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中国分权体制对辖区经济增长的影响研究

——基于地方政府竞争、外资集聚的视角

A Research on the Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Growth

——Based on the Government Competition, FDI Agglomeration

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## 摘 要

改革开放三十年来,我国的经济取得了巨大的成功,许多因素都起到了重要作用。本文在第二代财政分权理论的分析框架下,研究我国地方政府竞争、外资集聚对地方经济增长的影响。沿着内生经济增长理论的研究思路,在理论研究上,以内生经济增长理论为框架,在前人研究成果的基础上,将政府支出、外商直接投资纳入一个统一的分析框架,构建了一个包含政府支出、外商直接投资的内生经济增长模型。通过理论模型的推导,得出如下结论:稳态的经济增长率受税率、外资和公共支出结构的影响,外商直接投资对经济增长率有正向的促进作用,生产性支出占总支出的比重对经济增长率的作用呈现先上升后下降的形态,并且存在一个最优的财政支出结构使经济增长率的变化率最大化,这个最优的财政支出结构与资本产出弹性、生产性支出产出弹性、非生产性支出产出弹性、跨期消费替代率、贴现率有关。

关于地方政府竞争对外资集聚的影响、财政分权和外资集聚影响区域经济增长的分析,主要在实证部分。实证研究分三个部分进行,第一部分研究我国地方政府竞争的表现及影响。第二部分研究分权体制下我国地方政府竞争对外资集聚的影响。第三部分研究我国地方政府竞争、外资集聚对经济增长的影响。由于财政分权是以省为单位的,因此在实证分析中,就是以省为划分区域的单位来研究省域经济增长。

实证研究主要得出如下结论:一、我国 FDI 存在正的空间溢出效应,地方政府间的引资攀比效应明显,各地方政府为争夺外部资源而进行激烈的竞争,降低科技投入,这对地方经济的长期发展不利。二、我国的分权体制较好地保障了基础设施投入,但对经济发展和提高居民福利来说非常重要的公共服务投入却相对不足,这种基于政绩考核下的地方政府竞争,导致地方政府重基本建设等生产性支出,而轻人力资本投资、公共服务等非生产性支出。三、在 GDP 政绩指标激励下,地理邻近或经济发展水平相当的省区间竞相上马基础设施项目,增加生产性公共产品投入以促进辖区经济增长。但这种攀比和竞争,可能加重地方财政的困难,降低地方公共资源的配置效率。四、我国特色的分权体制刺激了地方政府

官员发展本地经济，但是这种激励机制如果单一化，可能导致地方政府单纯追求 GDP 指标的增长从而竞相引进 FDI，忽视本地居民实际生活水平和福利水平的提高。五、我国省区间 GDP 增长存在空间溢出效应、攀比效应明显。分税制改革显著改善了财政分权对地方经济增长的促进作用。

**关键词：**财政分权；财政支出结构；地方政府竞争；外资集聚；辖区经济增长

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## ABSTRACT

Since the reform of 30 years, China achieved great economic success; in it many factors have played an important role. This paper researches the influences on local economic development by China's local government competition and agglomeration of foreign capital under the framework of fiscal decentralization.

In the pursuit of endogenous economic growth theory, under the framework of endogenous economic growth theory and the previous research result, it builds up a model which includes government expense and FDI. And derived stable economic growth route, and proves that stable economic growth is influenced by FDI and public expenditure structure. Stable economic growth rate maximize under an optimal public expenditure structure. However, fiscal decentralization and foreign capital agglomeration are not reflected in the construction of the theoretical model. The analysis of influential effect of government competition on foreign capital agglomeration and influence of fiscal decentralization on regional economic growth are mainly discussed in empirical part. The empirical analysis is divided in to three parts, the first part analyses the status of government competition and its influence. And the second part analyses the influential effect of local government competition on foreign capital agglomeration under the decentralization system. The third part analyses the influence of our local government competition and foreign capital agglomeration on economic growth. Because province was taken for unit under fiscal decentralization, in the empirical study, the analysis of economic growth is under the area classification of provinces.

Under the deduction of theoretical model, we get a conclusion: stable economic growth rate is influenced by tax rate, foreign capital and public expenditure. FDI plays a positive role in prompting the economic growth, the production expense to total expense ratio influence the economic growth rate positively first and then negatively. There is an optimal financial expenditure structure which makes economic growth rate maximized. And the maximized financial expenditure structure is also related to capital-output elasticity, productive expenditure-output elasticity, non productive expense-output elasticity, inter-temporal consumption substitution rate and discount rate.

The empirical research draws the following conclusion: first, FDI in China have positive spill over effect, our local government compete fiercely to attract FDI and fight for outside resources, in the view of local government financial expenditure, in order to attract FDI, local government decreased its technical input, which is bad for the local economic development in the long run; moreover, in order to show political achievements, local financial expenditure structure distorted. Second, our fiscal decentralization system could ensure high quality infrastructure construction and fiscal decentralization of power, which provides great incentive. However, the public service input which is very important for people's welfare like education, healthcare is relatively not enough. Local government is obviously biased in arranging financial expenditure structure based on political achievement evaluation, and thus leads to severe public expenditure structure distortion. Third, under the incentive of GDP as an achievement evaluation, provinces alike in economic status compete for the infrastructure input, and the increase in public expenditure promote the local economic development. However, the competition between local governments may leads to unreasonable financial expenditure, and exert heavy burden on local finance as well as lowering the efficiency of distribution of local public resources. Fourth, the combination of China's political centralization and economic decentralization stimulate the activeness of local government to develop local economy to some extent, however, if the incentive mechanism seems too singularized, it may lead up to the pursuit of the increase in GDP and neglecting people's welfare. Fifth, China's provincial GDP growth shows spillover effect, this is maybe because of industrial agglomeration in areas adjacent, and promote the mutual exchange of knowledge, technology, information and experience. After the reform of tax federalism significantly improve the effect of fiscal decentralization on local economic growth, however, if the incentive mechanism seems too singularized, it may lead up to the pursuit of the increase in GDP and neglecting residents' welfare.

**Keywords:** Fiscal Decentralization; Public Expenditure Composition; Local Government Competition; FDI Agglomeration; Regional Economic Growth

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