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## Countering-insurgency : a comparative analysis of campaigns in Malaya (1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980)

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**Countering-Insurgency: A Comparative Analysis of  
Campaigns in Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60) and  
Rhodesia (1964-1980)**

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## ABSTRACT

History has lessons for the present; could this be the case for modern counter-insurgency operations in countries resembling Iraq and Afghanistan? This research set out to study three historical counter-insurgencies campaigns in, Malaya (1947-1960), Kenya (1952-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980), with a view to establishing whether or not the Colonial authorities had a substantial advantage over modern forces when combating insurgencies. If this was the case, are these advantages transferable to aid forces involved in modern counter-insurgencies?

The research questions focussed on how important the role of the Colonial Forces was to the eventual outcome, examining the principal factors that contributed to their effectiveness? Included in this examination were aspects of strategy, together with an appreciation of the concept of 'hearts and minds', tactics and the evolution of counter-insurgency doctrine.

A qualitative research design was adopted, using a case study methodology based upon comparative analysis of the data collected. Case studies were constructed for the three conflicts, based around the narratives obtained from a series of semi-structured interviews, with surviving members of the security forces; predominately police and Special Branch. The primary data was coded, using a thematic framework developed from the Literature Review. These themes were then synthesised, analysed and interpreted in response to the research questions related to the perceived problem. Lastly, the findings were compared and contrasted to provide theoretical recommendations and conclusions.

The study indicated the significant role played by the Colonial Police Forces, especially Special Branch, which appears to have been instrumental in dominating initiatives against the rebels. Supporting the police, were Colonial army units together with locally recruited indigenous militias in a combined approach to prosecuting an effective counter-insurgency campaign. In addition, this was reinforced by the Colonial Government's ability to apply draconian legislation in support of the strategic plan, to reinforce the rule of law by the police, coupled with its ability to garner popular support through civil projects, such as schools, clinics and housing. Evolving counter-insurgency doctrine advocated the need to cut off the insurgents from their supplies, by separating them from the general population. Separation was achieved by the forced movement of the population into 'Protected Villages' backed up by food control, harsh collective punishments, detention and curfews. Further key beneficial factors for the Colonial Forces included their knowledge of religious customs,

culture and language, which enhanced their ability to gather vital intelligence direct from the population; rather than second hand.

Analysing the concept of 'hearts and minds' since 1947, indicated it was evolving as a strategy and was not operationally as well accepted as it is today. Although often considered a benevolent approach to gaining the support of the population, the research also demonstrated the antithesis of this approach occurred by the insurgents applying power over 'minds' of the population through intimidation, terrorism, and physiological control. This psychological control was achieved through sorcery, spirit mediums and the taking of oaths. Ultimately, political solutions not military ones ended the insurgencies.

The theoretical recommendations indicated that greater attention needs to be expended in training counter-insurgency forces to empathise with the local population when conducting overseas operations; especially improved knowledge of religious customs, culture and language. The outcome would enhance their capabilities through better population support resulting in superior intelligence.

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## **PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS**

A number of publications together with conference proceedings were generated from this research. The list follows together with the abstracts.

### **Publications**

Bailey, W. J. (2012). **Creating a counter-insurgency plan**: Elements required based upon a comparative analysis of research findings. Paper presented at the 5th Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, Perth, Western Australia.

#### **Abstract: Creating a Counter-Insurgency Plan:**

The development of a counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary process: no two insurgencies are the same. However, certain fundamental principals remain consistent and these can be applied to meet the required circumstances. The creation of an overarching plan encompassing a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority is central. Therefore, understanding the basics allows for the development of a tactical strategy based upon a structured plan. Compiling the 'Plan' should be based upon the lessons learnt from the past. To this end, the methodology used is supported by a literature review and interviews from participants in a limited assessment of the two historical conflicts: Malaya and Kenya.

Based upon the findings, a condensed table is presented to aid analysis, using a French doctrinal approach as a tool for interpretation. In addition, this is supported by quotes from the respondents involved in the research process. These findings are the preliminary results of a research study looking at what was effective during the prosecution of the selected insurgencies. Outcomes indicate that the fundamental principals are pertinent today and are therefore generally applicable.

Bailey, W. J. (2011, December, 2011). **Case Studies**: A Security science research methodology. Paper presented at the 4th Australian Security and Intelligence Conference., Perth, Australia.

#### **Abstract: Case Studies**

As a relatively new discipline Security Science is searching for academic acceptance very often combining established hard science approaches with those of Social Science and Humanities. Methodologies need to be developed to equip the discipline to conduct more varied research. One such method is the use of the case study approach, as it allows multiple

inputs from a variety of sources to build up the research into a central review, allowing conclusions and recommendations to be drawn from the data. Though relatively common in the business world for conducting reports, this has not hitherto been the position in academia

The objective of this speculative paper develops a process used for research and seeks to open a debate as to the importance of case studies in the security field; the paper argues that it is an underutilized research paradigm. The merits of using the case study structure will be discussed, including the debate over positivism and constructivism, which will then lead on to a potential analytical method called Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA); used predominately in ethnographical studies. The importance of using a pilot study before proceeding to the full study is also suggested to avoid costly mistakes later in the research.

Bailey, W. J. (2010). **Hearts and minds, pseudo gangs and counter-insurgency:** Based upon experiences from previous campaigns in Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Paper presented at the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Perth, Australia.

#### **Abstract: Hearts and Minds, Pseudo Gangs and Counter-Insurgency**

Pseudo Gangs were used with great effect in both the Kenya (1952-60) and Malaya (1948-60) and later in the Rhodesian campaign (1964-1979) Although this type of activity was not new to counter-insurgency, with the British using a similar tactic in the Boer war (1899-1902); it was certainly perfected during these later campaigns producing good results. Capt Kitson in Kenya together with Ian Henderson of the Kenya Police Special Branch are often cited as the instigators of this concept, which was developed during the ‘Emergency’.

The principal concept is to ‘turn’ actual insurgents through a series of inducements to change sides and join the counter insurgency but not as regular forces. Rather they are to keep their actual identities or their ‘assumed’ identities and return to the conflict areas as part of a ‘gang’ which would be made to appear as if it is still fighting for the insurgents. This ‘pseudo’ gang would then rejoin or flush out the opposition and either capture, gain further intelligence or eliminate them. Recent research conducted by Bailey. W. into the Kenya campaign for a PhD thesis will be used to expand this model as one that could be developed for current conflicts against insurgents.

#### **Conference Presentations**

Bailey, W. J. (2011). **Counter-insurgency and intelligence gathering tactics using pseudo gangs:** Kenya (1952-60), Malaya (1948-60) and Rhodesia (1964-1979). Paper presented at

the Conference, *Threat from below: How intelligence counters irregular adversaries*, Kings College, London, England.

**Abstract: Counter-Insurgency and Intelligence Gathering Tactics Using Pseudo Gangs**

The capacity to control the psychological sphere of influence is crucial to fighting of asymmetrical wars as much as gaining intelligence is to undermining the enemy. ‘Pseudo gangs’ was a tactic which combined both of these elements making it a very effective tool in counter insurgency operations. The Colonial forces in Kenya, during the Mau Mau Emergency, are credited with instigating this tactic, which was copied in the Malayan Emergency and later in Rhodesian ‘Bush-War’ too. Although not totally new to counter-insurgency tactics, the use of such phoney gangs was certainly perfected during these campaigns producing excellent results.

Bailey, W. J., & McGill, A. (2008). **Freedom fighters or terrorists by another name**. Paper presented at the 1st Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, Perth, Australia.

**Abstract: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists by Another Name**

The term “terrorism” has been over-used in recent history. This has led to the term losing some of value as its meaning has been altered. This essay will refute the statement that freedom fighters are but terrorists of a different name. It will be argued that there are certain actions and practices that separate the two. Performing these behaviours will cause a group to fall under either one heading or the other. Defining Terrorism has been a challenge in recent history. Early usage of word stems from the writings of Russian Revolutionaries, modern day definitions have changed somewhat from these early beginnings.

The term freedom fighters first emerged in British controlled Palestine with creation of the group “Freedom Fighters for Israel”. Differentiating between freedom fighters and terrorists involves the identification of a number of issues including; who has the right to label activist groups, the requirement of popular support, freedom as a primary goal, their targets and areas of operation. Included within this paper will be an examination of the IRA which aims to isolate and identify changes in behaviours that lead to a group shifting its focus from freedom fighting to terrorism. It is certainly possible to evaluate a group by its actions and goals and categorize it as either a terrorist group or freedom fighters.

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction

The objective of this research study has been to ascertain whether the British Colonial Authorities had a substantial advantage over modern governments and coalitions when it came to prosecuting counter-insurgency. A review of the past is often capable of providing different insights to present-day problems. Consequently, an historical re-appraisal of three previous colonial insurgencies has been conducted with a view to identifying any potential lessons capable of being used today.

This chapter outlines the overall structure used to conduct a qualitative study to investigate which aspects of counter-insurgency were effective and how they operated in the recent past. Three historical conflicts were chosen: the Emergency in Malaya, the Emergency in Kenya and the ‘Bush War’ in Rhodesia. Malaya has always been held high by many authors as an example of how to counter an insurgency effectively (Hack, 2009; Marston & Malkasian, 2008; Mockaitis, 1990a; Short, 1975). Therefore, it was considered suitable to use this conflict as a bench mark to compare and contrast two further conflicts fought in Africa. Kenya and Rhodesia were selected; as they went through a traumatic period of decolonisation, as part of Britain divesting itself of its Colonial Empire during the Cold War period at a time of change and Communist expansion (White, 1998). Furthermore, these insurgencies were sequential, with a number of similarities worthy of further research; such as the assumed transfer of expertise, strategies, policies and tactics from one conflict to the other. In addition, by analysing conflicts in Africa, the considerable problems related to dealing with complex ethnic cultures, traditional religions and the use of indigenous forces against the insurgents could be explored. The selection was also based upon access to former participants from all three conflicts; even though for Malaya and Kenya these respondents were now in their 80s.

The case study approach was considered to be the most appropriate methodology to deal with perceived the Research Problem. Primarily, as this method facilitates dealing with multiple empirical cases of a “contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). Accordingly, case studies were constructed around the

narrative produced from a series of semi-structured interviews; with a number of former participants who were involved in the three selected conflicts. The data was then coded into appropriate themes identified by the Literature Review as well as those that surfaced during the coding process. Comparative analysis was then applied to the data, to address the Research Problem, in an effort to understand whether any lessons could be learnt, together with any potential recommendations.

## **1.2 Background and the Context**

This study addressed an aspect of counter-insurgency that has been causing a number of complex problems especially for those involved in recent actions, to be precise, the problems associated with operating in what are considered foreign lands (Mackinlay, 2007). For a number of complicated economic and geopolitical reasons, it has been found necessary by the United States (US) and its coalition allies to conduct counter-insurgency operations in hostile and non-aligned countries to establish more stable governments resulting in a less threatening international environment. In an effort to curb international terrorism, it has become desirable to restructure certain unstable countries (Krepinevich, 2005). The consequence of this policy has been a long and drawn out involvement in extensive counter-insurgency operations; as a result of occupying and trying to pacify such openly hostile countries as Iraq and Afghanistan (Nagl, 2007).

The changes in the global geopolitical structures have meant it is no longer viable for the sole super power to act alone. The US now needs to act in collaboration and in coalitions in order to accomplish its role as international sheriff; even if it is operating under a United Nations (UN) mandate. Together with this re-alignment of expediencies, is the necessity of political adhesion to keep the Coalition unified and focused on the desired objectives.

Historically, military might alone has been found to be incapable of subduing any country long term that is experiencing rebellion and insurgency. The evidence for this can be found in Aden and Cyprus for the British; in Indo- China and Algeria for the French; in Angola and Moçambique for the Portuguese and for the Americans in Vietnam and Somalia.

There has been an evolutionary development of counter-insurgency doctrine for conducting what are euphemistically called asymmetric or small wars, against mainly guerrilla operations. These types of conflicts have forced military generals to restructure their tactics and strategies away from direct full scale confrontations; as the armies they are now encountering during insurgencies operate as guerrillas in small bands, not as regimented



armies. Countering an insurgency is not the same as fighting a war, as many countries have found to their detriment.

### **1.2.1 End of Empire**

The re-adjustment for the European Powers, particularly Britain, post World War Two was a difficult and painful process. This period has become known as the 'End of Empire', a period when the European Powers began divesting themselves of their colonial possessions, not always by choice either, but often through violent conflicts with the inhabitants. The expansion of international Communism was seen at this time as a major threat to the interests of the west, with the fear of what was known as the 'Domino Theory'; with states falling progressively under Communist control: either Maoist or Soviet (Hill, Chase, & Kennedy, 1996; Merrill, 2006).

Whereas, all-out-warfare was an established concept, particularly after two world wars, the model of countering-insurgency was very much in its infancy requiring the adoption of new doctrines, tactics and strategies. Understanding how this could be accomplished produced a number of discourses, not least of these from a series of French military theorists, such as Galula (1964), Trinquier (1964) and Beaufre (1965), together with some notable British theorists as well, Thompson (1966) and Paget (1967).

The Emergency in Malaya (1948-60), required a considerable change of mind-set by the British authorities and the Colonial Government, in order to confront the insurgency. The old style of imperial policing was no longer capable of dealing with complex social-political-economic demands, made by the colonised population. A concerted military and socially changing approach had to be adopted in order to confront the challenges presented by the insurgency. Reinforcing the under strength and under trained police was foremost in these series of changes (Anderson & Killingray, 1992, pp. 110-122). In addition, an evolutionary process saw innovative and progressive reforms to the strategies and tactics used, which eventually brought about a dramatic turnaround in the ability of the colonial authorities to counter the Communist led insurrection (Stockwell, 1992) Part of this turnaround was the development of the concept of 'hearts and minds', based upon the creation of a revised approach to understanding that the population were an important, if not vital, component to achieving an effective outcome.

Subsequently, came a complete re-organisation of the available resources being brought about, which included a far larger police force, predominately locally recruited; supported by an effective intelligence gathering machinery operated by Special Branch

(Comber, 2008). The British Army were brought in to bolster the weak civil power. A comprehensive plan was adopted to incorporate all areas of government in support of destroying the capability of the Communist led insurgents from over running the country (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, pp. 100-127). Later, the principle of divide-and-rule was applied by offering full Independence to the Malays, which ensured the Malay population fully supported the counter-insurgency measures, and turned against the insurgents (Jackson, 2008, pp. 116-118). Based upon all these elements, a satisfactory outcome was achieved for Malaya. Consequently, it is often held up as an example of how to prosecute an effective counter-insurgency (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 130).

### **1.2.2 African Conflicts**

During this time period, a number of the colonies in Africa were clamouring for greater self government with rising discontentment prevalent in most (McCarthy, 1994, pp. 82-88). Kenya, in the 1940s experienced a serious set of land grievances, which confronted the European settlers and the Colonial Government. The Kikuyu tribe felt the most aggrieved, with a section of the tribe creating a revolutionary movement known as the Mau Mau (Wachanga, 1975, pp. xiv-xx). By the 1950s, a major conflict was underway requiring the declaration of a state of Emergency in 1952. British forces were required in support of the civil power, together with similar counter-measures as had been imposed in Malaya. It took ten years to subdue the insurrection. The British Government also had to change its policy on colonialism (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, p. 352), in order to gain the support of the majority of the population, by declaring that Kenya would gain its independence once the insurrection was defeated (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, pp. 354-366).

The ability of one tribe, the Kikuyu, to cause so much disruption to a major Colonial power made a significant influence on other African independence movements; especially as the Kikuyu received no identifiable assistance from outside of Kenya. The same issues of nationalism, identity and self determination were raised in other colonies in Africa, particularly in southern Africa. Unrest was spreading in Angola, Moçambique, South Africa, South-West Africa, the Belgium Congo, Nyasaland and Rhodesia (Hargreaves, 1988, pp. 166-167).

The European settlers in Rhodesia took note of the fate of their northern neighbours in Kenya and attempted to control their own destiny outside of the British Empire. A Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 saw Rhodesia become a renegade state, but with few supporters on the world stage. Similar to Kenya, land grievances unpinning the initial

unrest. However, the most notable difference was the support and training the rebels were given by both the Soviet Union and Maoist China, which turned the insurgency into one that was Communist led. Although the Rhodesian forces were able to hold their own militarily until the negotiated settlement brought about the British sponsored elections in 1980, they lacked the political support to affect their own internal compromise (Preston, 2004). The shortage of manpower, resources and dwindling support, both internally and externally, brought an end to Rhodesia and the creation of Zimbabwe within the British Commonwealth.

These three conflicts are considered to have a number of important lessons in the development of effective counter-insurgency strategies and tactics. Foremost amongst these was the control of legislation that was available to the colonial states, supported by a well integrated police force capable of leading the offensive against the insurgents. Furthermore, this was coupled with the multiple capabilities of their forces, most notably the high level of indigenous forces in their ranks, with the ability to gather effective intelligence through an extensive local network; led by Special Branch. In addition, they had a comprehensive understanding of their opponents including their weaknesses as well as their capabilities. All of these elements when combined together would seem to have provided a substantial advantage to the Colonial Forces when compared to those forces involved in counter-insurgencies today.

### **1.3 The Problem**

Research indicates (Alderson, 2007a; Egnell, 2011; Mackinlay, 2009; Nagl, 2007; Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012; Webber, 2009) that there has been a significant problem encountered by the United States (US) and its Coalition allies, when they attempt to conduct counter-insurgency operations within a foreign country, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem relates to difficulties in dealing with the local population, due to their lack of socio-cultural anthropological understanding, which inflames local sensitivity and causes animosity resulting in lack of population support (Lucas, 2008; McFate, 2005). The consequence of this failure undermines the ability of the Coalition forces to stabilise the country. Furthermore, this problem hampers and hinders the ability to gather effective intelligence, so necessary to conducting successful counter-insurgency operations

The rationale behind the study was to ascertain what were the effective elements used by the Colonial Forces, particularly the police and Special Branch, in the conflicts to see if they are transferable, or can even be adapted to benefit the prosecuting of counter-insurgencies today.

An early review of the literature, indicated a dearth of research related to the role played by the Colonial Police Forces in countering the insurgencies, which appeared to be incongruous, as a number of the historical accounts indicated how important the police are supposed to be to the whole effort (Anderson & Killingray, 1992; Hutchinson, 1969; Marston & Malkasian, 2008; Mumford, 2012; Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012; Sepp, 2005). Therefore, by using former colonial policemen as part of this research, it was thought this would address the imbalance and could provide valuable insights from their narratives as to how the counter-insurgency was conducted.

#### **1.4 Significance**

The proposed significance of this study would be to indicate directions for modern planners to consider when conducting counter-insurgency operations in foreign countries. It was thought it would be of particular significance to Australia, as a major participant in United Nations (UN) peace-keeping and peace-making efforts. The demands made on the Australian Forces involved, might be better served if they were able to adopt and adapt a number of the outcomes and recommendations derived from this study.

- The significant role played by the Colonial Police Forces in combating the insurgencies and how important the role of the police force was to re-asserting the rule of law in support of a fair judicial system. Understanding how important it is to have a functioning and accepted police force to create confidence in the elected government.
- Recording the narratives of the Colonial Police, particularly those now in their 80s, as soon their record of events will be lost forever without these types of studies; in fact some respondents have already passed on since this study began. History can only be interpreted authentically if there are sufficient records to assist with this aspiration.
- Another significant area was the relationship the Colonial Forces had with their indigenous colleagues. In many respects this was unique. Consequently, providing more recorded data on the important role indigenous forces played, as part of the structure of combating insurgencies, has been part of this research process. There appears to be latent recognition of this important aspect when dealing with countering insurgencies in other lands, “most counterinsurgency [sic] campaigns are not won or lost by external forces, but

by indigenous forces”(Jones, 2008, p. 9). Although a difficult and complex area for modern forces to adjust to and implement, it is considered almost imperative for the future of most counter-insurgency operations (Byman, 2005; Byman, 2006; Corum, 2006).

- A further significant feature discussed in this research, has been the role of religion, particularly the role of tribal religion and beliefs. Specifically, the psychological control this is capable of applying to the minds of the population. A failure to recognise and understand how this manifests itself, is capable of undermining all attempts to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population; considered so necessary in combating insurgencies. Furthermore, in developing societies, the role of the local witch-doctor, spirit medium or Imam can seriously challenge all endeavours to garner the support of the local population if their influence is underestimated. It is necessary to understand and appreciate the importance of culture and customs when operating in other than lands, as is the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan or Somalia.
- Intimidation through terrorism, coercion and death underlies much of the activities of insurgent and rebel organisations. Failure to recognise and account for this activity is a further hindrance to gaining the support of the population though any ‘hearts and minds’ initiative; as does compulsive and coercive indoctrination (Anderson, 2011c, pp. 122-124; Kilcullen, 2010, p. 153; Leites & Wolf Jr, 1970, pp. 90-120). All of these aspects have been discussed in this study, as a result of the narratives from the respondents regarding their experiences in countering insurgency.

## **1.5 Research Design Overview**

Concurrent with the research problem, the use of case studies was considered the most appropriate method for dealing with multiple layers of data in a historical context. The design also considered the difficulties in accessing the required data; especially from a primary source context, if this study was to generate any new outcomes. Consequently, a qualitative approach has been adopted incorporating supporting elements to ensure validity and reliability.

A pilot study was also incorporated as part of the design, even though this is an unusual approach when using qualitative methodology. Nonetheless, the benefits of testing the whole design before embarking upon the extensive data collection process have been

vindicated as mistakes would have been hard to rectify at a later stage, because extensive travel was required to conduct the interviews and access the archives.

The nature of the case studies necessitated selection of suitable participants and criterion sampling was used to ensure they had the required background and knowledge to participate in this study. The semi-structured interview technique was also considered the most appropriate due to the age of the participants. The data was coded and isolated using inductive analysis to allow any new themes, patterns and categories to emerge from the data, which was supported by logical analysis to elicit further patterns through cross-classification.

The three case studies were then compared and contrasted in relation to the themes identified, before being analysed, synthesised and interpreted. The outcomes provided the conclusions and theoretical recommendations to the initial Research Questions.

### **1.5.1 Primary Research Question**

A primary Research Question was developed:

What was the role played by the Colonial Forces in counter-insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 -1959) Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980), and can any of the lessons learnt be applied to conflicts today?

Supporting the primary question, a further four sub-questions were developed:

### **1.5.2 Sub-Questions:**

1. What factors and roles contributed to the security forces effectiveness in the insurgency campaigns of Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia?
2. Was 'hearts and minds' a substantial factor in the conflicts?
3. Was the concept of 'hearts and minds' one that was commonly understood and practiced by those involved on the ground?
4. What aspects of the colonial strategy appeared to be effective?

## **1.6 Hypotheses and Assumptions**

Based upon the use of a central research hypothesis, as Kumar ((1996, pp. 64-70) defines it for qualitative studies in humanities, a number of assumptions were formed, which needed to be tested.

The primary hypothesis was that the structural make up of the British Colonies—including Rhodesia as a renegade British Colony—provided them with a substantial advantage when compared to modern day conflicts involving countering insurgency. The ability to support the coercive forces with punitive legislation when required, thus ensuring

support for the strategies and policies was foremost in their capabilities. Furthermore, that this advantage was based upon a number of multi-faceted and possibly uniquely time specific factors difficult to replicate today. In addition, the research sought to confirm or redefine a modern assumption that 'hearts and minds' played a significant part in countering the three insurgencies used for this study. Insofar as not only was it central to the overall strategy for conducting operations, but was also understood by those involved on the ground at the time to be central to the overall strategy.

A further assumption concerned the role played by Special Branch (SB). Indications are that SB was the vital cog of the combined network that held the Colonial Forces together giving them a distinct advantage; through an extensive intelligence gathering network allowing commanders to optimise their decision making process for operations to great effect. Far reaching networks were established on back of the extensive capabilities of the Colonial Forces operating within the country, as they spoke the local languages and were culturally aware. Furthermore, the policy of incorporating indigenous forces into their competencies greatly enhanced their overall capabilities. The result was a significant ability to source valuable and accountable intelligence; a fundamental requirement for all counter-insurgency operations.

Supporting Special Branch (SB) was the colonial police, as they formed part of the police structure. Consequently it is argued, SB could not have been as effective had they not formed part of the police; all officers were drawn from police service. The assumption made for this study, is that the police were not only at the forefront of countering the insurgencies but were also a vital part of the combined structure, and this fact needs to be more firmly established into the literature of these events.

An additional hypothesis was that the role of 'hearts and minds' was not as well known as it is today and appears to have been imposed on these conflicts by revisionism trying to over impose modern interpretations on past events.

## **1.7 Theoretical Framework**

A number of theories have been considered to underpin this study. Consequently, as part of the research processes the merits of each were explored for suitability. Conflict theory has been considered to be the most appropriate based upon the thoughts of Marx (1867/1999), Engels (1969/1848) and Turner (1954), and these provided the central tenets upon which the theory is suggested. Conflict theory readily supports the notions of colonial conflict, especially as there was a strong element of class war involved, at all levels. In

addition to conflict theory, elements of cultural theory, anomie theory and general strain theory are also present in the theoretical framework.

## **1.8 Outline of the Thesis**

The thesis is structured in a sequential manner to ensure a progression of ideas and outcomes are obtained, before undertaking a comparative analysis to provide the conclusions. Chapter Two outlines the literature review process to establish the definitions required to conduct such a study. Primarily, to outline the difficulties in defining insurgency, before establishing what is meant by countering an insurgency. Chapter Three discusses the justification for using the methodology, together with explanation for the choice of the case study approach. The need for reliability underpinned by validity is made clear, as are the limitations in the study. To this end, bracketing was used as a “means of demonstrating the validity of the data collection and the analytic processes” (Ahern, 1999, p. 407).

The Pilot Study outcomes are discussed in Chapter Four, along with the importance of having tested the study design to ensure a robust outcome. In essence this is a case study in its own right, as the whole process has been conducted in order to verify the results were what were expected of the study design and therefore acceptable.

Chapters, Five, Six and Seven are the case studies for Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia. The context of the conflicts is established in relation to the literature, before presenting the data from the semi-structured interviews. Each case study is based upon the themes identified in the Literature Review, as expounded by the narrative provided by the participants in reply to the Research Questions.

The last two chapters deal with the outcomes of the case studies. Chapter Eight is the comparative analytical component, through interpretation, triangulating the findings with the literature to verify the context. Chapter Nine brings together the conclusions, extracted from the findings in order to present a series of theoretical recommendations. Further areas of research are suggested, based upon this study, along with the limitations in the conclusion.

## **1.9 Conclusion**

The study set out to research three historical conflicts from the perspective of how the authorities were able to counter the insurgencies in their respective countries, in an effort to understand if any of the strategies, tactics and methods used, were actually transferable to modern day conflicts. The purpose of this multicasestudy was to explore three previous counter-insurgency conflicts by interviewing a number of former participants, in order to



identify if there was a specific aspect that could be identified that was effective and could be re-applied again today. A case study methodology was considered the most appropriate for this type of comparative historical research.

Malaya was chosen as case study because it is well documented, with a number of strategies and tactics developed, which have been utilised elsewhere. Therefore, it was considered a useful benchmark upon which to compare two further insurgencies. Kenya and Rhodesia were chosen, as they represented specific problems related to strong ethnic religious and tribal identities coupled with self-determination with nationalistic undertones; found in all developing nations. These particular conflicts required further interpretation, as they were more likely to have a greater number of similarities and relevance to those being fought by the Western Coalitions today.

The use of primary sources was important to achieve the objectives of this study. Consequently, former members of the Security Forces, specifically from the police and Special Branch, were traced and interviewed in an effort to obtain a further dimension to that normally given by using solely the army. Accordingly, the case studies are built around the narratives provided by the respondents to the questions developed from the themes, identified in the Literature Review. These themes provided the framework for the case studies and remained consistent throughout the study.

A sequential process has been followed to allow the narrative to develop using the case studies as the vehicle and to demonstrate the exchange of ideas from one conflict to the next. The data was then synthesised, in order to conduct a comparative analysis of the findings and provided an interpretation and a conclusion. A series of theoretical recommendations are also presented in the Conclusion: these may provide lessons for future planning and strategy for counter-insurgency.

The study was designed specifically to be comparative, as it was felt this approach was more capable of providing fresh insights into to the perceived research problem. Furthermore, the use of two case studies from Africa has provided additional appreciation as to how counter-insurgency has evolved to combat complex socio-political-cultural conflicts. The next chapter discusses this evolution, with a review of the existing literature to position the study, prior to presenting the case studies.

# Chapter 2

## INSURGENCY AND COUNTERING

### INSURGENCY

#### 2.1 Introduction

When undertaking research it is imperative to position the study within the existing literature in order to demonstrate how it adds to the debate, thus increasing the sum body of knowledge. The crux of this chapter considered insurgency or revolutionary warfare, as it is sometimes referred to, from the viewpoint of three conflicts: Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia. Principally, insurgency is discussed from the perspective of countering, or opposing those who wish to topple an existing government and is termed ‘counter-insurgency’. There are many broad aspects that come under the heading of ‘counter-insurgency’ but this study looked at how the Colonial Security Forces operated and developed their tactics and strategies during the three selected campaigns.

In order to accomplish the desired aims, there are several viewpoints that have been considered significant if the study is to achieve the outcomes as proposed. Firstly, it was important to define the time period, then evolution of counter-insurgency as a doctrine and what is meant by the terms used in this study. Terms such as Guerrilla, Asymmetrical or Revolutionary warfare have been reviewed for clarification (Laqueur, 1976). Secondly, the methods used to counter-insurgency have been assessed by looking at policy, strategy and tactics from a historical perspective. Thirdly, although, the French de-colonisation experience was a bitter one, it has been included in the discussion, as many tactics developed by the French forces have been transferred elsewhere (Trinquier, 1964). Lastly, by looking at prominent themes, a framework was developed that was used in the case studies to evaluate the three conflicts: Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia.

Some of the more notable tactics are discussed such as: ‘hearts and minds’, the use of the military as an aid to civil power, creating a ‘Home Guard’ by using volunteer indigenous forces, intelligence gathering, resettlement of the population, food restrictions, collective punishments, together with any factors that appeared to have a significant impact of the course of the conflicts. The role of the Colonial Police predominates this study; in an effort to demonstrate how important their involvement was to counter-insurgency efforts in these conflicts (Hutchinson, 1969). Fundamentally, their importance stems from local knowledge

linked to their ability to harness intelligence gathering capabilities through multiple means under the direction of the Colonial Police Special Branch. Other specialised units are discussed, as many evolved during this period and became central to the thrust against the insurgents, such as Tracker Units, Pseudo Gangs, Fire-Force, SAS and Police Anti-Terrorist Units. The concept of 'hearts and minds' developed at this time, as did psychological warfare and propaganda. The role of intimidation through sorcery, black magic and tribal religions is also examined, as it is considered to be a significant aspect when dealing with conflicts in Africa. It is difficult to explain some of the contradictions in the African psyche without dealing with the aspect of tribal religion and sorcery (Mbiti, 1969; Ranger, 1985). A further feature that required consideration too, was the role played by the Colonial Administration in the general strategy and structure of the Governments' plan for defeating the insurgency. The Administration complemented the coercive forces by providing and implementing the necessary civilian improvements to the overall strategic plan.

The ability to measure 'success' in terms of counter-insurgency is fraught with difficulty; as it would have to be defined to suit various paradigms. It could be argued that for Malaya, not allowing the country to become a Chinese dominated Communist country was success. The same applies for Kenya, whereby the Kikuyu who formed the Mau Mau with their revolutionary, insurrectional and anti-traditional views did not defeat the colonial authority and assume power upon Independence. These outcomes suited the long term aspirations of Britain and the formation of the Commonwealth to replace the colonial structure associated with Empire, therefore, this can be treated as a success. Rhodesia is more problematic to assess, as the 'Bush War' sought to maintain a white minority Government. In this aspect it was a failure. However if viewed from a military perspective perhaps it can be argued that Rhodesia was a partial success, or at least was successful in many aspects of its counter-insurgency tactics "victory in every tactical battle with guerrilla forces in the field, but loss in the vital strategic battle to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the population" (Evans, 2007, p. 176). Therefore, 'success' is more a measure of favourable political outcomes related to tactics, objectives and plans, than measured as actually winning the counter-insurgency, "success in counter-insurgency is compromise" (Mumford, 2012, p. 12). Consequently, the research considers effectiveness rather than success as an outcome.

The last section, 2.18, deals with the literature that is associated with underlying theory that emerges and supports this research. The philosophical dimension is an important part of research at this level, consequently an abstract argument flows through the whole discussion underpinning the study. Conceptually 'conflict theory' is the most

prominent within the context of underlying theory, but this is discussed in relation to ‘anomie’ and ‘general strain theory’; all of which are derivatives from the structural class theory as proposed by Marx and Engels (Marx, 1867, 1974; Marx & Engels, 1969/1848; Williams, 1991).

**Figure 2.1 Literature Review development process**




Figure 2. 1 summarises the important points that have been discussed in this chapter and show the thought process involved to obtain the themes. The central boxes are the key points; these are supported by areas that have been considered significant in arriving at the

points chosen. In addition, this is a visual outline that assists in identifying the themes that formed the framework for analysing the case studies. The sub-headings used in the chapter further categorize the themes in order to contextualise their importance based upon the literature.

## **2.2 End of Empire**

The period of history within which these conflicts took place is from 1948-1980. This period was the era when the majority of British colonies sought either to move towards self government or full independence, with several taking up arms against the sovereign power in attempt to gain supremacy post independence. The process of decolonisation began soon after hostilities had ended the Second World War. Although, American had been allies with Britain, they were fundamentally against her keeping the colonies post war and sought to have the Empire disbanded (Porter, 1976, p. 315). However, the fear of Communism taking hold, especially in the Far East, tempered this policy and it developed into a much more measured approach. The Korean War (1950-53) emphasised how real the threat of Communist expansion was to western capitalism and democratic values. Britain, with the tacit support of the United States of America (USA), attempted to hold on to those colonies that were economically vital to her best interests; this included Malaya, which provided tin and rubber badly needed to fight the war in Korea (Porter, 1976, p. 321).

Malaya, was seen as necessary for two reasons, one, for its rubber and tin. The other, was because the insurgency was Communist led and this was contrary to American foreign policy ambitions of ensuring that the Far East remained within the western sphere of influence. This policy became known as the Truman Doctrine (1947) (Gaddis, 1973, p. 386; McLean, 1986; Merrill, 2006, p. 36). Britain began to fight a rear-guard action in Malaya against the insurgents, who were in the main Chinese and inspired by Maoist Communism. Whether Britain was intent on keeping Malaya long term as a Colony is debatable, it is more likely this was an exigency based upon the realities of post war economics (Brendon, 2007, pp. xix-xxii). Britain was certainly ill prepared to fight counter-insurgency at the start of hostilities in 1948. Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011a) argues that the counter-insurgency policy eventually adopted by the British was “one carefully calculated to allow decolonization to occur on British terms rather than those of the indigenous peoples” (2011a, p. 2). A view not shared by some of the reviewers of his argument (Murphy, 2011). This study did not seek to support either view, rather it was a review of what strategies, policies and tactics were developed and used as part of the counter-insurgency efforts in the three selected conflicts.

De-colonisation was taking place across the globe, not all of it peaceful either. In addition to Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands lost their colonial possessions too, some of them through bitter insurgencies; such as Portugal in Angola and Mozambique and France in Indo-China and Algeria. Although never the colonial power in Vietnam, nevertheless the USA was also defeated in its counter-insurgency battle in support of the American puppet regime (Kolko, 1987). Fighting insurgencies against nationalist guerrillas required some considerable changes in both strategies and tactics by all of those engaged in these types of conflicts.

In Africa the development of nationalism was met with recalcitrance by the European settlers and in some cases outright opposition to any form of majority rule for the African population (Birmingham, 1995; Davidson, 1994). Insurgency using guerrilla tactics became “the most effective means of defeating the highly organized and heavily armed, but also cumbersome alien armies of the major powers” (Clapham, 1998, p. 2). It was a very traumatic period for Britain, having come out of a devastating and extremely costly World War. Pacifying internal rebellion in the colonies was distressing as well as expensive, as often British servicemen were now pitted against former fellow soldiers who had fought with them in defence of the British Empire. The monetary outlay involved was considerable, for a country that had been devastated by war and was only grudgingly given in limited amounts to aid the counter-insurgency efforts; the colonies were expected to carry the burden themselves. The limitations imposed by budget restraints hampered effective strategy but ironically forced local innovative initiatives to take place, which will be assessed in this study.

The conflicts selected for study were in fact civil wars, but were called ‘Emergencies’ and this was for a very good reason. If they were called wars, or civil wars, then the insurance companies would not pay out for destruction of goods and services. However, if they were called ‘Emergencies’ caused by civil commotion then claims could be made for loss of property and goods (Barber, 1972, p. 11). The conflicts were not only against the colonial power, but set a section of society against another, with one side supporting the government of the day. They can be called insurrections or rebellions too, as they sought to change the constituted political order of power within the country by attempting to overthrow the authorized Government (Paget, 1967, p. 16). Importantly the rebels were not recognised as belligerents either under the terms of lawful warfare in international law-*jus in bello* (Howard, Andreopoulos, Shulman, & Devries, 1995; Posner, 2002, 2004; Posner & Sykes, 2004).

### 2.3 Defining the Discussion

The broad-spectrum type of warfare that took place in these conflicts goes by many names: revolutionary, insurgency, hybrid warfare, small wars, proxy wars, irregular, unconventional, guerrilla, asymmetrical, fourth-generation, and low-intensity conflict, to name the most prominent ones (Beckett, 2001; Joes, 2004; Kilcullen, 2010; Laqueur, 1976; Metelits, 2010; Nagl, 2002; O'Neill, 2005; Paget, 1967; The US Army/Marine Corps, 2006). There are notable differences in these terms and they are often interchangeable, but all of them refer to warfare conducted by relatively weak parties against more dominant adversaries; the constitutional government:

There are no declarations of war, there are no seasons for campaigning, and few end with peace treaties. Decisive battles are few. Attrition, terror, psychology, and actions against civilians highlight “combat”. Rather than highly organised armed forces based on a strict command hierarchy, wars are fought by loosely knit groups of regulars, irregulars, cells, and not infrequently by locally-based warlords under little or no central authority (Holsti, 2005, p. 20).

A description given here is of limited action by small bands, terrorising the general population with sporadic attacks toward the goal of gaining political concessions or overthrowing the legitimate government.

The contents of Table 2.1, demonstrates how many terms are available that basically describe the same thing. Unfortunately, some of the terms shown here can appear simplistic when analysed, however it does illuminate the complexities that are found when discussing differing types of conflicts. For the purposes of this study, the conflicts will be called anti-colonial insurgencies, although the tactics used by the insurgents were certainly guerrilla in nature. “Guerrilla warfare does not automatically produce a revolution” (Clapham, 1985, p. 164), but it certainly was the most effective means available in these conflicts. Furthermore, they were conflicts in which one side tried to destabilise the country by undermining law and order and the other attempts to uphold it. (Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 4). The objective of “the guerrillas was ‘to disrupt the civil administration and ultimately, to cause it to collapse’”(Ranger, 1985, p. 180). Undermining the social fabric is far cheaper than trying to maintain it “guerrilla warfare is cheap, and the fight against it is very costly” (Laqueur, 1976, p. 379)

Table 2.1 also defines Colonial war as a policing and public order issue, which is very limited in its definition. In fact, all the definitions used on the right of the table could be used to define the conflicts discussed in this study as could most of those on the left hand side as well.

**Table 2.1 Low intensity warfare and its variants**

| <b>Type</b>                 | <b>Definition</b>         |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Anti-colonial war           | Low intensity conflict    |
| Asymmetric warfare          | Low level war             |
| Bandit warfare              | Limited war               |
| Civil disturbance           | Partisan war              |
| Civil war                   | Peasant war               |
| Civil-military strife       | People's war              |
| Colonial war                | Policing and public order |
| Complex emergencies         | Political violence        |
| Ethnic conflict             | Rebellion                 |
| Guerrilla warfare           | Resistance                |
| Hit and run tactics         | Revolt                    |
| Insurgency                  | Revolutionary war         |
| Insurrection                | Small war                 |
| Internal war                | Sub-conventional war      |
| Intra-state war             | Sub-limited war           |
| Irregular war               | Sub-state war             |
| Non-state warfare           | Unconventional war        |
| Wars of national liberation | Uprising                  |

(Smith, 2003, p. 21)

Guerrilla war is not new and has been practiced since time immemorial, it has been evolving to the point where it can be termed fourth generation warfare, using “ all available networks-political, economic, social, and military” (Hammes, 2004, p. 2) Based upon the writings of Van Crevald's (1991), *The Transformation of War*, which highlights how irregular forces have been able to defeat regulars and have been more adept in learning new methods to overcome regular forces military superiority. Van Crevald (1991) posits that conventional militaries may well become irrelevant (Artelli & Deckro, 2008). An aspect discussed by Kilcullen (2009) paraphrasing from the work of Francart (1999), proposing that ground forces in the future would only intervene in extremely compound conditions of state failure to end violence rather than “achieve policy ends through violence” (p. 5). Others (Gray, 2005; Melshen, 2007) are hesitant to agree totally, for example Gray's (2005)



conclusions in *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* is that “Irregular warfare may well be the dominant mode in belligerency for some years to come, but interstate war, including great power conflict, will enjoy a healthy future.” (2005, p. 282).

In *On War*, Von Clausewitz (1968/1832), a Prussian General famous for his treatises on warfare, writing around 1827, is renowned for his dictum that war is “the continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means” (as cited in Esposito, 1954), often misquoted as "war is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means"; lists five general conditions that he considers essential if it is to be considered guerrilla warfare, and ergo insurgency:

The war must be carried on in the interior of the country;

The war cannot hinge on a single battle;

The theatre of war must extend over a considerable area;

The national character must support the war; and

The country must be irregular, difficult, inaccessible (1968, p. 1 ch XXVI).

These conditions were certainly present during the colonial conflicts, furthermore, as Janos (1963) points out, “if the objective of warfare is revolution-the transfer or destruction of organized power in society-then, on the other hand, we may speak of revolutionary warfare. The latter is a type of war that may be fought conventionally as well as unconventionally” (1963, p. 643).

Therefore, based upon these points the anti-colonial insurgencies have the necessary elements to be called revolutionary; as they set out to change the existing political order. However, Clapham (1998) breaks down the definition further by classifying them in to four subgroups: liberation insurgencies, separatist insurgencies, reform insurgencies and lastly war-lord insurgencies. For the purposes of this study the first definition is the most useful as it clearly describes the conflict by armed liberation movements against colonial rule in pursuit of self-determination and nationhood. Nevertheless, the revolutionary class aspect associated with Mao Tse Tung doctrine is also present, so this has to be understood as part of the underlying structural *raison d'être* (Clapham, 1998, p. 2); as does the underlying ethnic differentiation between the peoples and tribes involved in revolution in each conflict (p. 7). The latter point appears in all three conflicts, although in Malaya it was not termed tribal, but ‘ethnic’ with the Chinese being the predominant component of the insurgents against the Malays.

Although Rhodesia did not consider itself to be a British Colony during the period of the 'Bush war' 1964-1980, it was in fact an illegitimate state under international law, as it had declared unilaterally its own independence from Britain on the 11<sup>th</sup> - November 1965; a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) (Coggins, 2006; Marshall, 1968; Smith, 2001a; Wilkinson, 1980). Consequently, for the purposes of this study it is grouped under the definition of a British Colony, particularly as the structures of power remained very much the same and the security forces had been set up and were run along those employed elsewhere in British colonies.

Thompson (1966), whose own book *Defeating Communist insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* is considered a seminal work on fighting insurgences, outlines in the forward to the book by McCuen (1966), four accepted phases an insurgency conflict goes through as according the theory of guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung (1954). These phases are:

The period of organisation ( subversion);

The period of terrorism ( and to a certain extent low-scale guerrilla warfare);

The period of guerrilla warfare;

And finally, the period of mobile warfare. (McCuen, p. 17)

While this tends not to be a direct sequential process, and does not happen everywhere in the country at the same time, it does describe the progression that takes place during the attempt to overthrow the existing government. Insurgencies tend to be protracted affairs, which wax and wane depending on the fortunes of both sides; trying to put a defined process to this progression would be difficult to support. However, understanding the structure used by revolutionaries in their quest to overthrow the existing government is paramount if a sustainable and coherent counter strategy is to be developed and successfully applied (Taber, 1970, pp. 19-21). In two of the three conflicts studied (Malaya and Rhodesia), the four-element-strategy described above to conduct the insurgency was used by the revolutionaries; predominately as they were Communist inspired. The strategy was based upon the teachings of Chairman Mao Tse-tung (1954) and forms part of his discourse on how to conduct revolutionary warfare. However, no direct evidence has been found to show that the Mau Mau conflict in Kenya ever followed any such strategy, or was ideologically based upon Communist inspired revolutions found elsewhere. Although, all the components were certainly present for a class conflict: poverty, exploitation, imperialism, poor administration and land issues, nonetheless they were not formalised into a structured communist ideology (Clapham, 1985, pp. 161-162).

## 2.4 Insurgency

Defining 'insurgency' for the purposes of this study has required looking at many definitions (Beckett, 2001; Laqueur, 1976; McCuen, 1966; O'Neill, 2005; Paget, 1967; Taber, 1970). Guerrilla warfare and insurgency have become almost synonymous and the use of terror is common to both, so it has been important to clarify which aspects are being studied. However, "insurgency is essentially a political legitimacy crisis of some sort"(O'Neill, 1978, p. 12). Consequently, there is a need to understand what are the aims of the insurgents and what type of insurgency is it. Based upon political objectives six types can be identified: "secessionist, revolutionary, restorational, reactionary, conservative and reformist"(O'Neill, 1978, p. 12).

The writings of Lawrence (1927), known as *Lawrence of Arabia*, are a touch stone for all students of counter insurgency tactics and strategies. Lawrence's experiences as a British officer leading irregular Arab bands against the Turks during the First World War are laid out in his classic work the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. The book emphasizes how guerrilla war can be effectively waged by dedicated irregulars "ours would be a war of detachment...not disclosing ourselves till we attacked." (Lawrence, 1927, p. 200). The principles of attacking vulnerable targets and disappearing back into the desert are discussed through his personal insights in living and fighting with the Arabs. The ability to use the terrain, in this case the desert, to their advantage and wrong footing their adversaries; gaining an almost mythical superiority by their actions is poetically described. Basically Lawrence(1927) is expounding the crucial principal of gaining the support of the population, together with the doctrine of psychological warfare to undermine the moral of the opponents (Beckett, 2001). The ironic aspect of this book is that it is written from the side of the insurgent fighting against conventional troops, using small highly mobile forces striking out from secure bases equipped with tactical intelligence. Not from the perspective of countering the resistance from the governments side.

Notwithstanding the irony, what makes this book important is that it is based upon the classical doctrine of a Chinese military strategist from the 6<sup>th</sup> BC, Sun Tsu "It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles"(Tzu, 2011/ 6th Century BC, pp. 14, ch III) , often paraphrased to ' know your enemy, you must become your enemy'. Although a well-known saying it has been extremely difficult for modern armies fighting counter-insurgencies to put into practice. To many Generals it was demeaning to lower their tactics to level of those that they are fighting, as they often

considered the local indigenous insurgents to be less than capable of matching their own prowess; this attitude was particularly prevalent during the anti-colonial campaigns fought after the Second World War. Nevertheless, what becomes apparent when studying the selected conflicts, is once the axiom of ‘know your enemy’ had been adopted and the security forces started to understand their enemy’s weaknesses and modus operandi, they began to quickly overhaul their enemies and take the initiative in various campaigns.

## **2.5 Counter-insurgency**

The strategy, factors and roles to combat armed conflict can be summed up by the term ‘counter-insurgency’, which involves all the means available to accomplish success including repression, intimidation, reprisals, coercion, destruction and death (Beckett, 2001, pp. 26-43; Joes, 2004, pp. 233-246; Taber, 1970). As an evolving model, this has taken on many guises as it has developed over the years, which need to be defined in relation to this period of study (Beckett, 2012). Hence, “an effective counterinsurgency (sic) program depends on an accurate, substantive, and comprehensive profile of the adversary and the environmental context within which he operates” (O’Neill, 2005, p. 155). In essence, by analysing the three Emergencies through the use of case studies, this research seeks to understand how government forces adapted and adopted their strategies in an attempt to thwart the rebellions; as no two insurgencies are the same.

### **2.5.1 Doctrine**

Defining what has become known as a counter-insurgency doctrine has been an evolutionary practice, as it must move with the times if it is to remain relevant to those that use it.

Doctrine articulates an approach based on firm principles, which result from rigorous analysis and therefore should hold true. It is more than simple definitions found in publications: it is *how* to think, not the *what* to think. It is a guide, something that is flexible, not rigid. It needs to be relatively timeless and it is only valid if it is derived from practical experience and has broad acceptance. (Alderson, 2007b, p. 7)

The ways in which this process is brought about defines much of this study, as essentially only by exploring the past and performing an analysis can the fundamentals be understood and then applied; this is the case with doctrine (Alderson, 2007a; Anderson, 2011a; Corum, 2007; Harvey & Wilkinson, 2009; Rid, 2010; Roberts, 2009).

From the doctrine the strategy is developed. The process of developing a counter-insurgency strategy requires identification of the goals of the insurgents as well as your own; as this will assist in developing ways to frustrate their aims. This important aspect appears not to have been made at the start of the Emergencies in either Kenya or Malaya. Four major works of the time, point out this requirement in their methodologies for dealing with insurgencies, by stressing the need to understand the aims of the insurgents (Galula, 1964/2006; McCuen, 1966; Paget, 1967; Thompson, 1966).

There appears to have been recognition of failure that the methods used at the start of conflicts post World War II, were based upon out dated methods largely used by countries such as Britain and France; prior to the war; when they had the manpower to overwhelm any insurgency movements. However, as Strachan (2007) points out, strategy was evolving very quickly through necessity, as the British learnt the heavy lessons from the brutal campaign in Palestine, 1946 to 1948, and tried to apply them to Emergencies in both Kenya and Malaya.

Palestine policemen were recruited directly to the colonial forces in both Kenya and Malaya, to supplement the limited local police in 1948; as soon as they were de-mobbed (p. 9). Those men who had experience in dealing with terrorist activities were in particular demand (Jones, 1948). Approximately 500 joined the Malaya Police Force, with around 113 joining the Kenya Police Force, with incentives to keep them after the initial contract by increasing their level of rank, as the majority had been sergeants in Palestine and were consequently quickly promoted to higher ranks. Although these policemen brought several fresh ideas with them, they were often resented by the existing police (Sinclair, 2002, p. 35).

The four works mentioned (Galula, 1964/2006; McCuen, 1966; Paget, 1967; Thompson, 1966), all attest to the necessity to construct a strategic plan based upon the nature of the insurgency that is confronting them as the recognised government. Galula's (1964/2006) approach centres upon his theory that counterinsurgency is not solely military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. The four basic rules that he puts forward form the strategies for most of the operations that have followed across the globe, in one form or another:

Galula (Galula, 1964/2006), lays out the framework for conducting a counter-insurgency operation based upon four primary laws and six principals. The four laws are:

The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent (sic) as for the Insurgent;

Support is gained through an active minority;

Support from the population is conditional;  
Intensity of efforts and vastness of means. (pp. 52-55)

The interpretation of these laws indicates the aim of counter-insurgency is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory. The majority of the population will try to remain neutral in the conflict; from bitter experience they know being on the wrong side can mean death. However, there will be those that see advantage in supporting the government and they can help in convincing the masses to turn against the insurgents. The fear of retribution remains constant amongst the population. Normally the population will only give their support, active or passive, to the government if they know they will be protected. This support is fickle and quickly lost if they see any sign of weakness or lack of resolve from the government. The aim of the insurgents is to erode that support by any means available; including intimidation and terrorism (O'Neill, 1978, p. 16). Achieving order and support of the population can only be done by progressively removing armed opponents from the surrounding district thus securing the area from reprisals. Building infrastructure and strengthening positions will assist in creating long-term supportive relationships with the population (Artelli, 2007; Galula, 1964/2006).

## **2.6 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency Doctrine**

Despite the French having a poor record in countering-insurgency within their own sphere of influence, there has developed a respect for what could be termed a French doctrinal approach to counter-insurgency (Beaufre, 1965; Galliéni, 1908; Galula, 1964/2006; Trinquier, 1964). Consequently, no appraisal of approaches to counter-insurgency would be complete without inclusion of these noted authors.

McCuen (1966) emphasises the importance of controlling territory and using superior force to defend the local population, very much basing his analysis on that proposed by Galula (1964/2006) for fighting against the Front de Liberation National (FLN) in Algeria, by the French forces. Securing the major base areas is a priority. Once this can be achieved the population feels more at ease and starts to support the Government. In time, this will result in improved intelligence allowing strike forces to go out and attack the insurgents directly.

The process of gradually acquiring defended territory was named as *tâche d'huile*, or the oil-spot now called in common parlance the 'ink-spot' (Gougeon, 2005, p. 300). General Gallieni, who pre-dates Galula, called this carefully coordinated military and social strategy the *tâche d'huile*; as in spoken French when you drop oil on water it rapidly spreads

outwards, an oil-spot. But he also qualified this by adding that this must consist of aid in the form of improved administration, economic management and education to be given to the colonized (sic) population (Galliéni, 1908, p. 326; Rid, 2010, p. 750).

It can be argued that Galliéni's ideas are the basis of many modern strategists (Chaliand, 1990); as he implemented and adapted Governor General De Lanessan's plan (1892) in the French colony of Cochinchina. He used walled towns, both old and newly built ones, to secure the population from attacks in Indo-China; a definite fore-runner to the 'villagisation' process that was used in all three conflicts being studied (Phōam, 1985; Wright, 1991, p. 179). Galliéni successfully dealt with rebels or 'pirates', as they were often termed, in Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin from 1893 to 1895 – a region that today largely coincides with Vietnam, and consequently developed a successful strategy for dealing with insurgency (Rid, 2010, p. 748).

The importance of the previous paragraph highlights that when dealing with what is termed 'counter-insurgency', many of the ideas are not new and have been evolving for centuries under many guises. However, understanding how difficult it is to implement these theories into complex situations has been recognised by many (Berger, Burgess, Mauldin, & Sullivan, 2007), especially those who have taken part in such conflicts. The much used phrase "trying to eat soup with a knife" from Lawrence's (1920, p. 8) article, describing the problems of managing the Arab militias in their revolt against the Turks, has become synonymous with how difficult it is to put into practice.

Intellectually grasping the concept that fighting insurgents is messy and slow is a different thing from knowing how to defeat them; knowing how to win, in turn, is a different thing from implementing the measures required to do it (Nagl, 2002, pp. xi-xvi)

Many concepts and ideas are proposed during conflicts, some of them are put into practice whilst others are discarded. The formation of a counter-insurgency doctrine is thus an evolutionary process that progresses in stages. Reviewing the past allows a better understanding of how this occurs. Lieutenant Colonel Hubert Lyautey, of the French army, who had served under Galliéni in Indochina, re-organised his resources when he was dealing with the colonial situation in Madagascar. The structure of his command was broken down:

In[to] seven offices: 1st personnel, 2nd operations, 3rd civil affairs, 4th topographic service, 5th printing and publications, 6th indigenous affairs, and 7th intelligence. An

officer headed all bureaus except indigenous affairs. The 3rd bureau, civil affairs, had an elevated importance and was structured into four sections responsible for a wide portfolio of tasks: political affairs, local budget, judiciary system, militias, public works, and civil construction projects; personnel; commerce and colonization, agriculture, forests, mines, taxes, tariffs, and imports. The indigenous affairs bureau was responsible for education, religion and cults (Rid, 2010, p. 749).

The important point to note in this quote is that this structure was set out in 1897! It should have been standard practice when the conflicts that erupted in Kenya and Malaya in the late 1940s, but this was not the case. It appears that ‘lessons learnt’ was not an accepted practice at that time and it had to be re-learnt again before it could be applied. In addition, the French laid out a structured framework for dealing with their overseas possessions that shows an understanding of the holistic requirements necessary to conduct successful colonial campaigns.

When assessing how the British government dealt with the conflicts in both Malaya and Kenya when they started, it appears as if there was little coordination or structure to their counter-insurgency efforts. It was not until Lt-General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed Director of Operations in 1950 did any structure become apparent to produce an overall plan. The Plan became known as the *Briggs Plan* (1950) for Malaya, followed by the one developed later by Erskine in Kenya (1953); loosely based upon the same principals. Briggs sought to cut off the supplies to the insurgents by a series of measures, one of which was building new villages to keep the inhabitants away from being intimidated or supporting the rebels (Hack, 2009, pp. 387-388).

The plan incorporated much of what was basic structure for dealing with insurrections used by the French. Of note from the quote by Rid (2010) in the French structure is the 3rd bureau, civil affairs, which incorporated a wide portfolio of administrative and political tasks. In defence of the British Colonial structure, this would have been the role carried out by the Colonial civil administration. What was different was bringing it under the central coordinated counter-insurgency structure with a military man at the head as part of the strategy to manage the conflict. Only when in 1952 General Templer, was appointed as High Commissioner and Director of Operations in Malaya with full authority over the civilian and military resources did the British recognise the advantages this structure would have to the prosecution of the conflict (Hack, 2009, p. 387; Ucko, 2010, p. 16).



Another aspect that will be dealt with in the case studies, for both Kenya and Rhodesia, is the impact and influence of local religion, sorcery and cults had on the conflicts (Lan, 1985). It should be noted that in the French model, quoted above by Rid (2010), this was included in the indigenous affairs bureau. A recognition by the French of the importance traditional religions played amongst the indigenous populations of Africa and the power this had over their minds. A point developed later in this study.

As already noted Galula (Galula, 1964/2006) lays out the framework for conducting a counter-insurgency operation based upon four primary laws and six principals:

1. Seize the initiative and become offensive
2. The “full utilization of the counterinsurgent’s assets” , by which he includes all resources available to the nation: economic, administrative, judicial, military and police, control of the information and the political element too.
3. Economy of force, which in colonial terms was taken to mean both being thrifty, as fighting in the colonies was expensive and also not to wipe out the local population either; as this could prove counter-productive.
4. The concept of irreversibility, which means defending the ground gained and not to cede this back to the insurgents. It is this principle that underpins the whole strategy as once ground is gained, this goes a long way to convincing the population that the government forces are winning. Once this conviction is accepted then superior intelligence comes forth from the local population as they recognise it is in their best interests not to allow the insurgents to return. The fear of retribution if they did return becomes too great.
5. “to command is to control” . Control means to take over the administration, safety and security returning the area to a fully functioning part of the state where the rule of law is paramount. To achieve this will require the acquiescence of the local leaders incorporating them into the political structure, otherwise they have little to gain and their support will wane and fluctuate.
6. Simplicity: do not over complicate the whole process. The last of six principles, requires building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. (Galula, 1964/2006, pp. 55-60)

This discussion encapsulates how important the population are to the whole effort involved in countering- the-insurgency. In addition to the four laws presented by

Galula(1964/2006, pp. 52-55) , the third law has four important implications, according to Artelli (2007):

1. Effective political action on the population must be preceded by military and police operations against the insurgent political organizations;
2. Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative while the insurgent still controls the population;
3. The counterinsurgency needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win;
4. The counterinsurgency cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of strength, or his political supporters will flock to the insurgent side (2007, p. 33).

These measures formed the backbone of the strategy used by the French in both Indo China and in Algeria; insurgencies which they lost. The reasons for losing are many not least because they were applied to late in Indochina and in Algeria the harshness of their approach turned the support of the population against them. Every town, village and alleyway became a potential death trap for the security forces denying them vital intelligence. As argued intelligence is the key to successful operations and without it no counter-insurgency can be effective (Trinquier, 1964, pp. 32-33). Nonetheless, what was outlined above has been adopted by others and refined in order to make them work more effectively becoming the key essentials to combating insurgency (Beckett, 2001; Charters, 2009; Kilcullen, 2006a; Lewis, 2006).

There are some important reasons why the French experience of conducting counter-insurgency operations is important to this study. The experiences that the French acquired during their colonial campaigns are significant; especially recruiting the use of the local indigenous population on their side, together with an understanding of how important local political considerations were to the overall conduct of the campaign.

Trinquier (1964), a contemporary of Galula, and also a noted French combatant and military historian, writing in 1961 succinctly identifies these critical aspects in his work *Le Guerre Moderne*. He stresses the need to treat the population with consideration and respect, but also points out that the insurgency is seeking to do the same, “impose its will upon the population”; not necessarily with either consideration or respect but by terrorising them (Trinquier, 1964, p. 7). Essentially, he argues to combat this threat the government forces must use all the means at their disposal; primarily to combat terrorism: the weapon of

subversive warfare. By identifying terrorism, Trinquier explains how effective this weapon is against classic forces, dispiriting them and putting fear into the general population (p. 15).

Another noteworthy characteristic was the ability of the French officer corps to identify with the local population. They did not remain aloof from them but recruited them into their defensive structure and learnt their local languages (1964, p. xii). It was these aspects that gave the security forces in both Kenya and Rhodesia a greater capability ability to understand their enemies. A considerable number had been born and raised or had spent long periods in these countries. However, in Malaya there was a serious deficiency of European officers within the security forces who had any experience of the conditions to be found at the time the insurgency broke out. Once this shortfall of expertise was recognised as a key component, efforts were made to increase the recruitment of Malays and particularly Chinese into the security forces; particularly the police. Fighting counter-insurgencies requires a lot of manpower, which places a heavy reliance on recruiting large numbers to fill the ranks (Corum, 2006). Recruiting indigenous forces helped to overcome the shortages.

It is particularly poignant from these works by the French to note the tactic of using native tribes as part of the thrust against the insurgents. This strategy formed the backbone of tactics used in all three of the case studies. It can be argued without this use of local tribes against the insurgents, dividing them against each other, the capabilities of the security forces would have been severely restricted; perhaps their successes would have even been impossible to achieve without this type of support.

## **2.7 Hearts and Minds**

An important aspect of strategy was the development of the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ in the post war period. This phrase has become synonymous with discussions of counter- insurgency and combating asymmetrical conflicts, frequently interpreted as using less violent and coercive measures (Carruthers, 1995a; Charters, 1989; Dixon, 2009; Fine, 2010; Hack, 2009; Mockaitis, 1990a; Stubbs, 1989b; Zambarnardi, 2010).

The concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’ has become central to all modern day discussions concerned with counter insurgency and combating asymmetrical conflicts. Although often attributed to General Templer from the time of the Malayan Emergency, “the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people” (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 3; Stubbs, 1989b, pp. 1-2) there are many other claimants, not least Steinbeck (1939) in his book *Grapes of Wrath*, in which he says “the hearts and minds of the people, the grapes of wrath were growing heavy with vintage”. Lyndon B. Johnson,

certainly was keen on using the phrase often inverting it to ‘minds and hearts’ when discussing the war in Vietnam. Many think he took this from President John Adams’s letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> of February 1818 (Adams, 1818):

The Revolution was effected (sic) before the War commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments of their duties and obligations.... This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people, was the real American Revolution (as cited in Dickinson, 2009, p. 1).

This quote very much epitomizes what is at stake and links well with the principle as outlined above by Galula (1964/2006), and encapsulated in his first law of counter-insurgency where, “the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.” (p. 52). In order to gain their support the government forces must also demonstrate that they are capable of winning and furthermore that they are capable of protecting the population too, “for no one likes being shot as a reward for loyalty” (Paget, 1967, p. 176). The ability to achieve this has now become a recognised part of the total strategy, but this appears not to be the case during its development in the 1950’s, as its concept was not very well understood. Trying to trace the evolution through the conflicts was part of this research project.

Carruthers (1995a) outlines how this concept developed as part of strategy, in particular how the British government attempted to influence opinion to any challenges to its colonial rule in four counter-insurgency campaigns: Palestine, Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus; as well as how the propaganda war was fought by stigmatising the opponents (p. 2). The use of propaganda became very pronounced during the prosecution of the insurgencies being analysed and will be discussed in the case studies in Chapters 5.13, 6.12 and 7.13. O’Neill (2005) offers a more detailed definition:

Popular support [for insurgency] from the elites and especially the masses stems primarily from concrete grievances concerning such things as land reform, injustice, unfair taxation, and corruption. It is over these issues that the battle to win hearts and minds is most directly engaged. History suggests that a government can most effectively undercut insurgencies that rely on mass support by splitting the rank and file away from the leadership through calculated reforms that address the material grievances and needs of the people. (pp. 171-172)

It must be recognised that the rebellions have their roots in many long seated grievances; failure to take account of this factor will restrict any long term solutions. The military solution can only work with a comprehensive negotiated settlement. Therefore, the objective is to separate the rebels from their support, both tacit and direct, they may be obtaining from the general population (Dixon, 2009; Jones & Smith, 2010). Other authors including Mockaitis (2003) support this premise:

Trust and cooperation depend . . . on recognizing and as far as possible addressing the real needs and the legitimate grievances on which the insurgency feeds . . . .People generally support an insurgency out of a shared sense of wrong or frustration at not having their basic needs met'. (pp. 21-22)

Understanding this linkage to the people is often attributed to Mao Tse-tung (1961, ch 6) in his treatise *On Guerrilla Warfare* in which he points out the synergy between the two; without the support of the masses of the population then the insurgent cannot survive, he is likened to a fish in the sea. Take away the sea and the fish dies (Egnell, 2010, p. 286; Fitzsimmons, 2008, p. 340). Accordingly the complex social-economic-political-military strategy often becomes abbreviated to 'hearts and minds', but it is in addition to all the other tactics, not in place of them. Furthermore, it is not a soft option, as is sometimes misunderstood to be, it "denoted authority, not appeasement" (Strachan, 2007, p. 8).

Defining the difficulties involved with 'hearts and minds' approach from a military perspective, has brought out a number of interpretations, not least from Lieutenant General Sir Kiszley (2006), regarding the:

complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty;... problems that the military alone cannot solve requiring cooperation with other highly diverse agencies and individuals to achieve a comprehensive approach; the need for interaction with indigenous people whose culture it does not understand; and a requirement to talk to at least some of its opponents, which it can view as treating with the enemy (p. 20).

Stubbs (1989b) uses the Malayan Emergency to demonstrate how the process of winning hearts and minds actually occurred, with the blending of the social, political, economic and coercive structures under a more centralised strategy designed to win over the population to the merits of rejecting the Communist insurgents rebellion. The demand for both rubber and tin to fight the Korean War made Malaya an important resource. Therefore, the British Government was prepared to offer a carrot in the form of independence to the

Malays if they rejected the predominately Chinese Communists call to oust the Colonialists. Wages and working conditions improved greatly undermining communist propaganda (Brendon, 2007, pp. 461-466). The 'New Villages' gave tenure to the occupants; most of whom could never have afforded to own their own houses previously. When this is put into context, the whole process of hearts and minds can be seen to be a way of drawing the population over to the Government side. A firm and fair approach to law and order is a further requirement, ensuring the general population are not exploited, "justice must be done (and be seen to be done!)" (Paget, 1967, p. 177).

However, as Charles Colson, Chief Counsel to U.S. President Nixon, once said, "if you grab them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow". Although this quote is sometimes attributed to Lyndon B. Johnson, the meaning is the same and moves away from the much vaunted idea of 'hearts and minds' as a soft or benign approach and towards one which requires a more ruthless determination to achieve desired success. Galula (1964/2006) expounds the ideas that lie behind a successful campaign, which involve the ability to gain the support of the population and ultimately to solve the country's problems, through a series of actions. The aims of counterinsurgency are to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory

'Hearts and minds' has developed into meaning civic support for the population in the form of aid both financial and technical assistance, with the "provision of amenities such as schools, hospitals, roads, new industries, food and welfare"(Paget, 1967, p. 178). In Malaya, the police were ordered to take part in 'Operation Service' in 1952 by the Commissioner of Police, Colonel Young, to offer every assistance and kindness where possible to the people. Reports indicate this was very effective in gaining the support of the everyday citizens (Paget, 1967, p. 67). "The military and the police also had to cooperate with the civil government to implement programmes connected with the 'hearts and minds' campaign"(Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 69).

Malaya is often used as the shining example of how to fight a counter insurgency, with the combined strategy of structural reform, sound law and order principals adhering to justice for all and the inclusion of 'hearts and minds' too as a core aspect of policy. General Templer constantly emphasised this approach through actions and deeds thus limiting the appeal of rebellion (Komer, 1972, p. 64). The improvement in economic circumstances certainly allowed the authorities to implement and try many measures that may not have been considered had this not been the case (Edwards, 1990, p. 418). Detractors to Malaya as a

counter-insurgency success story, tend to insist the strategy could only have worked at this time and place and was non transferable to other conflicts (Nagl, 1999; Taber, 1970).

The ability to convince the population that the government will ultimately win is an essential part of the overall strategy “The counterinsurgent [sic] cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent” (Galula, 1964/2006, p. 83). Consequently, the security forces have to gain the support of the population in their efforts to eradicate the country of the insurgency. In this instance the meaning of “gaining” support of the population can be interpreted many ways but rarely do ‘kind acts’ achieve strategic successes, although they will achieve local support. The need for a more directed approach is one that is reviewed in this study.

## **2.8 Strategies**

Developing a sustainable working strategy is central to any counter-insurgency, clearly defining the aims and objectives. Paget (1967) structures these aims and objectives around three core considerations; once it has been accepted that the military aim is dependent on political considerations. These are “purpose and scope of military operations”, secondly, “short- term political and military aims governing the campaign and finally, the long term political aim which it is hoped to achieve when the military campaign is over” (p. 156)

The need for synergy between political and military is thus stressed as a major requirement, referred to as Civil-Military understanding. However, this needs to be broken down further to appreciate what this means in practice. Upon arrival in Malaya, General Templer issued this statement soon after his arrival:

Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and for all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated ( as cited Komer, 1972, p. 31).

To back this statement, up General Templer laid out a declaration of national policy. In the case of Malaya, this was fundamental to ensuring the support of the Malays against the predominately Chinese led insurgents. Once they understood they would be granted independence, if they supported the government to defeat the insurgency. In Kenya the Colonial Government did not articulate that they would grant independence until much later in the conflict. In Rhodesia, it was certainly understood by those that supported the Government of Ian Smith, that defeat would mean the end to any aspirations they might have had to maintaining their version of independence. Therefore, developing a national vision of

policy objectives capable of gaining the support of the population is central to garnering all sides under a single direction, if a common cause is to be prompted.

There are a number of strategies that have been identified that were used and passed on to other insurgencies: collective punishment, food control, restricted movement, identification documentation and resettlement or 'Villagisation' are considered the most potent. Resettlement was also termed as 'New Villages' and fell into two defined areas recognised as crucial for defeating the unity of purpose for the subversives. On one side, it separated the rebels from the population depriving them of their nourishment: food, supplies, fuel, ammunition, intelligence and additional manpower. On the other, it afforded the Government the opportunity to prove they were capable of protecting them from intimidation, as well as improving their welfare, by providing them with housing, health services, education and security (French, 2011, p. 2; Smith, 2001b, p. 62).

The policy of Villagisation (Hack, 1999c, pp. 98-102), was based upon the concept of securing the rural population from being terrorised by the insurgents. In Malaya over half a million people were moved to 500 'New Villages' to fulfil this policy (Robinson, 1956, p. 96). Consequently, the ability to control the population by separating them from the insurgents fulfils one of many basic counter-insurgency requirements. One of these was food control. By limiting the amount of food that was available to the rebels made many of them desperate and forced them out into the open to seek supplies. Away from their sanctuaries they were vulnerable; a fact not lost on the security forces that set ambushes for them. "[T]he most important factor in destroying the [Communist Terrorist] is to complete his isolation from the rest of the community. He must get no money, no food or clothing; no help of any sort" (as cited in Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 119)

A centralised command structure was paramount for ensuing unity of action and purpose (Hack, 1999a; Hamby, 2002; Paget, 1967, p. 158). Although not in place at the start of the conflicts in either Kenya or Malaya, however, once it was recognised that it was fundamental to defeating the insurgency it was soon put in place. Rhodesia, with the benefit of lessons learnt policy, had this in place very early in the 'Bush war'. The ability to bring together all the machinery needed to prosecute the conflict including the armed forces, the police, the intelligence organisations both civil and military and the relevant Government departments is considered essential if the counter-insurgency efforts are to be successful (Jeffery, 1987, p. 124; Paget, 1967, p. 158).



## 2.9 The Colonial Police

From the perspective of this research the Colonial Police have been identified as one of the key areas that needed to be assessed in more detail. Most works dealing with insurgencies tend to consider the conflict from the military view point. As a result a very important factor is ignored, which is how vital the police, and particularly Special Branch, are to the blending of the civil-military-police concept together (Hutchinson, 1969). Therefore:

The police are a crucial nexus between state and people. Their behavior (sic) will affect the perceptions people have and the evaluations they make of the state and its performance; they are a powerful socializing and symbolic agency (Marenin, 1982, p. 384).

The critical part of this quote is that insurgencies are fought with an eye to the future, when the situation is expected to return to normal. Central to normality is the maintenance of law and order, which is a police function, not a military one. Although difficult to assess just how important the Colonial Police role has been, they represent the visual front to the public of the Government in action. The police must be seen to be upholding the law and protecting the population from criminal activity, as well as protecting them from the insurgents. Public confidence can only be re-asserted if the everyday functions of law and order are seen to be working normally. The presence of the military on the streets does little to restore confidence that the insurgency is over.

Under the colonial structure, the military would only be brought in as an aid to the civil power (Huntington, 1981); recognition that the police would normally be the ones to maintain law and order (Epstein, 1968). Only when the police could not fulfil this function, was it necessary to supplement their numbers with additional armed units who would conduct quasi-police functions. Although, considered to be standard practice over many decades, it was still fraught with petty squabbles between the higher echelons over which force, the police or the army, had outright authority. “Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment functioning in close cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p. 9). Normally it was recognised that the police had a greater knowledge and understanding of local conditions based on living in the country, but just did not have the numbers necessary to combat an insurgency.

The development of colonial policing, according to Brogden (1987), has evolved through a need to legitimise imperial order, less through coercion and more through general

acceptance (pp. 10-15). But the Colonial Police was also formalised along the lines of the French Gendarmerie, in that it was a Para-military force capable of operating “in a military capacity as the colony’s first line of defence” (Sinclair, 2006, p. 69). They were armed and trained to maintain law and public order.

When the situation was considered beyond the capabilities of the Colonial Police force then the military was brought in but only as an aid to civil power. Usually this was not without its problems, as the military officers often considered themselves superior to the local expatriate personnel and therefore disliked ceding authority to them. There was also the tendency to try and ignore the law, as it was found to be too burdensome to use when countering insurgents. Often the military saw the law as an obstacle that prevented them doing what they were trained to do and that was to kill the enemy. Whereas the police tended to see the law as necessary in order to show that a civil society can only be based upon the rule of law. Failure to uphold this tenet would indicate they were no better than the insurgents that were terrorising the population at large. Arbitrary brutality is nearly always counterproductive (Brown, 1997, p. 123; Hutchinson, 1969, p. 57; Jeffery, 1985, pp. 119-121).

Once the situation became too serious for the limited police resources, control passed to the military and the police became part of a three legged stool: army police and administration (Sinclair, 2006, p. 155) The unified command structure was certainly far more capable of being effective as was seen by the results in Malaya when it was put into operation. General Briggs was appointed as Director of Operations in 1950 and developed the ‘Briggs Plan’, which was to become the over-arching operational template for prosecuting the insurgency (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 76; Smith, 2001b, p. 62). “The military and the police must also cooperate with the civil government to implement programmes connected with the hearts and minds campaign” (Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 69).

The major argument in favour of the joint command approach is that it eliminates the squabbles over who has overall control of operations. For many generals the situation where the army acts ‘in support of the Police’ is unsatisfactory (Paget, 1967, p. 159). The preferred structure was to use a Director of Operations, with a totally integrated team comprising of the police, military, civil and intelligence personnel; all in unison to form the triumvirate of civil-military-police with the intelligence service becoming the fourth member. The other services should be used in a consultancy role when appropriate (Jeffery, 1987, p. 145; Paget, 1967, p. 160).

It is important to recognise the central role that the police must continue to perform whilst efforts are being made to counter the insurgency (Hutchinson, 1969, p. 56). The everyday functions of policing still have to take place, as well as combating the tactics used by the insurgents in an effort to discredit and destabilise the Government. Typical tactics by insurgents is to overload the police by terrorising the local population with murders and kidnappings, as well as carrying out multiple criminal activities such as thefts, burglaries, civil disturbances leading to riots (Epstein, 1968, p. 151). It needs to be recognised that it is a difficult time, “in any counter-insurgency campaign there is confusion between ‘police’ and ‘military’ methods. This confusion is unavoidable because the threat is by nature confused” (Jeffery, 1987, p. 144).

## **2.10 Intelligence**

The need for intelligence is fundamental to all aspects of warfare and this readily understood by strategists as an essential aspect to counter insurgency. However, intelligence also attempts to pursue another crucial aspect of countering insurgency, in that it attempts to build a more comprehensive picture of the insurgents’ operational status; incorporating their mental, physical, political and economic positions into a structural image that can be readily analysed and quickly understood. This dimension is crucial to the ultimate aim of success, as military means alone can never achieve total victory. A political dimension that corresponds to the military one is an integral part of counter-insurgency tactics. Therefore, "essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population”(Galula, 1964/2006, p. 63) . Intelligence assists in achieving this objective.

A core feature of conducting a counter-insurgency campaign is ability to harness good, sound intelligence. The failure to understand and apply this aspect will undermine all attempts at gaining advantage. However, it is the police that are the fundamental link to achieving a sound intelligence gathering network (Jeffery, 1987, p. 118) . They should be “intimately acquainted with the local population” (p. 118) and capable of obtaining extensive information regarding the activities of the insurgents. Yet, it was apparent that in neither Malaya nor Kenya was the required level of intelligence sufficient to deal with insurgencies when they started. It can be further argued that had the intelligence been better in the first place, then the insurgencies may have been nipped in the bud and not have been able to develop at all (Hack, 1999a). Both countries were able to rectify this short coming and

proceeded to develop a considerable ability that greatly enhanced their ability to counter the insurgents in field.

Developing a comprehensive intelligence organisation is fundamental to the overall ability to prosecute an effective counter insurgency strategy (Jeffery, 1987, p. 120). Successful tactics are based upon the ability to know and then anticipate what the enemy is about to do and then counter it. The intelligence is divided into political and operational; neither is exclusive to the other as it assists in maintaining a comprehensive picture of the whole insurgency together with its aims (Kitson, 1971, p. 72). Furthermore, the organisation needs to be co-ordinated as it will have to deal with intelligence from multiple sources including: the police, Special Branch, the military forces on the ground, civil authorities and agencies inclusive of a population (Beckett, 2001, p. 107; Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 69; Mumford, 2012, p. 12). The process of gaining intelligence is a complicated one:

Practically speaking, there are three methods of intelligence gathering in counter-insurgency operations: *overt* (collected by uniformed patrols on the ground), *confidential* (retrieved largely from detainees under interrogation) and *clandestine* (including undercover or paralegal surveillance). These forms are collected by both police and military (Mumford, 2012, p. 15).

Mumford's examples are limited in their scope as intelligence comes from a far wider range of sources than has been offered, but he is correct when he says they fulfil three functions: background, operational and criminal. Each interlinking and illuminating the strategies needed to "undermine, subdue and eventually suppress an insurgency" (Mumford, 2012, p. 15). Most military strategists would agree on the need to 'know-the-enemy'. Although a simple enough statement, it is far more difficult when you are not part of the local population and even more difficult if they are directly opposed to your presence in their country anyway. From the perspective of the Colonial Administration, intelligence fulfilled a far wider purpose, it was:

Integral to the survival of the regime, colonial intelligence was also broader and encompassed not only Special Branch but also information acquired in the course of day-to-day administration. This political intelligence was important not only in providing warnings, but also in effective monitoring and in linking the administration and the population (Cormac, 2010, p. 804).

## 2.11 Special Branch

The British developed a strategic arm of policing capable of dealing with political crime called Special Branch, which was developed from the need to infiltrate the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1880s (Porter, 1991). Transposed to the Colonies it has had a chequered and secretive evolution, but has been formidable nonetheless. The importance of this specialist task force should not be underestimated and by many accounts was one of the single most effective weapons used against the insurgencies in all three of the insurgencies studied (Comber, 2008; Flower, 1987; Gentry, 2010; Melson, 2005; Modarelli, 2008; Randall, 1990). Its role will be discussed in all three case studies as the majority of participants in this study worked with Special Branch.

For many non specialists Military Intelligence is often confused with role of Special Branch. The difference is that Military Intelligence mainly provides information and plans to assist the military commander in making tactical plans; it is a support role. The role of Special Branch is far more complex, as it has to provide not only intelligence to police, the military and the Government, but it is also charged with destroying the insurgents from within; an operational role. The requirement involves infiltrating the subversive organisation at every level; even to the point of influencing decisions with disinformation and misinformation (Hutchinson, 1969, p. 58).

In Malaya, General Templer, former Director of Military Intelligence, U.K, created a combined intelligence unit together with a staff intelligence training school. Templar also separated Special Branch from the police Central Investigation Department (CID); as well as setting up a new psychological warfare section to undermine the insurgent's Communist propaganda machine. The other key aspect taken from the Briggs Plan was the creation of 'safe villages', which became the back bone of the strategy to deny the rebels succour from the local population. General Templer said "the shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us" (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, p. 102). Since the end of the Emergency it is now become more fully recognised how important Special Branch was to the overall changes in fortune for the security forces in Malaya (Comber, 2008; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b; Jeffery, 1987).

Kenya too, was found to be deficient in its capabilities regarding the structure of Special Branch. In 1952, a delegation from Military Intelligence 5, (MI5) was brought to the Colony with a remit to remedy the short comings and provide recommendations for improving the intelligence gathering capabilities. The recommendations were put into

immediate effect by the Governor (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 77; Jeffery, 1987, p. 125). The team was led by Sir Percy Stillitoe, Director General of MI5; who also had served earlier in Rhodesia as part of the police service (Majdalany, 1962, p. 111).

Rhodesia chose to integrate the roles performed by Special Branch and national intelligence gathering in 1963, under the tutelage of Ken Flower, into a new Security and Intelligence organisation called the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). Special Branch effectively became part of the CIO, but continued to have a function for internal security working with the police as it had done previously through the Provincial, District and Station Units. A unique structure but one that worked (Flower, 1987, p. 15).

The Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) had penetrated both Communist Insurgency organisations very early on in the conflict and this was “made easier by the tribalism and nepotism with which both organisations were afflicted at this stage” (Flower, 1987, p. 104). The penetration of the guerrilla organisations from the pre- UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence November the 11<sup>th</sup> 1965) until the early 1970s was as complete as it could have been by the Central Intelligence Organisation (p. 105). This assessment by Flower head of the of the Central Intelligence Organisation, of the intelligence gathering capabilities of his organisation are truly remarkable and attest to the comprehensive ability to manage and manipulate large numbers of informers over long periods of time. Ken Flower was also one of the prime movers for the setting up of pseudo operations, ( discussed in detail in each Case Study) but he also knew the value of not broadcasting the success either and made sure that pseudo operations remained clandestine (Baxter, 2011, p. 17).

## **2.12 Specialised and Elite Units**

All three conflicts provided the ideal opportunity for specialised counter-insurgency units to be set up and used. The Special Air Service (SAS) was certainly the most renowned of these, but not the only one as many other innovations were tried and tested in order to get results. Contrary to popular belief the British SAS were not disbanded after the Second World War, but continued to operate clandestinely in operations regarded as politically sensitive by the British Government. Greece was a notable example of this (Jones, 2010, pp. 71-85).

Malaya was a difficult terrain in which to fight a counter insurgency operation. The rubber plantations were on the edge of the dense jungle from which the insurgents were able to launch raids, afterwards returning to their jungle hideouts (Jones, 2010, p. 138). It soon became obvious it was necessary to penetrate the jungle and flush the Communist Terrorists

out of their lairs. However, this required specialised forces capable of living and surviving under extreme jungle conditions.

The first dedicated unit was the Jungle Guerrilla Force (JGF), which was used to seek and destroy the subversive forces in the jungle and became known as Ferret force. Though, they did not find favour with the army hierarchy, for many reasons and were quickly disbanded, despite their success. This led to a similar type of unit made up of Chinese policemen and called Chinese Assault Team (CAT). Interestingly this unit disguised itself as Communist Terrorists in a pseudo- guerrilla role, although it was not made up of captured terrorists that were turned and sent back in to betray their erstwhile comrades (Jones, 2010, p. 141). Pseudo-gangs as they became known did develop later on in Malaya, but this forerunner could have been the genus of the idea that spawned these units that became one of the hallmarks of all three campaigns and will be dealt with in the case studies.

Despite considerable opposition by many senior officers in the British Army, it was realised that in the Malayan campaign the use of unconventional soldiers capable of matching the enemy on their own terms was central to the offensive. The SAS were seen to suit this requirement. It was the officers that had served in Palestine together, that recognised the need for unorthodox tactics and were the driving force to use the SAS again in Malaya. These officers included General Templer, who became supreme commander of operations in Malaya, who knew the exploits of Calvert who had been in command of the Special Air Service Brigade until October 1945. Calvert was a member of the famous 'Chindits', which had fought in the Burmese jungles against the Japanese during the Second World War. Because of his experience he was asked to form the Malayan Scouts, which would become 22 SAS (Jones, 2010, p. 153; Mumford, 2012, pp. 33-34).

Calvert knew Briggs, who would develop the over-arching counter-insurgency plan for Malaya, called the Briggs Plan (Smith, 2001b, p. 62). Calvert also knew Gurney (who was Governor for a period but was assassinated in Malaya in October 1951) and Gray, who were in Palestine together and had used what were called Special Night Squads. These squads were controversial and used SAS members together with others to try and infiltrate the Jewish terrorist gangs; with limited success. Gray was Inspector General of the Palestine Police and became Commissioner of Police in Malaya until 1951 (Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 119). He appointed Richard Catling Deputy Commissioner of Police, who had served as head of Special Branch in Palestine under him and who went on to become Commissioner of Police in Kenya in 1954 (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 75). These men were at the vanguard of developing special units for counter-insurgency and it should come as no surprise they took

their experience, and those who knew what they were doing, with them when they transferred to other conflicts involving counter-insurgency.

The other important linkage to the re-formation of the SAS was the call to Rhodesia for volunteers to join up (Jones, 2010, p. 154). The Rhodesians were considered to have considerable bush craft skills and would not require as much training as soldiers from other army units; therefore, they were operationally ready for jungle warfare. A notable name amongst their number was Reid-Daly, who went on to command the Selous Scouts in the 'Bush War' (Beckett, 2001, p. 140). The Selous Scouts were to master the use of pseudo-gangs, as part of the general operating capability with much success. Stiff (1982) posits that as much as 68% of the insurgents killed during the 'Bush War' in Rhodesia can be attributed either directly or indirectly to the Selous Scouts (p. 330).

The back bone for success in any counter-insurgency is the ability to harness and use as many intelligence sources as is practicable. The intelligence must then be collated, analysed and acted upon as promptly as possible before it loses its operational value. Therefore, the ability to exploit and disseminate any unconventional sources is one that allows the security forces a substantial advantage, when prosecuted to the full.

A much sought after tactical requirement is a comprehensive picture of the insurgents' operational status. The ability to determine how the insurgents are dealing with the conflict, including their setbacks, their overall harmony and continuing affinity with the political dimensions of the struggle is of great value. Moreover, whether or not they might be wavering and losing heart for the fight are also essential pieces of the intelligence jigsaw. The ability to infiltrate your opponent's camps and assess these underlying signs would be major coup for the security forces. The information gathered is then used to build up strategies for psychological warfare too. Demoralising the opposition is an important aspect; hence letting them know that they are losing their men to the enemy has a very disheartening effect on the morale of the insurgent gangs.

### **2.12.1 Pseudo Gangs**

Gaining intelligence, by infiltrating opponent's camps is very much sought after tactic within conflicts and using spies to accomplish this has been much publicised over the centuries to achieve this goal. However, another method, which has been used in many guises, but never formalised, has been the use of 'turning' ex-captured gang members so that they return to their erstwhile colleagues and deceive them in to believing that they are still on their side; when in fact they have changed sides. This tactic has been labelled 'pseudo gangs'.



The Colonial Police Special Branch was the dominant unit behind the implementation of this ploy in both Kenya and Malaya, at around the same time in the early 1950's, with Kenya the leading advocate in its development (Comber, 2008; Lovatt-Smith, 2005; Parker, 2009a). The Rhodesian Special Branch went on to adopt and perfect this tactic too, with operational assistance and direction from those who had used it both in Kenya and Malaya (Flower, 1987).

The use of Pseudo Gangs was quickly seen by all the security forces that used them, to fulfil a number of very useful extra functions in addition to providing invaluable intelligence. The demoralising effect on the enemy was very important, especially when they realised they were losing fighters to the government forces. Furthermore, the levels of support for the government forces gradually increased as the general population learnt of the defections. The tactic was cheap and easy to deploy, which is why it was seen as such a useful tool in the arsenal of counter-insurgency (Cline, 2005; Kitson, 1960; Parker, 2009b; Parker, 2006; Reid-Daly, 1982; Stiff, 1982).

### **2.12.2 Indigenous Forces**

Using Indigenous tribes' people has been mentioned as it fulfils a central bulwark to the ability of the Colonial forces to fight in terrains that were basically alien to them; although many became adept at fighting in these conditions. The British in Malaya imported from nearby North Borneo and Sarawak a number of Dyak and Iban tribesmen, and used them as trackers and scouts. These indigenous tribesmen or irregulars provided needed skills to the government forces to avoid being ambushed, and to close with and destroy insurgents (Gregorian, 1994; Hack, 1999b; Hughes & Tripodi, 2009). The same was true in both Kenya and Rhodesia. In Rhodesia the use of tracker units based upon the 'flechas'; a Portuguese indigenous unit used in both Angola and Mozambique with great success and the forerunner of Selous Scouts, were very effective (Reid-Daly, 1999, p. 61).

The development of the Home Guard, meaning a locally recruited defence force, in all three conflicts was a crucial step as was the resettlement programmes (Hughes & Tripodi, 2009, p. 4; Paget, 1967, p. 157; Randazzo, 2011). Basically, the concept was one of a volunteer local defence force to protect their own and other villages. In many places this was supplemented by additional trained men from other districts who were armed with no more than pitch forks. In Malaya they became the bulwark of the security forces to cover the villages in outlying rubber plantations. The security forces did not have sufficient manpower to protect all the isolated rubber plantations; without these additional unpaid, for the most

part, volunteer-defence forces (Komer, 1972, p. 40). The total number raised in Malaya was more than 250,000 Home Guard; predominately Malays but Chinese were also recruited to counter act the effect of Chinese Communist insurgents (Hack, 2009, p. 385; Mumford, 2012, p. 37).

In Kenya, the ability to recruit what were termed as ‘Loyalist’ tribesmen from the main Kikuyu tribe into the Home Guard can be argued was central to the ability of splitting any allegiance many had to the Mau Mau and turned the tide in favour of the Colonial government in Kenya (Maloba, 1993, p. 89). Although termed as ‘loyalists’, this can be misleading as loyalty was based on such things as self preservation, support for the old traditional order or to protect their Christian faith and not necessarily because they supported the government (Maloba, 1993, p. 88). The Home Guard formed what was a resistance movement, “and was to make an important contribution to eventual victory (Majdalany, 1962, p. 111). Another significant fact is that the highest number of casualties came from this so called ‘loyalist’ section of society; as they were hated by the insurgents turning the conflict into a civil war between the Kikuyu (Majdalany, 1962, p. 188; Maloba, 1993, p. 83). The death toll between the two forces, the Home Guard and the Tribal Police, “accounted for 4,686 or 42 per cent of Mau Mau killed” (Majdalany, 1962, p. 221). The same is true in Rhodesia; local tribe’s people who formed their own defence forces took a heavy toll from retribution, intimidation and punishment for supporting the Government.

### **2.12.3 Internal Affairs**

The Rhodesians had developed a more sophisticated structure to manage and administer the various Districts as they were known; this included a Para-military Ministry of Internal Affairs (Intaf). They represented the Government throughout the country in urban and rural areas, providing a direct connection to the people. From this unit the Home Guard or Guard Force was formed in August 1975, with its commander Brigadier W. Godwin, who had served in Malaya; (once again a linkage to earlier campaigns is established through those that had served there). The intention of forming this new unit was to take over protection and manning of the Protected Villages, which required round the clock defence to be effective (Wall, 2007). The unit was deployed in some very isolated areas and probably lost more men than any other unit during the Bush War (Wall, 2012).

### **2.12.4 Police Special Units**

Other specialised units including the Mobile Police Units (MPU), General Service Units (GSU), Police Anti-Terrorist Units (PATU) Tracker Units, Dog and Horse Units. The

later were very effective in both Kenya and Rhodesia, but because of the jungle terrain were of little value in Malaya. Each in their own way contributed to the overall structure of the forces opposed to the rebels. Aspects will be discussed were appropriate based upon the responses from the interviewees.

### **2.13 Propaganda**

Propaganda was an important tool in the armoury of the Government; the concept of 'hearts and minds' very much falls under this umbrella. As modern methods of communication were evolving, so were the many methods used to influence the population. Propaganda evolved with every conflict, particularly as support of the general masses was seen as fundamental to the overall counter-insurgency effort. Convincing the troops not to be brutal to the population was one of many changes that were instigated (Beckett, 2001, p. 94). General Templer in Malaya recognised the importance of being able to influence the populace by setting up a new psychological warfare section for this role in 1954 (Beckett, 2001, p. 101). Using the vernacular press, especially Chinese, radio broadcast in local dialects, pamphlets and especially short films shown in the villages were of great value. Pamphlets were so effective that if anybody was caught by the terrorist with one, they were executed by the insurgents (Nagl, 2002, p. 94).

Propaganda was a one sided weapon for the insurgents too. "The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises not what he does" (Galula, 1964/2006, p. 9). However, this is not the case for the Government, which is held responsible for its actions, at all times, regardless of the causes. In a guerrilla war the government is on the defensive and has to protect all its assets at all times (Taber, 1970, p. 22). A progressive strategy is required to infiltrate all aspects of the populations' lives to convince them that quality of life is improving for them and will continue to improve; any bad publicity counts against this strategy very quickly. Separating the insurgent from the population is as much using a physical barrier as a mental one. Until the population is convinced the insurgency will not win, they will continue to hedge their bets. Overcoming this by any means is the function of the propaganda machine. There is a need to undermine the insurgents and thwart their political objectives by pushing an alternative view point that destroys their arguments (Brown, 1997, p. 136).

Carruthers (1995a) states that in Kenya it was important to point out the achievements that had been made despite the Mau Mau. In that it was essential to portray developments as

having been archived regardless of what the rebels were doing. A positive spin was sought to portray the virtues of the government's work rather than as a knee-jerk reaction (p. 165). It was imperative that any developments were not seen as the result of the actions taken by the insurgents forcing the authorities to act.

Developing a functioning propaganda apparatus was considered essential to the counter-insurgency efforts, which evolved over time. Psy-Ops, as it is often called, dealt with propaganda and psychological warfare to undermine the morale of the insurgents. Working closely with the Intelligence gathering apparatus, assessments and appreciations needed to be made concerning the direction to be taken with policy objectives. Once this has been done it had to be converted into the multiplicity of means: newspapers, tracts, pamphlets, news broadcasts and films to disseminate it (Kitson, 1971, p. 77).

## **2.14 Colonial Administration**

An area that appears to be rarely dealt with when discussing the Colonial counter insurgency campaigns is the role of the Colonial Administrator. The apparatus that drove the whole structure and maintained the civil side of imperial dominance is often described as the *Thin White Line* (Kirk-Greene, 1980). The term is short hand for the European Colonial Administration describing how few there were to administer large sections of territory. However, it appears “that the 'Thin White Line' was exiguous to the point of disbelief may be held now to have been unequivocally proved. Yet that line, however slender, was rarely in danger of being imperceptible or ineffective.” (1980, p. 38). It is important to realise that the judicial system was part of this civil structure too and presented the official face of the colonial government in operation; it was this aspect that held the composition of effective law and order in place. The machinery of the colonial government was one that sought to utilise the existing power structures to their own advantage consequently:

The vital consideration for colonial rulers was to establish a claim to authority and to uphold the colonial 'peace'. 'Customary' law was intended to sustain 'traditional' hierarchies endorsed by the colonial authorities. Thus the law imposed over much of British colonial Africa was largely designed to underpin the colonial presence (Killingray, 1986, p. 413).

Without the capabilities of the civil administration, few if any of the core aspects associated with 'hearts and minds' strategies could ever have been put in place. The security forces may have been the hard face of the might of Colonial power, but the civil

administration was the proof of the benefits that were to be found under a structured government, capable of handing out largesse as well as coercive power. The district magistrate's influence and power within this structure, controlling his area were considerable (Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 77). In addition, prior to the 'Emergences' the police were more perfunctory than a mighty dominant force,

the salient fact in the use of the police to maintain that framework of law and order in which alone any social or economic development could be initiated and implemented, was that the police were less a presence than an earnest. (Kirk-Greene, 1980, p. 40)

Understanding how such authority over thousands of inhabitants operated in practice or in theory is not part of this study, but what is important to understand is how powerful the sway the District Commissioners (DC) was over their indigenous charges. It could be said "his word was law: Pisi makubwa ni Serikali (Swahili)" (1980, p. 42). Furthermore, this sway, influence or authority, is not to be dismissed lightly and plays out as a significant factor in the support the security forces obtained by the power welded by the DC.

The ability of the colonial administration to rule with so few must in some way be attributed to many more factors than just having a white skin. "Colonial rule was maintained, after the initial conquest, with astonishingly small amounts of force, many of the forces themselves being locally recruited" (Clapham, 1985, p. 18). Why so many were prepared to support the security forces, and in some instances turn against their erstwhile comrades to join the pseudo gangs and become informers, to become so called collaborators, needs a more enlightened explanation. The case studies for Rhodesia and Kenya will look at the role spirit mediums, sorcery, oaths and soothsayers played in the whole process (Fields, 1982; Keen, 2006; Leakey, 1954; Middleton & Winter, 1963; Ranger, 1985; Sithole, 1987).

## **2.15 Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths**

The failure of many Europeans to understand the complex role witchcraft, sorcery and tribal beliefs plays in the cultural structure of African society could be a failure to grasp a significant reason why events unfolded the way they did in both the insurgencies in Kenya and Rhodesia (Ciekawy & Geschiere, 1998; Crawford, 1967; Fields, 1982; Geschiere, 1988; Lan, 1985; Mbiti, 1969; Middleton & Winter, 1963; Ranger, 1985).

The work of Malinowski (2004/1948) and Mbiti (1969) sought to illuminate the central role witchcraft, sorcery and tribal beliefs played in primitive societies and show how much it underpinned their whole cultural structure. It is the belief that there is an essential

nexus between magic and objects which, “it is a primeval possession of man to be known only through tradition and affirming man’s autonomist power of creating desired ends” (2004/1948, p. 56). Only by taking this aspect into consideration can the power of tradition be understood in relation to magic ritual and cult as supreme to the tribe (p. 55). In Africa, tribal traditions were (and still are) core to the structure and power within society, “whereas magic, sorcery and witchcraft are universally regarded as the main causes of individual diseases” (Mbiti, 1969, p. 44).

“Witchcraft is a mystical and innate power, which can be used by its possessor to harm other people” (Middleton & Winter, 1963, p. 3). The “sorcerers are the most feared and hated members of their communities (Mbiti, 1969)“In both Kenya and Rhodesia sorcery and witchcraft played a very important role for the insurgents, of which little has been written about in relation to understanding the physiological power this held over the people.

For example, in Rhodesia “there was an effective guerrilla war but it was a war in which spirit mediums became more significant than ever. Peasant religion formed an indispensable part of the composite ideology of the war.” (Ranger, 1985, p. 188). Ranger (Ranger, 1985) goes on to argue that the relationship that the African peasantry has with the land is uniquely tied to the spirits that are part of the land. The spirit mediums were the conduit to ensure this relationship worked to improve the agricultural outcomes. The Mediums were therefore the “articulators of radical consciousness” which allowed the guerrillas to convert the peasantry to their side by harnessing the Mediums. But in order to accomplish this they had to adopt the beliefs inherent in tribal cultural tradition. Thus tribal religion formed part of the “composite ideology of the war” (Ranger, 1985, p. 189). “It was only after they ascertained that the mediums held the respect of the peasantry that the guerrillas made attempts to win them to their side”(David Lan as quoted in Ranger, 1985, p. 190).

Access to land was an underlying grievance in both Rhodesia and Kenya. The white settlers wanted the prime areas and the African peasantry resented this greatly. “The consequent shortage of land for peasant cultivation was the single most significant incentive of the struggle” (David Lan as quoted in Ranger, 1985, p. 199). This quote could as easily be attributed to the struggle of the Mau Mau as it does for the peasantry in Rhodesia.

Interestingly enough the Colonial authorities were well aware of the central role the spirit mediums played in the affairs of the tribe. “Though opposed to each other in every other way, the guerrillas and the government forces were united in the seriousness with which they regarded the ancestors and their mediums” (Lan, 1985, p. 8). The authorities also attempted

to harness support offering “recognition and subsidy to mediums who were prepared to speak out against ‘trouble makers’ and to report to the District Commissioner when strangers entered the Tribal Trust Lands”(Ranger, 1985, p. 201). Even though some mediums did support the Government administering counter oaths as in Kenya, others were keen not to be tainted (Corfield, 1959, pp. 134, 152; Ranger, 1985, p. 201).

The relationship between the spirit mediums and the guerrillas in the Rhodesian conflict is important, “ from the earliest penetration of the guerrillas in the north-east, spirit mediums began to play an important role” (Ranger, 1985, p. 204). The spirit mediums indicated “if the guerrillas obey the ritual prohibitions that the mediums impose, they will be safe and the war they are fighting will meet with success” (Lan, 1985).

Sorcery and witchcraft lie at the very essence of the Kikuyu and hence their use by the Mau Mau, “through which violence related to supernatural beliefs and practices challenged the ability of the colonial state to maintain law and order” (Luongo, 2011, p. 160). The oathing rituals were a composite of tribal beliefs that were used to bind all who took them to secrecy, on pain of horrendous death, were drawn from the depths of Kikuyu tribal religion and used as engine of colonial resistance. The Mau Mau distorted the normal oaths and substituted “more barbarous and orgiastic elements of the old sacrifices” (Bewes, 1953, p. 23), making them more compelling. It needs to be understood this is why the oaths were so potent in their ability; forcing the adherents to obey through their beliefs that the oaths had a power greater than any human force if broken (Leakey, 1954; Osborne, 2010).

The Kenyan Government tried counter-oathing (Luongo, 2011, p. 161). The Christian churches were also very supportive of this action, as they too were being attacked by the Mau Mau; they were extremely active in trying to combat what was considered as a rival religion (Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 128). The District Commissioners of the areas involved requested that the *Athamaki* (tribal elders) conduct a counter oathing ceremony “after much deliberation the *Athamaki* unanimously recommended that a *thenge* oath should be invoked to cleanse their people, and to expose the trouble makers” (Corfield, 1959, pp. 134-135). According to the Corfield report these ceremonies met with some success and were arranged in mass public gatherings (1959, p. 135).

In Kikuyu society the *mundu mugo* is the good medicine man whereas the *murogi* is the worker of black magic. “Everyone is afraid of the *murogi*...his are the powers of life and death. Hidden fear, springing out of the darkness is not strange to the Kikuyu” (Bewes, 1953, p. 25). The fusion of political grievances and the use of pagan witchcraft lies at the core of the Mau Mau Movement (p. 43). The oathing encompassed the wives and children in an

effort to bind everyone to the movement. In addition those who had not been oathed were shunned by the rest of the group in an effort to force each person to join. A large number of staunch Christian Kikuyu stood against this practice and reported it to the authorities. It was these reluctant Kikuyu that formed the back bone of the Home Guard and led the fight against the perversions that the Mau Mau proffered (Leakey, 1952, p. 100).

It is within context of tribal beliefs and the power of the spirits that needs to be recognised if any further understanding of why Africans were swayed so easily from one side to the other. Sacrifice played a great part in the oathing ceremony, but this was a distortion from established practices. Consequently, the oath is very powerful and cannot be treated lightly (Bewes, 1953, p. 22). From a Western perspective this is difficult to comprehend, but it will form part of an argument proposed in an attempt to recognise the seamless ease with which captured insurgents were prepared to change sides and become ‘pseudos’ attacking their erstwhile comrades. Once captured many would believe the magic that they had thought protected them had been defeated by a greater magic. Thus when they were offered the opportunity to join forces with what they would now consider superior magic, they often quickly acquiesced.

In addition the physiological control wheeled by the insurgents through the spirit mediums, was capable of coercing the population to support the rebels. More support for both these lines of argument will be presented in the case study analysis, as it is considered to have been an important factor in the African insurgencies.

## **2.16 A Counter-Insurgency Plan**

An overall plan that encompasses a combination of strategy, tactics and policy needs to be developed. Lieutenant General Briggs produced such a plan in Malaya in 1950, which became the backbone of strategy for prosecuting the insurgency against the Communist inspired rebels. By recognising that this had to include a direct political element, which was comprehensible to all the population, made his plan acceptable gaining wide support. The promise of Independence to Malaya swung the Malays firmly behind the British forces and their actions (Hack, 2009). The basic outline of the plan was as follows:

5. Comprehensive resettlement of over 500,000 squatters, and re-groupment of up to 600,000 estate labourers. Started in June, this was mostly complete by the end of 1951, after which the emphasis shifted from movement to qualitative issues.



6. Resettlement areas (later rebranded as ‘New Villages’) were brought under government administration, with resettlement officers and the intention of extending services to them.
7. Civilian-military committees were introduced from District (District War Executive Committees, DWECs) to a Federal War Executive Committee. These brought together army, police, civil administration and Special Branch, and overrode bureaucratic sclerosis.
8. A military framework was established, with a particular unit attached to each specific area, allowing small unit patrols and a build-up of intelligence and security. The police were redirected back to normal, rather than paramilitary, duties.
9. The remaining forces would be concentrated as ‘striking forces’ to destroy communist forces, rolling the communists up state by state from south to north.  
(Hack, 2009, p. 388)

The Plan was fundamentally expounded a ‘hearts and minds’ approach to regaining control of the country from the subversive elements. The Briggs Plan can be summed up simplistically by saying it gave the populace and the insurgent supports a decision to make: either fight against the government and starve, or comply with the regulations then you can eat and live in peace. Food control and the re-settlement of compliant villagers was core to this Plan. Elements such as surrender for amnesty, usually for money, were also part of the carrot and stick approach (Hamby, 2002).

Due to the transfer of expertise from Malaya to Kenya, many of the principles of the Briggs Plan were utilised again in Kenya to remedy the many problems that had beset the conflict from the start. The appointment of Lt-General Sir George Erskine in May 1953, saw a dramatic change in the way the overall management of operations and strategy was harmonised (Melshen, 2007, p. 675). The use of a manual called ‘*Handbook of Anti Mau Mau Operations*’ was very much borrowed from an earlier version used in Malaya the ‘*Anti Terrorist Operations in Malaya*’ and was always referred to by its acronym (ATOMS) (Beckett, 2001, p. 103; Mumford, 2012, pp. 56-57).

This manual, ATOMS, used for operations is another clear example of the transfer of expertise from one campaign on to another. Although, the Briggs Plan was not totally implemented in the same way in Kenya, for instance there was no promise of independence (Mumford, 2012, p. 70); much of its structure was used such as: creating new villages, food

control, using the police to reinforce law and order and structuring a more interactive intelligence gathering operation.

Rhodesia appears to have learnt from these lessons and implemented a series of similar policies and objectives to create its own structured approach to fighting their Bush War: new villages together with segregated tribal areas; food control and restricted movement. In comparing this policy with the Malaya Emergency one could possibly argue that the Rhodesians 'borrowed' the best bits of Britain's strategy.

Protected Villages (PV) was one of these ideas; it was however, extremely unpopular with the African tribes' people and in many ways was counter-productive from a hearts and minds point of view too. "Whole communities were uprooted and put behind the wire. Although militarily effective it was a propaganda gift to the insurgents" (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 38). Whilst the resettlement idea was embraced in Malaya as land ownership came as part of the carrot, this was not so in Africa. Over 240,000 "were dumped into protected or 'consolidated' villages. Like the experiments in Mozambique, Angola, Algeria and Vietnam, the system produced only patchy results" (2011, p. 39)

Therefore when considering the many aspects that go towards a successful strategic plan the following would seem to be the most pertinent:

The structure that allows for 'population control';

Persuasion, or 'winning hearts and minds' through using minimum force; political concessions, and social provision;

command, unified and dynamic leadership;

The need for security forces to become effective 'learning organisations'. (Hack, 2009, p. 392)

In summary the Plan should be based upon "an approach centred on resettlement, measured coercion and good civil-military coordination, but ameliorated by political, civil and military 'hearts and minds' measures" (Hack, 1999b, p. 231). Keeping the population safe so they will support you and provide good intelligence was the main aim. The progressive destruction of the insurgent's political and social infrastructure was the objective. However, the aim should have been balanced against the negative outcomes that can be produced when a population is herded together (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 39).

## **2.17 Significant Actors**

One of the key things that has been noticeable in this study are the number of personalities involved from the same back ground and experiences who bring their expertise in other campaigns to the fore, three of these are: William Gray, Henry Gurney and Richard Catling. All three served in the Palestine conflict (1936-48) learning from the bitter lessons of poor intelligence, which contributed to the failure to defeat the Zionists (Newsinger, 2002, p. 16). They all went on to Malaya playing substantial roles in the development of Special Branch together with General Templer. Richard Catling subsequently became Commissioner of Police in Kenya from 1954- 63 and instigated to re-structuring of the intelligence capabilities during the Mau Mau Emergency (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 75; Jeffery, 1987, p. 125; Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 160).

With regard to the Rhodesian campaign there was Lieutenant General Peter Walls who had commanded the Rhodesian SAS 'D' squadron in the Malayan Emergency (Stiff, 1982, p. 12). Quite a number a number of his officers had also served in Malaya , particularly Ron Reid Daly (Stiff, 1999, p. 219); who formed the Selous Scouts at the behest of Walls, which used pseudo operations as their hall mark. Ken Flower, who headed the Central Intelligence Organisation in Rhodesia, had been in Kenya during the Emergency (Flower, 1987, p. 9) and was also influential in bringing former Colonial Police officers to support his operations, most notable of these was Ian Henderson of the Kenya Police. Henderson, had helped set up and run the pseudo operations in Kenya and later became an advisor for similar operations in Rhodesia with Reid Daly (Stiff, 1999, p. 218). (See Appendix B for a collective list

## **2.18 Underlying Theory**

Underlying the three insurgencies being studied, is a complex series of socio-political conflicts taking place in tandem, which can be traced to strong and contested theories such as conflict, rebellion and social stresses put forward by authors such as Marx (1867/1999; 1969/1848) and Simmel (1950; 1955), Williams (1947, 1970), Mack and Snyder (1957), Schelling (1960), Boulding (1962), Horton (1966) and Blalock (1967).

These social conflicts are multifaceted and interrelated to several upheavals taking place in the society at the same time and within the same event. The insurgency itself is a revolt against the existing order and follows the arguments put forward by Marx on conflict, rebellion and class in his noted works (Boswell & Dixon, 1993; Marx, 1867; Marx & Engels, 1969/1848; Padover, 1977/1850, pp. 51-52). Added to this, the social and political structures

of all those involved were undergoing change at many levels. Turner (1975) articulated that, “although social systems reveal interdependence of units, these interrelations always reveal conflicts of interest” (p. 619). He goes further, by stating that conflicts are based upon the unequal distribution of resources, especially of power and the quest for power within the society eventuating in “overt and violent conflict among social groupings” (p. 619). The conflict over who holds the power, which is normally a small group, leads to a re-organisation of power relations of the groups within the social system and the groups. A variant of the standards: order or conflict (Horton, 1966, p. 701).

In the case of the three conflicts under scrutiny in this study, there were multiple players that had to be considered:

1. Firstly, the indigenous population of the countries, both the rebel movement and the forces that opposed them in the form of the ‘Home Guard’.
2. Secondly, the colonial forces and settlers who were undergoing extraordinary political and social changes at this time.
3. Thirdly, the many forces, although predominately British, that were brought in to aid the counter-insurgency, who were also undergoing similar political and social changes within their own social and political structures.

The post war period saw significant socio-political transformations and cleavages taking place in all echelons of society, including those considered to be highly evolved western social orders. In colonised countries, sections of the indigenous society sought political and social structural modifications through direct conflict and at another level, the colonisers themselves were experiencing substantial upheavals too, based upon an alternative interpretation of their own goals and aspirations. Conflict, can therefore be argued, is a method to bring about change, at all levels.

Simmel (1950; 1955) sees conflict as one where men either drawn together or apart from the social groups within which they have found themselves. Conflict theorists Marx (Marx, 1974, 1977), Weber (Roth & Wittich, 1968; Weber, 1981/1923, 2002/1864; Zollschan & Hirsch, 1964) and Lockwood (Lockwood, 1966, 1982) emphasized the importance of interests; as argued by Thomas Hobbes as far back as 1691 (2010/1691), that all action is based upon self preservation, which is predominately materialistic in nature. In this sense, the idea of what is normative is crucial to the understandings of social interaction; the basic tenets of accepted society, what can be considered as shared, common or characteristic.

However, it is the pursuit of these interests that create 'conflict' rather than any other abstract notion of change.

The basic argument put forward by Marx, (Turner, 1991, p. 186), is that class divisions caused by the means of production will result in inevitable conflict. This is taken further by Weber (1981/1923) who posits that it is their economic position in society that puts groups in direct conflict seeking to obtain that which is most desirable. Thus, the classic definition of the Marxian theory and capitalist society: those that have against those who do not: the owners of production against those who have to work for the owners; or are being exploited. However, western developed society is made up of a number of complex relationships, each seeking to survive, prosper or dominate. When this is analysed in the Colonial setting, in which these conflicts took place, then further levels of social strata are added to the mix including tribal structures.

The Colonial conflicts become typical cases that conform to the notion of conflict theory, which when combined with cultural theory start to form a method of analysis offering a greater understanding of the underlying dynamics. Cultural theory has developed out of the past sociological works to be "a typology of five ways of life-egalitarianism, fatalism, individualism, hierarchy, and autonomy-to serve as an analytic tool in examining people, culture, and politics." (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990, p. 296). The multifaceted nature of society: societal tiers, social conservatism, diversity, ethnicity plus tradition and religion incorporating tribalism make this extremely complex. Cultural theory is therefore an attempt to engage with all of these issues in an effort to allow insight into what makes up the nature and notion of societies (Williams, 2001, p. 133).

According to Zollschan and Hirsch (Zollschan & Hirsch, 1964), in their summation of writers such as Ralf Dahrendorf (1958; Dahrendorf, 1959; 1968) David Lockwood and John Rex (1961), cultural theory refers to social integration as the accepted principles by which individuals relate to one another in a society; whereas system integration refers to the social system. Despite the use of the word integration there is no assumption that the relationships are harmonious. The terms social integration and system integration can embrace both order and conflict.

However, this model would be too simplistic if it did not incorporate the work of Emile Durkheim in 1893 (1964/1893), on the 'division of labour; whereby the move from primitive societies to more industrialised, or in this case colonial societies, was fraught with conflict and anomie theory as developed by Merton (1938). This 'anomie' manifests itself in 'cultural malintegration' thus "there develops a tradition-bound society, sacred society

characterized by neophobia” (Merton, 1938, p. 673). A concept expressed as ‘deviant theory’ as developed by Cohen from Merton, whereby a subculture is developed to neutralise and shield the deviant behaviour from conventional society (Cohen, 1965, p. 8) .

Although the use of anomie could be used to analyse the insurgents as undertaking a ‘deviant act’ by the use of subversion against the sovereign power, this stretches the understanding of this theory into a more complex and torrid interpretations, which do not fall within the confines of this research. However, if the social complexities of the relationships found within the Colonial social structures: police, army and the administration are to be analysed, then anomie is better suited as it deals with “the ways in which cultural goals and opportunities for realizing them within the limits of the institutional norms are distributed” (Cohen, 1965, p. 5). Understanding that there was a struggle within the expected social norms of British society, and therefore Colonial society, which were driving the actions of those involved in counter-insurgency to act in particular ways, surfaces from the research for this study. Accepting the ‘status quo’ was no longer an option, as this was being challenged by all those involved in the conflict at every level and not just at a insurgency conflict level, but at every juncture within the societies.

The theory that has evolved from anomie is general strain theory, whereby relationships are ‘strained’, which lead to deviant acts or crimes. Predominately the literature associated with these theories is concerned with criminology. Merton (1938) is credited with the development of strain theory, but its roots are clearly within the Marxian analysis of class conflict. The general thrust provided by Merton encompasses many groups within which his theory of ‘deviant’ behaviour exists but it is not presented as a theoretical principle (Rosenfeld, 1989, p. 454). Agnew (2001; Agnew & White, 1992). On the other hand Agnew (2010) has attempted to develop a more complex analysis of strain theory and his work in relation to terrorism provides an avenue of analysis insurgency as well .

A condensed précis of what constitutes conflict theory is taken from Boulding (1962) where he questions if the theory of conflict is generally applicable. The response he concludes is yes, although he accepts that there are many differences and digressions to be accounted for in the model he proposes (p. 2). Boulding’s (1962) definition sets out the basic requirements involved in a conflict which includes the presence of two ‘parties’. The ‘party’ is the ‘behavioural unit’ necessary for the conflict to take place in the ‘behavioural space’. The second aspect is competition, whereby the units, or parties, are incompatible with each other and wish to exclude the other from ownership, hence a conflict of interests. Based upon these factors a definition of conflict is established:

Conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other (Boulding, p. 5).

Interpreting this concept, Boulding (1962) uses the term 'value ordering', which indicates a restructuring of positions in an effort to exclude one or more of the parties from the preferred position; the preferred position being the most sought after. The process can be termed as dynamic, as it results in a new order based upon the conflict. Because of the complexities associated with this theory there are many spin offs that have been developed. One of these is 'game theory' where the parties involved are attempting to gain payoff from assuming positions that may or may not be beneficial. By developing a 'payoff matrix', as an analytical tool, Boulding contends it is possible to clarify variables within the conflict in terms of gain or loss (p. 57). A further series of models are also discussed in relation to the basic model of conflict, such as party, group or organisation as 'conflict units', as well as economic, international and ideological conflicts.

A further area that requires attention is the concept of ideology linked to the consciousness of identity, as represented in the form of nationalism. This concept also needs to be understood, as this evolves into conflicts in search of these ideals (Ormsbee, 2004 ). In many ways this too falls within classic Marxist theory as these relationships are what were in conflict. Therefore, whether it is called conflict theory or cultural theory, strain theory or anomie; these same structural dynamics are at work and need to be analysed in relation to the findings.

## **2.19 Conclusion**

By placing the study within its historical perspective, this chapter has sought to develop a thematic framework for analysis. A series of themes have been presented based essentially upon seminal works that underpin contemporary appreciation of the character of insurgency and how to combat it. The evolution and nature of insurgencies during this time period has been examined to elicit these essential themes. Discussion is varied concerning the methods for achieving success, but tends to agree that no two insurgencies are the same. Each has its own set of circumstances, which make it unique. However, what became apparent from these reviews is how comparable some of the circumstances were and how similar the methods eventually used were to prosecute the insurgency. Many of these methods were drawn from the past; consequently they may still be applicable again today. Furthermore, it

appears that often the errors of the past are repeated again, before they are bitterly re-learned. Only then is action taken to rectify these errors and implement a new doctrine, which in effect is based on the past anyway.

Decolonisation was a bitter contest fought through the prism of dramatic change in the world order. Power to control the subsequent aftermath was part of this upheaval, as much as were the grievances of many concerning land issues and the right to own the land. Whether this was in Malaya, where the Communists harnessed the landless and stateless Chinese squatters under their umbrella to fight Colonialism; or the landless Kikuyu squatters in Kenya who felt aggrieved by Colonial settlers occupying what they considered as their land; or the complexity of the situation in Rhodesia where the Colonialists were not only in dispute with the British Government over their illegitimate Independence, but also the Communist inspired rebels fighting them too; the issue was land and the control of that land.

Malaya has been chosen as a case study, because it has been one of the most discussed and debated of the past counter-insurgencies. Often held up as an example of how to fight and win an insurgency (Cassidy, 2008, p. 90; Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 130), but it was unique because of world events, such as Korea and the threat of Communist expansion. Malaya became an important economic asset because of tin and rubber needed to fight the war, which meant it worthy of extra attention to ensure it stayed friendly to Western interests. From a counter-insurgency perspective the strategies, tactics and methods used re-appear in other conflicts.

One such strategy was 'hearts and minds'. Almost synonymous with fighting insurgents in today's parlance. Another strategy is the use of local forces to supplement the main force, using their local skills against the insurgents. These forces were a vital supplement to the hard pressed police and military to defend their communities, who would have been greatly outnumbered without them. Understanding their structures, commitment and *raison d'être* for supporting the Colonial Government needs to be analysed.

Kenya and Rhodesia were two African conflicts that were similar in so many ways, especially when compared to the French Colonial experience in Africa. Much appears to have been related, in particular the end results: neither country was defeated militarily, but they lost politically; due to the realities of the end of empire. Minority rule could not be sustained without massive coercion, which was no longer politically acceptable internationally.

Conflict is at the core of survival and drives all aspects of human behaviour, in one way or another. Theories to explain how and why this occurs have been developed by many



philosophers. Aligning the theories to the work undertaken here, allows the outcomes to be understood from a philosophical framework, as well as an empirical historical aspect.

A review of the literature has been used to construct a working thematic framework as method of analysis for looking at counter-insurgency and how it operated during the three selected campaigns. The research questions were drawn from this framework, which will be used in each of the case studies to compare the similarities and differences. Analysis of the responses from all the participants in this study will also be based upon the framework developed here. The next chapter presents the study design used to accomplish the required objectives.

# Chapter 3

## METHODS AND MATERIALS

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter will deal with how the study was designed, conducted and what methods were used. A qualitative approach was used adopting a case study method. The case study research design was considered an appropriate methodology to deal with the objectives of this study, because it involved multiple sources of data requiring detailed and intense analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 18). In order to strengthen the design further a comparative approach was adopted (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 173). Accordingly, three cases were produced from a series of semi-structured interviews from respondents selected by criterion sampling. The findings were based upon the responses from the research questions then compared and analysed to generate an outcome based upon the findings to provide a conclusion.

A pilot study preceded the full data collection and was used after the first three semi-structured interviews to test the robustness of the study design; with the necessary changes being implemented before proceeding with the full data collection. The three cases were developed from the narratives provide by the respondents together with data accumulated from multiple sources including newspapers, video clips, government reports, letters, and diaries together with the semi-structured interviews with selected participants.

The next step involved content analysis by coding, identifying and categorizing the primary patterns and themes (Patton, 1980, p. 381). “When the predominant research strategy is qualitative, a case study tends to take an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research” (Bryman, 2012, p. 69). Inductive analysis was the chief method used to allow the themes, patterns and categories to emerge from the data, which was supported by logical analysis to elicit further patterns through cross-classification. The final results were a cumulative interpretation of the outputs from not only the three case studies, but also from a comparative analysis of the results drawing on all aspects of the data accumulated for this study. Bracketing was used as a “means of demonstrating the validity of the data collection and the analytic processes” (Ahern, 1999, p. 407). The overall robustness and reliability of the study was improved by adopting this approach.

### 3.2 Methodology overview

The case study method has been used in this study to consider what was the role played by the Colonial Forces in counter insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 -1959), Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980). The purpose was to analyse whether the Colonial States had a substantive advantage over modern day counter-insurgencies operations because of their control over the levers of power. Furthermore, to consider the role of the Colonial forces in the prosecution of the conflicts, particularly the police force, by analysing the strategy and tactics to ascertain what was effective and why. Included in this analysis, was the role played by the concept of ‘hearts and minds ‘in each of the conflicts. Lastly, could any of these strategies and tactics be transferable to modern day counter insurgencies?

The methodology used in this project is primarily qualitative (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007), using what can be termed as an interpretative approach to data collection and analysis because, “different genres of interpretive research have also demonstrated (even to their critics) that they are as rigorous as positivist science even though their rigor necessarily needs to be judged by criteria that are markedly different” (Prasad & Prasad, 2002, p. 4). Although there is often confusion between the terms qualitative and interpretative, they are not synonymous. For the purposes of this study the term is used as a process akin to the revised interpretations of hermeneutic research as defined by Prasad (2002):

For hermeneutic research, history serves as an important part of context. In other words, hermeneutic research conceptualizes context both synchronically as well as diachronically. In methodological terms, therefore, hermeneutic inquiry requires the organizational researcher to develop a thorough familiarity with the historical aspects of the phenomenon of interest.(Prasad, 2002, p. 24)

As this study is historical, the definition above is apt, as it describes how important it has been to understand the whole context of the case studies, rather than interpreting them solely based upon the specifics.

In order to make sure validity was maintained, research tasks have been done sequentially with the advantage that it allowed a far more comprehensive assessment of the methods used (Bergman, 2008, p. 15). Lack of validity is one of the common criticisms of qualitative research, (Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Prasad & Prasad, 2002). Consequently, attention has been paid throughout the study to guard against

lack of validity by incorporating a variety of controls as suggested by Kumar (1996, pp. 137-143).

### **3.2.1 Criterion Sampling**

Selected participants were chosen, using Criterion sampling from those who had taken part in the conflicts and were still available to be interviewed. Criterion or Purpose sampling is “extremely useful when you want to construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon” (Kumar, 1996, p. 162), to create a case study. The interviews were carried out using a semi-structured approach to allow for greater flexibility when dealing with the respondents.

When designing the data collection process the following four aspects were considered to allow the narrative to develop rather than being imposed:


The choice of participants and their selection was considered logical in relation to the study;

The research objectives were consistent with the methods used for data collection;

A broad data collection process has been ensured throughout to sustain the results;

To support the analysed findings the use of numerous sources was used to assist with the validity of the end results (Giacomini & Cook, 2000).

Each of the conflicts were conceptualised into case studies, which incorporated the research questions, the interview data, the analysis from the literature together interpretative data extracted from the semi-structured interviews. Reflective notes were taken throughout the process. The recorded interview data was analysed by using a narrative coding system (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 147), to determine what the common rudiments of the three campaigns were, according to the firsthand accounts from the respondents. Finally, the data was filtered and layered to ensure that all meanings were captured and could be comparatively analysed (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 147). Whilst at the same time bracketing was used as a “means of demonstrating the validity of the data collection and the analytic processes” (Ahern, 1999, p. 407). As the case studies are historical, it is important to use tools that can support such a requirement. Historiography (Lustick, 1996; Megill, 1989), has been used to interpret, analyse and put into perspective the narratives obtained from the semi-structured interviews with the historical facts.



**Figure 3.1 Study Design for this study**

Figure 3.1 is a simple flowchart of the process followed to design this study beginning with the first decision phase to present the proposal and then undertaking the pilot study to test the study design before confirming its use. The data collection process included the semi-structured interviews with the respondents together with accessing additional secondary data, such as newspapers, reports and books written at that time. Case studies were then constructed for all three conflicts before the data could be coded into themes ready for analysis. The last stage was synthesis of the outcomes to produce a series of theoretical recommendations and a conclusion.

The study design needed to consider what was being studied, what type of evidence was required and how this would support the investigation. Therefore, would the questions actually provide the desired results that could then be interpreted effectively enough to provide a satisfactory outcome, together with an accepted validity? Reliability, replication and validity remain the criteria required for assessing the quality of the research. “In qualitative research, issues of instrument validity and reliability ride largely with the skills of the researcher” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 38).

From the potential research designs, the case study approach was considered the most appropriate for this study (Bryman, 2012, p. 45; Kumar, 1996, p. 99). However, using a case study method would also require an interpretation of the results based on a more philosophical approach to the concluding outcomes. As a result, a sound knowledge of philosophy was beneficial when utilising research designs to avoid making critical errors that could cause unsubstantiated results and thus a discounted theory.

There are a number of philosophical positions (Table 3.1) that have found acceptance in qualitative research, but many are contested and debated. In simplistic terms these can be divided into either constructivism or positivism, which have become stereotyped. Each position can be associated with certain defined traditions but not with any one philosopher (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2004, p. 28).

Positivism holds that “the social world exists externally, and that its properties should be measured through objective measures, rather than inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p. 28). Conversely, constructivism or social constructivism, “focuses on the ways that people make sense of the world especially through sharing their experiences with others via the medium of language” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p. 29), often referred to as Interpretative methods.

**Table 3.1 Contrasting essential elements of positivism and constructivism**

| <b>Element</b>            | <b>Positivism</b>                                       | <b>Social Constructivism</b>                            | <b>Applied in the study</b>                        |
|---------------------------|---|---|--|
| The observer              | Must be independent                                     | Is part of what is being observed                       | Independent  |
| Human interest            | Should be irrelevant                                    | Are the main drivers of science                         | Distant interest                                   |
| Explanations              | Must demonstrate causality                              | Aims to increase general understanding of the situation | Increase understanding                             |
| Research progress through | Hypotheses and deductions                               | Gathering rich data from which ideas are induced        | Hypotheses and deductions                          |
| Concepts                  | Need to be operationalized so that they can be measured | Should incorporate stakeholder perspectives             | A mixture of both                                  |
| Units of analysis         | Should be reduced to simplest terms                     | May include the complexity of 'whole' situations        | May include the complexity of 'whole' situations   |
| Generalization through    | Statistical probability                                 | Theoretical abstraction                                 | Statistical probability                            |
| Sampling requires         | Large numbers selected randomly                         | Small numbers of cases chosen for specific reasons      | Small numbers of cases chosen for specific reasons |

(Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p. 29)

The value of highlighting the differences between the two approaches is especially important as this study has combined elements from both, as it has used the case study approach to interpreting the data. Nevertheless, as noted by Table 3.1, it does not correspond that because of this, the project has been based solely on social constructivism, when many aspects of post positivism have also been used where appropriate (Noor, 2008, p. 1602). Additionally, critical realism as a philosophical approach has been used for the epistemology required in this study (Yeung, 1997). Aspects of constructivism have been used when this appeared to allow for a greater understanding of the replies in relation to the research questions. “Researchers are interested in insight, discovery, and interpretation rather than hypothesis testing”(Noor, 2008, p. 1602). Merriam considers this can be accomplished using the case study approach (Merriam, 1988, pp. 4-25).

### **3.3 Case Study**

The use of multiple case studies formed the core of the method used as this is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real

life context” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). The case study approach is used when there are many variables of interest looking for one result (Creswell, 2007, p. 62).

A case study can be defined in a variety of ways, the central tenet being the need to explore an event or phenomenon in depth and in its natural context. It is for this reason sometimes referred to as a "naturalistic" design; this is in contrast to an "experimental" design (such as a randomised controlled trial) in which the investigator seeks to exert control over and manipulate the variable(s) of interest. (Crowe et al., 2011, p. 62)

As a research strategy, the use of case studies is beneficial as it allows multiple focus on understanding the dynamics found in particular settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Given, 2008). Numerous levels of analysis can thus be performed within the same study (Yin, 2009). Furthermore, “triangulation made possible by multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of the constructs and hypotheses” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 538), making the outcomes substantially stronger. The case is designed to meet the research objectives using sufficient material as is necessary (Naumes & Naumes, 2006, p. 4). This approach required being as comprehensive and systematic as feasible in the data collection, to ensure the case was as complete as possible before classifying and conducting content analysis (Patton, 1980, p. 384). A case study can be considered as “an analysis of a social phenomena specific to time and place” (Ragin & Becker, 1992, p. 2). The case study inquiry:


    copes with the technically distinctive situations in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result;  
    relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in triangulating fashion, and as another result;  
    benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide the data collection and analysis. (Yin, 2009, p. 18)

The advantage in this approach, as argued by Glaser and Strauss (1989), “it is the intimate connection with empirical reality that permits the development of a testable, relevant, and valid theory” (as cited in Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 532). Too often a theory is proposed that is not based sufficiently upon the verifiable data. Therefore, using a case study approach should reduce this tendency and sequentially allow a theory to come out of the case study itself (Gillham, 2000, p. 2). “The advantage of the case study is that it can “close in” on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in



practice.” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 235). Furthermore, case studies can be considered the preferred form for reporting alternative approaches (Lincoln & Guba, 1990).

Case study as a research paradigm fits comfortably in the midst of the nexus between two main schools of quantitative versus qualitative and often overlaps, as can be seen in Figure 3.2. The substantive arguments that Gill (2011) put forward in his book in support of the Case methods underpin its longevity and rigor when dealing with multiple inputs of data. Gill (2011) further asserts, “where substantial complexity is present in the system being studied, the case method is a valid approach-and possibly the most valid approach available-for exploring and learning about it” (p. 49).



**Figure 3.2 Positioning case study as a research method**  
(Gill, 2011, p. 18)

Denzin and Lincoln (1998) outline a variety of approaches to methods of inquiry, including case studies. Stake’s (1998) deals with this explicitly and indicates that “case content evolves in the act of writing itself” (p. 93). Stake (cited in Creswell, 2007) believed that “naturalistic, ethnographic case materials, to some extent, parallel natural experience, feeding into the most fundamental processes of awareness and experience” (p. 94). In contrast Merriam (cited in Creswell, 2007, p. 186) states, “there is no standard format for reporting case study research” which indicates case studies can achieve varying results including theories, general descriptions of events, analytical in single or multiple case compressions

that “undoubtedly shapes the larger structure of the written narrative” (p. 186). With this in mind, it was apparent that a strict framework had to be applied across the case studies to ensure the end result was robust.

Most case studies feature: descriptions that are complex, holistic, and involving a myriad of not highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration, and even allusion and metaphor. Comparisons are implicit rather than explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate to the understanding of the case. (Stake, 1978, p. 7)

### **3.3.1 How the Case Study was used in this Research**

The sequential process followed for this study was: selection of the cases, the evolution of research questions, data gathering, analysis, interpretation, the role of the researcher, and writing of the final results. A Pilot Study was used after the first three semi-structured interviews to test the robustness of the study design; with the necessary changes being implemented before proceeding with the data collection.

Once the three cases had been developed, the data formed part of a comprehensive accumulation of information from multiple sources. It was then necessary to begin the process of content analysis by coding, identifying and categorizing the primary patterns and themes (Patton, 1980, p. 381). Inductive analysis was the chief method used to allow the themes, patterns and categories to emerge from the data, rather than being imposed. Once the dimensions had been constructed, predominately by evaluator-generated constructions rather more than participant-generated constructions, they were cross-classified in order to look for patterns that may not have been obvious in the initial stages (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 147). This process is termed logical analysis whereby a new typology surfaces from the data analysis, which may not have been apparent at the onset of the process. By moving between the constructions, additional patterns can be thus be recognised enhancing the outcomes of the study (Patton, 1980, p. 411).

Inherent in using a case study approach, is the researcher’s bias in the selection of the data to be used. It is therefore beholden on the researcher to recognise this potential and mitigate as far as possible, or at least account for it when presenting the findings (Ahern, 1999). Based upon the literature review, which positioned the study, a series of semi structured interviews took place with the selected participants using criterion sampling from the three campaigns. A working framework was thus developed from the themes identified

from the literature review that became the outline for the case analysis. Subsequently, by analysing these themes across the cases it was possible to compare, contrast and interpret the themes to provide a more acceptable, generalisable outcome (Creswell, 2007, p. 64).

### **3.3.2 Case Study Building Process**

In order to build the case studies primary data was obtained from individuals that took part in the conflicts being studied. By using the narrative, as developed by the semi-structured interviews, the case studies were constructed around the themes identified at the literature review stage and subsequently through the coding of the narratives. The interpretation of personal experiences, versions of the actions undertaken by the respondents provided a fuller understanding of the events through their personal stories. The collection of the primary data was conducted using in-depth interviews, which enable the participant to provide a full, rich account and allow the researcher considerable flexibility in probing interesting areas which may emerge (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim and subjected to detailed qualitative analysis, attempting to elicit experiential themes in the participant's narrative.

### **3.3.3 Hermeneutics within the process**

Qualitative research that uses the narrative approach will, even at a subconscious level, have elements of hermeneutics within the process (Hein & Austin, 2001; Laverly, 2008). Hermeneutics has been considered an interpretive methodology for understanding ancient texts:

Hermeneutics is a much broader interpretive genre that has expanded the very meaning of the term text. In brief, texts now refer not only to documents and the like but also to social, organizational, and institutional structures and processes; cultures and cultural artifacts (sic); and so on. (Prasad & Prasad, 2002, p. 7)

The evolution of this form of interpretation has been gaining ground within the social sciences, although at times its value has been over emphasised it is nonetheless a process that needs to be understood as evolving (Bell, 2011). The meaning of hermeneutics has become much broader, as the quote above states, to include," social, organizational, and institutional structures and processes; cultures and cultural artifacts; and so on"(Prasad & Prasad, 2002, pp. 7-8).

Essentially we seek meaning from the themes within the narrative that can be interpreted. Therefore, each of the respondents has their own story, which in turn forms part

of a greater story that has to be interpreted within the context of the research. Thus the end result will be the sum total of all its parts, but only as told by this study. “The author’s intention is not the final arbiter of a text’s meaning, but it may cast light on meaning” (Bell, 2011, p. 535). Hermeneutics permeates the research process, whether or not it has been chosen as a distinct methodology or not. Therefore, although there may be a degree of hermeneutics in all qualitative research methodologies simply by default, this process needs to be understood within its context and not shunned but accepted that is part of a tacit process taking place regardless of choice. “Hermeneutics is about creating meaning, not simply reporting it” (Hultgren, 1994, p. 12).

### **3.3.4 Heuristic Inquiry**

Although personal narratives are being used, they can be interpreted in several ways, either as phenomenological experiences or alternatively heuristically to understand the meaning. “Heuristic Inquiry[sic].... seek[s] to discover the nature and meaning of phenomena themselves and to illuminate them through direct first-person accounts of individuals who have directly encountered the phenomena in experience” (Moustakas, 2001, p. 263). In much the same way as ‘Hermeneutics’ underlies the thinking and interpreting process so does the use of a heuristic approach which looks for patterns of meaning as part of the discovery process:

For any proposition there is always some sufficiently narrow interpretation of its terms, such that it turns out true and some sufficiently wide interpretation such that it turns out false. Which interpretation is intended and which is unintended depends of course on our intentions. (Lakatos, 1976, p. 99)

Essentially, the goal is to seek for understanding and meaning from the narratives, as expressed by Moustakas (1990), and again in the later addition of the work:

The crucial processes in heuristics (once one understands the values, beliefs, and knowledge inherent in the heuristic paradigm) are: concentrated gazing on something that attracts or compels one into a search for meaning: focus on a topic or formulation of the question; and methods of preparing, collecting, organizing, analysing, and synthesizing data. (Moustakas, 1994, p. 38)

However, it is necessary to explain the association between events and the narrative focusing on trying to make sense of what has happened and what does that mean in relation

to the events (Smith, et al., 2009). The Duquesne school focus on a situation in which the experience investigated occurs, seeks descriptions to construct structures of the experience and ends with a general structural description (Moustakas, 1994, p. 22). Triangulation is achieved through the use of further qualitative data collection methods i.e. diaries, newspapers, monographs or personal accounts (Smith, et al., 2009); a process that has been followed in this study.

### **3.3.5 Narrative**

The use of narrative has been used because of its attention to the structure of the story as given by the participants in the case studies, which will be sections of discourse. Although, this does mean a more hermeneutic or poststructuralist methodological approach rather than a positivistic one (Pranee & Douglas, 2005).

Scientific rationality is built out of logical, well-formed arguments that are designed to convince of truth through reference to repeatable, scientifically constructed empirical tests. The aim is to produce general laws that can be applied to particular events to explain why things happen. These laws are usually abstract and context free. (Pranee & Douglas, 2005, p. 125)

This approach has been preferred, as the participants find it easier to respond by placing themselves in the total situation, which in many cases requires justifying why they took a particular course of action rather than another. If the questions are exclusively directed, then this restricts the respondents desire to respond in a meaningful way, as they often feel that they may be exposing themselves in some way (Chase, 1995, p. 4). Consequently, by allowing the participants to tell their stories, with subtle guidance, allows a more truthful version to emerge. The stories have then been deconstructed and interpreted within the context of the events of the time, adding triangulation, wherever and whenever necessary, as well as using empirical data to verify the narratives. A process often termed ‘methodological triangulation’ (Stake, 1995, p. 114).

Bruner (1990) proposes that in order to understand the meaning of the narrative there are two components that have to be considered: a configuring plot and secondly, the succession of events that will shape the story itself. Only when the two are in tandem can the narrative be fully understood (Pranee & Douglas, 2005).

Based upon the proceeding argument, a thematic analysis “helps to unravel the themes or ‘experiential structures of experience’...which asks what is essential or revealed in

the text/data source” (Van Manen, 1990, p. 79). The ability to examine the concrete descriptions of the lived experience correlating it with the empirical data that references it to a specified time and place is an accepted mythological approach to conducting research.

### **3.4 Two Stage Study: Pilot Study First**

It was recognised that by conducting a pilot study, before proceeding with the full study would be beneficial to the research project and increase the robustness of the final outcomes. The ability to test the research questions on a selected number of participants was seen as a useful tool in assessing how they would respond to verify if the questions met the overall requirements of the study. The data collected could then be processed through the full case study approach to test the suitability of the methods chosen.

In order to run the pilot study, three participants were interviewed and the outcomes were analysed to check the results and validity. The major outcome was the realisation that the use of only two case studies would not produce sufficient data to develop a sustainable theory nor allow for a suitable comparative analysis. It was also realised that one of the research sub-questions would prove to be too problematical to achieve, because of the difficulty in being able to trace and interview ex-insurgents. The question dealing with “their opponent’s perspective” was therefore dropped from the design. In addition, some of the tertiary questions were found to be too mundane to elicit any worthwhile primary research responses therefore; they too were dropped from the study design.

Using a pilot study to validate the research design was seen as a useful tool, which had net benefits to the next stage of the data collection process and consequently improved the overall design of the project. This approach was especially important as extensive travel was required to South Africa, Kenya, Malaysia, France and the United Kingdom to conduct the interviews. It was seen as highly unlikely this amount of travel could be repeated again should there have been a major fault in the study design, or the collection of the data.

### **3.5 Population and Sampling**

There is a distinct difference between quantitative and qualitative approaches to sampling; with both attempting to deal with the threats to validity and the ability to apply the results as generalisable. However, the process differs, as the aims of qualitative case study are to “capture the frame of reference and definition of the situation of a given informant or participant and thus avoid instrumentation artefacts of standardized measurement procedures” (McClintock, Brannon, & Maynard-Moody, 1979, p. 612). Case studies, using idiographic

research principles, are an accepted method but this means that causality cannot be definitively demonstrated because of the limitations of the sample size and the way the sample has been selected. It is acknowledged that by using non-probability samples that  $N$  of 1 outcomes are confounded, therefore it is important not to draw cause an effect conclusions or apply generalisability as the results are not statistically reliable (McClintock, et al., 1979; Pierce, 2008, p. 91).

For the purposes of this research study, the population units chosen were based on non-probability methods, as is common with the majority of qualitative studies. Seale (1999) has pointed out, as the samples are based upon non-probability they are often considered not to be representative. This is common criticism of most social science studies where probability is achieved rarely due to the nature of the phenomenon being analysed, “because in social science we look at the social significance of the study rather than the statistical logic” (Seale, 1999, p. 436). However, to achieve what is termed representativeness of samples, a suitable number of cases needed to be included to a point where an interpretation is acceptable (Patton, 1990, p. 184). This can be attained by the use of theoretical sampling, a term coined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and often referred to in other sources as criterion sampling or purposeful sampling (Patton, 1990, p. 169). “Theoretical sampling is concerned with constructing a sample which is meaningful theoretically because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test your theory and explanation” (Mason as cited in Seale, 1999, p. 446). Lastly, generalisation is dependent on the variance noted in the topic that show an acceptable outcome from the phenomenon “not a standard or automatic algorithm of a statistical rule” (Seale, 1999, p. 453).

Due to the nature of the research questions, it was considered appropriate to use criterion sampling. Samples are selected purposely rather than through probability methods, because they can offer a research project insight into a particular experience, that is they ‘represent’ a perspective (Smith, et al., 2009). Patton describes the majority of sampling in qualitative research as ‘purposeful’ including criterion sampling (Patton, 1990, p. 16). They all illustrate information rich cases “that is, cases that are selected purposefully to fit the study” (Coyne, 1997, p. 627). There is however a problem with this method, as it is hard to replicate for other researchers at a later date (Kitson et al., 1982). Coyne is clear to make the distinction between what is termed theoretical sampling and purpose sampling, although at times used interchangeably they are not considered the same.

The major difficulty, with respect to undertaking primary interviews with those that had participated was the amount of time that had passed since the conflicts. Their average age was early 80s for those from Malaya and Kenya, plus there were not many survivors from this time period who were ready, willing and able to participate. The other difficulty was the geographical spread of those that took part as they have retired in different parts of the world. Consequently, it was necessary to travel extensively in order to interview these subjects in their own homes in Kenya, South Africa, Australia, Malaysia, France and the United Kingdom.

### **3.6 Research Instrument**

The ability of the researcher is paramount to achieving an acceptable result, as “the researcher is the instrument” and the methods used are part of the process (Britten, 1995, p. 418; Myburgh & Poggenpoel, 2003, pp. 418-421; Patton, 2002, p. 14) ; a stark reminder of the importance of academic experience to get it right (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 38). Furthermore, validity is dependent on careful construction of the instrument; in this case the semi-structured interviews, to ensure they are administered to measure what they set out to measure. It was important to clearly define the research questions, within the structure of the case study approach; as a primary objective to building a sustainable theory. “The rationale for defining the research question is the same as in hypothesis-testing research. Without a research focus, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the volume of data”(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 536). By creating a focus, this has assisted with the research design through the use of instruments together with the use of the empirical data supporting the emergent theory.

Eisenhardt (1989) pointed out the advantages of early identification of the research question together with potential constructs does have its benefits, but that it must also be accepted as only tentative. “ No construct is guaranteed a place in the resultant theory, no matter how well measured. Also the research question may shift during the research” (p. 536). During the pilot study two cases were found to be insufficient to respond to the Research Questions. Furthermore, that the proposed objective of being able to interview former insurgents was not achievable. Therefore, an additional case study was added and some of the objectives were amended to incorporate these necessary revisions.

The initial literature review assisted with the development of the most appropriate questions. A good deal of preparation was required in formulating which questions were best suited to the case study approach in order to construct a validated theory. “ A literature review is therefore a means to an end, and not-as many people have been taught to think-an



end in itself” (Yin, 2009, p. 14). The nature of this study has necessitated an ongoing approach to the literature review, which is often the case in qualitative work (Patton, 1990, p. 163).

### **3.7 Interviews**

The interview is one of the most, if not the most, commonly used research tool in social and political science (King, 2004).”In fact, it is estimated that ‘90% of all social science investigations’ use interviews of some sort “ (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 1). A large amount of knowledge is gained through the use of interview, therefore it is important to get it right (Morris, 2009). “The published account is not an objective rendering of ‘reality’, but it is the researcher’s interpretation of the facts that is published for public view” (Morris, 2009, p. 214).

There are four types of accepted interview techniques in academic research: structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, unstructured interviews and non-directive interviews. Each one of these has its place within the research process, but will largely depend on the nature of the study together with the applied methodology. It would be difficult to argue that one method is superior to another as each has its merits, but the choice should be made on the type of research design with regard to desired outcomes.

This research adopted the use of the semi- structured interview technique (Bryman, 2012, p. 471). The use of a semi-structured interview allowed for a flexible approach when interviewing, as each respondent does not interpret the questions asked in the same way nor do they give the same data:

In contrast, the opportunity to change the words but not the meaning of questions provided by a semi-structured interview schedule acknowledges that not every word has the same meaning to every respondent and not every respondent uses the same vocabulary. (Barriball & While, 1994, p. 330)

Hoyle (2002) comments that interview questions have “dual goals of motivating the respondent to give full and precise replies while avoiding biases stemming from social desirability, conformity, or other constructs of disinterest.”(p. 144). It was important not to use closed questions but rather to allow the respondents to paint in the canvas. Rosenthal (2004, p. 50) sets out a sequence for the interviews in narrative analysis:

During the main narration period:

1. Interviewer-initial narrative question
2. Participant-main narration or self presentation
3. Interviewer- active listening and taking notes during the questioning period:
4. Internal narrative questions
5. External narrative questions

The use of interviews is not as straight forward as many people might think and the many considerations that have to be borne in mind are discussed in paper by Barriball (Barriball & While, 1994) Every effort should be made to ensure the interview is conducted in a harmonious and acceptable manner. Informed consent prior to the interview process was necessary, together with an overall agreement over the proposed structure for the interview. Consideration was given to the general welfare of the participants when conducting long interviews. The later has been important for this research project, as nearly all the participants have been elderly.

The ability to listen was very important to the whole process. Seidman (1998) proposes that there are three levels of listening. The first being an attentive approach, followed by the use of the 'inner voice' allowing a connection with the speaker and lastly the interviewer "must listen while remaining aware of the process as well as the substance" (p. 65). The whole approach requires a good deal more concentration than that which is normally associated with general conversation. There is also a need to have a complete picture of where the interview needs to go. The use of a template on a clipboard can be distracting to the respondent; therefore, it is preferable to have the sequence of questions firmly fixed in one's mind. This ability facilitates flexibility, as a strand can be followed without losing sight of the general direction that the interview needs to take, to fulfil the requirements of the questions.

Recording the interview allows for a greater empathy with the respondent, as one is able to maintain eye contact, although taking additional notes not only aids the later interpretation process but it also gives the interviewee confidence that what is being said is of importance (Barriball & While, 1994; Gorden, 1975; Seidman, 1998). If there is any ambiguity then this should be clarified at the time as should follow up questions that allow stories to be told. This style will produce data rich responses that elucidate the interpretation of events for write up. Sometimes the chronology can become blurred and this too needs to be clarified with additional questions at the time.

A further aspect, is not to probe without understanding the sensitivity of many of the issues involved, as this could cause offence, but rather explore the experience together; the art of listening rather than interrogating (Gorden, 1975). With older people is important to keep them focussed on the topic rather than let them digress to other memories (Seidman, 1998, p. 74), which was the case for some of the participants in this study.

A valid criticism is that of interviewer bias, failing to be subjective enough or accepting what is being presented as correct. Such bias can prejudice much of the findings if caution is not properly exercised (Cohen, et al., 2007). This can often occur when the interviewer feels they have a greater knowledge of the events than that of the respondent. This aspect was pertinent to this study, because of the age of the participants. It was important not to overpower them or them to overpower the researcher with their experience either.

There can also be a tendency for self-serving bias and recall error by the interviewee (Patton, 1990, p. 245). A further area to be considered was that of misinterpretation of events, often called selective memory (Tafarodi, Tam, & Milne, 2001). Selective memory can manifest itself in a number of ways from wanting to appear more important in a previous event than was actually the case, or merely reporting an event, as if one had been present, to forgetting the involvement of others. All of these aspects must be measured and accounted for by validation from other sources. Therefore multiple interpretations must be considered as well as the principle of suspicion (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 77). “Examine the influences that the social context has upon the actions under study by seeking out and documenting multiple view points along with the reasons for them” (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 77).

All the interviews were transcribed with further analysis taking place using multiple methods predominately using the *NVivo* software to identify sequences, patterns and structures of the responses given. Once these trends were identified they were then compared to the existing literature through Historiographical analysis as part of the triangulation process to assist validity.

### **3.8 Research Quality Criteria and Reliability**

The importance of quality in the study needs to be addressed, as “transparency of research methodology; clearly based on and adding to the relevant literature in terms of insight and conceptualisation” makes it important to highlight this more than may have been the case in the past (Bryman, Becker, & Sempik, 2008, p. 267). Transparency is a major consideration to ensure acceptable methods have been used in the research.

Commonly there are four accepted research quality criteria: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. These four dictate the universal credence of the results from the research undertaken and need to be incorporated throughout the entire process. The validity of the research confirms the accuracy and usefulness of the data collected through the use of the selected instrument (Pandit, 1996). These terms are not exclusive and many authors propose alternative interpretivist positions (Seale, 1999) such as Altheide and Johnson's (1994) review on validity identifies "successor validity, catalytic validity, interrogated validity, transgressive validity, imperial validity, simulacra/ironic validity, situated validity, and voluptuous validity" (p. 488). The use of so many terms can be bewildering according to Seale, because of the "difficulty in regulating and constraining an endeavour whose guiding philosophy often stresses creativity, exploration, conceptual flexibility and freedom of spirit" (Seale, 1999, p. 467). The importance is to ensure that the methods chosen demonstrate credibility and are dependable (Yin, 2009, p. 40).

Construct validity accepts that some findings have no definite criterion measure of quality with which they can be checked against, and therefore, will require indirect measures to be used to achieve the required level of validation (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 14). The more measures that can be used the greater the validity outcomes. Yin (2009) also points out that one of the most frequent criticisms levelled against the use of case studies is to do with construct validity and that 'subjective' judgements' predominate the collection of data. Avoiding this pitfall has been difficult, because choosing the respondents has been dictated predominately by those who have been available. Yin (2009) suggests that "multiple sources of evidence" are useful to maintain a "chain of evidence", which is beneficial too (2009, p. 42).

Internal validity on the other hand asks whether the study has achieved the desired outcome as intended and whether or not the bias of the researcher has influenced the findings. Internal validity is threatened when credible and challengeable explanations cannot be eliminated (Onwuegbuzie & McLean, 2003). As with construct validity, the more variables that can be used to validate the data the more confident one can be of the results from the research. It is also important to fully explain how the results were achieved. Basically, are the study results credible and has this been adequately demonstrated.

External validity considers in what context can the results be applied or transferred to other situations or have generalisations crept into the findings because the type of sample used i.e. that is was not representative enough or was idiosyncratic. As this research has used criterion sampling it has been important to recognise this potential bias. Although the sample

was restricted in its selection, because of the nature of the research question and the conflicts that were studied, the use of additional data from other sources has been used to limit the threat that might have been caused by any weakness in this approach.

Lastly the question of reliability or dependability needs to be addressed: can the study be repeated or replicated and obtain the same results. Fundamentally, are the results trustworthy, which can be a subjective judgement anyway? Once again, an open approach as to how the study was conducted and how the context may have changed throughout is an important aspect to be addressed.

The reliability or validity of the evidence is one that is always raised when using interviews. This is highlighted in Cohen et al (2007) where they highlight several areas which could construe bias:

- The attitudes, opinions and expectations of the interviewer;
- A tendency for the interviewer to see the respondents in his or her own image;
- A tendency for the interviewer to seek answers that support preconceived notions;
- Misperceptions on the part of the interviewer of what the respondents are saying;
- Misunderstanding on the part of the respondent of what is being asked. (p. 150)

Therefore, it is the validity of the responses rather than the reliability of the respondents that is core to a robust outcome. The outcome requires that the concepts are well defined before any attempt is made to measure them, taking into account all the threats to validity that could occur.

Careful formulation of the questions was essential in an effort to minimise bias; in particular during the interview stage. However, it must be recognised that the interview is more than a one side episode, it is a shared experience which in turn is part of a power status, perhaps even a struggle, between the two individuals (Cohen, et al., 2007, p. 151). Lee (1993) goes further and states that there needs to be an understanding of the power asymmetries with either the interviewer having dominance in the situation, or the interviewee not feeling comfortable with the potentially lower status of the interviewer. Such a potential conflict could cause problems with the responses given by those interviewed and needs to be given careful consideration. This approach forms part of reflective process as being the:

recognition of the influence the researcher brings to the research process. It highlights the potential power relationships between the researcher and the research participant ... It also acknowledges how a researcher's [characteristics] ... influence the choices

made within the study, such as the research question itself and the methods of data collection. (Kuper, Lingard., & Levinson, 2008, p. 689)

The implications this brings needs to be judged in relation to what effect this may have on outcomes of the research. A continual reflection of how each additional piece of data has impacted or moderated the overall study has taken place. In addition a comprehensive account of how the research has been conducted will assist in allaying fears that it could not be replicated. It is this later part that underpins reliability, could the case study be conducted again, not replicated but undertaken using the same methods (Yin, 2009, p. 44). Consequently even “positivist methodologists accept that **case studies** [sic] have a strong comparative advantage with respect to the “depth” of the analysis, where depth can be understood as empirical completeness and natural wholeness or as conceptual richness and theoretical consistency” (Given, 2008). Furthermore:

Case method research has the potential of being far stronger in all three areas (reliability, construct validity and internal validity) than its statistical counterparts under conditions of complexity. The problem is that of weighing objective and subjective evidence (...). What the case method offers is the ability to employ many different types of evidence to support construct convergence. This evidence will likely include the ideas of the participants themselves. (Gill, 2011, pp. 154,156)

A basic reasoning for using the case study method has been that it allowed for an intense examination of the data collected from multiple sources. The data generated provides the support for the theoretical arguments as presented. However, as Bryman (2012) asks, “the crucial question is not whether the findings can be generalized to a wider universe but how well the researcher generates theory out of the findings” (p. 71). Furthermore, by using comparative analysis of more than one study, has assisted in reinforcing triangulation by using more than one specific type of interpretation to support critical realism.

The process of triangulation was used to increase reliability (Gillham, 2000, p. 13). A central mathematical concept that is the basis of navigation, whereby three points are identified and the angles between calculated to ascertain the exact position. When triangulation is used in research, the quest is to attempt to verify aspects of the data to certify they are validated with other separate sources and thus corroborate the data collected. This correlation ensures that what is said by the interviewee is cross checked to other primary and secondary sources such as: diaries, records, documents, newspapers and books, as part of the

verification and reliability process. “The demands of rigor typically *require* us to consider evidence from as many sources as possible” (Gill, 2011, p. 158). Eisenhardt (1989) argues that “the triangulation made possible by multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses” (p. 538). Bryman (2012) adds, “by comparing to or more cases, the researcher is in a better position to establish the circumstances in which theory will or will not hold” (p. 74). Therefore, using the multiple comparative case study approach should have assisted with achieving this objective.

### **3.9 Historiography**

As this thesis deals with events that took place in the past it has been necessary to interpret what are known as historical facts, “this process contextualises the issues being studied and gives shape to the parameters of the understanding which is being offered” (O’Brien, Remenyi, & Keaney, 2004, p. 135). However, this may not be as simple as it seems. Carr (as cited in Moran, 1959, p. 11) argued that the facts speak for themselves only when they are called upon to do so. It is the historian that decides which facts to use and which ones to omit. The judgement used by the writer will always be open to criticism of bias. Whether it is possible to avoid this challenge is hard to say, but it is necessary to ensure as much academic rigour as possible is present in an attempt to avoid it. Marwick (2001) emphasises that he does “not believe that historians ‘reconstruct’ or ‘craft’ anything; what they do is contribute to historical knowledge, that is knowledge about the past”(p. 3). Following this interpretation has been the objective of this thesis:

Historiography is an empirical research paradigm using interpretative or qualitative approach which focuses on a chronology over a substantial period of time in order to obtain a fuller and richer understanding of a situation or set of circumstances.  
(O’Brien, et al., 2004, p. 117)

Therefore, the process of interpreting the events through the case study approach has its benefits. These events have been placed in a chronological order to ascertain whether there was an implicit understanding by the men on the ground as to what the hierarchy may or may not have understood to be the guiding direction of the conflict; namely, whether or not ‘hearts and minds’ was the over-arching policy being used to fight the conflicts. The need to look at three conflicts sequentially has been adopted to determine the stated hypotheses, although technically the conflicts in Malay and Kenya were taking place virtually simultaneously.

Coupled with this approach is the need to be cognisant of the debate dealing with what is called historical distance. Two approaches are recognised: that of the “minimizers” and the “maximizers,” whereby the first sees,:

The past and present as separated by an (ontological) gap that ought to be bridged (cognitively) in order to achieve historical understanding. In other words, although the object of study is given, the problem for these minimizers is how to represent this object accurately, given the distance that separates them from their object of study. (Den Hollander, Paul, & Peters, 2011, p. 5)

But for those called “maximizers”,

argue along opposite lines. For them, clear distinctions between past and present do not exist, if only because the present is so much a result of the past that it is hard to say where “the past” stops and “the present” begins. For these maximizers, then, historical understanding is all about creating distance, that is to say, about distinctions between past and present that allow an idea, a text, or an image to appear as a historical object of study. (Den Hollander, et al., 2011, p. 5)

The undertaking that is then required by those studying historical events is:

Neither to project themselves in the past nor to bring the past to the present; their task is rather to engage in dialogue with the past so as to develop a conversational situation where both past and present are transformed. (Den Hollander, et al., 2011, p. 7)

When this is assimilated into the methodology being used to conduct this study, the use of case studies would seem appropriate, as would the use of narrative analysis to ensure the events have been placed in their historical context together with the narratives of the respondents. The interviews taken from the men who participated in the conflicts has formed part of the case study as primary source material. In addition, historical documents written at the time, such as books, have been part of the process of interpretation. The books or government documents can be classed as primary material; “Primary sources are sources generated within the period being studied. at the time”(Marwick, 2001, p. 156). These still require care when being interpreted as they too could contain secondary sources that will need to be verified (Marwick, 2001, p. 157).



Whilst accepting that the understanding of distance as hereby argued, it is also a necessary component of historiography research to understand there are a further four dimensions of representation, as they relate to the problem of mediating distance:

1. The genres, media, and vocabularies that shape the history's formal structures of representation;
  2. The affective claims made by the historical account, including the emotional experiences it promises or withholds;
  3. The work's implications for action, whether of a political or moral nature; and
  4. The modes of understanding on which the history's intelligibility depends.
- These overlapping, but distinctive, distances—formal, affective, ideological, and conceptual—provide an analytic framework for examining changing modes of historical representation. (Phillips, 2011, p. 16)

Where this becomes important is within the debate of attempting apply revisionist tendencies to the events that took place in the past. By this we tend to mean go over again with a view to improving, amending or correcting the version of history or imposing a current philosophical interpretation that suits modern day thinking (Foster, 1986; McPherson, 2003). The modern acceptance of replacing or adjusting the interpretation of the facts, thus revising the particulars of the event, is fraught with complexities, which can be argued are unethical. That is to say unethical because the morality of ethics is an ever evolving concept which should not be applied retrospectively. The debate regarding revisionism is argued admirably in the paper by Gorman (2007). Therefore, bearing this in mind the narratives given by the respondents regarding their experiences need to be assessed within the framework of what was or was not acceptable at that time and place. They should not be interpreted within the framework of what is considered ethical today.

### **3.10 Ethical Issues**

Edith Cowan University (ECU) requires a strict adherence to the regulations regarding ethical conduct of research and ensures that all candidates are fully aware of the guide lines. This project has followed these guide lines at all times to ensure compliance and has dealt with the risks identified at the proposal stage. As stated.

A key ethical imperative is that the respondent's identity be safeguarded at all times and to this end respondents have all been informed that their participation would remain anonymous. The participants were all given a letter to sign outlining the procedures and that

the study was voluntary. Prior to each interview they were informed that it would be recorded so the data could be transcribed; to ensure a true record of the proceedings. In some cases participants preferred not to be recorded and this was respected. Furthermore, the material would not be released to any other person and would only remain on a secure file for the required period under ECU regulations

### **3.11 Study limitations**

A number of limitations have been pointed out in this chapter and these will now be highlighted, together with any mitigation measures that have been used in the research. Foremost is the ability of the researcher, who is in fact the instrument (Patton, 1990, p. 14). This concept identifies that even if the instruments used are exceptional, they will fail if the researcher does not have the required qualifications and skills to apply them correctly. Poor technique, badly drafted or applied research questions could also reduce the reliability of the outcomes. Furthermore, “there are times when all researchers are going to be interpretative, holistic, naturalistic, and uninterested in cause, and then, by definition, they will be qualitative inquirers” (Stake, 1995, p. 46). It is the failure to understand that this occurs that may compromise the outcomes.

The supervisors have maintained a continual overview of the study, ensuring that as many of the potential failings have been mitigated as possible. The use of a pilot study was one such mitigation measure, as this allowed the study to be tested first and analysed prior to embarking on the full study. A number of probable problems were indentified and remedied before conducting the full study making it more reliable and robust. Other recommendations and comments have been incorporated where appropriate.

The issue related to criterion sampling and potential bias was recognised. Although the sample was necessarily restricted in its selection, the use of additional data from other sources has been maintained to limit the threat to validity that might have been caused by this approach. Ultimately the end result will be based upon the analysis of the data that was collected and its interpretation by the researcher. A continual process of analysis was performed to maintain a grasp of what the end result will achieve and when to call a halt to the overall process and stop. Recognition that collection process could continue ad infinitum was an important aspect that had to be dealt with.(Merriam, 1988, pp. 124-125).

### **3.12 Conclusion**

This chapter presented the study design, population, research instrumentation, research methodology, study limitations and the ethical considerations. Study design discussed the merits of selecting the case study approach to deal the perceived research problem, as it provided a method for undertaking comparative analysis. The use of a pilot study was highlighted as a method to test and improve the overall study design.

Population explained why criterion sampling was justified for this study and the limitations that this would have on the ability to generalise the final results. In addition, the advantages of using semi-structured interviewing techniques were expounded as a benefit when dealing participants over a certain age, as was required by this study.

Study limitations were considered, together with the mitigation measures appropriate for dealing with perceived bias. A further limitation was the requirement to work within the limitations of the study and not to stray in to other areas: a problem that could easily occur when using three case studies over such a time frame. To conclude the chapter, the importances of ethical considerations were presented.

The next chapter discusses the pilot study and how it was conducted in order to test the study design. Although this chapter has discussed the Methods and Materials, Chapter 4 expounds the procedure involved to achieve the outcomes already discussed, in order to display transparency in the overall process.

# Chapter 4

## PILOT STUDY

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the pilot study, which was conducted after the first three interviews had been conducted, prior to the main data collection process. The reasons for undertaking a pilot study are discussed, the process used and finally the changes made based upon the outcomes obtained. The proposed research methodology, instruments and research questions to be used were also tested; to ensure they met the requirements of the study proposal. Although, the previous chapter stated how the study was conducted, the pilot chapter describes the process involved in confirming the study design, in an effort to demonstrate transparency.

The interviews are analysed relative to the literature, by assessing the data obtained from three respondents. By using the responses, it has been possible to identify trends together with potential shortcomings that were present in the original formulation of the questions. A number of changes and modifications were found to be necessary to improve the design of the study and these are reviewed, with reasons for the modifications explained. In addition, the overall validity is assessed, together with any limitations found during the use of the pilot study.

The data collected from the semi-structured interviews has been transferred to the main case study on the Kenya Emergency; once it had been assessed in relation to the study design. The other main reason was the scarcity of respondents for this study, necessitating the use of all the primary data collected to build the case studies.

### 4.2 Why use a Pilot Study?

There are a number of significant reasons why a pilot study should be undertaken; not least of these is the significance of maintaining transparency throughout the process if validity is to be preserved.

It is often recommended to conduct what is commonly called a ‘pilot study’, which is mostly done prior to the final formulation of the proposal stage of the PhD. “A trial study carried out before a research design is finalised in order to assist in defining the research question or to test the feasibility, reliability and validity of the proposed study design” (Cambridge Institute for Research, 2004). In this study it has been carried out at the start of

the data collection process. This course of action can also be called a trial run of the research instruments, or a vanguard study. Many researchers (Baker, 1994; Polit-O'Hara & Hungler, 1997; Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001; Thabane, 2010) point to the value of using the pilot after the first stage of the data collection process to assess the internal validity of the whole process and a verification on any potential problems that might arise because of failings or errors in the study design. The pilot study performs the following:

- Developing and testing adequacy of research instruments;
- Administer the questions in the same way as for the main study;
- Collecting preliminary data;
- Establishing whether sampling frame and technique are appropriate;
- Ask subjects for feedback to identify ambiguities and difficult questions;
- Discard unnecessary, difficult or ambiguous questions;
- Establish that replies can be interpreted in terms of the information that is required;
- Re-word or re-scale any questions that are not answered as expected;
- Re-assess the methodology to ensure it will deliver the required outcome;
- Assessing the proposed data analysis techniques to uncover potential problems;
- Determining what resources are needed for the main study. (adjusted from Peat, Mellis, & Williams, 2002, p. 123)

Whether this is called a pilot study, trail run, vanguard study or a preliminary review of the first stage of data collection is immaterial, as it still serves an important function as demonstrated by the bullet points just mentioned. This function is often misunderstood or ignored by social science and humanities researchers, particularly the benefits of this type of approach, especially with regard to subjectivity. The pilot allows the researcher a valuable chance to evaluate the data outcomes based on the first series of interviews to establish whether or not they have achieved the desired outcomes. If it is found that the interviews have not achieved the anticipated outcome, then steps can be taken to rectify this problem before proceeding any further with the data gathering. The role of a pilot study is to reduce the risk of getting it wrong (Lancaster, Dodd, & Williamson, 2004; Rodney Turner, 2005). Furthermore as Lancaster (2004) points out the pilot study is a valid endeavour that is worthy of publishing in its own right; as every effort should be made to publish research endeavours.

As discussed in the Materials and Methods chapter, data collection is often done through participant observation, interviews and questionnaires and a large proportion of ethnographic type studies prefer an even more reflexive approach when conducting social science research. Progressively, more and more researchers report not just what they have found from a piece of research, but how they have actually gone about doing it (Sampson, 2004, p. 383). Transparency and thus validity are improved. Sampson (2004) considers the “importance of pilot work in undertaking qualitative and ethnographic studies, prior to researcher immersion in the ‘field’[sic]”(p. 383), as a vital component of the whole research process to ensure the adequacy of the research instruments. While the benefits of doing pilot work are not new to ethnographers, they are “under-discussed and to some extent under-utilized” (p. 383).

While pilot studies can be used to refine research instruments, such as questionnaires and the structure of the interview process to ensure better reliability and validity, they have greater use in ethnographic approaches to data collection in foreshadowing research problems. This process includes: highlighting potential gaps and wastage in data collection; as well as considering broader and highly significant issues, such as research validity, ethics, representation and researcher health and safety (De Vaus, 1993; Lancaster, et al., 2004; Rodney Turner, 2005; Sampson, 2004; Van Teijlingen, Rennie, Hundley, & Graham, 2001).

Subsequent to discussions with the supervisors, it was agreed to use a pilot study at the very start of the data collection process; to assess the validity of the research instruments and to ensure that the structure of the questions would achieve the desired outcomes. Therefore, the data collected was assessed, together with the methodology used and this was conducted after the first three semi-structured interviews:

While ethnography is frequently portrayed as involving ongoing analysis and adjustment in its conduct, this is not always the case with some researchers choosing to apply an analytic framework only at the writing-up stage during which process they feel sufficiently distanced to begin to ‘take a wider view’.(Cassell, 1988, p. 99)

Based upon these comments, it would seem a pilot study is a wise process to utilise in an effort to ensure that the data collection process will achieve the desired results, as set out in the proposal. Fortunately, a series of unique and some unexpected themes have surfaced from the first series of interviews. These themes have highlighted the rich source of primary material that has been uncovered by using non probability criterion sampling, i.e. selecting participants for the study who are perceived to be capable of providing a unique insight into

the case studies being analysed (Sandelowski, 2000). It is for this reason that the data collected still formed part of the body of research and not be discarded, as is sometimes the case in 'pilot studies'. Furthermore, as Sampson has pointed out, it may be beneficial to re-interview the original participants with the amended series of questions, to ensure the data collection process remains the same for all participants (Sampson, 2004).

### **4.3 Research Process and Design**

The original proposal for this study was to analyse what took place in the counter-insurgency campaigns conducted in Kenya and Malaya, with a view to identifying what actions and tactics worked during the prosecution of these insurgencies. The sub-set of questions set out to identify how far the participants were also aware of any political objectives that might have been part of the general strategy. This political objective has now become known more widely as 'hearts and minds' and is now considered to be a primary counter-insurgency strategy, which is based upon the concepts as devised by General during the "Emergency" in Malaya (1948-1960) (Barber, 1972; Carruthers, 1995a; Fall, 1998).

Due to the specific nature of the case studies to be researched, it was therefore considered appropriate to use criterion sampling. Samples are selected purposely rather than through probability methods, because they can offer a research project insight into a particular experience, that is they 'represent' a perspective (Smith, et al., 2009). The first case study dealt with Emergency in Kenya from 1952 until 1960, which required interviews with respondents who took part in this conflict, as members of the colonial forces at the time. Narrative analysis was then used to analyse the responses. The reasons for this approach have been discussed in the Chapter on Materials and Methods.

### **4.4 Population and Sample**

The target population for this study was those members of the security forces who had participated in conflicts that involved countering the insurgency; these were former Kenya police officers for the purpose of this pilot study. Criterion sampling was used to select the participants, as this allows for selection of data rich subjects although it does not conform to non probability sampling. This is an accepted form of collecting data for research in qualitative studies. However, the pool for selection was limited due to the age of any potential respondents (mostly in their 80s), as was the geographical dispersal of these men subsequent to their retirement from active service

The participants once interviewed remain anonymous; as per the research guidelines laid out by Edith Cowan University. In accordance with this requirement a coding system has been developed to ensure this occurs. All those who were in Kenya will be designated KENA, followed by a number to link this to their transcripts. The status of the participants will be reflected by the designation such as P, for police, or M for military, where appropriate. KENA-P- 2 would be a Kenya policeman and be the second person interviewed. Table 4.2 indicates how these respondents will be referred to in the study and the date the interview with them took place as an identifier.

**Table 4.1 Participants in this pilot study**

| Participant | Age | Sex  | Interview  | Status         |
|-------------|-----|------|------------|----------------|
| KENA-P-1    | 80s | Male | 02/03/2010 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-2    | 80s | Male | 19/05/2010 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-3    | 80s | Male | 19/12/2010 | Police Officer |

#### **4.5 Primary Research Questions**

The primary research question was “What was the role played by the colonial forces in counter insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 to 1959) and Malaya (1947-1960)”.

##### **4.5.1 Sub-Questions**

1. What factors and roles contributed to the security forces success in the insurgency campaigns of Kenya and Malaya?
2. Were those involved in the counter insurgency aware of any explicit policy objectives?
3. Was the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ one that was commonly understood and practiced by those involved on the ground?
4. What aspects of the colonial strategy appeared to be reason for their success?
5. Can these ‘lessons’ be applied to modern counter insurgency strategies?

#### **4.6 Interpretative Outcomes**

Following a series of personal interviews with three former Kenyan policemen, using the template developed from the research questions for conducting the semi-structured



interviews, the results were analysed and an interpretation attained. The following discussion highlights this process that was followed during the pilot study..

The response sought from the primary research question was how critical was the role played by the Colonial Police Forces in countering the Emergency in Kenya and Malaya. Deflem (1994) articulates their unique position within the campaign structure, especially under the indirect rule concept adopted by the Colonial office. Sinclair (2006) describes how they were more of a Para-military force in defence of the colonial settlers than as a police force as understood back in the Britain .The Kenyan Police, together with the Kenya Regiment, were crucial to counter insurgency tactics (Deflem, 1994, p. 47; Kitson, 1960; Lovatt-Smith, 2005, p. 175). Beckett (1985) develops this theme further, pointing out how important their detailed knowledge was in the overall strategy of the campaign.

Bennett (2007) also deals with ‘use of force’ elements, and the criticality of command and control of forces on the ground. When all these factors are considered they indicate the important role the Colonial Police played in being able to dominate the counter insurgency due to their local knowledge of language, terrain and customs.

Therefore, based upon the responses to the primary question would need to be supported by additional questions in order to elicit any worthwhile additional data regarding the role played by Colonial Forces and particularly the Kenya Police Force.

The responses given by the three participants in the pilot study indicated that a rich source of interesting material was potentially available and that this line of questioning need to concentrate on specific aspects of strategy and tactics. It was important to ensure that the sub-questions would be capable of following this theme whilst conducting the main data collection in the future.

A further aspect associated to the research questions 2 & 3, tries to deal with the now well-known “hearts and minds” phrase used by General Templer, in the Malayan insurgency (Barber, 1972). It is often quoted to convey the necessity of having a political aspect as a fundamental part of the counter-insurgency tactics, one that compliments the operational military strategy , or as Galula (1964) states, "revolutionary war is 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military” (Galula, 1964/2006, p. 63).

## **4.7 Methodology**

Qualitative methods were used for this study, using a case study approach and analysing the data collect by using the case study approach. The full explanation of the use of this methodology has already been discussed in the Materials and Methods chapter.

## **4.8 Outcomes from the Pilot Study**

The central outcome from the pilot study has been the limitations of dealing solely with Kenya and Malaya. It was therefore considered essential to revert to the original proposal and add Rhodesia as a case study. One of the main reasons behind this decision lies in the dearth of potential respondents that have been located to take part in the research. The paltry number of potential respondents became very clear as those being interviewed from the campaign in Kenya were well into their 80s. Gaining access to any that had taken part in the Malaya campaign proved even more difficult with virtually no respondents at all to the first casting of the net to the various Associations. This result was obviously not satisfactory and following discussions with the supervisors it was agreed that Rhodesia should be re-incorporated into the research study because this was a later conflict, which would increase the number of potential respondents for the study.

There were a number of important of additional reasons why the inclusion Rhodesia was essential to the study as a whole; not least of these was the transition of many who had fought in both Kenya and Malaya over to the Rhodesian conflict. The incorporation of Rhodesia would also assist in demonstrating the exchange of tactics, between the conflicts, similar back grounds and the use of personnel that that had been in these campaigns.

A further aspect has evolved from the pilot study, was how far was the political objectives were present in the operational objectives. Regardless of any favourable military outcomes, all successful counter insurgencies require an ultimate political outcome (Kilcullen, 2006c), but the question was how was this achieved? From the perspective of the research the ability to tie the successful tactics, used in prosecuting the counter-insurgency, to those that achieved the political outcome were part of the research.

### **4.8.1 Research Design Changes**

The changes in the research design process were as follows:

1. Accepted that it was not possible to get sufficient, if any, of required participants for the Malayan campaign to construct an acceptable case study. Therefore this would become a critique of the material based upon the literature, archive footage and commentary from recognised professionals in the field.
2. Addition of Rhodesia as a case study for the purposes of comparative analysis.
3. Amended the series of tertiary questions to ensure they provided potentially greater depth of data from the respondents, discarding those found to be deficient in this regard.
4. Modified the methodology to include empirical as part of the Interpretative phenomenological Analysis
5. Identified that Historiographical analysis is core to this research process.

Other than adding a further case study, which in essence is to compensate for the scarcity of respondents to interview from the Malayan campaign and to ensure a comparative analysis can be performed, there has been very little change to the process outlined in the accepted proposal. Although Malaya will now only be predominately a critique of the campaign; any potential respondents found during the field research in the UK or Malaysia will be interviewed to assist in building the case study for the Malayan conflict.

#### **4.8.2 Trial run of the Subsidiary Questions**

The other notable change was amongst the series of tertiary questions developed to use as a template guide for the structured interviews. It was noted that many of the questions appeared mundane and did not elicit any worthwhile responses. The responses appeared ordinary, although they could be constructed as having been necessary to put the subjects at ease; it was still felt that there needed to be more direction in the questions to draw out further information of more consequence.

Respondent KENA-P-3, who was quite happy to move away from the direction of the questioning on to other matters, which were of little value in relation to this research. This problem identified how important it was to keep to the script and ensure that not only were the respondents answering the same or similar questions as each other, but that they remained as close as possible to a response that answered the question set. Failure to follow this strict line would only generate large amounts of worthless transcript material, which would make it more difficult to identify a trend in the data that could then be subsequently followed through will further interviews.

However, some rich trends appeared from the first three interviews and these were thought worthy of pursuing at a later stage. Consequently, two of the original respondents were used later to verify data after the primary collection had been completed. Sampson (2004), highlighted the benefits of returning to respondents used in the pilot study at a later stage, using them to reconfirm details raised by the other respondents and as part of the triangulation process..

The pilot study identified a series of trends not recognised during the first literature review. These trends were then pursued throughout the remainder of the data collection process. It was considered this benefited this research, producing a series of papers, which assisted in validating the findings.

Table 4.1 indicated what areas needed to be addressed to strengthen the research design. One of the points was “Ask the subjects for feedback to identify ambiguities and difficult questions” this process was conducted during the pilot stage, which helped identify a series of tertiary questions that needed to be changed, amended or dropped completely:

**Table 4.2 Changes to the original questions**

| Original Question   | Reason for change  |
|---|--|
| How long were you involved?   | Not really of much value   |
| Where were you posted?  | Not really of much value, although useful  |
| Have you read anything about the current criticism of the Emergency?                | This is subjective and deals with situation today                                |
| Do you think there is any truth in the accusations?                                 | This is subjective and deals with situation today                                |
| Have you read any of the books by Elkins?   | Not relevant, even though controversial  |
| There are claims that 300,000 Kikuyu were killed what do you think about that?      | This is subjective and deals with a debate taking place today. Not relevant.     |
| Did you have any Kikuyu working for you as domestic servants prior to the emergency | Not relevant as did not provide any bearing on the methods of counter insurgency |

Table 4.3 sets out why certain questions were dropped to improve the study design. Further points taken from table 4.1, have also been used to improve the study such as:

1. Discard all unnecessary, difficult or ambiguous questions
2. Assess whether each question gives an adequate range of responses

3. Establish that replies can be interpreted in terms of the information that is required. (Peat, et al., 2002, p. 123)

The pilot study outcomes recognised that some of the questions presented in table 5, which were taken from the original proposal, did not fulfil the required purpose and have either been revised or discarded completely. By using the guide laid out in table 4, a structural analysis has been conducted, which has resulted in a more targeted series of tertiary questions.

#### **4.9 Pilot Study: Reliability and Validity**

Improvements were made to the validity and reliability of the research methodology and instruments. They were improved upon to ensure that the primary study would progress as required; notably the semi-structured interview process has been modified based upon the pilot results. “Ideally, tests for validity and reliability should be made at the pilot stage of the investigation, before the main phase of data collection” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p. 135).

“Validity measures the extent to which the research is accurate and the extent to which truth-claims can be made, based on the research – i.e., that it measures what is intended” (Curtis Bruce & Cate, 2011). Primarily a check whether the results from the instrument are plausible such as in “convergent validity: confirmation by comparing the instrument with other independent measurement procedures” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2004, p. 134). Ensuring the “method of data collection possesses the quality of being sound or true as far as can be judged.” (Pierce, 2008, p. 74). Rose (1982). suggests there are three important stages to be assessed: internal empirical validity; internal theoretical validity and external validity (p. 104). Firstly, evaluate whether the conclusions are reasonably drawn. Secondly, “whether the stated concepts are fairly drawn from the chosen theory and whether the stated concepts are fairly represented” and lastly the ‘strength of the relationship between the research, the wider literature and the ‘real world’ (p. 102)

#### **4.10 Study Modifications**

The major change from this proposal based upon the analysis of the initial review has been the addition of Rhodesia to the case studies. The trial run concluded that there would be insufficient data collected using solely Kenya and Malaya; particularly Malaya, which proved to be singularly difficult in obtaining sufficient potential respondents. This is mainly because there are few survivors that meet the criterion selection process, particularly any that are living in Australia.

## **4.11 Primary Research Questions**

What was the role played by the colonial forces in counter insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 to 1959) Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980) and how can the lessons learnt be applied to conflicts today?

### **4.11.1 Sub-Questions Modified**

1. What factors and roles contributed to the security forces success in the insurgency campaigns of Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia?
2. Were those involved in the counter insurgency aware of any explicit policy objectives?
3. Was the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ one that was commonly understood and practiced by those involved on the ground?
4. What aspects of the colonial strategy appeared to be reason for their success?

Once the second stage was begun, by interviewing three ex Kenya policemen who took part in the Mau Mau Emergency, it became apparent from the direction of the interviews that some excellent primary material was being divulged. When this was researched further, through the associated literature, a trend started to develop indentifying Pseudo Gangs as formidable part of the tactics developed during the Emergency to fight the insurgency.

The completion, analysis and interpretation of the pilot study resulted in a number of amendments to the research methodology and supporting survey instruments. The research methodology using case studies proved to be both valid and reliable, requiring minimal changes.

## **4.12 Pilot Study Limitations**

The purpose of conducting a pilot study was to expose and possible limitations or weaknesses in the study design at an early stage of the research process. By exposing these limitations and addressing them the study was improved and made more robust. For example, the use of only two case studies was considered insufficient to support the comparative analysis process required by multiple case study methodology. Consequently, Rhodesia was added as an additional case study.

Criterion sampling does provide a rich data source but it also limits the number of respondents capable of taking part in the research. The time elapsed since the conflicts took place reduced the pool of potential candidates, this in itself poses problems to generalisations

based upon the data collected. The limited number of respondents required caution with general applicability of the results when developing a final theory.

The age of the respondents require careful caution, especially by not giving general acceptance to the replies given. The problems related to selective memory has been discussed in the Materials and Methods chapter. Furthermore, the tendency to repeat what they might have read subsequent to their experiences, rather than actually having lived them should not be discounted. Nevertheless, the pilot study did test the appropriateness of the study's methodology and its general robustness compared to similar studies.

#### **4.13 Ethical considerations**

The pilot study was conducted under the Ethical guidelines as agreed in the application to conduct the research for this study and as required by Edith Cowan University in accordance with the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (Australian Government, 2009).

#### **4.14 Conclusions**

This chapter has dealt with the results obtained from the use of the pilot study, including primary analysis of the research questions, resulting outcomes, reliability and validity testing, as well as exposing any study limitations. By “conducting a pilot prior to the main study can enhance the likelihood of success of the main study and potentially help to avoid doomed main studies” (Thabane, 2010, p. 9). The pilot study allowed the research methodology to be tested and improved, leading to a number of changes in the study design. The foremost change has been the addition of a further case study to improve the comparative analysis component and aid validity to the main study. A number of the minor questions that were used during the pilot to put the respondents at their ease have been found to be superficial and not necessary. These have either been amended or eliminated.

The outcome from the pilot study demonstrated that the full research study was valuable, as it had exposed some aspects that have not been developed in other studies; as far as can be ascertained by the literature review. Another important aspect identified was the need to increase the number of case studies in order to provide more distinctive data for comparative analysis. Having only two case studies could not fulfil this requirement. In addition, by adding Rhodesia as a case study, this would allow two African conflicts to be assessed proving greater synergy of results. Subsequent analysis has proved this was a valid approach.

These preliminary outcomes supported the viability of the research and the justification for this study. Therefore, based upon these results it was appropriate to continue with the main study whilst making the modifications as discussed (Lancaster, et al., 2004). The collected primary data from the respondents has been transferred to the main case study on the 'Emergency' in Kenya.



# **Chapter 5**

## **THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948-1960: A CASE STUDY**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the findings from the participants obtained during the semi-structured interviews from the data collection process. The examination of their responses situates them in relation to the themes identified through the literature review across the course of the campaigns. As identified in the study design, the conflicts in Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia will be studied using the case study approach. Malaya is the first case study and was used as a yard stick to gauge the other two conflicts, because this conflict has become one of the most discussed due to a number of innovations and developments that took place during its prosecution. Considered by many to represent what should be done to combat an insurgency, it has therefore been claimed that it was a success for the sovereign government against the Communist inspired subversion that took place in Malaya (Barber, 1972; Clutterbuck, 1966; Jackson, 2008; 1972, p. 52; Nagl, 2002).

An overview of the conflict is presented first using supporting literature to position this case study within context based upon the themes that were identified in the literature review. The Malayan Emergency has been well documented with a number of contradictory claims being made as to how successful this was as counter-insurgency campaign (Bennett, 2009; Markel, 2006; Ramakrishna, 2002a; Reis, 2011). The main crux of the research relates to what took place that was effective from a colonial perspective and how this linked into the overall strategic thinking that has been part of the on-going development of counter insurgency strategy and doctrine at that time. The thrust of the research was to assess whether or not the Colonial authorities had a substantial advantage over modern counter-insurgency operations by reviewing the past conflicts through primary research with some of those that had taken part.

### **5.2 Thematic Approach**

The themes as developed in the headings in the literature review have formed the basis of the structure for analysing the case studies. To this end, the interviews are presented in each case study based upon the coding developed from the themes and applied to

responses of the participants. Any free codes developed through the additional themes from the respondents have been clustered under the established parent nodes to ensure they remain consist with aims and objectives of the study.

**Table 5.1 Themes identified from the Literature Review Chapter 2**

| Sub-headings | Themes                        |
|--------------|-------------------------------|
| 2.5          | Counter-insurgency            |
| 2.6          | The French influence          |
| 2.7          | Hearts and Minds              |
| 2.8          | Strategies                    |
| 2.9          | The Colonial Police           |
| 2.10         | Intelligence                  |
| 2.11         | Significant Actors            |
| 2.12         | Special Branch                |
| 2.13         | Specialised and Elite Units   |
| 2.14         | Propaganda                    |
| 2.15         | Colonial Administration       |
| 2.16         | Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths |
| 2.17         | A Counter-Insurgency Plan     |

Within each of these themes in 5.1 are numerous sub-themes, some of which are more important than others, but they all combine to produce the process that took place to conduct, combat and produce an acceptable result for the campaigns studied. In some instances the theme may be elaborated upon more than the others; if the responses indicate this was seen as more significant than perhaps the others. Where appropriate the findings are supported by the relevant literature.

Sub-heading 2.6, the French influence on counter-insurgency has been used as a tool for analysing and summarising the strategies used by the Colonial Government against the insurgents. It appears at the end of each case study chapter to aid the summary of the conflict.

### **5.3 Population and Sample**

The target population for main study was primarily those members of the security forces who had participated in conflict that involved countering the insurgency. A cross

section of participants has been used including a military historian, a rubber planter and a journalist. Criterion sampling was used to select the participants, “the logic of criterion sampling is to review and study all cases that meet some predetermined criterion of importance” (Patton, 1990, p. 176). However, the pool for selection was limited due to the age of any potential respondents (mostly in their 80s), as was the geographical dispersal of these men subsequent to their retirement.

| Participant | Age | Sex  | Date of interview | Status           |
|-------------|-----|------|-------------------|------------------|
| MALA-M-1    | 80s | Male | 20/03/11          | Military         |
| MALA-M-2    | 80s | Male | 10/03/11          | Military         |
| MALA-P-3    | 80s | Male | 03/03/11          | Police officer   |
| MALA-M-4    | 70s | Male | 04/03/11          | Military/Police  |
| MALA-C-5    | 80s | Male | 21/03/11          | Civilian Planter |
| MALA-J-6    | 80s | Male | 18/03/11          | Journalist       |
| MALA-M-7    | 80s | Male | 05/02/12          | Military         |
| MALA-M-8    | 80s | Male | 06/02/11          | Military         |

**Table 5.2 Population sample details of participants in this case study**

The participants remain anonymous; as per the research guidelines laid out by Edith Cowan University. In accordance with this requirement a coding system was developed to ensure this occurred. All those in this case study are designated with the initial M, for Malaya reduced to MALA, followed by a number to link this to their transcripts. The status of the participants will be reflected by the designation such as P, for Police, M for Military and J for journalist, where appropriate. Thus MALA-P- 2 would be a Malayan Policeman and be the second person interviewed. The code will be used to indicate a “Personal Communication” tother with the date of the interview e.g. MALA-J-6; 20/03/2011.

Eight semi-structured interviews were conducted, for this case study, transcribed and then coded. The coding was primarily based upon the themes already identified, although it was recognised that more topics were identified than had been considered by the literature themes. Consequently, a further series of codes were developed to cover these new avenues of research, “noticing relevant phenomena; collecting examples of those phenomena; and analysing those phenomena in order to find commonalities, differences, patterns and structures” by employing this method a researcher “ is able to question, evaluate and balance the data with a view to developing a further usable date “drop categories and to make a hierarchical order” (Basit, 2003, p. 144). Although, as pointed out by Basit, this cannot be

created “in isolation from the other categories we want to use in the analysis” (p. 144). Therefore, any new codes used were grouped back to the core themes, ensuring they corresponded to the areas identified for analysis

What follows is a presentation of the findings in relation to the themes placing them into a contextual structure that can be subsequently analysed. The same structure will be used for all three case studies in order to better create a comparative matrix capable of visually representing the similarities and the differences found from the research. It is always important to identify differences when undertaking analysis of historical works.

#### **5.4 Malaya 1948-1960: The Emergency**

Malaya was a further step along the path forced upon the British during the retreat from Empire post World War II. By 1970 most of the Colonies had gained their Independence, some of them through considerable conflict: Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya and Aden. Ignominious as the withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 had been for the British, there were a large number of lessons learnt that were put into place during the campaign in Malaya. However, the early losses in Malaya indicated that a radical change of approach was required by the British military establishment. Perhaps the most important was the transfer of officers with tactical experience ( such as from Palestine) to the operational side of the counter-insurgency campaign, developing the three required principals: minimum force, civil-military cooperation and tactical flexibility” (Nagl, 2002, p. 42).

The start of the conflict had not gone well, with the Chinese Communist insurgents seizing the initial offensive thus undermining the Colonial government and its limited security forces. The Government was forced to bring in additional forces. In addition radical changes were needed by the authorities in order to counter the insurgency. Furthermore, a series of far reaching changes were also made to formulate a strategy that encompassed major policy changes needed to gain the support of the majority Malay population and ensure they did not defect to the Communist insurgents’ side. The promise of independence was central to the many policy changes. Considered to be one of the most far reaching adjustments was the appointment of General Briggs, who formulated an all encompassing counter-insurgency blue print, known as the ‘Briggs Plan’. A radical departure from the unstructured approach that had characterised the early campaign, the strategic initiative brought together the military, civil and police under one command supported by a large number of tactics designed to support the Plan. Primarily these were legislative amendments, including the Emergency Regulations (Comber, 2008, p. 38; Smith, 2001b).

Figure 5.1 is a map of Malaya during the Emergency. The highlighted areas are elevated sections which were dense jungle at this time and very difficult to penetrate. The other important aspect to note is that there was only one border and that was with Thailand in the north. Singapore is in the south and there was very little conflict taking place here as this was a major British base for the Far East.



**Figure 5.1 Malaya Colony**

(Jackson, 1991, p.viii)

## 5.5 The Conflict Begins

Malaya was a British colony that had been re-gained at the end of World War II from Japanese occupation with the assistance of Communist inspired local forces, these were predominately Chinese. However, the general situation post war was very difficult with poor economic conditions, which resulted in general unrest and agitation led by Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The rubber plantations and tin mines were vital to Britain's post war economic strategies for recovery, especially for supporting the war efforts in Korea. The plantations and mines became the hot spots for the ensuing conflict. (Ghows, 2006, p. 35). Following the deaths of three rubber planters by the MCP, the 'Emergency', as it was termed; to avoid being called a war, was finally declared in June 1948 (Barber, 1972, p. 11; Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 37; Deery, 2003, p. 237). In 1948 there were Communist insurgencies in Burma, Indonesia, India and the Philippines: a situation that perturbed western strategists (Williams, 1973).

A further characteristic of note, was that the insurgents were almost totally ethnic Chinese, 'Nanyang' (Overseas), as they called themselves, and not ethnic Malays, who now supported the British in defence of their country. It is difficult to understand why the MCP thought they could overcome a country in which they were not indigenous, other than at the behest of the international Communist movement (Carruthers, 1995a, p. 76; Mackay, 1997, p. 29; Pye, 1956, p. 84; Thompson, 1966, p. 28). Some recent historians dispute this interpretation that it was an international Communist conspiracy from Moscow to instigate insurrection across Asia (Edwards & Pemberton, 1992, pp. 29-30; Stockwell, 2006, p. 284). Although this opinion may be acceptable to some, the involvement of the Maoists in China has been less documented and further research should elicit more understanding of their involvement in Malaya (Carruthers, 1995b, pp. 302-305; Deery, 2003; Edwards & Pemberton, 1992, pp. 29-37; Pye, 1956).

The MCP strategy of attacking Britain's economic interests, the rubber plantations and the tin mines that were to become vital in the war effort in Korea against the Communists supported by China, would seem to indicate that there was more external support involved than had it been just an internal conflict in Malaya (White, 1998, p. 151). It is certainly true that by alienating the native Malays from the offset their strategy appeared flawed, unless they expected outside support (Barber, 1972, p. 39; Comber, 2008, p. 11; Stewart, 2004, p. iv). However, this oversight proved fortuitous for the British Government as it was able to

divide the population. The allure of full independence was promised early on and soon became official policy in order to garner the Malays fully behind counter-insurgency efforts.

The initial response by the British Government was inept, with much fumbling over how to deal with the situation (Brendon, 2007, pp. 459-460). The police were grossly under strength for such an encounter as were the few military units stationed in Malaya. There was little equipment, few experienced personnel and the government structure needed to combat the terrorist acts of the insurgents was not in place. Whereas the strength of the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA), the military wing of the MCP, was estimated at 5,000 operational fighters with a further 250,000 civilian supports, called the Min Yuen. Pitted against them were 4,000 troops of mixed abilities and 10,223 police (Barber, 1972, pp. 43-48). The MRLA terrorists, or Communist Terrorists (CT's) as they were called, held the upper hand and sowed dread amongst the local population by committing atrocities in order to intimidate them for extortion purposes (Mackay, 1997, p. 68). Operating from their jungle hideouts they needed supplies, which they extracted from terrified villagers. It is estimated the number of guerrillas in the jungle had risen to 8,000 men by 1951. A ratio of 10: 1 forces to counter the insurgency is sometimes quoted as necessary, but this was never achieved in Malaya with a combined strength of 2:1 for both the army and the police (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 43).

Essential to the understanding of the way the counter-insurgency was conducted was that at no time was the country placed under martial law. Special laws called the Emergency Regulations 1948, amended in 1949 and 1953, laid out all the powers available to tackle the subversion (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 36-37). At all times the army was acting in support of the civilian power, which was an accepted principal held by British throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century for dealing with 'Imperial Policing' duties as they were termed in the colonies. The document '*Notes on Imperial Policing 1934*' "provided guidance on operations to maintain or restore internal security within a colonial or mandated territory under British rule, that was threatened by widespread organised internal disorder" (Moreman, 1996, p. 110). It is necessary to understand that the police held the primary role for combating the insurgency, regardless of whether they could actually achieve this outcome until they were re-enforced. Army units were brought into to supplement their capabilities, but the police were required to ensure operations were conducted according to the law. A document prepared for Emergency operations *The conduct of Anti-terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOMS)*, formed the basis and guidelines for undertaking these activities and was based upon previous experiences (Reis, 2011, p. 254).



What is noteworthy was the approach taken by the British Government: a composite strategy of combining the civil authorities with the police, military and intelligence under a determined rule of law, whilst enticing the population to support the government through welfare programmes. The carrot was independence, through gradual process of local self government, thus undermining any promises the Communist insurgents might make. A series of structure measures were progressively introduced to support the strategy. The combined approach is one that was put forward by Galula (1964/2006) in which he summaries that counter-insurgency is a combination of military, political and social actions under a strong control of a single authority.

Appointing General Briggs as an over-arching supremo and Director of Operations in 1950, with executive “authority over all the security forces-army, police and air force-and the power to coordinate actions of civil departments that affected the war”, was one of the most important actions taken to ensure that every one pulled together (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 56-57). Briggs went on to develop his ‘Plan’, which became the blue print for prosecuting the counter-insurgency efforts against the Communist Terrorists (CT’s). But it was General Templer that ensured the ‘Plan’ was carried through (Cloake, 1985 ch 9).

## **5.6 Counter-insurgency**

“It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles”(Tzu, 2011/ 6th Century BC, p. 14 ch III). Therefore, the fundamental starting point in preparing a counter-insurgency strategy must be who are your foes? Building up a clear understanding of the insurgents’ aims and objectives, unpinned by a clear appreciation as to where they are getting their support and how, is a basic requirement to developing a strategy. A substantial and comprehensive intelligence capability is requisite to build up the picture. Generalising at this early stage is fraught with problems. Errors may allow many insurgents to flee the net that needs to be cast to round them up, detain them and gain more valuable insights into the actual numbers and composition. Unfortunately this was the case in Malaya, the authorities ignored the early warnings and their initial actions were inept and fumbling, allowing a large section of the Communist insurgents to escape capture by heading into the deep jungle (Carruthers, 1995a, p. 74).

The insurgents in Malaya were overwhelming made up of Chinese Communists, many of whom had fought with, and been trained by, the British during World War II to defeat the Japanese. The Chinese, approximately two and half million, were predominately squatters in Malaya with few rights and still considered China to be their home. Considered



to be a clannish people, the Chinese settlers accept peer pressure readily and when coerced to support the insurrection against the renewed British colonial rule joined the movement to set up a Communist country by force of arms (Carnell, 1953, p. 106). In addition the secret societies, collectively called Triads, dominated the social structure by using coercive methods and deep seated family ties to control their compatriots (BNR, 1949, pp. 484-485). The tactics of the Triads were adopted by the Communists to intimidate and terrorise the Chinese squatter population (Carnell, 1953, p. 106). Post war the administration in Malaya had broken down and the Chinese peasants could see little value in supporting it. Whereas Communism promised them much and that allure saw the majority supporting the insurrection, whether they wanted to or not. However, the British:

Saw bureaucracy as a politically neutral mechanism for transmitting policies to the villages. The communists (sic) saw bureaucracy as an organizational weapon by which to cut villages away from the government in order to build an alternative power structure. (Grinter, 1975, p. 1127)

The Malays, also approximately two and a half million, saw the country as rightful theirs and did not consider that either the Indians or the Chinese were any more than ‘guest workers’ with no right to vote or remain in their country. Furthermore, the Malays were Muslims, an additional aspect that alienated them from the Chinese; despite “contrived bandit propaganda, designed to prove that the tenets of communism are not incompatible with those of Islam”, which failed (Carnell, 1953, p. 106).

In addition, in 1948 there were a further two ethnic groups to be considered, the Indians, imported to work on the plantations and tin mines; of which there were approximately 570,000 (Mackay, 1997, p. 9); this equates to roughly 10 percent of the population. The other group was the Europeans; representing less than one percent (Miller, 1972, p. 27).

Discontentment became rife with the return of the British after the War, who resumed their social positions dominating the society; as they had done prior to the Japanese invasion. However, they were no longer held in high regard; as they had failed to stem the Japanese invasion and lost their status of awe and deference they had had prior to the War (Mackay, 1997, p. 11). When all these points are taken into consideration it can be seen why the country was ripe for revolution.

The Colonial administration was ill prepared for such a task as combating international Communism, either financially, militarily or politically. The police were ill

equipped, under resourced and lacked the capabilities to deal with an insurrection. The military were in much the same dilemma with a garrison of “half trained Ghurkhas whose Government insisted as a condition of allowing recruitment in Nepal that they should not be used in aid of the Civil Power” (Mackay, 1997, p. 30). The Governor, Ghent, was loathed to declare an ‘Emergency’ despite the growing terror and bloodshed. This reluctance to deal with the insurgency head on lost the authorities much time and loss of life before they were able to harness the resources necessary to combat the rebels. It took the Colonial government almost four years before it moved from the defensive to the offensive, but a further eight years to complete the task (Miller, 1972, p. 15). A point emphasised by MALA-M-4:

The sad thing is that the British Armed forces don’t seem to learn from the lessons of the past. They should be reading the books that were written by army officers and others who were involved in these counter insurgency campaigns and carefully recording why things went wrong and making damned sure they didn’t make the same mistakes again, but they don’t seem to do that, they don’t consult the records of past campaigns. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)

One of the most discussed aspects that has emerged from conflict in Malaya was the development of an all encompassing strategy that became known as ‘Hearts and minds’. Accordingly, it figures prominently in discussions of counter-insurgency and is an important part of this study.

## **5.7 Hearts and Minds**

It is generally accepted that the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ was one that was perfected during the Malayan Emergency. It may have been used in many guises in other conflicts, but the holistic approach that was used in Malaya allowed the Director of Operations to harness all the elements necessary to put such a strategy into effect. General Templer is often credited with this achievement (Hack, 1999a). Harnessing all the resources in concert, especially the political and administrative ones together with the blunt power of the security forces allowed the foremost law that Galula (1964/2006) has emphasised to take place: control of the population through their support.

One of the key research questions sought to try and elicit responses that dealt with this aspect of ‘hearts and minds’ and ascertain how far those on the ground understood and applied this concept. Or, was this more of a post event interpretation that has since been cast over the counter-insurgency efforts, when in reality it was far more of an over arching concept that has caught the imagination of historians in an effort to explain why Malaya was

a success story. With this view in mind it was important to try and establish whether or not the participants had a different perspective.

The question put posed asked if they had heard of the term ‘hearts and minds’. The responses appeared to support that they had but were more in a reflective tone rather than one that was in common currency back in the days when they were in Malaya. As one participant commented:

The term hearts and minds evolved from there and I think it was the first real attempt to gain the support of the local people in a productive way, not just in terms of sentiment but getting, reporting information and taking active measures in support. (*MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011*)

‘Hearts and minds’ also developed into meaning civic support for the population in the form of aid both financial and technical with the “provision of amenities such as schools, hospitals, roads, new industries, food and welfare”(Paget, 1967, p. 178). In Malaya, the police were ordered to take part in ‘Operation Service’ in 1952 by the Commissioner of Police, Colonel Young, to offer every assistance and kindness where possible to the people. Reports indicate this was very effective in gaining the support of the everyday citizens (Paget, 1967, p. 67). The reply given by MALA-P-3 backed this up and mentions the emblem worn and that was placed outside each police post,



**Figure 5.2 The badge worn by the police denoting 'service'**

Young launched ‘Operation Service’ with signs outside every post with a pair of hands clasped and the word “service” in the appropriate language, (Figure 5.2). Apparently this, “boosted police morale as they saw themselves more as friends to the villagers, a change in concept from previous aggressive approaches by the police (Cloake, 1985, p. 233; Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 84).

Hearts and minds, it's very important. Templer was the man who turned it all around. He arrived in February 1952 and he left in June 1954. And in that time he instituted hearts and minds, which meant [long pause], in that it meant you had to, we wore a thing on our, or the police Specials, the full blown police used to wear a thing called [hesitates] the badge was known as Bersedia Berkhidmat. It was a black oval shaped badge worn on the sleeve of the khaki drill shirt of members of the Regular Federation of Malaya Police force. It was meant to represent the hoped for cooperation between the police and the Malay people. I think probably Templer turned it around simply and solely by that device, hearts and minds. (MALA-P-3, 03/03/2011)

MALA-P-3 goes on to say that this was a strategy that brought them over to the side of the British,

He [Templer] had to get the people off the fence. They weren't committed. In 1952 they didn't know who was going to win, and they weren't going to chance their arm. So he had to convince them that the British were going to be winning and giving them independence. And once they knew they'd get their independence they were on our side. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)

The mass bombing of the jungle did little to further the goals of 'hearts and minds'. Consequently indiscriminate bombing of the jungle stopped after 1952; as up until then hundreds tons were dropped each month. It was realised this was counterproductive and certainly did not endear the Government to the local population (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 161).

Especially when this hearts and minds business came about, they tried two methods, one was to put the existing plantation groups of villages into compounds, which they did, and secondly was to go and come face to face with the people who lived off the beaten track you might say. And in the end that is what worked plus of course there was the business of what they were doing with the people who were executed whilst on patrol. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)

When he was asked if 'hearts and minds' made any difference, the point brought up was it was necessary:

To go and make contact with the indigenous people, things that they hadn't done before and it narrows it down to two factors that were used with great success, and continue to this day is trust and information. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)

Trust and information are therefore the two keys components. If the people trust you, and that is in a far wider sense, then they will impart information back that is of use to further operations. Although, it was not always something that the average soldier was happy about doing as can be seen by this comment, from MALA-M-2:

It was hearts and minds and I would think the average soldier didn't really, not say understand it, they thought 'god I have got to walk seven miles through the jungle carrying a jerry can full of kerosene, or paraffin or petrol so that somebody could light a bloody lamp that I'm never going to see', that is putting it rather crudely but true but

that side of it. But when they came in contact with the villages and saw the poverty that they were living in then the inevitable British spirit came out, well lets share things with them, and out came the cigarettes, or the sweets that you never ate.(MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)

It was important to look at this theme carefully as it forms one of the research questions and has always been portrayed as being the reason for the success of the counter-insurgency in Malaya. Katagiri (2011), contends this has to be tempered with reservations as groups may use the dilemma of the authorities to gain their own political advantage, by undermining the campaign. Although Britain was able to extricate itself from Malaya, there was a complex political legacy in its wake, which he argues was caused by the certain groups taking advantage of the concept of hearts and minds to ensure they benefited (pp. 171-173).

## **5.8 Strategies**

The development of a comprehensive strategy was essential, if the insurgency was to be overcome. It has been noted how unprepared the British Government was at the start of the revolt, delaying the declaration of an ‘Emergency’, which would have allowed the measures necessary to have been taken, and bringing in the resources and expertise to counter the rising break down of law and order. The Briggs Plan went into effect on the 1<sup>st</sup> of June 1950 and was the product of a concerted effort to create a wide-ranging strategy capable of harnessing all the resources at the disposal of the authorities.

The Plan set out to institute appropriate administrative control in Malaya, requiring:

- General resettlement of squatters into ‘New Villages’ under surveillance of Special Constables and Home Guard
- Widening the recruitment of the Home guard to the Chinese as well as the Malays and Indians
- Collective punishment, with strict food control of all villages
- Securing the workforce of the rubber plantations and tin mines in camps
- Considerable recruitment, training and redeployment of the police back to civil duties
- Splitting Special Branch from criminal investigation and increasing their numbers
- Centralising Intelligence under Special Branch
- Ensuring that military intelligence worked with Special Branch
- Increasing the level of troops throughout the country to support police and create smaller specialised units for targeted operations
- Police and army operating jointly with closer operational integration

- Clearing and maintaining areas free from insurgent activity; designated as ‘white’ areas
- A further aspect related to population control was the strict enforcement of identity documents, which had been brought in 1948 to some areas and extended to the whole country
- Empowering local government and increasing public works Civilian-military committees were introduced from District (District War Executive Committees, DWECs) to a Federal War Executive Committee. These brought together army, police, civil administration and Special Branch, and overrode bureaucratic sclerosis (Hack, 2009, p. 388).

There were three important stages: one was the Briggs plan, two, was the appointment of Templer; who provided the dynamic leadership to apply the Plan. The third was the move towards self-government ensuring that the Malay people supported it politically, which was the role of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Chief Minister and subsequently the first Prime Minister, supporting the transition process. The strategies all depended on gaining the support of the population and the declaration by Templer that the “policy of the British Government is that Malaya should in due course become a fully self-governing nation” (as cited in Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 80). The objective was applying good government to the people so they could see the real benefits to be gained by supporting the authorities. Templer applied collective punishments to villages that continued to support the rebels: the Emergency regulations allowed this to take place. A good example was the village of Tanjong Malim, which would become a noted success story with up to 3,500 people joining the Home Guard at the end of the punishment period. (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 82). MALA-M-1 endorses, this:

The point about all these various initiatives which we used during the emergency is that they were able to take them to their natural conclusion, there was nothing standing in the way saying you can’t do that so it became to a half baked solution, they pushed it through until they had achieved success. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

There was a further important feature to gaining the support of the population, which allocated colours to the status of these villages according to how well they had progressed towards supporting the government. The attainment of ‘white’ was highly sought after rather than grey or black, as it came with considerable benefits for the villagers (Sepp, 2005, p. 9). A rural development and industrial authority was set up in 1950 with the aim of providing material benefits to those areas that supported the government, including “roads, bridges,

piped water, electricity, health clinics and schools” (Ghows, 2006, p. 85). Again this is endorsed by one of the respondents:

It was part of the benefit of bringing together of minds during the emergency, which enabled the British army to evolve from general war into a limited war with a particular application towards self government really, dependence, we also forget that was the background, and once the independence had been achieved in 1957 of course the CTs no longer had a platform, among most bright thinking people because that platform had been completely pulled away from their feet. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

The Briggs Plan had a series of measures to deprive the terrorist of succour. In essence the ‘Plan’ was a means of population control, which sought to move those Chinese squatters that were living near the jungle into what were called ‘New Villages’. By the end of 1951 over half a million Chinese had been resettled into these fortified and defended areas to prevent intimidation from the MLNA (Stockwell, 1984, p. 82).

The resettlement villages were considered to be one of the core strategies that had a considerable effect on breaking the supply lines between the insurgents hiding in the jungle and the Min Yuen; denying them access to recruits and military supplies. Furthermore, it allowed Special Branch to infiltrate the camps with spies and informers thus gaining access to valuable intelligence (Markel, 2006, p. 36). Separating the villagers away from the insurgents was denying them access to food as growing it in the jungle would have given their camps away and it took time too. Strict controls were put in place to ensure those in the protected villages did not smuggle food out with them each day when they went to tend their crops. There were harsh punishments for anybody caught attempting to do this (Pennycuick, 1954, p. 125). Central cooking was also established across the country by 1954, ensuring that no food was getting to the jungle camps, as cooked food had a very limited shelf life in humid conditions (Ghows, 2006, p. 103). MALA-M-7, emphasises this as, “we had to check everybody leaving the camps to see if they were smuggling any food out. We caught this one Chinese chap with rice in the frame of his bicycle” (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012)

The policy of giving areas colours according to their threat status was brought in by Templer in 1953. “Once an area was declared as ‘white’ then all Emergency regulations were removed including “food control, rationing, curfews, gate searches, and shops would be open all day” (Ghows, 2006, p. 297). Highlighting this approach, MALA-J- explained:

The government tried to create areas which had been cleansed of CTs, they called these by colours and a white area was free. When this happened, the area, or village, used to get bonuses from the Government so this made the locals act to get the money which they were promised. When they were black they had penalties and massive restrictions

on the inhabitants, so becoming white was a major goal. The idea helped the police catch Many CTs as informers were keen to get the rewards. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)

Gradually the strategy started to work. A Communist document came to the attention of Special Branch in 1952 that indicated that the tactics being used by the CT's needed to change. It confirmed that the strategy used by the Government, through the Briggs Plan, had forced a recognition by the insurgents that the terror tactics were counterproductive and turning the population against them. A series of instructions were issued to change the attacks so as not to target the masses, but concentrate on the security and government forces (Miller, 1972, p. 104). In addition the respondents noted other consequences:

As the Briggs Plan started to have effect the Min Yuen found it difficult to obtain supplies from the rural population for their comrades in the jungle. The Communist armed units began to look more and more to the jungle to provide their food; either by cultivating their own crops or persuading the aboriginal jungle communities to supply them. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)

The cumulative effect started to bring more and more support for the authorities, with the obvious benefits this brought to intelligence. Progressively the surrender programme influenced many more insurgents and their families as they realised that the tide was against them so better get a monetary advantage now and cut their losses. Actions taken by the Government did not always meet with general approval as MALA-J-6 explains:

They were always dropping stuff to them, telling them how to surrender, why they should surrender, telling them about the good life they would get including monetary rewards for weapons surrendered,. They told them they could come back and be citizens again or even promising them to send them back to China. They promised a lot which upset a lot of Malays who thought they should not [be] given anything as they had tried to take over the country. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)

Population control was an effective method of achieving several aims. One, it restricted the movement of known sympathisers separating them from collaboration and collusion. Two, it deprived the insurgents of recruits, military supplies and food. Three, it was more simple to find informers in the resettlement villages than it would have been if they were widely dispersed. Lastly, it gave those in the protected areas a chance to turn away from the intimidation, making them more amenable to support the government. The last point is one that was highlighted by Galula's (Galula, 1964/2006) strategy regarding the need to get the population on to your side .



## 5.9 The Colonial Police in Malaya

“The government must function in accordance with law” according to Thompson’s (1966) principles for countering an insurgency (p. 52). Under the colonial structure the military would only be brought in as an aid to the civil power (Huntington, 1981; Moreman, 1996, p. 125). Therefore, it was the police that led the counter-insurgency efforts with strong support from the military units brought in to support them in the early stages (Stockwell, 1992). Despite the heavy demands made upon the limited resources of the police force, their primary role still demanded that they upheld the law. Protecting the government from subversion and violence was also required but this was beyond their capabilities, consequently the majority of policemen were ill equipped to fight a counter-insurgency campaign as well (Hutchinson, 1969, pp. 56-57). For this reason, the death toll amongst the police together with the Home Guard attests to the heavy cost they both bore during the conflict, 1,346 police, whereas the t army only had 519.(Comber, 2008, p. 6). “The Malay Police field teams were very effective. In fact the Malay did a very good job and took a lot of casualties.” (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011).

“Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment functioning in close cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p. 9). At times the two might not be working in harmony as MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011, remembered: “Because the army would lay on their operations, and you’d take your patrol out but you wouldn’t be aware of where their operations had been laid on.” An important strategy of the Emergency Regulations was the imposition of an Identify Card regime (Komer, 1972, p. 34). Enforcing the ID regime by the police was vital measure to restrict unlawful movement as the document was required to get food and live in a village (Dewar, 1984, p. 31). Although, it was violently resited by the insurgents; as they realised this would hamper all their activities (Ghows, 2006, p. 82). Therefore, the identity checks were coupled with stringent verification of all movements, especially in vehicles. The power to arrest and detain without trial, regulation 17 D, overcame the difficulties of witnesses refusing to testify even though they had identified the CT’s (Dewar, 1984, pp. 31-32).

However the limited strength of the police restricted their abilities to work effectively. In 1948 there was less than one policeman for every hundred potential guerrillas but this rose to one policeman or Home Guard to between every five to nineteen guerrillas (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 44). MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011, virtually endorsees this:

Well I was left entirely on my own to do what I liked, and then from time to time they'd say "We want you to go on a ten day operation and sort out some men to go and some rations to take with you. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)

The other important factor was that the training for the police was very rudimentary in the early days, according to MALA-P-3:

You we had no training whatever, as Police Lieutenant. We were just chucked into the jungle...You were acting on your own instincts really, wherever you went in the jungle. You couldn't tell, to begin with you couldn't tell what was safe and what was not. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)

The lack of Chinese officers in the early stages was certainly a major handicap; in 1948 there were none (Comber, 2008, p. 60). "Some Cantonese speaking British officers" were transferred from the Royal Hong Kong Police to assist Special Branch (Comber, 2008, p. 114). It was the recruitment of local Chinese officers that were to make a substantial contribution to the defeat of the CT's as they had the ability to understand their mind set. There was large recruitment of disbanded Palestine police men into the Malayan Force, totalling 495, including Colonel Gray who became Commissioner of Police (Comber, 2008, p. 60). By 1952 there were 100,000 regular and auxiliary police, 189,000 Home Guards and 45,000 Kampong Guards (Sinclair, 2006, p. 166)

Gray, as Commissioner of Police had been unable to bring about the necessary changes required to fight an insurgency; he was replaced by Arthur Young of the City of London Police. The force was effectively spilt, with operational support units working with the army and general police duties the other. The emphasis went back to service as opposed to 'force' in an effort to gain the support of the population, together with the recruitment of more Chinese officers (Mackay, 1997, pp. 131-132). The other major change was splitting Special Branch from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), to become the combined intelligence service, which Templer brought about soon after his arrival (Cloake, 1985, pp. 228-230). Plus Templer continued with the structure of using a Director of Operations, with a totally integrated team comprising of the police, military, civil and intelligence personnel all in unison to form the triumvirate of civil-military-police with the intelligence.

The CT's were forced to change their tactics, as they were losing more and more of their men and women, so they moved to using smaller units of 20 to 30. Consequently when they attacked isolated police posts they did not have the necessary fire power; therefore the police were able to hold out until reinforcements arrived. The police losses dropped from 100

a month to around 20 by the middle of 1952, this was a similar case with civilians which also dropped from 90 a month to 15 (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 64; Moran, 1959, pp. 101-105).

The police formed one of the most important aspects to the strategy to defeat the insurgency (Corum, 2006, pp. 36-37). It was important that the police gained the respect of the population. Consequently, it was necessary to get them to accept their roles and responsibilities seriously, as well as sourcing intelligence and upholding the law at the same time. Reforming the police service was a pre-requisite to achieving the long term goals of Independence with the necessary security intact as well (Sinclair, 2011).

### **5.10 Intelligence**

Templer had been a former Director of Military Intelligence; consequently he had a particular interest and understanding of how important the gathering of intelligence was to the overall capabilities to counter the insurgency. He brought in a British expert, Jack Morton of Military Intelligence 5 (MI5). Morton's major recommendation was to split "Special Branch from the Criminal Investigation Department, thereby allowing the former to concentrate solely on counter-insurgency" (Smith, 2001b, p. 72).

Integral to the survival of the administration, was the use of sound intelligence. The Colonial intelligence gathering system was also broader and encompassed not only Special Branch, but also information acquired in the course of day-to-day administration. This political intelligence was important not only in providing warnings, but also in effective in linking the administration to the population (Cormac, 2010, p. 804). It also had to function within a psychological domain as well, if it was to be effective. MALA-M-1 put this succinctly when asked about intelligence:

Well I think the overarching success was psychological operations, without that you know had it been purely a military solution, I think it would have taken much longer, the fact is that there was a very successful defection program organised by psy-ops, a mixture of threats, inducements and Chinese predilection for money so they put large rewards for people who came out and told their story and I think towards the end, when we are talking about 1957 onwards, a large number on the successful operations were based entirely on information received from people who had defected. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

Two important pieces of information come out of this response. One, that a purely military solution was unlikely to be successful. Two, an alternative approach had to be used to convince the insurgents who were wavering to come over to the government side and supply vital intelligence (Komer, 1972, pp. 72-74). Buying information was developed into a

thriving tactic that worked well. However, the information needed to be treated with caution as there was always an element of doubt as highlighted by MALA-M-2:

There was always an element of doubt in what we were being told as sometimes they met the locals, had a chat, tried to find out what was happening and then as they left the other side they were ambushed so that put a great deal of doubt in...[what was said]. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/20112)

The line of questioning brought forth the other important aspect, which was how necessary it was to deal directly with the local people:

It was interesting how they went about it, because for the first time on a large scale an army was deciding that the way forward wasn't tallest out, shortest to the left, single rank advance, but to go and make contact with the indigenous people, things that they hadn't done before and it narrows it down to two factors that were used with great success, and continue to this day is trust and information. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)

The quote has been used previously but used again to emphasise this point when working with people: trust. However, it can be seen that developing this strategy changed making the troops get out and gather intelligence, which also seems to have been linked very much to the 'hearts and minds' direction that was being promoted. A point brought out by the next comment by MALA-M-2:

The idea in Malaya was obviously involved with the indigenous people who simply wanted change of government. Communism as opposed to democracy and they found that when they first went there, they merely through a battalion into an area, put them in a nice barracks but they never left the road. Especially when this hearts and minds business came about, they tried two methods, one was to put the existing plantation groups of villages into compounds and secondly was to go and come face to face with the people who lived off the beaten track you might say. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)

A significant aspect connected with intelligence was the issue of verification, especially of killed insurgents. If the overall picture was to be corroborated then identification had to take place, which could be by finger prints, if they had them on file or by sight. Bringing a dead body back through the jungle was not a task many would relish therefore, "the wonderful Dayak habit of cutting heads off was a lot easier than carrying a 10 stone man" was a viable alternative (MALA-M-2; 10/03/20112).

Cutting off heads was standard practice to facilitate identification of known CT's (Durkin, 2011, p. 77). The intelligence gathered by the forces in the field was processed too, as this built up the picture further for the Special Branch analysts. The inter-related relationships are brought out in the next response:

We had a local Malaya interpreter with us and of course Iban trackers, they were very good....Intelligence was passed to us and our officer passed back what we gathered. We did not much work with the police on our patrols, but other squads did. (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012)

The main objective of intelligence was to find and destroy the enemy. In order to achieve this, the information had to be checked to ensure that it was valid, as has been pointed out, it could well be a trap:

Information went through the system and eventually came back to us. So that we would get to know that a particular Kam Fong had been fortified but there were movements and so forth and on the basis of that information we would then go and have a look see and on the basis of the look see we would mount an operation if it was advantageous. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

Aircraft played an important role in this verification process, “Canberra’s were used extensively for photo reconnaissance” according to MALA-M-1. They were also used for re-supplying the troops in the jungle so that they could remain there for far longer periods. Dakotas were also used extensively for deploying troops, evacuating casualties and resupply (Jackson, 2008, p. 44). The problem of clearing the emphasised by MALA-M-7:

If we were given an old zone then we could get supplies dropped by Dakotas, if not then we had to cut an area so they could drop them to us Not that that was easy either, as you had to have clearing where they could drop them or else you would never find anything in that jungle.(MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012.)

### **5.11 Special Branch**

“The intelligence system which the Special Branch created in 1952 basically won the war, and some of the methods and operations used still remain on the classified list”(Miller, 1972, p. 90). A statement that sums up the importance of their role, but fails to recognise how inept they had been before they were given the tools by General Templer to accomplish this success story. Formed out of the discredited Malayan Secret Service in 1948, but as part of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), it was not given the resources or the authority to act until 1952; four years after the declaration of the Emergency (Sinclair, 2011) Although its shortcomings had been recognised by Briggs, who called it inadequate with few capabilities to deal with the situation, he was only able to make limited changes drastically needed.

The Commissioner of Police, Gray, was a stumbling block until Templer arrived and decreed the changes required. As a former Director of Military intelligence he understood the essentiality of intelligence in the grand strategy of fighting an insurgency; although he

ensured that the military intelligence officers worked with, and not separately from Special Branch (Miller, 1972, pp. 91-92). Bringing in expertise from MI5, in the form of Percy Sillitoe, to assist in the re-organisation was an important factor in the creation of a unit that subsequently worked effectively. Sillitoe would also be brought into Kenya to re-organise their Special Branch too (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 197-198).

Another key improvement, was the formation of training school tasked to teach the requirements of intelligence gathering and dissemination. The inclusion of Asian officers was critical to the eventual success of Special Branch, as it was they who could infiltrate and deal with their compatriots, not the Europeans. Understanding the operational structure of the CT's was crucial to their capabilities, if they were to provide the information related to "local units, their leaders, the supply and exchange points, the sites of 'letter-boxes' and of food and ammunition dumps, and the identities of Min Yuen contacts and their sources of supplies and funds" (Miller, 1972, p. 94) to nullify them.

#### **5.11.1 Surrendered Enemy Personnel**

Key to the intelligence campaign was the ability to utilise every communist guerrilla that was captured or surrendered, therefore each Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP's) was considered as a very prized asset (Pye, 1956, pp. 115-127). The financial incentives and inducements used to facilitate this were very successful. "All surrendered and captured guerrillas were thoroughly debriefed and, in some cases, employed on jungle operations against their erstwhile comrades as part of Special Operations Volunteer Force (SOVF) (Comber, 2008, p. 4). Special Branch not only used this information to great effect but also became very adept at 'turning' the insurgents and using them for what were called 'Q' operations, or pseudo operations (Bailey, 2010; Short, 1975, pp. 490-491). The name 'Q' comes from the First World War when decoy ships were used to trap German U-Boats and was the code name for Queenstown in Ireland, where they were built. The designation referred to special operations and was used in other conflicts, notably Rhodesia, to describe secret operations (Beyer, 1999, p. xix).

Considered to be a speciality of the Special Branch (SB) was the ability to 'turn' Min Yuen to work for them against the erstwhile comrades. Based upon a number of techniques, but usually consisted in presenting them with the evidence of their activities obtained by other informers and surveillance. SB was then able to convince them that changing sides would allow them to avoid harsh punishment that awaited them if they did not agree to work for them. When this offer was coupled with large monetary rewards the process was

accomplished relatively easily. Well rewarded for each terrorist captured, surrendered or killed, based upon their information, they were even offered the opportunity of a new life elsewhere (Miller, 1972, p. 95).

Turned insurgents divulged information on the whereabouts of their comrades and in many cases lead the Special Branch Chinese officers back to their recent hide-out. In some instances the SB officers would impersonate the enemy and infiltrate their groups. A tactic developed in Kenya called pseudo operations, that had been running with great effect in the Kenya Emergency (Kitson, 1977, pp. 30-41). It was critical that the insurgent was turned immediately before his operational value diminished or it became known that he had defected and his fellows scattered (Miller, 1972, pp. 96-97).

### **5.11.2 Running an Operation**

Developing an operation was a complex and highly coordinated affair requiring much planning before it could take place: weeks months or even years. It was this detailed planning that was crucial to the success or failure of these operations. Normally divided into three phases, the primary phase required extensive ground work to build up a picture of the targeted CT group. Using all its resources, especially informers and turned agents, the plan was developed. Phase two, involved the security forces to surround and cordon the village or villages targeted. No one was allowed out without being searched to ensure that no food was being smuggled out. Food deprivation was at the core of the strategic planning to cow the CT's into submission, forcing them to take chances to get it and therefore was taken very seriously (Miller, 1972, pp. 99-100) . MALA-P-3 explains how they conducted searches:

So you would put your men on either side of those gates, two of them on each side of the gates, and you'd search everyone who came through. They couldn't take anything out that would, aid the bandit. No medicine or bandages. All tins were punctured, and little did we know that in the bottom of their buckets of the night soil there were tins of rice. So who's going to put their arm down inside that mess and hike out a tin of rice? And that was the only way they could get food past us, in those...pails [of night soil] and that was one of the crucial things that broke the back of the bandits. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)

MALA-P-3 continued:

And we used to set ambushes for the tappers taking food into the jungle.... Oh yes, you couldn't take any food out to work with you at all. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)

The objective was to squeeze the insurgents out of their hiding places as they became more and more desperate to obtain food. Ambushes were set around the potential food areas and as can be seen by the comments made by MALA-P-3, this was a serious, and when asked

what would happen to them he replied “Well I took them back to, well I, yes, took them back to the police station, the nearest one to us and then they’d be charged. And then they’d be either fined or put in prison.”

Phase three required using turned rubber tappers. Special Branch would set up ambushes where they suddenly relaxed the food controls and let it slip out that food was available-honey traps- hungry CT’s came for the food and fell into the ambush. As they eliminated or captured more and more CT’s the ‘hot’ intelligence increased and allowed a full scale assault to be made against those left in the jungle, this was the last phase of the operation. It was essential that close cooperation took place between Special Branch, the police and the military at all stages to ensure success (Miller, 1972, p. 101) .The importance of restricting food is highlighted by the next conversation:

Food control was ever important...As the Briggs plan started to have effect the Min Yuen found it difficult to obtain supplies from the rural population for their comrades in the jungle. The Communist armed units began to look more and more to the jungle to provide their food; either by cultivating their own crops or persuading the aboriginal jungle communities to supply them. To stop the CTs getting food from the tribe’s people, in early 1954, the Federal Govt. passed the Aboriginal Peoples Act. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)

Supporting the food control programme was the strict enforcement of the use of Identification Documents (ID), as MALA-J- 6 indicated:

The creation of ID documents was really important. This stopped the CT’s from getting into town to get supplies. They hated it. There were checks everywhere. The British could do what they like as they were in charge, people may not have liked it but they had to accept it. (MALA-J- 6; 18/03/2011)

## **5.12 Specialised and Elite Units**

The military command recognised that operating in large numbers was counterproductive. A large concentration of troops was noisy in the jungle and easily avoided by the insurgents. The chances of engaging a similar number of enemy forces was not the strategy matched by the Communists, who were fighting according to the rules laid out by Mao Tse Tung for guerrilla warfare (Mao Tse-tung, 1954, 1961). Realisation by the hierarchy was slow, but after several fruitless large scale deployments, with nil results the support for smaller specialised units started to take place. Units such as had been used earlier in the campaign, like the “Ferret Force’ started to gain wider acceptance (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 52; Jardine, 2012, p. 643). Operating in the jungle was not an easy task as explained by MALA-M-7:



We had to walk in carrying our supplies for a week, plus ammo and such like, which was bloody tough in those conditions. Later they started dropping supplies by Dakotas. Not that that was easy either, as you had to have clearing where they could drop them or else you would never find anything in that jungle. (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2011)

The use of indigenous trackers: Ibans from Sawark or Dyaks from Indonesia or the Malayan aboriginals ‘Orang Asli’, who were courted through the “hearts and minds campaign” (Ghows, 2006, pp. 184, 212), improved the ability of the military forces to operate more effectively in the jungle environment. “We had Ibans with us, and an interpreter. Not that we found many terrorists, other units had better luck but it was not easy” (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2011)

Not only were Ibans and Dyaks used as trackers but some of the indigenous tribes were formed into their own unit in 1954 under the command of the police, called the ‘Senoi Praaq’, who operated in the deep jungle areas (Ghows, 2006, p. 239). In addition the Police Field Force manned the jungle forts; up to 3,000 of them in the aboriginal areas (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 43). The racism of the Chinese insurgents deprived them of valuable support from the local tribes people whom they seemed to despise.

### **5.12.1 Home Guard**

The concept of using a Home Guard was not a new one to British operations it had been used in Palestine with limited success (Corum, 2006; Hughes & Tripodi, 2009, p. 11). In Malaya they had a force of around 40,000 on duty at any one time (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 44) with a total strength of around 250,000 (Thompson, 1966, p. 48). They came under the control of the police. Village police posts would typically have ten to twelve men, normally Malays, although a large number of Chinese were recruited as the conflict progressed according to MALA-J-6:

Special Constables were set up. They asked for volunteers from the Malays at first. These formed the Home Guard. It was to give a sense of belonging to make sure people understood it was their country they were defending. It was not being defended by the British; no it was the Malays and later the Indians that joined up too that formed the Home Guard. Control of the minds was what the British tried to achieve. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)

A point confirmed by MALA-M-1:

Malay troops were used mainly for key point defence, static defence, rather than patrolling in the jungle. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

Nonetheless, in some areas the posts may not have worked as well as could be expected as pointed out by MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011 when asked if they worked alone:

Not really because people have got to be supervised, I'm sure that there were plenty of villages where the communal guard were fine, fine outstanding members of the community, who would protect the community for no other reason than they felt that was their duty to protect their fellow villagers but there were certainly instances of people using it to their own ends because that is human nature. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)

### **5.12.2 Malayan Scouts-SAS**

The Special Air Service (SAS) was given a new lease of life after almost being disbanded at the end of World War Two. They were reborn under the name Malayan Scouts SAS, commanded by Calvert, who took part in the setting up of the new unit for deep jungle penetration (Jones, 2010, pp. 137-156). The SAS replaced 'Ferret Force', which had been developed early in the campaign but had been disbanded; as it was seen to be too unorthodox, mainly as it was basically a police unit (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b; note 33). The army sought to control military operations in the early days of the campaign and only succumbed to a greater role to be played by other forces as the realisation occurred they did not have the knowhow or man power to do it all themselves (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 74).

For the purposes of this research a series of key elements emerged. One, that the main body of the SAS was made up of Rhodesian soldiers as they were considered to be 'jungle ready' and would not need intensive training (Durkin, 2011, p. 36). From this recruitment two individuals would return to Rhodesia and have a major impact on the 'Bush War' there: Colonel Peter Walls who went on to become overall commander of the Rhodesian army and Ron Reid-Daly who would asked to set up the Selous Scouts (Reid-Daly, 1982; Reid-Daly, 1999). Two, these men would take notable lessons from this conflict transferring them to their own country; the use of Pseudo gangs and the use of strike units to penetrate deep into enemy territory. The New Zealanders sent a squadron of reserve SAS to Malaya in 1955 following the deployment of an infantry battalion (2RAR) from Australia (Dennis & Grey, 1966); leading to the creation of the Australian SAS in 1957 based upon the effectiveness of the parent unit in Malaya (Edwards & Pemberton, 1992, p. 178; Horner, 1989, pp. 30-31)

### **5.12.3 Tracker Units**

The expertise the SAS and other jungle penetration units learnt from the indigenous tribes who were used as tracker units to find the CT's. The Ibans and Dyaks "were expert trackers and had been, until recently, head-hunters" (Jones, 2010, p. 140). Because of their intricate knowledge of the jungle, they taught the security forces valuable lessons (Jackson, 2009, p. 66). Important intelligence was gained as trust developed between the two. Tracker units were to be also used in both Kenya and Rhodesia with great effect. The Rhodesian

African Rifles were also deployed in Malaya and their men made excellent trackers (Reid-Daly, 1999).

The other tracking technique used in Malaya was the use of dogs (Oldfield, 1953, pp. 107-108). The jungle was to prove to be a very difficult terrain for them to work in as there are so many smells and spoor to disorientate the dog when following a trail. MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011, put forward the following “there are two basic methods of tracking as you know, one is the obviously a visual scout and the second is the dog team. Both have their drawbacks and both have their limitations.” Although MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012, pointed out another problem, “we did use dogs but they did not seem to do too well when it was wet, much better with trackers. Of course with the dogs we had to carry their food as well as ours, but they made a change to have around.” A further problem was highlighted too:

when we took the dogs out and we were flogging away and this dog said to itself, “I’ve had enough” and then turned around to his handler and said “I’m not going any further so we carried the dog for 3 days, have you tried carrying a Labrador?[laughs]. (MALA-M-2; 10/03/2011)

The Ghurkhas because of their capabilities must be counted amongst the specialised units. They were considered an extremely effective fighting unit in the jungle and seemed to be able to adapt far quicker than most other Commonwealth troops brought in to support the police. MALA-M-7 remembers that he:

Worked a lot with the Ghurkhas who were very good troops in the jungle, that is for sure. They were so tenacious, much more than us and did not seem to mind how hard it was to live in the jungle. (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012)

### **5.13 Propaganda**

Propaganda became highly developed during this campaign with both sides vying to gain influence over the population in general (Ramakrishna, 2002b). The Government went to great lengths to prevent the CT’s from producing any as explained in this comment:

The Bandits had printing presses which were smuggled into the jungle. They knew they had to get their message out to the people if they were ever to have any success. Anybody found without an official printing press was arrested. Propaganda was important to both sides but the Government tried to ensure that the Communists could not produce any. That is why the printing presses were strictly controlled. Controlling the news was important. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)

From a Government perspective it was important to try and counter the ideas that Communists were portraying. It was important to convince the public that it was the

government that was wining the counter-insurgency. Propaganda is directed at dislocation of the enemy's physiological and physical balance.

The Government tried to get their version to the CT's using leaflet drops from aircraft and voice broadcasts, also, generally, from the air, leaflets. There were always dropping stuff to them, telling them how to surrender, why they should surrender, telling them about the good life they would get, including monetary rewards for weapons surrendered. (MALA-J-6; 18/03/2011)

#### **5.14 Colonial Administration**

According to Thompson (1966), "there are three main forces which influence the people of a country: nationalism and national policies, religion and customs, material well-being and progress" (p. 64). The machinery of government, it is what the people see and conceive; therefore it must represent their ideals and aspirations if it is to gain their support. Support will based on the ability to deliver on promises encompassing rule of law, construction of infrastructure and an efficient administration (Thompson, 1966, p. 66). Creating the effective link through local councils to the people becomes central to the overall plan, if it is to succeed, plus ensuring the economic support of forthcoming too. The appointments of suitably adept and competent provincial civil servants capable of administering the region are crucial to the counter-insurgency efforts.

The administration is therefore concerned with civic well being, ensuring that services reach the population. The creation of 'New Villages' had to be scrutinised to see that corruption did not stifle the objectives of the Plan, and fail to deliver. The Civil Service was equally as important as the army, the police and the judiciary. The overall coordination of the counter-insurgency came under the National War Council. It was this combined structure that made such a difference in Malaya (Thompson, 1966, pp. 70-79).

#### **5.15 Religion, Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths**

The Chinese people follow what is can be called their own religious practices 'Chinese religion'. Compared to Christianity and Islam, Chinese Religion worshipers are more concerned with material welfare than life after death. Funeral rites are performed not only for the deceased but also for the prosperity and general welfare of the living. "This is not a case of man serving the supernatural as much as it is of the supernatural serving man.... When Chinese worshipers give offerings to deities, they expect them to reciprocate by protecting them and fulfilling their requests"(Tan, 1983, p. 242).

The understanding that bad *fung sui* can be caused by any number of wrongful acts underpins the way of life for the Chinese, the supernatural is a constant and needs to be addressed continually. Conversely, there has been very little of consequence written by other historians of the role that Islam played in the conflict. The Malays were Muslims, whereas the Chinese were not, this must have been another factor that estranged the two ethnic groups. Communism was a secular, even an anti religious ideology according to Karl Marx (1969/1848), which was completely at odds with that of Islam. MALA-J-6 articulates this further:

The Malays did not support Communism as it went against their religion, they were Muslims. Communism was against Muslims. The CT's were very brutal and this turned the people against them. This made it easy for the British to show how violent the bandits were. The CT's were their own worst enemies as they turned people against them. (MALA –J-6; 18/03/2011)

### **5.16 A Counter-Insurgency Plan**

The Malayan Emergency highlighted the need to have an over-arching plan that could be understood by all those involved. The initial failings demonstrated that fighting a counter-insurgency in a piece meal fashion was counter-productive. There were too many vested interests pulling in separate directions. Once this changed and a comprehensive 'Plan' was put into practice this changed. It could be argued that this was the fault with the Vietnam conflict, a lack of a comprehensive acceptable plan (Busch, 2002).

It was not until Lt-General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed Director of Operations in 1950 did any structure become apparent to produce an overall plan. The Plan became known as the *Briggs Plan* (1950). Briggs sought to cut off the supplies to the insurgents by a series of measures, one of which was building new villages to keep the inhabitants away from being intimidated or supporting the rebels (Hack, 2009, pp. 387-388).

The overall plan was a summary of the strategy used to accomplish stability based upon three key factors: control, morale and supply (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011b, p. 76). Each of these factors contributes to a sense of well being, which is reflected in support for the main objective of the government; a return to a stable, viable and confident country, free from fear and repression. If the government is to succeed, means it must demonstrate it can win (Thompson, 1966, p. 69).

### 5.17 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency

It has been recognised during the literature review process that the French were facing similar insurgencies in their colonies. They too failed to apply many of the lessons they had learnt during their own previous campaigns, in much the same way as the British had done. Nonetheless, as has been discussed in Chapter Two, the French authors Galula (1964/2006) and Trinquier (Trinquier, 1964), produced a series of conceptual frameworks required to conduct a successful campaign and these provide a useful outline for assessment of the Malayan Emergency.

Galula (1964/2006) , lays out the framework for conducting a counter-insurgency operation and lists four laws, sub-divided into seven principles, which align with the objectives of the research questions used for this study. All four laws indicate how important the population is to the whole effort:

- The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.
- Support is gained through an active minority.
- Support from the population is conditional.
- Intensity of Efforts and vastness of means are essential (Galula, 1964/2006, pp. 52-55).

Unfortunately, for the British this took some time and only occurred once the Briggs Plan was put into operation, coupled with the arrival of General Templer who galvanised the actions against the MLCP. It is evident that both Briggs and Templer recognised the importance of the population and ensured that this remained the primary focus of all actions to counter act the Communists. The principles drawn for the laws laid out will now be assessed in relation to the Malayan conflict.

Galula's (1964/2006) first law indicating that the support of the population is as necessary for both sides, was one that was certainly taking place in Malaya . The Briggs plan sought to ensure that the population not only took an active part in their own defence, thus adhering to the second law proposed by Galula, but also devised a vast strategy to keep the CT's away from their sources of sustenance; both physical and ideological. The construction of 'New Villages', which housed over half a million Chinese keeping them safe and secure from intimidation as well as proving them with welfare services, was fundamental to this approach (Ucko, 2010, p. 16). Coupling this with controlling only areas of territory that could be well defended and not lost back to the insurgents was also essential; so as not to lose the support of the population once they had supported the Government side. Improved

administration, economic management and education were further tools to aid this process (Rid, 2010, p. 750).

Table 5.3 has extracted the main elements as proposed by the French theorist and then indicates how this was applied in the Malayan Emergency. The first element *quadrillage*, which involved having the whole operational area divided into sections, was used with difficulty in Malaya. The jungle terrain made it almost impossible to search every sector entirely, therefore the second element, *ratissage* or search, was difficult to perform effectively. However, *regroupment* or gathering together, formed the backbone of the Briggs Plan and that was placing as many of the population into new villages as possible. Additionally, the *tache d'huile* principle of gradually enlarging the areas under government control outwards, from the well defended and secured area first. A series of colours were used to denote the change in status from black to grey and finally white, was used with great success.

**Table 5.3 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Malaya**

| Aspect   | How applied in Malaya  |
|--|--|
| <i>Quadrillage</i> : (over-laying an administrative grid on the map to control defined areas of population and territory). | The country was divided into tactical areas, although the jungle proved to be difficult  |
| <i>Ratissage</i> : (cordoning, raking or sweeping /clearing the area systematically)                                       | Undertaken when it was known that insurgents were operating in known area.               |
| <i>Regroupement</i> : bring together in one area   | Protected Villages implemented successfully  |
| ' <i>Tache d'huile</i> ': or 'oil spot' strategy, spreading influence from cleared area                                    | Used across Malaya with areas moving from black to grey to white as they became secured. |
| <i>Recruitment</i> : use of local leaders and use of native forces   | The Home Guard used very successfully  |
| Paramilitary organization and militias   | Trackers with a large recruitment of Malays into the forces, Pseudo Gangs used           |

(Adapted from Alexander & Keiger, 2002; Gougeon, 2005)

## 5.18 Summary

The important elements that have been identified by the findings have been condensed and placed into the Table.5.4.

**Table 5.4 Summary of elements from findings**

| Element                  | Malaya                                   |
|--------------------------|--|
| Administration           | Part of combined strategy                |
| Aircraft                 | Bombing used but halted                  |
| Communications           | Improved/ telephones targeted            |
| Dogs                     | Limited use by army/ not by police       |
| Emergency Powers         | Issued in 1948/draconian                 |
| Food Control             | Yes, harsh/strict imposition             |
| French Lessons           | Oil spot used and pop control            |
| Ground Coverage          | No, very limited intelligence gathering  |
| Hearts And Minds         | Developed successfully                   |
| Helicopters              | Early development/ effective/ jungle     |
| Home Guard               | Vital part of overall strategy           |
| Indigenous Forces        | Used in police/ army/home guard          |
| Insurgents               | Predominately Chinese communist          |
| Intimidation             | Wide and extensive                       |
| Intelligence             | Became very effective/monetary bribes    |
| Language                 | Major problem/ little Chinese speakers   |
| Legislation              | Extensive and draconian                  |
| Martial Law              | Never imposed/ emergency powers          |
| Mechanisms               | Over-arching supremo                     |
| Mounted Units            | Not used but Mules for transport were    |
| Notable Actors           | Templer/Briggs/Catling/Young             |
| Plan                     | Briggs Plan/ an overall blue print       |
| Problems                 | Poor intelligence at start/language poor |
| Oaths And Sorcery        | Chinese religion and Triad control       |
| Organisation             | Poor at first then highly successful     |
| Police                   | Poor at first then highly successful     |
| Population               | Part of overall strategy                 |
| Propaganda               | Comprehensive/effective                  |
| Pseudo Gangs             | Limited/ used near the end of conflict   |
| Psychological Operations | Very successful/comprehensive            |
| Public Works             | Used extensively to support Plan         |
| Reasons For Conflict     | Communism/Colonialism/identity           |
| Restricted Areas         | Security areas/ enforced                 |
| Roads                    | Used to infiltrate the jungle            |
| Special Branch           | Poor at first then highly successful     |
| Special Units            | SAS, Jungle squads, Ghurkhas             |
| Spotter Planes           | Used but not effective without infrared  |
| Strategy                 | Developed through central Plan           |
| Structure Of Forces      | Colonial forces with British army units  |
| Subversion               | Wide and extensive                       |
| Tactics                  | Progressively developed/ effective       |
| Villages                 | Developed successfully/ Briggs Plan      |



The table assists in visualising the wide and complex nature of rudiments that need to be considered when prosecuting a counter-insurgency. Each case study will have a similar table compiled in order to conduct a comparative analysis and an interpretation in chapter 8. As a consequence no further explanation will be performed at this point.

Particular regard has been given to developments of strategies, methods and tactics used to counter the Chinese Communist insurgents. Initial failures by the Colonial authorities in Malaya, required a substantial re-evaluation of capabilities linked to objectives. Eventually, this led to the development of a sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy encompassing a multi-dimensional approach. A unified command structure, coupled with the dynamic leadership provided by General Templar, was the formula necessary before the tide was turned and the authorities started to make inroads into defeating the insurgency. The 'Briggs Plan', provided the blue-print which set out the objectives, which emphasised persuasion, or 'winning hearts and minds' through using less blunt force and more political concessions, increasing the social provisions thereby gaining the support of the population. The Plan also set out to divide the insurgents from their support base and deprive them of resources. The creation of 'New Villages' ensured the protection of the population, as well as providing them with a stake in the country.

### **5.19 Significant and Influential Actors**

The research process has noted a number of personalities that have taken part in more than one theatre of operations connected with this study. Accordingly the transfer of tactics, expertise and strategy would have been part of this process. Therefore, it has been considered important to highlight these people together with the conflicts and influences they brought to bear on the development of operational counter-insurgency doctrine. Palestine has been incorporated into this assessment, as it had a significant influence on the campaigns in both Malay and Kenya and therefore by association Rhodesia. The involvement of Commonwealth troops in Malaya meant expertise was imported back to both Kenya and Rhodesia, as both countries sent troops to the Emergency.

A matrix is presented in the appendix, which highlights the significant Actors involved and their linkages to other conflicts. (See appendix B).

### **5.20 Conclusion**

The use of Malaya as a starting point to assess the next two counter-insurgencies has been important: many significant developments took place that went on to characterise the

way in which other conflicts have been prosecuted. However, applying a single template to any other conflict will undoubtedly be problematic, as no two conflicts are the same. Nonetheless, the etymology for counter-insurgency doctrine was certainly formalised in this campaign, incorporating: political, social, economic, administrative, military, psychological, civil and the intelligence capabilities into a combined approach, rather than a diverse one.

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Legislation was used in support of the counter-insurgency objectives of the Plan and the military brought in as an aid to civil power. The ability of the Colonial Government to enact legislation was substantial advantage as the police and the military were then acting lawfully in support of the legitimate authority. The rule of law was thus used as a tool to achieve the desired aim of over-powering the insurgents (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 16)

Furthermore, the British army had to undergo a series of mind changes moving away from the idea that they would be able to engage the enemy in an all out confrontation whereby superior numbers and fire power would overwhelm them. The jungle ensured limited the ability to use large forces making it necessary to reduce the large scale numbers down to effective fighting units that matched the enemy in ability to survive in the jungle. The development of highly specialised units, most notably the SAS, coupled with local indigenous forces was one of the features of this campaign. Helicopters capable of re-supply and evacuation also turned the tide in favour of the British, together with improvements in radio communications and the building of roads.

A wholesale restructuring of the police, especially Special Branch, was the vital change needed to overcome the insurgents. Additionally, the large scale recruitment of indigenous forces, including the creation of a 'Home Guard' was instrumental in gaining the upper hand and overcoming the severe deficiencies over manpower and expertise. The increased degree of local knowledge, customs and language made a significant difference.

In addition, a change in the mind set was needed for security forces to become effective 'learning organisations' (Hack, 2009, p. 392). Resources for major offensives were not available, it was now necessary to harness multiple assets to accomplish the task in hand. The 'end of empire' had impoverished the military supremacy that had enabled Britain to control her colonies and possessions in the past (Brendon, 2007; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a; Kiernan, 1998; Lapping, 1985).

On the political side, the formalisation of the concept of 'hearts and minds' certainly occurred in Malaya; allowing the authorities to garner support for their thrust to counter Communism in Malaya. However, limited evidence from these findings indicates that it was not a commonly understood concept at the lower echelons of the security forces. They did what they were told to do, but they were not privy to the overall concept and dealt with the difficulties of being in the field in the best way that they could. If they were able to extend a few benefits and sweeteners to the general public then all well and good, but this was probably no more than they would have done anyway. In addition, the administration has to function effectively and implement the civil and social programmes to ensure the continued support of the population for the Government. As has been argued, it is the population that are key to a successful outcome of a counter-insurgency effort.

The next chapter will present the findings taken from the Emergency in Kenya aligning them in similar fashion to the themes already identified. By maintaining a comparable structure to that used in this chapter, it is hoped this will allow for greater comparison to assist in indentifying trends in the way in which the conflicts were conducted.

# **Chapter 6**

## **THE KENYAN EMERGENCY 1952-1960: A CASE STUDY**

### **6.1 Introduction**

The second case study deals with the ‘Emergency’ in Kenya, declared in 1952, four years after that of Malaya. Consequently the evolution of counter-insurgency doctrine and strategy can be traced by assessing this conflict. Changing world events, together with ideological competition during the Cold War and the demand from African colonies for decolonisation make this an important conflict to study from a historical and counter-insurgency perspective. An overview of the conflict is presented first, using supporting literature to position this case study.

The ‘Emergency’ in Kenya has not been as well documented as the Malayan Emergency, although recently there have been a number of contradictory claims being made as to how this conflict was prosecuted. Notable amongst the detractors are Elkins and Anderson (Anderson, 2005; Elkins, 2005a, 2005b). Nonetheless, the main crux of this research relates to countering-the-insurgency by assessing what took place that was effective; rather than an analysis of the whole Emergency. Accordingly, core aspects have been identified from the findings in support of the themes identified in the Literature Review and placed under subheadings; maintaining uniformity with all three case studies. Furthermore, the review identified the low level of research dealing with counter-insurgency from the police perspective. In an effort to remedy this deficiency, it was seen as important to interview former Kenyan policemen to gain a greater understanding as to what took place based upon their experiences.

### **6.2 Thematic Approach**

The themes used in the previous case study have formed the basis of the structure for analysing this case study. To this end, the findings are presented using the same coding already developed from the themes and applied to responses of the participants. Any free codes developed from additional themes from the respondents have been clustered under the established parent nodes to ensure they remain consistent with aims and objectives of the whole study. To this end, fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted, transcribed

and then coded. The coding was primarily based upon the themes already identified in Table 5.1.

### 6.3 Population and Sample

The target population for the main study was primarily those members of the security forces who had participated in the ‘Emergency ‘in Kenya. Criterion sampling was used to select the participants, as per the previous case study. As per the Malayan case study the participants remain anonymous. All those in this case study are designated as KENA short for Kenya, followed by a number to link this to their transcripts and a date for the interview. The status of the participants will be reflected by the designation such as P, for Police and M for Military, where appropriate. Thus KENA-P- 2 would be a Kenyan Policeman and be the second person interviewed. The interviews took place over a period of two years and were conducted in Australia, South Africa, Kenya, Malaysia, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom (UK). Table 6.1 sets out the participants, their designation and when they were interviewed.

**Table 6.1 Population sample details of participants in this case study**

| Participant | Age | Sex  | Interview  | Status         |
|-------------|-----|------|------------|----------------|
| KENA-P-1    | 80s | Male | 02/03/2010 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-2    | 80s | Male | 19/05/2010 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-3    | 80s | Male | 19/12/2010 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-4    | 80s | Male | 06/02/2011 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-5    | 80s | Male | 23/02/2011 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-6    | 80s | Male | 23/02/2011 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-7    | 80s | Male | 05/02/2011 | Police Officer |
| KENA-M-8    | 60s | Male | 08/02/2011 | Kenya Military |
| KENA-P-9    | 80s | Male | 08/08/2011 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-10   | 80s | Male | 04/04/2012 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-11   | 80s | Male | 15/04/2012 | Police Officer |
| KENA-S-12   | 80s | Male | 20/04/2012 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-13   | 80s | Male | 20/07/2012 | Police Officer |
| KENA-P-14   | 80s | Male | 15/07/2012 | Police Officer |

Fourteen semi-structured interviews took place with former officers of the Kenya Police. These interviews were then coded, according to the same themes identified by the literature review and these have then been used to develop the narrative for this case study. What follows is a presentation of the findings in relation to the themes, placing them into a contextual structure that can be subsequently analysed




Figure 6.1 Map of Kenya Colony 1952

(Gordon-Brown, 1954)

#### 6.4 Kenya: The Emergency 1952-1960

The ‘Emergency’ in Kenya, formally declared on the 20<sup>th</sup> October 1952, has its roots in the past and has to be assessed as part of the ‘winds of change’ that swept the continent of

Africa clamouring for decolonization (Brendon, 2007, p. 550). Although the rebels in Kenya were not aligned to any other external movement, such as Communism, nor did they receive any outside assistance either, the ideals of self government were a common thread in most African countries at this time. Furthermore, common ideals espoused by Communism were present amongst the Trade Union agitators, that were part of the reactionary movement that led the revolt (Agnew, 2001) Although no formal links to outside Communist movements have ever been substantiated (Corfield, 1959, p. 220). Figure 6.1 shows the position of Kenya as a Colony in 1952 and its borders, which were porous at that time and could have facilitated outside support had there ever been any.

Decolonisation was more than economic and political emancipation; it was an attempt at cultural renewal to reverse the social imperialism that accompanied colonisation. Central to this argument was the need for economic freedom, shedding the dominance of western interests and control (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 12). Therefore, the central grievances that underpinned the rebellion were land and freedom; this was to become the name they would call themselves: The Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), not Mau Mau as they would become known.

Furedi (1989) expounds the origins of the conflict back to the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the appropriation of land by the European settlers under the misapprehension that they were able to purchase and own this land (Berman, 1992, pp. 56-57). The tribe most affected by this was the Kikuyu, as they lived in the most arable lands high on the Rift Valley and the Highlands of Kenya. A contorted history of grievances accompanied the steady growth of the tribe; culminated in large numbers of Kikuyu without land they could call their own (Furedi, 1989, pp. 9-13). The revolutionary movement calling for the restoration of land produced the 'Land and Freedom' movement; under many guises since the early 1920s (Anderson, 2005, pp. 21-42). This movement morphed into what has become known as the 'Mau Mau' and was the violent manifestation of what became the insurgency: a full scale assault on the organs of power in an attempt to subvert the Colonial Government by force of arms.

The Mau Mau, as the insurgency has become known, has a contested origin (Berman, 1976; Kennedy, 1992; Lonsdale, 1990; Throup, 1987; Uskalis, 1997). At the offset this was not the name the military wing of the KLFA would call themselves, although the Mau Mau movement itself was banned by Ordinance as early as 1950 (Corfield, 1959, p. 56). Kariuki



(2004b) argues it was in fact the word *Uma Uma* ‘go go’ said as an anagram to hide its original meaning (p. 19). Nonetheless,

Mau Mau did become the name used by one and all, including the Kikuyu themselves who were involved in its activities. Leakey (2004/1954) describes the organisation as a pseudo religious one, set up to replace the imposition of Christianity upon the Kikuyu (p. 42).

A further definition has been offered over the contested meaning, that it was mistaken in the court proceedings to denote the organisation when used by a defendant, when in fact he had repeated the words ‘those’ twice, in his statement, “*Ndingikwira maundu mau mau nderirwo ndikoige ni kima*” meaning “I cannot tell you *those, those* things I was told not to tell you by the Movement (sic)” (Agnew, 2001, p. xiv). Although this may have been the first time it was reported in the press as a ‘movement’ called the Mau Mau, the word was in vogue prior to 1950; as it was used to in a letter to the Governor in 1949 commenting on:

An outbreak of violence against Europeans, involving murders on a large scale under the direction of a secret society in existence called the ‘Maw Maw’, (sic) whose influence in the tribe is rapidly growing and whose oaths, taken in the utmost secrecy, are binding on those who are compelled to take them (Corfield, 1959, p. 81).

Whatever derivations are correct, the word Mau Mau has come to represent the insurgents in this Emergency; even by Kenyans today (Newsinger, 1981, p. 168).

Similar to Malaya, the insurgency in Kenya was instigated by only a section of the population; in this case the main protagonists were the Kikuyu tribe, with some support from the Embu and Meru; offshoots of the Kikuyu (Scott & Turner, 1965, p. 127). Consequently, the region affected by conflict was limited to what were called the ‘White Highlands’ and areas around Nairobi. At its height it is estimated the hard core of the movement reached between 12,000 to 15,000; although varying numbers have been quoted (Edgerton, 1989, p. 73; Orrù, 1989, p. 349). However, as in Malaya with the Min Yuen supporters of the Communist Terrorists, there was a substantial support base amongst the Kikuyu tribe as a whole. The Mau Mau movement brought together disparate groups, such as the unemployed, the disposed squatters and the youth led by a political elite thirsting for greater power. (Newsinger, 1990, p. 63; Throup, 1987)

There is however a dichotomy in this portrayal, as a large number, including some of the older generation of the tribe, fought against the Mau Mau usurpers and became what were know as ‘Loyalists’; who fought on the side of the Government. To explain this paradox, the underlying theory of this research related to revolution must be invoked, as the Mau Mau was



also “directed against the Kikuyu establishment as well as against colonial rule, and to a limited extent had the character of a civil war”(Furedi, 1989, p. 6). It pitted the affluent against the deprived, “the Christian missions against the adherents of the independent churches. The old against the young”(Throup, 1987, p. 250).Therefore, to depict this conflict as solely the Kikuyu tribe against the European colonialists could be argued as too simplistic. It can however be described as a revolutionary movement that revolted against the status quo and the Colonial Government. The Mau Mau:

Was fundamentally a Kikuyu tribal subversive [organisation]...Mau Mau had virtually no connexion with Communism, but was developed by Kenyatta as an atavistic tribal rising against western civilization and technology and in particular against Government and the Europeans as symbols of progress. (Corfield, 1959, pp. 219-220)

The complex make up of those that joined the Mau Mau, either readily or were forced to join and take the ‘oaths’; became the hall mark of organisation and can only be touched upon in this case study. It has also been asserted that wide spread discontentment was influenced by the returning soldiers that had fought in Burma as soldiers in the Kings Africa Rifles (KAR) during the Second World War (Parsons, 2000). These men expected far more upon their return only to find unemployment and lack of opportunity. It is alleged many saw Mau Mau as a way of regaining status and acquiring spoils from their exploits (Atieno Odhiambo & Lonsdale, 2003, p. 53). The point was confirmed by KENA-P-2 when asked about the makeup of the Mau Mau:

One of the great moving forces, I would have thought, were the number of ex-military people who had served with the British forces in Burma and in North Africa, and when they came back to Kenya after the war, they found that there was literally no employment for them. And they thought that if they could do the same work as a British soldier, than they were entitled to have the same say in the legislative council as any other British or ex-British soldier that was living in Kenya. (KENA-P-2; 02/03/2010)

When asked if he thought they formed the backbone of the organisation “I think you could say that it was the backbone, a very small backbone, but definitely a backbone of people who had military experience”, which highlighted that the organisation was a mixture. KENA-P-2 highlights that many may have been opportunists, but had a grudge too:

I think when they came back, because they had no employment, they drifted into the suburbs of Nairobi itself, where they mixed up, because they had nothing else to do, where they got mixed up in criminal activities. And they found that criminal activities,

not only kept them occupied, but gave them a reasonable standard of living. (KENA-P-2; 02/03/2010).

KENA-P-5 made the comment that several Kikuyu were bitter about the promises they had been made by the British Government and not kept:

They were promised all sorts of monetary rewards or British government had quite a lot of land available, and then they would get farms and all this sort of stuff and about 1946/47, [they] said when is all this, when is it going to come? you know the British government let us down they used me and lots of other black men to do a lot of the dirty work, up in the north Africa and in Malaya and places like that, and they promised us all sorts of fancy things when we came out and you know nothing happened. (KENA-P-5; 23/02/2011)

The other important factor was the conflict between Christianity and the Mau Mau organisation. A large proportion of the Kikuyu identified themselves as Christians; as it closely resembled their own tribal beliefs (Mbiti, 1969). But others deeply opposed Christianity's demands for an end to female circumcision as being contrary to the old ways (Branch, 2009, p. 211; Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 11). KENA-P-7 endorsed this view "remember the Mau Mau were very anti Christian, of all denominations, and come to that anti Muslims too, but that didn't really enter into matter". In many ways the divisions proved to be fortuitous, as it allowed the Government to apply a divide and return to rule approach; just as they had done in Malaya between the Chinese and the Malays.

## **6.5 The Conflict Begins to Intensify**

Comparable to the Emergency in Malaya, in many ways, the Government in Kenya was unprepared for the escalation of killings and atrocities that caused such consternation amongst the settler population. The situation had been deteriorating for the previous five years prior to the invoking of the state of Emergency 1952. However, 1947 is the date claimed to be the "key year" (Throup, 1987, p. 248). The previous Governor, Mitchell had been loathed to invoke Emergency powers; as that would have meant a loss of face that he and his administration were unable to deal with the situation (Majdalany, 1962, p. 103). Following the death of a European woman settler on the 3rd of October and also chief Waruhiu wa Kungu, a prominent supporter of the Government, on the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 1952, there was a clamour for more action against the rebels (Elkins, 2005a, p. 32). Evelyn Baring, the new Governor declared a state of Emergency on the 20<sup>th</sup> of October, with a swift arrest of all those suspected of being the leaders of the movement; this was operation 'Jock Scott' (Clayton, 2006, p. 21; Edgerton, 1989, p. 67). KENA -P-2 was one of those that helped with

the arrests of those suspected, and disputes the figures given by Edgerton (1989, p. 67) and Maloba (1993, p. 77), where they cite 187 arrests were made by the 21 October :

I think 120 arrest dossiers were prepared with around 99 or so being arrested that night, with others to follow over the next few days. This was called operation 'Jock Scott' and was supposed to cut the head off the snake, but it did not, in fact it allowed the hot heads to take over running the shop and made it even more radical. Blidad Kaggia and Kenyatta were arrested though. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)

Kenyatta was always suspected and later tried as being the ring leader of the organisation. Many have argued that he was swept along by events and had little real control over the movement being more of puppet than the leader (Anderson, 2005, pp. 30-43; Lovatt-Smith, 2005, pp. 111-117; Majdalany, 1962, pp. 270-285; Maloba, 1993, pp. 71-76).

However, KENA-2-P goes on to dispute this interpretation and contends:

Well, there's no doubt in my mind that Jomo Kenyatta was the leading light. Although some people will refute that, but I was intimately involved in the jailing ultimately, of Kenyatta. I met him several times. He was always a gentleman. He had an English degree, and he had an English wife at one stage. There's no doubt in my mind that he was the boss. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)

A sentiment shared by KENA-P-7, when asked if he thought he was the leader:

initially he certainly was, he always denied it right through to the end but he was regarded rightly or wrongly as the apex of the system, regarded from below and he was unquestionably the leader in later years. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)

KENA-P-1 picks up the story with the declaration of a state of Emergency:

Having declared a State of Emergency the response to the uprising was swift and in many respects brutal by today's standards. Area's where the Mau Mau were thought to be hiding or had camps were declared 'Prohibited Area's. This meant that anyone found in them could be shot on sight. The areas were also bombed from the air. People living on the edges of such area's were moved from their land and re settled in 'Protected Villages' which were guarded by loyal Kikuyu who formed an African 'Home Guard' This was done in an effort to restrict food, firearms, ammunition and information concerning the movement of the Government security forces. Large numbers of Kikuyu were moved from the European settled areas back to their home villages in the Kikuyu reserve. Many more Kikuyu men were arrested and held in 'Detention Camps' pending a decision as to if they were implicated in Mau Mau. (KENA-P-1; 02/03/2010)

An explanation needs to be given as there appears to be a contradiction in this summary, whereby villages were being protected by Kikuyu forming the Home Guard on one hand and on the other large numbers of Kikuyu being detained as well. At first sight this appears incongruous, but it confirms that there was a major split within the Kikuyu tribe; with

a large number being counted as loyal and recruited to guard their tribe's people. The other section of the tribe was considered hostile and detained pending further evidence, usual accomplished through screening (Branch, 2009, pp. 82-83). According to KENA-P-1:

Screening teams of believed to be loyal Kikuyu, who had information concerning the members of Mau Mau gangs were used to screen the inmates and pick out those who they thought or knew had been members of gangs or were assisting the gangs in the forests. These screen teams were later joined by ex members of the Mau Mau gangs who had been 'Turned' by the Pseudo gangs and could easily recognize fellow terrorists. (KENA-P-1; 02/03/2010)

Core to the understanding of how this counter-insurgency was conducted is an understanding of the role played by the Home Guard, a force claimed to have reached 100,000 (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 42). The vanguard against the Mau Mau became the 'loyal' Kikuyu themselves, their own kith and kin; as this became a tribal war. Those that formed the Home Guard were the eventual winners; as they divided the spoils of war taken from the Mau Mau (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 41).

The Kikuyu is not one tribe it is a number of very closely related tribes, but there are family tribes in side of all of that were the relationship is even stronger right. And so what you have is a kind of combat between the closer relations and the peripheral relations and the ultimate peripheral relation is the tribe. And so you find that inter-tribal rivalry started sometimes they wear the Mau Mau hats and the other buggers wore home guard hats. (KENA-P-11; 15/04/2012)

It is important to understand that this was a complex conflict with an intra-tribal war going on at the same time; it was a war of the Kikuyu against the Kikuyu, according to KENA-P-11.

Nonetheless, it can be seen by the argot used to describe the Mau Mau that the police did not at first take them seriously. KENA-P-2 observed, "at first the so-called terrorist movement, in fact we never called them Mau Mau we called them Mickey Mouse. [However] we soon came to realise that, we were dealing with more than little local gangs". The term 'Mickey Mouse' would tend to indicate they thought it was a joke, but KENA-P-2 highlights how wrong they were when they thought they had managed to stifle the uprising:

We thought we'd lop of the head of Mau Mau by incarcerating that mob. But in fact we precipitated things, which quite surprised us. It then became very violent and very bloody almost straight away. And we thought they had no backup, no organization behind that 120 who we detain—dor we arranged to be detained. We wrote the dossiers. Our little branch wrote all the dossiers, and the Governor signed them. And we thought that would be the end of the matter, but it wasn't, it was the beginning. It became very brutal after that. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)


A tacit acknowledgement by KENA-P-2 that the authorities had not only underestimated the size of the rebellion, but also had failed to quell it with their actions either. It is also important to note the reaction of those not detained; they stuck back very violently against the public using atrocities that were promulgated by the international press. The notoriety of the conflict became front page news (Carruthers, 1995a, p. 128).

## **6.6 Counter-Insurgency**

Fortunately for the British, the Kikuyu were concentrated in a very defined area of Kenya, although this did include the capital city Nairobi. Furthermore, as the Mau Mau was almost wholly concentrated in a single tribe, intense efforts were made to ensure that other tribes did not rally to the support of the Kikuyu rebels. Figure 6.2 indicates the limited area within which there was Mau Mau activity as well as the defined area in relation to the rest of the Colony. The Kamba, Kalenjin, Nandi, Luo and Massai tribes had also been agitating over land issues as well. Much effort was made by the authorities at remedying their concerns to forestall any spill over from these tribes (Osborne, 2010, p. 61). The Nandi, together with the Kalenjin, formed the bulk of the KAR and therefore were important to the fight against the Mau Mau by African Kenyans (Hilbert, 1989, p. 95).

Retrospectively it is difficult to understand why it was so difficult to overcome a single tribe concentrated in such a defined area, as shown in Figure 6.2. However, this area was very mountainous, with Mount Kenya, the highest peak in Kenya and the second highest in Africa, plus it was very heavily forested and difficult to penetrate. In the early days of the 'Emergency' the Mau Mau were able to maximise their advantage and use these harsh conditions to their advantage, creating forest camps deep inside the forests. Estimated to have been around 15,000 rebels hiding in the forests by 1953; these camps were well constructed and had all the requirements, including workshops for making guns, storerooms for supplies and even vegetable patches and hospitals (Edgerton, 1989, pp. 112-113).

Eventually, this geographical advantage would become the downfall for the Mau Mau, as the Security Forces would eventually seal off access to the forests and in consequence the camps, creating 'Prohibited' and 'Restricted Areas, (see section 6.7.4 ), thus restricting food and supplies from reaching the insurgents. The Mau Mau would be forced to attempt to cross the containment lines in order to get access to food and supplies. Ambushes were set up around the forests ready for any such sorties. Attempts were also made to bomb the insurgents out of the forest into the ambushes, but this was found to be ineffective and subsequently discontinued.



**Figure 6.2 Main areas of Mau Mau activity**

(Lovatt-Smith, 2000, p. 8)

Kenya was unable to construct an overall suprema to coordinate civil, police and military power; such as Templer was doing in Malaya. General George Erskine was appointed Commander-in Chief East Africa in May 1953. He attempted to replicate Templer's position in Malaya, but this was denied by the British Government; as the situation was confined to a small area of the country and therefore not deemed necessary (Lovatt-Smith, 2005, p. 132). Consequently, in Kenya, it appears there was a very limited overarching structure capable of achieving the desired results. The arrival of General Erskine was however, considered the turning point, whereby the momentum changed and the Mau Mau were gradually forced back into more restricted areas such as the forests (Majdalany, 1962, pp. 148-153).

Operation 'Jock Scott' was the first concerted attempt at trying to seize the initiative by arresting what were considered the ring leaders; as soon as a State of Emergency had been

declared in October 1952 (Corfield, 1959, pp. 160-161). KENA-P-2, contended “we thought that would be the end of the matter, but it wasn't, it was the beginning” consequently it failed in its desired objectives but it did bring the insurgency to a head (Parker, 2009a, p. 142).

KENA-P-2 was a member of Special Branch (SB) team that arranged for the arrests, so he was in a very privileged position to know what did happen at the start.

The next important phase was Operation Anvil in January 1954, overseen by General Erskine. Anvil was considered by many to have been the major turning point in the Emergency (Anderson, 2005, pp. 200-206; Brendon, 2007, p. 564), others are not so sure and would only concede that it was important:

Well, it scattered those who weren't arrested and locked others up in detention camps which of course put them out of action, those who weren't arrested scattered into the four winds which reduced a lot of the Mau Mau supply routes, cash, and stolen weapons and ammunition and things like that, so by and large I think that probably was the turning point and difficult to say, it was such a long time ago. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

Anvil virtually locked down Nairobi, with over 20,000 troops deployed to seal off the city. Around 24,000 were arrested and sent to detention camps, “which destroyed much of the central Mau Mau organisation and dealt a crushing blow to the revolt” (Brendon, 2007, p. 564). According to Wachanga (1975) this operation more than any other hurt the organisation badly and forced it underground. The supplies from the cities to the forest rebels dwindled and intensive policing continued to arrest further supporters (p. 55).

## **6.7 Hearts and Minds**

One of the key components of this research was to investigate the role played by the policy that has become known as ‘hearts and minds’, trying to ascertain whether it was commonly understood as strategy and applied as such. ‘Hearts and minds’ as a model, was certainly developed during the Malayan Emergency, but whether this concept was transported to Kenya is more debatable. Difficulties arise when it is supposed that this was a universal approach to counter-insurgency at this time; the 1950s (Carruthers, 1995a, pp. 11-18). Most of the respondents profess not to have heard of the term when they were involved, and only seem to recognise it from modern literature. When asked “do you think the average European policeman had an idea that hearts and minds was part of what he should be doing?” replies varied, but were mostly consistent in the negative, “I think he had to get on with his job you know, which was hard enough at the best of times, there were murders, nasty murders going

on all the time all over the place.” KENA-P-7, when pressed further expressed it more in a form of reflection rather than an actual memory:

I think it had to be yes, I think it did, the only trouble was that there was so many political overtones, you know, that didn't always come up, take for example agriculture, a lot of things which the government proposed like land consolidation was not popular but when finally it was accepted, it was accepted in whole measure, and I think that was a good example of hearts and minds exercise, but it went through an awful lot of trouble to get there. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

Another respondent KENA-P- 6 answered when asked if he had heard of 'hearts and minds', "Yes of course one's heard that, very much so recently and, but I certainly never heard of that expression in Kenya". He then went on to add:

I think everyone's got to realise how many different tribes there were in Kenya, there were at least 40 different tribes with 40 different languages and we are really talking only about three tribes here, The Embu, Meru and the Kikuyu. Are we trying to win the Kikuyu hearts and minds, possibly they were but it certainly never ever occurred to me or anybody that was the case. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

A further indication from KENA-P-12 supporting this lack of knowledge concerning the term, "I never heard the phrase "hearts and minds" used." KENA-P-13 stated very much the same thing, "I was never involved or heard of a 'hearts and minds' campaign in those words" He did go on to expound that what he had been doing could be construed as such a policy, but that it was never called 'hearts and minds':

That's not to say we didn't practice it, as it was widely recognized as being necessary to encourage the local population to cooperate and side with us, which they did. I was involved in many sweeps and hundreds of searches. We did not bust our way in and break things unless a fugitive was known to be hiding in a hut. I don't remember over many years civilians ever being shot or beaten up, it wasn't necessary as they were docile and cooperative as well as frightened by authority and the sight of weapons. It was more often than not done with a lot of humour and joking, as we all spoke Swahili at some level or another. (KENA-P-13; 20/07/2012)

Effectively, he is describing his service as being more inclusive in its application, which could be construed as an intrinsic application of 'hearts and minds', rather than a direct application as if he had been ordered to do so.

## **6.8 Strategies**

Creating a series of effective strategies is the requirement of leadership. "Erskine had no power to direct the Kenya Regiment, the KPR, the police or the Kikuyu Home Guard in their approaches to COIN [sic]. According to the command structure, he only had limited



‘operational control’ over them” (Thornton, 2009, p. 220). However, Military and police action only form one arm of this required thrust according to the French theorists such as Galula (1964/2006) and Trinquier (1964); the other must be a civil-legal framework that harnessed the support of the population. More often than not these measures proved to be unpopular, but their aim was to coerce the inhabitants to a point whereby they accepted that the Government was improving their welfare and their security. To this end, the Emergency Regulations were brought in between January and April 1953.

These included provisions for communal punishment, curfews, the control of the individual and mass movements of people, the confiscation of property and land, the imposition of special taxes, the issuance of special documentation and passes, the censorship and banning of publications, the disbanding of all African political organisations, the control and disposition of labor (sic), the suspension of due process, and detention without trial. (Elkins, 2005b, p. 55)

“Detention without trial was a controversial, but widely practised by the Government” with between 76,000 and 80,000 detained; as it was reminiscent of concentration camps used by the British in the Boer War (Parker, 2009a, p. 174). Mass detention was aimed cutting the rebel forces off from their support base and preventing them from terrorising others; this was not the same as ‘villagisation’ or protected villages. The extended settlements were all brought together in to a fortified protected village. “By October 1955 more than a million people had been concentrated into 854 villages” (Orrù, 1989, p. 366). KENA-P-2 explains how this was done:

This was villagisation. The idea was to protect the villagers. When the villagers were in the reserve, scattered all over the place, one hut there, another hut there, they were very vulnerable to attack by Mau Mau. Now the Mau Mau had to capture the minds of their own people. The idea was to herd them together into villages where they would be protected and safe at night. By day they could go back to their plots and work their plots, but by night they were protected, they were in a palisade, they had look out posts, protected by Home Guard. That was the idea. (KENA-P-2; 09/05/2010)

Asked whether this was an idea that originated in Kenya, the reply from KENA-P-7 was:

I think it was borrowed from Malaysia, Templar’s ideas and the idea was to keep the Mau Mau out and to deprive them of food and support and in that it largely helped. It didn’t solve the whole problem because they still got a fair amount of support from people that weren’t in villages, if there were any and in the towns and they had free movement. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

The programme of villagisation was not without its problems; especially amongst a tribe that was already disgruntled by issues of land in the first place. It could easily have turned those that were supportive of the Government against them:

It wasn't popular certainly but that raises another story. Having been brought into villages they then had reasonable central medical attention, primary schools and things for the kids, and better administration and that led in turn to land consolidation program. It might have come from Malaya, I don't know. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

Herdng together disparate members of the tribe was certainly not popular, especially as their land was taken and property looted by the Kikuyu Home Guard; who were used to contain them in 850 fortified villages (Brendon, 2007, p. 564). Nonetheless, as has been argued by Bennett (2007), it may well have been unpopular but in the end it was central to effectiveness of the combined strategy and increased the amount of intelligence gained (pp. 147-148). It has been propounded by Berman (1992) that it became a valuable tool of the administration in the reconstruction of Kikuyu society around a stable consolidation of land , recognising individual land rights (pp. 366-367).

Conversely, Berman (1992) also argues that much of the land redistribution was brought about by the confiscation of land and property under the Emergency regulations as a means of rewarding those that had joined the Kikuyu Home Guard. Berman (1992) claims “the objective of official action was not only to reward the loyalist and punish the supports of the forest fighters, but also to demonstrate to the latter the positive material benefits of cooperating with the government” (p. 365).

Food control was the other important aspect behind villagisation; as has been stated by KENA-P7 earlier, “and to deprive them of food and support and in that it largely helped”. Restricting food forced the insurgents to leave the forests in much the same was as happened in Malaya, making them vulnerable.

A further deterrent was to dig a “great ditch, which extended for fifty miles” around large sections of the forest areas to prevent the Mau Mau from sneaking out to obtain food supplies. It was filled with “thousands of sharpened stakes and these were augmented by miles of barbed wire which had been bobby trapped. At half-mile intervals there were police posts and the half-mile between them was continuously patrolled” (Majdalany, 1962, p. 216). As with Malaya, one of the key strategies was to deprive the rebels of food and sustenance, by restricting their abilities to access supplies as KENA-P-9 “was just saying they were just being hunted and they just disappeared further and further into the forest and you can't live on next to nothing in the forest.”

A further strict measure was the control of weapons. Heavy fines were imposed on any settlers that lost their weapons or were careless. According to KENA-P-9 this restricted the ability of the Mau Mau to mount a serious threat:

Well, I think first of all they were not able to get any proper weapons to fight, obviously the forces managed to keep any weapons out of their reach, I think they did once attack a police station to try to get some weapons but from where I was they never had anything which was really useful and of course I would say most of the Africans were against them, you see when they were out there to recruit they almost forced Kikuyu to join them, but the other tribes they never joined them. (KENA-P-9; 08/08/2011)

The second point he makes here backs up the earlier review of the literature that states the rebellion was largely only amongst a single tribe “ the Mau Mau revolt was tribal” (Malinowski & Redfield, 2004/1948, p. xvii). The authorities went to great pains to ensure other tribes did not align themselves with the Kikuyu dissidents. The respondents all agreed that they did not see the Mau Mau insurrection as an organised national rebellion within the colony of Kenya, more of a sectarian uprising by a section of Kikuyu society. Furthermore, only a few members of other tribes such as Meru and Emburu ever joined the insurgents, so it could hardly be called a national rebellion in any sense of the word. (Respondents: KENA-P-1, KENA-P-2 and KENA-P-3).

I think, because a number of the Kikuyu decided that they were wasting their time with trying to obtain change by merely obtaining more political power and more seats in the legislative council, as it was then. And they felt that something else needed to be done. And they thought that, perhaps, this would be a form of putting pressure on the government, to enable them to obtain more seats in legislative council. (KENA-P-1; 02/03/2010)

The respondents clearly considered the Mau Mau to be an identifiable group based predominately on one tribe, the Kikuyu. They all seem to agree that this was not an organised rebellion in Kenya but was based upon grievances that many felt they had over the land rights issue. This interpretation agrees with the work of Furedi (1989) who considers the problems related to lack of available land for a growing population, together with the increases in taxation placed upon the Kikuyu, was at the heart of the insurrection (pp. 129-143).

### **6.8.1 British Army in Support of Civil Authority**

It was clear that the police were not prepared sufficiently to deal with the Emergency; they were ill-equipped and lacked the manpower required to carry out normal policing duties, protect the population and fight the insurgents (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 154-155). The Kings African Rifles (KAR) was mobilised numbering nearly 6000, including the Kenya Regiment,

which included 4,786 white settlers (Edgerton, 1989, p. 67; Sinclair, 2006, p. 159). A number of British army units were brought in to act in support of the civil power, but there were heavy demands on the British army from elsewhere in the world (Lovatt-Smith, 2005, p. 131). Consequently, the majority of the personnel were national servicemen:

The army never wanted to be there, the army did not like being aides to civil authority. And they told me in words of one syllable often enough that we don't like being here. The army were an embarrassment, the British Army. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)

KENA-P-2 went on to add a story about the problems the army caused even between themselves:

I think they caused more problems than they solved. The Skins [Royal Enniskillen Fusiliers] and the Black Watch have always been at daggers drawn. And the amount of trouble they caused. I was in charge of CID and a lot of my time I was investigating cases which had been originated by the British Army. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010).

It does appear that they served a role, certainly on large scale sweeps which the police did not have the manpower to conduct operations according to KENA-P-7:

Well they were effective in large scale operations in particular and patrolling in the forest and that sort of thing. Even if they had a target they could plot it but they all had to have, and they did have, [um] local guides. It could have been more like KPR or Kenya regiment. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

The local person with them could have been a European or an African according to KENA-P-7. The consensus amongst the respondents was that the British Army was not very effective and did not really know what they were doing:

I think they were new, new[emphasises] to the area, [um] inclined to clod-hop their way around the area a bit and they didn't use a great deal of stealth, I always got the impression they would be far more at home fighting a more conventional enemy. (KENA-P-6, 05/02/2011)

He emphasised how much the army relied on the police as, "We acted as guides for the army and certainly without us, when I say us I mean any of the local police or even local settlers, they would have been almost ineffective I think (KENA-P-6, 05/02/2011)".

Continuing in this vein he explained the shortcomings further:

Probably we weren't getting enough out of, out of the army as we might of done had the army had more training before they went on operations. I went on a tracker course with the army, which was actually run by the army, but with, obviously with local trackers and watching the locals on the course and watching the army guys on the same course, the sort of stealth that we had become accustomed to using and as opposed to the rather blundering way the army went around in the bundu [bush], there was a great

need for further training for the army before they should have been let loose as it were. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

When asked how important was the African contingent was to combating the Mau Mau as opposed to just being part of the forces? The reply from KENA-P-7 was, “oh very much so I think” but he also indicated that the Kikuyu were not considered very good troops and consequently not many were used except to form the Kikuyu Guard (Wolf, 1973, p. 410). KENA-P-7 explains:

There was not at that time that many Kikuyu in the security forces, because they weren't regarded as good troops. Even during the war there were not many recruited except as clerks and signal people; things like that, because they were regarded as not quite reliable. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

The security forces comprised of a number of units and were not homogenous: the British army units, the KAR, the Kenya Regiment; the Kenya Police and the Reserve, plus the Kikuyu Home Guard (Thornton, 2009, pp. 216-217).

KENA-P-6 was enthusiastic about the Kenyan Regiment:

They were very good, they were local, local lads [repeats], and um [sic] you know they'd been around and most of them, probably 80 percent could speak certainly Swahili and probably 50 percent could speak a tribal language. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

The importance of being able to speak the local language has permeated the findings and conversely the inability to converse with the local population has been seen to be counterproductive. The use of the local language is therefore very important and is placed into the overall table as a key component to support the assertion that the Colonial forces had substantial advantages. The ability to speak the language was certainly one of them.

### **6.8.2 The British Air Force**

The use of air support was an important factor, as it provided additional surveillance capabilities as well as logistical support; although the use of bombers was more controversial (Parker, 2009a, pp. 164-165). The army was backed up by the Royal Air Force (RAF), that was able to conduct bombing raids on the forests and also provide valuable intelligence (Burton & Cullen, 1992, pp. 65-69), as KENA-P-7 explains:

Another thing they didn't like was the bombing, they didn't like the bombing because the Royal Air Force using Lincolns, they had photo reconnaissance and as I understand it the photo reconnaissance was able to show up cut foliage, it came up in certain, in a certain way if it was treated right, so they could work out where people had been cutting down bush to make huts and things and they would go and bomb it. And what

they didn't like about the bombs was the prospect about being buried under mountains of earth, (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

An alternative view was put forward by KENA-P-6 concerning the effectiveness of using the RAF:

No, complete and utter waste of time. Probably great using up old ammunition and teaching rear gunners how to fire their guns out of the back out of the aeroplane, but other than that it was a complete waste of time except that it shot up a lot of animals and made the whole area dangerous for those operating on the ground. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

### **6.8.3 Spotter Planes**

The use of light planes of the Police Air Wing to over fly the forests, noting any movements on the ground or areas where the vegetation had been cut back to make camps (Clayton, 2006, p. 34 note 66). "Yes, the ability to follow up with spotter planes was very good. On a couple of occasions a spotter plane assisted in following us up and dropping the odd supply of food; and dogs" according to KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011.

### **6.8.4 Prohibited Areas**

Two types of restricted areas were created: Special Areas and Prohibited Areas. The latter created 'no go zones', where anybody who was found within was shot on sight (Majdalany, 1962, pp. 161-162). KENA-P-7 describes how this worked:

A patrol in the forest if they saw a stranger he was shot and he would have been a Mau Mau there's no question about it, because nobody else would have had the stupidity to go there, nobody else would have gone there. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

Although this may well have been very effective for maintaining a cordon sanitaire, allowing the army carte blanche, there have been questions raised as to the legality of such measures under the laws of war (Bennett, 2007, p. 149). The Special Areas operated more as restricted movement and were the domain of the police and the Kikuyu Home Guard. A further measure that generated considerable controversy concerned the use of deadly force in certain proscribed areas (Majdalany, 1962, pp. 162-163).

### **6.8.5 Screening**

The use of screening teams was very prevalent and was used to identify suspects. Following sweeps of areas suspects were detained and then processed. Either an informer or a captured insurgent would be used to point out potential Mau Mau. They would have hood placed over their head, to avoid recognition, and then asked to identify a line up (Edgerton, 1989, p. 178). Kena-P-7 describes how the process worked:

The screening team consisted of its control; who would have been a British former, certainly a British officer of some kind, could have been KPR, could have been police or administration. The team was made up of Kikuyu loyalist, possibly Christians, well largely Christians and possibly some, certainly in the later days, some turned ex Mau Mau and they would sit down and talk with the subject of the exercise, who would be a captured Mau Mau probably. And they would go through it and eventually come to the conclusion whether he was or was not, or if he was whether he was converted or not or whatever and this would be looked at very carefully by the officer concerned and he would make a final decision. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/201)

Screening was widely used to identify potential suspects by the Kenya Police. Often 'Loyal' Kikuyu would be used in the identification process, which could lead to settling old scores (Anderson, 2005, p. 297; Elkins, 2005b, pp. 63-69).

## 6.9 The Colonial Police

Under the colonial structure the military would only be brought in as an aid to the civil power: the Kenya Police (Agnew & White, 1992, p. 383; Huntington, 1981; Lovatt-Smith, 2005, p. 132). A concept that had developed throughout the colonial era, consequently the police operated as a paramilitary organisation to deal with civil unrest (Harlan Jr & McDowell, 1981, p. 21). The army was only required if they could not deal with the problem. "Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment functioning in close cooperation with the military" (Mumford, 2012, p. 9).

The police force was made up of African *askaris* and led by Europeans. It appears that the force in Kenya was ill-prepared for the demands that were to be made of it to deal with the Emergency according to KENA-P-2:

At the beginning we were pathetic. We were still living in the [sighs] it was a pleasant place to be, Kenya. [laughs] When I joined there were 183 Europeans in the force, 183 and my number was 181. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)

KENA-P-2, joined in 1948 after serving in Palestine and was one of a number of police recruited to bolster the under strength force. KENA-P-12, confirms this situation:

The Colonial Police were under manned, under paid and under resourced. It was fortunate in the makeup of the force that the number of Kikuyu police officers was limited. It was not until after the war that the administration allowed police officers and police Stations into the native reserves. For the 'Emergency' there was a rapid expansion and half trained contract inspectors were used in the reserves more as soldiers than policeman. (KENA-P-12; 20/04/2012)

Similar to what occurred in Malaya, a large number of contract police were brought in to bolster the numbers, very often with rudimentary training at best and little knowledge of

the language, the country and its population (Clayton, 2006, p. 18) . KENA-P-7 reiterated this point “local knowledge was all important I think, because you bring in the British army, they didn’t have a clue”.

Next it was important to identify whether or not the Kikuyu formed part of the security establishment, as native Africans were generally recruited into military service units. KENA-P-2 was dismissive of their abilities:

We had very few Kikuyu natives in the police, because by and large they weren't trusted. We tended not to recruit Kikuyus into the Kenya Police. They were more intelligent, they'd had closer contact with the white man than any of the other tribes, and we didn't trust them. There were some, but very, very few. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)

However, in order to bolster the ranks of the security forces additional manpower was recruited and this took the form of a volunteer force. Additionally, the police started to recruit more Kikuyu in order to police their own communities. By 1956 the police force was considerably larger “1,341 Europeans, 106 Asians and 11,045 Africans” (Anderson & Killingray, 1992, p. 149).

### **6.9.1 Police Reservists**

As with the Kenya Regiment, the Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) played a significant role during the Emergency (Parker, 2009a, p. 167). They were used mainly in support but also undertook their own operations, as they had local expertise (Parker, 2009a, p. 366). The inspectorate numbered 8,603; which predominately came from the white settler community (Parker, 2009a, p. 164) KENA-P-7 was asked what role the KPR played:

During the emergency the Reservists of course became part of the whole Police Force, you know they would go in, but again depending on their individual abilities they would be put where they were most use. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/201)

Indicating that they served many purposes even though most had not be police trained they may have been unorthodox, but performed vital roles when used. Due to the lack of trained police Officers, a special unit was formed using Kenya Regiment Officers seconded to become policemen and lead local constables; this unit was known as ‘Ray Force’ (Parker, 2009a, p. 166). A further indication of the innovative methods used to overcome shortfalls in manpower.



## 6.10 Intelligence

The role of intelligence is central to conducting a counter-insurgency campaign (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 32). Both Kenya and Malaya were deficient in this domain at the start of the Emergencies and it has been argued this deficiency contributed to the insurgency in the first place. Clayton (2006) argues that the intelligence was available, but the ability to process it was not. In addition the actual set up was “quite inadequate for an extensive counter-insurgency campaign” (p. 33). The nature of the support for the insurgency needs to be fully understood before a comprehensive strategy can be developed (Joes, 2004, p. 238). To this end the re-organisation of Special Branch to become more effective was undertaken in both countries. Sir Percy Sillitoe from MI5 was brought in to ensure this occurred in both Kenya and Malaya (Sinclair, 2006, p. 197).

Integral to the survival of the regime, colonial intelligence was also broader and encompassed not only Special Branch, but also information acquired in the course of day-to-day administration. This political intelligence was important not only in providing warnings, but also in effective monitoring and linking the administration to the population (Cormac, 2010, p. 804). KENA-P-7 describes how this process with informers worked:

The contacts with the gangs would have been surreptitious and highly secretive, and their contacts would probably be scampering up into the forest, and they would come down out of the forest edge to meet their contacts, that sort of thing, and it was a matter of getting the information back, getting it out, which wasn't always available. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

The ability to source these networks became more and more important (Parker, 2009a, p. 286). Notwithstanding this description from a Special Branch officer, it would appear that those in the field had less access to this intelligence than might be presumed. KENA-P-9 suggested when asked if informers constituted the main source for intelligence, indicated “the only information we ever received was from the farmers themselves. If they thought something was going on they would let us know”. KENA-P-6 backs this observation up:

The intelligence capabilities were really from the local farmers, we would contact the local farmer, rancher, more often than not, um who would have probably gathered some intelligence from their local employees, which they would pass on to us and then we would act on that intelligence.... our following up ability was a lot greater because once you did get on the tracks you could go faster. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

Although when it came to dealing with more specialised intelligence, this was handed over to Special Branch to deal with, as KENA-P-6 explains:

it was really a very specialised field that that sort of handing on of information would really have been handled by Special Branch with what they call tame, tame terrorists who were collaborating with the special branch and you would have needed Kikuyu to extract the information. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

Questions were put to the respondents to see if they had adopted what was called in Rhodesia 'Ground-Coverage', which required a comprehensive picture of every village to be built up documenting the movements of all personnel, together with their personal habits and affiliations:

I don't think it quite went to that depth no. I mean one had, every local Special Branch officer and policeman had informers, as many as possible, it probably had the same effect but it wasn't so rigidly structured no. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)

The next problem appears to be the number of levels of command indicating the general set up was somewhat dysfunctional; as eluded to by KENA-P-12:

The Administration through their D.C's [District Commissioners] and D.O's [District Officers] ran their own intelligence system separate from the Police. Where the D.O and the local police officer were friends the intelligence would be discussed between them and the monthly Police intelligence report which each Police Station and D.O. submitted would be similar as the D'O's report. These reports would go to Divisional HQ in the case of the Police or the Area D.C in the case of the Administration. There they would be condensed and pushed further up the line. Neither the local DC: or Police Divisional Superintendent would like to admit there was anything wrong in their area so in many cases hard intelligence would be classified as rumour. (KENA-P-12; 20/04/2012)

Based upon these remarks it would tend to support how necessary it had been to bring in outside expertise to restructure the way in which intelligence and especially how Special Branch operated (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, p. 240; Randall, 1990, p. 64).

## **6.11 Special Branch**

Considered to have been core to the ability to combat the insurgency in Malaya, Kenya was not as well structured at first. It took a lot of re-organisation to get Special Branch up to scratch (Majdalany, 1962, p. 98; Parker, 2009a, p. 166). KENA-P-12 confirms this:

Special Branch was separate from the CID. It was very small and relied on intelligence from the monthly intelligence submitted by each Police Division. There were a small number of African officers who did sterling work against great difficulties and risk to their own life and that of their families. (KENA-P-12; 20/04/2012)

Although, KENA-P-12 is supportive of the African officers this was not the case, especially when it came to the Kikuyu whom were working in Special Branch:

I'm quite convinced that Githieya {name of policemen} was a double agent; quite convinced. But you wouldn't say that, because he was virtually Henderson's right hand man. He was the only Kikuyu; he was the only Kikuyu with the Branch. (KENA-P-2: 19/05/2010)

Henderson was the Special Branch officer charged with tracking down Dedan Kimathi and had virtual carte blanche to operate how he wanted to. He was Kenya born and spoke fluent Kikuyu (Anderson, 2005, p. 232). Henderson was instrumental in capturing Dedan Kimathi, considered to be one of the principal leaders of the Mau Mau (Litchfield, 1992, p. 90). He had eluded his captors for years and was only captured after a dedicated unit led by Chief Inspector Henderson managed to infiltrate his hideout using intelligence gained from pseudo operations he had been managing (Dahrendorf, 1968).

It also appears that Special Branch were not short of funds, but not too good on results as KENA-P-2 explains:

And then, of course, us six were brought in to Special Branch to form this Special Bureau. That was the brief. 'Beat Mau Mau'. So we were centred on Nyeri, our little team. We had unlimited money; we all had brand new Land Rovers with civvy number plates. And we were trying all sorts of things ...and we weren't getting anywhere at all. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)

A general sentiment that was confirmed by other respondents that "Special Branch was a very small unit based over the top of a shop in central Nairobi at the start of the Emergency" according to KENA-P-12. Although, Corfield (1959) highlights that the work they produced was commendable, Special Branch had no structure outside of Nairobi, except Mombasa. A deficiency; as a lot of critical intelligence was not appreciated until too late (pp. 36, 132). Catling's appointment in 1954, as Commissioner of Police, set about rectifying structural deficiencies implementing the report from Sillitoe, head of MI5 (Majdalany, 1962, p. 111; Sinclair, 2006, p. 198).

## **6.12 Specialised and Elite Units**

Malaya was notable for the use of specialised army units such as the SAS, the Ghurkhas and the Jungle squads. Neither of the former were used in Kenya, although a version of the Jungle squads was developed, the Combat Tracker units. The other important development was the creation of pseudo gangs. It was the police together with the Kenya Regiment and the Kenya Police Reserve that took the lead in countering the Mau Mau, developing several important units to accomplish this. The creation of Pseudo Gangs was an

important development and is often credited with bringing the Emergency to an end (Parker, 2009a, pp. 335-346).

### **6.12.1 Mounted Units**

The creation of a Police Horse Unit from the KPR Mounted Section, as horses could cover so much more ground and carry supplies too (Parker, 2009a, p. 337). KENA-P-6 was from the British Military Police mounted division and subsequently joined this unit in 1954. He was asked about the strategy and replied:

The strategy was really, when the Mau Mau at times moved from, more or less, the Emergency areas where the action was, to resting camps, they would be in the Aberdare's and various other places or even on the plains up in the Liakipia area and we would do patrols, trying to intercept the gangs going from one area to another. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

KENA-P-6 was then asked if he considered them to be more effective. "The mounted sections I think were more effective because at that time there was more to be effective against". These units were also made up of members of the Kenya Police Reserve and the KAR (Sinclair, 2006, p. 159).

### **6.12.2 Dogs**

The use of dogs was widespread by the army and the police. The handbook on anti-Mau Mau operations devotes a chapter on their use and welfare (Erskine, 1954, p. Ch VII). The army had two types of dog, the tracker dog and the patrol dog. The combat teams had a tracker dog capable of following a scent. Whereas the patrol dogs were there to alert the patrol to the presence of outsiders and had not been trained to follow a scent; acting more like an additional sentry. Dogs were in common use with farmers using their own to track suspects:

No, these were his lion dogs, he had a pack of lion dogs and it was just like something out of some novel. He arrived with, must of had 12 dogs at least, all baying and being handled by two dogs at a time by their handlers, great big sort of thick set ridgebacks' and that type of dog and obviously well trained to a certain extent and they got on the track of the gang and off we all went. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

The lion dogs he talks of are Rhodesian Ridgebacks bred for hunting. The tracker dogs used by the police were predominately Doberman pincers, whereas those used by the army were in most cases Alsatisans, according to KENA-P-12. Dogs had their limitations as was indicated by KENA-P-9:

Well they seemed to lose the track. I mean I went out with him once on something or other and he had the dogs in front of us and he said they've lost it and that was the only time I went out with them. I wasn't very impressed anyway. (KENA-P-9; 08/08/2011)

But it appears the dogs on this occasion were not always up to tracking the suspects as he has highlighted, nonetheless they were used extensively (Erskine, 1956).

### **6.12.3 General Service Units**

“Formed after the start of the Emergency from the Emergency Company, this unit was primarily used to deal with civil disorder, such as riots and was based in Nairobi”, KENA-P-12; 20/04/2012), (Sinclair, 2006, p. 153). They formed the nucleus of other initiatives, such as the Combat tracker teams and the Pseudo gangs, as the men were well trained and disciplined. “But there was always a sort of special unit, the GSU, a sort of strong arm unit if you like, which was designed and trained to cope with riots and that sort of thing” (KENA-P-1; 02/03/2010).

### **6.12.4 Tracker Units**

The Combat Tracker units were used to follow up attacks on farms, following the spoor with dogs and African trackers led by a European; either police or KAR. These units used their bush-craft skills in much the same way as the jungle squads in Malaya did (Franklin, 1996, pp. 99-100). KENA-P-13 explains that there was a difference between Tracker teams and Combat Tracker teams:

The Combat teams were different. These were uniformed in jungle green same as used in Malaya and did not disguise themselves. There were tracker teams as you describe, but the combat teams were different. Their task was to seek and eliminate the enemy. The officer leading them usually had prior army service. Police reservists often led tracker teams because they were local farmers who hunted and often brought their black trackers with them. The combat teams were more rigid and disciplined and trained continuously between patrols. They had radios and were sometimes directed to a contact from spotter plane. (KENA-P-13; 20/07/2012)

What is of interest from this reply is that it tends to support the literature regarding the formation of what became known as the Pseudo gangs (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 156-158).

### **6.12.5 Pseudo Gangs**

It is considered by many that the development of the use of Pseudo Gangs was one of the most important tactical innovations that occurred in this campaign (Bailey, 2010; Cline, 2005; Dahrendorf, 1968; Franklin, 1996; Kitson, 1960; Parker, 2009a). According to Sinclair (2006) the combat tracker units were used to follow up attacks on farms, following the spoor with dogs and African trackers led by a European, either police or KAR. These units used

indigenous tribesmen because of their bush-craft skills in much the same way as the ‘Jungle Squads’ did in Malaya. Sinclair (2006) further contends this led to the development of the pseudo gang concept; as the use of disguise evolved to imitate the Mau Mau gangs and eventually infiltrate them (pp. 156-158). Although the process described by Parker (2009a), is far more comprehensive and instructive (pp. 288-314). It should be noted that pseudo operations had official sanction and authorisation (Hewit, 2001, pp. 338-340).

KENA-P-6 expounds the use of pseudos, but at the same time indicates that there were a small section of the security forces:

We weren’t involved with the pseudo gangs as such except that we would possibly give them support, the pseudo gangs were managed by people like Ian Henderson, Special Branch and again you would have probably 2 white men, officers let’s call them, who would be disguised as Kikuyu, as Mau Mau, blackened faces, kept in the background, they could speak Kikuyu many of them. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

When asked whether or not other police units were running pseudo gangs unofficially for themselves, the reply from KENA-P-7 was:

Yes, [um] well it was meant to be thoroughly controlled, I don’t know in Central, it was meant to be coordinated so that you didn’t get cases of pseudo gangs shooting each other up but that did happen in a few instances I think, I can’t bring to mind any in particular, but I’m sure it did happen. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)

Following through on who actually set this idea up, as many have made claims that it was Captain Kitson, KENA-P-7 who was in Special Branch at the time states, “Firstly Henderson I think. Mostly, and he had a small team of people” but he goes on to develop a line that states this had been used in reverse in the past and would have been a format for use:

Well I mean basically it was straight forward police work because before all this happened you know where there were problems on farms we would dress up an informer as a policeman and take him out with us so he could point people out or point out situations that sort of thing... But of course, it’s a slight reversal, it wasn’t a pseudo gang, it was an informer dressed as a policeman but the principal applied. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)

KENA-P-6 had a similar response when asked who thought of the idea to set them up “I would have thought it was an initiative by Ian Henderson”. Then he was asked where he thought they were operating:

They operated all over, I was only stationed in the Rift Valley province and to my knowledge they would operate almost anywhere, where there was a tip off, where there was a likelihood of bumping into a gang. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

Further evidence to support the theory that it was an evolutionary process is put forward by Parker (2009a, p. 294) and this interpretation was supported by KENA-P-6:

'I' Force under Nev (sic) Cooper certainly incorporated Mau Mau prisoners into its ranks as trackers very early on-January 1953. These turned Mau Mau were then completely loyal to their units. They functioned primarily as soldiers and not pseudos. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

The question was then put "How would these Pseudo Gangs have operated? The reply was:

Well the basic members of the gang were in fact Kikuyu, they were terrorist who had been caught, and brainwashed, let's say for want of a better word, and brought over to the crown side shall we say. So they were like the enemy within as far as the Mau Mau were concerned, a typical operation would be a gang would, a pseudo gang would arrive and they would know where, more or less, where their old comrades were operating, and they would arrive and say we have just come from Mt Kenya and we have been told by Dedan Kimathi or whoever it may be that a new oath must be taken and um, one by one, you must strip down and you must come with us and you must take this oath, and they would take them one by one into the bush and promptly kill them, and maybe take one or two at the end and take them back to form the basis of another pseudo gang. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

Asked to explain why they would have changed sides so readily, the explanation given was, "I would say he would have been caught and he would probably have two options: either change sides or face the noose" (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011).

Unfortunately, things did go wrong and people got killed; as in this case where one of the Pseudo gangs was mistaken for a Mau Mau gang:

David Bellingham's death was the one I mentioned who was tracked and his entire unit killed, He was in turn tracking a Mau Mau gang when they were mowed down. The findings were that he was 'killed in action' and no-one was held responsible. The combat team's role was "seek and eliminate" and as Bellingham was inside the 'Prohibited- No -Go' area, which separated the forest from the settled area, where lethal force could be used without warning, they did just that. (KENA-P-13; 20/07/2012)

Not only were the Pseudo Gangs effective for tracking and eliminating Mau Mau gangs but they also played a wider role in the propaganda domain unsettling them. Mistrust crept into the minds of each of them (Parker, 2009a, p. 311).

### **6.13 Propaganda**

Those questioned did not have much of an opinion on aspects of propaganda, probably as they were more concerned with operational matters. Propaganda was not

generally part of the role of the police; consequently not much was said by the respondents on this aspect. One of the most comprehensive works on the propaganda war has been conducted by Carruthers (1995a, 2005). Overall the strategy was not as comprehensive internally as that used in Malaya, according to KENA-P-6:

Occasionally they had leaflet raids, which advised the gangs to come in, advised the gangs to come in and presumably offered them some sort of deal. Those were dropped in the forest and right towards the end when there was a big operation about Lake Naivasha, there were leaflets dropped all around there, where there was a gang supposed to be holed up in the papyrus rim of the lake. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

The idea was to try and entice the Mau Mau to give themselves up, something that had been widely used in Malaya:

Propaganda was limited to leaflet dropping giving gang members safe passage if they surrendered with the leaflet. Loud speakers in light aircraft were used in the forest areas. 'Baraza's or meetings were used by the local D.O.'s to encourage them to pass the word back that they should give themselves up. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

Conversely, according to KENA-P-2 the Mau Mau were also producing their own propaganda through their newspapers, "Henry Moria, who was one of the top lieutenants, he was the editor of Kikuyu newspaper. He [Moria], was disseminating more propaganda than anybody else through his Kikuyu newspapers" (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010).

#### **6.14 Colonial Administration**

As has been expounded, counter-insurgency requires much more than just a military-police response, it was "basically a civil problem" which could only be 'permanently resolved by civil measures'(Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011a, p. 354) . Therefore, without a civil-political element to the strategy there is little or no chance of ensuring the general population will continue to support the Government. It is also important to note that the administration had a longer term view as it expected to overcome the rebellion and move forward, this was supported by KENA-P-7:

The basic idea was initially to impose law and order and prevent terrorism and everybody was so tied up with that it really, the higher levels of government obviously, the district commissioner was probably thinking 5-10 years ahead for his district, Provincial Commissioner was thinking in terms of 10, 20, 30 years ahead for his district, and the governor was thinking more in terms of 50 years ahead you see. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

Kitson (1971) endorses this approach by the government in that it needs "an overall programme designed to achieve its aim of regaining and retaining the allegiance of the



population” (p. 50). As formulated by Galula (1964/2006) the support of the population remains the key objective that requires social measures to underpin the government’s strategy:

But you see, the Kenya Police were never allowed in native reserves. The Colonial Administration, the Kenya Administration ran the reserves, the district offices and the district commissioners. They had their own police force, what they call a Tribal Police., which were made up of people of the same tribe; therefore they were all biased in favour. They're not going to police their own people because of course they're going to get beaten up or done in afterwards by their own people. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)

Reflecting on these remarks it appears as if there were numerous divisions within the colonial structure that prevented it from dealing with the problems in a concerted approach; even to the point of operating separate police forces. KENA-P-2 reiterated this point:

So as I say, the Kenya police weren't allowed into reserves. If I went, if I was pursuing something, before the emergency, and it was necessary for me to go into reserve, I had to get permission from the DC first. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2010)

Under the Colonial system it was the District Commissioner (DC) that ran his own area. It was he that made the decisions about the welfare and the way to manage the tribes under his control. It was very paternalistic in nature (Berman, 1992, pp. 80-88). But it also caused complications when it came to actually dealing with things once they had gone wrong; as many of the DC’s still wanted to run the operation their way:

The DC was the boss, the army was there in aid of the civil power, who was the police and the police was subject to the directions of the DC normally speaking, and he was the representative of government in the district. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)

Clarification was asked as to whether the DC’s had their own forces, which were not part of the Kenya police:

He had his own, what was known as Tribal Police, but they were, in those days, they were recruited locally for use in that district in that tribal area. They were recruited purely to operate for the DCs purposes and it wasn’t until pretty well after World War Two, the Kenya police moved in to all the tribal areas, where previously they hadn’t operated except in case of serious crime, for example if it was a murder or something, the DC might call in the police to deal with it, well he’d have to call in the police to deal with it, but petty theft and stuff would be dealt with by the travel police and put probably before the DC’s court or the elders, the African native courts and apart from the usual disagreements that you might get between officials everywhere and anywhere, I don’t think there was anything certainly unusual, I don’t think there was any severe disagreement as to policy, I mean the army had to do what they were told and the police more or less had to do what they were told within reason, and the DC had to do what he was told by the PC and the Governor. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)

Understanding how the Colonial administration operated, with its stick demarcation of responsibilities, allows for a greater understanding regarding the difficulties that were faced at the onset of major hostilities. There were also the restrictions in place to deal with multiple jurisdictions. It should also be noted that as the fighting was only taking place in limited areas, other DC's were loathed to relinquish any authority they held over their own fiefdoms, as KENA-P-7 said "the DC was the boss".

### **6.15 Public Works**

In Malaya an important feature of the Briggs Plan was the Government public works programme; this appears not to have been the case in Kenya. "Very little public works were carried out in the Central Province during the Emergency owing to the risk of attacks on the workers by terrorists" according to KENA-P-12. Nonetheless, the building of roads into the forest was a major strategy to allow the security forces greater access (Majdalany, 1962, p. 164). There was also an allocation of funds for development and reconstruction of "water projects, the construction of schools, community centres, village halls, hospitals, urban housing and a new airport for Nairobi" (Percox, 1998, p. 65).

### **6.16 Religion, Witchcraft, Sorcery and Oaths**

The taking of an oath was fundamental to the essence of the Mau Mau, although it was actually a distortion of their tribal religious customs; nonetheless it held sway over those that had taken the oath (Green, 1990; Lovatt-Smith, 2005, pp. 137-158; Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966, p. 248). The oathing rituals formed a key character in the initiation ceremonies; many were forced to take the ceremony upon pain of death. The oaths also promised death to anyone of them that divulged the oath to an outsider. These 'oathings' became more and more gruesome and involved what was considered despicable acts that went against the taboos of the Kikuyu (Dahrendorf, 1968, p. 17).

The oaths were also very much anti-Christian in context; intended to de-cleanse the subject of his Christianity and to accept the 'new religion' that was the Mau Mau. "It is sufficient to state the accepted fact that the Kikuyu's complete belief in the power of magic, white and black, was a fundamental factor which regulated his whole life (Corfield, 1959, p. 163).

It is not easy to draw a dividing line between religion and magic in Kikuyu society, nor between white magic, which is beneficial, and black magic or witchcraft, which is anti-

social. The Kikuyu methods of administering an oath are intimately connected with the belief in magic and witchcraft and some understanding of the effects of oaths is essential if we are to fathom the methods which have been so successfully used by the Mau Mau. (Leakey, 2004/1954, p. 47)

The oath was very serious whether it had been taken voluntarily or forced, KENA-P-2 emphasises this aspect:

I mean the oath. Once they've been oathed, the oath is binding. And you never knew who'd been oathed and hadn't been oathed. The oath is binding. So you never really knew whether the fellow you were dealing with could be trusted or not. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2011)

A further interpretation of the oath was given by KENA-P-11 when asked why he thought they had been forced to take it “because they had been duped, almightily duped, by a very well educated small group of westernised trickeries and they believed everything they were told”. Understanding the role played by oaths is central to the comprehension of the Mau Mau phenomenon. Its importance should not be underestimated; as it was used to ensure as many of the Kikuyu as possible should be bound by the oath (Maloba, 1993, p. 68). Consequently, when there was a mass refusal to acquiesce, as happen in the village of Lari in 1953, retribution was brutal; wiping out the whole village and the committing of various atrocities (Anderson, 2005, pp. 125-127; Furedi, 1989, p. 122). The Lari massacre, as it was termed, gained worldwide notoriety and influenced many about the nature of Mau Mau insurrection (Carruthers, 1995a, pp. 136-138; Newsinger, 1981, p. 170).

### **6.16.1 De-oathing**

A key part of the strategy played by the Government in combating the insurgency was the programme to de-oath as many of the Kikuyu population as possible (Clayton, 2006, p. 4). The oath held incredible sway over the minds of those involved, and this aspect is difficult for many to grasp; nonetheless it was realised that it must be confronted head on to maintain the momentum against the Mau Mau (Lovatt-Smith, 2005, p. 156). Basically the process involved using respected tribal leaders and witchdoctors ‘*mganga*’ to administer the counter-oath:

The use of oaths by the terrorists to bind the local population to their cause was wide spread. The Kikuyu normally used oaths to bind a normal contract. The oaths given by the terrorists were in most cases abhorrent to the average Kikuyu. A further oath given by a ‘*Mganga*’ could absolve the original oath is considered stronger. (KENA-P-12; 20/04/2012)

KENA-P-7 explains further what this de-oathing involved:

What it boiled down to was [heavy pause] a lot of deep, dark, mysterious tribal ceremonies, where the elders would de-oathed them, because they firmly believed that the oath would kill them if they went against the Mau Mau. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)

Importantly when pressed if this was necessary, especially with the use of ‘turned’ insurgents who became pseudo gang members, then KENA-P-7 was adamant, “I think so, pretty well yes, 99 %, probably if not 100%”. When KENA-P 12 was asked if thought the aspect of sorcery by the medicine men had a lasting effect on the Kikuyu that came through the detention clearance system, the reply given was:

Yes totally. It’s rather like asking the question in the year 1100 did the power of religion have any effect on the behaviour of the people. Total, absolute, there was no question; it was a non-question as to whether in fact you would snuff it. (KENA-P-12; 20/04/2012)

When pressed to answer whether de-oathing was effective the reply was “anybody that was Kikuyu and had taken the oath was under the influence of the oath they had taken and anything they were promised wasn’t strong enough to overcome that”. Nonetheless, de-oathing was seen as a necessary tool to stop the spread of the Mau Mau and try to regain public support for the Government (Corfield, 1959, pp. 132-135).

### **6.17 A Counter-Insurgency Plan**

Unlike Malaya, there was not one single ‘Plan’ that can be held up as the blue print that led to the ending of the insurgency in Kenya. Notwithstanding, there were a series of measures that can be seen to have achieved much the same result: a series of plans by Baring from 1953 (Furedi, 1990, pp. 75-76), the Swynnerton plan, the Carpenter Committee report, the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, and the Lennox-Boyd proposed Constitution of 1957 (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 48). The Lyttelton proposals opened the way forward for African and Asian participation in the government by opening up the electoral system (Rex, 1961, pp. 278-279). Followed by Lennox-Boyd proposals of 1957 and 1958 resulting in the elections, which would lead on to the Lancaster House agreements of 1960 and full independence by 1963 (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, pp. 61-65). Effectively, these were the political measures that guaranteed the ‘loyal’ support for the Government based upon the emancipation of the African population and the ending of colonial status. (Orrù, 1989, pp. 395-400; Thompson, et al., 1990, p. 367).

The strategy behind the Villagisation process was to cut the supplies off from the insurgents in the forests. Restricting access to food was central to this objective. Erskine cleared the areas around the forests of crops, bananas and sugar cane, extending roads for greater access as well as building a fosse around the fringes. Harsh collective punishments were inflicted on those that contravened the regulations. There was also detention for any suspects considered to be Mau Mau. The rule of law required that they be prosecuted, but until they could bring the large numbers to court and face trial they were detained pending their appearance in court (Brendon, 2007, p. 564).

Collective punishment appears to have been a concept that had developed through-out the British colonies as a means to bring errant transgressors to heel; it was used in both Malaya and Kenya. Forced re-settlement of the population, mass detention and the destruction of their previous villages was very much part of this policy (Bennett, 2007, p. 151). Although, KENA-P-2 states “I was never aware of collective punishment” But there were collective fines (Clayton, 2006, p. 4).

Although the definition of success in terms of counter-insurgency is difficult to define; as there are so many variables that need to be taken into account, before such an assertion can be made. Nonetheless, the question needed to be asked whether the respondents considered it successful from their perspective. KENA-P-7 replied, “Yes, it was. The whole concept of war is to defeat your enemy in the field and no matter which way you look at it that ultimately happened”. However, when asked if there an alternative to the political one that created an independent Kenya, the reply by KENA-P-7 was:

Well another option was they could of just carried on, but it would have cost too much. HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] couldn’t afford the money basically and this did not just apply to Kenya this was worked out by, who was the Prime Minister of the day, Harold MacMillan, he worked out that it was just not feasible to keep the Empire going. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2010)

The question was put whether he thought it could have been done any differently his reply was, “so you know it had to be resolved one way or the other and ultimately what happened was the only feasibly option I think, I don’t see how else they could have done”. He then continued:

But by and large they were all united in the aim of driving the Europeans out and taking all their land. What they wanted, well in actual fact they didn’t bother much about where the Europeans would end up, all they wanted was their land if they could get it. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

The majority of the replies endorsed this response, which was fatalistic and must be assessed based on the time elapsed since the conflict, and the memories those dark days would invoke. The consensus appears to have been that they defeated the Mau Mau, by using a series of effective measures as KENA-P-6 contended:

It became obvious to us that the Pseudo Gangs were becoming probably the most important arm in defeating the Mau Mau and it got to a stage where the gangs really weren't sure who was friend and who was foe. (KENA-P-6; 23/02/2011)

“The hunger for land was the driving force behind the rebellion and this was very anti-Colonial, ultimately a political solution had to be found” as KENA-P-7 summed up. Land reform may have formed part of the strategy to ensure other tribes did not join the rebellion (Percox, 1998, p. 65). However, de-colonisation was that solution as far as the British Government was concerned, and from 1960 onwards they gradually moved towards this outcome (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 63).

### **6.18 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency**

As discussed in the literature review the French had an influence on the strategy used and this is presented in a summarised form in Table 6.2. As indicated in the previous chapter, the table outlines how the key aspects of the theory were applied in Kenya. Each case study has shown how much these aspects formed an integral part of the tactics for dealing with subversion and had found common currency.

Table 6.3 has extracted the main elements as proposed by the French theorist and then indicates how this was applied in the Kenyan Emergency. The first element *quadrillage*, which involved having the whole operational area divided into sections, was used with the desired effect in Kenya as it was not too difficult to seal off areas ( See Figure 6.2).

*Ratissage* or sweeps were conducted routinely using the British Army units supported by elements of the Home Guard and the Kenya Police Reserve; often the Mounted Units. The restricted area in which the Mau Mau were hiding made it easier to use sweeps.

*Regroupment* or gathering of the population to divide them from the Mau Mau and their supply chain was used, but not as effectively as in Malaya. But in Kenya, mass detention was conducted that had the same effect. Additionally, the *tache d'huile* principle of gradually enlarging the areas under government control outwards, from the well defended cleared area and keeping the area secured was used. Extensive use of armed militias, in the guise of the Home Guard, was employed, with great success

**Table 6.2 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Kenya**

| Aspect   | How applied in Kenya   |
|--|--|
| <i>Quadrillage</i> : (over-laying an administrative grid on the map to control defined areas of population and territory). | The Kikuyu areas were divided into tactical areas                                    |
| <i>Ratissage</i> : (cordonning, raking or sweeping /clearing the area systematically)                                      | Undertaken when it was known that insurgents were operating in known area.           |
| <i>Regroupement</i> : bring together in one area   | Protected Villages-implemented as were mass detentions of Kikuyu,                    |
| ' <i>Tache d'huile</i> ': or 'oil spot' strategy, spreading influence from cleared area                                    | Progressively used to clear and maintain cleared areas.                              |
| <i>Recruitment</i> : use of local leaders and use of native forces   | The Home Guard especial loyal Kikuyu together with other tribes in the forces        |
| Paramilitary organization and militias   | These formed the back bone of the counter-insurgency; Tracker Units and Pseudo Gangs |

(Adapted from Alexander & Keiger, 2002; Gougeon, 2005)

### 6.19 Summary

The general interpretation gleaned from these findings appears to be how much more piecemeal the approach to counter-insurgency was in Kenya when compared to Malaya, even though the insurgents were geographically contained and not receiving external support. The ability of the Mau Mau was gradually curtailed as they found it harder and harder to operate outside of their forest hide-aways. "Contacts or information became more and more scarce. They seemed to be fewer, fewer of the enemy on the ground" according to KENA-P-6; 'contacts' being the term used for military engagements with the enemy.

There are a number of points that have been raised in the findings that are considered to be important in assessing the capabilities of the security forces in combating the insurgency. These elements have been condensed and placed into Table 6.3. The majority of which have been discussed at length in the case study.

**Table 6.3 Summary of elements from the findings**

| Element                  | Kenya                                    |
|--------------------------|--|
| Administration           | Held sway over decision process          |
| Aircraft                 | Bombing but not effective                |
| Dogs                     | Large use of dogs by police/army         |
| Emergency Powers         | Issued in 1952/draconian                 |
| Food control             | Limited but used effectively             |
| French lessons           | Pop control, sweeps/ detentions          |
| Ground coverage          | Patchy and limited use/ improved         |
| Hearts and Minds         | Limited and not generally known          |
| Home Guard               | Vital part of overall strategy           |
| Indigenous forces        | Used in police/ army/home guard          |
| Insurgents               | Predominately Kikuyu tribe               |
| Intelligence             | Limited and patchy/ informers used       |
| Language                 | Few Kikuyu but many Swahili speakers     |
| Legislation              | Extensive and draconian                  |
| Martial Law              | Never Imposed/emergency powers           |
| Mechanisms               | No overarching supremo                   |
| Mounted units            | Both the Police and KR used effectively  |
| Notable actors           | Erskine/ Kitson/ Henderson/Catling       |
| Plan                     | Series of semi-interrelated plans        |
| Oaths and sorcery        | Main aspect of Mau Mau/de-oathing        |
| Organisation             | Poor becoming moderately successful      |
| Police                   | Poor at first then highly successful     |
| Population               | Part of overall strategy                 |
| Propaganda               | Limited and piecemeal                    |
| Pseudo gangs             | Highly successful/used from '53          |
| Psychological Operations | Limited success/limited                  |
| Public works             | Limited use but accelerated later        |
| Reasons for conflict     | Land issues/ tribal/Colonialism          |
| Restricted areas         | Prohibited & special areas/ enforced     |
| Roads                    | Used to infiltrate the forests           |
| Special Branch           | Poor at first then moderately successful |
| Special units            | Combat tracker units/Pseudos/GSU         |
| Spotter planes           | Became very effective                    |
| Strategy                 | Loosely held together/no central Plan    |
| Structure of forces      | Colonial forces with British army units  |
| Villages                 | Used limited success/hostility           |

The significance of placing the extracted elements into a table allows one to see how many aspects are involved in countering an insurgency. Controlling all these aspects is a formidable task for planners and strategists, as is the logistical support to keep all of the units operational. Furthermore, there needs to be an overview of exactly where each of the units



are, as mistakes can occur and people can get shot by their own troops. An event described in this case study. For example you may have a road gang working in an area and then suddenly it is in the line of a hot pursuit. The requirement would be to inform the commander of what other activities are in his area. Obviously with poor radio communications in those days, this was not an easy task. Therefore, the table assists with understanding how complex and inter-related all the activities were during the campaigns; a factor that is often over looked by many books on the subject

The other features that stand out are the points related to administration and legislation. Although this has been discussed, there were the Emergency Powers, such as restricted areas, identification documents, restricted movements, curfews and such like, as well as population control by enforcing the protected village's policy. The understandable difficulty was the ability to inter-lock all of these aspects together, which is why the argument has been made for an over arching supremo, capable of authorising the supporting legislation and enforcing the edicts.

These further findings will then be added to the Table 8.1, in Chapter 8, displaying the combined elements used in each campaign to combat the insurgency, which assists with the comparative analysis. The combined elements are also in Appendix C.

## **6.20 Significant and Influential Actors**

There have been a number of significant and influential actors that have had a direct and powerful authority over the way in which counter-insurgency developed. Some of these have transferred their knowledge and expertise from one conflict theatre to another. It would be remiss of a comparative research project not to note these. Consequently, they have been placed into a table for visual clarity. These include: Catling, Sillitoe, Erskine, Henderson, Kitson and Bleazard. (See Appendix B).

## **6.21 Conclusion**

A number of important aspects have been identified through the findings and these have been added to those already identified in Chapter 5 for Malaya in table 12. The creation of this comparative table allows for greater clarity and assists in recognising trends in the data, which will be used in Chapter 8 analysis and interpretation.

Many of the elements developed in Malaya were transferred over to Kenya and were used effectively; although the unified command structure was not replicated, despite calls by General Erskine to have similar powers to those used by General Templar in Malaya. In

addition, no central Plan similar to that set up by General Briggs was set up although a number of the recommendations were used, especially the separation of the vulnerable population into protected villages, the creation of a Home Guard and increased social provisions. Ensuring the other tribes did not join the insurrection was an important consideration for the authorities.

Legislation was also used in support of the counter-insurgency objectives and the military were brought in as an aid to civil power; as they were in Malaya. The ability of the Colonial Government to enact legislation was substantial advantage as the police and the military were then acting lawfully in support of the legitimate authority. The rule of law was thus used as a tool to achieve the desired aim of over-powering the insurgents. But as in Malaya, in order to ensure the loyalty of the majority of the population a political decision was taken by the British Government to grant independence to Kenya once the insurgency had been overcome.

The police required substantial enlargement and restructuring, especially Special Branch's ability to source actionable intelligence. Additionally, the large scale recruitment of indigenous forces, including the creation of a 'Home Guard' was instrumental in gaining the upper hand and overcoming the severe deficiencies over manpower and expertise. The increased degree of local knowledge, customs and language made a significant difference. The army played more of a supporting role and less of a front line role in Kenya. There was not the same use of specialised elite forces, but there was the development of innovative units to counter the Mau Mau in the field; such as Tracker Units and Pseudo Gangs.

The use of 'hearts and minds' was less formalised than in Malaya and was not understood by those involved as part of their strategy. However, limited evidence from these findings indicates that it was part of normal policing activities anyway, even if it was not stated as official policy. As has been argued, it is the population that are key to a successful outcome of a counter-insurgency effort and this aspect formed part of the overall strategy.

The next chapter presents the case study based upon the 'Bush War' in Rhodesia. Consistency will be maintained by using a similar format as the two previous case studies.

# Chapter 7

## THE RHODESIAN BUSH WAR 1964-1980: A CASE STUDY

### 7.1 Introduction

The third case study to be dealt with in this study was the insurgency in Rhodesia, often called the 'Bush War'. Using the same format as the two previous chapters, the participants have been used to develop the narrative, with supporting evidence from the literature. In addition, the direction of the research has continued in the same vein and utilised ex- members of the security forces as participants. In this case study predominately former members of the British South Africa Police (BSAP), Special Branch and other special units

An overview of the conflict is presented; once again to position the study within its historical dimension using supporting literature. The conflict was far more complex than that of the two previous studies: Kenya and Malaya; essentially as it took place after the other two conflicts had been brought to a conclusion. Consequently, there were more factors at play that needed to be considered: the accelerated end of colonialism, changing world expectations, the Cold War, Communist expansion and the use of proxies by the predominant powers to fight wars in Africa. All of these factors had a major influence on the struggle to maintain white dominance in Rhodesia (Henriksen, 1978, p. 31).

The other important clarification is that connected with the word 'Colonial'. Although Rhodesia declared itself unilaterally independent of the United Kingdom (UK), in November 1965, it remained technically a self governing colony "to which only the United Kingdom Parliament can grant independence" (Dore, 1980, p. 32). The Lancaster House agreements of 1979, setting out the requirements for full independence, substantiate its status as a colony under international jurisdiction of the UK (Marshall, 1968, p. 1022). Further to this understanding, those that formed the bulk of the security forces can be considered as 'colonial type forces', even though they were designated as being Rhodesian. Much of the structure and deployment was based upon those used in other colonial possessions, such as the use of African combatants to bolster the security forces. Perhaps the proviso should be that majority of white settlers had been 'born and bred' in Rhodesia and had a greater affinity to their concept of nationhood and land, than possibility experienced in either Kenya or Malaya.

### 7.1.1 Thematic Approach

The themes remain consistent with the two preceding chapters. To this end, the findings are also presented so that they continue to align with the coding developed and applied to responses of the earlier participants. As far as possible, the treatment also remains consistent; in an effort to minimize bias through interpretation in an effort to maintain trustworthiness.

### 7.1.2 Population and Sample

The target population for main study was primarily those members of the security forces who had participated in conflict that involved countering the insurgency; predominately police Special Branch. Table 7.1 details the participants involved in this case study. Criterion sampling was used to select the participants, to maintain consistency.

As per the two previous case studies, the participants remain anonymous. All those in this case study are designated with the initial R, for Rhodesia reduced to RODA, followed by a number to link this to their transcripts. The standing of the participant is reflected by the designation such as P, for Police or M for Military and I for Internal Affairs, where appropriate. Thus RODA-P- 2 would be a Rhodesian Policeman and be the second person interviewed. Fifteen semi-structured interviews took place and have been dealt with in a similar fashion to the earlier case studies, including similar themes for coding purposes

**Table 7.1 Population sample breakdown details**

| Participant | Age  | Sex  | Interview date | Status           |
|-------------|------|------|----------------|------------------|
| RODA-P-1    | 60's | Male | 27/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-2    | 60's | Male | 27/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-3    | 60's | Male | 25/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-4    | 60's | Male | 26/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-5    | 60's | Male | 26/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-6    | 60's | Male | 23/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-7    | 60's | Male | 20/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-M-8    | 60's | Male | 17/01/2011     | Military         |
| RODA-P-9    | 60's | Male | 24/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-10   | 60's | Male | 27/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-11   | 60's | Male | 24/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-S-12   | 60's | Male | 10/01/2011     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-13   | 60's | Male | 29/07/2012     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-P-14   | 60's | Male | 26/06/2012     | Police Officer   |
| RODA-I-15   | 60's | Male | 30/06/2012     | Internal Affairs |

## 7.2 Rhodesia: the Stage is Set

In 1964, Rhodesia, was a well established colony with around 250,000 white settlers and approximately four million black Africans (Birmingham, 1995, p. 74; Steinberg, 1964, pp. 473-480). The breakdown of the ethnic groups was Shona 77%, Ndebele 19%, European 3% and others one percent (Melson, 2005, p. 57). There was a well structured economy based around coal, copper and farming; the country had been self governing since 1923, but as stated, had been continually refused independence by Britain. Growing dissatisfaction at Britain's reluctance on this front, saw the Rhodesians take matters into their own hands and to declare a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on the 11<sup>th</sup> of November 1965 (Young, 1967, p. 286). The international response was to impose sanctions on the country, but these only had a serious effect after the fall of the Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974; after the coup d'état. Until this date both Portugal and South Africa had continued to funnel resources to an embattled Rhodesia (Mtshali, 1967, p. 175). After this date, Mozambique was granted independence and became hostile territory for Rhodesia, with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) supporting the insurgents (Guelke, 1980, p. 655)

Unrest had been brewing in Rhodesia for a number of years, but most military historians pin point the start of the 'bush war' in 1965, following the declaration of UDI (Baxter, 2011; Evans, 2007; Mills & Wilson, 2007; Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011). At this time there was wide clamour for Independence in a number of African countries; with armed rebellion and insurrection taking place in the neighbouring countries: Angola, South Africa, South-West Africa, Mozambique and the Belgian Congo (McCarthy, 1994, pp. 85-88). In addition to these external threats, Zambia and Tanzania gained their independence from Britain and became very supportive of the aspirations of the Zimbabwean Communist political movements (Young, 1967, p. 291). In effect, Rhodesia was surrounded by hostile neighbours, with even the South Africans labouring to contain the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), from operating with the anti-Rhodesian insurgents (Johnson & Martin, 1981, p. 10). South Africa bolstered Rhodesian military operations with weapons, troops and logistical supplies (Mandela, 1994, pp. 424-425; Sibanda, 2005, pp. 128-129).

Besides these pressures, international Communism was increasing its support for African revolutionary movements, supplying them with training, logistical support and ideological fervour (Hargreaves, 1988, pp. 116, 209-211). The 'winds of change' speech made by the British Prime Minister, Macmillan in 1960, (Porter, 1976, pp. 337-343; Watts,

2005) heralded the decolonisation process by Britain, thus blocking any support for governments that were seen not to be representative of the majority: Rhodesia was seen as not representative (Davidson, 1994, pp. 152-153; McDougal & Reisman, 1968). The political, social and national consequences of this approach were to have a deadly toll on the country as it attempted to defend the status quo. The complexities associated with this conflict make it difficult to understand in isolation to world events, or the general belief held by white population they were fighting for survival against the destructive forces of Communism (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 121) . In addition, the role played by South Africa is a contradictory one: on one side supportive with logistics, armed forces and moral support; on the other hostility towards the Rhodesian Front government's policies and the "paramount need to restore South African international legitimacy and regional authority"(Onslow, 2006, p. 125).

### **7.3 Rhodesia 1965: The 'Bush War' Begins**

From a military perspective, the war can be divided into three distinct phases. Phase one, from 1964 until 1968, marked by a series of incursions and incidents. Phase two, low level and a lull until the war began in earnest in 1972. Phase three, saw an internationalisation and intensification of the conflict until the ceasefire agreement of 1979 (Johnson & Martin, 1981, p. 9). It could be argued there were actually four phases, as in 1975, Moçambique gained independence and this allowed insurgents to operate more freely from its territory. Zambia too was allowed insurgent bases in its territory; as did Botswana (McLaughlin, 1978, p. 179).

The two main protagonists against the Rhodesian Government were the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, (ZANLA) the military wing of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union; and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union: both organisations were Communist inspired, however, ZIPRA was Soviet backed and ZANLA was Maoist and supported by the Chinese (Evans, 2007, p. 185; Kiernan, 1998, p. 223; Sibanda, 2005, p. x). These ideological differences, together with the tribal cleavages-ZANLA were Shona speaking and ZIPRA were Ndebele- caused major fighting between the two tribes during the years of the conflict (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 41; Reed, 1993; Watts, 2006, pp. 445, note).

These two armies harboured deep suspicions of one another. At the height of the war, they were based in different countries, and were backed by different superpowers. . . . They

had contrasting military strategies and, inside Zimbabwe, they fought in different regions of the country, ZIPRA focusing predominantly on the Ndebele-speaking regions of Matabeleland. When they met in the field, they often fought (Alexander & McGregor, 2004, p. 81).

From a strategic perspective, this was of great importance as it allowed the security forces to utilise these weakness to their advantage. RODA-P-6 expounds further the cleavages between the two revolutionary movements pitted against the Rhodesian security forces:

The first incursions were by ZIPRA and ZAPU in the Matabeleland area, they were disasters, they were wiped out almost to a man. The insurgency changed when ZANU came in from the Moçambique side. They came in with a totally different policy to ZAPU, ZAPU came in with an ultimate long term objective of conventional warfare, ZIPRA, that's ZIPRA the army of ZAPU were going to be conventional, their advanced guard was Guerrilla but the ultimate aim was conventional. ZANLA, ZANU on the other hand came in as a communist hearts and minds proper structured guerrilla operation, they went out of their way to terrorise the farmers and to indoctrinate the local population, ZAPU did not do that, so that is the difference between the two and there was a very distinct line of their operation, one was operating from Mozambique and the others were operating from Zambia. So there were two separate, totally separate enemies facing us, two separate political organisations. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

The first major confrontation occurred on the 28 April 1966, with an attack on farms. This date is considered by the present day government of Zimbabwe, to be the celebration of the what is known as Chimurenga Day, a name given to the first war against the settlers in 1896-97 (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 29). According to RODA-10, the war started earlier:

So the symbolic start of the war was certainly where white blood was spilt and it was spilt in a definitely terrorist inspired act so if you are looking at that then I can say that was the start of the war, July 1964 and shortly followed up by another murder outside another town in Mashonaland called Hartley, where the Viljoens were murdered in their farmhouse just north of Hartley, so the blow had been struck (RODA-10; 27/01/2010)

For many, the actual start of hostilities begun in 1964. The attacks could no longer be termed as just criminal, but targeted against the settler population. RODA-P-2 confirms this:

It was not coincidental that a year later [1964], the first terrorist killing against a white was committed right on his doorstep, which was inspired by none other than our friend, Ndabaningi Sithole using Ndaou tribesmen who had been trained in China, to come over here and assassinate Petrus Johannes Oberholzer. It was always an area that had potential for trouble, and that's how it turned out. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2010)

In addition there is another important point here, the confirmations of the involvement of China in the training of insurgents; once trained were sent back in to the country to commit terrorist acts (Clark, 1985, p. 15; Johnson & Martin, 1981, p. 12). “Everyone called them ‘Terrs’, short for terrorists, or CTs, Charlie Tango’s, they were also called Gooks” (RODA-P-10; 27/-1/2011).

Chimurenga is a Shona word for 'revolutionary struggle', which aligns the movement with the underlying theory of class conflict and revolution running through this research; especially as this was ideologically bound to the teachings of Marx and Lenin. However, according to Marxist teachings a peasantry cannot rebel successfully without outside leadership (Miller & Aya, 1971, p. 59). Outside support and leadership were crucial in this insurgency in order for it to prevail and both China and the Soviets were providing this support (Reed, 1993, p. 36).

In line with the reasons given for the conflict in Kenya, the rebellion in Rhodesia was also firmly tied to land issues. Ranger (1985) conducted a comparative analysis of the two agrarian struggles and poses the question, “why did a “Mau Mau” not happen earlier in Rhodesia “if some 100,000 Africans were evicted in Kenya and some 425,000 were evicted in Rhodesia, the uprising should have taken place in [Rhodesia rather than Kenya]” (p. 103). The evictions were in the 1940s and resentment was rife. Ranger (1985) argues that because it did not happen in Rhodesia, this allowed the nationalist movement to expand outside of the Ndebele tribe, who were the most affected, into a more diverse struggle in the 1970s (p. 131). He goes on to assert that Shona tribe identified with these grievances, giving rise to a mass peasant radicalism expressed as African nationalism culminating in guerrilla action in pursuit of restoration of land (Ranger, 1985, p. 137).

The security forces comprised of at least five separate entities. The British South Africa Police (BSAP, uniformed and plain clothes Central Investigation Department (CID), plus Special Branch. There was the Army, the Air Force, the Internal Affairs (Intaf) department and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO); all were directly involved in the counterinsurgency campaign. Conscription of whites increased progressively as the war intensified, but not for black Africans (White, 2004a, p. 109). The large number of black Africans that were in the security forces were all volunteers (p. 118). In addition there was the involvement of South Africa, who sent members of its police force up to Rhodesia as support units (Godwin & Hancock, 1993, p. 89; Raeburn, 1978, p. 7).

A number of assumptions have been made over the years of the strength of the army. According to Beckett (1985) “the great majority of the personnel of the Security Forces



remained black....to around 70 per cent. Approximately 75 per cent of the BSAP were also black” (p. 174). However, Wall (1980) indicates that in 1978 actual strength of the army was actually 5,027, considerably less than has been often supposed. “The figure in respect of the soldiery are interesting in that in March 1976 it was stated there were 1.5 black soldiers for every white” (Wall & Van Tonder, 1980, p. 179). He goes on to state the actual composition was:

Officers -555

Women’s Service -275

White soldiers –2,264

Black soldiers –1,933. (Wall & Van Tonder, 1980, p. 179)

These figures indicate that black Africans were not in the majority. Figures for the British South Africa Police (BSAP) indicate that they had approximately 5,000 full time with “35,000 predominately white BSAP reservists” (McLaughlin, 1978, p. 180). Stapleton (2011) states the strength at the height of the war was “approximately 2,000 white and 6,000 black full-time police (2012, p. 5).

One of the principal weapons used in an insurgency was intimidation; this took a number of forms as RODA-P-2 stated, “Murders, tortures, assaults, burning huts, whatever; and witchcraft.” The last element mentioned was witchcraft that was prevalent during this conflict and consequently has a later section 7.15, dealing with it more fully. When asked what could be done about countering intimidation, RODA-P-2 described how important it was to support the local population, “to continuously be with the people, not in a guarding capacity, but be there, to talk to them, sleep with them and eat with them.”

1965 may have been when the conflict was considered serious enough to call it a war, but it was 1972 when this became a fully fledged confrontation and accelerated, as RODA-P-3 conforms when asked when he thought it had changed, “’72, I was in Bulawayo”. He went on to describe why he thought this:

Ja, absolutely. The intensity, absolutely, Ja, because of the fronts. There were new fronts being opened up all the time. So I mean, how the thing really got going around about that period, and that of course, now you're talking about ZANLA, ZANLA's intensity. ZIPRA had already commenced their operations into Matabeleland in the '60s. Operation Nickel; I think was their major one, which incorporated the South African ANC. So that was in the late '60s, and then the intensity commenced after. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

It is important to note this second major stage in the war, as a number of external events changed its tenor particularly from 1975 when Mozambique gained Independence (McLaughlin, 1978, p. 179). Up until 1972 it could be argued that the Rhodesians were able to control the insurgency; certainly from a military perspective (Hoffman, Taw, & Arnold, 1991, p. 11). A good indicator of the increase in tempo of the conflict can be gained from considering the figures for the insurgents. By the Security Forces' own estimates, the number of guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia grew from 350 or 400 in July 1974 to 700 by March 1976, 2350 by April 1977, 5598 by November 1977, 6456 by March 1978, to 11,183 by January 1979 and as many as 12,500 by the end of the war. (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, p. 179)

#### **7.4 Counter-Insurgency**


The development of a counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary and learning process. The Rhodesians were mindful of other conflicts, particularly Kenya:

Counter-insurgency training for all Rhodesian Security Forces was adapted according to the lessons learnt in Kenya.... everything that could be learnt about the causes, consequences and handling of the Mau Mau insurgency was recorded, and a series of lectures and training demonstrations was prepared for delivery throughout Southern Rhodesia. (Flower, 1987, p. 10)

In addition to these comments another important source of experience came from those who had served in Malaya:

The Malayan conflict had a major impact on Rhodesian counter-insurgency tactics initially, thanks to the fact that many of the officers of the rank of major and above in the mid-1960s served in Malaya with the federal Army units that were deployed there. These included what was to become C Sqn SAS, from the Rhodesian Unit the Malayan Scouts, the Rhodesian African Rifles and the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. I am not sure if 1 and 2 KAR also served in Malaya that was before my time! When I joined the Rhodesian Army in 1965 our contact and counter-ambush drills were text-book Malaya. (RODA-M-8; 17/01/2011)

Counter-insurgency requires a comprehensive, strategic and organised approach that needs to be clearly defined and then articulated. Part of this requirement was the allocation of resources and identification of threats. Based upon these factors, which required detailed intelligence, the operational imperatives could be assessed and defined for action. Figure 7.1 displays the operational areas together with those of their opponents.



**Figure 7.1 Operational areas in Rhodesia**

(Wall, 2012)

Figure 7.1 indicates the number of borders that Rhodesia was trying to defend and how the country was divided into sectors for operational efficiency in order to achieve this. In addition this use of sectors fits with the provisions suggested in Table 7.2 by the French for the use of *quadrillage*.

## 7.5 Hearts and Minds

“It was the dictates of political ideology that led Rhodesia’s security forces into the classical dilemma of all counterinsurgents: victory in every tactical battle with guerrilla forces in the field, but loss in the vital strategic battle to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population” (Evans, 2007, p. 176).

The respondents were asked their impressions of ‘hearts and minds’ and whether it was commonly understood. The reply by RODA-P-3 was “No, we understood it, actually hearts and minds was a big issue. There was a big push to try and convert, to get to hearts and

minds”. He was pressed to consider when this came into the strategy, “It was late. It was too late [emphasis]” he continued:

You know, at this stage I mean it was almost full on war. I don't think there was too much support. No. I think Internal Affairs were probably [involved], because they were involved in it as well. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

RODA-P-4 was not supportive of the idea either, “Ja I did, first of all I didn't, I still think it was a waste of time, lets, when I say I thought it was quite a good concept but I changed my mind” and gave the impression that being soft on the population would not stop them from supporting the insurgents as they used brutal intimidation tactics:

I am a believer of fight fire with fire, but we could never be as gruesome as the gooks [insurgents], ... you know like cutting off peoples lips and noses and things like that, that was their speciality the gooks, we could never match that brutality so I think their hearts and minds worked much better than giving some vitamins some juju sweets. (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)

RODA-P-5 gives a similar view point when responding:

We couldn't give a shit for that [hearts and minds], it was a load of crap the people working on it, it was a load of crap, ... the fellows working on the hearts and minds they were hopeless cases, it didn't really work out so ja, that hearts and minds didn't work up there, they had it going in the middle of the war but it and towards the end but it didn't really work at all. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

Nevertheless, he also makes another point comparing the approach they got from the villagers when they pretended not to be with the security forces but with the insurgents:

Well we did that ourselves, we would supply villages but again we would try it as security force soldiers and then we'd try it as ZANLA terrorists or ZIPRA terrorists and we got a far better reception as ZANLA or ZIPRA terrorists, simple as that. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

Rather than attempting to provide the rural African with more facilities, there was a tendency to concentrate on broadening the representation of the African in government, however, this meant little to the average African and rarely offered a viable alternative to guerrilla intimidation. Moreover, with the Security Forces intent on eliminating guerrillas rather than winning hearts and minds, the latter tended to consist of a 'carrot and stick' approach (Beckett, 2007, p. 2). The stick was used for non cooperation with restrictions and punishments.

Collective fines were introduced in January 1973 if the presence of guerrillas was not reported within 72 hours, the fine being extracted in the form of livestock or, as in the case of

Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, in the form of enforced closure of African grinding mills and stores. Death sentences were introduced for harbouring guerrillas in September 1973 and the two pieces of legislation providing the legal basis for the enforcement of anti-terrorist measures-the Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act-were constantly updated (Beckett, 2007, p. 2).

A summary given by RODA-P-6 is perhaps the best indication of the difficulties that beset the Rhodesians:

The police were the main people responsible for the insurgency to keep law and order but internal affairs, the District Commissioner were actually the people responsible, because all the rural areas fell under them. So between, Internal Affairs and the police and the Military they decided to try a hearts and minds campaign based on the old Kenya and the old Mau Mau and Malaya. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

RODA-P-6 went on to describe how they tried to set up Protected Villages (PVs) but indicated that intimidation was still rife:

The theory was right, but in reality it never really worked because the people were more terrified of the guerrillas than they were of the Government, the people were more on the side of the guerrillas than the side of the Government so it was unsuccessful, very unsuccessful. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

A number of very important points are expressed in this summary and are dealt with subsequently. Although the police were at the forefront of dealing with the insurgency it was the Districts Commissioners that implemented the measures. These were similar to those that had been used elsewhere in the colonies, such as protective villages and food control; with varying degrees of success. The last point regarding intimidation is a very important one, as the respondent points out that 'hearts and minds' will not work, if the population are more terrified of the insurgents than they are of the Government and its promises.

### **7.5.1 Intimidation**

Although, the concept of 'hearts and minds' is usually perceived as a gentle approach it can be achieved by harsh measures too; as this description by RODA-P-5 elucidates:

To ensure that the locals did not pass on information, the Mugabe forces entered in the North East, would accuse an old man, usually too senile to even talk, of being an informer. A rock placed on his head and the kraal [villages] dwellers were forced to jump on the rock until we had what became known as a 'flathead'. Security forces, frustrated by not being called in the first place, would react to the scene and at times slap a few locals because they did not come forward with the information. Meanwhile, the flathead perpetrators had returned to Mozambique, only to return when the Security Forces had departed. They would again accuse the locals of being informants and

another flathead. Soon the locals were deadly silent and no one reported the presence of Terrs [to the Security Forces]. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

It can be seen from this account that the use of violence and intimidation would ensure the minds of the population remained firmly in support of the insurgents, even if their hearts thought otherwise (Kirk, 1975, p. 3; Mushonga, 2005, p. 179). Endorsing this description was the comment from RODA-P-2 about how much intimidation was taking place “Absolute, all over, absolute total intimidation, 90% of the time”. The process of indoctrination though intimidation was a definite strategy according to RODA-P-6:

ZANLA and ZANU got more entrenched and succeeded in indoctrinating the local population their influence spread like a plague as they went ahead because of their political indoctrination they were extremely successful in infiltrating large numbers of people, and the campaign spread rapidly through the country, they made a lot of ground because of their tactics that they used to indoctrinate the locals, terrify the locals, attack the local farmers. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

RODA-P-6 went on to describe what further form the process to control the minds of the population took:

Because they used political indoctrination they were taught by the Chinese, very successful, holding meetings of the locals, forcing them to sing, killing zealots, killing government representatives, chiefs, counsellors that sort of thing, ZIPRA never did that and by that way they terrified the local population, and they subjugated them, and they involved them in the struggle, ZAPU never involved the locals in the struggle. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

Once again the difference between the two revolutionary movements has been highlighted and is considered a significant factor when analysing the varying strategies. Understanding your enemy’s strategy is a central part of developing a counter-insurgency capability. Unfortunately, the ability to counter violent intimidation is very difficult, without extensive resources.

## **7.6 Strategies**

The need to separate the population from the insurgents has been laid out as a critical strategy progressively throughout this study. Forced resettlement of the population into Protected Villages (PVs), or ‘Villagisation’ as is sometimes referred to, was used in Rhodesia as well:

I believe that the Rhodesian senior command looked at the Briggs Plan as there were Rhodesian units (RAR and SAS) deployed in Malaya and were involved in its implementation there. Some elements of the plan were used in the Protected Village (PV) concept in Rhodesia. Having said that, I also know that the Rhodesian senior

command studied a similar tactic used by the Portuguese in Mozambique, which also had limited success... In comparing this with the Malaya Emergency one could possibly argue that the Rhodesians borrowed the best bits of Britain's strategy. (RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)

RODA-I-15 goes on to describe how this was managed by the Department of Internal Affairs, which had become a paramilitary arm of the administration:

The key to the success of any such concept will always be the civilian population and their attitude, who [sic] are being placed in the villages. From a Rhodesian view point they looked at the enemy in detail and realised that there was merit in the idea. They also determined that the responsibility for the PVs should be in the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [Intaf] and this is where Intaf became a paramilitary force. (RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)

A tacit agreement that the Rhodesians were adopting and using ideas used in other insurgencies, as RODA-M-14 indicated earlier, “the Rhodesians borrowed the best bits of Britain's strategy.” As he was in INTAF, he was in a good position to comment on its record:

Obviously there were some Intaf members and others including the elements of the BSAP and army who were against the Para-militarisation of the Ministry, but the necessities of the war negated their protests. Towards the end of the war, Intaf had the widest coverage of the country and the BSAP, army and air force were so stretched that many parts of the country were under partial guerrilla control, and only Intaf was left to try and do something about it. (RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)

Perhaps, this clearly puts into perspective how stretched the Rhodesian forces were towards the end of the war and why they were forced to the negotiating table at Lancaster House (Preston, 2004, p. 67):

The Protected Village scheme was much more unpopular with the enemy than with the local civvies. It was a direct Intaf responsibility and was based on the statement of Mao concerning the fish and water. If you take the water away from the fish they die! This was a major problem for the enemy as they were being deprived of food, intelligence, and home comforts. This was why so many of the PVs were regularly attacked during the war. This was also why Guard Force was raised, initially under command of Intaf, to take over the guarding [and] protection of PVs. The focus of Guard Force was soon diverted to rail and farm protection because of the deteriorating situation and Intaf continued to look after the PVs in their entirety. (RODA-M-14; 30/06/2012)

It appears these PV's were also called 'Keeps' or 'Povos':

In the Beitbridge area specifically we had a number of Keeps. So that all the locals were actually confined to these Keeps to try and minimize the support from the ground. What we called a Povo. What they called a Povo for the ZANLA. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

These appear more like overnight defensive potions than actual villages, which would have been protected at night but during the day the locals would return to their normal activities. Too often the Security Forces had forcibly removed the Africans to PVs and it is a measure of the failure of resettlement in Rhodesia that some 70 PVs in areas such as Mtoko, Mrewa and Mudsi had all restrictions lifted in September 1978 in the wake of the internal settlement. In almost every case the security situation immediately deteriorated, indicating how far the authorities had failed to win over the population (Beckett, 2007, p. 2).

RODA-P-11 was not supportive of the concept of PV's either and asserted that he felt they were counter-productive and badly placed:

I personally was not in favour of the PV concept in Rhodesia. It might of worked elsewhere, but in our case the PV's were first created in the rural north east of the country. Elsewhere, where they were created from a solid, well protected area and moved outwards. This meant that protection and logistics were far away. It also meant that terrorists, in order to have contact with locals had to move inward more quickly, in other words they were being brought closer to towns and farms, because without local support, forced or otherwise, they could not feed themselves. It also meant that our ability to gain intelligence was hampered. The protection of the PV's was suspect and the plan that locals from within [the PV] would assist in the protection did not really come about. Some months later, it took the Terrs just one night to remove the locals from the PV. (RODA-P-11; 24/01/2011)

RODA-P-4 was also dismissive of the idea when asked if they worked:

They also didn't work, I think it was from right in the beginning they were talking about [them]you see the Portuguese had these *Aldeamentos*, which was a protected village, they didn't even work 50% of the time". (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)

A implication that PVs were not effective due to the lack of the necessary protection, made them very vulnerable to attack, as he stated in the last sentence "it took the Terrs just one night to remove [eliminate] the locals from the PV". Although a model taken from the Malayan Emergency, it appears that application was as erratic, as it had been in Kenya, and loosely linked to an overall concept of 'hearts and minds'; thus making it piecemeal rather than a concerted integrated strategy (Cilliers, 1985, pp. 79-99). A pilot scheme for PVs had been tried in 1973, but the "main scheme then commenced with Operation 'Overload' in July 1974...Estimates of the total population of PVs range from 350,000 to 750,000 Africans" (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, p. 180).

It also appears that the other aspect of food control, associated with PVs, was not working either:



Invariably you would have a protected village in that area so that tended to be a bit of a fuck up. They didn't achieve much at all and no I think it was just feeding bins for the gooks. As you give the money to the people in the stockade there out it goes that night to the gooks. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

Collective punishment, summary arrest and food control formed part of the strategy; as they had done in other campaigns. Although criticised by Evans (2007), as a failure to apply 'hearts and minds' as a constructive strategy, he also indicates that the PV's were less about protecting the population and more about creating free zones for the army to operate within (p. 186). A similar interpretation is given by Beckett (1985) too, "PV's were regarded purely as a means of population control rather than a basis for winning 'heart and minds'" (p. 180). It would appear that "protected villages proved to be counter-productive" (Ellert, 1989, p. 27).

### **7.6.1 Incentives**

Incentives were used to encourage captures or kills according to RODA-P-5:

That's right, because we paid them well, and then we had this bonus system okay for the Selous Scouts and the SAS only, every gook {insurgent} you killed you got 50 rand [Rhodesian dollars] or 100 rand, if you killed 20 gooks total that by 100 rand. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/201)

Asked how were the 'kills' verified? "I would go on the ground and count the bodies". He also confirmed that they did not cut off ears as they had done in Malaya:

I would go on the ground and count but a lot of the time it wasn't necessary, because that came one of the captures we said well how many of them were you, well there were 10 of us well we killed 6 and maimed them and where was the other. The intelligence was very good, coming from the likes of Pete [removed], you know Pete, he actually had every single gook named right up towards the end of the war until all the field boys joined in and then you just lost control there. If you picked up one fellow, Pete would interrogate him for two weeks and you know he went to he'd go from where you were born, you went to school, you did this you did that, you joined that cadre, who was your commander, who taught you this, in depth stuff. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/201)

The second part of his response deals with two important aspects connected with intelligence. One is the level at which the Special Branch were operating, down to the point where they could actually identify dead bodies correctly, verifying the finger-prints. The other is how intensive intelligence gathering was to the overall process. The latter linked back to what was called 'Ground Coverage'.

## **7.7 The Rhodesian Police: The British South Africa Police (BSAP)**

As in both Kenya and Malaya, the police formed not only the backbone of the counter-insurgency effort but they also continued to play a major role in maintaining law and order; as well as obtaining intelligence (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, pp. 50-51). The BSAP had approximately 5,000 with “35,000 predominately White BSAP reservists” (McLaughlin, 1978, p. 180). At the height of the war the numbers increased to 2,000 whites and 6,000 blacks in the regular police (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 50): The important role the black policemen played within the BSAP should not be underestimated, especially their knowledge of local languages and cultures (Stapleton, 2011, p. 236). In addition was the role of the reservists according to RODA-P-9:

The number of police reservists was substantial for a small country and did a fantastic job manning stations, providing radio support around the clock and indeed taking part in military type operations. Most farmers were members of the reserve and most were fantastic shots. Some were outstanding bush trackers. (RODA-P-9; 24/01/2011)

RODA-P-9, went on to say how important the reservists were to the overall structure of the force as they provided well needed expertise as well as their time and energy, “Some of the best operational planners that I met were not members of the regular forces, but non regulars; like 2 and 6 Battalion of Bulawayo - who in civvy street were doctors, lawyers, farmers, businessmen”. These statements align with those given by the Kenya Police respondents where the Kenya Police Reserve played a similar role, as does this comment regarding the air support:

There was a Police Reserve Air Wing that played a very important part in the conflict. The reason for my comment is that as the war progressed, our Air Force was involved in many external operations in support of the SAS, Scouts and RLI, and internally the PRAW [Police Reconnaissance Air Wing] members were assisting wherever possible, often assisted in bringing injured members of the SF back to base, landing on farm strips and on one occasion the main road between Beit Bridge and Gwanda; transporting security personnel from one base to another. (RODA-P-9; 24/01/2011)

### **7.7.1 Ground-Coverage**

The Rhodesian Police force had developed an extensive intelligence network based on daily police duties in the field, which was termed ‘Ground-Coverage’. A comprehensive picture of what was happening in the local villages was built up continually by policemen when they were patrolling:

This include the names of all those from the village, what they were doing, where they were going, how they made their living, in fact everything that assisted in maintaining a comprehensive intelligence image of each village. Each constable would have his own

informants and these would be paid for their information on degree of 'usefulness'. This was then sent back to Special Branch teams who would collate the intelligence in to District reports, which allowed them to indentify insurgent activity and direct the Security forces to those areas where they had the best chance of obtaining good results. (RODA-P-12; 10/01/2011)

Confirmation of how this worked in practice was given by RODA-P-2:

I'd be doing patrolling. They'd be doing patrolling. We would patrol together [white and black policemen]. We'd collected it [intelligence]. We had special forms we had to fill in or type in. Can't remember if it was weekly or monthly or daily? We'd send that through to Special Branch, to our Special Branch runners. They would sift from it and send it up to Special Branch Headquarters. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)

He went on to elucidate further, as this was a major contribution to the overall intelligence capability of the Rhodesian forces:

Well we were the only people based in an area who had knowledge of that area. We were always in that area we were always patrolling from that area. We always had information as to what was going on in that area. We ran our sources and if we required any military assistance, army I'm talking about or air force we would call it. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)

### **7.7.2 Operations**

The importance of being able to speak the local language fluently allowed the police to operate more effectively, as they did not have to use interpreters as RODA-P-2 describes a typical operation:

He gave me a hell of a lot of information. And I went on my own. He would say to me, "Don't come tonight, the boys are in the area," or "Come tomorrow," or whatever. And I used to go on my own. We used to visit guys down the village on a mission in Shobani; we used to travel on our own. Yourself and one of your black guys and in hot [dangerous], hot areas. We had a Land Rover pickup. I used to pull the wires out of the one headlight and go down with one headlight, and come back and plug the wires in the two headlights and put a tin over the exhaust, so it looked like a different vehicle coming backwards and forwards. Little things like that. So Ja, we used to do a lot on our own. And you'd be better if you could speak the local lingo. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)

The problems for non Rhodesian born expatriates was raised to see if those not born and raised in Rhodesia could be effective without the language skills:

They did well. They got good information. But what I'm saying, it was hard for them. They were restricted in doing what we could do, because we knew the custom, we knew the language, knew the people, respected the people; which we did. We respected the fact that they had a hierarchy of control whatever. We'd go through those channels if necessary. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)

Knowledge of the local language and customs was beneficial for all aspects associated with dealing with the population. The importance of this aspect to the Security Forces, has been raised in all three case studies, as it has been recognised as one of significant factors for the Colonial authorities: even more so for the Rhodesians.

### **7.7.3 Police Anti-Terrorist Unit**

The police had a number of specialist units including the police Anti-Terrorist Unit (PATU) established in 1960. Bailey, who served with the Long Range Desert Group in World War Two-forerunner to the SAS-set this unit up with personnel drawn from the Rural Police Reserve. Credited with being more successful “than the rest of the Services put together” (Flower, 1987, p. 123) Other police units included the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams for urban incidents; A police Field Force support unit also known colloquially as the “Black Boots”, an Urban Emergency Unit, as well as the mounted division..It was important to ascertain whether PATU was just a duplicate of similar army units:

It was more independent. They were able to operate on their own more efficiently. Also, guys from that particular area that were members of PATU so they knew the area, they knew the roads, they knew the koppies [hills] and the caves and that sort of thing. I was a member of PATU for many years. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)

RODA-P-4 was able to add more details about the unit:

It started off as for additional training. . . . I mean we had instructors and they were good blokes, you know Bill Bailey he was ex long range desert group; and he was original SAS, but I mean their concept was with dessert war fighting, you know. So we had no real instructors on terrorist warfare. (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)

Indications are that in the police developed their tactics incrementally with additional support from the army. “Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment functioning in close cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p. 9). With regard to Rhodesia it could be argued this was the case, as all units worked closely with each other. As a result the transfer of intelligence and operational know-how between the security forces units was extremely good. Once again this highlights another important advantage the Colonial forces had between all their security apparatus.

## **7.8 Intelligence**

The previous two chapters have identified intelligence to be a central requirement in order to prosecute a counter-insurgency campaign (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 32). It can be argued that the Rhodesians understood the importance of this dimension through the way they linked

their intelligence gathering agencies under one organisation: the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). In 1963, the CIO was formed consisting of eleven branches, including Special Branch and all its separate divisions: internal, external, military, government telecommunications, close security and government protective security (Flower, 1987, p. 17). The incorporation of Special Branch was to make the difference, as it had its 'finger-on-the-pulse' in a way that Military Intelligence could never achieve. In essence an insurgency is a civil war and the population hold the information required, which can be accessed through the abilities of the police force linking back to Special Branch (Reid-Daly, 1999, p. 9).

It was seen as a Special Branch task to patiently piece together the ever-increasing jigsaw pieces of day-to-day information. Who were the insurgents? What were they up to? Where were they being trained? Who was training them? Who was supplying them? Where were their supply routes? Who were the known sympathisers? And so on ad infinitum. (Reid-Daly, 1999, p. 10)

Meshing intelligence into an effective outcome saw the development of a joint operation between the Army and Special Branch, using a technique that had been used in both Kenya and Malaya to great effective: Pseudo Gangs. The new unit was called the Selous Scouts and was formed in 1973, "it was a union which was to have far-reaching effects on the war in the future" (Stiff, 1982, p. 47). The evolution of the development in Rhodesia will be dealt with in section 7.12 Special Branch and in section 7.13 Special Units.

Special Branch had also penetrated deep into the various insurgent groups:

We also worked with political sources/contacts, deep cover, and those worked very very well for us okay. So we had deep cover stuff in ZANLA and ZIPRA and the Government right the way through until Mugabe took over. They were turned, they were primed earlier on, they were primed later, they were primed at that time and then proved to be very, very good that sort of thing. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

Asked if he thought the information was reliable, "Oh 100% because you would pick up very quickly if he was talking shit". In addition, was he able to ascertain this though his knowledge of the local language?

Not only my knowledge of the language, but my knowledge of the Takawira sector where I had been working for a year and a half, or my knowledge of that particular gang of gooks or whatever you know. You would very quickly find out if he was talking nonsense. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

The constant gathering of intelligence was critical as the Rhodesians did not have the manpower to cover the country, with a white population of 250, 000, in a country the size of France:

The only way they could counter that was to try and build up a very comprehensive intelligence picture of how the structures worked and then to select certain areas and when an area became too saturated they would take a whole Fire-Force and go in there and try and eradicate as quick as possible when they knew from intelligence there were big groups of guerrillas that could be easily countered. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

## **7.9 Special Branch**

The majority of the respondents were former members of Special Branch; therefore this case study is predominately a reflection of their views. It is important to emphasise that Special Branch played a central role in this conflict, predominately based upon the positive developments from other conflicts, chiefly Malaya and Kenya. Special Branch adopted many of the strategies and tactics, in particularly the use of pseudo operations from Kenya (Parker, 2006, p. 27):

Obviously our major responsibility was intelligence gathering. But at that stage, there was more emphasis on the internal operations, in terms of nationalism; also, trade-unionism, all those sort of things, and the European desk. There was a European desk as well. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

RODA-P-3 was asked to clarify why they would have a European desk, as 'European' was the word used in Southern Africa for whites:

Well, when I say European desk, it was white activists. There were a lot of white activists. But then the emphasis obviously started changing, once the infiltrations were starting to become effective. Then they started setting up these various desks of ZANLA, ZIPRA, and so it carried on. We started getting far more involved in the actual internal and external intelligence gathering, specifically on nationalism and of course their military rank. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

Special Branch also ran operations in Rhodesia and these were very effective.

### **7.9.1 Selous Scouts and Special Branch**

It was then important to clarify how Special Branch (SB) changed over the course of the war particularly with its relationships with other units:

As things went along they sort of formed these joint operational commands and obviously we've started working far closer with the army with the military. And in particular what actually happened was with the Scouts. They setup liaison officers at the various what they called forts, they were liaison directly between ourselves and the Scouts. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

‘Scouts’ is a reference to the Selous Scouts that were formed especially as a counterinsurgency and intelligence gathering unit; their formation came out of what was called ‘Z’ desk in SB, according to RODA-P-5. He goes on to add “we started off pseudo operations, Z desk operations at Red-Bricks, it was so successful that they then formed the Selous scouts, that’s where Uncle Ron comes in”. His reference to Uncle Ron; is to Ron Reid-Daley, who became head of the Scouts:

Then the unit formed the Selous Scouts got bigger and bigger and then they ended up being part of the biggest kill rate in the war but they still remained the same, they still did pseudo stuff all the way through. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

The development of a dedicated unit using pseudo operational tactics was very significant, as the next statement added:

So the Scouts went across there [outside of Rhodesia]as well, and then the Scouts from doing pseudo ground operations in Rhodesia then did flying column operations into Mozambique and Zambia, but again still pseudo, always dressed as the opposition. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

The use of ‘flying columns’ was considered a major development; as this indicates that the realm of operations had increased into neighbouring countries. There were also other important units “you had the Selous Scouts working internal and external, you had the SAS working only external, and then you had the RLI killing machine and that was a brilliant killing machine” (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011). RODA-P-5 was asked why it worked so well:

You had the two units combined so it was actually brilliant because you had your intelligence from Z desk and CIO okay, and then you had the fire power and the man power from the army and the aircraft as well. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

The link between Special Branch and the Selous Scouts was an important one:

For them to operate they were very reliant on our, [pause] not control but our involvement. They had to have our involvement because it involved freezing of areas; making sure that there was co-ordination between the various other services. And of course, we were the ones that were ultimately getting the intelligence out of these blokes handing them back to them for continued operations etc. so, they were very reliant on us. It was more of a closely working liaison with it, very difficult. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

The other important point mentioned here is the use of Joint Operational Command; a particular feature that evolved during this campaign. The other was the pivotal role that Special Branch played in turning captured insurgents, collating information and providing an operational framework for all units to use when formulating their plans.

RODA-P-3 indicates that using already turned insurgents to convince newly captured ones was part of this process, “We also used some of the captured guys to turn people. The turning of a capture [insurgent] wasn't a difficult task”. When asked why he thought it was not difficult to turn ‘captures’, he replied, “Because I think they had had enough out there. They had had enough. They had seen what we could do. Some of them were very lucky to be alive; very lucky to be alive”. An indication that changing sides did not trouble them as he added:

No, not at all, not at all[emphasis], and in fact, I can't recall, certainly from our little unit that we had there, we didn't have one desertion. Not one desertion. They lived within Beitbridge, within the compounds of Beitbridge. They had their weapons. There was no problem. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2012)

Confirmation was provided from another respondent RODA-P-5, who had been a member of SB:

I think out of the whole war three went sour. One fellow just turned around in the middle of the night and killed the whole call sign [stick]; another one killed two or three of a call sign, so we only had three that went sour which is bloody good in a 10 year war. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

RODA-M- 13 also confirmed this statement:

The reason for the Terrs changing sides was quite simple - they were not that politically motivated and many did not want to leave the country for training, but were forced to do so. Whilst in Gwanda in the later 70's we had 10-12 captured Terrs at our base, three ZIPRA and the remainder ZANLA. In almost all instances they turned within a very short time after capture, some the same day. None were tortured. All were asked individually at some point in time if they wanted to go home and all declined, including one member of the ZANLA General Staff, in other words, a field General. (RODA-M-13; 29/07/2012)

Clarifying the development of the pseudo operations indicates that it had been running in Special Branch first, before it became a total concept involving the army as well:

They were running off pseudo operations on a test, on a testing basis and I got involved with that so I was working with the pseudo operators before the Selous scouts were formed. I think it was towards the end of 73. RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011

It is considered significant that Special Branch were running their own pseudo operations before the Army became involved through the Selous Scouts. As RODA-P-3 stated, “as I said to you, we had our own little unit that we had developed from captures. The original pseudo operation started early in the '70s”. He was when asked to clarify who actually ran these units, “Originally, Special Branch, originally, until the army got involved



and then I think Walls. General Walls”. Asked which section of SB he replied, “Well we had the Branch One and Branch Two, Branch One did that”. RODA-P-3 then provided an interesting aside, “they had the black Special Branch members as well”, which was important to show how much the security forces were integrated, especially the police. Having black Africans allowed them to fit into the local populace:

It was unconventional and of course it wasn't a conventional war we were fighting. We were fighting a terrorist warfare, bush war. And they had to fit in; they had to melt in with the local populace. And it worked. It worked. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

The overall coordination of the pseudo operations was undertaken by SB, “It was such a delicate operation. You had to have the coordination. You know, areas were frozen. Who could freeze an area? It had to be coordinated, so that's where the Special Branch came in too” added RODA-p-3. The ability to freeze an area meant that no other security forces could enter during the operation to prevent inadvertently killing your own forces.

In Kenya, witchcraft appears to have played an important role in the ability to sway captured insurgents that the power of the spell had been broken by their arrest. It was significant to ascertain from RODA-P-3 if this was the case in Rhodesia, “No, not in that area. But I think up in the Mashonaland area, very much so, very much so”. Unfortunately he could not confirm how far it was an influence ‘Look, I never operated up there, so I can't, I think so, yes, definitely, from what I've read anyway, ja”. However, RODA-P-4 confirmed that there was a connection to Kenya through the early trail runs of Pseudo Operations:

Mike Powell and I remember talking to him and he had done Pseudo work in Kenya and I think, but I think he was killed in one of those Viscounts that were shot down and they had also done experimental, but under Special Branch. (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)

Sometimes disguise was used just for patrols although it appears that more surreptitious operations were being conducted outside of Rhodesia:

You had your pseudo gangs operating within the borders of Rhodesia and anyone who operated external were more clandestine, although they dressed as gooks it was just to blend in and maybe patrol it was just a disguise, but there were no pseudo operations as such carried out. Ja. Because the whole idea was to get in amongst the locals and take out groups, ultimately try and control an area. . (RODA-P-4; 26/01/2011)

## **7.10 Specialised and Elite Units**

Rhodesia developed a number of specialised units during the Bush war (Hoffman, et al., 1991, pp. 23-24). The formation of the Selous Scouts and the close relationship with Special Branch has already been discussed. The importance of this combined effort needs to

be emphasised, as its capabilities have been well documented (Croukamp, 2006; Parker, 2006; Reid-Daly, 1999; Stiff, 1982). The other is the development of what was termed 'Fire-Force' concept, using the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) to be an air mobile attack unit, acting on intelligence. The following units will be discussed:

- Fire-Force
- Dogs
- Mounted Units
- Grey Scouts
- Rhodesian SAS
- Tracker Units
- Selous Scouts
- Psychological Action Unit

## **7.11 Fire-Force**

Fire-Force would be called in following up on the active-intelligence obtained by the Selous Scouts or the BSAP and passed back through the chain. Using helicopters, which were in short supply due to sanctions, the troops would be brought straight to the zone of insurgent operations and confront them (Cocks, 1998; Stiff, 1982, pp. 86-87). Dakotas were also used dropping Para-borne troops from the RLI and using a helicopter gun ship as a support. The success of this tactic required expansion of the unit; as the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) was already trained and available they were integrated quickly. RAR was a predominately black African unit by apparently, "there was no shortage of Black volunteers" to join Fire-Force (Croukamp, 2006, p. 182).

### **7.11.1 Dogs**

Dogs were an integral part of all aspects of the security forces operations. Even the Grey Scouts, who operated on horseback, had tracker dogs as part of the patrol (Onoszko, 1991, p. 17):

The BSAP deployed with dogs that were trained to follow human beings as well as for detecting explosives. The Rhodesian Engineers also used dogs to detect explosives and there was at least one female dog handler who was extremely good at finding and lifting mines! The Rhodesian Air Force used dogs for airfield protection and had a number of handlers based at that major air bases at New Sarum, Salisbury and at Thornhill in Gwelo. The Prison Service also used dogs for security purposes at the different jails. Another little known unit was the Rhodesia Railways Security Unit who were responsible for all railway lines and stations. They had their own dog training and handlers and deployed at the major centres of Rhodesia. (RODA-I-15; 20/06/2012)

### **7.11.2 Mounted Units**

Mounted Units formed an important component of operations against the insurgents, for all the reason already identified in the two previous case studies. There was a historical precedent for the use of horses as the BSAP was formed as mounted force (McLaughlin, 1978, p. 179). “The BSAP had one troop of mounted men attached to Black Boots who were used for tracking purposes, ground coverage ops in support of Black Boot operations” according to RODA-P-2. The army also saw the merits of using horses and formed the Grey Scouts in 1976.

### **7.11.3 Grey Scouts**

After a successful trail run with the Mounted Infantry Unit, the Grey Scouts were formed. The benefit of using horses was seen as a viable way to compensate for the lack of helicopters for getting forces to a ‘contact’. Furthermore, there was a shortage of fuel for vehicles, coupled the ability of the horse to cross rugged terrain and the benefits are obvious (Onoszko, 1991). “Horses were less vulnerable to mines and ambushes than vehicles. Additionally, horse-mounted troops were better able to detect insurgent groups in the bush than helicopter borne troops” (p. 16).

### **7.11.4 Rhodesian SAS**

The SAS were formed as part of the reformed parent unit and joined them in the Malayan Emergency. They returned to Rhodesia post Emergency although disbanded before being reformed in 1961. Originally trained in Hereford, Britain, with the remnants of those from the Malayan Emergency, becoming ‘C’ squadron SAS. The trained ‘cadre’ returned to Rhodesia and became the instructors for the build up of the unit from 1962 onwards (Cole, 1984, pp. 18-20). Principally used for external operations, primarily intelligence gathering, they were a highly effective unit (Hoffman, et al., 1991, pp. 77-87). The numbers of men in the SAS went up to approximately 250 when in June 1978 "C" Squadron (Rhodesian) Special Air Service became 1 (Rhodesian) Special Air Service Regiment until the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980, when it then disbanded (The Rhodesian SAS, 2012).

### **7.11.5 Tracker Units**

There was the Army Tracker Combat Unit (TCU), which was used to train all other units and operated in support of all others units as well. With the formation of the Selous Scouts the TCU was transferred to operate directly with the Selous (Stiff, 1982, p. 82). The

unique feature of the Rhodesian security forces were the large number of trackers, both white and black, available to undertake tracking operations (Croukamp, 2006; Parker, 2006).

#### **7.11.6 Selous Scouts**

Developed from the success of pseudo operations run by Special Branch this unit became the primary combat-intelligence gathering component of the Security Forces. It also became used for external combat operations, as its capabilities were exploited due to shortages of manpower (Hoffman, et al., 1991, pp. 87-90). “A full sixty eight percent of all insurgent fatalities inside Rhodesia could be attributed to the Selous Scouts” (Cilliers, 1985, p. 133). The other aspect that is associated with these pseudo operations is the ability to sow distrust and suspicion amongst different insurgent groups (Cilliers, 1985, p. 128). Psychological warfare was also central to the efforts used by the regime in an effort to undermine support for the insurgent’s minds (Melson, 2005, p. 63). The army also had specialised unit called the Psychological Action Unit (PsyAc).

#### **7.11.7 Psychological Action Unit**

In addition to this unit a psychological warfare section was set up in 1977 to try and influence the general falling support for the war. Indications are that it had more effect on the white population than majority black and had poor results (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 129). Conceptually bound to the phrase ‘Hearts and Minds’; yet at the offset did not even have any black Africans on its staff. The implications for an effective strategy, or more likely ineffective, are obvious (Stiff, 1982, pp. 280-281). Although it can be argued that aspects of the psychological approach were apparent in other areas, particularly Intaf, generally the realisation of its importance came too late to be successful as a strategy (Cilliers, 1985, p. 148). Confirmation of this came from RODA-I-15:

The Rhodesians were a bit slow in realising the importance of this and in an effort to close the gap they introduced additional PsyOps [psychological operations] tactics over and above the PV concept. This was possibly the wrong way around! The other PsyOps measures included Interface Operations which were designed to get the locals outside of the PVs on sides. It was implemented by both the army and Intaf units as Operation Split-shot. (RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)

‘Split-Shot’ was similar to the approach taken in Kenya, dispersing leaflets from the air in an effort to convince the population that they should support the Government. Closely related to all aspects of psychological operations is the use of propaganda.

## 7.12 Propaganda

Propaganda played an important role for all sides in this conflict: the insurgents and the Government. Each side wished to show the other in a bad light and used every trick and nuance that they could to achieve this goal.

There was regularly fighting having a go at each other, killing each other. Because obviously ZANLA were encroaching on ZIPRA territory Matabeleland belonged to Nkomo; and ZANLA had this particular front and they were coming through. And in fact towards the end they were pouring through. There were just sheer numbers. So there was a lot of conflict. And obviously we used Scouts to ferment the situation, absolutely and it worked magic. It worked very well. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

Part of the role played by the pseudo operations was destabilisation which tried to sow discontentment and delusion amongst the differing factions of ZIPRA and ZANLA. RODA-P-5 was asked, how much was his section of Special Branch used in destabilisation between the two?

Heavily, heavily involved there, very heavily involved, Ja. It was an important element, it was done through CIO [Central Intelligence Organisation] and externally, we got them fighting each other externally, which was excellent; before they even sent the troops in [to Rhodesia]". (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

## 7.13 Rhodesian Administration

The Department of Internal Affairs (Intaf) was created out of the old Native Department with the use of District substituted in appointment titles. There were fifty-four districts throughout Rhodesia and each was led by a District Commissioner (DC) (Wall, 2012). The following comments were made by RODA-P-2 and P-3:

Once again, Internal Affairs was like a legacy of the old colonial regime. We had the District Commissioners and the tea-timers [derogatory] and all that crap. Some of the DC's were indigenous white Rhodesians who were good at the job. But again, it was a civilian organization becoming involved in a military campaign. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/2011)

Internal Affairs had good knowledge of the area. Internal Affairs did good things prior to the war hitting your specific area. Dipping and dog vaccinations and patrolling the areas and stuff like that. So they had good knowledge of the people. So in that respect it was good but when they became involved in the conflict side they weren't all that good. (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011)

Intaf also provided valuable assistance with informer networks, guides, information on the general area and logistical support for operations (Wall, 2007). The extent of the role played by Intaf is often underrated, which as the comments have shown is not deserved.

The Protective Villages (PV) was the responsibility of Intaf, “Internal Affairs. They were inside. They were part of the tribal authorities. They were the guards. Ja. And it subsequently grew into a thing called Guard Force” (RODA-P-10; 27/01/2011).

As the war escalated and more PV's were built, the strain on the Ministry of Internal Affairs to provide the required personal became prohibitive. It was argued that National Servicemen were required to guard the people and patrol the area. The police were stretched as was the Army. This eventually led to the formation of the Guard Force (Wall, 2007).

### **7.13.1 Legal Measures**

Legal measures were in place as in other conflicts: Emergency Powers Act, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act 1964 amended 1974 and the Indemnity Compensation Act of 1975 (Hassan, 1984). However, Martial Law itself was not instituted until 1978, used progressively to include more and more areas until by the end of the war it covered almost 90% of the country (Preston, 2004, p. 76). According to figures reported in the Boyd Report (Boyd as cited Delap, 1979, p. 434) there were only 232 persons detained under the Emergency Powers Acts, but this does not include statistics for Martial Law. Another effective piece of legislation was the use of the curfew to restrict movement after day light hours (Mushonga, 2005, p. 172). The legal measures are part of a suite of measures to counter:

Intimidation, sabotage, violence, incitement, the carrying of weapons, and acts of terrorism, the Act gives the police and the Minister of Home Affairs arbitrary powers to control suspected or potential foes, and to criminalise ordinary political activity. It provides for the prohibition of public meetings, processions, publications, the wearing of certain uniforms, boycotting, passive resistance to the law, the making of 'subversive statements' broadly defined, and other forms of political protest and opposition. (Weitzer, 1984, p. 532)

Rhodesia continued to uphold the rule of law as promulgated by the legislature. The measures may well have been draconian, but no more so than had been applied in both Kenya and Malaya, with the exception of Martial Law (Martin, 2006). The evidence of the use of the judicial system to prosecute and try those arrested confirms the continued application of the rule of law during the insurgency (Kirk, 1975, pp. 28-38).

## 7.14 Witchcraft, Sorcery and Spirit Mediums

In both Kenya and Rhodesia, tribal religion, witchcraft, sorcery and belief in ancestral worship played a significant part in the conflicts. RODA-I-15 who served with Internal Affairs (Intaf) explained further:

The Shona and Ndebele people have always practiced ancestral worship. They believe that the spirit of individual ancestors will always settle in the individual bodies of the living. There are specific ceremonies that take place to formalise this "process". The individual who oversees this process is known as a "spirit medium". All black Africans in sub Saharan Africa understand and believe this as being true ,even those who profess to be Christians, even the likes of Mugabe and South Africa's Mandela. They also believe that there are good and evil spirits and that an evil spirit can and will take possession of a person's body if it suits their purpose. A further belief is that a "witch doctor" can encourage or get an evil spirit to possess a person and do his / her will. The business of African religion and witch craft is a study in its own right. (RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)

RODA-I-15 then went on to elucidate further:

In Intaf we were obliged to study African Customs and Customary Law and to write exams on them. This also applied to African languages. Suffice to say we knew where all the spirit mediums lived as did the locals and the enemy. The enemy did try to get the spirit mediums to support them through intimidation or popularity. When a terrorist gang moved into an area the first thing they did was to make contact with the spirit mediums to get their "blessing" and their protection. If they did not then the spirits would be angry and do them a disservice! The enemy believed that they could be and were anointed with "medicine" to make them bullet proof etc. In my unit I was often the only white person and most of my blokes all believed in the spiritual world. (RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012)

The Rhodesian authorities understood the importance that the tribal religion played amongst the African population. The concept was not scoffed at by the Europeans, on the contrary they went to great lengths to understand it and utilise it, as RODA-I-15 has outlined. A considerable amount of research in support of this aspect of African society is available (Gelfand, 1967; Lan, 1985; Ranger, 1985). Instructions to District Commissioners in the 1960s indicated that they needed to be more cognisant of the importance of the mediums and their role in tribal loyalties towards the administration (Ranger, 1982, p. 365).

It was important to clarify whether oaths had been used as part of the binding process in Rhodesia, as they had been in amongst the Mau Mau in Kenya; as both conflicts involved Bantu tribes. RODA-P-11 explains:

I too don't think oaths were used, but Spirit Mediums, especially for ZANLA forces. The main spirit medium is one that is always called/titled *Mbuya Nehanda*. The Brits executed her in 1890, due to the number of witchcraft murders in the country, but a

new one will always arise and seen as the authentic link with the fore-fathers. She played a part during and after our war. (RODA-P-11; 24/01/2010)

The power of the spirit medium Nehanda should not be underestimated (Clark, 1985, p. 119). Johnson (1981) also endorses the importance for the guerrilla leaders of communicating with the first spirit leader Nehanda on all aspects of their plans (p. 75). Spirit mediums played a crucial role in developing counter-guerrilla strategies (Evans, 2007, p. 185; Johnson & Martin, 1981, pp. 75-78) The indoctrination and night time rallies held in the villages, called *pungwes*, always included incantations to the great spirits (Ranger, 1985, p. 205).

It has been important to recognise the unique position tribal religion plays in African culture (Mbiti, 1969, p. 1). Consequently, it was an important factor to deal with when analysing the conflicts in Africa.

## **7.15 A Counter-Insurgency Plan**

Developing a counter-insurgency plan requires considerable appreciation of the end game, that is to say what are the ultimate objectives:

The objectives from the Rhodesians did change for the simple reason that as the insurgency spread and became more country wide and more overpowering and overwhelming, they decided at higher level that perhaps the best way to do it was to attack them at their launching point in the countries surrounding the country deeper and deeper and then eventually towards the end of the war to actually attack those countries. That was the overall plan. (RODA-P-5; 23/01/2011)

Therefore, the plan evolved as the tempo of the war changed in line with tactics the opposition were using:

The Rhodesian forces understood that, they understood the tactics used by both sides, the tactics and fighting both sides were different, the strategy to attack or to counter both sides was different, it was understood by the defence, the Rhodesian forces, it was very well understood, it was understood. (RODA-P-6, 23/01/2011)

### **7.15.1 Joint Operations Centre**

The creation of a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) was an important aspect that was copied from the British in Malaya bringing together all arms of the Security Forces. High ranked officers formed the Centre, so that command decisions could be made without recourse to another layer of decision making. In addition they had oversight of all operations to avoid conflicts with other operations (Hoffman, et al., 1991, p. vi). To further enhance the system sub-JOCs were set up in major operational areas to coordinate activities. The JOC held daily meetings to discuss operations and arrive at consensual command decisions.



Although JOCs worked well at the tactical level, the Rhodesians discovered that the system was not effective at the senior command level, where ultimate authority had to be exercised by a single ‘supreme’ commander; not created until 1977 when Lieutenant General Walls became Commander of Combined Operations, but he too was still answerable to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 61). Combined Ops linked directly with the War Council, which was highest level of ministerial and operational control for all sensitive operations (Melson, 2005, pp. 65-66). Walls remained answerable to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, which often hindered tactical requirements to fall in line with national strategy and political exigencies (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 190).

### **7.15.2 What Worked**

Asked what aspects of strategy and tactics worked best, the replies were, “Covert operations, obviously, intelligence in conjunction with covert operations. It's the only thing that can work” was the reply from RODA-P-3. RODA-P-4 comment was, “to be quite honest the Fire-Force, that was the thing that worked well”, but he expounded that most ideas were good, “I think most ideas were good it was just we didn't have the man power, you know to, because some areas they became no-go areas for security forces”. A common thread throughout the testimonies and literature was the lack of manpower in relation to the forces the insurgents could call upon. The admission that there were also ‘no-go’ areas was quite startling too:

They were never publicised as no-go areas but it was; the gooks [insurgents] had it. You know the security forces wouldn't go into that area and that was Taboo, those areas the Scouts [Selous Scouts] couldn't operate because they had such a good security system going on so they were liberated areas. (ROD-P-4; 26/01/2011)

RODA-P-4 continued when asked what should have been done differently, “Fought the war externally, the whole emphasis would [sic] have been external”. What aspect would he have targeted, “Obviously, roots would be one, the camps for sure. Those were the most successful operations we had, external”. A number of operations had been conducted outside of the borders of Rhodesia and raised a lot of controversy not least from South Africa (Barratt, 1976, p. 157). RODA-P-3 too seems to feel that there should have been “greater emphasis on external operations, Ja. I think they came too late. Had we started it earlier and nipped it in the bud”, he felt they could have been more successful.

In addition the lack of airpower, due to international restrictions hampered the operational efficiency of many units, “air power. We could have done with a lot more air

power; particularly helicopters. I mean that 'Fire-Force' concept in that situation was unbeatable. They proved themselves time and time again that was the answer" (RODA-P-3; 25/01/2011). The lack of airpower, particularly helicopters, which were vital to the 'Fire-Force' concept of identify insurgents then bring in the troops by air to eliminate, was severely hampered by sanctions against the country (Preston, 2004, p. 76).

Growing desperation with the lack of resources and manpower is re-enforced by this comment from RODA-P-5, "In fact towards the end of the war they recruited youngest age 16, 17; that young Ja, 16, 17 not even 18 hey". There also appeared to be an element of the inevitable in their reflections when asked if a political settlement was the only way it could have been ultimately resolved:

Absolutely. Look, I think, going back I think if Smith [Prime Minister] had have gotten Nkomo [on side] then they had have signed up earlier, I'm not sure. But I think it was inevitable really it would end up the way we did. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

Ron Reid Daley (1999) summed up the general situation in Rhodesia near the end in 1978, when the heart had gone out of the Security Forces:

The situation in Rhodesia was crumbling. It has been crumbling visibly for at least a year. The stink of political defeat, which in practical terms always pre-empts a military defeat, even though the formations in the field might be intact and undefeated, had begun to seep like blood-poisoning into the veins of the security forces, and even visibly, into the veins of Rhodesia itself. (Reid-Daly, 1999, p. 480)

These sentiments are reiterated by Flower (1987) Head of the Rhodesian Intelligence Organisation, when he describes in detail the last days of the Smith government and the warnings given by the military commanders of the failing situation (pp. 194-209). However, it is important to note:

At the end of the war the Rhodesian Security Forces had surrendered no city or major communications route and the BSAP had closed no police station, even along the Mozambique frontier. The guerrillas had not succeeded in establishing any 'liberated zones', although clearly large parts of Rhodesia were being contested. (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, p. 186)

Nonetheless, as RODA-P-6 sums up:

The South Africans had decided 'Detente' was the way to go. They cut off our ammunition, we were down to our last ammunition, they put pressure on us to make

peace, and they were under pressure from the Americans and the British. So it was the British, the Americans and the South Africans that we had no more friends, our friends had walked away from us. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

### 7.16 The French Influence on Counter-Insurgency

As discussed in the previous case studies, a number of strategies have been used that align with French thinking on counter insurgency; as laid out in Table 7.2. The main strategies in Rhodesia were consistent with those used in both Kenya and Malaya.

In the case of Rhodesia all the elements were used in an effort to curb the activities of the insurgents. However, due to the shortage of manpower many of them were not used as effectively as they should have been. Consequently they did not have the desired outcome they had in the other two campaigns. The use of *regroupment* was attempted with the use of ‘Protected Villages’ but this did not prove a great success and in many ways has been argued was a failing, as it allowed the insurgents to intimidate and terrorise the villages which were not protected.

**Table 7.2 Key aspects of French counter-insurgency theory used in Rhodesia**

| Aspect   | How applied in Rhodesia  |
|--|--|
| <i>Quadrillage</i> : (over-laying an administrative grid on the map to control defined areas of population and territory). | The country was divided into tactical areas<br>As per the map in Figure in Appendix E  |
| <i>Ratissage</i> : (cordonning, raking or sweeping /clearing the area systematically)                                      | Undertaken when it was known that insurgents were operating in known area.   |
| <i>Regroupement</i> : bring together in one area   | Protected Villages-not implemented until late in the conflict, but used.   |
| <i>Tache d'huile</i> : or 'oil spot' strategy, spreading influence from cleared area                                       | Was in fact used by the guerrillas as they slowly infiltrated the country; although the Rhodesians maintained the major towns. |
| <i>Recruitment</i> : use of local leaders and use of native forces   | The Home Guard principal or Guard Force was also not used until late in the conflict<br>1978-INTAF                             |
| Paramilitary organization and militias   | (BSAP and Special Units). These formed the back bone of the counter-insurgency.  |

(Adapted from Alexander & Keiger, 2002; Gougeon, 2005)

Additionally, the ability to use the oil spot principle actually seemed to have been used more by the insurgents than the Security Forces. It was the insurgents that gradually forced their opponents to cede ground, only in the bush areas not in any urban ones, as they intimidated more of the rural areas, which were difficult to protect.

### **7.17 Summary**

The Rhodesian 'Bush War' was far more complex than that of either of the conflicts in Malaya or Kenya, as it had a larger number of variables which included: the thrust of international Communism, the clamour for decolonisation in Africa, Britain's role, the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, international distain for the rogue Rhodesian regime through increased economic and political sanctions, loss of support from South Africa and the rise of African political and social identity, to name but a few (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, pp. 163-168). The participants responses that have formed the narrative, point to a growing disenchantment with the enforced restraints caused by sanctions on their capabilities to continue the conflict. The narrative also points to a versatile and flexible contingent of people that were involved in this counter-insurgency.

A number of innovative strategies and tactics were developed during this conflict: Fire-Force, Pseudo Operations, Combined Intelligence Organisation together with an integration of security forces that was effective. Special Branch played a pivotal role in all aspects of the campaign. The political dimensions were more problematic, especially with the application of a concerted 'Hearts and Minds' strategy; as part of a counter-insurgency doctrine. Intimidation was found to be difficult to combat and became an obstacle to achieving greater support from the population; according to the respondents. Table 7.3 highlights the important elements that have merged from this case study.

The shortage of manpower directed most of the operational decisions and it can be argued, forced a guerrilla centric approach to combating the insurgency as opposed to a population centric approach. The charge made by Preston (2004) is that the Rhodesians concentrated too much on the tactic of striking the insurgents and trying to wipe out their capabilities rather than protecting the villages. Although it can be argued they had no choice with the limited resources at their disposal. However, the Rhodesians did continue to have police all the areas with the Internal Affairs maintaining a presence in the tribal areas throughout the war. Therefore, the argument that there was only a counter-guerrilla doctrine is not supported by the evidence; it was a major tactic, but there was a counter-insurgency

doctrine supported by a political agenda. It was the political agenda that failed to gain sufficient support to achieve an internal settlement.

A further significant factor was the relationship the Rhodesian Forces had with their indigenous colleagues. In many respects this was unique. Consequently, providing more recorded data on the important role indigenous forces played, as part of the structure of combating insurgencies, has been part of this research process. There appears to be latent recognition of this important aspect when dealing with countering insurgencies in other lands, “most counterinsurgency [sic] campaigns are not won or lost by external forces, but by indigenous forces”(Jones, 2008, p. 9). Although a difficult and complex area for modern forces to adjust to and implement, it is considered almost imperative for the future of most counter-insurgency operations (Byman, 2005; Byman, 2006; Corum, 2006).

The Rhodesians were more inter-connected than perhaps the other colonies had been when it comes to discussing the relationship between the authorities and the Security Forces. The majority of Rhodesians were connected by shared culture, common bonds of schooling, farming, sports and sense of community. The territorials were the back bone of the forces, they also had to run their farms and businesses, as well as serve in the forces. Consequently, they were also well aware of the intimidation that was taking place amongst their African work force, primarily because they were being informed by their indigenous colleagues and by the workers themselves. A large amount of intelligence was gained through this close relationship and perhaps much more so than in Kenya and Malaya.

Table 7.3 once again brings together all the elements that have been discussed in this chapter in relation to the themes established in the Literature Review and from the process of coding undertaken to assign alternative themes based upon responses. All three of the tables produced in each of the case studies are combined in Chapter 8 to facilitate comparative analysis of the elements in an effort to identify common threads.

Perhaps the most important aspect that is reflected by this table are the shortages of resources that hampered the operational imperatives required to combat the insurgents. For example, aircraft were in very short supply as were parts to repair any that were damaged, because of sanctions these parts were not available. Helicopters had become core to ‘Fire-Force’ operations and had proved themselves to be very effective, but once again they were in very short supply (Mills & Wilson, 2007). The same argument can be made for the ability to police the ‘protected Villages, there was not enough manpower to accomplish this, even though it was recognised as important to prevent intimidation.

**Table 7.3 Summary of important elements from the findings**

| Element                  | Rhodesia                                  |
|--------------------------|---|
| Administration           | Part of the wider political process       |
| Aircraft                 | Effectively used/ short supply            |
| Communications           | Highly effective radio net work           |
| Dogs                     | Extensive use/effective                   |
| Food Control             | Limited success/ hard to police           |
| French Lessons           | Pop control, sweeps/ detentions           |
| Hearts And Minds         | Limited success/patchy/half hearted       |
| Helicopters              | Extensive use/ shortage/effective         |
| Home Guard               | Set up as Guard Force/poor                |
| Indigenous Forces        | Volunteers in the all units               |
| Insurgents               | Communist/ Shona and Ndebele              |
| Intelligence             | Very effective and comprehensive          |
| Language                 | Large number of local speakers            |
| Lessons Learnt           | Integrated forces/SB pivotal              |
| Mechanisms               | JOC /No overarching supremo               |
| Mounted Units            | BSAP/ Grey Scouts effective               |
| Notable Personalities    | Walls/ Reid Daly/ Flower/Henderson        |
| Oaths And Sorcery        | Spirit mediums very influential           |
| Organisation             | Highly effective/ restricted numbers      |
| Police                   | Highly effective/ well structured         |
| Population               | Not inclusive enough/ failure             |
| Problems                 | Limited resources/sanctions/politics      |
| Propaganda               | Comprehensive/ limited success            |
| Pseudo Gangs             | Highly successful/widely used             |
| Psychological Operations | Limited success/limited                   |
| Reasons For Conflict     | Communism/Colonialism/land issues         |
| Roads                    | Access good as not dense bush             |
| Special Branch           | Pivotal/integrated/highly successful      |
| Special Units            | SAS/Selous Scouts/ RLI/Fire-Force         |
| Spotter Planes           | Used effectively / PRAW                   |
| Strategy                 | Dominated by political/generalist         |
| Structure Of Forces      | Based on British model/highly effective   |
| Subversion               | Grew consistently/intimidation            |
| Success                  | Militarily successful/ politically failed |
| Tactics                  | Multiple combined tactics                 |
| Villages                 | Used but not supported/unpopular          |

## **7.18 Significant and Influential Actors**

It has been argued throughout this study that a number of significant actors greatly enhanced the Colonial authorities' ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations due to their expertise and knowledge. A number had a major role on the development of tactics and strategies within the Rhodesian conflict. General Peter Walls, head of the Army had served in Malaya commanding the Rhodesian contingent in 1951, together with Ron Reid Daley, who was commanding officer of the Selous Scouts (Stiff, 1982, p. 44). Bill Bailey had served with the Long Range Desert Patrol Group (LRDPG), a fore-runner to the SAS and who ran PATU. Mac McGuinness, a long serving Rhodesian police officer was the 'brains' behind the Selous Scouts, as he was the SB controller (Stiff, 1982, p. 47). Ian Henderson, of Kenya Police fame who ran the pseudo gangs and captured Kimathi, was brought into Rhodesia as an advisor (Flower, 1987, p. 114). The experience these men had concerning the use of special operations from other theatres of war cannot be underestimated.

There were a large number of troops that had served in Malaya, notably the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) that brought their experience back to Rhodesia. A large number of Kenyans, who had served during the Emergency, had migrated to Rhodesia upon the granting of Independence in 1963 (Flower, 1987, p. 28). Many BSAP officers had be sent up to Kenya to learn from the Emergency; experience they were to use during the Bush War. Flower, the Head of CIO was sent up to Kenya to learn about counter-insurgency as the stirrings of unrest were unfolding in southern Africa (Flower, 1987, p. 10). (See Appendix B).

## **7.19 Conclusion**

Rhodesia faced a formidable series of obstacles in its efforts to overcome the insurgency; not least of these was the support the insurgents were receiving from Communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China (Guelke, 1980). The United States was not prepared to support the Smith regime and sustained international sanctions applied by Britain and the international community (Onslow, 2006; Watts, 2006). The collapse of Portugal's African colonies, followed by the South Africans changing their policy of supporting Rhodesia, in the quest for more international support for the apartheid regime, sealed the fate for Rhodesia (Evans, 2007; Preston, 2004). It managed to hold out militarily, but was unable to fashion an internal settlement capable of gaining majority support. Britain re-established its legitimacy over the Colony and forced elections to be held leading to an independent

Zimbabwe in 1980 (Day, 1975; de Meneses & McNamara, 2012; Evans, 2007; Galtung, 1967; Onslow, 2009).

Rhodesia certainly utilised many of the strategies tactics and policies used in the other two conflicts to counter the insurgency: mostly effectively. Arbuckle (1979) has argued manpower restraints forced the military to adopt a counter-guerrilla approach as opposed to a counter-insurgency approach. Whereby they chose to find and destroy the insurgents rather than trying to defend the population against intimidation and terrorism (p. 29). A failure to garner the support of the population led to a loss of political support (p. 32). The realisation came too late to apply the concept of 'hearts and minds' or adopt the protective villages strategy effectively, as was used in Malaya.

There was a unified command structure which ran a very effective campaign. The use of innovative units such as Fire-Force, Selous Scouts, SAS, Grey Scouts and PATU served effectively. The Security Forces recruited indigenous forces; with Internal Affairs creating Home Guard units. The Police worked very effectively, as a multi-racial force and were capable of sourcing a wide range of intelligence across the board. Special Branch was particularly adept at gaining intelligence and used the Pseudo Gang technique together with the Selous Scouts (Melson, 2005). The armed forces cooperated well together, because of their shared goals and experiences, with the majority capable of speaking local languages.

Legislation was used in support of the counter-insurgency objectives. But unlike in Kenya and Malaya, the Rhodesians did progressively apply Martial Law; although they did not resort to mass detentions, as had been the case in both Kenya and Malaya.

The use of 'hearts and minds' was not used effectively by the Rhodesians although they did understand the importance of trying to counter-act the physiological control the spirit mediums held over the population (Cilliers, 1985). Intimidation was rife in the outlying areas, with the security forces unable to combat it (Beckett, 2007). It was not until 1977 was a Psychological Unit formed and the Directorate of Psychological Warfare not until the last year of the war was in 1979 (Preston, 2004, p. 73). An indication of its low priority in the overall strategy this had as far as the counter-insurgency effort was concerned.

The next chapter will consider each of the case studies though comparative analysis to draw together interpretations. In order to achieve this, each of the tables developed at the end of chapters 5, 6 and 7 will be brought together in Chapter 8, together with the relevant findings.



# Chapter 8

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter gathers the findings from the three case studies together to compare and analyse them in relation to the research question, thus producing a comparative interpretation. The literature review established a series of themes, which became the framework for structuring the case studies. The participant's responses were used to populate the framework and create a narrative. By using this narrative, a story line has emerged of each of the conflicts, which has been aligned to the research objectives. In order to achieve this aim, the narratives were synthesised and considered in greater detail in order to address the research objectives of the whole study. Therefore, each of the sub-research questions will be dealt with sequentially, concluding with the primary question. Lastly, the underlying theory of conflict is considered in relation to its appropriateness for this study.

### 8.2 The Research Problem

The intention of the this research study was to investigate three historical colonial counter-insurgencies with a view to examining how they were pursued and whether the particular structure that the colonies operated under had any net advantages. Moreover, the objective sought to investigate claims that the use of a 'hearts and minds' was central to the effectiveness, or otherwise, of prosecuting the campaigns. In that it not only formed part of the strategy, but was understood by those on the ground as a necessary part of the operations. The actual relationship between the concept of 'hearts and minds' and its application at the time, has formed part of this study. Therefore, in an effort to appreciate if this was a correct interpretation, the respondents were asked about their appreciation and understanding of the concept from their perspectives.

The early hypothesis was that colonial forces had a substantial advantage to modern forces based upon their local knowledge of language, terrain and customs. This supposition has been vindicated in many ways, but tempered by evidence that in both Kenya and Malaya this was not as dominant as had been assumed. However, in the case of Rhodesia, without

this so called ‘advantage’ it is doubtful whether the Rhodesians would have been capable of persevering for so long or achieving the notable tactical successes that marked this conflict.

A further hypothesis was that Special Branch was a prevailing and decisive factor together with police support on the ground; this has been endorsed by the evidence of both the respondents and the literature. Therefore, it is hoped that this research adds to the body of knowledge in relation to the role of the police, particularly of Special Branch, in counter-insurgency doctrine.

The third part of the study was to assess whether the lessons can be applied to present conflicts. Here the evidence is very much more mixed and tempered, consequently far more subjective requiring caution and more analysis than this study is able to offer. However, one aspect remains as pertinent today as in these conflicts studied: the support of the population is critical to the long term objective of defeating the insurgents.

### **8.3 Primary Research Question**

What was the role played by the Colonial forces in counter-insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 -1959) Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980), and can any of lessons learnt be applied to conflicts today?

#### **8.3.1 Sub-Question:**

1. What factors and roles contributed to the security forces effectiveness in the insurgency campaigns of Kenya, Malaya and Rhodesia?
2. Was ‘hearts and minds’ a substantial factor in the conflicts?
3. Was the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ one that was commonly understood and practiced by those involved on the ground?
4. What aspects of the colonial strategy appeared to be effective?

Over the course of the study the questions have been refined and this is reflected in slight changes that have been made since the Pilot Study was undertaken; changes have not been substantial, more of an evolutionary use of language. However, the primary objective has remained the same which was to research the role of the Colonial forces in countering-insurgency. In line with addressing this objective, was a requirement to ascertain whether the Colonial forces were able to develop strategies and tactics that were unique to time and place. Furthermore, were such strategies and tactics transferable to modern day counter-insurgency doctrine? Therefore, the sub questions will be dealt with first to build up the argument before responding to the Primary question

#### **8.4 The Contributory Factors and Roles for Effectiveness**

Question: What factors and roles contributed to the Security Forces effectiveness in the insurgency campaigns of Malaya, Kenya and Rhodesia? At the end of each of the case studies, a table 5.4, 6.3 and 7.1, was presented listing a summary of the key elements that had been identified during the research, as being core to prosecuting the counter-insurgency. Table 8.1 combines all three of these tables together as summary of the factors which contributed to the overall effectiveness of the security forces. The key elements will now be discussed using supporting evidence in relation to the findings from the study.

In addition, there has to be a politically achievable objective that is widely supported and promoted. In both Kenya and Malaya the carrot of full independence was crucial to the eventual curtailing of the insurgency. Whereas in Rhodesia, this was never an option for the regime, although various power sharing arrangements were offered; these all came too late to have the desired effect. Consequently, the interpretation gleaned is that there was not a political objective in Rhodesia capable of gaining the mass support of the population. The majority of the literature dealing with counter-insurgency doctrine expounds the necessity of having the population on your side and hence this could point to why ultimately the objectives of the regime were unattainable (Dixon, 2009; Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2006a; McCuen, 1966; Mumford, 2012; Nagl, 2002; 1966; Tomes, 2004; Trinquier, 1964).

A wholesale restricting of the police, especially Special Branch, was the vital change needed to overcome the insurgents. Additionally, the large scale recruitment of indigenous forces, including the creation of a 'Home Guard' was instrumental in gaining the upper hand and overcoming the severe deficiencies over manpower and expertise. The increased degree of local knowledge, customs and language made a significant difference. These factors are considered significant and have contributed to the ability to source intelligence directly, rather than being influenced by a translator. Problems with the use of interpreters and translators are well known by all who have to work outside of their own language.

What is apparent from a review of Table 8.1 is the complexity of the elements involved in countering an insurgency. Although, the elements are presented in a précis form, they reflect the essential fundamentals; these are also interlinked. It is this aspect that has emerged from the study: the necessity to operate as a combined, organised structure following a defined plan under an over arching supremo. "Operational design for a counterinsurgency campaign must integrate the political, social, military, economic, legal,

informational, and intelligence spheres to fully pacify the population and to establish the legitimacy of the host government” (Cassidy, 2008, p. 127).

By assessing the various elements presented in Table 8.1, it is possible to draw together the key aspects that have emerged from the study. The component parts of the research questions are represented in the table, but require synthesizing to illuminate their inter-relationship with each other; for it is considered this relationship forms the rudiments required to combat an insurgency effectively. To this end, the table will be utilised during this Chapter for reference to indicate where the synergies lie and what is required as part of preparing a detailed counter-insurgency ‘Plan’. A number of studies have indicated the importance of having a comprehensive counter-insurgency ‘Plan’ (Hack, 2009; Strachan, 2007).

Table 8.1 is the culmination of the comparative analysis results from using three cases studies. The pilot study emphasised the importance of being able to compare more than two studies. Consequently, Table 8.1 demonstrates in a visual form the similarities between the three campaigns even though two of these were in Africa and one in Asia. Nonetheless, many of the requirements were the same, as is indicated by the Table.

All the elements have been dealt with during the study, but it is worth highlighting a few in order to prove the similarities. Perhaps the most important strategy of counter-insurgency is the need to separate the population from the insurgents. The creation of ‘Protected Villages’ was the main vehicle used to accomplish this objective. Although only Malaya was able to apply the concept in a comprehensive manner, it was tried in both Kenya, with some success, and in Rhodesia with less success. Food control was part of this strategy, which can be seen across the table to reflect the success of the ‘villagisation process’ thus indicating only complete separation of the population was effective in achieving this objective.

Two further examples are the recruitment of indigenous forces, which were used to great effect by all three Security Forces and the recruitment and establishment of a ‘Home Guard’ to protect the villages. Both were particular hallmarks of all three campaigns and were very successful. As Rhodesia was a later campaign, the ‘Home Guard’ principal had become an accepted strategy with the formation of Guard Force: a far more disciplined and trained unit than in the other two colonies.

Emergency Powers is a further example of the comparative similarities that have been identified during the study. The formidable ability of the Colonial Authorities to utilise

legislation in support of the counter-insurgency objectives has been discussed and can be readily identified as common to all three campaigns.

**Table 8.1 Combined list of elements involved with countering insurgencies**

| Element                  | Malaya                                   | Kenya                                    | Rhodesia                                |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|
| Administration           | part of combined strategy                | held sway over decision process          | part of the wider political process     |
| Aircraft                 | bombing used but halted                  | bombing but not effective                | effectively used/ short supply          |
| communications           | improved/ telephones targeted            | improved/ radio net work set up          | highly effective radio net work         |
| Dogs                     | limited use by army/ not by police       | large use of dogs by police/army         | extensive use/effective                 |
| Emergency Powers         | issued in 1948/draconian                 | issued in 1952/draconian                 | Progressively applied 1960/ Martial law |
| Food control             | yes, harsh/strict imposition             | limited but used effectively             | limited success/ hard to police         |
| French lessons           | oil spot used and pop control            | pop control, sweeps/ detentions          | pop control, sweeps/ detentions         |
| Ground coverage          | no, very limited intelligence gathering  | patchy and limited use/ improved         | Highly developed/ Very successful       |
| Hearts and Minds         | developed successfully                   | Limited and not generally known          | limited success/patchy/half hearted     |
| Helicopters              | early development/ effective/ jungle     | tested but no used; too high for lift    | extensive use/ shortage/effective       |
| Home Guard               | vital part of overall strategy           | vital part of overall strategy           | set up as Guard Force/poor              |
| Indigenous forces        | used in police/ army/home guard          | used in police/ army/home guard          | volunteers in the all units             |
| Insurgents               | predominately Chinese communist          | Predominately Kikuyu tribe               | Communist/ Shona and Ndebele            |
| Intimidation             | wide and extensive                       | limited to Kikuyu tribe primarily        | grew consistently/intimidation          |
| Intelligence             | became very effective/monetary bribes    | limited and patchy/ informers used       | very effective and comprehensive        |
| Language                 | major problem/ little Chinese speakers   | few Kikuyu but many Swahili speakers     | large number of local speakers          |
| Legislation              | extensive and draconian                  | extensive and draconian                  | extensive and progressively draconian   |
| Martial Law              | Never imposed/ emergency powers          | Never Imposed/emergency powers           | Gradually imposed as war progressed     |
| Mechanisms               | over-arching suprema                     | no overarching suprema                   | JOC /plus overarching suprema/political |
| Mounted units            | not used but Mules for transport were    | Both the Police and KR used effectively  | BSAP/ Grey Scouts effective             |
| Notable actors           | Templer/Briggs/Catling/Young             | Erskine/ Kitson/ Henderson/Catling       | Walls/ Reid Daley/ Flower/Henderson     |
| Plan                     | Briggs Plan/ an overall blue print       | series of semi-interrelated plans        | Military plan /unsupported politically  |
| Problems                 | poor intelligence at start/language poor | unstructured until 1954/ army conscripts | limited resources/sanctions/politics    |
| Oaths and sorcery        | Chinese religion and Triad control       | main aspect of Mau Mau/de-oathing        | Spirit mediums very influential         |
| Organisation             | poor at first then highly successful     | poor becoming moderately successful      | highly effective/ restricted numbers    |
| Police                   | poor at first then highly successful     | poor at first then highly successful     | highly effective/ well structured       |
| Population               | part of overall strategy                 | part of overall strategy                 | not inclusive enough/ failure           |
| Propaganda               | comprehensive/effective                  | Limited and piecemeal                    | comprehensive/ limited success          |
| Pseudo gangs             | limited/ used near the end of conflict   | Highly successful/used from '53          | highly successful/widely used           |
| Psychological operations | very successful/comprehensive            | limited success/limited                  | limited success/limited                 |
| Public works             | used extensively to support Plan         | limited use; but accelerated later       | limited use/ piecemeal/                 |
| Reasons for conflict     | Communism/Colonialism/identity           | land issues/ tribal/Colonialism          | Communism/Colonialism/land issues       |
| Restricted areas         | security areas/ enforced                 | Prohibited & special areas/ enforced     | curfew areas/de facto restricted        |
| Roads                    | used to infiltrate the jungle            | used to infiltrate the forests           | Access good as not dense bush           |
| Special Branch           | poor at first then highly successful     | poor at first then moderately successful | pivotal/integrated/highly successful    |
| Special units            | SAS, Jungle squads, Gurkhas              | combat tracker units/Pseudos/GSU         | SAS/Selous Scouts/ RLI/Fire-Force       |
| Spotter planes           | used but not effective without infrared  | became very effective                    | used effectively / PRAW                 |
| Strategy                 | developed through central Plan           | Loosely held together/no central Plan    | dominated by political/generalist       |
| Structure of forces      | colonial forces with British army units  | colonial forces with British army units  | based on British model/adapted          |
| subversion               | wide and extensive                       | limited to Kikuyu tribe primarily        | grew consistently/intimidation          |
| tactics                  | progressively developed/ effective       | mixed effect/ limited/pseudo gangs       | multiple combined tactics/effective     |
| Villages                 | developed successfully/ Briggs Plan      | used limited success/hostility           | used but not supported/unpopular        |

### **8.4.1 Significant Actors**

During the research process there have been a number of actors, as they have been termed, that continued to be mentioned as having been influential across a number of campaigns. Recognising that specific individuals, units and regiments, have had a significant contribution to the development of a counter-insurgency doctrine is important. Cross-fertilisation of ideas was a common occurrence and was part of a knowledge transfer process and respect for experience. Therefore, when assessing what was effective, it has been important to recognise the important role many of these actors had on the campaigns.

It is beyond the scope of this research to map out each actor and the influence they have exerted to the various conflicts; however, a table has been produced that indicates in précis form where these influences have been brought to bear (See Appendix B) Within the British Colonial context (which includes Rhodesia), it was normal to transfer individuals and units between colonies. Therefore, an actor of consequence would be expected to use their expertise in a number of scenarios of which Sillitoe, Thompson, Briggs, Kitson, Young, Catling, Henderson, Walls and Reid-Daly stand out, as does the regiments of the RAR, KAR, the Black Watch and the SAS. (See full table in Appendix B)

### **8.4.2 Specialised Units**

Accompanying these actors has been the development of more specialised and elite units, which have been central to the counter-insurgency achieving notable successes. Each case study has highlighted the more notable of these specialised units trained and adapted to the prevailing conditions of their particular conflict: see Sections 5.9; 6.9 and 7.9.

In Malaya, Ferret Force proved to be a notable success, which precipitated the introduction of the Malaya Scouts and the SAS. Jungle conditions required a considerable change in mind set in order to compete with the Communist insurgents on equal footing. The use of smaller patrols became the norm, as they were able to move through the jungle with less attention. Tracker Units utilising local indigenous tribesmen also proved to be very effective. A tactic used in both Kenya and Rhodesia.

In both Kenya and Rhodesia the use of mounted units proved to be very successful as was the use of dogs in all three campaigns. The locally recruited units such as the Kenya Regiment, Kings African Rifles and the Kenya Police Reserve played a significant role due to their local knowledge of language customs and culture. In Rhodesia, it was the same with the Rhodesian African Rifles, Rhodesian Regiment and the British South Africa Police.

Pseudo Operations were used in all three campaigns; normally operated by Special Branch but in Rhodesia there was also a joint operation with the Army, which became the Selous Scouts. Fire-Force was the support unit for such operations manned by the Rhodesian Light Infantry. In addition there was a Rhodesian SAS unit operating primarily outside of the borders (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 52).

### **8.4.3 Indigenous Forces**

In addition to specialised and elite units has been the deployment of indigenous forces. These forces played a significant part in boosting the capability of the colonial forces to match and compete against the local insurgents (Hack, 2009; Jeffery, 1987; Percox, 1998; Stapleton, 2011). It could be argued that without these vital additional forces the prosecution of the conflicts would have been extremely difficult; as it would have required substantial forces from overseas to match the numbers of the insurgents, on the ground. In the case of Rhodesia, they were essential to the war effort, as only the white, Indian and the Coloured population could be conscripted. Black Africans could not be conscripted and those that served were volunteers (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, p. 38). Many specialised units depended on black African forces, especially their expertise; such as the Selous Scouts and the Tracker Units (Hughes, 2012, p. 112).

Besides providing additional and valuable numbers, indigenous forces provided “ a significant increase in the quality of troops on the ground, troops whose knowledge of the terrain, culture, and language generally produce an even greater and exponential improvement in actionable intelligence on the insurgents” (Cassidy, 2008, p. 127). In respect to the police forces, they were predominately indigenous and only led by white or expatriate officers. It is the contention of this study that without this valuable and necessary resource, it would have been impossible to prosecute the counter-insurgencies with anything like the accepted effectiveness without local policemen: whether they were black Africans, Indians, Malays or Chinese. The respondents have all endorsed the capabilities of their local policemen. RODA-P-6 when asked how well he trusted his African policemen, replied, “100%, our black detectives were extremely loyal and extremely brave, extremely loyal [emphasis]”. They have also provided valuable support to the army units deployed, acting as interpreters and advisors. Support that should not be underestimated as it allowed sometimes raw, un-acclimatised foreign troops to operate in unfamiliar surroundings. KENA-P-7 endorsed this use of indigenous forces:

Well they were effective in large scale operations in particular and patrolling in the forest and that sort of thing.... no the local knowledge was all important I think, because you bring in the British army, they didn't have a clue. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

An aspect that was reiterated further by KENA-P-2 who stated that:

They were very important, very important [emphasis]. They lent a lot of weight to our field intelligence officers and, as I say, were attached to all the units of the British Army, because they didn't speak Swahili or anything like that. (KENA-p-2; 19/05/2011)

#### **8.4.4 Actionable Intelligence**

The other important aspect indigenous forces provided was good, actionable intelligence, which is essential if the Security Forces are to have any chance at combating them (Kitson, 1971, pp. 95-96). It has been the contention of this study that the crucial, and one of the most important aspects required in combating an insurgency is, intelligence (see sections 5.9; 6.9 and 7.9). Virtually all planning of operations can only be accomplished successfully if it is based upon good, sound, and actionable intelligence.

It has been argued that both Kenya and Malaya were seriously deficient in this domain at the start of the insurgencies; even to the point that this may have been a contributing factor in them starting in the first place (Clayton, 1976, p. 33; Miller, 1972, p. 90; Mockaitis, 1990a, p. 113; Percox, 1998, pp. 53-54; Popplewell, 208; Stockwell, 1993, pp. 71-72). Conversely, the Rhodesians had learnt the lessons of their counterparts in other conflicts and had developed a highly structured and capable intelligence gathering operation. According to RODA-P-6, “we had absolutely no problem as Special Branch getting information, we infiltrated all the organisations we had very good intelligence within ZAPU and ZANU, very good both internal and external, excellent intelligence”.

One of the most important requirements to conducting a counter-insurgency campaign is the ability to ‘know your enemy’. Accomplishing this requires a suite of capabilities, including a wide network of spies, informers and operatives capable of interpreting events for a central intelligence operation. Special Branch had this capability to adapt and become indispensable in both Malaya and Kenya. The importance of intelligence to countering insurgencies cannot be stressed sufficiently (Mumford, 2012, p. 154). Rhodesia understood the indispensable need for intelligence and was better prepared to ensure it kept acquiring actionable intelligence, as its very survival depended upon this capability. Special Branch was the tool used to accomplish these demands in all three conflicts.



#### **8.4.5 Special Branch**

A primary contention of this study has been the importance of Special Branch as the coordinating structure that harnessed all the intelligence gathering operations in country. Although both Kenya and Malaya, required a substantial re-structuring of their Branches, they became very effective and it could be argued ran the counter-insurgency operations (Comber, 2008; Jeffery, 1987, p. 125). . The Rhodesians had recognised the importance of their Special Branch and it too was the core of the overall strategy for operations (Flower, 1987). A former member of Rhodesian Special Branch explains:

We had a very structured system, a very very good structured system. Our Special Branch headquarters at 'Redbricks' was extremely efficient on the collation of intelligence. So all intelligence fed up a pyramid to the top, from the top of special branch headquarters it was then decided who it should be disseminated to, if it was very sensitive to where, at local level every JOC [Joint Operations Command] there were Special Branch, every meeting there was a Special Branch representative who was responsible to advise the JOC at all times of local tactical intelligence. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

The importance of this structure cannot be over emphasised when considering the effectiveness of the Colonial Forces, especially in Rhodesia. The support from the police and the Military units in the field all fed back into the central collation point, which was then presented in a useable format at the Joint Operations Command. Decisions were made based upon these assessments. The use of a combined operations centre has also been discussed in all three case studies: 5.14; 6.5 and 7.16.1. In Rhodesia it was called the JOC: a joined-up a multilayered interlocking structure that combined the police, military and civil administration to enforce rule of law using the operational tools available.

#### **8.4.6 Over-Arching Supremo**

Aligned to this requirement of having a combined operations centre, was the preferred condition of an over-arching supremo, such as General Templer in Malaya. Unfortunately General Erskine as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces In Kenya was never given this over-riding authority and only had 'operational control'. It could be argued this hampered the combined effort and lacked the strategic political direction of the counter-insurgency that Templer plainly had in Malaya. There was a War Cabinet with an "Emergency Joint Staff consisting of representatives of the Army, police and civil government who examined in detail problems before they came to the War Cabinet" (Erskine, 1956, p. 14). In Rhodesia, Lieutenant-General Walls was made head of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) in 1977 (see section 7.16.1), but this too was not as powerful as the position General Templer had

held in Malaya. Walls remained answerable to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, which hampered tactical requirements often to fall in line with national strategy and political exigencies (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 190).

Although an over-arching civil-military supremo would seem to be a default status, the reality is Templer was the exception rather than rule. Consequently, the future requires greater cooperation and cohesion amongst the partners involved in countering insurgencies to achieve desired political aims, with the military acting in support (Mumford, 2012, p. 153).

#### **8.4.7 Emergency Powers Legislation**

The ability of the Colonial State to impose often draconian and all encompassing legislation in support of the counter-insurgency efforts has been a noted feature of this study. A number of measures have become standard practice for the control of the population today in conflict zones, such as detention without trial, identification cards, movement restrictions and curfews. Although much has been made by many over the use of ‘hearts and minds’, the reality has indicated a much harsher regime is required to control the population during conflict.

#### **8.5 The Substantial Factor of ‘Hearts and Minds’**

Question: *Was ‘hearts and minds’ a substantial factor in the conflicts?* Much has been written over the years proclaiming the panacea of the ‘hearts and minds’ concept to counter insurgencies; ostensibly developed and honed by the conflict in Malaya (Carruthers, 1995a; Dixon, 2009; Duyvesteyn, 2011; Mockaitis, 2003; Stubbs, 1989a). As explained in the literature review, the concept has a long history, although certainly published and understood by a wider audience based upon the success of this combined strategy in Malaya. However, what was sought in the study, was how far was this concept a reality on the ground, or was this more a post conflict interpretation by writers and historians? Moreover, to examine what actions can actually be attributed directly to this term, as its meaning is perhaps far wider than most commentators have addressed hitherto. Essentially the concept requires a coordinated approach from all those involved with the campaign: civil, military, administrative and legislative (Mockaitis, 1990b, p. 215).

The evidence from this study suggests that it was not a well know phrase, or in common usage during the conflicts, although aspects associated with its concept may have been used. Although according to Edgerton (1989) Askwith, the African Affairs Officer in Nairobi, was told by General Templer in 1953 when he was on a fact finding mission from

Kenya to Malaya “the only way to control the Mau Mau was by winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people” (Edgerton, 1989, p. 176). Therefore, it might be fair to assert that although less known amongst the rank and file, it was used at the highest echelons of government.

In both Kenya and Rhodesia the approach to ‘hearts and minds’ appears to have been far more piecemeal, and in Rhodesia, almost shunned completely as a strategy until too late to have a positive influence on the outcome of the ‘Bush War’ (Arbuckle, 1979, p. 32). For the majority of the respondents, it was accepted wisdom that the concept, as understood today, came from prosecuting the Emergency in Malaya:

The term hearts and minds evolved from there and I think it was the first real attempt to gain the support of the local people in a productive way, not just in terms of sentiment but getting, reporting information and taking active measures in support. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

It is the second part of this response that is important and often it appears to be overlooked, “not just in terms of sentiment but getting, reporting information and taking active measures in support”. Note, it is not sentiment that drives an effective counter-insurgency-strategy; it is results. The badge known as *Bersedia Berkhidmat* depicting the clasped hands in Malaya (Figure 5.2; Chapter 5), epitomised “the hoped for cooperation between the police and the Malay people” (MALA-P-3, 03/03/2011). It can be argued that the badge was representative of the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ as a whole. In addition, the last part of the explanation made MALA-P-3 explains even further what was expected:

He [Templer] had to get the people off the fence. They weren’t committed. In 1952 they didn’t know who was going to win, and they weren’t going to chance their arm. So he had to convince them that the British were going to be winning and giving them independence. And once they knew they’d get their independence they were on our side. (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011)

Contained within this statement is the summary of several concepts that go towards producing a counter-insurgency doctrine. Paramount of these concepts is that the support of the population in the quest for overcoming the insurgency (Galula, 1964, pp. 52-55). The population has to be convinced they are backing the side that will eventually win. Getting this wrong has catastrophic consequences for them, especially if they show support for the government forces and they do not win. “The phrase “hearts and minds” which comprises of two separate components: “Hearts” means persuading people that their best interests are served by your success; “minds” means convincing them that you can protect them and that resisting you is pointless....Calculated self interest, not emotion, is what counts” (Kilcullen,

2006c, p. 52). However, it is insufficient to merely promise support, they have to be actually protected from intimidation as well. Intimidation is the antithesis of ‘hearts and minds’ and was prevalent in all three conflicts.

Trinquier (1964) a contemporary of Galula (1964), and also a noted French combatant and military historian, succinctly identifies these critical aspects in his work *Le Guerre Moderne*. Trinquier (1964) stresses the need to treat the population with consideration and respect (p. ix), but also points out that the insurgents are seeking to do the same “impose its will upon the population”; not necessarily with either consideration or respect but by terrorising them (p. 7). Essentially he argues to combat this threat, the government forces must use all the means at their disposal, primarily to combat terrorism: the weapon of subversive warfare (Santos, 2011, p. 3). By identifying terrorism, Trinquier (1964) explains how effect this weapon is against classic forces, dispiriting them and putting fear into the general population (p. 15).

In this study, rather than using terrorism, the word intimidation has been used, because it brings fewer connotations and explains the situation in clearer terms from an insurgency perspective. Although terror is an instrument of intimidation; terrorism, per se, has arguably become too emotive a word to be used without defining it, but that is outside of the margins of this study. (Hoffman, 2006; Thornton, 1964). Notwithstanding, intimidation has been discussed, as it forms the antithesis of ‘hearts and minds’ and was used in all three conflicts

In Rhodesia, intimidation was rife and undermined the ability of the Security Forces to secure the support of the population. Intimidation involved “killing zealots, killing government representatives, chiefs, counsellors that sort of thing” according to RODA-P-6; (23/01/2011). It can be seen from this description that the use of violence ensured the minds of the population remained firmly in support of the insurgents, even if their hearts thought otherwise (Kirk, 1975, p. 3; Mushonga, 2005, p. 179).

Understanding that both sides are vying for the support of the population is often missed by theoretical observers. It may well be good press to promote benevolent activities by the government forces; such as schools and clinics, but these are insufficient if the population is being terrorised by the insurgents (Branch & Wood, 2010, p. 10). The ability to terrorise the population was part of “their [ZANU and ZIPRA] tactics that they used to indoctrinate the locals, terrify the locals, attack the local farmers”. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011). In Kenya, this was mainly amongst their own tribe, the Kikuyu, whereas in Malaya it was prevalent against all those who were not active members of the Communist insurgents.

MALA-M-4 sums up how it is the general population that endures the worst efforts of both sides:

Well they will always suffer, they'll suffer because they are being intimidated and sometimes killed by the insurgent groups and they'll suffer by the hands of the security forces, so really they are in a no win situation. The security forces will do sweeps through a village and probably steal things, they may even rape the women, they certainly be very heavy handed with the population but then the insurgents will come in at night and threaten them if they don't get help in the form of food or shelter, they will also rape the women, so when you've got indigenous people, certainly those that are living in remote areas, they will suffer from both ends. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)

Therefore, the conquest of the minds of the people is a constant battle undertaken by both sides, with the population generally the losers.

### **8.5.1 Psychological Control**

Inherent in the concept of 'hearts and minds' is psychological control of the population through a variety of means: violence through intimidation being the most misunderstood. However, gaining control of the mind, was also achieved through coercion, applying ideological indoctrination and the use of aspects of religion; particularly tribal religion as in Kenya and Rhodesia (see sections 6.14 and 7.15). In Malaya, it was ideological coercion through Communist indoctrination and pressure through secret societies: the Triads (see section 5.15).

In Kenya, psychological intimidation took its form through the use of the oath (Corfield, 1959). The oath was very serious, whether it had been taken voluntarily or forced, KENA-P-2 emphasises this aspect, "once they've been oathed, the oath is binding. And you never knew who'd been oathed and hadn't been oathed. (KENA-P-2; 19/05/2011). Consequently, understanding the role played by oaths is central to understanding the psychological hold the Mau Mau had over their tribal members. Tribal religion has a deep significance for the African peoples; an implication not readily understood by outsiders (Gelfand, 1967; Lan, 1985; Ranger, 1985). Its importance should not be underestimated; as it was used to ensure as many of the Kikuyu as possible should be bound by the oath (Corfield, 1959; Maloba, 1993, p. 68). Consequently, when there was a mass refusal to comply, as happen in the village of Lari in 1953, retribution was brutal; wiping out the whole village and the committing of various atrocities (Anderson, 2005, pp. 125-127; Furedi, 1989, p. 122). The Lari massacre, as it was termed, gained worldwide notoriety and influenced many about the nature of Mau Mau insurrection (Carruthers, 1995a, pp. 136-138; Newsinger, 1981, p. 170).

Intimidation could be termed hard 'hearts and minds'; as coercion, brute force and terror are used to control the population.

In Rhodesia, it was the Spirit Mediums that held sway over much the African population, thus having a psychological hold over them in much the same way as experienced in Kenya by the use of the oath through the *Mganga*. The Rhodesian authorities understood the importance that the tribal religion played amongst the African population. The concept was not scoffed at by the Europeans, on the contrary they went to great lengths to understand it and utilise it, as RODA-I-15; 30/06/2012, outlined "the Shona and Ndebele people have always practiced ancestral worship... in Intaf [Internal Affairs] we were obliged to study African Customs and Customary Law and to write exams on them". He went on to explain the importance of the mediums to the insurgents: "when a terrorist gang moved into an area the first thing they did was to make contact with the spirit mediums to get their "blessing" and their protection. If they did not then the spirits would be angry and do them a disservice!"

From a 'hearts and minds' perspective in counter-insurgency, the factor of witchcraft, sorcery and oaths is one that has not been recognised or understood sufficiently with little discussion on this aspect. By contrast this aspect has been brought out in this research as both the Kenyan and Rhodesian authorities fully recognised its importance and took measures to incorporate it into their strategies for regaining the minds of the people (Ranger, 1985, p. 365). A key part of the strategy played by the Kenyan Government in combating the insurgency was the programme to de-oath as many of the Kikuyu population as possible (Clayton, 2006, p. 4; Corfield, 1959, p. 134). Spirit mediums played a crucial role in developing counter-guerrilla strategies in Rhodesia as well (Evans, 2007, p. 185; Johnson & Martin, 1981, pp. 75-78).

Although in Malaya, sorcery and witchcraft were not an issue, there was a distinct religious division between the predominately Chinese insurgents and the Malays who were Muslims (Carnell, 1953, p. 103; Von Glahn, 2004). While the supernatural and ancestral worship underpins a lot of Chinese beliefs, as part of their religion, there has been less explanation as to how far this was used against them in Malaya (Tan, 1983). But there was increased support for the building of mosques and Islamic schools by the Government to gain the support of the Malay population, against Communist insurgents (Carnell, 1953, p. 109). The Insurgents on the other hand, used ideological coercion in their quest for the minds of the population. Communism was a secular, even an anti religious ideology, according to Karl Marx (1970/1843), which was completely at odds with that of Islam. MALA-J-6 articulates this further:

The Malays did not support Communism as it went against their religion, they were Muslims. Communism was against Muslims. The CT's were very brutal and this turned the people against them. This made it easy for the British to show how violent the bandits were. The CT's were their own worst enemies as they turned people against them. (MALA -J-6; 18/03/2011)

However, an area of contention was the involvement of the Triads amongst the Chinese. There has been little direct evidence to support the contention that Chinese Triads were deeply involved in the manipulation of the Chinese for financial gain during the Emergency (Carnell, 1953, p. 108; Ownby & Heidhues, 1993; Topley, 1963); other than casual remarks made by some of the respondents; especially when asked about the involvement of Triads and Chinese secret societies, "we always knew they were mixed up in it, but I cannot tell how much" (MALA-P-3; 03/03/2011) . Although there is much conjecture over the relationship of Special Branch, Triads and the payment of rewards for the surrender of CT's: as to how far the Triads were implicated is far more convoluted (Comber, 2008, pp. 162-165; Pye, 1956; Stockwell, 1993). Suffice it to say that more research is necessary to explore this area of interest. Nonetheless, the psychological battle fought to gain the hearts of the population was certainly concentrated on defeating Communism and second by "endeavouring to narrow the communal divisions between the Malays and the Chinese" (Carnell, 1953, p. 109). Therefore, religion played its part in the 'hearts and minds' offensive in Malaya as much as it did in Kenya and Rhodesia.

### **8.5.2 Independence and Decolonisation**

Returning to the other point brought out by the statement made by MALA-P-2 was, "they knew they'd get their independence". The three case studies have shown that ultimately the end result lies within the political domain, not solely on a military might, which is unsustainable. Rhodesia was guilty of relying on the latter, to its detriment (Arbuckle, 1979, p. 29). It is this political aspect which is brought out in the response by saying the Malays would "get their independence". Once this was an accepted fact, the support of the population followed and allowed the British to gain the upper hand against the Communist led insurgency. Although, this was not as critical in Kenya; as the insurgency was predominately led by one tribe, the Kikuyu, nonetheless when independence was promised it ensured that any other dissenters were out flanked. The Lancaster House agreements of 1960 assured full independence by 1963 (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, pp. 61-65). Effectively, these were the political measures that guaranteed the 'loyal' support for the Government based upon the

emancipation of the African population and the ending of colonial status. (Orrù, 1989, pp. 395-400; Thompson, et al., 1990, p. 367).

In both Kenya and Rhodesia the “hunger for land was the driving force behind the rebellion and this was very anti-Colonial, ultimately a political solution had to be found”, as KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011, summed up (Throup, 1987, p. 250). Indicative of the influences that were underlying the insurgencies, land was the key issue, not only ownership of the land but also national ownership of the land too i.e. Independence. Decolonisation was ultimately the only acceptable long-term political solution (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). In Malaya and in Kenya this was realised and acceded to by the British Government. Consequently, Britain considered that it should also apply in Rhodesia, regardless of what a minority might want. A premise based upon the assertion that granting independence had solved the insurgencies in other conflicts: Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. Therefore, the accepted wisdom of the British was to ensure that this took place in Rhodesia, by steering the country to full independence as quickly as possible in 1980 (Preston, 2004). Britain was unable to secure the majority of the population against intimidation, for a number of practical reasons, consequently Mugabe and ZANU-PF were able to come to power regardless of how democratic the process might have been (Arbuckle, 1979; Baker, 1982, pp. 52-55; Kriger, 2005, pp. 1-5).

### **8.5.3 Good Governance**

The importance of the political dimension is an essential element in gaining and maintaining ‘hearts and minds’ by practical actions on the ground. Convincing the population that their welfare and well being will improve by supporting the Government needs to be backed up by civil actions such as extending the electoral franchise, political rights and citizenship. These were actions that were taken in Malaya to sway the Chinese away from Communism and to support the national identity of Malaya (Mumford, 2012, p. 10). In Kenya, the electoral franchise together with wider political rights was gradually doled out as was the promise of full independence in an effort to undermine the insurgency (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 48). Recognition in these two conflicts of the importance a political dimension was to the counter-insurgency efforts. Whereas in Rhodesia, various attempts were made to achieve a political dimension acceptable to the general population. Internal settlements; with extensions of the franchise and the promise of further political rights were all offered. But essentially they all failed, as the Rhodesians failed to comprehend the real nature of African nationalism (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2011, pp. 198-199). It can be



argued the Rhodesians failed to understand fully the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ sufficiently for them to realise it involved a political dimension, as much as a military one.

In support of the political dimension there needs to be support from the civil side of the administration in the form of improving the infrastructure through public works, such as schools, hospitals, clinics and agricultural improvements. In fact anything that can be done to improve the social welfare of the population will have a strong influence on their perceptions of how well the Government is doing in its fight against the insurgency. “The fundamental weapon in counterinsurgency [sic] remains good governance” (Hammes, 2006, pp. 20-21).

Each of the case studies has discussed these actions (see sections 5.14; 6.13 and 7.14). In addition Kitson (1971), endorses this approach by the Government in that it needs “an overall programme designed to achieve its aim of regaining and retaining the allegiance of the population” (p. 50). The importance of these actions should not be underestimated in the practice of winning ‘hearts and minds’.

#### **8.5.4 The Winning Aspect**

Lastly, a further part of the phrase “winning hearts and minds” also needs to be considered the word ‘winning’. It is not the aspect of winning as in ‘gaining’ hearts and minds, but rather that the security forces need to be seen to be winning, as in being successful; so that the population has confidence that they are backing the winners. Obviously to achieve this objective, there needs to be a general public relations campaign publicising the success stories and conducting a psychological drive to ensure the message is promulgated (Alderson, 2007b, p. 9; Galula, 1964, p. 85). “The counterinsurgency needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win. The counterinsurgency cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of strength, or his political supporters will flock to the insurgent side” (Artelli, 2007, p. 33). Furthermore, the message that they are winning must be one that is being passed on by what is called the ‘bush telegraph’. Although often made up by rumours, it is a powerful tool and much information is obtained this way by the average person. To ensure this occurs, the Security Forces will need to demonstrate they are obtaining good results as well as providing evidence that it actually transpired. In Malaya this was certainly the case:

Also there was none of this sort of lily livered sentiment against showing gory photographs in the news, every time they had a success they lined all the bodies up outside the police station and they took photographs and they were published in the paper, nowadays that’s not the sort of thing to view and that is why you don’t publish

photographs of lads dead and so on but in those days it was a powerful tool, especially with the vernacular press. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

## 8.6 Understanding the Concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’

*Question: Was the Concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’ one that was commonly understood and practiced by those involved on the ground?* This question sought to ascertain the depth of understanding for the strategy termed ‘hearts and minds’ by those actually involved in actual operations- what is called the ‘sharp end’-in Kenya and Rhodesia, rather than just Malaya. Those interviewed about the conflict in Malaya were generally supportive of the idea that ‘hearts and minds’ had developed in Malaya and was part of a successful strategy. However, in both Kenya and Rhodesia there were fewer acknowledgements by the respondents that this was part of a concerted strategy, as they understood it. Many aspects of the concept appeared to have been used as part of accepted practices, but the response tended to indicate not only was it not a widely accepted term, indeed in Rhodesia they appeared to be openly hostile to the concept. Consequently, this hostility might be considered to have formed part of the failure to garner the majority of population fully to the side of the Rhodesian government. Although, it is hard to fully support this as the major failure, it can be argued that it contributed to the eventual collapse of the Smith regime (Arbuckle, 1979, p. 32).

At one end of the spectrum are those who believe that ‘hearts and minds’ is winning the population through creating fear, then there are those who believe it means the acquiescence of the population. At the other end of the spectrum are those who require a greater degree of popular consent and seek the active, enthusiastic consent, support and trust of the people. (Dixon, 2009, p. 363)

It also became apparent from the interviews with those who had served in Kenya, that they did not use this expression during the time of the Mau Mau. They have heard of it since, but not at the time. Respondent KENA-P- 6 responded when asked if he had heard of ‘hearts and minds’, “Yes of course one’s heard that [phrase], very much so recently and, but I certainly never heard of that expression in Kenya” A further indication from KENA-P-12 supporting the lack of knowledge concerning the term “I never heard the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ used.” KENA-P-13 stated very much the same thing, “I was never involved or heard of a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in those words”. He did go on to expound that what he had been doing could be construed as such a policy, but that it was never called ‘hearts and minds’. “That’s not to say we didn’t practice it, as it was widely recognized as being

necessary to encourage the local population to cooperate and side with us, which they did”. KENA-P-6 went even further “Are we trying to win the Kikuyu ‘hearts and minds’, possibly they were, but it certainly never ever occurred to me or anybody that was the case”.

From these comments it is possible to deduce that although post Mau Mau, many authors, (Bennett, 2007; Branch, 2010; Carruthers, 1995a; Percox, 1998) have written of the ‘hearts and minds’ approach taken as part of overall strategy, the term was certainly not in common usage. Whereas, in Rhodesia the term may have been known, but it was not readily accepted as the right course of action; or certainly not by those interviewed in this study. It also appears it is the interpretation of the term that is contested. A lot of the respondents seemed to feel it was a ‘soft’ approach, rather than a coercive one. Although, in both Malaya and Kenya, despite claims hearts and minds was core to strategy, mass detentions, collective punishments and coercive activities took place too. The stick as well as the carrot applied as circumstances dictated (Hack, 2009, p. 412).

In Rhodesia, it appears to have been more of a ‘bolt-on’ idea, tried as things began to get desperate, but in reality it was too late to turn the population, “I still think it was a waste of time” was the comment from RODA-P-4. A similar dissenting remark was made by both RODA-P-5 and RODA-P-6:

The fellows working on the hearts and minds they were hopeless cases, it didn’t really work out so Ja, that hearts and minds didn’t work up there, they had it going in the middle of the war but it and towards the end but it didn’t really work at all. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)

Also from RODA-P-6:

The theory was right but in reality in never really worked because the people were more terrified of the guerrillas then they were of the government, the people were more on the side of the guerrillas than the side of the government so it was unsuccessful, very unsuccessful. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

Consequently, Rhodesia was unable to fully capitalise on the support of the general population in the same way as had occurred in Malaya; despite a high proportion of black troops in the Army, police and Internal Affairs (INTAF). The tide of outside influences constantly eroded internal majority support for the regime, until a negotiated settlement was the only option. The Rhodesian Forces had “victory in every tactical battle with guerrilla forces in the field, but loss in the vital strategic battle to win over the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ of the population” (Evans, 2007, p. 176). Realistically it was more a question of logistics that has to be taken into consideration for this failure. The Rhodesians just did not have the

manpower required to protect all the villages. As a result, the population were terrorised as soon as the Security Forces left an area (Cilliers, 1985, pp. 79-82). Intimidation is the antithesis to winning 'hearts and minds': threaten, kill and maim people and they will do as they are told. Protecting them from these threats requires moving them into safe areas. The Protected Village (PV) process was the only answer to this threat, and this met with much resistance from the local population; who disliked being uprooted from their land. In addition:

If you are going to keep locals "on side", you have to live cheek and jowl amongst them and face the perils of the night, unsupported and unprotected. The chief's through which they [the Security Forces] worked were basically fence sitters; several of them were contact men for the Terrs [Terrorists]. (RODA-M-15; 30/06/2012)

This comment supports the assertion that the population are more hesitant to commit themselves to one side or the other, until they are sure of the eventual outcome. The other aspect is that once sections of the community are given power over the others, such as the Home Guards then they terrorise the population too:

These men were permitted to carry firearms, one of the unfortunate results of that they had a certain amount of power, because they had weapons, they would use it to their advantage, because they were in remote rural areas without proper police coverage or without regular visits by the regular security forces, they would use the fact that they were armed and they would use their power for the wrong reasons and they would intimidate and control village life so they basically became thugs if you like. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)

Plus the ineffectiveness of protecting the villages as RODA-P-2 scoffed:

I ask how does a white civil servant convince any local that he has the government's full support when they were unable to prevent the deaths of over 20,000 of their number? They knew full well that his words carried no weight. Intimidation would win the day as it did in other African conflicts. (RODA-P-2:27/01/2011)

Although a model taken from the Malayan Emergency, it appears that application was as patchy in Rhodesia, as it had been in Kenya, and loosely linked to an overall concept of 'hearts and minds'; thus making it piecemeal rather than a concerted integrated strategy (Cilliers, 1985, pp. 79-99). "I personally was not in favour of the PV concept in Rhodesia. It might of worked elsewhere" RODA-P-11 summarised, but he felt it did not work in Rhodesia nor did he agree that the other aspect of denying the insurgents food worked too well either. RODA-P-5 endorsed this point, "they didn't achieve much at all and no I think it was just feeding bins for the gooks. As you give the money to the people in the stockade there, out it goes that night to the gooks". As indicated earlier, the problem was the inability to protect the

villages at night; this was when the insurgents would return using intimidation to gain control and get the resources they needed (Kirk, 1975, p. 3; Mushonga, 2005, p. 179).

On the other hand, RODA-P-6 argues that in fact many of the methods used by the Rhodesian Forces actually turned much of the population against them by their actions:

We were far too hard on the local population, we punished them not the guerrillas, we captured guerrillas in 5 minutes he was one of us; [whereas] a local fed him and got 15 years in jail and we burnt his house down, burnt his whole kraal down. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

The central theoretical approach underlines the importance of ensuring the population are cut off from the intimidation and the terrorising that occurs when they are not protected (Stockwell, 1984, p. 81). Unfortunately, this can only be effective if indeed the population are protected and ready to accept the confines made on their movements this strategy demands. It worked in Malaya, as the population were generally supportive. Mainly because they were given inducements and actually given the houses they built and forced to live in together with additional infrastructure, which included schools, clinics and veterinary support. They were also decisively protected at all times and in most cases mounted their own defence as well, in the form of the 'Home Guard' (Markel, 2006, p. 39). Whereas in Rhodesia, "PV's were regarded purely as a means of population control rather than a basis for winning 'Heart and Minds'" (Beckett & Pimlott, 1985, p. 180). In many ways this failure to apply the PV's as had been envisaged by the Briggs Plan was similar to the failure of the strategic hamlet campaign tried during the Vietnam war; this too failed for a number of reasons, not least lack of protection for those that had been moved (Catton, 1999, p. 921).

In essence 'hearts and minds' is part of the psychological warfare being waged using every nuance to gain an advantage. Both sides are vying for this advantage, which is why the population lie at the crux of the overall objective. The Rhodesians seemed to have been reluctant to accept this premise, as has been explained by the respondents. In support of this assertion, they did not set up a Psychological Operations Unit in the Army until July 1977 and the Directorate of Psychosocial Warfare was not established until 1979, the end of the bush War (Preston, 2004, p. 73). It can be argued this was a singular failure by the Rhodesians.

"You can't impose goodwill, it has got to be bought and of course in the middle of what was a war, it was very difficult to earn goodwill" (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011). This quote sums up the nexus of the problem: it is a transitory concept that depends on a number of fluctuating variables often based upon perceptions. Most of these variables are difficult to

maintain in a hostile and ever changing environment. Consequently, applying the theory is problematic.

## **8.7 Effective Colonial Strategy**

Question: *What aspects of the Colonial strategy appeared to be effective?*

Colonial strategy was formulated progressively in order to deal with the situations as they evolved. Because of the limited resources there was a need to be innovative and highly adaptable, yet in the case of Kenya and Malaya they still had to answer to Britain. Furthermore, they could ask for, though not always receive, Imperial troop reinforcements and request additional manpower through the Crown Agents; who administered the Colonial service. These options were not available to Rhodesia; who was forced to go it alone once they had declared UDI. Nonetheless, the ability to deal with the insurrection rested with the Government of the country undergoing an insurgency. Therefore, the strategies developed were for the most part comprehensive, as it was recognised fairly quickly that piecemeal solutions failed if not supported by a suite of further actions.

The approach developed by the Briggs Plan demonstrated how to deal with an insurgency, once it was applied comprehensively in Malaya. Kenya only had a limited version of such a plan, but from 1954 onwards the Colony progressively adopted more of the parts that had been being used in Malaya at the time (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 43; Strachan, 2007, p. 10). The military strategies in Rhodesia were predominately driven by manpower shortages, using the Fire-Force concept to engage larger concentrations of insurgents, rather than defending population settlements. Although strong on military strategy, any attempt at a comprehensive plan failed; as it lacked an “effective parallel political strategy” (Mills & Wilson, 2007, p. 30).

A French theoretical approach was discussed in the Literature Review, developing what could be termed a French doctrinal approach to counter-insurgency (Galliéni, 1908; Galula, 1964; Trinquier, 1964). The key elements have been extrapolated and presented in Table 8.2. In addition, all three campaigns have been included in order to show the comparisons between each of them. As can be seen in table 8.2, each of them adopted these strategies; in one form or another, and some with more success than the others. However, the principles of this doctrine were ingrained into the counter-insurgency thinking during the campaigns. It can be argued that they remain part of most tactical approaches to dealing with conflicts. In fact they are used by most commanders when confronted with a violent situation, even when dealing with a terrorist one. For example, the area needs to be

cleared and checked by stages, with the civilians kept out of harm's way, by progressively clearing the area of any threats or dangers.

**Table 8.2 French approach in each campaign**

| Aspect  | Applied | Malaya | Kenya            | Rhodesia |
|---|---------|--------|------------------|----------|
| <i>Quadrillage</i> : over-laying an administrative grid on the map to control defined areas of population and territory.                |         | yes    | yes              | yes      |
| <i>Ratissage</i> : cordoning, raking or sweeping /clearing the area systematically  |         | yes    | yes              | yes      |
| <i>Regroupement</i> : bring the population together in one area denying access to insurgents  |         | yes    | yes              | limited  |
| ' <i>Tache d'huile</i> ': or 'oil spot' strategy; extending influence outwards from the cleared area to increase the areas of security. |         | yes    | Kikuyu Highlands | limited  |
| <i>Recruitment</i> : use of local leaders and use of native forces  |         | yes    | yes              | yes      |
| Paramilitary organization and militias  |         | yes    | yes              | yes      |

(Adapted from Alexander & Keiger, 2002; Gougeon, 2005)

Therefore, using these points it has been possible to identify how many aspects align with those used in Colonial strategy and those recommended by the French approach. In addition they also summarise the effective aspects used in Colonial strategy. In support of using this approach, a number of commentators on counter-insurgency refer to the French experience of conducting counter-insurgency operations (Beckett, 2012; Heuser, 2007; Jones & Smith, 2010; Kahl, 2007; Santos, 2011).

It has been considered that the experiences acquired by the French during their colonial campaigns are significant: especially with regard to separating the local population from the insurgents; using grids for cordoning areas for systematic attention and ease of referral; employing a centre out approach called the oil-spot strategy; recruiting the local indigenous population as troops and as advocates, together with an understanding of how important local political considerations were to the overall conduct of the campaign (Tomes, 2004).

*Regroupement* refers to what became known as Villagisation, New Villages or Protected Villages all of which have been discussed at length in the case studies. (see sections

5.7; 6.7 and 7.7). In this chapter it has been dealt with under population control in sections 8.4 and 8.6.

Another noteworthy characteristic discussed by Trinquier (1964), was the ability of the French officer corps to identify with the local population, recruit them and learn their languages (p. xii). It was this aspect that gave the security forces in Kenya a greater capability to understand their enemy, the Mau Mau, with the essential lessons learnt transferred on to Rhodesia: where the security forces fundamentally understood the importance of this aspect. In both conflicts, knowledge of local customs, culture and language played an important role in enhancing their capabilities, both for managing their own indigenous forces but also in understanding their adversaries better. It also served to assist with gaining valuable intelligence from the local population, reducing the problems associated with using interpreters. The problems with interpreters were highlighted by MALA-M-4:

But interpreters will invariably not tell you the full story or they will tell you what they think you want to hear so to a large extent you are at the mercy of the interpreter because you can have lengthy conversation going on for about 5 or 10 minutes and the interpreter will turn around and translate that into one sentence, so you know he is not telling you the full story or you know that they told him something that he doesn't want you to know because he thinks it will upset you,... the ability is to learn to speak the language yourself and communicate directly and that is the best way of doing it. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)

Lastly, the use of paramilitary forces and militia has been a significant and important factor in all of the campaigns, (see sections 5.9, 6.9; and 7.9). The steady development and deployment of Special Forces; the SAS, Ferret Force, Pseudo Gangs, Tracker Units, Selous Scouts, Grey Scouts, RLI and Fire-Force. These specialist units have altered the way in which counter-insurgency were fought, taking the offensive into the heart of the insurgent's domain. Reflecting on the findings based upon the data, most of the respondents were very supportive of these units and considered they had made a significant impact on the course of the conflict in favour of the Government. RODA-P-5 summed up which units he thought were impressive:

Fire-Force Ja, it was very very good and so good that the South Africans took over the concept when they had problems down in Angola and in fact they formed the South African *Koevoet* was actually formed [based] on the Selous Scouts.... You had the two units combined so it was actually brilliant because you had your intelligence from Z desk and CIO okay and then you had the fire power and the man power from the army and the aircraft as well. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011)



*Koevoet* was the next generation development of pseudo operations by the South African Forces based upon the Selous Scouts model after the Bush War had ended (O'Brien, 2001).

The other notable development was that of the Pseudo Operations, which has been argued was one of the most influential aspects developed and used in all three campaigns with great effect (Bailey, 2010; Baxter, 2011; Comber, 2008; Gatchel, 2008; Hughes & Tripodi, 2009; Kitson, 1960; Nilsson, 1993; Stiff, 1982).

## **8.8 Primary Research Question**

The primary research question: *What was the role played by the Colonial forces in counter insurgency campaigns in Kenya (1952 -1959) Malaya (1947-1960) and Rhodesia (1964-1980) and can any of lessons learnt be applied to conflicts today?* The question is dealt with in two parts: the role played by the Colonial forces and can the lessons learnt be applied in modern conflicts today?

Table 8.1, presented at the start of the chapter, indicates the number of elements considered basic that have been identified from the data. Many of these have already been discussed, as far as they related to the secondary questions. However, in order to respond to the primary question it was felt necessary to build up the evidence sequentially as building blocks first, before providing a response.

### **8.8.1 Substantial Advantage**

The contention made at the start of this study, was that the Colonial administration had a substantial or net advantage over most modern day conflicts, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, in that they had control over the levers of power and an intimate working knowledge of the country. This knowledge included integrated administrative structures, civil servants, local indigenous police forces led by expatriates, together with extensive personal networks back up by the might of the Colonial Power itself. Power and the ability to wield that power rested firmly with the British Colonial Government; even in the case of Rhodesia: it was Britain that ultimately decided the fate of the country, (Section 7.1).

The evidence presented in this study has shown that Britain was not as powerful as might have been assumed. In many ways it was this perception of the all-encompassing power that led to the poor initial responses by each of the colonial administrations in their particular rebellions. In the case of Rhodesia, the initial response, although effective, gradually became less capable; losing the general support of the population. Indoctrination,

intimidation and world pressure, combined with the lack of a workable political solution overcame the regime, negating all efforts by the Security Forces to counter the insurgency (Preston, 2004). RODA-P-5 spoke with resignation when he pronounced “I think it was inevitable really it would end up the way we did. (RODA-P-5; 26/01/2011).

In Kenya, it took the authorities ten years to subdue what was in fact an insurgency led by one tribe, the Kikuyu, in a very limited part of the country: the Mau Mau had no outside support (Cleary, 1990, p. 241). In contrast to that of the Rhodesian rebels; who had received support from both China and the Soviet Union (Kirk, 1975, p. 7). Whereas, in addition to being isolated, the Mau Mau were basically defeated by the other half of their own tribe, which did not support Mau Mau methods and the destruction of Kikuyu cultural values (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995). Wasserman (1973) argues that Britain manipulated ‘a potentially disruptive nationalist party into the structures and requisites of the colonial structures’ in order to maintain her influence and to “prevent the formation and mobilization of a mass movement base” to preserve her economic well being (p. 133). “In the process it was the local interests of both the Kenya Administration and the settlers that were sacrificed for a negotiated settlement preserving metropolitan [Britain’s] interests” (Berman, 1976, p. 175). Ostensibly the local population were promised independence if they support the colonial government and rejected the Mau Mau, which generally they did (Furedi, 1990).

Therefore, the major point that comes out of the research is that although the Security Forces are used to blunt the excessive and violent nature of a terrorist inspired insurgency, the objective is not to re-establish the status quo, rather to accept the latest political reality and re-alignment economic interests accordingly. Security Forces are seen as expendable in the pursuit of economic and political objectives (Eisler, 2012; Taulbee, 2002; Welch, 2001; White, 2003). The evidence to support this assertion has been demonstrated by the way each of the conflicts ended: transfer of political power to the dominate group in exchange for continued economic access. Malaya was given independence and power was given to the Malays, based upon an agreement to maintain access to tin and rubber (White, 2003). In Kenya, Independence and the power was given to the conservative Kikuyu led by the alleged leader of the Mau Mau rebellion, Jomo Kenyatta (Azam & Daubrée, 1997; Gordon, 1981). Whereas in Rhodesia, despite widespread intimidation by ZANU-PF, during the elections, the country was handed over to the Maoist supported leader Mugabe: in an effort to curb Communist expansion by strategic alignment (Baker, 1982; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008; Onslow, 2008).

### 8.8.2 Colonial Administration

The second important point of note was the ability of the Colonial administration to use legislation as a tool for either coercion, or to support the counter-insurgency 'Plan'; depending on what was the agreed agenda at the time (Killingray, 1986, p. 422). Emergency Power enactments in all three conflicts were a substantial addition to the ability to force obedience and compliance on the population (Hack, 2009; Killingray, 1986; Komer, 1972; Martin, 2006). Although the ultimate draconian application of Martial Law was not imposed in either Kenya or Malaya, it was progressively applied in Rhodesia. Kenya and Malaya maintained that their insurgencies were internal Emergencies, thus avoiding financial complications by insurance companies for loss of property and goods. Rhodesia was outside of this constraint, once it became unilaterally independent: a pariah state. Nonetheless, all three administrations sought to prosecute their counter-insurgencies within the restraints laid down by legislation and hence the rule of law. RODA-P-6 emphasises this aspect:

It would all operate under the Law and Order Maintenance act. It was a death penalty for being in possession of a weapon, it was death penalty to be a terrorist, receiving communist training, it was a very serious penalty to feed guerrillas or terrorists; so it all operated under the Law and Order Maintenance act... The purpose of that was to get the message out to the locals, you feed a guy you are going to go to jail for 15 years. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

Most of the respondents seem to agree that this hampered their efforts to fight an insurgency, arguing they should fight fire with fire but accepted why they had to use the law:

It had to be shown to the international world that we were operating under proper western law and order laws. Everything was according to the law, everything that was done was according to the law; except the pseudo operations they had a 'carte blanche'. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

The last part of this statement refers to the predominately Selous Scouts operations that were so effective (Stiff, 1982). As the war intensified they needed to conduct more valuable and productive operations, but RODA-P-6 indicates "They had a 'carte blanche'. They were unanswerable [sic] to anybody" but asked if he thought this was a good thing "In theory good, in reality no because it was abused, it was abused! [emphasised]". (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011). The lesson from this remark is that Special Forces have to be on some kind of external supervision; otherwise they can go out of control and this would be counter-productive in winning 'hearts and minds' and to the propaganda effort.

### **8.8.3 Using the Police**

To support the rule of law, it was necessary to have an operationally effective police force (Bennett, 2007). It has been the contention of this study that this was an often neglected aspect of assessments of how the counter-insurgencies were enacted (Hutchinson, 1969). By using predominately former police officers in this research, an alternative voice has been used to review their contribution to the overall effort. The results have been mixed, but once again have generally supported the initial supposition, that they were an essential and effective composite of the whole counter-insurgency effort. Colonial Police Forces were central to the integral structure of colonial administration; as they were the primary defence mechanism. RODA-P-6 emphasised the importance of the police:

Counter insurgency was under the control of the police controlled by the law and order maintenance act, the police were responsible for the upholding of law and order in the country not the military, the military were only acting in support of police. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

RODA-P-6 continued when asked what happened when the army was involved in an incident:

It had to be handed to the police. The police had to go and investigate every skirmish. So after the skirmish it would be a full docket report handled by police, forensics, bullets, everything goes to the police, all the captures go to the police, it was a police matter. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

Consequently, their structure and make up was based upon the paramilitary construct to support the administration and suppress civil disorder when required (Hills, 1996, p. 279).

Placing the police at the fore front of the counter-insurgency effort was always seen as the right course of action; despite incoming army generals wanting to take over all the offensive actions. The army was the aid to the civil power (Epstein, 1968). It is important to emphasise “Effective counterinsurgency requires a strong police establishment functioning in close cooperation with the military” (Mumford, 2012, p. 9). In addition “counterinsurgency requires a police presence because it aims at facilitating or imposing a new form of order, and because developing a police is conventionally seen as ensuring justice and security (i.e. well-being) of a populace” (Hills, 2012, p. 101). Even in Rhodesia, the police maintained their primary role of maintaining law and order whilst at the fore front of combating the insurgency. It was accepted that their ability to gather intelligence and provide a visual statement that the government was still in control was paramount.

In all three conflicts, the police were over-stretched, as they had to meet their normal commitments as well as combating the insurgency. Malaya and Kenya had to build their police forces up quickly at the start of the conflicts. Malaya was able to take trained paramilitary police from Palestine in 1948 and 113 went to Kenya (Sinclair, 2002, p. 35). However, both countries had to recourse to recruitment of short term contract policemen who were quickly deployed and inadequately trained (Sinclair, 2006, p. 155). MALA-P- 3; 03/03/2011, confirmed this poor state of affairs with his training in Malaya, “the course had already been going for about six weeks and I think there were only two weeks left. So we missed most of the information. So after two weeks we got our posting”. This is an indication that many new recruits were rudimentarily trained and thrown in at the ‘deep-end’.

#### **8.8.4 Special Branch**

A further contention has been that Special Branch played a pivotal role in each conflict, the literature and the data all endorsed this assertion (see sections 5.11; 6.10 and 7.11) (Comber, 2008; Flower, 1987; Franklin, 1996; Sinclair, 2011). The ability of Special Branch officers to gather and collate intelligence has been shown to be vital if counter-insurgency is to be effectively combated and thwarted. In addition, the multiple methods used to achieve the required results, such as informers, spies, and perhaps the most innovative, the pseudo gang tactic have been shown to be part of the arsenal that Special Branch has undertaken and used effectively. Pseudo Gangs developed in Kenya, transferred to both Malaya and Rhodesia and in the latter, honed to a devastating tactic when it was combined with the Army in the form of the Selous Scouts and the Fire-Force concept (Bailey, 2010; Baxter, 2011; Gatchel, 2008; Kitson, 1960; Reid-Daly, 1999).

#### **8.8.5 Knowledge of Language and Culture**

Language has been identified as a significant element and an area in which the Colonial Police were proficient; basically as they employed indigenous policemen who knew the language, customs and foibles of the local population. It is perhaps this aspect which stands out when analysing the achievements of the police forces in countering the insurgencies. The ability to freely converse and fully appreciate the nuances should not be underestimated, not least when it comes to obtaining intelligence (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 142). Section 7.9 highlighted this aspect, which can be summarised by the response from RODA-P-2:

Well we were the only people based in an area who had knowledge of that area. We were always in that area we were always patrolling from that area. We always had

information as to what was going on in that area. We ran our sources. (RODA-P-2; 27/01/201)

This statement applies equally to the other two conflicts, as they also ensured that they used as many local policemen as possible. Routine intelligence gathering needs to be also recognised as a vital component to producing a working spatial map of what is actually going on. Chiefly this has been an evolutionary process developed in each conflict, but certainly honed by the BSAP with their ‘Ground Coverage’ patrols:

This include the names of all those from the village, what they were doing, where they were going, how they made their living, in fact everything that assisted in maintaining a comprehensive intelligence image of each village. Each constable would have his own informants and these would be paid for their information on degree of ‘usefulness’. This was then sent back to Special Branch teams who would collate the intelligence in to District reports, which allowed them to indentify insurgent activity and direct the Security forces to those areas where they had the best chance of obtaining good results. (RODA-P-12; 10/01/2011)

It is important to emphasise this aspect, as the basic routine roles are rarely highlighted when discussing counter-insurgency, although Kitson (1971) describes a similar process which he terms “collecting background information” (pp. 95-96). In consequence, the blunt approach taken by the military alienates them from the general population when dealing with rebellions. As a result they lack the basic core intelligence: only achievable with routine patrols, which the police had been trained to undertake as a matter of course.

### **8.8.6 Population Control**

Population control has been highlighted as the core to re-establishing the authority of the central government. Again, this is a routine activity requiring the use of trained police officers or in some cases the use of ‘Home Guards’ recruited and trained from the local population. The creation of ‘Protected Villages’ requires securing them against the insurgents in addition ensuring that food control operates and is strictly enforced. Policing the identification schemes crucial to controlling movement, curfews together with preventing crime are all aspects that may appear to be routine, but they vital in effort to counter the insurgency (Epstein, 1968, p. 149).

### **8.8.7 Rule of Law and Legislation**

Applying the rule of law; means using the legislative process to prosecute the insurgents under the court procedure by means of evidence and procedure (Killingray, 1986; Marenin, 1982). The military are not trained in this aspect, nor are they required to do so, whilst the police are trained and expected to carry out this function, especially if the ultimate

objective is to return the country back to normality. The police need to demonstrate they are operating normally, and not taking out summary justice out on those captured. Furthermore, acting with the rule of law assists in convincing potential converts amongst those that may be wavering, that the ideals of the insurgents are lame and not worthy of supporting. A further testament that the Government is in control: the police are the fore-front of this statement.

The driving force to overturn a rebellion is the Government, which has autocratic and wide ranging powers including the use of force. These include decrees, proclamations and laws to maintain and preserve the authority of the state (Killingray, 1986, p. 433). Amongst the most far reaching laws were: the creation of prohibited or restricted areas, mass detention, identification documentation, restrictions on movements, curfew restrictions and collective punishments. The authority to forcibly remove people from their abodes and move them to a new area, as part of the counter-insurgency plan is testimony to this power. It is the contention of this study that the Colonial authorities possessed inordinate powers to counter the insurgencies and that they used them extensively.

## **8.9 Can any of the Lessons Learnt be Applied to Conflicts Today?**

The second part of the primary Research Question considered whether aspects discussed in this study, regard to have been effective in the past, could in fact be used again in the conflicts today. Each of the respondents was asked this question at the end of the interview, so it would seem appropriate to use their replies in the first instance. MALA-M-4 offers what could well be a summary for this answer:

Yes, I think there is an awful lot that they did then that could work now, and the sad thing is that the British Armed forces don't seem to learn from the lessons of the past. They should be reading the books that were written by army officers and others who were involved in these counter insurgency campaigns and carefully recording why things went wrong and making damned sure they didn't make the same mistakes again, but they don't seem to do that, they don't consult the records of past campaigns. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)

A rueful answer, which was backed-up by the following statement:

Well, I've already mentioned in Afghanistan, why didn't anyone talk to Soviet officers, um Iraq, well the first Gulf war, why didn't anybody speak to the guys who fought in the desert in World War II, still plenty of them alive, there just seems to be this dreadful arrogance that we don't need to talk to people who have done this before, and in some cases, people were in those campaigns for years on end, their experience would have been invaluable but nobody thought to ask them. (MALA-M-4; 04/03/2011)

RODA-P-6 was more forthright in his answer:

Hit their logistics, without logistics, and go as far back as you can up the line of logistics to create terror, to create the fear on their logistics chain. If it was me and I had to advise a strategy I would look at their logistics and I'd see how far back they could go and just hit their logistics as hard as I could and as far back as I could. (RODA-P-6; 23/01/2011)

The important point being made here is that there is much to learn from the past and even more it is important to make sure that it is well documented and then re-appraised to see how it could fit with what is required today. A point endorsed by MALA-M-1, "of course there are always lessons which can be taken out but they have to be in context and probably have to be sort of moulded and massaged in order to fit the situation".

General Petraeus (2006) has certainly shown he is willing to ensure that the past is recognised when he co-authored the *Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24* on counter- terrorism. Kilcullen (2005, 2006b, 2006c, 2010) a noted advisor to Petraeus and the US Government, has written extensively on all aspects of counter-insurgency, firmly incorporating past experience into his writings. Notwithstanding these developments RODA-P-12 is more dismissive of the ability of the US to effect change on the ground because they conform to the conventional approach:

The US approach just is totally wrong for a counter-insurgency type of operation. They don't have a doctrine, I don't believe personally, and the experience that I've had in Afghanistan, is that they don't actually have the doctrine to fight a counter-insurgency war. So I can talk from experience there. Is that, you have this situation where US policy rules supreme. So, strategy is developed at that level and that controls tactics. So, there has been no allowance for innovation on the ground. (RODA-P-12; 10/01/2010)

However, despite what can be termed modern day interpretation of how conflicts were fought in the past and trying to apply today's judgement to them, MALA-M-1 was pretty emphatic about this aspect in his response to the Malayan Emergency:

It was very successful. Perhaps one or two people's human rights were undignified in the process – tough. We are talking 50 years ago, the whole attitude about how you treated other people was completely different, the British and the British soldier, we were very arrogant in the way in which we interfaced with local people, we even had very derogatory terms for them and it all stemmed from the fact that there was very little interaction between the two and when there was interaction it was very much one sided, colonial master, colonial subject and nowadays people say 'oohhh'[sic] but then it was normal, and therefore mostly I make no apologies for it because we were all if you like imprisoned in the laws of the day, that's the way we treated people, that's the way we treated each other. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)



Although KENA-P-1 accepts what was employed in the past may no longer be acceptable today, so his answer to the question of what could be used today was:

Well, because times have changed and a lot of the things that went on in the emergency at that time were accepted practice would never be accepted today. The amount of force used could be considered no longer reasonable. You would be accused of racialism and you would probably be taken before the International Criminal Court. No, times have changed completely. (KENA-P-1; 02/03/2010)

MALA-M-5 endorses this line of thought:

I think the lesson actually was that the means which were employed to eventually win cannot actually be replicated in a non-colonial area, the fact that it worked so well, and I believe that it did work very well, was that the British controlled every aspect of the country. (MALA-M-7; 05/02/2012)

Applying the concept of ‘hearts and minds’ has been a concept that has been carried on by all forces engaged in modern counter-insurgency operations: with varying degrees of success. But as has been argued in this study, it is not as simple as it sounds; this is brought out by MALA-M-1:

Difficult to translate that message into a non colonial situation but attempts obviously have been made and the way in which you could see the British forces were operating around Basra in Iraq , you could see that the hearts and minds were still going on, the Squaddy [soldier] with his chocolate, the children running around, just showing people that the troops are supposed to be there to help them. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

Another point that came out of the responses was the need to develop Special Forces, as large movements of troops was unproductive and was easily avoided by the insurgents using guerrilla tactics (see sections 5.12; 6.11; and 7.12). In each of the conflicts studied, various permutations have been tried with varying degrees of success. In Malaya, Ferret Force and the Malayan Scouts who went on to become the SAS together with Tracker Units. The specialised Tracker Units were used in all three campaigns employing indigenous tribe’s people. In Kenya, this morphed into the highly effective Pseudo gangs, which were copied in Rhodesia; becoming the Selous Scouts. Pseudo Gangs were also used in Malaya by Special Branch under the term Q Operations (Comber, 2008, p. 165). The use of Special Forces was endorsed by the respondents, but in many ways has already become an accepted aspect of modern operations as indicated by RODA-P-5, “I would say that your Brit SAS who are there in depth right now [Afghanistan], they are already doing exactly what we were doing, they are already doing exactly what we were doing [in Rhodesia]”.

The other aspect which endorses the use of Special Forces is the basic level at which insurgency has to be fought. MALA-M-1 summarises the points he thought were important:

I think in the background there was always the SAS, but it wasn't so much the SAS war, to some extent I think maybe the Ghurkhas were more successful. The Ghurkhas because they are well trained, but also because they think at a level which frankly most British soldiers can't think at, and that is a real subsistent level, they could relate to these guys who were living in the jungle and work out ways of taking them on, that is patrolling, ambushing and so on, and I have to say the British soldier was more inclined towards technical solutions bombing, artillery things like this. (MALA-M-1; 20/03/2011)

The research has indicated that core to counter-insurgency is the requirement for an overall 'Plan', which encompasses all aspects associated with overcoming the insurgents. The very nature of an insurgency will mean that there are multiple layers required that all have to be interlinked to each other. Each insurgency will require an appreciation and an adaption of the required fundamentals to compile such a plan (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 20; Rigden, 2008, p. 21). The ability to manage such a complex system has been argued requires an overall suprema, in whatever guise that may be. Unfortunately, for modern insurgencies this is perhaps the most difficult demand of all, because there are so many vested interests that cannot easily be overridden or accommodated effectively. Compromise is likely to undermine the efforts, but today this is the logical way forward (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 240; Mills, 2006, p. 24).

A strategic long term plan is therefore central to counter-insurgency; KENA-P-7 put it quite succinctly:

The basic idea was initially to impose law and order and prevent terrorism and everybody was so tied up with that it really, the higher levels of government obviously, the District Commissioner was probably thinking 5-10 years ahead for his district, Provincial Commissioner was thinking in terms of 10, 20, 30 years ahead for his district, and the Governor was thinking more in terms of 50 years ahead. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011)

Intelligence gathering is perhaps the most problematic of all functions required for countering insurgencies. The ability to collect and collate routine information leads to superior capabilities, but much of what is required is basic police work. A local police force has this capability, as has been shown by the research. Unfortunately, for modern day insurgencies this is a luxury, as the police force is normally the weakest link (Hills, 2012). The very concept of community policing is virtually nonexistent and the police are seen more

as enforcers of unpopular government policies, rather than upholders of communal values being corrupt in their approach and untrustworthy (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 47).

Conversely, the Colonial Police Forces were at the fore front of the counter campaigns and provided most of the basic intelligence, the language skills together with a deep understanding of the local culture and conditions. It will be hard to replicate anything similar today as has been highlighted by Hills (2012), where she argues that “the police can play an enabling role in counterinsurgency but the nature and purpose of that role is debated” (p. 106). The common agreement (Cassidy, 2007; Mumford, 2012, p. 8) is that indigenous police forces are seen as the way to underpin the efforts to counter the insurgency through assuring the security of the population. “ Yet their role is typically limited by corruption, brutality, ineffectiveness and sectarianism, and by the knowledge that the international counterinsurgency forces will leave” (Hills, p. 107). Recognition that although essential in reality almost impossible to achieve in a short time span.

Regardless of the charge that Colonialists were imperialistic in attitude, the integration of the indigenous population into all of the organs of authority, especially the police, ensured that they were culturally aware and sensitive. Even the Rhodesians were integrated and understood the cultural aspects of the country, speaking the local languages. Such a view was back-up by RODA-I-15, “In Intaf [Internal Affairs] we were obliged to study African customs and Customary Law and to write exams on them. This also applied to African languages”. There was an empathy between the Europeans and those that worked with them, which should not be underestimated in the ability to undermine their opponents.

Transferring this deep cultural awareness to modern conflicts is far more problematic; as the majority of the troops are mostly strangers to the country lacking language skills and social or cultural knowledge. There has been recognition by military authorities that this aspect needs to be addressed in some way and the US Army manual FM 3-07. 22 (2006) states. Although Gonzalez (2007) is highly critical of the superficial approach the manual takes failing to recognise that culture “has been profoundly shaped by capitalism, colonialism and other political and economic factors on a global scale (p. 15).

In order for U.S. forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs. (The US Army/Marine Corps, 2006, pp. sec 4-11)

For the US Forces the experiences of Vietnam runs deep and warn the politicians of the dangers involved in underestimating your insurgency foe. Vietnam was a prime example of how not to fight an insurgency, as a foreign power. Without over generalising, the Vietnam conflict was a long and drawn out failure by the US forces unprepared to fight a counter-insurgency campaign (Marston & Malkasian, 2008, p. 131). Convinced that overwhelming technological fire power and the use of American forces on the ground would overwhelm the enemy, lay at the heart of the misconception (Joes, 2004, p. 230). Despite informed advice from the British conflict in Malaya, including Thompson (1966) who helped develop the Briggs Plan, the American hierarchy was loathed to implement new tactics and strategies. An attempt was made at creating protected villages called the strategic hamlet campaign, but this was never implemented effectively (Rosen, 1982, p. 90).

The contention argued here is that the US failed to “adapt its organizational structure and strategy to win the support of the local population and directly defeat [the] insurgents” (Nagl, 2002, p. xiv). Therefore, much of what has been argued in this study regarding the advantages the Colonial forces had in prosecuting the insurgencies were not available to the US. Consequently, it had to rely too much on its military power and not enough on its ability to gain the support of the population and ensure they were protected from intimidation. Nor did the US embrace ‘hearts and minds’ sufficiently to have any positive impact on its relationship with the Vietnamese people. As a result of re-interpretation of past mistakes, a whole new section of what is termed ‘cultural anthropology’ or sometimes ‘Human Terrain’ has been developed and used by the US Military (González, 2008; Heuser, 2007; Lucas, 2008; McFate, 2005; Sluka, 2010). Therefore, the contention is that many of the points identified in this study are in fact being assessed -in many cases already being implemented into modern day counter-insurgency strategy.

It would be wrong to presume the US did not learn a lot of important counter-insurgency lessons. One of these was the use of Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), which were joint operations between the Marines and the South Vietnamese Popular Forces. Another imitative was similar to pseudo operations, called the Phoenix programme run by the CIA, using South Vietnamese to infiltrate the Viet Cong to gather intelligence and eliminate threats (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 257; Rosenau & Long, 2009). The creation of Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU’s) fulfilled very similar functions to the Tracker Units in Kenya and Rhodesia.

## **8.10 Underlying Theory**

The underlying theory discussed and considered at the start of this study has remained appropriate throughout. The complex and inter-connected aspects related to rebellion, insurrection and social upheaval required an interpretation of these events within a framework expounded by social scientists such as Marx (1867/1999; 1969/1848) and Simmel (1950; 1955), Williams (1947, 1970), Mack and Snyder (1957), Schelling (1960), Turner (1975), Boulding (1962), Horton(1966) and Blalock (1967).

As discussed in Section 2.18, there were more than one series of upheaves taking place within the same event and at the same time, as social change was occurring within all sections of society. Revolution and rebellion, by their inherent nature are a purging of the old order and when this was happening within the context of decolonisation, which was empowering a generation with new demands related to emancipation, it was even more dramatic. In addition, the accepted norms that had structured the pre-1940s were no longer tolerated; both in colonial and British society. The stresses and strains were evident on all sides during all of these conflicts.

Therefore, the strongest theory to support this study remains conflict theory as expounded by Marx (Marx, 1867/1999, 1970/1843; Marx & Engels, 1969/1848). Based upon this analysis of the conflicts that is inherent in society, other authors (Boulding, 1962; Cohen, 1965; Dahrendorf, 1959; Durkheim, 1964/1893; Hungerford, 2008; Lockwood, 1966) have developed the theory further, particularly in relation to strain theory and anomie theory as developed by Merton (Merton, 1938) and Cohen (Cohen, 1965).

In addition, the concept of ideology linked to the consciousness of identity, as represented in the form of nationalism, must also be considered; as expounded by Ormsbee (Ormsbee, 2004 ). It can be argued, this is a progressive development from the tenets of Marxism based upon the fluid dynamics created by conflict within society seeking to establish new hierarchical orders with nationalism becoming the vehicle to establish this.

## **8.11 Conclusion**

By analysing the Table 8.1, it has been possible to identify the key components and assess these in relation to the research questions. In so far as effectiveness is concerned, the following have been acknowledged as core to the process:

- The necessity to operate as a combined, organised structure following a defined plan under an over arching supremo;

- A politically achievable objective that is widely supported and promoted;
- An effective intelligence gathering structure operated and managed by Special Branch, with support from the police and the military units in the field;
- A multilayered interlocking structure that combines the police, military and civil administration under an joint command structure;
- Substantial legislation enforced by the police using the rule of law through a transparent judicial process;
- Incorporation of indigenous forces in all aspects of operations and defence;
- Special Forces Units capable of operating in the insurgent's terrain;
- Balance between counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgent objectives;
- Population centric: Linguistic and culturally aware;
- 'Hearts and minds' approach balanced by dealing with intimidation in all its guises: religious, sorcerous and ideologically based.

Programmes were put in place in all three conflicts in an effort to counter all aspects of intimidation including the psychological manipulation through sorcery, witchcraft, ideology and religion. Both sides were vying for control of the population and it would appear this needed to be fully understood. Exploring the relationship of witchcraft and sorcery as part of the psychological manipulation of the population, particularly in Africa, has brought a new dimension to the discussion on 'hearts and minds'. The effectiveness of the concept has been assessed in this study and has been found to encompass a lot more than most other studies have recognised: namely intimidation, coercion and psychological oppression are the antithesis of the term.

Although 'hearts and minds' is commonly accepted term in today's counter-insurgency parlance, it has been shown to be less well known by the combatants interviewed. Much of the intents of the concept were being applied in Kenya anyway, regardless of having a term for their actions. However, the Rhodesians were far less supportive of this approach; as they felt they could not overcome the violent intimidation without defeating the insurgents in the field. They did not have the resources necessary to carry out many of the components required to ensure the population was cut off from the insurgents. Arguments have been made that this was a failure in the long term, but from a strategic perspective their counter-guerrilla approach, or containment, was perhaps the only viable option open to them (Arbuckle, 1979, p. 29). International pressure, financial constraints and lack of manpower and resources

conspired against their objectives; however this is beyond this study to expound the merits or otherwise one way or the other.

The research conducted into the three historical counter-insurgency campaigns has identified that there were a number of advantages that are difficult to replicate in today's conflicts. However, there now appears to be belated recognition of these key aspects by military strategists with a view to incorporating them into overall strategy (Heuser, 2007, pp. 160-170). Counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary and often slow process; fortunately during colonial times innovation was often quicker, forced by necessity with less oversight due to the tyranny of distance.

Each insurgency is different, which requires adopting adjusted strategies and tactics to overcome them. The Colonial administrations did have net advantages due to the amount of control they could exert in their respective countries. Nevertheless, each Government had far less support and resources necessary to bring the insurgencies to an early resolution. The conflicts were all long drawn out affairs, each averaging ten years, but ingenuity and adaptation were very much in action with many innovative approaches being used (Johnston & Urlacher, 2012).

The last chapter gathers together all the key aspects discussed and extracts the pertinent points to allow conclusions to be drawn. Based upon these conclusions a series of theoretical recommendations are presented together with the perceived difficulties envisaged by modern day military strategists and planners in implementing any of them.

# Chapter 9

## CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

### 9.1 Introduction

The intention of this multi-case-study was to explore three historical insurgencies from the perspective of former participants of the role played by the Colonial Forces in countering the insurgency. The hypothesis considered that within the framework of the Colonial structure there was a substantial advantage, not available to most modern counter-insurgency forces. This advantage included the composition of the forces, with the integration of the indigenes working with a core of settlers and colonialists who also had a considerable understanding of the culture, languages and makeup of the country. Furthermore, this was coupled with the ability of the Colonial Administration to enact draconian, although necessary and supporting, legislation to underpin the counter-insurgency plan. The Forces consisted primarily of the police force, the locally recruited army units and the Colonial Administration. Moreover, self reliance brought about due to limited resources in the colonies instigated improvised solutions, lateral thinking and home grown tactics difficult to mimic in today's conflicts; but nonetheless effective.

In order to respond further to the research objectives, this last chapter condenses the discussions developed in Chapter 8, into manageable segments. Consequently, the conclusions drawn from this study are based upon the findings to the research questions, already discussed, addressing six principal areas:

- **Objective** of using colonial forces;
- **Effectiveness** of factors and roles adopted by the Security Forces to combat the insurgencies;
- **Substantial factor** of 'hearts and minds' to the strategy for prosecuting the campaigns;
- **Understood and applied** as an overt concept and strategy on the ground by the colonial forces;
- **Significance of strategy** used by the Colonial administration to counter-insurgency
- **Applicability** of any of the factors to modern day counter-insurgency practice.



The sixth point addresses the functionality of the findings, in an effort to apply them to modern day counter-insurgency strategies and tactics. The first five points used the empirical data upon which the recommendations are based. Furthermore, having used a comparative analytical structure across the three case studies, it has been possible to identify significant trends in relation to results, thus substantiating the empirical data. By triangulating the narratives provided by the respondents back through the existing literature, and also checking for verification by selected respondents, it has been possible to validate the majority of the material used (Costantino, 2008, p. 402). As a result the recommendations are a personal perspective based upon interpretation of the data supported by what Stake (1995) calls, “the quality and utility of the research is not based upon its reproducibility, but on whether or not the meanings generated, by the researcher or the reader, are valued” (p. 135).

The previous chapter, presented the findings in relation to the research questions, drawing together the material gathered in the three case studies, in order to make a comparative analysis possible. Although it is problematic to draw generalised conclusions from the data across conflicts that were unique to their time and geography; nonetheless, a series of trends have emerged that are worthy of note. These have been presented in bullet points above. By extracting what can be considered the essence of each of the research questions, it has been possible to provide a summary of the results in a more digestible format. A considerable amount of data has emerged from the research; therefore, it needed to be prioritised for greater clarity.

## **9.2 Pertinent Points Addressing the Research Questions**

Each of the following sections addressed one of the six bullet points expounding the interpretation and synthesis developed in Chapter 8. By extracting the significant points in relation to the research question, the context has been elaborated to provide a stronger personal interpretation and discussion.

### **9.3 Objective-Using Colonial Forces**

The primary research question used the word ‘role’ and this needs to be defined before the subsidiary parts of the sentence can be addressed; as it has multiple connotations. Amongst these connotations are: function, character, part, purpose, contribution and intention. Each of which holds a differing nuance to the word ‘role’.

In the first instance, the role played by the Colonial forces was to defend the interests of the Colonial State in relation to those of the mother country. In Kenya and Malaya this was

Britain, and in Rhodesia principally the Rhodesian regime, although ultimately it too was Britain. These interests were both political and economic, but essentially economic.

Therefore, the **objective** of the forces was to uphold these interests. The character of the Colony was its combined make up, providing the resources necessary to undertake this role.

In the second instance, it is the contribution made by the Colonial forces in pursuing their role and this has been dealt with in great depth in the case studies. Essentially, because it was the contribution these forces made that is under scrutiny, to explore their role in combating insurgency to ascertain whether this was unique, and if so how unique was it.

Lastly, in defining the word role is the undertone of the word and that is intention. It is argued intention is an extension of the principal understanding of role, which was to defend the vested interests. These interests have been shown to have altered during the conflicts, as world pressure changed the initial objectives from maintaining the status quo, to actually relinquishing the possessions yet ensuring continued economic access to the territories post conflict resolution. Malaya was granted Independence, whilst continuing to remain within the economic sphere of British influence, as was Kenya. Rhodesia too, was forced to accept an outcome that sought to achieve the same result as for Kenya and Malaya; namely continued favoured economic access. Therefore, the Colonial forces were to uphold the political objectives of the dominant power, Britain, regardless of what the Colonies might have considered to be in their best interests.

The other important distinction is that without the support of the British Army in both Kenya and Malaya it is doubtful whether the insurgency could ever have been brought to a comprehensive conclusion, certainly not in the time frames it took; as there was not sufficient resources available to accomplish this task. In support of this assertion, Rhodesia did not have the benefit of outside support and its capability to maintain the Bush War inextricably drained not only its resources but its will to pursue the conflict any further. Therefore, although the Colonial Forces were the first line of defence, they required additional support to ensure they could accomplish the task required of them.

Notwithstanding this point, the ability of the Colonies, Rhodesia as well, to recruit local forces was imperative. The strains placed on Britain during the end of empire retreat, meant it did not have sufficient resources to conduct multiple overseas commitments without the valuable resource of locally recruited ingenious forces.

As in Chapter 8, the second part of the question: “can any lessons learnt be applied to conflicts today”, is dealt with last. First and foremost because the data needs to be explained before the question can be addressed appropriately.

#### **9.4 Effectiveness: the Factors and Roles Adopted by the Security Forces**

The argument has been made in this research regarding the effectiveness of being able to work successfully with indigenous local forces that were incorporated into the structure of the colonial apparatus. The advantages of knowing and understanding local culture, traditions and languages all enhanced the net capabilities on the ground. In addition, this capability harnessed what is considered to be the fundamental requirement for countering an insurgency: the ability to know your enemy. It is perhaps this, more than any other aspect that has been shown to be crucial to effectiveness when combating an insurgency. The ability to get inside the mind of your adversary assists in developing counter-measures to overcome their known capabilities: it is a capacity highly sought after by all military strategists and planners.

The corollary to this capability is superior intelligence was gained by utilising all the assets available and fully understanding not only the advantages, but also the negatives of that information. Intelligence is recognised as crucial to developing effective counter-insurgency plans and operations. Police Special Branch has been identified as central to this role. The unique position Special Branch occupied in the Colonial structure, at the heart of operations; was seen as pivotal to the argued effectiveness of the forces. By harnessing not only the capabilities of the settlers and the indigenes in the central structure, but also the routine and unique capabilities of the police on the ground, Special Branch was able to utilise the limited resources to the best effect. Consequently, it is perhaps this synergy that epitomises the effectiveness of the Security Forces more than the other elements that have been identified in this study.

As a result of this capability the development of specialised units took place. These units were able to utilise the intelligence in a targeted operations; which would have been impracticable without such explicit information on their foes. The comprehensive knowledge of the set up and structures of the adversaries, particularly in Malaya and Rhodesia, was impressive. Ultimately, this capability led to what has been termed ‘turning’ of insurgents leading to the creation of pseudo gangs and pseudo operations. It has been argued that these were amongst the most effective of all the developments during the three campaigns, particularly in Rhodesia, where it became one of the most accomplished and formidable tactics of the Bush War (Stiff, 1982).

In support of Special Branch were not only the police, but the other auxiliary units such as the Home Guard, Internal Affairs, District Officers, Tribal Police, local Army units

and the volunteer support units. Each was part of the combined structure working in a sustained approach towards the same objective. In both Malaya and Kenya, the British Army was brought in to support the civil authority and provide additional and much needed resources. The Army brought a different, but needed expertise that complimented the police. In Rhodesia the Army was made up of settlers sharing a commonly accepted objective, which bonded them together more than the addition of the British Army did in the other two campaigns.

### **9.5 Substantial Factor: ‘Hearts and Minds’ to the Strategy**

The concept of ‘hearts and minds’ has been examined as one of the contributing factors in an effort to ascertain how substantial it was overall to the prosecution of the campaigns. Chiefly because of the many conflicting claims of how important it has become to the counter-insurgency strategy. There is no dispute that the Malayan Emergency saw the holistic application of the concept across the concerted strategy, becoming one of the overarching core principles to the Plan. However, the evidence from Kenya and Rhodesia is less supportive of this concept as being core to a recognised strategy for conducting the campaigns. It may well have been implied but there is not enough data to support the contention to justify any claims it was central to the Plan. Rhodesia did try to adopt the concept towards the end of the war, but it was too late to have a substantial effect on the eventual outcome (Cilliers, 1985).

Analysing the data further it was perhaps the interpretation of what hearts and minds meant that was more in dispute. For many of the respondents their understanding was that it was a ‘soft’ approach as opposed to a more hard line military one where little effort, or consideration, was expended in considering the collateral damage to the local population. The respondents’ understanding was that military objectives need to be accomplished regardless; as that was the only way to defeat the rebellions. Whereas, what they perceive to be the ‘soft’ approach, acquiring popular support for the government against the insurgents, was not effective. Therefore, what was contested by the respondents was the interpretation of what ‘hearts and minds’ meant. Paradoxically, it can mean different things to different people and this is why those respondents from Rhodesia were less supportive of the concept; as they considered the ‘soft’ interpretation could not match the coercive intimidation used by the insurgents and therefore was doomed to failure.

As far as this study is concerned the interpretation of the concept is as follows: on one side, control of the population is created by fear and psychological control, such as

intimidation and terrorism used by the insurgents. On the other, support is gained through expectation, approval and less coercive measures to achieve the preferred outcome, which is the support of the general populous. In essence it is about psychological control of the population through a less despotic approach (Dixon, 2009; Greenhill & Staniland, 2007; Wolf, 1965). This is the meaning that aligns more closely with the data from the respondents. The argument concerning how much coercion can be applied without a detrimental effect, is one that haunts advocates for a softer approach.

Notwithstanding this explanation, what has become apparent from the research has been the contention that the use of intimidation by the insurgents was far more effective than the efforts made by the Government's apparatus to persuade the population they could depend on the ability of the state to protect them. The majority of the data collected indicates defending the population against terror was not as easy as it may have seemed; a fact that needs to be recognised and understood today.

Furthermore, the counter-battle being fought for the 'hearts and minds of the population was dominated by the insurgents; especially the Mau Mau and the Zimbabwean rebel groups where tribal religion was used to maintain a psychological hold over them. The Mau Mau created a bastardised oath-taking ceremony, loosely based upon tribal beliefs to force other members of their tribe, the Kikuyu, to remain loyal to their cause on pain of death. The oath proved to be very effective in achieving this aim. Although there is no evidence for the use of oaths in Rhodesia, there was considerable psychological control through the use of spirit mediums and witchcraft, which had very much the same effect as the oaths had on the Kikuyu population: this was a form of psychological control.

The ability to apply this level of control through witchcraft and sorcery in African conflicts, has had little discussion in previous studies, consequently it is considered to be a significant factor that has emerged from this study requiring further research. Although this does not apply directly to the Malayan Emergency, the use of indoctrination was rampant during the Emergency, as well as being backed up with intimidation and the use of terror. Ideological indoctrination took place in both Kenya and Rhodesia and was reinforced by witchcraft and terror. Therefore, to fully understand how ineffectual 'soft-hearts and minds' was in the African conflicts it is important to understand the power of tribal beliefs over the indigenous population. Unless this was countered—and attempts were made in both Kenya and Rhodesia to achieve this—little headway could be made to secure the whole-hearted support of the population as propounded by the advocates of 'hearts and minds' strategy.

Conversely, some of those involved on the side of Security Forces were acutely aware of the power of witchcraft over the minds of their adversaries and this was used to gain control of many once captured. Once accomplished, the erstwhile insurgent would be used as part of the pseudo operations. Turning captured insurgents required a 'power relationship' to occur whereby the former rebel accepted in his mind the superiority of his capturers and that their magic was stronger. Once this had occurred, and the evidence obtained from the respondents confirms it could be accomplished relatively quickly with allegiances changing. Once again it is a difficult concept to comprehend from a Western perspective, but research into radicalisation explores many of the ambiguities that are present in highly susceptible converts (Aly, 2010; Johnston, 2009; Sageman, 2004). Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this study to expand this area any further.

## **9.6 Understood and Applied: Overt Concept and Strategies**

In addition to the previous points discussed, it was important to clarify claims that the use of a 'hearts and minds' was central to the tactical objectives of prosecuting the campaigns. In so far that it not only formed part of the strategy, but was understood by those on the ground as a necessary part of the operations too. Basically, in an effort to appreciate if this concept was more of a post-event-interpretation that is to say revisionist, rather than a known concept at the time.

Indications are that the concept was not well known at the time, or at least not as the phrase has come to be known. Nonetheless, aspects of this strategy were apparent in all of the counter-insurgency plans, as separating the population from the insurgents is a well understood concept. Villagisation took place in all three conflicts, although with less zeal than was seen in Malaya. Kenya, also undertook mass detention of the Kikuyu tribe in an effort to separate the Mau Mau from their resources. The ramifications of using this policy are still being debated and are before the British Court system at this juncture (Anderson, 2011b; Bennett, 2011; Elkins, 2011; Howe, 2011).

It is quite significant to note that mass detention did not take place in Rhodesia despite the legislation that could have accomplished this. It is therefore argued that this was an appreciation of 'hearts and minds'; as it was recognised that such an act would have been detrimental to the support the Government was actively courting amongst the African population. Conversely, mass detention of the Kikuyu did take place in Kenya, causing great resentment and this could be considered as very much against winning hearts and minds, or certainly of those detained in the camps (Furedi, 1989). On the other hand it was welcomed

by those that thought the Mau Mau was a direct threat to them and that detainment was more about winning, rather than pandering to the rebel's hearts and minds. The policy was also used in Malaya, with mass detention camps, burning of villages and whole scale resettlement of the Chinese squatter population (Hack, 2009, p. 412). All of which could be considered as contrary to any thoughts of winning hearts and minds, but it was the minds of those not detained that was the quest, not those being detained.

The ability to use intimidation against the population by the insurgents has become apparent from the data as presented. It has been argued that this is the antithesis of 'hearts and minds' and indicates how difficult it is to secure the population from such assaults, if they are not segregated from the insurgents. Mindful of this aspect, the respondents were less than supportive that 'soft' approach would ever have succeed as long as intimidation could not be combated. A series of measures were used to try and lower the incidences. Protective villages, the use of informers providing good actionable intelligence, together with weeding out the instigators and leaders all helped to lower the fear of intimidation. Providing locals with the ability to defend themselves, which led to formation of the Home Guard units, was another incentive to support of the population. Empowering the population to defend themselves accomplished many objectives, as it gave them a sense of purpose, as well as making them 'buy-into' the concept of their own destiny was in their hands; not solely in the hands of the Security Forces.

In addition, the data has indicated that the Colonial Administration used as many means as were at its disposal to encourage the local population to support the Government. Civil projects were undertaken, building of clinics, schools and roads together with increasing the number of jobs available. Additional assistance was given to farmers, as access to dealing with the government. The District Commissioners and their staff generally understood that only by actively improving the living conditions and standards could they every hope to swing the population behind the thrust against the insurgents. Therefore it is fair to say, the concept of 'hearts and minds' was applied even though it may not have been a stated term at the time. Generally it was felt it made good sense to coax the population to support the Government in its efforts to defeat the rebellion and the insurgency.

### **9.7 Significance of Strategy: Administration and Counter-Insurgency**

The contention has been made that the Colonial administration was part of an exceptional advantage as far as being able to implement almost unlimited legislation in support of the counter-insurgency effort. The ability to have almost unbridled control over the

levers of power with very little outside interference was certainly a distinct advantage. The down side for the Colonies was the lack of resources needed to support many initiatives. From this perspective it can be seen the Administrations in all of the conflicts discussed, were able to mobilise the whole counter-insurgency effort to their advantage. Virtually any legislation the Government required could be brought in to support the objectives. For example, what could be considered very draconian measures: mass detentions, collective punishments, and death for possession of weapons: the absolute power of the State was formidable.

On the other hand, they were also able to bring about support for the population in the way of civic improvements, greater access to facilities, more jobs and generally ensure the softer side was more in evidence than the harsher one. Land grievances lay at the heart of all three conflicts; consequently, dealing with these issues was key to gaining support from the population. In the case of Malaya and Kenya, the promise of independence altered the course of the insurgency and brought the majority over to the Government's side. Rhodesia attempted a series of initiatives to increase the power sharing proposals, but all of them fell on stony ground. But the concept of divide and rule runs through each of the Government's main policy objectives, predominately by supporting all those opposed to the main rebels.

Restructuring the Security Forces was crucial, especially Special Branch, which has been shown to be a very effective tool for countering an insurgency. Rhodesia recognised this aspect and even with the creation of the Central Intelligence Organisation, it however kept Special Branch independent. The need to keep it independent from the Army was also recognised as necessary in both Kenya and Malaya. Although the Army operated in support of the civil authority, namely the police, it was important not to let them dominate the intelligence domain; as they did not have the local knowledge, resources, language or expertise to be effective. It could also be argued that the political objectives of the Army did not always align with those in the Colonies either. The data suggests the role of Special Branch in all three conflicts to have been significant.

In support of Special Branch was the police. It was important to restructure and develop this valuable resource, which in both Malaya and Kenya was under strength and poorly resourced at the start of both conflicts; this was not the case in Rhodesia. Building up the police, particularly the recruitment of local officers, greatly enhanced its capabilities. The most notable of these capabilities was acquiring intelligence through its local officers, vital to the Special Branch for planning and operations.



Curiously, the under-resourcing forced the Security Forces to become more innovative and develop new initiatives and units. These have been discussed at length in sections 5.12; 6.13 and 7.13. Suffice to say, the police in all three countries formed specialised anti insurgency units, called by various names, which were at the fore front of taking the conflict direct to the insurgents. All of these units used the expertise of the indigenous forces, particularly tracking and local knowledge to great advantage. Such expertise was also core to developing the more specialised strike units; most notably of these were the pseudo operations.

In addition to the development of specialised and elite units such as the SAS, Selous Scouts and the Tracker Units was the creation the Home Guard. By utilising the local population to defend themselves, in predominately the Protected Villages, this freed up the other units to concentrate on the insurgents. The use of local people in their own defence was also an inclusive strategy, giving them a stake in their own destiny. Empowerment provided them with a sense of purpose, which greatly benefited the governments cause. It must not be over simplified either, as a great number of abuses were committed by the Home Guards for example, settling old scores and “they divided the spoils-land- of the Mau Mau amongst themselves”(Ogot & Ochieng, 1995, p. 41). Nonetheless, the strategy of using local people was generally effective.

Further to the concept of divide-and-rule, is the strategy of separating the population from the insurgents to prevent support and succour being given, as well as trying to prevent intimidation occurring. The main policy was the creation of new or protected villages, as they were called. In Malaya they were heavily guarded, as much to stop the insurgents getting in as to prevent the inhabitants from supplying the insurgents with food and supplies. The policy was less effective in Kenya, although mass detention did take place, and in Rhodesia it was used, but once again was not that effective. There are a number of reasons why this was not effective not least of these was the difficulty in supporting such large numbers of people in a central place. The cost to the Government was large, forcing it to use finances it did not have, which could account for it being less promoted than it had been in Malaya. It could be argued therefore, keeping the population in their own villages was more cost effective but less aligned with the principles of separating the population from the insurgents.

The other major strategy used by the Government was to evoke the propaganda war, using all the resources at its disposal: the press, radio, leaflet drops, village meetings, posters and word of mouth. Promoting the success of the Security Forces was important in maintaining the support of the population. In Malaya, it was common to show the dead

bodies of the killed and captured, as it was in both Kenya and Rhodesia. Convincing the waverers, as they were called, to leave the insurgents also called for the payment of large bribes and incentives in Malaya. Informers were rife in Kenya and Rhodesia, with information money being paid regularly to gain intelligence. Captured insurgents were offered many incentives to inform on their comrades in arms. Everything possible was used by the Government to undermine the insurgency and money played a large part in this strategy.

### **9.8 Applicability: Past Factors to Modern day Counter-Insurgency Practice**

It has been argued that the Colonial administration had a net advantage in that it had control over the levers of power and an intimate working knowledge of the country. This knowledge included integrated administrative structures, civil servants, local indigenous police forces led by expatriates, together with extensive personal networks back up by the might of the Colonial Power itself. An additional factor was the ability of the colonial administration to use legislation as a tool for either coercion or to support the counter-insurgency 'Plan' for example, the ability to apply Emergency Powers, including Martial Law, to force obedience and compliance on the population through the rule of law.

The use of the rule of law is seen as a legitimising factor in the eyes of world opinion, which in today's conflicts monitors events to protect against substantial human rights abuses. Therefore, ensuring the power of the State through its legislation is seen as a major contribution to effective counter-insurgency.

To support the rule of law, it is important to have an operationally effective police force: a point that has been made repeatedly. These forces need to be well trained, socially integrated and well financed; to limit corruption and abuses of power. In addition, they should be drawn from all sections of the ethnic make up to avoid sectarianism. Perhaps more than any other point, the role of having an effective police force stands out.

Applying the rule of law also means using the legislative process to prosecute the insurgents under the court procedure by means of evidence and procedure. The military are not trained in this aspect, nor are they required to do so. Whilst the police are trained and expected to carry out this function especially if the ultimate objective is to return the country back to normality. The police need to demonstrate they are operating normally, and not taking summary justice out on those captured. Furthermore, acting with the rule of law assists in convincing potential converts amongst those that may be wavering, that the ideals of the insurgents are lame and not worthy of supporting. The removal of the army from the streets

and replacing them with police is a further demonstration that the Government is confident it has regained control of the country.

Although it is not always practical to place the police at the vanguard of many insurgencies today, due in most cases because there is not an effective police force available. Consequently, the role of policing falls on the military in the first instance, whilst the police are recruited and trained to eventually take over. Stability and public order are required through the rule of law. The long term goals require a substantial police presence. Stability is gauged by the number of military personnel it takes to keep order. The fewer there are, generally signifies greater stability; therefore, once again establishing an effective police force is seen as paramount for achieving an acceptable political outcome (Hills, 2012, p. 103).

The study has contended that tied to having an effective Police Force, is the requirement of having a Special Branch 'type' set up. The ability of Special Branch Officers to gather and collate intelligence has been shown to be vital if counter-insurgency is to be effectively combated and thwarted. In addition, the multiple methods used to achieve the required results, such as informers, spies, and perhaps the most innovative, the Pseudo Gang tactic have been shown to be part of the arsenal that Special Branch has undertaken and used effectively. However, it can be seen this could be one of the most problematic areas, as this 'type' of organisation is renowned for its abuses of power in some countries. The Secret Police, as they often called, have often operated with impunity and not under the restraints shown to have existed in the Colonies in this research. Therefore, although effective a Special Branch set up is proposed, it would certainly be problematic to replicate today.

Language has been identified as a significant element and an area in which the Colonial Police were proficient; basically as they employed indigenous policemen who knew the language, customs and foibles of the local population. The ability to freely converse and fully appreciate the nuances should not be underestimated, not least when it comes to obtaining intelligence. Routine intelligence gathering needs to be also recognised as a vital component to producing a working knowledge of the activities of the general population. It is important to emphasise this aspect, as recognising changes in attitude of the population is an indicator of insurgent activity, namely intimidation (Bowers, 2013).

The ability to limit intimidation must be one of the prime objectives to ensure the population is not being terrorised into supporting the insurgency. Achieving this objective will require numerous measures, including separation and defence of the general population. It will also require extensive intelligence to ensure these are no agitators within the separated

areas. Knowledge of local traditions and religions has also been shown to be important; as this can be used to intimidate the population through psychological control.

Population control has been highlighted as the core to re-establishing the authority of the central government. Again, this is a routine activity requiring the use of trained police officers or in some cases the use of 'Home Guards' recruited and trained from the local population. The creation of 'Protected Villages' requires securing them against the insurgents in addition ensuring that food control operates and is strictly enforced. Policing the identification schemes crucial to controlling movement, curfews together with preventing crime are all aspects that may appear to be routine, but they vital in effort to counter the insurgency.

## **9.9 Theoretical Recommendations**

Research requires tangible benefits and is not conducted for its own sake. By assessing three historical campaigns, in particular the role of the police in countering insurgency in Kenya and Rhodesia, it was envisaged some alternative perspectives would emerge. Although the fundamentals can be equated to other studies conducted analysing the same campaigns, certain aspects have been highlighted and identified that are considered noteworthy.

A proviso is offered here; as the recommendations offered are based upon the assumption about the involvement of western forces in insurgencies requiring support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance rather than internal insurgencies, such as in the Philippines against the Moro separatists or the insurgency in southern Thailand. These would require an additional interpretation of these recommendations for them to be applied effectively.

The primary interpretation has been how important it is to have a deep and incisive understanding of the country, the nature of its peoples, the grievances that have driven them to rebel and what the rebels are trying to achieve through an insurgency. In essence know your adversary as well as he knows himself. To achieve this objective will require a far more comprehensive capability than most military forces can achieve at present. Recently steps have been made to incorporate Anthropology into assessments of strategy and structure of military forces (Gonzalez, 2007; Price, 2012). Unfortunately, this can only be very superficial at the onset of the conflict and requires a number of years for any meaningful outcomes to emerge. In addition, there will need to be a greater number of competent linguists to the point of being bi-lingual to be present at all levels of operations. Incorporating indigenous forces

into the structure is part of this process. However it is recognised this is not as easy simple, as events in Afghanistan have proved with green-on-blue attacks; Afghan forces attacking their western allies. Cultural sensitivities require a considerable effort to understand and appreciate; nonetheless it forms a central recommendation from this research.

Developing working relationships with the indigenous forces is paramount, but so is understanding that a military solution is rarely sustainable despite being the dominant force in the country. Rhodesia was proof of this statement. The military objectives must be allied with the long term political objectives incorporating social, economic and cultural alignment. Therefore, the military needs to be set achievable objectives, as part of an overall structured Plan, which encompasses all aspects associated with overcoming the insurgents. The very nature of an insurgency will mean that there are multiple layers required that all have to be interlinked to each other. Each insurgency will require an appreciation and an adaption of the required fundamentals to compile such a plan.

Developing such a plan is achievable with outside expertise both the Australian and US Militaries have recognised this requirement. The Australian Army's modernisation is guided by three documents: The Army Objective Force 2030 (Australian Army Headquarters, 2011b), Army Modernisation Handbook 2011 (Australian Army Headquarters, 2011a) and the Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept (Australian Army Headquarters, 2009). The Australian Army has also set the Army Knowledge Group (AKG) with the task ensuring that all available resources are examined and analysed to benefit the future of operations involving Australia. The US Army has a similar Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) based in the Combined Arms Centre at Fort Leavenworth.

The concept of 'hearts and minds' has become an accepted component of counter-insurgency doctrine and this needs to continue. Population centric operations are de rigueur, with all units trained in what this means for them. The 'Plan' should have elements to support these ideals, as it attempts to gain and garner the support of the population. Legislation should address inequalities and create a climate where the rule of law is accepted as the norm. Only by convincing the population they have a long term sustainable future in their own country, will they accept the measures put in place to counter the insurgency.

Any recommendations to form a replica of Special Branch are fraught with complications. The complexity of such a unit, coupled with the necessary personnel needed to make such a unit function effectively, put it beyond the scope of most modern day

conflicts. Curiously, this might be the one recommendation that could be tailored to internal insurgencies without western support or troops.

Crucially, there needs to be an organisation that is capable of mimicking the intelligence gathering capabilities that Special Branch has been shown to be proficient at acquiring. A creation of intricate networks of informers working through specialised agents would seem achievable. The ability to interpret developments would also seem to be attainable. Many nations have developed a secret police force, but they have dubious reputations and predominately work through fear and intimidation; not the best tools for gaining valuable intelligence. Furthermore, the ability to work with external forces would appear to be problematic for a variety of reasons, not least of these being nationalism.

As a consequence of limited access to necessary intelligence the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has developed a highly integrated network within most countries that are of interest to the USA and its allies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has also developed a considerable competence overseas too (Barno, 2006; Kuzmarov, 2008). The Army intelligence structure should link to this network creating an in-country intelligence gathering and interpretation capability. The sole recommendation that may be made is therefore to try and mimic, as far as possible, the aspects of Colonial Special Branches, with the resources available, such as recruitment of indigenous operatives. Training handlers would also be necessary, but this takes a long time to achieve, in order to gain competency in the language thus avoiding misunderstandings: unfortunately all too common when using interpreters, or using basic lingual skills.

The importance of having a structured, balanced police force incorporating all ethnic groups needs to be emphasised. Part of the agreement in Northern Ireland was this recommendation. Consequently the old Royal Ulster Constabulary was disbanded and reformed incorporating both sides of the cultural divide into a new force called the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The UN has started to develop international policing structures calling on serving policemen from its members to form the basis of these units sent to police troubled areas (Hills, 2009). Again, the difficult is always the language and no matter how many interpreters are used, the problems related to vested interests will always be present. Far better this international unit is used to train indigenous forces in how to police their own communities, rather than use them as police in country. At present even the US is deficient in this area of training (Ladwig, 2007).

A joint command structure needs to be set up encompassing all the major players. The ability to manage such a complex system has been argued requires a joint-operations

command, in whatever guise that may be. A supremo might have been effective in Malaya with General Templar, but such a position is considered incongruous in today's coalition of partners (Mumford, 2012, p. 153). As has been discussed, this would be very problematic in most modern day scenarios. Nonetheless, establishing an operational structure, often termed Tripartite, as it encompasses the Military, the civil in the form of political power and the Intelligence Organisation, is deemed essential (Mumford, 2012, p. 2).

Since these conflicts were fought, there has been a considerable development of specialised elite units capable of matching their foes in the field. One addition that could be considered is the use of pseudo operations. These proved to be highly successful in countering the insurgencies in the past and a hybrid capability might be possible. A considerable amount has been written about the legitimacy of such operations today, nonetheless consideration should be given to assessing whether they could again be successful (Gatchel, 2008).

Paradoxically the most profound interpretation that has come out of the research is the need to know yourself and your capabilities before you can assess those of your adversaries. By using this type of appreciation, one is then able to assess the capabilities of your foe but also of your indigenous allies. It is imperative that empathy allows for consideration of culture, language and religion displayed by respect. Having no respect for your own culture demeans you in the eyes of your allies, as all of these aspects mentioned signify who one is and why one is prepared to stand up and fight for these beliefs. If the troops from outside of the country show disdain for their own culture, they are hardly likely to respect another person's culture, therefore how can their allies respect them or what the purport to stand for.

The majority of those intervened had a profound respect for not only those that fought with them, but in the case of Kenya and Rhodesia, for the African as a whole by taking time to understand their culture and their beliefs. Notwithstanding this statement, the settlers also believed in their own racial superiority, their culture and their religious beliefs. All of which surprisingly the general population could align with and understand. What was at stake was these Africans wanted to have the same chance at equality and status, for which a large proportion were prepared to support the Colonial authorities in the hope this would accrue to them as well. A lesson that needs to be understood by any forces, in any foreign land, fighting a counter-insurgency campaign, what values are being presented and are these transferable.

## 9.10 Further Research

The power of witchcraft and sorcery has been identified as a substantial factor in the psychological control of the populations in African conflicts. More needs to be done to understand how far this control works and what influence this is having on modern conflicts today, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African Republic and Southern Sudan. Tribal religion is also linked to interpretations of Islam and this has a considerable influence on conflicts, such as in northern Mali, Niger and Nigeria.

The evolution and origin of the Pseudo Gang needs to be researched further as indications are this has become very confused, with claims and counter claims being made as to where it started first and how it evolved. Unfortunately, those involved at the time in both Kenya and Malaya are few in number, which requires haste to interview the last remaining participants of this important aspect in countering insurgency.

The relationship between insurgencies and international terrorism together with lessons learnt from counter-insurgency needs to be analysed in an effort to understand if they can be applied to countering terrorism. A complex and interrelated asymmetrical correlation has been noted, which requires further study.

Recent technological advances have added new capabilities to both sides, which will need to be countered, as they have created a whole new dimension where insurgency can take hold outside of the normal remit of the Security Forces. Any attempts at separating the population from technology will present substantial challenges and these need to be researched.

A further area of research has been highlighted by this research and that concerns the role of the police in future counter-insurgency efforts (Gentile, 2008). Moves have been made to increase the capability to use international policemen in the transition back to stability, but as has been pointed out, this is limited by their knowledge of language and customs. Developing key attributes for the training wing for such a police force might improve their competence to operate earlier in the re-training phase.

Understanding the language, customs and culture through the use of anthropological studies has also been discussed. Although some disquiet has been observed over this development, there is nonetheless a need to increase this aspect for all those engaged in countering-insurgency. The modern NGOs are also involved and they too require a greater appreciation of the anthropology to give them a greater understanding of the country in which



they are working. The conflict in Afghanistan would benefit from a re-appraisal of the approach being taken based upon much of what has been discussed in this thesis.

Lastly, the development of human rights has seen the extension of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to bring to justice abuses of these rights, particularly in the form of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Prohibitions and limitations on warfare as laid out in the Geneva Conventions will extend to all conflicts and those who commit abuses will be unable to avoid the increased powers the ICC is bringing to insurgencies. In essence these developments are set to change the nature of conflicts and are an area of further research.

### **9.11 Limitations**

As with all research there are limitations to the ability of the study to fully address all the issues involved, and this study is no exception (Erickson, 1986). The Material and Methods Chapter 3 discussed the many considerations needed to reduce the effects on reliability and validity of the research through triangulation, where possible and if appropriate. An investigation involving three case studies dealing with complex historical events must by design have its limitations. Consequently, there have been areas of research that could not be investigated fully, as they would have strayed outside of the conceptual design. When dealing with older respondents, it must also be accepted their memories are selective; consequently support for any controversial statements has been used where possible; whether this was in the form of supporting literature or statements from other respondents. Therefore, it has been necessary to restrict the research around the agreed methodology and to incorporate as many checks on reliability and validity as possible.

Interpretations of findings are by the nature of qualitative research subjective. In an effort to reduce any controversial results, use has been made of colleagues to assess the work and comment when and where necessary. Any such comments have been incorporated or addressed to reduce any such incidences, whereby the research may have been unsupported and lack sufficient validity.

Although the scope of this research was to add to the role played by the Security Forces in counter-insurgency, particularly that of the police and Special Branch in particular, it is recognised that the criterion selection of the respondents makes this a defined sample, which limits the ability to generalise. The conclusions of this study are therefore tempered by this limitation.

It is recognised that within a qualitative study the bias of the researcher is difficult to eliminate and is consequently subjective. Efforts have been made to limit this bias by allowing colleagues to read and comment on the work. Where appropriate their comments have been incorporated into the main body of the work.

## **9.12 Conclusion**

This chapter summarised the study in relation to the research questions raised in Chapter 1, taking into consideration the Literature Review. The research problem was addressed employing the methodology outlined in the study design in Chapter 3. All the pertinent data from the three case studies has been discussed, as part of a comparative analysis process in Chapter 8. The ensuing results have been synthesised to form a conclusion. As a result of undertaking this research, a series of recommendations have been presented, whilst acknowledging the limitations and constraints of the study; including potential bias. A study of this nature has identified areas of further research, which can be pursued in further journal articles and papers.

The argument has been put forward that only by studying the past can costly mistakes be avoided in the future; a statement that has to be tempered by saying, only if the right lessons are learnt and applied, can this be accomplished. Therefore, a further interpretation is required by strategists and planners to ascertain what elements might be worthy of note from this study, before trying to re-apply them to modern conflicts.

The countering of insurgencies is a complex and difficult process. It requires a deep understanding of the nature of the conflict, the reasons and the origins of the conflict, together with sufficient resources in order to combat it. This study has sought to offer an interpretation based upon the experiences of those that took part in three historical conflicts in order to present a comparative paradigm, which might provide useful strategies, examples and tactics for the future. The outcomes have demonstrated the complexity required to prosecute a strategy capable of achieving the desired results. In addition, by using actual combatants, it has been possible to gain a better understanding of the way the counter-insurgency took place through their recollections, rather than through existing secondary literature. Although the literature offers a point of reference to aid validity and improve reliability, it is important to recognise that it is not always correct either, and it too often needs verification.

Primarily, this study has sought to identify the significant role played by the Colonial Police Forces in combating the insurgencies and how important the role of the police force is

to re-asserting the rule of law in support of a fair judicial system. Understanding how important it was to have a functioning and accepted police force to create confidence in the elected government has been one of the dominant interpretations gained from this study. Achieving this aim was not without its difficulties; therefore, in order to deal with the insurgency in each colony, a substantial re-organisation of the police was required, although much less so in Rhodesia.

A further significant area was the relationship the Colonial Forces had with their indigenous colleagues. In many respects this was unique. Consequently, this study has provided more recorded primary data on the important role indigenous forces played, as part of the structure for combating insurgencies.

The other significant feature discussed in this research, has been the role of religion, particularly the role of tribal religion and beliefs. Specifically, the psychological control this was capable of applying to the minds of the population. A failure to recognise and understand how this manifests itself, is capable of undermining all attempts to win the 'hearts and minds' of the population; considered so necessary in combating insurgencies. Furthermore, in developing societies, underestimating the role of the local witch-doctor, spirit medium or Imam can seriously challenge all endeavours to garner the support of the local population. In essence, this re-enforces the importance to understand the cultural, social and religious aspects of the local population.

Regardless of the charge that colonialists were imperialistic in attitude, the integration of the indigenous population into all of the organs of authority, especially the police, ensured that they were culturally aware and sensitive to local issues. Even the Rhodesians, often considered racists, were integrated and understood the cultural aspects of the country, speaking the local languages as well as being culturally aware. There was empathy between the Europeans and those black Africans that worked with them, which should not be underestimated when assessing their capabilities to harness this advantage and thus undermine their opponents in the field.

Intimidation has been shown to be the major stumbling block to winning 'hearts and minds'. The ability to counter this threat needs to be fully understood as indoctrination, tribal religion and loyalties all play an important part in the control of the population. Exploring the relationship of witchcraft and sorcery as part of the psychological manipulation of the population, particularly in Africa, has brought a new dimension to the discussion on 'hearts and minds'. The effectiveness of the concept has been assessed in this study and has been found to encompass a lot more than most other studies have recognised: namely intimidation,

coercion and psychological oppression through witchcraft, oaths and spirit mediums are the antithesis of the concept. Consequently, greater attention needs to be exercised when applying the concept, to ensure all the potential threats to its application can be assessed and dealt with accordingly.

‘Hearts and minds’, has become an accepted term in today’s counter-insurgency jargon, although it has been shown to be less well known by the combatants interviewed, during their conflicts. However, once broken down into its component parts it has been shown to have been interwoven into the fabric of the actions being undertaken anyway. It was just not known by the phrase at that time by those involved. In Rhodesia, it even appears to have been shunned as strategy, predominately because it required considerable resources to be effective: resources the Rhodesians did not have.

The process of developing a counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary one: each conflict adds to the process and allows the doctrine to build up; although it should be understood that no two insurgencies are the same (Alderson, 2007a, 2007b; Harvey & Wilkinson, 2009). Each insurgency requires adaptations from the accepted doctrine to suit the time and circumstances. Some aspects appear to be quickly forgotten and it takes a review of the past to understand that these elements are still pertinent and useful. Insurgency is also a social phenomenon and therefore a product of the society from which it derives (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 360). Consequently, a political solution has to be sought eventually in which all the belligerents are seen to gain. A purely military solution is not sustainable long term.

Therefore, although the evolution of warfare has required the use of new technologies to compete and defeat the enemy, the fundamental principals remain consistent today (Artelli & Deckro, 2008, p. 228). Fuller (1916) made similar observations almost a century ago quoting from the ‘*Field Service Regulations*’ of the British Army, “the correct application of principals to circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge built up by study and practice” (p. 1). Nothing has changed; therefore the application of the principals to the actual situation is where the difficulty lies. The adage “no need to reinvent the wheel” applies not only to modern warfare but to counter-insurgency, as well.

In the US, two notable military reviews conducted by Aspin (1993) and Petraeus (2006), re-evaluated the past and applied effective principals to the requirements of the day. What is prominent in these reviews, was how much was taken from the past and reapplied to the modern conflicts, particularly in the *US manual FM 3-24* (2006) Counterinsurgency

followed by *Field Manual 3-0 Operations* in 2008 (Heuser, 2007; Rid, 2010; Santos, 2011; Tomes, 2004).

However, in answer to the contention did the Colonial states have any net advantages over those insurgencies being fought today; the assertion made here is in the affirmative. Control of the legislation, the administrative capabilities, the local police force and the use of indigenous local forces, the intelligence gathering apparatus run by Special Branch, coupled with the local knowledge of language and customs considerably benefited their counter-insurgency campaigns. Control of 'hearts and minds' may have played a part in countering the insurgents, in Malaya and Kenya, but as has been argued in Rhodesia, it was the insurgents that ultimately won the control of their minds through their manipulation of tribal beliefs. The population remained the crucial focus for both sides in an insurgency and whoever can win their 'hearts and minds' will prevail (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012, p. 361). Consequently, underestimating the physiological; power religion and beliefs have over the population can have serious repercussions for any forces attempting to subdue an insurgency in foreign lands. A fact confirmed by the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Attempting to reproduction these effective elements indentified in this study is the task of today's counter-insurgency planners and strategists. The past does have lessons for the future; the difficulty is interpreting which lessons and how to apply them effectively again.

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Appendix A has been removed from this  
version of the thesis

# APPENDIX B

## 10.5 Significant Actors

| Actors            | Palestine   | Malaya  | Kenya                            | Rhodesia                      | Other influences  |
|-------------------|---|---|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| General Templar   | Army posting  | High Commissioner                                   | influence                        | influence                     | Director of Military intelligence                             |
| General Briggs    |   | Director of Operations/<br>1950 to 1951             |                                  |                               | served in East & North Africa/ Burma                          |
| Arthur Young      |   | Commissioner of Police                              | Commissioner of Police           |                               | extensive police experience during the War/Gold coast Africa  |
| Calvert           | <i>Night squads</i>                                 | Malayan Scouts SAS                                  | influence                        | influence                     | SAS, Chindits   |
| Kitson            |   | Q squads  | Pseudo gangs                     | influence                     | Highly influential on use of pseudos                          |
| Gurney            | Chief secretary                                     | High Commissioner                                   |                                  |                               | Gold coast, Kenya   |
| Richard Catling   | CID-inspector general 1935-48                       | Commissioner of Police 1948-54                      | Commissioner of Police 1954-63   |                               | restructured police to deal with insurgency and post conflict |
| Nicol Gray        | Inspector General of Police                         | Commissioner of Police                              |                                  |                               | Former Royal Marine in WW2                                    |
| Bernard Fergusson | Assistant Inspector General of Police mobile squads | Army service C-in-C Black Watch/ advisor to Templar |                                  |                               | Intelligence, Wingate/ Chindits/ Black watch                  |
| Roy Farran        | Police mobile units                                 | Jungle squads                                       | influence                        | influence                     | Chindits  |
| Robert Thompson   |   |   | influence                        | influence                     | 136, Chindits/ advisor to US in Vietnam                       |
| Mitchell, Phillip |   |   | Governor 1944-52                 |                               | Previously Governor of Fiji and Uganda.                       |
| General Erskine   |   |   | GOC East Africa Command/ 1953-55 |                               | service thought WW2   |
| Kenyatta, Jomo    |   |   | Political leader of Mau Mau      | influence                     | studied in London and Moscow. President of Kenya              |
| Ian Henderson     |   |   | formed Pseudos /captured Kimathi | assisted with pseudos set up  |   |
| Evelyn Baring     |   |   | Governor 1952-59                 | Governor of Rhodesia 1942-44- | High Commissioner of South Africa 1944-51                     |

|  |              |                                       |   |  |  |
|--|--------------|---------------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Gerald Lathbury  | army service |                                       | GOC East Africa<br>Command/ 1955-57             |  | Parachute Rgt                            |
| Percy Sillitoe   |              | Adviser to SB                         | Adviser to SB                                   | BSAP Pre bush war  | Director General MI5,<br>BSAP-Tanganyika |
| Macpherson   |              |                                       | restructured CID                                |  | came from Royal Hong<br>Kong<br>Police   |
| RAR 1 <sup>st</sup> Battalion  |              | Served as RhAR                        |   | Returned to<br>Rhodesia  |  |
| KAR, 1 <sup>st</sup> , 2 <sup>nd</sup> and 3 <sup>rd</sup><br>battalions |              | Served as troops in<br>Malaya         | Returned to Kenya<br>/fought against Mau<br>Mau |  |  |
| 'C' sqd SAS<br>Rhodesia  |              | Formed part of the<br>Malayan scouts- | influence but no direct<br>involvement          | Returned to<br>Rhodesia  | influenced other<br>campaigns            |
| Black Watch  |              |                                       | 1953-55   |  |  |
| Peter Walls  |              | Commanded 'C' Sqd<br>SAS              |   | Commander of<br>Combined<br>Operations, the<br>head of the<br>Rhodesian Army | served with Black Watch                  |
| Ron Reid-Daly  |              | 'C' Sqd SAS                           |   | Cmdr Selous<br>Scouts/ Psuedo Ops  |  |
| Alex (Bill) Bailey   |              |                                       |   | Set up and trained<br>PATU   | Long Range Desert<br>Patrol Group WW2    |
| Ken Flower   |              |                                       | Studied operations in<br>Kenya                  | Head of CIO  | Served in Somalia and<br>Ethiopia WW 2   |

Throughout the research for this study a number of what have been termed actors appeared regularly in different campaigns. As this was a comparative study this was thought to be significant enough to record the names and present them separately as recognition of their importance. A completely new study would have to expand further on their roles and contributions overall, but this is beyond the scope of this work.



# APPENDIX C

## 10.6 Combined Table of Elements

What is apparent from a review of Table 8.1 is the complexity of the elements involved in countering an insurgency. Although, the elements are presented in a précis form, they reflect the essential fundamentals; these are also interlinked. It is this aspect that has emerged from the study: the necessity to operate as a combined, organised structure following a defined plan under an over arching supremo. “Operational design for a counterinsurgency campaign must integrate the political, social, military, economic, legal, informational, and intelligence spheres to fully pacify the population and to establish the legitimacy of the host government” (Cassidy, 2008, p. 127).

By assessing the various elements presented in Table 8.1, it is possible to draw together the key aspects that have emerged from the study. The component parts of the research questions are represented in the table, but require synthesizing to illuminate their inter-relationship with each other; for it is considered this relationship forms the rudiments required to combat an insurgency effectively. To this end, the table will be utilised during this Chapter for reference to indicate where the synergies lie and what is required as part of preparing a detailed counter-insurgency ‘Plan’. A number of studies have indicated the importance of having a comprehensive counter-insurgency ‘Plan’ (Hack, 2009; Strachan, 2007).

Table 8.1 is the culmination of the comparative analysis results from using three cases studies. The pilot study emphasised the importance of being able to compare more than two studies. Consequently, Table 8.1 demonstrates in a visual form the similarities between the three campaigns even though two of these were in Africa and one in Asia. Nonetheless, many of the requirements were the same, as is indicated by the Table.

All the elements have been dealt with during the study, the table is a reflection of the comparative approach this study has used. Each element has a story, which crosses into each of the conflicts.



| <b>Element</b>           | <b>Malaya</b>                            | <b>Kenya</b>                             | <b>Rhodesia</b>                         |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|
| <b>Administration</b>    | part of combined strategy                | held sway over decision process          | part of the wider political process     |
| <b>Aircraft</b>          | bombing used but halted                  | bombing but not effective                | effectively used/ short supply          |
| <b>communications</b>    | improved/ telephones targeted            | improved/ radio net work set up          | highly effective radio net work         |
| <b>Dogs</b>              | limited use by army/ not by police       | large use of dogs by police/army         | extensive use/effective                 |
| <b>Emergency Powers</b>  | issued in 1948/draconian                 | issued in 1952/draconian                 | Progressively applied 1960/ Martial law |
| <b>Food control</b>      | yes, harsh/strict imposition             | limited but used effectively             | limited success/ hard to police         |
| <b>French lessons</b>    | oil spot used and pop control            | pop control, sweeps/ detentions          | pop control, sweeps/ detentions         |
| <b>Ground coverage</b>   | no, very limited intelligence gathering  | patchy and limited use/ improved         | Highly developed/ Very successful       |
| <b>Hearts and Minds</b>  | developed successfully                   | Limited and not generally known          | limited success/patchy/half hearted     |
| <b>Helicopters</b>       | early development/ effective/ jungle     | tested but no used; too high for lift    | extensive use/ shortage/effective       |
| <b>Home Guard</b>        | vital part of overall strategy           | vital part of overall strategy           | set up as Guard Force/poor              |
| <b>Indigenous forces</b> | used in police/ army/home guard          | used in police/ army/home guard          | volunteers in the all units             |
| <b>Insurgents</b>        | predominately Chinese communist          | Predominately Kikuyu tribe               | Communist/ Shona and Nedebele           |
| <b>Intimidation</b>      | wide and extensive                       | limited to Kikuyu tribe primarily        | grew consistently/intimidation          |
| <b>Intelligence</b>      | became very effective/monetary bribes    | limited and patchy/ informers used       | very effective and comprehensive        |
| <b>Language</b>          | major problem/ little Chinese speakers   | few Kikuyu but many Swahili speakers     | large number of local speakers          |
| <b>Legislation</b>       | extensive and draconian                  | extensive and draconian                  | extensive and progressively draconian   |
| <b>Martial Law</b>       | Never imposed/ emergency powers          | Never Imposed/emergency powers           | Gradually imposed as war progressed     |
| <b>Mechanisms</b>        | over-arching supremo                     | no overarching supremo                   | JOC /plus overarching supremo/political |
| <b>Mounted units</b>     | not used but Mules for transport were    | Both the Police and KR used effectively  | BSAP/ Grey Scouts effective             |
| <b>Notable actors</b>    | Templer/Briggs/Catling/Young             | Erskine/ Kitson/ Henderson/Catling       | Walls/ Reid Daley/ Flower/Henderson     |
| <b>Plan</b>              | Briggs Plan/ an overall blue print       | series of semi-interrelated plans        | Military plan /unsupported politically  |
| <b>Problems</b>          | poor intelligence at start/language poor | unstructured until 1954/ army conscripts | limited resources/sanctions/politics    |
| <b>Oaths and sorcery</b> | Chinese religion and Triad control       | main aspect of Mau Mau/de-oathing        | Spirit mediums very influential         |

|                                 |   |  |                                      |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--------------------------------------|
| <b>Organisation</b>             | poor at first then highly successful    | poor becoming moderately successful      | highly effective/ restricted numbers |
| <b>Police</b>                   | poor at first then highly successful    | poor at first then highly successful     | highly effective/ well structured    |
| <b>Population</b>               | part of overall strategy                | part of overall strategy                 | not inclusive enough/ failure        |
| <b>Propaganda</b>               | comprehensive/effective                 | Limited and piecemeal                    | comprehensive/ limited success       |
| <b>Pseudo gangs</b>             | limited/ used near the end of conflict  | Highly successful/used from '53          | highly successful/widely used        |
| <b>Psychological operations</b> | very successful/comprehensive           | limited success/limited                  | limited success/limited              |
| <b>Public works</b>             | used extensively to support Plan        | limited use; but accelerated later       | limited use/ piecemeal/              |
| <b>Reasons for conflict</b>     | Communism/Colonialism/identity          | land issues/ tribal/Colonialism          | Communism/Colonialism/land issues    |
| <b>Restricted areas</b>         | security areas/ enforced                | Prohibited & special areas/ enforced     | curfew areas/de facto restricted     |
| <b>Roads</b>                    | used to infiltrate the jungle           | used to infiltrate the forests           | Access good as not dense bush        |
| <b>Special Branch</b>           | poor at first then highly successful    | poor at first then moderately successful | pivotal/integrated/highly successful |
| <b>Special units</b>            | SAS, Jungle squads, Ghurkhas            | combat tracker units/Pseudos/GSU         | SAS/Selous Scouts/ RLI/Fire-Force    |
| <b>Spotter planes</b>           | used but not effective without infrared | became very effective                    | used effectively / PRAW              |
| <b>Strategy</b>                 | developed through central Plan          | Loosely held together/no central Plan    | dominated by political/generalist    |
| <b>Structure of forces</b>      | colonial forces with British army units | colonial forces with British army units  | based on British model/adapted       |
| <b>subversion</b>               | wide and extensive                      | limited to Kikuyu tribe primarily        | grew consistently/intimidation       |
| <b>tactics</b>                  | progressively developed/ effective      | mixed effect/ limited/pseudo gangs       | multiple combined tactics/effective  |
| <b>Villages</b>                 | developed successfully/ Briggs Plan     | used limited success/hostility           | used but not supported/unpopular     |

Combined elements derived from the three case studies to show what was important and how in each conflict.