



**PARteecipazione e CONflitto**

*\* The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies*

<http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco>

ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)

ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version)

**PACO, Issue 13(1) 2020: 883-895**

DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v13i1p883

Published in March 15, 2020

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## SYMPOSIUM – AUTHORS’ REPLAY

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### EVERYDAY EUROPE AND TOMORROW’S EUROPE: is there a future for Social Transnationalism? A response to readers.

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We thank our respondents for a set of very interesting commentaries. As with our own text, these thoughts and insights have themselves inevitably been overtaken by events outside our immediate academic control. As we write, the world has been enveloped in a pandemic that apparently strikes at the heart of globalisation (as it was), after a decade in which the growing threat of impending or emergent crises to it has been heavily signalled on all sides. Ironically — in terms of our core concerns — the present crisis, itself a truly global event, clearly intertwines with the mobilities and transactions that most defined our now lost era. A disease that has spread through expansive human travel and unconstrained human interaction has been tackled everywhere with immobility and social lockdown. Most likely, mobilities — and Europe itself — will not be the same after the coronavirus and the new and revised forms of governance it has imposed. Just how different it will be remains to be seen. It may not be right

just yet to lament *Die Welt von Gestern* in despairing Stefan Zweig-like mode (Zweig 1942), but surely neither can we count on Europe or the world going back to “business as usual”. Nearly everything everywhere currently seems to be defaulting to highly-bounded, primarily nationalised forms of governance, that may well veer towards extreme nationalist governmentality and even eugenics depending on the severity of the crisis. The pandemic is thus raising echoes of the Dark Continent—that is, Europe’s dismal pre-1945 past (see Mazower’s prescient work, 1998)—as well as many revived utopian ideas about community, collective responsibility, ecological consciousness, or a new and proactive focus on welfare coverage and public health. We will not be able to adjudicate on all this, but these stakes do need to be evoked. What is clear is that *Everyday Europe*, which was published in early 2019, written 2015 to 2019, and based on research conducted from 2010 to 2014, will now assuredly be a timepiece, the portrait of a decade and a lost world. But for that reason its chapters and its readers’ responses may have a great value in specifying the extent to which mobilities and cross-border “social transnationalism”, as we call it, had transformed and was transforming the continent before the fateful year 2020. It may then become a yardstick of what we are losing as we speak.

Our introduction to the volume signals that a shift was afoot in the years preceding this cataclysmic global event. The multiple economic and political crises experienced across the continent since 2008, notably a growing wave of populism challenging liberal democratic institutions everywhere, already anticipated a slowing down if not yet a reversal of the regional European integration project. This project was premised on an economic model based on the usual capitalist triumvirate of free moving capital, goods and services, to which it added a distinctive European hallmark: the free movement of persons. Although there are other related examples (for example in Latin America, or within various historical configurations of empire), the European Union’s highly elaborated legal framework of free movement and supranational citizenship were an exception in a globalized world where cross-country movements were still heavily constrained and shaped by nation-state borders. Implicit in this unique free movement regime was the expectation that the pattern of mobilities it enabled would densify and enhance European peace, cooperation and growth, principally via cross-border ties and interactions. It was, for sure, incomplete as a cosmopolitan project: notably, its internally open cross-border regime was built on fortified external controls and discriminations, and one marked in recent years by increasingly differentiated internal application of rights (i.e., Bruzelius et al 2017; Juverdeanu 2019). Yet, its everyday cosmopolitan effects, as we have always argued, were undeniable. And while elements of “neoliberalism” were present in the European economic model, it was nevertheless a dis-

tinctly regulated European capitalism on a regional scale, dedicated to growth and global competition, but also designed to alleviate differentiations between national markets and move towards a non-discriminatory equalisation between nationals across the continent—at least, in principle.

As several of the readers point out, as well as the book's Epilogue, one of the consequences of the European crisis of the last decade has been growing inequalities between countries, thus revealing the idealised model — stated in bold form above — to be illusory in certain respects. Some of this, though, should not be attributed to the European Union. As underlined in the response by Gemma Scalise, European integration has never removed starkly different regulatory and governance structures of the varied national labour markets and welfare states across the continent, nor productivity imbalances — with asymmetric competition and distribution effects between member states. Global financial trends and shifts in the balance of manufacturing and services in national contexts have impacted these international systems in different ways, perpetuating relations of dependency and domination between the rich North West, the more peripheral South, and the substantially lagged East of the continent. These relations were exacerbated by the financial crisis, generating disparities in the effects of the four freedoms: with “winners and losers” dynamics and human resources drain, both between South and North and East and West, as well as within countries — typically between global/globalising cities and marginal peripheries. This in turn has fuelled populist resentment, the so-called “Euroclash” or “left behind” backlash (Fligstein 2008; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018) — and, of course, as detailed by Russell King, Brexit.

Everyday Europe on the whole takes an upbeat view of the social practices resultant from regional integration—something it shares with our previous work, as King also points out. Our fundamental claim is that these social practices—the everyday social transnationalism that is a product of 50+ years of cross-border cooperation and transactions in the *Deutschian* mode — have drifted increasingly apart from collective expressions of political will. As Virginie Van Ingelgom and Luis Vila-Henninger point out, the book does not do much to bring these back together, while exploring many of the ways practices do not match identifications. In a world where we might have expected the post-national dimensions of social transnationalism to continue to lead (albeit hesitantly) towards more regional, if not global, political governance, it would indeed be a next step to dig deeper into how the two have become so (dis)connected. What are the mechanisms that relate transnational practices with supranational legitimacy across the locations and period under study? We hint at this issue in our Introduction when we mention the incipient self-constrained mobilities of some millennials (usually in the name of ecological sustainability, as well as evolving virtual social media practic-

es), as fundamentally diverging from the habits of their epically mobile predecessor generation, who pioneered regional and global mobilities as boundless consumption and self-exploration. The point is, of course, that the world might not be the same again after the coronavirus pandemic of 2020 — and that the ultra-mobile cosmopolitan Euro-globalists of the 1990s and 2000s (our generation—we were born in 1966-1968) are now going to lose out or change their ways. Possibly mobilities in the future will be more virtual, and social transnationalism, if it survives, will not be based so easily on endless, multiple, seemingly infinite, physical mobilities and interactions.

Whatever their scope and modalities, mobilities will be an important piece of the world to come, in which the prevailing societal organization will be defined within a triangle of long-term social, cultural and economic processes: individualization (which might still be expressed through demands for rights and mobilities), inequality (with elites manoeuvring to defend existing monopolies and privileges), and sustainability (with some kind of trade off to reconcile common interest, for example on carbon emissions). Europe remains a key area in which these tensions will have to find a balance. As in our previous work (together and individually), we maintain that the idea of freedom of movement is the cornerstone of European integration after WWII. And, ultimately, the legal foundation of free movement across EU member states is non-discrimination by nationality. Yet this could be what has been destroyed — temporarily if not forever — by the coronavirus crisis.

Imagine the re-nationalized world we may be about to inherit. We have been quarantined in our designated national unit (including foreigners marooned in foreign lands and joining its fate), and we have been told that all international travel is cancelled, except for those returning “home”. “Home” has been assumed everywhere to be one’s bounded nationality — with little or no thought for all the “exceptional” transnational individuals and (especially) families that populate the contemporary globe. Those that do return “home” do so with a penalty—a quarantine on arrival. We have sat it out in our nation-states, sharing a “national” fate. This has meant enduring in many places crude evocations of patriotic virtue and collective nationalist identity, of a kind that were becoming less powerful in a formerly diasporic, increasingly multicultural and post-national era. These modes of politics almost always overlook the substantial presence of resident (transnational) foreigners. The newly bounded, almost air-tight, national units are experiencing the virus differentially. At the end of this, borders will be opened one by one selectively with other nations on a preferential, highly negotiated basis — implying visas for individuals based on citizenship and health clearance, and most likely a whole range of stratified criteria, from fast track to absolute prohibition. Outside of freedom of movement, this world of stratified mobilities was already highly

developed (think of all the new modes of selective economic mobility developed within Asian capitalism; see Lindquist and Xiang 2018) — it was the norm in fact, mitigated only by weak regimes of human rights. Eugenic properties in future may be the standard, correlated most likely with wealth and privilege. Forget equality of European citizenship. Discrimination by nationality will be absolutely enshrined. Could being Italian or Spanish face a new penalty because of the virus going first there? Or will they be in a better position than Britons and Swedes, because it reached their countries later? Perhaps crude political power relations and favours for favours will yield a new regime of “unfreedom of movement” in Europe, and beyond? It may be stratified in all kinds of ways—but certainly favouring those of better, “healthy” stock, with national passport visas stamped for border clearance. So it is very hard to see at all how there will ever again be visa-less free movement of persons as it was in the European Union—even after an all clear. Can the EU itself hold together in these circumstances? We shall see. For sure, nations have relearned their best default position: Danish for the Danes, Poland for the Poles, France for the French (etc), minus as far as possible the weak, unfirm, and unhealthy, behind strictly controlled borders — and with as few “foreign” transnationals (by definition difficult to regulate or validate in health terms) as possible. It was economic integration which founded freedom of movement, pulling people so dramatically across borders with their evolving social transnationalism. And only economic necessity will prise this open again. But it is beginning to look like new autarchic economic models (already hinted at by the peculiar capitalist politics of Trump and Brexit) will rise to fill the void. Intriguingly, certain aspects of the new nation-state centred politics of community and shared public health destiny may be more egalitarian than the world of socially polarised transnationalism. Nation-states are relearning old welfarist truisms; pure market-driven “roll-back” neoliberalism may be in abeyance, while there may be a lot of continuity with “roll-out” neoliberal forms — that is, state-centred governmentality (on roll back and roll out neoliberalism, see Peck 2010). To these powers, there will surely be a heightened concern with the eugenic dimensions of managed citizenries: selecting the “fit” for economic purpose, and in judging how much un-healthiness the national welfare state can bear.

The pandemic is thus an exogeneous shock that may align with pre-existing tendencies—and longer term European political ideologies — albeit perversely. Coronavirus crowns the advance of neo-nationalism over the last decade and legitimizes it through an apparently universal imperative: physical survival. Staying safe means staying immobile. Social distancing (and the end of physical transactionalism) — the key remedy to the spread of the disease — may ascend to become a core principle of international relations. And perhaps national “performance” will start to be measured more serious-

ly by health outcomes, and not only GDP. Of course, this is only one possible scenario, and a longing for freedom and mobility may also resurface at the end of the pandemic. But this is likely to be even more stratified in its patterning than it ever was under “neoliberal” globalisation, let alone in Europe, where the rights and opportunities were substantially massified across social classes.

The tug of war between advocates of a de-nationalized world versus a re-nationalizing one had been going on for several years, arguably reaching its tipping point with the election of Donald Trump in 2016, a champion of sovereigntism at the head of the most powerful country of the globe. His dubbing of the virus as “foreign” epitomizes the whole re-nationalization project. Before that, among a list of atrocious acts as President, his attempted travel ban on eight nationalities to the US was the clear mark of a new kind of nationalist assertion against freedom of movement. It was a radical idea: to control entry of certain foreign nationals to the US territory purely according to the passport they are holding, rather than selecting them for differential entry, as they would be, in the remote sending context and at the border, according to (the usual) criteria: family unification rights, human capital levels, or some other points based rationale (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). Even though visa policies and border controls had always erected barriers between the rich world and developing regions, no policy has ever sought so blatantly to translate Milanovic’s basic source of global inequality into a legal political principle. In the context of the world’s most famous country of immigration, as well as the heart of the mobile global economy, it imposed a total discrimination by nationality on certain nationals, the complete stripping out of human rights vested in the person, alongside the dismissal of other qualities that may have enabled them to cross borders. Its opposite of course would be non-discrimination by nationality—alongside other forms of discrimination—with rights of personhood anchored in human rights; that is, rights to cross borders regardless of who you are (Soysal 2012). We can all see this post-national order in utopian form (Shachar 2009; Carens 2013). The EU gave it a regional scale, albeit one grounded more in pragmatic economic integration in law than a fully complete post-national political order of rights. On a global scale, human rights and other incipient post-national rights (such as GATS mobility provisions) created other partial free movement frameworks (Lavenex 2018). Trump’s sovereigntist ban scythed through these provisions for nationalities at the bottom of the global league of mobility privilege (Mau et al 2012). Its innovation points towards how, post-virus, in a more thoroughly re-nationalized world, the attribute of nationality alone (correlated with national health?) might be used to exclude whole categories of people from mobility rights.

EU freedom of movement in a world of predominantly nationalised migration and mobilities governance was an imperfect alternative form. It is no surprise sociologically that the benefits of such freedom might have been distributed unequally, as Alberta Andreotti remarks. The continual emphasis of many social and political scientists on this point, echoed still in some of the responses here, can get a little tedious. Of course, we live in a world where economic and human capital distributes the opportunities of mobility (ie, “motility”: Kaufmann et al 2004) absolutely unfairly. Of course, global elites move freely while the left behind unemployed barely leave their own housing estates; free movement from the poorer nations in the world is massively skewed towards the rich and educated; and a select range of a rich country’s citizens can think nothing of taking an international holiday in Florida, whereas a vast majority of the world’s population could never dream of even setting foot there. We know all that, and it would not be surprising if much of the same might be expected of European societies with freedom of movement rights. The fact is, though, that the EU made possible a different system grounded in generalised mobility rights, not the economic, political or legal selectivity enshrined in these other discriminatory practices. The specific impact of EU freedom of movement should be held against this benchmark — one mapped out in this volume, and other works in which we have been involved — not just conflated with the effects of other pre-existing or evolving global inequalities. The effects of freedom of movement of persons should also be quite clearly distinguished from the distribution effects of the other three freedoms: North / South and West / East inequalities in Europe have far deeper historical and economic roots than intra-EU migration.

Whatever their origin, the evidence presented and discussed in the volume does confirm that such inequalities associate substantially with social transnationalism. However, we find this to mainly happen at the extremes of social stratification — upper classes being highly mobile, lower classes being more likely to live localized lives (see chapter by Salamońska and Recchi) — while it is in the middle of the social hierarchy that the interesting action takes place, with lots of nuances in the quantity and quality of cross-border experiences. Distinctly echoing previous work by Diez-Medrano (2010), the chapter by Favell, Jensen and Reimer underlines the nationality-based framing of many of these nuances. Narratives of transnationalism incorporate macro-institutional and historically bounded contexts, hinting also at sub-national variations which the size and scope of the EUCROSS project did not allow us to explore in greater detail (as also Andreotti notes). Our cartography of familiarity with the European space in the chapter by Savage et al is nonetheless revealing of a major geographical divide: in spite of the multi-layered spread of social transnationalism, Central-Eastern Europe

remains overall a blind spot for Western and Southern Europeans. EU's territorial integration de jure is limited de facto not only vertically (as with between-country inequality) but also horizontally (as missing certain forms of social transnationalism across space). Even before the coronavirus crisis, transnationalism was only very partially bridging 'Old' and 'New' Europe — East European movers being the ones who most provided targeted connections between localities (see also Deutschmann et al 2018).

Despite certain absences in interconnectedness across the continent, EU accession did nevertheless create the possibility of East-West bridges through the rights it ultimately bestowed on mobile Eastern Europeans. The sheer impact to the national hierarchy and aggregate freedom in Europe because of this geopolitical event is hard to imagine being lost entirely, unless we were to imagine a roll back to the Cold War division of the continent. In law and opportunity if not (of course) in achieved sociological reality, Romanians were now formally equals of Danes. Extraordinary new migration and mobility systems have resulted — as documented in Barbulescu et al's chapter on Romanians in the book. Exactly what this counts for, and where its limits lie, is one of our key empirical questions. It is for this reason too, that we might have chosen to routinely include Romanians (or, as in our previous *Pioneers of European Integration*, Poles) in a study about European mobilities, rather than thinking of them as a subset of "immigration" studies, as nearly all previous comparable work has done. Furthermore, the standard inequality claim (that mobilities only benefit elites) does not pertain to the many lower to middle class East Europeans who have leveraged freedom of movement and everyday European mobilities; in fact, the costs here are borne by the sending society, not the migrants. Even so, this "brain" or "capital drain" has significant mitigating effects because of return investments, seen in Poland and Romania through both movements of persons and movements of capital. It is true that the decade of European crisis and the rise of populism has affected this — widening brain drain (from the South and the East), as well as sharpening the de facto discrimination experienced by movers (Lafleur and Stanek 2017; White et al 2018). But the basic point about the equalising effects of free movement across Europe — in both symbolic and to a large extent material terms — remains important.

We add to this another point, that is tangentially touched upon in various parts of the book, and that represents a promising avenue for future work: transnationalism is a buffer to discrimination in its own right. We already have a corpus of research findings that highlight the robust association of social transnationalism — and particularly geographical mobility — with more open and tolerant attitudes (eg, Mau et al 2008; Salamońska and Recchi 2016; more recently on France, Mayer et al 2019, 155). Further mixed-method studies — along the lines envisaged by Russell King, and Virginie Van



Ingelgom and Luis Vila-Henninger — will have to shed light on the dimensions of transnationalism that are more impactful, identifying the intervening social mechanisms and their cultural and political embeddedness.

Again, the macro-institutional framework sets the scene. Many other critical voices will make the obvious point that non-EU migrants are treated differently, both in social relations and in legal terms. Of course they are: because they don't have freedom of movement. They would in a utopian world order, which cosmopolitans (like us) might like to see. Alas, this is the real world! What non-EU citizens have to cope with is international migration in a nationalised status quo — and all its inequities. The standard default, in other words. But the EU did change things for Southern and Eastern Europe — an between country inequalities, adding a new kind of freedom to the world.

A more serious issue here might be that (for example) Romanian migration to Western Europe has replaced non-EU migration that would have happened otherwise. This is difficult to assess, lacking a counterfactual, even if there is clearly a pernicious relation between internal freedoms and external controls. But does this entirely wipe out the geopolitical effect of accession and the end of the Cold War? Western Europe's relation to international migrants was hardly fairer in previous decades; it was in fact determined mostly by exploitative colonial relations. A further dimension in play might be racism among EU nationals towards non-EU migrants "of colour". This has been documented and is an unpleasant reminder of the subordinate colonialism that also characterised East European global relations (Fox and Mogilnicka 2017; Balogun 2018). But the point here is that none of these arguments removes the basic progressive effect of the accession on inequality within Europe — and the fact we can now present the mobilities of Romanians alongside West Europeans on a similar, if not identical plane, and thereby "demigrantize" them, as Christine Barwick rightly observes (alluding to Dahinden 2016).

Our volume goes one step further by also considering a non-EU population in the same terms: Turks in Europe. Here social transnationalism has flourished even in the absence of freedom of movement. Perhaps, as Barwick suggests, we could have focused more on the issue of racism or discrimination faced by Romanian and Turkish movers, despite their de facto mobility opportunities and practices, and given a less upbeat impression of their inclusion in Everyday Europe. Part of *Pioneers of European Integration* was dedicated to this much more standard immigration approach (see Favell and Nebe 2009), while *Everyday Europe* chooses to emphasise how they are not so far behind their West European counterparts — and certainly not in relation to many other non-EU migrants. Their European identifications could also have borne more investigations — although our emphasis in the book is more on practices than identities.

Where Barwick's comments do identify a lacuna, it is in the racial and ethnic diversity within EU national groups. Happily her own work and the work of Michaela Benson (Barwick 2017; Benson and Lewis 2019) have begun to fill this out — revealing race and religion as residual stratification devices which undermine the effects of (equal) national and/or European citizenship. This can be linked to the persistence of colonial relations embedded in certain ways in the European project itself (Hansen and Jonsson 2015), and not being just residual effects of “evil” national empires. A great deal more work is needed on the viability of a decolonial, multi-racial cosmopolitanism in Europe; something which may expose the inherent “whiteness” of first generation Eurostars' European dream. However, to ask for new and additional studies does not alter the analytical point we have always wished to stress. Basically, we put it forward as an a fortiori argument: if you want to know where the limits of the post-national or the cosmopolitan lie, you have to study those who (theoretically) should face the least barriers or penalties for leaving the national home and living or working elsewhere, not those obviously penalised by disadvantage, prejudice or colonial legacies. This remains both the fundamental strength of our work and its clearest limitation, both here and in other projects.

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