

# The Impact of Regulation on the Firm's Cost of Capital

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## What is the Cost of Capital?

$$\begin{split} WACC &= k_e(1-L) + k_d(1-T_c)L \\ k_e &= R_f(1-T) + MRP\beta_e \\ \beta_e &= \beta_a \left[1 + \frac{L}{1-L}\right] \\ k_d &= R_f + DRP \end{split}$$

 $\Rightarrow WACC = R_f (1 - T) + MRP\beta_a + DRP(1 - T)L$ 



## **Choosing the Risk Free Rate term**

This should be chosen so that the present value of the future cash flows equals the initial investment.

**Example** Regulator resets the output price every year Initial Investment = \$100m, with a life of two years No other costs

Complete certainty, including future interest rates

$$\begin{split} R_{f01} &= .06, \ R_{f02} = .07, \ R_{f12} = .08 \\ REV_1 &= \$50m + (\$100m)k \\ REV_2 &= \$50m + (\$50m).08 = \$54m \end{split}$$



## **Choosing the Risk Free Rate term**

Policy 1: Set *k* = 0.06

 $\Rightarrow REV_1 = \$50m + \$100m(.06) = \$56m$ 

$$\Rightarrow PV(REV_1, REV_2) = \frac{\$56m}{1.06} + \frac{\$54m}{(1.07)^2} = \$100m$$

Policy 2: Set k = 0.07  $\Rightarrow REV_1 = \$50m + \$100m(.07) = \$57m$  $\Rightarrow PV(REV_1, REV_2) = \frac{\$57m}{1.06} + \frac{\$54m}{(1.07)^2} = \$101m$ 



#### Example

Regulator resets the output price *P* every year Initial Investment = \$1000m, with an infinite life No other costs Historic Cost asset valuation applies Demand level is the only source of uncertainty All risk free rates are 6% Expected level of demand = 10m units per year Risk not currently compensated



 $\Rightarrow E(REV_1) = \$1000m(.06) = \$60m = PE(Demand) = P(10m)$ 

$$\Rightarrow P = \$6$$



#### **Demand Shock**

Suppose demand in the first year is only 8m units

$$\Rightarrow REV_1 = \$6(8m) = \$48m$$

P is reset so that

 $E(REV_2) = \$1000m(.06) = \$60m = PE(Demand) = P(8m)$ 

$$\Rightarrow P = $7.50$$

 $\Rightarrow$  cash flow shortfall resulting from the shock is only \$12m (PV = \$11.3m)

 $\Rightarrow$  Firm value suffers by 1.1%



#### What if the Regulator resets *P* every five years?

The above shock then generates a cash flow shortfall of \$12m in each of years 1... 5

The present value of this shortfall is \$51m

 $\Rightarrow$  Firm value suffers by 5.1%



#### Conclusion

- The length of the regulatory cycle is crucial to the risk faced by a firm
- For a one year cycle, risk is trivial



### Example

Regulator resets the allowed revenues every year Initial Investment = \$1000m, with an infinite life No other costs ODRC asset valuation applies Future ODRC is the only source of uncertainty All risk free rates are 6% Expected future ODRC = \$1000m, i.e., no expected depreciation Risk not currently compensated

ISCR

$$\Rightarrow REV_1 = \$1000m(.06) = \$60m$$
$$E(REV_2) = \$1000m(.06) = \$60m$$
$$E(REV_3) = \$1000m(.06) = \$60m$$

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$$\Rightarrow PV = \frac{\$60m}{1.06} + \frac{\$60m}{(1.06)^2} + \dots = \$1000m$$



#### **ODRC Shock**

Suppose ODRC in one year is \$900m, and is not expected to change

$$\Rightarrow REV_2 = \$900m(.06) = \$54m$$
$$E(REV_3) = \$900m(.06) = \$54m$$
$$E(REV_4) = \$900m(.06) = \$54m$$

$$\Rightarrow PV = \frac{\$54m}{1.06} + \frac{\$54m}{(1.06)^2} + \dots = \$900m$$



#### Is this risk systematic?

- Risk of optimising assets out is industry specific
- Risk of changes in replacement cost of assets comprises CPI risk and industry specific risk
- CPI risk lowers asset beta, i.e., lower than expected CPI reduces the allowed revenues, and hence firm value, as above, but it is also associated with higher stock market returns

