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地方政府竞争、制度变迁与中国经济奇迹之谜

Local Government Competiton、 Institutional Change and  
puzzle of China's Economy Miracle

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## 摘要

改革开放三十多年以来，中国取得了辉煌的经济成就，被誉为“经济奇迹”。但是我们也应该看到，中国经济不仅保持了如此长久的高速增长，同时还伴随着不完善的市场经济制度基础，如金融制度、法律制度、产权保护制度等，都存在较大的弊端。于是就出现了中国经济高速增长“制度悖论”，这是用标准的西方经济学理论无法解释的，也就是说中国的经济走的是一条不同于经济学教科书的非正统增长路径，因此也被称之为“中国经济之谜”。本文旨在为解开“中国之谜”提供一个理论解释。

要想打开谜题之门，首先要找到钥匙。本文认为这个钥匙就是地方政府。政府与经济的紧密关系已经得到了广大经济学者的认同，即便是完善的市场经济国家，政府的作用也是不可或缺。而对于处于转型时期的中国来说，市场经济发育不完善，曾经在计划经济时代掌控一切政府仍然处于主导地位，运用行政手段进行资源配置，“政府主导型经济”也被一致认同为中国的经济形式。而政府是由层级之分的，在幅员广阔的中国，主政的是中央政府，但是具体负责国家管理和政策执行的却是各级地方政府，这也与我国历来实行的属地化管理原则相关。中国的高速经济增长不仅表现在国家层面，更表现在各地区层面，其经济增长态势甚至超过国家整体，这其中地方政府的作用是不言而喻的。因此，也有学者认为中国的经济实际上是“地方政府主导型经济”。地方政府之所以能推动各地区的高速经济增长，其动力在于各地方政府之间为了政治经济利益而展开的相互经济竞争。这就是本文的突破口。从此出发，本文采用追本溯源的思路，顺藤摸瓜，为解释中国的高速经济增长及其制度悖论提供了一个完整的解释框架。

具体来讲，本文是这样逐渐解开谜题的：

本文第三章运用地方政府这把钥匙逐渐打开中国经济之门。本章详细分析了地方政府的利益格局和目标函数，指出地方政府在多重利益格局下，其目标函数中最理性的选择因素就是 GDP 增长，为地方政府竞争提供了标尺。随后本章将地方政府竞争放在中国经济主导因素的平台详细论述，结合分权化改革的制度变迁，探讨了地方政府竞争的发生机制，详细分析了地方政府竞争的四种方式及其双重效应。双重效应的分析表明了中国经济的各种现象（好的或坏

的)背后都有着地方政府的踪迹,从而也证明了中国的经济确实是地方政府主导型。为了将地方政府竞争框架清晰化和简洁化,本章通过对“公共品”的理解和对“投资”的概念延伸,将地方政府竞争简洁的归结为“对公共品的投资竞争”,这一理解将地方政府行为与标准的西方经济学增长理论结合了起来,因为在标准的经济理论中,投资是最重要的要素之一,也是中国经济的显性要素。这样不仅能够解释当前的地方政府政府行为,也能为今后的地方政府竞争转型提供指导,是一个一以贯之的框架。

第四章是分析地方政府竞争的微观机制,即政府治理和官员激励。地方政府竞争是一个宏观层面的解释平台,其背后的逻辑必须从微观视角寻找,答案就在政府治理。本章借鉴了“公司治理”的思想概述了政府治理理论,然后构建了一个中国经济增长的政府治理框架,主要包括基于属地化管理的行政发包制、财政分权、政治晋升锦标赛、特殊政企关系、官僚文化等五个因素,这五个因素有相互具有互补性,再详细分析了其中最为核心的政治晋升锦标赛机制。因为从个体理性出发,政府激励来源于官员激励,由此本章将研究触角延伸到了一门逐渐兴起的解释经济增长的理论分支——增长的激励理论,从而也逐渐将中国经济增长的非正统路径引导到正统的经济理论上来。

第五章将政府治理框架更深一步,分析政府治理背后的制度因素。这个研究思路不仅有助于我们清晰的理解的经济增长的制度基础,也能为后文解释中国的制度不完善提供铺垫。承接上文的政治晋升锦标赛,其对官员的激励源自干部人事制度改革。在本章先是分析干部人事制度变迁,提出了用“政府人力资本”解释的视角,这是干部人事制度变迁对中国经济增长的作用机制。然后将制度因素纳入标准的经济增长模型,再进一步详细论证了地方政府在制度变迁中的作用,充分证实了地方政府在改革开放中所起的至关重要的作用。

第六章是从制度变迁的方式出发研究我国制度弊端。虽然经济学界普遍给予林毅夫教授所作出的“强制性制度变迁”和“诱致性制度变迁”的制度变迁方法划分方法高度评价,但是也有学者提出了质疑,如黄少安。本文赞同黄少安教授的观点,指出任何制度变迁实质都是诱致性制度变迁。从诱致性制度变迁的理论逻辑出发,本文提出了用“制度滞后”来解释中国的制度问题。这一解释视角不仅有着严谨的理论逻辑背景,也能从中国经济转型的过程中找到现

实因素。为此，本章详细分析了制度滞后的发生原理，也提出了衡量标准即静态资源配置效率和动态适应性效率。根据这两个标准可以将制度滞后划分为匹配性制度滞后和非匹配性制度滞后，中国的制度滞后属于后者，严重地与经济发展不匹配。同时本章进一步指出我国的政治经济弊端来包括由地方政府竞争所导致的负面效应均来自政府治理失范乃至制度滞后。从而也能为规范政府治理和促进经济下一阶段发展提供政策建议。这样也使理论的落脚点回应前文论述。

**关键词：** 地方政府竞争； 政府治理； 制度变迁； 制度滞后

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## Abstracts

Since the reform and open more than 30 years ago, China has achieved the magnificent economical achievement, which is honored as the economic miracle. But simultaneously China economy is also following the imperfect market economy system foundation, such as financial institution, legal regime, property right protection system. This is called institution paradox, which couldn't explained by standard west economic theory. It is said that China economy is different with the economic textbook unorthodox growth way. This article is for the purpose to decrypt China economy to provide a theory explanation.

This article tells us that the key to untie the riddle topic is the local government. The close relations between government and economy have already obtained the general economical scholar's approval. China's economic growth is considered "the government leading economy". The government is division by the level. The one who are responsible for the national management and policy execution specifically are all levels of local governments. China's high speed economic growth displays not only in the national stratification plane, but also in various local stratification plane. China's economy in fact is "the local authority leading economy". The reason that the local government can impel the high speed local economic growth, is the mutual economic competition which launches for the political economic interest among local governments. Henceforth, this article have provided a complete explanation frame for China's high speed economic growth and the system paradox.

Specifically speaking, this article unties the riddle topic gradually like this:

Chapter 3 has analyzed local government's benefit pattern and objective function in detail, and pointed out that most rational choice factor of the local government under the multiple benefit patterns is the GDP growth. Afterward this article considered the local government competition as the Chinese economy predominant factor, discussed the occurrence mechanism of local government competition combined with institutional change of decentralization, and analyzed in

detail four local government competition ways and dual effects. The dual effect's analyses had also proven that China's economy is truly the local government leading. This article tributed local government competition to the “public investment competition” succinctly, through understanding “public goods” and extending the concept of investment. This understanding unified the local government behavior and the standard western economic growth theory, which can not only explain the current local government act, but also provided the instruction for present's local government competition reforming.

The chapter 4 analyzed the microscopic mechanism of local government competition, which are the government governance and the official incentive. The local government competition is a macroscopic explanation platform, whose behind logic must seek from the microscopic view. The government governance is the answer. This article outlined the government govern theory drawing lessons from the company governance, then constructed a Chinese economic growth government governance frame, mainly including administrative contract system based on the possession management, the financial decentralization, the political promotion tournament, the special relations between government and business, the bureaucrat culture and so on five factors. And most core factor is political promotion tournament mechanism. From this, the article extended the explanation economic growth theory branch - - incentive theory of growth which emerged gradually.

The chapter 5 deepened the government governance frame, analyzed the institutional factor of government governance. This research is not only helpful to understand clearly institutional foundation of economic growth, can also for explaining China's institutional imperfect. Official's incentive which cause political promotion tournament, comes from the cadres and personnel system reform. This chapter first analyzed the cadre personnel system vicissitude, proposing “the government human capital”, then integrated the system factor into the standard growth model, proved further local government's function in institutional change in detail.

The chapter 6 studied our country system malpractice embarked from the

institutional change's way. All institutional changes are induced institutional changes. From the logic of induced institutional change theory, this article used "the institutional hysteresis" to explain China's system question. This article analyzed occurrence principle of institutional hysteresis, also proposed measurement criterias which are the static resources deployment efficiency and the dynamic compatible efficiency. We could divided institutional hysteresis into matching institutional hysteresis and non-matching institutional hysteresis using the two measurement criterias. The China's institutional hysteresis belonged to the later. Simultaneously this article further pointed out that our country's political economical malpractice including the negative effect which caused by the local government competition come from the anomie of government governance and even the institutional hysteresis.

**Key words:** local government competition; government governance; institutional change; institutional hysteresis

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