and social development, EU officials are nowadays working on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and designing it so that it would contribute to accomplishing the Europe 2020 goals⁴¹. In implementing the features of the EESM, the Europe 2020 Strategy is being supported by the EU economic governance framework provided by the European Semester, the “Six-pack” legislation, the Euro Plus Pact and the more recent Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, which, by coordinating the economic and fiscal policies of the MS, are meant to create a stable environment for the EU to deliver economic growth.

Through the new so called “Fiscal Pact” (i.e. the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) another step towards a constitutionalization of the EU is being made by creating common binding rules regarding budget deficits and public debts for the MS of the Eurozone. The major threat nowadays is the risk of creating a “two-speed Europe”⁴². This would intensify the integration between the MS of the Eurozone, thus strengthening the EESM in these MS, but it would create a big gap between the Eurozone and the other EU MS, that would result in great delays in the convergence of the socio-economic models of the latter to the EESM. Thus, the EU finds itself in a great dilemma (again): to deepen the integration within a core of MS, i.e. the Eurozone members⁴³, by creating a genuine economic and monetary union with a corresponding strong coordination on social

from harsh austerity measures for those countries struggling with great public deficits and this will lead to giving up core assumptions of the European social model, i.e. job and social security. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203960804577241221244896782.html> accessed on 10.10. 2012).

⁴¹ The Strategy sets five measurable goals to be achieved by the EU by 2020 (EU, 2010: 10-11):

- a 75% employment rate for women and men aged 20-64;
- 3% of EU's GDP to be invested in R&D (by both public and private entities);
- the reduction of school drop-out rates below 10% and at least 40% of 30-34-year-olds completing third level education;
- the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels, the increase of the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 20% and a 20% increase in energy efficiency;
- at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion.

⁴² Given the developments of the Eurozone debt crisis, German politicians start talking more and more about a division within the EU, the so called “two speed Europe” (<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/divide-and-rescue-berlin-lays-groundwork-for-a-two-speed-europe-a-784348.html> accessed on 15.10.2012). Recently, the German Counsellor, Angela Merkel, also developed thoughts of abandoning the idea of a unified EU and discussed with European Commission President José Manuel Durão Barroso the possibility of developing a separate budget for the Eurozone in order to foster growth in the Eurozone – thus strengthen the EESM in those MS (<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/new-path-in-london-leads-away-from-european-union-a-861294.html> accessed on 15.10. 2012). Although, Barroso opposed the idea arguing that it would just speed up the divide within the EU, Merkel’s proposal might be discussed in the upcoming EU summit (N.B. the European Council meeting of 18 – 19 October 2012).

⁴³ Some argue that due to its good economic performance and its forthcoming joining of the Euro, Poland might also be included in this new core. (<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/new-path-in-london-leads-away-from-european-union-a-861294.html> accessed on 15.10. 2012)

issues, or go on with the existing “integration for all” framework and try to achieve convergence EU-wide by making all integration steps available to all MS. The future of the European integration, and, thus, the future of the EESM, will be decided in the EU summit, which will definitively include in its negotiations many strategic actions of the MS representatives, which would act according to their national interest, but would have to take into account also the EU-ethos, in order to support their proposals.

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NEW PATHS OF SOCIAL SERVICES THROUGH SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP

*Cristina SANDU**

Abstract. *Social entrepreneurship is not a new phenomenon, but in the present it uses a new language, in order to lead to the development of more effective models for addressing social needs. For a long time there have been attempts to develop and implement social programs in support of various vulnerable groups, government agencies and foundations investing substantial sums to meet social goals, but they have failed in terms of efficiency and sustainability.*

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the need for social entrepreneurship in social services delivery, based on the argument that national and international empirical research are found deficient in terms of social entrepreneurship, which is why new models of social entrepreneurship are becoming necessary on the background of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of social institutions in an effort to solve social problems with which communities are faced.

Research Methodology: The paper is based on an exploratory research to identify the coordinates of social entrepreneurship, by defining the concepts underlying this phenomenon and through further research and analysis and on data collection, using statistical methods of analysis in the area of social services, in order to identify the services, situations, beneficiaries and the types of employment opportunities, where the social entrepreneurship can intervene.

Keywords: *social services, Bucharest Municipality, social entrepreneurship*

1. Problem identification

To understand the mission and the need for social entrepreneurship in public sector development there should be considered the benefits generated that benefit the community such as the ability to create new employment opportunities, the creation of new goods and services to meet social needs, may respond to needs of vulnerable groups considered.

Nowadays, many social institutions are unable to respond communities' needs. Problems such as school problems, behavioral problems, learning disabilities, alcohol and drugs addiction, mental problems, poverty, unemployment, etc. are left "behind" based on the general argument of lack of financial resources.

In addition, the lack of human resources in public institutions represents an austerity measure effect in times of economic crisis.

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Even more, on a political crisis background, there are no concerns in elaborating new public policies on remedy the communities' social problems (for the moment).

Having all these aspects in mind, the major question is "who has more to loose?" - "social institutions?", "politicians?", "local representatives?". Unfortunately, the only answer is the community members, which can be identified by various vulnerable groups.

Vulnerable groups such as children, people with disabilities, women, unemployed people, elderly, Roma people (see Romanian Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection, 2010, *Research Project on Social Economy in Romania from European Comparative Perspective*, Bucharest) have so many needs, waiting to be satisfied.

2. Problem dissemination

In order to achieve the purpose mentioned above, the paper analysis the present situation of social services delivery at local level (Bucharest Municipality), through the main social services providers.

Table 1. Items of analysis

Code	From 1 to 178
Q1 - year of establishment	Q1a – 1999; Q1b-2000; Q1c-2001; Q1d-2002; Q1e-2003; Q1f-2004; Q1g-2005; Q1h-2006; Q1i-2007; Q1j-2008; Q1k-2009; Q1l-2010; Q1m- 2011
Q2 - form of organisation	Q2a-public body; Q2b - association; Q2c - foundation; Q2d - religious cult; Q2e - social assistance unit; Q2f - others
Q3 - types of services	Q3a-identification& evaluation; Q3b-information in domain; Q3c-professional orientation; Q3d-psychological orientation; Q3e-social orientation; Q3f-legal counselling; Q3g-psychological counselling; Q3h-social counselling; Q3i-social mediation people; Q3j-social mediation family; Q3k-social mediation groups; Q3l-social mediation community; Q3m-support in emergency situations; Q3n-family reintegration; Q3o-community reintegration; Q3p-professional reintegration; Q3q-social- medical care services by social nature; Q3r-social-medical care services by medical nature; Q3s-palliative care services; Q3t-recovery & rehabilitation services; Q3u-support & accompaniment; Q3v-sheltering; Q3w-social education; Q3x-special education; Q3y-dynamics of groups & communities; Q3z-social promotion & cooperation; Q3z1-promotion of social relations; Q3z2-services for food ensuring; Q3z3-occupational therapy
Q4 - situations	Q4a-age; Q4b-chronic disease; Q4c-incurable disease; Q4d-mental disabilities; Q4e-sensorial disabilities; Q4f-physical disabilities; Q4g-neuro-motor disabilities; Q4h-rare disease; Q4i-HIV/AIDS; Q4j-social isolation; Q4k-drugs addiction; Q4l-alcohol addiction; Q4m-toxic substances addiction; Q4n-physical abuse; Q4o-psyche abuse; Q4p-difficult situation in family; Q4q-poverty; Q4r-human trafficking; Q4s-labour exploitation; Q4t-sexual exploitation; Q4u-ethnic discrimination; Q4v-gender discrimination; Q4w-sexual orientation discrimination; Q4x-religious discrimination; Q4y-age discrimination; Q4z-unemployment; Q4z1-working conditions under legal standards; Q4z2-the need of a house; Q4z3-homeless people; Q4z4-delinquency; Q4z5-immigration; Q4z6-repatriation; Q4z7-other difficult situations; Q4z8-handicap; Q4z9-other discrimination situations
Q5 - locations	Q5a-specialized public services; Q5b-private offices; Q5c-home; Q5d-social centres; Q5e-street; Q5f-penitentiary; Q5g-hospitals and medical centres; Q5h-schools; Q5i-recovering centres; Q5j-residential centres; Q5k-others
Q6 - beneficiaries	Q6a-children (0-18 years old); Q6b-young people (18-26 years old); Q6c-adults; Q6d-old people; Q6e-families; Q6f-groups; Q6g-communities
Q7 - Human	Q7a-social education animator; Q7b-maternal assistant; Q7c-medical assistant; Q7d-physiotherapy medical assistant; Q7e-elderly care assistant; Q7f-social

Resources	assistant; Q7g-vocational guidance counsellor; Q7h-educator/special educator; Q7i-physiotherapist; Q7j-nurse; Q7k-children care person; Q7l-residence care person; Q7m-instructor animator; Q7n-education instructor; Q7o-occupational therapist; Q7p-sign-language interpreter; Q7q-jurist; Q7r-kinetic therapist; Q7r1-speech therapist; Q7s-social worker; Q7t-masseur; Q7u-general medicine/specialist doctor; Q7v-psychiatrist; Q7w-recovery teacher; Q7x-social teacher; Q7y-psychologist; Q7z-volunteers; Q7z1-sociologist
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Findings and comments

Figure 1 shows that the majority of social services providers are represented by the associations and foundations, and figure 2 shows that in 2006 there were established the majority of the organisations

(no. 60 representing 33.7% from the total of 178). In 2005, there were adopted some regulations regarding the establishment, registration, organisation and functioning of associations and foundations, but also regarding subsidies. The subsidies for a person in care increased from 2005 to 2006 with 48% (29 currencies), and starting with 2006, the beneficiaries can be also old people, persons victims of domestic violence, substances addicted persons, persons victims of human trafficking, immigrants and refugees, some other persons in difficult situations.

Table 2: Forms of organisation (author)

		form of organisation2			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	public body	16	9.0	9.0	9.0
	association	90	50.6	50.6	59.6
	foundation	68	38.2	38.2	97.8
	religious culte	2	1.1	1.1	98.9
	social assistance unit	2	1.1	1.1	100.0
	Total	178	100.0	100.0	

Figure 1. Forms of organisation (author)




Figure 2: The dynamics of organisations (author)





Figure 3. The distributed dynamics of organisations (author)



The decrease of number can be reasoned on financial considerations, human resources motivation, lack of strategic orientation, lack of specialists in the domain, the migration of capable people in developing new types of organisations.

The most frequent services provided in the field of social services are identification and evaluation, information in domain, psychological and social counselling, support in emergency situations, family and community reintegration, social-medical care services by social nature, sheltering, social education, promotion of social relations.

Table 3. Frequencies of services provided (author)

		Responses		Percent of Cases	
		N	Percent	N	
Services(Q3)	Q3a	75	6.3%	42.1%	
	Q3b	109	9.1%	61.2%	
	Q3c	33	2.8%	18.5%	
	Q3d	4	.3%	2.2%	
	Q3e	26	2.2%	14.6%	
	Q3f	38	3.2%	21.3%	
	Q3g	128	10.7%	71.9%	
	Q3h	123	10.3%	69.1%	
	Q3i	20	1.7%	11.2%	
	Q3j	3	.3%	1.7%	
	Q3k	1	.1%	.6%	
	Q3l	7	.6%	3.9%	
	Q3m	49	4.1%	27.5%	
	Q3n	41	3.4%	23.0%	
	Q3o	80	6.7%	44.9%	
	Q3p	11	.9%	6.2%	
Total		1196	100.0%	671.9%	

As the Table 4 shows, some very important situations as mental, sensorial, physical disabilities, or HIV/AIDS, drugs, alcohol, toxic substances addiction, physical and psychic abuse, discrimination of all types, unemployment do not get enough attention of the current services provided.

Table 4. Frequencies of situations (author)

		Responses		Percent of Cases		
		N	Percent	N		
Situations(Q4)	Q4a	39	6.6%	21.9%		
	Q4b	29	4.9%	16.3%		
	Q4c	5	.8%	2.8%		
	Q4d	10	1.7%	5.6%		
	Q4e	3	.5%	1.7%		
	Q4f	6	1.0%	3.4%		
	Q4g	9	1.5%	5.1%		
	Q4h	1	.2%	.6%		
	Q4i	3	.5%	1.7%		
	Q4j	39	6.6%	21.9%		
	Q4k	11	1.9%	6.2%		
	Q4l	2	.3%	1.1%		
	Q4m	2	.3%	1.1%		
	Q4n	6	1.0%	3.4%		
	Q4o	3	.5%	1.7%		
			Q4p	140	23.7%	78.7%
			Q4q	81	13.7%	45.5%
		Q4r	7	1.2%	3.9%	
		Q4t	1	.2%	.6%	
		Q4u	3	.5%	1.7%	
		Q4v	1	.2%	.6%	
		Q4w	3	.5%	1.7%	
		Q4x	2	.3%	1.1%	
		Q4y	1	.2%	.6%	
		Q4z	8	1.4%	4.5%	
		Q4z1	1	.2%	.6%	
		Q4z2	22	3.7%	12.4%	
		Q4z3	9	1.5%	5.1%	
		Q4z4	2	.3%	1.1%	
		Q4z5	2	.3%	1.1%	
		Q4z7	117	19.8%	65.7%	
		Q4z8	21	3.6%	11.8%	
		Q4z9	1	.2%	.6%	
Total			590	100.0%	331.5%	

Regarding the beneficiaries, Table 5 indicates that the majority of social services are oriented on children solving problems, demonstrating that there is a great need of attention giving to this specific category. Their education, their protection, their health and social relations are very important for their future, and finally for the society as a hole. Also, here are included all the situations of children discrimination, by trying to integrate them into society.

Table 5: Frequencies of beneficiaries

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	N
Beneficiaries(Q6)	Q6a	118	28.4%	66.3%
	Q6b	70	16.8%	39.3%
	Q6c	79	19.0%	44.4%
	Q6d	56	13.5%	31.5%
	Q6e	82	19.7%	46.1%
	Q6f	7	1.7%	3.9%
	Q6g	4	1.0%	2.2%
Total		416	100.0%	233.7%

On the human resources perspective, the Table 6 indicates that almost all the organizations analysed have a social assistant and a psychologist. Also very important are the positions of medical assistant, elderly care assistant and jurist.

Table 6: Frequencies of human resources

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	N
HR(Q7)	Q7a	24	4.5%	13.5%
	Q7b	1	.2%	.6%
	Q7c	32	6.1%	18.0%

	Q7e	27	5.1%	15.2%
	Q7f	178	33.7%	100.0%
	Q7g	22	4.2%	12.4%
	Q7h	9	1.7%	5.1%
	Q7i	4	.8%	2.2%
	Q7j	4	.8%	2.2%
	Q7k	3	.6%	1.7%
	Q7l	3	.6%	1.7%
	Q7n	17	3.2%	9.6%
	Q7o	2	.4%	1.1%
	Q7p	1	.2%	.6%
	Q7q	38	7.2%	21.3%
	Q7r	4	.8%	2.2%
	Q7r1	3	.6%	1.7%
	Q7t	1	.2%	.6%
	Q7w	2	.4%	1.1%
	Q7x	1	.2%	.6%
	Q7y	141	26.7%	79.2%
	Q7z	10	1.9%	5.6%
	Q7z1	1	.2%	.6%
Total		528	100.0%	296.6%

3. Social entrepreneurship - a possible solution?

From theory...

Literature describes social entrepreneurship as a new way of community problems solving, through specific mechanisms, of combining social and economic objectives.

In order to understand some basic aspects of social entrepreneurship, it is necessary to illustrate important definitions such as:

Table 7. Basic concepts (author – adaptation from literature)

Social entrepreneurship	an initiative with social impact belonging to an entrepreneur with social vision; it can be about an initiative without commercial purpose, or simply about a charity activity, about business with or without personal profit; some social entrepreneurs develop their projects by NGOs, while others get involved in profit-based activities (Yunus, 2010)
Social entrepreneur	someone who creates a new stable equilibrium, one that provides meaningfully higher levels of satisfaction for the participants in the system...the entrepreneur engineers permanent shift from a lower-quality equilibrium to a higher-quality one (Davie, 2007:2011).
Social enterprise	an effective instrument for combating social exclusion, a vehicle for social cohesion and a place of socialization. In addition to their social purpose, they emphasize production of goods and services and participation in the life of the enterprise by all its stakeholders- volunteers, employees, managers, users, representatives of public and private bodies- which is by no mean an easy task (OECD, 1999).

Galera (2007) mentioned that social entrepreneurship can have a great influence on the institutional development, capacity building, based on the fact that social enterprises contribution to social and economic activities was especially ascribed to its

capacity to create new forms of entrepreneurship and employment and the enhancing citizens' participation and social cohesion.

From the organisational forms perspective, it is considered that social entrepreneurship can represent the new trend in developing new forms of associations and foundations, that could take the shape of social enterprise (Davie, 2011).

...to some practical guidelines

All social services illustrated can represent the activity for the social entrepreneurship in the future, even more, social entrepreneurship can present some new paths of developing services that the associations and foundation were not focus on until the present, such as the relationships between the family members, between the groups, between the community members, professional reintegration, recovery and rehabilitation the dynamics of groups and communities.

This represents great importance, due the fact that there are many situations that they are not covered by the present types of services provided. The lack of organisations and human resources involvement have a great impact on community solving problems, in satisfying their needs.

Social entrepreneurship, in the line of beneficiaries, can represent a big challenge for the work integration perspective, with the aim of supporting the people that are facing the risk of permanent exclusion from the labour market, such as the people over the age of 45, people with disabilities, Roma people, etc.

There can be developed projects for helping old people with low incomes or that are abandoned by their families, homeless people, workshops for families with problems and activities inside the communities, by enforcing the relationships inside.

There are many graduates from the domain of social assistance, psychology, education, medicine and medical assistance, sociology that are not able to find any job at the end of the studies.

Through social entrepreneurship there can be created new jobs opportunities, especially after many institutions and companies reduced the number of employees, based on economic-financial reasons. Even the motivation of working in a social enterprise can be higher for young people, those representing the new labour force.

Specialization can also represent a strategic objective for social entrepreneurship, by initiative projects of training and special programmes with the aim of giving the best abilities of persons wheeling to be part of the social entrepreneurship activity.

4. The main emphasis

The analysis on the items of year establishment, form of organisation, services provided, situations determinants for the social services provision, type of location for social services, beneficiaries, human resources needed can represent elements for the strategic orientation directions of social entrepreneurship development in social services that ultimately will lead to the effectiveness of social services through social entrepreneurship.

The strategic orientation directions of social entrepreneurship development can be:

- the creation of new form of organisations in social services delivery, according to public sector principles: efficiency, efficacy, accountability, transparency
- the coverage of all situations described in the analysis, which represent the social needs, through quality improvement and added value of social services

- the creation of new job opportunities in the area of social services, new opportunities for young people graduates in the domains related with social services
- the satisfaction of social needs of all the beneficiaries categories analysed, from children to old people, and groups and communities.
- the elaboration of new public policies for supporting social entrepreneurship in Romania

5. Limitations and future research

This paper aims at highlighting social entrepreneurship in the provision of social services.

In this respect, a limitation of the paper is that it offers an overview of the current situation's social services providers. The paper does not deepening in the mechanisms of social entrepreneurship, only provides some statistical data (based on the author's data collection) on specific items - forms of organisation, services provided, situations, beneficiaries, human resources inside the social services providers.

The statistical situation represents the background of the future research in identifying and applying social entrepreneurship mechanism in social services delivery, even more in public sector development.

6. Conclusions

The welfare of population depends on the citizens' satisfaction regarding the consumption of goods and services, education access, medical services, social assistance.

The practice has demonstrated that the economic and social evolutions have a great influence on the public sector and these influences will lead to important changes. Thus, the public sector may not be able to cover all the services and the social needs of the citizens.

The social entrepreneurship, through new mechanisms and new approaches of public services, can represent the innovation, an alternative (not replacement) in the provision and delivery of social services.

The mission of social entrepreneurship is directly linked to the possibilities of creating new jobs opportunities, of creating new goods and services for satisfying the social needs and it responds to the necessities of certain vulnerable groups.

What the government and the associations, foundation and NGOs need to do is firstly, to understand the concept of social entrepreneurship and secondly, to admit that there is a great need of changing the approaches of social services delivery. Thirdly, they have to involve more the civil society and the communities in trying to find solutions of the social needs.

The social entrepreneurship, with the support of public and private actors and NGOs, will be able to satisfy the social needs of the communities and take part of the population welfare.

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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A SUPPORTING FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTRY COMPETITIVENESS

*Mihaela TUCĂ**

Abstract. *For each and every country, competitiveness can be a means of sustainable growth and development. Corporate social responsibility, by involving the business partners, society and public sectors all over, does just that: pushes towards a new model of development in the spirit of sustainability. Having in mind the unique characteristics of each country and placing them in a regional context, the papers aims at analyzing current practices and place them in from of the countries profile of competitiveness and see in to what lengths can CSR participate and in what domains to help the country achieve competitiveness and thus sustainable development.*

Keywords: *Corporate social responsibility, competitiveness, Central and Eastern Europe*

Introduction

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept related to the contribution that entities must have to the development of society. Over times, “responsible” initiatives have had a variety of themes: from simple corporate philanthropy, to contributions to social development and green growth¹. The new public management teaches the import of good practices from the private sector to the public sector. Thus, taking “corporate” out of CSR we obtain the mission for the public sector, to promote social responsible practices to achieve an added value for the society as a hole (Matei, Tucă, 2011: 251).

As globalization advances, social, cultural and economic borders between countries fade and national economies encounter international competition. Along with many opportunities, globalization can bring challenges. Every country is concerned about obtaining competitive advantage in the world economy and achieving sustainable development (Grant, 2010).

From this perspective, CSR incorporation in social and environmental concerns in core operations can be a critical tool for obtaining economical advantages and sustainable growth. In contrast, a lack of CSR expertise can segregate the economy of a country from the global supply chain and reduce its sustainability (Grant, 2010).

The World Economic Forum (WEF) defines competitiveness as a set of institutions, politics and factor that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity establishes the sustainable level of prosperity that can be obtained by

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¹ See Crane, A. /McWilliams, A. /Moon, J. /Siegel, D.S.: The Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008

an economy. In other words, more competitive economies have the tendency to produce higher levels of income for their citizens.

Keeping this in mind we will try to analyze the influence that CSR may have of the pillars of competitiveness defined by the WEF as a mean for contributing to sustainable growth and the tendencies that we can extract for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Finally combining the countries profiles with the pillars of competitiveness that are most sensitive to CSR practices we will be able to construct of model, specifically for these countries, of CSR practices in support of sustainable development.

There are a variety of lessons though witch there can be seen and cathegorised the engagement of the public sector in the CSR agenda, depending on the purpose of the analises and the answer to the question “Why is it important to take into consideration the role of the poublic sector?” (Grant, 2010)

Consumers in the global market increasingly seek products and services of companies they believe are doing the “right thing” in terms of human rights and the environment.

Investors look for companies that understand and manage their risks, and pursue innovative strategies in identifying emerging business opportunities.

Employees prefer to work for companies whose values they share, and where they can make a contribution to society².

The 12 Pillars of Competitiveness (World Economic Forum)

The World Economic Forum defines competitiveness as a set of institutions, politics and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity establishes the sustainable level of prosperity that can be obtained by an economy.³ In other words, more competitive economies have the tendency to produce higher levels of income for their citizens. The level of productivity also determines the return rate obtained from investments (physical, human, technological) in an economy. Because the rate of return is a fundamental driver of growing rates of economies, a more competitive economy is more likely to grow on a medium to long term.

The competitiveness concept involves static and dynamic components: even though the productivity of a country determines the ability to sustain a high level of income, is also a central determinant of investments return, which is also a key factor that explains the growth potential⁴.

Considering the complexity and dynamic of the factors behind productivity and competitiveness, in establishing the aggregated competitiveness of a state there are several key aspects that need to be considered. In the WEF view these aspects are grouped in the 12 pillars of competitiveness, and their weighted average gives the Global Competitiveness Index.

These pillars are: Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic environment, Primary education and health, High education and training, Goods market efficiency, Labor market efficiency, Financial market development, Technological readiness, Market size, Business sophistication, Innovation.

² Tuca, M.: Corporate Social Responsibility – supporting policy framework in the EU, <http://egpaconference2011.org/seminar-for-phd-students-list-of-papers/>, pp.6

³ World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, pp.4

⁴ idem

National Profiles: Competitiveness, CSR Potential and Practices

In this next section we will analyze countries of the European Union: Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. These states were chosen for their distinctive features to show the way in which competitiveness indicators can tell the CSR potential of countries. Afterwards we will see the national practices of CSR that the public sector has implemented to see if the analysis has valid conclusions.

For each country the analyses begins with the national profile of competitiveness, for each having the charts to illustrate the findings, in three sections.

The first section presents a selection of key indicators:

- Population figures come from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)'s *State of World Population 2009*.

- Gross domestic product (GDP) data come from the April 2010 edition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s *World Economic Outlook Database*. Reported GDP and GDP per capita are valued at current prices.

- The chart displays the evolution of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP), from 1980 through 2009 (or the period for which data are available) for the economy under review (blue line). The black line plots the GDP-weighted average of GDP per capita of the group of economies to which the economy under review belongs.

Global Competitiveness Index

This section details the economy's performance on the various components of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). The first column shows the country's rank among the 144 economies, while the second column presents the score. Another chart shows the country's performance in the 12 pillars of the GCI (blue line) measured against the average scores across all the economies in the same stage of development (black line).

The most problematic factors for doing business

This chart summarizes those factors seen by business executives as the most problematic for doing business in their economy. The information is drawn from the 2011 edition of the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey. From a list of 15 factors, respondents were asked to select the five most problematic and to rank those from 1 (most problematic) to 5. The results were then tabulated and weighted according to the ranking assigned by respondents.

After the analyses of the country competitiveness profiles, the analyses will focus on the CSR potential of the country: from each pillar considered to be relevant of potential generators of CSR: either domains that can have CSR or drivers or negative influence factors for CSR practices.

In this matter I have considered relevant the selection of indicators as follows: pillar 1 Institutions, pillar 4 Primary education and health, pillar 5 Higher education and training, pillar 6, Goods market efficiency, pillar 7, Labor market efficiency, pillar 8, Financial market development, pillar 9 Technological readiness, pillar 11, Business sophistication and pillar 12 Innovation.


As practice will show the potential analyses is susceptible to offer a clear image of the possibilities to develop a CSR agenda in a national economy.

a. Bulgaria

Country profile

Bulgaria, as a small country with an economy reactive to the international environment, followed the general tendency for Central and Eastern Europe. Thus we can see a growth in terms of GDP, starting in 1993 and going until 2009. Accelerate

rhythm can be seen from 2002 until 2009, under the influence of the European Union. Out of the 144 economies analyzed, Bulgaria went up from position 71 in 2010 to its current position, 62. Considering the pillars of competitiveness relevant to CSR development we can see that Bulgaria scores over the average of the efficiency driven economies in health and primary education, higher education and technological readiness. The first 3 most problematic factors of doing business were identified as corruption, inefficient government bureaucracy and the inadequate supply of infrastructure.



Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012

CSR practices

CSR is a highly important issue and a permanent priority in the government policy of the Republic of Bulgaria. In accordance with the European CSR policies, government policy is oriented towards promoting CSR at national level. The targets set are focused on promoting sustainable development, including the aspects of socio-


economic development and preserving the environment, as well as creating economic and financial tools for CSR promotion⁵.

This round table meeting led to articles published in specialized magazines and newspapers, the preparation and distribution of a booklet, arrangements to present an award to the socially responsible enterprise of the year, and the first National CSR Conference. The first National CSR Conference took place in July 2006, with the participation of state institutions, social partners, business representatives and experts from NGOs and other EU Member States⁶. At the beginning of 2007 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched the first regional project directed at accelerating CSR development in the new EU Member States and, which were the candidate countries Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Slovakia and Turkey. Business networks from Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany will take part in the project, which will contribute to the exchange of experience and good practices in the CSR area. The project is directed at disseminating practices adopted by local and foreign companies, but it is also aimed at business and branch associations, local and central governing bodies, trade unions, scientific circles, NGOs and the media from participating countries. The project is being implemented by the resident representatives of UNDP in the relevant countries, in cooperation with national and regional partners. The main target of this project is to accelerate the development and the application of socially responsible business practices in the new Member States and EU candidate states. This is seen as a way of harmonizing CSR across the European Union, improving competitiveness and social cohesion.

b. Hungary



Country profile

With a flourishing economy, almost double as the average of Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary has felt the effects of the constriction the economy is under for the last 2 years. Its ranking has gone down 12 places since its ranking last year. As an economy in transition between efficiency driven and innovation driven, Hungary scores barely on the average of the group. The pillars relevant to CSR are on the average also with a small contraction in intuitions and business sophistication. The first three most problematic factors for doing business we mention policy instability, access to financing and taxes rates and regulations.



⁵ www.csrforum.com

⁶ Matei, A., Tuca, M.: *Corporate Social Responsibility on the international area. Present development in Romania and Bulgaria*, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1802674, 2011



Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012

CSR practices

In accordance with the European CSR policies, the Hungarian Government has the same European objectives transposed at national level: to promote the implementation of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and to create policies, economic and financial rules promoting voluntary CSR. The CSR concept is mainly driven by large companies, even though socially responsible practices exist in all types of enterprises, public and private, including SMEs and cooperatives⁷.

In the context of globalization and in particular of the Internal Market, companies are increasingly aware that CSR can be of direct economic value, and they want to cooperate with the state authorities.


The promotion of non-discriminatory measures features strongly on the agenda in Hungary. The Act on Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities set the frame in Hungary from December 2000 for ensuring non-discriminatory principles, in conformity with two EU directives, the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive, adopted by the EU Council in 2000. It is in the framework of the EU initiatives on equal treatment and non-discrimination that Hungary has also developed an anti-discriminatory strategy on measures to combat discrimination in acceding and candidate countries.

⁷ Corporate social responsibility. National public policies in the European Union, European Commission, Brussels, 2004


c. Poland

Country profile

For this study, Poland is the biggest country analyzed. With an economy growth above the average of Central and Eastern Europe since 1997, Poland has kept this positive rhythm despite the economic crises. Poland has the best ranking of the four states, 41 and also an transition economy. From the pillars relevant to CSR we can see over the average ranking for higher education, financial market development and technological readiness. The first 3 most problematic factors for doing business we mention tax regulations, restrictive labor regulations and inefficient government bureaucracy.



Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012



Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012

CSR practices

Since 2004, representatives of the government administration have actively participated in the work of many European Union bodies, including the CSR-related activities. The administration has already commenced activities to increase awareness of

the participants of the CSR concept implementation process. The reason being rather the urgent need to effectively transform social structures towards the civil society than the mere membership of Poland in the European Union. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy is the leading body within the government administration as regards CSR⁸.


The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy initiated the preparation of a guidebook titled “CSR Implementation Guide. Nonlegislative Options for the Polish Government” to support the government administration in developing the basis for public policy on CSR. The initiative was joined by the World Bank, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) as well as the Ministry of Economy. The document is a good starting point for the Government to eventually formulate the basis for the social policy on CSR. On the initiative of the Dialogue and Social Partnership Department of the Ministry of Labor, training for government administration personnel was conducted by the World Bank in the IIIrd quarter of 2007. The training covered basic issues of CSR implementation⁹.

By means of its Institute of Labor and Social Studies, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy organizes an annual competition “Human Resources Management Leader”. In 2006 the Institute organized a conference “In Search of HRM Excellence” including the panel: “Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Dilemmas of Development under the EU Policy”. The Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Labor are currently trying to define and possibly include social considerations in public procurement – sustainable public procurement (SPP).

d. Romania


Country profile

Even though Romania had a constant small growth starting with 1992, this growth has been under the average of Central and Eastern Europe. In this matter the ranking of the country has gone only downwards, from 68 to 78. As an efficiency driven economy, the ranking of the pillars relevant to CSR is under average for institutions, goods market efficiency and business sophistication and over average only for higher education. From the first 3 most problematic factors for doing business the biggest one is corruption, followed by tax rates and inefficient government bureaucracy.




⁸ Corporate social responsibility. National public policies in the European Union, European Commission, Brussels, 2004

⁹ www.csrforum.com



Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012



Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012

CSR practices

The government has an important role in promoting CSR in a country in the sense that it helped the harmonization process. Romania entered in a process of harmonization of laws and regulations according to the European ones. Major developments were made regarding environmental protection and ecology: in 1990 was established The National Programmed for Environment Protection and in 1995 was elaborated the Environmental Protection Frame- Law. Many other laws and regulation were issued to fight against corruption, bribery, working conditions, etc¹⁰.

In order to stimulate social responsible behavior of companies and to promote company's involvement in the communities, the government issued the sponsorship law. According to this a company can make sponsorships up to the amount of 3 per thousand from their turnover but no more than 20% from their profit tax. This law entitles companies to use up to 20% of their profit tax on community investments. But if we look at the limitations imposed by the law, we can conclude that only large companies with big turnovers and profits are allowed to large amounts of money on sponsorships, and the SME's are not encouraged to involve communities through sponsorships, even though most of Romanian companies are small ones. Another important aspect of legislation is

¹⁰ www.responsabilitatesociala.ro

represented by the 2% law. This law stimulates taxpayers to donate 2% of their taxes to charities, churches, federations and other nonprofit organizations¹¹.

In 2007, within the Ministry of Labor, Family and Equal Opportunities was established the Corporate Social Responsibility Division under the supervision of a State Secretary. The main responsibility of the CSR division is to develop policies in the field of CSR in cooperation with the government, NGO's, civil society and to promote CSR concept at local level and towards companies. This Division does no longer exist, nor another to take charge of its programs.

Conclusions

The principles of the new public management encourage the import of successful practices, tested in the private sector in the public sector. Furthermore then the import of shapes without content, governs have adopted what might have worked for the public sector.

Empirical research was secondary, analyzing the data of the World Economic Forum report on competitiveness. The original part of this research is the identification of indicators that can illustrate the potential of CSR.

The first question that rises at this point is: what is the connection between competitiveness and CSR in the public sector?

The new demands of global economies bring not only the producers in competition but also national economy as a hole.

Engaging in CSR as an instrument of cooperating and regional integrating facilitates social, political, cultural integration in the region. Enterprises socially and economical receptive will attract the consumers, investors and employees that they desire.

Economies competitiveness can be influence by the CSR practices of the public sector form a state. Thus 8 pillars have been identified form the 12 in which the public sector can intervene though CSR practices. CSR interventions can be thus concentrated to the sectorial framework of these domains.

The pillars and their potential have been indentifies as goes:

Pillar 1: Institutions, with its components public institutions, ethics and corruption, transparency of policy making, private institutions, corporate ethics, ethical behavior of firms and accountability.

- By analyzing this pillar we can identify the perception on public and private institutions, to later establish the lines of action: is there need to invest to sustain the private sector, does the public sector need new projects, in who do the citizens trust more?
- For this pillar social responsible initiatives can act in the sense of raising responsibility, transparency, ethics both in the public and private sector.

Pillar 4: Primary education and health

- Though CSR the public sector cam act in the direction of diversifying the educational programs (technical education, post primary school for qualification of worker, etc).
- On the health part, CSR public-private partnership can identify the vulnerabilities or gaps of present situation and act accordingly.

¹¹ Matei, A., Tuca, M.: *Corporate Social Responsibility on the international area. Present development in Romania and Bulgaria*, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1802674, 2011

Pillar 5: Higher education and training, with its components higher education and on-job-training.

- In regards to higher education strategic partnership aim at connecting the offer with demand, meaning connecting universities with companies (to avoid the unemployment of bachelors), internship programs, and requalification.
- On-the-job training refers to the actions that the public sector can undertake to retrain and constantly prepare its employees to keep the public sector at a level in line with the citizen's demand.

Pillar 6: Goods market efficiency, with its components competition and degree of customer orientations.

- In this matter social responsible actions can offer advantages for public goods and services where the private sector is a direct competitor. The CSR strategies can offer that "plus" that the customers look for.

Pillar 7: Labor market efficiency, with its component flexibility.

- Labor flexibility can be influenced by CSR engagements by the public sector through rewarding movements either by rewards or by retraining of workers.

Pillar 8: Financial market development, with its components trustworthiness and confidence.

- In this matter positive influence can be obtained in this period of financial crises" it is important for the public sector to rebuild the trust in the financial sector of a state to encourage investors"
- Even though the banking sector is the most effected, there is a maximum need to rebuild image because of the negative repercussions it has on the economy as a hole.

Pillar 9: Technological readiness, with its component ICT use.

- Promoting a better training for public servants to apply the newest and most efficient particles and technological innovations can be made using CSR.

Pillar 11: Business sophistication, with its components state of cluster and extent of marketing.

- State of cluster can be influenced with the support of the public sector by encouraging the partnership between stakeholders: the first step to this is discussion forums to identify the potential areas.

Pillar 12: Innovations

- R&D centers can be set up by partnering of public sector institutions with private companies. This would be mutual rewording: private companies are more willing to invest in business with the state and public institutions need the private funds and market orientation.

Considering that the 4 countries we looked at in the study are either efficiency driven or in transition from efficiency driven to innovation driven economies we can say that the focus for competitiveness should take these into consideration. The involvement of CSR practices can complete the 2 pillars of basic requirement, strengthen the efficiency enhancers and support the 2 pillars of innovation and sophistication factors.

Thus, engaging in social responsible practices by the public sector can positively influence most of the competitiveness pillars, so placing a national economy higher in the global scene.

The public sector contributes to this first of all though its role as a meditating partner to establish the legal framework and the by partnering, facilitating and endorsing to practices what it preaches.

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