

## Tilburg University

### Credit Booms and Lending Standards

Dell’Ariccia, G.; Igan, D.; Laeven, L.

*Publication date:*  
2009

[Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Dell’Ariccia, G., Igan, D., & Laeven, L. (2009). *Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market*. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-46 S). Finance.

#### General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

#### Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.



# Discussion paper

## **CREDIT BOOMS AND LENDING STANDARDS: EVIDENCE FROM THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET**

By Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, Luc Laeven

April 2009

European Banking Center Discussion  
Paper No. 2009–14S

This is also a  
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2009–46S

ISSN 0924-7815



**CREDIT BOOMS AND LENDING STANDARDS:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET**

Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven\*

First Version: April 2008

This Draft: January 2009

**Abstract**

This paper links the current subprime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated with the rapid expansion and changes in the structure of this market. We show that lending standards declined more in areas that experienced faster credit growth. We also find that the entry of new lenders contributed to the decline in lending standards. The results are robust to controlling for house price appreciation, mortgage securitization, and other economic fundamentals, and to several robustness tests controlling for endogeneity. The results are consistent with the predictions of recent models based on asymmetric information, and shed light on the relationship between credit booms and financial instability.

**JEL classification codes:** G21, E51

**Keywords:** credit boom, lending standards, mortgages, subprime loans, moral hazard, financial accelerators

---

\* The authors are all at the IMF Research Department. Dell’Ariccia and Laeven are also at the CEPR. We would like to thank Richard Baldwin, Tam Bayoumi, Thorsten Beck, Mitchell Berlin, Olivier Blanchard, Stijn Claessens, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache, Gianni De Nicolo, Douglas Diamond, Darrell Duffie, Simon Gilchrist, John Griffin, Luigi Guiso, David Gussmann, Robert Hauswald, Patrick Honohan, Simon Johnson, Pete Kyle, Ross Levine, Mark Levonian, Elena Loutskina, Robert Marquez, Chris Mayer, Rebecca McCaughrin, Hamid Mehran, Donald Morgan, Steven Ongena, Marco Pagano, Marcelo Pinheiro, Andrea Pratt, Calvin Schnure, Amit Seru, Hyun Shin, Philip Strahan, Rene Stulz, Todd Vermilyea, Vikrant Vig, Josef Zechner and seminar participants at American University, Bank of England, Bank for International Settlements, Dutch Central Bank, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, George Washington University, International Monetary Fund, National Bank of Prague, University of Houston, University of Kansas, University of South Carolina, University of Virginia, University of Zurich, the 2008 BIS workshop on “Risk Transfer Mechanisms and Financial Stability”, and the 2008 Unicredit Conference on Finance and Banking at Vienna University for helpful discussions and/or comments on an earlier version of this paper. We would also like to thank Chris Crowe for sharing his data. Mattia Landoni provided outstanding research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF, its Executive Board, or its Management.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The recent global financial turmoil has placed the U.S. subprime mortgage industry in the spotlight. Over the last decade, this market has expanded rapidly and witnessed the entry of new major players, evolving from a small niche segment to a major portion of the U.S. mortgage market.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that this trend was accompanied by a decline in credit standards and excessive risk taking by lenders (e.g., FitchRatings, 2007). Indeed, the rapid expansion of subprime lending is seen by many as a credit boom gone bad, as evidenced by increased delinquency rates of subprime mortgages and insolvency problems at major mortgage lenders. Yet, few attempts have been made to link empirically lending standards in the subprime mortgage market to its rapid expansion. How did lending standards change over the expansion? How did changes in local market structure affect lender behavior during the boom? To answer these questions, we use data from over 50 million individual mortgage applications combined with information on local and national economic variables.

Our main finding is that the credit expansion in the subprime mortgage market led to a decrease in lending standards, as measured by a decline in application denial rates and a significant increase in loan-to-income ratios not explained by an improvement in the underlying economic fundamentals. Specifically, denial rates declined more and loan-to-income ratios rose more in areas where the number of loan applications rose faster. These areas subsequently experienced a sharper increase in delinquency rates (Figure 1), in a pattern reminiscent of boom-bust cycles in emerging markets (e.g., Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 2006; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2006). Indeed, some have compared the current crisis in the U.S. mortgage

market to major financial crises in developed countries and emerging market economies that also experienced credit booms (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).

We also find that changes in market structure affected lending standards. Denial rates declined more in areas with a larger number of competitors. Specifically, incumbents' lending standards were negatively affected by the entry into local markets of new financial institutions. We interpret this as evidence that local lenders were "forced" to cut lending standards when facing competition from new entrants, which as it appears often enjoyed lower costs of funding.

Recent work shows that house price appreciation (e.g., Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2007) and asset securitization (e.g., Keys et al., 2007; Mian and Sufi, 2007) helped fuel the subprime crisis. Therefore we control for these factors in our analysis and show that, while increased recourse to securitization and the housing boom contributed to the decline in denial rates, our main results on the relationship between lending standards and credit expansion are robust to these additional controls.

Our results are consistent with recent theories suggesting that strategic interaction among asymmetrically informed banks may lead banks to behave more aggressively and take on more risks during booms than in tranquil times (e.g., Ruckes, 2004, Dell'Araccia and Marquez, 2006, and Gorton and He, 2008).<sup>1</sup> The subprime mortgage market provides an almost ideal ground for testing such theories because it is a less developed credit market with significant informational asymmetries. Subprime borrowers are generally riskier, more heterogeneous, can post less collateral, and have shorter or worse credit histories (if any) than their prime counterparts. At the same time, the wealth of information available and the geographical variation (Figure 2) in this

---

<sup>1</sup> Our results are also consistent with, but not directly linked to, theoretical explanations for variations in credit standards focusing on the behavior of bank officers (Rajan, 1994, and Berger and Udell, 2004).

market allow us to control for several factors, such as changes in the pool of loan applicants, difficult to account for when analyzing aggregate credit growth.

The evidence in this paper has important policy implications in that it highlights the dangers to financial stability stemming from credit booms. In particular, the paper highlights that there is a credit quality element in lending cycles. It also sheds light on the origins of the current U.S. financial crisis by establishing a link between credit growth and lending standards in the subprime mortgage market, and by identifying changes in the structure of local credit markets as factors amplifying this decline in lending standards.

We obtain our results using an empirical model where, in addition to taking into account changes in economic fundamentals, we control for changes in the distribution of applicant borrowers and for the potential endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. Specifically, we develop a two-stage regression framework, explained in detail later on, that exploits individual loan application data to control for changes in the quality of the pool of loan applicants. We focus on loan applications rather than originations to reduce further the concern about simultaneity biases. For further robustness, we run an instrumental variable specification of our model, where we instrument the subprime applications variable with the number of applications in the prime market.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature. Section III provides a description of the data and introduces some stylized facts. Section IV describes our empirical methodology and central hypotheses. Section V presents the results. Section VI presents robustness tests of our main results. Section VII concludes.

## II. RELATED LITERATURE

Several studies examine the interaction between economic fluctuations and changes in bank credit (Bernanke and Lown, 1991, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Peek and Rosengren, 2000, Calomiris and Mason, 2003, and Matsuyama, 2007) and the link between financial development and economic volatility more generally (Raddatz, 2003, Kroszner et al., 2007, and Ranciere et al., 2008).<sup>2</sup> However, little evidence has been collected on how lending standards relate to credit booms. Asea and Blomberg (1998) find that loan collateralization increases during contractions and decreases during expansions, while Lown and Morgan (2003) show that lending standards are associated with innovations in credit. Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) find that during booms riskier borrowers obtain credit and collateral requirements decrease.

A few papers have examined the recent boom from a house-price perspective, while not strictly focusing on the subprime market (Himmelberg et al., 2005, and Case and Shiller, 2003). The literature on subprime mortgages has instead largely focused on issues of credit access and discrimination and on what determines access to subprime versus prime lenders. Our loan level analysis builds on a model from Munnell et al. (1996) who show that race has played an important, although diminishing, role in the decision to grant a mortgage. A few papers examine how local risk factors affect the fraction of the market that uses subprime lending (Pennington-Cross, 2002). Other studies focus on how borrowers choose a mortgage and on their decision to prepay or default on a loan (Campbell and Cocco, 2003, and Cutts and Van Order, 2005).

A few recent papers focus on how securitization affects the supply of loans (Loutskina and Strahan, 2007) and mortgage delinquencies. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2007) find that delinquency and foreclosure rates of subprime borrowers are to a large extent determined by high

---

<sup>2</sup> See Levine (2005) for a review of this literature.

loan-to-value ratios. Mian and Sufi (2007) link the increase in delinquency rates to a disintermediation-driven increase in loan originations, while Keys et al. (2007) find that loans that are easier to securitize default more frequently. While we control for the effect of mortgage securitization, our focus is on the link between credit expansion and lending standards.

### **III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS**

We combine data from several sources. Our main set of data consists of economic and demographic information on applications for mortgage loans. We use additional information on local and national economic environment and on home equity loan market conditions to construct our final data set.

The individual loan application data come from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Loan Application Registry. Relative to other sources, including LoanPerformance and the Federal Reserve Bank's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, this dataset has the important advantage of covering extensive time-series data on both the prime and subprime mortgage markets. The availability of data on the prime mortgage market provides us with a control group generally unavailable to studies focusing on aggregate credit or securitized pools of subprime loans. By comparing prime and subprime mortgage lenders we are also able to identify differences between the two lending markets. Given the different risk profiles of the prime and subprime markets, we include variables that proxy for the risk characteristics of a loan application to enhance comparability of the results across the two markets.

Enacted by Congress in 1975, HMDA requires most mortgage lenders located in metropolitan areas to collect data about their housing-related lending activity and make the data



publicly available.<sup>3</sup> The HMDA data covers a broad set of depository and nondepository financial institutions. Whether an institution is covered depends on its size, the extent of its activity in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and the weight of residential mortgage lending in its portfolio.<sup>4</sup> Comparisons of the total amount of loan originations in the HMDA and industry sources indicate that around 90 percent of the mortgage lending activity is covered by the loan application registry (Table 1).

Our coverage of HMDA data starts from 2000 and ends in 2006. This roughly corresponds to the picking up of both the housing boom and the rapid subprime mortgage market expansion (Figure 3). HMDA data does not include a field that identifies whether an individual loan application is a subprime loan application. In order to distinguish between the subprime and prime loans, we use the subprime lenders list as compiled by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) each year. HUD has annually identified a list of lenders who specialize in either subprime or manufactured home lending since 1993. HUD uses a number of HMDA indicators, such as origination rates, share of refinance loans, and proportion of loans sold to government-sponsored housing enterprises, to identify potential subprime lenders.

Since 2004, lenders are required to identify loans for manufactured housing and loans in which the annual percentage rate (APR) on the loan exceeds the rate on the Treasury security of

---

<sup>3</sup> The purpose of the Act was two-fold: enhance enforcement of anti-discriminatory lending laws and disseminate information to guide investments in housing.

<sup>4</sup> Any depository institution with a home office or branch in an MSA must report HMDA data if it has made a home purchase loan on a one-to-four unit dwelling or has refinanced a home purchase loan and if it has assets above an annually adjusted threshold. Any nondepository institution with at least ten percent of its loan portfolio composed of home purchase loans must also report HMDA data if it has assets exceeding \$10 million. Under these criteria, small lenders and lenders with offices only in non-metropolitan areas are exempt from HMDA data reporting requirements. Therefore, information for rural areas tend to be incomplete. Yet, U.S. Census figures show that about 83 percent of the population lived in metropolitan areas over our sample period, and hence, the bulk of residential mortgage lending activity is likely to be reported under the HMDA.

comparable maturity by at least three (five, for second-lien loans) percentage points and report this information under HMDA. The rate spread can be used as an alternative indicator (to the HUD list) to classify subprime loans. For the years with available data, the ranking of subprime lenders using the rate spread variable alone coincides closely with the ranking in the HUD list.<sup>5</sup> The HUD list of subprime lenders is also preferable to the rate spread information for a number of reasons. First, rate spreads are not available prior to 2004. Second, subprime loans do not necessarily have APRs that are three (or five) percentage points above a comparable Treasury rate but may reflect fees and yield spread premiums or other borrower characteristics determined by the lender. Third, and most importantly, the rate spread in HMDA is available only for originated loans, making it impossible to calculate denial rates for prime and subprime applications separately.

We remove some observations with missing HMDA data from the sample and also focus on the subset of loans that are either approved or denied. First, we drop applications with loan amounts smaller than \$1,000 because loan values are expressed in units of thousands of dollars and rounded up to the nearest number. Second, applicant income is left-censored at a value of \$10,000. We therefore eliminate applicants with missing applicant income or applicant income of exactly \$10,000. Third, we drop loans for multi-family purpose from the sample, as this is a distinct market from the overall mortgage market for single family homes. Fourth, we drop federally insured loans as their risk profile is likely to differ from that of other loans. Finally, and importantly, we eliminate all application records that did not end in one of the following three actions: (i) loan originated, (ii) application approved but loan not originated, or (iii) application denied. Other actions represent dubious statuses (e.g. application withdrawn by applicant) or

---

<sup>5</sup> The correlation is around 0.8.

loans purchased by other financial institutions. Including purchased loans would amount to double-counting as these loans are reported both by the originating institution and the purchasing institution.

We supplement the HMDA information with MSA-level data on economic and social indicators published by federal agencies, including annual data on macroeconomic variables, such as personal income, labor and capital remuneration, self-employment, and population from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), data on unemployment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), data on total population from the Census Bureau, data on the number and income of domestic immigrants moving from one MSA to another from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and data on house price appreciation in a given MSA (based on a quarterly housing price index) from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). We also obtain data on “seriously delinquent” subprime loans, defined as subprime loans with 60 or more days delay in payment, from LoanPerformance, a private data company. Data on these delinquency rates are available only for 2004 onwards.

Over the last decade, subprime mortgage lending has expanded rapidly both in terms of the number of loans originated and the average loan amount. Subprime mortgage originations almost tripled since 2000, reaching \$600 billion in 2006. Against an also fast growing market for prime mortgages, this boom brought the share of subprime lending from 9 percent in 2000 to 20 percent of all mortgage originations in 2006. Average loan amount also grew reaching \$132,784 in 2006 or 90 percent of the prime mortgage average amount. In absolute terms, the subprime market reached a size of about \$1.3 trillion in 2006.

A first look at our data suggests that rapid growth in subprime loan volume was associated with a decrease in denial rates on subprime loan applications and an increase in the

loan-to-income ratio on the loans originated by subprime lenders (Figure 4). These casual observations lend some support to the view that rapid credit growth episodes tend to be associated with a decline in lending standards. In the next sections, we explore these relations in a more formal setting.

Table 2 presents the name and definitions of the variables we use and the data sources. Table 3 presents the sample period summary statistics of these variables at the loan application and MSA levels. The data cover a total of 387 MSAs for a period of 7 years (2000 to 2006), amounting to a total of 2,709 observations.<sup>6</sup> For the entrant and incumbent variables, summary statistics are based on data for the period 2001 onwards only, as entry data is missing for the first year of the sample period. The summary statistics show that about one in five loan applications is denied, while about one-fourth of all loans are extended by subprime lenders. As expected, the denial rate of subprime lenders is much higher (about 2.5 times) than the denial rate of prime lenders.

#### IV. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

We rely on two main indicators of lending standards: the application denial rate and the loan to income ratio. We focus primarily on regressions at the MSA level. We control for changes in the economic environment in the MSA by including variables that have been shown to be good predictors of loan denial decisions at the individual level (see Munnell et al., 1996), such as average income, income growth, the unemployment rate, and the self-employment rate. We include a measure of house price appreciation to take into account the role of collateral. The

---

<sup>6</sup> In 2003, the US Office of Management and Budget introduced a new classification of MSAs. We use the 2003 classification of MSAs throughout the sample period to map individual loans to MSAs. Where necessary, the boundaries of the MSAs were changed to reflect this new definition.

number of competing lenders is a proxy for the competitive conditions in the MSA. Finally, we include the number of loan applications as a measure of credit expansion. We find this variable preferable to the number of loans originated or the growth in credit volume as it is arguably less endogenous to the dependent variable (i.e., denial rates). Endogeneity may remain a concern to the extent that potential borrowers might be deterred from applying for a loan if denial rates are generally high in their area. For this reason, we also estimate an instrumental variable specification of the model (details later on). In addition, we control for time-invariant MSA specific factors and for time-variant nationwide factors by including MSA and time fixed effects.

We estimate the following linear regression model:

$$DR_{it} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 HPAPP_{it-1} + \beta_2 AVGINC_{it} + \beta_3 INCGROW_{it} + \beta_4 UNEMP_{it} + \beta_5 SELFEMP_{it} + \beta_6 POP_{it} + \beta_7 COMP_{it} + \beta_8 APPL_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (\text{Eq. 1})$$

where  $DR_{it}$  is the average denial rate of mortgage loan applications for home purchase and refinance purposes in MSA  $i$  in year  $t$ .<sup>7</sup> It is computed as the number of loan applications denied divided by the total number of all loan applications in a given MSA using loan-level data at individual banks, and hence, takes on values between 0 and 1.<sup>8</sup> All explanatory variables are also measured at the MSA level.  $AVGINC$  denotes average income,  $INCGROW$  is income growth,  $UNEMP$  is unemployment rate,  $SELFEMP$  is self-employment rate,  $POP$  is the log of total population,  $COMP$  is the number of competing lending institutions,  $HPAPP$  is the annual change in house price appreciation, and  $APPL$  is the log of the number of loan applications. The error

---

<sup>7</sup> Main results are unaltered when we exclude loans for refinance purposes.

<sup>8</sup> We estimate regression equation 1 using ordinary least squares as well as using truncated regression methods. The results remain the same.

term  $\varepsilon_{it}$  has the standard properties. MSA and time fixed effects control for time-constant regional idiosyncrasies and nationwide changes in economic conditions.

Our main variable of interest is the log of the number of loan applications (*APPL*), our proxy for credit expansion. Our working assumption is that if banks did not change their lending standards during the credit boom, the variable measuring credit expansion should not be statistically significant after controlling for the other factors affecting the banks' decision to lend or not. If instead banks lent more leniently in regions and times of fast credit expansion, we should find a negative and significant coefficient for this variable.

Theoretical work by Ruckes (2004) and Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2006) suggest that variations in the distribution of borrowers arising from changes in credit demand can affect the standards that banks apply in lending. The reason is that informational asymmetries both across banks and between banks and borrowers generate adverse selection problems that constitute the main incentives for banks to screen loan applicants. The link between credit expansion and lending standards depends on the impact of changes in the distribution of borrowers on the profitability for banks to screen out bad borrowers. In Ruckes (2004), lending standards change in response to variations in the quality of borrowers over the cycle. Prospects of businesses improve during the upswing of a business cycle, resulting in credit expansion and a reduction in lending standards. In Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2006), each bank has private information about the creditworthiness of a different subset of borrowers. This generates an adverse selection problem when banks compete with each other. When the market expands and the proportion of new borrowers increases, the distribution of applicants each bank faces improves, and banks find it profitable not to screen out bad borrowers and grant credit to all borrowers indiscriminately. While this equilibrium of reduced lending standards is efficient (i.e., maximizes aggregate

surplus for banks and borrowers), the reduction in screening results in a banking system with a deteriorated loan portfolio, enhancing the probability of financial instability with potentially negative welfare consequences. Reductions in lending standards are thus not necessarily beneficial for society as a whole.

Our first control variable is house price appreciation. This variable is computed over the same period as the denial rates, although the results are not sensitive to using one-period lagged changes in house price appreciation. We expect this variable to have a negative coefficient. Price increases raise the net worth of borrowers, reducing their default risk. At the same time, lenders may gamble on a continued housing boom to evergreen potentially defaulting borrowers.

The next five variables control for the general economic and demographic conditions in the MSA. We expect areas with higher per capita income and income growth to have lower denial rates; areas with higher unemployment rates and larger proportions of self-employed people, whose income tends to be more volatile, to have higher denial rates; and areas with larger populations, proxying for market size, to have lower denial rates.

Finally, the number of competing lenders in the MSA (*COMP*) is meant to capture the effects of competition on lending standards. Since theory does not deliver unambiguous predictions of the number of competing lenders on lending standards<sup>9</sup>, we do not have a strong prior on the sign of this coefficient. Theoretical models focusing on adverse selection (e.g., Broecker, 1990, and Riordan, 1993) predict that an increase in the number of competing lenders in a market may have the perverse effect of increasing lending interest rates and tighten banks' lending standards. However, when local borrowers have an informational advantage, the threat

---

<sup>9</sup> See Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) for a discussion of this issue.

of new entry may also induce incumbents to cut standards and trade loan quality for market shares.

In an extension of our main specification, we test for these effects by focusing on the behavior of incumbent lenders when new lenders entered local markets. To that purpose we augment the model in equation (1) with a variable measuring the market share of new entrants. We compute the market share in terms of number of loan applications, not originations, to limit concerns about endogeneity. We expect the coefficient on the entrants variable to be negative since we already control for the adverse selection effect by including the number of competing lenders in the region.

For robustness purposes, we construct an alternative denial rate-based measure of lending standards. We borrow and augment the empirical model presented in Munnell et al. (1996) to estimate bank's loan approval decision with individual application data, though we do not have all variables they consider. Specifically, we do not have data on borrower credit scores. We augment their specification by including several new variables, including whether or not the loan is being used for refinancing purposes and whether or not the household income of the loan applicant is below the poverty line (as applicable in the year of loan application). We expect the latter to be particularly important in the case of subprime loans because applicants for subprime loans tend to have low income. We estimate the following logit specification at the loan application level for the year 2000:

$$D_{jk} = \alpha_k + \gamma_1 INC_j + \gamma_2 LIR_j + \gamma_3 POV_j + \gamma_4 REFIN_j + \gamma_5 OCC_j + \gamma_6 F_j + \gamma_7 B_j + \gamma_8 W_j + \varepsilon_{jk}, \quad (\text{Eq. 2})$$

where  $j$  denotes loan application  $j$ ,  $k$  denotes lender  $k$ ,  $\alpha_k$  denotes lender-specific fixed effects, and  $D_{jk}$  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if lender  $k$  denied loan application  $j$  in year



2000, and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables are measured at the loan application level. *INC* is applicant income, *LIR* is the loan-to-income ratio, *POV* is a dummy variable denoting whether or not the applicant income is below the poverty line for a family of four, *REFIN* is a dummy variable denoting whether or not the purpose of the loan is to refinance an existing loan, *OCC* is a dummy variable denoting whether or not the property financed by the loan is intended for owner occupancy, *F* is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the applicant is female, *B* is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the applicant is black, and *W* is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the applicant is white (the default option being of Hispanic origin).

Next, we use the estimated coefficients of equation (2) to forecast the denial rate for mortgage applications in subsequent years, and aggregate the residuals of this regression at the MSA level. Finally, we use this constructed measure of prediction errors as the dependent variable for our main model. The advantage of this two-stage regression approach over using simple, unadjusted denial rates is that it takes into account changes in the pool of applicant borrowers that are difficult to control for at the MSA level.

As an alternative measure of lending standards, we consider the average loan-to-income ratio in the MSA. Other things equal, an increase in this ratio would signal a looser attitude in banks' decisions to grant loans. We estimate the following regression model:

$$LIR_{it} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 HPAPP_{it-1} + \beta_2 AVGINC_{it} + \beta_3 INCGROW_{it} + \beta_4 UNEMP_{it} + \beta_5 SELFEMP_{it} + \beta_6 POP_{it} + \beta_7 COMP_{it} + \beta_8 APPL_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (\text{Eq. 3})$$

where the set of explanatory variables is the same as in equation 1.

## V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

We find robust evidence that lending standards eased in the subprime mortgage industry during the fast expansion of the past few years. After controlling for economic fundamentals, lenders appear to have denied fewer loan applications and to have approved larger loans. Results for the denial rate regression, controlling for MSA fixed effects, are in Table 4. Column (1) reports results for all lenders, while columns (2) and (3) report results separately for either only prime lenders or subprime lenders (where subprime lenders are defined according to the annual list compiled by the HUD). This sample breakdown between prime and subprime lenders allows us to identify different characteristics of the two lending markets, including differences in the evolution of lending standards.

Most coefficients have the expected sign. Starting from our main variable of interest, in the subprime mortgage market, the denial rate was negatively and significantly associated with the number of loan applications in the MSA. Given that we are including MSA fixed effects and thus effectively estimating regressions in first differences, this result suggests that the lending boom (as captured by changes in the number of applications) was associated with a reduction in lending standards (as captured by changes in denial rates). In the prime market, however, denial rates are positively and significantly associated with the number of applications, consistent with the notion that the lending standards in the prime market were tightened as applications grew. This suggests different credit boom dynamics in these two markets. In the subprime market, the decline in standards associated with the rise in the number of applications is consistent with theories of intermediation where asymmetric information among lenders plays an important role. In the prime market, the publicly available credit history of borrowers makes these frictions less likely to be relevant, and the tightening of standards in reaction to a growing number of

applications may reflect an expected deterioration in the quality of the pool of applicants. Indeed, the coefficient for the prime market loses significance when we control for changes in the characteristics of the applicant pool (see below).

Turning to the other coefficients, in both markets a faster rate of house price appreciation was associated with lower denial rates. This reflects the positive effect of higher borrower net worth on creditworthiness but, as discussed before, may also be consistent with lenders gambling to some extent on speculative borrowers. Notably, this effect was much more pronounced in the subprime relative to the prime mortgage market where both these factors are likely to be more relevant. Denial rates in both markets are also lower in MSAs where applicants tend to have higher income. In the subprime mortgage market, denial rates were lower in more competitive markets as measured by the number of competitors in the MSA. This coefficient was, instead, not statistically significant for the prime market. The rest of the control variables have the expected sign, but are generally not significant.

The greater effect of the credit boom, house appreciation, and bank lender competition on denial rates in the subprime market relative to its prime counterpart suggests that the decrease in lending standards was associated with different forces in these two markets. In the subprime market, the evidence is consistent with a decline in standards linked to lenders' strategic interaction under asymmetric information and speculative behavior. In contrast, for the prime market, it is more difficult to reject the hypothesis of a fundamental-driven decline in lending standards. This is consistent with our prior that, relative to fundamentals, the deterioration in lending standards was more pronounced in the subprime mortgage market where the class of borrowers tends to be riskier than in the prime market.

A comparison of year effects across the different specifications shows that denial rates decreased until the end of 2003 and then increased from 2004 onwards, though only in the prime mortgage market. In the subprime mortgage market, after controlling for other factors, denial rates did not vary much over the period 2002 to 2006. Following several years of low interest rates, Federal Reserve started tightening monetary policy in mid-2004 by increasing interest rates. While denial rates in the prime mortgage market closely mimic the evolution of interest rates, with denial rates increasing sharply in 2005 compared to 2004, this is not the case for the subprime market, where denial rates do not increase in 2005 compared to 2004 (although they do increase somewhat in 2006). This suggests that, while in the prime market monetary policy changes reflected quickly in the denial rate likely through their effect on loan affordability,<sup>10</sup> this did not happen for subprime mortgages. Indeed, a regression specification replacing the year fixed effects with the Federal Fund rate returned a positive coefficient for the prime market, but not for the subprime market (not reported).<sup>11</sup>

The economic effect of our main findings is substantial. From regression (3) in Table 4, it follows that changes in the number of loan applications (a proxy for credit expansion) have a particularly strong effect on denial rates in the subprime market. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the log of the number of applications reduces MSA-level denial rates of subprime lenders by 4 percentage points, which is substantial compared to a standard deviation of subprime denial rates of 8 percentage points. The effect of applications on denial rates is

---

<sup>10</sup> This is also consistent with the idea of a negative relationship between bank risk-taking and the monetary policy rate. This hypothesis is explored at length, though in a different context, in Jimenez et al. (2007).

<sup>11</sup> One explanation for this result relies on the fact that prime mortgages are mostly fixed-rate and are by definition underwritten for the fully-indexed cost while subprime mortgages are mostly adjustable-rate loans with low teaser rates.

significantly more negative in the subprime market than in the prime market. In fact, the effect is positive and significant in the prime market. A one standard deviation increase in the number of competitors reduces MSA-level subprime denial rates by 3 percentage points, slightly smaller than the effect of applications though still substantial. For the prime market, we obtain no significant relationship between denial rates and the number of competitors. Finally, a comparison of coefficients across regressions (2) and (3) shows that a one standard deviation increase in house price appreciation reduces MSA-level denial rates by 2 percentage points in the subprime market compared to only 1 percentage point in the prime market (compared to a standard deviation of denial rates of about 7 percent in both markets).

## **VI. ROBUSTNESS**

### **A. Changes in the Pool of Applicant Borrowers**

Changes in the pool of applicant borrowers not captured by aggregate controls could partly explain our findings on the association between the number of applications and denial rates. The results, however, are broadly the same when, following the two-step approach described above, we control for changes in the underlying borrower population using data on individual borrower characteristics.

To this end, we first identify in Table 5 (Panel A) which characteristics are likely to explain the decision on a loan application. We follow earlier studies on mortgage lending to form a list of variables that would account for the economic factors that might shape the financial institution's decision.<sup>12</sup> These regressions are based on a sample of close to 5 million loan applications in 2000, and include lender-specific fixed effects. The regression coefficients

---

<sup>12</sup> See Munnell et al. (1996) and references therein.

presented are odds ratios, hence a coefficient greater than one indicates that the application is more likely to be denied for higher values of the independent variable.

We find that loan applications are more likely denied if borrowers have low income, though this effect is only significant in the prime mortgage market. Applications with higher loan-to-income ratios, denoting riskier loans, are more likely denied in the subprime mortgage market, as expected, though we find the opposite effect in the prime mortgage market. Taken together, these results indicate that applicant income affects lending decisions in a nonlinear fashion, and differently in prime and subprime markets. This is in part because applicants with higher incomes, who primarily apply for prime loans, also tend to apply for larger loans. Loan applications are also more likely denied for male applicants in the subprime market and for female applicants in the prime market, while applications of African-American descent are more likely denied in both markets (as compared to white applicants or applicants of Hispanic descent). White applicants also appear to be less likely denied a mortgage in the prime market. Finally, loan applications for refinancing purposes are more likely denied, while owner occupation does not significantly affect the loan denial decision.

Next, we estimate the regression model with the MSA-level aggregated prediction errors from the model estimated in Panel A of Table 5 as the dependent variable. The results of these regressions (all of which include MSA fixed effects) are reported in Panel B of Table 5. These results, where we abstract from certain borrower characteristics that determine a lender's decision on a loan application, are broadly consistent with the findings in Table 4. Again, we find that denial rates in both prime and subprime markets tend to deteriorate more in areas with a stronger acceleration in house price appreciation. Subprime denial rates also respond negatively to an increase in competition, as measured by an increase in the log of the number of

competitors, and to an increase in the number of loan applications, capturing the expansion of the credit market. A t-test of coefficient differences indicates that the coefficient for subprime lenders is statistically significantly different from the one for prime lenders.

### **B. Size Effects**

The relationship between lending standards and credit expansion appears to depend on the size of the market as well as the size of the boom itself. Table 6 shows that the coefficient of log number of applications is larger and more significant when our baseline specification is estimated on subsamples of MSAs with the number of applications above the median and the growth rate of applications above the median. Furthermore, the relationship is not significant in markets that experienced negative application growth (Table 6, column 3).

Additionally, we confirm that the relationship between the growth in the number of applications and standards was stronger in relatively large markets in a specification interacting our growth variable with the log of the MSA population, using the log of MSA population as an alternative proxy for market size (not reported). While the linear coefficient for the growth variable is positive and significant, the overall relationship is negative for essentially all markets and becomes significant for markets above the 25th percentile of the population distribution.

These results indicate that the link between credit expansion and lending standards is most pronounced in relatively large markets and in markets that experience rapid credit growth.

### **C. Effects of Entry and Changes in Market Structure**

As the subprime mortgage market expanded, its market structure changed and experienced entry by new players, including large financial institutions that had previously not been active in this market. We further refine our analysis by assessing the impact on denial rates of credit expansion by new entrants.

In Table 7 we report the results of our analysis of the effects of entry by new players on incumbent lending standards. Consistent with asymmetric information theories of competition in credit markets implying that an increase in the number of competing institutions increases adverse selection (Broecker, 1990, and Riordan, 1993), we find that an increase in the number of entrants (i.e., competing institutions) increases the denial rates of incumbent institutions in the overall mortgage market (column 1). In this regression, we use the market share of entrants, computed as the sum of each entrant's share in total loan applications, rather than the simple number of entrants, to control for the size of each entrant and capture overall market power of entrants.

The evolution of denial rates in the subprime mortgage market, in contrast, supports the notion of incumbents cutting their lending standards in reaction to the entry of new competitors (column 3). As the industry expanded and more subprime lenders entered specific metropolitan areas, denial rates by incumbent lenders went down. We take this as direct evidence of a reduction in lending standards in this market. We find a similar, though much less pronounced, effect in the prime market (column 2). The finding also supports the view that relatively smaller local lenders were “forced” to cut lending standards to remain competitive against national institutions that entered their markets with lower costs of funding. On average, entrants appear to have had a statistically significant advantage on this front. Total interest expense divided by total liabilities, a proxy for cost of funding, was 2.7 percent for entrants as opposed to 2.9 percent for incumbents (the difference being larger in MSAs that experienced larger growth rates in loan applications).<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> These calculations are based on a dataset that combines reports of condition and income (so-called Call Reports) from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago with the information provided in HMDA.



Denial rates of incumbent institutions are unlikely to affect the entry of new lenders to the extent that they reflect underlying applicant fundamentals. Thus, by focusing on the effect of new entrants on the denial rates of incumbent lenders we are able to assess the independent effect of market entry (and expansion) on incumbent lending standards. That said, high denial rates could conceivably attract entry if they reflect collusion among incumbent lenders rather than the underlying fundamentals in the MSA. However, a close-to-zero correlation between the incumbent denial rate level (lagged) and our entry variable suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. The evidence in this section suggests that, as for small business lending (see Petersen and Rajan, 2002), information technology may have reduced but has not eliminated the importance of geography in the mortgage market.

#### **D. Identification Issues**

One should be careful in interpreting the estimated coefficients as causal relationships. As proxy for credit market expansion, the loan application series has arguably a smaller endogenous component than the loan origination series. That said, at least in theory, there remains some potential for reverse causality to the extent that potential borrowers may be deterred from applying for a loan if denial rates are generally high in their locale.

While our focus on total applications (rather than applications in the subprime market only) partly assuages the potential for an endogeneity bias, for further robustness we estimate an instrumental variable (IV) specification of our model. In this particular specification, we use the log of applications in the subprime market as our main regressor, but we instrument it with a variable constructed using immigration data.<sup>14</sup> To be more specific, we use tax records from the

---

<sup>14</sup> In another specification not reported here, we instrument the log of applications in the subprime market with the log of the number of prime applications. These two series are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is over 0.8), while, at least in theory, there should not be a direct negative link between the denial rate in the subprime

(continued)

IRS to determine the number of new residents in an MSA and the total income reported by these new residents. Then, we construct the instrumental variable as the log of the number of immigrants to the MSA divided by the average income level of the immigrants. The idea is that residents that are new to an area tend to be the ones applying for a mortgage loan yet their tendency to apply for a subprime loan is lower the richer they are. At the same time, it is very unlikely that immigrants' choice of new residence depends on the lending standards in that area, implying that this should be a valid instrument for applications in the subprime market. For comparison purposes, we also include the OLS regression of the specification that includes the number of applications in the subprime market.

These OLS and IV results are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8. The IV estimates broadly confirm our earlier results, suggesting that our findings are not the product of an endogeneity bias. The F-test of excluded instruments supports the choice of our instrument. The evidence supports the notion of a negative causal link between an increase in the number of applications and denial rates in the subprime market.

Similarly, house price changes may be affected by lending standards to the extent that a decline in standards and an increase in the local supply of mortgages leads to an increase in demand for housing. To address this concern, we consider a specification where we lag the house price variable one period. The results, presented in column (3) of Table 6, confirm our earlier findings that denial rates are negatively affected by (lagged) house price appreciation.

---

market and the number of applications in the prime market. If anything, this relationship should be positive, as higher denial rates in the subprime market would make the prime market more attractive. Indeed, the correlation between the denial rates in the subprime and prime markets in our sample is only about 0.1, suggesting that denial rates in both markets are largely independent from one another. This specification also delivers similar results.

However, some concern about endogeneity between denial rates and house price appreciation remains since it is conceivable that the expectation of a decline in standards, and hence, of an increase in the supply of mortgage liquidity, may trigger speculative pressures on the housing market. To address such concern we need an instrumental variable for house price appreciation. We obtain this instrumental variable from the work by Crowe (2008), who finds that in MSAs with a larger portion of the population belonging to Evangelical churches house prices tend to rise disproportionately faster when the “Rapture Index” rises.<sup>15</sup> This index maps current events into a subjective probability of an imminent coming of a time of “extreme and terrible” events and as such is independent from denial rates at the MSA level. We can then use the interaction term of the share of Evangelicals in the MSA population and change in the Rapture Index as an instrument for house price appreciation. The results of this exercise are reported in column (4) of Table 6 and confirm our original estimates.

#### **E. Alternative Proxies for Credit Expansion and Lending Standards**

We now turn to alternative proxies for credit expansion and lending standards. First, we estimate our baseline model using the number of originated loans and the total loan volume as alternative measures of credit market expansion, obtaining similar results (Table 8, columns 5 and 6).

Next, we turn regressions with the loan-to-income (LTI) ratio as dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, LTI ratios can be regarded as an alternative proxy for lending standards. We run separate regressions for average MSA-level LTI ratios in the prime market and the subprime market but only report results for the subprime market (Table 8, column 7). We find that higher average LTI ratios are associated with lower unemployment rates and are more common in high income areas and where there is a larger percentage of the population that is self employed.

---

<sup>15</sup> The Rapture Index is available at <http://www.raptureready.com/rap2.html>

Turning to our variables of interest, the results indicate that LTI ratios grow with the number of loan applications, particularly in the subprime market, confirming the link between credit expansion and lending standards. The effect of competition is also confirmed with higher LTI ratios in MSAs with larger number of competing lenders. The house price appreciation variable enters only significantly in the subprime market regression, suggesting that LTI ratios in the prime market are not much affected by house price appreciation. In the subprime market, LTI ratios are strongly positively associated with house price appreciation.

#### **F. Asset Securitization**

The increased ability of financial institutions to securitize mortgages over the past decade may have contributed to both the expansion of the mortgage market and the documented decline in denial rates. We want to make sure that our main results are not driven by asset securitization, which has been the focus of studies by Mian and Sufi (2007) and Keys et al. (2007). In Table 8, column 8, we explore how the increasing recourse to securitization of mortgages has affected denial rates in the subprime mortgage industry by augmenting our main specification with a variable measuring the percentage of loans in an MSA that are sold within a year from origination. For each originated loan in the HMDA database, the variable “Purchaser type” denotes whether the loan was kept on the books of the originating institution or sold through a private sale to another financial institution. We use this information to compute the share of loans sold within a year from origination and use this as a proxy for the ability to securitize loans in a given MSA. Given that the share of sold loans changes dramatically over the period, we allow this coefficient to be different for the 2000-2003 and the 2004-2006 periods.

The results indicate that denial rates were lower in MSAs where a greater proportion of originated loans were sold within one year from origination, consistent with findings by Mian

and Sufi (2007) and Keys et al. (2007). This effect was more pronounced during the second part of the sample period, when securitization of subprime loans increased dramatically.

## VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper provides robust evidence that the recent rapid credit expansion in the subprime mortgage market was associated with easing credit standards. We link the change in lending standards to two main factors. First, we find evidence that standards declined more where the credit boom was larger. This lends support to the assertions that rapid credit growth episodes tend to breed lax lending behavior. Second, we find that competition played a role. Lending standards declined more in regions where a large number of previously absent institutions entered the market. We establish the latter result using variables that capture the effect of new entrants on the denial rates of incumbent lenders. This approach allows us to assess the independent effect of changes in local market structure on lending standards.

We further present evidence consistent with existing work that disintermediation played a role in altering the supply of credit, with denial rates declining more in regions where larger portions of the lenders' loan portfolios were sold to third players. Finally, lower denial rates were associated with rapid house price appreciation, consistent with the notion that lenders relaxed credit conditions on the ground of expected gains in the value of housing collateral.

Our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including controlling for economic fundamentals using out-of-sample data and using alternative measures of lending standards. The results are also robust to using instrumental variables to identify the independent effect of the number of applications and changes in house prices on loan denial rates. This mitigates concerns that our results are confounded by endogeneity between loan denial rates and

the volume of loan applications. Finally, the effects we identify for the subprime market are either much weaker or absent in the prime mortgage market, lending additional support that the deterioration in lending standards was more pronounced in the subprime mortgage market. Our evidence suggests that while in the prime market lending standards were largely determined by underlying fundamentals, for subprime loans lending market conditions and strategic interactions played an important role in lending decisions.

From a policy perspective, our results are relevant for the ongoing debate on the procyclicality of bank regulation and its impact on bank risk-taking (e.g., Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2008, and Adrian and Shin, 2008). To the extent that during booms standards decline more than justified by economic fundamentals, our findings are consistent with the view that bankers have “an unfortunate tendency” to lend too aggressively at the peak of a cycle.<sup>16</sup> That said, credit booms may still be beneficial. While, in light of the recent financial turmoil, it is easy to argue that standards were excessively lax, it is much harder to assess the benefits associated with greater access to credit, and hence, the net welfare effect of the subprime expansion.

---

<sup>16</sup> Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in a speech delivered before the Independent Community Bankers of America on March 7, 2001. See also Bernanke (2007).

## References

- Adrian, Tobias, and Hyun Shin, 2008, "Liquidity and Leverage", *Journal of Financial Intermediation*, forthcoming.
- Asea, Patrick and Brock Blomberg, 1998, "Lending Cycles", *Journal of Econometrics* 83, 89-128.
- Berger, Allen and Gregory Udell, 2004, "The Institutional Memory Hypothesis and the Procyclicality of Bank Lending Behavior", *Journal of Financial Intermediation* 13, 458-495.
- Bernanke, Ben, 2007, "Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy," Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Economic Symposium.
- Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler, 1989, "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," *American Economic Review* 79(1), 14-31.
- Bernanke, Ben and Cara Lown, 1991, "The Credit Crunch," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2, 205-239.
- Broecker, Thorsten, 1990, "Credit Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition", *Econometrica* 58, 429-452.
- Caballero, Ricardo and Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2006, "Bubbles and Capital Flow Volatility: Causes and Risk Management", *Journal of Monetary Economics* 53, 35-53.
- Calomiris, Charles and Joseph Mason, 2003, "Consequences of Bank Distress during the Great Depression", *American Economic Review* 93(3), 937-947.
- Campbell, John Y. and Joao F. Cocco, 2003, "Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage Choice," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118(4), 1449-1494.
- Case, Karl, and Robert Shiller, 2003, "Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2, 299-342.
- Crowe, Christopher, 2008, "Asset Prices and Armageddon: Do Evangelicals' 'End Times' Beliefs Affect U.S. House Prices?" unpublished manuscript.
- Cutts, Amy Crews and Robert Van Order, 2005, "On the Economics of Subprime Lending," *Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics* 30(2), 167-196.
- Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni and Robert Marquez, 2006, "Lending Booms and Lending Standards", *Journal of Finance* 61(5), 2511-2546.

Demyanyk, Yuliya, and Otto Van Hemert, 2007, "Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, mimeo.

FitchRatings, 2007, "The Impact of Poor Underwriting Practices and Fraud in Subprime Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Performance," US Residential Mortgage Special Report, November 28, 2007.

Gorton, Gary and Ping He, 2008, "Bank Credit Cycles", *Review of Financial Studies*, forthcoming.

Himmelberg, Charles, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai, 2005, "Assessing High House Prices: Bubbles, Fundamentals, and Misperceptions", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, 67-92.

Jappelli, Tullio and Marco Pagano, 1993, "Information Sharing in Credit Markets", *Journal of Finance* 48(5), 1693-1718.

Jimenez, Gabriel, Vicente Salas, and Jesus Saurina, 2006, "Determinants of Collateral", *Journal of Financial Economics* 81(2), 255-281.

Jimenez, Gabriel, Steven Ongena, José Luis Peydró, and Jesús Saurina, 2007, "Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk?" Bank of Spain, unpublished manuscript.

Kashyap, Anil, Raghuram Rajan, and Jeremy Stein, 2008, "Rethinking Capital Regulation", mimeo, University of Chicago.

Keys, Benjamin, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig, 2007, "Securitization and Screening: Evidence from Subprime Mortgage Backed Securities", mimeo, London Business School.

Kiyotaki, Nobuhuro and John Moore, 1997, "Credit Cycles", *Journal of Political Economy* 105, 211-248.

Kroszner, Randall S., Luc Laeven, and Daniela Klingebiel, 2007, "Banking Crises, Financial Dependence, and Growth," *Journal of Financial Economics* 84, 187–228.

Levine, Ross, 2005, "Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence", In: Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf (Eds.), *Handbook of Economic Growth*, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science.

Lown, Cara, and Don Morgan, 2006, "The Credit Cycle and the Business Cycle: New Findings Using the Loan Officer Opinion Survey", *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking* 38, 1575-97.



- Loutskina, Elena and Philip Strahan, 2007, "Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Financial Condition on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations", *Journal of Finance*, forthcoming.
- Matsuyama, Kiminori, 2007, "Credit Traps and Credit Cycles," *American Economic Review* 97, 503-516.
- Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi, 2007, "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis," mimeo, University of Chicago.
- Munnell, Alicia, Geoffrey Tootell, Lynn Browne, and James McEneaney, 1996, "Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data," *American Economic Review* 86(1), 25-53.
- Peek, Joe and Eric Rosengren, 2000, "Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States," *American Economic Review* 90, 30-45.
- Pennington-Cross, Anthony, 2002, "Subprime Lending in the Primary and Secondary Markets," *Journal of Housing Research* 13, 31-50 .
- Petersen, Mitchell and Raghuram Rajan, 2002, "Does Distance Still Matter: The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending," *Journal of Finance* 57, 2533-2570.
- Raddatz, Claudio, 2006, "Liquidity Needs and Vulnerability to Financial Underdevelopment," *Journal of Financial Economics* 80(3), 677-722.
- Rajan, Raghuram, 1994, "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 109, 399-441.
- Ranciere, Romain, Aaron Tornell, and Frank Westermann, 2008, "Systemic Crises and Growth", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Forthcoming.
- Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff, 2008, "Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison", *American Economic Review*, forthcoming.
- Riordan, Michael, 1993, "Competition and Bank Performance: A Theoretical Perspective," In: C. Mayer and X. Vives (Eds.), *Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruckes, Martin, 2004, "Bank Competition and Credit Standards", *Review of Financial Studies* 17, 1073-1102.
- Sachs, Jeffrey, Aaron Tornell, and Andres Velasco, 1996, "Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995", *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1, 147-198.

Table 1. Coverage in HMDA

---

Total volume of originations (trillions of dollars)			
Year	HMDA database	Whole market	Coverage (percent)
2000	0.922	1.184	77.84
2001	1.854	2.080	89.14
2002	2.558	2.878	88.88
2003	3.338	3.810	87.60
2004	2.569	2.771	92.73
2005	2.888	3.031	95.28
2006	2.616	2.731	95.78

---

Table 2. Definitions and Sources of Variables

Name	Short name	Definition	Source
<u>Loan application level</u>			
Denied	<i>D</i>	Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan application is denied and 0 otherwise	HMDA
Subprime	<i>S</i>	Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the lender is in the HUD subprime lender list and 0 otherwise	HMDA
Loan amount	<i>AMT</i>	Principal amount of the loan or application (in thousands of dollars)	HMDA
Applicant income	<i>INC</i>	Total gross annual income the lender relied upon in making the credit decision (in thousands of dollars)	HMDA
Loan-to-income ratio	<i>LIR</i>	Ratio of loan amount to applicant income	HMDA
Poverty	<i>POV</i>	Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the applicant income is below the poverty line for a family of four as published by the Department of Health and Human Services and 0 otherwise	HMDA
Refinancing	<i>REFIN</i>	Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan purpose is refinancing an existing loan and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the loan purpose is new home purchase)	HMDA
Owner-occupied	<i>OCC</i>	Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the property is intended for owner occupancy and 0 otherwise	HMDA
Female	<i>F</i>	Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the applicant is female and 0 otherwise	HMDA
Black	<i>B</i>	Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the applicant is black and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the applicant is white or hispanic)	HMDA
White	<i>W</i>	Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the applicant is white and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the applicant is black or hispanic)	HMDA
<u>MSA level</u>			
Denial rate	<i>DR</i>	Number of denied loan applications divided by the total number of applications	HMDA
House price appreciation	<i>HPAPP</i>	Change in the house price index	OFHEO
Average income	<i>AVGINC</i>	Total MSA income divided by population	BEA
Income growth	<i>INCGROW</i>	Change in total MSA income	BEA
Unemployment rate	<i>UNEMP</i>	Number of unemployed as a percent of labor force	BLS
Self employment rate	<i>SELFEMP</i>	Number of self-employed (those whose primary source of income is profits from their unincorporated businesses) divided by the number of employed	BEA
Log population	<i>POP</i>	Population in MSA (in log)	Census Bureau
Log number of competitors	<i>COMP</i>	Number of institutions accepting applications and extending loans in the MSA	HMDA
Log number of applications	<i>APPL</i>	Number of loan applications in the MSA	HMDA
Loan-to-income ratio	<i>LIR</i>	Average loan-to-income ratio on the loans originated in the MSA	HMDA
Proportion of loans sold	<i>SEC</i>	Securitized loans as a percent of total originated loans	HMDA
Subprime delinquency rate	<i>DEL</i>	Subprime mortgages with 60 or more days of payment delay	LoanPerformance

Table 3. Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>Loan application level</u>					
Denied	72,119,135	0.19	0.39	0	1
Subprime	72,119,135	0.23	0.42	0	1
Loan amount (in thousands of dollars)	72,119,135	160.59	125.41	1	1800
Applicant income (in thousands of dollars)	72,119,135	82.16	50.32	16	363
Loan-to-income ratio	72,119,135	2.17	1.28	1	6
Poverty	72,119,135	0.00	0.02	0	1
Refinancing	72,119,135	0.60	0.49	0	1
Owner-occupied	72,119,135	0.92	0.28	0	1
Female	72,119,135	0.29	0.45	0	1
Black	72,119,135	0.10	0.29	0	1
White	72,119,135	0.73	0.45	0	1
<u>MSA level</u>					
Denial rate	2,709	0.25	0.07	0.07	0.55
Denial rate of prime lenders	2,709	0.18	0.07	0.04	0.52
Denial rate of subprime lenders	2,703	0.50	0.08	0.00	0.73
House price appreciation	2,651	0.07	0.06	-0.05	0.41
Average income (in thousands of dollars)	2,653	29.72	6.22	13.57	71.90
Income growth	2,653	0.05	0.03	-0.34	0.48
Unemployment rate (in %)	2,709	5.28	2.06	1.90	17.40
Self employment rate	2,653	0.17	0.03	0.07	0.31
Log population	2,653	12.77	1.23	10.87	16.75
Log number of competitors	2,709	5.42	0.50	1.95	6.62
Log number of applications	2,709	9.31	1.24	6.13	13.38
Loan-to-income ratio	2,709	1.88	0.37	1.05	3.40
Proportion of loans sold	2,709	0.46	0.10	0.00	0.78
Subprime delinquency rate (in %)	1,137	10.49	3.58	1.70	35.80
Denial rate of incumbents	2,316	0.25	0.07	0.07	0.52
Denial rate of prime lender incumbents	2,316	0.17	0.06	0.04	0.45
Denial rate of subprime lender incumbents	2,300	0.51	0.09	0.00	0.77
Denial rate of entrants	2,311	0.25	0.12	0.00	0.73
Denial rate of prime lender entrants	2,310	0.18	0.09	0.00	0.73
Denial rate of subprime lender entrants	2,299	0.47	0.17	0.00	1.00
Market share of entrants	2,316	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.98
Market share of prime lender entrants	2,316	0.05	0.06	0.00	0.99
Market share of subprime lender entrants	2,311	0.08	0.12	0.00	1.00

Table 4. Evolution of Denial Rates

Dependent variable: Denial rate	All lenders (1)	Prime lenders (2)	Subprime lenders (3)
House price appreciation	-0.234*** [0.014]	-0.150*** [0.016]	-0.308*** [0.025]
Average income	-0.002*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.001]	-0.004** [0.001]
Income growth	0.003 [0.037]	-0.021 [0.031]	0.1 [0.087]
Unemployment rate	0.003** [0.001]	0.002 [0.001]	0.003* [0.002]
Self employment rate	0.046 [0.075]	0.08 [0.083]	-0.311** [0.130]
Log population	-0.180*** [0.038]	-0.232*** [0.037]	-0.353*** [0.074]
Log number of competitors	0.018*** [0.006]	-0.003 [0.008]	-0.069*** [0.012]
Log number of applications	-0.017*** [0.005]	0.025*** [0.006]	-0.030*** [0.008]
Year = 2001	-0.052*** [0.004]	-0.086*** [0.004]	0.116*** [0.006]
Year = 2002	-0.075*** [0.005]	-0.112*** [0.006]	0.067*** [0.008]
Year = 2003	-0.070*** [0.007]	-0.135*** [0.008]	0.118*** [0.010]
Year = 2004	0.001 [0.006]	-0.085*** [0.007]	0.099*** [0.009]
Year = 2005	0.021*** [0.007]	-0.029*** [0.008]	0.098*** [0.011]
Year = 2006	0.021*** [0.008]	-0.007 [0.009]	0.114*** [0.012]
Constant	2.697*** [0.470]	3.065*** [0.465]	5.749*** [0.913]
Observations	2651	2651	2646
Number of MSAs	379	379	379
R-squared	0.69	0.71	0.44

Notes: Dependent variable in regression (1) is the MSA-level weighted-average denial rate of all mortgage lenders, weighted by the size of each institution in terms of number of loan applications received. Dependent variable in regression (2) is the weighted-average denial rate of prime mortgage lenders. Dependent variable in regression (3) is the weighted-average denial rate of subprime mortgage lenders. For detailed definitions of the independent variables, see Table 2. All regressions are OLS and include MSA fixed effects (not reported) and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. \* denotes significance at 10%; \*\* significance at 5%; \*\*\* significance at 1%.

Table 5. Changes in the Applicant Pool

Panel A. Determinants of Denial Decision			
	All lenders (1)	Prime lenders (2)	Subprime lenders (3)
Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if application is denied			
Applicant income	0.454*** [0.051]	0.387*** [0.056]	0.995 [0.058]
Loan-to-income ratio	0.922 [0.051]	0.813*** [0.049]	1.236*** [0.068]
Poverty	1.057 [0.060]	1.206*** [0.070]	0.948 [0.067]
Refinancing	1.573** [0.284]	1.213 [0.213]	1.514** [0.274]
Owner-occupied	1.089 [0.102]	1.074 [0.124]	0.986 [0.118]
Female	1.023 [0.021]	1.060*** [0.018]	0.897** [0.040]
Black	1.522*** [0.079]	1.526*** [0.085]	1.246*** [0.050]
White	0.704*** [0.033]	0.674*** [0.037]	0.953 [0.048]
Observations	5406178	4499811	906367
Number of lenders	7226	7041	185
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.07	0.02
Panel B. Prediction Errors			
	All lenders (1)	Prime lenders (2)	Subprime lenders (3)
Dependent variable: Prediction error			
House price appreciation	-0.178*** [0.012]	-0.104*** [0.013]	-0.281*** [0.028]
Average income	-0.004*** [0.001]	-0.005*** [0.001]	-0.003 [0.002]
Income growth	-0.015 [0.029]	0.007 [0.026]	-0.002 [0.077]
Unemployment rate	-0.001 [0.001]	-0.004*** [0.001]	0.003 [0.002]
Self employment rate	-0.120* [0.062]	-0.048 [0.062]	-0.414*** [0.140]
Log population	-0.183*** [0.032]	-0.166*** [0.030]	-0.335*** [0.084]
Log number of competitors	0.021*** [0.006]	0.008 [0.007]	-0.051*** [0.016]
Log number of applications	-0.019*** [0.004]	-0.002 [0.004]	-0.026** [0.010]
Constant	2.660*** [0.402]	2.355*** [0.379]	5.026*** [1.045]
Observations	2273	2273	2268
Number of MSAs	379	379	379
R-squared	0.90	0.87	0.42

Notes: Panel A displays the results of logit regressions using loan application-level data in 2000, where dependent variable is 1 if the loan application is denied and 0 if it is approved. The reported coefficients are odds ratios; hence, a coefficient greater than 1 indicates that the application is more likely to be denied for higher values of the independent variable. All regressions include lender fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors clustered by lender are in brackets. In Panel B, the dependent variable, prediction error, is calculated as the MSA-level average of the actual denial rate minus the MSA-level average of the denial rate predicted based on the logit regressions in Panel A. In each year, the coefficients obtained on the 2000 data are used to predict the probability of denial for a loan application. The average of these predicted values is the predicted denial rate. For detailed definitions of the independent variables, see Table 2. All regressions are OLS and include MSA fixed effects and year fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors are in brackets. \* denotes significance at 10%; \*\* significance at 5%; \*\*\* significance at 1%.

Table 6. Market and Boom Size

Dependent variable: Denial rate	Subprime lenders			
	All MSAs	Only MSAs with the number of applications exceeding the median	Only MSAs with both the number of applications and the growth in number of applications exceeding the median	Only MSAs with negative growth in number of applications
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
House price appreciation	-0.308*** [0.025]	-0.240*** [0.031]	-0.127* [0.073]	-0.303*** [0.049]
Average income	-0.004** [0.001]	-0.003 [0.002]	0.000 [0.003]	-0.001 [0.003]
Income growth	0.100 [0.087]	0.038 [0.124]	0.183* [0.110]	-0.065 [0.111]
Unemployment rate	0.003* [0.002]	0.006** [0.003]	0.012*** [0.004]	0.008** [0.004]
Self employment rate	-0.311** [0.130]	-0.109 [0.162]	0.051 [0.452]	-0.332* [0.178]
Log population	-0.353*** [0.074]	-0.170 [0.104]	-0.233* [0.131]	-0.257** [0.119]
Log number of competitors	-0.069*** [0.012]	-0.070*** [0.018]	-0.178*** [0.033]	-0.082*** [0.027]
Log number of applications	-0.030*** [0.008]	-0.067*** [0.012]	-0.061*** [0.019]	-0.017 [0.019]
Year = 2001	0.116*** [0.006]	0.120*** [0.010]	0.119*** [0.012]	0.039*** [0.013]
Year = 2002	0.067*** [0.008]	0.056*** [0.013]	0.061*** [0.018]	-0.005 [0.013]
Year = 2003	0.118*** [0.010]	0.116*** [0.016]	0.126*** [0.024]	0 [0.000]
Year = 2004	0.099*** [0.009]	0.083*** [0.014]	0.000 [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]
Year = 2005	0.098*** [0.011]	0.083*** [0.017]	0.094*** [0.030]	0.008 [0.011]
Year = 2006	0.114*** [0.012]	0.115*** [0.018]	0.159*** [0.040]	0.025* [0.014]
Constant	5.749*** [0.913]	3.898*** [1.346]	5.158*** [1.795]	4.430*** [1.430]
Observations	2646	1358	765	987
Number of MSAs	379	242	242	379
R-squared	0.44	0.53	0.63	0.52

Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is the MSA-level weighted-average denial rate of subprime mortgage lenders, weighted by the size of each institution in terms of number of loan applications received. Regression (1) is the same as the one in Table 4, column 3, reproduced here for easy comparison. Regression (2) uses only the observations where the number of applications in the MSA exceed the sample median of 11,000. Regression (3) uses only the observations where both the number of applications and the growth in number of applications exceed the sample medians (11,000 and 13 percent for MSAs with number of applications above median, respectively). For detailed definitions of the independent variables, see Table 2. All regressions are OLS and include MSA fixed effects (not reported) and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. \* denotes significance at 10%; \*\* significance at 5%; \*\*\* significance at 1%.

Table 7. Market Entry and Denial Rates of Incumbents in Prime and Subprime Markets

	All entrants (1)	Prime entrants (2)	Subprime entrants (3)
House price appreciation	-0.205*** [0.013]	-0.096*** [0.013]	-0.297*** [0.027]
Average income	-0.004*** [0.001]	-0.007*** [0.001]	-0.001 [0.002]
Income growth	0.009 [0.042]	0.041 [0.036]	0.031 [0.094]
Unemployment rate	0.001 [0.001]	-0.001 [0.001]	0.006** [0.002]
Self employment rate	-0.087 [0.074]	-0.074 [0.070]	-0.291** [0.136]
Log population	-0.164*** [0.042]	-0.224*** [0.038]	-0.348*** [0.093]
Log number of competitors	0.006 [0.006]	0.011** [0.004]	-0.063*** [0.014]
Log number of applications	-0.052*** [0.005]	-0.031*** [0.004]	-0.022** [0.010]
Market share of entrants	0.024 [0.028]		
Market share of entrants into prime market		-0.023* [0.014]	
Market share of entrants into subprime market			-0.149*** [0.032]
Year=2001	-0.104*** [0.005]	-0.104*** [0.005]	0.033*** [0.012]
Year=2002	-0.110*** [0.005]	-0.120*** [0.005]	-0.026*** [0.009]
Year=2003	-0.085*** [0.005]	-0.117*** [0.005]	0.022** [0.010]
Year=2004	-0.021*** [0.003]	-0.082*** [0.004]	0.001 [0.007]
Year=2005	0.003 [0.003]	-0.019*** [0.003]	-0.013** [0.005]
Year=2006	0 [0.000]	0 [0.000]	0 [0.000]
Constant	2.990*** [0.527]	3.568*** [0.476]	5.572*** [1.153]
Observations	2273	2273	2263
Number of MSAs	379	379	379
R-squared	0.76	0.74	0.34

Notes: Dependent variable in regression (1) is the MSA-level weighted-average denial rate of incumbent mortgage lenders, weighted by the size of each institution in terms of number of loan applications received. Dependent variable in regression (2) is the weighted-average denial rate of incumbent prime mortgage lenders. Dependent variable in regression (3) is the weighted-average denial rate of incumbent subprime mortgage lenders. Incumbent institutions are those that were active in the MSA at the start of the year. Entrants are those that entered the MSA during a given year. We consider each year that an institution entered the MSA an actual entry, even if the institution had entered and then exited the MSA. Market share of entrants is the market share in loan applications received by entrants. Market share of entrants into prime market is loan applications received by entering prime mortgage lenders as a fraction of loan applications received by all subprime mortgage lenders. Market share of entrants into subprime market is loan applications received by entering subprime mortgage lenders as a fraction of loan applications received by all subprime mortgage lenders. All regressions include MSA fixed effects (not reported) and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. \* denotes significance at 10%; \*\* significance at 5%; \*\*\* significance at 1%.



Table 8. Robustness Tests

	Log number of subprime applications (1)	IV: Income-scaled domestic immigration (2)	Lagged house price appreciation (3)	IV: Evangelicals and Rapture index (4)	Originations (5)	Volume of originated loans (6)	Dependent variable: Loan-to-income ratio (7)	Impact of securitization (8)
House price appreciation	-0.329*** [0.025]	-0.348*** [0.035]		-0.576*** [0.167]	-0.278*** [0.026]	-0.272*** [0.025]	0.222*** [0.079]	-0.269*** [0.026]
House price appreciation, lagged			-0.226*** [0.042]				0.029*** [0.004]	-0.002 [0.001]
Average income	-0.004** [0.001]	0.001 [0.002]	0.002 [0.002]	-0.004*** [0.001]	-0.003** [0.001]	-0.002 [0.001]	-0.924*** [0.145]	0.096 [0.083]
Income growth	0.108 [0.090]	-0.111 [0.090]	-0.103 [0.086]	0.189*** [0.071]	0.092** [0.045]	0.068 [0.045]	-0.009* [0.005]	0.004* [0.002]
Unemployment rate	0.003* [0.002]	0.001 [0.003]	0.005** [0.002]	0 [0.003]	0.003 [0.002]	0.002 [0.002]	1.578*** [0.383]	-0.271** [0.130]
Self employment rate	-0.271** [0.131]	-0.240 [0.170]	-0.167 [0.133]	-0.289** [0.124]	-0.332*** [0.120]	-0.310*** [0.120]	-0.176 [0.168]	-0.256*** [0.078]
Log population	-0.385*** [0.073]	0.068 [0.148]	-0.313*** [0.089]	-0.304*** [0.073]	-0.300*** [0.050]	-0.272*** [0.050]	0.277*** [0.034]	-0.057*** [0.012]
Log number of competitors	-0.074*** [0.013]	0.077 [0.046]	-0.055*** [0.013]	-0.057*** [0.017]	-0.067*** [0.012]	-0.053*** [0.012]	0.265*** [0.021]	-0.032*** [0.009]
Log number of all originations					-0.046*** [0.007]			
Log of originated loans by all lenders						-0.050*** [0.006]		
Log number of all applications			-0.033*** [0.010]					
Log number of subprime applications	-0.013** [0.006]	-0.248*** [0.069]		-0.014*** [0.005]				
Proportion of loans sold								-0.123*** [0.030]
Proportion of loans sold * Year >= 2004								-0.110*** [0.026]
Constant	5.996*** [0.910]	0.955 [1.696]	5.094*** [1.132]	4.918*** [0.953]	5.181*** [0.616]	4.975*** [0.613]	-0.801 [2.089]	4.444*** [0.972]
F-test of excluded instruments (p-value)		0.000***		0.000***				
Observations	2646	2646	2267	2646	2646	2646	2646	2646
Number of MSAs	379	379	379	379	379	379	379	379
R-squared	0.43	0.32	0.40	0.40	0.44	0.45	0.60	0.45

Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions except in (7) is the MSA-level weighted-average denial rate of subprime mortgage lenders, weighted by the size of each institution in terms of number of loan applications received. Dependent variable in regression (7) is the average loan-to-income ratio of loans originated by subprime mortgage lenders. In regression (1), log number of applications is replaced with the log number of subprime applications. In regression (2), log number of domestic immigrants scaled by their average income is used as an instrument for log number of subprime applications. In regression (3), house price appreciation is replaced with its lagged value. In regression (4), the interaction of the proportion of evangelicals in the MSA and the rapture index is used as an instrument for house price appreciation. In regressions (5) and (6), log number of originations and log volume of originated loans, respectively, are used instead of log number of applications. In regression (8), proportion of loans sold, the securitization measure, is the ratio of the number of loans sold within a year of origination to the total number of loans approved in the MSA. A variable constructed as the interaction of proportion of loans sold and a dummy variable that is 1 for years 2004, 2005, and 2006 is also included. For detailed variable definitions, see Table 2. Regressions (1), (3), (5), (6), (7), and (8) are estimated using OLS and regressions (2) and (4) are estimated using instrumental variables. All regressions include MSA fixed effects and year fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors are in brackets. We also report the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments. \* denotes significance at 10%; \*\* significance at 5%; \*\*\* significance at 1%.

Figure 1. A Credit Boom Gone Bad?





Figure 2. Subprime Mortgage Boom Across the Nation



© IMF 2008

Note: Data available for MSAs only.

Figure 3. House Prices and Credit Boom




Figure 4. Lending Standards and Subprime Credit Boom

