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Conference Paper

Optimizing Political Capacity of the Pro-Democracy Actors Through the Welfare Political Bloc

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Abstract

The paper explores problems and options that are challenged by the actors of pro-democracy movements in Indonesia. Its aim is to seek a-well-and-measurable strategies that enable the actors to continue promoting and advancing the democracy condition. The main analytical tool used in the study is the political capacity. It is assumed that the development of democracy depends on how the actors actualize their political capacity in dealing with the obstacles and opting for possible alternatives. The study concludes that during the period of 2008–2013, the Indonesian pro-democracy actors have tendency to become populist. However, there are three groups of actor practicing populism in three different ways. The first and majority group is the actors who tend to work individually from and within parties or progressive politicians, using the charisma and popular claims, yet they are not part of the mass. The second smaller group consists of actors who associate themselves as part and work along with mass organizations, e.g. trade unions, and demand for their interests. The third is a minority group of actors who opt for building network with other equal actors and coordinating organizational based activities. This study will help the actors to optimize their capacity by creating different roles in their efforts to develop the bloc and deliver louder public voices, e.g. demanding welfare state. Such situation enables the actors to foster a common platform for the democracy movement.

Keywords: Democracy, Democratization, Indonesia, Political capacity, Populism.

1. Introduction

This article analyses problems and options encountered by actors of democracy movement in Indonesia. This analysis is aimed at finding a formulation for action applicable to encourage democracy development and progress. The main analytical tool used to reveal those problems and options is the political capacity of the actors. The

assumption is that the development of democracy is determined by how the actors actualize their political capacity to make use of the existing democracy opportunities and to overcome the emerging problems. In short, this is a study on democracy and democratization within the frame of transformative politics.

2. Democratization and Political Capacity

The study on the political capacity becomes essential especially in action-oriented study. Substantial democracy or the working democracy relies heavily on public capability to perform control on democratic political process. Thus, basically each society member needs to have a certain number of basic capacities, at least to access the existing rights and democracy institutions. Some of them, the so-called "main actors", who became the leading pioneers in democracy movement, need to possess not only the ability to access rights and democracy institutions, but also to have vision, interest and the power to seek possible alternatives as well and to build the most effective strategy to promote the advancement of rights and the progress of democracy institutions [1]. The ability to access rights and democracy institutions is meant as political capacity.

Hitherto, specific studies on the political capacity of actors as the basis of information in promoting democracy have not been a common practice. Studies on actors usually snap directly on actual past or ongoing efforts performed by pro-emocracy movement activists (e.g. [1–4]). From such studies we could extract information and knowledge on many opts of strategies and actions already taken, the failures and successes, and the implications upon the situation of democracy within various contexts. Somehow, there is no clear explanation as whether or not the options of strategies and actions are suitable with the political capacity of the actors.

Törnquist [5] succeeded in identifying the existing politicizing lines, the past and the present ones, taken by various civil society movements in Indonesia. These politicizing lines are (i) civil society and popular interest politics, (ii) dissident community politics, (iii) direct participation politics, (iv) public discourse politics, and (v) contract politics. Five other lines are politicizing through party system, that is by performing (vi) from inside front, (vii) the foundation of labor party, (viii) multi-sectoral party, (ix) ideology-based national party, and (x) local political party.

However, arrived at the conclusion that in the contrary that there is a hope for the improvement of democracy, those efforts to go politics did not seem so promising

in creating a good representative situation. From several cases of go politics learned by those two studies it is even found the indications of competition and horizontal conflicts occurred among fellow social movements. Apart from that, the more integrated efforts such as founding a party are also inhibited by the rules that obligate political party to go nation-wide. This attempt definitely requires fund too much and too difficult to accomplish by social movement.

Another lesson extracted from these two studies is that those pro-democracy actors are likely to become reactive in facing the political-democratic situation, only to then anticipate by developing strategy to merely respond the development that takes place. They do not fully realize the importance to observe and analyze the potential of political capacity owned, so that actions and strategies developed ended up with failures.

Actually, the design on the form and action of democratic movement established which is based on the appraisal on the political capacity of actors was already built. A study by Demos & UiO in Mundayat and Priyono [6] recommended the building of Democratic Political Bloc (DPB) or *Blok Politik Demokratik* (BPD). Recommendation for building the DPB was aimed at gathering all efforts of actors and democracy movements into one power (the bloc) by the formulation a common platform to serve as shared agenda with collective struggle. In using such means, actors and democracy movements through DPB would possess strong bargaining power in the face of formal political organizations such as political parties and parliaments [7].

In fact, the idea to form DPB could not be realized as planned. One prominent explanation to be highlighted based on obstacles and failures in implementing the DPB is that the recommendation was merely based on the general trend of political capacity. Behind the general trend, it is highly possible that there are several political capacities with different characters. In a situation like this, there are two possibilities to be taken. Firstly, the recommendation for DPB is not necessarily executable for all pro-democracy actors. Or secondly, pro-democracy actors need to share different and specific roles for the establishment of DPB. From this point of view it is essential that an analyses on the characteristic differences (or similarities) of political capacity is to be conducted.

3. Democratization through Actors' Capacity Transformation

3.1. Democracy as transformative politics

This study understood democracy as a never-ending dynamic process. As reflected in Beetham's definition [7] democracy is a popular control over public affairs on the base of citizen equality. Based on this definition, democracy can be connotated as a possible condition which enables every citizen to not only possess the rights to perform control over the consented affairs, but also to be able to actualize their political capacity in exercising their rights within agreed means. Moreover, democracy also concerns with those who formulate public affairs, with what is meant with popular control, and on whom and how popular control is exercised.

Along with that, democratization is a process of implementing the 'basic principles of democracy' - the universal and ever-present elements and recognized by a variety of main theories on democracy. The basic principles can be categorized into six big groups of rules and regulations regarding: (i) citizenship, (ii) rule of law and the principle of law equity, (iii) recognition, upholding and protection of human rights and other rights concerning basic needs, (iv) representation and democratic participation, (v) democratic government effective on central and local levels, and (vi) freedom to elaborate public discourse, cultural expression, academic freedom and the presence of civil society [8]. The implementation of those basic principles aims to attain each accomplishment of certain democratic situation marked by different situation characteristic compared with the previous situation. It is not a mere shifting process from authoritarian regime to democratic regime. Democratization considers as well the process on how a series of political regulation, for example citizenship rights, is accepted and applied to replace the previous practice which put more stress on applying rules based on tradition, violence or the use of power, inspiration, word of command from intellectuals and perceived leaders, etc. Democratization is also a process of how political regulation guarantees the expansion of the right to participate for people or groups that are previously perceived with no possession of such right; it is also about the process of how political process accommodate group interests broader than previously recognized, or also about the process in which political regulation arranges and guarantees on whom would be granted the rights and authority to participate in state institutions (C.f. [9, 10]).

In short, democratization cannot longer be viewed as a linear process that occurs upon a spectrum that ranges between authoritarian extreme and democratic extreme. There are too many working dimensions to be considered, so that democratization is

never-ending "process of becoming" and constantly requires intervention from actors engaged within.

By using such frame of democracy and democratization comprehension then understanding the development of democracy is really about understanding problems that emerge in the middle of political shift from a certain condition to a new different one, and then how actors actualize their political capacity to handle problems and simultaneously benefit from the available democratic options to direct change towards the betterment. This is what is meant by study on democratization within the frame of transformative politics.

3.2. Transformative politics in democratization in Indonesia

This writing is developed to be part of the effort in promoting democratization in Indonesia. This is to become part of research report on democracy assessment in collaboration with University of Gadjah Mada (UGM) and *Universitetet i Oslo* (UiO) that was conducted in 2013 under the so-called Power, Welfare and Democracy (PWD) project. This paper uses part of gathered data in that research as secondary data but aiming at a different focus from the one in report papers issued by UGM & UiO [12]. The UGM & UiO research itself is a step further from the long attempt of democratization transformation study in Indonesia by the means of democracy assessment initiated by Demos and UiO. Demos & UiO collaboration is a development of preliminary study on actors in Indonesia democratization by Professor Olle Törnquist (UiO) in collaboration with Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI). Their study result is documented in [1, 2]. Those two studies amended the necessity of developing a research frame to evaluate democracy achievements with special attention on the political capacity of pro-democracy actors. For this purpose, Demos was then founded, a new research institution focusing on democracy and human right issues. Research frame developed by Demos-UiO at first was tried out in 2003, and then further advanced in 2007. The writer was actively involved from the start in the development of the research frame and also became one of the researchers, in 2003 and in 2007. Demos & UiO study that was initiated in 2003 (and continued in 2007) provided a specific attention on the variable of actors' political capacity. For results see [6–13]. Their study was then followed up and elaborated using a broader research framework by UGM and UiO in 2013 [12, 13].

The analytical framework applied and developed to conduct democracy assessment paid a wide and deep attention to actors and their political capacity in their endeavor to face emerging problems and options from the available opportunities in order to

improve the quality of representation and public participation. That signifies their study as dynamic-transformative, and different from many other studies that tend to focus on static-informative evaluation on the institutional aspects and democracy procedure. Beyond the alternative frame developed by Demos-UGM-UiO, study on democracy evaluation can be grouped into six major categories. **First,** a study that solely and fully uses framework and principles on human rights as the basis for democracy evaluation. **Second,** a study focuses on principles of good governance and rule of law. **Third,** a study that is directed into creating democracy index, that is by linking democratic rights as functions from other variables, such as development or degree of conflict. **Fourth,** a study with audit method that aims at observing the strengths and weaknesses in democracy application in various dimensions. **Fifth,** studies with structural approach that do not straightforwardly observe aspects of democracy but appraising the economy and social condition as democracy outcome. **Sixth,** a study that focuses on appraisal upon quality of the performance of democracy institutions while considering the political context and setting [13].

A review over actors' capacity aspect enables us to capture interaction between actors and the dynamic process of democratization, rather than solely take a capture shot at the condition of democracy in static. The understanding of democratization process dynamic will in turn enable us to view democracy not only as a goal, but as a means as well. The later is important since efforts to improve democracy should have been carried out in democratic ways. Only few studies focused on how the actors, particularly pro-democracy actors, use their political capacity to improve representation and democracy. Most studies on democratization tend to focus more on performance improvement of many democracy institutions, such as central and local parliaments (DPR and DPRD) and other general election committees, as well as procedural and electoral system improvement. Indeed, it goes beyond the study that the advocacy steps of democracy are directed toward action on power-struggle competitive aspect by the means of electoral system.

Pro-democracy actors have to deal with context-specific problems. After the fall of New Order and reformation era rolled on, political transparency and freedom did increase dramatically. In a spur of the moment civil society organizations and labor unions operated actively in political arena. The movement of *go politics* [13] seemed to become a new trend in civil society sphere following the decades of self-distancing from formal political activities. Some of them entered political parties, some established political parties, and some mobilized direct participation through the initiation of budgeting and participatory planning imitating the successful pattern in Brazil and

Kerala. By far, those initiatives have not fully helped in improving popular representation situation. Those political movements tend to last sectoral, sporadic, or individual.

In analyzing the relatively macro democracy above, UGM & UiO democracy assessment explored political capacity of actors by five actors, namely (i) the capacity to overcome exclusion and inclusion, (ii) the ability to transform sources of economy, social, cultural and the use of power/violence strengths into authority or political power, (iii) the capacity to transform private issues into politics on public level, (iv) the capacity to mobilize and organize to support demands and policy change, and (v) the capacity to use and advance the existing mechanism for participation and representation.

4. Actors' Characteristics Based on Political Capacity Aspects

4.1. The capacity to overcome exclusion and perform political inclusion

The pro-democracy actors generally tend to become inclusive or behave open and accommodative toward other people's involvement in politics. This attitude is expressed by most pro-democracy actors as listed in the survey. This data certainly indicates a positive symptom in democratization process since it allows a wider opportunity for participation. Moreover, even actor groups beyond democracy movement, that is dominant actors, demonstrate a relatively high tendency over inclusion as well.

Nonetheless, inclusive attitude shown by pro-democracy actors is not actively actualized in the form of mass organizations. It is at least reflected in the three ways often applied by actors to tackle all kinds of exclusive practices, namely discourse dissemination via mass media, mobilization in the form of demonstrations/rallies and persuasive actions. This means that the actors are likely to position themselves as a patron for people in majority, particularly in putting forth discourse mastery.

On the other side, it is safe to say that they rarely establish and develop mass-based organizations as a power base to tackle exclusion. On certain level, this step implicates on excluding most people from organized politics. This situation may also explain why welfare issues longed by public are relatively insufficiently accommodated in political agenda.

4.2. The capacity to transform power basis into valid and authoritative power

The second aspect of political capacity is associated with sources of power used to achieve valid and legitimate authority. Pro-democracy actors have social basis, namely inter-figure connection, which is far greater than the cultural basis. On average more than half pro-democracy actors rely on the accumulation of social power via connection, while data on the cultural basis only estimates as many as 26 % of the cases. Data demonstrates a shift of tendency. From the previous two studies pro-democracy actors generally tend to rely on more on cultural power basis, namely knowledge and information [5]. Another shift is the increasing economy basis proportion among pro-democracy actors if compared with previous studies, yet still far lower compared to cases among dominant actors.

4.3. The capacity to bring issues into politics

There are three aspects evaluated to find out actors' capacity to establish agenda setting. Firstly, selected issues most frequently highlighted. Secondly, the kinds of frame actors bring forth issues to public discussion in the attempt to bring them into public concern. And thirdly, the medium used by actors to deliver issues to the public. Data gained shows that there are two groups of issue most frequently highlighted by alternative actors or pro-democracy actors; they are issues on welfare and issues on democracy and human rights, including pluralism. The emergence of welfare issue seems to be as a new symptom that develops over the recent years, if compared with the previous tendency that highlighted issues on democratization, human rights and good governance, including anti-corruption [5].

Such development provides a more serious hope on the future of democracy in Indonesia because actors frame priority issues with strategic significant ideas, not only reactive and one-time response to the cases emerging among the people. This is a different case compared with the previous study that shows the tendency of alternative actors to be reactive and jumping from one case to another [5]. One might say that the current development reflects that actors are influenced by certain ideological frame, whatever ideology that may influence them.

The capacity of pro-democracy actors is still limited to push issues for campaign within political channels. They are likely to highlight issues among public through interest organizations or to deliver it in mass media. The space used in mass media is limited

in opinion pages, while the attempt to influence a wider public space via television or to influence mass media news coverage agenda is even scarcer. It is possible that they do not possess sufficient economic sources for it.

4.4. The capacity to mobilize and organize public support

The restriction of pro-democracy actors to influence political agenda directly into political institutions should be able to be addressed with the ability to raise public support. On general, pro-democracy actors show a significant tendency in the use of populism to gain support. Alternative-patronage means - the forms of relation such as patron-client, but is not based on economy transaction that creates dependency-are also most favored.

Protection and support become the medium for exchange. This form of patronage-alternative is commonly found in the relationship between NGOs in Indonesia with their communities. Problem observed from data on capacity aspect is that the symptom of pro-democracy actors working separately remains strong, that there are no significant signs of them working integrated and in organized manner. Methods of populism and alternative patronage show the tendency to act individually or in groups rather than networking and building inter-organization collaboration. These methods have not become a prioritized alternative for pro-democracy actors in order to gain a wide public support.

In comparison with the previous survey, the current situation suggests a significant shift. The 2007 survey reveals that pro-democracy actors are inclined to have the capacity to build network with independent figures in their effort to mobilize support [6]. The predisposition of populism and alternative patronage methods is significant, yet they are not indicated as the most important capacities even if both combined. It is principal to observe this shift since it shows a stronger indication that actors are working on individual basis and leaving behind the means of organizing.

4.5. The capacity to utilize and advance participation and representation

The fifth and last political capacity links directly with the effort for the utilization and advancement of the quality of participation and representation. In this matter, we will witness the tendency of actors toward a number of alternatives of mechanism and

public issue channeling institutions into political lines ending up as democratic policy that regulates in general and is able to be controlled back by public.

Pro-democracy movement actors have the inclination to enter formal political institutions, through the pathway of head of region and legislative general election, and through the bureaucratic positions filled in by appointment as well. The way to do it is to choose to enter political party, others may choose to use independent path. They no longer maintain their old role as watch dog, but rather chose to involve themselves in the system to 'perform change from within'. In reality, as shown by [12, 13], such effort is not influential enough for the improvement of participation and representation. Instead of improving the performance of formal institutions, democracy movement actors are typically co-opted by oligarchy.

Current situation has undergone a slight change for there exists a new open and usable arena for pro-democracy actors beyond formal posts in the government. The inception of independent commissions such as National Commission of Human Rights, the Commission of Corruption Eradication, Broadcast Commission, etc, have opened up opportunities for the participation of non-state actors to influence political processes and state policy. This opportunity is compelling because these institutions are relatively independent from the direct pressures from political power. In addition, certainly the large remuneration argument is a puling factor not to be dismissed.

This phenomenon can also be seized from the available data on actors' capacity in the effort to reinforce representation and participation. The independent commissions become one of public institutions targeted by many pro-democracy actors to report public matters. So, instead of bring forth matters directly to government and bureaucracy, the actors of democracy movement prefer to rely on problems solution to their 'colleagues' in those independent commissions, or governance institutions of the cooperating government and stakeholders. This phenomenon signifies a fairly significant shift compared with previous situation that showed how pro-democracy actors were prone to own the capacity to bring forth and settle public matters to executive and legislative institutions [5].

More than simply shift orientation to state auxiliary body, currently the actors even tend to prioritize on the independent community-based governance and civil society institutions to settle public matters. In the case of the currently strengthening public issue tendency and the prioritized issue among pro-democracy actors, that is the welfare issue, certainly this shifting potentially create serious problem. Welfare issues such

as health and basic education services are inter-community issues and, more essentially, concern with the most basic citizen rights. Public matter settlement concerning welfare issues should not be carried out by community-based governance institutions. It is the state or democratic political institutions that should run the managing role.

5. Cluster Analyses on Aspects of Political Capacity

In this section the data on five aspects of the actors' political capacity is processed as one by using cluster analyses method. Cluster analyses is a method in statistical analyses that aims to separate objects into several groups of different characteristics, and to integrate objects of the same or similar characteristic into one group. In this case, pro-democracy actors will serve as object to be separated or integrated based on the differences and similarities of the owned political capacity variables. The result will show whether there are similarities and differences of the characters of political capacity among the actors of democracy movement so as to perceive them in groups of different characters.

The process of grouping is initially carried out to examine the number of groups with proportional composition of members. For that purpose the writer will attempt to seek the probability of grouping scenario within the range of 2 to 4 clusters. That range is perceived fairly ideal since in the end the goal of this grouping is to offer action recommendation for each group of political capacity character. Too many groups will only cause intricacy during the formulation of recommendation for each group.

Assessment result on the scenario of the amount of groups reveals that there is one stabile and dominant cluster filled with 886 cases, or 82 % of the whole amount of identified alternative actors. That dominant cluster does not show composition change in the three scenarios of grouping. The same does not apply to the remaining 193 cases. On the scenario of three-cluster grouping, the cases are broken down into two different clusters, which consist of 100 and 93 cases respectively. Meanwhile, in the four-cluster scenario, a new cluster emerged as a fraction from 93 cases into 82 and 11 cases respectively.

By observing membership composition in each cluster, I chose to resume with character analyses over the political capacity of pro-democracy movement actors by using the developed three-cluster scenario. Cluster 1 mainly consists of pro-democracy movement actors originated from *frontline* of Inter-clan, ethnic, and religion relation, Environment, Education and Women and children's rights. Cluster 2 mainly consists of

actors from *frontline* of Reformation of general election and party, Inter-clan, ethnic, and religion relation, Environment, Women and children' rights and Labor movement. Cluster 3 mainly consists of actors of democracy movement from the *frontline* of Education, Reformation of general election and party, Anti-corruption movement, and Human rights movement. Based on the local context, cluster 1 is mostly filled with pro-democracy actors from Western and Eastern Indonesia, while cluster 2 and cluster 3 are similarly dominated by actors from Western Indonesia.

6. Characteristic of Political Capacity in Each Cluster

6.1. The capacity to conduct political inclusion

In this aspect, pro-democracy actors in each cluster demonstrate inclusive tendency with different levels. The highest inclusive tendency is found in the first cluster (80 %), while the second and third are 67 % and 74 % respectively.

6.2. The capacity to transform power basis into valid and authoritative power

Regarding aspect of power basis, the three clusters indicates the similar tendency where each cluster does not differ significantly. The actors in the three clusters incline to own the capacity to accumulate social source of power (network, inter-figure connection) as the main basis for the power. Cluster 1 reveals the highest tendency regarding this social basis. Other source of power that is dominant as well in the three clusters is cultural power basis. The similar tendency in these three clusters confirms as well the tendency shift in the accumulation of power basis of pro-democracy actors, from the cultural basis (the 2003 and 2007 studies) to social basis.

6.3. The capacity to bring issues into politics

Pro-democracy actors tend to do framing from the ideas and issues they prioritize in the form of strategic issues with the background of certain ideology frame. The tendency can be observed in the first and second clusters. The third cluster strongly tends to use single issues while the tendency of strategic issue is not as strong as that in the other two clusters.

On the aspect of method of issue communication, the inter-cluster comparison reveals a slight variation. The tendency of cluster three actors to campaign by the means of activities in social organizations is relatively low compared with the tendency shown in cluster 1 and cluster 2. Instead, they seem to be likely active in voicing ideas by the means of mass media. Meanwhile, actors in cluster 2 are not active enough to perform issue politicization by the means of political parties, yet they tend to opt for mass action and demonstration methods.

6.4. The capacity to mobilize

In the highlight of mobilization method, cluster 1 and cluster 2 are characterized with a strong tendency toward the use of populism as the means to raise public support. The difference of those two lies in how they establish relation with their supporters. Cluster 1 tends to associate themselves as part of the people, while cluster 2 tends to express themselves as establishment demolisher and emerge as leaders offering protection.

On the other side, actors in cluster 3 tend to carry out coordination among various movements and organizations, and count on inter-figure network connection. They barely show the capacity to mobilize with populist ways and heavily base on charismatic figure. Compared to the other clusters, the third cluster also shows lack of mobilization capacity through the exchange of protection and support. Conversely, they tend to use patron-client relation and clan-based connections, compared with actors in cluster 1 and cluster 2.

6.5. The capacity to advance representation

Concerning the capacity to utilize public governance institutions and intermediary institutions, the three clusters seem to indicate a similar tendency. Community-based and civil society governance institutions such *Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama,* regional association, profession organization, etc. turned out to be the most trusted institutions in resolving public matters. Other governance institutions often used as a forum for settlement is state auxiliary body such as the National Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on Corruption Eradication, the National Commission on Violence against Women, the National Commission on General Election, and other independent commissions. Their tendency to deliver public affairs to political executive institutions (government and bureaucracy) is as low as the tendency toward private

governance institutions. This accentuates the impression that pro-democracy actors still work within the frame of patronage that relies on informality. Their close relation with government-civil society governance institutions is also attributed by the personal proximities bearing in mind that the commissioners in similar institutions are mostly originated from activists circle. This also explains why current social source of power in the form of connection has become the main power basis for pro-democracy actors.

Patronage political style is increasingly emphasized with the high tendency of the actors to make use of the informal representation channels. Public figures, media and NGOs are perceived to be the most important representation channels. The inclination towards the mechanism of informal representation is far above the average tendency towards political representation institutions. Nevertheless, there are very few actors who opt for the utilization of the alternatives beyond the scheme of democratic representation.

What we could conclude from these two aspects is that behind the tendency toward informality politics, populist and patronage style, the actors do not own the sufficient capacity to improve the performance of political representation. In other words, the tendency of populist political reinforcement and the ongoing patronage ways are not associated with the improvement of democratic representation!

7. Characterization of Political Capacity

The discussion over the tendency of each cluster in each aspect of political capacity has shown us that in outline there is no significant difference among the three clusters. The existing differences are not contrast enough to serve as tendency differentiator that can be supposed sourcing from, or directed towards, a prominent strategic difference. The most prominent differentiation can only be found in one aspect, namely performing mobilization.

The most fundamental similarity worth noted is that all three clusters do not demonstrate the capacity and orientation to establish political representation, yet pay more attention to the community-based mechanism and governance and state auxiliary body as public affair governing institutions. As pro-democracy actors, they do not show a strong tendency to connect their ideas and interest through the available political society channel, such as political parties and parliament, including establishing contact with politicians. This indicates as well that the actors do not have the capacity to

promote the advancement and improvement of democratic political representation institutions. Furthermore, this situation once again reflects that democratization in Indonesia contains an enormous problem in representation issue.

Nevertheless, behind the general trend that demonstrates similarities, there still exist the differences of character patterns that can be observed should we observe more carefully. Firstly, the actors in cluster 1 tend to be more inclusive than those in cluster 2 and cluster 3. Secondly, the actors in cluster 1 tend to overlook cultural power basis by simply prioritizing in social power basis. Yet the same does not apply on the actors in cluster 2 and 3 who still own capacity in the accumulation of cultural basis aside social basis. Nonetheless, as discussed previously, on the whole the actors demonstrate capacity shift from the old trend, namely shifting from prioritizing cultural basis to social basis.

The third distinction, the actors in cluster 1 tend to own capacity to influence and create public discourse by the means of activities in political parties. The actors in cluster 3 own the same capacity as well, in addition they demonstrate stronger capacity to influence discourse in the means of mass media as well. Cluster 2 actors do not show sufficient capacity to influence discourse by the means of activities in party, rather they combine the use of media and conducting demonstration of mass action.

Fourthly, the tendency to utilize populism method to raise support is perceived very dominant in cluster 1 and cluster 2, while in cluster 3 they tend to achieve organization based support through the development of network among fellow actors. It is in the aspect of mobilization capacity that the sharpest difference was observed.

Lastly, although the three clusters demonstrate the general trend to utilize informal intermediary institutions, actors in cluster 1 appear to have a slight stronger capacity to approach politicians and political parties. While actors in cluster 2 and cluster 3 show a little more inclination to approach interest organizations.

Referring from the notes on those similarities and differences, the characteristic of each cluster may be concluded as follows:

Cluster 1 reveals the high tendency of being inclusive, open to involvement from various parties including party-based political figures; therefore they attain strong social basis and connection. Their strength mainly lies in their ability to influence public discourse through or into interest groups and political parties using populist issues and combine them with certain charismatic figures. Hence, this cluster serves the opinion of reflecting the charismatic-populist character. However, actors with such character show their weakness in their loose relation with organized mass basis. The absence

of sufficient economy basis contributes as well to their vulnerability in balancing the power-relation they once established with political figures and parties. However, this is the most common character of political capacity in pro–democracy actors of this period.

Cluster 2 actors also reflect a strong populist character but do not establish it through political party. They own the relative capacity to build relation and mobilize organized mass by direct contacts with the people. The base in building their relationship is offering certain protection for the groups willing to give support. Therefore these actors own the enormous capacity to mobilize demonstration and mass action. The leaders or actors who have been working together in labor unions are one of the groups that reflect this kind of characters.

Cluster 3 actors, the smallest cluster, demonstrate the most striking capacity in organizing basis groups and building network with fellow independent actors. The actors in this cluster are inclined to respond and voice single issues frequently, and combine them with more strategic issues. Unlike cluster 1 and 2 actors, cluster 3 actors can be perceived as not having the capacity to mobilize with populist means. This cluster is more or less signified with a relatively greater orientation toward government and bureaucracy institutions.

To make comparison with study resulted by Demos & UiO in 2007 [6], the character of political capacity of pro-democracy actors shows a fairly significant shift. In the previous period, the most prominent capacity character was similar with that of cluster 3 at this time. The tendency toward charismatic-populist at that moment was not really absent, but rather emerged more as action option than capacity. Many actors chose to take populist shortcut as the main way as they viewed it most strategic to breaking down a deadlock during attempts in establishing popular democracy [14]. Perhaps that fosters the recent character of charismatic-populist to become the most common trend in political capacity.

8. The Use of Populism for Political Bloc

Study conducted by UGM & UiO reveals situation, problem and the most strategic options that developed during democratization process in the years ahead of 2013. Aside from the ongoing process of institutionalization through the setting up of various rules and regulations, populism political style and welfare issues have become the most prominent disposition in the midst of democratization process in the recent

years. Populism politics reinforcement that takes place due to clientelism politics-the previously strong character in Indonesia politics (e.g [6, 16]) is no longer perceived as sufficient to be the sole means in winning general election [5, 15]. The candidates require a broader support basis, and populism creates opportunity to reach the majority of people through campaigns on welfare issues.

The emerging populism was not really surprising. The term populism itself is originated from Latin "populous" that means 'the people' thereby makes it link strongly with democracy. As claimed by [16], where there is democracy, there is always populism. Besides, populist politics style is effective in liberating democracy practice from patronage cooptation. Even in democratic situation, patronage politics is likely to deter public participation open space in determining a fair political economy structure. Conversely, populism offers a different way of broadening public participation and support through campaigns of public service improvement.

The recent emergence of populism in the practice of democratic politics cannot be separated from the weak social institutions and democratic politics. In such situation, the figure of charismatic political actors has become an attractive alternative for public. However, the politics of charismatic populist that relies on figure or personal charisma has the potential to cause a new problem such as delegimation the rule of the game. Figure becomes central. This kind of situation very easily directs populist figures' actions to merely maintain their authority by restricting public freedom and applying unpopular policies.

Therefore, the rise of populist political style should be counterbalanced and monitored by strengthening the political capacity of pro-democracy actors. From the elaborated data above, we have come to the understanding that the populist political style acted by political elites in fact have impact upon issues campaigned by pro-democracy actors. This congruence has opened up opportunities to establish alliance among political elites and pro-democracy actors in many regions. But the available data does not present a clear answer on how the established alliance in the context of general election will be able to sustain in government and politics process until the next general election. It is worth noted that the period between two general elections is a very crucial period to press popular ideas and interests to have effect on policies made by the elected political elites who use populist political style.

The important meaning of the described portrait above is the actors of democracy movement, either populist majority groups or some actors with clientelistic character, abandon the project of democratic political representation reinforcement. Instead

of pushing reformation toward political representation institutions, they perform 'go politic' action for the straightforward purpose of gaining political authority. The characters of charismatic-populist, populist-patron, and alternative patronage have merely become the shortcut instrument in the process of power contestation through various electoral processes, or at least to support candidates or politicians who are believed that they will apply leadership in a democratic way.

Electoralism phenomenon does appear to be inescapable due to the use of two main approaches, namely the idea of liberal democracy and crafting democracy. The idea of liberal democracy assumes that democracy will surely work well immediately after everyone is guaranteed their political rights and freedoms. Therefore, democracy is principally a process of political rights and freedom contestation among the citizens. General election is a main platform for the contestation. The crafting approach completes the liberal democracy approach by prioritizing the building of institutions (rules and regulations) to support democracy. The assumption is that democracy institution structuring by the creation of rules and procedures will necessarily direct people's attitudes to become democratic [10].

It is the combination of liberal and crafting democracy that creates electoralism trend. Democracy building is understood as the building of democracy institutions that ensure political equity for everyone and the most concrete form of equal political right is the guarantee of the right to vote and be voted for everyone in electoral process. It looks like that this pitfall is also successful in trapping pro-democracy movement actors in electoralism behavior.

Another factor that possibly leads actors of democracy movement to direct their activities toward government and formal politics positions is the declining support from donor agencies. Since 2009, there has been a declining trend of donor agency support for civil society organizations. Instead, donor institutions focus their attention and support directly to government and bureaucracy institutions in order to promote the principle of good governance. This initiative is triggered by the issued Jakarta Commitment document by Indonesian government that arranged provisions about the mechanism of fund delivery and finance accountability in accordance with government budget cycle. The document was supported by 22 donor institutions with their intention to maintain a good relation with Indonesian government [17].

Aside from the focus shift toward good governance advancement, such model of donor support distribution will indirectly change part of the structure of actors' political capacity and various democracy movements. On the previous two studies (2003 and

2007), the power basis of alternative actors, for instance, is knowledge/cultural. The most recent study by UGM & UiO shows that the alternative actors begin to abandon that basis and switch toward the accumulation of political sources in the form of connection with influential figures. But there is no clear indication whether the connection between pro–democracy actors and political figures is carried on within an equal or unequal power-relation. Therefore, a crucial step to be maintained by pro-democracy actors is to seek proper forms of political activities to use their personal proximities with political elites and at the same time to press democratic ideas into future policy made by political leaders. To do so, pro-democracy actors need to maintain their relation with fellow actors in order to put more strength into their political bargaining power in the face of political elites. Establishing political bloc is one of the main ways to do.

9. Conclusion

This study shows that there is a relatively significant shift in the accumulation of social power basis of the pro-democracy actors. Most actors have been broadening their connection network with the parties and political figures, moving beyond building network with fellow actors in civil society sphere as they used to do. The connection with political figures and parties has succeeded in bringing them into the circle of authority-politics in many regions and influenced public discourses in a stronger position. Thus, these actors are no longer marginal and excluded. They are relatively successful in positioning themselves and influencing centers of political authority especially via the connection with political figures.

Yet, the nature of their existence in political environment remains personal (individual), not based on organizational basis support, despite that in quantity the proportion is relatively more massive. Concretely, they succeeded in performing vertical mobilization through the claim figures as leaders or certain constituent representation. Moreover, pro-democracy actors have not been able to strengthen their capacity in economy basis.

Another more principal problem is that they do not have the orientation and capacity to improve the performance of political representation institutions. Pro-democracy actors still hold the tendency to utilize channels of interest-based representation via

the contact with informal figures and civil society organizations. The relation with political society is relatively limited and merely used as populism and patronage instrument, not as medium of representation.

With such description, it is crucial to take into account the reinforcement for actors' political capacity by establishing a more organized movement and by possessing an explicit mandate. Such endeavor might help those actors to avoid being fragmented based on political groups they join, and also in order to prevent the actors' support for political figures from moving toward the practice of merely fulfilling economy interest.

The idea of Democratic Political Bloc (DPB) or *Blok Politik Demokratik* (BPD) as recommended by Demos & UiO appears to remain relevant and can be developed as an alternative of democratization strategy that is appropriate with the characteristics of political capacity of pro-democracy actors. The last survey reveals that demand for welfare-oriented policy or the "longing for welfare state" has been spreading on various levels and arenas. There is now a sufficient common basis to establish a network of Welfare Political Bloc (WPB) or *Blok Politik Kesejahteraan* (BPK). By highlighting welfare issues as common platform WPB works in accordance with the trend of figure-based politics which relies on populism. The later will facilitate WPB in establishing political communication with the politicians, including utilizing political representation channels to produce new welfare-oriented regulations, and enhance the performance of political representation institutions as well.

The WPB could become a strategic think tank that supplies formulations of public policies in welfare section. However, to serve this purpose, it is imperative for WPB to recruit economists, experts in political-economy, budgeting and public policy so that recommendations issued by WPB are truly based on the result of serious calculation and thinking rather than a mere jargon.

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