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EVALUATION OF KOREA'S RESPONSE TO THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE

by

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to develop an alternative approach to the evaluation of humanitarian aid in order to make the gaps left by the current approaches smaller. To do this, the thesis applies McConnell's framework to the case of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and compares it to a prior evaluation done using the DAC-OECD criteria, currently the dominant framework in the humanitarian sector. It thus explores three different dimensions of Korea's response: process, programme and politics, and then determines the degree of success or failure of each dimension in order to investigate the validity and scope of McConnell's theory on the evaluation of humanitarian aid.

This study affirms that McConnell's theory helps to alleviate the difficulties and complexities of the evaluation of humanitarian response. His theory provides a broader perspective on evaluating humanitarian aid by assessing three aspects of policy which allows for the political dimension to be better understood, and easily determine the degree of success or failure through the provision of detailed criteria and a five-level continuum from success to failure: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure. It is thus possible to argue that McConnell's theory alleviates the shortcomings of existing approaches to humanitarian evaluation by widening the scope of evaluation and specifying the degree of success or failure of humanitarian aid.

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I am forever indebted to my wife Jiyoun Yeo and our children, Sunwoo and Jaeho, for their patience. This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Jeong-Nan Seo, who was always proud of me but unfortunately passed away before seeing its completion.

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List of Abbreviation

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
DAC-OECD	OECD/Development Assistance Committee
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
JDR	Japan Disaster Relief
KDR	Korean Disaster Relief
KOFIH	Korea Foundation for International Healthcare
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
KOSAR	Korea Search and Rescue
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MOHW	Ministry of Health and Welfare
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMC	National Medical Center
NRS	National 119 Rescue Services of Korea
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSOCC	On-Site Operational Coordination Centre
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue
WHO	World Health Organization

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Overview of the thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the evaluation of humanitarian aid by making the gap in current evaluation frameworks smaller. To do this, this thesis applies Allan McConnell's theory for evaluating policy and crisis management to the case of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake which has been already measured by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (DAC-OECD) criteria (ALNAP, 2006; DAC-OECD, 1999), the most commonly used evaluation framework in the humanitarian sector. The focus of the thesis is the examination of the applicability of an alternative to the orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation, the DAC-OECD criteria, specifically the validity and scope conditions of McConnell's approach for evaluating humanitarian aid policy. Based on the researcher's experience and McConnell's arguments of evaluation, the thesis investigates three different aspects of Korea's response in Haiti and then determines the degree of success or failure of each aspect.

In 2011, an evaluation team, including the researcher, met many difficulties in humanitarian evaluation when it conducted an assessment on the case of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake using the DAC-OECD criteria. The team, sponsored by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), applied the DAC-OECD criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance/appropriateness, coherence, connectedness, and coverage to the case (KOICA, 2011a). The team assessed the response in three different domains: system, preparedness and

response, considering the focus of evaluation from policy level to project level (Gasper, 2000; KOICA, 2011a). The two domains of preparedness and response were further divided into three technical parts: search and rescue, medical support, and logistics, in order to complete a systematic evaluation. With this evaluation, it was hoped to learn from past experiences and improve Korea's overseas emergency response. Furthermore, the response dimension was subdivided into three steps: mobilization, operation, and demobilization with the flow of time (KOICA, 2011a). These divisions were made for an analytical purpose so as to understand the nature of different aspects of the response. However, during the evaluation, the team confronted a significant challenge in applying the DAC-OECD criteria as the evaluation framework for the case. The framework missed out some important factors, for example, there was no mention of the political dimensions of humanitarian aid policy. There were also difficulties in determining the degree of success and/or failure of the response due to the absence of guidance in this respect. Moreover, the team found it difficult to understand how to apply some of the criteria. Indeed, some criteria were so generic that they were deemed not suitable to use in this case.

In view of these experiences, the thesis seeks to examine again Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake by employing McConnell's framework. His framework may help expand the scope of evaluation and deal more systematically with the degree of success and/or failure of the response by looking at it in three dimensions. By doing this, it is hoped that this thesis will make the gaps in current approaches, mentioned above, smaller. McConnell's theory includes the political aspects of policy to assess the nature of political success or failure. His theory also clarifies the definitions of policy success and failure by combining facts and perceptions in order to identify goal achievement and to accommodate the issue of success for whom (McConnell, 2010a). The theory further provides a set of standards for the

evaluation of project and programme success or failure, as well as a continuum of five levels of classification: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success, and failure, so as to distinguish intermediate levels between success and failure (McConnell, 2010b). The thesis adopts case study methodology in order to "assess the validity and scope conditions of single or competing theories" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 74) because the case of Korea's response had been already measure by other evaluation theory, the DAC-OECD criteria, as mentioned above. Single-case studies might thus be useful "if they pose a "tough test" for theories or identify alternative causal paths to similar outcomes when equifinality is present" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 74), even though single-case studies have been criticised by some scholars because they do not vary in their dependent variables. Considering this argument, the research examines the case study of McConnell's theory to see if it may be a useful tool for us to assess humanitarian action, because it can afford to determine the degrees of success or failure in different dimensions of policy.

1.2 Is the orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation adequate?

This section seeks to link this thesis with previous scholarly works to identify and investigate related literature on humanitarian evaluation. It will thus explore from the general problems of policy analysis, focusing on evaluation approaches, to the specific difficulties of humanitarian evaluation, focusing on the DAC-OECD criteria, and then examine the significance and issues of evaluating humanitarian aid policy. Finally, it will reveal the gap that exists in current frameworks for humanitarian evaluation, and then argue that the orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation is inadequate, and finally present the research question to be answered.

The discussion on what is policy closely relates to the approaches for policy analysis (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; McConnell, 2010a). The traditional perspective of policy science posits policy as authoritative decision making, straightforward formulation and problem solving in view of the theoretical approach to rational policy making, but alternative perspectives highlight the competitive struggle for the right to choose and a political perspective in the light of real or practical approaches (Colebatch, 2006). The traditional perspective of policy science argues that "Governments recognize problems and make decisions to bring public authority and resources to bear upon these problems" (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010). From this perspective, Dye (2005, p. 1) describes public policy as "whatever government chose to do or not to do". In contrast, alternative perspectives argue that policy has the characteristics of interest negotiation, process interaction and interpretation: Colebatch (2006, p. 14), for example, notes "policy is a collective process of managing interpretation across a range of fields of activity". Even though the traditional perspective takes the centre stage of policy debate, this perspective raises questions for both practitioners and scholars, and alternative perspectives are thus more highlighted by policy study literature (Colebatch et al., 2010).

Different approaches for policy analysis also exist in the base of norms, values and interests (Bovens, Hart, & Kuipers, 2006). In the rational perspective, Dye (2011, p. 4) defines policy analysis as "finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference, if any, it makes" in order to bring out description, causes and consequences of public policy. Dye (2011, p. 323) further defines policy evaluation as "learning about the consequences of public policy". Evaluation is conducted after implementing policies and it can thus discover what

was done and what was not done and may thus entail "policy refinements, policy improvements and policy learning" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 11). The rational approach suggests value neutrality of policy analysis and objective evaluation of policy implementation in view of scientific and positivistic perspectives (Dunn, 2004). On the other hand, the argumentative approach, in consideration of the post-positivist or discourse analysis, maintains evaluation as a debate between relevant interests (Fischer, 1998; Majone, 1989). Furthermore, Bovens et al. (2006, p. 319), so-called revisionist approach, argue that "policy evaluation is an inherently normative act, a matter of political judgement" from an opposite perspective of the rational approach. The revisionist approach also argues that it is difficult to come to only one substantive or at any rate consensual assessment of a policy and to extract definite lessons from evaluation because the methodology and results of evaluating a policy are widely varied (Bovens et al., 2006). Therefore, the selection of an evaluation framework depends on the different sets of what should be measured and this makes evaluation more difficult.

In relation to the above arguments, the evaluation of humanitarian assistance has many issues. Humanitarian aid can be defined in many different ways, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, for example, describes it as "to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations" (according to its own website at www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org). Evaluation of humanitarian action can perhaps best be defined as "a systematic and impartial examination of humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and to enhance accountability" (ALNAP, 2006, p. 14). Such an examination will assess policy or programme with matching appropriate criteria, produce findings or conclusions, and add

recommendations for improving humanitarian relief (Buchana-Smith & Telford, 2007). The evaluation of humanitarian aid is essential to measure the effect of response to disasters or crises as well as to foster the progress of policy or project regarding such responses. To do this, evaluators employ a number of different evaluation initiatives which are suitable to their evaluation orientation or context, such as peer review, codes of conduct and certification and there is also some overlap. Though each initiative is proper to a certain extent in each case, they are not mutually exclusive and should all be considered (Buchana-Smith & Telford, 2007).

In disaster relief literature, there is also a lot of critical discussion that points out the problems of the application of current initiatives of humanitarian evaluation. In relation to the DAC-OECD criteria, which is the most widely used evaluation framework in the humanitarian field, Frerks and Hilhorst (2002) question whether the availability of the criteria in the context of humanitarian crises is of any substantial use because humanitarian actions are often formulated in a contemporary response with little documentation. They also criticise the limitations of the criteria, for example, efficiency has the issue of suitability owing to the reluctance to quantify the saving of lives in economic terms and the inclination to employ cost/benefit analyses to life-saving actions. Impact and sustainability are also problematic because of the limited extent of the objectives and the relatively short time period involved and the ad-hoc nature of the implementation of humanitarian assistance (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Moreover, the meaning of some of the DAC-OECD criteria is difficult to understand, and their usage is thus employed mechanically in many cases (ALNAP, 2006). Oliver (2008) has further suggested that evaluators could not easily deal with complicated or contextual aspects because the criteria are so generic that they are not properly suited to each case. The Red Cross Codes of Conduct (IFRC, 1995) , which is self-regulated by the signatories, is

another initiative for evaluating humanitarian assistance. It has been criticized because it chiefly assesses humanitarian action by regarding a set of image and judgement not by an objective evaluation and this often happens because of a lack of instruments of compliance within the code (DEC, 2001). Oliver (2008) also maintained that the Codes of Conduct is not an assessment standard but a norm of action, and Hilhorst (2002) further claimed that the code does not provide measures in relation to humanitarian actions. Furthermore, the Sphere Project (2011), which seeks to build minimum standards in the humanitarian sector through the rights-based approach, has been questioned because of an insufficient perception of the political dimension in the humanitarian context (Hilhorst, 2002), and O'Donnell et al (2002) also argued that the project is so extensive that it does not easily adapt to a particular situation. In consideration of these arguments, the evaluation of humanitarian aid may be more difficult than the general evaluation of policy.

The increasing interest in the evaluation of humanitarian action shows the importance of the impact of humanitarian assistance. Due to the increase of natural disasters and other emergencies in the twenty-first century, humanitarian response has needed to expand its capacity and ability to deal effectively with the saving of lives and promoting the well-being of the population affected by disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones or other crises. To keep pace with these circumstances, many diverse humanitarian actors, such as public sector, private sector and international organizations, endeavour to assist the affected countries or regions by cooperation with other countries, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). A great amount of humanitarian assistance, including huge amounts of human resources and aid money, has in the past been raised to help the affected population on behalf of humanitarianism, after natural disasters or crises. The number of

humanitarian actors and the scope of their activities has significantly expanded due to the increase in humanitarian emergencies, specifically after the beginning of the 1990s (Hilhorst, 2002). The total amount of humanitarian assistance from the DAC-OECD donors has also increased dramatically during this time. Worldwide expenditure on humanitarian crises reached an average of over US$5 billion a year in the 1990s which doubled the US$2 billion average of the 1980s (GHA, 2008). In 2004, it stood at US$6.5 billion mainly due to the Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami and the South Asia (Kashmir) earthquake, and it then increased to US$10.8 billion in 2005. In 2008, it continued to grow and reached US$11.5 billion chiefly because of the global food price crisis, cyclones affecting Myanmar and Bangladesh and the Sichuan earthquake in China. Furthermore, in 2010 big natural disasters, such as the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods, caused the total humanitarian expenditure from the DAC-OECD members to reach US$12.3 billion, recorded as the highest amount in history (GHA, 2012). Despite these increases, humanitarian assistance might be susceptible to the problem of some affected nations being less able to respond to crises, concurrent with the problem of the affected population becoming less adaptable to the impact of disasters. This means humanitarian assistance is less able to focus on dealing with humanitarian crises. Also, with the constraints of aid resources, including human and financial, the effective delivery of humanitarian services is strongly demanded to save lives and mitigate the suffering of the affected population. These environments offer an impetus to the debate on the evaluation of humanitarian aid.

The issue of humanitarian evaluation is more important to the public sector, which is responsible for an aid budget and has to meet national expectations, than to others, and evaluating aid policy has thus become more and more highlighted in the humanitarian field (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). After the responses to the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2010 Haiti

earthquake, the international humanitarian community provided an outpouring of literature on humanitarian evaluation for measuring a policy or program (Oliver, 2008). These evaluations of humanitarian aid mainly emphasised furnishing progressive implementation. Many countries have also conducted humanitarian evaluation to seek policy amendment and to ameliorate their response to the next case, after providing various kinds of emergency relief, for example, supplying relief goods, saving lives and helping recovery and rehabilitation. A significant function of these evaluations may be to foster the improvement of aid policy in order to do humanitarianism more efficaciously. These relief activities are closely related to each country's legal framework because aid policies are a part of each government's foreign policy. Tremblay et al. (2010) and KOICA (2011a), for example, assessed Australia's response and Korea's response to the Haiti earthquake by employing the DAC-OECD criteria, a current orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation. The results, however, failed to involve political aspects of their responses and assessed only the operational level, excluding the strategic level of their humanitarian policies. They also did not determine how successful the responses were due to the limitations of the DAC-OECD framework. In view of these circumstances, humanitarian aid policy, composing both a strategic level which legitimises the planning of humanitarian relief and an operational level which performs relief, has the characteristics of humanitarian action as well as public policy, and this peculiarity exacerbates the difficulty of evaluating humanitarian aid policy. However, even though a lot of humanitarian evaluation papers have been published, there is not much literature which deals appropriately with the features and the necessity of evaluating humanitarian aid policy (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002), and this thus opens room for discussion on the issue.

In consideration of the above issues, McConnell's theory actively engages the general issues of policy analysis: how to involve political aspects of policy and how to determine the degree

of success or failure. It also tackles the executive problems of humanitarian evaluation: how to deal with the context of humanitarian crises and how to assess the operational as well as strategic levels of project or programme. By dividing a policy into three different dimensions: process, programme and politics, McConnell's theory can elucidate the ways in which success and failure might be made clear among these dimensions (McConnell, 2010b). It also provides a definition of policy success and failure by a pragmatic mixture of a fact, in view of the rational approach and interpretation, in light of the argumentative approach. In addition, the theory provides detailed assessment criteria for each dimension which evaluators can use to help in assessment (McConnell, 2010a). Moreover, the theory displays five levels of classification: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure, allowing the determination of the degrees of success and/or failure in the three dimensions (McConnnell, 2011). Therefore, his theory involves the political dimension of policy, which is a shortcoming of the DAC-OECD framework, as well as the rational approach for policy analysis, by analysing three different dimensions of policy. Evaluators can also easily identify success and/or failure of policy implementation by using McConnell's evaluation criteria, and further determine the degrees of success and/or failure by using a continuum from success to failure, which may mitigate the limitations of the current frameworks of humanitarian evaluation and the argumentative approach for policy analysis. McConnell's theory will thus overcome to a large context the deficiencies of the current approaches for policy analysis as well as the frameworks for humanitarian evaluation.

In view of the above, this thesis aims to contribute to the efforts of dealing with the evaluation of humanitarian aid through the application of McConnell's theory in the case study of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The thesis will look at policy making, the practice of humanitarian relief and the politics of overseas emergency response so as to

make the gaps in the current approaches smaller. To do this, the study proposes the following

research question:

To what extent can Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake be described as successful?

1.3 Understanding the case of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake

The 2010 Haiti earthquake has been recorded as one of the most catastrophic events in the

history of natural disasters and resulted in many evaluation papers. It affected about 3 million

people including the death of over 220,000 people and the injury of 300,000 more and

generated substantial assistance from the humanitarian community (Rencort, Stoddard, Haver,

Taylor, & Harvey, 2010). During and after the relief and recovery activities, many evaluation

papers relevant to the disaster were written to measure response systems and to assess the

impacts of aid at the scene. In the evaluation of humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake,

the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and

other humanitarian actors reviewed their activities by employing the DAC-OECD criteria

(Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011; IASC, 2010; KOICA, 2011a; Taylor, Gowthaman, Sanford,

& Hurst, 2010). In addition to that criteria, Taylor et al. (2010) involved gender equality and

the question of whether Australia's response met the accountability and minimum standards

of humanitarian aid, and the reports of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and

Performance (ALNAP) (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011; Patrick, 2011) also added

coordination and timeliness in their assessment, so as to do a more comprehensive evaluation

practice and to enable a better focus on the overall context (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002).

Tremblay (2010) further tried participatory action research in his study, analysing the

development of a UN coordination system in humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake, so as to elucidate useful knowledge for providing greater understanding of management and coordination systems for future humanitarian responses. His research applied this methodology for the sake of encouraging local, national and international actors to become actively involved in the ongoing study, thus contributing to better comprehension of the different interests and objectives of indigenous actors. Many of the relevant literature call for an increase in evaluation criteria, however it must be kept in mind that the addition of some criteria makes evaluation and the selection of criteria instruments more complicated and obscure (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002).

Like Australia, Korea also supported humanitarian assistance to Haiti and then evaluated the case by using the DAC-OECD criteria. The Korean government supplied a total of US$10 million for aid to Haiti, but the use of the first $1 million of this money constructs the main core of this research and it was all assigned for humanitarian relief. The money was allocated as follows: US$200,000 for medicine and medical support and US$800,000 for the dispatch of Korea Disaster Relief (KDR) teams (Jeong & Park, 2010b). The Haiti response by Korea is the first combined response by a rescue team and a medical team because Korea's relief for the 2008 China earthquake was implemented by only a rescue team and the 2008 Myanmar cyclone was attended only by a medical team. The Haiti case thus better serves to review the overall structure of the Korean humanitarian response system as a whole, because it also includes the public-private partnership, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) of Korea and the use of military assets in humanitarian relief. In addition, an evaluation team, including the researcher, sponsored by MOFAT and KOICA, assessed the response by applying the DAC-OECD criteria for the improvement of its system. This research can thus afford to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each framework by comparing the results of its evaluation, both

the DAC-OECD criteria and McConnell's approach. Furthermore, the response to the Haiti earthquake served as an impetus for Korea to reform its system of overseas emergency response. Korea amended both the Overseas Emergency Relief Act (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2007) and its enforcement decree in 2011. It has thus established various plans, for example, the Plan for the Advancement of Overseas Emergency Relief (MOFAT, 2010) and the KOICA Implementation Plan for Partnership with Civil Society in the Humanitarian Assistance Sector (KOICA, 2011b), so as to improve its response capacity for the realization of humanitarianism. Moreover, many papers, such as KOICA (2011a), Lee et al. (2012), Hong (2010), found that the Haiti case serves as a good exemplary among cases of assisting in overseas emergencies, and also pointed out that Korea contributed to the earthquake relief to some extent but needed to supply more resources and to further utilize preferable existent ways to enlarge its competence to respond. Therefore, considering the argument of George and Bennett (2005, p. 80), "Single cases serve the purpose of theory testing particularly well if they are "most-likely," " least-likely," or "crucial" cases", Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake as a crucial case may be suitable to explore McConnell's theory of evaluating humanitarian action because it provides a good opportunity to investigate almost all aspects of humanitarian aid policy due to its corporate response and self-reflection for policy reform. The case study can also be used to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation, the DAC-OECD criteria, and an alternative, McConnell's framework, by analysing the results of each framework.

This study applies McConnell's approach as the evaluation framework for this case study so as to challenge existing approaches to humanitarian evaluation. McConnell's framework provides a useful tool for evaluation by expanding the scope of assessment, especially the evaluation of political aspects and by determining the degree of success or failure of policy.

His framework assesses three different aspects of policy: process, program and politics. These three aspects are not mutually exclusive but may overlap to a degree, but for the sake of analysis may be considered individually (McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011). The framework may thus compensate the flaws of the DAC-OECD criteria by involving a political aspect. The main assessment for this research also applies McConnell's five grades of success or failure: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure, for determining the degrees of success or failure in three aspects of policy or project which can also help make up for the weak points of the current approaches for humanitarian evaluation. Moreover, the framework proffers a set of evaluation criteria for analysing and classifying levels of success or failure across the process, program and political aspects within a policy. Therefore, it may provide a useful measure for assessment and become a useful tool for evaluators in revealing success and/or failure among different dimensions of policy as well as helping to explain some peculiarities or dynamics of policy through the relationships between these dimensions of policy (McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011).

This study utilizes three different areas of data by employing a mixed methods, the combination of quantitative methods and qualitative methods. The method helps to reveal the circumstances of decision making, operational activities and political complexity within a policy by using a document review of the operational as well as strategic levels, and interviews with actors and stakeholders (European Commission, 2007). The first of these area of data is an extensive document review using both internal and external documents, reports and literature on the Haiti response, as well as Korea's legal framework and structures related to this case. The second is two focus group interviews and a number of individual in-depth key informant interviews. The focus group interviews were conducted, respectively, with

rescue staff and medical staff who participated in the Haiti operations, and the interviewees

gave their opinion of Korea's response to the Haiti earthquake. The key informant interviews

were conducted with domestic personnel who had the responsibility of emergency response

in agencies relevant to the Haiti response, as well as international personnel who were

officials in Haiti and the staff of international organizations. The third is an online survey

which investigated the essentials for strengthening the medical staff of emergency relief

teams. The survey conducted a total number of 180 online surveys to garner the perceptions

and motivation of the overseas emergency relief activities from the members of the Korea

Academy of Disaster Medicine, mainly composed of emergency medical personnel, and the

National Disaster Life Support. The interviews and online survey were conducted in 2011 in

Korea in compliance with an ethical review approved by the Seoul National University. All

data and materials used in this thesis were again approved by the Humanities Low Risk

Subcommittee, The University of Sydney in July, 2013.

1.4 Significance and limitations of this thesis

This study is significant because it explores a theory for humanitarian evaluation which has

not been previously tested, so as to alleviate the shortcomings of existing approaches. Using

the case study of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, this thesis will examine the

validity of an alternative approach, McConnell's theory, to the orthodox approach, the DAC-

OECD criteria, for humanitarian evaluation, by following McConnell's approach and by

investigating the possible reasons for success or failure with respect to the evaluation criteria.

It is important to the governments and population of countries affected by disasters as well as

to the governments of donor countries to know whether humanitarian aid is a success or

failure (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). In addition, a wider understanding of how and why humanitarian aid policies perform successfully (or why they do not) can help countries to respond more efficiently to recipients' needs and to more effectively reach their goals. Furthermore, the analysis on and refinement of a country's emergency relief system and relevant policy are imperative because each country is expected to contribute more and more to the international humanitarian community in accordance with the increase in the occurrence of large-scale natural disasters and the growing demand for humanitarian relief activities. However, the study of humanitarian aid policy has lagged behind other parts of the relevant studies such as the dialogue of development, though it has been more highlighted in the field of evaluation literature (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Therefore, this thesis intends to fill the gap in the literature relevant to evaluating humanitarian policy.

This research has limitations in dealing with the case of Korea's response to the Haiti earthquake. It focuses on Korea's response system, response operations and governmental directions, such as the dispatch of KDR teams, not on emergency relief goods and post-disaster reconstruction. Also, the private sector of Korea's assistance is not included because of its characteristic difference. Moreover, it seems that the results of the evaluation may not be easily applied to other countries' aid policies or programmes due to their different environments or contexts; nevertheless, their response policies and challenges might be germane to other systems or architectures employed in similar actions. Though the rationale for the research design does not include all other cases comprehensively, the study sets a good example for evaluating humanitarian aid policy, and this may be closely related to the evaluation of other countries' humanitarian policies. The research further supposes that the selected focus group interviewees are a true representation of the rescue and medical staff who participated in the Haitian operations.

As a previous National 119 Rescue Services of Korea (NRS) team member as well as Korea Search and Rescue (KOSAR) team member, the researcher may have the inclination to doubt of the efficacy of the Korean aid policy, specifically due to the KDR team's shortcomings and excessive red tape. Even if the researcher was cautious to adopt conditions free from these kinds of predisposition, he exposes the risk of inadvertently biasing the research findings with his prior view. He has endeavoured to conduct the data analysis from an objective viewpoint when he has encountered any chance of neglecting important points because of his tendency to be biased as a civil servant for the Korean government.

1.5 Thesis outline

To answer the research question raised in this study, this thesis is composed of seven chapters, with Chapter One being the Introduction. Chapter Two will review the literature of policy analysis, humanitarian evaluation and a new theory of evaluation. Chapter Three will explain the methodology used in this study. Chapter Four will be an evaluation of the process dimension of the Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake by applying McConnell's criteria for the examination of the legal framework and the architecture of overseas emergency relief. Chapter Five will also be an assessment of the programme dimension of the Korea's response by employing McConnell's standards for the analysis of the operations and activities of the KDR teams. Chapter Six will furthermore be an evaluation of the political dimension of the response by using his measures for the exploration of the policy agenda of humanitarian relief and the governmental direction of the policy. Finally, Chapter Seven will

discuss the findings of this research project and the contradictions between different forms of success and/or failure in relation to the three dimensions of the policy and then come to a conclusion.

Chapter 2 – Understanding Evaluation: From Policy Analysis to Humanitarian Aid

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has tried to outline and explain the motivation for this research of evaluating humanitarian response. This chapter aims to connect this thesis with prior scholarly efforts so as to identify and explore relevant literature. Even though the evaluation of humanitarian action is important to donors, the population affected by disasters and other stakeholders, by its nature humanitarian action is problematic to evaluate because disasters or crises entail intrinsically great uncertainty and variation, such relief work is put into practice under dangerous situations, and political intervention in the arena of humanitarian assistance entails enormous resources (ALNAP, 2006; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Oliver, 2008). Therefore, a review of the issues of policy analysis and the initiatives of humanitarian evaluation is valuable to draw out a new approach for evaluation so as to make the gap in current evaluation frameworks smaller.

This review has four principal sections. The first explores the arguments related to different approaches to policy analysis based on various questions and issues. The second explains the significance and difficulties of the evaluation of humanitarian aid and also points out the features and restrictions of major existing initiatives of humanitarian evaluation with the help of a useful taxonomy, as suggested by Hilhorst (2002) as a classification of evaluation initiatives for humanitarian action. The third investigates the applicability of the employment of a new approach in the evaluation of humanitarian aid. The last section reveals the deficiencies in prior research that this thesis intends to mitigate.

2.2 Policy analysis

The context of what is policy closely relates to the debate on policy analysis approaches (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; McConnell, 2010a). Dror (1968, p. 14) in view on the traditional perspective of policy science notes that policy "lays down general directives, rather than detailed instructions, on the main lines of action to be followed". This notion implies that policy is a theoretical action plan decided upon before taking action to achieve certain goals in the public and private sectors. In relation to this view, Dye (2005, p. 1) further notes public policy as "whatever government chose to do or not to do". This means that public policy is a principle determined by the government, and puts into play guidelines for decision-making, performance, and quality control of project or programme. However, policy cannot be easily differentiated from program, practice and other realms of policy performance. Policy has the nature of interaction; Colebatch (2006, p. 14), for example, notes that "policy is a collective process of managing interpretation across a range of fields of activity". The traditional perspective of policy science emphasises problem solving and authoritative, instrumental terms of policy; on the contrary, alternative perspectives highlight the competitive struggle for the right to choose and a political approach to policy analysis (Colebatch et al., 2010). The traditional perspective suggests policy to be authoritative decision making and straightforward formulation in the current pattern of governing, in view of the theoretical approach to rational policy making; while, alternative perspectives highlight the aspects of interest negotiation and structured interaction of policy processes and interpretation, and multiple perspectives in the light of a real or practical approach (Colebatch, 2006).

Considering the above arguments, Bovens et al. (2006) categorise three different evaluation approaches: rationalist and argumentativist, with regard to norms, values and interests, and then propose a so-called revisionist approach so as to challenge the limitations of both approaches. The rational approach, as an extension of the traditional perspective, claims value neutrality and intends to keep evaluation from the influence of politics and objective evaluation of policy implementation. On the contrary, the argumentative approach, as an extension of alternative perspectives, maintains evaluation as a debate among related interests and thus involves politics of policy. The revisionist approach thus argues that "policy evaluation is an inherently normative act, a matter of political judgement" (Fischer & Forester, 1993, p. 319).

2.2.1 Rational approach

The rational approach, as a scientific, positivistic and quantitative methodology in the same context as the rational tradition of policy science, was dominant in the past and still currently plays an important role, though it has been increasingly criticised by many different alternatives. The positivistic perspective of the rational approach regards evaluation as an essential part of the policy process, and the assessment of performance is measured by fixed goals, with the necessary data collected in prescribed ways and by applying established criteria (Bovens et al., 2006; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Policy analysis in the rational approach maintains a division of facts and values, apolitical and quantitative evaluation of policy execution, the provision of factual information of societal architecture and procedures

using scientific methodology, and the contribution of decision making to the policy process. Considered apart from the contexts of psychology, culture and linguistics, practical information, because of its premise of political and moral neutrality, is the basis of decision making for a project's effectiveness and efficiency. The rational approach also has the assumption of predefined policy goals and evaluation criteria and established parameters to assess the accomplishment of fixed objectives (Bovens et al., 2006). The positivistic perspective claims that it can provide an optimum of theoretical policy and can assess the difference between the anticipated results and the actual results of policy by evaluation (Dunn, 2004). Bovens et al. (2006) explain that the Organizations for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses a rationalist approach with its institutional objectives, for example, to seek policy improvement for social and economic development in the world and to build international standards for various fields. The OECD's peer reviews or country reports, which have got to some extent authority, and its established reviews and mutual examination by governments, are regarded as a judgement on national policy implementation (OECD, 2013). As Marsden and Oakley (1991) have noted, as an instrumental/technocratic approach, the positivist perspective is a constant learning process where evaluations provide lessons learned that give feedback in the policy process and this knowledge is thus combined in future projects, and this involves a scientific process of administrative-bureaucratic theory.

However, the argumentative approach, as an alternative to the rational perspective, asserts that it is difficult to differentiate between fact and value because policy implementation is an intrinsically value-laden activity in regard to its social and political aspects (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Majone, 1989). Participatory and stakeholder approaches further argue for the involvement of multiple interests, perceptions and interpretations rather than one-sided evaluation. Stakeholders include decision makers, executive organisations, recipients and

other actors involved in the project, and a participatory approach thus highlights the identification of the goals, processes, outcomes and results in all stakeholders' participation. The rational approach has also been criticised as managerialism in which managers and evaluators are commissioned, and this disempowers the other stakeholders (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002).

2.2.2 Argumentative approach

The argumentative approach asserts that it is impossible for us to divide values into facts and also impossible to separate politics and science and further insists on the active engagement of policy analysis in the discussion on values in decision making (Bovens & t' Hart, 1996; Fischer, 1998; Majone, 1989). The post-positivist or discourse analysis emphasises the differential interpretations and meanings of actors, the relationship between knowledge and power, and the separation of open and underlying assumptions and values of project and implementation (Fischer, 1998; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Fischer (1998), for example, criticised the first assessment of the Head Start Program as a short-term cost-benefit analysis because it failed to measure the long-term outcomes of the program and thus contributed to supporting the Nixon administration by befitting the position of the administrative which sought to dramatically reduce the program. In addition, the standardized comparison of terms and numbers has much room for interpretation and often causes controversy. Bovens et al. (2006) also pointed out the discrepancy between the 8 per cent figure in the OECD's report and the 23.5 per cent figure in the Belgian agency's report regarding the Belgian unemployment rate was due to different notions of what constituted employment. The argumentative approach thus criticises the pragmatic perspective of the rational approach

because it considers only decision making in the policy process, and further criticises the rational approach because of the poor recognition of the political aspects of policy (Barry & Rae, 1975; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Stone, 1997).

The argumentative approach highlights the political aspects of policy and evaluation (Barry & Rae, 1975; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). This approach argues that policies or programmes are influenced by societies and interpreted by actors' experience and interests. The approach further maintains that scientific evaluation can't easily comprehend "social, political and value-oriented character" (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 7-8), even though the positivistic perspective claims that it can know the reality of programmes and that these programmes are formulated rationally. The argumentative approach emphasises the issue of evaluation for whom which is closely related to the politics of policy evaluation. If evaluation is dominated by some actors' interests and interpretation in the design and control of evaluation activities, other actors' interests and voices are ignored. Some of the argumentative perspective thus maintains that policy evaluation has to incorporate the interpretation, meaning and interests of both dominant groups and under-represented groups in order to encompass everyone's experiences and interpretation as stakeholders of policy(Barry & Rae, 1975) (Fischer, 1998; Fischer & Forester, 1993). The argumentative approach thus suggests the consideration of multiple actors who participate in programs or projects and have their own interests and further compete in achieving goals (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Stone, 1997). Long (1997), for example, emphasises social construction through competition and negotiation of values and interests. The argumentative approach asserts that policy interference, considering social and political circumstances, has the meaning of value and norm which lends itself to value-oriented evaluation (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). However, Bovens et al. (2006) are critical that the argumentative approach including social constructivists do not

provide any guidelines that allows policy analysts to navigate the political arena of policy, even though they clearly point out the political realms of policy evaluation.

2.2.3 Revisionist approach

Bovens et al. (2006), so-called revisionist approach to policy analysis, present an outstanding view of how to deal with the norm, methodology and politics of policy evaluation. They highlight the nature of norm and the politics of policy analysis in the same context of argumentative approach, and argue that evaluation will have a political nature from the opposite perspective of the rational approach, and also has to involve winners and losers, even if it seems a typical or non-questionable policy evaluation. All policies, even technocratic and non-significant ones, incorporate various actors, such as decision makers, administrative organizations, recipients and interest groups, who have their own interests in the result of the evaluation. Evaluation can thus bring about the restructure of policy basis and goals, revise the combination of tools it depends on, and redistribute the allocation of relevant resources among the multiple stakeholders related to its execution (Bovens et al., 2006). The revisionist approach is rooted in an incrementalist viewpoint which advocates that one of the most important missions of policy makers is to make an effort to solve social problems through an open and pluralist discussion (Lindblom, 1990). Considering how to solve the problems of both the argumentative approach and the evaluation of politics, they argue that evaluators have to manage the problems of both positivism in methodology and relativism in the politics of evaluation, and evaluations should have relevance to the policy free from the exploitation of the politics of the relevant realm. The revisionist approach highlights the context of a new shift in policy science rather than the narrow view of the

argumentative approach that is based on restricted information and social construction. Therefore, evaluators need to change their perspective from positivistic to pluralistic, and the scope of policy evaluation has to be widened (Bovens et al., 2006).

The revisionist approach stresses the separation of the programmatic aspect and the political aspect of success and failure in policy execution (Bovens & Peters, 2001). A programmatic perspective of policy analysis focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy assessed and mainly concerns social problem solving, which is closely incorporated in the rational approach, such as the management of social issues and the provision of reasonable and appropriate solutions to social problems (Lasswell, 1971; Lindblom, 1990). These include normative and political judgement but mainly focus on an institutional perspective regarding policies as an interference in social affairs. The division between programmatic and political dimensions of policy has a strong analytical advantage because it clearly shows the difference between programmatic and political aspects of policy process. In a study of the problem of HIV in the blood supply of both Germany and France, for example, Bovens et al. (2006) recognised notable discrepancies between programmatic and political assessments. In the case, the two countries' responses resulted in the same degrees of failure to solve the problem but the overall results were much different. In France, this evaluation of failure caused serious political issues and legal problems; but in Germany, on the contrary, the evaluation did not give rise to any political issues. These kinds of evaluation asymmetries challenge "the commensense, "just world" hypothesis that good performance should lead to political success, vice versa" (Bovens et al., 2006, p. 332). Therefore, Bovens et al. recommend that evaluators search out asymmetries and then elucidate these differences with regard to the structural and cultural characteristics of the political architecture and "the dynamics of the evaluation process in the cases concerned" (Bovens et al., 2006, p. 332).

With respect to the arguments about approaches to evaluation, though the argumentative approach has shown the limitations of the rational approach and suggested a considerable view that "interpretative, constructivist and actor-oriented approaches" (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002, p. 6) easily involve the different social interests of the various actors and reveal the political aspects of evaluation , the argumentative approach failed to present a clear and convincing evaluation framework or instruments for evaluating political aspects of policy. However, the revisionist approach demonstrates the limitations and shortcomings of the rational approach and the argumentative approach and then highlights the separation between the programmatic and the political realms of policy analysis. It thus proposes that evaluators challenge the political dimension of policy evaluation by considering structural and cultural contexts of policy (Bovens et al., 2006).

2.3 Evaluation of humanitarian aid

This section explores the problems of the evaluation of humanitarian aid and the strengths and shortcomings of the many different initiatives of humanitarian evaluation. The debate on the evaluation of humanitarian action shows evidence of increasing interest in the impact of humanitarian relief. The necessity of improved humanitarian evaluation has lately been highlighted by scholars, practitioners and politicians but it is not easy to put it into practice, due to implementation issues. If there are multiple actors involved in implementation, effective purposive action will be very difficult to accomplish. In some cases, for example, implementation gaps might exist when both the formation of a policy and the implementation

of this policy occur in separate layers or levels of hierarchy (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) also elucidated the possible gap between the intentions of policy formations and the outcomes or achievements of a policy by noting that it may be more possible for agencies to make a distortion of the original policy goals if there is much room for interpretation within a complex inter-institutional context. In view of evaluation, clear awareness of what is happening during implementation is vital due to the fact that there is an information shortage problem in the initial phase. Also, poor prior assumptions produce many uncertainties, and this is aggravated by the time lag that often takes place between plan and action. Moreover, unanticipated events often occur when a program is implemented and a stakeholders' recognition is changed, which causes implementation issues and demands a formal evaluation system to solve any shortcomings (ALNAP, 2006; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Hallam, 1997).

The contextual and substantive issues further make humanitarian evaluation difficult. The context of humanitarian crises includes disasters or emergencies, displacement, paralysis of state functions, and safety and security problems, and this results in poor data collection from the field as well as within organizations (Hallam, 1997). Initial needs-assessment is often made with a lack of essential data and under huge time pressure (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). With regard to substantive issues, the uncertainty of the work in the field causes objectives to be changed many times and action plans to be adapted. Accordingly, assessment against a group of firm objectives and an inflexible action plan is not easy. In addition, the difference among crises causes the limitation of data comparability and the applicability of instances from one case to the next is not high (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Furthermore, the diversity of activities and the influence of the overall context regarding humanitarian evaluation means that there is difficulty in establishing the relationship between cause and

effect, and thus policy evaluation techniques are needed rather than traditional program evaluation techniques (ALNAP, 2006; DAC-OECD, 1999). These circumstances are advocated by Frerks and Hilhorst (2002, p. 4) as "the call for evaluation of humanitarian aid is young" in view of an institutional viewpoint, and they also argue that "the political nature of emergency aid, the role of media, fund raising and image building are difficult to match with the idea of an open and public 'impartial' and documented evaluation" (2002, p. 4)

There are many different evaluation initiatives for humanitarian aid, and these initiatives may, in reality, be partly overlapping, perhaps complementary and sometimes conflicting (Buchana-Smith & Telford, 2007; Oliver, 2008). In order to elucidate the features and restrictions of the promotion and major current initiatives of humanitarian evaluation, this thesis follows the classification of Hilhorst (2002) and the next subsections provide an overview of these initiatives.

2.3.1 Peer review

Peer review, described as a systematic investigation and evaluation of the performance of a state by other countries (Pagani, 2002), is regarded as a useful way of evaluating humanitarian policy or program. It is widely known through the efforts of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (DAC-OECD), a forum for selected OECD member countries to improve cooperation with developing countries by providing policy guidance by critically reviewing the policies and programmes of each member country once every four or five years (OECD, 2012). The

agency employs peer review, standing for rational approach for evaluation, as a tool for examining member country's relief programs and for learning from the experiences of others, and also for making recommendations to one another regarding good practice and shared objectives (Hilhorst, 2002; Pagani, 2002; Porter & Webb, 2007). The DAC-OECD (1999) has published guidelines for humanitarian evaluation in complex emergencies to foster performance, accountability and learning. The five major evaluation criteria of the DAC-OECD: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and relevance, are widely known and used in the humanitarian evaluation field (European Commission, 2007). In addition, ALNAP, founded in 1997 as a multi-agency learning network, has issued the Evaluating Humanitarian Action Using the DAC-OECD Criteria (2006) to guide users through a group of seven criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. In the new group of criteria, appropriateness has replaced relevance, and three new criteria of connectedness, coherence, and coverage have been added. Connectedness has substituted and expanded the notion of sustainability (European Commission, 2007).

Though ALNAP endeavours to manage quality and to foster learning in the humanitarian sector, the application of the evaluation criteria encounters many challenges. The former five criteria raise questions and pose limitations regarding their employment in the context of humanitarian crises because humanitarian operations are frequently framed in a temporary response with little documentation and thus there is a lack of information available to evaluators (ALNAP, 2006; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Oliver, 2008). Not having sufficient definite objectives causes the effectiveness of the criterion to be doubtful, and the limited extent of the objectives and the relatively short time period involved and the ad-hoc nature of the implementation cause impact and sustainability to become irrelevant. Efficiency has the problem of appropriateness owing to the unwillingness to represent lives saved in economic

terms and the reluctance to employ cost-benefit analyses to life-saving action (Frerks &

Hilhorst, 2002). Even though adding some criteria can mean a further broadening of

evaluation, it may also bring other issues, for example, it makes the evaluation practice and

the choice of instruments more complex and difficult and causes the question of how to

weigh the importance of the different criteria (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Considering other

critiques, the meaning of some of the DAC-OECD criteria is difficult to perceive, and their

usage is applied mechanically in many cases (ALNAP, 2006). Evaluators also could not

easily deal with complicated or contextual aspects because the criteria are so comprehensive

that they are not properly suited to them (Oliver, 2008). In addition, Frerks and Hilhorst

(2002) argue that the application of the criteria in the context of humanitarian crises has

limitations because humanitarian actions are often formulated as an immediate response with

little documentation. Furthermore, using these standards means that there is the added

difficulty in grasping the idea of the political realm of humanitarian assistance.

2.3.2 Codes of Conduct

The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-

Government Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief, adopted by eight of the largest disaster

assistance agencies in 1994, is also generally well known. As a voluntary code, which is self-

regulated by the signatories, the Code of Conduct is now engaged by 515 organizations. It is

based on 10 principles, for example, the humanitarian imperative comes first, and we shall

endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy (IFRC, 1995), and is

offered as a guideline for humanitarian assistance. Articles one to four of the code, rooted in

humanity, impartiality and independence, are major principles of humanitarian relief and

emphasise a need-based approach. The code has been applied in humanitarian evaluation as a framework by the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC), an umbrella organization of the United Kingdom.

Though the code may be employed as a tool for the evaluation of humanitarian response, it mainly measures humanitarian initiatives by considering a collection of impressions and judgements, not by an objective assessment, due to insufficient indicators of compliance with the code (DEC, 2001). Hilhorst (2005) has suggested that the code does not manifest proactive regulations in consideration of humanitarian activities, and Oliver (2008) has also criticised that it is not an evaluation standard but a norm of action. The code might be thus not a sufficient tool for assessing humanitarian aid due to mentioned above reasons.

2.3.3 The rights approach

The Sphere Project, begun in 1997 as a voluntary and multi-agency initiative, represents the rights-based approach to humanitarian relief, and seeks to facilitate the quality and accountability of the disaster response. The project has six core minimum standards, including people-centred humanitarian response, coordination and collaboration, and assessment, as process standards and a group of non-core minimum standards, a qualitative statement, that assess the basic sectors of humanitarian response, including water supply, sanitation, hygiene, food security, nutrition, shelter, settlement, non-food items and health action. It then recommends key actions to achieve the standards, and provides key indicators which are quantitative indexes that reveal whether a standard has been achieved or not by

assessing outcomes of key actions (The Sphere Project, 2011). The handbook, The Sphere

Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster (The Sphere Project,

2011), is a useful measure for managing quality and enhancing accountability of

humanitarian assistance, and includes both quantitative product parameters and qualitative

process parameters (Hilhorst, 2002).

As a rights-based approach to humanitarian response, the project emphases the fulfilment of

human rights, and this contrasts with the needs-based approach of the IFRC Code of Conduct

and the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, an informal donor forum and

network that fosters donors' activities and their accountability in the humanitarian field by

developing general principles and good practices (GHD, 2013). The rights-based approach is

criticized due to the lack of recognition of the political aspect in the humanitarian context

(Hilhorst, 2002) and, as claimed by O'Donnell et al. (2002), the project could be brought into

question because it is not specific enough. The approach may thus bring the same problems

of the DAC-OECD criteria including the difficulty in evaluating politics in humanitarian

response.

2.3.4 Social audit

The People In Aid, organized by humanitarian and development organizations in 1995, has as

its main function the social auditing of the humanitarian sector. The network seeks a high

quality and accountability of human resource management by applying their own code, The

People In Aid Code of Good Practice (2003). The code details seven principles including

human resource strategy, staff policies and practices, and its indicators, for example, "our organisational strategy or business plan explicitly values staff for their contribution to organisational and operational objectives" (People In Aid, 2003, p. 8) and "staff are familiarised with policies and practices that affect them" (People In Aid, 2003, p. 10). This gives a framework for improving NGOs' staff management and it also emphasises doing a social audit, which combines the accountability of internal stakeholders with a method of external audit (Hilhorst, 2002).

The project could be regarded as a methodology for the management and support of aid personnel, not so much as a way of assessing humanitarian relief (Oliver, 2008), and the social audit approach has also the constraints of how to set general criteria for analysing the accomplishment of humanitarian work as well as having a high cost of implementation (Hilhorst, 2002).

2.3.5 Certification

Certification engages a third party in assessing performance in accordance with a group of standards or codes, and then entails certification or accreditation which is value-oriented and seeks quality management by guaranteeing compliance to standards (Hilhorst, 2002). In the humanitarian field, Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP International), started in 2003, is a self-regulatory initiative with a certification system. HAP International aims to foster the quality and accountability of humanitarian relief for crisis-affected communities. After establishing a set of principles for accountability, HAP

International introduced the Standard in Accountability and Quality Management (2010) for providing standards covering areas such as humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. The Standard seeks to foster the quality of humanitarian programs and calls for indicators: "Commitment to humanitarian standards and rights" and "Setting standards and building capacity" (HAP International, 2010, p. 25).

Its scheme seeks to give a symbol of accreditation to humanitarian organizations which bring their operations into accordance with the HAP Standard (Oliver, 2008) but there is a question over the suitability of certification as a set of essential criteria because certification may not be easily used as a quality assurance system (Hilhorst, 2002). The Standard may also have some limitations as a tool for measuring humanitarian assistance because it is not well suited in the specific situations of humanitarian field.

The evaluation of humanitarian aid is an important matter for its stakeholders, such as donors, recipients and other actors. However, considering the existing context of humanitarian aid debate, it is questionable that humanitarian evaluation may build an umbrella agreement on evaluation initiatives to be applied or create a unique organization that will regulate conformity in this field. In relation to this, Hilhost (2002) offers a considered perspective that the humanitarian field seems not to build a unique initiative for evaluation but continues to use various initiatives in many ways. It may thus be concluded that the nature and characteristics of humanitarian evaluation is very wide, and there is no single set of standards to assess all the domains of this broad sector. As reviewed above, the various initiatives for humanitarian evaluation have some value but they are also deficient in some respects. This is much similar to discussion on evaluation approaches to policy analysis explored in the prior

section, as well as the experience described in the previous chapter, which was experienced

by the researcher during the evaluation of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

Therefore, it is valuable for us to explore a new framework for humanitarian evaluation in the

next section so as to make the gap of current initiatives smaller.

2.4 McConnell's approach

The prior section has shown the significance and problems of humanitarian evaluation and

the characteristics and shortfalls of current initiatives as tools for evaluating humanitarian aid.

This section, in turn, leads to the analysis of the features and benefits of McConnell's

approach, regarding the general problems of policy analysis: how to involve political aspects

of policy and how to determine the degree of success or failure, and also the specific

difficulties of humanitarian evaluation: how to deal with the context of humanitarian crises

and how to assess the operational as well as strategic levels of project or programme. As a

new approach for evaluating policy and crisis management, McConnell's theory is closely

linked to the arguments of the revisionist approach. McConnell's framework clarifies the

definitions of policy success and failure by combining the facts of the rational approach and

the perceptions of the argumentative approach. His theory also separates a policy into three

different aspects: process, program and politics, does this for evaluative purposes, which may

involve political characteristics of policy so as to explain the nature of political success.

Moreover, the theory clearly illustrates detailed assessment criteria for each aspect, which

evaluators can use to help in evaluation. To distinguish intermediate levels between success

and failure, the framework further displays five-levels of classification: success, durable

success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure. The identification of the grade of

success/failure is essential to expose shortcomings and conflicts of public value, and though

there are vast number of papers on policy failure, the notion and levels of failure have not been well identified by prior literature and the perceptions of levels of failure are also lacking (McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011). Therefore, McConnell's approach helps make the gap of policy analyses smaller by involving the political aspects of policy implementation and determining the degree of success and/or failure of policy.

In view of policy evaluation, McConnell (2010b) argues that politics and failure of policy are out of the range of traditional perspectives of policy sciences, and the political nature of policy may account for much political success, and this viewpoint is intimately connected with the arguments of the revisionist approach to evaluation. The reality of what constitutes process success is as difficult to verify as policy improvement or public value, though process success, such as involving stakeholders in decision making so as to alleviate implementation problems as well as to legitimize policy, may bring program success. The political dimensions of policy are also closely related to the nature of political success, and thus policy evaluation is needed to consider specific political actors who profit from such policies. In addition, McConnell (2010b) argues that process success may bring program success and the combination of evaluating programmatic and political aspects of a policy are needed to illuminate success or failure of the policy. Policy success has two aspects; the first is in programmatic terms, and is focused on "the effectiveness, efficiency and resilience of the specific policies being evaluated" (Bovens & Peters, 2001, p. 20) and the second is in political terms which refers to "the way policies and policy makers become evaluated in the political arena" (Bovens & Peters, 2001, p. 20). In relation to this, Bovens (2010, p. 584) argues that "the process that led to the adoption of a policy can also be analysed both from a programmatic and from a political perspective". The issue of the programme aspect of policy closely relates to "the Lasswellian-Lindblomian view of policy making as social problem

solving" (Bovens & Peters, 2001, p. 20), which emphasises instrumentalism and determined interference in social problems, whereas the political aspect of policy refers to "the discourse world of systems, emotions, political ideology and power relations" (Bovens & Peters, 2001, p. 20). McConnell (2010b) notes that the Lasswellian-Lindblomian perspective fails to assess the political aspects of policy, which is outside this perspective's scope.

With regard to evaluating crisis management, McConnell (2011) details methodological issues, including standards, interests, scope and outcomes, which are the same context of the contextual and substantive issues of humanitarian evaluation (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). He argues that the issue between fact and value in crisis management success is the same as in policy analysis, and the question about who profits may also be problematic for evaluators because it involves assessing both the benefits of winners and the losses of losers in crisis initiatives. In addition, evaluation may be needed to weigh up the priorities for determining the scope of multiple contexts from the strategic level or political systems to the operational level or practices of crises responses as well as considering if the time periods involved are short, medium and long-terms outcomes. Furthermore, goals can't be easily identified in the middle of the execution of crisis management, and assessing outcomes may also be problematic due to poor information, the complexity of outcomes and unexpected impacts of crisis management. Therefore, McConnell's framework also helps make the gap of current humanitarian evaluation framework smaller, by combining both fact and perception in the notion of success and failure and by incorporating legitimacy, objectives and outcomes, policy goals and instruments, and policy domain criteria into his evaluation standards (McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed what public studies tell us about evaluation and the specific problems of the current frameworks for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance and also how to evaluate humanitarian aid policy so as to deal systematically with different aspects of humanitarian response. In order to mitigate these problems of evaluation, this thesis applies McConnell's theory as the framework for the assessment of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which has already been measured by the DAC-OECD criteria, an orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation. McConnell's approach will alleviate the general issues of policy analysis and the specific difficulties of humanitarian evaluation because it combines the quantitative method of the rational approach and the qualitative method of the argumentative approach. McConnell's approach may thus be a good alternative to the DAC-OECD criteria and the International Red Cross Code of Conduct for conducting humanitarian evaluation. In addition, his theory includes the revisionist approach by identifying political aspects of policy as well as by employing three different dimensions of policy, which is the main failing of the DAC-OECD standards and the rights approach. Furthermore, his approach provides a continuum from success to failure and detailed evaluation criteria so that evaluators can easily clarify the levels of success and/or failure of policy or programme, which makes up for the flaws of the peer review and the social audit of humanitarian evaluation initiatives. Therefore, McConnell's approach will fill the gap left by current approaches to the evaluation of humanitarian aid, especially the DAC-OECD criteria.

Chapter 3 – Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The prior chapter reviewed the literature on policy analysis, humanitarian evaluation and McConnell's theory, by focusing on the analysis of the arguments of evaluation approaches, the strengths and weaknesses of various initiatives for humanitarian evaluation and a new theory for evaluation. This chapter now presents a more detailed explanation of the methodology used in this study. Through the methodology presented here, this thesis examines a new framework for the evaluation of humanitarian aid by broadening the scope of evaluation, and determining the degrees of success and/or failure in different dimensions of policy or project. This thesis intends to elaborate an alternative approach for humanitarian evaluation by applying McConnell's approach to the case of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which has already been measured with the widely used framework of the DAC-OECD criteria, a current orthodoxy of the humanitarian sector.

This chapter firstly explains McConnell's framework as a useful theory for humanitarian evaluation and then talks about the three different realms of policy, the identification of success, failure and its criteria and five degrees of success or failure. Secondly, it explores the meaning and types of mixed methods employed in this study and states a brief overview of each methodology used here. Finally, it shows the justification of these research methodologies.

3.2 Evaluation framework

Applying McConnell's theory as a lens for evaluating humanitarian aid may afford an explanation for success and failure among three different domains of policy, by combining fact and interpretation in the definition of success and failure and by providing assessment criteria for each domain. Also, a continuum of the five-levels of classification allows us to distinguish success, failure and in-between. The extent to which his theory accounts for what happens in an emergency response can foster elucidation of what are the causes of success or failure of the policy. In relation to this case study, McConnell's theory (2010b) for general policy evaluation is mainly applied because Korea's response was more one of foreign policy, even though it was closely related to humanitarian aid, and a general policy success framework may thus be more suitable to this case than a framework for crisis management evaluation.

To reveal the success and/or failure of different realms of policy as well as to account for some conspicuous characteristics and dynamics of policy through the relationship between these realms, McConnell (2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011) suggests three different realms of policy: process, program and politics. Process attracts the most interest within different aspects of policy analysis, crisis management and humanitarian aid, and involves agenda setting, weighing of alternatives and decision-making considering the advantages and disadvantages of different solutions based on their principles, systems, legal frameworks and procedures. Program is related to process but analytically distinguished because process is principally policy-making but decision is chiefly implementation. Program incorporates both the operational level, determining initial assessment, selection of operation sites and relief

activities by public officials, managers and team leaders; and the strategic level, determining whether to assist other countries affected by disasters or crises as well as what will be the amount of humanitarian relief as decided by political elites and senior officials. The sphere of politics is gaining increasing attention in the field of crisis management (McConnnell, 2011), and the argumentative approach criticises the poor recognition of the political aspects by traditional evaluation approaches (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). In this study, politics is noted as being very relevant to humanitarian aid policy, due to its capacity to respond to overseas emergencies, the values it attempts to foster, and the direction of government it seeks to sustain.

A pragmatic combination of facts relating to achievement of objects and outcomes, and interpretation relating to the issue of success for whom, regarding the notion of policy success is proposed by McConnell (2010b, p. 351); "A policy is successful if it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts no criticism of any significance and/or support is virtually universal". This definition provides several useful benefits in evaluating humanitarian aid policy, ranging from the identification of goal achievement in each of its three dimensions of policy to the accommodation of the issue of success for whom by using a constitutional and practical recognition and by combining both the objective aspects of goal achievement and subjective aspects of success. Failure is the exact opposite of success and McConnell (2010b, p. 356) thus notes that "A policy fails if it does not achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent".

McConnell (2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011) clarifies a set of standards for evaluating success and failure within the process, program and political realms of project as well as

providing a useful measure of an assessment. With regard to process success, the first

standard is preserving policy goals and instruments, for example, a successful process of

policy which can easily reach its goal. Process success also needs to ensure policy legitimacy

by following constitutional or quasi-constitutional procedures. Furthermore, process success

also calls for building a sustainable coalition that is apt to cause a programme's success.

Considering the criteria for program success, the first criterion is meeting objectives, such as

life-saving, disaster response and humanitarian relief for the population affected by disasters

or emergencies. A related but additional measure is producing desired outcomes, which are

mainly applied to a target group, such as the number of people rescued and the number of

patients treated in disaster operations, and thus can be recognised as different from policy

objectives. Furthermore, successful programs call for meeting policy domain criteria which

are widely accepted by its community of actors in each policy sector, for instance, INSARAG

Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2012b) and WHO-PAHO Guidelines (WHO & PAHO, 2003) in

emergency responses. In view of the political criteria of success, one criterion is controlling

the policy agenda and easing the business of governing. Another measure is sustaining the

broad values and direction of government. Finally, political success means that opposition to

political benefits for government is virtually non-existent.

In relation to this, McConnell argues that a systematic classification can afford the

categorisation of "different types of outcomes with broadly shared characteristics"

(McConnnell, 2011, p. 71) and thus proposes a spectrum of five levels: success, durable

success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure, to discriminate success, failure

and stages in-between. Figure 3.1 shows the continuum of five degrees of success or failure.

Placing a crisis response in any of these categories requires judgement in weighing up

multiple outcomes and interpretation because policy analysis is not an exact science (Fischer,

1998; Landsbergen & Bozeman, 1987; Majone, 1989; McConnnell, 2011). This is well presented in the argument of Wildavsky (1979, p. 3), "policy analysis presumes creativity, a subject on which much is written but little is known".

| Success			Failure
↑	↑	↑	
Durable Success	Conflicted Success	Precarious Success	
(successes outweigh failures)	(successes and failures fairly equally balanced)	(failures outweigh successes)	

Figure 3.1 The crisis management success/failure spectrum (McConnnell, 2011, p. 71).

In the continuum, outright success assumes the full achievement of policy goals but may also involve cases which have very minor failures in preserving goals. Durable success is the second best result but is one stage closer to failure in the continuum. Though it has some failings, flaws and opposition, a project is successful enough to be durable because it can deal with criticism and can maintain the achievement of what was expected. Conflicted success further moves in the direction of the failure end of the continuum because it falls short of what was to be accomplished and thus accomplishment and failure are on an equal footing because there are considerable time delays, great target shortfalls and communication failure (McConnell, 2010b). Precarious success moves towards the edge of failure. Even though policies or crisis initiatives achieve a minor good result, defects and criticism overwhelm a small amount of support. Outright failure involves the cases of very minor successes "in terms of meeting goals and benefiting target groups that are, nevertheless, overwhelmed by pathologies (McConnell, 2010a, p. 62).

3.3 Research design

The prior section looked at McConnell's theory as the framework for the case of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and this has in turn led to the exploration of the method because it is used in this study. For exploring a new theory for humanitarian evaluation, this study proposed the following research question:

To what extent can Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake be described as successful?

In order to answer this question, this study adopted a mixed methods design to foster the accuracy of data, to further investigate the degree of success or failure of policy by incorporating information from quantitative and qualitative sources, to avoid biases intrinsic to single-method research by compensating with other methods and to evolve the analyses, and findings by using different sets of sources or methods (Denscombe, 2008). A mixed methods research design such as the combination of quantitative methods and qualitative methods, can bring the best results (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). In view of this perspective, the study employed quantitative and qualitative data drawn from a carefully selected range of sources as follows: a comprehensive document review relevant to humanitarian aid and the Haitian response; focus group interviews of experts in rescue team and medical team; key informant interviews with the staff of Korean, Haitian and other countries' governments and international organizations; and an online survey.

In the social sciences, quantitative research relates to empirical methods, such as the collection of empirical data including online questionnaires and is initiated by philosophical

positivism. Koido et al. (2000), for example, employed quantitative methods such as the total treatment of patients, in order to assess the response of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) to the 1999 Taiwan earthquake. Qualitative research, on the other hand, seeks an in-depth interpretation of human behaviour and the perceptions of individual interests, and Oliver (2008) applied a qualitative research design in her thesis on the influence of evaluation in an international NGO of the humanitarian aid field. The most general method used in the qualitative approach is to interview people especially focus groups and key informants. The focus group interview entails a moderator assisting a small group discussion among selected individuals on a specific theme and this method was applied in this study to get a clear insight into the rescue and medical teams' motivations and practices in the Haiti response. A mixed methods approach may be useful to evaluate humanitarian aid because it may help obtain a comprehensive understanding of hidden motivations, to provide a more diverse perspective and to collect more specific information and many researches have thus used this method. Tremblay (2010), for example, used a mixed methods approach and involved aid community efforts so as to foster quality management and coordination practices for future humanitarian responses to disasters or crises, and Bhattacharjee and Lossio (2011) also employed both quantitative and qualitative data collection from a selected range of document reviews, surveys and interviews.

The first data source used in this thesis is a comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, reports and data on the Haiti response, as well as Korea's policies and legal framework related to humanitarian action, in order to comprehend the architecture of the overall response system of Korea and to explore operations and activities of the Korea Disaster Relief (KDR) teams. Also, to measure the achievements of the KDR

teams, the study identified various quantitative sources, such as the number of patients treated and the number of people rescued from the disaster area.

Keeping in consideration that qualitative methods can involve project participant perceptions of outcome, including the perspectives of local, field staff and organization or government workers (Bolton et al., 2007), the second source of data is focus group interviews and key informant interviews with those who were involved in the humanitarian operation, namely domestic personnel and international personnel, which were conducted between 23 July and 15 September, 2011. The interviewees offered insight into their own perceptions and experience of how successful the entire response to the Haiti earthquake was and also how successful their own involvement was, and the interviews examined both the perspectives of those who conducted the response activities and the perceptions of those who were in charge of the missions of each agency. The informants were selected on the basis of discussions with the two coordinators of the National 119 Rescue Services (NRS) and the National Medical Center (NMC). There is the possibility that a number of people have been excluded, but the design, to prevent this restraint, has used a method where the two coordinators, one from the NRS, and one from the NMC, reviewed the sets of respondents with consideration to their professional standing as well as years of experience. The interviewees were asked to talk freely of their opinions and experiences, even related to other disaster relief activities for a comprehensive consideration of overseas emergency responses. In addition, there were key informant interviews with a range of stakeholders including relevant Korean agencies, the Haitian government and other governments, UN agencies, NGOs and international organisations. Interviewees included managers and/or staff of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), KOICA, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) of Korea, NRS, Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), Korea Foundation for

International Healthcare (KOFIH), NMC; the Haitian government and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JAICA) in Haiti; UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, World Vision, and Good Neighbors in Haiti. Interview times ranged from 30 minutes to 60 minutes, and most were conducted in Korean and English which did not present any problem because the researcher's maternal language is Korean and he can also use English fluently. All of the interviews were conducted in compliance with an ethical review developed for this project and approved by the Seoul National University in 2011. All data and materials used in this thesis were again approved by Humanities Low Risk Subcommittee, The University of Sydney in July, 2013. A protocol for two focus group interviews, namely search and rescue staff and medical staff, and two sets of questionnaires, one for the investigation of the strategic aspects of Korea's overseas emergency response and the other for the analysis of the perspective of the officials of the Haitian government, the staff of international organizations and NGOs in Haiti.

The third method used in this research was an internet survey to examine the requirements of fostering a medical workforce for emergency relief, and its questionnaire is attached as Appendix Ⅱ. The survey was conducted by the evaluation team in 2011 for investigating the perceptions and motivations of overseas emergency relief activities. The research which consisted of a total number of 180 online surveys was responded by the members of the Korea Academy of Disaster Medicine, which was mainly composed of emergency medicine physician, and the National Disaster Life Support. The research permitted anonymity which supported the answering of questions with complete honesty. Privacy was not a significant issue in this survey as the analysis on how to foster the workforce of medical staff in humanitarian relief did not ask the responders to give individual or distinguishing information.

A total number of 70 people (38.9%) completed the survey in which 55 were male (78.6%) and 15 were female (21.4%). This group was composed of 41 doctors of emergency medicine (58.6%), 1 doctor of non-emergency medicine (1.4%), 10 nurses (14.24%), 16 emergency medicine technicians (22.8%) and 2 others (2.8%) (KOICA, 2011a).

This research tried to complement a process approach so as to explore the complexity and the unexpected results of humanitarian aid and to foster policy improvement, institutional change and inter-agency partnership. A process approach mainly focuses on the relations in, the context of, and the changes in projects and identifies dynamic, unanticipated and diverse components of humanitarian relief with the help of the different methodologies used (David Mosse, John Farrington, & Rew, 1998). A process approach is actor-oriented and regards evaluation as a learning process and this approach is closely related to ALNAP's efforts in the humanitarian sector (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). ALNAP (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011; Haver, 2011; Patrick, 2011; Rencort et al., 2010) has conducted and issued various evaluation reports about humanitarian relief for the 2010 Haiti earthquake as part of a learning process in the hope of changing the current reality. In consideration of the argument that a combination of approaches is also required to comprehend the overall context and the policy and institutional circumstances (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Suhrke, 1999), a participatory approach was also tried to identify the objectives, practices and results of policies involving all the relevant perspectives of stakeholders, for example, organisations, actors and groups which affect or are affected by the policy. The approach usually involves local interests, perceptions and interpretations and avoids donor-oriented and one-sided evaluation by bringing in these local perspectives. A participatory approach often identifies the goals, processes, outcomes and results in all stakeholder participation, including donors, recipients and other actors involved in the humanitarian project (Desai & Potter, 2006; Frerks &

Hilhorst, 2002). In consideration of this argument, this research employed a participatory approach to incorporate the beneficiaries' opinions and interests and to further investigate any negative or unexpected impacts of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

In keeping with this, the study interviewed Haitians who lived in the emergency accommodation camps in order to understand, in their own words, the greatest needs of Haitians affected by the earthquake during the acute phase, particularly in the area of search and rescue and emergency medical services. Given the difficulty of tracking and evaluating the direct beneficiaries of the services provided by the KDR teams, informants were expanded to include those who were not direct beneficiaries. Haitians who were affected either directly or indirectly by the earthquake and who resided in the camps for internally displaced persons in Port-au-Prince were included in the study. This was a qualitative study based on open-ended semi-structured interviews that lasted 30 minutes to one hour. Informants were identified using the snowball method and through partner organizations. Informed consent forms were collected before each voluntary interview. No financial compensation was given to informants. A total number of 20 interviews were conducted in the period between August 15-19, 2011, involving 11 women and 9 men. Interviews were conducted in English and Haitian Kreyol with a Haitian interpreter translating in real-time for the interviewer and interviewee. The interviews were simultaneously recorded, transcribed, translated and analysed. Six different camps in Port-au-Prince were visited in the study: Place P'tion, Place Dessalines, Ravine Pintade, ACRA 2 in Juvenat P'tion-ville, PARC ACRA, and ENAF 2.

The theme included in the study regards: the acute phase assistance in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, focusing on the search and rescue and emergency medical services. Most of the informants interviewed in this study expressed deep gratitude to the international community, including the Korean response, for providing search and rescue teams as well as emergency medical services even if they were not direct beneficiaries of such services. It could be inferred from the interview data that Korea needed a more robust delivery system that was able to systematically track the location of the afflicted in a timely manner, and real-time tracking of the delivery and receipt of aid, and that it is important to link up the emergency medical services to the existing medical networks to foster increased collaboration and coordination of care among international responders. Based on the interviews conducted in this study, in terms of the midterm recovery efforts, Haitians were asking for job creation in order to improve their own agency to provide food, water, shelter, housing and education for their households. It was made clear that in both the acute phase assistance and in the recovery and relief efforts, it is imperative that aid organizations deliver sufficient goods and services in an equitable and timely manner.

3.4 Conclusion

This study applies McConnell's theory as an evaluation framework together with a mixed methods research design for the case study of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. McConnell's framework divides policy into three dimensions: process, programme and politics, so as to explain some characteristics and dynamics of policy through the relationships between these dimensions. His framework also provides a set of standards for the evaluation of policy in order to elucidate success and failure, as well as a continuum of

five levels of classification: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure, for distinguishing intermediate levels between success and failure. A mixed methods research design was used in this research because, as Bolton et al. (2007) have explained, a mixed methods design, being the combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology, is necessary for humanitarian evaluation so as to illuminate the complexity of humanitarian action and its context. In addition, this thesis tried to supplement a process approach which regards evaluation as a learning process, and a participatory approach which involves beneficiaries' perceptions and interests for more complete humanitarian evaluation, because it is essential for evaluators to approach in a broad-based way consideration of the overall context of humanitarian crises (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

Chapter 4 – Evaluation of the Process Dimension

4.1 Introduction

Chapter Three identified the methodologies that were used to investigate the research propositions. This and the following two chapters, in turn, report on the outcomes of the data-gathering phase. The data and information are analysed in relation to the overarching research question posed in this thesis:

To what extent can Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake be described as successful?

In order to answer this research question, this thesis analyses the data through the lens of McConnell's (2010b) framework for a general policy evaluation including policy making, practice and politics. The results of this study are presented in three parts: evaluation of the process, programme and political dimensions. Also, the research assesses each of these parts via McConnell's five-fold categorization, namely: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure by employing relevant criteria for each dimension.

This chapter on the process aspect, "the way in which problems are defined, options examined, stakeholders consulted and decisions made" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 40), includes institutional structures, rules and procedures, as well as the cognitive processes of actors. With regard to process success, the first criterion is preserving policy goals and instruments. Process success also requires conferring legitimacy, "through the following of

constitutionally and quasi-constitutionally recognized procedures" (McConnnell, 2011, p. 68).

Moreover, process success also needs building a sustainable coalition.

4.2 Preserving policy goals and instruments

It seems reasonable to suggest that if an outcome of a policy is "the preservation of the broad values and detailed policy instruments" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 41), this may be regarded as a process success. In view of this, Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake was nearly successful because it preserved the goals and instruments of the relevant policies. Taking into account the policy goals and instruments of overseas emergency response, the Korean government provided a total of US$10 million for the Haiti response. The first US$1 million of aid forms the primary focus of this research and was clearly allocated for emergency humanitarian response, including US$800,000 in dispatching relief teams and US$200,000 in delivering relief goods (Jeong & Park, 2010a). Having no consultative capability actively engaged in Haiti, Korea's response was executed to some extent directly in keeping with its existent humanitarian policy structures. The policy represents three methods of assistance: delivery of rapid and effective Korean humanitarian aid, enhancement of the capacity of affected countries to prepare for and respond to disasters or emergencies, and assistance to major agents of international humanitarian assistance. The purposes, principles and types of overseas emergency response of the Korean government are plainly stated in the Overseas Emergency Relief Act and its Presidential Decree (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2007) (hereafter, the Act). Article 1 and 4 of the Act states that it seeks "to contribute to providing rapid rescue and relief to disaster-affected countries when overseas disasters occur", for example, dispatching relief teams, providing relief supplies and supporting interim

recovery from disasters, based on humanitarianism (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2007). Considering the international and economic status of Korea, its aid should be carried out "in close cooperation with affected countries or international organizations, upon request from the affected countries", including search and rescue and health care activities, support for transportation and other matters prescribed by Article 4 and 5 of the Act's Presidential Decree (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2007). In addition, the scale and manner of aid are considered by the damage scale and internal response capacity of the countries affected by disasters or crises and Korean government's capable fund and accessibility. Following the architecture of Korea's overseas emergency response, the KDR teams have been dispatched many times, for example, to Myanmar after the cyclone and to China after the earthquake in 2008, to Indonesia after the 2009 earthquake, to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and to Japan after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, by the cooperation of relevant ministries and agencies: the MOFAT controls the overall relief effort; the Ministry of Defence (MOD) supports rapid transport of personnel or supplies by military aircrafts on request; the MOHW selects and trains medical teams and provides medical supplies; the NEMA and the NRS maintain and train a deployment-ready rescue team and related equipment; and the KOICA prepares and manages supplies and provides support through its offices in the affected country (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). Therefore, Korea's response to the Haiti earthquake preserved the policy aims and measures through the dispatch of the KDR teams and the supply of relief goods to the Haiti, but it was not perfect response when giving consideration to Haiti's scale of loss in all areas affected by the disaster in its entity.

Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake could not have avoided the problem of information constraint, and its response was thus not completely relevant to the situation in

Haiti, even though the response attributed to some extent to Haiti's recovery, which was attested to Juan Alonso, an advisor of the WHO/PAHO, when interviewed: "I well know the dispatch of the KDR team in Haiti and highly praise its activities". Louis Lery, like many other informants interviewed, credited the international community in general for providing assistance:

> Right after the earthquake, when we had all kinds of problems in Haiti, the international community came to help us in what we couldn't provide ourselves and that met many of our needs…it was more than success for me. Even if, myself, didn't receive many things, others who were in the same situation received great relief. (Louis Lery)

Though information management and needs assessment are important to emergency response (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011), the Korean government did not only spread out a suitable information management team but also was effective in a rapid assessment of the initial damage and impact in the earthquake-affected area. As an entirely supply-oriented approach, in lieu of a needs-based approach to humanitarian aid, was used in the response, Korea's response did not much satisfy the demands of the field. The KDR did not appropriately collect information relating to casualties and physical damage at the acute phase of the Haiti earthquake and actual local needs were also not reflected due to the practical problems such as "the available budget, the accessibility to the affected areas and the local situation" (KOICA, 2011a, p. 351). Moreover, the implementation of prioritizing the demands from the field was lacking when considering the vulnerabilities and gaps in relief in the country or area affected by the disaster. These deficiencies caused many problems at various levels, such as the delay of departure and arrival of the KDR teams and the issues of transit of goods and support for the staff deployed. According to the report of the KOFIH (2010), there was general dissatisfaction among medical personnel who participated in the operation of the Haiti response, especially in the items such as: size and constitution

of medical team; preparedness of medicine and medical supplies; and preparedness of medical equipments. Information-gathering was also not sufficient and failed to fully reflect on-site conditions because it depended on formal diplomatic lines of information, information from international organizations and the mass media. Thus, the Korean government had difficulty in determining measures to support the humanitarian needs of the Haitians affected by the disaster with regard to the on-site circumstances. As a result, the Korean government nearly failed to collect essential information, such as the death and injury toll and the number of displaced people, in the early stage of the earthquake. This kind of information should have been rapidly and adequately provided for decision-making and action preparedness, but the information that was gathered was not well organized and did not truly reflect the context of the Haiti earthquake. There were some good examples in reference to information management in response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) as a rapid response management team made up of disaster relief specialists, who conduct assessments, identify and prioritize needs, manage on-site relief activities, report on the situation, recommend response actions, and coordinate with affected countries and other response organizations in disaster fields (USAID, 2011).

Needs assessment in Korea's response was the prioritization in the context of the Haiti earthquake and a better needs assessment would thus have allowed a more suitable response to the disaster in the country affected by the earthquake (KOICA, 2011a). However, Korea's needs assessment was poor in the Haiti earthquake due to the lack of data collection and information management. Having almost no substantial data about Haiti's condition misled the demand analysis for the Haiti field and this caused issues with the structure of medical staff, the packing of medical equipment and the location of the medical office, all of which was pointed out by the focus group interview with the medical staff involved in the Haiti

operations. A weak assessment of the situation of Haiti's crisis brought a delay in the proper response and thus led to the hindrance of the accomplishment of policy goals, for example, resolving the humanitarian crisis of Haiti (KOICA, 2011a). Therefore, the experience of Haiti was pivotal in the development of the Korea's system of overseas emergency relief (OECD, 2012). The Korean government, for example, set up the Plan for the Advancement of Overseas Emergency Relief (MOFAT, 2010) (hereafter, the Plan), in May 2010, which seeks more rapid decision-making and established the target of dispatching a KDR team within 72 hours to a humanitarian crisis. These efforts resulted in Korea achieving a significant response to the Japan earthquake, in March 2011, by deploying an advance team for information collection and needs assessment in the disaster field (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012).

In light of the criterion of preserving policy goals and instruments, the process domain of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake might be described as a durable process success because the Korean government contributed help to a certain extent to Haiti through the dispatch of the KDR teams and the supply of relief goods, though the scale of the relief was not quite relevant in view of the economic status of Korea and the total loss suffered by Haiti in the disaster. In this dimension of Korea's response, the lack of information management as well as the lack of needs assessment caused certain problems, such as the delay of the KDR teams' response and the assistance of the supply-oriented approach, and these problems hindered the contribution of Korea's response to the population affected by the earthquake.

4.3 Conferring Legitimacy

It tends to be a success for government if a policy is formulated by constitutional or quasi-constitutional procedures because the policy can do "what it set out to do, without any significant questions over its right to do so" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 44). In view of legitimacy, including the legal framework, policy papers and various kinds of guidelines, Korea's response to the Haiti disaster is considered in this section. In general the response followed the relevant rules, though the response met many challenges mainly due to the late arrival of the KDR teams in the earthquake struck area of Haiti.

Referring to the large-scale loss of life and property in Haiti caused by an earthquake on January 13, 2010 at 06:53 (January 12, 2010 at 16:53 local time), the Korean government opened the inter-governmental committee on January 14 at 08:50 for determining how to respond the event and decided to provide humanitarian relief worth US$ 1 million, including the dispatch of an emergency rescue team and the assistance of emergency relief goods (MOFAT, 2010). Although the decision was made over 24 hours after the earthquake's occurrence, the effect of the response was hindered by some other problems, such as resource mobilization and transportation issues. It took about 2 days from the occurrence of the disaster for the 1st KDR team led by search and rescue staff to depart, and about 3 more days to arrive in the field after its departure. The 2nd KDR team led by medical staff departed on January 20 and started its activities on January 22, 10 days after the earthquake struck (KOICA, 2011a). The arrival time did not adhere to general principles of humanitarian aid, for example, the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group Guidelines and Methodology (hereafter, INSARAG Guidelines) recommends that search and rescue operations should commence "in the affected country within 48 hours of the posting of the

disaster" on the Virtual On-Site Operational Coordination Centre (OSOCC) (UN OCHA, 2012a, p. 34). UN OCHA has fostered the development of the INSARAG Guidelines so as to result in a coordinated and efficient rescue effort by integrating effectively the operations of international urban search and rescue (hereafter, USAR) (UN OCHA, 2012a). Considering this experience of the late arrival of the KDR teams, the Korean government has developed a new strategy for facilitating the delivery of emergency response to humanitarian crises, in May 2010, for example, the use of military aircraft following the self-reflection on the response to the Haiti earthquake (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012).

The Korean government's humanitarian assistance is grounded in its legislation and policy papers, including a legal framework and major policy decisions. The Framework Act on International Development Cooperation (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 2007) manifests humanitarian aid as an essential component of Korea's development cooperation, and the Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2010), which is a strategic blueprint for the mid-term official development assistance policy, also includes humanitarian action in its development strategy and states that "Korea will contribute to world peace and prosperity by strengthening humanitarian assistance and peace-building efforts in countries affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts" (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012, p. 45). The Act, enacted in March 2007, also gives an extensive legal framework for rapid and efficient inter-governmental and civil response to overseas humanitarian crises. In addition, MOFAT created a division, dedicated to humanitarian aid, in 2007, and established a humanitarian policy framework, Policy Paper on Humanitarian Assistance (MOFAT, 2008), in July 2008. Furthermore, as a United Nations Good Humanitarian Donorship (UN GHD) member since July 2009, Korea focuses on providing assistance to meet the demands of humanitarian aid based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, in line with the UN GHD policy (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012).

In consideration of the above, the features of Korea's system of overseas emergency relief are its legal framework and structure, which relate to the process dimension of McConnell's approach. The Act states the objectives and principles of overseas emergency aid and allows for various ways of relief activity: to spread out an emergency rescue team and a medical support team and to provide relief goods and other in-kind supplies, depending on the intensity of the humanitarian crisis. The Act brought into being an inter-governmental coordination system and the Public-Private Joint Committee on Overseas Emergency Relief, chaired by the Minister of MOFAT and authorized to decide whom, what, how and to what extent aid is provided to deal with the aftermath of large-scale humanitarian crises (MOFAT, 2007). The structure of humanitarian aid response is now formed with MOFAT functioning as a control tower for policies and budget planning and allocation, with a hierarchical and vertical system descending to KOICA. Whereas MOFAT concentrates on policy and strategic planning as well as setting possible conditions in which numerous actors can play a constructive role in utilizing their competitive advantages, KOICA coordinates relief supplies and dispatches specialists as well as selecting and maintaining the necessary workforce and at all times collaborating with relevant agencies, such as NRS, KOFIH, NMC and Seoul National University Hospital (MOFAT, 2013).

In relation to the criterion of conferring legitimacy, the research finds that there is an outright process success in Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, because the process dimension of the response successfully adhered to the legal and institutional procedure. An inter-ministerial committee for discussing how to respond the Haiti earthquake, for example, was held within about 24 hours of the occurrence of the disaster and also decided to dispatch a KDR team led by search and rescue staff and to provide the assistance of relief goods. This thus met the legal procedure of the Act, even though the arrival time of the team in the

disaster field was not suitable to preserve the policy goal of providing rapid rescue and relief to disaster-affected countries, as is described in the Act (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 2007).

4.4 Building a Sustainable Coalition

The success of policy process in involving and considering the interests of relevant actors may bring programme success because a sustainable coalition of support has the tendency to render successful implementation (McConnell, 2010a). In view of this, the cooperation among relevant organizations and the partnership between the public and private sectors for emergency relief are examined in this section. The collaboration between relevant ministries and agencies was successful because of the first combined response of a search and rescue team and a medical team; conversely the partnership between the public and private sectors in the response was weak because of a lack of concrete guidance to cooperate with each other.

In the case of the Haiti earthquake, the cooperation of the related organizations was successful because the Haiti case was the first corporate response, the combination between a search and rescue team and a medical team, through the maintenance of the close relationship among relevant agencies and organizations and lesson learning from past experiences. Based on the Act, MOFAT led the response as a control tower with the cooperation of relevant ministries, for example, NEMA, MOHW and MOD at the strategic level. KOICA also conducted its operations and activities with the help of different agencies, such as NRS, NMC and KOFIH of the operational level (KOICA, 2011a). After the occurrence of the Haiti

earthquake, an inter-ministry emergency meeting was held within 24 hours, including the Prime Minister's Office, MOFAT, MOHW and NEMA, and it decided to dispatch a relief team and supply relief goods in consultation with relevant ministries (KOICA, 2011a).

However, the Korean public-private sector partnership for the response was poor because the division of their roles and the cooperation system between them were unclear or sometimes competitive, which was identified by many informants interviewed from MOFAT, KOICA and the NGOs. There was the absence of prior tuning between governments and NGOs and no connection between the activities of KDR teams and the efforts of NGOs in the Haiti event (KOICA, 2011a). Taking this into account, it may be helpful to Korea's capacity to assist to link short-term relief with long term development to make use of the know-how, experiences and resources of the private sector (KOICA, 2011a). It may thus be necessary to utilise private sector resources to link relief to rehabilitation and development because the issue of connecting short-term relief with long-term recovery is significant in fostering the living conditions and the degree of satisfaction of the population affected by disasters or emergencies. If not so, the overall effectiveness of emergency relief will be restricted (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). To do this, the Japan Platform may be a good example because it aims to combine the efforts of NGOs, the business community, and a government agency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) for a more rapid and effective execution of humanitarian relief with a tripartite cooperation system. The system of the Japan Platform is rooted on equal partnership and takes advantage of the individual sectors' characteristics and resources. The Japan Platform further seeks to proffer financial assistance to the financially frail NGOs of Japan through establishing a fund utilizing the Foreign Ministry's ODA funds as well as requesting donations from the private sector (Japan Platform, 2013). With the above experience and the example of Japan Platform, the Plan, the Korean government's self-

reflection on its response to the Haiti earthquake, looks at establishing a public-private cooperation network for overseas emergency relief and supplying financial and non-financial assistance to emergency relief teams of private organizations. To do this, in 2012, rooted on the Plan, the Korean government chose 8 private organizations based on their capacities and experiences in overseas humanitarian work and plans to supply them with financial assistance so that they can collaborate through discussion with the government in the occurrence of an overseas emergency (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012).

On the third criterion of building a sustainable coalition, the process realm of Korea's response to the Haiti earthquake constitutes a conflicted process success because Korea did not have a close public-private partnership, even though the Korean government managed a significant inter ministry cooperation related to the response. In order to overcome this problem, the Korean government has sought to build a stronger partnership with NGOs in order to respond more rapidly and efficiently to overseas emergencies in accordance with the Plan.

4.5 Conclusion

It seems reasonable to describe the process realm of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake as a durable process success. Korea's response preserved the policy goals of the provision of rapid rescue and relief to the affected country through, for example, the dispatch of rescue team and medical team and the supply of relief goods. In consideration of these, the Korean government deployed the 1st and 2nd KDR teams and supplied relief goods to the Haitians affected by the earthquake. In addition, Korea's response adhered to the legal and institutional procedures, such as the Act (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2007) and

the Policy Paper in Humanitarian Aid (MOFAT, 2008) when the government decided on the

response and dispatched the KDR teams to the Haiti. However, the measures of the response

were not sufficient in consideration of the total loss from the Haiti earthquake.

Chapter 5 - Evaluation of the Program Dimension

5.1 Introduction

The program dimension of policy is about what governments do with public personnel, public expenditure and tools of government, in this paper, for example, the mobilization of KDR teams including search and rescue team and medical support team, a mechanism to manage and support KDR teams, and includes relationships with the Haitian government, UN OCHA, clusters and other humanitarian actors. The measures of program assessment are also many, and the same qualifications apply in terms of mutual exclusiveness and potential for conflict between them (McConnell, 2010a). The first measure of program assessment is meeting objectives, encapsulating the bureaucratic objectives of execution, as well specific program objectives. A related but additional criterion is producing desired outcomes. Objectives and outcomes might overlap, but the outcome is more focused on a target group. Furthermore, meeting policy domain criteria is a measurement. Even though not all policy sectors have values that are greatly accepted by its community of actors, such values are instruments of assessment in that policy realm (McConnell, 2010a).

5.2 Meeting Objectives

On the basis of meeting objectives, if "governments did what they set out to do" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 47), a policy can be alleged to be successful. The implementation of the objectives , such as to save lives and to respond immediate needs, was limited by the lack of leadership

and coordination, resource mobilization and transportation. The communication and coordination between rescue, medical and support units were poor due to the absence of an accurate command and control system and organizational standards, the lack of coordination of operational direction between the participated agencies, and the problem of mechanism to manage and support the KDR teams (Hong, 2010). Especially, KOICA (2011a) critically pointed out that the absence of an accurate command and control system and an organization standard disturbed the communication between the rescue and the medical and the support units of the KDR team and hindered their field operations.

The rapid mobilization and transportation of the KDR teams' personnel and equipment had a significant setback due to the usage of a commercial airline and its regulation of baggage claim. Specifically, the 2nd KDR team bought medical supplies and goods in Dominica for establishing a clinic and thus started medical treatment on January 23, one day later than expected (Ahn, Hong, Lee, Ahn, & Kim, 2010). Korea did not perform well in terms of the rapid deployment of medical team due to the recruitment of civil volunteers, which caused an asymmetry of the numbers of nurses and doctors in the team and there was also the problem of the lack of education and training which is essential for relief staff, who could meet various emergency relief services and deal with relief work. According to many experts interviewed in the medical section, it was difficult for the Korean government to mobilize medical staff because a staff member's participation on a medical team for overseas emergency relief is not mandatory and this has often resulted in a lack of scale and structural flexibility in the medical teams of the KDR (KOICA, 2011a).

Even though the response was the first corporate action between a rescue team and a medical team in overseas emergency relief operations and the overall structure thus enhanced the

capability of the KDR teams, the teams faced a major challenge in getting the right balance of numbers and quality, skills and expertise (KOICA, 2011a). The KDR teams were composed of several distinct entities including the search and rescue unit of the NRS, the medical support unit of the KOFIH and the NMC, and support unit of the KOICA. In response to the Haiti earthquake, the overall structure of the KDR teams was appropriate to the policy objectives of providing rapid life rescue and relief to Haitians directly affected by the earthquake. The 1st KDR team was led by the rescue unit to provide life-saving response and the 2nd KDR team led by the medical unit to foster medical services to the affected population, and this is detailed in Table 4.1 below.

Table 5.1 Structures of the 1st KDR versus 2nd KDR

KDR team		1st	2nd
Period		2010.01.15-25	2010.01.20-30
Staff	Rescue	25	4
	Medical	7	18
	Support	2	2
	Others	7	16
Total		41	40

(Source: adapted from the NEMA(2010) and the KOFIH(2010))

However, the Korean government deployed only 25 rescue specialists in the 1st KDR team and the team lacked sufficient personnel with regard to the INSARAG Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2012b, p. 34), which recommends a rescue team "must be adequately staffed to allow for 24 hours operations at 2 separate sites for up to 10 days". With regard to the medical team, the number of nurses and assistance staff was not sufficient to meet the required doctor/assistance ratio, which was confirmed in the focus group interview with medical staff, who served in the Haiti earthquake, as well as the report of the KOFIH (2010). Table 5.2 compares and contrasts the structure of the 1st and 2nd medical teams of the KDR in the Haiti

response and the JDR medical team in the manual of the JAICA (Kawahara, 2011), so as to point out the ratio difference between doctor and nurse or support staff.

Table 5.2 Comparison the structures of the medical teams among the 1st and 2nd KDR and the JDR

	1st	2nd	JDR
Total	7	18	22 (21)
Team leader		1	1
Doctor	3	8	4 (3)
Nurse	3	5	6 (7)
Pharmacist		2	1
Medical support			4
Logistic	1	2	5

(Source: adapted from the KOFIH(2010) and the Kawahara(2011))

The absence of a highly experienced senior manager in the Haiti operations also made the activities of the 1st KDR team problematic. If the Korean government had made decisions early on regarding the management capacity needed to deploy in Haiti, it would have been possible for it to deploy a senior leader. Even if the government could not find someone for a long dispatch, there was no reason why one of its senior directors from MOFAT or KOICA could not have been dispatched for some weeks in the early phase. The Haiti case clearly demanded being dealt with by strong command and control, not by consensual decision-making, which was evidenced by many informants interviewed in the focus group of the search and rescue staff who participated in the Haiti operation. A specialist of the NRS who was interviewed stated that "the 1st KDR team did not well cooperate the UN OCHA and its various cluster meetings. This has mainly caused by the absence of an experienced senior director who could deal with the cooperation between the KDR team and the affected country

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or the UN". In addition, in consideration of the corporate response, many participant agencies had a recognized rule that the KDR's priorities prevail over the preferences of individual agencies (Hong, 2010). The failure of deploying a senior and experienced coordinator to Haiti rendered a leadership gap and resulted in a lack of coordination within the KDR team, which led to a vacuum in leadership and ultimately affected the KDR teams' ability to perform their objectives effectively.

With reference to the first criterion of meeting objectives, the research finds that there was only a precarious program success due to the problems of leadership and coordination, the mobilization of medical staff and the transportation of KDR teams. The KDR teams achieved no saving of lives, only some corpse collection from their search and rescue activities, and principally treated chronic diseases, not patients injured directly by the earthquake. Though it was the first corporate response to overseas emergencies, the response nearly did not meet the objectives of saving lives and responding to immediate needs because of the problems, mentioned above.

5.3 Producing Desired Outcomes

In the perspective of outcomes, such as the number of people rescued and the sum total of medical treatment, the Korean government did not get many desired outcomes in response to the Haiti earthquake mainly due to the time lag of initial response. The 1st KDR team, led by the search and rescue staff, failed to deploy in Haiti within 48 hours of the occurrence of the earthquake as recommended by the INSARAG Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2012b), and this resulted in no saving of lives, only the collection of 33 of corpse at the site of the earthquake

(NEMA, 2010). In relation to this, Table 5.3 has a significant implication for search and rescue operations to perform life rescue work.

Table 5.3 Status of people rescued by USAR teams in the Haiti earthquake

Country	Arrival day after the earthquake	Scale of USAR team	Rescued people	Total of rescued people
U.S.A.	1	75	10	25
France	1	73	8	
Island	1	36	3	
Panama	1	22	3	
Spain	1	17	1	
Colombia	1	33	0	
Turkey	2	9	5	10
U.K.	2	64	3	
Peru	2	9	2	
Republic of Dominica	2	12	0	
China	2	50	0	
Russia	3	44	4	7
Netherland	3	63	3	
Germany	3	22	0	
Poland	3	56	0	
Republic of Korea	5	25	0	0
Italy	5	5	0	

(Source: adapted from www.unocha.org January 18, 2010 at 06:00)

The 1st KDR arrived in the field on July 17 at 16:30 (local time) 5 days after the occurrence of the earthquake on January 12 at 16:53 because it took about 2 days for the departure and about 3 days in transit, and this also did not meet the essential requirements for emergency medical care during the first 48 hours (WHO & PAHO, 2003). The 2nd KDR of 18 staff members, led by medical support unit, departed on January 20 and started to perform medical services on January 22, which was 10 days after the occurrence of the earthquake. The 2nd KDR treated a total of 1,326 patients during its operation, and the main treatments were for

chronic diseases like cold, stomach pain, genital itching, vaginal discharge and headache, and did not take care of critically injured patients (KOFIH, 2010).

The dispatched KDR teams experienced the lack of support staff in the field, which seriously undermined the KDR teams' capacity to respond to the disaster and this was identified in the focus group interviews with the rescue and medical staff who operated in the Haiti earthquake. The consequence of this was a serious hindrance to the KDR teams' effective functioning and included problems such as: staff received insufficient support from the Korean government; rescue and medical staff had to resolve the problems of dining and residence by themselves and had to do the various tasks of equipment check-up and medicine classification after relief work themselves; also, there was no adequate facilities of billets, sanitation and shower (Ahn et al., 2010). Logistics was also confirmed in the focus group interviews as an area of weakness both in terms of accommodation for the KDR teams to stay and of support when considering the availability of personal deployment kits including camping and survival gear. The rescue and medical staff of the KDR teams had to spend a substantial amount of time on routine administration and housekeeping tasks, leaving little time for providing programmatic operations to save lives and treat patients (Ahn et al., 2010). Logistics for humanitarian response is a complicated mission seeking for the mobilization and deployment of the necessary resources to foster an effective response for the population affected by disasters or crises. The well-timed and safe supply of material and equipment to the crisis area is thus one of the most critical elements of the success of any emergency response operation (UNDP, 2009).

Following the Report of the Dispatch of the KDR Medical Team to the Haiti Earthquake (KOFIH, 2010), the 18 respondents of the total of 25 medical staff members of the KDR team were asked to what degree were they satisfied with their activities in Haiti. They were asked to rate a range of items on a five point scale (1='not at all satisfied', 2='not very satisfied', 3='somewhat satisfied', 4='very satisfied', 5='extremely satisfied'). Packing and transportation of medical supplies (2.4), preparedness of medical supplies and equipment (2.8) and scale and structure of medical team (3) were very low in satisfaction of the respondents. In addition, the overall condition including safety and security (3.4) and the selection of operation area (3.4) were also relatively low in satisfaction. In relation to this point, Koido et al. (2000) suggested that the choice of the site for medical operations has a big influence on the outcome of the relief activities as seen in the experiences of the JDR in the 1999 Taiwan earthquake. Based on the assessment of the degree of satisfaction of participants in the Haiti operation, the KOFIH (2010) thus proposed the sufficient field support, including greater preparedness, the establishment of effective communication between headquarter and the field, the improvement of transportation and the participation of chefs in order to facilitate the highest capacity of the KDR team in emergency response operations.

Furthermore, the members of the KDR team were sent to the field without sufficient information and deployed without and terms of reference or job description (KOFIH, 2010). Some of these problems were identified in the focus group interviews, such as: location and scale of casualties; information dealing the local architectural style and collapsed building; local health capacity such as medical personnel, facilities and equipments; state of local government to respond to the Haiti earthquake and the major contact point in Haiti. In view of the induction and briefing of staff, the KDR teams did not manage well this in the Haiti response, which had been built in MOFAT's Strategic Framework for Overseas Emergency

Relief, issued in 2008, and the KOICA's SOP of Overseas Emergency Relief, issued in 2006. However, an attempt to solve some of the problems mentioned above has been made by the Korean government after the response. A stockpile of the medical and rescue equipment and the recruitment of chefs has been set up by the Plan, which is the self-reflection on the response to the Haiti earthquake (NEMA, 2011b). UN OCHA has further recommended to the KDR that having an effective underpinning legislation and policy, it is important that all the entities that compose the KDR are well integrated and have processes that standardise procedures for internal information sharing and coordination in order to effectively engage these entities. The different practices of these entities should also be synchronized in areas such as administrative preparations, training, and implementation of standard operational procedures (NEMA, 2011a).

In the light of the criterion of producing desired outcomes, the programme domain of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake may be described as a precarious programme success because of the smaller number of lives saved and medical services performed than anticipated. Though the KDR did contribute to the Haiti response through its rescue and medical activities, it resulted in only 33 corpses being collected and mostly treated chronic diseases not patients injured by the earthquake. This was mainly caused by the time lag of initial response, the human composition of the KDR teams and the lack of support for the staff deployed in the field.

5.4 Meeting Policy Domain Criteria

Even though not all policy sectors have values that are greatly accepted by its community of actors, such values may serve an important role as standards or benchmarks and thus build "indicators of success in that policy domain" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 48). In the humanitarian response sector, for example, INSARAG Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2012a) provides guidance for the deployment of USAR teams for international disaster response operations in major disasters, and WHO-PAHO Guidelines (WHO & PAHO, 2003) clarifies the timing of the supply of initial emergency medical care and also outlines essential requirements for field hospitals used for emergency medical services in natural or complex disasters.

The 1st KDR team, led by search and rescue specialists, arrived in the field about five days after the occurrence of the earthquake, even though the INSARAG Guidelines recommends that USAR teams "should be operated in the affected country within 48 hours of the posting of the disaster" on the Virtual OSOCC (UN OCHA, 2012a, p. 34). The 2nd KDR team, led by medical staff, arrived in the field about 10 days after the earthquake, and thus treated not acute but chronic disease patients. The WHO/PAHO Guidelines (WHO & PAHO, 2003) identifies that the period of the provision of early emergency medical care lasts only up to 48 hours following the onset of an event. Also, another guideline of WHO-PAHO (2010), which proposes the minimum standards for the use of foreign medical teams in disasters, emphasizes the principles of accountability, quality control, reporting, coordination, demand and needs assessment, logistics and registration, all of which have many implications for humanitarian action.

In addition, the 2nd KDR team had a big problem in handover. When it came to replace the 1st KDR team, the 2nd KDR team could not take over its medical supplies and clinic because the

1st KDR team had donated them to the local hospital of L'Hospital de la Communatute Haitienne without checking whether the 2nd KDR team would be deployed or not (KOICA, 2011a). This caused the problem of buying medical equipment and supplies in Dominica and delayed the start of medical treatment. Operational continuity is very important in rosters meant for post-surge deployment where it is expected that people would be deployed for longer than a few weeks (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). Also, the WHO highlights four core principles for health care equipment donations and drug donations: maximum benefit to the recipient; respect for the wishes and authority of the recipient; no double standards in quality; and effective communication between donor and recipient (WHO, 1999, 2000).

Furthermore, the interaction between the KDR teams and the Haiti government and other humanitarian actors, such as UN OCHA, clusters and other humanitarian organizations was poor and there was no clear guidance on how the KDR teams would relate to them. The OSOCC reception centre, established by a United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) team "when there are major international search and rescue operations to be coordinated" in response to most disasters so as to deal with civil-military coordination (UN OCHA, 2007, p. 12), was set up in the early days of disaster management to provide information to all humanitarian actors, and clusters were also activated within the first three days after the earthquake (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). However, the KDR teams did not have any practical participation in these activities or have close relationships with them (KOICA, 2011a), even though they were perceived as being very useful (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). In addition, many interviewees, including an advisor of the WHO, a director of the Haitian government and a staff of the UN OCHA, pointed out that coordination was a big problem and they could not deal with all of the activities of international relief teams in Haiti because of their huge numbers and varieties (KOICA, 2011a). Bhattacharjee and Lossio

(2011, p. 28) further pointed out that the problem of coordination in the humanitarian sector is unmanageable and almost impossible to solve because it is a general phenomenon that hundreds of agencies come to the field, especially after a quick onset natural disaster, and there is also insufficient guidance on how to manage "non-professional humanitarian organizations, private citizens groups, religious organizations etc., which have little understanding of and commitment to humanitarian coordination". Taking this into account, the INSARAG Guidelines recommends international USAR teams to register the availability of all teams that participate on the virtual OSOCC and to participate in the OSOCC meetings regarding USAR operations so as to foster humanitarian relief in cooperation with relevant organizations (UN OCHA, 2012b).

On the third criterion of meeting policy domain criteria, the programme dimension of Korea's response constitutes an outright programme failure because Korea did not meet the criteria of the INSARAG Guidelines and the WHO-PAHO Guidelines in the dispatch of a search and rescue team and a medical team in the earthquake-stricken area. Though these guidelines highlight that both search and rescue operations and the provision of medical services should be conducted within 48 hours following the onset of disasters, the KDR teams failed to meet the guidelines due to their late arrival in the field affected by the earthquake. They also did not do well in the aspect of handover between the 1st and 2nd KDR teams as well as with cooperation with the Haitian government, UN OCHA and other humanitarian actors in the earthquake struck area, due to the lack of guidance and poor recognition of the international cooperation required, in consideration of the relevant guidelines.

5.5 Conclusion

Regarding the programme dimension of the response, precarious success seems the most appropriate term for taking into account the assessment of one conflicted programme success, one precarious programme successes and one outright programme failure. Though there was some degree of help to Haiti by dispatching the KDR teams, which was the first Korean corporate response as it combined a search and rescue team and a medical team in order to enhance their capacity for emergency relief, the response did not meet many objectives or produce desired outcomes, and failed to meet policy domain criteria. It did not much achieve the objectives of providing rapid rescue and relief for Haitians affected due to the problems with leadership, human resources and mobilization of the KDR teams. In addition, the KDR teams did not much bring about desired outcomes, including life-saving and medical treatment, because of the time lag of initial response and a lack of support from Korea. Furthermore, the response failed to follow the standards of the humanitarian sector, for example, INSARAG and WHO-PAHO Guidelines, due to the late arrival in the disaster field and the problem of handover between the 1st and 2nd KDR teams.

Chapter 6 - Evaluation of the Political Dimension

6.1 Introduction

The political dimension of policy is with reference to "government, its capacity to govern, the values it seeks to promote and so on" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 50). The choices of government including timing of decisions and particular forms of action or inaction take effect on its ability to deal with its political agenda (McConnell, 2010b). In relation to this, crisis events can further form "policy trajectories, governmental agendas … institutional reputations and even the veracity of governing and societal paradigms" (McConnnell, 2011, p. 67). Taking these points into account in the Haiti case, this thesis explores the Plan for the Advancement of Overseas Emergency Relief (MOFAT, 2010) (hereafter the Plan), the significant success of the response to the 2011 Japan earthquake, changes to humanitarian aid budgets, the cooperation with other humanitarian actors, and media coverage.

In terms of evaluating the political dimension of policy, one measure is sustaining the broad values and direction of government. It seems reasonable to say that if policies promote the values coveted by governments and are useful to retain the wide trajectory of government and its programmes, they might be considered successful in the political dimension. Another criterion is controlling the policy agenda and easing the business of governing. Finally, the criteria can be based on the idea that opposition to political benefits for government is virtually non-existent (McConnell, 2010a).

6.2 Sustaining the Broad Values and Direction of Government.

It appears to be possible that if a policy assists the shaping of new values and new pathways, it might be politically successful. In relation to this, McConnell argues that "A variation on this category of sustaining government trajectory relates to the situation where a government explicitly wants to change direction" (2010a, p. 53). Although the Haiti response was far from being a program success, and is in fact considered to be a precarious programme success, the response was nevertheless effective in sustaining the broad values and direction of government. In view of this, this section investigates the Plan, for example, the use of military aircraft, the achievements of the United Nations INSARAG External Classification (UN IEC), the introduction of a field hospital and the utilization of the World Food Program's humanitarian response depots, and the success of the response to the 2011 Japan earthquake.

After reviewing its response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Korea adopted the Plan in May 2010, so as to improve the capacity of the government's response in overseas disaster relief operations. The Plan covers most of the issues raised in the prior chapters of evaluation: faster decision-making by calling an inter-ministry emergency meeting within 24 hours after the occurrence of disasters; quick dispatch of the KDR team by setting up the principle of deploying search and rescue and other relief teams contingent on the possibility of dispatching the team within 72 hours; the increase of leadership and human resources by dispatching MOFAT officers to the field so as to manage response operations and by strengthening the pool of experts (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). Korea also amended the Overseas Emergency Relief Act and its enforcement ordinance (Government of

the Republic of Korea, 2007) (hereafter, the Act) in 2011, and these efforts thus brought about an advanced architecture of overseas emergency relief and an extensive measure for quick response (OECD, 2012).

The lessons learnt from the Haiti response together with the Plan brought a new direction to overseas emergency relief as well as a significant result regarding the 2011Japan earthquake response. In the earthquake of Japan, Korea dispatched a KDR team, led by the search and rescue staff, first of all in foreign relief agencies by transporting the team and relief goods in five C-130 military aircraft (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). An advance team of the KDR consisting of five rescue specialists departed on March 12, 2011 at 12:15 and its main team departed on March 14 at 08:10 and landed at Japan's Narita airport at 10:50. The 107 members of the KDR, including two coordinators of MOFAT, six medical staff members and eight support staff members, provided humanitarian aid, such as search and rescue activities and relief goods supply, to Japan after a magnitude 8.9 earthquake occurred on March 11 at 14:46 (KOICA, 2011a). The efforts of joint simulation exercise for utilizing military aircraft, the enlargement of the Korea Search and Rescue (KOSAR) team and the cooperation of related agencies brought these results (Jin, 2011). The MOFAT led a joint simulation exercise for overseas disaster response in May 2010 in order to resolve the transportation and logistics problems of the Haiti response. The exercise especially focused on the utilization of military aircraft, and the Standard Operational Procedure of Overseas Emergency Response was set up in July 2010 by MOFAT (Jin, 2011). In the future Korea will utilize military aircrafts, in particular, "in crises in 15 Asian countries based on a special manual drafted through consultation across all concerned ministries" (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012, p. 47) so as to foster the efficient transportation of relief goods and

the KDR team. In addition, the KOSAR added 56 personnel of local government firefighters in July 2010 to enlarge its capacity and 44 personnel of them were then deployed in the Japan response (NEMA, 2011b). The Plan and the amendment of the Act have built a solid inter-government cooperation for disaster response based on lessons learned from Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake (OECD, 2012). As a result of the above mentioned efforts, the Korean government response to the 2011 Japan earthquake has become a good exemplar of overseas emergency response because the response was the first case of using military aircraft for the mobilization and demobilization of the KDR staff members, the deployment of an advance team for information collection and needs assessment and dispatching local government firefighters in overseas emergency relief.

However, there is a significant issue of the use regarding military assets in response to humanitarian crises. In response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, twenty-six countries, for example, Canada, the Dominican Republic and the US, utilized military assets, including military aircraft, field hospitals, troops, hospital ships and helicopters (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). From the experience of the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the use of military assets might be important for saving lives in these non-conflict events, and increasingly the military of foreign governments is getting engaged in humanitarian interventions especially after natural disasters (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). In relation to this, Shiras warns that "intended or not, the presence of a large military force, and the political decisions about how to use the force, can easily overwhelm, distort, and work at cross purposes to the achievement of humanitarian objectives" (Collebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraff, 2010, p. 96). The Oslo Guidelines thus recommends that the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) in natural disaster should follow the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality and also emphasizes the

principle of last resort, which requires that "foreign MCDA should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need" (Hallam, 1997, p. 4).

As the Plan states the introduction of mobile clinics and the packing in advance of medical equipment (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012), Korea have equipped with a field hospital which can provide early emergency medical care in disaster fields, and packages of medical equipment to rapidly respond to emergencies (Lee et al., 2012, pp. 341-345). The WHO-PAHO Guidelines (2003, p. 6) identify a field hospital as a "mobile, self-contained, self-sufficient health care facility capable of rapid deployment and expansion or contraction to meet immediate emergency requirements for a specified period of time". It can thus substitute for or complement the medical systems in the disaster fields. Furthermore, the KOICA made a technology agreement with the World Food Programme in April 2012 to utilize the hubs of the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot, which enables Korea to procure rapidly and cost-effectively emergency supplies for distant countries by utilizing five depots: Europe (Brindisi / Italy), Africa (Accra / Ghana), Latin America (Panama City / Panama), South East (Subang / Malaysia), and Middle East (Dubai / UAE) (Lee et al., 2012). To foster the rapid and reliable supply of the large-volume of relief items, reserve supplies must be procured and appropriately stockpiled in advance at locations as strategically spread out as possible to ensure quick supply anywhere in the world.

In view of the first criterion of sustaining the broad values and direction of government, the research finds that there is an outright process success because the accomplishment of the Plan has improved the capacity of Korea in overseas emergency response, which has led to the success of forging new values and new pathways (McConnell, 2010a), and thus caused a

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significant result in response to the 2011 Japan earthquake. Based on the Plan, the self-reflection on the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Korea has enhanced its capacity to perform overseas emergency relief by the expansion of the KOSAR, the use of military aircraft and the set-up of field hospital and overseas warehouses for emergency response.

6.3 Controlling the Policy Agenda and Easing the Business of Governing

Governments often confront difficult situations, such as the limitation of resources at their disposal, and a phase of the business of government thus includes "producing programmes that might arguably leave much to be desired in terms of dealing with policy problems, but help sustain its capacity to govern" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 51). Therefore, a program might be suggested as a political success if it maintains a public impression of managing the issue, such as the formation of a new programme, or the achievement of support from significant actors (McConnell, 2010a). In view of this, this section examines the changes in humanitarian aid budgets, the issue of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and the cooperation with other humanitarian actors, such as NGOs and international organizations.

Taking into account the official humanitarian aid budget, Korea's budget considerably increased from US$ 11 million in 2008 to US$ 26 million in 2012, an increase of more than 230%. It will further increase in the run up to 2015 in order to meet the augmenting demand for humanitarian aid considering the frequent occurrence of big natural disasters as the total official development assistance (ODA) budget is anticipated to grow (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). However, the humanitarian aid budget is only an average of 2.6%

of Korea's total ODA budget and the figure is thus quite lower than the DAC average. To fill

the gap, Korea has committed to expanding the humanitarian budget to 6% of the ODA

budget (OECD, 2012). In relation to this, OECD (2012) further points out the issue of linking

relief to development phases in the peer review of Korea. Though its humanitarian budget

provides multilateral recovery measurements, recovery is not yet a basic component of

Korea's humanitarian programmes, and the lack of LRRD is considerable in the strategy of

its humanitarian assistance. When a big crisis occurs, the issue of LRRD becomes part of the

political agenda (VOICE & CONCORD, 2012). The approach of LRRD emphasizes the

interaction among the triangle of humanitarian aid (short-term), reconstruction/rehabilitation

(midterm) and development cooperation (long-term) in order to promote complementarity

and coherence (Swiss Red Cross, 2010). The VOICE and CONCORD (2012, p. 3)

emphasizes that "LRRD needs sustained political commitment over time, rather than only

when a large disaster hits" and also calls for coordination and interdisciplinary work between

governments and NGOs. Therefore, OECD (2012, p. 92) recommends that Korea should

clarify its role of supporting the recovery phase and lay out "how (or if) it will support the

preparedness and resilience of at-risk communities through the humanitarian budget".

In addition, in response to the Haiti earthquake, KDR's short-term humanitarian relief did not

link well with NGOs and their activities such as World Vision Korea and Good Neighbors

and Task Force Danbi of the Republic of Korea's sixth UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

regarding midterm reconstruction and rehabilitation because there was no clear guidance on

how these actors would connect emergency relief to recovery and development. In relation to

this, an official of Task Force Danbi who was interviewed commented that: "when the short-

term humanitarian relief efforts connect to the midterm reconstruction and rehabilitation, the

efforts will improve the living condition of the affected population and increase the

satisfaction of the recipients". Reconstruction seeks to stabilize food supplies, repair and reconstruct health and education facilities, rebuild economic and social infrastructure, and facilitate industrial rehabilitation over an extended period of time (Park, 2010). Much like other informants interviewed, Souvenise, a Haitian informant, stated that her needs in terms of food, clean water, sanitation, shelter, household items and health care were the same at the time of the interview as they had been in the time acute phase of the earthquake and prioritized having a home, food and education in that order as her greatest needs. The characteristics of humanitarian aid, peacebuilding and reconstruction missions to a large extent make military and civilian actors simultaneously work in the same place. There are many problems in cooperation between military forces and civilian relief organizations, even though there is increasing acceptance of broadening operational needs. The problem, Franke (2006, p. 6) observes, is "the cultural, organizational, and normative differences that hamper coordination between civilian and military actors in the field". Notwithstanding the primary differences in structure and approach between civilian and military actors, there is a possible way to foster effective and meaningful cooperation. It is a careful division of labour grounded on the comparative merits of civilian and military sectors. The military has relative advantages in the ability to provide security, logistic capacity and a strong sense of discipline; on the contrary, humanitarian agencies have advantage in their experience in working together with other civilian actors and knowledge of the region and established relationships with the local community (Franke, 2006; KOICA, 2011a).

In light of partnerships between the public-private sector, Korea has significantly progressed in recent years. With the increasing role of the civilian organizations in overseas disaster relief efforts, the Korean government devised the public-private action plan for humanitarian assistance in December 2011 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, 2013). In

2012, based on the Plan, which is the self-reflection on the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the Korean government has made agreements with eight major NGOs regarding their capacities to assist and their experience in overseas emergency relief so as to work together in response to overseas emergencies (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). This scheme provides an annual envelope of US$ 200,000 for each NGO, which may foster the timeliness and the predictability of the overall Korean response (OECD, 2012). In addition, Korea has upgraded its humanitarian aid to be more need-based and more aligned to global standards in order to make sure of its effectiveness. To foster the effectiveness of humanitarian relief, response should be accomplished promptly and under close relationships with international organizations and the affected countries. Korea is using either international (UN OCHA, IFRC or NGOs) or bilateral (via Korean embassies or KOICA country offices) needs assessments to determine the needs of affected countries (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). Korea has closely cooperated with the UNDAC, an international emergency response system. In November 2011, the Korea National 119 Rescue Services achieved the heavy-class qualification for its overseas disaster relief operations as a certification of the quality management of humanitarian aid (Hilhorst, 2002), which is the highest qualification level accredited by the INSARAG (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012).

In light of another criterion for controlling the policy agenda and easing the business of governing, the political facet is also described as a durable political success because of the increase in the official humanitarian aid budget, the enhancement of the partnership between the public-private sector and the increase in the cooperation with international organizations. The political facet has formed a new programme and also achieved support from significant actors, even though there are minor problems, such as the issues of LRRD and the cooperation between civil and military actors.

6.4 Opposition to Political Benefits for Government is Virtually Non-existent

A crisis management initiative can be politically successful if it wins the public relations war. Therefore, the political success demands the initiative "attract universal or near universal support for the political implications and/no or virtually no opposition" (McConnnell, 2011, p. 70). Considering this, this section mainly explores the media coverage of the Haiti response, focusing on the activities of the KDR and the relationship between the government and the media.

Even though Korea's response to the Haiti earthquake was highlighted by the media covering the activities of the KDR teams, the media sometimes hindered the teams' activities with a burden of supporting their news gathering. The major media outlets of Korea, such as KBS, MBC and YTN, publicized many times the activities of KDR in the earthquake-stricken area (NEMA, 2010). The Haitian media also reported on Korea's assistance to the population, which raised the image of Korea as a donor country (KOICA, 2011a) and most of the local Haitians interviewed by the research team expressed deep gratitude to the international community, including the Korean government. The media are taking an increasingly significant part in reporting humanitarian crises, and the advancement of technology has strengthened the immediacy of their publication (Rotberg & Weiss, 1996). With reference to the relationship between media and international emergency response, Olsen et al. (2003, p. 110) argues that "massive media coverage of a humanitarian crisis will lead to increased allocations of emergency funds, whereby humanitarian needs have a better chance of being met". Furthermore, media coverage of disasters deeply influences both public opinion and the policy-making process and can also play a crucial role in raising resources, as Congress is

pressured to expand its budget on the disaster response (Natsios, 1996). The expansion of real-time communication technology increased the power of the media and the power of media promoted humanitarian concern from the domestic audience and political elites for global events, which is the so-called CNN effect. Many studies have evidenced this effect in humanitarian crises (Robinson, 1999, 2005).

During the dispatch of the KDR teams to Haiti, many Korean media outlets competitively mobilized reporters and vied in covering the scene in order to report a special case to the public. A reporter who had covered the Haiti earthquake and was thus interviewed by the research team, commented that: "Overseas emergency situations are good material for media to find a source for reporting because both emergency assistance agencies and emergency relief staff have a strong demand for public relations". Many reporters wanted to cover activities on site and often competed with each other for exclusive news and this thus placed an increased pressure on the KDR team who needed to support the daily necessities for the reporters in the disaster fields. Therefore, KDR's burden of supporting them increased and the media sometimes hindered the activities of the KDR (KOICA, 2011a). The media of the twenty-first century arrive on the disaster field within hours, and start portraying the situation immediately and thus affect how the world respond to a disaster (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). Both the media and relief agencies have interests that are sometimes in conflict about how to depict to an exact picture of emergencies. Aid organizations' interest lie in presenting vividly the urgent character of and needs engaged in an event; on the contrary, "journalists want their stories to air or appear in print. Therefore, the more sensational the story, the greater its chances for publication" (Shiras, 1996, p. 110). Even so, the significance of the media's role in publicizing overseas crises and its positive effect on organizing an international response to disaster should be recognized (Shiras, 1996). In the Plan (MOFAT,

2010), the deputy director of the assistance unit of the KDR team manages the information of its activities in order to unify external communication. Korea further needs to build a system in which the KDR collaborates with the media so that they are not disturbing its operations and to insure that a public information/media relations officer is deployed on the scene in any emergency as one of the first-priority deployments.

On the third criterion of opposition to political benefits for the government, opposition is virtually non-existent, but this political facet still constitutes a conflicted political success because Korea did not well manage the media, even though KDR's activities received media focus and the praises of media in response to the Haiti earthquake. Korea has to be concerned over collaboration with the media in order to foster a greater humanitarian response, even though the relationship among policy-makers, humanitarian organizations and the media are complicated or chaotic (Rotberg & Weiss, 1996).

6.5 Conclusion

The political dimension of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake seems best captured within the framework of a durable political success. Though it has a conflicted political success related to the media, the politics well maintained new values and a new path by following the Plan, including the utilization of military aircraft and the introduction of a field hospital, the scheme of partnership between the public-private sectors, and the steady increase of humanitarian budget. However, it did not well deal with the relationship between the KDR and the media, and there are some considerable issues regarding LRRD and the cooperation between the civil sectors and the military sectors that need to be addressed to improve overall capacity of Korea in the humanitarian field.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the results presented in chapters Four, Five and Six, which assessed the three dimensions of policy: process, programme and politics, and revisits the arguments set out in this thesis. This thesis aimed to apply McConnell's approach to the case of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, because the DAC-OECD criteria (ALNAP, 2006; DAC-OECD, 1999), the dominant evaluation framework in the humanitarian field, was of limited utility in the evaluation of the case as mentioned Chapter 1. This research has also proposed a research question: To what extent can Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake be described as successful? In seeking an answer to this, the research has explored whether McConnell's theory may fill the gaps left by the current approaches for humanitarian evaluation. This is based on the argument of George and Bennett (2005, p. 74) that single-case studies might be useful "if they pose a "tough test" for theories or identify alternative causal paths to similar outcomes when equifinality is present".

This chapter is structured in the following way. Firstly, the major findings of the result chapters are brought together to better understand the whole picture of the evaluation and themes contained in the chapters are linked to the major literature. Secondly, a discussion of the unexpected findings from the evaluation is presented. Thirdly, the contributions of this thesis are discussed, and the chapter concludes with some suggestions for future study that would further develop McConnell's theory as a model for evaluating humanitarian action.

7.2 Applying McConnell's framework to evaluating humanitarian aid

This thesis has sought to develop an alternative approach to evaluating humanitarian action in order to make the gaps left by the current approaches smaller. The application of McConnell's theory to the case of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake has provided a deeper understanding of the subject than have pre-existing approaches to the evaluation of humanitarian response. Through this case study, McConnell's approach has provided a broader perspective on the evaluation of Korea's response by assessing these three dimensions of the response: process, programme and politics. In particular, the political dimension was relatively better understood and the degree of success or failure of the response was relatively easier to determine than when using the DAC-OECD criteria, currently the mostly widely used framework in the humanitarian sector.

This research has challenged two issues in the recent debate about evaluation. The first has been the general difficulties of policy analysis, whereas the second is the specific problems of evaluating humanitarian action. Each of these issues has its roots in the scientific and positivistic perspective of the traditional approach in policy sciences. The difficulties of policy analysis are: how to incorporate success as a fact, for example, the achievement of objectives and outcomes, and success as perception, such as the issue of success for whom; how to involve political aspect of policy; and how to determine the degree of success or failure of policy (McConnell, 2010a). The problems of evaluating humanitarian assistance are how to assess the operational as well as the strategic aspects of a project and how to evaluate within the various contexts of humanitarian crises (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). To alleviate

these issues, the research has applied McConnell's framework to the Korea case which has already been measured by the standard DAC-OECD framework (KOICA, 2011a).

This research divided Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake into the three realms of process, program and politics for analytical purposes and also for determining the degrees of success and failure within these realms by following McConnell's theory (2010b). In contrast, KOICA (2011a) utilized the three aspects of system, preparedness and response in regard to disaster response processes in its assessment of the same case studied in this research, so as to improve Korea's response ability in light of past experience. This division of the research into process, programme and politics has allowed us to catch some of the characteristics and dynamics of humanitarian response among these divisions (McConnell, 2010b).

In the researcher's experience, McConnell's framework has more benefits than the DAC-OECD criteria do in assessing humanitarian aid. His framework was firstly more successful in assessing the political aspect of the response, based on the argument of the revisionist approach, "policy evaluation is an inherently normative act, a matter of political judgement" (2006, p. 319) than the prior evaluation which employed the dominant framework of the DAC-OECD criteria which is the scientific or positivistic perspective of traditional approach (Bovens et al., 2006; Dunn, 2004; KOICA, 2011a). His framework has also provided working definitions of success and failure, which has a number of analytical benefits for policy or project evaluation. An   important point for analysis is that the definitions involve a fact in view of the rational approach, such as "government meeting its goals" (McConnell, 2010a, p. 39); and recognition, in relation to the argumentative approach, for example, "actors/interests/groups benefiting (McConnell, 2010a, p. 39). In contrast, as a dominant

standard framework for humanitarian evaluation, the DAC-OECD criteria has a set of limitations. One limitation is the failure to take into account the full context of humanitarian crises, because the criteria focus on objective assessment, not on interpretation or interest (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). It also fails to evaluate the interests or perceptions of stakeholders because of the framework's strong division of fact and value (Bovens et al., 2006). Furthermore, the application of McConnell's framework to the Korea's case has made the evaluation of humanitarian aid easier, through the provision of detailed criteria and a continuum from success to failure. When it comes to evaluating humanitarian assistance, the lack of detailed criteria causes the problem of suitability of the criteria for assessing each case, a problem encountered by evaluation teams during the assessment of the same case when employing the orthodox framework, currently the mostly widely accepted framework in humanitarian evaluation. A continuum from success to failure has provided criteria and guidance for determining the degree of success and failure of the response and thus allows us to solve the problem of subjectivity in assessment. Therefore, his framework may be a richer tool for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance, based on the researcher's experience of applying two evaluation frameworks to the same case, Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

In summary, McConnell's theory might be more helpful for us to alleviate the difficulties and complexities of humanitarian evaluation than the current approaches for humanitarian assistance do. By providing the notions of success and failure, his theory incorporates success as both a fact and interpretation. His theory also divides policy or project into three domains, including politics, and thus assesses the overall structure of policy domain. Moreover, a spectrum from success to failure has made it easier to determine various levels of success

among the process, programme and political domains of humanitarian assistance

(McConnnell, 2011)

7.3 Conflicts between different forms of success and/or failure

This thesis has produced various results, across the success-failure continuum, from the

evaluation of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. To do this a judgement was

needed to categorise policies or projects in specific levels of success and/or failure because

"policy outcomes do not always have tidy results" (McConnell, 2010b, p. 357). This is well

presented in the work of Wildavsky (1979, p. 3), "policy analysis is synonymous with

creativity, which may be stimulated by theory and sharpened by practice, which can be

learned but not taught". The results in the thesis differed across the three dimensions: durable

process success, precarious programme success and durable political success. Differences

also occurred within a dimension: for example, outright political success; durable political

success; and conflicted political success. Indeed, these differences are common in policy

analysis in consideration of the argument of McConnell (2010b, p. 357), "Such trade-offs and

tensions are at the heart of the dynamics of public policy". This thesis has identified the

conflict between precarious programme success and durable political success. The adherence

to processes, the resolution of operational problems and the achievement of political success

do not easily go along together in humanitarian aid or crisis management (McConnnell, 2011).

To answer this problem we might think that "political success sometimes necessitates

programs that leave much to be desired in terms of tackling policy problems" (McConnell,

2010b, p. 357). We may also more easily understand this point in consideration of the three

criteria of the political aspect. One criterion is sustaining the broad values and direction of

government. The second criterion is controlling the policy agenda and easing the business of governing. The third is that opposition to political benefits for government is virtually non-existent. In reality, governments often take action to manage symptoms rather than solve the fundamental causes of problems. For governments, attempting to manage the issue and reacting to popular concerns gives them a facade of success, "whether or not the response effectively engages with a wicked problem" (McConnnell, 2011, p. 72).

7.4 Significance of the thesis

This thesis has made three main contributions to current research. First, it has contributed to the development of an alternative to the popular, standard evaluation approach to the humanitarian sector, the DAC-OECD criteria. What this pre-existing approach and others lack is the strategic aspects of humanitarian response and appropriate consideration of the complexity of the humanitarian context. In response, the application of McConnell's framework in this research has made these gaps left by the current framework smaller by including the political aspect of policy and by incorporating success as a fact and success as interpretation in humanitarian evaluation, which might be useful for us to evaluate humanitarian aid. Second, it has offered a substantive evaluation of humanitarian assistance by expanding the scope of evaluation, as well as by using detailed criteria and a continuum from success and failure with the help of McConnell's theory, which may help to solve the problem of subjectivity in evaluation. Third, by employing McConnell's approach, the thesis has developed a distinct alternative analysis of Korea's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake as a case of evaluating humanitarian aid policy.

7.5 Further study

McConnell's framework employed in this thesis seems to provide a useful alternative to the standard DAC-OECD framework for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance. However, his framework necessarily remains open to the insights of the standard and other approaches to humanitarian evaluation. In other words, the framework provides a different view on the evaluation of humanitarian aid, but recognizes that elements of existing approaches also have relevant insights and have made important contributions. Indeed, to understand humanitarian evaluation more clearly, we also need to critically examine the interrelations between McConnell's approach and the DAC-OECD criteria and other approaches.

This thesis is a step towards a more systematic approach in understanding how we deal with humanitarian action. Therefore, further research that contributes to a more complete understanding of the approaches to humanitarian evaluation would be valuable. It would be interesting and valuable, also, to take McConnell's approach and apply it to a range of cases, for example, other countries' responses to humanitarian crises, and to use such evaluations with the intent of comparison to existing approaches.

Interview Protocol for Policy and Institutional Sectors

1. The questions about the legal and institutional systems related to overseas emergency response.
    a. Are the systems appropriate for the consideration of the humanitarian needs and concerns of the population affected by disasters?
        ⅰ. If not, what improvements can be made?
    b. Do the systems include the requirement of connecting emergency relief activities with the midterm reconstruction and recovery phase?
    c. Do the systems sufficiently reflect the principles of humanitarianism, such as impartiality, independence and neutrality?
    d. Do the systems make good use of the knowledge gained from the past experiences of overseas emergency relief activities?
2. The questions about the decision-making system related to overseas emergency response.
    a. Is the system appropriate for the consideration of the humanitarian needs and concerns of the population affected by disasters or crises?
    b. Do all the necessary agencies participate in the system?
    c. Does the system consider cross-cutting issues such as human rights, sexual equity, etc.?
    d. Does the system use the principle of priority in goal setting?
    e. Are there any unnecessary procedures or time-lag in procedures in the system, as evidenced from past experiences?

        i. If so, in what aspects of the system do problems occur?

    f. Does the system use the guidelines for the regulation and evaluation of the relevant agencies?

        i. If so, how effectively do the guidelines work?

3. The questions about the budget and information collecting system related to overseas emergency relief.
    a. What do you think about the scale and trends of humanitarian budgets?
    b. In consideration of your experience, is the humanitarian aid budget allocated on the basis of humanitarian value?
    c. In consideration of your experience, do the information collection systems provide the vital information and data relevant to the needs and concerns of the population affected by disasters or emergencies?
    d. In consideration of your experience, what do you think about the accuracy and swiftness of the information-collection systems? Were there any problems?
4. The questions about the structure and the dispatch plan of the Korea Disaster Relief Team (KDRT) related to overseas emergency operations.
    a. Are the structure and the plan capable of being adapted to the needs and concerns of the population affected by disasters?
    b. Do the structure and the plan consider the perspective of the midterm reconstruction and recovery phase of the countries affected by humanitarian crises?
    c. Do the structure and the plan sufficiently reflect the principles of humanitarianism,

such as impartiality, independence and neutrality?

    d. Do the structure and the plan give priority to different actions?

        i. If so, what do you think about the relevance of the priority given to action in the field?

    e. From your perspective, are the present guidelines, for example, the field manuals of KOICA, NRS and KOFIH, appropriate to the structure and the plan for responding to overseas disasters?

        i. If not, what is the problem?

5. The questions about the resources (workforce, equipment, manuals, SOPs, etc.) and the inter-agency cooperation system related to overseas emergency relief activities.

    a. Are the resources appropriate for responding to various kinds of disasters and do they have the necessities for the midterm reconstruction and recovery phase?

        i. For example, do the field manuals for overseas emergency relief activities have detailed guidelines for responding to the many different situations and needs of humanitarian crises?

        ii. For example, do the guidelines allow for the set-up of a workforce of medical staff who will work in the midterm reconstruction or recovery stages for the countries affected by disasters?

    b. Are the emergency response personnel well informed about humanitarianism, including its principles and practices?

    c. Is there any problem regarding the time lag from disaster occurrence to resource mobilization?

    d. What do you think about the safety and security of the personnel engaged in response activities?

    e. Is there any problem regarding the time lag in the instigation of cooperation between the inter-organizations involved in the humanitarian operations?

    f. Is there a coordinating structure for facilitating adequate integration of the relevant agencies?

6. The questions about KDRT mobilization from past experiences.

    a. Did the KDRT set up measures to ensure the safety and security of staff?

    b. Was the transportation of KDRT's personnel and equipment efficient?

        i. If not so, what was the problem and how can it be improved?

    c. Has there been any improvement in the mobilization and transit aspects of the KDRT as evidenced from past experience?

7. The questions about KDRT operations from past experience.

    a. Did the KDRT operate effectively in response to the needs and concerns of the disaster field and its action plan?

    b. What do you think about the comprehensiveness and relevance of the KDRT's operations?

    c. Was the coordination function of the KDRT rapid in light of goal setting and the changing process?

    d. Did the KDRT achieve effective assistance in responding to overseas disasters when compared with the response of teams from other countries?

    e. What was the degree of satisfaction of the countries affected by disasters and the foreign government agencies relevant to the KDRT's activities?

    f. What do you think about the ripple effect of the KDRT's past deployments?

8. The questions about KDRT demobilization from past experiences.

    a. Did the KDRT consider the field situations in the demobilization?

    b. Did the KDRT consider the linkage of the short-term relief activities and the midterm recovery activities regarding equipment donation after the declaration of end of operation?

    c. In demobilization, did the KDRT have prior consultation with local agencies, other foreign disaster relief agencies, international organizations (UN, IFRC), etc.?

9. Please feel free to make any additional comment.

Interview Protocol for Rescue and Medical Sectors

1. Have you undertaken any training program related to overseas emergency relief?
   a. If so, which organization's programme?
   b. If so, was it helpful for your activities in the Haiti response?
   c. Do you have any recommendations for that training programme?
2. Did you utilize any manual relevant to rescue and medical sectors for your activities as a member of KDRT in the Haiti case?
   a. If so, did the manual have contents relevant for the rapid response to the concerns and needs of the Haiti field work?
   b. If so, did the manual have contents relevant for the effective utilization of resources (workforce, equipment, etc.) in the Haiti case?
   c. Do you have any recommendation for improving the manual?
3. The questions about the KDRT mobilization in the Haiti case.
   a. What do you think about the 1st and 2nd KDRT responses in view of timing, structure and scale?
   b. Was the KDR teams' equipment adequate for the response?
   c. Was the means of transportation appropriate for the movement of staff, equipment, etc., from Santo Domingo airport to Port-au Prince? If not, what was the problem?
   d. Was the base of operations in Haiti appropriate regarding location and function?
   e. Did you make any requests to the base of operations?
      ⅰ. If so, what did you think about the reply?
   f. What do you think about the safety and security issues of the KDRT in the Haiti case?
      ⅰ. How did the KDRT prepare for the occurrence of any secondary shocks?
4. The questions about the KDRT's operations in the Haiti response.
   a. What do you think about the accuracy and swiftness of the KDRT's operations in relation to the concerns and needs in the Haiti field?
   b. Were the operations helpful to the recovery of the country or regions affected by the earthquake?
   c. What was the degree of satisfaction of the population affected by the earthquake as well as the foreign relief agencies deployed in Haiti regarding the KDRT's operations?
5. The questions about KDRT's demobilization in the Haiti case.
   a. What do you think about the timing of the KDRT's demobilization?
   b. What do you think about the consultation between the KDRT and the local agencies of the Haiti government regarding KDR team's demobilization?
6. Please feel free to make any additional comment.

Generic Interview Protocol for the Haiti Response

1. The questions about the relevance of emergency aid in relation to the reflections on the concerns and needs in the field.
   a. What kind of policy is essential for reflecting the concerns and needs of the countries affected by disasters?
   b. Is there any reliable method for donor countries to get information and data about the country affected by disasters especially in an earthquake situation?
   c. What kind of workforce, facilities, equipment, etc. was needed to response to the Haiti earthquake?
   d. What kind of measures were essential for the coordination of the KDRT's operations relevant to the concerns and needs of Haiti, after its dispatch to the Haiti field?
   e. In the KDRT's demobilization phase, was the consultation between the KDRT and the other relief agencies appropriate?
2. The questions about the sustainability and potential of the activities of the KDR's in the long term.
   a. (Asked of local agencies) What kinds of support systems and resources in the field were available for donor countries to link the relief and the midterm reconstruction and recovery phase? For example, when a temporary medical office established is enlarged to a hospital, what kinds of methods were made possible to connect it to the local health workforce?
   b. (Asked of exemplary foreign agencies) What kinds of systematic base in the field are possible to link the relief and the midterm reconstruction and recovery?
   c. What kinds of structures and resources used in the field actions are essential for the KDRT to link the relief and the midterm reconstruction and recovery phases?
3. Was there any inadequacy in the foreign relief agencies in view of human rights?
4. The questions about the scope of the relief aid.
   a. What improvement may be needed by donor country's relief teams to better aid main target groups affected by disasters or crises?
   b. What may be needed for donor country's relief teams to better cooperate with the local agencies in areas affected by disasters or the international organizations deployed in the disaster fields, for identifying target groups and setting and prioritizing goals?
5. The questions about the efficiency (the ration of output to input) of relief operations.
   a. Were the activities of the foreign agencies including Korea and international agencies efficient? If not so, are there any suggestions for improvement in efficiency in light of experience?
   b. Do you think the local people affected by the earthquake are satisfied or not by the international relief efforts? From this perspective, are there any improvements you can suggest for future activities?
   c. Were the results of the international aid effort sufficient to reduce the loss caused by the earthquake and to aid recovery from the disaster? If not so, what area was most deficient and what were the causes in your view?

6. The questions about the long-term and comprehensive impact of the relief activities.
   a. What kind of impact was made on Haiti through the activities of foreign relief agencies?
   b. What are the lessons of the international community through the response to the Haiti earthquake?
7. Please feel free to make any additional comment.

Survey regarding People's Perceptions of and Motivations for

Overseas Emergency Relief Activities

Dear Mr./Ms./Miss./Dr.

With the increased frequency and larger scale of natural and man-made disasters, the importance of international emergency relief has magnified. The United Nations has reported that the death toll from natural disasters since 2000 is more than 500,000 people. To keep pace with this trend, Korea has affirmed the intention to increase relief by amending the Emergency Relief Act and its enforcement ordinance. Specifically, Korea recently dispatched the 1st and 2nd Korea Disaster Relief teams to the Haiti earthquake field, and the teams involved 25 emergency medical staff who treated more than 1,300 patients.

In relation to this, the evaluation team, which relates to the Korea International Cooperation Agency's research project of the 'Evaluation of the Korean Emergency Response System and Results from Past Experiences', would like to examine the perceptions and motivations regarding overseas emergency relief activities within the members of the Korea Academy of Disaster Medicine and National Disaster Life Support.

All information and data will be only used for academic research and recorded anonymously. All information and data will also be kept strictly confidential.

If you participate in this survey, we deeply appreciate your cooperation.

The evaluation team of the

'Evaluation of the Korean Emergency Response System and Results from Past Experiences'

Ⅰ. Personal Details

1. What is your gender?
   ○ Male
   ○ Female
2. How old are you?
   (　) year old
3. What is your occupation?
   ○ Doctor – emergency medical treatment (Go to Q. 4)
   ○ Doctor – other non-emergency medical treatment (Go to Q. 4)
   ○ Nurse – working in the emergency room (Go to section Ⅱ)
   ○ Nurse – non emergency room work (Go to section Ⅱ)
   ○ Emergency medical technician – working in the emergency room (Go to section Ⅱ)
   ○ Emergency medical technician – non-emergency room work (Go to section Ⅱ)
4. What is your position within your regular organization?
   ○ Professor
   ○ Pay doctor
   ○ Private practice physician
   ○ Fellow
   ○ In Military service
   ○ resident
   ○ others (　　　　　　　　　　　　)

Ⅱ. Perception Indicator

1. Are you familiar with Korea's overseas emergency relief activities?
   ○ Yes
   ○ No
2. What do you think is the purpose of overseas emergency relief? Please tick the appropriate level of importance for each item.

	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important
Boost national prestige in the international community	○	○	○	○
Saving of lives and medical support for the affected people	○	○	○	○
Recovery of social infrastructure of the affected country	○	○	○	○

Friendship and cooperation with the affected country	○	○	○	○
Contribution to the improvement of the export industry	○	○	○	○
Others ( )				

Ⅲ. Training Indicator

1. Are you aware of any training program for the workforce engaged in emergency relief?
   ○ Yes
   ○ No
2. Did you pass any training program relevant to the overseas emergency relief?
   ○ Yes (Go to Q. 3)
   ○ No (Go to Q. 5)
3. Through the program, was it an opportunity for you to better understand the necessity of overseas emergency relief and to acquire essential information?
4. After finishing the program, did you still wish to participate in emergency relief work?
   ○ Yes
   ○ No
5. Have you thought about completing an overnight itinerary training programme for the workforce of the overseas emergency relief teams?
   ○ Yes (Go to section Ⅵ)
   ○ No (Go to Q. 6)
   ○ Already completed (Go to section Ⅵ)
6. If not so, what is the most important reason for not thinking about completing this programme?
   ○ A temporary vacuum of medical service
   ○ I considered it unnecessary
   ○ Not attracted to the contents of the programme
   ○ Others
      (   )

IV. Experience and Value Indicator

1. Have you participated in any overseas emergency relief activities?
   ○ Yes (Go to Q. 2)
   ○ No (Go to Q. 3)
2. What was the motivation of your participation? Please tick all relevant items.

○ Request from a hospital
　　　　○ Request from your government
　　　　○ Personal motivation to help
　　　　○ Others
　　　　(　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　)
　　3. Do you have in mind participating in overseas emergency relief activities in the future?
　　　　○ Yes
　　　　○ No
　　4. Questions regarding your overall opinion of the overseas emergency relief activities.

	Fully agree	Partly agree	Not sure	Don't quite agree	Don't agree at all
Participation in emergency aid may meet the requests and expectations of the countries affected by disasters.	○	○	○	○	○
Participation in emergency aid may be helpful in boosting the prestige of donor countries.	○	○	○	○	○
Participation in emergency aid is humanitarianism, and this makes my participation significant.	○	○	○	○	○
My family and I highly appreciate the significance and value of emergency aid.	○	○	○	○	○
If I decide to participate in emergency aid, my family will esteem and understand my decision.	○	○	○	○	○
I think that the participation may be a good opportunity for me to show my professionalism.	○	○	○	○	○
Participation may be helpful for me to broaden my mind such as acceptance of other cultures.	○	○	○	○	○
Participation may be a good opportunity for me to understand world poverty and to develop a more international view.	○	○	○	○	○
Participation may be a good remedy for my insipid daily life.	○	○	○	○	○
Participation may be a good opportunity for me to experience self-maturity.	○	○	○	○	○
Participation may contribute to developing greater friendship and cooperation between Korea and the affected country.	○	○	○	○	○
Participation may contribute to increased national interest through export to the countries affected by disasters.	○	○	○	○	○
Korea's participation will have a positive effect on the disaster affected population's perception of Korea	○	○	○	○	○
Other (　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　)					

Ⅴ. Essential Indicators.

Please tick only one answer in the right hand columns for assessing each factor's importance to the overseas emergency relief activities.

	Very important	A little important	important	Not quite important	Not important at all
Passionate about emergency aid	○	○	○	○	○
Devotion to humanity	○	○	○	○	○
Affection for the population affected by disasters	○	○	○	○	○
Possessing interpersonal skills	○	○	○	○	○
Possession of good language skills including English	○	○	○	○	○
Observance of the principles of emergency relief	○	○	○	○	○
Professionalism	○	○	○	○	○
Korea's efforts to ensure the safety and security of the emergency relief staff	○	○	○	○	○
Financial compensation	○	○	○	○	○
Career acknowledgement of the emergency relief activities	○	○	○	○	○

Ⅵ. Simulation

These questions will investigate the obstructive factors that might hinder your participation in emergency relief activities.

There is a big earthquake in a developing county. The temperature in the affected region often reaches 36℃, the death toll is more than 50,000 people and the size of the population in the disaster zone is also more than 500,000 people according to a formal report. In addition, the affected region has very poor in living conditions and is not safe. Under these conditions, Korea decides to dispatch a disaster relief team and you receive a request to participate in the team. The government gives an assurance of your safety and security through the mobilization of the highest level of resources possible.

The departure time is in 24 hours and the travel time will take 15 hours.

1. Do you accept the request for participation in the emergency relief team?

○ Yes (Go to Q. 2)
○ No (Go to Q. 3)

2. If so, why do you accept the proposal? (Tick all that are applicable)
   ○ Boost the national prestige of Korea in the international community
   ○ Feeling of duty to my country
   ○ To save lives and give medical support to the population affected by disasters
   ○ Show my professionalism
   ○ Personal development
   ○ New experience
   ○ Embark on a new career
   ○ Passion for emergency aid
   ○ Others (   )

3. What effect do the following factors have on your decision to engage in emergency relief activities?

	Large effect	Far effect	Slight effect	Little effect	No effect
It is a burden for me not to serve pre-planned medical treatment or work.	○	○	○	○	○
My current employer will not allow me to participate.	○	○	○	○	○
Communication problems – even with translators readily available.	○	○	○	○	○
It is very difficult for me to adapt to other cultures.	○	○	○	○	○
The living conditions in the affected country are too poor.	○	○	○	○	○
My safety and security cannot be completely assured.	○	○	○	○	○
A lack of knowledge and experience engaging in the emergency relief activities.	○	○	○	○	○
My family would object my participation.	○	○	○	○	○
No desire of the medical treatment to the population affected by disasters.	○	○	○	○	○
Others ( )	○	○	○	○	○

4. If the planned work in changeable, will you accept the request for participation?
   ○ Yes
   ○ No

5. If your current employer does allow your participation, will you accept the request to join the disaster relief team?
   ○ Yes
   ○ No

6. What period of time do you think may be needed for emergency relief activities?
   ○ Under 5 days
   ○ 5 ~ 7 days

○ 8 ~ 10 days
○ 11 ~ 13 days
○ 14 days and over

When you have completed all questions, please press the 'finish' button.

Thank you for your participation.

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