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#### Home, sweet home? The impact of working from home on the division of unpaid work during the COVID-19 lockdown

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# Abstract

A lockdown implies a shift from the public to the private sphere, and from market to non-market production, thereby increasing the volume of unpaid work. Already before the pandemic, unpaid work was disproportionately borne by women. This paper studies the effect of working from home for pay (WFH), due to a lockdown, on the change in the division of housework and childcare within couple households. While previous studies on the effect of WFH on the reconciliation of work and family life and the division of labour within the household suffered from selection bias, we are able to identify this effect by drawing upon the shock of the first COVID-19 lockdown in Austria. The corresponding legal measures left little choice over WFH. In any case, WFH is exogenous, conditional on a small set of individual and household characteristics we control for. We employ data from a survey on the gendered aspects of the lockdown. The dataset includes detailed information on time use during the lockdown and on the quality and experience of WFH. Uniquely, this survey data also includes information on the division, and not only magnitude, of unpaid work within households. Austria is an interesting case in this respect as it is characterized by very conservative gender norms. The results reveal that the probability of men taking on a larger share of housework increases if men are WFH alone or together with their female partner. By contrast, the involvement of men in childcare increased only in the event that the female partner was not able to WFH. Overall, the burden of childcare, and particularly homeschooling, was disproportionately borne by women.

# 1 Introduction

Crises and measures to cope with them exert a different impact on men and women, regardless of whether the nature of the crisis is economic (e.g. [1,2]), environmental (e.g. [3–5]) or social (e.g. [6,7]). The COVID-19 pandemic is no exception to this rule. Following the rapid spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in early 2020, the immediate response of governments across the world was to lockdown<sup>1</sup> large parts of the economy to slow down the spread of **7** 

the virus and to mitigate negative effects on public health. A tremendous amount of research investigates the impact of the pandemic and the meaa sures implemented to cope with it on social and economic outcomes.<sup>2</sup> The 10 vast majority of that research studies aspects that are subject to official 11 statistics, particularly labour market statistics and GDP, and stresses the 12 gendered, but country-specific, effects of the pandemic.<sup>3</sup> However, spheres 13 not subject to official or regular data production efforts usually remain 14 a blind spot. This paper sheds light on one of these economically and 15 socially significant blind spots: unpaid work. We study how the shift to-16 wards working from home (WFH) for pay due to the first, strict lockdown in 17 Austria has had an impact on the division of unpaid work within households. 18

Unpaid work is conducted to provide unpaid domestic services for use 20 within the household and for reproduction. It includes housework, care 21 given to household members and others and the provision of community 22 services [8]. Across the world, women work longer unpaid hours than 23 men [8,9]. Numerous approaches provide an explanation of the gendered 24 patterns of time use, ranging from time availability approaches [10], to 25 bargaining and separate spheres perspectives [11, 12], to the gender dis-26 play approach [13–15]. Most of these theories stress that the division of 27 labour within the household results from gendered power relations, which 28 in turn are due to various factors: "some quantifiable, such as individual 29 economic assets, others less so, such as communal/external support systems 30 or social norms and institutions, or perceptions about contributions and 31 needs" [16, p. 7]. Importantly, unpaid work enables productive and paid 32 economic activity and stabilizes the economy in times of crisis. Despite its 33 pivotal role for the economy, unpaid work is not counted as productive work 34 in conventional productivity measures or GDP. Moreover, as unpaid work is 35 invisible, it remains unrecognized in most policy decisions and is frequently 36 neglected due to the belief that what happens in the household is a private 37 matter. This became evident during the pandemic, as governments closed 38 kindergartens and schools, while taking the provision of unpaid work in the 30 home for granted [17]. 40

The COVID-19 lockdowns caused a substantial increase in the volume of 42 unpaid work by shifting production from paid to unpaid work and thus from 43 market to non-market production. This particularly affected parents of 44 young children. The closure of restaurants, canteens and bars translates into 45 more time spent on grocery shopping and the preparation of meals at home. 46 The lockdown of childcare institutions and schools increases the volume of 47 unpaid work by shifting care almost exclusively to the home. This is inten-48 sified by contact restrictions that make cleaning staff and nannies employed 49 by households unavailable. The hours spent on unpaid work also increased 50 as the support of grandparents, relatives and friends was to be avoided 51 in order protect their health and save lives. This overall increase in the 52 volume of hours spent on unpaid childcare during lockdown is documented 53 in a number of studies, and estimates range from an increase of 25% in 54 Spain [18], to 37% in Hungary [19], up to double the pre-lockdown hours in 55 the United Kingdom [20]. These and additional studies also find that during 56 COVID-19 lockdowns, women worked longer hours unpaid than men [21,22]. 57

In addition to causing a gender-specific increase in the volume of unpaid work, lockdowns also imply a shift towards work from home for pay (WFH) 60

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for non-essential<sup>4</sup> workers. As a result, many individuals and households 61 have to rearrange their entire (paid and unpaid) work life. Thus, as the 62 lockdown shifts the locus of production to the home, the household becomes 63 the prime location of both market and non-market production. Thereby 64 the barriers between WFH and unpaid work, between the public (paid) and 65 the private (unpaid) sphere are blurred. Such a shift towards the home 66 and household production also provokes behavioural responses that feed 67 back into the public sphere and the economy. For instance, to cope with 68 the increased volume of unpaid work, in particular childcare, mothers were 69 more likely than fathers to reduce paid working hours in response to the 70 lockdown [22–24]. Hence, the public and the private, the notion and extent 71 of paid and unpaid work, are by no means separate spheres of work; rather 72 – and this has clearly been revealed by COVID-19 lockdowns – they are 73 interwoven and inseparable. 74

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In this paper, we study the effect of WFH during the first, strict COVID-76 19 lockdown in Austria on the divisions of unpaid work within heterosexual 77 couple households and the working conditions of WFH. From a conceptual 78 point of view, we describe paid and unpaid work as interwoven dimensions of 79 work and we answer three related research questions: did the involvement of 80 males in housework and childcare increase during the lockdown as compared 81 to before? Is there a gender gradient in the experience of WFH? What is 82 the effect of WFH on the intra-household divisions of unpaid work? Our 83 empirical strategy for estimating the effect of WFH on the change in the di-84 vision of housework and childcare exploits the experimental setting provided 85 by the lockdown measures. In essence, the pandemic and the following first 86 lockdown are shocks exogenous to the demand of unpaid work. In Austria, 87 the case studied in this paper, the design of the lockdown measures allowed 88 for few possibilities to opt in and out of WFH. This fact makes it possible 89 to identify the effect of lockdown-induced WFH on the intra-household 90 division of unpaid work. We employ data collected from the survey *Multiple* 91 Burdens under COVID-19 that we conducted between April and May 2020, 92 that is, during the first strict lockdown. Due to its relatively conservative 93 views on gender roles, Austria is a country and case of great interest in 94 this respect. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey No. 465 [25] 95 almost 4 out of 10 residents agree that "the most important role of a woman 96 is to take care of her home and family". Amongst EU-15 countries, the 97 share of individuals who concurred with this statement is larger only in 98 Portugal (47%), Italy (51%), Ireland (52%) and Greece (69%). By contrast, 99 in countries which rank high on gender equality indices such as Sweden, 100 Denmark and the Netherlands, the share of respondents agreeing with this 101 statement is below 16 %. In addition, Austria was, next to Italy, confronted 102 with the rapid spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus at an early stage of the 103 pandemic. In the first weeks of the pandemic, Alon et al. [26] optimistically 104 argued that the COVID-19 crisis would result in a more equal division 105 of unpaid work within couple households, which would ultimately reduce 106 gender inequality on the labour market. Thus, we test this assumption 107 and examine whether WFH during the lockdown restrictions weakened 108 or strengthened traditional gender roles as expressed in the division of 109 housework and childcare. 110

We contribute to the literature on the gender-specific effects of lockdowns along the following lines. First, and most importantly, we present

the first paper that studies the *change* in the division of unpaid work, that 114 is to say, in the division of housework and childcare, within households due 115 to a lockdown. While previous work on the gendered division of labour in 116 high-income countries during lockdowns has focused on hours of unpaid 117 work by gender, we investigate whether and to what extent the first, strict 118 lockdown intensified the pre-lockdown gendered division of unpaid work 119 within the household. Second, we focus on the intervoven situations of 120 WFH and unpaid work and argue that the household composition of WFH 121 is a central mechanism behind this change. Although household charac-122 teristics such as age of household members, their education levels, and 123 the hours worked for pay, for instance, are important determinants of the 124 hours worked unpaid and the division of unpaid work within households, 125 we expect to find a significant effect of WFH on the change in the within-126 household division of unpaid work conditional on these demographic and 127 socio-economic characteristics. Third, we are able to identify the effect of 128 WFH on the change in the division of unpaid work within households by 129 exploiting the experiment provided by the first lockdown. While the impact 130 of WFH on the division of unpaid work was already debated and studied 131 before the COVID-19 pandemic (see for instance [27]), these contributions 132 struggled to identify the effect of WFH, as in the investigated settings WFH 133 could have been both a cause and a consequence of unpaid work. 134

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# 2 Research Design: Institutional Setting, Data 136 and Methods 137

In this chapter we introduce the research design. Specifically, we discuss the timing and nature of the lockdown measures, the data source, the sample definition and its characteristics, the definitions of the core variables, and the econometric strategy and estimation method we employ to study the effect of WFH due to the lockdown on the change in the division of unpaid work in couple households.

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## 2.1 The first lockdown

The first COVID-19 patients were hospitalized as early as February 2020, 146 yet it took a couple of weeks for the first legal measures to be announced 147 and become effective in Austria. On 10th March 10 2020 the Austrian 148 government announced the first regulations vastly restricting public and 149 private life. Starting with Monday, 16th March, people could leave their 150 homes only: (i) to attend their professional work if WFH was not feasible 151 (such as for emergency services, the healthcare sector, or the food retail 152 sector), (ii) to buy urgently needed goods (groceries, medicine, etc.), (iii) to 153 look after care recipients or (iv) to exercise outside for one's physical and 154 mental health. Thus, as of mid-March, restaurants, bars, hotels, nurseries, 155 kindergartens, schools, universities, most offices, theatres, retail stores, 156 other public institutions, and many more were temporarily closed. Only 157 grocery stores, banks and pharmacies remained open. A couple of days 158 later, an official obligation for "home office"<sup>5</sup> was announced a couple of 159 days later, which reframed it as a "target requirement", meaning that, if 160 feasible, employers should let their employees WFH.<sup>6</sup>. In practice, "home 161 office" was enacted overnight for large parts of the working population, 162 with no option to opt out. Additionally, with most of public life shut 163 down, police enforced high fines whenever regulations were violated. This 164 strict lockdown lasted one month, until after the Easter holidays (14th 165 April), but "reopening" only started slowly on 1st May. While shops and 166 stores could open again with strict safety measures on 14th April, childcare 167 facilities and most educational institutions, businesses and food services, 168 like restaurants, remained closed until the mid-Mid. Starting mid-May, 169 schools opened and divided their students into alternating groups with 170 each attending school only two days per week. With most offices stay-171 ing closed and employees continuing to work from home, as well as most 172 public childcare facilities still not fully operational, the "softer" lockdown 173 period lasted until the end of June. In addition, the Austrian government 174 implemented a short-time work scheme. That is to say, while essential 175 workers continued going to work and others WFH, a substantial share of 176 the workforce was confronted with a drastic reduction in paid working hours. 177

#### 2.2 Data and survey design

We use individual-level data from the cross-sectional survey Multiple Bur-180 dens under COVID-19 that we conducted during the strict COVID-19 181 restrictions in Austria. The overall aim of this survey is to enable research 182 on the gender-specific effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Compared to 183 related surveys conducted in other countries, the strength of this data is 184 that it is both broad in scope and particularly detailed on the extent of 185 unpaid work and its division within households before as well as during 186 the lockdown. Applying the guidelines of Statistics Austria on time use 187 surveys [28], respondents had to report their time use on the previous 188 working day in intervals of 15 minutes for a set of given time use categories, 189 and these intervals had to add up to 24 hours. This provided a detailed 190 overview of how people spent their days during April and May 2020, a 191 period characterized by limited possibilities for activities outside the home. 192 However, we refrained from surveying time use before the lockdown in simi-193 lar detail for several reasons.<sup>7</sup> This implies that we are unable to compare 194 the change in hours per activity (such as unpaid work tasks). However, 195 we are able to study the change in the division of unpaid work within 196 households by drawing on different questions. 197

In addition to information on time use, the data include rich informa-199 tion on the division, organization and quality of paid and unpaid work 200 during the lockdown, on (satisfaction with) WFH, as well as a large set 201 of socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents and 202 their partners and some information on any children who live in the same 203 household. For standard items, such as the highest level education com-204 pleted, the questionnaire was designed following other surveys, such as the 205 European Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2020 [29], or – regarding 206 time use – the last Austrian Time Use Survey of 2008/09 [28]. However, 207 those questions that target information on WFH and the implications of the 208 lockdown were adapted such that they could capture the novel situation of 209 WFH. Unique features of the data are that they include information both 210 on respondents' and their cohabiting partners' time use and on the division 211 of unpaid work before as well as during the lockdown. We asked respon-212

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dents living in couple households whether their partner was also willing to participate in the survey. If so, (a.i) they received an anonymous partner ID for their partner to enter, which enabled us to link their responses. If not, (a.ii) respondents had the opportunity to answer a "partner module" on the time use and key characteristics (such as age, gender, education) of their partner. Thus, while the sampling and (main) observational unit of the survey are individuals, we can depict household dynamics via this partner data.. 220 220

We designed the questionnaire in the first weeks of the lockdown and 221 implemented it by means of the software LimeSurvey<sup>8</sup>. Before starting to 222 distribute the survey, it was extensively pre-tested. The sampling strategy, 223 targeting respondents with and without children who worked from home, is 224 best described as "limited snowball sampling": We distributed the survey via 225 various mailing lists of the Vienna University of Economics and Business, 226 the Vienna Chamber of Labour (that is, the legal representation of all 227 dependent workers), and the Austrian transport and services union Vida. 228 The call to answer the questionnaire was accompanied by the appeal to 229 forward the survey to friends, family and colleagues. In addition, we posted 230 the survey in groups of the social media platform Facebook<sup>9</sup> and on Twitter. 231 The sampling strategy is hence a limited version of the standard snowball 232 sampling design that exclusively samples based on the appeal to invite 233 further respondents to answer a questionnaire. 2,113 respondents answered 234 the entire survey between 20th April and 14th May 2020. As the snowball 235 distribution strategy targeted individuals who were working from home at 236 that time, the sample has a constraint: compared to the Austrian working 237 population, it includes a disproportionately high share of individuals who 238 completed tertiary education, who were obliged to WFH by the lockdown, 239 and who live in Vienna, the capital city. 240

#### 2.3 Sample and key variables

The main interest of this paper is to study the effect of WFH on the change in the within-household division of unpaid work. For this reason, we restricted the overall sample to 730 heterosexual couples (1,460 individuals) who 246

- b.i lived in the same household during the lockdown<sup>10</sup>
- b.ii were both either employed, self-employed or on short-time work at the time of the survey, and 249
- b.iii either one partner answered the "partner module" and thereby provided information on her/his partner, or both partners answered the survey and linked them via an anonymous partner ID. 252

Restrictions (b.i) and (b.iii) are necessary for the study of intra-household 253 dynamics, while (b.ii) reduces the sample to working couples. We obtained 254 11% of the observations from questionnaires answered by two partners that 255 we can link using a partner ID. However, the vast majority, 78%, of the 256 observations are from questionnaires answered by women providing infor-257 mation about themselves and their male partner. The remainder is from 258 questionnaires answered by males. Table S1 describes the characteristics of 259 this sample in detail. In the following section, we discuss the main variables 260

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Division of unpaid work within the couple household before and 263 during the lockdown: We measure the division of unpaid work before 264 and during the lockdown based on two questions that asked respondents to 265 rank their share of (c.i) housework (HW) and (c.ii) childcare tasks (CC) 266 on a scale from zero ("Woman does everything") to ten ("Man does every-267 thing"). housework includes cooking, shopping and cleaning, but also tasks 268 like gardening, animal care or repair work. Childcare comprises basic care, 269 teaching (homeschooling), and recreational activities like talking, reading 270 or playing with a child. Respondents had to answer these questions after 271 having reported heir time use for each of these subcategories. Thus, we 272 assume that they were aware of the definition of housework and childcare 273 when answering these questions. We define two of the main variables of 274 interest based on these questions about the division of unpaid work within 275 the household. First, the dependent variable in the econometric analysis 276 is a dummy variable indicating whether the male partner took on more 277 housework or childcare tasks during the lockdown than before the lockdown. 278 This variable equals one, if the value on the corresponding 11-point scale 279 was reported as being at least one point higher during the lockdown than 280 before. 25% of all couples indicated that the male partner took on at least 281 marginally more HW and 31% of all couples with children reported an 282 increased involvement of the male partner in CC (see Table S1). Thus, 283 we define the change in the division of HW and CC as an increased in-284 volvement of the male partner in these tasks. Second, we employ these 285 questions as a measure for the division of housework and childcare prior 286 to the lockdown. For this purpose, we subdivide the two 11-scale variables 287 into four categories: "Woman does much more" (scale nos. 0–2), "Woman 288 does more" (scale nos. 3-4), "Equal" (scale no. 5), "Man does (much) more" 289 (scale nos. 6–10). Owing to the fact that in very few households men are 290 primarily responsible for housework and/or childcare, we did not differ-291 entiate between "more" and "much more" in the case of males (see Table S1). 292 293

Working from home (WFH): In order to measure WFH during the 294 COVID-19 restrictions, respondents who stated they were currently em-295 ployed, self-employed or in short-time work were asked if they do WFH 296 entirely, partly<sup>11</sup> or not at all. As we are interested in dynamics within 297 couple households, we created a factor variable indicating whether within 298 a heterosexual couple nobody, only the man, only the woman or both 299 partners were WFH during the lockdown. Table S1 shows that the majority 300 of respondents were WFH during the COVID-19 lockdown: in 19% only 301 the woman was WFH, in 8% of cases only the man was WFH, whereas in 302 64% of all couples both were WFH. 303

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Socio-economic characteristics (covariates): In addition, we include several covariates measured at the household and individual level in the econometric model: the relative income of partners, the highest level of education completed, age, number and age of children living in the household, employment status and working hours (see Table S1). In order to

be able to assess the presence and extent of power dynamics as manifested 310 in income differences between partners, respondents had to report their 311 own net income in the last month, their total disposable household income 312 and their partner's net income according to one of 15 income brackets.<sup>12</sup> 313 Based on this categorical income variable, we define a factor variable indi-314 cating whether a respondent earned either more, less, or roughly the same 315 as their partner<sup>13</sup>. In the econometric specification, we focus on couples 316 with children younger than 15 years and we grouped children according 317 to their age. The cutoffs between age groups reflect differences in the 318 educational status of the children: 0-2 years (very young children), 3-5 319 years (kindergarten), 6–9 years (primary school) and 10–14 years (lower 320 secondary school). Table S1 shows the average number of children by age 321 group and household type. Furthermore, we distinguish between individuals 322 working part-time (less than 21 hours per week) and those who reduced 323 their working time (involuntarily) due to short-time work. In addition, there 324 is the group of "full-time short-time workers", which refers to respondents 325 who were in short-time work but still worked more than 21 hours per week<sup>14</sup>. 326

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#### 2.4 Data analysis and econometric approach

In order to answer the research questions, we make use of descriptive 329 statistics as well as standard econometric methods. In the first part, the 330 descriptive analysis, we provide evidence on the gendered burden of WFH, 331 characterizing the division of housework and childcare during the lockdown. 332 In the second part, the econometric analysis, we study the effect of WFH 333 on the change in the division of unpaid work within households. For this 334 purpose, we estimate an econometric model that explains the probability 335 that the male partner increased his share in unpaid work during the lock-336 down. Importantly, under "normal" circumstances, that is to say, without 337 any COVID-19 restrictions in place, it is impossible to establish a clear 338 relationship between (a shift towards) WFH and (the resulting change 339 in) the division of unpaid work in an observational study. For instance, 340 individuals can opt into or out of the treatment (WFH), resulting in an 341 endogenous treatment and thus biased estimates. In that case, it would not 342 be clear whether the option of flexible work, specifically WFH arrangements, 343 is either a cause or a consequence of parents' involvement in household and 344 care work. The COVID-19 restrictions in Austria offer an experimental 345 setting that we can exploit to study the effect of WFH on the division of 346 unpaid work: WFH was strongly recommended by regulation (see section 347 2.1) and enacted overnight. In practice, it was no longer a personal decision 348 to WFH or not and there was no scope for planning. Within the population 349 of working individuals, WFH can thus be considered as randomly assigned 350 and exogenous. However, the legal WFH regulation entailed mereley a 351 strong recommendation to WFH. For this reason, we condition WFH on 352 individual and household-level factors known to exert a key influence on 353 the division of unpaid work as well as the pre-lockdown division of house-354 work and childcare tasks. Thereby we are able to rule out any remaining 355 possibilities for selection into or out of WFH. 356

We estimate a set of logistic regression models by maximum likelihood to investigate the effect of WFH on the binary dependent variable that describes changes in the division of unpaid work within couple households.

Subsequently, we calculate the average of the corresponding sample marginal 361 effects for each variable in the regression model. These average marginal 362 effects (AME) depict the average change in the probability that the depen-363 dent variable is true. 364

The population equation is given by equation 1

$$Pr(Y_h = 1|z) = G(\beta_0 + \beta_1 WFH_{i, j \text{ in } h} + \beta_2 D_{i, j \text{ in } h} + \beta_3 X_{i, j \text{ in } h} + \epsilon_h)$$
(1)

where G(z) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard lo-367 gistic distribution  $(G(z) = \frac{exp(z)}{1+exp(z)})$ , which, for all real numbers, takes on values strictly between zero and one (0 < G(z) < 1).  $\epsilon_h$  is assumed 369 to have mean zero and a constant variance. Note the h refers to the 370 couple household h = 1, ..., N nesting the partners i, ..., I and j, ..., J. 371 Thus, the dependent variable is the change in the division of housework 372 at the household level, while the variables on the right are measured at 373 the level of individuals nested in the corresponding household. For the 374 sake of simplicity, we define  $\beta = [\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_2]$  as the vector of coeffi-375 cients corresponding to the variables in the matrices  $D_i$ ,  $WFH_i$ , and  $X_i$ , 376 which together provide set of explanatory variables  $z_i$  in the population 377 equation.  $\beta_0$  is a constant. We estimate equation 1 by means of maxi-378 mum likelihood. Hence, we define the density of  $y_h$  conditional on  $z_h$  as 379  $f(y|z_h,\beta) = G(z_h\beta)^y [1 - G(z_h\beta)]^{1-y}$   $\forall y = 0,1$ ; the log-likelihood of an in-380 dividual observation is given by  $\ell_h(\beta) = y_i log(G(z_h\beta)) + (1-y_h)[1-G(z_h\beta)],$ 381 while the likelihood function that is maximized in order to estimate  $\beta$  is 382 defined as  $\mathcal{L}(\beta) = \sum_{h=1}^{n} \ell_h(\beta).$ 383

We work with two dependent variables, Y, thus, we estimate two vari-385 ants of equation 1. The first variable describes whether the male partner 386 increased his share in housework (of the household) during the lockdown, 387 the second depicts the increase in the male partner's involvement in child-388 care. The corresponding dummy variables are equal to one if the man 389 proportionally took on more unpaid work during the lockdown, but it 390 does not indicate how much more unpaid work this corresponds to than 391 before the lockdown. Thus, the hours corresponding to the male part of 392 the couple "doing more than before" can vary to a large extent in terms of 393 hours. In other words, in this definition, every increase in the male partner's 394 involvement in HW or CC counts equally, regardless of the corresponding 395 hours. As we are interested in whether WFH changed the pre-lockdown 396 division of unpaid work, conditional on covariates, we consider this to be the 397 appropriate specification. The main explanatory variable hence is working 398 from home (WFH), a factor variable measuring whether both, none, only 399 the woman or only the man of the couple was WFH during the lockdown. In 400 addition, we control for the division of unpaid work before the lockdown (D) 401 and other household and individual characteristics (X), specifically relative 402 income of partners, age, highest level of education completed, employment 403 status, full-time or part-time work, and the number of children and age of 404 any children living in the household. 405

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# 3 Results

In this section we present the results of the descriptive and econometric analysis and we discuss the findings in more detail.

#### 3.1 Descriptive results

This subsection presents the descriptive results of two overlapping spheres: the experience of WFH while coping with the increased demand for unpaid work (see section 3.1.1) and its division during the lockdown (see section 3.1.2). We reveal how the blurring of boundaries between the public and private domains and between work and family responsibilities have distinct implications on different types of households and genders. 411

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
#### 3.1.1 Working from home during lockdown restrictions

As stated in chapter 2.1, the legal basis to WFH whenever it was *feasible* 419 was enacted and communicated by the Austrian government starting in 420 March 2020. Since most facilities, especially public spaces (like schools, 421 universities, public buildings, libraries, restaurants, etc.) were closed, the 422 term feasible was interpreted as strongly advised for workers in "non-critical 423 infrastructure" (i.e. outside of supermarkets, elderly homes, hospitals, etc.). 424 Especially with childcare facilities being closed and meeting up with friends 425 and family being forbidden, Austrians spent most of their days at home. 426 WFH during the lockdown therefore cannot be compared with WFH in 427 non-pandemic and non-lockdown times. However, even by the end of 2020, 428 no legal agreement on how WFH should be implemented was enforced in 429 Austria. This implies that most employees had to manage WFH on their 430 own from the beginning, but with few guidelines from their employers. 431

WFH entails both advantages and disadvantages. The most propagated 433 benefits are not having to commute every day and an easier reconciliation 434 of family and (paid) work. At the same time, contact with supervisors, 435 managers or colleagues might be more limited. Another potential drawback 436 is the blurring of boundaries between paid work and leisure time. In the 437 survey, the respondents had to evaluate their current WFH situation by 438 answering a set of questions. The corresponding questions covered different 439 aspects, such as advantages and disadvantages of WFH, different forms of 440 childcare when WFH and the quality of working time and their workspace 441 at home. The respondents had to report how much they agreed or dis-442 agreed with statements on the quality of and their experience with WFH. 443 They had to "Strongly agree", "Somewhat agree", "Somewhat disagree" or 444 "Strongly disagree" with each of these statements. 419 respondents living in 445 couple households without children and 330 respondents living in couple 446 households with children (younger than 15), who worked either fully or 447 at least partially from home answered these questions. In this section, 448 we focus primarily on couple households with children under 15 years of 449 age. The findings are shown in Fig. 1, which captures the average agree-450 ment with different statements for fathers and mothers separately. The 451 smaller the distance on the axis to the centre, the more the respondents dis-452 agree with the statement. To inverse the stereotypical colours of the sexes, 453 blue areas represent answers from women and pink areas represent men's 454 responses. We find apparent gender-specific differences in couple households with children, which interestingly almost vanish in couple households without children (see Fig. S1). Hence, the presence of children seems to make a vast difference in assessing the quality and (dis-)advantages of WFH.

Turning to the specific advantages and disadvantages of WFH, Fig. 1A 460 shows that mothers (blue area) in couple households with children found 461 it more difficult to concentrate while WFH, to complete tasks better at 462 home than at the office and to reconcile work and family life. Fathers 463 (pink area) found these aspects on average easier than mothers. By con-464 trast, communication with supervisors, the supervisor's recognition of their 465 work performance, as well as contact with colleagues does not show any 466 systematic relationship by gender. The results of the indicator on the 467 quality of working time and of the workspace are shown in Fig. 1B The 468 most striking gender differences concern the workspace and the separation 469 of work from leisure time. Fewer mothers (blue area) had their own room 470 to work from, where they could close the door, compared to fathers (pink 471 area). Furthermore, we find that, on average, slightly more mothers worked 472 outside the agreed working hours: more mothers stated that they were 473 accessible outside their agreed working hours, worked overtime and also at 474 weekends. 475


Fig. 1. Average agreement with statements on WFH from couple households with children younger than 15 years by gender



Reading example: This radar chart displays the average agreement with different statements on WFH. The smaller the distance on the axis to the centre, the more the respondents disagree with the statement. Blue triangles represent answers from women, pink circles represent men's responses. An example: on average, men (pink area) found "compatibility of free time and career" to be more true than women (blue area).

Combining childcare and WFH during the lockdown was a difficult – and 477 sometimes even unfeasible - task. Fig. 2 displays different forms of childcare 478 available while WFH by gender. Among the 529 female respondents with 479 children under 15 years, 25% of mothers stated that their partner took care 480 of the children during their (paid) working hours, 30% reported that the 481 children took care of themselves, while 38% stated that they supervised the 482 children in the same room while working. However, 51% of men reported 483 that their partner was looking after the children, 27% that the children were 484 keeping themselves busy and only 19% stated that they were supervising 485 their children in the same room. These results might at least partially 486 explain why women have more difficulties concentrating on their work 487 compared to men, as they are more likely to supervise their children in the 488 same room. 489

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#### Fig. 2. Main childcare arrangement during working hours by gender

Reading example: The pink area (1) indicates the share of respondents who stated that they supervise their children in the same room while WFH. 38% of all women reported that they had to look after the children and work simultaneously, while only 19% of all men had to share their workspace with their children.

Overall, the results show that WFH is experienced differently by mothers 491 and fathers. Since we only find minimal differences between the genders for 492 households without children under 15 years old, we conclude that childcare 493 is the most influential factor explaining difficulties in working from home. 494 This is confirmed by an additional analysis, which shows that mothers find 495 it more challenging than fathers to reconcile family and work and more com-496 monly express feelings of guilt for neglecting their paid work and/or their 497 children (see Fig. S2). A likely explanation for this is the struggle for women 498 to combine the demands of the professional world with their role as the 499 primary caregiver, as gendered responsibilities still largely prevail in Austria. 500


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#### 3.1.2 Division of unpaid work

The conservative attitudes towards gender roles in Austria are also reflected in the unequal division of unpaid work. Missing information on time use before the pandemic prevents us from comparing absolute changes in hours 505 spent on different activities before and during the COVID-19 lockdown. 506 However, we asked respondents how they and their partner spent the pre-507 vious working day during the lockdown (see Tab. S3). The results reveal 508 that women in working couples spend, on average, almost two hours more 509 on unpaid work than men (3h59 compared to 5h53) per day. The average 510 time spent on unpaid work by women amounts to 6h43 compared to 7h53 511 for men. This shows that unusual times do not translate into unusual time 512 use by gender. 513

Respondents also had to evaluate the change in division of housework 515 and childcare between both partners, before and during the stay-at-home 516 orders. This enables us to analyse which partner primarily carried out 517 which chores and whether the lockdown changed the division of work. Fig. 3 518 reveals this division of unpaid work in couple households. The height of 519 each bar refers to the number of couples per value on the 11-point scale 520 during the lockdown and the breakdown of the bars by colour and category 521 shows the number of couple households that indicated "The woman does 522 more during lockdown" (green), "Nothing changed" (blue) and "The man 523 does more during lockdown" (grey-purple) compared to before the lockdown 524 for each value on the 11-point scale. 525

Fig. 3. Division of housework (A) and childcare (B) before COVID-19 and subsequent changes during lockdown.



Reading example: The height of the bars indicates the division of unpaid work before the lockdown. Regarding childcare (B): before the pandemic 92 couples shared childcare equally (scale no. 5) and for 37 nothing changed (blue bar). In 40 couples the female partner took on a larger share during the lockdown compared to before (green bar), whereas the opposite (male partner took on a larger share) holds true for the remaining 15 couples (grey-purple bar). Moreover, the black line indicates the division of unpaid work during COVID-19. At scale no. 5 for instance, it shows that fewer couples shared childcare equally during the lockdown compared to before the pandemic (81 compared to 92).

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Fig. 3A reveals three aspects: first, it shows that the distribution of 527 housework is right-skewed on the 11-point scale. Prior to the lockdown, in 528 55% of all couple households women did the majority of housework (scale 529 nos. 0-4), while it was equally divided in 30% of couples. In 15% of cases, 530 the male partner was mainly responsible for doing housework before the 531 outbreak of the pandemic. Hence, the data show that the division of house-532 work complies with traditional gender roles in the majority of the observed 533 couples. Men in couple households who spend more time on housework 534 than their female partner are still an exception. Second, the solid black 535 line indicates the division of housework during the COVID-19 stay-at-home 536 orders. In comparison to the division before COVID-19, the data reveal a 537 slightly more polarized distribution. What stands out is that the number 538 of households where the woman does everything roughly doubled from 12 539 (before) to 25 (during) cases. Nonetheless, the lockdown measures did not 540 alter the overall distribution much. Third, we examine the changes within 541 couple households. The colours of the bars shown in Fig. 3A depict those 542 changes. In almost half of all households (47%), the division of housework 543 did not change. In 27% of all couples, women took on a larger share of 544 housework during the lockdown than before. The share of couples where 545 men increased their share amounts to 26%. Two findings stand out in this 546 respect: first, in households where the division of housework was traditional 547 (scale nos. 1–3) before COVID-19 and changed during the stay-at-home 548 orders, the division became more equal (i.e. men increased their share). 549 Second, we observe a tendency towards retraditionalization of gender roles 550 in households where housework was equally shared (scale no. 5) before the 551 pandemic. No change occurred in 63% of households that shared housework 552 equally. In couples where the division of housework did change, a retradi-553 tionalization (i.e. females doing now a larger share than before) occurred 554 in two out of three households. 555

The division of childcare is shown in Fig. 3B Again, we observe a 557 right-skewed distribution, indicating an unequal division of childcare. In 558 comparison to housework, the division of childcare is more unequally divided. 559 Before the COVID-19 restrictions, the main provider of childcare was women 560 (66%). One in every four couples stated that childcare was equally shared 561 between partners. Role reversal (i.e. fathers being the primary caregiver) 562 is the exception (10%). During the pandemic, the distribution of childcare 563 became slightly more polarized, but the overall distribution did not change 564 significantly. Women still bore most of the childcare responsibilities, also 565 during times of school closures. What is striking is that also for childcare, 566 the amount of households where women were the sole caregiver (scale no. 567 0) almost doubled during the lockdown from 11 to 20. At the same time, 568 there is no household (before or during the pandemic) that reports that 569 the man does or did all the childcare. Regarding within-couple changes, we 570 find that changes are more dynamic in the case of childcare compared to 571 housework. The division remained unaltered in 36% of couples. If changes 572 occurred, these were again almost equally split between men doing more 573 (31%) and women doing more (33%). The findings concerning changes to 574 the division of housework also hold true for the division of childcare: men 575 whose share of childcare was relatively low beforehand (scale nos. 1-3) 576 mostly increased their share during the pandemic, whereas when childcare 577 responsibilities were shared equally before COVID-19 (scale no. 5), a re-578 traditionalization of gender roles can be observed. This is also the case 579

when women did slightly more than 50/50 (scale no. 4) before the lockdown. 580

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To summarize, we find that the pandemic did not substantially change 582 the overall division of housework and childcare between men and women. 583 In general it is still the case, that women bear on average more unpaid 584 work than men. Nevertheless, for the majority of couples the measures to 585 reduce the spread of the COVID-19 disease had (at least) little effects on 586 the division of unpaid labour within the household (53% for housework and 587 65% for childcare). The descriptive analysis further suggests that whether 588 couples moved towards a more gender-equal division or not seems to depend 589 strongly on the initial division of unpaid and paid work before the pandemic. 590

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#### **3.2** Regression results

The descriptive results presented in the previous subsection show how couple 503 households divided the burden of unpaid work at the expense of women. 594 In this section, we explain the change in the division of housework and 505 childcare during as compared to before the lockdown. Thus, Table 1 shows 596 the results of the logistic regressions on the probability that the share of 597 housework and childcare done by the man of a heterosexual couple was 598 higher during the lockdown than before. We focus on households with 599 children younger than 15, as older children are usually not as care-intensive 600 as younger ones. 601

Model (1) explains the change in the division of housework. The binary dependent variable indicates whether the male partner took on (at least marginally) more housework than before. All heterosexual couples where both partners are either employed, self-employed or in short-time work and with full information on all covariates are included in the regression sample  $(h=559)^{15}$ .

Model (2) checks whether the effects of the explanatory variables on the probability that a man took on more housework during the lockdown are different for couples with children younger than 15. The dependent variable is the same as in model 1, however, the sample is different as couple households without children under age 15 are excluded (h=300).

Model (3) explains the change in the division of childcare tasks (CC). The binary dependent variable equals one if the father took on (at least marginally) more childcare than before the restrictions. The sample is the same as in model 2 (h=300).

We find a positive and significant effect on the probability that men took 621 on a higher share of housework than before the lockdown in the event that 622 both partners were WFH compared to the reference group where nobody 623 was WFH (see model (1) in Table 1). The effect of WFH is even larger 624 when only the male partner worked from home. Moreover, these effects are 625 also highly significant for households with at least one child younger than 626 15 years (see model (2) in Table 1). However, in both samples (model (1) 627 and (2)), we do not find any significant effects on the probability of men 628 doing relatively more housework than before in the event of only the female 629 partner was WFH. Model (3) shows the results for the probability of men 630

increasing their share of childcare tasks. We find no significant effects of 631 both parents WFH or solely the mother WFH. The effect of only a father 632 WFH, by contrast, is positive and significant. Thus, there are two main 633 results of the effect of WFH on the change in the division of unpaid work. 634 First, we find a higher probability of men doing relatively more housework 635 than before if both partners or only the male partner are WFH. Second, 636 the effect is larger for childcare if fathers are WFH alone, but vanishes if 637 mothers are also (or solely) WFH. 638

As a robustness test (see model (4) in Table S4), we estimate a model 639 based on the sample of couple households without children only, and in this 640 case, all coefficients of WFH turn insignificant. In other words, we do not 641 find evidence that WFH influences the probability of men increasing their 642 share of unpaid work within childless households. This also indicates that 643 the effects of model (1), based on households with and without children, are 644 driven by households with children, where either men do more housework 645 if both parents are WFH (but not more childcare), or fathers take on more 646 housework (and childcare) if they alone are WFH. As long as mothers are 647 at home, childcare seems to be mostly their responsibility, whereas fathers 648 are more likely to take on more household chores instead. There are several 649 potential factors that might drive this finding. In principle, it could be 650 that those households initially had a more unequal pre-lockdown division 651 of unpaid work. However, we control for the pre-lockdown division of 652 housework and childcare. The results may also be explained by a gendered 653 specialization for certain household tasks. Some studies [18, 30] show that 654 men's share in grocery shopping increased during lockdown. The authors' 655 explanation for the increase in time devoted to shopping by men is that 656 this is an easy task, but a task that also carries a certain risk of infection. 657 Our results can also be interpreted as a change in the task specialization by 658 gender, to some extent. We find that both parents or only the mother WFH 659 does not alter the probability of men taking on more childcare tasks, but it 660 does have an impact on housework (if both partners are at home). This 661 indicates that especially childcare is still strongly separated into traditional 662 gender roles, even during (or rather also in) times of crisis. 663

With respect to the pre-lockdown division of housework and childcare, 665 we find a significant and substantial effect on the probability of men taking 666 on a higher share of unpaid work during the COVID-19 restrictions. The 667 corresponding variable is a categorical variable, derived from a ranking of 668 the female/male share of housework (HW) or childcare (CC) responsibilities 669 as described in section 2.3. We include the pre-lockdown division of HW only 670 in the regression explaining the change in the division of HW (model (1) and 671 (2)), and the pre-lockdown division of CC only in the regression explaining 672 the change in the division of  $CC \pmod{3}$ . Men and women who indicate 673 an equal division of tasks serve as the reference group in the regressions. We 674 find a both significant effect of women being primarily responsible for HW 675 and CC before the lockdown (compared to the reference group with an equal 676 division of these tasks) on the probability that the male partner does more 677 HW and CC during the restrictions. The effect is larger for couples where 678 the woman took on (i) *much more* unpaid work than her partner, compared 679 to households where the woman did just (ii) moderately more housework 680 and childcare tasks. This finding indicates that it is relatively "easier" for 681 men to do at least a little bit more of unpaid work during the lockdown 682 restrictions when they initially fulfilled none or only a few tasks. The results 683

hold true for all definitions of the sample (i.e. all couple households, couple 684 households with children younger than 15 years, couple households without 685 children). We hence conclude that these pre-lockdown division effects stem 686 from households with and without children. However, we find no significant 687 effect on men taking on more housework if they already took on a higher 688 share of unpaid work before the restrictions, which in general are rare 689 observations. Overall, these results show that changes in the division of 690 unpaid work during the lockdown are largely influenced by the pre-lockdown 691 division of HW and CC, and that change in times of crisis is easiest for men 692 in couples in which the woman formerly did most of the unpaid work herself. 693

Monthly net income: Bargaining models, especially the separate spheres 695 approach [12], assume that the division of labour in couple households is 696 the result of negotiations between the partners. Following this argument, 697 the individual income of each partner represents a power resource that 698 influences the division of labour. Therefore, the partner with the higher 699 individual income and thus the higher share in total household income has 700 more bargaining power and is able to influence the division of HW and CC 701 in his/her interest. To control for such a mechanism, we include the relative 702 income of the partners in the regression. The corresponding variable is a 703 categorical variable, with three categories: both partners have equal income 704 (reference group), the female outearns the male, or the male outearns the fe-705 male partner. We find a significant and positive effect of the female partner 706 having a higher income on the probability of men doing more housework 707 than before the lockdown. This also holds true for the subsamples consisting 708 only of households with and without children. The results presented here 709 suggest bargaining power as an underlying mechanism: if women earn more 710 than their partners, their respective power (represented by income) transfers 711 onto other fields of negotiation as well, such as division of unpaid work. 712 However, we do not find a positive effect of higher female income on the 713 change in the division of CC. On top of that, we find that if men earn more 714 than their female partners, the probability of men doing more housework 715 rises (significantly) as well. At first, this may seem to be diametrically 716 opposed to the theoretical prediction of bargaining power models, arguing 717 that men should rather be doing less or the same amount of unpaid work if 718 they hold more power (i.e. income). We explain this contradictory finding 719 by the fact that households in which men outearn women are for the most 720 part couples whose pre-lockdown division of unpaid work was already very 721 unequal. Thereby, bargaining power could have determined the division of 722 housework before the pandemic hit in male breadwinner households. Stated 723 differently, male income power does not play a role in determining their 724 current levels of HW, but rather their pre-lockdown division of unpaid work. 725 For women, the bargaining power argument seems to also play a small but 726 significant role in determining current levels of HW. Childcare, however, 727 appears to remain the mothers' responsibility, independent of bargaining 728 power. 729

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Working hours: Time-availability approaches [10] argue that couples 731 face time pressure, and the partner spending fewer hours on paid labour 732 will thus spend more time on housework. In model (1) we find no significant 733 effect of working hours on the probability that the male partner takes on 734

more unpaid work. A separate regression, where we reduced the sample 735 to childless couples (see again model (4) in Table S4), shows that this 736 result stems from households without children. Based on the theory of 737 time availability, we expected to find that male partners working fewer 738 hours for pay would have a positive likelihood of taking on more unpaid 739 work as they have more free time. A differentiated picture emerges in 740 models (2) and (3), based on households with children younger than 15 741 years only. Male part-time work shows a positive and significant effect on 742 the change in the division of HW and CC, while male short-time full-time 743 indicates a negative and significant effect, and male short-time part-time is 744 insignificant. Stated differently, we find a positive effect of fewer working 745 hours for voluntary part-time fathers, but a negative effect for fathers who 746 were forced to work fewer hours in their full-time positions. The positive 747 effect of a man working part-time voluntarily might be driven by male 748 selection into part-time. Those men might do so because they are willing 749 to be actively involved in HW and/or CC. As the lockdown increased the 750 burden of unpaid work, male involvement increased in response in these 751 cases. With respect to the negative effect of male short-time full-time work 752 (as compared to the reference group of full-time workers), the result can be 753 interpreted as follows: in this group of workers, full-time work corresponds 754 to any hours worked above 20 hours a week. As the lockdown increased the 755 volume of unpaid work to be done within households, short-time full-time 756 workers rather continued their role as primary earners while mothers con-757 tinued their role as primary caregivers, which, under an overall increase of 758 unpaid work, might imply that the share of unpaid work done by short-time 759 full-time workers even decreases. This means that a change in working 760 hours does not necessarily imply a change in involvement in unpaid work 761 for this particular group. This is also reflected in the largely insignificant 762 results on female working hours. Put differently, gender roles regarding the 763 division of unpaid work do not automatically change due to fewer working 764 hours. It seems that the majority of men do as much unpaid work as before 765 the lockdown, conditional on their hours of paid work. The only exception 766 is fathers voluntarily working part-time. As suggested by the gender display 767 approach [13], norms play an important role in determining the division of 768 work – also during crises. 769

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Number of children: The number of children in different age categories 771 seems to have an equivocal effect on the probability of men taking on 772 more housework or childcare. Model (1) compares all couple households, 773 regardless of the number and age of children. In this case, we assigned 774 childless households zero children in each age group. In model (1), we find 775 no significant effect of an additional child in any age group compared to 776 no (or fewer) children within the same age group. In model (2) we find a 777 weakly significant and positive effect on men taking on more HW with each 778 (additional) child between 6 and 9 years of age, while in model (3) we find 779 a negative effect on men taking on more CC with each (additional) child 780 between 10 and 14 years of age. Even though the effects are weak, we inter-781 pret this to mean that children between 6 and 9 years old might represent 782 a special age group, as they need more attention and support regarding 783 homeschooling than younger or older age groups. More children between 784 6 and 9 years therefore means even more workload during lockdown, such 785 that the probability of fathers doing more housework increases, probably 786 leaving the childcare to the mothers. Relatively more children between 10 787 and 14 indicates, that there are likely *older* children in this group compared 788 with no or younger children of this age group. Older children might be more 789 likely to manage the additional workload (e.g. homeschooling) themselves 790 or even help their younger siblings. Overall, the absence of a clear and 791 significant pattern points to the importance of persisting gender norms 792 during the lockdown. The pre-lockdown division of unpaid work already 793 depends (implicitly or explicitly) on the number of children within the 794 household. That is to say, once we control for the pre-lockdown division of 795 unpaid work, there remains no separate effect caused by the number and 796 age of children. 797

We control for the age of the female and male partners, their highest 799 level of education completed and their employment status in terms of being 800 either employed (reference category) or self-employed. In model (1) we find 801 no significant effect of the employment status on the probability of men 802 taking on more HW than before the lockdown. Analysing the effect of the 803 employment status on HW in separate samples of couple households with 804 and without children (see model (2) and model (4) in Table S4), we do not 805 find an effect among parent households, but a small and significant negative 806 effect of male self-employment in the subsample of households without 807 children. With respect to the change in the division of CC in model (3), 808 both male and female self-employment has a negative and significant effect 809 on the probability of fathers taking on more CC tasks. Both being negative 810 suggests that different factors might be at play. For instance, the result 811 might be driven by self-selection into self-employment based on the division 812 of CC. Being self-employed frequently entails more flexibility, autonomy 813 and the possibility to WFH, which facilitates reconciliation of work and 814 family. This appears to be one reason why women with dependent children 815 are more likely to be self-employed [31, 32]. Thus, self-selection of mothers 816 into self-employment for family reasons might explain the negative and 817 significant effect of their partners being less likely to increase their share in 818 childcare activities. 819

We only find a small positive and significant effect of female age on the 821 probability that fathers take on more childcare, but it does not seem to 822 play a significant role in any other model. Finally, there is no significant 823 effect of education on the probability of men taking on more unpaid work 824 during lockdown restrictions. Characteristics and structures defining the 825 pattern of change in the share of unpaid work carried out by males are 826 embodied in other variables, such as income or WFH. These are factors 827 that explain the independent variable (of men doing more unpaid work) 828 better than education categories, ceteris paribus. 829

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#### 3.3 Robustness tests

We provide an extensive set of robustness tests in the supporting materials (see section 6 for a detailed discussion). These checks alter the definition of the sample, control for the gender of the respondents, and are based on different specifications of the control variables and the dependent variable. In addition, we present the results of the main models based on a linear probability model, estimated by ordinary least squares. Stressing the most important findings of these tests, first we find that the change in the probability of a male taking on more housework is driven by couple households with children. Second, different specifications of the income, age, and working hours variables do not alter the results, while the cutoff for classifying individuals as working either part-time or full-time matters. Third, overall these tests do not alter the results presented in the main text in any unexpected way. Hence we conclude that the main results are robust.

	Dependent variable:		
	more HW: $\sigma^{*}$ (1)	more HW: $\sigma$ (2)	more CC: $\sigma^{*}$ (3)
WFH: both WFH: only $\varphi$ WFH: only $\sigma^{n}$ WFH: nobody (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \ (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.11 \ (0.10) \\ 0.23 \ (0.12)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.19 \ (0.10)^{**} \\ 0.06 \ (0.15) \\ 0.42 \ (0.14)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \ (0.10) \\ -0.05 \ (0.12) \\ 0.30 \ (0.12)^{**} \end{array}$
HW before: $\varphi$ more HW before: $\varphi$ much more HW before: $\sigma$ (much) more HW before: equal (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \; (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.32 \; (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.07 \; (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \; (0.06)^{**} \\ 0.33 \; (0.08)^{***} \\ 0.14 \; (0.11) \end{array}$	
CC before: $\varphi$ more CC before: $\varphi$ much more CC before: $\sigma$ (much) more CC before: equal (= $ref$ )			$\begin{array}{c} 0.21 \ (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.36 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.03 \ (0.12) \end{array}$
Higher income: $\bigcirc$ Higher income: $\bigcirc$ Equal income (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17  \left( 0.07 \right)^{**} \\ 0.09  \left( 0.04 \right)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.21  \left( 0.11 \right)^{**} \\ 0.11  \left( 0.06 \right)^{*} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \; (0.10) \\ 0.06 \; (0.06) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\varphi$ Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h: $\varphi$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.05) \\ -0.01 \; (0.08) \\ -0.13 \; (0.15) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \; (0.06) \\ 0.01 \; (0.09) \\ -0.18 \; (0.11)^* \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.11 \ (0.06)^* \\ -0.03 \ (0.09) \\ 0.05 \ (0.22) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\sigma$ Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours $> 20h$ (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours $> 20h$ : $\sigma$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.16 \; (0.10) \\ 0.06 \; (0.09) \\ 0.01 \; (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.35 \; (0.13)^{***} \\ 0.03 \; (0.10) \\ -0.19 \; (0.09)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.46 \; (0.09)^{**} \\ 0.14 \; (0.11) \\ -0.24 \; (0.10)^{**} \end{array}$
Self-employed: $\varphi$ Employed: $\varphi$ (= ref) Self-employed: $\sigma$ Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)	-0.06 (0.06) -0.08 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.08) -0.05 (0.07)	$-0.19 (0.07)^{**}$ $-0.18 (0.07)^{**}$
No. children 0 – 2 years No. children 3 – 5 years No. children 6 – 9 years No. children 10 – 14 years	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \ (0.05) \\ -0.06 \ (0.04) \\ 0.06 \ (0.03) \\ -0.06 \ (0.04) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \; (0.07) \\ -0.02 \; (0.05) \\ 0.09 \; (0.04)^* \\ -0.09 \; (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \; (0.07) \\ 0.05 \; (0.06) \\ 0.00 \; (0.05) \\ -0.17 \; (0.07)^{**} \end{array}$
Age: ♀ Age: ♂	$\begin{array}{c} -0.00 \ (0.00) \\ 0.00 \ (0.00) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.01) \\ 0.00 \; (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \ (0.01)^{**} \\ 0.00 \ (0.01) \end{array}$
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \; (0.06) \\ -0.04 \; (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \; (0.08) \\ 0.01 \; (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.09 \; (0.08) \\ 0.16 \; (0.11) \end{array}$
Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Tertiary (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \ (0.05) \\ -0.00 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \ (0.06) \\ -0.02 \ (0.09) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06 \; (0.06) \\ -0.09 \; (0.08) \end{array}$
Observations Log likelihood AIC	$559 \\ -299.90 \\ 653.81$	$300 \\ -148.58 \\ 351.15$	$300 \\ -152.99 \\ 359.98$
BIC	770.61	451.16	459.98

Table 1. Average marginal effects of logistic regressions

\*\*\*p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05; \* p < 0.1

Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

### 4 Limitations

First, we stress that it is necessary to interpret the findings in the context 847 of the specific circumstances of the lockdown, specifically, the shift towards 848 WFH in combination with the closure of childcare facilities and schools. It 849 remains an open question how couples would have allocated unpaid work 850 and experienced WFH if childcare facilities and schools had been open. 851 Second, the average marginal effects of the main variables of interest (WFH 852 and the pre-lockdown division of housework and childcare) on the change 853 of within-household division are robust to different specifications and both 854 statistically significant and large in magnitude. However, the standard 855 errors of most of the control variables (the number of children per age 856 group, age, education and employment status of both partners) are large. 857 We interpret this in the sense that these controls have no considerable 858 additional effect on the change in the division of housework and childcare 859 once WFH, the pre-lockdown division of unpaid work and the hours worked 860 for pay are taken into account. Third, we emphasize that the dependent 861 variable depicts the change in the division of unpaid work, and not the 862 change in hours spent on childcare and housework, respectively. An increase 863 in male involvement in housework, may (and on average does) imply that 864 women still spend more hours on unpaid housework. Finally, the sample is 865 not representative of the Austrian working population. Compared to the 866 population, it includes a disproportionately high number of individuals with 867 a tertiary qualification. However, this is the group of couples that had to 868 WFH more frequently than those with primary or secondary qualifications, 869 who work more often in sectors considered "critical infrastructure". Thus, 870 the sample stresses the change in the household division of unpaid work in 871 the group of highly educated couples. As higher educational attainment 872 is often associated with increased gender egalitarianism [33], we interpret 873 the results rather as upper bounds of the involvement of males in HW and 874 CC. The reason may be that constellations of *she* working part-time, and 875 he being the primary earner might be more common among couples where 876 neither partner has completed tertiary education [34]. 877

# 5 Conclusion

In recent years, social scientists [27, 35, 36] have discussed the potential 880 effects of WFH on the reconciliation of family and work. This debate was 881 reopened following the COVID-19 pandemic that forced many individuals 882 to WFH. While some argued that men would increase their share of unpaid 883 work during the pandemic, others argued that gender roles and the gendered 884 division of labour would intensify. To the best of our knowledge, we present 885 the first study that closely examines the gendered aspects of the COVID-19 886 crisis in the overlapping spheres of paid and unpaid work and that explains 887 the (change in the) division of unpaid work in couple households as a result 888 of WFH. While pre-COVID-19 studies on the effects of WFH on the division 889 of unpaid work suffered from selection bias, we have been able to investigate 890 this effect by drawing on the very strict (and exogenous) lockdown. Even 891 though the data employed is not representative of the Austrian working 892 population, it focuses on the parts of the population most likely to be able to 893 WFH during the lockdown, and it contains rich information on the division 894 of unpaid work and the experience of WFH. A key strength of this study 895

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is that it focuses on couples instead of individuals, thus offering unique 896 insights into the division of work within households in relation to both 897 partners' characteristics. In addition, while several studies documented the 898 division of unpaid work during lockdowns, we are able to focus on how it 899 changed during these extraordinary circumstances. This allows us to test 900 whether a retraditionalization of gender roles can be observed in Austria, 901 a country where conservative gender norms are predominant. We want to 902 stress that the results show how couple households coped with the situation 903 of WFH and unpaid work during the lockdown, but the findings cannot be 904 transferred to WFH under "normal" conditions, with childcare institutions 905 and schools being open. 906

The descriptive results reveal that unpaid work, especially childcare, has 908 not been equally distributed within most couples either before or during 909 the lockdown. The results from the econometric models indicate that men 910 proportionally took on more housework during the lockdown than before 911 in the event that both partners were WFH, or in the event that men were 912 WFH alone (compared to those couples where nobody was WFH). Yet, this 913 does not imply that men on average did more housework than their female 914 partners in absolute terms, but simply that they took on a bigger share than 915 before the COVID-19 crisis. While the econometric results do not provide 916 information about how much more or which kind of housework was done by 917 male partners, the descriptive results indicate that the steps towards a more 918 equal distribution of unpaid work have been rather small. The descriptive 919 analysis also shows that in households where the man's share of housework 920 was very low before the lockdown, the division became (at least a little 921 bit) more equal, whereas we observe a tendency towards a more traditional 922 division of gender roles in households where housework was shared equally 923 before the pandemic. This pattern is also confirmed in the econometric 924 analysis. Furthermore, we do not find a significant effect of both partners 925 WFH on the probability that fathers took on more childcare responsibilities 926 than before the pandemic. This was only the case for couples where fathers 927 were WFH alone. In addition, we find a significant effect of relative income 928 differences on the probability that men take on more housework, whereas 929 this does not seem to play a role for childcare. Strikingly, the results overall 930 indicate that the division of childcare tasks is even more rigid than the 931 division of housework. Given the massive increase in the volume of unpaid 932 work due to the lockdown, one might have expected a more equal and even 933 stronger involvement of males during these extraordinary circumstances. 934

WFH brings advantages and disadvantages for workers, but we find that 936 they differ strongly by gender and household type. Working from home 937 during the lockdown was very challenging, especially for mothers with chil-938 dren under 15 years. Mothers were more likely to find themselves stressed, 939 working overtime, at weekends and with blurred boundaries between work 940 and family time. Fathers were more likely to state that their concentration 941 at home was good and that they had their own room to work from. When 942 couples without children were asked about their experiences with WFH, the 943 gender gaps almost vanished: both halves of the couples regard WFH as 944 average equally good or bad. These findings are also reflected in the results 945 of mothers feeling guilty for neglecting both their children and paid work. 946

We rather confirm than reject the notion that gender roles prevail during

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unusual times. The division of responsibilities for childcare tasks and the 949 right "to work undisturbed" is not divided equally within couples. Primarily 950 mothers had to watch the children during their working time, with fathers 951 more often being able to rely on their partners doing that. WFH should 952 therefore neither be regarded as a promising and automatic instrument 953 to improve the reconciliation between family and career, nor as a way to 954 promote more gender equity. Even though it might help some families to 955 better reconcile childcare and work, WFH during times where childcare 956 facilities are closed puts more burden on mothers than fathers. As the 957 sample focuses on well-educated, working couples in urban areas, the actual 958 situation might even be more conservative and traditional than in this 959 analysis. Therefore, the results should be regarded as "lower-bound" effects. 960

The findings, nevertheless, are a good reference point for policies that 962 question current conceptions of work and that aim at promoting gender 963 equality. Despite the data underlying this study being collected during 964 unusual times, they provide valuable insights. WFH is often said to be 965 a promising tool to improve the reconciliation between work and family 966 life. As this study has shown, this does not hold true during hard lock-967 downs. Thus, the results further highlight the importance of the expansion 968 of high-quality and affordable childcare facilities to ensure more gender 969 equality at home and in the labour market. By providing institutional and 970 publicly funded childcare, welfare states enhance gender equality, counteract 971 dependencies within couples by facilitating full participation in the labour 972 market and also improve the chances of children – especially from house-973 holds that are economically worse off. Beyond the institutional setting, it is 974 also worth highlighting the importance of promoting more equitable gender 975 norms. Ideally this would start in kindergartens and schools, but should 976 also expand to other settings, such as businesses, etc. 977

Finally, we can conclude that no automatic change comes out of crisis, and that nobody "lived happily ever after" without additional effort. In fact, we want to stress that *home* could be much *sweeter* for (working) mothers if they could rely on a more equitable division of unpaid work, especially in difficult times when the volume of unpaid work increases. That is to say, regarding the highly gendered specialization of tasks, in particular childcare, we need to include men, if we *all* want to be better off in the future.

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#### Notes

<sup>1</sup>We define a lockdown as a "period of time in which people are not allowed to leave their homes or travel freely, because of a dangerous disease, accompanied by the general order to stay-at-home" [37].

 $^2 {\rm For}$  instance, as of March 10 2021, the National Bureau of Economic Research has published 375 working papers on COVID-19.

<sup>3</sup>The gendered labour market effects of lockdowns, for instance, depend on the specific restrictions in relation to the sectoral composition of the economy, and the sectoral composition by gender in particular. Early studies on the US, the UK, Australia and Spain have shown that women were disproportionately affected by job loss, short-time work and reduction of working time [18, 38–41] in the first months of the pandemic. However, in Austria and Germany unemployment and short-time work hit women and men to a similar extent in the first weeks of the pandemic (March to May 2020), while male employment recovered quicker than female employment in the second half of the year [42, 43]. Yet even in the latter countries, gendered effects of the pandemic were noticeable early on: studies for Germany [43] have shown that the reduction in minor employment, which is not covered by unemployment insurance and short-time work schemes, was disproportionately notable for women.

<sup>4</sup>These are individuals working outside *essential* sectors, such as grocery stories and healthcare that were not shut down during the pandemic. Importantly, the definition of "essential", and correspondingly, of "non-essential", varies by country, in the sense that the sectors regarded as "essential" and unaffected by lockdown measures differ across countries.

<sup>5</sup>The expression "home office" is used to describe WFH in Austria.

 $^6{\rm The}$  emergency ordinance BGBl. II Nr. 108/2020 declared that "professional activity should preferably take place outside the workplace".

<sup>7</sup>We refrained from surveying time use before the lockdown for the following reasons: first, several studies show that the respondents' memory of past events decreases with the time gap between the reference period and the timing of the interview, that is, recall bias increases. Reliable answers on pre-lockdown time use are unlikely, as their last working day was at least was four to five weeks before the survey was released. Second, as filling out a time use model on a working day before the lockdown involves the provision of mental capacities and time of the respondents, we expected that the share of attrition, that is, the share of respondents not filling out the entire questionnaire, would be much higher in that case. In addition, it might have decreased the accuracy of answers to questions following the time use module substantially. Hence, the gains of the module might not outweigh the effort costs of the respondents finishing the survey properly. Especially when, third, respondents were surveyed online (not via face-to-face interviews) and preferably had to report time use of their partners as well.

<sup>8</sup>LimeSurvey is an online software tool for user-friendly implementation of different types of online surveys. For more info please visit the *LimeSurvey manual*.

 $^{9}\mathrm{These}$  groups were selected on the basis that we expected a high share of WFH women to be members there.

 $^{10}\mathrm{We}$  exclude all same-sex couples, as their number in the sample is too small to allow for valid statements.

<sup>11</sup>Respondents who worked partially from home were assigned to the WFH group as well. In a robustness check, we excluded respondents who were WFH partially (see Table S5), but the main regression results are not affected by this change in the sample.

 $^{12} {\rm In}$  the case of the respondent's own net income, for example, these brackets range from "less than  $6\,e00$ " to "more than  $8\,e,000$ "

 $^{13}$ We divided the sample into tertile categories of net income in order to differentiate between couples in which both partners earn roughly the same (i.e. the reference group), and couples in which either the female or the male partner has higher monthly earnings.  $^{14}$ The short-time work scheme in place while the survey was in the field allowed a

reduction of working hours up to 90%.

 $^{15}$ The number of observations used in the regressions is lower than the target sample of 730 couples due to missing values, especially the income variable.

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# Supporting information

Fig. S1. Average agreement with statements on WFH from couple households without children

Fig. S2. Agreement with statements on reconciliation of family and WFH by gender

Tab. S1. Survey sample size and key variables

Tab. S2. Division of unpaid work before and during the lockdown

Tab. S3. Average time spent per activity during the lockdown by gender

## 6 Robustness tests

We conduct a series of robustness tests to check whether the results presented in the main text are robust in terms of (A.i) the sample definition, (A.ii) controlling for whether the questions on time use and characteristics of a partner were answered by a male, (A.iii) different definitions of the control variables, and (A.iv) modified definitions of the dependent variable. In section (A.v) we present the results of models presented in the main text based on a linear probability model, instead of a logistic regression. Note that, as we present average marginal effects, this serves as an indirect validation of the average marginal effects.

#### A.i Sample

In the main text, we work with two different samples. From the overall sample of 730 heterosexual couples (1,460 adult individuals), we selected the couples living in the same household, where both partners were either (self-)employed or in short-time work at the point when the survey was answered, and who answered the partner module of the questionnaire or linked their responses via anonymous partner IDs. Due to missing information, mainly the income variable, the resulting sample corresponding to model (1) of the main text consists of 599 couples. In models (2) and (3), this sample is reduced to the 300 couples with children under 15 years of age.

Model (1), explaining the change in the division of housework, is based on a sample consisting of households with and without children. Model (4) presented in Table S4 is based on a sample of households without children. Thereby, we can check whether the results presented in the main text are driven by households with or without children. The effect of WFH is insignificant in model (4). Thus, we do not find evidence that WFH influences the probability of men increasing their share of unpaid work in childless couple households. In other words, we do not find evidence that WFH influences the probability of men increasing their share of unpaid work within childless households. This also indicates that the effects of model (1), as presented in the main analysis, and based on households with and without children, are driven by households with children, where either men do more housework if both parents are WFH (but not more childcare), or fathers take on more housework (and childcare) if they alone are WFH.

In an additional robustness check (see Table S5), we excluded individuals who worked only partly, and not entirely, from home, which does not have a significant impact on the results.

#### A.ii Controlling for the gender of the survey respondent

This check concerns the fact that 78% of the couple questionnaires were filled out by women. Therefore, we test whether the main results change if we control for the gender of the respondent by including a binary variable which takes the value one if the questionnaire was filled out by the male partner (see Table S6). In fact, this variable is highly significant for housework but not for childcare tasks. Moreover, the probability that men take on more housework is no longer significant for the whole sample. This is, however, no surprise as Table S4 already revealed that this effect is driven by households with children.

# A.iii Variations in the specifications of the control variables

The variable defining the relative income of the partners presented in the main text is based on categorical income variables. In Table S7 we employ a variable that is based on a subjective assessment of the income difference between partners. Respondents had to report the perceived difference from their partners (low, equal, high). In this robustness test, we make use of this variable. However, the results are not driven by the definition of the income variable and related measurement errors.

Furthermore, we alter the specification of the working hours variable. In one specification (see Table S8), we use continuous working hours instead of a categorical variable. Although the results for each additional hour worked are highly significant, they are small in magnitude. Thus, the effect of each hour is very small, confirming the results obtained by measuring hours worked for pay in categories. In a similar exercise, we vary the definition of part-time work. In the analysis presented in main text, respondents are classified as working part-time in the event that they worked fewer than 20 hours per week for pay. In the models presented in Table S9, those working fewer than 35 hours are classified as working part time. We find that men who work fewer than 35 hours a week without any short-time work arrangement have a significantly higher probability of taking on more housework and childcare during lockdown.

Controlling for age by means of age groups instead of a continuous definition (see Table S10), we detect no major changes in the results.

# A.iv Variations in the definition of the dependent variable

We check the possibility that the results are driven by the definition of the dependent variable. Thus, we change the dependent variable to a dummy variable indicating whether the *woman* instead of the *man* within a couple took on more unpaid work during the lockdown. The results are presented in Table S11 and show that the main variable of interest – working from home – is not significant for this specification. Moreover, several other variables having a significant effect on the probability that the male partner within a couple takes on a greater share of unpaid work have no significant effect on the probability that a woman takes on more housework or childcare tasks (such as income and employment status). The only variable that remains highly significant is the pre-lockdown division of unpaid work. We conclude that the unequal division of unpaid work prior to the COVID-19 restrictions and the prevailing gender norms associated with it appear to be the most important predictor.


Furthermore, we changed the dependent variable to a binary variable that becomes one in the event that the division of unpaid work was more  $equal^{16}$  during the COVID-19 restrictions than before (see Table S12). The results show that only the male partner WFH has a positive effect on the probability that the division of unpaid work becomes more equal, even though the effect for the whole sample is no longer significant (as in Table 1). Also it has a positive and significant effect in all three model specifications if both partners are WFH. In the models presented in the main text (Table 1), the effect of both partners WFH on the probability that a man takes on more childcare tasks is also positive but not significant. This could come from the fact that this dependent variable also responds to the case where the male partner took over a larger proportion of the childcare tasks before the lockdown and the woman increased her share during the COVID-19 restrictions (see Fig. 3 in the main text). If the housework or childcare activities had already been equally distributed before the lockdown, it has a (highly significant) negative effect on the probability that unpaid work was even more equally distributed during the COVID-19 restrictions compared to households where the woman previously did much more unpaid work than her male partner. This finding is in line with the main results. The distribution of income within the couple has a positive significant effect on the division of housework in family households if the male partner earns more (similar to the base model), but is not significant for any other model or category. The results for the remaining explanatory variables are similar to the base model, even though some covariates are no longer significant.

#### A.v Linear probability model


The results presented in the main text and the previous robustness tests are based on a logistic regression, estimated by maximum likelihood. In the corresponding tables, we report average marginal effects. In this section, we estimated the models corresponding to Table 1 based on a linear probability model specification estimated by ordinary least squares. This serves as an indirect test, as the average marginal effects should correspond to the effects of the linear probability model. Table S13 shows that the results do not differ between these model specifications.

- **Tab. S4.** Additional model (4): households without children
- Tab. S5. Sample without people who work partly from home
- Tab. S6. Additional control variable: information supplied by man
- Tab. S7. Alternative income variable: subjective assessment
- Tab. S8. Working hours: continuous working hours
- **Tab. S9.** Working hours: part-time  $\leq 35h$
- Tab. S10. Age variable: age groups
- Tab. S11. Dependent variable: woman does more
- Tab. S12. Dependent variable: more equal division
- Tab. S13. Linear probability model

Fig. S1. Average agreement with statements on WFH from couple households without children



Reading example: This plot displays the average agreement with different statements on WFH. On average, men found "compatibility of free time and career" to be more true than women.



#### Fig. S2. Agreement to statements with reconciliation of family and WFH by gender

Reading example: This bar chart shows the distribution of agreement (from left to right "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" and "No info") with different statements by parents WFH. Statement 1 indicates that 39% of all women strongly disagree with "easy reconciliation at home", whereas only 22% of all men strongly disagree with this statement.

		C	OUPLE AND H	OUSEHOLD C	HARACTERISTIC	<b>s</b> $(n = 73)$	iU)			
Char	nge in the div	ision of housev	vork (HW): ♂	does more						
	True	Not true	NA							
$n_{\alpha}$	184	535	11							
%	25.21	73.29	1.51							
Char	nge in the divi	ision of childca	are tasks (CC)	: ♂ does mor	e					
	True	Not True	NA							
n %	$117 \\ 16.03$	$258 \\ 35.34$	$355 \\ 48.63$							
			40.05							
Worl	king from hon		0.1							
~	Both $470$	No one 62	Only woman 140	Only man 58						
n %	64.38	8.49	140 19.18	7.95						
Incor	me situation									
liicoi	♀ more	$\sim$ same	♂ more	NA						
n	⊊ <i>more</i> 94	271	295	70						
%	12.88	37.12	40.41	9.59						
Divis	sion of housew	vork (HW) bei	ore lockdown							
	♀ much more	♀ more	equal	$\circ$ more	♂ much more	NA				
n	126	268	217	94	17	8				
%	17.26	36.71	29.73	12.88	2.33	1.10				
Divis	sion of childca	re (CC) befor	e lockdown							
	$\varphi$ much more	$\varphi$ more	equal	$_{\circ}$ more	$_{\circ}$ much more	NA				
n	102	145	92	29	8	354				
%	13.97	19.86	12.60	3.97	1.10	48.49				
Hous	sehold type									
	Couple $w/o$	Couple with	Other							
	children <15	children <15	67							
n %	$316 \\ 43.29$	$347 \\ 47.53$	$67 \\ 9.18$							
Aver	age number o	f children by a	ge group							
	0 - 2 years	3-5 years	6 - 9 years	10 – 14 years						
Ø	0.13	0.23	0.25	0.20						
Regi	on									
rtegn	Burgen-		Lower	Upper		_		Vor-		
	land	Carinthia	Austria	Austria	Salzburg	Styria	Tyrol	arlberg	Vienna	Othe
n	29	19	129	65	24	51	12	6	373	22
%	3.97	2.60	17.67	8.90	3.29	6.99	1.64	0.82	51.10	3.01
			Individu	AL CHARACT	TERISTICS $(n = 1)$	460)				
Aver	age age									
	Ŷ	o"								
ð	40.7	43.5								
High	est education	completed								
	Prim		Hig		Tertiary		1	VA		
	lower s Q	econd. ♂	seco	nd. J	0	്	Ŷ	ď		
n	104	158	$\overset{\circ}{97}$	157	491	376	38	39		
%	14.25	21.64	13.29	21.51	67.26	51.51	5.21	5.34		
Emp	loyment statu	s								
	Empl	oyed	Self-em	ployed	Short-time u	vork				
~	9 626	් 572	9 59	♂ 100	9 46	♂ 56				
n %	$626 \\ 85.75$	$572 \\ 78.36$	$\frac{58}{7.95}$	$102 \\ 13.97$	$\begin{array}{c} 46 \\ 6.30 \end{array}$	$\frac{56}{7.67}$				
		art-time (≤20h								
**017	Full-		Full-tim	e(ST)	Part-time	ρ	Part-ti	me (ST)	N	A
	<i>гин-</i> 9	d'		d (51) d	Pari-time Q	്	₽ <i>ari-ii</i> ♀	ന്നു (S1) റ്	Ŷ.	ਮ ੋ
	526	611	$\overset{\circ}{5}$	$\frac{0}{21}$	148	38	$\overset{*}{41}$	35	$10^{4}$	25
n	72.05	83.70	0.68	2.88	20.27	5.21	5.62	4.79	1.37	3.42

## Table S1. Survey sample size and key variables

Dist	ribution of h	nousewo	ork (HW	) before	lockdow	'n						
	$arphi \ does \ everything$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	$_{\mathcal{O}}$ does $everything$	NA
$n \ \%$	$\begin{array}{c} 12 \\ 1.64 \end{array}$	$\frac{39}{5.34}$	$75 \\ 10.27$	$126 \\ 17.26$	$142 \\ 19.45$	$217 \\ 29.73$	$61 \\ 8.36$	$33 \\ 4.52$	$12 \\ 1.64$	$\begin{array}{c} 3 \\ 0.41 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c}2\\0.27\end{array}$	8 1.10
Dist	ribution of c	hildcar	e (CC) ł	oefore lo	ckdown							
	$arphi \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	$_{O^{*}} does$ $everything$	NA
$_{\%}^{n}$	$\begin{array}{c} 11 \\ 1.51 \end{array}$	$40 \\ 5.48$	$51 \\ 6.99$	$84 \\ 11.51$	$\begin{array}{c} 61 \\ 8.36 \end{array}$	$92 \\ 12.60$	$\begin{array}{c} 15 \\ 2.05 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 14 \\ 1.92 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 5\\ 0.68\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 3 \\ 0.41 \end{array}$	0 0	$354 \\ 48.49$
Dist	ribution of h	nousewo	ork (HW	) during	lockdow	vn						
	$arphi \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	$_{O^{*}} does$ $everything$	NA
$n \ \%$	$25 \\ 3.42$	$\frac{36}{4.93}$	$86 \\ 11.78$	$127 \\ 17.40$	$126 \\ 17.26$	$206 \\ 28.22$	$\begin{array}{c} 48 \\ 6.58 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 44 \\ 6.03 \end{array}$	$19 \\ 2.60$	$3 \\ 0.41$	$\begin{array}{c}2\\0.27\end{array}$	8 1.10
Dist	ribution of c	hildcar	e (CC) d	luring lo	ckdown							
	$arphi \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	$_{O^{*}}~~does$ $everything$	NA
$n \ \%$	$\begin{array}{c} 20 \\ 2.74 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 44 \\ 6.03 \end{array}$	$54 \\ 7.40$	$\begin{array}{c} 70 \\ 9.59 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 61 \\ 8.36 \end{array}$	81 11.10	$\begin{array}{c} 14 \\ 1.92 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 18 \\ 2.47 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 12 \\ 1.64 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c}2\\0.27\end{array}$	0 0	$354 \\ 48.49$

Table S2. Division of unpaid work before and during the lockdown

Note: ST=short-time; NA=not available

		Male (N=68)	7)		Female (N=6	90)
	$\varnothing^{\mathrm{a}}$	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Participation} \\ \text{rate}^{\text{b}} \end{array}$	$\emptyset$ participants <sup>c</sup>	${ \varnothing}^{\mathrm{a}}$	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Participation} \\ \text{rate}^{\text{b}} \end{array}$	$\emptyset$ participants
Activity	hh:mm	%	hh:mm	hh:mm	%	hh:mm
Paid work	07:53	97.8	08:03	06:43	98.8	06:48
Housework						
Cooking, baking, grocery						
shopping	00:53	75.4	01:10	01:27	95.5	01:32
Cleaning, laundry	00:41	75.7	00:54	01:09	93.6	01:14
Other: pet care, gardening,						
repairs	00:40	56.8	01:10	00:30	56.5	00:52
Childcare						
Physical care: feeding, wash-						
ing, supervision	00:36	42.6	01:25	00:53	49.3	01:48
Learning, teaching	00:17	23.1	01:12	00:37	34.9	01:46
Leisure time: reading, play-						
ing, speaking with child	00:53	48.5	01:49	01:16	52.3	02:26
Personal care						
Sleeping	07:13	100.0	07:13	07:14	100.0	07:14
Eating, drinking, washing,						
breaks	01:45	97.7	01:47	01:42	96.7	01:45
Leisure time						
Sports, hobbies, media use	01:58	83.1	02:22	01:16	74.6	01:42
Social contacts	00:45	71.9	01:03	00:47	82.6	00:57
Voluntary work						
Helping high-risk group	00:05	9.6	00:54	00:08	15.7	00:50
Other: Red Cross, etc.	00:03	3.6	01:25	00:02	3.8	00:44
Other activity: Not specified	00:19	21.4	01:28	00:16	21.2	01:14
Total						
Housework	02:13	92.7	02:24	03:06	99.1	03:08
Childcare	01:46	55.5	03:11	02:47	58.8	04:44
Unpaid work	03:59	97.4	04:06	05:53	99.4	05:55
Paid and unpaid work	11:52	100.0	11:52	12:37	100.0	12:37

Note: Estimates by self and by partner are taken into account. If both partners filled out the survey, only the self-reported estimates are used.

<sup>a</sup>Mean time spent by all individuals.

<sup>b</sup>Share of individuals who spent some time on the activity.

 $^{\rm c}{\rm Mean}$  time of all individuals who spent some time on the activity.

	Dependent variable:					
	more HW: $\sigma$ (1)	more HW: $\sigma$ (2)	more CC: $\sigma^{*}$ (3)	more HW: d (4)		
WFH: both WFH: only $\varphi$ WFH: only $\sigma^*$ WFH: nobody (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \; (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.11 \; (0.10) \\ 0.23 \; (0.12)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.19 \ (0.10)^{**} \\ 0.06 \ (0.15) \\ 0.42 \ (0.14)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \ (0.10) \\ -0.05 \ (0.12) \\ 0.30 \ (0.12)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.09 \; (0.11) \\ 0.17 \; (0.13) \\ 0.06 \; (0.16) \end{array}$		
HW before: $\varphi$ more HW before: $\varphi$ much more HW before: $\sigma^*$ (much) more HW before: equal (= $ref$ ) CC before: $\varphi$ more CC before: $\varphi$ much more CC before: $\sigma^*$ (much) more CC before: equal (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \; (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.32 \; (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.07 \; (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \ (0.06)^{**} \\ 0.33 \ (0.08)^{***} \\ 0.14 \ (0.11) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.21 \ (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.36 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.03 \ (0.12) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.22 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.35 \ (0.09)^{***} \\ 0.06 \ (0.09) \end{array}$		
Higher income: $\varphi$ Higher income: $\sigma$ Equal income (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \; (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.09 \; (0.04)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.21 \; (0.11)^{**} \\ 0.11 \; (0.06)^{*} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.10) \\ 0.06 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.16 \ (0.09)^{*} \\ 0.13 \ (0.07)^{**} \end{array}$		
Working hours $<20h: \varphi$ Working hours $<20h$ (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours $>20h$ (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours $>20h: \varphi$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.05) \\ -0.01 \; (0.08) \\ -0.13 \; (0.15) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \; (0.06) \\ 0.01 \; (0.09) \\ -0.18 \; (0.11)^* \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.11 \ (0.06)^* \\ -0.03 \ (0.09) \\ 0.05 \ (0.22) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \; (0.10) \\ -0.04 \; (0.13) \end{array}$		
Working hours <20h: $\sigma^{*}$ Working hours <20h (ST): $\sigma^{*}$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\sigma^{*}$ Working hours >20h: $\sigma^{*}$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.16 \ (0.10) \\ 0.06 \ (0.09) \\ 0.01 \ (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.35 \; (0.13)^{***} \\ 0.03 \; (0.10) \\ -0.19 \; (0.09)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.46 \ (0.09)^{***} \\ 0.14 \ (0.11) \\ -0.24 \ (0.10)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.03 \ (0.13) \\ 0.07 \ (0.15) \\ 0.07 \ (0.14) \end{array}$		
Self-employed: $\varphi$ Employed: $\varphi$ (= ref) Self-employed: $\sigma$ Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)	-0.06 (0.06) -0.08 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.08) -0.05 (0.07)	$-0.19 (0.07)^{***}$ $-0.18 (0.07)^{***}$	-0.03 (0.10) $-0.16 (0.08)^{**}$		
No. children 0 – 2 years No. children 3 – 5 years No. children 6 – 9 years No. children 10 – 14 years	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \; (0.05) \\ -0.06 \; (0.04) \\ 0.06 \; (0.03) \\ -0.06 \; (0.04) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \ (0.07) \\ -0.02 \ (0.05) \\ 0.09 \ (0.04)^* \\ -0.09 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \; (0.07) \\ 0.05 \; (0.06) \\ 0.00 \; (0.05) \\ -0.17 \; (0.07)^{**} \end{array}$			
Age: ♀ Age: ♂	$\begin{array}{c} -0.00 \ (0.00) \\ 0.00 \ (0.00) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.01) \\ 0.00 \; (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \ (0.01)^{**} \\ 0.00 \ (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \; (0.01)^* \\ 0.01 \; (0.01) \end{array}$		
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \; (0.06) \\ -0.04 \; (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \; (0.08) \\ 0.01 \; (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.09 \; (0.08) \\ 0.16 \; (0.11) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.09 \; (0.08) \\ -0.03 \; (0.10) \end{array}$		
Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \; (0.05) \\ -0.00 \; (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \; (0.06) \\ -0.02 \; (0.09) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06 \; (0.06) \\ -0.09 \; (0.08) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06 \; (0.07) \\ 0.02 \; (0.08) \end{array}$		
Observations Log likelihood Deviance AIC BIC	$559 \\ -299.90 \\ 599.81 \\ 653.81 \\ 770.61$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -148.58 \\ 297.15 \\ 351.15 \\ 451.16 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -152.99 \\ 305.98 \\ 359.98 \\ 459.98 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 259 \\ -136.79 \\ 273.58 \\ 317.58 \\ 395.83 \end{array}$		

Table S4. Additional model (4) households without children

\*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05; \* p < 0.1 Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

		Dependent variabl	e:
	more HW: $\sigma$ (1)	more HW: $\sigma$ (2)	more CC: $\sigma$ (3)
WFH: both WFH: only female WFH: only $\sigma'$ WFH: nobody (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \ (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.10 \ (0.10) \\ 0.25 \ (0.11)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.20 \ (0.10)^{**} \\ 0.05 \ (0.14) \\ 0.43 \ (0.13)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \ (0.11) \\ -0.06 \ (0.12) \\ 0.31 \ (0.12)^{**} \end{array}$
HW before: $\varphi$ more HW before: $\varphi$ much more HW before: $\sigma'$ (much) more HW before: equal (= $ref$ ) CC before: $\varphi$ more CC before: $\varphi$ much more CC before: $\sigma'$ (much) more CC before: $equal$ (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.18 \ (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.30 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.06 \ (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.14 \ (0.06)^{**} \\ 0.30 \ (0.09)^{***} \\ 0.12 \ (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.22 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.35 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.04 \ (0.12) \end{array}$
Higher income: $\varphi$ Higher income: $\sigma$ Equal income (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.19 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.07 \ (0.04) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.22 \ (0.11)^{**} \\ 0.08 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.11) \\ 0.04 \ (0.06) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h: \varphi$ Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h: $\varphi$ (= ref)Working hours $\leq 20h: \sigma$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \; (0.05) \\ 0.01 \; (0.08) \\ -0.15 \; (0.14) \\ 0.15 \; (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \ (0.06) \\ 0.06 \ (0.10) \\ -0.19 \ (0.09)^{**} \\ 0.35 \ (0.14)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.08 \ (0.06) \\ 0.01 \ (0.10) \\ 0.05 \ (0.23) \\ 0.47 \ (0.09)^{***} \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours >20h: $\sigma$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \ (0.09) \\ -0.03 \ (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.00 \ (0.10) \\ -0.20 \ (0.08)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.12 \ (0.11) \\ -0.26 \ (0.09)^{***} \end{array}$
Self-employed: $\varphi$ Employed: $\varphi$ (= ref) Self-employed: $\sigma$ Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)	-0.06 (0.06) -0.06 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.08) -0.04 (0.07)	$-0.19 (0.08)^{**}$ $-0.18 (0.07)^{***}$
No. children 0 – 2 years No. children 3 – 5 years No. children 6 – 9 years No. children 10 – 14 years	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \ (0.06) \\ -0.07 \ (0.04)^* \\ 0.07 \ (0.04)^{**} \\ -0.07 \ (0.04) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \ (0.08) \\ -0.02 \ (0.06) \\ 0.10 \ (0.05)^{**} \\ -0.09 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06 \ (0.08) \\ 0.06 \ (0.06) \\ 0.02 \ (0.05) \\ -0.16 \ (0.07)^{**} \end{array}$
Age: ♀ Age: ♂	$\begin{array}{c} -0.00 \ (0.00) \\ 0.00 \ (0.00) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \; (0.01) \\ 0.01 \; (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \; (0.01)^{**} \\ 0.00 \; (0.01) \end{array}$
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.06) \\ -0.06 \ (0.07) \end{array}$	$-0.02 (0.08) \\ -0.04 (0.10)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.07 \; (0.09) \\ 0.12 \; (0.11) \end{array}$
Educ. $\sigma^{*}$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\sigma^{*}$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\sigma^{*}$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \ (0.05) \\ 0.04 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \; (0.07) \\ 0.06 \; (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.08 \; (0.07) \\ -0.03 \; (0.09) \end{array}$
Observations Log likelihood Deviance AIC BIC	$527 \\ -279.44 \\ 558.89 \\ 612.89 \\ 728.10$	$\begin{array}{r} 282 \\ -135.37 \\ 270.74 \\ 324.74 \\ 423.07 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 282 \\ -143.71 \\ 287.42 \\ 341.42 \\ 439.75 \end{array}$

Table S5. Sample without people who work partly from home

\*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05; \* p < 0.1Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

		Dependent variabl	<i>e:</i>
	more HW: $\sigma$ (1)	more HW: $\sigma$ (2)	more CC: $\sigma$ (3)
WFH: both WFH: only $\varphi$ WFH: only $\sigma$ WFH: nobody (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.16 \; (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.14 \; (0.10) \\ 0.18 \; (0.11) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.20 \; (0.09)^{**} \\ 0.11 \; (0.14) \\ 0.37 \; (0.14)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.12 \ (0.10) \\ -0.03 \ (0.12) \\ 0.29 \ (0.13)^{**} \end{array}$
HW before: $\circ$ more HW before: $\circ$ much more HW before: $\sigma$ (much) more HW before: equal (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \; (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.34 \; (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.05 \; (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.14 \ (0.06)^{**} \\ 0.34 \ (0.08)^{***} \\ 0.11 \ (0.10) \end{array}$	
CC before: $\varphi$ more CC before: $\varphi$ much more CC before: $\sigma^*$ (much) more CC before: equal (= ref)			$\begin{array}{c} 0.21 \; (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.36 \; (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.01 \; (0.12) \end{array}$
Higher income: $\varphi$ Higher income: $\sigma$ Equal income (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.18 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.10 \ (0.04)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.25 \ (0.10)^{**} \\ 0.13 \ (0.05)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \; (0.11) \\ 0.06 \; (0.06) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\varphi$ Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h: $\varphi$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} -0.00 \; (0.05) \\ -0.02 \; (0.07) \\ -0.14 \; (0.14) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.04 \ (0.06) \\ 0.02 \ (0.09) \\ -0.19 \ (0.10)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.11 \ (0.05)^{**} \\ -0.03 \ (0.09) \\ 0.05 \ (0.23) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\sigma$ Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours >20h: $\sigma$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \ (0.10) \\ 0.05 \ (0.09) \\ 0.03 \ (0.11) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.38 \ (0.12)^{***} \\ 0.05 \ (0.10) \\ -0.20 \ (0.09)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.47 \; (0.09)^{***} \\ 0.15 \; (0.10) \\ -0.25 \; (0.10)^{**} \end{array}$
Self-employed: $\varphi$ Employed: $\varphi$ (= ref) Self-employed: $\sigma$ Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)	-0.07 (0.06) -0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07)	$-0.18 (0.08)^{**}$ $-0.17 (0.07)^{**}$
No. children 0 – 2 years No. children 3 – 5 years No. children 6 – 9 years No. children 10 – 14 years	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \; (0.05) \\ -0.05 \; (0.04) \\ 0.07 \; (0.03)^* \\ -0.06 \; (0.04) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \ (0.07) \\ -0.00 \ (0.05) \\ 0.10 \ (0.04)^{**} \\ -0.09 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.04 \ (0.07) \\ 0.05 \ (0.06) \\ 0.00 \ (0.05) \\ -0.17 \ (0.07)^{***} \end{array}$
Age: ♀ Age: ♂	$egin{array}{c} -0.01 & (0.00) \\ 0.00 & (0.00) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.01) \\ 0.00 \; (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \; (0.01)^{**} \\ 0.00 \; (0.01) \end{array}$
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \; (0.05) \\ -0.06 \; (0.06) \end{array}$	$-0.02 (0.07) \\ -0.02 (0.10)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.07 \; (0.08) \\ 0.15 \; (0.11) \end{array}$
Educ. $\sigma^{*}$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\sigma^{*}$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\sigma^{*}$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.04 \; (0.05) \\ 0.01 \; (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \ (0.06) \\ 0.00 \ (0.09) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.07 \ (0.06) \\ -0.08 \ (0.08) \end{array}$
Info by man Info by woman $(= ref)$	$0.18 (0.05)^{***}$	$0.28 (0.07)^{***}$	0.12 (0.07)
Observations Log likelihood Deviance AIC BIC	$559 \\ -293.99 \\ 587.99 \\ 643.99 \\ 765.12$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -141.23 \\ 282.46 \\ 338.46 \\ 442.17 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -151.74 \\ 303.48 \\ 359.48 \\ 463.18 \end{array}$
*** $p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1$			

Table S6. Additional control variable: information supplied by man

\*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05; \*p < 0.1Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

		Dependent variabl	<i>e:</i>
	more HW: $\sigma$ (1)	more HW: $\sigma^{*}$ (2)	more CC: $\sigma$ <sup>*</sup> (3)
WFH: both WFH: only $\varphi$ WFH: only $\sigma^{*}$ WFH: nobody (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.14 \ (0.07)^* \\ 0.09 \ (0.10) \\ 0.25 \ (0.11)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.20 \; (0.09)^{**} \\ 0.10 \; (0.15) \\ 0.45 \; (0.13)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.08 \ (0.11) \\ -0.05 \ (0.12) \\ 0.32 \ (0.12)^{***} \end{array}$
HW before: $\varphi$ more HW before: $\varphi$ much more HW before: $\sigma$ (much) more HW before: equal (= $ref$ ) CC before: $\varphi$ more CC before: $\varphi$ much more CC before: $\sigma$ (much) more CC before: $equal$ (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \ (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.34 \ (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.08 \ (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.14 \ (0.06)^{**} \\ 0.35 \ (0.08)^{***} \\ 0.11 \ (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.21 \ (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.39 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.02 \ (0.12) \end{array}$
Higher income: $\varphi$ Higher income: $\sigma$ Equal income (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.14 \ (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.14 \ (0.06)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \ (0.10) \\ 0.20 \ (0.08)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \ (0.10) \\ 0.05 \ (0.09) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\varphi$ Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h: $\varphi$ (= ref)Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\sigma$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.05) \\ -0.02 \ (0.07) \\ -0.13 \ (0.14) \\ 0.20 \ (0.09)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.03 \ (0.06) \\ -0.00 \ (0.09) \\ -0.19 \ (0.11)^* \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.09 \ (0.05)^{*} \\ -0.05 \ (0.09) \\ 0.05 \ (0.23) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours $> 20h$ (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours $> 20h$ : $\sigma$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.20 \\ 0.09 \\ (0.09) \\ -0.00 \\ (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.16 \ (0.11) \\ 0.08 \ (0.10) \\ -0.22 \ (0.07)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.19 \\ 0.09 \\ (0.10) \\ -0.25 \\ (0.10)^{**} \end{array}$
Self-employed: $\bigcirc$ Employed: $\bigcirc$ (= ref) Self-employed: $\sigma$ Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)	-0.04 (0.07) $-0.09 (0.05)^*$	-0.06 (0.09) -0.07 (0.07)	$-0.15 (0.08)^{*}$ $-0.16 (0.07)^{**}$
No. children $0 - 2$ years No. children $3 - 5$ years No. children $6 - 9$ years No. children $10 - 14$ years	$\begin{array}{c} -0.04 \ (0.05) \\ -0.06 \ (0.04) \\ 0.06 \ (0.03) \\ -0.06 \ (0.04) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.03 \ (0.07) \\ -0.05 \ (0.05) \\ 0.07 \ (0.05) \\ -0.10 \ (0.06)^* \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \ (0.07) \\ 0.02 \ (0.06) \\ -0.00 \ (0.05) \\ -0.18 \ (0.07)^{***} \end{array}$
Age: $\varphi$ Age: $\sigma$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.00) \\ 0.01 \ (0.00) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.00 \; (0.01) \\ 0.01 \; (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.01)^{*} \\ 0.00 \; (0.01) \end{array}$
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= $ref$ ) Educ. $\sigma$ : Higher sec.	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \ (0.05) \\ -0.02 \ (0.07) \\ 0.02 \ (0.05) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \ (0.07) \\ 0.02 \ (0.10) \\ 0.00 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06 \ (0.08) \\ 0.17 \ (0.11) \\ 0.05 \ (0.06) \end{array}$
Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Tertiary (= $ref$ )	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01(0.08)	-0.10(0.08)
Observations Log likelihood Deviance AIC BIC	$591 \\ -316.40 \\ 632.80 \\ 686.80 \\ 805.11$	$\begin{array}{r} 313 \\ -157.33 \\ 314.67 \\ 368.67 \\ 469.82 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 313\\ -161.51\\ 323.02\\ 377.02\\ 478.17\end{array}$

Table S7. Alternative income variable: subjective assessment

 $^{***}p<0.01;$   $^{**}p<0.05;$   $^{*}p<0.1$  Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

The sample is larger due to a smaller number of missing values in the alternative income variable.

		Dependent variable:	
	more HW: $\sigma$ (1)	more HW: $\sigma$ (2)	more CC: $\sigma$ (3)
WFH: both WFH: only $\varphi$ WFH: only $\sigma^*$ WFH: nobody (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1432 \ (0.0714)^{**} \\ 0.0877 \ (0.0954) \\ 0.2040 \ (0.1151)^{*} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1525 \ (0.1002) \\ 0.0057 \ (0.1356) \\ 0.3122 \ (0.1529)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0412 \; (0.1067) \\ -0.1394 \; (0.1042) \\ 0.1483 \; (0.1291) \end{array}$
HW before: $\circ$ more HW before: $\circ$ much more HW before: $\sigma$ (much) more HW before: equal (= ref) CC before: $\circ$ more CC before: $\circ$ much more	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1641 \ (0.0474)^{***} \\ 0.3242 \ (0.0632)^{***} \\ 0.0657 \ (0.0673) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1375 \ (0.0640)^{**} \\ 0.3275 \ (0.0846)^{***} \\ 0.1225 \ (0.1044) \end{array}$	$0.2422 (0.0606)^{***}$ $0.4100 (0.0619)^{***}$
CC before: $rac{1}{\circ}$ (much more CC before: $rac{1}{\circ}$ (much) more CC before: equal (= $ref$ )			0.0461 (0.0013) 0.0461 (0.1159)
Higher income: $\varphi$ Higher income: $\sigma^{*}$ Equal income (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.1561 \ (0.0696)^{**} \\ 0.1008 \ (0.0444)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.2229  \left( 0.1081 \right)^{**} \\ 0.1188  \left( 0.0579 \right)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0066 \; (0.0987) \\ 0.0948 \; (0.0597) \end{array}$
Working hours: ♀ Working hours: ♂	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0000 \ (0.0022) \\ -0.0051 \ (0.0019)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.0002 \ (0.0031) \\ -0.0055 \ (0.0024)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0059 \ (0.0033)^{*} \\ -0.0126 \ (0.0032)^{***} \end{array}$
Self-employed: $\varphi$ Employed: $\varphi$ (= ref) Self-employed: $\sigma$ Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)	-0.0641 (0.0609) -0.0553 (0.0531)	-0.0873 (0.0760) 0.0233 (0.0733)	$-0.2027 (0.0692)^{***}$ -0.0576 (0.0768)
No. children 0 – 2 years No. children 3 – 5 years No. children 6 – 9 years No. children 10 – 14 years	$\begin{array}{c} -0.0528 \ (0.0543) \\ -0.0687 \ (0.0427) \\ 0.0498 \ (0.0340) \\ -0.0643 \ (0.0416) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0232 \ (0.0741) \\ -0.0303 \ (0.0549) \\ 0.0697 \ (0.0435) \\ -0.0835 \ (0.0581) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0365 \; (0.0710) \\ 0.0350 \; (0.0548) \\ -0.0100 \; (0.0446) \\ -0.1523 \; (0.0630)^{**} \end{array}$
Age: $\varphi$ Age: $\sigma$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.0048 \ (0.0044) \\ 0.0034 \ (0.0041) \end{array}$	$egin{array}{c} 0.0053 & (0.0070) \ 0.0029 & (0.0055) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0141 \; (0.0077)^* \\ 0.0022 \; (0.0059) \end{array}$
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0234 \; (0.0553) \\ -0.0425 \; (0.0666) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0177 \; (0.0803) \\ 0.0066 \; (0.1040) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0975 \; (0.0837) \\ 0.1494 \; (0.1043) \end{array}$
Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\sigma^*$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0119 \ (0.0467) \\ -0.0074 \ (0.0557) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.0026 \ (0.0620) \\ -0.0328 \ (0.0846) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0524 \ (0.0632) \\ -0.1096 \ (0.0809) \end{array}$
Observations Log likelihood Deviance AIC BIC	$559 \\ -297.8869 \\ 595.7739 \\ 641.7739 \\ 741.2753$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -150.0648 \\ 300.1296 \\ 346.1296 \\ 431.3166 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -149.3522 \\ 298.7045 \\ 344.7045 \\ 429.8914 \end{array}$

Table S8. Alternative working hours variable: continuous working hours	Table	<b>S8</b> .	Alternative	working	hours	variable:	continuous	working	hours
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 $^{***}p<0.01;$ <br/> $^{**}p<0.05;$ <br/> $^{*}p<0.1$  Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

Table S9. Alternative working hours variable: part-time  $\leq 35h$ 

	D 1 1 1 1	
	A	
more HW: ♂ (1)	more HW: $\sigma$ (2)	more CC: $\sigma^{*}$ (3)
$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \ (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.10 \ (0.10) \\ 0.22 \ (0.12)^{*} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.18 \ (0.10)^* \\ 0.04 \ (0.14) \\ 0.36 \ (0.15)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.10 \ (0.10) \\ -0.06 \ (0.12) \\ 0.23 \ (0.13)^* \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 0.16 \ (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.32 \ (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.06 \ (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.14 \ (0.06)^{**} \\ 0.35 \ (0.08)^{***} \\ 0.12 \ (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.23 \ (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.39 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.04 \ (0.12) \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 0.16 \ (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.09 \ (0.04)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.22 \; (0.11)^{**} \\ 0.11 \; (0.06)^{*} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \; (0.11) \\ 0.05 \; (0.06) \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.05) \\ -0.03 \; (0.08) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.07) \\ -0.04 \; (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.08) \\ -0.02 \ (0.11) \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 0.08 \; (0.05) \\ 0.08 \; (0.08) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \; (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.01 \; (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.21 \ (0.07)^{***} \\ 0.11 \ (0.10) \end{array}$
-0.06 (0.06) -0.07 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07)	$-0.21 (0.07)^{***}$ -0.12 (0.07)
-0.05(0.05)	0.02(0.07)	0.03(0.07)
$-0.07~(0.04)^{*}$	-0.04(0.06)	0.01(0.06)
0.05(0.03)	0.07(0.04)	-0.02(0.05)
-0.06(0.04)	-0.08(0.06)	$-0.17 (0.07)^{**}$
$\begin{array}{c} -0.00 \ (0.00) \\ 0.00 \ (0.00) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.01) \\ 0.00 \; (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \ (0.01)^{**} \\ 0.00 \ (0.01) \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \; (0.06) \\ -0.04 \; (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.08) \\ 0.02 \; (0.11) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \ (0.09) \\ 0.15 \ (0.11) \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \ (0.05) \\ 0.00 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.06) \\ -0.01 \; (0.09) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.07 \; (0.07) \\ -0.07 \; (0.09) \end{array}$
559	300	300
-299.98	-150.60	-158.23
599.95	301.20	316.47
649.95	351.20	366.47
	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15\ (0.07)^{**}\\ 0.10\ (0.10)\\ 0.22\ (0.12)^{*}\\ \hline\\ 0.16\ (0.05)^{***}\\ 0.32\ (0.06)^{***}\\ 0.32\ (0.06)^{***}\\ 0.06\ (0.07)^{**}\\ \hline\\ 0.09\ (0.04)^{**}\\ \hline\\ 0.09\ (0.04)^{**}\\ \hline\\ 0.01\ (0.05)\\ -0.03\ (0.08)\\ \hline\\ 0.08\ (0.05)\\ 0.08\ (0.08)\\ \hline\\ -0.06\ (0.06)\\ \hline\\ -0.07\ (0.05)\\ \hline\\ -0.07\ (0.04)^{*}\\ 0.05\ (0.03)\\ -0.06\ (0.04)^{*}\\ \hline\\ 0.05\ (0.03)\\ -0.06\ (0.04)^{*}\\ \hline\\ 0.05\ (0.03)\\ -0.06\ (0.04)\\ \hline\\ -0.00\ (0.00)\\ \hline\\ 0.03\ (0.06)\\ -0.04\ (0.07)\\ \hline\\ 0.02\ (0.05)\\ 0.00\ (0.06)\\ \hline\\ \hline\\ 559\\ -299.98\\ \hline\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c cccc} (1) & (2) \\ \hline 0.15 & (0.07)^{**} & 0.18 & (0.10)^{*} \\ 0.10 & (0.10) & 0.04 & (0.14) \\ 0.22 & (0.12)^{*} & 0.36 & (0.15)^{**} \\ \hline 0.32 & (0.06)^{***} & 0.35 & (0.08)^{***} \\ \hline 0.32 & (0.06)^{***} & 0.35 & (0.08)^{***} \\ \hline 0.06 & (0.07) & 0.12 & (0.10) \\ \hline \end{array}$

\*\*\*<br/> p<0.01;\*\*p<0.05;\*p<0.1 Note: WFH=working from home; HW=<br/>housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

		Dependent variable	:
	more HW: ♂	more HW: ♂	more CC: ♂
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(1)	(2)	(5)
WFH: both	$0.15 (0.07)^{**}$	$0.19 (0.10)^{**}$	0.14(0.10)
WFH: only $\varphi$	0.10(0.01) 0.10(0.10)	0.04(0.15)	-0.03(0.12)
WFH: only $\sigma$	$0.10(0.10)^{*}$	$0.43 (0.13)^{***}$	$0.35 (0.12)^{***}$
WFH: nobody $(= ref)$	0.22(0.12)	0.45(0.15)	0.35(0.12)
wFII: hobody $(= 7ej)$			
HW before: $\circ$ more	$0.17 (0.05)^{***}$	$0.15 (0.06)^{**}$	
HW before: $\varphi$ much more	$0.33(0.06)^{***}$	$0.33(0.08)^{***}$	
HW before: $\vec{\sigma}$ (much) more	0.07(0.07)	0.17(0.11)	
HW before: equal $(= ref)$		- (- )	
CC before: $\mathcal{Q}$ more			$0.20 (0.07)^{***}$
$CC$ before: $\mathcal{Q}$ much more			$0.35 (0.07)^{***}$
CC before: $\sigma$ (much) more			0.05(0.01) 0.05(0.12)
CC before: equal $(= ref)$			0.00 (0.12)
CC before. equal (= <i>rej</i> )			
Higher income: $\mathcal{Q}$	$0.18 (0.07)^{**}$	$0.24 \ (0.11)^{**}$	-0.00(0.11)
Higher income:	$0.09(0.04)^{**}$	$0.10(0.06)^{*}$	0.06 (0.06)
Equal income $(= ref)$			× /
,	0.01 (0.07)	0.00 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)**
Working hours ≤20h: ♀	0.01(0.05)	-0.02(0.06)	$-0.13(0.06)^{**}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\varphi$	-0.01(0.08)	0.01(0.10)	-0.07(0.09)
Working hours >20h (ST): $\varphi$	-0.14(0.15)	-0.18(0.11)	0.05(0.21)
Working hours >20h: $\varphi$ (= ref)			
Working hours ≤20h: ♂	0.16(0.10)	$0.36 (0.13)^{***}$	$0.49 (0.09)^{***}$
Working hours ≤20h (ST): ♂	0.07(0.09)	0.03(0.10)	0.16(0.11)
Working hours >20h (ST): ♂	0.01(0.10)	$-0.18(0.10)^*$	$-0.23(0.11)^{**}$
Working hours >20h: $\sigma$ (= ref)		· · · ·	
	0.05 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)**
Self-employed: Q	-0.05(0.06)	-0.10(0.08)	$-0.19 \ (0.08)^{**}$
Employed: $\varphi$ (= ref)	()		/
Self-employed: d	-0.08(0.05)	-0.03(0.07)	$-0.16 (0.07)^{**}$
Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)			
No. children $0 - 2$ years	-0.05(0.06)	0.01(0.08)	0.02(0.07)
No. children $3-5$ years	-0.07(0.04)	-0.02(0.05)	0.04(0.06)
No. children $6 - 9$ years	0.05(0.04)	$0.10(0.05)^{**}$	-0.01(0.05)
No. children $10 - 14$ years	$-0.07 (0.04)^*$	-0.07(0.06)	$-0.15 (0.06)^{**}$
No. children 10 – 14 years	-0.07(0.04)	-0.07 (0.00)	-0.13 (0.00)
Age group 18 – 29: ♀	0.06(0.08)	0.02(0.15)	-0.07(0.12)
Age group $40 - 49$ : 9	-0.01(0.06)	0.01(0.07)	0.06(0.07)
Age group $50 - 59$ : $\circ$	-0.08(0.07)	0.18(0.15)	$0.25(0.14)^*$
Age group $>59: \varphi$	$-0.19(0.10)^{*}$	()	× /
Age group $30 - 39$ : $\circ$ (= ref)	(00)		
Age group $18 - 29$ : $\sigma$	-0.06(0.08)	$-0.19 (0.10)^*$	-0.19(0.12)
Age group $40 - 49$ : $7$	0.00(0.00) 0.01(0.06)	-0.03(0.07)	0.09(0.07)
Age group $50 - 59$ : $\sigma$	0.01(0.00) 0.05(0.08)	-0.04(0.09)	-0.06(0.10)
Age group $>59: \mathcal{O}$	0.03(0.03)	0.22(0.37)	0.21 (0.32)
Age group $30 - 39$ : $  (= ref) $	0.00 (0.10)	0.22 (0.01)	0.21 (0.02)
Educ. $Q$ : Higher sec.	0.03(0.06)	0.01(0.08)	0.12(0.09)
Educ. $Q$ : Lower sec.   prim.	-0.04(0.07)	0.03(0.11)	$0.23(0.11)^{**}$
Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= ref)			
Educ. $\sigma$ : Higher sec.	0.02(0.05)	0.01(0.06)	0.08(0.07)
Educ. ♂ : Lower sec.   prim.	-0.01(0.06)	-0.04(0.08)	-0.12(0.08)
Educ. $\sigma$ : Tertiary (= ref)	. /	. /	
Observations	559	300	300
Log likelihood	-298.83	-147.55	-152.48
Deviance	597.65	295.09	304.95
AIC	663.65	359.09	368.95
BIC	806.41	477.62	487.47
*** $n < 0.01$ · ** $n < 0.05$ · * $n < 0.1$			

Table S10. Alternative age variable: age groups

\*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05; \* p < 0.1Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

	Dependent variable:		
	more HW: $\varphi$ (1)	$\begin{array}{c} \text{more HW: } \varphi \\ (2) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \text{more CC: } \varphi \\ (3) \end{array}$
WFH: both WFH: only $\varphi$ WFH: only $\sigma^{n}$ WFH: nobody (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} -0.11 \ (0.08) \\ -0.00 \ (0.08) \\ -0.03 \ (0.08) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.04 \; (0.11) \\ 0.09 \; (0.12) \\ 0.10 \; (0.14) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.03 \ (0.10) \\ 0.12 \ (0.12) \\ -0.03 \ (0.13) \end{array}$
HW before: $\varphi$ more HW before: $\varphi$ much more HW before: $\sigma$ (much) more HW before: equal (= $ref$ ) CC before: $\varphi$ more CC before: $\varphi$ much more CC before: $\sigma$ (much) more CC before: $equal$ (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \ (0.05) \\ -0.18 \ (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.18 \ (0.06)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.06) \\ -0.28 \ (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.01 \ (0.09) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.03 \ (0.06) \\ -0.38 \ (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.02 \ (0.09) \end{array}$
Higher income: $\varphi$ Higher income: $\sigma^*$ Equal income (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \ (0.06) \\ 0.04 \ (0.04) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.10 \; (0.09) \\ 0.02 \; (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.04 \ (0.10) \\ 0.07 \ (0.06) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\varphi$ Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\varphi$ Working hours >20h: $\varphi$ (= ref) Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\neg$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \ (0.05) \\ 0.17 \ (0.09)^* \\ 0.19 \ (0.28) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \ (0.07) \\ 0.11 \ (0.11) \\ 0.28 \ (0.27) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06 \ (0.06) \\ 0.02 \ (0.10) \\ 0.31 \ (0.21) \end{array}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours >20h (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours >20h: $\sigma$ (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \ (0.08) \\ -0.09 \ (0.09) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \ (0.11) \\ -0.05 \ (0.17) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.02 \ (0.10) \\ -0.02 \ (0.17) \end{array}$
Self-employed: $\varphi$ Employed: $\varphi$ (= ref) Self-employed: $\sigma$ Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)	-0.01 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06)	0.04 (0.10) 0.07 (0.09)	0.07 (0.10) -0.06 (0.08)
No. children $0 - 2$ years No. children $3 - 5$ years No. children $6 - 9$ years No. children $10 - 14$ years	$\begin{array}{c} 0.10 \ (0.05)^{**} \\ 0.09 \ (0.04)^{**} \\ -0.03 \ (0.04) \\ 0.06 \ (0.04)^{*} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.07 \ (0.08) \\ -0.04 \ (0.06) \\ -0.11 \ (0.05)^{**} \\ -0.04 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.00 \ (0.08) \\ -0.06 \ (0.06) \\ 0.07 \ (0.05) \\ 0.08 \ (0.06) \end{array}$
Age: ♀ Age: ♂	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.00) \\ -0.01 \; (0.00)^{*} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.01) \\ -0.02 \; (0.01)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.01) \\ -0.01 \ (0.01) \end{array}$
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \; (0.05) \\ -0.04 \; (0.07) \end{array}$	$-0.01 (0.09) \\ -0.02 (0.10)$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \ (0.09) \\ -0.04 \ (0.10) \end{array}$
Educ. $\sigma$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\sigma$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\sigma$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.04 \; (0.05) \\ -0.08 \; (0.05) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06 \; (0.07) \\ -0.11 \; (0.09) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.11 \ (0.06)^* \\ -0.11 \ (0.08) \end{array}$
Observations Log likelihood Deviance AIC BIC	$559 \\ -297.29 \\ 594.58 \\ 648.58 \\ 765.39$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -171.64 \\ 343.28 \\ 397.28 \\ 497.28 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -160.49 \\ 320.97 \\ 374.97 \\ 474.97 \end{array}$

Table S11. Alternative dependent variable: woman does more

\*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05; \* p < 0.1 Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

		Dependent variable:	
	more equal HW (1)	more equal HW (2)	more equal C (3)
WFH: both	$0.11 (0.06)^*$	$0.16 (0.07)^{**}$	$0.22 (0.08)^{**}$
WFH: only $Q$	-0.03(0.08)	0.01(0.12)	0.06(0.12)
WFH: only ♂	0.14(0.10)	$0.33(0.12)^{***}$	$0.28(0.10)^{**}$
WFH: nobody $(= ref)$			
HW before: equal	$-0.34 (0.03)^{***}$	$-0.30 (0.03)^{***}$	
HW before: ♀ more	$-0.10(0.04)^{***}$	$-0.13(0.05)^{***}$	
HW before: ♂ (much) more	$-0.12(0.04)^{***}$	$-0.10 (0.05)^*$	
HW before: $\varphi$ much more (= ref)			0.00 (0.00)**
CC before: equal			$-0.39 (0.03)^{**}$
CC before: $\mathcal{Q}$ more			$-0.13 (0.05)^{**}$
CC before: $\sigma$ (much) more CC before: $\varphi$ much more (= ref)			-0.11(0.07)
Higher income: $Q$	0.01 (0.06)	-0.06(0.10)	0.04 (0.11)
Higher income: ♂	0.05(0.04)	$0.13 (0.05)^{***}$	0.06(0.06)
Equal income $(= ref)$	( )	()	()
Working hours ≤20h: ♀	-0.01(0.04)	-0.05(0.05)	-0.04(0.06)
Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\circ$	$-0.09(0.05)^{*}$	-0.09(0.06)	-0.01(0.09)
Working hours >20h (ST): $\circ$	$-0.22(0.02)^{***}$	$-0.21(0.02)^{***}$	0.10(0.18)
Working hours >20h: $\circ$ (= ref)			( ) *4
Working hours $\leq 20h$ : $\sigma$	$0.17 (0.09)^*$	$0.38 (0.09)^{***}$	$0.26 (0.11)^{**}$
Working hours $\leq 20h$ (ST): $\sigma$	0.02(0.08)	0.06(0.10)	0.02(0.10)
Working hours >20h (ST): $\sigma$ Working hours >20h: $\sigma$ (= ref)	0.02(0.09)	-0.11(0.10)	-0.17(0.11)
Self-employed: Q	0.02 (0.06)	-0.06(0.06)	$-0.22 (0.06)^{**}$
Employed: $\varphi$ (= ref)	0.02 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.22 (0.00)
Self-employed: 7	$-0.08 (0.05)^{*}$	-0.01(0.07)	$-0.14(0.07)^{**}$
Employed: $\sigma$ (= ref)			
No. children $0 - 2$ years	-0.01(0.04)	-0.03(0.07)	0.07(0.07)
No. children $3-5$ years	$-0.07(0.04)^{*}$	-0.07(0.05)	0.03(0.05)
No. children $6 - 9$ years	-0.02(0.03)	-0.02(0.04)	-0.03(0.04)
No. children 10 – 14 years	-0.06(0.04)	$-0.12(0.06)^{**}$	-0.06(0.05)
Age: $\circ$	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.01)	0.01(0.01)
Age: ♂	-0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.01)
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec.	0.01(0.05)	0.04(0.07)	0.05(0.08)
Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim.	-0.02(0.06)	0.11(0.10)	0.09(0.10)
Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= $ref$ )	0.04(0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.00(0.06)
Educ. $\sigma$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\sigma$ : Lower sec.   prim.	0.04(0.04) 0.02(0.05)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \; (0.05) \\ 0.00 \; (0.08) \end{array}$	0.00(0.08) 0.00(0.09)
Educ. $\sigma$ : Tertiary (= ref)	0.02 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.05)
Observations	559	300	300
Log likelihood	-227.19	-106.98	-130.29
Deviance	454.37	213.96	260.57
AIC	508.37	267.96	314.57
BIC	625.18	367.96	414.57

	Dependent variable:			
	$\begin{array}{c} \text{more HW: } \wp \\ (1) \end{array}$	more HW: $\varphi$ (2)	more CC: $\varphi$ (3)	
WFH: both WFH: only $\varphi$ WFH: only $\sigma$ WFH: nobody (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \ (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.11 \ (0.10) \\ 0.23 \ (0.12)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.19 \ (0.10)^{**} \\ 0.06 \ (0.15) \\ 0.42 \ (0.14)^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \ (0.10) \\ -0.05 \ (0.12) \\ 0.30 \ (0.12)^{**} \end{array}$	
HW before: $\[mathcal{Q}\]$ more HW before: $\[mathcal{Q}\]$ much more HW before: $\[mathcal{Q}\]$ (much) more HW before: $\[mathcal{Q}\]$ much more (= ref) CC before: $\[mathcal{Q}\]$ more CC before: $\[mathcal{Q}\]$ much more	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \ (0.05)^{***} \\ 0.32 \ (0.06)^{***} \\ 0.07 \ (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.15 \; (0.06)^{**} \\ 0.33 \; (0.08)^{***} \\ 0.14 \; (0.11) \end{array}$	$0.21 (0.06)^{***}$ $0.36 (0.07)^{***}$	
CC before: $\circ$ <sup>*</sup> (much) more CC before: $\circ$ <sup>*</sup> much more (= <i>ref</i> )			0.03(0.12)	
Higher income: $\varphi$ Higher income: $\sigma^{*}$ Equal income (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.17 \; (0.07)^{**} \\ 0.09 \; (0.04)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.21 \ (0.11)^{**} \\ 0.11 \ (0.06)^{*} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \; (0.10) \\ 0.06 \; (0.06) \end{array}$	
Working hours $\langle =20h; \varphi$ Working hours $\langle =20h (ST); \varphi$ Working hours $\rangle 20h (ST); \varphi$ Working hours $\rangle 20h; \varphi$ (= $ref$ )	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.05) \\ -0.01 \; (0.08) \\ -0.13 \; (0.15) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.01 \; (0.06) \\ 0.01 \; (0.09) \\ -0.18 \; (0.11)^* \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.11 \; (0.06)^* \\ -0.03 \; (0.09) \\ 0.05 \; (0.22) \end{array}$	
Working hours <=20h: d Working hours <=20h (ST): d Working hours >20h (ST): d Working hours >20h: d (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.16 \; (0.10) \\ 0.06 \; (0.09) \\ 0.01 \; (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.35 \ (0.13)^{***} \\ 0.03 \ (0.10) \\ -0.19 \ (0.09)^{**} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.46 \; (0.09)^{***} \\ 0.14 \; (0.11) \\ -0.24 \; (0.10)^{**} \end{array}$	
Self-employed: $\[mathcap{c}]$ Employed: $\[mathcap{c}]$ (= ref) Self-employed: $\[mathcap{c}]$ (= ref)	-0.06 (0.06) -0.08 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.08) -0.05 (0.07)	$-0.19 (0.07)^{***}$ $-0.18 (0.07)^{***}$	
No. children 0 – 2 years No. children 3 – 5 years No. children 6 – 9 years No. children 10 – 14 years	$\begin{array}{c} -0.05 \; (0.05) \\ -0.06 \; (0.04) \\ 0.06 \; (0.03) \\ -0.06 \; (0.04) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \ (0.07) \\ -0.02 \ (0.05) \\ 0.09 \ (0.04)^* \\ -0.09 \ (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \; (0.07) \\ 0.05 \; (0.06) \\ 0.00 \; (0.05) \\ -0.17 \; (0.07)^{**} \end{array}$	
Age: ♀ Age: ♂	$egin{array}{c} -0.00 & (0.00) \\ 0.00 & (0.00) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.01 \; (0.01) \\ 0.00 \; (0.01) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \ (0.01)^{**} \\ 0.00 \ (0.01) \end{array}$	
Educ. $\varphi$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\varphi$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\varphi$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \; (0.06) \\ -0.04 \; (0.07) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \ (0.08) \\ 0.01 \ (0.10) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.09 \; (0.08) \\ 0.16 \; (0.11) \end{array}$	
Educ. $\mathcal{F}$ : Higher sec. Educ. $\mathcal{F}$ : Lower sec.   prim. Educ. $\mathcal{F}$ : Tertiary (= ref)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \; (0.05) \\ -0.00 \; (0.06) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00 \; (0.06) \\ -0.02 \; (0.09) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.06 \; (0.06) \\ -0.09 \; (0.08) \end{array}$	
Observations Log likelihood Deviance AIC BIC	$559 \\ -299.90 \\ 599.81 \\ 653.81 \\ 770.61$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -148.58 \\ 297.15 \\ 351.15 \\ 451.16 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ -152.99 \\ 305.98 \\ 359.98 \\ 459.98 \end{array}$	

## Table S13. Linear probability model

\*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05; \*p < 0.1Note: WFH=working from home; HW=housework; CC=childcare; ST=short-time

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