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《论确定性》与知识论的重塑

On Certainty and the reconstruction of Epistemology

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摘　要

摩尔用"我知道这是一只手"来反驳怀疑主义者对外在物理对象存在的怀疑是哲学史上一件饶有趣味的事情，更加有趣的是维特根斯坦对这件事情的评论和处理，这些评论集中在维特根斯坦最后阶段的著作――《论确定性》中。

《论确定性》主要处理，但不局限于知识论问题。本文主要从知识论的角度，来考察《论确定性》一书的核心概念"轴心命题"及其对于知识论的意义。

本文的第二章阐述摩尔对怀疑主义的反驳的无效，以及维特根斯坦对怀疑主义的剖析。在维特根斯坦看来，摩尔和怀疑主义者有一个共同点，那就是他们分别把"知道"和"怀疑"这两个词给形而上学化了。"知道"和"怀疑"只在日常使用中才有意义，而在日常的使用中，"我如何知道"和"我的怀疑如何得到消除"这两个问题必须有得到回答的可能（摩尔和怀疑主义者都无法回答各自的问题）。维特根斯坦暴露出了摩尔和怀疑主义者在搞哲学的时候对"怀疑"和"知道"的误用，这和维特根斯坦希望把词语从形而上学的"使用"下降到日常使用的日常语言分析方法是完全一致的。

第三、第四章主要阐述"轴心命题"。维特根斯坦对摩尔用来反驳怀疑主义者的摩尔式命题很感兴趣，因为这些命题貌似绝对真理，但我们却不知道我们是如何达到这个真理的，不知道它们是怎么来的，简言之，它们属于"轴心命题"。第三章提炼了维特根斯坦对确定性的刻画，这些刻画是异质的：它们扮演逻辑的角色，既是一些基本信念，又是生活形式、世界图景，还是人们行动和思想的基础。正因为这种异质性，国外的二手文献经常就确轴心命题到底是什么这一点展开争论。在第四章中，本文把轴心命题和另一个经常出现在维特根斯坦著作中的概念――解释、理由依据、争论、验证、怀疑的"终点"联系起来，说明轴心命题就是这个终点。

第五章主要阐释轴心命题和广义的基础主义的关系。轴心命题是语言游戏的终点、框架、基础。但是这个终点、框架、基础，自身是没有基础、依据，无根无基的。本文的第五章分析用实用主义、经验主义来确证轴心命题的失败；揭示了作为轴心命题之典型代表的数学、科学命题，和"人类总要归纳"这样一个轴心命题（这样一种语言游戏）之所以保持确定，也是无法确证的；同时，轴心命题之所以保持确

定，恰恰是人类的使用使其保持确定，并不是它本身有什么逻辑上的优先性。人们可以说轴心命题的发现是一种新型的基础主义，也可以说不是基础主义，这源于对"基础主义"的不同理解：就语言游戏而言，解释、确证总有一个终点，而这个终点本身没有进一步的观念基础了，这就是轴心命题的状况，在这一点上，维特根斯坦是反基础主义的；另一方面，若没有这个终点作为基础，若没有确定性，那么人类的很多实践活动就无法建立起来，从这方面来说，维特根斯坦又是基础主义者。

论确定性；轴心命题；语言游戏

Abstract

Moore's refutation of Skeptic's doubt of the existence of the external physical world with 'I know that this is a hand' is interesting, while Wittgenstein's remarks on this issue, which has become the book named On Certainty (OC for short), is more interesting.

OC dealt, but not exclusively with epistemology. My thesis focuses mainly on the Hinge propositions, which is the core concept of OC, and its significance for epistemology.

The chapter 2 mainly discusses the invalidation of Moore's refutation and Wittgenstein's analysis concerning Skepticism. Moore and the Skeptic have the same misunderstanding and use "know" and "doubt" metaphysically. Words only have their meanings when being used in the ordinary language games, when it is meaningful to ask 'how do I know?' and 'how to remove my doubt?', and these questions can't be answered in Moore's and the Skeptic's situation. Wittgenstein exposes both Moore and the Skeptic's misunderstanding of words when doing Philosophy. This agrees with Wittgenstein's bringing the words from the metaphysical use down to the ordinary use.

The Chapter 3 and 4 elucidate the Hinge propositions. Wittgenstein is interested by the Moorean propositions –i.e. the Hinge propositions-- because these propositions look like absolute truth but meanwhile we can't figure out how they can become truth. The Chapter 3 shows Wittgenstein's description of Hinge propositions. His description is idiosyncratic: they can be basic beliefs, form of life and the foundation of people are thinking and action, sometimes they can play a logic role. This idiosyncratic description should be responsible for the disputes among researchers. In Chapter 4, we link the Hinge propositions with another concept---the "end" which often appears in Wittgenstein's other writings. Actually, the "end"(for instance, the "end" of interpreting, of justification, of argument, of

verification, of doubt) is the Hinge propositions.

The Chapter 5 will deal with the relation between Hinge propositions and foundationalism. While Hinge propositions are the foundations and frameworks of language games, the foundations and frameworks themselves have no foundations and justifications at all. This chapter will analyze the failure of using pragmatism and empiricism to justify Hinge propositions, and suggest that the mathematic and scientific propositions as well as the Hinge propositions that 'human beings always do induction' have no justification too. The Hinge proposition's certainty derives from the USE of human being, not that itself has the logical priority. However, theorists can say that the discovery of Hinge propositions can both lead to foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, because of different understanding of the term 'foundationalism'. As with language-games, the explanation and justification always have an end, and the end has no conceptual foundation. This is exactly the essential feature a Hinge proposition has and the reason why we call Wittgenstein an anti-foundationalist on one hand. On another hand, many kinds of praxis can't be established if there were no 'end' or certainty, that is the reason why we call Wittgenstein a foundationalist.

Keywords: On Certainty;Hinge proposition;Language Games

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