Tilburg University

Network governance roles

Span, K.C.L.

Publication date:
2012

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Network governance roles

Descriptions, identifications and predictions

Kees Span

Network governance roles

Descriptions, identifications and predictions

A study to advance knowledge about
effects of local network governance roles
in the context of social support in the Netherlands

Kees Span

Network governance roles

Descriptions, identifications and predictions

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University,
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof.dr. Ph. Eijlander,
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college
voor promoties aangewezen commissie
in zaal DZ1 van de Universiteit op vrijdag 1 juni 2012 om 14.15 uur

door

Kees Christianus Leonardus Span

geboren op 16 november 1982
te Tilburg

To Tijn

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

General Introduction

1.1 General Introduction

Public networks and their performance have been the subject of increasing interest in the literature (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Provan & Milward, 2001; Raab & Kenis, 2009). Formulating and executing public policy is increasingly based on working in public networks of organizations. Fundamentally, a network can be defined as a group of goal-oriented, interdependent but autonomous actors that work together to produce a collective output (Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2011). In this network era, there is a widespread belief that knowledge and practice that is necessary to provide effective solutions for the 'wicked' problems of today's society is no longer present in one sole governmental body (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Governments need to collaborate with organizations that together posses the necessary expertise and skills to effectively meet the intricate claims of citizens and organizations in a wide variety of contexts. Most of these networks can be classified as public networks, which are multi-actor arrangements explicitly constituted by public managers to produce and deliver public services (Isett, et al., 2011).

The general tendency has been to decentralize and to force local governments, for example, municipalities, to assume responsibility for formerly national government policies, such as emergency management and social support. Therefore, a special group of public networks are those at the local level. Local governments are constantly confronted with the intricate demands of today's society and, therefore, rely increasingly on relationships among organizations in public networks in local contexts (Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008). Local governments are collaborating in networks in many different contexts, such as education (Meier & O'Toole, 2005), social housing (Silverman, 2008), healthcare and welfare (Mitchell & Shortell, 2000), public safety (Andrew, 2009), the environment (Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002) and social policies (Gilsing, 2007). Because it is presumed that local governments better understand local needs, they may be able to govern local networks more adequately.
Consequently, local governments are free to make choices in designing and performing their own role so as to achieve the most effective and efficient policy results.
For the past 15 years, the study of public networks has been a central focus within public management research. The larger part of the research on public networks has focused on the questions why and when public networks are formed. Important insights that resulted from these questions are that the centrality of an actor determines his ability to exert power and to be more influential. The results also demonstrated that trust in network partners evolves gradually, and that organizations participate in networks because of similarity (homophily) and necessity (complementarity) (Provan, et al., 2007). An important conclusion derived from a literature review on public networks is that the focus on network governance is still in its infancy (Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007). Hence, there are still many aspects of public networks and its performance that are not well understood.
Local public networks can be governed in many different ways and also practitioners are often unaware of the best way to govern their network (Klijn, Edelenbos, Kort, & van Twist, 2008). Therefore, additional research is needed to advance public management research and knowledge about the various manners in which local governments can best manage their network (Gilsing, 2005; Herranz, 2008, 2010; Isett, et al.,

2011; Pestman, 2008; Pollitt, 2005; Van Slyke, 2007). In this dissertation, we want to advance knowledge about the effect of variety in governance roles within local public networks on performance, in theory and in the empirical reality of social support in the Netherlands.

The central research question of this dissertation is: *How do different local public network roles result in different outcomes and how is this effect influenced by network contingencies in the context of social support in the Netherlands?*

In order to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the effects of a variety of governance roles on network performance this thesis is structured around an iterative research process in science: Describe, identify and predict (Whetten, 1989). This iterative process is situated in theoretical and empirical studies.

1.1.1 Describe

Perhaps the most fundamental issue public network scholars' face today is the diverse definitions on key terms within their studies (Isett, et al., 2011). Governance roles and network performance are both phenomena that need specific theoretical attention (Provan, et al., 2007). Theoretical descriptions clearly delimitate the dependent and independent variables of this project and form the important first phase in our attempt to advance knowledge about the effects of variety in governance roles on network performance. After we have clearly defined the variables under study, our next step is to describe how these variables are related. This logical path of relationships has to be set into our research context; that is. the local public networks.

1.1.2 Identify

Theoretical considerations need to be translated into and identified within the empirical reality in order to contribute to our understanding. Most studies on governance roles so far present theoretical considerations rather than empirical investigations (Dekker, 2004). In particular, there is a lack of empirical knowledge about the existence of sets of governance activities within local public networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007; Provan, 2009). A critical question in this phase of the iterative process is whether the structured theoretical perspective on governance roles and network performance remains meaningful when it is placed into an empirical context. Are the theoretically defined variables of the description stage also of use in the empirical reality?

1.1.3 Predict

Now, we are finally able to examine whether different network roles predict different outcomes and how this effect is influenced by network contingencies (Provan, 2009; Provan & Kenis, 2008). In the last stage of our research project concerning the effects of governance role variety on the performance of local public networks we are finally able to formulate predictions. Thereby we explore the empirical reality of theoretical considerations in the particular context of social support in the Netherlands. This stage helps to explore whether our theoretical propositions predict the relation between governance role variety and network performance in reality.

1.2 Empirical domain

The Netherlands has over time developed into a welfare state with a very high level of services for care and welfare. This high level of services is achieved by an institutional system of co-government between the national government and the local governments. In the past, the responsibility for initiating and formulating policies for care and welfare was in the hands of the national government, whereas the practical implementation of policies was mainly a task of the local governmental organizations (Rouw & Schillemans, 2005; Schalk, van der Ham & Roozendaal, 2006).

However, because of changes in demographic and socio-economic conditions, the level of services in this system of co-government, appeared to become in danger (Haket & Martens, 2006). In order to preserve the quality as well as the affordability of services, a reorientation of the role of the different governmental layers in the Dutch welfare state was deemed to be necessary (Noordegraaf & Meulen, 2005). This development was in line with other changes that were emerging in the relationships between the state and other civil actors.

The role of the Dutch government as the sole authoritarian actor and main player in the welfare state gradually disappears (Enthoven, 2005; Rouw & Schillemans, 2005). Today, the position of the Dutch national government can be better characterized as a kind of co-player (Klijn, 1996).

In the past, the national government recognized the importance of a reorientation of roles and responsibilities between national and local governments. A vision on a different structural organization of the welfare state was formulated in the government statement 'a different government' (Noordegraaf & Meulen, 2005). The purpose of this vision was to make more effective and more efficient connections between products and services, and the specific needs of individual citizens. To achieve this purpose, a much greater emphasis is being placed on the responsibility of the citizens themselves and their social network. At the same time, the responsibility of organizations and governments in the direct local 'home' environment of the citizens is increased. To enable individual citizens and local environments to take this responsibility, the national government had to organize itself in a different way. A central theme in this process of reorganization was a move towards more decentralization.

The program 'a different government' had consequences for many aspects of the Dutch welfare state. Forceful statements about 'more discretion for local governments', or 'more decentralization within education' are heard for many years now (Derksen & Schaap, 2004; van Gestel, 1995; Michels & Meijer, 2003; Noordegraaf & Meulen, 2005; Turkenburg, 1999).

A recent example of the national government to implement principles of the program 'a different government' is the development of the Social Support Act (in Dutch: Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning, Wmo). The Wmo was implemented in January 2007 (Schalk et al., 2006). The reasons to implement the Wmo were related to demographic and socio-economic trends, such as the ageing of the population and an individualization process in the society, which did put the affordability and quality of care in the Netherlands to the test. The segmented structure of the original Dutch health care insurance system appeared to be not geared to the demands of a future-proof system.

The Social Support Act formulates the legal basis for various forms of care which were in an earlier stage covered by the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ), such as domestic aid and assistance to facilitate participation in society. The aim of this change was to limit the goals of the AWBZ to what this law was initially intended for: the insurance of severe chronic and permanent care, which encompasses great financial risks for individuals (Pruijssers, 2004; Schols, 2004). The implementation of the Wmo can also be seen as a cost-containment measure, as the budget for the Wmo is lower than the funds reserved for the same care in the AWBZ. The national government, however, argued that less funding was needed since municipalities could provide this care more efficiently (Ministerie van VWS, 2005). In addition, according to the national government, people should take more responsibility to take care for each other. Only in case when voluntary or informal care, for instance by family members and neighbours, is insufficient or impossible, professional care might be made available.

With the introduction of the Social Support Act, municipalities became responsible for social support within their local community. The main aim of the Social Support Act is that every citizen should be able to fully participate in all facets of society and that the municipality should support this by helping the citizen to overcome hindrances that people may experience in achieving that aim. This means that the municipality has to arrange that social support services will be provided through the local public network, for instance, by homecare and welfare providers, housing associations or by network partners that provide for instance mobility aids such as wheelchairs (Ministerie van VWS, 2006). To ensure the quality and affordability of these products and services, municipalities have to use a governance role to establish connections between a network of organizations that operate in the traditionally distinct policy areas of housing, social work, and care. Social support is a cross-cutting policy field characterised by fragmentation, departmentalisation, and increased external dependencies. Integrated cooperation between organizations in this cross-cutting policy field demands for a local public network director.

A municipality is responsible for the development as well as the execution of local social support policy. Goals are set and appointments are made between municipalities and the (social) partner organizations. In the process of policy execution the question arises whether and how this process is actually directed, and to what degree network organizations are deviating from formulated policies. Municipalities as well as social partners are confronted with new authority structures. The importance of the social partners is evident in the Dutch context, since The Netherlands have the most extensive non-profit sector of the world (van der Donk & Hendriks, 2001). A municipality is keen to deal in a good way with these important network partners. With the implementation of the Wmo, the social partners have to bargain with the municipality in order to try to receive critical (financial) resources, necessary for them to continue their day-to-day business. Municipalities as well as social partners are confronted with these new roles and the frictions these new relations can cause to their historical developed relationships.

Local governments are expected to have better insight into local needs and opportunities than the national government and, therefore, to be better able to anticipate local possibilities (Ministerie van VWS, 2006). Municipalities have discretion with regard to their governance role in order to balance local needs and local

possibilities. However, since municipalities are free to implement the act to their own whishes, differences in interpretation between municipalities emerge, which results in differences in type and level of support offered to people. This in turn leads to regional differences in terms of financial impact on individuals in need of social support (Schäfer, Kroneman, Boerma, van den Berg, Westert, Devillé, van Ginneken, 2010). Initial explorative studies on the role of governments in this changing context stressed the importance of gaining more insight into the different roles that could be taken by local governments. More information on advantages and disadvantages of different governance roles will enable the Dutch municipalities to evaluate their own role and to make better systematic choices in relation to network performance (SCP, 2010).

From a theoretical point of view the Social Support Act is also very interesting. Most studies related to local contexts rely on a small number of cases. Indeed, it is hard to include large numbers of comparable, equally-structured, local public networks into a study on the effects of a variety in governance roles on network performance (Isett, et al., 2011; Provan, 2009). As a result of the introduction of the Social Support Act in 2007, Dutch municipalities became responsible for the implementation of social support, which offers a unique opportunity to examine the effect of diversity in governance roles on network performance for 430 similarly structured networks (Ministerie van VWS, 2006; SCP, 2010).

We have limited our study to the governance role of the municipality. We consider the municipality as an uniform actor. We are aware that a municipality consists of multiple actors. Governance roles are embedded in a political arena with for example, politicians, aldermen, and different departments struggling for power. However, in every municipality, project managers social support are the main actors in governing the networks operating under the same conditions. In our study we therefore used project managers social support to get information from informed respondents on the main governance roles and performance of the local networks.

Governing social support networks demands for a reorientation of municipalities as well as the social partners in the local network. In our project, we only studied the mechanisms of governance from the perspective of the directing municipality. Therefore, we certainly do not intend to capture the full complexity of provisions in the welfare state. However, with regard to the Social Support Act, the municipality is assigned, by mandate, as legal director of the local network. In our study we therefore primarily considered the perspective of the municipality regarding the governance of the network.

Because the principles underlying the social support policy in the Netherlands are unique, the Social Support Act can be characterized as a typical natural experiment. The central debate about the functioning of the act concentrates on the possibilities of local authorities to formulate and execute their governance roles (Schalk, 2006; SCP, 2010). Therefore, we use the Dutch Social Support Act as a unique case in order to advance knowledge about the effect of variety in governance roles in local public networks on performance, in theory and in practice. The central tenet in this dissertation is to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the effects of a variety of governance roles on local public network performance. To contribute to this understanding, we describe characteristics of local public networks, governance roles, contingency factors, and performance indicators. We also describe theoretically informed relations between those

variables. Thereafter, we use the context of social support in the Netherlands to identify the theoretical considerations in the empirical reality. Furthermore, we examine the effect of a variety in governance roles on network performance to predict its use in the reality of Dutch social support.

In the next section, we elaborate on the studies that constitute the different phases within our research project.

1.3 Overview of the thesis

Following the rationale to advance knowledge about the effect of variety in governance roles in local public networks on performance, in theory and in practice in the context of Dutch social support in the Netherlands, this dissertation describes, identifies and predicts the effects of variety of governance roles on performance in the local public networks of social support in the Netherlands.

The description phase starts in chapter 2 with examining the research questions: *what are governance roles in local public networks, and what activities within network governance determine the variety in possible governance roles?* To answer these research questions, we have conducted an empirical theoretical analysis of the literature on governance roles based on a concept analysis of existing definitions about governance roles.

Network governance is considered to be a multidimensional concept and has offered a conceptual umbrella wide enough to encompass virtually any activity of a government when working in networks of organizations. Therefore, scholars suggest to clearly delimitate the meaning of network governance (Hupe & Klijn, 1997; Isett, et al., 2011; Pröpper, Litjens, & Weststeijn, 2004; van den Berg, 2001; van Dolron, 2006).

An answer on what governance roles are and what governance activities determine the variety in governance roles allows for a more systematic implementation of the governance role by local authorities. It also provides a more theoretical basis to assess governance attempts by the governed parties, as well as users of products and services that result from governance roles (Ball, Broadbent, & Moore, 2002; Pröpper, et al., 2004). Furthermore, it facilitates a scientific discussion on consensus on governance, partly by mapping out the different governance roles and through the research into the effectiveness of the different forms of governance (Williams, Barclay, & Schmied, 2004).

The description stage continues in chapter 3 by examining the research question: *which governance roles of local governments work best under which contingency conditions, according to literature?* This research question is also answered by conducting a literature study. In a recent review on interorganisational networks, Provan et al. (2007) concluded that an examination of how to govern networks well, and under which circumstances is an important challenge. Therefore in this chapter, we describe a model that positions governance roles, network contingencie,s and network performance in local public networks. Besides describing governance roles (i.e.,the independent variables), contingency variables (i.e., moderating variables) and network performance (i.e., the dependent variable), this article deals with positioning local public networks as a distinct form of interorganizational networks. It provides specific characteristics of these networks on terms of network nature and network structure.

Describing what governance roles are and how governance roles affect network performance, influenced by the presence of certain contingency conditions is not context specific. Chapters 2 and 3 delimitate the meaning of local public network

governance. We also formulate propositions that are useful when different local public contexts are under study.

After describing the variables and relations between variables, translation into the empirical reality is necessary. Therefore, we proceed our project with the identification stage. This stage identifies the existence of governance role variety within a specific empirical local public context: Social support policy in the Netherlands. The empirical part of our dissertation starts with the question: '*which governance roles can be distinguished in local government policy documents about the Dutch Social Support Act?*' (Chapter 4). The data underlying this empirical exploration were abstracted from mandatory policy documents of local governments concerning governance in respect of the Dutch Social Support Act. These documents were analysed using mixed qualitative and quantitative research methods within a multiple case study (Yin, 1994). This chapter is innovative in linking qualitative and quantitative data, as this has not been done often. The quantitative analysis provides insight in the importance of certain governance roles and characteristics above other roles and its characteristics. The qualitative analysis illustrates how the different roles and underlying characteristics are operationalized in the context of social support in the Netherlands.

Policy documents reflect the intended action regarding governance within local support networks. In chapter 5, we answer the following research question: *can actual governance roles performed by municipalities, reflecting different ways of governing local networks, be identified?* Of the few empirical studies on the governance of networks, most are based on a small number of cases (Herranz, 2008, 2010; Provan & Milward, 1995). To examine how networks are governed in different circumstances, a large number of comparable networks need to be included in the study.

To examine the actual governance roles, we have collected primary data on 186 Dutch municipalities. Electronic questionnaires were sent out and the functionary responsible for the governance role regarding the Social Support Act filled out the actual choices made regarding governance roles. Latent class cluster analysis is used to identify different types of governance roles based on functions within governance roles. This chapter also provides insight in differences in network contingencies when clusters of local authorities rely on a particular governance role.

To identify what governance roles municipalities rely upon we have used qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative methods are used to gain insight into different views on governance roles by local governments. Quantitative methods were used to identify significant differences within the variety of governance roles. Chapters 4 and 5 have identified the theoretical variables within the empirical reality of social support in the Netherlands. The identification stage provides insight in the meaning of the theoretical concepts in a specific empirical context. This stage also elaborates on the actual reliance of local authorities on the possible variety of local public governance roles regarding social support in the Netherlands.

After the theoretical variables are translated and identified in the context of social support in the Netherlands, we are able to continue with the prediction stage. The prediction stage offers empirical investigations of the propositions on the relationships between governance roles and network outcomes. Network governance can produce either positive or negative externalities, depending on how governance is structured and organized (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 1996).

Another challenge for governments in public networks is to determine what successful network outcomes are, and for whom? In the shift from government to governance, governments face network performance ambiguity. Network performance is a political concept. Successful performance is viewed differently depending on which stakeholders are involved. Until now, scholars measure network performance by determining whether network organizations judge that the network is accomplishing its goals at the right quality and with the appropriate resources (Daft, 2001; Klijn, et al., 2008).

Most studies on network performance thus rely on the judgment of the individual network members on performance. Therefore in chapter 6, we focus on the research question: *how do different municipal governance roles affect the municipality's own evaluation of its social support performance?* In this study 175 municipalities have evaluated the functioning and performance of their own local public network in an electronic questionnaire (also used for chapter 5). In this chapter, evaluations of municipalities are considered to be the key indicator concerning network performance. Municipalities are the lead organizations within the local networks concerning social support. As key stakeholder with a central position in the network, local authorities are made responsible for former national policies. To bear responsibility, a local authority has to evaluate the performance of the network, for which they are responsible.

The prediction stage continues in chapter 7. This chapter deals with the research question: *what is the effect of various governance roles of municipalities on citizens' evaluations of social support?* After examining public network performance, Provan & Milward (2001) stated that the rationale for public networks is most apparent at the community level. Public networks seek to satisfy their citizens' demands. The degree to which these demands are adequately met constitutes the most important performance indicator (Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2009). Citizens are the actors that receive products and services that are the result of the attempt of the local authority to use the governance role as to meet their demands in the best possible way. To answer the research question, we have linked two existing data sets conducted on two different hierarchical levels. The first dataset contained data on governance roles of municipalities implementing the Dutch Social Support Act and the characteristics of these social support networks as gathered for chapters 5 and 6. The second dataset resulted from an evaluation of the Social Support Act, commissioned by the national government and executed by The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP). This data set contains individual evaluations of 1476 respondents. To relate governance roles to local citizens' evaluations of social support, we performed multilevel analyses.

Finally, chapter 8 presents a summary and discussion of the major findings of this dissertation, and recommendations based on the previous chapters.

References

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network Management Research. J Public Administration Research & Theory, 11(3), 295-326.

Agranoff, R.., & McGuire, M. (2003). Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

Andrew, S. A. (2009). Regional Integration Through Contracting Networks: An Emperical Analysis of Institutional Collective Action. Urban Affairs Review, 44, 378-402.

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., Law, J., & Walker, R. M. (2009). Centralization, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 19(1), 57-80. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum039

Ball, A., Broadbent, J., & Moore, C. (2002). Best Value and the Control of Local Government: Challenges and Contradictions Public money & management, 22(2), 9.

Brass, D. J., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. R., & Tsai, W. P. (2004). Taking stock of networks and organizations: A multilevel perspective. Academy Of Management Journal, 47(6), 795-817.

Daft, R. L. (2001). Organization Theory and Design. . Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing.

Dekker, H. C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. Accounting Organizations And Society, 29(1), 27-49. doi: 10.1016/s0361-3682(02)00056-9

Denters, B., & Rose, L. E. (2005). Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Derksen, W. & Schaap, L. (2004). Lokaal bestuur. 's-Gravenhage: Elsevier Bedrijfsinformatie.

Enthoven, G. (2005). Representatief en participatief, een tussenbalans na tien jaar interactief besturen. Bestuurskunde (2), 21-29.

Gilsing, R. (2005). Bestuur aan Banden. Den Haag: SCP.

Gilsing, R. (2007). Intergovernmental relations and the effectiveness of local governance: the case of Dutch youth policy. International Review Of Administrative Sciences, 73(1), 45-64.

Gössling, T., & Oerlemans, L. (2007). Inside networks : a process view on multi-organisational partnerships, alliances and networks. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Haket, E.R. & Martens, F.L. (2006). Info wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning. 's-Gravenhage: Elsevier overheid.

Herranz, J. (2008). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 18, 1-31.

Herranz, J. (2010). Multilevel Performance Indicators for Multisectoral Networks and Management. American Review of Public Administration, 40(4), 445-460. doi: 10.1177/0275074009341662

Hupe, P. L., & Klijn, E. H. (1997). De gemeente als regisseur van het preventief jeugdbeleid

Klijn, E.H. (1996). Regels en sturing in netwerken: de invloed van netwerkregels op de herstructurerig van naoorlogse wijken. Delft: Eburon.

Isett, K. R., Mergel, I. A., LeRoux, K., Mischen, P. A., & Rethemeyer, R. K. (2011). Networks in Public Administration Scholarship: Understanding Where We Are and Where We Need to Go. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 21, 157-173.

Klijn, E., Edelenbos, J., Kort, M., & van Twist, M. (2008). Facing management choices: an analysis of managerial choices in 18 complex environmental public partnership projects. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74, 251-282.

Koppenjan, J. F. M., & Klijn, E. (2004). Public management and policy networks. public management review, 2, 135-158.

Lincoln, J. R., Gerlach, M., & Ahmadjian, C. L. (1996). Keiretsu Networks and Corporate Performance in Japan. . American Sociological Review, 61, 67-88.

Lubell, M., Schneider, M., Scholz, J., & Mete, M. (2002). Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions. American Journal of Political Science, 46, 48-63.

Meier, K. J., & O'Toole, L. J. (2005). Managerial networking - Issues of measurement and research design. Administration & Society, 37(5), 523-541. doi: 10.1177/0095399705277142

Michels, A.M.B. & Meijer, A.J. (2003). Horizontalisering van bestuur: een vraag om

nieuwe vormen van publieke verantwoording. Bestuurswetenschappen, 57(4), 329-347.

Ministerie van VWS. (2005). Memorie van toelichting op de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning.

Ministerie van VWS. (2006). Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning. Staatscourant, 351.

Mitchell, S., & Shortell, S. (2000). The governance and management of effective community health partnerships: A typology for research, policy, and practice. Milbank Quarterly, 78(2), 241-289.

Moynihan, D. P. (2005). Leveraging Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.

Noordegraaf, M. & van der Meulen, M. (2005). Verouderde verniewing? Hoe een andere overheid echt anders kan zijn. Bestuurskunde (4), 2-12.

O'Toole, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2004). Public management in intergovernmental networks: Matching structural networks and managerial networking. Journal Of Public Administration Research & Theory, 14(4), 469-494.

Pestman, P. (2008). Naar een betere benutting van beleidsvrijheid door decentrale overheden. Bestuurswetenschappen, 1, 63-72.

Pollitt, C. (2005). Decentralization. In Ferlie E., L. E. J. Lyn & C. Pollitt (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Management (pp. 371-397). Oxford: Oxford University.

Pröpper, I., Litjens, B., & Weststeijn, E. (2004). Lokale regie uit macht of onmacht? : onderzoek naar de optimalisering van de gemeentelijke regiefunctie.

Provan, K. G. (2009). Examining the parts of the whole? Expanding the focus of Organizational Network Research. Paper presented at the EGOS, Barcelona.

Provan, K. G., Fish, A., & Sydow, J. (2007). Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal Of Management, 33(3), 479-516.

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. Journal Of Public Administration Research &Theory, 18(2), 229-252.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. (1995). A preliminary theory of interorganizational network effectiveness: a comparative-study of 4 community mental-health systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 1-33.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks. Public Administration Review, 61(4), 414-423.

Pruissers, N. (2004). Toekomst AWBZ. Diemen: Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ)

Raab, J., & Kenis, P. (2009). Heading Toward a Society of Networks. Journal of Management Inquiry, 18(3), 198-210. doi: 10.1177/1056492609337493

Rethemeyer, R. K., & Hatmaker, D. M. (2008). Network management reconsidered: An inquiry into management of network structures in public sector service provision. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(4), 617-646.

Rouw, R. & Schillemans, T. (2005). Horizontalisering als complement op een andere overheid. Bestuurskunde (6), 13-22.

Schäfer, W., Kroneman, M., Boerma, W., van den Berg, M., Westert, G., Devillé, W. & van Ginneken, E. (2010). The Netherlands: Health system review. Health Systems in Transition. 12(1).

Schalk, R. (2006). De Wmo komt! . Deventer: Kluwer.

Schols, J.M.G.A. (2004). De toekomst van de chronische zorg, ons een zorg? Van oude structuren, de dingen, die voorbijgaan. Amsterdam: Dutch University Press.

SCP. (2010). Op weg met de Wmo: Evaluatie van de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 2007-2009. 's-Gravenhage: SCP.

Silverman, R. M. (2008). The influence of nonprofit networks on local affordable housing funding - Findings from a national survey of local public administrators. Urban Affairs Review, 44(1), 126-141.

Turkenburg, M. (1999). Gemeentelijk onderwijsachterstandenbeleid. 's-Gravenhage: SCP.

van den Berg, J. T. J. (2001). Au Fond: Wat is dat: Regie? B & G, 28(10), 1.

van der Donk, W.B.H.J. & Hendriks, F. (2001). Bewegingen op het middenveld: de bestuurskunde van maatschappelijk besturen. Bestuurskunde (1), 4-13.

van Dolron, J. H. A. (2006). Gemeentelijke regie: techniek of gevoel. B & G, 33, 38.

van Gestel, N.M. (1995). De onzichtbare overheid. Beleidswetenschap, 9(1), 79.

Van Slyke, D. M. (2007). Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship. J Public Adm Res Theory, 17(2), 157-187. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mul012

Whetten, D. A. (1989). What constitutes a theoretical contribution? Academy of Management Review, 14, 490-495.

Williams, P., Barclay, L., & Schmied, V. (2004). Defining Social Support in Context: a Necessary Step in Improving Research, Intervention, and Practice. Qualitative Health Research, 14(7), 942-960.

Yin, R. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Clarifying the local governance role:

An empirical theoretical analysis of the literature

Abstract

Through new legislation such as the Social Support Act (Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning, Wmo), the national government is increasingly assigning municipalities a governance role in finding solutions for local matters. However, much remains unclear as to the meaning and the implementation of this municipal governance role. Drawing on scientific governance literature, this article applies concept analysis to formulate an answer to the question: what does 'giving governance' mean? This answer consists of an explorative, general definition and a model. This model is subsequently related to concepts used in public administration such as commissioning, co-production and facilitating. Following their validation, the definition and model should help municipalities and researchers to describe, analyze and discuss the various municipal governance roles. This will then enable municipalities to pursue their governance role in a well-founded manner.

2.1 Introduction

In the governance literature, much attention is devoted to the collaboration between public authorities and private and public organizations in the form of networks (see e.g. Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Provan, Fish & Sydow 2007; Kilduf & Tsai, 2003). One example of such a collaborative network is provided by organizations operating within the scope of the Wmo. Every organization involved has its own organizational goals, but is also expected to contribute to the overall goal of an affordable and qualitatively adequate social support for vulnerable citizens within the municipality. The national government has given municipalities a governance role with a view to achieving this overall goal in collaboration with other parties.

How this governance role is pursued will affect the achievement of this overall goal. Municipalities are free to make their own choices in the implementation of their role, resulting in a certain amount of variation in municipal governance roles. This variety is constructive, as it allows researchers to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the different implementations by the municipal authorities (Gilsing, 2007; Pestman, 2008; Pollitt, 2005).

Governance is a frequently used concept in practice, though the meaning of the term is understood in several different ways (Van der Putten et al., 2002). Various authors argue for a clear delimitation of the meaning of the term 'governance' (Van den Berg, 2001; Van Dolron, 2006; Hupe & Klijn, 1997; Pröpper et al., 2004). This would allow for a more systematic implementation of the governance role by municipalities, as well as an assessment of the joint activities by the governed parties (Ball et al., 2002; Pröpper et al., 2004). Such a definition would facilitate a scientific discussion of the meaning of the term, partly by mapping out the different directing roles and through the research into the effectiveness of the different forms of governance (Williams et al., 2004).

This article therefore formulates a general definition of governance. Subsequently, an explorative model is used to further describe forms of collaboration such as commissioning, co-production and facilitating as possible implementations of municipal governance.

2.2 Method

A concept analysis was conducted to obtain a general definition of the term 'municipal governance'. Concept analysis helps to further delimit a concept and thereby contributes to theory development (Morse et al., 1996; Xyrichis & Ream, 2007). To this end, first the literal definitions offered in the literature were identified. The (Dutch) databases that were used are: 'Abi inform', 'Nederlandse Centrale Catalogus', 'Online Contents Landelijk' and the 'Online Contents Tijdschriftartikelen UvT'. The used search terms were (in Dutch): 'directing role', 'directing', 'direction' and 'local policy'. For each definition it was determined what terms give content to the definition (relevant features), after which these relevant features were grouped according to shared properties (categories). Also, literature references in the found articles were used to select supplementary literature, and the different opinions concerning the relevant features were compared and contrasted to form the foundation for a decision model for the implementation of municipal governance.

The results of the literature study were submitted to five scholars working at public administration faculties of the universities of Tilburg and Rotterdam, with the question whether any significant authors or scientific articles about governance had been omitted. All scholars indicated that the presented literature sufficed.

2.3 Results

The quest resulted in twelve literal definitions of governance in a public administration context. The scientific underpinning of the twelve definitions is often unclear, however. Thus, how a particular definition was developed is only explicated in the article by Pröpper et al. (2004). These authors used interviews as a means of empirically validating their self-developed concept of governance among users of the concept. These authors also state that further research is required into the plurality of definitions. The other articles do not explicate whether the definition originates from the authors, or from users, or is the result of a literature study. None of the selected articles has verifiably used an existing definition of governance with the intention of refining this definition. The definitions moreover generally do not address the options open to municipalities when taking on and carrying out a governance role (Gilsing, 2007; Hofman et al., 2005).

The articles do provide information about the features that characterize the municipal governance role, according to the literal definitions. Table 1 presents these features. We have grouped these features into more abstract categories (Table 2) as a means of exploring a general definition of governance, which can subsequently be refined and tested through empirical research. This is followed by a systematic discussion of each of the identified categories.

Table 1 - Features of definitions and grouping into categories.

Reference	Definition	Category
(in't Veld, 1989)	Governance is a form of <u>targeted influencing</u> within a <u>particular context.</u>	steering boundaries
(Koppenjan et al., 1990)	Governance is <u>targeted influencing</u> of the behavior of <u>individuals, groups or organizations,</u> or of their mutual relations.	steering actor
(Denters, 1999)	The municipal governance role concerns situations in which the municipal authority, on the basis of higher legislation or of an autonomous political choice, bears <u>responsibility</u> for policy development, but is <u>dependent</u> on the cooperation of one or <u>more parties</u> for the development of this policy.	responsibility dependency actor
(ROB, 1999)	Governance means that 'the municipal government' should have <u>tools</u> with which to <u>influence various actors</u> in the new fragmented social arena, even if it lacks explicit <u>steering options</u> and <u>competencies</u>.	actor steering boundaries
(ZonMw, 2006)	The director <u>monitors</u> the whole and <u>steers</u> when and where necessary.	monitoring steering
(Terpstra, 2002)	Governance is the manner in which various municipal administrative <u>actors</u>, within the <u>framework of rules</u> of the democratic state, attempt to <u>promote</u> the development of the <u>respective policy.</u>	actor boundaries goal steering
(van der Ham, 2002)	Within a governance role, <u>objectives</u> need to be set, a <u>desired quality</u> should be defined, and <u>partners</u> should be invited to indicate their added value in achieving these <u>goals</u>.	boundaries actor goals
(Fiers & Jansen, 2003)	Governance is the municipality's behavior that attempts to (locally) <u>steer</u> social processes with <u>relevant actors</u> in the direction it sees fit, regardless of the municipality's <u>authority</u> over those <u>actors.</u>	actor steering vision dependency
(SCP, 2002)	The governance role implies the assignment to <u>bring together local parties</u> – institutions and services – that operate in the social domain and act under different governance structures, and to develop a <u>joint vision</u> and make <u>policy agreements.</u>	actor alignment vision boundaries

Reference	Definition	Category
(Pröpper et al., 2004)	Governance is a particular form of steering that concentrates on the alignment of actors, their goals and actions to form a more or less cohesive unity, with a view to a certain result.	steering alignment actor goal
(Landman & Muller, 2004)	Governance has to do with coordination, with joint responsibility, with tasks and competencies and with boundaries for implementation.	alignment responsibility Boundaries
(Daniel van der Laan, 2005)	Governance as a term should make clear that the collaboration between (...) parties is necessary, but that this collaboration will not arise spontaneously. Whenever organizational boundaries are transcended, it seems to require a third party to direct the collaboration.	actor boundaries

Table 2 - Categories of governance

Category	Relevant aspects
Actor	'Individuals, groups, or organizations', 'one or more actors', 'various actors', 'diverse public administration actors', 'partners', 'relevant actors', 'local parties', 'actors' and 'parties'.
Steering	'targeted influencing', 'steering options', 'correcting', 'promoting', 'steer' and 'steering',
Boundaries	'particular context' ,'framework of rules', 'competencies, tools, social arena', 'objectives, desired quality', 'policy agreements', 'tasks and competencies', 'prerequisites' and 'boundaries'
Vision	'joint vision',
Dependency	'dependent' and 'authority'
Alignment	'alignment of actors'
Goal	'goals' and 'a certain result'
Responsibility	'responsibility'
Monitoring	'monitors'

2.3.1 Actor

Governance involves multiple actors. The definitions reveal that there is no consensus on the role of the diverse actors in governance. Most of the definitions use neutral terms such as 'actors' and 'parties', or they classify these actors as 'individuals', 'groups' and 'organizations'. Such neutral terms do not help develop the governance role. A term like 'partner' does add some specificity by placing a greater emphasis on the hierarchical relations between the various partners. According to the definitions given, the roles assigned to the different actors can range from executer to partner to initiator.

2.3.2 Steering

For some authors, governance is synonymous with steering (Pröpper et al., 2004). Others view steering as more of a tool with which to govern (Fiers & Jansen, 2003). Van der Aa et al. (2002) discuss this distinction, stating that governance is closely related to steering and management, but that these concepts generally imply a commanding role. Such a commanding role is not always necessary from the point of view of governing. After all, steering and management can also be characterized in terms of consulting, negotiating, and persuading (Oosten, 2006).

2.3.3 Boundaries

By setting boundaries, the freedom of the various actors is curtailed. Virtually every author, including those that do not offer an explicit definition of governance, acknowledge the importance of setting boundaries, but the question is what these boundaries are, and by whom they are set? Van der Aa et al. (2002) raise the question whether public authorities should specify social performances to serve as benchmarks for all organizations within the network, or whether they should bring together parties and, on the basis of consensus, rigidly set the boundaries of direction.

2.3.4 Dependency

Dependency is related to power. There are several power bases for more formal or informal power (Scott, 2003). Wherever definitions include the term competencies or influencing, reference is made to power and dependency. For example, competencies constitute a formal power base through which to impose a certain working procedure on another actor.

2.3.5 Alignment

Alignment is about which actor will contribute what service, so that it helps achieve the jointly set end result. A municipality may impose alignment unilaterally. Alignment between parties can also be achieved through consultation on the basis of demand and supply in the policy domains where the municipality needs to give direction.

2.3.6 Goal

There is a difference between goals and objectives. Objectives are preconditions that need to be fulfilled in order to reach the goal. The goal is the end result to be achieved through governance and the fulfillment of the preconditions. Even if the municipality defines its goal directly, it can determine the objectives that ensure the goal's success in consultation with other actors.

2.3.7 Responsibility

Responsibility is interpreted in a variety of ways. Landman and Muller (2004) refer to a shared responsibility involving all actors. Denters (1999) posits that the municipality bears responsibility for the development of policy.

2.3.8 Vision

A vision is the starting point from which a goal is defined or fleshed out. In order to achieve a goal, the parties that were involved in the initial deliberations about the goal may be a relevant factor.

2.3.9 Monitoring

Monitoring entails mapping out or keeping tabs on the different relevant aspects of the directed process. Having a clear view of whether and how something happens through monitoring can sometimes suffice as an effective form of influencing.

2.4 Discussion and conclusion

All of the categories discussed appear to constitute an aspect of governance. For instance, governance in any form is impossible if it does not involve multiple actors. Goals determine in part which preconditions are required (e.g. money, time, tasks and competencies). Monitoring is required to determine whether preconditions are exceeded or violated, whether goals will be or have been achieved, whether responsibilities have been met, and so on. The different categories, taken together, result in the following general definition of the municipal governance role: 'A municipality governs when it steers through the alignment of multiple actors to reach a goal based on a vision. In this process the municipality and other actors have various dependency relations and responsibilities that arise from the preconditions imposed on the various actors. These preconditions are controlled through monitoring.'

In designing and implementing its governance role, a municipality has various options. These options are presented per category in the model below. The variety of options that a municipality can choose within the model connects to discussions about the possible ways in which the municipality can govern its network partners (Mandell, 2001; O'Toole, 1997). The main options concern the question whether the municipality, in its relations with other actors, keeps a tight rein or instead takes a facilitating approach (Arnstein, 1971; Agranoff en Mcguire, 2001; Hupe & Klijn, 1997). Here, a distinction can be made as to whether the municipality "commands the other party", "collaborates with the other party", or "leaves it to the other party". Commanding can be related to the principles of commissioning, collaborating implies co-production, and leaving it to the other party is characteristic of a facilitating approach.

The model thereby offers insights into the actual implementation of the governance role by a municipality. In fact, a municipality's position with respect to the model answers three questions: is the municipality actively involved in the implementation of policy; when does the municipality involve the various actors in the process of governance; and what influence does the municipality subsequently grant to the different actors?

The answers to these questions determine each individual municipality's position within the model. This can then be taken as starting point for an analysis of the effectiveness of the adopted governance role.

Figure 1 - A typology for local network governance

Directing typologies by local government			
Actor	Executer	Partner	Initiator
Steering	Steering by the municipality	Joint steering	Self steering
Boundaries	Fixed boundaries by the municipality	Jointly set boundaries	Boundaries set by the parties
Dependency	Formal dependency	Informal / formal dependency	Informal dependencies
Alignment	Alignment by the municipality	Joint alignment	Alignment by the parties
Goal	Fixed goals by the municipality	Joint goal formulation	Goal formulation by the parties
Responsibility	Municipal responsibilities	Joint responsibility	Responsibility by the partners
Vision	Vision of the municipality	Joint vision formulation	Vision formulation by the parties
Monitoring	Monitoring by the municipality	Joint monitoring	Monitoring by the parties
	Commissioner	**Co-Producer**	**Facilitator**

To explicate the practical relevance of the governance model, the Dutch social support policy field is used to illustrate the different governance forms of the commissioning, co-production and facilitating approaches. Once various municipalities have been positioned within the model, it will then become clear which approach to municipal governance delivers an effective and efficient achievement of general goals. That there is a relation between the different approaches to governance and the achievement of a general goal is repeatedly posited as evident in the governance literature, but has seldom been researched so far (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007).

2.4.1 Commissioner

Commissioning is a governance form that belongs to the 'tight rein' side of the direction model. The municipality formulates an assignment based on a certain municipal vision. The goal of the municipality is also operationalized in this assignment (Bezemer, 2002), and the time schedule and resources to be used are specified (Brown & Potoski, 2004). Then, at the municipality's initiative, alignment takes place to determine which executing parties can meet the requirements of the assignment. The municipality remains responsible for the end result (Bezemer, 2002), but it can steer the party performing the assignment through the schedule of requirements. It is important for the municipality to check the performance of the assignment on a regular basis. Commissioning can be identified within the Dutch social support domain, for instance in the public tendering of domestic help. The municipality has a certain vision as to citizens' needs in terms of domestic help. The municipality then translates this vision into the goal and operationalizes the goal in a Request for Proposal. This document is provided to the various parties (home care organizations, but also private cleaning firms) that, upon contract award, will proceed to deliver the services as defined in a formal contract. The performing parties will annually submit a report to the municipality to account for their implementation of the contract.

2.4.2 Co-Producer

Co-production takes the middle position in the governance model. Here, the various parties within the governance process are viewed as partners. Jointly with the municipality they will steer the governance process in a certain direction through informal steering mechanisms such as negotiating, persuading, and other forms of communication. The resulting direction can be seen as a vision that is developed interactively (Teisman, Edelenbos, Klijn et al., 2004). An important aspect of the co-production process is that goals are defined from the viewpoint of different actors. The guiding principle is a generous and flexible determination of the number of actors involved. Together the parties coordinate what resources are made available to each party. As there is no negotiation on the basis on formal tasks and competencies, the diverse partners each feel responsible for their own contribution to the whole (Larson, 1992). This responsibility also implies that each partner monitors and evaluates its own activities and those of others, to make clear where goals have been achieved, where additional effort is required, or where policy needs to be refined.

Within the domain of the Dutch Social Support Act, co-production can be discerned in situations where municipalities formulate a joint vision, for instance with housing associations, care institutions and welfare organizations on 'the preservation of autonomy' (performance area 6). The parties then jointly define the goal of creating special housing arrangements, after which each party draws on its own particular expertise to realize such arrangements, indicating to the others what resources they intend to apply to this end. In this way they jointly align the requests for support experienced by the different institutions and organizations. Agreements are recorded in dynamic covenants with respect to staffing, subsidies and building lots, but also about consultation structures, for example. Then, throughout the implementation phase the partners continue to discuss the vision, the parties involved and the agreements, and parties are addressed with respect to their responsibilities.

2.4.3 Facilitator

When taking the facilitating approach, the municipality is 'simply' supportive towards parties encountered within a certain policy domain. The municipality will point out opportunities that exist within this policy domain, without imposing any predetermined goals on the partners (Rutgers, 2004). Policy is generally developed at the partners' initiative. First the partners formulate goals, after which they check to see whether funding, administrative capacity and other resources can be made collectively available. The partners bear responsibility for the policy, and the availability of public resources is not strictly necessary to seeing initiatives implemented within a certain policy domain. Partners that are facilitated by the municipality will need to align their formulated and pursued policy through self-direction (Hupe & Klijn, 1997). To arrive at an effective and efficient deployment of resources, the various partners need to monitor the activities. Facilitating for instance occurs where a housing association and care institution initiate the realization of a special housing arrangement. The municipality wishes to contribute as best it can on the grounds of legal procedural obligations, but does not bear responsibility for what the social partners seek to achieve. If the housing arrangement meets the needs and wishes of the parties that require support and that provide support, the continuity of this housing arrangement is assured. The municipality will not

actively intervene, since the directing role as facilitator implies that the institutions are directly responsible for maintaining the housing arrangement.

2.5 Recommendations

This article takes a first step toward a model-based approach to the municipal governance role. The collaborative approaches of commissioning, co-production and facilitating have been elaborated through the model as forms of a municipal governance role. Such a role will often combine components of more than just one of these collaborative approaches. The varying content of the categories reflects the variety in implementation.

The general definition and associated model can thus serve as basis for further empirical research into the municipal governance role. This may for example yield insight into the content as well the reach of municipal governance (Morse et al., 1996). The different implementations may also provide explanations for the differences in effectiveness with respect to achieving general goals. This can then produce insight into which implementation will be effective in what specific context.

References

Aa, A. van der, B. Beemer, T. Konijn, e.a. Naar een methodisch kader voor ketenregie in het openbaar bestuur. 's Gravenhage, 2002.

Aedes, Lokaal wat kan, centraal wat moet, Hilversum, mei 2005.

Agranoff, R. en M. McGuire., After the network is formed: process, power and performance, in M. Mandell (red.), Getting results through collaboration, Quorum Books, Westport, CT, 2001, pp. 11-29.

Agranoff, R. en M. McGuire, Collaborative Public Management: new strategies for local governments, Georgetown University press, Washington D.C., 2003.

Arnstein, S. The ladder of citizen participation, in: Journal of the Royal Town Planning institute, 1971, vol. 57, nr. 1, pp. 176-182.

Ball, A., J. Broadbent en C. Moore, Best value and the control of local government: Challenges and contradictions, in: Public money en management, 2002 vol. 22 nr. 2, p. 9.

Berg, J. van den, Au fond: wat is dat: regie?, in: B en G, 2001, vol. 28, nr. 10, p. 1.

Bezemer, J. Opdrachtgeving: Het overbrengen van een uitgedrukte wil van de één op een ander, in: Stadswerk: tijdschrift voor ruimtelijke inrichting en milieu, 2002, vol. 10, nr. 4 p. 18..

Brown, T. en M. Potoski, Managing the public service market, in: Public Administration Review, 2004, vol. 64, nr. 6, pp. 656-668.

Daniel, M. en F. van der Laan, Gemeentelijke regie in het lokale veiligheidsbeleid, in: Tijdschrift voor de politie, juni 2005, nr. 6, pp. 30-33.

Denters, S. De regiefunctie in gemeenten: Preadvies, Den Haag, 1999.

Dolron, J. van, Gemeentelijke regie: Techniek of gevoel, in: B en G, 2006, nr. 33, p. 38.

Fiers, B. en A. Jansen, Gemeentelijke regie in de sociale sector: Het bestrijden van complexe problemen als integratievraagstukken en veiligheid in wijken vereist meer dan agendasetting. Overheidsmanagement, 1998, vol. 16, nr. 6, pp. 176-177.

Gilsing, R. Intergovernmental relations and the effectiveness of local governance: The case of dutch youth policy, in: International Review of Administrative Sciences, 2007, vol. 73, nr. 1, p. 45-64.

Ham, W. van der, Publiek-private samenwerking. Maar hoe zit het met de regie?, in: B en G, 2002, nr. 29, p. 28-30.

Hofman, W., J. de Boom, R. Hofman e.a., Variatie en effectiviteit van de gemeentelijke regiefunctie in het onderwijsachterstandenbeleid. Risbo, Rotterdam, 2005.

Hupe, P. en E. Klijn, De gemeente als regisseur van het preventief jeugdbeleid, Rijswijk, 1997

Kickert, W., E. Klijn en J. Koppenjan, Managing complex networks. London, 1997.

Kilduff, M. en W. Tsai, Social networks and organizations, Sage Thousand Oaks, CA, 2003

Koppenjan, J. De barneveld-connectie versus de staatsuitgeverij en co: De 'mismatch' tussen sturingsstijl en omgevingskenmerken als verklarende factor bij het paspoortdebacle, in: J.

Landman, W. en T. Muller, Regie in het integrale veiligheidsbeleid, in: Het tijdschrift voor de politie, 2004, vol. 66, nr. 10, p. 20-25.

Larson, A. Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings – a study of the governance of exchange relationships, in: Administrative Science Quarterly, 1992, vol. 37, nr. 1, p. 76-104.

Morse, J., J. Hupcey, C. Mitchman, e.a. Concept analysis in nursing research: A critical appraisal, in: Scholarly Inquiry for Nursing Practice, 1996, vol. 10, nr. 3, p. 253-277.

Oosten, W., Inleiding bestuurskunde. Den Haag, 2006.

O'toole, L. J. Treating networks seriously: Practical and research-based agendas in public administration, in: Public Administration Review, 1997, vol. 57, nr, 1, p. 45-52.

Pestman, P. Naar een betere benutting van beleidsvrijheid door decentrale overheden, in: Bestuurswetenschappen, 2008, nr. 1, p. 63-72.

Pollitt, C. Decentralization, in: Ferlie E., L. Lyn en C. Pollitt (red.), The oxford handbook of public management, p. 371-390. Oxford, 2005.

Pröpper, I., B. Litjens en E. Weststeijn, Lokale regie uit macht of onmacht? Onderzoek naar de optimalisering van de gemeentelijke regiefunctie. Vught, 2004.

Provan, K., A. Fish en J. Sydow, Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the

empirical literature on whole networks, in: Journal Of Management, 2007, vol. 33, nr. 3, p. 479-516.

Putten, E. van der, P. Dordregter, B. Staan e.a., Daar sta je voor! Verslag van een onderzoek naar de regierol van gemeenten bij stedelijke vernieuwing. Den Haag, 2002

Rhodes, R. Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability. Maidenhead, 1997.

ROB, Op het toneel en achter de coulissen: de regiefunctie van gemeenten. Den Haag, 1999.

Rutgers, E., Lokaal onderwijsbestuur in ontwikkeling. Vormgeven aan bestuurlijke vernieuwing, Den Haag, 2004.

SCP, De werkelijkheid van de welzijnswet. Den Haag, 2002.

Scott, W., Organizations: Rational, natural and open systems. New Jersey, 2003.

Teisman, G., J. Edelenbos, E. Klijn, e.a., State of the art coproductie. Stip-studie in opdracht van NWO en het Kenniscentrum Grote Steden. Den Haag, 2004.

Terpstra, P., De gemeente van producent naar regisseur?, in: B en G, 2002, vol. 29, p. 17-19.

Veld, R. in't, De verguisde staat. Den Haag, 1989.

Williams, P., L. Barclay en V. Schmied, Defining social support in context: A necessary step in improving research, intervention, and practice, in: Qualitative Health Research, 2004, vol. 14, nr. 7, p. 942-960.

Xyrichis, A., en E. Ream, Teamwork: A concept analysis, in: Journal of Advanced Nursing, 2007, vol. 61, nr. 2, p. 232-241.

ZonMw, Beter in GGZ en Verslavingszorg, Landelijk Actieprogramma Kwaliteit GGZ/Verslavingszorg, Juni, 2006.

CHAPTER 3

The relationship between governance roles and performance in local public interorganizational networks:

a conceptual analysis

Abstract

Local public networks can be governed in many different ways. Among scholars as well as among practitioners, there is some debate about the best approach. Based on literature, this article examines the relationship between local public network governance roles, contingency factors, and network performance in a theoretically informed way. Governance roles are positioned on a continuum from top-down (commissioner) to bottom-up (facilitator), with an intermediate area (co-producer). How governance roles influence the performance of local public networks is assumed to depend on contingency factors, which might explain the inconsistent results of studies examining this influence. An integrated model of local public network governance is presented that includes four contingency factors: the number of network participants, diversity of network members, degree of customizability of service demands, and the number of new network participants. The model can be applied to the heterogeneous contexts that local governments encounter when governing local public networks.

3.1 Introduction

Public networks and their performance have been the subject of increasing interest in the literature (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). A special group of public networks are those at the local level. The general tendency has been to decentralize and to force local governments, like municipalities, to assume responsibility for formerly national government policies. Authorities are constantly confronted with the intricate demands of today's society, and therefore rely increasingly on relationships among organizations in public networks in local contexts (Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008). Local governments are collaborating in networks in many different contexts, such as education (Meier & O'Toole, 2005), social housing (Silverman, 2008), healthcare and welfare (Mitchell & Shortell, 2000), and social policies (Gilsing, 2007). It is presumed that local governments better understand local needs and may therefore be able to govern local networks more adequately.

Local public networks can be governed in many different ways. Local governments are often unaware of the best way to govern their network (Klijn, Edelenbos, Kort, & van Twist, 2008). In the literature the focus on network governance roles is still in its infancy (Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007). Therefore, additional research is needed to advance public management research and knowledge about the various manners in which local governments can best manage their network (Van Slyke, 2007).

Governance roles are collections of activities and rules that serve to achieve the goals of a network (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Insight into governance roles within a network and the effectiveness of these roles can support local managers and policy makers in determining their choice of governance.

Our research question is:

Which governance roles of local governments work best under which contingency conditions, according to literature?

This article results in a model that contributes to understanding which governance role works best under which conditions (Provan, 2009). These conditions may vary within local public networks. The propositions may moreover guide future empirical studies in the area of interorganizational networks.

First, this article elaborates the general characteristics of local public networks. Next, different governance roles are described, and finally, the ways in which local governance roles influence local network performance are presented in a model from which propositions are drawn. The model includes four contingency factors that influence the relationship between local governance roles and local performance.

3.2 Characteristics of local public networks

Local public networks are a special type of interorganizational network, constituted around a governmental body. Within these networks it is always a lower governmental body such as a city district or a municipality that governs the network based on a variety of roles, with the local government ultimately held accountable for the satisfactory delivery of public goods and services (McGuire, 2006). Local public networks have general characteristics that pertain to most such networks, such as the network's nature, structure and performance. Other characteristics act as contingency factors, and may vary between networks.

3.2.1 Local public network nature

The network nature reveals the conditions under which organizations establish a network. The dominant focus within interorganizational network research concentrates on an emerging (voluntary) nature of networks (Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007). However, local public networks are different from most other interorganizational networks in being primarily of a mandated nature. Organizations collaborating in the network with the local government participate because they are dependent on the public (monetary) resources that it provides. A mandated nature can also stem from legal directives. In that case organizations are forced by law to work within local public networks (Andrews et al., 2008).

3.2.2 Local public network structure

The structure of a network is an important determinant of network performance (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). Structural typologies use concepts such as network density and centrality to predict network performance (Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007). Local public networks typically have a lead-organization structure that is dense and central (Johnston & Romzek, 2008). The central position of the local government derives from its legal authority. Local governments provide administration for the networks and/or facilitate the activities of member organizations to achieve network goals.

Organizations in local public networks collaborate to comprehensively 'treat' clients through integrated, jointly produced services. For example, an elderly person suffering age-related disabilities may simultaneously need a wheelchair, a stair lift, help with her administration and help with her housekeeping. In the Netherlands, local governments must ensure that those products and services are delivered. To that end they have to govern the organizations within their local network. The various services are provided by different organizations, and only the bundle of services together fulfills the total demand of the elderly person.

3.3 Local public network performance

Network studies generally aim to understand why some governance mechanisms are more effective than others (Agranoff, 2007). Unfortunately, there is little agreement among organizational and public-policy scholars or among public administrators on how public networks should be evaluated. Local public networks can be evaluated at three levels of analysis: the community, network, and participant levels. Each of these levels has its own effectiveness criteria. However, the evaluations at the different levels are related. While local public networks that are successful are likely to be effective on all three levels of analysis, the different stakeholder needs and expectations are not necessarily consistent across levels. Therefore, scholars claim that within local public network, the community value outweighs the performance criteria for the other two categories. Korssen-van Raaij (2006, p. 19) states after examining the control processes in Dutch Health Care Networks that "public networks tend to produce community level network results which could not be realized by one of the organizations individually". Also Provan & Milward (2001) state after examining the diferent levels of effectiveness analysis that "the rationale for local public networks is most apparent at the community level" (p. 421). The goal of most public networks is to enhance client services. The community level can best be evaluated by examining whether the needs and expectations are met of those groups within a community that have both a direct and indirect interest in seeing that client needs are adequately met. This is in line with Andrews et al. (2009) who also examined the effectiveness of local governments and concluded that "local public networks aim to satisfy the demands of their citizens and therefore the degree to which these demands are met constitutes the most important performance indicator" (Andrews et al., 2009).

Besides assessing whether the performance goals are achieved (effectiveness), efficiency (cost-effectiveness) should also be considered (Provan, 2009). After all, different governance roles by governments imply different costs, making it important to examine which governance role achieves the best outcome relative to costs (Boyne, 2003).

We have argued that local public networks in general have a mandated nature, a lead organizational structure, and that they aim for the maximum level of citizen satisfaction within a policy area. Next, we will describe the different local governance roles.

3.4 Governance mechanisms at the local level

How a network is governed is a critical factor in predicting network performance (Klijn, 2005; Park, 1996; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Although scholars mention the importance of this relationship, empirical studies are scarce (Dekker, 2004). Governance mechanisms in local networks are often complex and local governments are not always familiar with the role forced upon them by the national government (Gilsing, 2007). Moreover, they frequently do not understand how governance mechanisms affect network performance (Rethemeyer, 2005). Therefore we elaborate on different governance roles that can be distinguished when studying local public networks.

Networks are affected from below and from above (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Herranz, 2008; Provan, et al., 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008). We can consequently distinguish various governance mechanisms on a continuum of top-down to bottom-up processes. The notion of a continuum is important because the intermediate area between bottom-up and top-down governance may achieve the best network effects (Alvesson & Karreman, 2004).

Often, only one of the governance roles is considered. Hill & Lynn (2005), for example, focus on the top-down type of governance, Lee (2006) concentrates on bottom-up governance, and Bogason (2000) only discusses co-governance. Kooiman (2005) presented a model that incorporates several governance roles. However, based on an analysis of the co-governance role, Somerville & Haines (2008) concluded that the model of Kooiman (2005) was difficult to use, because it does not specify which mechanisms belong to the three different roles. Span et al. (2009) developed an overview of characteristics of governance roles in local government, based on an analysis of the literature. Figure 1 depicts the model. In the model, the characteristics of three governance roles (commissioner, co-producer, facilitator), are elaborated for nine dimensions: who is the main actor, what is the steering mechanism, who sets the boundary conditions, who is dependent, who aligns, who sets goals, who is responsible, who develops the vision, and who monitors results? Organizations in a local network can be seen as executors (commissioner role), partners (co-producer role) or initiators (facilitator role). Boundary conditions are the conditions that determine whether goals are reached. This relates to quality or quantity criteria of the services delivered; for example, what is the quality of a wheelchair and what are the activities performed when delivering housekeeping? The question is who sets these criteria: the local government, the local government together with the other parties, or the other parties? Dependency is understood as being dependent on the power wielded by local governments, based on rules and procedures. Alignment refers to which party coordinates the delivery of products and services. Responsibility for reaching the goals can be with the local government or the other parties, or can be acknowledged as a shared responsibility. A vision is the basis for the network goal. Monitoring means keeping an overview of all different aspects of governance. Governance roles can be positioned on each of the nine dimensions separately on a continuum of bottom-up versus top-down (Span et al., 2009).

Figure 1- A typology for local network governance

Directing typologies by local government			
Actor	Executer	Partner	Initiator
Steering	Steering by the municipality	Joint steering	Self steering
Boundaries	Fixed boundaries by the municipality	Jointly set boundaries	Boundaries set by the parties
Dependency	Formal dependency	Informal / formal dependency	Informal dependencies
Alignment	Alignment by the municipality	Joint alignment	Alignment by the parties
Goal	Fixed goals by the municipality	Joint goal formulation	Goal formulation by the parties
Responsibility	Municipal responsibilities	Joint responsibility	Responsibility by the partners
Vision	Vision of the municipality	Joint vision formulation	Vision formulation by the parties
Monitoring	Monitoring by the municipality	Joint monitoring	Monitoring by the parties
	Commissioner	**Co-Producer**	**Facilitator**

3.5 The effect of governance roles on the performance of local public networks

Although there is consensus on the importance of governance within public networks, there is hardly any systematic investigation of how governance roles affect performance (O'Toole & Meier, 2004). As far as we know, there are no empirical tests and few conceptual papers on the effects of governance roles on network performance when the network has a mandated nature and a lead organization structure, which is the case for local public networks (e.g. Provan & Kenis, 2008). Scholars preferring top-down governance suggest that this leads to better performance because of the greater decision speed, stronger direction and clear goals, and less risk of internal conflicts (McGuire, 2006). Scholars who opt for bottom-up governance suggest that top-down governance may harm performance because it prevents other organizations from making independent decisions, leads to inflexible rules and procedures, and endangers adequate responsiveness to changing circumstances (Andrews et al., 2009). Studies in the public sector have found contradictory results on the effects of top-down and bottom-up governance on performance. Top-down roles may be characteristic for mandated networks (Agranoff, 2007), or may be critical to encouraging autonomous organizations to act in ways that lead to achieving desired network-level goals (Provan & Milward, 1995). Top-down governance has been shown to have a positive effect on the output of US manpower agencies (Whetten, 1978). However, pulling the central policy lever does not necessarily mean that something happens at the bottom. Top-down governance is often presented as the 'philosopher's stone' of modern government, ever sought after, but always just beyond reach (Rhodes, 2007).

Other research has concluded that excluding professional organizations from governance results in poor-quality public services (Ashmos et al., 1998; Holland, 1973; Martin & Segal, 1977). Korssen-van Raaij (2006), studying Dutch healthcare, found that networks using bottom-up governance achieves better network performance if organizations are forced into a network. Mandated healthcare networks need bottom-up mechanisms in order to transcend own interorganizational interests in favor of the interests of the network as a whole. Warren et al. (1974), however, examined 42 local public networks that used a bottom-up governance role to increase the quality of public services, but did not find these advantages. In these networks, even in cases where all organizations stated to rely on bottom-up governance, they were not willing to exchange knowledge, time, or other scarce resources. Bottom-up governance led to an ongoing inefficient struggle for authority among the network organizations. This process resulted in some organizations benefiting more from governance activities than the clients (Warren et al., 1974). Therefore, it is suggested that there may be a darker side to bottom-up local public network governance (O'Toole & Meier, 2004).

In sum, the literature is not conclusive about the variables that predict network effectiveness. Different contexts may lead to different performances. As network contexts are reflected by network contingencies, these contingencies may help explain these inconsistent results (Andrews et al., 2008). In different conditions, different governance roles will prove most effective. A context can be considered as the set of contingencies of the network. Next, we discuss the main contingency factors and formulate propositions about their moderating effects, given the relationship between governance roles and the performance of local public networks.

3.6 Network contingencies

Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) showed that there is no universal best way to govern organizations. The same is true with respect to governing local public networks. Empirical evidence suggests that contingency factors are likely to have a significant impact on the performance of local public networks (Andrews et al., 2008; Kastelein et al., 1977).

Mintzberg (1979) concentrated on the influence of the stability and complexity of a context on performance. Based on his research he identified age, size, and diversity as important contingency factors. In addition, he noticed the importance of stability in demand for products and services. Mintzberg formulated these contingencies at the organizational level. We propose to use them at the network level as well. Network age, network size, network diversity, and customization of services can be considered as contingency factors that influence the relationship between governance roles and network performance.

Next, these contingencies are elaborated and, based on an overview of the literature, propositions are formulated regarding the influence of these contingencies on the effects of governance roles on network performance.

3.6.1 Network evolution

The age of a network is an important condition when examining its performance (Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Borgatti & Foster (2003) relate this factor to the evolution of the network. There are many different aspects within a network that evolve over the years. The content of relations between actors can change over time as a result of external and internal processes. Perceived trust among network members, shared institutional norms and values, the subject of communication and communication intensity can all be characteristics of different aspects of evolution. The evolution of networks can also be assessed using quantitative measures, for example with respect to the in- and outflow of organizations in the network. How many organizations entered or left the network during a certain period? What is the proportion of new network members in one year compared to the previous year? This way of assessing network evolution demands a longitudinal measurement of network composition. Mintzberg (1979) found that organizations with a stable composition favor top-down governance. In his view collaboration becomes more predictable when parties have worked together for a longer period of time. However, Mintzberg observed what is most common practice, which is not by definition the practice associated with best performance. Organizations are different from networks and networks may evolve differently (Korssen-van Raaij, 2006). Local governments are often confronted with complex and dynamic local networks. The entrance of new network members creates uncertainty because the performance level and contributions of these new members need to be evaluated. In these situations, mutual trust has to develop (Korssen-van Raaij, 2006). Mutual trust originates from past positive experiences and accrued reputation over the years (Larson, 1992). Maturation of the pool of network members requires bottom-up governance to be effective (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). If partners are working together for the first time, control mechanisms are needed because they do not know what to expect from each other (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Potential gains of using a bottom-up role need time to reach their full strength (Korssen-van Raaij, 2006).

Before this maturation state is attained, control by the lead organization (top-down governance) is the best way to create trust (Gulati & Singh, 1998). As a network evolves, the need for top-down governance roles decreases because of an increase in trust (Human & Provan, 2000).
Therefore, we propose the following:

P1   *In young public networks, local governments that use the commissioner role will achieve highest performance.*
P2   *In medium-aged public networks, local governments that use the co-producer role will achieve highest performance.*
P3   *In mature public networks, local governments that use the facilitator role will achieve highest performance.*

3.6.2 Network size

Network size can be considered an important determinant of the effectiveness of one governance role over another (Reuer, 2001). Network size is often operationalized as the number of organizations involved in the network. There is no standard classification of network sizes. How to classify the size of a local public network depends on the size of the local public networks active within the same policy field. Research suggests that a large size is associated with top-down governance roles (Dewar & Hage, 1978; Scott, 2003); as a network becomes larger, the complexity of the division of tasks, agreements about responsibilities and the obligations between the partners become increasingly blurry, because of factors such as bounded rationality. It can therefore be concluded that with a larger network size, the need for formalization increases (Mintzberg, 1979). Using top-down mechanisms increases the span of control of the local government in the network. The additional complexity created by greater size requires more procedures and documentation and a further functional decentralization of tasks. This is consistent with the claim that, when relying on top-down governance, large organizations are more effective than small organizations (Haveman, 1993). There is an upper limit to the number of organizations that can be governed within a network. If local governments lack a clear picture of how many and which organizations are involved in the network, the number of organizations that need to be governed may exceed the span of control of the governing organization. In that case, a bottom-up governance role works better (Scott, 2003). In most local public networks, local governments are obliged to identify all network members connected to the aim of the network (e.g. disaster or watershed management).
In large networks, agreeing on goals, formulating boundary conditions and monitoring performance is very time consuming, if not impossible (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Using the co-producer role or facilitator role in large networks may lead to an inefficient and ineffective use of critical resources and processes (Faerman, McCaffrey, & Slyke, 2001). Conversely, using a facilitator role or a co-producer role in small networks facilitates a greater responsiveness towards changing demands in the environment. Evaluating processes and outcomes on a mutual basis is feasible if the number of organizations involved is small. In a small network it is also easier to maintain contact with organizations on a frequent basis, as well as to evaluate the contributions of all parties involved. This mutual evaluation may be less costly and more effective than exerting power through formal rules and procedures (Andrews et al., 2009).

Therefore, we propose the following:

P4   *In large public networks, local governments that use the commissioner role will achieve highest performance.*

P5   *In medium-sized public networks, local governments that use the co-producer role will achieve highest performance.*

P6   *In small public networks, local governments that use the facilitator role will achieve highest performance.*

3.6.3 Network member diversity

Local public networks consist of different types of organizations differing in nature, operational values, skills and knowledge. These differences are relevant to how the network can best be governed. What processes underlie the effects of diversity and how do local governments need to manage these processes (van Knippenberg et al., 2004)? These questions pose major challenges to network theory and practice. In principle, any dimension of differentiation can be studied. In practice however, most attention goes to demographic differences, educational background and functional background. With respect to diversity among members of a local public network, only the differences in functional background are relevant.

Examples of functional diversity in the context of local public networks are the following. In the Netherlands, local governments govern local network organizations operating in such diverse sectors as healthcare, social work and housing. All these sectors have their own attributes. The role of the local government is to connect these organizations in order to provide integrated packages of products and services to citizens. If the contributions of different sectors are considered to be equally important, this leads to a heterogeneous network. If one sector has a leading role and is more prominent in the network, this is likely to be reflected in a more homogeneous network.

According to Lawrence & Lorsch (1967), as diversity increases, so does uncertainty. An adequate response to uncertainty cannot be foreseen at forehand. Therefore, increasing uncertainty necessitates using bottom-up governance mechanisms.

On the other hand, if a network is more homogeneous, the behavior and outcomes of the network are more predictable. In a heterogeneous network the behavior of the other members is difficult to predict. These differences of behavior can be functional if the desired outcomes are unstable. Where there is a need for different expertise, skills and other diversity-increasing attributes, bottom-up governance seems more suitable to achieve the highest community network goals (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).

This leads to the following propositions:

P7   *In highly diverse (heterogeneous) public networks, the facilitator role will achieve highest performance.*

P8   *In moderately diverse public networks, the co-producer role will achieve highest performance.*

P9   *In slightly diverse (homogeneous) public networks, the commissioner role will achieve highest performance.*

3.6.4 Customization of services

Customization of services is also an important contingency factor. The questions remain whether the services that have to be delivered are complex or simple, and if the demand for these services is of a stable or dynamic nature.

Local governments need strategies to forestall, forecast, or absorb uncertainty in order to achieve orderly, reliable resource flows (Oliver, 1990). Stability refers to a situation of constant demand for the same products and services. For example, concerning local government, it is important to explore the differences in citizens' demands and to take the predictability and standardization of services into account (Boyne & Chen, 2007). Frequently changing citizens' demands are best governed by bottom-up mechanisms. Bottom-up mechanisms make the network more flexible in overcoming uncertainties (Gater et al., 1966; Woodward, 1965). Highly stable service demands can potentially be standardized. For unstable service demands, each service needs to be customized and therefore requires creativity and innovative power. Such creativity cannot be regulated by the local government and therefore seems best managed by a bottom-up governance role.

The commissioner role is most appropriate for local governments if services for citizens are predictable and standardized. By establishing standards that produce predictability (Johnston & Romzek, 2008), top-down governance creates stability. A facilitator role enables local public networks to be "light on their feet" as an advantage over hierarchies (Powell, 1990). The flexibility offered by bottom-up governance roles is essential to responding quickly and adequately to the changing demands and needs of stakeholders. If local governments are unable to forestall, forecast, or absorb uncertainty, the co-producer or facilitator role fits best. Innovative power from network partners can be used to provide new ideas and opportunities for effective service delivery (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001).

Therefore, we propose that:

P10   In public networks with low customizable service, local governments that use the commissioner role will achieve highest network performance.

P11   In public networks with moderately customizable services, local government that use a co-producer role achieve highest network performance.

P12   In public networks with high customizable services, local government that use a facilitator role achieve highest network performance.

3.7 Co-existence of contingencies

Contingencies are associated with the stability and complexity of a local public network (Thompson, 1967). Stability refers to the predictability of the activities that have to be performed by the network. Complexity refers to the degree of coordination required to let the network perform well. Stability and complexity of local public networks are key factors for performance (Andrews et al., 2009).

Although contingencies within network research are mentioned in current research, actual studies on network contingencies were mainly conducted in the 1970s. If governance roles fit the level of uncertainty connected to stability and complexity, performance can be expected to be optimal (Galbraith, 1973). In general, stable networks benefit most from top-down governance (Neuhauser, 1971). Dynamic and

complex conditions require bottom-up governance roles (Khandwalla, 1973). Stability and complexity can be seen as two independent dimensions. Combining stability and complexity creates a typology with four categories. Figure 2 highlights how stable networks can be complex and dynamic networks can be simple. We will discuss the effects of co-existence of contingencies by elaborating the four types of networks, providing examples, and discussing governance roles.

Table 1 - Co-existence of contingencies

	Stable	Dynamic
Simple	Commissioner role	Co-producer role
	Old	Young
	Small	Large
	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
	Low customizable services	Low customizable services
	(e.g. local waste polic)y	(e.g. developing a business park)
Complex	Co-producer role	Facilitator role
	Old	Young
	Small	Large
	Heterogeneous	Heterogeneous
	Highly customizable services	Highly customizable services
	(e.g. local disaster management)	(e.g. local social support)

3.7.1 Stable and simple

Local waste policy in the Netherlands can be considered a stable and simple network. Local governments work with a small number of organizations that dispose of waste. Waste is divided into a small number of categories, for example paper, glass, chemical waste (batteries, medicines), organic waste (vegetables, fruit) and residual waste. Categories of waste are dealt with by one or a few waste disposal companies. Local governments have a limited pool of organizations to select from for their networks. Waste disposal companies must operate according to strict regulations set by the national government. Since waste disposal is stable and simple at the local level, governments use a commissioner governance role to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the local waste policy. Relying on a co-producer or even a facilitator role may lead to decreased citizen satisfaction and deficiencies, because organizations and civilians will need to be consulted, which is time-consuming.

3.7.2 Dynamic and simple

When a local government plans to create a business park, there is usually a dynamic and simple local public network available. Creating a business park is a non-frequent event for local governments, since local communities can generally accommodate just a few business parks, and such parks have a long lifespan. To create a network to establish a business park, governments usually select organizations that are specialized

and experienced in this area. This allows for a standardization of complex issues. The requirements for the business park are defined by the network organizations and local government jointly. For example, it may be decided to only allow small-scale business activities, thus excluding, say, chemical production. For the greater part, the network will include organizations that are interested in participating in the business park. Since these organizations have to meet the same criteria, the network is homogeneous.
In the process of developing the business park, parties have the right to several legal objection procedures. This makes the required course of action unpredictable (dynamic). Objections may constrain the realization of the business park, but only if they arise. As they arise, local governments must follow standardized procedures as required by the national government. In this way the response to possible objections is standardized (simplified). There is a limited variety in demands for places in the business park, and requirements set by the local government create standardization. Therefore, the best fitting governance role for the local government is that of co-producer. Setting the requirements is done in collaboration with the network organizations, whereas actual governance is a top-down governance role, since the network organizations are obliged to meet predetermined requirements.

3.7.3 Stable and complex

Local disaster management networks need to be stable and complex to successfully respond to challenges associated with a disaster. If a disaster strikes, local public networks need to behave according to procedures in order to restore order (Moynihan, 2005). There are a limited number of network members that are assigned to complex services. Beforehand, scenarios are cooperatively designed in order to organize the use of services that need to be provided by specialized organizations of different types (stable). The specific requirements to fulfill the demand that may arise in case of a disaster are not easy to determine, and therefore these specialized organizations have discretion when their specific skills are needed to address unpredictable requirements. It is clear for the different organizations which tasks they have to fulfill (stable), but the services they provide are complex and cannot be considered as standardized solutions. Networks for disaster management consist of organizations that have been collaborating for a long time. For example, police or the military are expected to secure safety, hospitals are considered to tend to wounded people, firemen will evacuate buildings and sites, local broadcasting companies will provide emergency information, and so on. Therefore, the network is relatively small as well as very diverse. All parties have to be very flexible towards demands that may occur in a different way than expected beforehand. Local governments are in charge of coordinating the local network. These networks tend to be most effective when a co-producer role is used in which consensus between the local government and the other parties is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency.

3.7.4 Dynamic and complex

Most local social policies can be characterized as dynamic and complex. Adequate, integral healthcare services (Korssen-van Raaij, 2006), for example, or providing social support (Span et al., 2009), both require dynamic and complex networks.
An example is local social support in the Netherlands. Local governments govern local public networks. In 2007, following the introduction of the Social Support Act, the

Dutch national government provided local governments with policy discretion to better balance the local support demand and the local support supply (Schalk, 2006). Local governments rely on old as well as new collaborations with other organizations in order to provide this support. Social support aims to enable every person to participate in society and live independently. People that need social support are individuals suffering age or disability limitations, or a chronic psychological problem. In providing social support, the demand is very diverse. Products and services need to be customized. To achieve this, local governments use governance roles to connect organizations in the areas of living, care and well-being. Variety in demand requires variety in connections between organizations. This makes the network less predictable (dynamic). The heterogeneous composition of organizations unites knowledge and resources necessary to deliver highly customizable and complex service demands (complex).

Since providing local social support is dynamic and complex, local governments often use a co-producer or facilitator role to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of social support services.

These examples demonstrate that various combinations of contingencies exist. The examples given are, of course, prototypical types. Local networks in comparable contexts, for example social support networks, will vary in network size, network diversity, network evolution and customizability of services. For example, variability in service demands and opportunities to standardize these services depend on the needs of local citizens. If disabled senior citizens all request the same housekeeping activities, services are easy to standardize.

3.8 Towards an integrated model of local public network governance

This article began with the observation that local governments are frequently unsure of how to best fulfill the role forced upon them. Knowing whether local governments achieve or fail to achieve the network goal is not enough. Drawing upon existing literature, we proposed how different governance roles may influence public local network performance. A model was developed to help explain why performance is at a particular level and how network performance can be improved.

The model in Figure 2 summarizes our propositions and includes different contexts for local public networks in which local government takes the lead and mandates policy. In these contexts, local governments can take the roles of commissioner, co-producer, or facilitator, on a continuum from top-down to bottom-up. The effects of these roles on network performance depend on several contingency factors. The commissioner role is expected to be most effective if there are many organizations, many new network members, low network member diversity, and if services are stable. The co-producer role is expected to work best if there is a balance between young and old network members, a moderate number of network organizations, moderate network member diversity, and if services are moderately stable. Finally, the facilitator role is expected to perform well if there are many old network members, few organizations, a high network member diversity, and if services are unstable.

Figure 2 - Contingencies conditions leading to a positive effect of governance roles on network performance

3.9 Discussion and conclusion

This article offers a theory-based model for examining the effects of governance roles on local public networks and specifies propositions on these effects. It provides a starting point for further research into local public networks characteristics, and into the contingency factors that affect performance when specific governance roles are used. The model can be applied to a variety of local contexts. This has been demonstrated with examples of disaster management, waste policy, business park development, and organizing local social assistance. However, these examples are only intended to be illustrative. In practice, different governance roles are often used simultaneously within a network. Within disaster management, for example, responsibilities and broad task descriptions are set out in advance based on a commissioner role, but all organizations may rely on a co-producer or even a facilitator role if a disaster actually occurs (Moynihan, 2005).

The approach we have chosen in looking at governance roles is fairly innovative and more specific than previous approaches, in that it specifies characteristics on several continua.

The contingency factors included in the model are derived from contingency theory literature. Nevertheless, the list of contingencies may not be exhaustive. Future research could broaden the model by looking at the role of other possible contingencies that might be relevant; for example the local political culture, the local government form, or specific network member values.

This article has focused primarily on local public networks. However, the model presented may also be applicable to other lead organizational networks. At the level of country networks, such as the European Union, the effects of different ways of governing individual member states in a certain policy area may be influenced by the same contingencies as in local network governance.

The question is whether our propositions also hold if the lead organization is not a local government but a school organization or a public health service. McGuire (2006) states that there is a growing interest in determining the strength and influence of collaborative management. Rather than simply documenting the existence of different governance roles, we have elaborated the influence of different governance roles on performance in specific situations.

As said, the model and propositions can be tested further in future research. It would be interesting, for example, to examine the effects of different governance roles on local governments in changing circumstances. One such example pertains to the changes in responsibilities regarding social support in the Netherlands. In 2007, local governments became responsible for coordinating local support networks. All these networks are local public networks as defined in this article. Given the differences in governance roles used, the contingency factors, and network performance, this offers an excellent opportunity to test the propositions of the model developed in this article.

References

Agranoff, R. (2007). Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (1999). Managing in network settings. Review of Policy Research, 16(1), 18-41. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1999.tb00839.x

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network Management Research. J Public Administration Research & Theory, 11(3), 295-326.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2003). Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

Alvesson, M., & Karreman, D. (2004). Interfaces of control. Technocratic and socio-ideological control in a global management consultancy firm. Accounting Organizations And Society, 29(3-4), 423-444.

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., Law, J., & Walker, R. M. (2008). Organizational strategy, external regulation and public service performance. Public Administration, 86(1), 185-203. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00695.x

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., Law, J., & Walker, R. M. (2009). Centralization, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 19(1), 57-80. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum039

Ashmos, D. P., Duchon, D., & McDaniel, R. R. (1998). Participation in strategic decision making: The role of organizational predisposition and issue interpretation. Decision Sciences, 29(1), 25-51.

Bogason, P. (2000). Public Policy and Local Governance: Institutions in Postmodern Society. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

Borgatti, S., & Foster, P. (2003). The network paradigm in organizational research: a review and typology. Journal Of Management, 29(6), 991-1013.

Boyne, G. A. (2003). Sources of public service improvement: A critical review and research agenda. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 13, 367-394.

Boyne, G. A., & Chen, A. A. (2007). Performance Targets and Public Service Improvement. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 17(3), 455-477. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mul007

Brass, D. J., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. R., & Tsai, W. P. (2004). Taking stock of networks and organizations: A multilevel perspective. Academy Of Management Journal, 47(6), 795-817.

Dekker, H. C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. Accounting Organizations And Society, 29(1), 27-49. doi: 10.1016/s0361-3682(02)00056-9

Dewar, R., & Hage, J. (1978). Size, Technology, Complexity, and Structural Differentiation: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23(1), 111-136.

Faerman, S. R., McCaffrey, D. P., & Slyke, D. M. v. (2001). Understanding Interorganizational Cooperation: Public-Private Collaboration in Regulating Financial Market Innovation. Organization Science, 12(3), 372.

Galbraith. (1973). Designing Complex Organizations. Boston: Longman Publishing Co. .

Gater, A., Insull, H., Lind, P., & Seglow, P. (1966). Attitudes in British management. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Gilsing, R. (2007). Intergovernmental relations and the effectiveness of local governance: the case of Dutch youth policy. International Review Of Administrative Sciences, 73(1), 45-64.

Gössling, T., & Oerlemans, L. (2007). Inside networks : a process view on multi-organisational partnerships, alliances and networks. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Gulati, R., & Singh, H. (1998). The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4), 781-814.

Haveman, H. A. (1993). Organizational size and change: diversificatoin in the savings and loan industry after deregulation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(1), 20-50.

Herranz, J. (2008). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18, 1-31.

Hill, C. J., & Lynn, L. (2005). Is hierarchical governance in decline? Evidence from empirical research. . Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 15(2), 173-195.

Hite, J. M., & Hesterly, W. S. (2001). The evolution of firm networks: From emergence to early growth of the firm. Strategic management journal, 22(3), 275-286.

Holland, T. P. (1973). Organizational structure and institutional care. J Health Soc Behav, 14(3), 241-251.

Human, S. E., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Legitimacy Building in the Evolution of Small-Firm Multilateral Networks: A Comparative Study of Success and Demise. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(2), 327-365.

Jehn, K. A., & Mannix, E. A. (2001). The dynamic nature of conflict: A longitudinal study of intragroup conflict and group performance. Academy Of Management Journal, 44(2), 238-251.

Johnston, J. M., & Romzek, B. S. (2008). Social welfare contracts as networks - The impact of network stability on management and performance. Administration & Society, 40(2), 115-146.

Kastelein, J., Attema, T., Blindeman Krabbenbos, K., Klanderman, J. E., & Beljaar Spruit, M. J. (1977). Management in de rijksdienst: een vergelijkende verkenning in 30 eenheden van de centrale overheid. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University.

Khandwalla, P. N. (1973). Viable and Effective Organizational Designs of Firms. The Academy of Management Journal, 16(3), 481-495.

Klijn, E. (2005). Networks and interorganizational management: challenging, steering, evaluation and the role of public actors in public management. The handbook of public management, 9, 257-281.

Klijn, E., Edelenbos, J., Kort, M., & van Twist, M. (2008). Facing management choices: an analysis of managerial choices in 18 complex environmental public partnership projects. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74, 251-282.

Kooiman, J. (2003). Governing as governance. London: Sage.

Korssen-van Raaij, D. (2006). Norms Network Members Use: An Alternative Perspective for Indicating Network Success or Failure. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 249-270.

Larson, A. (1992). Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: a study of the governance of exchange relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 76-104.

Lawrence, P. R., & Lorsch, J. W. (1967). Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 12(1), 1-47.

Martin, P. Y., & Segal, B. (1977). Bureaucracy, size, and staff expectations for client independence in halfway houses. J Health Soc Behav, 18(4), 376-390.

McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we know it. Public Administration Review, 66, 33-43.

Meier, K. J., & O'Toole, L. J. (2005). Managerial networking - Issues of measurement and research design. Administration & Society, 37(5), 523-541. doi: 10.1177/0095399705277142

Mintzberg, H. (1979). the structuring of organizations. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Mitchell, S., & Shortell, S. (2000). The governance and management of effective community health partnerships: A typology for research, policy, and practice. Milbank Quarterly, 78(2), 241-289.

Moynihan, D. P. (2005). Leveraging Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.

Neuhauser, D. (1971). The relationship between administriative acitiveties and hospital performance. An empirical study of the relaiton between managerial techniques and organizational performance in 30 mediumsized community general hospitals. Chicago: University of Chicago.

O'Toole, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2004). Public management in intergovernmental networks: Matching structural networks and managerial networking. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 14(4), 469-494.

Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of interorganizational relationships: integration and future directions. Academy Of Management Review, 15(2), 241-265.

Park, S. (1996). Managing an interorganizational network: A framework of the institutional mechanism for network control. Organization Studies, 17(5), 795-824.

Powell, W. (1990). Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336.

Provan, K. G. (2009). Examining the parts of the whole? Expanding the focus of Organizational Network Research. Paper presented at the EGOS, Barcelona.

Provan, K. G., Fish, A., & Sydow, J. (2007). Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal Of Management, 33(3), 479-516.

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(2), 229-252.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. (1995). A preliminary theory of interorganizational network effectiveness: a comparative-study of 4 community mental-health systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 1-33.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks. Public Administration Review, 61(4), 414-423.

Reagans, R., & Zuckerman, E. W. (2001). Networks, diversity, and productivity: The social capital of corporate R&D teams. Organization Science, 12(4), 502-517.

Rethemeyer, R. K. (2005). Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector. Public Administration Review, 65(1), 117-121.

Rethemeyer, R. K., & Hatmaker, D. M. (2008). Network management reconsidered: An inquiry into management of network structures in public sector service provision. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(4), 617-646.

Reuer, J. J. (2001). From hybrids to hierarchies: Shareholder wealth effects of joint venture partner buyouts. Strategic management journal, 22(1), 27-44.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2007). Understanding governance: Ten years on. Organization Studies, 28(8), 1243-1264.

Schalk, R. (2006). De Wmo komt! . Deventer: Kluwer.

Scott, W. (2003). Organizations: rational, natural and open systems. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Silverman, R. M. (2008). The influence of nonprofit networks on local affordable housing funding - Findings from a national survey of local public

administrators. Urban Affairs Review, 44(1), 126-141.

Somerville, P., & Haines, N. (2008). Prospects for local co-governance. Local Government Studies, 34(1), 61-79. doi: 10.1080/03003930701770488

Span, K. C. L., Schalk, M. J. D., Luijkx, K. G., & Schols, J. M. G. A. (2009). Clarifying the local directing role; an empirical theoretical analysis of the literature. Bestuurskunde, 18(1), 92-100.

Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organization in actio: social science bases of administrative theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.

van Knippenberg, D., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Homan, A. C. (2004). Work group diversity and group performance: An integrative model and research agenda. Journal Of Applied Psychology, 89(6), 1008-1022.

Van Slyke, D. M. (2007). Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship. J Public Adm Res Theory, 17(2), 157-187. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mul012

Warren, R. L., Rose, S. M., & Bergunder, A. F. (1974). The structure of urban reform: community decision organisations in stability and change. Lexington: Heath.

Wensing, M., Baker, R., Szecsenyi, J., & Grol, R. (2004). Impact of national health care systems on patient evaluations of general practice in Europe. Health Policy, 68(3), 353-357.

Whetten, D. A. (1978). Coping with Incompatible Expectations: An Integrated View of Role Conflict. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23(2), 254-271.

Woodward, J. (1965). Industrial organization: Theory and practice. London: Oxford University Press.

Different choices on governing support networks by local governments:
a policy document analysis

Abstract

The aim of this study is to identify and describe the different views on governance roles held by local governments in the context of Dutch social support policy. Local government policy statements about governance found in documents of a representative sample of Dutch local governments were analysed using qualitative and quantitative techniques. This study shows that views on local governance vary between local governments and that these views are related to the local population size. This article makes local governance less vague and more specific.

4.1 Introduction

In the context of social policies aiming to provide support to citizens, the general tendency has been to decentralize authority, forcing local governments to assume responsibility for formerly national government policies. An example of decentralized social policy can be seen in social support policy. The introduction of a new Social Support Act in the Netherlands has engendered new social support policy. In its wake, the role of local governments has changed from 'local government' to the 'local governance' of public networks (Gilsing, 2007). It is assumed that local governments better understand local needs and should therefore be able to govern local networks more adequately. Consequently, local governments are free to make choices in designing and performing their role so as to achieve the most effective and efficient policy results. However, there is hardly any insight into how local governments cope with this position in the field of local governance. Literature about governance roles is still in its infancy (Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007), which hampers the practical application of theoretical insights. This therefore calls for additional research into how the different roles taken by local governments in governing their network affect their performance (Van Slyke, 2007). Understanding the differences in governance roles within comparable networks will help scholars, managers and policy makers make well-considered choices concerning their role in the local public network (Olberding, 2002). Identifying the differences in governance roles by local governments is an important first step to enabling scholars to examine the relationship between governance roles, contingency conditions, and the performance of the network (Span, Luijkx, Schols, & Schalk, 2011). Local government governance roles occur in a variety of contexts such as education (O'Toole & Meier, 2004), emergency management (Moynihan, 2005) and health care (Mitchell & Shortell, 2000). The reliance on governance roles may be dependent on the context under study. Emergency management may favour other governance roles than for example social policies (Span, et al., 2011).

The aim of this study is to gain insight into different views on governance roles by local governments in the context of Dutch social support policy. For three reasons, social support in the Netherlands is of particular interest. First, social support is a cross-cutting policy field, characterised by fragmentation, departmentalisation and increased external dependencies. These features imply major complications for effective and efficient governance (Denters & Rose, 2005). Second, it is hard to find comparable structured networks with different governance roles to study. The context of the Dutch Social Support Act provides excellent opportunities for the empirical study of governance roles in 430 similarly structured networks. Third, explorative studies on the role of government stress the importance of gaining more insight into the different roles taken by local

governments, and may take in the local support networks (SCP, 2010).

The introduction of the Social Support Act forced local governments to write policy documents explicitly dealing with the choices concerning their governance role within their local support networks.

These policy documents provide data to study the following research question:

Which governance roles can be distinguished in local government policy documents about the Dutch Social Support Act?

In this section we briefly introduce the research setting of this article, namely social support and local governance in the Netherlands. Next, we elaborate on the scientific model used to examine the diversity of governance roles in the Social Support Act. Then, we describe the quantitative and qualitative methods used to analyse the policy documents obtained from the participating local governments. After that, the results of the analysis are described, and we conclude by discussing the contribution of our study to public administration literature.

4.2 The research setting

Governance in the Netherlands is fragmented across three layers of government: the national, regional (12 provinces) and local (430 municipalities) layers. As generally in Western Europe, also in the Netherlands the local level is gaining in importance compared to national and provincial levels due to the decentralisation processes that have occurred in recent decades (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). National and provincial governments deal with other governments, while individual citizens are dealt with at the municipal level (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). It is the individual citizen that is key in the recently introduced local support act (2007). According to this act, social support aims to enable every individual citizen to participate in society and live independently. Persons requiring social support are those that suffer from constraints due to age or disability, or a chronic psychological problem. When a person is unable to participate or live independently, local governments must ensure that social support is provided. This means that the local government governs services provided by the local network such as homecare or the provision of e.g. mobility aids such as a wheelchair (MinVWS, 2006). For this purpose local governments need to use their governance role to connect all organisations active in the policy areas of living, care and well-being, and to operate in the intermediate area of social support. Social support is also provided to volunteers and family care givers. Local governments are thought to have better insight into local needs and opportunities and therefore to be better able to anticipate local possibilities. This insight into local (im)possibilities provides an impetus to making social support policy more efficient and effective (Denters & Rose, 2005; van Berkel, 2006).

4.3 Local governance roles model

Networks are affected from below and from above (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Herranz, 2008; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008). The notion of a continuum is important since the intermediate area between bottom-up and top-down governance may achieve the best network effects (Alvesson & Karreman, 2004). We can consequently distinguish various governance roles on a continuum of top-down to bottom-up processes.

In most research, scholars focus on one specific governance role. Hill & Lynn (2005), for example, focus on the top-down type of governance, Lee (2006) concentrates on bottom-up governance, and Bogason (2000) only discusses co-governance. Kooiman (2005) presented a model that incorporates three governance roles. However, Kooiman's model is difficult to use because it does not specify which characteristics belong to the three different roles (Somerville & Haines, 2008).

Span et al. (2009) developed a model that specifies the characteristics that belong to each of three most relevant governance roles (Figure 1). The characteristics of the three roles can be compared in terms of nine dimensions: who is the main actor, what is the steering mechanism, who sets the boundary conditions, who is dependent, who aligns, who sets goals, who is responsible, who develops the vision, and who monitors results. Organisations in a local network can be considered executors (commissioner role), partners (co-producer role) or initiators (facilitator role). Boundary conditions are the conditions that determine whether goals are reached. This relates to the quality or quantity criteria of the services delivered; for example, what activities does housekeeping entail, and what physical modifications (stairlift e.g.) can be made to a client's house?

The question is who sets these criteria: the local government, the local government together with other parties, or other parties? Dependency is understood as being dependent on the power wielded by local governments, based on rules and procedures. Alignment refers to which party coordinates the delivery of products and services. Responsibility for achieving the goals can lie with the local government or the other parties, or can be acknowledged as a shared responsibility. A vision is the basis for the network goal. Monitoring means keeping oversight of all different aspects of governance. Governance roles can be positioned on each of the nine dimensions separately on a continuum of bottom-up versus top-down, resulting in nine governance role-specific characteristics (Span, et al., 2009).

Figure 1- A typology for local network governance

Directing typologies by local government			
Actor	Executer	Partner	Initiator
Steering	Steering by the municipality	Joint steering	Self steering
Boundaries	Fixed boundaries by the municipality	Jointly set boundaries	Boundaries set by the parties
Dependency	Formal dependency	Informal / formal dependency	Informal dependencies
Alignment	Alignment by the municipality	Joint alignment	Alignment by the parties
Goal	Fixed goals by the municipality	Joint goal formulation	Goal formulation by the parties
Responsibility	Municipal responsibilities	Joint responsibility	Responsibility by the partners
Vision	Vision of the municipality	Joint vision formulation	Vision formulation by the parties
Monitoring	Monitoring by the municipality	Joint monitoring	Monitoring by the parties

Commissioner   **Co-Producer**   **Facilitator**

4.4 Methods

To answer the research question we used mixed qualitative and quantitative research methods within a multiple case study (Yin, 1994). Cases in this study are local policy documents of local governments concerning social support. Below we elaborate on the selection of local governments, data collection, the qualitative data analysis and the quantitative data analysis.

4.4.1 Representative selection of local governments

Twenty local governments were randomly selected within four strata based on the number of inhabitants. For every stratum we determined the number of local governments to be included. The terms of percentages within our sample are a reflection of the presence of the percentages in the total population (Table 1). Selection on the basis of inhabitants and random selection within strata are frequently-used methods of selection when conducting policy research on local governments (Patton, 1990) The selected local governments are distributed geographically across the Netherlands.

Table 1 - Sample of local governments

Number of inhabitants	Number of local governments in the Netherlands		Number of local governments in this study
< 15.000	126	(28.44%)	5
15.000 - 40.000	218	(49.21%)	9
40.000 – 100.000	74	(16.70%)	4
100.000 >	25	(5.64%)	2
Total	**430**		**20**

4.4.2 Data Collection

Policy documents about the Social Support Act are publicly available. All of the selected policy documents were collected through the websites of local governments or requested from managers responsible for the social support policy.

4.4.3 Qualitative Data Analysis

The integral text of each of the policy documents was coded using selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Electronic analysis software ATLAS.ti. was used for the coding process to achieve a systematic analysis of qualitative data and prevent information-processing bias (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The labels used in the coding process were derived from the model of Span et al. (2009) described above. Text fragments were related to characteristics (e.g. monitoring by the municipality, joint monitoring, or monitoring by the parties). Each characteristic is located on a row (category) and a column (governance role) (see Figure 1).

One researcher coded all collected policy documents. To assess the reliability and validity of the analysis, another researcher coded the first half of the policy documents independently (Whittemore, Chase, & Mandle, 2001) but with the same coding scheme. After coding the same policy document independently, the phrases and associated codes were compared. There was approximately 70% agreement on the codes. At the start, whenever differences in coding occurred discussion led to consensus about the appropriate code. After discussing the codes of the first half, consistency in the coding process was reached. Twenty policy documents accounted for 2,763 coded citations. These qualitative citations were also used to provide clear examples of qualitative descriptions of the quantitative results.

4.4.4 Quantitative Data Analysis

After coding the qualitative data we performed a quantitative editing process. Codes were quantified in order to establish frequencies of different roles, categories, and characteristics. ATLAS.ti was used to generate a frequency table that was subsequently converted to the analysis software SPSS and Excel. Thereafter these frequencies within each policy document were made relative. Absolute frequencies could not be used, as the differences in the amount of relevant text fragments found in the different documents would result in a skewed image.

4.4.4.1 Governance roles

In order to examine the prominence of the different governance roles, we established the degree to which characteristics belonging to commissioner, co-producer or facilitator roles were present in the total pool of documents.

The mean of nine characteristics belonging to one role was considered to be the relative frequency of a role within one policy document. For each role, we divided the number of references to a characteristic of this role by the number of references to characteristics of all three roles. This procedure resulted in percentages reflecting the occurrence of each of the three roles within a policy document. Role distributions were subsequently clustered based on the number of inhabitants, and the means were calculated for these clusters. Thus, the data of the nine local governments of cluster 15.000 – 40.000 were used to calculate the distribution of roles for this cluster.

An Anova analysis was performed to examine the significance of the difference in

these aggregated roles for the different strata of inhabitants. We also conducted a post hoc Bonferroni test in order to examine significant differences in means between governments with different population sizes. Since this is an explorative study we chose to rely on Bonferroni instead of contrast analyses.

4.4.4.2 Categories and the characteristics within the three governance roles

To determine the proportion of the categories used to describe a governance role in the total sample of policy documents, we examined the relative frequency of categories (columns in Figure 1). As it turned out, certain categories (e.g. goal, actor) are used more frequently in order to describe a governance role than other categories.

To assess the relative weight of the nine characteristics within a specific governance role, we examined how these characteristics actually determine each governance role. Every governance role (commissioner, co-producer and facilitator) has its own nine characteristics (e.g. for the commissioner role: executer, steering by the municipality, fixed boundaries by the municipality, formal dependency, alignment by the municipality, fixed goals by the municipality, municipal responsibilities, vision of the municipality, monitoring by the municipality).

4.4.4.3 The relationship between governance characteristics and number of inhabitants

Does the number of inhabitants lead to significant differences in the use of role characteristics? In order to perform the analysis the relative frequencies were converted from ATLAS.ti to SPSS. An Anova analysis was subsequently performed to determine which characteristics differ when introducing the influence of the number of inhabitants. We also conducted a post hoc Bonferroni test to examine differences related to the classification of the number of inhabitants.

4.4.4.4 Commissioner, co-producer, or facilitator; solo or combinations?

Local governments do not rely solely on characteristics of the commissioner, co-producer, or facilitator role within their whole policy document. The different roles are positioned on a continuum from top-down (commissioner) to bottom-up (facilitator). We conducted a scatter plot analysis to determine whether there are local governments that can be classified as commissioner, co-producer, or facilitator, and if there are hybrids. Every local government policy document was set out separately on a scatterplot that contrasts two different governance roles (Figure 4). These positions on the various scatter-plots make it possible to compare the different policy documents in relation to the three distinct roles. Every policy document described to a certain degree a commissioner role, a co-producer role, or a facilitator role (1= only characteristics of one role, 0= no characteristics of one role). The total sample could be positioned on these scatterplots independently. The aggregated roles provide insight into how certain local governments can be viewed as exemplary for one particular governance role.

4.5 Results

4.5.1 Roles

In the total sample, the most prominent local government role was that of co-producer (46%), followed by a facilitator (28%) and lastly a commissioner role (26%). The predominance of a certain governance role over others varied between the local governments. The number of inhabitants is associated with differences in the exercise of the local governance role in our sample of local governments. In small local networks the commissioner role seems more prominent (36%). The proportion of local governments with a co-producer role decreases in this stratum (37%). As the size of a local government increases, the influence and involvement of the other network members also increases. Accordingly, a shift from governance characterised by the commissioner role towards that of co-production can be discerned (see Figure 2).

References to a reliance on a facilitating governance role are only different in the stratum of 15,000 to 40,000 inhabitants (30%). The results of our sample regarding the relationship between the number of inhabitants and governance role are not significant.

Figure 2 - Distribution of the local governance role

References to local governance roles as commissioner, co-producer as well as facilitator were present in every document in the sample. In none of the documents the governance role is of only one of the three types. Also, the interpretation of the governance role varies according to the policy area and situation.

'Within the scope of the Social Support Act, we clearly state per policy area how we give shape to our governance role' (Local government 15.000 – 40.000).

Local governments also state that they view the governance role as a continuum on which they guide the network members towards a situation in which these members can govern the social support network on their own.

'The interpretation can vary in different stages from initiator to one of the parties in the chain to ultimately a situation where governance is fully exerted by the other parties' (Local government > 100.000).

Local governments that rely on co-producer governance, more often aim to reshape their local social support services. Co-producing and facilitating entails enhancing the involvement of institutions and citizens in social support policy and the fulfilment of specific social support demands by citizens.

'We want to establish more co-productions with citizens, groups of citizens and institutions. Our job is primarily to interconnect, to facilitate, to direct.. We have to take risks, must dare to be demanding and dare to try out new things' (Local government 15.000 – 40.000).

A commissioner role presupposes a local government that possesses all the necessary knowledge. A co-producer or a facilitator role entails using the knowledge as presented by the other network members. A governance role is used to integrate the formerly distinct policy domains of care, living, and wellfare.

'The elaboration of the governance role should lead to more policy integration in providing care, living and well-being services' (Local government > 100.000).

4.5.2 Categories and the characteristics within the three governance roles
All categories of the model are present when considering the total sample of policy documents. Every category is referred to almost equally often, as illustrated in Table 2 (column 1). Only the category of dependency is used infrequently to describe a governance role.
As illustrated in Table 2 (column 2, 3 and 4), the categories are of varying importance when describing the three governance roles. Concerning the commissioner role, vision (16%), boundaries (15%) and goal (15%) were most frequently alluded to, while the co-producer role is most frequently associated with the categories of actor (18%), alignment (13%), or a goal (13%). For the facilitator role, the actor category (31%) is most frequently referred to, followed by responsibility (17%) and dependency (15%).

Table 2 - Distribution of categories and characteristics in descriptions of the directing role in 20 local government policy documents concerning social support (n=2763 quotes)

Categories		Commissioner		Co-producer		Facilitator	
Actor	12%	Executer	5%	Partner	18%	Initiator	31%
Steering	10%	Steering by the local government	10%	Joint steering	10%	Self-steering	8%
Boundaries	13%	Boundaries set by the local government	15%	Jointly set boundary conditions	12%	Boundary settings set by the parties	6%
Dependency	5%	Formal dependency	4%	Informal / formal dependency	0%	Informal dependency	15%
Alignment	12%	Alignment by the local government	13%	Joint alignment	13%	Alignment by parties	9%
Goal	13%	Goals fixed by the local government	15%	Joint goal formulation	13%	Goal formulation by the parties	2%
Responsibility	12%	Local responsibilities	11%	Joint responsibility	12%	Responsibility by the partners	17%
Vision	12%	Vision of the local government	16%	Joint vision formulation	10%	Vision formulation by the parties	1%
Monitoring	11%	Monitoring by the local government	11%	Joint monitoring	12%	Monitoring by the parties	11%
	100%		100%		100%		100%

4.5.2.1 Characteristics of the local commissioner role

The commissioner role (Table 2, column 2) is defined particularly by the formulation of boundaries by the local government (15%). These boundaries are expressed by performance agreements, lists of demands for social support suppliers, and enforceable rules resulting from tendering. The formulation of fixed boundaries by the local government should ensure the efficient use of financial resources.

'Local governments have a legal obligation to come to sound agreements about the coordination of care, together with the obligation of care organisations to be helpful in fulfilling these agreements (obligation of perseverance)' (Local government < 15.000).

The vision of the local government entails a first line of reasoning on social support. From these broad visions (16%) it does not become clear what has really been planned.

'The social life in our local government can still get richer, more diverse and more accessible' (Local government 40.000 – 100.000).

Goals set by the local government (15%) concern the quality as well as the financial controllability of local social support. Set goals are benchmarks that vary substantially among local governments. Goals are formulated in line with the activities necessary to achieve these goals.

'To stimulate the possibility of supporting the elderly in their own homes requires investing in housing that remains adequate throughout the entire life-course and to combine this with appropriate care and welfare' (Local government 40.000 – 100.000).

4.5.2.2 Characteristics of the local co-producer role

References to a co-producer role are distributed equally across the different characteristics of the typology (Table 2, column 3). The only exception is the characteristic of partner (18%). We furthermore focus on joint monitoring (12%) and joint boundary formulation (12%).
In the sample of policy plans, the reference to an actor as partner (18%) occurs in the context of increasing the involvement of organisations in the attempt to accomplish a jointly formulated goal.

'Our local government wants to increase the involvement of organisations and citizens when formulating local policy. Policy should no longer be formulated top-down. After all, the local citizens and organisations have to implement the policies' (Local government 40.000 – 100.000).

In addition to the references to organisations as a partner active in the integrated policy field of well-being, living, and care, the citizen as a partner in social support policy also becomes evident.
The notion of partnership is often invoked to encourage the freedom improving the quality of social support.

'The Social Support Act represents an enormous opportunity to innovate policies in the intermediate areas of living, care, and well-being. Partnerships between local governments, citizens, and local partners are essential to improving quality and efficiency' (Local government 15.000 – 40.000).

Jointly set boundaries (12%) are often associated with joint investments aimed at experimenting with innovative solutions.

'By using other financial possibilities like money from other parties (e.g. housing associations), resources from the health finance law and other subsidiaries, joint innovative projects can be embraced' (Local government 15.000-45.000).

Discussions between local governments and partners revolve around the mutual knowledge and means of increasing the quality of social support.

'Organisations active in the intermediate area of housing, care, and well-being have insight into solutions that are beyond the present knowledge of the local government' (Local government 40.000 – 100.000).

Joint monitoring (12%) refers to how a local government wants to be accountable to the local community. Institutions individually, as well as citizens at their own initiative, must be encouraged to evaluate their local policy themselves.

4.5.2.3 Characteristics of the local facilitator role
With regard to the facilitator role, the most prominent characteristic is that an actor is an initiator (31%, Table 2 column 4). An initiator is related to innovative policy. Initiators emerge in response to a need for individual solutions. Collective solutions are considered inadequate to satisfy individual demands.
'Our local government is committed to redesigning policy. We want to save our budget and are inviting organisations to come up with their own and original ideas. The choice for quality means a choice for custom-made solutions' (Local government > 100.000).
Volunteers, family caregivers, care institutions and housing associations can be all fulfil the role of initiator. Besides organisations, individual citizens are also important initiators. Initiators are stimulative network members that invigorate activities in the quest for effective and efficient social support.
Responsibility by the partners (17%) is understood as a local government that acts in response to efforts by to give shape to social support.
Society consists of citizens, organisations, and societal institutions. The explicit association between governance and the responsibility of actors other than the local government is confirmed in different policy documents.
'Our local government wants to have a directive role in advancing social cohesion and quality of life. The local government will facilitate initiatives by organisations and citizens, but normally will not initiate activities directly' (Local government < 15.000).
Informal dependency (15%) means that a local government needs expertise and help in providing local social support, partly due to the governance possibilities of that local government.

4.5.3 The relationship between governance characteristics and number of inhabitants
When focusing on the differences in characteristics instead of aggregate roles, the ANOVA analysis showed a significant difference within strata of inhabitants ($p<0.05$) for the following characteristics: Goals are set by the local government (F: 10.324., sig. 0.001), goals are jointly set (F: 13.986., sig. 0.01) and the local government steers the network together with the other parties (F: 7.390, sig. 0.003). All other characteristics

were not significantly different when focusing on the number of inhabitants.
As illustrated in Table 3, local governments with 15.000-40.000 inhabitants differ
significantly from the other local governments in that they more often choose to jointly
steer the network with other parties. Small local governments also differ from large local
governments in that the former less often set the social support goals directly (Table 3).
This difference is significant compared to governments with 40.000-100.000 inhabitants
and governments with more than 100.000> inhabitants (Table 3). Furthermore, small
local governments rely significantly more often on jointly set goals compared to the
other local governments (Table 3).

Table 3 - Significant different characteristics related to the number of inhabitants

Characteristic	Group	Group	Mean difference	Sig.
Joint steering	15.000-40.000	< 15.000	0.66667	0.012
		40.000-100.000	0.58333	0.002
		> 100.000	0.48667	0.023
Local government goal	< 15.000	40.000-100.000	-0.91	0.000
		> 100.000	-0.81	0.003
Goals jointly set	< 15.000	15.000 – 40.000	0.55128	0.044
		40.000-100.000	0.91583	0.000
		100.000 >	0.90000	0.000

4.5.4 Commissioner, co-producer, or facilitator; solo or combinations?

Figure 4 plots the aggregated characteristics within a policy document with respect
to two types of governance roles in a scatter-plot. The scatter-plot that charts the
characteristics of the co-producer role against the commissioner role in particular
shows a negative linear coherence between these two roles. This means that, the
more characteristics of a commissioner role occur in a policy document, the fewer
characteristics of the co-producer role occur, and vice versa. In other words, a local
government that opts for a commissioner role is less of a co-producer.
Plots containing the facilitator role show that the relative score for the facilitator role is
independent of the score on commissioner or co-producer roles (extremes excluded).
The facilitator role is therefore unrelated to the commissioner or co-producer role.
The plots also illustrate how every role has its own ideal typical governments. The
different scatter-plots show that for every role there is a policy document in which the
characteristics of that particular role dominate that document for more than 60%.

Figure 3 -Twenty distinct policy documents characterized with respect to two possible directing roles

4.6 Discussion and conclusion

4.6.1 Discussion

This article offers a first empirical exploration of distinctions in governance roles in local public networks. The data underlying this empirical exploration were abstracted from mandatory policy documents of local governments concerning governance in respect of the Dutch Social Support Act. The analysis provides evidence that the three governance forms of the scientific model (commissioner, co-producer and facilitator) were all present in the local public networks of Dutch social support. The three governance roles were mentioned in each policy document. The scatter-plots illustrated that although the three governance roles were not mutually exclusive, there is a linear coherence between roles in our sample. The plots also demonstrated that every role has its own ideal type of government.

Within the total sample of local governments, the co-producer role is most prominent, followed by a facilitating role and lastly the commissioner role. Taking the population size of local governments into account results in the observation that as the population size increases, the influence and involvement of the other network members also increases.

Governance roles can be determined by focusing on nine categories (actor, steering, boundaries, dependency, alignment, goal, responsibility, vision and monitoring). Each role has its own nine characteristics in terms of these categories. For example, the actor category means the actor is an executer in the commissioner role, partner in the co-producer role and initiator in the facilitator role. The categories vary in importance depending on the governance role under study. Each role has its own important characteristics. At the characteristics level, the number of inhabitants of a local government implies significant mean differences. This means that choices of governance roles are related to the local population size.

The effects of population size on governance roles probably relate to how the local public networks under study receive financial resources. In the Netherlands, local governments receive the required resources mainly from the national government. This resource distribution is principally based on the number of inhabitants (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). Local governments serving a lower number of inhabitants, receive fewer financial resources and are therefore more inclined to control their behaviour and resources. Local governments serving a higher number of inhabitants have far greater resources at their disposal, thus providing scope for experimentation with innovative solutions.

These differences also impact the aims of governance roles. The three governance roles all have their own aims with respect to governing the local support network. This result can be explained by a tension recognised in literature between controllability (Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Wooldcock, 2004) and boosting quality (Alter & Hage, 1993). The commissioner role aims to control the behaviour of other network members and achieve efficiency advantages. The co-producer role seeks to increase the involvement of network members in order to benefit from shared knowledge and to increase the quality of performance. The facilitator role specifically aims to innovate policy and to provide innovative solutions to local citizens' individual demands. This is in line with theoretical claims by Span et al. (2011). These authors made assumptions on the effect

of governance roles on network performance. This article shows that their assumptions hold for the context of local public networks providing social support in the Netherlands. This study illustrates how conducting research on a sole governance role (Bogason, 2000; Hill & Lynn, 2005; Lee, 2006) results in an incomplete image of governance as a whole. There was not one government that relies on a single type of governance role only. The recognition of all three roles within a single policy document is supportive of scholars such as Herranz (2008) and Alvesson & Karreman (2004), who have suggested using a continuum from bottom-up to top-down in order to analyse the governance roles of local governments.

In most policy documents the concept of governance remained undefined. The majority of local governments considered it sufficient to remark that they take the governance role, without explaining what they mean by governance role. Therefore, this study also demonstrates the need for a model that specifies characteristics of governance roles instead of just providing broad descriptions (Somerville & Haines, 2008). By focusing on specific characteristics, scholars will be able to study differences in governance roles. This first exploration of differences in governance roles based on the model of Span et al. (2011) illustrates that the model is useful in exploring differences in governance roles. It also provides insight into (qualitative) operationalisations of roles, categories and characteristics. A follow up study will interview public servants about the actual governance role within the local social support network. The findings regarding this actual governance role in the Dutch Social Support Act can be compared with the intended governance role as described in the policy documents used for this study (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997).

Aside from the context of Dutch social support, the methods and insights of this article can also be used toe examine other contexts such as emergency management, local education networks and healthcare services. Some authors have already stressed the importance of obtaining insight into differences in governance roles in these contexts (McGuire, 2006; Moynihan, 2005). In addition to the moderating effect of population sizes, it has been suggested to use contingency factors such as network evolution, network size, network member diversity and customisation of services (Span, et al., 2011).

This article has been innovative in linking qualitative and quantitative data, as this is not done often. Linking these data is considered to be a relevant research strategy within network research (Provan, 2009).

4.6.2 Conclusions

By conducting this explorative policy document analysis, a first insight has been acquired into intended governance roles within local networks in the context of revised social legislation in the Netherlands. Combining quantitative and qualitative data adds further essential knowledge to existing research on inter-organisational networks. Local governments are required to describe the form and content of their local governance role in their policy documents. In this study we examined which characteristics and aggregates of characteristics (roles or categories) can be identified within and between the different policy documents. The taxonomy obtained by using this model is helpful in creating a structured description of how a local government understands its governance role. The model thus provides a helpful tool to benchmark performance among local governments.

References

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network Management Research. Journal of Public Administrative Research & Theory, 11(3), 295-326.

Alter, C., & Hage, J. (1993). Organizations Working Together. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Alvesson, M., & Karreman, D. (2004). Interfaces of control. Technocratic and socio-ideological control in a global management consultancy firm. Accounting Organizations And Society, 29(3-4), 423-444.

Andeweg, R. B., & Irwin, G. A. (2005). Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (second ed.). Houndmills/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Atkinson, P., & Coffey, A. (1997). Analysing documentary realities Qualitative Research Theory, Method and Practice (pp. 45-62). London,: Sage.

Bogason, P. (2000). Public Policy and Local Governance: Institutions in Postmodern Society. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

Denters, B., & Rose, L. E. (2005). Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gilsing, R. (2007). Intergovernmental relations and the effectiveness of local governance: the case of Dutch youth policy. International Review Of Administrative Sciences, 73(1), 45-64.

Gössling, T., & Oerlemans, L. (2007). Inside networks : a process view on multi-organisational partnerships, alliances and networks. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Herranz, J. (2008). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18, 1-31.

Hill, C. J., & Lynn, L. (2005). Is hierarchical governance in decline? Evidence from empirical research. . Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 15(2), 173-195.

Keast, R., Mandell, M. R., Brown, K., & Wooldcock, G. (2004). Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations. Public Administration Review, 64(3), 363-371.

Kooiman, J. (2005). Governing as governance.: Sage.

Lee, E. J. (2006). Local self-governance and the citizens' movement. Korea Journal, 46(2), 129-154.

McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we know it. Public Administration Review, 66, 33-43.

Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

MinVWS. (2006). Memorie van Toelichting bij de Wmo. 's-Gravenhage.

MinVWS. (2007). Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (Social Support Act). 's-Gravenhage.

Mitchell, S., & Shortell, S. (2000). The governance and management of effective community health partnerships: A typology for research, policy, and practice. Milbank Quarterly, 78(2), 241-289.

Moynihan, D. P. (2005). Leveraging Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.

O'Toole, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2004). Public management in intergovernmental networks: Matching structural networks and managerial networking. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 14(4), 469-494.

Olberding, J. C. (2002). Does Regionalism Beget Regionalism? The Relationship between Norms and Regional Partnerships for Economic Development. Public Administration Review, 62(4), 480-491. doi: 10.1111/0033-3352.00201

Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Provan, K. G. (2009). Examining the parts of the whole? Expanding the focus of Organizational Network Research. Paper presented at the EGOS, Barcelona.

Provan, K. G., Fish, A., & Sydow, J. (2007). Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal Of Management, 33(3), 479-516.

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(2), 229-252.

SCP. (2010). Op weg met de Wmo: Evaluatie van de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 2007-2009. 's-Gravenhage: SCP.

Somerville, P., & Haines, N. (2008). Prospects for local co-governance. Local Government Studies,

34(1), 61-79. doi: 10.1080/03003930701770488

Span, K. C. L., Luijkx, K. G., Schols, J. M. G. A., & Schalk, R. (2011). The Relationship Between Governance Roles and Performance in Local Public Interorganizational Networks: A Conceptual Analysis. The American Review of Public Administration. doi: 10.1177/0275074011402193

Span, K. C. L., Schalk, M. J. D., Luijkx, K. G., & Schols, J. M. G. A. (2009). Clarifying the local directing role; an empirical theoretical analysis of the literature. Bestuurskunde, 18(1), 92-100.

Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques. London: Sage.

van Berkel, R. (2006). The decentralisatoin of social assistance in The Netherlands. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 26(1/2), 20-31.

Van Slyke, D. M. (2007). Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship. J Public Adm Res Theory, 17(2), 157-187. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mul012

Whittemore, R., Chase, S. K., & Mandle, C. L. (2001). Validity in Qualitative Research. Qual Health Res, 11(4), 522-537. doi: 10.1177/104973201129119299

Yin, R. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

What governance roles do municipalities use in local social support networks in the Netherlands?

Abstract

Until now, there is no consensus about variations in governance roles. This consensus is necessary to enable researchers to examine how network are governed well. In this paper governance roles are considered to be clusters of consistent choices on a top-down versus bottom-up continuum, regarding nine governance activities. Our results reveal that three governance roles can be discerned: top-down, intermediate and bottom-up governance roles. Furthermore, these roles are applied municipalities with specific (network) characteristics. Our results open the black box of network governance and might facilitate municipalities to make choices regarding their role in the new network era.

5.1 Introduction

The role of municipalities has changed from 'local government' to 'local governance' of public networks (Agranoff, 2007). As a result, municipalities have more possibilities to govern local networks. However, governance within local contexts is often complex and local governments are not always familiar with the options that this new position offers. Municipalities are expected to work more with networks in which they have less authority, while at the same time they are increasingly held accountable for performance and improved outcomes. Insight into the different types of governance roles that exist within comparable networks might help municipalities make choices regarding their role in the network (Olberding, 2002).

Literature about governance roles is still in its infancy (Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007). Governance roles are collections of activities and rules that serve to achieve the goals of a network (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve & Tsai, 2004). In order to support managers within local public networks to choose appropriate governance roles, more research is needed. Most studies on governance roles so far present theoretical considerations rather than empirical investigations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Dekker, 2004). In addition, to date, studies on governance have lacked consensus on approaches to network governance (Herranz, 2008). In order to contribute to this consensus on approaches to network governance a set of dimensions is used to explore clusters of municipalities. Municipalities that are cluster member rely on same governance roles in Dutch local social support networks. This article also explores whether cluster membership is contingent on network and municipality characteristics. Consensus on network governance roles is necessary in order to explore one of the key questions that remain in interorganizational network research: what are the most effective governance roles and under which circumstances (Provan, 2009).

Therefore the aim of this article is to: identify actual governance roles performed by municipalities, reflecting different ways of governing local networks.

For this article we collected primary data on a large sample of Dutch municipalities for the purpose of examining which governance roles municipalities use in their implementation of the Dutch Social Support Act. Of the few empirical studies on the governance of networks, most are based on a small number of cases (Herranz, 2008, 2010; Provan & Milward, 1995). In order to examine how networks are governed in different circumstances, a large number of comparable networks need to be included in the study. This is one of the challenges faced by organizational network research (Provan, 2009). The context of the Dutch Social Support Act provides the opportunity for empirical

study of governance roles in local networks. In 2007, the national government adopted a new Social Support Act. The aims were to ensure quality and affordability of local social support in an ageing society. Municipalities have now become responsible for the implementation of social support (MinVWS, 2006), implying that they need to take a governance role in establishing connections between a network of organizations operating in the traditionally distinct policy areas of housing, wellbeing and care. A first evaluation ordered by the national government on the functioning of the Social Support Act concluded that more insight must be obtained into governance role variation among the different local networks. This insight should enable local governments to evaluate their own role and to make better systematic choices about the role they want to play, given the discretion available within their governance role (SCP, 2010).

This article describes an empirical investigation of governance roles in the context of the Dutch Social Support Act, using dimensions of municipal governance roles that reflect top-down versus bottom-up approaches. Before describing the research methods, the article first outlines theoretical considerations of types of network governance roles within a top-down versus bottom-up continuum of governance.

5.2 Network governance roles

Network governance offers a conceptual umbrella wide enough to encompass virtually any action of a municipality when operating in local public networks situated around a societal issue such as social policies (Gilsing, 2007), healthcare (Ferlie & McGivern, 2003) or education (Meier & O'Toole, 2005). Most studies on governance roles aim to identify actions within network governance (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). The greater part of these studies conclude that instead of focusing on distinct functions within governance, studies should focus on establishing a set of actions that represent different types of governance roles (e.g. (Agranoff, 2007; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). Although these scholars all advocate developing a set of activities representing different types of governance roles, they lack consensus on a perspective on governance.

A literature review by Rethemeyer (2005) on network governance roles provides a starting point to develop a set of functions that represents the different types of governance roles that stem from differences in perspectives in literature. Rethemeyer (2005) reviewed literature about network governance roles and concluded that all governance roles can be positioned on a continuum of bottom-up to top-down governance. Park (1996) studied network control and concluded that all networks are governed on a continuum of discretion in actions for all network members to formalized mandated actions imposed by network managers. A consensus typology for network governance roles incorporates bottom-up perspectives (i.e. facilitator) (Kickert et al., 1997) as well as top-down governance perspectives (i.e. maestro) (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003) and an intermediate role on this continuum (i.e. manipulator) (Mandell, 2001). The top-down perspective suggests that networks are coordinated primarily through authoritarian procedural mechanisms, rather than relying on social mechanisms (Herranz, 2008; Ryan, Williams, Charles & Waterhouse, 2008).

Other scholars have developed governance models that represent positions on this continuum (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2006; Considine & Lewis, 2003a; Herranz, 2008; Pröpper, Litjens, & Weststeijn, 2004; Span, Luijkx, Schols, & Schalk, 2011; Keast, 2011; Ling, 2002). Herranz (2008) for example recognizes a 'passive-to-active continuum' of network governance. In order to examine different network governance roles related to sector-based orientations, he distinguishes three 'strategic orientation value sets' based on the work of Pfeffer (1981). Bureaucratic, Entrepreneurial and Community governance roles are characterized by seven dimensions: ideology, goals and preferences, power and control, implicit structure, decision process, decisions, and information requirements. Herranz (2008) uses dimensions that provide more insight into the roles he distinguishes. However, not all these dimensions are easy to understand on the bottom-up to top-down continuum.

Pröpper et al. (2004) focused on the governance role of municipalities in local public networks dealing with education, safety and integration. These authors claim that in order to govern their local networks, municipalities need to 'hold on or let go'. Within their governance role, municipalities must balance the tension between hierarchical governance mechanisms and the need for more authority among network members. In their conceptualization of local governance, these authors distinguish four governance roles, based on two principles: perseverance and having an own script. Perseverance means the ability of the municipality to coerce participation of other network members. A script represents 'the rules and ideas of the network'. Combining these two principles distinguishes a 'commanding municipality', a 'performance-oriented municipality', a 'visionary municipality' and a 'facilitating municipality'. Especially the script dimension should be developed further. What does a local authority's own script entail? What set of tasks is connected to the different roles of a 'commanding municipality', a 'performance orientated municipality', a 'visionary municipality' and a 'facilitating municipality'.

Considine & Lewis (2003a) examined governance regimes that reflected the market type, the managed partnership type and the standard bureaucratic type on a national level within the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Australia. After examining the level and intensity of engagement between officials, three network types have been identified and are classified into basic, public and civic network types.

Andrews et al. (2006) tested four different strategies in governance roles on English local authorities: prospectors, defenders, analyzers and reactors. At a conceptual level, these categories appear to cover the major organizational responses to new circumstances: innovate (prospector), consolidate (defender), or wait for instructions (reactor).

All these scholars point to the existence of different types of governance roles. They all offer broad descriptions, or mindsets, that can be used to examine small pieces of the total pallet that represents local governance roles. These roles can be situated on a continuum of top-down to bottom-up governance. All models offer ideas about network governance. However, the underlying concepts of these ideas are either absent, underdeveloped, or cannot be understood easily on the continuum of top-down to bottom-up. Broad descriptions of the roles cause normative determination towards the roles.

5.2.1 Dimensions of governance roles

In order to acquire insight into governance roles, the concept needs to be operationalized through a set of actions (dimensions). Literature on governance is used to determine this set of actions. This yields the following nine dimensions, elaborated below: actor, steering, boundary conditions, responsibility, network goal, vision, alignment, dependencies and monitoring.

The set of actions (the set of dimensions) within a governance role can be based on: who is the **main actor** (Provan & Milward, 2001). In governing the local network, a municipality has to decide whether other network organizations are considered as executor (Bezemer, 2002), partner (van der Ham, 2002) or initiator (Hupe & Klijn, 1997). Another action often mentioned in literature is determining the **steering mechanisms** (Provan & Milward, 2001). A municipality has to decide whether to rely on directive steering mechanisms (van der Aa et al., 2002), or instead to rely on mechanisms that entail negotiating and influencing the other network members, as suggested by Kickert et. al (1997).

Setting boundary conditions for the network is also mentioned as a network action (Agranoff, 2007). After examining governance roles, Van der Aa (2002) concludes that a municipality must consider whether it will formulate the network requirements (products, services and resources) directly, or formulate these requirements together with the network members, or even will let the other network members formulate the necessary requirements. Boundary conditions within the context of social support can for example be understood as the set of activities performed when delivering housekeeping services to frail elderly.

Bearing responsibility is also recognized as an action within a governance role (Provan & Milward, 2006). Some authors state that within a local governance role, municipalities solely bear responsibility for the consequences of their own role (Denters, van der Haar, de Jong & Noppe, 1999). Other scholars claim that all network members have a shared responsibility for the consequences of network governance activities (Landman, 2004).

Setting the ultimate network goal is always part of a governance role. Without a network goal, governance has no purpose. Regarding this goal, again a municipality may decide to formulate a shared goal (Kenis & Provan, 2006), which means that all network members agree on the goal of the network. It is also possible for a municipality to formulate this goal independently (Span et al., 2011). Within the context of providing social support an example of a goal can be that: 'Every elderly in our municipality must be provided with services and products that will enable him or her to remain living independently for as long as possible, such as housekeeping, help with administration, providing a wheelchair'.

Before a goal can be set, a first line of reasoning needs to be formulated as basis for the network goal. This **vision** on the context of the network is the starting point for all other activities within the governance role (Span, Schalk, Luijkx, & Schols, 2009; Keast et. all, 2004). An example of a vision in the context of the Dutch Social Support act is: 'Every person in our municipality must be enabled to participate in our local community'. The goal described above provides more insight into every person (the elderly) and the problem experienced (remain living independently) and the solution needed (provide housekeeping, help with administration and providing a wheelchair).

Alignment is also an action within a local governance role. Alignment pertains to the products and services every party should supply in order to fulfill the network goal. Alignment can be mandated solely by a municipality, but it is also possible to jointly align the necessary products and services together with the other network members (Span et al., 2009). In the above example, when providing social support it has to be determined whether a cleaning company provides the housekeeping, or a care institution that already provides professional homecare. Do civil servants of the municipality help elderly with their administration, or is an administration office contracted for the job, etcetera.

Another task when local governments govern their local networks is to determine the **dependencies** that exist between the municipality and its network members. Within local support networks, municipalities deal with public and non-profit organizations. In general, scholars find that these organizations are more dependent on the municipality due to their reliance on government funding (Fogarty, 1996). Municipalities may conversely be dependent on member organizations if products, services or resources only flow into the network thanks to the willingness of these organizations (Span et al., 2009).

The last task mentioned in the set of governance actions is **monitoring**. All activities should be analyzed and evaluated. Monitoring is considered important within the governance of local networks (Korssen-van Raaij, 2006). As for every other action, it is essential to determine whether this entails an action by the municipality, the municipality together with other parties, or solely by other parties? The notion to examine the engagement of the different parties towards functions within governance roles is in line with Considine & Lewis (2003a) who studied the level of engagement of different governance regimes within public network regimes in the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Australia.

The set of actions within a municipal governance role thus consists of nine dimensions that position a governance role on the top-down versus bottom-up continuum: actor, steering, boundary conditions, dependency, alignment, goal, responsibility, vision and monitoring. If all nine dimensions are performed solely by the municipality, the governance role is positioned on the top-down end of the continuum. If the dimensions are performed entirely by the other network members, then this represents the bottom-up end of the governance continuum.

5.3 Network characteristics

McGuire (2002) suggests that governance activities are contingent on network characteristics. Provan & Kenis illustrated that network trust and network size are important variables. A low level of trust is generally associated with a top-down governance role. High levels of trust are associated with bottom-up governance roles. A bottom-up governance role demands trust as a basis for collective action (Provan & Kenis, 2008). According to Provan & Kenis (2008), network size is only relevant in small-sized networks. When problems occur in networks governed by a bottom-up role, face-to-face participation is necessary to solve conflicts. The more network members, the more inefficient the governance role will be (Provan & Kenis, 2008). This is in line with Gulati & Singh (1998) who found that, in large networks, agreeing on goals, formulating boundary conditions, and monitoring performance is very time-

consuming, if not impossible. Conversely, using a bottom-up governance role in small networks stimulates a greater responsiveness towards changing demands in the environment. In a small network it is easier to maintain contact frequently, as well as to evaluate the contributions of all parties involved (Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2009). Three network characteristics are important in determining the governance role of municipalities in a local public network: the diversity of network members, the degree of customizability of service demands, and the number of new network participants (Span et al., 2011). Diversity of network members is reflected in the differentiation in functional backgrounds of network members. In this article, local governments govern local network organizations that operate in such diverse sectors as health care, social work and housing. All these sectors have their own attributes. The role of the local government is to connect these organizations to provide integrated packages of products and services to citizens. If the contributions of different sectors are considered equally important, this leads to a heterogeneous network. If one sector dominates, this is likely to be reflected in a more homogeneous network. In heterogeneous networks the behavior of the other members is difficult to predict. Heterogeneous networks favor a bottom-up governance role, whereas homogeneous networks favor a top-down governance role. The degree of customization of services reflects whether services demanded by citizens can be predicted and standardized (Boyne & Chen, 2007). If local governments are unable to satisfy citizens' service demands, or these demands are too diverse, a bottom-up governance role fits best (Powell, 1990). Networks with a top-down role are often characterized by standardized services (Span et al., 2011).
Lastly, governance activities are contingent on network evolution. Network evolution is measured as the number of new members joining in a certain period, compared to the total number of network members. Highly evolved networks are associated with top-down governance roles (Faerman, McCaffrey, & Slyke, 2001). Less evolved networks are associated with bottom-up governance roles (Andrews et al., 2009).

5.4 Method

5.4.1 The questionnaire

Data were gathered using electronic questionnaires during the summer of 2010. The nine dimensions of governance roles that are distinguished in the literature were each measured by one question. Table 1 shows the questions used to measure these dimensions. Every dimension was scored using a five-point Likert scale.

Table 1 - Questions on the dimensions of the governance role of municipalities

Dimensions	Questions
1) Actor[1]	'Which role best characterizes the role of housing, social work and care institutions within the social support network?'
2) Dependency[2]	'How would you characterize the dependency relationship between your municipality and the other institutions within the social support network?'
3) Boundaries[3]	'Who formulates boundary conditions (time period, financial resources, and quality requirements) in the context of the social support network?'
4) Power[3]	'Power in relationships is used by?'
5) Alignment[3]	'Services and products concerning social support for elderly are aligned by?'
6) Goal[3]	'The goal for elderly in the Social Support Act is formulated by?'
7) Responsibility[3]	'Responsibility for reaching the stated goal for elderly is borne by?'
8) Vision[3]	'A first vision about providing social support for elderly in a local network is formulated by?'
9) Monitoring[3]	'Compliance with the boundaries of the social support network is monitored by?'

1 *1. Exclusively an executor. 2. Largerly an executer. 3. A partner. 4. Largerly an initiator. 5. Excusively an initiator.*
2 *1. The other institutions are completely dependent on the municipality. 2. The other institutions are largely dependent on the municipality. 3. The municipality and other institutions are equally dependent on each other. 4. The municipality is largely dependent on the other institutions. 5. The municipality is completely dependent on the other institutions.*
3 *1. Exclusively the municipality. 2. Largely the municipality. 3. Equally by the municipality and the other institutions. 4. Largely by the other institutions. 5. Exclusively by the other institutions.*

Table 2 shows the questions used to measure network characteristics. In addition, we also measured population size (Span et al., 2011) and urbanization degree (Gilsing, 2005) as characteristics of municipalities.

Table 2 - Network characteristics influencing choices within a governance role

Network characteristic	Questions
Network size	What is the actual number of network members present in your local support network for elderly?
Network evolution[4]	What is the number of new members in your local social support network since the introduction of the Social Support Act in 2007?
Network diversity	Please divide 100 points between the sectors of housing, care and social work, reflecting their importance in your local support network. (Equal importance results in: 33% housing, 33% care and 33% social work)
Stability in network services[5]	What services does your social support network use in order to fulfill social support demands?
Trust[6]	Do you trust the institutions within your local support network?

5.4.2 Pilot study
Prior to the data-collection, eight fellow researchers and four civil servants were asked to comment on the draft questionnaire. Also, the questionnaire was distributed among employees of care departments, social work departments and housing departments of three different municipalities, to obtain feedback on the way the questions were asked. This led to a number of improvements in the questionnaire.

5.4.3 Sample
All 430 municipalities in the Netherlands were invited to participate. Every local government has a functionary responsible for the governance role regarding the Social Support Act. Contact details of these persons were provided by the SCP[7] in March 2010 and we invited these functionaries directly through email addresses at work. Email and telephone reminders were used to increase the response rate.

5.4.4 Non-response analysis
Reminders also provided us with information about the reasons for non-response. Non-responders had two reasons not to participate in this study. First, they indicated that they were over-asked, citing budget constraints and the amount of requests to participate in studies about social support. The second reason given was that they were insufficiently informed to answer all questions. The contacted person had either taken up the position very recently, or indicated that, in order to answer all questions, they would have to contact numerous colleagues to obtain the necessary information.

4 The ratio between new and total members is used to determine the degree of evolution in the network.
5 1. Exclusively collective products and services. 2. Largely collective products and services. 3. Equally collective as well as individual products and services. 4. Largely individual products and services. 5. Exclusively individual products and services.
6 Likert scales represent the following answers: 1. Complete trust in network members. 2. Trust in network members. 3. Impartial concerning trust in network members. 4. Distrust in network members. 5. Complete distrust in network members.
7 The Netherlands Institute for Social Research / SCP is a government agency that conducts research into the social aspects of all areas of government policy. The main fields studied are health, welfare, social security, the labor market and education, with a particular focus on their various interfaces.

5.5 Statistical analyses

5.5.1 Latent class cluster analysis

To explore the occurrence of different types of government roles, a latent class analysis (LCA) was performed using the software Latent GOLD (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). LCA is used to differentiate variables into latent (unobserved) classes within a typology. Homogeneous groups are identified from multivariate data. Municipalities are clustered in classes based on the probabilities of belonging to the specific class. In LCA, the observed variables are considered to be indicators of an unobserved, latent variable, with a limited number of mutually exclusive categories. The model's main assumption is that responses on these observed variables are mutually independent given a municipality's class membership. The association of the observed responses can be explained by the existence of a small number of clusters. The probabilities indicate the likelihood that a municipality belonging to a particular class gives a particular answer to a question. Latent class analysis determines the probabilities of belonging to classes based on a position on a continuum. There is no fully automated procedure in LCA for determining the number of classes based on a single measure. The interpretability of the classes plays an important role in the model selection (Vermunt & Magidson, 2004). It is recommended to identify the classes that are derived from the data with expectations as derived from literature (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). A three-clusters solution provided results that were best in terms of interpretation and distribution of municipalities within these clusters. It is also consistent with most models using a top-down versus bottom-up continuum of governance. Besides governance roles at the extremes of the continuum, they also distinguish a third intermediate position (e.g. (Herranz, 2008; Kooiman, 2005; Span et al., 2011).

5.6 Results

We received 182 completed questionnaires, amounting to a response rate of 40.42% of the total population. Of the participating municipalities, 6% were large sized, 17% were large-to-middle sized, 53.8% were small-to-middle sized and 23.1% were small. Further, 24.7% of the municipalities were not urbanized, 40.7% were slightly urbanized, 17.0% were moderately urbanized, 14.8% highly urbanized and 2.7% were very highly urbanized. The municipalities were geographically spread all across the Netherlands. The distribution of the answers provided by the municipalities on the governance model dimensions are shown in Table 3. This reveals that the option "solely other network members" was never used (0%), and that the top-down end of governance was most prominent. The options 'solely the municipality' (4.8%) and 'largely the municipality' (45.7%) amounted to 50.5% of all choices on the governance role. The bottom-up end of the continuum, represented by the options 'solely the other network members' (0%) and 'largely the other network members' (5.0%) together accounted for only 5% of all choices on the dimensions.

Looking at the differences between dimensions, municipalities take the lead in actions such as setting the boundaries (75.8%) and monitoring network activities (76.9%). Dependency recognition (81.3%) and alignment of products and services (57.7%) are actions found more on the intermediate-to-bottom-up side. The most prominent dimensions at an intermediate position on the governance role were actor (59.9%) and dependency (70.3%).

Table 3 - Distribution of answers on the dimensions of network governance by 182 municipalities.

Dimensions	1		2		3		4		5	
Actor	6	3.3%	56	30.8%	109	59.9%	11	6.0%	0	0%
Dependency	1	0.5%	33	18.1%	128	70.3%	20	11.0%	0	0%
Boundaries	23	12.6%	115	63.2%	41	22.5%	3	1.6%	0	0%
Power	0	0%	76	41.8%	101	55.5%	5	2.7%	0	0%
Alignment	4	2.2%	73	40.1%	91	50.0%	14	7.7%	0	0%
Goal formulation	1	0.5%	99	54.4%	77	42.3%	5	2.7%	0	0%
Responsibility	14	7.7%	78	42.9%	84	46.2%	6	3.3%	0	0%
Vision	10	5.5%	98	53.8%	65	35.7%	9	4.9%	0	0%
Monitoring	19	10.4%	121	66.5%	33	18.1%	9	4.9%	0	0%
Total	**78**	**4.8%**	**749**	**45.7%**	**729**	**44.5%**	**82**	**5.0%**	**0**	**0%**

5.6.1 Network characteristics

Concerning the network characteristics, Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of the local networks, irrespective of which governance role they use. The largest local public network consists of 115 organizations. The minimum number of organizations participating in a local public network concerning social support is one. On average a municipality network is composed of 12 network members.

There are local public networks that consist of only new organizations (100%), whereas other networks are composed of the same organizations as before the introduction of the Social Support Act (0%). On average, municipalities govern local networks that consist of 37% new network members.

Regarding stability in services, the whole range from only providing collective services and products to only providing individual services and products is used. In general, the local public networks in our sample prefer a mix of individual products and services (3.47). Respondents never indicated that they do not completely trust or distrust organizations in their network. Overall, other organizations are trusted by the municipalities when governing local social support networks. Within social support, municipalities must govern their local networks in order to connect the sectors of housing, care and social work. Table 4 shows that the different sectors are prioritized differently across the networks. There are municipalities that indicate that housing is the most important sector in their network (60%). Other municipalities value the social work sector as most important (70%). Lastly, there are networks in which the care sector has the most prominent role (80%). None of the respondents identified any one sector as having no importance at all within the social support network. Housing is sometimes mentioned as the sector with the least importance (5%). In general, the care sector is indicated to be the most prominent, followed by the social work sector and completed by the housing sector.

Table 4 - Descriptive statistics about the network characteristics

Network characteristics	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Network size	12.40	15.61	1	115
Network evolution	37.3%	33.07%	0%	100%
Stability in services	3.47	0.678	1	5
Trust	2.18	0.50	1	3
Network member Diversity				
Housing	28.85%	9.36%	5%	60%
Care	37.14%	11.73%	10%	80%
Social work	33.76%	9.55%	10%	70%

5.6.2 Three governance roles of municipalities on the governance dimensions.

Municipalities are clustered based on the nine dimensions (the set of actions) of governance roles. A profile plot (see Figure 1, which plots all dimensions on a 0-1 range). 0 refers to a top-down approach, and 1 to a bottom-up approach. If three ideal types of governance existed there would be three horizontal lines at Y:1, Y:0.5 and Y:0, respectively.

*Figure 1 - Plot of distribution of probabilities of the three clusters.*

Figure 1 shows that there are three clusters positioned on the top-down versus bottom-up continuum. Overall, there is a tendency towards the top-down side of network governance. Most municipalities use a moderate top-down governance role. In line with literature we have labeled the roles: top-down (7.7%), intermediate (70.9%) and bottom-up (21.4%).

Figure 1 also shows that a role on the top-down versus bottom-up continuum is consistent with respect to the different dimensions. Municipalities with a bottom-up role indicate for every dimension that they rely more on other organizations compared to the answers given by the municipalities of the other clusters. The actor dimension detracts from the consistency on the dimensions between municipalities with a top-down role and municipalities with an intermediate role.

As already found in the distribution in answers on the governance dimensions (Table 4), the latent class cluster analysis also shows that differences are larger or smaller when the distinct dimensions are considered. Therefore, the actor dimension is not very useful in distinguishing differences in governance roles in our sample of municipalities. The same is true for the dependency dimension. This is also a dimension that is not very distinctive in terms of the different roles. Both dimensions position all municipalities on the bottom-up end of the continuum (Y>0.5).

Only the steering dimension positions every municipality on the top-down end (Y<0.5) of the underlying continuum. All governance roles are characterized by a municipality that steers the network, instead of the option that other network members steer the network. However, the degree to which municipalities steer the network varies according to the different roles. In a top-down role the municipality indicates that it largely steers the network, while in a bottom-up role the municipality indicates that it is more of a matter of steering the network together with the other network members. All other dimensions put the bottom-up role on the bottom-up end of the underlying continuum (Y>0.5).

The dimensions that show most difference between roles are establishing a vision and monitoring. Especially as regards monitoring, municipalities with a top-down governance role indicate that they solely monitor all activities performed within their governance role. Municipalities with an intermediate governance role indicate that monitoring is performed on a more mutual basis between the municipality and the other network members. Bottom-up governance membership indicates that monitoring is positioned between a mutual process and largely done by the other network members. The same differences between roles can be seen on the vision dimension. Alignment is a dimension that is most typical for a bottom-up role. Municipalities with a bottom-up role indicate that alignment is largely performed by the other network members. Municipalities with a top-down role indicate on this dimension that alignment is largely done by the municipality or jointly with the other organizations.

5.6.3 Characteristics per governance role

Table 5 shows the descriptive network characteristics per cluster. It also shows significant differences between clusters on the different variables based on independent t-tests between clusters.

Table 5 - Descriptive network characteristics per cluster

	Mean			SD			
Cluster	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**3**	
Network characteristics							
Network size	18.14	10.49[1]	17.05[1]	28.76	11.92	20.65	
Network evolution	63.31%[2,4]	40.78%[2,3]	15.89%[3,4]	28.62%	32.58%	24.29%	
Stability in services	3.50	3.49	3.38	0.65	0.686	0.67	
Trust	2.17	2.22[1,5]	2.05[1,5]	0.58	0.49	0.52	
Network member Diversity							
Housing	28.86%	28.49%	30.05%	12.66%	9.19%	8.68%	
Care	40.36%	37.14%	36.00%	16.03%	11.83%	9.35%	
Social work	30.64%	34.12%	8.31%	6.91%	10.12%	8.31%	

Municipalities with top-down governance roles govern more organizations compared to municipalities with other governance roles. Local public networks governed by an intermediate governance role are significantly larger than more bottom-up governed networks ($p<.10$). Networks governed by top-down roles (cluster 1) consist of significantly more new network members since the introduction of the Dutch Social Support Act than networks governed by an intermediate role (cluster 2) ($p<0.05$), or a bottom-up governance role (cluster 3) ($p<0.01$). Intermediate-governed organizations also consist of significantly more new network members compared to networks governed by bottom-up roles ($p<0.01$). Municipalities governing their networks bottom-up (cluster 3) have significantly less trust in their network partners compared to municipalities using an intermediate governance role ($p.=<0.10$). All other variables (network and control variables) are not significant between governance clusters within our sample of Dutch municipalities concerning the Social Support Act.

1 . Cluster 2 and cluster 3 are significantly different ($p < 0.10$).
2. Cluster 1 and cluster 2 are significantly different ($p < 0.05$).
3. Cluster 2 and cluster 3 are significantly different ($p < 0.01$).
4. Cluster 1 and cluster 3 are significantly different ($p < 0.01$).
5. Cluster 2 and cluster 3 are significantly different ($p \leq 0.10$).

5.7 Discussion and conclusion

This article offers an empirical investigation of actual network governance roles in local public networks. The results of this study illustrate three types of governance roles of Dutch municipalities within the social support networks, which systematically differ in their position on the top-down versus bottom-up continuum. However, the differences between the roles are smaller than suggested by the theoretical ideal-type roles of top-

	Min			Max		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
	1	1	1	115	115	115
	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	100%
	2	1	2	4	5	4
	1	1	1	3	3	3
	5%	5%	10%	50%	50%	60%
	10%	10%	20%	80%	80%	70%
	15%	10%	20%	40%	70%	50%

down, bottom-up and the intermediate area. Network governance by municipalities within the social support network tends towards the top-down end of the governance continuum.

Choices on the continuum that would represent extremes of the bottom-up continuum are entirely absent. The results of this study are in contrast with the dominant perspective within studies on network governance that inform theoretical considerations. In most studies on network governance roles, scholars presume a distinction between the hierarchical tradition in public governance from that of network governance (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Kettl, 2002; Kickert et al., 1997; Mandell, 2001; O'Toole, 1997; Considine & Lewis, 2003a,b; Keast, Brown & Mandell, 2007; Keast, 2011). After studying public networks, Kickert et al. (1997) concluded that top-down governance roles are not appropriate in the network era and that scholars should focus on a new set of bottom-up governance activities (Kicker et al., 1997).

Top-down roles are stigmatized and marginalized as outmoded and as functionally and morally bankrupt (Considine & Lewis, 2003b). However, by only focusing on distinctions between traditional top-down governance and network governance, scholars may have overlooked the presence of top-down mechanisms within network governance (Kenis & Provan, 2006). A study conducted by Ferlie and McGivern (2003) on health care networks already illustrated that, in local public contexts, top-down governance is still the dominant approach. This study supports that result in social support networks. The results of this study fit within the framework by Span et al. (2011) that identifies different types of roles (commissioner, co-producer and facilitator) on the top-down versus bottom-up continuum. The results of this study indicate that choices for the facilitator role are completely absent. Instead, this study shows a continuum from completely top-down (commissioner) versus largely bottom-up (between the

co-producer and facilitator role). Governance in this study was operationalized through a set of functions within the governance role to identify different types of governance roles. This fairly innovative way of identifying systematic differences between governance roles revealed that not every dimension is equally distinctive. On the 'actor' dimension, differences between the roles were small while on 'vision' dimension they were larger. The results of the study provide evidence for the existence of clusters of municipalities that consistently differ on type of governance.

A second aim of this study was to identify network and municipality characteristics that are associated with the different governance roles. In our sample, only network size, network evolution and network trust proved to be significantly different between the roles. Insight in this difference is important. Each governance role has its merits and pitfalls, depending on characteristics and expectations of the network and its members (Keast, 2011; Ling, 2002). The results show that a small-sized network is associated with a more bottom-up governance approach. This finding is consistent with the claim that it is easier within small networks to maintain contact regularly as well as to evaluate the contributions of all parties involved (Andrews et al., 2009).

The more new network members there are in the local network, the more reliance on a top-down approach of government. This is consistent with the work of (Korssen-van Raaij, 2006), who found that the admission of new network members creates uncertainty. When partners begin to work together, top-down approaches are required since they do not know what to expect from each other. As a network evolves, the need for bottom-up governance roles increases because of an increase in trust (Human & Provan, 2000). This is also consistent with the results of this study, as it demonstrates that municipalities favoring top-down governance have significantly less trust in their network partners than municipalities in the bottom-up governance cluster. A more bottom-up ethos may prove to be important on the long run (Keast, 2011).

In an earlier study, Considine (1996) also aimed to develop measures of ideal types of governance roles in action and to the test the existence and explanatory power of these roles. By conducting a factor analysis it was studied which items formed coherent and sensible dimensions. In this study, dimensions again were not mutually exclusive. Respondents were rating more than one role as evenly important. Therefore, respondents should be forced to make a choice between the different roles. By using top down to bottom up choices on nine functions within a governance role, this study provided a start to empirically examining governance in local public networks. The results of the study provide evidence for the existence of clusters of municipalities that consistently differ in type of governance. Future research might follow qualitative research methods in order to flesh out the perceptions and rationales for the governance roles adopted and how they are operationalized. Future research could also assess governance roles in other local public contexts as well. The results of this study can contribute to the realization of a consensus typology on local network governance. Moreover, future research may involve the other network organizations in examining the governance role of municipalities. In this study only the municipality representatives scored the activities within its governance role. Respondents of other organizations may think differently on the use of governance roles by municipalities.

Our results make governance roles more developed. This is a first step towards examining the effects of governance roles on network performance. From a theoretical

point of view there is no consensus on how governance roles can be conceptualized, hence this has to be established first. Above, this article also elaborates on network characteristics that may interact as contingencies on the causal relationship between governance roles and network performance. With regard to the practice of network governance this article provides some useful insights that can be used by policy makers and network managers. This article sheds light on the black box of network governance. It provided more insight in the pallet of options municipalities possess when executing social policies in the network era. This study also illustrates that using choices inspired on top-down governance are not marginalized or outmoded in a network era that is theoretically dominated by the participation mantra (Keast & Brown, 2006). Top-down governance roles might be well suitable in overcoming the wicked problems of today's society.

The classification into groups of municipalities with same governance roles might help municipalities to get insight in their own role and compare it with its alternatives. Insight in differences in network and municipal characteristics between roles can be used to legitimate changing to, or relying on a particular governance role.

Also, better insight in their actual governance role enables better communication about the expectations towards the other network members. Better explicating a governance role leads to more clarity in what to expect from network membership. Clarity in the do's and don'ts within the network leads to more focus on achieving network goals. Municipalities might also face less confusion when experiencing what they actually do, is contrasting what they intend to do as proclaimed within their policy documents (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997).

References

Agranoff, R. (2007). Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations. Washintong D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network Management Research. J Public Adm Res Theory, 11(3), 295-326.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2003). Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., Law, J., & Walker, R. M. (2009). Centralization, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance.. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 19(1), 57-80. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum039

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., & Walker, R. M. (2006). Strategy content and organizational performance: An empirical analysis. Public Administration Review, 66(1), 52-63.

Atkinson, P., & Coffey, A. (1997). Analysing documentary realities Qualitative Research Theory, Method and Practice (pp. 45-62). London,: Sage.

Bezemer, J. (2002). Opdrachtgeving: Het overbrengen van een uitgedrukte wil van de één op een ander. Stadswerk : tijdschrift voor ruimtelijke inrichting en milieu, 10(4), 18.

Boyne, G. A., & Chen, A. A. (2007). Performance Targets and Public Service Improvement. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 17(3), 455-477. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mul007

Brass, D. J., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. R., & Tsai, W. P. (2004). Taking stock of networks and organizations: A multilevel perspective. Academy Of Management Journal, 47(6), 795-817.

Considine, M. (1996). Market Bureaucracy? Exploring the Contending Rationalities of Contemporary Administrative Regimes. Labour and Industry, 7(1), 1-27.

Considine, M., & Lewis, J. M. (2003a). Networks and interactivity: making sense of front-line governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(1), 46-58.

Considine, M., & Lewis, J. M. (2003b). Bureaucracy, Network, or Enterprise? Comparing Models of Governance in Australia, Britain, The Netherlands & New Zealand. Public Administration Review, 63(2), 131-140.

Dekker, H. C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. Accounting Organizations And Society, 29(1), 27-49. doi: 10.1016/s0361-3682(02)00056-9

Denters, S. A. H., van der Haar, M.J.I., de Jong, H.M., Noppe, R.M. . (1999). De Regiefunctie in Gemeenten. . Den Haag: Raad voor het Openbaar bestuur.

Faerman, S. R., McCaffrey, D. P., & Slyke, D. M. v. (2001). Understanding Interorganizational Cooperation: Public-Private Collaboration in Regulating Financial Market Innovation. Organization Science, 12(3), 372.

Ferlie, E., & McGivern, G. (2003). Relationships between health care organisations: a critical overview of the literature and a research agenda. London: Centre for NHS Service Delivery & Organisation.

Fogarty, T.J. (1996). The imagery and reelity of peer review in the U.S.: Insights form institutional theory. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 21, 243-267.

Gilsing, R. (2005). Bestuur aan Banden. Den Haag: SCP.

Gilsing, R. (2007). Intergovernmental relations and the effectiveness of local governance: the case of Dutch youth policy. International Review Of Administrative Sciences, 73(1), 45-64.

Gössling, T., & Oerlemans, L. (2007). Inside networks : a process view on multi-organisational partnerships, alliances and networks. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Gulati, R., & Singh, H. (1998). The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4), 781-814.

Herranz, J. (2008). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18, 1-31.

Herranz, J. (2010). Multilevel Performance Indicators for Multisectoral Networks and Management. American Review of Public Administration, 40(4), 445-460. doi: 10.1177/0275074009341662

Human, S. E., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Legitimacy Building in the Evolution of Small-Firm Multilateral Networks: A Comparative Study of Success and Demise. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(2), 327-365.

Hupe, P. L., & Klijn, E. H. (1997). De gemeente als regisseur van het preventief jeugdbeleid

Kenis, P. N., & Provan, K. G. (2006). The control of public networks. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 227-247.

Keast, R. (2011). Joined-Up Governance in Australia: How the Past Can Inform the Future. International Journal of Public Administration, 34(4), 221-231.

Keast, R., & Brown, K. (2006). Adjusting new ways of working: Experiments in service delivery in the public sector. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 65(4), 41-53.

Keast, R., Brown, K., & Mandell, M. (2007). Getting The Right Mix: Unpacking Intergration Meanings and Strategies. International Public Management Journal, 10(1), 9-33.

Keast, R., Mandell, M., Brown, K., & Woolcock, G. (2004). Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations. Public Administration Review, 64(3), 363-371.

Kettl, D. (2002). The tranformation of governance: public administration for the twenty first century America. Baltimore: John Hopkins university press.

Kickert, W., Klijn, E., & Koppenjan, J. (1997). Managing complex networks. London: Sage Press.

Kooiman, J. (2005). Governing as governance. London: Sage.

Korssen-van Raaij, D. (2006). Norms Network Members Use: An Alternative Perspective for Indicating Network Success or Failure. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 249-270.

Landman, W. M., T.J. (2004). Regie in het integrale veiligheidsbeleid Het tijdschrift voor de politie, 66(10), 20.

Ling, T. (2002). Delivering Joined-up Government in the U.K.: Dimensions, Issues and Problems. Public Administration, 80, 615-642.

Mandell, M. (2001). Getting results through collaboration: Networks and network structures for public policy and management. Westport: Quorum

Books.

McGuire, M. (2002). Managing Networks: propositions on what managers do and why they do it. Public Administration Review, 62, 599-609.

Meier, K. J., & O'Toole, L. (2005). Managerial networking: Issues of measurement and design. Administration & Society, 37, 523-541.

MinVWS. (2006). Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (Social Support Act). 's-Gravenhage: Staatsblad.

O'Toole, L. (1997). Treating networks seriously: Practical and research-based agendas in public administration. Public Administration Review, 57(45-52).

Olberding, J. C. (2002). Does Regionalism Beget Regionalism? The Relationship between Norms and Regional Partnerships for Economic Development. Public Administration Review, 62(4), 480-491. doi: 10.1111/0033-3352.00201

Park, S. (1996). Managing an interorganizational network: A framework of the institutional mechanism for network control. Organization Studies, 17(5), 795-824.

Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Boston, MA: Pitman Publishing.

Powell, W. (1990). Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336.

Pröpper, I., Litjens, B., & Weststeijn, E. (2004). Lokale regie uit macht of onmacht? : onderzoek naar de optimalisering van de gemeentelijke regiefunctie.

Provan, K. G. (2009, July 4th). Examining the parts of the whole? Expanding the focus of Organizational Network Research. Paper presented at the EGOS Barcelona.

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(2), 229-252.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. (2006). A manager's guide to choosing and using collaborative networks Washington D.C.: IBM centre for the business of government.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (1995). A Preliminary Theory Of Interorganizational Network Effectiveness - A Comparative-Study Of 4 Community Mental-

Health Systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 1-33.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks. Public Administration Review, 61(4), 414-423.

Rethemeyer, R. K. (2005). Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector. Public Administration Review, 65(1), 117-121.

Ryan, N., Williams, T., Charles, M., & Waterhouse, J. (2008). Top-down organizational change in an Australian goverment agency. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 21(1), 26-44.

SCP. (2010). Op weg met de Wmo: Evaluatie van de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 2007-2009. 's-Gravenhage: SCP.

Span, K. C. L., Luijkx, K. G., Schols, J. M. G. A., & Schalk, R. (2011). The Relationship Between Governance Roles and Performance in Local Public Interorganizational Networks: A Conceptual Analysis. The American Review of Public Administration. doi: 10.1177/0275074011402193

Span, K. C. L., Schalk, M. J. D., Luijkx, K. G., & Schols, J. M. G. A. (2009). Clarifying the local directing role; an empirical theoretical analysis of the literature. Bestuurskunde, 18(1), 92-100.

van der Aa, A., Beemer, B., Konijn, T., van Roost, M., de Ruigh, H., & van Twist, M. (2002). Naar een Methodisch Kader voor Ketenregie in het Openbaar Bestuur. 's Gravenhage: Ministerie van BZK.

van der Ham, W. (2002). Publiek-Private Samenwerking - maar hoe zit het met de regie? B & G, 29, 28-30.

Vermunt, J. K., & Magidson, J. (2004). Latent class analysis. In M. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman & T. F. Liao (Eds.), The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Sciences Resarch Methods (pp. 549-553). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sge Publications.

Vermunt, J. K., & Magidson, J. (2005). Latent Gold 4.0 User's Guide. . Berlmont, Massachusetts: Statistical Innovations Inc.

The effect of public multi-actor governance on local authorities' evaluation of social support:

an empirical analysis

Abstract

This article offers an empirical investigation of the relationships between diversity in local governance roles and authorities' evaluation of performance. The study analyzes these relationships in the context of local public social support networks in the Netherlands. 175 municipalities (comprising 40.6% of the total Dutch population) participated in this study; they described their governance activities and evaluated the performance of their social support network. On the basis of their governance activities, these municipalities were clustered into three groups of governance roles: top-down, intermediate and bottom-up. Analyses of variance are conducted to examine the effect of these roles.

Local authorities' evaluations do not differ according to governance role types. However, at the governance activity level there are differences in their evaluations. We propose using client evaluations of the products and services provided through the network as a better alternative for measuring public network performance.

6.1 Introduction

Formulating and executing local public policy is increasingly pursued through public networks of organizations. In the network era, there is a widespread belief that the knowledge and experience required for effective solutions to persistent problems in today's society can no longer be found in any single governmental body (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Public authorities need to collaborate with organizations to pool and share the expertise and skills necessary to effectively meet the intricate claims of citizens and organizations, in a wide variety of contexts. A growing number of policies are being decentralized to local authorities as a means of boosting their effectiveness (Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2009; Meier & O'Toole, 2009; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). This authority level is believed to better understand local needs and possibilities and to govern policies more adequately in local public networks (Fleurke, Hulst, & de Vries, 1997; Gilsing, 2007).

Despite decades of research on public inter-organizational networks, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the governance and governance-related performance of whole networks (Herranz, 2010; Provan & Milward, 2001; Raab & Kenis, 2009). This question remains somewhat neglected in both theoretical and empirical studies on public networks. Two main reasons hamper empirical studies in this domain.

First, researchers lack consensus on what possible governance roles are (Dekker, 2004; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). Researchers have concluded from extensive literature reviews that in order to take network research to the next level, future studies should focus on diversity in sets of governance activities that can be applied when public authorities work together with other organizations in public multi-actor networks (Herranz, 2008; Provan, et al., 2007). Also, local governments empirically face ambiguity in the options offered through the freedom of governance given by decentralized policies (SCP, 2010). To understand the determinants of network performance requires a deeper understanding of governance roles (Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007).

Second, there is not a single best way of governing public networks in relation to societal benefits. Network performance is subject to political processes. Successful performance is viewed differently depending on which stakeholders are involved. Until now, scholars have measured network performance by determining whether network organizations

themselves feel that the network is accomplishing its goals at the right quality and with the appropriate resources (Daft, 2001; Klijn, Edelenbos, Kort, & van Twist, 2008). In exploring the variety in governance roles that are tied to outcomes, the key stakeholders in the networks need to be identified (Freeman, 1985). In this study we consider the local authority as the most important stakeholder. Local authorities are the directors of the local public networks. In their role as directors, they monitor and provide resources to the local network and its activities. Directors need to create service-delivery mechanisms that utilize resources efficiently while adequately serving public needs (Provan & Milward, 2001). Within formally established and governed public networks, success heavily depends on the expectations of the local authority regarding the ultimate goal (Keuzenkamp, 2009). Local authorities define the context for action by the network members. They thus use governance roles in order to provide opportunities and direct behavior (Borgatti & Foster, 2003).

In this article we use the context of social support in the Netherlands in order to examine the effect of the variety in governance roles on the local authority's evaluation of network performance. Social support policy has recently been subjected to decentralization processes in the Netherlands, with the national government assigning responsibility for providing adequate social support to the municipality level. To ensure the quality and affordability of social support, municipalities use a governance role to build and encourage connections within a network of organizations. Municipalities in the Netherlands function as directors of the local public network. Through connections within these networks, products and services are realized such as home care, help with administration, or the provision of mobility aids. Municipalities are believed to have better insight into local needs and opportunities than the national government and to therefore be better able to anticipate local possibilities (Ministry of Health Welfare and Sport (VWS), 2006). Municipalities have discretion with respect to their governance role in order to balance local needs and local possibilities. However, municipalities are often unaware of the possibilities offered by their governance role, and of the effect of their role with respect to the desired outcomes (Klerk, Marangos, Dijkgraaf, & Boer, 2009; Marangos, Cardol, & Klerk, 2008; SCP, 2010). Therefore, there is a growing demand for more insight into role variation and local authority evaluations of the network. This leads to the following research question:

How do different municipal governance roles affect the municipality's own evaluation of its social support performance?

The article proceeds in four parts. First, we provide a theoretical background to elaborate the concepts used in this empirical study: governance roles and network performance, in particular citizens' evaluations. Next, the research methodology is described. This section introduces the data set used and the data analysis performed. The third part describes the results of the analysis of governance roles and network performance. The article's final section discusses the implications and limitations of the study for advancing theory, research and practice.

6.2 Theoretical background

In this section we elaborate the theoretical background and the variables included in the study: governance roles, and network performance, in particular local authorities' evaluation.

6.2.1 Governance roles

Governance roles are collections of activities performed by lead organizations in networks to achieve desired network outcomes. Governance roles in public networks can be positioned on a continuum from top-down to bottom-up options. With respect to local public networks this means that the leading role may be fulfilled by either the municipal authority or by other network members (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, 2003; Herranz, 2008; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Span, Luijkx, Schalk & Schols (2009) analyzed the literature on governance roles in local government, and distilled from that the following overview of characteristics of governance roles (see Figure 1).

Figure 1- A typology for local network governance

Directing typologies by local government			
Actor	Executer	Partner	Initiator
Steering	Steering by the municipality	Joint steering	Self steering
Boundaries	Fixed boundaries by the municipality	Jointly set boundaries	Boundaries set by the parties
Dependency	Formal dependency	Informal / formal dependency	Informal dependencies
Alignment	Alignment by the municipality	Joint alignment	Alignment by the parties
Goal	Fixed goals by the municipality	Joint goal formulation	Goal formulation by the parties
Responsibility	Municipal responsibilities	Joint responsibility	Responsibility by the partners
Vision	Vision of the municipality	Joint vision formulation	Vision formulation by the parties
Monitoring	Monitoring by the municipality	Joint monitoring	Monitoring by the parties
	Commissioner	**Co-Producer**	**Facilitator**

The characteristics of governance roles (commissioner, co-producer, facilitator) can be described on nine dimensions: who is the main actor, what is the steering mechanism, who sets the boundary conditions, who is dependent, who aligns, who sets goals, who is responsible, who develops the vision, and who monitors results. Governance roles can be positioned on each of the nine dimensions on a continuum of bottom-up versus top-down (Span et al., 2009). Overall, there are three different sets of governance activities: commissioner at the top-down end of the continuum, co-producer on the intermediate position, and facilitator at the bottom-up end of the continuum.

Different types of governance roles were identified by Span, Luijkx, Schalk, & Schols (2011) in the context of local public networks for social support in the Netherlands, based on latent cluster class analysis.

6.2.2 Local authorities' evaluations

Research on networks that deliver social support has shown that there is a tension between effectiveness as perceived by network members(Alter & Hage, 1993; Pfeffer, 1981; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh 2002), and effectiveness as perceived by the users (Provan & Milward, 1995), suggesting a need for further research. Within the context of social support, local authorities are principals; they monitor and fund the network and its activities. The importance of local authorities' network involvement can be evaluated on three primary criteria: client outcomes, goal attainment, and involvement of other organizations. Client outcomes are important since local networks are established with a view to the optimal fulfillment of the specific demands of individual citizens (Ministerie van VWS, 2006). Goal attainment is important to assess whether the goals as stated in the official policy documents as approved by the city council are met. Local governments must report to the central government to what degree the long-term goals have been reached. Concerning the involvement of other organizations, it is stated in the literature that in order to be effective, a network must satisfy the needs and interests of those who work for and support the network (Provan & Milward, 2001). Therefore, building a cooperative network of inter-organizational relationships that collectively provides services is more effective and efficient than a system based on fragmented funding and services (Gilsing, 2005, 2007).

In this article, network performance is assessed through municipalities' own evaluation of the achievement of goals, the involvement of the other organizations in the governance process, and the degree to which individual needs are met.

6.3 Methods

6.3.1 The questionnaire

Data were gathered using an electronic questionnaire sent to social support managers of each of the 430 Dutch local government organizations, during the summer of 2010. This questionnaire included questions on the use of governance roles, network contingencies and evaluations of the performance of the social support network. A total of 175 municipalities (representing 41% of the national population) completed the whole questionnaire. The response group was a representative sample for the total population in terms of geographical distribution, urbanization degree and population sizes (Span et al., accepted). For all 175 municipalities, the project manager answered the questions.

Table 1 shows the questions used to measure the local governance activities.

Table 1 - Questions on the activities of municipal governance roles

Activities	Questions
1) Actor[1]	'Which role best characterizes the role of housing, social work and care institutions within the social support network?'
2) Dependency[2]	'How would you characterize the dependency relationship between your municipality and the other institutions within the social support network?'
3) Boundaries[3]	'Who formulates boundary conditions (time period, financial resources, and quality requirements) in the context of the social support network?'
4) Power[3]	'Power in relationships is used by?'
5) Alignment[3]	'Services and products concerning social support for elderly are aligned by?
6) Goal[3]	'The goal for elderly in the Social Support Act is formulated by?'
7) Responsibility[3]	'Responsibility for reaching the stated goal for elderly is borne by?'
8) Vision[3]	'A first vision about providing social support for elderly in a local network is formulated by?'
9) Monitoring[3]	'Compliance with the boundaries of the social support network is monitored by?'

Table 2 shows the questions used to capture local authorities' evaluations of social support network outcomes.

Table 2 - Questions on the network performance as evaluated by local authorities

Evaluation	Questions
1) Goal achievement[4]	'To what degree is the local support network achieving its goals?'
2) Involvement[5]	'To what degree are network organizations involved in developing and providing social support?'
3) Involvement judgment[5]	'To what degree do network organizations feel involved in developing and providing social support?'
4) Individual needs[4]	'To what degree are individual needs of citizens met?'

1 *1. Exclusively an executor. 2. Largerly an executer. 3. A partner. 4. Largerly an initiator. 5. Excusively an initiator.*

2 *1. The other institutions are completely dependent on the municipality. 2. The other institutions are largely dependent on the municipality. 3. The municipality and other institutions are equally dependent on each other. 4. The municipality is largely dependent on the other institutions. 5. The municipality is completely dependent on the other institutions.*

3 *1. Exclusively the municipality. 2. Largely the municipality. 3. Equally by the municipality and the other institutions. 4. Largely by the other institutions. 5. Exclusively by the other institutions.*

4 *1. Totally. 2. Largely. 3. In half of the occasions. 4. Hardly. 5. Totally not.*

5 *1. Very good. 2. Good. 3. Neutral. 4. Poor. 5. Very poor.*

6.3.2 Statistical analysis

The relationship between governance role membership and local authorities' evaluations of social support network performance was examined using variance analysis. In addition, analyses of variance were performed separately for each of the activities within a governance role. In this article we use a $p< 0.1$ level to examine whether there are significant differences between the effects of governance roles and activities on local authority evaluations. This more robust level of significance stems from the explorative nature of this study. The authors are unaware of empirical studies examining the effect of governance roles on local authority evaluations on a similarly large scale.

6.4 Results

To examine the effects of governance roles on local authorities' evaluations of local support network performance, we classified municipalities into three different clusters of governance roles. In our dataset, 6.9% of municipalities had a top-down governance role, 71.4% an intermediate governance role and 21.7% a bottom-up governance role. The distribution of the answers provided by the municipalities is shown in Table 3. This table reveals that municipalities in general evaluate the performance of their network as positive (answers 4 & 5; 84.7%). The most negative category is never used (0%). Only in 1% of the evaluations does the municipality indicate that the network is performing poorly. The local authorities mostly indicate a neutral state (3) or indicate that the network is performing well (4) (14.3% - 78%).

The variation in answers depends on the variable under study. Most variation is observed concerning the question whether member organizations feel involved when providing social support. The least variation occurs where local authorities evaluate the level in which the network serves individual needs.

Table 3 - Distribution of answers on the network performance criteria regarding social support by 175 municipalities

Criteria	1		2		3		4		5		Kurtosis	Skewness
Goal achievement[4]	0	0%	2	1.1%	33	18.9%	140	80.0%	0	0%	5.33	1.82
Involvement[5]	0	0%	0	0%	19	10.9%	130	74.3%	26	14.9%	3.88	-0.07
Involvement judgment[5]	0	0%	4	2.3%	42	24.0%	113	64.6%	16	9.1%	3.58	0.42
Individual needs[4]	0	0%	1	0.6%	6	3.4%	163	93.1%	5	2.9%	20.68	1.88
Total	**0**	**0.0%**	**7**	**1.0%**	**100**	**14.3%**	**546**	**78.0%**	**47**	**6.7%**		

An analysis of variance shows no significant difference in the evaluations of local authorities with respect to governance roles. Governance role type is not associated with differences in performance evaluations by local authorities.

Governance roles consist of nine governance activities. These nine activities differ in the extent to which they are characteristic for a particular role. Therefore we performed analyses of variance on the separate activities within governance. Table 4-7 show the results for the nine activities (actor, dependency, boundaries, power, alignment, goal

formulation, responsibility, vision, monitoring) in the different performance evaluations by local authorities (goal achievement, involvement, involvement judgment and individual needs).

Table 4 - The effects of different activities within a governance role on goal achievement

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F.	Sig.
Corrected model	4.058	26	0.156	0.793	0.751
Intercept	19.331	1	19.331	98.248	0.000***
Actor	0.473	3	0.158	0.802	0.495
Dependency	0.260	3	0.087	0.440	0.724
Boundaries	0.453	3	0.151	0.768	0.514
Power	0.112	2	0.056	0.284	0.753
Alignment	0.404	3	0.135	0.685	0.563
Goal formulation	0.602	3	0.201	1.020	0.386
Responsibility	1.490	3	0.497	2.524	0.060*
Vision	0.238	3	0.079	0.402	0.751
Monitoring	0.127	3	0.042	0.215	0.886
Error	53.651	148	0.363		
Total	910.000	175			
Corrected Total	67.394	174			

The evaluation of the degree to which the network is achieving its goals is associated with the question whether responsibility is carried by the local authority alone or jointly with the other network members ($p<0.1$). In total, the nine activities of governance are responsible for 12.2 % of the variance in the evaluation of network goals.

Table 5 - The effects of different activities within a governance role on involvement

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F.	Sig.
Corrected model	10.311	26	0.397	1.706	0.026**
Intercept	13.867	1	13.867	59.643	0.000***
Actor	2.174	3	0.725	3.118	0.028**
Dependency	0.725	3	0.242	1.039	0.377
Boundaries	3.248	3	1.083	4.656	0.004***
Power	0.274	2	0.137	0.588	0.556
Alignment	0.473	3	0.158	0.678	0.567
Goal formulation	1.525	3	0.508	2.186	0.092*
Responsibility	0.846	3	0.282	1.213	0.307
Vision	0.690	3	0.230	0.989	0.400
Monitoring	0.262	3	0.087	0.375	0.771
Error	34.409	148	0.232		
Total	717.000	175			
Corrected Total	44.720	174			

*P. < 0.1   ** P. < 0.05   *** P. < 0.01*

The degree to which a municipality formulates the goals of the network alone determines the extent to which other organizations are involved in the development and execution of social support policy (P<0.1). There is also a significant relationship between the extent to which the municipality formulates the boundary conditions and how much the network members are involved (P<0.01). Finally, the degree to which the municipality indicates whether a network member is a partner or an executer is also associated with the extent to which network members are involved. The nine activities account for 23.1% of the variance in municipalities' assessment of how much network members are involved.

Table 6 - The effects of different activities within a governance role on judgment of involvement as perceived by network members

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F.	Sig.
Corrected model	13.774	26	0.529	1.458	0.085*
Intercept	12.706	1	12.706	59.643	0.000***
Actor	0.885	3	0.295	3.118	0.488
Dependency	3.185	3	1.062	1.039	0.036**
Boundaries	1.914	3	0.638	4.656	0.157
Power	0.492	2	0.246	0.588	0.509
Alignment	0.397	3	0.132	0.678	0.778
Goal formulation	3.509	3	1.170	2.186	0.024**
Responsibility	1.075	3	0.358	1.213	0.400
Vision	1.652	3	0.0.551	0.989	0.212
Monitoring	0.711	3	0.237	0.375	0.582
Error	53.651	148	0.363		
Total	910.000	175			
Corrected Total	67.394	174			

The extent to which a municipality sets the goals for the network is associated with the extent to which a municipality indicates that other network members are involved in the development and execution of social support policy (P<0.05). Also the extent to which a municipality indicates that it is dependent on the network members differs to the extent that other network members are involved (P<0.05). The nine activities account for 20.4% of the variance in municipalities' assessment of network members' involvement in the development and execution of social support policy.

*Table 7 - The effects of different activities within a governance role on the fulfillment
of individual needs*

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F.	Sig.
Corrected model	3.125	26	0.120	1.508	0.068*
Intercept	20.367	1	20.367	59.643	0.000***
Actor	0.385	3	0.128	3.118	0.191
Dependency	0.351	3	0.117	1.039	0.226
Boundaries	0.314	3	0.105	4.656	0.273
Power	0.825	2	0.413	0.588	0.007***
Alignment	0.280	3	0.093	0.678	0.324
Goal formulation	0.067	3	0.022	2.186	0.839
Responsibility	0.453	3	0.358	1.213	0.134
Vision	0.013	3	0.004	0.989	0.984
Monitoring	0.206	3	0.069	0.375	0.463
Error	11.823	148	0.080		
Total	727.000	175			
Corrected Total	14.949	174			

The degree to which a municipality exercise power over the other network members
determines the degree to which individual needs are perceived to be fulfilled (P<0.01).
The nine activities amount to 20.9% of the variance in municipalities' assessment of the
extent to which other network members are involved.

6.5 Discussion and Conclusion

In this article we examined the following research question: How do different municipal
governance roles affect the municipality's own evaluation of its social support performance?
In order to answer this research question we conducted analyses of variance. First, we
examined the effects of the general governance roles on local authorities' evaluations.
Second, we examined the effects of specific governance activities on network
performance.

In general, a governance role is unrelated to differences in local authorities' evaluations
of social support. There are no significant effects of governance roles on the evaluations
by municipalities. This is probably due to the (absence of) variation in the performance
evaluations. All local authorities value the performance of their network as positive. With
respect to specific governance activities, we found several differences in local authorities'
evaluations. However, there is variety in effects, depending on which evaluation criteria
is examined; different activities appear to be of importance. Certain activities, such as the
exercise of power, prove to have an effect on the evaluation of whether individual needs
are fulfilled, but prove ineffective with respect to the other evaluation criteria used in
this study.

These results are in line with the results of other empirical studies (Agranoff, 2005,
2007; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Korssen-van Raaij, 2006; McGuire & Agranoff,
2007). Therefore, we agree with scholars who propose to study consistent collections of
governance activities, clustered within governance roles (Herranz, 2008).

*P. < 0.1   ** P. < 0.05   *** P. < 0.01*

With respect to the limited variation in evaluations of network performance, it can be concluded that performance evaluations by local authorities themselves is probably not a valid measure. However, based on an extensive review of the literature, Provan, Fish & Sydow (2007) have reported that the performance of a network is often assessed by asking for the members' own evaluation. This study shows that self-evaluations may suffer from 'restriction of range' problems because of self-serving biases. If network evaluations are used as network performance indicators, the theoretical basis and operationalization of the evaluations need closer scrutiny. What constitutes a good self-evaluation? Evaluations can have different meanings in different contexts. Using theory-based measures improves chances of selecting better criteria for the context under study (in this study, the context of social support). This might enable researchers as well as practitioners to better interpret the results of the evaluations.

With regard to the performance of local public networks, other evaluation measures could be considered. Local public networks are different from most other inter-organizational networks in being primarily of a mandated nature (see for example Herranz, 2010). Organizations collaborating in the network with the local government participate because they are dependent on the public (monetary) resources that the local government provides. Therefore citizens' evaluations are probably more effective measures of the performance of a local public network. After all, since network organizations are (partly) responsible for the performance of the network, they stand to benefit from positive self-evaluations.

When citizens evaluate network performance, they assess the quality of the products and services that the whole network delivers. Public networks seek to adequately balance citizens' needs with the available packages of products and services, delivered by different organizations (Andrews, et al., 2009; Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2006; Boyne, 2003). As network performance indicators at the (local) community level outweigh the criteria at the other level (Provan & Milward, 2001), we confirm the conclusion by Boyne (2003) that "local public networks aim to satisfy the demands of their citizens, and therefore the degree to which these demands are met constitutes the most important network indicator".

In addition to the direct effect of governance roles, contingency factors such as network characteristics can also have an effect on public network performance (see for example Span, Luijkx, Schols & Schalk, 2011).

Scholars focusing on the public multi-actor networks have mostly illustrated the enormous (theoretical) potential of working through public networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). However, public authorities acting as lead organizations in these networks lack an understanding of how to govern these networks in such a way as to utilize their enormous potential. This article provides further empirical insight into the possible ways of governing local public networks. We have tried to pry open the black box of the effect of different forms of governance on self-evaluations.

Regarding the practice of network governance, this article provides some useful insights that can be used by policy makers and network managers. It is imperative for (local) government policy makers to understand why networks succeed and what the impact of governance roles is on overall network performance (Kenis & Provan, 2006). The results of this study provide more insight into the pallet of options available to municipalities in executing social policies in the network era. It also proves that self-evaluations of

their local network performance do not help them gain insight into their performance as perceived by objective measures in benchmarks by the government (see for example SCP, 2010).

Examining the effects of different governance choices on valid network performance evaluations may help municipalities gain insight into their own role and its effects. With this insight they can compare their own performance with alternative roles. This insight can serve to legitimize switching to or relying on a particular governance role.

Also, a better understanding of their actual governance role enables better communication about their expectations towards other network members. A further explication of a governance role and its effects leads to more clarity in what to expect from network membership. Clarity as regards the do's and don'ts within the network leads to a more effective focus on achieving network goals.

References

Agranoff, R. (2005). Managing collaborative performance: Changing the boundaries of the state? Public Performance & Management Review, 29, 18-45.

Agranoff, R. (2007). Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations. Washintong D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network Management Research. J Public Adm Res Theory, 11(3), 295-326.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2003). Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

Alter, C., & Hage, J. (1993). Organizations Working Together. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., Law, J., & Walker, R. M. (2009). Centralization, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 19(1), 57-80. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum039

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., & Walker, R. M. (2006). Strategy content and organizational performance: An empirical analysis. Public Administration Review, 66(1), 52-63.

Borgatti, S., & Foster, P. (2003). The network paradigm in organizational research: a review and typology. Journal Of Management, 29(6), 991-1013.

Boyne, G. A. (2003). Sources of public service improvement: A critical review and research agenda. . Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 13, 367-394.

Daft, R. L. (2001). Organization Theory and Design. . Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing.

Dekker, H. C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. Accounting Organizations And Society, 29(1), 27-49. doi: 10.1016/s0361-3682(02)00056-9

Fleurke, F., Hulst, R., & de Vries, P. J. (1997). Decentraliseren met beleid: een heuristiek. Den Haag: Sdu.

Freeman, G. (1985). National styles and policy variation: Explaining structured variation. Journal of Public Policy, 5, 467-496.

Gilsing, R. (2005). Bestuur aan Banden. Den Haag: SCP.

Gilsing, R. (2007). Intergovernmental relations and the effectiveness of local governance: the case of Dutch youth policy. International Review Of Administrative Sciences, 73(1), 45-64.

Gössling, T., & Oerlemans, L. (2007). Inside networks : a process view on multi-organisational partnerships, alliances and networks. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Herranz, J. (2008). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18, 1-31.

Herranz, J. (2010). Multilevel Performance Indicators for Multisectoral Networks and Management. American Review of Public Administration, 40(4), 445-460. doi: 10.1177/0275074009341662

Keast, R., Brown, K., & Mandell, M. (2007). Getting The Right Mix: Unpacking Intergration Meanings and Strategies. International Public Management Journal, 10(1), 9-33.

Kenis, P. N., & Provan, K. G. (2006). The control of public networks. . International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 227-247.

Keuzenkamp. (2009). Decentralisatie en de bestuurskracht van de gemeente. Den Haag: Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau.

Klerk, M. d., Marangos, A. M., Dijkgraaf, M., & Boer, A. d. (2009). Wmo Evaluatie; derde tussenrapportage. SCP.

Klijn, E., Edelenbos, J., Kort, M., & van Twist, M. (2008). Facing management choices: an analysis of managerial choices in 18 complex environmental public partnership projects. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74, 251-282.

Koppenjan, J. F. M., & Klijn, E. (2004). Public management and policy networks. public management review, 2, 135-158.

Korssen-van Raaij, D. (2006). Norms Network Members Use: An Alternative Perspective for Indicating Network Success or Failure. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 249-270.

Marangos, A. M., Cardol, M., & Klerk, M. d. (2008). Wmo evaluatie; tweede tussenrapportage. SCP.

McGuire, M., & Agranoff, R. (2007). Answering

the Big Questions, Asking the Bigger questions: Expanding the Public Network Management Empirical Research Agenda. Paper presented at the Public Management Research Conference, Tuscon, Arizona.

Meier, K. J., & O'Toole, L. J. (2009). The proverbs of New Public Management: lessons from an evidence-based research agenda. The American Review of Public Administration, 39(1), 4-22.

Ministerie van VWS. (2006). Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning. Staatscourant, 351.

MinVWS. (2006). Memorie van Toelichting bij de Wmo. 's-Gravenhage.

Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Boston, MA: Pitman Publishing.

Provan, K. G., Fish, A., & Sydow, J. (2007). Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal Of Management, 33(3), 479-516.

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(2), 229-252.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (1995). A Preliminary Theory Of Interorganizational Network Effectiveness - A Comparative-Study Of 4 Community Mental-Health Systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 1-33.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks. Public Administration Review, 61(4), 414-423.

Raab, J., & Kenis, P. (2009). Heading Toward a Society of Networks. Journal of Management Inquiry, 18(3), 198-210. doi: 10.1177/1056492609337493

Rethemeyer, R. K., & Hatmaker, D. M. (2008). Network management reconsidered: An inquiry into management of network structures in public sector service provision. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(4), 617-646.

SCP. (2010). Op weg met de Wmo: Evaluatie van de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 2007-2009. 's-Gravenhage: SCP.

Smith, S. R., & Lipsky, M. (1993). Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting. Cambridge, MA:: Harvard University Press.

Span, K. C. L., Luijkx, K. G., Schalk, R., & Schols, J. M. G. A. (2011). What governance roles do municipalities use in Dutch local social support networks. Public management review, under review.

Span, K. C. L., Luijkx, K. G., Schols, J. M. G. A., & Schalk, M. J. D. (2011). The Relationship between Governance Roles and Performance in Local Public Interorganizational Networks: a Conceptual Analysis. American Review of Public Administration, Accepted for Publication(7 february 2011), 18.

Span, K. C. L., Schalk, M. J. D., Luijkx, K. G., & Schols, J. M. G. A. (2009). Clarifying the local directing role; an empirical theoretical analysis of the literature. Bestuurskunde, 18(1), 92-100.

Zollo, M., Reuer, J. J., & Singh , H. (2002). Interorganizational routines and performance in strategic alliances. Organization Science, 13, 701-713.

The effect of public multi-actor governance on citizens' evaluation of social support:

an empirical analysis

Abstract

This article offers an empirical investigation of the relationships between diversity in local governance roles, citizen's evaluations of performance and the influence of network contingencies. The study explores these effects in the context of local public social support networks in the Netherlands.

Two levels of existing hierarchical data are used to answer the research question. In an earlier study we collected data on governance roles and network characteristics (independent variables) at the network level. We aggregated our own dataset with a dataset collected by the government agency 'Netherlands institute for social research' (SCP). This agency collects data on citizens' evaluation of individual social support. Linear multilevel regression analyses are used to examine the effects of the diversity in governance roles and the influence of network characteristics.

Governance roles are positioned on a continuum from top-down to bottom-up processes. Intermediate governance roles cause higher evaluations of social support aspects, compared to their alternatives. With regard to the consequences of social support, clients within intermediate governed networks are better able to run their own household. The results show that network characteristics influence the effect of an intermediate governance role on the different aspects of social support. The consequences of social support are valued higher when a municipality applies an intermediate governance role within large networks, compared to this governance role in small local networks. Intermediate governance also leads to the highest citizens' evaluation when the network under study is highly evolved. Furthermore, low network service stability proves to be the optimal condition in the relationship between an intermediate governance role and the consequences of social support.

Diversity in governance roles of Dutch municipalities within Dutch social support networks has an effect on citizens' evaluation of different aspects of social support. The effect of a governance role on citizens' evaluations is contingent on network characteristics. Our results may help municipalities make evidence-based choices regarding their role in multi-actor social support networks.

7.1 Introduction

Despite decades of research on public inter-organizational networks, understanding how differences in governance roles influence performance is still in its infancy (Herranz, 2010). This question remains underemphasized in both theoretical and empirical studies on public networks.

Network governance can produce either positive or negative externalities, depending on how governance is structured and organized (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve & Tsai, 2004; Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian, 1996: in Brass et al., 2004). Governance structures rely on concepts of centrality and density. Studies into these concepts have yielded diverging evidence in its relation to network performance. Some scholars found that less central and less dense networks are superior with regard to performance (e.g. Watts, 1999; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005), while other scholars favor its dense and central counterparts (e.g. Provan & Milward, 1995). However, networks with identical governance structures can rely on different governance roles, causing different network effects. The structure of the network is cemented by the governance roles within a network (Milward and Provan, 2006); but what mix of ingredients should the cement contain given different exogenous conditions?

To understand the determinants of network performance requires a deeper understanding of governance roles (Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007). Researchers recently concluded from extensive literature reviews that in order to take network research to the next level, future studies should focus on diversity in sets of governance activities that can be applied when governments work together with other organizations in public multi-actor networks. However, not much is known about the difference that network governance may make in network performance (Herranz, 2010; Klijn, Edelenbos, Kort, & van Twist, 2008). There is a particular lack of empirical knowledge about the existence and effects of these sets of governance activities within multi-actor networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Dekker, 2004; Gössling & Oerlemans, 2007; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). To date, network governance has offered a conceptual umbrella wide enough to encompass virtually any activity of a government when working in networks of organizations. Most theoretical studies have focused on broadening the pallet of actions that can be understood as a part of the whole of governance (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Instead of focusing on distinct actions, collections of governance activities should be distinguished that represent different types of governance roles (Herranz, 2008). All possible governance activities can be positioned on a continuum from bottom-up to top-down perspectives (Rethemeyer, 2005). Several authors have developed theoretical models that cluster governance activities on three positions on this continuum (e.g. Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2009; Herranz, 2008; Span, Luijkx, Schols, & Schalk, 2011). However, most of these scholars give broad normative descriptions to determine their governance roles on the continuum. Underlying concepts of their broad descriptions are generally lacking, are underdeveloped, or are not easily understood on the continuum of bottom-up versus top-down.

Theory also presents inconsistent claims with respect to the effects of various governance roles on network performance. Some authors favor top-down governance roles within mandated local public networks (Agranoff, 2007; Provan & Milward, 1995; Whetten, 1978), while other scholars opt for bottom-up alternatives (Ashmos, Duchon, & McDaniel, 1998; Holland, 1973; Korssen-van Raaij, 2006).

There is not a single best way of governing public networks in relation to societal benefits. Some networks prove effective (Agranoff, 2005; Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Wooldcock, 2004; Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Mandell & Keast, 2007; Provan & Sebastian, 1998), while others may even generate further dilemmas for society (Raab & Milward, 2003). One of the challenges for governments in public networks is to determine what successful performances are, and for whom? In the shift from government to governance, governments face network performance ambiguity. Network performance is a political concept. Successful performance is viewed differently depending on which stakeholders are involved. Until now, scholars measure network performance by determining whether network organizations judge that the network is accomplishing its goals at the right quality and with the appropriate resources (Daft, 2001; Klijn et al., 2008). Most studies on network performance thus rely on the judgment of the individual network members on performance. However, after examining public network performance, Provan & Milward (2001) stated that the rationale for public networks is most apparent at the community level. Public networks seek to satisfy their citizens' demands, so that the degree to which these demands are adequately met constitutes the most important performance indicator (Andrews et al., 2009). To assess this level of

citizens' evaluations, scholars should assess whether clients of the networks feel that the products and services delivered by the network adequately meet their demands (Span, et al., 2011).

The context of the Dutch Social Support Act offers opportunities to explore the effect of diversity in governance roles on client evaluations. As a result of the introduction of the Social Support Act in 2007, Dutch municipalities became responsible for the implementation of social support. In order to fulfill their task, every municipality (430 in total) became a lead organization within their local public network. These social support networks aim to enable every individual citizen to participate in the local society and live independently. If a person is unable to participate or live independently, Dutch municipalities must ensure that social support is provided. This means that a municipality manages services provided through the local public network such as homecare, or the provision of e.g. mobility aids such as a wheelchair (MinVWS, 2006a).

To ensure the quality and affordability of these products and services, municipalities use a governance role to establish connections between a network of organizations that operate in traditionally distinct policy areas of housing, social work and care. Local governments are thought to have better insight into local needs and opportunities than the national government and to therefore be better able to anticipate local possibilities. Municipalities have discretion with regard to their governance role in order to balance local needs and local possibilities. An important other aspect of the Act is that municipalities have to legitimize the results and functioning of their network directly to their citizens (MinVWS, 2006b).

A first evaluation demanded by the national government on the functioning of the Social Support Act concluded that it is important to gain more insight into governance role variation among the 430 different local networks. This insight enables the Dutch municipalities to evaluate their own role, and to make better systematic choices in relation to network performance (SCP, 2010).

In both theory and policy, there is growing demand for more insight into role variation and an explicit recognition of the importance of citizens' evaluations of the network. This leads to the following research question:

What is the effect of various governance roles of municipalities on citizens' evaluations on social support?

The article proceeds in four parts. First, we provide a theoretical background in order to elaborate on important concepts used in our empirical study: governance roles, network performance, in particular citizen's evaluations, and network contingencies. Next, the research methodology is described. This section introduces the data sets used and the data analysis performed. The third part describes the results of the analysis on governance roles and network performance. The article's final section discusses the implications and limitations of this study for advancing theory and research, and suggests evidence-based choices for municipalities that wish to successfully govern their local networks.

7.2 Theoretical background

We consider our research project as an iterative process. The earlier stages presented in chapters 2-5 resulted in a theoretical background and theoretical ideas on operationalisations of governance roles (chapter 2, 3, 4 & 5), network characteristics (chapters 3 & 5), and network performance. In the following section we purely summarize the results of these chapters by describing expectations on the relations between governance roles, network characteristics and citizens' evaluations.

In our study, we developed a (theoretical) model on the relationships between governance roles and network performance, and the influence of network characteristics (see chapter 3 for more details). When we summarize our model, regarding young public networks, we expect that local governments that use the commissioner role will achieve highest performance; in medium-aged public networks, local governments that use the co-producer role will achieve highest performance, and in mature public networks, local governments that use the facilitator role will achieve highest performance. In large public networks, local governments that use the commissioner role will achieve highest performance. In medium-sized public networks, local governments that use the co-producer role will achieve highest performance. In small public networks, local governments that use the facilitator role will achieve highest performance.

In highly diverse (heterogeneous) public networks, the facilitator role will achieve highest performance. In moderately diverse public networks, the co-producer role will achieve highest performance. In slightly diverse (homogeneous) public networks, the commissioner role will achieve highest performance. Our last expectations deal with the network service stability. We expect that in public networks with low customizable service, local governments that use the commissioner role will achieve highest network performance. In public networks with moderately customizable services, local government that use a co-producer role achieve highest network performance. And finally, in public networks with high customizable services, local government that use a facilitator role achieve highest network performance. In this chapter we examine whether we find support for these theoretical relationships in the context of the Dutch Social Support Act by combining two datasets with information on the governance role of the municipality as well as the evaluations of individual citizens in the municipalities.

7.2.1 Governance roles

In governance roles in local networks, the leading role may be fulfilled by either the municipal authority or the other network members (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Herranz, 2008; Provan, et al., 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008). We can consequently distinguish various governance mechanisms on a continuum of top-down to bottom-up processes. The notion of a continuum is important because the intermediate area between bottom-up and top-down governance may achieve the best network effects (Alvesson & Karreman, 2004). Span et al. (2009) have developed an overview of characteristics of governance roles in local government, based on an analysis of the literature (Figure 1).

Figure 1- A typology for local network governance

Directing typologies by local government			
Actor	Executer	Partner	Initiator
Steering	Steering by the municipality	Joint steering	Self steering
Boundaries	Fixed boundaries by the municipality	Jointly set boundaries	Boundaries set by the parties
Dependency	Formal dependency	Informal / formal dependency	Informal dependencies
Alignment	Alignment by the municipality	Joint alignment	Alignment by the parties
Goal	Fixed goals by the municipality	Joint goal formulation	Goal formulation by the parties
Responsibility	Municipal responsibilities	Joint responsibility	Responsibility by the partners
Vision	Vision of the municipality	Joint vision formulation	Vision formulation by the parties
Monitoring	Monitoring by the municipality	Joint monitoring	Monitoring by the parties
	Commissioner	**Co-Producer**	**Facilitator**

In this overview, the characteristics of three governance roles (commissioner, co-producer, facilitator) are elaborated for nine dimensions: who is the main actor, what is the steering mechanism, who sets the boundary conditions, who is dependent, who aligns, who sets goals, who is responsible, who develops the vision, and who monitors results? Organizations in a local network act as executors (commissioner role), partners (co-producer role) or initiators (facilitator role). Boundary conditions are the conditions that determine whether goals are reached. This relates to quality or quantity criteria of the services delivered; for example, what is the quality of a wheelchair and what are the activities performed when delivering housekeeping? The question is who sets these criteria: the local government, the local government together with the other parties, or the other parties? Dependency is understood as being dependent on the power wielded by local governments, based on rules and procedures. Alignment refers to which party coordinates the delivery of products and services. Responsibility for reaching the goals can be with the local government or the other parties, or can be acknowledged as a shared responsibility. A vision is the basis for the network goal. Monitoring means keeping an overview of all different aspects of governance. Governance roles can be positioned on each of the nine dimensions separately on a continuum of bottom-up versus top-down (Span et al., 2009). The overview results in three different collections of governance activities: commissioner at the top-down end of the continuum, co-producer on the intermediate position, and facilitator at the bottom-up end of the continuum. Within the social support networks, Dutch municipalities systematically differ in these three positions on the top-down versus bottom-up continuum (Span et al., 2011). In most studies on network governance roles, scholars presume a distinction between the hierarchical traditions in public governance and the structure of network governance (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Kettl, 2002; Kickert et al., 1997; Mandell, 2001; O'Toole, 1997). However, by only focusing on distinctions between traditional top-down traditions and network governance, scholars may have overlooked the presence of top-down mechanisms within network governance (Kenis & Provan, 2006).

7.2.2 Network characteristics

Organization theory departs from the assumption that there is not one best way of organizing, but also that not every way of organizing is successful to the same degree (Galbraith, 1973). McGuire (2002) suggests that the effects of governance activities on network performance are also contingent on network characteristics. Provan & Kenis illustrated that bottom-up governance is an important variable. According to Provan & Kenis (2008), network size is only relevant in small-sized networks. When problems occur in networks governed by a bottom-up role, face-to-face participation is necessary to solve conflicts. The more network members, the more inefficient the governance role will be (Provan & Kenis, 2008). This is in line with Gulati & Singh (1998) who found that, in large networks, agreeing on goals, formulating boundary conditions, and monitoring performance is very time-consuming, if not impossible. Conversely, using a bottom-up governance role in small networks stimulates a greater responsiveness towards changing demands in the environment. In a small network it is easier to maintain contact frequently, as well as to evaluate the contributions of all parties involved (Andrews et al., 2009). Three other network characteristics are important in determining the governance role of municipalities in a local public network as well: the diversity of network members, the degree of customizability of service demands, and the number of new network participants (Span et al., 2011). Diversity of network members is reflected in the differentiation in functional backgrounds of network members (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004).

In this article, local governments govern local network organizations that operate in sectors as diverse as health care, social work and housing. All these sectors have their own attributes. The role of the local government is to connect these organizations to provide integrated packages of products and services to citizens. If the contributions of different sectors are considered equally important, this leads to a heterogeneous network. If one sector dominates, this is likely to be reflected in a more homogeneous network. In heterogeneous networks the behavior of the other members is difficult to predict. Heterogeneous networks perform best with a bottom-up governance role, whereas homogeneous networks require a top-down governance role to achieve strong performance. The degree of customization of services reflects whether services demanded by citizens can be predicted and standardized (Boyne & Chen, 2007). If local governments are unable to satisfy citizens' service demands, or these demands are too diverse, a bottom-up governance role fits best (Powell, 1990). Networks with a top-down role are often characterized by standardized services (Span et al., 2011).

Lastly, governance activities are contingent on network evolution. Network evolution refers to the number of new members joining in a certain period, compared to the total number of network members (Span et al., 2011). Highly evolved networks are associated with top-down governance roles (Faerman, McCaffrey, & Slyke, 2001). Less evolved networks are associated with bottom-up governance roles (Andrews et al., 2009).

7.2.3 Citizens' evaluation

Research on networks that deliver social support has shown that there is a tension between effectiveness as perceived by network members (Alter & Hage,1993), and effectiveness as perceived by the users (Provan & Milward,1995), suggesting a need for additional work. Dutch social support networks aim to enable every individual citizen to participate in society and live independently. Therefore network performance is most relevant at the individual citizen level. The degree to which individual citizens evaluate their participation opportunities and the possibility to live independently reflects whether the products and services delivered by the network adequately meet their needs. A large-scale quantitative study conducted by the government agency 'Netherlands institute for social research' (SCP) concentrated on the consequences of social support as evaluated by local citizens. This topic was determined after consulting scientific experts on social support. The perceived consequences of social support relate to how the received products and services impact the degree of personal hygiene, possibilities to be mobile in and around the house, possibilities to travel to other regions, possibilities to run your own household, and finally with the overall level of individual dependency.

7.3 Methods

To answer the research question we linked two existing data sets conducted on two different hierarchical levels. On this combined dataset we conducted three different multilevel analyses. In the first analysis we explored the effect of the three governance roles with citizens' evaluations. In the second analysis we explored the effect of network characteristics on citizens' evaluations, and finally we explored the influence of network characteristics on the relation between an intermediate governance role on citizens' evaluations. This last analysis was only possible for the intermediate governance role. The number of cases that relied on the intermediate role was large enough to conduct this analysis. These cases also proved to have the largest differentiation on the network characteristics.

The first dataset contained data on governance roles of municipalities implementing the Dutch Social Support Act and the characteristics of these social support networks. The origin of this dataset was to explore the actual reliance on either, a commissioner governance role, a co-producer governance role, or a facilitator governance role. Characteristics were used to explore whether reliance on governance roles was contingent on network size, network evolution, network diversity and network service customizability.

The second dataset resulted from an evaluation of the Social Support Act, commissioned by the national government. As far as the authors are aware, this dataset best suits the aim of this article to include individual evaluations of received social support. This dataset contains an enormous number of individual evaluations. Further insight into both data sets is provided below.

7.3.1 Datasets

7.3.1.1 Dataset 1: governance roles of municipalities implementing the Dutch Social Support Act (X)

In an earlier study we collected data using electronic questionnaires. Data were gathered on three types of governance roles of Dutch municipalities within Dutch social support. A total of 182 municipalities (representing 42% of the national population) participated in this study. This constituted a representative sample for the total population in terms of geographical distribution, urbanization degrees and population sizes. For all 182 municipalities, one representative answered an electronic questionnaire about the execution of the functions within this governance role. For every function (determining the goal, establishing a vision, steering the network, bearing responsibilities, determining dependencies, setting boundary conditions, determining the role of the main actor, aligning products and services and monitoring all governance activities), the municipality indicated whether it was an activity performed by the municipality itself, together with the other network members, or solely by the other network members.

7.3.1.2 Dataset 2: citizens' evaluation of social support aspects (Y)

In another earlier study on behalf of the Dutch national government, data were gathered on 4055 individual support-requiring citizens in 81 different municipalities (SCP, 2010). For every municipality, the first 100 citizens requesting social support were invited to participate in the study. Municipalities yielded a total of 6570 of such civilians, of which 5535 were selected at random to be included in the sample. Of these, 4073 agreed to participate as respondents. These 4073 respondents were orally interviewed for approximately 45 minutes about the quality, the consequences and the affordability of social support. They also provided answers to questions on personal characteristics, health conditions, application processes, the actual use of provided products and services, and the possibilities for citizen participation within social support policy. In total the questionnaire consisted of 121 questions, divided into eight sections.

In this study, social support is defined as products and services delivered to enable citizens to run their own household, to be mobile in their own city, to be socially active and to participate sufficiently in society (SCP, 2010). Eighteen of these respondents were excluded from the data because the interviewer doubted the reliability of the answers given. For every municipality, ultimately an average of 50 citizens participated in the study.

7.3.1.3 The integrated dataset and its operationalization

The 182 municipalities in dataset 1 had an overlap of 32 participating municipalities with the 81 participating municipalities of dataset 2. So, linking both data samples resulted in 32 participating municipalities at the network level. These 32 municipalities represented a total of 1493 clients within these 32 networks (a mean of 46.7 clients per municipality). Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics on the citizens' characteristics after integrating both datasets into one sample.

Table 1 - Descriptive statistics on citizen characteristics (n=1493) of the municipality sample (n=32)

Sex	Male	Female			
	28.4 %	71.6%			
Domestic situation	**Single**	**Co-habiting**			
	44.9%	55.1%			
Level of education	**Low**	**Intermediate**	**High**		
	59.5%	30.4%	10%		
Net income (€)	**<1000**	**1000-1500**	**1500-2000**	**>2000**	
	24%	42%	19.7%	14.3%	
Age	**>55**	**55-64**	**65-74**	**75-84**	**85>**
	18.1%	14.2%	22.9%	35.3%	9.5%

In the first dataset, municipalities were assigned to one of three possible roles: top-down governance roles, intermediate governance roles, and bottom-up governance roles. Latent class cluster analysis was used to identify those three roles based on nine functions. A total of 182 municipalities were divided into three clusters of governance roles. Fourteen (7.7%) municipalities consistently used a top-down governance role, 39 (21.4%) municipalities had a more bottom-up governance role and 129 (70.9%) municipalities used an intermediate governance role. This classification is used as the governance role variable in the dataset of this study. With respect to the governance roles (x) of these overlapping municipalities, these showed almost the same distribution as in the original sample, resulting in two top-down roles (6.3%; a mean of 52 respondents per municipality), eight more bottom-up roles (25%; a mean of 47 respondents per municipality) and 22 intermediate roles (68.8%; a mean of 46 respondents per municipality).

For this study, network size, network evolution, stability in services and network diversity reflect the network characteristics. Network size is operationalized by the number of organizations active in the local social support network. Network evolution is measured by dividing the new active organizations since the introduction of the Act, by the total number of organizations active in the local network. Network diversity is measured by the importance of the different sectors (housing, social work and care) within the local social support network. Equal importance of the different sectors means a heterogeneous network, while a network dominated by one sector is considered to be a homogeneous network. The degree of customization of services indicates whether services demanded by citizens can be predicted and standardized. Municipalities indicated whether social support products and services could be standardized. To increase the interpretation of data analysis we dichotomized the control variables. It was determined for all 32 municipalities whether its contingency conditions were above or below the mean of the contingencies of the sample of 182, resulting in high or low contingency conditions. We also dichotomized network diversity. Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics on the network characteristics within the sample. Again, the

distribution of network characteristics within the sample corresponded with that found in the original sample.

Table 2 - Descriptive statistics on the network characteristics of the network sample

Network charact.	Mean	SD	Min	Max	High	Low
Network size	14.37	16.68	1	88	34.4%	65.6%
Network evolution	36.0%	31.9%	0%	100%	47.4%	52.6%
Stability in services	3.50	0.62	2	4	55.6%	44.4%
Network Diversity	21.5	19.5	0	73	56.25%	43.75%
Housing	27.7%	8.3%	10%	50%		
Care	36.7%	10.4%	10%	60%		
Social work	35.4%	10.8%	20%	70%		

Regarding citizens' evaluations of social support, we selected questions from the second dataset. We had to select only those evaluations that could be influenced by the exposure to different governance roles. From the original eight sections, only one section provided useful evaluations concerning the consequences of social support. Next, we could only select those questions that were answered by a minimum number of citizens (>15) per municipality. This process resulted in the use of 5 citizens' evaluations regarding social support. The consequences of social support were uncovered through five questions: (1) To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to run your own household? (2) To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to take care of your personal hygiene? (3) To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to move in and around your own house? (4) To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to move to and in other regions? (5) Have the provided products and services made you less dependent?

7.3.2 Statistical analyses
Multi-level regression analyses
Organizational scholars increasingly and formally acknowledge that many network outcomes have their antecedents and/or consequences at different levels of the network (Rousseau, 1985). To date, this multi-level perspective draws heavily on the core of theoretical tenets. In order to empirically explore those theoretical tenets, multi-level analysis might be a helpful methodological technique (Moliterno & Mahoney, 2010). However, multi-level analysis has not been employed before in the study of organizational networks. This analytic technique affords researchers the opportunity to move beyond the limitations of existing within-level models and to explore components of the theoretically rich multi-level network theory of organization (Moliterno & Mahoney, 2010). To explore the effects of different types of governance roles (level 2) on client outcomes (level 1) and the influence of network contingencies (level 2), a multi-level analyses was performed using the software Stata 11.
Multi-level analyses are used to take into account the dependency of observations within clusters of respondents (Twisk, 2006). When analysing the effects of governance by the municipalities on the performance evaluated by individual clients, the

observations are not independent. Clients are clustered within municipalities, and therefore there is a sort of hierarchy in the data. Multi-level analysis has the advantage that it takes the variety in responses of individual citizens into account. Aggregating individual data to the community level implies that this variation is lost. Moreover, multilevel analysis takes the homogeneity within the municipalities into account. Multi-level analysis can be seen as an extension of the 'standard' regression techniques. Additionally to standard regression, multi-level analysis deals with unequal intercepts among groups and the dependency of data within groups (Twisk, 2006).

7.4 Results

We conducted three multi-level analyses. In the first analysis we explored the effect of the three governance roles on citizens' evaluations. In the second analysis we explored the effect of network characteristics on citizens' evaluations, and finally we explored the influence of network characteristics on the relationship between an intermediate governance role and citizens' evaluations.

7.4.1 The different effects of governance roles on citizens' evaluation

Our first analysis concentrated on the effect of various governance roles on a citizen's evaluation of social support. Table 3 gives for each question an indication for the effect of the three governance roles. It shows the regression coefficients for the effect of the governance roles of each of the client's evaluations regarding social support. The more bottom-up role was used as the reference role. Therefore this role has no regression coefficients, no standard errors and no p-values reported in the table. The p-value indicates which effects of governance roles on client evaluations are significant on a $p<0.10$ level*, a $p<0.05$ level** and a $p<0.01$*** level. Linear regression is conducted since the variables were continuous. Multi-level linear regression results include a random effect residual.

7.4.1.1 Consequences of social support

Clients governed by municipalities using a more bottom-up role are minimally able to run their own household. Clients in intermediate governing municipalities are best able to run their own household and value social support significantly higher ($p<0.1$). Clients in top-down governing municipalities are also better able to run their own household compared to their counterparts in bottom-up governing municipalities. All other measured values on the consequences of social support are not significantly different.

Table 3 - Effects of governance roles on the evaluations of citizens on the consequences of social support' in 32 municipalities

Question	N Citizen level	Role	Coefficient[1]	S.E	p.
To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to run your own household?[2]	1472	Top-down role	-0.01	0.12	0.91
		Intermediate role	-0.12	0.07	0.07*
		Intercept	2.10	0.06	0.00***
		Random effect	0.13	0.02	
		Random effect residual	0.59	0.01	
To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to take care of your personal hygiene?[2]	1449	Top-down role	0.06	0.20	0.77
		Intermediate role	-0.12	0.11	0.27
		Intercept	2.10	0.08	0.00***
		Random effect	0.01	0.07	
		Random effect residual	0.97	0.03	
To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to move in and around your own house?[2]	1476	Top-down role	0.10	0.15	0.49
		Intermediate role	-0.01	0.08	0.91
		Intercept	1.92	0.07	0.00***
		Random effect	0.17	0.03	
		Random effect residual	0.56	0.01	
To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to travel to and in other regions?[2]	1473	Top-down role	-0.02	0.07	0.81
		Intermediate role	0.03	0.14	0.80
		Intercept	2.04	0.06	0.00***
		Random effect	0.15	0.03	
		Random effect residual	0.64	0.01	
Have the provided products and services made you less dependent?[3]	1059	Top-down role	-0.03	0.09	0.76
		Intermediate role	-0.21	0.17	0.23
		Intercept	2.07	0.08	0.00***
		Random effect	0.20	0.03	
		Random effect residual	0.62	0.01	

In our sample, various governance roles have different effects on citizens' valuation of aspects of social support. The intermediate role causes a significantly different effect compared to the two other roles. Concerning the consequences of social support, only the products and services provided to enable clients to run their own household are significantly positively affected by the use of the intermediate governance role. However, the directions of the effect of governance roles on perceived consequences of social support vary among the different variables under study. This might indicate that the relationship between governance roles and citizen evaluation is contingent on other variables as well.

---

[1] Low scores on the variables represent high valuations by the citizens. So, negative coefficients represent positive directions.
[2] 1. Largely sufficient. 2. Sufficient. 3. Insuffient. 4. Largely insufficient.
[3] 1. Much less dependent. 2. Less dependent. 3. More dependent. 4. Much more dependent.

7.4.2 The effects of network characteristics on citizens' evaluation

The inconsistent results in our first analysis might be explained by rival independent variables. For example, network characteristics may have an effect on the evaluations by support-demanding citizens. For our second analysis we conducted a multi-level regression analysis and explored the effect of network characteristics on citizens' evaluations of social support.

In our sample, network characteristics prove to have significant effects on client values. Low stability in service provision is effective for citizens' evaluation of the possibility to travel to other regions ($p < 0.01$). Low stability in services leads to higher evaluations of the possibility to move in and around the house ($p < 0.05$). High network evolution has a positive effect on the evaluation of the possibility to move in and around the house ($p < 0.05$). Finally, large-sized networks result in higher evaluations of the possibility to move in and around the house ($p < 0.05$), and of the possibility to take care of one's own hygiene ($p < 0.1$). Thus, network characteristics prove to have significant effects on client evaluations of social support. Just as with regard to the effects of governance roles, these are also inconsistent. Again, inconsistency may arise from a misfit between the network characteristics and the governance role of the local government in their local public network.

7.4.3 The influence of network characteristics on the effect of an intermediate governance role on citizens' evaluation

Lastly, we explored the effect of the fit between network characteristics and governance roles and its effect on citizens' evaluation of social support. To explore this effect, we selected all municipalities with an intermediate governance role. In the above analysis, the intermediate role proved to differ significantly from the other two roles. Within our sample, the intermediate governance role is also the most prominent one, and the role with most differentiation on the network characteristics.

Table 4 shows the effects of the network characteristics when an intermediate governance role is applied. The interpretation of Table 4 is the same as for Table 2.

Table 4 - Significant effects of network characteristics and an intermediate governance role on citizens' evaluations on the consequences of social support in 22 municipalities.

Question	N Citizen level	Network characteristics	Coefficient	S.E	p.
To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to run your own household?	997	**Large network size**	-0.13	0.07	0.08*
		Random effect	0.13	0.03	
		Random effect residual	0.57	0.01	
To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to take care of personal hygiene?	1002	**High network service stability**	0.18	0.11	0.09*
		Random effect	0.24	0.04	
		Random effect residual	0.51	0.01	
	1002	**Large network size**	-0.24	0.11	0.03**
		Random effect	0.23	0.04	
		Random effect residual	0.51	0.11	
To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to move in and around your own house?	1004	**High network service stability**	0.18	0.08	0.02**
		Random effect	0.16	0.03	
		Random effect residual	0.58	0.01	
	1004	**Large network size**	-0.17	0.09	0.05**
		Random effect	0.16	0.03	
		Random effect residual	0.58	0.01	
To what degree do the provided products and services enable you to travel to and in other regions?	1004	**High network service stability**	0.18	0.07	0.01**
		Random effect	0.13	0.03	
		Random effect residual	0.64	0.01	
Have the provided products and services made you less dependent?	712	**High network evolution**	-0.16	0.09	0.09*
		Random effect	0.18	0.04	
		Random effect residual	0.65	0.02	

Concentrating on the relation between governance roles, network characteristics and client evaluations, Table 4 shows that there is fit between an intermediate governance role, network size, and network evolution and network service stability. Network diversity was also included in the analysis. However, the effect of intermediate governance roles on clients' evaluations is not influenced by different network diversity conditions.

The intermediate governance role seems to perform best in municipalities with large social support networks that are highly evolved and have low network service stability; when the intermediate role is used the valuation of social support is highest in municipalities with these characteristics.

This study therefore illustrates that there might be a relationship between the effects of an intermediate governance role on citizens' evaluations of social support and that this relationship is contingent on network conditions.

7.5 Discussion and Conclusion

In this study we contribute to the empirical knowledge about the effects of different governance roles in multi-actor networks on citizens' evaluations of the network performance. The theoretical contribution of this article is threefold.

First, we used governance roles that represent consistent collections of governance activities on a top-down versus bottom-up continuum, instead of focusing on distinct governance activities. The focus on the effect of distinct governance activities on network performance led to contrasting conclusions (Agranoff, 2005, 2007; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Korssen-van Raaij, 2006; Mandell & Keast, 2007). Therefore, scholars have called for empirical evidence for the effect of consistent collections of governance activities, clustered within governance roles (Herranz, 2008).

Second, to date research has concentrated on the network level performance indicators. In most research, network organizations themselves judge the quality, quantity and affordability of the products and services provided through their public network (Daft, 2001; Klijn, et al., 2008). By contrast, this study uses performance indicators at the community level, as suggested earlier by Provan & Milward (2001). Public networks seek to adequately balance citizens' needs with the available packages of products and services, delivered by different organizations (Span et al., 2011). Evaluations by member organizations at the network level might be influenced as all these organizations are (partly) responsible for this performance, while evaluations by citizens may be considered less biased since they only receive products and services.

Lastly, there is no single best way to govern public networks (Kenis & Provan, 2006). The best way to govern public networks is contingent on the network characteristics. This article deals with the circumstances that (might) fit an optimal relation between governance roles and client evaluations. Therefore this article explored whether the relation between the intermediate governance role and citizens' evaluations are contingent on the size of the network, the evolution of the network, the diversity of the network and the customizability of network services.

We conclude that governance role diversity of municipalities in our sample is indeed related to differences in citizens' evaluations of social support. Intermediate governance roles cause higher evaluations of social support aspects, compared to their alternatives. Moreover, to date the focus on top-down governance roles in public network research is scarce (Kenis & Provan, 2006). Most research only concentrates on bottom-up inspired governance activities. This article demonstrates that is worthwhile to include the top-down perspective.

Additional to the governance roles, network characteristics in our sample, also prove to have an effect on clients' evaluations of social support. The inconsistency in the main effects of these characteristics illustrates that network characteristics are not a sole explanation for this effect.

Therefore, we conducted a multilevel analysis on the influence of network characteristics on the relationship between governance roles and client evaluations. However, only,

the number of cases that relied on the intermediate role was large enough to warrant that this analysis would provide valid results. However, these cases showed the largest degree of differentiation in network characteristics. After exploring the fit between network characteristics and the intermediate governance role on citizens' evaluations, consistency in the results was found. The intermediate governance role seems to perform best in municipalities with large social support networks that are highly evolved and have low network service stability; when the intermediate role is used the valuation of social support is highest in municipalities with these characteristics.

Scholars focusing on the public multi-actor networks have mostly illustrated the enormous (theoretical) potential of working through public networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). These theorists concur on the notion that the intrinsic demands of today's society demand an increase in relationships among organizations (Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008). However, public authorities acting as lead organizations in these networks lack an understanding of how to govern these networks in such a way as to utilize its enormous potential. The need for more insight into the effect of various governance roles on network performance is most prominent at the local level (Klijn, 2005).

Also, of the few empirical studies available, most rely on a small number of cases (Herranz, 2008, 2010). In order to advance theory and practice on the effect of governance roles on performance, a large number of comparable networks should be studied. The introduction of the Social Support Act provided a unique research opportunity. All municipalities in the Netherlands (430) are mandated by the national government to establish their own local support network. In these networks the municipalities are obliged by law to take the role of lead organization. As a result, these networks are all structured the same and have the same aims and goals, and may rely on the same resources to govern their networks. Using the available dataset that resulted from the national evaluation of the Social Support Act was a fertile means to answering our research question. This illustrates how large-scale questionnaires with other initial purposes can provide a useful empirical basis for testing the many theoretical notions about the functioning of local public networks. However, the datasets were not created based on existing theories, which implies that there is not a perfect fit. In future research, datasets that include assessments of citizens' evaluations of social support can be developed based on a theoretical foundation of how citizens evaluations are related to governance roles. This will enable researchers to better interpret the results, and in consequence to offer better recommendations for governance discretion.

In our study we could not really test all hypotheses because of the number of municipalities with data in both data sets was limited. In this study we included two hierarchical layers of data. The independent variables are conducted at the level of the network. The dependent variables are conducted at the citizen level. Especially our focus on the specific evaluations of local citizens is unique. Local public networks aim to satisfy the demands of their citizens, and therefore the degree to which these demands are met constitutes the most important network indicator (Boyne, 2003).

In order to relate governance roles to local citizens' evaluations of social support we performed multi-level analyses. These analyzing techniques are fairly innovative in the

public administration literature. They may be helpful in a wide variety of contexts. This article provides a first empirical exploration of the effect of diverse governance roles on local citizens' evaluations. Future research, based on this article, may for example include other contingencies as well. It is also worth considering whether the findings of this article hold when the context of study is not social support, but for example disaster management, waste policy or park development. The effect of the intermediate governance role may also be influenced by the governance culture of the country under study. The governance culture of the Netherlands is well known for its reliance on cooperation (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). Other more directive cultures, like for example Germany, might cause other effects on (local) citizens' evaluations in the context of social support (Hofstede, 1998). Other contexts may enable scholars to explore the influence of network characteristics on the relationship between top-down or more bottom-up governance roles on citizen's evaluations. It would also be interesting to examine whether citizens' evaluations of social support are consistent with the evaluations of the network member organizations on the same aspects of social support. However, this article provides more empirical insight in how public networks are governed well, and under which circumstances (Provan, 2009).

The study of governance roles is also important for policy makers, while for (local) government policy makers it is imperative to understand why networks succeed and what the impact of governance roles is on overall network performance (Kenis & Provan, 2006).

References

Agranoff, R. (2005). Managing collaborative performance: Changing the boundaries of the state? Public Performance & Management Review, 29, 18-45.

Agranoff, R. (2007). Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations. Washintong D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network Management Research. J Public Adm Res Theory, 11(3), 295-326.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2003). Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

Alter, C., & Hage, J. (1993). Organizations Working Together. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., Law, J., & Walker, R. M. (2009). Centralization, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 19(1), 57-80. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum039

Ashmos, D. P., Duchon, D., & McDaniel, R. R. (1998). Participation in strategic decision making: The role of organizational predisposition and issue interpretation. Decision Sciences, 29(1), 25-51.

Boyne, G. A. (2003). Sources of public service improvement: A critical review and research agenda. .Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 13, 367-394.

Boyne, G. A., & Chen, A. A. (2007). Performance Targets and Public Service Improvement. Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 17(3), 455-477. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mul007

Brass, D. J., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. R., & Tsai, W. P. (2004). Taking stock of networks and organizations: A multilevel perspective. Academy Of Management Journal, 47(6), 795-817.

Daft, R. L. (2001). Organization Theory and Design. .Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing.

Dekker, H. C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. Accounting Organizations And Society, 29(1), 27-49. doi: 10.1016/s0361-3682(02)00056-9

Faerman, S. R., McCaffrey, D. P., & Slyke, D. M. v. (2001). Understanding Interorganizational Cooperation: Public-Private Collaboration in Regulating Financial Market Innovation. Organization Science, 12(3), 372.

Galbraith. (1973). Designing Complex Organizations. Boston: Longman Publishing Co. .

Gössling, T., & Oerlemans, L. (2007). Inside networks : a process view on multi-organisational partnerships, alliances and networks. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Gulati, R., & Singh, H. (1998). The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4), 781-814.

Herranz, J. (2008). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18, 1-31.

Herranz, J. (2010). Multilevel Performance Indicators for Multisectoral Networks and Management. American Review of Public Administration, 40(4), 445-460. doi: 10.1177/0275074009341662

Hofstede, G. (1998). Identifying organizational subcultures: An empirical approach. Journal of Management Studies, 35(1), 1-12. doi: 10.1111/1467-6486.00081

Holland, T. P. (1973). Organizational structure and institutional care. J Health Soc Behav, 14(3), 241-251.

Keast, R., Mandell, M. R., Brown, K., & Wooldcock, G. (2004). Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations. Public Administration Review, 64(3), 363-371.

Kenis, P. N., & Provan, K. G. (2006). The control of public networks. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 227-247.

Kettl, D.F. (2002). The transformation of governance: Public administration for the tweny-first century America. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

Kickert, W., Klijn, E., & Koppenjan, J. (1997). Managing complex networks. London: Sage Press.

Klijn, E. (2005). Networks and interorganizational management: challenging, steering, evaluation and the role of public actors in public management. The handbook of public management, 9, 257-281.

Klijn, E., Edelenbos, J., Kort, M., & van Twist, M. (2008). Facing management choices: an analysis of managerial choices in 18 complex environmental public partnership projects. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74, 251-282.

Koontz, T. M., & Thomas, C. W. (2006). What do we know and need to know about the environmental outcomes of collaborative management? Public Administration Review, 66, 111-121. doi:

113

10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00671.x

Korssen-van Raaij, D. (2006). Norms Network Members Use: An Alternative Perspective for Indicating Network Success or Failure. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 249-270.

O'toole, L. J. Treating networks seriously: Practical and research-based agendas in public administration, in: Public Administration Review, 1997, vol. 57, nr, 1, p. 45-52.

Mandell, M. (2001). Getting results through collaboration. Westport, CT: Quorum Books.

Mandell, M., & Keast, R. (2007). Evaluating network arrangements: Towards revised performance measures. Public Performance & Management Review, 30, 574-597.

Moliterno, T.P., & Mahony, D.M. (2010). Network Theory of Organization: A Multilevel Approach. Journal of Management. doi: 10.1177/0149206310371692.

McGuire, M. (2002). Propositions on What Managers Do and Why They Do It. Public Administration Review 62(5), 426-433.

Milward, H.B. & Provan, K.G. (2006). A Manager's Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks. IBM Center for the Business of Government.

MinVWS. (2006a). Memorie van Toelichting bij de Wmo. 's-Gravenhage.

MinVWS. (2006b). Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (Social Support Act). 's-Gravenhage: Staatsblad.

Powell, W. (1990). Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336.

Provan, K. G. (2009). Examining the parts of the whole? Expanding the focus of Organizational Network Research. Paper presented at the EGOS, Barcelona.

Provan, K. G., Fish, A., & Sydow, J. (2007). Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal Of Management, 33(3), 479-516.

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(2), 229-252.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. (1995). A preliminary theory of interorganizational network effectiveness: a comparative-study of 4 community mental-health

systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 1-33.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks. Public Administration Review, 61(4), 414-423.

Provan, K. G., & Sebastian, J. G. (1998). Networks within networks: Service link overlap, organizational cliques, and network effectiveness. Academy Of Management Journal, 41(4), 453-463.

Raab, J., & Milward, H. B. (2003). Dark networks as problems. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 13(4), 413-439. doi: 10.1093/jpart/mug029

Rethemeyer, R. K. (2005). Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector. Public Administration Review, 65(1), 117-121.

Rethemeyer, R. K., & Hatmaker, D. M. (2008). Network management reconsidered: An inquiry into management of network structures in public sector service provision. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 18(4), 617-646.

Rousseau, D.M. (1985). Issues of level in organizational research: Multilevel and cross-level perspectives. In: L.L. Cummings & B.M. Staw (eds.), Research in organizational behavior. 1-37. Greenwich, CT: JAI.

SCP. (2010). Op weg met de Wmo: Evaluatie van de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 2007-2009. 's-Gravenhage: SCP.

Span, K. C. L., Luijkx, K. G., Schols, J. M. G. A., & Schalk, R. (2011). The Relationship Between Governance Roles and Performance in Local Public Interorganizational Networks: A Conceptual Analysis. The American Review of Public Administration. doi: 10.1177/0275074011402193

Twisk, J. W. R. (2006). Applied Multilevel Analysis. Cambridge: University Press.

van Knippenberg, D., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Homan, A. C. (2004). Work group diversity and group performance: An integrative model and research agenda. Journal Of Applied Psychology, 89(6), 1008-1022.

Uzzi, B. & Spiro, J. (2005). Collaboration and creativity: the small world Problem. American Journal of Sociology, 111: 447-504.

Watts, D. (1999). Networks, dynamic, and the small world phenomenon. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 493-527.

Whetten, D. A. (1978). Coping with Incompatible Expectations: An Integrated View of Role Conflict. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23(2), 254-271.

CHAPTER 8

Discussion and conclusions

8.1 General discussion

The aim of this research was to advance knowledge about the influence of governance roles in local public networks on network performance, in theory and in the empirical reality of social support in the Netherlands. To acquire insight in the effects of governance roles, the main research question was:

How do different local public network governance roles predict different outcomes and how are these effects influenced by network contingencies in the context of local public networks on social support governed by municipalities in the Netherlands?

We have described the theoretical variety in governance roles and its effects on network performance (chapters 2 & 3). Furthermore, we have identified the empirical existence of these governance roles (chapters 4 & 5). Finally, we have empirically explored whether the effects of the variety in governance roles were consistent with the theoretical predictions (chapters 6 &7).

In the remainder of this chapter, we summarize the main findings and reflect on the implications.

We point out directions for future research and provide recommendations for governing local public networks providing social support in the Netherlands.

8.2 Main findings

8.2.1 Describe

In chapter 2, an empirical theoretical analysis has been performed of the literature on governance roles. The aim of this analysis was to describe the concept of local public network governance. This chapter illustrated that local public network governance is a frequently-used concept in theory and in practice, although the meaning of the term was understood in several different ways. According to the literature, governance roles seemed to be compromised out of nine activities: Determining the actors, steering, setting preconditions, exerting power, aligning products and services, setting the network goal, bearing responsibility, formulating a network vision, and monitoring all these activities. The different activities, taken together, have resulted in the following general definition of local public governance by municipalities: 'A municipality governs when it steers through the alignment of multiple actors to reach a goal based on a vision. In this process the municipality and other actors have various dependency relations and responsibilities that arise from the preconditions imposed on the various actors. These preconditions are controlled through monitoring.'

In designing and implementing its governance role, a municipality has various options regarding the nine activities. The main options concern the question whether the municipality keeps a tight rein or instead takes a facilitating approach in its relations with other actors. Here, a distinction can be made as to whether the municipality "commands the other party", "collaborates with the other party", or "leaves it to the other party". Three ideal type roles emerged from our analysis: Commissioner, co-producer and facilitator. Commanding can be related to the principles of commissioning, collaborating implies co-production, and leaving it to the other party is characteristic of a facilitating approach.

Based on the nine activities that reflect different ways of governing, a typology was developed that can be used to identify governance roles of municipalities The general

definition and associated model presented in chapter 2 serve as basis for further empirical research into the local public governance roles in this dissertation. Different roles can have different effects on performance and these effects are also likely to be influenced by context factors

In chapter 3, we conducted a literature study to determine how a variety in governance roles is related to network performance, and whether these relations are influenced by a set of network contingencies. Prior to elaborating on the effect of governance roles on the performance of local public networks, we first described relevant characteristics of local public networks. We concluded that local public networks are constituted around a lower governmental body and, in general, that they have a mandated nature and a lead-organizational structure, and that they aim for the maximum level of citizen satisfaction within a policy area.

Regarding governance roles, the typology developed in chapter 2 was appropriate in exploring the effect of variety in governance roles on local public network performance. The typology is more specific than previous approaches in that it specifies characteristics on several continua.

With respect to the effect of governance roles on performance in local public networks the literature was not conclusive about the variables that predict network effectiveness. Different contexts may lead to different performances. As network contexts are reflected by network contingencies, these network contingencies may help explain these inconsistent results. With respect to contingency conditions, the commissioner role is expected to be most effective if there are many organizations, many new network members, low network member diversity, and services are stable. The co-producer role is expected to work best if there is a balance between young and old network members, a moderate number of network organizations, moderate network diversity, and services are moderately stable. Finally, the facilitator role is expected to perform well if there are many old network members, few organizations, high network member diversity, and services are unstable.

8.2.2 Identify

In the remaining chapters of this thesis, we used the context of social support in the Netherlands as an empirical reality to examine theoretical propositions based on the literature research.

All 430 municipalities in the Netherlands are mandated by the national government to establish their own local support network. In these networks, the municipalities are obliged by law to take the role of lead organization. As a result, these networks are all equally structured, have the same aims and goals, and may rely on the same resources to govern their networks. These local public networks differ in the used governance roles, the contingency conditions, and their local network performance. Therefore, this context offered an excellent opportunity to test the propositions developed in chapters 2 and 3.

In chapter 4, we offered an empirical exploration of distinctions in governance roles in local public networks by examining intended policies that were formulated within mandatory policy documents of local governments concerning the Dutch Social Support Act. We used qualitative and quantitative techniques to provide insight in the use and existence of the theoretically described concepts of chapters 2 and 3.

The analysis provided evidence that the three governance roles of the governance

model of chapter 2 (commissioner, co-producer, and facilitator) could all be recognized in policy documents by municipalities about their local public networks of Dutch social support. It also revealed that there was not one municipality that only relied on a single type of governance role. Within our sample of municipalities, the co-producer role was most prominent, followed by a facilitating role and lastly the commissioner role. When the population size of local governments increases, the influence and involvement of the other network members increases also, resulting in a more bottom-up governance role. Chapter 5 offers an empirical exploration of actual network governance roles in local public networks. Data were gathered by electronic questionnaires filled out by 182 project managers social support of municipalities in the Netherlands. The data were analyzed using latent class cluster analysis. The results of chapter 5 reveal that the differences between the actual governance roles were smaller than suggested by the theoretical ideal-type governance roles. Network governance by municipalities within social support networks tended towards the top-down end of the governance continuum. Choices that would represent the bottom-up extreme of the governance continuum were entirely absent. Governance roles in this chapter can be translated to a continuum from completely top down (commissioner) to largely bottom up (between the co-producer and facilitator role). Chapter 5 also revealed that not every activity within governance was equally distinctive. On the 'actor' activity differences were small, whereas on 'vision' activity they were large. Besides the existence of clusters of governance roles, chapter 5 also showed that this variety is associated with differences in network contingencies and municipality characteristics. In our sample, network size, network evolution, and network trust proved to be significantly different between the roles. The results showed that a small network is associated with a more bottom-up governance approach. The more new network members there are in the local network, the more reliance on a top-down approach of government. Municipalities favoring top-down governance have significantly less trust in their network partners than municipalities in the bottom-up governance cluster.

8.2.3 Predict

In chapter 6, we examined the influence of various governance roles of municipalities on local authorities' evaluations of social support. The data gathered for chapter 5 were also used to acquire this insight. First, we conducted analyses of variances on the effects of the general governance roles on local authorities' evaluations. Second, we conducted analyses of variances to examine the effects of specific governance activities on network performance.

In general, a governance role proved unrelated to differences in local authorities' evaluations of social support. There were no significant effects of governance roles on the evaluations by municipalities. This can probably be explained by the absence of variation in the performance evaluations. All local authorities valued the performance of their network as positive.

With respect to specific governance activities, we have found several differences relating to local authorities' evaluations. However, there was a variety in effects depending on which evaluation criteria were examined; different activities appeared to be of importance. Certain activities, such as the exercise of power, prove to have an effect on the evaluation of whether individual needs are fulfilled, but prove ineffective on the

other evaluation criteria used in this study.

With respect to the limited variation in evaluations of network performance, it can be concluded that performance evaluations by local authorities themselves is probably not the most valid measure. Regarding the performance of local public networks, other evaluation measures might be considered. Citizens' evaluations are probably more effective measures of the performance of a local public network. After all, because network organizations are (partly) responsible for the performance of the network, they stand to benefit from positive self-evaluations.

Therefore, in chapter 7 we examined the effects of various local governance roles of municipalities on citizens' evaluations of social support. We also explored whether these effects were contingent on network characteristics as distinguished in chapter 3. To examine these effects we had to combine two data sets. The variety in governance roles and contingency conditions were identified in chapter 5 and these data were collected on the level of the network. However, the citizens' evaluations were conducted at the citizen level. To relate governance roles to local citizens' evaluations of social support, we performed a multilevel analysis.

In chapter 7, we showed that there is a relationship between the effects of an intermediate governance role on citizens' evaluations of social support and that this relationship is contingent on network conditions. The consequences of social support are valued higher if a municipality applies an intermediate governance role within large networks, compared to this governance role in small local network. Intermediate governance also leads to the highest citizens' evaluations if the network under study is highly evolved. Furthermore, low network service stability proves to be the optimal condition in the relationship between an intermediate governance role and the consequences of social support.

8.3 Discussion of the main findings

Network governance, network performance evaluations, and the relationships between these concepts demanded new insights. Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007) indicated that to advance knowledge about the functioning of local public networks, scholars should come up with new ideas.

We started with describing local public governance roles and delimitated the possible variety within them. This is a way to cope with the ambiguous meaning of network governance and a call for developing typologies to compare alternatives (e.g. van der Putten et al. 2002; van Dolron, 2006; Hupe & Klijn, 1997; Herrranz, 2008) because of a lack of consensus on a unifying perspective on governance (e.g., Agranoff, 2007; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997). Although scholars propose models that offer ideas about network governance, the underlying concepts of their ideas are either absent, underdeveloped, or cannot easily be understood on the top-down to bottom-up continuum (e.g., Considine & Lewis, 2003; Andrews et al., 2009; Herranz, 2008; Pröpper, Litjens & Weststeijn, 2004). The indistinctness of the underlying concepts cause normative determination towards governance role variety. Our model offers three consistent choices concerning a set of nine activities within governance resulting in three ideal types of governance roles.

Our study provides empirical evidence for the existence of a continuum of bottom up to top-down governance roles. Most public network theorists focus on one side of

the continuum, the participation mantra (Keast & Brown, 2006), and stigmatize and marginalize top-down roles as outmoded and as functionally and morally bankrupt (Considine & Lewis, 2003). However, Rethemeyer (2005) reviewed literature about network governance roles and concluded that all governance roles can be positioned on a continuum of bottom-up to top-down governance. If scholars only focus on bottom-up governance, they overlook the presence of other mechanisms within network governance. In our study the top-down side of the continuum was the most prominent form of governance. This result is in line with a study of Felie and McGivern (2003) on health care networks that revealed that in local public networks, top-down based governance is still the dominant approach.

With respect to governance roles, there was no municipality that only relied on one single type of governance role. Municipalities used several governance roles at the same time. Therefore, studying a sole governance role (e.g., Bogason, 2000; Hill & Lynn, 2005; Lee, 2006) results in an incomplete image of governance. All governance roles were found within policy documents, which is in line with findings of Herranz (2008) and Alvesson and Karreman (2004).

With respect to governance as intended and as performed, there is a contrast between the intended governance roles as stated in policy documents and actual governance. The intended governance roles are more similar to the governance roles described in theoretical studies. These roles are more often balanced at the bottom-up side of our governance typology. However, the performed governance roles were situated more on the top-down side of the continuum. That there is a relation between different governance roles and network performance is repeatedly posited as evident in the governance literature, but has seldom been researched so far (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). We contributed to the understanding of this relation by explicating contingency factors that influence the relationship between governance role variety and network performance. We positioned these relationships within a specific context; local public networks. This context is different from mainstream interorganizational network research, because local public networks are typical from a mandatory instead of an emerging nature (Gossling & Oerlemans, 2007). As a result, important measures of network success, such as network centralization and network density, lose expressiveness within this mandated local context. Different levels of network performance can better be explained by other measures, for example, governance roles and contingency conditions.

In our project network size, network evolution and network trust proved to be significantly different between the roles. Our results support claims that it is easier within small networks to maintain contact regularly and to evaluate the contributions of all parties involved. Our results are also consistent with the work of Korssen-van Raaij (2006) who found that the admission of new network members creates uncertainty. Therefore, as a network evolves, the need for bottom-up governance increases because of an increase in trust (Human & Provan, 2000).

Provan, Fish & Sydow (2007) reported that the performance of a network is most often assessed by asking for the members' own evaluation. However, our project is supportive towards scholars that claim that local public networks should be evaluated on the citizen level (e.g., Andrews et al., 2009; Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2006; Boyne, 2003; Provan &

Milward, 2001). By focusing on the citizen level of evaluation, we revealed that there is no single best way to govern public networks as suggested by Kenis & Provan (2006). The best way to govern public networks is indeed contingent on the network characteristics.

8.4 Strengths, limitations and recommendations for future research

To advance knowledge about the effect of governance roles in local public networks on performance, we have developed new ideas on governance roles typologies, contingencies, network performance and how these variables are interrelated. Furthermore, our study goes beyond traditional interorganizational network research, which is in general theoretically informed. According to Raab & Kenis (2009), it is very time-consuming and risky to collect interorganizational network data. Therefore, there are few empirical network studies. These studies mostly do not use primary data (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007; Raab & Kenis, 2009). Instead of focusing on secondary data collected through case studies, we have collected and used large scale, qualitative and quantitative datasets that contained variables on the network level and the citizen level. New ideas and large scale, multi-layered datasets demand for other analyzing techniques than traditionally applied within public administration literature. For example, multilevel analysis is suggested to connect the different levels that exist within interorganizational networks (Moliterno & Mahony, 2010). As far as we know, up until now, multilevel analysis to explore the effects of one level of data upon another has not yet been performed. We also applied latent class cluster analysis to uncover municipalities within clusters of governance roles based on governance activities. Of course, presenting new ideas, using large scale-multi layered data and innovative analyzing techniques demand for a critical assessment of the limitations of the study. We believe we have created openings for new directions in future research, which expands conventional approaches.

Our first limitation is that we focused on one particular interorganizational network: The local public network. Within this particular network context we also delimitated our perspective on a variety of governance roles, network performance, network contingencies, and the possible relations between them. Future research could try to apply our theoretical framework in studying other interorganizational networks. At the level of country networks such as the European Union, the effects of different ways of governing individual member states in a certain policy area may be influenced by the same contingencies as in local network governance. Another question is whether our theoretical propositions hold if the lead organization is not a local government but another type of organization such as a school organization or other public health services?
The contingency factors included in our model are derived from contingency theory literature. Nevertheless, the list of contingencies may not be exhaustive. Future research could broaden the model by looking at the role of other possible contingencies that might be relevant, for example, the local political culture, the local government form, or specific network member values.
The institutional embedding of the networks and the history of cooperation on the local level plays an important role how the contingency factors influence network performance. Institutional factors, political influences, and resource dependencies all

influence governance and the effects of governance roles.

The type of services and products provided might be of significance when the effect of governance roles on the evaluations of these products and services is considered. An interorganizational social support network consists out of public and private organizations. The domination of one of these two parties might influence the effect of the governance role. Municipalities are only able to direct the other organizations in the network when the other organizations are heavily dependent on the resources of the municipality. Private organizations in a network have also other sources of income and are less dependent on a governmental funding. This might limit the ability of municipalities to exert a more top-down governance role. If municipalities remain commissioners, this might be counterproductive when there are relatively many private organizations in their network.

Furthermore, our empirical results revealed that not all activities within governance are equally distinctive with respect to governance roles. Future research should focus on whether these activities need to be incorporated in a consensus typology of local network governance.

Also, our study illustrated that municipalities used several governance roles at the same time. Traditionally, top-down mechanisms such as hierarchy and command are considered as the opposite of bottom-up mechanisms such as negotiation and consensus. Our study illustrates that it is interesting in future research to examine whether these mechanisms can be combined and how to create combinations that are effective.

In our study, the evaluations of citizens constitutes the most important performance indicator. However, the question remains whether citizens' evaluations are the key performance indicator in all local public networks. In most networks, it is hard to select a representative sample of citizens. In most occasions, scholars are able to select interest groups of citizens. Interest groups can be considered as part of the network. Our study demonstrated that local authority evaluations were not an appropriate measure of network performance. Future studies have to point out whether evaluations of other of network member organizations, such as interest groups of citizens, are of use to evaluate the performance of the local public network.

Furthermore, our study focused on the specific context of social support in the Netherlands. This research context enabled us to study a large number of lead organizational networks in a particular context. Local public networks in this particular context arose as a result of the introduction of the Social Support Act in 2007. Data on governance roles and network performance evaluations were collected during 2010. Because the Social Support Act entails a new situation, we were only able to examine short term effects. Since 2007, municipalities had to choose a perspective on the local governance role, which they believed that best balanced the demand for social support, and the services and products delivered to fulfill these needs. Governments had to formulate their governance roles within their mandatory policy plans on social support. These policy plans have a life-span of 4 years. Future studies might focus on the development of the governance roles as a result of learning effects. These studies might also concentrate on the performance of local public social support networks on the long run.

The effects of governance roles on performance and the influence of the contingencies found in this study might be generalizable to other contexts. Future research should reveal whether the results of our study can be translated to other countries and other settings. The models described in this project could also be useful in other contexts, such as local waste policy, local disaster management, and developing a business park.

8.4.1 Methodological considerations

In our study, we used mixed methods of quantitative and qualitative nature in to enhance our understanding of the effects of governance roles on performance. This combination is considered to be a necessary research strategy to advance interorganizational network research (Provan, 2009). Although this strategy contributed to the novel findings in this research, there were also methodological limitations, which are discussed below.

The description phase was based on literature research. The multiple interpretation of the meaning of local public governance forced us to make choices in our literature research. To make well-considered choices, we consulted scientific experts on public administration and interorganizational network research. Future literature research might uncover the strengths and weaknesses of the models that resulted from our choices.

The identification stage contained a policy plan analysis and a latent class cluster analysis based on electronic questionnaires.

The policy plan analysis provided insight in the use and existence of the theoretical governance roles and underlying concepts. The results of the policy plan analysis provided insight in, but not a total and generalizable picture of, the whole population of Dutch local governments. Only a limited sample of policy plans could be included in the study. To explore the use and existence of governance roles, this small sample was sufficient. 2.763 quotations led to clear examples of qualitative descriptions of the quantitative results.

Our latent class cluster analysis provided insight in the existence of clusters of local governments that consistently differed on type of governance. In order to be able to explore comparable cases, we have limited our study to the municipality as an uniform actor. Within these uniform actors, only one particular person in the local governments (i.e., the project manager social support) was considered. We chose these representing persons because of their actual task within the municipalities regarding social support. However, the local government itself can be considered as an arena with different actors exerting influence on governance roles and the effects of governance roles. Future studies should look into the heterogeneity within the different municipalities and might also include for example mayors, city councils and the administration with various departments to explore governance roles and their effects on network performance.

In the prediction stage, we first examined self-evaluations of network performance by local authorities. Local authorities' evaluations do not differ with respect to governance role types. This finding is probably due to the absence of variation in performance evaluations. This absence of variance may have to do with the self evaluations on general Likert type questions. More context specific questions might create more variance. Specificity can be achieved by formulating specific theory based questions on social support. Also a more qualitative approach towards self-evaluations might result in more variation in performance evaluations. Therefore, in the future, qualitative studies could flesh out

whether performance evaluations by local authorities can be assessed in a valid way. The examination of the effects of governance roles on citizens' evaluations was based on two different data sets. The two data sets were collected with different purposes and their primary aim was not to explore the effects of governance roles on citizens' evaluations. However, merging the two data sets was a fertile means to answer our research question. This illustrates how large-scale questionnaires with other initial purposes can provide a useful empirical basis for exploring the many theoretical notions about the functioning of local public networks. The counterpart is that it has to be considered which data sets best fit the existing theories. In our study it was not possible to test hypotheses because of the limited number of municipalities involved; only exploration of relations was possible. In future research, the datasets that include assessments of citizens' evaluations of social support can be developed based on a theoretical foundation of how citizens' evaluations are related to governance roles. This will enable researchers to better interpret the results, and in consequence to offer better recommendations for governance discretion.

Furthermore, this study deals with governance within networks of organizations. However, in our study, we only asked local governments to indicate their choices on the different governance activities. Both policy plans and the electronic questionnaire are from the one-sided local government perspective. Perspectives on the governance role as executed by the local government by other network members could throw new light on the effect of governance roles on network performance. These perspectives on governance are of importance when exploring the effect of governance. Therefore, future research should also involve other network organizations. The electronic questionnaires of this study can be used to let other network members indicate what in their view the governance role of the local government within their local public network is. Some organizations are active in more than one local public network. They are better able to evaluate the differences in governance roles between the different local public networks.

The effects of governance roles on network performance are based on quantitative data analysis. Future research should also use qualitative research to flesh out the interpretations of our quantitative study on the effects of governance roles.

8.5 Implications for practice

Scholars focusing on public multi-actor networks have often illustrated the enormous theoretical potential of public networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). However, public authorities acting as lead organizations in such networks often lack an understanding of how to govern these networks in such a way as to utilize their enormous potential to deliver integrated solutions for the intricate demands of today's society.

Allocating the governance role to municipalities originates from an attempt to preserve the quality as well as the affordability of provisions within the Dutch welfare state. Governing by the municipality demands for a reorientation of roles of the municipalities as well as of the social partners in the local network. All these parties are confronted with new roles which can cause changes and frictions with the existing relationships that were developed in the course of time in a different institutional setting. This transformation takes place in the extremely complex policy field of social support. The complexity of the policy area of social support and its embedding in social institutions

can not be captured completely in the models we developed. In this study we used a rather instrumental approach to governance of local networks, and disregarded the complexities of politics and the history of cooperation of network partners. We studied the mechanisms of governance only from the perspective of the directing municipality. We certainly do not claim that we have fully captured the complexity of provisions in the welfare state. However, our study provides insights that can be used by policy makers to disentangle the complexity of social support provided in the local network context. The new insights provided in this study can be used to be a useful fruit of thought when developing and executing a new role.

Although Governance is a frequently-used concept in practice, the meaning of the term is understood in different ways. Local governments face ambiguity in the options offered through the freedom of governance given by decentralized policies. Therefore, local governments call for insight in their options within governance. They also demand for insight in these options and their effects on the achievement of local public network goals. Our study offers tools to policy makers within local governments to structurally develop and execute their desired governance role. The governance typology presented in chapter 2 provides policy makers insight in their options concerning nine activities that have to be performed when local governments execute their governance role. Governing local public network does not automatically mean that all other network members have influence on what actually happens in the network. Networks in which the local government keeps a tight rein on the network activities by other members are also characterized as a form of governance. Accepting the options within governance underlying the commissioner role could bridge the gap between the reality of policy formulation and the reality of policy execution. Consistency in policy formulation and policy execution enables local governments to better explicate their expectations towards their network members.

This study also helps local governments to select the most appropriate governance role with respect to the contingencies of the network they have to govern. A more top-down role is expected to be most effective if there are many participating network organizations, many new network members, low network member diversity, and services are stable. Local governments should opt for a more bottom-up role if there are few organizations, old network members, a high network member diversity, and services are unstable.

Our study showed that governance roles and contingencies have effects on the degree to which citizens evaluate the services and products of their local public network as successful. Therefore, it is imperative for local governments to make well-considered choices on their governance activities. In addition, the effect of governance is not demonstrated in self-evaluations by the local governments themselves.

Local governments could make really new choices towards their governance role. Governments that rely on bottom-up options of the nine activities govern their local public network different than all others.

This observation opposites the reasons underlying the adoption of the Dutch Social Support Act. Our study demonstrates Dutch governmental bodies still can be characterized as the most important authoritarian actor and main player in the welfare state.

Although often described in available policy documents of municipalities, anno 2011 facilitating choices are totally absent in the actual policy execution of local support policy.

The facilitator options described in policy plans are based on theoretical studies on the benefits of the participation perspective in interorganizational network research. The choices underlying the Dutch Social Support Act also rely on the benefits of the participation perspective. The Dutch welfare state will only be future proof when a greater emphasis is placed on responsibility of the citizens themselves and their social network. At the same time, the responsibility of organizations in the direct local 'home' environment of the citizens should be increased. To enable individual citizens and local environments to take this responsibility, not only the national government have to organize themselves in a different way. The findings of our study seem to suggest that local governments have more or less copied the traditional role of the national government. They consider themselves to be the most important player in the field of social support instead of taking the role of co-creator, one of the important players in the field. In order to explore the foreseen benefits in a reorganisation of the Dutch welfare state, local governments should actually execute the facilitator role. Despite the positive mantra of participation through local networks, this study illustrates that the theoretical benefits are beyond reach in real life

References

Agranoff, R. (2007). Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations. Washintong D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2003). Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

Alvesson, M., & Karreman, D. (2004). Interfaces of control. Technocratic and socio-ideological control in a global management consultancy firm. Accounting Organizations And Society, 29(3-4), 423-444.

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., & Walker, R. M. (2006). Strategy content and organizational performance: An empirical analysis. Public Administration Review, 66(1), 52-63.

Andrews, R., Boyne, G. A., Law, J., & Walker, R. M. (2009). Centralization, Organizational Strategy, and Public Service Performance. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 19(1), 57-80. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum039

Bogason, P. (2000). Public Policy and Local Governance: Institutions in Postmodern Society. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

Boyne, G. A. (2003). Sources of public service improvement: A critical review and research agenda. . Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 13, 367-394.

Considine, M., & Lewis, J. M. (2003). Bureaucracy, Network, or Enterprise? Comparing Models of Governance in Australia, Britain, The Netherlands & New Zealand. Public Administration Review, 63(2), 131-140.

Ferlie, E., & McGivern, G. (2003). Relationships between health care organisations: a critical overview of the literature and a research agenda. London: Centre for NHS Service Delivery & Organisation.

Gössling, T., & Oerlemans, L. (2007). Inside networks : a process view on multi-organisational partnerships, alliances and networks. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Herranz, J. (2008). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18, 1-31.

Hill, C. J., & Lynn, L. (2005). Is hierarchical governance in decline? Evidence from empirical research. . Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 15(2), 173-195.

Human, S. E., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Legitimacy Building in the Evolution of Small-Firm Multilateral Networks: A Comparative Study of Success and Demise. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(2), 327-365.

Hupe, P. en E. Klijn, De gemeente als regisseur van het preventief jeugdbeleid, Rijswijk, 1997

Keast, R., Mandell, M. R., Brown, K., & Wooldcock, G. (2004). Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations. Public Administration Review, 64(3), 363-371.

Kenis, P. N., & Provan, K. G. (2006). The control of public networks. . International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 227-247.

Kickert, W., Klijn, E., & Koppenjan, J. (1997). Managing complex networks. London: Sage Press.

Korssen-van Raaij, D. (2006). Norms Network Members Use: An Alternative Perspective for Indicating Network Success or Failure. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 249-270.

Lee, E. J. (2006). Local self-governance and the citizens' movement. Korea Journal, 46(2), 129-154.

Mandell, M., & Keast, R. (2007). Evaluating network arrangements: Towards revised performance measures. Public Performance & Management Review, 30, 574-597.

Moliterno, T.P., & Mahony, D.M. (2010). Network Theory of Organization: A Multilevel Approach. Journal of Management. doi: 10.1177/0149206310371692.

Pröpper, I., Litjens, B., & Weststeijn, E. (2004). Lokale regie uit macht of onmacht? : onderzoek naar de optimalisering van de gemeentelijke regiefunctie.

Provan, K. G. (2009). Examining the parts of the whole? Expanding the focus of Organizational Network Research. Paper presented at the EGOS, Barcelona.

Provan, K. G., Fish, A., & Sydow, J. (2007). Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal Of Management, 33(3), 479-516.

Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector

organizational networks. Public Administration Review, 61(4), 414-423.

Putten, E. van der, P. Dordregter, B. Staan e.a., Daar sta je voor! Verslag van een onderzoek naar de regierol van gemeenten bij stedelijke vernieuwing. Den Haag, 2002

Raab, J., & Kenis, P. (2009). Heading Toward a Society of Networks. Journal of Management Inquiry, 18(3), 198-210. doi: 10.1177/1056492609337493

Rethemeyer, R. K. (2005). Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector. Public Administration Review, 65(1), 117-121.

van Dolron, J. H. A. (2006). Gemeentelijke regie: techniek of gevoel. B & G, 33, 38.

Summary

Over the course of the 20th century, countries in the western world developed into welfare states with very high levels of care and welfare services. As a result of changes in demographic and social-economic conditions, however, both the quality and the affordability of the welfare state system has come under pressure. This has compelled national governments to reconsider their role within the social landscape of civil actors. Today, there is a widespread belief that the knowledge and practice required to provide effective solutions for the intricate claims of citizens and organizations in contemporary society can no longer be found within any single governmental body. Consequently, the formulation and implementation of public policy is increasingly pursued through public networks of organizations.

Within this trend of networked public policies, local governments (such as municipal councils) are forced to assume responsibility for what were once national government policies. Local governments are presumed to better understand local needs, and hence to be capable of governing local networks more adequately. In order to fulfill this potential, local governments are therefore at liberty to design and perform their own role within their network. This also means, however, that differences in interpretation and performance between local governments emerge, resulting in differences in the type and level of services offered to citizens.

So far, it is not well understood in either the theoretical or practical realm which governance roles in public networks result in the best public network performance. Nevertheless, local governments are currently engaging in networks in many different contexts, such as education, social housing, public safety, healthcare and welfare.

In the Netherlands, a recent example of local governments governing their local public networks concerns the implementation of the Dutch Social Support Act. With the introduction of the Social Support Act, municipalities in the Netherlands have become responsible for social support within their local community. This means that the municipality has to arrange for social support services to be provided to their citizens through a local network consisting of homecare and welfare providers, housing associations, and other network partners that for instance provide (mobility) aids such as wheelchairs. To ensure the quality and affordability of these services, municipalities must apply their governance role to establish connections between a network of organizations that traditionally operate in distinct areas of housing, social work and care. However, since municipalities are free to implement the Social Support Act as they see fit, regional differences occur in the type and level of support offered to people in need of social support.

The aim of this research project, therefore, was to advance knowledge about the influence of governance roles in local public networks on network performance, both in theory and in the empirical reality of social support in the Netherlands.

The general introduction provided in **Chapter 1** offers a brief overview of background information. First, the field of public inter-organizational network research is introduced. Second, the chapter describes the iterative research process of describing, indentifying and predicting the effects of a variety of local governance roles on network outcomes. Third, the chapter introduces the empirical domain of the Dutch Social Support Act and explains various characteristics of the Dutch system of social support that need to be taken into account when exploring the effects of various governance roles in this

context. The chapter ends with an overview of the studies that constitute the different phases of our research project and of the research questions addressed in those different phases.

Research questions:

Description phase
1.   What are governance roles in local public networks, and what activities within network governance determine the variety in possible governance roles?
2.   Which governance roles of local governments work best under which contingency conditions, according to the literature?

Identification phase
3.   Which governance roles can be distinguished in local government policy documents concerning the Dutch Social Support Act?
4.   Can actual governance roles performed by municipalities be identified?

Prediction phase
5.   How do different municipal governance roles affect the municipality's own evaluation of its social support performance?
6.   What is the effect of various governance roles of municipalities on citizens' evaluations of social support?

In the description phase we theoretically delimited the dependent and independent variables of our project and investigated how these variables are seen to be related in the literature. To address the question 'What are governance roles in local public networks, and what activities within network governance determine the variety in possible governance roles?' we describe the concept of local public network governance in **Chapter 2**. The multi-interpretability of this concept required a conceptual theoretical analysis of the literature. According to this analysis, governance roles are comprised of nine dimensions that each represent governance activities: determining the actors, steering, setting preconditions, exerting power, aligning products and services, setting the network goal, bearing responsibility, formulating a network vision, and monitoring all of these activities. For every dimension, a municipality has to consider whether the municipality keeps a tight regime, or instead takes a (more) facilitating approach in its relations with other actors. Three ideal types of roles emerged from our analysis: commissioner, co-producer and facilitator. These three ideal types of roles reflect the three options that municipalities have with respect to the dimensions, namely to 'command the other party', 'collaborate with the other party', or 'leave it to the other party'. For every dimension, municipalities have to make choices on a continuum from top-down to bottom-up. We conclude that the three roles and the corresponding choices are reflected through a typology of local public network governance, as presented in Chapter 2. After the operationalization of governance roles we describe the conceptual relations between the three governance roles, network performance and the influence of contingency conditions. Accordingly, in **Chapter 3** we address the research question: Which governance roles of local governments work best under which

contingency conditions, according to the literature? In this chapter, we first elaborate on the characteristics of local public networks as a distinct form of inter-organizational network. Our literature study shows that local public networks aim for the maximum level of citizen satisfaction within a policy area; that they are constituted around a lower governmental body; and that they generally have a mandated nature and a lead organizational structure.

Our study of the literature on governance roles also reveals that the local governance typology presented in Chapter 2 is more specific than other governance role approaches, in that it specifies characteristics on several continuums. In addition, the literature study also demonstrates that there is not one single best way of governing local public networks. The effect of governance roles on the maximum level of citizen satisfaction is influenced by differences in contingency conditions. We conclude this chapter with a conceptual model that summarizes our propositions about the influence of network size, network evolution, network diversity, and the customization of services on the effect of local governance roles on local network performance. With respect to contingency conditions, the commissioner role is expected to be most effective if there are many organizations, many new network members, low network member diversity, and if services are stable. The co-producer role is expected to work best if there is a balance between young and old network members, a moderate number of network organizations, moderate network diversity, and services are moderately stable. Finally, the facilitator role is expected to perform well if there are many old network members, few organizations, high network member diversity, and services are unstable.

Together, Chapters 2 and 3 provide conceptual grounding for the empirical exploration of the feasibility of our local public governance concepts in the context of the Dutch Social Support Act. A critical question in this phase of the iterative process is whether the structured theoretical perspective on governance roles and network performance remains meaningful when placed in the empirical context of the Dutch Social Support Act. Will the theoretically defined variables of the description phase also prove useful in empirical reality?

Therefore our first empirical exploration is presented in **Chapter 4,** addressing the research question: 'Which governance roles can be distinguished in local government policy documents about the Dutch Social Support Act?' According to this Act, municipalities are forced to formulate their intended governance role in mandatory policy documents. We have analysed these documents using both qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the feasibility of our concepts. We conclude that the commissioner role, the co-producer role, and the facilitator role can be recognized in these policy documents. Within our representative sample of municipalities, the co-producer role was most prominent, followed by a facilitating role and lastly the commissioning role. It also appeared that there was not one municipality that relied on any single type of governance role. The final result with regard to our sample of policy documents was that the choice of governance role also depends on population size. As population size increases, so do the influence and involvement of the other network members, resulting in a more bottom-up governance role.

Chapter 5 addresses the research question: 'Can actual governance roles performed by municipalities be identified?', and it provides insight into how project managers

evaluate the way the local government acted in governing the local public networks. Based on 182 questionnaires, analyzed by using latent cluster class analysis, we found that range of answers provided by the project managers were smaller than suggested by the theoretical ideal types of roles in the description stage. Responses reflecting the facilitator role were completely absent in our sample of municipalities. The majority of choices were situated on the top-down side of the continuum of our typology.

Our theoretical typology of top-down to bottom-up choices therefore needs to be slightly rephrased as a continuum from completely top-down towards largely bottom-up choices, to reflect the actual choices of local public governance roles in our sample of municipalities in the context of social support. In addition to identifying clusters of governance roles, Chapter 5 also shows that this variety is associated with differences in network contingencies and municipality characteristics. Actual governance roles appear to diverge from intended governance roles. In our sample, network size, network evolution, and network trust proved to vary significantly between the roles. The results show that a small network is associated with a more bottom-up governance approach. The more a local network contains new network members, the more reliance on a top-down approach by the local government. Municipalities favoring top-down governance have significantly less trust in their network partners than municipalities in the bottom-up governance cluster.

Chapters 4 and 5 reveal that our operationalizations of governance roles are feasible within the context of Dutch social support networks.

The prediction phase aims to further extend knowledge on the actual effect of governance roles on network performance. This phase helps to explore whether our theoretical propositions accurately predict the relationship between governance role variety, network performance and the influence of contingencies in reality. Accordingly, **Chapter 6** addresses the research question: How do different municipal governance roles affect the municipality's own evaluation of its social support performance? To answer this question we again used the survey data gathered for Chapter 5. First, we conducted analyses of variances on the effects of the general governance roles on local authorities' evaluations. Second, we conducted analyses of variances to examine the effects of specific governance activities on network performance.

Overall, each specific governance role proved unrelated to differences in local authorities' evaluations of social support. This can probably be explained by the absence of variation in the performance evaluations. All local authorities valued the performance of their network as positive.

On the governance activity level (dimensions), there was a variety in effects depending on which evaluation criteria were examined, with different activities appearing to be important.

Nevertheless, other means might be considered to evaluate the performance of local public networks. Citizens' evaluations are probably a more effective measure of the performance of a local public network. After all, since network organizations are (partly) responsible for the performance of the network, they stand to benefit from positive self-evaluations. Chapter 7 provides insight into the use of citizens' evaluations as performance measures within local public networks. By addressing the research question: 'What is the effect of various governance roles of municipalities on citizens' evaluations of social support', this chapter examines the relationships between

governance role variety and citizens' evaluations of social support. In this chapter we also explore whether these effects are influenced by contingencies. The variety in governance roles and contingency conditions was identified in Chapter 5 and the related data were collected at network level. However, the citizens' evaluations were conducted at the citizen level. To relate governance roles to local citizens' evaluations of social support, we performed a multilevel analysis. In **Chapter 7** we show that there is a relationship between the effects of an intermediate governance role on citizens' evaluations of social support and that this relationship is contingent on network conditions. The consequences of social support are valued higher if a municipality applies an intermediate governance role within large networks, compared to this governance role in small local networks. These citizens indicate that they are better able to run their own household, are better able to take care of personal hygiene, and finally are better able to move in and around their own home. Intermediate governance also leads to the highest citizens' evaluations if the network under study is highly evolved. Citizens within these networks indicate that they are less dependent compared to citizens within slightly evolved networks. Furthermore, low network service stability proves to be the optimal condition in the relationship between an intermediate governance role and the consequences of social support. These citizens are also better able to attend to their personal hygiene and have more possibilities to move in and around their own home. They also indicate that products and services in networks with low service stability are more easily transferred to other regions.

The general discussion, as presented in **Chapter 8**, provides an overarching reflection on the six studies (two descriptive conceptual studies, two identifying empirical studies and two predictive empirical studies) described in this dissertation. It thereby integrates the partial research contributions of the individual chapters of this dissertation that each focused on a different angle of the effect of governance roles in local public networks and the influence of contingencies. The chapter presents the main research contributions and proposes new ideas to advance knowledge about the functioning of local public networks. We furthermore assess the strengths and limitations of our study, and suggest new openings or new directions for future research, which expand traditional approaches. Finally, the chapter ends by offering some food for thought for the practice within the context of the Dutch social support.

The main scientific contributions of our study on the effect of a variety in governance roles of local networks in the context of Dutch social support are:

1.   We present a typology that proposes three consistent choices concerning a set of nine activities, resulting in three ideal types of governance roles.
    1.   This offers a means of coping with the ambiguous meaning of governance and enables researchers to compare the three alternatives.
    2.   This is relevant since other typologies cause normative determination towards governance role variety.

2.   Our study provides empirical evidence for the existence of a continuum of
      bottom-up to top-down governance roles.
      1.   Most public network theorists focus on one side of the continuum,
            the participation mantra, and stigmatize and marginalize top-down
            roles as outmoded and/or as functionally and morally bankrupt.
      2.   If scholars only focus on bottom-up governance, they overlook the
            presence of other mechanisms within network governance.
            Our study demonstrates that the top-down side of governance is still
            the most dominant form of governance.

3.   With respect to governance roles, in our study there was no municipality that
      only relied on a single type of governance role. Municipalities use several
      governance roles at the same time. Therefore, studying a sole governance role
      results in an incomplete picture of governance.

4.   With respect to governance as intended and as performed, there is some
      contrast between the intended governance roles as stated in policy documents
      and actual governance. The intended governance roles resemble the
      governance roles described in theoretical studies. These roles are tend to
      be located at the bottom-up side of our governance typology. However, the
      performed governance roles are situated more at the top-down side of the
      continuum.

5.   The best way to govern local public networks is contingent on the network
      characteristics and also on the performance criteria used.
      1.   In our project, network size, network evolution and network trust
            proved to vary significantly across different between roles.
      2.   Network performance is generally evaluated by inviting the
            members' own assessment. However, this dissertation is supportive
            towards scholars that claim that local public networks should be
            evaluated at the citizen level.

Many policy makers within the social support sector lack an understanding of how
to govern their networks in such way as to utilize their enormous potential to deliver
integrated solutions for the intricate demands of today's society. Our study provides
insights that can be used by policy makers to disentangle the complexity of social
support provided in the local network context, and also when developing and executing
new local network governance roles.
Our study offers tools to municipal policy makers to structurally develop and execute
their desired governance role. Our governance typology offers policy makers more
insight into their options concerning nine activities that have to be performed when
municipalities execute their governance role.
We have also demonstrated that governing local public networks does not automatically
mean that all other network members have influence on what actually happens in the
network. Accepting the commissioner role as mode of governance could bridge the
gap between the reality of policy formulation and the reality of policy implementation.

Consistency in formulation and implementation will help local governments to better explicate their expectations towards their network members.

This study also helps local governments select the most appropriate governance role with respect to the contingencies of the network they need to govern.

Our study shows that governance roles and contingencies have effects on the degree to which citizens evaluate the services and products of their local public network as successful. Therefore, it is imperative for local governments to make well-considered choices regarding their governance activities.

Local governments could make really new choices in terms of their governance role. Governments that rely on bottom-up options govern their local public network in a different way than others do. This observation runs counter to the reasons underlying the adoption of the Dutch Social Support Act.

Our study demonstrates that Dutch public authorities still can be characterized as the main player in the welfare state. The reasons for the introduction of the Dutch Social Support Act include the presumed benefits of the participation (facilitator) perspective. The Dutch welfare state will only be future-proof if it manages to place a greater emphasis on the responsibility of citizens themselves and their social network. At the same time, the responsibility of organizations in the direct local 'home' environment of the citizens should be increased. To enable individual citizens and local environments to fulfil this responsibility, it is not only the national government that needs to reorganize itself. The findings of our study suggest that local governments have more or less copied the traditional role of the national government. They view themselves as the most important player in the field of social support, rather than taking on the role of co-creator, hence as just one of the important players in the field. To explore the anticipated benefits of a reorganisation of the Dutch welfare state, local governments should emerge that actually pursue the facilitator role. Despite the positive mantra of participation through local networks, this study illustrates that the theoretical benefits are, as yet, beyond reach in real life.

Samenvatting

Landen in onze westerse wereld hebben zich in de loop der tijd ontwikkeld tot verzorgingsstaten met zeer hoge zorg- en welzijnsniveaus. Echter, vanwege veranderingen in zowel demografische als sociaal-economische omstandigheden kwamen zowel de kwaliteit als de betaalbaarheid van deze verzorgingsstaten onder druk te staan. Dit dwong nationale overheden ertoe om de traditionele overheidsrol te heroverwegen in het sociale landschap van civiele actoren.

Vandaag de dag wordt algemeen aangenomen dat vragen vanuit burgers en organisaties zo complex zijn, dat de benodigde kennis en kunde niet meer voorhanden is binnen één enkele overheidsinstantie. Daarom wordt het formuleren en uitvoeren van beleid steeds vaker gebaseerd op het werken in publieke netwerken van organisaties. Binnen deze trend van publiek beleid, vormgegeven in netwerken van organisaties, worden lokale overheden (zoals gemeenten) gedwongen om verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor beleid dat eerder onder de verantwoordelijkheid van nationale overheden viel. Van lokale overheden wordt verondersteld dat zij beter inzicht hebben in lokale behoeften, en dat zij daardoor beter in staat zijn om deze lokale netwerken goed te regisseren. Om dit potentieel goed te benutten worden lokale overheden vrij gelaten om eigen keuzes te maken ten aanzien van het vormgeven aan, en het uitvoeren van de regisseursrol in hun netwerk.

Echter, omdat lokale overheden vrijheid hebben in de implementatie van de eigen regierol treden er verschillen op met betrekking tot zowel interpretaties als uitkomsten van deze rol. Zo ontstaat er onderscheid tussen gemeenten ten aanzien van zowel het type, als de kwaliteit van diensten die aan mensen geboden wordt. In zowel de theoretische realiteit, alsook in de praktijk is niet goed bekend welke regierollen van lokale overheden resulteren in de beste uitkomsten van publieke netwerkfuncties.

Lokale overheden regisseren lokale netwerken in veel verschillende contexten, zoals onderwijs, sociale huisvesting, openbare veiligheid, zorg en welzijn. Een recent voorbeeld waarbinnen lokale overheden hun lokale publieke netwerken regisseren vormt de invoering van de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning (Wmo) in Nederland. Met het aannemen van deze wet werden gemeenten in Nederland verantwoordelijk voor de maatschappelijke ondersteuning binnen de eigen lokale gemeenschap. Dit betekent dat de gemeente zorg draagt voor de verstrekking van allerhande sociale ondersteuning, door een netwerk van organisaties, bestaande uit thuiszorg- en welzijnsaanbieders, woningcorporaties en andere netwerkpartners. Deze organisaties leveren samen diensten en producten zoals bijvoorbeeld: huishoudelijke ondersteuning, mobiliteitshulpmiddelen en taxivervoer en hulp bij het voeren van de persoonlijke administratie. Om zowel de kwaliteit als de betaalbaarheid van deze diensten en producten te waarborgen dient een gemeente een regierol op te pakken. Deze regierol dient te zorgen voor verbindingen tussen organisaties die traditioneel actief waren binnen verschillende sectoren zoals wonen, zorg en welzijn.

Echter, aangezien gemeenten vrij zijn om de regierol naar eigen inzicht te implementeren treden er regionale verschillen op in termen van type en niveau van ondersteuning die geboden worden aan mensen die behoefte hebben aan maatschappelijke ondersteuning.

Het doel van dit onderzoeksproject was dan ook om kennis op te doen over de invloed van regierollen binnen lokale publieke netwerken op de behaalde netwerkuitkomsten. Deze kennis werd zowel vanuit de theorie gegenereerd, als ook vanuit de empirische

realiteit van de maatschappelijke ondersteuning in Nederland.

In de algemene inleiding, zoals beschreven in **hoofdstuk 1**, wordt korte achtergrondinformatie gegeven. Eerst wordt het veld van interorganisationeel netwerkonderzoek geïntroduceerd. Ten tweede beschrijft het hoofdstuk het iteratieve onderzoeksproces van het beschrijven, het identificeren, en het voorspellen van de effecten van een verscheidenheid aan lokale regierollen op behaalde resultaten van netwerken. Ten derde, behandelt het hoofdstuk het empirische domein van de Nederlandse Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning en bevat het een aantal kenmerken van het Nederlandse systeem van maatschappelijke ondersteuning waarmee rekening gehouden dient te worden wanneer de effecten van verschillende regierollen in deze context verkend worden. Dit hoofdstuk eindigt met het beschrijven van de verschillende studies, die samen de verschillende fases van ons onderzoek vormen. Hier komen ook de verschillende onderzoeksvragen binnen de verschillende fases aan bod.

Onderzoeksvragen:

Beschrijvende fase
1.   Wat zijn regierollen in lokaal publieke netwerken, en welke activiteiten binnen netwerkregie bepalen de variëteit in mogelijke regierollen?
2.   Welke gemeentelijke regierollen werken, volgens de literatuur, het beste onder welke contingentiecondities?

Identificatiefase
3.   Welke regierollen kunnen er worden onderscheiden in gemeentelijke beleidsplannen over de Nederlandse Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning?
4.   Kunnen feitelijke regierollen worden geïdentificeerd, zoals ze worden uitgevoerd door gemeenten?

Voorspellende fase
5.   Hoe beïnvloeden verschillende gemeentelijke regierollen, de eigen evaluatie door gemeenten over de prestaties ten aanzien van maatschappelijk ondersteuning?
6.   Wat is het effect van verschillende gemeentelijke regierollen op burgerevaluaties ten aanzien van maatschappelijke ondersteuning?

In de beschrijvende fase hebben we de afhankelijke en onafhankelijke variabelen van ons project theoretisch afgebakend en hebben we beschreven hoe deze variabelen zich, volgens de literatuur, tot elkaar verhouden. Om de vraag te beantwoorden 'wat zijn regierollen in lokaal publieke netwerken, en welke activiteiten binnen netwerkregie bepalen de variëteit in mogelijke regierollen?' hebben we het concept van lokaal publieke netwerkregie beschreven in **hoofdstuk 2**. De multi-interpreteerbaarheid van dit concept vroeg om een conceptuele, theoretische analyse van de literatuur. Resulterend uit deze literatuuranalyse zijn regierollen samengesteld uit negen dimensies, die activiteiten omvatten: het bepalen van de actoren, sturen, het instellen van randvoorwaarden, macht uitoefenen, afstemmen van producten en diensten, het instellen van een netwerkdoel, verantwoordelijkheid dragen, het formuleren van

een netwerkvisie, en het monitoren van al deze activiteiten. Voor elke dimensie dient een gemeente te overwegen of de gemeente strak stuurt of veeleer faciliteert met betrekking tot de andere netwerkpartijen. Uit onze analyse kwamen drie ideaaltypische regierollen naar voren: opdrachtgever, coproducent en facilitator. Deze drie ideaaltypische rollen weerspiegelen de drie opties die een gemeente heeft ten aanzien van de dimensies: 'het commanderen van de andere partij', 'samenwerken met de andere partij', of 'het overlaten aan de andere partij'. Voor iedere dimensie moet de gemeente een keuze maken op een continuüm van bottom-up tot top-down. We concluderen dat de drie rollen en de bijbehorende keuzes worden weergegeven in een typologie voor gemeentelijke netwerkregie zoals opgenomen is in hoofdstuk 2.

Na de operationalisering van regierollen beschrijven we de conceptuele relatie tussen de drie regierollen, netwerkprestaties en de invloed van contingentiecondities. Daarom beantwoorden we in **hoofdstuk 3** de onderzoeksvraag: 'welke gemeentelijke regierollen werken, volgens de literatuur, het beste onder welke contingentiecondities?' In dit hoofdstuk wordt eerst ingegaan op de kenmerken van lokaal publieke netwerken, als een aparte vorm van een interorganisationeel netwerk. Onze literatuurstudie toont aan dat lokaal publieke netwerken streven naar een maximaal niveau van burgertevredenheid binnen een beleidsterrein. Deze netwerken zijn gevormd rondom een lager overheidsorgaan, en hebben in het algemeen een gemandateerde oorsprong en een leidende organisatiestructuur. Ook bleek uit deze literatuurstudie naar regierollen dat de regietypologie uit hoofdstuk 2 specifieker is dan eerdere benaderingen van regierollen, omdat onze regietypologie eigenschappen specificeert op verschillende continua. Daarnaast toonde de literatuurstudie ook aan dat er niet één beste manier van regisseren is binnen lokaal publieke netwerken. Het effect van regierollen op het maximale niveau van burgertevredenheid wordt beïnvloed door verschillen in contingenties. We sluiten dit hoofdstuk af met een conceptueel model dat onze stellingen over de invloed van de grootte van het netwerk, de ontwikkeling van netwerken, netwerk diversiteit, en de aanpassing van diensten samenvat met betrekking tot het effect van lokale regierollen en netwerk prestaties. Met betrekking tot deze contingentie condities wordt de opdrachtgeverrol naar verwachting het meest effectief als er veel organisaties zijn, er veel nieuwe leden zijn, er weinig diversiteit in netwerkleden is en de te leveren diensten stabiel zijn. De co-producentenrol zal naar verwachting het beste werken als er een evenwicht is tussen jonge en oude leden binnen het netwerk, er een gemiddeld aantal netwerk organisaties is, er een matige netwerkdiversiteit is, en diensten redelijk stabiel zijn. Tot slot zal de rol van facilitator naar verwachting goed functioneren als er veel oude leden in het netwerk zijn, het netwerk bestaat uit weinig organisaties, het netwerk een grote diversiteit kent, en de gevraagde diensten instabiel zijn.

Samen voorzien hoofdstukken 2 en 3 in de conceptuele grondslag voor de empirische verkenning van de haalbaarheid van onze regieconcepten in de context van de Nederlandse Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning. Een cruciale vraag in deze fase van het iteratieve proces was of onze gestructureerd theoretisch perspectieven op regierollen en de prestaties van het netwerk zinvol bleven wanneer ze werden geplaatst in de empirische context van de Nederlandse Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning. Waren de theoretisch gedefinieerde variabelen vanuit de beschrijvende fase ook nuttig in de empirische werkelijkheid?

Daarom wordt onze eerste empirische verkenning gepresenteerd in **hoofdstuk 4** en deze richt zich op de onderzoeksvraag: 'welke regierollen kunnen er worden onderscheiden in gemeentelijke beleidsplannen over de Nederlandse Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning?' Vanuit de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning zijn Nederlandse gemeenten verplicht hun beoogde regierol te beschrijven in een beleidsplan Wmo. We hebben kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve methodieken gebruikt om de bruikbaarheid van onze concepten te exploreren in deze beleidsplannen. We concluderen dat de opdrachtgeverrol, de coproducentenrol, maar ook de facilitatorrol allemaal te herkennen zijn in deze beleidsplannen. Binnen onze representatieve steekproef van gemeenten was de coproducentenrol het sterkst vertegenwoordigd, gevolgd door een faciliterende rol en tenslotte de opdrachtgeverrol. Ook bleek dat er niet één gemeente is die zich op een enkel type regierol baseert. Wij concluderen in dit hoofdstuk ook dat de keuze voor een bepaalde voorgenomen regierol door een gemeente afhankelijk is van het inwoneraantal van een gemeente. Wanneer het inwoneraantal toeneemt, neemt ook de invloed en betrokkenheid van de andere netwerkleden toe en resulteert dit in een meer bottom-up regierol.

Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de onderzoeksvraag: 'kunnen feitelijke regierollen worden geïdentificeerd, zoals ze worden uitgevoerd door gemeenten?' en geeft inzicht in de evaluaties van projectmanagers Wmo met betrekking tot de manier waarop de gemeente uitvoering geeft aan de regierol binnen de lokaal publieke netwerken. Gebaseerd op 182 vragenlijsten, geanalyseerd met latente klasse clusteranalyse, vinden we dat de gekozen opties minder van elkaar verschillen dan theoretisch verondersteld in onze ideaaltypische regierollen. De keuzes die zouden resulteren in een faciliterende regierol worden niet gemaakt. De meerderheid van de gemaakte keuzes zijn gesitueerd op de top-down zijde van onze typologie.
Wanneer feitelijke regierollen binnen de lokaal publieke netwerken van de Wmo worden bevraagd dient onze theoretische typologie van top-down tot bottom-up keuzes geherformuleerd te worden in een continuüm van volledig top-down tot grotendeels bottom-up keuzes. Naast het bestaan van clusters van regierollen, toont hoofdstuk 5 ook aan dat rollidmaatschap verband houdt met verschillen in netwerkcontingenties en gemeentelijke kenmerken. In onze studie waren de verschillende rollen significant verschillend wanneer gekeken werd naar de grootte van het netwerk, de ontwikkeling van het netwerk, en het vertrouwen binnen het netwerk. Bottom-up regierollen hangen samen met kleine netwerken. Meer nieuwe leden in een netwerk leiden tot een meer top-down vorm van regie. Gemeenten die kiezen voor een top-down regierol hebben ook significant minder vertrouwen in hun netwerkpartners, in vergelijking met gemeenten die kiezen voor een meer bottom-up regierol.
Uit hoofdstukken 4 en 5 bleek dat onze operationaliseringen van regierollen toepasbaar zijn in de context van de Nederlandse Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning.

De voorspellende fase van ons onderzoek is er op gericht om meer kennis te vergaren over het feitelijke effect van regierollen op netwerkresultaten. Deze fase helpt om te onderzoeken of onze theoretische proposities de relatie tussen regierol variëteit, netwerkprestaties en de invloed van contingenties, in de praktijk kunnen voorspellen. Daarom gaat **hoofdstuk 6** in op de onderzoeksvraag: 'hoe beïnvloeden verschillende

gemeentelijke regierollen, de eigen evaluatie door gemeenten over de prestaties ten aanzien van maatschappelijk ondersteuning? De vragenlijsten verzameld voor hoofdstuk 5 leverden ook data op met betrekking tot de eigen evaluaties van gemeenten over de prestaties ten aanzien van maatschappelijke ondersteuning. Allereerst hebben we variatieanalyses uitgevoerd op het effect van de algemene regierollen op gemeentelijke evaluaties. Vervolgens voerden we variatieanalyses uit om het effect van regieactiviteiten op netwerkprestaties te bekijken.

Over het algemeen blijkt dat regierollen niet gerelateerd zijn aan verschillen in gemeentelijke evaluaties over maatschappelijke ondersteuning. Dit kan mogelijk verklaard worden door een gebrek aan variatie in antwoorden ten aanzien van prestatie-evaluaties. Iedere gemeente evalueert de eigen netwerkprestatie als positief. Op het niveau van regieactiviteiten (dimensies) vinden we een verschil in effecten. Dit effect is afhankelijk van de evaluatiecriteria die werden onderzocht; voor ieder evaluatiecriterium lijkt een andere regieactiviteit belangrijk.

Wat betreft de prestaties van lokaal publieke netwerken zullen dus andere evaluatiemetingen moeten worden overwogen. Burgerevaluaties zijn waarschijnlijk beter geschikt om de prestaties van een lokaal publiek netwerk te meten. Immers, omdat netwerkorganisaties (mede) verantwoordelijk zijn voor het eindresultaat zijn zij zelf vaak genegen een positieve zelfevaluatie te geven.

Hoofdstuk 7 geeft inzicht in het gebruik van burgerevaluaties als prestatie-indicatoren voor lokale openbare netwerken. Door het onderzoeken van de onderzoeksvraag: 'wat is het effect van verschillende gemeentelijke regierollen op burgerevaluaties ten aanzien van maatschappelijke ondersteuning?' gaat dit hoofdstuk in op de relaties tussen verschillende regierollen en burgevaluaties. In dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken we ook of deze effecten worden beïnvloed door contingentiefactoren. De verschillende regierollen en contingentiecondities werden geïdentificeerd in hoofdstuk 5 en waren gebaseerd op gegevens die verzameld waren op het niveau van het netwerk. In dit hoofdstuk worden burgerevaluaties toegevoegd die zijn verzameld op het niveau van de individuele burger. Om regierollen te relateren aan burgerevaluaties hebben we een multilevel analyse uitgevoerd. In hoofdstuk 7 laten we zien dat er een effect bestaat van een coproducerende regierol op burgerevaluaties over maatschappelijke ondersteuning en dat dit effect afhankelijk is van netwerkcondities. De gevolgen van maatschappelijke ondersteuning worden hoger geëvalueerd wanneer een gemeente een coproducerende regierol op zich neemt binnen grote netwerken, afgezet tegen een coproducerende regierol binnen kleine netwerken. Burgers binnen deze netwerken geven aan dat ze beter in staat zijn hun eigen huishouden te voeren, zichzelf beter kunnen verzorgen en dat zij beter in staat zijn zich in en rond het huis te verplaatsen. Een coproducerende regierol leidt ook tot hogere scores wanneer een netwerk meer geëvolueerd is. Burgers binnen deze netwerken beschouwen zichzelf als minder afhankelijk, wanneer zij vergeleken worden met burgers in minder geëvolueerde netwerken. Bovendien blijkt een lage stabiliteit in netwerkdiensten de optimale conditie wanneer de relatie tussen een coproducerende regierol en de gevolgen van maatschappelijke ondersteuning door burgers worden geëvalueerd. Burgers in deze netwerken geven ook aan dat zij zichzelf beter kunnen verzorgen, en dat zij meer mogelijkheden hebben zich in en rond het eigen huis te bewegen. Zij geven ook aan dat binnen netwerken met een lage stabiliteit in netwerkdiensten, het makkelijker is om jezelf naar andere gemeenten te verplaatsen.

De algemene discussie, zoals beschreven in **hoofdstuk 8**, geeft een overkoepelende reflectie op de zes studies (twee beschrijvende conceptuele studies, twee identificerende empirische studies en twee voorspellende empirische studies) die in dit proefschrift zijn gepresenteerd. Daarmee integreert het hoofdstuk de deelbijdragen van de voorgaande hoofdstukken die elk een verschillende invalshoek van het effect van regie en de invloed van contingentiecondities, in lokaal publieke netwerken hebben behandeld. Eerst worden de voornaamste bijdragen besproken die nieuwe ideeën omvatten om kennis over het functioneren van lokaal publieke netwerken te verbeteren. Verder hebben we de sterke punten en beperkingen van ons onderzoek behandeld en geloven wij dat we nieuwe richtingen hebben aangeduid voor toekomstig onderzoek. Deze reiken verder dan traditioneel onderzoek. Ten slotte eindigden we het hoofdstuk met enkele ideeën die door beleidsmakers (Wmo) kunnen worden opgepakt wanneer zij hun toekomstige regierollen ontwerpen en uitvoeren.

De belangrijkste wetenschappelijke bijdragen van onze studie naar het effect van verschillende regierollen in lokale netwerken in het kader van de Wmo zijn:

1. Wij bieden een typologie met drie consistente keuzes op een reeks van negen activiteiten, resulterend in drie ideaaltypen van gemeentelijke regie.
    1. Dit betekent dat er een manier is om om te gaan met de dubbelzinnige betekenis van regie en dit stelt onderzoekers in staat de drie alternatieven te vergelijken.
    2. Dit is van belang omdat andere typologieën leiden tot normatieve determinatie van regierolvariëteit.

2. Onze studie geeft empirisch bewijs voor het bestaan van een continuüm van bottom-up van top-down regierollen.
    1. De meeste publieke netwerk theoretici richten zich op slechts een zijde van het continuüm, de participatie mantra, en stigmatiseren en marginaliseren daarbij de top-down rol als achterhaald en als functioneel en moreel failliet.
    2. Indien wetenschappers zich enkel richten op bottom-up regie, missen ze het belangrijkste deel van regiemogelijkheden. Onze studie toonde aan dat een top-down invulling van regie, hedentendage nog steeds de meest gekozen vorm van regie is.

3. In ons onderzoek was er geen enkele gemeente die zich uitsluitend baseerde op één enkel type regierol. Gemeenten maken gebruik van verschillende regierollen op hetzelfde moment. Daarom resulteert het bestuderen van één type regierol in een onvolledig beeld van regie.

4.   Er is een groot contrast tussen een beoogde regierol, zoals omschreven in beleidsnotities, en de regierol zoals hij daadwerkelijk wordt uitgevoerd.
De beoogde regierol, zoals deze is opgenomen in beleidsplannen, lijkt op regierollen zoals ze worden beschreven in theoretische studies. Deze rollen balanceren meer aan de bottom-up zijde van ons regiecontinuüm. De regierol zoals deze daadwerkelijk wordt uitgevoerd is gesitueerd aan de top-down zijde van ons continuüm.

5.   Er bestaat niet één beste manier om lokaal publieke netwerken goed te regisseren. De keuze voor de juiste regierol is afhankelijk van netwerkcontingenten en de gekozen prestatiecriteria.

        1.   Gedurende ons project hebben we aangetoond dat de verschillende regierollen significant variëren in netwerkgrootte, netwerkevolutie en netwerkvertrouwen.

        2.   Vaak worden netwerkprestaties gemeten door netwerkleden te bevragen over de eigen evaluatie van het netwerksucces. Echter, resultaten uit deze dissertatie zijn ondersteunend aan onderzoekers die beweren dat lokaal publieke netwerken geëvalueerd moeten worden op het niveau van de burger.

Veel beleidsmakers binnen de sector van sociale ondersteuning ontbreekt het aan kennis over hoe lokale netwerken te regisseren, zodat er recht wordt gedaan aan het enorme potentieel van geïntegreerde oplossingen voor de ingewikkelde eisen vanuit onze huidige maatschappij. Onze studie biedt beleidsmakers inzichten die kunnen worden gebruikt om regierollen gestructureerd te benaderen wanneer deze rollen ontworpen en uitgevoerd worden. Meer specifiek kunnen onze inzichten ook gebruikt worden om meer orde te scheppen in de complexiteit van lokale maatschappelijke ondersteuning. Structuur ontstaat door het gebruik van de negen activiteiten die moeten worden uitgevoerd wanneer gemeenten regie over hun lokale netwerken voeren.

We hebben ook aangetoond dat gemeentelijke netwerkregie niet automatisch betekent dat alle netwerkleden invloed hebben op wat er zich afspeelt in het netwerk. Het accepteren van een opdrachtgeverrol als vorm van regie zou de kloof tussen de beleidswerkelijkheid en de uitvoeringsrealiteit weleens kunnen slechten. Wanneer gemeenten consistenter worden in het formuleren van beleid dat ook daadwerkelijk zo wordt uitgevoerd, kunnen zij de verwachtingen over en van de andere netwerkpartners beter managen.

Deze studie helpt beleidsmakers ook bij het kiezen van de meest geschikte regierol, gegeven de contingenties die aanwezig zijn in het netwerk dat ze moeten regisseren. In onze studie hebben we ook aangetoond dat regierollen en netwerkcontingenten daadwerkelijk een effect hebben op de mate waarop burgers producten en diensten geleverd door het netwerk als nuttig evalueren. Daarom is het ook daadwerkelijk van belang dat gemeenten weloverwogen beslissingen nemen ten aanzien van hun regieactiviteiten.

Gemeenten kunnen hun regierol vernieuwend invullen. Gemeenten die kiezen voor bottom-up opties, regisseren het lokaal publieke netwerk daadwerkelijk anders dan alle andere gemeenten. Deze observatie staat haaks op redenen waarom de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning is ingevoerd. Wij toonden aan dat Nederlandse overheden nog steeds de belangrijkste speler zijn in de welvaartstaat. Dit staat haaks op de grondgedachten onderliggend aan de Wmo. De redenen om de Wmo in te voeren gingen uit van de voordelen die te behalen zijn vanuit een participatie (facilitator) perspectief. De Nederlandse welvaartstaat zal alleen toekomstbestendig zijn wanneer er een grotere nadruk komt op de verantwoordelijkheid van burgers zelf, en hun persoonlijk netwerk. Tegelijkertijd zou de verantwoordelijkheid van organisaties in de directe omgeving van burgers ook toe moeten nemen. Voordat burgers en instellingen deze verantwoordelijkheden ook daadwerkelijk kunnen nemen, dient niet alleen de nationale overheid zich anders te organiseren. De resultaten van deze studie stellen immers dat lokale overheden de traditionele rol van nationale overheden min of meer gekopieerd hebben. Gemeenten zien zichzelf als belangrijkste speler in het veld. Om te kunnen profiteren van de voorziene voordelen van een gereorganiseerde verzorgingsstaat, dienen gemeenten echt de facilitatorrol op te gaan pakken. Ondanks de positieve mantra van participatie in lokale netwerken, laat deze studie zien dat de theoretisch omschreven voordelen nog buiten bereik zijn in de realiteit.

Dankwoord

De afgelopen viereneenhalf jaar stonden grotendeels in het teken van regie binnen (maatschappelijke) ondersteuningsnetwerken. Hedendaagse sociale ondersteuning is veelal te complex en te dynamisch om door één enkele organisatie opgepakt te kunnen worden. Wanneer organisaties complementair samenwerken om hedendaagse uitdagingen om te zetten in kansen, wordt er veelal een regisseur ingezet om ervoor te zorgen dat de prestatie van het netwerk groter is dan de prestaties die de organisaties afzonderlijk zouden kunnen leveren.

Mijn promotieproject was ook een complexe, dynamische uitdaging die ik zonder samenwerking binnen een netwerk van personen nooit tot een goed einde had kunnen brengen. Ik zou graag iedereen persoonlijk bedanken voor (en feliciteren met) zijn aandeel in de voltooiing van deze dissertatie. Het netwerk is echter zo omvangrijk dat ik me in dit dankwoord moet beperken tot een arbitraire afbakening van het netwerk. Gelukkig is dit een wetenschappelijk gevalideerde methode die bekend staat onder netwerkanalyse.

Allereerst wil ik mijn promotieteam bedanken. Dit werd gevormd door Katrien Luijkx, René Schalk en Jos Schols. Dit team omvatte een gezonde mix aan diversiteit, creativiteit en complementariteit, zowel in persoonlijkheden, competenties, als in visies. Katrien vormde voor mij het dagelijkse klankbord voor zowel wetenschappelijke, persoonlijke, als organisatorische overwegingen. Jij hebt mij gestimuleerd om innovatieve ideeën over methoden en theorieën uit te werken. Waar ik in mijn enthousiasme vaak drie stappen te snel vooruit wilde, heb jij me, met altijd kritische opbouwende vragen, het geleidelijke pad der wetenschap geleerd. Ik ben je dankbaar voor je steun, kritische wetenschappelijke houding en je gezelligheid. René, op de momenten dat ik worstelde met theorieën, methodieken of formuleringen wist jij altijd een oplossing aan te dragen. Jouw relativeringsvermogen, kunde en rust zijn onmisbaar geweest voor mij. Jos, hartelijk dank dat je mij hebt geënthousiasmeerd voor het verrichten van promotieonderzoek. Gedurende het onderzoek heb je mij altijd de ruimte gegeven een eigen beeld op zowel de literatuur als op onderzoeksmethodieken te ontwikkelen. Je waardeerde mijn enthousiasme, maar herkende ook de momenten dat een meer pragmatischere aanpak nodig was. Tijdens onze gezamenlijke interessante discussies wist je zeer krachtig, met zeer heldere argumenten, de koers naar het einddoel scherp te houden. Ook wil ik je danken voor je goede ambassadeurschap voor zowel mij als persoon, als het onderzoek. Dit heeft voor mij vele deuren geopend. Ik wil jullie alle drie graag danken voor het vertrouwen dat ik van jullie heb gehad en wat ik hierdoor heb kunnen leren.

Op deze plaats wil ik ook de overige leden van de promotiecommissie, prof. dr. P.H.A. Frissen, prof. dr. H.F.L. Garretsen, prof. dr. K. Putters, prof. dr. A. A. de Roo en dr. J. Raab bedanken voor het kritisch evalueren van mijn proefschrift.

Daarnaast ben ik het onderzoeksdepartement Tranzo zeer dankbaar dat mijn onderzoek hier plaats mocht vinden. Bij Tranzo worden binnen een zeer breed onderzoeksprogramma, zowel de talenten van de wetenschap als de praktijk van de zorg- en welzijnssector, multidisciplinair ingezet om te komen tot een algemene verbetering van beide sectoren. De diversiteit aan mensen binnen Tranzo maakt het mogelijk om ook daadwerkelijk tot nieuwe inzichten te kunnen komen. Prof. dr. Garretsen, Henk, jij weet als sociaal en betrokken leider de mix aan talenten binnen Tranzo in een zeer collegiale, vriendschappelijke sfeer samen te laten komen. Veel dank

ben ik verschuldigd aan alle tranzo collega's voor hun collegialiteit, hun interesse in mijn onderzoek, inspiratie, maar zeker ook voor alle gezelligheid. Iedere collega heeft op enig moment wel een bijdrage geleverd aan de totstandkoming van dit proefschrift.

Mijn specifieke dank gaat uit naar mijn twee paranimfen. Bram en Marie-Jeanne, bedankt voor jullie humor, meningen, inzichten, maar bovenal voor jullie vriendschap. EmJeetje, klein van stuk, groot van bereik. Je hebt de afgelopen viereneenhalf jaar vaak meegedacht over alle uitdagingen waarmee je als promovendus geconfronteerd wordt. Veel van de onderwerpen die de afgelopen jaren besproken zijn, zijn reeds gepasseerd. Slechts enkele zullen op de zeer korte termijn werkelijkheid worden. Jij bent inmiddels gepromoveerd en wat betreft je verdediging hoop ik dat 'goed voorbeeld doet volgen'. Een andere wens van jou gaat ook binnenkort in vervulling. Ik wilde je er graag op attenderen dat Kees een hele leuke jongensnaam is. Bram, door jouw methodologisch talent, fundamentele kijk op onderzoek, en je humor heb ik me altijd gesteund gevoeld in de kansen die je moet grijpen en de ontberingen die je moet doorstaan, en de ontspanning die je moet nemen, in een promotietraject. Ik heb hoge verwachtingen ten aanzien van jullie beider academische carrières, en voel me dan ook gesterkt omdat juist jullie tijdens mijn verdediging achter mij staan.

Ook Matthijs, Hendrik en Stéfanie wil ik graag bedanken voor hun ondersteuning bij de verschillende statistische analyses, het proeflezen van de verschillende hoofdstukken en de afleiding.

Ik wil graag Frank Staal, Bakir Awad en prof. dr. Ferd Sturmans bedanken voor het aanwakkeren en het volgen van mijn interesse voor de Nederlandse gezondsheidszorg en voor de kansen die zij mij hierbinnen geboden hebben. Frank en Bakir, ik heb jullie samen met Henny Brons en Matthé Hoogenboom leren kennen als visionaire zorgbestuurders. Ik hoop dat jullie visies een vervolg blijven krijgen in de totale Nederlandse zorgwereld. Ik hoop dat toekomstig onderzoek onder leiding van prof. dr. Schols en prof. dr. Vrijhoef hieraan bij zal dragen. Ik ben in ieder geval blij dat jullie deze visies met mij hebben willen delen.

De gemeenteraad in Loon op Zand ben ik dankbaar voor het inzicht in de rol van de gemeente in de context van de Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning. Ad van Laarhoven en Wim Aussems, hartelijk dank voor het vertrouwen dat jullie hadden in een jonge, maar ambitieuze academicus, die zijn maatschappelijke steentje wilde bijdragen. Jullie boden mij de gelegenheid om een zogenaamde practicing scientist te zijn.

De respondenten in mijn onderzoek verdienen ook mijn dank. Zonder de medewerking van de vele projectleiders Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning in al die verschillende gemeenten had ik mijn onderzoek nooit uit kunnen voeren. Ik wil jullie danken dat jullie in de onderzoeksintensieve beleidscontext van de Wmo, toch het nut van mijn onderzoek hebben onderkend en de gelegenheid hebben gevonden mijn vragenlijsten in te vullen. Ik hoop dat ons onderzoek bijdraagt aan het benodigde inzicht in de verschillende vormen van regie.

Ook het Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (SCP) wil ik danken voor het beschikbaar stellen van data over evaluaties van burgers ten aanzien van de product- dienstverlening binnen de Wmo. Wij hadden beiden één oogpunt wanneer wij onze data tegen het licht hielden van de relatie tussen regierollen en burgerevaluaties. Het combineren van beide oogpunten was nodig om de resultaten in beter perspectief te zien. Anna Maria Marangos en Mirjam de Klerk , hartelijk dank voor de samenwerking op het SCP.

Een promotieonderzoek is een traject waar je helemaal in op kunt gaan. Gelukkig heb ik een aantal vrienden naast me staan, die ieder op hun eigen manier weten hoe ze de aandacht van dit onderzoek af moeten leiden. Rob, Mitchell, Nick, Roel, Jean, Mark, Matthijs, Arjen, Lilian, Clasien en Sjaak. Bedankt voor jullie kameraadschap, (actieve) sportieve afleiding, nuchter positivisme en het geloof in mijn kunnen, waar we het ook over hebben.

Ook wil ik graag mijn collega's bij de ING bedanken voor de goede en hartelijke ontvangst. Ik heb als 'relatiemanager instellingen' de ambitie een goed intermediar te worden wanneer wederzijdse doelen en middelen op elkaar afgestemd worden. Zo kunnen beide werelden samen gaan voor verbetering van de Nederlandse sociale leefwereld.

Mijn (schoon)familie bedank ik voor de interesse die zij steeds getoond hebben in de perikelen en uitkomsten rondom mijn proefschrift. Ik kijk er naar uit om te proosten op het feit dat ik geen doctor 'anders', maar gewoon doctor wordt. Dat brengt mij bij mijn zusje Kristel. Ik mag dan in titel doctor zijn. Ik ben zo trots dat jij daadwerkelijk mensen in levensbedreigende situaties helpt. Als ik tijdens mijn onderzoek bij jou te rade ging, gaf je me altijd het beste advies dat ik kon krijgen; 'Kees, niet zeuren, jij maakt toch altijd overal een succes van. Kom we gaan iets leuks doen!'

Pap en mam, ik weet dat jullie trots zijn, maar ik ben ook enorm trots op jullie. Ik kom uit een bijzonder prachtig en hecht gezin. Jullie energie en drive zijn ongeëvenaard. Vanuit een groot maatschappelijk besef hebben jullie mij geleerd om me in te zetten voor hetgeen waarin ik geloof. Gestoeld op kernwaarden als positivisme, warmte, integriteit en betrokkenheid zetten jullie je ook altijd in voor onze maatschappij. Presteren is een werkwoord, waarvoor blijvend een sterke arbeidsethos vereist is. Deze ingrediënten vormen de basis om succes te (blijven) zien en tegenslagen te verwerken. Jullie staan altijd voor me klaar en ik ben dan ook blij dat ik op 1 juni dit jaar met jullie wederom een succes mag vieren.

Tijn, ik zie jou als volleerd wetenschapper de hele wereld om je heen systematisch verkennen. Bij iedere nieuwe empirische ontdekking, grijp je een nieuwe probleemstelling aan waardoor jouw wereld steeds groter en interessanter wordt. Ik zal ervoor zorgen dat je in je vader een goed ondersteuningsnetwerk blijft vinden. Zo kun jij de regie voeren over je eigen gelukkige leventje. Dit ondersteuningsnetwerk vorm ik niet alleen.

Lieve Linda, ik wil je bedanken voor al je liefde, de rust en je vertrouwen. De energie en passie die jij steekt in het vormen en onderwijzen van de nieuwe generatie zijn ongekend. Ik heb veel liefde, respect en bewondering voor je en ben blij dat ik dagelijks samen met jou van het leven een feest kan maken.

Kees Span
Dongen, april 2012

Curriculum vitae

Kees Christianus Leonardus Span werd geboren op 16 november 1982 te
Tilburg. In 2002 behaalde hij zijn VWO diploma, conform het profiel economie en
maatschappij, aan het dr. Mollercollege in Waalwijk. Van 2002 tot 2006 studeerde
hij Organisation Studies aan de Universiteit van Tilburg. In 2005 behaalde hij zijn
bachelordiploma Organisatiewetenschappen, aangevuld met een minorprogramma
Personeelswetenschappen. Zijn bachelorscriptie was getiteld 'De ouderenzorg in
Nederland: scenario's voor structuur in een grijs gebied'. In 2006 volgde hij naast zijn
studie Organisation studies ook de studie Financial Management. In augustus 2006
behaalde Kees zijn masterdiploma Organisation Studies. Zijn masterthesis was getiteld
'Motives underlying inter-organisational relationships: a way to structure the complexity
and dynamics in the care-sector for the elderly?
In maart 2006 werd hij verkozen tot raadslid in de gemeenteraad van Loon op Zand
en was hij actief binnen de commissies bestuur en middelen, ruimtelijke ordening
en planning & control. Bij zijn afscheid in oktober 2009 ontving hij de gemeentelijke
erepenning in brons ter erkenning voor zijn inspirerende visie op financiën en kansen
voor gemeenten. Van 2007 tot 2012 was Kees aangesteld als promovendus bij het
onderzoeksdepartement Tranzo aan de Universiteit van Tilburg. Thans is hij werkzaam als
relatiemanager instellingen bij de ING Bank.

Kees woont samen met Linda en samen hebben zij een zoontje genaamd Tijn.

Kees Christianus Leonardus Span was born on 16 November 1982 in Tilburg, the Netherlands. He obtained his pre-university diploma in 2002, majoring in economy and social studies, at the Dr. Mollercollege in Waalwijk. From 2002 to 2006 he studied Organization Studies at Tilburg University, achieving a Bachelor's degree in Organization Studies in 2005, complemented with a minor program in Human Resource Studies. His Bachelor's thesis carried the title (in Dutch): 'Care for the elderly in the Netherlands: scenarios for structure in a grey area'. In addition to Organisation Studies, in 2006 he also followed a study in Financial Management. Kees was awarded the Master's Degree in Organisation Studies in August 2006. His Master's thesis was entitled 'Motives underlying inter-organizational relationships: a way to structure the complexity and dynamics in the care-sector for the elderly?' In March 2006 he was elected as councilor in the Municipality of Loon op Zand, where he mainly dedicated his efforts to the committees on governance and resources, spatial planning and control. Upon leaving his position in October 2009 he was presented the bronze municipal honorary medal in recognition of his inspiring vision on finances and opportunities for the municipality. From 2007 to 2012 Kees worked as PhD student at the Tranzo research department of Tilburg University. He currently works as institutional relations manager at ING Bank.

Kees lives with his partner Linda and their young son named Tijn.

List of publications

International publications

Span, K.C.L., Luijkx, K.G., Schols, J.M.G.A., Schalk, R. (2012). The relationship between governance roles and performance in local public interorganizational networks: a conceptual analysis. The American Review of Public Administration. 42 (2): 186-201.

Span, K.C.L., Luijkx, K.G., Schalk, R., Schols, J.M.G.A. Different choices on governing support networks by local governments: a policy document analysis. Submitted for publication.

Span, K.C.L., Luijkx, K.G., Schalk, R., Schols, J.M.G.A. (2012). What governance roles do municipalities use in local support networks in the Netherlands?
Accepted for publication. Public Management Review.
Estimated publication date: April, 24th 2012. Doi: 10.1080/14719037.2012.664013

Span, K.C.L., Luijkx, K.G., Schalk, R., Schols, J.M.G.A. The effect of public multi-actor governance on local authories' evaluation of social support: an empirical analysis. Submitted for publication.

Span, K.C.L., Luijkx, K.G., Marangos, A., Schalk, R., Schols, J.M.G.A. The effect of public multi-actor governance on citizens' evaluation of social support: an empirical analysis. Submitted for publication.

National publications

Aarts, M.J.; Span, K.C.L. (2008). De brug versterkt - vervlechting van onderzoek en praktijk. Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidswetenschappen, 86(6), 435 - 436.

Span, K.C.L. (2008). De gemeentelijke regierol, leren van elkaar!
Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidswetenschappen, 86(5), 224 - 225.

Span, K.C.L. (2008). Vermaatschappelijking: Aandacht voor kwetsbare groepen.
Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidswetenschappen, 86(5), 236 - 237.

Span, K.C.L., Luijkx, K.G., Schalk, R., Schols, J.M.G.A. (2009). De regierol van gemeenten nader bekeken: een theoretisch empirische analyse van de literatuur.
Bestuurskunde, 18(1), 92 - 100.

Span, K.C.L. (2011). Het belang en de reikwijdte van innovaties in de gezondheidszorg.
Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidswetenschappen, 89(2), 91 - 92.