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The 1928 Olympic Winter Games in St Moritz: Tourism, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics

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ABSTRACT

The 1928 Olympic Winter Games in St Moritz was the first international sports competition in Switzerland to bring together the country's Olympic and sport circles, its hotel industry and local authorities. Doing so crystallized public and semi-public actions around an event capable of making or breaking Switzerland's reputation as a tourist destination. In addition, the Swiss government, which did not directly initiate the project, ensured the event would serve the aims of its foreign policy by placing a foreign ministry representative on the organising committee. The involvement of these stakeholders meant that the games mainly affected three interconnected areas: tourism – hosting the Games was a way of fending off competition from other winter sports destinations; diplomacy – the event allowed the Foreign Ministry to bolster Switzerland's image abroad; and domestic politics – obtaining and staging the Olympics led to the development of a strong sports lobby during the 1920s.

KEYWORDS

Winter Olympics; tourism; diplomacy; politics; Switzerland

Switzerland first contemplated the question of whether hosting the Olympic Winter Games could boost tourism in the 1920s with an eye to bringing the 1928 winter Olympics to St Moritz, almost a century before Lausanne staged the 2020 Youth Olympic Games. It had established itself as a leading European tourism destination during the nineteenth century, mostly thanks to the British, who came to convalesce in the mountain air or to seek inspiration among the Alps.¹ The two countries' close economic and political ties and their shared penchant for liberal ideas facilitated this early development. Although Switzerland remained the paradigm for mountain tourism throughout the nineteenth century, by the 1890s increasing competition from Germany, Austria and France had eroded the country's monopoly over summer tourists.² World War I dealt a further blow to the sector, which stagnated as borders closed, Europeans' spending power slumped and the Swiss franc appreciated in value. The federal government responded by introducing a plan to help the tourism

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industry, centred round a business support fund called the Société Suisse de Crédit Hôtelier.³ In turn, the tourism sector took steps to attract domestic visitors and decided to promote the newly fashionable activities of automobile tourism and winter sports in order to create an image of Switzerland as ‘the playground of the world’.⁴

After World War I, European States became increasingly interested in using sport for their international relations, not only through events like the Olympic games but also through specific sports like soccer.⁵ This was the case even in Switzerland, whose historiography is strongly attached to the idea of sport autonomy.⁶ When it comes to international sport competitions and the use of sport by governments during that period, authors often refer to European neutral countries as ‘small states’.⁷ Despite the benefits of this approach, it would be

more useful to consider Switzerland as an important alpine country in strong competition with other tourist destinations, as this explains why various stakeholders worked together to defend this image.⁸ With the rapid growth of mass media, holding the 1928 Olympic games in St Moritz was expected to provide excellent publicity for the country and its resorts, and thereby boost both summer and winter tourism.⁹ Hotel owners saw the event as a way to gain an advantage over their competitors in the Alps and in Scandinavia, while sporting circles did not want to miss the chance of staging the Olympic games in Switzerland, the home of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the cradle of winter sports. A disparate group of people and organizations with seemingly divergent objectives came together to stage the 1928 Olympic Winter Games. The effort required to bring the Olympic games to St Moritz helped create a sports lobby within the highest echelons of the Swiss state and parliament during the 1920s. Hence, Switzerland sowed the initial seeds of its foreign policy on sport in its domestic politics. The Swiss Olympic Committee (SOC) enabled St Moritz to obtain the Olympics, and the Federal Political Department (DPF) – responsible for foreign affairs – represented the government in sporting circles and in coordinating the various stakeholders. Nevertheless, it proved difficult for the country and its diplomats to counter criticism of the Games from the Nordic countries, which wanted to prevent the nascent winter Olympics overshadowing the Nordic Games, created partly to attract tourists to Scandinavia, and to challenge Switzerland’s claim to be the land of winter sports.¹⁰ Thus, the challenges facing Swiss tourism in the early 1920s (tourism) led to debates on the domestic front, resulting in new alliances thanks to the Olympic Games (domestic politics), which served the interests of the Swiss foreign policy (diplomacy).

From Discovering Winter Sports to Creating a National Sport and Tourism Lobby

Bringing the 1928 Olympic Winter Games to St Moritz was part of a longstanding effort to develop tourism in Switzerland, especially by promoting winter sports. According to Cédric Humair, the history of Swiss tourism between the mid-eighteenth century and World War I can be divided into three phases.¹¹ The first phase covered the period up to 1820, when travellers began considering Switzerland a destination in its own right, rather than just a point of passage en-route to other countries. The ‘progressive industrialization of tourism’, due to the introduction of steamships on Switzerland’s lakes and the extension of the Swiss (and European) railway network, characterized phase two, from 1820 to 1875. Finally, a substantial increase in tourism and the creation of trade associations aimed at improving

collaboration between the tourism sector and the public authorities followed a decade of crisis during phase three, from 1875 to 1914. Winter sports came to the Alps in the 1860s and quickly grew in popularity, initially in the Grisons canton (home to St Moritz and Davos), and then in western Switzerland. However, consensus on how winter sports began in Switzerland still does not exist. Some historians maintain that patients and tourists created sports such as tobogganing and skating by adapting traditional modes of transport for amusement, whereas others suggest that hoteliers invented these sports as a way of attracting guests through the winter.¹²

What is more, each resort has its own founding legend. For Davos, St Moritz's neighbour and rival, the best-known story attributes the rise from poor mountain village to international resort to a German political refugee and doctor called Alexander Spengler and his sanatorium's first two patients. Spengler's name is still intrinsically linked to Davos thanks to the Spengler Cup, the world's oldest international ice hockey competition, which was founded in 1923 and named by Carl Spengler in homage to his father, Alexander. In fact, ice skating was Davos' first winter sport, having begun in the mid-1860s, although skaters had to travel to the frozen lake, some distance from the resort's hotels. This drawback was overcome in 1869, when the first artificial ice rink was built in the gardens of the Curhaus Hotel. During the following decade, British tourists began coming to Davos in ever greater numbers and founded several clubs, including, in 1889, a skating club affiliated to the British ice skating association and based at the Hotel Buol.¹³ This early specialization in skating – and then ice hockey¹⁴ – meant Davos had a special place in the hearts of the International Skating Union (ISU) and resulted in the village hosting 19 international figure skating and speed skating championships between 1899 and 1925.¹⁵ Furthermore, Hans Valaer, the president of western Switzerland's tourist board during the 1920s, joined the ISU's council in 1907 and the federation held its 14th annual congress in Davos in 1925.¹⁶

In St Moritz, winter tourism is said to have originated with the hotelier Johannes Badrutt, who supposedly offered his summer guests at the Engadiner Kulm free accommodation if they came back in winter. The veracity of this story remains uncertain, but it is likely that Badrutt and his guests at the Kulm wanted to compete with the neighbouring resort of Davos, which already had toboggan runs and competitions. Together, they formed the Outdoor Amusements Committee in 1884 and the following year St Moritz saw the launch of a specialist tourism journal and the founding of the St Moritz Tobogganing Club.¹⁷ Nevertheless, skating remained the most popular winter sport here, too, and by 1913 St Moritz had 18 ice rinks, which enabled it to host the European Ice Hockey Championships in 1922.¹⁸ Skiing was introduced to Switzerland in the 1890s and gradually grew in popularity, especially after World War I, partly as a result of support from the Swiss army, which recognized skiing's military uses.¹⁹ However, tourism remained depressed during the post-war period, so St Moritz needed to find ways to bring back visitors. In this respect, hosting the Olympic Winter Games was seen as an ideal tool for promoting both the resort and the country, and for creating closer ties between the Swiss authorities and the Olympic system.

Contributing to the development of Olympic internationalism was an important goal for the heads of Swiss sport, who joined forces with the country's hoteliers in order to host international sport competitions, which were growing in size and attracting ever greater media coverage. They were not alone in taking an interest in the Olympics. Contrary to what is described in the meagre historiography of Swiss sport, by the 1920s the Swiss government had begun to realize how important international sport, and therefore the Olympic games, were becoming. However, a lot of resistance remained to both the collaboration between sport and the hotel trade and the government's stance on international sport, most notably from the Swiss military, which still exercised a large degree of control over sport in interwar Switzerland. It is not our aim to overemphasize the army's antipathy against other forms of physical education than gymnastics. In fact, the Swiss military organized many football games between military teams during World War I.²⁰

However, the military aversion to the Olympic games is very real. The army held enough sway over the Swiss gymnastics federation (Société Fédérale de Gymnastique), which was in conflict with the country's other sport organizations, to ensure it turned down a Swiss government subsidy for taking part in the 1920 Antwerp Olympics. The Swiss military felt that the Federal Department of Defence (DMF), which was responsible for physical education, should confine itself to encouraging gymnastics and exercise, rather than encouraging participation in 'costly sparring matches in a foreign city'.²¹ As a result, the SOC had to lobby members of the government very hard in order to obtain even a small contribution to taking part in the Olympics.

Nevertheless, in 1922 the sports sector gained a more powerful voice with the creation of the Association Nationale d'Éducation Physique (ANEP - National Association for Physical Education), an umbrella organization to coordinate the work of Switzerland's sport federations in all areas, not just the Olympics. This change can be seen clearly in the Federal Council's discussions on the 1924 summer Olympics in Paris, during which the DMF endorsed the sport federations' request for a government subsidy.²² Support for sport was also becoming more widespread among members of Switzerland's parliament, such as Adrien Lachenal, a radical (liberal) member of Geneva's Grand Council. Lachenal, whose father had been a member of the Swiss government, was a founding member of the automobile section of the Touring Club of Switzerland and had close ties with the tourism sector, so he felt that Switzerland should not pass up the opportunity to shine during the International Week of Winter Sport in Chamonix in January 1924:

I am thinking, for example, of skiing, which is becoming our national sport and in which, over the last few years, we can be proud to have claimed the upper hand. In the past it was the Norwegians and Swedes, who exported this sport to us, who could be considered the incontestable masters. Today, thanks to the particularly favourable geography of our Swiss mountains, thanks to the physical abilities of our youth, it can be said that Switzerland has overtaken the Norwegians in skiing.²³

At a time when winter sports were becoming ever more important in attracting hotel guests, Lachenal's views on sport were nothing less than a statement of support for Swiss tourism. He even noted that foreign teams were coming to Switzerland to train before competing in the forthcoming winter games in Chamonix and expressed

the fear that refusing to subsidize the country's participation in the event led other teams to boycott Switzerland and make it impossible for the country to host future Olympic games.²⁴ That the tourism sector accorded great importance to sport can be seen not only in their representations to parliament, but also in hotel trade journals, which carried articles announcing, for example, the English ice hockey team's arrival in the resort of Villars in January 1924.²⁵ Nevertheless, hoteliers were also wary of the potential difficulties involved in staging the Olympic Games, with the *Revue Suisse des Hôtels* noting that the Paris Olympics had not benefitted the city's hotels, restaurants and shops due to tourists avoiding the city during the event due to worries about finding accommodation.²⁶

In order to circumvent any doubts about hosting the Olympics, towards the end of 1924 the press in the Grisons canton, home to Davos and St Moritz, began promoting the idea that the next Olympic Winter Games should be held in Switzerland. The *Engadiner Post*, St Moritz council's official newspaper, claimed that the sports sector was enthusiastic about this idea. The editor quoted his colleagues at the *Basler Nachrichten*, Basel's liberal-conservative, protestant newspaper, who felt that the competition was intense. Indeed, Norway was also hoping to host the event as part of the 300th anniversary celebrations for the city of Christiania, the country's capital, whose name changed to Oslo. Hosting the Olympic games was an excellent way to publicise the new name.²⁷ Given this potential competition for the games, the *Basler Nachrichten* demanded to take all necessary measures to ensure the choice of Switzerland ahead of Norway. *Sport*, the official journal of the SOC and many Swiss sport federations, published a similarly patriotic article:

Ask anyone: no country is better known and more greatly appreciated for winter sports than Switzerland. Only us, the Swiss, appear to be unaware of this. ... Our high-altitude stadiums are the most suited to the modern Olympic Winter Games. Let's do what we need to do for the name of Switzerland and for one of our most important economic sectors. Let's get to work! The 1928 Olympic Winter Games belong to Switzerland.²⁸

Although articles such as this gave an outward impression of confidence, fears lurked behind the scenes because the Nordic countries were dangerous rivals and it was against them that the battle for Swiss tourism had to be fought. In order to win this battle, the tourism and sports sectors had to come together and find a unity of purpose. They had achieved this by the end of 1924, but they still had to gain the support of the Federal government if they were to convince the IOC to award the games to Switzerland. At this period, the struggles faced by the tourism industry shifted to exacerbate existing domestic policy issues, including local rivalries.

Obtaining the Games Despite Local and International Rivalries

St Moritz had become a well-known winter sports resort by the end of the nineteenth century, but it struggled to regain its earlier dynamism during the years following World War I, in contrast to neighbouring Davos, buoyed by the success of its sanatoriums.²⁹ As a result, in addition to competing with foreign destinations, the two resorts were vying to outdo each other by building new winter sports facilities and by becoming the first Swiss resort to obtain the Olympics. Besides this local

rivalry, Pierre de Coubertin faced difficulties at a national level. By the beginning of the twentieth century, he had come to admire Switzerland's social and political model, and the country's centrality and neutrality, but he was not blind to the resistance to sport in the country.³⁰ For example, in his *Olympic Memoirs* he criticizes Swiss sport for not having an international outlook: 'Switzerland had its gymnasts, its marksmen, its Alpine wrestlers and stopped there. It did not aspire to outside honours and used its mountains for walking and not yet for winter sports'.³¹ In addition, politicians often regarded Coubertin's Olympic project with indifference, while gymnasts and the military saw it with opposition, even though the IOC had moved its headquarters to Switzerland in 1915. Despite his contacts within the government, Olympic circles and the press, and the increasing likelihood that Switzerland was asked to host the Olympic Games, he struggled to find majority support in the 1920s.

However, some people did recognize the potential value of embracing the Olympics. For example, the December 1924 issue of the *Revue Suisse des Hôtels* began with an article entitled 'Will the 1928 Olympic Winter Games be held in Switzerland?', which argued that it was in the interests of sport organizations, health and winter sports resorts and the railways to support the project in every way possible.³² The author went on to encourage the Swiss tourist board to organize a conference of all the stakeholders, while the magazine's editor felt that any Swiss winter Olympics should be shared between St Moritz and Davos, the Bernese Oberland, Central Switzerland, and French-speaking Switzerland in order to avoid excessive rivalry between resorts. On the other hand, the IOC's objective was to exercise control over new winter competitions, despite resistance from some international federations, especially the ISU. That is why Coubertin tried to close the debate over who hosted the 1928 winter Olympics by setting out the IOC's position in the pages of *Sport Suisse*, a propaganda sheet for the sport sector in French-speaking Switzerland that became later one of the games' official newspapers. According to Coubertin's article, the issues being raised in Switzerland were irrelevant because the Netherlands, like France in 1924, was due to host both the summer and winter Olympics, so the only city to stage Olympic games in 1928 was Amsterdam.³³ In response, a journalist writing in the *Revue Suisse des Hôtels* accused him of a 'blatantly obvious smokescreen':

At this time, Switzerland is the only major winter sports centre. In this respect it enjoys an incontestable worldwide reputation. That this advantageous situation arouses jealousy is easy to understand. So it is no surprise that certain interested parties are looking for a way of taking away, as often as they can, the core of our winter clientele by rotating competitions from country to country. Much ado will be made about areas that are currently unknown as winter sports resorts ... and that will take away from our Swiss resorts. ... Therefore, it is not a matter of us putting forward new advantages; our aim is to defend our position and protect our winter resorts. This idea of a winter sports cycle appears to me to be a great danger for Switzerland; I feel it is imperative to address it and to prevent the consequences before it is too late.³⁴

Beyond this criticism of Coubertin's universalist vision, Switzerland's hoteliers were mostly worried that the winter Olympics increased competition from other tourist destinations, most notably those in Nordic countries, especially if Switzerland

did not host the event often enough. Nevertheless, the specialist press continued to criticize Switzerland, for example, suggesting that Swiss resorts did not have enough snow, which was not the case in Sweden. Thus, some hoteliers feared that Sweden's Jämtland region and its capital, Åre, would dethrone the Engadine region of Switzerland, home to St Moritz, and siphon off some of its British tourists: 'The Swedes want to contest our title as Europe's winter sports paradise. They justify their claims with very clear arguments, the first of which is that snow sports did not originate in Switzerland, but in the Nordic countries'.³⁵

Consequently, Switzerland had to define a clear position within the country before trying to promote its case abroad. During a meeting of the ANEP's central committee on January 18, 1925, four months before the IOC Session in Prague, the SOC's president, William Hirschy, warned the other members: 'We must be ready to say whether or not we would like to take on the Games'.³⁶ He also felt that Switzerland's sport sector should ensure it was up to the task. Although some ANEP members warned against addressing the issue solely from the hotelier's point of view, revealing a division between the interests of certain sport federations and the tourism sector, both sides worked together to gain the support of the Swiss government. To this end, the presidents of the SOC and the ANEP, accompanied by Albert Junod, the head of the Swiss tourist board, met with Karl Scheurer, the head of the DMF.³⁷ Scheurer assured them of the government's moral support, 'given the importance of this event to Switzerland, both from the point of view of developing physical exercise and from the point of view of tourism'.³⁸ At its 1925 Session, held in Prague from May 26 to 28, the IOC's members agreed to hold the Olympic Winter Games every four years, the same year as the summer Olympics. This meeting also provided an occasion for Godefroy de Blonay, Switzerland's IOC member, to enter Switzerland's bid to host the 1928 winter Olympics and present his country's geographical advantages.³⁹ However, relations between the IOC and Switzerland were soon to fray. Jean-Marie Musy, the very conservative Swiss president and head of the Finance and Customs Department, gave a speech during the Federal Gymnastics Festival, held in Geneva from July 17 to 21, 1925, in which he supported gymnastics in its conflict against modern sports: 'The type of sport that offers only the conquest of meaningless records, the preparation of stars and champions, is a pernicious sport'.⁴⁰ Coubertin, just back from Prague, watched the speech in astonishment. The next day he wrote to his friend Ernest Chuard, a federal councillor:

Musy's speech was the clearest condemnation of the entire Olympic doctrine and ... the International Committee, a league of the peoples of 45 nations whose head office has been in Lausanne for ten years, finds itself attacked most plainly by this speech ... What imports is the attitude taken publicly against an international organization that could expect to be immune from such acts by the highest-ranking person in the country in which it is based! Before letting my colleagues draw the consequences of this unpleasant incident ... I am appealing to your friendship and advising you of the indispensable need to find a way of erasing the impression it produced.⁴¹

Without saying so openly, Coubertin was making a clear threat: Switzerland could lose the opportunity to stage the 1928 winter Olympics. Chuard's efforts to mediate between Coubertin and President Musy appear to have worked, as the incident did not adversely affect the campaign to obtain the Olympic games. Nevertheless, the

Realpolitik approach Coubertin used to defend the IOC's interests put pressure on the Swiss, who had to remain circumspect and overcome the local and international rivalries that were beginning to emerge.

When the IOC's Executive Committee, meeting in Paris in November 1925, pressed the SOC to designate its candidate, de Blonay admitted that St Moritz, Engelberg and Davos were vying for the right to host the event. However, only the first two of these towns had put forward 'firm proposals' at this stage and the Executive Committee seemed to prefer St Moritz.⁴² Coubertin went as far as drafting a letter to the IOC's members suggesting that they choose St Moritz, but it was decided not to send the letter until St Moritz and the SOC had provided new guarantees. The SOC asked the heads of St Moritz's and Davos' bids to come to Bern on November 22 for what turned out to be a very tense meeting. The hotelier Emil Thoma-Badrutt, the first president of the *Ski Club Alpina* and the developer of the funicular railway from St Moritz to the Chantarelle Plateau, represented St Moritz. According to Thoma-Badrutt's account in the *Engadiner Post*, published four days later, Davos' supporters came to the meeting with the firm intention of dissuading the IOC from choosing St Moritz by dragging their rival into the 'manure' and by claiming that winter sports in St Moritz were run merely to benefit spa companies and hoteliers, not sportspeople.⁴³ For Thoma-Badrutt, it was no surprise that the ISU and Dutch press, which had close ties with Davos, tried to derail St Moritz's bid. Paul Müller, a Davos resident and president of the Swiss Ice Hockey Federation, replied the following week in the same newspaper, suggesting that Thoma-Badrutt's reading of the situation was misleading. According to Müller, the SOC's decision to support St Moritz's bid was the result of lobbying by a few members, rather than being based on the merits of the technical reports submitted to the committee:

Swiss sport has the right to demand that the Olympic Winter Games are held in the place that provides the best guarantees for the staging of the competitions and the smooth running of the event. It is unacceptable that individuals use their official position within the association to impose their personal opinion.⁴⁴

In fact, Müller was lobbying on behalf of the ISU, whose president and secretary were from Sweden and who feared the IOC was trying to take control over their sport. They felt it was up to the ISU to decide where skating events should take place. These manoeuvres were primarily motivated by the threat the Olympic Winter Games posed to the Nordic Games, which had been created by Viktor Balck, another Swede and a former president of the ISU. As part of his counter-offensive against St Moritz, Müller invited the IOC's new president, Henri de Baillet-Latour, to stay at Davos' Grand Hôtel and Belvédère, from 14 to 20 January 1926. To entice Baillet-Latour to Davos, Müller scheduled the visit to coincide with the European Ice Hockey Championships, from January 11 to 17 (which was won by Switzerland), the European Bobsleigh Championships, from January 18 to 19, and a meeting of delegates from the International Ski Federation. He also ensured that Hans Valaer, who was secretary of Davos International Ice Skating Club and a member of the ISU's Central Committee, as well as president of the western Switzerland tourist board, was present. In addition, Müller asked Baillet-Latour to attend a meeting of the four international winter sport federations, which would 'greatly facilitate the

resolution of several current issues'.⁴⁵ As the founder and president of Davos Hockey Club, Müller undoubtedly had a strong attachment to Davos, which may partly explain why he was so keen to persuade the IOC's president to prefer Davos over St Moritz and thereby break ranks with his predecessor as IOC president, Pierre de Coubertin, who openly favoured St Moritz. This hypothesis is supported by Müller's efforts to promote Davos during the 1920s, related in the *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, and his contribution to creating the Spengler Cup.⁴⁶ Thus, at a time when Davos was increasingly attracting an elite clientele, notably due to its international sports events, the rivalry between St Moritz and Davos was central to the question of which of the two Grisons resorts should host the Olympics.

The IOC's Executive Committee addressed the issue on March 7 and 8, 1926, in Paris. However, before the Olympic Winter Games could be awarded to Switzerland, it had to ask Baron de Schimmelpenninck, the Netherlands' IOC member and president of the organising committee for the 1928 summer Olympics in Amsterdam, to officially withdraw from hosting the winter games. This meeting also provided an occasion for Switzerland's IOC member, de Blonay, to report on his negotiations with the SOC and with the towns of Davos, Engelberg and St Moritz, and to present their bids and the contracts they had signed. After studying these documents, the Executive Committee found that St Moritz offered the most affordable accommodation but recorded reservations about Engelberg's bid due to its climate and low altitude. This latter remark came primarily from the skiing community. The SOC and sport federations felt that St Moritz's and Davos' bids were 'roughly equal'.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, Baillet-Latour was concerned about a background issue that was much more political. As he confided to de Schimmelpenninck: 'There is more to this than meets the eye because I think there is a certain hostility towards some Swiss towns that may be chosen instead of Davos, which has the favour of skating (highly confidential)'.⁴⁸ Indeed, the Dutch Skating Federation had a distinct preference for Davos. During the Lisbon Session – which officially bestowed the title of 1st Olympic Winter Games on Chamonix 1924 – Italy's Alberto Bonacossa and France's Melchior de Polignac supported St Moritz's bid, undoubtedly following a recommendation from Coubertin and Baillet-Latour. In turn, de Schimmelpenninck reminded the Session that the ISU wanted its competitions to take place in Davos. According to Sigfrid Edström, Sweden's IOC member and a key figure in the IOC's negotiations with Ulrich Salchow, the ISU's Swedish president, Salchow felt that St Moritz was at too high an altitude for skating. However, this seems to have been just a pretext as the ISU subsequently put forward other arguments relating to breaches of the amateurism rule.⁴⁹ Despite these controversies, the IOC's members voted almost unanimously (22 votes to 0 plus 1 abstention) to award the 1928 Olympic Winter Games to St Moritz. The abstention, by Sweden's Clarence von Rosen, was undoubtedly a gesture of support for his country's tourism industry.⁵⁰ However, the ISU continued its opposition to the IOC by insisting on holding the World Speed Skating Championships in Davos during the winter of 1928, just a few days before the Olympic games.⁵¹

The discussions over which town should stage the Olympics reveal a somewhat unexpected link between the local and international rivalries described above.

Although the competition between Davos and St Moritz was primarily related to local tourism, the IOC rivalled with the ISU at the international level, with each organization defending the interests of its network and fighting to control certain events. The IOC, where Coubertin still wielded influence, concurred with the SOC in favouring St Moritz, whereas the ISU, dominated by Sweden and the Netherlands, logically supported Davos, their home-from-home in the heart of Europe and a bastion of ice skating. From then on, the organisation of the Olympic games in St. Moritz became a diplomatic matter.

Organising the Games and Defending St Moritz's Olympic Image: A Multi-Actor Diplomacy

Once the games had been awarded to St Moritz, they had to be organized, which meant coordinating all the parties concerned. The SOC played a key role in doing this, but it was also essential to involve the federal authorities, as one of the main goals for the event was to enhance the country's prestige. For this purpose, the Swiss government chose a reliable diplomat instead of a delegate of its military administration. Once the games were over, the need to defend Switzerland's honour and prestige turned the event into a foreign policy issue. As the literature on diplomatic incidents shows, even though such considerations may seem relatively unimportant, they can seriously impact international relations.⁵² The attacks in the Swedish press put the Swiss government in a difficult position, especially in a period when a new agreement between the two countries, signed in 1924, had increased trade between them.⁵³

On May 17, 1926, the SOC's secretary general, Francis Messerli, called a plenary meeting in Bern for the following month in order to constitute an organising committee for the event. Only then did the SOC ask the Swiss government to assign, first temporarily and then permanently, a representative to attend future meetings.⁵⁴ The person the Federal Council chose for this task was Max Ratzenberger, first secretary to the DPF's Foreign Affairs Division, who was given the role probably because he had attended the previous meeting and because he had an excellent understanding of the international situation, gained during his time as an attaché with the Swiss embassies in Berlin (1909-1910) and Paris (1910-1913), and as secretary to the Swiss embassies in Buenos Aires (1914-1916), Madrid (1916-1917) and Vienna (1918-1922).⁵⁵ Appointing a member of the political department, rather than a representative of the military department, shows how diplomatically important the Olympics were to the government. Nevertheless, a month later the SOC asked the DMF to designate a second representative from the Federal Council, an offer the DMF declined. Instead, it proposed appointing Colonel Steiner, a head of section in the infantry department, as an ad hoc delegate responsible for technical issues of interest to the DMF.⁵⁶ One such issue was the 'military patrol' competition, which had been contested in Chamonix in 1924 and which the 1925 Prague Congress had approved for inclusion in the 1928 Olympics. This event was particularly dear to the DMF, as it was one in which Switzerland excelled and which allowed the army to show how well it trained its troops. However, a new move by the Scandinavian

countries took the Swiss by surprise: The Swedish president of the International Ski Federation, Ivar Holmquist, applied to remove the military patrol from the Olympics. When the IOC's Executive Committee, meeting at the Hague on July 31, supported Holmquist's proposal,⁵⁷ Godefroy de Blonay wrote to Baillet-Latour on behalf of the Swiss government, outlining his country's objections to the decision and asking him to review it: 'This is a very important issue for Switzerland because the DMF is highly attached to the event and this Department has sole control over the subsidy for all Olympic Games (including Amsterdam)'.⁵⁸ The SOC also put pressure on the IOC to reinstate the military patrol, stating that it did not recognize the international federation's authority on this issue. In addition, it suggested asking 'the Swiss DMF to extend a special invitation to all the war ministers of the various countries' and thereby associate the event with other military competitions, such as horse trials and the pentathlon.⁵⁹ Messerli, the SOC's secretary general, pressed the IOC's secretary to win over the Executive Committee, highlighting the insistence of the Swiss government: 'I urge you to inform them of the importance the Authorities, the people of St Moritz, in fact all Swiss people, attach to including the military patrol in the programme'.⁶⁰ As to the possibility of including it as a demonstration sport, the St Moritz organising committee was against the idea, fearing that few countries took part.⁶¹ During a discussion of the issue at the Federal Council on January 28, 1927, the head of the DMF, Karl Scheurer, supported the Swiss ski federation's request that the Federal Council invite countries likely to be interested, arguing that 'promoting skiing is not only of military importance for our country, it is also of practical importance'.⁶² Switzerland's efforts were partly successful, as the games included the military patrol event, but only as a demonstration sport. However, funding for the Olympics was assured and some excellent news came for local businesses: According to St Moritz's mayor, Carl Nater, each and every hotel in the resort was asked to make at least 20% of its beds available to accommodate participants and officials. This measure, which involved 1,000 beds, overcame what Nater considered the greatest difficulty facing St Moritz before the games.⁶³ Thus, Switzerland was confident it was able to stage a successful Olympic Games. Doing so enabled the SOC to strengthen Switzerland's position in the Olympic Movement, raise the country's profile abroad, attract more tourists, and allow hoteliers to advertise St Moritz as 'the world centre for winter sports'.⁶⁴

The hotel trade was extremely well represented on the bodies responsible for organising the St Moritz Olympics. For example, the Administrative Commission was comprised mostly of hoteliers, alongside a few local grandees, while Hans Badrutt, the grandson of the legendary Johannes Badrutt, was president of the Reception and Festivities Commission and Emil Thoma-Badrutt, Hans Badrutt's brother-in-law, was the head of the Local Committee.⁶⁵ Throughout the games period, from February 11 to 19, 1928, these businessmen filled local newspapers and magazines published for foreigners with adverts for winter and summer holidays.⁶⁶ Initially, the unfavourable weather hampered their efforts to promote the resort – mild temperatures had already been a problem for the organizers of the Chamonix Games four years earlier,⁶⁷ but temperatures dropped after a few days, thereby providing better conditions for the competitions. Nevertheless, the DPF's fears that Swiss hospitality was criticized once the

games were over quickly proved to be founded. On February 27, 1928, just a week after the games had ended, Switzerland's ambassador in Stockholm, Charles Louis Etienne Lardy, reported to the DPF's foreign affairs division that 'the Scandinavian press has expressed itself in the most unfavourable terms with respect to the St Moritz Olympic Games'.⁶⁸ *Idrottsbladet*, Sweden's leading sports newspaper, had gone as far as accusing the Swiss of coming from a long line of 'brigands', but most of the criticism was aimed at hoteliers. According to Lardy's translation:

Many guests did not come here for the Games; rather it was the Games that were brought here for the guests. The hoteliers have to keep up strong competition against other sporting towns and they were attributed these Games so they could give their guests a taste of this great feeling, because the Olympic name always has a very special ring.⁶⁹

The article in question continued in this vein, evoking the so-called 'Grafström affair', in which the Palace de St Moriz turned out Sweden's gold-medal-winning figure skater Gillis Grafström to make way for higher-paying guests. It also criticized the Swiss organizers, who were accused of cheating in various ways and castigated for the generally chaotic organization, which led to delayed starts to many ceremonies and competitions. In addition, the journalist suggested that Switzerland's military patrol team was able to use lighter equipment than its competitors because the specification for the equipment and clothing to be used – described merely as 'field equipment' – was too vague. Sports newspapers were not alone in complaining about Swiss hoteliers and the organizers of the winter Olympics; negative articles also appeared in the general press. For example, the liberal daily *Stockholms Tidning* reported an argument at the ski-jump hill that allegedly arose when the Swiss agreed to jump from the top platform but the Norwegians refused because they felt the weather was not good enough to do so safely:

The quarrel became increasingly violent and the Norwegians wanted to come down and stop the event. But Östgaard [president of the Norwegian ski federation] ordered them to start from the middle platform, adding that it was the last time Norway would compete in Switzerland. A Swiss competitor, named Feuz, brandishing a knife, wanted to force the Norwegian starter to order his countrymen to start from the top and tried to cut the rope the starter had put above the middle platform ... In Scandinavia there is the general impression that the Swiss organizers' only concern was to satisfy the spectators' appetite for spectacle and that their attitude was irresponsible.⁷⁰

While it is possible that there was an actual issue with organization, Giuseppe Motta, head of the DPF, saw things differently: Passing on these criticisms to his opposite number at the DMF, Karl Scheurer, he asked him to gather the information needed to counter these 'outrageously fanciful comments'. He went on:

it is not surprising ... that the Scandinavians, who have always stubbornly opposed creating a special cycle of winter games, so they can maintain their monopoly, have seized the occasion to take out their bitterness on St Moritz, whose worldwide reputation they envy, and they will stop at nothing to turn its clientele away to their benefit.⁷¹

Motta's letter shows how important the issue was to Switzerland. His references to Switzerland's 'worldwide reputation' and to the clientele the Scandinavians were

supposedly trying to poach from Switzerland highlights the economic and tourism interests at stake. The DPF's foreign affairs department informed the heads of the SOC and asked them to provide all relevant information.⁷² Messerli replied that an enquiry had been launched to clarify what had happened but that the SOC and organising committee had not received any complaints until then.⁷³ On March 31, 1928, St Moritz's mayor, Carl Nater, wrote to the DPF about the Scandinavian press's criticisms of his resort. According to Nater, the allegations were not only completely unjustified, they were very surprising because Sven Lindhagen, who had written the articles for *Idrottsbladet*, had taken part in the information tour for journalists in January 1927 and had not, at this time, expressed the slightest criticism of Switzerland's resorts.

One could wonder why the attacks came from Sweden, rather than Norway, a country with which there had been intense competition and numerous conflicts during the games. The most probable answer is that the heads of the ISU, who had wanted the Olympics to take place in Davos, directly instigated the Swedish press campaign. In addition, when Norway won the military patrol event, Karl Scheurer, the head of the DFM had praised the Norwegian delegation in his official speech, suggesting that its 'fame would extend to the entire country'.⁷⁴ Another possibility is that attacks from Norway have not come to light due to a lack of sources or due to the Swiss ambassador in Oslo reacting less strongly to criticisms in the Norwegian press than his opposite number in Stockholm.

Pax Olympica as a Showcase of Swiss Foreign Policy

The development of winter sports competitions was intrinsically linked to the tourism industry. The organizers of the Chamonix games, four years before St Moritz, wanted to show that the resort had developed to the point where it could rival the successful Swiss model.⁷⁵ In contrast, St Moritz 1928 had both economic and sporting goals: while the resort's hoteliers wanted to promote the town as a tourism destination ahead of their Scandinavian rivals, the Olympic circles tried to demonstrate the superiority of the winter Olympics over the Nordic Games. However, they could not turn a blind eye to the importance of the local and international rivalries that surrounded this edition of the winter Olympics, as well as to the different interests of the stakeholders who came together to organize the event. As for Switzerland, St Moritz 1928 was the first international sports competition to bring together such a wide range of stakeholders and thereby crystallize public and semi-public actions around an event capable of making or breaking the country's reputation as a tourist destination. Although the federal government played a central role in coordinating the project's stakeholders, it was the SOC's 'diplomats in tracksuits'⁷⁶ who lobbied the IOC, exhibiting a form of diplomacy that was halfway between government diplomacy and international sports diplomacy.

Consequently, the development of winter sports competitions and the desire of Switzerland's sports and tourism sectors to host the Olympic games contributed greatly to creating a sports lobby within Swiss political and administrative circles during the 1920s. This proved useful when the SOC had to use its political network

to gain government support for the St Moritz Olympics. The Swiss government's aim was not just to help the country's tourism industry, but also to strengthen its own role in spreading the 'spirit of Locarno'. In other words, it hoped to use its 'tradition' for arbitrage to reintegrate Germany, its big neighbour and preferred economic partner during the interwar period, into the concert of nations.⁷⁷ Having joined the League of Nations in 1926, Germany became an Olympic nation again at St Moritz, where it headed the Olympic parade. Thus, Switzerland realized that the *pax olympica* could serve as a showcase in the process of creating the balance its foreign policy had been trying to achieve since the early 1920s.⁷⁸

Notes

1. Susan Barton, *Healthy Living in the Alps: The Origins of Winter Tourism in Switzerland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); Laurent Tissot, *Naissance d'une industrie touristique: les Anglais et la Suisse au 19^e siècle*, (Lausanne: Payot, 2000). For a more general perspective, see: Paul P. Bernard, *Rush to the Alps. The Evolution of Vacationing in Switzerland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Jim Ring, *How the English made the Alps*, (London: John Murray, 2000).
2. Predominantly the Tyrol and Vorarlberg regions of Austria, which was then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In contrast to the Swiss model, the Tyrol encouraged more 'popular' forms of tourism by developing private guesthouses and chalet rentals: Laurent Tissot, 'Tourism in Austria and Switzerland: Models of Development and Crises, 1880-1960', in *Economic Crises and Restructuring in History: Experiences of Small Countries*, ed. Timo Myllyntaus (St Katharinen: Scripta-Mercatura, 1998), 285–302.
3. Mathieu Narindal, *La société suisse des hôteliers face aux défis touristiques de l'Entre-deux-guerres*, (History Master's degree thesis, University of Lausanne, 2012), 39–46 ; Grégoire Schneider, 'Configurations et reconfigurations sociales du modèle hôtelier suisse (1914-1953)', in *Pension complète! Tourisme et hôtellerie (XVIIIe-XXe siècle)*, ed. Jean-Yves Andrieux and Patrick Harismendy (Rennes: PUR, 2016), 135–45.
4. Cédric Humair, 'Introduction: le tourisme comme moteur du développement socioéconomique et vecteur du rayonnement international de la Switzerland (XIXe-XXe siècles)', in *Le tourisme suisse et son rayonnement international (XIXe-XXe siècles): 'Switzerland, the playground of the world'*, ed. Cédric Humair and Laurent Tissot (Lausanne: Antipodes, 2011), 9–54.
5. Paul Dietschy, 'Creating Football Diplomacy in the French Third Republic, 1914–1939', in *Soccer Diplomacy*, ed. Heather L. Dichter (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2020), 30–47.
6. Christian Koller, 'Réconciliation des nations à travers le sport ? Le football et le hockey sur glace suisses et l'essai d'un retour à la normale dans les relations internationales sportives (1919-1926)', in *Des réseaux et des hommes. Participation et contribution de la Suisse à l'internationalisation du sport (1912-1972)*, ed. Grégory Quin, Philippe Vonnard, and Christophe Jaccoud (Neuchâtel, Alphil, 2019).
7. See for example the conclusion of Peter Olof Holmäng's article: Peter Olof Holmäng, 'International sports organizations 1919-25: Sweden and the German question', *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 9, no. 3 (1992): 455–66.
8. Sébastien Guex, 'Introduction. De la Suisse comme petit État faible : jalons pour sortir d'une image en trompe-l'oeil', in *La Suisse et les Grandes Puissances, 1914-1945*, ed. Sébastien Guex (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1999), 7–29.
9. As Pierre Arnaud and Thierry Terret showed for Chamonix 1924, the boost the event gave to tourism would, in the end, be quite small. Pierre Arnaud and Thierry Terret, *Le rêve blanc. Olympisme et sports d'hiver en France. Chamonix 1924 – Grenoble 1968*

- (Bordeaux: Presses universitaires de Bordeaux, 1993). For another study of the Olympic Games' impact on tourism in the early twentieth century, see: Therese Nordlund Edvinsson, 'Before the Sunshine: Organising and Promoting the Olympic Games in Stockholm 1912', *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 31, no. 5 (2014): 570–87.
10. Ron Edgeworth, 'The Nordic Games and the Origins of the Olympic Winter Games', *Journal of Olympic History* 2, no. 2 (1994): 29–37; Leif Yttergren, 'The Nordic Games: Visions of a Winter Olympics or a National Festival?', *International Journal of the History of Sport* 11, no. 3 (1994): 495–505.
 11. Humair, 'Introduction: le tourisme comme moteur du développement socioéconomique et vecteur du rayonnement international de la Switzerland (XIXe-XXe siècles)', 17–21.
 12. For more on this issue, see: Laurent Tissot, *Histoire du tourisme en Suisse au XIXe siècle: les Anglais à la conquête de la Suisse* (Neuchâtel: Alphil, 2017), 130–3.
 13. Barton, *Healthy Living in the Alps*, 19–36.
 14. Jules Ferdmann, *Der Aufstieg von Davos: Nach den Quellen dargestellt* (Davos: Davoser Revue, 1990).
 15. Michael Lütscher, *Snow, Sun And Stars: How Winter Tourism Has Conquered the Alps, Starting from St. Moritz* (Zürich: NZZ Verlag, 2014), 93.
 16. 'Tourisme', *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, June 5, 1924, 3. For more on this issue, see: Benjamin T. Wright, *Skating Around The World 1892-1992: The One Hundredth Anniversary History of the ISU* (Davos, ISU, 1992).
 17. For example, the *St Moritz Post* was founded in 1886. Cordula Seger, 'Wintersport im Grand Hotel: Strategien einer Inszenierung – das Oberengadin zwischen 1886-1914', in *Pour une histoire des sports d'hiver [Zur Geschichte des Wintersports]*, ed. Thomas Busset and Marco Marcacci (Neuchâtel: CIES, 2006), 35–49.
 18. Lütscher, *Snow, Sun And Stars*, 17.
 19. Busset and Marcacci, 'Comment les sports d'hiver conquièrent les Alpes', 5–33.
 20. Christian Koller, 'Neutrality as the Norm? Football and Politics in Switzerland during the First and Second World War', in *European Football during the Second World War*, ed. Markwart Herzog and Fabian Brändle (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2015), 179–207.
 21. Letter from the DMF to the SOC, October 24, 1919, CIO PRIVE-MESSE_CNO, Olympic Studies Centre (hereafter OSC), Lausanne, Switzerland.
 22. Minutes of the Federal Council, October 1, 1923, E1004.1#1000/9#289*, Swiss Federal Archives (hereafter AFS), Bern, Switzerland.
 23. Minutes of the Federal Assembly, Winter Ordinary Session, December 19, 1923, E1301#1960/51#231, 788, AFS.
 24. *Ibid.*, 788–9; 791. The event was not yet officially known as the Olympic Winter Games, but the press was already using the term.
 25. 'Nouvelles diverses', *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, January 24, 1924, 6.
 26. 'Nouvelles diverses', *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, August 7, 1924, 6.
 27. 'St.Moritz', *Engadiner Post*, November 29, 1924, 2.
 28. *Sport* quoted in the 'St.Moritz', *Engadiner Post*, November 29, 1924, 2.
 29. Statistic collated by Historical Statistics of Switzerland, 2012. Tab. M.7b. hssoc.ch/2012/m/7b (accessed June 5, 2020).
 30. Patrick Clastres, 'Pierre de Coubertin et la Suisse', in *Le système olympique. Passé, présent et futur*, ed. Emmanuel Bayle (Lausanne: PPUR, 2019), 25–39.
 31. Pierre de Coubertin, *Mémoires olympiques* (Lausanne: Bureau International de Pédagogie Sportive, 1931), 128.
 32. 'Kommt die Winter-Olympiade 1928 in die Schweiz?', *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, December 25, 1924, 1.
 33. Extracts from an interview with Pierre de Coubertin in *Sport Suisse*, quoted in the *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, December 22, 1925, 6.
 34. 'Les sports d'hiver des Jeux olympiques', *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, January 22, 1925, 5.

35. Extract from the trade journal *Das Hotel*, quoted in the 'Les sportifs d'hiver en Suisse', *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, January 29, 1925, 6.
36. Minutes of the meeting of the ANEP's Central Committee, January 18, 1925, E5281-02#2005/150#67*, AFS.
37. In 1928, the year of the St Moritz Olympics, the Federal Council appointed Albert Junod to the Monitoring Commission (the most important body) of the Swiss Office for Trade Expansion. Claire-Lise Deblüë, *Exposer pour exporter. Culture visuelle et expansion commerciale en Suisse (1908-1939)* (Neuchâtel: Editions Alphil, 2015), 285.
38. Minutes of the Swiss Federal Council meeting of May 20, 1925, E27#1000/721#8628*, AFS.
39. Minutes of the IOC Session, Prague, May 26 to 28, 1925, OSC, digitized.
40. Remarks quoted by the newspaper *Le Confédéré*, July 24, 1925, 1–2.
41. Letter from Pierre de Coubertin to Ernest Chuard, July 22, 1925, E27#1000/721#8621*, AFS.
42. Minutes of the IOC Executive Committee meeting in Paris, November 1925, OSC, digitized.
43. Emil Thoma-Badrutt, 'Bericht über die Sitzung des Schweizerischen Olympischen Comité am 22. November 1925 im 'Bürgerhaus' in Bern', *Engadiner Post*, November 26, 1925, 1.
44. 'Winterolympiade', *Engadiner Post*, December 3, 1925, 1.
45. These issues were the venue for the Olympic ice skating competitions and, more generally, the relationship between the ISU and the IOC: Letter from Paul Müller, president of the Swiss Ice Hockey League, to Henri Baillet-Latour, January 5, 1926, CIO JO-1928W-FI, OSC.
46. See *Revue Suisse des Hôtels*, May 3, 1928, 6; Koller, 'Réconciliation des nations à travers le sport?', 71.
47. Minutes of the IOC Executive Committee meeting in Paris, March 7-8, 1926, OSC, digitized.
48. Letter from Henri de Baillet-Latour to Baron de Schimmelpenninck, March 12, 1926, D-RM0 2-PATIN/003, OSC.
49. In an article in the Swiss newspaper *Sport* on December 10, 1926, the president of the ISU claimed that it was because the amateurism rule had been broken during the European Speed Skating Championships and the international figure skating competitions held in St Moritz in February 1925 that his federation refused to organize the ice skating competitions at the 1928 Olympic Games: Translation of an article published in *Sport* on December 10, 1926, CIO JO-1928W-ARTPR, OSC. In 1927, Ulrich Salchow went as far as admitting to André Poplimont, the Belgian member of the ISU, that he was an 'opponent of the Olympic Games'. Letter from André Poplimont, representing the Belgian Ice Skating Federation, to Henri de Baillet-Latour, May 31, 1927, D-RM02-PATIN/003, OSC.
50. Minutes of the IOC Session, Lisbon, May 3-7, 1926, OSC, digitized.
51. For more on this heated political battle, see the correspondence between the IOC and the ISU, D-RM02-PATIN/003, OSC.
52. Lucien Bély and Géraud Poumarède, eds., *L'incident diplomatique XVI^e-XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Pedone, 2010).
53. Elise Bütler, *Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Schweden und der Schweiz*, (undergraduate dissertation, Bern, 1955); Hans Rudolf Briner, *Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Schweiz-Skandinavien* (Zürich: Juris Druck & Verlag AG, 1970).
54. Letter from Francis Messerli, general secretary of the SOC, and William Hirschy, president of the SOC, to the Federal Council, May 22, 1926, E2001C#1000/1531#1342*, AFS.
55. Letter from Dinichert to the SOC, July 10, 1926, CIO PRIVE-MESSE_CNO, OSC. See also the entry on Max Ratzenberger on the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland website: <https://dodis.ch/P5360> (accessed May 5, 2020). Max Ratzenberger's private documents have been kept by his descendants, who told the author that the many letters

- they include relate mainly to his postings to Vienna (1918-1922) and Athens (1934-1941).
56. Letter from Karl Scheurer, head of the DMF, to Messerli, August 13, 1926, CIO PRIVE-MESSE_CNO, OSC.
 57. Letter from Berdez to Messerli, August 13, 1926, CIO JO-1928W-COJO, OSC.
 58. Letter from de Blonay to Baillet-Latour, October 3, 1926, CIO JO-1928W-COJO, OSC.
 59. Letter from Messerli to the IOC's Executive Committee, November 9, 1926, CIO JO-1928W-FI, OSC.
 60. Letter from Messerli to André Berdez, secretary of the IOC, November 22, 1926, CIO JO-1928W-FI, OSC.
 61. Letter from the St Moritz Olympic Winter Games organising committee to de Blonay, December 18, 1926, CIO JO-1928W-COJO, OSC.
 62. Extract from the minutes of the Swiss Federal Council meeting of January 28, 1927, E2001C#1000/1531#1342*, AFS.
 63. Circular from Nater to members of the SOC and the St Moritz Olympic Winter Games organising committee, July 7, 1927, E2001C#1000/1531#1342*, AFS.
 64. *Excelsior*, November 20, 1927, 5.
 65. Publication of the St Moritz Olympic Winter Games organising committee (1928), n.d., OSC, 15–6.
 66. See, for example: *Engadin Express & Alpine Post*, February 17, 1928, CIO JO-1928W-PUBLI, OSC.
 67. Coubertin, *Mémoires olympiques*, 189.
 68. Letter from Charles Louis Etienne Lardy, Switzerland's ambassador in Stockholm, to the DPF's Foreign Affairs Division, February 27, 1928, E2001C#1000-1531#1343*, AFS.
 69. Ibid.
 70. Ibid., 3–4.
 71. Letter from Giuseppe Motta, head of the DPF, to Scheurer, March 7, 1928, E2001C#1000-1531#1343*, AFS.
 72. Letter from the DPF's Foreign Affairs Division to the SOC, March 8, 1928, E2001C#1000-1531#1343*, AFS.
 73. Letter from Messerli to Dinichert, March 12, 1928, E2001C#1000-1531#1343*, AFS.
 74. General Report of the Organising Committee of the 2nd Olympic Winter Games, 1928, OSC, digitized.
 75. Arnaud and Terret, *Le rêve blanc*, 62–74.
 76. Andrew Strenk, 'Diplomats in Track Suits: the Role of Sports in the Foreign Policy of the German Democratic Republic', *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 4, no. 1 (1980): 34–45.
 77. Wilfred Feldenkirchen, 'Die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Schweiz von 1914 bis 1945', in *La Suisse et les Grandes Puissances, 1914-1945*, ed. Sébastien Guex (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1999), 237–63.
 78. Christophe Farquet, *La politique étrangère de la Confédération helvétique après la Grande Guerre: commerce, finance et diplomatie* (Department of Contemporary History, Faculty of Letters, University of Fribourg, 2019); Christophe Farquet, 'Diplomatie de réhabilitation et politique d'équilibre: les relations diplomatiques et économiques de la Confédération helvétique après la Première Guerre mondiale', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* no. 1 (2020): 51–68.

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